[House Prints, 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




106th Congress 2d Session   COMMITTEE PRINT                 

_______________________________________________________________________


 
                        INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:
                      A COMPILATION OF MAJOR LAWS,
                       TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND
                          EXECUTIVE DOCUMENTS

                               ----------                              

                              R E P O R T

                            prepared for the

                  COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
                     U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                                 by the

                     CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
                          LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

                                     
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13

                                     

                               JULY 2000


    Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
         U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402





                  COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

  BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, 
             Chairman
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut           WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
TOM LANTOS, California               JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California         HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York           DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American SamoaCHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California      DAN BURTON, Indiana
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey          ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey          ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio                  CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia         DANA ROHRABACHER, California
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida           DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
PAT DANNER, Missouri                 EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama            PETER T. KING, New York
BRAD SHERMAN, California             STEVEN CHABOT, Ohio
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida               MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South 
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey        Carolina
JIM DAVIS, Florida                   MATT SALMON, Arizona
EARL P0MEROY, North Dakota           AMO HOUGHTON, New York
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts   TOM CAMPBELL, California
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York           JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
BARBARA LEE, California              KEVIN BRADY, Texas
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York             RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania      PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio
                                     GEORGE RADANOVICH, California
                                     JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
                                     THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
                 Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
          Kathleen Bertelsen Moazed, Democratic Chief of Staff






                                FOREWORD

                              ----------                              

                          House of Representatives,
                      Committee on International Relations,
                                     Washington, DC, July 25, 2000.

    This updated compendium prepared by the Congressional 
Research Service, entitled ``International Terrorism: A 
Compilation of Major Laws, Treaties, Agreements, and Executive 
Documents'' was requested by me on behalf of the Committee on 
International Relations. The earlier editions have proven to be 
a very useful source for those responsible for dealing with 
issues of international terrorism.
    In addition to U.S. legislation and executive documents 
related to terrorism, the volume also includes bilateral and 
multilateral treaties and agreements, as well as other 
multilateral documents. I would like to acknowledge the efforts 
of those in the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of 
the Congressional Research Service who worked on the project. 
The principal contributors to this volume were C. Winston 
Woodland who coordinated the assembly of the report, and 
Carolyn Hatcher who prepared major portions. Others who 
provided significant contributions included Terrence Lisbeth, 
Dagnija Sterste-Perkins, Marjorie A. Browne, Ellen Grigorian, 
and Raphael Perl, under the direction of Francis T. Miko. I 
also want to acknowledge the advice and assistance provided by 
Michael Kraft of the Office of Counterterrorism, Department of 
State.

                                        Benjamin A. Gilman,
                                                          Chairman.





                          LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                    Congressional Research Service,
                                   The Library of Congress,
                                     Washington, DC, July 24, 2000.
Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations,
    House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: In response to the Committee's request, 
I am submitting an updated version of a compendium entitled: 
``International Terrorism: A Compilation of Major Laws, 
Treaties, Agreements, and Executive Documents,'' first issued 
as a committee print in August 1987 and subsequently updated in 
July 1991 and December 1994.
    The compilation includes major statutes of interest to the 
committee along with related Executive orders, documents, and 
reports. It also includes international treaties and 
agreements, as well as relevant documents of international 
organizations. The principal contributors to this volume were 
C. Winston Woodland who coordinated the assembly of the volume 
and Carolyn Hatcher who prepared major portions. Others who 
provided significant contributions included Terrence Lisbeth, 
Dagnija Sterste-Perkins, Marjorie A. Browne, Ellen Grigorian, 
and Raphael Perl. The volume was prepared under the overall 
direction of Francis T. Miko. Michael Kraft of the office of 
Counterterrorism, Department of State, provided extensive 
advice and support.

            Sincerely,
                                     Daniel P. Mulhollan, Director.




                                ABSTRACT

                              ----------                              

    This compilation comprises major laws, treaties and 
agreements, and executive documents relating to U.S. and 
international efforts to combat terrorism. The legislation is 
subdivided into sections relating to foreign assistance, the 
Department of State, defense legislation, trade and financial 
issues, aviation security, and other issues.
    It also includes a selection of significant executive 
orders, executive department regulations, and other executive 
branch documents and reports. Sections on international 
agreements include bilateral agreements, as well as relevant 
multilateral treaties. Other multilateral documents include 
selected statements from economic summit conferences, United 
Nations Security Council resolutions, and documents of other 
organizations.






                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Foreword.........................................................   iii

Letter of Submittal..............................................     v

Abstract.........................................................   vii

A. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND RELATED LEGISLATION....................     1

 1. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (Public Law 
    87-195) (partial text).......................................     3
 2. Arms Export Control Act, as amended (Public Law 90-629) 
    (partial text)...............................................    11
 3. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172)....    19
 4. Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992, as amended 
    (Title XVI of Public Law 102-484)............................    30
 5. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 
    1985, as amended (Public Law 99-83) (partial text)...........    35
 6. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 
    1981, as amended (Public Law 97-113) (partial text)..........    40
 7. Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-513) (partial 
    text)........................................................    42
 8. International Narcotics Control Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-
    623) (partial text)..........................................    46
 9. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
    Appropriations Act, 1999 (Public Law 105-277) (partial text).    47
10. Department of Justice Appropriations Act, 1999 (Public Law 
    105-277) (partial text)......................................    58
      Title I--Department of Justice.............................    58
11. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal year 
    1999 (Public Law 105-277) (partial text).....................    61
      Title II--Antiterrorism....................................    61
12. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
    Appropriations Act, 1997 (Public Law 104-208) (partial text).    68

B. DEPARTMENT OF STATE LEGISLATION...............................    69

 1. State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, as amended 
    (Public Law 84-885) (partial text)...........................    71
 2. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public 
    Law 104-93) (partial text)...................................    78
 3. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1998 and 
    1999 (Public Law 105-277) (partial text).....................    80
 4. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 
    1995, as amended (Public Law 103-236) (partial text).........    82
 5. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 
    1993, as amended (Public Law 102-138) (partial text).........    86
 6. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 
    1989, as amended (Public Law 100-204) (partial text).........    87
 7. Department of State and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 
    1999 (Public Law 105-277) (partial text).....................    90
 8. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1999 
    (Public Law 105-277) (partial text)..........................    91
 9. Hostage Relief Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-449)...............    93

C. TRADE AND FINANCIAL LEGISLATION...............................   101

 1. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Public 
    Law 104-132) (partial text)..................................   105
 2. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, as 
    amended (Public Law 99-399) (partial text)...................   121
 3. Crimes and Criminal Procedure (Title 18, United States Code) 
    (partial text)...............................................   160
 4. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (Public 
    Law 103-322) (partial text)..................................   209
 5. Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official 
    Guests of the United States (Public Law 92-539) (partial 
    text)........................................................   210
 6. Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989 (Public 
    Law 101-222) (partial text)..................................   211
 7. Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 (Public Law 
    101-298) (partial text)......................................   212
 8. 1984 Act To Combat International Terrorism, as amended 
    (Public Law 98-533) (partial text)...........................   213
 9. Foreign Sovereign Immunities (Title 28, United States Code) 
    (partial text)...............................................   215

D. DEFENSE LEGISLATION...........................................   227

 1. Armed Forces Legislation (Title 10, United State Code) 
    (partial text)...............................................   229
 2. Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
    Year 1999 (Public Law 105-261) (partial text)................   237
 3. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1999 (Public Law 
    105-262) (partial text)......................................   243
 4. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 
    (Public Law 105-85) (partial text)...........................   244
 5. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 
    (Public Law 104-201) (partial text)..........................   248
 6. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 
    (Public Law 103-337) (partial text)..........................   249
 7. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 
    (Public Law 103-160) (partial text)..........................   252
 8. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 
    (Public Law 102-484) (partial text)..........................   254
 9. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 
    (Public Law 99-661) (partial text)...........................   260
10. Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986 (Public Law 99-
    145) (partial text)..........................................   261
11. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (Title 50, United States 
    Code) (partial text).........................................   263
12. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public 
    Law 104-93) (partial text)...................................   274

E. TRADE AND FINANCIAL LEGISLATION...............................   275

 1. Trade Act of 1974, as amended (Public Law 93-618) (partial 
    text)........................................................   277
 2. Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended (Public Law 96-
    72) (partial text)...........................................   282
 3. Trade Expansion Act of 1969, as amended (Public Law 87-794) 
    (partial text)...............................................   291
 4. Trading With The Enemy Act, as amended (Public Law 65-91) 
    (partial text)...............................................   295
 5. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, as amended 
    (Public Law 95-223) (partial text)...........................   298
 6. Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended (Public Law 79-
    173) (partial text)..........................................   303
 7. Internal Revenue Code........................................   308
 8. Bretton Woods Agreements Act Amendments, 1978, as amended 
    (Public Law 95-435) (partial text)...........................   312
 9. International Financial Institutions Act, as amended (Public 
    Law 95-118) (partial text)...................................   313
10. Inter-American Development Bank Act, as amended (Public Law 
    86-147) (partial text).......................................   315

F. AVIATION SECURITY.............................................   317

 1. Aviation Programs (Title 49, United State Code) (partial 
    text)........................................................   319
 2. Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-
    264) (partial text)..........................................   343
 3. Crimes and Criminal Procedures (Title 18, United States Code)   348
 4. Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, as amended (Public 
    Law 101-604) (partial text)..................................   351
 5. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 
    1985 (Public Law 99-83) (partial text).......................   358

G. OTHER LEGISLATION.............................................   361

 1. The Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended (Public Law 
    82-414)......................................................   363
 2. Middle East Activities.......................................   374
 3. National Emergencies Act, as amended (Public Law 94-412).....   393
 4. Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 
    (Public Law 105-277) (partial text)..........................   398

H. EXECUTIVE ORDERS..............................................   399

 1. Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with the 
    Taliban (Executive Order 13129, July 4, 1999)................   401
 2. Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting 
    Transactions with Sudan (Executive Order 13067, November 3, 
    1997)........................................................   404
 3. Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to Iran 
    (Executive Order 13059, August 19, 1997).....................   406
 4. Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to Iran 
    (Executive Order 12959, May 6, 1995).........................   410
 5. Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to the 
    Development of Iranian Petroleum Resources (Executive Order 
    12957, March 15, 1995).......................................   412
 6. Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists Who Threaten to 
    Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process (Executive Order 12947, 
    January 24, 1995)............................................   413
 7. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Executive Order 
    12938, November 14, 1994)....................................   416
 8. Continuation of Export Control Regulations (Executive Order 
    12924, August 19, 1994)......................................   421
 9. Barring Overflight, Takeoff, and Landing of Aircraft, Flying 
    to or from Libya (Executive Order 12801, April 15, 1992).....   423
10. Victims of Terrorism Compensation (Executive Order 12598, 
    June 17, 1987)...............................................   425
11. Blocking Libyan Government Property in the United States or 
    Held by U.S. Persons (Executive Order 12544, January 8, 1986)   426
12. Prohibiting Trade and Certain Transactions Involving Libya 
    (Executive Order 12543, January 7, 1986).....................   427
13. Imports of Refined Petroleum Products from Libya (Executive 
    Order 12538, November 15, 1985)..............................   429
14. Revocation of Prohibitions Against Transactions Involving 
    Iran (Executive Order 12282, January 19, 1981)...............   430
15. Hostage Relief Act of 1980--Delegation of Authority 
    (Executive Order 12268, January 15, 1981)....................   431
16. Administration of the Export Administration Act of 1969, as 
    amended (Executive Order 12002, July 7, 1977)................   432

I. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT REGULATIONS..............................   435

 1. Department of State:.........................................   437
 2. Department of the Treasury...................................   468
 3. Federal Aviation Administration:.............................   489

J. OTHER EXECUTIVE BRANCH DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS..................   537

 1. Office of the President......................................   539
 2. Office of the Vice President.................................   663
 3. Department of State..........................................   755
 4. Department of Defense........................................   886
 5. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration......   977
 6. Department of Treasury.......................................  1016
 7. Department of Transportation.................................  1094

K. BILATERAL AGREEMENTS..........................................  1235

 1. Counter terrorism............................................  1237
 2. Aviation Security............................................  1242
 3. Extradition..................................................  1289
 4 Mutual Legal Assistance.......................................  1380

L. MULTILATERAL TREATIES.........................................  1423

 1. Treaties in Force to Which the United States is a Party......  1425
 2. Treaties Signed by the United States, But Not Yet in Force...  1512
 3. Treaties to Which the United States is Not a Party...........  1521

M. OTHER MULTILATERAL DOCUMENTS..................................  1535

 1. Economic Summits of the G-7/G-8 and Related Meetings.........  1537
 2. Other Conferences............................................  1565
 3. Hemispheric Documents........................................  1572
 4. International Civil Aviation Organization Documents..........  1593
 5. United Nations Documents.....................................  1627

APPENDIX.........................................................  1701

  Legislative Requirements for Reports to Congress Concerning 
    International Terrorism......................................  1701
=======================================================================




             A. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND RELATED LEGISLATION

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

 1. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (Public Law 
    87-195) (partial text).......................................     3
      Part II:...................................................
            Chapter 8--Antiterrorism Assistance..................     3
                Section 571--General Authority...................     3
                Section 572--Purposes............................     3
                Section 573--Limitations.........................     4
                Section 574--Authorizations of Appropriations....     5
      Part III:..................................................     6
                Section 620A--Prohibition on Assistance to 
                  Governments Supporting International Terrorism.     6
                Section 620G--Prohibition on Assistance to 
                  Countries That Aid Terrorist States............     8
                Section 620H--Prohibition on Assistance to 
                  Countries that Provide Military Equipment to 
                  Terrorist States...............................     9
      Part IV--Enterprise for the Americas Initiative............     9
            Section 701--Purpose.................................     9
            Section 703--Eligibilty for Benefits.................    10
 2. Arms Export Control Act, as amended (Public Law 90-629) 
    (partial text)...............................................    11
      Chapter 1--Foreign and National Security Policy Objectives 
          and Restraints.........................................    11
            Section 6--Foreign Intimidation and Harassment of 
                Individuals in the United States.................    11
      Chapter 3--Military Export Controls........................    11
            Section 38--Control of Arms Exports and Imports......    11
            Section 40--Transactions With Countries Supporting 
                Acts of International Terrorism..................    12
            Section 40A--Transactions with Countries not Fully 
                Cooperating with United States Antiterrorism 
                Efforts..........................................    17
      Chapter 7--Control of Missiles and Missile Equipment or 
          Technology.............................................    18
            Section 72--Denial of the Transfer of Missile 
                Equipment or Technology by United States Persons.    18
            Section 73--Transfers of Missile Equipment or 
                Technology by Foreign Persons....................    18
 3. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172)....    19
 4. Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992, as amended 
    (Title XVI of Public Law 102-484)............................    30
 5. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 
    1985, as amended (Public Law 99-83) (partial text)...........    35
      Title V--International Terrorism and Foreign Airport 
          Security...............................................    35
            Part A--International Terrorism Generally............    35
            Part B--Foreign Airport Security.....................    37
      Title XIII--Miscellaneous Provisions.......................    39
            Section 1302--Codification of Policy Prohibiting 
                Negotations with the Palestine Liberation 
                Organization.....................................    39
 6. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 
    1981, as amended (Public Law 97-113) (partial text)..........    40
      Title VII--Miscellaneous Provisions........................    40
            Section 718--Condemnation of Libya for Its Support of 
                International Terrorist Movements................    40
            Section 719--United States Citizens Acting in the 
                Service of International Terrorism...............    40
 7. Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-513) (partial 
    text)........................................................    42
      Title V--General Provisions................................    42
            Section 586--Short Title.............................    42
            Section 586F--Declarations Regarding Iraq's Long-
                standing Violations of International Law.........    42
            Section 586G--Sanctions Against Iraq.................    44
            Section 586H--Waiver Authority.......................    45
 8. International Narcotics Control Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-
    623) (partial text)..........................................    46
      Section 2(b)(2)--Economic Assistance and Administration of 
          Justice Programs for Andean Countries..................    46
 9. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
    Appropriations Act, 1999 (Public Law 105-277) (partial text).    47
      Title II--Bilateral Economic Assistance....................    47
            Department of State--Nonproliferation, Anti-
                Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs.........    47
      Title V--General Provisions................................    48
            Section-528--Prohibition on Bilateral Assistance to 
                Terrorist Countries..............................    48
            Section 540--Special Authorities.....................    49
            Section 543--Eligibility for Assistance..............    49
            Section 551--Prohibition on Assistance to Foreign 
                Countries that Export Lethal Military Equipment..    50
            Section 559--Special Debt Relief for the Poorest.....    51
            Section 586--Sense of Congress Regarding Iran........    52
            Section 591--National Commission on Terrorism........    52
            Section 596--Sense of Congress Regarding the Trial in 
                the Netherlands of the Suspects Indicted in the 
                Bombing of Pan Am Flight 103.....................    55
10. Department of Justice Appropriations Act, 1999 (Public Law 
    105-277) (partial text)......................................    58
      Title I--Department of Justice.............................    58
11. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal year 
    1999 (Public Law 105-277) (partial text).....................    61
      Title II--Antiterrorism....................................    61
12. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
    Appropriations Act, 1997 (Public Law 104-208) (partial text).    68
      Title V--General Provisions................................    68
            Section 589--Civil Liability for Acts of State 
                Sponsored Terrorism..............................    68

=======================================================================

           1. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended

  Partial text of Public Law 87-195 [S. 1983], 75 Stat. 424, approved 
                     September 4, 1961, as amended

AN ACT To promote the foreign policy, security, and general welfare of 
 the United States by assisting peoples of the world in their efforts 
toward economic development and internal and external security, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this 
Act may be cited as ``The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.''

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


PART II

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                Chapter 8--Antiterrorism Assistance \1\

    Sec. 571.\2\ General Authority.--Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law that restricts assistance to foreign countries 
(other than sections 502B and 620A of this Act), the President 
is authorized to furnish, on such terms and conditions as the 
President may determine, assistance to foreign countries in 
order to enhance the ability of their law enforcement personnel 
to deter terrorists and terrorist groups from engaging in 
international terrorist acts such as bombing, kidnaping, 
assassination, hostage taking, and hijacking. Such assistance 
may include training services and the provision of equipment 
and other commodities related to bomb detection and disposal, 
management of hostage situations, physical security, and other 
matters relating to the detection, deterrence, and prevention 
of acts of terrorism, the resolution of terrorist incidents, 
and the apprehension of those involved in such acts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Ch. 8 was added by the International Security and Development 
Assistance Authorizations Act of 1983 (sec. 101(b)(2) of the Further 
Continuing Appropriations, 1984; Public Law 98-151; 97 Stat. 972). 
Pursuant to Public Law 98-151, ch. 8 was enacted as contained in title 
II of H.R. 2992, as reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
on May 17, 1983, except for sec. 575 (redesignated in 1996 as sec. 
574), which was included in Public Law 98-151.
    Sec. 122 of Public Law 104-164 (110 Stat. 1428) provided the 
following:
    ``sec. 122. research and development expenses.
    ``Funds made available for fiscal years 1996 and 1997 to carry out 
chapter 8 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
2349aa et seq.; relating to antiterrorism assistance) may be made 
available to the Technical Support Working Group of the Department of 
State for research and development expenses related to contraband 
detection technologies or for field demonstrations of such technologies 
(whether such field demonstrations take place in the United States or 
outside the United States).''.
    \2\ 22 U.S.C. 2349aa. Delegation of Authority No. 145 (February 4, 
1984) delegated the functions conferred upon the President by chapter 8 
to the Director of the Office for Combating Terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Sec. 572.\3\ Purposes.--Activities conducted under this 
chapter shall be designed--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ 22 U.S.C. 2349aa-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) to enhance the antiterrorism skills of friendly 
        countries by providing training and equipment to deter 
        and counter terrorism;
          (2) to strengthen the bilateral ties of the United 
        States with friendly governments by offering concrete 
        assistance in this area of great mutual concern; and
          (3) to increase respect for human rights by sharing 
        with foreign civil authorities modern, humane, and 
        effective antiterrorism techniques.
    Sec. 573.\4\ Limitations.--(a) Whenever the President 
determines it to be consistent with and in furtherance of the 
purposes of this chapter, and on such terms and conditions 
consistent with this Act as he may determine, any agency of the 
United States Government is authorized to furnish services and 
commodities, without charge to funds available to carry out 
this chapter, to an eligible foreign country, subject to 
payment in advance of the value thereof (within the meaning of 
section 644(m)) in United States dollars by the foreign 
country. Credits and the proceeds of guaranteed loans made 
available to such countries pursuant to the Arms Export Control 
Act shall not be used for such payments. Collections under this 
chapter shall be credited to the currently applicable 
appropriation, account, or fund of the agency providing such 
services and commodities and shall be available for the 
purposes for which such appropriation, account, or fund is 
authorized to be used.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ 22 U.S.C. 2349aa-2. Sec. 121(b)(1) of Public Law 104-164 (110 
Stat. 1428) struck out ``Specific Authorities and'' from the section 
heading. Sec. 121(b)(2) of that Public Law struck out subsec. (a) of 
this section and redesignated subsecs. (b) through (f) as subsecs. (a) 
through (e), respectively. Subsec. (f), however, had been struck out 
previously by Public Law 104-132 (see note below). Subsec. (a) had read 
as follows:
    ``(a) Notwithstanding section 660 of this Act, services and 
commodities may be granted for the purposes of this chapter to eligible 
foreign countries, subject to reimbursement of the value thereof 
(within the meaning of section 644(m)) pursuant to section 632 of this 
Act from funds available to carry out this chapter.''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) The Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor \5\ shall be consulted in the \6\ 
determinations of the foreign countries that will be furnished 
assistance under this chapter and determinations of the nature 
of assistance to be furnished to each such country.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Sec. 163(e)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 405), amended 
the title designation by striking out ``Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Affairs'', and inserting in lieu thereof ``Democracy, Human Rights, and 
Labor''.
    \6\ Sec. 328(a)(1) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-132; 110 Stat. 1257) struck out 
``development and implementation of the antiterrorism assistance 
program under this chapter, including'' at this point.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (c) \7\ (1) Arms and ammunition may be provided under this 
chapter only if they are directly related to antiterrorism 
assistance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Subsec. (c), redesignated from subsec. (d) by sec. 121(b)(3) of 
Public Law 104-164 (110 Stat. 1428), was amended and restated by sec. 
328(a)(2) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(Public Law 104-132; 110 Stat. 1257). Portions were amended and 
restated earlier by sec. 213(b) of Public Law 101-604 (104 Stat. 3086), 
sec. 507 of Public Law 99-399 (100 Stat. 873).
    In view of amendments to this subsection by Public Law 104-132, 
amendments contained in sec. 121(b)(4) of Public Law 104-164 (110 Stat. 
1428) cannot be executed. Sec. 121(b)(4) of that Public Law required:
    ``(b) limitations.--Section 573 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 2349aa-2) is 
amended-- * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          ``(4) in subsection (c) (as redesignated)--

                  ``(A) by striking paragraphs (1) and (2);
                  ``(B) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (5) as 
                paragraphs (1) through (3), respectively; and
                  ``(C) by amending paragraph (2) (as redesignated) to 
                read as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ``(2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), funds made 
available to carry out this chapter shall not be made available for the 
procurement of weapons and ammunition.
    ``(B) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to small arms and ammunition 
in categories I and III of the United States Munitions List that are 
integrally and directly related to antiterrorism training provided 
under this chapter if, at least 15 days before obligating those funds, 
the President notifies the appropriate congressional committees 
specified in section 634A of this Act in accordance with the procedures 
applicable to reprogramming notifications under such section.
    ``(C) The value (in terms of original acquisition cost) of all 
equipment and commodities provided under this chapter in any fiscal 
year may not exceed 25 percent of the funds made available to carry out 
this chapter for that fiscal year.''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (2) The value (in terms of original acquisition cost) of 
all equipment and commodities provided under this chapter in 
any fiscal year shall not exceed 30 percent of the funds made 
available to carry out this chapter for that fiscal year.
    (d) This chapter does not apply to information exchange 
activities conducted by agencies of the United States 
Government under other authority for such purposes.
    (f) \8\ [Repealed--1996]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Subsec. (f) was added by sec. 501(c) of Public Law 99-83 (99 
Stat. 221), and struck out by sec. 328(a)(3) of the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-132; 110 Stat. 
1257). It had read as follows:
    ``(f) Funds made available to carry out this chapter may not be 
used for personnel compensation or benefits.''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Sec. 574.\9\ * * * [Repealed--1996]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Formerly at 22 U.S.C. 2349aa-3. Sec. 121(c) of Public Law 104-
164 (110 Stat. 1428) repealed sec. 574, which had required reports to 
Congress on antiterrorism assistance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Sec. 574.\10\ Authorizations of Appropriations.--(a) There 
are authorized to be appropriated to the President to carry out 
this chapter $9,840,000 for the fiscal year 1986 and 
$14,680,000 for the fiscal year 1987.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ 22 U.S.C. 2349aa-4. Redesignated from sec. 575 to sec. 574 by 
sec. 121(d) of Public Law 104-164 (110 Stat. 1428). The authorization 
for fiscal year 1986 was enacted by sec. 501(a) of the International 
Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (Public Law 99-83; 99 
Stat. 219). The authorization for fiscal year 1987 of $14,680,000 was 
inserted in lieu of the amount of $9,840,000 (originally enacted by 
Public Law 99-83) by sec. 401 of Public Law 99-399 (100 Stat. 862). 
Previous authorizations include: fiscal year 1984--$5,000,000; fiscal 
year 1985--no authorization; fiscal years 1988 through 1999--no 
authorization.
    Congress did not enact an authorization for fiscal year 1999. 
Instead, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act, 1999 (division A, sec. 101(d) of Public Law 105-
277; 112 Stat. 2681), waived the requirements for authorization, and 
title II of that Act provided the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

   ``nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, demining and related programs
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ``For necessary expenses for nonproliferation, anti-terrorism and 
related programs and activities, $198,000,000, to carry out the 
provisions of chapter 8 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 for anti-terrorism assistance, section 504 of the FREEDOM Support 
Act for the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, section 23 of the 
Arms Export Control Act or the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for 
demining activities, the clearance of unexploded ordnance, and related 
activities, notwithstanding any other provision of law, including 
activities implemented through nongovernmental and international 
organizations, section 301 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for a 
voluntary contribution to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
and a voluntary contribution to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development 
Organization (KEDO), and for a United States contribution to the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission: Provided, 
That the Secretary of State shall inform the Committees on 
Appropriations at least twenty days prior to the obligation of funds 
for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission: 
Provided further, That of this amount not to exceed $15,000,000, to 
remain available until expended, may be made available for the 
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, to promote bilateral and multilateral activities 
relating to nonproliferation and disarmament: Provided further, That 
such funds may also be used for such countries other than the New 
Independent States of the former Soviet Union and international 
organizations when it is in the national security interest of the 
United States to do so: Provided further, That such funds shall be 
subject to the regular notification procedures of the Committees on 
Appropriations: Provided further, That of the funds appropriated under 
this heading not less than $35,000,000 should be made available for 
demining, clearance of unexploded ordnance, and related activities: 
Provided further, That of the funds made available for demining and 
related activities, not to exceed $500,000, in addition to funds 
otherwise available for such purposes, may be used for expenses related 
to the operation and management of the demining program: Provided 
further, That funds appropriated under this heading may be made 
available for the International Atomic Energy Agency only if the 
Secretary of State determines (and so reports to the Congress) that 
Israel is not being denied its right to participate in the activities 
of that Agency.''.
    See also in that Act: sec. 506--Prohibition on Financing Nuclear 
Goods; sec. 515--Notification Requirements; and sec. 576--Assistance 
for the Middle East.
    Sec. 328(b) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996 (Public Law 104-132; 110 Stat. 1257) provided the following:
    ``(b) Assistance to Foreign Countries To Procure Explosives 
Detection Devices and Other Counterterrorism Technology.--(1) Subject 
to section 575(b), up to $3,000,000 in any fiscal year may be made 
available--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          ``(A) to procure explosives detection devices and other 
        counterterrorism technology; and
          ``(B) for joint counterterrorism research and development 
        projects on such technology conducted with NATO and major non-
        NATO allies under the auspices of the Technical Support Working 
        Group of the Department of State.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ``(2) As used in this subsection, the term `major non-NATO allies' 
means those countries designated as major non-NATO allies for purposes 
of section 2350a(i)(3) of title 10, United States Code.
    ``(c) Assistance to Foreign Countries.--Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law (except section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961) up to $1,000,000 in assistance may be provided to a foreign 
country for counterterrorism efforts in any fiscal year if--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          ``(1) such assistance is provided for the purpose of 
        protecting the property of the United States Government or the 
        life and property of any United States citizen, or furthering 
        the apprehension of any individual involved in any act of 
        terrorism against such property or persons; and
          ``(2) the appropriate committees of Congress are notified not 
        later than 15 days prior to the provision of such 
        assistance.''.
    (b) Amounts appropriated under this section are authorized 
to remain available until expended.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                                PART III


Chapter 1--General Provisions

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    Sec. 620A.\11\, \12\ Prohibition on Assistance 
to Governments Supporting International Terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ 22 U.S.C. 2371.
    \12\ Section 620A was added by sec. 303 of the International 
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-
329; 90 Stat. 753). It was amended and restated by sec. 503(a) of the 
International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (Public 
Law 99-83; 99 Stat. 220). It was further amended and restated by sec. 5 
of the Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989 (Public 
Law 101-222; 103 Stat. 1897).
    Section 10 of the Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 
1989 (Public Law 101-222; 103 Stat. 1900) provided the following in 
relation to the amendment of sec. 620A:
    ``Sec. 10. self-defense in accordance with international law.
    ``The use by any government of armed force in the exercise of 
individual or collective self-defense in accordance with applicable 
international agreements and customary international law shall not be 
considered an act of international terrorism for purposes of the 
amendments made by this Act.''.
    The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act, 1999 (division A, sec. 101(d) of Public Law 105-
277; 112 Stat. 2681), provided the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      ``prohibition on bilateral assistance to terrorist countries
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ``Sec. 528. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, funds 
appropriated for bilateral assistance under any heading of this Act and 
funds appropriated under any such heading in a provision of law enacted 
prior to enactment of this Act, shall not be made available to any 
country which the President determines--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          ``(1) grants sanctuary from prosecution to any individual or 
        group which has committed an act of international terrorism, or
          ``(2) otherwise supports international terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ``(b) The President may waive the application of subsection (a) to 
a country if the President determines that national security or 
humanitarian reasons justify such waiver. The President shall publish 
each waiver in the Federal Register and, at least fifteen days before 
the waiver takes effect, shall notify the Committees on Appropriations 
of the waiver (including the justification for the waiver) in 
accordance with the regular notification procedures of the Committees 
on Appropriations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          * * * * * * *

 ``prohibition on assistance to foreign governments that export lethal 
   military equipment to countries supporting international terrorism
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ``Sec. 551. (a) None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made 
available by this Act may be available to any foreign government which 
provides lethal military equipment to a country the government of which 
the Secretary of State has determined is a terrorist government for 
purposes of section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act or any other 
comparable provision of law. The prohibition under this section with 
respect to a foreign government shall terminate 12 months after that 
government ceases to provide such military equipment. This section 
applies with respect to lethal military equipment provided under a 
contract entered into after October 1, 1997.
    ``(b) Assistance restricted by subsection (a) or any other similar 
provision of law, may be furnished if the President determines that 
furnishing such assistance is important to the national interests of 
the United States.
    ``(c) Whenever the waiver of subsection (b) is exercised, the 
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
report with respect to the furnishing of such assistance. Any such 
report shall include a detailed explanation of the assistance estimated 
to be provided, including the estimated dollar amount of such 
assistance, and an explanation of how the assistance furthers United 
States national interests.''.
    See also in that Act: sec. 540--Special Authorities; sec. 543--
Eligibility for Assistance; and sec. 559--Special Debt Relief for the 
Poorest; and sec. 591--National Commission on Terrorism.
    See also sec. 586 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and 
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1991 (Public Law 101-513; 104 
Stat. 2047), cited as the ``Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990'',in sec. A.7 of 
this publication.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (a) \13\ Prohibition.--The United States shall not provide 
any assistance under this Act, the Agricultural Trade 
Development and Assistance Act of 1954, the Peace Corps Act, or 
the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 to any country if the 
Secretary of State determines that the government of that 
country has repeatedly provided support for acts of 
international terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ See also 18 U.S.C. 2332d, as added by sec. 321 of Public Law 
104-132 (110 Stat. 1254), which provides that U.S. persons engaging in 
financial transactions with the government of a country designated as 
supporting international terrorism under sec. 6(j) of the Export 
Administration Act (50 U.S.C. App. 2405) shall be fined under title 18, 
imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Publication of Determinations.--Each determination of 
the Secretary of State under subsection (a), including each 
determination in effect on the date of the enactment of the 
Antiterrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989, shall be 
published in the Federal Register.
    (c) Rescission.--A determination made by the Secretary of 
State under subsection (a) may not be rescinded unless the 
President submits to the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate--
          (1) before the proposed rescission would take effect, 
        a report certifying that--
                  (A) there has been a fundamental change in 
                the leadership and policies of the government 
                of the country concerned;
                  (B) that government is not supporting acts of 
                international terrorism;
                  (C) that government has provided assurances 
                that it will not support acts of international 
                terrorism in the future; or
          (2) at least 45 days before the proposed rescission 
        would take effect, a report justifying the rescission 
        and certifying that--
                  (A) the government concerned has not provided 
                any support for international terrorism during 
                the preceding 6-month period; and
                  (B) the government concerned has provided 
                assurances that it will not support acts of 
                international terrorism in the future.
    (d) Waiver.--Assistance prohibited by subsection (a) may be 
provided to a country described in that subsection if--
          (1) the President determines that national security 
        interests or humanitarian reasons justify a waiver of 
        subsection (a), except that humanitarian reasons may 
        not be used to justify assistance under part II of this 
        Act (including chapter 4, chapter 6, and chapter 8), or 
        the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945; and
          (2) at least 15 days before the waiver takes effect, 
        the President consults with the Committee on Foreign 
        Affairs \14\ of the House of Representatives and the 
        Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate regarding 
        the proposed waiver and submits a report to the Speaker 
        of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the 
        Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 
        containing--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Sec. 1(a)(5) of Public Law 104-14 (109 Stat. 186) provided 
that referenses to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives shall be treated as referring to the Committee on 
International Relations of the House of Representatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  (A) the name of the recipient country;
                  (B) a description of the national security 
                interests or humanitarian reasons which require 
                the waiver;
                  (C) the type and amount of and the 
                justification for the assistance to be provided 
                pursuant to the waiver; and
                  (D) the period of time during which such 
                waiver will be effective.
The waiver authority granted in this subsection may not be used 
to provide any assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 which is also prohibited by section 40 of the Arms Export 
Control Act.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 620G.\15\, \16\ PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES 
                    THAT AID TERRORIST STATES.

    (a) Withholding of Assistance.--The President shall 
withhold assistance under this Act to the government of any 
country that provides assistance to the government of any other 
country for which the Secretary of State has made a 
determination under section 620A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ 22 U.S.C. 2377. Sec. 325 of the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-132; 110 Stat. 1256) added 
this sec. 620G.
    Sec. 149 of Public Law 104-164 (110 Stat. 1436) also added a new 
sec. 620G, relating to depleted uranium ammunition.
    \16\ Sec. 329 of that Act (110 Stat. 1258) defined assistance as 
follows:
    ``(1) the term `assistance' means assistance to or for the benefit 
of a government of any country that is provided by grant, concessional 
sale, guaranty, insurance, or by any other means on terms more 
favorable than generally available in the applicable market, whether in 
the form of a loan, lease, credit, debt relief, or otherwise, including 
subsidies for exports to such country and favorable tariff treatment of 
articles that are the growth, product, or manufacture of such country; 
and
    ``(2) the term `assistance' does not include assistance of the type 
authorized under chapter 9 of part 1 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 (relating to international disaster assistance).''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Waiver.--Assistance prohibited by this section may be 
furnished to a foreign government described in subsection (a) 
if the President determines that furnishing such assistance is 
important to the national interests of the United States and, 
not later than 15 days before obligating such assistance, 
furnishes a report to the appropriate committees of Congress 
including--
          (1) a statement of the determination;
          (2) a detailed explanation of the assistance to be 
        provided;
          (3) the estimated dollar amount of the assistance; 
        and
          (4) an explanation of how the assistance furthers 
        United States national interests.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 620H.\16\, \17\ PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES 
                    THAT PROVIDE MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO TERRORIST 
                    STATES.

    (a) Prohibition.--
          (1) In general.--The President shall withhold 
        assistance under this Act to the government of any 
        country that provides lethal military equipment to a 
        country the government of which the Secretary of State 
        has determined is a terrorist government for the 
        purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration 
        Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)), or 620A of the 
        Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ 22 U.S.C. 2378. Sec. 326 of the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-132; 110 Stat. 1256) added 
sec. 620H.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (2) Applicability.--The prohibition under this 
        section with respect to a foreign government shall 
        terminate 1 year after that government ceases to 
        provide lethal military equipment. This section applies 
        with respect to lethal military equipment provided 
        under a contract entered into after the date of 
        enactment of this Act.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ ``[D]ate of enactment of this Act'' probably refers to 
enactment of the amendment, April 24, 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Waiver.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
assistance may be furnished to a foreign government described 
in subsection (a) if the President determines that furnishing 
such assistance is important to the national interests of the 
United States and, not later than 15 days before obligating 
such assistance, furnishes a report to the appropriate 
committees of Congress including--
          (1) a statement of the determination;
          (2) a detailed explanation of the assistance to be 
        provided;
          (3) the estimated dollar amount of the assistance; 
        and
          (4) an explanation of how the assistance furthers 
        United States national interests.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


          PART IV--ENTERPRISE FOR THE AMERICAS INITIATIVE \19\


SEC. 701.\20\ PURPOSE.

    The purpose of this part is to encourage and support 
improvement in the lives of the people of Latin America and the 
Caribbean through market-oriented reforms and economic growth 
with interrelated actions to promote debt reduction, investment 
reforms, community based conservation, and sustainable use of 
the environment, and child survival and child development. The 
Facility will support these objectives through administration 
of debt reduction operations under this part for those 
countries with democratically elected governments that meet 
investment reforms and other policy conditions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Sec. 602(a) of the Jobs Through Exports Act of 1992 (Public 
Law 102-549; 106 Stat. 3664) added Part IV--Enterprise for the Americas 
Initiative, secs. 701-710. Formerly, Part IV, which related to 
amendments to other laws, was repealed by sec. 401 of the FA Act of 
1962.
    \20\ 22 U.S.C. 2430.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 703.\21\ ELIGIBILITY FOR BENEFITS.

  (a) Requirements.--To be eligible for benefits from the 
Facility under this part, a country must be a Latin American or 
Caribbean country--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ 22 U.S.C. 2430b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) whose government is democratically elected;
          (2) whose government has not repeatedly provided 
        support for acts of international terrorism;
          (3) whose government is not failing to cooperate on 
        international narcotics control matters;
          (4) whose government (including its military or other 
        security forces) does not engage in a consistent 
        pattern of gross violations of internationally 
        recognized human rights;
          (5) that has in effect, has received approval for, 
        or, as appropriate in exceptional circumstances, is 
        making significant progress toward--
                  (A) an International Monetary Fund standby 
                arrangement, extended Fund arrangement, or an 
                arrangement under the structural adjustment 
                facility or enhanced structural adjustment 
                facility, or in exceptional circumstances, a 
                Fund monitored program or its equivalent, 
                unless the President determines (after 
                consultation with the Enterprise for the 
                Americas Board) that such an arrangement or 
                program (or its equivalent) could reasonably be 
                expected to have significant adverse social or 
                environmental effects; and
                  (B) as appropriate, structural or sectoral 
                adjustment loans from the International Bank 
                for Reconstruction and Development or the 
                International Development Association, unless 
                the President determines (after consultation 
                with the Enterprise for the Americas Board) 
                that the resulting adjustment requirements 
                could reasonably be expected to have 
                significant adverse social or environmental 
                effects;
          (6) has put in place major investment reforms in 
        conjunction with an Inter-American Development Bank 
        loan or otherwise is implementing, or is making 
        significant progress toward, an open investment regime; 
        and
          (7) if appropriate, has agreed with its commercial 
        bank lenders on a satisfactory financing program, 
        including, as appropriate, debt or debt service 
        reduction.
  (b) Eligibility Determinations.--Consistent with subsection 
(a), the President shall determine whether a country is 
eligible to receive benefits under this part. The President 
shall notify the appropriate congressional committees of his 
intention to designate a country as an eligible country at 
least 15 days in advance of any formal determination.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                     2. The Arms Export Control Act

  Public Law 90-629 [H.R. 15681], 82 Stat. 1320, approved October 22, 
                            1968, as amended

    AN ACT To consolidate and revise foreign assistance legislation 
               relating to reimbursable military exports.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this 
Act may be cited as the ``Arms Export Control Act''.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The new title, ``Arms Export Control Act,'' was added in lieu 
of ``The Foreign Military Sales Act'' by sec. 201 of the International 
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-
329; 90 Stat. 734). Sec. 201 further stated that ``any reference to the 
Foreign Military Sales Act shall be deemed to be a reference to the 
Arms Export Control Act.''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Chapter 1--FOREIGN AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY OBJECTIVES AND 
RESTRAINTS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    Sec. 6.\2\ Foreign Intimidation and Harassment of 
Individuals in the United States.--No letters of offer may be 
issued, no credits or guarantees may be extended, and no export 
licenses may be issued under this Act with respect to any 
country determined by the President to be engaged in a 
consistent pattern of acts of intimidation or harassment 
directed against individuals in the United States. The 
President shall report any such determination promptly to the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the chairman of 
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ 22 U.S.C. 2756. Sec. 6. was added by sec. 115 of the 
International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 (Public 
Law 97-113; 95 Stat. 1528).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Chapter 3--MILITARY EXPORT CONTROLS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    Sec. 38.\3\ Control of Arms Exports and Imports.--(a)(1) * 
* *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ 22 U.S.C. 2778.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (2) \4\ Decisions on issuing export licenses under this 
section shall be made in coordination with the Director of the 
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, taking into 
account the Director's assessment as to whether the export of 
an article would contribute to an arms race, aid in the 
development of weapons of mass destruction, support 
international terrorism, increase the possibility of outbreak 
or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the development of 
bilateral or multilateral arms control or nonproliferation 
agreements or other arrangements. The Director of the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency is authorized, whenever the 
Director determines that the issuance of an export license 
under this section would be detrimental to the national 
security of the United States, to recommend to the President 
that such export license be disapproved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Sec. 714(a)(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 497), amended 
and restated para. (2). The paragraph formerly read as follows:
    ``(2) Decisions on issuing export licenses under this section shall 
be made in coordination with the director of the United States Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency and shall take into account the 
Director's opinion as to whether the export of an article will 
contribute to an arms race, support international terrorism, increase 
the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the 
development of bilateral or multilateral arms control arrangements.''.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Sec. 40.\5\ Transactions With Countries Supporting Acts of 
International Terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ 22 U.S.C. 2780. See also 22 CFR Part 120-130. Sec. 40 was added 
by sec. 509(a) of Public Law 99-399 (100 Stat. 874). Sec. 40 was 
amended and restated by the Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Amendments 
Act of 1989 (Public Law 101-222; 103 Stat. 1892). It previously read as 
follows:
    ``Sec. 40. Exports to Countries Supporting Acts of International 
Terrorism.
    ``(a) Prohibition.--Except as provided in subsection (b), items on 
the United States Munitions List may not be exported to any country 
which the Secretary of State has determined, for purposes of section 
6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 
2405(j)(1)(A)), has repeatedly provided support for acts of 
international terrorism.
    ``(b) Waiver.--The President may waive the prohibition contained in 
subsection (a) in the case of a particular export if the President 
determines that the export is important to the national interests of 
the United States and submits to the Congress a report justifying that 
determination and describing the proposed export. Any such waiver shall 
expire at the end of 90 days after it is granted unless the Congress 
enacts a law extending the waiver.''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (a) Prohibited Transactions by the United States 
Government.--The following transactions by the United States 
Government are prohibited:
          (1) Exporting or otherwise providing (by sale, lease 
        or loan, grant, or other means), directly or 
        indirectly, any munitions item to a country described 
        in subsection (d) under the authority of this Act, the 
        Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or any other law 
        (except as provided in subsection (h)). In implementing 
        this paragraph, the United States Government--
                  (A) shall suspend delivery to such country of 
                any such item pursuant to any such transaction 
                which has not been completed at the time the 
                Secretary of State makes the determination 
                described in subsection (d), and
                  (B) shall terminate any lease or loan to such 
                country of any such item which is in effect at 
                the time the Secretary of State makes that 
                determination.
          (2) Providing credits, guarantees, or other financial 
        assistance under the authority of this Act, the Foreign 
        Assistance Act of 1961, or any other law (except as 
        provided in subsection (h)), with respect to the 
        acquisition of any munitions item by a country 
        described in subsection (d). In implementing this 
        paragraph, the United States Government shall suspend 
        expenditures pursuant to any such assistance obligated 
        before the Secretary of States makes the determination 
        described in subsection (d). The President may 
        authorize expenditures otherwise required to be 
        suspended pursuant to the preceding sentence if the 
        President has determined, and reported to the Congress, 
        that suspension of those expenditures causes undue 
        financial hardship to a supplier, shipper, or similar 
        person and allowing the expenditure will not result in 
        any munitions item being made available for use by such 
        country.
          (3) Consenting under section 3(a) of this Act, under 
        section 505(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 
        under the regulations issued to carry out section 38 of 
        this Act, or under any other law (except as provided in 
        subsection (h)), to any transfer of any munitions item 
        to a country described in subsection (d). In 
        implementing this paragraph, the United States 
        Government shall withdraw any such consent, which is in 
        effect at the time the Secretary of State makes the 
        determination described in subsection (d), except that 
        this sentence does not apply with respect to any item 
        that has already been transferred to such country.
          (4) Providing any license or other approval under 
        section 38 of this Act for any export or other transfer 
        (including by means of a technical assistance 
        agreement, manufacturing licensing agreement, or 
        coproduction agreement) of any munitions item to a 
        country described in subsection (d). In implementing 
        this paragraph, the United States Government shall 
        suspend any such license or other approval which is in 
        effect at the time the Secretary of State makes the 
        determination described in subsection (d), except that 
        this sentence does not apply with respect to any item 
        that has already been exported or otherwise transferred 
        to such country.
          (5) Otherwise facilitating the acquisition of any 
        munitions item by a country described in subsection 
        (d). This paragraph applies with respect to activities 
        undertaken--
                  (A) by any department, agency, or other 
                instrumentality of the Government,
                  (B) by any officer or employee of the 
                Government (including members of the United 
                States Armed Forces), or
                  (C) by any other person at the request or on 
                behalf of the Government.
The Secretary of State may waive the requirements of the second 
sentence of paragraph (1), the second sentence of paragraph 
(3), and the second sentence of paragraph (4) to the extent 
that the Secretary determines, after consultation with the 
Congress, that unusual and compelling circumstances require 
that the United States Government not take the actions 
specified in that sentence.
    (b) Prohibited Transactions by United States Persons.--
          (1) In general.--A United States person may not take 
        any of the following actions:
                  (A) Exporting any munitions item to any 
                country described in subsection (d).
                  (B) Selling, leasing, loaning, granting, or 
                otherwise providing any munitions item to any 
                country described in subsection (d).
                  (C) Selling, leasing, loaning, granting, or 
                otherwise providing any munitions item to any 
                recipient which is not the government of or a 
                person in a country described in subsection (d) 
                if the United States person has reason to know 
                that the munitions item with be made available 
                to any country described in subsection (d).
                  (D) Taking any other action which would 
                facilitate the acquisition, directly or 
                indirectly, of any munitions item by the 
                government of any country described in 
                subsection (d), or any person acting on behalf 
                of that government, if the United States person 
                has reason to know that that action will 
                facilitate the acquisition of that item by such 
                a government or person.
          (2) Liability for actions of foreign subsidiaries, 
        etc.--A United State person violates this subsection if 
        a corporation or other person that is controlled in 
        fact by that United States person (as determined under 
        regulations, which the President shall issue), takes an 
        action described in paragraph (1) outside the United 
        States.
          (3) Applicability to actions outside the united 
        states.--Paragraph (1) applies with respect to actions 
        described in that paragraph which are taken either 
        within or outside the United States by a United States 
        person described in subsection (l)(3)(A) or (B). To the 
        extent provided in regulations issued under subsection 
        (l)(3)(D), paragraph (1) applies with respect to 
        actions described in that paragraph which are taken 
        outside the United State by a person designated as a 
        United States person in those regulations.
    (c) Transfers to Governments and Persons Covered.--This 
section applies with respect to--
          (1) the acquisition of munitions items by the 
        government of a country described in subsection (d); 
        and
          (2) the acquisition of munitions items by any 
        individual, group, or other person within a country 
        described in subsection (d), except to the extent that 
        subparagraph (D) of subsection (b)(1) provides 
        otherwise.
    (d) \6\ Countries Covered by Prohibition.--The prohibitions 
contained in this section apply with respect to a country if 
the Secretary of State determines that the government of that 
country has repeatedly provided support for acts of 
international terrorism. For purposes of this subsection, such 
acts shall include all activities that the Secretary determines 
willfully aid or abet the international proliferation of 
nuclear explosive devices to individuals or groups or willfully 
aid or abet an individual or groups in acquiring unsafeguarded 
special nuclear material.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Sec. 551 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and 
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1999 (division A, sec. 101(d) of 
Public Law 105-277; 112 Stat. 2681), provided the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 ``prohibition on assistance to foreign governments that export lethal 
   military equipment to countries supporting international terrorism
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ``Sec. 551. (a) None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made 
available by this Act may be available to any foreign government which 
provides lethal military equipment to a country the government of which 
the Secretary of State has determined is a terrorist government for 
purposes of section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act or any other 
comparable provision of law. The prohibition under this section with 
respect to a foreign government shall terminate 12 months after that 
government ceases to provide such military equipment. This section 
applies with respect to lethal military equipment provided under a 
contract entered into after October 1, 1997.
    ``(b) Assistance restricted by subsection (a) or any other similar 
provision of law, may be furnished if the President determines that 
furnishing such assistance is important to the national interests of 
the United States.
    ``(c) Whenever the waiver of subsection (b) is exercised, the 
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
report with respect to the furnishing of such assistance. Any such 
report shall include a detailed explanation of the assistance estimated 
to be provided, including the estimated dollar amount of such 
assistance, and an explanation of how the assistance furthers United 
States national interests.''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (e) Publication of Determinations.--Each determination of 
the Secretary of State under subsection (d) shall be published 
in the Federal Register.
    (f) Rescission.--(1) A determination made by the Secretary 
of State under subsection (d) may not be rescinded unless the 
President submits to the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate--
          (A) before the proposed rescission would take effect, 
        a report certifying that--
                  (i) there has been a fundamental change in 
                the leadership and policies of the government 
                of the country concerned;
                  (ii) that government is not supporting acts 
                of international terrorism; and
                  (iii) that government has provided assurances 
                that it will not support acts of international 
                terrorism in the future; or
          (B) at least 45 days before the proposed rescission 
        would take effect, a report justifying the rescission 
        and certifying that--
                  (i) the government concerned has not provided 
                any support for international terrorism during 
                the preceding 6-month period; and
                  (ii) the government concerned has provided 
                assurances that it will not support acts of 
                international terrorism in the future.
  (2) (A) No rescission under paragraph (1)(B) of a 
determination under subsection (d) may be made if the Congress, 
within 45 days after receipt of a report under paragraph 
(1)(B), enacts a joint resolution the matter after the 
resolving clause of which is as follows: ``That the proposed 
rescission of the determination under section 40(d) of the Arms 
Export Control Act pursuant to the report submitted to the 
Congress on ________________ is hereby prohibited.'', the blank 
to be completed with the appropriate date.
  (B) A joint resolution described in subparagraph (A) and 
introduced within the appropriate 45-day period shall be 
considered in the Senate and the House of Representatives in 
accordance with paragraphs (3) through (7) of section 8066(c) 
of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act (as contained 
in Public Law 98-473), except that references in such 
paragraphs to the Committees on Appropriations of the House of 
Representatives and the Senate shall be deemed to be references 
to the Committee on Foreign Affairs \7\ of the House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate, respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Sec. 1(a)(5) of Public Law 104-14 (109 Stat. 186) provided that 
references to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives shall be treated as referring to the Committee on 
International Relations of the House of Representatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (g) Waiver.--The President may waive the prohibitions 
contained in this section with respect to a specific 
transaction if--
          (1) the President determines that the transaction is 
        essential to the national security interests of the 
        United States; and
          (2) not less than 15 days prior to the proposed 
        transaction, the President--
                  (A) consults with the Committee on Foreign 
                Affairs \7\ of the House of Representatives and 
                the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate; and
                  (B) submits to the Speaker of the House of 
                Representatives and the chairman of the 
                Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a 
                report containing--
                          (i) the name of any country involved 
                        in the proposed transaction, the 
                        identity of any recipient of the items 
                        to be provided pursuant to the proposed 
                        transaction, and the anticipated use of 
                        those items;
                          (ii) a description of the munitions 
                        items involved in the proposed 
                        transaction (including their market 
                        value) and the actual sale price at 
                        each step in the transaction (or if the 
                        items are transferred by other than 
                        sale, the manner in which they will be 
                        provided);
                          (iii) the reasons why the proposed 
                        transaction is essential to the 
                        national security interests of the 
                        United States and the justification for 
                        such proposed transaction;
                          (iv) the date on which the proposed 
                        transaction is expected to occur; and
                          (v) the name of every United States 
                        Government department, agency, or other 
                        entity involved in the proposed 
                        transaction, every foreign government 
                        involved in the proposed transaction, 
                        and every private party with 
                        significant participation in the 
                        proposed transaction.
To the extent possible, the information specified in 
subparagraph (B) of paragraph (2) shall be provided in 
unclassified form, with any classified information provided in 
an addendum to the report.
    (h) Exemption for Transactions Subject to National Security 
Act Reporting Requirements.--The prohibitions contained in this 
section do not apply with respect to any transaction subject to 
reporting requirements under title V of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.; relating to congressional 
oversight of intelligence activities).
    (i) Relation to Other Laws.--
          (1) In general.--With regard to munitions items 
        controlled pursuant to this Act, the provisions of this 
        section shall apply notwithstanding any other 
        provisions of law, other than section 614(a) of the 
        Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2364(a)).
          (2) Section 614(a) waiver authority.--If the 
        authority of section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance 
        Act of 1961 is used to permit a transaction under that 
        Act or the Arms Export Control Act which is otherwise 
        prohibited by this section, the written policy 
        justification required by that section shall include 
        the information specified in subsection (g)(2)(B) of 
        this section.
    (j) Criminal Penalty.--Any person who willfully violates 
this section shall be fined for each violation not more than 
$1,000,000, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
    (k) Civil Penalties; Enforcement.--In the enforcement of 
this section, the President is authorized to exercise the same 
powers concerning violations and enforcement which are 
conferred upon departments, agencies, and officials by sections 
11(c), 11(e), 11(g), and 12(a) of the Export Administration Act 
of 1979 (subject to the same terms and conditions as are 
applicable to such powers under that Act), except that, 
notwithstanding section 11(c) of that Act, the civil penalty 
for each violation of this section may not exceed $500,000.
    (l) Definitions.--As used in this section--
          (1) the term ``munitions item'' means any item 
        enumerated on the United States Munitions list (without 
        regard to whether the item is imported into or exported 
        from the United States);
          (2) the term ``United States'', when used 
        geographically, means the several States, the District 
        of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the 
        Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any 
        territory or possession of the United States;
          (3) the term ``United States person'' means--
                  (A) any citizen or permanent resident alien 
                of the United States;
                  (B) any sole proprietorship, partnership, 
                company, association, or corporation having its 
                principal place of business within the United 
                States or organized under the laws of the 
                United States, any State, the District of 
                Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the 
                Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 
                or any territory or possession of the United 
                States;
                  (C) any other person with respect to that 
                person's actions while in the United States; 
                and
                  (D) to the extent provided in regulations 
                issued by the Secretary of state, any person 
                that is not described in subparagraph (A), (B), 
                or (C) but--
                          (i) is a foreign subsidiary or 
                        affiliate of a United States person 
                        described in subparagraph (B) and is 
                        controlled in fact by that United 
                        States person (as determined in 
                        accordance with those regulations), or
                          (ii) is otherwise subject to the 
                        jurisdiction of the United States
                with respect to that person's actions while 
                outside the United States;
          (4) the term ``nuclear explosive device'' has the 
        meaning given that term in section 830(4) of the 
        Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994; and
          (5) the term ``unsafeguarded special nuclear 
        material'' has the meaning given that term in section 
        830(8) of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 
        1994.
    Sec. 40A.\8\ Transactions With Countries Not Fully 
Cooperating With United States Antiterrorism Efforts.--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ 22 U.S.C. 2781. Sec. 330 of the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-132; 110 Stat. 1258) added 
this sec. 40A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (a) Prohibited Transactions.--No defense article or defense 
service may be sold or licensed for export under this Act in a 
fiscal year to a foreign country that the President determines 
and certifies to Congress, by May 15 of the calendar year in 
which that fiscal year begins, is not cooperating fully with 
United States antiterrorism efforts.
    (b) Waiver.--The President may waive the prohibition set 
forth in subsection (a) with respect to a specific transaction 
if the President determines that the transaction is important 
to the national interests of the United States.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 7--CONTROL OF MISSILES AND MISSILE EQUIPMENT OR TECHNOLOGY \9\

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Sec. 1703 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1991 (Public Law 101-510; 104 Stat. 1745) added chapter 7, secs. 
71-74.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Sec. 72.\10\ Denial of the Transfer of Missile Equipment or 
Technology by United States Persons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ 22 U.S.C. 2797a.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (c) \11\ Presumption.--In determining whether to apply 
sanctions under subsection (a) to a United States person 
involved in the export, transfer, or trade of an item on the 
MTCR Annex, it should be a rebuttable presumption that such 
item is designed for use in a missile listed in the MTCR Annex 
if the President determines that the final destination of the 
item is a country the government of which the Secretary of 
State has determined, for purposes of 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export 
Administration Act of 1979, has repeatedly provided support for 
acts of international terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Sec. 734(a) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 505), added subsec. 
(c).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Sec. 73.\12\ Transfers of Missile Equipment or Technology 
by Foreign Persons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ 22 U.S.C. 2797b.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (f) \13\ Presumption.--In determining whether to apply 
sanctions under subsection (a) to a foreign person involved in 
the export, transfer, or trade of an item on the MTCR Annex, it 
should be a rebuttable presumption that such item is designed 
for use in a missile listed in the MTCR Annex if the President 
determines that the final destination of the item is a country 
the government of which the Secretary of State has determined, 
for purposes of 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of 
1979, has repeatedly provided support for acts of international 
terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Sec. 734(b) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 505), added subsec. 
(f).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                3. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996

Public Law 104-172 [H.R. 3107], 110 Stat. 1541, approved August 5, 1996

   AN ACT To impose sanctions on persons making certain investments 
   directly and significantly contributing to the enhancement of the 
  ability of Iran or Libya to develop its petroleum resources, and on 
    persons exporting certain items that enhance Libya's weapons or 
    aviation capabilities or enhance Libya's ability to develop its 
              petroleum resources, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1.\1\ SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Iran and Libya Sanctions Act 
of 1996''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 50 U.S.C. 1701 note. In a memorandum of November 21, 1996 (61 
F.R. 64249), the President made the following delegations of authority 
under this Act:
    ``. . . I hereby delegate to the Secretary of State the functions 
vested in the President by the following provisions of the Iran and 
Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172) (`the Act'), such 
functions to be exercised in consultation with the Departments of the 
Treasury and Commerce and the United States Trade Representative, and 
with the Export-Import Bank and the Federal Reserve Board and other 
interested agencies as appropriate: sections 4(c), 5(a), 5(b), 5(c), 
5(f), 6(1), 6(2), and 9(c). I hereby delegate to the Secretary of State 
the functions vested in the President by the following provisions of 
the Act: sections 4(a), 4(b), 4(d), 4(e), 5(d), 5(e), 9(a), 9(b), and 
10. * * * The following functions vested in the President by the 
following provisions of the Act delegated by this memorandum may be 
redelegated: 4(a), 4(b), 4(d), 4(e), 4(d), 5(e), and 10. All other 
functions delegated by this memorandum may not be redelegated.''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 2.\1\ FINDINGS.

    The Congress makes the following findings:
          (1) The efforts of the Government of Iran to acquire 
        weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver 
        them and its support of acts of international terrorism 
        endanger the national security and foreign policy 
        interests of the United States and those countries with 
        which the United States shares common strategic and 
        foreign policy objectives.
          (2) The objective of preventing the proliferation of 
        weapons of mass destruction and acts of international 
        terrorism through existing multilateral and bilateral 
        initiatives requires additional efforts to deny Iran 
        the financial means to sustain its nuclear, chemical, 
        biological, and missile weapons programs.
          (3) The Government of Iran uses its diplomatic 
        facilities and quasi-governmental institutions outside 
        of Iran to promote acts of international terrorism and 
        assist its nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile 
        weapons programs.
          (4) The failure of the Government of Libya to comply 
        with Resolutions 731, 748, and 883 of the Security 
        Council of the United Nations, its support of 
        international terrorism, and its efforts to acquire 
        weapons of mass destruction constitute a threat to 
        international peace and security that endangers the 
        national security and foreign policy interests of the 
        United States and those countries with which it shares 
        common strategic and foreign policy objectives.

SEC. 3.\1\ DECLARATION OF POLICY.

    (a) Policy With Respect to Iran.--The Congress declares 
that it is the policy of the United States to deny Iran the 
ability to support acts of international terrorism and to fund 
the development and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction 
and the means to deliver them by limiting the development of 
Iran's ability to explore for, extract, refine, or transport by 
pipeline petroleum resources of Iran.
    (b) Policy With Respect to Libya.--The Congress further 
declares that it is the policy of the United States to seek 
full compliance by Libya with its obligations under Resolutions 
731, 748, and 883 of the Security Council of the United 
Nations, including ending all support for acts of international 
terrorism and efforts to develop or acquire weapons of mass 
destruction.

SEC. 4.\1\ MULTILATERAL REGIME.

    (a) Multilateral Negotiations.--In order to further the 
objectives of section 3, the Congress urges the President to 
commence immediately diplomatic efforts, both in appropriate 
international fora such as the United Nations, and bilaterally 
with allies of the United States, to establish a multilateral 
sanctions regime against Iran, including provisions limiting 
the development of petroleum resources, that will inhibit 
Iran's efforts to carry out activities described in section 2.
    (b) Reports to Congress.--The President shall report to the 
appropriate congressional committees, not later than 1 year 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and periodically 
thereafter, on the extent that diplomatic efforts described in 
subsection (a) have been successful. Each report shall 
include--
          (1) the countries that have agreed to undertake 
        measures to further the objectives of section 3 with 
        respect to Iran, and a description of those measures; 
        and
          (2) the countries that have not agreed to measures 
        described in paragraph (1), and, with respect to those 
        countries, other measures (in addition to that provided 
        in subsection (d)) the President recommends that the 
        United States take to further the objectives of section 
        3 with respect to Iran.
    (c) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of 
section 5(a) with respect to nationals of a country if--
          (1) that country has agreed to undertake substantial 
        measures, including economic sanctions, that will 
        inhibit Iran's efforts to carry out activities 
        described in section 2 and information required by 
        subsection (b)(1) has been included in a report 
        submitted under subsection (b); and
          (2) the President, at least 30 days before the waiver 
        takes effect, notifies the appropriate congressional 
        committees of his intention to exercise the waiver.
    (d) Enhanced Sanction.--
          (1) Sanction.--With respect to nationals of countries 
        except those with respect to which the President has 
        exercised the waiver authority of subsection (c), at 
        any time after the first report is required to be 
        submitted under subsection (b), section 5(a) shall be 
        applied by substituting ``$20,000,000'' for 
        ``$40,000,000'' each place it appears, and by 
        substituting ``$5,000,000'' for ``$10,000,000''.
          (2) Report to congress.--The President shall report 
        to the appropriate congressional committees any country 
        with respect to which paragraph (1) applies.
    (e) Interim Report on Multilateral Sanctions; Monitoring.--
The President, not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, shall report to the appropriate 
congressional committees on--
          (1) whether the member states of the European Union, 
        the Republic of Korea, Australia, Israel, or Japan have 
        legislative or administrative standards providing for 
        the imposition of trade sanctions on persons or their 
        affiliates doing business or having investments in Iran 
        or Libya;
          (2) the extent and duration of each instance of the 
        application of such sanctions; and
          (3) the disposition of any decision with respect to 
        such sanctions by the World Trade Organization or its 
        predecessor organization.

SEC. 5.\1\ IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.

    (a) Sanctions With Respect to Iran.--Except as provided in 
subsection (f), the President shall impose 2 or more of the 
sanctions described in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section 6 
if the President determines that a person has, with actual 
knowledge, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
made an investment of $40,000,000 or more (or any combination 
of investments of at least $10,000,000 each, which in the 
aggregate equals or exceeds $40,000,000 in any 12-month 
period), that directly and significantly contributed to the 
enhancement of Iran's ability to develop petroleum resources of 
Iran.
    (b) Mandatory Sanctions With Respect to Libya.--
          (1) Violations of prohibited transactions.--Except as 
        provided in subsection (f), the President shall impose 
        2 or more of the sanctions described in paragraphs (1) 
        through (6) of section 6 if the President determines 
        that a person has, with actual knowledge, on or after 
        the date of the enactment of this Act, exported, 
        transferred, or otherwise provided to Libya any goods, 
        services, technology, or other items the provision of 
        which is prohibited under paragraph 4(b) or 5 of 
        Resolution 748 of the Security Council of the United 
        Nations, adopted March 31, 1992, or under paragraph 5 
        or 6 of Resolution 883 of the Security Council of the 
        United Nations, adopted November 11, 1993, if the 
        provision of such items significantly and materially--
                  (A) contributed to Libya's ability to acquire 
                chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or 
                destabilizing numbers and types of advanced 
                conventional weapons or enhanced Libya's 
                military or paramilitary capabilities;
                  (B) contributed to Libya's ability to develop 
                its petroleum resources; or
                  (C) contributed to Libya's ability to 
                maintain its aviation capabilities.
          (2) Investments that contribute to the development of 
        petroleum resources.--Except as provided in subsection 
        (f), the President shall impose 2 or more of the 
        sanctions described in paragraphs (1) through (6) of 
        section 6 if the President determines that a person 
        has, with actual knowledge, on or after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, made an investment of 
        $40,000,000 or more (or any combination of investments 
        of at least $10,000,000 each, which in the aggregate 
        equals or exceeds $40,000,000 in any 12-month period), 
        that directly and significantly contributed to the 
        enhancement of Libya's ability to develop its petroleum 
        resources.
    (c) Persons Against Which the Sanctions Are To Be 
Imposed.--The sanctions described in subsections (a) and (b) 
shall be imposed on--
          (1) any person the President determines has carried 
        out the activities described in subsection (a) or (b); 
        and
          (2) any person the President determines--
                  (A) is a successor entity to the person 
                referred to in paragraph (1);
                  (B) is a parent or subsidiary of the person 
                referred to in paragraph (1) if that parent or 
                subsidiary, with actual knowledge, engaged in 
                the activities referred to in paragraph (1); or
                  (C) is an affiliate of the person referred to 
                in paragraph (1) if that affiliate, with actual 
                knowledge, engaged in the activities referred 
                to in paragraph (1) and if that affiliate is 
                controlled in fact by the person referred to in 
                paragraph (1).
For purposes of this Act, any person or entity described in 
this subsection shall be referred to as a ``sanctioned 
person''.
    (d) Publication in Federal Register.--The President shall 
cause to be published in the Federal Register a current list of 
persons and entities on whom sanctions have been imposed under 
this Act. The removal of persons or entities from, and the 
addition of persons and entities to, the list, shall also be so 
published.
    (e) Publication of Projects.\2\--The President shall cause 
to be published in the Federal Register a list of all 
significant projects which have been publicly tendered in the 
oil and gas sector in Iran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ The Department of State published such a list in Public Notice 
No. 2501, January 2, 1997 (62 F.R. 1141).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (f) Exceptions.--The President shall not be required to 
apply or maintain the sanctions under subsection (a) or (b)--
          (1) in the case of procurement of defense articles or 
        defense services--
                  (A) under existing contracts or subcontracts, 
                including the exercise of options for 
                production quantities to satisfy requirements 
                essential to the national security of the 
                United States;
                  (B) if the President determines in writing 
                that the person to which the sanctions would 
                otherwise be applied is a sole source supplier 
                of the defense articles or services, that the 
                defense articles or services are essential, and 
                that alternative sources are not readily or 
                reasonably available; or
                  (C) if the President determines in writing 
                that such articles or services are essential to 
                the national security under defense 
                coproduction agreements;
          (2) in the case of procurement, to eligible products, 
        as defined in section 308(4) of the Trade Agreements 
        Act of 1979 (19 U.S.C. 2518(4)), of any foreign country 
        or instrumentality designated under section 301(b)(1) 
        of that Act (19 U.S.C. 2511(b)(1));
          (3) to products, technology, or services provided 
        under contracts entered into before the date on which 
        the President publishes in the Federal Register the 
        name of the person on whom the sanctions are to be 
        imposed;
          (4) to--
                  (A) spare parts which are essential to United 
                States products or production;
                  (B) component parts, but not finished 
                products, essential to United States products 
                or production; or
                  (C) routine servicing and maintenance of 
                products, to the extent that alternative 
                sources are not readily or reasonably 
                available;
          (6) to information and technology essential to United 
        States products or production; or
          (7) to medicines, medical supplies, or other 
        humanitarian items.

SEC. 6.\1\ DESCRIPTION OF SANCTIONS.

    The sanctions to be imposed on a sanctioned person under 
section 5 are as follows:
          (1) Export-import bank assistance for exports to 
        sanctioned persons.--The President may direct the 
        Export-Import Bank of the United States not to give 
        approval to the issuance of any guarantee, insurance, 
        extension of credit, or participation in the extension 
        of credit in connection with the export of any goods or 
        services to any sanctioned person.
          (2) Export sanction.--The President may order the 
        United States Government not to issue any specific 
        license and not to grant any other specific permission 
        or authority to export any goods or technology to a 
        sanctioned person under--
                  (i) the Export Administration Act of 1979;
                  (ii) the Arms Export Control Act;
                  (iii) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or
                  (iv) any other statute that requires the 
                prior review and approval of the United States 
                Government as a condition for the export or 
                reexport of goods or services.
          (3) Loans from united states financial 
        institutions.--The United States Government may 
        prohibit any United States financial institution from 
        making loans or providing credits to any sanctioned 
        person totaling more than $10,000,000 in any 12-month 
        period unless such person is engaged in activities to 
        relieve human suffering and the loans or credits are 
        provided for such activities.
          (4) Prohibitions on financial institutions.--The 
        following prohibitions may be imposed against a 
        sanctioned person that is a financial institution:
                  (A) Prohibition on designation as primary 
                dealer.--Neither the Board of Governors of the 
                Federal Reserve System nor the Federal Reserve 
                Bank of New York may designate, or permit the 
                continuation of any prior designation of, such 
                financial institution as a primary dealer in 
                United States Government debt instruments.
                  (B) Prohibition on service as a repository of 
                government funds.--Such financial institution 
                may not serve as agent of the United States 
                Government or serve as repository for United 
                States Government funds.
        The imposition of either sanction under subparagraph 
        (A) or (B) shall be treated as 1 sanction for purposes 
        of section 5, and the imposition of both such sanctions 
        shall be treated as 2 sanctions for purposes of section 
        5.
          (5) Procurement sanction.--The United States 
        Government may not procure, or enter into any contract 
        for the procurement of, any goods or services from a 
        sanctioned person.
          (6) Additional sanctions.--The President may impose 
        sanctions, as appropriate, to restrict imports with 
        respect to a sanctioned person, in accordance with the 
        International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
        1701 and following).

SEC. 7.\1\ ADVISORY OPINIONS.

    The Secretary of State may, upon the request of any person, 
issue an advisory opinion to that person as to whether a 
proposed activity by that person would subject that person to 
sanctions under this Act. Any person who relies in good faith 
on such an advisory opinion which states that the proposed 
activity would not subject a person to such sanctions, and any 
person who thereafter engages in such activity, will not be 
made subject to such sanctions on account of such activity.

SEC. 8.\1\ TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.

    (a) Iran.--The requirement under section 5(a) to impose 
sanctions shall no longer have force or effect with respect to 
Iran if the President determines and certifies to the 
appropriate congressional committees that Iran--
          (1) has ceased its efforts to design, develop, 
        manufacture, or acquire--
                  (A) a nuclear explosive device or related 
                materials and technology;
                  (B) chemical and biological weapons; and
                  (C) ballistic missiles and ballistic missile 
                launch technology; and
          (2) has been removed from the list of countries the 
        governments of which have been determined, for purposes 
        of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 
        1979, to have repeatedly provided support for acts of 
        international terrorism.
    (b) Libya.--The requirement under section 5(b) to impose 
sanctions shall no longer have force or effect with respect to 
Libya if the President determines and certifies to the 
appropriate congressional committees that Libya has fulfilled 
the requirements of United Nations Security Council Resolution 
731, adopted January 21, 1992, United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 748, adopted March 31, 1992, and United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 883, adopted November 11, 1993.

SEC. 9.\1\ DURATION OF SANCTIONS; PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER.

    (a) Delay of Sanctions.--
          (1) Consultations.--If the President makes a 
        determination described in section 5(a) or 5(b) with 
        respect to a foreign person, the Congress urges the 
        President to initiate consultations immediately with 
        the government with primary jurisdiction over that 
        foreign person with respect to the imposition of 
        sanctions under this Act.
          (2) Actions by government of jurisdiction.--In order 
        to pursue consultations under paragraph (1) with the 
        government concerned, the President may delay 
        imposition of sanctions under this Act for up to 90 
        days. Following such consultations, the President shall 
        immediately impose sanctions unless the President 
        determines and certifies to the Congress that the 
        government has taken specific and effective actions, 
        including, as appropriate, the imposition of 
        appropriate penalties, to terminate the involvement of 
        the foreign person in the activities that resulted in 
        the determination by the President under section 5(a) 
        or 5(b) concerning such person.
          (3) Additional delay in imposition of sanctions.--The 
        President may delay the imposition of sanctions for up 
        to an additional 90 days if the President determines 
        and certifies to the Congress that the government with 
        primary jurisdiction over the person concerned is in 
        the process of taking the actions described in 
        paragraph (2).
          (4) Report to congress.--Not later than 90 days after 
        making a determination under section 5(a) or 5(b), the 
        President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
        committees a report on the status of consultations with 
        the appropriate foreign government under this 
        subsection, and the basis for any determination under 
        paragraph (3).
    (b) Duration of Sanctions.--A sanction imposed under 
section 5 shall remain in effect--
          (1) for a period of not less than 2 years from the 
        date on which it is imposed; or
          (2) until such time as the President determines and 
        certifies to the Congress that the person whose 
        activities were the basis for imposing the sanction is 
        no longer engaging in such activities and that the 
        President has received reliable assurances that such 
        person will not knowingly engage in such activities in 
        the future, except that such sanction shall remain in 
        effect for a period of at least 1 year.
    (c) Presidential Waiver.--
          (1) Authority.--The President may waive the 
        requirement in section 5 to impose a sanction or 
        sanctions on a person described in section 5(c), and 
        may waive the continued imposition of a sanction or 
        sanctions under subsection (b) of this section, 30 days 
        or more after the President determines and so reports 
        to the appropriate congressional committees that it is 
        important to the national interest of the United States 
        to exercise such waiver authority.
          (2) Contents of report.--Any report under paragraph 
        (1) shall provide a specific and detailed rationale for 
        the determination under paragraph (1), including--
                  (A) a description of the conduct that 
                resulted in the determination under section 
                5(a) or (b), as the case may be;
                  (B) in the case of a foreign person, an 
                explanation of the efforts to secure the 
                cooperation of the government with primary 
                jurisdiction over the sanctioned person to 
                terminate or, as appropriate, penalize the 
                activities that resulted in the determination 
                under section 5(a) or (b), as the case may be;
                  (C) an estimate as to the significance--
                          (i) of the provision of the items 
                        described in section 5(a) to Iran's 
                        ability to develop its petroleum 
                        resources, or
                          (ii) of the provision of the items 
                        described in section 5(b)(1) to the 
                        abilities of Libya described in 
                        subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of 
                        section 5(b)(1), or of the investment 
                        described in section 5(b)(2) on Libya's 
                        ability to develop its petroleum 
                        resources, as the case may be; and
                  (D) a statement as to the response of the 
                United States in the event that the person 
                concerned engages in other activities that 
                would be subject to section 5(a) or (b).
          (3) Effect of report on waiver.--If the President 
        makes a report under paragraph (1) with respect to a 
        waiver of sanctions on a person described in section 
        5(c), sanctions need not be imposed under section 5(a) 
        or (b) on that person during the 30-day period referred 
        to in paragraph (1).

SEC. 10.\1\ REPORTS REQUIRED.

    (a) Report on Certain International Initiatives.--Not later 
than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 
every 6 months thereafter, the President shall transmit a 
report to the appropriate congressional committees describing--
          (1) the efforts of the President to mount a 
        multilateral campaign to persuade all countries to 
        pressure Iran to cease its nuclear, chemical, 
        biological, and missile weapons programs and its 
        support of acts of international terrorism;
          (2) the efforts of the President to persuade other 
        governments to ask Iran to reduce the presence of 
        Iranian diplomats and representatives of other 
        government and military or quasi-governmental 
        institutions of Iran and to withdraw any such diplomats 
        or representatives who participated in the takeover of 
        the United States embassy in Tehran on November 4, 
        1979, or the subsequent holding of United States 
        hostages for 444 days;
          (3) the extent to which the International Atomic 
        Energy Agency has established regular inspections of 
        all nuclear facilities in Iran, including those 
        presently under construction; and
          (4) Iran's use of Iranian diplomats and 
        representatives of other government and military or 
        quasi-governmental institutions of Iran to promote acts 
        of international terrorism or to develop or sustain 
        Iran's nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile 
        weapons programs.
    (b) Other Reports.--The President shall ensure the 
continued transmittal to the Congress of reports describing--
          (1) the nuclear and other military capabilities of 
        Iran, as required by section 601(a) of the Nuclear Non-
        Proliferation Act of 1978 and section 1607 of the 
        National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
        1993; and
          (2) the support provided by Iran for acts of 
        international terrorism, as part of the Department of 
        State's annual report on international terrorism.

SEC. 11.\1\ DETERMINATIONS NOT REVIEWABLE.

    A determination to impose sanctions under this Act shall 
not bereviewable in any court.

SEC. 12.\1\ EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES.

    Nothing in this Act shall apply to any activities subject 
to the reporting requirements of title V of the National 
Security Act of 1947.

SEC. 13.\1\ EFFECTIVE DATE; SUNSET.

    (a) Effective Date.--This Act shall take effect on the date 
of the enactment of this Act.
    (b) Sunset.--This Act shall cease to be effective on the 
date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this 
Act.

SEC. 14.\1\ DEFINITIONS.

    As used in this Act:
          (1) Act of international terrorism.--The term ``act 
        of international terrorism'' means an act--
                  (A) which is violent or dangerous to human 
                life and that is a violation of the criminal 
                laws of the United States or of any State or 
                that would be a criminal violation if committed 
                within the jurisdiction of the United States or 
                any State; and
                  (B) which appears to be intended--
                          (i) to intimidate or coerce a 
                        civilian population;
                          (ii) to influence the policy of a 
                        government by intimidation or coercion; 
                        or
                          (iii) to affect the conduct of a 
                        government by assassination or 
                        kidnapping.
          (2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the 
        Committee on Finance, the Committee on Banking, 
        Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on 
        Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
        Ways and Means, the Committee on Banking and Financial 
        Services, and the Committee on International Relations 
        of the House of Representatives.
          (3) Component part.--The term ``component part'' has 
        the meaning given that term in section 11A(e)(1) of the 
        Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 
        2410a(e)(1)).
          (4) Develop and development.--To ``develop'', or the 
        ``development'' of, petroleum resources means the 
        exploration for, or the extraction, refining, or 
        transportation by pipeline of, petroleum resources.
          (5) Financial institution.--The term ``financial 
        institution'' includes--
                  (A) a depository institution (as defined in 
                section 3(c)(1) of the Federal Deposit 
                Insurance Act), including a branch or agency of 
                a foreign bank (as defined in section 1(b)(7) 
                of the International Banking Act of 1978);
                  (B) a credit union;
                  (C) a securities firm, including a broker or 
                dealer;
                  (D) an insurance company, including an agency 
                or underwriter; and
                  (E) any other company that provides financial 
                services.
          (6) Finished product.--The term ``finished product'' 
        has the meaning given that term in section 11A(e)(2) of 
        the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 
        2410a(e)(2)).
          (7) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' 
        means--
                  (A) an individual who is not a United States 
                person or an alien lawfully admitted for 
                permanent residence into the United States; or
                  (B) a corporation, partnership, or other 
                nongovernmental entity which is not a United 
                States person.
          (8) Goods and technology.--The terms ``goods'' and 
        ``technology'' have the meanings given those terms in 
        section 16 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 
        U.S.C. App. 2415).
          (9) Investment.--The term ``investment'' means any of 
        the following activities if such activity is undertaken 
        pursuant to an agreement, or pursuant to the exercise 
        of rights under such an agreement, that is entered into 
        with the Government of Iran or a nongovenmental entity 
        in Iran, or with the Government of Libya or a 
        nongovernmental entity in Libya, on or after the date 
        of the enactment of this Act:
                  (A) The entry into a contract that includes 
                responsibility for the development of petroleum 
                resources located in Iran or Libya (as the case 
                may be), or the entry into a contract providing 
                for the general supervision and guarantee of 
                another person's performance of such a 
                contract.
                  (B) The purchase of a share of ownership, 
                including an equity interest, in that 
                development.
                  (C) The entry into a contract providing for 
                the participation in royalties, earnings, or 
                profits in that development, without regard to 
                the form of the participation.
        The term ``investment'' does not include the entry 
        into, performance, or financing of a contract to sell 
        or purchase goods, services, or technology.
          (10) Iran.--The term ``Iran'' includes any agency or 
        instrumentality of Iran.
          (11) Iranian diplomats and representatives of other 
        government and military or quasi-governmental 
        institutions of iran.--The term ``Iranian diplomats and 
        representatives of other government and military or 
        quasi-governmental institutions of Iran'' includes 
        employees, representatives, or affiliates of Iran's--
                  (A) Foreign Ministry;
                  (B) Ministry of Intelligence and Security;
                  (C) Revolutionary Guard Corps;
                  (D) Crusade for Reconstruction;
                  (E) Qods (Jerusalem) Forces;
                  (F) Interior Ministry;
                  (G) Foundation for the Oppressed and 
                Disabled;
                  (H) Prophet's Foundation;
                  (I) June 5th Foundation;
                  (J) Martyr's Foundation;
                  (K) Islamic Propagation Organization; and
                  (L) Ministry of Islamic Guidance.
          (12) Libya.--The term ``Libya'' includes any agency 
        or instrumentality of Libya.
          (13) Nuclear explosive device.--The term ``nuclear 
        explosive device'' means any device, whether assembled 
        or disassembled, that is designed to produce an 
        instantaneous release of an amount of nuclear energy 
        from special nuclear material (as defined in section 
        11(aa) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954) that is 
        greater than the amount of energy that would be 
        released from the detonation of one pound of 
        trinitrotoluene (TNT).
          (14) Person.--The term ``person'' means--
                  (A) a natural person;
                  (B) a corporation, business association, 
                partnership, society, trust, any other 
                nongovernmental entity, organization, or group, 
                and any governmental entity operating as a 
                business enterprise; and
                  (C) any successor to any entity described in 
                subparagraph (B).
          (15) Petroleum resources.--The term ``petroleum 
        resources'' includes petroleum and natural gas 
        resources.
          (16) United states or state.--The term ``United 
        States'' or ``State'' means the several States, the 
        District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 
        the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 
        American Samoa, Guam, the United States Virgin Islands, 
        and any other territory or possession of the United 
        States.
          (17) United states person.--The term ``United States 
        person'' means--
                  (A) a natural person who is a citizen of the 
                United States or who owes permanent allegiance 
                to the United States; and
                  (B) a corporation or other legal entity which 
                is organized under the laws of the United 
                States, any State or territory thereof, or the 
                District of Columbia, if natural persons 
                described in subparagraph (A) own, directly or 
                indirectly, more than 50 percent of the 
                outstanding capital stock or other beneficial 
                interest in such legal entity.

             4. Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992

Partial text of Public Law 102-484 [National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 1993; H.R. 5006], 106 Stat. 2315, approved October 23, 
                            1992, as amended

        TITLE XVI--IRAN-IRAQ ARMS NON-PROLIFERATION ACT OF 1992

SEC. 1601.\1\ SHORT TITLE.

    This title may be cited as the ``Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
Proliferation Act of 1992''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 50 U.S.C. 1701 note. In a September 27, 1994, memorandum for 
the Secretary of State, the President delegated all functions vested in 
the President by this title to the Secretary of State, in consultation 
with the Secretaries of Defense, Treasury, Commerce, the Director of 
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and other heads of appropriate 
departments and agencies (59 F.R. 50685).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 1602. UNITED STATES POLICY.

    (a) In General.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States to oppose, and urgently to seek the agreement of other 
nations also to oppose, any transfer to Iran or Iraq of any 
goods or technology, including dual-use goods or technology, 
wherever that transfer could materially contribute to either 
country's acquiring chemical, biological, nuclear, or 
destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional 
weapons.
    (b) Sanctions.--(1) In the furtherance of this policy, the 
President shall apply sanctions and controls with respect to 
Iran, Iraq, and those nations and persons who assist them in 
acquiring weapons of mass destruction in accordance with the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Act of 1978, the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and 
Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, chapter 7 of the Arms Export 
Control Act,\2\ and other relevant statutes, regarding the non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of 
their delivery.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ For text of chapter 7 of the Arms Export Control Act, see 
section A.2 of this publication.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (2) The President should also urgently seek the agreement 
of other nations to adopt and institute, at the earliest 
practicable date, sanctions and controls comparable to those 
the United States is obligated to apply under this subsection.
    (c) Public Identification.--The Congress calls on the 
President to identify publicly (in the report required by 
section 1607) any country or person that transfers goods or 
technology to Iran or Iraq contrary to the policy set forth in 
subsection (a).

SEC. 1603. APPLICATION TO IRAN OF CERTAIN IRAQ SANCTIONS.

    The sanctions against Iraq specified in paragraphs (1) 
through (4) of section 586G(a) of the Iraq Sanctions Act of 
1990 (as contained in Public Law 101-513),\3\ including denial 
of export licenses for United States persons and prohibitions 
on United States Government sales, shall be applied to the same 
extent and in the same manner with respect to Iran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ For text, see sec. A.7 of this publication.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 1604. SANCTIONS AGAINST CERTAIN PERSONS.

    (a) Prohibition.--If any person transfers or retransfers 
goods or technology so as to contribute knowingly and 
materially to the efforts by Iran or Iraq (or any agency or 
instrumentality of either such country) to acquire chemical, 
biological, or nuclear weapons or \4\ to acquire destabilizing 
numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons, then the 
sanctions described in subsection (b) shall be imposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Sec. 1408(a) of Public Law 104-106 (110 Stat. 494) inserted 
``to acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or'' before ``to 
acquire''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Mandatory Sanctions.--The sanctions to be imposed 
pursuant to subsection (a) are as follows:
          (1) Procurement sanction.--For a period of two years, 
        the United States Government shall not procure, or 
        enter into any contract for the procurement of, any 
        goods or services from the sanctioned person.
          (2) Export sanction.--For a period of two years, the 
        United States Government shall not issue any license 
        for any export by or to the sanctioned person.

SEC. 1605. SANCTIONS AGAINST CERTAIN FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

    (a) Prohibition.--If the President determines that the 
government of any foreign country transfers or retransfers 
goods or technology so as to contribute knowingly and 
materially to the efforts by Iran or Iraq (or any agency or 
instrumentality of either such country) to acquire chemical, 
biological, or nuclear weapons or \5\ to acquire destabilizing 
numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons, then--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Sec. 1408(b) of Public Law 104-106 (110 Stat. 494) inserted 
``to acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or'' before ``to 
acquire''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) the sanctions described in subsection (b) shall 
        be imposed on such country; and
          (2) in addition, the President may apply, in the 
        discretion of the President, the sanction described in 
        subsection (c).
    (b) Mandatory Sanctions.--Except as provided in paragraph 
(2), the sanctions to be imposed pursuant to subsection (a)(1) 
are as follows:
          (1) Suspension of united states assistance.--The 
        United States Government shall suspend, for a period of 
        one year, United States assistance to the sanctioned 
        country.
          (2) Multilateral development bank assistance.--The 
        Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United 
        States Executive Director to each appropriate 
        international financial institution to oppose, and vote 
        against, for a period of one year, the extension by 
        such institution of any loan or financial or technical 
        assistance to the sanctioned country.
          (3) Suspension of codevelopment or coproduction 
        agreements.--The United States shall suspend, for a 
        period of one year, compliance with its obligations 
        under any memorandum of understanding with the 
        sanctioned country for the codevelopment or 
        coproduction of any item on the United States Munitions 
        List (established under section 38 of the Arms Export 
        Control Act), including any obligation for 
        implementation of the memorandum of understanding 
        through the sale to the sanctioned country of technical 
        data or assistance or the licensing for export to the 
        sanctioned country of any component part.
          (4) Suspension of military and dual-use technical 
        exchange agreements.--The United States shall suspend, 
        for a period of one year, compliance with its 
        obligations under any technical exchange agreement 
        involving military and dual-use technology between the 
        United States and the sanctioned country that does not 
        directly contribute to the security of the United 
        States, and no military or dual-use technology may be 
        exported from the United States to the sanctioned 
        country pursuant to that agreement during that period.
          (5) United states munitions list.--No item on the 
        United States Munitions List (established pursuant to 
        section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act) may be 
        exported to the sanctioned country for a period of one 
        year.
    (c) Discretionary Sanction.--The sanction referred to in 
subsection (a)(2) is as follows:
          (1) Use of authorities of international emergency 
        economic powers act.--Except as provided in paragraph 
        (2), the President may exercise, in accordance with the 
        provisions of that Act, the authorities of the 
        International Emergency Economic Powers Act with 
        respect to the sanctioned country.
          (2) Exception.--Paragraph (1) does not apply with 
        respect to urgent humanitarian assistance.

SEC. 1606. WAIVER.

    The President may waive the requirement to impose a 
sanction described in section 1603, in the case of Iran, or a 
sanction described in section 1604(b) or 1605(b), in the case 
of Iraq and Iran, 15 days after the President determines and so 
reports to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign 
Relations of the Senate and the Committees on Armed Services 
and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives \6\ that it 
is essential to the national interest of the United States to 
exercise such waiver authority. Any such report shall provide a 
specific and detailed rationale for such determination.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Sec. 1(a)(1) of Public Law 104-14 (109 Stat. 186) provided that 
references to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
Representatives shall be treated as referring to the Committee on 
National Security of the House of Representatives. Sec. 1(a)(5) of that 
Act provided that references to the Committee on Foreign Affairs shall 
be treated as referring to the Committee on International Relations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 1607. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.

    (a) Annual Report.--Beginning one year after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, and every 12 months thereafter, the 
President shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services and 
Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committees on Armed 
Services and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives 
\6\ a report detailing--
          (1) all transfers or retransfers made by any person 
        or foreign government during the preceding 12-month 
        period which are subject to any sanction under this 
        title; and
          (2) the actions the President intends to undertake or 
        has undertaken pursuant to this title with respect to 
        each such transfer.
    (b) Report on Individual Transfers.--Whenever the President 
determines that a person or foreign government has made a 
transfer which is subject to any sanction under this title, the 
President shall, within 30 days after such transfer, submit to 
the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of the 
Senate and the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Affairs 
of the House of Representatives \6\ a report--
          (1) identifying the person or government and 
        providing the details of the transfer; and
          (2) describing the actions the President intends to 
        undertake or has undertaken under the provisions of 
        this title with respect to each such transfer.
    (c) Form of Transmittal.--Reports required by this section 
may be submitted in classified as well as in unclassified form.

SEC. 1608. DEFINITIONS.

    For purposes of this title:
          (1) The term ``advanced conventional weapons'' 
        includes--
                  (A) such long-range precision-guided 
                munitions, fuel air explosives, cruise 
                missiles, low observability aircraft, other 
                radar evading aircraft, advanced military 
                aircraft, military satellites, electromagnetic 
                weapons, and laser weapons as the President 
                determines destabilize the military balance or 
                enhance offensive capabilities in destabilizing 
                ways;
                  (B) such advanced command, control, and 
                communications systems, electronic warfare 
                systems, or intelligence collection systems as 
                the President determines destabilize the 
                military balance or enhance offensive 
                capabilities in destabilizing ways; and
                  (C) such other items or systems as the 
                President may, by regulation, determine 
                necessary for purposes of this title.
          (2) The term ``cruise missile'' means guided missiles 
        that use aerodynamic lift to offset gravity and 
        propulsion to counteract drag.
          (3) The term ``goods or technology'' means--
                  (A) any article, natural or manmade 
                substance, material, supply, or manufactured 
                product, including inspection and test 
                equipment; and
                  (B) any information and know-how (whether in 
                tangible form, such as models, prototypes, 
                drawings, sketches, diagrams, blueprints, or 
                manuals, or in intangible form, such as 
                training or technical services) that can be 
                used to design, produce, manufacture, utilize, 
                or reconstruct goods, including computer 
                software and technical data.
          (4) The term ``person'' means any United States or 
        foreign individual, partnership, corporation, or other 
        form of association, or any of their successor 
        entities, parents, or subsidiaries.
          (5) The term ``sanctioned country'' means a country 
        against which sanctions are required to be imposed 
        pursuant to section 1605.
          (6) The term ``sanctioned person'' means a person 
        that makes a transfer described in section 1604(a).
          (7) The term ``United States assistance'' means--
                  (A) \7\ any assistance under the Foreign 
                Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et 
                seq.), other than urgent humanitarian 
                assistance or medicine;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Sec. 1408(c) of Public Law 104-106 (110 Stat. 494) amended and 
restated subpara. (A), which formerly read as follows:
    ``(A) any assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 
other than--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          ``(i) urgent humanitarian assistance or medicine, and
          ``(ii) assistance under chapter 11 of part I (as enacted by 
        the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and 
        Open Markets Support Act of 1992);''.
                  (B) sales and assistance under the Arms 
                Export Control Act;
                  (C) financing by the Commodity Credit 
                Corporation for export sales of agricultural 
                commodities; and
                  (D) financing under the Export-Import Bank 
                Act.

   5. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985

   Partial text of Public Law 99-83 [S. 960], 99 Stat. 190, approved 
                       August 8, 1985 as amended

 AN ACT To authorize international development and security assistance 
 programs and Peace Corps programs for fiscal years 1986 and 1987, and 
                          for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
``International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 
1985''.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


   TITLE V--INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND FOREIGN AIRPORT SECURITY \1\

               Part A--International Terrorism Generally

SEC. 501. * * *

SEC. 502. COORDINATION OF ALL UNITED STATES TERRORISM-RELATED 
                    ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

    (a) Coordination.--The Secretary of State shall be 
responsible for coordinating all assistance related to 
international terrorism which is provided by the United States 
Government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ See Section F for the text of legislation on foreign airport 
security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Reports.--Not later than February 1 each year, the 
Secretary of State, in consultation with appropriate United 
States Government agencies, shall report to the appropriate 
committees of the Congress on the assistance related to 
international terrorism which was provided by the United States 
Government during the preceding fiscal year. Such reports may 
be provided on a classified basis to the extent necessary, and 
shall specify the amount and nature of the assistance provided.
    (c) Rule of Construction.--Nothing contained in this 
section shall be construed to limit or impair the authority or 
responsibility of any other Federal agency with respect to law 
enforcement, domestic security operations, or intelligence 
activities as defined in Executive Order 12333.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ For text, see U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International 
Relations. Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1996, (Washington, 
G.P.O., 1997), vol. II, sec. D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 503.\3\ PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES SUPPORTING 
                    INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ Sec. 503(a) amended sec. 620A of the FAA of 1961. Sec. 503(b) 
amended sec. 3(f) of the AECA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 504. PROHIBITION ON IMPORTS FROM AND EXPORTS TO LIBYA.

    (a) Prohibition on Imports.--Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, the President may prohibit any article grown, 
produced, extracted, or manufactured in Libya from being 
imported into the United States.
    (b) Prohibition on Exports.--Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, the President may prohibit any goods or 
technology, including technical data or other information, 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or exported by 
any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, 
from being exported to Libya.
    (c) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the term 
``United States'', when used in a geographical sense, includes 
territories and possessions of the United States.

SEC. 505.\4\ BAN ON IMPORTING GOODS AND SERVICES FROM COUNTRIES 
                    SUPPORTING TERRORISM.

    (a) Authority.--The President may ban the importation into 
the United States of any good or service from any country which 
supports terrorism or terrorist organizations or harbors 
terrorist or terrorist organizations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ 22 U.S.C. 2349aa-9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Consultation.--The President, in every possible 
instance, shall consult with the Congress before exercising the 
authority granted by this section and shall consult regularly 
with the Congress so long as that authority is being exercised.
    (c) Reports.--Whenever the President exercises the 
authority granted by this section, he shall immediately 
transmit to the Congress a report specifying--
          (1) The country with respect to which the authority 
        is to be exercised and the imports to be prohibited;
          (2) the circumstances which necessitate the exercise 
        of such authority;
          (3) why the President believes those circumstances 
        justify the exercise of such authority; and
          (4) why the President believes the prohibitions are 
        necessary to deal with those circumstances.
At least once during each succeeding 6-month period after 
transmitting a report pursuant to this subsection, the 
President shall report to the Congress with respect to the 
actions taken, since the last such report, pursuant to this 
section and with respect to any changes which have occurred 
concerning any information previously furnished pursuant to 
this subsection.
    (d) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the term 
``United States'' includes territories and possessions of the 
United States.

SEC. 506. INTERNATIONAL ANTI-TERRORISM COMMITTEE.

    The Congress calls upon the President to seek the 
establishment of an international committee, to be known as the 
International Anti-Terrorism Committee, consisting of 
representatives of the member countries of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, Japan, and such other countries as may be 
invited and may choose to participate. The purpose of the 
Committee should be to focus the attention and secure the 
cooperation of the governments and the public of the 
participating countries and of other countries on the problems 
and responses to international terrorism, by serving as a forum 
at both the political and law enforcement levels.

SEC. 507. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM CONTROL TREATY.

    It is the sense of the Congress that the President should 
establish a process by which democratic and open societies of 
the world, which are those most plagued by terrorism, negotiate 
a viable treaty to effectively prevent and respond to terrorist 
attacks. Such a treaty should incorporate an operative 
definition of terrorism, and should establish effective close 
intelligence-sharing, joint counterterrorist training, and 
uniform laws on asylum, extradition, and swift punishment for 
perpetrators of terrorism. Parties to such a treaty should 
include, but not be limited to, those democratic nations who 
are most victimized by terrorism.

SEC. 508. STATE TERRORISM.

    It is sense of the Congress that all civilized nations 
should firmly condemn the increasing use of terrorism by 
certain states as an official instrument for promoting their 
policy goals, as evidenced by such examples as the brutal 
assassination of Major Arthur D. Nicholson, Junior, by a member 
of the Soviet armed forces.

                    Part B--Foreign Airport Security

SEC. 551. SECURITY STANDARDS FOR FOREIGN AIR TRANSPORTATION.

    (a) \5\ Security at Foreign Airports.--* * * [Repealed--
1994]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Sec. 7(b) of Public Law 103-272 (108 Stat. 1379) repealed sec. 
551(a) and (b), which enacted an amendment to sec. 1115 of the Federal 
Aviation Act of 1958, and related amendments, concerning security 
standards in foreign air transportation, codified at 49 U.S.C. App. 
1515.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Conforming Amendments.--* * * [Repealed--1994]
    (c) Closing of Beirut International Airport.--It is the 
sense of the Congress that the President is urged and 
encouraged to take all appropriate steps to carry forward his 
announced policy of seeking the effective closing of the 
international airport in Beirut, Lebanon, at least until such 
time as the Government of Lebanon has instituted measures and 
procedures designed to prevent the use of that airport by 
aircraft hijackers and other terrorists in attacking civilian 
airlines or their passengers, hijacking their aircraft, or 
taking or holding their passengers hostage.

SEC. 552.\6\ * * * [Repealed--1994]

SEC. 553.\7\ * * * [Repealed--1994]

SEC. 554. ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION 
                    STANDARDS.

    The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Transportation, 
jointly, shall call on the member countries of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization to enforce that 
Organization's existing standards and to support United States 
actions enforcing such standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Formerly at 49 U.S.C. app. 1515a. Sec. 552, relating to travel 
advisories and suspension of foreign assistance, was repealed by sec. 
7(b) of Public Law 103-272 (108 Stat. 1379).
    \7\ Formerly at 49 U.S.C. app. 1356b. Sec. 553, relating to the 
United States airmarshal program, was repealed by sec. 7(b) of Public 
Law 103-272 (108 Stat. 1379).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 555. INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION BOYCOTT OF COUNTRIES SUPPORTING 
                    INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.

    It is the sense of the Congress that the President--
          (1) should call for an international civil aviation 
        boycott with respect to those countries which the 
        President determines--
                  (A) grant sanctuary from prosecution to any 
                individual or group which has committed an act 
                of international terrorism, or
                  (B) otherwise support international 
                terrorism; and
          (2) should take steps, both bilateral and 
        multilateral, to achieve a total international civil 
        aviation boycott with respect to those countries.

SEC. 556.\8\ * * * [Repealed--1994]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ Formerly 49 U.S.C. app. 1515 note. Sec. 556, relating to 
multilateral and bilateral agreements with respect to aircraft 
sabotage, aircraft hijacking, and airport security, was repealed by 
sec. 7(b) of Public Law 103-272 (108 Stat. 1379).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 557. RESEARCH ON AIRPORT SECURITY TECHNIQUES FOR DETECTING 
                    EXPLOSIVES.

    In order to improve security at international airports, 
there are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of 
Transportation from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (in 
addition to amounts otherwise available for such purpose) 
$5,000,000, without fiscal year limitation, to be used for 
research on and the development of airport security devices or 
techniques for detecting explosives.

SEC. 558. HIJACKING OF TWA FLIGHT 847 AND OTHER ACTS OF TERRORISM.

    The Congress joins with all Americans in celebrating the 
release of the hostages taken from Trans World Airlines flight 
847. It is the sense of the Congress that--
          (1) purser Uli Derickson, pilot John Testrake, co-
        pilot Philip Maresca, flight engineer Benjamin 
        Zimmermann, and the rest of the crew of Trans World 
        Airlines flight 847 displayed extraordinary valor and 
        heroism during the hostages' ordeal and therefore 
        should be commended;
          (2) the hijackers who murdered United States Navy 
        Petty Officer Stethem should be immediately brought to 
        justice;
          (3) all diplomatic means should continue to be 
        employed to obtain the release of the 7 United States 
        citizens previously kidnapped and still held in 
        Lebanon;
          (4) acts of international terrorism should be 
        universally condemned; and
          (5) the Secretary of State should be supported in his 
        efforts to gain international cooperation to prevent 
        future acts of terrorism.

SEC. 559. * * *

                  TITLE XIII--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

SEC. 1301. * * *

SEC. 1302.\9\ CODIFICATION OF POLICY PROHIBITING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE 
                    PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION

    (a) United States Policy.--The United States in 1975 
declared in a memorandum of agreement with Israel, and has 
reaffirmed since, that ``The United States will continue to 
adhere to its present policy with respect to the Palestine 
Liberation Organization, whereby it will not recognize or 
negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization so long as 
the Palestine Liberation Organization does not recognize 
Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338.''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ 22 U.S.C. 2151 note. Sec. 531 of the Foreign Assistance 
Appropriations Act, 1986 (Sec. 101(i) of Public Law 99-190; 99 Stat. 
1307), provided the following:
    ``In reaffirmation of the 1975 memorandum of agreement between the 
United States and Israel, and in accordance with section 1302 of the 
International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (Public 
Law 99-83), no employee of or individual acting on behalf of the United 
States Government shall recognize or negotiate with the Palestine 
Liberation Organization or representatives thereof, so long as the 
Palestine Liberation Organization does not recognize Israel's right to 
exist, does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and 
does not renounce the use of terrorism.''. Sec. 530 of the Foreign 
Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1987 (sec. 101(f) 
of Public Law 99-591; 100 Stat. 3341-231) contained identical language.
    Sec. 527 of the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act 1987 (see. 101(f) of Public Law 99-591; 100 Stat. 
3341-230) provided:
    ``Notwithstanding any other provision of law or this Act, none of 
the funds provided for ``International organizations and programs'' 
shall be available for the United States proportionate share for any 
programs for the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Southwest 
African Peoples Organization, Libya, Iran, or, at the discretion of the 
President, Communist countries listed in section 620(f) of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Reaffirmation and Codification of Policy.--The United 
States hereby reaffirms that policy. In accordance with that 
policy, no officer or employee of the United States Government 
and no agent or other individual acting on behalf of the United 
States Government shall negotiate with the Palestine Liberation 
Organization or any representatives thereof (except in 
emergency or humanitarian situations) unless and until the 
Palestine Liberation Organization recognizes Israel's right to 
exist, accepts United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 
and 338 and renounces the use of terrorism, except that no 
funds authorized to be appropriated by this or any other Act 
may be obligated or made available for the conduct of the 
current dialogue on the Middle East process with any 
representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization if the 
President knows and advises the Congress that the 
representative directly participated in the planning or 
execution of a particular terrorist activity which resulted in 
the death or kidnapping of a United States citizen.
          * * * * * * *

   6. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981

 Partial text of Public Law 97-113 [S. 1196], 95 Stat. 1519, approved 
                     December 29, 1981, as amended

 AN ACT To authorize appropriations for the fiscal years 1982 and 1983 
for international security and development assistance and for the Peace 
 Corps, to establish the Peace Corps as an autonomous agency, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

                              short title

    Section 1. This Act may be cited as the ``International 
Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981''.




           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
                  TITLE VII--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS




           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
   condemnation of libya for its support of international terrorist 
                               movements

    Sec. 718. (a) The Congress condemns the Libyan Government 
for its support of international terrorist movements, its 
efforts to obstruct positive movement toward the peaceful 
resolution of problems in the Middle East region, and its 
actions to destabilize and control governments of neighboring 
states in Africa.
    (b) The Congress believes that the President should conduct 
an immediate review of concrete steps the United States could 
take, individually and in concert with its allies, to bring 
economic and political pressure on Libya to cease such 
activities, and should submit a report on that review to the 
Congress within one hundred and eighty days after the date of 
enactment of this Act. Such a review should include the 
possibility of tariffs on or prohibitions against the import of 
crude oil from Libya.

united states citizens acting in the service of international terrorism

    Sec. 719. (a) It is the sense of the Congress that the 
spread of international terrorism poses a grave and growing 
danger for world peace and for the national security of the 
United States. As a part of its vigorous opposition to the 
activities of international terrorist leaders and the increase 
of international terrorism, the United States should take all 
steps necessary to ensure that no United States citizen is 
acting in the service of terrorism or of the proponents of 
terrorism.
    (b) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                     7. Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990

    Partial text of Public Law 101-513 [Foreign Operations, Export 
 Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1991; H.R. 5114], 
           104 Stat. 1979 at 2047, approved November 5, 1990

AN ACT Making appropriations for foreign operations, export financing, 
and related programs for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1991, and 
                          for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the 
following sums are appropriated, out of any money in the 
Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for foreign operations, 
export financing, and related programs for the fiscal year 
ending September 30, 1991, and for other purposes, namely:

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE V--GENERAL PROVISIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                       iraq sanctions act of 1990

SEC. 586. SHORT TITLE.

  Sections 586 through 586J of this Act may be cited as the 
``Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990''.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 586F. DECLARATIONS REGARDING IRAQ'S LONG-STANDING VIOLATIONS OF 
                    INTERNATIONAL LAW.

  (a) Iraq's Violations of International Law.--The Congress 
determines that--
          (1) the Government of Iraq has demonstrated repeated 
        and blatant disregard for its obligations under 
        international law by violating the Charter of the 
        United Nations, the Protocol for the Prohibition of the 
        Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, 
        and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (done at 
        Geneva, June 17, 1925), as well as other international 
        treaties;
          (2) the Government of Iraq is a party to the 
        International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
        and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
        Cultural Rights and is obligated under the Covenants, 
        as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
        to respect internationally recognized human rights;
          (3) the State Department's Country Reports on Human 
        Rights Practices for 1989 again characterizes Iraq's 
        human rights record as ``abysmal'';
          (4) Amnesty International, Middle East Watch, and 
        other independent human rights organizations have 
        documented extensive, systematic, and continuing human 
        rights abuses by the Government of Iraq, including 
        summary executions, mass political killings, 
        disappearances, widespread use of torture, arbitrary 
        arrests and prolonged detention without trial of 
        thousands of political opponents, forced relocation and 
        deportation, denial of nearly all civil and political 
        rights such as freedom of association, assembly, 
        speech, and the press, and the imprisonment, torture, 
        and execution of children;
          (5) since 1987, the Government of Iraq has 
        intensified its severe repression of the Kurdish 
        minority of Iraq, deliberately destroyed more than 
        3,000 villages and towns in the Kurdish regions, and 
        forcibly expelled more than 500,000 people, thus 
        effectively depopulating the rural areas of Iraqi 
        Kurdistan;
          (6) Iraq has blatantly violated international law by 
        initiating use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq 
        war;
          (7) Iraq has also violated international law by using 
        chemical weapons against its own Kurdish citizens, 
        resulting in tens of thousands of deaths and more than 
        65,000 refugees;
          (8) Iraq continues to expand its chemical weapons 
        capability, and President Saddam Hussein has threatened 
        to use chemical weapons against other nations;
          (9) persuasive evidence exists that Iraq is 
        developing biological weapons in violation of 
        international law;
          (10) there are strong indications that Iraq has taken 
        steps to produce nuclear weapons and has attempted to 
        smuggle from the United States, in violation of United 
        States law, components for triggering devices used in 
        nuclear warheads whose manufacture would contravene the 
        Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to 
        which Iraq is a party; and
          (11) Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has threatened to 
        use terrorism against other nations in violation of 
        international law and has increased Iraq's support for 
        the Palestine Liberation Organization and other 
        Palestinian groups that have conducted terrorist acts.
  (b) Human Rights Violations.-- * * *
  (c) Support for International Terrorism.--(1) The Congress 
determines that Iraq is a country which has repeatedly provided 
support for acts of international terrorism, a country which 
grants sanctuary from prosecution to individuals or groups 
which have committed an act of international terrorism, and a 
country which otherwise supports international terrorism. The 
provisions of law specified in paragraph (2) and all other 
provisions of law that impose sanctions against a country which 
has repeatedly provided support for acts of international 
terrorism, which grants sanctuary from prosecution to an 
individual or group which has committed an act of international 
terrorism, or which otherwise supports international terrorism 
shall be fully enforced against Iraq.
  (2) The provisions of law referred to in paragraph (1) are--
          (A) section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act;
          (B) section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
        1961;
          (C) sections 555 and 556 of this Act (and the 
        corresponding sections of predecessor foreign 
        operations appropriations Acts); and
          (D) section 555 of the International Security and 
        Development Cooperation Act of 1985.
  (d) Multilateral Cooperation.--The Congress calls on the 
President to seek multilateral cooperation--
          (1) to deny dangerous technologies to Iraq;
          (2) to induce Iraq to respect internationally 
        recognized human rights; and
          (3) to induce Iraq to allow appropriate international 
        humanitarian and human rights organizations to have 
        access to Iraq and Kuwait, including the areas in 
        northern Iraq traditionally inhabited by Kurds.

SEC. 586G. SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ.

  (a) Imposition.--Except as provided in section 586H, the 
following sanctions shall apply with respect to Iraq:
          (1) FMS sales.--The United States Government shall 
        not enter into any sale with Iraq under the Arms Export 
        Control Act.
          (2) Commercial arms sales.--Licenses shall not be 
        issued for the export to Iraq of any item on the United 
        States Munitions List.
          (3) Exports of certain goods and technology.--The 
        authorities of section 6 of the Export Administration 
        Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405) shall be used to 
        prohibit the export to Iraq of any goods or technology 
        listed pursuant to that section or section 5(c)(1) of 
        that Act (50 U.S.C. App. 2404(c)(1)) on the control 
        list provided for in section 4(b) of that Act (50 
        U.S.C. App. 2403(b)).
          (4) Nuclear equipment, materials, and technology.--
                  (A) NRC licenses.--The Nuclear Regulatory 
                Commission shall not issue any license or other 
                authorization under the Atomic Energy Act of 
                1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 and following) for the 
                export to Iraq of any source or special nuclear 
                material, any production or utilization 
                facility, any sensitive nuclear technology, any 
                component, item, or substance determined to 
                have significance for nuclear explosive 
                purposes pursuant to section 109b. of the 
                Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2139(b)), 
                or any other material or technology requiring 
                such a license or authorization.
                  (B) Distribution of nuclear materials.--The 
                authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
                shall not be used to distribute any special 
                nuclear material, source material, or byproduct 
                material to Iraq.
                  (C) DOE authorizations.--The Secretary of 
                Energy shall not provide a specific 
                authorization under section 57b. (2) of the 
                Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 
                2077(b)(2)) for any activity that would 
                constitute directly or indirectly engaging in 
                Iraq in activities that require a specific 
                authorization under that section.
          (5) Assistance from international financial 
        institutions.--The United States shall oppose any loan 
        or financial or technical assistance to Iraq by 
        international financial institutions in accordance with 
        section 701 of the International Financial Institutions 
        Act (22 U.S.C. 262d).
          (6) Assistance through the export-import bank.--
        Credits and credit guarantees through the Export-Import 
        Bank of the United States shall be denied to Iraq.
          (7) Assistance through the commodity credit 
        corporation.--Credit, credit guarantees, and other 
        assistance through the Commodity Credit Corporation 
        shall be denied to Iraq.
          (8) Foreign assistance.--All forms of assistance 
        under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
        2151 and following) other than emergency assistance for 
        medical supplies and other forms of emergency 
        humanitarian assistance, and under the Arms Export 
        Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 and following) shall be 
        denied to Iraq.
  (b) Contract Sanctity.--For purposes of the export controls 
imposed pursuant to subsection (a)(3), the date described in 
subsection (m)(1) of section 6 of the Export Administration Act 
of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405) shall be deemed to be August 1, 
1990.

SEC. 586H. WAIVER AUTHORITY.

  (a) In General.--The President may waive the requirements of 
any paragraph of section 586G(a) if the President makes a 
certification under subsection (b) or subsection (c).
  (b) Certification of Fundamental Changes in Iraqi Policies 
and Actions.--The authority of subsection (a) may be exercised 
60 days after the President certifies to the Congress that--
          (1) the Government of Iraq--
                  (A) * * *
                  (B) * * *
                  (C) does not provide support for 
                international terrorism;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) Certification of Fundamental Changes in Iraqi Leadership 
and Policies.--The authority of subsection (a) may be exercised 
30 days after the President certifies to the Congress that--
          (1) there has been a fundamental change in the 
        leadership of the Government of Iraq; and
          (2) the new Government of Iraq has provided reliable 
        and credible assurance that--
                  (A) * * *
                  (B) * * *
                  (C) it is not and will not provide support 
                for international terrorism; and
                  (D) * * *
  (d) Information To Be Included in Certifications.--Any 
certification under subsection (b) or (c) shall include the 
justification for each determination required by that 
subsection. The certification shall also specify which 
paragraphs of section 586G(a) the President will waive pursuant 
to that certification.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


             8. International Narcotics Control Act of 1990

    Partial text of Public Law 101-623 [H.R. 5567], 104 Stat. 3350, 
                       approved November 21, 1990

  AN ACT To authorize international narcotics control activities for 
               fiscal year 1991, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.

  (a) \1\ Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
``International Narcotics Control Act of 1990''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 22 U.S.C. 2151 note.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 2. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS FOR 
                    ANDEAN COUNTRIES.

  (a) * * *
  (b) Administration of Justice Programs.--
          (1) Additional assistance for bolivia, colombia, and 
        peru.-- * * *
          (2) Protection against narco-terrorist attacks.--
        Funds used in accordance with paragraph (1) may be used 
        to provide to Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, 
        notwithstanding section 660 of the Foreign Assistance 
        Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2420; relating to the 
        prohibition on assistance to law enforcement agencies), 
        such assistance as the government of that country may 
        request to provide protection against narco-terrorist 
        attacks on judges, other government officials, and 
        members of the press.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


     9. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
                        Appropriations Act, 1999

  Partial text of section 101(d) of Division A of Public Law 105-277 
         [H.R. 4328], 112 Stat. 2681, approved October 21, 1998

    (d) For programs, projects or activities in the Foreign 
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act, 1999, provided as follows, to be effective 
as if it had been enacted into law as the regular 
appropriations Act:

AN ACT Making appropriations for foreign operations, export financing, 
and related programs for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1999, and 
for other purposes.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                TITLE II--BILATERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

                  Funds Appropriated to the President

    For expenses necessary to enable the President to carry out 
the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and for 
other purposes, to remain available until September 30, 1999, 
unless otherwise specified herein, as follows:

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Department of State

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, demining and related programs

    For necessary expenses for nonproliferation, anti-terrorism 
and related programs and activities, $198,000,000, to carry out 
the provisions of chapter 8 of part II of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 for anti-terrorism assistance, section 
504 of the FREEDOM Support Act for the Nonproliferation and 
Disarmament Fund, section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act or 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for demining activities, the 
clearance of unexploded ordnance, and related activities, 
notwithstanding any other provision of law, including 
activities implemented through nongovernmental and 
international organizations, section 301 of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 for a voluntary contribution to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and a voluntary 
contribution to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development 
Organization (KEDO), and for a United States contribution to 
the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Preparatory 
Commission: Provided, That the Secretary of State shall inform 
the Committees on Appropriations at least twenty days prior to 
the obligation of funds for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty Preparatory Commission: Provided further, That of this 
amount not to exceed $15,000,000, to remain available until 
expended, may be made available for the Nonproliferation and 
Disarmament Fund, notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
to promote bilateral and multilateral activities relating to 
nonproliferation and disarmament: Provided further, That such 
funds may also be used for such countries other than the New 
Independent States of the former Soviet Union and international 
organizations when it is in the national security interest of 
the United States to do so: Provided further, That such funds 
shall be subject to the regular notification procedures of the 
Committees on Appropriations: Provided further, That of the 
funds appropriated under this heading not less than $35,000,000 
should be made available for demining, clearance of unexploded 
ordnance, and related activities: Provided further, That of the 
funds made available for demining and related activities, not 
to exceed $500,000, in addition to funds otherwise available 
for such purposes, may be used for expenses related to the 
operation and management of the demining program: Provided 
further, That funds appropriated under this heading may be made 
available for the International Atomic Energy Agency only if 
the Secretary of State determines (and so reports to the 
Congress) that Israel is not being denied its right to 
participate in the activities of that Agency.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE V--GENERAL PROVISIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


       prohibition on bilateral assistance to terrorist countries

    Sec. 528.\1\ (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, funds appropriated for bilateral assistance under any 
heading of this Act and funds appropriated under any such 
heading in a provision of law enacted prior to enactment of 
this Act, shall not be made available to any country which the 
President determines--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Sec. 576 of the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act, 1988, 
first enacted a ``Prohibition on Bilateral Assistance to Terrorist 
Countries''. Sec. 564 of the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act, 
1990, substantially reworded this prohibition, providing the criteria 
for restriction, and the requirement for Presidential determination and 
waiver.
    See also sec. 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, sec. 40 
of the Arms Export Control Act (this volume), and sec. 6(j) of the 
Export Administration Act (Sec. E, this volume).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) grants sanctuary from prosecution to any 
        individual or group which has committed an act of 
        international terrorism, or
          (2) otherwise supports international terrorism.
    (b) The President may waive the application of subsection 
(a) to a country if the President determines that national 
security or humanitarian reasons justify such waiver. The 
President shall publish each waiver in the Federal Register 
and, at least fifteen days before the waiver takes effect, 
shall notify the Committees on Appropriations of the waiver 
(including the justification for the waiver) in accordance with 
the regular notification procedures of the Committees on 
Appropriations.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                          special authorities

    Sec. 540. (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (d) \2\ (1) Waiver.--The President may waive the provisions 
of section 1003 of Public Law 100-204 if the President 
determines and certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House 
of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate 
that it is important to the national security interests of the 
United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ In a memorandum of November 25, 1998, for the Secretary of 
State, the President ``determine[d] and certif[ied] that it is 
important to the national security interests of the United States to 
waive the provisions of section 1003 of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, 
Public Law 100-204, through May 24, 1999.'' (Presidential Determination 
No. 99-5; 63 F.R. 68145).
    Sec. 3 of the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1993, as 
amended (Public Law 103-125; 107 Stat. 1309), authorized the President 
to suspend certain provisions of law as they applied to the P.L.O. or 
entities associated with it if certain conditions were met and the 
President so certified and consulted with relevant congressional 
committees. This authority was continued in the Middle East Peace 
Facilitation Act of 1994 (part E of Public Law 103-236) and the Middle 
East Peace Facilitation Act of 1995 (title VI of the Foreign 
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 
1996; Public Law 104-107).
    New authority to waive certain provisions was continued in general 
provisions of this Act; see also secs. 552, 556, 566, and 584.
    The President issued such a certification in Presidential 
Determination No. 94-13 of January 14, 1994 (59 F.R. 4777), which was 
extended until January 1, 1995, by Presidential Determination No. 94-30 
of June 30, 1994 (59 F.R. 35607); until July 1, 1995, by Presidential 
Determination No. 95-12 of December 31, 1994 (60 F.R. 2673); until 
August 15, 1995, by Presidential Determination No. 95-31 of July 2, 
1995 (60 F.R. 35827); until October 1, 1995, by Presidential 
Determination No. 95-36 of August 14, 1995 (60 F.R. 44725); until 
November 1, 1995, by Presidential Determination No. 95-50 of September 
30, 1995 (60 F.R. 53093); until December 31, 1995, by Presidential 
Determination No. 96-5 of November 13, 1995 (60 F.R. 57821); until 
March 31, 1996, by Presidential Determination No. 96-8 of January 4, 
1996 (61 F.R. 2889); until June 15, 1996, by Presidential Determination 
No. 96-20 of April 1, 1996 (61 F.R. 26019); until August 12, 1996, by 
Presidential Determination No. 96-32 of June 14, 1996 (61 F.R. 32629); 
until February 12, 1997, by Presidential Determination No. 96-41 of 
August 12, 1996 (61 F.R. 43137); until August 12, 1997, by Presidential 
Determination No. 97-17 of February 21, 1997 (62 F.R. 9903); through 
June 4, 1998, by Presidential Determination No. 98-8 of December 5, 
1997 (62 F.R. 66255); through November 26, 1998, by Presidential 
Determination No. 98-29 of June 3, 1998 (63 F.R. 32711); and through 
May 24, 1999, by Presidential Determination No. 99-5 of November 25, 
1998 (63 F.R. 68145).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (2) Period of Application of Waiver.--Any waiver pursuant 
to paragraph (1) shall be effective for no more than a period 
of six months at a time and shall not apply beyond twelve 
months after enactment of this Act.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                       eligibility for assistance

    Sec. 543.\3\ (a) Assistance Through Nongovernmental 
Organizations.--Restrictions contained in this or any other Act 
with respect to assistance for a country shall not be construed 
to restrict assistance in support of programs of 
nongovernmental organizations from funds appropriated by this 
Act to carry out the provisions of chapters 1, 10, and 11 of 
part I and chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961, and from funds appropriated under the heading 
``Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States'': 
Provided, That the President shall take into consideration, in 
any case in which a restriction on assistance would be 
applicable but for this subsection, whether assistance in 
support of programs of nongovernmental organizations is in the 
national interest of the United States: Provided further, That 
before using the authority of this subsection to furnish 
assistance in support of programs of nongovernmental 
organizations, the President shall notify the Committees on 
Appropriations under the regular notification procedures of 
those committees, including a description of the program to be 
assisted, the assistance to be provided, and the reasons for 
furnishing such assistance: Provided further, That nothing in 
this subsection shall be construed to alter any existing 
statutory prohibitions against abortion or involuntary 
sterilizations contained in this or any other Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Similar language was first enacted in sec. 562 of the Foreign 
Assistance Appropriations Act, 1993.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Public Law 480.--During fiscal year 1999, restrictions 
contained in this or any other Act with respect to assistance 
for a country shall not be construed to restrict assistance 
under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 
1954: Provided, That none of the funds appropriated to carry 
out title I of such Act and made available pursuant to this 
subsection may be obligated or expended except as provided 
through the regular notification procedures of the Committees 
on Appropriations.
    (c) Exception.--This section shall not apply--
          (1) with respect to section 620A of the Foreign 
        Assistance Act or any comparable provision of law 
        prohibiting assistance to countries that support 
        international terrorism; or
          (2) with respect to section 116 of the Foreign 
        Assistance Act of 1961 or any comparable provision of 
        law prohibiting assistance to countries that violate 
        internationally recognized human rights.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


  prohibition on assistance to foreign governments that export lethal 
   military equipment to countries supporting international terrorism

    Sec. 551.\4\ (a) None of the funds appropriated or 
otherwise made available by this Act may be available to any 
foreign government which provides lethal military equipment to 
a country the government of which the Secretary of State has 
determined is a terrorist government for purposes of section 
40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act or any other comparable 
provision of law. The prohibition under this section with 
respect to a foreign government shall terminate 12 months after 
that government ceases to provide such military equipment. This 
section applies with respect to lethal military equipment 
provided under a contract entered into after October 1, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Similar language was first enacted as sec. 573 of the Foreign 
Assistance Appropriations Act, 1994. See also sec. 620A of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Assistance restricted by subsection (a) or any other 
similar provision of law, may be furnished if the President 
determines that furnishing such assistance is important to the 
national interests of the United States.
    (c) Whenever the waiver of subsection (b) is exercised, the 
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report with respect to the furnishing of such 
assistance. Any such report shall include a detailed 
explanation of the assistance estimated to be provided, 
including the estimated dollar amount of such assistance, and 
an explanation of how the assistance furthers United States 
national interests.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                  special debt relief for the poorest

    Sec. 559. (a) \5\ Authority To Reduce Debt.--The President 
may reduce amounts owed to the United States (or any agency of 
the United States) by an eligible country as a result of--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ In a memorandum of July 8, 1996, the President delegated to the 
Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretaries of 
State and Defense, the functions, authorities, and duties conferred on 
the President by sec. 570(a) of this Act, sec. 561(a) of Public Law 
103-306, and any similar subsequent provision of law (61 F.R. 38563).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) guarantees issued under sections 221 and 222 of 
        the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961;
          (2) credits extended or guarantees issued under the 
        Arms Export Control Act; or
          (3) any obligation or portion of such obligation for 
        a Latin American country, to pay for purchases of 
        United States agricultural commodities guaranteed by 
        the Commodity Credit Corporation under export credit 
        guarantee programs authorized pursuant to section 5(f ) 
        of the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act of June 
        29, 1948, as amended, section 4(b) of the Food for 
        Peace Act of 1966, as amended (Public Law 89-808), or 
        section 202 of the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978, as 
        amended (Public Law 95-501).
    (b) Limitations.--
          (1) The authority provided by subsection (a) may be 
        exercised only to implement multilateral official debt 
        relief and referendum agreements, commonly referred to 
        as ``Paris Club Agreed Minutes''.
          (2) The authority provided by subsection (a) may be 
        exercised only in such amounts or to such extent as is 
        provided in advance by appropriations Acts.
          (3) The authority provided by subsection (a) may be 
        exercised only with respect to countries with heavy 
        debt burdens that are eligible to borrow from the 
        International Development Association, but not from the 
        International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
        commonly referred to as ``IDA-only'' countries.
    (c) Conditions.--The authority provided by subsection (a) 
may be exercised only with respect to a country whose 
government--
          (1) does not have an excessive level of military 
        expenditures;
          (2) has not repeatedly provided support for acts of 
        international terrorism;
          (3) is not failing to cooperate on international 
        narcotics control matters;
          (4) (including its military or other security forces) 
        does not engage in a consistent pattern of gross 
        violations of internationally recognized human rights; 
        and
          (5) is not ineligible for assistance because of the 
        application of section 527 of the Foreign Relations 
        Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995.
    (d) Availability of Funds.--The authority provided by 
subsection (a) may be used only with regard to funds 
appropriated by this Act under the heading ``Debt restructuring 
''.
    (e) Certain Prohibitions Inapplicable.--A reduction of debt 
pursuant to subsection (a) shall not be considered assistance 
for purposes of any provision of law limiting assistance to a 
country. The authority provided by subsection (a) may be 
exercised notwithstanding section 620(r) of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                    sense of congress regarding iran

    Sec. 586. (a) The Congress finds that--
          (1) according to the Department of State, Iran 
        continues to support international terrorism, providing 
        training, financing, and weapons to such terrorist 
        groups as Hizballah, Islamic Jihad and Hamas;
          (2) Iran continues to oppose the Arab-Israeli peace 
        process and refuses to recognize Israel's right to 
        exist;
          (3) Iran continues aggressively to seek weapons of 
        mass destruction and the missiles to deliver them;
          (4) it is long-standing United States policy to offer 
        official government-to-government dialogue with the 
        Iranian regime, such offers having been repeatedly 
        rebuffed by Tehran;
          (5) more than a year after the election of President 
        Khatemi, Iranian foreign policy continues to threaten 
        American security and that of our allies in the Middle 
        East; and
          (6) despite repeated offers and tentative steps 
        toward rapprochement with Iran by the Clinton 
        Administration, including a decision to waive sanctions 
        under the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act and the President's 
        veto of the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act, 
        Iran has failed to reciprocate in a meaningful manner.
    (b) Therefore it is the sense of the Congress that--
          (1) the Administration should make no concessions to 
        the Government of Iran unless and until that government 
        moderates its objectionable policies, including taking 
        steps to end its support of international terrorism, 
        opposition to the Middle East peace process, and the 
        development and proliferation of weapons of mass 
        destruction and their means of delivery; and
          (2) there should be no change in United States policy 
        toward Iran until there is credible and sustained 
        evidence of a change in Iranian policies.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                    national commission on terrorism

    Sec. 591. (a) Establishment of National Commission on 
Terrorism.--
          (1) Establishment.--There is established a national 
        commission on terrorism to review counter-terrorism 
        policies regarding the prevention and punishment of 
        international acts of terrorism directed at the United 
        States. The commission shall be known as ``The National 
        Commission on Terrorism''.
          (2) Composition.--The commission shall be composed of 
        10 members appointed as follows:
                  (A) Three members shall be appointed by the 
                Majority Leader of the Senate.
                  (B) Three members shall be appointed by the 
                Speaker of the House of Representatives.
                  (C) Two members shall be appointed by the 
                Minority Leader of the Senate.
                  (D) Two members shall be appointed by the 
                Minority Leader of the House of 
                Representatives.
                  (E) The appointments of the members of the 
                commission should be made no later than 3 
                months after the date of the enactment of this 
                Act.
          (3) Qualifications.--The members should have a 
        knowledge and expertise in matters to be studied by the 
        commission.
          (4) Chair.--The Speaker of the House of 
        Representatives, after consultation with the majority 
        leader of the Senate and the minority leaders of the 
        House of Representatives and the Senate, shall 
        designate one of the members of the Commission to serve 
        as chair of the Commission.
          (5) Period of appointment: vacancies.--Members shall 
        be appointed for the life of the Commission. Any 
        vacancy in the Commission shall be filled in the same 
        manner as the original appointment.
          (6) Security clearances.--All Members of the 
        Commission should hold appropriate security clearances.
    (b) Duties.--
          (1) In general.--The commission shall consider issues 
        relating to international terrorism directed at the 
        United States as follows:
                  (A) Review the laws, regulations, policies, 
                directives, and practices relating to 
                counterterrorism in the prevention and 
                punishment of international terrorism directed 
                towards the United States.
                  (B) Assess the extent to which laws, 
                regulations, policies, directives, and 
                practices relating to counterterrorism have 
                been effective in preventing or punishing 
                international terrorism directed towards the 
                United States. At a minimum, the assessment 
                should include a review of the following:
                          (i) Evidence that terrorist 
                        organizations have established an 
                        infrastructure in the western 
                        hemisphere for the support and conduct 
                        of terrorist activities.
                          (ii) Executive branch efforts to 
                        coordinate counterterrorism activities 
                        among Federal, State, and local 
                        agencies and with other nations to 
                        determine the effectiveness of such 
                        coordination efforts.
                          (iii) Executive branch efforts to 
                        prevent the use of nuclear, biological, 
                        and chemical weapons by terrorists.
                  (C) Recommend changes to counterterrorism 
                policy in preventing and punishing 
                international terrorism directed toward the 
                United States.
          (2) Report.--Not later than 6 months after the date 
        on which the Commission first meets, the Commission 
        shall submit to the President and the Congress a final 
        report of the findings and conclusions of the 
        commission, together with any recommendations.
    (c) Administrative Matters.--
          (1) Meetings.--
                  (A) The commission shall hold its first 
                meeting on a date designated by the Speaker of 
                the House which is not later than 30 days after 
                the date on which all members have been 
                appointed.
                  (B) After the first meeting, the commission 
                shall meet upon the call of the chair.
                  (C) A majority of the members of the 
                commission shall constitute a quorum, but a 
                lesser number may hold meetings.
          (2) Authority of individuals to act for commission.--
        Any member or agent of the commission may, if 
        authorized by the commission, take any action which the 
        commission is authorized to take under this section.
          (3) Powers.--
                  (A) The commission may hold such hearings, 
                sit and act at such times and places, take such 
                testimony, and receive such evidence as the 
                commission considers advisable to carry out its 
                duties.
                  (B) The commission may secure directly from 
                any agency of the Federal Government such 
                information as the commission considers 
                necessary to carry out its duties. Upon the 
                request of the chair of the commission, the 
                head of a department or agency shall furnish 
                the requested information expeditiously to the 
                commission.
                  (C) The commission may use the United States 
                mails in the same manner and under the same 
                conditions as other departments and agencies of 
                the Federal Government.
          (4) Pay and expenses of commission members.--
                  (A) Subject to appropriations, each member of 
                the commission who is not an employee of the 
                government shall be paid at a rate not to 
                exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate 
                of basic pay prescribed for level IV of the 
                Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 
                5, United States Code, for each day (including 
                travel time) during which such member is 
                engaged in performing the duties of the 
                commission.
                  (B) Members and personnel for the commission 
                may travel on aircraft, vehicles, or other 
                conveyances of the Armed Forces of the United 
                States when travel is necessary in the 
                performance of a duty of the commission except 
                when the cost of commercial transportation is 
                less expensive.
                  (C) The members of the commission may be 
                allowed travel expenses, including per diem in 
                lieu of subsistence, at rates authorized for 
                employees of agencies under subchapter I of 
                chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code, 
                while away from their homes or regular places 
                of business in the performance of services for 
                the commission.
                  (D)(i) A member of the commission who is an 
                annuitant otherwise covered by section 8344 or 
                8468 of title 5, United States Code, by reason 
                of membership on the commission shall not be 
                subject to the provisions of such section with 
                respect to membership on the commission.
                  (ii) A member of the commission who is a 
                member or former member of a uniformed service 
                shall not be subject to the provisions of 
                subsections (b) and (c) of section 5532 of such 
                title with respect to membership on the 
                commission.
          (5) Staff and administrative support.--
                  (A) The chairman of the commission may, 
                without regard to civil service laws and 
                regulations, appoint and terminate an executive 
                director and up to three additional staff 
                members as necessary to enable the commission 
                to perform its duties. The chairman of the 
                commission may fix the compensation of the 
                executive director and other personnel without 
                regard to the provisions of chapter 51, and 
                subchapter III of chapter 53, of title 5, 
                United States Code, relating to classification 
                of positions and General Schedule pay rates, 
                except that the rate of pay may not exceed the 
                maximum rate of pay for GS-15 under the General 
                Schedule.
                  (B) Upon the request of the chairman of the 
                commission, the head of any department or 
                agency of the Federal Government may detail, 
                without reimbursement, any personnel of the 
                department or agency to the commission to 
                assist in carrying out its duties. The detail 
                of an employee shall be without interruption or 
                loss of civil service status or privilege.
    (d) Termination of Commission.--The commission shall 
terminate 30 days after the date on which the commission 
submits a final report.
    (e) Funding.--There are authorized to be appropriated such 
sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this 
section.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    sense of congress regarding the trial in the netherlands of the 
         suspects indicted in the bombing of pan am flight 103

    Sec. 596. (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following 
findings:
          (1) On December 21, 1988, 270 people, including 189 
        United States citizens, were killed in a terrorist 
        bombing on Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland.
          (2) Britain and the United States indicted 2 Libyan 
        intelligence agents--Abdel Basset Al-Megrahi and Lamen 
        Khalifa Fhimah--in 1991 and sought their extradition 
        from Libya to the United States or the United Kingdom 
        to stand trial for this heinous terrorist act.
          (3) The United Nations Security Council called for 
        the extradition of the suspects in Security Council 
        Resolution 731 and imposed sanctions on Libya in 
        Security Council Resolutions 748 and 883 because Libyan 
        leader, Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, refused to transfer 
        the suspects to either the United States or the United 
        Kingdom to stand trial.
          (4) The sanctions in Security Council Resolutions 748 
        and 883 include a worldwide ban on Libya's national 
        airline, a ban on flights into and out of Libya by 
        other nations' airlines, a prohibition on supplying 
        arms, airplane parts, and certain oil equipment to 
        Libya, and a freeze on Libyan government funds in other 
        countries.
          (5) Colonel Qadhafi has continually refused to 
        extradite the suspects to either the United States or 
        the United Kingdom and has insisted that he will only 
        transfer the suspects to a third and neutral country to 
        stand trial.
          (6) On August 24, 1998, the United States and the 
        United Kingdom proposed that Colonel Qadhafi transfer 
        the suspects to the Netherlands, where they would stand 
        trial before a Scottish court, under Scottish law, and 
        with a panel of Scottish judges.
          (7) The United States-United Kingdom proposal is 
        consistent with those previously endorsed by the 
        Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab 
        States, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Islamic 
        Conference.
          (8) The United Nations Security Council endorsed the 
        United States-United Kingdom proposal on August 27, 
        1998, in United Nations Security Council Resolution 
        1192.
          (9) The United States Government has stated that this 
        proposal is nonnegotiable and has called on Colonel 
        Qadhafi to respond promptly, positively, and 
        unequivocally to this proposal by ensuring the timely 
        appearance of the two accused individuals in the 
        Netherlands for trial before the Scottish court.
          (10) The United States Government has called on Libya 
        to ensure the production of evidence, including the 
        presence of witnesses before the court, and to comply 
        fully with all the requirements of the United Nations 
        Security Council resolutions.
          (11) Secretary of State Albright has said that the 
        United States will urge a multilateral oil embargo 
        against Libya in the United Nations Security Council if 
        Colonel Muammar Qadhafi does not transfer the suspects 
        to The Netherlands to stand trial.
          (12) The United Nations Security Council will convene 
        on October 30, 1998, to review sanctions imposed on 
        Libya.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
          (1) Colonel Qadhafi should promptly transfer the 
        indicted suspects Abdel Basset Al-Megrahi and Lamen 
        Khalifa Fhimah to The Netherlands to stand trial before 
        the Scottish court;
          (2) the United States Government should remain firm 
        in its commitment not to negotiate with Colonel Qadhafi 
        on any of the details of the proposal approved by the 
        United Nations in United Nations Security Council 
        Resolution 1192; and
          (3) if Colonel Qadhafi does not transfer the indicted 
        suspects Abdel Basset Al-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa 
        Fhimah to The Netherlands by October 29, 1998, the 
        United States Permanent Representative to the United 
        Nations should--
                  (A) introduce a resolution in the United 
                Nations Security Council to impose a 
                multilateral oil embargo against Libya;
                  (B) actively promote adoption of the 
                resolution by the United Nations Security 
                Council; and
                  (C) assure that a vote will occur in the 
                United Nations Security Council on such a 
                resolution.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    This Act may be cited as the ``Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1999''.

           10. Department of Justice Appropriations Act, 1999

Partial text of Public Law 105-277 [Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency 
 Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999; H.R. 4328], 112 Stat. 2681-50, 
approved October 21, 1998

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    Sec. 101. * * *
    (b) For programs, projects or activities in the Departments 
of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999, provided as follows, to be 
effective as if it had been enacted into law as the regular 
appropriations Act:

AN ACT Making appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, 
  and State, the Judiciary, and related agencies for the fiscal year 
           ending September 30, 1999, and for other purposes.

                     TITLE I--DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

                         General Administration

salaries and expenses

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                         counterterrorism fund

    For necessary expenses, as determined by the Attorney 
General, $10,000,000, to remain vailable until expended, to 
reimburse any Department of Justice organization for (1) the 
costs incurred in establishing the operational capability of an 
office or facility which has been damaged or destroyed as a 
result of any domestic or international terrorist incident; (2) 
the costs of providing support to counter, investigate or 
prosecute domestic or international terrorism, including 
payment of rewards in connection with these activities; (3) the 
costs of conducting a terrorism threat assessment of Federal 
agencies and their facilities; (4) the costs associated with 
ensuring the continuance of essential Government functions 
during a time of emergency;and (5) the costs of activities 
related to the protection of the Nation's critical 
infrastructure: Provided, That any Federal agency may be 
reimbursed for the costs of detaining in foreign countries 
individuals accused of acts of terrorism that violate the laws 
of the United States: Provided further, That funds provided 
under this paragraph shall be available only after the Attorney 
General notifies the Committees on Appropriations of the House 
of Representatives and the Senate in accordance with section 
605 of this Act.
    In addition, for necessary expenses, as determined by the 
Attorney General, $135,000,000, to remain available until 
expended, to reimburse or transfer to agencies of the 
Department of Justice for any costs incurred in connection 
with: (1) providing bomb training and response capabilities to 
State and local law enforcement agencies; (2) providing 
training and related equipment for chemical, biological, 
nuclear, and cyber attack prevention and response capabilities 
for States, cities, territories, and local jurisdictions; and 
(3) providing grants, contracts, cooperative agreements, and 
other assistance authorized by sections 819, 821, and 822 of 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: 
Provided, That such funds transferred to the Office of Justice 
Programs may include amounts for management and administration, 
which shall be transferred to and merged with the ``Justice 
Assistance'' account.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                    Federal Bureau of Investigation

                         salaries and expenses

    For necessary expenses of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation for detection, investigation, and prosecution of 
crimes against the United States; including purchase for 
police-type use of not to exceed 2,668 passenger motor 
vehicles, of which 2,000 will be for replacement only, without 
regard to the general purchase price limitation for the current 
fiscal year, and hire of passenger motor vehicles; acquisition, 
lease, maintenance, and operation of aircraft; and not to 
exceed $70,000 to meet unforeseen emergencies of a confidential 
character, to be expended under the direction of, and to be 
accounted for solely under the certificate of, the Attorney 
General, $2,746,805,000; of which not to exceed $50,000,000 for 
automated data processing and telecommunications and technical 
investigative equipment and not to exceed $1,000,000 for 
undercover operations shall remain available until September 
30, 2000; of which not less than $292,473,000 shall be for 
counterterrorism investigations, foreign counterintelligence, 
and other activities related to our national security; of which 
not to exceed $61,800,000 shall remain available until 
expended; of which not to exceed $10,000,000 is authorized to 
be made available for making advances for expenses arising out 
of contractual or reimbursable agreements with State and local 
law enforcement agencies while engaged in cooperative 
activities related to violent crime, terrorism, organized 
crime, and drug investigations; and of which $1,500,000 shall 
be available to maintain an independent program office 
dedicated solely to the automation of fingerprint 
identification services: Provided, That not to exceed $45,000 
shall be available for official reception and representation 
expenses: Provided further, That no funds in this Act may be 
used to provide ballistics imaging equipment to any State or 
local authority which has obtained similar equipment through a 
Federal grant or subsidy unless the State or local authority 
agrees to return that equipment or to repay that grant or 
subsidy to the Federal Government.
    In addition, $223,356,000 for such purposes, to remain 
available until expended, to be derived from the Violent Crime 
Reduction Trust Fund, as authorized by the Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, as amended, and the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Sec. 115. (a)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, for fiscal year 1999, the Attorney General may obligate 
any funds appropriated for or reimbursed to the 
Counterterrorism programs, projects or activities of the 
Department of Justice to purchase or lease equipment or any 
related items, or to acquire interim services, without regard 
to any otherwise applicable Federal acquisition rule, if the 
Attorney General determines that--
          (A) there is an exigent need for the equipment, 
        related items, or services in order to support an 
        ongoing counterterrorism, national security, or 
        computercrime investigation or prosecution;
          (B) the equipment, related items, or services 
        required are not available within the Department of 
        Justice; and
          (C) adherence to that Federal acquisition rule 
        would--
                  (i) delay the timely acquisition of the 
                equipment, related items, or services; and
                  (ii) adversely affect an ongoing 
                counterterrorism, national security, or 
                computercrime investigation or prosecution.
    (2) In this subsection, the term ``Federal acquisition 
rule'' means any provision of title II or IX of the Federal 
Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, the Office of 
Federal Procurement Policy Act, the Small Business Act, the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation, or any other provision of law 
or regulation that establishes policies, procedures, 
requirements, conditions, or restrictions for procurements by 
the head of a department or agency or the Federal Government.
    (b) The Attorney General shall immediately notify the 
Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives 
and the Senate in writing of each expenditure under subsection 
(a), which notification shall include sufficient information to 
explain the circumstances necessitating the exercise of the 
authority under that subsection.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    This title may be cited as the ``Department of Justice 
Appropriations Act, 1999''.

     11. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1999

Title II of division B of Public Law 105-277 [Omnibus Consolidated and 
 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1999; H.R. 
          4328], 112 Stat. 2681-565, approved October 21, 1998

DIVISION B--EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                        TITLE II--ANTITERRORISM

                               CHAPTER 1

                         DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

                    Federal Bureau of Investigation

                         salaries and expenses

    For an additional amount for ``Salaries and Expenses'', 
$21,680,000, to remain available until expended: Provided, That 
the entire amount is designated by the Congress as an emergency 
requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced 
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended.

                          DEPARTMENT OF STATE

                   Administration of Foreign Affairs

                    diplomatic and consular programs

    Notwithstanding section 15 of the State Department Basic 
Authorities Act of 1956, an additional amount for ``Diplomatic 
and Consular Programs'', $773,700,000, to remain available 
until expended, of which $25,700,000 shall be available only to 
the extent that an official budget request that includes the 
designation of the entire amount of the request as an emergency 
requirement as defined in the Balanced Budget and Emergency 
Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended, is transmitted by the 
President to the Congress: Provided, That as determined by the 
Secretary of State, such funds may be used to procure services 
and equipment overseas necessary to improve worldwide security 
and reconstitute embassy operations in Kenya and Tanzania on 
behalf of any other agency: Provided further, That the entire 
amount is designated by the Congress as an emergency 
requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced 
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended.

                         salaries and expenses

    Notwithstanding section 15 of the State Department Basic 
Authorities Act of 1956, an additional amount for ``Salaries 
and Expenses'', $12,000,000, to remain available until 
expended: Provided, That the entire amount is designated by the 
Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 
251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1985, as amended.

                      office of inspector general

    Notwithstanding section 15 of the State Department Basic 
Authorities Act of 1956, an additional amount for ``Office of 
Inspector General'', $1,000,000, to remain available until 
expended: Provided, That the entire amount is designated by the 
Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 
251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1985, as amended.

           security and maintenance of united states missions

    Notwithstanding section 15 of the State Department Basic 
Authorities Act of 1956, an additional amount for ``Security 
and Maintenance of United States Missions'', $627,000,000, to 
remain available until expended; of which $56,000,000 is for 
security projects, relocations, and security equipment on 
behalf of missions of other U.S. Government agencies, which 
amount may be transferred to any appropriation for this 
purpose, to be merged with and available for the same time 
period as the appropriation to which transferred; and of which 
$185,000,000 is for capital improvements or relocation of 
office and residential facilities to improve security, which 
amount shall become available fifteen days after notice thereof 
has been transmitted to the Appropriations Committees of both 
Houses of Congress: Provided, That the entire amount is 
designated by the Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant 
to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency 
Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended.

           emergencies in the diplomatic and consular service

    Notwithstanding section 15 of the State Department Basic 
Authorities Act of 1956, an additional amount for ``Emergencies 
in the Diplomatic and Consular Service'', $10,000,000, to 
remain available until expended: Provided, That the entire 
amount is designated by the Congress as an emergency 
requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced 
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended.

                               CHAPTER 2

                    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE--MILITARY

                       OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE

                Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide

                     (including transfer of funds)

    For an additional amount for ``Operation and Maintenance, 
Defense- Wide'', $358,427,000, to remain available for 
obligation until expended: Provided, That the Secretary of 
Defense may transfer these funds to fiscal year 1999 
appropriations for operation and maintenance; procurement; 
research, development, test and evaluation; and family housing: 
Provided further, That the funds transferred shall be merged 
with and be available for the same purposes and for the same 
time period as the appropriation to which transferred: Provided 
further, That the transfer authority provided under this 
heading is in addition to any other transfer authority 
available to the Department of Defense: Provided further, That 
the entire amount made available under this heading is 
designated by the Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant 
to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency 
Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended: Provided further, That 
the entire amount shall be available only to the extent that an 
official budget request for $358,427,000, that includes 
designation of the entire amount of the request as an emergency 
requirement as defined in the Balanced Budget and Emergency 
Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended, is transmitted by the 
President to the Congress.

                    GENERAL PROVISIONS, THIS CHAPTER

    Sec. 201.\1\ Maintenance and Operation of Equipment. * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Sec. 201 amended sec. 374 of title 10, United States Code. See 
sec. D.1 of this publication for text..
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                     (including transfer of funds)

    Sec. 202. In addition to amounts appropriated or otherwise 
made available in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 
1999, $50,000,000 is hereby appropriated, only to initiate and 
expand activities of the Department of Defense to prevent, 
prepare for, and respond to a terrorist attack in the United 
States involving weapons of mass destruction: Provided, That 
$35,000,000 of the funds made available in this section shall 
be transferred to the following accounts in the specified 
amounts:
          ``National Guard Personnel, Army'', $4,000,000;
          ``National Guard Personnel, Air Force'', $1,000,000;
          ``Operation and Maintenance, Army'', $2,000,000;
          ``Operation and Maintenance, Army National Guard'', 
        $20,000,000; and
          ``Procurement, Defense-Wide'', $8,000,000:
Provided further, That of the funds made available in this 
section, $15,000,000 shall be transferred to ``Research, 
Development, Test and Evaluation, Army'', only to develop and 
support a long term, sustainable Weapons of Mass Destruction 
emergency preparedness training program: Provided further, That 
funds transferred pursuant to this section shall be merged with 
and be available for the same purposes and for the same time 
period as the appropriation to which transferred: Provided 
further, That the transfer authority provided in this section 
is in addition to any other transfer authority available to the 
Department of Defense: Provided further, That the entire amount 
provided in this section is designated by the Congress as an 
emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as 
amended: Provided further, That the entire amount shall be 
available only to the extent that an official budget request 
for $50,000,000, that includes designation of the entire amount 
of the request as an emergency requirement as defined in the 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as 
amended, is transmitted by the President to the Congress.
    Sec. 203. In addition to amounts appropriated or otherwise 
made available in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 
1999, $120,500,000, to remain available for obligation until 
expended, is appropriated to the proper accounts within the 
Department of the Air Force: Provided, That the additional 
amount shall be made available only for the provision of crisis 
response aviation support for critical national security, law 
enforcement and emergency response agencies: Provided further, 
That the entire amount is designated by the Congress as an 
emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as 
amended: Provided further, That the entire amount shall be 
available only to the extent that an official budget request 
for $120,500,000, that includes designation of the entire 
amount of the request as an emergency requirement as defined in 
the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, 
as amended, is transmitted by the President to the Congress: 
Provided further, That the President of the United States shall 
submit to the Congress by March 15, 1999, an interagency 
agreement for the utilization of Department of Defense assets 
to support the crisis response requirements of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation and the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency.

                               CHAPTER 3

                  FUNDS APPROPRIATED TO THE PRESIDENT

                   International Security Assistance

                         economic support fund

                     (including transfer of funds)

    Notwithstanding section 10 of Public Law 91-672, for an 
additional amount for ``Economic Support Fund'' for assistance 
for Kenya and Tanzania, $50,000,000, to remain available until 
September 30, 2000: Provided, That the entire amount is 
designated by the Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant 
to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency 
Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended: Provided further, That 
funds appropriated under this paragraph may be made available 
for administrative costs associated with assistance provided 
under this paragraph: Provided further, That $2,500,000 shall 
be transferred to and merged with ``Operating Expenses of the 
Agency for International Development'' for security and related 
expenses: Provided further, That $1,269,000 shall be 
transferred to and merged with ``Peace Corps'' for security and 
related expenses: Provided further, That the transfers 
authorized in the preceding provisos shall be in addition to 
sums otherwise available for such purposes: Provided further, 
That funds appropriated under this paragraph shall only be 
available through the regular notification procedures of the 
Committees on Appropriations.

    Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs

    Notwithstanding section 15 of the State Department Basic 
Authorities Act of 1956 and section 10 of Public Law 91-672, 
for an additional amount for ``Nonproliferation, Anti-
Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs'' for anti-terrorism 
assistance, $20,000,000, to remain available until September 
30, 2000: Provided, That the entire amount is designated by the 
Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 
251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1985, as amended.

                               CHAPTER 4

                       DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

                         National Park Service

                 operation of the national park system

    For an additional amount for ``Operation of the National 
Park System'' for emergency security related expenses, 
$2,320,000, to remain available until expended: Provided, That 
the entire amount is designated by the Congress as an emergency 
requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced 
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended.

                              construction

    For an additional amount for ``Construction'' for emergency 
security related expenses, $3,680,000, to remain available 
until expended: Provided, That the entire amount is designated 
by the Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 
251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1985, as amended.

                               CHAPTER 5

                        ARCHITECT OF THE CAPITOL

                         Capitol Visitor Center

    For necessary expenses for the planning, engineering, 
design, and construction, as each such milestone is approved by 
the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate, the 
Committee on House Oversight of the House of Representatives, 
the Committees on Appropriations of the House of 
Representatives and of the Senate, and other appropriate 
committees of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, 
of a new facility to provide greater security for all persons 
working in or visiting the United States Capitol and to enhance 
the educational experience of those who have come to learn 
about the Capitol building and Congress, $100,000,000, to be 
supplemented by private funds, which shall remain available 
until expended: Provided, That Section 3709 of the Revised 
Statutes of the United States (41 U.S.C. 5) shall not apply to 
the funds made available under this heading: Provided further, 
That the entire amount is designated by the Congress as an 
emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as 
amended.

                          CAPITOL POLICE BOARD

                         Security Enhancements

    For the Capitol Police Board for security enhancements to 
the Capitol complex, including the buildings and grounds of the 
Library of Congress, $106,782,000, to remain available until 
expended: Provided, That such security enhancements shall be 
carried out in accordance with a plan or plans approved by the 
Committee on House Oversight of the House of Representatives, 
the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate, the 
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, 
and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate: Provided 
further, That the Capitol Police Board shall transfer to the 
Architect of the Capitol such portion of the funds made 
available under this heading as the Architect may require for 
expenses necessary to provide support for the security 
enhancements, subject to the approval of the Committee on 
Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the 
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate: Provided further, 
That the Capitol Police Board shall transfer to the Librarian 
of Congress such portion of the funds made available under this 
heading as the Librarian may require for expenses necessary to 
provide support for the security enhancements, subject to the 
approval of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
Senate: Provided further, That the entire amount is designated 
by the Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 
251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1985, as amended.

                    GENERAL PROVISION, THIS CHAPTER

    The responsibility for design, installation, and 
maintenance of security systems to protect the physical 
security of the buildings and grounds of the Library of 
Congress is transferred from the Architect of the Capitol to 
the Capitol Police Board. Such design, installation, and 
maintenance shall be carried out under the direction of the 
Committee on House Oversight of the House of Representatives 
and the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate, 
and without regard to section 3709 of the Revised Statutes of 
the United States (41 U.S.C. 5). Any alteration to a 
structural, mechanical, or architectural feature of the 
buildings and grounds of the Library of Congress that is 
required for a security system under the preceding sentence may 
be carried out only with the approval of the Architect of the 
Capitol.

                               CHAPTER 6

                      DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

                    Federal Aviation Administration

                        facilities and equipment

                    (airport and airway trust fund)

    For an additional amount for ``Facilities and Equipment'', 
$100,000,000, for necessary expenses for acquisition, 
installation and related activities supporting the deployment 
of bulk and trace explosives detection systems and other 
advanced security equipment at airports in the United States, 
to remain available until September 30, 2001: Provided, That 
the entire amount shall be available only to the extent an 
official budget request for a specific dollar amount that 
includes designation of the entire amount of the request as an 
emergency requirement as defined in the Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended, is 
transmitted by the President to the Congress: Provided further, 
That the entire amount is designated as an emergency 
requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced 
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.

                               CHAPTER 7

                       DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

                Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

                         salaries and expenses

    For an additional amount for ``Salaries and Expenses'', 
$3,548,000, to remain available until expended: Provided, That 
the entire amount is designated by the Congress as an emergency 
requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced 
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended.

                      United States Secret Service

                         salaries and expenses

    For an additional amount for ``Salaries and Expenses'', 
$80,808,000, to remain available until expended: Provided, That 
the entire amount is designated by the Congress as an emergency 
requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced 
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended.

    12. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
                        Appropriations Act, 1997

Partial text of Public Law 104-208 [Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations 
Act, 1997; H.R. 3610], 110 Stat. 3009, approved September 30, 1996

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


         civil liability for acts of state sponsored terrorism

    Sec. 589. (a) an official, employee, or agent of a foreign 
state designated as a state sponsor of terrorism designated 
under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 
while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, 
or agency shall be liable to a United States national or the 
national's legal representative for personal injury or death 
caused by acts of that official, employee, or agent for which 
the courts of the United States may maintain jurisdiction under 
section 1605(a)(7) of title 28, United States Code, for money 
damages which may include economic damages, solatium, pain, and 
suffering, and punitive damages if the acts were among those 
described in section 1605(a)(7).
    (b) Provisions related to statute of limitations and 
limitations on discovery that would apply to an action brought 
under 28 U.S.C. 1605(f) and (g) shall also apply to actions 
brought under this section. No action shall be maintained under 
this action if an official, employee, or agent of the United 
States, while acting within the scope of his or her office, 
employment, or agency would not be liable for such acts if 
carried out within the United States.
    Titles I through V of this Act may be cited as the 
``Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act, 1997''.
=======================================================================




                   B. DEPARTMENT OF STATE LEGISLATION

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

 1. State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, as amended 
    (Public Law 84-885) (partial text)...........................    71
      Title I--Basic Authorities Generally.......................    71
            Section 1--Secretary of State--Coordinator for 
                Counterterrorism.................................    71
            Section 36--Rewards for Information on Terrorism.....    71
            Section 39--Counterterrorism Protection Fund.........    75
            Section 40--Authority to Control Certain Terrorism-
                Related Services.................................    75
            Section 51--Denial of Visas..........................    77
 2. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public 
    Law 104-93) (partial text)...................................    78
      Title III--General Provisions..............................    78
            Section 310--Assistance to Foreign Countries.........    78
      Title VI--Federal Bureau of Investigation..................    78
 3. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1998 and 
    1999 (Public Law 105-277) (partial text).....................    80
      Subtitle B--Foreign Relations Authorization................    80
      Title XX--General Provisions...............................    80
      Chapter 2--Consular Authorities of the Department of State.    80
            Section 2221--Use of Certain Passport Processing Fees 
                for Enhanced Passport Services...................    80
 4. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 
    1995, as amended (Public Law 103-236) (partial text).........    82
      Title I--Department of State and Related Agencies..........    82
            Part B--Authorities and Activities...................    82
                Section 133--Terrorism Rewards and Reports.......    82
                Section 140--Visas...............................    82
      Title V--Foreign Policy....................................    83
            Part A--General Provisions...........................    83
                Section 517--Sense of the Senate on the 
                  Establishment of an International Criminal 
                  Court..........................................    83
                Section 518--International Criminal Court 
                  Participation..................................    84
            Part B--Spoils of War Act............................    85
                Section 516--Short Title.........................    85
                Section 553--Prohibition on Transfers to 
                  Countries which Support Terrorism..............    85
 5. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 
    1993, as amended (Public Law 102-138) (partial text).........    86
      Title III--Miscellaneous Foreign Policy Provisions.........    86
            Part A--Foreign Policy Provisions....................    86
                Section 304--Report on Terrorist Assets in the 
                  United States..................................    86
 6. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 
    1989, as amended (Public Law 100-204) (partial text).........    87
      Title I--The Department of State...........................    87
            Part B--Department of State Authorities and 
                Activities.......................................    87
                Section 140--Annual Country Reports on Terrorism.    87
 7. Department of State and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 
    1999 (Public Law 105-277) (partial text).....................    90
      Title IV--Department of State and Related Agencies.........    90
            Diplomatic and Consular Programs.....................    90
 8. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1999 
    (Public Law 105-277) (partial text)..........................    91
      Title II--Antiterrorism....................................    91
            Chapter 1--Department of State Administration of 
                Foreign Affairs..................................    91
                Diplomatic and Consular Programs.................    91
 9. Hostage Relief Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-449)...............    93

=======================================================================

           1. State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956

Public Law 84-885 [S. 2569], 70 Stat. 890, approved August 1, 1956, as 
                                amended

 AN ACT To provide certain basic authority for the Department of State.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this 
Act may be cited as the ``State Department Basic Authorities 
Act of 1956''.

                  TITLE I--BASIC AUTHORITIES GENERALLY

                organization of the department of state

    Section 1. (a) Secretary of State.--

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (f)\1\ Coordinator for Counterterrorism.--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Sec. (f) was added by Sec. 2301(a) of Public Law 105-277 (112 
Stat. 2681-824)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (1) In general.--There is within the office of the 
Secretary of State a Coordinator for Counterterrorism (in this 
paragraph referred to as the `Coordinator') who shall be 
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent 
of the Senate.
    (2) Duties.--
          (A) In general.--The Coordinator shall perform such 
        duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary of 
        State shall prescribe.
          (B) Duties described.--The principal duty of the 
        Coordinator shall be the overall supervision (including 
        policy oversight of resources) of international 
        counterterrorism activities. The Coordinator shall be 
        the principal adviser to the Secretary of State on 
        international counterterrorism matters. The Coordinator 
        shall be the principal counterterrorism official within 
        the senior management of the Department of State and 
        shall report directly to the Secretary of State.
    (3) Rank and status of ambassador.--The Coordinator shall 
have the rank and status of Ambassador at Large.''.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 36.\2\ DEPARTMENT OF STATE REWARDS PROGRAM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ 22 U.S.C. 2708. Sec 36 was added by sec. 102 of Public Law 98-
533 (98 Stat. 2708). It was subsequently amended by Public Law 100-690 
(102 Stat. 4287); by Public Law 103-236 (108 Stat. 519); by Public Law 
104-134 (110 Stat. 1321-45); In 1998, sec. 36 was amended both by sec. 
2202 of Public Law 105-277 (112 Stat. 2681-805) and subsequently by 
sec. 101 of Public Law 105-323 (112 Stat. 3029).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (a) Establishment.--
          (1) In general.--There is established a program for 
        the payment of rewards to carry out the purposes of 
        this section.
          (2) Purpose.--The rewards program shall be designed 
        to assist in the prevention of acts of international 
        terrorism, international narcotics trafficking, and 
        other related criminal acts.
          (3) Implementation.--The rewards program shall be 
        administered by the Secretary of State, in 
        consultation, as appropriate, with the Attorney 
        General.
    (b) Rewards Authorized.--In the sole discretion of the 
Secretary (except as provided in subsection (c)(2)) and in 
consultation, as appropriate, with the Attorney General, the 
Secretary may pay a reward to any individual who furnishes 
information leading to--
          (1) the arrest or conviction in any country of any 
        individual for the commission of an act of 
        international terrorism against a United States person 
        or United States property;
          (2) the arrest or conviction in any country of any 
        individual conspiring or attempting to commit an act of 
        international terrorism against a United States person 
        or United States property;
          (3) the arrest or conviction in any country of any 
        individual for committing, primarily outside the 
        territorial jurisdiction of the United States, any 
        narcotics-related offense if that offense involves or 
        is a significant part of conduct that involves--
                  (A) a violation of United States narcotics 
                laws such that the individual would be a major 
                violator of such laws;
                  (B) the killing or kidnapping of--
                          (i) any officer, employee, or 
                        contract employee of the United States 
                        Government while such individual is 
                        engaged in official duties, or on 
                        account of that individual's official 
                        duties, in connection with the 
                        enforcement of United States narcotics 
                        laws or the implementing of United 
                        States narcotics control objectives; or
                          (ii) a member of the immediate family 
                        of any such individual on account of 
                        that individual's official duties, in 
                        connection with the enforcement of 
                        United States narcotics laws or the 
                        implementing of United States narcotics 
                        control objectives; or
                  (C) an attempt or conspiracy to commit any 
                act described in subparagraph (A) or (B);
          (4) the arrest or conviction in any country of any 
        individual aiding or abetting in the commission of an 
        act described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3); or
          (5) the prevention, frustration, or favorable 
        resolution of an act described in paragraph (1), (2), 
        or (3).
    (c) Coordination.--
          (1) Procedures.--To ensure that the payment of 
        rewards pursuant to this section does not duplicate or 
        interfere with the payment of informants or the 
        obtaining of evidence or information, as authorized to 
        the Department of Justice, the offering, 
        administration, and payment of rewards under this 
        section, including procedures for--
                  (A) identifying individuals, organizations, 
                and offenses with respect to which rewards will 
                be offered;
                  (B) the publication of rewards;
                  (C) the offering of joint rewards with 
                foreign governments;
                  (D) the receipt and analysis of data; and
                  (E) the payment and approval of payment, 
                shall be governed by procedures developed by 
                the Secretary of State, in consultation with 
                the Attorney General.
          (2) Prior approval of attorney general required.--
        Before making a reward under this section in a matter 
        over which there is Federal criminal jurisdiction, the 
        Secretary of State shall obtain the concurrence of the 
        Attorney General.
    (d) Funding.--
          (1) Authorization of appropriations.--Notwithstanding 
        section 102 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
        Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987 (Public Law 99-93; 99 Stat. 
        408), but subject to paragraph (2), there are 
        authorized to be appropriated to the Department of 
        State from time to time such amounts as may be 
        necessary to carry out this section.
          (2) Limitation.--No amount of funds may be 
        appropriated under paragraph (1) which, when added to 
        the unobligated balance of amounts previously 
        appropriated to carry out this section, would cause 
        such amounts to exceed $15,000,000.
          (3) Allocation of funds.--To the maximum extent 
        practicable, funds made available to carry out this 
        section should be distributed equally for the purpose 
        of preventing acts of international terrorism and for 
        the purpose of preventing international narcotics 
        trafficking.
          (4) Period of availability.--Amounts appropriated 
        under paragraph (1) shall remain available until 
        expended.
    (e) Limitations and Certification.--
          (1) Maximum amount.--No reward paid under this 
        section may exceed $2,000,000.
          (2) Approval.--A reward under this section of more 
        than $100,000 may not be made without the approval of 
        the Secretary.
          (3) Certification for payment.--Any reward granted 
        under this section shall be approved and certified for 
        payment by the Secretary.
          (4) Nondelegation of authority.--The authority to 
        approve rewards of more than $100,000 set forth in 
        paragraph (2) may not be delegated.
          (5) Protection measures.--If the Secretary determines 
        that the identity of the recipient of a reward or of 
        the members of the recipient's immediate family must be 
        protected, the Secretary may take such measures in 
        connection with the payment of the reward as he 
        considers necessary to effect such protection.
    (f) Ineligibility.--An officer or employee of any entity of 
Federal, State, or local government or of a foreign government 
who, while in the performance of his or her official duties, 
furnishes information described in subsection (b) shall not be 
eligible for a reward under this section.
    (g) Reports.--
          (1) Reports on payment of rewards.--Not later than 30 
        days after the payment of any reward under this 
        section, the Secretary shall submit a report to the 
        appropriate congressional committees with respect to 
        such reward. The report, which may be submitted in 
        classified form if necessary, shall specify the amount 
        of the reward paid, to whom the reward was paid, and 
        the acts with respect to which the reward was paid. The 
        report shall also discuss the significance of the 
        information for which the reward was paid in dealing 
        with those acts.
          (2) Annual reports.--Not later than 60 days after the 
        end of each fiscal year, the Secretary shall submit a 
        report to the appropriate congressional committees with 
        respect to the operation of the rewards program. The 
        report shall provide information on the total amounts 
        expended during the fiscal year ending in that year to 
        carry out this section, including amounts expended to 
        publicize the availability of rewards.
    (h) Publication Regarding Rewards Offered by Foreign 
Governments.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
section, in the sole discretion of the Secretary, the resources 
of the rewards program shall be available for the publication 
of rewards offered by foreign governments regarding acts of 
international terrorism which do not involve United States 
persons or property or a violation of the narcotics laws of the 
United States.
    (i) Determinations of the Secretary.--A determination made 
by the Secretary under this section shall be final and 
conclusive and shall not be subject to judicial review.
    (j) Definitions.--As used in this section:
          (1) Act of international terrorism.--The term `act of 
        international terrorism' includes--
                  (A) any act substantially contributing to the 
                acquisition of unsafeguarded special nuclear 
                material (as defined in paragraph (8) of 
                section 830 of the Nuclear Proliferation 
                Prevention Act of 1994 (22 U.S.C. 3201 note)) 
                or any nuclear explosive device (as defined in 
                paragraph (4) of that section) by an 
                individual, group, or non-nuclear-weapon state 
                (as defined in paragraph (5) of that section); 
                and
                  (B) any act, as determined by the Secretary, 
                which materially supports the conduct of 
                international terrorism, including the 
                counterfeiting of United States currency or the 
                illegal use of other monetary instruments by an 
                individual, group, or country supporting 
                international terrorism as determined for 
                purposes of section 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export 
                Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 
                2405(j)(1)(A)).
          (2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        `appropriate congressional committees' means the 
        Committee on International Relations of the House of 
        Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations 
        of the Senate.
          (3) Member of the immediate family.--The term `member 
        of the immediate family', with respect to an 
        individual, includes--
                  (A) a spouse, parent, brother, sister, or 
                child of the individual;
                  (B) a person with respect to whom the 
                individual stands in loco parentis; and
                  (C) any person not covered by subparagraph 
                (A) or (B) who is living in the individual's 
                household and is related to the individual by 
                blood or marriage.
          (4) Rewards program.--The term `rewards program' 
        means the program established in subsection (a)(1).
          (5) United states narcotics laws.--The term `United 
        States narcotics laws' means the laws of the United 
        States for the prevention and control of illicit 
        trafficking in controlled substances (as such term is 
        defined in section 102(6) of the Controlled Substances 
        Act (21 U.S.C. 802(6))).
          (6) United states person.--The term `United States 
        person' means--
                  (A) a citizen or national of the United 
                States; and
                  (B) an alien lawfully present in the United 
                States.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                    counterterrorism protection fund

    Sec. 39.\3\ (a) Authority.--The Secretary of State may 
reimburse domestic and foreign persons, agencies, or 
governments for the protection of judges or other persons who 
provide assistance or information relating to terrorist 
incidents primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States. Before making a payment under this section in a 
matter over which there is Federal criminal jurisdiction, the 
Secretary shall advise and consult with the Attorney General.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ 22 U.S.C. 2711. Sec. 39 was added by sec. 504(2) of Public Law 
99-399 (100 Stat. 871).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
to be appropriated to the Secretary of State for 
``Administration of Foreign Affairs'' $1,000,000 for fiscal 
year 1986 and $1,000,000 for fiscal year 1987 for use in 
reimbursing persons, agencies, or governments under this 
section.
    (c) Designation of Fund.--Amounts made available under this 
section may be referred to as the ``Counterterrorism Protection 
Fund''.

        authority to control certain terrorism-related services

    Sec. 40.\4\ (a) Authority.--The Secretary of State may, by 
regulation, impose controls on the provisions of the services 
described in subsection (b) if the Secretary determines that 
provision of such services would aid and abet international 
terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ 22 U.S.C. 2712. Sec. 40 was added by sec. 506(2) of Public Law 
99-399 (100 Stat. 872).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Services Subject to Control.--The services subject to 
control under subsection (a) are the following:
          (1) Serving in or with the security forces of a 
        designated foreign government.
          (2) Providing training or other technical services 
        having a direct military, law enforcement, or 
        intelligence application, to or for the security forces 
        of a designated foreign government.
Any regulations issued to impose controls on services described 
in paragraph (2) shall list the specific types of training and 
other services subject to the controls.
    (c) Persons Subject of Controls.--These services may be 
controlled under subsection (a) when they are provided within 
the United States by any individual or entity and when they are 
provided anywhere in the world by a United States person.
    (d) Licenses.--In carrying out subsection (a), the 
Secretary of State may require licenses, which may be revoked, 
suspended, or amended, without prior notice, whenever such 
action is deemed to be advisable.
    (e) Definitions.--
          (1) Designated foreign government.--As used in this 
        section, the term ``designated foreign government' 
        means a foreign government that the Secretary of State 
        has determined, for purposes of section 6(j)(1) of the 
        Export Administration Act of 1979, has repeatedly 
        provided support for acts of international terrorism.
          (2) Security forces.--As used in this section, the 
        term ``security forces'' means any military or 
        paramilitary forces, any police or other law 
        enforcement agency (including any police or other law 
        enforcement agency at the regional or local level), and 
        any intelligence agency of a foreign government.
          (3) United states.--As used in this section, the term 
        ``United States'' includes any State, the District of 
        Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the 
        Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any 
        territory or possession of the United States.
          (4) United states person.--As used in this section, 
        the term ``United States person'' means any United 
        States national, any permanent resident alien, and any 
        sole proprietorship, partnership, company, association, 
        or corporation organized under the laws of or having 
        its principal place of business within the United 
        States.
    (f) Violations.--
          (1) Penalties.--Whoever willfully violates any 
        regulation issued under this section shall be fined not 
        more than $100,000 or five times the total compensation 
        received for the conduct which constitutes the 
        violation, whichever is greater, or imprisoned for not 
        more than ten years, or both, for each such offense.
          (2) Investigations.--The Attorney General and the 
        Secretary of the Treasury shall have authority to 
        investigate violations of regulations issued under this 
        section.
    (g) Congressional Oversight.--
          (1) Review of regulations.--Not less than 30 days 
        before issuing any regulations under this section 
        (including any amendment thereto), the Secretary of 
        State shall transmit the proposed regulations to the 
        Congress.
          (2) Reports.--Not less than once every six months, 
        the Secretary of State shall report to the Congress 
        concerning the number and character of licenses granted 
        and denied during the previous reporting period, and 
        such other information as the Secretary may find to be 
        relevant to the accomplishment of the objectives of 
        this section.
  (h) Relationship to Other Laws.--The authority granted by 
this section is in addition to the authorities granted by any 
other provision of law.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                          denial of visas \5\

  Sec. 51.\5\ (a) Report to Congress.--The Secretary shall 
report, on a timely basis, to the appropriate committees of the 
Congress each time a consular post denies a visa on the grounds 
of terrorist activities or foreign policy. Such report shall 
set forth the name and nationality of each such person and a 
factual statement of the basis for such denial.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ 22 U.S.C. 2723. Sec. 127(a) of the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-138; 105 
Stat. 660), added sec. 51. See also sec. 128 of that Act, relating to 
visa lookout systems.
    Functions vested in the Secretary of State in this section were 
further delegated to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, in 
consultation with the Under Secretary for Management, by Delegation of 
Authority No. 193, January 7, 1992 (Public Notice 1555; 57 F.R. 2298; 
January 21, 1992).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  (b) Limitation.--Information contained in such report may be 
classified to the extent necessary and shall protect 
intelligence sources and methods.
  (c) Appropriate Committees.--For the purposes of this section 
the term ``appropriate committees of the Congress'' means the 
Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
\6\ of the House of Representatives and the Committee on the 
Judiciary and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Sec. 1(a)(5) of Public Law 104-14 (109 Stat. 186) provided that 
references to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives shall be treated as referring to the Committee on 
International Relations of the House of Representatives.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


         2. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996

 Public Law 104-93 [H.R. 1665], 109 Stat. 961, approved January 6, 1996

      AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1996 for 
 intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States 
     Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
  Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this 
Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1996''.

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996''.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 310. ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

    Notwithstanding any other provision of law, funds 
authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be used to 
provide assistance to a foreign country for counterterrorism 
efforts if--
          (1) such assistance is provided for the purpose of 
        protecting the property of the United States Government 
        or the life and property of any United States citizen, 
        or furthering the apprehension of any individual 
        involved in any act of terrorism against such property 
        or persons; and
          (2) the Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and 
        the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
        House of Representatives are notified not later than 15 
        days prior to the provision of such assistance.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


               TITLE VI--FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SEC. 601. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION AND CONSUMER REPORTS TO FBI FOR 
                    COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PURPOSES.

    (a) In General.--The Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 
1681 et seq.) is amended by adding after section 623 the 
following new section:``

Sec. 624.\1\ Disclosures to FBI for counterintelligence purposes

    ``(a) Identity of Financial Institutions.--Notwithstanding 
section 604 or any other provision of this title, a consumer 
reporting agency shall furnish to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation the names and addresses of all financial 
institutions (as that term is defined in section 1101 of the 
Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978) at which a consumer 
maintains or has maintained an account, to the extent that 
information is in the files of the agency, when presented with 
a written request for that information, signed by the Director 
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or the Director's 
designee, which certifies compliance with this section. The 
Director or the Director's designee may make such a 
certification only if the Director or the Director's designee 
has determined in writing that--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 15 USC 1681u.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``(1) such information is necessary for the conduct 
        of an authorized foreign counterintelligence 
        investigation; and
          ``(2) there are specific and articulable facts giving 
        reason to believe that the consumer--
                  ``(A) is a foreign power (as defined in 
                section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence 
                Surveillance Act of 1978) or a person who is 
                not a United States person (as defined in such 
                section 101) and is an official of a foreign 
                power; or
                  ``(B) is an agent of a foreign power and is 
                engaging or has engaged in an act of 
                international terrorism (as that term is 
                defined in section 101(c) of the Foreign 
                Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978) or 
                clandestine intelligence activities that 
                involve or may involve a violation of criminal 
                statutes of the United States.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

      ``(c) Court Order for Disclosure of Consumer Reports.--
Notwithstanding section 604 or any other provision of this 
title, if requested in writing by the Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, or a designee of the Director, a court 
may issue an order ex parte directing a consumer reporting 
agency to furnish a consumer report to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, upon a showing in camera that--
          ``(1) the consumer report is necessary for the 
        conduct of an authorized foreign counterintelligence 
        investigation; and
          ``(2) there are specific and articulable facts giving 
        reason to believe that the consumer whose consumer 
        report is sought--
                  ``(A) is an agent of a foreign power, and
                  ``(B) is engaging or has engaged in an act of 
                international terrorism (as that term is 
                defined in section 101(c) of the Foreign 
                Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978) or 
                clandestine intelligence activities that 
                involve or may involve a violation of criminal 
                statutes of the United States.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


   3. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1998 and 1999

     Partial text of subdivision B of Public Law 105-277 [Omnibus 
Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999; H.R. 
          4328], 112 Stat. 2681-801, approved October 21, 1998

             SUBDIVISION B--FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION

                      TITLE XX--GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 2001.\1\ SHORT TITLE.

    This subdivision may be cited as the ``Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1998 and 1999''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 22 U.S.C. 2651 note.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 2202. REVISION OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE REWARDS PROGRAM.\2\ * * *.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


       CHAPTER 2--CONSULAR AUTHORITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SEC. 2221. USE OF CERTAIN PASSPORT PROCESSING FEES FOR ENHANCED 
                    PASSPORT SERVICES.

    For each of the fiscal years 1998 and 1999, of the fees 
collected for expedited passport processing and deposited to an 
offsetting collection pursuant to title V of the Department of 
State and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 
1995 (Public Law 103-317; 22 U.S.C. 214 note), 30 percent shall 
be available only for enhancing passport services for United 
States citizens, improving the integrity and efficiency of the 
passport issuance process, improving the secure nature of the 
United States passport, investigating passport fraud, and 
deterring entry into the United States by terrorists, drug 
traffickers, or other criminals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Sec. 2202 amends section 36 of the State Department Basic 
Authorities Act of 1956. The text of this amendment can be found at 
sec. B.1 in this volume.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

  TITLE XXIII--ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE; DEPARTMENT OF 
                  STATE PERSONNEL; THE FOREIGN SERVICE

           CHAPTER 1--ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SEC. 2301. COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM.\3\ * * *.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    (b) Technical and Conforming Amendments.--Section 161 of 
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 
1995 (Public Law 103-236) is amended by striking subsection 
(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Sec. 2301 amends section 1 of the State Department Basic 
Authorities Act of 1956. The text of this amendment can be found at 
sec. B.1 in this volume.

   4. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995

Public Law 103-236 [H.R. 2333], 108 Stat. 382, approved April 30, 1994, 
                               as amended

  AN ACT To authorize appropriations for the Department of State, the 
 United States Information Agency, and related agencies, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1.\1\ SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 22 U.S.C. 2651 note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

TITLE I--DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND RELATED AGENCIES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


PART B--AUTHORITIES AND ACTIVITIES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 133. TERRORISM REWARDS AND REPORTS.

    (a) Rewards for Information on Acts of International 
Terrorism in the United States.--
          (1) \2\ * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Para. (1) amended sec. 36 of the State Department Basic 
Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2708).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (2) Notwithstanding section 36(g) of the State 
        Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 
        2708), in addition to amounts otherwise available the 
        Department of State may expend not more than $4,000,000 
        in fiscal years 1994 and 1995 to pay rewards pursuant 
        to section 36(a) of such Act.
    (b) \3\ Annual Reports on Terrorism.--* * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Subsec. (b) amended sec. 140(b)(2) of the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2656f); and 
sec. 304(a) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 
1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-138).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 140. VISAS.

    (a) * * *
    (b) \4\ Automated Visa Lookout System.--Not later than 18 
months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary of State shall implement an upgrade of all overseas 
visa lookout operations to computerized systems with automated 
multiple-name search capabilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ 8 U.S.C. 1182 note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (c) \4\ Processing of Visas for Admission to the United 
States.--
          (1)(A) Beginning 24 months after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, whenever a United States 
        consular officer issues a visa for admission to the 
        United States, that official shall certify, in writing, 
        that a check of the Automated Visa Lookout System, or 
        any other system or list which maintains information 
        about the excludability of aliens under the Immigration 
        and Nationality Act, has been made and that there is no 
        basis under such system for the exclusion of such 
        alien.
          (B) If, at the time an alien applies for an immigrant 
        or nonimmigrant visa, the alien's name is included in 
        the Department of State's visa lookout system and the 
        consular officer to whom the application is made fails 
        to follow the procedures in processing the application 
        required by the inclusion of the alien's name in such 
        system, the consular officer's failure shall be made a 
        matter of record and shall be considered as a serious 
        negative factor in the officer's annual performance 
        evaluation.
          (2) If an alien to whom a visa was issued as a result 
        of a failure described in paragraph (1)(B) is admitted 
        to the United States and there is thereafter probable 
        cause to believe that the alien was a participant in a 
        terrorist act causing serious injury, loss of life, or 
        significant destruction of property in the United 
        States, the Secretary of State shall convene an 
        Accountability Review Board under the authority of 
        title III of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and 
        Antiterrorism Act of 1986.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                        TITLE V--FOREIGN POLICY

PART A--GENERAL PROVISIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 517. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL 
                    CRIMINAL COURT.

    (a) Senate Findings.--The Senate makes the following 
findings:
          (1) The freedom and security of the international 
        community rests on the sanctity of the rule of law.
          (2) The international community is increasingly 
        threatened by unlawful acts such as war crimes, 
        genocide, aggression, crimes against humanity, 
        terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, and 
        other crimes of an international character.
          (3) The prosecution of individuals suspected of 
        carrying out such acts is often impeded by political 
        and legal obstacles such as amnesties, disputes over 
        extradition, differences in the structure and 
        capabilities of national courts, and the lack of 
        uniform guidelines under which to try such individuals.
          (4) The war crimes trials held in the aftermath of 
        World War II at Nuremberg, Germany, and Tokyo, Japan, 
        demonstrated that fair and effective prosecution of war 
        criminals could be carried out in an international 
        forum.
          (5) Since its inception in 1945 the United Nations 
        has sought to build on the precedent established at the 
        Nuremberg and Tokyo trials by establishing a permanent 
        international criminal court with jurisdiction over 
        crimes of an international character.
          (6) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 44/39, 
        adopted on December 4, 1989, called on the 
        International Law Commission to study the feasibility 
        of an international criminal court.
          (7) In the years after passage of that resolution the 
        International Law Commission has taken a number of 
        steps to advance the debate over such a court, 
        including--
                  (A) the provisional adoption of a draft Code 
                of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of 
                Mankind;
                  (B) the creation of a Working Group on an 
                International Criminal Jurisdiction and the 
                formulation by that Working Group of several 
                concrete proposals for the establishment and 
                operation of an international criminal court; 
                and
                  (C) the determination that an international 
                criminal court along the lines of that 
                suggested by the Working Group is feasible and 
                that the logical next step would be to proceed 
                with the formal drafting of a statute for such 
                a court.
          (8) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 47/33, 
        adopted on November 25, 1992, called on the 
        International Law Commission to begin the process of 
        drafting a statute for an international criminal court 
        at its next session.
          (9) Given the developments of recent years, the time 
        is propitious for the United States to lend its support 
        to this effort.
    (b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate 
that--
          (1) the establishment of an international criminal 
        court with jurisdiction over crimes of an international 
        character would greatly strengthen the international 
        rule of law;
          (2) such a court would thereby serve the interests of 
        the United States and the world community; and
          (3) the United States delegation should make every 
        effort to advance this proposal at the United Nations.
    (c) * * *

SEC. 518. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT PARTICIPATION.

    The United States Senate will not consent to the 
ratification of a treaty providing for United States 
participation in an international criminal court with 
jurisdiction over crimes of an international nature which 
permits representatives of any terrorist organization, 
including but not limited to the Palestine Liberation 
Organization, or citizens, nationals or residents of any 
country listed by the Secretary of State under section 6(j) of 
the Export Administration Act of 1979 as having repeatedly 
provided support for acts of international terrorism, to sit in 
judgement \5\ on American citizens.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ As enrolled. Should read ``judgment''.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       PART B--SPOILS OF WAR ACT

SEC. 551.\6\ SHORT TITLE.

    This part may be cited as the ``Spoils of War Act of 
1994''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ 50 U.S.C. 2201 note.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 553.\7\ PROHIBITION ON TRANSFERS TO COUNTRIES WHICH SUPPORT 
                    TERRORISM.

    Spoils of war in the possession, custody, or control of the 
United States may not be transferred to any country determined 
by the Secretary of State, for purposes of section 40 of the 
Arms Export Control Act, to be a nation whose government has 
repeatedly provided support for acts of international 
terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ 50 U.S.C. 2202.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


   5. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993

Partial text of Public Law 102-138 [H.R. 1415], 105 Stat. 647, approved 
                      October 28, 1991, amended by

 AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1992 and 1993 for 
            the Department of State, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1.\1\ SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 22 U.S.C. 2651 note.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

           TITLE III--MISCELLANEOUS FOREIGN POLICY PROVISIONS

PART A--FOREIGN POLICY PROVISIONS  

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 304. REPORT ON TERRORIST ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES.

  (a) Reports to Congress.--Beginning 90 days after the date of 
enactment of this Act and every 365 days thereafter, the 
Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney 
General and appropriate investigative agencies,\2\ shall submit 
to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
Finance of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs \3\ 
and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
Representatives a report describing the nature and extent of 
assets held in the United States by terrorist countries and any 
organization engaged in international terrorism. Each such 
report shall provide a detailed list and description of 
specific assets.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Sec. 133(b)(2)(A) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 396), struck 
out ``Treasury'' and inserted in lieu thereof ``Treasury, in 
consultation with the Attorney General and appropriate investigative 
agencies,''.
    \3\ Sec. 1(a)(5) of Public Law 104-14 (109 Stat. 186) provided that 
references to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives shall be treated as referring to the Committee on 
International Relations of the House of Representatives.
    \4\ Sec. 133(b)(2)(B) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 396), added 
this sentence.
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  (b) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
          (1) the term ``terrorist countries'', refers to 
        countries designated by the Secretary of State under 
        section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act; and
          (2) the term ``international terrorism'' has the 
        meaning given such term in section 140(d) of the 
        Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 
        and 1989.

   6. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989

    Partial text of Public Law 100-204 [H.R. 1777], 101 Stat. 1331, 
                 approved December 22, 1987, as amended

 AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1988 and 1989 for 
  the Department of State, the United States Information Agency, the 
  Voice of America, the Board for International Broadcasting, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1.\1\ SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.

  (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 22 U.S.C. 2651 note.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

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                    TITLE I--THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Part B--Department of State Authorities and Activities

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 140.\2\ ANNUAL COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM.

  (a) Requirement of Annual Country Reports on Terrorism.--The 
Secretary of State shall transmit to the Speaker of the House 
of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate, by April 30 \3\ of each year, a full and complete 
report providing--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ 22 U.S.C. 2656f.
    \3\ Sec. 122 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-246; 104 Stat. 27), struck out 
``March 31'' and inserted in lieu thereof ``April 30''.
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          (1) detailed assessments with respect to each foreign 
        country--
                  (A) in which acts of international terrorism 
                occurred which were, in the opinion of the 
                Secretary, of major significance;
                  (B) about which the Congress was notified 
                during the preceding five years pursuant to 
                section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act 
                of 1979; and
                  (C) which the Secretary determines should be 
                the subject of such report; \4\
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    \4\ Sec. 578(1) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and 
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 (sec. 101(c) of title I of 
the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997; Public Law 104-208; 
110 Stat. 3009), struck out ``and'' at the end of para. (1), struck out 
a period at the end of para. (2) and inserted instead a semicolon, and 
added new paras. (3) and (4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (2) all relevant information about the activities 
        during the preceding year of any terrorist group, and 
        any umbrella group under which such terrorist group 
        falls, known to be responsible for the kidnapping or 
        death of an American citizen during the preceding five 
        years, any terrorist group known to be financed by 
        countries about which Congress was notified during the 
        preceding year pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export 
        Administration Act of 1979, and any other known 
        international terrorist group which the Secretary 
        determines should be the subject of such report; \4\
          (3) \4\ with respect to each foreign country from 
        which the United States Government has sought 
        cooperation during the previous five years in the 
        investigation or prosecution of an act of international 
        terrorism against United States citizens or interests, 
        information on--
                  (A) the extent to which the government of the 
                foreign country is cooperating with the United 
                States Government in apprehending, convicting, 
                and punishing the individual or individuals 
                responsible for the act; and
                  (B) the extent to which the government of the 
                foreign country is cooperating in preventing 
                further acts of terrorism against United States 
                citizens in the foreign country; and
          (4) \4\ with respect to each foreign country from 
        which the United States Government has sought 
        cooperation during the previous five years in the 
        prevention of an act of international terrorism against 
        such citizens or interests, the information described 
        in paragraph (3)(B).
  (b) Provisions To Be Included in Report.--The report required 
under subsection (a) should to the extent feasible include (but 
not be limited to)--
          (1) with respect to subsection (a)(1)--
                  (A) a review of major counterterrorism 
                efforts undertaken by countries which are the 
                subject of such report, including, as 
                appropriate, steps taken in international fora;
                  (B) the response of the judicial system of 
                each country which is the subject of such 
                report with respect to matters relating to 
                terrorism affecting American citizens or 
                facilities, or which have, in the opinion of 
                the Secretary, a significant impact on United 
                States counterterrorism efforts, including 
                responses to extradition requests; and
                  (C) significant support, if any, for 
                international terrorism by each country which 
                is the subject of such report, including (but 
                not limited to)--
                          (i) political and financial support;
                          (ii) diplomatic support through 
                        diplomatic recognition and use of the 
                        diplomatic pouch;
                          (iii) providing sanctuary to 
                        terrorists or terrorist groups; and
                          (iv) the positions (including voting 
                        records) on matters relating to 
                        terrorism in the General Assembly of 
                        the United Nations and other 
                        international bodies and fora of each 
                        country which is the subject of such 
                        report; and
          (2) with respect to subsection (a)(2), any--
                  (A) significant financial support provided by 
                foreign governments to those groups directly, 
                or provided in support of their activities;
                  (B) provisions of significant military or 
                paramilitary training or transfer of weapons by 
                foreign governments to those groups;
                  (C) provision of diplomatic recognition or 
                privileges by foreign governments to those 
                groups;
                  (D) provision by foreign governments of 
                sanctuary from prosecution to these groups or 
                their members responsible for the commission, 
                attempt, or planning of an act of international 
                terrorism; and
                  (E) efforts by the United States to eliminate 
                international financial support provided to 
                those groups directly or provided in support of 
                their activities.
  (c) Classification of Report.--
          (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2),\5\ the 
        report required under subsection (a) shall, to the 
        extent practicable, be submitted in an unclassified 
        form and may be accompanied by a classified appendix.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Sec. 578(2)(A) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and 
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 (sec. 101(c) of title I of 
the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997; Public Law 104-208; 
110 Stat. 3009), struck out ``The report'' in subsec. (c) and inserted 
in lieu thereof ``(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the 
report''. Sec. 578(2)(B) of that Act also indented para. (1).
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          (2) \6\ If the Secretary of State determines that the 
        transmittal of the information with respect to a 
        foreign country under paragraph (3) or (4) of 
        subsection (a) in classified form would make more 
        likely the cooperation of the government of the foreign 
        country as specified in such paragraph, the Secretary 
        may transmit the information under such paragraph in 
        classified form.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Sec. 578(2)(C) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and 
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 (sec. 101(c) of title I of 
the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997; Public Law 104-208; 
110 Stat. 3009), added para. (2).
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  (d) Definitions.--As used in this section--
          (1) the term ``international terrorism'' means 
        terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more 
        than 1 country;
          (2) the term ``terrorism'' means premeditated, 
        politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
        noncombatant targets by subnational groups or 
        clandestine agents; and
          (3) the term ``terrorist group'' means any group 
        practicing, or which has significant subgroups which 
        practice, international terrorism.
  (e) Reporting Period.--
          (1) The report required under subsection (a) shall 
        cover the events of the calendar year preceding the 
        year in which the report is submitted.
          (2) The report required by subsection (a) to be 
        submitted by March 31, 1988, may be submitted no later 
        than August 31, 1988.

  7. Department of State and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999

Partial text of Public Law 105-277 [Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency 
 Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999; H.R. 4328], 112 Stat. 2681-92, 
approved October 21, 1998

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    Sec. 101. * * *
    (b) For programs, projects, or activities in the 
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and 
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999, provided as follows, 
to be effective as if it had been enacted into law as the 
regular appropriations Act:

AN ACT Making appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, 
  and State, the Judiciary, and related agencies for the fiscal year 
ending September 30, 1999, and for other purposes.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


           TITLE IV--DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND RELATED AGENCIES

                          DEPARTMENT OF STATE

                   Administration of Foreign Affairs

                    diplomatic and consular programs

    For necessary expenses of the Department of State and the 
Foreign Service not otherwise provided for, including expenses 
authorized by the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 
1956, as amended; representation to certain international 
organizations in which the United States participates pursuant 
to treaties, ratified pursuant to the advice and consent of the 
Senate, or specific Acts of Congress; acquisition by exchange 
or purchase of passenger motor vehicles as authorized by 31 
U.S.C. 1343, 40 U.S.C. 481(c), and 22 U.S.C. 2674; and for 
expenses of general administration, $1,644,300,000: Provided, 
That, of the amount made available under this heading, not to 
exceed $4,000,000 may be transferred to, and merged with, funds 
in the ``Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Service'' 
appropriations account, to be available only for emergency 
evacuations and terrorism rewards: * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


     8. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1999

 Partial text of Title II of division B of Public Law 105-277 [Omnibus 
 Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal 
  Year 1999; H.R. 4328], 112 Stat. 2681-565, approved October 21, 1998

DIVISION B--EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                        TITLE II--ANTITERRORISM

CHAPTER 1

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                          DEPARTMENT OF STATE

                   Administration of Foreign Affairs

                    diplomatic and consular programs

    Notwithstanding section 15 of the State Department Basic 
Authorities Act of 1956, an additional amount for ``Diplomatic 
and Consular Programs'', $773,700,000, to remain available 
until expended, of which $25,700,000 shall be available only to 
the extent that an official budget request that includes the 
designation of the entire amount of the request as an emergency 
requirement as defined in the Balanced Budget and Emergency 
Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended, is transmitted by the 
President to the Congress: Provided, That as determined by the 
Secretary of State, such funds may be used to procure services 
and equipment overseas necessary to improve worldwide security 
and reconstitute embassy operations in Kenya and Tanzania on 
behalf of any other agency: Provided further, That the entire 
amount is designated by the Congress as an emergency 
requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced 
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended.

                         salaries and expenses

    Notwithstanding section 15 of the State Department Basic 
Authorities Act of 1956, an additional amount for ``Salaries 
and Expenses'', $12,000,000, to remain available until 
expended: Provided, That the entire amount is designated by the 
Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 
251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1985, as amended.

                      office of inspector general

    Notwithstanding section 15 of the State Department Basic 
Authorities Act of 1956, an additional amount for ``Office of 
Inspector General'', $1,000,000, to remain available until 
expended: Provided, That the entire amount is designated by the 
Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 
251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1985, as amended.

           security and maintenance of united states missions

    Notwithstanding section 15 of the State Department Basic 
Authorities Act of 1956, an additional amount for ``Security 
and Maintenance of United States Missions'', $627,000,000, to 
remain available until expended; of which $56,000,000 is for 
security projects, relocations, and security equipment on 
behalf of missions of other U.S. Government agencies, which 
amount may be transferred to any appropriation for this 
purpose, to be merged with and available for the same time 
period as the appropriation to which transferred; and of which 
$185,000,000 is for capital improvements or relocation of 
office and residential facilities to improve security, which 
amount shall become available fifteen days after notice thereof 
has been transmitted to the Appropriations Committees of both 
Houses of Congress: Provided, That the entire amount is 
designated by the Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant 
to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency 
Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended.

           emergencies in the diplomatic and consular service

    Notwithstanding section 15 of the State Department Basic 
Authorities Act of 1956, an additional amount for ``Emergencies 
in the Diplomatic and Consular Service'', $10,000,000, to 
remain available until expended: Provided, That the entire 
amount is designated by the Congress as an emergency 
requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced 
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended.

                   9. Hostage Relief Act of 1980 \1\

Public Law 96-449 [H.R. 7085], 94 Stat. 1967, approved October 14, 1980

AN ACT To provide certain benefits to individuals held hostage in Iran 
     and to similarly situated individuals, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this 
Act may be cited as the ``Hostage Relief Act of 1980''.

                  TITLE I--SPECIAL PERSONNEL BENEFITS

                              definitions

    Sec. 101. For purposes of this title--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 5 U.S.C. 5561 note. See also sec. 599C of the Foreign 
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 
1991 (Public Law 101-513; 104 Stat. 2064), as amended by sec. 302 of 
Public Law 102-138 (105 Stat. 707), and further amended by sec. 5 of 
Public Law 102-499 (106 Stat. 3266), relating to benefits for U.S. 
hostages in Iraq and Kuwait and U.S. hostages captured in Lebanon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) The term ``American hostage'' means any 
        individual who, while--
                  (A) in the civil service or the uniformed 
                services of the United States, or
                  (B) a citizen or resident alien of the United 
                States rendering personal service to the United 
                States abroad similar to the service of a civil 
                officer or employee of the United States (as 
                determined by the Secretary of State),
        is placed in a captive status during the hostage 
        period.
          (2) The term ``hostage period'' means the period 
        beginning on November 4, 1979, and ending on the later 
        of--
                  (A) the date the President specifies, by 
                Executive order, as the date on which all 
                citizens and resident aliens of the United 
                States who were placed in a captive status due 
                to the seizure of the United States Embassy in 
                Iran have been returned to the United States or 
                otherwise accounted for, or
                  (B) January 1, 1983.
          (3) The term ``family member'', when used with 
        respect to any American hostage, means--
                  (A) any dependent (as defined in section 5561 
                of title 5, United States Code) of such 
                hostage; and
                  (B) any member of the hostage's family or 
                household (as determined under regulations 
                which the Secretary of State shall prescribe).
          (4) The term ``captive status'' means a missing 
        status arising because of a hostile action abroad--
                  (A) which is directed against the United 
                States during the hostage period; and
                  (B) which is identified by the Secretary of 
                State in the Federal Register.
          (5) The term ``missing status''--
                  (A) in the case of employees, has the meaning 
                given it in section 5561(5) of title 5, United 
                States Code;
                  (B) in the case of members of the uniformed 
                services, has the meaning given it in section 
                551(2) of title 37, United States Code; and
                  (C) in the case of other individuals, has a 
                similar meaning as that provided under such 
                sections, as determined by the Secretary of 
                State.
          (6) The terms ``pay and allowances'', ``employee'', 
        and ``agency'' have the meanings given to such terms in 
        section 5561 of title 5, United States Code, and the 
        terms ``civil service'', ``uniformed services'', and 
        ``armed forces'' have the meanings given to such terms 
        in section 2101 of such title 5.

       pay and allowances may be allotted to special savings fund

    Sec. 102. (a) The Secretary of the Treasury shall establish 
a savings fund to which the head of an agency may allot all or 
any portion of the pay and allowances of any American hostage 
which are for pay periods during which the American hostage is 
in a captive status and which are not subject to an allotment 
under section 5563 of title 5, United States Code, under 
section 553 of title 37, United States Code, or under any other 
provision of law.
    (b) Amounts so allotted to the savings fund shall bear 
interest at a rate which, for any calendar quarter, shall be 
equal to the average rate paid on United States Treasury bills 
with three-month maturities issued during the preceding 
calendar quarter. Such interest shall be compounded quarterly.
    (c) Amounts may be allotted to the savings fund from pay 
and allowances for any pay period ending after November 4, 
1979, and before the establishment of the savings fund. 
Interest on amounts allotted from the pay and allowances for 
any such pay period shall be calculated as if the allotment had 
occurred at the end of the pay period.
    (d) Amounts in the savings fund credited to any American 
hostage shall be considered as pay and allowances for purposes 
of section 5563 of title 5, United States Code (or in the case 
of a member of the uniformed services, for purposes of section 
553 of title 37, United States Code) and shall otherwise be 
subject to withdrawal under procedures which the Secretary of 
the Treasury shall establish.

              medical and health care and related expenses

    Sec. 103. Under regulations prescribed by the President, 
the head of an agency may pay (by advancement or reimbursement) 
any individual who is an American hostage, or any family member 
of such an individual, for medical and health care, and other 
expenses related to such care, to the extent such care--
          (1) is incident to that individual being an American 
        hostage; and
          (2) is not covered by insurance.

                         education and training

    Sec. 104. (a)(1) Under regulations prescribed by the 
President, the head of an agency shall pay (by advancement or 
reimbursement) a spouse or child of an American hostage for 
expenses incurred for subsistence, tuition, fees, supplies, 
books, and equipment, and other educational expenses, while 
attending an educational or training institution.
    (2) Except as provided in paragraph (3), payments shall be 
available under this subsection for a spouse or child of an 
individual who is an American hostage for education or training 
which occurs--
          (A) after the nineteenth day after the date the 
        individual is placed in a captive status, and
          (B) on or before--
                  (i) the end of any semester or quarter (as 
                appropriate) which begins before the date on 
                which the hostage ceases to be in a captive 
                status, or
                  (ii) if the educational or training 
                institution is not operated on a semester or 
                quarter system, the earlier of the end of any 
                course which began before such date or the end 
                of the twelve-week period following that date.
In order to respond to special circumstances, the President may 
specify a date for purposes of cessation of assistance under 
subparagraph (B) which is later than the date which would 
otherwise apply under subparagraph (B).
    (3) In the event an American hostage dies and the death is 
incident to that individual being an American hostage, payments 
shall be available under this subsection for a spouse or child 
of an individual who is an American hostage for education or 
training which occurs after the date of death.
    (4) The preceding provisions of this subsection shall not 
apply with respect to any spouse or child who is eligible for 
assistance under chapter 35 of title 38, United States Code.
    (b)(1) In order to respond to special circumstances, the 
head of an agency may, under regulations prescribed by the 
President, pay (by advancement or reimbursement) an American 
hostage for expenses incurred for subsistence, tuition, fees, 
supplies, books, and equipment, and other educational expenses, 
while attending an educational or training institution.
    (2) Payments shall be available under this subsection for 
an American hostage for education or training which occurs--
          (A) after the termination of such hostages' captive 
        status, and
          (B) on or before--
                  (i) the end of any semester or quarter (as 
                appropriate) which begins before the date which 
                is 10 years after the day on which the hostage 
                ceases to be in a captive status, or
                  (ii) if the educational or training 
                institution is not operated on a semester or 
                quarter system, the earlier of the end of any 
                course which began before such date or the end 
                of the twelve-week period following that date.
    (c) Assistance under this section shall be discontinued for 
any individual whose conduct or progress is unsatisfactory 
under standards consistent with those established pursuant to 
section 1724 of title 38, United States Code.
    (d) In no event may assistance be provided under this 
section for any individual for a period in excess of forty-five 
months (or the equivalent thereof in part-time education or 
training).
    (e) Regulations prescribed by the President under this 
section shall provide that the program under this section be 
consistent with the assistance program under chapters 35 and 36 
of title 38, United States Code.

  extension of applicability of certain benefits of the soldiers' and 
                   sailors' civil relief act of 1940

    Sec. 105. (a) Under regulations prescribed by the 
President, an American hostage is entitled to the benefits 
provided by the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 
(50 U.S.C. App. 501 et seq.), including the benefits provided 
by section 701 (50 U.S.C. App. 591) but excluding the benefits 
provided by sections 104, 105, 106, 400 through 408, 501 
through 512, and 514 (50 U.S.C. App. 514, 515, 516, 540 through 
548, 561 through 572, and 574).
    (b) In applying such Act for purposes of this section--
          (1) the term ``person in the military service'' is 
        deemed to include any such American hostage;
          (2) the term ``period of military service'' is deemed 
        to include the period during which such American 
        hostage is in a captive status; and
          (3) references to the Secretary of the Army, the 
        Secretary of the Navy, the Adjutant General of the 
        Army, the Chief of Naval Personnel, and the Commandant, 
        United States Marine Corps, are deemed to be references 
        to the Secretary of State.
    (c) The preceding provisions of this section shall not 
apply with respect to any American hostage covered by such 
provisions of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 
1940 by reason of being in the Armed Forces.

                   applicability to colombian hostage

    Sec. 106. Notwithstanding the requirements of section 
101(1), for purposes of this title, Richard Starr of Edmonds, 
Washington, who, as a Peace Corps volunteer, was held captive 
in Colombia and released on or about February 10, 1980, shall 
be held and considered to be an American hostage placed in a 
captive status on November 4, 1979.

                             effective date

    Sec. 107. The preceding provisions of this title shall take 
effect as of November 4, 1979.

                        TITLE II--TAX PROVISIONS

                compensation excluded from gross income

    Sec. 201. For purposes of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986,\2\ the gross income of an individual who was at any time 
an American hostage does not include compensation from the 
United States received for any month during any part of which 
such individual was--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Sec. 2 of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-514; 100 
Stat. 2095) struck out ``Internal Revenue Code of 1954'' and inserted 
in lieu thereof ``Internal Revenue Code of 1986'', wherever it is cited 
in any law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) in captive status, or
          (2) hospitalized as a result of such individual's 
        captive status.

    income taxes of hostage where death results from captive status

    Sec. 202. (a) General Rule.--In the case of an individual 
who was at any time an American hostage and who dies as a 
result of injury or disease or physical or mental disability 
incurred or aggravated while such individual was in captive 
status--
          (1) any tax imposed by subtitle A of the Internal 
        Revenue Code of 1986 \2\ shall not apply with respect 
        to--
                  (A) the taxable year in which falls the date 
                of such individual's death, or
                  (B) any prior taxable year ending on or after 
                the first day such individual was in captive 
                status, and
          (2) any tax imposed under such subtitle A for taxable 
        years preceding those specified in paragraph (1) which 
        is unpaid at the date of such individual's death 
        (including interest, additions to the tax, and 
        additional amounts)--
                  (A) shall not be assessed,
                  (B) if assessed, the assessment shall be 
                abated, and
                  (C) if collected, shall be credited or 
                refunded as an overpayment.
    (b) Death Must Occur Within 2 Years of Cessation of Captive 
Status.--This section shall not apply unless the death of the 
individual occurs within 2 years after such individual ceases 
to be in captive status.

                      spouse may file joint return

    Sec. 203. (a) General Rule.--If an individual is an 
American hostage who is in captive status, such individual's 
spouse may elect to file a joint return under section 6013(a) 
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 \2\ for any taxable year--
          (1) which begins on or before the day which is 2 
        years after the date on which the hostage period ends, 
        and
          (2) for which such spouse is otherwise entitled to 
        file such a joint return.
    (b) Certain Rules Made Applicable.--For purposes of 
subsection (a), paragraphs (2) and (4) of section 6013(f) of 
such Code (relating to joint return where individual is in 
missing status) shall apply as if the election described in 
subsection (a) of this section were an election described in 
paragraph (1) of such section 6013(f).

 time for performing certain acts postponed by reason of captive status

    Sec. 204. (a) General Rule.--In the case of any individual 
who was at any time an American hostage, any period during 
which he was in captive status (and any period during which he 
was outside the United States and hospitalized as a result of 
captive status), and the next 180 days thereafter, shall be 
disregarded in determining, under the internal revenue laws, in 
respect of any tax liability (including any interest, penalty, 
additional amount, or addition to the tax) of such individual--
          (1) whether any of the acts specified in paragraph 
        (1) of section 7508(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
        1986 \2\ was performed within the time prescribed 
        therefor, and
          (2) the amount of any credit or refund (including 
        interest).
    (b) Application to Spouse.--The provisions of this section 
shall apply to the spouse of any individual entitled to the 
benefits of subsection (a). The preceding sentence shall not 
cause this section to apply to any spouse for any taxable year 
beginning more than 2 years after the date on which the hostage 
period ends.
    (c) Section 7508(d) Made Applicable.--Subsection (d) of 
section 7508 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 \2\ shall 
apply to subsection (a) in the same manner as if the benefits 
of subsection (a) were provided by subsection (a) of such 
section 7508.

                     definitions and special rules

    Sec. 205. (a) American Hostage.--For purposes of this 
title, the term ``American hostage'' means any individual who, 
while--
          (1) in the civil service or the uniformed services of 
        the United States, or
          (2) a citizen or resident alien of the United States 
        rendering personal service to the United States abroad 
        similar to the service of a civil officer or employee 
        of the United States (as determined by the Secretary of 
        State),
is placed in a captive status during the hostage period.
    (b) Hostage Period.--For purposes of this title, the term 
``hostage period'' means the period beginning on November 4, 
1979, and ending on whichever of the following dates is the 
earlier:
          (1) the date the President specifies, by Executive 
        order, as the date on which all citizens and resident 
        aliens of the United States who were placed in a 
        captive status due to the seizure of the United States 
        Embassy in Iran have been returned to the United States 
        or otherwise accounted for, or
          (2) December 31, 1981.
    (c) Captive Status.--For purposes of this title--
          (1) In general.--The term ``captive status'' means a 
        missing status arising because of a hostile action 
        abroad--
                  (A) which is directed against the United 
                States during the hostage period, and
                  (B) which is identified by the Secretary of 
                State in the Federal Register.
          (2) Missing status defined.--The term ``missing 
        status''--
                  (A) in the case of employees, has the meaning 
                given it in section 5561(5) of title 5, United 
                States Code,
                  (B) in the case of members of the uniformed 
                services, has the meaning given it in section 
                551(2) of title 37, United States Code, and
                  (C) in the case of other individuals, has a 
                similar meaning as that provided under such 
                sections, as determined by the Secretary of 
                State.
          For purposes of the preceding sentence, the term 
        ``employee'' has the meaning given to such term by 
        section 5561(2) of title 5, United States Code.
    (d) Hospitalized as a Result of Captive Status.--
          (1) In general.--For purposes of this title, an 
        individual shall be treated as hospitalized as a result 
        of captive status if such individual is hospitalized as 
        a result of injury or disease or physical or mental 
        disability incurred or aggravated while such individual 
        was in captive status.
          (2) 2-year limit.--Hospitalization shall be taken 
        into account for purposes of paragraph (1) only if it 
        is hospitalization--
                  (A) occurring on or before the day which is 2 
                years after the date on which the individual's 
                captive status ends (or, if earlier, the date 
                on which the hostage period ends), or
                  (B) which is part of a continuous period of 
                hospitalization which began on or before the 
                day determined under subparagraph (A).
    (e) Civil Service; Uniformed Services.--For purposes of 
this section, the terms ``civil service'' and ``uniformed 
services'' have the meanings given to such terms by section 
2101 of title 5, United States Code.
    (f) Application of Title to All Tehran Hostages.--In the 
case of any citizen or resident alien of the United States who 
is determined by the Secretary of State to have been held 
hostage in Tehran at any time during November 1979, for 
purposes of this title--
          (1) such individual shall be treated as an American 
        hostage whether or not such individual meets the 
        requirements of paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a), 
        and
          (2) if such individual was not in the civil service 
        or the uniformed services of the United States--
                  (A) section 201 shall be applied by 
                substituting ``earned income (as defined in 
                section 911(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
                1986) \2\ attributable to'' for ``compensation 
                from the United States received for'', and
                  (B) the amount excluded from gross income 
                under section 201 for any month shall not 
                exceed the monthly equivalent of the annual 
                rate of basic pay payable for level V of the 
                Executive Schedule.
    (g) Application of Title to Individual Held Captive in 
Colombia.--For purposes of this title, Richard Starr of 
Edmonds, Washington, who, as a Peace Corps volunteer, was held 
captive in Colombia, shall be treated as an American hostage 
who was in captive status beginning on November 4, 1979, and 
ending on February 10, 1980.
    (h) Special Rules.--
          (1) Compensation.--For purposes of this title, the 
        term ``compensation'' shall not include any amount 
        received as an annuity or as retirement pay.
          (2) Wage withholding.--Any amount excluded from gross 
        income under section 201 shall not be treated as wages 
        for purposes of chapter 24 of the Internal Revenue Code 
        of 1986.\2\

                   study of tax treatment of hostages

    Sec. 206. (a) Study.--The Chief of Staff of the Joint 
Committee on Taxation shall study all aspects of the tax 
treatment of citizens and resident aliens of the United States 
who are taken hostage or are otherwise placed in a missing 
status.
    (b) Report.--The Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on 
Taxation shall, before July 1, 1981, report the results of the 
study made pursuant to subsection (a) to the Committee on Ways 
and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
Finance of the Senate.

              TITLE III--TREATMENT OF THE HOSTAGES IN IRAN

                 visits by the international red cross

    Sec. 301. (a) The Congress finds that--
          (1) the continued illegal and unjustified detention 
        of the American hostages by the Government of Iran has 
        resulted in the deterioration of relations between the 
        United States and Iran; and
          (2) the protracted length and the conditions of their 
        confinement have reportedly endangered the physical and 
        mental well-being of the hostages.
    (b) Therefore, it is the sense of the Congress that the 
President should make a formal request of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross to--
          (1) make regular and periodic visits to the American 
        hostages being held in Iran for the purpose of 
        determining whether the hostages are being treated in a 
        humane and decent manner and whether they are receiving 
        proper medical attention;
          (2) urge other countries to solicit the cooperation 
        of the Government of Iran in the visits to the hostages 
        by the International Committee of the Red Cross; and
          (3) report to the United States its findings after 
        each such visit.
=======================================================================




          C. ANTITERRORISM AND DIPLOMATIC SECURITY LEGISLATION

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

1. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Public 
    Law 104-132) (partial text)..................................   105
      Title II--Justice for Victims..............................   105
      Title III--International Terrorism Prohibitions............   106
      Title V--Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons 
          Restrictions...........................................   110
      Title VI--Implementation of Plastic Explosives Convention..   115
      Title VII--Criminal Law Modifications to Counter Terrorism.   116
      Title VIII--Assistance to Law Enforcement..................   117
2. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, as 
    amended (Public Law 99-399) (partial text)...................   121
      Title I--Diplomatic Security...............................   123
      Title II--Personnel........................................   127
      Title III--Performance and Accountability..................   128
      Title IV--Diplomatic Security Program......................   132
      Title V--State Department Authorities to Combat 
          International Terrorism................................   139
      Title VI--International Nuclear Terrorism..................   139
      Title VII--Multilateral Cooperation to Combat International 
          Terrorism..............................................   141
      Title VIII--Victims of Terrorism Compensation..............   142
      Title IX--Maritime Security................................   153
      Title XI--Security at Military Bases Abroad................   157
      Title XII--Criminal Punishment of International Terrorism..   158
3. Crimes and Criminal Procedure (Title 18, United States Code) 
    (partial text)...............................................   160
      Part 1--Crimes.............................................   160
            Chapter 1--General provisions........................   160
                Section 7--Special Maritime and Territorial 
                  Jurisdiction of the United States Defined......   160
            Chapter 2--Aircraft and Motor Vehicles...............   161
                Section 32--Destruction of Aircraft or Aircraft 
                  Facilities.....................................   161
                Section 37--Violence at International Airports...   162
            Chapter 7--Assault...................................   163
                Section 112--Protection of Foreign Officials, 
                  Official Guests, and Internationally Protected 
                  Persons........................................   163
            Chapter 10--Biological Weapons.......................   164
                Section 175--Prohibitions with Respect to 
                  Biological Weapons.............................   164
                Section 175a--Requests for Military Assistance to 
                  Enforce Prohibition in Certain Emergencies.....   165
                Section 176--Seizure, Forfeiture, and Destruction   165
                Section 177--Injunctions.........................   165
                Section 178--Definitions.........................   166
            Chapter 39--Explosives and combustibles..............   166
                Section 831--Prohibited Transactions Involving 
                  Nuclear Materials..............................   166
            Chapter 41--Extortion and threats....................   170
                Section 878--Threats and Extortion Against 
                  Foreign Officials, Official Guests, or 
                  Internationally Protected Persons..............   170
            Chapter 44--Firearms.................................   170
                Section 922--Includes Undetectable Firearms Act 
                  of 1988........................................   170
                Section 924--Penalties...........................   171
            Chapter 45--Foreign relations........................   177
                Section 970--Protection of Property Occupied by 
                  Foreign Governments............................   177
            Chapter 51--Homicide.................................   178
                Section 1116--Murder or Manslaughter of Foreign 
                  Officials, Official Guests, or Internationally 
                  Protected Persons..............................   178
                Section 1117--Conspiracy to Murder...............   180
            Chapter 55--Kidnapping...............................   180
                Section 1201--Kidnapping.........................   180
                Section 1203--Hostage Taking.....................   180
            Chapter 75--Passports and Visas......................   182
                Section 1541--Issuance without Authority.........   182
                Section 1542--False Statement in Application and 
                  Use of Passport................................   182
                Section 1543--Forgery or False Use of Passport...   183
                Section 1544--Misuse of Passport.................   183
                Section 1545--Safe Conduct Violation.............   183
                Section 1546--Fraud and Misuse of Visas, Permits, 
                  and Other Documents............................   183
            Chapter 111--Shipping................................   185
                Section 2280--Violence Against Maritime 
                  Navigation.....................................   185
                Section 2281--Violence Against Maritime Fixed 
                  Platforms......................................   187
            Chapter 113B--Terrorism..............................   189
                Section 2331--Definitions........................   189
                Section 2332--Criminal Penalties.................   190
                Section 2332a--Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction   191
                Section 2332b--Acts of Terrorism Transcending 
                  National Boundaries............................   192
                Section 2332c--Use of Chemical Weapons...........   195
                Section 2332d--Financial Transactions............   195
                Section 2332e--Requests for Military Assistance 
                  to Enforce Prohibition in Certain Emergencies..   196
                Section 2333--Civil Remedies.....................   196
                Section 2334--Jurisdiction and Venue.............   196
                Section 2335--Limitation of Actions..............   197
                Section 2336--Other Limitations..................   197
                Section 2337--Suits Against Government Officials.   198
                Section 2338--Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction.....   198
                Section 2339A--Providing Material Support to 
                  Terrorists.....................................   198
                Section 2339B--Providing Material Support or 
                  Resources to Designated Foreign Terrorist 
                  Organizations..................................   198
            Chapter 204--Rewards for Information Concerning 
                Terrorist Acts...................................   202
                Section 3071--Information for Which Rewards 
                  Authorized.....................................   202
                Section 3072--Determination of Entitlement; 
                  Maximum Amount; Presidential Approval; 
                  Conclusiveness.................................   202
                Section 3073--Protection of Identity.............   203
                Section 3074--Exception of Governmental Officials   203
                Section 3075--Authorization for Appropriations...   203
                Section 3076--Eligibility for Witness Security 
                  Program........................................   203
                Section 3077--Definitions........................   203
            Chapter 213--Limitations.............................   204
                Section 3286--Extension of Statute of Limitation 
                  for Certain Terrorism Offenses.................   204
                Section 3291--Nationality, Citizenship and 
                  Passports......................................   205
            Chapter 228--Death sentence..........................   205
                Section 3592--Mitigating and aggravating factors 
                  to be considered in determining whether a 
                  sentence of death is justified; include (c)(9).   205
4. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (Public 
    Law 103-322) (partial text)..................................   209
      Title XI--Terrorism........................................   209
            Section 120004--Sentencing Guidelines Increase for 
                Terrorist Crimes.................................   209
5. Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official 
    Guests of the United States (Public Law 92-539) (partial 
    text)........................................................   210
6. Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989 (Public 
    Law 101-222) (partial text)..................................   211
      Section 10--Self-Defense in Accordance with International 
          Law....................................................   211
7. Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 (Public Law 101-
    298) (partial text)..........................................   212
      Section 2--Purpose and Intent..............................   212
8. 1984 Act To Combat International Terrorism, as amended (Public 
    Law 98-533) (partial text)...................................   213
      Title II--International Cooperation........................   213
      Title III--Security of United States Missions Abroad.......   214
9. Foreign Sovereign Immunities (Title 28, United States Code) 
    (partial text)...............................................   215
      Chapter 85--District Courts; Jurisdiction..................   215
            Section 1330--Actions against Foreign States.........   215
      Chapter 97--Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States....   215

=======================================================================

        1. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

 Partial text of Public Law 104-132 [S. 735], 110 Stat. 1214, approved 
                             April 24, 1996




          Note.--Except for the provisions noted below, the 
        Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
        amends other legislation and has been incorporated into 
        those laws, or consists of legislation not generally 
        related to foreign policy. Complete text of the Act may 
        be found at 110 Stat. 1214.




AN ACT To deter terrorism, provide justice for victims, provide for an 
            effective death penalty, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996''.

SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    The table of contents of this Act is as follows: * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE II--JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


     Subtitle B--Jurisdiction for Lawsuits Against Terrorist States

SEC. 221.\1\ JURISDICTION FOR LAWSUITS AGAINST TERRORIST STATES. * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Sec. 221 amended 28 USC 1605 and 1610, relating to foreign 
sovereign immunity. See Sec. C.9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

             Subtitle C--Assistance to Victims of Terrorism

SEC. 231. SHORT TITLE.

    This subtitle may be cited as the ``Justice for Victims of 
Terrorism Act of 1996''.

SEC. 232. VICTIMS OF TERRORISM ACT.

    (a) Authority To Provide Assistance and Compensation to 
Victims of Terrorism.--The Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (42 
U.S.C. 10601 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 
1404A the following new section:

``SEC. 1404B.\2\ COMPENSATION AND ASSISTANCE TO VICTIMS OF TERRORISM OR 
                    MASS VIOLENCE.

    ``(a) Victims of Acts of Terrorism Outside the United 
States.--The Director \3\ may make supplemental grants as 
provided in section 1404(a) to States to provide compensation 
and assistance to the residents of such States who, while 
outside of the territorial boundaries of the United States, are 
victims of a terrorist act or mass violence and are not persons 
eligible for compensation under title VIII of the Omnibus 
Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ 42 U.S.C. 10603b.
    \3\ Director of the Crime Victims Fund, Department of the Treasury, 
as established by the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (title II of Public 
Law 98-473; 42 U.S.C. 10601 et seq..).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 233. COMPENSATION OF VICTIMS OF TERRORISM.

    (a) * * *
    (b) \4\ Foreign Terrorism.--Section 1403(b)(6)(B) of the 
Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 10602(b)(6)(B)) is 
amended by inserting ``are outside of the United States (if the 
compensable crime is terrorism, as defined in section 2331 of 
title 18, United States Code), or'' before ``are States not 
having''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Sec. 1403(b)(6)(B) of the Victims of Crime Act of 1984, as 
amended, effective April 24, 1997, provides as follows:
    ``Sec. 10602. Crime victim compensation
    ``(b) Eligible crime victim compensation programs
    * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          ``(6) such program provides compensation to residents of the 
        State who are victims of crimes occurring outside the State 
        if--

                  ``(A) the crimes would be compensable crimes had they 
                occurred inside that State; and
                  ``(B) the places the crimes occurred in are outside 
                of the United States (if the compensable crime is 
                terrorism, as defined in section 2331 of title 18, 
                United States Code), or are States not having eligible 
                crime victim compensation programs;''.
    (c) * * *
    (d) Effective Date.--This section and the amendments made 
by this section shall take effect 1 year after the date of 
enactment of this Act.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


            TITLE III--INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM PROHIBITIONS


     Subtitle A--Prohibition on International Terrorist Fundraising


SEC. 301.\5\ FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.

    (a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ 18 U.S.C. 2339B note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) international terrorism is a serious and deadly 
        problem that threatens the vital interests of the 
        United States;
          (2) the Constitution confers upon Congress the power 
        to punish crimes against the law of nations and to 
        carry out the treaty obligations of the United States, 
        and therefore Congress may by law impose penalties 
        relating to the provision of material support to 
        foreign organizations engaged in terrorist activity;
          (3) the power of the United States over immigration 
        and naturalization permits the exclusion from the 
        United States of persons belonging to international 
        terrorist organizations;
          (4) international terrorism affects the interstate 
        and foreign commerce of the United States by harming 
        international trade and market stability, and limiting 
        international travel by United States citizens as well 
        as foreign visitors to the United States;
          (5) international cooperation is required for an 
        effective response to terrorism, as demonstrated by the 
        numerous multilateral conventions in force providing 
        universal prosecutive jurisdiction over persons 
        involved in a variety of terrorist acts, including 
        hostage taking, murder of an internationally protected 
        person, and aircraft piracy and sabotage;
          (6) some foreign terrorist organizations, acting 
        through affiliated groups or individuals, raise 
        significant funds within the United States, or use the 
        United States as a conduit for the receipt of funds 
        raised in other nations; and
          (7) foreign organizations that engage in terrorist 
        activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that 
        any contribution to such an organization facilitates 
        that conduct.
    (b) Purpose.--The purpose of this subtitle is to provide 
the Federal Government the fullest possible basis, consistent 
with the Constitution, to prevent persons within the United 
States, or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, 
from providing material support or resources to foreign 
organizations that engage in terrorist activities.

SEC. 302. DESIGNATION OF FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.

    (a) In General.--Chapter 2 of title II of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1181 et seq.) is amended by 
adding at the end the following: * * * \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Sec. 302 added a new sec. 219 (8 U.S.C. 1189), relating to the 
designation of foreign terrorist organizations, to the Immigration and 
Nationality Act. See Sec. 6.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b)  * * *

SEC. 303. PROHIBITION ON TERRORIST FUNDRAISING.

    (a) In General.--Chapter 113B of title 18, United States 
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new 
section: * * * \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Sec. 303(a) added a new sec. 2339B to 18 U.S.C., relating to 
providing material support or resources to designated foreign terrorist 
organizations; see Sec. 6.1. Subsecs. (b) and (c) made technical 
amendments to 18 U.S.C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b)  * * *
    (c)  * * *

       Subtitle B--Prohibition on Assistance to Terrorist States


SEC. 321. FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS WITH TERRORISTS.

    (a) In General.--Chapter 113B of title 18, United States 
Code, relating to terrorism, is amended by inserting after the 
section 2332c added by section 521 of this Act the following 
new section: * * * \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Sec. 321(a) added a new sec. 2332d to 18 U.S.C., relating to 
financial transactions with terrorists. See Sec. 6.1. Subsec. (b) made 
a technical amendment to the same title.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) * * *
    (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
shall become effective 120 days after the date of enactment of 
this Act.

SEC. 322. FOREIGN AIR TRAVEL SAFETY.

    Section 44906 of title 49, United States Code, is amended 
to read as follows: * * * \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Sec. 322 amended and restated 49 U.S.C. 44906, relating to 
foreign air carrier security programs. See Sec. F.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 323. MODIFICATION OF MATERIAL SUPPORT PROVISION.

    Section 2339A of title 18, United States Code, is amended 
to read as follows: * * * \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Sec. 323 amended and restated 18 U.S.C. 2339A, relating to 
providing material support to terrorists. See Sec. C.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 324.\11\ FINDINGS.

    The Congress finds that--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ 22 U.S.C. 2377 note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) international terrorism is among the most serious 
        transnational threats faced by the United States and 
        its allies, far eclipsing the dangers posed by 
        population growth or pollution;
          (2) the President should continue to make efforts to 
        counter international terrorism a national security 
        priority;
          (3) because the United Nations has been an inadequate 
        forum for the discussion of cooperative, multilateral 
        responses to the threat of international terrorism, the 
        President should undertake immediate efforts to develop 
        effective multilateral responses to international 
        terrorism as a complement to national counter terrorist 
        efforts;
          (4) the President should use all necessary means, 
        including covert action and military force, to disrupt, 
        dismantle, and destroy international infrastructure 
        used by international terrorists, including overseas 
        terrorist training facilities and safe havens;
          (5) the Congress deplores decisions to ease, evade, 
        or end international sanctions on state sponsors of 
        terrorism, including the recent decision by the United 
        Nations Sanctions Committee to allow airline flights to 
        and from Libya despite Libya's noncompliance with 
        United Nations resolutions; and
          (6) the President should continue to undertake 
        efforts to increase the international isolation of 
        state sponsors of international terrorism, including 
        efforts to strengthen international sanctions, and 
        should oppose any future initiatives to ease sanctions 
        on Libya or other state sponsors of terrorism.

SEC. 325. PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES THAT AID TERRORIST 
                    STATES.

    The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 151 et seq.) 
is amended by adding immediately after section 620F the 
following new section: * * * \12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ Sec. 325 added a new sec. 620G to the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2377), relating to a prohibition on assistance to 
countries that aid terrorist states. See Sec. A.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 326. PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES THAT PROVIDE MILITARY 
                    EQUIPMENT TO TERRORIST STATES.

    The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 151 et seq.) 
is amended by adding immediately after section 620G the 
following new section: * * * \13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Sec. 326 added a new sec. 620H to the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2377), relating to a prohibition on assistance to 
countries that provide military equipment to terrorist states. See Sec. 
A.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 327. OPPOSITION TO ASSISTANCE BY INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
                    INSTITUTIONS TO TERRORIST STATES.

    The International Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 
262c et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 1620 the 
following new section: * * * \14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Sec. 327 added a new sec. 1621 to the International Financial 
Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262p-4q), relating to opposition to 
assistance by international financial institutions to terrorist states. 
See Sec. E.9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 328. ANTITERRORISM ASSISTANCE.

    (a) Foreign Assistance Act.--Section 573 of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2349aa-2) is amended--* * * 
\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ See Sec. A.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Assistance to Foreign Countries To Procure Explosives 
Detection Devices and Other Counterterrorism Technology.--(1) 
Subject to section 575(b), up to $3,000,000 in any fiscal year 
may be made available--
          (A) to procure explosives detection devices and other 
        counterterrorism technology; and
          (B) for joint counterterrorism research and 
        development projects on such technology conducted with 
        NATO and major non-NATO allies under the auspices of 
        the Technical Support Working Group of the Department 
        of State.
    (2) As used in this subsection, the term ``major non-NATO 
allies'' means those countries designated as major non-NATO 
allies for purposes of section 2350a(i)(3) of title 10, United 
States Code.
    (c) Assistance to Foreign Countries.--Notwithstanding any 
other provision of law (except section 620A of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961) up to $1,000,000 in assistance may be 
provided to a foreign country for counterterrorism efforts in 
any fiscal year if--
          (1) such assistance is provided for the purpose of 
        protecting the property of the United States Government 
        or the life and property of any United States citizen, 
        or furthering the apprehension of any individual 
        involved in any act of terrorism against such property 
        or persons; and
          (2) the appropriate committees of Congress are 
        notified not later than 15 days prior to the provision 
        of such assistance.

SEC. 329.\16\ DEFINITION OF ASSISTANCE.

    For purposes of this title--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ 22 U.S.C. 2349aa)-10 note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) the term ``assistance'' means assistance to or 
        for the benefit of a government of any country that is 
        provided by grant, concessional sale, guaranty, 
        insurance, or by any other means on terms more 
        favorable than generally available in the applicable 
        market, whether in the form of a loan, lease, credit, 
        debt relief, or otherwise, including subsidies for 
        exports to such country and favorable tariff treatment 
        of articles that are the growth, product, or 
        manufacture of such country; and
          (2) the term ``assistance'' does not include 
        assistance of the type authorized under chapter 9 of 
        part 1 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating 
        to international disaster assistance).

SEC. 330. PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE UNDER ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT FOR 
                    COUNTRIES NOT COOPERATING FULLY WITH UNITED STATES 
                    ANTITERRORISM EFFORTS.

    Chapter 3 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2771 et 
seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following: * * * \17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ Sec. 330 added a new sec. 40A to the Arms Export Control Act 
(22 U.S.C. 2781), relating to transactions with countries not fully 
cooperating with United States antiterrorism efforts. See Sec. A.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      TITLE IV--TERRORIST AND CRIMINAL ALIEN REMOVAL AND EXCLUSION


                Subtitle A--Removal of Alien Terrorists


SEC. 401. ALIEN TERRORIST REMOVAL.

    (a) In General.--The Immigration and Nationality Act is 
amended by adding at the end the following new title: * * * 
\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ Sec. 401(a) added a new title V to the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, relating to alien terrorist removal procedures. See 8 
U.S.C. 1531-1537. Subsec. (b) through (e) made related technical 
amendments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b)-(e) * * *
    (f) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
shall take effect on the date of enactment of this Act and 
shall apply to all aliens without regard to the date of entry 
or attempted entry into the United States.

   Subtitle B--Exclusion of Members and Representatives of Terrorist 
                        Organizations * * * \19\

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Subtitle B made several amendments to the Immigration and 
Nationality Act relating to the exclusion of alien terrorists, denial 
of visas and other relief. See 8 U.S.C. 1182, 1251, 1253, 1254, 1255, 
and 1259.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Subtitle C--Modification to Asylum Procedures * * * \20\

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ Subtitle C made several amendments to the Immigration and 
Nationality Act relating to asylum procedures. See 8 U.S.C. 1105a, 
1158, and 1225.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    TITLE V--NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS RESTRICTIONS


                     Subtitle A--Nuclear Materials


SEC. 501.\21\ FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.

    (a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ 18 U.S.C. 831 note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) nuclear materials, including byproduct materials, 
        can be used to create radioactive dispersal devices 
        that are capable of causing serious bodily injury as 
        well as substantial damage to property and to the 
        environment;
          (2) the potential use of nuclear materials, including 
        byproduct materials, enhances the threat posed by 
        terrorist activities and thereby has a greater effect 
        on the security interests of the United States;
          (3) due to the widespread hazards presented by the 
        threat of nuclear contamination, as well as nuclear 
        bombs, the United States has a strong interest in 
        ensuring that persons who are engaged in the illegal 
        acquisition and use of nuclear materials, including 
        byproduct materials, are prosecuted for their offenses;
          (4) the threat that nuclear materials will be 
        obtained and used by terrorist and other criminal 
        organizations has increased substantially since the 
        enactment in 1982 of the legislation that implemented 
        the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
        Material, codified at section 831 of title 18, United 
        States Code;
          (5) the successful efforts to obtain agreements from 
        other countries to dismantle nuclear weapons have 
        resulted in increased packaging and transportation of 
        nuclear materials, thereby decreasing the security of 
        such materials by increasing the opportunity for 
        unlawful diversion and theft;
          (6) the trafficking in the relatively more common, 
        commercially available, and usable nuclear and 
        byproduct materials creates the potential for 
        significant loss of life and environmental damage;
          (7) report trafficking incidents in the early 1990's 
        suggest that the individuals involved in trafficking in 
        these materials from Eurasia and Eastern Europe 
        frequently conducted their black market sales of these 
        materials within the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
        Baltic States, the former Soviet Union, Central Europe, 
        and to a lesser extent in the Middle European 
        countries;
          (8) the international community has become 
        increasingly concerned over the illegal possession of 
        nuclear and nuclear byproduct materials;
          (9) the potentially disastrous ramifications of 
        increased access to nuclear and nuclear byproduct 
        materials pose such a significant threat that the 
        United States must use all lawful methods available to 
        combat the illegal use of such materials;
          (10) the United States has an interest in encouraging 
        United States corporations to do business in the 
        countries that comprised the former Soviet Union, and 
        in other developing democracies;
          (11) protection of such United States corporations 
        from threats created by the unlawful use of nuclear 
        materials is important to the success of the effort to 
        encourage business ventures in these countries, and to 
        further the foreign relations and commerce of the 
        United States;
          (12) the nature of nuclear contamination is such that 
        it may affect the health, environment, and property of 
        United States nationals even if the acts that 
        constitute the illegal activity occur outside the 
        territory of the United States, and are primarily 
        directed toward foreign nationals; and
          (13) there is presently no Federal criminal statute 
        that provides adequate protection to United States 
        interests from nonweapons grade, yet hazardous 
        radioactive material, and from the illegal diversion of 
        nuclear materials that are held for other than peaceful 
        purposes.
    (b) Purpose.--The purpose of this title is to provide 
Federal law enforcement agencies with the necessary means and 
the maximum authority permissible under the Constitution to 
combat the threat of nuclear contamination and proliferation 
that may result from the illegal possession and use of 
radioactive materials.

SEC. 502. EXPANSION OF SCOPE AND JURISDICTIONAL BASES OF NUCLEAR 
                    MATERIALS PROHIBITIONS.

    Section 831 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--* 
* * \22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ See Sec. C.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 503. REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THEFTS OF EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS FROM 
                    ARMORIES.

    (a) Study.--The Attorney General and the Secretary of 
Defense shall jointly conduct a study of the number and extent 
of thefts from military arsenals (including National Guard 
armories) of firearms, explosives, and other materials that are 
potentially useful to terrorists.
    (b) Report to the Congress.--Not later than 6 months after 
the date of enactment of this Act, the Attorney General and the 
Secretary of Defense shall jointly prepare and transmit to the 
Congress a report on the findings of the study conducted under 
subsection (a).

              Subtitle B--Biological Weapons Restrictions


SEC. 511.\23\ ENHANCED PENALTIES AND CONTROL OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS.

    (a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ 42 U.S.C. 262 note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) certain biological agents have the potential to 
        pose a severe threat to public health and safety;
          (2) such biological agents can be used as weapons by 
        individuals or organizations for the purpose of 
        domestic or international terrorism or for other 
        criminal purposes;
          (3) the transfer and possession of potentially 
        hazardous biological agents should be regulated to 
        protect public health and safety; and
          (4) efforts to protect the public from exposure to 
        such agents should ensure that individuals and groups 
        with legitimate objectives continue to have access to 
        such agents for clinical and research purposes.
    (b) Criminal Enforcement.--Chapter 10 of title 18, United 
States Code, is amended-- * * * \24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ Subsec. (b) amended 18 U.S.C. 175-178. For text, see Sec. C.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (c) Terrorism.--Section 2332a(a) of title 18, United States 
Code,\25\ is amended by inserting ``, including any biological 
agent, toxin, or vector (as those terms are defined in section 
178)'' after ``destruction''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ See Sec. C.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (d) Regulatory Control of Biological Agents.--
          (1) List of biological agents.--
                  (A) In general.--The Secretary shall, through 
                regulations promulgated under subsection (f), 
                establish and maintain a list of each 
                biological agent that has the potential to pose 
                a severe threat to public health and safety.
                  (B) Criteria.--In determining whether to 
                include an agent on the list under subparagraph 
                (A), the Secretary shall--
                          (i) consider--
                                  (I) the effect on human 
                                health of exposure to the 
                                agent;
                                  (II) the degree of 
                                contagiousness of the agent and 
                                the methods by which the agent 
                                is transferred to humans;
                                  (III) the availability and 
                                effectiveness of immunizations 
                                to prevent and treatments for 
                                any illness resulting from 
                                infection by the agent; and
                                  (IV) any other criteria that 
                                the Secretary considers 
                                appropriate; and
                          (ii) consult with scientific experts 
                        representing appropriate professional 
                        groups.
    (e) Regulation of Transfers of Listed Biological Agents.--
The Secretary shall, through regulations promulgated under 
subsection (f), provide for--
          (1) the establishment and enforcement of safety 
        procedures for the transfer of biological agents listed 
        pursuant to subsection (d)(1), including measures to 
        ensure--
                  (A) proper training and appropriate skills to 
                handle such agents; and
                  (B) proper laboratory facilities to contain 
                and dispose of such agents;
          (2) safeguards to prevent access to such agents for 
        use in domestic or international terrorism or for any 
        other criminal purpose;
          (3) the establishment of procedures to protect the 
        public safety in the event of a transfer or potential 
        transfer of a biological agent in violation of the 
        safety procedures established under paragraph (1) or 
        the safeguards established under paragraph (2); and
          (4) appropriate availability of biological agents for 
        research, education, and other legitimate purposes.
    (f) Regulations.--The Secretary shall carry out this 
section by issuing--
          (1) proposed rules not later than 60 days after the 
        date of enactment of this Act; and
          (2) final rules not later than 120 days after the 
        date of enactment of this Act.
    (g) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
          (1) the term ``biological agent'' has the same 
        meaning as in section 178 of title 18, United States 
        Code; and
          (2) the term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of 
        Health and Human Services.

               Subtitle C--Chemical Weapons Restrictions


SEC. 521. CHEMICAL WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION; STUDY OF FACILITY FOR 
                    TRAINING AND EVALUATION OF PERSONNEL WHO RESPOND TO 
                    USE OF CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IN URBAN AND 
                    SUBURBAN AREAS.

    (a) Chemical Weapons of Mass Destruction.--Chapter 113B of 
title 18, United States Code, relating to terrorism, is amended 
by inserting after section 2332b as added by section 702 of 
this Act the following new section: * * * \26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Sec. 521(a) added a new sec. 2332c to 18 U.S.C., relating to 
the use of chemical weapons. See Sec. C.3. Subsec. (c) made a clerical 
amendment to 18 U.S.C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) \27\ Study of Facility for Training and Evaluation of 
Personnel Who Respond To Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons 
in Urban and Suburban Areas.--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ 50 U.S.C. 1522 note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
                  (A) the threat of the use of chemical and 
                biological weapons by Third World countries and 
                by terrorist organizations has increased in 
                recent years and is now a problem of worldwide 
                significance;
                  (B) the military and law enforcement agencies 
                in the United States that are responsible for 
                responding to the use of such weapons require 
                additional testing, training, and evaluation 
                facilities to ensure that the personnel of such 
                agencies discharge their responsibilities 
                effectively; and
                  (C) a facility that recreates urban and 
                suburban locations would provide an especially 
                effective environment in which to test, train, 
                and evaluate such personnel for that purpose.
          (2) Study of facility.--
                  (A) In general.--The President shall 
                establish an interagency task force to 
                determine the feasibility and advisability of 
                establishing a facility that recreates both an 
                urban environment and a suburban environment in 
                such a way as to permit the effective testing, 
                training, and evaluation in such environments 
                of government personnel who are responsible for 
                responding to the use of chemical and 
                biological weapons in the United States.
                  (B) Description of facility.--The facility 
                considered under subparagraph (A) shall 
                include--
                          (i) facilities common to urban 
                        environments (including a multistory 
                        building and an underground rail 
                        transit system) and to suburban 
                        environments;
                          (ii) the capacity to produce 
                        controllable releases of chemical and 
                        biological agents from a variety of 
                        urban and suburban structures, 
                        including laboratories, small 
                        buildings, and dwellings;
                          (iii) the capacity to produce 
                        controllable releases of chemical and 
                        biological agents into sewage, water, 
                        and air management systems common to 
                        urban areas and suburban areas;
                          (iv) chemical and biocontaminant 
                        facilities at the P3 and P4 levels;
                          (v) the capacity to test and evaluate 
                        the effectiveness of a variety of 
                        protective clothing and facilities and 
                        survival techniques in urban areas and 
                        suburban areas; and
                          (vi) the capacity to test and 
                        evaluate the effectiveness of variable 
                        sensor arrays (including video, audio, 
                        meteorological, chemical, and biosensor 
                        arrays) in urban areas and suburban 
                        areas.
                  (C) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of 
                Congress that the facility considered under 
                subparagraph (A) shall, if established--
                          (i) be under the jurisdiction of the 
                        Secretary of Defense; and
                          (ii) be located at a principal 
                        facility of the Department of Defense 
                        for the testing and evaluation of the 
                        use of chemical and biological weapons 
                        during any period of armed conflict.
    (c) * * *

       TITLE VI--IMPLEMENTATION OF PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES CONVENTION


SEC. 601.\28\ FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.

    (a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ 18 U.S.C. 841 note. Secs. 602-605 of this title amended 18 
U.S.C. to implement the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives 
for the Purpose of Detection, done at Montreal, March 1, 1991. See 18 
U.S.C. 841, 842, 844, 845. Sec. 606 amended sec. 596(c)(1) of the 
Tariff Act of 1930; see 19 U.S.C. 1595a(c)(1)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) plastic explosives were used by terrorists in the 
        bombings of Pan American Airlines flight number 103 in 
        December 1988 and UTA flight number 722 in September 
        1989;
          (2) plastic explosives can be used with little 
        likelihood of detection for acts of unlawful 
        interference with civil aviation, maritime navigation, 
        and other modes of transportation;
          (3) the criminal use of plastic explosives places 
        innocent lives in jeopardy, endangers national 
        security, affects domestic tranquility, and gravely 
        affects interstate and foreign commerce;
          (4) the marking of plastic explosives for the purpose 
        of detection would contribute significantly to the 
        prevention and punishment of such unlawful acts; and
          (5) for the purpose of deterring and detecting such 
        unlawful acts, the Convention on the Marking of Plastic 
        Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Done at 
        Montreal on 1 March 1991, requires each contracting 
        State to adopt appropriate measures to ensure that 
        plastic explosives are duly marked and controlled.
    (b) Purpose.--The purpose of this title is to fully 
implement the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives 
for the Purpose of Detection, Done at Montreal on 1 March 1991.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 607.\29\ EFFECTIVE DATE.

    Except as otherwise provided in this title, this title and 
the amendments made by this title shall take effect 1 year 
after the date of enactment of this Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ 18 U.S.C. 841 note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

       TITLE VII--CRIMINAL LAW MODIFICATIONS TO COUNTER TERRORISM


Subtitle A--Crimes and Penalties

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



SEC. 702. ACTS OF TERRORISM TRANSCENDING NATIONAL BOUNDARIES.

    (a) Offense.--Chapter 113B of title 18, United States Code, 
relating to terrorism, is amended by inserting after section 
2332a the following new section: * * * \30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ Sec. 702(a) added a new sec. 2332b to 18, U.S.C., relating to 
acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries. See Sec. C.3. 
Subsecs. (b) and (c) made technical amendments.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 709. DETERMINATION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RESTRICTING THE 
                    DISSEMINATION OF BOMB-MAKING INSTRUCTIONAL 
                    MATERIALS.

    (a) Study.--The Attorney General, in consultation with such 
other officials and individuals as the Attorney General 
considers appropriate, shall conduct a study concerning--
          (1) the extent to which there is available to the 
        public material in any medium (including print, 
        electronic, or film) that provides instruction on how 
        to make bombs, destructive devices, or weapons of mass 
        destruction;
          (2) the extent to which information gained from such 
        material has been used in incidents of domestic or 
        international terrorism;
          (3) the likelihood that such information may be used 
        in future incidents of terrorism;
          (4) the application of Federal laws in effect on the 
        date of enactment of this Act to such material;
          (5) the need and utility, if any, for additional laws 
        relating to such material; and
          (6) an assessment of the extent to which the first 
        amendment protects such material and its private and 
        commercial distribution.
    (b) Report.--
          (1) Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the 
        date of enactment of this Act, the Attorney General 
        shall submit to the Congress a report that contains the 
        results of the study required by this section.
          (2) Availability.--The Attorney General shall make 
        the report submitted under this subsection available to 
        the public.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


               TITLE VIII--ASSISTANCE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT


                   Subtitle A--Resources and Security


SEC. 801.\31\ OVERSEAS LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING ACTIVITIES.

    The Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury are 
authorized to support law enforcement training activities in 
foreign countries, in consultation with the Secretary of State, 
for the purpose of improving the effectiveness of the United 
States in investigating and prosecuting transnational offenses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ 28 U.S.C. 509 note.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 807.\32\ COMBATTING INTERNATIONAL COUNTERFEITING OF UNITED STATES 
                    CURRENCY.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of the Treasury (hereafter 
in this section referred to as the ``Secretary''), in 
consultation with the advanced counterfeit deterrence steering 
committee, shall--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ 18 U.S.C. 470 note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) study the use and holding of United States 
        currency in foreign countries; and
          (2) develop useful estimates of the amount of 
        counterfeit United States currency that circulates 
        outside the United States each year.
    (b) Evaluation Audit Plan.--
          (1) In general.--The Secretary shall develop an 
        effective international evaluation audit plan that is 
        designed to enable the Secretary to carry out the 
        duties described in subsection (a) on a regular and 
        thorough basis.
          (2) Submission of detailed written summary.--The 
        Secretary shall submit a detailed written summary of 
        the evaluation audit plan developed pursuant to 
        paragraph (1) to the Congress before the end of the 6-
        month period beginning on the date of the enactment of 
        this Act.
          (3) First evaluation audit under plan.--The Secretary 
        shall begin the first evaluation audit pursuant to the 
        evaluation audit plan no later than the end of the 1-
        year period beginning on the date of the enactment of 
        this Act.
          (4) Subsequent evaluation audits.--At least 1 
        evaluation audit shall be performed pursuant to the 
        evaluation audit plan during each 3-year period 
        beginning after the date of the commencement of the 
        evaluation audit referred to in paragraph (3).
    (c) Reports.--
          (1) In general.--The Secretary shall submit a written 
        report to the Committee on Banking and Financial 
        Services of the House of Representatives and the 
        Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the 
        Senate on the results of each evaluation audit 
        conducted pursuant to subsection (b) within 90 days 
        after the completion of the evaluation audit.
          (2) Contents.--In addition to such other information 
        as the Secretary may determine to be appropriate, each 
        report submitted to the Congress pursuant to paragraph 
        (1) shall include the following information:
                  (A) A detailed description of the evaluation 
                audit process and the methods used to develop 
                estimates of the amount of counterfeit United 
                States currency in circulation outside the 
                United States.
                  (B) The method used to determine the currency 
                sample examined in connection with the 
                evaluation audit and a statistical analysis of 
                the sample examined.
                  (C) A list of the regions of the world, types 
                of financial institutions, and other entities 
                included.
                  (D) An estimate of the total amount of United 
                States currency found in each region of the 
                world.
                  (E) The total amount of counterfeit United 
                States currency and the total quantity of each 
                counterfeit denomination found in each region 
                of the world.
          (3) Classification of information.--
                  (A) In general.--To the greatest extent 
                possible, each report submitted to the Congress 
                under this subsection shall be submitted in an 
                unclassified form.
                  (B) Classified and unclassified forms.--If, 
                in the interest of submitting a complete report 
                under this subsection, the Secretary determines 
                that it is necessary to include classified 
                information in the report, the report shall be 
                submitted in a classified and an unclassified 
                form.
    (d) Sunset Provision.--This section shall cease to be 
effective as of the end of the 10-year period beginning on the 
date of the enactment of this Act.
    (e) Rule of Construction.--No provision of this section 
shall be construed as authorizing any entity to conduct 
investigations of counterfeit United States currency.
    (f) Findings.--The Congress hereby finds the following:
          (1) United States currency is being counterfeited 
        outside the United States.
          (2) The One Hundred Third Congress enacted, with the 
        approval of the President on September 13, 1994, 
        section 470 of title 18, United States Code, making 
        such activity a crime under the laws of the United 
        States.
          (3) The expeditious posting of agents of the United 
        States Secret Service to overseas posts, which is 
        necessary for the effective enforcement of section 470 
        and related criminal provisions, has been delayed.
          (4) While section 470 of title 18, United States 
        Code, provides for a maximum term of imprisonment of 20 
        years as opposed to a maximum term of 15 years for 
        domestic counterfeiting, the United States Sentencing 
        Commission has failed to provide, in its sentencing 
        guidelines, for an appropriate enhancement of 
        punishment for defendants convicted of counterfeiting 
        United States currency outside the United States.
    (g) Timely Consideration of Requests for Concurrence in 
Creation of Overseas Posts.--
          (1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall--
                  (A) consider in a timely manner the request 
                by the Secretary of the Treasury for the 
                placement of such number of agents of the 
                United States Secret Service as the Secretary 
                of the Treasury considers appropriate in posts 
                in overseas embassies; and
                  (B) reach an agreement with the Secretary of 
                the Treasury on such posts as soon as possible 
                and, in any event, not later than December 31, 
                1996.
          (2) Cooperation of treasury required.--The Secretary 
        of the Treasury shall promptly provide any information 
        requested by the Secretary of State in connection with 
        such requests.
          (3) Reports required.--The Secretary of the Treasury 
        and the Secretary of State shall each submit, by 
        February 1, 1997, a written report to the Committee on 
        Banking and Financial Services of the House of 
        Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, 
        and Urban Affairs of the Senate explaining the reasons 
        for the rejection, if any, of any proposed post and the 
        reasons for the failure, if any, to fill any approved 
        post by such date.
    (h) Enhanced Penalties for International Counterfeiting of 
United States Currency.--Pursuant to the authority of the 
United States Sentencing Commission under section 994 of title 
28, United States Code, the Commission shall amend the 
sentencing guidelines prescribed by the Commission to provide 
an appropriate enhancement of the punishment for a defendant 
convicted under section 470 of title 18 of such Code.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Subtitle B--Funding Authorizations for Law Enforcement

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



SEC. 820. ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES TO PROCURE EXPLOSIVE 
                    DETECTION DEVICES AND OTHER COUNTERTERRORISM 
                    TECHNOLOGY.

    There are authorized to be appropriated to the National 
Institute of Justice Office of Science and Technology not more 
than $10,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 1997 and 1998 to 
provide assistance to foreign countries facing an imminent 
danger of terrorist attack that threatens the national interest 
of the United States, or puts United States nationals at risk, 
in--
          (1) obtaining explosive detection devices and other 
        counterterrorism technology;
          (2) conducting research and development projects on 
        such technology; and
          (3) testing and evaluating counterterrorism 
        technologies in those countries.

SEC. 821. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TO SUPPORT COUNTERTERRORISM 
                    TECHNOLOGIES.

    There are authorized to be appropriated to the National 
Institute of Justice Office of Science and Technology not more 
than $10,000,000 for fiscal year 1997, to--
          (1) develop technologies that can be used to combat 
        terrorism, including technologies in the areas of--
                  (A) detection of weapons, explosives, 
                chemicals, and persons;
                  (B) tracking;
                  (C) surveillance;
                  (D) vulnerability assessment; and
                  (E) information technologies;
          (2) develop standards to ensure the adequacy of 
        products produced and compatibility with relevant 
        national systems; and
          (3) identify and assess requirements for technologies 
        to assist State and local law enforcement in the 
        national program to combat terrorism.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 823. FUNDING SOURCE.

    Appropriations for activities authorized in this subtitle 
may be made from the Violent Crime Reduction Trust Fund.

      2. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986

Partial text of Public Law 99-399 [H.R. 4151], 100 Stat. 853, approved 
                      August 27, 1986, as amended

AN ACT To provide enhanced diplomatic security and combat international 
                   terrorism, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled,\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\22 U.S.C. 4801 note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Omnibus Diplomatic Security 
and Antiterrorism Act of 1986''.

SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    The table of contents of this Act is as follows:
                                                                    Page
Sec. 1.  Short title..............................................   724
Sec. 2.  Table of contents........................................   724

                      TITLE I--DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

Sec. 101. Short title.............................................   726
Sec. 102. Findings and purposes...................................   726
Sec. 103. Responsibility of the Secretary of State................   727
Sec. 106. Cooperation of other Federal agencies...................   730
Sec. 107. Protection of foreign consulates........................   731

                           TITLE II--PERSONNEL

Sec. 201. Diplomatic Security Service.............................   731
Sec. 202. Director of Diplomatic Security Service.................   731
Sec. 203. Special Agents..........................................   731

                TITLE III--PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Sec. 301. Accountability review...................................   732
Sec. 302. Accountability Review Board.............................   733
Sec. 303. Procedures..............................................   733
Sec. 304. Findings and recommendations by a Board.................   735
Sec. 305. Relation to other proceedings...........................   736

                  TITLE IV--DIPLOMATIC SECURITY PROGRAM

Sec. 401. Authorization...........................................   736
Sec. 402. Diplomatic construction program.........................   738
Sec. 403. Security requirements for contractors...................   740
Sec. 404. Qualifications of persons hired for the diplomatic 
    construction program..........................................   740
Sec. 405. Cost overruns...........................................   740
Sec. 406. Efficiency in contracting...............................   740
Sec. 407. Advisory Panel on Overseas Security.....................   741
Sec. 408. Training to improve perimeter security at United States 
    diplomatic missions aboard....................................   741
Sec. 409. Protection of public entrances of United States 
    diplomatic missions abroad....................................   741
Sec. 410. Certain protective functions............................   741
Sec. 411. Reimbursement of the Department of the Treasury.........   741
Sec. 412. Inspector General for the United States Information 
    Agency........................................................   741
Sec. 413. Inspector General for the Department of State...........   742
Sec. 414. Prohibition on the use of funds for facilities in 
    Israel, Jerusalem, or the West Bank...........................   742
Sec. 415. Use of cleared personnel to ensure secure maintenance 
    and repair of diplomatic facilities abroad....................   743

 TITLE V--STATE DEPARTMENT AUTHORITIES TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Sec. 501. Rewards for international terrorists....................   743
Sec. 502. Rewards for information relating to international 
    narcoterrorism and drug trafficking [amends other legislation]
Sec. 503. Coordination of terrorism-related assistance [amends 
    other legislation]
Sec. 504. Counterterrorism Protection Fund [amends other 
    legislation]
Sec. 505. Terrorism-related travel advisories.....................   743
Sec. 506. Authority to control certain terrorism-related services 
    [amends other legislation]
Sec. 507. Management of antiterrorism assistance programs [amends 
    other legislation]
Sec. 508. Nonlethal airport security equipment and commodities for 
    Egypt.........................................................   744
Sec. 509. Exports to countries supporting acts of international 
    terrorism [amends other legislation]

                TITLE VI--INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR TERRORISM

Sec. 601. Actions to combat international nuclear terrorism.......   744
Sec. 602. Authority to suspend nuclear cooperation with nations 
    which have not ratified the Convention on the Physical 
    Protection of Nuclear Material [amends other legislation]
Sec. 603. Consultation with the Department of Defense concerning 
    certain nuclear exports and subsequent arrangements [amends 
    other legislation]
Sec. 604. Review of physicial security standards..................   745
Sec. 605. International review of nuclear terrorism problem.......   745
Sec. 606. Criminal history record checks [amends other 
    legislation]

  TITLE VII--MULTILATERAL COOPERATION TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Sec. 701. International Antiterrorism Committee...................   745
Sec. 702. International arrangement relating to passports and 
    visas.........................................................   746
Sec. 703. Protection of Americans endangered by the appearance of 
    their place of birth on their passports.......................   746
Sec. 704. Use of diplomatic privileges and immunities for 
    terrorism purposes............................................   746
Sec. 705. Reports on progress in increasing multilateral 
    cooperation...................................................   746

              TITLE VIII--VICTIMS OF TERRORISM COMPENSATION

Sec. 801. Short title.............................................   746
Sec. 802. Payment to individuals held in captive status between 
    November 4, 1979, and January 21, 1981........................   747
Sec. 803. Benefits for captives and other victims of hostile 
    action........................................................   747
Sec. 804. Retention of leave by alien employees following injury 
    from hostile action abroad....................................   751
Sec. 805. Transition provisions...................................   751
Sec. 806. Benefits for members of uniformed services who are 
    victims of hostile action.....................................   752
Sec. 807. Regulations.............................................   758
Sec. 808. Effective date of entitlements..........................   758

                       TITLE IX--MARITIME SECURITY

Sec. 901. Short title.............................................   758
Sec. 902. International measures for seaport and shipboard 
    security......................................................   758
Sec. 903. Measures to prevent unlawful acts against passengers and 
    crews on board ships..........................................   759
Sec. 904. Panama Canal security...................................   759
Sec. 905. Threat of terrorism to United States ports and vessels..   759
Sec. 906. Port, harbor, and coastal facility security.............   759
Sec. 907. Security standards at foreign ports.....................   760
Sec. 908. Travel advisories concerning security at foreign ports..   760
Sec. 909. Suspension of passengers services.......................   761
Sec. 910. Sanctions for the seizure of vessels by terrorists......   761
Sec. 911. Definitions.............................................   762
Sec. 912. Authorization of appropriations.........................   762
Sec. 913. Reports.................................................   762

                   TITLE X--FASCELL FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM

     * * * * * * *

               TITLE XI--SECURITY AT MILITARY BASES ABROAD

Sec. 1101. Findings...............................................   763
Sec. 1102. Recommended actions by the Secretary of Defense........   763
Sec. 1103. Report to the Congress.................................   763

        TITLE XII--CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Sec. 1201. Encouragement for negotiation of a convention..........   763
Sec. 1202. Extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over terrorist 
    conduct.......................................................   764

                  TITLE XIII--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Sec. 1301. Peace Corps authorization of appropriations [amends 
    other legislation]
Sec. 1302. Demonstrations at embassies in the District of Columbia   764
Sec. 1303. Kurt Waldheim's retirement allowance...................   764
Sec. 1304. Eradication of Amblyomma Variegatum [amends other 
    legislation]
Sec. 1305. Strengthen foreign language skills.....................   765
Sec. 1306. Forfeiture of proceeds derived from espionage 
    activities....................................................   765
Sec. 1307. Expression of support of activities of the United 
    States Telecommunications Training Institute..................   766
Sec. 1308. Policy toward Afghanistan..............................   766

                      TITLE I--DIPLOMATIC SECURITY


SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.

    Titles I through IV of this Act may be cited as the 
``Diplomatic Security Act''.

SEC. 102.\2\ FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.

    (a) Findings.--The Congress finds and declares that--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ 22 U.S.C. 4801.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) the United States has a crucial stake in the 
        presence of United States Government personnel 
        representing United States interests abroad;
          (2) conditions confronting United States Government 
        personnel and missions abroad are fraught with security 
        concerns which will continue for the foreseeable 
        future; and
          (3) the resources now available to counter acts of 
        terrorism and protect and secure United States 
        Government personnel and missions abroad, as well as 
        foreign officials and missions in the United States, 
        are inadequate to meet the mounting threat to such 
        personnel and facilities.
    (b) \3\ Purposes.--The purposes of titles I through IV 
are--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Sec. 162(g)(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 406), struck 
out para. (2) and redesignated paras. (3) through (6) as paras. (2) 
through (5), respectively. Para. (2) had provided:
    ``(2) to provide for an Assistant Secretary of State to head the 
Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the Department of State, and to set 
forth certain provisions relating to the Diplomatic Security Service of 
the Department of State;''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) to set forth the responsibility of the Secretary 
        of State with respect to the security of diplomatic 
        operations in the United States and abroad;
          (2) to maximize coordination by the Department of 
        State with Federal, State, and local agencies and 
        agencies of foreign governments in order to enhance 
        security programs;
          (3) to promote strengthened security measures and to 
        provide for the accountability of United States 
        Government personnel with security-related 
        responsibilities;
          (4) to set forth the responsibility of the Secretary 
        of State with respect to the safe and efficient 
        evacuation of United States Government personnel, their 
        dependents, and private United states citizens when 
        their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or 
        natural disaster; and
          (5) to provide authorization of appropriations for 
        the Department of State to carry out its 
        responsibilities in the area of security and 
        counterterrorism, and in particular to finance the 
        acquisition and improvements of United States 
        Government missions abroad, including real property, 
        buildings, facilities, and communications, information, 
        and security systems.

SEC. 103.\4\ RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE

    (a) Security Functions.--(1) The Secretary of State shall 
develop and implement (in consultation with the heads of other 
Federal agencies having personnel or missions abroad where 
appropriate and within the scope of the resources made 
available) policies and programs, including funding levels and 
standards, to provide for the security of United States 
Government operations of a diplomatic nature and foreign 
government operations of a diplomatic nature in the United 
States. Such policies and programs shall include--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ 22 U.S.C. 4802.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (A) protection of all United States Government 
        personnel on official duty abroad (other than those 
        personnel under the command of a United States area 
        military commander) and their accompanying dependents;
          (B) establishment and operation of security functions 
        at all United States Government missions abroad (other 
        than facilities or installations subject to the control 
        of a United States area military commander);
          (C) establishment and operation of security functions 
        at all Department of State facilities in the United 
        States; and
          (D) protection of foreign missions, international 
        organizations, and foreign officials and other foreign 
        persons in the United States, as authorized by law.
    (2) \5\ Security responsibilities shall include the 
following:
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    \5\ The Secretary of State delegated functions authorized under 
this subsection to the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security 
(Department of State Public Notice 2086; sec. 8 of Delegation of 
Authority No. 214; 59 F.R. 50790).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (A) Former office of security functions.--Functions 
        and responsibilities exercised by the Office of 
        Security, Department of State, before November 11, 
        1985.
          (B) Security and protective operations.--
                  (i) Establishment and operation of post 
                security and protective functions abroad.
                  (ii) Development and implementation of 
                communications, computer, and information 
                security.
                  (iii) Emergency planning.
                  (iv) Establishment and operation of local 
                guard services abroad.
                  (v) Supervision of the United States Marine 
                Corps security guard program.
                  (vi) Liaison with American overseas private 
                sector security interests.
                  (vii) Protection of foreign missions and 
                international organizations, foreign officials, 
                and diplomatic personnel in the United States, 
                as authorized by law.
                  (viii) Protection of the Secretary of State 
                and other persons designated by the Secretary 
                of State, as authorized by law.
                  (ix) Physical protection of Department of 
                State facilities, communications, and computer 
                and information systems in the United States.
                  (x) Conduct of investigations relating to 
                protection of foreign officials and diplomatic 
                personnel and foreign missions in the United 
                States, suitability for employment, employee 
                security, illegal passport and visa issuance or 
                use, and other investigations, as authorized by 
                law.
                  (xi) Carrying out the rewards program for 
                information concerning international terrorism 
                authorized by section 36(a) of the State 
                Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956.
                  (xii) Performance of other security, 
                investigative, and protective matters as 
                authorized by law.
          (C) Counterterrorism planning and coordination.--
        Development and coordination of counterterrorism 
        planning, emergency action planning, threat analysis 
        programs, and liaison with other Federal agencies to 
        carry out this paragraph.
          (D) Security technology.--Development and 
        implementation of technical and physical security 
        programs, including security-related construction, 
        radio and personnel security communications, armored 
        vehicles, computer and communications security, and 
        research programs necessary to develop such measures.
          (E) Diplomatic courier service.--Management of the 
        diplomatic courier service.
          (F) Personnel training.--Development of facilities, 
        methods, and materials to develop and upgrade necessary 
        skills in order to carry out this section.
          (G) Foreign government training.--Management and 
        development of antiterrorism assistance programs to 
        assist foreign government security training which are 
        administered by the Department of State under chapter 8 
        of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
        U.S.C. 2349aa et seq.).
    (b) Overseas Evacuations.--The Secretary of State shall 
develop and implement policies and programs to provide for the 
safe and efficient evacuation of United States Government 
personnel, dependents, and private United States citizens when 
their lives are endangered. Such policies shall include 
measures to identify high risk areas where evacuation may be 
necessary and, where appropriate, providing staff to United 
States Government missions abroad to assist in those 
evacuations. In carrying out these responsibilities, the 
Secretary shall--
          (1) develop a model contingency plan for evacuation 
        of personnel, dependents, and United States citizens 
        from foreign countries;
          (2) develop a mechanism whereby United States 
        citizens can voluntarily request to be placed on a list 
        in order to be contacted in the event of an evacuation, 
        or which, in the event of an evacuation, can maintain 
        information on the location of United States citizens 
        in high risk areas submitted by their relatives;
          (3) assess the transportation and communications 
        resources in the area being evacuated and determine the 
        logistic support needed for the evacuation; and
          (4) develop a plan for coordinating communications 
        between embassy staff, Department of State personnel, 
        and families of United States citizens abroad regarding 
        the whereabouts of those citizens.
    (c) Oversight of Posts Abroad.--The Secretary of State 
shall--
          (1) have full responsibility for the coordination of 
        all United States Government personnel assigned to 
        diplomatic or consular posts or other United States 
        missions abroad pursuant to United States Government 
        authorization (except for facilities, installations, or 
        personnel under the command of a United States area 
        military commander);
          (2) establish appropriate overseas staffing levels 
        for all such posts or missions for all Federal agencies 
        with activities abroad (except for personnel and 
        activities under the command of a United States area 
        military commander or regional inspector general 
        offices under the jurisdiction of the Inspector 
        General, Agency for International Development).
    (d) \5\ Federal Agency.--As used in this title and title 
III, the term ``Federal agency'' includes any department or 
agency of the United States Government.

SEC. 104.\6\ * * * [REPEALED--1994]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ Formerly at 22 U.S.C. 4803. Sec. 162(g)(3) of the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 
103-236; 108 Stat. 407), repealed sec. 104, which established the 
Bureau of Diplomatic Security, overseen by the Assistant Secretary for 
Diplomatic Security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 105.\7\ * * * [REPEALED--1994]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ Formerly at 22 U.S.C. 4804. Sec. 162(g)(4) of the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 
103-236; 108 Stat. 407), repealed sec. 105, which stated the 
responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 106.\8\ COOPERATION OF OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES.

    (a) Assistance.--In order to facilitate fulfillment of the 
responsibilities described in section 103(a), other Federal 
agencies shall cooperate (through agreements) to the maximum 
extent possible with the Secretary of State. Such agencies may, 
with or without reimbursement, provide assistance to the 
Secretary, perform security inspections, provide logistical 
support relating to the differing missions and facilities of 
other Federal agencies, and perform other overseas security 
functions as may be authorized by the Secretary. Specifically, 
the Secretary may agree to delegate operational control of 
overseas security functions of other Federal agencies to the 
heads of such agencies, subject to the Secretary's authority as 
set forth in section 103(a). The agency head receiving such 
delegated authority shall be responsible to the Secretary in 
the exercise of the delegated operational control.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ 22 U.S.C. 4805.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Other Agencies.--Nothing contained in titles I through 
IV shall be construed to limit or impair the authority or 
responsibility of any other Federal, State, or local agency 
with respect to law enforcement, domestic security operations, 
or intelligence activities as defined in Executive Order 12333.
    (c) Certain Lease Arrangements.--The Administrator of 
General Services is authorized to lease (to such extent or in 
cash amounts as are provided in appropriation Acts) such amount 
of space in the United States as may be necessary for the 
Department of State to accommodate the personnel required to 
carry out this title. The Department of State shall pay for 
such space at the rate established by the Administrator of 
General Services for space and related services.

SEC. 107.\9\ PROTECTION OF FOREIGN CONSULATES.

    The Secretary of State shall take into account security 
considerations \10\ in making determinations with respect to 
accreditation of all foreign consular personnel in the United 
States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ 22 U.S.C. 4806. The Secretary of State delegated functions 
authorized under this section to the Chief of Protocol (Department of 
State Public Notice 2086; sec. 15 of Delegation of Authority No. 214; 
59 F.R. 50790).
    \10\ Sec. 162(g)(5) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 407), struck 
out ``The Chief of Protocol of the Department of State shall consult 
with the Assistant Secretary of Diplomatic Security'' and inserted in 
lieu thereof ``The Secretary of State shall take into account security 
considerations''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                        TITLE II--PERSONNEL \11\


SEC. 201. DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE.

    The Secretary of State may establish a Diplomatic Security 
Service, which shall perform such functions as the Secretary 
may determine.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Sec. 162(g)(6) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 407), struck 
out ``DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE'' and inserted in lieu thereof 
``PERSONNEL''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 202.\12\ DIRECTOR OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE.

    Any such Diplomatic Security Service should be headed by a 
Director designated by the Secretary of State. The Director 
should be a career member of the Senior Foreign Service or the 
Senior Executive Service and shall be qualified for the 
position by virtue of demonstrated ability in the areas of 
security, law enforcement, management, and public 
administration. Experience in management or operations abroad 
should be considered an affirmative factor in the selection of 
the Director.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ 22 U.S.C. 4822.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 203.\13\ SPECIAL AGENTS.

    Special agent positions shall be filled in accordance with 
the provisions of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 
3901 et seq.) and title 5, United States Code. In filling such 
positions, the Secretary of State shall actively recruit women 
and members of minority groups. The Secretary of State shall 
prescribe the qualifications required for assignment or 
appointment to such positions. The qualifications may include 
minimum and maximum entry age restrictions and other physical 
standards and shall incorporate such standards as may be 
required by law in order to perform security functions, to bear 
arms, and to exercise investigatory, warrant, arrest, and such 
other authorities, as are available by law to special agents of 
the Department of State and the Foreign Service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ 22 U.S.C. 4823.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 206.\14\ CONTRACTING AUTHORITY.

    The Secretary of State is authorized to employ individuals 
or organizations by contract to carry out the purposes of this 
Act, and individuals employed by contract to perform such 
services shall not by virtue of such employment be considered 
to be employees of the United States Government for purposes of 
any law administered by the Office of Personnel Management 
(except that the Secretary may determine the applicability to 
such individuals of any law administered by the Secretary 
concerning the employment of such individuals); and such 
contracts are authorized to be negotiated, the terms of the 
contracts to be prescribed, and the work to be performed, where 
necessary, without regard to such statutory provisions as 
relate to the negotiation, making and performance of contracts 
and performance of work in the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ 22 USC 4824. Sec. 206 was added by Public Law 105-277 (112 
Stat. 2681-586).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

               TITLE III--PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY


SEC. 301.\15\ ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW.

    In any case of serious injury, loss of life, or significant 
destruction of property at or related to a United States 
Government mission abroad, and in any case of a serious breach 
of security involving intelligence activities of a foreign 
government directed at a United States Government mission 
abroad, which is covered by the provisions of titles I through 
IV (other than a facility or installation subject to the 
control of a United States area military commander), the 
Secretary of State shall convene an Accountability Review Board 
\16\ (hereafter in this title referred to as the ``Board''). 
With respect to breaches of security involving intelligence 
activities, the Secretary of State may delay establishing an 
Accountability Review Board if, after consultation with the 
Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate 
and the Chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the House of Representatives, the Secretary 
determines that doing so would compromise intelligence sources 
and methods. The Secretary shall promptly advise the Chairmen 
of such committees of each determination pursuant to this 
section to delay the establishment of an Accountability Review 
Board. The Secretary shall not convene a Board where the 
Secretary determines that a case clearly involves only causes 
unrelated to security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ 22 U.S.C. 4831.
    \16\ In Department of State Public Notice 2349 (61 F.R. 8322; 
February 22, 1996), the Deputy Secretary of State:
    ``* * * determined that the November 13, 1995, car-bomb attack on 
the headquarters of the Office of Program Manager, Saudi Arabian 
National Guard in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, involved loss of life related 
to a U.S. mission abroad. Therefore, I am convening an Accountability 
Review Board, as required by that statute, to examine the facts and 
circumstances of the attack and report to me such findings and 
recommendations as it deems appropriate, * * *''.
    In Department of State Public Notice 2191 (60 F.R. 21020; April 28, 
1995), the Deputy Secretary of State:
    ``* * * determined that the March 8, 1995, terrorist attack on the 
Consulate shuttle bus in Karachi, Pakistan, involved loss of life 
related to a U.S. mission abroad. Therefore I am convening an 
Accountability Review Board, as required by that statute, to examine 
the facts and circumstances of the attack and report to me such 
findings and recommendations as it deems appropriate, * * *.''.
    Previously, an accountability review board was convened to 
investigate an explosion at the U.S. ambassador's residence in Lima, 
Peru (State Department Public Notice 1587; April 15, 1992; 57 F.R. 
14744).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 302.\17\ ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW BOARD.

    (a) Membership.--A Board shall consist of five members, 4 
appointed by the Secretary of State, and 1 appointed by the 
Director of Central Intelligence. The Secretary of State shall 
designate the Chairperson of the Board. Members of the Board 
who are not Federal officers or employees shall each be paid at 
a rate not to exceed the maximum rate of basic pay payable for 
level GS-18 of the General Schedule for each day (including 
travel time) during which they are engaged in the actual 
performance of duties vested in the Board. Members of the Board 
who are Federal officers or employees shall receive no 
additional pay by reason of such membership.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ 22 U.S.C. 4832.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Facilities, Services, Supplies, and Staff.--
          (1) Supplied by department of state.--A Board shall 
        obtain facilities, services, and supplies through the 
        Department of State. All expenses of the Board, 
        including necessary costs of travel, shall be paid by 
        the Department of State. Travel expenses authorized 
        under this paragraph shall be paid in accordance with 
        subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States 
        Code or other applicable law.
          (2) Detail.--At the request of a Board, employees of 
        the Department of State or other Federal agencies, 
        members of the Foreign Service, or members of the 
        uniformed services may be temporarily assigned, with or 
        without reimbursement, to assist the Board.
          (3) Experts and consultants.--A Board may employ and 
        compensate (in accordance with section 3109 of title 5, 
        United States Code) such experts and consultants as the 
        Board considers necessary to carry out its functions. 
        Experts and consultants so employed shall be 
        responsible solely to the Board.

SEC. 303.\18\ PROCEDURES.

    (a) Evidence.--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ 22 U.S.C. 4833.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) United states government personnel and 
        contractors.--
                  (A) With respect to any individual described 
                in subparagraph (B), a Board may--
                          (i) administer oaths and 
                        affirmations;
                          (ii) require that depositions be 
                        given and interrogatories answered; and
                          (iii) require the attendance and 
                        presentation of testimony and evidence 
                        by such individual.
                Failure of any such individual to comply with a 
                request of the Board shall be grounds for 
                disciplinary action by the head of the Federal 
                agency in which such individual is employed or 
                serves, or in the case of a contractor, 
                debarment.
                  (B) The individuals referred to in 
                subparagraph (A) are--
                          (i) employees as defined by section 
                        2105 of title 5, United States Code 
                        (including members of the Foreign 
                        Service);
                          (ii) members of the uniformed 
                        services as defined by section 101(3) 
                        of title 37, United States Code;
                          (iii) employees of instrumentalities 
                        of the United States; and
                          (iv) individuals employed by any 
                        person or entity under contract with 
                        agencies or instrumentalities of the 
                        United States Government to provide 
                        services, equipment, or personnel.
          (2) Other persons.--With respect to a person who is 
        not described in paragraph (1)(B), a Board may 
        administer oaths and affirmations and require that 
        depositions be given and interrogatories answered.
          (3) Subpoenas.--(A) The Board may issue a subpoena 
        for the attendance and testimony of any person (other 
        than a person described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) 
        of paragraph (1)(B)) and the production of documentary 
        or other evidence from any such person if the Board 
        finds that such a subpoena is necessary in the 
        interests of justice for the development of relevant 
        evidence.
          (B) In the case of contumacy of refusal to obey a 
        subpoena issued under this paragraph, a court of the 
        United States within the jurisdiction of which a person 
        is directed to appear or produce information, or within 
        the jurisdiction of which the person is found, resides, 
        or transacts business, may upon application of the 
        Attorney General, issue to such person an order 
        requiring such person to appear before the Board to 
        give testimony or produce information as required by 
        the subpoena.
          (C) Subpoenaed witnesses shall be paid the same fee 
        and mileage allowances which are paid subpoenaed 
        witnesses in the courts of the United States.
    (b) Confidentiality.--A Board shall adopt for 
administrative proceedings under this title such procedures 
with respect to confidentiality as may be deemed necessary, 
including procedures relating to the conduct of closed 
proceedings or the submission and use of evidence in camera, to 
ensure in particular the protection of classified information 
relating to national defense, foreign policy, or intelligence 
matters. The Director of Central Intelligence shall establish 
the level of protection required for intelligence information 
and for information relating to intelligence personnel, 
including standards for secure storage.
    (c) Records.--Records pertaining to administrative 
proceedings under this title shall be separated from all other 
records of the Department of State and shall be maintained 
under appropriate safeguards to preserve confidentiality and 
classification of information. Such records shall be prohibited 
from disclosure to the public until such time as a Board 
completes its work and is dismissed. The Department of State 
shall turn over to the Director of Central Intelligence 
intelligence information and information relating to 
intelligence personnel which shall then become records of the 
Central Intelligence Agency. After that time, only such 
exemptions from disclosure under section 552(b) of title 5, 
United States Code (relating to freedom of information), as 
apply to other records of the Department of State, and to any 
information transmitted under section 304(c) to the head of a 
Federal agency or instrumentality, shall be available for the 
remaining records of the Board.
    (d) Status of Boards.--The provisions of the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App. 1 et seq.) and section 
552b of title 5 of the United States Code (relating to open 
meetings) shall not apply to any Board.

SEC. 304.\19\ FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY A BOARD.

    (a) Findings.--A Board convened in any case shall examine 
the facts and circumstances surrounding the serious injury, 
loss of life, or significant destruction of property at or 
related to a United States Government mission abroad or 
surrounding the serious breach of security involving 
intelligence activities of a foreign government directed at a 
United States Government mission abroad (as the case may be) 
and shall make written findings determining--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ 22 U.S.C. 4834.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) the extent to which the incident or incidents 
        with respect to which the Board was convened was 
        security related;
          (2) whether the security systems and security 
        procedures at that mission were adequate;
          (3) whether the security systems and security 
        procedures were properly implemented;
          (4) the impact of intelligence and information 
        availability; and
          (5) such other facts and circumstances which may be 
        relevant to the appropriate security management of 
        United States missions abroad.
    (b) Program Recommendations.--A Board shall submit its 
findings (which may be classified to the extent deemed 
necessary by the Board) to the Secretary of State, together 
with recommendations as appropriate to improve the security and 
efficiency of any program or operation which the Board has 
reviewed.
    (c) Personnel Recommendations.--Whenever a Board finds 
reasonable cause to believe that an individual described in 
section 303(a)(1)(B) has breached the duty of that individual, 
the Board shall--
          (1) notify the individual concerned,
          (2) transmit the finding of reasonable cause, 
        together with all information relevant to such finding, 
        to the head of the appropriate Federal agency or 
        instrumentality, and
          (3) recommend that such agency or instrumentality 
        initiate an appropriate investigatory or disciplinary 
        action.
In determining whether an individual has breached a duty of 
that individual, the Board shall take into account any standard 
of conduct, law, rule, regulation, contract, or order which is 
pertinent to the performance of the duties of that individual.
    (d) Reports.--
          (1) Program recommendations.--In any case in which a 
        Board transmits recommendations to the Secretary of 
        State under subsection (b), the Secretary shall, not 
        later than 90 days after the receipt of such 
        recommendations, submit a report to the Congress on 
        each such recommendation and the action taken with 
        respect to that recommendation.
          (2) Personnel recommendations.--In any case in which 
        a Board transmits a finding of reasonable cause under 
        subsection (c), the head of the Federal agency or 
        instrumentality receiving the information shall review 
        the evidence and recommendations and shall, not later 
        than 30 days after the receipt of that finding, 
        transmit to the Congress a report specifying--
                  (A) the nature of the case and a summary of 
                the evidence transmitted by the Board; and
                  (B) the decision by the Federal agency or 
                instrumentality, to take disciplinary or other 
                appropriate action against that individual or 
                the reasons for deciding not to take 
                disciplinary or other action with respect to 
                that individual.

SEC. 305.\20\ RELATION TO OTHER PROCEEDINGS.

    Nothing in this title shall be construed to create 
administrative or judicial review remedies or rights of action 
not otherwise available by law, nor shall any provision of this 
title be construed to deprive any person of any right or legal 
defense which would otherwise be available to that person under 
any law, rule, or regulation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ 22 U.S.C. 4835.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 TITLE IV--DIPLOMATIC SECURITY PROGRAM


SEC. 401.\21\ AUTHORIZATION.

    (a) Diplomatic Security Program.--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ 22 U.S.C. 4851. Sec. 302 of the Department of State 
Appropriations Act, 1989 (Public Law 100-459; 102 Stat. 2207; 22 U.S.C. 
4851 note), provided the following:
    ``The Secretary of State shall report to the appropriate committees 
of the Congress on the obligation of funds provided for diplomatic 
security and related expenses every month.''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) In general.--In addition to amounts otherwise 
        available for such purposes, the following amounts are 
        authorized to be appropriated for fiscal years 1986 and 
        1987, for the Department of State to carry out 
        diplomatic security construction, acquisition, and 
        operations pursuant to the Department of State's 
        Supplemental Diplomatic Security Program, as justified 
        to the Congress for the respective fiscal year for 
        ``Administration of Foreign Affairs,'' as follows:
                  (A) For ``Salaries and Expenses,'' 
                $308,104,000.
                  (B) For ``Acquisition and Maintenance of 
                Buildings Abroad,'' $857,806,000.
                  (C) For ``Counterterrorism Research and 
                Development,'' $15,000,000.
          (2) Antiterrorism assistance.--* * *.
          (3) \22\ * * * [Repealed--1995]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ Sec. 101(c) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 388), repealed para. 
(3), effective October 1, 1995. It had read, as amended, as follows:
    ``(3) Capital construction, fiscal years 1988 through 1990.--There 
is authorized to be appropriated for the Department of State for 
``Acquisition and Maintenance of Buildings Abroad'' for each of the 
fiscal years 1988 through 1990, $417,962,000 to carry out diplomatic 
security construction, acquisition, and operations pursuant to the 
Department of State's Supplemental Diplomatic Security Program. 
Authorizations of appropriations under this paragraph shall remain 
available until the appropriations are made.''.
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          (4) Allocation of amounts authorized to be 
        appropriated.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated by 
        this sub-

        section, and by the amendment made by paragraph (2), 
        shall be allocated as provided in the table entitled 
        ``Diplomatic Security Program'' relating to this 
        section which appears in the Joint Explanatory 
        Statement of the Committee of Conference to accompany 
        H.R. 4151 of the 99th Congress (the Omnibus Diplomatic 
        Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986).
    (b) Notification to authorizing Committees of Requests for 
Appropriations.--In any fiscal year, whenever the Secretary of 
State submits to the Congress a request for appropriations to 
carry out the program described in subsection (a), the 
Secretary shall notify the Committee on Foreign Affairs \23\ of 
the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate of such request, together with a 
justification of each item listed in such request.
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    \23\ Sec. 1(a)(5) of Public Law 104-14 (109 Stat. 186) provided 
that references to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives shall be treated as referring to the Committee on 
International Relations of the House of Representatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (c) * * * [Repealed--1994]
    (d) Prohibition on Reallocations of Authorizations.--
Section 24(d) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 
1956 (22 U.S.C. 2692(d)) shall not apply with respect to any 
amounts authorized to be appropriated under this section.
    (e) Security Requirements of Other Foreign Affairs 
Agencies.--Based solely on security requirements and within the 
total amount of funds available for security, the Secretary of 
State shall ensure that an equitable level of funding is 
provided for the security requirements of other foreign affairs 
agencies.
    (f) Insufficiency of Funds.--In the event that sufficient 
funds are not available in any fiscal year for all of the 
diplomatic security construction, acquisition, and operations 
pursuant to the Department of State's Supplemental Diplomatic 
Security Program, as justified to the Congress for such fiscal 
year, the Secretary of State shall report to the Congress the 
effect that the insufficiency of funds will have with respect 
to the Department of State and each of the other foreign 
affairs agencies.
    (g) Allocation of Funds for Certain Security Programs.--Of 
the amount of funds authorized to be appropriated by subsection 
(a)(1)(A), $34,537,000 shall be available to the Secretary of 
State only for the protection of classified office equipment, 
the expansion of information systems security, and the hiring 
of American systems managers and operators for computers at 
high threat locations.
    (h) Furniture, Furnishings, and Equipment.
          (1) Use of existing furniture, furnishings, and 
        equipment.--If physically possible, facilities 
        constructed or acquired pursuant to subsection (a) 
        shall be furnished and equipped with the furniture, 
        furnishings, and equipment that were being used in the 
        facilities being replaced, rather than with newly 
        acquired furniture, furnishings, and equipment.

SEC. 402.\24\ DIPLOMATIC CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM.

    (a) Preference for United States Contractors.--
Notwithstanding section 11 of the Foreign Service Buildings 
Act, 1926, and where adequate competition exists, only United 
States persons and qualified United States joint venture 
persons may--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ 22 U.S.C. 4852.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) bid on a diplomatic construction or design 
        project which has an estimated total project value 
        exceeding $10,000,000; and
          (2) bid on a diplomatic construction or design 
        project which involves technical security, unless the 
        project involves low-level technology, as determined by 
        the Secretary of State.
    (b) Exception.--Subsection (a) shall not apply with respect 
to any diplomatic construction or design project in a foreign 
country whose statutes prohibit the use of United States 
contractors on such projects. The exception contained in this 
subsection shall only become effective with respect to a 
foreign country 30 days after the Secretary of State certifies 
to the Committee on Foreign Affairs \25\ and the Committee on 
Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the 
Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
Appropriations of the Senate what specific actions he has taken 
to urge such foreign country to permit the use of United States 
contractors on such projects, and what actions he shall take 
with respect to that country as authorized by title II of the 
State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4301 
et seq.; commonly referred to as the ``Foreign Missions Act'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Sec. 1(a)(5) of Public Law 104-14 (109 Stat. 186) provided 
that references to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives shall be treated as referring to the Committee on 
International Relations of the House of Representatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (c) Definitions.--For the purposes of this section--
          (1) the term ``adequate competition'' means with 
        respect to a construction or design project, the 
        presence of two or more qualified bidders submitting 
        responsive bids for that project;
          (2) the term ``United States person'' means a person 
        which--
                  (A) is incorporated or legally organized 
                under the laws of the United States, including 
                State, the District of Columbia, and local 
                laws;
                  (B) has its principal place of business in 
                the United States;
                  (C) has been incorporated or legally 
                organized in the United States--
                          (i) for more than 5 years before the 
                        issuance date of the invitation for 
                        bids or request for proposals with 
                        respect to a construction project under 
                        subsection (a)(1); and
                          (ii) for more than 2 years before the 
                        issuance date of the invitation for 
                        bids or request for proposals with 
                        respect to a construction or design 
                        project which involves physical or 
                        technical security under subsection 
                        (a)(2);
                  (D) has performed within the United States 
                administrative and technical, professional, or 
                construction services similar in complexity, 
                type of construction, and value to the project 
                being bid;
                  (E) with respect to a construction project 
                under subsection (a)(1), has achieved total 
                business volume equal to or greater than the 
                value of the project being bid in 3 years of 
                the 5-year period before the date specified in 
                subparagraph (C)(i);
                  (F)(i) employs United State citizens in at 
                least 80 percent of its principal management 
                positions in the United States,
                  (ii) employs United States citizens in more 
                than half of its permanent, full-time positions 
                in the United States, and
                  (iii) will employ United States citizens in 
                at least 80 percent of the supervisory 
                positions on the foreign buildings office 
                project site; and
                  (G) has the existing technical and financial 
                resources in the United States to perform the 
                contract; and
          (3) the term ``qualified United States joint venture 
        person'' means a joint venture in which a United States 
        person or persons owns at least 51 percent of the 
        assets of the joint venture.
    (d) American Minority Contractors.--Not less than 10 
percent of the amount appropriated pursuant to section 401(a) 
for diplomatic construction or design projects each fiscal year 
shall be allocated to the extent practicable for contracts with 
American minority contractors.
    (e) American Small Business Contractors.--Not less than 10 
percent of the amount appropriated pursuant to section 401(a) 
for diplomatic construction or design projects each fiscal year 
shall be allocated to the extent practicable for contracts with 
American small business contractors.
    (f) Limitation on Subcontracting.--With respect to a 
diplomatic construction project, a prime contractor may not 
subcontract more than 50 percent of the total value of its 
contract for that project.

SEC. 403.\26\ SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTRACTORS.

    Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this 
Act, the Secretary of State shall issue regulations to--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ 22 U.S.C. 4853.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) strengthen the security procedures applicable to 
        contractors and subcontractors involved in any way with 
        any diplomatic construction or design project; and
          (2) permit a contractor or subcontractor to have 
        access to any design or blueprint relating to such a 
        project only in accordance with those procedures.

SEC. 404.\27\ QUALIFICATIONS OF PERSONS HIRED FOR THE DIPLOMATIC 
                    CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM.

    In carrying out the diplomatic construction program 
referred to in section 401(a), the Secretary of State shall 
employ as professional staff (by appointment, contract, or 
otherwise) only those persons with a demonstrated specialized 
background in the fields of construction law, or contract 
management. In filling such positions, the Secretary shall 
actively recruit women and members of minority groups.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ 22 U.S.C. 4854.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 405.\28\ COST OVERRUNS.

    Any amount required to complete any capital project 
described in the Department of State's Supplemental Diplomatic 
Security Program, as justified to the Congress for the 
respective fiscal year, which is in excess of the amount made 
available for that project pursuant to section 401(a) (1) or 
(3) shall be treated as a reprogramming of funds under section 
34 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 
U.S.C. 2706) and shall not be available for obligation or 
expenditure except in compliance with the procedures applicable 
to such reprogrammings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ 22 U.S.C. 4855.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 406.\29\ EFFICIENCY IN CONTRACTING.

    (a) Bonuses and Penalties.--The Director of the Office of 
Foreign Buildings shall provide for a contract system of 
bonuses and penalties for the diplomatic construction program 
funded pursuant to the authorizations of appropriations 
provided in this title. Not later than 3 months after the date 
of enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit a report to 
the Congress on the implementation of this section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ 22 U.S.C. 4856.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Surety Bonds and Guarantees.--The Director of the 
Office of Foreign Buildings shall require each person awarded a 
contract for work under the diplomatic construction program to 
post a surety bond or guarantee, in such amount as the Director 
may determine, to assure performance under such contract.
    (c) Disqualification of Contractors.--No person doing 
business with Libya may be eligible for any contract awarded 
pursuant to this Act.

SEC. 407.\30\ ADVISORY PANEL ON OVERSEAS SECURITY.

    Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this 
Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the 
Congress on the implementation of the 91 recommendations 
contained in the final report of the Advisory Panel on Overseas 
Security. If any such recommendation has been rejected, the 
Secretary shall provide the reasons why that recommendation was 
rejected.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ 22 U.S.C. 4857.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 408.\31\ TRAINING TO IMPROVE PERIMETER SECURITY AT UNITED STATES 
                    DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS ABROAD.

    (a) Training.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
President should use the authority under chapter 8 of title II 
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to 
antiterrorism assistance) to improve perimeter security of 
United States diplomatic missions abroad.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ 22 U.S.C. 4858. Sec. 139(20) of the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 
Stat. 398), repealed subsec. (b) of this section, which had required 
that the President report annually ``on the progress and problems of 
improving perimeter security of United States diplomatic missions 
abroad.''.
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SEC. 409.\32\ PROTECTION OF PUBLIC ENTRANCES OF UNITED STATES 
                    DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS ABROAD.

    The Secretary of State shall install and maintain a walk-
through metal detector or other advanced screening system at 
public entrances of each United States diplomatic mission 
abroad.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ 22 U.S.C. 4859.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 410. CERTAIN PROTECTIVE FUNCTIONS.

    Section 208(a) of title 3, United States Code, is amended 
by adding at the end thereof the following: ``In carrying out 
any duty under section 202(7), the Secretary of State is 
authorized to utilize any authority available to the Secretary 
under title II of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 
1956.''.

SEC. 411.\33\ REIMBURSEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY.

    The Secretary of State shall reimburse the appropriate 
appropriations account of the Department of the Treasury out of 
funds appropriated pursuant to section 401(a)(1) for the actual 
costs incurred by the United States Secret Service, as agreed 
to by the Secretary of the Treasury, for providing protection 
for the spouses of foreign heads of state during fiscal years 
1986 and 1987.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ 22 U.S.C. 4860.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 412. INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY.

    (a) * * *.
    (b) Earmark.--Of the funds authorized to be appropriated to 
the United States Information Agency for the fiscal year 1987, 
not less than $3,000,000 shall be available only for the 
operation of the office of the Inspector General established by 
the amendment made by subsection (a).
    (c) Position at Level IV of the Executive Schedule.--
Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by 
adding at the end thereof the following:

    ``Inspector General, United States Information Agency.''.

SEC. 413.\34\ INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

    (a) Direction to establish.--The Congress directs the 
Secretary of State to proceed immediately to establish an 
Office of Inspector General of the Department of State not 
later than October 1, 1986. Not later than January 31, 1987, 
the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the Committee 
on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs \35\ of the House of Representatives on the progress of 
establishing that office. Such report shall include an 
accounting of the obligation of funds for fiscal year 1987 for 
that office.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ 22 U.S.C. 4861.
    \35\ Sec. 1(a)(5) of Public Law 104-14 (109 Stat. 186) provided 
that references to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives shall be treated as referring to the Committee on 
International Relations of the House of Representatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Duties and responsibilities.--The Inspector General of 
the Department of State (as established by the amendment made 
by section 150(a) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987) is authorized to perform all duties 
and responsibilities, and to exercise the authorities, stated 
in section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 
3929) and in the Inspector General Act of 1978.
    (c) Earmark.--Of the amounts made available for fiscal year 
1987 for salaries and expenses under the heading 
``Administration of Foreign Affairs'', not less than $6,500,000 
shall be used for the sole purpose of establishing and 
maintaining the Office of Inspector General of the Department 
of State.
    (d) Limitation on appointment.--No career member of the 
Foreign Service, as defined by section 103 of the Foreign 
Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 3903), may be appointed 
Inspector General of the Department of State.
    (e) Position at level iv of the executive schedule.--
Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code (as amended by 
section 412), is amended by adding at the end thereof the 
following:

    ``Inspector General, Department of State.''.

          (6) \36\ * * * [Repealed--1986]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ Paragraph (6) was repealed by sec. 405 of Public Law 99-529 
(100 Stat. 3010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) * * * [Repealed--1987]
    (c) * * *

SEC. 414.\37\ PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FUNDS FOR FACILITIES IN ISRAEL, 
                    JERUSALEM, OR THE WEST BANK.

    None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act 
may be obligated or expended for site acquisition, development, 
or construction of any facility in Israel, Jerusalem, or the 
West Bank.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ 22 U.S.C. 4862. Sec. 305 of the Department of State 
Appropriations Act, 1989 (Public Law 100-459; 102 Stat. 2208), provided 
the following:
    ``Sec. 305. Notwithstanding section 130 of the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988-89 and section 414 of the 
Diplomatic Security Act and any other provisions of law, such funds as 
are authorized, or that may be authorized, under the Diplomatic 
Security Act or any other statute, and appropriated to the Department 
of State under this or any other Act, may be hereafter obligated or 
expended for site acquisition, development, and construction of two new 
diplomatic facilities in Israel, Jerusalem, or the West Bank, provided 
that each facility (A) equally preserves the ability of the United 
States to locate its Ambassador or its Consul General at that site, 
consistent with United States policy; (B) shall not be denominated as 
the United States Embassy or Consulate until after the construction of 
both facilities has begun, and construction of one facility has been 
completed, or is near completion; and (C) unless security 
considerations require otherwise, commences operation 
simultaneously.''.
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SEC. 415. USE OF CLEARED PERSONNEL TO ENSURE SECURE MAINTENANCE AND 
                    REPAIR OF DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES ABROAD.

    (a) Policies and Regulations.--The Secretary of State shall 
develop and implement policies and regulations to provide for 
the use of persons who have been granted an appropriate United 
states security clearance to ensure that the security of areas 
intended for the storage of classified materials or the conduct 
of classified activities in a United States diplomatic mission 
or consular post abroad is not compromised in the performance 
of maintenance and repair services in those areas.
    (b) Study and Report.--The Secretary of State shall conduct 
a study of the feasibility and necessity of requiring that, in 
the case of certain United States diplomatic facilities abroad, 
no contractor shall be hired to perform maintenance or repair 
services in an area intended for the storage of classified 
materials or the conduct of classified activities unless such 
contractor has been granted an appropriate United States 
security clearance. Such study shall include, but is not 
limited to, United States facilities located in Cairo, New 
Delhi, Riyadh, and Tokyo. Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary of State 
shall report the results of such study to the Chairman of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs \38\ of the House of Representatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \38\ Sec. 1(a)(5) of Public Law 104-14 (109 Stat. 186) provided 
that references to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives shall be treated as referring to the Committee on 
International Relations of the House of Representatives.
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TITLE V--STATE DEPARTMENT AUTHORITIES TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM


SEC. 501.\39\ REWARDS FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS.

    It is the sense of the Congress that the Secretary of State 
should more vigorously utilize the moneys available under 
section 36(a) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 
1956 (22 U.S.C. 2708(a); relating to rewards for information on 
international terrorism) to more effectively apprehend and 
prosecute international terrorists. It is further the sense of 
the Congress that the Secretary of State should consider widely 
publicizing the sizable rewards available under present law so 
that major international terrorist figures may be brought to 
justice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ 22 U.S.C. 2708 note. Sec. 12 of the International Narcotics 
Control Act of 1989 (Public Law 101-231; 103 Stat. 1963), amended 
section 36(c) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, to 
increase the amount available for rewards for information leading to 
the arrest and conviction in any country of any individual involved in 
the commission of an act of international terrorism from $500,000 to 
$2,000,000.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

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SEC. 505.\40\ TERRORISM-RELATED TRAVEL ADVISORIES.

    The Secretary of State shall promptly advise the Congress 
whenever the Department of State issues a travel advisory, or 
other public warning notice for United States citizens 
traveling abroad, because of a terrorist threat or other 
security concern.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ 22 U.S.C. 2656e.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 508. NONLETHAL AIRPORT SECURITY EQUIPMENT AND COMMODITIES FOR 
                    EGYPT.

    In addition to funds otherwise available for such purposes 
under chapter 8 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961, assistance authorized to carry out the purposes of 
chapter 4 of part II of such Act for the fiscal years 1986 and 
1987 (as well as undisbursed balances of previously obligated 
funds under such chapter) which are allocated for Egypt may be 
furnished, notwithstanding section 660 of such Act, for the 
provision of nonlethal airport security equipment and 
commodities, and training in the use of such equipment and 
commodities. The authority contained in this section shall be 
exercised by the Department of State's office responsible for 
administering chapter 8 of part II of the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961, in coordination with the Agency for International 
Development.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


               TITLE VI--INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR TERRORISM


SEC. 601.\41\ ACTIONS TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR TERRORISM.

    (a) Actions to be Taken by the President.--The Congress 
hereby directs the President--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \41\ 22 U.S.C. 3244.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) to seek universal adherence to the Convention on 
        the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material;
          (2) to--
                  (A) conduct a review, enlisting the 
                participation of all relevant departments and 
                agencies of the Government, to determine 
                whether the recommendations on Physical 
                Protection of Nuclear Material published by the 
                International Atomic Energy Agency are adequate 
                to deter theft, sabotage, and the use of 
                nuclear facilities and materials in acts of 
                international terrorism, and
                  (B) transmit the results of this review to 
                the Director-General of the International 
                Atomic Energy Agency;
          (3) to take, in concert with United States allies and 
        other countries, such steps as may be necessary--
                  (A) to keep to a minimum the amount of 
                weapons-grade nuclear material in international 
                transit, and
                  (B) to ensure that when any such material is 
                transported internationally, it is under the 
                most effective means for adequately protecting 
                it from acts or attempted acts of sabotage or 
                theft by terrorist groups or nations; and
          (4) to seek agreement in the United Nations Security 
        Council to establish--
                  (A) an effective regime of international 
                sanctions against any nation or subnational 
                group which conducts or sponsors acts of 
                international nuclear terrorism, and
                  (B) measures for coordinating responses to 
                all acts of international nuclear terrorism, 
                including measures for the recovery of stolen 
                nuclear material and the clean-up of nuclear 
                releases.
    (b) Reports to the Congress.--The President shall report to 
the Congress annually, in the reports required by section 601 
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3281), 
on the progress made during the preceding year in achieving the 
objectives described in this section.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 604. REVIEW OF PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS.

    (a) Reviews.--The Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of 
Defense, the Secretary of State, the Director of the Arms 
Controls and Disarmament Agency, and the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission shall each review the adequacy of the physical 
security standards currently applicable with respect to the 
shipment and storage (outside the United States) of plutonium, 
and uranium enriched to more than 20 percent in the isotope 233 
or the isotope 235, which is subject to United States prior 
consent rights, with special attention to protection against 
risks of seizure or other terrorist acts.
    (b) Reports.--Not later than 6 months after the date of 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary 
of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Director of the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission shall each submit a written report to the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs \42\ of the House of Representatives and the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate setting forth the 
results of the review conducted pursuant to this section, 
together with appropriate recommendations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ Sec. 1(a)(5) of Public Law 104-14 (109 Stat. 186) provided 
that references to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives shall be treated as referring to the Committee on 
International Relations of the House of Representatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 605. INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE NUCLEAR TERRORISM PROBLEM.

    The Congress strongly urges the President to seek a 
comprehensive review of the problem of nuclear terrorism by an 
international conference.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


 TITLE VII--MULTILATERAL COOPERATION TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM


SEC. 701. INTERNATIONAL ANTITERRORISM COMMITTEE.

    (a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
          (1) international terrorism is and remains a serious 
        threat to the peace and security of free, democratic 
        nations;
          (2) the challenge of terrorism can only by met 
        effectively by concerted action on the part of all 
        responsible nations;
          (3) the major developed democracies evidenced their 
        commitment to cooperation in the fight against 
        terrorism by the 1978 Bonn Economic Summit Declaration 
        on Terrorism; and
          (4) that commitment was renewed and strengthened at 
        the 1986 Tokyo Economic Summit and expressed in a joint 
        statement on terrorism.
    (b) International Antiterrorism Committee--The Congress 
hereby directs the President to continue to seek the 
establishment of an international committee, to be known as the 
International Antiterrorism Committee. As a first step in 
establishing such committee, the President should propose to 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization the establishment of a 
standing political committee to examine all aspects of 
international terrorism, review opportunities for cooperation, 
and make recommendations to member nations. After the 
establishment of this committee, the President should invite 
such other countries who may choose to participate. The purpose 
of the International Antiterrorism Committee should be to focus 
the attention and secure the cooperation of the governments and 
the public of the participating countries and of other 
countries on the problems and responses to international 
terrorism (including nuclear terrorism), by serving as a forum 
at both the political and law enforcement levels.

SEC. 702. INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS RELATING TO PASSPORTS AND VISAS.

    The Congress strongly urges the President to seek the 
negotiation of international agreements (or other appropriate 
arrangements) to provide for the sharing of information 
relating to passports and visas in order to enhance cooperation 
among countries in combating international terrorism.

SEC. 703. PROTECTION OF AMERICANS ENDANGERED BY THE APPEARANCE OF THEIR 
                    PLACE OF BIRTH ON THEIR PASSPORTS.

    (a) Findings.--The Congress finds that some citizens of the 
United States may be specially endangered during a hijacking or 
other terrorist incident by the fact that their place of birth 
appears on their United States passport.
    (b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of 
enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United 
States shall submit a report to the Congress on the 
implications of deleting the place of birth as a required item 
of information on passports.

SEC. 704. USE OF DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES FOR TERRORISM 
                    PURPOSES.

    The Congress strongly urges the President to instruct the 
Permanent Representative of the United States to the United 
Nations to seek the adoption of a resolution in the United 
Nations condemning the use for terrorist purposes of diplomatic 
privileges and immunities under the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations, especially the misuse of diplomatic 
pouches and diplomatic missions.

SEC. 705. REPORTS ON PROGRESS IN INCREASING MULTILATERAL COOPERATION.

    Not later than February 1, 1987, the President shall submit 
a report to the Congress on the steps taken to carry out each 
of the preceding sections of this title (except for section 
703) and the progress being made in achieving the objectives 
described in these sections.

             TITLE VIII--VICTIMS OF TERRORISM COMPENSATION


SEC. 801. SHORT TITLE.

    This title may be cited as the ``Victims of Terrorism 
Compensation Act.''

SEC. 802. PAYMENT TO INDIVIDUALS HELD IN CAPTIVE STATUS BETWEEN 
                    NOVEMBER 4, 1979, AND JANUARY 21, 1981.

    The amount of the payment for individuals in the Civil 
Service referred to in section 5569(d) of title 5, United 
States Code (as added by section 803 of this title), or for 
individuals in the uniformed services referred to in section 
559(c) of title 37, United States Code (as added by section 806 
of this title), as the case may be, shall be $50 for each day 
any such individual was held in captive status during a period 
commencing on or after November 4, 1979, and ending on or 
before January 21, 1981.

SEC. 803. BENEFITS FOR CAPTIVES AND OTHER VICTIMS OF HOSTILE ACTION.

    (a) In General.--Subchapter VII of chapter 55 of title 5, 
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end therefore 
the following:

``Sec. 5569. Benefits for captives

    ``(a) For the purpose of this section--
          ``(1) `captive' means any individual in a captive 
        status commencing while such individual is--
                  ``(A) in the Civil Service, or
                  ``(B) a citizen, national, or resident alien 
                of the United States rendering personal service 
                to the United States similar to the service of 
                an individual in the Civil Service (other than 
                as a member of the uniformed services);
          ``(2) `captive status' means a missing status which, 
        as determined by the President, arises because of a 
        hostile action and is a result of the individual's 
        relationship with the Government;
          ``(3) `missing status'--
                  ``(A) in the case of an employee, has the 
                meaning provided under section 5561(5) of this 
                title; and
                  ``(B) in the case of an individual other than 
                an employee, has a similar meaning; and
          ``(4) `family member,' as used with respect to a 
        person, means--
                  ``(A) any dependent of such person; and
                  ``(B) any individual (other than a dependent 
                under subparagraph (A)) who is a member of such 
                person's family or household.
    ``(b)(1) The Secretary of the Treasury shall establish a 
savings fund to which the head of an agency may allot all or 
any portion of the pay and allowances of any captive to the 
extent that such pay and allowances are not subject to an 
allotment under section 5563 of this title or any other 
provision of law.
    ``(2) Amounts so allotted to the savings fund shall bear 
interest at a rate which, for any calendar quarter, shall be 
equal to the average rate paid on United States Treasury bills 
with 3-month maturities issued during the preceding calendar 
quarter. Such interest shall be compounded quarterly.
    ``(3) Amounts in the savings fund credited to a captive 
shall be considered as pay and allowances for purposes of 
section 5563 of this title and shall otherwise be subject to 
withdrawal under procedures which the Secretary of the Treasury 
shall establish.
    ``(4) Any interest accruing under this subsection on--
          ``(A) any amount for which an individual is indebted 
        to the United States under section 5562(c) of this 
        title shall be deemed to be part of the amount due 
        under such section 5562(c); and
          ``(B) any amount referred to in section 5566(f) of 
        this title shall be deemed to be part of such amount 
        for purposes of such section 5566(f).
    ``(5) An allotment under this subsection may be made 
without regard to section 5563(c) of this title.
    ``(c) The head of an agency shall pay (by advancement or 
reimbursement) any individual who is a captive, and any family 
member of such individual, for medical and health care, and 
other expenses related to such care, to the extent that such 
care--
        ``(1) is incident to such individual being a captive; 
        and
          ``(2) is not covered--
                  ``(A) by any Government medical or health 
                program; or
                  ``(B) by insurance.
    ``(d)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (3), the President 
shall make a cash payment, computed under paragraph (2), to any 
individual who became or becomes a captive commencing on or 
after November 4, 1979. Such payment shall be made before the 
end of the one-year period beginning on the date on which the 
captive status of such individual terminates or, in the case of 
any individual whose status as a captive terminated before the 
date of the enactment of the Victims of Terrorism Compensation 
Act, before the end of the one-year period beginning on such 
date.
    ``(2) Except as provided in section 802 of the Victims of 
Terrorism Compensation Act, the amount of the payment under 
this subsection with respect to an individual held as a captive 
shall be not less than one-half of the amount of the world-wide 
average per diem rate under section 5702 of this title which 
was in effect for each day that individual was so held.
    ``(3) The President--
          ``(A) may refer a payment under this subsection in 
        the case of any individual who, during the one-year 
        period described in paragraph (1), is charged with an 
        offense described in subparagraph (B), until final 
        disposition of such charge; and
          ``(B) may deny such payment in the case of any 
        individual who is convicted of an offense described in 
        subsection (b) or (c) of section 8312 of this title 
        committed--
                  ``(i) during the period of captivity of such 
                individual; and
                  ``(ii) related to the captive status of such 
                individual.
    ``(4) A payment under this subsection shall be in addition 
to any other amount provided by law.
    ``(5) The provisions of subchapter VIII of this chapter 
(or, in the case of any person not covered by such subchapter, 
similar provisions prescribed by the President) shall apply 
with respect to any amount due an individual under paragraph 
(1) after such individual's death.
    ``(6) Any payment made under paragraph (1) which is later 
denied under paragraph (3)(B) is a claim of the United States 
Government for purposes of section 3711 of title 31.
    ``(e)(1) Under regulations prescribed by the President, the 
benefits provided by the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief 
Act of 1940 including the benefits provided by section 701 of 
such Act but excluding the benefits provided by sections 104, 
105, 106, 400 through 408, 501 through 512, and 514 of such 
Act, shall be provided in the case of any individual who is a 
captive.
    ``(2) In applying such Act under this subsection--
          ``(A) the term `person in the military service' is 
        deemed to include any such captive;
          ``(B) the term `period of military service' is deemed 
        to include the period during which the individual is in 
        a captive status; and
          ``(C) references to the Secretary of the Army, the 
        Secretary of the Navy, the Adjutant General of the 
        Army, the Chief of Naval Personnel, and the Commandant, 
        United States Marine Corps, are deemed, in the case of 
        any captive, to be references to an individual 
        designated for that purpose by the President.
    ``(f)(1)(A) Under regulations prescribed by the President, 
the head of an agency shall pay (by advancement or 
reimbursement) a spouse or child of a captive for expenses 
incurred for subsistence, tuition, fees, supplies, books, and 
equipment, and other educational expenses, while attending an 
educational or training institution.
    ``(B) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), payments 
shall be available under this paragraph for a spouse or child 
of an individual who is a captive for education or training 
which occurs--
          ``(i) after that individual has been in captive 
        status for 90 days or more, and
          ``(ii) on or before--
                  ``(I) the end of any semester or quarter (as 
                appropriate) which begins before the date on 
                which the captive status of that individual 
                terminates, or
                  ``(II) if the educational or training 
                institution is not operated on a semester or 
                quarter system, the earlier of the end of any 
                course which began before such date or the end 
                of the 16-week period following that date.
In order to respond to special circumstances, the appropriate 
agency head may specify a date for purposes of cessation of 
assistance under clause (ii) which is later than the date which 
would otherwise apply under such clause.
    ``(C) In the event a captive dies and the death is incident 
to that individual being a captive, payments shall be available 
under this paragraph for a spouse or child of such individual 
for education or training which occurs after the date of such 
individual's death.
    ``(D) The preceding provisions of this paragraph shall not 
apply with respect to any spouse or child who is eligible for 
assistance under chapter 35 of title 38 or similar assistance 
under any other provision of law.
    ``(E) For the purpose of this paragraph, `child' means a 
dependent under section 5561(3)(B) of this title.
    ``(2)(A) In order to respond to special circumstances, the 
head of an agency may pay (by advancement or reimbursement) a 
captive for expenses incurred for subsistence, tuition, fees, 
supplies, books, and equipment, and other educational expenses, 
while attending an educational or training institution.
    ``(B) Payments shall be available under this paragraph for 
a captive for education or training which occurs--
          ``(i) after the termination of that individual's 
        captive status, and
          ``(ii) on or before--
                  ``(I) the end of any semester or quarter (as 
                appropriate) which begins before the date which 
                is 10 years after the day on which the captive 
                status of that individual terminates, or
                  ``(II) if the educational or training 
                institution is not operated on a semester or 
                quarter system, the earlier of the end of any 
                course which began before such date or the end 
                of the 16-week period following that date, and
shall be available only to the extent that such payments are 
not otherwise authorized by law.
    ``(3) Assistance under this subsection--
          ``(A) shall be discontinued for any individual whose 
        conduct or progress is unsatisfactory under standards 
        consistent with those established pursuant to section 
        1724 of title 38; and
          ``(B) may not be provided for any individual for a 
        period in excess of 45 months (or the equivalent 
        thereof in other than fulltime education or training).
    ``(4) Regulations prescribed to carry out this subsection 
shall provide that the program under this subsection shall be 
consistent with the assistance program under chapters 35 and 36 
of title 38.
    ``(g) Any benefit provided under subsection (c) or (d) may, 
under regulations prescribed by the President, be provided to a 
family member of an individual if--
          ``(1) such family member is held in captive status; 
        and
          ``(2) such individual is performing service for the 
        United States as described in subsection (a)(1)(A) when 
        the captive status of such family member commences.
    ``(h) Except as provided in subsection (d), this section 
applies with respect to any individual in a captive status 
commencing after January 21, 1981.
    ``(i) Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
subchapter, any determination by the President under subsection 
(a)(2) or (d) shall be conclusive and shall not be subject to 
judicial review.
    ``(j) The President may prescribe regulations necessary to 
administer this section.
    ``(k) Any benefit or payment pursuant to this section shall 
be paid out of funds available for salaries and expenses of the 
relevant agency of the United States.

``Sec. 5570. Compensation for disability or death

    ``(a) For the purpose of this section--
          ``(1) `employee' means--
                  ``(A) any individual in the Civil Service; 
                and
                  ``(B) any individual rendering personal 
                service to the United States similar to the 
                service of an individual in the Civil Service 
                (other than as a member of the uniformed 
                services); and
          ``(2) `family member', as used with respect to an 
        employee, means--
                  ``(A) any dependent of such employee; and
                  ``(B) any individual (other than a dependent 
                under subparagraph (A)) who is a member of the 
                employee's family or household.
    ``(b) The President shall prescribe regulations under which 
an agency head may pay compensation for the disability or death 
of an employee or a family member of an employee if, as 
determined by the President, the disability or death was caused 
by hostile action and was a result of the individual's 
relationship with the Government.
    ``(c) Any compensation otherwise payable to an individual 
under this section in connection with any disability or death 
shall be reduced by any amounts payable to such individual 
under any other program funded in whole or in part by the 
United States (excluding any amount payable under section 
5569(d) of this title) in connection with such disability or 
death, except that nothing in this subsection shall result in 
the reduction of any amount below zero.
    ``(d) A determination by the President under subsection (b) 
shall be conclusive and shall not be subject to judicial 
review.
    ``(e) Compensation under this section may include payment 
(whether by advancement or reimbursement) for any medical or 
health expenses relating to the death or disability involved to 
the extent that such expenses are not covered under subsection 
(c) of section 5569 of this title (other than because of 
paragraph (2) of such subsection).
    ``(f) This section applies with respect to any disability 
or death resulting from an injury which occurs after January 
21, 1981.
    ``(g) Any benefit or payment pursuant to this section shall 
be paid out of funds available for salaries and expenses of the 
relevant agency of the United States.''.
    (b) Conforming Amendment.--The analysis for chapter 55 of 
title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the 
item relating to section 5568 the following:

``5569. Benefits for captives.
``5570. Compensation for disability or death.''.

SEC. 804. RETENTION OF LEAVE BY ALIEN EMPLOYEES FOLLOWING INJURY FROM 
                    HOSTILE ACTION ABROAD.

    Section 6325 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by 
adding at the end thereof the following: ``The preceding 
provisions of this section shall apply in the case of an alien 
employee referred to in section 6301(2)(viii) of this title 
with respect to any leave granted to such alien employee under 
section 6310 of this title or section 408 of the Foreign 
Service Act of 1980.''.

SEC. 805. TRANSITION PROVISIONS.

    (a) Savings Fund.--(1) Amounts may be allotted to the 
savings fund under subsection (b) of section 5569 of title 5, 
United States Code (as added by section 803(a) of this Act) 
from pay and allowances for any pay period ending after January 
21, 1981, and before the establishment of such fund.
    (2) Interest on amounts so allotted with respect to any 
such pay period shall be calculated as if the allotment had 
occurred at the end of such pay period.
    (b) Medical and Health Care; Educational Expenses.--
Subsections (c) and (f) of such section 5569 (as so added) 
shall be carried out with respect to the period after January 
21, 1981, and before the effective date of those subsections, 
under regulations prescribed by the President.
    (c) Definition.--For the purpose of this subsection, ``pay 
and allowances'' has the meaning provided under section 5561 of 
title 5, United States Code.

SEC. 806. BENEFITS FOR MEMBERS OF UNIFORMED SERVICES WHO ARE VICTIMS OF 
                    HOSTILE ACTION.

    (a) Payments.--(1) Chapter 10 of title 37, United States 
Code is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new 
section:

``Sec. 559. Benefits for members held as captives

    ``(a) In this section:
          ``(1) The term `captive status' means a missing 
        status of a member of the uniformed services which, as 
        determined by the President, arises because of a 
        hostile action and is a result of membership in the 
        uniformed services, but does not include a period of 
        captivity of a member as a prisoner of war if Congress 
        provides to such member, in an Act enacted after August 
        27, 1986,\43\ monetary payment in respect of such 
        period of captivity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\ Sec. 1484(d)(4) of Public Law 101-510 (104 Stat. 1717) amended 
title 37, sec. 559, by striking out ``the date of the enactment of the 
Victims of Terrorism Compensation Act'' and inserting in lieu thereof 
``August 27, 1986''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``(2) The term `former captive' means a person who, 
        as a member of the uniformed services, was held in a 
        captive status.
    ``(b)(1) The Secretary of the Treasury shall establish a 
savings fund to which the Secretary concerned may allot all or 
any portion of the pay and allowances of any member of the 
uniformed services who is in a captive status to the extent 
that such pay and allowances are not subject to an allotment 
under section 553 of this title or any other provision of law.
    ``(2) Amounts so allotted shall bear interest at a rate 
which for any calendar quarter, shall be equal to the average 
rate paid on United States Treasury bills with three-month 
maturities issued during the preceding calendar quarter. Such 
interest shall be computed quarterly.
    ``(3) Amounts in the savings fund credited to a member 
shall be considered as pay and allowances for purposes of 
section 553(c) of this title and shall otherwise be subject to 
withdrawal under procedures which the Secretary of the Treasury 
shall establish.
    ``(4) Any interest accruing under this subsection on--
          ``(A) any amount for which a member is indebted to 
        the United States under section 552(c) of this title 
        shall be deemed to be part of the amount due under such 
        section; and
          ``(B) any amount referred to in section 556(f) of 
        this title shall be deemed to be part of such amount 
        for purposes of such section.
    ``(5) An allotment under this subsection may be made 
without regard to section 553(c) of this title.
    ``(c)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (3), the President 
shall make a cash payment to any person who is a former 
captive. Such payment shall be made before the end of the one-
year period beginning on the date on which the captive status 
of such person terminates.
    ``(2) Except as provided in section 802 of the Victims of 
Terrorism Compensation Act (5 U.S.C. 5569 note), the amount of 
such payment shall be determined by the President under the 
provisions of section 5569(d)(2) of title 5.
    ``(3)(A) The President--
          ``(i) may defer such payment in the case of any 
        former captive who during such one-year period is 
        charged with an offense described in clause (ii) of 
        this subparagraph, until final disposition of such 
        charge; and
          ``(ii) may deny such payment in the case of any 
        former captive who is convicted of a captivity-related 
        offense--
                  ``(I) referred to in subsection (b) or (c) of 
                section 8312 of title 5; or
                  ``(II) under chapter 47 of title 10 (the 
                Uniform Code of Military Justice) that is 
                punishable by dishonorable discharge, 
                dismissal, or confinement for one year or more.
    ``(B) For the purposes of subparagraph (A) of this 
paragraph, a captivity-related offense is an offense that is--
          ``(i) committed by a person while the person is in a 
        captive status; and
          ``(ii) related to the captive status of the person.
    ``(4) A payment under this subsection is in addition to any 
other amount provided by law.
    ``(5) Any amount due a person under this subsection shall, 
after the death of such person, be deemed to be pay and 
allowances for the purposes of this chapter.
    ``(6) Any payment made under paragraph (1) that is later 
denied under paragraph (3)(A)(ii) is a claim of the United 
States Government for purposes of section 3711 of title 31.
    ``(d) A determination by the President under subsection 
(a)(1) or (c) is final and is not subject to judicial 
review.''.
    (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter 
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new item:

``559. Benefits for members held as captives.''.

    (3)(A)(i) Except as provided in clause (ii), section 559 of 
title 37, United States Code, as added by paragraph (1), shall 
apply to any person whose captive status begins after January 
21, 1981.
    (ii)(I) Subsection (c) of such section shall apply to any 
person whose captive status begins on or after November 4, 
1979.
    (II) In the case of any person whose status as a captive 
terminated before the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
President shall make a payment under paragraph (1) of such 
subsection before the end of the one-year period beginning on 
such date.
    (B) Amounts may be allotted to a savings fund established 
under such section from pay and allowances for any pay period 
ending after January 21, 1981, and before the establishment of 
such fund.
    (C) Interest on amounts so allotted with respect to any 
such pay period shall be calculated as if the allotment had 
occurred at the end of such pay period.
    (b) Disability and Death Benefits.--(1) Chapter 53 of title 
10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof 
the following new section:

``Sec. 1032. Disability and death compensation: dependents of members 
                    held as captives

    ``(a) \44\ The President shall prescribe regulations under 
which the Secretary concerned may pay compensation for the 
disability or death of a dependent of a member of the uniformed 
services if the President determines that the disability or 
death--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \44\ Functions vested in the President by this section were 
delegated to the Secretary of Defense, to be exercised in consultation 
with the Secretary of Labor, by Executive Order 12598 (June 17, 1987; 
52 F.R. 23421).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ``(1) was caused by hostile action; and
          ``(2) was a result of the relationship of the 
        dependent to the member of the uniformed services.
    ``(b) Any compensation otherwise payable to a person under 
this section in connection with any disability or death shall 
be reduced by any amount payable to such person under any other 
program funded in whole or in part by the United States in 
connection with such disability or death, except that nothing 
in this subsection shall result in the reduction of any amount 
below zero.
    ``(c) A determination by the President under subsection (a) 
is conclusive and is not subject to judicial review.
    ``(d) In this section:
          ``(1) The term `dependent' has the meaning given that 
        term in section 551 of title 37.
          ``(2) The term `Secretary concerned' has the meaning 
        given that term in section 101 of that title.''.
    (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter 
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new item:

``1032. Disability and death compensation: dependents of members held as 
          captives.''.

    (3) Section 1032 of title 10, United States Code, as added 
by paragraph (1), shall apply with respect to any disability or 
death resulting from an injury that occurs after January 21, 
1981.
    (c) Medical Benefits.--(1) Chapter 55 of title 10, United 
States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the 
following new section:

``Sec. 1095a. Medical care: members held as captives and their 
                    dependents

    ``(a) Under regulations prescribed by the President, the 
Secretary concerned shall pay (by advancement or reimbursement) 
any person who is a former captive, and any dependent of that 
person or of a person who is in a captive status, for health 
care and other expenses related to such care, to the extent 
that such care--
          ``(1) is incident to the captive status; and
          ``(2) is not covered--
                  ``(A) by any other Government medical or 
                health program; or
                  ``(B) by insurance.
    ``(b) In the case of any person who is eligible for medical 
care under section 1074 or 1076 of this title, such regulations 
shall require that, whenever practicable, such care be provided 
in a facility of the uniformed services.
    ``(c) In this section:
          ``(1) `captive status' and `former captive' have the 
        meanings given those terms in section 559 of title 37.
          ``(2) `dependent' has the meaning given that term in 
        section 551 of that title.''.
    (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter 
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new item:

``1095a. Medical care: members held as captives and their dependents.''.

    (3)(A) Section 1095 of title 10, United States Code, as 
added by paragraph (1), shall apply with respect to any person 
whose captive status begins after January 21, 1981.
    (B) The President shall prescribe specific regulations 
regarding the carrying out of such section with respect to 
persons whose captive status begins during the period beginning 
on January 21, 1981, and ending on the effective date of that 
section.
    (d) Educational Assistance.--(1) Part III of title 10, 
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the 
following new chapter:

``CHAPTER 110--EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR MEMBERS HELD AS CAPTIVES AND 
                         THEIR DEPENDENTS \45\

``Sec.
``2181. Definitions.
\45\ Functions vested in the President by this chapter were delegated to 
    the Secretary of Defense by Executive Order 12598 (June 17, 1987; 52 
    F.R. 23421).
``2182. Educational assistance: dependents of captives.
``2183. Educational assistance: former captives.
``2184. Termination of assistance.
``2185. Programs to be consistent with programs administered by the 
          Department of Veterans Affairs.

``Sec. 2181. Definitions

    ``In this chapter:
          ``(1) The terms `captive status' and `former captive' 
        have the meanings given those terms in section 559 of 
        title 37.
          ``(2) The term `dependent' has the meaning given that 
        term in section 551 of that title.

``Sec. 2182. Educational assistance: dependents of captives

    ``(a) Under regulations prescribed by the President, the 
Secretary concerned shall pay (by advancement or reimbursement) 
a dependent of a person who is in a captive status for expenses 
incurred, while attending an educational or training 
institution, for--
          ``(1) substance;
          ``(2) tuition;
          ``(3) fees;
          ``(4) supplies;
          ``(5) books;
          ``(6) equipment; and
          ``(7) other educational expenses.
    ``(b) Except as provided in section 2184 of this title, 
payments shall be available under this section for dependent of 
a person who is in a captive status for education or training 
that occurs--
          ``(1) after that person is in a captive status for 
        not less than 90 days; and
          ``(2) on or before--
                  ``(A) the end of any semester or quarter (as 
                appropriate) that begins before the date on 
                which the captive status of that person 
                terminates;
                  ``(B) the earlier of the end of any course 
                that began before such date or the end of the 
                16-week period following that date if the 
                education or training institution is not 
                operated on a semester or quarter system; or
                  ``(C) a date specified by the Secretary 
                concerned in order to respond to special 
                circumstances.
    ``(c) If a person in a captive status or a former captive 
dies and the death is incident to the captivity, payments shall 
be available under this section for a dependent of that person 
for education or training that occurs after the date of the 
death of that person.
          ``(d) The provisions of this section shall not apply 
        to any dependent who is eligible for assistance under 
        chapter 35 of title 38 or similar assistance under any 
        other provision of law.

``Sec. 2183. Educational assistance: former captives

    ``(a) In order to respond to special circumstances, the 
Secretary concerned may pay (by advancement or reimbursement) a 
person who is a former captive for expenses incurred, while 
attending an educational or training institution, for--
          ``(1) substance;
          ``(2) tuition;
          ``(3) fees;
          ``(4) supplies;
          ``(5) books;
          ``(6) equipment; and
          ``(7) other educational expenses.
    ``(b) Except as provided in section 2184 of this title, 
payments shall be available under this section for a person who 
is a former captive for education or training that occurs--
          ``(1) after the termination of the status of that 
        person as a captive; and
          ``(2) on or before--
                  ``(A) the end of any semester or quarter (as 
                appropriate) that begins before the end of the 
                10-year period beginning on the date on which 
                the status of that person as a captive 
                terminates; or
                  ``(B) if the educational or training 
                institution is not operated on a semester or 
                quarter system, the earlier of the end of any 
                course that began before such date or the end 
                of the 16-week period following that date.
    ``(c) Payments shall be available under this section only 
to the extent that such payments are not otherwise authorized 
by law.

``Sec. 2184. Termination of assistance

    ``Assistance under this chapter--
          ``(1) shall be discounted for any person whose 
        conduct or progress is unsatisfactory under standards 
        consistent with those established under section 3524 of 
        title 38; and
          ``(2) may not be provided for any person for more 
        than 45 months (for the equivalent in other than full-
        time education or training).

``Sec. 2185. Programs to be consistent with programs administered by 
                    the Department of Veterans Affairs

    ``Regulations prescribed to carry out this chapter shall 
provide that the programs under this chapter shall be 
consistent with the educational assistance programs under 
chapters 35 and 36 of title 38.''.
    (2) The table of chapters at the beginning of subtitle A of 
such title, and the table of chapters at the beginning of part 
III of such subtitle, are amended by inserting after the item 
relating to chapter 109 the following new item:

``110. Educational Assistance for Members Held as Captives and 
              Their Dependents...................................2181''.

    (3) Chapter 110 of title 10, United States Code, as added 
by paragraph (1) shall apply with respect to persons whose 
captive status begins after January 21, 1981.
    (e) Account Used for Payment of Compensation for Victims of 
Terrorism.--(1) Chapter 19 of title 37, United States Code, is 
amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

``Sec. 1013. Payment of compensation for victims of terrorism

    ``Any benefit or payment pursuant to section 559 of this 
title, or section 1051 or 1095a or chapter 110 of title 10, 
shall be paid out of funds available to the Secretary concerned 
for military personnel.''.
    (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter 
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new item:

``1013. Payment of compensation for victims of terrorism.''.

 SEC. 807. REGULATIONS.

    Any regulation required by this title or by any amendment 
made by this title shall take effect not later than 6 months 
after the date of enactment of this Act.

SEC. 808. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ENTITLEMENTS.

    Provisions enacted by this title which provide new spending 
authority described in section 401(c)(2)(C) of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 shall not be effective until 
October 1, 1986.

                      TITLE IX--MARITIME SECURITY


SEC. 901. SHORT TITLE.

    This title may be cited as the ``International Maritime and 
Port Security Act''.

SEC. 902.\46\ INTERNATIONAL MEASURES FOR SEAPORT AND SHIPBOARD 
                    SECURITY.

    The Congress encourages the President to continue to seek 
agreement through the International Maritime Organization on 
matters of international seaport and shipboard security, and 
commends him on his efforts to date. In developing such 
agreement, each member country of the International Maritime 
Organization should consult with appropriate private sector 
interests in that country. Such agreement would establish 
seaport and vessel security measures and could include--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \46\ 46 U.S.C. app. 1801.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) seaport screening of cargo and baggage similar to 
        that done at airports;
          (2) security measures to restrict access to cargo, 
        vessels, and dockside property to authorized personnel 
        only;
          (3) additional security on board vessels;
          (4) licensing or certification of compliance with 
        appropriate security standards; and
          (5) other appropriate measures to prevent unlawful 
        acts against passengers and crews on board vessels.

SEC. 903. MEASURES TO PREVENT UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST PASSENGERS AND 
                    CREWS ON BOARD SHIPS.

    (a) Report on Progress of IMO.--The Secretary of 
Transportation and the Secretary of State, jointly, shall 
report to the Congress by February 28, 1987, on the progress of 
the International Maritime Organization in developing 
recommendations on Measures to prevent Unlawful Acts Against 
Passengers and Crews On Board Ships.
    (b) Content of Report.--The report required by subsection 
(a) shall include the following information--
          (1) the specific areas of agreement and disagreement 
        on the recommendations among the member nations of the 
        International Maritime Organization;
          (2) the activities of the Maritime Safety Committee, 
        the Facilitation Committee, and the Legal Committee of 
        the International Maritime Organization in regard to 
        the proposed recommendations; and
          (3) the security measures specified in the 
        recommendations.
    (c) Security Measures at United States Ports.--If the 
member nations of the International Maritime Organization have 
not finalized and accepted the proposed recommendations by 
February 28, 1987, the Secretary of Transportation shall 
include in the report required by this section a proposed plan 
of action (including proposed legislation if necessary) for the 
implementation of security measures at United States ports and 
on vessels operating from those parts based on the assessment 
of threat from acts of terrorism reported by the Secretary of 
Transportation under section 905.

SEC. 904. PANAMA CANAL SECURITY.

    Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this 
Act, the President shall report to the Congress on the status 
of physical security at the Panama Canal with respect to the 
threat of terrorism.

SEC. 905.\47\ THREAT OF TERRORISM TO UNITED STATES PORTS AND VESSELS.

    Not later than February 28, 1987, and annually thereafter, 
the Secretary of Transportation shall report to the Congress on 
the threat from acts of terrorism to United States ports and 
vessels operating from those ports.
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    \47\ 46 U.S.C. app. 1802
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SEC. 906. PORT, HARBOR, AND COASTAL FACILITY SECURITY.

    The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (33 U.S.C. 1221 
et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 6 of the 
following new section:
    ``Sec. 7. Port, Harbor, and Coastal Facility Security.
    ``(a) General Authority.--The Secretary may take actions 
described in subsection (b) to prevent or respond to an act of 
terrorism against--
          ``(1) an individual, vessel, or public or commercial 
        structure, that is--
                  ``(A) subject to the jurisdiction of the 
                United States; and
                  ``(B) located within or adjacent to the 
                marine environment; or
          ``(2) a vessel of the United States or an individual 
        on board that vessel.
    ``(b) Specific Authority.--Under subsection (a), the 
Secretary may--
          ``(1) carry out or require measures, including 
        inspections, port and harbor patrols, the establishment 
        of security and safety zones, and the development of 
        contingency plans and procedures, to prevent or respond 
        to acts of terrorism; and
          ``(2) recruit members of the Regular Coast Guard and 
        the Coast Guard Reserve and train members of the 
        Regular Coast Guard and the Coast Guard Reserve in the 
        techniques of preventing and responding to acts of 
        terrorism.''.

SEC. 907.\48\ SECURITY STANDARDS AT FOREIGN PORTS.

    (a) Assessment of Security Measures.--The Secretary of 
Transportation shall develop and implement a plan to assess the 
effectiveness of the security measures maintained at those 
foreign ports which the Secretary, in consultation with the 
Secretary of State, determines pose a high risk of acts of 
terrorism directed against passenger vessels.
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    \48\ 46 U.S.C. app. 1803.
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    (b) Consultation With the Secretary of State.--In carrying 
out subsection (a), the Secretary of Transportation shall 
consult the Secretary of State with respect to the terrorist 
threat which exists in each country and poses a high risk of 
acts of terrorism directed against passenger vessels.
    (c) Report of Assessments.--Not later than 6 months after 
the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
Transportation shall report to the Congress on the plan 
developed pursuant to subsection (a) and how the Secretary will 
implement the plan.
    (d) Determination and Notification to Foreign Country.--If, 
after implementing the plan in accordance with subsection (a), 
the Secretary of Transportation determines that a port does not 
maintain and administer effective security measures, the 
Secretary of State (after being informed by the Secretary of 
Transportation) shall notify the appropriate government 
authorities of the country in which the port is located of such 
determination, and shall recommend the steps necessary to bring 
the security measures in use at that port up to the standard 
used by the Secretary of Transportation in making such 
assessment.
    (e) Antiterrorism Assistance Related to Maritime 
Security.--The President is encouraged to provide antiterrorism 
assistance related to maritime security under chapter 8 of part 
II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to foreign countries, 
especially with respect to a port which the Secretary of 
Transportation determines under subsection (d) does not 
maintain and administer effective security measures.

SEC. 908.\49\ TRAVEL ADVISORIES CONCERNING SECURITY AT FOREIGN PORTS.

    (a) Travel Advisory.--Upon being notified by the Secretary 
of Transportation that the Secretary has determined that a 
condition exists that threatens the safety or security of 
passengers, passenger vessels, or crew traveling to or from a 
foreign port which the Secretary of Transportation has 
determined pursuant to section 907(d) to be a port which does 
not maintain and administer effective security measures, the 
Secretary of State shall immediately issue a travel advisory 
with respect to that port. Any travel advisory issued pursuant 
to this subsection shall be published in the Federal Register. 
The Secretary of State shall take the necessary steps to widely 
publicize that travel advisory.
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    \49\ 46 U.S.C. app. 1804.
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    (b) Lifting of Travel Advisory.--The travel advisory 
required to be issued under subsection (a) may be lifted only 
if the Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with the 
Secretary of State, has determined that effective security 
measures are maintained and administered at the port with 
respect to which the Secretary of Transportation had made the 
determination described in section 907(d).
    (c) Notification to Congress.--The Secretary of State shall 
immediately notify the Congress of any change in the status of 
a travel advisory imposed pursuant to this section.

SEC. 909.\50\ SUSPENSION OF PASSENGER SERVICES.

    (a) President's Determination.--Whenever the President 
determines that a foreign nation permits the use of territory 
under its jurisdiction as a base of operations or training for, 
or as a sanctuary for, or in any way arms, aids, or abets, any 
terrorist or terrorist group which knowingly uses the illegal 
seizure of passenger vessels or the threat thereof as an 
instrument of policy, the President may, without notice or 
hearing and for as long as the President determines necessary 
to assure the security of passenger vessels against unlawful 
seizure, suspend the right of any passenger vessel common 
carrier to operate to and from, and the right of any passenger 
vessel of the United States to utilize, any port in that 
foreign nation for passenger service.
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    \50\ 46 U.S.C. app. 1805.
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    (b) Prohibition.--It shall be unlawful for any passenger 
vessel common carrier, or any passenger vessel of the United 
States, to operate in violation of the suspension of rights by 
the President under this section.
    (c) Penalty.--(1) If a person operates a vessel in 
violation of this section, the Secretary of the department in 
which the Coast Guard is operating may deny the vessels of that 
person entry to United States ports.
    (2) A person violating this section is liable to the United 
States Government for a civil penalty of not more than $50,000. 
Each day a vessel utilizes a prohibited port shall be a 
separate violation of this section.

SEC. 910.\51\ SANCTIONS FOR THE SEIZURE OF VESSELS BY TERRORISTS.

    The Congress encourages the President--
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    \51\ 46 U.S.C. app. 1806.
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        (1) to review the adequacy of domestic and 
        international sanctions against terrorists who seize or 
        attempt to seize vessels; and
          (2) to strengthen where necessary, through bilateral 
        and multilateral efforts, the effectiveness of such 
        sanctions.
Not later than one year after the date of enactment of this 
Act, the President shall submit a report to the Congress which 
includes the review of such sanctions and the efforts to 
improve such sanctions.

SEC. 911.\52\ DEFINITIONS.

    For purposes of this title--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \52\ 46 U.S.C. app. 1807.
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          (1) the term ``common carrier'' has the same meaning 
        given such term in section 3(6) of the Shipping Act of 
        1984 (46 U.S.C. App. 1702(6)); and
          (2) the terms ``passenger vessel'' and ``vessel of 
        the United States'' have the same meaning given such 
        terms in section 2102 of title 46, United States Code.

SEC 912.\53\ AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    There are authorized to be appropriated $12,500,000 for 
each of the fiscal years 1987 through 1991, to be available to 
the Secretary of Transportation to carry out this title.
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    \53\ 46 U.S.C. app. 1808.
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SEC. 913.\54\ REPORTS.

    (a) Consolidation.--To the extent practicable, the reports 
required under sections 903, 905, and 907 shall be consolidated 
into a single document before being submitted to the Congress. 
Any classified material in those reports shall be submitted 
separately as an addendum to the consolidated report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \54\ 46 U.S.C. app. 1809.
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    (b) Submission to Committees.--The reports required to be 
submitted to the Congress under this title shall be submitted 
to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the House of Representatives 
\55\ and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee 
on Commerce, Science and Transportation of the Senate.
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    \55\ Sec. 1(a)(5) of Public Law 104-14 (109 Stat. 186) provided 
that references to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives shall be treated as referring to the Committee on 
International Relations of the House of Representatives.
    The House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries was abolished 
in the 104th Congress, and sec. 1(b)(3) of Public Law 104-14 (109 Stat. 
186) stated that the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the 
House of Representatives shall be treated as referring to the Committee 
on National Security of the House of Representatives, in the case of a 
provision of law relating to interoceanic canals, the Merchant Marine 
Academy and State Maritime Academies, or national security aspects of 
merchant marine.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

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              TITLE XI--SECURITY AT MILITARY BASES ABROAD


SEC. 1101.\56\ FINDINGS.

    The Congress finds that--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \56\ 10 U.S.C. 133 note.
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          (1) there is evidence that terrorists consider bases 
        and installations of United States Armed Forces outside 
        the United States to be targets for attack;
          (2) more attention should be given to the protection 
        of members of the Armed Forces, and members of their 
        families, stationed outside the United States; and
          (3) current programs to educate members of the Armed 
        Forces, and members of their families, stationed 
        outside of the United States to the threats of 
        terrorist activity and how to protect themselves should 
        be substantially expanded.

SEC. 1102.\56\ RECOMMENDED ACTIONS BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.

    It is the sense of the Congress that--
          (1) the Secretary of Defense should review the 
        security of each base and installation of the 
        Department of Defense outside the United States, 
        including the family housing and support activities of 
        each such base or installation, and take the steps the 
        Secretary considers necessary to improve the security 
        of such bases and installations; and
          (2) the Secretary of Defense should institute a 
        program of training for members of the Armed Forces, 
        and for members of their families, stationed outside 
        the United States concerning security and 
        antiterrorism.

SEC. 1103.\56\ REPORT TO THE CONGRESS.

    Not later than June 30, 1987, the Secretary of Defense 
shall report to the Congress on any actions taken by the 
Secretary described in section 1102.

       TITLE XII--CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM


SEC. 1201. ENCOURAGEMENT FOR NEGOTIATION OF A CONVENTION.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress 
that the President should establish a process encourage the 
negotiation of an international convention to prevent and 
control all aspects of international terrorism.
    (b) Relation to Existing International Conventions.--Such 
convention should address the prevention and control of 
international terrorism in a comprehensive fashion, taking into 
consideration matters not covered by--
          (1) the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
        Seizure of Aircraft (the Hague, December 16, 1970; 22 
        U.S.T. 1641, TIAS 7192);
          (2) the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
        Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal, 
        September 23, 1971; 24 U.S.T. 564, TIAS 7570);
          (3) the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
        of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons 
        (New York, December 14, 1973; 28 U.S.T. 1975, TIAS 
        8532);
          (4) the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages 
        (New York, December 17, 1979; XVIII International Legal 
        Materials 1457);
          (5) the Convention on the Physical Protection of 
        Nuclear Materials (October 26, 1979; XVIII 
        International Legal Materials 1419); and
          (6) the Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts 
        Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo, September 14, 1963; 
        20 U.S.T. 2941, TIAS 6768).
    (c) What the Convention Should Provide.--Such convention 
should provide--
          (1) an explicit definition of conduct constituting 
        terrorism;
          (2) effective close intelligence-sharing, joint 
        counterterrorist training, and uniform rules for asylum 
        and extradition for perpetrators of terrorism; and
          (3) effective criminal penalties for the swift 
        punishment of perpetrators of terrorism.
    (d) Consideration of an International Tribunal.--The 
President should also consider including on the agenda for 
these negotiations the possibility of eventually establishing 
an international tribunal for prosecuting terrorists.
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    \57\ Sec. 1202 added a new chapter 113A to title 18, U.S.C. 
(redesignated as chapter 113B).
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SEC. 1202.\57\ EXTRATERRITORIAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER TERRORIST 
                    CONDUCT. * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                    3. Crimes and Criminal Procedure

      Title 18, United States Code--Crimes and Criminal Procedure

                             PART I--CRIMES

                     CHAPTER 1--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 7. Special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United 
                    States defined

    The term ``special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of 
the United States'', as used in this title, includes:
          (1) The high seas, any other waters within the 
        admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United 
        States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular 
        State, and any vessel belonging in whole or in part to 
        the United States or any citizen thereof, or to any 
        corporation created by or under the laws of the United 
        States, or of any State, Territory, District, or 
        possession thereof, when such vessel is within the 
        admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United 
        States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular 
        State.
          (2) Any vessel registered, licensed, or enrolled 
        under the laws of the United States, and being on a 
        voyage upon the waters of any of the Great Lakes, or 
        any of the waters connecting them, or upon the Saint 
        Lawrence River where the same constitutes the 
        International Boundary Line.
          (3) Any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the 
        United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent 
        jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased or 
        otherwise acquired by the United States by consent of 
        the legislature of the State in which the same shall 
        be, for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, 
        dockyard, or other needful building.
          (4) Any island, rock, or key containing deposits of 
        guano, which may, at the discretion of the President, 
        be considered as appertaining to the United States.
          (5) Any aircraft belonging in whole or in part to the 
        United States, or any citizen thereof, or to any 
        corporation created by or under the laws of the United 
        States, or any State, Territory, district, or 
        possession thereof, while such aircraft is in flight 
        over the high seas, or over any other waters within the 
        admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United 
        States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular 
        State.
          (6) Any vehicle used or designed for flight or 
        navigation in space and on the registry of the United 
        States pursuant to the Treaty on Principles Governing 
        the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
        Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial 
        Bodies and the Convention on Registration of Objects 
        Launched into Outer Space, while that vehicle is in 
        flight, which is from the moment when all external 
        doors are closed on Earth following embarkation until 
        the moment when one such door is opened on Earth for 
        disembarkation or in the case of a forced landing, 
        until the competent authorities take over the 
        responsibility for the vehicle and for persons and 
        property aboard.
          (7) Any place outside the jurisdiction of any nation 
        with respect to an offense by or against a national of 
        the United States.
          (8) To the extent permitted by international law, any 
        foreign vessel during a voyage having a scheduled 
        departure from or arrival in the United States with 
        respect to an offense committed by or against a 
        national of the United States.

                 CHAPTER 2--AIRCRAFT AND MOTOR VEHICLES

Sec. 32. Destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities

    (a) Whoever willfully--
          (1) sets fire to, damages, destroys, disables, or 
        wrecks any aircraft in the special aircraft 
        jurisdiction of the United States or any civil aircraft 
        used, operated, or employed in interstate, overseas, or 
        foreign air commerce;
          (2) places or causes to be placed a destructive 
        device or substance in, upon, or in proximity to, or 
        otherwise makes or causes to be made unworkable or 
        unusable or hazardous to work or use, any such 
        aircraft, or any part or other materials used or 
        intended to be used in connection with the operation of 
        such aircraft, if such placing or causing to be placed 
        or such making or causing to be made is likely to 
        endanger the safety of any such aircraft;
          (3) sets fire to, damages, destroys, or disables any 
        air navigation facility, or interferes by force or 
        violence with the operation of such facility, if such 
        fire, damaging, destroying, disabling, or interfering 
        is likely to endanger the safety of any such aircraft 
        in flight;
          (4) with the intent to damage, destroy, or disable 
        any such aircraft, sets fire to, damages, destroys, or 
        disables or places a destructive device or substance 
        in, upon, or in proximity to, any appliance or 
        structure, ramp, landing area, property, machine, or 
        apparatus, or any facility or other material used, or 
        intended to be used, in connection with the operation, 
        maintenance, loading, unloading or storage of any such 
        aircraft or any cargo carried or intended to be carried 
        on any such aircraft;
          (5) performs an act of violence against or 
        incapacitates any individual on any such aircraft, if 
        such act of violence or incapacitation is likely to 
        endanger the safety of such aircraft;
          (6) communicates information, knowing the information 
        to be false and under circumstances in which such 
        information may reasonably be believed, thereby 
        endangering the safety of any such aircraft in flight; 
        or
          (7) attempts to do anything prohibited under 
        paragraphs (1) through (6) of this subsection;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 
twenty years or both.
    (b) Whoever willfully--
          (1) performs an act of violence against any 
        individual on board any civil aircraft registered in a 
        country other than the United States while such 
        aircraft is in flight, if such act is likely to 
        endanger the safety of that aircraft;
          (2) destroys a civil aircraft registered in a country 
        other than the United States while such aircraft is in 
        service or causes damage to such an aircraft which 
        renders that aircraft incapable of flight or which is 
        likely to endanger that aircraft's safety in flight;
          (3) places or causes to be placed on a civil aircraft 
        registered in a country other than the United States 
        while such aircraft is in service, a device or 
        substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or 
        to cause damage to that aircraft which renders that 
        aircraft incapable of flight or which is likely to 
        endanger that aircraft's safety in flight; or
          (4) attempts to commit an offense described in 
        paragraphs (1) through (3) of this subsection;
shall, if the offender is later found in the United States, be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty 
years, or both.
    (c) Whoever willfully imparts or conveys any threat to do 
an act which would violate any of paragraphs (1) through (5) of 
subsection (a) or any of paragraphs (1) through (3) of 
subsection (b) of this section, with an apparent determination 
and will to carry the threat into execution shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or 
both.

Sec. 37. Violence at international airports

    (a) Offense.--A person who unlawfully and intentionally, 
using any device, substance, or weapon--
          (1) performs an act of violence against a person at 
        an airport serving international civil aviation that 
        causes or is likely to cause serious bodily injury (as 
        defined in section 1365 of this title) or death; or
          (2) destroys or seriously damages the facilities of 
        an airport serving international civil aviation or a 
        civil aircraft not in service located thereon or 
        disrupts the services of the airport, if such an act 
        endangers or is likely to endanger safety at that 
        airport, or attempts to do such an act, shall be fined 
        under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or 
        both; and if the death of any person results from 
        conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall be 
        punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years 
        or for life.
    (b) Jurisdiction.--There is jurisdiction over the 
prohibited activity in subsection (a) if--
          (1) the prohibited activity takes place in the United 
        States; or
          (2) the prohibited activity takes place outside the 
        United States and the offender is later found in the 
        United States.
    (c) It is a bar to Federal prosecution under subsection (a) 
for conduct that occurred within the United States that the 
conduct involved was during or in relation to a labor dispute, 
and such conduct is prohibited as a felony under the law of the 
State in which it was committed. For purposes of this section, 
the term ``labor dispute'' has the meaning set forth in section 
2(c) \1\ of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. 
113(c)).
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    \1\ So in original. Probably should be section ``13(c)''.
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                           CHAPTER 7--ASSAULT

Sec. 112.\2\ Protection of foreign officials, official guests, and 
                    internationally protected persons

    (a) Whoever assaults, strikes, wounds, imprisons, or offers 
violence to a foreign official, official guest, or 
internationally protected person or makes any other violent 
attack upon the person or liberty of such person, or, if likely 
to endanger his person or liberty, makes a violent attack upon 
his official premises, private accommodation, or means of 
transport or attempts to commit any of the foregoing shall be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, 
or both. Whoever in the commission of any such act uses a 
deadly or dangerous weapon, or inflicts bodily injury shall be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, 
or both.
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    \2\ Sec. 112 was enacted by the Act for the Protection of Foreign 
Officials and Official Guests of the United States (Public Law 92-539; 
86 Stat. 1070), and was amended and restated by sec. 5 of Public Law 
94-467. Sec. 2 of Public Law 92-539 provided the following statement of 
findings and delcaration of policy:
    ``Sec. 2. The Congress recognizes that from the beginning of our 
history as a nation, the police power to investigate, prosecute, and 
punish common crimes such as murder, kidnapping, and assault has 
resided in the several States, and that such power should remain with 
the States.
    ``The Congress finds, however, that harassment, intimidation, 
obstruction, coercion, and acts of violence committed against foreign 
officials or their family members in the United States or against 
official guests of the United States adversely affect the foreign 
relations of the United States.
    ``Accordingly, this legislation is intended to afford the United 
States jurisdiction concurrent with that of the several States to 
proceed against those who by such acts interfere with its conduct of 
foreign affairs.''.
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    (b) Whoever willfully--
          (1) intimidates, coerces, threatens, or harasses a 
        foreign official or an official guest or obstructs a 
        foreign official in the performance of his duties;
          (2) attempts to intimidate, coerce, threaten, or 
        harass a foreign official or an official guest or 
        obstruct a foreign official in the performance of his 
        duties; or
          (3) within the United States but outside the District 
        of Columbia and within one hundred feet of any building 
        or premises in whole or in part owned, used, or 
        occupied for official business or for diplomatic, 
        consular, or residential purposes by--
                  (A) a foreign government, including such use 
                as a mission to an international organization;
                  (B) an international organization;
                  (C) a foreign official; or
                  (D) an official guest;
        congregates with two or more other persons with intent 
        to violate any other provision of this section;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than six 
months, or both.
    (c) For the purpose of this section ``foreign government'', 
``foreign official'', ``internationally protected person'', 
``international organization'', ``national of the United 
States'', and ``official guest'' shall have the same meanings 
as those provided in section 1116(b) of this title.
    (d) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed or 
applied so as to abridge the exercise of rights guaranteed 
under the first amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States.
    (e) If the victim of an offense under subsection (a) is an 
internationally protected person outside the United States, the 
United States may exercise jurisdiction over the offense if (1) 
the victim is a representative, officer, employee, or agent of 
the United States, (2) an offender is a national of the United 
States, or (3) an offender is afterwards found in the United 
States. As used in this subsection, the United States includes 
all areas under the jurisdiction of the United States including 
any of the places within the provisions of sections 5 and 7 of 
this title and section 46501(2) of title 49.
    (f) In the course of enforcement of subsection (a) and any 
other sections prohibiting a conspiracy or attempt to violate 
subsection (a), the Attorney General may request assistance 
from any Federal, State, or local agency, including the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force, any statute, rule, or regulation to the 
contrary, notwithstanding.

                   CHAPTER 10--BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS \3\

Sec. 175. Prohibitions with respect to biological weapons

    (a) In General.--Whoever knowingly develops, produces, 
stockpiles, transfers, acquires, retains, or possesses any 
biological agent, toxin, or delivery system for use as a 
weapon, or knowingly assists a foreign state or any 
organization to do so, or attempts, threatens, or conspires to 
do the same, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for 
life or any term of years, or both. There is extraterritorial 
Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this section 
committed by or against a national of the United States.
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    \3\ The Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 enacted a new 
chapter 10 to 18 U.S.C. relating to biological weapons to implement the 
Biological Weapons Convention. The freestanding sections of the Act 
provided as follows:
    ``AN ACT To implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction, by prohibiting 
certain conduct relating to biological weapons, and for other purposes.
    ``Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,
    ``SECTION 1. [18 U.S.C. 175 note] SHORT TITLE.
    ``This Act may be cited as the `Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism 
Act of 1989'.
    ``SEC. 2. [18 U.S.C. 175 note] PURPOSE AND INTENT.
    ``(a) Purpose.--The purpose of this Act is to--
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          ``(1) implement the Biological Weapons Convention, an 
        international agreement unanimously ratified by the United 
        States Senate in 1974 and signed by more than 100 other 
        nations, including the Soviet Union; and
          ``(2) protect the United States against the threat of 
        biological terrorism.
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    ``(b) Intent of Act.--Nothing in this Act is intended to restrain 
or restrict peaceful scientific research or development.''.
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    (b) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the term 
`for use as a weapon' does not include the development, 
production, transfer, acquisition, retention, or possession of 
any biological agent, toxin, or delivery system for 
prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes.

Sec. 175a.\4\ Requests for military assistance to enforce prohibition 
                    in certain emergencies

    The Attorney General may request the Secretary of Defense 
to provide assistance under section 382 of title 10 in support 
of Department of Justice activities relating to the enforcement 
of section 175 of this title in an emergency situation 
involving a biological weapon of mass destruction. The 
authority to make such a request may be exercised by another 
official of the Department of Justice in accordance with 
section 382(f)(2) of title 10.''.
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    \4\ Sec. 1416(c)(1)A) of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201; 110 Stat. 2723) enacted a new 
sec. 175a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 176. Seizure, forfeiture, and destruction

    (a) In General.--(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
the Attorney General may request the issuance, in the same 
manner as provided for a search warrant, of a warrant 
authorizing the seizure of any biological agent, toxin, or 
delivery system that--
          (A) exists by reason of conduct prohibited under 
        section 175 of this title; or
          (B) is of a type or in a quantity that under the 
        circumstances has no apparent justification for 
        prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes.
    (2) In exigent circumstances, seizure and destruction of 
any biological agent, toxin, or delivery system described in 
subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1) may be made upon 
probable cause without the necessity for a warrant.
    (b) Procedure.--Property seized pursuant to subsection (a) 
shall be forfeited to the United States after notice to 
potential claimants and an opportunity for a hearing. At such 
hearing, the Government shall bear the burden of persuasion by 
a preponderance of the evidence. Except as inconsistent 
herewith, the same procedures and provisions of law relating to 
a forfeiture under the customs laws shall extend to a seizure 
or forfeiture under this section. The Attorney General may 
provide for the destruction or other appropriate disposition of 
any biological agent, toxin, or delivery system seized and 
forfeited pursuant to this section.
    (c) Affirmative Defense.--It is an affirmative defense 
against a forfeiture under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section 
that--
          (1) such biological agent, toxin, or delivery system 
        is for a prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful 
        purpose; and
          (2) such biological agent, toxin, or delivery system, 
        is of a type and quantity reasonable for that purpose.

Sec. 177. Injunctions

    (a) In General.--The United States may obtain in a civil 
action an injunction against--
          (1) the conduct prohibited under section 175 of this 
        title;
          (2) the preparation, solicitation, attempt, threat, 
        or conspiracy to engage in conduct prohibited under 
        section 175 of this title; or
          (3) the development, production, stockpiling, 
        transferring, acquisition, retention, or possession, or 
        the attempted development, production, stockpiling, 
        transferring, acquisition, retention, or possession of 
        any biological agent, toxin, or delivery system of a 
        type or in a quantity that under the circumstances has 
        no apparent justification for prophylactic, protective, 
        or other peaceful purposes.
    (b) Affirmative Defense.--It is an affirmative defense 
against an injunction under subsection (a)(3) of this section 
that--
          (1) the conduct sought to be enjoined is for a 
        prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purpose; 
        and
          (2) such biological agent, toxin, or delivery system 
        is of a type and quantity reasonable for that purpose.

Sec. 178. Definitions

    As used in this chapter--
          (1) the term ``biological agent'' means any micro-
        organism, virus, infectious substance, or biological 
        product that may be engineered as a result of 
        biotechnology, or any naturally occurring or 
        bioengineered component of any such microorganism, 
        virus, infectious substance, or biological product, 
        capable of causing--
                  (A) death, disease, or other biological 
                malfunction in a human, an animal, a plant, or 
                another living organism;
                  (B) deterioration of food, water, equipment, 
                supplies, or material of any kind; or
                  (C) deleterious alteration of the 
                environment;
          (2) the term ``toxin'' means the toxic material of 
        plants, animals, microorganisms, viruses, fungi, or 
        infectious substances, or a recombinant molecule, 
        whatever its origin or method of production, 
        including--
                  (A) any poisonous substance or biological 
                product that may be engineered as a result of 
                biotechnology produced by a living organism; or
                  (B) any poisonous isomer or biological 
                product, homolog, or derivative of such a 
                substance;
          (3) the term `delivery system' means--
                  (A) any apparatus, equipment, device, or 
                means of delivery specifically designed to 
                deliver or disseminate a biological agent, 
                toxin, or vector; or
                  (B) any vector;
          (4) the term ``vector'' means a living organism, or 
        molecule, including a recombinant molecule, or 
        biological product that may be engineered as a result 
        of biotechnology, capable of carrying a biological 
        agent or toxin to a host; and
          (5) the term ``national of the United States'' has 
        the meaning prescribed in section 101(a)(22) of the 
        Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)).

                CHAPTER 39--EXPLOSIVES AND COMBUSTIBLES


Sec. 831. Prohibited transactions involving nuclear materials

    (a) Whoever, if one of the circumstances described in 
subsection (c) of this section occurs--
          (1) without lawful authority, intentionally receives, 
        possesses, uses, transfers, alters, disposes of, or 
        disperses any nuclear material and--
                  (A) thereby knowingly causes the death of or 
                serious bodily injury to any person or 
                substantial damage to property; or
                  (B) knows that circumstances exist which are 
                likely to cause the death of or serious bodily 
                injury to any person or substantial damage to 
                property;
          (2) with intent to deprive another of nuclear 
        material, knowingly--
                  (A) takes and carries away nuclear material 
                of another without authority;
                  (B) makes an unauthorized use, disposition, 
                or transfer, of nuclear material belonging to 
                another; or
                  (C) uses fraud and thereby obtains nuclear 
                material belonging to another;
          (3) knowingly--
                  (A) uses force; or
          (B) threatens or places another in fear that any 
        person other than the actor will imminently be subject 
        to bodily injury;
and thereby takes nuclear material belonging to another from 
the person or presence of any other;
          (4) intentionally intimidates any person and thereby 
        obtains nuclear material belonging to another;
          (5) with intent to compel any person, international 
        organization, or governmental entity to do or refrain 
        from doing any act, knowingly threatens to engage in 
        conduct described in paragraph (2)(A) or (3) of this 
        subsection;
          (6) knowingly threatens to use nuclear material to 
        cause death or serious bodily injury to any person or 
        substantial damage to property under circumstances in 
        which the threat may reasonably be understood as an 
        expression of serious purposes;
          (7) attempts to commit an offense under paragraph 
        (1), (2), (3), or (4) of this subsection; or
          (8) is a party to a conspiracy of two or more persons 
        to commit an offense under paragraph (1), (2), (3), or 
        (4) of this subsection, if any of the parties 
        intentionally engages in any conduct in furtherance of 
        such offense;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this 
section.
    (b) The punishment for an offense under--
          (1) paragraphs (1) through (7) of subsection (a) of 
        this section is--
                  (A) a fine under this title; and
                  (B) imprisonment--
                          (i) for any term of years or for life 
                        (I) if, while committing the offense, 
                        the offender knowingly causes the death 
                        of any person; or (II) if, while 
                        committing an offense under paragraph 
                        (1) or (3) of subsection (a) of this 
                        section, the offender, under 
                        circumstances manifesting extreme 
                        indifference to the life of an 
                        individual, knowingly engages in any 
                        conduct and thereby recklessly causes 
                        the death of or serious bodily injury 
                        to any person; and
                          (ii) for not more than 20 years in 
                        any other case; and
          (2) paragraph (8) of subsection (a) of this section 
        is--
                  (A) a fine under this title; and
                  (B) imprisonment--
                          (i) for not more than 20 years if the 
                        offense which is the object of the 
                        conspiracy is punishable under 
                        paragraph (1)(B)(i); and
                          (ii) for not more than 10 years in 
                        any other case.
    (c) The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) of this 
section are that--
          (1) the offense is committed in the United States or 
        the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of 
        the United States, or the special aircraft jurisdiction 
        of the United States (as defined in section 46501 of 
        title 49);
          (2) the defendant is a national of the United States, 
        as defined in section 101 of the Immigration and 
        Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101);
          (3) at the time of the offense the nuclear material 
        is in use, storage, or transport, for peaceful 
        purposes, and after the conduct required for the 
        offense occurs the defendant is found in the United 
        States, even if the conduct required for the offense 
        occurs outside the United States; or
          (4) the conduct required for the offense occurs with 
        respect to the carriage of a consignment of nuclear 
        material for peaceful purposes by any means of 
        transportation intended to go beyond the territory of 
        the state where the shipment originates beginning with 
        the departure from a facility of the shipper in that 
        state and ending with the arrival at a facility of the 
        receiver within the state of ultimate destination and 
        either of such states is the United States.
    (d) The Attorney General may request assistance from the 
Secretary of Defense under chapter 18 of title 10 in the 
enforcement of this section and the Secretary of Defense may 
provide such assistance in accordance with chapter 18 of title 
10, except that the Secretary of Defense may provide such 
assistance through any Department of Defense personnel.
    (e)(1) The Attorney General may also request assistance 
from the Secretary of Defense under this subsection in the 
enforcement of this section. Notwithstanding section 1385 of 
this title, the Secretary of Defense may, in accordance with 
other applicable law, provide such assistance to the Attorney 
General if--
          (A) an emergency situation exists (as jointly 
        determined by the Attorney General and the Secretary of 
        Defense in their discretion); and
          (B) the provision of such assistance will not 
        adversely affect the military preparedness of the 
        United States (as determined by the Secretary of 
        Defense in such Secretary's discretion).
    (2) As used in this subsection, the term ``emergency 
situation'' means a circumstance--
          (A) that poses a serious threat to the interests of 
        the United States; and
          (B) in which--
                          (i) enforcement of the law would be 
                        seriously impaired if the assistance 
                        were not provided; and
                          (ii) civilian law enforcement 
                        personnel are not capable of enforcing 
                        the law.
    (3) Assistance under this section may include--
          (A) use of personnel of the Department of Defense to 
        arrest persons and conduct searches and seizures with 
        respect to violations of this section; and
          (B) such other activity as is incidental to the 
        enforcement of this section, or to the protection of 
        persons or property from conduct that violates this 
        section.
    (4) The Secretary of Defense may require reimbursement as a 
condition of assistance under this section.
    (5) The Attorney General may delegate the Attorney 
General's function under this subsection only to a Deputy, 
Associate, or Assistant Attorney General.
    (f) As used in this section--
          (1) the term ``nuclear material'' means material 
        containing any--
                  (A) plutonium with an isotopic concentration 
                not in excess of 80 percent plutonium 238;
                  (B) uranium not in the form of ore or ore 
                residue that contains the mixture of isotopes 
                as occurring in nature;
                  (C) uranium that contains the isotope 233 or 
                235 or both in such amount that the abundance 
                ratio of the sum of those isotopes to the 
                isotope 238 is greater than the ratio of the 
                isotope 235 to the isotope 238 occurring in 
                nature; or
                  (D) uranium 233;
          (2) the term ``international organization'' means a 
        public international organization designated as such 
        pursuant to section 1 of the International 
        Organizations Immunities Act (22 U.S.C. 288) or a 
        public organization created pursuant to treaty or other 
        agreement under international law as an instrument 
        through or by which two or more foreign governments 
        engage in some aspect of their conduct of international 
        affairs;
          (3) the term ``serious bodily injury'' means bodily 
        injury which involves--
                  (A) a substantial risk of death;
                  (B) extreme physical pain;
                  (C) protracted and obvious disfigurement; or
                  (D) protracted loss or impairment of the 
                function of a bodily member, organ, or mental 
                faculty; and
          (4) the term ``bodily injury'' means--
                  (A) a cut, abrasion, bruise, burn, or 
                disfigurement;
                  (B) physical pain;
                  (C) illness;
                  (D) impairment of a function of a bodily 
                member, organ, or mental faculty; or
                  (E) any other injury to the body, no matter 
                how temporary.

                   CHAPTER 41--EXTORTION AND THREATS


Sec. 878.\5\ Threats and extortion against foreign officials, official 
                    guests, or internationally protected persons

    (a) Whoever knowingly and willfully threatens to violate 
section 112, 1116, or 1201 shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than five years, or both, except that 
imprisonment for a threatened assault shall not exceed three 
years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Added by sec. 8 of Public Law 94-467 (90 Stat. 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Whoever in connection with any violation of subsection 
(a) or actual violation of section 112, 1116, or 1201 makes any 
extortionate demand shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
    (c) For the purpose of this section ``foreign official'', 
``internationally protected person'', ``national of the United 
States'', and ``official guest'' shall have the same meanings 
as those provided in section 1116(a) of this title.
    (d) If the victim of an offense under subsection (a) is an 
internationally protected person outside the United States, the 
United States may exercise jurisdiction over the offense if (1) 
the victim is a representative, officer, employee, or agent of 
the United States, (2) an offender is a national of the United 
States, or (3) an offender is afterwards found in the United 
States. As used in this subsection, the United States includes 
all areas under the jurisdiction of the United States including 
any of the places within the provisions of section 5 and 7 of 
this title and section 46501(2) of title 49.

                          CHAPTER 44--FIREARMS


Sec. 922. Unlawful acts

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    (p)(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, 
import, sell, ship, deliver, possess, transfer, or receive any 
firearm--
          (A) that, after removal of grips, stocks, and 
        magazines, is not as detectable as the Security 
        Exemplar, by walk-through metal detectors calibrated 
        and operated to detect the Security Exemplar; or
          (B) any major component of which, when subjected to 
        inspection by the types of x-ray machines commonly used 
        at airports, does not generate an image that accurately 
        depicts the shape of the component. Barium sulfate or 
        other compounds may be used in the fabrication of the 
        component.
    (2) For purposes of this subsection--
          (A) the term ``firearm'' does not include the frame 
        or receiver of any such weapon;
          (B) the term ``major component'' means, with respect 
        to a firearm, the barrel, the slide or cylinder, or the 
        frame or receiver of the firearm; and
          (C) the term ``Security Exemplar'' means an object, 
        to be fabricated at the direction of the Secretary, 
        that is--
                  (i) constructed of, during the 12-month 
                period beginning on the date of the enactment 
                of this subsection, 3.7 ounces of material type 
                17-4 PH stainless steel in a shape resembling a 
                handgun; and
                  (ii) suitable for testing and calibrating 
                metal detectors:
        Provided, however, That at the close of such 12-month 
        period, and at appropriate times thereafter the 
        Secretary shall promulgate regulations to permit the 
        manufacture, importation, sale, shipment, delivery, 
        possession, transfer, or receipt of firearms previously 
        prohibited under this subparagraph that are as 
        detectable as a ``Security Exemplar'' which contains 
        3.7 ounces of material type 17-4 PH stainless steel, in 
        a shape resembling a handgun, or such lesser amount as 
        is detectable in view of advances in state-of-the-art 
        developments in weapons detection technology.
    (3) Under such rules and regulations as the Secretary shall 
prescribe, this subsection shall not apply to the manufacture, 
possession, transfer, receipt, shipment, or delivery of a 
firearm by a licensed manufacturer or any person acting 
pursuant to a contract with a licensed manufacturer, for the 
purpose of examining and testing such firearm to determine 
whether paragraph (1) applies to such firearm. The Secretary 
shall ensure that rules and regulations adopted pursuant to 
this paragraph do not impair the manufacture of prototype 
firearms or the development of new technology.
    (4) The Secretary shall permit the conditional importation 
of a firearm by a licensed importer or licensed manufacturer, 
for examination and testing to determine whether or not the 
unconditional importation of such firearm would violate this 
subsection.
    (5) This subsection shall not apply to any firearm which--
          (A) has been certified by the Secretary of Defense or 
        the Director of Central Intelligence, after 
        consultation with the Secretary and the Administrator 
        of the Federal Aviation Administration, as necessary 
        for military or intelligence applications; and
          (B) is manufactured for and sold exclusively to 
        military or intelligence agencies of the United States.
    (6) This subsection shall not apply with respect to any 
firearm manufactured in, imported into, or possessed in the 
United States before the date of the enactment of the 
Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 924. Penalties

    (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, 
subsection (b), (c), or (f) of this section, or in section 929, 
whoever--
          (A) knowingly makes any false statement or 
        representation with respect to the information required 
        by this chapter to be kept in the records of a person 
        licensed under this chapter or in applying for any 
        license or exemption or relief from disability under 
        the provisions of this chapter;
          (B) knowingly violates subsection (a)(4), (f), (k), 
        (r), (v), or (w) of section 922;
          (C) knowingly imports or brings into the United 
        States or any possession thereof any firearm or 
        ammunition in violation of section 922(l); or
          (D) willfully violates any other provision of this 
        chapter,
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than five 
years, or both.
    (2) Whoever knowingly violates subsection (a)(6), (d), (g), 
(h), (i), (j), or (o) of section 922 shall be fined as provided 
in this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
    (3) Any licensed dealer, licensed importer, licensed 
manufacturer, or licensed collector who knowingly--
          (A) makes any false statement or representation with 
        respect to the information required by the provisions 
        of this chapter to be kept in the records of a person 
        licensed under this chapter, or
          (B) violates subsection (m) of section 922,
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than one 
year, or both.
    (4) Whoever violates section 922(q) shall be fined under 
this title, imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the term of 
imprisonment imposed under this paragraph shall not run 
concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed under 
any other provision of law. Except for the authorization of a 
term of imprisonment of not more than 5 years made in this 
paragraph, for the purpose of any other law a violation of 
section 922(q) shall be deemed to be a misdemeanor.
    (5) \6\ Whoever knowingly violates subsection (s) or (t) of 
section 922 shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for not 
more than 1 year, or both.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ So in original. Two pars. (5) have been enacted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (5)(A)(i) \6\ A juvenile who violates section 922(x) shall 
be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 1 year, or 
both, except that a juvenile described in clause (ii) shall be 
sentenced to probation on appropriate conditions and shall not 
be incarcerated unless the juvenile fails to comply with a 
condition of probation.
    (ii) A juvenile is described in this clause if--
          (I) the offense of which the juvenile is charged is 
        possession of a handgun or ammunition in violation of 
        section 922(x)(2); and
          (II) the juvenile has not been convicted in any court 
        of an offense (including an offense under section 
        922(x) or a similar State law, but not including any 
        other offense consisting of conduct that if engaged in 
        by an adult would not constitute an offense) or 
        adjudicated as a juvenile delinquent for conduct that 
        if engaged in by an adult would constitute an offense.
    (B) A person other than a juvenile who knowingly violates 
section 922(x)--
          (i) shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not 
        more than 1 year, or both; and
          (ii) if the person sold, delivered, or otherwise 
        transferred a handgun or ammunition to a juvenile 
        knowing or having reasonable cause to know that the 
        juvenile intended to carry or otherwise possess or 
        discharge or otherwise use the handgun or ammunition in 
        the commission of a crime of violence, shall be fined 
        under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or 
        both.
    (b) Whoever, with intent to commit therewith an offense 
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or 
with knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that an offense 
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year is to 
be committed therewith, ships, transports, or receives a 
firearm or any ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce 
shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than 
ten years, or both.
    (c)(1)(A) \7\ Except to the extent that a greater minimum 
sentence is otherwise provided by this subsection or by any 
other provision of law, any person who, during and in relation 
to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime (including a 
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime that provides for 
an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or 
dangerous weapon or device) for which the person may be 
prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a 
firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a 
firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such 
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Sec. 924(c) was ammended by Public Law 105-386 (112 Stat. 
3469).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not 
        less than 5 years;
          (ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a 
        term of imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and
          (iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a 
        term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years.
    (B) If the firearm possessed by a person convicted of a 
violation of this subsection--
          (i) is a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled 
        shotgun, or semiautomatic assault weapon, the person 
        shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not 
        less than 10 years; or
          (ii) is a machinegun or a destructive device, or is 
        equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, 
        the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
        of not less than 30 years.
    (C) In the case of a second or subsequent conviction under 
this subsection, the person shall--
          (i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not 
        less than 25 years; and
          (ii) if the firearm involved is a machinegun or a 
        destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm 
        silencer or firearm muffler, be sentenced to 
        imprisonment for life.
    (D) Notwithstanding any other provision of law--
          (i) a court shall not place on probation any person 
        convicted of a violation of this subsection; and
          (ii) no term of imprisonment imposed on a person 
        under this subsection shall run concurrently with any 
        other term of imprisonment imposed on the person, 
        including any term of imprisonment imposed for the 
        crime of violence or drug trafficking crime during 
        which the firearm was used, carried, or possessed.
    (2) For purposes of this subsection, the term ``drug 
trafficking crime'' means any felony punishable under the 
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the 
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et 
seq.), or the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App. 
1901 et seq.).
    (3) For purposes of this subsection the term ``crime of 
violence'' means an offense that is a felony and--
          (A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
        threatened use of physical force against the person or 
        property of another, or
          (B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk 
        that physical force against the person or property of 
        another may be used in the course of committing the 
        offense.
    (4) \8\ For purposes of this subsection, the term 
`brandish' means, with respect to a firearm, to display all or 
part of the firearm, or otherwise make the presence of the 
firearm known to another person, in order to intimidate that 
person, regardless of whether the firearm is directly visible 
to that person.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Sec. 924(c)(4) was added by Public Law 105-386 (112 Stat. 
3469).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (d)(1) Any firearm or ammunition involved in or used in any 
knowing violation of subsection (a)(4), (a)(6), (f), (g), (h), 
(i), (j), or (k) of section 922, or knowing importation or 
bringing into the United States or any possession thereof any 
firearm or ammunition in violation of section 922(l), or 
knowing violation of section 924, or willful violation of any 
other provision of this chapter or any rule or regulation 
promulgated thereunder, or any violation of any other criminal 
law of the United States, or any firearm or ammunition intended 
to be used in any offense referred to in paragraph (3) of this 
subsection, where such intent is demonstrated by clear and 
convincing evidence, shall be subject to seizure and 
forfeiture, and all provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 relating to the seizure, forfeiture, and disposition of 
firearms, as defined in section 5845(a) of that Code, shall, so 
far as applicable, extend to seizures and forfeitures under the 
provisions of this chapter: Provided, That upon acquittal of 
the owner or possessor, or dismissal of the charges against him 
other than upon motion of the Government prior to trial, or 
lapse of or court termination of the restraining order to which 
he is subject, the seized or relinquished firearms or 
ammunition shall be returned forthwith to the owner or 
possessor or to a person delegated by the owner or possessor 
unless the return of the firearms or ammunition would place the 
owner or possessor or his delegate in violation of law. Any 
action or proceeding for the forfeiture of firearms or 
ammunition shall be commenced within one hundred and twenty 
days of such seizure.
    (2)(A) In any action or proceeding for the return of 
firearms or ammunition seized under the provisions of this 
chapter, the court shall allow the prevailing party, other than 
the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee, and the United 
States shall be liable therefor.
    (B) In any other action or proceeding under the provisions 
of this chapter, the court, when it finds that such action was 
without foundation, or was initiated vexatiously, frivolously, 
or in bad faith, shall allow the prevailing party, other than 
the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee, and the United 
States shall be liable therefor.
    (C) Only those firearms or quantities of ammunition 
particularly named and individually identified as involved in 
or used in any violation of the provisions of this chapter or 
any rule or regulation issued thereunder, or any other criminal 
law of the United States or as intended to be used in any 
offense referred to in paragraph (3) of this subsection, where 
such intent is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence, 
shall be subject to seizure, forfeiture, and disposition.
    (D) The United States shall be liable for attorneys' fees 
under this paragraph only to the extent provided in advance by 
appropriation Acts.
    (3) The offenses referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2)(C) 
of this subsection are--
          (A) any crime of violence, as that term is defined in 
        section 924(c)(3) of this title;
          (B) any offense punishable under the Controlled 
        Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.) or the 
        Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 
        951 et seq.);
          (C) any offense described in section 922(a)(1), 
        922(a)(3), 922(a)(5), or 922(b)(3) of this title, where 
        the firearm or ammunition intended to be used in any 
        such offense is involved in a pattern of activities 
        which includes a violation of any offense described in 
        section 922(a)(1), 922(a)(3), 922(a)(5), or 922(b)(3) 
        of this title;
          (D) any offense described in section 922(d) of this 
        title where the firearm or ammunition is intended to be 
        used in such offense by the transferor of such firearm 
        or ammunition;
          (E) any offense described in section 922(i), 922(j), 
        922(l), 922(n), or 924(b) of this title; and
          (F) any offense which may be prosecuted in a court of 
        the United States which involves the exportation of 
        firearms or ammunition.
    (e)(1) In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) 
of this title and has three previous convictions by any court 
referred to in section 922(g)(1) of this title for a violent 
felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on 
occasions different from one another, such person shall be 
fined not more than $25,000 and imprisoned not less than 
fifteen years, and, notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
the court shall not suspend the sentence of, or grant a 
probationary sentence to, such person with respect to the 
conviction under section 922(g).
    (2) As used in this subsection--
          (A) the term ``serious drug offense'' means--
                          (i) an offense under the Controlled 
                        Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), 
                        the Controlled Substances Import and 
                        Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or 
                        the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act 
                        (46 U.S.C. App. 1901 et seq.) for which 
                        a maximum term of imprisonment of ten 
                        years or more is prescribed by law; or
                          (ii) an offense under State law, 
                        involving manufacturing, distributing, 
                        or possessing with intent to 
                        manufacture or distribute, a controlled 
                        substance (as defined in section 102 of 
                        the Controlled Substances Act (21 
                        U.S.C. 802)), for which a maximum term 
                        of imprisonment of ten years or more is 
                        prescribed by law;
          (B) the term ``violent felony'' means any crime 
        punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one 
        year, or any act of juvenile delinquency involving the 
        use or carrying of a firearm, knife, or destructive 
        device that would be punishable by imprisonment for 
        such term if committed by an adult, that--
                          (i) has as an element the use, 
                        attempted use, or threatened use of 
                        physical force against the person of 
                        another; or
                          (ii) is burglary, arson, or 
                        extortion, involves use of explosives, 
                        or otherwise involves conduct that 
                        presents a serious potential risk of 
                        physical injury to another; and
          (C) the term ``conviction'' includes a finding that a 
        person has committed an act of juvenile delinquency 
        involving a violent felony.
    (f) In the case of a person who knowingly violates section 
922(p), such person shall be fined under this title, or 
imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
    (g) Whoever, with the intent to engage in conduct which--
          (1) constitutes an offense listed in section 1961(1),
          (2) is punishable under the Controlled Substances Act 
        (21 U.S.C. 802 et seq.), the Controlled Substances 
        Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or the 
        Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1901 
        et seq.),
          (3) violates any State law relating to any controlled 
        substance (as defined in section 102(6) of the 
        Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802(6))), or
          (4) constitutes a crime of violence (as defined in 
        subsection (c)(3)),
travels from any State or foreign country into any other State 
and acquires, transfers, or attempts to acquire or transfer, a 
firearm in such other State in furtherance of such purpose, 
shall be imprisoned not more than 10 years, fined in accordance 
with this title, or both.
    (h) Whoever knowingly transfers a firearm, knowing that 
such firearm will be used to commit a crime of violence (as 
defined in subsection (c)(3)) or drug trafficking crime (as 
defined in subsection (c)(2)) shall be imprisoned not more than 
10 years, fined in accordance with this title, or both.
    (i)(1) \9\ A person who knowingly violates section 922(u) 
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 
years, or both.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ So in original. Two subsecs. (i) have been enacted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (2) Nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed 
as indicating an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the 
field in which provisions of this subsection operate to the 
exclusion of State laws on the same subject matter, nor shall 
any provision of this subsection be construed as invalidating 
any provision of State law unless such provision is 
inconsistent with any of the purposes of this subsection.
    (i) \9\ A person who, in the course of a violation of 
subsection (c), causes the death of a person through the use of 
a firearm, shall--
          (1) if the killing is a murder (as defined in section 
        1111), be punished by death or by imprisonment for any 
        term of years or for life; and
          (2) if the killing is manslaughter (as defined in 
        section 1112), be punished as provided in that section.
    (j) A person who, with intent to engage in or to promote 
conduct that--
          (1) is punishable under the Controlled Substances Act 
        (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances 
        Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or the 
        Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1901 
        et seq.);
          (2) violates any law of a State relating to any 
        controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the 
        Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 802); or
          (3) constitutes a crime of violence (as defined in 
        subsection (c)(3),\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ So in original. Probably should be subsection ``(c)(3)),''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
smuggles or knowingly brings into the United States a firearm, 
or attempts to do so, shall be imprisoned not more than 10 
years, fined under this title, or both.
    (k) A person who steals any firearm which is moving as, or 
is a part of, or which has moved in, interstate or foreign 
commerce shall be imprisoned for not more than 10 years, fined 
under this title, or both.
    (l) A person who steals any firearm from a licensed 
importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed 
collector shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more 
than 10 years, or both.
    (m) A person who, with the intent to engage in conduct that 
constitutes a violation of section 922(a)(1)(A), travels from 
any State or foreign country into any other State and acquires, 
or attempts to acquire, a firearm in such other State in 
furtherance of such purpose shall be imprisoned for not more 
than 10 years.
    (n) A person who conspires to commit an offense under 
subsection (c) shall be imprisoned for not more than 20 years, 
fined under this title, or both; and if the firearm is a 
machinegun or destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm 
silencer or muffler, shall be imprisoned for any term of years 
or life.

                     CHAPTER 45--FOREIGN RELATIONS


Sec. 970.\11\ Protection of property occupied by foreign governments

    (a) Whoever willfully injures, damages, or destroys, or 
attempts to injure, damage, or destroy, any property, real or 
personal, located within the United States and belonging to or 
utilized or occupied by any foreign government or international 
organization, by a foreign official or official guest, shall be 
fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than five years, 
or both.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Sec. 970 was enacted by the Act for the Protection of Foreign 
Officials and Official Guests of the United States (Public Law 92-539; 
86 Stat. 1070).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Whoever, willfully with intent to intimidate, coerce, 
threaten, or harass--
          (1) forcibly thrusts any part of himself or any 
        object within or upon that portion of any building or 
        premises located within the United States, which 
        portion is used or occupied for official business or 
        for diplomatic, consular, or residential purposes by--
                  (A) a foreign government, including such use 
                as a mission to an international organization;
                  (B) an international organization;
                  (C) a foreign official; or
                  (D) an official guest; or
          (2) refuses to depart from such portion of such 
        building or premises after a request--
                  (A) by an employee of a foreign government or 
                of an international organization, if such 
                employee is authorized to make such request by 
                the senior official of the unit of such 
                government or organization which occupies such 
                portion of such building or premises;
                  (B) by a foreign official or any member of 
                the foreign official's staff who is authorized 
                by the foreign official to make such request;
                  (C) by an official guest or any member of the 
                official guest's staff who is authorized by the 
                official guest to make such request; or
                  (D) by any person present having law 
                enforcement powers;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than six 
months, or both.
    (c) For the purpose of this section ``foreign government'', 
``foreign official'', ``international organization'', and 
``official guest'' shall have the same meanings as those 
provided in section 116(b) of this title.

                          CHAPTER 51--HOMICIDE


Sec. 1116.\12\ Murder or manslaughter of foreign officials, official 
                    guests, or internationally protected persons

    (a) Whoever kills or attempts to kill a foreign official, 
official guest, or internationally protected person shall be 
punished as provided under sections 1111, 1112, and 1113 of 
this title, except that.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ Sec. 1116 was enacted by the Act for the Protection of Foreign 
Officials and Official Guests of the United States (Public Law 92-539; 
86 Stat. 1070), and amended and restated by sec. 2 of Public Law 94-
467.
    \13\ So in original. The phrase ``except that'' preceding the 
period probably should not appear.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) For the purposes of this section:
          (1) ``Family'' includes (a) a spouse, parent, brother 
        or sister, child, or person to whom the foreign 
        official of internationally protected person stands in 
        loco parentis, or (b) any other person living in his 
        household and related to the foreign official or 
        internationally protected person by blood or marriage.
          (2) ``Foreign government'' means the government of a 
        foreign country, irrespective of recognition by the 
        United States.
          (3) ``Foreign official'' means--
                  (A) a Chief of State or the political 
                equivalent, President, Vice President, Prime 
                Minister, Ambassador, Foreign Minister, or 
                other officer of Cabinet rank or above of a 
                foreign government or the chief executive 
                officer of an international organization, or 
                any person who has previously served in such 
                capacity, and any member of his family, while 
                in the United States; and
                  (B) any person of a foreign nationality who 
                is duly notified to the United States as an 
                officer or employee of a foreign government or 
                international organization, and who is in the 
                United States on official business, and any 
                member of his family whose presence in the 
                United States is in connection with the 
                presence of such officer or employee.
          (4) ``Internationally protected person'' means--
                  (A) a Chief of State or the political 
                equivalent, head of government, or Foreign 
                Minister whenever such person is in a country 
                other than his own and any member of his family 
                accompanying him; or
                  (B) any other representative, officer, 
                employee, or agent of the United States 
                Government, a foreign government, or 
                international organization who at the time and 
                place concerned is entitled pursuant to 
                international law to special protection against 
                attack upon his person, freedom, or dignity, 
                and any member of his family then forming part 
                of his household.
          (5) ``International organization'' means a public 
        international organization designated as such pursuant 
        to section 1 of the International Organizations 
        Immunities Act (22 U.S.C. 288) or a public organization 
        created pursuant to treaty or other agreement under 
        international law as an instrument through or by which 
        two or more foreign governments engage in some aspect 
        of their conduct of international affairs.
          (6) ``Official guest'' means a citizen or national of 
        a foreign country present in the United States as an 
        official guest of the Government of the United States 
        pursuant to designation as such by the Secretary of 
        State.
          (7) \14\ ``National of the United States'' has the 
        meaning prescribed in section 101(a)(22) of the 
        Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Sec. 721(c)(1) of Public Law 104-132 (110 Stat. 1298) added 
para. (7). Sec. 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
defines the term as ``(A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) a 
person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent 
allegiance to the United States.''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (c) If the victim of an offense under subsection (a) is an 
internationally protected person outside the United States, the 
United States may exercise jurisdiction over the offense if (1) 
the victim is a representative, officer, employee, or agent of 
the United States, (2) an offender is a national of the United 
States, or (3) an offender is afterwards found in the United 
States. As used in this subsection, the United States includes 
all areas under the jurisdiction of the United States including 
any of the places within the provisions of sections 5 and 7 of 
this title and section 46501(2) of title 49.
    (d) In the course of enforcement of this section and any 
other sections prohibiting a conspiracy or attempt to violate 
this section, the Attorney General may request assistance from 
any Federal, State, or local agency, including the Army, Navy, 
and Air Force, any statute, rule, or regulation to the contrary 
notwithstanding.

Sec. 1117.\15\ Conspiracy to murder

    If two or more persons conspire to violate section 1111, 
1114, 1116, or 1119 of this title, and one or more of such 
persons do any overt act to effect the object of the 
conspiracy, each shall be punished by imprisonment for any term 
of years or for life.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Sec. 1117 was enacted by the Act for the Protection of Foreign 
Officials and Official Guests of the United States (Public Law 92-539; 
86 Stat. 1070).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                         CHAPTER 55--KIDNAPPING


Sec. 1201.\16\ Kidnapping

    (a) Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, 
kidnaps, abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom or 
reward or otherwise any person, except in the case of a minor 
by the parent thereof, when--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ Sec. 1201 was enacted by the Act for the Protection of Foreign 
Officials and Official Guests of the United States (Public Law 92-539; 
86 Stat. 1070).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) the person is willfully transported in interstate 
        or foreign commerce regardless of whether the person 
        was alive when transported across a State boundary if 
        the person was alive when the transportation began;
          (2) any such act against the persons is done within 
        the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of 
        the United States;
          (3) any such act against the person is done within 
        the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States 
        as defined in section 46501 of title 49;
          (4) the person is a foreign official, an 
        internationally protected person, or an official guest 
        as those terms are defined in section 1116(b) of this 
        title; or
          (5) the person is among those officers and employees 
        described in section 1114 of this title and any such 
        act against the person is done while the person is 
        engaged in, or on account of, the performance of 
        official duties;
shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for 
life and, if the death of any person results, shall be punished 
by death or life imprisonment.
    (b) With respect to subsection (a)(1), above, the failure 
to release the victim within twenty-four hours after he shall 
have been unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, 
kidnapped, abducted, or carried away shall create a rebuttable 
presumption that such person has been transported in interstate 
or foreign commerce. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, 
the fact that the presumption under this section has not yet 
taken effect does not preclude a Federal investigation of a 
possible violation of this section before the 24-hour period 
has ended.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ Last sentence added by sec. 702(c) of Public Law 105-314 (112 
Stat. 2987).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (c) If two or more persons conspire to violate this section 
and one or more of such persons do any overt act to effect the 
object of the conspiracy, each shall be punished by 
imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
    (d) Whoever attempts to violate subsection (a) shall be 
punished by imprisonment for not more than twenty years.
    (e) If the victim of an offense under subsection (a) is an 
internationally protected person outside the United States, the 
United States may exercise jurisdiction over the offense if (1) 
the victim is a representative, officer, employee, or agent of 
the United States, (2) an offender is a national of the United 
States, or (3) an offender is afterwards found in the United 
States. As used in this subsection, the United States includes 
all areas under the jurisdiction of the United States including 
any of the places within the provisions of section 5 and 7 of 
this title and section 46501(2) of title 49. For purposes of 
this subsection, the term ``national of the United States'' has 
the meaning prescribed in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)).
    (f) In the course of enforcement of subsection (a)(4) and 
any other sections prohibiting a conspiracy or attempt to 
violate subsection (a)(4), the Attorney General may request 
assistance from any Federal, State, or local agency, including 
the Army, Navy, and Air Force, any statute, rule, or regulation 
to the contrary notwithstanding.''.
    (g) Special Rule for Certain Offenses Involving Children.--
          (1) To whom applicable.--If--
                  (A) the victim of an offense under this 
                section has not attained the age of eighteen 
                years; and
                  (B) the offender--
                          (i) has attained such age; and
                          (ii) is not--
                                  (I) a parent;
                                  (II) a grandparent;
                                  (III) a brother;
                                  (IV) a sister;
                                  (V) an aunt;
                                  (VI) an uncle; or
                                  (VII) an individual having 
                                legal custody of the victim;
the sentence under this section for such offense shall be 
subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection.
          (2) Guidelines.--The United States Sentencing 
        Commission is directed to amend the existing guidelines 
        for the offense of ``kidnapping, abduction, or unlawful 
        restraint,'' by including the following additional 
        specific offense characteristics: If the victim was 
        intentionally maltreated (i.e., denied either food or 
        medical care) to a life-threatening degree, increase by 
        4 levels; if the victim was sexually exploited (i.e., 
        abused, used involuntarily for pornographic purposes) 
        increase by 3 levels; if the victim was placed in the 
        care or custody of another person who does not have a 
        legal right to such care or custody of the child either 
        in exchange for money or other consideration, increase 
        by 3 levels; if the defendant allowed the child to be 
        subjected to any of the conduct specified in this 
        section by another person, then increase by 2 levels.
    (h) As used in this section, the term ``parent'' does not 
include a person whose parental rights with respect to the 
victim of an offense under this section have been terminated by 
a final court order.

                    CHAPTER 75--PASSPORTS AND VISAS


Sec. 1541. Issuance Without Authority.

    Whoever, acting or claiming to act in any office or 
capacity under the United States, or a State, without lawful 
authority grants, issues, or verifies any passport or other 
instrument in the nature of a passport to or for any person 
whomsoever; or
    Whoever, being a consular officer authorized to grant, 
issue, or verify passports, knowingly and willfully grants, 
issues, or verifies any such passport to or for any person not 
owing allegiance, to the United States, whether a citizen or 
not--
    Shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 
25 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate an act of 
international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of this 
title)), 20 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate a 
drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 929(a) of this 
title)), 10 years (in the case of the first or second such 
offense, if the offense was not committed to facility such an 
act of international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime), or 
15 years (in the case of any other offense),\18\ or both.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ Sec. 211(a)(2) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (division C of Public Law 104-208; 110 Stat. 
3009) struck out ``imprisoned not more than ten years'' and inserted in 
lieu thereof ``imprisoned not more than 25 years (if the offense was 
committed to facilitate an act of international terrorism (as defined 
in section 2331 of this title)), 20 years (if the offense was committed 
to facilitate a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 929(a) of 
this title)), 10 years (in the case of the first or second such 
offense, if the offense was not committed to facility such an act of 
international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime), or 15 years (in 
the case of any other offense)''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For purposes of this section, the term ``State'' means a 
State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any 
commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.

Sec. 1542. False Statement in Application and Use of Passport.

    Whoever willfully and knowingly makes any false statement 
in an application for passport with intent to induce or secure 
the issuance of a passport under the authority of the United 
States, either for his own use or the use of another, contrary 
to the laws regulating the issuance of passports or the rules 
prescribed pursuant to such laws; or
    Whoever willfully and knowingly uses, or attempts to use, 
or furnishes to another for use any passport the issue of which 
was secured in any way by reason of any false statement--
    Shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 
25 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate an act of 
international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of this 
title)), 20 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate a 
drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 929(a) of this 
title)), 10 years (in the case of the first or second such 
offense, if the offense was not committed to facility such an 
act of international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime), or 
15 years (in the case of any other offense),\19\ or both.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Sec. 211(a)(2) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (division C of Public Law 104-208; 110 Stat. 
3009) struck out ``imprisoned not more than ten years'' and inserted in 
lieu thereof ``imprisoned not more than 25 years (if the offense was 
committed to facilitate an act of international terrorism (as defined 
in section 2331 of this title)), 20 years (if the offense was committed 
to facilitate a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 929(a) of 
this title)), 10 years (in the case of the first or second such 
offense, if the offense was not committed to facility such an act of 
international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime), or 15 years (in 
the case of any other offense)''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 1543. Forgery or False Use of Passport.

    Whoever falsely makes, forges, counterfeits, mutilates, or 
alters any passport or instrument purporting to be a passport, 
with intent that the same may be used; or
    Whoever willfully and knowingly uses, or attempts to use, 
or furnishes to another for use any such false, forged, 
counterfeited, mutilated, or altered passport or instrument 
purporting to be a passport, or any passport validly issued 
which has become void by the occurrence of any condition 
therein prescribed invalidating the same--
    Shall be fined not under this title, imprisoned not more 
than 25 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate an 
act of international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of 
this title)), 20 years (if the offense was committed to 
facilitate a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 
929(a) of this title)), 10 years (in the case of the first or 
second such offense, if the offense was not committed to 
facility such an act of international terrorism or a drug 
trafficking crime), or 15 years (in the case of any other 
offense),\19\ or both.

Sec. 1544. Misuse of Passport.

    Whoever willfully and knowingly uses, or attempts to use, 
any passport issued or designed for the use of another; or
    Whoever willfully and knowingly uses, or attempts to use, 
any passport in violation of the conditions or restrictions 
therein contained or of the rules prescribed pursuant to the 
laws regulating the issuance of passports; or
    Whoever willfully and knowingly furnishes, disposes of, or 
delivers a passport to any person, for use by another than the 
person for whose use it was originally issued and designed--
    Shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 
25 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate an act of 
international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of this 
title)), 20 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate a 
drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 929(a) of this 
title)), 10 years (in the case of the first or second such 
offense, if the offense was not committed to facility such an 
act of international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime), or 
15 years (in the case of any other offense),\19\ or both.

Sec. 1545. Safe Conduct Violation.

    Whoever violates any safe conduct or passport duly obtained 
and issued under authority of the United States shall be fined 
under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

Sec. 1546. Fraud and Misuse of Visas, Permits, and Other Documents.

    (a) Whoever knowingly forges, counterfeits, alters, or 
falsely makes any immigrant or nonimmigrant visa, permit, 
border crossing card, alien registration receipt card, or other 
document prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into or 
as evidence of authorized stay or employment in the United 
States, or utters, uses, attempts to use, possesses, obtains, 
accepts, or receives any such visa, permit, border crossing 
card, alien registration receipt card, or other document 
prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into or as 
evidence of authorized stay or employment in the United States, 
knowing it to be forged, counterfeited, altered, or falsely 
made, or to have been procured by means of any false claim or 
statement, or to have been otherwise procured by fraud or 
unlawfully obtained; or
    Whoever, except under direction of the Attorney General or 
the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
or other proper officer, knowingly possesses any blank permit, 
or engraves, sells, brings into the United States, or has in 
his control or possession any plate in the likeness of a plate 
designed for the printing of permits, or makes any print, 
photograph, or impression in the likeness of any immigrant or 
nonimmigrant visa, permit or other document required for entry 
into the United States, or has in his possession a distinctive 
paper which has been adopted by the Attorney General or the 
Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service for 
the printing of such visas, permits, or documents; or
    Whoever, when applying for an immigrant or nonimmigrant 
visa, permit, or other document required for entry into the 
United States, or for admission to the United States personates 
another, or falsely appears in the name of a deceased 
individual, or evades or attempts to evade the immigration laws 
by appearing under an assumed or fictitious name without 
disclosing his true identity, or sells or otherwise disposes 
of, or offers to sell or otherwise dispose of, or utters, such 
visa, permit, or other document, to any person not authorized 
by law to receive such document; or
    Whoever knowingly makes under oath, or as permitted under 
penalty of perjury under section 1746 of title 28, United 
States Code, knowingly subscribes as true, any false statement 
with respect to a material fact in any application, affidavit, 
or other document required by the immigration laws or 
regulations prescribed thereunder, or knowingly presents any 
such application, affidavit, or other document which contains 
any such false statement or which fails to contain any 
reasonable basis in law or fact--
    Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 
25 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate an act of 
international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of this 
title)), 20 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate a 
drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 929(a) of this 
title)), 10 years (in the case of the first or second such 
offense, if the offense was not committed to facility such an 
act of international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime), or 
15 years (in the case of any other offense),\20\ or both.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ Sec. 211(a)(2) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (division C of Public Law 104-208; 110 Stat. 
3009) struck out ``imprisoned not more than ten years'' and inserted in 
lieu thereof ``imprisoned not more than 25 years (if the offense was 
committed to facilitate an act of international terrorism (as defined 
in section 2331 of this title)), 20 years (if the offense was committed 
to facilitate a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 929(a) of 
this title)), 10 years (in the case of the first or second such 
offense, if the offense was not committed to facility such an act of 
international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime), or 15 years (in 
the case of any other offense)''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Whoever uses--
          (1) an identification document, knowing (or having 
        reason to know) that the document was not issued 
        lawfully for the use of the possessor,
          (2) an identification document knowing (or having 
        reason to know) that the document is false, or
          (3) a false attestation,
for the purpose of satisfying a requirement of section 274A(b) 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, shall be fined under 
this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
    (c) This section does not prohibit any lawfully authorized 
investigative, protective, or intelligence activity of a law 
enforcement agency of the United States, a State, or a 
subdivision of a State, or of an intelligence agency of the 
United States, or any activity authorized under title V of the 
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. For purposes of this 
section, the term ``State'' means a State of the United States, 
the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or 
possession of the United States.

                         CHAPTER 111--SHIPPING


Sec. Sec. 2280. Violence against maritime navigation

    (a) Offenses.--
          (1) In general.--A person who unlawfully and 
        intentionally--
                  (A) seizes or exercises control over a ship 
                by force or threat thereof or any other form of 
                intimidation;
                  (B) performs an act of violence against a 
                person on board a ship if that act is likely to 
                endanger the safe navigation of that ship;
                  (C) destroys a ship or causes damage to a 
                ship or to its cargo which is likely to 
                endanger the safe navigation of that ship;
                  (D) places or causes to be placed on a ship, 
                by any means whatsoever, a device or substance 
                which is likely to destroy that ship, or cause 
                damage to that ship or its cargo which 
                endangers or is likely to endanger the safe 
                navigation of that ship;
                  (E) destroys or seriously damages maritime 
                navigational facilities or seriously interferes 
                with their operation, if such act is likely to 
                endanger the safe navigation of a ship;
                  (F) communicates information, knowing the 
                information to be false and under circumstances 
                in which such information may reasonably be 
                believed, thereby endangering the safe 
                navigation of a ship;
                  (G) injures or kills any person in connection 
                with the commission or the attempted commission 
                of any of the offenses set forth in 
                subparagraphs (A) through (F); or
                  (H) attempts to do any act prohibited under 
                subparagraphs (A) through (G),
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 
years,or both; and if the death of any person results from 
conductprohibited by this paragraph, shall be punished by death 
orimprisoned for any term of years or for life.
          (2) Threat to navigation.--A person who threatens to 
        do any actprohibited under paragraph (1)(B), (C) or 
        (E), with apparentdetermination and will to carry the 
        threat into execution, if thethreatened act is likely 
        to endanger the safe navigation of the shipin question, 
        shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not 
        morethan 5 years, or both.
    (b) Jurisdiction.--There is jurisdiction over the activity 
prohibited in subsection (a)--
          (1) in the case of a covered ship, if--
                  (A) such activity is committed--
                          (i) against or on board a ship flying 
                        the flag of the United States at the 
                        time the prohibited activity is 
                        committed;
                          (ii) in the United States and the 
                        activity is not prohibited as a crime 
                        by the State in which the activity 
                        takes place; or
                          (iii) the activity takes place on a 
                        ship flying the flag of a foreign 
                        country or outside the United States, 
                        by a national of the United States or 
                        by a stateless person whose habitual 
                        residence is in the United States;
                  (B) during the commission of such activity, a 
                national of the United States is seized, 
                threatened, injured or killed; or
                  (C) the offender is later found in the United 
                States after such activity is committed;
          (2) in the case of a ship navigating or scheduled to 
        navigate solely within the territorial sea or internal 
        waters of a country other than the United States, if 
        the offender is later found in the United States after 
        such activity is committed; and
          (3) in the case of any vessel, if such activity is 
        committed in an attempt to compel the United States to 
        do or abstain from doingany act.
    (c) Bar To Prosecution.--It is a bar to Federal prosecution 
under subsection (a) for conduct that occurred within the 
United States that the conduct involved was during or in 
relation to a labor dispute, and such conduct is prohibited as 
a felony under the law of the State in which it was committed. 
For purposes of this section, the term ``labor dispute'' has 
the meaning set forth in section 2(c) \21\ of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. 113(c)).
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    \21\ So in original. Probably should be section ``13(c)''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (d) Delivery of Suspected Offender.--The master of a 
covered ship flying the flag of the United States who has 
reasonable grounds to believe that there is on board that ship 
any person who has committed an offense under Article 3 of the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation may deliver such person to the 
authorities of a State Party to that Convention. Before 
delivering such person to the authorities of another country, 
the master shall notify in an appropriate manner the Attorney 
General of the United States of the alleged offense and await 
instructions from the Attorney General as to what action to 
take. When delivering the person to a country which is a State 
Party to the Convention, the master shall, whenever 
practicable, and if possible before entering the territorial 
sea of such country, notify the authorities of such country of 
the master's intention to deliver such person and the reasons 
therefor. If the master delivers such person, the master shall 
furnish to the authorities of such country the evidence in the 
master's possession that pertains to the alleged offense.
    (e) Definitions.--In this section--
          ``covered ship'' means a ship that is navigating or 
        is scheduled to navigate into, through or from waters 
        beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea of a 
        single country or a lateral limit of that country's 
        territorial sea with an adjacent country.
          ``national of the United States'' has the meaning 
        stated in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and 
        Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)).
          ``territorial sea of the United States'' means all 
        waters extending seaward to 12 nautical miles from the 
        baselines of the United States determined in accordance 
        with international law.
          ``ship'' means a vessel of any type whatsoever not 
        permanently attached to the sea-bed, including 
        dynamically supported craft, submersibles or any other 
        floating craft, but does not include a warship, a ship 
        owned or operated by a government when being used as a 
        naval auxiliary or for customs or police purposes, or a 
        ship which has been withdrawn from navigation or laid 
        up.
          ``United States'', when used in a geographical sense, 
        includes the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the 
        Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands and all 
        territories and possessions of the United States.

Sec. 2281. Violence against maritime fixed platforms

    (a) Offenses.--
          (1) In general.--A person who unlawfully and 
        intentionally--
                  (A) seizes or exercises control over a fixed 
                platform by force or threat thereof or any 
                other form of intimidation;
                  (B) performs an act of violence against a 
                person on board a fixed platform if that act is 
                likely to endanger its safety;
                  (C) destroys a fixed platform or causes 
                damage to it which is likely to endanger its 
                safety;
                  (D) places or causes to be placed on a fixed 
                platform, by any means whatsoever, a device or 
                substance which is likely to destroy that fixed 
                platform or likely to endanger its safety;
                  (E) injures or kills any person in connection 
                with the commission or the attempted commission 
                of any of the offenses set forth in 
                subparagraphs (A) through (D); or
                  (F) attempts to do anything prohibited under 
                subparagraphs (A) through (E),
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 
years, or both; and if death results to any person from conduct 
prohibited by this paragraph, shall be punished by death or 
imprisoned for any term of years or for life.
          (2) Threat to safety.--A person who threatens to do 
        anything prohibited under paragraph (1)(B) or (C), with 
        apparent determination and will to carry the threat 
        into execution, if the threatened act is likely to 
        endanger the safety of the fixed platform, shall be 
        fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 
        years, or both.
    (b) Jurisdiction.--There is jurisdiction over the activity 
prohibited in subsection (a) if--
          (1) such activity is committed against or on board a 
        fixed platform--
                  (A) that is located on the continental shelf 
                of the United States;
                  (B) that is located on the continental shelf 
                of another country, by a national of the United 
                States or by a stateless person whose habitual 
                residence is in the United States; or
                  (C) in an attempt to compel the United States 
                to do or abstain from doing any act;
          (2) during the commission of such activity against or 
        on board a fixed platform located on a continental 
        shelf, a national of the United States is seized, 
        threatened, injured or killed; or
          (3) such activity is committed against or on board a 
        fixed platform located outside the United States and 
        beyond the continental shelf of the United States and 
        the offender is later found in the United States.
    (c) Bar To Prosecution.--It is a bar to Federal prosecution 
under subsection (a) for conduct that occurred within the 
United States that the conduct involved was during or in 
relation to a labor dispute, and such conduct is prohibited as 
a felony under the law of the State in which it was committed. 
For purposes of this section, the term ``labor dispute'' has 
the meaning set forth in section 2(c) \22\ of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. 113(c)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ So in original. Probably should be section ``13(c)''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (d) Definitions.--In this section--
          ``continental shelf'' means the sea-bed and subsoil 
        of the submarine areas that extend beyond a country's 
        territorial sea to the limits provided by customary 
        international law as reflected in Article 76 of the 
        1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.
          ``fixed platform'' means an artificial island, 
        installation or structure permanently attached to the 
        sea-bed for the purpose of exploration or exploitation 
        of resources or for other economic purposes.
          ``national of the United States'' has the meaning 
        stated in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and 
        Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)).
          ``territorial sea of the United States'' means all 
        waters extending seaward to 12 nautical miles from the 
        baselines of the United States determined in accordance 
        with international law.
          ``United States'', when used in a geographical sense, 
        includes the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the 
        Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands and all 
        territories and possessions of the United States.

                      CHAPTER 113B--TERRORISM \23\


Sec. 2331.\24\ Definitions

    As used in this chapter--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ Sec. 250002(a) of Public Law 103-322 (108 Stat. 2082) 
redesignated this chapter as chapter 113B from chapter 113A, and 
inserted a new chapter 113A relating to telemarketing fraud.
    \24\ Sec. 132 of Public Law 101-519 (104 Stat. 225) amended section 
2331 of chapter 113A, title 18, U.S.C., redesignated it as section 
2332, and added new secs. 2331, 2333 through 2338. Sec. 132(d) of that 
Act further provided that ``This section and the amendments made by 
this section shall apply to any pending case and any cause of action 
arising on or after 3 years before the date of enactment of this 
section.''.
    However, sec. 402 of Public Law 102-27 (105 Stat. 155), as amended 
by sec. 126 of Public Law 102-136 (105 Stat. 643), repealed the 
amendments of Public Law 101-519, restoring sec. 2332 as sec. 2331. 
Sec. 402 of Public Law 102-27, as amended, provided as follows:
    ``sec. 402. military construction.
    ``(a) In Public Law 101-519, the Military Construction 
Appropriations Act, 1991, sections 131 and 132 are hereby repealed 
effective November 5, 1990.
    ``(b) Effective November 5, 1990, chapter 113A of title 18, United 
States Code, is amended to read as if section 132 of Public Law 101-519 
[104 Stat. 2250] had not been enacted.''.
    Subsequently, sec. 1003(a) of the Federal Courts Administration Act 
of 1992 (Public Law 102-572; 106 Stat. 4521) redesignated sec. 2331 as 
2332, and inserted new secs. 2331, 2333-2338, with such amendments 
applicable ``to any pending case or any cause of action arising on or 
after 4 years before the date of enactment of this Act'', pursuant to 
sec. 1003(c) of Public Law 102-572 (106 Stat. 4524; 18 U.S.C. 2331 
note).
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          (1) the term ``international terrorism'' means 
        activities that--
                  (A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to 
                human life that are a violation of the criminal 
                laws of the United States or of any State, or 
                that would be a criminal violation if committed 
                within the jurisdiction of the United States or 
                of any State;
                  (B) appear to be intended--
                          (i) to intimidate or coerce a 
                        civilian population;
                          (ii) to influence the policy of a 
                        government by intimidation or coercion; 
                        or
                          (iii) to affect the conduct of a 
                        government by assassination or 
                        kidnapping; and
                  (C) occur primarily outside the territorial 
                jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend 
                national boundaries in terms of the means by 
                which they are accomplished, the persons they 
                appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the 
                locale in which their perpetrators operate or 
                seek asylum;
          (2) the term ``national of the United States'' has 
        the meaning given such term in section 101(a)(22) of 
        the Immigration and Nationality Act;
          (3) the term ``person'' means any individual or 
        entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial 
        interest in property; and
          (4) the term ``act of war'' means any act occurring 
        in the course of--
                  (A) declared war;
                  (B) armed conflict, whether or not war has 
                been declared, between two or more nations; or
                  (C) armed conflict between military forces of 
                any origin.

Sec. 2332.\25\ Criminal penalties

    (a) Homicide.--Whoever kills a national of the United 
States, while such national is outside the United States, 
shall--
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    \25\ This section was added as sec. 2331 by sec. 1202(a) of Public 
Law 99-399 (100 Stat. 896), with a caption that read ``Terrorist acts 
abroad against United States nationals''. Sec. 1003(a)(2) of Public Law 
102-572 (106 Stat. 4521) redesignated sec. 2331 as 2332, struck out the 
caption, and inserted in its place a caption that read ``Criminal 
penalties'', with such amendment applicable ``to any pending case or 
any cause of action arising on or after 4 years before the date of 
enactment of this Act'', pursuant to sec. 1003(c) of Public Law 102-572 
(106 Stat. 4524; 18 U.S.C. 2331 note).
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          (1) if the killing is murder (as defined in section 
        1111(a), be fined under this title, punished by death 
        or imprisonment for any term of years or for life, or 
        both;
          (2) if the killing is a voluntary manslaughter as 
        defined in section 1112(a) of this title, be fined 
        under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, 
        or both; and
          (3) if the killing is an involuntary manslaughter as 
        defined in section 1112(a) of this title, be fined 
        under this title or imprisoned not more than three 
        years, or both.
    (b) Attempt or Conspiracy With Respect to Homicide.--
Whoever outside the United States attempts to kill, or engages 
in a conspiracy to kill, a national of the United States 
shall--
          (1) in the case of an attempt to commit a killing 
        that is a murder as defined in this chapter, be fined 
        under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, 
        or both; and
          (2) in the case of a conspiracy by two or more 
        persons to commit a killing that is a murder as defined 
        in section 1111(a) of this title, if one or more of 
        such persons do any overt act to effect the object of 
        the conspiracy, be fined under this title or imprisoned 
        for any term of years or for life, or both so fined and 
        so imprisoned.
    (c) Other Conduct.--Whoever outside the United States 
engages in physical violence--
          (1) with intent to cause serious bodily injury to a 
        national of the United States; or
          (2) with the result that serious bodily harm is 
        caused to a national of the United States;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten 
years, or both.
    (d) \26\ Limitation on Prosecution.--No prosecution for any 
offense described in this section shall be undertaken by the 
United Stats except on written certification of the Attorney 
General or the highest ranking subordinate of the Attorney 
General with responsibility for criminal prosecutions that, in 
the judgment of the certifying official, such offense was 
intended to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against a 
government or a civilian population.
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    \26\ Sec. 1003(a)(1) of Public Law 102-572 (106 Stat. 4521) struck 
out subsec. (d), and redesignated subsec. (e) as (d), with such 
amendment applicable ``to any pending case or any cause of action 
arising on or after 4 years before the date of enactment of this Act'', 
pursuant to sec. 1003(c) of Public Law 102-572 (106 Stat. 4524; 18 
U.S.C. 2331 note). Subsec. (d) defined ``national of the United 
States'' as having the meaning given in section 101(a)(22) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 2332a.\27\ Use of certain weapons of mass destruction

    (a) \28\ Offense Against a National of the United States or 
Within the United States.--A person who, without lawful 
authority, uses, threatens, or attempts \29\ or conspires to 
use, a weapon of mass destruction (other than a chemical weapon 
as that term is defined in section 229F), including any 
biological agent, toxin, or vector (as those terms are defined 
in section 178)--\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ Sec. 60023(a) of Public Law 103-322 (108 Stat. 1980) added 
sec. 2332a.
    \28\ Sec. 725(1)(A) of Public Law 104-132 (110 Stat. 1300) inserted 
``Against a National of the United States or Within the United States'' 
after ``Offense'' in the subsec. heading.
    \29\ Sec. 725(1)(B) of Public Law 104-132 (110 Stat. 1300) struck 
out ``uses, or attempts'' and inserted in lieu thereof ``, without 
lawful authority, uses, threatens, or attempts''.
    \30\ Sec. 511(c) of Public Law 104-132 (110 Stat. 1284) added 
``including any biological agent, toxin, or vector (as those terms are 
defined in section 178)'' after ``destruction''.
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          (1) against a national of the United States while 
        such national is outside of the United States;
          (2) against any person within the United States, and 
        the results of such use affect interstate or foreign 
        commerce or, in the case of a threat, attempt, or 
        conspiracy, would have affected interstate or foreign 
        commerce; \31\ or
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ Sec. 725(1)(C) of Public Law 104-132 (110 Stat. 1300) added 
``, and the results of such use affect interstate or foreign commerce 
or, in the case of a threat, attempt, or conspiracy, would have 
affected interstate or foreign commerce''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (3) against any property that is owned, leased or 
        used by the United States or by any department or 
        agency of the United States, whether the property is 
        within or outside of the United States,
shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life, and if 
death results, shall be imprisoned by death or imprisoned for 
any term of years of for life.
    (b) \32\ Offense by National of the United States Outside 
of the United States.--Any national of the United States who, 
without lawful authority, uses, or threatens, attempts, or 
conspires to use, a weapon of mass destruction (other than a 
chemical weapon (as that term is defined in section 229F)) 
outside of the United States shall be imprisoned for any term 
of years or for life, and if death results, shall be punished 
by death, or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ Sec. 725(3) and (4) of Public Law 104-132 (110 Stat. 1300) 
redesignated subsec. (b) as subsec. (c), and added a new subsec. (b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (c) \32\ Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
          (1) the term ``national of the United States'' has 
        the meaning given in section 101(a)(22) of the 
        Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)); 
        and
          (2) the term ``weapon of mass destruction'' means--
                  (A) any destructive device as defined in 
                section 921 of this title;
          (B) any weapon that is designed or intended to cause 
        death or serious bodily injury through the release, 
        dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous 
        chemicals, or their precursors;
                  (C) any weapon involving a disease organism; 
                or
                  (D) any weapon that is designed to release 
                radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous 
                to human life.

Sec. 2332b.\33\ Acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries

    (a) Prohibited Acts.--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ Added by sec. 702(a) of Public Law 104-132 (110 Stat. 1291).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) Offenses.--Whoever, involving conduct 
        transcending national boundaries and in a circumstance 
        described in subsection (b)--
                  (A) kills, kidnaps, maims, commits an assault 
                resulting in serious bodily injury, or assaults 
                with a dangerous weapon any person within the 
                United States; or
                  (B) creates a substantial risk of serious 
                bodily injury to any other person by destroying 
                or damaging any structure, conveyance, or other 
                real or personal property within the United 
                States or by attempting or conspiring to 
                destroy or damage any structure, conveyance, or 
                other real or personal property within the 
                United States;
        in violation of the laws of any State, or the United 
        States, shall be punished as prescribed in subsection 
        (c).
          (2) Treatment of threats, attempts and 
        conspiracies.--Whoever threatens to commit an offense 
        under paragraph (1), or attempts or conspires to do so, 
        shall be punished under subsection (c).
    (b) Jurisdictional Bases.--
          (1) Circumstances.--The circumstances referred to in 
        subsection (a) are--
                  (A) the mail or any facility of interstate or 
                foreign commerce is used in furtherance of the 
                offense;
                  (B) the offense obstructs, delays, or affects 
                interstate or foreign commerce, or would have 
                so obstructed, delayed, or affected interstate 
                or foreign commerce if the offense had been 
                consummated;
                  (C) the victim, or intended victim, is the 
                United States Government, a member of the 
                uniformed services, or any official, officer, 
                employee, or agent of the legislative, 
                executive, or judicial branches, or of any 
                department or agency, of the United States;
                  (D) the structure, conveyance, or other real 
                or personal property is, in whole or in part, 
                owned, possessed, or leased to the United 
                States, or any department or agency of the 
                United States;
                  (E) the offense is committed in the 
                territorial sea (including the airspace above 
                and the seabed and subsoil below, and 
                artificial islands and fixed structures erected 
                thereon) of the United States; or
                  (F) the offense is committed within the 
                special maritime and territorial jurisdiction 
                of the United States.
          (2) Co-conspirators and accessories after the fact.--
        Jurisdiction shall exist over all principals and co-
        conspirators of an offense under this section, and 
        accessories after the fact to any offense under this 
        section, if at least one of the circumstances described 
        in subparagraphs (A) through (F) of paragraph (1) is 
        applicable to at least one offender.
    (c) Penalties.--
          (1) Penalties.--Whoever violates this section shall 
        be punished--
                  (A) for a killing, or if death results to any 
                person from any other conduct prohibited by 
                this section, by death, or by imprisonment for 
                any term of years or for life;
                  (B) for kidnapping, by imprisonment for any 
                term of years or for life;
                  (C) for maiming, by imprisonment for not more 
                than 35 years;
                  (D) for assault with a dangerous weapon or 
                assault resulting in serious bodily injury, by 
                imprisonment for not more than 30 years;
                  (E) for destroying or damaging any structure, 
                conveyance, or other real or personal property, 
                by imprisonment for not more than 25 years;
                  (F) for attempting or conspiring to commit an 
                offense, for any term of years up to the 
                maximum punishment that would have applied had 
                the offense been completed; and
                  (G) for threatening to commit an offense 
                under this section, by imprisonment for not 
                more than 10 years.
          (2) Consecutive sentence.--Notwithstanding any other 
        provision of law, the court shall not place on 
        probation any person convicted of a violation of this 
        section; nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed 
        under this section run concurrently with any other term 
        of imprisonment.
    (d) Proof Requirements.--The following shall apply to 
prosecutions under this section:
          (1) Knowledge.--The prosecution is not required to 
        prove knowledge by any defendant of a jurisdictional 
        base alleged in the indictment.
          (2) State law.--In a prosecution under this section 
        that is based upon the adoption of State law, only the 
        elements of the offense under State law, and not any 
        provisions pertaining to criminal procedure or 
        evidence, are adopted.
    (e) Extraterritorial Jurisdiction.--There is 
extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction--
          (1) over any offense under subsection (a), including 
        any threat, attempt, or conspiracy to commit such 
        offense; and
          (2) over conduct which, under section 3, renders any 
        person an accessory after the fact to an offense under 
        subsection (a).
    (f) Investigative Authority.--In addition to any other 
investigative authority with respect to violations of this 
title, the Attorney General shall have primary investigative 
responsibility for all Federal crimes of terrorism, and the 
Secretary of the Treasury shall assist the Attorney General at 
the request of the Attorney General. Nothing in this section 
shall be construed to interfere with the authority of the 
United States Secret Service under section 3056.
    (g) Definitions.--As used in this section--
          (1) the term ``conduct transcending national 
        boundaries'' means conduct occurring outside of the 
        United States in addition to the conduct occurring in 
        the United States;
          (2) the term ``facility of interstate or foreign 
        commerce'' has the meaning given that term in section 
        1958(b)(2);
          (3) the term ``serious bodily injury'' has the 
        meaning given that term in section 1365(g)(3);
          (4) the term ``territorial sea of the United States'' 
        means all waters extending seaward to 12 nautical miles 
        from the baselines of the United States, determined in 
        accordance with international law; and
          (5) the term ``Federal crime of terrorism'' means an 
        offense that--
                  (A) is calculated to influence or affect the 
                conduct of government by intimidation or 
                coercion, or to retaliate against government 
                conduct; and
                  (B) is a violation of--
                          (i) section 32 (relating to 
                        destruction of aircraft or aircraft 
                        facilities), 37 (relating to violence 
                        at international airports), 81 
                        (relating to arson within special 
                        maritime and territorial jurisdiction), 
                        175 (relating to biological weapons), 
                        351 (relating to congressional, 
                        cabinet, and Supreme Court 
                        assassination, kidnapping, and 
                        assault), 831 (relating to nuclear 
                        materials), 842 (m) or (n) (relating to 
                        plastic explosives), 844(e) (relating 
                        to certain bombings), 844 (f) or (i) 
                        (relating to arson and bombing of 
                        certain property),930(c),\34\ 956 
                        (relating to conspiracy to injure 
                        property of a foreign government), 1114 
                        (relating to protection of officers and 
                        employees of the United States), 1116 
                        (relating to murder or manslaughter of 
                        foreign officials, official guests, or 
                        internationally protected persons), 
                        1203 (relating to hostage taking), 1361 
                        (relating to injury of Government 
                        property or contracts), 1362 (relating 
                        to destruction of communication lines, 
                        stations, or systems), 1363 (relating 
                        to injury to buildings or property 
                        within special maritime and territorial 
                        jurisdiction of the United States), 
                        1366 (relating to destruction of an 
                        energy facility), 1751 (relating to 
                        Presidential and Presidential staff 
                        assassination, kidnapping, and 
                        assault), 1992,\34\ 2152 (relating to 
                        injury of fortifications, harbor 
                        defenses, or defensive sea areas), 2155 
                        (relating to destruction of national 
                        defense materials, premises, or 
                        utilities), 2156 (relating to 
                        production of defective national 
                        defense materials, premises, or 
                        utilities), 2280 (relating to violence 
                        against maritime navigation), 2281 
                        (relating to violence against maritime 
                        fixed platforms), 2332 (relating to 
                        certain homicides and other violence 
                        against United States nationals 
                        occurring outside of the United 
                        States), 2332a (relating to use of 
                        weapons of mass destruction), 2332b 
                        (relating to acts of terrorism 
                        transcending national boundaries), 
                        2332c,\34\ 2339A (relating to providing 
                        material support to terrorists), 2339B 
                        (relating to providing material support 
                        to terrorist organizations), or 2340A 
                        (relating to torture);
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    \34\ Sec. 601(s)(3) of Public Law 104-294 (110 Stat. 3502) inserted 
reference to secs. 930(c), 1992, and 2332c.
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                          (ii) section 236 (relating to 
                        sabotage of nuclear facilities or fuel) 
                        of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
                        U.S.C. 2284); or
                          (iii) section 46502 (relating to 
                        aircraft piracy) or section 60123(b) 
                        (relating to destruction of interstate 
                        gas or hazardous liquid pipeline 
                        facility) of title 49.

Sec. 2332c.\35\ Use of chemical weapons

    (a) Prohibited Acts.--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ Sec. 521(a) of Public Law 104-132 (110 Stat. 1286) added sec. 
2332c.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) Offense.--A person shall be punished under 
        paragraph (2) if that person, without lawful authority, 
        uses, or attempts or conspires to use, a chemical 
        weapon against--
                  (A) a national of the United States while 
                such national is outside of the United States;
                  (B) any person within the United States; or
                  (C) any property that is owned, leased, or 
                used by the United States or by any department 
                or agency of the United States, whether the 
                property is within or outside of the United 
                States.
          (2) Penalties.--A person who violates paragraph (1)--
                  (A) shall be imprisoned for any term of years 
                or for life; or
                  (B) if death results from that violation, 
                shall be punished by death or imprisoned for 
                any term of years or for life.
    (b) Definitions.--As used in this section--
          (1) the term ``national of the United States'' has 
        the same meaning as in section 101(a)(22) of the 
        Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)); 
        and
          (2) the term ``chemical weapon'' means any weapon 
        that is designed or intended to cause widespread death 
        or serious bodily injury through the release, 
        dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous 
        chemicals or precursors of toxic or poisonous 
        chemicals.

Sec. 2332d.\36\ Financial transactions

    (a) Offense.--Except as provided in regulations issued by 
the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the 
Secretary of State, whoever, being a United States person, 
knowing or having reasonable cause to know that a country is 
designated under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act 
(50 U.S.C. App. 2405) as a country supporting international 
terrorism, engages in a financial transaction with the 
government of that country, shall be fined under this title, 
imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ Sec. 321(a) of Public Law 104-132 (110 Stat. 1254) added sec. 
2332d. Sec. 321(c) of that Act also provided that ``The amendments made 
by this section shall become effective 120 days after the date of 
enactment of this Act.'' [enactment date, April 24, 1996].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Definitions.--As used in this section--
          (1) the term ``financial transaction'' has the same 
        meaning as in section 1956(c)(4); and
          (2) the term ``United States person'' means any--
                  (A) United States citizen or national;
                  (B) permanent resident alien;
                  (C) juridical person organized under the laws 
                of the United States; or
                  (D) any person in the United States.

Sec. 2332e.\37\ Requests for military assistance to enforce prohibition 
                    in certain emergencies

    The Attorney General may request the Secretary of Defense 
to provide assistance under section 382 of title 10 in support 
of Department of Justice activities relating to the enforcement 
of section 2332c of this title during an emergency situation 
involving a chemical weapon of mass destruction. The authority 
to make such a request may be exercised by another official of 
the Department of Justice in accordance with section 382(f)(2) 
of title 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ Sec. 1416(c)(2)(A) of Public Law 104-201 (110 Stat. 2723) 
added this section as section 2332d to ``chapter 133B of title 18, 
United States Code, that relates to terrorism after section 2332c''. 
There is no chapter 133B; it is assumed the amendment is to chapter 
113B. Sec. 605(q) of Public Law 104-294 (110 Stat. 3510) subsequently 
redesignated the section as sec. 2332e and moved the section to follow 
sec. 2332d.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 2333.\24\ Civil remedies

    (a) Action and Jurisdiction.--Any national of the United 
States injured in his or her person, property, or business by 
reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her 
estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any 
appropriate district court of the United States and shall 
recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost 
of the suit, including attorney's fees.
    (b) Estoppel Under United States Law.--A final judgment or 
decree rendered in favor of the United States in any criminal 
proceeding under section 1116, 1201, 1203, or 2332 of this 
title or section 46314, 46502, 46505, or 46506 of title 49 \38\ 
shall estop the defendant from denying the essential 
allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil 
proceeding under this section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \38\ Sec. 2(1) of Public Law 103-429 (108 Stat. 4377) struck out 
``section 902(i), (k), (l), (n), or (r) of the Federal Aviation Act of 
1958 (49 U.S.C. App. 1472(i), (k), (l), (n), or (r))'' and inserted in 
lieu thereof ``section 46314, 46502, 46505, or 46506 of title 49''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (c) Estoppel Under Foreign Law.--A final judgment or decree 
rendered in favor of any foreign state in any criminal 
proceeding shall, to the extent that such judgment or decree 
may be accorded full faith and credit under the law of the 
United States, estop the defendant from denying the essential 
allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil 
proceeding under this section.

Sec. 2334.\24\ Jurisdiction and venue

    (a) General Venue.--Any civil action under section 2333 of 
this title against any person may be instituted in the district 
court of the United States for any district where any plaintiff 
resides or where any defendant resides or is served, or has an 
agent. Process in such a civil action may be served in any 
district where the defendant resides, is found, or has an 
agent.
    (b) Special Maritime or Territorial Jurisdiction.--If the 
actions giving rise to the claim occurred within the special 
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, as 
defined in section 7 of this title, then any civil action under 
section 2333 of this title against any person may be instituted 
in the district court of the United States for any district in 
which any plaintiff resides or the defendant resides, is 
served, or has an agent.
    (c) Service on Witnesses.--A witness in a civil action 
brought under section 2333 of this title may be served in any 
other district where the defendant resides, is found, or has an 
agent.
    (d) Convenience of the Forum.--The district court shall not 
dismiss any action brought under section 2333 of this title on 
the grounds of the inconvenience or inappropriateness of the 
forum chosen, unless--
          (1) the action may be maintained in a foreign court 
        that has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over 
        all the defendants;
          (2) that foreign court is significantly more 
        convenient and appropriate; and
          (3) that foreign court offers a remedy which is 
        substantially the same as the one available in the 
        courts of the United States.

Sec. 2335.\24\ Limitation of actions

    (a) In General.--Subject to subsection (b), a suit for 
recovery of damages under section 2333 of this title shall not 
be maintained unless commenced within 4 years after the date 
the cause of action accrued.
    (b) Calculation of Period.--The time of the absence of the 
defendant from the United States or from any jurisdiction in 
which the same or a similar action arising from the same facts 
may be maintained by the plaintiff, or of any concealment of 
the defendant's whereabouts, shall not be included in the 4-
year period set forth in subsection (a).

Sec. 2336.\24\ Other limitations

    (a) Acts of War.--No action shall be maintained under 
section 2333 of this title for injury or loss by reason of an 
act of war.
    (b) Limitation on Discovery.--If a party to an action under 
section 2333 seeks to discover the investigative files of the 
Department of Justice, the Assistant Attorney General, Deputy 
Attorney General, or Attorney General may object on the ground 
that compliance will interfere with a criminal investigation or 
prosecution of the incident, or a national security operation 
related to the incident, which is the subject of the civil 
litigation. The court shall evaluate any such objections in 
camera and shall stay the discovery if the court finds that 
granting the discovery request will substantially interfere 
with a criminal investigation or prosecution of the incident or 
a national security operation related to the incident. The 
court shall consider the likelihood of criminal prosecution by 
the Government and other factors it deems to be appropriate. A 
stay of discovery under this subsection shall constitute a bar 
to the granting of a motion to dismiss under rules 12(b)(6) and 
56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If the court grants 
a stay of discovery under this subsection, it may stay the 
action in the interests of justice.
    (c) Stay of Action for Civil Remedies.--(1) The Attorney 
General may intervene in any civil action brought under section 
2333 for the purpose of seeking a stay of the civil action. A 
stay shall be granted if the court finds that the continuation 
of the civil action will substantially interfere with a 
criminal prosecution which involves the same subject matter and 
in which an indictment has been returned, or interfere with 
national security operations related to the terrorist incident 
that is the subject of the civil action. A stay may be granted 
for up to 6 months. The Attorney General may petition the court 
for an extension of the stay for additional 6-month periods 
until the criminal prosecution is completed or dismissed.
    (2) In a proceeding under this subsection, the Attorney 
General may request that any order issued by the court for 
release to the parties and the public omit any reference to the 
basis on which the stay was sought.

Sec. 2337.\24\ Suits against Government officials

    No action shall be maintained under section 2333 of this 
title against--
          (1) the United States, an agency of the United 
        States, or an officer or employee of the United States 
        or any agency thereof acting within his or her official 
        capacity or under color of legal authority; or
          (2) a foreign state, an agency of a foreign state, or 
        an officer or employee of a foreign state or an agency 
        thereof acting within his or her official capacity or 
        under color of legal authority.

Sec. 2338.\24\ Exclusive Federal jurisdiction

    The district courts of the United States shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction over an action brought under this 
chapter.

Sec. 2339A.\39\ Providing material support to terrorists

    (a) Offense.--Whoever, within the United States, provides 
material support or resources or conceals or disguises the 
nature, location, source, or ownership of material support or 
resources, knowing or intending that they are to be used in 
preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of section 32, 
37, 81, 175, 351, 831, 842 (m) or (n), 844 (f) or (i), 930(c), 
956, 1114, 1116, 1203, 1361, 1362, 1363, 1366, 1751, 1992, 
2155, 2156, 2280, 2281, 2332, 2332a, 2332b, 2332c, or 2340A of 
this title or section 46502 of title 49, or in preparation for, 
or in carrying out, the concealment or an escape from the 
commission of any such violation, shall be fined under this 
title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ No sec. 2339 is enacted. Sec. 2339A was added by sec. 
120005(a) of Public Law 103-322 (108 Stat. 2022), and amended and 
restated by sec. 323 of Public Law 104-132 (110 Stat. 1255).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Definition.--In this section, the term ``material 
support or resources'' means currency or other financial 
securities, financial services, lodging, training, safehouses, 
false documentation or identification, communications 
equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, 
personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except 
medicine or religious materials.

Sec. 2339B.\40\ Providing material support or resources to designated 
                    foreign terrorist organizations
    (a) Prohibited Activities.--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ Sec. 303(a) of Public Law 104-132 (110 Stat. 1250) added sec. 
2339B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) Unlawful conduct.--Whoever, within the United 
        States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
        States, knowingly provides material support or 
        resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or 
        attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under 
        this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or 
        both.
          (2) Financial institutions.--Except as authorized by 
        the Secretary, any financial institution that becomes 
        aware that it has possession of, or control over, any 
        funds in which a foreign terrorist organization, or its 
        agent, has an interest, shall--
                  (A) retain possession of, or maintain control 
                over, such funds; and
                  (B) report to the Secretary the existence of 
                such funds in accordance with regulations 
                issued by the Secretary.
  (b) Civil Penalty.--Any financial institution that knowingly 
fails to comply with subsection (a)(2) shall be subject to a 
civil penalty in an amount that is the greater of--
                  (A) $50,000 per violation; or
                  (B) twice the amount of which the financial 
                institution was required under subsection 
                (a)(2) to retain possession or control.
  (c) Injunction.--Whenever it appears to the Secretary or the 
Attorney General that any person is engaged in, or is about to 
engage in, any act that constitutes, or would constitute, a 
violation of this section, the Attorney General may initiate 
civil action in a district court of the United States to enjoin 
such violation.
  (d) Extraterritorial Jurisdiction.--There is extraterritorial 
Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this section.
  (e) Investigations.--
          (1) In general.--The Attorney General shall conduct 
        any investigation of a possible violation of this 
        section, or of any license, order, or regulation issued 
        pursuant to this section.
          (2) Coordination with the department of the 
        treasury.--The Attorney General shall work in 
        coordination with the Secretary in investigations 
        relating to--
                  (A) the compliance or noncompliance by a 
                financial institution with the requirements of 
                subsection (a)(2); and
                  (B) civil penalty proceedings authorized 
                under subsection (b).
          (3) Referral.--Any evidence of a criminal violation 
        of this section arising in the course of an 
        investigation by the Secretary or any other Federal 
        agency shall be referred immediately to the Attorney 
        General for further investigation. The Attorney General 
        shall timely notify the Secretary of any action taken 
        on referrals from the Secretary, and may refer 
        investigations to the Secretary for remedial licensing 
        or civil penalty action.
  (f) Classified Information in Civil Proceedings Brought by 
the United States.--
          (1) Discovery of classified information by 
        defendants.--
                  (A) Request by united states.--In any civil 
                proceeding under this section, upon request 
                made ex parte and in writing by the United 
                States, a court, upon a sufficient showing, may 
                authorize the United States to--
                          (i) redact specified items of 
                        classified information from documents 
                        to be introduced into evidence or made 
                        available to the defendant through 
                        discovery under the Federal Rules of 
                        Civil Procedure;
                          (ii) substitute a summary of the 
                        information for such classified 
                        documents; or
                          (iii) substitute a statement 
                        admitting relevant facts that the 
                        classified information would tend to 
                        prove.
                  (B) Order granting request.--If the court 
                enters an order granting a request under this 
                paragraph, the entire text of the documents to 
                which the request relates shall be sealed and 
                preserved in the records of the court to be 
                made available to the appellate court in the 
                event of an appeal.
                  (C) Denial of request.--If the court enters 
                an order denying a request of the United States 
                under this paragraph, the United States may 
                take an immediate, interlocutory appeal in 
                accordance with paragraph (5). For purposes of 
                such an appeal, the entire text of the 
                documents to which the request relates, 
                together with any transcripts of arguments made 
                ex parte to the court in connection therewith, 
                shall be maintained under seal and delivered to 
                the appellate court.
          (2) Introduction of classified information; 
        precautions by court.--
                  (A) Exhibits.--To prevent unnecessary or 
                inadvertent disclosure of classified 
                information in a civil proceeding brought by 
                the United States under this section, the 
                United States may petition the court ex parte 
                to admit, in lieu of classified writings, 
                recordings, or photographs, one or more of the 
                following:
                          (i) Copies of items from which 
                        classified information has been 
                        redacted.
                          (ii) Stipulations admitting relevant 
                        facts that specific classified 
                        information would tend to prove.
                          (iii) A declassified summary of the 
                        specific classified information.
                  (B) Determination by court.--The court shall 
                grant a request under this paragraph if the 
                court finds that the redacted item, 
                stipulation, or summary is sufficient to allow 
                the defendant to prepare a defense.
          (3) Taking of trial testimony.--
                  (A) Objection.--During the examination of a 
                witness in any civil proceeding brought by the 
                United States under this subsection, the United 
                States may object to any question or line of 
                inquiry that may require the witness to 
                disclose classified information not previously 
                found to be admissible.
                  (B) Action by court.--In determining whether 
                a response is admissible, the court shall take 
                precautions to guard against the compromise of 
                any classified information, including--
                          (i) permitting the United States to 
                        provide the court, ex parte, with a 
                        proffer of the witness's response to 
                        the question or line of inquiry; and
                          (ii) requiring the defendant to 
                        provide the court with a proffer of the 
                        nature of the information that the 
                        defendant seeks to elicit.
                  (C) Obligation of defendant.--In any civil 
                proceeding under this section, it shall be the 
                defendant's obligation to establish the 
                relevance and materiality of any classified 
                information sought to be introduced.
          (4) Appeal.--If the court enters an order denying a 
        request of the United States under this subsection, the 
        United States may take an immediate interlocutory 
        appeal in accordance with paragraph (5).
          (5) Interlocutory appeal.--
                  (A) Subject of appeal.--An interlocutory 
                appeal by the United States shall lie to a 
                court of appeals from a decision or order of a 
                district court--
                          (i) authorizing the disclosure of 
                        classified information;
                          (ii) imposing sanctions for 
                        nondisclosure of classified 
                        information; or
                          (iii) refusing a protective order 
                        sought by the United States to prevent 
                        the disclosure of classified 
                        information.
                  (B) Expedited consideration.--
                          (i) In general.--An appeal taken 
                        pursuant to this paragraph, either 
                        before or during trial, shall be 
                        expedited by the court of appeals.
                          (ii) Appeals prior to trial.--If an 
                        appeal is of an order made prior to 
                        trial, an appeal shall be taken not 
                        later than 10 days after the decision 
                        or order appealed from, and the trial 
                        shall not commence until the appeal is 
                        resolved.
                          (iii) Appeals during trial.--If an 
                        appeal is taken during trial, the trial 
                        court shall adjourn the trial until the 
                        appeal is resolved, and the court of 
                        appeals--
                                  (I) shall hear argument on 
                                such appeal not later than 4 
                                days after the adjournment of 
                                the trial;
                                  (II) may dispense with 
                                written briefs other than the 
                                supporting materials previously 
                                submitted to the trial court;
                                  (III) shall render its 
                                decision not later than 4 days 
                                after argument on appeal; and
                                  (IV) may dispense with the 
                                issuance of a written opinion 
                                in rendering its decision.
                  (C) Effect of ruling.--An interlocutory 
                appeal and decision shall not affect the right 
                of the defendant, in a subsequent appeal from a 
                final judgment, to claim as error reversal by 
                the trial court on remand of a ruling appealed 
                from during trial.
          (6) Construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall 
        prevent the United States from seeking protective 
        orders or asserting privileges ordinarily available to 
        the United States to protect against the disclosure of 
        classified information, including the invocation of the 
        military and State secrets privilege.
  (g) Definitions.--As used in this section--
          (1) the term ``classified information'' has the 
        meaning given that term in section 1(a) of the 
        Classified Information Procedures Act (18 U.S.C. App.);
          (2) the term ``financial institution'' has the same 
        meaning as in section 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United 
        States Code;
          (3) the term ``funds'' includes coin or currency of 
        the United States or any other country, traveler's 
        checks, personal checks, bank checks, money orders, 
        stocks, bonds, debentures, drafts, letters of credit, 
        any other negotiable instrument, and any electronic 
        representation of any of the foregoing;
          (4) the term ``material support or resources'' has 
        the same meaning as in section 2339A;
          (5) the term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of the 
        Treasury; and
          (6) the term ``terrorist organization'' means an 
        organization designated as a terrorist organization 
        under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality 
        Act.

                      PART II--CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

  CHAPTER 204--REWARDS FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING TERRORIST ACTS AND 
                               ESPIONAGE

Sec. 3071. Information for which rewards authorized
    (a) With respect to acts of terrorism primarily within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States, the Attorney 
General may reward any individual who furnishes information--
          (1) leading to the arrest or conviction, in any 
        country, of any individual or individuals for the 
        commission of an act of terrorism against a United 
        States person or United States property; or
          (2) leading to the arrest or conviction, in any 
        country, of any individual or individuals for 
        conspiring or attempting to commit an act of terrorism 
        against a United States person or property; or
          (3) leading to the prevention, frustration, or 
        favorable resolution of an act of terrorism against a 
        United States person or property.
    (b) With respect to acts of espionage involving or directed 
at the United States, the Attorney General may reward any 
individual who furnished information--
          (1) leading to the arrest or conviction, in any 
        country, of any individual or individuals for 
        commission of an act of espionage against the United 
        States;
          (2) leading to arrest or conviction, in any country, 
        of any individual or individuals for conspiring or 
        attempting to commit an act of espionage against the 
        United States; or
          (3) leading to the prevention or frustration of an 
        act of espionage against the United States.

Sec. 3072. Determination of entitlement; maximum amount; Presidential 
                    approval; conclusiveness
    The Attorney General shall determine whether an individual 
furnishing information described in section 3071 is entitled to 
a reward and the amount to be paid. A reward under this section 
may be in an amount not to exceed $500,000. A reward of 
$100,000 or more may not be made without the approval of the 
President or the Attorney General personally. A determination 
made by the Attorney General or the President under this 
chapter shall be final and conclusive, and no court shall have 
power or jurisdiction to review it.

Sec. 3073. Protection of identity
    Any reward granted under this chapter shall be certified 
for payment by the Attorney General. If it is determined that 
the identity of the recipient of a reward or of the members of 
the recipient's immediate family must be protected, the 
Attorney General may take such measures in connection with the 
payment of the reward as deemed necessary to effect such 
protection.

Sec. 3074. Exception of governmental officials
    No officer or employee of any governmental entity who, 
while in the performance of his or her official duties, 
furnishes the information described in section 3071 shall be 
eligible for any monetary reward under this chapter.

Sec. 3075. Authorization for appropriations
    There are authorized to be appropriated, without fiscal 
year limitation, $5,000,000 for the purpose of this chapter.

Sec. 3076. Eligibility for witness security program
    Any individual (and the immediate family of such 
individual) who furnishes information which would justify a 
reward by the Attorney General under this chapter or by the 
Secretary of State under section 36 of the State Department 
Basic Authorities Act of 1956 may, in the discretion of the 
Attorney General, participate in the Attorney General's witness 
security program authorized under chapter 224 of this title.

Sec. 3077. Definitions
    As used in this chapter, the term--
          (1) ``act of terrorism'' means an activity that--
                  (A) involves a violent act or an act 
                dangerous to human life that is a violation of 
                the criminal laws of the United States or of 
                any State, or that would be a criminal 
                violation if committed within the jurisdiction 
                of the United States; and
                  (B) appears to be intended--
                          (i) to intimidate or coerce a 
                        civilian population;
                          (ii) to influence the policy of a 
                        government by intimidation or coercion; 
                        or
                          (iii) to affect the conduct of a 
                        government by assassination or 
                        kidnapping;
          (2) ``United States person'' means--
                  (A) a national of the United States as 
                defined in section 101(a)(22) of the 
                Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
                1101(a)(22));
                  (B) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
                residence in the United States as defined in 
                section 101(a)(20) of the Immigration and 
                Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(20));
                  (C) any person within the United States;
                  (D) any employee or contractor of the United 
                States Government, regardless of nationality, 
                who is the victim or intended victim of an act 
                of terrorism by virtue of that employment;
                  (E) a sole proprietorship, partnership, 
                company, or association composed principally of 
                nationals or permanent resident aliens of the 
                United States; and
                  (F) a corporation organized under the laws of 
                the United States, any State, the District of 
                Columbia, or any territory or possession of the 
                United States, and a foreign subsidiary of such 
                corporation;
          (3) ``United States property'' means any real or 
        personal property which is within the United States or, 
        if outside the United States, the actual or beneficial 
        ownership of which rests in a United States person or 
        any Federal or State governmental entity of the United 
        States;
          (4) ``United States'', when used in a geographical 
        sense, includes Puerto Rico and all territories and 
        possessions of the United States;
          (5) ``State'' includes any State of the United 
        States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of 
        Puerto Rico, and any other possession or territory of 
        the United States;
          (6) ``government entity'' includes the Government of 
        the United States, any State or political subdivision 
        thereof, any foreign country, and any state, 
        provincial, municipal, or other political subdivision 
        of a foreign country;
          (7) ``Attorney General'' means the Attorney General 
        of the United States or that official designated by the 
        Attorney General to perform the Attorney General's 
        responsibilities under this chapter; and
          (8) ``act of espionage'' means an activity that is a 
        violation of--
                  (A) section 793, 794, or 798 of this title; 
                or
                  (B) section 4 of the Subversive Activities 
                Control Act of 1950.

                        CHAPTER 213--LIMITATIONS

Sec. 3286. Extension of statute of limitation for certain terrorism 
                    offenses.
    Notwithstanding section 3282, no person shall be 
prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense involving a 
violation of section 32 (aircraft destruction), section 36 \41\ 
(airport violence), section 112 (assaults upon diplomats), 
section 351 (crimes against Congressmen or Cabinet officers), 
section 1116 (crimes against diplomats), section 1203 (hostage 
taking), section 1361 (willful injury to government property), 
section 1751 (crimes against the President), section 2280 
(maritime violence), section 2281 (maritime platform violence), 
section 2331 (terrorist acts abroad against United States 
nationals), section 2339 \42\ (use of weapons of mass 
destruction), or section 2340A (torture) of this title or 
section 46502, 46504, 46505, or 46506 of title 49, unless the 
indictment is found or the information is instituted within 8 
years after the offense was committed.
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    \41\ So in original. Probably should be section ``37''.
    \42\ So in original. Probably should be section ``2332a''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 3291. Nationality, citizenship and passports.
    No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for 
violation of any provision of sections 1423 to 1428, inclusive, 
of chapter 69 and sections 1541 to 1544, inclusive, of chapter 
75 of title 18 of the United States Code, or for conspiracy to 
violate any of such sections, unless the indictment is found or 
the information is instituted within ten years after the 
commission of the offense.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                      CHAPTER 228--DEATH SENTENCE

Sec. 3592. Mitigating and aggravating factors to be considered in 
                    determining whether a sentence of death is 
                    justified
    (a) Mitigating Factors.--In determining whether a sentence 
of death is to be imposed on a defendant, the finder of fact 
shall consider any mitigating factor, including the following:
          (1) Impaired capacity.--The defendant's capacity to 
        appreciate the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct 
        or to conform conduct to the requirements of law was 
        significantly impaired, regardless of whether the 
        capacity was so impaired as to constitute a defense to 
        the charge.
          (2) Duress.--The defendant was under unusual and 
        substantial duress, regardless of whether the duress 
        was of such a degree as to constitute a defense to the 
        charge.
          (3) Minor participation.--The defendant is punishable 
        as a principal in the offense, which was committed by 
        another, but the defendant's participation was 
        relatively minor, regardless of whether the 
        participation was so minor as to constitute a defense 
        to the charge.
          (4) Equally culpable defendants.--Another defendant 
        or defendants, equally culpable in the crime, will not 
        be punished by death.
          (5) No prior criminal record.--The defendant did not 
        have a significant prior history of other criminal 
        conduct.
          (6) Disturbance.--The defendant committed the offense 
        under severe mental or emotional disturbance.
          (7) Victim's consent.--The victim consented to the 
        criminal conduct that resulted in the victim's death.
          (8) Other factors.--Other factors in the defendant's 
        background, record, or character or any other 
        circumstance of the offense that mitigate against 
        imposition of the death sentence.
    (b) Aggravating Factors for Espionage and Treason.--In 
determining whether a sentence of death is justified for an 
offense described in section 3591(a)(1), the jury, or if there 
is no jury, the court, shall consider each of the following 
aggravating factors for which notice has been given and 
determine which, if any, exist:
          (1) Prior espionage or treason offense.--The 
        defendant has previously been convicted of another 
        offense involving espionage or treason for which a 
        sentence of either life imprisonment or death was 
        authorized by law.
          (2) Grave risk to national security.--In the 
        commission of the offense the defendant knowingly 
        created a grave risk of substantial danger to the 
        national security.
          (3) Grave risk of death.--In the commission of the 
        offense the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of 
        death to another person.
The jury, or if there is no jury, the court, may consider 
whether any other aggravating factor for which notice has been 
given exists.
    (c) Aggravating Factors for Homicide.--In determining 
whether a sentence of death is justified for an offense 
described in section 3591(a)(2), the jury, or if there is no 
jury, the court, shall consider each of the following 
aggravating factors for which notice has been given and 
determine which, if any, exist:
          (1) Death during commission of another crime.--The 
        death, or injury resulting in death, occurred during 
        the commission or attempted commission of, or during 
        the immediate flight from the commission of, an offense 
        under section 32 (destruction of aircraft or aircraft 
        facilities), section 33 (destruction of motor vehicles 
        or motor vehicle facilities), section 36 \43\ (violence 
        at international airports), section 351 (violence 
        against Members of Congress, Cabinet officers, or 
        Supreme Court Justices), an offense under section 751 
        (prisoners in custody of institution or officer), 
        section 794 (gathering or delivering defense 
        information to aid foreign government), section 844(d) 
        (transportation of explosives in interstate commerce 
        for certain purposes), section 844(f) (destruction of 
        Government property by explosives), section 1118 
        (prisoners serving life term), section 1201 
        (kidnapping), section 844(i) (destruction of property 
        affecting interstate commerce by explosives), section 
        1116 (killing or attempted killing of diplomats), 
        section 1203 (hostage taking), section 1992 (wrecking 
        trains), section 2280 (maritime violence), section 2281 
        (maritime platform violence), section 2332 (terrorist 
        acts abroad against United States nationals), section 
        2339 \44\ (use of weapons of mass destruction), or 
        section 2381 (treason) of this title, or section 46502 
        of title 49, United States Code (aircraft piracy).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\ So in original. Probably should be section ``37''.
    \44\ So in original. Probably should be section ``2332a''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (2) Previous conviction of violent felony involving 
        firearm.--For any offense, other than an offense for 
        which a sentence of death is sought on the basis of 
        section 924(c), the defendant has previously been 
        convicted of a Federal or State offense punishable by a 
        term of imprisonment of more than 1 year, involving the 
        use or attempted or threatened use of a firearm (as 
        defined in section 921) against another person.
          (3) Previous conviction of offense for which a 
        sentence of death or life imprisonment was 
        authorized.--The defendant has previously been 
        convicted of another Federal or State offense resulting 
        in the death of a person, for which a sentence of life 
        imprisonment or a sentence of death was authorized by 
        statute.
          (4) Previous conviction of other serious offenses.--
        The defendant has previously been convicted of 2 or 
        more Federal or State offenses, punishable by a term of 
        imprisonment of more than 1 year, committed on 
        different occasions, involving the infliction of, or 
        attempted infliction of, serious bodily injury or death 
        upon another person.
          (5) Grave risk of death to additional persons.--The 
        defendant, in the commission of the offense, or in 
        escaping apprehension for the violation of the offense, 
        knowingly created a grave risk of death to 1 or more 
        persons in addition to the victim of the offense.
          (6) Heinous, cruel, or depraved manner of committing 
        offense.--The defendant committed the offense in an 
        especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner in that 
        it involved torture or serious physical abuse to the 
        victim.
          (7) Procurement of offense by payment.--The defendant 
        procured the commission of the offense by payment, or 
        promise of payment, of anything of pecuniary value.
          (8) Pecuniary gain.--The defendant committed the 
        offense as consideration for the receipt, or in the 
        expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary 
        value.
          (9) Substantial planning and premeditation.--The 
        defendant committed the offense after substantial 
        planning and premeditation to cause the death of a 
        person or commit an act of terrorism.
          (10) Conviction for two felony drug offenses.--The 
        defendant has previously been convicted of 2 or more 
        State or Federal offenses punishable by a term of 
        imprisonment of more than one year, committed on 
        different occasions, involving the distribution of a 
        controlled substance.
          (11) Vulnerability of victim.--The victim was 
        particularly vulnerable due to old age, youth, or 
        infirmity.
          (12) Conviction for serious federal drug offenses.--
        The defendant had previously been convicted of 
        violating title II or III of the Controlled Substances 
        Act for which a sentence of 5 or more years may be 
        imposed or had previously been convicted of engaging in 
        a continuing criminal enterprise.
          (13) Continuing criminal enterprise involving drug 
        sales to minors.--The defendant committed the offense 
        in the course of engaging in a continuing criminal 
        enterprise in violation of section 408(c) of the 
        Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 848(c)), and that 
        violation involved the distribution of drugs to persons 
        under the age of 21 in violation of section 418 of that 
        Act (21 U.S.C. 859).
          (14) High public officials.--The defendant committed 
        the offense against--
                  (A) the President of the United States, the 
                President-elect, the Vice President, the Vice 
                President-elect, the Vice President-designate, 
                or, if there is no Vice President, the officer 
                next in order of succession to the office of 
                the President of the United States, or any 
                person who is acting as President under the 
                Constitution and laws of the United States;
                  (B) a chief of state, head of government, or 
                the political equivalent, of a foreign nation;
                  (C) a foreign official listed in section 
                1116(b)(3)(A), if the official is in the United 
                States on official business; or
                  (D) a Federal public servant who is a judge, 
                a law enforcement officer, or an employee of a 
                United States penal or correctional 
                institution--
                          (i) while he or she is engaged in the 
                        performance of his or her official 
                        duties;
                          (ii) because of the performance of 
                        his or her official duties; or
                          (iii) because of his or her status as 
                        a public servant.
        For purposes of this subparagraph, a ``law enforcement 
        officer'' is a public servant authorized by law or by a 
        Government agency or Congress to conduct or engage in 
        the prevention, investigation, or prosecution or 
        adjudication of an offense, and includes those engaged 
        in corrections, parole, or probation functions.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

The jury, or if there is no jury, the court, may consider 
whether any other aggravating factor for which notice has been 
given exists.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


        4. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994

Partial text of Title XII of Public Law 103-322 [H.R. 3355], 108 Stat. 
     1796 at 1959, 1975 and following, approved September 13, 1994

                  AN ACT To control and prevent crime.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE

  This Act may be cited as the 'Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994'.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE XII--TERRORISM

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 120004. SENTENCING GUIDELINES INCREASE FOR TERRORIST CRIMES.

  The United States Sentencing Commission is directed to amend 
its sentencing guidelines to provide an appropriate enhancement 
for any felony, whether committed within or outside the United 
States, that involves or is intended to promote international 
terrorism, unless such involvement or intent is itself an 
element of the crime.

 5. Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of 
                           the United States

Partial text of Public Law 92-539 [H.R. 15883], 86 Stat. 1070, approved 
                            October 24, 1972

 AN ACT To amend title 18, United States Code, to provide for expanded 
        protection of foreign officials, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________


          Note.--Sections 112, 970, 1117, and 1201 of 18 U.S.C. 
        which were enacted by this Act can be found in Section 
        C.3.

_______________________________________________________________________


    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this 
Act maybe cited as the ``Act for the Protection of Foreign 
Officials and Official Guests of the United States''.
    Sec. 2. The Congress recognizes that from the beginning of 
our history as a nation, the police power to investigate, 
prosecute, and punish common crimes such as murder, kidnapping, 
and assault has resided in the several States, and that such 
power should remain with the States.
  The Congress finds, however, that harassment, intimidation, 
obstruction, coercion, and acts of violence committed against 
foreign officials or their family members in the United States 
or against official guests of the United States adversely 
affect the foreign relations of the United States.
  Accordingly, this legislation is intended to afford the 
United States jurisdiction concurrent with that of the several 
States to proceed against those who by such acts interfere with 
its conduct of foreign affairs.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


        6. Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989

  Public Law 101-222 [H.R. 91], 103 Stat. 1892, approved December 12, 
                                  1989

     AN ACT To prohibit exports of military equipment to countries 
      supporting international terrorism, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________


          Note.--The Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Amendments 
        Act of 1989 consists of amendments to the Arms Export 
        Control Act, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the 
        Export Administration Act, and the Revised Statutes of 
        the United States (22 U.S.C. 1732), except for sec. 10 
        which provides as follows.

_______________________________________________________________________


SEC. 10.\1\ SELF-DEFENSE IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW.

    The use by any government of armed force in the exercise of 
individual or collective self-defense in accordance with 
applicable international agreements and customary international 
law shall not be considered an act of international terrorism 
for purposes of the amendments made by this Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 22 U.S.C. 2371 note.

            7. Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989

 Partial text Public Law 101-298 [S. 993] 104 Stat. 201, approved May 
                                22, 1990

     AN ACT To implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
      Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
 (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction, by prohibiting 
certain conduct relating to biological weapons, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.\1\

    This Act may be cited as the `Biological Weapons Anti-
Terrorism Act of 1989'.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 18 U.S.C. 175 note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 2. PURPOSE AND INTENT.\2\

    (a) Purpose.--The purpose of this Act is to--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ 18 U.S.C. 175 note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) implement the Biological Weapons Convention, an 
        international agreement unanimously ratified by the 
        United States Senate in 1974 and signed by more than 
        100 other nations, including the Soviet Union; and
          (2) protect the United States against the threat of 
        biological terrorism.
    (b) Intent of Act.--Nothing in this Act is intended to 
restrain or restrict peaceful scientific research or 
development.

SEC. 3. TITLE 18 AMENDMENTS.\3\

    In General.--Title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
inserting after chapter 9 the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ The Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989, as amended, 
enacted a new chapter 10 to 18 U.S.C. relating to biological weapons 
and to implement the Biological Weapons Convention. The text of this 
chapter can be found in Section C.3.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


             8. 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism

  Public Law 98-533 [H.R. 6311], 98 Stat. 2706, approved October 19, 
                            1984, as amended

               AN ACT To combat international terrorism.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

                              short title

    Section 1. This Act may be cited as the ``1984 Act to 
Combat International Terrorism''.

      TITLE I--REWARDS FOR INFORMATION ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

                   authority of the attorney general

    Sec. 101.\1\ (a) Title 18 of the United States Code is 
amended by adding the following new chapter after chapter 203:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Sec. 101 enacted a new chapter 204 to 18 U.S.C. relating to 
rewards for information concerining terrorist acts. The text of this 
chapter can be found in Section C.3.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                  TITLE II--INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

        increasing international cooperation to combat terrorism

    Sec. 201. (a) The President is urged to seek more effective 
international cooperation in combatting international 
terrorism, including--
          (1) severe punishment for acts of terrorism, which 
        endanger the lives of diplomatic staff, military 
        personnel, other government personnel, or private 
        citizens; and
          (2) extradition of all terrorists and their 
        accomplices to the country where the terrorist incident 
        occurred or whose citizens were victims of the 
        incident.
    (b) High priority should also be given to negotiations 
leading to the establishment of a permanent international 
working group which would combat international terrorism by--
          (1) promoting international cooperation among 
        countries;
          (2) developing new methods, procedures, and standards 
        to combat international terrorism;
          (3) negotiating agreements for exchanges of 
        information and intelligence and for technical 
        assistance; and
          (4) examining the use of diplomatic immunity and 
        diplomatic facilities to further international 
        terrorism.
This working group should have subgroups or appropriate 
matters, including law enforcement and crisis management.

          TITLE III--SECURITY OF UNITED STATES MISSIONS ABROAD

      advisory panel on security of united states missions abroad

    Sec. 301. In light of continued terrorist incidents and 
given the ever increasing threat of international terrorism 
directed at United States missions and diplomatic personnel 
abroad, the Congress believes that it is imperative that the 
Department of State review its approach to providing security 
against international terrorism. Not later than February 1, 
1985, the Secretary of State shall report to the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs \2\ of the House of Representatives on the findings and 
recommendations of the Advisory Panel on Security of United 
States Missions Abroad.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Sec. 1(a)(5) of Public Law 104-14 (109 Stat. 186) provided that 
references to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives shall be treated as referring to the Committee on 
International Relations of the House of Representatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

         security enhancement at united states missions abroad

    Sec. 302. (a) In addition to amounts otherwise authorized 
to be appropriated, there are authorized to be appropriated, 
without fiscal year limitation--
          (1) $350,963,000 for the Department of State for 
        ``Administration of Foreign Affairs'', and
          (2) $5,315,000 for the United States Information 
        Agency,
which amounts shall be for security enhancement at United 
States missions abroad.
    (b) Not later than February 1, 1985, the Secretary of State 
and the Director of the United States Information Agency shall 
each report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 
and the Committee on Foreign Affairs \2\ of the House of 
Representatives on how their respective agencies have allocated 
the funds authorized to be appropriated by this section.

                   state department basic authorities

    Sec. 303.\3\ * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Sec. 303 amended sec. 2 of the State Department Basic 
Authorities Act of 1956.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               danger pay

    Sec. 304. In recognition of the current epidemic of 
worldwide terrorist activity and the courage and sacrifice of 
employees of United States agencies overseas, civilian as well 
as military, it is the sense of Congress that the provisions of 
section 5928 of title 5, United States Code, relating to the 
payment of danger pay allowance, should be more extensively 
utilized at United States missions abroad.

                    9. Foreign Sovereign Immunities

     Title 28, United States Code--Judiciary and Judicial Procedure

               Chapter 85--District Courts; Jurisdiction

Sec. 1330. Actions against foreign states

    (a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction 
without regard to amount in controversy of any nonjury civil 
action against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of 
this title as to any claim for relief in personae with respect 
to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either 
under sections 1605-1607 of this title or under any applicable 
international agreement.
    (b) Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist 
as to every claim for relief over which the district courts 
have jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been 
made under section 1608 of this title.
    (c) For purposes of subsection (b), an appearance by a 
foreign state does not confer personal jurisdiction with 
respect to any claim for relief not arising out of any 
transaction or occurrence enumerated in sections 1605-1607 of 
this title.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


        Chapter 97--JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF FOREIGN STATES

Sec.
1602. Findings and declaration of purpose.
1603. Definitions.
1604. Immunity of a foreign state from jurisdiction.
1605. General exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign 
          state.
1606. Extent of liability.
1607. Counterclaims.
1608. Service; time to answer default.
1609. Immunity from attachment and execution of property of a foreign 
          state.
1610. Exceptions to the immunity from attachment or execution.
1611. Certain types of property immune from execution.

Sec. 1602. Findings and declaration of purpose

    The Congress finds that the determination by United States 
courts of the claims of foreign states to immunity from the 
jurisdiction of such courts would serve the interests of 
justice and would protect the rights of both foreign states and 
litigants in United States courts. Under international law, 
states are not immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts 
insofar as their commercial activities are concerned, and their 
commercial property may be levied upon for the satisfaction of 
judgments rendered against them in connection with their 
commercial activities. Claims of foreign states to immunity 
should henceforth be decided by courts of the United States and 
of the States in conformity with the principles set forth in 
this chapter.

Sec. 1603. Definitions

    For purposes of this chapter--
          (a) A ``foreign state'', except as used in section 
        1608 of this title, includes a political subdivision of 
        a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a 
        foreign state as defined in subsection (b).
          (b) An ``agency or instrumentality of a foreign 
        state'' means any entity--
                  (1) which is a separate legal person, 
                corporate or otherwise, and
                  (2) which is an organ of a foreign state or 
                political subdivision thereof, or a majority of 
                whose shares or other ownership interest is 
                owned by a foreign state or political 
                subdivision thereof, and
                  (3) which is neither a citizen of a State of 
                the United States as defined in section 1332 
                (c) and (d) of this title, nor created under 
                the laws of any third country.
          (c) The ``United States'' includes all territory and 
        waters, continental or insular, subject to the 
        jurisdiction of the United States.
          (d) A ``commercial activity'' means either a regular 
        course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial 
        transaction or act. The commercial character of an 
        activity shall be determined by reference to the nature 
        of the course of conduct or particular transaction or 
        act, rather than by reference to its purpose.
          (e) A ``commercial activity carried on in the United 
        States by a foreign state'' means commercial activity 
        carried on by such state and having substantial contact 
        with the United States.

Sec. 1604. Immunity of a foreign state from jurisdiction

    Subject to existing international agreements to which the 
United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a 
foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the United States and of the States except as 
provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.

Sec. 1605.\1\ General exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of a 
                    foreign state

    (a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the 
jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in 
any case--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Sec. 589 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and 
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 (sec. 101(c) of title I of 
Public Law 104-208; 110 Stat. 3009) provided the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        ``civil liability for acts of state sponsored terrorism
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ``Sec. 589. (a) an official, employee, or agent of a foreign state 
designated as a state sponsor of terrorism designated under section 
6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 while acting within the 
scope of his or her office, employment, or agency shall be liable to a 
United States national or the national's legal representative for 
personal injury or death caused by acts of that official, employee, or 
agent for which the courts of the United States may maintain 
jurisdiction under section 1605(a)(7) of title 28, United States Code, 
for money damages which may include economic damages, solatium, pain, 
and suffering, and punitive damages if the acts were among those 
described in section 1605(a)(7).
    ``(b) Provisions related to statute of limitations and limitations 
on discovery that would apply to an action brought under 28 U.S.C. 
1605(f) and (g) shall also apply to actions brought under this section. 
No action shall be maintained under this action if an official, 
employee, or agent of the United States, while acting within the scope 
of his or her office, employment, or agency would not be liable for 
such acts if carried out within the United States.''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) in which the foreign state has waived its 
        immunity either explicitly or by implication, 
        notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the 
        foreign state may purport to effect except in 
        accordance with the terms of the waiver;
          (2) in which the action is based upon a commercial 
        activity carried on in the United States by the foreign 
        state; or upon an act performed in the United States in 
        connection with a commercial activity of the foreign 
        state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory 
        of the United States in connection with a commercial 
        activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act 
        causes a direct effect in the United States;
          (3) in which rights in property taken in violation of 
        international law are in issue and the property or any 
        property exchanged for such property is present in the 
        United States in connection with a commercial activity 
        carried on in the United States by the foreign state; 
        or that property or any property exchanged for such 
        property is owned or operated by an agency or 
        instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or 
        instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in 
        the United States;
          (4) in which rights in property in the United States 
        acquired by succession or gift or rights in immovable 
        property situated in the United States are in issue;
          (5) not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above, 
        in which money damages are sought against a foreign 
        state for personal injury or death, or damage to or 
        loss of property, occurring in the United States and 
        caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign 
        state or of any official or employee of that foreign 
        state while acting within the scope of his office or 
        employment; except this paragraph shall not apply to--
                  (A) any claim based upon the exercise on 
                performance or the failure to exercise or 
                perform a discretionary function regardless of 
                whether the discretion be abused, or
                  (B) any claim arising out of malicious 
                prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, 
                misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with 
                contract rights;
          (6) in which the action is brought, either to enforce 
        an agreement made by the foreign state with or for the 
        benefit of a private party to submit to arbitration all 
        or any difference which have arisen or which may arise 
        between the parties with respect to a defined legal 
        relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a 
        subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration 
        under the laws of the United States, or to confirm an 
        award made pursuant to such an agreement to arbitrate, 
        if (A) the arbitration takes place or is intended to 
        take place in the United States, (B) the agreement or 
        award is or may be governed by a treaty or other 
        international agreement in force for the United States 
        calling for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
        awards, (C) the underlying claim, save for the 
        agreement to arbitrate, could have been brought in a 
        United States court under this section or section 1607, 
        or (D) paragraph (1) of this subsection is otherwise 
        applicable; or
          (7) not otherwise covered by paragraph (2), in which 
        money damages are sought against a foreign state for 
        personal injury or death that was caused by an act of 
        torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, 
        hostage taking, or the provision of material support or 
        resources (as defined in section 2339A of title 18) for 
        such an act if such act or provision of material 
        support is engaged in by an official, employee, or 
        agent of such foreign state while acting within the 
        scope of his or her office, employment, or agency, 
        except that the court shall decline to hear a claim 
        under this paragraph--
                  (A) if the foreign state was not designated 
                as a state sponsor of terrorism under section 
                6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 
                (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)) or section 620A of the 
                Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371) 
                at the time the act occurred, unless later so 
                designated as a result of such act; and
                  (B) even if the foreign state is or was so 
                designated, if--
                          (i) the act occurred in the foreign 
                        state against which the claim has been 
                        brought and the claimant has not 
                        afforded the foreign state a reasonable 
                        opportunity to arbitrate the claim in 
                        accordance with accepted international 
                        rules of arbitration; or
                          (ii) neither the claimant nor the 
                        victim was \2\ a national of the United 
                        States (as that term is defined in 
                        section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration 
                        and Nationality Act) when the act upon 
                        which the claim is based occurred.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Public Law 105-11 (111 Stat. 22) inserted ``neither the 
claimant nor the victim was'' in lieu of ``the claimant or victim was 
not'' at this point.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) A foreign state shall not be immune from the 
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States in any case in 
which a suit in admiralty is brought to enforce a maritime lien 
against a vessel or cargo of the foreign state, which maritime 
lien is based upon a commercial activity of the foreign state: 
Provided, That--
          (1) notice of the suit is given by delivery of a copy 
        of the summons and of the complaint to the person, or 
        his agent, having possession of the vessel or cargo 
        against which the maritime lien is asserted; and if the 
        vessel or cargo is arrested pursuant to process 
        obtained on behalf of the party bringing the suit, the 
        service of process of arrest shall be deemed to 
        constitute valid delivery of such notice, but the party 
        bringing the suit shall be liable for any damages 
        sustained by the foreign state as a result of the 
        arrest if the party bringing the suit had actual or 
        constructive knowledge that the vessel or cargo of a 
        foreign state was involved; and \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Sec. 1(1) of Public Law 100-640 (102 Stat. 3333) inserted text 
to this point from the semicolon, and struck out the following: ``but 
such notice shall not be deemed to have been delivered, nor may it 
thereafter be delivered, if the vessel or cargo is arrested pursuant to 
process obtained on behalf of the party bringing the suit--unless the 
party was unaware that the vessel or cargo of a foreign state was 
involved, in which event the service of process of arrest shall be 
deemed to constitute valid delivery of such notice; and''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (2) notice to the foreign state of the commencement 
        of suit as provided in section 1608 of this title is 
        initiated within ten days either of the delivery of 
        notice as provided in paragraph (1) of this subsection 
        or, in the case of a party who was unaware that the 
        vessel or cargo of a foreign state was involved, of the 
        date such party determined the existence of the foreign 
        state's interest.
    (c) Whenever notices is delivered under subsection (b)(1), 
the suit to enforce a maritime lien shall be thereafter proceed 
and shall be heard and determined according to the principles 
of law and rules of practice of suits in rem whenever it 
appears that, had the vessel been privately owned and 
possessed, a suit in rem might have been maintained. A decree 
against the foreign state may include costs of the suit and, if 
the decree is for a money judgment, interest as ordered by the 
court, except that the court may not award judgment against the 
foreign state in an amount greater than the value of the vessel 
or cargo upon which the maritime lien arose. Such value shall 
be determined as of the time notice is served under subsection 
(b)(1). Decrees shall be subject to appeal and revision as 
provided in other cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. 
Nothing shall preclude the plaintiff in any proper case from 
seeking relief in personam in the same action brought to 
enforce a maritime lien as provided in this section.
    (d) A foreign state shall not be immune from the 
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States in any action 
brought to foreclose a preferred mortgage, as defined in the 
Ship Mortgage Act, 1920 (46 U.S.C. 911 and following). Such 
action shall be brought, heard, and determined in accordance 
with the provisions of that Act and in accordance with the 
principles of law and rules of practice of suits in rem, 
whenever it appears that had the vessel been privately owned 
and possessed a suit in rem might have been maintained.
    (e) \4\ For purposes of paragraph (7) of subsection (a)--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Sec. 221(a)(2) of Public Law 104-132 (110 Stat. 1241) added 
subsecs. (e) through (g).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) the terms ``torture'' and ``extrajudicial 
        killing'' have the meaning given those terms in section 
        3 of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991;
          (2) the term ``hostage taking'' has the meaning given 
        that term in Article 1 of the International Convention 
        Against the Taking of Hostages; and
          (3) the term ``aircraft sabotage'' has the meaning 
        given that term in Article 1 of the Convention for the 
        Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
        Civil Aviation.
    (f) \4\ No action shall be maintained under subsection 
(a)(7) unless the action is commenced not later than 10 years 
after the date on which the cause of action arose. All 
principles of equitable tolling, including the period during 
which the foreign state was immune from suit, shall apply in 
calculating this limitation period.
    (g) \4\ Limitation on Discovery.--
          (1) In general.--(A) Subject to paragraph (2), if an 
        action is filed that would otherwise be barred by 
        section 1604, but for subsection (a)(7), the court, 
        upon request of the Attorney General, shall stay any 
        request, demand, or order for discovery on the United 
        States that the Attorney General certifies would 
        significantly interfere with a criminal investigation 
        or prosecution, or a national security operation, 
        related to the incident that gave rise to the cause of 
        action, until such time as the Attorney General advises 
        the court that such request, demand, or order will no 
        longer so interfere.
          (B) A stay under this paragraph shall be in effect 
        during the 12-month period beginning on the date on 
        which the court issues the order to stay discovery. The 
        court shall renew the order to stay discovery for 
        additional 12-month periods upon motion by the United 
        States if the Attorney General certifies that discovery 
        would significantly interfere with a criminal 
        investigation or prosecution, or a national security 
        operation, related to the incident that gave rise to 
        the cause of action.
          (2) Sunset.--(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), no stay 
        shall be granted or continued in effect under paragraph 
        (1) after the date that is 10 years after the date on 
        which the incident that gave rise to the cause of 
        action occurred.
          (B) After the period referred to in subparagraph (A), 
        the court, upon request of the Attorney General, may 
        stay any request, demand, or order for discovery on the 
        United States that the court finds a substantial 
        likelihood would--
                  (i) create a serious threat of death or 
                serious bodily injury to any person;
                  (ii) adversely affect the ability of the 
                United States to work in cooperation with 
                foreign and international law enforcement 
                agencies in investigating violations of United 
                States law; or
                  (iii) obstruct the criminal case related to 
                the incident that gave rise to the cause of 
                action or undermine the potential for a 
                conviction in such case.
          (3) Evaluation of evidence.--The court's evaluation 
        of any request for a stay under this subsection filed 
        by the Attorney General shall be conducted ex parte and 
        in camera.
          (4) Bar on motions to dismiss.--A stay of discovery 
        under this subsection shall constitute a bar to the 
        granting of a motion to dismiss under rules 12(b)(6) 
        and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
          (5) Construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall 
        prevent the United States from seeking protective 
        orders or asserting privileges ordinarily available to 
        the United States.

Sec. 1606. Extent of liability

    As to any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign 
state is not entitled to immunity under section 1605 or 1607 of 
this chapter, the foreign state shall be liable in the same 
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under 
like circumstances; but a foreign state except for an agency or 
instrumentality thereof shall not be liable for punitive 
damages, except any action under section 1605(a)(7) or 
1610(f);\5\ if, however, in any case wherein death was caused, 
the law of the place where the action or omission occurred 
provides, or has been construed to provide, for damages only 
punitive in nature, the foreign state shall be liable for 
actual or compensatory damages measured by the pecuniary 
injuries resulting from such death which were incurred by the 
persons for whose benefit the action was brought.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Sec. 117(b) of Public Law 105-277 (112 Stat. 2681-491) added 
``, except any action under section 1605(a)(7) or 1610(f)''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 1607. Counterclaims

    In any action brought by a foreign state, or in which a 
foreign state intervenes, in a court of the United States or of 
a State, the foreign state shall not be accorded immunity with 
respect to any counterclaim--
          (a) for which a foreign state would not be entitled 
        to immunity under section 1605 of this chapter had such 
        claim been brought in a separate action against the 
        foreign state; or
          (b) arising out of the transaction or occurrence that 
        is the subject matter of the claim of the foreign 
        state; or
          (c) to the extent that the counterclaim does not seek 
        relief exceeding in amount or differing in kind from 
        that sought by the foreign state.

Sec. 1608. Service; time to answer; default

    (a) Service in the courts of the United States and of the 
States shall be made upon a foreign state or political 
subdivision of a foreign state:
          (1) by delivery of a copy of the summons and 
        complaint in accordance with any special arrangement 
        for service between the plaintiff and the foreign state 
        or political subdivision; or
          (2) if no special arrangement exists, by delivery of 
        a copy of the summons and complaint in accordance with 
        an applicable international convention on service of 
        judicial documents; or
          (3) if service cannot be made under paragraph (1) or 
        (2), by sending a copy of the summons and complaint and 
        a notice of suit, together with a translation of each 
        into the official language of the foreign state, by any 
        form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be 
        addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to 
        the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the 
        foreign state concerned, or
          (4) if service cannot be made within 30 days under 
        paragraph (3), by sending two copies of the summons and 
        complaint and a notice of suit, together with a 
        translation of each into the official language of the 
        foreign state, by any form of mail requiring a signed 
        receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of 
        the court to the Secretary of State in Washington, 
        District of Columbia, to the attention of the Director 
        of Special Consular Services--and the Secretary shall 
        transmit one copy of the papers through diplomatic 
        channels to the foreign state and shall send to the 
        clerk of the court a certified copy of the diplomatic 
        note indicating when the papers were transmitted.
As used in this subsection, a ``notice of suit'' shall mean a 
notice addressed to a foreign state and in a form prescribed by 
the Secretary of Safety regulation.
    (b) Service in the courts of the United States and of the 
States shall be made upon an agency or instrumentality of a 
foreign state:
          (1) by delivery of a copy of the summons and 
        complaint in accordance with any special arrangement 
        for service between the plaintiff and the agency or 
        instrumentality; or
          (2) if no special arrangement exists, by delivery of 
        a copy of the summons and complaint either to an 
        officer, a managing or general agent, or to any other 
        agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive 
        service or process in the United States; or in 
        accordance with an applicable international convention 
        or service on judicial document; or
          (3) if service cannot be made under paragraph (1) or 
        (2), and if reasonably calculated to given actual 
        notice, by delivery of a copy of the summons and 
        complaint, together with a translation of each into the 
        official language of the foreign state--
                  (A) as directed by an authority of the 
                foreign state or political subdivision in 
                response to a letter rogatory or request or
                  (B) by any form of mail requiring a signed 
                receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the 
                clerk of the court to the agency or 
                instrumentality to be served, or
                  (C) as directed by order of the court 
                consistent with the law of the place where 
                service is to be made.
    (c) Service shall be deemed to have been made--
          (1) in the case of service under subsection (a)(4), 
        as of the date of transmittal indicated in the 
        certified copy of the diplomatic note; and
          (2) in any other case under this section, as of the 
        date of receipt indicated in the certification, signed 
        and returned postal receipt, or other proof of service 
        applicable to the method of service employed.
    (d) In any action brought in a court of the United States 
or of a State, a foreign state, a political subdivision 
thereof, or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state 
shall serve an answer or other responsive pleading to the 
complaint within sixty days after service has been made under 
this section.
    (e) No judgment by default shall be entered by a court of 
the United States or of a State against a foreign state, a 
political subdivision thereof, or an agency or instrumentality 
of a foreign state, unless the claimant establishes his claim 
or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court. A 
copy of any such default judgment shall be sent to the foreign 
state or political subdivision in the manner prescribed for 
service in this section

Sec. 1609. Immunity from attachment and execution of property of a 
                    foreign state

    Subject to existing international agreements to which the 
United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act 
the property in the United States of a foreign state shall be 
immune from attachment arrest and execution except as provided 
in sections 1610 and 1611 of this chapter.

Sec. 1610. Exceptions to the immunity from attachment or execution

    (a) The property in the United States of a foreign state, 
as defined in section 1603(a) of this chapter, used for a 
commercial activity in the United States, shall not be immune 
from attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, upon a 
judgment entered by a court of the United States or of a State 
after the effective date of this Act, if--
          (1) the foreign state has waived its immunity from 
        attachment in aid of execution or from execution either 
        explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding any 
        withdrawal of the waiver the foreign state may purport 
        to effect except in accordance with the terms of the 
        waiver, or
          (2) the property is or was used for the commercial 
        activity upon which the claim is based, or
          (3) the execution relates to a judgment establishing 
        rights in property which has been taken in violation of 
        international law or which has been exchanged for 
        property taken in violation of international law, or
          (4) the execution relates to a judgment establishing 
        rights in property--
                  (A) which is acquired by succession or gift, 
                or
                  (B) which is immovable and situated in the 
                United States: Provided, That such property is 
                not used for purposes of maintaining a 
                diplomatic or consular mission or the residence 
                of the Chief of such mission, or
          (5) the property consists of any contractual 
        obligation or any proceeds from such a contractual 
        obligation to indemnify or hold harmless the foreign 
        state or its employees under a policy of automobile or 
        other liability or casualty insurance covering the 
        claim which merged into the judgment; or
          (6) the judgment is based on an order confirming an 
        arbitral award rendered against the foreign state, 
        provided that attachment in aid of execution, or 
        execution, would not be inconsistent with any provision 
        in the arbitral agreement, or \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Sec. 221(b)(1) of Public Law 104-132 (110 Stat. 1242) struck 
out a period at the end of para. (6), inserted instead ``, or'', and 
added a new para. (7).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (7) \6\ the judgment relates to a claim for which the 
        foreign state is not immune under section 1605(a)(7), 
        regardless of whether the property is or was involved 
        with the act upon which the claim is based.
    (b) In addition to subsection (a), any property in the 
United States of an agency or instrumentality of a foreign 
state engaged in commercial activity in the United States shall 
not be immune from attachment in aid of execution, or from 
execution, upon a judgment entered by a court of the United 
States or of a State after the effective date of this Act, if--
          (1) the agency or instrumentality has waived its 
        immunity from attachment in aid execution or from 
        execution either explicitly or implicitly, 
        notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver the agency 
        or instrumentality may purport to effect except in 
        accordance with the terms of the waiver, or
          (2) the judgment relates to a claim for which the 
        agency or instrumentality is not immune by virtue of 
        section 1605(a) (2), (3), (5), or (7) or 1605(b) of 
        this chapter, regardless of whether the property is or 
        was involved in the act upon which the claim is based.
    (c) No attachment or execution referred to in subsections 
(a) and (b) of this section shall be permitted until the court 
has ordered such attachment and execution after having 
determined that a reasonable period of time has elapsed 
following the entry of judgment and the giving of any notice 
required under section 1608(e) of this chapter.
    (d) The property of a foreign state, as defined in section 
1603(a) of this chapter, used for a commercial activity in the 
United States, shall not be immune from attachment prior to the 
entry of judgment in any action brought in a court of the 
United States or of a State, or prior to the elapse of the 
period of time provided in subsection (c) of this section if--
          (1) the foreign state has explicitly waived its 
        immunity from attachment prior to judgment, 
        notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver the 
        foreign state may purport to effect except in 
        accordance with the terms of the waiver, and
          (2) the purpose of the attachment is to secure 
        satisfaction of a judgment that has been or may 
        ultimately be entered against the foreign state, and 
        not to obtain jurisdiction.
    (e) The vessels of a foreign state shall not be immune from 
arrest in rem, interlocutory sale, and execution in actions 
brought to foreclose a preferred mortgage as provided in 
section 1605(d).
    (f)(1)(A) \7\ Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
including but not limited to section 208(f) of the Foreign 
Missions Act (22 U.S.C. 4308(f)), and except as provided in 
subparagraph (B), any property with respect to which financial 
transactions are prohibited or regulated pursuant to section 
5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. App. 5(b)), 
section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
2370(a)), sections 202 and 203 of the Inter-national Emergency 
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-1702), or any other 
proclamation, order, regulation, or license issued pursuant 
thereto, shall be subject to execution or attachment in aid of 
execution of any judgment relating to a claim for which a 
foreign state (including any agency or instrumentality or such 
state) claim-ing such property is not immune under section 
1605(a)(7).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Subsec. (f) was added by Public Law 105-277 (112 Stat. 2681-
491).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (B) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply if, at the time the 
property is expropriated or seized by the foreign state, the 
property has been held in title by a natural person or, if held 
in trust, has been held for the benefit of a natural person or 
persons.
    (2)(A) At the request of any party in whose favor a 
judgment has been issued with respect to a claim for which the 
foreign state is not immune under section 1605(a)(7), the 
Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State shall 
fully, promptly, and effectively assist any judgment creditor 
or any court that has issued any such judgment in identifying, 
locating, and executing against the property of that foreign 
state or any agency or instrumentality of such state.
    (B) In providing such assistance, the Secretaries--
          (i) may provide such information to the court under 
        seal;
and
          (ii) shall provide the information in a manner 
        sufficient to allow the court to direct the United 
        States Marshall's office to promptly and effectively 
        execute against that property.

Sec. 1611. Certain types of property immune from execution

    (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1610 of this 
chapter, the property of those organizations designated by the 
President as being entitled to enjoy the privileges, 
exemptions, and immunities provided by the International 
Organizations Immunities Act shall not be subject to attachment 
or any other judicial process impeding the disbursement of 
funds to, or on the order of, a foreign state as the result of 
an action brought in the courts of the United States or of the 
States.
    (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1610 of this 
chapter, the property of a foreign state shall be immune from 
attachment and from the execution, if--
          (1) the property is that of a foreign central bank or 
        monetary authority held for its own account, unless 
        such bank or authority, or its parent foreign 
        government, has explicitly waived its immunity from 
        attachment in aid of execution, or from execution 
        notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the 
        bank, authority or government may purport to effect 
        except in accordance with the terms of the waiver; or
          (2) the property is, or is intended to be, used in 
        connection with a military activity and
                  (A) is of a military character, or
                  (B) is under the control of a military 
                authority or defense agency.
    (c) \8\ Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1610 of 
this chapter, the property of a foreign state shall be immune 
from attachment and from execution in an action brought under 
section 302 of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity 
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 to the extent that the property is a 
facility or installation used by an accredited diplomatic 
mission for official purposes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Sec. 302(e) of Public Law 104-114 (110 Stat. 818) added subsec. 
(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
=======================================================================




                         D. DEFENSE LEGISLATION

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

 1. Armed Forces Legislation (Title 10, United State Code) 
    (partial text)...............................................   229
    Subtitle A--General Military Law.............................   229
        Part I--Organization and General Military Powers.........   229
            Chapter 7--Boards, Councils, and Committees..........   229
                Section 182--Center for Excellence in Disaster 
                  Management and Humanitarian Assistance.........   229
            Chapter 18--Military Support for Civilian Law 
                Enforcement Agencies.............................   230
                Section 374--Maintenance and Operation of 
                  Equipment......................................   230
            Chapter 101--Training Generally......................   231
                Section 2011--Special Operations Forces-- 
                  Training.......................................   232
            Chapter 134--Miscellaneous Administrative Provisions.   233
                Section 2249a--Prohibition on Providing Financial 
                  Assistance to Terrorist Countries..............   233
        Part IV--Service, Supply, and Procurement................   233
            Chapter 137--Procurement Generally...................   234
                Section 2327--Contracts: Consideration of 
                  National Security Objectives...................   234
            Chapter 152--Issue of Supplies, Services, and 
                Facilities.......................................   235
                Section 2576a--Excess Personal Property: Sale or 
                  Donation for Law Enforcement Activities........   235
 2. Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
    Year 1999 (Public Law 105-261) (partial text)................   237
    Title V--Military Personnel Policy...........................   237
        Section 531--Study of New Decorations for Injury or Death 
            in Line Of Duty......................................   237
    Title X--General Provisions..................................   237
        Section 1023--Department of Defense Counter-Drug 
            Activities in Transit Zone...........................   238
    Title XIII--Cooperative Threat Reduction with States of the 
        Former Soviet Union......................................   238
        Section 1306--Cooperative Counter Proliferation Program..   238
    Title XIV--Domestic Preparedness for Defense Against Weapons 
        of Mass Destruction......................................   240
 3. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1999 (Public Law 
    105-262) (partial text)......................................   243
    Title VIII--General Provisions...............................   243
        Section 8129--[Obligating Funds for Counterterror 
            Technical Support]...................................   243
 4. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 
    (Public Law 105-85) (partial text)...........................   244
    Title III--Operation and Maintenance.........................   244
        Subtitle F--Other Matters................................   244
            Section 382--Center for Excellence in Disaster 
                Management and Humanitarian Assistance...........   244
    Title X--General Provisions..................................   244
        Subtitle E--Matters Relating to Terrorism................   244
 5. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 
    (Public Law 104-201) (partial text)..........................   248
    Section 306--Availability of Additional Funds for 
        Antiterrorism Activities.................................   248
 6. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 
    (Public Law 103-337) (partial text)..........................   249
    Title XIII--Matters Relating to Allies and Other Nations.....   249
        Section 1324--Sense of Congress concerning the North 
            Korean Nuclear Weapons Development Program...........   249
    Title XV--Arms Control Matters...............................   251
        Section 1504--Amounts for Counter proliferation 
            Activities...........................................   251
 7. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 
    (Public Law 103-160) (partial text)..........................   252
    Title VIII--Acquisition Policy, Acquisition Management, and 
        Related Matters..........................................   252
        Section 843--Reports by Defense Contractors of Dealings 
            with Terrorist Countries.............................   252
    Title XVII--Chemical and Biological Weapons Defense..........   253
        Section 1704--Sense of Congress Concerning Federal 
            Emergency Planning for Response to Terrorist Threats.   253
 8. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 
    (Public Law 102-484) (partial text)..........................   254
    Title XIV--Demilitarization of the Former Soviet Union.......   254
        Section 1411--Demilitarization of the Independent States 
            of the Former Soviet Union...........................   254
        Section 1412--Authority for Programs to Facilitate 
            Demilitarization.....................................   255
    Title XV--Nonproliferation...................................   256
        Section 1502--Sense of Congress..........................   256
        Section 1505--International Nonproliferation Initiative..   257
    Title XVI--Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992......   258
        Section 1604--Sanctions Against Certain Persons..........   258
        Section 1605--Sanctions Against Certain Foreign Countries   258
 9. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 
    (Public Law 99-661) (partial text)...........................   260
    Title XIII--General Provisions...............................   260
        Section 1353--Prompt Reporting of Intelligence on 
            Terrorist Threats....................................   260
10. Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986 (Public Law 99-
    145) (partial text)..........................................   261
    Title XIV--General Provisions................................   261
        Section 1452--Sense of Congress Concerning Protection of 
            United States Military Personnel Against Terrorism...   261
        Section 1453--Readiness of Special Operations Forces.....   261
11. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (Title 50, United States 
    Code) (partial text).........................................   263
    Chapter 15--Foreign Intelligence Surveillance................   263
        Subchapter I--Coordination for National Security.........   263
            Section 402--National Security Council...............   263
    Chapter 36--Foreign Intelligence Surveillance................   264
        Subchapter I--Electronic Surveillance....................   264
            Section 1801--Definitions............................   264
            Section 1841--Definitions............................   265
            Section 1842--Pen Registers and Trap and Trace 
                Devices for Foreign Intelligence and 
                International Terrorism Investigations...........   266
            Section 1843--Authorization During Emergencies.......   268
            Section 1844--Authorization During Time of War.......   269
            Section 1845--Use of Information.....................   269
            Section 1846--Congressional Oversight................   271
        Subchapter IV--Access to Certain Business Records for 
            Foreign Intelligence Purposes........................   271
            Section 1861--Definitions............................   271
            Section 1862--Access to Certain Business Records for 
                Foreign Intelligence and International Terrorism 
                Investigations...................................   272
            Section 1863--Congressional Oversight................   273
12. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public 
    Law 104-93) (partial text)...................................   274
    Title III--General Provisions................................   274
        Section 310--Assistance to Foreign Countries.............   274

=======================================================================

                      1. Armed Forces Legislation

Partial text of Title 10, United States Code

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                    Subtitle A--General Military Law

            PART I--ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL MILITARY POWERS

CHAPTER 7--BOARDS, COUNCILS, AND COMMITTEES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 182.\1\ Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and 
                    Humanitarian Assistance

  (a) Establishment.--The Secretary of Defense may operate a 
Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian 
Assistance (in this section referred to as the `Center').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Added by sec. 382(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105-85; 111 Stat. 1709).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  (b) Missions.--(1) The Center shall be used to provide and 
facilitate education, training, and research in civil-military 
operations, particularly operations that require international 
disaster management and humanitarian assistance and operations 
that require coordination between the Department of Defense and 
other agencies.
  (2) The Center shall be used to make available high-quality 
disaster management and humanitarian assistance in response to 
disasters.
  (3) The Center shall be used to provide and facilitate 
education, training, interagency coordination, and research on 
the following additional matters:
          (A) Management of the consequences of nuclear, 
        biological, and chemical events.
          (B) Management of the consequences of terrorism.
          (C) Appropriate roles for the reserve components in 
        the management of such consequences and in disaster 
        management andhumanitarian assistance in response to 
        natural disasters.
          (D) Meeting requirements for information in 
        connection with regional and global disasters, 
        including the use of advanced communications technology 
        as a virtual library.
          (E) Tropical medicine, particularly in relation to 
        the medical readiness requirements of the Department of 
        Defense.
  (4) The Center shall develop a repository of disaster risk 
indicators for the Asia-Pacific region.
  (5) The Center shall perform such other missions as the 
Secretary of Defense may specify.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 18--MILITARY SUPPORT FOR CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 374. Maintenance and operation of equipment

  (a) The Secretary of Defense may, in accordance with other 
applicable law, make Department of Defense personnel available 
for the maintenance of equipment for Federal, State, and local 
civilian law enforcement officials, including equipment made 
available under section 372 of this title.
  (b)(1) Subject to paragraph (2) and in accordance with other 
applicable law, the Secretary of Defense may, upon request from 
the head of a Federal law enforcement agency, make Department 
of Defense personnel available to operate equipment (including 
equipment made available under section 372 of this title) with 
respect to--
          (A) a criminal violation of a provision of law 
        specified in paragraph (4)(A);
          (B) assistance that such agency is authorized to 
        furnish to a State, local, or foreign government which 
        is involved in the enforcement of similar laws;
          (C) \2\ a foreign or domestic counter-terrorism 
        operation;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Added by sec. 201 of Public Law 105-277 (112 Stat. 2681-567).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  or
          (D) \2\ a rendition of a suspected terrorist from a 
        foreign country to the United States to stand trial.
  (2) Department of Defense personnel made available to a 
civilian law enforcement agency under this subsection may 
operate equipment for the following purposes:
          (A) Detection, monitoring, and communication of the 
        movement of air and sea traffic.
          (B) Detection, monitoring, and communication of the 
        movement of surface traffic outside of the geographic 
        boundary of the United States and within the United 
        States not to exceed 25 miles of the boundary if the 
        initial detection occurred outside of the boundary.
          (C) Aerial reconnaissance.
          (D) Interception of vessels or aircraft detected 
        outside the land area of the United States for the 
        purposes of communicating with such vessels and 
        aircraft to direct such vessels and aircraft to go to a 
        location designated by appropriate civilian officials.
          (E) Operation of equipment to facilitate 
        communications in connection with law enforcement 
        programs specified in paragraph (4)(A).
          (F) Subject to joint approval by the Secretary of 
        Defense andthe Attorney General (and the Secretary of 
        State in the case of a law enforcement operation 
        outside of the land area of the United States)--
                  (i) the transportation of civilian law 
                enforcement personnel along with any other 
                civilian or military personnel who are 
                supporting, or conducting, a joint operation 
                with civilian law enforcement personnel;\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ The text beginning with ``along with'' to this point, was added 
by sec. 201 of Public Law 105-277 (112 Stat. 2681-567).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  (ii) the operation of a base of operations 
                for civilian law enforcement and supporting 
                personnel; and
                  (iii) \2\ the transportation of suspected 
                terrorists from foreign countries to the United 
                States for trial (so long as the requesting 
                Federal law enforcement agency provides all 
                security for such transportation and maintains 
                custody over the suspect through the duration 
                of the transportation).
  (3) Department of Defense personnel made available to operate 
equipment for the purpose stated in paragraph (2)(D) may 
continue to operate such equipment into the land area of the 
United States in cases involving the pursuit of vessels or 
aircraft where the detection began outside such land area.
  (4) In this subsection:
          (A) The term ``Federal law enforcement agency'' means 
        a Federal agency with jurisdiction to enforce any of 
        the following:
                  (i) The Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 
                801 et seq.) or the Controlled Substances 
                Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.).
                  (ii) Any of sections 274 through 278 of the 
                Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1324-
                1328).
                  (iii) A law relating to the arrival or 
                departure of merchandise (as defined in section 
                401 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1401) 
                into or out of the customs territory of the 
                United States (as defined in general note 2 of 
                the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United 
                States) or any other territory or possession of 
                the United States.
                  (iv) The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act 
                (46 U.S.C. App. 1901 et seq.).
                  (v) \2\ Any law, foreign or domestic, 
                prohibiting terrorist activities.
          (B) The term ``land area of the United States'' 
        includes the land area of any territory, commonwealth, 
        or possession of the United States.
  (c) The Secretary of Defense may, in accordance with other 
applicable law, make Department of Defense personnel available 
to any Federal, State, or local civilian law enforcement agency 
to operate equipment for purposes other than described in 
subsection (b)(2) only to the extent that such support does not 
involve direct participation by such personnel in a civilian 
law enforcement operation unless such direct participation is 
otherwise authorized by law.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 101--TRAINING GENERALLY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 2011.\4\ Special operations forces: training with friendly foreign 
                    forces

  (a) Authority To Pay Training Expenses.--Under regulations 
prescribed pursuant to subsection (c), the commander of the 
special operations command established pursuant to section 167 
of this title and the commander of any other unified or 
specified combatant command may pay, or authorize payment for, 
any of the following expenses:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Added by sec. 1052(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-190; 105 Stat. 1470).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) Expenses of training special operations forces 
        assigned to that command in conjunction with training, 
        and training with, armed forces and other security 
        forces of a friendly foreign country.
          (2) Expenses of deploying such special operations 
        forces for that training.
          (3) In the case of training in conjunction with a 
        friendly developing country, the incremental expenses 
        incurred by that country as the direct result of such 
        training.
  (b) Purpose of Training.--The primary purpose of the training 
for which payment may be made under subsection (a) shall be to 
train the special operations forces of the combatant command.
  (c) Regulations.--The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe 
regulations for the administration of this section. The 
regulations shall establish accounting procedures to ensure 
that the expenditures pursuant to this section are appropriate.
  (d) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) The term ``special operations forces'' includes 
        civil affairs forces and psychological operations 
        forces.
          (2) The term ``incremental expenses'', with respect 
        to a developing country, means the reasonable and 
        proper cost of rations, fuel, training ammunition, 
        transportation, and other goods and services consumed 
        by such country, except that the term does not include 
        pay, allowances, and other normal costs of such 
        country's personnel.
  (e) Reports.--Not later than April 1 of each year, the 
Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report 
regarding training during the preceding fiscal year for which 
expenses were paid under this section. Each report shall 
specify the following:
          (1) All countries in which that training was 
        conducted.
          (2) The type of training conducted, including whether 
        such training was related to counter-narcotics or 
        counter-terrorism activities, the duration of that 
        training, the number of members of the armed forces 
        involved, and expenses paid.
          (3) The extent of participation by foreign military 
        forces, including the number and service affiliation of 
        foreign military personnel involved and physical and 
        financial contribution of each host nation to the 
        training effort.
          (4) The relationship of that training to other 
        overseas training programs conducted by the armed 
        forces, such as military exercise programs sponsored by 
        the Joint Chiefs of Staff, military exercise programs 
        sponsored by a combatant command, and military training 
        activities sponsored by a military department 
        (including deployments for training, short duration 
        exercises, and other similar unit training events).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


          CHAPTER 134--MISCELLANEOUS ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS

Subchapter I--Miscellaneous Authorities, Prohibitions, and Limitations 
on the Use of Appropriated Funds

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 2249a.\5\ Prohibition on providing financial assistance to 
                    terrorist countries

    (a) Prohibition.--Funds available to the Department of 
Defense may not be obligated or expended to provide financial 
assistance to--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Added by sec. 1341(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106; 110 Stat. 485).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) any country with respect to which the Secretary 
        of State has made a determination under section 
        6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 
        App. 2405(j));
          (2) any country identified in the latest report 
        submitted to Congress under section 140 of the Foreign 
        Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 
        (22 U.S.C. 2656f), as providing significant support for 
        international terrorism; or
          (3) any other country that, as determined by the 
        President--
                  (A) grants sanctuary from prosecution to any 
                individual or group that has committed an act 
                of international terrorism; or
                  (B) otherwise supports international 
                terrorism.
    (b) Waiver.--(1) The President may waive the application of 
subsection (a) to a country if the President determines--
          (A) that it is in the national security interests of 
        the United States to do so; or
          (B) that the waiver should be granted for 
        humanitarian reasons.
    (2) The President shall--
          (A) notify the Committee on Armed Services and the 
        Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
        Committee on National Security and the Committee on 
        International Relations of the House of Representatives 
        at least 15 days before the waiver takes effect; and
          (B) publish a notice of the waiver in the Federal 
        Register.
    (c) Definition.--In this section, the term ``international 
terrorism'' has the meaning given that term in section 140(d) 
of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 
and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2656f(d)).

PART IV--SERVICE, SUPPLY, AND PROCUREMENT

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 137--PROCUREMENT GENERALLY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 2327.\6\ Contracts: consideration of national security objectives

    (a) Disclosure of Ownership or Control by a Foreign 
Government.--The head of an agency shall require a firm or a 
subsidiary of a firm that submits a bid or proposal in response 
to a solicitation issued by the Department of Defense to 
disclose in that bid or proposal any significant interest in 
such firm or subsidiary (or, in the case of a subsidiary, in 
the firm that owns the subsidiary) that is owned or controlled 
(whether directly or indirectly) by a foreign government or an 
agent or instrumentality of a foreign government, if such 
foreign government is the government of a country that the 
Secretary of State determines under section 6(j)(1)(A) of the 
Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 2405(j)(1)(A)) has 
repeatedly provided support for acts of international 
terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ See also sec. 843 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160; 107 Stat. 1720), requiring 
reports by defense contractors of dealings with terrorist countries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Prohibition of Entering Into Contracts Against the 
Interests of the United States.--Except as provided in 
subsection (c), the head of an agency may not enter into a 
contract with a firm or a subsidiary of a firm if--
          (1) a foreign government owns or controls (whether 
        directly or indirectly) a significant interest in such 
        firm or subsidiary (or, in case of a subsidiary, in the 
        firm that owns the subsidiary); and
          (2) such foreign government is the government of a 
        country that the Secretary of State determines under 
        section 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of 
        1797 (50 U.S.C. 2405(j)(1)(A)) has repeatedly provided 
        support for acts of international terrorism.
    (c) Waiver.--(1)(A) If the Secretary of Defense determines 
under paragraph (2) that entering into a contract with a firm 
or a subsidiary of a firm described in subsection (b) is not 
inconsistent with the national security objectives of the 
United States, the head of an agency may enter into a contract 
with such firm or subsidiary after the date on which such head 
of an agency submits to Congress a report on the contract.
    (B) A report under subparagraph (A) shall include the 
following:
          (i) The identify of the foreign government concerned.
          (ii) The nature of the contract.
          (iii) The extent of ownership or control of the firm 
        or subsidiary concerned (or, if appropriate in the case 
        of a subsidiary, of the firm that owns the subsidiary) 
        by the foreign government concerned or the agency or 
        instrumentality of such foreign government.
          (iv) The reasons for entering into the contract.
    (C) After the head of an agency submits a report to 
Congress under subparagraph (A) with respect to a firm or a 
subsidiary, such head of an agency is not required to submit a 
report before entering into any subsequent contract with such 
firm or subsidiary unless the information required to be 
included in such report under subparagraph (B) has materially 
changed since the submission of the previous report.
    (2) Upon the request of the head of an agency, the 
Secretary of Defense shall determine whether entering into a 
contract with a firm or subsidiary described in subsection (b) 
is inconsistent with the national security objectives of the 
United States. In making such a determination, the Secretary of 
Defense shall consider the following:
          (A) The relationship of the United States with the 
        foreign government concerned.
          (B) The obligations of the United States under 
        international agreements.
          (C) The extent of the ownership or control of the 
        firm or subsidiary (or, if appropriate in the case of a 
        subsidiary, of the firm that owns the subsidiary) by 
        the foreign government or an agent or instrumentality 
        of the foreign government.
          (D) Whether payments made, or information made 
        available, to the firm or subsidiary under the contract 
        could be used for purposes hostile to the interests of 
        the United States.
    (d) Applicability.--(1) This section does not apply to a 
contract for an amount less than $100,000.
    (2) This section does not apply to the Coast Guard or the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
    (e) Regulations.--The Secretary of Defense, after 
consultation with the Secretary of State, shall prescribe 
regulations to carry out this section. Such regulations shall 
include a definition of the term ``significant interest.''

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 152--ISSUE OF SUPPLIES, SERVICES, AND FACILITIES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


 Subchapter II--Issue of Serviceable Material Other Than to the Armed 
Forces

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 2576a.\7\ Excess personal property: sale or donation for law 
                    enforcement activities

    (a) Transfer Authorized.--(1) Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law and subject to subsection (b), the Secretary 
of Defense may transfer to Federal and State agencies personal 
property of the Department of Defense, including small arms and 
ammunition, that the Secretary determines is--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Sec. 1033(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201; 110 Stat. 2640) added sec. 2576a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (A) suitable for use by the agencies in law 
        enforcement activities, including counter-drug and 
        counter-terrorism activities; and
          (B) excess to the needs of the Department of Defense.
  (2) The Secretary shall carry out this section in 
consultation with the Attorney General and the Director of 
National Drug Control Policy.
    (b) Conditions for Transfer.--The Secretary of Defense may 
transfer personal property under this section only if--
          (1) the property is drawn from existing stocks of the 
        Department of Defense;
          (2) the recipient accepts the property on an as-is, 
        where-is basis;
          (3) the transfer is made without the expenditure of 
        any funds available to the Department of Defense for 
        the procurement of defense equipment; and
          (4) all costs incurred subsequent to the transfer of 
        the property are borne or reimbursed by the recipient.
    (c) Consideration.--Subject to subsection (b)(4), the 
Secretary may transfer personal property under this section 
without charge to the recipient agency.
    (d) Preference for Certain Transfers.--In considering 
applications for the transfer of personal property under this 
section, the Secretary shall give a preference to those 
applications indicating that the transferred property will be 
used in the counter-drug or counter-terrorism activities of the 
recipient agency.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


 2. Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
                                  1999

    Partial text of Public Law 105-261 [H.R. 3616], 112 Stat. 1920, 
                       approved October 17, 1998

 AN ACT to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1999 for military 
activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and 
   for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe 
personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of American in Congress assembled,

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE V--MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


           Subtitle D--Decorations, Awards, and Commendations

SEC. 531. STUDY OF NEW DECORATIONS FOR INJURY OR DEATH IN LINE OF DUTY.

    (a) Study of Need and Criteria for New Decoration.--(1) The 
Secretary of Defense shall carry out a study of the need for, 
and the the appropriate criteria for, two possible new 
decorations.
    (2) The first such decoration would, if implemented, be 
awarded to members of the Armed Forces who, while serving under 
competent authority in any capacity with the Armed Forces, are 
killed or injured in the line of duty as a result of noncombat 
circumstances occurring--
          (A) as a result of an international terrorist attack 
        against the United States or a foreign nation friendly 
        to the United States;
          (B) while engaged in, training for, or traveling to 
        or from a peacetime or contingency operation; or
          (C) while engaged in, training for, or traveling to 
        or from service outside the territory of the United 
        States as part of a peacekeeping force.
    (3) The second such decoration would, if implemented, be 
awarded to civilian nationals of the United States who, while 
serving under competent authority in any capacity with the 
Armed Forces, are killed or injured in the line of duty under 
circumstances which, if they were members of the Armed Forces, 
would qualify them for award of the Purple Heart or the medal 
described in paragraph (2).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE X--GENERAL PROVISIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


 Subtitle C--Counter-Drug Activities and Other Assistance for Civilian 
Law Enforcement

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 1023. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTER-DRUG ACTIVITIES IN TRANSIT 
                    ZONE.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    (d) Resulting Availability of Funds for 
Counterproliferation and Counterterrorism Activities.--(1) In 
light of subsection (c), of the amount authorized to be 
appropriated pursuant to section 301(5) for the Special 
Operations Command, $4,500,000 shall be available for the 
purpose of increased training and related operations in support 
of the activities of the Special Operations Command regarding 
counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
counterterrorism.
    (2) The amount made available under this subsection is in 
addition to other funds authorized to be appropriated under 
section 301(5) for the Special Operations Command for such 
purpose.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


  TITLE XIII--COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION WITH STATES OF THE FORMER 
SOVIET UNION

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 1306. COOPERATIVE COUNTER PROLIFERATION PROGRAM.

    (a) In General.--Of the amount authorized to be 
appropriated in section 1302 (other than the amounts authorized 
to be appropriated in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of that 
section) and subject to the limitations in that section and 
subsection (b), the Secretary of Defense may provide a country 
of the former Soviet Union with emergency assistance for 
removing or obtaining from that country--
          (1) weapons of mass destruction; or
          (2) materials, equipment, or technology related to 
        the development or delivery of weapons of mass 
        destruction.
    (b) Certification Required.--(1) The Secretary may not 
provide assistance under subsection (a) until 15 days after the 
date that the Secretary submits to the congressional defense 
committees a certification in writing that the weapons, 
materials, equipment, or technology described in that 
subsection meet each of the following requirements:
          (A) The weapons, materials, equipment, or technology 
        are at risk of being sold or otherwise transferred to a 
        restricted foreign state or entity.
          (B) The transfer of the weapons, materials, 
        equipment, or technology would pose a significant near-
        term threat to the national security interests of the 
        United States or would significantly advance a foreign 
        country's weapon program that threatens the national 
        security interests of the United States.
          (C) Other options for securing or otherwise 
        preventing the transfer of the weapons, materials, 
        equipment, or technology have been considered and 
        rejected as ineffective or inadequate.
    (2) The 15-day notice requirement in paragraph (1) may be 
waived if the Secretary determines that compliance with the 
requirement would compromise the national security interests of 
the United States. In such case, the Secretary shall promptly 
notify the congressional defense committees of the 
circumstances regarding such determination in advance of 
providing assistance under subsection (a) and shall submit the 
certification required not later than 30 days after providing 
such assistance.
    (c) Content of Certifications.--Each certification required 
under subsection (b) shall contain information on the following 
with respect to the assistance being provided:
          (1) The specific assistance provided and the purposes 
        for which the assistance is being provided.
          (2) The sources of funds for the assistance.
          (3) Whether any assistance is being provided by any 
        other Federal department or agency.
          (4) The options considered and rejected for 
        preventing the transfer of the weapons, materials, 
        equipment, or technology, as described in subsection 
        (b)(1)(C).
          (5) Whether funding was requested by the Secretary 
        from other Federal departments or agencies.
          (6) Any additional information that the Secretary 
        determines is relevant to the assistance being 
        provided.
    (d) Additional Sources of Funding.--The Secretary may 
request assistance and accept funds from other Federal 
departments or agencies in carrying out this section.
    (e) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) The term ``restricted foreign state or entity'', 
        with respect to weapons, materials, equipment, or 
        technology covered by a certification or notification 
        of the Secretary of Defense under subsection (b), 
        means--
                  (A) any foreign country the government of 
                which has repeatedly provided support for acts 
                of international terrorism, as determined by 
                the Secretary of State under section 620A of 
                the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
                2371); or
                  (B) any foreign state or entity that the 
                Secretary of Defense determines would 
                constitute a military threat to the United 
                States, its allies, or interests, if that 
                foreign state or entity were to possess the 
                weapons, materials, equipment, or technology.
          (2) The term ``weapons of mass destruction'' has the 
        meaning given that term in section 1403(1) of the 
        Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 
        (title XIV of Public Law 104-201; 50 U.S.C. 2302(1)).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


 TITLE XIV--DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS FOR DEFENSE AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS 
                              DESTRUCTION

Sec. 1401. Short title.
Sec. 1402. Domestic preparedness for response to threats of 
  terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction.
Sec. 1403. Report on domestic emergency preparedness.
Sec. 1404. Threat and risk assessments.
Sec. 1405. Advisory panel to assess domestic response 
  capabilities for terrorism involving weapons of mass 
  destruction.

SEC. 1401.\1\ SHORT TITLE.
    This title may be cited as the ``Defense Against Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Act of 1998''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 50 U.S.C. 2301 note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 1402.\1\ DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS FOR RESPONSE TO THREATS OF 
                    TERRORIST USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.
    (a) Enhanced Response Capability.--In light of the 
continuing potential for terrorist use of weapons of mass 
destruction against the United States and the need to develop a 
more fully coordinated response to that threat on the part of 
Federal, State, and local agencies, the President shall act to 
increase the effectiveness at the Federal, State, and local 
level of the domestic emergency preparedness program for 
response to terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass 
destruction by utilizing the President's existing authorities 
to develop an integrated program that builds upon the program 
established under the Defense Against Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Act of 1996 (title XIV of Public Law 104-201; 110 
Stat. 2714; 50 U.S.C. 2301 et seq.).
    (b) Report.--Not later than January 31, 1999, the President 
shall submit to Congress a report containing information on the 
actions taken at the Federal, State, and local level to develop 
an integrated program to prevent and respond to terrorist 
incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.

SEC. 1403.\2\ REPORT ON DOMESTIC EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ 50 USC 2301 note. Sec. 1403 amended sec. 1051 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105-85; 111 
Stat. 1889; 31 U.S.C. 1113 note).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 1404.\1\ THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENTS.
    (a) Requirement To Develop Methodologies.--The Attorney 
General, in consultation with the Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation and representatives of appropriate 
Federal, State, and local agencies, shall develop and test 
methodologies for assessing the threat and risk of terrorist 
employment of weapons of mass destruction against cities and 
other local areas. The results of the tests may be used to 
determine the training and equipment requirements under the 
program developed under section 1402. The methodologies 
required by this subsection shall be developed using cities or 
local areas selected by the Attorney General, acting in 
consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and appropriate representatives of Federal, 
State, and local agencies.
    (b) Required Completion Date.--The requirements in 
subsection (a) shall be completed not later than 1 year after 
the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 1405.\1\ ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES 
                    FOR TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS 
                    DESTRUCTION.
    (a) Requirement for Panel.--The Secretary of Defense, in 
consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of 
Energy, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the 
Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, shall 
enter into a contract with a federally funded research and 
development center to establish a panel to assess the 
capabilities for domestic response to terrorism involving 
weapons of mass destruction.
    (b) Composition of Panel; Selection.--(1) The panel shall 
be composed of members who shall be private citizens of the 
United States with knowledge and expertise in emergency 
response matters.
    (2) Members of the panel shall be selected by the federally 
funded research and development center in accordance with the 
terms of the contract established pursuant to subsection (a).
    (c) Procedures for Panel.--The federally funded research 
and development center shall be responsible for establishing 
appropriate procedures for the panel, including procedures for 
selection of a panel chairman.
    (d) Duties of Panel.--The panel shall--
          (1) assess Federal agency efforts to enhance domestic 
        preparedness for incidents involving weapons of mass 
        destruction;
          (2) assess the progress of Federal training programs 
        for local emergency responses to incidents involving 
        weapons of mass destruction;
          (3) assess deficiencies in programs for response to 
        incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, 
        including a review of unfunded communications, 
        equipment, and planning requirements, and the needs of 
        maritime regions;
          (4) recommend strategies for ensuring effective 
        coordination with respect to Federal agency weapons of 
        mass destruction response efforts, and for ensuring 
        fully effective local response capabilities for weapons 
        of mass destruction incidents; and
          (5) assess the appropriate roles of State and local 
        government in funding effective local response 
        capabilities.
    (e) Deadline To Enter Into Contract.--The Secretary of 
Defense shall enter into the contract required under subsection 
(a) not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act.
    (f) Deadline for Selection of Panel Members.--Selection of 
panel members shall be made not later than 30 days after the 
date on which the Secretary enters into the contract required 
by subsection (a).
    (g) Initial Meeting of the Panel.--The panel shall conduct 
its first meeting not later than 30 days after the date that 
all the selections to the panel have been made.
    (h) Reports.--(1) Not later than 6 months after the date of 
the first meeting of the panel, the panel shall submit to the 
President and to Congress an initial report setting forth its 
findings, conclusions, and recommendations for improving 
Federal, State, and local domestic emergency preparedness to 
respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.
    (2) Not later than December 15 of each year, beginning in 
1999 and ending in 2001, the panel shall submit to the 
President and to the Congress a report setting forth its 
findings, conclusions, and recommendations for improving 
Federal, State, and local domestic emergency preparedness to 
respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.
    (i) Cooperation of Other Agencies.--(1) The panel may 
secure directly from the Department of Defense, the Department 
of Energy, the Department of Health and Human Services, the 
Department of Justice, and the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, or any other Federal department or agency information 
that the panel considers necessary for the panel to carry out 
its duties.
    (2) The Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the 
Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, and any other official of the United States shall 
provide the panel with full and timely cooperation in carrying 
out its duties under this section.
    (j) Funding.--The Secretary of Defense shall provide the 
funds necessary for the panel to carry out its duties from the 
funds available to the Department of Defense for weapons of 
mass destruction preparedness initiatives.
    (k) Compensation of Panel Members.--(1) Members of the 
panel shall serve without pay by reason of their work on the 
panel.
    (2) Members of the panel shall be allowed travel expenses, 
including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates authorized 
for employees of agencies under subchapter 57 of title 5, 
United States Code, while away from their homes or regular 
place of business in performance of services for the panel.
    (l) Termination of the Panel.--The panel shall terminate 
three years after the date of the appointment of the member 
selected as chairman of the panel.
    (m) Definition.--In this section, the term ``weapon of mass 
destruction'' has the meaning given that term in section 
1403(1) of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act 
of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 2302(1)).

           3. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1999

Partial text of Public Law 105-262 [H.R. 4103], 112 Stat. 2279 at 2335, 
                       approved October 17, 1998

  AN ACT Making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the 
     fiscal year ending September 30, 1999, and for other purposes

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of American in Congress assembled,

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE VIII--GENERAL PROVISIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    Sec. 8129. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
Secretary of Defense shall obligate the funds provided for 
Counterterror Technical Support in the Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act, 1998 (under title IV of Public Law 105-56) 
for the projects and in the amounts provided for in House 
Report 105-265 of the House of Representatives, One Hundred 
Fifth Congress, First Session: Provided, That the funds 
available for the Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis Project should 
be executed through cooperation with the Office of National 
Drug Control Policy.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


       4. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998

Partial text of Public Law 105-85 [H.R. 1119], 112 Stat. 1920, approved 
                           November 18, 1997

 AN ACT to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1998 for military 
activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and 
   for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe 
personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of American in Congress assembled,

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


DIVISION A--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE III--OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Subtitle F--Other Matters

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 382. CENTER FOR EXCELLENCE IN DISASTER MANAGEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN 
                    ASSISTANCE.

    (a) Establishment and Operation of Center.--(1) Chapter 7 
of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the 
end the following new section: \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Sec. 382 added a new Sec. 182 to 10 U.S.C. See D.1, this 
section for text.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

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TITLE X--GENERAL PROVISIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


               Subtitle E--Matters Relating to Terrorism

SEC. 1051.\2\ OVERSIGHT OF COUNTERTERRORISM AND ANTITERRORISM 
                    ACTIVITIES; REPORT.

    (a) Oversight of Counterterrorism and Antiterrorism 
Activities.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of Management 
and Budget shall--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ 31 U.S.C. 1113 note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) establish a reporting system for executive 
        agencies with respect to the budget and expenditure of 
        funds by such agencies for the purpose of carrying out 
        counterterrorism and antiterrorism programs and 
        activities; and
          (2) using such reporting system, collect information 
        on--
                  (A) the budget and expenditure of funds by 
                executive agencies during the current fiscal 
                year for purposes of carrying out 
                counterterrorism and antiterrorism programs and 
                activities; and
                  (B) the specific programs and activities for 
                which such funds were expended.
      (b) Report.--Not later that March 1 of each year, the 
President shall submit to Congress a report in classified and 
unclassified form (using the information described in 
subsection (a)(2)) describing, for each executive agency and 
for the executive branch as a whole, the following:
          (1) The amounts proposed to be expended for 
        counterterrorism and antiterrorism programs and 
        activities for the fiscal year beginning in the 
        calendar year in which the report is submitted.
          (2) The amounts proposed to be expended for 
        counterterrorism and antiterrorism programs and 
        activities for the fiscal year in which the report is 
        submitted and the amounts that have already been 
        expended for such programs and activities for that 
        fiscal year.
          (3) The specific counterterrorism and antiterrorism 
        programs and activities being implemented, any 
        priorities with respect to such programs and 
        activities, and whether there has been any duplication 
        of efforts in implementing such programs and 
        activities.
      (c) \3\ Annex on Domestic Emergency Preparedness 
Program.--As part of the annual report submitted to Congress 
under subsection (b), the President shall include an annex 
which provides the following information on the domestic 
emergency preparedness program for response to terrorist 
incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (as established 
under section 1402 of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Act of 1998):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Subsec. (c) was added by sec. 1403 of the Strom Thurmond 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 
105-261; 112 Stat. 2168; 50 U.S.C. 2301 note).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) Information on program responsibilities for each 
        participating Federal department, agency, and bureau.
          (2) A summary of program activities performed during 
        the preceding fiscal year for each participating 
        Federal department, agency, and bureau.
          (3) A summary of program obligations and expenditures 
        during the preceding fiscal year for each participating 
        Federal department, agency, and bureau.
          (4) A summary of the program plan and budget for the 
        current fiscal year for each participating Federal 
        department, agency, and bureau.
          (5) The program budget request for the following 
        fiscal year for each participating Federal department, 
        agency, and bureau.
          (6) Recommendations for improving Federal, State, and 
        local domestic emergency preparedness to respond to 
        incidents involving weapons of mass destruction that 
        have been made by the advisory panel to assess the 
        capabilities of domestic response to terrorism 
        involving weapons of mass destruction (as established 
        under section 1405 of the Defense Against Weapons of 
        Mass Destruction Act of 1998), and actions taken as a 
        result of such recommendations.
          (7) Additional program measures and legislative 
        authority for which congressional action may be 
        required.

SEC. 1052.\4\ PROVISION OF ADEQUATE TROOP PROTECTION EQUIPMENT FOR 
                    ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN PEACE OPERATIONS; 
                    REPORT ON ANTITERRORISM ACTIVITIES AND PROTECTION 
                    OF PERSONNEL.

    (a) Protection of Personnel.--The Secretary of Defense 
shall take appropriate actions to ensure that units of the 
Armed Forces engaged in a peace operation are provided adequate 
troop protection equipment for that operation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ 10 USC 113 note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      (b) Specific Actions.--In taking actions under subsection 
(a), the Secretary shall--
          (1) identify the additional troop protection 
        equipment, if any, required to equip a division (or the 
        equivalent of a division) with adequate troop 
        protection equipment for peace operations; and
          (2) establish procedures to facilitate the exchange 
        or transfer of troop protection equipment among units 
        of the Armed Forces.
      (c) Designation of Responsible Official.--The Secretary 
of Defense shall designate an official within the Department of 
Defense to be responsible for--
          (1) ensuring the appropriate allocation of troop 
        protection equipment among the units of the Armed 
        Forces engaged in peace operations; and
          (2) monitoring the availability, status or condition, 
        and location of such equipment.
      (d) Troop Protection Equipment Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``troop protection equipment'' means the equipment 
required by units of the Armed Forces to defend against any 
hostile threat that is likely during a peace operation, 
including an attack by a hostile crowd, small arms fire, mines, 
and a terrorist bombing attack.
      (e) Report on Antiterrorism Activities of the Department 
of Defense and Protection of Personnel.--Not later than 120 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 
of Defense shall submit to Congress a report, in classified and 
unclassified form, on antiterrorism activities of the 
Department of Defense and the actions taken by the Secretary 
under subsections (a), (b), and (c). The report shall include 
the following:
          (1) A description of the programs designed to carry 
        out antiterrorism activities of the Department of 
        Defense, any deficiencies in those programs, and any 
        actions taken by the Secretary to improve 
        implementation of such programs.
          (2) An assessment of the current policies and 
        practices of the Department of Defense with respect to 
        the protection of members of the Armed Forces overseas 
        against terrorist attack, including any modifications 
        to such policies or practices that are proposed or 
        implemented as a result of the assessment.
          (3) An assessment of the procedures of the Department 
        of Defense for determining accountability, if any, in 
        the command structure of the Armed Forces in instances 
        in which a terrorist attack results in the loss of life 
        at an overseas military installation or facility.
          (4) A detailed description of the roles of the Office 
        of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint 
        Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries of the military 
        departments, and the combatant commanders in providing 
        guidance and support with respect to the protection of 
        members of the Armed Forces deployed overseas against 
        terrorist attack (both before and after the November 
        1995 bombing in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia) and how these 
        roles have changed since the June 25, 1996, terrorist 
        bombing at Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.
          (5) A description of the actions taken by the 
        Secretary of Defense under subsections (a), (b), and 
        (c) to provide adequate troop protection equipment for 
        units of the Armed Forces engaged in a peace operation.

       5. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997

    Partial text of Public Law 104-201 [H.R. 3230], 110 Stat. 2422, 
                      approved September 23, 1996

 AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1997 for military 
activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and 
   for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe 
personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997''.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 306. AVAILABILITY OF ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR ANTITERRORISM 
                    ACTIVITIES.

    Of the amount authorized to be appropriated pursuant to 
section 301 for operation and maintenance, $14,000,000 shall be 
available to the Secretary of Defense for activities designed 
to meet the antiterrorism responsibilities of the Department of 
Defense, including activities related to intelligence support, 
physical security measures, and education and training 
regarding antiterrorism. The amount made available by this 
section is in addition to amounts otherwise made available by 
this Act for antiterrorism activities.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


       6. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995

Partial text of Public Law 103-337 [S. 2182], 108 Stat. 2663, approved 
                      October 5, 1994, as amended

 AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1995 for military 
activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and 
   for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe 
personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995''.



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
TITLE XIII--MATTERS RELATING TO ALLIES AND OTHER NATIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Subtitle C--Matters Relating to Specific Countries

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 1324. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR 
                    WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
          (1) Between 1950 and 1953, the United States led a 
        military coalition that successfully repelled an 
        invasion of the Republic of Korea by North Korea, at a 
        cost of more than 54,000 American lives.
          (2) The United States and the Republic of Korea 
        ratified a Mutual Security Treaty in 1954 that commits 
        the United States to helping the Republic of Korea 
        defend itself against external aggression.
          (3) Approximately 37,000 United States military 
        personnel are presently stationed in the Republic of 
        Korea.
          (4) The United States and the Republic of Korea have 
        regularly conducted joint military exercises, including 
        ``Team Spirit'' exercises.
          (5) North Korea has built up an armed force nearly 
        twice the size of that in the Republic of Korea and has 
        not renounced the use of force, terrorism, and 
        subversion in its attempts to subdue and subjugate the 
        Republic of Korea.
          (6) Although North Korea signed the Treaty on the 
        Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1985, it has 
        impeded the international inspection of its nuclear 
        facilities that is required of all signatories of that 
        Treaty.
          (7) North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic 
        missile programs represent a grave threat to the 
        security of the Korean peninsula and the entire world.
          (8) Efforts in recent years by the United States to 
        reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula have included--
                  (A) the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons 
                from the territory of the Republic of Korea and 
                a reduction in the number of United States 
                military personnel stationed there;
                  (B) the postponement of the 1994 Team Spirit 
                exercises;
                  (C) the establishment of direct diplomatic 
                contacts with the North Korean government; and
                  (D) the offer of expanded diplomatic and 
                economic contacts with North Korea.
          (9) Weapons-grade plutonium can be extracted from the 
        fuel rods removed from North Korea's principal reactor 
        at Yongbyon.
          (10) International inspectors were not permitted to 
        examine and test in a timely manner spent fuel rods 
        removed from North Korea's principal nuclear reactor at 
        Yongbyon, as required to ensure compliance with North 
        Korea's obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
        Treaty.
          (11) Diplomacy concerning the North Korean nuclear 
        program has clearly reached a crucial stage, the 
        unsatisfactory resolution of which would place the 
        international nonproliferation regime in jeopardy and 
        threaten the peace and security of the Korean 
        peninsula, the Northeast Asia region, and, by 
        extension, the rest of the world.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
          (1) the announced freeze on the North Korean nuclear 
        program should remain in place until internationally 
        agreed-upon safeguards of any North Korean civilian 
        nuclear program can be made fully effective;
          (2) the North Korean government should take a further 
        step toward verified cooperation with the international 
        nonproliferation regime by--
                  (A) permitting the unfettered international 
                inspection and testing of the spent fuel rods 
                removed from North Korea's nuclear reactor at 
                the Yongbyon nuclear complex, followed by 
                adequate international supervision of the 
                transfer of all spent fuel rods from the 
                Yongbyon complex and their disposal in another 
                country; and
                  (B) accepting a comprehensive inspection 
                process as required by the Treaty on the Non-
                Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
          (3) a resolution of the inspection controversy at the 
        Yongbyon complex that allows for anything less than the 
        full international inspection of facilities in that 
        complex required by North Korea's obligations under the 
        Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty--
                  (A) would be unsatisfactory; and
                  (B) should prompt the Government of the 
                United States to take such action as would 
                indicate the severity with which the United 
                States views this provocation against 
                international norms; and
          (4) such action should include (but not necessarily 
        be limited to)--
                  (A) the seeking of international sanctions 
                against North Korea; and
                  (B) the rescheduling of the Team Spirit 
                exercises for 1994.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE XV--ARMS CONTROL MATTERS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 1504. AMOUNTS FOR COUNTERPROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    (e) Use of Funds for Technology Development.--(1) Of the 
funds authorized to be appropriated by section 201(4) for 
counterproliferation technology projects--
          (A) up to $5,000,000 shall be available for a program 
        to detect, locate, and disarm weapons of mass 
        destruction that are hidden by a hostile state or 
        terrorist or terrorist group in a confined area outside 
        the United States; and
          (B) * * *
    (2) The Secretary of Defense shall make funds available for 
the program referred to in paragraph (1)(A) in a manner that, 
to the maximum extent practicable, ensures the effective use of 
existing resources of the national weapons laboratories.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


       7. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994

    Partial text of Public Law 103-160 [H.R. 2401], 107 Stat. 1547, 
                 approved November 30, 1993, as amended

 AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1994 for military 
activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and 
   for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe 
personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for 
                            other purposes.

  Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994''.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


  TITLE VIII--ACQUISITION POLICY, ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT, AND RELATED 
MATTERS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Subtitle E--Other Matters

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 843.\1\ REPORTS BY DEFENSE CONTRACTORS OF DEALINGS WITH TERRORIST 
                    COUNTRIES.

    (a) Report Requirement.--(1) Whenever the Secretary of 
Defense proposes to enter into a contract with any person for 
an amount in excess of $5,000,000 for the provision of goods or 
services to the Department of Defense, the Secretary shall 
require that person--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 10 U.S.C. 2327 note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (A) before entering into the contract, to report to 
        the Secretary each commercial transaction which that 
        person has conducted with the government of any 
        terrorist country during the preceding three years or 
        the period since the effective date of this section, 
        whichever is shorter; and
          (B) to report to the Secretary each such commercial 
        transaction which that person conducts during the 
        course of the contract (but not after the date 
        specified in subsection (h)) with the government of any 
        terrorist country.
    (2) The requirement contained in paragraph (1)(B) shall be 
included in the contract with the Department of Defense.
    (b) Regulations.--The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe 
such regulations as may be necessary to carry out this section.
    (c) Annual Report to Congress.--The Secretary of Defense 
shall submit to the Congress each year by December 1 a report 
setting forth those persons conducting commercial transactions 
with terrorist countries that are included in the reports made 
pursuant to subsection (a) during the preceding fiscal year, 
the terrorist countries with which those transactions were 
conducted, and the nature of those transactions. The version of 
the report made available for public release shall exclude 
information exempt from public disclosure under section 552 of 
title 5, United States Code (commonly known as the Freedom of 
Information Act).
    (d) Liability.--This section shall not be interpreted as 
imposing any liability on a person for failure to comply with 
the reporting requirement of subsection (a) if the failure to 
comply is caused solely by an act or omission of a third party.
    (e) Person Defined.--For purposes of this section, the term 
``person'' means a corporate or other business entity proposing 
to enter or entering into a contract covered by this section. 
The term does not include an affiliate or subsidiary of the 
entity.
    (f) Terrorist Country Defined.--A country shall be 
considered to be a terrorist country for purposes of a contract 
covered by this section if the Secretary of State has 
determined pursuant to law, as of the date that is 60 days 
before the date on which the contract is signed, that the 
government of that country is a government that has repeatedly 
provided support for acts of international terrorism.
    (g) Effective Date.--This section shall apply with respect 
to contracts entered into after the expiration of the 90-day 
period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, or 
after the expiration of the 30-day period beginning on the date 
of publication in the Federal Register of the final regulations 
referred to in subsection (b), whichever is earlier.
    (h) Termination.--This section expires on September 30, 
1996.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE XVII--CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS DEFENSE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 1704.\2\ SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING FEDERAL EMERGENCY PLANNING 
                    FOR RESPONSE TO TERRORIST THREATS.

    It is the sense of Congress that the President should 
strengthen Federal interagency emergency planning by the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency and other appropriate 
Federal, State, and local agencies for development of a 
capability for early detection and warning of and response to--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ 50 U.S.C. 1522 note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) potential terrorist use of chemical or biological 
        agents or weapons; and
          (2) emergencies or natural disasters involving 
        industrial chemicals or the widespread outbreak of 
        disease.

       8. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993

    Partial text of Public Law 102-484 [H.R. 5006], 106 Stat. 2315, 
                 approved October 23, 1992, as amended

 AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1993 for military 
activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and 
   for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe 
   personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, to 
        provide for defense conversion, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993''.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


         TITLE XIV--DEMILITARIZATION OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

                        Subtitle A--Short Title

SEC. 1401.\1\ SHORT TITLE.

    This title may be cited as the ``Former Soviet Union 
Demilitarization Act of 1992''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 22 U.S.C. 5901 note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

               Subtitle B--Findings and Program Authority

SEC. 1411.\2\ DEMILITARIZATION OF THE INDEPENDENT STATES OF THE FORMER 
                    SOVIET UNION.

    The Congress finds that it is in the national security 
interest of the United States--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ 22 U.S.C. 5901.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) to facilitate, on a priority basis--
                  (A) the transportation, storage, 
                safeguarding, and destruction of nuclear and 
                other weapons of the independent states of the 
                former Soviet Union, including the safe and 
                secure storage of fissile materials, 
                dismantlement of missiles and launchers, and 
                the elimination of chemical and biological 
                weapons capabilities;
                  (B) the prevention of proliferation of 
                weapons of mass destruction and their 
                components and destabilizing conventional 
                weapons of the independent states of the former 
                Soviet Union, and the establishment of 
                verifiable safeguards against the proliferation 
                of such weapons;
                  (C) the prevention of diversion of weapons-
                related scientific expertise of the former 
                Soviet Union to terrorist groups or third 
                countries; and
                  (D) other efforts designed to reduce the 
                military threat from the former Soviet Union;
          (2) to support the demilitarization of the massive 
        defense-related industry and equipment of the 
        independent states of the former Soviet Union and 
        conversion of such industry and equipment to civilian 
        purposes and uses; and
          (3) to expand military-to-military contacts between 
        the United States and the independent states of the 
        former Soviet Union.

SEC. 1412.\3\ AUTHORITY FOR PROGRAMS TO FACILITATE DEMILITARIZATION.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, the President is authorized, in accordance with this 
title, to establish and conduct programs described in 
subsection (b) to assist the demilitarization of the 
independent states of the former Soviet Union.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ 22 U.S.C. 5902.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Types of Programs.--The programs referred to in 
subsection (a) are limited to--
          (1) transporting, storing, safeguarding, and 
        destroying nuclear, chemical, and other weapons of the 
        independent states of the former Soviet Union, as 
        described in section 212(b) of the Soviet Nuclear 
        Threat Reduction Act of 1991 (title II of Public Law 
        102-228);
          (2) establishing verifiable safeguards against the 
        proliferation of such weapons and their components;
          (3) preventing diversion of weapons-related 
        scientific expertise of the former Soviet Union to 
        terrorist groups or third countries;
          (4) facilitating the demilitarization of the defense 
        industries of the former Soviet Union and the 
        conversion of military technologies and capabilities 
        into civilian activities;
          (5) establishing science and technology centers in 
        the independent states of the former Soviet Union for 
        the purpose of engaging weapons scientists, engineers, 
        and other experts previously involved with nuclear, 
        chemical, and other weapons in productive, nonmilitary 
        undertakings; and
          (6) expanding military-to-military contacts between 
        the United States and the independent states of the 
        former Soviet Union.
    (c) United States Participation.--The programs described in 
subsection (b) should, to the extent feasible, draw upon United 
States technology and expertise, especially from the United 
States private sector.
    (d) Restrictions.--United States assistance authorized by 
subsection (a) may not be provided unless the President 
certifies to the Congress, on an annual basis, that the 
proposed recipient country is committed to--
          (1) making a substantial investment of its resources 
        for dismantling or destroying such weapons of mass 
        destruction, if such recipient has an obligation under 
        a treaty or other agreement to destroy or dismantle any 
        such weapons;
          (2) forgoing any military modernization program that 
        exceeds legitimate defense requirements and forgoing 
        the replacement of destroyed weapons of mass 
        destruction;
          (3) forgoing any use in new nuclear weapons of 
        fissionable or other components of destroyed nuclear 
        weapons;
          (4) facilitating United States verification of any 
        weapons destruction carried out under this title or 
        section 212 of the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act 
        of 1991 (title II of Public Law 102-228);
          (5) complying with all relevant arms control 
        agreements; and
          (6) observing internationally recognized human 
        rights, including the protection of minorities.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                       TITLE XV--NONPROLIFERATION

SEC. 1501. SHORT TITLE.

    This title may be cited as the ``Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Control Act of 1992''.

SEC. 1502. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of the Congress that--
          (1) the proliferation (A) of nuclear, biological, and 
        chemical weapons (hereinafter in this title referred to 
        as ``weapons of mass destruction'') and related 
        technology and knowledge and (B) of missile delivery 
        systems remains one of the most serious threats to 
        international peace and the national security of the 
        United States in the post-cold war era;
          (2) the proliferation of nuclear weapons, given the 
        extraordinary lethality of those weapons, is of 
        particularly serious concern;
          (3) the nonproliferation policy of the United States 
        should continue to seek to limit both the supply of and 
        demand for weapons of mass destruction and to reduce 
        the existing threat from proliferation of such weapons;
          (4) substantial funding of nonproliferation 
        activities by the United States is essential to 
        controlling the proliferation of all weapons of mass 
        destruction, especially nuclear weapons and missile 
        delivery systems;
          (5) the President's nonproliferation policy statement 
        of June 1992, and his September 10, 1992, initiative to 
        increase funding for nonproliferation activities in the 
        Department of Energy are praiseworthy;
          (6) the Congress is committed to cooperating with the 
        President in carrying out an effective policy designed 
        to control the proliferation of weapons of mass 
        destruction;
          (7) the President should identify a full range of 
        appropriate, high priority nonproliferation activities 
        that can be undertaken by the United States and should 
        include requests for full funding for those activities 
        in the budget submission for fiscal year 1994;
          (8) the Department of Defense and the Department of 
        Energy have unique expertise that can further enhance 
        the effectiveness of international nonproliferation 
        activities;
          (9) under the guidance of the President, the 
        Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy should 
        continue to actively assist in United States 
        nonproliferation activities and in formulating and 
        executing United States nonproliferation policy, 
        emphasizing activities such as improved capabilities 
        (A) to detect and monitor proliferation, (B) to respond 
        to terrorism, theft, and accidents involving weapons of 
        mass destruction, and (C) to assist with interdiction 
        and destruction of weapons of mass destruction and 
        related weapons material; and
          (10) in a manner consistent with United States 
        nonproliferation policy, the Department of Defense and 
        the Department of Energy should continue to maintain 
        and to improve their capabilities to identify, monitor, 
        and respond to proliferation of weapons of mass 
        destruction and missile delivery systems.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 1505.\4\ INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION INITIATIVE.

    (a) Assistance for International Nonproliferation 
Activities.--Subject to the limitations and requirements 
provided in this section, the Secretary of Defense, under the 
guidance of the President, may provide assistance to support 
international nonproliferation activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ 22 U.S.C. 5859a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Activities for Which Assistance May Be Provided.--
Activities for which assistance may be provided under this 
section are activities such as the following:
          (1) Activities carried out by international 
        organizations that are designed to ensure more 
        effective safeguards against proliferation and more 
        effective verification of compliance with international 
        agreements on nonproliferation.
          (2) Activities of the Department of Defense in 
        support of the United Nations Special Commission on 
        Iraq.
          (3) Collaborative international nuclear security and 
        nuclear safety projects to combat the threat of nuclear 
        theft, terrorism, or accidents, including joint 
        emergency response exercises, technical assistance, and 
        training.
          (4) Efforts to improve international cooperative 
        monitoring of nuclear, biological, chemical, and 
        missile proliferation through technical projects and 
        improved information sharing.
    (c) Form of Assistance.--(1) Assistance under this section 
may include funds and in-kind contributions of supplies, 
equipment, personnel, training, and other forms of assistance.
    (2) Assistance under this section may be provided to 
international organizations in the form of funds only if the 
amount in the ``Contributions to International Organizations'' 
account of the Department of State is insufficient or otherwise 
unavailable to meet the United States fair share of assessments 
for international nuclear nonproliferation activities.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


      TITLE XVI--IRAN-IRAQ ARMS NON-PROLIFERATION ACT OF 1992 \5\

SEC. 1601. SHORT TITLE.

    This title may be cited as the ``Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
Proliferation Act of 1992''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ 50 U.S.C. 1701 note.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 1604. SANCTIONS AGAINST CERTAIN PERSONS.

    (a) Prohibition.--If any person transfers or retransfers 
goods or technology so as to contribute knowingly and 
materially to the efforts by Iran or Iraq (or any agency or 
instrumentality of either such country) to acquire chemical, 
biological, or nuclear weapons or to acquire destabilizing 
numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons, then the 
sanctions described in subsection (b) shall be imposed.
    (b) Mandatory Sanctions.--The sanctions to be imposed 
pursuant to subsection (a) are as follows:
          (1) Procurement sanction.--For a period of two years, 
        the United States Government shall not procure, or 
        enter into any contract for the procurement of, any 
        goods or services from the sanctioned person.
          (2) Export sanction.--For a period of two years, the 
        United States Government shall not issue any license 
        for any export by or to the sanctioned person.

SEC. 1605. SANCTIONS AGAINST CERTAIN FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

    (a) Prohibition.--If the President determines that the 
government of any foreign country transfers or retransfers 
goods or technology so as to contribute knowingly and 
materially to the efforts by Iran or Iraq (or any agency or 
instrumentality of either such country) to acquire chemical, 
biological, or nuclear weapons or to acquire destabilizing 
numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons, then--
          (1) the sanctions described in subsection (b) shall 
        be imposed on such country; and
          (2) in addition, the President may apply, in the 
        discretion of the President, the sanction described in 
        subsection (c).
    (b) Mandatory Sanctions.--Except as provided in paragraph 
(2), the sanctions to be imposed pursuant to subsection (a)(1) 
are as follows:
          (1) Suspension of united states assistance.--The 
        United States Government shall suspend, for a period of 
        one year, United States assistance to the sanctioned 
        country.
          (2) Multilateral development bank assistance.--The 
        Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United 
        States Executive Director to each appropriate 
        international financial institution to oppose, and vote 
        against, for a period of one year, the extension by 
        such institution of any loan or financial or technical 
        assistance to the sanctioned country.
          (3) Suspension of codevelopment or coproduction 
        agreements.--The United States shall suspend, for a 
        period of one year, compliance with its obligations 
        under any memorandum of understanding with the 
        sanctioned country for the codevelopment or 
        coproduction of any item on the United States Munitions 
        List (established under section 38 of the Arms Export 
        Control Act), including any obligation for 
        implementation of the memorandum of understanding 
        through the sale to the sanctioned country of technical 
        data or assistance or the licensing for export to the 
        sanctioned country of any component part.
          (4) Suspension of military and dual-use technical 
        exchange agreements.--The United States shall suspend, 
        for a period of one year, compliance with its 
        obligations under any technical exchange agreement 
        involving military and dual-use technology between the 
        United States and the sanctioned country that does not 
        directly contribute to the security of the United 
        States, and no military or dual-use technology may be 
        exported from the United States to the sanctioned 
        country pursuant to that agreement during that period.
          (5) United states munitions list.--No item on the 
        United States Munitions List (established pursuant to 
        section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act) may be 
        exported to the sanctioned country for a period of one 
        year.
    (c) Discretionary Sanction.--The sanction referred to in 
subsection (a)(2) is as follows:
          (1) Use of authorities of international emergency 
        economic powers act.--Except as provided in paragraph 
        (2), the President may exercise, in accordance with the 
        provisions of that Act, the authorities of the 
        International Emergency Economic Powers Act with 
        respect to the sanctioned country.
          (2) Exception.--Paragraph (1) does not apply with 
        respect to urgent humanitarian assistance.

       9. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987

 Partial text of Public Law 99-661 [S. 2638], 100 Stat. 3816, approved 
                     November 14, 1986, as amended

 AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1987 for military 
activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and 
   for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe 
   personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, to 
    improve the defense acquisition process, and for other purposes

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of American in Congress assembled,

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE XIII--GENERAL PROVISIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Part F--Miscellaneous

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 1353. PROMPT REPORTING OF INTELLIGENCE ON TERRORIST THREATS

    (a) In General.--(1) Subject to subsection (b), the 
Secretary of Defense shall instruct all appropriate officials 
of the Department of Defense to take such action as may be 
necessary to ensure that all credible, time-sensitive 
intelligence received by or otherwise available to United 
States officials concerning potential terrorist threats to--
          (A) United States citizens or facilities (including 
        citizens and facilities overseas); or
          (B) any other potential target for terrorist 
        activities designated by the Secretary,
is reported promptly to the headquarters or office of the 
Department of Defense concerned.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


           10. Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986

  Partial text of Public Law 99-145 [S. 1160], 99 Stat. 583, approved 
                      November 8, 1985, as amended

   AN ACT To authorize appropriations for military functions of the 
 Department of Defense and to prescribe military personnel levels for 
 the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1986, to revise and improve 
    military compensation programs, to improve defense procurement 
   procedures, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1986 for 
 national security programs of the Department of Energy, and for other 
                                purposes

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE XIV--GENERAL PROVISIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                    Part E--Miscellaneous Provisions

SEC. 1452. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING PROTECTION OF UNITED STATES 
                    MILITARY PERSONNEL AGAINST TERRORISM

    (a) Finding.--The Congress finds that the protection of 
members of the Armed Forces against terrorist activity is among 
the highest national security concerns of the United States.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--Therefore, it is the sense of 
Congress that--
          (1) the President should be supported in the vigorous 
        exercise of his powers as Commander-in-Chief to protect 
        members of the Armed Forces against terrorist activity; 
        and
          (2) such exercise of power should include the use of 
        such measures as may be appropriate and consistent with 
        law.

SEC. 1453. READINESS OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

    (a) Congressional Findings.--The Congress finds that--
          (1) the first duty of the Government is to provide 
        for the common defense, including safeguarding the 
        peace, safety, and security of the citizens of the 
        United States;
          (2) the incidence of terrorist, guerrilla, and other 
        violent threats to citizens and property of the United 
        States has rapidly increased;
          (3) the special operations forces of the Armed Forces 
        provide the United States with immediate and primary 
        capability to respond to terrorism; and
          (4) the special operations forces are the military 
        mainstay of the United States for the purposes of 
        nation-building and training friendly foreign forces in 
        order to preclude deployment or combat involving the 
        conventional or strategic forces of the United States.
    (b) Sense of the Congress.--In view of the findings in 
subsection (a), it is the sense of the Congress that--
          (1) the revitalization of the capability of the 
        special operations forces of the Armed Forces should be 
        pursued as a matter of the highest priority;
          (2) personnel and other resources allocations should 
        reflect the priority referred to in paragraph (1);
          (3) the political and military sensitivity and the 
        importance to national security of the special 
        operations forces require that the Office of the 
        Secretary of Defense should improve its management 
        supervision of such forces in all aspects of the 
        special operations mission area;
          (4) the joint command and control of the special 
        operations forces must permit direct and immediate 
        access by the President and Secretary of Defense; and
          (5) the commanders-in-chief of the unified commands 
        should have available, within their operational areas 
        of responsibility, sufficient special operations assets 
        to execute the operations plans for which they are 
        responsible or to support additional contingency 
        operations directed from the national level.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


               11. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance \1\

Title 50, United States Code--War and National Defense

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                     CHAPTER 15--NATIONAL SECURITY

            SUBCHAPTER I--COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

Sec. 402. National Security Council

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    (i) \2\ Committee on Transnational Threats
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Enacted on October 25, 1978, in sec. 101 and following of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-511; 92 
Stat. 1783).
    \2\ Added by sec. 804 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-293; 110 Stat. 3476).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (1) There is established within the National Security 
Council a committee to be known as the Committee on 
Transnational Threats (in this subsection referred to as the 
``Committee'').
    (2) The Committee shall include the following members:
          (A) The Director of Central Intelligence.
          (B) The Secretary of State.
          (C) The Secretary of Defense.
          (D) The Attorney General.
          (E) The Assistant to the President for National 
        Security Affairs, who shall serve as the chairperson of 
        the Committee.
          (F) Such other members as the President may 
        designate.
    (3) The function of the Committee shall be to coordinate 
and direct the activities of the United States Government 
relating to combatting transnational threats.
    (4) In carrying out its function, the Committee shall--
          (A) identify transnational threats;
          (B) develop strategies to enable the United States 
        Government to respond to transnational threats 
        identified under subparagraph (A);
          (C) monitor implementation of such strategies;
          (D) make recommendations as to appropriate responses 
        to specific transnational threats;
          (E) assist in the resolution of operational and 
        policy differences among Federal departments and 
        agencies in their responses to transnational threats;
          (F) develop policies and procedures to ensure the 
        effective sharing of information about transnational 
        threats among Federal departments and agencies, 
        including law enforcement agencies and the elements of 
        the intelligence community; and
          (G) develop guidelines to enhance and improve the 
        coordination of activities of Federal law enforcement 
        agencies and elements of the intelligence community 
        outside the United States with respect to transnational 
        threats.
    (5) For purposes of this subsection, the term 
``transnational threat'' means the following:
          (A) Any transnational activity (including 
        international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, the 
        proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the 
        delivery systems for such weapons, and organized crime) 
        that threatens the national security of the United 
        States.
          (B) Any individual or group that engages in an 
        activity referred to in subparagraph (A).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


             CHAPTER 36--FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE

                 SUBCHAPTER I--ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

Sec. 1801. Definitions

    As used in this subchapter:
          (a) ``Foreign power'' means--

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (4) a group engaged in international 
                terrorism \3\ or activities in preparation 
                therefor;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Note use of the term ``terrorism'' as defined in sec. 1801(c) 
for purposes of this chapter. The term ``terrorism'' appears in the 
chapter in sec. 1801(a)(4).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (b) ``Agent of a foreign power'' means--
                  (1) * * *
                  (2) any person who--
                          (A) knowingly engages in clandestine 
                        intelligence gathering activities for 
                        or on behalf of a foreign power, which 
                        activities involve or may involve a 
                        violation of the criminal statutes of 
                        the United States;
                          (B) pursuant to the direction of an 
                        intelligence service or network of a 
                        foreign power, knowingly engages in any 
                        other clandestine intelligence 
                        activities for or on behalf of such 
                        foreign power, which activities involve 
                        or are about to involve a violation of 
                        the criminal statutes of the United 
                        States;
                          (C) knowingly engages in sabotage or 
                        international terrorism, or activities 
                        that are in preparation therefore, or 
                        on behalf of a foreign power, or
                          (D) knowingly aids or abets any 
                        person in the conduct of activities 
                        described in subparagraph (A), (B), or 
                        (C) or knowingly conspires with any 
                        person to engage in activities 
                        described in subparagraph (A),(B), or 
                        (C).
          (c) ``International terrorism'' means \3\ activities 
        that--
                  (1) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to 
                human life that are a violation of the criminal 
                laws of the United States or of any State, or 
                that would be a criminal violation if committed 
                within the jurisdiction of the United States or 
                any State;
                  (2) appear to be intended--
                          (A) to intimidate or coerce a 
                        civilian population;
                          (B) to influence the policy of a 
                        government by intimidation or coercion; 
                        or
                          (C) to effect the conduct of a 
                        government by assassination or 
                        kidnapping; and
                  (3) occur totally outside the United States, 
                or transcend national boundaries in terms of 
                the means by which they are accomplished, the 
                persons they appear intended to coerce or 
                intimidate, or the locale in which their 
                perpetrators operate or seek asylum.
          (d) * * *
          (e) ``Foreign intelligence information'' means--
                  (1) information that relates to, and if 
                concerning a United States person is necessary 
                to, the ability of the United States to protect 
                against--
                          (A) actual or potential attack or 
                        other grave hostile acts of a foreign 
                        power or an agent of a foreign power;
                          (B) sabotage or international 
                        terrorism by a foreign power or an 
                        agent of a foreign power; or
                          (C) clandestine intelligence 
                        activities by an intelligence service 
                        or network of a foreign power or by an 
                        agent of a foreign power; or
                  (2) information with respect to a foreign 
                power or foreign territory that relates to, and 
                if concerning a United States person is 
                necessary to--
                          (A) the national defense or the 
                        security of the United States; or
                          (B) the conduct of the foreign 
                        affairs of the United States.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 1841.\4\ Definitions

    As used in this subchapter:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Added by sec. 601 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105-272; 112 Stat. 2404).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) The terms ``foreign power'', ``agent of a foreign 
        power'', ``international terrorism'', ``foreign 
        intelligence information'', ``Attorney General'', 
        ``United States person'', ``United States'', 
        ``person'', and ``State'' shall have the same meanings 
        as in section 1801 of this title.
          (2) The terms ``pen register'' and ``trap and trace 
        device'' have the meanings given such terms in section 
        3127 of title 18.
          (3) The term ``aggrieved person'' means any person--
                  (A) whose telephone line was subject to the 
                installation or use of a pen register or trap 
                and trace device authorized by subchapter IV of 
                this chapter; or
                  (B) whose communication instrument or device 
                was subject to the use of a pen register or 
                trap and trace device authorized by subchapter 
                IV to capture incoming electronic or other 
                communications impulses.

Sec. 1842.\4\ Pen registers and trap and trace devices for foreign 
                    intelligence and international terrorism 
                    investigations

    (a)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
Attorney General or a designated attorney for the Government 
may make an application for an order or an extension of an 
order authorizing or approving the installation and use of a 
pen register or trap and trace device for any investigation to 
gather foreign intelligence information or information 
concerning international terrorism which is being conducted by 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation under such guidelines as 
the Attorney General approves pursuant to Executive Order No. 
12333, or a successor order.
    (2) The authority under paragraph (1) is in addition to the 
authorityunder subchapter I of this chapter to conduct the 
electronic surveillance referred to in that paragraph.
    (b) Each application under this section shall be in writing 
under oath or affirmation to--
          (1) a judge of the court established by section 1803 
        of this title; or
          (2) a United States Magistrate Judge under chapter 43 
        of title 28, United States Code, who is publicly 
        designated by the Chief Justice of the United States to 
        have the power to hear applications for and grant 
        orders approving the installation and use of a pen 
        register or trap and trace device on behalf of a judge 
        of that court.
    (c) Each application under this section shall require the 
approval of the Attorney General, or a designated attorney for 
the Government, and shall include--
          (1) the identity of the Federal officer seeking to 
        use the pen register or trap and trace device covered 
        by the application;
          (2) a certification by the applicant that the 
        information likely to be obtained is relevant to an 
        ongoing foreign intelligence or international terrorism 
        investigation being conducted by the Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation under guidelines approved by the Attorney 
        General; and
          (3) information which demonstrates that there is 
        reason to believe that the telephone line to which the 
        pen register or trap and trace device is to be 
        attached, or the communication instrument or device to 
        be covered by the pen register or trap and trace 
        device, has been or is about to be used in 
        communication with--
                  (A) an individual who is engaging or has 
                engaged in international terrorism or 
                clandestine intelligence activities that 
                involve or may involve a violation of the 
                criminal laws of the United States; or
                  (B) a foreign power or agent of a foreign 
                power under circumstances giving reason to 
                believe that the communication concerns or 
                concerned international terrorism or 
                clandestine intelligence activities that 
                involve or may involve a violation of the 
                criminal laws of the United States.
    (d)(1) Upon an application made pursuant to this section, 
the judge shall enter an ex parte order as requested, or as 
modified, approving the installation and use of a pen register 
or trap and trace device if the judge finds that the 
application satisfies the requirements of this section.
    (2) An order issued under this section--
          (A) shall specify--
                  (i) the identity, if known, of the person who 
                is the subject of the foreign intelligence or 
                international terrorism investigation;
                  (ii) in the case of an application for the 
                installation and use of a pen register or trap 
                and trace device with respect to a telephone 
                line--
                          (I) the identity, if known, of the 
                        person to whom is leased or in whose 
                        name the telephone line is listed; and
                          (II) the number and, if known, 
                        physical location of the telephone 
                        line; and
                  (iii) in the case of an application for the 
                use of a pen register or trap and trace device 
                with respect to a communication instrument or 
                device not covered by clause (ii)--
                          (I) the identity, if known, of the 
                        person who owns or leases the 
                        instrument or device or in whose name 
                        the instrument or device is listed; and
                          (II) the number of the instrument or 
                        device; and
          (B) shall direct that--
                  (i) upon request of the applicant, the 
                provider of a wire or electronic communication 
                service, landlord, custodian, or other person 
                shall furnish any information, facilities, or 
                technical assistance necessary to accomplish 
                the installation and operation of the pen 
                register or trap and trace device in such a 
                manner as will protect its secrecy and produce 
                a minimum amount of interference with the 
                services that such provider, landlord, 
                custodian, or other person is providing the 
                person concerned;
                  (ii) such provider, landlord, custodian, or 
                other person--
                          (I) shall not disclose the existence 
                        of the investigation or of the pen 
                        register or trap and trace device to 
                        any person unless or until ordered by 
                        the court; and
                          (II) shall maintain, under security 
                        procedures approved by the Attorney 
                        General and the Director of Central 
                        Intelligence pursuant to section 
                        1805(b)(2)(C) of this title, any 
                        records concerning the pen register or 
                        trap and trace device or the aid 
                        furnished; and
                          (iii) the applicant shall compensate 
                        such provider, landlord, custodian, or 
                        other person for reasonable expenses 
                        incurred by such provider, landlord, 
                        custodian, or other person in providing 
                        such information, facilities, or 
                        technical assistance.
    (e) An order issued under this section shall authorize the 
installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device 
for a period not to exceed 90 days. Extensions of such an order 
may be granted, but only upon an application for an order under 
this section and upon the judicial finding required by 
subsection (d). The period of extension shall be for a period 
not to exceed 90 days.
    (f) No cause of action shall lie in any court against any 
provider of a wire or electronic communication service, 
landlord, custodian, or other person (including any officer, 
employee, agent, or other specified person thereof) that 
furnishes any information, facilities, or technical assistance 
under subsection (d) in accordance with the terms of a court 
under this section.
    (g) Unless otherwise ordered by the judge, the results of a 
pen register or trap and trace device shall be furnished at 
reasonable intervals during regular business hours for the 
duration of the order to the authorized Government official or 
officials.

Sec. 1843.\4\ Authorization during emergencies

    (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, 
when the Attorney General makes a determination described in 
subsection (b), the Attorney General may authorize the 
installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device 
on an emergency basis to gather foreign intelligence 
information or information concerning international terrorism 
if--
          (1) a judge referred to in section 1842(b) of this 
        title is informed by the Attorney General or his 
        designee at the time of such authorization that the 
        decision has been made to install and use the pen 
        register or trap and trace device, as the case may be, 
        on an emergency basis; and
          (2) an application in accordance with section 
        1842(a)(1) of this title is made to such judge as soon 
        as practicable, but not more than 48 hours, after the 
        Attorney General authorizes the installation and use of 
        the pen register or trap and trace device, as the case 
        may be, under this section.
    (b) A determination under this subsection is a reasonable 
determination by the Attorney General that--
          (1) an emergency requires the installation and use of 
        a pen register or trap and trace device to obtain 
        foreign intelligence information or information 
        concerning international terrorism before an order 
        authorizing the installation and use of the pen 
        register or trap and trace device, as the case may be, 
        can with due diligence be obtained under section 1842 
        of this title; and
          (2) the factual basis for issuance of an order under 
        such section 1842(c) of this title to approve the 
        installation and use of the pen register or trap and 
        trace device, as the case may be, exists.
    (c)(1) In the absence of an order applied for under 
subsection (a)(2) approving the installation and use of a pen 
register or trap and trace device authorized under this 
section, the installation and use of the pen register or trap 
and trace device, as the case may be, shall terminate at the 
earlier of--
          (A) when the information sought is obtained;
          (B) when the application for the order is denied 
        under section 1842 of this title; or
          (C) 48 hours after the time of the authorization by 
        the Attorney General.
    (2) In the event that an application for an order applied 
for under subsection (a)(2) is denied, or in any other case 
where the installation and use of a pen register or trap and 
trace device under this section is terminated and no order 
under section 1842(b)(2) of this title is issued approving the 
installation and use of the pen register or trap and trace 
device, as the case may be, no information obtained or evidence 
derived from the use of the pen register or trap and trace 
device, as the case may be, shall be received in evidence or 
otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding 
in or before any court, grand jury, department, office, agency, 
regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of 
the United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof, 
and no information concerning any United States person acquired 
from the use of the pen register or trap and trace device, as 
the case may be, shall subsequently be used or disclosed in any 
other manner by Federal officers or employees without the 
consent of such person, except with the approval of the 
Attorney General if the information indicates a threat of death 
or serious bodily harm to any person.

Sec. 1844.\4\ Authorization during time of war

    Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President, 
through the Attorney General, may authorize the use of a pen 
register or trap and trace device without a court order under 
this subchapter to acquire foreign intelligence information for 
a period not to exceed 15 calendar days following a declaration 
of war by Congress.

Sec. 1845.\4\ Use of information

    (a)(1) Information acquired from the use of a pen register 
or trap and trace device installed pursuant to this subchapter 
concerning any United States person may be used and disclosed 
by Federal officers and employees without the consent of the 
United States person only in accordance with the provisions of 
this section.
    (2) No information acquired from a pen register or trap and 
trace device installed and used pursuant to this subchapter may 
be used or disclosed by Federal officers or employees except 
for lawful purposes.
    (b) No information acquired pursuant to this subchapter 
shall be disclosed for law enforcement purposes unless such 
disclosure is accompanied by a statement that such information, 
or any information derived therefrom, may only be used in a 
criminal proceeding with the advance authorization of the 
Attorney General.
    (c) Whenever the United States intends to enter into 
evidence or otherwise use or disclose in any trial, hearing, or 
other proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, 
agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United 
States against an aggrieved person any information obtained or 
derived from the use of a pen register or trap and trace device 
pursuant to this subchapter, the United States shall, before 
the trial, hearing, or the other proceeding or at a reasonable 
time before an effort to so disclose or so use that information 
or submit it in evidence, notify the aggrieved person and the 
court or other authority in which the information is to be 
disclosed or used that the United States intends to so disclose 
or so use such information.
    (d) Whenever any State or political subdivision thereof 
intends to enter into evidence or otherwise use or disclose in 
any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, 
department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other 
authority of the State or political subdivision thereof against 
an aggrieved person any information obtained or derived from 
the use of a pen register or trap and trace device pursuant to 
this subchapter, the State or political subdivision thereof 
shall notify the aggrieved person, the court or other authority 
in which the information is to be disclosed or used, and the 
Attorney General that the State or political subdivision 
thereof intends to so disclose or so use such information.
    (e)(1) Any aggrieved person against whom evidence obtained 
or derived from the use of a pen register or trap and trace 
device is to be, or has been, introduced or otherwise used or 
disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or 
before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, 
or other authority of the United States, or a State or 
political subdivision thereof, may move to suppress the 
evidence obtained or derived from the use of the pen register 
or trap and trace device, as the case may be, on the grounds 
that--
          (A) the information was unlawfully acquired; or
          (B) the use of the pen register or trap and trace 
        device, as the case may be, was not made in conformity 
        with an order of authorization or approval under this 
        subchapter.
    (2) A motion under paragraph (1) shall be made before the 
trial, hearing, or other proceeding unless there was no 
opportunity to make such a motion or the aggrieved person 
concerned was not aware of the grounds of the motion.
    (f)(1) Whenever a court or other authority is notified 
pursuant to subsection (c) or (d), whenever a motion is made 
pursuant to subsection (e), or whenever any motion or request 
is made by an aggrieved person pursuant to any other statute or 
rule of the United States or any State before any court or 
other authority of the United States or any State to discover 
or obtain applications or orders or other materials relating to 
the use of a pen register or trap and trace device authorized 
by this subchapter IV of this chapter or to discover, obtain, 
or suppress evidence or information obtained or derived from 
the use of a pen register or trap and trace device authorized 
by subchapter IV of the chapter, the United States district 
court or, where the motion is made before another authority, 
the United States district court in the same district as the 
authority shall, notwithstanding any other provision of law and 
if the Attorney General files an affidavit under oath that 
disclosure or any adversary hearing would harm the national 
security of the United States, review in camera and ex parte 
the application, order, and such other materials relating to 
the use of the pen register or trap and trace device, as the 
case may be, as may be necessary to determine whether the use 
of the pen register or trap and trace device, as the case may 
be, was lawfully authorized and conducted.
    (2) In making a determination under paragraph (1), the 
court may disclose to the aggrieved person, under appropriate 
security procedures and protective orders, portions of the 
application, order, or other materials relating to the use of 
the pen register or trap and trace device, as the case may be, 
or may require the Attorney General to provide to the aggrieved 
person a summary of such materials, only where such disclosure 
is necessary to make an accurate determination of the legality 
of the use of the pen register or trap and trace device, as the 
case may be.
    (g)(1) If the United States district court determines 
pursuant to subsection (f) that the use of a pen register or 
trap and trace device was not lawfully authorized or conducted, 
the court may, in accordance with the requirements of law, 
suppress the evidence which was unlawfully obtained or derived 
from the use of the pen register or trap and trace device, as 
the case may be, or otherwise grant the motion of the aggrieved 
person.
    (2) If the court determines that the use of the pen 
register or trap and trace device, as the case may be, was 
lawfully authorized or conducted, it may deny the motion of the 
aggrieved person except to the extent that due process requires 
discovery or disclosure.
    (h) Orders granting motions or requests under subsection 
(g), decisions under this section that the use of a pen 
register or trap and trace device was not lawfully authorized 
or conducted, and orders of the United States district court 
requiring review or granting disclosure of applications, 
orders, or other materials relating to the installation and use 
of a pen register or trap and trace device shall be final 
orders and binding upon all courts of the United States and the 
several States except a United States Court of Appeals or the 
Supreme Court.

Sec. 1846.\4\ Congressional oversight

    (a) On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General shall fully 
inform the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
House of Representatives and the Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the Senate concerning all uses of pen registers 
and trap and trace devices pursuant to this subchapter.
    (b) On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General shall also 
provide to the committees referred to in subsection (a) and to 
the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives 
and the Senate a report setting forth with respect to the 
preceding 6-month period--
          (1) the total number of applications made for orders 
        approving the use of pen registers or trap and trace 
        devices under this subchapter; and
          (2) the total number of such orders either granted, 
        modified, or denied.

     SUBCHAPTER IV--ACCESS TO CERTAIN BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN 
                         INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES

Sec. 1861.\5\ Definitions

    As used in this subchapter:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Added by sec. 602 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105-272; 112 Stat. 2410).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) The terms ``foreign power'', ``agent of a foreign 
        power'', ``foreign intelligence information'', 
        ``international terrorism'', and ``Attorney General'' 
        shall have the same meanings as in section 1801 of this 
        title.
          (2) The term ``common carrier'' means any person or 
        entity transporting people or property by land, rail, 
        water, or air for compensation.
          (3) The term ``physical storage facility'' means any 
        business or entity that provides space for the storage 
        of goods or materials, or services related to the 
        storage of goods or materials, to the public or any 
        segment thereof.
          (4) The term ``public accommodation facility'' means 
        any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment that 
        provides lodging to transient guests.
          (5) The term ``vehicle rental facility'' means any 
        person or entity that provides vehicles for rent, 
        lease, loan, or other similar use to the public or any 
        segment thereof.

Sec. 1862.\5\ Access to certain business records for foreign 
                    intelligence andinternational terrorism 
                    investigations

    (a) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or 
a designee of the Director (whose rank shall be no lower than 
Assistant Special Agent in Charge) may make an application for 
an order authorizing a common carrier, public accommodation 
facility, physical storage facility, or vehicle rental facility 
to release records in its possession for an investigation to 
gather foreign intelligence information or an investigation 
concerning international terrorism which investigation is being 
conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation under such 
guidelines as the Attorney General approves pursuant to 
Executive Order No. 12333, or a successor order.
    (b) Each application under this section--
          (1) shall be made to--
                  (A) a judge of the court established by 
                section 1803(a) of this title; or
                  (B) a United States Magistrate Judge under 
                chapter 43 of title 28, United States Code, who 
                is publicly designated by the Chief Justice of 
                the United States to have the power to hear 
                applications and grant orders for the release 
                of records under this section on behalf of a 
                judge of that court; and
          (2) shall specify that--
                  (A) the records concerned are sought for an 
                investigation described in subsection (a); and
                  (B) there are specific and articulable facts 
                giving reason to believe that the person to 
                whom the records pertain is a foreign power or 
                an agent of a foreign power.
    (c)(1) Upon application made pursuant to this section, the 
judge shall enter an ex parte order as requested, or as 
modified, approving the release of records if the judge finds 
that the application satisfies the requirements of this 
section.
    (2) An order under this subsection shall not disclose that 
it is issued for purposes of an investigation described in sub-
section (a).
    (d)(1) Any common carrier, public accommodation facility, 
physical storage facility, or vehicle rental facility shall 
comply with an order under subsection (c).
    (2) No common carrier, public accommodation facility, 
physical storage facility, or vehicle rental facility, or 
officer, employee, or agent thereof, shall disclose to any 
person (other than those officers, agents, or employees of such 
common carrier, public accommodation facility, physical storage 
facility, or vehicle rental facility necessary to fulfill the 
requirement to disclose information to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation under this section) that the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation has sought or obtained records pursuant to an 
order under this section.

Sec. 1863.\5\ Congressional oversight

    (a) On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General shall fully 
inform the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
House of Representatives and the Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the Senate concerning all requests for records 
under this subchapter.
    (b) On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General shall 
provide to the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of 
Representatives and the Senate a report setting forth with 
respect to the preceding 6-month period--
          (1) the total number of applications made for orders 
        approving requests for records under this subchapter; 
        and
          (2) the total number of such orders either granted, 
        modified, or denied.

        12. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996

Partial text of Public Law 104-93 [H.R. 1655], 109 Stat. 961, approved 
                            January 6, 1996

      AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1996 for 
 intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States 
     Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
  Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996''.
    (b) Table of Contents.--* * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 310. ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

    Notwithstanding any other provision of law, funds 
authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be used to 
provide assistance to a foreign country for counterterrorism 
efforts if--
          (1) such assistance is provided for the purpose of 
        protecting the property of the United States Government 
        or the life and property of any United States citizen, 
        or furthering the apprehension of any individual 
        involved in any act of terrorism against such property 
        or persons; and
          (2) the Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and 
        the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
        House of Representatives are notified not later than 15 
        days prior to the provision of such assistance.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

=======================================================================




                   E. TRADE AND FINANCIAL LEGISLATION

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

 1. Trade Act of 1974, as amended (Public Law 93-618) (partial 
    text)........................................................   277
      Section 502--Beneficiary Developing Country................   277
 2. Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended (Public Law 96-
    72) (partial text)...........................................   282
      Section 3(8)--Declaration of Policy........................   282
      Section 6(a)--Foreign Policy Controls: Authority...........   282
      Section 6(f)--Foreign Policy Controls: Consultation with 
          the Congress...........................................   283
      Section 6(j)--Foreign Policy Controls: Countries Supporting 
          International Terrorism................................   285
      Section 6(1)--Foreign Policy Controls: Missile Technology..   287
      Section 11C--Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation 
          Sanctions: Imposition of Sanctions.....................   287
      Section 14--Annual Report..................................   288
 3. Trade Expansion Act of 1969, as amended (Public Law 87-794) 
    (partial text)...............................................   291
      Section 232--Safeguarding National Security................   291
      Section 233 --Import Sanctions for Export Violations.......   294
 4. Trading With The Enemy Act, as amended (Public Law 65-91) 
    (partial text)...............................................   295
      Section 5(b)--[Presidential Authority].....................   295
 5. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, as amended 
    (Public Law 95-223) (partial text)...........................   298
      Title II--International Emergency Economic Powers..........   298
 6. Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended (Public Law 79-
    173) (partial text)..........................................   303
       Section 2(b)(1)--[U.S. Policy]............................   303
 7. Internal Revenue Code........................................   308
      a. Federal Income Tax Forgiveness for U.S. Military and 
          Civilian Employees Killed Overseas (Title 26, United 
          States Code)...........................................   308
            Section 692(c)--Certain Military or Civilian 
                Employees of the United States Dying as a Result 
                of Injuries Sustained Overseas...................   308
      b. Denial of Foreign Tax Credit (Title 26, United States 
          Code)..................................................   310
            Section 901(j)--Denial of Foreign Tax Credit, etc., 
                with Respect to Certain Foreign Countries........   310
 8. Bretton Woods Agreements Act Amendments, 1978, as amended 
    (Public Law 95-435) (partial text)...........................   312
      Section 6--[Instructions from the Secretary of State]......   312
 9. International Financial Institutions Act, as amended (Public 
    Law 95-118) (partial text)...................................   313
      Title VII--Human Rights....................................   313
10. Inter-American Development Bank Act, as amended (Public Law 
    86-147) (partial text).......................................   315
      Section 37--[Authorization to Contribute to the 
          Multilateral Investment Fund]..........................   315

=======================================================================

                    1. Trade Act of 1974, as amended

Partial text of Public Law 93-618 [H.R. 10710], 88 Stat. 1978, approved 
                      January 3, 1975, as amended

 AN ACT To promote the development of an open, nondiscriminatory, and 
  fair world economic system, to stimulate fair and free competition 
 between the United States and foreign nations, to foster the economic 
  growth of, and full employment in, the United States, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this 
Act, with the following table of contents, may be cited as the 
``Trade Act of 1974''.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 19 U.S.C. 2101.
    \2\ Sec. 1952(a) of the GSP Renewal Act of 1996 (in subtitle J of 
title I of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996; Public Law 
104-188; 110 Stat. 1917) amended and restated title V in its entirety, 
applicable after October 1, 1996.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

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TITLE V--GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES \2\

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 502.\3\ DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

    (a) Authority To Designate Countries.--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ 19 U.S.C. 2462.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) Beneficiary developing countries.--The President 
        is authorized to designate countries as beneficiary 
        developing countries for purposes of this title.
          (2) Least-developed beneficiary developing 
        countries.--The President is authorized to designate 
        any beneficiary developing country as a least-developed 
        beneficiary developing country for purposes of this 
        title, based on the considerations in section 501 and 
        subsection (c) of this section.
    (b) Countries Ineligible for Designation.--
          (1) Specific countries.--The following countries may 
        not be designated as beneficiary developing countries 
        for purposes of this title:
                  (A) Australia.
                  (B) Canada.
                  (C) European Union member states.
                  (D) Iceland.
                  (E) Japan.
                  (F) Monaco.
                  (G) New Zealand.
                  (H) Norway.
                  (I) Switzerland.
          (2) Other bases for ineligibility.--The President 
        shall not designate any country a beneficiary 
        developing country under this title if any of the 
        following applies:
                  (A) Such country is a Communist country, 
                unless--
                          (i) the products of such country 
                        receive nondiscriminatory treatment,
                          (ii) such country is a WTO Member (as 
                        such term is defined in section 2(10) 
                        of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act) 
                        (19 U.S.C. 3501(10)) and a member of 
                        the International Monetary Fund, and
                          (iii) such country is not dominated 
                        or controlled by international 
                        communism.
                  (B) Such country is a party to an arrangement 
                of countries and participates in any action 
                pursuant to such arrangement, the effect of 
                which is--
                          (i) to withhold supplies of vital 
                        commodity resources from international 
                        trade or to raise the price of such 
                        commodities to an unreasonable level, 
                        and
                          (ii) to cause serious disruption of 
                        the world economy.
                  (C) Such country affords preferential 
                treatment to the products of a developed 
                country, other than the United States, which 
                has, or is likely to have, a significant 
                adverse effect on United States commerce.
                  (D)(i) Such country--
                          (I) has nationalized, expropriated, 
                        or otherwise seized ownership or 
                        control of property, including patents, 
                        trademarks, or copyrights, owned by a 
                        United States citizen or by a 
                        corporation, partnership, or 
                        association which is 50 percent or more 
                        beneficially owned by United States 
                        citizens,
                          (II) has taken steps to repudiate or 
                        nullify an existing contract or 
                        agreement with a United States citizen 
                        or a corporation, partnership, or 
                        association which is 50 percent or more 
                        beneficially owned by United States 
                        citizens, the effect of which is to 
                        nationalize, expropriate, or otherwise 
                        seize ownership or control of property, 
                        including patents, trademarks, or 
                        copyrights, so owned, or
                          (III) has imposed or enforced taxes 
                        or other exactions, restrictive 
                        maintenance or operational conditions, 
                        or other measures with respect to 
                        property, including patents, 
                        trademarks, or copyrights, so owned, 
                        the effect of which is to nationalize, 
                        expropriate, or otherwise seize 
                        ownership or control of such property, 
                        unless clause (ii) applies.
                  (ii) This clause applies if the President 
                determines that--
                          (I) prompt, adequate, and effective 
                        compensation has been or is being made 
                        to the citizen, corporation, 
                        partnership, or association referred to 
                        in clause (i),
                          (II) good faith negotiations to 
                        provide prompt, adequate, and effective 
                        compensation under the applicable 
                        provisions of international law are in 
                        progress, or the country described in 
                        clause (i) is otherwise taking steps to 
                        discharge its obligations under 
                        international law with respect to such 
                        citizen, corporation, partnership, or 
                        association, or
                          (III) a dispute involving such 
                        citizen, corporation, partnership, or 
                        association over compensation for such 
                        a seizure has been submitted to 
                        arbitration under the provisions of the 
                        Convention for the Settlement of 
                        Investment Disputes, or in another 
                        mutually agreed upon forum,
                and the President promptly furnishes a copy of 
                such determination to the Senate and House of 
                Representatives.
                  (E) Such country fails to act in good faith 
                in recognizing as binding or in enforcing 
                arbitral awards in favor of United States 
                citizens or a corporation, partnership, or 
                association which is 50 percent or more 
                beneficially owned by United States citizens, 
                which have been made by arbitrators appointed 
                for each case or by permanent arbitral bodies 
                to which the parties involved have submitted 
                their dispute.
                  (F) \4\ Such country aids or abets, by 
                granting sanctuary from prosecution to, any 
                individual or group which has committed an act 
                of international terrorism or the Secretary of 
                State makes a determination with respect to 
                such country under section 6(j)(1)(A) of the 
                Export Administration Act of 1979.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Sec. 35(a) of Public Law 104-295 (110 Stat. 3538) amended and 
restated subpara. (F), effective October 1, 1996. It formerly read as 
follows: ``Such country aids or abets, by granting sanctuary from 
prosecution to, any individual or group which has committed an act of 
international terrorism.''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  (G) Such country has not taken or is not 
                taking steps to afford internationally 
                recognized worker rights to workers in the 
                country (including any designated zone in that 
                country).
        Subparagraphs (D), (E), (F), and (G) shall not prevent 
        the designation of any country as a beneficiary 
        developing country under this title if the President 
        determines that such designation will be in the 
        national economic interest of the United States and 
        reports such determination to the Congress with the 
        reasons therefor.
    (c) Factors Affecting Country Designation.--In determining 
whether to designate any country as a beneficiary developing 
country under this title, the President shall take into 
account--
          (1) an expression by such country of its desire to be 
        so designated;
          (2) the level of economic development of such 
        country, including its per capita gross national 
        product, the living standards of its inhabitants, and 
        any other economic factors which the President deems 
        appropriate;
          (3) whether or not other major developed countries 
        are extending generalized preferential tariff treatment 
        to such country;
          (4) the extent to which such country has assured the 
        United States that it will provide equitable and 
        reasonable access to the markets and basic commodity 
        resources of such country and the extent to which such 
        country has assured the United States that it will 
        refrain from engaging in unreasonable export practices;
          (5) the extent to which such country is providing 
        adequate and effective protection of intellectual 
        property rights;
          (6) the extent to which such country has taken action 
        to--
                  (A) reduce trade distorting investment 
                practices and policies (including export 
                performance requirements); and
                  (B) reduce or eliminate barriers to trade in 
                services; and
          (7) whether or not such country has taken or is 
        taking steps to afford to workers in that country 
        (including any designated zone in that country) 
        internationally recognized worker rights.
    (d) Withdrawal, Suspension, or Limitation of Country 
Designation.--
          (1) In general.--The President may withdraw, suspend, 
        or limit the application of the duty-free treatment 
        accorded under this title with respect to any country. 
        In taking any action under this subsection, the 
        President shall consider the factors set forth in 
        section 501 and subsection (c) of this section.
          (2) Changed circumstances.--The President shall, 
        after complying with the requirements of subsection 
        (f)(2), withdraw or suspend the designation of any 
        country as a beneficiary developing country if, after 
        such designation, the President determines that as the 
        result of changed circumstances such country would be 
        barred from designation as a beneficiary developing 
        country under subsection (b)(2). Such country shall 
        cease to be a beneficiary developing country on the day 
        on which the President issues an Executive order or 
        Presidential proclamation revoking the designation of 
        such country under this title.
          (3) Advice to congress.--The President shall, as 
        necessary, advise the Congress on the application of 
        section 501 and subsection (c) of this section, and the 
        actions the President has taken to withdraw, to 
        suspend, or to limit the application of duty-free 
        treatment with respect to any country which has failed 
        to adequately take the actions described in subsection 
        (c).
    (e) Mandatory Graduation of Beneficiary Developing 
Countries.--If the President determines that a beneficiary 
developing country has become a ``high income'' country, as 
defined by the official statistics of the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, then the President shall 
terminate the designation of such country as a beneficiary 
developing country for purposes of this title, effective on 
January 1 of the second year following the year in which such 
determination is made.
    (f) Congressional Notification.--
          (1) Notification of designation.--
                  (A) In general.--Before the President 
                designates any country as a beneficiary 
                developing country under this title, the 
                President shall notify the Congress of the 
                President's intention to make such designation, 
                together with the considerations entering into 
                such decision.
                  (B) Designation as least-developed 
                beneficiary developing country.--At least 60 
                days before the President designates any 
                country as a least-developed beneficiary 
                developing country, the President shall notify 
                the Congress of the President's intention to 
                make such designation.
          (2) Notification of termination.--If the President 
        has designated any country as a beneficiary developing 
        country under this title, the President shall not 
        terminate such designation unless, at least 60 days 
        before such termination, the President has notified the 
        Congress and has notified such country of the 
        President's intention to terminate such designation, 
        together with the considerations entering into such 
        decision.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                2. Export Administration Act of 1979 \1\

Partial text of Public Law 96-72 [S. 737], 93 Stat. 503, approved 
    September 29, 1979, as amended



          Note.--The Export Administration Act of 1979 replaced 
        the Export Administration Act of 1969, as amended, 
        which expired on September 30, 1979. The Export 
        Administration Act of 1979 was comprehensively amended 
        by the Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985 
        [Public Law 99-64; 99 Stat. 120].




    AN ACT To provide authority to regulate exports, to improve the 
efficiency of export regulation, and to minimize interference with the 
                     ability to engage in commerce.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

                              short title

    Section 1.\1\ This Act may be cited as the ``Export 
Administration Act of 1979''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 note.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                         declaration of policy

    Sec. 3.\2\ The Congress makes the following declarations:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ 50 U.S.C. app. 2402.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (8) It is the policy of the United States to use 
        export controls to encourage other countries to take 
        immediate steps to prevent the use of their territories 
        or resources to aid, encourage, or give sanctuary to 
        those persons involved in directing, supporting, or 
        participating in acts of international terrorism. To 
        achieve this objective, the President shall make 
        reasonable and prompt efforts to secure the removal or 
        reduction of such assistance to international 
        terrorists through international cooperation and 
        agreement before imposing export controls.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                        foreign policy controls

    Sec. 6.\3\ (a) Authority.--(1) In order to carry out the 
policy set forth in paragraph (2)(B), (7), (8), or (13) of 
section 3 of this Act, the President may prohibit or curtail 
the exportation of any goods, technology, or other information 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or exported by 
any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, to 
the extent necessary to further significantly the foreign 
policy of the United States or to fulfill its declared 
international obligations. The authority granted by this 
subsection shall be exercised by the Secretary, in consultation 
with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the 
Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of the Treasury, the 
United States Trade Representative, and such other departments 
and agencies as the Secretary considers appropriate, and shall 
be implemented by means of export licenses issued by the 
Secretary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ 50 U.S.C. app. 2405.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (2) Any export control imposed under this section shall 
apply to any transaction or activity undertaken with the intent 
to evade that export control, even if that export control would 
not otherwise apply to that transaction or activity.
    (3) Export controls maintained for foreign policy purposes 
shall expire on December 31, 1979, or one year after 
imposition, whichever is later, unless extended by the 
President in accordance with subsections (b) and (f). Any such 
extension and any subsequent extension shall not be for a 
period of more than a year.
    (4) Whenever the Secretary denies any export license under 
this subsection, the Secretary shall specify in the notice to 
the applicant of the denial of such license that the license 
was denied under the authority contained in this subsection, 
and the reasons for such denial, with reference to the criteria 
set forth in subsection (b) of this section. The Secretary 
shall also include in such notice what, if any, modifications 
in or restrictions on the goods or technology for which the 
license was sought would allow such export to be compatible 
with controls implemented under this section, or the Secretary 
shall indicate in such notice which officers and employees of 
the Department of Commerce who are familiar with the 
application will be made reasonably available to the applicant 
for consultation with regard to such modifications or 
restrictions, if appropriate.
    (5) In accordance with the provisions of section 10 of this 
Act, the Secretary of State shall have the right to review any 
export license application under this section which the 
Secretary of State requests to review.
  (6) Before imposing, expanding, or extending export controls 
under this section on exports to a country which can use goods, 
technology, or information available from foreign sources and 
so incur little or no economic costs as a result of the 
controls, the President should, through diplomatic means, 
employ alternatives to export controls which offer 
opportunities of distinguishing the United States from, and 
expressing the displeasure of the United States with, the 
specific actions of that country in response to which the 
controls are proposed. Such alternatives include private 
discussions with foreign leaders, public statements in 
situations where private diplomacy is unavailable or not 
effective, withdrawal of ambassadors, and reduction of the size 
of the diplomatic staff that the country involved is permitted 
to have in the United States.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (f) Consultation With the Congress.--(1) The president may 
impose or expand export controls under this section, or extend 
such controls as required by subsection (a)(3) of this section, 
only after consultation with the Congress, including the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs \4\ of the House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs of the Senate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Sec. 1(a)(5) of Public Law 104-14 (109 Stat. 186) provided that 
references to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives shall be treated as referring to the Committee on 
International Relations of the House of Representatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (2) The President may not impose, expand, or extend export 
controls under this section until the President has submitted 
to the Congress a report--
          (A) specifying the purpose of the controls;
          (B) specifying the determinations of the President 
        (or, in the case of those export controls described in 
        subsection (b)(2), the considerations of the President) 
        with respect to each of the criteria set forth in 
        subsection (b)(1), the bases for such determinations 
        (or considerations), and any possible adverse foreign 
        policy consequences of the controls;
          (C) describing the nature, the subjects, and the 
        results of, or the plans for, the consultation with 
        industry pursuant to subsection (c) and with other 
        countries pursuant to subsection (d);
          (D) specifying the nature and results of any 
        alternative means attempted under subsection (e), or 
        the reasons for imposing, expanding, or extending the 
        controls without attempting any such alternative means; 
        and
          (E) describing the availability from other countries 
        of goods or technology comparable to the goods or 
        technology subject to the proposed export controls, and 
        describing the nature and results of the efforts made 
        pursuant to subsection (h) to secure the cooperation of 
        foreign governments in controlling the foreign 
        availability of such comparable goods or technology.
Such report shall also indicate how such controls will further 
significantly the foreign policy of the United States or will 
further its declared international obligations.
    (3) To the extent necessary to further the effectiveness of 
the export controls portions of a report required by paragraph 
(2) may be submitted to the Congress on a classified basis, and 
shall be subject to the provisions of section 12(c) of this 
Act.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Sec. 128(c) of Public Law 104-316 (110 Stat. 3841) struck out a 
sentence at this point that read as follows:``Each such report shall, 
at the same time it is submitted to the Congress, also be submitted to 
the General Accounting Office for the purpose of assessing the report's 
full compliance with the intent of this subsection.''.
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    (4) In the case of export controls under this section which 
prohibit or curtail the export of any agricultural commodity, a 
report submitted pursuant to paragraph (2) shall be deemed to 
be the report required by section 7(g)(3)(A) of this Act.
    (5) In addition to any written report required, under this 
section, the Secretary, not less frequently than annually, 
shall present in oral testimony before the Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs \6\ of the House of 
Representatives a report on policies and actions taken by the 
Government to carry out the provisions of this section.
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    \6\ Sec. 1(a)(5) of Public Law 104-14 (109 Stat. 186) provided that 
references to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives shall be treated as referring to the Committee on 
International Relations of the House of Representatives.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

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    (j) \7\ Countries Supporting International Terrorism.--(1) 
A validated license shall be required for the export of goods 
or technology to a country if the Secretary of State has made 
the following determinations:
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    \7\ In Department of State Public Notice 1878 of August 12, 1993, 
(58 F.R. 52523), the Secretary of State stated: ``In accordance with 
section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)), 
I hereby determine that Sudan is a country which has repeatedly 
provided support for acts of international terrorism. The list of 6(j) 
countries as of this time therefore includes Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, 
North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.''.
    Sec. 4 of Public Law 101-222 (103 Stat. 1897) amended and restated 
sec. 6(j).
    Title V of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related 
Programs Appropriations Act, 1999 (sec. 101(d) of Division A of Public 
Law 105-277; 112 Stat. 2681) provided the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      ``prohibition on bilateral assistance to terrorist countries
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ``Sec. 528. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, funds 
appropriated for bilateral assistance under any heading of this Act and 
funds appropriated under any such heading in a provision of law enacted 
prior to enactment of this Act, shall not be made available to any 
country which the President determines--
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          ``(1) grants sanctuary from prosecution to any individual or 
        group which has committed an act of international terrorism, or
          ``(2) otherwise supports international terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ``(b) The President may waive the application of subsection (a) to 
a country if the President determines that national security or 
humanitarian reasons justify such waiver. The President shall publish 
each waiver in the Federal Register and, at least fifteen days before 
the waiver takes effect, shall notify the Committees on Appropriations 
of the waiver (including the justification for the waiver) in 
accordance with the regular notification procedures of the Committees 
on Appropriations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          * * * * * * *

 ``prohibition on assistance to foreign governments that export lethal 
   military equipment to countries supporting international terrorism
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ``Sec. 551. (a) None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made 
available by this Act may be available to any foreign government which 
provides lethal military equipment to a country the government of which 
the Secretary of State has determined is a terrorist government for 
purposes of section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act or any other 
comparable provision of law. The prohibition under this section with 
respect to a foreign government shall terminate 12 months after that 
government ceases to provide such military equipment. This section 
applies with respect to lethal military equipment provided under a 
contract entered into after October 1, 1997.
    ``(b) Assistance restricted by subsection (a) or any other similar 
provision of law, may be furnished if the President determines that 
furnishing such assistance is important to the national interests of 
the United States.
    ``(c) Whenever the waiver of subsection (b) is exercised, the 
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
report with respect to the furnishing of such assistance. Any such 
report shall include a detailed explanation of the assistance to be 
provided, including the estimated dollar amount of such assistance, and 
an explanation of how the assistance furthers United States national 
interests.
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          (A) The government of such country has repeatedly 
        provided support for acts of international terrorism.
          (B) The export of such goods or technology could make 
        a significant contribution to the military potential of 
        such country, including its military logistics 
        capability, or could enhance the ability of such 
        country to support acts of international terrorism.
    (2) The Secretary and the Secretary of State shall notify 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs \6\ of the House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate at least 30 days before issuing any validated license 
required by paragraph (1).
    (3) Each determination of the Secretary of State under 
paragraph (1)(A), including each determination in effect on the 
date of the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Arms Export 
Amendments Act of 1989, shall be published in the Federal 
Register.
    (4) A determination made by the Secretary of State under 
paragraph (1)(A) may not be rescinded unless the President 
submits to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the 
chairman of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations 
of the Senate--
          (A) before the proposed rescission would take effect, 
        a report certifying that--
                  (i) there has been a fundamental change in 
                the leadership and policies of the government 
                of the country concerned;
                  (ii) that government is not supporting acts 
                of international terrorism; and
                  (iii) that government has provided assurances 
                that it will not support acts of international 
                terrorism in the future; or
          (B) at least 45 days before the proposed rescission 
        would take effect, a report justifying the rescission 
        and certifying that--
                  (i) the government concerned has not provided 
                any support for international terrorism during 
                the preceding 6-month period; and
                  (ii) the government concerned has provided 
                assurances that it will not support acts of 
                international terrorism in the future.
    (5) \8\ The Secretary and the Secretary of State shall 
include in the notification required by paragraph (2)--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Sec. 736 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 506) added para. 
(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  (A) a detailed description of the goods or 
                services to be offered, including a brief 
                description of the capabilities of any article 
                for which a license to export is sought;
                  (B) the reasons why the foreign country or 
                international organization to which the export 
                or transfer is proposed to be made needs the 
                goods or services which are the subject of such 
                export or transfer and a description of the 
                manner in which such country or organization 
                intends to use such articles, services, or 
                design and construction services;
                  (C) the reasons why the proposed export or 
                transfer is in the national interest of the 
                United States;
                  (D) an analysis of the impact of the proposed 
                export or transfer on the military capabilities 
                of the foreign country or international 
                organization to which such export or transfer 
                would be made;
                  (E) an analysis of the manner in which the 
                proposed export would affect the relative 
                military strengths of countries in the region 
                to which the goods or services which are the 
                subject of such export would be delivered and 
                whether other countries in the region have 
                comparable kinds and amounts of articles, 
                services, or design and construction services; 
                and
                  (F) an analysis of the impact of the proposed 
                export or transfer on the United States 
                relations with the countries in the region to 
                which the goods or services which are the 
                subject of such export would be delivered.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (l) Missile Technology.--
          (1) Determination of controlled items.--The 
        Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State, 
        the Secretary of Defense, and the heads of other 
        appropriate departments and agencies--
                  (A) shall establish and maintain, as part of 
                the control list established under this 
                section, a list of all dual use goods and 
                technology on the MTCR Annex; and
                  (B) may include, as part of the control list 
                established under this section, goods and 
                technology that would provide a direct and 
                immediate impact on the development of missile 
                delivery systems and are not included in the 
                MTCR Annex but which the United States is 
                proposing to the other MTCR adherents to have 
                included in the MTCR Annex.
          (2) Requirement of individual validated licenses.--
        The Secretary shall require an individual validated 
        license for--
                  (A) any export of goods or technology on the 
                list established under paragraph (1) to any 
                country; and
                  (B) any export of goods or technology that 
                the exporter knows is destined for a project or 
                facility for the design, development, or 
                manufacture of a missile in a country that is 
                not an MTCR adherent.
          (3) Policy of denial of licenses.--(A) Licenses under 
        paragraph (2) should in general be denied if the 
        ultimate consignee of the goods or technology is a 
        facility in a country that is not an adherent to the 
        Missile technology Control regime and the facility is 
        designed to develop or build missiles.
          (B) Licenses under paragraph (2) shall be denied if 
        the ultimate consignee of the goods or technology is a 
        facility in a country the government of which has been 
        determined under subsection (j) to have repeatedly 
        provided support for acts of international terrorism.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


        chemical and biological weapons proliferation sanctions

  Sec. 11C.\9\ (a) Imposition of Sanctions.--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ 50 U.S.C. app. 2410c. Sec. 505(a) of the Chemical and 
Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (title V 
of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993; 
Public Law 102-138; 105 Stat. 724) added sec. 11C. Subsequently, sec. 
309(a) of Public Law 102-182 (105 Stat. 1258) repealed title V of the 
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 and all 
the amendments therein, including this new sec. 11C.
    However, sec. 305(a) of Public Law 102-182 (105 Stat. 1247) amended 
this Act by inserting a new sec. 11C at this point.
    Executive Order 12851 of June 11, 1993 (58 F.R. 33181) delegated 
the authority in sec. 11C to the Secretary of State with the following 
exceptions:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          --sec. 11C(c)(1)(A), pursuant to a determination made by the 
        Secretary of State under sec. 81(a)(1) of the AECA or sec. 
        11C(a)(1) of this Act, as well as the authority and duties 
        provided for in section 81(c)(2) of the AECA and section 
        11C(c)(2) of this Act--Secretary of Defense;
          --sec. 11C(c)(1)(B), pursuant to a determination made by the 
        Secretary of State under sec. 81(a)(1) of the AECA, or sec. 
        11C(a)(1) of this Act, and the obligation to implement the 
        exceptions provided for in sec. 81(c)(2) of the AECA or sec. 
        11C(c)(2) of this Act, insofar as the exceptions affect imports 
        of goods into the U.S.,--Secretary of the Treasury.
          (1) Determination by the president.--Except as 
        provided in subsection (b)(2), the President shall 
        impose both of the sanctions described in subsection 
        (c) if the President determines that a foreign person, 
        on or after the date of the enactment of this 
        section,\10\ has knowingly and materially contributed--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Sec. 309(b)(1) of Public Law 102-182 (105 Stat. 1258) deemed 
this date of enactment to be the date of enactment of the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 
102-138), October 28, 1991.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  (A) through the export from the United States 
                of any goods or technology that are subject to 
                the jurisdiction of the United States under 
                this Act, or
                  (B) through the export from any other country 
                of any goods or technology that would be, if 
                they were United States goods or technology, 
                subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
                States under this Act, to the efforts by any 
                foreign country, project, or entity described 
                in paragraph (2) to use, develop, produce, 
                stockpile, or otherwise acquire chemical or 
                biological weapons.
          (2) Countries, projects, or entities receiving 
        assistance.--Paragraph (1) applies in the case of--

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (B) any foreign country whose government is 
                determined for purposes of section 6(j) of this 
                Act to be a government that has repeatedly 
                provided support for acts of international 
                terrorism; or

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                             annual report

    Sec. 14.\11\ (a) Contents.--Not later than December 31 of 
each year, the Secretary shall submit to the Congress a report 
on the administration of this Act during the preceding fiscal 
year. All agencies shall cooperate fully with the Secretary in 
providing information for such report. Such report shall 
include detailed information with respect to--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ 50 U.S.C. app. 2413.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) the implementation of the policies set forth in 
        section 3;
          (2) general licensing activities under sections 5, 6, 
        and 7, and any changes in the exercise of the 
        authorities contained in sections 5(a), 6(a), and 7(a);
          (3) the results of the review of United States policy 
        toward individual countries pursuant to section 5(b);
          (4) the results, in as much detail as may be included 
        consistent with the national security and the need to 
        maintain the confidentiality of proprietary 
        information, of the actions, including reviews and 
        revisions of export controls maintained for national 
        security purposes, required by section 5(c)(3);
          (5) actions taken to carry our section 5(d);
          (6) changes in categories of items under export 
        control referred to in section 5(e);
          (7) determinations of foreign availability made under 
        section 5(f), the criteria used to make such 
        determinations, the removal of any export controls 
        under such section, and any evidence demonstrating a 
        need to impose export controls for national security 
        purposes notwithstanding foreign availability;
          (8) actions taken in compliance with section 5(f)(6);
          (9) the operation of the indexing system under 
        section 5(g);
          (10) consultations with the technical advisory 
        committees established pursuant to section 5(h), the 
        use made of the advice rendered by such committees, and 
        the contributions of such committees toward 
        implementing the policies set forth in this Act;
          (11) the effectiveness of export controls imposed 
        under section 6 in furthering the foreign policy of the 
        United States;
          (12) export controls and monitoring under section 7;
          (13) the information contained in the reports 
        required by section 7(b)(2), together with an analysis 
        of--
                  (A) the impact on the economy and world trade 
                of shortages or increased prices for 
                commodities subject to monitoring under this 
                Act or section 812 of the Agricultural Act of 
                1970;
                  (B) the worldwide supply of such commodities; 
                and
                  (C) actions being taken by other countries in 
                response to such shortages or increased prices;
          (14) actions taken by the President and the Secretary 
        to carry out the antiboycott policies set forth in 
        section 3(5) of this Act;
          (15) organizational and procedural changes undertaken 
        in furtherance of the policies set forth in this Act, 
        including changes to increase the efficiency of the 
        export licensing process and to fulfill the 
        requirements of section 10, including an accounting of 
        appeals received, court orders issued, and actions 
        taken pursuant thereto under subsection (j) of such 
        section;
          (16) delegations of authority by the President as 
        provided in section 4(e) of this Act;
          (17) efforts to keep the business sector of the 
        Nation informed with respect to policies and procedures 
        adopted under this Act;
          (18) any reviews undertaken in furtherance of the 
        policies of this Act, including the results of the 
        review required by section 12(d), and any action taken, 
        on the basis of the review required by section 12(e), 
        to simplify regulations issued under this Act;
          (19) violations under section 11 and enforcement 
        activities under section 12; and
          (20) the issuance of regulations under the authority 
        of this Act, including an explanation of each case in 
        which regulations were not issued in accordance with 
        the first sentence of section 13(b).
    (b) Report on Certain Export Controls.--To the extent that 
the President determines that the policies set forth in section 
3 of this Act require the control of the export of goods and 
technology other than those subject to multilateral controls, 
or require more stringent controls than the multilateral 
controls, the President shall include in each annual report the 
reasons for the need to impose, or to continue to impose, such 
controls and the estimated domestic economic impact on the 
various industries affected by such controls.
    (c) Report on Negotiations.--The President shall include in 
each annual report a detailed report on the progress of the 
negotiations required by section 5(i), until such negotiations 
are concluded.
    (d) Report on Exports to Controlled Countries.--The 
Secretary shall include in each annual report a detailed report 
which lists every license for exports to controlled countries 
which was approved under this Act during the preceding fiscal 
year. Such report shall specify to whom the license was 
granted, the type of goods or technology exported, and the 
country receiving the goods or technology. The information 
required by this subsection shall be subject to the provisions 
of section 12(c) of this Act.
    (e) Report on Domestic Economic Impact of Exports to 
Controlled Countries.--The Secretary shall include in each 
annual report a detailed description of the extent of injury to 
United States industry and the extent of job displacement 
caused by United States exports of goods and technology to 
controlled countries. The annual report shall also include a 
full analysis of the consequences of exports of turnkey plants 
and manufacturing facilities to controlled countries which are 
used by such countries to produce goods for export to the 
United States or to compete with United States products in 
export markets.
  (f) Annual Report of the President.--The President shall 
submit an annual report to the Congress estimating the 
additional defense expenditures of the United States arising 
from illegal technology transfers, focusing on estimated 
defense costs arising from illegal technology transfers that 
resulted in a serious adverse impact on the strategic balance 
of forces. These estimates shall be based on assessment by the 
intelligence community of any technology transfers that 
resulted in such serious adverse impact. This report may have a 
classified annex covering any information of a sensitive 
nature.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


               3. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended

Partial text of Public Law 87-794 [H.R. 11970], 76 Stat. 872, approved 
                      October 11, 1962, as amended

                   TITLE I--SHORT TITLE AND PURPOSES

SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Trade Expansion Act of 
1962''.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 232.\1\ SAFEGUARDING NATIONAL SECURITY.

    (a) No action shall be taken pursuant to section 201(a) or 
pursuant to section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930 to decrease 
or eliminate the duty or other import restriction on any 
article if the President determines that such reduction or 
elimination would threaten to impair the national security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 19 U.S.C. 1862.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  (b) \2\ (1)(A) Upon request of the head of any department or 
agency, upon application of an interested party, or upon his 
own motion, the Secretary of Commerce (hereafter in this 
section referred to as the `Secretary') shall immediately 
initiate an appropriate investigation to determine the effects 
on the national security of imports of the article which is the 
subject of such request, application, or motion.
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    \2\ Former subsec. (b), as amended by sec. 127(d) of Public Law 93-
618 (88 Stat. 1978 at 1993), was struck out by sec. 1501(a)(3) of 
Public Law 100-418 (102 Stat. 1257) which added new subsecs. (b) and 
(c).
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  (B) The Secretary shall immediately provide notice to the 
Secretary of Defense of any investigation initiated under this 
section.
  (2)(A) In the course of any investigation conducted under 
this subsection, the Secretary shall--
          (i) consult with the Secretary of Defense regarding 
        the methodological and policy questions raised in any 
        investigation initiated under paragraph (1),
          (ii) seek information and advice from, and consult 
        with, appropriate officers of the United States, and
          (iii) if it is appropriate and after reasonable 
        notice, hold public hearings or otherwise afford 
        interested parties an opportunity to present 
        information and advice relevant to such investigation.
  (B) Upon the request of the Secretary, the Secretary of 
Defense shall provide the Secretary an assessment of the 
defense requirements of any article that is the subject of an 
investigation conducted under this section.
  (3)(A) By no later than the date that is 270 days after the 
date on which an investigation is initiated under paragraph (1) 
with respect to any article, the Secretary shall submit to the 
President a report on the findings of such investigation with 
respect to the effect of the importation of such article in 
such quantities or under such circumstances upon the national 
security and, based on such findings, the recommendations of 
the Secretary for action or inaction under this section. If the 
Secretary finds that such article is being imported into the 
United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as 
to threaten to impair the national security, the Secretary 
shall so advise the President in such report.
  (B) Any portion of the report submitted by the Secretary 
under subparagraph (A) which does not contain classified 
information or proprietary information shall be published in 
the Federal Register.
  (4) The Secretary shall prescribe such procedural regulations 
as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this 
subsection.
  (c) \2\ (1)(A) Within 90 days after receiving a report 
submitted under subsection (b)(3)(A) in which the Secretary 
finds that an article is being imported into the United States 
in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten 
to impair the national security, the President shall--
          (i) determine whether the President concurs with the 
        finding of the Secretary, and
          (ii) if the President concurs, determine the nature 
        and duration of the action that, in the judgment of the 
        President, must be taken to adjust the imports of the 
        article and its derivatives so that such imports will 
        not threaten to impair the national security.
  (B) If the President determines under subparagraph (A) to 
take action to adjust imports of an article and its 
derivatives, the President shall implement that action by no 
later than the date that is 15 days after the day on which the 
President determines to take action under subparagraph (A).
  (2) By no later than the date that is 30 days after the date 
on which the President makes any determinations under paragraph 
(1), the President shall submit to the Congress a written 
statement of the reasons why the President has decided to take 
action, or refused to take action, under paragraph (1). Such 
statement shall be included in the report published under 
subsection (e).
  (3)(A) If--
          (i) the action taken by the President under paragraph 
        (1) is the negotiation of an agreement which limits or 
        restricts the importation into, or the exportation to, 
        the United States of the article that threatens to 
        impair national security, and
          (ii) either--
                  (I) no such agreement is entered into before 
                the date that is 180 days after the date on 
                which the President makes the determination 
                under paragraph (1)(A) to take such action, or
                  (II) such an agreement that has been entered 
                into is not being carried out or is ineffective 
                in eliminating the threat to the national 
                security posed by imports of such article,
the President shall take such other actions as the President 
deems necessary to adjust the imports of such article so that 
such imports will not threaten to impair the national security. 
The President shall publish in the Federal Register notice of 
any additional actions being taken under this section by reason 
of this subparagraph.
  (B) If--
          (i) clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (A) apply, 
        and
          (ii) the President determines not to take any 
        additional actions under this subsection,
the President shall publish in the Federal Register such 
determination and the reasons on which such determination is 
based.
    (d) \3\ For the purposes of this section, the Secretary and 
the President shall, in the light of the requirements of 
national security and without excluding other relevant factors, 
give consideration to domestic production needed for projected 
national defense requirements, the capacity of domestic 
industries to meet such requirements, existing and anticipated 
availabilities of the human resources, products, raw materials, 
and other supplies and services essential to the national 
defense, the requirements of growth of such industries and such 
supplies and services including the investment, exploration, 
and development necessary to assure such growth, and the 
importation of goods in terms of their quantities, 
availabilities, character, and use of those affect such 
industries and the capacity of the United States to meet 
national security requirements. In the administration of this 
section, the Secretary and the President shall further 
recognize the close relation of the economic welfare of the 
Nation to our national security, and shall take into 
consideration the impact of foreign competition on the economic 
welfare of individual domestic industries; and any substantial 
unemployment, decrease in revenues of government, loss of 
skills or investment, or other serious effects resulting from 
the displacement of any domestic products by excessive imports 
shall be considered, without excluding other factors, in 
determining whether such weakening of our internal economy may 
impair the national security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Subsec. (d) was redesignated from subsec. (c) by sec. 1501(a) 
of Public Law 100-418 (102 Stat. 1257).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  (d) \4\ (1) Upon the disposition of each request, 
application, or motion under subsection (b), the Secretary 
shall submit to the Congress, and publish in the Federal 
Register, a report on such disposition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ This second subsec. (d) was redesignated as subsec. (e) by sec. 
1501(a)(2) of Public Law 100-418 (102 Stat. 1257). Subsequently, sec. 
1501(b)(1) of that Act amended subsec. ``(e)'' to read as subsec. 
``(d)''. This subsec. should probably read ``(e)''. This subsec. 
previously read as follows:
    ``(d) A report shall be made and published upon the disposition of 
each request, application, or motion under subsection (b). The 
Secretary shall publish procedural regulations to give effect to the 
authority conferred on him by subsection (b).''.
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  (2) The President shall submit to the Congress an annual 
report on the operation of the provisions of this section.
    (f) \5\ (1) An action taken by the President under 
subsection (c) \5\ to adjust imports of petroleum or petroleum 
products shall cease to have force and effect upon the 
enactment of a disapproval resolution, provided for in 
paragraph (2), relating to that action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Subsec. (f), previously added as subsec. (e) by sec. 402 of the 
Windfall Profit Tax Act (Public Law 96-223; 94 Stat. 301), was amended 
by sec. 1501(a)(2) of Public Law 100-418 (102 Stat. 1257) which 
substituted ``subsection (c)'' lieu of ``subsection (b)'' each place it 
appeared, and redesignated subsec. (e) as subsec. (f).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (2)(A) This paragraph is enacted by the Congress--
          (i) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the 
        House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively, 
        and as such is deemed a part of the rules of each 
        House, respectively, but applicable only with respect 
        to the procedures to be followed in that House in the 
        case of disapproval resolutions and such procedures 
        supersede other rules only to the extent that they are 
        inconsistent therewith; and
          (ii) with the full recognition of the constitutional 
        right of either House to change the rules (so far as 
        relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, 
        in the same manner, and to the same extent as any other 
        rule of that House.
    (B) For purposes of this subsection, the term ``disapproval 
resolution'' means only a joint resolution of either House of 
Congress the matter after resolving clause of which is as 
follows: ``That the Congress disapproves the action taken under 
section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 with respect to 
petroleum imports under ......................... dated 
.........................'', the first blank space being filled 
with the number of the proclamation, Executive order, or other 
Executive act issued under the authority of subsection (c) \5\ 
of such section 232 for purposes of adjusting imports of 
petroleum or petroleum products and the second blank being 
filled with the appropriate date.
    (C)(i) All disapproval resolutions introduced in the House 
of Representatives shall be referred to the Committee on Ways 
and Means and all disapproved resolutions introduced in the 
Senate shall be referred to the Committee on Finance.
    (ii) No amendment to a disapproval resolution shall be in 
order in either the House of Representatives or the Senate, and 
no motion to suspend the application of this clause shall be in 
order in either House nor shall it be in order in either House 
for the Presiding Officer to entertain a request to suspend the 
application of this clause by unanimous consent.

SEC. 233.\6\ IMPORT SANCTIONS FOR EXPORT VIOLATIONS.

    Any person who violates any national security export 
control imposed under section 5 of the Export Administration 
Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2404), or any regulation, order, or 
license issued under that section, may be subject to such 
controls on the importing of goods or technology into the 
United States as the President may prescribe.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ 19 U.S.C. 1864. Sec. 233 was added by sec. 121 of the Export 
Administration Amendments Act of 1985 (Public Law 99-43; 99 Stat. 154). 
Subsequently, sec. 233 was amended by sec. 2447(a) of Public Law 100-
418 (102 Stat. 1370) which struck out the ``(a)'' preceding ``Any 
person'' and deleted subsec. (b).  Subsec. (b) previously read as 
follows:
    ``(b) Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section, any 
person who violates any regulation issued under a multilateral 
agreement, formal or informal, to control exports for national security 
purposes, to which the United States is a party, may be subject to such 
controls on the importing of goods or technology into the United States 
as the President may prescribe, but only if--
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          ``(1) negotiations with the government or governments, party 
        to the multilateral agreement, with jurisdiction over the 
        violation have been conducted and been unsuccessful in 
        restoring compliance with the regulation involved;
          ``(2) the President, after the failure of such negotiations, 
        has notified the government or governments described in 
        paragraph (1) and the other parties to the multilateral 
        agreement that the United States proposes to subject the person 
        committing the violation to specific controls on the importing 
        of goods or technology into the United States upon the 
        expiration of 60 days from the date of such notification; and
          ``(3) a majority of the parties to the multilateral agreement 
        (other than the United States), before the end of that 60-day 
        period, have expressed to the President concurrence in the 
        proposed import controls or have abstained from stating a 
        position with respect to the proposed controls.''.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


               4. Trading With the Enemy Act, as amended

 Partial text of Public Law 65-91 [H.R. 4960], 40 Stat. 411, approved 
                      October 6, 1917, as amended

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That \1\ 
this Act shall be known as the ``Trading with the enemy \2\ 
Act''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 50 U.S.C. app. 1.
    \2\ So in original.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Sec. 5. (a) * * *
    (b) \3\ (1) During the time of war,\4\ the President may 
through any agency that he may designate, and under such rules 
and regulations as he may prescribe, by means of instructions, 
licenses, or otherwise--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ 50 U.S.C. app. 5(b). Subsec. (b), which is also classified to 
12 U.S.C. 95a (Banks and Banking) was amended and restated by sec. 301 
of Public Law 77-354 (55 Stat. 839).
    \4\ The words ``or during any other period of national emergency 
declared by the President'', which previously appeared at this point, 
were struck out by sec. 101(a) of Public Law 95-223 (91 Stat. 1625). 
Sec. 101 (b) and (c) of the same Act further stipulated:
    ``(b) Notwithstanding the amendment made by subsection (a), the 
authorities conferred upon the President by section 5(b) of the Trading 
With the Enemy Act, which were being exercised with respect to a 
country on July 1, 1977, as a result of a national emergency declared 
by the President before such date, may continue to be exercised with 
respect to such country, except that, unless extended the exercise of 
such authorities shall terminate (subject to the savings provisions of 
the second sentence of section 101(a) of the National Emergencies Act) 
at the end of the two-year period beginning on the date of enactment of 
the National Emergencies Act. The President may extend the exercise of 
such authorities for one-year periods upon a determination of each such 
extension that the exercise of such authorities with respect to such 
country for another year is in the national interest of the United 
States.
    ``(c) The termination and extension provisions of subsection (b) of 
this section supersede the provisions of section 101(a) and of title II 
of the National Emergencies Act to the extent that the provisions of 
subsection (b) of this section are inconsistent with those 
provisions.''.
    Each year since 1977, the President has utilized authority granted 
his office pursuant to the National Emergencies Act to extend certain 
authorities being exercised prior to July 1, 1977, under sec. 5(b) of 
the Trading with the Enemy Act. The most recent action, Presidential 
Determination 97-32 of September 12, 1997 (62 F.R. 48729), extended 
until September 14, 1998, the exercise of those authorities with 
respect to countries affected by the Foreign Assets Control Regulations 
(31 CFR Part 500), the Transaction Control Regulations (31 CFR Part 
505), and the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (31 CFR Part 515).
    Previous extensions have been issued as a memorandum of September 
8, 1978 (43 F.R. 40449); memorandum of September 12, 1979 (44 F.R. 
553153); memorandum of September 8, 1980 (45 F.R. 59549); memorandum of 
September 10, 1981 (46 F.R. 45321); memorandum of September 8, 1982 (47 
F.R. 39797); memorandum of September 7, 1983 (48 F.R. 40695); 
memorandum of September 11, 1984 (49 F.R. 35927); memorandum of 
September 5, 1985 (5 F.R. 36563); memorandum of August 20, 1986 (51 
F.R. 30201); memorandum of August 27, 1987 (52 F.R. 33397); 
Presidential Determination No. 88-22 of September 8, 1988 (53 F.R. 
35289); Presidential Determination No. 89-25 of August 28, 1989 (54 
F.R. 37089); Presidential Determination No. 90-38 of September 5, 1990 
(55 F.R. 37309); Presidential Determination No. 91-52 of September 13, 
1991 (56 F.R. 48415); Presidential Determination No. 92-45 of August 
28, 1992 (57 F.R. 43125); Presidential Determination No. 93-38 of 
September 13, 1993 (58 F.R. 51209); Presidential Determination No. 94-
46 of September 8, 1994 (59 F.R. 47229); Presidential Determination No. 
95-41 of September 8, 1995 (60 F.R. 47659); and Presidential 
Determination No. 96-43 of August 27, 1996 (61 F.R. 46529).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit, any 
        transactions in foreign exchange, transfers of credit 
        or payments between, by, through, or to any banking 
        institution, and the importing, exporting, hoarding, 
        melting, or earmarking of gold or silver coin or 
        bullion, currency or securities, and
          (B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, 
        nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, 
        holding, withholding, use, transfer withdrawal, 
        transportation, importation or exportation of, or 
        dealing in or exercising any right, power, or privilege 
        with respect to, or transactions involving, any 
        property in which any foreign country or a national 
        thereof has any interest,
by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States; and any property or interest 
of any foreign country or national thereof shall vest, when, 
as, and upon the terms, directed by the President in such 
agency or person as may be designated from time to time by the 
President, and upon such terms and conditions as the President 
may prescribe such interest or property shall be held, used, 
administered, liquidated, sold, otherwise dealt with in the 
interest of and for the benefit of the United States and such 
designated agency or person may perform any and all acts 
incident to the accomplishment or furtherance of these 
purposes; and the President shall, in the manner hereinabove 
provided, require any person to keep a full record of, and to 
furnish under oath, in the form of reports or otherwise, 
complete information relative to any act or transaction 
referred to in this subdivision either before, during, or after 
the completion thereof, or relative to any interest in foreign 
property, or relative to any property in which any foreign 
country or any national thereof has or has had any interest, or 
as may be otherwise necessary to enforce the provisions of this 
subdivision, and in any case in which a report could be 
required, the President may, in the manner hereinabove 
provided, require the production, or if necessary to the 
national security or defense, the seizure, of any books of 
account, records, contracts, letters, memoranda, or other 
papers, in the custody or control of such person.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ The words ``; and the President may, in the manner hereinabove 
provided, take other or further measures not inconsistent herewith for 
the enforcement of this subdivision'', which previously appeared at 
this point, were struck out by sec. 102(2) of Public Law 95-223 (91 
Stat. 1625).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (2) Any payment, conveyance, transfer, assignment, or 
delivery of property or interest therein, made to or for the 
account of the United States, or as otherwise directed, 
pursuant to this subdivision or any rule, regulation, 
instruction, or direction issued hereunder shall to the extent 
thereof be a full acquittance and discharge for all purposes of 
the obligation of the person making the same; and no person 
shall be held liable in any court for or in respect to anything 
done or omitted in good faith in connection with the 
administration of, or in pursuance of and in reliance on, this 
subdivision, or any rule, regulation, instruction, or direction 
issued hereunder.
    (3) As used in this subdivision the term ``United States'' 
means the United States and any place subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof: \6\ Provided, however, That the foregoing 
shall not be construed as a limitation upon the power of the 
President, which is hereby conferred, to prescribe from time to 
time, definitions, not inconsistent with the purposes of this 
subdivision, for any or all of the terms used in this 
subdivision.\7\ As used in this subdivision the term ``person'' 
means an individual, partnership, association, or corporation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Words ``including the Philippine Islands, and the several 
courts of first instance of the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands 
shall have jurisdiction in all cases, civil or criminal, arising under 
this subdivision in the Philippine Islands and concurrent jurisdiction 
with the district courts of the United States of all cases, civil or 
criminal, arising upon the high seas'' immediately preceding the 
proviso in subsec. (b)(3) of this section, have been omitted on the 
authority of 1946 Proclamation No. 2695, which is set out as a note 
under section 1394 of Title 22, Foreign Relations and Intercourse, and 
in which the President proclaimed the independence of the Philippines.
    \7\ Sec. 103(b) of Public Law 95-223 (91 Stat. 1626) struck out the 
following sentence which previously appeared at this point:
    ``Whoever willfully violates any of the provisions of this 
subdivision or of any license, order, rule or regulation issued 
thereunder, shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $10,000, or, 
if a natural person, may be imprisoned for not more than ten years, or 
both; and any officer, director, or agent of any corporation who 
knowingly participates in such violation may be punished by a like 
fine, imprisonment, or both.''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  (4) \8\ The authority granted to the President by this 
section does not include the authority to regulate or prohibit, 
directly or indirectly, the importation from any country, or 
the exportation to any country, whether commercial or 
otherwise, regardless of format or medium of transmission, of 
any information or informational materials, including but not 
limited to, publications, films, posters, phonograph records, 
photographs, microfilms, microfiche, tapes, compact disks, CD 
ROMs, artworks, and news wire feeds. The exports exempted from 
regulation or prohibition by this paragraph do not include 
those which are otherwise controlled for export under section 5 
of the Export Administration Act of 1979, or under section 6 of 
that Act to the extent that such controls promote the 
nonproliferation or antiterrorism policies of the United 
States, or with respect to which acts are prohibited by chapter 
37 of title 18, United States Code.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Sec. 525(b)(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 474), amended 
and restated para. (4). Sec. 525(b)(2) of that Act further provided:
    ``(2) The authorities conferred upon the President by section 5(b) 
of the Trading With the Enemy Act, which were being exercised with 
respect to a country on July 1, 1977, as a result of a national 
emergency declared by the President before such date, and are being 
exercised on the date of the enactment of this Act, do not include the 
authority to regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly, any activity 
which, under section 5(b)(4) of the Trading With the Enemy Act, as 
amended by paragraph (1) of this subsection, may not be regulated or 
prohibited.''.
    Sec. 525(a) of that Act, furthermore, stated the following:
    ``(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress that the 
President should not restrict travel or exchanges for informational, 
educational, religious, cultural, or humanitarian purposes or for 
public performances or exhibitions, between the United States and any 
other country.''.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


             5. International Emergency Economic Powers Act

  Title II of Public Law 95-223 [H.R. 7738], 91 Stat. 1625, approved 
                     December 28, 1977, as amended

 AN ACT With respect to the powers of the President in time of war or 
                          national emergency.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


           TITLE II--INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS

                              short title

    Sec. 201.\1\ This title may be cited as the ``International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 50 U.S.C. 1701 note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

            situations in which authorities may be exercised

    Sec. 202.\2\ (a) Any authority granted to the President by 
section 203 may be exercised to deal with any unusual and 
extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or 
substantial part outside the United States, to the national 
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if 
the President declares a national emergency with respect to 
such threat.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ 50 U.S.C. 1701. Relating to Presidential authority and 
relations with Iraq, see sec. 1458 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (Public Law 101-510; 104 Stat. 
1697); the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (secs. 586-586J of Public Law 
101-513; 104 Stat. 2047).
    See also title XVI of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1993 (Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992) (Public 
Law 102-484; 106 Stat. 2571).
    See also sec. 533 of the Foreign Relations, Export Financing, and 
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 (sec. 101(c) of title I of 
Public Law 104-208; 110 Stat. 3009), relating to compliance with United 
Nations sanctions against Iraq, Serbia and Montenegro, in U.S. 
Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Legislation on 
Foreign Relations Through 1996, (Washington, G.P.O., 1997), volume I-A.
    See also sec. 1511 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160; 107 Stat. 1839), relating to 
sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, in U.S. Congress. House. 
Committee on International Relations. Legislation on Foreign Relations 
Through 1996, (Washington, G.P.O., 1997), volume I-B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) The authorities granted to the President by section 203 
may only be exercised to deal with an unusual and extraordinary 
threat with respect to which a national emergency has been 
declared for purposes of this title and may not be exercised 
for any other purpose. Any exercise of such authorities to deal 
with any new threat shall be based on a new declaration of 
national emergency which must be with respect to such threat.

                         grants of authorities

    Sec. 203.\3\ (a)(1) At the times and to the extent 
specified in section 202, the President may, under such 
regulations as he may prescribe, by means of instructions, 
licenses, or otherwise--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ 50 U.S.C. 1702.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit--
                  (i) any transactions in foreign exchange,
                  (ii) transfer of credit or payments between, 
                by, through, or to any banking institution, to 
                the extent that such transfers or payments 
                involve any interest of any foreign country or 
                a national thereof,
                  (iii) the importing or exporting of currency 
                or securities; and
          (B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, 
        nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, 
        holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, 
        transportation, importation or exportation of, or 
        dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or 
        privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, 
        any property in which any foreign country or a national 
        thereof has any interest; by any person, or with 
        respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of 
        the United States.
    (2) In exercising the authorities granted by paragraph (1), 
the President may require any person to keep a full record of, 
and to furnish under oath, in the form of reports or otherwise, 
complete information relative to any act or transaction 
referred to in paragraph (1) either before, during, or after 
the completion thereof, or relative to any interest in foreign 
property, or relative to any property in which any foreign 
country or any national thereof has or has had any interest, or 
as may be otherwise necessary to enforce the provisions of such 
paragraph. In any case in which a report by a person could be 
required under this paragraph, the President may require the 
production of any books of account, records, contracts, 
letters, memorandums, or other papers, in the custody or 
control of such person.
    (3) Compliance with any regulation, instruction, or 
direction issued under this title shall to the extent thereof 
be a full acquittance and discharge for all purposes of the 
obligations of the person making the same. No person shall be 
held liable in any court for or with respect to anything done 
or omitted in good faith in connection with the administration 
of, or pursuant to and in reliance on, this title, or any 
regulation, instruction, or direction issued under this title.
    (b) The authority granted to the President by this section 
does not include the authority to regulate or prohibit, 
directly or indirectly--
          (1) any postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or other 
        personal communication, which does not involve a 
        transfer of anything of value; \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Sec. 203(b) was amended by sec. 2502(b)(1) of Public Law 100-
418 (102 Stat. 1371) which struck out ``or'' in par. (1); struck out 
the period and inserted ``; or'' in par. (2) and added new par. (3).  
Sec. 2502(b)(2) of that Act also stated that:
    ``(2) The amendments made by paragraph (1) apply to actions taken 
by the President under section 203 of the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act before the date of the enactment of this Act which 
are in effect on such date of enactment, and to actions taken under 
such section on or after such date of enactment.''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (2) donations, by persons subject to the jurisdiction 
        of the United States, of articles, such as food, 
        clothing, and medicine, intended to be used to relieve 
        human suffering, except to the extent that the 
        President determines that such donations (A) would 
        seriously impair his ability to deal with any national 
        emergency, declared under section 202 of this title, 
        (B) or in response to coercion against the proposed 
        recipient or donor, or (C) would endanger Armed Forces 
        of the United States which are engaged in hostilities 
        or are in a situation where imminent involvement in 
        hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.
          (3) \5\ the importation from any country, or the 
        exportation to any country, whether commercial or 
        otherwise, regardless of format or medium of 
        transmission, of any information or informational 
        materials, including but not limited to, publications, 
        films, posters, phonograph records, photographs, 
        microfilms, microfiche, tapes, compact disks, CD ROMs, 
        artworks, and news wire feeds. The exports exempted 
        from regulation or prohibition by this paragraph do not 
        include those which are otherwise controlled for export 
        under section 5 of the Export Administration Act of 
        1979, or under section 6 of such Act to the extent that 
        such controls promote the nonproliferation or 
        antiterrorism policies of the United States, or with 
        respect to which acts are prohibited by chapter 37 of 
        title 18, United States Code; or
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Sec. 525(c)(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 474) struck 
out para. (3) and inserted new paras. (3) and (4). Paragraph (3) 
formerly read as follows:
    ``(3) the importation from any country, or the exportation to any 
country, whether commercial or otherwise, of publications, films, 
posters, phonograph records, photographs, microfilms, microfiche, 
tapes, or other informational materials, which are not otherwise 
controlled for export under section 5 of the Export Administration Act 
of 1979 or with respect to which no acts are prohibited by chapter 37 
of title 18, United States Code.''.
    Sec. 525(c)(2) and (3) of that Act further provided the following:
    ``(2) The amendments made by paragraph (1) to section 203(b)(3) of 
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act apply to actions taken 
by the President under section 203 of such Act before the date of 
enactment of this Act which are in effect on such date and to actions 
taken under such section on or after such date.
    ``(3) Section 203(b)(4) of the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act (as added by paragraph (1)) shall not apply to restrictions 
on the transactions and activities described in section 203(b)(4) in 
force on the date of enactment of this Act, with respect to countries 
embargoed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act on the 
date of enactment of this Act.''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (4) \5\ any transactions ordinarily incident to 
        travel to or from any country, including importation of 
        accompanied baggage for personal use, maintenance 
        within any country including payment of living expenses 
        and acquisition of goods or services for personal use, 
        and arrangement or facilitation of such travel 
        including nonscheduled air, sea, or land voyages.

                        consultation and reports

    Sec. 204.\6\ (a) The President, in every possible instance, 
shall consult with the Congress before exercising any of the 
authorities granted by this title and shall consult regularly 
with the Congress so long as such authorities are exercised.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ 50 U.S.C. 1703.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Whenever the President exercises any of the authorities 
granted by this title, he shall immediately transmit to the 
Congress a report specifying--
          (1) the circumstances which necessitate such exercise 
        of authority;
          (2) why the President believes those circumstances 
        constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat, which 
        has its source in whole or substantial part outside the 
        United States, to the national security, foreign 
        policy, or economy of the United States;
          (3) the authorities to be exercised and the actions 
        to be taken in the exercise of those authorities to 
        deal with those circumstances;
          (4) why the President believes such actions are 
        necessary to deal with those circumstances; and
          (5) any foreign countries with respect to which such 
        actions are to be taken and why such actions are to be 
        taken with respect to those countries.
    (c) At least once during each succeeding six-month period 
after transmitting a report pursuant to subsection (b) with 
respect to an exercise of authorities under this title, the 
President shall report to the Congress with respect to the 
actions taken, since the last such report, in the exercise of 
such authorities, and with respect to any changes which have 
occurred concerning any information previously furnished 
pursuant to paragraphs (1) through (5) of subsection (b).
    (d) The requirements of this section are supplemental to 
those contained in title IV of the National Emergencies Act.

                     authority to issue regulations

    Sec. 205.\7\ The President may issue such regulations, 
including regulations prescribing definitions, as may be 
necessary for the exercise of the authorities granted by this 
title.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ 50 U.S.C. 1704.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               penalties

    Sec. 206.\8\ (a) A civil penalty of not to exceed $10,000 
\9\ may be imposed on any person who violates any license, 
order or regulation issued under this title.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ 50 U.S.C. 1705.
    \9\ Sec. 629 of the Treasury, Postal Service, and General 
Government Appropriations Act, 1993 (Public Law 102-393; 106 Stat. 
1773) struck out ``$10,000'' and inserted in lieu thereof ``$50,000''. 
Sec. 9155 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1993 (Public 
Law 102-396; 106 Stat. 1943), however, struck out ``$50,000'' and 
inserted in lieu thereof ``$10,000''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Whoever willfully violates any license, order, or 
regulation issued under this title shall, upon conviction, be 
fined not more than $50,000, or, if a natural person, may be 
imprisoned for not more than ten years, or both; and any 
officer, director, or agent of any corporation who knowingly 
participates in such violation may be punished by a like fine, 
imprisonment, or both.

                           savings provision

    Sec. 207.\10\ (a)(1) Except as provided in subsection (b), 
notwithstanding the termination pursuant to the National 
Emergencies Act of a national emergency declared for purposes 
of this title, any authorities granted by this title, which are 
exercised on the date of such termination on the basis of such 
national emergency to prohibit transactions involving property 
in which a foreign country or national thereof has any 
interest, may continue to be so exercised to prohibit 
transactions involving that property if the President 
determines that the continuation of such prohibition with 
respect to that property is necessary on account of claims 
involving such country of its nationals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ 50 U.S.C. 1706.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (2) Notwithstanding the termination of the authorities 
described in section 101(b) of this Act, any such authorities, 
which are exercised with respect to a country on the date of 
such termination to prohibit transactions involving any 
property in which such country or any national thereof has any 
interest, may continue to be exercised to prohibit transactions 
involving that property if the President determines that the 
continuation of such prohibition with respect to that property 
is necessary on account of claims involving such country or its 
nationals.
    (b) The authorities described in subsection (a)(1) may not 
continue to be exercised under this section if the national 
emergency is terminated by the Congress by concurrent 
resolution pursuant to section 202 of the National Emergencies 
Act and if the Congress specifies in such concurrent resolution 
that such authorities may not continue to be exercised under 
this section.
    (c)(1) The provisions of this section are supplemental to 
the savings provisions of paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of 
section 101(a) and of paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of section 
202(a) of the National Emergencies Act.
    (2) The provisions of this section supersede the 
termination provisions of section 101(a) and of title II of the 
National Emergencies Act to the extent that the provisions of 
this section are inconsistent with these provisions.
    (d) If the President uses the authority of this section to 
continue prohibitions on transactions involving foreign 
property interests, he shall report to the Congress every six 
months on the use of such authority.
    Sec. 208.\11\ If any provision of this Act is held invalid, 
the remainder of the Act shall not be affected thereby.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ 50 U.S.C. 1701 note.

             6. Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended

Partial text of Public Law 79-173 [H.R. 3771], 59 Stat. 526, approved 
    July 31, 1945, as amended
 AN ACT To provide for increasing the lending authority of the Export-
       Import Bank of the United States, and for other purposes.
    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this 
Act may be cited as the ``Export-Import Bank Act of 1945.''
    Sec. 2. * * *
    (b)(1) (A) It is the policy of the United States to foster 
expansion of exports of manufactured goods, agricultural 
products, and other goods and services, thereby contributing to 
the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and 
real income to the increased development of the productive 
resources of the United States. To meet this objective in all 
its programs, the Export-Import Bank is directed, in the 
exercise of its functions, to provide guarantees, insurance, 
and extensions of credit at rates and on terms and other 
conditions which are fully competitive with the Government-
supported rates and terms and other conditions available for 
the financing of exports of goods and services from the 
principal countries whose exporters compete with United States 
exporters. The Bank shall, in cooperation with the export 
financing instrumentalities of other governments, seek to 
minimize competition in Government-supported export financing 
and shall, in cooperation with other appropriate United States 
Government agencies, seek to reach international agreements to 
reduce government subsidized export financing. The Bank shall, 
on a annual basis, report to the appropriate committees of 
Congress its actions in complying with these directives. In 
this report the Bank shall include a survey of all other major 
export-financing facilities available from other governments 
and government-related agencies through which foreign exporters 
compete with United States exporters and indicate in specific 
terms the ways in which the Bank's rates, terms, and other 
conditions compare with those offered from such other 
governments directly or indirectly. Further the Bank shall at 
the same time survey a representative number of United States 
exporters and United States commercial lending institutions 
which provide export credit to determine their experience in 
meeting financial competition from other countries whose 
exporters compete with United States exporters. The results of 
this survey shall be included as part of the annual report \1\ 
required by this subparagraph. The Bank shall include in the 
annual report a description of its role in the implementation 
of the strategic plan prepared by the Trade Promotion 
Coordinating Committee in accordance with section 2312 of the 
Export Enhancement Act of 1988.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ So in original. Should read ``an''. This requirement was 
altered from a semiannual report to an annual report by sec. 210 of 
Public Law 96-470 (94 Stat. 2245).
    \2\ Sec. 121(a)(2) of the Export Enhancement Act of 1992 (Public 
Law 102-429; 106 Stat. 2198) struck out ``The Bank shall also include 
in the annual report a description of each loan by the Bank involving 
the export of any product or service related to the production, 
refining, or transportation of any type of energy or the development of 
any energy resources with a statement assessing the impact, if any, on 
the availability of such products, services, or energy supplies thus 
developed for use within the United States.'', and inserted in lieu 
thereof ``The Bank shall include in the annual report a description of 
its role in the implementation of the strategic plan prepared by the 
Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee in accordance with section 2312 
of the Export Enhancement Act of 1988.''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (B) It is further the policy of the United States that 
loans made by the Bank in all its programs shall bear interest 
at rates determined by the Board of Directors, consistent with 
the Bank's mandate to support United States exports at rates 
and on terms and conditions which are fully competitive with 
exports of other countries, and consistent with international 
agreements. For the purpose of the preceding sentence, rates 
and terms and conditions need not be identical in all respects 
to those offered by foreign countries, but should be 
established so that the effect of such rates, terms, and 
conditions for all the Bank's programs, including those for 
small businesses and for medium-term financing, will be to 
neutralize the effect of such foreign credit on international 
sales competition. The Bank shall consider its average cost of 
money as one factor in its determination of interest rates, 
where such consideration does not impair the Bank's primary 
function of expanding United States exports through fully 
competitive financing. The Bank may not impose a credit 
application fee unless (i) the fee is competitive with the 
average fee charged by the Bank's primary foreign competitors, 
and (ii) the borrower or the exporter is given the option of 
paying the fee at the outset of the loan or over the life of 
the loan and the present value of the fee determined under 
either such option is the same amount. It is also the policy of 
the United States that the Bank in the exercise of its 
functions should supplement and encourage, and not compete 
with, private capital; that the Bank, in determining whether to 
provide support for a transaction under the loan, guarantee, or 
insurance program, or any combination thereof, shall consider 
the need to involve private capital in support of United States 
exports as well as the cost of the transaction as calculated in 
accordance with the requirements of the Federal Credit Reform 
Act of 1990; \3\ that the Bank shall accord equal opportunity 
to export agents and managers, independent export firms, export 
trading companies, and small commercial banks in the 
formulation and implementation of its programs; that the Bank 
should give emphasis to assisting new and small business 
entrants in the agricultural export market, and shall, in 
cooperation with other relevant Government agencies, including 
the Commodity Credit Corporation, develop a program of 
education to increase awareness of export opportunities among 
small agribusinesses and cooperatives, that loans, so far as 
possible consistent with the carrying out of the purposes of 
subsection (a) of this section, shall generally be for specific 
purposes, and, in the judgment of the Board of Directors, offer 
reasonable assurance of repayment; and that in authorizing any 
loan or guarantee, the Board of Directors shall take into 
account any serious adverse effect of such loan or guarantee on 
the competitive position of United States industry, the 
availability of materials which are in short supply in the 
United States, and employment in the United States, and shall 
give particular emphasis to the objective of strengthening the 
competitive position of United States exporters and thereby of 
expanding total United States exports. Only in cases where the 
President determines that such action would be in the national 
interest where such action would clearly and importantly 
advance United States policy in such areas as international 
terrorism, nuclear proliferation, environmental protection and 
human rights, should the Export-Import Bank deny applications 
for credit for nonfinancial or noncommercial considerations.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Sec. 104 of the Export Enhancement Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-
429; 106 Stat. 2189) added this clause.
    \4\ Popularly referred to as the Chafee amendment. Sec. 1904 of 
Public Law 95-630 (92 Stat. 3724) struck out a phrase concerning human 
rights, which had been added by sec. 2 of Public Law 95-143 (91 Stat. 
1210), and substituted the words to this point beginning with ``and 
shall give particular emphasis to''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (C) Consistent with the policy of section 501 of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 and section 119 of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Board of Directors shall 
name an officer of the Bank whose duties shall include advising 
the President of the Bank on ways or promoting the export of 
goods and services to be used in the development, production, 
and distribution of nonnuclear renewable energy resources, 
disseminating information concerning export opportunities and 
the availability of Bank support for such activities, and 
acting as a liaison between the Bank and the Department of 
Commerce and other appropriate departments and agencies.
    (D) (i) It is further the policy of the United States to 
foster the delivery of United States services in international 
commerce. In exercising its powers and functions, the Bank 
shall give full and equal consideration to making loans and 
providing guarantees for the export of services (independently, 
or in conjunction with the export of manufactured goods, 
equipment, hardware or other capital goods) consistent with the 
Bank's policy to neutralize foreign subsidized credit 
competition and to supplement the private capital market.
    (ii) The Bank shall include in its annual report a summary 
of its programs regarding the export of services.
    (E) (i)(I) It is further the policy of the United States to 
encourage the participation of small business in international 
commerce.
    (II) In exercising its authority, the Bank shall develop a 
program which gives fair consideration to making loans and 
providing guarantees for the export of goods and services by 
small businesses.
    (ii) It is further the policy of the United States that the 
Bank shall give due recognition to the policy stated in section 
2(a) of the Small Business Act that ``the Government should 
aid, counsel, assist, and protect, insofar as is possible, the 
interests of small business concerns in order to preserve free 
competitive enterprise''.
    (iii) In furtherance of this policy, the Board of Directors 
shall designate an officer of the Bank who--
          (I) shall be responsible to the President of the Bank 
        for all matters concerning or affecting small business 
        concerns; and
          (II) among other duties, shall be responsible for 
        advising small business concerns of the opportunities 
        for small business concerns in the functions of the 
        Bank and for maintaining liaison with the Small 
        Business Administration and other departments and 
        agencies in matters affecting small business concerns.)
    (iv) The Director appointed to represent the interests of 
small business under section 3(c) of this Act shall ensure that 
the Bank carries out its responsibilities under clauses (ii) 
and (iii) of this subparagraph and that the Bank's financial 
and other resources are, to the maximum extent possible, 
appropriately used for small business needs.
    (v) To assure that the purposes of clauses (i) and (ii) of 
this subparagraph are carried out, the Bank shall make 
available, from the aggregate loan, guarantee, and insurance 
authority available to it, an amount to finance exports 
directly by small business concerns (as defined under section 3 
of the Small Business Act) which shall be not less than 10 
percent of such authority for each fiscal year.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Sec. 121(a)(3) of the Export Enhancement Act of 1992 (Public 
Law 102-429; 106 Stat. 2198) struck out ``not less than--(I) 6 per 
centum of such authority for fiscal year 1984; (II) 8 per centum of 
such authority for fiscal year 1985; and (III) 10 per centum of such 
authority for fiscal year 1986 and thereafter.'', and inserted in lieu 
thereof ``not less than 10 percent of such authority for each fiscal 
year.''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (vi) The Bank shall utilize the amount set-aside pursuant 
to clause (v) of this subparagraph to offer financing for small 
business exports on terms which are fully competitive with 
regard to interest rates and with regard to the portion of 
financing which may be provided, guaranteed, or insured. 
Financing under this clause (vi) shall be available without 
regard to whether financing for the particular transaction was 
disapproved by any other Federal agency.
    (vii)(I) The Bank shall utilize a part of the amount set 
aside pursuant to clause (v) to provide lines of credit or 
guarantees to consortia of small or medium size banks, export 
trading companies, State export finance agencies, export 
financing cooperatives, small business investment companies (as 
defined in section 103 of the Small Business Investment Act of 
1958), or other financing institutions or entities in order to 
finance small business exports.
    (II) Financing under this clause (vii) shall be made 
available only where the consortia or the participating 
institutions agree to undertake processing, servicing, and 
credit evaluation functions in connection with such financing.
    (III) To the maximum extent practicable, the Bank shall 
delegate to the consortia the authority to approve financing 
under this clause (vii).
    (IV) In the administration of the program under this clause 
(vii), the Bank shall provide appropriate technical assistance 
to participating consortia and may require such consortia 
periodically to furnish information to the Bank regarding the 
number and amount of loans made and the creditworthiness of the 
borrowers.
    (viii) In order to assure that the policy stated in clause 
(i) is carried out, the Bank shall promote small business 
exports and its small business export financing programs in 
cooperation with the Secretary of Commerce, the Office of 
International Trade of the Small Business Administration, and 
the private sector, particularly small business organizations, 
State agencies, chambers of commerce, banking organizations, 
export management companies, export trading companies and 
private industry.
    (ix) The Bank shall provide, through creditworthy trade 
associations, export trading companies, State export finance 
companies, export finance cooperatives, and other multiple-
exporter organizations, medium-term risk protection coverage 
for the members and clients of such organizations. Such 
coverage shall be made available to each such organization 
under a single risk protection policy covering its members or 
clients. Nothing in this provision shall be interpreted as 
limiting the Bank's authority to deny support for specific 
transactions or to disapprove a request by such an organization 
to participate in such coverage.
    (F) Consistent with international agreements, the Bank 
shall urge the Foreign Credit Insurance Association to provide 
coverage against 100 per centum of any loss with respect to 
exports having a value of less than $100,000.
    (G) Participation in or access to long-, medium-, and 
short-term financing, guarantees, and insurance provided by the 
Bank shall not be denied solely because the entity seeking 
participation or access is not a bank or is not a United States 
person.
    (H) \6\ (i) It is further the policy of the United States 
to foster the development of democratic institutions and market 
economies in countries seeking such development, and to assist 
the export of high technology items to such countries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Sec. 114 of the Export Enhancement Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-
429; 106 Stat. 2195) added subpar. (H).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (ii) In exercising its authority, the Bank shall develop a 
program for providing guarantees and insurance with respect to 
the export of high technology items to countries making the 
transition to market based economies, including eligible East 
European countries (within the meaning of section 4 of the 
Support For East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989).
    (iii) As part of the ongoing marketing and outreach efforts 
of the Bank, the Bank shall, to the maximum extent practicable, 
inform high technology companies, particularly small business 
concerns (as such term is defined in section 3 of the Small 
Business Act), about the programs of the Bank for United States 
companies interested in exporting high technology goods to 
countries making the transition to market based economies, 
including any eligible East European country (within the 
meaning of section 4 of the Support For East European Democracy 
(SEED) Act of 1989).
    (iv) In carrying out clause (iii), the Bank shall--
          (I) work with other agencies involved in export 
        promotion and finance; and
          (II) invite State and local governments, trade 
        centers, commercial banks, and other appropriate public 
        and private organizations to serve as intermediaries 
        for the outreach efforts.

                        7. Internal Revenue Code

   a. Federal Income Tax Forgiveness for U.S. Military and Civilian 
                       Employees Killed Overseas

  Partial text of Title 26, United States Code--Internal Revenue Code

                        Subtitle A--Income Taxes

                  CHAPTER 1--NORMAL TAXES AND SURTAXES

      Subchapter J--Estates, Trusts, Beneficiaries, and Decedents

Part II--Income in Respect of Decedents

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 692. Income taxes on members of Armed Forces on death

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    (c) Certain military or civilian employees of the United 
States dying as a result of injuries sustained overseas
          (1) In general
          In the case of any individual who dies while a 
        military or civilian employee of the United States, if 
        such death occurs as a result of wounds or injury which 
        was incurred while the individual was a military or 
        civilian employee of the United States and which was 
        incurred outside the United States in a terroristic or 
        military action, any tax imposed by this subtitle shall 
        not apply--
                  (A) with respect to the taxable year in which 
                falls the date of his death, and
                  (B) with respect to any prior taxable year in 
                the period beginning with the last taxable year 
                ending before the taxable year in which the 
                wounds or injury were incurred.
          (2) Terroristic or military action
          For purposes of paragraph (1), the term ``terroristic 
        or military action'' means--
                  (A) any terroristic activity which a 
                preponderance of the evidence indicates was 
                directed against the United States or any of 
                its allies, and
                  (B) any military action involving the Armed 
                Forces of the United States and resulting from 
                violence or aggression against the United 
                States or any of its allies (or threat 
                thereof).
          For purposes of the preceding sentence, the term 
        ``military action'' does not include training 
        exercises.
          (3) Treatment of multinational forces
          For purposes of paragraph (2), any multinational 
        force in which the United States is participating shall 
        be treated as an ally of the United States.

                    b. Denial of Foreign Tax Credit

  Partial text of Title 26, United States Code--Internal Revenue Code

                        Subtitle A--Income Taxes

                  CHAPTER 1--NORMAL TAXES AND SURTAXES

 Subchapter N--Tax Based on Income From Sources Within or Without the 
                             United States

   Part III--Income from Sources Within or Without the United States

                     subpart a--foreign tax credit

Sec. 901. Taxes of foreign countries and of possessions of United 
                    States

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    (j) Denial of foreign tax credit, etc., with respect to 
certain foreign countries
         (1) In general
          Notwithstanding any other provision of this part--
                  (A) no credit shall be allowed under 
                subsection (a) for any income, war profits, or 
                excess profits taxes paid or accrued (or deemed 
                paid under section 902 or 960) to any country 
                if such taxes are with respect to income 
                attributable to a period during which this 
                subsection applies to such country, and
                  (B) subsections (a), (b), and (c) of section 
                904 and sections 902 and 960 shall be applied 
                separately with respect to income attributable 
                to such a period from sources within such 
                country.
         (2) Countries to which subsection applies
                  (A) In general
                  This subsection shall apply to any foreign 
                country--
                          (i) the government of which the 
                        United States does not recognize, 
                        unless such government is otherwise 
                        eligible to purchase defense articles 
                        or services under the Arms Export 
                        Control Act,
                          (ii) with respect to which the United 
                        States has severed diplomatic 
                        relations,
                          (iii) with respect to which the 
                        United States has not severed 
                        diplomatic relations but does not 
                        conduct such relations, or
                          (iv) which the Secretary of State 
                        has, pursuant to section 6(j) of the 
                        Export Administration Act of 1979, as 
                        amended, designated as a foreign 
                        country which repeatedly provides 
                        support for acts of international 
                        terrorisms.
                  (B) Period for which subsection applies
                  This subsection shall apply to any foreign 
                country described in subparagraph (A) during 
                the period--
                          (i) beginning on the later of--
                                  (I) January 1, 1987, or
                                  (II) 6 months after such 
                                country becomes a country 
                                described in subparagraph (A), 
                                and
                          (ii) ending on the date the Secretary 
                        of State certifies to the Secretary of 
                        the Treasury that such country is no 
                        longer described in subparagraph (A).

            8. Bretton Woods Agreements Act Amendments, 1978

Partial text of Public Law 95-435 [H.R. 9214], 92 Stat. 1051, approved 
                      October 10, 1978, as amended

   AN ACT To amend the Bretton Woods Agreements Act to authorize the 
United States to participate in the Supplementary Financing Facility of 
the International Monetary Fund.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    Sec. 6.\1\ The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the 
Executive Director of the United States to the International 
Monetary Fund to work in opposition to any extension of 
financial or technical assistance by the Supplemental Financing 
Facility or by any other agency or facility of such Fund to any 
country the government of which--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 22 U.S.C. 286e-11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) permits entry into the territory of such country 
        to any person who has committed an act of international 
        terrorism, including any act of aircraft hijacking, or 
        otherwise supports, encourages, or harbors such person; 
        or
          (2) fails to take appropriate measures to prevent any 
        such person from committing any such act outside the 
        territory of such country.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


              9. International Financial Institutions Act

Partial text of Public Law 95-118 [H.R. 5262], 91 Stat. 1067, approved 
                      October 3, 1977, as amended

_______________________________________________________________________


          Note.--Except for the provisions noted below, this 
        Act consists of amendments to the Bretton Woods 
        Agreements Act, International Finance Corporation Act, 
        International Development Association Act, Asian 
        Development Bank Act, African Development Fund Act, and 
        the Inter-American Development Bank Act.

_______________________________________________________________________


 AN ACT To provide for increased participation by the United States in 
    the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the 
   International Development Association, the International Finance 
Corporation, the Asian Development Bank and the Asian Development Fund, 
                        and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

                              short title

    Section 1. This Act may be cited as the International 
Financial Institutions Act.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                        TITLE VII--HUMAN RIGHTS

    Sec. 701.\1\ (a) \2\ The United States Government, in 
connection with its voice and vote in the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, the International 
Development Association, the International Finance Corporation, 
the Inter-American Development Bank, the African Development 
Fund, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the 
International Monetary Fund,\3\ shall advance the cause of 
human rights, including by seeking to channel assistance toward 
countries other than those whose governments engage in--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 22 U.S.C. 262d. Section 701 was invoked in sec. 586G(a)(5) of 
the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990, as contained in the Foreign Operations, 
Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1991 (Public 
Law 101-513; 104 Stat. 1979 at 2052).
    See also secs. 568, 576, and 579 in Title V of the Foreign 
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 
1997 (sec. 101(c) of title I of Public Law 104-208; 110 Stat. 3009).
    \2\ Sec. 823(a) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 512), provided the 
following:
    ``(a) In General.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the 
United States executive director to each of the international financial 
institutions described in section 701(a) of the International Financial 
Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262d(a)) to use the voice and vote of the 
United States to oppose any use of the institution's funds to promote 
the acquisition of unsafeguarded special nuclear material or the 
development, stockpiling, or use of any nuclear explosive device by any 
non-nuclear-weapon state.''.
    See also amendment and note at subsec. (b)(3) of this section.
    \3\ Reference to the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and the International Monetary Fund was added by sec. 
1008(a) of the FREEDOM Support Act (Public Law 102-511; 106 Stat. 
3361).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) a pattern of gross violations of internationally 
        recognized human rights, such as torture or cruel, 
        inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment, 
        prolonged detention without charges, or other flagrant 
        denial to life, liberty, and the security of person; or
          (2) provide refuge to individuals committing acts of 
        international terrorism by hijacking aircraft.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE XVI--HUMAN WELFARE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 1621.\4\ OPPOSITION TO ASSISTANCE BY INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
                    INSTITUTIONS TO TERRORIST STATES.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall 
instruct the United States executive director of each 
international financial institution to use the voice and vote 
of the United States to oppose any loan or other use of the 
funds of the respective institution to or for a country for 
which the Secretary of State has made a determination under 
section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 
U.S.C. App. 2405(j)) or section 620A of the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ 22 U.S.C. 262p-4q. Added by sec. 327 of the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-132; 110 Stat. 
1257), resulting in two ``Sec. 1621''.
    Similar language had previously been adopted in annual foreign 
assistance appropriations acts since FY 1988.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the term 
``international financial institution'' includes--
          (1) the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
        Development, the International Development Association, 
        and the International Monetary Fund;
          (2) wherever applicable, the Inter-American Bank, the 
        Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for 
        Reconstruction and Development, the African Development 
        Bank, and the African Development Fund; and
          (3) any similar institution established after the 
        date of enactment of this section.

          10. Inter-American Development Bank Act, as amended

  Partial text of Public Law 86-147 [S. 1928], 73 Stat. 299, approved 
                       August 7, 1959, as amended

  AN ACT To provide for the participation of the United States in the 
                    Inter-American Development Bank.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

                              short title

    Section 1. This Act may be cited as the ``Inter-American 
Development Bank Act''.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Sec. 37.\1\ (a) The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized 
to contribute, and to make payment of, $500,000,000 to the 
Multilateral Investment Fund established pursuant to the 
agreements of February 11, 1992: Provided, That such funds 
shall only be disbursed from the Fund to countries that have 
governments that are democratically elected, that do not harbor 
or sponsor international terrorists; that do not fail to 
cooperate in narcotics matters; and that do not engage in a 
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally 
recognized human rights.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 22 U.S.C. 283z-9. Added by sec. 594(b) of the Foreign 
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 
1993 (Public Law 102-391; 106 Stat. 1693).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) There is hereby authorized to be appropriated without 
fiscal year limitation $500,000,000 for the contribution 
authorized in subsection (a).\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Appropriations for U.S. contributions authorized in sec. 36(b) 
have been provided in the following amounts and Public Laws: fiscal 
year 1993--$90 million (Public Law 102-391); fiscal year 1994--$75 
million (Public Law 103-87); fiscal year 1995--75 million (Public Law 
103-306); fiscal year 1996--75 million (Public Law 104-107); fiscal 
year 1997--53.75 million (Public Law 104-208).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

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=======================================================================




                          F. AVIATION SECURITY

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

1. Aviation Programs (Title 49, United State Code) (partial text)   319
      Subtitle VII--Aviation Programs............................   319
2. Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-
    264) (partial text)..........................................   343
3. Crimes and Criminal Procedures (Title 18, United States Code).   348
      Chapter 2--Aircraft and Motor Vehicles.....................   348
            Section 32--Destruction of Aircraft or Aircraft 
                Facilities.......................................   348
            Section 37--Violence at International Airports.......   349
4. Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, as amended (Public 
    Law 101-604) (partial text)..................................   351
5. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 
    (Public Law 99-83) (partial text)............................   358
      Title V--International Terrorism and Foreign Airport 
          Security...............................................   358

=======================================================================

                          1. Aviation Programs

      Partial text of Title 49, United States Code--Transportation




        Note.--Public Law 103-272 (108 Stat. 745) repealed 
        several Public Laws relating to transportation, 
        aviation, and airport security, and consolidated their 
        substance into 49 U.S.C.




                    SUBTITLE VII--AVIATION PROGRAMS

                    PART A--AIR COMMERCE AND SAFETY

                           subpart i--general

CHAPTER 401--GENERAL PROVISIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 40106. Emergency powers

    (a) Deviations From Regulations.--Appropriate military 
authority may authorize aircraft of the armed forces of the 
United States to deviate from air traffic regulations 
prescribed under section 40103(b)(1) and (2) of this title when 
the authority decides the deviation is essential to the 
national defense because of a military emergency or urgent 
military necessity. The authority shall--
          (1) give the Administrator of the Federal Aviation 
        Administration prior notice of the deviation at the 
        earliest practicable time; and
          (2) to the extent time and circumstances allow, make 
        every reasonable effort to consult with the 
        Administrator and arrange for the deviation in advance 
        on a mutually agreeable basis.
    (b) Suspension of Authority.--(1) When the President 
decides that the government of a foreign country is acting 
inconsistently with the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft or that the government of a 
foreign country allows territory under its jurisdiction to be 
used as a base of operations or training of, or as a sanctuary 
for, or arms, aids, or abets, a terrorist organization that 
knowingly uses the unlawful seizure, or the threat of an 
unlawful seizure, of an aircraft as an instrument of policy, 
the President may suspend the authority of--
          (A) an air carrier or foreign air carrier to provide 
        foreign air transportation to an from that foreign 
        country;
          (B) a person to operate aircraft in foreign air 
        commerce to and from that foreign country;
          (C) a foreign air carrier to provide foreign air 
        transportation between the United states and another 
        country that maintains air service with the foreign 
        country; and
          (D) a foreign person to operate aircraft in foreign 
        air commerce between the United States and another 
        country that maintains air service with the foreign 
        country.
    (2) The President may act under this subsection without 
notice or a hearing. The suspension remains in effect for as 
long as the President decides is necessary to ensure the 
security of aircraft against unlawful seizure. Notwithstanding 
section 40105(b) of this title, the authority of the President 
to suspend rights under this subsection is a condition to a 
certificate of public convenience and necessity, air carrier 
operating certificate, foreign air carrier or foreign aircraft 
permit, or foreign air carrier operating specification issued 
by the Secretary of Transportation under this part.
    (3) An air carrier or foreign air carrier may not provide 
foreign air transportation, and a person may not operate 
aircraft in foreign air commerce, in violation of a suspension 
of authority under this subsection.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                          subpart iii--safety

                         CHAPTER 449--SECURITY

                       subchapter i--requirements

Sec. 44901. Screening passengers and property

    (a) General Requirements.--The Administrator of the Federal 
Aviation Administration shall prescribe regulations requiring 
screening of all passengers and property that will be carried 
in a cabin of an aircraft in air transportation or intrastate 
air transportation. The screening must take place before 
boarding and be carried out by a weapon-detecting facility or 
procedure used or operated by an employee or agent of an air 
carrier, intrastate air carrier, or foreign air carrier.
    (b) Amending Regulations.--Notwithstanding subsection (a) 
of this section, the Administrator may amend a regulation 
prescribed under subsection (a) to require screening only to 
ensure security against criminal violence and aircraft piracy 
in air transportation and intrastate air transportation.
    (c) Exemptions and Advising Congress on Regulations.--The 
Administrator--
          (1) may exempt from this section air transportation 
        operations, except scheduled passenger operations of an 
        air carrier providing air transportation under a 
        certificate issued under section 41102 of this title or 
        a permit issued under section 41302 of this title; and
          (2) shall advise Congress of a regulation to be 
        prescribed under this section at least 30 days before 
        the effective date of the regulation, unless the 
        Administrator decides an emergency exists requiring the 
        regulation to become effective in fewer than 30 days 
        and notifies Congress of that decision.

Sec. 44902. Refusal to transport passengers and property

    (a) Mandatory Refusal.--The Administrator of the Federal 
Aviation Administration shall prescribe regulations requiring 
an air carrier, intrastate air carrier, or foreign air carrier 
to refuse to transport--
          (1) a passenger who does not consent to a search 
        under section 44901(a) of this title establishing 
        whether the passenger is carrying unlawfully a 
        dangerous weapon, explosive, or other destructive 
        substance; or
          (2) property of a passenger who does not consent to a 
        search of the property establishing whether the 
        property unlawfully contains a dangerous weapon, 
        explosive, or other destructive substance.
    (b) Permissive Refusal.--Subject to regulations of the 
Administrator, an air carrier, intrastate air carrier, or 
foreign air carrier may refuse to transport a passenger or 
property the carrier decides is, or might be, inimical to 
safety.
    (c) Agreeing to Consent to Search.--An agreement to carry 
passengers or property in air transportation or intrastate air 
transportation by an air carrier, intrastate air carrier, or 
foreign air carrier is deemed to include an agreement that the 
passenger or property will not be carried if consent to search 
the passenger or property for a purpose referred to in this 
section is not given.

Sec. 44903. Air transportation security

    (a) Definition.--In this section, ``law enforcement 
personnel'' means individuals--
          (1) authorized to carry and use firearms;
          (2) vested with the degree of the police power of 
        arrest the Administrator of the Federal Aviation 
        Administration considers necessary to carry out this 
        section; and
          (3) identifiable by appropriate indicia of authority.
    (b) Protection Against Violence and Piracy.--The 
Administrator shall prescribe regulations to protect passengers 
and property on an aircraft operating in air transportation or 
intrastate air transportation against an act of criminal 
violence or aircraft piracy. When prescribing a regulation 
under this subsection, the Administrator shall--
          (1) consult with the Secretary of Transportation, the 
        Attorney General, the heads of other departments, 
        agencies, and instrumentalities of the United States 
        Government, and State and local authorities;
          (2) consider whether a proposed regulation is 
        consistent with--
                  (A) protecting passengers; and
                  (B) the public interest in promoting air 
                transportation and intrastate air 
                transportation;
          (3) to the maximum extent practicable, require a 
        uniform procedure for searching and detaining 
        passengers and property to ensure--
                  (A) their safety; and
                  (B) courteous and efficient treatment by an 
                air carrier, an agent or employee of an air 
                carrier, and Government, State, and local law 
                enforcement personnel carrying out this 
                section; and
          (4) consider the extent to which a proposed 
        regulation will carry out this section.
    (c) Security Programs.--(1) The Administrator shall 
prescribe regulations under subsection (b) of this section that 
require each operator of an airport regularly serving an air 
carrier holding a certificate issued by the Secretary of 
Transportation to establish an air transportation security 
program that provides a law enforcement presence and capability 
at each of those airports that is adequate to ensure the safety 
of passengers. The regulations shall authorize the operator to 
use the services of qualified State, local, and private law 
enforcement personnel. When the Administrator decides, after 
being notified by an operator in the form the Administrator 
prescribes, that not enough qualified State, local, and private 
law enforcement personnel are available to carry out subsection 
(b), the Administrator may authorize the operator to use, on a 
reimbursable basis, personnel employed by the Administrator, or 
by another department, agency, or instrumentality of the 
Government with the consent of the head of the department, 
agency, or instrumentality, to supplement State, local, and 
private law enforcement personnel. When deciding whether 
additional personnel are needed, the Administrator shall 
consider the number of passengers boarded at the airport, the 
extent of anticipated risk of criminal violence or aircraft 
piracy at the airport or to the air carrier aircraft operations 
at the airport, and the availability of qualified State or 
local law enforcement personnel at the airport.
    (2)(A) The Administrator may approve a security program of 
an airport operator, or an amendment in an existing program, 
that incorporates a security program of an airport tenant 
(except an air carrier separately complying with part 108 or 
129 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations) having access to 
a secured area of the airport, if the program or amendment 
incorporates--
          (i) the measures the tenant will use, within the 
        tenant's leased areas or areas designated for the 
        tenant's exclusive use under an agreement with the 
        airport operator, to carry out the security 
        requirements imposed by the Administrator on the 
        airport operator under the access control system 
        requirements of section 107.14 of title 14, Code of 
        Federal Regulations, or under other requirements of 
        part 107 of title 14; and
          (ii) the methods the airport operator will use to 
        monitor and audit the tenant's compliance with the 
        security requirements and provides that the tenant will 
        be required to pay monetary penalties to the airport 
        operator if the tenant fails to carry out a security 
        requirement under a contractual provision or 
        requirement imposed by the airport operator.
    (B) If the Administrator approves a program or amendment 
described in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the airport 
operator may not be found to be in violation of a requirement 
of this subsection or subsection (b) of this section when the 
airport operator demonstrates that the tenant or an employee, 
permittee, or invitee of the tenant is responsible for the 
violation and that the airport operator has complied with all 
measures in its security program for securing compliance with 
its security program by the tenant.
    (d) Authorizing Individuals To Carry Firearms and Make 
Arrests.--With the approval of the Attorney General and the 
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Transportation may 
authorize an individual who carries out air transportation 
security duties--
          (1) to carry firearms; and
          (2) to make arrests without warrant for an offense 
        against the United States committed in the presence of 
        the individual or for a felony under the laws of the 
        United States, if the individual reasonably believes 
        the individual to be arrested has committed or is 
        committing a felony.
    (e) Exclusive Responsibility Over Passenger Safety.--The 
Administrator has the exclusive responsibility to direct law 
enforcement activity related to the safety of passengers on an 
aircraft involved in an offense under section 46502 of this 
title from the moment all external doors of the aircraft are 
closed following boarding until those doors are opened to allow 
passengers to leave the aircraft. When requested by the 
Administrator, other departments, agencies, and 
instrumentalities of the Government shall provide assistance 
necessary to carry out this subsection.

Sec. 44904. Domestic air transportation system security

    (a) Assessing Threats.--The Administrator of the Federal 
Aviation Administration and the Director of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation jointly shall assess current and potential 
threats to the domestic air transportation system. The 
assessment shall include consideration of the extent to which 
there are individuals with the capability and intent to carry 
out terrorist or related unlawful acts against that system and 
the ways in which those individuals might carry out those acts. 
The Administrator and the Director jointly shall decide on and 
carry out the most effective method for continuous analysis and 
monitoring of security threats to that system.
    (b) Assessing Security.--In coordination with the Director, 
the Administrator shall carry out periodic threat and 
vulnerability assessments on security at each airport that is 
part of the domestic air transportation system. Each assessment 
shall include consideration of--
          (1) the adequacy of security procedures related to 
        the handling and transportation of checked baggage and 
        cargo;
          (2) space requirements for security personnel and 
        equipment;
          (3) separation of screened and unscreened passengers, 
        baggage, and cargo;
          (4) separation of the controlled and uncontrolled 
        areas of airport facilities; and
          (5) coordination of the activities of security 
        personnel of the Administration, the United States 
        Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization 
        Service, and air carriers, and of other law enforcement 
        personnel.
    (c) Improving Security.--The Administrator shall take 
necessary actions to improve domestic air transportation 
security by correcting any deficiencies in that security 
discovered in the assessments, analyses, and monitoring carried 
out under this section.

Sec. 44905. Information about threats to civil aviation

    (a) Providing Information.--Under guidelines the Secretary 
of Transportation prescribes, an air carrier, airport operator, 
ticket agent, or individual employed by an air carrier, airport 
operator, or ticket agent, receiving information (except a 
communication directed by the United States Government) about a 
threat to civil aviation shall provide the information promptly 
to the Secretary.
    (b) Flight Cancellation.--If a decision is made that a 
particular threat cannot be addressed in a way adequate to 
ensure, to the extent feasible, the safety of passengers and 
crew of a particular flight or series of flights, the 
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall 
cancel the flight or series of flights.
    (c) Guidelines on Public Notice.--(1) The President shall 
develop guidelines for ensuring that public notice is provided 
in appropriate cases about threats to civil aviation. The 
guidelines shall identify officials responsible for--
          (A) deciding, on a case-by-case basis, if public 
        notice of a threat is in the best interest of the 
        United States and the traveling public;
          (B) ensuring that public notice is provided in a 
        timely and effective way, including the use of a toll-
        free telephone number; and
          (C) canceling the departure of a flight or series of 
        flights under subsection (b) of this section.
    (2) The guidelines shall provide for consideration of--
          (A) the specificity of the threat;
          (B) the credibility of intelligence information 
        related to the threat;
          (C) the ability to counter the threat effectively;
          (D) the protection of intelligence information 
        sources and methods;
          (E) cancellation, by an air carrier or the 
        Administrator, of a flight or series of flights instead 
        of public notice;
          (F) the ability of passengers and crew to take steps 
        to reduce the risk to their safety after receiving 
        public notice of a threat; and
          (G) other factors the Administrator considers 
        appropriate.
    (d) Guidelines on Notice to Crews.--The Administrator shall 
develop guidelines for ensuring that notice in appropriate 
cases of threats to the security of an air carrier flight is 
provided to the flight crew and cabin crew of that flight.
    (e) Limitation on Notice to Selective Travelers.--Notice of 
a threat to civil aviation may be provided to selective 
potential travelers only if the threat applies only to those 
travelers.
    (f) Restricting Access to Information.--In cooperation with 
the departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the 
Government that collect, receive, and analyze intelligence 
information related to aviation security, the Administrator 
shall develop procedures to minimize the number of individuals 
who have access to information about threats. However, a 
restriction on access to that information may be imposed only 
if the restriction does not diminish the ability of the 
Government to carry out its duties and powers related to 
aviation security effectively, including providing notice to 
the public and flight and cabin crews under this section.
    (g) Distribution of Guidelines.--The guidelines developed 
under this section shall be distributed for use by appropriate 
officials of the Department of Transportation, the Department 
of State, the Department of Justice, and air carriers.

Sec. 44906.\1\ Foreign air carrier security programs

    The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration 
shall continue in effect the requirement of section 129.25 of 
title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, that a foreign air 
carrier must adopt and use a security program approved by the 
Administrator. The Administrator shall not approve a security 
program of a foreign air carrier under section 129.25, or any 
successor regulation, unless the security program requires the 
foreign air carrier in its operations to and from airports in 
the United States to adhere to the identical security measures 
that the Administrator requires air carriers serving the same 
airports to adhere to. The foregoing requirement shall not be 
interpreted to limit the ability of the Administrator to impose 
additional security measures on a foreign air carrier or an air 
carrier when the Administrator determines that a specific 
threat warrants such additional measures. The Administrator 
shall prescribe regulations to carry out this section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Sec. 322 of Public Law 104-132 (110 Stat. 1254) amended and 
restated sec. 44906.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. Sec. 44907. Security standards at foreign airports

    (a) Assessment.--(1) At intervals the Secretary of 
Transportation considers necessary, the Secretary shall assess 
the effectiveness of the security measures maintained at--
          (A) a foreign airport--
                  (i) served by an air carrier;
                  (ii) from which a foreign air carrier serves 
                the United States; or
                  (iii) that poses a high risk of introducing 
                danger to international air travel; and
          (B) other foreign airports the Secretary considers 
        appropriate.
    (2) The Secretary of Transportation shall conduct an 
assessment under paragraph (1) of this subsection--
          (A) in consultation with appropriate aeronautic 
        authorities of the government of a foreign country 
        concerned and each air carrier serving the foreign 
        airport for which the Secretary is conducting the 
        assessment;
          (B) to establish the extent to which a foreign 
        airport effectively maintains and carries out security 
        measures; and
          (C) by using a standard that will result in an 
        analysis of the security measures at the airport based 
        at least on the standards and appropriate recommended 
        practices contained in Annex 17 to the Convention on 
        International Civil Aviation in effect on the date of 
        the assessment.
    (3) Each report to Congress required under section 44938(b) 
of this title shall contain a summary of the assessments 
conducted under this subsection.
    (b) Consultation.--In carrying out subsection (a) of this 
section, the Secretary of Transportation shall consult with the 
Secretary of State--
          (1) on the terrorist threat that exists in each 
        country; and
          (2) to establish which foreign airports are not under 
        the de facto control of the government of the foreign 
        country in which they are located and pose a high risk 
        of introducing danger to international air travel.
    (c) Notifying Foreign Authorities.--When the Secretary of 
Transportation, after conducting an assessment under subsection 
(a) of this section, decides that an airport does not maintain 
and carry out effective security measures, the Secretary of 
Transportation, after advising the Secretary of State, shall 
notify the appropriate authorities of the government of the 
foreign country of the decision and recommend the steps 
necessary to bring the security measures in use at the airport 
up to the standard used by the Secretary of Transportation in 
making the assessment.
    (d) Actions When Airports Not Maintaining and Carrying Out 
Effective Security Measures.--(1) When the Secretary of 
Transportation decides under this section that an airport does 
not maintain and carry out effective security measures--
          (A) the Secretary of Transportation shall--
                  (i) publish the identity of the airport in 
                the Federal Register;
                  (ii) have the identity of the airport posted 
                and displayed prominently at all United States 
                airports at which scheduled air carrier 
                operations are provided regularly; and
                  (iii) notify the news media of the identity 
                of the airport;
          (B) each air carrier and foreign air carrier 
        providing transportation between the United States and 
        the airport shall provide written notice of the 
        decision, on or with the ticket, to each passenger 
        buying a ticket for transportation between the United 
        States and the airport;
          (C) notwithstanding section 40105(b) of this title, 
        the Secretary of Transportation, after consulting with 
        the appropriate aeronautic authorities of the foreign 
        country concerned and each air carrier serving the 
        airport and with the approval of the Secretary of 
        State, may withhold, revoke, or prescribe conditions on 
        the operating authority of an air carrier or foreign 
        air carrier that uses that airport to provide foreign 
        air transportation; and
          (D) the President may prohibit an air carrier or 
        foreign air carrier from providing transportation 
        between the United States and any other foreign airport 
        that is served by aircraft flying to or from the 
        airport with respect to which a decision is made under 
        this section.
    (2)(A) Paragraph (1) of this subsection becomes effective--
          (i) 90 days after the government of a foreign country 
        is notified under subsection (c) of this section if the 
        Secretary of Transportation finds that the government 
        has not brought the security measures at the airport up 
        to the standard the Secretary used in making an 
        assessment under subsection (a) of this section; or
          (ii) immediately on the decision of the Secretary of 
        Transportation under subsection (c) of this section if 
        the Secretary of Transportation decides, after 
        consulting with the Secretary of State, that a 
        condition exists that threatens the safety or security 
        of passengers, aircraft, or crew traveling to or from 
        the airport.
    (B) The Secretary of Transportation immediately shall 
notify the Secretary of State of a decision under subparagraph 
(A)(ii) of this paragraph so that the Secretary of State may 
issue a travel advisory required under section 44908(a) of this 
title.
    (3) The Secretary of Transportation promptly shall submit 
to Congress a report (and classified annex if necessary) on 
action taken under paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection, 
including information on attempts made to obtain the 
cooperation of the government of a foreign country in meeting 
the standard the Secretary used in assessing the airport under 
subsection (a) of this section.
    (4) An action required under paragraph (1)(A) and (B) of 
this subsection is no longer required only if the Secretary of 
Transportation, in consultation with the Secretary of State, 
decides that effective security measures are maintained and 
carried out at the airport. The Secretary of Transportation 
shall notify Congress when the action is no longer required to 
be taken.
    (e) Suspensions.--Notwithstanding sections 40105(b) and 
40106(b) of this title, the Secretary of Transportation, with 
the approval of the Secretary of State and without notice or a 
hearing, shall suspend the right of an air carrier or foreign 
air carrier to provide foreign air transportation, and the 
right of a person to operate aircraft in foreign air commerce, 
to or from a foreign airport when the Secretary of 
Transportation decides that--
          (1) a condition exists that threatens the safety or 
        security of passengers, aircraft, or crew traveling to 
        or from that airport; and
          (2) the public interest requires an immediate 
        suspension of transportation between the United States 
        and that airport.
    (f) Condition of Carrier Authority.--This section is a 
condition to authority the Secretary of Transportation grants 
under this part to an air carrier or foreign air carrier.

Sec. 44908. Travel advisory and suspension of foreign assistance

    (a) Travel Advisories.--On being notified by the Secretary 
of Transportation that the Secretary of Transportation has 
decided under section 44907(d)(2)(A)(ii) of this title that a 
condition exists that threatens the safety or security of 
passengers, aircraft, or crew traveling to or from a foreign 
airport that the Secretary of Transportation has decided under 
section 44907 of this title does not maintain and carry out 
effective security measures, the Secretary of State--
          (1) immediately shall issue a travel advisory for 
        that airport;
          (2) shall publish the advisory in the Federal 
        Register; and
          (3) shall publicize the advisory widely.
    (b) Suspended Assistance.--The President shall suspend 
assistance provided under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
(22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) or the Arms Export Control Act (22 
U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) to a country in which is located an 
airport with respect to which section 44907(d)(1) of this title 
becomes effective if the Secretary of State decides the country 
is a high terrorist threat country. The President may waive 
this subsection if the President decides, and reports to 
Congress, that the waiver is required because of national 
security interests or a humanitarian emergency.
    (c) Actions No Longer Required.--An action required under 
this section is no longer required only if the Secretary of 
Transportation has made a decision as provided under section 
44907(d)(4) of this title. The Secretary shall notify Congress 
when the action is no longer required to be taken.

Sec. 44910. Agreements on aircraft sabotage, aircraft hijacking, and 
                    airport security

    The Secretary of State shall seek multilateral and 
bilateral agreement on strengthening enforcement measures and 
standards for compliance related to aircraft sabotage, aircraft 
hijacking, and airport security.

Sec. 44911. Intelligence

    (a) Definition.--In this section, ``intelligence 
community'' means the intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities of the following units of the United States 
Government:
          (1) the Department of State.
          (2) the Department of Defense.
          (3) the Department of the Treasury.
          (4) the Department of Energy.
          (5) the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
          (6) the Central Intelligence Agency.
          (7) the National Security Agency.
          (8) the Defense Intelligence Agency.
          (9) the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
          (10) the Drug Enforcement Administration.
    (b) Policies and Procedures on Report Availability.--The 
head of each unit in the intelligence community shall prescribe 
policies and procedures to ensure that intelligence reports 
about international terrorism are made available, as 
appropriate, to the heads of other units in the intelligence 
community, the Secretary of Transportation, and the 
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration.
    (c) Unit for Strategic Planning on Terrorism.--The heads of 
the units in the intelligence community shall consider placing 
greater emphasis on strategic intelligence efforts by 
establishing a unit for strategic planning on terrorism.
    (d) Designation of Intelligence Officer.--At the request of 
the Secretary, the Director of Central Intelligence shall 
designate at least one intelligence officer of the Central 
Intelligence Agency to serve in a senior position in the Office 
of the Secretary.
    (e) Written Working Agreements.--The heads of units in the 
intelligence community, the Secretary, and the Administrator 
shall review and, as appropriate, revise written working 
agreements between the intelligence community and the 
Administrator.

Sec. 44912. Research and development

    (a) Program Requirement.--(1) The Administrator of the 
Federal Aviation Administration shall establish and carry out a 
program to accelerate and expand the research, development, and 
implementation of technologies and procedures to counteract 
terrorist acts against civil aviation. The program shall 
provide for developing and having in place, not later than 
November 16, 1993, new equipment and procedures necessary to 
meet the technological challenges presented by terrorism. The 
program shall include research on, and development of, 
technological improvements and ways to enhance human 
performance.
    (2) In designing and carrying out the program established 
under this subsection, the Administrator shall--
          (A) consult and coordinate activities with other 
        departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the 
        United States Government doing similar research;
          (B) identify departments, agencies, and 
        instrumentalities that would benefit from that 
        research; and
          (C) seek cost-sharing agreements with those 
        departments, agencies, and instrumentalities.
    (3) In carrying out the program established under this 
subsection, the Administrator shall review and consider the 
annual reports the Secretary of Transportation submits to 
Congress on transportation security and intelligence.
    (4) The Administrator may--
          (A) make grants to institutions of higher learning 
        and other appropriate research facilities with 
        demonstrated ability to carry out research described in 
        paragraph (1) of this subsection, and fix the amounts 
        and terms of the grants; and
          (B) make cooperative agreements with governmental 
        authorities the Administrator decides are appropriate.
    (b) Review of Threats.--(1) The Administrator shall 
complete an intensive review of threats to civil aviation, with 
particular focus on--
          (A) explosive material that presents the most 
        significant threat to civil aircraft;
          (B) the minimum amounts, configurations, and types of 
        explosive material that can cause, or would reasonably 
        be expected to cause, catastrophic damage to commercial 
        aircraft in service and expected to be in service in 
        the 10-year period beginning on November 16, 1990;
          (C) the amounts, configurations, and types of 
        explosive material that can be detected reliably by 
        existing, or reasonably anticipated, near-term 
        explosive detection technologies;
          (D) the feasibility of using various ways to minimize 
        damage caused by explosive material that cannot be 
        detected reliably by existing, or reasonably 
        anticipated, near-term explosive detection 
        technologies;
          (E) the ability to screen passengers, carry-on 
        baggage, checked baggage, and cargo; and
          (F) the technologies that might be used in the future 
        to attempt to destroy or otherwise threaten commercial 
        aircraft and the way in which those technologies can be 
        countered effectively.
    (2) The Administrator shall use the results of the review 
under this subsection to develop the focus and priorities of 
the program established under subsection (a) of this section.
    (c) Scientific Advisory Panel.--The Administrator shall 
establish a scientific advisory panel, as a subcommittee of the 
Research, Engineering and Development Advisory Committee, to 
review, comment on, advise on the progress of, and recommend 
modifications in, the program established under subsection (a) 
of this section, including the need for long-range research 
programs to detect and prevent catastrophic damage to 
commercial aircraft by the next generation of terrorist 
weapons. The panel shall consist of individuals with scientific 
and technical expertise in--
          (1) the development and testing of effective 
        explosive detection systems;
          (2) aircraft structure and experimentation to decide 
        on the type and minimum weights of explosives that an 
        effective technology must be capable of detecting;
          (3) technologies involved in minimizing airframe 
        damage to aircraft from explosives; and
          (4) other scientific and technical areas the 
        Administrator considers appropriate.

Sec. 44913. Explosive detection

    (a) Deployment and Purchase of Equipment.--(1) A deployment 
or purchase of explosive detection equipment under section 
108.7(b)(8) or 108.20 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, 
or similar regulation is required only if the Administrator of 
the Federal Aviation Administration certifies that the 
equipment alone, or as part of an integrated system, can detect 
under realistic air carrier operating conditions the amounts, 
configurations, and types of explosive material that would 
likely be used to cause catastrophic damage to commercial 
aircraft. The Administrator shall base the certification on the 
results of tests conducted under protocols developed in 
consultation with expert scientists outside of the 
Administration. Those tests shall be completed not later than 
April 16, 1992.
    (2) Before completion of the tests described in paragraph 
(1) of this subsection, but not later than April 16, 1992, the 
Administrator may require deployment of explosive detection 
equipment described in paragraph (1) if the Administrator 
decides that deployment will enhance aviation security 
significantly. In making that decision, the Administrator shall 
consider factors such as the ability of the equipment alone, or 
as part of an integrated system, to detect under realistic air 
carrier operating conditions the amounts, configurations, and 
types of explosive material that would likely be used to cause 
catastrophic damage to commercial aircraft. The Administrator 
shall notify the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation of the Senate and the Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure \2\ of the House of 
Representatives of a deployment decision made under this 
paragraph.
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    \2\ Sec. 5(9) of Public Law 104-287 (110 Stat. 3389) struck out 
``Public Works and Transportation'' and inserted in lieu thereof 
``Transportation and Infrastructure''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (3) \3\ Until such time as the Administrator determines 
that equipment certified under paragraph (1) is commercially 
available and has successfully completed operational testing as 
provided in paragraph (1), the Administrator shall facilitate 
the deployment of such approved commercially available 
explosive detection devices as the Administrator determines 
will enhance aviation security significantly. The Administrator 
shall require that equipment deployed under this paragraph be 
replaced by equipment certified under paragraph (1) when 
equipment certified under paragraph (1) becomes commercially 
available. The Administrator is authorized , based on 
operational considerations at individual airports, to waive the 
required installation of commercially available equipment under 
paragraph (1) in the interests of aviation security. The 
Administrator may permit the requirements of this paragraph to 
be met at airports by the deployment of dogs or other 
appropriate animals to supplement equipment for screening 
passengers, baggage, mail, or cargo for explosives or weapons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Sec. 305(a) of Public Law 104-264 (110 Stat. 3252) redesignated 
para. (3) as para. (4), and added a new para. (3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (4) \3\ This subsection does not prohibit the Administrator 
from purchasing or deploying explosive detection equipment 
described in paragraph (1) of this subsection.
    (b) Grants.--The Secretary of Transportation may provide 
grants to continue the Explosive Detection K-9 Team Training 
Program to detect explosives at airports and on aircraft.

Sec. 44914. Airport construction guidelines

    In consultation with air carriers, airport authorities, and 
others the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration 
considers appropriate, the Administrator shall develop 
guidelines for airport design and construction to allow for 
maximum security enhancement. In developing the guidelines, the 
Administrator shall consider the results of the assessment 
carried out under section 44904(a) of this title.

Sec. 44915. Exemptions

    The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration 
may exempt from sections 44901, 44903(a)-(c) and (e), 44906, 
44935, and 44936 of this title airports in Alaska served only 
by air carriers that--
          (1) hold certificates issued under section 41102 of 
        this title;
          (2) operate aircraft with certificates for a maximum 
        gross takeoff weight of less than 12,500 pounds; and
          (3) board passengers, or load property intended to be 
        carried in an aircraft cabin, that will be screened 
        under section 44901 of this title at another airport in 
        Alaska before the passengers board, or the property is 
        loaded on, an aircraft for a place outside Alaska.

Sec. 44916.\4\ Assessments and evaluations

    (a) Periodic Assessments.--The Administrator shall require 
each air carrier and airport (including the airport owner or 
operator in cooperation with the air carriers and vendors 
serving each airport) that provides for intrastate, interstate, 
or foreign air transportation to conduct periodic vulnerability 
assessments of the security systems of that air carrier or 
airport, respectively. The Administration shall perform 
periodic audits of such assessments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Sec. 312(a) of Public Law 104-264 (110 Stat. 3254) added sec. 
44916.
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    (b) Investigations.--The Administrator shall conduct 
periodic and unannounced inspections of security systems of 
airports and air carriers to determine the effectiveness and 
vulnerabilities of such systems. To the extent allowable by 
law, the Administrator may provide for anonymous tests of those 
security systems.

              subchapter ii--administration and personnel

Sec. 44931. Director of Intelligence and Security

    (a) Organization.--There is in the Office of the Secretary 
of Transportation a Director of Intelligence and Security. The 
Director reports directly to the Secretary.
    (b) Duties and Powers.--The Director shall--
          (1) receive, assess, and distribute intelligence 
        information related to long-term transportation 
        security;
          (2) develop policies, strategies, and plans for 
        dealing with threats to transportation security;
          (3) make other plans related to transportation 
        security, including coordinating countermeasures with 
        appropriate departments, agencies, and 
        instrumentalities of the United States Government;
          (4) serve as the primary liaison of the Secretary to 
        the intelligence and law enforcement communities; and
          (5) carry out other duties and powers the Secretary 
        decides are necessary to ensure, to the extent 
        possible, the security of the traveling public.

Sec. 44932. Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security

    (a) Organization.--There is an Assistant Administrator for 
Civil Aviation Security. The Assistant Administrator reports 
directly to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation 
Administration and is subject to the authority of the 
Administrator.
    (b) Duties and Powers.--The Assistant Administrator shall--
          (1) on a day-to-day basis, manage and provide 
        operational guidance to the field security resources of 
        the Administration, including Federal Security Managers 
        as provided by section 44933 of this title;
          (2) enforce security-related requirements;
          (3) identify the research and development 
        requirements of security-related activities;
          (4) inspect security systems;
          (5) report information to the Director of 
        Intelligence and Security that may be necessary to 
        allow the Director to carry out assigned duties and 
        powers;
          (6) assess threats to civil aviation; and
          (7) carry out other duties and powers the 
        Administrator considers appropriate.
    (c) Review and Development of Ways To Strengthen 
Security.--The Assistant Administrator shall review and, as 
necessary, develop ways to strengthen air transportation 
security, including ways--
          (1) to strengthen controls over checked baggage in 
        air transportation, including ways to ensure baggage 
        reconciliation and inspection of items in passenger 
        baggage that could potentially contain explosive 
        devices;
          (2) to strengthen control over individuals having 
        access to aircraft;
          (3) to improve testing of security systems;
          (4) to ensure the use of the best available x-ray 
        equipment for air transportation security purposes; and
          (5) to strengthen preflight screening of passengers.

Sec. 44933. Federal Security Managers

    (a) Establishment, Designation, and Stationing.--The 
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall 
establish the position of Federal Security Manager at each 
airport in the United States at which the Administrator decides 
a Manager is necessary for air transportation security. The 
Administrator shall designate individuals as Managers for, and 
station those Managers at, those airports. The Administrator 
may designate a current field employee of the Administration as 
a Manager. A Manager reports directly to the Assistant 
Administrator for Civil Aviation Security. The Administrator 
shall station an individual as Manager at each airport in the 
United States that the Secretary of Transportation designates 
as a category X airport.
    (b) Duties and Powers.--The Manager at each airport shall--
          (1) receive intelligence information related to 
        aviation security;
          (2) ensure, and assist in, the development of a 
        comprehensive security plan for the airport that--
                  (A) establishes the responsibilities of each 
                air carrier and airport operator for air 
                transportation security at the airport; and
                  (B) includes measures to be taken during 
                periods of normal airport operations and during 
                periods when the Manager decides that there is 
                a need for additional airport security, and 
                identifies the individuals responsible for 
                carrying out those measures;
          (3) oversee and enforce the carrying out by air 
        carriers and airport operators of United States 
        Government security requirements, including the 
        security plan under clause (2) of this subsection;
          (4) serve as the on-site coordinator of the 
        Administrator's response to terrorist incidents and 
        threats at the airport;
          (5) coordinate the day-to-day Government aviation 
        security activities at the airport;
          (6) coordinate efforts related to aviation security 
        with local law enforcement; and
          (7) coordinate activities with other Managers.
    (c) Limitation.--A Civil Aviation Security Field Officer 
may not be assigned security duties and powers at an airport 
having a Manager.

Sec. 44934. Foreign Security Liaison Officers

    (a) Establishment, Designation, and Stationing.--The 
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall 
establish the position of Foreign Security Liaison Officer for 
each airport outside the United States at which the 
Administrator decides an Officer is necessary for air 
transportation security. In coordination with the Secretary of 
State, the Administrator shall designate an Officer for each of 
those airports. In coordination with the Secretary, the 
Administrator shall designate an Officer for each of those 
airports where extraordinary security measures are in place. 
The Secretary shall give high priority to stationing those 
Officers.
    (b) Duties and Powers.--An Officer reports directly to the 
Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security. The 
Officer at each airport shall--
          (1) serve as the liaison of the Assistant 
        Administrator to foreign security authorities 
        (including governments of foreign countries and foreign 
        airport authorities) in carrying out United States 
        Government security requirements at that airport; and
          (2) to the extent practicable, carry out duties and 
        powers referred to in section 44933(b) of this title.
    (c) Coordination of Activities.--The activities of each 
Officer shall be coordinated with the chief of the diplomatic 
mission of the United States to which the Officer is assigned. 
Activities of an Officer under this section shall be consistent 
with the duties and powers of the Secretary and the chief of 
mission to a foreign country under section 103 of the Omnibus 
Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 (22 U.S.C. 
4802) and section 207 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 
U.S.C. 3927).

Sec. 44935. Employment standards and training

    (a) Employment Standards.--The Administrator of the Federal 
Aviation Administration shall prescribe standards for the 
employment and continued employment of, and contracting for, 
air carrier personnel and, as appropriate, airport security 
personnel. The standards shall include--
          (1) minimum training requirements for new employees;
          (2) retraining requirements;
          (3) minimum staffing levels;
          (4) minimum language skills; and
          (5) minimum education levels for employees, when 
        appropriate.
    (b) Review and Recommendations.--In coordination with air 
carriers, airport operators, and other interested persons, the 
Administrator shall review issues related to human performance 
in the aviation security system to maximize that performance. 
When the review is completed, the Administrator shall recommend 
guidelines and prescribe appropriate changes in existing 
procedures to improve that performance.
    (c) Security Program Training, Standards, and 
Qualifications.--(1) The Administrator--
          (A) may train individuals employed to carry out a 
        security program under section 44903(c) of this title; 
        and
          (B) shall prescribe uniform training standards and 
        uniform minimum qualifications for individuals eligible 
        for that training.
    (2) The Administrator may authorize reimbursement for 
travel, transportation, and subsistence expenses for security 
training of non-United States Government domestic and foreign 
individuals whose services will contribute significantly to 
carrying out civil aviation security programs. To the extent 
practicable, air travel reimbursed under this paragraph shall 
be on air carriers.
    (d) Education and Training Standards for Security 
Coordinators, Supervisory Personnel, and Pilots.--(1) The 
Administrator shall prescribe standards for educating and 
training--
          (A) ground security coordinators;
          (B) security supervisory personnel; and
          (C) airline pilots as in-flight security 
        coordinators.
    (2) The standards shall include initial training, 
retraining, and continuing education requirements and methods. 
Those requirements and methods shall be used annually to 
measure the performance of ground security coordinators and 
security supervisory personnel.

Sec. 44936. Employment investigations and restrictions

    (a) Employment Investigation Requirement.--(1)(A) \5\ The 
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall 
require by regulation that an employment investigation, 
including a criminal history record check, shall be conducted, 
as the Administrator decides is necessary to ensure air 
transportation security, of each individual employed in, or 
applying for, a position in which the individual has unescorted 
access, or may permit other individuals to have unescorted 
access, to--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Sec. 304(a) of Public Law 104-264 (110 Stat. 3251) redesignated 
subparas. (A) and (B) as clauses (i) and (ii), added new subpara. 
designation (A) in para. (1), and added a new subparas. (B), (C), and 
(D).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (i) aircraft of an air carrier or foreign air 
        carrier; or
          (ii) a secured area of an airport in the United 
        States the Administrator designates that serves an air 
        carrier or foreign air carrier.
    (B) The Administrator shall require by regulation that an 
employment investigation (including a criminal history record 
check in any case described in subparagraph (C)) be conducted 
for--
          (i) individuals who will be responsible for screening 
        passengers or property under section 44901 of this 
        title;
          (ii) supervisors of the individuals described in 
        clause (i); and
          (iii) such other individuals who exercise security 
        functions associated with baggage or cargo, as the 
        Administrator determines is necessary to ensure air 
        transportation security.
    (C) Under the regulations issued under subparagraph (B), a 
criminal history record check shall be conducted in any case in 
which--
          (i) an employment investigation reveals a gap in 
        employment of 12 months or more that the individual who 
        is the subject of the investigation does not 
        satisfactorily account for;
          (ii) such individual is unable to support statements 
        made on the application of such individual;
          (iii) there are significant inconsistencies in the 
        information provided on the application of such 
        individual; or
          (iv) information becomes available during the 
        employment investigation indicating a possible 
        conviction for one of the crimes listed in subsection 
        (b)(1)(B).
    (D) If an individual requires a criminal history record 
check under subparagraph (C), the individual may be employed as 
a screener until the check is completed if the individual is 
subject to supervision.
    (2) An air carrier, foreign air carrier, or airport 
operator that employs, or authorizes or makes a contract for 
the services of, an individual in a position described in 
paragraph (1) of this subsection shall ensure that the 
investigation the Administrator requires is conducted.
    (3) \6\ The Administrator shall provide for the periodic 
audit of the effectiveness of criminal history record checks 
conducted under paragraph (1) of this subsection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Sec. 306 of Public Law 104-264 (110 Stat. 3252) added para. 
(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Prohibited Employment.--(1) Except as provided in 
paragraph (3) of this subsection, an air carrier, foreign air 
carrier, or airport operator may not employ, or authorize or 
make a contract for the services of, an individual in a 
position described in subsection (a)(1) of this section if--
          (A) the investigation of the individual required 
        under this section has not been conducted; or
          (B) the results of that investigation establish that, 
        in the 10-year period ending on the date of the 
        investigation, the individual was convicted of--
                  (i) a crime referred to in section 46306, 
                46308, 46312, 46314, or 46315 or chapter 465 of 
                this title or section 32 of title 18;
                  (ii) murder;
                  (iii) assault with intent to murder;
                  (iv) espionage;
                  (v) sedition;
                  (vi) treason;
                  (vii) rape;
                  (viii) kidnapping;
                  (ix) unlawful possession, sale, distribution, 
                or manufacture of an explosive or weapon;
                  (x) extortion;
                  (xi) armed robbery;
                  (xii) distribution of, or intent to 
                distribute, a controlled substance; or
                  (xiii) conspiracy to commit any of the acts 
                referred to in clauses (i)-(xii) of this 
                paragraph.
    (2) The Administrator may specify other factors that are 
sufficient to prohibit the employment of an individual in a 
position described in subsection (a)(1) of this section.
    (3) An air carrier, foreign air carrier, or airport 
operator may employ, or authorize or contract for the services 
of, an individual in a position described in subsection (a)(1) 
of this section without carrying out the investigation required 
under this section, if the Administrator approves a plan to 
employ the individual that provides alternate security 
arrangements.
    (c) Fingerprinting and Record Check Information.--(1) If 
the Administrator requires an identification and criminal 
history record check, to be conducted by the Attorney General, 
as part of an investigation under this section, the 
Administrator shall designate an individual to obtain 
fingerprints and submit those fingerprints to the Attorney 
General. The Attorney General may make the results of a check 
available to an individual the Administrator designates. Before 
designating an individual to obtain and submit fingerprints or 
receive results of a check, the Administrator shall consult 
with the Attorney General.
    (2) The Administrator shall prescribe regulations on--
          (A) procedures for taking fingerprints; and
          (B) requirements for using information received from 
        the Attorney General under paragraph (1) of this 
        subsection--
                  (i) to limit the dissemination of the 
                information; and
                  (ii) to ensure that the information is used 
                only to carry out this section.
    (3) If an identification and criminal history record check 
is conducted as part of an investigation of an individual under 
this section, the individual--
          (A) shall receive a copy of any record received from 
        the Attorney General; and
          (B) may complete and correct the information 
        contained in the check before a final employment 
        decision is made based on the check.
    (d) Fees and Charges.--The Administrator and the Attorney 
General shall establish reasonable fees and charges to pay 
expenses incurred in carrying out this section. The employer of 
the individual being investigated shall pay the costs of a 
record check of the individual. Money collected under this 
section shall be credited to the account in the Treasury from 
which the expenses were incurred and are available to the 
Administrator and the Attorney General for those expenses.
    (e) When Investigation or Record Check Not Required.--This 
section does not require an investigation or record check when 
the investigation or record check is prohibited by a law of a 
foreign country.
    (f) \7\ Records of Employment of Pilot Applicants.--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Sec. 502(a) of Public Law 104-264 (110 Stat. 3259) added 
subsecs. (f) through (h).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) In general.--Before hiring an individual as a 
        pilot, an air carrier shall request and receive the 
        following information:
                  (A) FAA records.--From the Administrator of 
                the Federal Aviation Administration, records 
                pertaining to the individual that are 
                maintained by the Administrator concerning--
                          (i) current airman certificates 
                        (including airman medical certificates) 
                        and associated type ratings, including 
                        any limitations to those certificates 
                        and ratings; and
                          (ii) summaries of legal enforcement 
                        actions resulting in a finding by the 
                        Administrator of a violation of this 
                        title or a regulation prescribed or 
                        order issued under this title that was 
                        not subsequently overturned.
                  (B) Air carrier and other records.--From any 
                air carrier or other person that has employed 
                the individual at any time during the 5-year 
                period preceding the date of the employment 
                application of the individual, or from the 
                trustee in bankruptcy for such air carrier or 
                person--
                          (i) records pertaining to the 
                        individual that are maintained by an 
                        air carrier (other than records 
                        relating to flight time, duty time, or 
                        rest time) under regulations set forth 
                        in--
                                  (I) section 121.683 of title 
                                14, Code of Federal 
                                Regulations;
                                  (II) paragraph (A) of section 
                                VI, appendix I, part 121 of 
                                such title;
                                  (III) paragraph (A) of 
                                section IV, appendix J, part 
                                121 of such title;
                                  (IV) section 125.401 of such 
                                title; and
                                  (V) section 135.63(a)(4) of 
                                such title; and
                          (ii) other records pertaining to the 
                        individual that are maintained by the 
                        air carrier or person concerning--
                                  (I) the training, 
                                qualifications, proficiency, or 
                                professional competence of the 
                                individual, including comments 
                                and evaluations made by a check 
                                airman designated in accordance 
                                with section 121.411, 125.295, 
                                or 135.337 of such title;
                                  (II) any disciplinary action 
                                taken with respect to the 
                                individual that was not 
                                subsequently overturned; and
                                  (III) any release from 
                                employment or resignation, 
                                termination, or 
                                disqualification with respect 
                                to employment.
                  (C) National driver register records.--In 
                accordance with section 30305(b)(7), from the 
                chief driver licensing official of a State, 
                information concerning the motor vehicle 
                driving record of the individual.
          (2) Written consent; release from liability.--An air 
        carrier making a request for records under paragraph 
        (1)--
                  (A) shall be required to obtain written 
                consent to the release of those records from 
                the individual that is the subject of the 
                records requested; and
                  (B) may, notwithstanding any other provision 
                of law or agreement to the contrary, require 
                the individual who is the subject of the 
                records to request to execute a release from 
                liability for any claim arising from the 
                furnishing of such records to or the use of 
                such records by such air carrier (other than a 
                claim arising from furnishing information known 
                to be false and maintained in violation of a 
                criminal statute).
          (3) 5-year reporting period.--A person shall not 
        furnish a record in response to a request made under 
        paragraph (1) if the record was entered more than 5 
        years before the date of the request, unless the 
        information concerns a revocation or suspension of an 
        airman certificate or motor vehicle license that is in 
        effect on the date of the request.
          (4) Requirement to maintain records.--The 
        Administrator shall maintain pilot records described in 
        paragraph (1)(A) for a period of at least 5 years.
          (5) Receipt of consent; provision of information.--A 
        person shall not furnish a record in response to a 
        request made under paragraph (1) without first 
        obtaining a copy of the written consent of the 
        individual who is the subject of the records requested. 
        A person who receives a request for records under this 
        paragraph shall furnish a copy of all of such requested 
        records maintained by the person not later than 30 days 
        after receiving the request.
          (6) Right to receive notice and copy of any record 
        furnished.--A person who receives a request for records 
        under paragraph (1) shall provide to the individual who 
        is the subject of the records--
                  (A) on or before the 20th day following the 
                date of receipt of the request, written notice 
                of the request and of the individual's right to 
                receive a copy of such records; and
                  (B) in accordance with paragraph (10), a copy 
                of such records, if requested by the 
                individual.
          (7) Reasonable charges for processing requests and 
        furnishing copies.--A person who receives a request 
        under paragraph (1) or (6) may establish a reasonable 
        charge for the cost of processing the request and 
        furnishing copies of the requested records.
          (8) Standard forms.--The Administrator shall 
        promulgate--
                  (A) standard forms that may be used by an air 
                carrier to request records under paragraph (1); 
                and
                  (B) standard forms that may be used by an air 
                carrier to--
                          (i) obtain the written consent of the 
                        individual who is the subject of a 
                        request under paragraph (1); and
                          (ii) inform the individual of--
                                  (I) the request; and
                                  (II) the individual right of 
                                that individual to receive a 
                                copy of any records furnished 
                                in response to the request.
          (9) Right to correct inaccuracies.--An air carrier 
        that maintains or requests and receives the records of 
        an individual under paragraph (1) shall provide the 
        individual with a reasonable opportunity to submit 
        written comments to correct any inaccuracies contained 
        in the records before making a final hiring decision 
        with respect to the individual.
          (10) Right of pilot to review certain records.--
        Notwithstanding any other provision of law or 
        agreement, an air carrier shall, upon written request 
        from a pilot employed by such carrier, make available, 
        within a reasonable time of the request, to the pilot 
        for review, any and all employment records referred to 
        in paragraph (1)(B) (i) or (ii) pertaining to the 
        employment of the pilot.
          (11) Privacy protections.--An air carrier that 
        receives the records of an individual under paragraph 
        (1) may use such records only to assess the 
        qualifications of the individual in deciding whether or 
        not to hire the individual as a pilot. The air carrier 
        shall take such actions as may be necessary to protect 
        the privacy of the pilot and the confidentiality of the 
        records, including ensuring that information contained 
        in the records is not divulged to any individual that 
        is not directly involved in the hiring decision.
          (12) Periodic review.--Not later than 18 months after 
        the date of the enactment of the Pilot Records 
        Improvement Act of 1996, and at least once every 3 
        years thereafter, the Administrator shall transmit to 
        Congress a statement that contains, taking into account 
        recent developments in the aviation industry--
                  (A) recommendations by the Administrator 
                concerning proposed changes to Federal Aviation 
                Administration records, air carrier records, 
                and other records required to be furnished 
                under subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph 
                (1); or
                  (B) reasons why the Administrator does not 
                recommend any proposed changes to the records 
                referred to in subparagraph (A).
          (13) Regulations.--The Administrator may prescribe 
        such regulations as may be necessary--
                  (A) to protect--
                          (i) the personal privacy of any 
                        individual whose records are requested 
                        under paragraph (1); and
                          (ii) the confidentiality of those 
                        records;
                  (B) to preclude the further dissemination of 
                records received under paragraph (1) by the 
                person who requested those records; and
                  (C) to ensure prompt compliance with any 
                request made under paragraph (1).
    (g) Limitation on Liability; Preemption of State Law.--
          (1) Limitation on liability.--No action or proceeding 
        may be brought by or on behalf of an individual who has 
        applied for or is seeking a position with an air 
        carrier as a pilot and who has signed a release from 
        liability, as provided for under paragraph (2), 
        against--
                  (A) the air carrier requesting the records of 
                that individual under subsection (f)(1);
                  (B) a person who has complied with such 
                request;
                  (C) a person who has entered information 
                contained in the individual's records; or
                  (D) an agent or employee of a person 
                described in subparagraph (A) or (B);
        in the nature of an action for defamation, invasion of 
        privacy, negligence, interference with contract, or 
        otherwise, or under any Federal or State law with 
        respect to the furnishing or use of such records in 
        accordance with subsection (f).
          (2) Preemption.--No State or political subdivision 
        thereof may enact, prescribe, issue, continue in 
        effect, or enforce any law (including any regulation, 
        standard, or other provision having the force and 
        effect of law) that prohibits, penalizes, or imposes 
        liability for furnishing or using records in accordance 
        with subsection (f).
          (3) Provision of knowingly false information.--
        Paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not apply with respect to 
        a person who furnishes information in response to a 
        request made under subsection (f)(1), that--
                  (A) the person knows is false; and
                  (B) was maintained in violation of a criminal 
                statute of the United States.
    (h) Limitation of Statutory Construction.--Nothing in 
subsection (f) shall be construed as precluding the 
availability of the records of a pilot in an investigation or 
other proceeding concerning an accident or incident conducted 
by the Administrator, the National Transportation Safety Board, 
or a court.

Sec. 44937. Prohibition on transferring duties and powers

    Except as specifically provided by law, the Administrator 
of the Federal Aviation Administration may not transfer a duty 
or power under section 44903(a), (b), (c), or (e), 44906,\8\ 
44912, 44935, 44936, or 44938(b)(3) of this title to another 
department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States 
Government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Sec. 6(57) of Public Law 103-429 (108 Stat. 4385) struck out 
``44906(a) or (b)'' and inserted in lieu thereof ``44906''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 44938. Reports

    (a) Transportation Security.--Not later than March 31 \9\ 
of each year, the Secretary of Transportation shall submit to 
Congress a report on transportation security with 
recommendations the Secretary considers appropriate. The report 
shall be prepared in conjunction with the biennial \10\ report 
the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration 
submits under subsection (b) of this section in each year the 
Administrator submits the biennial report,\10\ but may not 
duplicate the information submitted under subsection (b) or 
section 44907(a)(3) of this title. The Secretary may submit the 
report in classified and unclassified parts. The report shall 
include--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Sec. 502 of Public Law 103-305 (108 Stat. 1595) struck out 
``December 31'' and inserted ``March 31''.
    \10\ Sec. 1502 of Public Law 105-362 (112 Stat. 3295) struck out 
``annual'' and inserted ``biennial''; inserted ``in each year the 
Administrator submits the biennial report''; struck out ``annually'' 
and inserted ``biennially''; and struck out subsection (c). Subsec. (c) 
formerly required the submission of an annual report on the 
implementation of section 44904 of this title.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) an assessment of trends and developments in 
        terrorist activities, methods, and other threats to 
        transportation;
          (2) an evaluation of deployment of explosive 
        detection devices;
          (3) recommendations for research, engineering, and 
        development activities related to transportation 
        security, except research engineering and development 
        activities related to aviation security to the extent 
        those activities are covered by the national aviation 
        research plan required under section 44501(c) of this 
        title;
          (4) identification and evaluation of cooperative 
        efforts with other departments, agencies, and 
        instrumentalities of the United States Government;
          (5) an evaluation of cooperation with foreign 
        transportation and security authorities;
          (6) the status of the extent to which the 
        recommendations of the President's Commission on 
        Aviation Security and Terrorism have been carried out 
        and the reasons for any delay in carrying out those 
        recommendations;
          (7) a summary of the activities of the Director of 
        Intelligence and Security in the 12-month period ending 
        on the date of the report;
          (8) financial and staffing requirements of the 
        Director;
          (9) an assessment of financial and staffing 
        requirements, and attainment of existing staffing 
        goals, for carrying out duties and powers of the 
        Administrator related to security; and
          (10) appropriate legislative and regulatory 
        recommendations.
    (b) Screening and Foreign Air Carrier and Airport 
Security.--The Administrator shall submit biennially \10\ to 
Congress a report--
          (1) on the effectiveness of procedures under section 
        44901 of this title;
          (2) that includes a summary of the assessments 
        conducted under section 44907(a)(1) and (2) of this 
        title; and
          (3) that includes an assessment of the steps being 
        taken, and the progress being made, in ensuring 
        compliance with section 44906 of this title for each 
        foreign air carrier security program at airports 
        outside the United States--
                  (A) at which the Administrator decides that 
                Foreign Security Liaison Officers are necessary 
                for air transportation security; and
                  (B) for which extraordinary security measures 
                are in place.
    (c) \10\* * *

            2. Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996

   Partial text of Public Law 104-264, [H.R. 3539], 110 Stat. 3213, 
                        approved October 9, 1996

 AN ACT To amend title 49, United States Code, to reauthorize programs 
    of the Federal Aviation Administration, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Federal 
Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996''.
    (b) Table of Contents.--

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                      TITLE III--AVIATION SECURITY

Sec. 301. Report including proposed legislation on funding for airport 
    security.
Sec. 302. Certification of screening companies.
Sec. 303. Weapons and explosive detection study.
Sec. 304. Requirement for criminal history records checks.
Sec. 305. Interim deployment of commercially available explosive 
    detection equipment.
Sec. 306. Audit of performance of background checks for certain 
    personnel.
Sec. 307. Passenger profiling.
Sec. 308. Authority to use certain funds for airport security programs 
    and activities.
Sec. 309. Development of aviation security liaison agreement.
Sec. 310. Regular joint threat assessments.
Sec. 311. Baggage match report.
Sec. 312. Enhanced security programs.
Sec. 313. Report on air cargo.
Sec. 314. Sense of the Senate regarding acts of international 
    terrorism.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS TO TITLE 49, UNITED STATES CODE.

    Except as otherwise specifically provided, whenever in this 
Act an amendment or repeal is expressed in terms of an 
amendment to, or repeal of, a section or other provision of 
law, the reference shall be considered to be made to a section 
or other provision of title 49, United States Code.

SEC. 3. APPLICABILITY.

    (a) In General.--Except as otherwise specifically provided, 
this Act and the amendments made by this Act apply only to 
fiscal years beginning after September 30, 1996.
    (b) Limitation on Statutory Construction.--Nothing in this 
Act or any amendment made by this Act shall be construed as 
affecting funds made available for a fiscal year ending before 
October 1, 1996.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                      TITLE III--AVIATION SECURITY


SEC. 301. REPORT INCLUDING PROPOSED LEGISLATION ON FUNDING FOR AIRPORT 
                    SECURITY.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the Federal 
Aviation Administration, in cooperation with other appropriate 
persons, shall conduct a study and submit to Congress a report 
on whether, and if so how, to transfer certain responsibilities 
of air carriers under Federal law for security activities 
conducted onsite at commercial service airports to airport 
operators or to the Federal Government or to provide for shared 
responsibilities between air carriers and airport operators or 
the Federal Government.
    (b) Contents of Report.--The report submitted under this 
section shall--
          (1) examine potential sources of Federal and non-
        Federal revenue that may be used to fund security 
        activities, including providing grants from funds 
        received as fees collected under a fee system 
        established under subtitle C of title II of this Act 
        and the amendments made by that subtitle; and
          (2) provide legislative proposals, if necessary, for 
        accomplishing the transfer of responsibilities referred 
        to in subsection (a).

SEC. 302. CERTIFICATION OF SCREENING COMPANIES.

    The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration is 
directed to certify companies providing security screening and 
to improve the training and testing of security screeners 
through development of uniform performance standards for 
providing security screening services.

SEC. 303. WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVE DETECTION STUDY.

    (a) In General.--The Administrator of the Federal Aviation 
Administration shall enter into an arrangement with the 
Director of the National Academy of Sciences (or if the 
National Academy of Sciences is not available, the head of 
another equivalent entity) to conduct a study in accordance to 
this section.
    (b) Panel of Experts.--
          (1) In general.--In carrying out a study under this 
        section, the Director of the National Academy of 
        Sciences (or the head of another equivalent entity) 
        shall establish a panel (hereinafter in this section 
        referred to as the ``panel'').
          (2) Expertise.--Each member of the panel shall have 
        expertise in weapons and explosive detection 
        technology, security, air carrier and airport 
        operations, or another appropriate area. The Director 
        of the National Academy of Sciences (or the head of 
        another equivalent entity) shall ensure that the panel 
        has an appropriate number of representatives of the 
        areas specified in the preceding sentence.
    (c) Study.--The panel, in consultation with the National 
Science and Technology Council, representatives of appropriate 
Federal agencies, and appropriate members of the private 
sector, shall--
          (1) assess the weapons and explosive detection 
        technologies that are available at the time of the 
        study that are capable of being effectively deployed in 
        commercial aviation;
          (2) determine how the technologies referred to in 
        paragraph (1) may more effectively be used for 
        promotion and improvement of security at airport and 
        aviation facilities and other secured areas;
          (3) assess the cost and advisability of requiring 
        hardened cargo containers as a way to enhance aviation 
        security and reduce the required sensitivity of bomb 
        detection equipment; and
          (4) on the basis of the assessments and 
        determinations made under paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), 
        identify the most promising technologies for the 
        improvement of the efficiency and cost- effectiveness 
        of weapons and explosive detection.
    (d) Cooperation.--The National Science and Technology 
Council shall take such actions as may be necessary to 
facilitate, to the maximum extent practicable and upon request 
of the Director of the National Academy of Sciences (or the 
head of another equivalent entity), the cooperation of 
representatives of appropriate Federal agencies, as provided 
for in subsection (c), in providing the panel, for the study 
under this section--
          (1) expertise; and
          (2) to the extent allowable by law, resources and 
        facilities.
    (e) Reports.--The Director of the National Academy of 
Sciences (or the head of another equivalent entity) shall, 
pursuant to an arrangement entered into under subsection (a), 
submit to the Administrator such reports as the Administrator 
considers to be appropriate. Upon receipt of a report under 
this subsection, the Administrator shall submit a copy of the 
report to the appropriate committees of Congress.
    (f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 1997 through 2001 
such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section.

SEC. 304. REQUIREMENT FOR CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORDS CHECKS.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    (b) Applicability.--The amendment made by subsection (a)(3) 
shall apply to individuals hired to perform functions described 
in section 44936(a)(1)(B) of title 49, United States Code, 
after the date of the enactment of this Act; except that the 
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration may, as 
the Administrator determines to be appropriate, require such 
employment investigations or criminal history records checks 
for individuals performing those functions on the date of the 
enactment of this Act.

SEC. 305. INTERIM DEPLOYMENT OF COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE EXPLOSIVE 
                    DETECTION EQUIPMENT.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    (b) Agreements.--The Administrator is authorized to use 
noncompetitive or cooperative agreements with air carriers and 
airport authorities that provide for the Administrator to 
purchase and assist in installing advanced security equipment 
for the use of such entities.

SEC. 306. AUDIT OF PERFORMANCE OF BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR CERTAIN 
                    PERSONNEL.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 307. PASSENGER PROFILING.

    The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, 
the Secretary of Transportation, the intelligence community, 
and the law enforcement community should continue to assist air 
carriers in developing computer-assisted passenger profiling 
programs and other appropriate passenger profiling programs 
which should be used in conjunction with other security 
measures and technologies.

SEC. 308. AUTHORITY TO USE CERTAIN FUNDS FOR AIRPORT SECURITY PROGRAMS 
                    AND ACTIVITIES.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, funds referred to in subsection (b) may be used for the 
improvement of facilities and the purchase and deployment of 
equipment to enhance and ensure the safety and security of 
passengers and other persons involved in air travel.
    (b) Covered Funds.--The following funds may be used under 
subsection (a):
          (1) Project grants made under subchapter I of chapter 
        471 of title 49, United States Code.
          (2) Passenger facility fees collected under section 
        40117 of title 49, United States Code.

SEC. 309. DEVELOPMENT OF AVIATION SECURITY LIAISON AGREEMENT.

    The Secretary of Transportation and the Attorney General, 
acting through the Administrator of the Federal Aviation 
Administration and the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, shall enter into an interagency agreement 
providing for the establishment of an aviation security liaison 
at existing appropriate Federal agencies' field offices in or 
near cities served by a designated high-risk airport.

SEC. 310. REGULAR JOINT THREAT ASSESSMENTS.

    The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration 
and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall 
carry out joint threat and vulnerability assessments on 
security every 3 years, or more frequently, as necessary, at 
each airport determined to be high risk.

SEC. 311. BAGGAGE MATCH REPORT.

    (a) Report.--If a bag match pilot program is carried out as 
recommended by the White House Conference on Aviation Safety 
and Security, not later than the 30th day following the date of 
completion of the pilot program, the Administrator of the 
Federal Aviation Administration shall submit to Congress a 
report on the safety, effectiveness, and operational 
effectiveness of the pilot program. The report shall also 
assess the extent to which implementation of baggage match 
requirements (coupled with the best available technologies and 
methodologies, such as passenger profiling) enhance domestic 
aviation security.
    (b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate 
that the Administrator should work with airports and air 
carriers to develop, to the extent feasible, effective domestic 
bag matching proposals.

SEC. 312. ENHANCED SECURITY PROGRAMS.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 313. REPORT ON AIR CARGO.

    (a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Transportation shall 
transmit to Congress a report on any changes recommended and 
implemented as a result of the White House Commission on 
Aviation Safety and Security to enhance and supplement 
screening and inspection of cargo, mail, and company-shipped 
materials transported in air commerce.
    (b) Contents.--The report shall include--
          (1) an assessment of the effectiveness of the changes 
        referred to in subsection (a);
          (2) an assessment of the oversight by the Federal 
        Aviation Administration of inspections of shipments of 
        mail and cargo by domestic and foreign air carriers;
          (3) an assessment of the need for additional security 
        measures with respect to such inspections;
          (4) an assessment of the adequacy of inspection and 
        screening of cargo on passenger air carriers; and
          (5) any additional recommendations, and if necessary 
        any legislative proposals, necessary to carry out 
        additional changes.
    (c) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate 
that the inspection of cargo, mail, and company-shipped 
materials can be enhanced.

SEC. 314. SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL 
                    TERRORISM.

    (a) Findings.--The Senate finds that--
          (1) there has been an intensification in the 
        oppression and disregard for human life among nations 
        that are willing to export terrorism;
          (2) there has been an increase in attempts by 
        criminal terrorists to murder airline passengers 
        through the destruction of civilian airliners and the 
        deliberate fear and death inflicted through bombings of 
        buildings and the kidnapping of tourists and Americans 
        residing abroad; and
          (3) information widely available demonstrates that a 
        significant portion of international terrorist activity 
        is state-sponsored, -organized, -condoned, or -
        directed.
    (b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate 
that if evidence establishes beyond a clear and reasonable 
doubt that any act of hostility towards any United States 
citizen was an act of international terrorism sponsored, 
organized, condoned, or directed by any nation, a state of war 
should be considered to exist or to have existed between the 
United States and that nation, beginning as of the moment that 
the act of aggression occurs.

                    3. Crimes and Criminal Procedure

   Partial text of Title 18, United States Code--Crimes and Criminal 
                               Procedure

                             PART I--CRIMES

CHAPTER 2--AIRCRAFT AND MOTOR VEHICLES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 32. Destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities

    (a) Whoever willfully--
          (1) sets fire to, damages, destroys, disables, or 
        wrecks any aircraft in the special aircraft 
        jurisdiction of the United States or any civil aircraft 
        used, operated, or employed in interstate, overseas, or 
        foreign air commerce;
          (2) places or causes to be placed a destructive 
        device or substance in, upon, or in proximity to, or 
        otherwise makes or causes to be made unworkable or 
        unusable or hazardous to work or use, any such 
        aircraft, or any part or other materials used or 
        intended to be used in connection with the operation of 
        such aircraft, if such placing or causing to be placed 
        or such making or causing to be made is likely to 
        endanger the safety of any such aircraft;
          (3) sets fire to, damages, destroys, or disables any 
        air navigation facility, or interferes by force or 
        violence with the operation of such facility, if such 
        fire, damaging, destroying, disabling, or interfering 
        is likely to endanger the safety of any such aircraft 
        in flight;
          (4) with the intent to damage, destroy, or disable 
        any such aircraft, sets fire to, damages, destroys, or 
        disables or places a destructive device or substance 
        in, upon, or in proximity to, any appliance or 
        structure, ramp, landing area, property, machine, or 
        apparatus, or any facility or other material used, or 
        intended to be used, in connection with the operation, 
        maintenance, loading, unloading or storage of any such 
        aircraft or any cargo carried or intended to be carried 
        on any such aircraft;
          (5) performs an act of violence against or 
        incapacitates any individual on any such aircraft, if 
        such act of violence or incapacitation is likely to 
        endanger the safety of such aircraft;
          (6) communicates information, knowing the information 
        to be false and under circumstances in which such 
        information may reasonably be believed, thereby 
        endangering the safety of any such aircraft in flight; 
        or
          (7) attempts to do anything prohibited under 
        paragraphs (1) through (6) of this subsection;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 
twenty years or both.
    (b) Whoever willfully--
          (1) performs an act of violence against any 
        individual on board any civil aircraft registered in a 
        country other than the United States while such 
        aircraft is in flight, if such act is likely to 
        endanger the safety of that aircraft;
          (2) destroys a civil aircraft registered in a country 
        other than the United States while such aircraft is in 
        service or causes damage to such an aircraft which 
        renders that aircraft incapable of flight or which is 
        likely to endanger that aircraft's safety in flight;
          (3) places or causes to be placed on a civil aircraft 
        registered in a country other than the United States 
        while such aircraft is in service, a device or 
        substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or 
        to cause damage to that aircraft which renders that 
        aircraft incapable of flight or which is likely to 
        endanger that aircraft's safety in flight; or(4) 
        attempts to commit an offense described in paragraphs 
        (1) through (3) of this subsection;
shall, if the offender is later found in the United States, be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty 
years, or both. There is jurisdiction over an offense under 
this subsection if a national of the United States was on 
board, or would have been on board, the aircraft; an offender 
is a national of the United States; or an offender is 
afterwards found in the United Sates. For purposes of this 
subsection, the term ``national of the United States'' has the 
meaning prescribed in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act.
    (c) Whoever willfully imparts or conveys any threat to do 
an act which would violate any of paragraphs (1) through (5) of 
subsection (a) or any of paragraphs (1) through (3) of 
subsection (b) of this section, with an apparent determination 
and will to carry the threat into execution shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or 
both.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 37. Violence at international airports

    (a) Offense.--A person who unlawfully and intentionally, 
using any device, substance, or weapon--
          (1) performs an act of violence against a person at 
        an airport serving international civil aviation that 
        causes or is likely to cause serious bodily injury (as 
        defined in section 1365 of this title) or death; or
          (2) destroys or seriously damages the facilities of 
        an airport serving international civil aviation or a 
        civil aircraft not in service located thereon or 
        disrupts the services of the airport,
if such an act endangers or is likely to endanger safety at 
that airport, or attempts to do such an act, shall be fined 
under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both; 
and if the death of any person results from conduct prohibited 
by this subsection, shall be punished by death or imprisoned 
for any term of years or for life.
    (b) Jurisdiction.--There is jurisdiction over the 
prohibited activity in subsection (a) if--
          (1) the prohibited activity takes place in the United 
        States; or
          (2) the prohibited activity takes place outside the 
        United States and the offender is later found in the 
        United States.
    (c) Bar to prosecution.--It is a bar to Federal prosecution 
under subsection (a) for conduct that occurred within the 
United States that the conduct involved was during or in 
relation to a labor dispute, and such conduct is prohibited as 
a felony under the law of the State in which it was committed. 
For purposes of this section, the term ``labor dispute'' has 
the meaning set forth in section 2(c) \1\ of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. 113(c)), and the term 
``State'' means a State of the United States, the District of 
Colombia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the 
United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ So in original. Probably should be section ``13(c).''

              4. Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990

    Partial text of Public Law 101-604 [H.R. 5732], 104 Stat. 3066, 
                 approved November 16, 1990, as amended

   AN ACT To promote and strengthen aviation security, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1.\1\ SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Aviation 
Security Improvement Act of 1990''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 49 U.S.C. app. 1301 note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Table of Contents.--* * *

SEC. 2.\2\ FINDINGS.

    Congress finds that--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ 22 U.S.C. 5501 note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) the safety and security of passengers of United 
        States air carriers against terrorist threats should be 
        given the highest priority by the United States 
        Government;
          (2) the report of the President's Commission on 
        Aviation Security and Terrorism, dated May 15, 1990, 
        found that current aviation security systems are 
        inadequate to provide such protection;
          (3) the United States Government should immediately 
        take steps to ensure fuller compliance with existing 
        laws and regulations relating to aviation security;
          (4) the United States Government should work through 
        the International Civil Aviation Organization and 
        directly with foreign governments to enhance aviation 
        security of foreign carriers and at foreign airports;
          (5) the United States Government should ensure that 
        enhanced security measures are fully implemented by 
        both United States and foreign air carriers;
          (6) all nations belonging to the Summit Seven should 
        promptly amend the Bonn Declaration to extend sanctions 
        for all terrorist acts, including attacks against 
        airports and air carrier ticket offices;
          (7) the United States Government, in bilateral 
        negotiations with foreign governments, should emphasize 
        upgrading international aviation security objectives;
          (8) the United States Government should have in place 
        a mechanism by which the Government notifies the 
        public, on a case-by-case basis and through the 
        application of a uniform national standard, of certain 
        credible threats to civil aviation security;
          (9) the United States Government has a special 
        obligation to United States victims of acts of 
        terrorism directed against this Nation and should 
        provide prompt assistance to the families of such 
        victims and assure that fair and prompt compensation is 
        provided to such victims and their families;
          (10) the United States should work with other nations 
        to treat as outlaws state sponsors of terrorism, 
        isolating such sponsors politically, economically, and 
        militarily;
          (11) the United States must develop a clear 
        understanding that state-sponsored terrorism threatens 
        United States values and interests, and that active 
        measures are needed to counter more effectively the 
        terrorist threat; and
          (12) the United States must have the national will to 
        take every feasible action to prevent, counter, and 
        respond to terrorist activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Sec. 7(b) of Public Law 103-272 (108 Stat. 1398) repealed sec. 
101(a) and (b), secs. 102 through 111, sec. 203(a) through (c). See 49 
U.S.C. relating to aviation security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                     TITLE I--AVIATION SECURITY \3\

   TITLE II--UNITED STATES RESPONSE TO TERRORISM AFFECTING AMERICANS 
                                 ABROAD

SEC. 201.\4\ INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING AVIATION SECURITY.

    (a) United States Policy.--It is the policy of the United 
States--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ 22 U.S.C. 5501.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) to seek bilateral agreements to achieve United 
        States aviation security objectives with foreign 
        governments;
          (2) to continue to press vigorously for security 
        improvements through the Foreign Airport Security Act 
        and the foreign airport assessment program; and
          (3) to continue to work through the International 
        Civil Aviation Organization to improve aviation 
        security internationally.
    (b) Negotiations for Aviation Security.--(1) The Department 
of State, in consultation with the Department of 
Transportation, shall be responsible for negotiating requisite 
aviation security agreements with foreign governments 
concerning the implementation of United States rules and 
regulations which affect the foreign operations of United 
States air carriers, foreign air carriers, and foreign 
international airports. The Secretary of State is directed to 
enter, expeditiously, into negotiations for bilateral and 
multilateral agreements--
          (A) for enhanced aviation security objectives;
          (B) to implement the Foreign Airport Security Act and 
        the foreign airport assessment program to the fullest 
        extent practicable; and
          (C) to achieve improved availability of passenger 
        manifest information.
    (2) A principal objective of bilateral and multilateral 
negotiations with foreign governments and the International 
Civil Aviation Organization shall be improved availability of 
passenger manifest information.

SEC. 202.\5\ COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM.

    The Coordinator for Counterterrorism shall be responsible 
for the coordination of international aviation security for the 
Department of State.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ 22 U.S.C. 5502.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 204.\6\ DEPARTMENT OF STATE NOTIFICATION OF FAMILIES OF VICTIMS.

    (a) Department of State Policy.--It is the policy of the 
Department of State pursuant to section 43 of the State 
Department Basic Authorities Act to directly and promptly 
notify the families of victims of aviation disasters abroad 
concerning citizens of the United States directly affected by 
such a disaster, including timely written notice. The Secretary 
of State shall ensure that such notification by the Department 
of State is carried out notwithstanding notification by any 
other person.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ 22 U.S.C. 5503.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Department of State Guidelines.--Not later than 60 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
State shall issue such regulations, guidelines, and circulars 
as are necessary to ensure that the policy under subsection (a) 
is fully implemented.

SEC. 205.\7\ DESIGNATION OF STATE DEPARTMENT-FAMILY LIAISON AND TOLL-
                    FREE FAMILY COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM.

    (a) Designation of State Department-Family Liaison.--Not 
later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Secretary of State shall issue such rules and guidelines as 
are necessary to provide that in the event of an aviation 
disaster directly involving United States citizens abroad, if 
possible, the Department of State will assign a specific 
individual, and an alternate, as the Department of State 
liaison for the family of each such citizen.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ 22 U.S.C. 5504.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Toll-Free Communications System.--In the establishment 
of the Department of State toll-free communications system to 
facilitate inquiries concerning the affect of any disaster 
abroad on United States citizens residing or traveling abroad, 
the Secretary of State shall ensure that a toll-free telephone 
number is reserved for the exclusive use of the families of 
citizens who have been determined to be directly involved in 
any such disaster.

SEC. 206.\8\ DISASTER TRAINING FOR STATE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL.

    (a) Additional Training.--The Secretary of State shall 
institute a supplemental program of training in disaster 
management for all consular officers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ 22 U.S.C. 5505.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Training Improvements.--
          (1) In expanding the training program under 
        subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall consult 
        with death and bereavement counselors concerning the 
        particular demands posed by aviation tragedies and 
        terrorist activities.
          (2) In providing such additional training under 
        subsection (a) the Secretary of State shall consider 
        supplementing the current training program through--
                  (A) providing specialized training to create 
                a team of ``disaster specialists'' to deploy 
                immediately in a crisis; or
                  (B) securing outside experts to be brought in 
                during the initial phases to assist consular 
                personnel.

SEC. 207.\9\ DEPARTMENT OF STATE RESPONSIBILITIES AND PROCEDURES AT 
                    INTERNATIONAL DISASTER SITE.

    (a) Dispatch of Senior State Department Official to Site.--
Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, the Secretary of State shall issue such rules and 
guidelines as are necessary to provide that in the event of an 
international disaster, particularly an aviation tragedy, 
directly involving significant numbers of United States 
citizens abroad not less than one senior officer from the 
Bureau of Consular Affairs of the Department of State shall be 
dispatched to the site of such disaster.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ 22 U.S.C. 5506.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Criteria for Department of State Staffing at Disaster 
Site.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Secretary of State shall promulgate criteria 
for Department of State staffing of disaster sites abroad. Such 
criteria shall define responsibility for staffing decisions and 
shall consider the deployment of crisis teams under subsection 
(d). The Secretary of State shall promptly issue such rules and 
guidelines as are necessary to implement criteria developed 
pursuant to this subsection.
    (c) State Department Ombudsman.--Not later than 60 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
State shall issue such rules and guidelines as are necessary to 
provide that in the event of an international aviation disaster 
involving significant numbers of United States citizens abroad 
not less than one officer or employee of the Department of 
State shall be dispatched to the disaster site to provide on-
site assistance to families who may visit the site and to act 
as an ombudsman in matters involving the foreign local 
government authorities and social service agencies.
    (d) Crisis Teams.--Not later than 60 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall 
promulgate procedures for the deployment of a ``crisis team'', 
which may include public affairs, forensic, and bereavement 
experts, to the site of any international disaster involving 
United States citizens abroad to augment in-country Embassy and 
consulate staff. The Secretary of State shall promptly issue 
such rules and guidelines as are necessary to implement 
procedures developed pursuant to this subsection.

SEC. 208.\10\ RECOVERY AND DISPOSITION OF REMAINS AND PERSONAL EFFECTS.

    It is the policy of the Department of State (pursuant to 
section 43 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act) to 
provide liaison with foreign governments and persons and with 
United States air carriers concerning arrangements for the 
preparation and transport to the United States of the remains 
of citizens who die abroad, as well as the disposition of 
personal effects. The Secretary of State shall ensure that 
regulations and guidelines of the Department of State reflect 
such policy and that such assistance is rendered to the 
families of United States citizens who are killed in terrorist 
incidents and disasters abroad.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ 22 U.S.C. 5507.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 209.\11\ ASSESSMENT OF LOCKERBIE EXPERIENCE.

    (a) Assessment.--The Secretary of State shall compile an 
assessment of the Department of State response to the Pan 
American Airways Flight 103 aviation disaster over Lockerbie, 
Scotland, on December 21, 1988.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ 22 U.S.C. 5508.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Guidelines.--The Secretary of State shall establish, 
based on the assessment compiled under subsection (a) and other 
relevant factors, guidelines for future Department of State 
responses to comparable disasters and shall distribute such 
guidelines to all United States diplomatic and consular posts 
abroad.

SEC. 210.\12\ OFFICIAL DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECOGNITION.

    Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, the Secretary of State shall promulgate guidelines 
for appropriate ceremonies or other official expressions of 
respect and support for the families of United States citizens 
who are killed through acts of terrorism abroad.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ 22 U.S.C. 5509.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 211.\13\ UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF 
                    TERRORISM.

    (a) Compensation.--The President shall submit to the 
Congress, not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, recommendations on whether or not 
legislation should be enacted to authorize the United States to 
provide monetary and tax relief as compensation to United 
States citizens who are victims of terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ 22 U.S.C. 5510.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Board.--The President may establish a board to develop 
criteria for compensation and to recommend changes to existing 
laws to establish a single comprehensive approach to victim 
compensation for terrorist acts.
    (c) Income Tax Benefit for Victims of Lockerbie 
Terrorism.--
          (1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), in the 
        case of any individual whose death was a direct result 
        of the Pan American Airways Flight 103 terrorist 
        disaster over Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 
        1988, any tax imposed by subtitle A of the Internal 
        Revenue Code of 1986 shall not apply--
                  (A) with respect to the taxable year which 
                includes December 21, 1988, and
                  (B) with respect to the prior taxable year.
          (2) Limitation.--In no case may the tax benefit 
        pursuant to paragraph (1) for any taxable year, for any 
        individual, exceed an amount equal to 28 percent of the 
        annual rate of basic pay at Level V of the Executive 
        Schedule of the United States as of December 21, 1988.

SEC. 212.\14\ OVERSEAS SECURITY ELECTRONIC BULLETIN BOARD.

    Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, the Secretary of State shall issue such rules and 
regulations as may be necessary to establish, under the Bureau 
of Consular Affairs, an electronic bulletin board accessible to 
the general public. Such bulletin board shall contain all 
information, updated daily, which is available on the Overseas 
Security Electronic Bulletin Board of the Bureau of Diplomatic 
Security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ 22 U.S.C. 5511.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 213. ANTITERRORISM ASSISTANCE.

    (a) Aviation Security.--In addition to amounts otherwise 
authorized to be appropriated, there are authorized to be 
appropriated $7,000,000 for fiscal year 1991 for aviation 
security assistance under chapter 8 of part II of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2349aa et seq.), relating to 
antiterrorism assistance.
    (b) \15\ Training Services.-- * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Sec. 213(b) amended sec. 573(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2349aa2). For text, see U.S. Congress. House. 
Committee on International Relations. Legislation on Foreign Relations 
Through 1996, (Washington, G.P.O., 1997), vol. I-A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 214.\16\ ANTITERRORISM MEASURES.

    (a) Guidelines for International Aviation Travelers.--For 
the purpose of notifying the public, the Secretary of State, in 
consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, shall 
develop and publish guidelines for thwarting efforts by 
international terrorists to enlist the unwitting assistance of 
international aviation travelers in terrorist activities. 
Notices concerning such guidelines shall be posted and 
prominently displayed domestically and abroad in international 
airports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ 22 U.S.C. 5512.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Development of International Standards.--The Secretary 
of State and the Secretary of Transportation in all appropriate 
fora, particularly talks and meetings related to international 
civil aviation, shall enter into negotiations with other 
nations for the establishment of international standards 
regarding guidelines for thwarting efforts by international 
terrorists to enlist the unwitting assistance of international 
aviation travelers in terrorist activities.
    (c) Publication of Rewards for Terrorism-Related 
Information.--For the purpose of notifying the public, the 
Secretary of State shall publish the availability of United 
States Government rewards for information on international 
terrorist-related activities, including rewards available under 
section 36(a) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 
1956 (22 U.S.C. 2708(a)) and chapter 204 of title 18, United 
States Code. To the extent appropriate and feasible, notices 
making such publication shall be posted and prominently 
displayed domestically and abroad in international airports.
    (d) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
the Secretary of Transportation should take appropriate 
measures to utilize and train properly the officers and 
employees of other United States Government agencies who have 
functions at international airports in the United States and 
abroad in the detection of explosives and firearms which could 
be a threat to international civil aviation.

SEC. 215.\17\ PROPOSAL FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL 
                    AVIATION ORGANIZATION.

    Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Transportation, shall propose to the International 
Civil Aviation Organization the establishment of a 
comprehensive aviation security program which shall include (1) 
training for airport security personnel, (2) grants for 
security equipment acquisition for certain nations, and (3) 
expansion of the appropriate utilization of canine teams in the 
detection of explosive devices in all airport areas, including 
use in passenger screening areas and nonpublic baggage assembly 
and processing areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ 22 U.S.C. 5513.

   5. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985

  Partial text of Title V of Public Law 99-83 [S. 960], 99 Stat. 190, 
                  approved August 8, 1985, as amended

 AN ACT To authorize international development and security assistance 
 programs and Peace Corps programs for fiscal years 1986 and 1987, and 
                          for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
``International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 
1985''.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE V--INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND FOREIGN AIRPORT SECURITY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                    Part B--Foreign Airport Security

SEC. 551. SECURITY STANDARDS FOR FOREIGN AIR TRANSPORTATION.

    (a) \1\ Security at Foreign Airports.--* * * [Repealed--
1994]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Sec. 7(b) of Public Law 103-272 (108 Stat. 1379) repealed sec. 
551(a) and (b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Conforming Amendments.--* * * [Repealed--1994]
    (c) Closing of Beirut International Airport.--It is the 
sense of the Congress that the President is urged and 
encouraged to take all appropriate steps to carry forward his 
announced policy of seeking the effective closing of the 
international airport in Beirut, Lebanon, at least until such 
time as the Government of Lebanon has instituted measures and 
procedures designed to prevent the use of that airport by 
aircraft hijackers and other terrorists in attacking civilian 
airlines or their passengers, hijacking their aircraft, or 
taking or holding their passengers hostage.

SEC. 552.\2\ TRAVEL ADVISORY AND SUSPENSION OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. * * 
                    * [REPEALED--1994]

SEC. 553.\2\ UNITED STATES AIRMARSHAL PROGRAM. * * * [REPEALED--1994]

SEC. 554. ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION 
                    STANDARDS.

    The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Transportation, 
jointly, shall call on the member countries of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization to enforce that 
Organization's existing standards and to support United States 
actions enforcing such standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Sec. 7(b) of Public Law 103-272 (108 Stat. 1379) repealed secs. 
552, 553, and 556. See 49 U.S.C. relating to aviation security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 555. INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION BOYCOTT OF COUNTRIES SUPPORTING 
                    INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.

    It is the sense of the Congress that the President--
          (1) should call for an international civil aviation 
        boycott with respect to those countries which the 
        President determines--
                  (A) grant sanctuary from prosecution to any 
                individual or group which has committed an act 
                of international terrorism, or
                  (B) otherwise support international 
                terrorism; and
          (2) should take steps, both bilateral and 
        multilateral, to achieve a total international civil 
        aviation boycott with respect to those countries.

SEC. 556.\2\ MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO 
                    AIRCRAFT SABOTAGE, AIRCRAFT HIJACKING, AND AIRPORT 
                    SECURITY. * * * [REPEALED--1994]

SEC. 557. RESEARCH ON AIRPORT SECURITY TECHNIQUES FOR DETECTING 
                    EXPLOSIVES.

    In order to improve security at international airports, 
there are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of 
Transportation from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (in 
addition to amounts otherwise available for such purpose) 
$5,000,000, without fiscal year limitation, to be used for 
research on and the development of airport security devices or 
techniques for detecting explosives.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

=======================================================================




                          G. OTHER LEGISLATION

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

1. The Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended (Public Law 
    82-414)......................................................   363
      Title I--General...........................................   363
            Definitions..........................................   363
            Section 101(a)(15)(S)--[Immigrant Defined]...........   363
      Title II--Immigration......................................   364
            Chapter 2--Qualifications for Admission of Aliens; 
                Travel Control of Citizens and Aliens............   364
                Section 212(a)(3)(B)--Classes of Aliens 
                  Ineligible for Visas or Admission: Terrorist 
                  Activities.....................................   364
            Admission of Nonimmigrants...........................   366
                Section 214(k)(5)--[Annual Report of the Attorney 
                  General].......................................   366
                Section 219--Designation of Foreign Terrorist 
                  Organizations..................................   366
            Chapter 4--Provisions Relating to Entry and Exclusion   369
                Section 237(a)(4)(b)--Classes of Deportable 
                  Aliens: Terrorist Activities...................   369
      Title V--Alien Terrorist Removal Procedures................   369
2. Middle East Activities........................................   374
      a. Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1995 (Public Law 
          104-99)................................................   374
            Title VI.............................................   374
      b. Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1994, as amended 
          (Public Law 103-236)...................................   381
            Title V, Part E......................................   381
      c. PLO Commitments Compliance Act of 1989 (Public Law 101-
          246)...................................................   385
            Title VIII...........................................   385
      d. Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 (Public Law 100-204).........   390
            Title X..............................................   390
3. National Emergencies Act, as amended (Public Law 94-412)......   393
4. Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 (Public 
    Law 105-277) (partial text)..................................   398
            Title III--Inspections...............................   398
                Section 303(b)(3)--Authority to Conduct 
                  Inspections: Objections to Individuals Serving 
                  as Inspectors..................................   398

=======================================================================

                 1. The Immigration and Nationality Act

 Partial text of Public Law 82-414 [H.R. 5678], 66 Stat. 163, approved 
                       June 27, 1952, as amended

                            TITLE I--GENERAL

                              definitions

    Sec. 101.\1\ (a) As used in this Act--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 8 U.S.C. 1101.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (15) The term ``immigrant'' means every alien except 
        an alien who is within one of the following classes of 
        nonimmigrant aliens--

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (S) subject to section 214(k), an alien--
                          (i) who the Attorney General 
                        determines--
                                  (I) is in possession of 
                                critical reliable information 
                                concerning a criminal 
                                organization or enterprise;
                                  (II) is willing to supply or 
                                has supplied such information 
                                to Federal or State law 
                                enforcement authorities or a 
                                Federal or State court; and
                                  (III) whose presence in the 
                                United States the Attorney 
                                General determines is essential 
                                to the success of an authorized 
                                criminal investigation or the 
                                successful prosecution of an 
                                individual involved in the 
                                criminal organization or 
                                enterprise; or
                          (ii) who the Secretary of State and 
                        the Attorney General jointly 
                        determine--
                                  (I) is in possession of 
                                critical reliable information 
                                concerning a terrorist 
                                organization, enterprise, or 
                                operation;
                                  (II) is willing to supply or 
                                has supplied such information 
                                to Federal law enforcement 
                                authorities or a Federal court;
                                  (III) will be or has been 
                                placed in danger as a result of 
                                providing such information; and
                                  (IV) is eligible to receive a 
                                reward under section 36(a) of 
                                the State Department Basic 
                                Authorities Act of 1956,
          and, if the Attorney General (or with respect to 
        clause (ii), the Secretary of State and the Attorney 
        General jointly) considers it to be appropriate, the 
        spouse, married and unmarried sons and daughters, and 
        parents of an alien described in clause (i) or (ii) if 
        accompanying, or following to join, the alien.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE II--IMMIGRATION

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


 Chapter 2--Qualifications for Admission of Aliens; Travel Control of 
Citizens and Aliens

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


 general classes of aliens ineligible to receive visas and ineligible 
               for admission; waivers of inadmissibility

    Sec. 212.\2\ (a) Classes of Aliens Ineligible for Visas or 
Admissions.--Except as otherwise provided in this Act, aliens 
who are inadmissible under the following paragraphs are 
ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to 
the United States:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ 8 U.S.C. 1182.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1)-(2) * * *
          (3) Security and related grounds.--* * *
                  (B) Terrorist activities.--
                          (i) In general.--Any alien who--
                                  (I) has engaged in a 
                                terrorist activity,
                                  (II) a consular officer or 
                                the Attorney General knows, or 
                                has reasonable ground to 
                                believe, is likely to engage 
                                after entry in any terrorist 
                                activity (as defined in clause 
                                (iii)),
                                  (III) has, under 
                                circumstances indicating an 
                                intention to cause death or 
                                serious bodily harm, incited 
                                terrorist activity,
                                  (IV) is a representative (as 
                                defined in clause (iv)) of a 
                                foreign terrorist organization, 
                                as designated by the Secretary 
                                under section 219 which the 
                                alien knows or should have 
                                known is a terrorist 
                                organization, or
                                  (V) is a member of a foreign 
                                terrorist organization, as 
                                designated by the Secretary 
                                under section 219,
                  is inadmissible. An alien who is an officer, 
                official, representative, or spokesman of the 
                Palestine Liberation Organization is 
                considered, for purposes of this Act, to be 
                engaged in a terrorist activity.
                          (ii) Terrorist activity defined.--As 
                        used in this Act, the term ``terrorist 
                        activity'' means any activity which is 
                        unlawful under the laws of the place 
                        where it is committed (or which, if 
                        committed in the United States, would 
                        be unlawful under the laws of the 
                        United States or any State) and which 
                        involves any of the following:
                                  (I) The highjacking or 
                                sabotage of any conveyance 
                                (including an aircraft, vessel, 
                                or vehicle).
                                  (II) The seizing or 
                                detaining, and threatening to 
                                kill, injure, or continue to 
                                detain, another individual in 
                                order to compel a third person 
                                (including a governmental 
                                organization) to do or abstain 
                                from doing any act as an 
                                explicit or implicit condition 
                                for the release of the 
                                individual seized or detained.
                                  (III) A violent attack upon 
                                an internationally protected 
                                person (as defined in section 
                                1116(b)(4) of title 18, United 
                                States Code) or upon the 
                                liberty of such a person.
                                  (IV) An assassination.
                                  (V) The use of any--
                                          (a) biological agent, 
                                        chemical agent, or 
                                        nuclear weapon or 
                                        device, or
                                          (b) explosive or 
                                        firearm (other than for 
                                        mere personal monetary 
                                        gain),
                                with intent to endanger, 
                                directly or indirectly, the 
                                safety of one or more 
                                individuals or to cause 
                                substantial damage to property.
                                  (VI) A threat, attempt, or 
                                conspiracy to do any of the 
                                foregoing.
                          (iii) Engage in terrorist activity 
                        defined.--As used in this Act, the term 
                        ``engage in terrorist activity'' means 
                        to commit, in an individual capacity or 
                        as a member of an organization, an act 
                        of terrorist activity or an act which 
                        the actor knows, or reasonably should 
                        know, affords material support to any 
                        individual, organization, or government 
                        in conducting a terrorist activity at 
                        any time, including any of the 
                        following acts:
                                  (I) The preparation or 
                                planning of a terrorist 
                                activity.
                                  (II) The gathering of 
                                information on potential 
                                targets for terrorist activity.
                                  (III) The providing of any 
                                type of material support, 
                                including a safe house, 
                                transportation, communications, 
                                funds, false documentation or 
                                identification, weapons, 
                                explosives, or training, to any 
                                individual the actor knows or 
                                has reason to believe has 
                                committed or plans to commit a 
                                terrorist activity.
                                  (IV) The soliciting of funds 
                                or other things of value for 
                                terrorist activity or for any 
                                terrorist organization.
                                  (V) The solicitation of any 
                                individual for membership in a 
                                terrorist organization, 
                                terrorist government, or to 
                                engage in a terrorist activity.
                          (iv) Representative defined.--As used 
                        in this paragraph, the term 
                        ``representative'' includes an officer, 
                        official, or spokesman of an 
                        organization, and any person who 
                        directs, counsels, commands, or induces 
                        an organization or its members to 
                        engage in terrorist activity.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                       Admission of nonimmigrants

    Sec. 214.\3\ (a)-(j) * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ 8 U.S.C. 1184.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (k) \4\(1) The number of aliens who may be provided a 
        visa as nonimmigrants under section 101(a)(15)(S)(i) in 
        any fiscal year may not exceed 200. The number of 
        aliens who may be provided a visa as nonimmigrants 
        under section 101(a)(15)(S)(ii) in any fiscal year may 
        not exceed 50.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Sec. 220(b) of Public Law 103-416 (108 Stat. 4319) added 
subsec. (k).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (2) No alien may be admitted into the United States 
        as such a nonimmigrant more than 5 years after the date 
        of the enactment of this subsection.
          (3) The period of admission of an alien as such a 
        nonimmigrant may not exceed 3 years. Such period may 
        not be extended by the Attorney General.
          (4) * * *
          (5) The Attorney General shall submit a report 
        annually to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House 
        of Representatives and the Committee on the Judiciary 
        of the Senate concerning--
                  (A) the number of such nonimmigrants 
                admitted;
                  (B) the number of successful criminal 
                prosecutions or investigationsresulting from 
                cooperation of such aliens;
                  (C) the number of terrorist acts prevented or 
                frustrated resulting from cooperation of such 
                aliens;
                  (D) the number of such nonimmigrants whose 
                admission or cooperation has not resulted in 
                successful criminal prosecution or 
                investigation or the prevention or frustration 
                of a terrorist act; and
                  (E) the number of such nonimmigrants who have 
                failed to report quarterly (as required under 
                paragraph (4)) or who have been convicted of 
                crimes in the United States after the date of 
                their admission as such a 
                nonimmigrant.Restrictions on waiver.--* * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 219.\5\ DESIGNATION OF FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.

    (a) Designation.--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ 8 U.S.C. 1189. Added by sec. 302(a) of Public Law 104-132 (110 
Stat. 1248).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) In general.--The Secretary is authorized to 
        designate an organization as a foreign terrorist 
        organization in accordance with this subsection if the 
        Secretary finds that--
                  (A) the organization is a foreign 
                organization;
                  (B) the organization engages in terrorist 
                activity (as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B)); 
                and
                  (C) the terrorist activity of the 
                organization threatens the security of United 
                States nationals or the national security of 
                the United States.
          (2) Procedure.--
                  (A) Notice.--Seven days before making a 
                designation under this subsection, the 
                Secretary shall, by classified communication--
                          (i) notify the Speaker and Minority 
                        Leader of the House of Representatives, 
                        the President pro tempore, Majority 
                        Leader, and Minority Leader of the 
                        Senate, and the members of the relevant 
                        committees, in writing, of the intent 
                        to designate a foreign organization 
                        under this subsection, together with 
                        the findings made under paragraph (1) 
                        with respect to that organization, and 
                        the factual basis therefor; and
                          (ii) seven days after such 
                        notification, publish the designation 
                        in the Federal Register.
                  (B) Effect of designation.--
                          (i) For purposes of section 2339B of 
                        title 18, United States Code, a 
                        designation under this subsection shall 
                        take effect upon publication under 
                        subparagraph (A).
                          (ii) Any designation under this 
                        subsection shall cease to have effect 
                        upon an Act of Congress disapproving 
                        such designation.
                  (C) Freezing of assets.--Upon notification 
                under paragraph (2), the Secretary of the 
                Treasury may require United States financial 
                institutions possessing or controlling any 
                assets of any foreign organization included in 
                the notification to block all financial 
                transactions involving those assets until 
                further directive from either the Secretary of 
                the Treasury, Act of Congress, or order of 
                court.
          (3) Record.--
                  (A) In general.--In making a designation 
                under this subsection, the Secretary shall 
                create an administrative record.
                  (B) Classified information.--The Secretary 
                may consider classified information in making a 
                designation under this subsection. Classified 
                information shall not be subject to disclosure 
                for such time as it remains classified, except 
                that such information may be disclosed to a 
                court ex parte and in camera for purposes of 
                judicial review under subsection (c).
          (4) Period of designation.--
                  (A) In general.--Subject to paragraphs (5) 
                and (6), a designation under this subsection 
                shall be effective for all purposes for a 
                period of 2 years beginning on the effective 
                date of the designation under paragraph (2)(B).
                  (B) Redesignation.--The Secretary may 
                redesignate a foreign organization as a foreign 
                terrorist organization for an additional 2-year 
                period at the end of the 2-year period referred 
                to in subparagraph (A) (but not sooner than 60 
                days prior to the termination of such period) 
                upon a finding that the relevant circumstances 
                described in paragraph (1) still exist. The 
                procedural requirements of paragraphs (2) and 
                (3) shall apply to a redesignation under this 
                subparagraph.
          (5) Revocation by act of congress.--The Congress, by 
        an Act of Congress, may block or revoke a designation 
        made under paragraph (1).
          (6) Revocation based on change in circumstances.--
                  (A) In general.--The Secretary may revoke a 
                designation made under paragraph (1) if the 
                Secretary finds that--
                          (i) the circumstances that were the 
                        basis for the designation have changed 
                        in such a manner as to warrant 
                        revocation of the designation; or
                          (ii) the national security of the 
                        United States warrants a revocation of 
                        the designation.
                  (B) Procedure.--The procedural requirements 
                of paragraphs (2) through (4) shall apply to a 
                revocation under this paragraph.
          (7) Effect of revocation.--The revocation of a 
        designation under paragraph (5) or (6) shall not affect 
        any action or proceeding based on conduct committed 
        prior to the effective date of such revocation.
          (8) Use of designation in trial or hearing.--If a 
        designation under this subsection has become effective 
        under paragraph (1)(B), a defendant in a criminal 
        action shall not be permitted to raise any question 
        concerning the validity of the issuance of such 
        designation as a defense or an objection at any trial 
        or hearing.
    (b) Judicial Review of Designation.--
          (1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after 
        publication of the designation in the Federal Register, 
        an organization designated as a foreign terrorist 
        organization may seek judicial review of the 
        designation in the United States Court of Appeals for 
        the District of Columbia Circuit.
          (2) Basis of review.--Review under this subsection 
        shall be based solely upon the administrative record, 
        except that the Government may submit, for ex parte and 
        in camera review, classified information used in making 
        the designation.
          (3) Scope of review.--The Court shall hold unlawful 
        and set aside a designation the court finds to be--
                  (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
                discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
                law;
                  (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, 
                privilege, or immunity; or
                  (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, 
                authority, or limitation, or short of statutory 
                right.
                  (D) lacking substantial support in the 
                administrative record taken as a whole or in 
                classified information submitted to the court 
                under paragraph (2), or
                  (E) not in accord with the procedures 
                required by law.
          (4) Judicial review invoked.--The pendency of an 
        action for judicial review of a designation shall not 
        affect the application of this section, unless the 
        court issues a final order setting aside the 
        designation.
    (c) Definitions.--As used in this section--
          (1) the term ``classified information'' has the 
        meaning given that term in section 1(a) of the 
        Classified Information Procedures Act (18 U.S.C. App.);
          (2) the term ``national security'' means the national 
        defense, foreign relations, or economic interests of 
        the United States;
          (3) the term ``relevant committees'' means the 
        Committees on the Judiciary, Intelligence, and Foreign 
        Relations of the Senate and the Committees on the 
        Judiciary, Intelligence, and International Relations of 
        the House of Representatives; and
          (4) the term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of 
        State, in consultation with the Secretary of the 
        Treasury and the Attorney General.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Chapter 4--Provisions Relating to Entry and Exclusion

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                  general classes of deportable aliens

    Sec. 237.\6\ (a) Classes of Deportable Aliens.--Any alien 
(including an alien crewman) in and admitted to the United 
States shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be 
removed if the alien is within one or more of the following 
classes of deportable aliens:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ 8 U.S.C. 1227; redesignated from sec. 241 (8 U.S.C. 1251) by 
sec. 305(a)(2) of Public Law 104-208 (110 Stat. 3009), effective on the 
first day of the first month beginning more than 180 days after 
September 30, 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) Inadmissible at time of entry or of adjustment of 
        status or violates status.--* * *
          (2) Criminal offenses.--* * *
          (3) Failure to register and falsification of 
        documents.--* * *
          (4) Security and related grounds.--
                  (A) In general.--* * *
                  (B) Terrorist activities.--Any alien who has 
                engaged, or at any time after admission engages 
                in any terrorist activity (as defined in 
                section 212(a)(3)(B)(iii)) is deportable.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


            TITLE V--ALIEN TERRORIST REMOVAL PROCEDURES \7\

SEC. 501.\8\ DEFINITIONS.

    As used in this title--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Sec. 401(a) of Public Law 104-132 (110 Stat. 1258) added title 
V.
    \8\ 8 U.S.C. 1531.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) the term ``alien terrorist'' means any alien 
        described in section 241(a)(4)(B);
          (2) the term ``classified information'' has the same 
        meaning as in section 1(a) of the Classified 
        Information Procedures Act (18 U.S.C. App.);
          (3) the term ``national security'' has the same 
        meaning as in section 1(b) of the Classified 
        Information Procedures Act (18 U.S.C. App.);
          (4) the term ``removal court'' means the court 
        described in section 502;
          (5) the term ``removal hearing'' means the hearing 
        described in section 504; and
          (6) the term ``removal proceeding'' means a 
        proceeding under this title.
          (7) the term ``special attorney'' means an attorney 
        who is on the panel established under section 502(e).

SEC. 502.\9\ ESTABLISHMENT OF REMOVAL COURT.

    (a) Designation of Judges.--* * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ 8 U.S.C. 1532.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Terms.--* * *
    (c) Chief Judge.--* * *
    (d) Expeditious and Confidential Nature of Proceedings.--* 
* *
    (e) Establishment of Panel of Special Attorneys.--* * *

SEC. 503.\10\ REMOVAL COURT PROCEDURE.

    (a) Application.--
          (1) In general.--In any case in which the Attorney 
        General has classified information that an alien is an 
        alien terrorist, the Attorney General may seek removal 
        of the alien under this title by filing an application 
        with the removal court that contains--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ 8 U.S.C. 1533.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  (A) the identity of the attorney in the 
                Department of Justice making the application;
                  (B) a certification by the Attorney General 
                or the Deputy Attorney General that the 
                application satisfies the criteria and 
                requirements of this section;
                  (C) the identity of the alien for whom 
                authorization for the removal proceeding is 
                sought; and
                  (D) a statement of the facts and 
                circumstances relied on by the Department of 
                Justice to establish probable cause that--
                          (i) the alien is an alien terrorist;
                          (ii) the alien is physically present 
                        in the United States; and
                          (iii) with respect to such alien, 
                        removal under title II would pose a 
                        risk to the national security of the 
                        United States.
          (2) Filing.--* * *
    (b) Right To Dismiss.--The Attorney General may dismiss a 
removal action under this title at any stage of the proceeding.
    (c) Consideration of Application.--
          (1) Basis for decision.--In determining whether to 
        grant an application under this section, a single judge 
        of the removal court may consider, ex parte and in 
        camera, in addition to the information contained in the 
        application--
                  (A) other information, including classified 
                information, presented under oath or 
                affirmation; and
                  (B) testimony received in any hearing on the 
                application, of which a verbatim record shall 
                be kept.
          (2) Approval of order.--The judge shall issue an 
        order granting the application, if the judge finds that 
        there is probable cause to believe that--
                  (A) the alien who is the subject of the 
                application has been correctly identified and 
                is an alien terrorist present in the United 
                States; and
                  (B) removal under title II would pose a risk 
                to the national security of the United States.
          (3) Denial of order.--If the judge denies the order 
        requested in the application, the judge shall prepare a 
        written statement of the reasons for the denial, taking 
        all necessary precautions not to disclose any 
        classified information contained in the Government's 
        application.
    (d) Exclusive Provisions.--If an order is issued under this 
section granting an application, the rights of the alien 
regarding removal and expulsion shall be governed solely by 
this title, and except as they are specifically referenced in 
this title, no other provisions of this Act shall be 
applicable.

SEC. 504.\11\ REMOVAL HEARING.

    (a) In General.--
          (1) Expeditious hearing.--In any case in which an 
        application for an order is approved under section 
        503(c)(2), a removal hearing shall be conducted under 
        this section as expeditiously as practicable for the 
        purpose of determining whether the alien to whom the 
        order pertains should be removed from the United States 
        on the grounds that the alien is an alien terrorist.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ 8 U.S.C. 1534.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (2) Public hearing.--The removal hearing shall be 
        open to the public.
    (b) Notice.--* * *
    (c) Rights in Hearing.--* * *
    (d) Subpoenas.--* * *
    (e) Discovery.--* * *
    (f) Arguments.--* * *
    (g) Burden of Proof.--In the hearing, it is the 
Government's burden to prove, by the preponderance of the 
evidence, that the alien is subject to removal because the 
alien is an alien terrorist.
    (h) Rules of Evidence.--The Federal Rules of Evidence shall 
not apply in a removal hearing.
    (i) Determination of Deportation.--If the judge, after 
considering the evidence on the record as a whole, finds that 
the Government has met its burden, the judge shall order the 
alien removed and detained pending removal from the United 
States. If the alien was released pending the removal hearing, 
the judge shall order the Attorney General to take the alien 
into custody.
    (j) Written Order.--At the time of issuing a decision as to 
whether the alien shall be removed, the judge shall prepare a 
written order containing a statement of facts found and 
conclusions of law. Any portion of the order that would reveal 
the substance or source of information received in camera and 
ex parte pursuant to subsection (e) shall not be made available 
to the alien or the public.
    (k) No Right to Ancillary Relief.--* * *

SEC. 505.\12\ APPEALS.

    (a) Appeal of Denial of Application for Removal 
Proceedings.--* * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ 8 U.S.C. 1535.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Appeal of Determination Regarding Summary of Classified 
Information.--* * *
    (c) Appeal of Decision in Hearing.--* * *
    (d) Certiorari.--* * *
    (e) Appeal of Detention Order.--* * *

SEC. 506.\13\ CUSTODY AND RELEASE PENDING REMOVAL HEARING.

    (a) Upon Filing Application.--* * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ 8 U.S.C. 1536.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Conditional Release if Order Denied and Review 
Sought.--* * *

SEC. 507.\14\ CUSTODY AND RELEASE AFTER REMOVAL HEARING.

    (a) Release.--* * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ 8 U.S.C. 1537.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Custody and Removal.--
          (1) Custody.--If the judge decides that an alien 
        shall be removed, the alien shall be detained pending 
        the outcome of any appeal. After the conclusion of any 
        judicial review thereof which affirms the removal 
        order, the Attorney General shall retain the alien in 
        custody and remove the alien to a country specified 
        under paragraph (2).
          (2) Removal.--
                  (A) In general.--The removal of an alien 
                shall be to any country which the alien shall 
                designate if such designation does not, in the 
                judgment of the Attorney General, in 
                consultation with the Secretary of State, 
                impair the obligation of the United States 
                under any treaty (including a treaty pertaining 
                to extradition) or otherwise adversely affect 
                the foreign policy of the United States.
                  (B) Alternate countries.--If the alien 
                refuses to designate a country to which the 
                alien wishes to be removed or if the Attorney 
                General, in consultation with the Secretary of 
                State, determines that removal of the alien to 
                the country so designated would impair a treaty 
                obligation or adversely affect United States 
                foreign policy, the Attorney General shall 
                cause the alien to be removed to any country 
                willing to receive such alien.
                  (C) Continued detention.--If no country is 
                willing to receive such an alien, the Attorney 
                General may, notwithstanding any other 
                provision of law, retain the alien in custody. 
                The Attorney General, in coordination with the 
                Secretary of State, shall make periodic efforts 
                to reach agreement with other countries to 
                accept such an alien and at least every 6 
                months shall provide to the attorney 
                representing the alien at the removal hearing a 
                written report on the Attorney General's 
                efforts. Any alien in custody pursuant to this 
                subparagraph shall be released from custody 
                solely at the discretion of the Attorney 
                General and subject to such conditions as the 
                Attorney General shall deem appropriate.
                  (D) Fingerprinting.--Before an alien is 
                removed from the United States pursuant to this 
                subsection, or pursuant to an order of removal 
                because such alien is inadmissible under 
                section 212(a)(3)(B), the alien shall be 
                photographed and fingerprinted, and shall be 
                advised of the provisions of section 276(b).
    (c) Continued Detention Pending Trial.--
          (1) Delay in removal.--* * *The Attorney General may 
        hold in abeyance the removal of an alien who has been 
        ordered removed, pursuant to this title, to allow the 
        trial of such alien on any Federal or State criminal 
        charge and the service of any sentence of confinement 
        resulting from such a trial.
          (2) Maintenance of custody.--Pending the commencement 
        of any service of a sentence of confinement by an alien 
        described in paragraph (1), such an alien shall remain 
        in the custody of the Attorney General, unless the 
        Attorney General determines that temporary release of 
        the alien to the custody of State authorities for 
        confinement in a State facility is appropriate and 
        would not endanger national security or public safety.
          (3) Subsequent removal.--Following the completion of 
        a sentence of confinement by an alien described in 
        paragraph (1), or following the completion of State 
        criminal proceedings which do not result in a sentence 
        of confinement of an alien released to the custody of 
        State authorities pursuant to paragraph (2), such an 
        alien shall be returned to the custody of the Attorney 
        General who shall proceed to the removal of the alien 
        under this title.
    (d) Application of Certain Provisions Relating to Escape of 
Prisoners.--* * *
    (e) Rights of Aliens in Custody.--* * *

                       2. Middle East Activities

             a. Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1995

 Title VI of Public Law 104-99 [Foreign Operations, Export Financing, 
 and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1996, H.R. 1868, enacted by 
 reference in sec. 301 of Public Law 104-99; H.R. 2880], 110 Stat. 26, 
 approved January 26, 1996; enacted again as Public Law 104-107 [H.R. 
            1868], 110 Stat. 704, approved February 12, 1996

          TITLE VI--MIDDLE EAST PEACE FACILITATION ACT OF 1995

                              short title

    Sec. 601. This title may be cited as the ``Middle East 
Peace Facilitation Act of 1995''.

                                findings

    Sec. 602. The Congress finds that--
          (1) the Palestine Liberation Organization (hereafter 
        the ``P.L.O.'') has recognized the State of Israel's 
        right to exist in peace and security, accepted United 
        Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, 
        committed itself to the peace process and peaceful 
        coexistence with Israel, free from violence and all 
        other acts which endanger peace and stability, and 
        assumed responsibility over all P.L.O. elements and 
        personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent 
        violations, and discipline violators;
          (2) Israel has recognized the P.L.O. as the 
        representative of the Palestinian people;
          (3) Israel and the P.L.O. signed a Declaration of 
        Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements 
        (hereafter the ``Declaration of Principles'') on 
        September 13, 1993 at the White House;
          (4) Israel and the P.L.O. signed an Agreement on the 
        Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (hereafter the ``Gaza-
        Jericho Agreement'') on May 4, 1994 which established a 
        Palestinian Authority for the Gaza and Jericho areas;
          (5) Israel and the P.L.O. signed an Agreement on 
        Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities 
        (hereafter the ``Early Empowerment Agreement'') on 
        August 29, 1994 which provided for the transfer to the 
        Palestinian Authority of certain powers and 
        responsibilities in the West Bank outside of the 
        Jericho Area;
          (6) under the terms of the Israeli-Palestinian 
        Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza (hereafter 
        the ``Interim Agreement) signed on September 28, 1995, 
        the Declaration of Principles, the Gaza-Jericho 
        Agreement and the Early Empowerment Agreement, the 
        powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian 
        Authority are to be assumed by an elected Palestinian 
        Council with jurisdiction in the West Bank and Gaza 
        Strip in accordance with the Interim Agreement;
          (7) permanent status negotiations relating to the 
        West Bank and Gaza Strip are scheduled to begin by May 
        1996;
          (8) the Congress has, since the conclusion of the 
        Declaration of Principles and the P.L.O.'s renunciation 
        of terrorism, provided authorities to the President to 
        suspend certain statutory restrictions relating to the 
        P.L.O., subject to Presidential certifications that the 
        P.L.O. has continued to abide by commitments made in 
        and in connection with or resulting from the good faith 
        implementation of, the Declaration of Principles;
          (9) the P.L.O. commitments relevant to Presidential 
        certifications have included commitments to renounce 
        and condemn terrorism, to submit to the Palestinian 
        National Council for former approval the necessary 
        changes to those articles of the Palestinian Covenant 
        which call for Israel's destruction, and to prevent 
        acts of terrorism and hostilities against Israel; and
          (10) the United States is resolute in its 
        determination to ensure that in providing assistance to 
        Palestinians living under the jurisdiction of the 
        Palestinian Authority or elsewhere, the beneficiaries 
        of such assistance shall be held to the same standard 
        of financial accountability and management control as 
        any other recipient of United States assistance.

                           sense of congress

    Sec. 603. It is the sense of the Congress that the P.L.O. 
must do far more to demonstrate an irrevocable denunciation of 
terrorism and ensure a peaceful settlement of the Middle East 
dispute, and in particular it must--
          (1) submit to the Palestinian National Council for 
        formal approval the necessary changes to those articles 
        of the Palestinian National Covenant which call for 
        Israel's destruction;
          (2) make greater efforts to pre-empt acts of terror, 
        discipline violators and contribute to stemming the 
        violence that has resulted in the deaths of over 140 
        Israeli and United States citizens since the signing of 
        the Declaration of Principles;
          (3) prohibit participation in its activities and in 
        the Palestinian Authority and its successors by any 
        groups or individuals which continue to promote and 
        commit acts of terrorism;
          (4) cease all anti-Israel rhetoric, which potentially 
        undermines the peace process;
          (5) confiscate all unlicensed weapons;
          (6) transfer and cooperate in transfer proceedings 
        relating to any person accused by Israel to acts of 
        terrorism; and
          (7) respect civil liberties, human rights and 
        democratic norms.

                authority to suspend certain provisions

    Sec. 604. (a) In General.--Subject to subsection (b), 
beginning on the date of enactment of this Act and for eighteen 
months thereafter, the President may suspend for a period of 
not more than 6 months at a time any provision of law specified 
in subsection (d). Any such suspension shall cease to be 
effective after 6 months, or at such earlier date as the 
President may specify.
    (b) Conditions.--
          (1) \1\ Consultations.--Prior to each exercise of the 
        authority provided in subsection (a) or certification 
        pursuant to subsection (c), the President shall consult 
        with the relevant congressional committees. The 
        President may not exercise that authority or make such 
        certification until 30 days after a written policy 
        justification is submitted to the relevant 
        congressional committees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Responsibilities delegated to the President in para. (1) and 
(5) of subsec. (b) were redelegated by the President to the Secretary 
of State in a Presidential memorandum of February 29, 1996 (61 F.R. 
9889).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (2) Presidential Certification.--The President may 
        exercise the authority provided in subsection (a) only 
        if the President certifies to the relevant 
        congressional committees each time he exercises such 
        authority that--
                  (A) it is in the national interest of the 
                United States to exercise such authority;
                  (B) the P.L.O., the Palestinian Authority, 
                and successor entities are complying with all 
                the commitments described in paragraph (4); and
                  (C) funds provided pursuant to the exercise 
                of this authority and the authorities under 
                section 583(a) of Public Law 103-236 and 
                section 3(a) of Public Law 103-125 have been 
                used for the purposes for which they were 
                intended.
          (3) Requirement for continuing p.l.o. compliance.--
        (A) The President shall ensure that P.L.O. performance 
        is continuously monitored and if the President at any 
        time determines that the P.L.O. has not continued to 
        comply with all the commitments described in paragraph 
        (4), he shall so notify the relevant congressional 
        committees and any suspension under subsection (a) of a 
        provision of law specified in subsection (d) shall 
        cease to be effective.
          (B) Beginning six months after the date of enactment 
        of this Act, if the President on the basis of the 
        continuous monitoring of the P.L.O.'s performance 
        determines that the P.L.O. is not complying with the 
        requirements described in subsection (c), he shall so 
        notify the relevant congressional committees and no 
        assistance shall be provided pursuant to the exercise 
        by the President of the authority provided by 
        subsection (a) until such time as the President makes 
        the certification provided for in subsection (c).
          (4) P.L.O. commitments described.--The commitments 
        referred to in paragraphs (2)(B) and (3)(A) are the 
        commitments made by the P.L.O--
                  (A) in its letter of September 9, 1993, to 
                the Prime Minister of Israel; in its letter of 
                September 9, 1993, to the Foreign Minister of 
                Norway to--
                          (i) recognize the right of the State 
                        of Israel to exist in peace and 
                        security;
                          (ii) accept United Nations Security 
                        Council Resolutions 242 and 338;
                          (iii) renounce the use of terrorism 
                        and other acts of violence;
                          (iv) assume responsibility over all 
                        P.L.O. elements and personnel in order 
                        to assure their compliance, prevent 
                        violations and discipline violators;
                          (v) call upon the Palestinian people 
                        in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to take 
                        part in the steps leading to the 
                        normalization of life, rejecting 
                        violence and terrorism, and 
                        contributing to peace and stability; 
                        and
                          (vi) submit to the Palestine National 
                        Council for formal approval the 
                        necessary changes to the Palestinian 
                        National Covenant eliminating calls for 
                        Israel's destruction, and
                  (B) in, and resulting from, the good faith 
                implementation of the Declaration of 
                Principles, including good faith implementation 
                of subsequent agreements with Israel, with 
                particular attention to the objective of 
                preventing terrorism, as reflected in the 
                provisions of the Interim Agreement 
                concerning--
                          (i) prevention of acts of terrorism 
                        and legal measures against terrorists, 
                        including the arrest and prosecution of 
                        individuals suspected of perpetrating 
                        acts of violence and terror;
                          (ii) abstention from and prevention 
                        of incitement, including hostile 
                        propaganda;
                          (iii) operation of armed forces other 
                        than the Palestinian Police;
                          (iv) possession, manufacture, sale, 
                        acquisition or importation of weapons;
                          (v) employment of police who have 
                        been convicted of serious crimes or 
                        have been found to be actively involved 
                        in terrorist activities subsequent to 
                        their employment;
                          (vi) transfers to Israel of 
                        individuals suspected of, charged with, 
                        or convicted of an offense that falls 
                        within Israeli criminal jurisdiction;
                          (vii) cooperation with the government 
                        of Israel in criminal matters, 
                        including cooperation in the conduct of 
                        investigations; and
                          (viii) exercise of powers and 
                        responsibilities under the agreement 
                        with due regard to internationally 
                        accepted norms and principles of human 
                        rights and the rule of law.
          (5) \1\ Policy justification.--As part of the 
        President's written policy justification to be 
        submitted to the relevant Congressional Committees 
        pursuant to paragraph (1), the President will report 
        on--
                  (A) the manner in which the P.L.O. has 
                complied with the commitments specified in 
                paragraph (4), including responses to 
                individual acts of terrorism and violence, 
                actions to discipline perpetrators of terror 
                and violence, and actions to preempt acts of 
                terror and violence;
                  (B) the extent to which the P.L.O. has 
                fulfilled the requirements specified in 
                subsection (c);
                  (C) actions that the P.L.O. has taken with 
                regard to the Arab League boycott of Israel;
                  (D) the status and activities of the P.L.O. 
                office in the United States;
                  (E) all United States assistance which 
                benefits, directly or indirectly, the projects, 
                programs, or activities of the Palestinian 
                Authority in Gaza, Jericho, or any other area 
                it may control, since September 13, 1993, 
                including--
                          (i) the obligation and disbursal of 
                        such assistance, by project, activity, 
                        and date, as well as by prime 
                        contractor and all subcontractors;
                          (ii) the organizations or individuals 
                        responsible for the receipt and 
                        obligation of such assistance;
                          (iii) the intended beneficiaries of 
                        such assistance; and
                          (iv) the amount of international 
                        donor funds that benefit the P.L.O. or 
                        the Palestinian Authority in Gaza, 
                        Jericho, or any other area the P.L.O. 
                        or the Palestinian Authority may 
                        control, and to which the United States 
                        is a contributor; and
                  (F) statements by senior officials of the 
                P.L.O., the Palestinian Authority, and 
                successor entities that question the right of 
                Israel to exist or urge armed conflict with or 
                terrorism against Israel or its citizens, 
                including an assessment of the degree to which 
                such statements reflect official policy of the 
                P.L.O., the Palestinian Authority, or successor 
                entities.
    (c) Requirement for Continued Provision of Assistance.--Six 
months after the enactment of this Act, United States 
assistance shall not be provided pursuant to the exercise by 
the President of the authority provided by subsection (a), 
unless and until the President determines and so certifies to 
the Congress that--
          (1) if the Palestinian Council has been elected and 
        assumed its responsibilities, it has, within 2 months, 
        effectively disavowed and thereby nullified the 
        articles of the Palestine National Covenant which call 
        for Israel's destruction, unless the necessary changes 
        to the Covenant have already been approved by the 
        Palestine National Council;
          (2) the P.L.O., the Palestinian Authority, and 
        successor entities have exercised their authority 
        resolutely to establish the necessary enforcement 
        institutions; including laws, police, and a judicial 
        system, for apprehending, transferring, prosecuting, 
        convicting, and imprisoning terrorists;
          (3) the P.L.O., has limited participation in the 
        Palestinian Authority and its successors to individuals 
        and groups that neither engage in nor practice 
        terrorism or violence in the implementation of their 
        political goals;
          (4) the P.L.O., the Palestinian Authority, and 
        successor entities have not provided any financial or 
        material assistance or training to any group, whether 
        or not affiliated with the P.L.O., to carry out actions 
        inconsistent with the Declaration of Principles, 
        particularly acts of terrorism against Israel;
          (5) the P.L.O., the Palestinian Authority, or 
        successor entities have cooperated in good faith with 
        Israeli authorities in--
                  (A) the preemption of acts of terrorism;
                  (B) the apprehension, trial, and punishment 
                of individuals who have planned or committed 
                terrorist acts subject to the jurisdiction of 
                the Palestinian Authority or any successor 
                entity; and
                  (C) the apprehension of and transfer to 
                Israeli authorities of individuals suspected 
                of, charged with, or convicted of, planning or 
                committing terrorist acts subject to Israeli 
                jurisdiction in accordance with the specific 
                provisions of the Interim Agreement;
          (6) the P.L.O., the Palestinian Authority, and 
        successor entities have exercised their authority 
        resolutely to enact and implement laws requiring the 
        disarming of civilians not specifically licensed to 
        possess or carry weapons;
          (7) the P.L.O., the Palestinian Authority, and 
        successor entities have not funded, either partially or 
        wholly, or have ceased funding, either partially or 
        wholly, any office, or other presence of the 
        Palestinian Authority in Jerusalem unless established 
        by specific agreement between Israel and the P.L.O., 
        the Palestinian Authority, or successor entities;
          (8) the P.L.O., the Palestinian Authority, and 
        successor entities are cooperating fully with the 
        Government of the United States on the provision of 
        information on United States nationals known to have 
        been held at any time by the P.L.O. or factions 
        thereof; and
          (9) the P.L.O., the Palestinian Authority, and 
        successor entities have not, without the agreement of 
        the Government of Israel, taken any steps that will 
        change the status of Jerusalem or the West Bank and 
        Gaza Strip, pending the outcome of the permanent status 
        negotiations.
    (d) \2\ Provisions That May Be Suspended.--The provisions 
that may be suspended under the authority of subsection (a) are 
the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ In a memoranda for the Secretary of State, the President has 
certified that it is in the national interests to suspend the 
application of these provisions of law. (Presidential Determination No. 
96-20 of April 1, 1996; 61 F.R. 26019).
    This certification was extended in Presidential Determination No. 
96-32 of June 14, 1996 (61 F.R. 32629); Presidential Determination No. 
96-41 of August 12, 1996 (61 F.R. 43137); and Presidential 
Determination No. 97-17 of February 21, 1997 (62 F.R. 9903).
    This most recent determination extends the suspension through 
August 12, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
        (22 U.S.C. 2227) as it applies with respect to the 
        P.L.O. or entities associated with it.
          (2) Section 114 of the Department of State 
        Authorization Act, fiscal years 1984 and 1985 (22 
        U.S.C. 287e note) as it applies with respect to the 
        P.L.O. or entities associated with it.
          (3) Section 1003 of the Foreign Relations 
        Authorization Act, fiscal years 1988 and 1989 (22 
        U.S.C. 5202).
          (4) Section 37 of the Bretton Woods Agreement Act (22 
        U.S.C. 286W) as it applies on the granting to the 
        P.L.O. of observer status or other official status at 
        any meeting sponsored by or associated with the 
        International Monetary Fund. As used in this paragraph, 
        the term ``other official status'' does not include 
        membership in the International Monetary Fund.
    (e) Definitions.--As used in this title:
          (1) Relevant Congressional Committees.--The term 
        ``relevant congressional committees'' mean--
                  (A) the Committee on International Relations, 
                the Committee on Banking and Financial 
                Services, and the Committee on Appropriations 
                of the House of Representatives; and
                  (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and 
                the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
          (2) United States Assistance.--The term ``United 
        States assistance'' means any form of grant, loan, loan 
        guarantee, credit, insurance, in kind assistance, or 
        any other form of assistance.

                          transition provision

    Sec. 605. (a) In General.--Section 583(a) of the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public 
Law 103-236) is amended by striking ``November 1, 1995'' and 
inserting ``January 1, 1996''.
    (b) Consultation.--For purposes of any exercise of the 
authority provided in section 583(a) of the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-
236) prior to November 15, 1995, the written policy 
justification dated June 1, 1995, and submitted to the Congress 
in accordance with section 583(b)(1) of such Act, and the 
consultations associated with such policy justification, shall 
be deemed to satisfy the requirements of section 583(b)(1) of 
such Act.

                         reporting requirement

    Sec. 606. Section 804(b) of the P.L.O. Commitments 
Compliance Act of 1989 (title VIII of Public Law 101-246) is 
amended--
          (1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by 
        striking ``section (3)(b)(1) of the Middle East Peace 
        Facilitation Act of 1994'' and inserting ``section 
        604(b)(1) of the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 
        1995''; and
          (2) in paragraph (1), by striking ``section (4)(a) of 
        the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1994 (Oslo 
        commitments)'' and inserting ``section 604(b)(4) of the 
        Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1995''.

             b. Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1994

Title V, Part E of Public Law 103-236 [Foreign Relations Authorization 
 Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995; H.R. 2333], 108 Stat. 488, approved 
                       April 23, 1994, as amended

                 PART E--MIDDLE EAST PEACE FACILITATION

SEC. 581. SHORT TITLE.

    This part may be cited as the ``Middle East Peace 
Facilitation Act of 1994''.

SEC. 582. FINDINGS.

    The Congress finds that--
          (1) the Palestine Liberation Organization has 
        recognized the State of Israel's right to exist in 
        peace and security; accepted United Nations Security 
        Council Resolutions 242 and 338; committed itself to 
        the peace process and peaceful coexistence with Israel, 
        free from violence and all other acts which endanger 
        peace and stability; and assumed responsibility over 
        all Palestine Liberation Organization elements and 
        personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent 
        violations, and discipline violators;
          (2) Israel has recognized the Palestine Liberation 
        Organization as the representative of the Palestinian 
        people;
          (3) Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization 
        signed a Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-
        Government Arrangements on September 13, 1993, at the 
        White House;
          (4) the United States has resumed a bilateral 
        dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization; 
        and
          (5) in order to implement the Declaration of 
        Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements and 
        facilitate the Middle East peace process, the President 
        has requested flexibility to suspend certain provisions 
        of law pertaining to the Palestine Liberation 
        Organization.

SEC. 583. AUTHORITY TO SUSPEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS.
    (a) In General.--Subject to subsection (b), beginning July 
1, 1994, the President may suspend for a period of not more 
than 6 months any provision of law specified in subsection (c). 
The President may continue the suspension for a period or 
periods of not more than 6 months until March 31, 1996,\1\ if, 
before each such period, the President satisfies the 
requirements of subsection (b). Any suspension shall cease to 
be effective after 6 months, or at such earlier date as the 
President may specify.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Sec. 1 of Public Law 104-17 (109 Stat. 191) extended this 
authority from July 1, 1995 to August 15, 1995. Further extensions were 
provided in Public Law 104-22 (109 Stat. 260)--extending to October 1, 
1995; Public Law 104-30 (109 Stat. 277)--extending to November 1, 1995; 
Public Law 104-47 (109 Stat. 423)--extending to December 31, 1995; and 
Public Law 104-89 (109 Stat. 960)--extending to March 31, 1996. The 
latter extensions further provided the following, with appropriate 
dates adjusted:
    ``(b) Consultation.--For purposes of any exercise of the authority 
provided in section 583(a) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236) prior to January 10, 
1996, the written policy justification dated December 1, 1995, and 
submitted to the Congress in accordance with section 583(b)(1) of such 
Act, shall be deemed to satisfy the requirements of section 583(b)(1) 
of such Act.''.
    Sec. 605(a) Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related 
Programs Appropriations Act, 1996 (Public Law 104-107; 110 Stat. 760), 
struck out ``November 1, 1995'' and inserted in lieu thereof ``January 
1, 1996'', an amendment already similarly provided in Public Law 104-47 
and further amended by Public Law 104-89.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Conditions.--
          (1) \2\ Consultation.--Prior to each exercise of the 
        authority provided in subsection (a), the President 
        shall consult with the relevant congressional 
        committees. The President may not exercise that 
        authority until 30 days after a written policy 
        justification is submitted to the relevant 
        congressional committees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ In a July 26, 1994, memorandum the President delegated 
responsibility of fulfilling functions in subsec. (b)(1) and (b)(6) to 
the Secretary of State.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (2) Presidential certification.--The President may 
        exercise the authority provided in subsection (a) only 
        if the President certifies to the relevant 
        congressional committees each time he exercises such 
        authority that--
                  (A) it is in the national interest of the 
                United States to exercise such authority; and
                  (B) the Palestine Liberation Organization 
                continues to abide by all the commitments 
                described in paragraph (4).
          (3) Requirement for continuing plo compliance.--Any 
        suspension under subsection (a) of a provision of law 
        specified in subsection (c) shall cease to be effective 
        if the President certifies to the relevant 
        congressional committees that the Palestine Liberation 
        Organization has not continued to abide by all the 
        commitments described in paragraph (4).
          (4) PLO commitments described.--The commitments 
        referred to in paragraphs (2) and (3) are the 
        commitments made by the Palestine Liberation 
        Organization--
                  (A) in its letter of September 9, 1993, to 
                the Prime Minister of Israel; in its letter of 
                September 9, 1993, to the Foreign Minister of 
                Norway to--
                          (i) recognize the right of the State 
                        of Israel to exist in peace and 
                        security;
                          (ii) accept United Nations Security 
                        Council Resolutions 242 and 338;
                          (iii) renounce the use of terrorism 
                        and other acts of violence;
                          (iv) assume responsibility over all 
                        PLO elements and personnel in order to 
                        assure their compliance, prevent 
                        violations and discipline violators;
                          (v) call upon the Palestinian people 
                        in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to take 
                        part in the steps leading to the 
                        normalization of life, rejecting 
                        violence and terrorism, and 
                        contributing to peace and stability; 
                        and
                          (vi) submit to the Palestine National 
                        Council for formal approval the 
                        necessary changes to the Palestinian 
                        National Covenant eliminating calls for 
                        Israel's destruction, and
                  (B) in, and resulting from, the good faith 
                implementation of, the Declaration of 
                Principles on Interim Self-Government 
                Arrangements signed on September 13, 1993.
          (5) Expectation of congress regarding any extension 
        of presidential authority.--The Congress expects that 
        any extension of the authority provided to the 
        President in subsection (a) will be conditional on the 
        Palestine Liberation Organization--
                  (A) renouncing the Arab League boycott of 
                Israel;
                  (B) urging the nations of the Arab League to 
                end the Arab League boycott of Israel;
                  (C) cooperating with efforts undertaken by 
                the President of the United States to end the 
                Arab League boycott of Israel; \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Sec. 565A of Public Law 103-306 (108 Stat. 1650) struck out 
``and'' at the end of subpar. (C); struck out the period at the end of 
subpar. (D) and inserted in lieu thereof ``; and''; and added subpar. 
(E).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  (D) condemning individual acts of terrorism 
                and violence; and \3\
                  (E) \3\ amending its National Covenant to 
                eliminate all references calling for the 
                destruction of Israel.
          (6) Reporting requirement.--As part of the 
        President's written policy justification referred to in 
        paragraph (1), the President will report on the PLO's 
        response to individual acts of terrorism and violence, 
        as well as its actions concerning the Arab League 
        boycott of Israel as enumerated in paragraph (5) and on 
        the status of the PLO office in the United States as 
        enumerated in subsection (c)(3).
    (c) \4\ Provisions That May Be Suspended.--The provisions 
that may be suspended under the authority of subsection (a) are 
the following:
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    \4\ In memoranda for the Secretary of State, the President has 
certified that it is in the national interests to suspend the 
application of these provisions of law. Presidential Determination No. 
94-13 of January 14, 1994 (59 F.R. 4777).
    This certification was extended in Presidential Determination No. 
94-30 of June 30, 1994 (59 F.R. 35607); Presidential Determination No. 
95-12 of December 31, 1994 (60 F.R. 2673); Presidential Determination 
No. 95-31 of July 2, 1995 (60 F.R. 35827); Presidential Determination 
No. 95-36 of August 14, 1995 (60 F.R. 44725); Presidential 
Determination No. 95-50 of September 30, 1995 (60 F.R. 53093; 
Presidential Determination No. 96-5 of November 13, 1995 (60 F.R. 
57821); Presidential Determination No. 96-8 of January 4, 1996 (61 F.R. 
2889); Presidential Determination No. 96-20 of April 1, 1996 (61 F.R. 
26019); Presidential Determination No. 96-32 of June 14, 1996 (61 F.R. 
32629); Presidential Determination No. 96-41 of August 12, 1996 (61 
F.R. 43137); andPresidential Determination No. 97-17 of February 21, 
1997 (62 F.R. 9903).
    This most recent determination extends the suspension through 
August 12, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
        (22 U.S.C. 2227) as it applies with respect to the 
        Palestine Liberation Organization or entities 
        associated with it.
          (2) Section 114 of the Department of State 
        Authorization Act, Fiscal years 1984 and 1985 (22 
        U.S.C. 287e note) as it applies with respect to the 
        Palestine Liberation Organization or entities 
        associated with it.
          (3) Section 1003 of the Foreign Relations 
        Authorization Act, Fiscal years 1988 and 1989 (22 
        U.S.C. 5202).
          (4) Section 37 of the Bretton Woods Agreement Act (22 
        U.S.C. 286w) as it applies to the granting to the 
        Palestine Liberation Organization of observer status or 
        other official status at any meeting sponsored by or 
        associated with the International Monetary Fund. As 
        used in this paragraph, the term ``other official 
        status'' does not include membership in the 
        International Monetary Fund.
    (d) Relevant Congressional Committees Defined.--As used in 
this section, the term ``relevant congressional committees'' 
means--
          (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee 
        on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, and the 
        Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
        Representatives; \5\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Sec. 1(a)(2) of Public Law 104-14 (109 Stat. 186) provided that 
references to the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs of 
the House of Representatives shall be treated as referring to the 
Committee on Banking and Financial Services of the House of 
Representatives. Sec. 1(a)(5) of that Act provided that references to 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives shall 
be treated as referring to the Committee on International Relations of 
the House of Representatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
        Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

               c. PLO Commitments Compliance Act of 1989

Title VIII of Public Law 101-246 [Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
 Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991; H.R. 3792], 104 Stat. 15 at 76, approved 
                     February 16, 1990, as amended

 AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1990 and 1991 for 
            the Department of State, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


         TITLE VIII-PLO  COMMITMENTS COMPLIANCE ACT OF 1989 \1\

SEC. 801. SHORT TITLE.

    This title may be cited as the ``PLO Commitments Compliance 
Act of 1989''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ On March 14, 1990, the President designated and empowered ``the 
Secretary of State to perform, without the approval, ratification, or 
other approval of the President, the functions of the President set 
forth in Title VIII of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Years 1990 and 1991; Public Law 101-246.'' (55 F.R. 11131).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 802. FINDINGS.

    The Congress finds that--
          (1) United States policy regarding contacts with the 
        Palestine Liberation Organization (including its 
        Executive Committee, the Palestine National Council, 
        and any constituent groups related thereto (hereafter 
        in this title referred to as the ``PLO'')) set forth in 
        the Memorandum of Agreement between the United States 
        and Israel, dated September 1, 1975, stated that the 
        United States ``will not recognize or negotiate with 
        the Palestine Liberation Organization so long as the 
        PLO does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does 
        not accept United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
        242 and 338'';
          (2) section 1302 of the International Security and 
        Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (22 U.S.C. 2151 
        note; Public Law 99-83), effective October 1, 1985, 
        stated that ``no officer or employee of the United 
        States Government and no agent or other individual 
        acting on behalf of the United States Government shall 
        negotiate with the PLO or any representatives thereof 
        (except in emergency or humanitarian situations) unless 
        and until the PLO recognizes Israel's right to exist, 
        accepts United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 
        and 338, and renounces the use of terrorism'';
          (3) the Department of State statement of November 26, 
        1988, found that ``the United States Government has 
        convincing evidence that PLO elements have engaged in 
        terrorism against Americans and others'' and that ``Mr. 
        [Yasser] Arafat, Chairman of the PLO, knows of, 
        condones, and lends support to such acts; he therefore 
        is an accessory to such terrorism'';
          (4) Secretary of State Shultz declared on December 
        14, 1988, that ``the [PLO] today issued a statement in 
        which it accepted United Nations Security Council 
        Resolutions 242 and 338, recognized Israel's right to 
        exist in peace and security, and renounced terrorism. 
        As a result, the United States is prepared for a 
        substantive dialogue with PLO representatives'';
          (5) President Ronald Reagan, subsequent to the 
        decision to open a United States-PLO dialogue, stated 
        that the PLO ``must demonstrate that its renunciation 
        of terrorism is pervasive and permanent'' and if the 
        PLO reneges on its commitments, the United States 
        ``will certainly break off communications'';
          (6) since the United States agreed to enter into a 
        dialogue with the PLO, there have been several 
        attempted incursions into Israel by the following PLO-
        affiliated groups: the Popular Struggle Front, the 
        Palestine Liberation Front, the Democratic Front for 
        the Liberation of Palestine, and the Islamic Jihad 
        group;
          (7) Yasser Arafat has not renounced any of these 
        incidents, that he has threatened ``ten bullets in the 
        chest'' to those Palestinians who advocate a cessation 
        of the unrest, and that his principal deputy, Abu Iyad, 
        as well as other senior Al-Fatah figures, have been 
        quoted as saying that the PLO recognition of Israel and 
        renunciation of terrorism is merely tactical and that a 
        Palestinian state is but the first step in the 
        ``liberation of Palestine'';
          (8) \2\ the President, following an attempted 
        terrorist attack upon a Tel Aviv beach on May 30, 1990, 
        suspended the United States dialogue with the PLO;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Sec. 524(7) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 473), added paras. 
(8) and (9).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (9) \2\ the President resumed the United States 
        dialogue with the PLO in response to the commitments 
        made by the PLO in letters to the Prime Minister of 
        Israel and the Foreign Minister of Norway of September 
        9, 1993; and
          (10) \3\ that the United States should regularly 
        evaluate the PLO's compliance with the commitments made 
        by Yasser Arafat on behalf of the PLO in Geneva on 
        December 14, 1988 and on September 9, 1993.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Sec. 524(5) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 473), redesignated 
former para. (8) as para. (10).
    \4\ Sec. 524(4) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 473), inserted ``and 
on September 9, 1993''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. 803. POLICY.

    (a) In General.--The Congress reiterates long-standing 
United States policy that any dialogue with the PLO be 
contingent upon the PLO's recognition of Israel's right to 
exist, its acceptance of United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338, and its abstention from and 
renunciation of all acts of terrorism.
    (b) Policy Toward Implementation of PLO Commitments.--It is 
the sense of the Congress that the United States, in any 
discussions with the PLO, should seek--
          (1) the prevention of terrorism and other violent 
        activity by the PLO or any of its factions; and
          (2) the implementation of concrete steps by the PLO 
        consistent with its commitments to recognize Israel and 
        renounce terrorism, including concrete actions that 
        will further the peace process such as--
                  (A) disbanding units which have been involved 
                in terrorism;
                  (B) publicly condemning all acts of 
                terrorism;
                  (C) ceasing the intimidation of Palestinians 
                who advocate a cessation of or who do not 
                support the unrest;
                  (D) calling on the Arab states to recognize 
                Israel and to end their economic boycott of 
                Israel; and
                  (E) amending the PLO's Covenant to remove 
                provisions which undermine Israel's legitimacy 
                and which call for Israel's destruction.
    (c) Policy Toward Recent Armed Incursions Into Israel By 
PLO-Affiliated Groups.--During the next round of talks with the 
PLO, should such talks occur after the date of enactment of 
this Act, the representative of the United States should obtain 
from the representative of the PLO a full accounting of the 
following attempted incursions into Israel which occurred after 
Yasser Arafat's statement of December 14, 1988:
          (1) On December 26, 1988, an attempted armed 
        infiltration into Israel by boat by four members of the 
        PLO-affiliated Popular Struggle Front.
          (2) On December 28, 1988, an attempted armed 
        infiltration into Israel by three members of the PLO-
        affiliated Palestine Liberation Front.
          (3) On January 24, 1989, an unprovoked attack on an 
        Israeli patrol in Southern Lebanon by the PLO-
        affiliated Palestine Liberation Front.
          (4) On February 5, 1989, an attempted armed 
        infiltration into Israel by nine members of the PLO-
        affiliated Palestine Liberation Front and Popular Front 
        for the Liberation of Palestine.
          (5) On February 23, 1989, an attempted attack on 
        targets in Israel by members of the PLO-affiliated 
        Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
          (6) On February 27, 1989, a PLO-affiliated Popular 
        Front for the Liberation of Palestine ambush of a pro-
        Israeli Southern Lebanese army vehicle.
          (7) On March 2, 1989, an attempted armed infiltration 
        into Israel by four members of the PLO-affiliated 
        Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine headed 
        for the civilian town of Zarit.
          (8) On March 13, 1989, an attempted armed 
        infiltration into Israel by three members of the PLO-
        aligned Palestine Liberation Front.
          (9) On March 15, 1989, an attempted attack on Israel 
        through Gaza by two members of the Islamic Jihad group.

SEC. 804. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.

    (a) Report on Armed Incursions.--In the event that talks 
are held with the PLO after the date of enactment of this Act, 
the Secretary of State, shall, within 30 days after the next 
round of such talks, report to the Chairman of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs \5\ of the Senate and the Speaker of the House 
of Representatives any accounting provided by the 
representative of the PLO of the incidents described in section 
803(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ As enrolled. Should read ``Committee on Foreign Relations''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Report on Compliance With Commitments.--In conjunction 
with each written policy justification required under section 
583(b)(1) of the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1994 \6\ 
or every 180 days,,\7\ the President shall submit to the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report, in 
unclassified form to the maximum extent practicable, regarding 
progress toward the achievement of the measures described in 
section 803(b). Such report shall include--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Sec. 1(kk)(10 of Public Law 103-415 (108 Stat. 4303) struck out 
``section (3)(b)(1) of the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1994'' 
and inserted in lieu thereof ``section 583(b)(1) of the Middle East 
Peace Facilitation Act of 1994''.
    \7\ Sec. 524(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 473), struck out 
``Beginning 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act, and every 
120 days thereafter in which the dialogue between the United States and 
the PLO has not been discontinued'' and inserted in lieu thereof ``In 
conjunction with each written policy justification required under 
section (3)(b)(1) of the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1994 or 
every 180 days,'' [resulting in a double comma].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) a description of actions or statements by the PLO 
        as an organization, its Chairman, members of its 
        Executive Committee, members of the Palestine National 
        Council, or any constituent groups related thereto, as 
        they relate to the Geneva commitments of December 1988 
        and each of the commitments described in section 584(a) 
        of the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1994 \8\ 
        (Oslo commitments),\9\ including actions or statements 
        that contend that the declared ``Palestinian state'' 
        encompasses all of Israel;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Sec. 1(kk)(2) of Public Law 103-415 (108 Stat. 4303) struck out 
``section (4)(a) of the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1994'' 
and inserted in lieu thereof ``section 584(a) of the Middle East Peace 
Facilitation Act of 1994''.
    \9\ Sec. 524(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 473), struck out 
``regarding [the] cessation of terrorism and recognition of Israel's 
right to exist'' and inserted in lieu thereof ``and each of the 
commitments described in section (4)(A) of the Middle East Peace 
Facilitation Act of 1994 (Oslo commitments)''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (2) a description of the steps, if any, taken by the 
        PLO to evict or otherwise discipline individuals or 
        groups taking actions inconsistent with the Geneva and 
        Oslo \10\ commitments;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Sec. 524(3) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 473), inserted ``and 
Oslo'' after ``Geneva''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (3) a statement of whether the PLO, in accordance 
        with procedures in Article 33 of the Palestinian 
        National Covenant, has repealed provisions in that 
        Covenant which call for Israel's destruction;
          (4) a statement of whether the PLO has repudiated its 
        ``strategy of stages'' whereby it seeks to use a 
        Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza as the 
        first step in the total elimination of the state of 
        Israel;
          (5) a statement of whether the PLO has called on any 
        Arab state to recognize and enter direct negotiations 
        with Israel or to end its economic boycott of Israel;
          (6) a statement of whether ``Force 17'' and the 
        ``Hawari Group'', units directed by Yasser Arafat that 
        have carried out terrorist attacks, have been disbanded 
        and not reconstituted under different names;
          (7) a statement of whether the following PLO 
        constituent groups conduct or participate in terrorist 
        or other violent activities: the Fatah; the Popular 
        Front for the Liberation of Palestine; the Democratic 
        Front for the Liberation of Palestine; the Arab 
        Liberation Front; the Palestine Liberation Front;
          (8) a statement of the PLO's position on the unrest 
        in the West Bank and Gaza, and whether the PLO 
        threatens, through violence or other intimidation 
        measures, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza who 
        advocate a cessation of or who do not support the 
        unrest, and who might be receptive to taking part in 
        elections there;
          (9) a statement of the position of the PLO regarding 
        the prosecution and extradition, if so requested, of 
        known terrorists such as Abu Abbas, who directed the 
        Achille Lauro hijacking during which Leon Klinghoffer 
        was murdered, and Muhammed Rashid, implicated in the 
        1982 bombing of a PanAm jet and the 1986 bombing of a 
        TWA jet in which four Americans were killed; \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Sec. 574 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and 
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1995 (Public Law 103-306; 108 
Stat. 1653), replaced ``; and'' in para. (9) with a semicolon; struck 
out the period at the end of para. (10) and inserted in lieu thereof 
``; and''; and added a new para. (11).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (10) a statement of the position of the PLO on 
        providing compensation to the American victims or the 
        families of American victims of PLO terrorism; and \11\
          (11) \11\ measures taken by the PLO to prevent acts 
        of terrorism, crime and hostilities and to legally 
        punish offenders, as called for in the Gaza-Jericho 
        agreement of May 4, 1994.
    (c) Report on Policies of Arab States.--Not more than 30 
days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
State shall prepare and submit to the Congress a report 
concerning the policies of Arab states toward the Middle East 
peace process, including progress toward--
          (1) public recognition of Israel's right to exist in 
        peace and security;
          (2) ending the Arab economic boycott of Israel; and
          (3) ending efforts to expel Israel from international 
        organizations or denying participation in the 
        activities of such organizations.

                     d. Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987

  Title X of Public Law 100-204 [Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
   Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989; H.R. 1777], 101 Stat. 1406, approved 
                           December 22, 1987

 AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1988 and 1989 for 
  the Department of State, the U.S. Information Agency, the Voice of 
   America, the Board for International Broadcasting, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                  TITLE X--ANTI-TERRORISM ACT OF 1987

SEC. 1001. SHORT TITLE.

  This title may be cited as the ``Anti-Terrorism Act of 
1987''.

SEC. 1002.\1\ FINDINGS; DETERMINATIONS.

  (a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 22 U.S.C. 5201.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) Middle East terrorism accounted for 60 percent of 
        total international terrorism in 1985;
          (2) the Palestine Liberation Organization (hereafter 
        in this title referred to as the ``PLO'') was directly 
        responsible for the murder of an American citizen on 
        the Achille Lauro cruise liner in 1985, and a member of 
        the PLO's Executive Committee is under indictment in 
        the United States for the murder of that American 
        citizen;
          (3) the head of the PLO has been implicated in the 
        murder of a United States Ambassador overseas;
          (4) the PLO and its constituent groups have taken 
        credit for, and been implicated in, the murders of 
        dozens of American citizens abroad;
          (5) the PLO covenant specifically states that ``armed 
        struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine, thus it 
        is an overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase'';
          (6) the PLO rededicated itself to the ``continuing 
        struggle in all its armed forms'' at the Palestine 
        National Council meeting in April 1987; and
          (7) the Attorney General has stated that ``various 
        elements of the Palestine Liberation Organization and 
        its allies and affiliates are in the thick of 
        international terror''.
  (b) Determinations.--Therefore, the Congress determines that 
the PLO and its affiliates are a terrorist organization and a 
threat to the interests of the United States, its allies, and 
to international law and should not benefit from operating in 
the United States.

SEC. 1003.\2\ PROHIBITIONS REGARDING THE PLO.
  It shall be unlawful, if the purpose be to further the 
interests of the Palestine Liberation Organization or any of 
its constituent groups, any successor to any of those, or any 
agents thereof, on or after the effective date of this title--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ 22 U.S.C. 5202. In a memorandum for the Secretary of State, 
issued on January 14, 1994, the President, pursuant to the authority 
stated in the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1993 (Public Law 
103-125):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          ``(A) certif[ied] that it is in the national interest to 
        suspend the application of the following provisions of law 
        until July 1, 1994:

                  ``(1) Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
                1961 (22 U.S.C. 2227), as it applies with respect to 
                the Palestine Liberation Organization or entities 
                associated with it;
                  ``(2) Section 114 of the Department of State 
                Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985 (22 
                U.S.C. 287e note), as it applies with respect to the 
                Palestine Liberation Organization or entities 
                associated with it;
                  ``(3) Section 1003 of the Foreign Relations 
                Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 
                U.S.C. 5202); and
                  ``(4) Section 37 of the Bretton Woods Agreement [sic] 
                Act (22 U.S.C. 286w), as it applies to the granting of 
                the Palestine Liberation Organization of observer 
                status or other official status at any meeting 
                sponsored by or associated with the International 
                Monetary Fund.

          ``(B) certif[ied] that the Palestine Liberation Organization 
        continues to abide by its commitments: in its letter of 
        September 9, 1993, to the Prime Minister of Israel; in its 
        letter of September 9, 1993, to the Foreign Minister of Norway; 
        and in, and resulting from the implementation of the 
        Declaration of Principles on interim self-government 
        arrangements signed on September 13, 1993.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ``II. Pursuant to the authority vested in me by section 516 of the 
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act, Public Law 103-87, I hereby determine that the 
suspension of section 516(a) of that Act with respect to the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO), programs for the PLO, and programs for 
the benefit of entities associated with it, which accept the 
commitments made by the PLO on September 9, 1993, is in the national 
interest.'' (Presidential Determination No. 94-13 of January 14, 1994; 
59 F.R. 4777).
    This certification was extended in Presidential Determination No. 
94-30 of June 30, 1994 (59 F.R. 35607); Presidential Determination No. 
95-12 of December 31, 1994 (60 F.R. 2673); Presidential Determination 
No. 95-31 of July 2, 1995 (60 F.R. 35827); Presidential Determination 
No. 95-36 of August 14, 1995 (60 F.R. 44725); Presidential 
Determination No. 95-50 of September 30, 1995 (60 F.R. 53093; 
Presidential Determination No. 96-5 of November 13, 1995 (60 F.R. 
57821); Presidential Determination No. 96-8 of January 4, 1996 (61 F.R. 
2889); Presidential Determination No. 96-20 of April 1, 1996 (61 F.R. 
26019); Presidential Determination No. 96-32 of June 14, 1996 (61 F.R. 
32629); Presidential Determination No. 96-41 of August 12, 1996 (61 
F.R. 43137); andPresidential Determination No. 97-17 of February 21, 
1997 (62 F.R. 9903).
    This most recent determination extends the suspension through 
August 12, 1997.
    Sec. 583(c) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 490), authorized the 
suspension of provisions in this section when certain conditions were 
met. See particularly sec. 583(a) of that Act.
    Pursuant to the authority vested in the President under section 
540(d) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related 
Programs Appropriations Act, 1999 (Public Law 105-277), the provisions 
of sec. 1003 of this Act were waived until October 21, 1999 in 
Presidential Determination No. 99-25 of May 24, 1999 (64 F.R. 29537). 
The provisions of this section were previously waived in Presidential 
Determination No. 99-5 of November 25, 1998 (63 F.R. 68145); 
Presidential Determination No. 98-29 of June 3, 1998 (63 F.R. 32711); 
and in Presidential Determination No. 98-8 of December 5, 1997 (64 F.R. 
29537).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) to receive anything of value except informational 
        material from the PLO or any of its constituent groups, 
        any successor thereto, or any agents thereof;
          (2) to expend funds from the PLO or any of its 
        constituent groups, any successor thereto, or any 
        agents thereof; or
          (3) notwithstanding any provision of law to the 
        contrary, to establish or maintain an office, 
        headquarters, premises, or other facilities or 
        establishments within the jurisdiction of the United 
        States at the behest or direction of, or with funds 
        provided by the Palestine Liberation Organization or 
        any of its constituent groups, any successor to any of 
        those, or any agents thereof.

SEC. 1004.\3\ ENFORCEMENT.

  (a) Attorney General.--The Attorney General shall take the 
necessary steps and institute the necessary legal action to 
effectuate the policies and provisions of this title.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ 22 U.S.C. 5203.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  (b) Relief.--Any district court of the United States for a 
district in which a violation of this title occurs shall have 
authority, upon petition of relief by the Attorney General, to 
grant injunctive and such other equitable relief as it shall 
deem necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.

SEC. 1005. EFFECTIVE DATE.

  (a) Effective Date.--Provisions of this title shall take 
effect 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act.
  (b) Termination.--The provisions of this title shall cease to 
have effect if the President certifies in writing to the 
President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the 
House that the Palestine Liberation Organization, its agents, 
or constituent groups thereof no longer practice or support 
terrorist actions anywhere in the world.

                3. National Emergencies Act, as amended

 Public Law 94-412 [H.R. 3884], 90 Stat. 1255, approved September 14, 
 1976; Public Law 95-223 [International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 
 H.R. 7738], 91 Stat. 1625, approved December 28, 1977; and by Public 
 Law 99-93 [Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 
        1987; H.R. 2068], 99 Stat. 448, approved August 16, 1985

   AN ACT To terminate certain authorities with respect to national 
emergencies still in effect, and to provide for orderly implementation 
            and termination of future national emergencies.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this 
Act may be cited as the ``National Emergencies Act''.

           TITLE I--TERMINATING EXISTING DECLARED EMERGENCIES

    Sec. 101.\1\ (a) All powers and authorities possessed by 
the President, any other officer or employee of the Federal 
Government, or any executive agency, as defined in section 105 
of title 5, United States Code, as a result of the existence of 
this Act are terminated two years from the date of such 
enactment. Such termination shall not affect--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 50 U.S.C. 1601.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) any action taken or proceeding pending not 
        finally concluded or determined on such date;
          (2) any action or proceeding based on any act 
        committed prior to such date; or
          (3) any rights or duties that matured or penalties 
        that were incurred prior to such date.
    (b) For the purpose of this section, the words ``any 
national emergency in effect'' means a general declaration of 
emergency made by the President.

         TITLE II--DECLARATIONS OF FUTURE NATIONAL EMERGENCIES

    Sec. 201.\2\ (a) With respect to Acts of Congress 
authorizing the exercise, during the period of a national 
emergency, of any special or extraordinary power, the President 
is authorized to declare such national emergency. Such 
proclamation shall immediately be transmitted to the Congress 
and published in the Federal Register.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ 50 U.S.C. 1621.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Any provisions of law conferring powers and authorities 
to be exercised during a national emergency shall be effective 
and remain in effect (1) only when the President (in accordance 
with subsection (a) of this section), specifically declares a 
national emergency, and (2) only in accordance with this Act. 
No law enacted after the date of enactment of this Act shall 
supersede this title unless it does so in specific terms, 
referring to this title, and declaring that the new law 
supersedes the provisions of this title.
    Sec. 202.\3\ (a) Any national emergency declared by the 
President in accordance with this title shall terminate if--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ 50 U.S.C. 1622. References to a ``joint'' resolution instead of 
a ``concurrent'' resolution in this section were added by sec. 801 of 
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987 
(Public Law 99-93; 99 Stat. 448).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) there is enacted into law a joint resolution 
        terminating the emergency; or
          (2) the President issues a proclamation terminating 
        the emergency.
Any national emergency declared by the President shall be 
terminated on the date specified in any joint resolution 
referred to in clause (1) or on the date specified in a 
proclamation by the President terminating the emergency as 
provided in clause (2) of this subsection, whichever date is 
earlier, and any powers or authorities exercised by reason of 
said emergency shall cease to be exercised after such specified 
date, except that such termination shall not affect--
          (A) any action taken or proceeding pending not 
        finally concluded or determined on such date;
          (B) any action or proceeding based on any act 
        committed prior to such date; or
          (C) any rights or duties that matured or penalties 
        that were incurred prior to such date.
    (b) Not later than six months after a national emergency is 
declared, and not later than the end of each six-month period 
thereafter that such emergency continues, each House of 
Congress shall meet to consider a vote on a joint resolution to 
determine whether that emergency shall be terminated.
    (c)(1) A joint resolution to terminate a national emergency 
declared by the President shall be referred to the appropriate 
committee of the House of Representatives or the Senate, as the 
case may be. One such joint resolution shall be reported out by 
such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen 
calendar days after the day on which such resolution is 
referred to such committee, unless such House shall otherwise 
determine by the yeas and nays.
    (2) Any joint resolution so reported shall become the 
pending business of the House in question (in the case of the 
Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the 
proponents and the opponents) and shall be voted on within 
three calendar days after the day on which such resolution is 
reported, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas 
and nays.
    (3) Such a joint resolution passed by one House shall be 
referred to the appropriate committee of the other House and 
shall be reported out by such committee together with its 
recommendations within fifteen calendar days after the day on 
which such resolution is referred to such committee and shall 
thereupon become the pending business of such House and shall 
be voted upon within three calendar days after the day on which 
such resolution is reported, unless such House shall otherwise 
determine by yeas and nays.
    (4) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses 
of Congress with respect to a joint resolution passed by both 
Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee 
of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such 
joint resolution within six calendar days after the day on 
which managers on the part of the Senate and the House have 
been appointed. Notwithstanding any rule in either House 
concerning the printing of conference reports or concerning any 
delay in the consideration of such reports, such report shall 
be acted on by both Houses not later than six calendar days 
after the conference report is filed in the House in which such 
report is filed first. In the event the conferees are unable to 
agree within forty-eight hours, they shall report back to their 
respective houses in disagreement.
    (5) Paragraphs (1)-(4) of this subsection, subsection (b) 
of this section, and section 502(b) of this Act are enacted by 
Congress--
          (A) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the 
        Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, 
        and as such they are deemed a part of the rules of each 
        House, respectively, but applicable only with respect 
        to the procedure to be followed in the House in the 
        case of resolutions described by this subsection; and 
        they supersede other rules only to the extent that they 
        are inconsistent therewith; with
          (B) with full recognition of the constitutional right 
        of either House to change the rules (so far as relating 
        to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the 
        same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of 
        any other rule of that House.
    (d) Any national emergency declared by the President in 
accordance with this title, and not otherwise previously 
terminated, shall terminate on the anniversary of the 
declaration of that emergency if, within the ninety-day period 
prior to each anniversary date, the President does not publish 
in the Federal Register and transmit to the Congress a notice 
stating that such emergency is to continue in effect after such 
anniversary.

        TITLE III--EXERCISE OF EMERGENCY POWERS AND AUTHORITIES

    Sec. 301.\4\ When the President declares a national 
emergency, no powers or authorities made available by statute 
for use in the event of an emergency shall be exercised unless 
and until the President specifies the provisions of law under 
which he proposes that he, or other officers will act. Such 
specification may be made either in the declaration of a 
national emergency, or by one or more contemporaneous or 
subsequent Executive orders published in the Federal Register 
and transmitted to the Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ 50 U.S.C. 1631.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

  TITLE IV--ACCOUNTABILITY AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS OF THE PRESIDENT

    Sec. 401.\5\ (a) When the President declares a national 
emergency, or Congress declares war, the President shall be 
responsible for maintaining a file and index of all significant 
orders of the President, including Executive orders and 
proclamations, and each Executive agency shall maintain a file 
and index of all rules and regulations, issued during such 
emergency or war issued pursuant to such declarations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ 50 U.S.C. 1641.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) All such significant orders of the President, including 
Executive orders, and such rules and regulations shall be 
transmitted to the Congress promptly under means to assure 
confidentiality where appropriate.
    (c) When the President declares a national emergency or 
Congress declares war, the President shall transmit to 
Congress, within ninety days after the end of each six-month 
period after such declarations, a report on the total 
expenditures incurred by the United States Government during 
such six-month period which are directly attributable to the 
exercise of powers and authorities conferred by such 
declaration. Not later than ninety days after the termination 
of each such emergency or war, the President shall transmit a 
final report on all such expenditures.

 TITLE V--REPEAL AND CONTINUATION OF CERTAIN EMERGENCY POWER AND OTHER 
                                STATUTES

    Sec. 501. (a) Section 349(a) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 148(a)) is amended--
          (1) at the end of paragraph (9), by striking out ``; 
        or'' and inserting in lieu thereof a period; and
          (2) by striking out paragraph (10).
    (b) Section 2667(b) of title 10 of the United States Code 
is amended--
          (1) by inserting ``and'' at the end of paragraph (3);
          (2) by striking out paragraph (4); and
          (3) by redesignating paragraph (5) and (4).
    (c) The joint resolution entitled ``Joint resolution to 
authorize the temporary continuation of regulation of consumer 
credit'', approved August 8, 1947 (12 U.S.C. 249), is repealed.
    (d) Section 5(m) of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 
1933 as amended (16 U.S.C. 831d(m)) is repealed.
    (e) Section 1383 of title 18, United States Code, is 
repealed.
    (f) Section 6 of the Act entitled ``An Act to amend the 
Public Health Service Act is regard to certain matters of 
personnel and administration, and for other purposes'', 
approved February 28, 1948, is amended by striking out 
subsections (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) (42 U.S.C. 211b).
    (g) Section 9 of the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946 (50 
U.S.C. App. 1742) is repealed.
    (h) This section shall not affect--
          (1) any action taken or proceeding pending not 
        finally concluded or determined at the time of repeal;
          (2) any action or proceeding based on any act 
        committed prior to repeal; or
          (3) any rights or duties that matured or penalties 
        that were incurred prior to repeal;
    Sec. 502.\6\ (a) The provisions of this Act shall not apply 
to the following provisions of law, the powers and authorities 
conferred thereby, and actions taken thereunder:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ 50 U.S.C. 1651.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) * * * [Repealed--1977] \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Paragraph (1), which contained a reference to sec. 5(b) of the 
Trading With the Enemy Act, was repealed by sec. 101(d) of Public Law 
95-223 (91 Stat. 1625).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (2) Act of April 28, 1942 (40 U.S.C. 278b);
          (3) Act of June 30, 1949 (41 U.S.C. 252);
          (4) Section 3477 of the Revised Statutes, as amended 
        (31 U.S.C. 203);
          (5) Section 3737 of the Revised Statutes, as amended 
        (41 U.S.C. 15);
          (6) Public Law 85-804 (Act of Aug. 28, 1958, 72 Stat. 
        972; 50 U.S.C. 1431-1435);
          (7) Section 2304(a)(1) of title 10, United States 
        Code;
          (8) Section 3313, 6386(c), and 8313 of title 10, 
        United States Code.
    (b) Each committee of the House of Representatives and the 
Senate having jurisdiction with respect to any provision of law 
referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall make a 
complete study and investigation concerning that provision of 
law and make a report, including any recommendations and 
proposed revisions such committee may have, to its respective 
House of Congress within two hundred and seventy days after the 
date of enactment of this Act.

       4. Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998.

Partial text of Division I of Public Law 105-277 [Omnibus Consolidated 
  and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1999; 
    H.R. 4328], 112 Stat. 2681-856 at 872, approved October 21, 1998

                DIVISION I--CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

SECTION 1. \1\ SHORT TITLE.

    This Division may be cited as the ``Chemical Weapons 
Convention Implementation Act of 1998''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 22 USC 6701 note.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

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TITLE III--INSPECTIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 303. \2\ AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT INSPECTIONS.

    (a) Prohibition.--* * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ 22 USC 6723.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) Authority.--
          (1) Technical secretariat inspection teams.--* * *
          (2) United states government representatives.--* * *
          (3) Objections to individuals serving as 
        inspectors.--
                  (A) In general.--In deciding whether to 
                exercise the right of the United States under 
                the Convention to object to an individual 
                serving as an inspector, the President shall 
                give great weight to his reasonable belief 
                that--
                          (i) such individual is or has been a 
                        member of, or a participant in, any 
                        group or organization that has engaged 
                        in, or attempted or conspired to engage 
                        in, or aided or abetted in the 
                        commission of, any terrorist act or 
                        activity;
                          (ii) such individual has committed 
                        any act or activity which would be a 
                        felony under the laws of the United 
                        States; or
                          (iii) the participation of such 
                        individual as a member of an inspection 
                        team would pose a risk to the national 
                        security or economic well-being of the 
                        United States.  * * *
=======================================================================




                          H. EXECUTIVE ORDERS

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

 1. Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with the 
    Taliban (Executive Order 13129, July 4, 1999)................   401
 2. Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting 
    Transactions with Sudan (Executive Order 13067, November 3, 
    1997)........................................................   404
 3. Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to Iran 
    (Executive Order 13059, August 19, 1997).....................   406
 4. Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to Iran 
    (Executive Order 12959, May 6, 1995).........................   410
 5. Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to the 
    Development of Iranian Petroleum Resources (Executive Order 
    12957, March 15, 1995).......................................   412
 6. Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists Who Threaten to 
    Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process (Executive Order 12947, 
    January 24, 1995)............................................   413
 7. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Executive Order 
    12938, November 14, 1994)....................................   416
 8. Continuation of Export Control Regulations (Executive Order 
    12924, August 19, 1994)......................................   421
 9. Barring Overflight, Takeoff, and Landing of Aircraft, Flying 
    to or from Libya (Executive Order 12801, April 15, 1992).....   423
10. Victims of Terrorism Compensation (Executive Order 12598, 
    June 17, 1987)...............................................   425
11. Blocking Libyan Government Property in the United States or 
    Held by U.S. Persons (Executive Order 12544, January 8, 1986)   426
12. Prohibiting Trade and Certain Transactions Involving Libya 
    (Executive Order 12543, January 7, 1986).....................   427
13. Imports of Refined Petroleum Products from Libya (Executive 
    Order 12538, November 15, 1985)..............................   429
14. Revocation of Prohibitions Against Transactions Involving 
    Iran (Executive Order 12282, January 19, 1981)...............   430
15. Hostage Relief Act of 1980--Delegation of Authority 
    (Executive Order 12268, January 15, 1981)....................   431
16. Administration of the Export Administration Act of 1969, as 
    amended (Executive Order 12002, July 7, 1977)................   432

=======================================================================

   1. Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with the Taliban

           Executive Order 13129, July 4, 1999, 64 F.R. 36759

    By the authority vested in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, 
including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)(``IEEPA''), the National Emergencies Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United 
States Code,
    I, WILLIAM J. CLINTON, President of the United States of 
America, find that the actions and policies of the Taliban in 
Afghanistan, in allowing territory under its control in 
Afghanistan to be used as a safe haven and base of operations 
for Usama bin Ladin and the Al-Qaida organization who have 
committed and threaten to continue to commit acts of violence 
against the United States and its nationals, constitute an 
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and 
foreign policy of the United States, and hereby declare a 
national emergency to deal with that threat.
    I hereby order:
    Section 1. Except to the extent provided in section 203(b) 
of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)) and in regulations, orders, 
directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this 
order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any 
license or permit granted prior to the effective date:
    (a) all property and interests in property of the Taliban; 
and
    (b) all property and interests in property of persons 
determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation 
with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General:
    (i) to be owned or controlled by, or to act for or on 
behalf of, the Taliban; or
    (ii) to provide financial, material, or technological 
support for, or services in support of, any of the foregoing, 
that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the 
United States, or that are or hereafter come within the 
possession or control of United States persons, are blocked.
    Sec. 2. Except to the extent provided in section 203(b) of 
IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)) and in regulations, orders, 
directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this 
order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any 
license or permit granted prior to the effective date:
    (a) any transaction or dealing by United States persons or 
within the United States in property or interests in property 
blocked pursuant to this order is prohibited, including the 
making or receiving of any contribution of funds, goods, or 
services to or for the benefit of the Taliban or persons 
designated pursuant to this order;
    (b) the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, 
directly or indirectly, from the United States, or by a United 
States person, wherever located, of any goods, software, 
technology (including technical data), or services to the 
territory of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban or to the 
Taliban or persons designated pursuant to this order is 
prohibited;
    (c) the importation into the United States of any goods, 
software, technology, or services owned or controlled by the 
Taliban or persons designated pursuant to this order or from 
the territory of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban is 
prohibited;
    (d) any transaction by any United States person or within 
the United States that evades or avoids, or has the purpose of 
evading or avoiding, or attempts to violate, any of the 
prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited; and
    (e) any conspiracy formed to violate any of the 
prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.
    Sec. 3. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with 
the Secretary of State, is hereby directed to authorize 
commercial sales of agricultural commodities and products, 
medicine, and medical equipment for civilian end use in the 
territory of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban under 
appropriate safeguards to prevent diversion to military, 
paramilitary, or terrorist end users or end use or to political 
end use.
    Sec. 4. For the purposes of this order:
    (a) the term ``person'' means an individual or entity;
    (b) the term ``entity'' means a partnership, association, 
corporation, or other organization, group, or subgroup;
    (c) the term ``the Taliban'' means the political/military 
entity headquartered in Kandahar, Afghanistan that as of the 
date of this order exercises de facto control over the 
territory of Afghanistan described in paragraph (d) of this 
section, its agencies and instrumentalities, and the Taliban 
leaders listed in the Annex to this order or designated by the 
Secretary of State in consultation with the Secretary of the 
Treasury and the Attorney General. The Taliban is also known as 
the ``Taleban,'' ``Islamic Movement of Taliban,'' ``the Taliban 
Islamic Movement,'' ``Talibano Islami Tahrik,'' and ``Tahrike 
Islami'a Taliban";
    (d) the term ``territory of Afghanistan controlled by the 
Taliban'' means the territory referred to as the ``Islamic 
Emirate of Afghanistan,'' known in Pashtun as ``de Afghanistan 
Islami Emarat'' or in Dari as ``Emarat Islami-e Afghanistan,'' 
including the following provinces of the country of 
Afghanistan: Kandahar, Farah, Helmund, Nimruz, Herat, Badghis, 
Ghowr, Oruzghon, Zabol, Paktiha, Ghazni, Nangarhar, Lowgar, 
Vardan, Faryab, Jowlan, Balkh, and Paktika. The Secretary of 
State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, is 
hereby authorized to modify the description of the term 
``territory of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban";
    (e) the term ``United States person'' means any United 
States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized 
under the laws of the United States (including foreign 
branches), or any person in the United States.
    Sec. 5. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with 
the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, is hereby 
authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation of 
rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to me 
by IEEPA as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this 
order. The Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any of 
these functions to other officers and agencies of the United 
States Government. All agencies of the United States Government 
are hereby directed to take all appropriate measures within 
their authority to carry out the provisions of this order.
    Sec. 6. Nothing contained in this order shall create any 
right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any 
party against the United States, its agencies or 
instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other 
person.
    Sec. 7. (a) This order is effective at 12:01 a.m. Eastern 
Daylight Time on July 6, 1999.
    (b) This order shall be transmitted to the Congress and 
published in the Federal Register.

 2. Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions 
                               With Sudan

         Executive Order 13067, November 3, 1997, 62 F.R. 59989

    By the authority vested in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, 
including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United States 
Code;
    I, WILLIAM J. CLINTON, President of the United States of 
America, find that the policies and actions of the Government 
of Sudan, including continued support for international 
terrorism; ongoing efforts to destabilize neighboring 
governments; and the prevalence of human rights violations, 
including slavery and the denial of religious freedom, 
constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national 
security and foreign policy of the United States, and hereby 
declare a national emergency to deal with that threat. I hereby 
order:
    Section 1. Except to the extent provided in section 203(b) 
of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)) and in regulations, orders, 
directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this 
order, all property and interests in property of the Government 
of Sudan that are in the United States, that hereafter come 
within the United States, or that hereafter come within the 
possession or control of United States persons, including their 
overseas branches, are blocked.
    Sec. 2. The following are prohibited, except to the extent 
provided in section 203(b) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)) and in 
regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued 
pursuant to this order:
    (a) the importation into the United States of any goods or 
services of Sudanese origin, other than information or 
informational materials;
    (b) the exportation or reexportation, directly or 
indirectly, to Sudan of any goods, technology (including 
technical data, software, or other information), or services 
from the United States or by a United States person, wherever 
located, or requiring the issuance of a license by a Federal 
agency, except for donations of articles intended to relieve 
human suffering, such as food, clothing, and medicine;
    (c) the facilitation by a United States person, including 
but not limited to brokering activities, of the exportation or 
reexportation of goods, technology, or services from Sudan to 
any destination, or to Sudan from any location;
    (d) the performance by any United States person of any 
contract, including a financing contract, in support of an 
industrial, commercial, public utility, or governmental project 
in Sudan;
    (e) the grant or extension of credits or loans by any 
United States person to the Government of Sudan;
    (f) any transaction by a United States person relating to 
transportation of cargo to or from Sudan; the provision of 
transportation of cargo to or from the United States by any 
Sudanese person or any vessel or aircraft of Sudanese 
registration; or the sale in the United States by any person 
holding authority under subtitle 7 of title 49, United States 
Code, of any transportation of cargo by air that includes any 
stop in Sudan; and
    (g) any transaction by any United States person or within 
the United States that evades or avoids, or has the purpose of 
evading or avoiding, or attempts to violate, any of the 
prohibitions set forth in this order.
    Sec. 3. Nothing in this order shall prohibit:
    (a) transactions for the conduct of the official business 
of the Federal Government or the United Nations by employees 
thereof; or
    (b) transactions in Sudan for journalistic activity by 
persons regularly employed in such capacity by a news-gathering 
organization.
    Sec. 4. For the purposes of this order:
    (a) the term ``person'' means an individual or entity;
    (b) the term ``entity'' means a partnership, association, 
trust, joint venture, corporation, or other organization;
    (c) the term ``United States person'' means any United 
States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized 
under the laws of the United States (including foreign 
branches), or any person in the United States; and
    (d) the term ``Government of Sudan'' includes the 
Government of Sudan, its agencies, instrumentalities and 
controlled entities, and the Central Bank of Sudan.
    Sec. 5. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with 
the Secretary of State and, as appropriate, other agencies, is 
hereby authorized to take such actions, including the 
promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers 
granted to me by IEEPA, as may be necessary to carry out the 
purposes of this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may 
redelegate any of these functions to other officers and 
agencies of the United States Government. All agencies of the 
United States Government are hereby directed to take all 
appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the 
provisions of this order.
    Sec. 6. Nothing contained in this order shall create any 
right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any 
party against the United States, its agencies or 
instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other 
person.
    Sec. 7. (a) This order shall take effect at 12:01 a.m. 
eastern standard time on November 4, 1997, except that trade 
transactions under contracts in force as of the effective date 
of this order may be performed pursuant to their terms through 
12:01 a.m. eastern standard time on December 4, 1997, and 
letters of credit and other financing agreements for such 
underlying trade transactions may be performed pursuant to 
their terms.
    (b) This order shall be transmitted to the Congress and 
published in the Federal Register.

        3. Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to Iran

         Executive Order 13059, August 19, 1997, 62 F.R. 44531

    By the authority vested in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, 
including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (``IEEPA''), the National Emergencies Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), section 505 of the International 
Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (22 U.S.C. 
2349aa-9) (``ISDCA''), and section 301 of title 3, United 
States Code,
    I, WILLIAM J. CLINTON, President of the United States of 
America, in order to clarify the steps taken in Executive 
Orders 12957 of March 15, 1995, and 12959 of May 6, 1995, to 
deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national 
security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States 
declared in Executive Order 12957 in response to the actions 
and policies of the Government of Iran, hereby order:
    Section 1. Except to the extent provided in section 3 of 
this order or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses 
issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract 
entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the 
effective date of this order, the importation into the United 
States of any goods or services of Iranian origin or owned or 
controlled by the Government of Iran, other than information or 
informational materials within the meaning of section 203(b)(3) 
of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(3)), is hereby prohibited.
    Sec. 2. Except to the extent provided in section 3 of this 
order, in section 203(b) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)), or in 
regulations, orders, directives, or licenses issued pursuant to 
this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or 
any license or permit granted prior to the effective date of 
this order, the following are prohibited:
    (a) the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, 
directly or indirectly, from the United States, or by a United 
States person, wherever located, of any goods, technology, or 
services to Iran or the Government of Iran, including the 
exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply of any goods, 
technology, or services to a person in a third country 
undertaken with knowledge or reason to know that:
          (i) such goods, technology, or services are intended 
        specifically for supply, transshipment, or 
        reexportation, directly or indirectly, to Iran or the 
        Government of Iran; or
          (ii) such goods, technology, or services are intended 
        specifically for use in the production of, for 
        commingling with, or for incorporation into goods, 
        technology, or services to be directly or indirectly 
        supplied, transshipped, or reexported exclusively or 
        predominantly to Iran or the Government of Iran;
    (b) the reexportation from a third country, directly or 
indirectly, by a person other than a United States person of 
any goods, technology, or services that have been exported from 
the United States, if:
          (i) undertaken with knowledge or reason to know that 
        the reexportation is intended specifically for Iran or 
        the Government of Iran, and
          (ii) the exportation of such goods, technology, or 
        services to Iran from the United States was subject to 
        export license application requirements under any 
        United States regulations in effect on May 6, 1995, or 
        thereafter is made subject to such requirements imposed 
        independently of the actions taken pursuant to the 
        national emergency declared in Executive Order 12957; 
        provided, however, that this prohibition shall not 
        apply to those goods or that technology subject to 
        export license application requirements if such goods 
        or technology have been:
                  (A) substantially transformed into a foreign-
                made product outside the United States; or
                  (B) incorporated into a foreign-made product 
                outside the United States if the aggregate 
                value of such controlled United States goods 
                and technology constitutes less than 10 percent 
                of the total value of the foreign-made product 
                to be exported from a third country;
    (c) any new investment by a United States person in Iran or 
in property, including entities, owned or controlled by the 
Government of Iran;
    (d) any transaction or dealing by a United States person, 
wherever located, including purchasing, selling, transporting, 
swapping, brokering, approving, financing, facilitating, or 
guaranteeing, in or related to:
          (i) goods or services of Iranian origin or owned or 
        controlled by the Government of Iran; or
          (ii) goods, technology, or services for exportation, 
        reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, 
        to Iran or the Government of Iran;
    (e) any approval, financing, facilitation, or guarantee by 
a United States person, wherever located, of a transaction by a 
foreign person where the transaction by that foreign person 
would be prohibited by this order if performed by a United 
States person or within the United States; and
    (f) any transaction by a United States person or within the 
United States that evades or avoids, or has the purpose of 
evading or avoiding, or attempts to violate, any of the 
prohibitions set forth in this order.
    Sec. 3. Specific licenses issued pursuant to Executive 
Orders 12613 (of October 29, 1987), 12957, or 12959 continue in 
effect in accordance with their terms except to the extent 
revoked, amended, or modified by the Secretary of the Treasury. 
General licenses, regulations, orders, and directives issued 
pursuant to those orders continue in effect in accordance with 
their terms except to the extent inconsistent with this order 
or to the extent revoked, amended, or modified by the Secretary 
of the Treasury.
    Sec. 4. For the purposes of this order:
    (a) the term ``person'' means an individual or entity;
    (b) the term ``entity'' means a partnership, association, 
trust, joint venture, corporation, or other organization;
    (c) the term ``United States person'' means any United 
States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized 
under the laws of the United States (including foreign 
branches), or any person in the United States;
    (d) the term ``Iran'' means the territory of Iran and any 
other territory or marine area, including the exclusive 
economic zone and continental shelf, over which the Government 
of Iran claims sovereignty, sovereign rights, or jurisdiction, 
provided that the Government of Iran exercises partial or total 
de facto control over the area or derives a benefit from 
economic activity in the area pursuant to international 
arrangements;
    (e) the term ``Government of Iran'' includes the Government 
of Iran, any political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality 
thereof, and any person owned or controlled by, or acting for 
or on behalf of, the Government of Iran;
    (f) the term ``new investment'' means:
          (i) a commitment or contribution of funds or other 
        assets; or
          (ii) a loan or other extension of credit, made after 
        the effective date of Executive Order 12957 as to 
        transactions prohibited by that order, or otherwise 
        made after the effective date of Executive Order 12959.
    Sec. 5. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with 
the Secretary of State and, as appropriate, other agencies, is 
hereby authorized to take such actions, including the 
promulgation of rules and regulations, the requirement of 
reports, including reports by United States persons on oil and 
related transactions engaged in by their foreign affiliates 
with Iran or the Government of Iran, and to employ all powers 
granted to me by IEEPA and the ISDCA as may be necessary to 
carry out the purposes of this order. The Secretary of the 
Treasury may redelegate any of these functions to other 
officers and agencies of the United States Government. All 
agencies of the United States Government are hereby directed to 
take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry 
out the provisions of this order.
    Sec. 6. (a) The Secretary of the Treasury may authorize the 
exportation or reexportation to Iran or the Government of Iran 
of any goods, technology, or services also subject to export 
license application requirements of another agency of the 
United States Government only if authorization by that agency 
of the exportation or reexportation to Iran would be permitted 
by law.
    (b) Nothing contained in this order shall be construed to 
supersede the requirements established under any other 
provision of law or to relieve a person from any requirement to 
obtain a license or other authorization from another department 
or agency of the United States Government in compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations subject to the jurisdiction of 
that department or agency.
    Sec. 7. The provisions of this order consolidate the 
provisions of Executive Orders 12613, 12957, and 12959. 
Executive Order 12613 and subsections (a), (b), (c), (d), and 
(f) of section 1 of Executive Order 12959 are hereby revoked 
with respect to transactions occurring after the effective date 
of this order. The revocation of those provisions shall not 
alter their applicability to any transaction or violation 
occurring before the effective date of this order, nor shall it 
affect the applicability of any rule, regulation, order, 
license, or other form of administrative action previously 
taken pursuant to Executive Orders 12613 or 12959.
    Sec. 8. Nothing contained in this order shall create any 
right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any 
party against the United States, its agencies or 
instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other 
person.
    Sec. 9. The measures taken pursuant to this order are in 
response to actions of the Government of Iran occurring after 
the conclusion of the 1981 Algiers Accords, and are intended 
solely as a response to those later actions.
    Sec. 10. (a) This order is effective at 12:01 a.m. eastern 
daylight time on August 20, 1997.
    (b) This order shall be transmitted to the Congress and 
published in the Federal Register.

        4. Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect To Iran

   Executive Order 12959, May 8, 1995, 60 F.R. 24757; as amended by 
         Executive Order 13059, August 19, 1997, 62 F.R. 44531

    By the authority vested in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, 
including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (Ieepa), the National Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), section 505 of the International Security 
and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (22 U.S.C. 2349aa-9) 
(Isdca), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,
    I, William J. Clinton, President of the United States of 
America, in order to take steps with respect to Iran in 
addition to those set forth in Executive Order No. 12957 of 
March 15, 1995, to deal with the unusual and extraordinary 
threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of 
the United States referred to in that order, hereby order:
    Section 1. The following are prohibited, except to the 
extent provided in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses 
that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding 
any contract entered into or any license or permit granted 
prior to the effective date of this order:
    Subsections (a), (b), (c), (d), and (f) of section 1 were 
revoked by E.O. 13059 of August 19, 1997.
    (e) any new investment by a United States person in Iran or 
in property (including entities) owned or controlled by the 
Government of Iran; and,
    (g) any transaction by any United States person or within 
the United States that evades or avoids, or has the purpose of 
evading or avoiding, or attempts to violate, any of the 
prohibitions set forth in this order.
    Sec. 2. For the purposes of this order:
    (a) the term ``person'' means an individual or entity;
    (b) the term ``entity'' means a partnership, association, 
trust, joint venture, corporation, or other organization;
    (c) the term ``United States person'' means any United 
States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized 
under the laws of the United States (including foreign 
branches), or any person in the United States;
    (d) the term ``Iran'' means the territory of Iran and any 
other territory or marine area, including the exclusive 
economic zone and continental shelf, over which the Government 
of Iran claims sovereignty, sovereign rights or jurisdiction, 
provided that the Government of Iran exercises partial or total 
de facto control over the area or derives a benefit from 
economic activity in the area pursuant to international 
arrangements; and
    (e) the term ``new investment'' means (i) a commitment or 
contribution of funds or other assets, or (ii) a loan or other 
extension of credit.
    Sec. 3. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with 
the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to take such 
actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, 
the requirement of reports, including reports by United States 
persons on oil transactions engaged in by their foreign 
affiliates with Iran or the Government of Iran, and to employ 
all powers granted to the President by Ieepa and Isdca as may 
be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order. The 
Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any of these functions 
to other officers and agencies of the United States Government. 
All agencies of the United States Government are hereby 
directed to take all appropriate measures within their 
authority to carry out the provisions of this order.
    Sec. 4. The Secretary of the Treasury may not authorize the 
exportation or reexportation to Iran, the Government of Iran, 
or an entity owned or controlled by the Government of Iran of 
any goods, technology, or services subject to export license 
application requirements of another agency of the United States 
Government, if authorization of the exportation or 
reexportation by that agency would be prohibited by law.
    Sec. 5. Sections 1 and 2 of Executive Order No. 12613 of 
October 29, 1987, and sections 1 and 2 of Executive Order No. 
12957 of March 15, 1995, are hereby revoked to the extent 
inconsistent with this order. Otherwise, the provisions of this 
order supplement the provisions of Executive Orders No. 12613 
and 12957.
    Sec. 6. Nothing contained in this order shall create any 
right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any 
party against the United States, its agencies or instrumen- 
talities, its officers or employees, or any other person.
    Sec. 7. The measures taken pursuant to this order are in 
response to actions of the Government of Iran occurring after 
the conclusion of the 1981 Algiers Accords, and are intended 
solely as a response to those later actions.
    Sec. 8. (a) This order is effective at 12:01 a.m., eastern 
daylight time, on May 7, 1995, except that (i) section 1(b), 
(c), and (d) of this order shall not apply until 12:01 a.m., 
eastern daylight time, on June 6, 1995, to trade transactions 
under contracts in force as of the date of this order if such 
transactions are authorized pursuant to Federal regulations in 
force immediately prior to the date of this order (``existing 
trade contracts''), and (ii) letters of credit and other 
financing agreements with respect to existing trade contracts 
may be performed pursuant to their terms with respect to 
underlying trade transactions occurring prior to 12:01 a.m., 
eastern daylight time, on June 6, 1995.
    (b) This order shall be transmitted to the Congress.

5. Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to the Development of 
                      Iranian Petroleum Resources

  Executive Order 12957, March 15, 1995, 60 F.R. 14615; as amended by 
           Executive Order 12959, May 6, 1995, 60 F.R. 24757

    By the authority vested in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, 
including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 
1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,
    I, WILLIAM J. CLINTON, President of the United States of 
America, find that the actions and policies of the Government 
of Iran constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the 
national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United 
States, and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with 
that threat.
    I hereby order:
    Sections 1 and 2 were revoked by E.O. 12959 of May 6, 1995, 
sec. 5.
    Sec. 3. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with 
the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to take such 
actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, 
and to employ all powers granted to me by the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act as may be necessary to carry out 
the purposes of this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may 
redelegate any of these functions to other officers and 
agencies of the United States Government. All agencies of the 
United States Government are hereby directed to take all 
appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the 
provisions of this order.
    Sec. 4. Nothing contained in this order shall create any 
right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any 
party against the United States, its agencies or 
instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other 
person.
    Sec. 5. (a) This order is effective at 12:01 a.m., eastern 
standard time, on March 16, 1995.
    (b) This order shall be transmitted to the Congress.

6. Prohibiting Transactions With Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt the 
                       Middle East Peace Process

 Executive Order 12947, January 24, 1995, 60 F.R. 7059; as amended by 
         Executive Order 13099, August 20, 1998, 63 F.R. 45167

    By the authority vested in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, 
including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (Ieepa), the National Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United States 
Code,
    I, William J. Clinton, President of the United States of 
America, find that grave acts of violence committed by foreign 
terrorists that disrupt the Middle East peace process 
constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national 
security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and 
hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.
    I hereby order:
    Section 1. Except to the extent provided in section 
203(b)(3) and (4) of Ieepa (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(3) and (4)) and 
in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be 
issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract 
entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the 
effective date:
    (a) all property and interests in property of:
          (i) the persons listed in the Annex to this order;
          (ii) foreign persons designated by the Secretary of 
        State, in coordination with the Secretary of the 
        Treasury and the Attorney General, because they are 
        found:
                  (A) to have committed, or to pose a 
                significant risk of committing, acts of 
                violence that have the purpose or effect of 
                disrupting the Middle East peace process, or
                  (B) to assist in, sponsor, or provide 
                financial, material, or technological support 
                for, or services in support of, such acts of 
                violence; and
          (iii) persons determined by the Secretary of the 
        Treasury, in coordination with the Secretary of State 
        and the Attorney General, to be owned or controlled by, 
        or to act for or on behalf of, any of the foregoing 
        persons, that are in the United States, that hereafter 
        come within the United States, or that hereafter come 
        within the possession or control of United States 
        persons, are blocked;
    (b) any transaction or dealing by United States persons or 
within the United States in property or interests in property 
of the persons designated in or pursuant to this order is 
prohibited, including the making or receiving of any 
contribution of funds, goods, or services to or for the benefit 
of such persons;
    (c) any transaction by any United States person or within 
the United States that evades or avoids, or has the purpose of 
evading or avoiding, or attempts to violate, any of the 
prohibitions set forth in this order, is prohibited.
    Sec. 2. For the purposes of this order:
    (a) the term ``person'' means an individual or entity;
    (b) the term ``entity'' means a partnership, association, 
corporation, or other organization, group, or subgroup;
    (c) the term ``United States person'' means any United 
States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized 
under the laws of the United States (including foreign 
branches), or any person in the United States; and
    (d) the term ``foreign person'' means any citizen or 
national of a foreign state (including any such individual who 
is also a citizen or national of the United States) or any 
entity not organized solely under the laws of the United States 
or existing solely in the United States, but does not include a 
foreignstate.
    Sec. 3. I hereby determine that the making of donations of 
the type specified in section 203(b)(2)(A) of Ieepa (50 U.S.C. 
1702(b)(2)(A)) by United States persons to persons designated 
in or pursuant to this order would seriously impair my ability 
to deal with the national emergency declared in this order, and 
hereby prohibit such donations as provided by section 1 of this 
order.
    Sec. 4. (a) The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation 
with the Secretary of State and, as appropriate, the Attorney 
General, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including 
the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ all 
powers granted to me by Ieepa as may be necessary to carry out 
the purposes of this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may 
redelegate any of these functions to other officers and 
agencies of the United States Government. All agencies of the 
United States Government are hereby directed to take all 
appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the 
provisions of this order.
    (b) Any investigation emanating from a possible violation 
of this order, or of any license, order, or regulation issued 
pursuant to this order, shall first be coordinated with the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (Fbi), and any matter involving 
evidence of a criminal violation shall be referred to the Fbi 
for further investigation. The Fbi shall timely notify the 
Department of the Treasury of any action it takes on such 
referrals.
    Sec. 5. Nothing contained in this order shall create any 
right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any 
party against the United States, its agencies or 
instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other 
person.
    Sec. 6. (a) This order is effective at 12:01 a.m., eastern 
standard time on January 24, 1995.
    (b) This order shall be transmitted to the Congress.

                                 Annex

    terrorists who threaten to disrupt the middle east peace process

Abu Hafs al-Masri

Abu Nidal Organization (Ano)

Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Dflp)

Hizballah

Islamic Army (a.k.a. Al-Qaida, Islamic Salvation Foundation, 
        The Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places, 
        The World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and 
        Crusaders, and The Group for the Preservation of the 
        Holy Sites)

Islamic Gama'at (Ig)

Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)

Jihad

Kach

Kahane Chai

Palestinian Islamic Jihad-Shiqaqi faction (Pij)

Palestine Liberation Front-Abu Abbas faction (Plf-Abu Abbas)

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Pflp)

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command 
(Pflp-Gc)

Rifa'i Ahmad Taha Musa

Usama bin Muhammad bin Awad bin Ladin (a.k.a. Usama bin Ladin)

            7. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Executive Order 12938, November 14, 1994, 59 F.R. 59099, 50 U.S.C. 1701 
   note; as amended by Executive Order 13094, July 28, 1998, 63 F.R. 
   40803; and by Executive Order 13128, June 25, 1999, 64 F.R. 34703

    By the authority vested in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, 
including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 
1601 et seq.), the Arms Export Control Act, as amended (22 
U.S.C. 2751 et seq.), Executive Orders Nos. 12851 and 12924, 
and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,
    I, WILLIAM J. CLINTON, President of the United States of 
America, find that the proliferation of nuclear, biological, 
and chemical weapons (``weapons of mass destruction'') and of 
the means of delivering such weapons, constitutes an unusual 
and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign 
policy, and economy of the United States, and hereby declare a 
national emergency to deal with that threat.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The President continued this national emergency in notice of 
November 8, 1995 (60 F.R. 57137); in notice of November 12, 1996 (61 
F.R. 58309); in notice of November 12, 1997 (62 F.R. 60993); and in 
notice of November 12, 1998 (63 F.R. 63589).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Accordingly, I hereby order:
    Section 1. International Negotiations. It is the policy of 
the United States to lead and seek multilaterally coordinated 
efforts with other countries to control the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering such 
weapons. Accordingly, the Secretary of State shall cooperate in 
and lead multilateral efforts to stop the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.
    Sec. 2. Imposition of Controls. As provided herein, the 
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce shall use 
their respective authorities, including the Arms Export Control 
Act and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, to 
control any exports, to the extent they are not already 
controlled by the Department of Energy and the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, that either Secretary determines would 
assist a country in acquiring the capability to develop, 
produce, stockpile, deliver, or use weapons of mass destruction 
or their means of delivery. The Secretary of State shall pursue 
early negotiations with foreign governments to adopt effective 
measures comparable to those imposed under this order.
    Sec. 3. Department of Commerce Controls. (a) The Secretary 
of Commerce shall prohibit the export of any goods, technology, 
or services subject to the Secretary's export jurisdiction that 
the Secretary of Commerce determines, in consultation with the 
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and other 
appropriate officials, would assist a foreign country in 
acquiring the capability to develop, produce, stockpile, 
deliver, or use weapons of mass destruction or their means of 
delivery. The Secretary of State shall pursue early 
negotiations with foreign governments to adopt effective 
measures comparable to those imposed under this section.
    (b) Subsection (a) of this section will not apply to 
exports relating to a particular category of weapons of mass 
destruction (i.e., nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons) if 
their destination is a country with whose government the United 
States has entered into a bilateral or multilateral arrangement 
for the control of that category of weapons of mass 
destruction-related goods (including delivery systems) and 
technology, or maintains domestic export controls comparable to 
controls that are imposed by the United States with respect to 
that category of goods and technology, or that are otherwise 
deemed adequate by the Secretary of State.
    (c) The Secretary of Commerce shall require validated 
licenses to implement this order and shall coordinate any 
license applications with the Secretary of State and the 
Secretary of Defense.
    (d) The Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the 
Secretary of State, shall take such actions, including the 
promulgation of rules, regulations, and amendments thereto, as 
may be necessary to continue to regulate the activities of 
United States persons in order to prevent their participation 
in activities that could contribute to the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery, as 
provided in the Export Administration Regulations, set forth in 
Title 15, Chapter VII, Subchapter C, of the Code of Federal 
Regulations, Parts 768 to 799 inclusive.
    (e) \2\ The Secretary of Commerce shall impose and enforce 
such restrictions on the importation of chemicals into the 
United States as may be necessary to carry out the requirements 
of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on 
Their Destruction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Subsection (e) was added by Executive Order 13128, June 25, 
1999 (64 F.R. 34703).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Sec. 4.\3\ Measures Against Foreign Persons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Section 4 was revised by Executive Order 13094, July 28, 1998 
(63 F.R. 40803).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (a) Determination by Secretary of State; Imposition of 
Measures. Except to the extent provided in section 203(b) of 
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
1702(b)), where applicable, if the Secretary of State 
determines that a foreign person, on or after November 16, 
1990, the effective date of Executive Order 12735, the 
predecessor order to Executive Order 12938, has materially 
contributed or attempted to contribute materially to the 
efforts of any foreign country, project, or entity of 
proliferation concern to use, acquire, design, develop, 
produce, or stockpile weapons of mass destruction or missiles 
capable of delivering such weapons, the measures set forth in 
subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section shall be imposed 
on that foreign person to the extent determined by the 
Secretary of State in consultation with the implementing agency 
and other relevant agencies. Nothing in this section is 
intended to preclude the imposition on that foreign person of 
other measures or sanctions available under this order or under 
other authorities.
    (b) Procurement Ban. No department or agency of the United 
States Government may procure, or enter into any contract for 
the procurement of, any goods, technology, or services from any 
foreign person described in subsection (a) of this section.
    (c) Assistance Ban. No department or agency of the United 
States Government may provide any assistance to any foreign 
person described in subsection (a) of this section, and no such 
foreign person shall be eligible to participate in any 
assistance program of the United States Government.
    (d) Import Ban. The Secretary of the Treasury shall 
prohibit the importation into the United States of goods, 
technology, or services produced or provided by any foreign 
person described in subsection (a) of this section, other than 
information or informational materials within the meaning of 
section 203(b)(3) of the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(3)).
    (e) Termination. Measures pursuant to this section may be 
terminated against a foreign person if the Secretary of State 
determines that there is reliable evidence that such foreign 
person has ceased all activities referred to in subsection (a) 
of this section.
    (f) Exceptions. Departments and agencies of the United 
States Government, acting in consultation with the Secretary of 
State, may, by license, regulation, order, directive, 
exception, or otherwise, provide for:
        (i) Procurement contracts necessary to meet U.S. 
        operational military requirements or requirements under 
        defense production agreements; intelligence 
        requirements; sole source suppliers, spare parts, 
        components, routine servicing and maintenance of 
        products for the United States Government; and medical 
        and humanitarian items; and
        (ii) Performance pursuant to contracts in force on the 
        effective date of this order under appropriate 
        circumstances.''
    Sec. 5. Sanctions Against Foreign Countries. (a) In 
addition to the sanctions imposed on foreign countries as 
provided in the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and 
Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, sanctions also shall be 
imposed on a foreign country as specified in subsection (b) of 
this section, if the Secretary of State determines that the 
foreign country has, on or after the effective date of this 
order or its predecessor, Executive Order No. 12735 of November 
16, 1990, (1) used chemical or biological weapons in violation 
of international law; (2) made substantial preparations to use 
chemical or biological weapons in violation of international 
law; or (3) developed, produced, stockpiled, or otherwise 
acquired chemical or biological weapons in violation of 
international law.
    (b) The following sanctions shall be imposed on any foreign 
country identified in subsection (a)(1) of this section unless 
the Secretary of State determines, on grounds of significant 
foreign policy or national security, that any individual 
sanction should not be applied. The sanctions specified in this 
section may be made applicable to the countries identified in 
subsections (a)(2) or (a)(3) when the Secretary of State 
determines that such action will further the objectives of this 
order pertaining to proliferation. The sanctions specified in 
subsection (b)(2) below shall be imposed with the concurrence 
of the Secretary of the Treasury.
          (1) Foreign Assistance. No assistance shall be 
        provided to that country under the Foreign Assistance 
        Act of 1961, or any successor act, or the Arms Export 
        Control Act, other than assistance that is intended to 
        benefit the people of that country directly and that is 
        not channeled through governmental agencies or entities 
        of that country.
          (2) Multilateral Development Bank Assistance. The 
        United States shall oppose any loan or financial or 
        technical assistance to that country by international 
        financial institutions in accordance with section 701 
        of the International Financial Institutions Act (22 
        U.S.C. 262d).
          (3) Denial of Credit or Other Financial Assistance. 
        The United States shall deny to that country any credit 
        or financial assistance by any department, agency, or 
        instrumentality of the United States Government.
          (4) Prohibition of Arms Sales. The United States 
        Government shall not, under the Arms Export Control 
        Act, sell to that country any defense articles or 
        defense services or issue any license for the export of 
        items on the United States Munitions List.
          (5) Export of National Security-Sensitive Goods and 
        Technology. No exports shall be permitted of any goods 
        or technologies controlled for national security 
        reasons under the Export Administration Regulations.
          (6) Further Export Restrictions. The Secretary of 
        Commerce shall prohibit or otherwise substantially 
        restrict exports to that country of goods, technology, 
        and services (excluding agricultural commodities and 
        products otherwise subject to control).
          (7) Import Restrictions. Restrictions shall be 
        imposed on the importation into the United States of 
        articles (that may include petroleum or any petroleum 
        product) that are the growth, product, or manufacture 
        of that country.
          (8) Landing Rights. At the earliest practicable date, 
        the Secretary of State shall terminate, in a manner 
        consistent with international law, the authority of any 
        air carrier that is controlled in fact by the 
        government of that country to engage in air 
        transportation (as defined in section 101(10) of the 
        Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. App. 1301(10)).
    Sec. 6. Duration. Any sanctions imposed pursuant to 
sections 4 or 5 of this order shall remain in force until the 
Secretary of State determines that lifting any sanction is in 
the foreign policy or national security interests of the United 
States or, as to sanctions under section 4 of this order, until 
the Secretary has made the determination under section 4(e).
    Sec. 7. Implementation. The Secretary of State, the 
Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Commerce are 
hereby authorized and directed to take such actions, including 
the promulgation of rules and regulations, as may be necessary 
to carry out the purposes of this order. These actions, and in 
particular those in sections 4 and 5 of this order, shall be 
made in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and, as 
appropriate, other agency heads and shall be implemented in 
accordance with procedures established pursuant to Executive 
Order No. 12851. The Secretary concerned may redelegate any of 
these functions to other officers in agencies of the Federal 
Government. All heads of departments and agencies of the United 
States Government are directed to take all appropriate measures 
within their authority to carry out the provisions of this 
order, including the suspension or termination of licenses or 
other authorizations.
    Sec. 8. Preservation of Authorities. Nothing in this order 
is intended to affect the continued effectiveness of any rules, 
regulations, orders licenses, or other forms of administrative 
action issued, taken, or continued in effect heretofore or 
hereafter under the authority of the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act, the Export Administration Act, the Arms 
Export Control Act, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act, 
Executive Order No. 12730 of September 30, 1990, Executive 
Order No. 12735 of November 16, 1990, Executive Order No. 12924 
of August 18, 1994, and Executive Order No. 12930 of September 
29, 1994.
    Sec. 9. Judicial Review. This order is not intended to 
create, nor does it create, any right or benefit, substantive 
or procedural, enforceable at law by party against the United 
States, its agencies, officers, or any other person.
    Sec. 10. Revocation of Executive Orders Nos. 12735 and 
12930. Executive Orders No. 12735 of November 16, 1990, and 
Executive Order No. 12930 of September 29, 1994, are hereby 
revoked.
    Sec. 11. Effective Date. This order is effective 
immediately.
    This order shall be transmitted to the Congress and 
published in the Federal Register.

             8. Continuation of Export Control Regulations

        Executive Order 12924,\1\ August 19, 1994, 59 F.R. 43437

    By the authority vested in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, 
including but not limited to section 203 of the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act (``Act'') (50 U.S.C. 1702), I, 
WILLIAM J. CLINTON, President of the United States of America, 
find that the unrestricted access of foreign parties to U.S. 
goods, technology, and technical data and the existence of 
certain boycott practices of foreign nations, in light of the 
expiration of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended 
(50 U.S.C. 2401 et seq.), constitute an unusual and 
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, 
and economy of the United States and hereby declare a national 
emergency with respect to that threat.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The Export Administration Act of 1979 expired on September 30, 
1990. To continue export control regulations governed by the Act, the 
President issued Executive Order 12730 (September 30, 1990; 55 F.R. 
40373), which in turn was extended by a Presidential notice on 
September 26, 1991 (56 F.R. 49385), and further extended on September 
25, 1992 (57 F.R. 44649).
    Sec. 2 of Public Law 103-10 (107 Stat. 40) renewed the authority of 
the Act through June 30, 1994, effective March 27, 1993, and authorized 
funds for fiscal years 1993 and 1994. Executive Order 12730 
subsequently was rescinded by sec. 1 of Executive Order 12867 of 
September 30, 1993 (58 F.R. 51747).
    On the day the Act was once again set to expire, June 30, 1994, the 
President issued Executive Order 12923 (59 F.R. 34551) to continue the 
provisions of the Act and provisions for its for administration. 
Subsequently, Public Law 103-277 (108 Stat. 1407; enacted July 5, 1994) 
renewed the authority of the Export Administration Act through August 
20, 1994. Near that expiration, the President issued Executive Order 
12924 (August 19, 1994; 59 F.R. 43437) to continue the authorities in 
the Act.
    Executive Order 12924 has been continued beyond August 19, 1995, by 
a notice of August 15, 1995 (60 F.R. 42767); beyond August 19, 1996, by 
a notice of August 14, 1996 (61 F.R. 42527); and beyond August 19, 
1997, by a notice of August 13, 1997 (62 F.R. 43629).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Accordingly, in order (a) to exercise the necessary 
vigilance over exports and activities affecting the national 
security of the United States; (b) to further significantly the 
foreign policy of the United States, including its policy with 
respect to cooperation by U.S. persons with certain foreign 
boycott activities, and to fulfill its international 
responsibilities; and (c) to protect the domestic economy from 
the excessive drain of scarce materials and reduce the serious 
economic impact of foreign demand, it is hereby ordered as 
follows:
    Section 1. To the extent permitted by law, the provisions 
of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended, and the 
provisions for administration of the Export Administration Act 
of 1979, as amended, shall be carried out under this order so 
as to continue in full force and effect and amend, as 
necessary, the export control system heretofore maintained by 
the Export Administration regulations issued under the Export 
Administration Act of 1979, as amended. The delegations of 
authority set forth in Executive Order No. 12002 of July 7, 
1977, as amended, by Executive Order No. 12755 of March 12, 
1991; Executive Order No. 12214 of May 2, 1980; Executive Order 
No. 12735 of November 16, 1990; and Executive Order 12851 of 
June 11, 1993, shall be incorporated in this order and shall 
apply to the exercise of authorities under this order.
    Sec. 2. All rules and regulations issued or continued in 
effect by the Secretary of Commerce under the authority of the 
Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended, including those 
published in Title 15, Subtitle B, Chapter VII, Subchapter C, 
of the Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 768 to 799, and all 
orders, regulations, licenses, and other forms of 
administrative action issued, taken, or continued in effect 
pursuant thereto, shall, until amended or revoked by the 
Secretary of Commerce, remain in full force and effect as if 
issued or taken pursuant to this order, except that the 
provisions of sections 203(b)(2) and 206 of the Act (50 U.S.C. 
1702(b)(2) and 1705) shall control over any inconsistent 
provisions in the regulations. Nothing in this section shall 
affect the continued applicability of administrative sanctions 
provided for by the regulations described above.
    Sec. 3. Provisions for administration of section 38(e) of 
the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(e)) may be made and 
shall continue in full force and effect until amended or 
revoked under the authority of section 203 of the Act (50 
U.S.C. 1702). To the extent permitted by law, this order also 
shall constitute authority for the issuance and continuation in 
full force and effect of all rules and regulations by the 
President or his delegate, and all orders, licenses, and other 
forms of administrative actions issued, taken, or continued in 
effect pursuant thereto, relating to the administration of 
section 38(e).
    Sec. 4. Executive Order 12923 of June 30, 1994, is revoked, 
and that declaration of emergency is rescinded. The revocation 
of Executive Order No. 12923 shall not affect any violation of 
any rules, regulations, orders, licenses, and other forms of 
administrative action under that order that occurred during the 
order was in effect.
    Sec. 5. This order shall be effective as of midnight 
between August 20, 1994 and August 21, 1994, and shall remain 
in effect until terminated.

 9. Barring Overflight, Takeoff, and Landing of Aircraft Flying To or 
                               From Libya

 Executive Order 12801, April 15, 1992, 57 F.R. 14319, 50 U.S.C. 1701 
                                  note

    By the authority vested in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, 
including the International Emergency Economic Power Act (50 
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 
1601 et seq.), section 1114 of the Federal Aviation Act of 
1958, as amended (49 U.S.C. App. 1514), section 5 of the United 
Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended (22 U.S.C. 287c), 
and section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, in view 
of United Nations Security Council Resolutions No. 731 of 
January 21, 1992, and 748 of March 31, 1992,\1\ and in order to 
take additional steps with respect to Libya's continued support 
for international terrorism and the national emergency declared 
in Executive Order No. 12543 of January 7, 1986, it is hereby 
ordered that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 731 of January 
21, 1992, in part, reaffirmed earlier resolutions calling for 
international aviation security, condemned the downing of Pan Am flight 
103 and UTA flight 772, and called on the Government of Libya to 
provide full and effective responses toward the elimination of 
international terrorism. United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 
748 of March 31, 1992, in part, reaffirmed Resolution 731, expressed 
conviction in the role of involved States and the international 
community in the suppression of international terrorism. Resolution 
731, furthermore, called on the international community to impose 
economic and diplomatic sanctions against Libya on April 15, 1992, if 
Libya failed to provide documentation relating to the downing of Pan Am 
flight 103 and UTA flight 772, and further failed to commit itself to 
the cessation of international terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Section 1. Except to the extent provided in regulations, 
orders, directives, authorizations, or licenses that may 
hereafter be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding 
the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed 
by any international agreement or any contract entered into or 
any license or permit granted before the effective date of this 
order, the granting of permission to any aircraft to take off 
from, land in, or overfly the United States, if the aircraft, 
as part of the same flight or as a continuation of that flight, 
is destined to land in or has taken off from the territory of 
Libya, is hereby prohibited.
    Sec. 2. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with 
the Secretary of Transportation, is hereby authorized to take 
such actions, including the promulgation of rules and 
regulations, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of 
section 1 of this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may 
redelegate the authority set forth in this order to other 
officers in the Department of the Treasury and may confer or 
impose such authority upon any other officer of the United 
States, with the consent of the head of the department or 
agency within which such officer is serving. All executive 
branch agencies of the Federal Government hereby affected are 
directed to consult as appropriate on the implementation of 
this order and to take all necessary measures within their 
authority to carry out the provisions of this order, including 
the suspension or termination of licenses or other 
authorizations in effect as of the date of this order.
    Sec. 3. Nothing contained in this order shall confer any 
substantive or procedural right or privilege on any person or 
organization, enforceable against the United States, its 
agencies or instrumentalities, its officers, or its employees.
    Sec. 4. This order is effective 11:59 p.m. eastern daylight 
time, April 15, 1992.
    Sec. 5. This order shall be transmitted to the Congress and 
published in the Federal Register.

                 10. Victims of Terrorism Compensation

          Executive Order 12598, June 17, 1987, 52 F.R. 23421

    By the authority vested in me as President by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States of America, 
including Title VIII of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and 
Antiterrorism, Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-399, 100 Stat. 853) 
(``the Act''), and in order to provide for the implementation 
of that Act, it is hereby ordered as follows:
    Section 1. The functions vested in the President by that 
part of section 803(a) of the Act to be codified at 5 U.S.C. 
5569 are delegated to the Secretary of State.
    Sec. 2. The functions vested in the President by that part 
of section 803(a) of the Act to be codified at 5 U.S.C. 5570 
are delegated to the Secretary of State, to be exercised in 
consultation with the Secretary of Labor.
    Sec. 3. The functions vested in the President by section 
805(a) (to be codified at 37 U.S.C. 559), section 806(c) (to be 
codified at 10 U.S.C. 1095), and section 806(d) (to be codified 
at 10 U.S.C. 2181-2185) are delegated to the Secretary of 
Defense.
    Sec. 4. The functions vested in the President by section 
806(b) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 1051), are delegated to the 
Secretary of Defense, to be exercised in consultation with the 
Secretary of Labor.
    Sec. 5. The Secretaries of State and Defense shall consult 
with each other and with the heads of other appropriated 
Executive departments and agencies in carrying out their 
functions under this Order.
    Sec. 6. Executive Order No. 12576 of December 2, 1986, is 
hereby superseded.

11. Blocking Libyan Government Property in the United States or Held by 
                              U.S. Persons

 Executive Order 12544, January 8, 1986, 51 F.R. 1235, 50 U.S.C. 1701 
                                  note

    By the authority vested in me as President by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States, including the 
International Emergency Economic Power Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et 
seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) 
and section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, in order 
to take steps with respect to Libya additional to those set 
forth in Executive Order No. 12543 of January 7, 1986, to deal 
with the threat to the national security and foreign policy of 
the United States referred to in that Order.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Since 1986, the President has continued this national 
emergency. The most recent continuation of the national emergency with 
respect to Libya was declared in notice of December 30, 1998 (64 F.R. 
383). Previous continuations were declared in notices dated December 
23, 1986 (51 F.R. 46849); December 15, 1987 (52 F.R. 47891); December 
28, 1988 (53 F.R. 52971); January 4, 1990 (55 F.R. 589); January 2, 
1991 (56 F.R. 447); December 26, 1991 (56 F.R. 67465); December 14, 
1992 (57 F.R. 59895); December 2, 1993 (58 F.R. 64361); December 22, 
1994 (59 F.R. 67119); January 3, 1996 (61 F.R. 383); January 2, 1997 
(62 F.R. 587); and January 2, 1998 (63 F.R. 653).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    I, RONALD REAGAN, President of the United States, hereby 
order blocked all property and interests in property of the 
Government of Libya, its agencies, instrumentalities and 
controlled entities and the Central Bank of Libya that are in 
the United States, that hereafter come within the United States 
or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control 
of U.S. persons, including overseas branches of U.S. persons.
    The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the 
Secretary of State, is authorized to employ all powers granted 
to me by the International Emergency Economics Power Act, 50 
U.S.C. 1701 et seq., to carry out the provisions of this Order.
    This Order is effective immediately and shall be 
transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal 
Register.

     12. Prohibiting Trade and Certain Transactions Involving Libya

  Executive Order 12543, January 7, 1986, 51 F.R. 875, 50 U.S.C. 1701 
                                  note

    By the authority vested in me as President by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States of America, 
including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 
1601 et seq.), sections 504 and 505 of the International 
Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (Public Law 
99-83), section 1114 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as 
amended (49 U.S.C. 1514), and section 301 of title 3 of the 
United States Code.
    I, RONALD REAGAN, President of the United States of 
America, find that the policies and actions of the Government 
of Libya constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the 
national security and foreign policy of the United States and 
hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that 
threat.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Since 1986, the President has continued this national 
emergency. The most recent continuation of the national emergency with 
respect to Libya was declared in notice of December 30, 1998 (64 F.R. 
383). Previous continuations were declared in notice of December 23, 
1986 (51 F.R. 46849); by the notice dated December 15, 1987 (52 F.R. 
47891); by notice of December 28, 1988 (53 F.R. 52971); by notice of 
Jan. 4, 1990 (55 F.R. 589); by notice of January 2, 1991 (56 F.R. 447); 
by notice of December 26, 1991 (56 F.R. 67465); by notice of December 
14, 1992 (57 F.R. 59895); by notice of December 2, 1993 (58 F.R. 
64361); by notice of December 22, 1994 (59 F.R. 67119); by notice of 
January 3, 1996 (61 F.R. 383); by notice of January 2, 1997 (62 F.R. 
587); and by notice of January 2, 1998 (63 F.R. 653).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    I hereby order:
    Section 1. The following are prohibited, except to the 
extent provided in regulations which may hereafter be issued 
pursuant to this Order:
    (a) The import into the United States of any goods or 
services of Libyan origin, other than publications and 
materials imported for news publications or news broadcast 
dissemination;
    (b) The export to Libya of any goods, technology (including 
technical data or other information) or services from the 
United States, except publications and donations of articles 
intended to relieve human suffering, such as food, clothing, 
medicine and medical supplies intended strictly for medical 
purposes;
    (c) Any transaction by a United States person relating to 
transportation to or from Libya; the provision of 
transportation to or from the United States by any Libyan 
person or any vessel or aircraft of Libyan registration; or the 
sale in the United States by any person holding authority under 
the Federal Aviation Act of any transportation by air which 
includes any stop in Libya;
    (d) The purchase by any United States person of goods for 
export from Libya to any country;
    (e) The performance by any United States person of any 
contract in support of an industrial or other commercial or 
governmental project in Libya;
    (f) The grant or extension of credits or loans by any 
United States person to the Government of Libya, its 
instrumentalities and controlled entities;
    (g) Any transaction by a United States person relating to 
travel by any United States citizen or permanent resident alien 
to Libya, or to activities by any such person within Libya, 
after the date of this Order, other than transactions necessary 
to effect such person's departure from Libya, to perform acts 
permitted until February 1, 1986, by Section 3 of this Order, 
or travel for journalistic activity by persons regularly 
employed in such capacity by a newsgathering organization; and
    (h) Any transaction by any United States person which 
evades or avoids, or has the purpose of evading or avoiding, 
any of the prohibitions set forth in this Order.
    For purposes of this Order, the term ``United States 
person'' means any United States citizen, permanent resident 
alien, juridical person organized under the laws of the United 
States or any person in the United States.
    Sec. 2. In light of the prohibition in Section 1(a) of this 
Order, section 251 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as 
amended (19 U.S.C. 1881), and section 126 of the Trade Act of 
1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. 2136) will have no effect with 
respect of Libya.
    Sec. 3. This Order is effective immediately, except that 
the prohibitions set forth in Section 1 (a), (b), (c), (d) and 
(e) shall apply as of 12:01 a.m. Eastern Standard Time, 
February 1, 1986.
    Sec. 4.  The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation 
with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to take such 
actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, 
as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Order. 
Such actions may include prohibiting or regulating payments or 
transfers of any property or any transactions involving the 
transfer of anything of economic value by any United States 
person to the Government of Libya, its instrumentalities and 
controlled entities, or to any Libyan national or entity owned 
or controlled, directly or indirectly, by Libya or Libyan 
nationals. The Secretary may redelegate any of these functions 
to other officers and agencies of the Federal government. All 
agencies of the United States government are directed to take 
all appropriate measures within their authority to carry out 
the provisions of this Order, including the suspension or 
termination of licenses or other authorizations in effect as of 
the date of this Order.
    Sec. 5.This Order shall be transmitted to the Congress and 
published in the Federal Register.

          13. Imports of Refined Petroleum Products From Libya

Executive Order 12538, November 15, 1985, 50 F.R. 47527, 19 U.S.C. 1862 
                                  note

    By the authority vested in me as President by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States, including Section 
504 of the International Security and Development Cooperation 
Act of 1985 (Public Law 99-83), and considering that the Libyan 
government actively pursues terrorism as an instrument of state 
policy and that Libya has developed significant capability to 
export petroleum products and thereby circumvent the 
prohibition imposed by Proclamation No. 4907 of March 10, 1982 
and retained in Proclamation No. 5141 of December 22, 1983 on 
the importation of Libyan crude oil, it is ordered as follows:
    Section 1. (a) No petroleum product refined in Libya 
(except petroleum product loaded aboard maritime vessels at any 
time prior to two days after the effective date of this 
Executive Order) may be imported into the United States, its 
territories or possessions.
    (b) For the purposes of this Executive Order, the 
prohibition on importation of petroleum products refined in 
Libya shall apply to petroleum products which are currently 
classifiable under Item Numbers: 475.05; 475.10; 475.15; 
475.25; 475.30; 475.35; 475.45; 475.65; 475.70 of the Tariff 
Schedules of the United States (19 U.S.C. 1202).
    Sec. 2. The Secretary of the Treasury may issue such 
rulings and instructions, or, following consultation with the 
Secretaries of State and Energy, such regulations as he deems 
necessary to implement this Order.
    Sec. 3. This Order shall be effective immediately.

   14. Revocation of Prohibitions Against Transactions Involving Iran

         Executive Order 12282, January 19, 1981, 46 F.R. 7925

    By the authority vested in me as President by the 
Constitution and statutes of the United States, including 
Section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1701), Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States 
Code, Section 1732 of Title 22 of the United States Code, and 
Section 301 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1631), 
in view of the continuing unusual and extraordinary threat to 
the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United 
States upon which I based my declarations of national emergency 
in Executive Order 12170, issued November 14, 1979, and in 
Executive Order 12211, issued April 17, 1980, in order to 
implement agreements with the Government of Iran, as reflected 
in Declarations of the Government of the Democratic and Popular 
Republic of Algeria dated January 19, 1981, relating to the 
release of U.S. diplomats and nationals being held as hostage 
and to the resolution of claims of United States nationals 
against Iran, and to begin the process of normalization of 
relations between the United States and Iran, it is hereby 
ordered that as of the effective date of this Order.
    1-101. The prohibitions contained in Executive Order 12205 
of April 7, 1980, and Executive Order 12211 of April 17, 1980, 
and Proclamation 4702 of November 12, 1979, are hereby revoked.
    1-102. The Secretary of the Treasury is delegated and 
authorized to exercise all functions vested in the President by 
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 
et seq.) to carry out the purpose of this Order.
    1-103. This Order shall be effective immediately.

        15. Hostage Relief Act of 1980--Delegation of Authority

 Executive Order 12268, January 15, 1981, 46 F.R. 4671, 5 U.S.C. 5561 
                                  note

    By the authority vested in me as President by the 
Constitution and statutes of the United States of America, 
including the Hostage Relief Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-449, 94 
Stat. 1967, 5 U.S.C. 5561 note) and Section 301 of Title 3 of 
the United States Code, and in order to provide for the 
implementation of that Act, it is hereby ordered as follows:
    1-101. The functions vested in the President by Sections 
103, 104, 105 and 301 of the Hostage Relief Act of 1980 (5 
U.S.C. 5561 note) are delegated to the Secretary of State.
    1-102. The Secretary of State shall consult with the heads 
of appropriate Executive agencies in carrying out the functions 
in Sections 103, 104, and 105 of the Act.

16. Administration of the Export Administration Act of 1969, as amended 
                                  \1\

   Executive Order 12002, July 7, 1977, 42 F.R. 35623; as amended by 
          Executive Order 12755, March 12, 1991, 56 F.R. 11057

    By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution 
and statutes of the United States of America, including Export 
Administration Act of 1969, as amended (50 U.S.C. App. 2401, et 
seq.), and as President of the United States of America, it is 
hereby ordered as follows:
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    \1\ When the Export Administration Act of 1969 expired on Sept. 30, 
1979, it was replaced by the Export Administration Act of 1979. Sec. 21 
of the 1979 Act provided that all orders (which would include this 
executive order) issued under the 1969 Act and which were in force on 
the effective date of the 1979 Act, would continue in effect until 
modified, superseded, set aside, or revoked. Executive Order 12214 was 
issued on May 2, 1980, providing for the administration of the Export 
Administration Act of 1979. However, the new Executive Order stated 
that it did not supersede or otherwise affect Executive Order 12002.
    Authority of the Export Administration Act of 1979 expired on 
September 30, 1990, pursuant to sec. 20 of that Act. Executive Order 
12730 of September 30, 1990, provided for the continuation of export 
control regulations until passage of an extension of the 1979 Act. 
Public Law 103-10 (107 Stat. 40; March 27, 1993) renewed the authority 
of the Act through June 30, 1994, effective March 27, 1993, and 
authorized funds for fiscal years 1993 and 1994. Executive Order 12730 
subsequently was rescinded by sec. 1 of Executive Order 12867 of 
September 30, 1993 (58 F.R. 51747).
    On the day the Act was once again set to expire, June 30, 1994, the 
President issued Executive Order 12923 (59 F.R. 34551) to continue the 
provisions of the Act and provisions for its for administration. 
Subsequently, Public Law 103-277 (108 Stat. 1407; enacted July 5, 1994) 
renewed the authority of the Export Administration Act through August 
20, 1994. Near that expiration, the President issued Executive Order 
12924 (August 19, 1994; 59 F.R. 43437) to continue the authorities in 
the Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Section 1. Except as provided in Section 2, the power, 
authority, and discretion conferred upon the President by the 
provisions of the Export Administration Act of 1969, as amended 
(50 U.S.C. App. 2401, et seq.) hereinafter referred to as the 
Act, are delegated to the Secretary of Commerce, with the power 
of successive redelegation.
    Sec. 2. (a) The power, authority and discretion conferred 
upon the President in Sections 4(h) and 4(l) of the Act are 
retained by the President.
    (b) The power, authority and discretion conferred upon the 
President in Section 3(8) of the Act, which directs that every 
reasonable effort be made to secure the removal of reduction of 
assistance by foreign countries to international terrorists 
through cooperation and agreement, are delegated to the 
Secretary of State, with the power of successive redelegation.
    Sec. 3.\2\ The Export Administration Review Board, 
hereinafter referred to as the Board, which was established by 
Executive Order No. 11533 of June 4, 1970, as amended, is 
hereby continued. The Board shall continue to have as its 
members, the Secretary of Commerce, who shall be Chairman of 
the Board, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of 
Defense. The Secretary of Energy and the Director of the United 
States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency shall be members of 
the Board, and shall participate in meetings that consider 
issues involving nonproliferation of armaments and other issues 
within their respective statutory and policy-making 
authorities. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 
Director of Central Intelligence shall be non-voting members of 
the Board. No alternate Board members shall be designated, but 
the acting head or deputy head of any department or agency may 
serve in lieu of the head of the concerned department or 
agency. The Board may invite the heads of other United States 
Government departments or agencies, other than the agencies 
represented by Board members, to participate in the activities 
of the Board when matters of interest to such departments or 
agencies are under consideration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Sec. 1 of Executive Order 12755 of March 12, 1991 (56 F.R. 
11057) amended and restated sec. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Sec. 4. The Secretary of Commerce may from time to time 
refer to the Board such particular export license matters, 
involving questions of national security or other major policy 
issues, as the Secretary shall select. The Secretary of 
Commerce shall also refer to the Board any other such export 
license matter, upon the request of any other member of the 
Board or of the head of any other United States Government 
department or agency having any interest in such matter. The 
Board shall consider the matters so referred to it, giving due 
consideration to the foreign policy of the United States, the 
national security, concerns about the nonproliferation of 
armaments,\3\ and the domestic economy, and shall make 
recommendation thereon to the Secretary of Commerce.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Sec. 2 of Executive Order 12755 of March 12, 1991 (56 F.R. 
11057) added ``concerns about the nonproliferation of armaments,''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Sec. 5. The President may at any time (a) prescribe rules 
and regulations applicable to the power, authority, and 
discretion referred to in this Order, and (b) communicate to 
the Secretary of Commerce such specific directives applicable 
thereto as the President shall determine. The Secretary of 
Commerce shall from time to time report to the President upon 
the administration of the Act and, as the Secretary deems 
necessary, may refer to the President recommendations made by 
the Board under Section 4 of this Order. Neither the provisions 
of this section nor those of Section 4 shall be construed as 
limiting the provisions of Section 1 of this Order.
    Sec. 6. All delegations, rules, regulations, orders, 
licenses, and other forms of administrative action made, 
issued, or otherwise taken under, or continued in existence by, 
the Executive orders revoked in Section 7 of this Order, and 
not revoked administratively or legislatively, shall remain in 
full force and effect under this Order until amended, or 
terminated by proper authority. The revocations in Section 7 of 
this Order shall not affect any violation of any rules, 
regulations, orders, licenses or other forms of administrative 
action under those Orders during the period those Orders were 
in effect.
    Sec. 7. Executive Order No. 11533 of June 4, 1970, 
Executive Order No. 11683 of August 29, 1972, Executive Order 
No. 11798 of August 14, 1974, Executive Order No. 11818 of 
November 5, 1974, Executive Order No. 11907 of March 1, 1976, 
and Executive Order No. 11940 of September 30, 1976, are hereby 
revoked.
=======================================================================




                  I. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT REGULATIONS

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

1. Department of State:..........................................   437
      a. Protection of Foreign Dignitaries and Other Official 
          Personnel (22 CFR Part 2)..............................   437
      b. Hostage Relief Assistance (22 CFR Part 191).............   440
      c. Victims of Terrorism Compensation (22 CFR Part 192).....   450
      d. Benefits for Hostages in Iraq, Kuwait, or Lebanon (22 
          CFR Part 193)..........................................   465
2. Department of the Treasury....................................   468
      a. Terrorism List Government Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR 
          Part 596)..............................................   468
      b. Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations 
          (31 CFR Part 597)......................................   475
3. Federal Aviation Administration:..............................   489
      a. Airport Security (14 CFR Part 107)......................   489
      b. Airplane Operator Security (14 CFR Part 108)............   505
      c. Operations: Foreign Air Carriers and Foreign Operators 
          of U.S.-Registered Aircraft Engaged in Common Carriage 
          (14 CFR Part 129)......................................   524

=======================================================================

                         1. Department of State

   a. Protection of Foreign Dignitaries and Other Official Personnel

             Department of State Regulations, 22 CFR Part 2

                         SUBCHAPTER A--GENERAL

 Part 2--Protection of Foreign Dignitaries and Other Official Personnel

Sec. 2.1  Designation of personnel to carry firearms and exercise 
                    appropriate power of arrest.

    (a) The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security is 
authorized to designate certain employees of the Department of 
State and the Foreign Service, as well as employees of other 
departments and agencies detailed to and under the supervision 
and control of the Department of State, as Security Officers, 
as follows.
    (1) Persons so designated shall be authorized to carry 
firearms when engaged in the performance of the duties 
prescribed in section (1) of the act of June 28, 1955, 69 Stat. 
188, as amended. No person shall be so designated unless he has 
either qualified in the use of firearms in accordance with 
standards established by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for Security, or in accordance with standards established 
by the department or agency from which he is detailed.
    (2) Persons so designated shall also be authorized, when 
engaged in the performance of duties prescribed in section (1) 
of the act of June 28, 1955, 69 Stat. 188, as amended, to 
arrest without warrant and deliver into custody any person 
violating the provisions of section 111 or 112 of Title 18, 
United States Code, in their presence or if they have 
reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested 
has committed or is committing such felony.
    (b) When the Under Secretary of State for Management 
determines that it is necessary, persons designated under 
paragraph (a) of this section shall be authorized to provide 
protection to an individual who has been designated by the 
President to serve as Secretary of State, prior to his 
appointment, or to a departing Secretary of State. In providing 
such protection, they are authorized to exercise the 
authorities described in paragraphs (a) (1) and (2) of this 
section. Such protection shall be for the period or periods 
determined necessary by the Under Secretary of State for 
Management, except that in the case of a departing Secretary of 
State, the period of protection under this paragraph shall in 
no event exceed 30 calendar days from the date of termination 
of that individual's incumbency as Secretary of State.
    (c) When the Under Secretary of State for Management 
determines that it is necessary, persons designated under 
paragraph (a) of this section shall be authorized to provide 
protection to a departing United States Representative to the 
United Nations. In providing such protection, they are 
authorized to exercise the authorities described in paragraphs 
(a) (1) and (2) of this section. Such protection shall be for 
the period or periods determined necessary by the Under 
Secretary of State for Management, except that the period of 
protection under this paragraph shall in no event exceed 30 
calendar days from the date of termination of that individual's 
incumbency as United States Representative to the United 
Nations.

Sec. 2.2 Purpose.

    Section 1116(b)(2) of Title 18 of the United States Code, 
as added by Pub. L. 92-539, An Act for the Protection of 
Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States (86 
Stat. 1071), defines the term ``foreign official'' for purposes 
of that Act as ``any person of a foreign nationality who is 
duly notified to the United States as an officer or employee of 
a foreign government or international organization, and who is 
in the United States on official business, and any member of 
his family whose presence in the United States is in connection 
with the presence of such officer or employee.'' Section 
1116(c)(4) of the same Act defines the term ``official guest'' 
for the purposes of that Act as ``a citizen or national of a 
foreign country present in the United States as an official 
guest of the Government of the United States pursuant to 
designation as such by the Secretary of State.'' It is the 
purpose of this regulation to specify the officer of the 
Department of State who shall be responsible for receiving 
notification of foreign officials under the Act and determining 
whether persons are ``duly notified'' to the United States and 
who shall be responsible for processing official guest 
designations by the Secretary of State.

Sec. 2.3 Notification of foreign officials.

    (a) Any notification of a foreign official for purposes of 
section 1116(b)(2) of Title 18 of the United States Code shall 
be directed by the foreign government or international 
organization concerned to the Chief of Protocol, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. For persons normally accredited 
to the United States in diplomatic or consular capacities and 
also for persons normally accredited to the United Nations and 
other international organizations and in turn notified to the 
Department of State, the procedure for placing a person in the 
statutory category of being ``duly notified to the United 
States'' shall be the current procedure for accreditation, with 
notification in turn when applicable. The Chief of the Office 
of Protocol will place on the roster of persons ``duly notified 
to the United States'' the names of all persons currently 
accredited and, when applicable, notified in turn, and will 
maintain the roster as part of the official files of the 
Department of State adding to and deleting therefrom as changes 
in accreditations occur.
    (b) For those persons not normally accredited, the Chief of 
Protocol shall determine upon receipt of notification, by 
letter from the foreign government or international 
organization concerned, whether any person who is the subject 
of such a notification has been duly notified under the Act. 
Any inquiries by law enforcement officers or other persons as 
to whether a person has been duly notified shall be directed to 
the Chief of Protocol. The determination of the Chief of 
Protocol that a person has been duly notified is final.

Sec. 2.4 Designation of official guests.

    The Chief of Protocol shall also maintain a roster of 
persons designated by the Secretary of State as official 
guests. Any inquiries by law enforcement officers or other 
persons as to whether a person has been so designated shall be 
directed to the Chief of Protocol. The designation of a person 
as an official guest is final. Pursuant to section 2658 of 
Title 22 of the U.S.C., the authority of the Secretary of State 
to perform the function of designation of official guests is 
hereby delegated to the Chief of Protocol.

Sec. 2.5 Records.

    The Chief of Protocol shall maintain as a part of the 
official files of the Department of State a cumulative roster 
of all persons who have been duly notified as foreign officials 
or designated as official guests under this part. The roster 
will reflect the name, position, nationality, and foreign 
government or international organization concerned or purpose 
of visit as an official guest and reflect the date the person 
was accorded recognition as being ``duly notified to the United 
States'' or designated as an official guest and the date, if 
any, of termination of such status.

                      b. Hostage Relief Assistance

            Department of State Regulations, 22 CFR Part 191

                      SUBCHAPTER T--HOSTAGE RELIEF

                  Part 191--Hostage Relief Assistance

                           Subpart A--General

Sec. 191.1 Declaration of hostile action.

    (a) The Secretary of State from time to time shall declare 
when and where individuals in the civil or uniformed services 
of the United States, or a citizen or resident alien of the 
United States rendering personal services to the United States 
abroad similar to the service of a civil officer or employee of 
the United States, have been placed in captive status because 
of hostile action abroad directed against the United States and 
occurring or continuing between November 4, 1979, and such date 
as may be declared by the President under section 101(2)(A) of 
the Hostage Relief Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-449, hereafter ``the 
Act'') or January 1, 1983, whichever is later. Each such 
declaration shall be published in the Federal Register
    (b) The Secretary of State upon his or her own initiative, 
or upon application under Sec. 191.2 shall determine which 
individuals in captive status as so declared shall be 
considered hostages eligible for benefits under the Act. The 
Secretary shall also determine who is eligible under the Act 
for benefits as a member of a family or household of a hostage. 
The determination of the Secretary shall be final, but any 
interested person may request reconsideration on the basis of 
information not considered at the time of original 
determination. The criteria for determination are set forth in 
sections 101 and 205 of the Act, and in these regulations.

Sec. 191.2 Application for determination of eligibility.

    (a) Any person who believes that they or other persons 
known to them are either hostages as defined in the Act, or 
members of the family or household of hostages as defined in 
Sec. 191.3(a)(1), or a child eligible for benefits under 
subpart D, may apply for benefits under this subchapter for 
themselves, or on behalf of others entitled thereto.
    (b) The application shall be in writing, should contain all 
identifying and other pertinent data available to the person 
applying about the person or persons claimed to be eligible, 
and should be addressed to the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Administration, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 
Applications may be filed at any time after publication of a 
declaration under Sec. 191.1(a) in the Federal Register, and 
during the period of its validity, or within 60 days after 
release from captivity. Later filing may be considered when in 
the opinion of the Secretary of State there is good cause for 
the late filing.

Sec. 191.3 Definitions.

    When used in this subchapter, unless otherwise specified, 
the terms--
    (a) Family Member means (1) a spouse, (2) an unmarried 
dependent child including a step-child or adopted child, (3) a 
person designated in official records or determined by the 
agency head or designee thereof to be a dependent, or (4) other 
persons such as parents, parents-in-law, persons who stand in 
the place of a spouse or parents, or other members of a 
household when fully justified by the circumstances of the 
hostage situation, as determined by the Secretary of State.
    (b) Agency head means the head of an agency as defined in 
the Act (or successor agency) employing an individual 
determined to be an American hostage. The Secretary of State is 
the agency head with respect to any hostage not employed by an 
agency.
    (c) Principal means the hostage whose captivity forms the 
basis for benefits under this subchapter for a family member.

Sec. 191.4 Notification of eligible persons.

    The Assistant Secretary of State for Administration shall 
be responsible for notifying each individual determined to be 
eligible for benefits under the Act or, if that person is not 
available, a representative or Family Member of the hostage.

Sec. 191.5 Relationships among agencies.

    (a) The Assistant Secretary of State for Administration 
shall promptly inform the head of any agency whenever an 
employee (including a member of the Armed Forces) in that 
agency, or Family Member of such employee, is determined to be 
eligible for benefits under this subchapter.
    (b) In accordance with inter-agency agreements between the 
Department of State and relevant agencies--
    (1) The Veterans Administration will periodically bill the 
Department of State for expenses it pays for each eligible 
person under subpart D of this subchapter plus the 
administrative costs of carrying out its responsibilities under 
this part.
    (2) The Department of State will, on a periodic basis, 
determine the cost for services and benefits it provides to all 
eligible persons under this subchapter and bill each agency for 
the costs attributable to Principals (and Family Members) in or 
acting on behalf of the agency plus a proportionate share of 
related administrative expenses.

Sec. 191.6 Effective date.

    This regulation is effective as of November 4, 1979. 
Reimbursement may be made for expenses approved under this 
subchapter for services rendered on or after such date.

   Subpart B--Application of Soldiers' and Sailor's Civil Relief Act

Sec. 191.10 Eligibility for benefits.

    A person designated as a hostage under subpart A of this 
subchapter, other than a member of the Armed Forces covered by 
the provisions of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act 
of 1940, shall be eligible for benefits under this part.

Sec. 191.11 Applicable benefits.

    (a) Eligible persons are entitled to the benefits provided 
by the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50 
U.S.C. App. 501, et seq.), including the benefits provided by 
section 701 (50 U.S.C. App. 591) notwithstanding paragraph (c) 
thereof, but excluding the benefits provided by sections 104, 
105, 106, 400 through 408, 501 through 512, and 514 (50 U.S.C. 
App. 514, 515, 516, 540 through 548, 561 through 572, and 574).
    (b) In applying such Act for purposes of this section--
    (1) The term ``person in the military service'' is deemed 
to include any such American hostage;
    (2) The term ``period of military service'' is deemed to 
include the period during which such American hostage is in a 
captive status;
    (3) References therein to the Secretary of the Army, the 
Secretary of the Navy, the Adjutant General of the Army, the 
Chief of Naval Personnel, and the Commandant, United States 
Marine Corps, or other officials of government are deemed to be 
references to the Secretary of State; and
    (4) The term ``dependents'' shall, to the extent 
permissible by law, be construed to include ``Family Members'' 
as defined in section 101 of the Hostage Relief Act.

Sec. 191.12 Description of benefits.

    The following material is included to assist persons 
affected, by providing a brief description of some of the 
provisions of the Civil Relief Act. Note that not all of the 
sections applicable to hostages have been included here. 
References to sections herein are references to the Civil 
Relief Act of 1940, as amended, followed by references in 
parentheses to the same section in the United States Code.
    (a) Guarantors, endorsers. Section 103 (50 U.S.C. App. 513) 
provides that whenever a hostage is granted relief from the 
enforcement of an obligation, a court, in its discretion, may 
grant the same relief to guarantors and endorsers of the 
obligation. Amendments extend relief to accommodation makers 
and others primarily or secondarily liable on an obligation, 
and to sureties on a criminal bail bond. They provide, on 
certain conditions, that the benefits of the section with 
reference to persons primarily or secondarily liable on an 
obligation may be waived in writing.
    (b) Written Agreements. Section 107 (50 U.S.C. App. 517) 
provides that nothing contained in the Act shall prevent 
hostages from making certain arrangements with respect to their 
contracts and obligations, but requires that such arrangements 
be in writing.
    (c) Protection in Court. Section 200 (50 U.S.C. App. 520) 
provides that if a hostage is made defendant in a court action 
and is unable to appear in court, the court shall appoint an 
attorney to represent the hostage and protect the hostage's 
interests. Further, if a judgment is rendered against the 
hostage, an opportunity to reopen the case and present a 
defense, if meritorious, may be permitted within 90 days after 
release.
    (d) Court Postponement. Section 201 (50 U.S.C. App. 521) 
authorizes a court to postpone any court proceedings if a 
hostage is a party thereto and is unable to participate by 
reason of being a captive.
    (e) Relief Against Penalties. Section 202 (50 U.S.C. App. 
522) provides for relief against fines or penalties when a 
court proceeding involving a hostage is postponed, or when the 
fine or penalties are incurred for failure to perform any 
obligation. In the latter case, relief depends upon whether the 
hostage's ability to pay or perform is materially affected by 
being held captive.
    (f) Postponement of Action. Section 203 (50 U.S.C. App. 
523) authorizes a court to postpone or vacate the execution of 
any judgment, attachment or garnishment.
    (g) Period of Postponement. Section 204 (50 U.S.C. App. 
524) authorizes a court to postpone proceedings for the period 
of captivity, and for 3 months thereafter, or any part thereof.
    (h) Extended Time Limits. Section 205 (50 U.S.C. App. 525) 
excludes the period of captivity from computing time under 
existing or future statutes of limitation. Amendments extend 
relief to include actions before administrative agencies, and 
provide that the period of captivity shall not be included in 
the period for redemption of real property sold to enforce any 
obligation, tax, or assessment. Section 207 excludes 
application of section 205 to any period of limitation 
prescribed by or under the internal revenue laws of the United 
States.
    (i) Interest Rates. Section 206 (50 U.S.C. App. 526) 
provides that interest on the obligations of hostages shall not 
exceed a specified per centum per annum, unless the court 
determines that ability to pay greater interest is not affected 
by being held captive.
    (j) Misuse of Benefits. Section 600 (50 U.S.C. App. 580) 
provides against transfers made with intent to delay the just 
enforcement of a civil right by taking advantage of the Act.
    (k) Further Relief. Section 700 (50 U.S.C. App. 590) 
provides that a person, during a period of captivity or 6 
months thereafter, may apply to a court for relief with respect 
to obligations incurred prior to captivity, or any tax or 
assessment whether falling due prior to or during the period of 
captivity. The court may, on certain conditions, stay the 
enforcement of such obligations.
    (l) Stay of Eviction. Section 300 (50 U.S.C. App. 530) 
provides that a hostage's dependents shall not be evicted from 
their dwelling if the rental is $ 150 or less per month, except 
upon leave of a court. If it is proved that inability to pay 
rent is a result of being in captivity, the court is authorized 
to stay eviction proceedings for not longer than 3 months. An 
amendment extends relief to owners of the premises with respect 
to payments on mortgage and taxes.
    (m) Contract and Mortgage Obligations. As provided by 
sections 301 and 302 of the Act (50 U.S.C. App. 531 and 532), 
as amended, contracts for the purchase of real and personal 
property, which originated prior to the period of captivity, 
may not be rescinded, terminated, or foreclosed, or the 
property repossessed, except as provided in section 107 (50 
U.S.C. App. 517), unless by an order of a court. The mentioned 
sections give the court wide discretionary powers to make such 
disposition of the particular case as may be equitable in order 
to conserve the interests of both the hostage and the creditor. 
The cited sections further provide that the court may stay the 
proceedings for the period of captivity and 3 months 
thereafter, if in its opinion the ability of the hostage to 
perform the obligation is materially affected by reason of 
captivity. Section 303 (50 U.S.C. App. 533) provides that the 
court may appoint appraisers and, based upon their report, 
order such sum as may be just, if any, paid to hostages or 
their dependents, as a condition to foreclosing a mortgage, 
resuming possession of property, and rescinding or terminating 
a contract.
    (n) Termination of a Lease. Section 304 (50 U.S.C. App. 
534) provides, in general, that a lease covering premises 
occupied for dwelling, business, or agricultural purpose, 
executed by persons who subsequently become hostages, may be 
terminated by a notice in writing given to the lessor, subject 
to such action as may be taken by a court on application of the 
lessor. Termination of a lease providing for monthly payment of 
rent shall not be effective until 30 days after the first date 
on which the next rental payment is due, and, in the case of 
other leases, on the last day of the month following the month 
when the notice is served.
    (o) Assignment of Life Insurance Policy. Section 305 (50 
U.S.C. App. 535) provides that the assignee of a life insurance 
policy assigned as security, other than the insurer in 
connection with a policy loan, except upon certain conditions, 
shall not exercise any right with respect to the assignment 
during the period of captivity of the insured and one year 
thereafter, unless upon order of a court.
    (p) Storage Lien. Section 305 (50 U.S.C. App. 535) provides 
that a lien for storage of personal property may not be 
foreclosed except upon court order. The court may stay 
proceedings or make other just disposition.
    (q) Extension of Benefits to Dependents. Section 306 (50 
U.S.C. App. 536) extends the benefits to section 300 through 
305 to dependents of a hostage.
    (r) Real and Personal Property Taxes. Section 500 (50 
U.S.C. App. 560) forbids sale of property, except upon court 
leave, to enforce collection of taxes or assessments (other 
than taxes on income) on personal property or real property 
owned and occupied by the hostage or dependents thereof at the 
commencement of captivity and still occupied by the hostage's 
dependents or employees. The court may stay proceedings for a 
period not more than 6 months after termination of captivity. 
When by law such property may be sold to enforce collection, 
the hostage will have the right to redeem it within 6 months 
after termination of captivity. Unpaid taxes or assessments 
bear interest at 6 percent.
    (s) Income Taxes. Section 513 provides for deferment of 
payment of income taxes. However, section 204 of the Hostage 
Relief Act of 1980 provides for deferment and certain other 
relief, and should be referred to in order to determine 
statutory tax benefits in addition to those in section 513 of 
the Civil Relief Act.
    (t) Certification of Hostage. Section 601 provides that a 
certificate signed by the agency head shall be prima facie 
evidence that the person named has been a hostage during the 
period specified in the certification.
    (u) Interlocutory Orders. Section 602 (50 U.S.C. App. 582) 
provides that a court may revoke an interlocutory order it has 
issued pursuant to any provision of the Soldiers' and Sailors' 
Civil Relief Act of 1940.
    (v) Power of Attorney. Section 701 (50 U.S.C. App. 591) 
provides that certain powers of attorney executed by a hostage 
which expire by their terms after the person was captured shall 
be automatically extended for the period of captivity. 
Exceptions are made with respect to powers of attorney which by 
their terms clearly indicate they are to expire on the date 
specified irrespective of hostage status. (Section 701 applies 
to American hostages notwithstanding paragraph (c) thereof 
which states that it applies only to powers of attorney issued 
during the ``Vietnam era''.)

Sec. 191.13 Administration of benefits.

    (a) The Assistant Secretary of State for Administration 
will issue certifications or other documents when required for 
purposes of the Civil Relief Act.
    (b) The Assistant Secretary of State shall whenever 
possible promptly inform the chief legal officer of each State 
in which hostages maintain residence of all persons determined 
to be hostages eligible for assistance under this subpart.

                      Subpart C--Medical Benefits

Sec. 191.20 Eligibility for benefits.

    A person designated as a hostage or Family Member of a 
hostage under subpart A of this subchapter shall be eligible 
for benefits under this subpart.

Sec. 191.21 Applicable benefits.

    A person eligible for benefits under this part shall be 
eligible for authorized medical and health care at U.S. 
Government expense, and for payment of other authorized 
expenses related to such care or for obtaining such care for 
any illness or injury which is determined by the Secretary of 
State to be caused or materially aggravated by the hostage 
situation, to the extent that such care may not--
    (a) Be provided or paid for under any other Government 
health or medical program, including, but not limited to, the 
programs administered by the Secretary of Defense, the 
Secretary of Labor and the Administrator of Veterans Affairs; 
or
    (b) Be entitled to reimbursement by any private or 
Government health insurance or comparable plan.

Sec. 191.22 Administration of benefits.

    (a) An eligible person, who desires medical or health care 
under this subpart or any person acting on behalf thereof, 
shall submit an application to the Office of Medical Services, 
Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520 (hereafter referred 
to as the ``Office''). The applicant shall supply all relevant 
information, including insurance information, requested by the 
Director of the Office. An eligible person may also submit 
claims to the Office for payment for emergency care when there 
is not time to obtain prior authorization as prescribed by this 
paragraph, and for payment for care received prior to or 
ongoing on the effective date of these regulations.
    (b) The Office shall evaluate all requests for care and 
claims for reimbursement and determine, on behalf of the 
Secretary of State, whether the care in question is authorized 
under Sec. 191.21 of this subpart. The Office will authorize 
care, or payment for care when it determines the criteria of 
such section are met. Authorization shall include a 
determination as to the necessity and reasonableness of medical 
or health care.
    (c) The Office will refer applicants eligible for benefits 
under other Government health programs to the Government agency 
administering those programs. Any portion of authorized care 
not provided or paid for under another Government program will 
be reimbursed under this subpart.
    (d) Eligible persons may obtain authorized care from any 
licensed facility or health care provider of their choice 
approved by the Office. To the extent possible, the Office will 
attempt to arrange for authorized care to be provided in a 
Government facility at no cost to the patient.
    (e) Authorized care provided by a private facility or 
health care provider will be paid or reimbursed under this 
subpart to the extent that the Office determines that costs do 
not exceed reasonable and customary charges for similar care in 
the locality.
    (f) All bills for authorized medical or health care covered 
by insurance shall be submitted to the patient's insurance 
carrier for payment prior to submission to the Office for 
payment of the balance authorized by this part. The Office will 
request the health care providers to bill the insurance carrier 
and the Department of State for authorized care, rather than 
the patient.
    (g) Eligible persons will be reimbursed by the Office for 
authorized travel to obtain an evaluation of their claim under 
paragraph (b) of this section and for other authorized travel 
to obtain medical or health care authorized by this subpart.

Sec. 191.23 Disputes.

    Any dispute between the Office and eligible persons 
concerning (a) whether medical or health care is required in a 
given case, (b) whether required care is incident to the 
hostage taking, or (c) whether the cost for any authorized care 
is reasonable and customary, shall be referred to the Medical 
Director, Department of State and the Foreign Service for a 
determination. If the person bringing the claim is not 
satisfied with the decision of the Medical Director, the 
dispute shall be referred to a medical board composed of three 
physicians, one appointed by the Medical Director, one by the 
eligible person and the third by the first two members. A 
majority decision by the board shall be binding on all parties.

                    Subpart D--Educational Benefits

Sec. 191.30 Eligibility for benefits.

    (a) A spouse or unmarried dependent child aged 18 or above 
of a hostage as determined under Subpart A of this subchapter 
shall be eligible for benefits under Sec. 191.31 of this 
subpart. (Certain limitations apply, however, to persons 
eligible for direct assistance through other programs of the 
Veterans Administration under Chapter 35 of Title 38, United 
States Code).
    (b) A Principal (see definition in Sec. 191.3) designated 
as a hostage under Subpart A of this subchapter, who intends to 
change jobs or careers because of the hostage experience and 
who desires additional training for this purpose, shall be 
eligible for benefits under Sec. 191.32 of this part unless 
such person is eligible for comparable benefits under Title 38 
of the United States Code as determined by the Administrator of 
the Veterans Administration.

Sec. 191.31 Applicable family benefits.

    (a) An eligible spouse or child shall be paid (by 
advancement or reimbursement) for expenses incurred for 
subsistence, tuition, fees, supplies, books, and equipment, and 
other educational expenses, while attending an educational or 
training institution approved in accordance with procedures 
established by the Veterans Administration, which shall be 
comparable to procedures established pursuant to Chapters 35 
and 36 of Title 38 U.S.C.
    (b) Except as provide in paragraph (c) or (d) of this 
section), payments shall be available under this subsection for 
an eligible spouse or child for education or training which 
occurs--
    (1) 90 days after the Principal is placed in a captive 
status, and
    (i) Through the end of any semester or quarter which begins 
before the date on which the Principal ceases to be in a 
captive status, or
    (ii) If the educational or training institution is not 
operated on a semester or quarter system, the earlier of the 
end of any course which began before such date or the end of 
the twelve-week period following that date.
    (c) In special circumstances and within the limitation of 
Sec. 191.34, the Secretary of State may, under the criteria and 
procedures set forth in Sec. 191.33, approve payments for 
education or training under this subsection which occurs after 
the date determined under paragraph (b) of thissection.
    (d) In the event a Principal dies and the death is 
determined by the Secretary of State to be incident to that 
individual being a hostage, payments shall be available under 
this subsection for education or training of a spouse or child 
of the Principal which occurs after the date of death, up to 
the maximum that may be authorized under Sec. 191.34.

Sec. 191.32 Applicable benefits for hostages.

    (a) When authorized by the Secretary of State a Principal, 
following released from captivity, shall be paid (by 
advancement or reimbursement) for expenses incurred for 
subsistence, tuition, fees, supplies, books and equipment, and 
other educational expenses, while attending an educational or 
training institution approved in accordance with procedures 
established by the Veterans Administration comparable to 
procedures established pursuant to Chapters 35 and 36 of Title 
38 U.S.C. Payments shall be available under this subsection for 
education or training which occurs on or before--
    (1) The end of any semester or quarter (as appropriate) 
which begins before the date which is 10 years after the day on 
which the Principal ceases to be in a captive status, or
    (2) If the educational or training institution is not 
operated on a semester or quarter system, the earlier of the 
end of any course which began before such date or the end of 
the twelve-week period following that date.
    (b) A person eligible for benefits under this subsection 
shall not be required to separate from Government service in 
order to undertake the training or education, but while in 
Government service, may only receive such training or education 
during off-duty hours or during periods of approved leave.

Sec. 191.33 Administration of benefits.

    (a) Any person desiring benefits under this part shall 
apply in writing to the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Administration, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 
The application shall specify the benefits desired and the 
basis of eligibility for those benefits. The Secretary of State 
shall make determinations of eligibility for benefits under 
this part, and shall forward approved applications to the 
Veterans Administration and advise the applicant of the name 
and address of the office in the Veterans Administration that 
will counsel the eligible persons on how to obtain the benefits 
that have been approved. Persons whose applications are 
disapproved shall be advised of the reasons for the 
disapproval.
    (b) The Veterans Administration shall provide the same 
level and kind of assistance, including payments (by 
advancement or reimbursement) for authorized expenses up to the 
same maximum amounts, to spouses and children of hostages, and 
to Principals following their release from captivity as it does 
to eligible spouses and children of veterans and to eligible 
veterans, respectively, under Chapters 35 and 36 of Title 38, 
United States Code. The Veterans Administration shall, 
following consultation with the Secretary of State and under 
procedures it has established to administer section 1724 of 
Title 38, United States Code, discontinue assistance for any 
individual whose conduct or progress is unsatisfactory under 
standards consistent with those established pursuant to such 
section 1724.
    (c) An Advisory Board shall be established to advise on 
eligibility for benefits under paragraphs (c) and (d) of 
Sec. Sec. 191.31 and 191.32. The Board shall be composed of the 
Assistant Secretary of State for Administration as Chairperson, 
the Director of the Office of Medical Services of the 
Department of State, the Executive Director of the regional 
bureau of the Department of State in whose region the relevant 
hostile action occurred, the Director of Personnel or other 
designee of the applicable employing agency, and a 
representative of the Veterans Administration designated by the 
Administrator.
    (d) If an application is received from a spouse or child 
for extended training under Sec. 191.31(c), the Secretary of 
Administration shall determine with the advice of the Advisory 
Board whether the Principal, following release from captivity, 
is incapacitated by the hostage experience to the extent that 
(1) he or she has not returned to full-time active duty and is 
unlikely to be able to resume the normal duties of his or her 
position or career, or (2) in the event of a separation from 
Government service, a comparable position or career, for at 
least six months from the date the Principal is released from 
captivity. If the Secretary makes such a determination, he or 
she may approve, within the limits of Sec. 191.34, an 
application under Sec. 191.31(c) for up to one year of 
education or training. If the Principal remains incapacitated, 
the Secretary may approve additional training or education up 
to the maximum authorized under Sec. 191.34.

Sec. 191.34 Maximum limitation on benefits.

    (a) In no event may assistance be provided under this 
subpart for any individual for a period in excess of 45 months, 
or the equivalent thereof in part-time education or training.
    (b) The eligibility of a spouse for benefits under 
paragraph (c) or (d) of Sec. 191.31 shall expire on a date 
which is 10 years after the date of the release of the hostage, 
or the death of the hostage, respectively. The eligibility of a 
dependent child for benefits under such paragraphs (c) and (d) 
shall expire on the 26th birthday of such child or on such 
later date as determined by the Administrator of the Veterans 
Administration, as would be applicable if section 1712 of Title 
38, United States Code, were applicable.

                  c. Victims of Terrorism Compensation

            Department of State Regulations, 22 CFR Part 192

              Part 192--Victims of Terrorism Compensation

                           Subpart A--General

Sec. 192.1 Declarations of hostile action.

    (a)(1) The Secretary of State shall declare when and where 
individuals in the Civil Service of the United States, 
including members of the Foreign Service and foreign service 
nationals, or a citizen, national or resident alien of the 
United States rendering personal services to the United States 
similar to the service of an individual in the Civil Service, 
have been placed in captive status commencing on or after 
November 4, 1979, for purposes of Sec. 192.11(b) or January 21, 
1981, for all other purposes under this part, which arises 
because of hostile action abroad and is a result of the 
individual's relationship with the U.S. Government as provided 
in the Victims of Terrorism Compensation Act, codified in 5 
U.S.C. 5569 and 5570 and Executive Order 12598.
    (2) The Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Labor, shall also declare when and where 
individuals in the Civil Service of the United States including 
members of the Foreign Service and foreign service nationals, 
including individuals rendering personal services to the United 
States similar to the service of an individual in the Civil 
Service, and family members of these individuals are eligible 
to receive compensation for disability or death occurring after 
January 21, 1981. Such determination shall be based on the 
decision by the Secretary of State that the disability or death 
was caused by hostile action abroad and was a result of the 
individual's relationship with the Government.
    (3) Declarations of hostile action in domestic situations 
shall be made by the Secretary of State in consultation with 
the Attorney General of the United States and the head of the 
employing agency or agencies.
    (b) The Secretary of State for actions abroad, or Agency 
Head for domestic actions, upon his or her own initiative, or 
upon application under Sec. 192.2 shall determine which 
individuals in captive or missing status as so declared shall 
be considered captives eligible for benefits under the Act. The 
Secretary or Agency Head shall also determine who is eligible 
under the Act for benefits as a member of a family or household 
of a captive. The determination of the Secretary or Agency Head 
shall be final for purposes of determining captive status and 
cash payments, and not subject to judicial review, but any 
interested person may request reconsideration on the basis of 
information not considered at the time of original 
determination. The criteria for determination are set forth in 
sections 5569 and 5570 of Title 5 of U.S.C., and in these 
regulations.

Sec. 192.2 Application for determination of eligibility.

    (a) Any person who believes that that person or other 
persons known to that person are either captives as defined in 
5 U.S.C. 5569(a)(1), individuals who have suffered disability 
or death caused by hostile action which was a result of the 
individual's relationship with the U.S. Government, members of 
the family or household of such individuals as defined in 
Sec. 192.3(a)(1), or a child eligible for benefits under 
subchapter D, may apply for benefits under this subchapter for 
that person, or on behalf of others entitled thereto.
    (b) The application in connection with hostile action 
abroad shall be in writing, shall contain all identifying and 
other pertinent data available to the person applying about the 
person or persons claimed to be eligible, and shall be 
addressed to the Director General of the Foreign Service, 
Department of State, Washington, DC 20520. Applications may be 
filed within 60 days after the latest of: a declaration under 
Sec. 192.1(a), the hostile action, or release from captivity. 
Later filing may be considered when in the opinion of the 
Secretary of State there is good cause for the late filing. 
Applications in connection with hostile action in domestic 
situations shall conform to these same requirements and be 
filed with the Agency Head.

Sec. 192.3 Definitions.

    When used in this subchapter, unless otherwise specified, 
the terms--
    (a) Secretary of State includes any person to whom the 
Secretary of State has delegated the responsibilities of 
carrying out this subpart.
    (b) Family Member means a dependent of a captive and any 
individual other than a dependent who is a member of such 
person's family or household and shall include the following: 
(1) A spouse, (2) an unmarried dependent child including a 
step-child or adopted child under 21 years of age, (3) a person 
designated in official records or determined by the agency head 
or designee thereof to be dependent, and (4) other persons such 
as parents, non-dependent children, parents-in-law, persons who 
stand in the place of a spouse or parents, or other members of 
the family or household of a captive or employee, as determined 
by the Agency head concerned.
    (c) Agency Head means the head of an Executive Agency of 
the U.S. Federal Government employing an individual affected by 
hostile action as covered by these regulations. The Secretary 
of State is the agency head for actions abroad with respect to 
any such individual not employed by an agency.
    (d) Captive means any individual in a captive status 
commencing while such individual is in the Civil Service or a 
citizen, national or resident alien of the United States 
rendering personal service to the United States similar to the 
service of an individual in the Civil Service (other than as a 
member of the uniformed services).
    (e) Captive Status means a missing status which, as 
determined under Sec. 192.1, arises because of a hostile action 
and is a result of the individual's relationship with the 
Government.
    (f) Principal means the person whose captivity, death or 
disability forms the basis for benefits for that individual or 
for a family member under this subchapter.
    (g) Individual rendering personal services to the United 
States similar to the service of an individual in the Civil 
Service includes contract employees and other individuals 
fitting that description.
    (h) Pay and Allowances has the meaning set forth in 5 
U.S.C. 5561(6):
    (1) Basic pay;
    (2) Special pay;
    (3) Incentive pay;
    (4) Basic allowances for quarters;
    (5) Basic allowance for subsistence; and
    (6) Station per diem allowances for not more than 90 days.
    (i) Child means a dependent as defined in paragraph (b)(2) 
of this section.

Sec. 192.4 Notification of eligible persons.

    The Director General of the Foreign Service for the 
Department of State, or other Agency Head in domestic 
situations, shall be responsible for notifying each individual 
determined to be eligible for benefits under the Act, or if 
that person is not available, a representative or family member 
of the eligible individual.

Sec. 192.5 Relationships among agencies.

    (a) To assist in ensuring that eligible persons receive 
compensation, each Agency Head shall notify the Director 
General of the Foreign Service of the Department of State of 
any incident which he or she believes may be appropriately 
declared a hostile action under Sec. 192.1.
    (b) The Director General of the Foreign Service for the 
Department of State shall promptly inform the head of any 
agency whenever an employee of that agency, or Family Member of 
such employee, is determined to be eligible for benefits under 
this subchapter in connection with hostile action.
    (c) In accordance with inter-agency agreements between the 
Department of State and relevant agencies--
    (1) The Department of Veterans Affairs will periodically 
bill the Department of State for expenses it pays for each 
eligible person under subpart E of this subchapter plus the 
administrative costs of carrying out its responsibilities under 
this part.
    (2) The Department of State will, on a periodic basis, 
determine the cost for services and benefits it provides to all 
eligible persons under this subchapter, and bill each agency 
for the medical service costs (in connection with hostile 
action abroad) and educational benefits attributable to 
Principals and Family Members, plus a proportionate share of 
related administrative expenses.

 Subpart B--Payment of Salary and Other Benefits for Captive Situations

Sec. 192.10 Eligibility for benefits.

    A person designated as a captive under subpart A of this 
subchapter shall be eligible for benefits under this subpart.

Sec. 192.11 Applicable benefits.

    (a) Captives are entitled to receive or have credited to 
their account, for the period in captive status, the same pay 
and allowances to which they were entitled at the beginning of 
that period or to which they may have become entitled 
thereafter.
    (b) A person designated as a captive (or a family member of 
a principal) under subpart A of this subchapter whose captivity 
commenced on or after November 4, 1979, is also entitled to 
receive a cash payment from the captive's employing agency, for 
each day held captive, in an amount equal to but not less than 
one-half of the amount of the world-wide average per diem rate 
established under 5 U.S.C. 5702.

Sec. 192.12 Administration of benefits.

    (a) The amount deducted from the pay and allowances of 
captives must be recorded in the individual accounts of the 
agency concerned. A Treasury designated account, set up on the 
books of the agency concerned, may be utilized by the head of 
an agency to report the net amount of pay, allowances and 
interest credited to captives pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 5569(b). 
Interest payments under this section shall be paid out of funds 
available for salaries and expenses of the agency. Interest 
shall be computed at a rate for any calendar quarter equal to 
the average rate paid on United States Treasury bills with 3-
month maturities issued during the preceding calendar quarter, 
with quarterly compounding.
    (b) Cash payments to captives for each day of captivity 
shall be made by the head of an agency before the end of the 
one-year period beginning on the date on which the captive 
status terminates. In the event the captive dies in captivity 
or prior to payment of these benefits, payment shall be made to 
the eligible survivors under Sec. 192.51(c) or the estate. A 
payment under this subchapter may be deferred or denied by the 
head of an agency pending determination of an offense committed 
by the captive under the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 8312.

 Subpart C--Application of Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act to 
                           Captive Situations

Sec. 192.20 Eligibility for benefits.

    A person designated as a captive under subpart A of this 
subchapter, shall be eligible for benefits under this part.

Sec. 192.21 Applicable benefits.

    (a) Eligible persons are entitled to the benefits provided 
by the Soldiers' and Sailors' CivilRelief Act of 1940 (50 
U.S.C. App. 501, et seq.), including the benefits provided by 
section 701 (50 U.S.C. App 591) notwithstanding paragraph (c) 
thereof, but excluding the benefits provided by sections 104, 
105, 106, 400 through 408, 501 through 512, and 514 (50 U.S.C. 
App. 514, 515, 516, 540through 548, 561 through 572, and 574).
    (b) In applying such Act for purposes of this section--
    (1) The term ``person in the military service'' is deemed 
to include any such captive;
    (2) The term ``period of military service'' is deemed to 
include the period during which such captive is in a captive 
status;
    (3) References therein to the Secretary of the Army, the 
Secretary of the Navy, the Adjutant General of the Army, the 
Chief of Naval Personnel, and the Commandant, United States 
Marine Corps, or other officials of government are deemed, in 
the case of any captive, to be references to the Secretary of 
State; and
    (4) The term ``dependents'' shall, to the extent 
permissible by law, be construed to include ``Family Members'' 
as defined in Sec. 192.3 of these regulations.

Sec. 192.22 Description of benefits.

    The following material is included to assist persons 
affected, by providing a brief description of some of the 
provisions of the Civil Relief Act. Note that not all of the 
sections applicable to captives have been included here. 
References to sections herein are references to the Civil 
Relief Act of 1940, as amended, followed by references in 
parentheses to the same section in the United States Code.
    (a) Guarantors, endorsers. Section 103 (50 U.S.C. App 513) 
provides that whenever a captive is granted relief from the 
enforcement of an obligation, a court, in its discretion, may 
grant the same relief to guarantors and endorsers of the 
obligation. Amendments extend relief to accommodation makers 
and others primarily or secondarily liable on an obligation, 
and to sureties on a criminal bail bond. They provide, on 
certain conditions, that the benefits of the section with 
reference to persons primarily or secondarily liable on an 
obligation may be waived in writing.
    (b) Written Agreements. Section 107 (50 U.S.C. App. 517) 
provides that nothing contained in the Act shall prevent 
captives from making certain arrangements with respect to their 
contracts and obligations, but requires that such arrangements 
be in writing.
    (c) Protection in Court. Section 200 (50 U.S.C. App. 517) 
provides that if a captive is made a defendant in a court 
action and is unable to appear in court, the court shall 
appoint an attorney to represent the captive and protect the 
captive's interests. Further, if a judgment is rendered against 
the captive, an opportunity to reopen the case and present a 
defense, if meritorious, may be permitted within 90-days after 
release.
    (d) Court Postponement. Section 201 (50 U.S.C. App. 521) 
authorizes a court to postpone any court proceedings if a 
captive is a party thereto and is unable to participate by 
reason of being a captive.
    (e) Relief Against Penalties. Section 202 (50 U.S.C. App. 
522) provides for relief against fines or penalties when a 
court proceeding involving a captive is postponed, or when the 
fine or penalties are incurred for failure to perform any 
obligation. In the latter case, relief depends upon whether the 
captive's ability to pay or perform is materially affected by 
being held captive.
    (f) Postponement of Action. Section 203 (50 U.S.C. App. 
523) authorizes a court to postpone or vacate the execution of 
any judgment, attachment or garnishment.
    (g) Period of Postponement. Section 204 (50 U.S.C. App. 
524) authorizes a court to postpone proceedings for the period 
of captivity and for 3 months thereafter, or any part thereof.
    (h) Extended Time Limits. Section 205 (50 U.S.C. App. 525) 
excludes the period of captivity from computing time under 
existing or future statutes of limitation. Amendments extend 
relief to include actions before administrative agencies, and 
provide that the period of captivity shall not be included in 
the period for redemption of real property sold to enforce any 
obligation, tax, or assessment. Section 207 excludes 
application of section 205 to any period of limitation 
prescribed by or under the internal revenue laws of the United 
States.
    (i) Interest Rates. Section 206 (50 U.S.C. App. 526) 
provides that interest on the obligations of captives shall not 
exceed a specified per centum per annum, unless the court 
determines that ability to pay greater interest is not affected 
by being held captive.
    (j) Misuse of Benefits. Section 600 (50 U.S.C. App. 580) 
provides against transfers made with intent to delay the just 
enforcement of a civil right by taking advantage of the Act.
    (k) Further Relief. Section 700 (50 U.S.C. App. 590) 
provides that a person, during a period of captivity or 6 
months thereafter, may apply to a court for relief with respect 
to obligations incurred prior to captivity, or any tax or 
assessment whether falling due prior to or during the period of 
captivity. The court may, on certain conditions, stay the 
enforcement of such obligations.
    (l) Stay of Eviction. Section 300 (50 U.S.C. App. 530) 
provides that a captive's dependents shall not be evicted from 
their dwelling if the rental is minimal, except upon leave of a 
court. If it is proved that inability to pay rent is a result 
of being in captivity, the court is authorized to stay eviction 
proceedings for not longer than 3 months. An amendment extends 
relief to owners of the premises with respect to payment on 
mortgage and taxes.
    (m) Contract and Mortgage Obligations. As provided by 
sections 301 and 302 of the Act (50 U.S.C. App. 531 and 532), 
as amended, contracts for the purchase of real and personal 
property, which originated prior to the period of captivity, 
may not be rescinded, terminated, or foreclosed, or the 
property repossessed, except as provided in section 107 (50 
U.S.C. App. 517), unless by an order of a court. The mentioned 
sections give the court wide discretionary powers to make such 
disposition of the particular case as may be equitable in order 
to conserve the interests of both the captive and the creditor. 
The cited sections further provide that the court may stay the 
proceedings for the period of captivity and 3 months 
thereafter, if in its opinion the ability of the captive to 
perform the obligation is materially affected by reason of 
captivity. Section 303 (50 U.S.C. App. 533) provides that the 
court may appoint appraisers and, based upon their report, 
order such sum as may be just, if any, paid to captives or 
their dependents, as a condition to foreclosing a mortgage, 
resuming possession of property, and rescinding or terminating 
a contract.
    (n) Termination of a Lease. Section 304 (50 U.S.C. App. 
534) provides, in general, that a lease covering premises 
occupied for dwelling, business, or agricultural purpose, 
executed by persons who subsequently become captives, may be 
terminated by a notice in writing given to the lessor, subject 
to such action as may be taken by a court on application of the 
lessor. Termination of a lease providing for monthly payment of 
rent shall not be effective until 30 days after the first date 
on which the next rental payment is due, and, in the case of 
other leases, on the last day of the month following the month 
when the notice is served.
    (o) Assignment of Life Insurance Policy. Section 305 (50 
U.S.C. App. 535) provides that the assignee of a life insurance 
policy assigned as security, other that the insurer in 
connection with a policy loan, except upon certain conditions, 
shall not exercise any right with respect to the assignment 
during period of captivity of the insured and one year 
thereafter, unless upon order of a court.
    (p) Storage Lien. Section 305 (50 U.S.C. App. 535) provides 
that a lien for storage of personal property may not be 
foreclosed except upon court order. The court may stay 
proceedings or make other just disposition.
    (q) Extension of Benefits to Dependents. Section 306 (50 
U.S.C. App. 536) extends the benefits to section 300 through 
305 to dependents of a captive.
    (r) Real and Personal Property Taxes. Section 500 (50 
U.S.C. App. 560) forbids sale of property, except upon court 
leave, to enforce collection of taxes or assessments (other 
than taxes on income) on personal property or real property 
owned and occupied by the captive or dependents thereof at the 
commencement of captivity and still occupied by the captive's 
dependents or employees. The court may stay proceedings for a 
period not more than 6 months after termination of captivity. 
When by law such property may be sold to enforce collection, 
the captive will have the right to redeem it within 6 months 
after termination of captivity. Unpaid taxes or assessments 
bear interest at 6 percent.
    (s) Income Taxes. Section 513 provides for deferment of 
payment of income taxes.
    (t) Certification of Captive. Section 601 provides that a 
certificate signed by the agency head shall be prima facie 
evidence that the person named has been a captive during the 
period specified in the certification.
    (u) Interlocutory Orders. Section 602 (50 U.S.C. App. 582) 
provides that a court may revoke an interlocutory order it has 
issued pursuant to any provision of the Soldiers' and Sailors' 
Civil Relief Act of 1940.
    (v) Power of Attorney. Section 701 (50 U.S.C. App. 591) 
provides that certain powers of attorney executed by a captive 
which expire by their terms after the person was captured shall 
be automatically extended for the period of captivity. 
Exceptions are made with respect to powers of attorney which by 
their terms clearly indicate they are to expire on the date 
specified irrespective of captive status. (Section 701 applies 
to American captives notwithstanding paragraph (c) thereof 
which states that it applies only to powers of attorney issued 
during the ``Vietnam era'').

Sec. 192.23 Administration of benefits.

    (a) The Director General of the Department of State or 
Agency Head will issue certifications or other documents when 
required for purposes of the Civil Relief Act.
    (b) The Director General of the Department of State or 
Agency Head shall whenever possible promptly inform the chief 
legal officer of each U.S. State in which captives maintain 
residence of all persons determined to be captives eligible for 
assistance under this subpart.

           Subpart D--Medical Benefits For Captive Situations

Sec. 192.30 Eligibility for benefits.

    A person designated as a captive or family member of a 
captive under subpart A of this subchapter, shall be eligible 
for benefits under this subpart.

Sec. 192.31 Applicable benefits.

    A person eligible for benefits under this part shall be 
eligible for authorized physical and mental health care at U.S. 
Government expense (through either or advancement or 
reimbursement), and for payment of other authorized expenses 
related to such care or for obtaining such care for any illness 
or injury, to the extent, as determined by the Secretary of 
State or Agency Head, that such care is incident to an 
individual being held captive and is not covered by--
    (a) Any other Government health or medical program, 
including, but not limited to, the programs administered by the 
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary 
of Veteran Affairs; or
    (b) Reimbursement by any private or Government health 
insurance or comparable plan. In the case of coverage by a 
private or Government health insurance plan, that carrier will 
be designated as the primary carrier, and benefits under this 
subpart will serve only to supplement expenses not paid by the 
primary carrier.

Sec. 192.32 Administration of benefits.

    (a) (1) A person eligible due to hostile action abroad, who 
desires medical or health care under this subpart or any person 
acting on behalf thereof, shall submit an application to the 
Office of Medical Services, Department of State, Washington, DC 
20520 (hereafter referred to as the ``Office''). That office 
will handle and process medical applications and claims using 
the criteria in this subpart. Persons eligible in connection 
with domestic situations shall make application with the Agency 
Head, and the Agency Head shall apply the following procedures 
in a similar manner in administering medical benefits in 
domestic situations involving the respective agency.
    (2) The applicant shall supply all relevant information, 
including insurance information, requested by the Director of 
the Office. An eligible person may also submit claims to the 
Office for payment for emergency care when there is not time to 
obtain prior authorization as prescribed by this paragraph.
    (b) The Office shall evaluate all requests for care and 
claims for reimbursement and determine, on behalf of the 
Secretary of State, whether the care in question is authorized 
under Sec. 192.31 of this subpart. The Office will authorize 
care or payment of care, when it determines the criteria of 
Sec. 192.31 are met. Authorization shall include a 
determination as to the necessity and reasonableness of medical 
or health care.
    (c) The Office will refer applicants eligible for benefits 
under other Government health programs to the Government agency 
administering those programs. Any portion of authorized care 
not provided or paid for under another Government program or 
private insurance will be reimbursed under this subpart, 
subject to a determination of the reasonableness of charges. 
Such determination shall be made by applying the fee schedule 
established by the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs 
(OWCP), Department of Labor, which is used in paying medical 
benefits for work-related injuries to employees who are fully 
covered by OWCP.
    (d) Eligible persons may obtain authorized care from any 
licensed facility or health care provider of their choice 
approved by the Office. To the extent possible, the Office will 
attempt to arrange for authorized care to be provided in a 
Government facility at no cost to the patient.
    (e) Authorized care provided by a private facility or 
health care provider will be paid or reimbursed under this 
subpart to the extent that the Office determines that costs do 
not exceed reasonable and customary charges for similar care in 
the locality.
    (f) All bills for authorized medical or health care covered 
by insurance shall be submitted to the patient's insurance 
carrier for payment prior to submission to the Office for 
payment of the balance authorized by this part. The Office will 
request the health care providers to bill the insurance carrier 
and the Department of State for authorized care, rather than 
the patient.
    (g) Eligible persons will be reimbursed by the Office for 
authorized travel to obtain an evaluation of their claim under 
paragraph (b) of this section and for other authorized travel 
to obtain medical or health care authorized by this subpart.

Sec. 192.33 Dispute.

    Any dispute between the Office and eligible persons 
concerning whether medical or health care is required in a 
given case, whether required care is incident to the captivity, 
or whether the cost for any authorized care is reasonable and 
customary, shall be referred to the Medical Director, 
Department of State, for a determination. If the person 
bringing the claim is not satisfied with the decision of the 
Medical Director, the dispute shall be referred to a medical 
board composed of three physicians, one appointed by the 
Medical Director, one by the eligible person and the third by 
the first two members. A majority decision by the board shall 
be binding on all parties.

         Subpart E--Educational Benefits for Captive Situations

Sec. 192.40 Eligibility for benefits.

    (a) A spouse or unmarried dependent child (including an 
unmarried dependent stepchild or adopted child) under 21 years 
of age of a captive as determined under subpart A of the 
subchapter shall be eligible for benefits under 192.41 of this 
subpart. (Certain limitations apply, however, to persons 
eligible for direct assistance through other programs of the 
Department of Veterans' Affairs under Chapter 35 of Title 38, 
United States Code).
    (b) A Principal designated as a captive under subpart A of 
this subchapter, who intends to change jobs or careers because 
of the captive experience and who desires additional training 
for this purpose, shall be eligible for benefits under 
Sec. 192.42 of this part, unless the Secretary of the 
Department of Veterans' Affairs determines that such person is 
eligible to receive educational assistance for the additional 
training under either chapters 30, 32, 34, or 35, title 38 
U.S.C.

Sec. 192.41 Applicable family benefits.

    (a) An eligible spouse or child shall be paid (by 
advancement or reimbursement) for expenses incurred for 
subsistence, tuition, fees, supplies, books and equipment, and 
other educational expenses while attending an educational or 
training institution approved in accordance with procedures 
established by the Department of Veterans' Affairs, which shall 
be comparable to procedures established pursuant to Chapters 35 
and 36 of Title 38 U.S.C.
    (b) Except as provided in paragraph (c) or (d) of this 
section, payments shall be available under this subsection for 
an eligible spouse or child for educational training which 
occurs--
    (1) 90 days after the Principal is placed in a captive 
status, and
    (i) Through the end of any semester or quarter which begins 
before the date on which the Principal ceases to be in a 
captive status, or
    (ii) If the educational or training institution is not 
operated on a semester or quarter system, the earlier of the 
end of any course which began before such date or the end of 
the sixteen-week period following that date.
    (c) In special circumstances and within the limitation of 
Sec. 192.44, the Secretary of State, under the criteria and 
procedures set forth in Sec. 192.43, may approve payments for 
education or training under this subsection which occurs after 
the date determined under paragraph (b) of this section.
    (d) In the event a Principal dies and the death is 
determined by the Agency Head to be incident to that individual 
being a captive, payments shall be available under this 
subsection for education or training of a spouse or child of 
the Principal which occurs after the date of death, up to the 
maximum that may be authorized under Sec. 192.44.
    (e) Family benefits under this subsection shall not be 
available for any spouse or child who is eligible for 
assistance under Chapter 35 of Title 38 U.S.C., or similar 
assistance under any other law.

Sec. 192.42 Applicable benefits for captives.

    (a) When authorized by the Agency Head, a Principal, 
following release from captivity, may be paid (by advancement 
or reimbursement) for expenses incurred for subsistence, 
tuition, fees, supplies, books and equipment, and other 
educational expenses while attending an educational or training 
institution approved in accordance with procedures established 
pursuant to Chapter 35 and 36 of Title 38 U.S.C. Payments shall 
be available under this subsection for education or training 
which occurs on or before--
    (1) The end of any semester or quarter (as appropriate) 
which begins before the date which is 10 years after the day on 
which the Principal ceases to be in a captive status, or
    (2) If the educational or training institution is not 
operated on a semester or quarter system, the earlier of the 
end of any course which began before such date or the end of 
the sixteen-week period following that date.
    (b) A person eligible for benefits under this subsection 
shall not be required to separate from Government service in 
order to undertake the training or education. However, no 
educational assistance allowance shall be paid to any eligible 
person who is attending a course of education or training paid 
for under the Government Employees' Training Act and whose full 
salary is being paid to such person while so training.

Sec. 192.43 Administration of benefits.

    (a) Any person desiring benefits under this part, shall 
apply in writing to the Director General of the Foreign 
Service, Department of State, Washington, DC 20502. The 
application shall specify the benefits desired and the basis of 
eligibility for those benefits. The Director General of the 
Foreign Service, on behalf of the Secretary of State, shall 
make determinations of eligibility for benefits under this 
part, and shall forward certified applications to the 
Department of Veterans' Affairs and advise the applicant of the 
name and address of the office in the Department of Veterans' 
Affairs that will counsel the eligible persons on how to obtain 
the benefits that have been approved. Persons whose 
applications are disapproved shall be advised in writing of the 
reason for the disapproval. Applications for foreign service 
nationals and their dependents shall be made with the Office of 
Foreign Service National Personnel, Department of State. That 
office will handle the administrative details and benefits 
using the criteria specified in this subchapter.
    (b) The Department of Veterans' Affairs shall provide the 
same level and kind of assistance, including payments (by 
advancement or reimbursement) for authorized expenses up to the 
same maximum amounts, to spouses and children of captives, and 
to Principals following their release from captivity as it does 
to eligible spouses and children of veterans and to eligible 
veterans, respectively, under Chapters 35 and 36 of Title 38 
U.S.C. The Department of Veterans' Affairs shall, under 
procedures it has established to administer section 1724 of 
Title 38, U.S.C., discontinue assistance for any individual 
whose conduct or progress is unsatisfactory under standards 
consistent with those established pursuant to such section 
1724.
    (c) An Advisory Board shall be established to advise on 
eligibility for benefits under paragraphs (c) and (d) of 
Sec. 192.41. The Board shall be composed of the Under Secretary 
of State for Management as Chair, the Director of the Office of 
Medical Services of the Department of State, the Executive 
Director of the regional bureau of the Department of State in 
whose region the relevant hostile action occurred, the Director 
of Personnel or other designee of the applicable employing 
agency, and a representative of the Department of Veterans' 
Affairs designated by the Secretary.
    (d) If an application is received from a spouse or child 
for extended training under Sec. 192.41(c), the Director 
General of the Foreign Service of the Department of State shall 
determine with the advice of the Advisory Board whether the 
Principal, following release from captivity, is incapacitated 
by the captive experience--
    (1) To the extent that he or she has not returned to full-
time active duty and is unlikely to be able to resume the 
normal duties of his or her position or career, or
    (2) In the event of a separation from Government service, 
that the Principal is unable to assume a comparable position or 
career, for at least six months from the date of release from 
captivity. If the Secretary makes such a determination, he or 
she may approve, within the limits of Sec. 192.44, an 
application under Sec. 192.41(c) for up to one year of 
education or training. If the Principal remains incapacitated, 
the Secretary may approve additional training or education up 
to the maximum authorized under 192.44.

Sec. 192.44 Maximum limitation on benefits.

    (a) In no event may assistance be provided under this 
subpart for any individual for a period in excess of 45 months, 
or the equivalent thereof in part-time education or training.
    (b) The eligibility of a spouse for benefits under 
paragraph (c) or (d) of Sec. 192.41 shall expire on a date 
which is 10 years after the date of the release of the captive 
or the death of the captive while in captivity, respectively. 
The eligibility of a dependent child for benefits under 
Sec. 192.41 (c) and (d) shall expire on the 21st birthday of 
such child.

            Subpart F--Compensation for Disability or Death

Sec. 192.50 Eligibility for benefits.

    (a) (1) The Federal Employees' Compensation Act (5 U.S.C. 
8101 et seq.) provides for medical coverage and the payment of 
compensation for wage loss and for permanent impairment of 
specified members and functions of the body incurred by 
employees as a result of an injury sustained while in the 
performance of their duties to the United States. The Office of 
Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP), Department of Labor, 
administers the program. All individuals employed by the U.S. 
Government as defined by 5 U.S.C. 8101(1) are eligible to apply 
for wage-loss and medical benefits under the FECA. Family 
members of such employees may apply for death benefits. An 
application must be made with OWCP by such individual or on 
behalf of such individuals, prior to the determination of 
eligibility or payment of any benefits under this subpart.
    (2) In the case of foreign service national employees 
covered for work related injury or death under the local 
compensation plan established pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 3968, such 
applications should be filed with the organizational authority 
in the country of employment which provides such coverage. 
Benefit levels payable to foreign service national employees 
under this subpart shall be no less than comparable benefits 
payable to U.S. citizen employees under FECA. Eligibility 
determination and payment of supplemental benefits, if any, is 
the responsibility of the Director General of the Foreign 
Service for the State Department.
    (b) Any death or disability benefit payment made under this 
section shall be reduced by the amount of any other death or 
disability benefits funded in whole or in part by the United 
States, except that the amount shall not be reduced below zero. 
The cash payment under Sec. 192.11(b) of subpart B is excluded 
from the offset requirement.
    (c) Compensation under this section may include payment 
(whether advancement or reimbursement) for any medical or 
health expenses relating to the death or disability involved to 
the extent that such expenses are not covered under subpart D 
of these regulations. Procedures of subpart D of these 
regulations shall apply in making such determinations.

Sec. 192.51 Death benefit.

    (a) The Secretary of State or Agency Head may provide for 
payment, by the employing agency, of a death benefit to the 
surviving dependents of any eligible individual under 
Sec. 192.1(a) who dies as a result of injuries caused by 
hostile action whose death was the result of the individual's 
relationship with the Government.
    (b) The death benefit payment for an employee shall be 
equal to one year's salary at the time of death. Such death 
benefit is subject to the offset provisions under 
Sec. 192.50(b) including the Federal Employees' Compensation 
Act. The death benefit for an employee's spouse and other 
eligible individuals under Sec. 192.1(b) of subpart A shall be 
equal to one year's salary of theprincipal at the time of 
death.
    (c) A death benefit payment for an adult under this section 
shall be made as follows:
    (1) First, to the widow or widower.
    (2) Second, to the dependent child, or children in equal 
shares, if there is no widow or widower.
    (3) Third, to the dependent parent, or dependent parents in 
equal shares, if there is no widow, widower, or dependent 
child.
    (4) Fourth, to adult, non-dependent children in equal 
shares.
    If there is no survivor entitled to payment under this 
paragraph (c), no payment shall be made.
    (d) A death benefit payment for a child under this section 
shall be made as follows: To the surviving parents or legal 
guardian. If there are no surviving parents or legal guardian, 
no payment shall be made.
    (e) As used in this section--each of the terms ``widow'', 
``widower'', and ``parent'' shall have the same meaning given 
such term by section 8101 of title 5, U.S.C.; ``child'' has the 
meaning given in Sec. 192.3(b)(2).

Sec. 192.52 Disability benefits.

    (a) Principals who qualify for benefits under Sec. 192.1 
and are employees of the U.S. Government are considered for 
disability payments under programs administered by the Office 
of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP), Department of Labor, 
or in the case of foreign service national employees, the 
programs may be administered by either OWCP or the 
organizational authority in the country of employment which 
provides similar coverage under the local compensation plan 
established pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 3968. Normal filing 
procedures as specified by either OWCP or the local 
organizational authority which provides such coverage should be 
followed in determining eligibility. Duplicate benefits may not 
be received from both OWCP and the local organizational 
authority for the same claim. Additional benefits to persons 
qualifying for full FECA or similar benefits would not normally 
be payable under this subpart, except to foreign service 
national employees whose benefit levels are below comparable 
benefits payable to U.S. citizen employees under FECA. Foreign 
service national employees whose benefit levels are below 
comparable benefits payable to U.S. citizens under FECA may 
receive benefits under this subpart so that total benefits 
received are comparable to the benefits payable to U.S. citizen 
employees under FECA.
    (b) Family members who do not qualify for either OWCP 
benefits or benefits from the organizational authority in the 
country of employment which provides similar coverage, and 
anyone eligible under Sec. 192.1(a) who does not qualify for 
full benefits from OWCP, must file an application for 
disability benefits with the Office of Medical Services, 
Department of State, for a determination of eligibility under 
this subpart, if connected with hostile action abroad. 
Applications made in connection with hostile action in domestic 
situations will be directed to the Agency Head. Such 
applications for disability payments will be considered using 
the same criteria for determination as established by OWCP.
    (c) Family members who are determined to be disabled by the 
Office of Medical Services, or Agency Head using the OWCP 
criteria, are eligible to receive a lump-sum payment based on 
the following guidelines:
    (1) Permanent total disability rate. A lump-sum payment 
equal to two year's salary of the Principal at the time of the 
qualifying incident.
    (2) Temporary total disability rate. A lump-sum payment 
computed at 662/3 percent of the monthly 
pay rate of the Principal for each month of temporary total 
disability, not to exceed one year's salary of the Principal.
    (3) Partial disability rate. A lump-sum payment authorized 
in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 8106, equal to 662/
3 percent of the difference between the monthly pay 
at the time of the qualifying incident and the monthly wage-
earning capacity of the family member after the beginning of 
the partial disability, not to exceed one year's salary of the 
Principal. For family members with no wage-earning history, a 
lump-sum payment equal to 662/3 percent 
of the difference between the estimated monthly wage-earning 
capacity of the family member at the time of the qualifying 
incident and the monthly wage-earning capacity after the 
beginning of the partial disability, not to exceed one year's 
salary of the Principal may be authorized, using the criteria 
established by OWCP for such determination.
    (4) Special loss schedule. In addition to the temporary 
disability benefits payable in accordance with this subsection, 
if there is permanent disability involving the loss, or loss of 
use, of a member or function of the body or involving 
disfigurement, a lump-sum payment may be authorized at the rate 
of 25 percent of the payment authorized in accordance with the 
schedule and procedures in 5 U.S.C. 8107 and 20 CFR 10.304. The 
Director General of the Foreign Service of State or the Agency 
Head, may at their discretion, authorize payments under this 
subpart in addition to payments for those organs and members of 
the body specified in 5 U.S.C. 8107 and in 20 CFR 10.304. The 
provisions of 20 CFR part 10, subpart D, which prevent the 
payment of disability compensation and scheduled compensation 
simultaneously, shall not apply to these regulations.
    Cash payments under this subpart are the responsibility of 
the employing agency.

          d. Benefits for Hostages in Iraq, Kuwait, or Lebanon

            Department of State Regulations, 22 CFR Part 193

      Part 193--Benefits for Hostages in Iraq, Kuwait, or Lebanon

Sec. 193.1 Determination of hostage status.

    (a) The Secretary of State shall, upon his or her own 
initiative or upon application under Sec. 193.3, notify the 
appropriate federal authorities, in classified or unclassified 
form as he or she determines to be necessary in the best 
interests of the affected individuals, the names of persons 
whom he or she determines to be in a hostage status within the 
meaning of subsection 599C)(d) of Public Law No. 101-513.
    (b) In the case of Iraq and Kuwait, hostage status may be 
accorded to United States nationals, or family members of 
United States nationals,
    (1) who are or who have been in a hostage status as defined 
in paragraph (b)(2) of this section in Iraq or Kuwait at any 
time during the period beginning on August 2, 1990 and 
terminating on the date on which United States economic 
sanctions are lifted, and
    (2) who are being or who have been held in custody by 
governmental or military authorities of such country or who are 
taking or have taken refuge in the country in fear of being 
taken into such custody (including residing in any diplomatic 
mission or consular post in that country.)
    (c) In the case of Lebanon, hostage status may be accorded 
to United States nationals, which, for purposes of this 
paragraph, includes lawful permanent residents of the United 
States, who have been forcibly detained, held hostage, or 
interned for any period of time after June 1, 1982, by any 
government (including the agents thereof) or group in Lebanon 
for the purpose of coercing the United States or any other 
government.
    (d) Determinations of the Secretary regarding questions of 
eligibility status under 599C of the Act shall be final, but 
interested persons may request administrative reconsideration 
on the basis of information which was not considered at the 
time of the original determination. The criteria for such 
determinations are those which are prescribed in the Act and in 
these regulations.
    (e) Eligibility determinations made under these regulations 
shall not be deemed to confer federal employment status for any 
purpose.
    (f) Eligibility for benefits shall be subject to the 
availability of funds under subsection 599C(e) of the Act.

Sec. 193.2 Definitions.

    (a) For purposes of eligibility, the term covered family 
members shall be defined as prescribed by the Office of 
Personnel Management in accordance with 5 CFR Sec. 890.1202.
    (b) The term United States economic sanctions against Iraq 
means the exercise of authorities under the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act by the President with respect to 
financial transactions with Iraq.
    (c) The term United States national means any individual 
who is a citizen of the United States or who, though not a 
citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the 
United States.
    (d) The term lawful permanent resident means any individual 
who has been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing 
permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance 
with the immigration laws, such status not having changed.

Sec. 193.3 Applications.

    (a) Individuals who claim any eligibility under section 
599C of the Act may apply for benefits in accordance with the 
procedures described herein. Family members may submit 
applications on behalf of persons who are unable to do so by 
reason of their hostage status.
    (b) All applications for benefits \1\ shall be attested to 
by a declaration under penalty of perjury as prescribed in 
section 1746 of title 28 of the United States Code.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Application form may be obtained from the Office of Citizens 
Consular Services, Department of State, Washington, DC 20520.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (c) Applications shall contain all identifying and other 
data to support the claim, including, where appropriate, copies 
of relevant documents respecting status, salary, and health and 
life insurance coverage.
    (d) All applications shall be mailed to: Kuwait/Iraq/
Lebanon Hostage Benefits Program, room 4817, Department of 
State, Washington, DC 20520-4818.
    (e) Applications should be filed as quickly as possible, 
because benefits are available only until the funds allocated 
under the Act have been spent. When funds have been expended, 
the Department will publish a notice in the Federal Register so 
stating.
    (f) The Department of State may require of applicants such 
additional verification of hostage status and other pertinent 
information as it deems necessary.

Sec. 193.4 Consideration and denial of claims: Notification of 
                    determinations.

    (a) No application under this subpart may be denied by the 
Department except upon the written concurrence of the Assistant 
Legal Adviser for Consular Affairs.
    (b) All applications shall be considered, evaluated, and/or 
prepared by the Federal Benefits Section of the Office of 
Overseas Citizens Consular Services. All federal agencies or 
other interested persons should contact the office at the 
address listed in Sec. 193.3(d).
    (c) The Department of State shall, where possible, notify 
individuals in writing of their eligibility for benefits under 
the Act, or ineligibility therefor, within thirty days of the 
Department's decision.

                     2. Department of the Treasury

          a. Terrorism List Governments Sanctions Regulations

31 CFR Part 596; Authority--18 U.S.C. 2332d; 31 U.S.C. 321(b); Source--
         61 FR 43463, August 23, 1996, unless otherwise noted.

     Subpart A--Relation of This Part to Other Laws and Regulations

Sec. 596.101 Relation of this part to other laws and regulations.

    (a) This part is separate from, and independent of, the 
other parts of this chapter with the exception of part 501 of 
this chapter, the recordkeeping and reporting requirements and 
license application and other procedures of which apply to this 
part. Differing foreign policy and national security contexts 
may result in differing interpretations of similar language 
among the parts of this chapter. Except as otherwise authorized 
in this part, no license or authorization contained in or 
issued pursuant to those other parts authorizes any transaction 
prohibited by this part. Except as otherwise authorized in this 
part, no license or authorization contained in or issued 
pursuant to any other provision of law or regulation authorizes 
any transaction prohibited by this part. See Sec. 596.503.
    (b) No license or authorization contained in or issued 
pursuant to this part relieves the involved parties from 
complying with any other applicable laws or regulations.

    [62 FR 45112; August 11, 1997]

                        Subpart B--Prohibitions

Sec. 596.201 Prohibited financial transactions.

    Except as authorized by regulations, orders, directives, 
rulings, instructions, licenses, or otherwise, no United States 
person, knowing or having reasonable cause to know that a 
country is designated under section 6(j) of the Export 
Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2405, as a country 
supporting international terrorism, shall engage in a financial 
transaction with the government of that country. Countries 
designated under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act 
as of the effective date of this part are listed in the 
following schedule.

                                schedule

    Cuba.
    Iran.
    Iraq.
    Libya.
    North Korea.
    Sudan.
    Syria.

Sec. 596.202 Evasions; attempts; conspiracies.

    Any transaction for the purpose of, or which has the effect 
of, evading or avoiding, or which facilitates the evasion or 
avoidance of, any of the prohibitions set forth in this part, 
is hereby prohibited. Any attempt to violate the prohibitions 
set forth in this part is hereby prohibited. Any conspiracy 
formed for the purpose of engaging in a transaction prohibited 
by this part is hereby prohibited.

                     Subpart C--General Definitions

Sec. 596.301 Donation.

    The term donation means a transfer made in the form of a 
gift or charitable contribution.

Sec. 596.302 Effective date.

    The term effective date refers to the effective date of the 
applicable prohibitions and directives contained in this part 
which is 12:01 a.m. EDT, August 22, 1996.

Sec. 596.303 Financial institution.

    The term financial institution shall have the definition 
given that term in 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(2) or the regulations 
promulgated thereunder, as from time to time amended.
    Note: The breadth of the definition precludes its 
reproduction in this section.

Sec. 596.304 Financial transaction.

    The term financial transaction shall have the meaning set 
forth in 18 U.S.C. 1956(c)(4), as from time to time amended. As 
of the effective date, this term includes:
          (a) A transaction which in any way or degree affects 
        interstate or foreign commerce;
                  (1) Involving the movement of funds by wire 
                or other means; or
                  (2) Involving one or more monetary 
                instruments; or
                  (3) Involving the transfer of title to any 
                real property, vehicle, vessel, or aircraft; or
          (b) A transaction involving the use of a financial 
        institution which is engaged in, or the activities of 
        which affect, interstate or foreign commerce in any way 
        or degree.

Sec. 596.305 General license.

    The term general license means any license or authorization 
the terms of which are set forth in this part.

Sec. 596.306 License.

    Except as otherwise specified, the term license means any 
license or authorization contained in or issued pursuant to 
this part.

Sec. 596.307 Monetary instruments.

    The term monetary instruments shall have the meaning set 
forth in 18 U.S.C. 1956(c)(5), as from time to time amended. As 
of the effective date, this term includes coin or currency of 
the United States or of any other country, travelers' checks, 
personal checks, bank checks, and money orders, or investment 
securities or negotiable instruments, in bearer form or 
otherwise in such form that title thereto passes upon delivery.

Sec. 596.308 Person; entity.

    (a) The term person means an individual or entity.
    (b) The term entity means a partnership, association, 
corporation, or other organization.

Sec. 596.309 Specific license.

    The term specific license means any license or 
authorization not set forth in this part but issued pursuant to 
this part.

Sec. 596.310 Terrorism List Government.

    The term Terrorism List Government includes:
          (a) The government of a country designated under 
        section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, as well 
        as any political subdivision, agency, or 
        instrumentality thereof, including the central bank of 
        such a country;
          (b) Any entity owned or controlled by such a 
        government.

Sec. 596.311 Transaction.

    The term transaction shall have the meaning set forth in 18 
U.S.C. 1956(c)(3), as from time to time amended. As of the 
effective date, this term includes a purchase, sale, loan, 
pledge, gift, transfer, delivery, or other disposition, and 
with respect to a financial institution includes a deposit, 
withdrawal, transfer between accounts, exchange of currency, 
loan, extension of credit, purchase or sale of any stock, bond, 
certificate of deposit, or other monetary instrument, use of a 
safe deposit box, or any other payment, transfer, or delivery 
by, through, or to a financial institution, by whatever means 
effected.

Sec. 596.312 United States.

    The term United States means the United States, including 
its territories and possessions.

Sec. 596.313 United States person.

    The term United States person means any United States 
citizen or national, permanent resident alien, juridical person 
organized under the laws of the United States, or any person in 
the United States.

                       Subpart D--Interpretations

Sec. 596.401 Reference to amended sections.

    Except as otherwise specified, reference to any section of 
this part or to any regulation, ruling, order, instruction, 
direction, or license issued pursuant to this part refers to 
the same as currently amended.

Sec. 596.402 Effect of amendment.

    Any amendment, modification, or revocation of any section 
of this part or of any order, regulation, ruling, instruction, 
or license issued by or under the direction of the Director of 
the Office of Foreign Assets Control does not, unless otherwise 
specifically provided, affect any act done or omitted to be 
done, or any civil or criminal suit or proceeding commenced or 
pending prior to such amendment, modification, or revocation. 
All penalties, forfeitures, and liabilities under any such 
order, regulation, ruling, instruction, or license continue and 
may be enforced as if such amendment, modification, or 
revocation had not been made.

Sec. 596.403 Transactions incidental to a licensed transaction.

    Any transaction ordinarily incident to a licensed 
transaction and necessary to give effect thereto is also 
authorized.

Sec. 596.404 Financial transactions transferred through a bank of a 
                    Terrorism List Government.

    For the purposes of this part only, a financial transaction 
not originated by a Terrorism List Government, but transferred 
to the United States through a bank owned or controlled by a 
Terrorism List Government, shall not be deemed a financial 
transaction with the government of a country supporting 
international terrorism pursuant to Sec. 596.201.

 Subpart E--Licenses, Authorizations and Statements of Licensing Policy

Sec. 596.501 Effect of license or authorization.

    (a) No license or other authorization contained in this 
part, or otherwise issued by or under the direction of the 
Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, authorizes or 
validates any transaction effected prior to the issuance of the 
license, unless specifically provided in such license or other 
authorization.
    (b) No regulation, ruling, instruction, or license 
authorizes a transaction prohibited under this part unless the 
regulation, ruling, instruction, or license is issued by the 
Office of Foreign Assets Control and specifically refers to a 
part in 31 CFR chapter V. No regulation, ruling, instruction, 
or license referring to this part authorizes any transactions 
prohibited by any provision of this chapter unless the 
regulation, ruling, instruction or license specifically refers 
to such provision.
    (c) Any regulation, ruling, instruction or license 
authorizing any transaction otherwise prohibited under this 
part has the effect of removing a prohibition or prohibitions 
contained in this part from the transaction, but only to the 
extent specifically stated by its terms. Unless the regulation, 
ruling, instruction or license otherwise specifies, such an 
authorization does not create any right, duty, obligation, 
claim, or interest in, or with respect to, any property which 
would not otherwise exist under ordinary principles of law.

Sec. 596.502 Exclusion from licenses and authorizations.

    The Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control 
reserves the right to exclude any person, property, or 
transaction from the operation of any license, or from the 
privileges therein conferred, or to restrict the applicability 
thereof with respect to particular persons, property, 
transactions, or classes thereof. Such action is binding upon 
all persons receiving actual or constructive notice of such 
exclusion or restriction.

Sec. 596.503 Financial transactions with a Terrorism List Government 
                    otherwise subject to 31 CFR chapter V.

    United States persons are authorized to engage in financial 
transactions with a Terrorism List Government that is subject 
to regulations contained in parts of 31 CFR chapter V other 
than this part to the extent and subject to the conditions 
stated in such other parts, or in any regulations, orders, 
directives, rulings, instructions, or licenses issued pursuant 
thereto.

Sec. 596.504 Certain financial transactions with Terrorism List 
                    Governments authorized.

    (a) United States persons are authorized to engage in all 
financial transactions with a Terrorism List Government that is 
not otherwise subject to 31 CFR chapter V, except for a 
transfer from a Terrorism List Government:
          (1) Constituting a donation to a United States 
        person; or
          (2) With respect to which the United States person 
        knows (including knowledge based on advice from an 
        agent of the United States Government), or has 
        reasonable cause to believe, that the transfer poses a 
        risk of furthering terrorist acts in the United States.
    (b) Nothing in this section authorizes the return of a 
transfer prohibited by paragraph (a)(2) of this section.

Sec. 596.505 Certain transactions related to stipends and scholarships 
                    authorized.

    (a) United States persons are authorized to engage in all 
financial transactions with respect to stipends and 
scholarships covering tuition and related educational, living 
and travel expenses provided by the Government of Syria to 
Syrian nationals or the Government of Sudan to Sudanese 
nationals who are enrolled as students in an accredited 
educational institution in the United States. Representations 
made by an accredited educational institution concerning the 
status of a student maybe relied upon in determining the 
applicability of this section.
    (b) Nothing in this section authorizes a transaction 
prohibited by Sec. 596.504(a)(2).

[61 FR 67944, Dec. 26, 1996]

                           Subpart F--Reports

Sec. 596.601 Records and reports.

    For provisions relating to records and reports, see subpart 
C of part 501 of this chapter.

    [62 FR 45112; August 11, 1997]

                          Subpart G--Penalties

Sec. 596.701 Penalties.

    Attention is directed to 18 U.S.C. 2332d, as added by 
Public Law 104-132, section 321, which provides that, except as 
provided in regulations issued by the Secretary of the 
Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, a United 
States person, knowing or having reasonable cause to know that 
a country is designated under section 6(j) of the Export 
Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2405, as a country 
supporting international terrorism, engages in a financial 
transaction with the government of that country, shall be fined 
under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned for not more 
than 10 years, or both.

                         Subpart H--Procedures

Sec. 596.801 Procedures.

    For license application procedures and procedures relating 
to amendments, modifications, or revocations of licenses; 
administrative decisions; rulemaking; and requests for 
documents pursuant to the Freedom of Information and Privacy 
Acts (5 U.S.C. 552 and 552a), see subpart D of part 501 of this 
chapter.

    [62 FR 45112; August 11, 1997]

Sec. 596.802 Delegation by the Secretary of the Treasury.

    Any action which the Secretary of the Treasury is 
authorized to take pursuant to section 321 of the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214, 1254 (18 U.S.C. 2332d), may be taken by the 
Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control, or by any other 
person to whom the Secretary of the Treasury has delegated 
authority so to act.

    [62 FR 45112 removed Sec. Sec. 596.802-4 and 596.806, and 
redesignated Sec. 596.805 as Sec. 506.802; August 11, 1997.]

                   Subpart I--Paperwork Reduction Act

Sec. 596.901 Paperwork Reduction Act notice.

    For approval by the Office of Management and Budget 
(``OMB'') under the Paperwork Reduction Act of information 
collections relating to recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements, to licensing procedures (including those pursuant 
to statements of licensing policy), and to other procedures, 
see Sec. 501.901 of this chapter. An agency may not conduct or 
sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a 
collection of information unless it displays a valid control 
number assigned by OMB.

    [62 FR 45112; August 11, 1997]

                        Appendices to Chapter V

    Notes: The alphabetical lists below provide the following 
information (to the extent known) concerning blocked persons, 
specially designated nationals, specially designated 
terrorists, specially designated narcotics traffickers and 
blocked vessels.
    For blocked individuals: name and title (known aliases), 
address, (other identifying information), (the notation 
``individual''), [sanctions program under which the individual 
is blocked].
    For blocked entities: name (known former or alternate 
names), address, [sanctions program under which the entity is 
blocked].

    For blocked vessels: name, sanctions program under which 
the vessel is blocked, registration of vessel, type, size in 
dead weight and/or gross tons, call sign, vessel owner, and 
alternate names.
    Abbreviations: ``a.k.a.'' means ``also known as''; 
``f.k.a.'' means ``formerly known as''; ``n.k.a.'' means ``now 
known as''; ``DOB'' means ``date of birth''; ``DWT'' means 
``Deadweight''; ``FRY (S&M)'' means ``Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)''; ``GRT'' means ``Gross 
Registered Tonnage''; ``POB'' means ``place of birth''; 
``SRBH'' refers to the suspended sanctions against the Bosnian 
Serbs.
    Reference to regulatory parts in chapter V: * * * \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ For complete text of appendices, see 31 CFR Part 596 as 
prepared by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, published by the 
National Archives, and occasionally updated in the Federal Register.

        b. Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations

 31 CFR Part 597; Authority--31 U.S.C. 321(b); Public Law 104-132, 110 
  Stat. 1214, 1248-53 (8 U.S.C. 1189, 18 U.S.C. 2339B); Source--62 FR 
            52493, October 8, 1997, unless otherwise noted.

     Subpart A--Relation of This Part to Other Laws and Regulations

Sec. Sec. 597.101 Relation of this part to other laws and regulations.

    (a) This part is separate from, and independent of, the 
other parts of this chapter, with the exception of part 501 of 
this chapter, the recordkeeping and reporting requirements and 
license application and other procedures of which apply to this 
part. Differing statutory authority and foreign policy and 
national security contexts may result in differing 
interpretations of similar language among the parts of this 
chapter. No license or authorization contained in or issued 
pursuant to those other parts authorizes any transaction 
prohibited by this part. No license or authorization contained 
in or issued pursuant to any other provision of law or 
regulation authorizes any transaction prohibited by this part.
    (b) No license or authorization contained in or issued 
pursuant to this part relieves the involved parties from 
complying with any other applicable laws or regulations. This 
part does not implement, construe, or limit the scope of any 
other part of this chapter, including (but not limited to) the 
Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, part 595 of this chapter, and 
does not excuse any person from complying with any other part 
of this chapter, including (but not limited to) part 595 of 
this chapter.
    (c) This part does not implement, construe, or limit the 
scope of any criminal statute, including (but not limited to) 
18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1) and 2339A, and does not excuse any person 
from complying with any criminal statute, including (but not 
limited to) 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. 2339A.

                        Subpart B--Prohibitions

Sec. 597.201 Prohibited transactions involving blocked assets or funds 
                    of foreign terrorist organizations or their agents.

    (a) Upon notification to Congress of the Secretary of 
State's intent to designate an organization as a foreign 
terrorist organization pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1189(a), until the 
publication in the Federal Register as described in paragraph 
(c) of this section, any U.S. financial institution receiving 
notice from the Secretary of the Treasury by means of order, 
directive, instruction, regulation, ruling, license, or 
otherwise shall, except as otherwise provided in such notice, 
block all financial transactions involving any assets of such 
organization within the possession or control of such U.S. 
financial institution until further directive from the 
Secretary of the Treasury, Act of Congress, or order of court.
    (b) Except as otherwise authorized by order, directive, 
instruction, regulation, ruling, license, or otherwise, from 
and after the designation of an organization as a foreign 
terrorist organization pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1189(a), any U.S. 
financial institution that becomes aware that it has possession 
of or control over any funds in which the designated foreign 
terrorist organization or its agent has an interest shall:
          (1) Retain possession of or maintain control over 
        such funds; and
          (2) Report to the Secretary of the Treasury the 
        existence of such funds in accordance with Sec. 501.603 
        of this chapter.
    (c) Publication in the Federal Register of the designation 
of an organization as a foreign terrorist organization pursuant 
to 8 U.S.C. 1189(a) shall be deemed to constitute a further 
directive from the Secretary of the Treasury for purposes of 
paragraph (a) of this section, and shall require the actions 
contained in paragraph (b) of this section.
    (d) The requirements of paragraph (b) of this section shall 
remain in effect until the effective date of an administrative, 
judicial, or legislative revocation of the designation of an 
organization as a foreign terrorist organization, or until the 
designation lapses, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1189.
    (e) When a transaction results in the blocking of funds at 
a financial institution pursuant to this section and a party to 
the transaction believes the funds have been blocked due to 
mistaken identity, that party may seek to have such funds 
unblocked pursuant to the administrative procedures set forth 
in Sec. 501.806 of this chapter. Requests for the unblocking of 
funds pursuant to Sec. 501.806 must be submitted to the 
attention of the Compliance Programs Division.

Sec. 597.202 Effect of transfers violating the provisions of this part.

    (a) Any transfer after the effective date which is in 
violation of Sec. 597.201 or any other provision of this part 
or of any regulation, order, directive, ruling, instruction, 
license, or other authorization hereunder and involves any 
funds or assets held in the name of a foreign terrorist 
organization or its agent or in which a foreign terrorist 
organization or its agent has or has had an interest since such 
date, is null and void and shall not be the basis for the 
assertion or recognition of any interest in or right, remedy, 
power or privilege with respect to such funds or assets.
    (b) No transfer before the effective date shall be the 
basis for the assertion or recognition of any right, remedy, 
power, or privilege with respect to, or interest in, any funds 
or assets held in the name of a foreign terrorist organization 
or its agent or in which a foreign terrorist organization or 
its agent has an interest, or has had an interest since such 
date, unless the financial institution with whom such funds or 
assets are held or maintained, prior to such date, had written 
notice of the transfer or by any written evidence had 
recognized such transfer.
    (c) Unless otherwise provided, an appropriate license or 
other authorization issued by or pursuant to the direction or 
authorization of the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control before, during, or after a transfer shall validate such 
transfer or render it enforceable to the same extent that it 
would be valid or enforceable but for the provisions of this 
part, and any regulation, order, directive, ruling, 
instruction, or license issued hereunder.
    (d) Transfers of funds or assets which otherwise would be 
null and void or unenforceable by virtue of the provisions of 
this section shall not be deemed to be null and void or 
unenforceable as to any financial institution with whom such 
funds or assets were held or maintained (and as to such 
financial institution only) in cases in which such financial 
institution is able to establish to the satisfaction of the 
Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control each of the 
following:
          (1) Such transfer did not represent a willful 
        violation of the provisions of this part by the 
        financial institution with whom such funds or assets 
        were held or maintained;
          (2) The financial institution with which such funds 
        or assets were held or maintained did not have 
        reasonable cause to know or suspect, in view of all the 
        facts and circumstances known or available to such 
        institution, that such transfer required a license or 
        authorization by or pursuant to this part and was not 
        so licensed or authorized, or if a license or 
        authorization did purport to cover the transfer, that 
        such license or authorization had been obtained by 
        misrepresentation of a third party or the withholding 
        of material facts or was otherwise fraudulently 
        obtained; and
          (3) The financial institution with which such funds 
        or assets were held or maintained filed with the Office 
        of Foreign Assets Control a report setting forth in 
        full the circumstances relating to such transfer 
        promptly upon discovery that:
                  (i) Such transfer was in violation of the 
                provisions of this part or any regulation, 
                ruling, instruction, license, or other 
                direction or authorization hereunder; or
                  (ii) Such transfer was not licensed or 
                authorized by the Director of the Office of 
                Foreign Assets Control; or
                  (iii) If a license did purport to cover the 
                transfer, such license had been obtained by 
                misrepresentation of a third party or the 
                withholding of material facts or was otherwise 
                fraudulently obtained.
    Note to paragraph (d): The filing of a report in accordance 
with the provisions of paragraph (d)(3) of this section shall 
not be deemed evidence that the terms of paragraphs (d)(1) and 
(2) of this section have been satisfied.
    (e) Except for exercises of judicial authority pursuant to 
8 U.S.C. 1189(b), unless licensed or authorized pursuant to 
this part, any attachment, judgment, decree, lien, execution, 
garnishment, or other judicial process is null and void with 
respect to any funds or assets which, on or since the effective 
date, were in the possession or control of a U.S. financial 
institution and were held in the name of a foreign terrorist 
organization or its agent or in which there existed an interest 
of a foreign terrorist organization or its agent.

Sec. 597.203 Holding of funds in interest-bearing accounts; investment 
                    and reinvestment.

    (a) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, or 
as otherwise directed by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, 
any U.S. financial institution holding funds subject to 
Sec. 597.201(b) shall hold or place such funds in a blocked 
interest-bearing account which is in the name of the foreign 
terrorist organization or its agent and which is located in the 
United States.
    (b)(1) For purposes of this section, the term interest-
bearing account means a blocked account:
          (i) in a federally-insured U.S. bank, thrift 
        institution, or credit union, provided the funds are 
        earning interest at rates which are commercially 
        reasonable for the amount of funds in the account or 
        certificate of deposit; or
          (ii) with a broker or dealer registered with the 
        Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities 
        Exchange Act of 1934, provided the funds are invested 
        in a money market fund or in U.S. Treasury Bills.
    (2) Funds held or placed in a blocked interest-bearing 
account pursuant to this paragraph may not be invested in 
instruments the maturity of which exceeds 180 days. If interest 
is credited to a separate blocked account or sub-account, the 
name of the account party on each account must be the same and 
must clearly indicate the foreign terrorist organization or 
agent having an interest in the accounts.
    (c) Blocked funds held as of the effective date in the form 
of stocks, bonds, debentures, letters of credit, or instruments 
which cannot be negotiated for the purpose of placing the funds 
in a blocked interest-bearing account pursuant to paragraph (a) 
may continue to be held in the form of the existing security or 
instrument until liquidation or maturity, provided that any 
dividends, interest income, or other proceeds derived therefrom 
are paid into a blocked interest-bearing account in accordance 
with the requirements of this section.
    (d) Funds subject to this section may not be held, 
invested, or reinvested in a manner in which an immediate 
financial or economic benefit or access accrues to the foreign 
terrorist organization or its agent.

Sec. 597.204 Evasions; attempts; conspiracies.

    Any transaction for the purpose of, or which has the effect 
of, evading or avoiding, or which facilitates the evasion or 
avoidance of, any of the prohibitions set forth in this part, 
is hereby prohibited. Any attempt to violate the prohibitions 
set forth in this part is hereby prohibited. Any conspiracy 
formed for the purpose of engaging in a transaction prohibited 
by this part is hereby prohibited.

                     Subpart C--General Definitions

Sec. 597.301 Agent.

    (a) The term agent means:
          (1) Any person owned or controlled by a foreign 
        terrorist organization; or
          (2) Any person to the extent that such person is, or 
        has been, or to the extent that there is reasonable 
        cause to believe that such person is, or has been, 
        since the effective date, acting or purporting to act 
        directly or indirectly on behalf of a foreign terrorist 
        organization.
    (b) The term agent includes, but is not limited to, any 
person determined by the Director of the Office of Foreign 
Assets Control to be an agent as defined in paragraph (a) of 
this section.
    Note to Sec. 597.301: Please refer to the appendices at the 
end of this chapter for listings of persons designated as 
foreign terrorist organizations or their agents. Section 
501.807 of this chapter sets forth the procedures to be 
followed by a person seeking administrative reconsideration of 
a designation as an agent, or who wishes to assert that the 
circumstances resulting in the designation as an agent are no 
longer applicable.

Sec. 597.302 Assets.

    The term assets includes, but is not limited to, money, 
checks, drafts, bullion, bank deposits, savings accounts, 
debts, indebtedness, obligations, notes, guarantees, 
debentures, stocks, bonds, coupons, any other financial 
instruments, bankers acceptances, mortgages, pledges, liens or 
other rights in the nature of security, warehouse receipts, 
bills of lading, trust receipts, bills of sale, any other 
evidences of title, ownership or indebtedness, letters of 
credit and any documents relating to any rights or obligations 
thereunder, powers of attorney, goods, wares, merchandise, 
chattels, stocks on hand, ships, goods on ships, real estate 
mortgages, deeds of trust, vendors' sales agreements, land 
contracts, leaseholds, ground rents, real estate and any other 
interest therein, options, negotiable instruments, trade 
acceptances, royalties, book accounts, accounts payable, 
judgments, patents, trademarks or copyrights, insurance 
policies, safe deposit boxes and their contents, annuities, 
pooling agreements, services of any nature whatsoever, 
contracts of any nature whatsoever, and any other property, 
real, personal, or mixed, tangible or intangible, or interest 
or interests therein, present, future or contingent.

Sec. 597.303 Blocked account; blocked funds.

    The terms blocked account and blocked funds shall mean any 
account or funds subject to the prohibitions in Sec. 597.201 
held in the name of a foreign terrorist organization or its 
agent or in which a foreign terrorist organization or its agent 
has an interest, and with respect to which payments, transfers, 
exportations, withdrawals, or other dealings may not be made or 
effected except pursuant to an authorization or license from 
the Office of Foreign Assets Control authorizing such action.

Sec. 597.304 Designation.

    The term designation includes both the designation and 
redesignation of a foreign terrorist organization pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. 1189.

Sec. 597.305 Effective date.

    Except as that term is used in Sec. 597.201(d), the term 
effective date refers to the effective date of the applicable 
prohibitions and directives contained in this part which is 
October 6, 1997, or, in the case of foreign terrorist 
organizations designated after that date and their agents, the 
earlier of the date on which a financial institution receives 
actual or constructive notice of such designation or of the 
Secretary of Treasury's exercise of his authority to block 
financial transactions pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1189(a)(2)(C) and 
Sec. 597.201(a).

Sec. 597.306 Entity.

    The term entity includes a partnership, association, 
corporation, or other organization, group, or subgroup.

Sec. 597.307 Financial institution.

    The term financial institution shall have the definition 
given that term in 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(2) as from time to time 
amended, notwithstanding the definition of that term in 31 CFR 
part 103.
    Note: The breadth of the statutory definition of financial 
institution precludes its reproduction in this section. Among 
the types of businesses covered are insured banks (as defined 
in 12 U.S.C. 1813(h)), commercial banks or trust companies, 
private bankers, agencies or branches of a foreign bank in the 
United States, insured institutions (as defined in 12 U.S.C. 
1724(a)), thrift institutions, brokers or dealers registered 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission under 15 U.S.C. 78a 
et seq., securities or commodities brokers and dealers, 
investment bankers or investment companies, currency exchanges, 
issuers, redeemers, or cashiers of traveler's checks, checks, 
money orders, or similar instruments, credit card system 
operators, insurance companies, dealers in precious metals, 
stones or jewels, pawnbrokers, loan or finance companies, 
travel agencies, licensed senders of money, telegraph 
companies, businesses engaged in vehicle sales, including 
automobile, airplane or boat sales, persons involved in real 
estate closings and settlements, the United States Postal 
Service, a casino, gambling casino, or gaming establishment 
with an annual gaming revenue of more than $1,000,000 as 
further described in 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(2), or agencies of the 
United States Government or of a State or local government 
carrying out a duty or power of any of the businesses described 
in 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(2).

Sec. 597.308 Financial transaction.

    The term financial transaction means a transaction 
involving the transfer or movement of funds, whether by wire or 
other means.

Sec. 597.309 Foreign terrorist organization.

    The term foreign terrorist organization means an 
organization designated or redesignated as a foreign terrorist 
organization, or with respect to which the Secretary of State 
has notified Congress of the intention to designate as a 
foreign terrorist organization, under 8 U.S.C. 1189(a).

Sec. 597.310 Funds.

    The term funds includes coin or currency of the United 
States or any other country, traveler's checks, personal 
checks, bank checks, money orders, stocks, bonds, debentures, 
drafts, letters of credit, any other negotiable instrument, and 
any electronic representation of any of the foregoing. An 
electronic representation of any of the foregoing includes any 
form of digital or electronic cash, coin, or currency in use 
currently or placed in use in the future.

Sec. 597.311 General license.

    The term general license means any license or authorization 
the terms of which are set forth in this part.

Sec. 597.312 Interest.

    Except as otherwise provided in this part, the term 
interest when used with respect to funds or assets (e.g., ``an 
interest in funds'') means an interest of any nature 
whatsoever, direct or indirect.

Sec. 597.313 License.

    Except as otherwise specified, the term license means any 
license or authorization contained in or issued pursuant to 
this part.

Sec. 597.314 Person.

    The term person means an individual or entity.

Sec. 597.315 Specific license.

    The term specific license means any license or 
authorization not set forth in this part but issued pursuant to 
this part.

Sec. 597.316 Transaction.

    The term transaction shall have the meaning set forth in 18 
U.S.C. 1956(c)(3), as from time to time amended. As of the 
effective date, this term includes a purchase, sale, loan, 
pledge, gift, transfer, delivery, or other disposition of any 
asset, and with respect to a financial institution includes a 
deposit, withdrawal, transfer between accounts, exchange of 
currency, loan, extension of credit, purchase or sale of any 
stock, bond, certificate of deposit, or other monetary 
instrument, use of a safe deposit box, or any other payment, 
transfer, or delivery by, through, or to a financial 
institution, by whatever means effected.

Sec. 597.317 Transfer.

    The term transfer means any actual or purported act or 
transaction, whether or not evidenced by writing, and whether 
or not done or performed within the United States, the purpose, 
intent, or effect of which is to create, surrender, release, 
convey, transfer, or alter, directly or indirectly, any right, 
remedy, power, privilege, or interest with respect to any 
property and, without limitation upon the foregoing, shall 
include the making, execution, or delivery of any assignment, 
power, conveyance, check, declaration, deed, deed of trust, 
power of attorney, power of appointment, bill of sale, 
mortgage, receipt, agreement, contract, certificate, gift, 
sale, affidavit, or statement; the making of any payment; the 
setting off of any obligation or credit; the appointment of any 
agent, trustee, or fiduciary; the creation or transfer of any 
lien; the issuance, docketing, filing, or levy of or under any 
judgment, decree, attachment, injunction, execution, or other 
judicial or administrative process or order, or the service of 
any garnishment; the acquisition of any interest of any nature 
whatsoever by reason of a judgment or decree of any foreign 
country; the fulfillment of any condition; the exercise of any 
power of appointment, power of attorney, or other power; or the 
acquisition, disposition, transportation, importation, 
exportation, or withdrawal of any security.

Sec. 597.318 United States.

    The term United States means the United States, its 
territories, states, commonwealths, districts, and possessions, 
and all areas under the jurisdiction or authority thereof.

Sec. 597.319 U.S. financial institution.

    The term U.S. financial institution means:
          (a) Any financial institution organized under the 
        laws of the United States, including such financial 
        institution's foreign branches;
          (b) Any financial institution operating or doing 
        business in the United States; or
          (c) Those branches, offices and agencies of foreign 
        financial institutions which are located in the United 
        States, but not such foreign financial institutions' 
        other foreign branches, offices, or agencies.

                       Subpart D--Interpretations

Sec. 597.401 Reference to amended sections.

    Except as otherwise specified, reference to any section of 
this part or to any regulation, ruling, order, instruction, 
direction, or license issued pursuant to this part shall be 
deemed to refer to the same as currently amended.

Sec. 597.402 Effect of amendment.

    Any amendment, modification, or revocation of any section 
of this part or of any order, regulation, ruling, instruction, 
or license issued by or under the direction of the Director of 
the Office of Foreign Assets Control shall not, unless 
otherwise specifically provided, be deemed to affect any act 
done or omitted to be done, or any civil or criminal suit or 
proceeding commenced or pending prior to such amendment, 
modification, or revocation. All penalties, forfeitures, and 
liabilities under any such order, regulation, ruling, 
instruction, or license shall continue and may be enforced as 
if such amendment, modification, or revocation had not been 
made.

Sec. 597.403 Termination and acquisition of an interest in blocked 
                    funds.

    (a) Whenever a transaction licensed or authorized by or 
pursuant to this part results in the transfer of funds 
(including any interest in funds) away from a foreign terrorist 
organization or its agent, such funds shall no longer be deemed 
to be funds in which the foreign terrorist organization or its 
agent has or has had an interest, or which are held in the name 
of a foreign terrorist organization or its agent, unless there 
exists in the funds another interest of a foreign terrorist 
organization or its agent, the transfer of which has not been 
effected pursuant to license or other authorization.
    (b) Unless otherwise specifically provided in a license or 
authorization issued pursuant to this part, if funds (including 
any interest in funds) are or at any time since the effective 
date have been held by a foreign terrorist organization or its 
agent, or at any time thereafter are transferred or attempted 
to be transferred to a foreign terrorist organization or its 
agent, including by the making of any contribution to or for 
the benefit of a foreign terrorist organization or its agent, 
such funds shall be deemed to be funds in which there exists an 
interest of the foreign terrorist organization or its agent.

Sec. 597.404 Setoffs prohibited.

    A setoff against blocked funds (including a blocked 
account) by a U.S. financial institution is a prohibited 
transaction under Sec. 597.201 if effected after the effective 
date.

Sec. 597.405 Transactions incidental to a licensed transaction.

    Any transaction ordinarily incident to a licensed 
transaction and necessary to give effect thereto is also 
authorized, except a transaction by an unlicensed, foreign 
terrorist organization or its agent or involving a debit to a 
blocked account or a transfer of blocked funds not explicitly 
authorized within the terms of the license.

Sec. 597.406 Offshore transactions.

    The prohibitions contained in Sec. 597.201 apply to 
transactions by U.S. financial institutions in locations 
outside the United States with respect to funds or assets which 
the U.S. financial institution knows, or becomes aware, are 
held in the name of a foreign terrorist organization or its 
agent, or in which the U.S. financial institution knows, or 
becomes aware that, a foreign terrorist organization or its 
agent has or has had an interest since the effective date.

Subpart E--Licenses, Authorizations, and Statements of Licensing Policy

Sec. 597.501 Effect of license or authorization.

    (a) No license or other authorization contained in this 
part, or otherwise issued by or under the direction of the 
Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, shall be 
deemed to authorize or validate any transaction effected prior 
to the issuance of the license, unless specifically provided in 
such license or authorization.
    (b) No regulation, ruling, instruction, or license 
authorizes any transaction prohibited under this part unless 
the regulation, ruling, instruction, or license is issued by 
the Office of Foreign Assets Control and specifically refers to 
this part. No regulation, ruling, instruction, or license 
referring to this part shall be deemed to authorize any 
transaction prohibited by any provision of this chapter unless 
the regulation, ruling, instruction or license specifically 
refers to such provision.
    (c) Any regulation, ruling, instruction, or license 
authorizing any transaction otherwise prohibited under this 
part has the effect of removing a prohibition or prohibitions 
contained in this part from the transaction, but only to the 
extent specifically stated by its terms. Unless the regulation, 
ruling, instruction, or license otherwise specifies, such an 
authorization does not create any right, duty, obligation, 
claim, or interest in, or with respect to, any property which 
would not otherwise exist under ordinary principles of law.

Sec. 597.502 Exclusion from licenses and authorizations.

    The Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control 
reserves the right to exclude any person, property, or 
transaction from the operation of any license, or from the 
privileges therein conferred, or to restrict the applicability 
thereof with respect to particular persons, property, 
transactions, or classes thereof. Such action shall be binding 
upon all persons receiving actual or constructive notice of 
such exclusion or restriction.

Sec. 597.503 Payments and transfers to blocked accounts in U.S. 
                    financial institutions.

    (a) Any payment of funds or transfer of credit or other 
financial or economic resources or assets by a financial 
institution into a blocked account in a U.S. financial 
institution is authorized, provided that a transfer from a 
blocked account pursuant to this authorization may only be made 
to another blocked account held in the same name on the books 
of the same U.S. financial institution.
    (b) This section does not authorize any transfer from a 
blocked account within the United States to an account held 
outside the United States.
    Note to Sec. 597.503: Please refer to Sec. Sec. 501.603 and 
597.601 of this chapter for mandatory reporting requirements 
regarding financial transfers.

Sec. 597.504 Entries in certain accounts for normal service charges 
                    authorized.

    (a) U.S. financial institutions are hereby authorized to 
debit any blocked account with such U.S. financial institution 
in payment or reimbursement for normal service charges owed to 
such U.S. financial institution by the owner of such blocked 
account.
    (b) As used in this section, the term normal service charge 
shall include charges in payment or reimbursement for interest 
due; cable, telegraph, or telephone charges; postage costs; 
custody fees; small adjustment charges to correct bookkeeping 
errors; and, but not by way of limitation, minimum balance 
charges, notary and protest fees, and charges for reference 
books, photostats, credit reports, transcripts of statements, 
registered mail insurance, stationery and supplies, check 
books, and other similar items.

Sec. 597.505 Payment for certain legal services.

    Specific licenses may be issued, on a case-by-case basis, 
authorizing receipt of payment of professional fees and 
reimbursement of incurred expenses through a U.S. financial 
institution for the following legal services by U.S. persons:
          (a) Provision of legal advice and counseling to a 
        foreign terrorist organization or an agent thereof on 
        the requirements of and compliance with the laws of any 
        jurisdiction within the United States, provided that 
        such advice and counseling is not provided to 
        facilitate transactions in violation of any of the 
        prohibitions of this part;
          (b) Representation of a foreign terrorist 
        organization or an agent thereof when named as a 
        defendant in or otherwise made a party to domestic U.S. 
        legal, arbitration, or administrative proceedings;
          (c) Initiation and conduct of domestic U.S. legal, 
        arbitration, or administrative proceedings on behalf of 
        a foreign terrorist organization or an agent thereof;
          (d) Representation of a foreign terrorist 
        organization or an agent thereof before any federal or 
        state agency with respect to the imposition, 
        administration, or enforcement of U.S. sanctions 
        against a foreign terrorist organization or an agent 
        thereof;
          (e) Provision of legal services to a foreign 
        terrorist organization or an agent thereof in any other 
        context in which prevailing U.S. law requires access to 
        legal counsel at public expense; and
          (f) Representation of a foreign terrorist 
        organization seeking judicial review of a designation 
        before the United States Court of Appeals for the 
        District of Columbia Circuit pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
        1189(b)(1).

                           Subpart F--Reports

Sec. 597.601 Records and reports.

    For provisions relating to records and reports, see subpart 
C of part 501 of this chapter; provided, however, that all of 
the powers afforded the Director pursuant to the first 3 
sentences of Sec. 501.602 of this chapter may also be exercised 
by the Attorney General in conducting administrative 
investigations pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2339B(e); provided 
further, that the investigative authority of the Director 
pursuant to Sec. 501.602 of this chapter shall be exercised in 
accordance with 18 U.S.C. 2339B(e); and provided further, that 
for purposes of this part no person other than a U.S. financial 
institution and its directors, officers, employees, and agents 
shall be required to maintain records or to file any reports or 
furnish any information under Sec. Sec. 501.601, 501.602, or 
501.603 of this chapter.

                          Subpart G--Penalties

Sec. 597.701 Penalties.

    (a) Attention is directed to 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1), as 
added by Public Law 104-132, 110 Stat. 1250-1253, section 303, 
which provides that whoever, within the United States or 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, knowingly 
provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist 
organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined 
under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned for not more 
than 10 years, or both.
    (b) Attention is directed to 18 U.S.C. 2339B(b), as added 
by Public Law 104-132, 110 Stat. 1250-1253, section 303, which 
provides that, except as authorized by the Secretary of the 
Treasury, any financial institution that knowingly fails to 
retain possession of or maintain control over funds in which a 
foreign terrorist organization or its agent has an interest, or 
to report the existence of such funds in accordance with these 
regulations, shall be subject to a civil penalty in an amount 
that is the greater of $50,000 per violation, or twice the 
amount of which the financial institution was required to 
retain possession or control.
    (c) Attention is directed to 18 U.S.C. 1001, which provides 
that whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the 
executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of 
the United States, knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals 
or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, 
or makes any materially false, fictitious or fraudulent 
statement or representation, or makes or uses any false writing 
or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, 
fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined 
under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned not more than 
5 years, or both.
    (d) Conduct covered by this part may also be subject to 
relevant provisions of other applicable laws.

Sec. 597.702 Prepenalty notice.

    (a) When required. If the Director of the Office of Foreign 
Assets Control has reasonable cause to believe that there has 
occurred a violation of any provision of this part or a 
violation of the provisions of any license, ruling, regulation, 
order, direction or instruction issued by or pursuant to the 
direction or authorization of the Secretary of the Treasury 
pursuant to this part, and the Director, acting in coordination 
with the Attorney General, determines that civil penalty 
proceedings are warranted, the Director shall issue to the 
person concerned a notice of intent to impose a monetary 
penalty. The prepenalty notice shall be issued whether or not 
another agency has taken any action with respect to this 
matter.
    (b) Contents.--(1) Facts of violation. The prepenalty 
notice shall describe the violation, specify the laws and 
regulations allegedly violated, and state the amount of the 
proposed monetary penalty.
    (2) Right to respond. The prepenalty notice also shall 
inform the respondent of respondent's right to respond within 
30 days of mailing of the notice as to why a monetary penalty 
should not be imposed, or, if imposed, why it should be in a 
lesser amount than proposed.

Sec. 597.703 Response to prepenalty notice.

    (a) Time within which to respond. The respondent shall have 
30 days from the date of mailing of the prepenalty notice to 
respond in writing to the Director of the Office of Foreign 
Assets Control.
    (b) Form and contents of written response. The written 
response need not be in any particular form, but shall contain 
information sufficient to indicate that it is in response to 
the prepenalty notice. It should respond to the allegations in 
the prepenalty notice and set forth the reasons why the 
respondent believes the penalty should not be imposed or, if 
imposed, why it should be in a lesser amount than proposed.
    (c) Informal settlement. In addition or as an alternative 
to a written response to a prepenalty notice pursuant to this 
section, the respondent or respondent's representative may 
contact the Office of Foreign Assets Control as advised in the 
prepenalty notice to propose the settlement of allegations 
contained in the prepenalty notice and related matters. In the 
event of settlement at the prepenalty stage, the prepenalty 
notice will be withdrawn, the respondent is not required to 
take a written position on allegations contained in the 
prepenalty notice, and the Office of Foreign Assets Control 
will make no final determination as to whether a violation 
occurred. The amount accepted in settlement of allegations in a 
prepenalty notice may vary from the civil penalty that might 
finally be imposed in the event of a formal determination of 
violation. In the event no settlement is reached, the 30-day 
period specified in paragraph (a) of this section for written 
response to the prepenalty notice remains in effect unless 
additional time is granted by the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control.

Sec. 597.704 Penalty notice.

    (a) No violation. If, after considering any written 
response to the prepenalty notice and any relevant facts, the 
Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control determines 
that there was no violation by the respondent, the Director 
promptly shall notify the respondent in writing of that 
determination and that no monetary penalty will be imposed.
    (b) Violation. (1) If, after considering any written 
response to the prepenalty notice and any relevant facts, the 
Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control determines 
that there was a violation by the respondent, the Director 
promptly shall issue a written notice of the imposition of the 
monetary penalty on the respondent. The issuance of a written 
notice of the imposition of a monetary penalty shall constitute 
final agency action.
    (2) The penalty notice shall inform the respondent that 
payment of the assessed penalty must be made within 30 days of 
the mailing of the penalty notice.
    (3) The penalty notice shall inform the respondent of the 
requirement to furnish respondent's taxpayer identification 
number pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 7701 and that the Department 
intends to use such number for the purposes of collecting and 
reporting on any delinquent penalty amount in the event of a 
failure to pay the penalty imposed.

Sec. 597.705 Administrative collection; referral to United States 
                    Department of Justice.

    In the event that the respondent does not pay the penalty 
imposed pursuant to this part or make payment arrangements 
acceptable to the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control within 30 days of the mailing of the written notice of 
the imposition of the penalty, the matter may be referred for 
administrative collection measures by the Department of the 
Treasury or to the United States Department of Justice for 
appropriate action to recover the penalty in a civil suit in a 
Federal district court.

                         Subpart H--Procedures

Sec. 597.801 Procedures.

    For license application procedures and procedures relating 
to amendments, modifications, or revocations of licenses; 
administrative decisions; rulemaking; and requests for 
documents pursuant to the Freedom of Information and Privacy 
Acts (5 U.S.C. 552 and 552a), see subpart D of part 501 of this 
chapter.

Sec. 597.802 Delegation by the Secretary of the Treasury.

    Any action which the Secretary of the Treasury is 
authorized to take pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1189 or 18 U.S.C. 
2339B, as added by Public Law 104-132, 110 Stat. 1248-1253, 
sections 302 and 303, may be taken by the Director of the 
Office of Foreign Assets Control, or by any other person to 
whom the Secretary of the Treasury has delegated authority so 
to act.

                   Subpart I--Paperwork Reduction Act

Sec. 597.901 Paperwork Reduction Act notice.

    For approval by the Office of Management and Budget 
(``OMB'') under the Paperwork Reduction Act of information 
collections relating to recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements, to licensing procedures (including those pursuant 
to statements of licensing policy), and to other procedures, 
see Sec. 501.901 of this chapter. An agency may not conduct or 
sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a 
collection of information unless it displays a valid control 
number assigned by OMB.

                   3. Federal Aviation Administration

                          a. Airport Security

      Federal Aviation Administration Regulations, 14 CFR Part 107

                       Part 107--Airport Security

Sec. 107.1 Applicability and definitions.

    (a) This part prescribes aviation security rules 
governing--
    (1) The operation of each airport regularly serving the 
scheduled passenger operations of a certificate holder required 
to have a security program by Sec. 108.5(a) of this chapter;
    (2) The operation of each airport regularly serving 
scheduled passenger operations of a foreign air carrier 
required to have a security program by Sec.  129.25 of this 
chapter; and
    (3) Each person who is in or entering a sterile area on an 
airport described in paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(2) of this 
section.
    (b) For purposes of this part--
    (1) Airport operator means a person who operates an airport 
regularly serving scheduled passenger operations of a 
certificate holder or a foreign air carrier required to have a 
security program by Sec. 108.5(a) or Sec. 129.25 of this 
chapter;
    (2) Air Operations Area means a portion of an airport 
designed and used for landing, taking off, or surface 
maneuvering of airplanes;
    (3) Exclusive area means that part of an air operations 
area for which an air carrier has agreed in writing with the 
airport operator to exercise exclusive security responsibility 
under an approved security program or a security program used 
in accordance with Sec. 129.25;
    (4) Law enforcement officer means an individual who meets 
the requirements of Sec. 107.17; and
    (5) Sterile area means an area to which access is 
controlled by the inspection of persons and property in 
accordance with an approved security program or a security 
program used in accordance with Sec. 129.25.

Sec. 107.3 Security program

    (a) No airport operator may operate an airport subject to 
this part unless it adopts and carries out a security program 
that--
    (1) Provides for the safety of persons and property 
traveling in air transportation and intrastate air 
transportation against acts of criminal violence and aircraft 
piracy;
    (2) Is in writing and signed by the airport operator or any 
person to whom the airport operator has delegated authority in 
this matter;
    (3) Includes the items listed in paragraph (b), (f), or (g) 
of this section, as appropriate; and
    (4) Has been approved by the Director of Civil Aviation 
Security.
    (b) For each airport subject to this part regularly serving 
scheduled passenger operations conducted in airplanes having a 
passenger seating configuration (as defined in Sec. 108.3 of 
this section of this chapter) of more than 60 seats, the 
security program required by paragraph (a) of this section must 
include at least the following:
    (1) A description of each air operations area, including 
its dimensions, boundaries, and pertinent features.
    (2) A description of each area on or adjacent to, the 
airport which affects the security of any air operations area.
    (3) A description of each exclusive area, including its 
dimensions, boundaries, and pertinent features, and the terms 
of the agreement establishing the area.
    (4) The procedures, and a description of the facilities and 
equipment, used to perform the control functions specified in 
Sec. 107.13(a) by the airport operator and by each air carrier 
having security responsibility over an exclusive area.
    (5) The procedures each air carrier having security 
responsibility over an exclusive area will use to notify the 
airport operator when the procedures, facilities, and equipment 
it uses are not adequate to perform the control functions 
described in Sec. 107.13(a).
    (6) A description of the alternate security procedures, if 
any, that the airport operator intends to use in emergencies 
and other unusual conditions.
    (7) A description of the law enforcement support necessary 
to comply with Sec. 107.15.
    (8) A description of the training program for law 
enforcement officers required by Sec. 107.17.
    (9) A description of the system for maintaining the records 
described in Sec. 107.23.
    (c) The airport operator may comply with paragraph (b), 
(f), or (g) of this section by including in the security 
program as an appendix any document which contains the 
information required by paragraph (b), (f), or (g) of this 
section.
    (d) Each airport operator shall maintain at least one 
complete copy of its approved security program at its principal 
operations office, and shall make it available for inspection 
upon the request of any Civil Aviation Security Special Agent.
    (e) Each airport operator shall restrict the distribution, 
disclosure, and availability of information contained in the 
security program to those persons with an operational need-to-
know and shall refer requests for such information by other 
than those persons to the Director of Civil Aviation Security 
of the FAA.
    (f) For each airport subject to this part regularly serving 
scheduled passenger operations conducted in airplanes having a 
passenger seating configuration (as defined in Sec. 10.3 of 
this chapter) of more than 30 but less than 61 seats, the 
security program required by paragraph (a) of this section must 
include at least the following:
    (1) A description of the law enforcement support necessary 
to comply with Sec. 107.15(b), and the procedures which the 
airport operator has arranged to be used by the certificate 
holder or foreign air carrier to summon that support.
    (2) A description of the training program for law 
enforcement officers required by Sec. 107.17.
    (3) A description of the system for maintaining the records 
described in Sec. 107.23.
    (g) For each airport subject to this part where the 
certificate holder or foreign air carrier is required to 
conduct passenger screening under a security program required 
by Sec. 108.5(a) (2) or (3) or Sec. 129.25(b) (2) or (3) of 
this chapter, or conducts screening under a security program 
being carried out pursuant to Sec. 108.5(b), as appropriate, 
the security program required by paragraph (a) of this section 
must include at least the following:
    (1) A description of the law enforcement support necessary 
to comply with Sec. 107.15.
    (2) A description of the training program for law 
enforcement officers required by Sec. 107.17.
    (3) A description of the system for maintaining the records 
described in Sec. 107.23.

Sec. 107.5 Approval of security program

    (a) Unless a shorter period is allowed by the Director of 
Civil Aviation Security, each airport operator seeking initial 
approval of a security program for an airport subject to this 
part shall submit the proposed program to the Director of Civil 
Aviation Security at least 90 days before any scheduled 
passenger operations are expected to begin by any certificate 
holder or permit holder to whom Sec. 121.538 or Sec. 129.25 of 
this chapter applies.
    (b) Within 30 days after receipt of a proposed security 
program, the Director of Civil Aviation Security either 
approves the program or gives the airport operator written 
notice to modify the program to make it conform to the 
applicable requirements of this part.
    (c) After receipt of a notice to modify, the airport 
operator may either submit a modified security program or 
petition the Administrator to reconsider the notice to modify. 
A petition for reconsideration must be filed with the Director 
of Civil Aviation Security.
    (d) Upon receipt of a petition for reconsideration, the 
Director of Civil Aviation Security reconsiders the notice to 
modify and either amends or withdraws the notice or transmits 
the petition, together with any pertinent information, to the 
Administrator for consideration.
    (e) After review of a petition for reconsideration, the 
Administrator disposes of the petition by either directing the 
Director of Civil Aviation Security to withdraw or amend the 
notice to modify, or by affirming the notice to modify.

Sec. 107.7 Changed conditions affecting security

    (a) After approval of the security program, the airport 
operator shall follow the procedures prescribed in paragraph 
(b) of this section whenever it determines that any of the 
following changed conditions has occurred:
    (1) Any description of an airport area set out in the 
security program in accordance with Sec. 107.3(b) (1), (2), or 
(3) is no longer accurate.
    (2) The procedures included, and the facilities and 
equipment described, in the security program in accordance with 
Sec. 107.3(b) (4) and (5) are not adequate for the control 
functions described in Sec. 107.13(a).
    (3) The airport operator changes any alternate security 
procedures described in the security program in accordance with 
Sec. 107.3(b)(6).
    (4) The law enforcement support described in the security 
program in accordance with Sec. 107.3 (b)(7), (f)(1), or (g)(1) 
is not adequate to comply with Sec. 107.15.
    (5) Any changes to the designation of the Airport Security 
Coordinator (ASC) required under Sec. 107.29.
    (b) Whenever a changed condition described in paragraph (a) 
of this section occurs, the airport operator shall--
    (1) Immediately notify the FAA security office having 
jurisdiction over the airport of the changed condition, and 
identify each interim measure being taken to maintain adequate 
security until an appropriate amendment to the security program 
is approved; and
    (2) Within 30 days after notifying the FAA in accordance 
with paragraph (b)(1) of this section, submit for approval in 
accordance with Sec. 107.9 an amendment to the security program 
to bring it into compliance with this part.

Sec. 107.9 Amendment of security program by airport operator

    (a) An airport operator requesting approval of a proposed 
amendment to the security program shall submit the request to 
the Director of Civil Aviation Security. Unless a shorter 
period is allowed by the Director of Civil Aviation Security, 
the request must be submitted at least 30 days before the 
proposed effective date.
    (b) Within 15 days after receipt of a proposed amendment, 
the Director of Civil Aviation Security issues to the airport 
operator, in writing, either an approval or a denial of the 
request.
    (c) An amendment to a security program is approved if the 
Director of Civil Aviation Security determines that--
    (1) Safety and the public interest will allow it, and
    (2) The proposed amendment provides the level of security 
required by Sec. 107.3.
    (d) After denial of a request for an amendment the airport 
operator may petition the Administrator to reconsider the 
denial. A petition for reconsideration must be filed with the 
Director of Civil Aviation Security.
    (e) Upon receipt of a petition for reconsideration the 
Director of Civil Aviation Security reconsiders the denial and 
either approves the proposed amendment or transmits the 
petition, together with any pertinent information, to the 
Administrator for consideration.
    (f) After review of a petition for reconsideration, the 
Administrator disposes of the petition by either directing the 
Director of Civil Aviation Security to approve the proposed 
amendment or affirming the denial.

Sec. 107.11 Amendment of security program by FAA

    (a) The Administrator or Director of Civil Aviation 
Security may amend an approved security program for an airport, 
if it is determined that safety and the public interest require 
the amendment.
    (b) Except in an emergency as provided in paragraph (f) of 
this section, when the Administrator or the Director of Civil 
Aviation Security proposes to amend a security program, a 
notice of the proposed amendment is issued to the airport 
operator, in writing, fixing a period of not less than 30 days 
within which the airport operator may submit written 
information, views, and arguments on the amendment. After 
considering all relevant material, including that submitted by 
the airport operator, the Administrator or the Director of 
Civil Aviation Security either rescinds the notice or notifies 
the airport operator in writing of any amendment adopted, 
specifying an effective date not less than 30 days after 
receipt of the notice of amendment by the airport operator.
    (c) After receipt of a notice of amendment from a Director 
of Civil Aviation Security, the airport operator may petition 
the Administrator to reconsider the amendment. A petition for 
reconsideration must be filed with the Director of Civil 
Aviation Security. Except in an emergency as provided in 
paragraph (f) of this section, a petition for reconsideration 
stays the amendment until the Administrator takes final action 
on the petition.
    (d) Upon receipt of a petition for reconsideration, the 
Director of Civil Aviation Security reconsiders the amendment 
and either rescinds or modifies the amendment or transmits the 
petition, together with any pertinent information, to the 
Administrator for consideration.
    (e) After review of a petition for reconsideration, the 
Administrator disposes of the petition by directing the 
Director of Civil Aviation Security to rescind the notice of 
amendment or to issue the amendment as proposed or in modified 
form.
    (f) If the Administrator or the Director of Civil Aviation 
Security finds that there is an emergency requiring immediate 
action that makes the procedure in paragraph (b) of this 
section impracticable or contrary to the public interest, an 
amendment may be issued effective without stay on the date the 
airport operator receives notice of it. In such a case, the 
Administrator or the Director of Civil Aviation Security 
incorporates in the notice of the amendment the finding, 
including a brief statement of the reasons for the emergency 
and the need for emergency action.

Sec. 107.13 Security of air operations area

    (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, 
each operator of an airport serving scheduled passenger 
operations where the certificate holder or foreign air carrier 
is required to conduct passenger screening under a program 
required by Sec. 108.5(a)(1) or Sec. 129.25(b)(1) of this 
chapter as appropriate shall use the procedures included, and 
the facilities and equipment described, in its approved 
security program, to perform the following control functions:
    (1) Controlling access to each air operations area, 
including methods for preventing the entry of unauthorized 
persons and ground vehicles.
    (2) Controlling movement of persons and ground vehicles 
within each air operations area, including, when appropriate, 
requirements for the display of identification.
    (3) Promptly detecting and taking action to control each 
penetration, or attempted penetration, of an air operations 
area by a person whose entry is not authorized in accordance 
with the security program.
    (b) An airport operator need not comply with paragraph (a) 
of this section with respect to an air carrier's exclusive 
area, if the airport operator's security program contains--
    (1) Procedures, and a description of the facilities and 
equipment, used by the air carrier to perform the control 
functions described in paragraph (a) of this section; and
    (2) Procedures by which the air carrier will notify the 
airport operator when its procedures, facilities, and equipment 
are not adequate to perform the control functions described in 
paragraph (a) of this section.

Sec. 107.14 Access control system

    (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, 
each operator of an airport regularly serving scheduled 
passenger operations conducted in airplanes having a passenger 
seating configuration (as defined in Sec. 108.3 of this 
chapter) of more than 60 seats shall submit to the Director of 
Civil Aviation Security, for approval and inclusion in its 
approved security program, an amendment to provide for a 
system, method, or procedure which meets the requirements 
specified in this paragraph for controlling access to secured 
areas of the airport. The system, method, or procedure shall 
ensure that only those persons authorized to have access to 
secured areas by the airport operator's security program are 
able to obtain that access and shall specifically provide a 
means to ensure that such access is denied immediately at the 
access point or points to individuals whose authority to have 
access changes. The system, method, or procedure shall provide 
a means to differentiate between persons authorized to have 
access to only a particular portion of the secured areas and 
persons authorized to have access only to other portions or to 
the entire secured area. The system, method, or procedure shall 
be capable of limiting an individual's access by time and date.
    (b) The Director of Civil Aviation Security will approve an 
amendment to an airport operator's security program that 
provides for the use of an alternative system, method, or 
procedure if, in the Director's judgment, the alternative would 
provide an overall level of security equal to that which would 
be provided by the system, method, or procedure described in 
paragraph (a) of this section.
    (c) Each airport operator shall submit the amendment to its 
approved security program required by paragraph (a) or (b) of 
this section according to the following schedule:
    (1) By August 8, 1989, or by 6 months after becoming 
subject to this section, whichever is later, for airports where 
at least 25 million persons are screened annually or airports 
that have been designated by the Director of Civil Aviation 
Security. The amendment shall specify that the system, method, 
or procedure must be fully operational within 18 months after 
the date on which an airport operator's amendment to its 
approved security program is approved by the Director of Civil 
Aviation Security.
    (2) By August 8, 1989, or by 6 months after becoming 
subject to this section, whichever is later, for airports where 
more than 2 million persons are screened annually. The 
amendment shall specify that the system, method, or procedure 
must be fully operational within 24 months after the date on 
which an airport operator's amendment to its approved security 
program is approved by the Director of Civil Aviation Security.
    (3) By February 8, 1990, or by 12 months after becoming 
subject to this section, whichever is later, for airports where 
at least 500,000 but not more than 2 million persons are 
screened annually. The amendment shall specify that the system, 
method, or procedure must be fully operational within 30 months 
after the date on which an airport operator's amendment to its 
approved security program is approved by the Director of Civil 
Aviation Security.
    (4) By February 8, 1990, or by 12 months after becoming 
subject to this section, whichever is later, for airports where 
less than 500,000 persons are screened annually. The amendment 
shall specify that the system, method, or procedure must be 
fully operational within 30 months after the date on which an 
airport operator's amendment to its approved security program 
is approved by the Director of Civil Aviation Security.
    (d) Notwithstanding paragraph (c) of this section, an 
airport operator of a newly constructed airport commencing 
initial operation after December 31, 1990, as an airport 
subject to paragraph (a) of this section, shall include as part 
of its original airport security program to be submitted to the 
FAA for approval a fully operational system, method, or 
procedure in accordance with this section.

Sec. 107.15 Law enforcement support

    (a) Each airport operator shall provide law enforcement 
officers in the number and in a manner adequate to support--
    (1) Its security program; and
    (2) Each passenger screening system required by part 108 or 
Sec. 129.25 of this chapter.
    (b) For scheduled or public charter passenger operations 
with airplanes having a passenger seating configuration (as 
defined in Sec. 108.3 of this chapter) of more than 30 but less 
than 61 seats for which a passenger screening system is not 
required, each airport operator shall ensure that law 
enforcement officers are available and committed to respond to 
an incident at the request of a certificate holder or foreign 
air carrier and shall ensure that the request procedures are 
provided to the certificate holder or foreign air carrier.

Sec. 107.17 Law enforcement officers

    (a) No airport operator may use, or arrange for response 
by, any person as a required law enforcement officer unless, 
while on duty on the airport, the officer--
    (1) Has the arrest, authority described in paragraph (b) of 
this section;
    (2) Is readily identifiable by uniform and displays or 
carries a badge or other indicia of authority;
    (3) Is armed with a firearm and authorized to use it; and
    (4) Has completed a training program that meets the 
requirements in paragraph (c) of this section.
    (b) The law enforcement officer must, while on duty on the 
airport, have the authority to arrest, with or without a 
warrant, for the following violations of the criminal laws of 
the State and local jurisdictions in which the airport is 
located:
    (1) A crime committed in the officer's presence.
    (2) A felony, when the officer has reason to believe that 
the suspect has committed it.
    (c) The training program required by paragraph (a)(4) of 
this section must provide training in the subjects specified in 
paragraph (d) of this section and either--
    (1) Meet the training standards, if any, prescribed by 
either the State or the local jurisdiction in which the airport 
is located, for law enforcement officers performing comparable 
functions; or
    (2) If the State and local jurisdictions in which the 
airport is located do not prescribe training standards for 
officers performing comparable functions, be acceptable to the 
Administrator.
    (d) The training program required by paragraph (a)(4) of 
this section must include training in--
    (1) The use of firearms;
    (2) The courteous and efficient treatment of persons 
subject to inspection, detention, search, arrest, and other 
aviation security activities;
    (3) The responsibilities of a law enforcement officer under 
the airport operator's approved security program; and
    (4) Any other subject the Administrator determines is 
necessary.

Sec. 107.19 Use of federal law enforcement officers

    (a) Whenever State, local, and private law enforcement 
officers who meet the requirements of Sec. 107.17 are not 
available in sufficient numbers to meet the requirements of 
Sec. 107.15, the airport operator may request that the 
Administrator authorize it to use Federal law enforcement 
officers.
    (b) Each request for the use of Federal law enforcement 
officers must be accompanied by the following information:
    (1) The number of passengers enplaned at the airport during 
the preceding calendar year and the current calendar year as of 
the date of the request.
    (2) The anticipated risk of criminal violence and aircraft 
piracy at the airport and to the air carrier aircraft 
operations at the airport.
    (3) A copy of that portion of the airport operator's 
security program which describes the law enforcement support 
necessary to comply with Sec. 107.15.
    (4) The availability of State, local, and private law 
enforcement officers who meet the requirements of Sec. 107.17, 
including a description of the airport operator's efforts to 
obtain law enforcement support from State, local, and private 
agencies and the responses of those agencies.
    (5) The airport operator's estimate of the number of 
Federal law enforcement officers needed to supplement available 
officers and the period of time for which they are needed.
    (6) A statement acknowledging responsibility for providing 
reimbursement for the cost of providing Federal law enforcement 
officers.
    (7) Any other information the Administrator considers 
necessary.
    (c) In response to a request submitted in accordance with 
this section, the Administrator may authorize, on a 
reimbursable basis, the use of law enforcement officers 
employed by the FAA or by any other Federal agency, with the 
consent of the head of that agency.

Sec. 107.20 Submission to screening

    No person may enter a sterile area without submitting to 
the screening of his or her person and property in accordance 
with the procedures being applied to control access to that 
area under Sec. 108.9 or Sec. 129.25 of this chapter.

Sec. 107.21 Carriage of an explosive, incendiary, or deadly or 
                    dangerous weapon

    (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, no 
person may have an explosive, incendiary, or deadly or 
dangerous weapon on or about the individual's person or 
accessible property--
    (1) When performance has begun of the inspection of the 
individual's person or accessible property before entering a 
sterile area; and
    (2) When entering or in a sterile area.
    (b) The provisions of this section with respect to firearms 
do not apply to the following:
    (1) Law enforcement officers required to carry a firearm by 
this part while on duty on the airport.
    (2) Persons authorized to carry a firearm in accordance 
with Sec. 108.11 or Sec. 129.27.
    (3) Persons authorized to carry a firearm in a sterile area 
under an approved security program or a security program used 
in accordance with Sec. 129.25.

Sec. 107.23 Records

    (a) Each airport operator shall ensure that--
    (1) A record is made of each law enforcement action taken 
in furtherance of this part;
    (2) The record is maintained for a minimum of 90 days; and
    (3) It is made available to the administrator upon request.
    (b) Data developed in response to paragraph (a) of this 
section must include at least the following:
    (1) The number and type of firearms, explosives, and 
incendiaries discovered during any passenger screening process, 
and the method of detection of each.
    (2) The number of acts and attempted acts of air piracy.
    (3) The number of bomb threats received, real and simulated 
bombs found, and actual bombings on the airport.
    (4) The number of detentions and arrests, and the immediate 
disposition of each person detained or arrested.

Sec. 107.25 Airport identification media

    (a) As used in this section, security identification 
display area means any area identified in the airport security 
program as requiring each person to continuously display on 
their outermost garment, an airport-approved identification 
medium unless under airport-approved escort.
    (b) After January 1, 1992, an airport operator may not 
issue to any person any identification media that provides 
unescorted access to any security identification display area 
unless the person has successfully completed training in 
accordance with an FAA-approved curriculum specified in the 
security program.
    (c) By October 1, 1992, not less than 50 percent of all 
individuals possessing airport-issued identification that 
provides unescorted access to any security identification 
display area at that airport shall have been trained in 
accordance with an FAA-approved curriculum specified in the 
security program.
    (d) After May 1, 1993, an airport operator may not permit 
any person to possess any airport-issued identification medium 
that provides unescorted access to any security identification 
display area at that airport unless the person has successfully 
completed FAA-approved training in accordance with a curriculum 
specified in the security program.
    (e) The curriculum specified in the security program shall 
detail the methods of instruction, provide attendees the 
opportunity to ask questions, and include at least the 
following topics:
    (1) Control, use, and display of airport-approved 
identification or access media;
    (2) Challenge procedures and the law enforcement response 
which supports the challenge procedure;
    (3) Restrictions on divulging information concerning an act 
of unlawful interference with civil aviation if such 
information is likely to jeopardize the safety of domestic or 
international aviation;
    (4) Non-disclosure of information regarding the airport 
security system or any airport tenant's security systems; and
    (5) Any other topics deemed necessary by the Assistant 
Administrator for Civil Aviation Security.
    (f) No person may use any airport-approved identification 
medium that provides unescorted access to any security 
identification display area to gain such access unless that 
medium was issued to that person by the appropriate airport 
authority or other entity whose identification is approved by 
the airport operator.
    (g) The airport operator shall maintain a record of all 
training given to each person under this section until 180 days 
after the termination of that person's unescorted access 
privileges.

Sec. 107.27 Evidence of compliance

    On request of the Assistant Administrator for Civil 
Aviation Security, each airport operator shall provide evidence 
of compliance with this part and its approved security program.

Sec. 107.29 Airport security coordinator

    Each airport operator shall designate an Airport Security 
Coordinator (ASC) in its security program. The designation 
shall include the name of the ASC, and a description of the 
means by which to contact the ASC on a 24-hour basis. The ASC 
shall serve as the airport operator's primary contact for 
security-related activities and communications with FAA, as set 
forth in the security program.

Sec. 107.31 Employment history, verification and criminal history 
                    records checks.

    (a) Scope. On or after January 31, 1996, this section 
applies to all airport operators; airport users; individuals 
currently having unescorted access to a security identification 
display area (SIDA) that is identified by Sec. 107.25; all 
individuals seeking authorization for, or seeking the authority 
to authorize others to have, unescorted access to the SIDA; and 
each airport user and air carrier making a certification to an 
airport operator pursuant to paragraph (n) of this section. An 
airport user, for the purposes of Sec. 107.31 only, is any 
person making a certification under this section other than an 
air carrier subject to Sec. 108.33.
    (b) Employment history investigations required. Except as 
provided in paragraph (m) of this section, each airport 
operator must ensure that no individual is granted 
authorization for, or is granted authority to authorize others 
to have, unescorted access to the SIDA unless the following 
requirements are met:
    (1) The individual has satisfactorily undergone Part 1 of 
an employment history investigation. Part 1 consists of a 
review of the previous 10 years of employment history and 
verification of the 5 employment years preceding the date the 
appropriate investigation is initiated as provided in paragraph 
(c) of this section; and
    (2) If required by paragraph (c)(5) of this section, the 
individual has satisfied Part 2 of the employment history 
investigation. Part 2 is the process to determine if the 
individual has a criminal record. To satisfy Part 2 of the 
investigation the criminal record check must not disclose that 
the individual has been convicted or found not guilty by reason 
of insanity, in any jurisdiction, during the 10 years ending on 
the date of such investigation, of any of the crimes listed 
below:
    (i) Forgery of certificates, false marking of aircraft, and 
other aircraft registration violation, 49 U.S.C. 46306;
    (ii) Interference with air navigation, 49 U.S.C. 46308;
    (iii) Improper transportation of a hazardous material, 49 
U.S.C. 46312;
    (iv) Aircraft piracy, 49 U.S.C. 46502;
    (v) Interference with flightcrew members or flight 
attendants, 49 U.S.C. 46504;
    (vi) Commission of certain crimes aboard aircraft in 
flight, 49 U.S.C. 46506;
    (vii) Carrying a weapon or explosive aboard aircraft, 49 
U.S.C. 46505;
    (viii) Conveying false information and threats, 49 U.S.C. 
46507;
    (ix) Aircraft piracy outside the special aircraft 
jurisdiction of the United States, 49 U.S.C. 46502(b);
    (x) Lighting violations involving transporting controlled 
substances, 49 U.S.C. 46315;
    (xi) Unlawful entry into an aircraft or airport area that 
serves air carriers or foreign air carriers contrary to 
established security requirements, 49 U.S.C. 46314;
    (xii) Destruction of an aircraft or aircraft facility, 18 
U.S.C. 32;
    (xiii) Murder;
    (xiv) Assault with intent to murder;
    (xv) Espionage;
    (xvi) Sedition;
    (xvii) Kidnapping or hostage taking;
    (xviii) Treason;
    (xix) Rape or aggravated sexual abuse;
    (xx) Unlawful possession, use, sale, distribution, or 
manufacture of an explosive or weapon;
    (xxi) Extortion;
    (xxii) Armed robbery;
    (xxiii) Distribution of, or intent to distribute, a 
controlled substance;
    (xxiv) Felony arson; or
    (xxv) Conspiracy or attempt to commit any of the 
aforementioned criminal acts.
    (c) Investigative steps. Part 1 of the employment history 
investigation must be completed on all persons listed in 
paragraph (a) of this section. If required by paragraph (c)(5) 
of this section, Part 2 of the employment history investigation 
must also be completed on all persons listed in paragraph (a) 
of this section.
    (1) The individual must provide the following information 
on an application form:
    (i) The individual's full name, including any aliases or 
nicknames.
    (ii) The dates, names, phone numbers, and addresses of 
previous employers, with explanations for any gaps in 
employment of more than 12 consecutive months, during the 
previous 10-year period.
    (iii) Any convictions during the previous 10-year period of 
the crimes listed in paragraph (b)(2) of this section.
    (2) The airport operator or the airport user must include 
on the application form a notification that the individual will 
be subject to an employment history verification and possibly a 
criminal records check.
    (3) The airport operator or the airport user must verify 
the identity of the individual through the presentation of two 
forms of identification, one of which must bear the 
individual's photograph.
    (4) The airport operator or the airport user must verify 
the information on the most recent 5 years of employment 
history required under paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this section. 
Information must be verified in writing, by documentation, by 
telephone, or in person.
    (5) If one or more of the conditions (triggers) listed in 
Sec. 107.31(c)(5)(i) through (iv) exist, the employment history 
investigation must not be considered complete unless Part 2 is 
accomplished. Only the airport operator may initiate Part 2 for 
airport users under this section. Part 2 consists of a 
comparison of the individual's fingerprints against the 
fingerprint files of known criminals maintained by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The comparison of the 
individual's fingerprints must be processed through the FAA. 
The airport operator may request a check of the individual's 
fingerprint-based criminal record only if one or more of the 
following conditions exist:
    (i) The individual does not satisfactorily account for a 
period of unemployment of 12 consecutive months or more during 
the previous 10- year period.
    (ii) The individual is unable to support statements made on 
the application form.
    (iii) There are significant inconsistencies in the 
information provided on the application.
    (iv) Information becomes available to the airport operator 
or the airport user during the investigation indicating a 
possible conviction for one of the crimes listed in paragraph 
(b)(2) of this section.
    (d) Individual notification. Prior to commencing the 
criminal records check, the airport operator must notify the 
affected individual and identify the Airport Security 
Coordinator as a contact for follow- up. An individual, who 
chooses not to submit fingerprints, after having met a 
requirement for Part 2 of the employment investigation, may not 
be granted unescorted access privilege.
    (e) Fingerprint processing. If a fingerprint comparison is 
necessary under paragraph (c)(5) of this section to complete 
the employment history investigation the airport operator must 
collect and process fingerprints in the following manner:
    (1) One set of legible and classifiable fingerprints must 
be recorded on fingerprint cards approved by the FBI, and 
distributed by the FAA for this purpose.
    (2) The fingerprints must be obtained from the individual 
under direct observation by the airport operator or a law 
enforcement officer. Individuals submitting their fingerprints 
may not take possession of their fingerprint card after they 
have been fingerprinted.
    (3) The identity of the individual must be verified at the 
time fingerprints are obtained. The individual must present two 
forms of identification, one of which must bear the 
individual's photograph.
    (4) The fingerprint card must be forwarded to the FAA at 
the location specified by the Administrator.
    (5) Fees for the processing of the criminal record checks 
are due upon application. Airport operators must submit payment 
through corporate check, cashier's check, or money order made 
payable to ``U.S. FAA,'' at the designated rate for each 
fingerprint card. Combined payment for multiple applications is 
acceptable. The designated rate for processing the fingerprint 
cards is available from the local FAA security office.
    (f) Determinaiton of arrest status. In conducting the 
criminal record checks required by this section, the airport 
operator must not consider the employment history investigation 
complete unless it investigates arrest information for the 
crimes listed in paragraph (b)(2) of this section for which no 
disposition has been recorded and makes a determination that 
the arrest did not result in a disqualifying conviction.
    (g) Availability and correction of FBI records and 
notification of disqualification. (1) At the time Part 2 is 
initiated and the fingerprints are collected, the airport 
operator must notify the individual that a copy of the criminal 
record received from the FBI will be made available to the 
individual if requested in writing. When requested in writing, 
the airport operator must make available to the individual a 
copy of any criminal record received from the FBI.
    (2) Prior to making a final decision to deny authorization 
to an individual described in paragraph (a) of this section, 
the airport operator must advise the individual that the FBI 
criminal record discloses information that would disqualify 
him/her from receiving unescorted access and provide the 
individual with a copy of the FBI record if it has been 
requested.
    (3) The airport operator must notify an individual that a 
final decision has been made to grant or deny authority for 
unescorted access.
    (h) Corrective action by the individual. The individual may 
contact the local jurisdiction responsible for the information 
and the FBI to complete or correct the information contained in 
his/her record before any final decision is made, subject to 
the following conditions:
    (1) Within 30 days after being advised that the criminal 
record received from the FBI discloses disqualifying 
information, the individual must notify the airport operator, 
in writing, of his/her intent to correct any information 
believed to be inaccurate.
    (i) Upon notification by an individual that the record has 
been corrected, the airport operator must obtain a copy of the 
revised FBI record prior to making a final determination.
    (2) If no notification is received within 30 days, the 
airport operator may make a final determination.
    (i) Limits on dissemination of results. Criminal record 
information provided by the FBI must be used solely for the 
purposes of this section, and no person may disseminate the 
results of a criminal record check to anyone other than:
    (1) The individual to whom the record pertains or that 
individual's authorized representative;
    (2) Airport officials with a need to know; and
    (3) Others designated by the Administrator.
    (j) Employment status while awaiting criminal record 
checks. Individuals who have submitted their fingerprints and 
are awaiting FBI results may perform work within the SIDA when 
under escort by someone who has unescorted SIDA access 
privileges.
    (k) Recordkeeping. (1) Except when the airport operator has 
received a certification under paragraph (n)(1) of this 
section, the airport operator must physically maintain and 
control the Part 1 employment history investigation file until 
180 days after the termination of the individual's authority 
for unescorted access. The Part 1, employment history 
investigation file, must consist of the following:
    (i) The application;
    (ii) The employment verification information obtained by 
the employer;
    (iii) The names of those from whom the employment 
verification information was obtained;
    (iv) The date and the method of how the contact was made; 
and
    (v) Any other information as required by the Administrator.
    (2) The airport operator must physically maintain, control 
and when appropriate destroy Part 2, the criminal record, for 
each individual for whom a fingerprint comparison has been 
completed. Part 2 must be maintained for 180 days after the 
termination of the individual's authority for unescorted 
access. Only direct airport operator employees may carry out 
this criminal record file responsibility. The Part 2 criminal 
record file must consist of the following:
    (i) The criminal record received from the FBI as a result 
of an individual's fingerprint comparison; or
    (ii) Information that the check was completed and no record 
exists.
    (3) The files required by this section must be maintained 
in a manner that is acceptable to the Administrator and in a 
manner that protects the confidentiality of the individual.
    (l) Continuing responsibilities. (1) Any individual 
authorized to have unescorted access privileges or who may 
authorize others to have unescorted access, who is subsequently 
convicted of any of the crimes listed in paragraph (b)(2) of 
this section must, within 24 hours, report the conviction to 
the airport operator and surrender the SIDA access medium to 
the issuer.
    (2) If information becomes available to the airport 
operator or the airport user indicating that an individual with 
unescorted access has a possible conviction for one of the 
disqualifying crimes in paragraph (b)(2) of this section, the 
airport operator must determine the status of the conviction. 
If a disqualifying conviction is confirmed the airport operator 
must withdraw any authority granted under this section.
    (m) Exceptions. Notwithstanding the requirements of this 
section, an airport operator may authorize the following 
individuals to have unescorted access, or to authorize others 
to have unescorted access to the SIDA:
    (1) An employee of the Federal government or a state or 
local government (including a law enforcement officer) who, as 
a condition of employment, has been subjected to an employment 
investigation which includes a criminal record check.
    (2) A crewmember of a foreign air carrier covered by an 
alternate security arrangement in the foreign air carrier's 
approved security program.
    (3) An individual who has been continuously employed in a 
position requiring unescorted access by another airport 
operator, airport user or air carrier.
    (4) Those persons who have received access to a U.S. 
Customs secured area prior to November 23, 1998.
    (n) Investigations by air carriers and airport users. An 
airport operator is in compliance with its obligation under 
paragraph (b) of this section, as applicable, when the airport 
operator accepts for each individual seeking unescorted access 
one of the following:
    (1) Certification from an air carrier subject to Sec. 
108.33 of this chapter indicating it has complied with Secs. 
108.33 of this chapter for the air carrier's employees and 
contractors seeking unescorted access; or
    (2) Certification from an airport user indicating it has 
complied with and will continue to comply with the provisions 
listed in paragraph (p) of this section. The certification must 
include the name of each individual for whom the airport user 
has conducted an employment history investigation.
    (o) Airport operator responsibility. The airport operator 
must:
    (1) Prior to the acceptance of a certification from the 
airport user, the airport operator must conduct a preliminary 
review of the file for each individual listed on the 
certification to determine that Part 1 has been completed.
    (2) Designate the airport security coordinator (ASC), in 
the security program, to be responsible for reviewing the 
results of the airport employees' and airport users' employment 
history investigations and for destroying the criminal record 
files when their maintenance is no longer required by paragraph 
(k)(2) of this section;
    (3) Designate the ASC, in the security program, to serve as 
the contact to receive notification from individuals applying 
for unescorted access of their intent to seek correction of 
their FBI criminal record; and
    (4) Audit the employment history investigations performed 
by the airport operator in accordance with this section and 
those investigations conducted by the airport users made by 
certification under paragraph (n)(2). The audit program must be 
set forth in the airport security program.
    (p) Airport user responsibility.
    (1) The airport user is responsible for reporting to the 
airport operator information, as it becomes available, which 
indicates an individual with unescorted access may have a 
conviction for one of the disqualifying crimes in paragraph 
(b)(2) of this section; and
    (2) If the airport user offers certification to the airport 
operator under paragraph (n)(2) of this section, the airport 
user must for each individual for whom a certification is made:
    (i) Conduct the employment history investigation, Part 1, 
in compliance with paragraph (c) of this section. The airport 
user must report to the airport operator if one of the 
conditions in paragraph (C)(5) of this section exist;
    (ii) Maintain and control Part 1 of the employment history 
investigation file in compliance with paragraph (k) of this 
section, unless the airport operator decides to maintain and 
control Part 1 of the employment history investigation file;
    (iii) Provide the airport operator and the FAA with access 
to each completed Part 1 employee history investigative file of 
those individuals listed on the certification; and
    (iv) Provide either the name or title of the individual 
acting as custodian of the files, and the address of the 
location and the phone number at the location where the 
investigative files are maintained.

[Doc. No. 28859, 63 FR 51218, Sept. 24, 1998; 63 FR 60448, Nov. 
9, 1998]

                     b. Airplane Operator Security

      Federal Aviation Administration Regulations, 14 CFR Part 108

                  Part 108--Airplane Operator Security

Sec. 108.1 Applicability.

    (a) This part prescribes aviation security rules 
governing--
    (1) The operations of holders of FAA air carrier operating 
certificates or operating certificates engaging in scheduled 
passenger operations or public charter passenger operations;
    (2) Each person aboard an airplane operated by a 
certificate holder described in paragraph (a)(1) of this 
section; and
    (3) Each person on an airport at which the operations 
described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section are conducted.
    (4) Each certificate holder who receives a Security 
Directive or Information Circular and each person who receives 
information from a Security Directive or an Information 
Circular issued by the Director of Civil Aviation Security.
    (5) Each person who files an application or makes entries 
into any record or report that is kept, made or used to show 
compliance under this part, or to exercise any privileges under 
this part.
    (b) This part does not apply to helicopter or to all-cargo 
operations.

Sec. 108.3 Definitions.

    The following are definitions of terms used in this part: 
(a) Certificate holder means a person holding an FAA operating 
certificate when that person engages in scheduled passenger or 
public charter passenger operations or both.
    (b) Passenger seating configuration means the total number 
of seats for which the aircraft is type certificated that can 
be made available for passenger use aboard a flight and 
includes that seat in certain airplanes which may be used by a 
representative of the Administrator to conduct flight checks 
but is available for revenue purposes on other occasions.
    (c) Private charter means any charter for which the 
charterer engages the total capacity of an airplane for the 
carriage of: (1) Passengers in civil or military air movements 
conducted under contract with the Government of the United 
States of the Government of a foreign country; or
    (2) Passengers invited by the charterer, the cost of which 
is borne entirely by the charterer and not directly or 
indirectly by the individual passengers.
    (d) Public charter means any charter that is not a private 
charter.
    (e) Scheduled passenger operations means holding out to the 
public of air transportation service for passengers from 
identified air terminals at a set time announced by timetable 
or schedule published in a newspaper, magazine, or other 
advertising medium.
    (f) Sterile area means an area to which access is 
controlled by the inspection of persons and property in 
accordance with an approved security program or a security 
program used in accordance with Sec. 129.25.

Sec. Sec. 108.4 Falsification.

    No person may make, or cause to be made, any of the 
following:
    (a) Any fraudulent or intentionally false statement in any 
application for any security program, access medium, or 
identification medium, or any amendment thereto, under this 
part.
    (b) Any fraudulent or intentionally false entry in any 
record or report that is kept, made, or used to show compliance 
with this part, or to exercise any privileges under this part.
    (c) Any reproduction or alteration, for fraudulent purpose, 
of any report, record, security program, access medium, or 
identification medium issued under this part.

Sec. 108.5 Security program: Adoption and implementation.

    (a) Each certificate holder shall adopt and carry out a 
security program that meets the requirements of Sec. 108.7 for 
each of the following scheduled or public charter passenger 
operations: (1) Each operation with an airplane having a 
passenger seating configuration of more than 60 seats.
    (2) Each operation that provides deplaned passengers 
access, that is not otherwise controlled by a certificate 
holder using an approved security program or a foreign air 
carrier using a security program required by Sec. 129.25, to a 
sterile area.
    (3) Each operation with an airplane having a passenger 
seating configuration of more than 30 but less than 61 seats; 
except that those parts of the program effecting compliance 
with the requirements listed in Sec. 108.7(b) (1), (2), and (4) 
need only be implemented when the Director of Civil Aviation 
Security or a designate of the Director notifies the 
certificate holder in writing that a security threat exists 
with respect to the operation.
    (b) Each certificate holder that has obtained FAA approval 
for a security program for operations not listed in paragraph 
(a) of this section shall carry out the provisions of that 
program.

Sec. 108.7 Security program: Form, content, and availability.

    (a) Each security program required by Sec. 108.5 shall--
    (1) Provide for the safety of persons and property 
traveling in air transportation and intrastate air 
transportation against acts of criminal violence and air 
piracy;
    (2) Be in writing and signed by the certificate holder or 
any person delegated authority in this matter;
    (3) Include the items listed in paragraph (b) of this 
section, as required by Sec. 108.5; and
    (4) Be approved by the Administrator.
    (b) Each security program required by Sec. 108.5 must 
include the following, as required by that section:
    (1) The procedures and a description of the facilities and 
equipment used to perform the screening functions specified in 
Sec. 108.9.
    (2) The procedures and a description of the facilities and 
equipment used to perform the airplane and facilities control 
functions specified in Sec. 108.13.
    (3) The procedures used to comply with the applicable 
requirements of Sec. 108.15 regarding law enforcement officers.
    (4) The procedures used to comply with the requirements of 
Sec. 108.17 regarding the use of X-ray systems.
    (5) The procedures used to comply with the requirements of 
Sec. 108.19 regarding bomb and air piracy threats.
    (6) The procedures used to comply with the applicable 
requirements of Sec. 108.10.
    (7) The curriculum used to accomplish the training required 
by Sec. 108.23.
    (8) The procedures and a description of the facilities and 
equipment used to comply with the requirements of Sec. 108.20 
regarding explosives detection systems.
    (c) Each certificate holder having an approved security 
program shall--
    (1) Maintain at least one complete copy of the approved 
security program at its principal business office;
    (2) Maintain a complete copy or the pertinent portions of 
its approved security program or appropriate implementing 
instructions at each airport where security screening is being 
conducted;
    (3) Make these documents available for inspection upon 
request of any Civil Aviation Security Inspector;
    (4) Restrict the availability of information contained in 
the security program to those persons with an operational need-
to-know; and
    (5) Refer requests for such information by other persons to 
the Director of Civil Aviation Security of the FAA.

Sec. 108.9 Screening of passengers and property.

    (a) Each certificate holder required to conduct screening 
under a security program shall use the procedures included, and 
the facilities and equipment described, in its approved 
security program to prevent or deter the carriage aboard 
airplanes of any explosive, incendiary, or a deadly or 
dangerous weapon on or about each individual's person or 
accessible property, and the carriage of any explosive or 
incendiary in checked baggage.
    (b) Each certificate holder required to conduct screening 
under a security program shall refuse to transport--
    (1) Any person who does not consent to a search of his or 
her person in accordance with the screening system prescribed 
in paragraph (a) of this section; and
    (2) Any property of any person who does not consent to a 
search or inspection of that property in accordance with the 
screening system prescribed by paragraph (a) of this section.
    (c) Except as provided by its approved security program, 
each certificate holder required to conduct screening under a 
security program shall use the procedures included, and the 
facilities and equipment described, in its approved security 
program for detecting explosives, incendiaries, and deadly or 
dangerous weapons to inspect each person entering a sterile 
area at each preboarding screening checkpoint in the United 
States for which it is responsible, and to inspect all 
accessible property under that person's control.
    (d) Each certificate holder shall staff its security 
screening checkpoints with supervisory and non-supervisory 
personnel in accordance with the standards specified in its 
security program.

Sec. 108.10 Prevention and management of hijackings and sabotage 
                    attempts.

    (a) Each certificate holder shall--
    (1) Provide and use a Security Coordinator on the ground 
and in flight for each international and domestic flight, as 
required by its approved security program; and
    (2) Designate the pilot in command as the inflight Security 
Coordinator for each flight, as required by its approved 
security program.
    (b) Ground Security Coordinator. Each ground Security 
Coordinator shall carry out the ground Security Coordinator 
duties specified in the certificate holder's approved security 
program.
    (c) Inflight Security Coordinator. The pilot in command of 
each flight shall carry out the inflight Security Coordinator 
duties specified in the certificate holder's approved security 
program.

Sec. 108.11 Carriage of weapons.

    (a) No certificate holder required to conduct screening 
under a security program may permit any person to have, nor may 
any person have, on or about his or her person or property, a 
deadly or dangerous weapon, either concealed or unconcealed, 
accessible to him or her while aboard an airplane for which 
screening is required unless:
    (1) The person having the weapon is--
    (i) An official or employee of the United States, or a 
State or political subdivision of a State, or of a municipality 
who is authorized by his or her agency to have the weapon; or
    (ii) Authorized to have the weapon by the certificate 
holder and the Administrator and has successfully completed a 
course of training in the use of firearms acceptable to the 
Administrator.
    (2) The person having the weapon needs to have the weapon 
accessible in connection with the performance of his or her 
duty from the time he or she would otherwise check it in 
accordance with paragraph (d) of this section until the time it 
would be returned after deplaning.
    (3) The certificate holder is notified--
    (i) Of the flight on which the armed person intends to have 
the weapon accessible to him or her at least 1 hour, or in an 
emergency as soon as practicable, before departure; and
    (ii) When the armed person is other than an employee or 
official of the United States, that there is a need for the 
weapon to be accessible to the armed person in connection with 
the performance of that person's duty from the time he or she 
would otherwise check it in accordance with paragraph (d) of 
this section until the time it would be returned to him or her 
after deplaning.
    (4) The armed person identifies himself or herself to the 
certificate holder by presenting credentials that include his 
or her clear, full-face picture, his or her signature, and the 
signature of the authorizing official of his or her service or 
the official seal of his or her service. A badge, shield, or 
similar may not be used as the sole means of identification.
    (5) The certificate holder--
    (i) Ensures that the armed person is familiar with its 
procedures for carrying a deadly or dangerous weapon aboard its 
airplane before the time the person boards the airplane;
    (ii) Ensures that the identity of the armed person is known 
to each law enforcement officer and each employee of the 
certificate holder responsible for security during the boarding 
of the airplane; and
    (iii) Notifies the pilot in command, other appropriate 
crewmembers, and any other person authorized to have a weapon 
accessible to him or her aboard the airplane of the location of 
each authorized armed person aboard the airplane.
    (b) No person may, while on board an airplane operated by a 
certificate holder for which screening is not conducted, carry 
on or about that person a deadly or dangerous weapon, either 
concealed or unconcealed. This paragraph does not apply to--
    (1) Officials or employees of a municipality or a State, or 
of the United States, who are authorized to carry arms; or
    (2) Crewmembers and other persons authorized by the 
certificate holder to carry arms.
    (c) No certificate holder may knowingly permit any person 
to transport, nor may any person transport or tender for 
transport, any explosive, incendiary or a loaded firearm in 
checked baggage aboard an airplane. For the purpose of this 
section, a loaded firearm means a firearm which has a live 
round of ammunition, cartridge, detonator, or powder in the 
chamber or in a clip, magazine, or cylinder inserted in it.
    (d) No certificate holder may knowingly permit any person 
to transport, nor may any person transport or tender for 
transport, any unloaded firearm in checked baggage aboard an 
airplane unless--
    (1) The passenger declares to the certificate holder, 
either orally or in writing before checking the baggage, that 
any firearm carried in the baggage is unloaded;
    (2) The firearm is carried in a container the certificate 
holder considers appropriate for air transportation;
    (3) When the firearm is other than a shotgun, rifle, or 
other firearm normally fired from the shoulder position, the 
baggage in which it is carried is locked, and only the 
passenger checking the baggage retains the key or combination; 
and
    (4) The baggage containing the firearm is carried in an 
area, other than the flightcrew compartment, that is 
inaccessible to passengers.
    (e) No certificate holder may serve any alcoholic beverage 
to a person having a deadly or dangerous weapon accessible to 
him or her nor may such person drink any alcoholic beverage 
while aboard an airplane operated by the certificate holder.
    (f) Paragraphs (a), (b), and (d) of this section do not 
apply to the carriage of firearms aboard air carrier flights 
conducted for the military forces of the Government of the 
United States when the total cabin load of the airplane is 
under exclusive use by those military forces if the following 
conditions are met:
    (1) No firearm is loaded and all bolts to such firearms are 
locked in the open position; and
    (2) The certificate holder is notified by the unit 
commander or officer in charge of the flight before boarding 
that weapons will be carried aboard the aircraft.

Sec. 108.13 Security of airplanes and facilities.

    Each certificate holder required to conduct screening under 
a security program shall use the procedures included, and the 
facilities and equipment described, in its approved security 
program to perform the following control functions with respect 
to each airplane operation for which screening is required:
    (a) Prohibit unauthorized access to the airplane.
    (b) Ensure that baggage carried in the airplane is checked 
in by a responsible agent and that identification is obtained 
from persons, other than known shippers, shipping goods or 
cargo aboard the airplane.
    (c) Ensure that cargo and checked baggage carried aboard 
the airplane is handled in a manner that prohibits unauthorized 
access.
    (d) Conduct a security inspection of the airplane before 
placing it in service and after it has been left unattended.

Sec. 108.14 Transportation of Federal Air Marshals.

    (a) Each certificate holder shall carry Federal Air 
Marshals, in the number and manner specified by the 
Administrator, on each scheduled and public charter passenger 
operation designated by the Administrator.
    (b) Each Federal Air Marshal shall be carried on a first 
priority basis and without charge while on official duty, 
including repositioning flights.
    (c) Each certificate holder shall assign the specific seat 
requested by a Federal Air Marshal who is on official duty.

Sec. 108.15 Law enforcement officers.

    (a) At airports within the United States not governed by 
part 107 of this chapter, each certificate holder engaging in 
scheduled passenger or public charter passenger operations 
shall--
    (1) If security screening is required for a public charter 
operation by Sec. 108.5(a), or for a scheduled passenger 
operation by Sec. 108.5(b) provide for law enforcement officers 
meeting the qualifications and standards, and in the number and 
manner specified, in part 107; and
    (2) When using airplanes with a passenger seating 
configuration of 31 through 60 seats in a public charter 
operation for which screening is not required, arrange for law 
enforcement officers meeting the qualifications and standards 
specified in part 107 to be available to respond to an 
incident, and provide to its employees, including crewmembers, 
as appropriate, current information with respect to procedures 
for obtaining law enforcement assistance at that airport.
    (b) At airports governed by part 107 of this chapter, each 
certificate holder engaging in scheduled or public charter 
passenger operations, when using airplanes with a passenger 
seating configuration of 31 through 60 seats for which 
screening is not required, shall arrange for law enforcement 
officers meeting the qualifications and standards specified in 
part 107 to be available to respond to an incident and provide 
its employees, including crewmembers, as appropriate, current 
information with respect to procedures for obtaining this law 
enforcement assistance at that airport.

Sec. 108.17 Use of X-ray systems.

    (a) No certificate holder may use an X-ray system within 
the United States to inspect carry-on or checked articles 
unless specifically authorized under a security program 
required by Sec. 108.5 of this part or use such a system 
contrary to its approved security program. The Administrator 
authorizes certificate holders to use X-ray systems for 
inspecting carry-on or checked articles under an approved 
security program if the certificate holder shows that--
    (1) For a system manufactured before April 25, 1974, it 
meets either the guidelines issued by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW) and published in the Federal Register (38 FR 
21442, August 8, 1973); or the performance standards for 
cabinet X-ray systems designed primarily for the inspection of 
carry-on baggage issued by the FDA and published in 21 CFR 
1020.40 (39 FR 12985, April 10, 1974);
    (2) For a system manufactured after April 24, 1974, it 
meets the standards for cabinet X-ray systems designed 
primarily for the inspection of carry-on baggage issued by the 
FDA and published in 21 CFR 1020.40 (39 FR 12985, April 10, 
1974);
    (3) A program for initial and recurrent training of 
operators of the system is established, which includes training 
in radiation safety, the efficient use of X-ray systems, and 
the identification of weapons and other dangerous articles;
    (4) Procedures are established to ensure that each operator 
of the system is provided with an individual personnel 
dosimeter (such as a film badge or thermoluminescent 
dosimeter). Each dosimeter used shall be evaluated at the end 
of each calendar month, and records of operator duty time and 
the results of dosimeter evaluations shall be maintained by the 
certificate holder; and
    (5) The system meets the imaging requirements set forth in 
an approved Air Carrier Security Program using the step wedge 
specified in American Society for Testing and Materials 
Standard F792-82.
    (b) No certificate holder may use an X-ray system within 
the United States unless within the preceding 12 calendar 
months a radiation survey has been conducted which shows that 
the system meets the applicable performance standards in 21 CFR 
1020.40 or guidelines published by the FDA in the Federal 
Register of August 8, 1973 (38 FR 21442).
    (c) No certificate holder may use an X-ray system after the 
system is initially installed or after it has been moved from 
one location to another, unless a radiation survey is conducted 
which shows that the system meets the applicable performance 
standards in 21 CFR 1020.40 or guidelines published by the FDA 
in the Federal Register of August 8, 1973 (38 FR 21442) except 
that a radiation survey is not required for an X-ray system 
that is moved to another location if the certificate holder 
shows that the system is so designed that it can be moved 
without altering its performance.
    (d) No certificate holder may use an X-ray system that is 
not in full compliance with any defect notice or modification 
order issued for that system by the FDA, unless that 
Administration has advised the FAA that the defect or failure 
to comply does not create a significant risk or injury, 
including genetic injury, to any person.
    (e) No certificate holder may use an X-ray system to 
inspect carry-on or checked articles unless a sign is posted in 
a conspicuous place at the screening station and on the X-ray 
system which notifies passengers that such items are being 
inspected by an X-ray and advises them to remove all X-ray, 
scientific, and high-speed film from carry-on and checked 
articles before inspection. This sign shall also advise 
passengers that they may request that an inspection be made of 
their photographic equipment and film packages without exposure 
to an X-ray system. If the X-ray system exposes any carry-on or 
checked articles to more than 1 milliroentgen during the 
inspection, the certificate holder shall post a sign which 
advises passengers to remove film of all kinds from their 
articles before inspection. If requested by passengers, their 
photographic equipment and film packages shall be inspected 
without exposure to an X-ray system.
    (f) Each certificate holder shall maintain at least one 
copy of the results of the most recent radiation survey 
conducted under paragraph (b) or (c) of this section and shall 
make it available for inspection upon request by the 
Administrator at each of the following locations:
    (1) The certificate holder's principal business office; and
    (2) The place where the X-ray system is in operation.
    (g) The American Society for Testing and Materials Standard 
F792-82, ``Design and Use of Ionizing Radiation Equipment for 
the Detection of Items Prohibited in Controlled Access Areas,'' 
described in this section is incorporated by reference herein 
and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All 
persons affected by these amendments may obtain copies of the 
standard from the American Society for testing and Materials, 
1916 Race Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103. In addition, a copy 
of the standard may be examined at the FAA Rules Docket, Docket 
No. 24115, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC, 
weekdays, except Federal holidays, between 8:30 a.m. and 5 p.m.
    (h) Each certificate holder shall comply with X-ray 
operator duty time limitations specified in its security 
program.

Sec. 108.18 Security Directives and Information Circulars.

    (a) Each certificate holder required to have an approved 
security program for passenger operations shall comply with 
each Security Directive issued to the certificate holder by the 
Director of Civil Aviation Security, or by any person to whom 
the Director has delegated the authority to issue Security 
Directives, within the time prescribed in the Security 
Directive for compliance.
    (b) Each certificate holder who receives a Security 
Directive shall--
    (1) Not later than 24 hours after delivery by the FAA or 
within the time prescribed in the Security Directive, 
acknowledge receipt of the Security Directive;
    (2) Not later than 72 hours after delivery by the FAA or 
within the time prescribed in the Security Directive, specify 
the method by which the certificate holder has implemented the 
measures in the Security Directive; and
    (3) Ensure that information regarding the Security 
Directive and measures implemented in response to the Security 
Directive are distributed to specified personnel as prescribed 
in the Security Directive and to other personnel with an 
operational need to know.
    (c) In the event that the certificate holder is unable to 
implement the measures contained in the Security Directive, the 
certificate holder shall submit proposed alternative measures, 
and the basis for submitting the alternative measures, to the 
Director of Civil Aviation Security for approval. The 
certificate holder shall submit proposed alternative measures 
within the time prescribed in the Security Directive. The 
certificate holder shall implement any alternative measures 
approved by the Director of Civil Aviation Security.
    (d) Each certificate holder who receives a Security 
Directive or Information Circular and each person who receives 
information from a Security Directive or Information Circular 
shall--
    (1) Restrict the availability of the Security Directive or 
Information Circular and information contained in the Security 
Directive or the Information Circular to those persons with an 
operational need to know; and
    (2) Refuse to release the Security Directive or Information 
Circular and information regarding the Security Directive or 
Information Circular to persons other than those with an 
operational need to know without the prior written consent of 
the Director of Civil Aviation Security.
     (Approved by the Office of Management and Budget under 
control number 2120-0098)

Sec. 108.19 Security threats and procedures.

    (a) Upon receipt of a specific and credible threat to the 
security of a flight, the certificate holder shall--
    (1) Immediately notify the ground and in-flight security 
coordinators of the threat, any evaluation thereof, and any 
countermeasures to be applied; and
    (2) Ensure that the in-flight security coordinator notifies 
the flight and cabin crewmembers of the threat, any evaluation 
thereof, and any countermeasures to be applied.
    (b) Upon receipt of a bomb threat against a specific 
airplane, each certificate holder shall attempt to determine 
whether or not any explosive or incendiary is aboard the 
airplane involved by doing the following:
    (1) Conducting a security inspection on the ground before 
the next flight or, if the airplane is in flight, immediately 
after its next landing.
    (2) If the airplane is being operated on the ground, 
advising the pilot in command to immediately submit the 
airplane for a security inspection.
    (3) If the airplane is in flight, immediately advising the 
pilot in command of all pertinent information available so that 
necessary emergency action can be taken.
    (c) Immediately upon receiving information that an act or 
suspected act of air piracy has been committed, the certificate 
holder shall notify the Administrator. If the airplane is in 
airspace under other than United States jurisdiction, the 
certificate holder shall also notify the appropriate 
authorities of the State in whose territory the airplane is 
located and, if the airplane is in flight, the appropriate 
authorities of the State in whose territory the airplane is to 
land. Notification of the appropriate air traffic controlling 
authority is sufficient action to meet this requirement.

Sec. 108.20 Use of Explosives Detection Systems.

    When the Administrator shall require by amendment under 
Sec. 108.25, each certificate holder required to conduct 
screening under a security program shall use an explosive 
detection system that has been approved by the Administrator to 
screen checked baggage on international flights in accordance 
with the certificate holder's security program.

Sec. 108.21 Carriage of passengers under the control of armed law 
                    enforcement escorts.

    (a) Except as provided in paragraph (e) of this section, no 
certificate holder required to conduct screening under a 
security program may carry a passenger in the custody of an 
armed law enforcement escort aboard an airplane for which 
screening is required unless--
    (1) The armed law enforcement escort is an official or 
employee of the United States, of a State or political 
subdivision of a State, or a municipality who is required by 
appropriate authority to maintain custody and control over an 
individual aboard an airplane;
    (2) The certificate holder is notified by the responsible 
government entity at least 1 hour, or in case of emergency as 
soon as possible, before departure--
    (i) Of the identity of the passenger to be carried and the 
flight on which it is proposed to carry the passenger; and
    (ii) Whether or not the passenger is considered to be in a 
maximum risk category;
    (3) If the passenger is considered to be in a maximum risk 
category, that the passenger is under the control of at least 
two armed law enforcement escorts and no other passengers are 
under the control of those two law enforcement escorts;
    (4) No more than one passenger who the certificate holder 
has been notified is in a maximum risk category is carried on 
the airplane;
    (5) If the passenger is not considered to be in a maximum 
risk category, the passenger is under the control of at least 
one armed law enforcement escort, and no more than two of these 
persons are carried under the control of any one law 
enforcement escort;
    (6) The certificate holder is assured, prior to departure, 
by each law enforcement escort that--
    (i) The officer is equipped with adequate restraining 
devices to be used in the event restraint of any passenger 
under the control of the escort becomes necessary; and
    (ii) Each passenger under the control of the escort has 
been searched and does not have on or about his or her person 
or property anything that can be used as a deadly or dangerous 
weapon;
    (7) Each passenger under the control of a law enforcement 
escort is--
    (i) Boarded before any other passengers when boarding at 
the airport where the flight originates and deplaned at the 
destination after all other deplaning passengers have deplaned;
    (ii) Seated in the rear-most passenger seat when boarding 
at the airport where the flight originates; and
    (iii) Seated in a seat that is neither located in any 
lounge area nor located next to or directly across from any 
exit; and
    (8) A law enforcement escort having control of a passenger 
is seated between the passenger and any aisle.
    (b) No certificate holder operating an airplane under 
paragraph (a) of this section may--
    (1) Serve food beverage or provide metal eating utensils to 
a passenger under the control of a law enforcement escort while 
aboard the airplane unless authorized to do so by the law 
enforcement escort.
    (2) Serve a law enforcement escort or the passenger under 
the control of the escort any alcoholic beverages while aboard 
the airplane.
    (c) Each law enforcement escort carried under the 
provisions of paragraph (a) of this section shall, at all 
times, accompany the passenger under the control of the escort 
and keep the passenger under surveillance while aboard the 
airplane.
    (d) No law enforcement escort carried under paragraph (b) 
of this section or any passenger under the control of the 
escort may drink alcoholic beverages while aboard the airplane.
    (e) This section does not apply to the carriage of 
passengers under voluntary protective escort.

Sec. 108.23 Training.

    (a) No certificate holder may use any person as a Security 
Coordinator unless, within the preceding 12 calendar months, 
that person has satisfactorily completed the security training 
as specified in the certificate holder's approved security 
program.
    (b) No certificate holder may use any person as a 
crewmember on any domestic or international flight unless 
within the preceding 12 calendar months or within the time 
period specified in an Advanced Qualification Program approved 
under SFAR 58 that person has satisfactorily completed the 
security training required by Sec. 121.417(b)(3)(v) or 
Sec. 135.331(b)(3)(v) of this chapter and as specified in the 
certificate holder's approved security program. With respect to 
training conducted under Sec. 121.417 or Sec. 135.331, whenever 
a crewmember who is required to take recurrent training 
completes the training in the calendar month before or the 
calendar month after the calendar month in which that training 
is required, he is considered to have completed the training in 
the calendar month in which it was required.

Sec. 108.25 Approval of security programs and amendments.

    (a) Unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator, each 
certificate holder required to have a security program for a 
passenger operation shall submit its proposed security program 
to the Administrator for approval at least 90 days before the 
date of the intended passenger operations. Within 30 days after 
receiving the program, the Administrator either approves the 
program or notifies the certificate holder to modify the 
program to comply with the applicable requirements of this 
part. The certificate holder may petition the Administrator to 
reconsider the notice to modify within 30 days after receiving 
the notice, and, except in the case of an emergency requiring 
immediate action in the interest of safety, the filing of the 
petition stays the notice pending a decision by the 
Administrator.
    (b) The Administrator may amend an approved security 
program if it is determined that safety and the public interest 
require the amendment, as follows:
    (1) The Administrator notifies the certificate holder, in 
writing, of the proposed amendment, fixing a period of not less 
than 30 days within which it may submit written information, 
views, and arguments on the amendment.
    (2) After considering all relevant material, the 
Administrator notifies the certificate holder of any amendment 
adopted or rescinds the notice. The amendment becomes effective 
not less than 30 days after the certificate holder receives the 
notice, unless the certificate holder petitions the 
Administrator to reconsider the amendment, in which case the 
effective date is stayed by the Administrator.
    (3) If the Administrator finds that there is an emergency 
requiring immediate action with respect to safety in air 
transportation or in air commerce that makes the procedure in 
this paragraph impracticable or contrary to the public 
interest, the Administrator may issue an amendment, effective 
without stay, on the date the certificate holder receives 
notice of it. In such a case, the Administrator incorporates 
the findings, and a brief statement of the reasons for it, in 
the notice of the amendment to be adopted.
    (c) A certificate holder may submit a request to the 
Administrator to amend its program. The application must be 
filed with the Administrator at least 30 days before the date 
it proposes for the amendment to become effective, unless a 
shorter period is allowed by the Administrator. Within 15 days 
after receiving a proposed amendment, the Administrator either 
approves or denies the request. Within 30 days after receiving 
from the Administrator a notice of refusal to approve the 
application for amendment, the applicant may petition the 
Administrator to reconsider the refusal to amend.

Sec. 108.27 Evidence of compliance.

    On request of the Administrator, each certificate holder 
shall provide evidence of compliance with this part and its 
approved security program.

Sec. 108.29 Standards for security oversight.

    (a) Each certificate holder shall ensure that:
    (1) Each person performing a security-related function for 
the certificate holder has knowledge of the provisions of this 
part 108, applicable Security Directives and Information 
Circulars promulgated pursuant to Sec. 108.18, and the 
certificate holder's security program to the extent that the 
performance of the function imposes a need to know.
    (2) Daily, a Ground Security Coordinator at each airport:
    (i) Reviews all security-related functions for 
effectiveness and compliance with this part, the certificate 
holder's security program, and applicable Security Directives; 
and
    (ii) Immediately initiates corrective action for each 
instance of noncompliance with this part, the certificate 
holder's security program, and applicable Security Directives.
    (b) The requirements prescribed in paragraph (a) of this 
section apply to all security-related functions performed for 
the certificate holder whether by a direct employee or a 
contractor employee.

Sec. 108.31 Employment standards for screening personnel.

    (a) No certificate holder shall use any person to perform 
any screening function, unless that person has:
    (1) A high school diploma, a General Equivalency Diploma, 
or a combination of education and experience which the 
certificate holder has determined to have equipped the person 
to perform the duties of the position;
    (2) Basic aptitudes and physical abilities including color 
perception, visual and aural acuity, physical coordination, and 
motor skills to the following standards:
    (i) Screeners operating X-ray equipment must be able to 
distinguish on the X-ray monitor the appropriate imaging 
standard specified in the certificate holder's security 
program. Wherever the X-ray system displays colors, the 
operator must be able to perceive each color;
    (ii) Screeners operating any screening equipment must be 
able to distinguish each color displayed on every type of 
screening equipment and explain what each color signifies;
    (iii) Screeners must be able to hear and respond to the 
spoken voice and to audible alarms generated by screening 
equipment in an active checkpoint environment;
    (iv) Screeners performing physical searches or other 
related operations must be able to efficiently and thoroughly 
manipulate and handle such baggage, containers, and other 
objects subjects to security processing; and
    (v) Screeners who perform pat-downs or hand-held metal 
detector searches of persons must have sufficient dexterity and 
capability to conduct those procedures on all parts of the 
persons' bodies.
    (3) The ability to read, speak, and write English well 
enough to:
    (i) Carry out written and oral instructions regarding the 
proper performance of screening duties;
    (ii) Read English language identification media, 
credentials, airline tickets, and labels on items normally 
encountered in the screening process;
    (iii) Provide direction to and understand and answer 
questions from English-speaking persons undergoing screening; 
and
    (iv) Write incident reports and statements and log entries 
into security records in the English language.
    (4) Satisfactorily completed all initial, recurrent, and 
appropriate specialized training required by the certificate 
holder's security program.
    (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a)(4) of 
this section, the certificate holder may use a person during 
the on-the-job portion of training to perform security 
functions provided that the person is closely supervised and 
does not make independent judgments as to whether persons or 
property may enter a sterile area or aircraft without further 
inspection.
    (c) No certificate holder shall use a person to perform a 
screening function after that person has failed an operational 
test related to that function until that person has 
successfully completed the remedial training specified in the 
certificate holder's security program.
    (d) Each certificate holder shall ensure that a Ground 
Security Coordinator conducts and documents an annual 
evaluation of each person assigned screening duties and may 
continue that person's employment in a screening capacity only 
upon the determination by that Ground Security Coordinator that 
the person:
    (1) Has not suffered a significant dimunition of any 
physical ability required to perform a screening function since 
the last evaluation of those abilities;
    (2) Has a satisfactory record of performance and attention 
to duty; and
    (3) Demonstrates the current knowledge and skills necessary 
to courteously, vigilantly, and effectively perform screening 
functions.
    (e) Paragraphs (a) through (d) of this section do not apply 
to those screening functions conducted outside the United 
States over which the certificate holder does not have 
operational control.
    (f) At locations outside the United States where the 
certificate holder has operational control over a screening 
function, the certificate holder may use screeners who do not 
meet the requirements of paragraph (a)(3) of this section, 
provided that at least one representative of the certificate 
holder who has the ability to functionally read and speak 
English is present while the certificate holder's passengers 
are undergoing security processing.

Sec. 108.33 Employment history, verification and criminal history 
                    records checks.

    (a) Scope. The following persons are within the scope of 
this section:
    (1) Each employee or contractor employee covered under a 
certification made to an airport operator, pursuant to Sec. 
107.31(n) of this chapter, made on or after November 23, 1998.
    (2) Each individual issued air carrier identification media 
that one or more airports accepts as airport approved media for 
unescorted access within a security identification display area 
(SIDA) as described in Sec. 107.25 of this chapter.
    (3) Each individual assigned, after November 23, 1998, to 
perform the following functions:
    (i) Screen passengers or property that will be carried in a 
cabin of an aircraft of an air carrier required to screen 
passengers under this part.
    (ii) Serve as an immediate supervisor (checkpoint security 
supervisor (CSS)), or the next supervisory level (shift or site 
supervisor), to those individuals described in paragraph 
(a)(3)(i) of this section.
    (b) Employment history investigations required. Each air 
carrier must ensure that, for each individual described in 
paragraph (a) of this section, the following requirements are 
met:
    (1) The individual has satisfactorily undergone Part 1 of 
an employment history investigation. Part 1 consists of a 
review of the previous 10 years of employment history and 
verifications of the 5 employment years preceding the date the 
employment history investigation is initiated as provided in 
paragraph (c) of this section; and
    (2) If required by paragraph (c)(5) of this section, the 
individual has satisfied Part 2 of the employment history 
investigation. Part 2 is the process to determine if the 
individual has a criminal record. To satisfy Part 2 of the 
investigation the criminal records check must not disclose that 
the individual has been convicted or found not guilty by reason 
of insanity, in any jurisdiction, during the 10 years ending on 
the date of such investigation, of any of the crimes listed 
below:
    (i) Forgery of certificates, false marking of aircraft, and 
other aircraft registration violation, 49 U.S.C. 46306;
    (ii) Interference with air navigation, 49 U.S.C. 46308;
    (iii) Improper transportation of a hazardous material, 49 
U.S.C. 46312;
    (iv) Aircraft piracy, 49 U.S.C. 46502;
    (v) Interference with flightcrew members or flight 
attendants, 49 U.S.C. 46504;
    (vi) Commission of certain crimes aboard aircraft in 
flight, 49 U.S.C. 46506;
    (vii) Carrying a weapon or explosive aboard aircraft, 49 
U.S.C. 46505;
    (viii) Conveying false information and threats, 49 U.S.C. 
46507;
    (ix) Aircraft piracy outside the special aircraft 
jurisdiction of the United States, 49 U.S.C. 46502(b);
    (x) Lighting violations involving transporting controlled 
substances, 49 U.S.C. 46315;
    (xi) Unlawful entry into an aircraft or airport area that 
serves air carriers or foreign air carriers contrary to 
established security requirements, 49 U.S.C. 46314;
    (xii) Destruction of an aircraft or aircraft facility, 18 
U.S.C. 32;
    (xiii) Murder;
    (xiv) Assault with intent to murder;
    (xv) Espionage;
    (xvi) Sedition;
    (xvii) Kidnapping or hostage taking;
    (xviii) Treason;
    (xix) Rape or aggravated sexual abuse;
    (xx) Unlawful possession, use, sale, distribution, or 
manufacture of an explosive or weapon;
    (xxi) Extortion;
    (xxii) Armed robbery;
    (xxiii) Distribution of, or intent to distribute, a 
controlled substance;
    (xxiv) Felony arson; or
    (xxv) Conspiracy or attempt to commit any of the 
aforementioned criminal acts.
    (c) Investigative steps. Part 1 of the employment history 
investigations must be completed on all persons described in 
paragraph (a) of this section. If required by paragraph (c)(5) 
of this section, Part 2 of the employment history investigation 
must also be completed on all persons listed in paragraph (a) 
of this section.
    (1) The individual must provide the following information 
on an application:
    (i) The individual's full name, including any aliases or 
nicknames;
    (ii) The dates, names, phone numbers, and addresses of 
previous employers, with explanations for any gaps in 
employment of more than 12 consecutive months, during the 
previous 10-year period;
    (iii) Any convictions during the previous 10-year period of 
the crimes listed in paragraph (b)(2) of this section.
    (2) The air carrier must include on the application form a 
notification that the individual will be subject to an 
employment history verification and possibly a criminal records 
check.
    (3) The air carrier must verify the identity of the 
individual through the presentation of two forms of 
identification, one of which must bear the individual's 
photograph.
    (4) The air carrier must verify the information on the most 
recent 5 years of employment history required under paragraph 
(c)(1)(ii) of this section. Information must be verified in 
writing, by documentation, by telephone, or in person.
    (5) If one or more of the conditions (triggers) listed in 
Sec. 108.33(c)(5) (i) through (iv) exist, the employment 
history investigation must not be considered complete unless 
Part 2 is accomplished. Only the air carrier may initiate Part 
2. Part 2 consists of a comparison of the individual's 
fingerprints against the fingerprint files of known criminals 
maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The 
comparison of the individual's fingerprints must be processed 
through the FAA. The air carrier may request a check of the 
individual's fingerprint- based criminal record only if one or 
more of the following conditions exist:
    (i) The individual does not satisfactorily account for a 
period of unemployment of 12 consecutive months or more during 
the previous 10- year period.
    (ii) The individual is unable to support statements made on 
the application form.
    (iii) There are significant inconsistencies in the 
information provided on the application.
    (iv) Information becomes available to the air carrier 
during the investigation indicating a possible conviction for 
one of the crimes listed in paragraph (b)(2) of this section.
    (d) Individual notification. Prior to commencing the 
criminal records check, the air carrier must notify the 
affected individuals and identify a point of contact for 
follow-up. An individual who chooses not to submit fingerprints 
may not be granted unescorted access privilege and may not be 
allowed to hold screener or screener supervisory positions.
    (e) Fingerprint processing. If a fingerprint comparison is 
necessary under paragraph (c)(5) of this section to complete 
the employment history investigation the air carrier must 
collect and process fingerprints in the following manner:
    (1) One set of legible and classifiable fingerprints must 
be recorded on fingerprint cards approved by the FBI and 
distributed by the FAA for this purpose.
    (2) The fingerprints must be obtained from the individual 
under direct observation by the air carrier or a law 
enforcement officer. Individuals submitting their fingerprints 
must not take possession of their fingerprint card after they 
have been fingerprinted.
    (3) The identify of the individual must be verified at the 
time fingerprints are obtained. The individual must present two 
forms of identification, one of which must bear the 
individual's photograph.
    (4) The fingerprint card must be forwarded to FAA at the 
location specified by the Administrator.
    (5) Fees for the processing of the criminal records checks 
are due upon application. Air carriers must submit payment 
through corporate check, cashier's check, or money order made 
payable to ``U.S. FAA,'' at the designated rate for each 
fingerprint card. Combined payment for multiple applications is 
acceptable. The designated rate for processing the fingerprint 
cards is available from the local FAA security office.
    (f) Determination of arrest status. In conducting the 
criminal record checks required by this section, the air 
carrier must not consider the employment history investigation 
complete unless it investigates arrest information for the 
crimes listed in paragraph (b)(2) of this section for which no 
disposition has been recorded and makes a determination that 
the arrest did not result in a disqualifying conviction.
    (g) Availability and correction of FBI records and 
notification of disqualification. (1) At the time Part 2 is 
initiated and the fingerprints are collected, the air carrier 
must notify the individual that a copy of the criminal record 
received from the FBI will be made available to the individual 
if requested in writing. When requested in writing, the air 
carrier must make available to the individual a copy of any 
criminal record received from the FBI.
    (2) Prior to making a final decision to deny authorization 
to an individual described in paragraph (a) of this section, 
the air carrier must advise the individual that the FBI 
criminal record discloses information that would disqualify 
him/her from positions covered under this rule and provide him/
her with a copy of their FBI record if requested.
    (3) The air carrier must notify an individual that a final 
decision has been made to forward or not forward a letter of 
certification for unescorted access to the airport operator, or 
to grant or deny the individual authority to perform screening 
functions listed under paragraph (a)(3) of this section.
    (h) Corrective action by the individual. The individual may 
contact the local jurisdiction responsible for the information 
and the FBI to complete or correct the information contained in 
his/her record before the air carrier makes any decision to 
withhold his/her name from a certification, or not grant 
authorization to perform screening functions subject to the 
following conditions:
    (1) Within 30 days after being advised that the criminal 
record received from the FBI discloses disqualifying 
information, the individual must notify the air carrier, in 
writing, of his/her intent to correct any information believed 
to be inaccurate.
    (2) Upon notification by an individual that the record has 
been corrected, the air carrier must obtain a copy of the 
revised FBI record prior to making a final determination.
    (3) If no notification is received within 30 days, the air 
carrier may make a final determination.
    (i) Limits on dissemination of results. Criminal record 
information provided by the FBI must be used solely for the 
purposes of this section, and no person may disseminate the 
results of a criminal record check to anyone other than:
    (1) The individual to whom the record pertains or that 
individual's authorized representative;
    (2) Air carrier officials with a need to know; and
    (3) Others designated by the Administrator.
    (j) Employment status while awaiting criminal record 
checks. Individuals who have submitted their fingerprints and 
are awaiting FBI results may perform work details under the 
following conditions:
    (1) Those seeking unescorted access to the SIDA must be 
escorted by someone who has unescorted SIDA access privileges;
    (2) Those applicants seeking positions covered under 
paragraphs (a)(3) and (a)(4) of this section, may not exercise 
any independent judgments regarding those functions.
    (k) Recordkeeping. (1) The air carrier must physically 
maintain and control Part 1 employment history investigation 
file until 180 days after the termination of the individual's 
authority for unescorted access or termination from positions 
covered under paragraph (a)(3) of this section. Part 1 of the 
employment history investigation, completed on screening 
personnel must be maintained at the airport where they perform 
screening functions. Part 1 of the employment history 
investigation file must consist of the following:
    (i) The application;
    (ii) The employment verification information obtained by 
the employer;
    (iii) the names of those from whom the employment 
verification information was obtained;
    (iv) The date and the method of how the contact was made; 
and
    (v) Any other information as required by the Administrator.
    (2) The air carrier must physically maintain, control and 
when appropriate destroy Part 2, the criminal record file, for 
each individual for whom a fingerprint comparison has been 
made. Part 2 must be maintained for 180 days after the 
termination of the individual's authority for unescorted access 
or after the individual ceases to perform screening functions. 
Only direct air carrier employees may carry out Part 2 
responsibilities. Part 2 must consist of the following:
    (i) The results of the record check; or
    (ii) Certification from the air carrier that the check was 
completed and did not uncover a disqualifying conviction.
    (3) The files required by this paragraph must be maintained 
in a manner that is acceptable to the Administrator and in a 
manner that protects the confidentiality of the individual.
    (l) Continuing responsibilities. (1) Any individual 
authorized to have unescorted access privilege to the SIDA or 
who performs functions covered under paragraph (a)(3) of this 
section, who is subsequently convicted of any of the crimes 
listed in paragraph (b)(2) of this section must, within 24 
hours, report the conviction to the air carrier and surrender 
the SIDA access medium or any employment related identification 
medium to the issuer.
    (2) If information becomes available to the air carrier 
indicating that an individual has a possible conviction for one 
of the disqualifying crimes in paragraph (b)(2) of this 
section, the air carrier must determine the status of the 
conviction and, if the conviction is confirmed:
    (i) Immediately revoke access authorization for unescorted 
access to the SIDA; or
    (ii) Immediately remove the individual from screening 
functions covered under paragraph (a)(3) of this section.
    (m) Air carrier responsibility. The air carrier must:
    (1) Designate an individual(s), in the security program, to 
be responsible for maintaining and controlling the employment 
history investigation for those whom the air carrier has made a 
certification to an airport operator under Sec. 107.31(n)(1) of 
this chapter and for destroying the criminal record files when 
their maintenance is no longer required by paragraph (k)(2) of 
this section.
    (2) Designate individual(s), in the security program, to 
maintain and control Part 1 of the employment history 
investigations of screeners whose files must be maintained at 
the location or station where the screener is performing his or 
her duties.
    (3) Designate individual(s), in the security program, to 
serve as the contact to receive notification from an individual 
applying for either unescorted access or those seeking to 
perform screening functions of his or her intent to seek 
correction of his or her criminal record with the FBI.
    (4) Designate an individual(s), in the security program, to 
maintain and control Part 2 of the employment history 
investigation file for all employees, contractors, or others 
who undergo a fingerprint comparison at the request of the air 
carrier.
    (5) Audit the employment history investigations performed 
in accordance with this section. The audit process must be set 
forth in the air carrier approved security program.

[Doc. No. 28859, 63 FR 51220, Sept. 24, 1998; 63 FR 60448, Nov. 
9, 1998]

   c. Operations: Foreign Air Carriers and Foreign Operators of U.S.-
             Registered Aircraft Engaged in Common Carriage

      Federal Aviation Administration Regulations, 14 CFR Part 129

  Part 129--Operations: Foreign Air Carriers and Foreign Operators of 
          U.S.-Registered Aircraft Engaged in Common Carriage

              special federal aviation regulation no. 38-2

Sec. 129.1 Applicability.

    (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, 
this part prescribes rules governing the operation within the 
United States of each foreign air carrier holding a permit 
issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board or the Department of 
Transportation under section 402 of the Federal Aviation Act of 
1958 (49 U.S.C. 1372) or other appropriate economic or 
exemption authority issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board or 
the Department of Transportation.
    (b) Section 129.14 also applies to U.S.-registered aircraft 
operated in common carriage by a foreign person or foreign air 
carrier solely outside the United States. For the purpose of 
this part, a foreign person is any person, not a citizen for 
the United States, who operates a U.S.-registered aircraft in 
common carriage solely outside the United States.

Sec. 129.11 Operations specifications.

    (a) Each foreign air carrier shall conduct its operations 
within the United States in accordance with operations 
specifications issued by the Administrator under this part and 
in accordance with the Standards and Recommended Practices 
contained in part I (International Commercial Air Transport) of 
Annex 6 (Operation of Aircraft) to the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation Organization. Operations 
specifications shall include:
    (1) Airports to be used;
    (2) Routes or airways to be flown, and
    (3) Such operations rules and practices as are necessary to 
prevent collisions between foreign aircraft and other aircraft.
    (4) Registration marketings of each U.S.-registered 
aircraft.
    (b) An application for the issue or amendment of operations 
specifications must be submitted in duplicate, at least 30 days 
before beginning operations in the United States, to the Flight 
Standards District Office in the area where the applicant's 
principal business office is located or to the Regional Flight 
Standards Division Manager having jurisdiction over the area to 
be served by the operations. If a military airport of the 
United States is to be used as a regular, alternate, refueling, 
or provisional airport, the applicant must obtain written 
permission to do so from the Washington Headquarters of the 
military organization concerned and submit two copies of that 
written permission with his application. Detailed requirements 
governing applications for the issue or amendment of operations 
specifications are contained in Appendix A.
    (c) No person operating under this part may operate or list 
on its operations specifications any airplane listed on 
operations specifications issued under part 125.

Sec. 129.13 Airworthiness and registration certificates.

    (a) No foreign air carrier may operate any aircraft within 
the United States unless that aircraft carries current 
registration and airworthiness certificates issued or validated 
by the country of registry and displays the nationality and 
registration markings of that country.
    (b) No foreign air carrier may operate a foreign aircraft 
within the United States except in accordance with the 
limitations on maximum certificated weights prescribed for that 
aircraft and that operation by the country of manufacture of 
the aircraft.

Sec. 129.14 Maintenance program and minimum equipment list requirements 
                    for U.S.-registered aircraft.

    (a) Each foreign air carrier and each foreign person 
operating a U.S.-registered aircraft within or outside the 
United States in common carriage shall ensure that each 
aircraft is maintained in accordance with a program approved by 
the Administrator.
    (b) No foreign air carrier or foreign person may operate a 
U.S.-registered aircraft with inoperable instruments or 
equipment unless the following conditions are met:
    (1) A master minimum equipment list exists for the aircraft 
type.
    (2) The foreign operator submits for review and approval 
its aircraft minimum equipment list based on the master minimum 
equipment list, to the FAA Flight Standards District Office 
having geographic responsibility for the operator. The foreign 
operator must show, before minimum equipment list approval can 
be obtained, that the maintenance procedures used under its 
maintenance program are adequate to support the use of its 
minimum equipment list.
    (3) For leased aircraft maintained and operated under a 
U.S. operator's continuous airworthiness maintenance program 
and FAA-approved minimum equipment list, the foreign operator 
submits the U.S. operator's approved continuous airworthiness 
maintenance program and approved aircraft minimum equipment 
list to the FAA office prescribed in paragraph (b)(2) of this 
section for review and evaluation. The foreign operator must 
show that it is capable of operating under the lessor's 
approved maintenance program and that it is also capable of 
meeting the maintenance and operational requirements specified 
in the lessor's approved minimum equipment list.
    (4) The FAA letter of authorization permitting the operator 
to use an approved minimum equipment list is carried aboard the 
aircraft. The minimum equipment list and the letter of 
authorization constitute a supplemental type certificate for 
the aircraft.
    (5) The approved minimum equipment list provides for the 
operation of the aircraft with certain instruments and 
equipment in an inoperable condition.
    (6) The aircraft records available to the pilot must 
include an entry describing the inoperable instruments and 
equipment.
    (7) The aircraft is operated under all applicable 
conditions and limitations contained in the minimum equipment 
list and the letter authorizing the use of the list.

Sec. 129.15 Flight crewmember certificates.

    No person may act as a flight crewmember unless he holds a 
current certificate or license issued or validated by the 
country in which that aircraft is registered, showing his 
ability to perform his duties connected with operating that 
aircraft.

Sec. 129.17 Radio equipment.

    (a) Subject to the applicable laws and regulations 
governing ownership and operation of radio equipment, each 
foreign air carrier shall equip its aircraft with such radio 
equipment as is necessary to properly use the air navigation 
facilities, and to maintain communications with ground 
stations, along or adjacent to their routes in the United 
States.
    (b) Whenever VOR navigational equipment is required by 
paragraph (a) of this section, at least one distance measuring 
equipment unit (DME), capable of receiving and indicating 
distance information from the VORTAC facilities to be used, 
must be installed on each airplane when operated at or above 
24,000 feet MSL within the 50 states, and the District of 
Columbia.

Sec. 129.18 Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System.

    (a) After December 30, 1993, no foreign air carrier may 
operate in the United States a turbine powered airplane that 
has a maximum passenger seating configuration, excluding any 
pilot seat, of more than 30 seats unless it is equipped with--
    (1) A TCAS II traffic alert and collision avoidance system 
capable of coordinating with TCAS units that meet the 
specifications of TSO C-119, and
    (2) The appropriate class of Mode S transponder.
    (b) Unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator, after 
December 31, 1995, no foreign air carrier may operate in the 
United States a turbine powered airplane that has a passenger 
seat configuration, excluding any pilot seat, of 10 to 30 seats 
unless it is equipped with an approved traffic alert and 
collision avoidance system. If a TCAS II system is installed, 
it must be capable of coordinating with TCAS units that meet 
TSO C-119.

Sec. 129.19 Air traffic rules and procedures.

    (a) Each pilot must be familiar with the applicable rules, 
the navigational and communications facilities, and the air 
traffic control and other procedures, of the areas to be 
traversed by him within the United States.
    (b) Each foreign air carrier shall establish procedures to 
assure that each of its pilots has the knowledge required by 
paragraph (a) of this section and shall check the ability of 
each of its pilots to operate safely according to applicable 
rules and procedures.
    (c) Each foreign air carrier shall conform to the 
practices, procedures, and other requirements prescribed by the 
Administrator for U.S. air carriers for the areas to be 
operated in.

Sec. 129.20 Digital flight data recorders.

    No person may operate an aircraft under this part that is 
registered in the United States unless it is equipped with one 
or more approved flight recorders that use a digital method of 
recording and storing data and a method of readily retrieving 
that data from the storage medium. The flight data recorder 
must record the parameters that would be required to be 
recorded if the aircraft were operated under part 121, 125, or 
135 of this chapter, and must be installed by the compliance 
times required by those parts, as applicable to the aircraft.

Sec. 129.21 Control of traffic.

    (a) Subject to applicable immigration laws and regulations, 
each foreign air carrier shall furnish the ground personnel 
necessary to provide for two-way voice communication between 
its aircraft and ground stations, at places where the 
Administrator finds that voice communication is necessary and 
that communications cannot be maintained in a language with 
which ground station operators are familiar.
    (b) Each person furnished by a foreign air carrier under 
paragraph (a) of this section must be able to speak both 
English and the language necessary to maintain communications 
with the aircraft concerned, and shall assist ground personnel 
in directing traffic.

Sec. 129.23 Transport category cargo service airplanes: Increased zero 
                    fuel and landing weights.

    (a) Notwithstanding the applicable structural provisions of 
the transport category airworthiness regulations, but subject 
to paragraphs (b) through (g) of this section, a foreign air 
carrier may operate (for cargo service only) any of the 
following transport category airplanes (certificated under part 
4b of the Civil Air Regulations effective before March 13, 
1956) at increased zero fuel and landing weights--
    (1) DC-6A, DC-6B, DC-7B, and DC-7C; and
    (2) L-1049 B, C, D, E, F, G, and H, and the L-1649A when 
modified in accordance with supplemental type certificate SA 4-
1402.
    (b) The zero fuel weight (maximum weight of the airplane 
with no disposable fuel and oil) and the structural landing 
weight may be increased beyond the maximum approved in full 
compliance with applicable rules only if the Administrator 
finds that--
    (1) The increase is not likely to reduce seriously the 
structural strength;
    (2) The probability of sudden fatigue failure is not 
noticeably increased;
    (3) The flutter, deformation, and vibration characteristics 
do not fall below those required by applicable regulations; and
    (4) All other applicable weight limitations will be met.
    (c) No zero fuel weight may be increased by more than five 
percent, and the increase in the structural landing weight may 
not exceed the amount, in pounds, of the increase in zero fuel 
weight.
    (d) Each airplane must be inspected in accordance with the 
approved special inspection procedures, for operations at 
increased weights, established and issued by the manufacturer 
of the type of airplane.
    (e) A foreign air carrier may not operate an airplane under 
this section unless the country of registry requires the 
airplane to be operated in accordance with the passenger-
carrying transport category performance operating limitations 
in part 121 or the equivalent.
    (f) The Airplane Flight Manual for each airplane operated 
under this section must be appropriately revised to include the 
operating limitations and information needed for operation at 
the increased weights.
    (g) Each airplane operated at an increased weight under 
this section must, before it is used in passenger service, be 
inspected under the special inspection procedures for return to 
passenger service established and issued by the manufacturer 
and approved by the Administrator.

Sec. 129.25 Airplane security.

    (a) The following are definitions of terms used in this 
section:
    (1) Approved security program means a security program 
required by part 108 of this title approved by the 
Administrator.
    (2) Certificate holder means a person holding an FAA air 
carrier operating certificate or operating certificate when 
that person engages in scheduled passenger or public charter 
operations, or both.
    (3) Passenger seating configuration means the total number 
of seats for which the aircraft is type certificated that can 
be made available for passenger use aboard a flight and 
includes that seat in certain airplanes which may be used by a 
representative of the Administrator to conduct flight checks 
but is available for revenue purposes on other occasions.
    (4) Private charter means any charter for which the 
charterer engages the total capacity of an airplane for the 
carriage only of:
    (i) Passengers in civil or military air movements conducted 
under contract with the Government of the United States or the 
Government of a foreign country; or
    (ii) Passengers invited by the charterer, the cost of which 
is borne entirely by the charterer and not directly or 
indirectly by the individual passengers.
    (5) Public charter means any charter that is not a private 
charter.
    (6) Scheduled passenger operations means holding out to the 
public of air transportation service for passengers from 
identified air terminals at a set time announced by timetable 
or schedule published in a newspaper, magazine, or other 
advertising medium.
    (7) Sterile area means an area to which access is 
controlled by the inspection of persons and property in 
accordance with an approved security program or a security 
program used in accordance with Sec. 129.25.
    (b) Each foreign air carrier landing or taking off in the 
United States shall adopt and use a security program, for each 
scheduled and public charter passenger operation, that meets 
the requirements of--
    (1) Paragraph (c) of this section for each operation with 
an airplane having a passenger seating configuration of more 
than 60 seats;
    (2) Paragraph (c) of this section for each operation that 
will provide deplaned passengers access, that is not controlled 
by a certificate holder using an approved security program or a 
foreign air carrier using a security program required by this 
section, to a sterile area;
    (3) Paragraph (c) of this section for each operation with 
an airplane having a passenger seating configuration of more 
than 30 seats but less than 61 seats for which the FAA has 
notified the foreign air carrier that a threat exists; and
    (4) Paragraph (d) of this section for each operation with 
an airplane having a passenger seating configuration of more 
than 30 seats but less than 61 seats, when the the Director of 
Civil Aviation Security or a designate of the Director has not 
notified the foreign air carrier in writing that a threat 
exists with respect to that operation.
    (c) Each security program required by paragraph (b) (1), 
(2), or (3) of this section shall be designed to--
    (1) Prevent or deter the carriage aboard airplanes of any 
explosive, incendiary device or a deadly or dangerous weapon on 
or about each individual's person or accessible property, 
except as provided in Sec. 129.27 of this part, through 
screening by weapon-detecting procedures or facilities;
    (2) Prohibit unauthorized access to airplanes;
    (3) Ensure that baggage is accepted by a responsible agent 
of the foreign air carrier; and
    (4) Prevent cargo and checked baggage from being loaded 
aboard its airplanes unless handled in accordance with the 
foreign air carrier's security procedures.
    (d) Each security program required by paragraph (b)(4) of 
this section shall include the procedures used to comply with 
the applicable requirements of paragraphs (h)(2) and (i) of 
this section regarding law enforcement officers.
    (e) Each foreign air carrier required to adopt and use a 
security program pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section 
shall have a security program acceptable to the Administrator. 
A foreign air carrier's security program is acceptable only if 
the Administrator finds that the security program provides 
passengers a level of protection similar to the level of 
protection provided by U.S. air carriers serving the same 
airports. Foreign air carriers shall employ procedures 
equivalent to those required of U.S. air carriers serving the 
same airport if the Administrator determines that such 
procedures are necessary to provide passengers a similar level 
of protection. The following procedures apply for acceptance of 
a security program by the Administrator:
    (1) Unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator, each 
foreign air carrier required to have a security program by 
paragraph (b) of this section shall submit its program to the 
Administrator at least 90 days before the intended date of 
passenger operations. The proposed security program must be in 
English unless the Administrator requests that the proposed 
program be submitted in the official language of the foreign 
air carrier's country. The Administrator will notify the 
foreign air carrier of the security program's acceptability, or 
the need to modify the proposed security program for it to be 
acceptable under this part, within 30 days after receiving the 
proposed security program. The foreign air carrier may petition 
the Administrator to reconsider the notice to modify the 
security program within 30 days after receiving a notice to 
modify.
    (2) In the case of a security program previously found to 
be acceptable pursuant to this section, the Administrator may 
subsequently amend the security program in the interest of 
safety in air transportation or in air commerce and in the 
public interest within a specified period of time. In making 
such an amendment, the following procedures apply:
    (i) The Administrator notifies the foreign air carrier, in 
writing, of a proposed amendment, fixing a period of not less 
than 45 days within which the foreign air carrier may submit 
written information, views, and arguments on the proposed 
amendment.
    (ii) At the end of the comment period, after considering 
all relevant material, the Administrator notifies the foreign 
air carrier of any amendment to be adopted and the effective 
date, or rescinds the notice of proposed amendment. The foreign 
air carrier may petition the Administrator to reconsider the 
amendment, in which case the effective date of the amendment is 
stayed until the Administrator reconsiders the matter.
    (3) If the Administrator finds that there is an emergency 
requiring immediate action with respect to safety in air 
transportation or in air commerce that makes the procedures in 
paragraph (e)(2) of this section impractical or contrary to the 
public interest, the Administrator may issue an amendment to 
the foreign air carrier security program, effective without 
stay on the date the foreign air carrier receives notice of it. 
In such a case, the Administrator incorporates in the notice of 
amendment the finding and a brief statement of the reasons for 
the amendment.
    (4) A foreign air carrier may submit a request to the 
Administrator to amend its security program. The requested 
amendment must be filed with the Administrator at least 45 days 
before the date the foreign carrier proposes that the amendment 
would become effective, unless a shorter period is allowed by 
the Administrator. Within 30 days after receiving the requested 
amendment, the Administrator will notify the foreign air 
carrier whether the amendment is acceptable. The foreign air 
carrier may petition the Administrator to reconsider a notice 
of unacceptability of the requested amendment within 45 days 
after receiving notice of unacceptability.
    (5) Each foreign air carrier required to use a security 
program by paragraph (b) of this section shall, upon request of 
the Administrator and in accordance with the applicable law, 
provide information regarding the implementation and operation 
of its security program.
    (f) No foreign air carrier may land or take off an airplane 
in the United States, in passenger operations, after receiving 
a bomb or air piracy threat against that airplane, unless the 
following actions are taken:
    (1) If the airplane is on the ground when a bomb threat is 
received and the next scheduled flight of the threatened 
airplane is to or from a place in the United States, the 
foreign air carrier ensures that the pilot in command is 
advised to submit the airplane immediately for a security 
inspection and an inspection of the airplane is conducted 
before the next flight.
    (2) If the airplane is in flight to a place in the United 
States when a bomb threat is received, the foreign air carrier 
ensures that the pilot in command is advised immediately to 
take the emergency action necessary under the circumstances and 
a security inspection of the airplane is conducted immediately 
after the next landing.
    (3) If information is received of a bomb or air piracy 
threat against an airplane engaged in an operation specified in 
paragraph (f)(1) or (f)(2) of this section, the foreign air 
carrier ensures that notification of the threat is given to the 
appropriate authorities of the State in whose territory the 
airplane is located or, if in flight, the appropriate 
authorities of the State in whose territory the airplane is to 
land.
    (g) Each foreign air carrier conducting an operation for 
which a security program is required by paragraph (b) (1), (2), 
or (3) of this section shall refuse to transport--
    (1) Any person who does not consent to a search of his or 
her person in accordance with the security program; and
    (2) Any property of any person who does not consent to a 
search or inspection of that property in accordance with the 
security program.
    (h) At airports within the United States not governed by 
part 107 of this chapter, each foreign air carrier engaging in 
public charter passenger operations shall--
    (1) When using a screening system required by paragraph (b) 
of this section, provide for law enforcement officers meeting 
the qualifications and standards, and in the number and manner, 
specified in part 107; and
    (2) When using an airplane having a passenger seating 
configuration of more than 30 but less than 61 seats for which 
a screening system is not required by paragraph (b) of this 
section, arrange for law enforcement officers meeting the 
qualifications and standards specified in part 107 to be 
available to respond to an incident and provide to appropriate 
employees, including crewmembers, current information with 
respect to procedures for obtaining law enforcement assistance 
at that airport.
    (i) At airports governed by part 107 of this chapter, each 
foreign air carrier engaging in scheduled passenger operations 
or public charter passenger operations when using an airplane 
with a passenger seating configuration of more than 30 but less 
than 61 seats for which a screening system is not required by 
paragraph (b) of this section shall arrange for law enforcement 
officers meeting the qualifications and standards specified in 
part 107 to be available to respond to an incident and provide 
to appropriate employees, including crewmembers, current 
information with respect to procedures for obtaining law 
enforcement assistance at that airport.
    (j) Unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator, each 
foreign air carrier required to conduct screening under this 
part shall use procedures, facilities, and equipment for 
detecting explosives, incendiaries, and deadly or dangerous 
weapons to inspect each person entering a sterile area at each 
preboarding screening checkpoint in the United States for which 
it is responsible, and to inspect all accessible property under 
that person's control.

Sec. 129.26 Use of X-ray system.

    (a) No foreign air carrier may use an X-ray system in the 
United States to inspect carry-on and checked articles unless:
    (1) For a system manufactured prior to April 25, 1974, it 
meets either the guidelines issued by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare and published in the Federal Register (38 FR 21442, 
August 8, 1973); or the performance standards for cabinet X-ray 
systems designed primarily for the inspection of carry-on 
baggage issued by the FDA and published in 21 CFR 1020.40 (39 
FR 12985, April 10, 1974);
    (2) For a system manufactured after April 24, 1974, it 
meets the standards for cabinet X-ray systems designed 
primarily for the inspection of carry-on baggage issued by the 
FDA and published in 21 CFR 1020.40 (39 FR 12985, April 10, 
1974);
    (3) A program for initial and recurrent training of 
operators of the system has been established, which includes 
training in radiation safety, the efficient use of X-ray 
systems, and the identification of weapons and other dangerous 
articles;
    (4) Procedures have been established to ensure that such 
operator of the system will be provided with an individual 
personnel dosimeter (such as a film badge or thermoluminescent 
dosimeter). Each dosimeter used will be evaluated at the end of 
each calendar month, and records of operator duty time and the 
results of dosimeter evaluations will be maintained by the 
foreign air carrier; and
    (5) The system meets the imaging requirements set forth in 
an accepted Foreign Air Carrier Security Program using the step 
wedge specified in American Society for Testing and Materials 
Standard F792-82.
    (b) No foreign air carrier may use an X-ray system as 
specified in paragraph (a) of this section--
    (1) Unless within the preceding 12 calendar months a 
radiation survey has been conducted which shows that the system 
meets the applicable performance standards in 21 CFR 1020.40 or 
guidelines published by the Food and Drug Administration in the 
Federal Register of August 8, 1973 (38 FR 21442);
    (2) After the system is initially installed or after it has 
been moved from one location to another, unless a radiation 
survey is conducted which shows that the system meets the 
applicable performance standards in 21 CFR 1020.40 or 
guidelines published by the Food and Drug Administration in the 
Federal Register on August 8, 1973 (38 FR 21442); except that a 
radiation survey is not required for an X-ray system that is 
moved to another location, if the foreign air carrier shows 
that the system is so designed that it can be moved without 
altering its performance:
    (3) That is not in full compliance with any defect notice 
or modification order issued for that system by the Food and 
Drug Administration, Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, unless that Administration has advised the FAA that 
the defect or failure to comply is not such as to create a 
significant risk or injury, including genetic injury, to any 
person; and
    (4) Unless a sign is posted in a conspicuous place at the 
screening station and on the X-ray system which notifies 
passengers that carry-on and checked articles are being 
inspected by an X-ray system and advises them to remove all X-
ray, scientific, and high-speed film from their carry-on and 
checked articles before inspection. This sign shall also advise 
passengers that they may request an inspection to be made of 
their photographic equipment and film packages without exposure 
to an X-ray system. If the X-ray system exposes any carry-on or 
checked articles to more than 1 milliroentgen during the 
inspection, the foreign air carrier shall post a sign which 
advises passengers to remove film of all kinds from their 
articles before inspection. If requested by passengers, their 
photographic equipment and film packages shall be inspected 
without exposure to an X-ray system.
    (c) Each foreign air carrier shall maintain at least one 
copy of the results of the most recent radiation survey 
conducted under paragraph (b)(1) or (b)(2) of this section at 
the place where the X-ray system is in operation and shall make 
it available for inspection upon request by the Administrator.
    (d) The American Society for Testing and Materials Standard 
F792-82, ``Design and Use of Ionizing Radiation Equipment for 
the Detection of Items Prohibited in Controlled Access Areas,'' 
described in this section is incorporated by reference herein 
and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All 
persons affected by these amendments may obtain copies of the 
standard from the American Society for Testing and Materials, 
1916 Race Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103. In addition, a copy 
of the standard may be examined at the FAA Rules Docket, Docket 
No. 24115, 800 Independence Avenue ST., Washington, DC, 
weekdays, except Federal holidays, between 8:30 a.m. and 5 p.m.

Sec. 129.27 Prohibition against carriage of weapons.

    (a) No person may, while on board an aircraft being 
operated by a foreign air carrier in the United States, carry 
on or about his person a deadly or dangerous weapon, either 
concealed or unconcealed. This paragraph does not apply to--
    (1) Officials or employees of the state of registry of the 
aircraft who are authorized by that state to carry arms; and
    (2) Crewmembers and other persons authorized by the foreign 
air carrier to carry arms.
    (b) No foreign air carrier may knowingly permit any 
passenger to carry, nor may any passenger carry, while aboard 
an aircraft being operated in the United States by that 
carrier, in checked baggage, a deadly or dangerous weapon, 
unless:
    (1) The passenger has notified the foreign air carrier 
before checking the baggage that the weapon is in the baggage; 
and
    (2) The baggage is carried in an area inaccessible to 
passengers.

Sec. 129.29 Prohibition against smoking.

    No person may smoke and no operator shall permit smoking in 
the passenger cabin or lavatory during any scheduled airline 
flight segment in air transportation or intrastate air 
transportation which is:
    (a) Between any two points within Puerto Rico, the United 
States Virgin Islands, the District of Columbia, or any State 
of the United States (other than Alaska or Hawaii) or between 
any two points in any one of the above-mentioned jurisdictions 
(other than Alaska or Hawaii);
    (b) Within the State of Alaska or within the State of 
Hawaii; or
    (c) Scheduled in the current Worldwide or North American 
Edition of the Official Airline Guide for 6 hours or less in 
duration and between any point listed in paragraph (a) of this 
section and any point in Alaska or Hawaii, or between any point 
in Alaska and any point in Hawaii.

Sec. 129.31 Airplant security.

    Each foreign air carrier required to adopt and use a 
security program under Sec. 129.25(b) shall--
    (a) Restrict the distribution, disclosure, and availability 
of sensitive security information, as defined in part 191 of 
this chapter, to persons with a need-to-know; and
    (b) Refer requests for sensitive security information by 
other persons to the Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation 
Security.

 Appendix A to Part 129--Application for Operations Specifications by 
                          Foreign Air Carriers

    (a) General. Each application must be executed by an 
authorized officer or employee of the applicant having 
knowledge of the matter set forth therein, and must have 
attached thereto two copies of the appropriate written 
authority issued to that officer or employee by the applicant. 
Negotiations for permission to use airports under U.S. military 
jurisdiction is effected through the respective embassy of the 
foreign government and the United States Department of State.
    (b) Format of application. The following outline must be 
followed in completing the information to be submitted in the 
application.

     Application for Foreign Air Carrier Operations Specifications

                               (outline)

    In accordance with the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 
U.S.C. 1372) and part 129 of the Federal Air Regulations, 
application is hereby made for the issuance of Foreign 
Operations Specifications.
    Give exact name and full post office address of applicant.
    Give the name, title, and post office address (within the 
United States if possible) of the official or employee to whom 
correspondence in regard to the application is to be addressed.
    Unless otherwise specified, the applicant must submit the 
following information only with respect to those parts of his 
proposed operations that will be conducted within the United 
States.
    Section I. Operations. State whether the operation proposed 
is day or night, visual flight rules, instrument flight rules, 
or a particular combination thereof.
    Sec. II. Operational plans. State the route by which entry 
will be made into the United States, and the route to be flown 
therein.
    Sec. III. A. Route. Submit a map suitable for aerial 
navigation upon which is indicated the exact geographical track 
of the proposed route from the last point of foreign departure 
to the United States terminal, showing the regular terminal, 
and alternate airports, and radio navigational facilities. This 
material will be indicated in a manner that will facilitate 
identification. The applicant may use any method that will 
clearly distinguish the information, such as different colors, 
different types of lines, etc. For example, if different colors 
are used, the identification will be accomplished as follows:
    1. Regular route: Black.
    2. Regular terminal airport: Green circle.
    3. Alternate airports: Orange circle.
    4. The location of radio navigational facilities which will 
be used in connection with the proposed operation, indicating 
the type of facility to be used, such as radio range ADF, VOR, 
etc.
    B. Airports. Submit the following information with regard 
to each regular terminal and alternate to be used in the 
conduct of the proposed operation:
    1. Name of airport or landing area.
    2. Location (direction distance to and name of nearest city 
or town).
    Sec. IV. Radio facilities: Communications. List all ground 
radio communication facilities to be used by the applicant in 
the conduct of the proposed operations within the United States 
and over that portion of the route between the last point of 
foreign departure and the United States.
    Sec. V. Aircraft. Submit the following information in 
regard to each type and model aircraft to be used.
    A. Aircraft.
    1. Manufacturer and model number.
    2. State of origin.
    3. Single-engine or multiengine. If multiengine, indicate 
number of engines.
    4. What is the maximum takeoff and landing weight to be 
used for each type of aircraft?
    5. Registration markings of each U.S.-registered aircraft.
    B. Aircraft Radio. List aircraft radio equipment necessary 
for instrument operation within the United States.
    C. Licensing. State name of country by whom aircraft are 
certificated.
    Sec. VI. Airmen. List the following information with 
respect to airmen to be employed in the proposed operation 
within the United States.
    A. State the type and class of certificate held by each 
flight crewmember.
    B. State whether or not pilot personnel have received 
training in the use of navigational facilities necessary for en 
route operation and instrument letdowns along or adjacent to 
the route to be flown within the United States.
    C. State whether or not personnel are familiar with those 
parts of the Federal Air Regulations pertaining to the conduct 
of foreign air carrier operations within the United States.
    D. State whether pilot personnel are able to speak and 
understand the English language to a degree necessary to enable 
them to properly communicate with Airport Traffic Control 
Towers and Airway Radio Communication Stations using 
radiotelephone communications.
    Sec. VII. Dispatchers.
    A. Describe briefly the dispatch organization which you 
propose to set up for air carrier operations within the United 
States.
    B. State whether or not the dispatching personnel are 
familiar with the rules and regulations prescribed by the 
Federal Air Regulations governing air carrier operations.
    C. Are dispatching personnel able to read and write the 
English language to a degree necessary to properly dispatch 
flights within the United States?
    D. Are dispatching personnel certificated by the country of 
origin?
    Sec. VIII. Additional Data.
    A. Furnish such additional information and substantiating 
data as may serve to expedite the issuance of the operations 
specifications.
    B. Each application shall be concluded with a statement as 
follows:

    I certify that the above statements are true.

    Signed this ________ day of ________________________ 19 
____

    ________________________ (Name of Applicant)

    By __________________________________________

    (Name of person duly authorized to execute this application 
on behalf of the applicant.)
=======================================================================




            J. OTHER EXECUTIVE BRANCH DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

1. Office of the President.......................................   539
      a. Presidential Decision Directives--PDD...................   539
            (1) Establishing the Office of the National 
                Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure 
                Protection and Counter-Terrorism (PDD-62) (fact 
                sheet)...........................................   539
            (2) U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism (PDD-39) 
                (declassified parts and FEMA abstract)...........   541
      b. Terrorism Incident Annex to the Federal Response Plan 
          Implementing PDD-39....................................   549
      c. Comprehensive Readiness Program for Countering 
          Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (House 
          Document 105-79).......................................   562
      d. National Emergencies....................................   616
            (1) Report to Congress on Developments Concerning the 
                National Emergency with Respect to the Afghan 
                Taliban (Under Executive Order 13129 of July 6, 
                1999)............................................   616
            (2) Report to Congress on Developments Concerning the 
                National Emergency with Respect to Sudan (Under 
                Executive Order 13067 of November 3, 1997).......   619
            (3) Continuation of the National Emergency with 
                Respect to Sudan (Under Executive Order 13067)...   622
            (4) Report to Congress on Developments Concerning the 
                National Emergency with Respect to Iran (Under 
                Executive Order 12957 of March 15, 1995).........   624
            (5) Continuation of the National Emergency with 
                Respect to Iran (Under Executive Order 12957)....   629
            (6) Report to Congress on Developments Concerning the 
                National Emergency with Respect to Terrorists Who 
                Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process 
                (Under Executive Order 12947 of January 23, 1995)   631
            (7) Report to Congress on an Amendment to Executive 
                Order 12947, Responding to the Worldwide Threat 
                Posed by Foreign Terrorists Who Threaten to 
                Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process............   635
            (8) Continuation of the National Emergency with 
                Respect to Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt the 
                Middle East Peace Process (Under Executive Order 
                12947)...........................................   637
            (9) Report and Notice to Congress on the Continuation 
                of the National Emergency with Respect to Weapons 
                of Mass Destruction (Under Executive Order 12938 
                of November 14, 1994)............................   639
            (10) Report to Congress on Developments Concerning 
                the National Emergency with Respect to Iraq 
                (Under Executive Order 12722 of August 2, 1990)..   647
            (11) Continuation of the National Emergency with 
                Respect to Iraq (Under Executive Order 12722)....   652
            (12) Report to Congress on Developments Concerning 
                the National Emergency with Respect to Libya 
                (Under Executive Order 12543 of January 7, 1986 )   654
            (13) Continuation of the National Emergency with 
                Respect to Libya (Under Executive Order 12543)...   657
            (14) Report to Congress on Developments Concerning 
                the National Emergency with Respect to Iran 
                (Under Executive Order 12170 of November 14, 1979 
                )................................................   659
            (15) Continuation of the National Emergency with 
                Respect to Iran (Under Executive Order 12170)....   661
2. Office of the Vice President..................................   663
      a. Report of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety 
          and Security, February 12, 1997........................   663
      b. Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on 
          Combatting Terrorism, February, 1986...................   719
3. Department of State...........................................   755
      a. Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1998......................   755
      b. Antiterrorism Assistance Program: Annual Report--Fiscal 
          Year 1997..............................................   841
      c. Foreign Terrorist Organizations, October 8, 1997........   852
      d. Report to the Congress Concerning the Administration's 
          Comprehensive Counterterrorism Strategy: Agency 
          Resource Requirements, April 29, 1997 (unclassified 
          excerpts)..............................................   855
      e. P.L.O. Commitments Compliance Act: Report to Congress, 
          November 20, 1997......................................   861
      f. Report on Rewards for Information Relating to 
          International Narco-Terrorism, June 20, 1994...........   878
      g. Determination on Sudan (Public Notice 1878, Oct. 7, 
          1993)..................................................   880
      h. Counter-Terrorism Rewards Program.......................   881
4. Department of Defense.........................................   886
      a. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Reserve Component 
          Integration Plan, January 1998.........................   886
      b. Combating Terrorism: Status of DoD Efforts to Protect 
          Its Forces Overseas, July 21, 1997.....................   929
      c. Domestic Preparedness Program in the Defense Against 
          Weapons of Mass Destruction: Report to Congress, May 1, 
          1997...................................................   930
      d. Protection of U.S. Forces Deployed Abroad: Report to the 
          President, September 15, 1996..........................   959
5. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration--1999 
    Report on Foreign Policy Export Controls.....................   977
6. Department of Treasury........................................  1016
      a. Terrorist Assets Report--1999...........................  1016
      b. Office of Foreign Assets Control:.......................  1024
          (1) Terrorism: What You Need to Know About U.S. 
              Sanctions..........................................  1024
          (2) Cuba: What You Need to Know About the U.S. Embargo.  1050
          (3) Iran: What You Need to Know About U.S. Economic 
              Sanctions..........................................  1061
          (4) Iraq: What You Need to Know About the U.S. Embargo.  1071
          (5) Libya: What You Need to Know About the U.S. Embargo  1077
          (6) North Korea: What You Need to Know About the U.S. 
              Embargo............................................  1082
          (7) Sudan: What You Need to Know About U.S. Sanctions..  1087
          (8) Taliban: What You Need to Know About the U.S. 
              Embargo............................................  1091
7. Department of Transportation..................................  1094
      a. Federal Aviation Administration.........................  1094
            (1) Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation, 1998 
                (partial text)...................................  1094
            (2) Study and Report to Congress on Civil Aviation 
                Security Responsibility and Funding, December 
                1998.............................................  1119
            (3) Report to Congress--Aviation Security: Aircraft 
                Hardening Program, December 1998.................  1161
            (4) Annual Report to Congress on Civil Aviation 
                Security, 1997...................................  1168
      b. Office of Inspector General Audit Report--Security for 
          Passenger Terminals and Vessels, U.S. Coast Guard, 
          September 1998.........................................  1191
      c. White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security--
          The DOT Status Report, February 1998 (partial text)....  1199
      d. Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular No. 3-96--
          Security for Passenger Vessels and Passenger Terminals.  1222

=======================================================================

                       1. Office of the President

                a. Presidential Decision Directives--PDD

 (1) Establishing the Office of the National Coordinator for Security, 
        Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism (PDD-62)

The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
May 22, 1998

                               Fact Sheet

        Combating Terrorism: Presidential Decision Directive 62

    Since he took office, President Clinton has made the fight 
against terrorism a top national security objective. The 
President has worked to deepen our cooperation with our friends 
and allies abroad, strengthened law enforcement's 
counterterrorism tools and improved security on airplanes and 
at airports. These efforts have paid off as major terrorist 
attacks have been foiled and more terrorists have been 
apprehended, tried and given severe prison terms.
    Yet America's unrivaled military superiority means that 
potential enemies--whether nations or terrorist groups--that 
choose to attack us will be more likely to resort to terror 
instead of conventional military assault. Moreover, easier 
access to sophisticated technology means that the destructive 
power available to terrorists is greater than ever. Adversaries 
may thus be tempted to use unconventional tools, such as 
weapons of mass destruction, to target our cities and disrupt 
the operations of our government. They may try to attack our 
economy and critical infrastructure using advanced computer 
technology.
    President Clinton is determined that in the coming century, 
we will be capable of deterring and preventing such terrorist 
attacks. The President is convinced that we must also have the 
ability to limit the damage and manage the consequences should 
such an attack occur.
    To meet these challenges, President Clinton signed 
Presidential Decision Directive 62. This Directive creates a 
new and more systematic approach to fighting the terrorist 
threat of the next century. It reinforces the mission of the 
many U.S. agencies charged with roles in defeating terrorism; 
it also codifies and clarifies their activities in the wide 
range of U.S. counter-terrorism programs, from apprehension and 
prosecution of terrorists to increasing transportation 
security, enhancing response capabilities and protecting the 
computer-based systems that lie at the heart of America's 
economy. The Directive will help achieve the President's goal 
of ensuring that we meet the threat of terrorism in the 21st 
century with the same rigor that we have met military threats 
in this century.

                        The National Coordinator

    To achieve this new level of integration in the fight 
against terror, PDD-62 establishes the Office of the National 
Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and 
Counter-Terrorism. The National Coordinator will oversee the 
broad variety of relevant polices and programs including such 
areas as counter-terrorism, protection of critical 
infrastructure, preparedness and consequence management for 
weapons of mass destruction. The National Coordinator will work 
within the National Security Council, report to the President 
through the Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs and produce for him an annual Security Preparedness 
Report. The National Coordinator will also provide advice 
regarding budgets for counter-terror programs and lead in the 
development of guidelines that might be needed for crisis 
management.

              (2) U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism (PDD-39)

Partial text of a declassified copy of Presidential Decision Directive 
(PDD) 39 as released by the National Security Council, January 24, 1997

                            THE WHITE HOUSE

                               WASHINGTON

                             june 21, 1995

                       [Classified text omitted]

MEMORANDUM FOR:
  THE VICE PRESIDENT
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE
  THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
  THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
  THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
  THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
  THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
  THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
  ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
      AGENCY
  ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
      SECURITY AFFAIRS
  DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
  DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
  CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
  DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
  DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
      AGENCY

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism (U)

    It is the policy of the United States to deter, defeat and 
respond vigorously to all terrorist attacks on our territory 
and against our citizens, or facilities, whether they occur 
domestically, in international waters or airspace or on foreign 
territory. The United States regards all such terrorism as a 
potential threat to national security as well as a criminal act 
and will apply all appropriate means to combat it. In doing so, 
the U.S. shall pursue vigorously efforts to deter and preempt, 
apprehend and prosecute, or assist other governments to 
prosecute, individuals who perpetrate or plan to perpetrate 
such attacks. (U)
    We shall work closely with friendly governments in carrying 
out our counterterrorism policy and will support Allied and 
friendly governments in combating terrorist threats against 
them. (U)
    Furthermore, the United States shall seek to identify 
groups or states that sponsor or support such terrorists, 
isolate them and extract a heavy price for their actions. (U)
    It is the policy of the United States not to make 
concessions to terrorists. (U)
    To ensure that the United States is prepared to combat 
domestic and international terrorism in all its forms, I direct 
the following steps be taken. (U)

                    1. Reducing our Vulnerabilities

    The United States shall reduce its vulnerabilities to 
terrorism, at home and abroad.
    It shall be the responsibility of all Department and Agency 
heads to ensure that their personnel and facilities, and the 
people and facilities under their jurisdiction, are fully 
protected against terrorism. With regard to ensuring security:

  --The Attorney General, as the chief law enforcement officer, 
        shall chair a Cabinet Committee to review the 
        vulnerability to terrorism of government facilities in 
        the United States and critical national infrastructure 
        and make recommendations to me and the appropriate 
        Cabinet member or Agency head;
  --The Director, FBI, as head of the investigative agency for 
        terrorism, shall reduce vulnerabilities by an expanded 
        program of counterterrorism;
  --The Secretary of State shall reduce vulnerabilities 
        affecting the security of all personnel and facilities 
        at non-military U.S. Government installations abroad 
        and affecting the general safety of American citizens 
        abroad);
  --The Secretary of Defense shall reduce vulnerabilities 
        affecting the security of all U.S. military personnel 
        (except those assigned to diplomatic missions) and 
        facilities);
  --The Secretary of Transportation shall reduce 
        vulnerabilities affecting the security of all airports 
        in the U.S. and all aircraft and passengers and all 
        maritime shipping under U.S. flag or registration or 
        operating within the territory of the United States and 
        shall coordinate security measures for rail, highway, 
        mass transit and pipeline facilities);
  --The Secretary of State and the Attorney General, in 
        addition to the latter's overall responsibilities as 
        the chief law enforcement official, shall use all legal 
        means available to exclude from the United States 
        persons who pose a terrorist threat and deport or 
        otherwise remove from the United States any such 
        aliens;
  --The Secretary of the Treasury shall reduce vulnerabilities 
        by preventing unlawful traffic in firearms and 
        explosives, by protecting the President and other 
        officials against terrorist attack and through 
        enforcement of laws controlling movement of assets, and 
        export from or import into the United States of goods 
        and services, subject to jurisdiction of the Department 
        of the Treasury;
  --The Director, Central Intelligence shall lead the efforts 
        of the Intelligence Community to reduce U.S. 
        vulnerabilities to international terrorism through an 
        aggressive program of foreign intelligence collection, 
        analysis, counterintelligence and covert action in 
        accordance with the National Security Act of 1947 and 
        E.O. 12333. (U)

                         2. Deterring Terrorism

    The United States shall seek to deter terrorism through a 
clear public position that our policies will not be affected by 
terrorist acts and that we will act vigorously to deal with 
terrorists and their sponsors. Our actions will reduce the 
capabilities and support available to terrorists. (U)

                       [Classified text omitted]

    Within the United States, we shall vigorously apply U.S. 
laws and seek new legislation to prevent terrorist groups from 
operating in the United States or using it as a base for 
recruitment, training, fund raising or other related 
activities. (U)

   Return of Indicted Terrorists to the U.S. for 
        Prosecution: We shall vigorously apply extraterritorial 
        statutes to counter acts of terrorism and apprehend 
        terrorists outside of the United States. When 
        terrorists wanted for violation of U.S. law are at 
        large overseas, their return for prosecution shall be a 
        matter of the highest priority and shall be a 
        continuing central issue in bilateral relations with 
        any state that harbors or assists them. Where we do not 
        have adequate arrangements, the Departments of State 
        and Justice shall work to resolve the problem, where 
        possible and appropriate, through negotiation and 
        conclusion of new extradition treaties. (U)

                       [Classified text omitted]

   State Support and Sponsorship: Foreign governments 
        assist terrorists in a variety of ways. (U)

                       [Classified text omitted]

    C. Enhancing Counterterrorism Capabilities: The Secretaries 
of State, Defense, Treasury, Energy and Transportation, the 
Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence and the 
Director, FBI shall ensure that their organizations' 
counterterrorism capabilities within their present areas of 
responsibility are well managed, funded and exercised. (U)

                       [Classified text omitted]

                       3. Responding to Terrorism

    We shall have the ability to respond rapidly and decisively 
to terrorism directed against us wherever it occurs, to protect 
Americans, arrest or defeat the perpetrators, respond with all 
appropriate instruments against the sponsoring organizations 
and governments and provide recovery relief to victims, as 
permitted by law. (U)

                       [Classified text omitted]

    D. Lead Agency Responsibilities: This directive validates 
and reaffirms existing lead agency responsibilities for all 
facets of the United States counterterrorism effort. Lead 
agencies are those that have the most direct role in and 
responsibility for implementation of U.S. counterterrorism 
policy, as set forth in this Directive. Lead agencies will 
normally be designated as follows: (U)
    The Department of State is the lead agency for 
international terrorist incidents that take place outside of 
U.S. territory, other than incidents on U.S. flag vessels in 
international waters. The State Department shall act through 
U.S. ambassadors as the on-scene coordinators for the U.S. 
Government. Once military force has been directed, however, the 
National Command Authority shall exercise control of the U.S. 
military force. (U)

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    F. Interagency Support: To ensure that the full range of 
necessary expertise and capabilities are available to the on-
scene coordinator, there shall be a rapidly deployable 
interagency Emergency Support Team (EST). The State Department 
shall be responsible for leading and managing the Foreign 
Emergency Support Team (FEST) in foreign incidents. The FBI 
shall be responsible for the Domestic Emergency Support Team 
(DEST) in domestic incidents. The DEST shall consist only of 
those agencies needed to respond to the specific requirements 
of the incident. Membership in the two teams shall include 
modules for specific types of incidents such as nuclear, 
biological or chemical threats. The Defense Department shall 
provide timely transportation for ESTs. (U)
    G. Transportation-related terrorism: The Federal Aviation 
Administration has exclusive responsibility in instances of air 
piracy for the coordination of any law enforcement activity 
affecting the safety of persons aboard aircraft within the 
special aircraft jurisdiction of the UPS. as defined in public 
law. The Department of Justice, acting through the FBI, shall 
establish and maintain procedures, in coordination with the 
Departments of State, Defense, and Transportation, to ensure 
the efficient resolution of terrorist hijackings. These 
procedures shall be based on the principle of lead agency 
responsibility for command, control and rules of engagement. 
(U)
    H. Consequence Management: The Director of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency shall ensure that the Federal 
Response Plan is adequate to respond to the consequences of 
terrorism directed against large populations in the United 
States, including terrorism involving weapons of mass 
destruction.
    FEMA shall ensure that States' response plans are adequate 
and their capabilities are tested. The State Department shall 
develop a plan with the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance 
and DOD to Provide assistance to foreign populations so 
victimized. (U)

                       [Classified text omitted]

    K. Costs: Agencies directed to participate in the 
resolution of terrorist incidents or conduct of 
counterterrorist operations shall bear the costs of their 
participation, unless otherwise directed by me. (U)

                     4. Weapons of Mass Destruction

    The United States shall give the highest priority to 
developing effective capabilities to detect, prevent, defeat 
and manage the consequences of nuclear, biological or chemical 
(NBC) materials or weapons use by terrorists. (U)
    The acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by a 
terrorist group, through theft or manufacture, is unacceptable. 
There is no higher priority than preventing the acquisition of 
this capability or removing this capability from terrorist 
groups potentially opposed to the U.S. (U)

                       [Classified text omitted]

    Attachment Tab A Interagency Groups

                       [Classified text omitted]

                Unclassified FEMA Abstract on PDD-39 \1\

 Appendix C to a hearing on security in cyberspace held by the Senate 
              Governmental Affairs Committee, June 5, 1996

                         SECURITY IN CYBERSPACE

                              U.S. SENATE

                PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

                       (Minority Staff Statement)

                              june 5, 1996

APPENDIX C

                       NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

                         WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

March 8, 1996
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Document from the Web site of the Federation of American 
Scientists at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39--fema.htm.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN F. SOPKO
Minority Deputy Chief Counsel
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee

SUBJECT: Senator Nunn's Request for Copy of FEMA Abstract on 
PDD-39

    Pursuant to Senator Nunn's request, enclosed for your 
information is a copy of the NSC approved unclassified FEMA 
abstract on PDD-39.
    All requests for copies of, access to or information about 
Presidential Decision Directives (PDD) should be sent directly 
to the National Security Council.

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary
Attachment
Tab A--Unclassified FEMA Abstract on PDD-39
cc: Ms. Catherine H. Light Director
Office of National Security Coordination Federal Emergency 
Management Agency

                    U.S. POLICY ON COUNTERTERRORISM

    1. General. Terrorism is both a threat to our national 
security as well as a criminal act. The Administration has 
stated that it is the policy of the United States to use all 
appropriate means to deter, defeat and respond to all terrorist 
attacks on our territory and resources, both people and 
facilities, wherever they occur. In support of these efforts, 
the United States will:

   Employ efforts to deter, preempt, apprehend and 
        prosecute terrorists.
   Work closely with other governments to carry out our 
        counterterrorism policy and combat terrorist threats 
        against them.
   Identify sponsors of terrorists, isolate them, and 
        ensure they pay for their actions.
   Make no concessions to terrorists

    2. Measures to Combat Terrorism. To ensure that the United 
States is prepared to combat terrorism in all its forms, a 
number of measures have been directed. These include reducing 
vulnerabilities to terrorism, deterring and responding to 
terrorist acts, and having capabilities to prevent and manage 
the consequences of terrorist use of nuclear, biological and 
chemical (NBC) weapons, including those of mass destruction.
    a. Reduce Vulnerabilities. In order to reduce our 
vulnerabilities to terrorism, both at home and abroad, all 
department/agency heads have been directed to ensure that their 
personnel and facilities are fully protected against terrorism. 
Specific efforts that will be conducted to ensure our security 
against terrorist acts include the following:

   Review the vulnerability of government facilities 
        and critical national infrastructure.
   Expand the program of counterterrorism.
   Reduce vulnerabilities affecting civilian personnel/
        facilities abroad and military personnel/facilities.
   Reduce vulnerabilities affecting U.S. airports, 
        aircraft/passengers and shipping, and provide 
        appropriate security measures for other modes of 
        transportation.
   Exclude/deport persons who pose a terrorist threat
   Prevent unlawful traffic in firearms and explosives, 
        and protect the President and other officials against 
        terrorist attack.
   Reduce U.S. vulnerabilities to international 
        terrorism through intelligence collection/analysis, 
        counterintelligence and covert action.

    b. Deter. To deter terrorism, it is necessary to provide a 
clear public position that our policies will not be affected by 
terrorist acts and we will vigorously deal with terrorist/
sponsors to reduce terrorist capabilities and support. In this 
regard, we must make it clear that we will not allow terrorism 
to succeed and that the pursuit, arrest, and prosecution of 
terrorists is of the highest priority. Our goals include the 
disruption of terrorist-sponsored activity including 
termination of financial support, arrest and punishment of 
terrorists as criminals, application of U.S. laws and new 
legislation to prevent terrorist groups from operating in the 
United States, and application of extraterritorial statutes to 
counter acts of terrorism and apprehend terrorists outside of 
the United States. Return of terrorists overseas, who are 
wanted for violation of U.S. law, is of the highest priority 
and a central issue in bilateral relations with any state that 
harbors or assists them.
    c. Respond. To respond to terrorism, we must have a rapid 
and decisive capability to protect Americans, defeat or arrest 
terrorists, respond against terrorist sponsors, and provide 
relief to the victims of terrorists. The goal during the 
immediate response phase of an incident is to terminate 
terrorist attacks so that the terrorists do not accomplish 
their objectives or maintain their freedom, while seeking to 
minimize damage and loss of life and provide emergency 
assistance. After an incident has occurred, a rapidly 
deployable interagency Emergency Support Team (EST) will 
provide required capabilities on scene: a Foreign Emergency 
Support Team (FEST) for foreign incidents and a Domestic 
Emergency Support Team (DEST) for domestic incidents. DEST 
membership will be limited to those agencies required to 
respond to the specific incident. Both teams will include 
elements for specific types of incidents such as nuclear, 
biological or chemical threats.
    The Director, FEMA, will ensure that the Federal Response 
Plan is adequate for consequence management activities in 
response to terrorist attacks against large U.S. populations, 
including those where weapons of mass destruction are involved. 
FEMA will also ensure that State response plans and 
capabilities are adequate and tested. FEMA, supported by all 
Federal Response Plan signatories, will assume the Lead Agency 
role for consequence management in Washington, D.C. and on 
scene. If large scale casualties and infrastructure damage 
occur, the President may appoint a Personal Representative for 
consequence management as the on scene Federal authority during 
recovery. A roster of senior and former government officials 
willing to perform these functions will be created and the 
rostered individuals will be provided training and information 
necessary to allow them to be called upon on short notice.
    Agencies will bear the costs of their participation in 
terrorist incidents and counterterrorist operations, unless 
otherwise directed.
    d. NBC Consequence Management. The development of effective 
capabilities for preventing and managing the consequences of 
terrorist use of nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) 
materials or weapons is of the highest priority. Terrorist 
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction is not acceptable 
and there is no higher priority than preventing the acquisition 
of such materials/weapons or removing this capability from 
terrorist groups. FEMA will review the Federal Response Plan on 
an urgent basis, in coordination with supporting agencies, to 
determine its adequacy in responding to an NBC-related 
terrorist incident; identify and remedy any shortfalls in 
stockpiles, capabilities or training; and report on the status 
of these efforts in 180 days.

 b. Terrorism Incident Annex to the Federal Response Plan Implementing 
                                 PDD-39

                  Federal Emergency Management Agency

                        Terrorism Incident Annex

Signatory Agencies: Department of Defense, Department of 
        Energy, Department of Health and Human Services, 
        Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
        Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Emergency 
        Management Agency.

                            I. Introduction

    Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39), U.S. Policy on 
Counter Terrorism, establishes policy to reduce the Nation's 
vulnerability to terrorism, deter and respond to terrorism, and 
strengthen capabilities to detect, prevent, defeat, and manage 
the consequences of terrorist use of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD). PDD-39 states that the United States will 
have the ability to respond rapidly and decisively to terrorism 
directed against Americans wherever it occurs, arrest or defeat 
the perpetrators using all appropriate instruments against the 
sponsoring organizations and governments, and provide recovery 
relief to victims, as permitted by law.
    Responding to terrorism involves instruments that provide 
crisis management and consequence management. ``Crisis 
management'' refers to measures to identify, acquire, and plan 
the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or 
resolve a threat or act of terrorism. The Federal Government 
exercises primary authority to prevent, preempt, and terminate 
threats or acts of terrorism and to apprehend and prosecute the 
perpetrators; State and local governments provide assistance as 
required. Crisis management is predominantly a law enforcement 
response. ``Consequence management'' refers to measures to 
protect public health and safety, restore essential government 
services, and provide emergency relief to governments, 
businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of 
terrorism. State and local governments exercise primary 
authority to respond to the consequences of terrorism; the 
Federal Government provides assistance as required. Consequence 
management is generally a multi function response coordinated 
by emergency management.
    Based on the situation, a Federal crisis management 
response may be supported by technical operations, and by 
Federal consequence management, which may operate concurrently. 
``Technical operations'' include actions to identify, assess, 
dismantle, transfer, dispose of, or decontaminate personnel and 
property exposed to explosive ordnance or WMD.

                               a. purpose

    The purpose of this annex is to ensure that the Federal 
Response Plan (FRP) is adequate to respond to the consequences 
of terrorism within the United States, including terrorism 
involving WMD. This annex:
    1. Describes crisis management. Guidance is provided in 
other Federal emergency operations plans;
    2. Defines the policies and structures to coordinate crisis 
management with consequence management; and
    3. Defines consequence management, which uses the FRP 
process and structure, supplemented as necessary by resources 
normally activated through other Federal emergency operations 
plans.

                                b. scope

    This annex:
    1. Applies to all threats or acts of terrorism within the 
United States that the White House determines require a 
response under the FRP;
    2. Applies to all Federal departments and agencies that may 
be directed to respond to the consequences of a threat or act 
of terrorism within the United States; and
    3. Builds upon the process and structure of the FRP by 
addressing unique policies, situations, operating concepts, 
responsibilities, and funding guidelines required for response 
to the consequences of terrorism.

                              II. Policies

    A. PDD-39 validates and reaffirms existing lead agency 
responsibilities for all facets of the U.S. counter terrorism 
effort.
    B. The Department of Justice is designated as the lead 
agency for threats or acts of terrorism within U.S. territory. 
The Department of justice assigns lead responsibility for 
operational response to the Federal Bureau of investigation 
(FBI). Within that role, the FBI operates as the on-scene 
manager for the federal Government. It is FBI policy that 
crisis management will involve only those federal agencies 
requested by the FBI to provide expert guidance and/or 
assistance, as described in the PDD-39 Domestic Deployment 
Guidelines (classified) and the FBI WMD Incident Contingency 
Plan.
    C. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)is 
designated as the lead agency for consequence management within 
U.S. territory.FEMA retains authority and responsibility to act 
as the lead agency for consequence management throughout the 
Federal response.It is FEMA policy to use FRP structures 
coordinate all Federal assistance to State and local 
governments for consequence management.
    D. To ensure that there is one overall Lead Federal Agency 
(LFA), PDD-39 directs FEMA to support the Department of Justice 
(as delegated to the FBI) until the Attorney General transfers 
the overall LFA role to FEMA. FEMA supports the overall LFA as 
permitted by law.

                             III. Situation

                             a. conditions

    1. FBI assessment of a potential or credible threat of 
terrorism within the United States may cause the FBI to direct 
other members of the law enforcement community and to 
coordinate with other Federal agencies to implement a pre-
release response.
          a. FBI requirements for assistance from other Federal 
        agencies will be coordinated through the Attorney 
        General and the President, with coordination of 
        National Security Council (NSC) groups as warranted.
          b. FEMA will advise and assist the FBI and coordinate 
        with the affected state and local emergency management 
        authorities to identify potential consequence 
        management requirements and with Federal consequence 
        management agencies to increase readiness.
    2. An act that occurs without warning and produces major 
consequences may cause FEMA to implement a post-release 
consequence management response under the FRP. FEMA will 
exercise its authorities and provide concurrent support to the 
FBI as appropriate to the specific incident.

                        b. planning assumptions

    1. No single agency at the local, State, Federal, or 
private-sector level possesses the authority and expertise to 
act unilaterally on many difficult issues that may arise in 
response to a threat or act of terrorism, particularly if WMD 
are involved.
    2. An act of terrorism, particularly an act directed 
against a large population center within the United States 
involving WMD, may produce major consequences that would 
overwhelm the capabilities of many local and State governments 
almost immediately.
    3. Major consequences involving WMD may overwhelm existing 
Federal capabilities as well, particularly if multiple 
locations are affected.
    4. Local, State, and Federal responders will define working 
perimeters that may overlap. Perimeters may be used to control 
access to the area, target public information messages, assign 
operational sectors among responding organizations, and assess 
potential effects on the population and the environment. 
Control of these perimeters may be enforced by different 
authorities, which will impede the overall response if adequate 
coordination is not established.
    5. If appropriate personal protective equipment is not 
available, entry into a contaminated area (i.e., a hot zone) 
may be delayed until the material dissipates to levels that are 
safe for emergency response personnel. Responders should be 
prepared for secondary devices.
    6. Operations may involve geographic areas in a single 
State or multiple States, involving responsible FBI Field 
Offices and Regional Offices as appropriate. The FBI and FEMA 
will establish coordination relationships as appropriate, based 
on the geographic areas involved.
    7. Operations may involve geographic areas that spread 
across U.S. boundaries. The Department of State is responsible 
for coordination with foreign governments.

                       IV. Concept of Operations

                        a. crisis management \1\

    1. PDD-39 reaffirms the FBI's Federal lead responsibility 
for crisis management response to threats or acts of terrorism 
that take place within U.S. territory or in international 
waters and that do not involve the flag vessel of a foreign 
country. The FBI provides a graduated, flexible response to a 
range of incidents, including:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Source: FBI, National Security Division, Domestic Terrorism/
Counterterrorism Planning Section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          a. A credible threat, which may be presented in 
        verbal, written,intelligence-based, or other form;
          b. An act of terrorism that exceeds the local FBI 
        field division's capability to resolve;
          c. The confirmed presence of an explosive device or 
        WMD capable of causing a significant destructive event, 
        prior to actual injury or property loss;
          d. The detonation of an explosive device, utilization 
        of a WMD, or other destructive event, with or without 
        warning, that results in limited injury or death; and
          e. The detonation of an explosive device, utilization 
        of a WMD, or other destructive event, with or without 
        warning, that results in substantial injury or death.
    2. The FBI notifies FEMA and other Federal agencies 
providing direct support to the FBI of a credible threat of 
terrorism. The FBI initiates a threat assessment process that 
involves close coordination with Federal agencies with 
technical expertise, in order to determine the viability of the 
threat from a technical as well as tactical and behavioral 
standpoints.
    3. The FBI provides initial notification to law enforcement 
authorities within the affected State of a threat or occurrence 
that the FBI confirms as an act of terrorism.
    4. If warranted, the FBI implements an FBI response and 
simultaneously advises the Attorney General, who notifies the 
President and NSC groups as warranted, that a Federal crisis 
management response is required. If authorized, the FBI 
activates multiagency crisis management structures at FBI 
Headquarters, the responsible FBI Field Office, and the 
incident scene. Federal agencies requested by the FBI, 
including FEMA, will deploy a representative(s) to the FBI 
Headquarters Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) 
and take other actions as necessary and appropriate to support 
crisis management. (The FBI provides guidance on the crisis 
management response in the FBI WMD Incident Contingency Plan.)
    5. If the threat involves WMD, the FBI Director may 
recommend to the Attorney General, who notifies the President 
and NSC groups as warranted, to deploy a Domestic Emergency 
Support Team (DEST). The mission of the DEST is to provide 
expert advice and assistance to the FBI On-Scene Commander 
(OSC) related to the capabilities of the DEST agencies and to 
coordinate follow-on response assets. When a Joint Operations 
Center (JOC) is formed, DEST components merge into the JOC 
structure as appropriate. (The FBI provides guidance on the 
DEST in the PDD-39 Domestic Deployment Guidelines 
(classified).)
    6. During crisis management, the FBI coordinates closely 
with local law enforcement authorities to provide a successful 
law enforcement resolution to the incident. The FBI also 
coordinates with other Federal authorities, including FEMA.
    7. The FBI Field Office responsible for the incident site 
modifies its Command Post to function as a JOC and establishes 
a Joint Information Center (JIC). The JOC structure includes 
the following standard groups: Command, Operations, Support, 
and Consequence Management. Representation within the JOC 
includes some Federal, State, and local agencies.
    8. The JOC Command Group plays an important role in 
ensuring coordination of Federal crisis management and 
consequence management actions. Issues arising from the 
response that affect multiple agency authorities and 
responsibilities will be addressed by the FBI OSC and the other 
members of the JOC Command Group, who are all working in 
consultation with other local, State, and Federal 
representatives. While the FBI OSC retains authority to make 
Federal crisis management decisions at all times, operational 
decisions are made cooperatively to the greatest extent 
possible. The FBI OSC and the Senior FEMA Official at the JOC 
will provide, or obtain from higher authority, an immediate 
resolution of conflicts in priorities for allocation of 
critical Federal resources (such as airlift or technical 
operations assets) between the crisis management and the 
consequence management response.
    9. A FEMA representative coordinates the actions of the JOC 
Consequence Management Group, expedites activation of a Federal 
consequence management response should it become necessary, and 
works with an FBI representative who serves as the liaison 
between the Consequence Management Group and the FBI OSC. The 
JOC Consequence Management Group monitors the crisis management 
response in order to advise on decisions that may have 
implications for consequence management, and to provide 
continuity should a Federal consequence management response 
become necessary. Coordination will also be achieved through 
the exchange of operational reports on the incident. Because 
reports prepared by the FBI are ``law enforcement sensitive,'' 
FEMA representatives with access to the reports will review 
them, according to standard procedure, in order to identify and 
forward information to Emergency Support Function (ESF) #5--
Information and Planning that may affect operational priorities 
and action plans for consequence management.

                       b. consequence management

1. Pre-Release
    a. FEMA receives initial notification from the FBI of a 
credible threat of terrorism. Based on the circumstances, FEMA 
Headquarters and the responsible FEMA region(s) may implement a 
standard procedure to alert involved FEMA officials and Federal 
agencies supporting consequence management.
    b. FEMA deploys representatives with the DEST and deploys 
additional staff for the JOC, as required, in order to provide 
support to the FBI regarding consequence management. FEMA 
determines the appropriate agencies to staff the JOC 
Consequence Management Group and advises the FBI. With FBI 
concurrence, FEMA notifies consequence management agencies to 
request that they deploy representatives to the JOC. 
Representatives may be requested for the JOC Command Group, the 
JOC Consequence Management Group, and the JIC.
    c. When warranted, FEMA will consult immediately with the 
Governor's office and the White House in order to determine if 
Federal assistance is required and if FEMA is permitted to use 
authorities of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act to mission-assign Federal consequence 
management agencies to pre-deploy assets to lessen or avert the 
threat of a catastrophe. These actions will involve appropriate 
notification and coordination with the FBI, as the overall LFA.
    d. FEMA Headquarters may activate an Emergency Support Team 
(EST) and may convene an executive-level meeting of the 
Catastrophic Disaster Response Group (CDRG). When FEMA 
activates the EST, FEMA will request FBI Headquarters to 
provide liaison. The responsible FEMA region(s) may activate a 
Regional Operations Center (ROC) and deploy a representative(s) 
to the affected State(s). When the responsible FEMA region(s) 
activates a ROC, the region(s) will notify the responsible FBI 
Field Office(s) to request a liaison.
2. Post-Release
    a. If an incident involves a transition from joint (crisis/
consequence) response to a threat of terrorism to joint 
response to an act of terrorism, then consequence management 
agencies providing advice and assistance at the JOC pre-release 
will reduce their presence at the JOC post-release as necessary 
to fulfill their consequence management responsibilities. The 
Senior FEMA Official and staff will remain at the JOC until the 
FBI and FEMA agree that liaison is no longer required.
    b. If an incident occurs without warning that produces 
major consequences and appears to be caused by an act of 
terrorism, then FEMA and the FBI will initiate consequence 
management and crisis management actions concurrently. FEMA 
will consult immediately with the Governor's office and the 
White House to determine if Federal assistance is required and 
if FEMA is permitted to use the authorities of the Stafford Act 
to mission-assign Federal agencies to support a consequence 
management response. If the President directs FEMA to implement 
a Federal consequence management response, then FEMA will 
support the FBI as required and will lead a concurrent Federal 
consequence management response.
    c. The overall LFA (either the FBI or FEMA when the 
Attorney General transfers the overall LFA role to FEMA) will 
establish a Joint Information Center in the field, under the 
operational control of the overall LFA's Public Information 
Officer, as the focal point for the coordination and provision 
of information to the public and media concerning the Federal 
response to the emergency. Throughout the response, agencies 
will continue to coordinate incident-related information 
through the JIC. FEMA and the FBI will ensure that appropriate 
spokespersons provide information concerning the crisis 
management and consequent management responses. Before a JIC is 
activated, public affairs offices of responding Federal 
agencies will coordinate the release of information through the 
FBI SIOC.
    d. During the consequence management response, the FBI 
provides liaison to either the ROC Director or the Federal 
Coordinating Officer (FCO) in the field, and a liaison to the 
EST Director at FEMA Headquarters. While the ROC Director or 
FCO retains authority to make Federal consequence management 
decisions at all times, operational decisions are made 
cooperatively to the greatest extent possible.
    e. As described previously, resolution of conflicts between 
the crisis management and consequence management responses will 
be provided by the Senior FEMA Official and the FBI OSC at the 
JOC or, as necessary, will be obtained from higher authority. 
Operational reports will continue to be exchanged. The FBI 
liaisons will remain at the EST and the ROC or DFO until FEMA 
and the FBI agree that a liaison is no longer required.
3. Disengagement
    a. If an act of terrorism does not occur, the consequence 
management response disengages when the FEMA Director, in 
consultation with the FBI Director, directs FEMA Headquarters 
and the responsible region(s) to issue a cancellation 
notification by standard procedure to appropriate FEMA 
officials and FRP agencies. FRP agencies disengage according to 
standard procedure.
    b. If an act of terrorism occurs that results in major 
consequences, each FRP component (the EST, CDRG, ROC, and DFO 
if necessary) disengages at the appropriate time according to 
standard procedure. Following FRP disengagement, operations by 
individual Federal agencies or by multiple Federal agencies 
under other Federal plans may continue, in order to support the 
affected State and local governments with long-term hazard 
monitoring, environmental decontamination, and site restoration 
(cleanup).

                          V. Responsibilities

                        a. department of justice

    PDD-39 validates and reaffirms existing lead agency 
responsibilities for all facets of the U.S. counterterrorism 
effort. The Department of Justice is designated as the overall 
LFA for threats of acts of terrorism that take place within the 
United States until the Attorney General transfers the overall 
LFA role to FEMA. The Department of Justice delegates this 
overall LFA role to the FBI for the operational response. On 
behalf of the Department of Justice, the FBI will:
    1. Consult with and advise the White House, through the 
Attorney General, on policy matters concerning the overall 
response;
    2. Designate and establish a JOC in the field;
    3. Appoint an FBI OSC to manage and coordinate the Federal 
operational response (crisis management and consequence 
management). As necessary, the FBI OSC will convene and chair 
meetings of operational decision makers representing lead State 
and local crisis management agencies, FEMA, and lead State and 
local consequence management agencies in order to provide an 
initial assessment of the situation, develop an action plan, 
monitor and update operational priorities, and ensure that the 
overall response (crisis management and consequence management) 
is consistent with U.S. law and achieves the policy objectives 
outlined in PDD-39. The FBI and FEMA may involve supporting 
Federal agencies as necessary; and
    4. Issue and track the status of actions assigned by the 
overall LFA.

                   b. federal bureau of investigation

    Under PDD-39, the FBI supports the overall LFA by operating 
as the lead agency for crisis management. The FBI will:
    1. Determine when a threat of an act of terrorism warrants 
consultation with the White House, through the Attorney 
General;
    2. Advise the White House, through the Attorney General, 
when the FBI requires assistance for a Federal crisis 
management response, in accordance with the PDD-39 Domestic 
Deployment Guidelines;
    3. Work with FEMA to establish and operate a JIC in the 
field as the focal point for information to the public and the 
media concerning the Federal response to the emergency;
    4. Establish the primary Federal operations centers for the 
crisis management response in the field and Washington, DC;
    5. Appoint an FBI OSC (or subordinate official) to manage 
and coordinate the crisis management response. Within this 
role, the FBI OSC will convene meetings with operational 
decision makers representing Federal, State, and local law 
enforcement and technical support agencies, as appropriate, to 
formulate incident action plans, define priorities, review 
status, resolve conflicts, identify issues that require 
decisions from higher authorities, and evaluate the need for 
additional resources;
    6. Issue and track the status of crisis management actions 
assigned by the FBI; and
    7. Designate appropriate liaison and advisory personnel to 
support FEMA.

                 c. federal emergency management agency

    Under PDD-39, FEMA supports the overall LFA by operating as 
the lead agency for consequence management until the overall 
LFA role is transferred to FEMA. FEMA will:
    1. Determine when consequences are ``imminent'' for the 
purposes of the Stafford Act;
    2. Consult with the Governor's office and the White House 
to determine if a Federal consequence management response is 
required and if FEMA is directed to use Stafford Act 
authorities. This process will involve appropriate notification 
and coordination with the FBI, as the overall LFA;
    3. Work with the FBI to establish and operate a JIC in the 
field as the focal point for information to the public and the 
media concerning the Federal response to the emergency;
    4. Establish the primary Federal operations centers for 
consequence management in the field and Washington, DC;
    5. Appoint a ROC Director or FCO to manage and coordinate 
the Federal consequence management response in support of State 
and local governments. In coordination with the FBI, the ROC 
Director or FCO will convene meetings with decision makers of 
Federal, State, and local emergency management and technical 
support agencies, as appropriate, to formulate incident action 
plans, define priorities, review status, resolve conflicts, 
identify issues that require decisions from higher authorities, 
and evaluate the need for additional resources;
    6. Issue and track the status of consequence management 
actions assigned by FEMA; and
    7. Designate appropriate liaison and advisory personnel to 
support the FBI.

          d. federal agencies supporting technical operations

1. Department of Defense
    As directed in PDD-39, the Department of Defense (DOD) will 
activate technical operations capabilities to support the 
Federal response to threats or acts of WMD terrorism. DOD will 
coordinate military operations within the United States with 
the appropriate civilian lead agency(ies) for technical 
operations.
2. Department of Energy
    As directed in PDD-39, the Department of Energy (DOE) will 
activate technical operations capabilities to support the 
Federal response to threats or acts of WMD terrorism. In 
addition, the FBI has concluded formal agreements with 
potential LFAs of the Federal Radiological Emergency Response 
Plan (FRERP) that provide for interface, coordination, and 
technical assistance in support of the FBI's mission. If the 
FRERP is implemented concurrently with the FRP:
    a. The Federal On-Scene Commander under the FRERP will 
coordinate the FRERP response with the FEMA official (either 
the ROC Director or the FCO), who is responsible under PDD-39 
for coordination of all Federal support to State and local 
governments.
    b. The FRERP response may include on-site management, 
radiological monitoring and assessment, development of Federal 
protective action recommendations, and provision of information 
on the radiological response to the public, the White House, 
Members of Congress, and foreign governments. The LFA of the 
FRERP will serve as the primary Federal source of information 
regarding on-site radiological conditions and off-site 
radiological effects.
    c. The LFA of the FRERP will issue taskings that draw upon 
funding from the responding FRERP agencies.
3. Department of Health and Human Services
    As directed in PDD-39, the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) will activate technical operations capabilities 
to support the Federal response to threats or acts of WMD 
terrorism. HHS may coordinate with individual agencies 
identified in the HHS Health and Medical Services Support Plan 
for the Federal Response to Acts of Chemical/Biological (C/B) 
Terrorism, to use the structure, relationships, and 
capabilities described in the HHS plan to support response 
operations. If the HHS plan is implemented:
    a. The HHS on-scene representative will coordinate, through 
the ESF #8--Health and Medical Services Leader, the HHS plan 
response with the FEMA official (either the ROC Director or the 
FCO), who is responsible under PDD-39 for on-scene coordination 
of all Federal support to State and local governments.
    b. The HHS plan response may include threat assessment, 
consultation, agent identification, epidemiological 
investigation, hazard detection and reduction, decontamination, 
public health support, medical support, and pharmaceutical 
support operations.
    c. HHS will issue taskings that draw upon funding from the 
responding HHS plan agencies.
4. Environmental Protection Agency
    As directed in PDD-39, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) will activate technical operations capabilities to 
support the Federal response to acts of WMD terrorism. EPA may 
coordinate with individual agencies identified in the National 
Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) 
to use the structure, relationships, and capabilities of the 
National Response System as described in the NCP to support 
response operations. If the NCP is implemented:
    a. The Hazardous Materials On-Scene Coordinator under the 
NCP will coordinate, through the ESF #10--Hazardous Materials 
Chair, the NCP response with the FEMA official (either the ROC 
Director or the FCO), who is responsible under PDD-39 for on-
scene coordination of all Federal support to State and local 
governments.
    b. The NCP response may include threat assessment, 
consultation, agent identification, hazard detection and 
reduction, environmental monitoring, decontamination, and long-
term site restoration (environmental cleanup) operations.

                         VI. Funding Guidelines

    A. As stated in PDD-39, Federal agencies directed to 
participate in the resolution of terrorist incidents or conduct 
of counterterrorist operations bear the costs of their own 
participation, unless otherwise directed by the President. This 
responsibility is subject to specific statutory authorization 
to provide support without reimbursement. In the absence of 
such specific authority, the Economy Act applies, and 
reimbursement cannot be waived.
    B. FEMA can use limited pre-deployment authorities in 
advance of a Stafford Act declaration to ``lessen or avert the 
threat of a catastrophe'' only if the President expresses 
intention to go forward with a declaration. This authority is 
further interpreted by congressional intent, to the effect that 
the President must determine that assistance under existing 
Federal programs is inadequate to meet the crisis, before FEMA 
may directly intervene under the Stafford Act. The Stafford Act 
authorizes the President to issue ``emergency'' and ``major 
disaster'' declarations.
          1. Emergency declarations may be issued in response 
        to a Governor's request, or in response to those rare 
        emergencies, including some acts of terrorism, for 
        which the Federal Government is assigned in the laws of 
        the United States the exclusive or preeminent 
        responsibility and authority to respond.
          2. Major disaster declarations may be issued in 
        response to a Governor's request for any natural 
        catastrophe or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, 
        or explosion that has caused damage of sufficient 
        severity and magnitude, as determined by the President, 
        to warrant major disaster assistance under the Act.
          3. If a Stafford Act declaration is provided, funding 
        for consequence management may continue to be allocated 
        from responding agency operating budgets, the Disaster 
        Relief Fund, and supplemental appropriations.
    C. If the President directs FEMA to use Stafford Act 
authorities, FEMA will issue mission assignments through the 
FRP to support consequence management.
          1. Mission assignments are reimbursable work orders, 
        issued by FEMA to Federal agencies, directing 
        completion of specific tasks. Although the Stafford Act 
        states that ``Federal agencies may [emphasis added] be 
        reimbursed for expenditures under the Act'' from the 
        Disaster Relief Fund, it is FEMA policy to reimburse 
        Federal agencies for eligible work performed under 
        mission assignments.
          2. Mission assignments issued to support consequence 
        management will follow FEMA's Standard Operating 
        Procedures for the Management of Mission Assignments or 
        applicable superseding documentation.
    D. FEMA provides the following funding guidance to the FRP 
agencies:
          1. Commitments by individual agencies to take 
        precautionary measures in anticipation of special 
        events will not be reimbursed under the Stafford Act, 
        unless mission-assigned by FEMA to support consequence 
        management.
          2. Stafford Act authorities do not pertain to law 
        enforcement functions. Law enforcement or crisis 
        management actions will not be mission-assigned for 
        reimbursement under the Stafford Act.

                            VII. References

    A. Presidential Decision Directive 39, U.S. Policy on 
Counterterrorism (classified). An unclassified extract may be 
obtained from FEMA.
    B. PDD-39 Domestic Deployment Guidelines (classified).
    C. PDD-62, Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the 
Homeland and Americans Overseas (classified).
    D. FBI WMD Incident Contingency Plan.
    E. HHS Health and Medical Services Support Plan for the 
Federal Response to Acts of Chemical/Biological Terrorism.

                      VIII. Terms and Definitions

                          a. biological agents

    The FBI WMD Incident Contingency Plan defines biological 
agents as microorganisms or toxins from living organisms that 
have infectious or noninfectious properties that produce lethal 
or serious effects in plants and animals.

                           b. chemical agents

    The FBI WMD Incident Contingency Plan defines chemical 
agents as solids, liquids, or gases that have chemical 
properties that produce lethal or serious effects in plants and 
animals.

                       c. consequence management

    FEMA defines consequence management as measures to protect 
public health and safety, restore essential government 
services, and provide emergency relief to governments, 
businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of 
terrorism.

                           d. credible threat

    The FBI conducts an interagency threat assessment that 
indicates that the threat is credible and confirms the 
involvement of a WMD in the developing terrorist incident.

                          e. crisis management

    The FBI defines crisis management as measures to identify, 
acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, 
prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism.

               f. domestic emergency support team (dest)

    PDD-39 defines the DEST as a rapidly deployable interagency 
support team established to ensure that the full range of 
necessary expertise and capabilities are available to the on-
scene coordinator. The FBI is responsible for the DEST in 
domestic incidents.

                             g. lead agency

    The FBI defines lead agency, as used in PDD-39, as the 
Federal department or agency assigned lead responsibility to 
manage and coordinate a specific function--either crisis 
management or consequence management. Lead agencies are 
designated on the basis of their having the most authorities, 
resources, capabilities, or expertise relative to 
accomplishment of the specific function. Lead agencies support 
the overall Lead Federal Agency during all phases of the 
terrorism response.

                           h. nuclear weapons

    The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (DOE, 1977) defines nuclear 
weapons as weapons that release nuclear energy in an explosive 
manner as the result of nuclear chain reactions involving 
fission and/or fusion of atomic nuclei.

                        i. senior fema official

    The official appointed by the Director of FEMA or his 
representative to represent FEMA on the Command Group at the 
Joint Operations Center. The Senior FEMA Official is not the 
Federal Coordinating Officer.

                        j. technical operations

    As used in this annex, technical operations include actions 
to identify, assess, dismantle, transfer, dispose of, or 
decontaminate personnel and property exposed to explosive 
ordnance or WMD.

                         k. terrorist incident

    The FBI defines a terrorist incident as a violent act, or 
an act dangerous to human life, in violation of the criminal 
laws of the United States or of any State, to intimidate or 
coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment 
thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives.

                  l. weapon of mass destruction (wmd)

    Title 18, U.S.C. 2332a, defines a weapon of mass 
destruction as (1) any destructive device as defined in section 
921 of this title, [which reads] any explosive, incendiary, or 
poison gas, bomb, grenade, rocket having a propellant charge of 
more than four ounces, missile having an explosive or 
incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce, mine or 
device similar to the above; (2) poison gas; (3) any weapon 
involving a disease organism; or (4) any weapon that is 
designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level 
dangerous to human life.
      
    Updated: June 3, 1999.

  c. Comprehensive Readiness Program for Countering Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Report to Congress, Pursuant to Public Law 
                   104-201, Sec. 1443(c), May 5, 1997

                       105th congress,1st session

                         house document 105-79

            Message from the President of the United States

                              Transmitting

   a report that describes the united states comprehensive readiness 
 program for countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
     pursuant to public law 104-201, sec. 1443(c) (110 stat. 2729)

May 5, 1997--Message and accompanying papers referred to the Committees 
  on National Security and International Relations, and ordered to be 
                                printed

      
      
      
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                        d. National Emergencies

 (1) Report to Congress on the Declaration of a National Emergency and 
 the Issuance of an Executive Order with Respect to the Afghan Taliban

                            The White House

                     Office of the Press Secretary

  Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of 
            Representatives and the President of the Senate

July 4, 1999
      
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
    Pursuant to section 204(b) of the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1703(b) and section 301 of the 
National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1631, I hereby report that 
I have exercised my statutory authority to declare a National 
emergency with respect to the threat to the United States posed 
by the actions and policies of the Afghan Taliban and have 
issued an executive order to deal with this threat.
    The actions and policies of the Afghan Taliban pose an 
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and 
foreign policy of the United States. The Taliban continues to 
provide safe haven to Usama bin Ladin allowing him and the Al-
Quida organization to operate from Taliban-controlled territory 
a network of terrorist training camps and to use Afghanistan as 
a base from which to sponsor terrorist operations against the 
United States.
    Usama bin Ladin and the Al-Qaida organization have been 
involved in at least two separate attacks against the United 
States. On August 7, 1998, the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, 
Kenya, and in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, were attacked using 
powerful explosive truck bombs. The following people have been 
indicted for criminal activity against the United States in 
connection with Usama bin Ladin and/or the Al-Qaida 
organization: Usama bin Ladin, his military commander Muhammed 
Atef, Wadih El Hage, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, Mohammed Sadeek 
Odeh, Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-Owhali, Mustafa Mohammed Fadhil, 
Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, Fahid Mohommed 
Ally Msalam, Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan, Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, 
Ali Mohammed, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, and Khaled Al Fawwaz. In 
addition, bin Ladin and his network are currently planning 
additional attacks against U.S. interests and nationals.
    Since at least 1998 and up to the date of the Executive 
order, the Taliban has continued to provide bin Ladin with safe 
haven and security, allowing him the necessary freedom to 
operate. Repeated efforts by the United States to persuade the 
Taliban to expel bin Ladin to a third country where he can be 
brought to justice for his crimes have failed. The United 
States has also attempted to apply pressure on the Taliban both 
directly and through frontline states in a position to 
influence Taliban behavior. Despite these efforts, the Taliban 
has not only continued, but has also deepened its support for, 
and its relationship with, Usama bin Ladin and associated 
terrorist networks.
    Accordingly, I have concluded that the actions and policies 
of the Taliban pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the 
national security and foreign policy of the United States. I 
have, therefore, exercised my statutory authority and issued an 
Executive order which, except to the extent provided for in 
section 203 (b) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1072(b)) and regulations, 
orders, directives or licenses that may be issued pursuant to 
this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or 
any license or permit granted prior to the effective date:

  --blocks all property and interests in property of the 
        Taliban, including the Taliban leaders listed in the 
        annex to the order that are in the United States or 
        that are or hereafter come within the possession or 
        control of United States persons;
  --prohibits any transaction or dealing by United States 
        persons or within the United States in property or 
        interests in property blocked pursuant to the order, 
        including the making or receiving of any contribution 
        of funds, goods, or services to or for the benefit of 
        the Taliban;
  --prohibits the exportation, re-exportation, sale, or supply, 
        directly or indirectly, from the United States, or by a 
        United States person, wherever located, of any goods, 
        software, technology (including technical data), or 
        services to the territory of Afghanistan under the 
        control of the Taliban or to the Taliban; and
  --prohibits the importation into the United States of any 
        goods, software, technology, or services owned or 
        controlled by the Taliban or from the territory of 
        Afghanistan under the control of the Taliban.

    The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the 
Secretary of State, is directed to authorize commercial sales 
of agricultural commodities and products, medicine and medical 
equipment, for civilian end use in the territory of Afghanistan 
controlled by the Taliban under appropriate safeguards to 
prevent diversion to military, paramilitary, or terrorist end-
users or end-use or to political end-use. This order and 
subsequent licenses will likewise allow humanitarian, 
diplomatic, and journalistic activities to continue.
    I have designated in the Executive order, Mullah Mohhamad 
Omar, the leader of the Taliban, and I have authorized the 
Secretary of State to designate additional persons as Taliban 
leaders in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and 
the Attorney General.
    The Secretary of the Treasury is further authorized to 
designate persons or entities, in consultation with the 
Secretary of State and the Attorney General, that are owned or 
controlled, or are acting for or on behalf of the Taliban or 
that provide financial, material, or technical support to the 
Taliban. The Secretary of the Treasury is also authorized to 
issue regulations in the exercise of my authorities under the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act to implement these 
measures in consultation with the Secretary of State and the 
Attorney General. All Federal agencies are directed to take 
actions within their authority to carry out the provisions of 
the Executive order.
    The measures taken in this order will immediately 
demonstrate to the Taliban the seriousness of our concern over 
its support for terrorists and terrorist networks, and increase 
the international isolation of the Taliban. The blocking of the 
Taliban's property and the other prohibitions imposed under 
this executive order will further limit the Taliban's ability 
to facilitate and support terrorists and terrorist networks. It 
is particularly important for the United States to demonstrate 
to the Taliban the necessity of conforming to accepted norms of 
international behavior.
    I am enclosing a copy of the Executive order \1\ I have 
issued. This order is effective at 12:01 a.m. Eastern Daylight 
Time on July 6, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ See section H1 of this compilation for text of this Executive 
Order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Sincerely,

    William J. Clinton

    (2) Report to Congress on Developments Concerning the National 
                  Emergency with Respect to Sudan \1\

 Message from the President of the United States transmitting a report 
on developments concerning the national emergency with respect to Sudan 
  that was declared in Executive Order 13067 of November 3, 1997, and 
 matters relating to the measures in that Order, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 
                                1641(c)

To the Congress of the United States:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ House Document 106-58.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As required by section 401(c) of the National Emergencies 
Act, 50 U.S.C. 1641(c) and section 204(c) of the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. 1703(c), I 
transmit herewith a 6-month periodic report on the national 
emergency with respect to Sudan that was declared in Executive 
Order 113067 of November 3, 1997.

    William J. Clinton.
    The White House, May 3, 1999.

 President's Periodic Report on the National Emergency With Respect to 
                                 Sudan

    I hereby report to the Congress on developments concerning 
the national emergency with respect to Sudan that was declared 
in Executive Order 13067 of November 3, 1997, and matters 
relating to the measures in that order. This report is 
submitted pursuant to section 204(c) of the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1703(c) (``IEEPA''), 
and section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 
1641(c). This report discusses only matters concerning the 
national emergency with respect to Sudan that was declared in 
Executive Order 13067.
    1. On November 3, 1997, I issued Executive Order 13067 (62 
Fed. Reg. 59989, November 5, 1997--the ``Order'') to declare a 
national emergency with respect to Sudan pursuant to IEEPA. A 
copy of the order was provided to the Speaker of the House and 
the President of the Senate by letter dated November 3, 1997.
    2. Executive Order 13067 became effective at 12:01 a.m., 
eastern standard time on November 4, 1997. On July 1, 1998, the 
Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control 
(``OFAC'') issued the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations (the 
``SSR'' or the ``Regulations'') (63 Fed. Reg. 35809, July 1, 
1998). The Regulations block all property and interests in 
property of the Government of Sudan, its agencies, 
instrumentalities, and controlled entities, including the 
Central Bank of Sudan, that are in the United States, that 
hereafter come within the United States, or that are or 
hereafter come within the possession or control of U.S. 
persons, including their overseas branches. The SSR also 
prohibit (1) the importation into the United States of any 
goods or services of Sudanese origin except for information or 
informational materials; (2) the exportation or reexportation 
of goods, technology, or services, to Sudan or the Government 
of Sudan except for information or informational materials and 
donations of humanitarian aid; (3) the facilitation by a U.S. 
person of the exportation or reexportation of goods, 
technology, or services to or from Sudan; (4) the performance 
by any U.S. person of any contract including a financing 
contract, in support of an industrial, commercial, public 
utility, or governmental project in Sudan; (5) the grant or 
extension of credits or loans by any U.S. person to the 
Government of Sudan; and (6) transactions relating to the 
transportation or cargo.
    3. Since the issuance of Executive Order 13067, OFAC has 
made numerous decisions with respect to applications for 
authorizations to engage in transactions under the Sudanese 
sanctions. As of March 23, 1999, OFAC has issued 68 
authorizations to non-governmental organizations engaged in the 
delivery of humanitarian aid and 198 licenses to others. OFAC 
has denied many requests for licenses. The majority of 
denialswere in response to requests to authorize commercial 
exports to Sudan--particularly of machinery and equipment for 
various industries-- and the importation of Sudanese-origin 
goods. The majority of licenses issued permitted the unblocking 
of financial transactions for individual remitters who 
inadvertently routed their funds through blocked Sudanese 
banks. Other licenses authorized the completion of diplomatic 
transfers, pre-effective date trade transactions, intellectual 
property protection, the performance of certain legal services, 
and transactions relating to air and sea safety policy.
    4. At the time of signing Executive Order 13067, I directed 
the Secretary of the Treasury to block all property and 
interests in property of persons determined, in consultation 
with the Secretary of State, to be owned or controlled by, or 
to act for or on behalf of, the Government of Sudan. On 
November 5, 1997, OFAC disseminated details of this program to 
the financial, securities, and international trade communities 
by both electronic and conventional media. This information 
included the names of 62 entities owned or controlled by the 
Government of Sudan. The list includes 12 financial 
institutions and 50 other enterprises. As of March 17, 1999, 
OFAC has blocked approximately $730,000 during this reporting 
period.
    5. During this reporting period, OFAC has collected three 
civil monetary penalties totaling more than $13,000 from three 
U.S. financial institutions for violations of IEEPA and the 
SSR. The violations related to funds transfers in which the 
Government of Sudan or an entity owned or controlled by the 
Government of Sudan had an interest or which involved 
commercial transactions relating to Sudan. OFAC, in cooperation 
with the U.S. Customs Service, is closely monitoring potential 
violations of the import prohibitions of the Regulations by 
businesses and individuals. Various reports of violations are 
being pursued aggressively.
    6. The expenses incurred by the Federal Government in the 
six-month period from November 3, 1998, through May 2, 1999, 
that are directly attributable to the exercise of powers and 
authorities conferred by the declaration of a national 
emergency with respect to Sudan are reported to be 
approximately $360,000, most of which represent wage and salary 
costs of Federal personnel. Personnel costs were largely 
centered in the Department of the Treasury (particularly in the 
Office of Foreign Assets Control, the U.S. Customs Service, the 
Office of the Under Secretary for Enforcement, and the Office 
of the General Counsel), the Department of State (particularly 
the Bureaus of Economic and Business Affairs, African Affairs, 
Near Eastern Affairs, Consular Affairs, and the Office of the 
Legal Adviser), and the Department of Commerce (the Bureau of 
Export Administration and the General Counsel's Office).
    7. The situation in Sudan continues to present an 
extraordinary and unusual threat to the national security and 
foreign policy of the United States. The declaration of the 
national emergency with respect to Sudan contained in Executive 
Order 13067 underscores the United States Government's 
opposition to the actions and policies of the Government of 
Sudan, particularly its support of international terrorism and 
its failure to respect basic human rights including freedom of 
religion. The prohibitions contained in Executive Order 13067 
advance important objectives in promoting the anti-terrorism 
and human rights policies of the United States. I shall 
exercise the powers at my disposal to deal with these problems 
and will continue to report periodically to the Congress on 
significant developments.

    (3) Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Sudan

                            The White House

                     Office of the Press Secretary

  Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of 
            Representatives and the President of the Senate

October 27, 1998

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
    Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 
1622(d)) provides for the automatic termination of a national 
emergency unless, prior to the anniversary date of its 
declaration, the President publishes in the Federal Register 
and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the 
emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date. 
In accordance with this provision, I have sent the enclosed 
notice to the Federal Register for publication, stating that 
the Sudanese emergency is to continue in effect beyond November 
3, 1998.
    The crisis between the United States and Sudan that led to 
the declaration on November 3, 1997, of a national emergency 
has not been resolved. The Government of Sudan continues to 
support international terrorism and engage in human rights 
violations, including the denial of religious freedom. Such 
Sudanese actions pose a continuing unusual and extraordinary 
threat to the national security and foreign policy of the 
United States. For these reasons, I have determined that it is 
necessary to maintain in force the broad authorities necessary 
to apply economic pressure on the Government of Sudan.
    Sincerely,

    William J. Clinton

                                 Notice

            Continuation of Emergency with Respect to Sudan

    On November 3, 1997, by Executive Order 13067, I declared a 
national emergency to deal with the unusual and extraordinary 
threat to the national security and foreign policy of the 
United States constituted by the actions and policies of the 
Government of Sudan. By Executive Order 13067, I imposed trade 
sanctions on Sudan and blocked Sudanese government assets. 
Because the Government of Sudan has continued its activities 
hostile to United States interests, the national emergency 
declared on November 3, 1997, and the measures adopted on that 
date to deal with that emergency must continue in effect beyond 
November 3, 1998. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) 
of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am 
continuing the national emergency for 1 year with respect to 
Sudan.
    This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and 
transmitted to the Congress.

    William J. Clinton
    The White House, October 27, 1998.

    (4) Report to Congress on Developments Concerning the National 
                   Emergency with Respect to Iran \1\

Message from the President of the United States transmitting a 6-month 
periodic report on the national emergency with respect to Iran that was 
  declared in Executive Order 12957 of March 15, 1995, pursuant to 50 
                             U.S.C. 1641(c)

 President's Periodic Report on the National Emergency with Respect to 
                                  Iran

    I hereby report to the Congress on developments concerning 
the national emergency with respect to Iran that was declared 
in Executive Order 12957 of March 15, 1995, and matters 
relating to the measures in that order and in Executive Order 
12959 of May 6, 1995, and in Executive Order 13059 of August 
19, 1997. This report is submitted pursuant to section 204(c) 
of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 
1703(c) (IEEPA), section 401(c) of the National Emergencies 
Act, 50 U.S.C. 1641(c), and section 505(c) of the International 
Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, 22 U.S.C. 
2349aa-9(c). This report discusses only matters concerning the 
national emergency with respect to Iran that was declared in 
Executive Order 12957 and does not deal with those relating to 
the emergency declared on November 14, 1979, in connection with 
the hostage crisis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ House Document 106-40, March 15, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    1. On March 15, 1995, I issued Executive Order 12957 (60 
Fed. Reg. 14615, March 17, 1995) to declare a national 
emergency with respect to Iran pursuant to IEEPA, and to 
prohibit the financing, management, or supervision by United 
States persons of the development of Iranian petroleum 
resources. This action was in response to actions and policies 
of the Government of Iran, including support for international 
terrorism, efforts to undermine the Middle East peace process, 
and the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and the 
means to deliver them. A copy of the Order was provided to the 
Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate by letter 
dated March 15, 1995.
    Following the imposition of these restrictions with regard 
to the development of Iranian petroleum resources, Iran 
continued to engage in activities that represent a threat to 
the peace and security of all nations, including Iran's 
continuing support for international terrorism, its support for 
acts that undermine the Middle East peace process, and its 
intensified efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. On 
May 6, 1995, I issued Executive Order 12959 (60 Fed. Reg. 
24757, May 9, 1995) to further respond to the Iranian threat to 
the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the 
United States. The terms of that order and an earlier order 
imposing an import ban on Iranian-origin goods and services 
(Executive Order 12613 of October 29, 1987) were consolidated 
and clarified in Executive Order 13059 of August 19, 1997.
    At the time of signing Executive Order 12959, I directed 
the Secretary of the Treasury to authorize through specific 
licensing certain transactions, including transactions by 
United States persons related to the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal in The Hague, established pursuant to the Algiers 
Accords, and related to other international obligations and 
U.S. Government functions, and transactions related to the 
export of agricultural commodities pursuant to preexisting 
contracts consistent with section 5712(c) of title 7, United 
States Code. I also directed the Secretary of the Treasury, in 
consultation with the Secretary of State, to consider 
authorizing United States persons through specific licensing to 
participate in market-based swaps of crude oil from the Caspian 
Sea area for Iranian crude oil in support of energy projects in 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan.
    Executive Order 12959 revoked sections 1 and 2 of Executive 
Order 12613 of October 29, 1987, and sections 1 and 2 of 
Executive Order 12957 of March 15, 1995, to the extent they are 
inconsistent with it. A copy of Executive Order 12959 was 
transmitted to the Congressional leadership by letter dated May 
6, 1995.
    2. On August 19, 1997, I issued Executive Order 13059 in 
order to clarify the steps taken in Executive Order 12957 and 
Executive Order 12959, to confirm that the embargo on Iran 
prohibits all trade and investment activities by United States 
persons, wherever located, and to consolidate in one order the 
various prohibitions previously imposed to deal with the 
national emergency declared on March 15, 1995. A copy of the 
Order was transmitted to the Speaker of the House and the 
President of the Senate by letter dated August 19, 1997.
    The Order prohibits (1) the importation into the United 
States of any goods or services of Iranian origin or owned or 
controlled by the Government of Iran except information or 
informational material; (2) the exportation, reexportation, 
sale, or supply from the United States or by a United States 
person, wherever located, of goods, technology, or services to 
Iran or the Government of Iran, including knowing transfers to 
a third country for direct or indirect supply, transshipment, 
or reexportation to Iran or the Government of Iran, or 
specifically for use in the production, commingling with, or 
incorporation into goods, technology, or services to be 
supplied, trans-shipped, or reexported exclusively or 
predominantly to Iran or the Government of Iran; (3) knowing 
reexportation from a third country to Iran or the Government of 
Iran of certain controlled U.S.-origin goods, technology, or 
services by a person other than a United States person; (4) the 
purchase, sale, transport, swap, brokerage, approval, 
financing, facilitation, guarantee, or other transactions or 
dealings by United States persons, wherever located, related to 
goods, technology, or services for exportation, reexportation, 
sale or supply, directly or indirectly, to Iran or the 
Government of Iran, or to goods or services of Iranian origin 
or owned or controlled by the Government of Iran; (5) new 
investment by United States persons in Iran or in property or 
entities owned or controlled by the Government of Iran; (6) 
approval, financing, facilitation, or guarantee by a United 
States person of any transaction by a foreign person that a 
United States person would be prohibited from performing under 
the terms of the Order; and (7) any transaction that evades, 
avoids, or attempts to violate a prohibition under the Order.
    Executive Order 13059 became effective at 12:01 a.m., 
eastern daylight time on August 20, 1997. Because the Order 
consolidated and clarified the provisions of prior orders, 
Executive Order 12613 and paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d) and (f) 
of section 1 of Executive Order 12959 were revoked by Executive 
Order 13059. The revocation of corresponding provisions in the 
prior Executive orders did not affect the applicability of 
those provisions, or of regulations, licenses or other 
administrative actions taken pursuant to those provisions, with 
respect to any transaction or violation occurring before the 
effective date of Executive Order 13059. Specific licenses 
issued pursuant to prior Executive orders continue in effect, 
unless revoked or amended by the Secretary of the Treasury. 
General licenses, regulations, orders, and directives issued 
pursuant to prior orders continue in effect, except to the 
extent inconsistent with Executive Order 13059 or otherwise 
revoked or modified by the Secretary of the Treasury.
    The declaration of national emergency made by Executive 
Order 12957, and renewed each year since, remains in effect and 
is not affected by the Order.
    3. On March 10, 1999, I renewed for another year the 
national emergency with respect to Iran pursuant to IEEPA. This 
renewal extended the authority for the current comprehensive 
trade embargo against Iran in effect since May 1995. Under 
these sanctions, virtually all trade with Iran is prohibited 
except for trade in information and informational materials and 
certain other limited exceptions.
    4. There has been one amendment to the Iranian Transactions 
Regulations, 31 CFR Part 560 (the ``ITR''), since my report of 
September 16, 1998. On November 10, 1998, section 560.603 was 
amended to eliminate dealings in Iranian-origin petrochemicals 
from the definition of `reportable transactions' and to 
terminate the reporting requirement for subsidiaries' sales of 
oilfield supplies and equipment (63 Fed. Reg. 62940, November 
10, 1998). The revised section 560.603 retains the reporting 
requirements covering crude oil and natural gas. A copy of the 
amendment is attached to this report.
    5. During the current 6-month period, the Department of the 
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) made 
numerous decisions with respect to applications for licenses to 
engage in transactions under the ITR, and issued 14 licenses. 
The majority of denials were in response to requests to 
authorize commercial exports to Iran--particularly of machinery 
and equipment for various industries--and the importation of 
Iranian-origin goods. The licenses that were issued authorized 
certain administrative, diplomatic, and financial transactions, 
and the importation of art objects for public exhibition. 
Pursuant to sections 3 and 4 of Executive Order 12959, 
Executive Order 13059, and consistent with statutory 
restrictions concerning certain goods and technology, including 
those involved in air safety cases, Treasury continues to 
consult with the Departments of State and Commerce prior to 
issuing licenses.
    Since September 15, 1998, more than 900 financial 
transactions involving Iran initially have been ``rejected'' by 
U.S. financial institutions based on their possible 
constituting transactions prohibited by IEEPA and the ITR. U.S. 
banks declined to process these instructions in the absence of 
OFAC authorization. Twelve percent of the 900 transactions 
scrutinized by OFAC resulted in investigations by OFAC to 
assure compliance with regulations by United States persons. As 
of January 29, 1999, such investigations have resulted in 15 
referrals for civil penalty action and the issuance of 36 
warning letters involving de minimis transactions. Numerous 
other cases are still undergoing compliance or legal review 
prior to final agency action.
    Since my last report, OFAC has collected nearly $380,000 in 
civil monetary penalties from one U.S. financial institution, 
three companies, and eight individuals for violations of IEEPA 
and the Regulations.
    6. On October 6, 1998, a Federal Grand Jury in Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin, returned a five-count indictment against a Wisconsin 
corporation and two if its officers for transactions relating 
to the illegal exportation of U.S. origin aircraft parts to 
Iran. Trial is scheduled for March 1999. On December 2, 1998, a 
Federal Grand Jury in Atlanta, Georgia, returned a 24-count 
indictment against a Georgia corporation and two of its 
officers for transactions relating to the illegal exportation 
of automobile parts to Iran.
    The U.S. Customs Service has continued to effect numerous 
seizures of Iranian-origin merchandise, primarily carpets, for 
violation of the import prohibitions of the ITR. Various 
enforcement actions carried over from previous reporting 
periods are continuing and new reports of violations are being 
aggressively pursued.
    7. The expenses incurred by the Federal Government in the 
6-month period from September 15, 1998 through March 14, 1999, 
that are directly attributable to the exercise of powers and 
authorities conferred by the declaration of a national 
emergency with respect to Iran are reported to be approximately 
$1.2 million, most of which represent wage and salary costs for 
Federal personnel. Personnel costs were largely centered in the 
Department of the Treasury (particularly in the Office of 
Foreign Assets Control, the U.S. Customs Service, the Office of 
the Under Secretary for Enforcement, and the Office of the 
General Counsel), the Department of State (particularly the 
Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, the Bureau of Near 
Eastern Affairs, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and 
the Office of the Legal Adviser), and the Department of 
Commerce (the Bureau of Export Administration and the General 
Counsel's Office).
    8. The situation reviewed above continues to present an 
extraordinary and unusual threat to the national security, 
foreign policy, and economy of the United States. The 
declaration of the national emergency with respect to Iran 
contained in Executive Order 12957 and the comprehensive 
economic sanctions imposed by Executive Order 12959 underscore 
the Government's opposition to the actions and policies of the 
Government of Iran, particularly its support of international 
terrorism and its efforts to acquire weapons of mass 
destruction and the means to deliver them. The Iranian 
Transactions Regulations issued pursuant to Executive Orders 
12957, 12959, and 13059 continue to advance important 
objectives in promoting the nonproliferation and anti-terrorism 
policies of the United States. I shall exercise the powers at 
my disposal to deal with these problems and will report 
periodically to the Congress on significant developments.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    (5) Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Iran

                            The White House

                     Office of the Press Secretary

March 10, 1999
      
To the Congress of the United States:
    Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 
1622(d)) provides for the automatic termination of a national 
emergency unless, prior to the anniversary date of its 
declaration, the President publishes in the Federal Register 
and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the 
emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date. 
In accordance with this provision, I have sent the enclosed 
notice, stating that the national emergency declared with 
respect to Iran on March 15, 1995, pursuant to the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-
1706) is to continue in effect beyond March 15, 1999, to the 
Federal Register for publication. This emergency is separate 
from that declared on November 14, 1979, in connection with the 
Iranian hostage crisis and therefore requires separate renewal 
of emergency authorities. The last notice of continuation was 
published in the Federal Register on March 6, 1998.
    The factors that led me to declare a national emergency 
with respect to Iran on March 15, 1995, have not been resolved. 
The actions and policies of the Government of Iran, including 
support for international terrorism, its efforts to undermine 
the Middle East peace process, and its acquisition of weapons 
of mass destruction and the means to deliver them, continue to 
threaten the national security, foreign policy, and economy of 
the United States. Accordingly, I have determined that it is 
necessary to maintain in force the broad programs I have 
authorized pursuant to the March 15, 1995, declaration of 
emergency.

    William J. Clinton
    The White House, March 10, 1999.

                                 NOTICE

                     Continuation of Iran Emergency

    On March 15, 1995, by Executive Order 12957, I declared a 
national emergency with respect to Iran pursuant to the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-
1706) to deal with the threat to the national security, foreign 
policy, and economy of the United States constituted by the 
actions and policies of the Government of Iran, including its 
support for international terrorism, efforts to undermine the 
Middle East peace process, and acquisition of weapons of mass 
destruction and the means to deliver them. On May 6, 1995, I 
issued Executive Order 12959 imposing more comprehensive 
sanctions to further respond to this threat, and on August 19, 
1997, I issued Executive Order 13059 consolidating and 
clarifying these previous orders. The last notice of 
continuation was published in the Federal Register on March 6, 
1998.
    Because the actions and policies of the Government of Iran 
continue to threaten the national security, foreign policy, and 
economy of the United States, the national emergency declared 
on March 15, 1995, must continue in effect beyond March 15, 
1999. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the 
National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing 
the national emergency with respect to Iran. Because the 
emergency declared by Executive Order 12957 constitutes an 
emergency separate from that declared on November 14, 1979, by 
Executive Order 12170, this renewal is distinct from the 
emergency renewal of November 1998. This notice shall be 
published in the Federal Register and transmitted to the 
Congress.

    William J. Clinton
    The White House, March 10, 1999.

    (6) Report to Congress on Developments Concerning the National 
Emergency Declared in Executive Order 12947, with Respect to Terrorists 
       Who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process \1\

Message from the President of the United States transmitting a 6-month 
 periodic report on the national emergency with respect to terrorists 
who threaten to disrupt the Middle East peace process that was declared 
  in Executive Order 12947 of January 23, 1995, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 
                                1703(c)

 President's Periodic Report on the National Emergency with Respect to 
    Terrorists who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process

    I hereby report to the Congress on developments concerning 
the national emergency with respect to terrorists who threaten 
to disrupt the Middle East peace process that was declared in 
Executive Order 12947 of January 23, 1995. This report is 
submitted pursuant to section 401(c) of the National 
Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1641(c), and section 204(c) of the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. 
1703(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ House Document 106-106, July 30, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    1. On January 23, 1995, I signed Executive Order 12947, 
``Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists Who Threaten To 
Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process'' (the ``Order'') (60 
Fed. Reg. 5079, January 25, 1995). The Order blocks all 
property subject to U.S. jurisdiction in which there is any 
interest of 12 terrorist organizations that threaten the Middle 
East peace process as identified in an Annex to the Order. The 
Order also blocks the property and interests in property 
subject to U.S. jurisdiction of persons designated by the 
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the 
Treasury and the Attorney General, who are found (1) to have 
committed, or to pose a significant risk of committing, acts of 
violence that have the purpose or effect of disrupting the 
Middle East peace process, or (2) to assist in, sponsor, or 
provide financial, material, or technological support for, or 
services in support of, such acts of violence. In addition, the 
Order blocks all property and interests in property subject to 
U.S. jurisdiction in which there is any interest of persons 
determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in coordination 
with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, to be 
owned or controlled by, or to act for or on behalf of, any 
other person designated pursuant to the Order (collectively 
``Specially Designated Terrorists'' or ``SDTs''.
    The Order further prohibits any transaction or dealing by a 
United States person or within the United States in property or 
interests in property of SDTs, including the making or 
receiving of any contribution of funds, goods, or services to 
or for the benefit of such persons. This prohibition includes 
donations that are intended to relieve human suffering.
    Designations of persons blocked pursuant to the Order are 
effective upon the date of determination by the Secretary of 
State or her delegate, or the Director of the Office of Foreign 
Assets Control (``OFAC'') acting under authority delegated by 
the Secretary of the Treasury. Public notice of blocking is 
effective upon the date of filing with the Federal Register, or 
upon prior actual notice.
    Because terrorist activities continue to threaten the 
Middle East peace process and vital interests of the United 
States in the Middle East, on January 21, 1999, I continued for 
another year the national emergency declared on January 23, 
1995, and the measures that took effect on January 24, 1995, to 
deal with that emergency. This action was taken in accordance 
with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 
1622(d)).
    2. On January 25, 1995, the Department of the Treasury 
issued a notice listing persons blocked pursuant to Executive 
Order 12947 who have been designated by the President as 
terrorist organizations threatening the Middle East peace 
process or who have been found to be owned or controlled by, or 
to be acting for or on behalf of, these terrorist organizations 
(60 Fed. Reg. 5084, January 25, 1995). The notice identified 31 
entities that act for or on behalf of the 12 Middle East 
terrorist organizations listed in the Annex to Executive Order 
12947, as well as 18 individuals who are leaders or 
representatives of these groups. In addition, the notice 
provided 9 name variations or pseudonyms used by the 18 
individuals identified. The list identifies blocked persons who 
have been found to have committed, or to pose a significant 
risk of committing, acts of violence that have the purpose or 
effect of disrupting the Middle East peace process or to have 
assisted in, sponsored, or provided financial, material or 
technological support for, or services in support of, such acts 
of violence, or are owned or controlled by, or act for or on 
behalf of other blocked persons. The Department of the Treasury 
issued three additional notices adding the names of three 
individuals, as well as their pseudonyms, to the List of SDTs 
(60 Fed. Reg. 41152, August 11, 1995; 60 Fed. Reg. 41152, 
August 11, 1995; 60 Fed. Reg. 44932, August 29, 1995; and 60 
Fed. Reg. 58435, November 27, 1995).
    On August 20, 1998, I signed Executive Order 13099 (63 Fed. 
Reg. 45167, August 20, 1998) amending Executive Order 12947 by 
adding Usama bin Muhammad bin Awad bin Ladin (a.k.a. Usama bin 
Ladin) and two of his associates, Abu Hafa al-Marsi and Rifai 
Ahmad Taha Musa, and the Islamic Army to the Annex of Executive 
Order 12947 as terrorists who threaten to disrupt the Middle 
East peace process. Executive Order 13099 does not limit or 
otherwise affect the other provisions of Executive Order 12947.
    3. On February 2, 1996, OFAC issued the Terrorism Sanctions 
Regulations (the ``TSRs'' or the ``Regulations'') (61 Fed. Reg. 
3805, February 2, 1996). The TSRs implement the President's 
declaration of a national emergency and imposition of sanctions 
against certain persons whose acts of violence have the purpose 
or effect of disrupting the Middle East peace process. Pursuant 
to Executive Order 13099 of August 20, 1998, ``Prohibiting 
Transactions with Terrorists who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle 
East Peace Process,'' (63 Fed. Reg. 45167, 3 C.F.R., 1998 
Comp., p. 208) and the Regulations, on June 28, 1999, OFAC 
amended appendix A to 31 C.F.R. chapter V by adding three 
individuals and one organization as persons who have been 
designated in the Executive Order as terrorists who threaten to 
disrupt the Middle East peace process or STDs (64 Fed. Reg. 
35575, 31 C.F.R., July 1, 1999).
    4. Since the signing of Executive Order 12947 in January 
1995 through June 1998, more than $650,000 in assets in which 
STDs have an interest were blocked. The blocking of these 
assets, consisting of funds and real property, stopped their 
conversion or other disposal for the benefit of the STDs having 
an interest in them. In June 1998, assets totaling $1.2 
million, including a large portion of the assets previously 
blocked, were seized pursuant to civil forfeiture statutes.
    Following the issuance of Executive Order 13099, several 
million dollars in STD-related funds were blocked in aid of 
investigation. On May 3, 1999, a determination was made to 
unblock the funds in light of pending lawsuits filed seeking to 
release the funds, the information then at the government's 
disposal, and following consultations with the Department of 
Justice. Federal agencies will continue to work closely to 
identify and block assets in which STDs have an interest and 
will vigorously implement Executive Orders 12947 and 13099 
against Usama bin Ladin and other Middle East terrorists.
    5. Since January 25, 1995, OFAC has issued nine licenses 
pursuant to the Regulations. These licenses authorize payment 
of legal expenses of individuals and the disbursement of funds 
for normal expenditures for the maintenance of family members, 
the employment, receipt of salary and payment of educational 
expenses for an STD, secure storage of tangible assets of STDs, 
and certain administrative transactions of individuals 
designated pursuant to Executive Order 12947.
    6. The expenses incurred by the Federal Government in the 
6-month period from January 23 through July 22, 1999, that are 
directly attributable to the exercise of powers and authorities 
conferred by the declaration of the national emergency with 
respect to organizations that disrupt the Middle East peace 
process, are estimated at approximately $4.2 million. This 
amount reflects additional personnel costs not previously 
identified as being directly associated with the administration 
of this program.
    7. Executive Orders 12947 and 13099 provide this 
Administration with a tool for combating fund raising in this 
country on behalf of organizations that use terror to undermine 
the Middle East peace process. The orders makes it harder for 
such groups to finance these criminal activities by cutting off 
their access to sources of support in the United States and to 
U.S. financial facilities. It is also intended to reach 
charitable contributions to designated organizations and 
individuals to preclude diversion of such donations to 
terrorist activities.
    The Executive Orders demonstrate the United States 
determination to confront and combat those who would seek to 
destroy the Middle East peace process, and our commitment to 
the global fight against terrorism. I shall continue to 
exercise the powers at my disposal to apply economic sanctions 
against extremists seeking to destroy the hopes of peaceful 
coexistence between Arabs and Israelis as long as these 
measures are appropriate, and will continue to report 
periodically to the Congress on significant developments 
pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 1703(c).

    (7) Report to Congress on an Amendment to Executive Order 12947 
  Responding to the Worldwide Threat Posed by Foreign Terrorists Who 
           Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process

                            The White House

                     Office of the Press Secretary

  Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of 
            Representatives and the President of the Senate

August 20, 1998
      
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
    On January 23, 1995, in light of the threat posed by grave 
acts of violence committed by foreign terrorists that disrupt 
the Middle East peace process, using my authority under, inter 
alia, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), I declared a national emergency and 
issued Executive Order 12947. Because such terrorist activities 
continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the 
national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United 
States, I have renewed the national emergency declared in 
Executive Order 12947 annually, most recently on January 21, 
1998. Pursuant to section 204(b) of the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703(b)) and section 201 of the 
National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1631), I hereby report to 
the Congress that I have exercised my statutory authority to 
issue an Executive Order that amends Executive Order 12947 in 
order more effectively to respond to the worldwide threat posed 
by foreign terrorists.
    The amendment to the Annex of Executive Order 12947 adds 
Usama bin Muhammad bin Awad bin Ladin (a.k.a. Usama bin Ladin), 
Islamic Army, Abu Hafs al-Masri, and Rifa'i Ahmad Taha Musa to 
the list of terrorists that are subject to the prohibitions 
contained in the Executive Order. These prohibitions include 
the blocking of all property and interests in the property of 
the terrorists listed in the Annex, the prohibition of any 
transaction or dealing by United States persons or within the 
United States in property or interests in property of the 
persons designated, and the prohibition of any transaction by 
any United States persons or within the United States that 
evades or avoids, or has the purpose of evading or avoiding, 
any of the prohibitions set forth in the Executive Order.
    Usama bin Ladin and his organizations and associates have 
repeatedly called upon their supporters to perform acts of 
violence. Bin Ladin has declared that killing Americans and 
their allies ``is an individual duty for every Muslim . . . in 
order to liberate the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Holy Mosque.'' 
These threats are clearly intended to violently disrupt the 
Middle East peace process.
    This Executive Order does not limit or otherwise affect the 
other provisions of Executive Order 12947.
    I have authorized these actions in view of the danger posed 
to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the 
United States by the activities of Usama bin Muhammad bin Awad 
bin Ladin (a.k.a. Usama bin Ladin), Islamic Army, Abu Hafs al-
Masri, and Rifa'i Ahmad Taha Musa that disrupt the Middle East 
peace process. I am enclosing a copy of the Executive Order 
that I have issued exercising my emergency authorities.
    Sincerely,
    William J. Clinton

                         Executive Order 13099

 Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists who Threaten to Disrupt the 
                       Middle East Peace Process

    By the authority vested in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, 
including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 
1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,
    I, WILLIAM J. CLINTON, President of the United States of 
America, in order to take additional steps with respect to 
grave acts of violence committed by foreign terrorists that 
disrupt the Middle East peace process and the national 
emergency described and declared in Executive Order 12947 of 
January 23, 1995, hereby order:
    Section 1. The title of the Annex to Executive Order 12947 
of January 23, 1995, is revised to read ``Terrorists who 
Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process.''
    Sec. 2. The Annex to Executive Order 12947 of January 23, 
1995, is amended by adding thereto the following persons in 
appropriate alphabetical order:

  Usama bin Muhammad bin Awad bin Ladin (a.k.a. Usama bin 
            Ladin) Islamic Army (a.k.a. Al-Qaida, Islamic 
            Salvation Foundation, The Islamic Army for the 
            Liberation of the Holy Places, The World Islamic 
            Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, and The 
            Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites)
  Abu Hafs al-Masri
  Rifa'i Ahmad Taha Musa

    Sec. 3. Nothing contained in this order shall create any 
right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any 
party against the United States, its agencies or 
instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other 
person.
    Sec. 4. (a) This order is effective at 12:01 a.m., eastern 
daylight time on August 21, 1998.
    (b) This order shall be transmitted to the Congress and 
published in the Federal Register.
    William J. Clinton
    The White House, August 20, 1998.

(8) Continuation of the National Emergency Declared in Executive Order 
 12947, with Respect to Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle 
                           East Peace Process

                            The White House

                     Office of the Press Secretary

  Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of 
            Representatives and the President of the Senate

January 20, 1999
      
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
    Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 
1622(d)) provides for the automatic termination of a national 
emergency unless, prior to the anniversary date of its 
declaration, the President publishes in the Federal Register 
and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the 
emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date. 
In accordance with this provision, I have sent the enclosed 
notice, stating that the emergency declared with respect to 
grave acts of violence committed by foreign terrorists that 
disrupt the Middle East peace process is to continue in effect 
beyond January 23, 1999, to the Federal Register for 
publication. The most recent notice continuing this emergency 
was published in the Federal Register on January 22, 1998.
    The crisis with respect to the grave acts of violence 
committed by foreign terrorists that threaten to disrupt the 
Middle East peace process that led to the declaration on 
January 23, 1995, of a national emergency has not been 
resolved. Terrorist groups continue to engage in activities 
with the purpose or effect of threatening the Middle East peace 
process, and which are hostile to United States interests in 
the region.
    Such actions threaten vital interests of the national 
security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. On 
August 20, 1998, I identified four additional persons, 
including Usama bin Ladin, that threaten to disrupt the Middle 
East peace process. For these reasons, I have determined that 
it is necessary to maintain in force the broad authorities 
necessary to deny any financial support from the United States 
for foreign terrorists that threaten to disrupt the Middle East 
peace process.
    Sincerely,

    William J. Clinton

                                 Notice

Continuation of Emergency Regarding Terrorists who Threaten to Disrupt 
                     the Middle East Peace Process

    On January 23, 1995, by Executive Order 12947, I declared a 
national emergency to deal with the unusual and extraordinary 
threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of 
the United States constituted by grave acts of violence 
committed by foreign terrorists that disrupt the Middle East 
peace process. By Executive Order 12947 of January 23, 1995, I 
blocked the assets in the United States, or in the control of 
United States persons, of foreign terrorists who threaten to 
disrupt the Middle East peace process. I also prohibited 
transactions or dealings by United States persons in such 
property. On August 20, 1998, by Executive Order 13099, I 
identified four additional persons, including Usama bin Ladin, 
that threaten to disrupt the Middle East peace process. I have 
annually transmitted notices of the continuation of this 
national emergency to the Congress and the Federal Register. 
Last year's notice of continuation was published in the Federal 
Register on January 22, 1998.
    Because terrorist activities continue to threaten the 
Middle East peace process and vital interests of the United 
States in the Middle East, the national emergency declared on 
January 23, 1995, and the measures that took effect on January 
24, 1995, to deal with that emergency must continue in effect 
beyond January 23, 1999. Therefore, in accordance with section 
202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I 
am continuing the national emergency with respect to foreign 
terrorists who threaten to disrupt the Middle East peace 
process.
    This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and 
transmitted to the Congress.

    William J. Clinton
    The White House, January 20, 1999.

 (9) Report and Notice to Congress on the Continuation of the National 
       Emergency with Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction \1\

Message from the President of the United States transmitting a 6-month 
 report on the national emergency declared by Executive Order 12938 of 
November 14, 1994, in response to the threat posed by the proliferation 
   of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and of the means of 
         delivering such weapons, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 1703(c)

Report to the Congress on the National Emergency Concerning Weapons of 
                            Mass Destruction

    On November 14, 1994, in light of the dangers of the 
proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons 
(``weapons of mass destruction''--WMD) and of the means of 
delivering such weapons, I issued Executive Order 12938, and 
declared a national emergency under the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). Under section 
202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), the 
national emergency terminates on the anniversary date of its 
declaration, unless I publish in the Federal Register and 
transmit to the Congress a notice of its continuation. Because 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their 
means of delivery continues to pose an unusual and 
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, 
and economy of the United States, on November 12, 1998, I 
extended the national emergency declared in Executive Order 
12938.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ House Document 106-93, July 14, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The following report is made pursuant to section 204 of the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703) 
and section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 
1641(c)), regarding activities taken and money spent pursuant 
to the emergency declaration. Additional information on 
nuclear, missile, and/or chemical and biological weapons (CBW) 
nonproliferation efforts is contained in the most recent annual 
Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and Essential 
Components of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, 
provided to the Congress pursuant to section 1097 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 
1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as the ``Nonproliferation 
Report,'' and the most recent annual report provided to the 
Congress pursuant to section 308 of the Chemical and Biological 
Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (Public Law 
102-182), also known as the ``CBW Report.''
    On July 28, 1998, in E.O. 13094, I amended section 4 of 
E.O. 12938 so that the United States Government could more 
effectively respond to the worldwide threat of weapons of mass 
destruction proliferation activities. The amendment to section 
4 strengthens Executive Order 12938 in several significant 
ways. The amendment broadens the type of proliferation activity 
that subjects entities to potential penalties under the 
Executive Order. The original Executive Order provided for 
penalties for contributions to the efforts of any foreign 
country, project or entity to use, acquire, design, produce, or 
stockpile chemical or biological weapons; the amended Executive 
Order also covers contributions to foreign programs for nuclear 
weapons and for missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass 
destruction. Moreover, the amendment expands the original 
Executive Order to include attempts to contribute to foreign 
proliferation activities, as well as actual contributions, and 
broadens the range of potential penalties to expressly include 
the prohibition of United States Government assistance to 
foreign persons, and the prohibition of imports into the United 
States and U.S. Government procurement.

                            Nuclear Weapons

    In May 1998, India and Pakistan each conducted a series of 
nuclear tests. World reaction included nearly universal 
condemnation across a broad range of international fora and 
multilateral support for a broad range of sanctions, including 
new restrictions on lending by international financial 
institutions unrelated to basic human needs and aid from the G-
8 and other countries.
    Since the mandatory imposition of U.S. sanctions, we have 
worked unilaterally, with other P-5 and G-8 members, and 
through the U.N., to dissuade India and Pakistan from taking 
further steps toward developing nuclear weapons. We have urged 
them to join multilateral arms control efforts, to prevent a 
regional arms race and build confidence by practicing 
restraint, and to resume efforts to resolve their differences 
through dialogue. The P-5, G-8, and U.N. Security Council have 
called on India and Pakistan to take a broad range of concrete 
actions. The United States has focused most intensely on 
several objectives that can be met over the short and medium 
term: an end to nuclear testing and prompt, unconditional 
adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); 
a moratorium on production of fissile material for nuclear 
weapons and other explosive devices, and engagement in 
productive negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty 
(FMCT); restraint in deployment of nuclear-capable missiles and 
aircraft; and adoption of controls meeting international 
standards on exports of sensitive materials and technology.
    Against this backdrop of international pressure on India 
and Pakistan, high-level U.S. dialogues with Indian and 
Pakistani officials have yielded some progress. Both 
governments, having already declared testing moratoria, 
indicated they are prepared to adhere to the CTBT by September 
1999 under certain conditions. Both India and Pakistan withdrew 
their opposition to negotiations on an FMCT in Geneva at the 
end of the 1998 Conference on Disarmament session. They have 
also pledged, in the last two rounds of discussions, to 
institute strict control of sensitive exports that meet 
internationally accepted standards. In addition, they have 
resumed their bilateral dialogue on outstanding disputes, 
including Kashmir, at the Foreign Secretary level. We will 
continue discussions with both governments at the senior and 
expert levels, and our diplomatic efforts in concert with P-5, 
G-8, and in international fora.
    The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North 
Korea) continues to maintain a freeze on its nuclear facilities 
consistent with the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, which 
calls for the immediate freezing and eventual dismantling of 
the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and reprocessing plant 
at Yongbyon and Taechon. The United States has raised its 
concerns with the DPRK about a suspect underground site under 
construction, possibly intended to support nuclear activities 
contrary to the Agreed Framework. In March 1999, the United 
States reached agreement with the DPRK for visits by a team of 
U.S. experts to the facility.
    The framework requires the DPRK to come into full 
compliance with its NPT and IAEA obligations as a part of a 
process that also included the supply of two light water 
reactors to North Korea. U.S. experts remain on-site in North 
Korea working to complete clean-up operations after largely 
finishing the canning of spent fuel from the North's 5-megawatt 
nuclear reactor.
    So far, 152 countries have signed and 34 have ratified the 
CTBT. During 1998, CTBT signatories conducted numerous meetings 
of the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) in Vienna, seeking to 
promote rapid completion of the International Monitoring System 
(IMS) established by the Treaty.
    On September 22, 1997, I transmitted the CTBT to the 
Senate, requesting prompt advice and consent to ratification. 
The CTBT will serve several U.S. national security interests by 
prohibiting all nuclear explosions. It will constrain the 
development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons; end 
the development of advanced new types; contribute to the 
prevention of nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear 
disarmament; and strengthen international peace and security. 
The CTBT marks a historic milestone in our drive to reduce the 
nuclear threat and to build a safer world.
    With 35 member states, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is 
a widely accepted, mature, and effective export-control 
arrangement. China is the only major nuclear supplier which is 
not a member of the NSG, primarily because it has not accepted 
the NSG policy of requiring full-scope safeguards as a 
condition for supply of nuclear trigger list items to non-
nuclear weapon states. However, China has taken major steps 
toward improving its export control system by adopting language 
identical to the NSG trigger list, becoming a full-member of 
the Zangger Committee, and by promulgating in 1998 nuclear-
related dual-use export control regulations.
    The NSG is considering requests for membership from 
Belarus, Cyprus, Kazakhstan and Turkey; of these four potential 
candidate countries, only Turkey has all the necessary steps 
for acceptance as a member. The NSG continues to consider 
whether adherence without membership, rather than membership, 
is more appropriate for countries which are not suppliers but 
transit states for nuclear transactions. The Chairman, in 
coordination with other members, will continue contacts with 
all candidate countries. The ultimate goal of the NSG continues 
to be to obtain agreement of all supplier and transit states, 
including non-NSG members, to control nuclear and nuclear-
related exports in accordance with the NSF Guideline
    During the last six months, we reviewed intelligence and 
other reports of trade in nuclear-related material and 
technology that might be relevant to nuclear-related sanctions 
provisions in the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992, 
as amended and in the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 
1994. No statutory sanctions determinations were reached during 
this reporting period. The administrative measure imposed 
against three Russian entities for their nuclear-and missile-
related cooperation with Iran are discussed in the Missiles 
section below.

                    Chemical and Biological Weapons

    The export control regulations issued under the Enhanced 
Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) remain fully in force 
and continue to be applied by the Department of Commerce in 
order to control the export of items with potential use in 
chemical or biological weapons or unmanned delivery systems for 
weapons of mass destruction.
    Chemical weapons (CW) continue to pose a very serious 
threat to our security and that of our allies. On April 29, 
1997, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on 
Their Destruction (the Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC) 
entered into force with 87 of the CWC's 165 signatories as 
original States Parties. The United States was among their 
number, having deposited its instrument of ratification on 
April 25. Russia ratified the CWC on November 5, 1997, and 
became a State Party on December 5, 1997. To date, 121 
countries (including China, Iran, India, Pakistan, and Ukraine) 
have become States Parties.
    The implementing body for the CWC--the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)--was established at 
entry into force (EIF) of the Convention on April 29, 1997. The 
OPCW, located in The Hague, has primary responsibility (along 
with States Parties) for implementing the CWC. It consists of 
the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council 
(EC), and the Technical Secretariat (TS). The TS carries out 
the verification provisions of the CWC, and presently has a 
staff of approximately 500, including about 200 inspectors 
trained and equipped to inspect military and industrial 
facilities throughout the world. To date, the OPCW has 
conducted nearly 300 inspections in some 26 countries. To date, 
nearly 100 inspections have been conducted at military 
facilities in the United States. The OPCW maintains a permanent 
inspector presence at operational U.S. CW destruction 
facilities in Utah, Nevada, and Johnston Island.
    The United States is determined to seek full implementation 
of the concrete measures in the CWC designed to raise the costs 
and risks for any state or terrorist attempting to engage in 
chemical weapons-related activities. The CWC's declaration 
requirements improve our knowledge of possible chemical weapons 
activities. Its inspection provisions provide for access to 
declared and undeclared facilities and locations, thus making 
clandestine chemical weapons production and stockpiling more 
difficult, more risky, and more expensive.
    The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 
was enacted into U.S. law in October 1998, as part of the 
Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriation 
Act, 1999 (Public Law 105-277). Accordingly, the Administration 
is working to publish the appropriate executive order and 
regulations regarding industrial declarations and inspections 
of industrial facilities. Submission of these declarations to 
the OPCW will begin to bring the U.S. into full compliance with 
the CWC. U.S. noncompliance to date has, among other things, 
undermined U.S. leadership in the organization as well as our 
ability to encourage other States Parties to make complete, 
accurate, and timely declarations.
    Countries that refuse to join the CWC will be politically 
isolated and prohibited under the CWC from trading with States 
Parties in certain key chemicals. The relevant treaty provision 
is specifically designed to penalize countries that refuse to 
join the rest of the world in eliminating the threat of 
chemical weapons.
    The United States also continues to play a leading role in 
the international effort to reduce the threat from biological 
weapons (BW). We are an active participant in the Ad Hoc Group 
(AHG) striving to complete a legally binding protocol to 
strengthen and enhance compliance with the 1972 Convention on 
the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stock-piling 
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their 
Destruction (the Biological Weapons Convention or BWC). This Ad 
Hoc Group was mandated by the September 1994 BWC Special 
Conference. The Fourth BWC Review Conference, held in November/
December 1996, urged the AHG to complete the protocol as soon 
as possible but not later than the next Review Conference to be 
held in 2001. Work is progressing on a draft rolling text 
through insertion of national views and clarification of 
existing text. Five AHG negotiating sessions are scheduled for 
1999. The United States is working toward completion of the 
substance of a strong Protocol by the end of 1999.
    On January 19, 1998,\2\ during the State of the Union 
Address, I announced that the United States would take a 
leading role in the effort to erect stronger international 
barriers against the proliferation and use of BW by 
strengthening the BWC with a new international system to detect 
and deter cheating. The United States is working closely with 
U.S. industry representatives to obtain technical input 
relevant to the development of U.S. negotiating positions and 
then to reach international agreement on data declarations, 
non-challenge visits, and challenge investigations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ 1998 State of the Union Address delivered on January 27, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The United States continued to be a leading participant in 
the 30-member Australia Group (AG) CBW nonproliferation regime. 
The United States attended the most recent annual AG Plenary 
Session from October 9-15, 1998, during which the Group 
reaffirmed the members' continued collective belief in the 
Group's viability, importance and compatibility with the CWC 
and BWC. It was further agreed that full adherence to the CWC 
and BWC will be the only way to achieve a permanent global ban 
on chemical and biological weapons, and that all states 
adhering to these Conventions must take steps to ensure that 
their national activities support these goals. At the 1998 
Plenary, the Group continued to focus on strengthening AG 
export controls and share information to address the threat of 
CBW terrorism. AG participants shared information on legal and 
regulatory efforts each member has taken to counter this 
threat. The AG also reaffirmed its commitment to continue its 
active outreach program of briefings for non-AG countries, and 
to promote regional consultations on export controls and 
nonproliferation to further awareness and understanding of 
national policies in these areas.
    During the last six months, we continued to examine closely 
intelligence and other reports of trade in CBW-related material 
and technology that might be relevant to sanctions provisions 
under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare 
Elimination Act of 1991. No new sanctions determinations were 
reached during this reporting period. The United States also 
continues to cooperate with its AG partners and other countries 
in stopping shipments of proliferation concern.

          Missiles for Delivery of Weapons of Mass Destruction

    The United States carefully controlled exports that could 
contribute to unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass 
destruction and closely monitored activities of potential 
missile proliferation concern. We also continued to implement 
U.S. missile sanctions law. In March 1999, we imposed missile 
sanctions against three Middle Eastern entities for transfers 
involving Category II MTCR Annex items. Category II missile 
sanctions imposed against two North Korean entities in August 
1977 also remain in effect, as do Category I missile sanctions 
imposed in April 1998 against North Korean and Pakistani 
entities for the transfer from North Korea to Pakistan of 
equipment and technology related to the Ghauri missile.
    During this reporting period, MTCR Partners continued to 
share information about proliferation problems with each other 
and with other potential supplier, consumer, and transshipment 
states. Partners also emphasized the need for implementing 
effective export control systems. This cooperation has resulted 
in the interdiction of missile-related materials intended for 
use in missile programs of concern.
    The United States worked unilaterally and in coordination 
with its MTCR Partners to combat missile proliferation and to 
encourage non-members to export responsibly and to adhere to 
the MTCR Guidelines. Since my last report, we have continued 
our missile nonproliferation dialogues with China, India, the 
republic of Korea (ROK), North Korea (DPRK), and Pakistan. In 
the course of normal diplomatic relations, we also have pursued 
such discussions with other countries in Central Europe and the 
Middle East.
    In March 1999, the United States and the DPRK held a fourth 
round of missile talks aimed at obtaining the DPRK commitments 
to restrain its missile practices. The talks were detailed and 
substantive, and covered the full range of missile 
proliferation issues. The United States expressed serious 
concerns about North Korea's missile-related exports and its 
indigenous missile activities, including missile production, 
deployment, and flight testing. We continued to press for tight 
constraints on these activities, and also made clear that 
further launches of long-range missiles or further exports of 
such missile or their related technology would have very 
negative consequences for efforts to improve U.S.-North Korean 
relations.
    In response to reports of continuing Iranian efforts to 
acquire sensitive items from Russian entities for use in Iran's 
missile development program, the United States continued its 
high-level dialogue with Russia. This dialogue is developing 
ways the United States and Russia can work together to cut off 
the flow of sensitive goods to Iran. Despite the Russian 
government's nonproliferation and export control efforts, 
Russian entities continued to cooperate with Iran's ballistics 
missile program during this reporting period, and to engage in 
nuclear cooperation with Iran beyond the Bushehr reactor 
project. There was some improvement in Russia's efforts to 
crack down on such activities during 1998. However, while 
Russia continues to try to implement some export control 
measures, the flow to Iran continues. We continue to press 
Russia to improve its record.
    In January 1999, we imposed administrative measures against 
three Russian entities for their nuclear- and missile-related 
cooperation with Iran. Specifically, the United States has 
banned exports to and imports from these entities. We also have 
banned U.S. Government procurement from and assistance to them. 
(Last July, we took the same action against seven Russian 
entities involved with Iran's ballistic missile program.) In 
addition, we are continuing our longstanding, broad, and 
intensive efforts with the Russian government aimed at stopping 
proliferation. As part of this approach, the United States will 
be chairing in June the first meeting of the joint U.S.-Russia 
Missile Sub-group of our bilateral Export Control Working 
Group. This Sub-group will focus, among other things, on 
improving risk assessment in Russia's missile-related licensing 
decisions.

                            Threat Reduction

    The proliferation of WMD and delivery system expertise also 
poses a significant threat to national and international 
security. A major concern is that the potential for 
proliferation is increased due to the economic crisis in Russia 
and other NIS. The Administration gives high priority to 
controlling the human dimension of proliferation through 
programs that support the transition of former Soviet weapons 
scientists to civilian research and technology development 
activities. I have proposed an additional $4.5 billion for 
programs embodied in the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative 
(ETRI) that would support activities in four areas: nuclear 
security; non-nuclear WMD; science and technology 
nonproliferation; and military relocation, stabilization and 
other security cooperation programs. Congressional support for 
this initiative would enable the engagement of a broad range of 
programs under the Departments of State, Energy and Defense.

                                Expenses

    Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), I report that there were no expenses 
directly attributable to the exercise of Authorities conferred 
by the declaration of the national emergency in Executive Order 
12938 during the period from November 1, 1998, through May 14, 
1999.

                                 Notice

    Continuation of Emergency Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction

    On November 14, 1994, by Executive Order 12938, I declared 
a national emergency with respect to the unusual and 
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, 
and economy of the United States posed by the proliferation of 
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (``weapons of mass 
destruction'') and the means of delivering such weapons. 
Because the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
the means of delivering them continues to pose an unusual and 
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, 
and economy of the United States, the national emergency first 
declared on November 14, 1994, and extended on November 14, 
1995, November 12, 1996, and November 13, 1997, must continue 
in effect beyond November 14, 1998. Therefore, in accordance 
with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 
1622(d)), I am continuing the national emergency declared in 
Executive Order 12938.
    This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and 
transmitted to the Congress.

    William J. Clinton
    The White House, November 12, 1998.

    (10) Report to Congress on Developments Concerning the National 
                     Emergency with Respect to Iraq

                            The White House

                     Office of the Press Secretary

  Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of 
            Representatives and the President of the Senate

August 13, 1998
      
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
    I hereby report to the Congress on the developments since 
my last report of February 3, 1998, concerning the national 
emergency with respect to Iraq that was declared in Executive 
Order 12722 of August 2, 1990. This report is submitted 
pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act, 50 
U.S.C. 1641(c), and section 204(c) of the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. 1703(c).
    Executive Order 12722 ordered the immediate blocking of all 
property and interests in property of the Government of Iraq 
(including the Central Bank of Iraq) then or thereafter located 
in the United States or within the possession or control of a 
United States person. That order also prohibited the 
importation into the United States of goods and services of 
Iraqi origin, as well as the exportation of goods, services, 
and technology from the United States to Iraq. The order 
prohibited travel-related transactions to or from Iraq and the 
performance of any contract in support of any industrial, 
commercial, or governmental project in Iraq. United States 
persons were also prohibited from granting or extending credit 
or loans to the Government of Iraq.
    The foregoing prohibitions (as well as the blocking of 
Government of Iraq property) were continued and augmented on 
August 9, 1990, by Executive Order 12724, which was issued in 
order to align the sanctions imposed by the United States with 
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 661 of 
August 6, 1990.
    This report discusses only matters concerning the national 
emergency with respect to Iraq that was declared in Executive 
Order 12722 and matters relating to Executive Orders 12724 and 
12817 (the ``Executive Orders''). The report covers events from 
February 2 through August 1, 1998.
    1. In April 1995, the U.N. Security Council adopted UNSCR 
986 authorizing Iraq to export up to $1 billion in petroleum 
and petroleum products every 90 days for a total of 180 days 
under U.N. supervision in order to finance the purchase of 
food, medicine, and other humanitarian supplies. UNSCR 986 
includes arrangements to ensure equitable distribution of 
humanitarian goods purchased with UNSCR 986 oil revenues to all 
the people of Iraq. The resolution also provides for the 
payment of compensation to victims of Iraqi aggression and for 
the funding of other U.N. activities with respect to Iraq. On 
May 20, 1996, a memorandum of understanding was concluded 
between the Secretariat of the United Nations and the 
Government of Iraq agreeing on terms for implementing UNSCR 
986. On August 8, 1996, the UNSC committee established pursuant 
to UNSCR 661 (``the 661 Committee'') adopted procedures to be 
employed in implementation of UNSCR 986. On December 9, 1996, 
the President of the Security Council received the report 
prepared by the Secretary General as requested by paragraph 13 
of UNSCR 986, making UNSCR 986 effective as of 12:01 a.m. 
December 10, 1996.
    On June 4, 1997, the U.N. Security Council adopted UNSCR 
1111, renewing for another 180 days the authorization for Iraqi 
petroleum sales and purchases of humanitarian aid contained in 
UNSCR 986 of April 14, 1995. The Resolution became effective on 
June 8, 1997. On September 12, 1997, the Security Council, 
noting Iraq's decision not to export petroleum and petroleum 
products pursuant to UNSCR 1111 during the period June 8 to 
August 13, 1997, and deeply concerned about the resulting 
humanitarian consequences for the Iraqi people, adopted UNSCR 
1129. This resolution replaced the two 90-day quotas with one 
120-day quota and one 60-day quota in order to enable Iraq to 
export its full $2 billion quota of oil within the original 180 
days of UNSCR 1111. On December 4, 1997, the U.N. Security 
Council adopted UNSCR 1143, renewing for another 180 days, 
beginning December 5, 1997, the authorization for Iraqi 
petroleum sales and humanitarian aid purchases contained in 
UNSCR 986.
    On February 20, 1998, the U.N. Security Council adopted 
UNSCR 1153, authorizing the sale of Iraqi petroleum and 
petroleum products and the purchase of humanitarian aid for a 
180-day period beginning with the date of notification by the 
President of the Security Council to the members thereof of 
receipt of the report requested in UNSCR 1153. UNSCR 1153 
authorized the sale of $5.256 billion worth of Iraqi petroleum 
and petroleum products. On March 25, 1998, the Security 
Council, noting the shortfall in revenue from Iraq's sale of 
petroleum and petroleum products during the first 90-day period 
of implementation of UNSCR 1143, due to the delayed resumption 
in sales and a serious decrease in prices, and concerned about 
the resulting humanitarian consequences for the Iraqi people, 
adopted UNSCR 1158. This Resolution reaffirmed the 
authorization for Iraqi petroleum sales and purchases of 
humanitarian aid contained in UNSCR 1143 for the remainder of 
the second 90-day period and set the authorized value during 
that time frame to $1.4 billion pending implementation of UNSCR 
1153. The 180-day period authorized in UNSCR 1153 began on May 
30, 1998. On June 19, 1998, the Security Council adopted UNSCR 
1175, authorizing the expenditure of up to $300 million on 
Iraqi oil infrastructure repairs in order to help Iraq reach 
the higher export ceiling permitted under UNSCR 1153. UNSCR 
1175 also reaffirmed the Security Council's endorsement of the 
Secretary General's recommendation that the ``oil-for-food'' 
distribution plan be ongoing and project-based. During the 
period covered by this report, imports into the United States 
under the program totaled about 14.2 million barrels, bringing 
total imports since December 10, 1996, to approximately 51.5 
million barrels.
    2. There have been no amendments to the Iraqi Sanctions 
Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 575 (the ``ISR'' or the 
``Regulations'') administered by the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (OFAC) of the Department of the Treasury during the 
reporting period.
    As previously reported, the Regulations were amended on 
December 10, 1996, to provide a statement of licensing policy 
regarding specific licensing of United States persons seeking 
to purchase Iraqi-origin petroleum and petroleum products from 
Iraq (61 Fed. Reg. 65312, December 11, 1996). Statements of 
licensing policy were also provided regarding sales of 
essential parts and equipment for the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik 
pipeline system, and sales of humanitarian goods to Iraq, 
pursuant to United Nations approval. A general license was also 
added to authorize dealings in Iraqi-origin petroleum and 
petroleum products that have been exported from Iraq with 
United Nations and United States Government approval.
    All executory contracts must contain terms requiring that 
all proceeds of oil purchases from the Government of Iraq, 
including the State Oil Marketing Organization, must be placed 
in the U.N. escrow account at Banque Nationale de Paris, New 
York (the ``986 escrow account''), and all Iraqi payments for 
authorized sales of pipeline parts and equipment, humanitarian 
goods, and incidental transaction costs borne by Iraq will, 
upon approval by the 661 Committee and satisfaction of other 
conditions established by the United Nations, be paid or 
payable out of the 986 escrow account.
    3. Investigations of possible violations of the Iraqi 
sanctions continue to be pursued and appropriate enforcement 
actions taken. Several cases from prior reporting periods are 
continuing, and recent additional allegations have been 
referred by OFAC to the U.S. Customs Service for investigation.
    Investigation also continues into the roles played by 
various individuals and firms outside Iraq in the Iraqi 
government procurement network. These investigations may lead 
to additions to OFAC's listing of individuals and organizations 
determined to be Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) of the 
Government of Iraq.
    Since my last report, OFAC has collected two civil monetary 
penalties totaling $9,000 from one company and one individual 
for violations of IEEPA and ISR prohibitions against 
transactions with Iraq.
    4. The Office of Foreign Assets Control has issued hundreds 
of licensing determinations regarding transactions pertaining 
to Iraq or Iraqi assets since August 1990. Specific licenses 
have been issued for transactions such as the filing of legal 
actions against Iraqi governmental entities, legal 
representation of Iraq, and the exportation to Iraq of donated 
medicine, medical supplies, and food intended for humanitarian 
relief purposes, sales of humanitarian supplies to Iraq under 
UNSCRs 986, 1111, 1143, and 1153, diplomatic transactions, the 
execution of powers of attorney relating to the administration 
of personal assets and decedents' estates in Iraq, and the 
protection of preexistent intellectual property rights in Iraq. 
Since my last report, 75 specific licenses have been issued, 
most with respect to sales of humanitarian goods.
     Since December 10, 1996, OFAC has issued specific licenses 
authorizing commercial sales of humanitarian goods funded by 
Iraqi oil sales pursuant to UNSCRs 986, 1111, 1143, and 1153 
valued at more than $324 million. Of that amount, approximately 
$298 million represents sales of basic foodstuffs, $14 million 
for medicines and medical supplies, $9.2 million for water 
testing and treatment equipment, and nearly $3 million to fund 
a variety of United Nations activities in Iraq. International 
humanitarian relief in Iraq is coordinated under the direction 
of the United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator of 
Iraq. Assisting U.N. agencies include the World Food Program, 
the U.N. Population Fund, the U.N. Food and Agriculture 
Organization, the World Health Organization, and UNICEF. As of 
June 29, 1998, OFAC had authorized sales valued at more than 
$85 million worth of humanitarian goods during the current 
reporting period.
    5. The expenses incurred by the Federal Government in the 
6-month period from February 2 through August 1, 1998, that are 
directly attributable to the exercise of powers and authorities 
conferred by the declaration of a national emergency with 
respect to Iraq, are reported to be about $1.1 million, most of 
which represents wage and salary costs for Federal personnel. 
Personnel costs were largely centered in the Department of the 
Treasury (particularly in the Office of Foreign Assets Control, 
the U.S. Customs Service, the Office of the Under Secretary for 
Enforcement, and the Office of the General Counsel), the 
Department of State (particularly the Bureau of Economic and 
Business Affairs, the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, the 
Bureau of International Organization Affairs, the Bureau of 
Political-Military Affairs, the Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, and the 
Office of the Legal Adviser), and the Department of 
Transportation (particularly the U.S. Coast Guard).
    6. The United States imposed economic sanctions on Iraq in 
response to Iraq's illegal invasion and occupation of Kuwait, a 
clear act of brutal aggression. The United States, together 
with the international community, is maintaining economic 
sanctions against Iraq because the Iraqi regime has failed to 
comply fully with relevant United Nations Security Council 
resolutions. Iraqi compliance with these resolutions is 
necessary before the United States will consider lifting 
economic sanctions. Security Council resolutions on Iraq call 
for the elimination of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, Iraqi 
recognition of Kuwait and the inviolability of the Iraq-Kuwait 
boundary, the release of Kuwaiti and other third-country 
nationals, compensation for victims of Iraqi aggression, long-
term monitoring of weapons of mass destruction capabilities, 
the return of Kuwaiti assets stolen during Iraq's illegal 
occupation of Kuwait, renunciation of terrorism, an end to 
internal Iraqi repression of its own civilian population, and 
the facilitation of access by international relief 
organizations to all those in need in all parts of Iraq. Eight 
years after the invasion, a pattern of defiance persists: a 
refusal to account for missing Kuwaiti detainees; failure to 
return Kuwaiti property worth millions of dollars, including 
military equipment that was used by Iraq in its movement of 
troops to the Kuwaiti border in October 1994; sponsorship of 
assassinations in Lebanon and in northern Iraq; incomplete 
declarations to weapons inspectors and refusal to provide 
immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to sites by 
these inspectors; and ongoing widespread human rights 
violations. As a result, the U.N. sanctions remain in place; 
the United States will continue to enforce those sanctions 
under domestic authority.
    The Baghdad government continues to violate basic human 
rights of its own citizens through systematic repression of all 
forms of political expression, oppression of minorities, and 
denial of humanitarian assistance. The Government of Iraq has 
repeatedly said it will not comply with UNSCR 688 of April 5, 
1991. The Iraqi military routinely harasses residents of the 
north, and has attempted to ``Arabize'' the Kurdish, Turkomen, 
and Assyrian areas in the north. Iraq has not relented in its 
artillery attacks against civilian population centers in the 
south, or in its burning and draining operations in the 
southern marshes, which have forced thousands to flee to 
neighboring states.
    The policies and actions of the Saddam Hussein regime 
continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the 
national security and foreign policy of the United States, as 
well as to regional peace and security. The U.N. resolutions 
affirm that the Security Council be assured of Iraq's peaceful 
inten-ions in judging its compliance with sanctions. Because of 
Iraq's failure to comply fully with these resolutions, the 
United States will continue to apply economic sanctions to 
deter it from threatening peace and stability in the region.
    Sincerely,

    William J. Clinton

    (11) Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Iraq

                            The White House

                     Office of the Press Secretary

July 21, 1999
      
To The Congress of the United States:
    Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 
1622(d)) provides for the automatic termination of a national 
emergency unless, prior to the anniversary date of its 
declaration, the President publishes in the Federal Register 
and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the 
emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date. 
In accordance with this provision I have sent the enclosed 
notice, stating that the Iraqi emergency is to continue in 
effect beyond August 2, 1999, to the Federal Register for 
publication.
    The crisis between the United States and Iraq that led to 
the declaration on August 2, 1990, of a national emergency has 
not been resolved. The Government of Iraq continues to engage 
in activities inimical to stability in the Middle East and 
hostile to United States interests in the region. Such Iraqi 
actions pose a continuing unusual and extraordinary threat to 
the national security and vital foreign policy interests of the 
United States. For these reasons, I have determined that it is 
necessary to maintain in force the broad authorities necessary 
to apply economic pressure on the Government of Iraq.

    William J. Clinton
    The White House, July 20, 1999.

                                 Notice

                    Continuation of Iraqi Emergency

    On August 2, 1990, by Executive Order 12722, President Bush 
declared a national emergency to deal with the unusual and 
extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign 
policy of the United States constituted by the actions and 
policies of the Government of Iraq. By Executive Orders 12722 
of August 2, 1990, and 12724 of August 9, 1990, the President 
imposed trade sanctions on Iraq and blocked Iraqi government 
assets. Because the Government of Iraq has continued its 
activities hostile to United States interests in the Middle 
East, the national emergency declared on August 2, 1990, and 
the measures adopted on August 2 and August 9, 1990, to deal 
with that emergency must continue in effect beyond August 2, 
1999. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the 
National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing 
the national emergency with respect to Iraq.
    This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and 
transmitted to the Congress. William J. Clinton The White 
House, July 20, 1999.

    William J. Clinton
    The White House, July 20, 1999.

    (12) Report to Congress on Developments Concerning the National 
                    Emergency with Respect to Libya

                            The White House

                     Office of the Press Secretary

July 19, 1999
      
To The Congress of the United States:
    I hereby report to the Congress on the developments since 
my last report of December 30, 1998, concerning the national 
emergency with respect to Libya that was declared in Executive 
Order 12543 of January 7, 1986. This report is submitted 
pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act, 50 
U.S.C. 1641(c); section 204(c) of the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. 1703(c); and section 
505(c) of the International Security and Development 
Cooperation Act of 1985, 22 U.S.C. 2349aa-9(c).
    1. On December 30, 1998, I renewed for another year the 
national emergency with respect to Libya pursuant to IEEPA. 
This renewal extended the current comprehensive financial and 
trade embargo against Libya in effect since 1986. Under these 
sanctions, virtually all trade with Libya is prohibited, and 
all assets owned or controlled by the Government of Libya in 
the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. 
persons are blocked.
    2. On April 28, 1999, I announced that the United States 
will exempt commercial sales of agricultural commodities and 
products, medicine, and medical equipment from future 
unilateral sanctions regimes. In addition, my Administration 
will extend this policy to existing sanctions programs by 
modifying licensing policies for currently embargoed countries 
to permit case-by-case review of specific proposals for 
commercial sales of these items. Certain restrictions apply.
    The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the 
Department of the Treasury is currently drafting amendments to 
the Libyan Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 550 (the 
Regulations), to implement this initiative. The amended 
Regulations will provide for the licensing of sales of 
agricultural commodities and products, medicine, and medical 
supplies to nongovernmental entities in Libya or to government 
procurement agencies and parastatals not affiliated with the 
coercive organs of that country. The amended Regulations will 
also provide for the licensing of all transactions necessary 
and incident to licensed sales transactions, such as insurance 
and shipping arrangements. Financing for the licensed sales 
transactions will be permitted in the manner described in the 
amended Regulations.
    3. During the reporting period, OFAC reviewed numerous 
applications for licenses to authorize transactions under the 
Regulations. Consistent with OFAC's ongoing scrutiny of banking 
transactions, the largest category of license approvals (20) 
involved types of financial transactions that are consistent 
with U.S. policy. Most of these licenses authorized personal 
remittances not involving Libya between persons who are not 
blocked parties to flow through Libyan banks located outside 
Libya. Three licenses were issued authorizing certain travel-
related transactions. One license was issued to a U.S. firm to 
allow it to protect its intellectual property rights in Libya; 
another authorized receipt of payment for legal services; and a 
third authorized payments for telecommunications services. A 
total of 26 licenses were issued during the reporting period.
    4. During the current 6-month period, OFAC continued to 
emphasize to the international banking community in the United 
States the importance of identifying and blocking payments made 
by or on behalf of Libya. The office worked closely with the 
banks to assure the effectiveness of interdiction software 
systems used to identify such payments. During the reporting 
period, 87 transactions potentially involving Libya, totaling 
nearly $3.4 million, were interdicted.
    5. Since my last report, OFAC has collected 7 civil 
monetary penalties totaling $38,000 from 2 U.S. financial 
institutions, 3 companies, and 2 individuals for violations of 
the U.S. sanctions against Libya. The violations involved 
export transactions relating to Libya and dealings in 
Government of Libya property or property in which the 
Government of Libya had an interest.
    On April 23, 1999, a foreign national permanent resident in 
the United States was sentenced by the Federal District court 
for the Middle District of Florida to 2 years in prison and 2 
years supervised release for criminal conspiracy to violate 
economic sanctions against Libya, Iran, and Iraq. He had 
previously been convicted of violation of the Libyan Sanctions 
Regulations, the Iranian Transactions Regulations, the Iraqi 
Sanctions Regulations, and the Export Administration 
Regulations for exportation of industrial equipment to the oil, 
gas, petrochemical, water, and power industries of Libya, Iran, 
and Iraq.
    Various enforcement actions carried over from previous 
reporting periods have continued to be aggressively pursued. 
Numerous investigations are ongoing and new reports of 
violations are being scrutinized.
    6. The expenses incurred by the Federal Government in the 
6-month period from January 7 through July 6, 1999, that are 
directly attributable to the exercise of powers and authorities 
conferred by the declaration of the Libyan national emergency 
are estimated at approximately $4.4 million. Personnel costs 
were largely centered in the Department of the Treasury 
(particularly in the Office of Foreign Assets Control, the 
Office of the General Counsel, and the U.S. Customs Service), 
the Department of State, and the Department of Commerce.
    7. In April 1999, Libya surrendered the 2 suspects in the 
Lockerbie bombing for trial before a Scottish court seated in 
the Netherlands. In accordance with UNSCR 748, upon the 
suspects' transfer, UN sanctions were immediately suspended. We 
will insist that Libya fulfill the remaining UNSCR requirements 
for lifting UN sanctions and are working with UN Secretary 
Annan and UN Security Council members to ensure that Libya does 
so promptly. U.S. unilateral sanctions remain in force, and I 
will continue to exercise the powers at my disposal to apply 
these sanctions fully and effectively, as long as they remain 
appropriate. I will continue to report periodically to the 
Congress on significant developments as required by law.

    William J. Clinton
    The White House, July 19, 1999.

   (13) Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Libya

                            The White House

                     Office of the Press Secretary

  Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of 
            Representatives and the President of the Senate

December 30, 1998
      
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
    Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 
1622(d)) provides for the automatic termination of a national 
emergency unless, prior to the anniversary date of its 
declaration, the President publishes in the Federal Register 
and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the 
emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date. 
In accordance with this provision, I have sent the enclosed 
notice, stating that the Libyan emergency is to continue in 
effect beyond January 7, 1999, to the Federal Register for 
publication. Similar notices have been sent annually to the 
Congress and published in the Federal Register. The most recent 
notice was signed on January 2, 1998, and appeared in the 
Federal Register on January 6, 1998.
    The crisis between the United States and Libya that led to 
the declaration of a national emergency on January 7, 1986, has 
not been resolved. The Government of Libya has continued its 
actions and policies in support of terrorism, despite the calls 
by the United Nations Security Council, in Resolutions 731 
(1992), 748 (1992), and 883 (1993), that Libya demonstrate by 
concrete actions its renunciation of terrorism. Such Libyan 
actions and policies pose a continuing unusual and 
extraordinary threat to the national security and vital foreign 
policy interests of the United States. Furthermore, the Libyan 
government has not delivered the two Lockerbie bombing suspects 
for trial, even though the United States and United Kingdom 
accepted Libya's proposal to try the suspects in a Scottish 
court in a third country. Libya's stalling in handing over the 
suspects is yet another indication of Libya's continued support 
for terrorism and rejection of international norms. For these 
reasons, I have determined that it is necessary to maintain in 
force the broad authorities necessary to apply economic 
pressure to the Government of Libya to reduce its ability to 
support international terrorism.
    Sincerely,

    William J. Clinton

                                 Notice

                    Continuation of Libyan Emergency

    On January 7, 1986, by Executive Order 12543, President 
Reagan declared a national emergency to deal with the unusual 
and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign 
policy of the United States constituted by the actions and 
policies of the Government of Libya. On January 8, 1986, by 
Executive Order 12544, the President took additional measures 
to block Libyan assets in the United States. Every President 
has transmitted to the Congress and the Federal Register a 
notice continuing this emergency each year since 1986.
    The crisis between the United States and Libya that led to 
the declaration of a national emergency on January 7, 1986, has 
not been resolved. The Government of Libya has continued its 
actions and policies in support of terrorism, despite the calls 
by the United Nations Security Council, in Resolutions 731 
(1992), 748 (1992), and 883 (1993), that it demonstrate by 
concrete actions its renunciation of terrorism. Therefore, in 
accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing the national emergency 
with respect to Libya. This notice shall be published in the 
Federal Register and transmitted to the Congress.

    William J. Clinton
    The White House, December 30, 1998.

    (14) Report to Congress on Developments Concerning the National 
                   Emergency with Respect to Iran \1\

Message from the President of the United States transmitting a 6-month 
periodic report on the national emergency with respect to Iran that was 
declared in Executive Order 12170 of November 14, 1979, pursuant to 50 
                             U.S.C. 1703(c)

 President's Periodic Report on the National Emergency with Respect to 
                    Iran and Iranian Assets Blocking

    I hereby report to the Congress on developments since the 
last Presidential report of November 16, 1998, concerning the 
national emergency with respect to Iran that was declared in 
Executive Order 12170 of November 14, 1979. This report is 
submitted pursuant to section 204(c) of the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1703(c) (``IEEPA''). 
This report covers events through March 31, 1999. My last 
report, dated November 16, 1998, covered events through 
September 30, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ House Document 106-73, May 27, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    1. There have been no amendments to the Iranian Assets 
Control Regulations, 31 CFR Part 535 (the ``IACR''), since my 
last report.
    2. The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (the 
``Tribunal''), established at The Hague pursuant to the Algiers 
Accords, continues to make progress in arbitrating the claims 
before it. Since the period covered in my last report, the 
Tribunal has rendered three awards. This brings the total 
number of awards rendered by the Tribunal to 591, the majority 
of which have been in favor of U.S. claimants. As of March 31, 
1998, the value of awards to successful U.S. claimants paid 
from the Security Account held by the NV Settlement Bank was 
$2,502,365,655.22.
    Since my last report, Iran has failed to replenish the 
Security Account established by the Algiers Accords to ensure 
payment of awards to successful U.S. claimants. Thus, since 
November 5, 1992, the Security Account has continuously 
remained below the $500 million balance required by the Algiers 
Accords. As of March 31, 1998, the total amount in the Security 
Account was $106,713,705.15, and the total amount in the 
Interest Account was $29,521,369.18. Therefore, the United 
States continues to pursue Case No. A/28, filed in September 
1993, to require Iran to meet its obligation under the Algiers 
Accords to replenish the Security Account. In Case No. A/28, 
the United States filed a request for additional relief on 
November 30, 1998, to which Iran responded on March 8, 1999. 
The Tribunal has scheduled a hearing on this case for June 28-
30, 1999.
    The United States also continues to pursue Case No. A/29 to 
require Iran to meet its obligation of timely payment of its 
equal share of advances for Tribunal expenses when directed to 
do so by the Tribunal.
    3. The Department of State continues to present other 
United States Government claims against Iran and to respond to 
claims brought against the United States by Iran, in 
coordination with concerned government agencies.
    Under the February 22, 1996, settlement agreement related 
to the Iran Air case before the International Court of Justice 
and Iran's bank-related claims against the United States before 
the Tribunal (see report of May 16, 1996), the Department of 
State has been processing payments. As of March 31, 1999, the 
Department has authorized payment to U.S. nationals totaling 
$17,615,113.84 for 56 claims against Iranian banks. In 
addition, the Department authorized transfer of $2,886,580.00 
to the Tribunal for Iran's share of the Tribunal's operating 
expenses. The Department has also authorized payments to 
surviving family members of 242 Iranian victims of the aerial 
incident, totaling $60,600,000.00.
    On December 29, 1998, the full Tribunal issued a partial 
award in cases A/15 and A/24. The Tribunal dismissed some 
Iran's claims and, with respect to other, held that the United 
States had failed to comply with obligations under the Algiers 
Accords to terminate claims against Iran in U.S. courts, and 
that the United States may be obligated to compensate Iran for 
expenses incurred in connections with such failures. In a 
subsequent phase, the Tribunal will determine the nature and 
amount of damages, if any, suffered by Iran.
    In Case No. A/30, a case in which Iran alleges that the 
United States has violated paragraphs 1 and 10 of the General 
Declaration of the Algiers Accords, based on an alleged covert 
action program aimed at Iran and U.S. sanctions, the United 
States filed a submission on March 9, 1999, in response to 
Iran's request that the Tribunal require the United States to 
produce classified intelligence information.
    4. U.S. nationals continue to pursue claims against Iran at 
the Tribunal. Since my last report, the Tribunal has issued 
awards in two private claims. On November 16, 1998, Chamber One 
issued an award in Ford Aerospace & Communications v. Iran, AWD 
No. 589-93-1, heeding Iran's ``Request to Close the Case,'' and 
determining that the sole remaining issue, Iran's counterclaim 
against Ford Aerospace, was moot.
    On January 13, 1999, Chamber One issued an award in Rana 
Kipour v. Iran, AWD No. 591-336-1, giving effect to a 
settlement agreement between the parties, under which the 
claimant was paid $850,000.
    5. The situation reviewed above continues to implicate 
important diplomatic, financial, and legal interests of the 
United States and its nationals and presents an unusual 
challenge to the national security and foreign policy of the 
United States. The Iranian Assets Control Regulations issued 
pursuant to Executive Order 12170 continue to play an important 
role in structuring our relationship with Iran and in enabling 
the United States to implement properly the Algiers Accords. I 
shall continue to exercise the powers at my disposal to deal 
with these problems and will continue to report periodically to 
the Congress on significant developments.

    (15) Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Iran

                            The White House

                     Office of the Press Secretary

  Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of 
            Representatives and the President of the Senate

November 9, 1998
      
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
    Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 
1622(d)) provides for the automatic termination of a national 
emergency unless, prior to the anniversary date of its 
declaration, the President publishes in the Federal Register 
and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the 
emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date. 
In accordance with this provision, I have sent the enclosed 
notice, stating that the Iran emergency declared in 1979 is to 
continue in effect beyond November 14, 1998, to the Federal 
Register for publication. Similar notices have been sent 
annually to the Congress and the Federal Register since 
November 12, 1980. The most recent notice appeared in the 
Federal Register on October 1, 1997. This emergency is separate 
from that declared with respect to Iran on March 15, 1995, in 
Executive Order 12957.
    The crisis between the United States and Iran that began in 
1979 has not been fully resolved. The international tribunal 
established to adjudicate claims of the United States and U.S. 
nationals against Iran and of the Iranian government and 
Iranian nationals against the United States continues to 
function, and normalization of commercial and diplomatic 
relations between the United States and Iran has not been 
achieved. On March 15, 1995, I declared a separate national 
emergency with respect to Iran pursuant to the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act and imposed separate sanctions. 
By Executive Order 12959 of May 6, 1995, these sanctions were 
significantly augmented, and by Executive Order 13059 of August 
19, 1997, the sanctions imposed in 1995 were further clarified. 
In these circumstances, I have determined that it is necessary 
to maintain in force the broad authorities that are in place by 
virtue of the November 14, 1979, declaration of emergency, 
including the authority to block certain property of the 
Government of Iran, and that are needed in the process of 
implementing the January 1981 agreements with Iran.
    Sincerely,

    William J. Clinton

                                 Notice

                     Continuation of Iran Emergency

    On November 14, 1979, by Executive Order 12170, the 
President declared a national emergency to deal with the threat 
to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the 
United States constituted by the situation in Iran. Notices of 
the continuation of this national emergency have been 
transmitted annually by the President to the Congress and the 
Federal Register. The most recent notice appeared in the 
Federal Register on October 1, 1997. Because our relations with 
Iran have not yet returned to normal, and the process of 
implementing the January 19, 1981, agreements with Iran is 
still underway, the national emergency declared on November 14, 
1979, must continue in effect beyond November 14, 1998. 
Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National 
Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing the 
national emergency with respect to Iran. This notice shall be 
published in the Federal Register and transmitted to the 
Congress.

    William J. Clinton
    The White House, November 9, 1998.

                    2. Office of the Vice President

a. Report of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security

 Partial text of the report of the White House Commission on Aviation 
Safety and Security, submitted by the Vice President in compliance with 
                Executive Order 13015 of August 22, 1996

                    Vice President Al Gore, Chairman

                           february 12, 1997

                            the white house

                             washington, dc

Dear Mr. President,
    We are pleased to present you with the report of the White 
House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. You 
established this Commission by issuing Executive Order 13015 on 
August 22, 1996 with a charter to study matters involving 
aviation safety and security, including air traffic control and 
to develop a strategy to improve aviation safety and security, 
both domestically and internationally.
    During the past six months, we have conducted an intensive 
inquiry into civil aviation safety, security and air traffic 
control modernization. Commission and staff have gathered 
information from a broad range of aviation specialists, Federal 
Agencies, consumer groups, and industry leaders.
    After many months of deliberations we have agreed on a set 
of recommendations which we believe will serve to enhance and 
ensure the continued safety and security of our air 
transportation system.
    We are privileged to submit these recommendations herewith.
    Sincerely,

              Vice President Al Gore, Chairman
      
    In compliance with the Executive Order 13015 of August 22, 
1996, the undersigned present the report of the White House 
Commission on Aviation Safety and Security.
_______________________________________________________________________


        Editor's Note:
          l. The final two sentences of the first paragraph of 
        Recommendation 4.4 have been changed to reflect the 
        precise nature of the agreement by U.S. airlines.
          2. The typed version of the final report 
        inadvertently omitted manufacturers from the list of 
        those to whom the Commission expressed appreciation. 
        That mistake has been corrected in this edition.
          3. In this edition, typographical errors have been 
        silently corrected.
          4. This edition contains as Appendix I a dissent by 
        Commissioner Cummock which was transmitted to the 
        Commission one week after the report was voted on in 
        public session and presented to President Clinton.
          During the public session, Commissioner Cummock 
        dissented from three recommendations. The dissent 
        published in this document goes far beyond those 
        registered in public. It presents for the first time 
        material and arguments the other Commissioners did not 
        have an opportunity to consider. However, many of the 
        arguments made in the dissent were considered and 
        rejected by the other members of the Commission.
          Supplemental material included in Commissioner 
        Cummock's dissent is available upon request to Richard 
        K. Pemberton, Office of the Secretary of 
        Transportation, U.S. Department of Transportation.

_______________________________________________________________________


                              Introduction

                                change.

    That one word sums up both the challenges in aviation 
safety and security, and the means by which government and 
industry must respond. Change is nothing new in this field. The 
first powered flight, covering 120 feet in twelve seconds, took 
place just over ninety years ago. Today, planes cross the 
Atlantic Ocean in a matter of hours, as hundreds of passengers 
watch movies and dine. An industry that essentially did not 
even exist before World War I now occupies a central position 
in our economy. Today, commercial aviation generates over $300 
billion annually, and accounts for close to one million 
American jobs.
    The changes taking place in aviation today are as profound 
as any this industry has seen before. Since 1992, sixty new 
airlines have started service, opening up new markets, 
attracting new passengers, and impacting the economics of the 
industry significantly. The number of passengers flying in the 
United States over the last decade has grown to more than half 
a billion. The FAA has certified twenty new aircraft models in 
the last ten years, and plans are under consideration for a new 
High-Speed Civil Transport.
    As dramatic as these changes have been, even more 
significant change looms on the horizon. Information technology 
presents opportunities that will again revolutionize the 
industry, in ways as significant as the introduction of the jet 
engine forty years ago. Air traffic today is still controlled 
through ground-based radar, and on a point-to-point basis. 
Satellite-based navigation will bring a fundamental change in 
the way that air traffic is directed, and may make the notion 
of ``highway lanes in the sky'' as obsolete as the bonfires 
that used to guide early fliers. Digital technology will 
replace analog systems, making communications with and among 
aircraft dramatically faster, more efficient, and effective. 
These and other new technologies offer tremendous opportunities 
for improved safety, security and efficiency, and will 
transform aviation in the same way that the Internet and World 
Wide Web are transforming the way the world does business.
    Other changes are even more imminent. By the end of the 
century, the commercial fleet serving the United States will 
have been completely overhauled, with aircraft that make a 
fraction of the old noise and emit far less pollution. 
Continuing success in the United States' efforts to open up 
foreign markets to competition by our airlines likely will mean 
more airlines, serving more markets, carrying more people. A 
continuation of the trend toward greater competition and lower 
fares will make flying even more available to average Americans 
than it is today. In fact, the FAA projects that, in 2007, more 
than 800 million passengers will fly in the United States--
three times the number who flew in 1980.
    This is a time of change for government, as well. President 
Clinton's declaration that ``the era of big government is 
over,'' coalesced a bipartisan drive to make government work 
better and cost less. The Administration's commitment to 
government reform resulted not just from a desire to bring down 
government spending, but from a recognition that the same types 
of changes facing industries such as aviation face government, 
as well. Like the private sector, government must change with 
the times. The question is, how?

    establishment of the commission on aviation safety and security

    President Clinton created the White House Commission on 
Aviation Safety and Security to address that question, and 
assigned it three specific mandates: to look at the changing 
security threat, and how we can address it; to examine changes 
in the aviation industry, and how government should adapt its 
regulation of it; to look at the technological changes coming 
to air traffic control, and what should be done to take best 
advantage of them. In the wake of concerns over the crash of 
Trans World Airlines Flight 800, President Clinton asked the 
Commission to focus its attention first on the issue of 
security. He asked for an initial report on aviation security 
in 45 days, including an action plan to deploy new 
hightechnology machines to detect the most sophisticated 
explosives.
    On September 9, 1996, the Commission presented that initial 
report to the President. It contained twenty recommendations 
for enhancing aviation security which are presented again in 
Chapter 3 of this report. The response to the initial report 
was unprecedented. In October 1996, at the request of President 
Clinton, the Congress appropriated over $400 million, in direct 
accord with the Commission's recommendations, for the 
acquisition of new explosives detection technology and other 
security enhancements. In the five months since they were 
presented, implementation has begun on virtually all of the 
initial recommendations.
    From its inception, the Commission took a hands-on approach 
to its work. President Clinton announced the formation of the 
Commission on July 25, 1996. A few days later, Vice President 
Gore led a site visit to Dulles International Airport, where he 
and other Commissioners saw airport and airline operations 
first-hand, and discussed issues with front line workers. This 
was the first of dozens of such visits. Over the next six 
months, the Commission visited facilities throughout the United 
States and in various locations abroad. Seeking to reach the 
broadest possible audience, the Commission established a 
homepage on the Internet (http://
www.aviationcommission.dot.gov), both to make the Commission's 
work available and to receive input. The web site has had 
almost 7,000 contacts, many providing valuable insights. The 
Commission held six public meetings, hearing from over fifty 
witnesses representing a cross section of the aviation industry 
and the public, including families of victims of air disasters. 
Recognizing the increasingly global nature of aviation, the 
Commission co-sponsored an International Conference on Aviation 
Safety and Security with the George Washington University, 
attended by over 700 representatives from sixty-one countries.
    Out of this extensive process, the Commission compiled the 
recommendations presented in this final report.

                        a vision for the future

    To compete in the global economy of the 21st Century, 
America needs a healthy, vibrant aviation industry. In turn, 
the health and vibrancy of aviation depend on improved levels 
of safety, security and modernization. For the last fifty 
years, the United States has led the field of aviation. But, 
that position is being challenged, both by competition from 
abroad and by weaknesses in our own systems.
    These weaknesses can be overcome. The Commission believes 
that it should be a national priority to do so. This report 
outlines steps that can set government and industry on a course 
to achieve that goal together. Heading into the next century, 
our activities, programs, and results should define aviation 
safety and security for the rest of the world.
    Leadership in aviation goes far beyond having strong, 
competitive airlines. It means assuring leadership in 
communications, satellite, aerospace, and other technologies 
that increasingly are defining the global economy. It means 
more than the highest possible levels of safety and security 
for travelers.
    The Commission's report reflects a focus on this vision: to 
ensure greater safety and security for passengers; to 
restructure the relationships between government and industry 
into partnerships for progress; and to maintain global 
leadership in the aviation industry.

                          key recommendations

    In the area of safety, the Commission believes that the 
principal focus should be on reducing the rate of accidents by 
a factor of five within a decade, and recommends a re-
engineering of the FAA's regulatory and certification programs 
to achieve that goal.
    In the area of air traffic control, the Commission believes 
that the safety and efficiency improvements that will come with 
a modernized system should not be delayed, and recommends that 
the program be accelerated for to achieve full operational 
capability by the year 2005. In addition, a more effective 
system must be established to finance modernization of the 
National Airspace System and enhancements in safety and 
security.
    In the area of security, the Commission believes that the 
threat against civil aviation is changing and growing, and that 
the federal government must lead the fight against it. The 
Commission recommends that the federal government commit 
greater resources to improving aviation security, and work more 
cooperatively with the private sector and local authorities in 
carrying out security responsibilities.
    Although not specifically directed to do so, the Commission 
also took up the issue of responding to aviation disasters. In 
this area, the Commission believes that a better coordinated 
and more compassionate response is necessary, and that the 
responsibility for coordinating the response needs to be placed 
with a single entity. The Commission is pleased with the 
progress made to date in this area, including the designation 
of the National Transportation Safety Board as that single 
entity.
    Many of the Commission's recommendations apply equally to 
each of the three major areas of focus, including those 
relating to regulation and certification. Primary among these 
recommendations is the call for greater use of partnerships in 
meeting goals. Regulatory and enforcement agencies such as the 
Customs Service, the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, and the Food and Drug Administration have put 
new emphasis on partnerships with industries, and are achieving 
tremendous results: seizing more drugs while expediting travel 
for legitimate travelers; reducing workplace accidents while 
increasing productivity; and getting important new AIDS and 
cancer-fighting drugs to market in a fraction of the time it 
used to take.
    The premise behind these partnerships is that government 
can set goals, and then work with industry in the most 
effective way to achieve them. Partnership does not mean that 
government gives up its authorities or responsibilities. Not 
all industry members are willing to be partners. In those 
cases, government must use its full authority to enforce the 
law. But, through partnerships, government works with industry 
to find better ways to achieve its goals, seeking to replace 
confrontation with cooperation. Such partnerships hold 
tremendous promise for improving aviation safety and security. 
A shift away from prescriptive regulations will allow companies 
to take advantage of incentives and reach goals more quickly.
    Transportation Secretary Pena's cooperative program with 
airlines to establish a single level of safety is an example of 
innovative government-industry partnership. Another is Vice 
President Gore's January 15, 1997 announcement that Boeing, in 
concert with government agencies, had developed a plan to 
modify the rudders on hundreds of its 737 aircraft. By acting 
without waiting for a government mandate, Boeing will complete 
many of these safety-enhancing modifications before the 
government could complete a rule requiring the action.
    Partnership must extend not only to regulated entities, but 
also to the various federal agencies involved with aviation 
safety and security. A number of agencies outside the 
Department of Transportation have expertise and resources that 
can have a direct impact on improving safety and security. The 
Commission urges the Administration to continue to work to 
expand and improve these intergovernmental relationships.
    In the last few years, the FAA has begun to recognize and 
respond to the tremendous changes it faces. Reviews such as the 
Challenge 2000 report examined ways of improving the way the 
FAA regulates operators and manufacturers. Now is the time for 
the FAA to build on that work, and aggressively reengineer 
itself to adapt to the demands of the 21st Century.
    It is important to note that the FAA, alone among federal 
agencies, has been given some critical new tools to help shape 
its own future. A new Management Advisory Council will provide 
valuable input to the agency's decision-making process. In 
1995, the Congress granted the Clinton Administration's request 
for unprecedented reforms of the FAA's personnel and 
procurement systems. These reforms give the FAA almost 
unlimited latitude to design new systems to meet the agency's 
unique and particular needs. The first phases of these reforms 
were implemented in April 1996, and are already producing 
dividends. The FAA used to have 233 procurement documents, and 
today there are less than 50. Using its streamlined process, 
the FAA recently completed a billion dollar procurement in six 
months, with no protests. Under the old system, it would have 
taken three times as long, and likely would have been delayed 
by costly protests. A stack of personnel rules that used to be 
one-foot high has been reduced to 41 pages, and will allow the 
agency to hire people where they're needed and when they're 
needed.
    This flexibility will be critical to meeting the challenges 
of the next century. As former FAA Administrator David Hinson 
recently noted, this type of reform is ``the seed for what 
needs to happen at the FAA.'' The incoming leadership at the 
Department of Transportation and the FAA must utilize fully the 
flexibilities that have been granted if the agency is to keep 
pace with the rapidly changing industry it regulates.

                 responsibility for implementing change

    The Commission's goal for aviation in the next century may 
be summed up by the words of Robert Crandall, Chairman of 
American Airlines, when he said, ``We would like the public to 
take safety and security as a given. If that is going to 
happen, change is necessary.''
    The responsibility for achieving that change lies with all 
the partners in aviation. The Administration, the Congress, the 
entire aviation industry and its employees must work together 
to make the changes that are necessary to keep pace with the 
challenges facing them. Commitments must be made at the highest 
levels of every organization, in government and in the private 
sector.
    To ensure that the government remains focused on the goals 
established in this report, the Commission recommends three 
steps:
    (1) that the Secretary of Transportation report publicly 
each year on the implementation status of these 
recommendations;
    (2) that the President assign the incoming leadership at 
the Department of Transportation and the FAA the clear mission 
of leading their agencies through the necessary transition to 
re-engineered safety and security programs; and
    (3) that the performance agreements for these positions, 
which the documents that senior managers sign with the 
President outlining their goals and specific means of measuring 
progress, include implementation of these recommendations.

                 Chapter One: Improving Aviation Safety

        ``The FAA, despite its professionalism and many 
        accomplishments, was simply never created to deal with 
        the environment that has been produced by deregulation 
        of the air transport industry.''
                  --Stuart Matthews, President and CEO, Flight 
        Safety Foundation.

    Commercial aviation is the safest mode of transportation. 
That record has been established not just through government 
regulation, but through the work of everyone involved in 
aviation--manufacturers, airlines, airport operators, and a 
highly-skilled and dedicated workforce. Their combined efforts 
have produced a fatal accident rate of 0.3 per million 
departures in the United States. The accident rate for 
commercial aviation declined dramatically between 1950 and 
1970. But, over the last two decades, that rate has remained 
low, but flat. Heading into the next century, the overall goal 
of aviation safety programs is clear: to bring that rate down 
even lower.
    Focusing on the accident rate is critical because of the 
projected increases in traffic. Unless that rate is reduced, 
the actual number of accidents will grow as traffic increases. 
Given the international nature of aviation, cutting the 
accident rate is an imperative not just for the United States, 
but for all countries involved in aviation. Accident rates in 
some areas of the world exceed those in the U.S. by a factor of 
ten or more. Boeing projects that unless the global accident 
rate is reduced, by the year 2015, an airliner will crash 
somewhere in the world almost weekly.
    While fatality rates in general aviation are higher than in 
commercial operations, the principal causes of general aviation 
accidents are similar to commercial aviation accidents. The 
Commission's recommendations will help address the safety of 
general aviation as well.
    Lessons from reinventing government must be applied to 
aviation programs. Improvements in safety and security will 
result from a focus on several key areas: expanded use of 
partnerships; reengineering of the FAA's regulatory and 
certification processes; greater focus on human factors and 
training; and, the faster introduction of proven new 
technologies. These technologies are enabling the introduction 
of increasingly sophisticated automation into virtually every 
aspect of aviation operations. They offer opportunities for 
improved safety, security, and efficiency, and are driving the 
aviation industry toward an integrated system that will alter 
many of the things that have remained unchanged in aviation for 
decades.
    Adapting to these changes will require renewed commitments 
from all partners, and a willingness to re-engineer long-
standing practices and procedures. This change also calls for a 
cultural transformation of the FAA to improve its ability to 
regulate and lead the development of the integrated aviation 
system on the horizon. In the areas of regulation and 
certification, the Challenge 2000 report represents a good 
first step. However, it and other internal reviews have not 
provided a comprehensive, agency-wide assessment of the need 
for change. That is what is needed.
    A strong government-industry partnership is needed to 
develop and integrate the research, standards, regulations, 
procedures, and infrastructure needed to support the aviation 
system of the future. The FAA has applied this approach 
successfully to cooperative research projects with NASA in the 
development of advanced air traffic technologies. The 
Commission encourages these agencies and others to expand their 
cooperative efforts in aviation safety research and 
development.
    Regular and random inspection of airlines and facilities 
should remain an important part of the FAA's safety and 
security oversight programs. However, given the tremendous 
growth and globalization in the industry, it is neither 
realistic nor desirable to expect the FAA to rely on hands-on 
inspections to ensure safety. It is critical that industry be 
given the incentives and flexibility to be full partners in 
this effort, and be encouraged to monitor and improve their own 
performance. This will not only produce better focus on 
results, but will also allow the FAA to deploy its resources 
more effectively.

                            recommendations

    1.1 Government and industry should establish a national 
goal to reduce the aviation fatal accident rate by a factor of 
five within ten years and conduct safety research to support 
that goal.
    Historically, major advances in aviation safety have been 
driven by technological improvements in airframes, engines, 
communications, radar and other areas. Today, information 
technology can help aviation make the next leap forward in 
safety.
    Aviation safety experts at the FAA and at NASA are 
confident that a five-fold reduction in the fatal accident rate 
could be achieved in the next decade given the right resources 
and focus. The Commission urges the FAA, NASA and industry to 
step up to this challenge. Achieving this goal will require the 
combined efforts of government and industry focused on three 
objectives: preventing equipment malfunctions; reducing human-
caused mishaps; and ensuring separation between aircraft and 
other air or ground hazards. Government can play a strong role 
in research and development, but it must be in partnership with 
industry, which ultimately is responsible for operating safely. 
The Commission urges NASA, which has considerable expertise and 
resources in the area of safety research, to expand its 
involvement in the promotion of aviation safety.
    1.2. The FAA should develop standards for continuous safety 
improvement, and should target its regulatory resources based 
on performance against those standards.
    The FAA should promote aviation safety and security by 
setting high standards, requiring aviation businesses to 
monitor and improve their own safety performance, and by 
developing objective methods of measuring the ability of 
companies to monitor and improve its own safety. Significant 
efforts have already been made in this direction. Current 
regulations, for example, require commercial air carriers to 
implement a Continuing Analysis and Surveillance Program to 
evaluate the effectiveness of their maintenance and inspection 
processes. Significant investment and effort have been put into 
developing the Safety Performance Analysis System, which will 
allow safety inspectors to compare the performance of similar 
operators to identify trends that could lead to reduced levels 
of safety. Such approaches to aviation safety oversight should 
be broadened. Operators should be encouraged to implement 
systems that ensure their continued compliance with regulations 
and that promote continuous improvements in aviation safety and 
security.
    Last year, the FAA undertook an independent review of its 
regulatory and certification programs. That effort, known as 
Challenge 2000, recommended in part that the agency move toward 
implementing rules that establish performance standards where 
possible, and that the rulemaking process be streamlined and 
reengineered. Further, the report urged that the regulatory 
process be restructured to provide compelling technical and 
business incentives for industry to develop and certify 
products that help fulfill priority safety needs.
    The Commission recognizes the value of the Challenge 2000 
report, and urges the FAA and industry to work together to 
develop standards for continuous safety and security 
improvement that recognize variations in company maturity and 
best industry practices. These standards should serve as the 
basis for certification, regulation and oversight of the 
aviation industry. Objective criteria should be developed that 
enable the FAA to assess each organization's safety improvement 
processes and performance, and use this assessment to improve 
performance throughout the industry. As an incentive to 
implement effective safety and security improvement programs, 
FAA oversight should be adjusted to recognize the maturity and 
actual performance of individual operators and manufacturers. 
Such an approach will allow the FAA to target its inspector 
resources on those operators demonstrating the greatest risk, 
while allowing mature operators and manufacturers to manage 
their organizations without unproductive FAA involvement. The 
FAA should adjust its internal classifications and rankings of 
inspectors to reflect this change.
    1.3 The DOT and the FAA should be more vigorous in the 
application of high standards for certification of aviation 
businesses.
    In the past, both the FAA and the DOT have devoted 
significant resources to helping new companies meet regulatory 
requirements and manage their operations. The recent 90 Day 
Safety Review conducted by the DOT and the FAA determined that 
this is an inappropriate role for the government and 
recommended many actions that will improve the certification 
process. The Commission agrees. While the government should 
assist companies in improving the safety and security of their 
operations, it should not use its resources to compensate for 
lack of experience, technical expertise or judgment in a 
company's day-to-day operations.
    In some cases, the FAA's certification standards and 
processes have not kept up with the changing needs of civil 
aviation. For example, current standards for hiring security 
personnel do not take into account changes in explosives 
detection technology. And the certification of engines and 
airframes still reflects a time when these systems were 
produced as completely independent systems. Today, engine and 
airframe development is integrated, so the certification 
process must take into account the entire system rather than 
its individual parts. In the future, as the airplane becomes an 
integral component of the air traffic management system, the 
certification of the aircraft, as part of an integrated 
aviation system, will become even more important.
    The FAA demonstrated its ability to integrate these 
processes and work effectively with industry in the 
certification of the Boeing 777 airplane. Lessons from the 777 
certification should be applied to the way the FAA certificates 
airplanes in the future. Additional certification tools and 
processes should be developed to encourage the introduction of 
new technologies.
    Considerable attention has been given to the issue of 
outsourcing of maintenance and other work, particularly in the 
wake of the Valujet crash. The Commission does not believe that 
outsourcing, in and of itself, presents a problem--if it is 
performed by qualified companies and individuals. The proper 
focus of concern should be on the FAA's certification and 
oversight of any and all companies performing aviation safety 
functions, including repair stations certificated by the FAA 
but located outside of the United States,.
    1.4. The Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) should be 
simplified and, as appropriate, rewritten as plain English, 
performance-based regulations.
    The Commission believes that government can achieve better 
regulatory compliance if its objectives are stated clearly and 
its focus is on goals, not process. While that sounds simple, 
the FAA's rules too often do not meet those criteria.
    The Commission urges the FAA to take two steps to address 
this problem. First, as appropriate, all new rules should be 
rewritten as performance-based regulations, and in plain 
English. Second, within 18 months, a bottom-up review of 
existing regulations should be conducted to identify those in 
need of rewriting as performance-based, plain English 
regulations. Such clarifications would improve compliance and 
help the FAA resolve serious problems created by differences in 
interpretation of regulations by FAA officials across the 
country.The current FARs and supporting Handbooks, Technical 
Standards Orders, Security Directives, and Advisory Circulars 
have become too prescriptive and complex and are increasingly 
open to misinterpretation. Sometimes they provide conflicting 
policy or procedural guidance. They often stifle the creativity 
of those who would do more than the rules require. In many 
cases, the FARs do not allow for advances in technology that 
increase security, safety or efficiency. For example, the FARs 
currently have no provisions for design criteria to protect 
aircraft from high intensity electromagnetic fields such as 
those emanating from TV antennas, radars, cellular phones, 
portable stereos, and laptop computers. These electromagnetic 
fields are potentially hazardous to aircraft using digital 
communications, avionics and flight controls. The FAA has been 
working for more than eight years to develop standard 
certification requirements to address these hazards, but today 
each certification is handled through the use of special 
conditions. Mandating performance rather than dictating 
procedures will break the regulatory logjam.
    1.5. Cost alone should not become dispositive in deciding 
aviation safety and security rulemaking issues.
    As noted earlier, the rate of fatal accidents in commercial 
aviation in the U.S. is less than 0.3 per million departures. 
The rarity of accidents can make it difficult to justify safety 
and security improvements under benefitcost criteria applied to 
regulatory activities. Nevertheless, benefitcost analysis can 
enlighten the regulatory decisionmaking process. For example, 
such analysis can help identify the most costeffective way to 
achieve a safety or security objective. Cost considerations and 
mathematical formulas, however, should never be dispositive in 
making policy determinations regarding aviation safety they are 
one input for decisionmaking. Further, non-quantifiable safety 
and security benefits should be included in the analysis of 
proposals.
    1.6. Government and industry aviation safety research 
should emphasize human factors and training.
    Over the past ten years, flight crew error accounted for 
over 60% of all aviation accidents world-wide. And over the 
past five years, two types of flight crew error, loss of 
control in flight and controlled flight into terrain, accounted 
for over 70% of all airline fatalities. Moreover, recent 
airport testing of explosive detection systems revealed 
significant deficiencies in the performance of security 
personnel. Research, technology, training and sharing of safety 
data can reduce human error. Aviation safety and security have 
always depended upon a talented and dedicated workforce. Today, 
changes in technology are presenting that workforce--flight 
crews, ground and air traffic controllers, maintenance 
technicians--with new challenges. The aviation system will 
continue to rely on these highly skilled people to be 
responsible for all aspects of operations, and it is critical 
to assess and address issues relating to human interaction with 
changing technologies.
    The FAA, NASA, the DoD, and the aviation industry jointly 
developed a National Aviation Human Factors Plan that describes 
a strategic approach to solving the problem of human-caused 
mishaps. Two additional studies, one by the FAA dealing with 
flight deck human factors and the other published by 
representatives from government, industry, and union 
organizations as their 1997 Aviation Safety Plan, identify a 
wide range of safety issues, including human factors. The 
Commission acknowledges the importance of all three of these 
reports and urges the immediate development of an 
implementation plan.
    1.7. Enhanced ground proximity warning systems should be 
installed in all commercial and military passenger aircraft.
    The introduction of ground proximity warning systems (GPWS) 
in commercial aircraft in the late-1970s led to significant 
reductions in controlled flight into terrain, the second-
leading cause of aviation accidents. These accidents occur when 
pilots cannot reconcile their positions with changing terrain. 
Current GPWS systems are not predictive, however, and only warn 
pilots when ground impact is imminent. Several recent incidents 
indicate the need for a forward-looking system that can provide 
better situational awareness and advanced warning to pilots 
when they are approaching hazardous terrain. Digital terrain 
elevation data developed for military purposes can help provide 
this capability.
    On January 15, 1997, Vice President Gore announced that the 
Department of Defense is releasing a version of its global 
digital terrain elevation database for use in the civilian 
sector. Combined with advanced navigation systems, this will 
provide pilots with the tools that they need to reduce, and 
maybe even eliminate, these kinds of accidents in the future.
    The Commission applauds the voluntary introduction of 
advanced ground proximity warning systems in commercial 
aircraft, and urges all segments of the aviation community to 
install this vital safety system. To achieve this goal, the 
Commission urges the FAA to work with industry to develop and 
promote the use of such equipment in general aviation aircraft.
    1.8. The FAA should work with the aviation community to 
develop and protect the integrity of standard safety databases 
that can be shared in accident prevention programs.
    The identification of deviations from normal operations, 
adverse trends, and other incidents can be a valuable tool in 
preventing accidents. The most effective way to identify 
incidents and problems in aviation is for the people who 
operate in the system (pilots, mechanics, controllers, 
dispatchers, etc.) to self-disclose the information. There are 
a number of separate safety data collection efforts ongoing 
within government and industry. Many of these efforts either 
duplicate existing data, report the same information, or are 
not interconnected or integrated. The FAA should work with the 
aviation community to develop standard databases of safety 
information that can be shared openly and encompass operations 
within the aviation industry as well as those within the FAA, 
such as air traffic control.
    People and companies will not provide or assemble safety 
data or information if the information will disclose trade 
secrets, if it can threaten a person's job or be used in an 
enforcement action against a person or company, or if it can in 
any way cause them a liability. Data protection is the key to 
self-disclosure. The Flight Safety Foundation has studied this 
issue and concluded that legislation is the only way to 
guarantee protection of safety data. The joint industry/DOT 
Aviation Safety Plan cites data protection as a key to 
achieving Zero Accidents. The Congress, at the request of the 
Administration, recently enacted legislation providing for the 
protection from public disclosure of certain safety and 
security data voluntarily provided to the FAA. The FAA needs to 
expeditiously complete its rulemaking to implement this 
legislation. Since adequate legislative protection is key to 
building the trust necessary for self disclosure and safety 
monitoring, the FAA should assess the adequacy of the new 
legislative authority and implementing regulations one year 
after the regulations take effect. Any necessary regulatory or 
legislative modifications identified at that time should be 
promptly addressed.
    1.9. In cooperation with airlines and manufacturers, the 
FAA's Aging Aircraft program should be expanded to cover non-
structural systems.
    The average age of commercial airline fleets is continuing 
to increase. In 1975, few large commercial aircraft were in 
service beyond their original design life, typically twenty 
years. But with increased competition and growth in passenger 
and cargo traffic brought on by deregulation, service lives of 
dependable aircraft models were extended through expanded 
maintenance and overhaul programs. By the year 2000, more than 
2,500 commercial aircraft in the United States may be flying 
beyond their original design life.
    In 1988, a Boeing 737 in Hawaii suffered severe structural 
failure of its forward fuselage sections due to corrosion not 
visible during normal maintenance inspections. As a direct 
result of this accident, the FAA greatly expanded its 
structural integrity inspection program and formed the 
Airworthiness Assurance Working Group (AAWG). Its focus has 
been almost exclusively on structural integrity, and the 
effects of structural corrosion and fatigue. The programs in 
existence under the AAWG have been effective and are considered 
adequate to deal proactively with the structural problems 
associated with aging commercial aircraft.
    However, much less is known about the potential effects of 
age on non-structural components of commercial aircraft. Non-
structural components include electrical wiring; connectors, 
wiring harnesses, and cables; fuel, hydraulic and pneumatic 
lines; and electro-mechanical systems such as pumps, sensors, 
and actuators. Neither the manufacturers nor the commercial 
airlines consider the aging of non-structural components to 
pose serious safety problems primarily because they consider 
their redundancy, replacement upon failure, and periodic, 
programmed maintenance to be sufficient to assure aircraft 
safety.
    The Commission is concerned that existing procedures, 
directives, quality assurance, and inspections may not be 
sufficient to prevent safety related problems caused by the 
corrosive and deteriorating effects of non-structural 
components of commercial aircraft as they age. To address this, 
the Commission recommends that the FAA work with airlines and 
manufacturers to expand the aging aircraft program to include 
non-structural components, through steps including: full and 
complete tear-downs of selected aircraft scheduled to go out of 
service; the establishment of a lead-the-fleet research 
program; an expansion of the FAA-DoD-NASA cooperative aging 
aircraft program; an expansion of programs of the Airworthiness 
Assurance Working Group to include non-structural components; 
and encouraging the development of modern technical means to 
ensure and predict the continued airworthiness of aging non-
structural components and systems.
    1.10. The FAA should develop better quantitative models and 
analytic techniques to inform management decision-making.
    The FAA is called upon to evaluate many proposals for 
safety and security improvements and capacity enhancements as 
part of its NAS modernization, and other programs. The FAA does 
not have a developed model for the air traffic control system 
that permits the systematic evaluation and comparison of these 
proposals with respect to their life-cycle cost and their 
likely effects on the operation of the air traffic control 
system. If available, such analysis would be of great 
assistance to support decision-making by the FAA and the DOT 
leadership.
    The Commission urges the FAA to strengthen its analytic and 
planning tools, especially through the development of models 
that give insight into the system-wide consequences of 
alternative courses of action and the development of a credible 
cost accounting system, as mandated in the Federal Aviation 
Reauthorization Act of 1996.
    1.11. The DOT should work with the Department of Justice to 
ensure that airline crew members performing their duties are 
protected from passenger misconduct.
    Passenger behavior that amounts to criminal conduct is a 
matter of growing concern to U.S. airlines. When crew members 
are called upon to enforce in-flight safety and security rules 
and regulations, they are working to ensure that our aviation 
system remains safe and secure. Their responsibilities at times 
require them to confront passengers who are unwilling to comply 
with lawful instructions and become abusive. Such conduct by 
passengers threatens the well-being of all those on the plane, 
and is subject to federal prosecution. The Commission urges the 
DOT to work with the Department of Justice and the United 
States Attorneys to ensure that priority is given the 
prosecution of offending passengers to the fullest extent of 
the law for interfering with airline crew members in the 
performance of their duties.
    1.12. Legislation should be enacted to protect aviation 
industry employees who report safety or security violations.
    In a number of important industries, statutory protection 
is provided to ``whistleblowers'' who report violations of 
safety procedures. The Commission believes that aviation safety 
and security will be enhanced if employees, who are a critical 
link in safety and security, are able to report unsafe 
conditions to the FAA without fear of retribution from their 
employers. Some aviation employees are provided protections 
through contractual agreements. However, the Commission 
believes that statutory protection, such as that provided to 
workers under the Occupational Health and Safety Act, would 
provide uniformity within the industry and provide coverage to 
those not already protected.
    1.13. The FAA should eliminate the exemptions in the 
Federal Aviation Regulations that allow passengers under the 
age of two to travel without the benefit of FAA-approved 
restraints.
    Current regulations require that all passengers over the 
age of two have their own seats, and that those seats are 
equipped with FAA-approved restraints. The Commission believes 
that it is inappropriate for infants to be afforded a lesser 
degree of protection than older passengers. The FAA should 
revise its regulations to require that all occupants be 
restrained during takeoff, landing, and turbulent conditions, 
and that all infants and small children below the weight of 40 
pounds and under the height of 40 inches be restrained in an 
appropriate child restraint system, such as child safety seats, 
appropriate to their height and weight. The Commission also 
notes and commends the FAA's ongoing efforts in collaboration 
with major airframe and seat manufacturers to develop standards 
for integrated child safety seats.
    1.14. The Commission commends the joint government-industry 
initiative to equip the cargo holds of all passenger aircraft 
with smoke detectors, and urges expeditious implementation of 
the rules and other steps necessary to achieve the goal of both 
detection and suppression in all cargo holds.
    In December 1996, most of the nation's major airlines 
announced a voluntary action to install smoke detection systems 
in the cargo holds of commercial airplanes and to study 
additional measures for fire suppression. This announcement 
broke a deadlock that had existed for most of the last decade. 
The Commission commends this initiative as an example of the 
partnership that will be necessary to enhance safety and 
security.

    Chapter Two: Making Air Traffic Control Safer and More Efficient

        ``While the airlines are posting record traffic figures 
        and profits, the ground-based air traffic control 
        infrastructure is outdated and unable to keep pace with 
        expansion.''
              --Barry Krasner, President of the National Air
                  Traffic Controllers Association

    It is essential that the air traffic system of the United 
States be modernized. Although the current system remains safe, 
it is showing signs of aging. System outages, brownouts, 
inefficiencies in air traffic control, and capacity limitations 
on the ground add costs to the FAA and to users of the airspace 
system. The Air Transport Association estimates that 
inefficiencies in the system cost airlines in excess of $3 
billion in 1995--costs ultimately paid by passengers and anyone 
who purchases goods shipped by air.
    In 1996, a government-industry task force defined a future 
operational concept known as Free Flight. Under this concept, 
national airspace system (NAS) operations will transition from 
ground-based air traffic control (using analog radios, 
navigational beacons and radar) to more collaborative air 
traffic management based on digital communication, satellite 
navigation, and computer-aided decision support tools for 
controllers and pilots. This proposed new system offers 
significant benefits for users of the NAS, for the safety and 
convenience of the traveling public, and for greater FAA 
operational efficiency.
    The FAA's proposed technical approach and schedule for NAS 
modernization are documented in its recently published National 
Airspace System Architecture. The proposed NAS architecture is 
generally consistent with industry's vision for the future of 
air traffic management, but the proposed schedule for 
modernization is too slow to meet projected demands and funding 
issues are not adequately addressed. Unless the schedule is 
accelerated, the United States may lose its position of global 
leadership in civil aviation.
    The technology needed to modernize the ATC system by and 
large exists, and is available off-the-shelf. The challenge is 
completing the transition to the new system in a timely and 
cost-effective manner, and ensuring that all users participate 
in the upgrade. Unfortunately, the FAA has encountered serious 
problems in its modernization program. Before major changes 
were made in 1994, the centerpiece of the FAA's modernization 
program had, according to the General Accounting Office, fallen 
eight years behind schedule, and was $5 billion over budget. 
Cost overruns in five other key programs ranged from 50 to more 
than 500%, and delays averaged close to four years.
    These problems have been traced to inadequate user input, 
poor management and contractor performance, and inadequate 
oversight. Although availability of funds does not appear to 
have been a problem in the past, the capital needs of the 
future could well outstrip the ability to fund them through the 
traditional budget process, particularly as capital 
improvements are accelerated, as recommended by the Commission.
    Traditionally, the FAA has seen it necessary to design, own 
and operate its air traffic control system, in cooperation with 
the Department of Defense. Current off-the-shelf technology 
allows the FAA to consider its needs differently, particularly 
in areas such as the acquisition of communications systems. In 
other critical areas of government, including Defense, the 
private sector has proved its ability to provide critical 
services with increased quality and lower costs. A number of 
major U.S. manufacturers are producing new ATC systems for 
deployment in other countries. The FAA should seek 
collaborative opportunities with the private sector in order to 
accelerate the transition to a new NAS.
    There have been several important changes that should allow 
the modernization program to move forward more effectively. The 
Commission notes, in particular, the following factors which 
should help avoid problems of the past: the redefinition of the 
modernization program; the personnel and procurement reforms 
granted the FAA, which give it unprecedented ability to hold 
managers accountable for results and to streamline procurement 
processes; and the creation of the new Management Advisory 
Committee by the Congress, which will give users a more 
effective voice in decision-making. However, the Commission 
believes that a new long-term financing mechanism is also 
necessary to ensure that modernization occurs on an acceptable 
schedule, and that the resulting safety and efficiency benefits 
are realized faster.
    The FAA must take advantage of personnel, procurement, and 
other reforms to ensure that it is spending existing resources 
more effectively in order to gain approval of innovative 
funding proposals from the Administration and the Congress. 
Additionally, the Commission believes that it is critical that 
the senior management at the DOT and the FAA take additional 
steps to ensure that past problems are being dealt with, and 
that an accelerated modernization schedule can proceed.

                            recommendations

    2.1. The FAA should develop a revised NAS modernization 
plan within six months that will set a goal of the modernized 
system being fully operational nationwide by the year 2005; and 
the Congress, the Administration, and users should develop 
innovative means of financing this acceleration.
    Modernization of our aging airspace system is critical to 
the safety of the traveling public, to maintaining our world 
leadership in aviation, and to our economic interests. The 
FAA's current plan calls for the modernized system to be 
operational after 2012. That is simply too long to postpone the 
safety and economic benefits that will derive from the 
modernized system. Therefore, the Commission recommends that 
2005 be set as the date when all elements of the communication, 
navigation, and surveillance and air traffic management 
capabilities defined in the NAS architecture should be fully 
operational. This accelerated implementation must be 
coordinated with the Department of Defense, which is a major 
user and provider of air traffic control services. 
Implementation of the initiative announced by Vice President 
Gore on January 15, 1997 to demonstrate these systems in Hawaii 
and Alaska is an important step toward full operational status.
    Achieving this goal depends on the availability of several 
tools, as discussed in the following recommendations. Chief 
among these tools is the need to find non-traditional means of 
financing the capital improvements. Innovative approaches to 
federal financing of major infrastructure projects have been 
proposed in the past, including leveraging the revenues coming 
into the FAA, multi-year appropriations and non-traditional 
budget scoring. Non-federal financing approaches have also been 
proposed, such as the creation of private infrastructure banks. 
The Commission expects that the National Civil Aviation Review 
Commission (NCARC), established in the Federal Aviation 
Reauthorization Act of 1996 by Congress to explore funding 
options for the FAA, will consider these options. Whatever the 
funding mechanism selected, the Commission believes it is 
critical to our global leadership in civil aviation to finance 
an accelerated modernization of the NAS.
    2.2. The FAA should develop plans to ensure that 
operational and airport capacity needs are integrated into the 
modernization of the NAS.
    The FAA's current NAS modernization program focuses on 
equipment and infrastructure. However, there is no clear plan 
for how the people who operate the system will make the 
transition, and what their roles and responsibilities will be 
under the new systems. The FAA should develop immediately a NAS 
Operational Plan to address these issues.
    The FAA should also develop a National Airport System 
Modernization Plan that presents a strategic vision, plan and 
schedule for modernization of U.S. airports that is consistent 
with modernization of the NAS. This plan, produced in 
collaboration with local airport officials, should identify 
critical system capacity enhancement needs and should address 
major safety issues at airports. These plans, when incorporated 
into the revised NAS implementation plan called for in 
recommendation 2.1, would provide a balanced strategic plan for 
aviation in the United States.
    2.3. The FAA should explore innovative means to accelerate 
the installation of advanced avionics in general aviation 
aircraft.
    The safety and efficiency benefits of the modernized NAS 
will not be realized fully until all users have incorporated 
its features. Delays in the installation of the equipment 
needed to operate in the future NAS will put off the benefits 
for all system users. Therefore, it is essential that the FAA, 
as it accelerates its modernization, works with users to ensure 
that they keep pace.
    Savings from more efficient operations provide significant 
incentive for commercial carriers to install the required 
digital radios, GPS receivers, and automatic dependent 
surveillance equipment. But it is essential to find ways to 
ensure general aviation users are equipped for future NAS 
operations.
    2.4. The U.S. government should ensure the accuracy, 
availability and reliability of the GPS system to accelerate 
its use in NAS modernization and to encourage its acceptance as 
an international standard for aviation.
    Satellite-based navigation and positioning is a core 
element of our NAS modernization plans, and is critical to 
achieving a seamless, efficient global aviation system in the 
future. The U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS), which is a 
dual civil-military system operated by the U.S. Air Force, is 
the current and foreseeable backbone for any global navigation 
satellite system. Full acceptance of GPS as an international 
standard for aviation is dependent on greater assurance to the 
user community--both foreign and domestic--of its accuracy, 
availability and reliability. As part of its NAS modernization 
plans, the FAA is currently developing a Wide Area Augmentation 
System (WAAS) that will enhance the basic GPS civil service to 
meet the requirements of civil aviation users. Many other 
nations, including Europe and Japan, are planning similar 
augmentations, but are still somewhat reluctant to base their 
own airspace management on a GPS system which they perceive to 
be controlled by the U.S. military.
    The recent U.S. GPS policy made considerable progress in 
addressing these international concerns by assuring the 
continued availability of basic civil GPS services worldwide, 
free of direct user fees. This new policy also established a 
joint civil-military Executive Board to manage GPS and its 
augmentations, and initiated formal international discussions 
aimed at developing agreements on the provision and use of GPS 
services. But, there are still a number of important technical 
and policy issues that must be resolved if GPS is to become the 
system of choice for global aviation navigation and 
positioning.
    First, the U.S. must provide stronger strategic leadership 
for civil users of GPS. The acceptance of GPS as an 
international standard is key to continued U.S. leadership in 
aviation, and can only be achieved through strong civilian 
participation in GPS planning and decision-making. A number of 
working groups and advisory committees currently exist 
throughout the Federal government and the private sector to 
coordinate and represent the needs of civil users of GPS. The 
Commission recommends that civilian leadership be strengthened 
by establishing a Civil GPS Users Advisory Council, with 
representatives from both the users and providers of GPS 
equipment and services, reporting to the GPS Executive Board. 
The Commission also encourages the Administration to work 
rapidly on the development of international guidelines on the 
provision and use of GPS services called for in the President's 
recent GPS policy directive.
    Second, greater redundancy is needed to enhance the ability 
of users to cross-check GPS accuracy and to verify the system's 
reliability. The most effective means of achieving this 
redundancy is to provide additional civil GPS precision ranging 
signals in space. Studies have shown that additional precision 
ranging capability can be achieved at relatively little cost 
while providing enormous benefits to all civil GPS users. The 
Commission recommends that this capability be added to the 
FAA's WAAS system. This action will result in a more robust and 
inherently more reliable system and will provide a major boost 
to the international acceptance of GPS as a standard for 
aviation navigation and positioning.
    Third, the GPS Executive Board should resolve the remaining 
issues over funding and frequency assignment for a second civil 
frequency as quickly as possible so that this needed 
improvement can be included in the next generation of GPS 
satellites. The GPS Executive Board is considering enhancements 
to future GPS satellites that would include an additional 
broadcast frequency. This additional frequency would expand the 
base of civil GPS users worldwide and would send a strong 
message to the international community that the U.S. intends to 
maintain a long-term commitment to providing civil GPS 
services. Moreover, the FAA's WAAS system requires two 
frequencies to meet the accuracy needs of civil aviation users, 
and the additional frequency would allow for complete 
independence of civil and military GPS services in the future.
    Fourth, the GPS system must be protected from both 
intentional and unintentional interference. The GPS system will 
be a core, safety-critical component of the future global 
aviation information system. The security of GPS should be a 
major consideration in carrying out Recommendation 3.6 for 
protecting all aviation information systems.
    2.5. The users of the NAS should fund its development and 
operation.
    The current system of funding the ATC system provides 
little direct connection between the excise taxes paid and 
services provided or the amount made available to the FAA 
through the budget and appropriations process. Replacing the 
traditional system of excise taxes with user fees offers the 
potential to correlate revenues and spending more closely. \1\ 
Importantly, a financing system would not only help ensure 
adequate availability of funding , but would also build 
incentives for efficiency and safety into the system--both for 
the users and for the FAA. The National Civil Aviation Review 
Commission is the proper venue for resolving the details of a 
new user fee system, and the Commission expects that it will be 
formed and begin its work in the very near future. The 
Commission urges the NCARC, in designing a new financing 
system, to ensure that any changes in the relative amount of 
revenues generated from any segment of the aviation industry do 
not result in undue economic disruption within any segment of 
the industry, and that the fees are not discriminatory or anti-
competitive among carriers. In addition, non-business general 
aviation users of the NAS should not be adversely impacted by 
any new financing system. This will help ensure that general 
aviation users will be full and willing participants in the 
modernized NAS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Commissioner Coleman takes no position with respect to the 
first two sentences of recommendation 2.5 as he feels this is among the 
issues NCARC is to resolve.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2.6. The FAA should identify and justify by July 1997 the 
frequency spectrum necessary for the transition to a modernized 
air traffic control system.
    Expansion of telecommunications and other industries is 
creating greater competition for frequency spectrum. The FAA 
has indicated a need to retain large segments of its current 
spectrum allocation, but has provided insufficient 
justification for doing so. To ensure that the FAA's spectrum 
needs during modernization are not compromised the Commission 
recommends that the FAA complete a full justification, as well 
as a plan for freeing up spectrum as older systems are 
modernized or decommissioned. This process must be completed 
not later than July, 1997, and the results included by the DOT 
in the Federal Radio Navigation Plan and the RTCA 185 Report: 
Aeronautical Spectrum Planning for the Years 1997-2010.

            Chapter Three: Improving Security for Travelers

        ``We know we can't make the world risk-free, but we can 
        reduce the risks we face and we have to take the fight 
        to the terrorists. If we have the will, we can find the 
        means.''
              --President Clinton

    The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central 
Intelligence Agency, and other intelligence sources have been 
warning that the threat of terrorism is changing in two 
important ways. First, it is no longer just an overseas threat 
from foreign terrorists. People and places in the United States 
have joined the list of targets, and Americans have joined the 
ranks of terrorists. The bombings of the World Trade Center in 
New York and the Federal Building in Oklahoma City are clear 
examples of the shift, as is the conviction of Ramzi Yousef for 
attempting to bomb twelve American airliners out of the sky 
over the Pacific Ocean. The second change is that in addition 
to well-known, established terrorist groups, it is becoming 
more common to find terrorists working alone or in ad-hoc 
groups, some of whom are not afraid to die in carrying out 
their designs.
    Although the threat of terrorism is increasing, the danger 
of an individual becoming a victim of a terrorist attack--let 
alone an aircraft bombing--will doubtless remain very small. 
But terrorism isn't merely a matter of statistics. We fear a 
plane crash far more than we fear something like a car 
accident. One might survive a car accident, but there's no 
chance in a plane at 30,000 feet. This fear is one of the 
reasons that terrorists see airplanes as attractive targets. 
And, they know that airlines are often seen as national 
symbols.
    When terrorists attack an American airliner, they are 
attacking the United States. They have so little respect for 
our values--so little regard for human life or the principles 
of justice that are the foundation of American society--that 
they would destroy innocent children and devoted mothers and 
fathers completely at random. This cannot be tolerated, or 
allowed to intimidate free societies. There must be a concerted 
national will to fight terrorism. There must be a willingness 
to apply sustained economic, political and commercial pressure 
on countries sponsoring terrorists. There must be an unwavering 
commitment to pursuing terrorists and bringing them to justice. 
There must be the resolve to punish those who would violate 
sanctions imposed against terrorist states.
    Today's aviation security is based in part on the defenses 
erected in the 1970s against hijackers and on recommendations 
made by the Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, 
which was formed in the wake of the bombing of Pan Am 103 over 
Lockerbie, Scotland. Improvements in aviation security have 
been complicated because government and industry often found 
themselves at odds, unable to resolve disputes over financing, 
effectiveness, technology, and potential impacts on operations 
and passengers.
    Americans should not have to choose between enhanced 
security and efficient and affordable air travel. Both goals 
are achievable if the federal government, airlines, airports, 
aviation employees, local law enforcement agencies, and 
passengers work together to achieve them. Accordingly, the 
Commission recommends a new partnership that will marshal 
resources more effectively, and focus all parties on achieving 
the ultimate goal: enhancing the security of air travel for 
Americans.
    The Commission considered the question of whether or not 
the FAA is the appropriate government agency to have the 
primary responsibility for regulating aviation security. The 
Commission believes that, because of its extensive interactions 
with airlines and airports, the FAA is the appropriate agency, 
with the following qualifications: first, that the FAA must 
improve the way it carries out its mission; and second, that 
the roles of intelligence and law enforcement agencies in 
supporting the FAA must be more clearly defined and 
coordinated. The Commission's recommendations address those 
conditions.
    The terrorist threat is changing and growing. Therefore, it 
is important to improve security not just against familiar 
threats, such as explosives in checked baggage, but also to 
explore means of assessing and countering emerging threats, 
such as the use of biological or chemical agents, or the use of 
missiles. While these do not present significant threats at 
present, it would be short-sighted not to plan for their 
possible use and take prudent steps to counter them.
    The Commission believes that aviation security should be a 
system of systems, layered, integrated, and working together to 
produce the highest possible levels of protection. Each of the 
Commission's recommendations should be looked upon as a part of 
a whole, and not in isolation. It should be noted that a number 
of the Commission's recommendations outlined in the previous 
chapter, particularly those relating to certification and 
regulation, apply to the FAA's security programs, as well.

                            recommendations

    3.1. The federal government should consider aviation 
security as a national security issue, and provide substantial 
funding for capital improvements.
    The Commission believes that terrorist attacks on civil 
aviation are directed at the United States, and that there 
should be an ongoing federal commitment to reducing the threats 
that they pose. In its initial report, the Commission called 
for approximately $160 million in federal funds for capital 
costs associated with improving security, and Congress agreed. 
As part of its ongoing commitment, the federal government 
should devote significant resources, of approximately $100 
million annually, to meet capital requirements identified by 
airport consortia and the FAA. The Commission recognizes that 
more is needed. The Commission expects the National Civil 
Aviation Review Commission to consider a variety of options for 
additional user fees that could be used to pay for security 
measures including, among others, an aviation user security 
surcharge, the imposition of local security fees, tax 
incentives and other means.
    3.2. The FAA should establish federally mandated standards 
for security enhancements.
    These enhancements should include standards for use of 
Explosive Detection System (EDS) machines, training programs 
for security personnel, use of automated bag match technology, 
development of profiling programs (manual and automated), and 
deployment of explosive detection canine teams.
    3.3. The Postal Service should advise customers that all 
packages weighing over 16 ounces will be subject to examination 
for explosives and other threat objects in order to move by 
air.
    The Postal Service now requires that packages weighing over 
16 ounces must be brought to a post office, rather than be 
placed in a mailbox. To improve security further, the Postal 
Service should mandate that all mail weighing over 16 ounces 
contain a written release that allows it to be examined by 
explosive detection systems in order to be shipped by air. The 
Postal Service should develop and implement procedures to 
randomly screen such packages for explosives and other threat 
objects. If necessary, the Postal Service should seek 
appropriate legislation to accomplish this.
    3.4. Current law should be amended to clarify the U.S. 
Customs Service's authority to search outbound international 
mail.
    Currently, the Customs Service searches for explosives and 
other threat objects on inbound mail and cargo. This 
recommended legislative enhancement parallels the Customs 
Service's existing border search authority.
    3.5. The FAA should implement a comprehensive plan to 
address the threat of explosives and other threat objects in 
cargo and work with industry to develop new initiatives in this 
area.
    The FAA should place greater emphasis on the work of teams, 
such as the Aviation Security Advisory Committee and the 
Baseline Cargo Working Group, to address cargo issues. The 
Commission believes that the FAA should implement the Baseline 
Group's recommendation with regard to profiling by ``known'' 
and ``unknown'' shippers. In addition, unaccompanied express 
shipments on commercial passenger aircraft should be subject to 
examination by explosives detection systems; the FAA should 
work with industry to develop a computer assisted cargo 
profiling system that can be integrated into airlines' and 
forwarders' reservation and operating systems; requirements 
should be implemented requiring that trucks delivering cargo 
for loading on planes be sealed and locked; the FAA should 
develop and distribute air cargo security training materials; 
and enhanced forwarder and shipper employee screening 
procedures should be developed.
    3.6. The FAA should establish a security system that will 
provide a high level of protection for all aviation information 
systems.
    In addition to improving the physical security of the 
traveling public, information systems critical to aircraft, air 
traffic control and airports should also be protected. Although 
government is responsible for a great number of aviation 
related information systems, a partnership must be formed in 
order to create integrated protection among these and related 
private sector systems. Some protective measures will become 
the responsibility of airlines, some that of the airports and 
others of the aircraft and air traffic control systems 
manufacturers and maintenance providers. The National Security 
Agency must play a role in coordinating information security 
measures, setting standards and providing oversight of system 
security to ensure protection against outside interference, 
disruption and corruption. Specific legislation should be 
reviewed that makes willful interference with information 
systems a federal crime with substantial penalties to provide a 
clear deterrent.
    3.7. The FAA should work with airlines and airport 
consortia to ensure that all passengers are positively 
identified and subjected to security procedures before they 
board aircraft.
    Curb-side check-in, electronic ticketing, advance boarding 
passes, and other initiatives are affecting the way passengers 
enter the air transportation system. As improved security 
procedures are put into place, it is essential that all 
passengers be accounted for in that system, properly identified 
and subject to the same level of scrutiny. The Commission urges 
the FAA to work with airlines and airport consortia to ensure 
that necessary changes are made to accomplish that goal.
    3.8. Submit a proposed resolution, through the U.S. 
Representative, that the International Civil Aviation 
Organization begin a program to verify and improve compliance 
with international security standards.
    Although 185 nations have ratified the International Civil 
Aviation Organization convention, and the security standards 
contained in it, compliance is not uniform. This creates the 
potential for security vulnerabilities on connecting flights 
throughout the world. To help raise levels of security 
throughout the world, the International Civil Aviation 
Organization needs greater authority to determine whether 
nations are in compliance. Strong U.S. sponsorship for adding 
verification and compliance capabilities to the International 
Civil Aviation Organization could lead to enhanced worldwide 
aviation security.
    3.9. Assess the possible use of chemical and biological 
weapons as tools of terrorism.
    FAA should work with the Department of Defense and the 
Department of Energy on programs to anticipate and plan for 
changing threats, such as chemical and biological agents.
    3.10. The FAA should work with industry to develop a 
national program to increase the professionalism of the 
aviation security workforce, including screening personnel.The 
Commission believes it's critical to ensure that those charged 
with providing security for over 500 million passengers a year 
in the United States are the best qualified and trained in the 
industry. One proposal that could accomplish this goal is the 
creation of a nationwide non-profit security corporation, 
funded by the airlines, to handle airport security. This 
concept, under consideration by the major airlines, merits 
further review.
    The Commission recommends that the FAA work with the 
private sector and other federal agencies to promote the 
professionalism of security personnel through a program that 
could include: licensing and performance standards that reflect 
best practices; adequate, common and recurrent training that 
considers human factors; emphasis on reducing turnover rates; 
rewards for performance; opportunities for advancement; a 
national rank and grade structure to permit employees to find 
opportunities in other areas; regional and national 
competitions to identify highly skilled teams; and, an 
agreement among users to hire based on performance, not just 
cost.
    3.11 Access to airport controlled areas must be secured and 
the physical security of aircraft must be ensured.
    Air carriers and airport authorities, working with FAA, 
must develop comprehensive and effective means by which to 
secure aircraft and other controlled areas from unauthorized 
access and intrusion. Use of radio frequency transponders to 
track the location of people and objects in airport controlled 
areas, including aircraft, offers significant advantages over 
the current security measures commonly used today. Where 
adequate airport controlled area and aircraft security are not 
assured by other means, this technology should be considered 
for use at both international and domestic airports.
The Following Recommendations Were Presented to President Clinton on 
        September 9, 1996
    3.12. Establish consortia at all commercial airports to 
implement enhancements to aviation safety and security.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
    Establish consortia at all commercial airports to implement 
enhancements to aviation safety and security. The Commission is 
convinced that safety, security, efficiency, and affordability 
can go hand in hand if all parties work as partners. The FAA 
should direct its officials responsible for oversight of 
security procedures at the nation's 450 commercial airports to 
convene relevant aviation and law enforcement entities for the 
purpose of implementing the Commission's recommendations and 
further improving aviation safety and security. At each 
airport, these partners will: (1) immediately conduct a 
vulnerability assessment; and (2) based on that assessment, 
develop an action plan that includes the deployment of new 
technology and processes to enhance aviation safety and 
security.
    The FAA will approve these action plans on an expedited 
basis; procure and allocate, based on availability, new 
equipment; and test airports to ensure that the plans are being 
implemented properly.
Status
    Forty-one major airport consortia have submitted action 
plans for FAA review.
    The Commission's most important recommendation in its 
initial report was that local consortia be convened to identify 
vulnerabilities and propose action plans. The Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) called for initial consortia meetings by 
September 27, 1996, at 41 major U.S. airports where FAA 
personnel are permanently deployed. By December 2, 1996, all 
consortia action plans or reports from these airports had been 
presented to the FAA for review. The consortia action plans 
defined local security threat conditions based on input from 
FAA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Consortia also 
assessed other areas such as personnel training, passenger 
screening, access control measures, and equipment and 
technology needs.
Augmenting Recommendation
    The FAA should formalize the establishment of consortia at 
all Category X through Category III airports by September 30, 
1997, and, after consultation with industry, issue guidance on 
the future of consortia.
    3.13. Conduct airport vulnerability assessments and develop 
action plans.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
    Conduct airport vulnerability assessments and develop 
action plans.
    Using models already developed by Sandia National 
Laboratory, periodic vulnerability assessments of the nation's 
commercial airports should be conducted. Based on the results, 
action plans tailored to each airport will be developed for 
expedited approval by the FAA.
Status
    Law enforcement agencies are conducting assessments and 
addressing problems.
    The FAA Authorization Act of 1996 required the FAA and FBI 
to conduct joint threat and vulnerability assessments on 
security every three years, or more frequently if necessary, at 
each airport determined to be high risk.
    In November 1996, officials from the FBI, FAA and 
Department of Transportation (DOT) established a working group 
to define ``high risk'' airports. Discussions have been held on 
the criteria to be used to identify an airport facility as high 
risk, methodology to use in conducting joint FAA/FBI 
vulnerability assessments, and which airports should be 
assessed on a priority basis. The target date for completing 
the procedures for conducting vulnerability assessments is 
April 30, 1997, and initial assessments are to begin by late 
June, 1997.
    3.14. Require criminal background checks and FBI 
fingerprint checks for all screeners, and all airport and 
airline employees with access to secure areas.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
    Require criminal background checks and FBI fingerprint 
checks for all screeners, and all airport and airline employees 
with access to secure areas.
    Currently, employees, including those with unescorted 
access to secure areas of airports, are not subject to such 
review. Given the risks associated with the potential 
introduction of explosives into these areas, the Commission 
recommends that screeners and employees with access to secure 
areas be subject to criminal background checks and FBI 
fingerprint checks.
Status
    The FBI has reduced fingerprint check turnaround time to at 
most seven days.
    The FBI has expedited the processing of aviation related 
fingerprint submissions. The FBI will accelerate its efforts to 
make software modifications and purchase additional computer 
hardware to adapt its Electronic Fingerprinting Image Print 
Server (EFIPS) system to accept civil fingerprint cards.
Augmenting Recommendation
    The Commission reiterates that the overall goal is FBI 
fingerprint checks of all airport and airline employees with 
access to secure areas, no later than mid-1999.
    3.15 Deploy existing technology.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
    Deploy existing technology. The Commission has reviewed 
numerous machines designed to detect explosives in cargo, 
checked baggage, carry-on bags, and on passengers. There is no 
silver bullet. No single machine offers a solution to the 
challenges we face. Each machine has its own advantages and its 
own limitations. Even machines that work fairly well in the 
laboratory need to be tested in actual use at busy airports. We 
recognize that the FAA has certified only one technology for 
baggage screening, but we believe we must get a variety of 
machines, including some in use in other countries, into the 
field. There day-to-day operators can figure out which 
equipment works best in what situations and combinations, and 
what features need to be improved. Finding the strengths and 
weakness of existing technology will spur industry's 
creativity, leading to the invention of better and better 
instruments. Ultimately, the goal should be to deploy equipment 
that can be certified by the FAA to detect explosives likely to 
be used by terrorists.
    The Commission recommends the government purchase 
significant numbers of computed tomography detection systems, 
upgraded x-rays, and other innovative systems. By deploying 
equipment widely, passengers throughout the aviation system 
will receive the benefits of the enhancements. The Commission 
strongly believes it would be improper to discuss the details 
of such deployment, as to do so would serve only to compromise 
the integrity of an enhanced security system.
    The Commission recommends that this initial equipment 
purchase be paid for with appropriated funds. This 
recommendation does not settle the issue of how security costs 
will be financed in the long run. That will be dealt with in 
our final report.
Status
    Congress funded the purchase of commercially available 
advanced security screening equipment.
    The FAA has ordered 54 advanced explosives detection 
systems.
    In November and December 1996, FAA awarded six fixed priced 
contracts to various manufacturers of explosives trace 
detection technologies.
Augmenting Recommendation
    The Commission recognizes that deployed technology for 
examining carry-on baggage may be outdated. New developments 
such as computerized systems with high resolution digital 
displays, innovative use of color to highlight threat objects, 
and ability to accommodate technologies such as threat image 
projection to maintain screener performance, can provide 
enhanced security. The FAA should review available technology 
for screening carry on items, regularly update minimum 
standards for new installations, and develop programs for 
upgrading deployed technology.
Cross Reference to Related Recommendations
    This recommendation is related to recommendation 3.2.
    3.16. Establish a joint government-industry research and 
development program.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
    Establish a joint government-industry research and 
development program. The Commission recommends the 
establishment of a new joint government-industry partnership 
whose mission will be to accelerate research and development to 
enhance the security of air travel.
    This could be modeled on the Partnership For A New 
Generation Vehicle (PNGV), in which the federal government and 
auto makers are combining resources to develop automobiles with 
significantly enhanced fuel economy, safety, and reduced 
emissions. We propose to increase federal funding and to ask 
the private sector to contribute.
Status
    The FAA is working with industry to develop agreements and 
award research grants.
    Congress increased the federal funding of R&D as required.
    The FAA is moving in the direction of interacting more 
closely with industry, having set up advisory mechanisms such 
as the Aviation Security Advisory Committee; participating in 
individual Cooperative Research and Development Agreements with 
individual firms; giving grants to airlines and airports to 
conduct demonstrations and otherwise involve themselves in 
security technology development; entering into cost-sharing 
arrangements with firms to develop security technology.
Augmenting Recommendation
    The FAA received additional funding and has aggressively 
accelerated systems to (1) improve screener performance, (2) 
reduce aircraft vulnerability, (3) screen cargo, and (4) to 
develop options for dealing with threats other than explosives. 
The FAA is encouraged to use the best technology available to 
solve security and safety challenges throughout the air 
transportation system.
    3.17. Establish an interagency task force to assess the 
potential use of surface-to-air missiles against commercial 
aircraft.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
    Assess the viability of anti-missile defense systems.. 
Whether or not the explosion of TWA 800 turns out to have been 
due to a surface-to-air missile attack, as some eye-witness 
accounts suggest, missile attacks have downed passenger planes 
in other countries, and it is a risk that should be evaluated. 
The Commission will continue to analyze this problem in 
cooperation with the Department of Defense and other government 
agencies.
Status
    DoD will convene an interagency task force to examine the 
threat to civil aircraft.
    Initial analyses of both the missile threat and electronic 
systems available to counter it support a decision to take 
positive steps. Experts from the Department of Defense (DoD), 
the intelligence community, defense contractors and research 
scientists contributed to analysis of the viability of anti-
missile defense systems for civil aviation.
Augmenting Recommendation
    Within ninety days, the Department of Defense should 
convene an interagency task force including the DOT, the FAA 
and the intelligence community to address the potential threat 
from surface-to-air missiles against commercial aviation. 
Working with airport consortia, this task force should develop 
plans to provide increased surveillance, and, if necessary, the 
deployment of countermeasures. The task force should make 
recommendations to the DOT regarding the testing, evaluation 
and preparation for deployment of measures to protect civil 
aircraft against an increased threat from surface-to-air 
missiles.
    Appropriate steps should be taken by the intelligence 
community and through international diplomacy to reduce the 
possibility that terrorists could obtain or use surface-to-air 
missiles. The State Department should study the expansion of 
conventional arms agreements to include man-portable surface-
to-air missiles, and the U.S. Representative to the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) should propose 
a new convention addressing these weapons.
    3.18. Significantly expand the use of bomb-sniffing dogs.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
    Significantly expand the use of bomb-sniffing dogs. Canines 
are used to detect explosives in many important areas, but only 
sparingly in airport security. The Commission is convinced that 
an increase in the number of well-trained dogs and handlers can 
make a significant and rapid improvement in security, and 
recommends the deployment of 114 additional teams.
Status
    The FAA received funding for 114 new dog teams and training 
has begun.
Augmenting Recommendation
    Additionally, the Commission recommends that ATF continue 
to work to develop government-wide standards for canine teams.
    3.19. Complement technology with automated passenger 
profiling.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
    Complement technology with automated passenger profiling. 
Profiling can leverage an investment in technology and trained 
people. Based on information that is already in computer 
databases, passengers could be separated into a very large 
majority who present little or no risk, and a small minority 
who merit additional attention.
    Such systems are employed successfully by other agencies, 
including the Customs Service. By utilizing this process 
Customs is better able to focus its resources and attention. As 
a result, many legitimate travelers never see a customs agent 
anymore--and drug busts are way up.
    The FAA and Northwest Airlines are developing an automated 
profiling system tailored to aviation security, and the 
Commission supports the continued development and 
implementation of such a system.
    To improve and promote passenger profiling, the Commission 
recommends three steps. First, FBI, CIA, and BATF should 
evaluate and expand the research into known terrorists, 
hijackers, and bombers needed to develop the best possible 
profiling system. They should keep in mind that such a profile 
would be most useful to the airlines if it could be matched 
against automated passenger information which the airlines 
maintain.
    Second, the FBI and CIA should develop a system that would 
allow important intelligence information on known or suspected 
terrorists to be used in passenger profiling without 
compromising the integrity of the intelligence or its sources. 
Similar systems have been developed to give environmental 
scientists access to sensitive data collected by satellites.
    Third, the Commission will establish an advisory board on 
civil liberties questions that arise from the development and 
use of profiling systems.
Status
    Profiling systems are being developed.
    The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Northwest 
Airlines are completing final programming changes to an 
automated profiling system. A tentative completion date for 
programming changes and implementation of Computer Assisted 
Passenger Screening (CAPS) on Northwest flights is April, 1997. 
Additional programming will begin for use of CAPS on other 
airline reservations systems, with a tentative completion date 
of August, 1997.
    On January 17, 1997, a Civil Liberties Advisory Board met 
with Commissioners to discuss civil liberties concerns 
pertaining to profiling. The Board submitted recommendations to 
the Commission. (Appendix A)
Augmenting Recommendation
    The Commission believes that profiling is one part of a 
comprehensive, layered security program. As with other 
measures, it becomes less necessary with the introduction of 
efficient screening technology. Based on readily-available 
information, passengers could be separated into a very large 
majority about whom we know enough to conclude that they 
present little or no risk, and a small minority about whom we 
do not know enough and who merit additional attention. The 
Customs Service uses this approach successfully to better focus 
its resources and attention. As a result, many legitimate 
travelers never see a customs agent anymore--and drug busts are 
way up.
    The Commission supports the development and implementation 
of manual and automated profiling systems, such as the one 
under development by the FAA and Northwest Airlines. The 
Commission strongly believes the civil liberties that are so 
fundamentally American should not, and need not, be compromised 
by a profiling system. Consistent with this viewpoint, the 
Commission sought the counsel of leading experts in the civil 
liberties field. Those experts provided a series of 
recommendations found in Appendix A. The Commission recommends 
the following safeguards:

  1. No profile should contain or be based on material of a 
        constitutionally suspect nature--e.g., race, religion, 
        national origin of U.S. citizens. The Commission 
        recommends that the elements of a profiling system be 
        developed in consultation with the Department of 
        Justice and other appropriate experts to ensure that 
        selection is not impermissibly based on national 
        origin, racial, ethnic, religious or gender 
        characteristics.
  2. Factors to be considered for elements of the profile 
        should be based on measurable, verifiable data 
        indicating that the factors chosen are reasonable 
        predictors of risk, not stereotypes or generalizations. 
        A relationship must be demonstrated between the factors 
        chosen and the risk of illegal activity.
  3. Passengers should be informed of airlines security 
        procedures and of their right to avoid any search of 
        their person or luggage by electing not to board the 
        aircraft.
  4. Searches arising from the use of an automated profiling 
        system should be no more intrusive than search 
        procedures that could be applied to all passengers. 
        Procedures for searching the person or luggage of, or 
        for questioning, a person who is selected by the 
        automated profiling system should be premised on 
        insuring respectful, non-stigmatizing, and efficient 
        treatment of all passengers.
  5. Neither the airlines nor the government should maintain 
        permanent databases on selectees. Reasonable 
        restrictions on the maintenance of records and strict 
        limitations on the dissemination of records should be 
        developed.
  6. Periodic independent reviews of profiling procedures 
        should be made. The Commission considered whether an 
        independent panel be appointed to monitor 
        implementation and recommends at a minimum that the 
        DOJ, in consultation with the DOT and FAA, periodically 
        review the profiling standards and create an outside 
        panel should that, in their judgment, be necessary.
  7. The Commission reiterates that profiling should last only 
        until Explosive Detection Systems are reliable and 
        fully deployed.
  8. The Commission urges that these elements be embodied in 
        FAA standards that must be strictly observed.

    3.20. Certify screening companies and improve screener 
performance.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
    Certify screening companies and improve screener 
performance. Better selection, training, and testing of the 
people who work at airport x-ray machines would result in a 
significant boost in security. The Commission recommends 
development of uniform performance standards for the selection, 
training, certification, and recertification of screening 
companies and their employees. The Commission further 
recommends that in developing these standards, the FAA give 
serious consideration to implementing the National Research 
Council recommendations. The Commission also recommends the 
purchase and deployment of SPEARS, a computerized training and 
testing system.
Status
    The FAA has begun rulemaking procedures to require new 
certifications.
    The Federal Aviation Administration is developing an 
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) which will 
establish the requirement for screening companies to be 
certified in order to provide screening services to air 
carriers. The rule will include requirements to improve the 
training and testing of security screeners through development 
of uniform performance standards for providing security 
screening services. Congress gave FAA authority to certify 
screening companies, but did not provide FAA authority to 
certify individual screeners. This Commission urges Congress to 
provide that additional authority.
Augmenting Recommendation
    The Commission also recommends that the purchase and 
deployment of SPEARS, a computerized training and testing 
system, be completed at all major airports by the end of 1997.
    3.21. Aggressively test existing security systems.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
    Aggressively test existing security systems. ``Red team'' 
(adversary) type testing should also be increased by the FAA, 
and incorporated as a regular part of airport security action 
plans. Frequent, sophisticated attempts by these red teams to 
find ways to dodge security measures are an important part of 
finding weaknesses in the system and anticipating what 
sophisticated adversaries of our nation might attempt. An 
aggressive red team strategy will require significant increases 
in the number of FAA personnel currently assigned to these 
tasks.
Status
    The FAA is hiring 300 new special agents to test airport 
security.
    3.22. Use the Customs Service to enhance security.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
    Use the Customs Service to enhance security. The Customs 
Service has many responsibilities that are parallel to the 
FAA's in dealing with airlines and contraband. As a law 
enforcement agency, Customs has authorities and tools not 
available to the FAA. Further, it has developed successful 
partnership programs with the airlines. By using the Customs 
Service to complement the FAA, FBI, and other agencies, the 
Commission believes that aviation security would be 
significantly enhanced.
    The Customs Service has thousands of agents currently 
stationed at US international airports. Customs has statutory 
authority to search people and cargo to stop contraband from 
coming in or going out of the country. Customs has arrangements 
with most airlines to receive automated passenger and cargo 
manifests. These arrangements could be adapted for use in 
security procedures. Customs, as a law enforcement agency, has 
access to automated law enforcement databases that could be an 
invaluable tool in fighting not just drugs but terrorism. The 
Commission recommends that Customs upgrade and adapt its 
computer systems to take on this additional responsibility.
Status
    The Customs Service is deploying 140 inspectors and 
investigators to critical airports.
    The U.S. Customs Service is in the process of deploying 140 
inspectors, intelligence analysts, and criminal investigators 
(special agents) to critical airports, for aviation security; 
anti-terrorism efforts, and to perform increased searches of 
passengers, baggage, and cargo departing the United States. 
Customs is purchasing and deploying additional x-ray vans, tool 
trucks and radiation detector pagers at critical airports to 
assist in these searches.
    The Customs Service and the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) are working with an FAA contractor to study the technical 
issues associated with converting Customs' Automated Targeting 
System (ATS), which is designed for sea cargo analysis, to air 
cargo analysis. Although ATS is designed for contraband 
analysis and detection in the sea cargo environment, the plan 
would be to add anti-terrorism criteria to the system and 
convert it to an air cargo environment. The study should be 
completed in the Spring of 1997.
    3.23. Give properly cleared airline and airport security 
personnel access to the classified information they need to 
know.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
    Give properly cleared airline and airport security 
personnel access to the classified information they need to 
know. The red tape of classification is getting in the way of 
security. There are two problems that must be solved. The first 
involves intelligence information about specific terrorist 
threats. The CIA or FBI pass the threat information to the FAA, 
which in turn alerts the airlines. But the information gets 
progressively ``sanitized'' to avoid jeopardizing the source. 
Often, airlines are just told what to do but not why they are 
to do it. If airlines were provided more information about the 
threat, they could help design more effective responses.
    Corporate personnel are often cleared to know the most 
secret information when national security is at stake. Defense 
contractors with access to highly classified intelligence 
information are far from rare. For that matter, airline 
personnel were cleared to know highly classified information 
during Operation Desert Storm, when commercial aircraft 
transported 80% of our troops to Saudi Arabia.
    The other classified information problem involves the 
airport vulnerability assessments in recommendation number 2. 
These assessments become classified information if they 
conclude that a high degree of vulnerability exists. Some 
people responsible for security at the airports are not cleared 
to receive classified information.
    The Commission recommends that the FAA arrange for 
appropriate airline and airport security personnel to be 
cleared to address this problem.
Status
    The FAA is arranging for adequate clearance levels at 
airports and airlines.
    The FAA has agreed to collaborate more closely with 
airlines and airports in developing responses to threat 
information, and has agreed to disseminate vulnerability 
assessments to properly cleared officials.
    3.24. Begin implementation of full bag-passenger match.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
    Begin implementation of full bag-passenger match. Matching 
bags to passengers ensures that the baggage of anyone who does 
not board the plane is removed. Full bag match ensures that no 
unaccompanied bag remains on board a flight.
    Manual and automated systems to conduct full bag match have 
been employed in international aviation for several years, but 
need additional work to ensure they can be phased into domestic 
airline operations. The Commission recommends implementing full 
bag match at selected airports, including at least one hub, 
within sixty days to determine the best means of implementing 
the process system-wide.
Status
    The Commission remains committed to baggage match as a 
component of a comprehensive, layered security program aimed at 
keeping bombs and explosive devices off airlines. New 
technologies are available which facilitate positive and 
automated identification of the bag as it is tracked through 
the system. Automatic bag tracking systems can also facilitate 
the removal of bags from aircraft if required by security 
concerns. The Commission feels that these technologies can be 
combined with the development of a passenger manifest to 
implement a passenger-bag matching system as one component of a 
layered approach to aviation security.
    The Commission urges the industry and the FAA to work 
together to hasten the development of sophisticated technology 
for determining the presence of explosives in checked baggage. 
Until such machines are widely available, the Commission 
believes that bag match, initially based on profiling, should 
be implemented no later than December 31, 1997. The 
Commission's recommendation is consistent with that of the 
Baseline Working Group's recommendation in this contentious and 
difficult area.
    By that date, the bags of those selected either at random 
or through the use of automated profiling must either be 
screened or matched to a boarded passenger. No unaccompanied 
bag should be transported on a passenger aircraft unless (1) it 
has been screened by a screening method that meets the FAA 
standard, or (2) it belongs to a passenger who at the time of 
check in was neither randomly selected for security review nor 
selected by the profile for further review. This approach is 
the most effective methodology available now. It would allow 
the aviation industry to remove the unaccompanied bag or bags 
which represent the greatest threat.
    3.25. Provide more compassionate and effective assistance 
to families of victims.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
    Providing more compassionate and effective assistance to 
families of victims. The tragedy of losing a loved one in an 
aviation disaster can be unnecessarily and cruelly compounded 
by disjointed or incomplete information in the aftermath of the 
incident. At the Commission's urging, the President is 
directing the National Transportation Safety Board to take the 
lead in coordinating provision of services to families of 
victims. The NTSB will work with the Departments of State, 
Defense, Transportation, Health and Human Services, the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, and private organizations like the 
Red Cross.
Status
    The NTSB was given responsibility to coordinate response.
    On October 9, 1996, Congress passed the Aviation Family 
Disaster Act of 1996 giving the National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB) the responsibility for aiding families of aircraft 
accident victims and coordinating the federal response to major 
domestic aviation accidents.
    Since the signing of the law, NTSB has completed the 
initial phase of coordinating the federal response to a major 
domestic aviation accident. The NTSB is in the process of 
finalizing existing interim Memoranda of Understanding with the 
Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of 
Health and Human Services, Department of Justice, Department of 
Transportation, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the 
American Red Cross (ARC). The NTSB has been vigorously 
assisting the airline industry to develop a model plan to 
address the needs of aviation disaster victims and their 
families. Letters from Chairman Jim Hall and DOT Secretary 
Federico Pena went out in November, 1996, to airlines informing 
them of their responsibility for producing an emergency 
response plan as specified in section 703 of the Aviation 
Disaster Family Assistance Act of 1996.
    An interim federal response has been developed by the NTSB 
that assigns responsibilities to the airlines and participating 
federal agencies. The ARC will be responsible for family care 
and mental health; the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) will be responsible for identification and preparation of 
human remains (with support by the Department of Defense, as 
needed); and the Department of State will assist the airlines 
and NTSB when foreign passengers are involved in an aviation 
accident. The Federal Emergency Management Agency will provide 
the NTSB with communications equipment and additional public 
affairs personnel. If the aviation disaster is officially 
determined to be a criminal act, the Department of Justice will 
provide information to families on entitlements and benefits 
under the Victims of Crime Act. Many elements of the interim 
NTSB plan were successfully implemented and tested following 
the United Express Flight 5925/5926 accident in Quincy, 
Illinois on November 19, 1996.
    The Department of Transportation and the NTSB have formed a 
task force to provide recommendations on the issues elaborated 
in section 704 of the Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act 
of 1996. The task force includes officials from the NTSB, 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, American Red Cross, 
airlines, family groups, and organizations considered 
appropriate by the Secretary of Transportation. Airlines are 
required by the Act to submit their plans to the Secretary of 
Transportation and to the Chairman of the NTSB by April 9, 
1996.
Cross Reference to Related Recommendations
    This recommendation is related to recommendations 4.2 and 
4.3.
    3.26. Improve passenger manifests.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
    Improve passenger manifests. The Commission believes that 
Section 203 of the 1990 Aviation Security Improvement Act, 
which requires airlines to keep a comprehensive passenger 
manifest for international flights, should be implemented as 
quickly as possible. While Section 203 does not apply to 
domestic flights, the Commission urges the Department of 
Transportation to explore immediately the costs and effects of 
a similar requirement on the domestic aviation system.
Status
    The DOT is proceeding with rulemaking to require 
international and domestic manifests.
    The DOT has developed a draft rule covering domestic flight 
manifesting, and an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(ANPRM), should be issued in early 1997. The DOT anticipates an 
extensive comment period for the ANPRM, because no data exist 
related to domestic flights. The final rule for domestic 
manifesting is likely to be published in 1998.
    3.27. Significantly increase the number of FBI agents 
assigned to counterterrorism investigations, to improve 
intelligence, and to crisis response.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
    Significantly increase the number of FBI agents assigned to 
counter-terrorism investigations, to improve intelligence, and 
to crisis response. The Commission recognizes the vital role 
that the FBI plays in fighting terrorism against Americans, and 
recommends that the agency's ability to assess vulnerabilities, 
gather and analyze intelligence, and conduct forensic 
investigations be augmented.
    3.28 Provide anti-terrorism assistance in the form of 
airport security training to countries where there are airports 
served by airlines flying to the US.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
    Provide anti-terrorism assistance in the form of airport 
security training to countries where there are airports served 
by airlines flying to the US. The Commission believes that it 
is important to raise the level of security at all airports 
serving Americans. Assisting foreign countries through training 
in explosive detection, post-blast investigation, VIP 
protection, hostage negotiation, and incident management is an 
important means of achieving this goal.
Status
    The State Department and the FAA are sponsoring domestic 
and foreign courses.
    The Department of State and the FAA continue to jointly 
sponsor Anti-Terrorism Assistance Training Programs. In FY 
1997, six domestic law enforcement classes and six 
international/foreign classes will be held.
    3.29. Resolve outstanding issues relating to explosive 
taggants and require their use.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
    Resolve outstanding issues relating to explosive taggants 
and require their use. The use of taggants can be a critical 
aid when investigating explosions on aircraft and in bringing 
terrorists to justice. The Commission recommends that remaining 
issues relating to the use of these taggants, including the 
analysis of black and smokeless powder, be resolved as quickly 
as possible, and that requirements for the use of taggants then 
be put into place.
Status
    Studies by the ATF have been initiated, with results 
expected in April, 1997.
    ATF has contracted with the National Academy of Sciences/
National Research Council to conduct an independent study. The 
International Fertilizer Development Center is under contract 
with ATF to conduct a study on the economic and agronomic 
effects of tagging ammonium nitrate fertilizer. A report is due 
to Congress on the study findings late in April, 1997.
    3.30. Provide regular, comprehensive explosives detection 
training programs for foreign, federal, state, and local law 
enforcement, as well as FAA and airline personnel.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
    Provide regular, comprehensive explosives detection 
training programs for foreign, federal, state, and local law 
enforcement, as well as FAA and airline personnel. The 
Commission believes that law enforcement agencies with 
expertise in explosives detection can provide valuable training 
to those involved in aviation security.
Status
    The ATF and FAA are preparing a training course for airport 
law enforcement agencies.
    The ATF is developing a curriculum on Improvised Explosive 
Devices. The pilot program is planned for Spring, 1997. In 
addition to ongoing explosives training for ATF personnel, 
three states and local Advanced Explosives Investigative 
Techniques classes are scheduled at the Federal Law Enforcement 
Training Center in Glynco, Georgia. Finally, post blast and 
improvised explosive device recognition training will be 
conducted by 198 ATF certified explosive specialists for State 
and Local law enforcement personnel throughout the United 
States.
    3.31. Create a central clearinghouse within government to 
provide information on explosives crime.
Recommendation from Initial Report dated September 9, 1996
    Create a central clearinghouse within government to provide 
information on explosives crime. The Commission recommends that 
a central clearinghouse be established to compile and 
distribute important information relating to previously 
encountered explosive devices, both foreign and domestic.
Status
    The Secretary of the Treasury has established a national 
repository at the ATF.
    The Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to establish a 
national repository of information on incidents involving arson 
and the suspected criminal misuse of explosives. All Federal 
agencies having information concerning such incidents report 
the information to the Secretary. The ATF National Repository 
committee, has established a target date of October 1, 1997, 
for the implementation of the pilot project, with full 
implementation by the end of FY 1998. The system will be 
designed and constructed in incremental stages providing 
varying levels of service as early as April, 1997.

             Chapter Four: Responding to Aviation Disasters

        ``I am testifying today to give a sense of purpose to 
        the death of my daughter and the others who lost their 
        lives on TWA flight 800. I believe that by identifying 
        areas in need of improvement, we can successfully 
        generate a change in policy and action for the future. 
        We will create a living memorial to their death.''
              --Aurlie Becker.

    The Commission's recommendations included setting a goal of 
reducing the rate of fatal accidents by a factor of five over 
the next ten years, and outlined a course of action that would 
help achieve that goal. Additionally, the Commission has 
recommended specific steps to reduce the threat of terrorism 
against commercial aircraft. However, it must be recognized 
that, in spite of the strongest efforts of all involved, 
disasters may still occur. While government and industry must 
do everything possible to prevent them, they must also be 
prepared to respond quickly and compassionately when one does 
take place. The tragedy of losing a loved one in a plane crash 
can be cruelly and needlessly compounded by an uncoordinated, 
ineffective, or uninformed response to family members.
    The infrequency of commercial aviation accidents has 
complicated the response to such disasters. For example, when 
TWA Flight 800 crashed on July 17, 1996, it had been over 
twenty years since that airline's last fatal accident. Most 
crashes simply overwhelm state and local response teams, and 
take a tremendous toll on airline employees, who must 
immediately begin addressing the concerns of family members at 
the same time that they are coping with the loss of their own 
colleagues.
    Responding to the frustrations and complaints of family 
members over the treatment they received after accidents, 
President Clinton signed an executive memorandum giving the 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) the responsibility 
for coordinating federal services to families after aviation 
disasters. Congress subsequently passed legislation further 
expanding and clarifying the NTSB's new responsibilities.
    Since its creation in 1967, the NTSB is the one entity that 
has been on the site of every transportation disaster. The 
Commission applauds the designation of the NTSB as the 
coordinating agency after aviation disasters, and commends the 
agency for its diligence in carrying out its new 
responsibilities.

                            recommendations

    4.1. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) should 
finalize by April, 1997, its coordinated federal response plan 
to aviation disasters, and Congress should provide the NTSB 
with increased funding to address its new responsibilities.
    The NTSB has developed an interim plan for a coordinated 
federal response to aviation disasters, which should be 
finalized as quickly as possible. That interim plan was put to 
the test in two recent disasters involving commuter aircraft, 
and resulted in clear improvements in service. The Commission 
commends the work of the NTSB and believes that only through a 
coordinated effort, and establishment of a standard protocol, 
can effective support be provided to local governments and 
airlines to meet the needs of family members. The Commission 
recommends that Congress provide such additional funds 
necessary to allow the NTSB to carry out the new 
responsibilities described in the Aviation Disaster Family 
Assistance Act of 1996.
    4.2. The Department of Transportation should coordinate the 
development of plans for responding to aviation disasters 
involving civilians on government aircraft.
    The families of civilians killed while traveling on 
government aircraft face the same traumas and challenges as 
those whose loved ones were killed on commercial flights. 
However, the response to such disasters is covered under 
different laws and procedures. Those differences, and a clear 
statement regarding their rights and benefits in the event of 
an aviation disaster, should be provided to passengers on 
government aircraft prior to boarding. The Commission believes 
that it is essential that those families receive assistance 
comparable to that provided after commercial disasters through 
the enhanced role of the NTSB. The Commission urges the DOT to 
work with the NTSB, DoD, other agencies, and family members to 
develop plans to accomplish that goal by September 1997 and to 
evaluate the need to revise existing laws and regulations 
governing the rights and benefits of civilians on government 
aircraft.
    4.3. The Department of Transportation and the NTSB should 
implement key provisions of the Aviation Disaster Family 
Assistance Act of 1996 by March 31, 1997.
    This Act authorized the formation of a task force to study 
the need for modifications to laws or regulations that would 
result in improvements to the treatment of family members of 
victims of aviation disasters. This task force will consider, 
among other things, issues relating to treatment of families by 
the media and legal community. Additionally, the Commission 
urges the task force to consider the development of uniform 
guidelines for notification, autopsies and DNA testing and 
other issues raised by family members, including rights and 
treatment of foreign citizens and non-traditional families, 
securing crash sites, availability of cockpit voice recorder 
transcripts, and the composition of accident investigation 
teams. The Commission expects that establishment of the task 
force will be one of the first priorities for the new Secretary 
of Transportation, and that it will be accomplished without 
delay.
    In November 1996, the Chairman of the NTSB and the 
Secretary of Transportation (DOT) sent a joint letter to 
airlines to underscore the importance of this Act and to advise 
on the responsibilities of airlines to formulate disaster 
response plans. Those plans are due to the DOT and the NTSB by 
early April 1997.
    In addition, the NTSB should work with the State Department 
through Memoranda of Understanding or other mechanisms to 
provide direct services to the families of U.S. citizens who 
are victims of disasters on U.S. carriers abroad.
    4.4. The United States Government should ensure that family 
members of victims of international aviation disasters receive 
just compensation and equitable treatment through the 
application of federal laws and international treaties.
    Certain statutes and international treaties, established 
over 50 years ago, historically have not provided equitable 
treatment for families of passengers involved in international 
aviation disasters. Specifically, the Death on the High Seas 
Act of 1920 (Act) and the Warsaw Convention of 1929 
(Convention), although designed to aid families of victims of 
maritime and aviation disasters, have inhibited the ability of 
family members of international aviation disasters from 
obtaining fair compensation. A recent agreement by U.S. 
airlines waived the liability of the Warsaw Convention. 
However, the Death on the High Seas Act still limits recoveries 
available after certain aviation disasters.
    Congress passed the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 
1996 as a first step to remedy this situation. The Commission 
urges the Administration and the Congress to take additional 
steps necessary to ensure fairer and more equitable treatment 
of families of victims of international aviation disasters, 
including the establishment of an advisory board, pursuant to 
section 211 of the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, 
to develop a plan for equitable compensation of victims of 
aviation disasters.
    4.5 Provisions should be made to ensure the availability of 
funding for extraordinary costs associated with accident 
response.
    The NTSB and other federal, state, and local government 
agencies can incur significant costs in the course of an 
accident response. Those costs cannot be anticipated nor 
budgeted for in advance, and their recovery has been made on an 
ad hoc basis, further complicating an already difficult 
situation. The Commission urges the Administration and Congress 
to address this issue, through the consideration of measures 
such as requirements for increased insurance coverage for 
companies involved in air transportation.
    4.6. Federal agencies should establish peer support 
programs to assist rescue, investigative, law enforcement, 
counseling and other personnel involved in aviation disaster 
response.
    The men and women who respond on the scene of aviation 
disasters can suffer from considerable trauma and emotional 
impact. Specially trained peer support counselors, who are 
themselves investigators who have had similar experiences, 
should be dispatched to the scene of a disaster to help those 
involved in the response effort. The Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), because of its frequent 
investigations of arson and bombings, has developed such a 
program for its agents. The NTSB, the FAA, and other agencies 
should work with the ATF to develop programs for their 
personnel within existing budgets.

                              conclusions

    The Commission believes that each of its recommendations is 
achievable. But, the Commission has no authority to implement 
its recommendations. That responsibility lies with government 
and industry. Many of the proposals will require additional 
funding. Some of them will require legislation. Each of them 
requires sustained attention. We now urge the President to make 
these recommendations his own. We urge Congress to provide the 
necessary legislation and funding. We urge the incoming 
leadership of the DOT and the FAA to make fulfillment of these 
recommendations a cornerstone of their work. We urge the 
commercial aviation industry to take up the technical and 
organizational challenges. We urge the thousands of private 
pilots across the nation to convert their enthusiasm for flying 
into a commitment make the changes necessary to enhance safety 
for everyone flying. And, we urge the American people to demand 
that this country take the steps now to do what is needed.
    By virtually any measure, the aviation system in the United 
States is the best in the world. But, every system can be 
improved; made safer, more secure, and more efficient. Every 
crash is a stark reminder of that reality.
    The world is changing, and so, too, must our aviation 
policies and practices. They should challenge everyone involved 
in aviation to improve. They should serve as the model for the 
rest of the world, and lead to improvements that will make 
passengers safer, regardless of where they board their flight.
    There are few areas in which the public so uniformly 
believes that government should play a strong role as in 
aviation safety and security. Aviation is an area over which 
the average person can exert little control; therefore, it 
becomes government's responsibility to work with industry to 
make sure that Americans enjoy the highest levels of safety and 
security when flying. Problems in these areas contribute to an 
erosion of public faith in aviation, and in government itself. 
The Commission has laid out an aggressive agenda to help 
address those concerns, and believes that the implementation of 
this course of action must be the top priority for all those 
involved in aviation.
    The Commission expresses its appreciation to: President 
Clinton, for his heartfelt interest and his strong support for 
this work; to the 104th Congress, for its decisive action in 
response to the initial report; to the men and women in 
numerous government agencies, for their work in identifying 
issues and in implementing recommendations; and to the 
representatives of airlines, airports, labor, and general 
aviation who provided invaluable input.
    Finally, and especially, the Commission thanks the families 
of those who have lost loved ones in crashes, for their 
commitment and their insights, and for ensuring that the 
Commission always kept its focus on the ultimate goals.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


          Appendix D: Executive Order 13015 of August 22, 1996

         White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security

    By the authority vested in me as President by the 
constitution and the laws of the United States, including 
section 301 of title 3, United States Code, it is hereby 
ordered as follows:
    Section 1. Establishment. There is established the White 
House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security (the 
``Commission''). The Commission shall be of not more than 25 
members, to be appointed by the President from the public and 
private sectors, each of whom shall have experience or 
expertise in some aspect of safety or security. The Vice 
President shall serve as Chair of the Commission.
    Section 2. Functions.
          (a) The Commission shall advise the President on 
        matters involving aviation safety and security, 
        including air traffic control.
          (b) The Commission shall develop and recommend to the 
        President a strategy designed to improve aviation 
        safety and security, both domestically and 
        internationally.
          (c) The Chair may, from time to time, invite experts 
        to submit information to the Commission; hold hearings 
        on relevant issues; and form committees and teams to 
        assist the Commission in accomplishing its objectives 
        and duties, which may include individuals other than 
        members of the Commission.
    Sec. 3. Administration.
          (a) The heads of executive departments and agencies 
        shall, to the extent permitted by law, provide the 
        Commission such information with respect to aviation 
        safety and security as the Commission requires to 
        fulfill its functions.
          (b) The Commission shall be supported, both 
        administratively and financially, by the Department of 
        Transportation and such other sources (including other 
        Federal agencies) as may lawfully contribute to 
        Commission activities.
    Sec. 4. General.
          (a) I have determined that the Commission shall be 
        established in compliance with the Federal Advisory 
        Committee Act, as amended (5.U.S.C. App.2). 
        Notwithstanding any other Executive Order, the 
        functions of the President under the Federal Advisory 
        Committee Act, as amended, shall be performed by the 
        Secretary of Transportation in accordance with the 
        guidelines and procedures established by the 
        Administrator of General Services, except that of 
        reporting to the Congress.
          (b) The Commission shall exist for a period of 6 
        months from the date of this order, unless extended by 
        the President.

              William Jefferson Clinton
              The White House, August 22, 1996

(FR Doc. 96-21996)

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


            Appendix I: Commissioner Cummock Dissent Letter

February 19, 1997
Vice President Albert Gore, Chairman
White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security
18th and F Streets, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20405

Re: Dissent with the Final Report of the White House Commission 
on Aviation Safety and Security

Dear Mr. Vice President:
    It is after much thoughtful consideration and with a very 
heavy heart that I register my dissent with the final report of 
the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. 
Sadly, the overall emphasis of the recommendations reflects a 
clear commitment to the enhancement of aviation at the expense 
of the Commission's mandate of enhancing aviation safety and 
security. Clearly, as a nation we have the capability to do all 
three, but sadly as a Commission have not had the moral courage 
nor will to do so.
    History has proven the aviation industry's lack of 
sincerity and willingness to address safety and security on 
behalf of their customers by continually citing misleading 
safety statistics as their rationale for inaction. Valid 
statistics compare apples to apples, yet repeatedly we are 
inundated with apple to orange comparisons by the industry.
    Specifically, we must compare injuries and deaths of 
PASSENGERS ABOARD MASS TRANSPORTATION, not invalid comparisons 
to automotive injuries and deaths. Even more far fetched was 
the comparison made to the Commission by Charles Higgins, a 
Boeing VP citing aviation safety statistics versus household 
related injuries and death. Yes living is risky, but clearly 
flying is riskier than traveling on a bus or a train. Last year 
alone hundreds of passengers died aboard scheduled flights, a 
far cry from the number of passenger deaths onboard public 
busses or trains.
    Detailed below are specific objections to the various 
passengers and/or air disaster victims issues pertaining to 
aviation safety and security. Most were raised by family 
members of the victims of numerous air disasters, ranging from 
TWA 800, Valujet 592, Sec. Ron Brown's plane, KAL007 and Pan Am 
103. Some previous recommendations were omitted entirely, 
others were included but reduced to a nebulous inactionable 
mention, while a large number contained language that was 
either unnecessarily misleading or non-specific in order to 
give the perception of recommended change.
    These are the standards that I have applied in evaluating 
the Commissions' recommendations:
    (a) Specificity (b) Responsibility (c) Substance (d) 
Accountability (e) Applicability (f) Timetables/Deadline

                      i. improving aviation safety

    1.14 ``The commission commends the joint government-
industry initiative to equip the cargo holds of all passenger 
aircraft with smoke detectors, and urges expeditious 
implementation of the rules and other steps necessary to 
achieve the goal of both detection and suppression in all cargo 
holds.''
    1.14 Is a statement not a recommendation since it lacks: 
(a) Specificity (c) Substance (d) Accountability (f) Timetable-
Deadline
  --Require the immediate installation of smoke detectors and 
        fire suppressants in all passenger planes' cargo holds.
    Rationale: There are approximately 2,900 airplanes without 
smoker detectors and fire suppressants that regularly fly 
passengers with hazardous materials and dangerous cargo in the 
class D cargo holds. The current partial, voluntary deployment 
of smoke detectors is limited to a handful of airlines, with no 
time table for completion of installation. Installation of FAA 
certified fire suppression systems (currently in use on class C 
cargo holds, new 777 and other planes) must also be mandated. 
Both systems must be mandated immediately since each are 
essential for survivability of passengers; detectors warn the 
cockpit of a problem, while suppressants buys time to land the 
plane. Estimated cost 30 cents per ticketed passenger.
    --Mandate installation of passenger protective breathing 
apparatus effective against smoke, toxic fumes and oxygen 
deprivation.
    Rationale: Existing breathing apparatus technology is over 
20 yr. old and limited only to oxygen deprivation, but does not 
protect passengers from smoke or toxic fumes in the cabin. 
Enhanced breathing apparatus technology is available and FAA 
certified. The FAA certified technology is on military planes, 
used by crews on passenger planes, used on Air Force One and 
Two and numerous corporate/ private planes. Commercial 
passenger planes should provide equal standard of protection 
for passengers by providing FAA certified protective breathing 
apparatus currently used by crews. Estimated cost 4 cents per 
ticketed passenger.
    --Ship hazardous materials and dangerous cargo on ``cargo 
carriers'' until smoke detector, fire suppressant and 
protective breathing apparatus technology are installed on 
``passenger carriers'' for passenger use.
    Rationale: Until passengers can adequately be protected and 
increase their survivability from smoke and toxic fumes in the 
cabin, remove all unnecessary dangerous cargo and hazards 
materials from passenger carriers.
    1.13 ``The FAA should eliminate the exemptions in the 
Federal Aviation Regulations that allow passengers under the 
age of two to travel without the benefit of FAA approved 
restraints.''
    1.13 Recommendation lacks: (a) Specificity (f) Timetable/
deadline
  --Require immediate use of FAA certified babyseats for all 
        children under two yrs.
    1.5 ``Cost alone should not become dispositive in deciding 
aviation safety and security rulemaking issues.''
    1.5 Recommendation lacks: (a) Specificity (b) 
Responsibility (c) Substance (d) Accountability (f) timetable/
Deadline
  --Waive FAA/DOT cost/benefit requirement criteria in deciding 
        safety and security rulemaking issues.
  --Eliminate FAA's authority to issue private or secret 
        exceptions/waivers to safety and security rules, except 
        in very limited and controlled circumstances..
    Rationale: Airlines and airports regularly obtain 
indefinite waivers to safety and/or security rules without 
knowledge or oversight creating an ineffective regulatory 
system. Require exceptions or waivers to include a statement of 
necessity, signed by the air carriers' president, the Assoc. 
Administrator of FAA for Rulemaking, and reviewed by the FAA 
Administrator and Chairman of the relevant advisory committee. 
Any approved waivers or exceptions shall be sent to all members 
of the FAA's Advisory Committee on Rulemaking (ARAC) and the 
chairmen of the Senate and House Aviation Subcommittees.
  --Limit safety/security exceptions/waivers to no more than 6 
        months.
    Rationale: The use of indefinite waivers or private 
exceptions to air safety and security regulations must be 
limited in time to temporary emergency situations. The current 
indefinite secret waiver system compromises safety and 
security, and provides certain carriers with unfair competitive 
advantages over other carriers that are in compliance with a 
safety or security regulations. Furthermore, such a system 
amounts to fraud on the public who is led to believe that 
safety and security standards and regulations are being 
complied with and enforced. Time limits of 6 months or less 
will ensure that remedial actions are undertaken promptly by 
out of compliance carriers, rather than rewarding out of 
compliance carriers with indefinite waivers.
    Pan Am alleged that it had received prior to the Lockerbie 
bombing a verbal FAA waiver of the security rule requiring hand 
searching of unaccompanied luggage for Pan Am European 
locations. Pan Am claimed this waiver allowed it merely to X-
ray unaccompanied luggage. It is quite possible that the bomb 
which destroyed Pan Am 103 could have been discovered if a then 
excising FAA security regulation had been strictly followed and 
enforced. The criminal investigation determined that an 
unaccompanied bag containing a Toshiba cassette played packed 
with explosives destroyed the jumbo jet over Lockerbie 
resulting in the worst terrorist attack against U.S. civilians 
in history.

                 iii. improving security for travelers

    With the current day realities of domestic terrorism such 
as the bombings of the World Trade Center in New York and the 
Murrah Federal building in Oklahoma City, combined with the 
numerous successful airmail bombs sent by a variety of 
disgruntled criminals, the Unibomber, and the recent Egyptian 
letter bombs, domestically the flying public is now flying less 
secure than when my husband John and his fellow passengers died 
aboard Pan Am 103! To-date, both the FAA and Dept. of 
Transportation have required only minimal changes in aviation 
security for international flights and have maintained the 
status-quo for domestic flights, not only leaving aviation's 
back door unlocked, but wide open.
    The security preamble on p.25 effectively ignores the 
significant measures taken unilaterally by the FAA in the mid-
1985 to protect U.S. International Aviation from bombs in 
unaccompanied checked baggage (FAA Aircarrier Standard Security 
Program (ACSSP), Section XV,C,1,(a) July 7, 1985). It also 
ignores the joint actions, or is ignorant of, the joint actions 
by the U.S. Secretary of Transportation and her Canadian 
counterpart, the Minister of Transport, to get the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to adopt ICAO 
Annex 17 Security Standards to protect international aviation 
against bombs in 1985. This ICAO Security Standard 4.3.1 
states:
    ``Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure 
that operators when providing service from that State do not 
transport the baggage of passengers who are not on board the 
aircraft unless the baggage separated from the passengers is 
subject to other security measures.
    Note--This Standard has been applicable since 19 December 
1987 with respect to the baggage of passengers at the point of 
origin and on-line transfer passengers. With respect to the 
baggage of other categories of passengers, the Standard became 
applicable on 1 April 1989.''
    This specific ICAO Security Standard was not only 
significant from the protection it provided against 
unaccompanied baggage but also because it has the distinction 
of being ratified by a majority of ICAO Contracting States in a 
record time of a few months. These actions sometimes take years 
to win adoption. These are still mandatory ICAO requirements 
and the U.S. is a ICAO Contracting State and thus is to comply 
with these procedures internationally.
    These ICAO Security Standards, set in the mid to late 
1980's, internationally recognized that the primary threat to 
civil aviation had shifted from hijacking to sabotage requiring 
specific security measures that both the U.S. and ICAO would 
undertake to protect air passengers against bombs.
    This FAA ACSSP requirements stated than a U.S. airline 
could not carry an unaccompanied bag from a designated high-
threat international airport unless the bag had been physically 
searched. This FAA unaccompanied bag requirement preceded the 
subsequent ICAO Accompanied Bag Standard by 2 years. Pan 
American World Airways failure to comply with this FAA security 
requirement resulted in the PAA-103 tragedy on December 21, 
1988 and the airline's conviction of ``Willful Misconduct'' in 
U.S. Federal Court on July 10, 1992.
    Needless to say, if the public was aware of the test 
results of the ``Red Team'' aviation security forces 
domestically to regularly and successfully breach the so called 
``Aviation Security'' systems, in combination with the 
aforementioned domestic terrorist acts and threats, they would 
be shocked and terrified at how much they are currently at 
risk.
    Even of greater concern are that the recommendations in 
this report will do nothing more than give the flying public 
the perception of security. They do not provide any tangible or 
immediate improvement in our security measures. Once again, we 
will enable the tombstone mentality that is pervasive of the 
FAA, DOT and the U.S. airlines to continue.
    This report contains no specific call to action, no 
commitments to address aviation security system-wide by 
mandating the deployment of current technology and training, 
with actionable timetables and budgets. As the previous 
commission on aviation security and terrorism noted eight years 
ago, ``The U.S. civil aviation security system is seriously 
flawed and has failed to provide the proper level of protection 
for the traveling public. This system needs major reform. 
Rhetoric is no substitute for strong, effective action.''
    3.1 ``The federal government should consider aviation 
security as a national security issue, and provide substantial 
funding for capitol improvements.''
    3.1 Recommendation lacks (c) Substance (d) Accountability 
(e) Applicability (f) Timetables/Deadlines
  --Mandate the establishment of a federal passenger ``User 
        Security Surcharge''
  --Sequester funds solely to be allocated for the purchase/
        development:
  --EDS (Explosive Detection Systems) equipment grant money
  --R & D grant money for EDS development for cargo, mail, 
        carry on and checked baggage.
  --Standardized Training Programs for Security Personnel
  --FBI Fingerprinting/National NCIC Criminal Background Checks
  --Deploy hardened baggage containers through attrition
  --Interim purchase of automated bag match technology
  --Development of Profiling Programs--Manual/Automated
  --Fund Explosive Detection Canine Teams
    The initial $160 million in federal funds provided by 
Congress in 1996 was woefully inadequate to address the scope 
of the problems in U.S. aviation security. There are 450 
commercial airports that have obsolete security systems, most 
of which is 20 yrs. old and designed for anti-hijacking system. 
This technology provides basic metal detection X-ray technology 
with no explosive detection capabilities for carry on baggage. 
Outside of the limited deployment of CTX 5000 SP, this is also 
true for checked baggage. Additionally, this funding does not 
address inadequate security personnel selection/training).
    Likewise, ``$100 million annual recommendation by the Gore 
Commission . . . to meet capitol requirements identified by 
local airport consortia and FAA'' is woefully inadequate to 
meet anti-sabotage aviation security needs. A ``passenger user 
security surcharge'' of ($4-5) would raise in excess of $2 
Billion a year, swiftly and adequately funding the actual cost 
to upgrade aviation security to an effective level. A 
``passenger user surcharge,'' sequestered only for security is 
the most viable method to raise the large amount of capitol 
needed to adequately address the changes system wide, due to 
the inaccessibility/deficit of general revenue funds and/or 
aviation trust funds. Security related expenses should not be 
considered a part of the airlines cost of doing business, but a 
part of our National responsibility to protect our citizens. 
``Security'' threats typically are not targeted against a 
specific airline but after the American Flag on the tail of 
passenger carriers. There must be a clear, consistent source of 
revenue and commitment in order to adequately protect our 
citizens.
    Rationale: Since the bombing of Pan Am 103 there have been 
numerous but unsuccessful attempts at ``aviation security 
enhancements'' by the former President Bush's Commission on 
Aviation Security & Terrorism, Congress and two 
Administrations. For 8+ yr. without an adequate and consistent 
funding mechanism in place to implement recommendations, 
legislation's (i.e. ``1990 Aviation Security Improvement Act'') 
or regulations, the obsolete security status-quo has prevailed. 
Note: Section 107(9) ``1990 Aviation Security Improvement 
Act''--entitled ``Authorization of Appropriations.'' There are 
authorized to be appropriated from the Airport and Airway Trust 
Fund, . . . such sums of money necessary for the purpose of 
caring out the technology grant program.'' In 7 yr. no security 
funds were made available due to budget constraints in the 
Trust Fund.
    3.3 `` The Postal Service should advise customers that all 
packages weighing over 16 ounces will be subject to examination 
for explosives and other threat objects in order to move by 
air.''
    3.3 Recommendation lacks: (c) Substance (e) Applicability 
(f) Timetable/Deadline
  --Mandate immediate examination of all packages weighing over 
        8 ounces or move them on ``cargo'' carriers.
  --Required the research and development of (EDS) explosive 
        detection systems for mail.
    Rationale: Forensic scientists who investigated the bombing 
of Pan Am 103 estimated that the bomb used contained as little 
as 9.6 ounces of explosives. While I commend the Commissions' 
recommendation a more effective and realistic solution is 
required by changing the recommendation to 8 versus 16 ounces. 
Additionally, Section 112(b,1)of the ``1990 Aviation Security 
Improvement Act'' entitled, ``Screening Mail and Cargo'' stated 
`` require for mail and cargo the same screening procedures as 
are required for checked baggage.''
    3.5 ``The FAA should implement a comprehensive plan to 
address the threat of explosives and other threat objects in 
cargo and work with industry to develop new initiatives in this 
area.''
    3.5 Recommendation lacks (a) Specificity (c) Substance (d) 
Accountability (f) Timetables/Deadlines
  --Mandate immediate examination of all cargo or move cargo on 
        ``cargo'' carriers.
  --Required the research and development of (EDS) explosive 
        detection systems for cargo.
    Rationale: Profiling relies on the honesty of the shipper 
and is not an effective security tool in itself since many 
shippers and freight forwarders regularly combine questionable 
cargo together that are manifested as ``known'' shipments. 
Currently, all express packages shipped by express mail 
companies are considered as ``known'' shipments and don not 
require further scrutiny. Additionally, EDS for cargo has not 
been developed yet ! Additionally, Section 112(b,1)of the 
``1990 Aviation Security Improvement Act'' entitled, 
``Screening Mail and Cargo'' stated `` require for mail and 
cargo the same screening procedures as are required for checked 
baggage.''
    3.7 `` The FAA should work with airlines and airport 
consortia to ensure that all passengers are positively 
identified and subject to security procedures before they board 
aircraft.''
    3.7 Recommendation lacks: (a) Specificity (c) Substance (e) 
Applicability (f) Timetable/Deadline
  --Eliminate the issuance of advanced boarding passes and 
        require that all passengers, including electronically 
        ticketed passengers, check-in with a airline employee 
        prior to boarding a flight until EDS is utilized 
        systemwide.
    Rationale: Current airline ticketing procedure allows 
passenger to be issued advanced boarding passes with seat 
assignments. Passengers with advance issued boarding passes can 
walk directly to the jet bridge entrance at the boarding gate, 
present the boarding pass to an airline employee, and have a 
cursory security and identification take place. While this 
procedure provides a convenience to the passenger, it takes 
away from airline security procedures. The FAA should implement 
a regulatory change requiring that all air carriers stop 
issuing advanced boarding passes and ticketless travel. Require 
all passengers including those participating in electronic 
ticketing to check-in at an airline counter or gate check-in 
desk prior to boarding, until explosive detection technology is 
in place for passenger carry on bags and checked baggage.
    3.10 ``The FAA should work with industry to develop a 
national program to increase the professionalism of the 
aviation security workforce, including screening personnel.''
    3.10 Recommendation lacks: (a) Specificity (b) 
Responsibility (c) Substance (d) Accountability (e) 
Applicability (f) Timetables/Deadline
    Rationale: This recommendation contains a number of 
admirable objectives but it, like its predecessor 
recommendation in President Bush's Commission on Aviation 
Security and Terrorism lacks teeth. Following President Bush's 
Commission of Aviation Security and Terrorism and the follow-on 
Aviation Security Improvement Act in 1990, the FAA established 
standards for the selection and training of aviation security 
personnel. Those standards were, and still are, totally 
inadequate. There is nothing to prevent the same inadequate 
actions by the FAA to this recommendation. The Commission 
should specifically recommend that the FAA mandate 80 hours of 
intensive classroom/laboratory and 40 hours of On-the-Job 
training before performance certification for all airline 
security screening personnel.
    3.11 ``Establish consortia at all commercial airports to 
implement enhancements to aviation safety and security.''
    3.11 Recommendation lacks (b) Responsibility (d) 
Accountability (f) Timetables/Deadline
  --Require all 450 Commercial Airports to immediately 
        establish a local consortia to implement safety and 
        security FAA and DOT mandates
    Rationale: Only about 10% or 41 out of 450 commercial 
airports have established consortia. Since effective security 
is as good as its weakest link, a system wide approach to 
implement federal standards must be required. The local 
consortia role should be limited to executing minimal federal 
safety and security standards not to determining the federal 
standards. For example, the consortia can determine the best 
placement for deployment of EDS but not if, how many or when to 
install explosive detection systems.
    3.13 ``Conduct airport vulnerability assessments and 
develop action plans.''
    3.13 Recommendation lacks (a) Specificity (d) 
Accountability (f) Timetables/Deadline
    Rationale: This recommendation does not contain criteria to 
ensure that follow-up actions are taken to problems identified 
during vulnerability assessments. The recommendation for FAA 
``Red Teams'' test of airport security systems outlined in 3.21 
should be tied to this recommendation to ensure that these 
assessments do not continue the incestuous process where 
security problems are rationalized away and no corrective 
actions are taken within a specified period of time. 
Additionally, a dis-interested third party should be contracted 
to work with the FAA to conduct airport and/or airline tests in 
order to avoid a conflict of interest.
    3.14 ``Require criminal background checks and FBI 
fingerprint checks for all screeners, and all airport and 
airline employees with access to secure areas . . . The 
Commission reiterates that the overall goal is FBI fingerprint 
check of all airport and airline employees with access to 
secure areas, no later than mid-1999''
    3.14 Recommendation lacks (a) Specificity (b) Substance (f) 
Timetable/Deadline
  --Require immediate and direct access to NCIC III for 
        comprehensive evaluations of screeners and all 
        individuals with unescorted access to secure areas of 
        airports. NCIC will be used as a ``trigger'' for a FBI 
        criminal record prior to granting unescorted access to 
        secure areas. Use NCIC as an interim measure pending 
        IAFIS for conducting fingerprint generated FBI criminal 
        history checks by mid-1999.
    Rationale: The aviation industry must be required to 
provide the same degree of employment security review that is 
currently required of employees hired by banks and security 
exchange companies. Double standards must be eliminated to 
adequately protect peoples lives equal to protecting peoples 
money. The'' FAA Reauthorization Act of 1996'' section 304 
entitled ``Requirement for criminal history checks'' did not 
require security checks equal to that of the banking or 
securities industries. The legislation allows for ineffective 
``local'' criminal background checks on the basis of an array 
of triggering criteria such as ``(I) an employment 
investigation leaves a gap in employment of 12 months or 
more..''etc. The ``1990 Aviation Security Improvement Act'' 
section 105 (2 a-c) required national criminal history checks 
as did the Bush Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism. 
We can not expect to have any meaningful security measures 
implemented if the background of thousands of airport personnel 
is potentially questionable
    3.15 ``Deploy existing technology.''
    3.15 Recommendation lacks: (a) Specificity (c) Substance 
(f) Timetable/Deadlines
    Rationale: This recommendation is far too nebulous and 
vague. It like many other recommendations contain no deadlines 
and is quite non-specific in addressing several needed 
technology additions to the U.S. aviation security system. The 
statement recognizing `` . . . that deployed technology for 
examining carry-on baggage may be outdated'' was a major 
understatement. The facts are that the technology currently in 
use for examining carry-on baggage is not capable of 
automatically detecting explosives, and in many instances is 
not even capable of imaging explosives compounds. I believe 
that an unequivocal recommendation should be made to change out 
all technology that is currently used to screen carry-on 
luggage. Moreover, I believe that on-going research that is 
funded by the FAA should be accelerated to complete the 
development and deployment of walk-through trace explosives 
detectors that can be used to examine passengers for explosives 
residues. Additionally, the deployment of 54 advanced explosive 
detection systems for checked bag to cover 450 commercial 
airports does very little to catch up with 20 yr. of technology 
advancements in a meaningful way to protect the flying public .
    3.16 `` Establish a joint government-industry research and 
development program.''
    3.16 Recommendation lacks: (c) Substance (d) 
Accountability(f) Timetable/Deadline
    Rationale: The current $3 million FAA R&D budget is totally 
inadequate to research & develop technology for screening 
cargo, mail, checked bag, carry on bags and passengers. 
Adoption of a ``Passenger Security Surcharge'' of ($4-5) could 
generate substantial revenue to adequately accelerate the 
aviation R&D process, deploy existing technology and provide 
adequate security personnel training programs.
    3.19 ``Compliment technology with automated passenger 
profiling.''
    3.19 Recommendation lacks: (c) Substance (e) Applicability 
(f) Timetables/Deadlines
    Rationale: I agree that profiles can be most useful as an 
overall part of a multi-layered security system. This 
recommendation has placed an over-reliance, and therefore 
unrealistic expectations on an early development and the 
widespread application of an automated profile system. The 
historical review of attempts to automate profiles within 
airline's computer system takes us back to the mid-l980's when 
a fledging attempt was made to do so by TWA. I believe that a 
realistic implementation date for a fully automated profile 
system that interfaces with law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies will take several years to accomplish. I state this 
mindful of the substantial amount of work that must be done by 
the FBI, CIA, and BATF (and others) in building terrorist 
databases on which detailed profile elements can be built. In 
addition, interfacing any such data base with airline computer 
systems will, in itself; be a major undertaking.
    Nonetheless, I recognize that a limited automated profile 
system such as Northwest Airlines' CAPS can be developed and 
implemented more quickly. While I applaud and support the 
effort to automate the CAPS system I doubt that the additional 
programming for CAPS use outside of the Northwest Airlines 
system can be completed by August 1997. In the interim I urge 
the FAA mandate the use of manual profiles to identify the 
small minority of passengers that may merit additional 
attention.
    Another serious concern regarding the recommended use of 
profiles to trigger the use of a passenger/baggage match. This 
process is actually less effective than the procedures Pan Am 
was using (illegally) that led to the destruction of Pan Am 103 
on December 21, 1988. If profiles are a necessary part of a 
good layered security system then full baggage/passenger match 
is as well. The recommendation to base passenger/baggage match 
on profile and random selectees is unacceptable. I believe that 
both security efficiency techniques, i.e., profiles and full 
bag/passenger match, should be equally applied throughout the 
U.S. aviation security system. In fact full automated baggage/
passenger match procedures can be implemented immediately and 
provide an immediate substantive increase in our aviation 
security system. As noted above, this is not so for the 
recommended automated profile system in 3.19.
    3.20 ``Certify screening companies and improve screener 
performance.''
    3.20 Recommendation lacks (a) Specificity (d) 
Accountability (e) Applicability (f) Timetables/Deadlines
  --FAA mandate 80 hours of intensive classroom/laboratory and 
        40 hours of On-the-Job training, before performance 
        certification, for all airline security screening 
        personnel.
    Rationale: Currently, screeners typically receive 8 hr. of 
combined class room and on-the-job training. Most security 
screeners are minimum wage employees required to buy their 
uniforms and pay for parking daily. Airlines typically pay 
airplane cleaners more that security screeners, hence a 200-400 
% employment turnover rate exists for security screeners. 
Security screeners are an integral part of a effective security 
system. Security screeners must be selected and trained 
adequately, paid fairly and given the appropriate technology 
tools to do their job
    3.23 ``Give properly cleared airline and airport security 
personnel access to the classified information they need to 
know.''
    3.23 Recommendation lacks: (a) Specificity (c) Substance
    Rationale: It is my understanding that the problem of 
distribution of classified intelligence information extends to 
FAA Regional and Field facilities. Here the primary problem is 
no one without clearance is to see classified data (the persons 
needing access are FAA employees). In this instance it is a 
problem of a failure of the FAA to establish a requirement for 
their employees to see the data and to establish a means of 
rapid distribution of the information to its own field 
employees.
    3.24 ``Begin implementation of full bag-passenger 
match....the Commission believes that bag match, initially 
based on profiling, should be implemented no later than 
December 31, 1997...........By that date, the bags of those 
selected either at random or through the use of automated 
profiling must either be screened or matched to a boarded 
passenger. . . .''
    3.24 Recommendation lacks: (a) Specificity (b) 
Responsibility(c) Substance (d) Accountability (e) 
Applicability (f) Timetables/Deadline
    Rationale: The recommendation states that `` the Commission 
remains committed to baggage match as a component of a 
comprehensive, layered security program aimed at keeping bombs 
and explosive devices off airlines'' but subsequent comments 
tie bag-match to profiles and random selections. I do not take 
issue that bag-match should be specifically applied to 
``profile selectees'' and/or random selection of passengers as 
both these measures are a welcome addition to our aviation 
security system. I do however, adamantly object to a failure to 
endorse the immediate application of a full-baggage/passenger 
match.
    The enclosed detection matrix in Figure 1 (see p.XXX) 
illustrates that the terrorist bomb that downed Pan Am Flight 
103 on December 21, 1988 would only have been caught by either 
a full-baggage/passenger match or through and examination of 
the suitcase carrying the bomb using the new CTX-5000SP EDS. 
Applying a profile in this instance would not have worked 
because there was never a passenger ever associated with the 
bag containing the bomb. Since you can only profile passengers 
(not bags) the bag with the bomb would not have been detected.
    As there are no current plans to screen all baggage using a 
CTX-5000SP EDS then the only reliable security counter measure 
(see Figure 1 detection matrix) available to serve as an alert 
to a Pan Am-103 type of attack is the full-bag/passenger match. 
Therefore the recommended application of a bag-match to a 
``profile selectee'', i.e., a passenger, will not catch a Pan 
Am-103 type of attack. The second approach is to applying a 
bag-match was to randomly select passengers. (see Figures 2-3 
p. ) As no passenger was ever associated with the Pan Am-103 
bomb then this part of the recommendation to apply a bag-
passenger match to randomly selected passengers would also not 
stop a Pan Am-103 type of attack. I cannot accept this 
recommendation as Pan American World Airways was illegally 
using an originating passenger bag-match (partial passenger-bag 
match) procedure that resulted in the death of my husband and 
269 other people. To do so would be unconscionable.

                  iv. responding to aviation disasters

    4.3 `` The Department of Transportation and the NTSB should 
implement key provisions of the Aviation Disaster Family 
Assistance Act of 1996 by March 31, 1997. . . . The Commission 
urges the task force to consider the development of uniform 
guidelines..''
    4.3 Recommendation lacks (a) Specificity (c) Substance (e) 
Applicability and actionable timetable.
    4.3 ``Air Disaster Family Assistance Act'' Title VII, 
section 705 of the ``FAA Reauthorization Act of 1996'' requires 
the establishment of a joint task force, including ``families 
which have been involved in aircraft accidents.''
    Task force should address and develop uniform federal 
standards for:
  --Civilians killed on government planes
  --American passengers on U.S. carriers that crash 
        internationally.
  --Notification procedures of families of air disasters
  --Autopsy procedures
  --DNA testing
  --Care and disposition of unidentified remains (i.e. 
        knowledge and consent by next-of-kin prior to burial or 
        disposition)
  --Personal possession decontamination, return and/or 
        disposition (i.e. knowledge and consent by next-of-kin 
        prior to disposition)
  --Media access to survivors and victims families
  --Legal solicitation/Access to survivors and victims families
  --Develop and distribute a ``Disaster Response Information 
        Pamphlet'' to air disaster victims and their families.
    Rationale: ``Implementation of key provisions of the act by 
March 31, 1997'' can only be accomplished with the input of all 
parties as cited by the law (including the victims families). 
Family representatives have not been named or included in a 
task force nor provided equal access to work group meetings or 
received underlying documents to allow them to assist in the 
work in progress. Additionally, representation of both the 
legal and media are a necessary part of the process to develop 
guidelines and negotiate the MOU (memoranda of understanding) 
between all organizations responding to air disasters.
    4.4 `` The U.S. Government should ensure that family 
members of victims of international aviation disasters receive 
just compensation and equitable treatment through the 
application of federal laws and international treaties.''
    4.4 Recommendation lacks: (a) Specificity (e) Applicability 
(f) Timetable/Deadline
    4.4 Restore passenger rights whether crashes occur over 
land, territorial waters or over the high seas. Equality in 
awardable damages can be restored by amendment to 49 U.S.C. 
40120.
    Rationale: Currently the application of law for aircraft 
that crash over water (three miles or more off shore) is based 
on a 1920's treaty ``Death on the High Seas Act,'' limiting 
liability of air carrier or manufacturer up to $2,300. 
Ironically, DOHSA was adopted prior to start of commercial 
passenger air transportation, yet it still applies to air 
disasters such as recently as TWA 800, Aeroperu, KAL007 and 
others. Since all international flights and most domestic 
landing approaches on our coasts are over water this unjust and 
inequitable system must be abolished. Airlines and 
manufacturers have hidden behind DOHSA indefinitely avoiding 
swift and adequate compensation of victims families requiring 
prolonged trial lasting over a decade.
  --Provide the same venue (U.S. Courts jurisdiction) for U.S. 
        citizens regardless of where their tickets were bought 
        , changed or if they live abroad. U.S. jurisdiction can 
        be obtained by amendment to 49 U.S.C. 40105.
    Rationale: Presently, U.S. citizens are afforded U.S. court 
jurisdiction only if their ticket was purchased in the U.S. 
Over 5 million Americans live, work and travel outside the U.S. 
depriving them and their families of swift and adequate damages 
in case of air disasters. Airlines and manufacturers have 
hidden behind jurisdictional issues to indefinitely avoiding 
swift and adequate compensation of victims families requiring 
prolonged international trials lasting over a decade and 
compensatory damages or awards paid in foreign currency.
  --Require uniform certification standards and mandate 
        adequate levels of liability insurance on all non-
        scheduled commercial passenger air travel (i.e. 
        charters)
    Rationale: Privatization and deregulation has created a 
sizable market of non scheduled air entities that regularly 
transport private citizens, government employees and military. 
Many private charters temporarily lease aircraft and crews with 
questionable certification, maintenance and recurrent training, 
putting unwitting passengers at great unnecessary risk. Mandate 
equal requirement levels of certification for scheduled and 
non-scheduled passenger flights. Note: Most personal life and 
travel insurance policies exclude payment of charter related 
claims since charters do not afford passengers the established 
scheduled commercial passengers air travel safety standards.

                              conclusions

    In summary, the final report contains no specific call to 
action, no commitments to address aviation safety and security 
system-wide by mandating the deployment of current technology 
and training, with actionable timetables and budgets. Later 
attempts to track these recommendations will result in problems 
with differing agency interpretations, misunderstandings, and 
outright opposition to implementation by individuals and/or 
organizations who oppose the specific recommendations.
    I recommend that time limits for completion be added to all 
recommendations that have no deadlines and that all 
recommendations be re-written for specific actions by specific 
agencies with an accountability matrix added for follow-on 
actions to ensure that the recommendations are implemented. 
Without specifics, once again we will allow the airlines to 
lead and the government follow as to what is necessary to 
secure the flying public.
    Sadly we remain, as noted eight years ago, by our 
predecessor commission, President Bush's Commission on Aviation 
Security and Terrorism which concluded that, ``The U.S. civil 
aviation security system is seriously flawed and has failed to 
provide the proper level of protection for the traveling 
public. This system needs major reform. Rhetoric is no 
substitute for strong, effective action.''
    At best, these recommendations allow and encourage more 
research, more pilot programs and more analysis. Once again, it 
leaves in place domestically and internationally, highly 
limited anti-hijacking machines that provide basic metal 
detection X-ray technology with no explosive detection 
capabilities for carry on baggage. Outside of the limited 
deployment (54 units ) of CTX 5000SP, this is also true for 
checked in baggage.
    Until Explosive detection technology is ordered in 
sufficient quantities and deployed system wide, specific 
efficiency measures must be implemented to identify which bags 
out of the millions transported annually need further scrutiny. 
Matching bags to passengers does this. Sadly, the commissions 
recommendation matches bags only to ``Selectees'' after 
profiling. Partial bag match does not allow for the 
identification of an unaccompanied ``rouge'' bag since it 
requires a ``passenger Selectee'' to trigger matching 
passengers to their bags and further scrutiny.
    The automated profiling system developed by Northwest 
Airlines and the FAA will rely on the ability of a skycab or a 
counter check in agent to successfully verify a passengers 
identity as the same individual the computer profiled. 
Currently the airlines are not required to collect complete 
passenger manifest data on either domestic or international 
flights. We have seen the short comings of incomplete fight 
manifest information, as evident every time a plane crashes. It 
often takes the airlines days to notify victims families since 
without complete names, the airlines don't accurately know who 
boarded the plane. Profiling will now rely on the incomplete 
passenger data to produce a ``Selectee'' in order to identify 
the bags that need further scrutiny.
    While I greatly support the upgrade in training and 
certification of security screeners and personnel, we can not 
expect them to adequately perform their jobs in detecting 
explosives inside carry on bags with minimal training and 
obsolete 8-20 yr. old anti-hijacking technology designed to 
detect metal and not explosives. We must deploy state of the 
art screening technology with at least limited EDS (Explosive 
Detection) capabilities.
    In terms of mail and cargo transported on passengers 
planes, the recommendations do not provide any meaningful 
degree of protection for the flying public nor require and fund 
Research & Development of EDS (Explosion Detection Systems). 
Based on the threat of letter bombs/packages and the systemwide 
vulnerability that exist in the belly of every passenger plane 
the recommendations do not provide either a short or long term 
fix.
    Mr. Vice President, we are all aware that any comprehensive 
security system is as good as its weakest link. Criminals and 
terrorist will continue to identify and exploit the weakest 
link in our defenses. Nationally, there are over 450 commercial 
airports with scheduled passenger flights. It is up to the 
Federal government that regulates the airlines to provide 
national security standards, adequate funding and actionable 
timetables. Anything short of that does not fulfill the 
Commissions mandate of enhancing aviation security in a 
meaningful way.
    The Boeing chart on p.6 projects an aviation accident a 
week by the year 2015 based on the projected increases in air 
traffic. That acknowledges 250-300 people will die onboard 
passenger airplanes a week; 1,000-1,200 a month or projected 
total deaths of 12,000-15,000 annually ! Statistically, that 
compares weekly commercial aviation deaths to the weekly death 
toll in the Vietnam War. This is totally unacceptable and an 
outrage ! Commercial air travel need not bear the same risk as 
going to war.
    In closing, Mr. Vice President, I feel that the flying 
public should be able to put their family members aboard a 
plane with a great degree of confidence that they will walk off 
at the point of their destination and not come home in a body 
bag like my husband did. It is for all the aforementioned 
safety and security reasons that I can not sign a report that 
blatantly allows the American flying public to be placed 
regularly at ``unnecessary risk'' while we as a nation have the 
capability, but not the will to reasonably protect them.
    For the record, I take objection to the inclusion of any 
``Classified Annex'' to the Final Report of the White House 
Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. If a classified 
annex was issued in the name of the Commissioners, it has been 
included without privying all the Commissioners to the 
contents, issues, or providing applicable background data or 
conclusions, with our knowledge or consent.
    Sincerely,

M. Victoria Cummock

Commissioner, White House Commission on Aviation Safety and 
Security
Member, FAA Security Baseline Work Group
President, Families of Pan Am 103/Lockerbie
Widow of John Binning Cummock

   b. Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting 
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                         3. Department of State

                  a. Patterns of Global Terrorism 1998

                              Introduction

    The cowardly and deadly bombings of the US Embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 were powerful reminders that 
the threat of international terrorism still confronts the 
world. These attacks contributed to a record-high number of 
casualties during 1998: more than 700 people died and almost 
6,000 were wounded. It is essential that all law-abiding 
nations redouble their efforts to contain this global threat 
and save lives.
    Despite the Embassy bombings, the number of international 
terrorist attacks actually fell again in 1998, continuing a 
downward trend that began several years ago. There were no acts 
of international terrorism in the United States last year. This 
decrease in international terrorism both at home and abroad 
reflects the diplomatic and law enforcement progress we have 
made in discrediting terrorist groups and making it harder for 
them to operate. It also reflects the improved political 
climate that has diminished terrorist activity in recent years 
in various parts of the world.
    The United States is engaged in a long-term effort against 
international terrorism to protect lives and hold terrorists 
accountable. We will use the full range of tools at our 
disposal, including diplomacy backed by the use of force when 
necessary, as well as law enforcement and economic measures.

                               US Policy

    The United States has developed a counterterrorism policy 
that has served us well over the years and was advanced 
aggressively during 1998:

   First, make no concessions to terrorists and strike 
        no deals.
   Second, bring terrorists to justice for their 
        crimes.
   Third, isolate and apply pressure on states that 
        sponsor terrorism to force them to change their 
        behavior.

    The Secretary of State has designated seven countries as 
state sponsors of terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North 
Korea, Sudan, and Syria. In addition, the US Government 
certified an eighth country--Afghanistan--as not fully 
cooperating with US antiterrorism efforts.

   Fourth, bolster the counterterrorism capabilities of 
        those countries that work with the United States and 
        require assistance.

    This last element is especially important in light of the 
evolving threat from transnational terrorist groups. These 
loosely affiliated organizations operate more independently of 
state sponsors, although those relationships still exist. They 
are highly mobile and operate globally, raising large amounts 
of money, training in various countries, and possessing 
sophisticated technology. The United States must continue to 
work together with like-minded nations to close down these 
terrorist networks wherever they are found and make it more 
difficult for them to operate any place in the world.

                 The US Response to the Africa Bombings

    Following the bombings of the two US Embassies in East 
Africa, the US Government obtained evidence implicating Usama 
Bin Ladin's network in the attacks. To preempt additional 
attacks, the United States launched military strikes against 
terrorist targets in Afghanistan and Sudan on 20 August. That 
same day, President Clinton amended Executive Order 12947 to 
add Usama Bin Ladin and his key associates to the list of 
terrorists, thus blocking their US assets-including property 
and bank accounts-and prohibiting all US financial transactions 
with them. As a result of what Attorney General Janet Reno 
called the most extensive overseas criminal investigation in US 
history, and working closely with the Kenyan and Tanzanian 
Governments, the US Government indicted Bin Ladin and 11 of his 
associates for the two bombings and other terrorist crimes. 
Several suspects were brought to the United States to stand 
trial. The Department of State announced a reward of up to $5 
million for information leading to the arrest or conviction of 
any of the suspects anywhere in the world. \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Legislation passed by Congress and signed by the President in 
1998 increased the maximum amount of a reward offered under the 
Counterterrorism Rewards Program from $2 million to $5 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                  New Presidential Decision Directives

    On 22 May President Clinton announced the signing of two 
new Presidential decision directives, or PDDs, on combating 
terrorism and protecting critical infrastructures.

   The first directive, PDD-62, highlights the growing 
        threat of unconventional attacks against the United 
        States and details a new, more systematic approach to 
        fighting the terrorist threat. It reinforces the 
        mission of the many US agencies charged with roles in 
        defeating terrorism. It also codifies and clarifies 
        their activities in the wide range of US 
        counterterrorism programs, from apprehending and 
        prosecuting terrorists to increasing transportation 
        security, enhancing response capabilities, and 
        protecting the computer-based systems that lie at the 
        heart of the US economy. The new directive also 
        establishes the position of the National Coordinator 
        for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and 
        Counterterrorism to oversee the broad variety of 
        relevant policies and programs.
   The second directive, PDD-63, calls for a national 
        effort to ensure the security of the United States' 
        increasingly vulnerable and interconnected 
        infrastructures. These infrastructures include 
        telecommunications, banking and finance, energy, 
        transportation, and essential government services. The 
        directive requires immediate US Government action, 
        including risk assessment and planning, to reduce 
        exposure to attack. It stresses the critical importance 
        of cooperation between the US Government and the 
        private sector by linking designated federal agencies 
        with private-sector representatives.

                         US Diplomatic Efforts

    On 24 August, Secretary Albright, in an effort to bring to 
justice the two Libyans suspected in the Pan Am 103 bombing, 
announced a joint US-UK proposal to try them in the Netherlands 
before a Scottish court with Scottish judges applying Scottish 
law. The Arab League, the Organization of African Unity, the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the Non-Aligned 
Movement endorsed the proposal. At yearend, however, Libya 
continued to defy UN Security Council resolutions by refusing 
to turn over the suspects for trial.
    The Group of 8 (G-8) partners intensified their exchange of 
basic information on persons and groups suspected of terrorist-
linked activities. The eight nations also focused their efforts 
on trying to deprive terrorist groups of the money, acquired 
through criminal activities or raised by front organizations, 
used to fund operations. Toward this end, the G-8 placed major 
emphasis on countering terrorist fundraising and did 
substantial work to advance a French draft international 
convention to make such fundraising illegal. The G-8 also 
worked for the acceptance of a Russian-proposed international 
convention against nuclear terrorism, discussed improved export 
controls on explosives and other terrorist-related materials, 
and considered guidelines for the prevention and resolution of 
international hostage-taking incidents.
    Representatives from the Organization of American States 
met in Mar del Plata, Argentina, on 23-24 November for the 
second Inter-American Specialized Conference on Terrorism. They 
agreed to recommend the creation of an Inter-American Committee 
on Terrorism to combat the threat in Latin America. They also 
agreed to establish a central database of information about 
terrorists, to follow certain guidelines for improving 
counterterrorism cooperation, and to adopt measures to 
eliminate terrorist fundraising.
    The United States conducts a successful program to train 
foreign law enforcement personnel in such areas as airport 
security, bomb detection, maritime security, VIP protection, 
hostage rescue, and crisis management. To date, we have trained 
more than 20,000 representatives from more than 100 countries. 
We also conduct an active research and development program to 
adapt modern technology for use in defeating terrorists.
    As Secretary Albright declared shortly after the US 
military strikes against terrorist targets in Afghanistan and 
Sudan: ``The terrorists should have no illusion: Old Glory will 
continue to fly wherever we have interests to defend. We will 
meet our commitments. We will strive to protect our people. And 
we will wage the struggle against terror on every front, on 
every continent, with every tool, every day.''

                        Legislative Requirements

    This report is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the 
United States Code, Section 2656f(a), which requires the 
Department of State to provide Congress a full and complete 
annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups 
meeting the criteria of Section (a)(1) and (2) of the Act. As 
required by legislation, the report includes detailed 
assessments of foreign countries where significant terrorist 
acts occurred and countries about which Congress was notified 
during the preceding five years pursuant to Section 6(j) of the 
Export Administration Act of 1979 (the so-called terrorism list 
countries that repeatedly have provided state support for 
international terrorism). In addition, the report includes all 
relevant information about the previous year's activities of 
individuals, terrorist organizations, or umbrella groups known 
to be responsible for the kidnapping or death of any US citizen 
during the preceding five years and groups known to be financed 
by state sponsors of terrorism.
    In 1996, Congress amended the reporting requirements 
contained in the above-referenced law. The amended law requires 
the Department of State to report on the extent to which other 
countries cooperate with the United States in apprehending, 
convicting, and punishing terrorists responsible for attacking 
US citizens or interests. The law also requires that this 
report describe the extent to which foreign governments are 
cooperating, or have cooperated during the previous five years, 
in preventing future acts of terrorism. As permitted in the 
amended legislation, the Department of State is submitting such 
information to Congress in a classified annex to this 
unclassified report.

                              Definitions

    No one definition of terrorism has gained universal 
acceptance. For the purposes of this report, however, we have 
chosen the definition of terrorism contained in Title 22 of the 
United States Code, Section 2656f(d). That statute contains the 
following definitions:

   The term ``terrorism'' means premeditated, 
        politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
        noncombatant \2\ targets by subnational groups or 
        clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an 
        audience.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ For purposes of this definition, the term ``noncombatant'' is 
interpreted to include, in addition to civilians, military personnel 
who at the time of the incident are unarmed or not on duty. For 
example, in past reports we have listed as terrorist incidents the 
murders of the following US military personnel: the 19 airmen killed in 
the bombing of the Khubar Towers housing facility in Saudi Arabia in 
June 1996; Col. James Rowe, killed in Manila in April 1989; Capt. 
William Nordeen, US defense attache killed in Athens in June 1988; the 
two servicemen killed in the La Belle discotheque bombing in West 
Berlin in April 1986; and the four off-duty US Embassy Marine guards 
killed in a cafe in El Salvador in June 1985. We also consider as acts 
of terrorism attacks on military installations or on armed military 
personnel when a state of military hostilities does not exist at the 
site, such as bombings against US bases in Europe, the Philippines, or 
elsewhere.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   The term ``international terrorism'' means terrorism 
        involving citizens or the territory of more than one 
        country.
   The term ``terrorist group'' means any group 
        practicing, or that has significant subgroups that 
        practice, international terrorism.

    The US Government has employed these definitions of 
terrorism for statistical and analytical purposes since 1983.
    Domestic terrorism is a more widespread phenomenon than 
international terrorism. Because international terrorism has a 
direct impact on US interests, it is the primary focus of this 
report. Nonetheless, the report also describes, but does not 
provide statistics on, significant developments in domestic 
terrorism.

                                  Note

    Adverse mention in this report of individual members of any 
political, social, ethnic, religious, or national group is not 
meant to imply that all members of that group are terrorists. 
Indeed, terrorists represent a small minority of dedicated, 
often fanatical, individuals in most such groups. It is those 
small groups-and their actions-that are the subject of this 
report.
    Furthermore, terrorist acts are part of a larger phenomenon 
of politically inspired violence, and at times the line between 
the two can become difficult to draw. To relate terrorist 
events to the larger context, and to give a feel for the 
conflicts that spawn violence, this report will discuss 
terrorist acts as well as other violent incidents that are not 
necessarily international terrorism.

Michael A. Sheehan
Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism

                           The Year in Review

    There were 273 international terrorist attacks during 1998, 
a drop from the304 attacks we recorded the previous year and 
the lowest annual total since1971. The total number of persons 
killed or wounded in terrorist attacks,however, was the highest 
on record: 741 persons died, and 5,952 personssuffered 
injuries.

   Most of these casualties resulted from the 
        devastating bombings in August of the US Embassies in 
        Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. In Nairobi, 
        where the US Embassy was located in a congested 
        downtown area, 291 persons were killed in the attack, 
        and about 5,000 were wounded. In Dar es Salaam, 10 
        persons were killed and 77 were wounded.
   About 40 percent of the attacks in 1998-111-were 
        directed against US targets. The majority of these--
        77--were bombings of a multinational oil pipeline in 
        Colombia, which terrorists regard as a US target.
   Twelve US citizens died in terrorist attacks last 
        year, all in the Nairobi bombing. Each was an Embassy 
        employee or dependent:
    --Marine Sgt. Jesse N. Aliganga, Marine Security Guard 
            detachment
    --Julian L. Bartley, Sr., Consul General
    --Julian L. Bartley, Jr., son of the Consul General
    --Jean Rose Dalizu, Defense Attache's Office
    --Molly Huckaby Hardy, Administrative Office
    --Army Sgt. Kenneth Ray Hobson, II, Defense Attache's 
            Office
    --Prabhi Kavaler, General Services Office
    --Arlene Kirk, Military Assistance Office
    --Mary Louise Martin, Centers for Disease Control and 
            Prevention
    --Air Force Senior Master Sgt. Sherry Lynn Olds, Military 
            AssistanceOffice
    --Michelle O'Connor, General Services Office
    --Uttamlal Thomas Shah, Political Section

   Eleven other US citizens were wounded in terrorist 
        attacks last year, including six in Nairobi and one in 
        Dar es Salaam.
   Three-fifths--166--of the total attacks were 
        bombings. The foremost type of target was business 
        related.

    There were no acts of international terrorism in the United 
States in 1998.There were successful efforts to bring 
international terrorist suspects to justice, however, in 
several important cases:

   On 4 November indictments were returned before the 
        US District Court for the Southern District of New York 
        in connection with the two US Embassy bombings in 
        Africa. Charged in the indictment were: Usama Bin 
        Ladin, his military commander Muhammad Atef, and al-
        Qaida members Wadih El Hage, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, 
        Mohammed Sadeek Odeh, and Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-
        Owhali. Two of these suspects, Odeh and al-Owhali, were 
        turned over to US authorities in Kenya and brought to 
        the United States to stand trial. Another suspect, 
        Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, was arrested in Germany in 
        September and extradited to the United States in 
        December. On 16 December five others were indicted for 
        their role in the Dar es Salaam Embassy bombing: 
        Mustafa Mohammed Fadhil, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, Ahmed 
        Khalfan Ghailani, Fahid Mohommed Ally Msalam, and 
        Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan. (See box on Usama Bin Ladin 
        on page 29.)
   In June, Mohammed Rashid was turned over to US 
        authorities overseas and brought to the United States 
        to stand trial on charges of planting a bomb in 1982 on 
        a Pan Am flight from Tokyo to Honolulu that detonated, 
        killing one passenger and wounding 15 others. Rashid 
        had served part of a prison term in Greece in 
        connection with the bombing until that country released 
        him from prison early and expelled him in December 
        1996, in a move the United States called 
        ``incomprehensible.'' The nine-count US indictment 
        against Rashid charges him with murder, sabotage, 
        bombing, and other crimes in connection with the Pan Am 
        explosion.
   Three additional persons convicted in the bombing of 
        the World Trade Center in 1993 were sentenced last 
        year. Eyad Mahmoud Ismail Najim, who drove the 
        explosive-laden van into the World Trade Center, was 
        sentenced to 240 years in prison and ordered to pay $10 
        million in restitution and a $250,000 fine. Mohammad 
        Abouhalima, who was convicted as an accessory for 
        driving his brother to the Kennedy International 
        Airport knowing he had participated in the bombing, was 
        sentenced to eight years in prison. Ibrahim Ahmad 
        Suleiman received a 10-month sentence on two counts of 
        perjury for lying to the grand jury investigating the 
        bombing.
   In May, Abdul Hakim Murad was sentenced to life in 
        prison without parole for his role in the failed 
        conspiracy in January 1995 to blow up a dozen US 
        airliners over the Pacific Ocean. Murad received an 
        additional 60-year sentence for his role and was fined 
        $250,000. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, who was convicted 
        previously in this conspiracy and for his role in the 
        World Trade Center bombing in 1993, is serving a life 
        prison term.
      
      
      
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                            Africa Overview

    The murderous and near-simultaneous bombing attacks on the 
US Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on 7 
August 1998 caused more casualties than any other terrorist 
attack during the year. In Nairobi, where the US Embassy was 
located in a congested downtown area, the attack killed 291 
persons and wounded about 5,000. The bombing in Dar es Salaam 
killed 10 persons and wounded 77.
    These attacks clarified more than ever that terrorism is a 
global phenomenon. In the months since the bombings, evidence 
has emerged of terrorist networks involved in potential anti-US 
activity in a number of African nations.
    In addition, state sponsors of terrorism, particularly 
Libya, are increasing significantly their activities in Sub-
Saharan Africa.

                                 angola

    In late April, National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola (UNITA) guerrillas kidnapped two Portuguese citizens 
from thecommune of Ebangano. The two have not been found.
    UNITA rebels fired on a United Nations Mission to Angola 
(MONUA) vehicle near Calandula on 19 May. The attack killed an 
Angolan official working for MONUA and wounded two foreigners.
    On 23 March and 22 April, separatists from the Cabinda 
Liberation Front-Cabindan Armed Forces (FLEC-FAC) kidnapped 
three Portuguese citizens working for Mota and Company, a 
Portuguese construction firm. FLEC-FAC claimed it took the 
workers hostage to force Portugal to pressure the Angolan 
Government to leave Cabinda.
    On 9 November more than 100 suspected UNITA rebels overran 
the Canadian-owned Yetwene diamond mine in eastern Angola, 
killing eight individuals-including two British nationals, one 
Portuguese, and five Angolans-and wounding at least 22 persons. 
The gunmen took four workers hostage: a South African, a 
British national, and two Filipinos.
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                        central african republic

    A small bomb detonated on 27 November outside the walls of 
the French Embassy, causing only minor damage.

                                  chad

    On 3 February armed rebels of the Union of Democratic 
forces kidnapped four French citizens in Manda National Park. 
The four were released unharmed five days later. On 22 March a 
group calling itself the National Front for the Renewal of Chad 
took six French and two Italian nationals hostage in the 
Tibesti region. Chadian forces freed all but one hostage within 
hours. The militants announced they would not release the last 
hostage until all French troops and Western oil firms left 
Chad. Five days later Chadian security forces freed the last 
hostage.

                      democratic republic of congo

    On 12 August gunmen seized a tour group sightseeing along a 
nature trail in the Ruwenzori Range of western Congo. The 
tourists--one Canadian, two Swedes, and three New Zealanders--
were abducted after they crossed from Uganda into the Congo. A 
previously unknown group, the People in Action for the 
Liberation of Rwanda, claimed responsibility for the abduction. 
Local authorities believe the gunmen are former Rwandan 
soldiers who fled to Congo after the former regime was forced 
from power in 1994. Two New Zealanders escaped one week later, 
and the Canadian was released on 19 August. The other victims 
still are missing.

                                ethiopia

    On 25 February rebels of the Ogaden National Liberation 
Front took an Austrian national hostage as she traveled from 
Gode to Denan. She was released in mid-April after the rebels 
determined that she ``was not a spy for the Ethiopian 
Government.''
    An Islamic group based in Somalia, al-Ittihad al-Islami, 
claimed responsibility for kidnapping six International 
Committee of the Red Cross workers in the eastern Ogaden region 
of Ethiopia on 25 June. Al-Ittihad said the abducted workers--
one Swiss national and five ethnic Somalis--were spies. The six 
were released unharmed on 10 July even though al-Ittihad found 
them ``guilty of conducting business outside of their duties.''

                                 kenya

    On 7 August a car bomb exploded behind the US Embassy, 
killing 291 persons and wounding about 5,000. The majority of 
the casualties were Kenyan citizens. Twelve US citizens died, 
and six were injured in the attack. A group calling itself the 
``Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places'' 
immediately claimed responsibility for the attacks in Nairobi 
and a near-simultaneous explosion in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. 
US officials believe the group is a cover name used by Usama 
Bin Ladin' al-Qaida organization. Indictments were returned in 
the US District Court for the Southern District of New York 
charging Usama Bin Ladin and 11 other individuals for these and 
other terrorist acts against US citizens. At year end, four of 
the indicted--Wadih El Hage, Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-Owhali, 
Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, and Mohammed Sadeeck Odeh--were being 
held in New York, while Khalid al-Fawwaz remained in the United 
Kingdom pending extradition to the United States. The other 
suspects remain at large. The Government of Kenya cooperated 
closely with the United States in the criminal investigation of 
the bombing. On 20 August, President Clinton amended Executive 
Order 12947 to add Usama Bin Ladin and his key associates to 
the list of terrorists, thus blocking their US assets--
including property and bank accounts--and prohibiting all US 
financial transactions with them.

                                nigeria

    On 11 November a mob of angry youths abducted eight Shell 
Oil workers in Bayelsa. The hostages included three US 
citizens, one British citizen, one Croatian, one Italian, one 
South African, and one Nigerian. The youths demanded jobs and 
economic development projects for their community. After talks 
with the oil firm, all eight hostages were released unharmed on 
18 November.

                              sierra leone

    Revolutionary United Front (RUF) militants commanded by 
S.A.F. Musa kidnapped an Italian Catholic missionary from his 
residence in Kamalo on 15 November. In exchange for the 
hostage' release, Musa demanded medical supplies, a satellite 
phone, and contact with his family, who are being detained by 
regional peacekeeping forces in the capital. At year end, talks 
between the RUF and the government were at a standstill.

                              south africa

    An explosion on 25 August in the entrance of the US-
franchised Planet Hollywood restaurant in Cape Town killed one 
person and injured at least two dozen others, including nine 
British citizens. Muslims Against Global Opression (MAGO), a 
front organization for the Islamic radical groups People 
Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) and Qibla, initially 
claimed responsibility but then denied involvement. Local 
authorities believe that PAGAD members masterminded the attack 
in retaliation for the US bombings of terrorism-related targets 
in Sudan and Afghanistan.
    PAGAD, a vigilante group that first appeared in August 
1996, conducted a series of violent attacks against criminal 
elements and moderate Muslim leaders in Cape Town last year. 
Though police are investigating PAGAD members aggressively, 
none has been convicted for these crimes.

                                somalia

    On 15 April militant Somali clansmen took nine foreign 
nationals hostage after their aircraft landed at a north 
Mogadishu airstrip. The hostages included one US citizen, a 
German, a Belgian, a Frenchman, a Norwegian, and two Swiss. The 
two pilots, a South African and a Kenyan, also were held. The 
clansmen demanded $100,000 ransom. The kidnappers released the 
hostages unharmed on 24 April without receiving any ransom, 
however, after the international community pressured the 
kidnappers' leaders.

                                tanzania

    Terrorists associated with Usama Bin Ladin' al-Qaida 
organization detonated an extremely large truck bomb outside 
the US Embassy in Dar es Salaam on 7 August, just as another 
truck bomb exploded outside the US Embassy in Nairobi. The 
blast killed 10 Tanzanians, including seven local Embassy 
employees, and injured 77 persons, including one US citizen. 
Tanzanian authorities cooperated closely with the United States 
in the criminal investigation of the bombing.

                                 uganda

    Unidentified assailants on 4 April detonated bombs at two 
downtown Kampala restaurants, the Nile Grill and the outdoor 
cafe at the Speke Hotel, killing five persons--including 
Swedish and Rwandan nationals--and wounding six others. The 
Ugandan Government suspects that Islamic militants of the 
Allied Democratic Forces are responsible.
    On 8 July a United Nations World Food Program worker was 
killed when rebels of the Uganda National Rescue Front II fired 
a rocket-propelled grenade at his truck while he was driving in 
northwestern Uganda.
    Rebels of the Lord' Resistance Army attacked a civilian 
convoy traveling along a major corridor in the north on 27 
November, killing seven persons and wounding 28 others.

                             Asia Overview

    The overall number of terrorist incidents in East Asia 
decreased in 1998. Individual countries still suffered 
terrorist attacks and endured continued terrorist group 
activities, however.
    In Cambodia, the last remnants of the weakened Khmer Rouge 
(KR) virtually disbanded in 1998, and two of the group's top 
three leaders came out of hiding to surrender. Earlier in the 
year, KR elements committed two acts of international terrorism 
that caused 12 deaths. The US Secretary of State has designated 
the KR a foreign terrorist organization pursuant to the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
    In Japan, the Aum Shinrikyo religious cult, accused of 
attacking the Tokyo subway system with sarin gas in March 1995, 
increased its membership and business activity in 1998. 
Prosecution of cult leaders continues at a sluggish pace. In 
June a Lebanese court rejected appeals by five imprisoned 
Japanese Red Army members; Japan has asked that they be 
deported to Japan upon completion of their three-year jail 
terms. Both groups are designated foreign terrorist 
organizations pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996.
    The Philippines experienced violent attacks in the southern 
province of Mindanao from rebels in the Moro Islamic Liberation 
Army (MILF), the New Peoples Army (NPA), and the Abu Sayyaf 
Group (ASG). The government began negotiations with the MILF 
that showed little progress in 1998. The ASG experienced a 
major setback in December when its leader was killed during a 
government ambush. Other incidents, including attacks on rural 
police posts around the country and kidnappings of foreign 
nationals, occurred in 1998.
    In Thailand, a strong military offensive against Muslim 
separatists of the New Pattani United Liberation Organization 
(New PULO)--in cooperation with Malaysia--helped restore calm 
in the south, which had experienced a wave of bombings in 
January. The Thai Supreme Court overturned the conviction of 
Hossein Dastgiri, an Iranian charged in 1994 with plotting to 
bomb the Israeli Embassy in Bangkok.
    In South Asia, the Taliban has made Afghanistan a safehaven 
for international terrorists, particularly Usama Bin Ladin. The 
United States made it clear to the Taliban on numerous 
occasions that it must stop harboring such terrorists. Despite 
US engagement of the Taliban in an ongoing dialogue, its 
leaders have refused to expel Bin Ladin to a country where he 
can be brought to justice.
    In 1998 the United States continued its efforts to 
ascertain the fate of the four Western hostages--including one 
US citizen--kidnapped in India's Kashmir in 1995 by affiliates 
of the Harakat-ul-Ansar (HUA). Despite ongoing cooperative 
efforts between US and Indian law enforcement authorities, we 
have been unable to determine their whereabouts. The HUA was 
designated a foreign terrorist organization in 1997 pursuant to 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
    In Pakistan, sectarian violence continues to affect lives 
and property. In Karachi and elsewhere in the Sindh and Punjab 
Provinces, clashes between rival ethnic and religious groups 
reached dangerously high levels. As in previous years, there 
were continuing credible reports of official Pakistani support 
for Kashmiri militant groups that engage in terrorism.
    In Sri Lanka, the government continues to battle the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Designated a foreign 
terrorist organization in 1997 pursuant to the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the LTTE has continued 
its attempts to gain a Tamil homeland through a campaign of 
violence, intimidation, and assassination. By targeting 
municipal officials and civilian infrastructure and conducting 
random attacks, the LTTE seeks to force the government to meet 
to its demands. The Government of Sri Lanka is pursuing a two-
track policy of fighting the Tigers and building support for 
its ambitious package of political reforms aimed at addressing 
many of the Tamil minority's grievances. Recent military 
setbacks may push the government toward negotiations, but the 
LTTE has shown no willingness to move in this direction.

                              afghanistan

    Islamic extremists from around the world--including large 
numbers of Egyptians, Algerians, Palestinians, and Saudis--in 
1998 continued to use Afghanistan as a training ground and a 
base of operations for their worldwide terrorist activities. 
The Taliban, which controls most of the territory in 
Afghanistan, facilitated the operation of training and 
indoctrination facilities for non-Afghans and provided 
logistical support and sometimes passports to members of 
various terrorist organizations. Throughout 1998 the Taliban 
continued to host Usama Bin Ladin, who was indicted in November 
for the bombings in August of two US Embassies in East Africa.

                                cambodia

    Weakened by defections and internal discord, the last 
remnants of the Khmer Rouge virtually disbanded in 1998 
following 30 years of civil war and terror. The KR suffered 
significant losses in 1998, including the death of leader Pol 
Pot in April. During crackdowns in August, the government 
arrested Nuon Paet, a former KR fugitive suspected of ordering 
the execution of three European tourists after holding them 
hostage for two months in 1994. By late December the last main 
fighting unit of the KR had surrendered, including two of the 
group's top three leaders: Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea.
    Before fragmenting, Khmer Rouge elements committed two acts 
of international terrorism in 1998. In January, KR militants 
reportedly placed a handgrenade near the Vietnamese military 
attache's office in Phnom Penh. In April, KR forces murdered 12 
Vietnamese nationals at a fishing village near Tonle Sap lake.

                                 india

    Security problems persisted in India in 1998 because of 
ongoing insurgencies in Kashmir and the northeast. Kashmiri 
militant groups stepped up attacks against civilian targets in 
India's Kashmir and shifted their tactics from bombings to 
targeted killings, including the massacres of Kashmiri 
villagers. In April the massacres spilled over to Udhampur 
district, where 28 villagers died in two simultaneous attacks. 
Elsewhere in India, election-related violence at the beginning 
of 1998 claimed more than 150 lives. In an effort to disrupt a 
Bharatiya Janata Party rally on 14 February, Islamic militants 
in Coimbatore conducted a series of bombings that killed 50 and 
wounded more than 200.
    The Indian and Pakistani Governments each claim that the 
intelligence service of the other country sponsors bombings on 
its territory. The Government of Pakistan acknowledges that it 
continues to provide moral, political, and diplomatic support 
to Kashmiri militants but denies allegations of other 
assistance. Reports continued in 1998, however, of official 
Pakistani support to militants fighting in Kashmir.

                                 japan

    Three years after the sarin nerve gas attack on the Tokyo 
subway system in March 1995, the prosecution of high-level Aum 
Shinrikyo religious cult leaders--including cult founder Shoko 
Asahara--continues. Press reports indicate that, if it 
maintains its current sluggish pace, the trial could take 30 
years to complete. Japanese security officials reported a rise 
in Aum Shinrikyo membership and business activity in 1998, 
despite a severe police crackdown on the group following the 
sarin attack. The United States designated Aum Shinrikyo a 
foreign terrorist organization in 1997 pursuant to the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
    On 3 June the highest criminal court in Lebanon rejected an 
appeal made by five convicted Japanese Red Army members and 
endorsed their three-year prison sentence for forgery and 
illegal residency. Tokyo has asked that they be deported to 
Japan upon completion of their jail terms.

                                pakistan

    Sectarian and political violence surged in Pakistan in 1998 
as Sunni and Shia extremists conducted attacks against each 
other, primarily in Punjab Province, and as rival wings of an 
ethnic party feuded in Karachi. The heightened political 
violence prompted the imposition of Governor's rule in Sindh 
Province in October. According to press reports, more than 900 
persons were killed in Karachi from January to September, the 
majority by acts of domestic terrorism.
    In the wake of US missile strikes on terrorist training 
camps in Afghanistan, several Pakistani-based Kashmiri militant 
groups vowed revenge for casualties their groups suffered. At a 
press conference held in Islamabad in November, former Harakat 
ul-Ansar and current Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM) leader Fazlur 
Rehman Khalil reportedly vowed: ``We will kill one hundred 
Americans for one Muslim.'' Other Kashmiri and domestic 
Pakistani sectarian groups also threatened to target US 
interests. The leader of the Lashkar-i-Taiba declared a jihad 
against the United States, and the leader of the Lashkar-i-
Jhangvi vowed publicly to kill US citizens and offered his 
support to Bin Ladin.
    Pakistani officials stated publicly that, while the 
Government of Pakistan provides diplomatic, political, and 
moral support for"freedom fighters'' in Kashmir, it is firmly 
against terrorism and provides no training or materiel support 
for Kashmiri militants. Kashmiri militant groups continued to 
operate in Pakistan, however, raising funds and recruiting new 
cadre. These activities created a fertile ground for the 
operations of militant and terrorist groups in Pakistan, 
including the HUA and its successor organization, the HUM.

                              philippines

    The new government of President Joseph Estrada continued 
the previous administration's attempts to reach a peaceful 
settlement with rebels of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. In 
August the two sides pledged to begin substantive talks in 
September. By yearend, however, little progress had been made 
toward ending the conflict, and both sides continued to engage 
in low-level violence. The Communist New People's Army also was 
active in 1998, conducting a series of attacks on rural police 
posts throughout the country.
    Clashes between government forces and various insurgent 
groups were particularly violent in the southern province of 
Mindanao. In this remote region the Philippine Armed Forces 
sporadically engaged militants of the MILF and the smaller, 
more extremist Abu Sayyaf Group. These periodic military sweeps 
appear to have weakened both groups. The ASG, in particular, 
suffered a major setback in late December when government 
security forces killed its leader during an ambush.
    Islamic insurgents were responsible for several 
international terrorist incidents in the Philippines in 1998. 
In early September, suspected MILF and ASG militants conducted 
a rash of kidnappings of foreign nationals, including three 
Hong Kong businessmen and an Italian priest. Two months later, 
one group of rebels freed the Italian after 100 MILF fighters 
surrounded the rebels' jungle hideout and forced his release.

                               sri lanka

    The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam conducted significant 
levels of terrorist activity in 1998. The LTTE attacked 
government troops, bombed economic and infrastructure targets, 
and assassinated political opponents. An LTTE suicide vehicle 
bombing at the Temple of the Tooth in Kandy in January 1998 
killed the three suicide bombers and 13 civilians--including 
three children--and injured 23. The LTTE's deadliest terrorist 
act in 1998 was a vehicle bomb explosion in the Maradana 
district of Colombo in March that killed 36 persons--including 
five schoolchildren--and wounded more than 250.
    The LTTE assassinated several political and military 
officials in 1998. In May a suicide bomber killed a senior Sri 
Lankan Army commander, Brigadier Larry Wijeratne. Three days 
after that attack, armed gunmen assassinated newly elected 
Jaffna Mayor S. Yogeswaran--a widow of an LTTE-assassinated 
Tamil politician--in an attack claimed by the Sangilian Force, 
a suspected LTTE front group. In July an LTTE mine explosion 
killed Tamil parliamentarian S. Shanmuganathan, his son, and 
three bodyguards. In September an LTTE bomb planted in a Jaffna 
government building killed new Jaffna Mayor P. Sivapalan and 11 
others.
    During the year, the LTTE conducted numerous attacks on 
infrastructure and commercial shipping. In the first half of 
1998 the LTTE bombed several telecommunications and power 
facilities in Sri Lanka. In August the LTTE stormed a Dubai-
owned cargo ship, the Princess Kash, which was carrying food, 
concrete, and general supplies to the Jaffna Peninsula. The 
Tigers took hostage the 21 crewmembers--including 16 Indians--
but released the Indians five days later.
    ``Operation Sure Victory,'' the Sri Lankan military's 
ground offensive aimed at reopening and securing a ground 
supply route through LTTE-held territory in northern Sri Lanka, 
continued through 1998. The offensive ended in December about 
40 kilometers short of its goal. The Sri Lankan military 
immediately initiated a new offensive in the same area.
    The Sri Lankan Government strongly supported international 
efforts to address the problem of terrorism in 1998. Colombo 
was quick to condemn terrorist attacks in other countries and 
has raised terrorism issues in several international venues, 
including the UN General Assembly in New York and the UN High 
Commission for Refugees in Geneva. Sri Lanka was the first 
country to sign the International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings at the United Nations in 
January.
    There were no confirmed cases of LTTE or other terrorist 
groups targeting US interests or citizens in Sri Lanka in 1998. 
Nonetheless, the Sri Lankan Government was quick to cooperate 
with US requests to enhance security for US personnel and 
facilities and cooperated fully with US officials investigating 
possible violations of US law by international terrorist 
organizations. Sri Lankan security forces received training in 
explosive incident countermeasures, vital installation 
security, and post-blast investigation under the US Anti-
Terrorism Assistance Program.

                                thailand

    On February 18 the Thai Supreme Court overturned the 
conviction of Iranian Hossein Dastgiri, who had been prosecuted 
for a plot in 1994 to bomb the Israeli Embassy in Bangkok. The 
court ruled that conflicting eyewitness testimony failed to 
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that Dastgiri was the 
driver of the bomb-laden truck. In southern Thailand, Muslim 
separatists of the New Pattani United Liberation Organization 
conducted a series of bombings in January. Thai authorities 
launched a military counteroffensive in mid-January that netted 
several PULO militants. These arrests, combined with 
unprecedented assistance from Malaysia, where PULO militants 
had traditionally found refuge, helped to restore calm in the 
south.

                            Eurasia Overview

    In Russia, several prominent local officials were killed 
and some US and Russian citizens were kidnapped in Chechnya and 
the North Caucasus region. At least some of the killings 
appeared politically motivated, including the assassination of 
Russian State Duma deputy Galina Starovoytova and Shadid 
Bargishev, head of the Chechen antikidnapping squad. Some 
Chechen insurgents have links to terrorist Usama Bin Ladin.
    Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze survived an 
assassination attempt by supporters of a former president in 
1998. The arrest of some of his attackers provoked further 
incidents and led to Russian cooperation in the arrest and 
extradition of an individual alleged to have conspired in 
planning the attack. The breakaway region of Abkhazia witnessed 
the abduction of four UN military observers in July and the 
ambush and wounding of UN observers in September.
    The Kazakhstan Government averted a potential threat to the 
US Embassy in Almaty by arresting and expelling three Iranian 
Government agents for illegal activities. Four members of a 
United Nations mission of observers to Tajikistan were killed 
while on patrol 150 kilometers outside of Dushanbe. Of the 
various terrorist incidents that occurred in Tajikistan in 
1998, this was of greatest concern to the international 
community.

                                armenia

    On 1 April local US Embassy guards discovered and safely 
disarmed a handgrenade outside the US Ambassador's residence. 
There was no claim of responsibility.

                                georgia

    Supporters of deceased former Georgian President Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia, known as ``Zviadists,'' and ethnic Chechen 
mercenaries attempted to assassinate Georgian President Eduard 
Shevardnadze on 9 February. The assailants launched a well-
organized attack against Shevardnadze's motorcade late in the 
evening using rocket-propelled grenades and automatic weapons. 
Shevardnadze survived the attack--the second against him in 
three years--but it almost succeeded. Two officers of 
Shevardnadze's protective service and one of the attackers, an 
ethnic Chechen, died in the ensuing gunfight. The government 
arrested 11 of the assailants within days of the attack.
    Subsequently, some 15 of Shevardnadze's assailants 
kidnapped four United Nations observers from their compound in 
Zugdidi, western Georgia, to ensure the assailants' escape and 
their colleagues' release. The hostages escaped or were 
released following a dialogue between the Shevardnadze 
government and former members of Gamsakhurdia's faction. Some 
of the hostage takers surrendered, but Gocha Esebua, the 
Zviadist leader of the assassination team, escaped. According 
to press reports, Georgian police killed Esebua in a shootout 
on 31 March after they tracked him to a house in western 
Georgia.
    Georgian officials also apprehended former Gamsakhurdia 
government Finance Minister Guram Absandze, the alleged 
mastermind of the assassination attempt. Russian security 
authorities detained Absandze in Smolensk, Russia, on 16 March 
and extradited him to Georgia three days later, where he was 
formally arrested.
    Violence in Georgia's breakaway region of Abkhazia 
accounted for several incidents that involved foreign 
personnel. In July four UN military observers were taken 
hostage. On 21 September three UN military observers and their 
Abkhaz driver were wounded in Sukhumi during an ambush on a 
clearly marked UN vehicle, according to press reporting. Two of 
the injured were military observers from Bangladesh, and the 
third victim was a UN employee from Nigeria.

                               kazakhstan

    During 1998 the United States and Kazakhstan cooperated to 
avert potential security threats to the US Embassy in Almaty. 
In February, Committee for National Security (KNB) authorities 
arrested--and subsequently expelled--three Iranian Ministry of 
Intelligence and Security agents for illegal activities. The 
Government of Kazakhstan did not publicize details of the 
Iranian agents' activities or prosecute them before their 
expulsion, however. The US Government and the Government of 
Kazakhstan signed a joint statement on combating terrorism in 
November.

                               kyrgyzstan

    According to press reports, Kyrgyzstani security 
authorities alleged that Islamic extremists, vaguely identified 
as ``Wahhabis,'' conducted two bombings in 1998 in Osh, 
Kyrgyzstan's second-largest city located in the Fergana Valley. 
On 30 May an explosion occurred in a public minibus, killing 
two persons and wounding 10, while an explosion in an apartment 
the next day killed two persons. The motive behind the 
explosions was unclear because of insufficient information. 
Nonetheless, Wahhabism, a fundamentalist Sunni Islamic sect 
originating in Saudi Arabia, never has been widespread in 
Kyrgyzstan.

                                 russia

    The assassination on 20 November of noted reformist and 
Russian State Duma deputy Galina Starovoytova by unidentified 
assailants--possibly a politically motivated contract killing--
highlights both the terrorist tactics used by domestic 
antagonists to influence Russian politics and Moscow's 
inability to curb this violence. Chechen militants assassinated 
Shadid Bargishev, head of the Chechen antikidnapping squad, on 
25 October in reaction to widely publicized antikidnapping 
operations in Chechnya's capital, Groznyy. No one claimed 
responsibility for an explosive device that detonated under 
Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov's car in June. Maskhadov 
escaped without injury, but four others were killed in the 
attack.
    At least three US citizens were kidnapped in Russia for 
financial gain in 1998. On 18 March unknown assailants abducted 
two US missionaries in Saratov, Russia, took their money and 
bank cards, and released them on 22 March. No ransom appears to 
have been paid. On 11 November in Makhachkala, Dagestan, 
unidentified assailants kidnapped US citizen Herbert Gregg, a 
member of a nondenominational Protestant organization based in 
Illinois. Russian authorities continue to investigate the 
incident.
    Numerous abductions occurred in Russia's North Caucasus 
region during 1998. Most involved ransom demands, although 
political motives cannot be excluded. Some Chechen groups in 
1998 used kidnapping to raise money, and hostages could be sold 
and resold among various Chechen kidnapping groups, according 
to Russian officials. Several foreigners and hundreds of 
Russian civilians and soldiers kidnapped in the region still 
are missing. On 20 January, Vincent Cochetel, a French citizen 
who led the United Nations Human Rights Commission's North 
Caucasus office, was abducted. He finally was released on 12 
December. Four British employees of Granger Telecom were 
kidnapped in early October and on 8 December were found 
murdered. On 1 May, Valentin Vlasov, President Boris Yeltsin's 
representative to Chechnya, was kidnapped by unknown 
assailants. He was released on 13 November.
    Mujahidin with extensive links to Middle Eastern and 
Southwest Asian terrorists aided Chechen insurgents with 
equipment and training. The insurgents were led by Habib Abdul 
Rahman, alias Ibn al-Khattab, an Arab mujahidin commander with 
links to Usama Bin Ladin. Khattab's forces launched attacks 
against Russian military targets, but their activities in 
Russia were localized in the North Caucasus region.

                               tajikistan

    Security for the international community in Tajikistan did 
not improve significantly in 1998, as a number of criminal and 
terrorist incidents--including bombings, assaults, and 
murders--took place. The most serious incident occurred on 20 
July when attackers shot and killed four members of the United 
Nations mission of observers to Tajikistan while on patrol some 
150 kilometers east of Dushanbe. Tajikistani authorities later 
arrested three former Tajikistani opposition members, who 
initially confessed to the killings but later recanted.
    In September the US State Department ordered the suspension 
of Embassy operations in Dushanbe. The decision was made 
because of threats to US facilities worldwide following the US 
Embassy bombings on 7 August in East Africa, turmoil in 
Tajikistan, and the Embassy's limited ability to secure the 
safety of US and foreign personnel in the facility.

                            Europe Overview

    The number of terrorist incidents declined in Europe in 
1998, in large part because of increased vigilance by security 
forces and the recognition by some terrorist groups that 
longstanding political and ethnic controversies should be 
addressed in negotiations. Terrorism in Spain was attributable 
almost entirely to the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) 
group. In Turkey, most incidents were related to the Kurdistan 
Workers' Party (PKK). In Greece, a variety of anarchist and 
terrorist groups continued to operate with virtual impunity. 
The deadliest terrorist act occurred in Omagh, Northern 
Ireland, when a splinter Irish Republican Army (IRA) group 
exploded a 500-pound car bomb that killed 29 persons, including 
children.
    In Northern Ireland, the Catholic and Protestant 
communities made a major commitment to end the violence by 
signing the Good Friday Accord. Under the leadership of the 
British and Irish Governments, both communities and the 
political parties that represent them agreed to compromises 
that are to create new, local governmental institutions for 
resolving conflicts and turn away from terrorism as an accepted 
political instrument. In support of the peace process, most 
paramilitary terrorist groups on both nationalist and loyalist 
sides agreed to a cease-fire. The issue of ``decommissioning'' 
the IRA's weaponry and bombs continued to complicate the 
process, however.
    In Spain, the terrorist ETA declared a cease-fire on 16 
September to provoke negotiations with the central government. 
Public outrage throughout Spain over the ETA assassinations of 
several local Spanish officials earlier in 1998 and the 
government's infiltration and dismantling of several ETA 
``commandos'' in recent years prompted the group's cease-fire. 
Strong French legal pressure also eroded the ETA's support base 
in neighboring French provinces.
    The Turkish Government's threat to act against PKK 
safehavens in neighboring Syria led Damascus to expel PKK 
leader Abdullah Ocalan, who for years had been directing PKK 
terrorist activities from his villa there. Ocalan's departure 
and subsequent flight to seek a new safehaven left the PKK in 
some disarray, although its members conducted several deadly 
suicide bombings in Turkey after his departure from Syria.
    The Greek Government's counterterrorist efforts remained 
ineffective. The Revolutionary Organization 17 November group 
struck six times in early 1998, and several other groups 
claimed responsibility for bombings in various locations in 
Greece. The Greek Government has not arrested a single 17 
November member in the 23 years since the group killed its 
first victim, a US Embassy employee; the group subsequently 
eliminated 22 other persons.
    In Germany, the remnants of the Red Army Faction (RAF) 
announced the dissolution of their organization, once among the 
world's deadliest. The declaration suggested that the remaining 
members realized their terrorist group had lost its purpose.

                                albania

    Albania took an active stance against international 
terrorism in 1998 by launching a campaign of arrests and 
investigations against suspected Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) 
terrorists operating in the capital, Tirana. In late June, 
Albanian security forces captured four Egyptian extremists and 
rendered them immediately to Egypt. Despite public EIJ threats, 
Albanian police continued to pursue the group. In October 
security forces raided an EIJ safehouse, killing one suspected 
terrorist.
    While these examples demonstrate the government's 
commitment to fight terrorism, Albania's poor internal security 
provides an environment conducive to terrorist activity.

                                belgium

    Belgian police arrested 10 suspected Armed Islamic Group 
(GIA) members in March during raids in Brussels. Police seized 
false documents, detonators, and some small caliber weapons. 
During a follow-up raid, police uncovered explosives in a GIA 
supporter's home. The arrests were part of a joint security 
operation with France, Britain, Sweden, and Italy before the 
World Cup soccer match in Paris.
    In April, Belgium prosecuted three suspected GIA members 
for the grenade attack in December 1995 on two police officers 
in Bastogne. Two suspects, Kamel Saddeddine and Youssef El 
Majda, were convicted and sentenced to five years in prison. 
The other, Ah El Madja, also was convicted and sentenced to 
serve three years.

                                 france

    French authorities initiated a large-scale security effort 
across Europe before France hosted the World Cup soccer match 
last summer. In late May police apprehended about 100 suspected 
Algerian GIA members during simultaneous operations in France, 
Germany, Italy, Belgium, and Switzerland. Antiterrorism 
magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguiere described the coordinated 
effort as a ``preventive'' measure to protect the games.
    In 1998, French authorities brought numerous terrorists to 
justice for past acts of violence. In September, French 
prosecutors began a mass trial of 138 Algerian terrorists for a 
wave of bombings committed in 1995 and 1996. Controversy marred 
the two-month trial, however, and more than 50 politicians 
signed a petition denouncing the proceedings as unfair and 
racist. Those convicted received sentences ranging from four 
months to 10 years.
    In late November, France prosecuted eight suspected members 
of Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) on charges of 
smuggling arms to terrorists. The suspects allegedly belong to 
a network headed by FIS leader Djamel Lounici, currently under 
house arrest in Italy pending trial. A French court already has 
sentenced Lounici in absentia to five years in prison for arms 
smuggling in another case concerning Morocco.

                                germany

    The Red Army Faction announced its ``self-dissolution'' in 
April, following more than two decades of struggle against the 
German Government. Meanwhile, German courts continued to 
adjudicate cases against RAF members for terrorist acts 
committed in the 1980s.
    German police took an active stance against terrorism in 
1998. Acting on a request from the United States, they detained 
Salim Mamdouh Mahmud, an associate of Usama Bin Ladin, in 
September and extradited him to the United States in December. 
In the weeks before the World Cup soccer match, they worked 
closely with the French to disrupt Algerian terrorist networks 
in Germany.
    On the judicial front, the trial of five suspected 
terrorists continued for their part in the La Belle discotheque 
bombing in 1986 in Berlin. Controversy has plagued the trial 
from the start, and at the current pace a verdict is not 
expected before the year 2000.
    The German Government showed less resolve in November when 
PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan arrived unannounced in Rome. Germany 
withdrew its longstanding international arrest warrant for the 
Kurdish terrorist leader after PKK militants threatened riots 
and violence in German cities if Ocalan were prosecuted there. 
The German action effectively precluded Ocalan's extradition 
from Italy.

                                 greece

    The majority of the international terrorist incidents 
committed in Europe in 1998 occurred in Greece. Most of these 
attacks were firebombings that numerous leftist and anarchist 
groups conducted against businesses and Greek Government 
offices. The government made arrests in connection with only 
one attack.
    Greece's most deadly terrorist group, the Revolutionary 
Organization 17 November, claimed responsibility for six 
attacks against US or US-related businesses in Athens between 
February and April, including a rocket attack on a Citibank 
office. As in the past, Greek efforts failed to achieve any 
tangible success against 17 November terrorists. To augment 
their counterterrorism capability, Greek officials met in 
September with FBI Director Louis Freeh. The discussions 
improved Greek cooperation with US law enforcement agencies.
    In January an Athens appeals court denied Italy's petition 
to extradite Enrico Bianco, a former Red Brigades member whom 
Greek police arrested in November 1997 and subsequently freed. 
Bianco continues to live freely in Greece.
    Greek relations with Turkey remained tense as numerous 
members of the Greek Parliament continued to court PKK members. 
In April some Greek parliamentarians attended a reception 
hosted by the PKK's political wing, the ERNK. At the reception 
a self-proclaimed PKK representative announced plans to open an 
office in Athens under the PKK's rubric. Greek officials 
interceded to prevent the opening.
    In November, 109 Greek parliamentarians-mostly from the 
governing PASOK party-signed a letter reiterating a standing 
invitation to PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan to visit Greece. The 
Greek Government distanced itself from the invitation, saying 
Ocalan was not welcome. In November, Ocalan arrived in Rome at 
the beginning of what became an odyssey to gain asylum in 
Europe. (After his capture in Nairobi in February 1999, it 
became known that Ocalan had transited Greece at least twice 
during his travels with the knowledge and assistance of highly 
placed Greek officials. At one point, Ocalan remained in Greece 
for several days. Senior Greek officials took responsibility 
for providing Ocalan with haven in the Greek Embassy residence 
in Kenya in February 1999.)

                                 italy

    On 12 November, PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan arrived 
unexpectedly in Rome and requested political asylum. He 
initially was detained there on an international warrant issued 
by Germany. Italy declined to act on a Turkish extradition 
request, citing Turkey's long-unused capital punishment 
statute, which prohibits extradition to countries with capital 
punishment. Italy also declined to exercise its option under 
international law to prosecute Ocalan. After Bonn withdrew the 
warrant, the Italians told Ocalan he was free to leave. After 
trying unsuccessfully to find a country willing to take him, 
Italian officials said he no longer was welcome in Italy. 
Ocalan eventually left for Russia, with the apparent assistance 
of Italian officials, beginning an odyssey that culminated in 
his seizure in Kenya in February 1999.
    In October police arrested five Islamic terrorists in Turin 
for weapons violations and reported links to Usama Bin Ladin. 
The next month police arrested suspected GIA terrorist Rahid 
Fetter in Milan on charges of forgery, counterfeiting, and 
membership in a subversive organization. The Italians accused 
Fetter of providing shelter, funds, and false identification 
papers to GIA militants.

                                 latvia

    A series of bomb attacks in the Latvian capital, Riga, 
targeted Russian and Jewish interests in 1998. On 2 April a 
bomb exploded in the courtyard of the main Jewish synagogue in 
Riga's historic Old Town. The blast caused extensive damage to 
the main entrance and a swastika-adorned Latvian flag was found 
on the scene, according to press reporting. On 5 April a mine 
exploded in a park across the street from the Russian Embassy 
in Riga. The explosion did not damage the Embassy, but it 
shattered the windows of four Embassy vehicles. These 
incidents, which occurred late at night, caused no casualities. 
There were no claims of responsibility, but authorities suspect 
members of Eduard Limonov's Russian National Bolshevist Party, 
a Russian ultranational group. On 19 October, Israeli officials 
discovered a mail bomb during a routine check of packages 
mailed to the Israeli Embassy in Riga. Latvian authorities 
safely destroyed the device.

                                 spain

    The terrorist group Basque Fatherland and Liberty announced 
a unilateral and unconditional cease-fire on 16 September. At 
yearend the cease-fire was holding. ETA has not renounced 
terrorism and continued to engage in terrorist activity before 
the cease-fire. In 1998, the ETA killed six persons, compared 
with 13 in 1997. On 3 November, President Aznar called for 
direct talks with ETA to make the cease-fire permanent, but the 
two sides appear to have differing agendas for the talks. The 
government is offering some measures of relief for 530 ETA 
prisoners in Spanish jails and an estimated 1,000 exiles, while 
ETA wants to include political issues of sovereignty and self-
determination.
    The Spanish Government energetically and successfully has 
sought extradition of ETA fugitives from some countries, 
including France and several Latin American nations. A Spanish 
request for extradition from the United States of accused ETA 
terrorist Ramon Aldasoro was delayed in 1998, but on 4 February 
1999 the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in 
Atlanta paved the way for Aldasoro's extradition.
    In addition to ongoing police and law enforcement action to 
break up ETA commandos and arrest their members, the Spanish 
Government in 1998 undertook a series of measures designed to 
debilitate ETA's financial infrastructure. These measures 
included attempts to limit ETA's fundraising capabilities, shut 
down businesses with ETA involvement, and locate ETA's 
financial assets. In July the government shut down the pro-ETA 
newspaper Egin.
    The leftwing terrorist First of October Anti-Fascist 
Resistance Group (GRAPO) reemerged in 1998 after a three-year 
hiatus. The government discounts GRAPO's operational 
capability, but the organization claimed responsibility for a 
number of bombings and sent extortion letters to businessmen.

                                 turkey

    Turkey achieved some notable successes in its battle 
against terrorism in 1998, especially against the PKK, its 
foremost terrorist group. Turkey continued its vigorous 
campaign against the PKK in southeastern Turkey and northern 
Iraq. Turkey's large-scale military offensives appear to have 
affected greatly the PKK's ability to operate in Turkey. In 
March, Turkish military commandos captured Semdin Sakik, the 
PKK's second in command, in northern Iraq and bought him to 
Turkey. Turkish security forces launched a series of successful 
military campaigns in late spring and early fall that hampered 
PKK activity in southeast Turkey. In October, Turkey applied 
intense pressure on the Syrian Government to discourage Syrian 
support for the PKK. As a result, Syria forced PKK leader 
Ocalan to leave. Ocalan fled to Russia and then on to Italy 
where he requested political asylum. Italy subsequently refused 
to extradite Ocalan to Turkey and Ocalan left Italy. (Turkey 
scored a major coup against PKK terrorism in February 1999, 
when Turkish officials tracked down Ocalan in Nairobi, captured 
him, and brought him back to Turkey to stand trial.)
    During 1998 the PKK continued to conduct acts of violence 
against military and civilian targets. On 10 April, PKK 
terrorists on a motorcycle threw a bomb into a park near the 
Blue Mosque in Istanbul. The explosion injured two Indians, a 
New Zealander, and four Turkish citizens. The PKK also 
continued its campaign of kidnappings in southeast Turkey. In 
early June, PKK terrorists kidnapped a German tourist and a 
Turkish truckdriver at a roadblock in Karakose. The German 
tourist was found unharmed the next morning near the kidnapping 
site, but the truckdriver still is missing. Immediately after 
Ocalan's arrest in Italy, the PKK conducted three suicide 
bombings in southeastern Turkey, which killed three persons and 
injured dozens of Turkish citizens, despite Ocalan's public 
renunciation of terrorism.
    Several extreme leftist and other groups were active in 
Turkey in 1998. Leftist groups operating in Turkey include the 
Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front, Turkish Workers' 
and Peasants' Liberation Army, Turkish Peoples' Liberation 
Army, and the Turkish Peoples' Liberation Front. Fundamentalist 
Islamic organizations operating in Turkey include the so-called 
``Turkish Hizballah,'' the Islamic Movement Organization, and 
the Islamic Great Eastern Raiders Front. Effective Turkish 
security measures appear to have reduced the threat from these 
fringe groups over the years. For example, on 31 December, 
Turkish police arrested the head of the Islamic Great Eastern 
Raiders Front, Salih Mirzabeyoglou, in Istanbul.

                             united kingdom

    In April feuding Catholic and Protestant parties signed the 
landmark Good Friday Accord. This historic agreement outlined a 
comprehensive power-sharing arrangement between both 
communities in a multiparty administration of Northern Ireland. 
For the first time, the Irish Republican Army's political wing, 
Sinn Fein, was allowed to join the new administration, as long 
as its leaders remained committed to ``exclusively peaceful 
means.'' Both sides hotly debated the meaning of this and other 
provisions in the accord following the signing. The most 
contentious issue was whether the IRA would abandon its weapons 
and bombs. Notwithstanding the IRA's commitment to uphold its 
cease-fire, several splinter groups continued to engage in 
terrorist activity.
    As the debates wore on over the summer, Ireland suffered 
its worst single terrorist act. On 15 August terrorists from 
one of the splinter groups, the self-styled Real IRA, exploded 
a 500-pound car bomb outside a courthouse in downtown Omagh, 
killing 29 persons and injuring more than 330 others. This 
attack followed another terrorist bombing by the Real IRA in 
Banbridge on 1 August, which injured 35 persons and damaged 
approximately 200 homes.
    By November the accord appeared on the verge of collapse as 
neither side could come to agreement on key issues. Both sides 
worked vigorously to jump-start negotiations by Christmas so 
that the new government could take power by February 1999. Only 
one paramilitary group-one of Northern Ireland's most vicious, 
the Loyalist Volunteer Force-willingly has surrendered a cache 
of weapons. Both sides viewed the group's disarmament as a sign 
that a breakthrough in the stalled peace accord was possible. 
The IRA continued to resist what it labels a ``surrender'' of 
its arms, however, while in its view the conditions that caused 
the conflict remain unresolved.
    The United Kingdom continued to cooperate closely with the 
United States on counterterrorism issues in 1998. In September, 
British authorities arrested Khalid al-Fawwaz, a Saudi 
national, who is wanted by the United States for conspiring to 
murder US citizens between January 1993 and September 1998. Al-
Fawwaz remains in British custody pending his extradition to 
the United States.

                         Latin America Overview

    Colombia's principal insurgent groups, the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation 
Army (ELN), stepped up attacks against security forces and 
civilians in 1998, despite a budding peace process with the 
Colombian Government. They continued to conduct kidnapping, 
bombing, and extortion campaigns against civilians and 
commercial interests.
    Bogota pursued peace negotiations while guerrillas launched 
a concerted offensive against police and military bases 
throughout the country. By yearend, the government had 
completed the demilitarization of five municipalities as an 
incentive for talks, which began in January 1999.
    In March, FARC commanders announced they would target US 
military personnel assisting Colombian security forces, but 
insurgent attacks--including intensified operations against 
police and military bases--did not harm US forces. Colombian 
terrorists continued to target private US interests, however. 
Guerrillas kidnapped US citizens in Colombia and northern 
Ecuador, and the FARC refused to account for the whereabouts of 
three missionaries it kidnapped in January 1993. Guerrillas 
also continued to bomb US commercial interests, such as oil 
pipelines and small businesses.
    Arrests in Peru contributed to the steady decline in 
Sendero Luminoso (SL) and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement 
(MRTA) terrorist capabilities. Peruvian officials arrested two 
of the four original members of SL's Central Emergency 
Committee, which comprises the SL's top leaders. The SL failed 
uncharacteristically to commemorate Peru's Independence Day in 
July with even a low-level attack or to disrupt municipal 
elections in October. The MRTA did not launch a terrorist 
attack in 1998, continuing a trend of relative inactivity since 
the hostage crisis at the Japanese Ambassador's residence in 
Lima ended in April 1997.
    Switzerland denied Chile's request for the extradition of a 
terrorist from the dissident wing of the Manuel Rodriguez 
Patriotic Front, who escaped from a maximum security prison in 
Santiago in December 1996.
    In the triborder area, Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay 
consolidated efforts to stem the illicit activities of 
individuals linked to Islamic terrorist groups. The three 
countries consulted closely on enforcement efforts and actively 
promoted regional counterterrorist cooperation.
    The Government of Argentina hosted an Organization of 
American States conference on terrorism and gained the 
participants' commitment to form a regional commission on 
counterterrorist initiatives.

                               argentina

    Investigations continued into the two devastating bombings 
against Jewish and Israeli targets in Buenos Aires: the attack 
in March 1992 against the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, in 
which 29 persons died, and the bombing in July 1994 of the 
Argentine Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) building that 
killed 86 persons and injured hundreds more. Islamic Jihad, 
Hizballah's terrorist arm, claimed responsibility for the 
attack in 1992. No clear claim for the AMIA bombing has been 
made, although the two attacks had many similarities. At 
yearend, Argentine authorities questioned two possible key 
informants in the attacks.
    The Iranian Government expelled the Argentine commercial 
attache from Tehran in early 1998 in response to growing 
criticism in Argentina about a possible official Iranian role 
in the attacks. The Argentine Government responded by asking 
Tehran to reduce the number of diplomats in its mission in 
Buenos Aires to one, the number of official Argentines left in 
Iran. The judge responsible for the AMIA investigation 
interviewed Iranian defectors in Western Europe and the United 
States who claimed to have knowledge about the bombing. He also 
charged an Argentine citizen with providing the stolen vehicle 
used in the bombing. Several former Buenos Aires provincial 
police officials remain in custody for their role in supplying 
the vehicle.
    In August, Argentine authorities arrested two SL members 
living in Argentina. At yearend, they were awaiting extradition 
to Peru.
    Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay cooperated actively in the 
triborder region against terrorism and continued their work to 
counter criminal activities of individuals linked to Islamic 
terrorist groups. In March the three countries signed a plan to 
improve security in the triborder area and created a commission 
to oversee implementation of the plan.
    In late November, Argentina hosted the second Inter-
American Specialized Conference on Terrorism in Mar del Plata. 
Conference participants agreed to recommend that the 
Organization of American States' General Assembly form an 
Inter-American Committee on Terrorism to coordinate regional 
cooperation against terrorism.

                                 chile

    The Swiss Government denied Chile's extradition request for 
Patricio Ortiz Montenegro, a member of the Manuel Rodriguez 
Patriotic Front dissident wing who escaped from prison in 
Santiago on 30 December 1996, because it was concerned that 
Chile would not safeguard Ortiz's physical and psychological 
well-being. Chilean authorities continued to pursue the 
whereabouts of the three other terrorists who escaped with 
Ortiz.

                                colombia

    The incipient peace process in Colombia did not inhibit the 
guerrillas' use of terrorist tactics. The FARC and ELN 
continued to fund their insurgencies by protecting narcotics 
traffickers, conducting kidnap-for-ransom operations, and 
extorting money from oil and mining companies operating in the 
Colombian countryside.
    Colombian insurgents began an offensive against security 
forces in the summer and retained their military momentum at 
yearend. The Colombian Government demilitarized five 
municipalities to meet FARC conditions for peace negotiations, 
and in mid-December the FARC leader agreed to meet Colombia's 
President on 7 January 1999 to set the agenda for talks.
    FARC commanders announced in March that they would target 
US military personnel assisting Colombian security forces. The 
guerrillas did not act on these threats, and their heightened 
attacks against Colombian police and military bases did not 
target or incidentally kill or injure US forces.
    Colombian terrorists continued to target private US 
interests, kidnapping seven US citizens in 1998. The FARC 
abducted four US birdwatchers in March at a FARC roadblock; one 
escaped and the terrorists released the three others in April. 
Also in March, the FARC kidnapped one retired US oil worker and 
released him in September. ELN terrorists in September released 
one US citizen held since February 1997. The ELN kidnapped two 
other US citizens in northern Ecuador in October; one hostage 
escaped, and the kidnappers released the other in late 
November. The FARC has not accounted for the whereabouts of 
three missionaries it kidnapped in January 1993.
    Terrorists also continued to bomb US commercial interests, 
such as oil pipelines and small businesses, raising costs to US 
companies operating in Colombia. There were 77 pipeline 
bombings during the year. In October the ELN bombed Colombia's 
central oil pipeline--used by US companies--causing a massive 
explosion that killed 71 persons, including 28 children. An ELN 
commander subsequently announced that, despite the 
unanticipated death toll, the guerrillas would continue to 
target the nation's oil infrastructure to prevent the foreign 
``looting'' of Colombia's wealth.

                                 panama

    Alleged terrorist Pedro Miguel Gonzalez won the Democratic 
Revolutionary Party (PRD) candidacy for a seat in the National 
Assembly. Gonzalez, whose father heads the ruling PRD, was 
acquitted of the murder in 1992 of US serviceman Zak Hernandez 
in a Panamanian trial characterized by irregularities and 
political manipulation. The US case against Gonzalez and one 
other suspect remains open, and the US Embassy in Panama 
continues to raise the issue with senior Panamanian 
authorities.
    Panamanian authorities made no arrests in connection with 
the bombing in 1994 of a commuter airline that killed 21 
persons, including three US citizens. US law enforcement 
agencies continued to investigate the case actively but still 
had not determined whether the bombing was politically 
motivated or tied to drug traffickers.

                                  peru

    Peruvian law enforcement and judicial authorities continued 
to arrest and prosecute members of the SL and MRTA terrorist 
groups. In 1998 they arrested Pedro Quinteros Ayylon and Jenny 
Maria Rodriguez Neyra, two of the four original members of SL's 
25-person Central Emergency Committee who still were at large. 
The Peruvian Government also captured Andres Remigio Huarnan 
Ore, leader of the MRTA military detachment in the Chanchanmayo 
Valley, and most of that unit's members.
    Peru extradited Peruvian citizen Cecilia Nunez Chipana, a 
Sendero Luminoso militant, from Venezuela. The Peruvian 
Government also requested the extradition from Argentina of 
Peruvian nationals Julio Cesar Mera Collazo and Maria del 
Rosano Silva, two SL members accused of murder. At yearend the 
extradition request was pending in Buenos Aires.
    Both groups failed to launch a significant terrorist 
operation in Lima in 1998 and generally limited their 
activities to low-level attacks and propaganda campaigns in 
rural areas. The SL continued to attack police stations and 
other government targets in the Peruvian countryside and in 
August conducted a particularly brutal attack in Sapasoa, 
killing the mayor and three of his supporters at a rally. The 
SL did not commemorate Peru's Independence Day or disrupt 
municipal elections in October with its characteristic 
terrorist violence. The MRTA had not engaged in major terrorist 
activities since the end of the hostage crisis at the Japanese 
Ambassador's residence in Lima in April 1997.

                          Middle East Overview

    Middle Eastern terrorist groups and their state sponsors 
continued to plan, train for, and conduct terrorist acts in 
1998, although their actions cumulatively were less lethal than 
in 1997. The lower level of fatalities resulted from more 
effective counterterrorist measures by various governments and 
from the absence in 1998 of the kinds of major incidents that 
had killed dozens the previous year, such as the attack on 
Luxor temple in Egypt and a series of HAMAS suicide bombings in 
public places in Israel. The most dramatic terrorist acts 
attributed to Middle Eastern terrorists in 1998 actually 
occurred in Africa, where Usama Bin Ladin's multinational al-
Qaida network bombed the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es 
Salaam.
    In Egypt, government security forces scored some successes 
in reducing violence by Islamist opponents, particularly the 
al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya, which had conducted the lethal attack 
on tourists at Luxor in 1997. Judicial proceedings brought 
convictions against many terrorists. Deaths from terrorism-
related incidents in 1998 fell to 47, fewer than one-third the 
number in 1997. Nonetheless, there was troubling evidence of a 
growing collaboration in other countries between Egyptian 
extremists--from both the Gama' and the Egyptian al-Jihad--and 
Usama Bin Ladin.
    The Algerian Government also made progress in combating 
domestic terrorism in 1998, undertaking aggressive 
counterinsurgency operations again the Armed Islamic Group 
(GIA) that slowed the GIA's campaign of indiscriminate violence 
against civilians. As the GIA's bloody tactics drew increasing 
criticism both inside and outside Algeria, other militants 
joined the unilateral cease-fire that the Islamic Salvation 
Army had declared in late 1997.
    Palestinian groups opposed to the peace process mounted 
terrorist attacks in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. HAMAS 
conducted car bombings, shootings, and grenade attacks--
injuring dozens of civilians--while two terrorists belonging to 
the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) launched a suicide bombing at 
a Jerusalem market. Both Israel and the Palestinian Authority 
conducted raids and arrests that undercut the extremists' 
ability to inflict as many fatalities as in previous years.
    Security conditions in Lebanon improved in 1998, but the 
lack of complete government control in parts of Beirut, 
portions of the Bekaa Valley, and the so-called Israeli 
security zone in southern Lebanon enabled numerous terrorist 
groups to operate with relative impunity. Hizballah, HAMAS, the 
PIJ, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine--
General Command (PFLP-GC) used camps in Lebanon for training 
and operational planning. The conflict in southern Lebanon 
between Lebanese armed groups and Israel and its local allies 
continued unabated.
    In Yemen, foreign and indigenous extremists in 1998 
conducted several bombings and numerous kidnappings, including 
the abduction and subsequent release of more than 60 foreign 
nationals. A group calling itself the Islamic Army of Aden 
claimed responsibility for the seizure of 16 Western tourists. 
The terrorists killed four of the hostages when Yemeni 
Government security forces tried to free them.
    Iran, Syria, Libya, and Iraq all persisted in their direct 
and indirect state sponsorship of terrorism. In most cases, 
this support included providing assistance, training, or 
safehaven to terrorist groups opposed to the Middle East peace 
process. In some cases, particularly Iran and Iraq, it also 
included targeting dissidents and opponents of these 
authoritarian regimes for assassination or harassment.

                                algeria

    The Government of Algeria in 1998 made progress in 
combating domestic terrorism, which has claimed approximately 
75,000 lives since Islamic extremists began their violent 
campaign to overthrow the government in 1992. The government 
intensified its counterinsurgency operations against the Armed 
Islamic Group, and several militant groups in 1998 joined the 
unilateral cease-fire declared by the Islamic Salvation Army 
(AIS)--the armed wing of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)--in 
October 1997. The GIA also suffered a number of setbacks to its 
networks in Europe. No foreign nationals were killed in acts of 
terrorism in Algeria during the year.
    The GIA continued to conduct terrorist operations in 
Algeria in 1998, targeting a broad spectrum of Algerian 
civilians. The worst incident of 1998 occurred on 11 January 
during the holy month of Ramadan, when GIA extremists massacred 
numerous civilians in Sidi Hamed. Official estimates put the 
death toll at more than 100 civilians; press accounts reported 
the death toll even higher. Other smaller civilian massacres 
and acts of violence also continued throughout the year.
    The seemingly indiscriminate and horrific violence against 
civilians--including women and children--was condemned widely 
in domestic and international circles and eroded Islamist 
support for the group abroad. The GIA's campaign of attacking 
civilians also exacerbated internal divisions: dissident GIA 
leader Hassan Hattab in May publicly criticized GIA faction 
leader Antar Zouabri for his attacks on civilians and in 
September formally separated from the GIA. Hattab created a new 
element, the Salafi Group for Call and Combat, aimed primarily 
at attacking security force elements. Despite the split from 
Zouabri, Hattab's faction continued to commit violence in 
Algeria throughout 1998. Hattab claimed responsibility for 
assassinating the popular Berber singer Matoub Lounes in June, 
an act that further alienated the Algerian public.

                                bahrain

    Minor security incidents continued to plague Bahrain in 
1998. Bahraini security forces in November arrested several 
Bahraini and Lebanese citizens, seizing weapons and explosives, 
in connection with a plot to attack public facilities and other 
installations in Bahrain. Bahraini Prime Minister Shaykh 
Khalifa claimed the operation was planned in Lebanon, where 
members of the group reportedly had received military training. 
Some of those arrested allegedly also confessed to conducting 
arson attacks.
    Bahrain continued in 1998 to seek the extradition of eight 
individuals--including five in the United Kingdom--who were 
convicted in absentia in November 1997 for orchestrating and 
funding from abroad a campaign aimed at disrupting Bahraini 
security.

                                 egypt

    The number of deaths in 1998 from terrorist-related 
incidents fell to 47, fewer than one-third of the tally for 
1997 and the lowest since 1992. Egyptian security forces 
increased security and counterterrorist operations against 
Egyptian extremists, particularly al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya, 
following its attack in November 1997 at Luxor that killed 58 
foreign tourists and four Egyptians. Trials of Egyptian 
extremists responsible for various terrorist acts were held 
throughout the year, resulting in several convictions. The 
improving security situation led tourism to increase in 1998. 
Egypt also hosted in October an Interpol conference that 
promoted international cooperation in the fight against 
terrorism. Egypt also worked closely with other Arab countries 
in counterterrorism efforts, pursuant to an agreement reached 
among Arab interior ministers earlier in the year.
    Despite the intensified security and counterterrorist 
actions following the Luxor incident, Egyptian extremists--
particularly al-Jihad--continued to levy threats against Egypt 
and the United States for the arrests and extradition in 1998 
of their cadre from Albania, Azerbaijan, South Africa, Italy, 
and the United Kingdom. Both al-Jihad and al-Gama'at al-
Islamiyya signed terrorist sponsor Usama Bin Ladin's fatwa in 
February that called for attacks against US civilians, although 
al-Gama'at publicly denied that it is a member of Bin Ladin's 
World Islamic Front for the Jihad Against the Jews and 
Crusaders. Al-Gama'at leaders imprisoned in Egypt followed the 
lead of imprisoned Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman, issuing a public 
statement in early November that called for the cessation of 
operations in Egypt and urged al-Gama'at to create a ``peaceful 
front.'' Gama'at leaders abroad endorsed the idea but 
emphasized they would continue to target US interests and 
support the jihad.

                 israel, the west bank, and gaza strip

    Violence and terrorism by Palestinian groups opposed to the 
peace process continued in 1998, albeit at a reduced level as 
compared with the previous two years. HAMAS alone launched more 
than a dozen attacks over the year. Among the more notable were 
grenade attacks in Hebron in September that injured 25 persons 
and in Beersheva in October that injured more than 50. A HAMAS 
car bomb in the Gaza Strip in late October killed one Israeli 
soldier and injured several schoolchildren. The PIJ attempted a 
car bombing in November in Jerusalem that killed only the two 
militants.
    Other serious attacks against Israel and its citizens also 
occurred, including the shooting deaths of two settlers on 
guard duty in early August and the assassination of a prominent 
rabbi in Hebron later that month. Small bomb explosions in Tel 
Aviv in August and in Jerusalem in September wounded a total of 
13 Israelis.
    For its part, Israel continued vigorous counterterrorist 
operations, including numerous arrests and seizures of weapons 
and explosives. In one of the most significant actions of the 
year, Israeli forces on 10 September raided a farmhouse near 
Hebron, killing two leading HAMAS terrorists, Adil and Imad 
Awadallah.
    The Palestinian Authority (PA), which is responsible for 
security in Gaza and most major West Bank cities, continued to 
act against Palestinian perpetrators of anti-Israeli violence. 
The PA's security apparatus preempted several attacks over the 
year, including a planned HAMAS double-suicide bombing staged 
from the Gaza Strip in late September. The PA launched several 
large-scale arrest campaigns targeting individuals with ties to 
terrorist organizations and detained several leading HAMAS and 
PIJ political figures. In one of the more significant 
operations of the year, the PA in late September uncovered a 
HAMAS bomb lab filled with hundreds of kilograms of explosives. 
At the same time, more PA effort is needed to enhance its 
bilateral cooperation with Israel and its unilateral fight 
against terrorism.
    In late October, the PA and Israel signed the Wye River 
Memorandum, which includes a number of provisions for increased 
security cooperation.

                                 jordan

    There were no major international terrorist attacks in 
Jordan in 1998, but several low-level incidents kept security 
forces focused on combating the terrorist threat. In February, 
amid rising tensions over Iraqi weapons inspections, the 
British Embassy in Amman was the target of a firebomb attack 
that caused no damage. Between mid-March and early May, the 
Reform and Defiance Movement--a small, mostly indigenous 
radical Islamic group--conducted a string of small bombings in 
Amman targeting Jordanian security forces, the Modern American 
School, and a major hotel. These attacks caused minor property 
damage.
    Amman continued to maintain tight security along its 
borders and to interdict and prosecute individuals caught 
smuggling weapons and explosives, primarily intended for 
Palestinian rejectionist groups in the West Bank. In September, 
Amman convicted two Jordanians of possession of illegal 
explosives with the intent to commit terrorist acts and 
sentenced them to 15 years in prison with hard labor. The two 
reportedly had planned to attack Israelis in Israel or the West 
Bank. In October the state prosecutor referred to the security 
court the case of six men accused of possessing and selling of 
explosives to support terrorist aims.
    Jordan permitted and monitored the limited presence of 
several Palestinian rejectionist groups, including HAMAS, the 
PIJ, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of the Palestine-General 
Command. The Jordanian Government allowed the HAMAS Political 
Bureau to maintain a small information office in Amman as well 
as personal offices for senior HAMAS members who live in 
Jordan, several of whom are Jordanian citizens. In 1998, Jordan 
did not permit known members of the group's military wing to 
reside or operate in country, however. In November, Jordan 
issued a public warning to HAMAS and other rejectionist groups 
that it would not tolerate acts that ``impede implementation'' 
of the Wye River Memorandum.
    Jordan continued to cooperate with other regional states 
concerning terrorist threats to the region and in April signed 
the multilateral Arab Anti-Terrorism Agreement. King Hussein 
publicly voiced support for the US-UK initiative in the Pan Am 
103 case.

                                lebanon

    Security conditions in Lebanon continued to improve in 
1998, but lack of complete government control in several areas 
of the country--including portions of the Bekaa Valley and 
Beirut's southern suburbs--and easy access to arms and 
explosives throughout much of the country contributed to an 
environment with the potential for acts of violence. The 
Lebanese Government did not exert full control over militia 
groups engaged in fighting in and near the so-called security 
zone occupied by Israel and its proxy militia, the Army of 
South Lebanon.
    In these areas, a variety of terrorist groups continued to 
operate with relative impunity, conducting terrorist training 
and other operational activities. These groups include 
Hizballah, HAMAS, the Abu Nidal organization (ANO), the PIJ and 
the PFLP-GC. Hizballah presents the most potent threat to US 
personnel and facilities in Lebanon by an organized group. 
Although Hizballah has not attacked US interests in Lebanon 
since 1991, its animosity toward the United States has not 
abated, and the group continued to monitor the US Embassy and 
its personnel in Beirut. Hizballah leaders routinely denounced 
US policies in the region and sharply condemned the Wye River 
Memorandum between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
    One anti-US attack occurred in Lebanon in 1998. On 21 June 
four rocket-propelled grenades were fired at the US Embassy in 
Beirut from some 700 meters away, falling only a short distance 
from their launch site and causing no damage. The grenades were 
launched from a crudely manufactured firing device, suggesting 
that the attack was not conducted by an organized group. 
Lebanese authorities responded swiftly to the incident, but as 
of 31 December investigators had not determined who had 
conducted the attack and there were no claims of 
responsibility. The reason for the attack is unclear, but its 
occurrence two days after Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri had 
visited Washington suggested it was intended as a sign of 
displeasure with US-Lebanese relations or was an attempt to 
embarrass Hariri.
    Lebanese citizens also were the targets of random bombings 
in 1998. Car bombs targeted Amal and PIJ leaders in south 
Lebanon in October, a resident of Sidon in July, and a Sunni 
mayoral candidate in west Beirut in May. Although no one was 
killed, these incidents illustrate the potential danger from 
random political violence in Lebanon.
    The Lebanese Government continued to support publicly 
international counterterrorist initiatives, and its judiciary 
system made limited progress in prosecuting terrorist court 
cases. In early June the Lebanese Supreme Court rejected a 
defense appeal for a retrial of five Japanese Red Army members 
and endorsed the three-year prison sentence handed down last 
year.

                              saudi arabia

    There were several reported threats against US interests in 
Saudi Arabia in 1998 but no terrorist incidents. The US Embassy 
in Riyadh and Consulates in Jiddah and Dhahran closed for a few 
days in early October after receiving information that a 
terrorist attack was being planned against the Embassy.
    Terrorist Usama Bin Ladin, whose Saudi citizenship was 
revoked in 1994, continued publicly to threaten US interests in 
Saudi Arabia in 1998. In a press conference in Afghanistan in 
May, Bin Ladin declared a holy war against US forces in the 
Arabian Peninsula, many of whom are stationed in Saudi Arabia. 
The declaration followed a communique in February in which Bin 
Ladin and other terrorists called for attacks on US and allied 
civilians and military interests worldwide.
    The investigation into the bombing in June 1996 of the 
Khubar Towers housing facility near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, 
continued in 1998, but it has not been resolved. In that 
incident, a large truck bomb killed 19 US citizens and wounded 
more than 500 others. The Saudi Government has requested that 
the United States extradite Hani al-Sayegh--a Saudi national 
arrested by the Canadians and deported to the United States in 
1997--so they may question him about his alleged role in the 
bombing. At the end of 1998 a decision on al-Sayegh's 
extradition case was pending with the US Immigration and 
Naturalization Service. In November, Saudi Interior Minister 
Prince Nayif stated publicly that Bin Ladin was not responsible 
for the Khubar Towers bombing or the bombing in November 1995 
of the Office of the Program Manager-Saudi Arabia National 
Guard (OPM/ SANG) facility in Riyadh, which killed seven 
persons. Nayif allowed that individuals motivated by Bin Ladin 
could have conducted the attacks, however.

                                tunisia

    There were no terrorist incidents reported in Tunisia in 
1998. The Government of Tunisia remains publicly committed to 
countering terrorist threats, particularly from Islamic 
extremists. The government continued publicly to express its 
opposition to international terrorism, strongly condemning the 
terrorist attacks in August against the US Embassies in Nairobi 
and Dar es Salaam. Tunis also remains concerned about Algeria's 
violence spilling over into Tunisia and employs strict domestic 
security controls to counter this threat.
    Tunisia continued to participate in regional counter-
terrorism efforts. In January the government hosted a meeting 
of Arab League interior ministers at which an agreement was 
reached to enhance inter-Arab counterterrorism cooperation. 
Tunisia agreed to extradite convicted terrorists, improve 
information exchanges, and strengthen control on the 
infiltration and travel of suspected terrorists in Arab 
countries.
    The government continued to prosecute individuals for 
membership in the outlawed An-Nahda movement, which it 
considers a terrorist organization, although there were no 
reports of terrorist attacks by the group in 1998. On 2 June a 
Tunisian court found two Tunisian nationals guilty of 
assassinating Belgian Vice Premier Andre Cools in Liege in 1991 
and sentenced them to 20-year prison terms.

                                 yemen

    A series of bombings in 1998 in Sanaa and southern Yemen 
caused numerous casualties and some property damage. A bombing 
in April at a mosque near Sanaa killed two persons and injured 
27 others, including two US citizens. In response to the 
bombings, Yemeni authorities in August announced the arrest of 
several Yemeni oppositionists, alleging they were working for 
``foreign parties.'' Interior Minister Arab also blamed 
``foreign groups'' for a bombing in September at a market in 
Aden that caused two deaths and 27 injuries. In August the 
United States warned US citizens in Yemen of a threat to US 
interests there, days after terrorists bombed the US Embassies 
in Kenya and Tanzania. Three persons were killed and several 
were injured in November when a car bomb exploded near the 
German Embassy in Sanaa.
    Yemeni tribesmen kidnapped and released more than 60 
foreign nationals in l998, more than three times the number 
abducted in 1997. The Islamic Army of Aden--a little known 
Islamic group that has issued anti-US threats--claimed 
responsibility for the kidnapping in late December of 16 
Western tourists, including two US citizens. Four of the 
tourists died, and two others--including one US citizen--were 
wounded during a Yemeni Government rescue attempt that 
liberated the remaining hostages. Following the incident, the 
group issued a statement calling for the lifting of sanctions 
against Iraq. In addition, gunmen in December shot and wounded 
a US citizen working on a Dutch agricultural development 
project while they were attempting to hijack his car. The 
Yemeni Government issued a decree in August implementing severe 
punishment--including execution--for kidnappers and stepped up 
enforcement of the law on unlicensed weapons in major cities.
    Continuing efforts begun in 1997, the Yemeni Government 
took further steps to rein in foreign extremists. Sanaa 
increased its security cooperation with other Arab countries 
and reportedly forced several foreign extremists to leave 
Yemen. The government also instituted the requirement that 
Algerian, British, Egyptian, Libyan, Sudanese, and Tunisian 
nationals seeking entry into Yemen travel directly from their 
home counties. Nevertheless, the government's inability to 
control many remote areas continued to make the country a 
safehaven for terrorist groups.

                 Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism

    Terrorist attacks sponsored by states have declined in 
recent years but remain a serious threat. With state 
sponsorship a terrorist group often receives safehaven, money, 
weapons, training, logistic support, or use of diplomatic 
facilities. Some of the most violent terrorist attacks on 
record would not have been possible without such sponsorship.

                            usama bin ladin

    The bombings of the US Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar 
es Salaam, Tanzania on 7 August 1998 underscored the global 
reach of Usama Bin Ladin--a long-time sponsor and financier of 
Sunni Islamic extremist causes--and his network. A series of 
public threats to drive the United States and its allies out of 
Muslim countries foreshadowed the attacks. The foremost threat 
was presented as a Muslim religious decree and published on 23 
February 1998 by Bin Ladin and allied groups under the name 
``World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and 
Crusaders.'' The statement asserted that it was a religious 
duty for all Muslims to wage war on US citizens, military and 
civilian, anywhere in the world.
    The 17th son of Saudi construction magnate Muhammad Bin 
Ladin, Usama joined the Afghan resistance almost immediately 
after the Soviet invasion in December 1979. He played a 
significant role in financing, recruiting, transporting, and 
training Arab nationals who volunteered to fight in 
Afghanistan. During the war, Bin Ladin founded al-Qaida--the 
``Base"--to serve as an operational hub for like-minded Sunni 
Islamic extremists. In 1994 the Saudi Government revoked his 
citizenship and his family officially disowned him. He moved to 
Sudan in 1991 but international pressure on Khartoum forced him 
to move to Afghanistan in 1996.
    Bin Ladin leads a broad-based, versatile organization. 
Suspects named in the wake of the Embassy bombings--four 
Egyptians, one Comoran, one Jordanian, three Saudis, one US 
citizen, one or possibly two Kenyan citizens, and one 
Tanzanian--reflect the range of al-Qaida operatives. The 
diverse groups under his umbrella afford Bin Ladin resources 
beyond those of the people directly loyal to him. With his own 
inherited wealth, business interests, contributions from 
sympathizers in various countries, and support from close 
allies like the Egyptian and South Asian groups that signed his 
so-called fatwa, he funds, trains, and offers logistic help to 
extremists not directly affiliated with his organization.
    Bin Ladin seeks to aid those who support his primary goal--
driving US forces from the Arabian Peninsula, removing the 
Saudi ruling family from power, and ``liberating Palestine"--or 
his secondary goals of removing Western military forces and 
overthrowing what he calls corrupt, Western-oriented 
governments in predominantly Muslim countries. To these ends, 
his organization has sent trainers throughout Afghanistan as 
well as to Tajikistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chechnya, 
Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen, and has trained fighters from 
numerous other countries, including the Philippines, Egypt, 
Libya, Pakistan, and Eritrea.
    Using the ties al-Qaida has developed, Bin Ladin believes 
he can call upon individuals and groups virtually worldwide to 
conduct terrorist attacks. His Egyptian and South Asian allies, 
for example, publicly threatened US interests in the latter 
half of 1998. Bin Ladin's own public remarks underscore his 
expanding interests, including a desire to obtain a capability 
to deploy weapons of mass destruction.
    On 4 November indictments were returned in the US District 
Court for the Southern District of New York in connection with 
the two US Embassy bombings in Africa. Charged in the 
indictment were: Usama Bin Ladin, his military commander 
Muhammad Atef, and Wadih El Hage, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, 
Mohammed Sadeek Odeh, and Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-Owhali, all 
members of al-Qaida. Two of these suspects, Odeh and al-Owhali, 
were turned over to US authorities in Kenya and brought to the 
United States to stand trial. Another suspect, Mamdouh Mahmud 
Salim, was arrested in Germany and extradited to the United 
States in December. On 16 December five others were indicted 
for their role in the Dar es Salaam Embassy bombing: Mustafa 
Mohammed Fadhil, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, Ahmed Khalfan 
Ghailani, Fahid Mohommed Ally Msalam, and Sheikh Ahmed Salim 
Swedan.
    Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria are 
the seven governments that the US Secretary of State has 
designated as state sponsors of international terrorism. US 
policy is to pressure these states to cease their support by 
applying a broad range of sanctions, both unilateral and 
multilateral. International cooperation is essential in making 
these sanctions work, and more needs to be done in this area.
    Cuba has reduced significantly its support to leftist 
revolutionaries in Latin America and elsewhere, but it 
maintains close ties to other state sponsors of terrorism and 
leftist insurgent groups and continues to provide safehaven to 
a number of international terrorists.
    Iran continues to plan and conduct terrorist attacks, 
including the assassination of dissidents abroad. It supports a 
variety of groups that use terrorism to pursue their goals--
including several that oppose the Middle East peace process--by 
providing varying degrees of money, training, safehaven, and 
weapons.
    Iraq provides safehaven to terrorist and rejectionist 
groups and continues its efforts to rebuild its intelligence 
network, which it used previously to support international 
terrorism. The leader of the Abu Nidal organization may have 
relocated to Baghdad in late 1998.
    Libya continues to harbor two Libyan intelligence 
operatives charged in the United States and Scotland for the 
bombing in 1988 of Pan Am Flight 103. Libya's action defies UN 
Security Council resolutions requiring Tripoli to surrender 
them for trial and ignores a US-UK offer to prosecute them 
before a Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands. Libya also 
harbors six suspects in the bombing of UTA flight 772 in 1989, 
although French authorities agreed to try the six in absentia. 
Several Middle Eastern terrorist groups continue to receive 
support from Libya, including the PIJ and the PFLP-GC. There is 
no evidence of Libyan involvement in recent acts of 
international terrorism, however.
    Although North Korea has not been linked definitively to 
any act of international terrorism since 1987, it continues to 
provide safehaven to terrorists who hijacked a Japanese 
airliner to North Korea in 1970.
    Sudan provides safehaven to some of the world's most 
violent terrorist groups, including Usama Bin Ladin's al-Qaida, 
Lebanese Hizballah, the PIJ, the ANO, and HAMAS. The Sudanese 
Government also refuses to comply with UN Security Council 
demands that it hand over for trial three fugitives linked to 
the assassination attempt in 1995 against Egyptian President 
Mubarak in Ethiopia.
    There is no evidence of direct Syrian involvement in acts 
of international terrorism since 1986, but Syria continues to 
provide sanctuary and support for a number of terrorist groups 
that seek to disrupt the Middle East peace process.

                                  cuba

    Cuba no longer actively supports armed struggle in Latin 
America or elsewhere. Previously, the Castro regime provided 
significant levels of funding, military training, arms, and 
guidance to various revolutionary groups across the globe. 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Havana has been 
forced to reduce dramatically its support to leftist 
revolutionaries.
    Cuba, nonetheless, continues to maintain close ties to 
other state sponsors of terrorism and leftist insurgent groups 
in Latin America. For instance, Colombia's two main terrorist 
groups, the FARC and the ELN, maintain representatives in Cuba. 
Moreover, Havana continues to provide safehaven to a number of 
international terrorists and US terrorist fugitives.

                                  iran

    Iran in 1998 continued to be involved in the planning and 
execution of terrorist acts. Tehran apparently conducted fewer 
antidissident assassinations abroad in 1998 than in 1997. 
Tehran continued, however, to support a variety of groups that 
use terrorism to pursue their goals. Despite Iranian public 
statements condemning certain terrorist acts or expressing 
sympathy for Kenyan and Tanzanian victims of the August 1998 
bombings of the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, 
Iranian support for terrorism remains in place.
    Tehran is reported to have conducted several assassinations 
outside Iran during 1998. In June the ``League of the Followers 
of the Sunna'' accused Iranian intelligence agents of murdering 
an Iranian Sunni cleric, Shaikh Nureddin Ghuraybi, in 
Tajikistan. In September the leaders of Sipah-e-Sahaba 
Pakistan, a virulently anti-Shia sectarian group, accused Iran 
of responsibility for the murders of two of the organization's 
leaders, Allama Shoaib Nadeem and Maulana Habibur Rehman 
Siddiqui. In late November the National Council of Resistance 
claimed that the Iranian regime had kidnapped and killed Reza 
Pirzadi in Pakistan. Pirzadi was described as a warrant officer 
who had been released from prison in Iran in 1996.
    Members of Iran's Ministry of Security and Intelligence 
(MOIS) may have conducted five mysterious murders of leading 
writers and political activists in Iran. Late in the year, 
Tehran announced the discovery of an operational cell within 
the MOIS that it alleged operated without the knowledge of 
senior government officials. Tehran reportedly arrested the 
cell's members.
    The Iranian Government stated publicly that it would take 
no action to enforce the fatwa on Salman Rushdie, a British 
citizen, which has been in effect since 1989. The Iranian 
Government's assurance led the UK Government to upgrade its 
diplomatic relations with Iran. Tehran stated, however, that 
revoking the fatwa is impossible since its author is deceased. 
Moreover, the Iranian Government has not required the Fifteen 
Khordad Foundation to withdraw its reward for executing the 
fatwa on Rushdie, and in November the Foundation increased its 
offer to $2.8 million.
    Iran continued to provide support to a variety of terrorist 
groups, including the Lebanese Hizballah, HAMAS, and the 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which oppose the Middle East peace 
process through violence. Iran supports these groups with 
varying amounts of training, money, and/or weapons.
    In March, a US district court ruled that Iran should pay 
$247 million to the family of Alisa Flatow, a US citizen killed 
in a PIJ bomb attack in Gaza in April 1995. The court ruled 
that Iran was responsible for her death because it provided 
funding to the PIJ, which claimed responsibility for the act. 
Palestinian sources said Iran supported the PIJ's claimed 
attack in Jerusalem in early November 1998, in which two 
suicide bombers injured some 21 persons.
    Iran still provides safehaven to elements of the PKK, a 
Turkish separatist group that has conducted numerous terrorist 
attacks in Turkey and on Turkish targets in Europe.
    Iran also provides support to North African groups. In an 
interview in April 1998, former Iranian president Bani Sadr 
accused Tehran of training Algerian fighters, among others.
    Tehran accurately claims it also is a victim of terrorism. 
In 1998 several high-ranking members of the Iranian Government 
were attacked and at least two were killed in attacks claimed 
by the terrorist group Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK). The MEK claimed 
responsibility for the killing on 23 August of Asadollah 
Lajevardi, the former director of Tehran's Evin Prison. It also 
claimed responsibility for the deaths in June of several 
persons, including Haj Hassan Salehi, allegedly a torturer at 
the prison, during a bombing attack on the Revolutionary 
Prosecutor's Office in Tehran.
    Mohsen Rafiqdust, head of the Foundation for the Oppressed 
and Disabled, escaped an attack on his life on 13 September. He 
said counterrevolutionary elements had embarked on efforts to 
make the country insecure.
    At least nine Iranian diplomatic and associated personnel 
died when unknown persons invaded the Iranian Consulate in 
Mazar-e Sharif, Afghanistan, in early August during the Taliban 
takeover of that city. The Taliban denied responsibility for 
the deaths.

                                  iraq

    In 1998, Baghdad continued efforts to rebuild its 
intelligence network, which it previously had used to support 
international terrorism. Press reports indicated that Iraqi 
intelligence agents may have been planning an attack against 
Radio Free Europe in Prague in October 1998. Other press 
reports citing ``reliable diplomatic sources'' in Amman claimed 
that Iraq had sent abroad for terrorist purposes intelligence 
agents who pretended to be refugees and businessmen. Iraqi 
oppositionists have claimed publicly that the regime intends to 
silence them and have accused Baghdad of planning to 
assassinate Iraqi exiles. There are various claims that the 
Iraqi intelligence service was responsible for the killings of 
some nine persons in Amman, but we cannot corroborate the 
charges.
    In January 1998 an Iraqi diplomat was fired on in Amman, 
Jordan. Jordanian authorities arrested five persons who 
subsequently confessed responsibility. In a separate incident, 
eight persons--including an Iraqi diplomat--were murdered in 
the home of an Iraqi businessman. Jordanian authorities in 
April arrested several persons for this crime.
    In southern Iraq, Ayatollah Morteza Borujerdi--a senior 
Shia cleric--was killed on 22 April. Oppositionists claimed the 
Iraqi Government assassinated Borujerdi because he refused to 
cease leading prayers. A second high-ranking Shia cleric, 
Ayatollah Ali Gharavi, was killed on 18 June. The oppositionist 
Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq accused 
Baghdad of responsibility. Both men were respected Shia clerics 
of Iranian origin and their murders remain unsolved.
    Iraq continues to provide safehaven to a variety of 
Palestinian rejectionist groups, including the Abu Nidal 
organization, the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), and the former 
head of the now-defunct 15 May Organization, Abu Ibrahim, who 
masterminded several bombings of US aircraft. In December press 
reports indicated that Abu Nidal had relocated to Iraq and may 
be receiving medical treatment. Abu Nidal's move to Baghdad--if 
true--would increase the prospect that Saddam may call on the 
ANO to conduct anti-US attacks. Iraq also provides bases, 
weapons, and protection to the MEK, a terrorist group that 
opposes the current Iranian regime.

                                 libya

    Despite a joint US-UK offer to prosecute the two Libyans 
charged with the bombing in 1988 of Pan Am Flight 103 before a 
Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands, Libya remained 
unwilling to meet the demands of UN Security Council 
resolutions 731, 748, 883, and 1192. These measures call upon 
Libyan leader Qadhafi to cease all support to terrorism, turn 
over the two indicted Pan Am 103 suspects for trial, and 
cooperate in the investigation. (On 5 April 1999, Libya turned 
over the two suspects, `Abd al Basit al-Megrahi and Lamin 
Kalifah Fhima, for prosecution in the Netherlands under 
Scottish law.)
    French officials in January completed their investigation 
into the bombing in 1989 of UTA Flight 772. The French 
officials believe that the Libyan intelligence service was 
responsible and named Qadhafi's brother-in-law, Muhammad 
Sanusi, as the attack's mastermind. (Six Libyan suspects, all 
intelligence officers, were tried in absentia by a French court 
in March 1999. The suspects were convicted on 8 March 1999.)
    Libya remains the primary suspect in several other past 
terrorist operations, including the La Belle discotheque 
bombing in Berlin in 1986, which killed two US servicemen, one 
Turkish civilian, and wounded more than 200. The trial in 
Germany of five defendants in the case, who are accused of ``an 
act of assassination commissioned by the Libyan state,'' began 
in November 1997 and continued through 1998.
    Despite ongoing sanctions against Libya for its sponsorship 
of terrorism, Tripoli in 1998 continued to harass and 
intimidate expatriate dissidents. Moreover, Qadhafi continued 
publicly and privately to support Palestinian terrorist groups, 
including the PIJ and the PFLP-GC. Libya has not been 
implicated in any international terrorist act for several 
years, however.

                              north korea

    The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has not been 
linked solidly to the planning or execution of an international 
terrorist attack since 1987, when a KAL airliner was bombed in 
flight. North Korea continues to provide safehaven to members 
of the Japanese Communist League-Red Army Faction who 
participated in the hijacking of a Japanese Airlines flight to 
North Korea in 1970. In March, P'yongyang allowed members of 
the Japanese Diet to visit some of the hijackers.

                                 sudan

    Sudan continued to serve as a meeting place, safehaven, and 
training hub for a number of international terrorist groups, 
particularly Usama Bin Ladin's al-Qaida organization. The 
Sudanese Government also condoned many of Iran's objectionable 
activities, such as funding terrorist and radical Islamic 
groups operating and transiting Sudan.
    Sudan still has not complied fully with UN Security Council 
Resolutions 1044, 1054, and 1070, passed in 1996, despite the 
regime's efforts to distance itself publicly from terrorism. 
The UNSC demands that Sudan end all support to terrorists. It 
also requires Khartoum to hand over three Egyptian al-Gama'at 
fugitives linked to the assassination attempt in 1995 against 
Egyptian President Mubarak in Ethiopia. Sudanese officials 
continue to deny that they are harboring the three suspects and 
that they had a role in the attack.
    Khartoum continues to provide safehaven to members of 
several of the world's most violent terrorist groups, including 
Lebanese Hizballah, the PIJ, the ANO, and HAMAS. Khartoum also 
supports regional Islamic and non-Islamic opposition and 
insurgent groups in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, and Tunisia.
    Sudanese support to terrorists includes provision of 
paramilitary training, money, religious indoctrination, travel 
documents, safe passage, and refuge. Most of the organizations 
in Sudan maintain offices or other types of representation.
    In August the United States accused Sudan of involvement in 
chemical weapons development. On 20 August the United States 
conducted military strikes against the al-Shifa pharmaceutical 
plant in Khartoum, which was associated with Usama Bin Ladin's 
terrorist network and believed to be involved in the 
manufacture of chemical weapons, to prevent an anti-US attack. 
Sudan has denied that the plant was involved in chemical 
weapons production and vigorously has protested the US bombing.

                                 syria

    There is no evidence that Syrian officials have engaged 
directly in planning or executing international terrorist 
attacks since 1986. Syria, nonetheless, continues to provide 
safehaven and support to several terrorist groups, allowing 
some to maintain training camps or other facilities on Syrian 
territory. Ahmad Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine-General Command and the Palestine Islamic Jihad, for 
example, have their headquarters in Damascus. In addition, 
Syria grants a wide variety of terrorist groups--including 
HAMAS, the PFLP-GC, and the PIJ--basing privileges or refuge in 
areas of Lebanon's Bekaa Valley under Syrian control.
    In response to Turkish pressure, Damascus took several 
important steps against the Kurdistan Workers' Party in 
October. PKK leader Abdallah Ocalan departed Syria, and 
Damascus forced many PKK members to relocate to northern Iraq. 
It is unclear whether Damascus has made a long-term commitment 
to sever its ties to the PKK.
    Although Damascus claims to be committed to the Middle East 
peace process, it has not acted to stop anti-Israeli attacks by 
Hizballah and Palestinian rejectionist groups in southern 
Lebanon. Syria allowed--but did not participate in--a meeting 
of Palestinian rejectionist groups in Damascus in December to 
reaffirm their public opposition to the peace process. Syria 
also assists the resupply of rejectionist groups operating in 
Lebanon via Damascus. Nonetheless, the Syrian Government 
continues to restrain the international activities of some 
groups and to participate in a multinational monitoring group 
to prevent attacks against civilian targets in southern Lebanon 
and northern Israel.

       Appendix A: Chronology of Significant Terrorist Incidents

5 January

Yemen
Two Yemeni tribesmen kidnapped three South Korean citizens, 
including the wife and daughter of the First Secretary of the 
Korean Embassy, in Sanaa. The hostages were released on 9 
January.

8 January

Russia
Two Swedish missionaries were kidnapped in Makhackala. An 
anonymous telephone caller claiming to represent the Dagestani 
kidnappers stated the hostages had been moved to Chechnya. The 
hostages were released on 24 June 1998.

14 January

Israel
A boobytrapped videocassette exploded at the Israel-Lebanon 
border crossing near Metulla, injuring three Israelis and three 
Lebanese, including the man who carried it. The Amal claimed 
responsibility, stating that the intended target was a senior 
Israeli intelligence officer.

21 January

Yemen
Armed tribesmen abducted two engineers in two separate 
incidents. The tribesmen released the hostages, one German and 
one Chinese, the next day.

25 January

India
Heavily armed masked militants attacked four Hindu families in 
Wandhama, on the Pakistani side of the Kashmir Line of Control, 
killing at least 23 men, women, and children. A lone survivor 
described the militants as Urdu-speaking foreigners, who first 
took tea with the Hindu families before opening fire. The 
militants also set fire to a Hindu temple and some homes.

3 February

Chad
Five armed members of a Chadian opposition group kidnapped four 
French nationals in Manda National park in Moyen-Chari 
Prefecture, releasing them unharmed on 8 February. The Union of 
Democratic Forces (UFD) claimed responsibility.

Greece
Bombs detonated at two McDonald's restaurants in the Halandri 
and Vrilissia suburbs of Athens, causing extensive damage. 
Authorities suspect anarchists carried out the attacks in 
retaliation for the arrest of the alleged leader of the 
Fighting Guerrilla Formation (MAS).

9 February

Yemen
Yemeni tribesmen kidnapped a Dutch tourist in Sanaa. The 
kidnappers demanded the release of three members of their clan 
who had been arrested for stealing a United Nations vehicle. 
The hostage was released on 25 February.

19 February

Georgia
Armed supporters of late Georgian president Zviad Gamsakhurdia 
abducted four United Nations military observers from Sweden, 
Uruguay, and the Czech Republic. On 22 February one Uruguayan 
military observer was released. The remaining hostages were 
released after President Shevardnadze met with the Gamsakhurdia 
opposition on 25 February. Eight of the kidnappers were 
captured. (The leader, a key figure in the assault on 9 
February on President Shevardnaze's motorcade, remained at 
large until Georgian authorities tracked him to western Georgia 
and killed him in a shootout on 31 March.)

19 February

Yemen
Yemeni al-Hadda tribesmen kidnapped a Dutch agricultural expert 
in Dhamar. The kidnappers demanded development projects in 
their area and released the hostage the next day.

21 February

Pakistan
Unidentified gunmen killed two Iranian engineers near the 
Iranian Cultural Center in Karachi. The shooting may have been 
conducted to mark the anniversary of the attack on 20 February 
1997 on the Iranian Cultural Center in Multan.

25 February

Ethiopia
An armed group kidnapped an Austrian national as she traveled 
from Gode to Denan, according to press reports. The Ogaden 
National Liberation Front (ONLF) claimed responsibility. The 
ONLF released the hostage 23 March after announcing on a 
radiobroadcast its intent to release her.

14 March

Colombia
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas 
kidnapped two French businessmen in Meta Department, according 
to press accounts. The hostages are brothers who run a hotel in 
the department. One hostage was released shortly after the 
abduction with a huge ransom demand by the rebels for his 
brother's release.

21 March

Colombia
FARC rebels kidnapped a US citizen in Sabaneta. According to 
multiple media sources, the hostage was released to the 
International Red Cross on 6 September 1998.

22 March

Chad
Gunmen kidnapped six French and two Italian nationals in the 
Tibesti region. Chadian forces freed all but one hostage within 
hours. A group called the National Front for the Renewal of 
Chad (FNTR) claimed responsibility in a statement to the press, 
saying it would release the remaining hostage on the condition 
that French troops withdraw from Chad and that Western oil 
companies halt exploration and exploitation of all resources in 
Chad. On 27 March, Chadian security forces freed the last 
hostage.

23 March

Angola
Rebels from the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda 
Enclave-Cabinda Armed Forces (FLEC-FAC) abducted two Portuguese 
citizens in Cabinda. The victims are employed by Mota & 
Company, a Portuguese construction company. The FLEC-FAC 
demanded $500,000 in ransom, the intervention of Portuguese 
authorities, and negotiations for the withdrawal of Portugal 
from Angola. On 24 June the FLEC-FAC released the hostages. It 
is not known if a ransom was paid.

Colombia
FARC rebels killed three persons, wounded 14, and kidnapped at 
least 27 others at a roadblock near Bogota. Four US citizens 
and one Italian were among those kidnapped, as well as the 
acting president of the National Electoral Council (CNE) and 
his wife. On 25 March the rebels released the CNE president and 
his wife. The rebels released nine of the Colombian hostages 
two days later. On 2 April one of the US hostages escaped his 
captors. On 25 April the last two hostages were released.

25 March

Colombia
At the British Petroleum oil field in Cupiagua, a bomb blast 
injured one US citizen and two British workers. At least one 
bomb was placed near the oil workers' sleeping trailers and 
detonated around midnight. Police blame the attack on the 
National Liberation Army.

Early April

Morocco
An armed Islamic group killed 10 Moroccans near the border town 
of Oujda in early April, according to news reports.

4 April

Uganda
The US Embassy reported that bombs exploded at two restaurants 
in Kampala, killing five persons--including one Swedish and one 
Rwandan national--and wounding at least six others. The 
restaurants, the Nile Grill and the cafe at the Speke Hotel, 
are within walking distance of the US Embassy and the Sheraton 
Hotel. A Ugandan Government official reported to local press 
that the Allied Democratic Forces may be responsible.

10 April

Turkey
Two Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) members on a motorcycle 
threw a bomb into a park near the Blue Mosque in Istanbul, 
according to press reports. The explosion injured two Indian 
tourists, one New Zealander, four Turkish civilians, and two 
Turkish soldiers. On 12 April authorities arrested the two PKK 
members involved in the attack.

15 April

Somalia
Multiple media sources reported that militiamen abducted nine 
Red Cross and Red Crescent workers at an airstrip north of 
Mogadishu. The hostages included a US citizen, a German, a 
Belgian, a French, a Norwegian, two Swiss, and one Somali. The 
gunmen are members of a subclan loyal to Ali Mahdi Mohammed, 
who controls the northern section of the capital. On 24 April 
the hostages were released unharmed, and no ransom was paid.

17 April

Cambodia
Approximately 60 armed suspected Khmer Rouge militants attacked 
two fishing villages on the Tonle Sap lake in Kampong Chhnang 
Province, killing 21 persons and wounding at least nine others, 
according to press accounts. Twelve of the victims were 
Vietnamese nationals. The attack occurred in the early morning 
when the victims were asleep.

Yemen
Press reported that tribesmen kidnapped a British Council 
official, along with his wife and son, as they traveled from 
Aden to Sanaa. The kidnappers released the hostages on 3 May.

18 April

India
Muslim militants attacked Barankot village in Udhampur 
district, Kashmir, killing 29 persons, according to press 
reports. Lashkar-i-Taiba claimed responsibility for the 
massacre.

19 April

Venezuela
Unidentified Colombian guerrillas kidnapped a Venezuelan 
cattleman in Los Flores hacienda. On 23 April the Venezuelan 
Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention Services rescued the 
hostage.

22 April

Angola
Suspected secessionists from the Front for the Liberation of 
the Cabinda Enclave abducted a Portuguese citizen and nine 
Angolans in Cabinda, according to press reports. The victims 
are employed by Mota & Company, a Portuguese construction 
company. The Portuguese hostage was released unharmed on 24 
June.

Iraq
A gunman shot and killed an Iranian clergyman and injured his 
two companions in An Najaf, according to press reports. No one 
claimed responsibility for the attack.

23 April

Yemen
A police officer from the Al-Marakesha tribe kidnapped a 
Ukrainian citizen on his way to Sanaa and handed him over to 
the tribe, according to press reports. Tribesmen released the 
hostage the next day.

24 April

Yemen
A bomb exploded in the courtyard of the Al-Kheir mosque after 
midday prayers in Sanaa, according to US Embassy reporting. The 
explosion killed two persons and wounded 26 others, including 
two United States citizens, one Canadian, one Libyan, and 
several Somalis.

25 April

Colombia
FARC guerrillas kidnapped a Palestinian connected to the 
Palestine Liberation Organization in Bogota. The victim is a 
Colombian citizen who has resided in Colombia for the past 20 
years. On 17 July the FARC rebels released the hostage, 
reportedly at the request of the International Red Cross and of 
a special envoy of the Palestinian Authority.

Late April

Angola
Militants thought to be from the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA) abducted a Portuguese couple 
involved in trading, according to the press. An administrative 
source told the Angolan Press Agency that the abduction 
occurred after 150 armed men occupied the commune of Ebanga. 
UNITA does not have a history of kidnapping foreigners, and the 
motive is unclear.

1 May

India
A bomb exploded under a crowded bus in Shupiyan, injuring six 
persons, according to press reports. Muslim militants are 
suspected.

4 May

India
Near Manchar, east of Jammu, Kashmir, police reported that 
suspected Muslim militants killed four members of a village 
defense committee, four other villagers and one police officer.

5 May

India
Armed Islamic militants reportedly entered a home in Surankote, 
north of Jammu and killed four persons.

6 May

India
Suspected Muslim militants killed five Hindu family members 
during a funeral procession outside the town of Punch, Kashmir, 
according to US Embassy reports.

16 May

Colombia
Six unidentified heavily armed men kidnapped an Italian 
engineer near Medellin. The engineer, who was overseeing the 
construction of a tunnel, was taken from his car and forced to 
enter a taxi with the gunmen, according to police reports. 
Police said it was unclear whether the kidnappers were leftist 
guerrillas.

India
In Binola Chuora village, Kashmir, militants killed at least 
seven persons. According to press accounts, the victims were 
former militants who had become police informants or members of 
village defense groups opposed to the militants.

19 May

Angola
Armed assailants attacked a marked United Nations vehicle at 
Calandula, killing one Angolan interpreter working for the UN 
and wounding two other UN employees and one Angolan police 
officer. A UN spokesperson blamed UNITA.

22 May

Sudan
Guerrillas from the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) 
abducted a British contractor for the World Food Program (WFP) 
and held him for ransom in an SPLA-controlled area of southern 
Sudan, according to official sources. The victim is employed by 
Terra Firma and was on a survey mission for WFP when he was 
abducted. SPLA demanded $58,000 and 125 drums of diesel fuel. 
The contractor was released on 19 June.

23 May

India
A provincial legislator, his driver, a bodyguard, and three 
others were injured seriously when a bomb detonated on the 
outskirts of Srinagar, according to police reports. Their 
armored car was totally destroyed. Pakistani-supported Muslim 
militants are suspected.

26 May

Venezuela
Three armed FARC guerrillas kidnapped a Venezuelan engineer in 
La Victoria. On 18 June the rebels released the engineer and 
gave him money to travel home. The hostage told authorities 
that the FARC stated they intended to kidnap a businessman from 
that area but took him by mistake.

27 May

Colombia
In Santa Marta, 20 National Liberation Army (ELN) rebels bombed 
the offices of a subsidiary of the US-owned Dole company. The 
guerrillas overpowered the guards, gagged the employees, and 
destroyed files before detonating four bombs, partially 
destroying the headquarters. The rebels painted graffiti 
accusing the company owners of assisting paramilitary groups in 
the region. The rebels opened fire on the police as they 
escaped.

1 June

India
Local press reported that a bomb exploded at a busy market in 
the heart of Jammu, Kashmir, killing one child and injuring 19 
other persons. At least 10 shops were damaged. Indian officials 
suspect that Muslim militants are responsible.

India
A bomb exploded at an Army base in Jammu, Kashmir, killing two 
civilians and damaging the Army's intelligence wing. Indian 
officials suspect that Muslim militants are responsible.

3 June

Turkey
Armed PKK militants kidnapped a German tourist and a Turkish 
truck driver at a roadblock in Agri, according to press 
reports. The German tourist was found unharmed the next morning 
near the kidnapping site, but the truck driver still is 
missing.

7 June

Pakistan
Police reported that a bomb ripped through an 18-car passenger 
train en route from Karachi to Peshawar, killing 23 persons and 
wounding at least 32 others, and destroying one railcar. 
Pakistan blames India's Research and Analysis Wing for the 
bombing. Indian officials deny the accusation.

18 June

Iraq
Unidentified assailants shot and killed an Iranian Shiite 
cleric, two of his relatives, and his driver. The victims were 
driving back to An Najaf after a pilgrimage to a shrine in 
Karbala'.

Yemen
Tribesmen kidnapped nine Italian tourists and their Yemeni 
driver in Husn al-Ghurab in the Bir Ali area of Mayfaah 
District. The tribesmen demanded the government pay them 
800,000 riyals that were pledged to them in a previous 
agreement, compensation for a car lost in the civil war in 
1994, and construction of a school and health facility in their 
region. The kidnappers released two elderly women and the 
driver on 19 June and the remaining seven hostages on 21 June.

19 June

India
Five armed militants attacked Hindu villagers in Champnari 
village in Jammu's Doda District, killing at least 25 persons 
and injuring seven others, according to police reports. The 
victims were members of two wedding parties. Indian officials 
blame Pakistani-backed Muslim militants.

21 June

Lebanon
Unknown assailants fired four rocket-propelled grenades in the 
direction of the US Embassy in Beirut. The rockets exploded 
immediately after being launched, missing the Embassy.

23 June

India
A remote-controlled bomb exploded under the Delhi-bound 
Shalimar Express in Kashmir, injuring at least 35 of the 2,000 
passengers and derailing seven cars, according to press 
reports. A police spokesperson stated that Muslim militants are 
suspected.

25 June

Ethiopia
Six staff members of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross were abducted when they were traveling from Gode to Degeh 
Bur in three marked vehicles. The ICRC members include one 
Swiss national and five ethnic Somalis. On 3 July the Islamic 
group al-Ittihad al-Islami claimed responsibility, stating that 
the hostages were under investigation for spying. On 10 July 
the hostages were released.

Colombia
FARC rebels kidnapped a Canadian, a Bolivian, and a Colombian 
citizen in Santander Department. The Bolivian citizen works for 
a Colombian-German firm, while both the Canadian and Colombian 
work for a Canadian mining company. The three men were 
kidnapped while driving on a rural road.

28 June

India
According to press reports, a bomb hidden in a lunchbox 
detonated in Achaval Gardens, a popular picnic site in 
Anantnag, Kashmir. Two persons were killed and at least fifteen 
persons were injured in the blast.

8 July

Uganda
A United Nations World Food Program (WFP) worker was killed 
instantly when guerrillas from the Uganda National Rescue Front 
II fired a rocket-propelled grenade at his WFP truck.

14 July

Colombia
FARC rebels kidnapped an Ecuadorian citizen near Medellin. The 
victim, a US resident, was enroute to visit his family in 
Ecuador when he was abducted. The FARC demanded $1 million for 
his release.

17 July

India
An unidentified militant threw a grenade in the Jehangir Chowk 
area in Srinagar, Kashmir, injuring 13 persons, according to 
press accounts. A police official stated that the grenade was 
thrown at a Border Security Force post but exploded in the road 
instead. No one claimed responsibility, but police believe that 
Muslim militants are behind the attack.

18 July

Ecuador
The Indigenous Defense Front for Pastaza Province (FDIP) 
kidnapped three employees of an Ecuadorian pipeline maker 
subcontracted by a US oil company in Pastaza Province. The 
group accuses the company of causing environmental damage in 
its oilfield developments. On 28 July the FDIP released one 
hostage, and it released the remaining two hostages the next 
day.

20 July

Tajikistan
Unidentified assailants ambushed and killed four members of the 
United Nations Mission of Observers in the Tavildara area. The 
victims included military observers from Poland and Uruguay, a 
Japanese Civil Affairs officer, and a Tajikistani interpreter.

22 July

Yemen
An assailant possibly associated with the Abu Nidal 
organization murdered an Egyptian citizen in Sanaa. The victim, 
Muhammad Salah Sha'ban, was the Imam of al-Husayni Mosque in 
Sanaa. The motive for the murder of Sha'ban--reportedly a 
member of the Egyptian al-Gama'at-al-Islamiyya--is unclear.

24 July

India
A bomb exploded near the railroad tracks moments after the 
Shalimar Express passed by in Jammu and Kashmir, killing one 
soldier and injuring two civilians. Indian officials believe 
that Muslim militants are responsible.

25 July

Yemen
A Yemeni shot and killed three Catholic nuns, one Filipino, and 
two Indians in the Red Sea port city of Al Hudaydah. Press 
reports stated that the assailant considers himself a Muslim 
fundamentalist and that he trained in Bosnia as a fighter, but 
Yemeni officials described him as ``deranged.''

26 July

India
A bomb exploded on an empty bus parked at the interstate bus 
terminal in New Delhi, killing two persons and injuring at 
least eight others, according to police reports. The bomb 
destroyed the bus and caused major damage to six others.

28 July

India
According to police reports, suspected Muslim militants killed 
ten villagers in a predawn attack northwest of Doda, Kashmir. 
Five persons are reported missing.

India
In Doda, Kashmir, suspected Muslim militants killed at least 
eight members of two Hindu families and wounded three others. 
Eyewitnesses reported that the gunmen lined up the victims and 
shot them at point blank range.

1 August

Northern Ireland
A 500-pound car bomb exploded outside a shoe store in 
Banbridge, injuring 35 persons and damaging at least 200 homes. 
Authorities had received a warning telephone call and were 
evacuating the area when the bomb went off. The Real IRA, the 
Republic of Ireland-based military wing of the 32 County 
Sovereignty Council, claimed responsibility.

4 August

India
Suspected militants from the Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM) gunned 
down 19 persons near Surankot, Kashmir, according to the Indian 
Border Security Force and press reports. Two survivors traveled 
six hours on foot to report the attack to authorities. The 
victims were family members of a rival group that reportedly 
had been collaborating with Indian security forces.

India
Unidentified assailants with automatic rifles opened fire on a 
group of sleeping laborers at a remote construction site in 
Himachal Pradesh, killing 26 persons and wounding eight others. 
As the militants headed back to Kashmir they attacked a second 
group of workers, killing eight persons and wounding three 
others. Authorities suspect Pakistani-backed militants.

India
According to eyewitness reports, militants detonated a grenade 
in a crowded marketplace in Lal Chowk, Srinagar, Kashmir, 
injuring seven persons.

7 August

Kenya
A bomb exploded at the rear entrance of the US Embassy in 
Nairobi, killing 12 US citizens, 32 Foreign Service Nationals 
(FSNs), and 247 Kenyan citizens. Approximately 5,000 Kenyans, 
six US citizens, and 13 FSNs were injured. The US Embassy 
building sustained extensive structural damage. The US 
Government is holding terrorist financier Usama Bin Ladin 
responsible.

Tanzania
Almost simultaneously, a bomb detonated outside the US Embassy 
in Dar es Salaam, killing seven FSNs and three Tanzanian 
citizens, and injuring one US citizen and 76 Tanzanians. The 
explosion caused major structural damage to the US Embassy 
facility. The US Government holds Usama Bin Ladin responsible.

10 August

India
Unidentified assailants threw a grenade and fired automatic 
weapons into a crowded bus in Anantnag, Kashmir, killing four 
persons and injuring seven others, according to police reports. 
Authorities suspect Pakistani-backed separatists.

12 August

Democratic Republic of the Congo
Suspected former Rwandan soldiers abducted six tourists--one 
Canadian, two Swedes, and three New Zealanders--after the 
tourists crossed into the Congo from Uganda. Two of the New 
Zealanders escaped one week later, and the Canadian was 
released on 19 August with a statement from a previously 
unknown group called People in Action for the Liberation of 
Rwanda. The group claimed responsibility and stated that the 
remaining captives would be freed if a message from the group 
was read over BBC broadcasts in Africa. The remaining hostages 
reportedly were sighted in the forests in eastern Congo.

14 August

Sri Lanka
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) seized a Dubai-
owned cargo ship and abducted 21 crew-members, including 17 
Indian nationals. The LTTE evacuated the crew before the Sri 
Lankan Air Force bombed and destroyed the ship, on the 
suspicion that the vessel was transporting supplies to the 
LTTE. The 17 Indian hostages were released to the International 
Committee of the Red Cross on 19 August. The LTTE continues to 
hold four Sri Lankans hostage.

15 August

Northern Ireland
A 500-pound car bomb exploded outside a local courthouse in 
Omag's central shopping district, killing 29 persons and 
injuring more than 330. Authorities were in the process of 
clearing the shopping area around the courthouse when the bomb 
exploded. On 17 August authorities arrested five local men 
suspected of involvement in the bombing. The Real IRA claimed 
responsibility.

25 August

India
Separatist guerrillas threw a grenade at a vehicle carrying 
security personnel in Srinagar. According to police, the 
grenade missed its target and exploded in the crowded street, 
injuring 12 persons.

India
Police reported that unidentified militants threw a grenade in 
downtown Srinagar, killing one civilian and injuring 11 others.

South Africa
A bomb exploded in the Planet Hollywood restaurant in Capetown, 
killing one person and injuring at least 24 others--including 
nine British citizens--and causing major damage. The Muslims 
Against Global Oppression (MAGO) claimed responsibility in a 
phone call to a local radio station, stating that the bomb was 
in retaliation for the US missile attacks on terrorist 
facilities in Sudan and Afghanistan. Police believe that People 
Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) are responsible.

29 August

Belgium
Arsonists firebombed a McDonald's restaurant in Puurs, 
destroying the restaurant and causing up to $1.4 million in 
damage. The Animal Liberation Front (ALF) claimed 
responsibility for the attack.

2 September

India
Police reported that Muslim militants detonated a landmine 
under a bus carrying troops from Jammu to Punch, killing the 
civilian driver and seriously injuring 15 soldiers.

8 September

Philippines
Approximately 30 suspected Muslim militants armed with rifles 
and grenade launchers abducted an Italian priest and 12 
Filipinos from a cooperative store in the parish church. The 
Filipino hostages were released the next day, but the priest 
still is being held. No ransom has been demanded. Police 
suspect either the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) or the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF).

9 September

Philippines
Suspected ASG members kidnapped three Hong Kong businessmen in 
Mindanao. The victims are employed by the Jackaphil Company. No 
ransom demand has been made. On 23 December the three kidnapped 
victims were released unharmed.

21 September

Georgia
Unidentified assailants opened fire on a bus in Sukhumi, 
wounding three UN military observers and one other UN mission 
employee, according to UN officials. The injured include two 
Bangladeshis and one Nigerian.

22 September

Colombia
Suspected FARC members kidnapped a Japanese businessman from 
his farm in Bogota.

India
Police and doctors reported that unidentified gunmen shot and 
wounded a French tourist near the Jama Masjid mosque in 
Srinagar. Witnesses said that two assailants fired at the 
victim. Muslim guerrillas are suspected.

29 September

Ecuador
A bomb exploded at the Ecuadorian Bishops' Conference, injuring 
one Spanish missionary and causing major damage. The explosion 
released leaflets calling for improved cost of living and 
utility services. Police believe the bombing is linked to a 
national strike protesting the economic package implemented by 
the Ecuadorian President.

3 October

Russia
On 3 October 1998 in Groznyy, Chechnya, 20 unidentified armed 
assailants kidnapped three Britons and one New Zealander. On 8 
December partial remains of the hostages were discovered on a 
roadside.

5 October

Ecuador
Three employees of the Santa Fe Oil Company, two US citizens 
and one Ecuadorian, were kidnapped, according to local press 
accounts. One US citizen escaped the next day.

6 October

India
According to police reports, suspected Muslim militants threw a 
bomb at a vehicle carrying a prominent former militant in Tral, 
Kashmir, killing him and 10 others.

8 October

India
According to police officials, Muslim militants threw a grenade 
at a police post in Srinagar, Kashmir, injuring five civilians, 
four police officers and four soldiers.

India
Police reported that Muslim militants detonated a bomb near the 
state secretariat building in Srinagar, Kashmir, injuring 13 
persons and causing minor damage.

9 October

Pakistan
Police reported that unidentified assailants opened fire on the 
Iranian Cultural Center in Multan, killing one Pakistani 
security guard and wounding another.

12 October

Colombia
People's Liberation Army (EPL) rebels kidnapped 20 persons, 
including four foreigners at a road block on the Northeastern 
Highway. The rebels burned three cars and released two hostages 
to report the situation to the media.

18 October

Colombia
A bomb exploded on the Ocensa pipeline in Antioquia Department, 
killing approximately 71 persons and injuring at least 100 
others. The explosion caused major damage when the spilled oil 
caught fire and burned nearby houses in the town of Machuca. 
The pipeline is jointly owned by the Colombia State Oil Company 
Ecopetrol and a consortium including US, French, British, and 
Canadian companies. On 19 October the ELN claimed 
responsibility.

26 October

Colombia
Guerrillas abducted a Danish engineer and two Colombians at a 
roadblock in San Juan. Local authorities suspect the FARC or 
ELN is responsible. (On 21 January 1999 in Carmen de Bolivar 
EPL rebels freed the Danish hostage. There have been no reports 
on the two Colombians.)

28 October

Yemen
Armed tribesmen in the Mahfad region kidnapped two Belgian 
citizens, demanding the release of a tribesman sentenced to 
death by a Yemeni court. On 29 October tribesmen released the 
hostages.

8 November

Angola
In Lunde Norte Province at least 50 armed assailants attacked a 
Canadian-owned diamond mine, killing one Portuguese national, 
two Britons, three Angolans, and wounding 18 others. The 
assailants also took four workers hostage, including one South 
African, one Briton, and two Filipinos. Angolan officials blame 
the attack on UNITA. The secretary general of UNITA claimed 
responsibility for the attack but denied taking hostages.

14 November

India
In Budgam, near Srinagar, Kashmir, a police spokesman reported 
that militants threw a grenade near a telephone booth, 
seriously injuring one person.

India
Police reported an explosion at a taxi stand near Srinagar that 
injured four persons and damaged four vehicles.

15 November

Colombia
Armed assailants followed a US businessman and his family home 
in Cundinamarca Department and kidnapped his 11-year-old son 
after stealing money, jewelry, one automobile, and two cell 
phones. The kidnappers demanded $1 million in ransom.
On 21 January 1999 the US Embassy reported that the kidnappers 
released the boy to his mother and uncle in Tolima Department. 
It is not known if any ransom was paid. The kidnappers claim to 
be members of the Leftist Revolutionary Armed Commandos for 
Peace in Colombia.

Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone authorities report that rebels led by Sierra 
Leone's ousted junta leader, Solomon Musa, kidnapped an Italian 
Catholic missionary from his residence. Musa leads a faction of 
the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. Musa demanded a 
satellite telephone, medical supplies, and radio contact with 
his wife for release of the priest. His wife, Tina Musa, was 
arrested in September and is being detained in Freetown.

17 November

Greece
According to press reports, a bomb exploded outside a Citibank 
branch in Athens, causing major damage. An unidentified 
telephone caller to a local newspaper claimed the attack was to 
protest against arrests made during a student march.

India
A bomb exploded near the Madana bridge in Surankot, Kashmir, 
killing four persons and injuring several others, according to 
press reporting. Muslim militants are suspected.

India
Press reported a bomb detonated near a crowded bus stand in 
Anantnag, killing three persons and wounding 38 others.

India
Police reported Muslim militants detonated a grenade in 
Anantnag, killing three persons and injuring 35 others.

24 November

Yemen
A car bomb exploded near the German Embassy in Sanaa, killing 
two persons and injuring several others, according to reports 
from German and Yemeni officials. The German Embassy confirmed 
that no Germans were killed or injured.

25 November

India
In Handwara, Kashmir, police reported that Muslim militants 
threw a grenade at a wedding party, injuring 11 persons.

27 November

Uganda
Ugandan officials state that 30 Lord's Resistance Army rebels 
attacked a World Food Program (WFP) convoy, killing seven 
persons and wounding 28 others. An eyewitness reported the 
rebels also abducted five persons believed to be WFP officials, 
and one other person.

3 December

Colombia
Guerrillas kidnapped one German citizen and two Colombians from 
a bus at a false roadblock in Cauca Department. The guerrillas 
set the bus on fire and dynamited a tollbooth after stealing 
the money. Authorities suspect the FARC or ELN is responsible. 
On 8 January the ELN released the German citizen unharmed.

6 December

Yemen
Local press reported that armed tribals kidnapped four German 
tourists in Sanaa, demanding $500,000 ransom and improvements 
to local health and educational facilities. On 30 December the 
guerrillas released the hostages.

7 December

Italy
During the week of 7 December the ALF sent panettone cakes 
laced with rat poison to two branches of the Italian news 
agency ANSA. Two Italian subsidiaries of Swiss Nestle were 
forced to halt production, costing the company $30 million. 
According to Italy's ALF founder, the poisoned cakes were sent 
to protest Nestle's genetic manipulation of food.

8 December

Colombia
A Spanish newspaper reported that FARC guerrillas kidnapped one 
Spanish citizen and three Colombians. No ransom demands have 
been made.

9 December

India
A bomb exploded in a shop in the Punch District of Kashmir, 
wounding the shopkeeper. Police suspect Muslim militants are 
responsible.

India
In Bandipura, Kashmir, local press reported that Muslim 
militants threw a grenade at a group near a bus station, 
killing three persons and injuring 20 others.

Yemen
In Sanaa, Yemeni passengers on a chartered Egyptian airliner 
demanded to be flown to Libya. The Egyptian pilot landed the 
plane in Tunisia and told the 150 passengers he could not fly 
the plane to Libya due to the UN sanctions. The plane and 
passengers remained on the ground for 15 hours before returning 
to Yemen.

23 December

India
Muslim militants forced their way into three homes in three 
separate villages in Kulham District, Kashmir, killing nine 
persons, according to police reports. The victims were all 
close relatives of former militants who now support the pro-
Indian government militia. Kashmir authorities blame the 
attacks on the Hizbul Mujahidin.

26 December

Angola
United Nations officials report that a transport plane carrying 
10 UN officials and four crew members was shot down over an 
area of intense fighting between UNITA rebels and government 
troops. National Radio Services state that UNITA shot down the 
plane. A UN rescue team arrived at the crash site on 8 January 
1999, reporting that no one survived the crash and that the 
bodies of all 14 persons aboard the plane were accounted for.

28 December

Yemen
Armed militants kidnapped a group of tourists traveling on the 
main road from Habban to Aden. The victims included two US 
citizens, twelve Britons, and two Australians. On 29 December 
Yemeni security forces undertook a rescue attempt, during which 
three Britons and one Australian were killed, and one US 
citizen was injured seriously. Yemeni officials reported that 
the kidnappers belong to the Islamic Jihad, but the 
investigation is ongoing.

         Appendix B: Background Information on Terrorist Groups

    The following list of terrorist groups is not exhaustive. 
It focuses on the groups that were designated foreign terrorist 
organizations on 8 October 1997 pursuant to the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (denoted by an 
asterisk) but also includes other major groups that were active 
in 1998. Terrorist groups whose activities were limited in 
scope in 1998 are not included.

                     abu nidal organization (ano)*

    a.k.a.: Fatah Revolutionary Council, Arab Revolutionary 
Council, Arab Revolutionary Brigades, Black September, and 
Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims
    Description: International terrorist organization led by 
Sabri al-Banna. Split from PLO in 1974. Made up of various 
functional committees, including political, military, and 
financial.
    Activities: Has carried out terrorist attacks in 20 
countries, killing or injuring almost 900 persons. Targets 
include the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Israel, 
moderate Palestinians, the PLO, and various Arab countries. 
Major attacks included the Rome and Vienna airports in December 
1985, the Neve Shalom synagogue in Istanbul and the Pan Am 
Flight 73 hijacking in Karachi in September 1986, and the City 
of Poros day-excursion ship attack in July 1988 in Greece. 
Suspected of assassinating PLO deputy chief Abu Iyad and PLO 
security chief Abu Hul in Tunis in January 1991. ANO 
assassinated a Jordanian diplomat in Lebanon in January 1994 
and has been linked to the killing of the PLO representative 
there. Has not attacked Western targets since the late 1980s.
    Strength: Several hundred plus militia in Lebanon and 
limited overseas support structure.
    Location/Area of Operation: Al-Banna may have relocated to 
Iraq in December 1998, where the group maintains a presence. 
Has an operational presence in Lebanon in the Bekaa Valley and 
several Palestinian refugee camps in coastal areas of Lebanon. 
Also has a presence in Sudan and Syria, among others. Has 
demonstrated ability to operate over wide area, including the 
Middle East, Asia, and Europe.
    External Aid: Has received considerable support, including 
safehaven, training, logistic assistance, and financial aid 
from Iraq, Libya, and Syria (until 1987), in addition to close 
support for selected operations.

                        abu sayyaf group (asg)*

    Description: Smallest and most radical of the Islamic 
separatist groups operating in the southern Philippines. Split 
from the Moro National Liberation Front in 1991 under the 
leadership of Abdurajik Abubakar Janjalani, who was killed in a 
clash with Philippine police on 18 December 1998. Some members 
have studied or worked in the Middle East and developed ties to 
Arab mujahidin while fighting and training in Afghanistan.
    Activities: Uses bombs, assassinations, kidnappings, and 
extortion payments to promote an independent Islamic state in 
western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, areas in the 
southern Philippines heavily populated by Muslims. Raided the 
town of Ipil in Mindanao in April 1995, the group's first 
large-scale action. Suspected of several small-scale bombings 
and kidnappings in 1998.
    Strength: Unknown, but believed to have about 200 members.
    Location/Area of Operation: The ASG operates in the 
southern Philippines and occasionally in Manila.
    External Aid: Probably receives support from Islamic 
extremists in the Middle East and South Asia.

                                al-jihad

    (see under J)

                      alex boncayao brigade (abb)

    Description: The ABB, the urban hit squad of the Communist 
Party of the Philippines, was formed in the mid-1980s.
    Activities: Responsible for more than 100 murders and 
believed to have been involved in the 1989 murder of US Army 
Col. James Rowe in the Philippines. Although reportedly 
decimated by a series of arrests in late 1995, the murder in 
June 1996 of a former high-ranking Philippine official, claimed 
by the group, demonstrates that it still maintains terrorist 
capabilities. In March 1997 the group announced that it had 
formed an alliance with another armed group, the Revolutionary 
Proletarian Army.
    Strength: Approximately 500.
    Location/Area of Operation: Operates exclusively in Manila.
    External Aid: Unknown.

                       armed islamic group (gia)*

    Description: An Islamic extremist group, the GIA aims to 
overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an 
Islamic state. The GIA began its violent activities in early 
1992 after Algiers voided the victory of the Islamic Salvation 
Front (FIS)--the largest Islamic party--in the first round of 
legislative elections in December 1991.
    Activities: Frequent attacks against civilians, 
journalists, and foreign residents. In the last several years 
the GIA has conducted a terrorist campaign of civilian 
massacres, sometimes wiping out entire villages in its area of 
operations and frequently killing hundreds of civilians. Since 
announcing its terrorist campaign against foreigners living in 
Algeria in September 1993, the GIA has killed more than 100 
expatriate men and women--mostly Europeans--in the country. 
Uses assassinations and bombings, including car bombs, and it 
is known to favor kidnapping victims and slitting their 
throats. The GIA hijacked an Air France flight to Algiers in 
December 1994, and suspicions centered on the group for a 
series of bombings in France in 1995.
    Strength: Unknown, probably several hundred to several 
thousand.
    Location/Area of Operation: Algeria.
    External Aid: Algerian expatriates and GIA members abroad, 
many of whom reside in Western Europe, provide some financial 
and logistic support. In addition, the Algerian Government has 
accused Iran and Sudan of supporting Algerian extremists and 
severed diplomatic relations with Iran in March 1993.

                        aum supreme truth (aum)*

    a.k.a.: Aum Shinrikyo
    Description: A cult established in 1987 by Shoko Asahara, 
Aum aims to take over Japan and then the world. Its 
organizational structure mimicks that of a nation-state, with 
``finance,'' ``construction,'' and ``science and technology'' 
ministries. Approved as a religious entity in 1989 under 
Japanese law, the group ran candidates in a Japanese 
parliamentary election in 1990. Over time, the cult began to 
emphasize the imminence of the end of the world and stated that 
the United States would initiate"Armageddon'' by starting World 
War III with Japan. The Japanese Government revoked its 
recognition of Aum as a religious organization in October 1995, 
but in 1997 a government panel decided not to invoke the Anti-
Subversive Law against the group, which would have outlawed the 
cult.
    Activities: On 20 March 1995 Aum members simultaneously 
released sarin nerve gas on several Tokyo subway trains, 
killing 12 persons and injuring up to 6,000. The group was 
responsible for other mysterious chemical incidents in Japan in 
1994. Its efforts to conduct attacks using biological agents 
have been unsuccessful. Japanese police arrested Asahara in May 
1995, and he remained on trial facing seventeen counts of 
murder at the end of 1998. In 1997 and 1998 the cult resumed 
its recruiting activities in Japan and opened several 
commercial businesses. Maintains an Internet homepage that 
indicates Armageddon and anti-US sentiment remain a part of the 
cult's world view.
    Strength: At the time of the Tokyo subway attack, the group 
claimed to have 9,000 members in Japan and up to 40,000 
worldwide. Its current strength is unknown.
    Location/Area of Operation: Operates in Japan, but 
previously had a presence in Australia, Russia, Ukraine, 
Germany, Taiwan, Sri Lanka, the former Yugoslavia, and the 
United States.
    External Aid: None.

                  basque fatherland and liberty (eta)*

    a.k.a: Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna
    Description: Founded in 1959 with the aim of establishing 
an independent homeland based on Marxist principles in Spain's 
Basque region and the southwestern French provinces of Labourd, 
Basse-Navarra, and Soule.
    Activities: Primarily bombings and assassinations of 
Spanish Government officials, especially security and military 
forces, politicians, and judicial figures. In response to 
French operations against the group, ETA also has targeted 
French interests. Finances its activities through kidnappings, 
robberies, and extortion. Has killed more than 800 persons 
since it began lethal attacks in the early 1960s; responsible 
for murdering 6 persons in 1998. ETA declared a ``unilateral 
and indefinite'' cease-fire on 17 September 1998.
    Strength: Unknown; may have hundreds of members, plus 
supporters.
    Location/Area of Operation: Operates primarily in the 
Basque autonomous regions of northern Spain and southwestern 
France, but also has bombed Spanish and French interests 
elsewhere.
    External Aid: Has received training at various times in the 
past in Libya, Lebanon, and Nicaragua. Some ETA members 
allegedly have received sanctuary in Cuba. Also appears to have 
ties to the Irish Republican Army through the two groups' legal 
political wings.

                continuity irish republican army (cira)

    a.k.a.: Continuity Army Council
    Description: Radical terrorist group formed in 1994 as the 
clandestine armed wing of Republican Sinn Fein, a political 
organization dedicated to the reunification of Ireland. 
Established to carry on the republican armed struggle after the 
Irish Republican Army announced a cease-fire in September 1994.
    Activities: Bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, 
extortion, and robberies. Targets include British military and 
Northern Irish security targets and Northern Irish Loyalist 
paramilitary groups. Also has launched bomb attacks against 
predominantly Protestant towns in Northern Ireland. Does not 
have an established presence or capability to launch attacks on 
the UK mainland.
    Strength: Fewer than 50 activists. The group probably 
receives limited support from IRA hardliners, who are 
dissatisfied with the IRA cease-fire, and other republican 
sympathizers.
    Location/Area of Operation: Northern Ireland, Ireland.
    External Aid: Suspected of receiving funds and arms from 
sympathizers in the United States.

        democratic front for the liberation of palestine (dflp)*

    Description: Marxist-Leninist organization founded in 1969 
when it split from the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP). Believes Palestinian national goals can be 
achieved only through revolution of the masses. In early 1980s 
occupied political stance midway between Arafat and the 
rejectionists. Split into two factions in 1991; Nayif Hawatmah 
leads the majority and more hardline faction, which continues 
to dominate the group. Joined with other rejectionist groups to 
form the Alliance of Palestinian Forces (APF) to oppose the 
Declaration of Principals signed in 1993. Broke from the APF--
along with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP)--over ideological differences. Has made limited moves 
toward merging with the PFLP since the mid-1990s.
    Activities: In the 1970s conducted numerous small bombings 
and minor assaults and some more spectacular operations in 
Israel and the occupied territories, concentrating on Israeli 
targets. Involved only in border raids since 1988, but 
continues to oppose the Israel-PLO peace agreement.
    Strength: Estimated at 500 (total for both factions).
    Location/Area of Operation: Syria, Lebanon, and the 
Israeli-occupied territories; terrorist attacks have taken 
place entirely in Israel and the occupied territories. Conducts 
occasional guerrilla operations in southern Lebanon.
    External Aid: Receives limited financial and military aid 
from Syria.

                   devrimci sol (revolutionary left)

    a.k.a.: Dev Sol (see Revolutionary People's Liberation 
Party/Front, DHKP/C)

                                  ela

    (see Revolutionary People's Struggle)

                                  eln

    (see National Liberation Army)

                                  eta

    (see Basque Fatherland and Liberty)

                                  farc

    (see Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)

                                  fpmr

     (see Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front)

             al-gama'at al-islamiyya (islamic group, ig) *

    Description: Egypt's largest militant group, active since 
the late 1970s; appears to be loosely organized. Has an 
external wing with a worldwide presence. Signed Usama Bin 
Ladin's fatwa in February 1998 calling for attacks against US 
civilians but publicly has denied that it supports Bin Ladin. 
Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman is al-Gama'at's preeminent spiritual 
leader, and the group publicly has threatened to retaliate 
against US interests for his incarceration. Primary goal is to 
overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an 
Islamic state.
    Activities: Armed attacks against Egyptian security and 
other government officials, Coptic Christians, and Egyptian 
opponents of Islamic extremism. Al-Gama'at has launched attacks 
on tourists in Egypt since 1992, most notably the attack in 
November 1997 at Luxor that killed 58 foreign tourists. Also 
claimed responsibility for the attempt in June 1995 to 
assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia.
    Strength: Unknown, but probably several thousand hardcore 
members and another several thousand sympathizers.
    Location/Area of Operation: Operates mainly in the Al 
Minya, Asyu't, Qina, and Soha Governorates of southern Egypt. 
Also appears to have support in Cairo, Alexandria, and other 
urban locations, particularly among unemployed graduates and 
students. Has a worldwide presence, including in the United 
Kingdom, Afghanistan, and Austria.
    External Aid: Unknown. The Egyptian Government believes 
that Iranian, Sudanese, and Afghan militant groups support the 
IG.

                  hamas (islamic resistance movement)*

    Description: Formed in late 1987 as an outgrowth of the 
Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Various HAMAS 
elements have used both political and violent means, including 
terrorism, to pursue the goal of establishing an Islamic 
Palestinian state in place of Israel. Loosely structured, with 
some elements working clandestinely and others working openly 
through mosques and social service institutions to recruit 
members, raise money, organize activities, and distribute 
propaganda. HAMAS's strength is concentrated in the Gaza Strip 
and a few areas of the West Bank. Also has engaged in peaceful 
political activity, such as running candidates in West Bank 
Chamber of Commerce elections.
    Activities: HAMAS activists, especially those in the Izz 
el-Din al-Qassam Brigades, have conducted many attacks--
including large-scale suicide bombings--against Israeli 
civilian and military targets, suspected Palestinian 
collaborators, and Fatah rivals.
    Strength: Unknown number of hardcore members; tens of 
thousands of supporters and sympathizers.
    Location/Area of Operation: Primarily the occupied 
territories, Israel, and Jordan.
    External Aid: Receives funding from Palestinian 
expatriates, Iran, and private benefactors in Saudi Arabia and 
other moderate Arab states. Some fundraising and propaganda 
activity take place in Western Europe and North America.

                       harakat ul-mujahidin (hum)

    Description: Formerly the Harakat ul-Ansar, which was 
designated a foreign terrorist organization in October 1997. 
HUM is an Islamic militant group based in Pakistan that 
operates primarily in Kashmir. Leader Fazlur Rehman Khalil has 
been linked to Bin Ladin and signed his fatwa in February 1998 
calling for attacks on US and Western interests. Operates 
terrorist training camps in eastern Afghanistan and suffered 
casualties in the US missile strikes on Bin Ladin-associated 
training camps in Khowst in August 1998. Fazlur Rehman Khalil 
subsequently said that HUM would take revenge on the United 
States.
    Activities: Has conducted a number of operations against 
Indian troops and civilian targets in Kashmir. Linked to the 
Kashmiri militant group al-Faran that kidnapped five Western 
tourists in Kashmir in July 1995; one was killed in August 
1995, and the other four reportedly were killed in December of 
the same year.
    Strength: Has several thousand armed supporters located in 
Azad Kashmir, Pakistan, and India's southern Kashmir and Doda 
regions. Supporters are mostly Pakistanis and Kashmiris, and 
also include Afghans and Arab veterans of the Afghan war. Uses 
light and heavy machineguns, assault rifles, mortars, 
explosives, and rockets.
    Location/Area of Operation: Based in Muzaffarabad, 
Pakistan, but members conduct insurgent and terrorist 
activities primarily in Kashmir. The HUM trains its militants 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
    External Aid: Collects donations from Saudi Arabia and 
other Gulf and Islamic states and from Pakistanis and 
Kashmiris. The source and amount of HUA's military funding are 
unknown.

                       hizballah (party of god)*

    a.k.a.: Islamic Jihad, Revolutionary Justice Organization, 
Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, and Islamic Jihad for 
the Liberation of Palestine
    Description: Radical Shia group formed in Lebanon; 
dedicated to creation of Iranian-style Islamic republic in 
Lebanon and removal of all non-Islamic influences from the 
area. Strongly anti-West and anti-Israel. Closely allied with, 
and often directed by, Iran but may have conducted operations 
that were not approved by Tehran.
    Activities: Known or suspected to have been involved in 
numerous anti-US terrorist attacks, including the suicide truck 
bombing of the US Embassy and US Marine barracks in Beirut in 
October 1983 and the US Embassy annex in Beirut in September 
1984. Elements of the group were responsible for the kidnapping 
and detention of US and other Western hostages in Lebanon. The 
group also attacked the Israeli Embassy in Argentina in 1992.
    Strength: Several thousand.
    Location/Area of Operation: Operates in the Bekaa Valley, 
the southern suburbs of Beirut, and southern Lebanon. Has 
established cells in Europe, Africa, South America, North 
America, and elsewhere.
    External Aid: Receives substantial amounts of financial, 
training, weapons, explosives, political, diplomatic, and 
organizational aid from Iran and Syria.

                      irish republican army (ira)

    a.k.a.: Provisional Irish, Republican Army (PIRA), the 
Provos
    Description: Radical terrorist group formed in 1969 as 
clandestine armed wing of Sinn Fein, a legal political movement 
dedicated to removing British forces from Northern Ireland and 
unifying Ireland. Has a Marxist orientation. Organized into 
small, tightly knit cells under the leadership of the Army 
Council.
    Activities: Bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, 
extortion, and robberies. Before its cease-fire in 1994, 
targets included senior British Government officials, British 
military and Royal Ulster Constabulary targets in Northern 
Ireland, and a British military facility on the European 
Continent. The IRA has been observing a cease-fire since July 
1997; the group's previous cease-fire was from 1 September 1994 
to February 1996.
    Strength: Several hundred, plus several thousand 
sympathizers.
    Local/Area of Operation: Northern Ireland, Ireland, Great 
Britain, and Europe.
    External Aid: Has received aid from a variety of groups and 
countries and considerable training and arms from Libya and, at 
one time, the PLO. Is suspected of receiving funds and arms 
from sympathizers in the United States. Similarities in 
operations suggest links to the ETA.

                islamic resistance movement (see hamas)

                            jamaat ul-fuqra

    Description: Islamic sect that seeks to purify Islam 
through violence. Led by Pakistani cleric Shaykh Mubarik Ali 
Gilani, who established the organization in the early 1980s. 
Gilani now resides in Pakistan, but most cells are located in 
North America and the Caribbean. Members have purchased 
isolated rural compounds in North America to live communally, 
practice their faith, and insulate themselves from Western 
culture.
    Activities: Fuqra members have attacked a variety of 
targets that they view as enemies of Islam, including Muslims 
they regards as heretics and Hindus. Attacks during the 1980s 
included assassinations and firebombings across the United 
States. Fuqra members in the United States have been convicted 
of criminal violations, including murder and fraud.
    Strength: Unknown.
    Location/Area of Operation: North America, Pakistan.
    External Aid: None.

                        japanese red army (jra)*

    a.k.a.: Anti-Imperialist International Brigade (AIIB)
    Description: An international terrorist group formed around 
1970 after breaking away from Japanese Communist League-Red 
Army Faction. Led by Fusako Shigenobu, believed to be in 
Syrian-garrisoned area of Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. Stated goals 
are to overthrow Japanese Government and monarchy and help 
foment world revolution. Organization unclear but may control 
or at least have ties to Anti-Imperialist International Brigade 
(AIIB). Also may have links to Antiwar Democratic Front, an 
overt leftist political organization in Japan. Details released 
following arrest in November 1987 of leader Osamu Maruoka 
indicate that JRA may be organizing cells in Asian cities, such 
as Manila and Singapore. Has had close and longstanding 
relations with Palestinian terrorist groups--based and 
operating outside Japan--since its inception.
    Activities: During the 1970s JRA conducted a series of 
attacks around the world, including the massacre in 1972 at Lod 
Airport in Israel, two Japanese airliner hijackings, and an 
attempted takeover of the US Embassy in Kuala Lumpur. In April 
1988, JRA operative Yu Kikumura was arrested with explosives on 
the New Jersey Turnpike, apparently planning an attack to 
coincide with the bombing of a USO club in Naples and a 
suspected JRA operation that killed five, including a US 
servicewoman. Kikumura was convicted of these charges and is 
serving a lengthy prison sentence in the United States. In 
March 1995, Ekita Yukiko, a longtime JRA activist, was arrested 
in Romania and subsequently deported to Japan. Eight others 
have been arrested since 1996, but leader Shigenobu remains at 
large.
    Strength: About eight hardcore members; undetermined number 
of sympathizers.
    Location/Area of Operation: Location unknown, but possibly 
based in Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon.
    External Aid: Unknown.

                               al-jihad*

    a.k.a.: Jihad Group, Islamic Jihad, Vanguards of Conquest, 
Talaa' al-Fateh
    Description: Egyptian Islamic extremist group active since 
the late 1970s. Appears to be divided into two factions: one 
led by Ayman al-Zawahiri--who currently is in Afghanistan and 
is a key leader in terrorist financier Usama Bin Ladin's new 
World Islamic Front--and the Vanguards of Conquest (Talaa' al-
Fateh) led by Ahmad Husayn Agiza. Abbud al-Zumar, leader of the 
original Jihad, is imprisoned in Egypt and recently joined the 
group's jailed spiritual leader, Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman, in 
a call for a ``peaceful front.'' Primary goal is to overthrow 
the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state. 
Increasingly willing to target US interests in Egypt.
    Activities: Specializes in armed attacks against high-level 
Egyptian Government officials. The original Jihad was 
responsible for the assassination in 1981 of Egyptian President 
Anwar Sadat. Appears to concentrate on high-level, high-profile 
Egyptian Government officials, including cabinet ministers. 
Claimed responsibility for the attempted assassinations of 
Interior Minister Hassan al-Alfi in August 1993 and Prime 
Minister Atef Sedky in November 1993. Has not conducted an 
attack inside Egypt since 1993 and never has targeted foreign 
tourists there. Has threatened to retaliate against the United 
States, however, for its incarceration of Shaykh Umar Abd al-
Rahman and, more recently, for the arrests of its members in 
Albania, Azerbaijan, and the United Kingdom.
    Strength: Not known, but probably several thousand hardcore 
members and another several thousand sympathizers among the 
various factions.
    Location/Area of Operation: Operates in the Cairo area. Has 
a network outside Egypt, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, the 
United Kingdom, and Sudan.
    External Aid: Not known. The Egyptian Government claims 
that Iran, Sudan, and militant Islamic groups in Afghanistan--
including Usama Bin Ladin--support the Jihad factions. Also may 
obtain some funding through various Islamic nongovernmental 
organizations.

                         kach* and kahane chai*

    Description: Stated goal is to restore the biblical state 
of Israel. Kach (founded by radical Israeli-American rabbi Meir 
Kahane) and its offshoot Kahane Chai, which means ``Kahane 
Lives,'' (founded by Meir Kahane's son Binyamin following his 
father's assassination in the United States) were declared to 
be terrorist organizations in March 1994 by the Israeli Cabinet 
under the 1948 Terrorism Law. This followed the groups' 
statements in support of Dr. Baruch Goldstein's attack in 
February 1994 on the al-Ibrahimi Mosque--Goldstein was 
affiliated with Kach--and their verbal attacks on the Israeli 
Government.
    Activities: Organize protests against the Israeli 
Government. Harass and threaten Palestinians in Hebron and the 
West Bank. Have threatened to attack Arabs, Palestinians, and 
Israeli Government officials. Claimed responsibility for 
several shootings of West Bank Palestinians that killed four 
persons and wounded two in 1993.
    Strength: Unknown.
    Location/Area of Operation: Israel and West Bank 
settlements, particularly Qiryat Arba' in Hebron.
    External Aid: Receives support from sympathizers in the 
United States and Europe.

                              khmer rouge

    (see The Party of Democratic Kampuchea)

                    kurdistan workers' party (pkk)*

    Description: Established in 1974 as a Marxist-Leninist 
insurgent group primarily composed of Turkish Kurds. In recent 
years has moved beyond rural-based insurgent activities to 
include urban terrorism. Seeks to establish an independent 
Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey, where the population is 
predominantly Kurdish.
    Activities: Primary targets are Turkish Government security 
forces in Turkey but also has been active in Western Europe 
against Turkish targets. Conducted attacks on Turkish 
diplomatic and commercial facilities in dozens of West European 
cities in 1993 and again in spring 1995. In an attempt to 
damage Turkey's tourist industry, the PKK has bombed tourist 
sites and hotels and kidnapped foreign tourists.
    Strength: Approximately 10,000 to 15,000. Has thousands of 
sympathizers in Turkey and Europe.
    Location/Area of Operation: Operates in Turkey, Europe, the 
Middle East, and Asia.
    External Aid: Has received safehaven and modest aid from 
Syria, Iraq, and Iran. The Syrian Government claims to have 
expelled the PKK from its territory in October 1998.

                liberation tigers of tamil eelam (ltte)*

    Known front organizations: World Tamil Association (WTA), 
World Tamil Movement (WTM), the Federation of Associations of 
Canadian Tamils (FACT), the Ellalan Force, the Sangillan Force.
    Description: The most powerful Tamil group in Sri Lanka, 
founded in 1976. Uses overt and illegal methods to raise funds, 
acquire weapons, and publicize its cause of establishing an 
independent Tamil state. Began its armed conflict with the Sri 
Lankan Government in 1983 and relies on a guerrilla strategy 
that includes the use of terrorist tactics.
    Activities: Has integrated a battlefield insurgent strategy 
with a terrorist program that targets not only key government 
personnel in the countryside but also senior Sri Lankan 
political and military leaders in Colombo. LTTE political 
assassinations and bombings have become commonplace, including 
suicide attacks against Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe 
Premadasa in 1993 and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 
1991. Has refrained from targeting Western tourists out of fear 
that foreign governments would crack down on Tamil expatriates 
involved in fundraising activities abroad. Prefers to attack 
vulnerable government facilities and withdraw before 
reinforcements arrive.
    Strength: Approximately 10,000 armed combatants in Sri 
Lanka; about 3,000 to 6,000 form a trained cadre of fighters. 
The LTTE also has a significant overseas support structure for 
fundraising, weapons procurement, and propaganda activities.
    Location/Area of Operation: Controls most of the northern 
and eastern coastal areas of Sri Lanka and has conducted 
operations throughout the island. Headquartered in the Jaffna 
peninsula, LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran has established 
an extensive network of checkpoints and informants to keep 
track of any outsiders who enter the group's area of control.
    External Aid: The LTTE's overt organizations support Tamil 
separatism by lobbying foreign governments and the United 
Nations. Also uses its international contacts to procure 
weapons, communications, and bombmaking equipment. Exploits 
large Tamil communities in North America, Europe, and Asia to 
obtain funds and supplies for its fighters in Sri Lanka. Some 
Tamil communities in Europe also are involved in narcotics 
smuggling.

                     loyalist volunteer force (lvf)

    Description: Extremist terrorist group formed in 1996 as a 
splinter of the mainstream loyalist Ulster Volunteer Force 
(UVF). Seeks to subvert a political settlement with Irish 
nationalists in Northern Ireland by attacking Catholic 
politicians, civilians, and Protestant politicians who endorse 
the Northern Ireland peace process. Composed of hardliners 
formerly associated with the UVF. Mark ``Swinger'' Fulton now 
leads the LVF following the assassination in December 1997 of 
LVF founder Billy"King Rat'' Wright. Announced a unilateral 
cease-fire on 15 May and, in a move unprecedented among Ulster 
terrorist groups, decommissioned a small but significant amount 
of weapons on 18 December 1998.
    Activities: Bombings, kidnappings, and close-quarter 
shooting attacks. LVF bombs often have contained Powergel 
commercial explosives, typical of many loyalist groups. LVF 
attacks have been particularly vicious: LVF terrorists killed 
an 18-year old Catholic girl in July 1997 because she had a 
Protestant boyfriend. Murdered numerous Catholic civilians with 
no political or terrorist affiliations following Billy Wright's 
assassination. Also has conducted successful attacks against 
Irish targets in Irish border towns.
    Strength: British press speculates about 500 activists.
    Location/Area of Operation: Northern Ireland, Ireland
    External Aid: None.

                manuel rodriguez patriotic front (fpmr)*

    Description: Founded in 1983 as the armed wing of the 
Chilean Communist Party and named for the hero of Chile's war 
of independence against Spain. Splintered into two factions in 
the late 1980s, and one faction became a political party in 
1991. The dissident wing FPMR/D is Chile's only remaining 
active terrorist group.
    Activities: FPMR/D attacks civilians and international 
targets, including US businesses and Mormon churches. In 1993, 
FPMR/D bombed two McDonald's restaurants and attempted to bomb 
a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant. Successful government 
counterterrorist operations have undercut the organization 
significantly. Four FPMR/D members escaped from prison using a 
helicopter in December 1996. One of them, Patricio Ortiz 
Montenegro, fled to Switzerland where he requested political 
asylum. Chile requested Ortiz's extradition, but the Swiss 
Government--fearing Chile would not safeguard Ortiz's physical 
and psychological well-being--denied the request. Chilean 
authorities continued to pursue the whereabouts of the three 
others who escaped with Ortiz.
    Strength: Now believed to have between 50 and 100 members.
    Location/Area of Operation: Chile.
    External Aid: None.

              mujahedin-e khalq organization (mek or mko)*

    a.k.a.: The National Liberation Army of Iran (NLA, the 
militant wing of the MEK), the People's Mujahidin of Iran 
(PMOI), National Council of Resistance (NCR), Muslim Iranian 
Student's Society (front organization used to garner financial 
support)
    Description: Formed in the 1960s by the college-educated 
children of Iranian merchants, the MEK sought to counter what 
it perceived as excessive Western influence in the Shah's 
regime. Following a philosophy that mixes Marxism and Islam, 
has developed into the largest and most active armed Iranian 
dissident group. Its history is studded with anti-Western 
activity, and, most recently, attacks on the interests of the 
clerical regime in Iran and abroad.
    Activities: Worldwide campaign against the Iranian 
Government stresses propaganda and occasionally uses terrorist 
violence. During the 1970s the MEK staged terrorist attacks 
inside Iran and killed several US military personnel and 
civilians working on defense projects in Tehran. Supported the 
takeover in 1979 of the US Embassy in Tehran. In April 1992 
conducted attacks on Iranian embassies in 13 different 
countries, demonstrating the group's ability to mount large-
scale operations overseas. Recent attacks in Iran include three 
explosions in Tehran in June 1998 that killed three persons and 
the assassination of Asadollah Lajevardi, the former director 
of the Evin Prison.
    Strength: Several thousand fighters based in Iraq with an 
extensive overseas support structure. Most of the fighters are 
organized in the MEK's National Liberation Army (NLA).
    Location/Area of Operation: In the 1980s the MEK's leaders 
were forced by Iranian security forces to flee to France. Most 
resettled in Iraq by 1987. In the mid-1980s did not mount 
terrorist operations in Iran at a level similar to its 
activities in the 1970s. In recent years has claimed credit for 
a number of operations in Iran.
    External Aid: Beyond support from Iraq, the MEK uses front 
organizations to solicit contributions from expatriate Iranian 
communities.

                                  mrta

    (see Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement)

               national liberation army (eln)--colombia*

    Description: Pro-Cuban, anti-US guerrilla group formed in 
January 1965. Primarily rural based, although has several urban 
fronts, particularly in the Magdalena Medio region. Entered 
peace talks with Colombian Civil Society in mid-1998 and was 
preparing to participate in a national convention in early 
1999.
    Activities: Conducted weekly assaults on oil infrastructure 
(typically pipeline bombings) and has inflicted massive oil 
spills. Extortion and bombings against US and other foreign 
businesses, especially the petroleum industry. Annually 
conducts several hundred kidnappings for profit, including 
foreign employees of large corporations. Forces coca and opium 
poppy cultivators to pay protection money and attacks 
government efforts to eradicate these crops.
    Strength: Approximately 3,000-5,000 armed combatants and an 
unknown number of active supporters.
    Location/Area of Operation: Colombia, border regions of 
Venezuela.
    External Aid: None.

                        new people's army (npa)

    Description: The guerrilla arm of the Communist Party of 
the Philippines (CPP), NPA is an avowedly Maoist group formed 
in December 1969 with the aim of overthrowing the government 
through protracted guerrilla warfare. Although primarily a 
rural-based guerrilla group, the NPA has an active urban 
infrastructure to conduct terrorism and uses city-based 
assassination squads called sparrow units. Derives most of its 
funding from contributions of supporters and so-called 
revolutionary taxes extorted from local businesses.
    Activities: Has suffered setbacks since the late 1980s 
because of splits within the CPP, lack of money, and successful 
government operations. The NPA primarily targets Philippine 
security forces, corrupt politicians, and drug traffickers. 
Opposes any US military presence in the Philippines and 
attacked US military interests before the US base closures in 
1992.
    Strength: Estimated between 6,000 to 8,000.
    Location/Area of Operation: Operates in rural Luzon, 
Visayas, and parts of Mindanao. Has cells in Manila and other 
metropolitan centers.
    External Aid: Unknown.

                   the palestine islamic jihad (pij)*

    Description: Originated among militant Palestinians in the 
Gaza Strip during the 1970s; a series of loosely affiliated 
factions rather than a cohesive group. Committed to the 
creation of an Islamic Palestinian state and the destruction of 
Israel through holy war. Because of its strong support for 
Israel, the United States has been identified as an enemy of 
the PIJ. Also opposes moderate Arab governments that it 
believes have been tainted by Western secularism.
    Activities: Has threatened to retaliate against Israel and 
the United States for the murder of PIJ leader Fathi Shaqaqi in 
Malta in October 1995. Conducted suicide bombings against 
Israeli targets in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Israel. Has 
threatened to attack US interests in Jordan.
    Strength: Unknown.
    Location/Area of Operation: Primarily Israel and the 
occupied territories and other parts of the Middle East, 
including Jordan and Lebanon. The largest faction is based in 
Syria.
    External Aid: Receives financial assistance from Iran and 
limited assistance from Syria.

                   palestine liberation front (plf)*

    Description: Broke away from the PFLP-GC in mid-1970s. 
Later split again into pro-PLO, pro-Syrian, and pro-Libyan 
factions. Pro-PLO faction led by Muhammad Abbas (Abu Abbas), 
who became member of PLO Executive Committee in 1984 but left 
it in 1991.
    Activities: The Abu Abbas-led faction has conducted attacks 
against Israel. Abbas's group also was responsible for the 
attack in 1985 on the cruise ship Achille Lauro and the murder 
of US citizen Leon Klinghoffer. A warrant for Abu Abbas's 
arrest is outstanding in Italy.
    Strength: At least 50.
    Location/Area of Operation: PLO faction based in Tunisia 
until Achille Lauro attack. Now based in Iraq.
    External Aid: Receives support mainly from Iraq. Has 
received support from Libya in the past.

            the party of democratic kampuchea (khmer rouge)*

    Description: Communist insurgency trying to overthrow the 
Cambodian Government. Under Pol Pot's leadership, conducted a 
campaign of genocide, killing more than 1 million persons 
during its four years in power in the late 1970s. Defections 
starting in 1996 and accelerating in spring 1998 appear to have 
shattered the Khmer Rouge as a military force, but hardline 
remnants still may pose a threat in remote areas.
    Activities: Virtually has disintegrated as a viable 
insurgent organization because of defections, but hardline 
remnants continue low-level attacks against government troops 
in isolated areas. Some small groups may have turned to 
banditry. Also targets Cambodian and ethnic Vietnamese 
villagers and occasionally has kidnapped and killed foreigners 
traveling in remote rural areas.
    Strength: Fewer than 500, possibly no more than 100.
    Location/Area of Operation: The Khmer Rouge operates in 
outlying provinces in Cambodia, particularly in the northwest 
along the border with Thailand.
    External Aid: The Khmer Rouge currently does not receive 
external assistance.

                                  pkk

    (see Kurdistan Workers' Party)

         popular front for the liberation of palestine (pflp)*

    Description: Marxist-Leninist group founded in 1967 by 
George Habash as a member of the PLO. Joined the Alliance of 
Palestinian Forces (APF) to oppose the Declaration of 
Principles signed in 1993 and has suspended participation in 
the PLO. Broke away from the APF, along with the DFLP, in 1996 
over ideological differences. Has made limited moves toward 
merging with the DFLP since the mid-1990s.
    Activities: Committed numerous international terrorist 
attacks during the 1970s. Since 1978 has conducted numerous 
attacks against Israeli or moderate Arab targets, including 
killing a settler and her son in December 1996.
    Strength: Some 800.
    Location/Area of Operation: Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and the 
occupied territories.
    External Aid: Receives most of its financial and military 
assistance from Syria and Libya.

  popular front for the liberation of palestine-general command (pflp-
                                  gc)*

    Description: Split from the PFLP in 1968, claiming it 
wanted to focus more on fighting and less on politics. 
Violently opposed to Arafat's PLO. Led by Ahmad Jabril, a 
former captain in the Syrian Army. Closely tied to both Syria 
and Iran.
    Activities: Has conducted numerous cross-border terrorist 
attacks into Israel using unusual means, such as hot-air 
balloons and motorized hang gliders.
    Strength: Several hundred.
    Location/Area of Operation: Headquartered in Damascus with 
bases in Lebanon and cells in Europe.
    External Aid: Receives logistic and military support from 
Syria and financial support from Iran.

                provisional irish republican army (pira)

    (see Irish Republican Army)

                                al-qaida

    Description: Established by Usama Bin Ladin about 1990 to 
bring together Arabs who fought in Afghanistan against the 
Soviet invasion. Helped finance, recruit, transport, and train 
Sunni Islamic extremists for the Afghan resistance. Current 
goal is to ``reestablish the Muslim State'' throughout the 
world. Works with allied Islamic extremist groups to overthrow 
regimes it deems ``non-Islamic'' and remove Westerners from 
Muslim countries. Issued statement under banner of ``The World 
Islamic Front for Jihad Against The Jews and Crusaders'' in 
February 1998, saying it was the duty of all Muslims to kill US 
citizens, civilian or military, and their allies everywhere.
    Activities: Conducted the bombings of the US Embassies in 
Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on 7 August that 
killed at least 301 persons and injured more than 5,000 others. 
Claims to have shot down US helicopters and killed US 
servicemen in Somalia in 1993 and to have conducted three 
bombings targeted against the US troop presence in Aden, Yemen 
in December 1992. Linked to plans for attempted terrorist 
operations, including the assassination of the Pope during his 
visit to Manila in late1994; simultaneous bombings of the US 
and Israeli Embassies in Manila and other Asian capitals in 
late 1994; the midair bombing of a dozen US trans-Pacific 
flights in 1995; and a plan to kill President Clinton during a 
visit to the Philippines in early 1995. Continues to train, 
finance, and provide logistic support to terrorist groups that 
support these goals.
    Strength: May have from several hundred to several thousand 
members. Also serves as the core of a loose umbrella 
organization that includes many Sunni Islamic extremist groups, 
including factions of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Gama'at 
al-Islamiyya, and the Harakat ul-Mujahidin.
    Location/Area of Operation: The Embassy bombings in Nairobi 
and Dar es Salaam underscore al-Qaida's global reach. Bin Ladin 
and his key lieutenants reside in Afghanistan, and the group 
maintains terrorist training camps there.
    External Aid: Bin Ladin, son of a billionaire Saudi family, 
is said to have inherited around $300 million that he uses to 
finance the group. Al-Qaida also maintains money-making 
businesses, collects donations from like-minded supporters, and 
illicitly siphons funds from donations to Muslim charitable 
organizations.

         qibla and people against gangsterism and drugs (pagad)

    Description: Qibla is a small radical Islamic group led by 
Achmad Cassiem, who was inspired by Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini. 
Cassiem founded Qibla in the 1980s, seeking to establish an 
Islamic state in South Africa. PAGAD began in 1996 as a 
community anticrime group fighting drug lords in Cape Town's 
Cape Flats section. PAGAD now shares Qibla's anti-Western 
stance as well as some members and leadership. Though distinct, 
the media often treat the two groups as one.
    Activities: Qibla routinely protests US policies toward the 
Muslim world and uses radio station 786 to promote its message 
and mobilze Muslims. PAGAD is suspected of conducting 170 
bombings and 18 other violent actions in 1998 alone. Qibla and 
PAGAD may have masterminded the bombing on 15 August of the 
Cape Town Planet Hollywood. Often use the front names Muslims 
Against Global Oppression (MAGO) and Muslims Against 
Illegitimate Leaders (MAIL) when anti-Western campaigns are 
launched.
    Strength: Qibla is estimated at 250 members. Police 
estimate there are at least 50 gunmen in PAGAD, and the size of 
PAGAD-organized demonstrations suggests it has considerably 
more adherents than Qibla.
    Location/Area of Operation: Operate mainly in the CapeTown 
area, South Africa's foremost tourist venue.
    External Aid: Probably have ties to Islamic extremists in 
the Middle East.

                            real ira (rira)

    a.k.a: True IRA
    Description: Formed in February-March 1998 as clandestine 
armed wing of the 32-County Sovereignty Movement, a ``political 
pressure group'' dedicated to removing British forces from 
Northern Ireland and unifying Ireland. The 32-County 
Sovereignty Movement opposed Sinn Fein's adoption in September 
1997 of the Mitchell principles of democracy and nonviolence 
and opposed the amendment in May 1998 of Articles 2 and 3 of 
the Irish Constitution, which lay claim to Northern Ireland. 
Former IRA ``quartermaster general'' Mickey McKevitt leads the 
group; Bernadette Sands-McKevitt, his common-law wife, is the 
vice-chair of the 32-County Sovereignty Movement.
    Activities: Bombings, assassinations, and robberies. Most 
Real IRA activists are former IRA members; the group has 
inherited a wealth of experience in terrorist tactics and 
bombmaking. Targets include British military and police in 
Northern Ireland and Northern Irish Protestant communities. 
Claimed responsibility for the car bomb attack in Omagh, 
Northern Ireland on 15 August, which killed 29 and injured 220 
persons. Announced a cease-fire after that bombing. Has 
attempted several unsuccessful bomb attacks on the UK mainland.
    Strength: About 70, plus limited support from IRA 
hardliners dissatisfied with the current IRA cease-fire and 
other republican sympathizers.
    Location/Area of Operation: Northern Ireland, Ireland, 
Great Britain.
    External Aid: Suspected of receiving funds from 
sympathizers in the United States. Press reports claim Real IRA 
leaders also have sought support from Libya.

             revolutionary armed forces of colombia (farc)*

    Description: The largest, best-trained, and best-equipped 
insurgent organization in Colombia. Established in 1964 as a 
rural-based, pro-Soviet guerrilla army. Organized along 
military lines and includes several urban fronts. Has been 
anti-United States since its inception. The FARC agreed in 1998 
to enter into preliminary peace talks with the Colombian 
Government. The Pastrana administration demilitarized five 
large rural municipalities to meet FARC conditions for peace 
talks. (President Pastrana traveled to this area on 7 January 
1999 to inaugurate peace talks with guerrilla leaders, although 
the FARC's senior-most leader failed to attend.)
    Activities: Armed attacks against Colombian political, 
economic, military, and police targets. Many members pursue 
criminal activities, carrying out hundreds of kidnappings for 
profit annually. Foreign citizens often are targets of FARC 
kidnappings. Group has well-documented ties to narcotics 
traffickers, principally through the provision of armed 
protection for coca and poppy cultivation and narcotics 
production facilities, as well as through attacks on government 
narcotics eradication efforts. Also began in 1998 a bombing 
campaign against oil pipelines.
    Strength: Approximately 8,000-12,000 armed combatants and 
an unknown number of supporters, mostly in rural areas.
    Location/Area of Operation: Colombia, with occasional 
operations in border areas of Venezuela, Panama, Peru, Brazil, 
and Ecuador.
    External Aid: None.

         revolutionary organization 17 november (17 november)*

    Description: Radical leftist group established in 1975 and 
named for the student uprising in Greece in November 1973 that 
protested the military regime. Anti-Greek establishment, anti-
US, anti-Turkey, anti-NATO, and committed to the ouster of US 
bases, removal of Turkish military presence from Cyprus, and 
severing of Greece's ties to NATO and the European Union (EU). 
Possibly affiliated with other Greek terrorist groups.
    Activities: Initial attacks were assassinations of senior 
US officials and Greek public figures. Added bombings in 1980s. 
Since 1990 has expanded targets to include EU facilities and 
foreign firms investing in Greece and has added improvised 
rocket attacks to its methods.
    Strength: Unknown, but presumed to be small.
    Location/Area of Operation: Athens, Greece.
    External Aid: Unknown.

        revolutionary people's liberation party/front (dhkp/c)*

    a.k.a.: Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left), Dev Sol
    Description: Originally formed in 1978 as Devrimci Sol, or 
Dev Sol, a splinter faction of the Turkish People's Liberation 
Party/Front. Renamed in 1994 after factional infighting, it 
espouses a Marxist ideology and is virulently anti-US and anti-
NATO. Finances its activities chiefly through armed robberies 
and extortion.
    Activities: Since the late 1980s has concentrated attacks 
against current and retired Turkish security and military 
officials. Began a new campaign against foreign interests in 
1990. Assassinated two US military contractors and wounded a US 
Air Force officer to protest the Gulf war. Launched rockets at 
US Consulate in Istanbul in 1992. Assassinated prominent 
Turkish businessman in early 1996, its first significant 
terrorist act as DHKP/C.
    Strength: Unknown.
    Location/Area of Operation: Conducts attacks in Turkey--
primarily in Istanbul--Ankara, Izmir, and Adana. Raises funds 
in Western Europe.
    External Aid: Unknown.

                 revolutionary people's struggle (ela)*

    Description: Extreme leftist group that developed from 
opposition to the military junta that ruled Greece from 1967 to 
1974. Formed in 1971, ELA is a self-described revolutionary, 
anti-capitalist, and anti-imperialist group that has declared 
its opposition to ``imperialist domination, exploitation, and 
oppression.'' Strongly anti-US and seeks the removal of US 
military forces from Greece.
    Activities: Since 1974 has conducted bombings against Greek 
Government and economic targets as well as US military and 
business facilities. In 1986 stepped up attacks on Greek 
Government and commercial interests. Raid on a safehouse in 
1990 revealed a weapons cache and direct contacts with other 
Greek terrorist groups, including 1 May and Revolutionary 
Solidarity. In 1991, ELA and 1 May claimed joint responsibility 
for over 20 bombings. Greek police believe they have 
established a link between the ELA and the Revolutionary 
Organization 17 November. Has not claimed responsibility for a 
terrorist attack since January 1995.
    Strength: Unknown.
    Location/Area of Operation: Greece.
    External Aid: No known foreign sponsors.

                  sendero luminoso (shining path, sl)*

    Description: Larger of Peru's two insurgencies, SL is among 
the world's most ruthless guerrilla organizations. Formed in 
the late 1960s by then university professor Abimael Guzman. 
Stated goal is to destroy existing Peruvian institutions and 
replace them with peasant revolutionary regime. Also wants to 
rid Peru of foreign influences. Guzman's capture in September 
1992 was a major blow, as were arrests of other SL leaders in 
1995, defections, and Peruvian President Fujimori's amnesty 
program for repentant terrorists.
    Activities: Has engaged in particularly brutal forms of 
terrorism, including the indiscriminate use of bombs. Conducted 
fewer attacks in 1998, generally limited to rural areas. Almost 
every institution in Peru has been a target of SL violence. Has 
bombed diplomatic missions of several countries in Peru, 
including the US Embassy. Conducts bombing campaigns and 
selective assassinations. Has attacked US businesses since its 
inception. Involved in cocaine trade.
    Strength: Approximately 1,500 to 2,500 armed militants; 
larger number of supporters, mostly in rural areas.
    Location/Area of Operation: Rural based, with few violent 
attacks in the capital.
    External Aid: None.

                              17 november

    (see Revolutionary Organization 17 November)

                             sikh terrorism

    Description: Sikh terrorism is sponsored by expatriate and 
Indian Sikh groups who want to carve out an independent Sikh 
state called Khalistan (Land of the Pure) from Indian 
territory. Active groups include Babbar Khalsa, International 
Sikh Youth Federation, Dal Khalsa, Bhinderanwala Tiger Force. A 
previously unknown group, the Saheed Khalsa Force, claimed 
credit for the marketplace bombings in New Delhi in 1997.
    Activities: Attacks in India are mounted against Indian 
officials and facilities, other Sikhs, and Hindus; they include 
assassinations, bombings, and kidnappings. Attacks have dropped 
markedly since 1992, as Indian security forces have killed or 
captured numerous senior Sikh militant leaders and have 
conducted successful army, paramilitary, and police operations. 
Many low-intensity bombings that might be attributable to Sikh 
extremists now occur without claims of credit.
    Strength: Unknown.
    Location/Area of Operation: Northern India, western Europe, 
Southeast Asia, and North America.
    External Aid: Militant cells are active internationally and 
extremists gather funds from overseas Sikh communities. Sikh 
expatriates have formed a variety of international 
organizations that lobby for the Sikh cause overseas. Most 
prominent are the World Sikh Organization and the International 
Sikh Youth Federation.

               tupac amaru revolutionary movement (mrta)*

    Description: Traditional Marxist-Leninist revolutionary 
movement formed in 1983. Aims to rid Peru of imperialism and 
establish Marxist regime. Has suffered from defections and 
government counterterrorist successes in addition to infighting 
and loss of leftist support.
    Activities: Bombings, kidnappings, ambushes, 
assassinations. Previously responsible for large number of 
anti-US attacks; recent activity has dropped off dramatically. 
Most members have been jailed. Nonetheless, in December 1996, 
14 MRTA members overtook the Japanese Ambassador's residence in 
Lima during a diplomatic reception, capturing hundreds. 
Government forces stormed the residence in April, 1997 rescuing 
all but one of the remaining hostages. Has not conducted a 
significant terrorist operation since then.
    Strength: Believed to have fewer than 100 remaining 
members.
    Location/Area of Operation: Peru.
    External Aid: None.

                                al ummah

    Description: Radical Indian Muslim group founded in 1992 by 
S.A. Basha.
    Activities: Believed responsible for the Coimbatore 
bombings in Southern India in February 1998. Basha and 30 of 
his followers were arrested and await trial for those bombings.
    Strength: Unknown. No estimate available.
    Location/Area of Operation: Southern India.
    External Aid: Unknown.

                               zviadists

    Description: Extremist supporters of deceased former 
Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Following Gamsakhurdia's 
ouster in 1991, his supporters launched a revolt against his 
successor, Eduard Shevardnadze. Suppressed in late 1993, and 
Gamsakhurdia committed suicide in January 1994. Some 
Gamsakhurdia sympathizers have formed a weak legal opposition 
in Georgia, but others remain violently opposed to 
Shevardnadze's rule and seek to overthrow him. Some 
Gamsakhurdia government officials fled to Russia following 
Gamsakhurdia's ouster and now use Russia as a base of 
operations to bankroll anti-Shevardnadze activities.
    Activities: Bombings and kidnappings. Attempted two 
assassinations against Shevardnadze in August 1995 and February 
1998. Took UN personnel hostage following the February 1998 
attempt, but released the hostages unharmed.
    Strength: Unknown.
    Location/Area of Operation: Georgia, especially Mingrelia, 
and Russia.
    External Aid: May have received support and training in 
Chechen terrorist training camps. Chechen mercenaries 
participated in the assassination attempt against Shevardnadze 
in February 1998.
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Appendix D: Extraditions and Renditions of Terrorists to the U.S. 1993-
                                  1998

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                             Extradition  or
             Date                                  Name                         Rendition             From
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
March 1993....................  Mahmoud Abu Halima                          Extradition        a
                                (February 1993 World Trade Center bombing)
July 1993.....................  Mohammed Ali Rezaq                          Rendition          Nigeria
                                (November 1985 hijacking of Egyptair 648)
February 1995.................  Ramzi Ahmed Yousef                          Extradition        Pakistan
                                (January 1995 Far East bomb plot, February
                                 1993 World Trade Center bombing
April 1995....................  Abdul Hakim Murad                           Rendition          Philippines
                                (January 1995 Far East bomb plot)
August 1995...................  Eyad Mahmoud Ismail Najim                   Extradition        Jordan
                                (February 1993 World Trade Center bombing)
December 1995.................  Wali Khan Amin Shah                         Rendition          a
                                (January 1995 Far East bomb plot)
September 1996................  Tsutomu Shirosaki                           Rendition          a
                                (May 1986 attack on US Embassy Jakarta)
June 1997.....................  Mir Aimal Kansi                             Rendition          a
                                (January 1993 shooting outside CIA
                                 headquarters)
June 1998.....................  Mohammed Rashid                             Rendition          a
                                (August 1982 Pan Am bombing)
August 1998...................  Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-Owhali              Rendition          Kenya
                                (August 1998 US Embassy bombing in Kenya)
August 1998...................  Mohamed Sadeek Odeh                         Rendition          Kenya
                                (August 1998 U.S. Embassy bombing in
                                 Kenya)
December 1998.................  Mamdouh Mahmud Salim                        Extradition        Germany
                                (August 1998 East African bombings)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a Country not disclosed.

 b. Antiterrorism Assistance Program: Annual Report--Fiscal Year 1997 
                [Pursuant to Public Law 99-83, sec. 502]

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                   c. Foreign Terrorist Organizations

        Designation and list of foreign terrorist organizations

             Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism

                        U.S. Department of State

                            October 8, 1997

                            The Designations

   The Secretary of State has designated 30 groups as 
        foreign terrorist organizations. Her action sends a 
        powerful signal that the United States will not 
        tolerate support for international terrorism.
   The Secretary acted under the authority provided by 
        the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
        1996, with the concurrence of the Attorney General and 
        the Secretary of the Treasury.
   On October 1, the State Department notified Congress 
        of the Secretary's intent to designate 30 foreign 
        terrorist organizations. Congress also received the 
        factual bases for her decisions on each of the 30 
        designations.
   A formal announcement of the designations was placed 
        in the Federal Register on October 8, and the 
        Department of the Treasury has notified financial 
        institutions to block funds of the designated 
        organization.
   The designations are a significant addition to our 
        enforcement tools against international terrorists and 
        their supporters. They supplement the Executive Order 
        the President signed in January 1995 (and has renewed 
        annually), which blocks funds of 12 Middle Eastern 
        organizations that use or threaten to use violence to 
        disrupt the Middle East Peace Process.

                           Legal Consequences

   The 1996 law makes it a criminal offense to provide 
        funds or other forms of material support or resources, 
        such as weapons or safehouses, to designated foreign 
        terrorist organizations.
    --The law applies to anyone within the United States or 
            subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
    --Violators are subject to fines and up to 10 years in 
            prison.
   Aliens abroad who are members or representatives of 
        designated foreign terrorist organizations are 
        ineligible for visas to the U.S. and are subject to 
        exclusion from the U.S.
   U.S. financial institutions are required to block 
        those funds of designated foreign terrorist 
        organizations or their agents over which they have 
        possession or control. They are subject to civil 
        penalties and possible criminal prosecution if they do 
        not conform with the law and regulations.

                              The Process

   The designations are subject to judicial review, as 
        the statute required, and extensive administrative 
        records were created to substantiate each 
        recommendation to the Secretary of State. A major 
        interagency effort included the examination of 
        thousands of pages of documents and the preparation of 
        a complete administrative record on each group.
    --The administrative records are and will remain 
            classified. Unclassified descriptions of terrorist 
            organizations, including those formally designated, 
            appear in the annex of the Department's annual 
            report, Patterns of Global Terrorism, which is 
            available on the State Department's web site.
   The designations expire in two years unless renewed. 
        The law also allows groups to be added at any time 
        following a decision by the Secretary, in consultation 
        with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the 
        Treasury. Designations can also be revoked if the 
        Secretary determines that there are grounds for doing 
        so and notifies Congress. Congress can also pass 
        legislation to revoke designations.

                               Background

   The law responded to concerns that foreign terrorist 
        organizations were raising money in the United States. 
        Some groups have tried to broaden their financial base 
        because state sponsors were becoming less reliable 
        sources of money.
   Some terrorist organizations have tried to portray 
        themselves as raising money for charitable activities 
        such as clinics or schools. These activities have 
        helped recruit supporters and activists.
   Congress noted in the statement of findings in the 
        legislation:
    --Foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity 
            are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any 
            contribution to such an organization facilitates 
            that conduct.'' (Section 301(a)(7)).
    --Therefore, any contribution to a foreign terrorist 
            organization, regardless of the intended purpose, 
            is prohibited by the statute, unless the 
            contribution is limited to medicine or religious 
            materials.

                    Foreign Terrorist Organizations

             office of the coordinator for counterterrorism

                 department of state, october 8, 1997.

   Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
   Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
   Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
   Aum Shinrikyo (Aum)
   Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)
   Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine-
        Hawatmeh Faction (DFLP)
   HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)
   Harakat ul-Ansar (HUA)
   Hizballah (Party of God)
   Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG)
   Japanese Red Army (JRA)
   al-Jihad
   Kach
   Kahane Chai
   Khmer Rouge
   Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)
   Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
   Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front Dissidents (FPMR/D)
   Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK, MKO)
   National Liberation Army (ELN)
   Palestine Islamic Jihad-Shaqaqi Faction (PIJ)
   Palestine Liberation Front-Abu Abbas Faction (PLF)
   Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
   Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-
        General Command (PFLP-GC)
   Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
   Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November)
   Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/
        C)
   Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA)
   Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL)
   Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)

  d. Report To Congress Concerning the Administration's Comprehensive 
Counterterrorism Strategy: Agency Resource Requirements, April 29, 1997 
                        (unclassified excerpts)

                    3. Agency Resource Requirements

                        a. department of justice

    The Department of Justice is requesting $417,683,000 and 
2,984 positions (1,579 agents and attorneys) in FY 1998 for 
counterterrorism programs, an increase of more than $50,000,000 
over the FY 1997 appropriations level. The Department's 
counterterrorism budget has increased 360 percent since 1993, 
reflecting the heightened threat from domestic and 
international terrorism and the substantial expansion in the 
Department's counterterrorism responsibilities pursuant to PDD-
39, the 1996 anti-terrorism law, the President's Executive 
order on critical infrastructure protection, and recent 
Congressional appropriations initiatives. (U)
    A substantial portion of the increase in FY 1998 is 
required to annualize the enhancements provided in the FY 1997 
appropriations process, which more than doubled the 
Department's counterterrorism resources. The Department is 
requesting a limited number of enhancements in FY 1998, 
primarily to bolster the Department's ability to locate, 
apprehend and prosecute persons suspected of terrorist 
activities. (U)
    Federal Bureau of Investigation. In FY 1998, the FBI is 
requesting $287,598,000 for 2,632 positions (1,350 agents) and 
2,592 FTEs for counterterrorism activities, an increase of more 
than $40,000,000 over the FY 1997 enacted level. The increase 
is required to annualize the enhancements provided in the FY 
1997 counterterrorism appropriations amendment. In addition, 
the 1998 budget requests $6,000,000 for additional regional 
computer crime squads. (U)
    The resource requirements of the FBI are dictated largely' 
by its responsibilities under PDD-39. The FBI has lead-agency 
responsibility for investigating terrorist acts in the United 
States by foreign or domestic terrorist groups and for such 
attacks against U.S. citizens or interests abroad; providing an 
operational. response to terrorist incidents in the United 
States; leading and managing the Domestic Emergency Support 
Team in domestic incidents; collecting, analyzing and 
disseminating intelligence on terrorist groups in the United 
States, including threat warnings; and preventing, detecting 
and deterring terrorist attacks involving weapons of mass 
destruction. (U)
    To meet the FBI's responsibility to investigate terrorist 
acts committed in the United States or directed at U.S. 
citizens or interests abroad, the FY 1997 counterterrorism 
appropriations amendment provided $27,800,000 and 331 positions 
for emerging domestic terrorism; $2,700,000 for Joint Terrorism 
Task Force matters; and $17,900,000 and 216 positions for 
infrastructure vulnerability and key asset matters. The FBI's 
FY 1998 budget request seeks annualized base-level funding for 
each of these and related programs funded in FY 1997. (U)
    The FBI also is responsible for identifying critical 
national information and other infrastructure and developing 
plans to harden such targets against terrorist attack and/or 
respond to actual terrorist attacks. The FBI's Critical 
Infrastructure Threat Assessment Center (CITAC) and 
infrastructure vulnerability/key asset program require 
continued funding for the 63 CITAC and 216 key asset positions 
provided in FY 1997. (U)
    To enhance FBI's ability to coordinate the collection, 
analysis and dissemination of counterterrorism information, the 
FBI is seeking annualized base-level funding for 31 positions 
in the counterterrorism Center, continued funding for state and 
local participation in the Center, and two field translation 
centers staffed with contract translators. (U)
    The FBI resource requirements discussed above are in 
addition to the $77,140,000 enhancement provided in the 1995 
supplemental terrorism bill, including initial funding for the 
FBI's Counterterrorism Center ($10,000,000), evidence response 
teams ($2,900,000), lab equipment modernization ($2,100,000), 
427 new positions for counterterrorism investigations, 
intelligence collection and analysis, and technical support 
($48,040,000) . Approximately $52,100,000 of the 1995 
supplement appropriation had been obligated as of January 31, 
1997, with the multi-year capital projects constituting the 
balance of the unobligated funds. (U)
    Criminal Division. The Department is requesting 82 
positions, 55 attorneys, and $11,064,000 for the Criminal 
Division's counterterrorism activities. This represents a 
program increase of 22 positions, 10 attorneys, and $3,113,000 
from the Division's FY 1998 base level. (U)
    The Criminal Division plays an important role in 
implementing the components of the terrorism strategy involving 
the swift investigation, apprehension and prosecution of 
domestic and international terrorists; the identification and 
protection of national information infrastructure; and the 
training of foreign and U.S. State and local law enforcement 
personnel in counterterrorism investigations and prosecutions. 
The Division also maintains a cadre of experienced prosecutors 
with expertise in terrorism cases who handle major terrorism 
cases together with Assistant United States Attorneys in the 
particular districts. (U)
    Congress recently ratified twelve new extradition and 
mutual legal assistance treaties, including the first 
extradition treaty with an Arab country (Jordan) . Two 
additional criminal Division attorneys are needed to address 
the anticipated increase in requests for extradition and/or 
mutual legal assistance under these new agreements as well as 
to handle the explosive growth in requests from federal, state 
and local agencies under existing international agreements. (U)
    The Division also is requesting funding to expand its 
presence overseas in areas where an on-the-ground presence will 
facilitate more effective cooperation in sensitive extradition 
cases and cooperative law enforcement investigations. Three new 
attorney positions are sought for placement in the following 
strategic locations: Manila to support East Asia, Brasilia to 
support South America, and Athens to support the Middle East. 
In addition, with the assumption by the United States of the 
Presidency of the Eight in 1997, and as summit agendas focus 
increasingly on terrorism, the Criminal Division will be relied 
upon, and has requested one attorney and two support positions, 
to provide support and assistance to the myriad task forces 
originating front the Eight. (U)
    Similarly, the Division is requesting new funds for the 
creation of an Analysis Unit in the Office of International 
Affairs. The Analysis Unit will collect, organize, and 
critically analyze sensitive international law enforcement and 
terrorism information, with the goal of developing specific 
enforcement strategies for particular countries, regions, or 
forms of terrorist and criminal activity. The Division's FY 
1998 request seeks nine positions (five analysts and four 
support staff) for this new unit. (U)
    Last year, Congress approved the creation of a new 
Computer, Crime Section within the Division. The Section is 
coordinating and/or participating in the implementation of key 
aspects of the Administration's effort to identify and protect 
the national information infrastructure. Additional resources 
also are needed to prosecute computer terrorists, strengthen 
network integrity, cooperate with foreign entities and 
governments in efforts' to harmonize computer crime laws, and 
eliminate procedural impediments in international computer 
terrorism investigations. The Division's FY 1998 budget request 
seeks funding for an additional four attorneys and one support 
staff for the Computer Crime Section. (U)
    U.S. Attorneys. Additional resources for the U.S. 
Attorneys' Offices are needed to respond to the increasing 
number of cases involving radi ' cal militias and extremist 
groups, the use of explosives, and other domestic terrorism 
matters. Moreover, to address the need for greater coordination 
of counterterrorism efforts at the district level, the 
Department's FY 1998 budget request seeks $3,100,000 and 18 
additional AUSAs for the appointment of a terrorism coordinator 
in U.S. Attorneys' Offices around the country. The coordinator 
would be responsible for assessing the terrorist threat in 
their district; working with federal, state and local officials 
to prepare and update emergency response plans for terrorist 
attacks; and effectively prosecuting terrorism cases in their 
district. (U)
    Counterterrorism Fund. Recent experience has demonstrated 
the need for a mechanism to marshal massive and sustained 
counterterrorism resources in response to specific terrorist 
incidents or threats, and much of the U.S. strategy focuses on 
the continuing development of such capabilities it the tactical 
and operational level. The creation of the Counterterrorism 
Fund in the 1995 supplement appropriation provided an effective 
resource response mechanism for the Department of Justice, 
while ensuring adequate accountability and oversight of 
counter-terrorism spending. The Administration is requesting 
$29,450,000 for the Counterterrorism Fund in FY 1998, the same 
as the FY 1997 appropriations level. (U)
    Other DOJ Programs. Other DOJ components have important 
responsibilities under PDD-39 and the U.S. terrorism strategy, 
including the Office of intelligence Policy and Review 
(assisting in the investigation of terrorism cases under the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) ; Executive Office for 
Immigration Review (expeditiously expelling suspected 
terrorists who are in the United States unlawfully) ; and 
office of Justice Programs (providing funds to state and local 
law enforcement agencies to bolster their preparedness in the 
event of a terrorist attack, particularly involving chemical or 
biological weapons). (U)
    Additional DOJ components with responsibilities under the 
strategy are the Justice Management Division (security and 
emergency planning staff); Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (arrest and exclusion and/or incarceration of foreign 
alien terrorists); U.S. National Central Bureau-Interpol; Drug 
Enforcement Administration (protection of DEA facilities and 
personnel in the United States and abroad); and the U.S. 
Marshals Service (security at high-risk facilities and 
proceedings). Each of these components received substantial 
funding increases in FYs 1996 or 1997, and the Department is 
seeking an increase in appropriations to provide full-year 
funding for each of these components. (U)

                         b. department of state

    PDD-39 continued the designation of the State Department as 
the lead agency for international terrorism outside U.S. 
territory and within the jurisdiction of another nation. State 
also is responsible for counterterrorism training programs for 
foreign security personnel; operating the international 
terrorism rewards program; and ensuring that visas to enter the 
United States are not issued to persons involved in terrorist 
activities. In addition, the Department bears the 
responsibility for protecting diplomatic facilities and U.S. 
government personnel against terrorist attack. (U)
    The State Department's expenditures for countering 
terrorism include both identifiable budget items such as those 
described below, and difficult-to-quantify efforts by various 
elements of the Department and overseas missions on diplomatic 
activities related to countering terrorism, or dealing with a 
specific terrorist incident. For FY 1998, the State 
Department's request for specific components and programs is 
$325 million, an increase of about $11 million above the FY 
1997 estimates. (U)
    Policy-level guidance and coordination for international 
terrorism is the responsibility of the Department's Coordinator 
for Counterterrorism. Approximately $2,250,000 is required in 
FY 1998 for salaries and expenses, equipment, and deployment 
and exercises. Further, the State Department is requesting 
$19,000,000 for the Antiterrorism Assistance Training (ATA) 
program, $1,800,000 for the Department's contribution of the 
interagency counterterrorism research and development program, 
and $1,500,000 for the rewards program. (U)
    The Department requires $600,000 in FY 1998 funds to 
support the TIPOFF initiative, which serves as the interface 
between the highly classified intelligence products of U.S. 
agencies and U.S. personnel and consular officials, who must 
have access to such information in adjudicating visa 
applications and requests to enter the United States. (U)
    The Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) 
provides the security platform for the protection of U.S. 
government personnel, national security information, and 
diplomatic facilities under the authority of the Chiefs of 
Mission overseas, as well as for the protection of State 
Department personnel and facilities in the United States. The 
Department is requesting $285,200,000 in FY 1998 for diplomatic 
security and law enforcement operations, including DS 
operations, along with $7,900,000 to reimburse state and local 
jurisdictions for ``extraordinary'' protective services 
associated with the activities of foreign missions and 
officials. The Security and Maintenance of United States 
Missions account supports overseas buildings which must be 
built and maintained to withstand terrorist attacks. In 
addition, for FY 1998, $5,000,000 is requested specifically for 
physical security upgrades for buildings. (U)
    The Fiscal Year 1997 Counterterrorism Budget Amendment, 
provided an additional $38 million in no-year funding to help 
combat the threat of terrorism worldwide, especially in the 
Middle East, and to make an initial down payment on the 
security infrastructure gap that has to addressed over the next 
several years. The operating portion of that amendment, which 
is essential for continuing the security improvements now 
underway, has been included in the FY 98 request. (U)

                        c. department of defense

    The Department of Defense spends approximately $3.5 to 4.0 
billion each year to combat overseas and domestic terrorism. 
DOD's combatting terrorism program consists of all actions 
taken to oppose terrorism including defensive measures used to 
reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts and offensive measures 
taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. The program 
includes resources (personnel and dollars) for physical 
security; security and investigative matters, 
counterintelligence; and counterterrorism. The effort excludes 
costs associated with counterproliferation, information 
assurance and intelligence activities since these activities do 
not directly focus upon combatting terrorism. (U)
    In addition, DOD received $100 million in FY 1997 for 
defense against weapons of mass destruction. The FY 1998/FY 
1999 President's Budget submission includes $49.5 million in FY 
1998 and $52.1 million in FY 1999 to continue to provide 
emergency response preparedness, first responder training, and 
assistance to metropolitan area agencies, and to conduct 
exercises and preparedness tests in coordination with federal, 
state, and local agencies. It is DOD's intention to transition 
the first responder training and expert assistance programs to 
other agencies after FY 1999 as allowed for in section 1412 of 
the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 1997. 
Similarly, DOD intends to fund exercises and preparedness tests 
only through FY 2001 in accordance with section 1415 of the 
NDAA. (U)
    Approximately $350 million of the Administration's $1.1 
billion supplemental to the FY 1997 budget was earmarked for 
DOD, including measures to tighten security at U.S. facilities 
in the Persian Gulf; general overseas facilities and force 
protection upgrades; and training, awareness, and other 
programs designed to combat terrorism. (U)

                        d. intelligence agencies

    Although the preparation of this Report was coordinated 
through appropriate channels within the U.S. intelligence 
community,. the Report does not address the counterterrorism 
resource requirements of the Central Intelligence Agency or 
other components of the National Foreign Intelligence Program. 
(U)
    Pursuant to Executive Order 12333, the Director of Central 
Intelligence is responsible for developing an annual budget 
specifically for the NFIP components, which is reviewed by the 
Executive Branch and Congress outside the normal budget 
process. A substantial portion of the counterterrorism assets 
of U.S. intelligence agencies fall within the NFIP. Persons 
interested in reviewing the terrorism resource requirements in 
the NFIP are referred to the classified NFIP budget and 
analysis prepared by the staff elements within the DCI. (U)

  e. PLO Commitments Compliance Act--Report to Congress, November 20, 
                                  1997

    Report to Congress pursuant to Title VIII of Public Law 101-246 
   [Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1990-91], as 
                                amended

    This document is submitted in accordance with Title VIII of 
Public Law 101-246 (the PLO Commitments Compliance Act of 
1989--PLOCCA), as amended. This report covers the period from 
the date of submission of the last combined PLOCCA/Middle East 
Peace Facilitation Act (MEPFA) report on January 22, 1997 to 
November 20, 1997.
    This report describes actions and statements of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and, as relevant, the 
performance of the Palestinian Authority (PA) with respect to 
commitments set forth in Chairman Arafat's September 9, 1993 
letters to Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and Norwegian Foreign 
Minister Holst and those in, and resulting from, the good faith 
implementation of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) and 
subsequent agreements. Under the commitments in these letters 
and accords, the PLO, inter alia, (1) recognizes Israel's right 
to exist in peace and security; (2) accepts UN Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338; (3) commits itself to the Middle East 
peace process and to a peaceful resolution of its conflict with 
Israel; (4) undertakes to submit to the Palestine National 
Council (PNC) changes to the PLO Covenant necessary to 
eliminate articles that deny Israel's right to exist; (5) 
renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence, 
states that it will call on Palestinians to refrain from 
violence, and assumes responsibility over all PLO elements and 
personnel to assure their compliance, prevent violations and 
discipline violators; and (6) agrees to strengthen cooperation 
with Israel on a wide range of security issues. Even though a 
MEPFA report is not required at this time, because of 
Congressional interest this report also addresses MEPFA topics.

                    Incidents of Violence/Terrorism

    The month following the signing on January 15, 1997 of the 
Hebron redeployment agreement was relatively calm and free of 
violence. In accordance with the terms of that agreement, 
Israel-Palestinian joint security patrols--suspended since the 
September 1996 violence--resumed operation. Tensions increased 
significantly, however, following announcement by Israel in 
late February that construction was to begin on the Har Homa/
Jebel Abu Ghunaym housing project in Jerusalem. Palestinian 
demonstrators in the West Bank and Gaza routinely clashed with 
settlers and Israeli security forces. While there were reports 
that the PA organized large-scale demonstrations in the major 
cities under its control, we have no evidence that the PA or 
Chairman Arafat at any time directed participants to use 
violence.
    As Israel-Palestinian confrontations grew in scope and 
intensity throughout March (Har Homa construction began March 
18), PA security and police forces were ordered to refrain from 
using arms or resorting to violence against Israeli forces, 
whatever the circumstances. As a result of the violent clashes 
between Palestinian and Israeli security forces near Hebron in 
September 1996, the PA confiscated weapons from Palestinian 
police in the West Bank. During the demonstrations this spring, 
the police in the West Bank were not issued arms in order to 
avoid an escalation of the conflict as had occurred in 
September 1996. Muhammad Dahlan, head of the Palestinian 
Preventive Security Organization in Gaza, stated ``I am 
certainly concerned about an outbreak of violence. We do not 
want an escalation which would only serve HAMAS and the Popular 
Front. However, we will not be able to prevent the protest 
activities. In any case, even if there are confrontations with 
Israel, we will not reach a situation in which firearms will be 
used, because this would only lead to casualties and exacerbate 
our relations. We will not permit anybody to use firearms or 
carry out terrorist attacks.''
    Confrontations diminished following the March 21 ``Cafe 
Apropos'' bombing in Tel Aviv (discussed below). However, a new 
and more violent series of demonstrations--primarily occurring 
on the separation line between Palestinian and Israeli-
controlled areas in the city of Hebron--followed the mid-June 
Congressional Concurrent Resolution expressing the sense of 
Congress regarding Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. 
Palestinian security forces were initially slow to respond to 
the increasing intensity of the clashes, which included 
incendiary and explosive devices thrown at Israeli forces.
    Israel claimed that Palestinian police were deliberately 
not acting as required by the Hebron accord to impose calm on 
the demonstrators and prevent confrontation. By mid-July, 
however, following the serious wounding of an Israeli soldier, 
the Palestinian police took up positions along the 
confrontation line and were able to reinstate calm in the city 
of Hebron and elsewhere. Senior IDF commanders and Israeli 
Defense Minister Mordechai praised the Palestinian security 
officers for their cooperation in bringing the situation under 
control.
    We have no information that any PLO element under Arafat's 
control was involved in terrorism during the period covered by 
this report. Nor do we have any information that the PLO has 
provided financial or material assistance or training to any 
group to carry out actions inconsistent with the Declaration of 
Principles. PLO rejectionist groups such as the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine (IPFLP) and the Democratic 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) do not participate 
in PLO decision-making and are beyond Arafat's political and 
physical control. These groups actively seek to undermine the 
Palestinian Authority and to disrupt the peace process. 
Statements made by leaders of these factions do not reflect 
official PLO policy.
    In March, the Government of Israel stated its belief that 
Arafat had given a ``green light'' to terror by failing to 
crack down on terrorist groups and signaling to these groups 
that the PA would not act against them. We do not have any 
information to suggest that a ``green light'' was given, but it 
is clear that a sufficiently ``red light'' was not given 
either. We have made clear to the PA that anything less than a 
serious, sustained and concrete effort to uproot the terrorist 
infrastructure is unacceptable.
    In addition to the ongoing confrontations between 
Palestinians and Israeli security forces, the following is a 
list of incidents of violence and terrorism in relevant areas 
during the period from January 22 through November 20, 1997:

6 March.
    A settler reported that Palestinians tried to murder him 
and that the assailants escaped in a car in the direction of 
Hebron. The man sustained light injuries. The car was found 
abandoned near the entrance to Hebron.
    In Jerusalem a 50 year old man was stabbed near the King 
David Hotel by a young Arab man. A suspect was later detained 
by Israeli authorities and the attack was deemed to be criminal 
in nature.

21
    March A bomber killed himself and 3 others at the Cafe 
Apropos in Tel Aviv. A HAMAS caller to the Israeli Channel 1 
Television news room said his ``organization carried out the 
operation but was not responsible for the action. The 
responsible party is the Government of Israel which attacked 
Jerusalem.''

23 March
    A fire bomb was thrown at an IDF post in Hebron; no 
casualties were reported.

1 April
    A bomb detonated at approximately 7:00 a.m. local time near 
Netzarim in Gaza, killing only the bomber.
    Around 7:30 a.m. local time a second bomb exploded on 
Gaza's main north-south road (Rte 4) near the Israeli 
settlement of Kfar Darom. The suicide bomber involved 
reportedly wore a Palestinian police uniform. The blast 
occurred close to a local (Palestinian) taxi. Five Palestinians 
were injured.

27 April
    Two Israeli women were stabbed to death in Wadi Kelt. A 
Palestinian Bedouin was eventually arrested and confessed to 
the attack. The Bedouin was not affiliated with any terrorist 
organization and the attack was treated as a crime by Israeli 
authorities.

29 May
    Three terrorists, reportedly armed with an automatic weapon 
and knives, attacked Jewish merchants visiting a Gazan 
greenhouse. The Palestinian owner of the greenhouse hid the 
Jewish woman in his house and defended her husband with his own 
body. The Gazan was wounded in the attack, the couple was 
unharmed.

13 June
    An Israeli woman was shot and wounded by terrorists as she 
drove out of Har Adar, northwest of Jerusalem. Six Palestinians 
from a nearby village were arrested by Israeli Defense Forces.

20 June
    An Israeli thief discovered a bomb in a bag he had stolen 
from a beach in Tel Aviv. Israeli police were able to disarm 
the bomb.

9 July
    Two border policemen were lightly injured when a small 
explosive device detonated close to their jeep as they escorted 
a bus of students from the 'Od Yosef Hay Yeshiva at Joseph's 
Tomb.

10 July
    A Rabbi's car was shot at near Elon Moreh; no one was hurt.

15 July
    Israeli security forces arrested three Palestinian 
policemen who allegedly planned to attack a guard at the Har 
Bracha settlement near Nablus. According to Israeli police, the 
three were also responsible for the shooting attack on the 
Rabbi's car near Elon Moreh on July 10.
    Israeli officials later stated their belief that the 
Palestinian policemen were operating on orders from the 
Palestinian Authority's Chief of Civil Police, Ghazi Al-Jabali. 
The Palestinian Authority is conducting its own, internal 
investigation of these allegations.

20 July
    Palestinian security forces uncovered a bomb making factory 
in Bayt Sahur near Bethlehem. The discovery came as part of the 
investigation into the death of a HAMAS activist who blew 
himself up while making a bomb on July 14.

30 July
    Two suicide bombs detonated in the Mahane Yehuda Jerusalem 
market place. Sixteen people, including the 2 bombers, were 
killed in the blast and over 160 were injured. HAMAS 
distributed leaflets claiming responsibility for the attack and 
vowed that the attacks would continue if Palestinian prisoners 
were not released.

4 September
    Suicide bombers detonated 3 explosive charges on Ben Yehuda 
street in downtown Jerusalem, killing 8 people and wounding 
over 100.
    Israeli security forces detained 69 Palestinians throughout 
the territories in the wake of the Jerusalem bombing on 
suspicion of aiding terrorist infrastructures.

12 September
    Israel issued an arrest warrant and extradition request to 
the Palestinian Authority for Ghazi Al-Jibali.

13 September
    A young Arab woman tried to stab a border policeman near 
the gate of an IDF base on the Jerusalem-Ramallah highway. The 
policeman was not hurt and the woman was detained.

29 September
    A Palestinian suspect was detained by Israel for abetting 
the kidnappers of soldier Nachshon Wachsman, who was murdered 
three years ago.

30 September
    An Israeli court convicted Musa Mustafa, head of 
Palestinian security in Jericho, of kidnapping and aggravated 
extortion. The conviction stemmed from a case 15 months prior, 
in which a resident of East Jerusalem was kidnapped, tortured, 
and detained for over five months on suspicion of having 
committed murder while under the employment of Israeli 
intelligence.

6 November
    Shots were fired at a school bus near Elon Moreh. No one 
was injured.

19 November
    A yeshiva student was killed and a second wounded in a 
suspected terrorist attack inside the old city of Jerusalem. 
The students were ambushed while returning to their residence, 
a settler-owned home in the Muslim Quarter.

                     PLO Renunciation of Terrorism

    The Palestinian Authority in general, and Chairman Arafat 
in particular, consistently condemned acts of violence and 
terrorism during this period. Following the March 21 Cafe 
Apropos bombing Marwan Kanafani, adviser to and spokesman for 
Chairman Arafat, spoke on Voice of Palestine radio saying ``the 
bombing incident today was condemned by the [Palestinian] 
Authority.'' Chairman Arafat spoke to Israeli President Weizman 
and reiterated his condemnation of the bombing, stating that 
``the Palestinian National Authority is against any violence.'' 
Palestinian Council member Ziad Abu Ziad told Israeli TV ``the 
bombing truly pains me. I condemn it sharply. I think 
condemnations are not enough to express the anger and pain we 
feel as we see the region reverting to the era of bombings, 
dead, and wounded. I sincerely hope the situation will not 
become like it was before, that this was an isolated event.''
    Likewise, Orient House head Faisel Husseini stated that the 
bombing ``is a painful thing. We hope that it is an isolated 
event, that it is even not a political one; that it is not a 
terrorist attack. But if it is, we condemn it. We are against 
hurting, injuring innocent people. I am not for violence and my 
heart is with those who have been injured.''
    In the aftermath of the two apparently botched suicide 
bombings on April 1 in the Gaza strip that killed only the 
bombers themselves and wounded five Palestinians, the 
Palestinian Authority mounted a campaign against Islamic 
militants particularly members of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
(PIJ) in the Gaza strip.
    As he had done following the March 21 bombing, Chairman 
Arafat strongly condemned the July 30 double suicide bombing in 
Jerusalem saying, ``today's explosions ... aim to undermine the 
peace process.'' Mahmud Abbas (``Abu Mazen'') also condemned 
the attack saying it was ``tantamount to a crime against the 
peace process.'' In an interview with London's MBC television 
Faisel Husseini condemned the attack saying ``First of all we 
expressed, and have always expressed, our rejection and 
denunciation of any incident that involves the killing of 
civilians, Palestinians or Israelis ... Moreover, there can be 
no security for us if there is no security for the Israelis. 
So, we feel that we have to provide security, not only for 
ourselves, but also for the Israelis.''

                            Security Matters

    The Palestinian Authority has constituted law enforcement 
institutions for carrying out its security responsibilities in 
areas subject to its jurisdiction. The Palestinian Police Force 
(PPF) was established in May 1994 and consists of the 
Palestinian National Security Force (PNSF); the Palestinian 
civil police; the Preventive Security Organization (PSO); 
Palestinian intelligence, or the Mukhabarat; the civil defense 
force; and the Palestinian Presidential Security Force. 
Palestinian police are responsible for security and law 
enforcement for Palestinians and other non-Israelis in Gaza and 
five West Bank towns and surrounding villages. The 
establishment of these security forces is pursuant to the 
Interim Agreement.
    The PA inherited a court system based on structures and 
legal codes of differing origins. The Gaza legal code derives 
from the British Mandate, Egyptian, and some locally generated 
law. Pre-1967 Jordanian law applies in those areas in the West 
Bank under PA control. However, the body of law in both Gaza 
and the West Bank was substantially modified by Israeli 
military orders. The PA is continuing efforts to unify the Gaza 
and West Bank legal codes.
    In February 1995 the PA established a security court in 
Gaza to try cases involving terrorism. The PA has also 
established military courts to handle cases of abuse of 
authority. In each case, three judges, drawn from senior ranks 
of the security forces, preside over the civilian law court. 
There is no right of appeal, but verdicts may be either 
ratified or repealed by the head of the PA. A similar system 
operates in the West Bank under the same guidelines as the Gaza 
court. On June 2, five PA intelligence officers (Mukhabarat) 
were brought before the military courts on charges of having 
caused the death of a suspect in custody. The courts convicted 
the officers who received sentences from 2 months to 5 years in 
prison.
    In a highly publicized case, the eight Palestinian 
policemen allegedly responsible for the death of Nasir Radwan, 
a Gazan who died June 30, 1997, as a result of violent beating 
in the hands of Palestinian security service members, were 
immediately brought before the military courts. The officers 
were charged with unlawful detention and perpetrating gross 
abuse which led to death. In an unprecedented move Chairman 
Arafat ordered that this trial be open to the public. Six of 
the eight officers were found guilty with three receiving death 
sentences and the other three receiving sentences from six 
months to five years.
    Human rights organizations have reported that the PA 
continues to engage in arbitrary arrests, denial of due process 
rights and abusive treatment. The U.S. government has urged the 
PA to respect the rule of law, even as it pursues those who 
defy it. In an effort to address these issues, the PA has 
established a team of legal advisors to provide guidance to 
interrogators who are stationed at PA security facilities.
    Security coordination and cooperation diminished in the 
period between March and September, largely as a result of 
tension between Israel and the Palestinians. Both sides had 
publicly announced a severing of the security dialogue: the 
Israelis in reaction to Palestinian accusations of Israeli 
involvement in the April 1 Gaza bombings, and the Palestinians 
in reaction to the late February Israeli decision to build at 
Har Homa/Jebel Abu Ghunaym.
    Despite the public posturing regarding security 
cooperation, and an absence of high level, public cooperation, 
some security cooperation continued at lower levels prior to 
October. For example, Joint Patrols were halted in March after 
Har Homa construction began and the Cafe Apropos bombing, but 
were gradually resumed as the situation normalized. They were 
halted again by the Government of Israel after the July 30 
Mahane Yehuda bombing. In general Joint Patrols have been 
linked to closure by the Israeli government. At times when 
closure is imposed the Joint Patrols are also stopped. As of 
this report, Joint Patrols had resumed in all areas of the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. Likewise, both bilateral and trilateral 
meetings to coordinate and facilitate security cooperation 
(with U.S. participation) took place over the period of this 
report, totaling over 20 meetings held between April and 
November 20, 1997.
    During her September 9-15 trip to the region, Secretary 
Albright emphasized the paramount importance of the Palestinian 
Authority's resuming security cooperation with Israel and 
undertaking unilateral security measures as a sine qua non for 
moving the peace process forward. In conjunction with the 
Secretary's visit, the Palestinian Authority gave assurances 
that it would adopt a systematic approach to uprooting the 
HAMAS terrorist infrastructure.
    Partially as a result of this trip and a follow-up meeting 
in New York between the Secretary, Israeli Foreign Minister 
David Levy and chief Palestinian negotiator Abu Mazen (Mahmud 
Abbas), Israel and the Palestinians resumed direct bilateral 
negotiations on October 6 with SMEC Ross present. Since then, 
the quality and frequency of security cooperation has improved 
significantly. Following meetings between Israeli and 
Palestinian security chiefs in mid-October, an Israeli 
government source was quoted as saying that security 
cooperation had nearly reached the level. extant at the 
beginning of the year. SMEC Ross attended a trilateral security 
meeting on October 21 with PA Chairman Arafat, Israeli Defense 
Minister Mordechai, and their respective security chiefs to 
review security cooperation between the two sides. Most 
recently, the Joint Security Committee met on November 19 
chaired by senior Israeli and Palestinian military officials.
    The following list highlights on-going security relations 
between the Israelis and the Palestinians as well as specific 
examples of Palestinian efforts to control violence and 
terrorist acts during this period:

26 Feb. An IDF undercover unit in the Palestinian town of Hizma 
near Jerusalem fired at residents, killing 1 and injuring 3 
others. Principal Palestinian peace process negotiator Sa'eb 
Erekat said ``We condemn this act and regard it as a planned 
terrorist action against our people. We strongly condemn this 
act and demand from all the sponsors of the peace process to 
stand against the Israeli government and request it to adhere 
to the peace process.'' West Bank Preventive Security 
Organization (PSO) chief Jibril al Rajoub and his forces 
intervened rapidly to quiet demonstrations which followed the 
shootings.

17 March
    A senior PSO official claimed that a planned terrorist 
attack in Jerusalem had been thwarted by Palestinian security 
forces. At the same time, he cautioned that a HAMAS squad was 
believed to be at large and planning an attack in Jerusalem. 
The Palestinian Authority reported that recent raids on HAMAS 
activists resulted in 60 arrests and the confiscation of 1500 
kilos of explosive material and 14 pistols.

21 March
    In the aftermath of the Cafe Apropos bombing in Tel Aviv, 
PSO chiefs Rajoub (West Bank) and Dahlan (Gaza) met immediately 
with the head of Israel's Shin Bet to coordinate actions. 
Rajoub also met with the Israeli Security Minister and the two 
established a hotline to improve cooperation between their 
offices. The PA immediately launched a wave of arrests, 
detaining over 30 HAMAS activists within the first two days. By 
the end of the week, Palestinian security forces reported the 
arrest of over 100 people. The raids and arrests resulted in 
the confiscation of 8 machine guns, 10 pistols, 3 remote 
control explosive devises, 20 kilos of inflammable liquid, 15 
thousand rounds of ammunition, 25 hand grenades, 5 suitcase 
bombs, and 150 kilos of TNT, and arrested five trained suicide 
bombers.

30 March
    Palestinian police effectively intervened to avoid violence 
during Palestinian Land day demonstrations in Nablus and 
Ramallah. Israeli Defense Minister Mordechai said ``I have to 
say that in most places the Palestinian police made visible 
efforts to deal with the incident. I think the majority of the 
Palestinian forces, policemen, were working with us against the 
violence in the area.''

8 April
    An Israeli settler shot and killed a Palestinian in the 
Hizbi market area of Hebron and a female settler driving a car 
struck and injured a 16 year old Palestinian also in Hebron.
    Palestinian authorities condemned the settlers' actions but 
acted to quell the street violence in Hebron. Senior IDF 
commanders praised the Palestinian police forces for 
controlling the situation.

9 April
    Joint Israeli-Palestinian coordination led to the break-up 
of a previously-unknown terrorist cell in Surif. The arrest of 
one of the cell members produced information which led Israeli 
forces to the body of long-missing, slain Israeli soldier 
Sharon Edri. In addition to Edri's kidnapping and murder, the 
cell was also implicated in the Cafe Apropos bombing.

7 May
    Chairman Arafat announced that Palestinian security 
officials would participate in a trilateral meeting that 
evening with the aim of resuming security coordination with 
Israel.

14 May
    The Palestinian Authority uncovered and destroyed a tunnel 
at the Gaza-Israel border adjacent to Burayj camp. The tunnel 
was 35 meters long, heading in the direction of Israeli 
territory.

15 May
    The PSO conducted a campaign of arrests against the PIJ, 
detaining some 200 activists, including a group of doctors who 
reportedly held positions in the top echelon of the PIJ's 
military wing and were responsible for the planning and 
execution of attacks in Israel. Israeli security sources 
praised the PSO actions as a step aimed at crippling the PIJ.

7 June
    In response to an Israeli request that the Palestinian 
police help search for a missing family feared to have been 
victims of terrorist activities, Palestinian security forces 
immediately responded with a widespread search resulting in 
location of the family. Joint Israeli-Palestinian investigation 
showed the family had died in a car accident and no foul play 
was involved.

21 June
    Palestinian police intervened to quell large-scale 
demonstrations in Nablus. Palestinian protesters were blocked 
from going to Joseph's tomb--a flash point for earlier violent 
confrontations.

2 July
    Palestinian Public Security Commander Brig. Gen. al-Hajj 
Isma'il Jabber met with Major General Gabi Ofir, Commander of 
IDF troops in the West Bank, to discuss the resumption of 
security cooperation. Jibril al-Rajoub traveled to Hebron, the 
site of on-going clashes, to restore calm and meet with the 
commander of IDF troops in the area.

12 July
    Palestinian and Israeli security forces worked jointly to 
search for a missing Israeli businessman. He was found unharmed 
within 24 hours.

14 July
    Palestinian security forces took up positions in Hebron to 
prevent Palestinians from confronting IDF troops.

18 July
    Following the arrest of three Palestinian policemen by 
Israeli security forces, Chairman Arafat appointed an inquiry 
committee to investigate allegations that the police were 
involved in planning terrorist attacks.

20 July
    Palestinian police, under direct orders from Chairman 
Arafat, arrested Nablus police commander Colonel Jihad Masimi, 
accused by Israel of being connected to the Palestinian 
policemen who were allegedly planning to carry out terrorist 
attacks against Israel.
    Palestinian Security forces uncovered a bomb making factory 
in Bayt Sahur near Bethlehem. The discovery came as part of the 
investigation into the death of a HAMAS activist who blew 
himself up while making a bomb on July 14.

22 July
    Prime Minister Netanyahu's special envoy, Yitzhaq Molkho, 
delivered a message from the Prime Minister to Chairman Arafat 
expressing the Prime Minister's satisfaction with the PA's 
cooperation with Israel on the issue of the Palestinian 
policemen.

25 July
    Palestinian security officials announced they had 
apprehended a wanted PIJ terrorist.

28 July
    Prime Minister Netanyahu, in an Israeli television 
interview ``the Palestinians have taken measures to restrain 
(Hamas and the PIJ). I set the goal of lowering the level of 
terrorism and stopping the horror that was happening here. This 
was hard and required a concentrated effort, but we did it.''

30 July
    In the wake of the Mahane Yehuda suicide bombing, three 
high-level security meetings took place. At this time, the 
Israelis shared the preliminary information they had gained 
from the bomb site, including photographs of the suicide 
bombers. Palestinian authorities provided Israel with samples 
of explosive material from the Bayt Sahui bomb factory for 
comparison.

31 July
    Palestinian security forces arrested over 20 Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad members in the wake of the July 30 suicide 
bombings.

1 August
    The PA detained two of the most senior HAMAS fugitives 
wanted by the Israelis, Muhammad Sanwar, a member of the 
military branch and Muhammad Dayf's long-time partner, and Abd-
al-Fatah Sutari, another senior member of HAMAS.

8 August
    Palestinian police uncovered a arms cache in Qalqilyah. 
Police confiscated the weapons and arrested a person connected 
to the cache.

11 August
    Palestinian police in Hebron stopped protesters from 
heading to an Israeli checkpoint, avoiding violent clashes 
between the demonstrators and Israeli security forces.

16 August
    Israeli security forces asked the PA for help in locating 
an Israeli taxi driver missing since August 14.
    Palestinian police located his body in a well near Jericho 
and found his taxi near the Aqabat Jabr refugee camp. Three 
suspects were arrested by the Palestinian police and 
immediately brought to trial and convicted of the driver's 
murder. Two of the men were given life sentences and the third 
15 years in prison. Israeli authorities praised the action of 
the PA and Prime Minister Netanyahu's advisor Yitzhaq Molkho 
met with Arafat to thank him for his cooperation.

27 August
    Israeli soldiers and Palestinian police held a first-ever 
joint exercise, simulating a car-bomb attack in the Gaza Strip.

9 September
    September Palestinian security forces arrested more than 30 
Hamas activists throughout PA-controlled territory in response 
to the September 4 bombing.

12 September
    Israeli and Palestinian security personnel worked together 
to search for an Israeli man missing for two days. He was found 
in an burning abandoned building, tied up and in a state of 
shock. It was later learned that the kidnapping was a hoax 
orchestrated by the victim himself.

16 September
    September Palestinian security services shut down the Gaza 
Headquarters of the Islamic Bloc Youth Union, a student 
organization with ties to Hamas.

23 September
    Israeli security services announced that they had 
identified four of the five suicide bombers involved in the 
Mahane Yehuda and Ben Yehuda incidents.
    According to the Government of Israel, all four were 
residents of Azira Shamaliya, a village near Nablus, and had 
been arrested by the Palestinian Authority in the spring of 
1996. In September 1996 the four men escaped and had been 
fugitives ever since. According to the Government of Israel, 
the four were included in a list of 88 individuals the 
Government of Israel had requested the Palestinian Authority to 
arrest.
    According to information from the PA, these individuals 
were sought by the PA but were fugitives from justice. The PA 
also noted that the town of Azira Shamaliya is in an area in 
which Israel retains responsibility for internal security; the 
Palestinian authority has responsibility only for public order 
for Palestinians.
    Israeli and Palestinian security officials met in Ramallah 
to discuss the results of Israel's investigation.
    According to press reports, this was the first time the two 
sides had met since the September 4 bombing.

5 September
    Thirteen people were detained by Palestinian security 
forces in Qaiqilya as part of the crackdown against Hamas.
    The Palestinian Authority ordered the closing of sixteen 
Hamas-affiliated associations and institutions in response to 
the news that several of those responsible from the recent 
bombings in Jerusalem had come from an area jointly 
administered by Israel and the PA.

13 October
    Shin Bet Chief Ayalon conducted a series of meetings over 
the previous weekend with his Palestinian counterparts Amin al-
Hindi, Mohammed Dahlan and Jibril al-Rajoub aimed at renewing 
security cooperation. Commenting on these meetings, an unnamed 
Israeli government official was quoted on Israel Channel One as 
saying that ``we are on our way to being where we were early 
this year when the level of intelligence sharing was ongoing, 
thorough and serious.'' He added that the sides had ``reached 
understandings'' on holding regular meetings.

21 October
    PA Chairman Yassir Arafat, Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak 
Mordechai, and U.S. Special Middle East Coordinator Dennis Ross 
held a trilateral security meeting at Erez crossing. The 
meeting was attended by Israeli Defense Forces Chief of Staff 
Shahak, Shin Bet Chief Ayalon, the Chief of Israeli Military 
Intelligence, and Palestinian security chiefs Jibril Rajoub, 
Amin al-Hindi and Mohammed Dahlan. The goal of the meeting was 
to rebuild trust and mutual confidence between the two security 
apparatuses. Amidst a positive atmosphere, Arafat pledged to 
step up counter-terrorism efforts.

29 October
    Israeli Shin Bet established the identity of the third 
suicide bomber who carried out the Ben-Yehuda street attack.

13 November
    Israeli security forces seized two Hamas activists from 
members of the Palestinian Preventative Security Organization 
(PSO) who were transporting them from one prison to another in 
the West Bank. The action took place near the West Bank village 
of Hawara within ``Zone B.'' The PSO escorts were detained 
briefly as well. The Government of Israel stated that the two 
detainees, from the West Bank village of Surif, ran a Hamas 
terrorist cell responsible for the deaths of eleven Israelis.

17 November
    Major General Abdel Razek al-Majaydah, Palestinian director 
of public security for Gaza, denied Hamas' public accusation 
that the PA had voluntarily handed over the two Hamas activists 
seized by Israel on November 13. Describing the Israeli action 
as an ``abduction,'' al-Majaydah demanded that Israel return 
the two suspects.

19 November
    The Joint Security Committee met to discuss issues of 
security cooperation and coordination. The Israeli side was 
headed by Major General Shlomo Yanai and included Brig. General 
Shlomo Brom and Colonel Michael Herzog. The Palestinian side 
was represented by General Abdul Rizaq al-Yahya.

                              PLO Covenant

    The April 24, 1996 action by the Palestinian National 
Council (PNC) honored the important commitment to Israel to 
make the necessary changes to the PLO covenant. At that time, 
the Israeli Government accepted the PNC vote as the fulfillment 
of the PLO's commitment to abandon violence and all other 
actions that endanger peace and stability.
    The PNC action is best understood through a comparison of 
the actual text of the PLO commitment--as contained in the 
September 9, 1993 and May 4, 1994 letters from Chairman Arafat 
to Prime Minister Rabin and Article XXXI(9) of the September 
1995 Interim Agreement between Israel and the PLO--with the 
official English language text of the PNC resolution adopted on 
April 24.
    Arafat's September 9, 1993 letter to Rabin states:

          In view of the promise of a new era and the signing 
        of the Declaration of Principles and based on 
        Palestinian acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 
        242 and 338, the PLO affirms that those articles of the 
        Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel's right to 
        exist, and the provisions of the Covenant which are 
        inconsistent with the commitments of this letter are 
        now inoperative and no longer valid. Consequently, the 
        PLO undertakes to submit to the Palestinian National 
        Council for formal approval the necessary changes in 
        regard to the Palestinian Covenant.

    The commitments in the September 9, 1993 letter include: 
recognition of the right of the State of Israel to exist in 
peace and security, PLO acceptance of Security Council 
resolutions 242 and 338, PLO commitment to the Middle East 
peace process and the peaceful resolution of the conflict 
through negotiations, PLO renunciation of the use of terrorism 
and its assumption of responsibility over all PLO elements to 
assure their compliance.
    In a May 4, 1994 letter to Rabin, Arafat further stated:

          The PLO undertakes to submit to the next meeting of 
        the Palestinian National Council for formal approval 
        the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian 
        Covenant, as undertaken in the letter dated September 
        9, 1993 signed by the Chairman of the PLO and addressed 
        to the Prime Minister of Israel.

    In the September 1995 Interim Agreement, Article XXXI(9), 
the PLO undertook that ``within two months of the date of the 
inauguration of the Council, the Palestinian National Council 
will convene and formally approve the necessary changes in 
regard to the Palestinian Covenant, as undertaken in the 
letters signed by the Chairman of the PLO and addressed to the 
Prime Minister of Israel, dated September 9, 1993 and May 4, 
1994.''
    The key sections of the April 24, 1996 PNC resolution to 
amend the Covenant read as follows:

          1. The Palestinian National Charter is hereby amended 
        by canceling the articles that are contrary to the 
        letters exchanged between the PLO and the Government of 
        Israel 9-10 September 1993.
          2. Assigns its legal committee with the task of 
        redrafting the Palestinian National Charter in order to 
        present it to the first session of the Palestinian 
        central council.

    This resolution was approved overwhelmingly by a vote of 
504-54 (with 14 abstentions), easily sufficient for amending 
the Covenant. The PNC delegated to its legal committee the 
responsibility of writing a new Covenant but did not fix a 
timetable for this undertaking.
    PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat conveyed this decision in a May 
4, 1996 letter to Prime Minister Peres, which stated:

          As part of our commitment to the peace process, and 
        in adhering to the mutual recognition between the 
        Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Government 
        of Israel, the PNC was held in Gaza City between 22-25 
        of April 1996, and in an extraordinary session decided 
        that the Palestine National Charter is hereby amended 
        by canceling the provisions that are contrary to the 
        letters exchanged between the PLO and the Government of 
        Israel on 9/10 September 1993.

    The White House issued the following statement after the 
PNC decision:

          President Clinton warmly welcomes the Palestine 
        National Council's vote to revoke the sections of the 
        Palestinian Covenant that called for the destruction of 
        the State of Israel. By an overwhelming majority, the 
        Palestine National Council has honored an important 
        commitment made in the Interim Agreement signed here in 
        September 1995. It is a major step forward on the road 
        to a lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians. 
        The President applauds this action as a decisive 
        statement, at this difficult moment, that those who 
        champion peace will not be deterred by the murderous 
        acts of those desperate to prevent the people of the 
        Middle East from building a better future.

    During the Hebron negotiations (October 1996-January 1997), 
Chairman Arafat undertook to complete the process of revising 
the Palestinian National Charter.
    On March 5, 1997, Chairman Arafat told assembled Permanent 
Representatives of the UN Security Council that 29 paragraphs 
in the Covenant were annulled, all of them concerning the 
elimination of the state of Israel. He also noted that a 
Palestinian legal committee was working on a revised charter.

                     Arab League Boycott of Israel

    The PLO reiterated its stand against the Arab boycott of 
Israel when it signed the September 28, 1995 Joint Declaration 
of the Washington Summit. That declaration called, inter alia, 
for an end to the boycott as soon as possible. Additionally, 
senior Palestinian Authority economic and trade official Ahmed 
Quray (now Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council) made 
the following commitment in an October 17, 1996 letter to then 
U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor: ``The PLO and the 
Palestinian Authority and its successors will support all 
efforts to end the boycott of Israel and will not enforce any 
elements of the boycott within the West Bank and Gaza Strip.''
    Three weeks after the July 30 Israeli closure of the West 
Bank and Gaza, the Palestinian Authority (PA) began urging 
Palestinians to stop purchasing certain Israeli products and 
items imported by Israelis that are considered luxury items or 
which can be produced within the West Bank and Gaza. 
Enforcement appears to be lax, but there have been reports of 
zealous officials barring the entry of certain goods, 
especially in Gaza. PA officials have generally avoided 
referring to this measure as a ``boycott.'' While it is 
impossible at this time to gauge the effectiveness of the PA's 
urging, there have been extensive reports of exceptions granted 
to Palestinian businessmen who have approached the PA for 
clearance to import products covered by the action. The 
extensive easing of closure measures brought no change in the 
PA's call for restricted imports. Although some officials have 
referred to the need for the GOI to lift its 'blockade`` 
against the West Bank and Gaza in order for the PA's action to 
be rescinded, the exact measures that must be taken for this to 
occur have not been made clear.

                        Status of the PLO Office

    The State Department's Office of Foreign Missions 
designated the PLO office in Washington a ``foreign mission'' 
under the Foreign Missions Act on June 21, 1994, to provide a 
statutory basis for regulating the office. The designation was 
published in the Federal Register on July 20, 1994. The PLO 
office and personnel are not accorded diplomatic status, 
privileges or immunities. The office may not portray itself as 
a diplomatic mission or embassy, but may portray itself as 
representing the PLO. Office personnel support U.S. travel by 
members of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority and have 
testified before Congress and participated in discussions with 
U.S. government officials and in numerous meetings and media 
events. The office has approximately ten employees, all of whom 
are permanent resident aliens or U.S. citizens. The office is 
currently headed by Mr. Hassan Abdel Rahman.
    On August 8, the PLO Office in Washington was informed by 
the Department of State that effective midnight, August 12, 
with the expiration of the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act 
and accompanying Presidential waiver of statutory restrictions 
on the PLO, the PLO Office was required to suspend its 
activities.

                         Palestinian Assistance

    The U.S. is working with the international donor community 
to meet the legitimate development needs of the Palestinians as 
they seek to build self-governing institutions and implement 
their agreements with Israel. We also have worked to ensure 
that all U.S. assistance is handled in a transparent and 
accountable manner. The largest single international assistance 
program has been the World Bank's Holst Fund, to which the U.S. 
has contributed $39.9 million and other donors $187.2 million 
(as of December 7, 1996). A total amount of $227.1 million for 
the Holst Fund has been disbursed. This fund sustains 
Palestinian Authority operations and is subject to rigorous 
World Bank auditing.
    There have been no credible reports of irregularities in 
the use of the Holst Fund, nor is there any information to 
indicate that other U.S. assistance projects have been used for 
other than their intended purposes. The U.S. Agency for 
International Development continues to implement scrupulously 
its procedures for the monitoring and supervision of activities 
performed by USG-funded non-governmental organizations and 
contractors.
    The U.S. has been actively engaged, together with other 
donors, in supporting ongoing efforts to increase the 
accountability of the Palestinian Authority's financial 
operations. We have also taken a leadership role in ensuring 
that the fiscal control steps in the Tripartite Action Plan 
(TAP), a document signed by the Palestinian Authority, Israel 
and the donor community, are functioning. The PA reiterated its 
commitment to fulfill its TAP obligations regarding account 
consolidation at the December 10 meeting of the Ad Hoc Liaison 
Committee in Brussels. According to the IMF, higher than 
anticipated revenues and extraordinary expenditure control 
resulted in a slight budget surplus for the first quarter of 
1997. The PA and the IMF are still projecting an overall budget 
deficit of $52 million for this year, significantly lower than 
the deficit of $95 million recorded in 1996. Major Western 
based accounting and consulting firms are involved in the 
monitoring and supervision of Palestinian financial activities 
on a regular basis.

                              Other Issues

    Finally, the PLO Commitments Compliance Act calls for 
information on several other issues:

   The status of Muhammad Rashid and Abu Abbas were 
        last discussed in the January 22, 1997 report. The 
        status of Rashid and Abu Abbas has not changed since 
        that time.
   We have raised with the PLO the issue of PLO 
        compensation to American citizen victims of PLO 
        terrorism. Lawyers representing the PLO, the family of 
        Leon Klinghoffer (who was murdered in 1985 when 
        terrorists seized the cruise ship Achille Lauro) and 
        Crown Travel Service Inc. reached a settlement on 
        compensation that was entered into the US district 
        court in Manhattan on August 6, 1997. The State 
        Department was not a participant in the litigation and 
        has no information on the terms of the settlement.
   Issues relating to the Hawari group and others were 
        last reported in the January 1994 report. Their status 
        has remained unchanged since that time.
   The PLO has cooperated in the past with our requests 
        for information available to them that could shed light 
        on the status of U.S. nationals known to have been held 
        by the PLO or factions thereof in the past. There have 
        been no new developments.
   In the Interim Agreement, both Israel and the PLO 
        agreed that, ``Neither side shall initiate or take any 
        step that will change the status of the West Bank and 
        the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent 
        status negotiations.'' The PLO has respected this 
        commitment. Under Israeli-Palestinian agreements, the 
        Palestinian Authority may only maintain offices in the 
        areas under its jurisdiction, which do not include 
        Jerusalem. Oft-repeated Palestinian rhetoric about the 
        future ``state of Palestine with its capital in 
        Jerusalem,'' constitutes a statement of position only.
   Several Palestinian institutions were given a 
        closure notice by Israeli authorities in August 1995, 
        but were allowed to remain open after they signed a 
        declaration that they were not connected with or funded 
        by the PA. Similarly, PLO Executive Committee member 
        and Orient House head Faisal Husseini has consistently 
        refused appointment as an official of the PA, nor did 
        he seek election to the Palestinian legislative 
        council. His most recent disavowal came on July 1.
   The Palestinian Authority Minister of Religious 
        Affairs, Hassan Tahbub maintains offices in Ramallah 
        and Gaza for the conduct of his official PA duties. He 
        is also president of the Higher Islamic Council, which 
        has been headquartered in Jerusalem's Old City since 
        its establishment in 1967. He occupied this office 
        prior to being named minister of religious affairs. 
        Tahboub has publicly said that his Jerusalem office 
        pre-dates the existence of the Palestinian Authority 
        and has nothing to do with the PA.
   In response to Israeli concerns, the PA announced 
        that three offices (the Vocational Training Center, the 
        Mapping and Geography Department, and the Youth and 
        Sports Department) were to be closed in August. Israeli 
        officials welcomed this move.
   We have no evidence the PLO has signed any 
        agreements not within the areas allowed in its 
        agreements with Israel (economic agreements, agreements 
        with donor countries for the purpose of implementing 
        arrangements for the provision of assistance to the 
        Council, agreements for the purpose of implementing the 
        regional development plans, cultural, scientific, and 
        educational agreements), nor have we seen any evidence 
        that Palestinian offices abroad issue Palestinian 
        passports or other Palestinian travel documents.
   We continue to monitor the size and composition of 
        the Palestinian police. Israel alleges that the force 
        totals more than the 30,000 allowed in the Interim 
        Agreement. The PA acknowledges employing about 34,500, 
        but contends that the excess is due to the employment 
        of five to six thousand Palestinians as unarmed, non-
        uniformed clerical and support staff and informants. 
        The PA indicates that it routinely notifies the GOI of 
        all regular police hires, but not of clerical staff or 
        informants. The PA, as part of the agreement on Hebron, 
        reaffirmed its commitment on the size of the 
        Palestinian police forces, in accordance with the 
        Interim Agreement.
   Israel has alleged that the Palestinian Authority 
        has not transferred suspected terrorists. The PA has 
        deferred action on the transfer of some of those 
        requested, citing Annex IV, article II, section 7(f)(2) 
        of the Interim Agreement, covering delays in transfers 
        to the requesting side for the duration of a suspect's 
        detention or imprisonment. The PA notes that in other 
        cases the Israeli government has not officially 
        requested a transfer in accordance with the procedures 
        outlined in the agreement. In still other cases, the PA 
        indicates that the suspects are at large, their 
        whereabouts unknown.

    f. Report on Rewards for Information Relating to International 
   Narcoterrorism July 12, 1994 [Pursuant to P.L. 84-885, sec. 36(h)]

United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
June 20, 1994
      
The Honorable Thomas S. Foley,
Speaker of the House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Speaker:
    I am writing to advise the Congress that a reward has been 
paid pursuant to 22 U.S.C. Sec. 2708. The enclosed 
documentation provides information required under paragraph (h) 
of that statute.

Sincerely,

Wendy R. Sherman
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

                       Amount of the Reward Paid

    Special Agents of the Diplomatic Security Service met with 
Mr. Adnan Awad and provided him with a reward of $750,000.

                      To Whom the Reward Was Paid

    The reward recipient is Mr. Adnan Awad. Although normally 
we do not reveal the identity of a reward recipient, in this 
case the recipient has publicly revealed his participation in 
the Rewards Program. His role in the trial of terrorist Mohamed 
Rashed is also public knowledge.

             Acts with Respect to Which the Reward was Paid

    Over the span of more than a decade, Mr. Adnan Awad 
provided crucial information to the United States regarding the 
``15 May'' organization. This terrorist organization was 
responsible for at least fifteen bombings during the early and 
mid-1980s, three of which involved aircraft. In one particular 
case, a top aide to the organization, Mohamed Rashed, placed a 
bomb on board a Pan American World Airways aircraft. The bomb 
exploded en route from Tokyo to Honolulu on August 11, 1982, 
killing a teenager.
    Terrorist Mohamed Rashed was arrested in Greece in 1988. 
Rashed's trial for the Pan American aircraft bombing started in 
1991 and was conducted within the Greek legal system. As a 
result of Mr. Awad's cooperation and testimony, provided at 
extreme personal risk, the ``15 May'' organization was 
dismantled; and Mohamed Rashed was convicted in 1992, receiving 
eighteen years in prison. Rashed appealed the verdict which was 
upheld on June 18, 1993, followed another trial by a higher 
court. Mr. Awad provided testimony in both of Rashed's trials 
in Greece and also testified before a U.S. Grand Jury.

                    Significance of the Information

    Mr. Adnan Awad's information was pivotal to the dismantling 
of the ``15 May'' terrorist organization and the conviction of 
terrorist Mohamed Rashed. Particularly significant were the 
sustained nature of Mr. Awad's contributions and the powerful 
signal his court testimony sent to terrorists everywhere about 
our commitment to defeat international terrorism.

g. Determination Placing Sudan on Terrorism List (Public Notice 1878), 
                            October 7, 1993

                          DEPARTMENT OF STATE

                        Office of the Secretary

                          [Public Notice 1878]

                          determination sudan

    On August 12, 1993, Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
made the following determination:
    ``In accordance with section 6(j) of the Export 
Administration Act (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)), I hereby determine 
that Sudan is a country which has repeatedly provided support 
for acts of international terrorism. The list of 6(j) countries 
as of this time therefore includes Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, 
North Korea, Sudan and Syria.''

Warren Christopher,
Secretary of State.
[FR Doc. 93-24838 Filed 10-7-93; 8:45 am]
Billing Code 4710-10-M

    h. Counter-Terrorism Rewards Program \1\ (Bureau of Diplomatic 
                  Security, U.S. Department of State)

     U.S. Offers up to $7 Million for Information About Terrorists

    The U.S. Department of State offers substantial rewards for 
information preventing acts of international terrorism against 
United States persons or property, or leading to the arrest or 
conviction of terrorist criminals responsible for such acts. 
The reward level is up to $7 million when U.S. civil aviation 
is targeted by terrorists.
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    The Counter-Terrorism Rewards Program was established by 
the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism, Public Law 98-
533. Under the Rewards Program, cooperating individuals and 
their immediate family members may be relocated to the U.S., or 
elsewhere, and they are assured complete confidentiality. 
Rewards, totaling millions of dollars, have been paid in dozens 
of cases. Innocent lives have been saved and terrorists put 
behind bars.
    In 1994, Congress expanded the definition of 
``international terrorism'', authorizing rewards for 
information regarding '' . . . any act substantially 
contributing to the acquisition of unsafeguarded special 
nuclear material . . . or any nuclear explosive device . . . by 
an individual, group, or non-nuclear-weapon state.''

                       Public-Private Partnership

    In 1990, the State Department forged a unique public-
private partnership with the Air Transport Association of 
America and the Air Line Pilots Association, International, in 
which each organization pledges up to $1 million to supplement 
rewards paid by the U.S. Government for information that 
prevents a terrorist act against U.S. civil aviation, or leads 
to the arrest and conviction of any person who has committed 
such an act. This has resulted in a maximum reward of up to $7 
million in such cases.
    The U.S. Government's standing reward offer of up to $5 
million applies in all cases not addressed by the partnership 
agreement. Moreover, efforts are underway to expand the 
Government partnership with the private sector, so that rewards 
at the $7 million level can be offered outside the sphere of 
civil aviation.

                     Interagency Rewards Committee

    The Director of the Diplomatic Security Service, or his/her 
designee, chairs an interagency committee which identifies 
reward candidates and then recommends rewards to the Secretary 
of State. This committee serves as the forum for discussion of 
many aspects of the Program. The Interagency Rewards Committee 
is comprised of representatives from the White House National 
Security Council staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, the 
Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 
Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Marshals Service 
Witness Security Program, the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Department of 
Energy, and the Department of State.

                   Every Government and Every Citizen

    While the law governing the Rewards Program is aimed at 
terrorism directed against Americans, the United States shares 
information with other nations whose citizens are at risk. 
Every government and every citizen has a stake in bringing 
terrorists to justice and in preventing acts of terrorism. 
Terrorists are violent criminals. They must be stopped.

   On August 7, 1998, terrorist bombings in Nairobi, 
        Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania tragically resulted 
        in hundreds of deaths and the savage maimings of 
        thousands, those murdered included U.S. Embassy 
        personnel in Nairobi.
   On the morning of November 12, 1997, Ephrahim C. 
        Egbu, Joel B. Enlow, William L. Jennings, and Tracy L. 
        Ritchie, employees of the Union Texas Petroleum Company 
        (UTP) who were in Karachi on temporary assignment, were 
        picked up from the Sheraton Hotel for a ride to UTP 
        headquarters along the waterfront. As the station wagon 
        in which they were traveling proceeded across the only 
        bridge leading to the UTP office building, a red Honda 
        Civic pulled in front and two gunmen jumped out. The 
        gunmen fired into the UTP station wagon, brutally 
        murdering the Pakistani driver, Anwar Mirza, and 
        Messrs. Egbu, Enlow, Jennings and Ritchie.
   During the period December 1996 to January 1997, 
        sixteen letter bombs disguised as holiday greeting 
        cards were delivered through the mail to recipients in 
        the United States and the United Kingdom.
   On June 25, 1996, the brutal and cowardly terrorist 
        attack on a multi-national peacekeeping force in 
        Dhahran, Saudi Arabia left 19 dead and hundreds 
        injured. These peacekeepers were enforcing United 
        Nations sanctions and the dead and injured represent 
        citizens from several nations. The Department of State 
        is offering a reward of up to $5 million for 
        information leading to the arrest and/or conviction of 
        those responsible for the Khobar Towers bombing. 
        Additionally, the Government of Saudi Arabia is 
        offering a reward of $3 million.
   On July 4, 1995, Dr. Donald Hutchings, a respected 
        American medical professional, was abducted by unknown 
        persons in the hill country of Kashmir. Please help us 
        find Dr. Hutchings.
   On March 8, 1995 in Karachi, Pakistan, terrorists 
        armed with automatic rifles murdered two American 
        Consulate employees and wounded a third as they 
        traveled in the Consulate shuttle bus.
   On January 6, 1995, a fire broke out in an apartment 
        in Manila occupied by Khaled Shaikh Mohammad. The 
        information developed from an investigation revealed 
        that in August 1994 through January 1995, in this 
        apartment and elsewhere, Khaled Shaikh Mohammad 
        unlawfully and willfully conspired to bomb U.S. 
        civilian airliners by placing explosive devices on 
        twelve airliners flying over the Pacific Ocean during a 
        two-day period in January 1995.
   On February 26, 1993, terrorists bombed the New York 
        World Trade Center, murdering six innocent people, 
        injuring over 1,000 others and trapping terrified 
        school children in a smoke-filled elevator for hours.
   On January 25, 1993, Mir Aimal Kansi allegedly 
        murdered two persons and injured seriously three 
        others, allegedly firing an AK-47 assault rifle into 
        cars waiting at a stoplight.
   On December 21, 1988, terrorists destroyed Pan 
        American Flight 103. The terrorist bombing of Pan Am 
        103 over Scotland points to the global impact of 
        terrorism. The plane carried 259 citizens from 30 
        nations, including Americans, when it was destroyed 
        over Lockerbie, Scotland; another 11 persons perished 
        on the ground.
   In April 1986, one of the youngest victims of 
        terrorism, nine-month-old Demetra Stylian Klug, was 
        killed in the terrorist bombing of TWA Flight 840.
   On June 13, 1985, terrorists hijacked TWA Flight 
        847. During a violent rampage against passengers and 
        crew, they beat Robert Stethem to death then dumped his 
        body onto the tarmac.
   On October 23, 1983, 243 U.S. Marines were murdered 
        in a cowardly truck bomb attack, ending their mission 
        to help establish peace for the people of Lebanon.
   During the 1980's, in conditions of the utmost 
        cruelty and deprivation, kidnapped American citizens--
        as many as nine at one time--were held hostage in 
        Lebanon. For long and painful years, they were chained 
        in the dark, beaten, and denied medical care. Three 
        were murdered during their captivity.
   In the past 22 years, terrorist actions in Greece 
        have resulted in the deaths of four Americans: Richard 
        Welch, George Tsantes, William Nordeen, and Ronald 
        Stewart, injuries to 28 other Americans, and a rocket 
        attack on the Embassy compound in February 1996.

                         Emphasis on Prevention

    During the first four years of the Program, the State 
Department offered specific rewards for information leading to 
the arrest or conviction of those responsible for specific 
terrorist attacks. In December 1988, however, new emphasis was 
placed on provisions of the law which allowed for payment of 
rewards in cases where information led to the ``prevention, 
frustration, or favorable resolution of terrorist attacks 
against United States persons.'' Specific reward amounts for 
particular terrorist incidents were no longer announced. It was 
instead announced the Secretary of State is authorized to pay 
for information regarding any past, present, or planned future 
act of terrorism. This policy reaped benefits during Operation 
Desert Storm, during which the Program was heavily publicized.

                         Operation Desert Storm

    At the start of the Persian Gulf War, an informant in an 
East Asian country came forward with alarming information about 
a series of terrorist attacks planned by the Iraqi intelligence 
service. The terrorists had already surveyed their intended 
targets. They had acquired automatic weapons, grenades and high 
explosives. The attacks were beyond the planning stage and 
about to be carried out. One of the attacks, a planned 
terrorist bombing and strafing of airline ticket counters at a 
major airport, was scheduled to be carried out within 48 hours. 
The cooperating individual provided information which was 
essential in thwarting the planned terror attacks; and the 
terrorists were stopped in their tracks by U.S. and host nation 
authorities. Had the planned attacks succeeded, scores of 
Americans and citizens of our coalition partners would have 
been murdered. The informant, and his/her immediate family, 
were relocated under the Rewards Program to a place of safety 
in the United States. He/She was given a reward of 
approximately $1/2 million for coming forward and saving lives.

                  New York World Trade Center Bombing

    On February 26, 1993, the phenomenon of terrorism struck 
home for Americans in New York. A large improvised explosive 
device, concealed in a vehicle, was detonated in the sub-ground 
garage of the 110-story World Trade Center complex. One of the 
terrorists responsible, when subsequently captured, admitted 
the attackers sought to collapse one or both of the twin 
towers, killing tens of thousands of innocent people. The 
terrorists who bombed the World Trade Center succeeded in 
murdering six innocent people, injuring 1,000 others, and 
trapping terrified school children in a smoke-filled elevator 
for hours. Suspected terrorists Abdul Rahman Yasin and Ramzi 
Ahmed Yousef fled the United States following the bombing. 
Yasin is believed to be hiding in Iraq. Immediately following 
the indictments of Yasin and Yousef, the U.S. launched a 
massive international manhunt for the two fugitives. Wanted 
posters offering up to $5 million rewards for information 
leading to their capture were distributed in a variety of 
languages. Multi-language leaflets containing the reward offers 
were also sent throughout the world. Even matchbooks containing 
photos of the fugitives have been distributed. On February 8, 
1995, based upon information provided through the Counter-
Terrorism Rewards Program, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef was captured in 
Pakistan. He is currently in jail.

                             Public Efforts

    The State Department has an ongoing public campaign to 
promote awareness of the Rewards Program. Advertisements have 
been placed both to promote awareness of the Program and to 
reach those with information. Ads in English, Arabic, Spanish, 
French, German and Russian have appeared in publications as 
far-ranging as The New York Times, Al Hayat, Paris Match, Die 
Welt, and Pravda. Additionally, public service announcements 
featuring entertainment personalities Charlton Heston, Charles 
Bronson, and Charlie Sheen have been widely distributed.

For further information, contact:

        Rewards for Justice
        P.O. Box 96781
        Washington, D.C. 20090-6781, USA.

        Internet: [email protected]

        Voice: 1-800-HEROES-1

                        4. Department of Defense

a. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Reserve Component Integration Plan

Partial text of the Department of Defense Plan for Integrating National 
   Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using 
               Weapons of Mass Destruction, January 1998

Memorandum for the Under Secretary of the Army

Subject: Transmittal of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
Tiger Team--Reserve Component Integration Plan \1\
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    This plan was developed at the direction of the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense. It is based on using the premise that 
disaster relief is primarily a state mission. Given the unique 
nature of a WMD attack, we anticipate requests for federal 
assets much earlier than during typical disasters. Accordingly, 
we focused on the most likely tasks that DoD would be asked to 
support as the Federal Response Plan is implemented in support 
of a WMD event. With integration of the RC as our cornerstone, 
our work focused on the vulnerabilities from a United States' 
state, territory and possession perspective.
    During the mission analysis we assessed current DoD 
capabilities. Our analysis concluded we are insufficiently 
prepared to perform likely tasks which other federal agencies 
may request within consequence management. Additionally, there 
is a significant void in the response community chemical, 
biological and radiological assessment capability. As a result, 
we found it necessary to create a DoD response capability that 
does not exist today. These Rapid Assessment and Initial 
Detection Elements will assist with agent identification and 
appropriate hazard mitigation in the affected areas of a WMD 
release. Operationally, these elements will be responsible for 
identifying the areas to evacuate and where it is safer to 
remain. The elements are intended to respond under the State 
control and, if necessary, be available for military 
contingencies. We recommend fielding teams in every state. We 
were reminded frequently during our survey process, if the 
responders were not in the geographic proximity, then they were 
likely to be too late. This plan represents a beginning, a 
start point, of a larger effort that requires support of senior 
leadership. So too must be our overall commitment to prepare 
for WMD attacks. Preparing for this mission requires a multi-
year effort.
    Finally I would like to recognize the Team that made this 
integration plan possible. Lt Col Jay Steinmetz from the Forces 
Command Domestic Plans Branch served as the Tiger Team Chief. 
In that capacity, he performed superbly and represents a real 
DoD treasure. The core group included: Mr. William McCoy, 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special 
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict; COL Chuck Winn, Office 
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs; LTC 
Tim Madere, Office of the Under Secretary of the Army; Maj 
Keith McCullough, Office of Air Force National Security 
Emergency Preparedness; LTC Pete Aylward, Directorate of 
Military Support, LTC Dutch Thomas, National Guard Bureau, and 
MAJ Alicia Tate-Nadeau, U.S. Army Reserve Command.
    Special recognition is due to Captain Todd Burton of the 
Army National Guard Military Support Branch, and Major Tom 
Welch of the U.S. Army Reserve 100th Division, whose technical 
contributions to the team and their agencies, truly ensured a 
quality final product. This Team, truly experts in their 
respective fields, have exceeded the standards by every 
measure. Their work must be regarded as ``above and beyond'' 
the call.
    (signed)
    Roger C. Schultz
    Brigadier General, USA
    Executive Director

                                Foreword

                               background

    The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 
sponsored by Senators Nunn, Lugar, and Domenici mandates the 
enhancement of domestic preparedness and response capability 
for terrorist attacks involving nuclear, radiological, 
biological, and chemical weapons. The Legislation provided 
funding to improve the capability of the federal, state and 
local emergency response agencies to prevent and, if necessary, 
respond to domestic terrorist incidents involving weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD).
    The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) designated the Secretary 
of the Army (SECARMY) as the Executive Agent for DoD program 
implementation. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for 
Installations, Logistics, and Environment (ASA(ILE)) provides 
oversight for the Director of Military Support (DOMS) as the 
Staff Action Agent. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)) 
provides policy and funding oversight for the DoD Domestic 
Preparedness Program.
    A Senior Interagency Coordinating Group (SICG), chaired by 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), provides 
direction for orchestration of the overall program, ensuring 
that terrorism-related federal preparedness programs are 
coordinated nationally to enhance state and local response 
capabilities. ASD (SO/LIC) and DOMS represent DoD on the SICG. 
The SICG receives guidance from the National Security Council 
(NSC).
    The Interagency Strategic Plan, developed in concert with 
our federal interagency partners represented on the SICG, was 
written to enhance response using a peacetime context 
addressing incident models such as the World Trade Center and 
the Tokyo Subway. While many facets of response are included in 
this program, its overwhelming emphasis is on training first 
responders in large U.S. cities. Interagency teams coordinate 
with local city officials including fire, law enforcement and 
medical responders to tailor training to meet their specific 
needs and requirements.
    As a result of an October 3, 1997 Defense Review Board 
meeting, the Deputy Secretary of Defense asked the ASD (SO/
LIC), ASD (Reserve Affairs), and the ASA (ILE) to provide an 
assessment for integrating the National Guard and Reserves into 
ongoing Nunn-Lugar-Domenici sponsored WMD Domestic Preparedness 
programs. On October 19, 1997 the Deputy Secretary of Defense 
(DEPSECDEF) returned the initial Reserve Component (RC) plan 
seeking a more complete RC integration model.
    On November 3, 1997 the DEPSECDEF directed that the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness oversee the 
development of a plan to integrate the Reserve Components into 
the DoD response to attacks using WMD. During a November 7, 
1997 meeting, the Under Secretary of Defense directed the 
construction of a complete model for integrating the Reserve 
Components into a consequence management response for domestic 
terrorism incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. The 
formation of a core group of experts, with support from 
agencies throughout the Department, was formed to complete the 
plan. In a November 14, 1997, memorandum, the Under Secretary 
of Defense placed the Under Secretary of the Army in charge of 
the plan development. Subsequently, the Under Secretary of the 
Army directed this core group ``Tiger Team'', to incorporate 
the capabilities of the RC into the plan. The Tiger Team 
tasking included developing the concept, model, overall 
direction for the program, and the funding necessary to support 
the RC integration. The Team's focus on the appropriate, 
substantive and integrated DoD support model to local, state, 
and federal government authorities responding to a WMD attack 
form the basis for this plan.
    In developing this plan, the Tiger Team reviewed existing 
programs, applied scenario-driven analysis, and sought the 
opinions of other recognized experts in the Emergency 
Preparedness field. The Tiger Team recognized statutory 
restrictions and training limitations as part of their analysis 
and used the Interagency Strategic Plan and the Federal 
Response Plan (FRP) as the framework for roles and missions 
definition.
    This plan outlines the evolutionary process to fill 
existing gaps in consequence management response capabilities. 
It focuses on improving DoD support for the response to a WMD 
event. In particular, response options were developed to 
incorporate and leverage the unique assets and capabilities of 
the Reserve Component into the overarching WMD strategy.

                              methodology

    The Tiger Team mission and charter focused on producing a 
comprehensive plan to incorporate work from many previous 
efforts and leverage all available assets. The Tiger Team 
recognized that any response effort must be accomplished within 
the statutory and regulatory provisions that govern Military 
Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA). A questionnaire designed 
to assess current DoD capabilities was developed. This survey 
resulted in a response profile outlining DoD capabilities to 
support the Emergency Support Functions in the FRP.
    More specifically, the team used Annex C to the U.S. 
Government Interagency CONPLAN entitled ``Combating Domestic 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Terrorism (Draft- November 
10, 1997)''. The annex lists the tasks the Interagency Group 
deemed critical to successfully respond to a WMD incident. The 
Tiger Team grouped these tasks to correspond with the Emergency 
Support Functions in the FRP. Next the Team identified vital 
response tasks and requested the Services assess their 
capability to perform the tasks that DoD would likely be asked 
to support. The Team consolidated the Service responses to 
identify existing gaps in the DoD capability to respond to a 
WMD event. The results form a snapshot baseline of capabilities 
and assets.
    Following the assessment of current capabilities, the Team 
developed a model for a prototype National Guard response 
concept that enhances and supports the existing and planned 
federal response structure. The model was tested for 
appropriateness by querying experts in the field representing 
the first responder community, primary federal agencies tasked 
to support state and local governments, and knowledgeable 
representatives from DoD organizations. These experts provided 
the Team with comments and recommendations. The Tiger Team also 
reviewed and considered numerous authoritative DoD sanctioned 
studies. These included the findings of the 1997 Defense 
Science Board (DSB) Summer Study on Transnational Terrorism, 
and the Chem-Bio 2010 (Foss-Downing) Report. It is recognized 
that some interagency partners possess a robust capability, and 
may already have sufficient resources to deal with small-scale 
WMD events. This plan capitalizes on these existing resources 
and provides a basis for modeling, analysis and prototyping for 
further exercise. As a result, a framework for even more 
enhanced integration of the Total Force into the WMD program is 
clearly possible. The existing DoD Directives, policies, and 
MSCA related statutes were also considered in the development 
of this plan.
    The Tiger Team recognized the federal response concepts 
identified in the May 1, 1997 Report to Congress and the SICG 
Strategic Plan. In addition, the Tiger Team reviewed the United 
States Atlantic Command (USACOM) and Chemical and Biological 
Defense Command (CBDCOM) response plans which included Response 
Task Force (RTF) and Chem-Bio Rapid Response Team concepts. 
Upon review, it was evident that few military elements are 
currently focused, trained or equipped to respond to WMD 
events. Hence the purpose of the project -- to increase the DoD 
response capabilities while developing the potential within the 
Reserve Component units.
    While this project focuses on the RC response to a WMD 
attack on cities, there are other areas potentially at even 
greater risk. With our military today primarily CONUS based, 
the ability to project our Nation's military power becomes 
crucial to our military response options. By leveraging the 
Reserve Component capability, the DoD response model takes on a 
new and different dimension. Even further as certain RC units 
qualify for direct deployment, a local WMD response capability 
becomes all the more important.
    The employment of a WMD in the United States against our 
power projection systems during a Major Theater War could 
severely degrade our ability to respond during a crisis. Both 
the Chem-Bio 2010 Study and the 1997 DSB Summer Study on 
Transnational Terrorist Threats found that no dedicated force 
structure exists to address potential CB use on military and 
civilian facilities in CONUS or in theater. At issue - 
projecting our Nation's military power at the appropriate time 
and place.
    The concept for an integrated DoD consequence management 
model recognizes that the same or similar capabilities are 
required against this asymmetric threat. The response model in 
this plan includes force protection concepts, research & 
development, and resource allocations that could be applied to 
CONUS Major Theater of War enabling facilities. Here again, 
using the RC integrated response capability would support both 
the National Military Strategy of Force Projection by providing 
support to United States bases prior to and during operational 
deployments and also provides a response capability to WMD 
attacks on other U.S. targets. In addition to current tactical 
battlefield CB defense units, the Total Army Analysis (TAA) has 
documented the need for additional CB structure. As these new 
units are stationed, the USAR and ARNG leadership will be 
informed of the gaps in state and regional coverage. These new 
MTOE units will greatly enhance the capability to respond to 
WMD emergencies. Again, the existing RC unit capability is 
being leveraged. Since there is a relationship between the WMD 
skills and the unit's wartime mission, a complementary outcome 
clearly exists.
    The methods for the first phase of this project and during 
the mission analysis were oriented first on the units in the 
current force and their capabilities to respond to WMD attacks. 
In the final analysis, the concept outlined here reaches far 
beyond just local WMD contingencies. Over time, these response 
elements will develop the skills necessary to be employed at US 
military bases or at other strategic points of U.S. interest 
under Title 10 U.S.C. In addition to the current force 
structure, this plan outlines a requirement for new structure. 
This proposed structure is not large by any measure but the 
potential impact is enormous. Further detailed in this plan, 
the Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) Element 
provides the core capability for the technical DoD response. 
Early assessment and detection of a WMD agent, determining the 
concentration of the release and the areas to evacuate or 
remain are the likely technical areas the DoD will be asked to 
support.
    These questions form the most significant challenge facing 
communities and states as they respond to WMD attacks. Here 
again, National Guard and RC integration will enhance the DoD 
capability in response to WMD attacks.

                           Executive Summary

    This plan was developed by direction of the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense. Its aim is to improve the military 
capabilities required to effectively support local, state, and 
federal agency consequence management response to terrorist 
attacks. These attacks may include the use of nuclear, 
radiological, biological, and chemical weapons - Weapons of 
Mass Destruction.
    The Quadrennial Defense Review and National Defense Panel 
Report underscore the need to fully address the possibility 
that a future adversary will use biological or chemical weapons 
and integrate that threat into defense planning. Appropriate 
acquisition, intelligence and domestic response operations will 
result. Emerging doctrine, training and equipment requirements 
must be developed in concert with this theme. Recognizing the 
importance and understanding the complexities involved, we must 
provide the force with a capability to defend against and 
respond to asymmetric attacks at military installations or 
support the response to attacks on our homeland.
    The very nature of a WMD attack places tremendous pressure 
on the local response community. As a result, consequence 
management planning is just as demanding and even evolutionary 
in many respects. This plan outlines the concept to fill 
existing gaps in consequence management response capabilities. 
It defines the concepts, model, direction, and funding required 
for appropriate, substantive, integrated military support to 
local, state, and federal government authorities responding to 
the use of weapons of mass destruction. Specifically, the plan 
focuses on improving DoD's support for the response to a WMD 
attack. This plan includes response options. Options that 
explore ways to incorporate and leverage unique Reserve 
Component assets and capabilities into the overarching local, 
state, and federal interagency effort to assist first 
responders.
    This effort reinforces the Department of Defense supporting 
role in the overall domestic response capability. Furthermore, 
an efficient response requires cooperation among federal 
departments and agencies, as well as state and local 
authorities. Each of these governmental organizations possesses 
unique responsibilities, priorities, and demands on resources. 
Success depends on a fully integrated effort that shares both a 
common vision and mutual goals and objectives. Consequently, 
this plan builds upon previous interagency work (most notably 
the Senior Interagency Coordinating Group Strategic Plan 
written August 29, 1997) and develops DoD capabilities to 
support those concepts and initiatives.
    The complementary skills of the Reserve Component create a 
more robust DoD response capability that must be integrated 
into a comprehensive WMD consequence management response. The 
realities of an operational environment are characterized by 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, rapidly 
changing technologies, and a smaller military with severely 
constrained resources. This plan reinforces the principles in 
the Defense Reform Initiative and conveys the structure and 
direction required for implementing and institutionalizing 
changes necessary in the DoD for successful program execution.
    The first part (Chapters 1-3) defines the plan's purpose 
and scope, identifies the nature of the problems we face as a 
nation in responding to WMD attacks, and assesses current 
capabilities to respond. It sets the conceptual foundation of 
the response process and highlights the need to enhance 
currently limited response capabilities. The second part 
(Chapters 4-6) identifies the tasks for improving military 
response capabilities, describes the required response 
elements, and outlines the training requirements necessary to 
establish and sustain the essential skill levels.
    Functional tasks which the military anticipates from local, 
state, and other federal agencies have been defined for the DoD 
response elements based on the Emergency Support Functions in 
the Federal Response Plan. Specific elements have been 
identified to perform these functional tasks. The integration 
of these elements into the current response model provides a 
flexible, robust response capability that can be applied to 
support local, state, and federal responders.
    Finally, the annexes provide the framework for a continued 
effort by the program office. They provide additional 
information, references, points of contact, and specific 
equipment and training requirements for those elements that 
will be initially organized. The first year program sets the 
foundation to establish a Rapid Assessment and Initial 
Detection capability in every state and territory. It also 
begins the identification of, training for, and equipping of 
reconnaissance and decontamination elements from the existing 
chemical companies in National Guard and Reserve Component. 
Other elements will necessarily be refined and focused during 
the first year of the program. The plan provides sufficient 
detail to establish a program office to integrate these 
activities, execute the FY99 budget request, and field the 
initial military support elements. As this program develops, 
the new program office performs a key role in synchronizing the 
RC integration activities with existing interagency programs.
    Since the Tiger Teams effort was executed in short measure, 
portions of this plan will require additional study and 
development. Of particular note are the results of the DoD 
capability survey. It was evident early on in the survey 
process that the Department sponsored training in the Domestic 
Preparedness Program that could also be of real benefit to 
selected members of the RC. It is envisioned during the first 
year of this integration program that a small cadre at each 
installation, reserve center and armory will receive the 
(Awareness Biological Chemical Plus) ABC+ training. ABC+ is 
based on the Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) awareness 
course currently being taught in the NLD City Training Program. 
In addition to the awareness training, key leaders and 
individuals will receive training in WMD emergency procedures. 
These procedures will also reinforce the proper techniques, 
protocols, and references that are essential to first 
responders. The intent is to answer questions that might be 
asked and provide an awareness of particular items to be alert 
to as the events develop during a WMD event. An ABC+ checklist 
will be provided that will guide the person through a series of 
questions that provide a profile of a potential WMD attack. 
ABC+ training will be provided on an interactive CD-ROM. At a 
minimum, full time National Guard and Reserve Component staff 
members need to complete the ABC+ training.
    Overall, this is an integration effort, one that requires a 
long-term commitment. The Program Office must assume 
sponsorship and follow the major themes outlined in this work -
- both now and into the future.

                          Chapter 1: Overview

                              introduction

    The United States is beginning to realize that terrorists 
may attack individuals, institutions, and facilities with 
weapons of considerable destructive power. Under Secretary of 
State Bartholomew, during testimony before the House Armed 
Services Committee in 1993, delivered an almost prophetic 
warning when he said,

        ``We are especially concerned about the spread of 
        biological and toxin weapons falling into the hands of 
        terrorists. . . . To date we have no evidence that any 
        known terrorist organization has the capability to 
        employ such weapons . . . However, we cannot dismiss 
        the possibilities . . . It may be only a matter of time 
        before terrorists do acquire and use these weapons.''

    While not employing true weapons of mass destruction, the 
1993 terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center in New York 
and the 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma 
City portend the tremendous response necessary if a WMD is used 
in the US. Few communities, including military installations 
and facilities, have the full array of response assets and 
expertise required to adequately deal with the effects of 
radiological, biological, or chemical weapons or the necessary 
depth to sustain these response operations. They must rely on 
the concerted effort of local, state, and federal government 
agencies, cooperating with private organizations, to meet the 
technological, medical, and engineering demands posed by such 
attacks. The DoD anticipates requests from civilian agencies 
responding to WMD attacks and plans to augment the local 
response capability with expertise, manpower, and equipment. 
Conversely, the DoD may also require mutual community and state 
support to respond to attacks on military installations, bases, 
or ports necessary to deploy and sustain military forces 
employed overseas.

                           purpose and scope

    The DEPSECDEF directed the development of this plan which 
includes the concepts, model, direction, and funding required 
to deliver an appropriate, substantive, integrated military 
support to local, state, and federal government authorities 
responding to the use of WMD. This plan provides a 
comprehensive and cohesive program consistent with national 
policy and DoD Directives. It integrates and advances many 
ongoing efforts throughout the Department and specifically 
addresses issues identified in a number of studies and reports. 
The plan supports evolving interagency plans including the FRP 
and the evolving Interagency Plan for WMD Response. It 
specifically identifies the actions required to leverage the 
capabilities of United States military forces. These 
capabilities are vital to fill the gaps in civil response 
assets currently prepared to respond throughout the United 
States. Many cities, states, and other federal agencies simply 
do not have the focus, the equipment, or the trained personnel 
needed in such a demanding environment. This plan addresses the 
DoD role within that context and the emergency management tasks 
that may require a DoD response.
    This plan develops capabilities for operational response to 
nuclear, biological, and chemical threats within the confines 
of the United States, its territories, and possessions. These 
capabilities can and should be used outside the United States 
when required to support validated Commander-in-Chief 
requirements.

               definition of weapons of mass destruction

    For the purpose of this strategic plan, WMD include any 
weapon or device that are intended, or have the capability, to 
cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of 
people through the release of toxic or poisonous chemicals or 
their precursors, a disease organism, or radiation or 
radioactivity.

               the threat of weapons of mass destruction

    The threat to the US posed by WMD is characterized by 
several factors. Recent events illustrate a real threat of 
domestic terrorism. Today terrorists have an improved ability 
to collect information, raise money, and disseminate rhetoric. 
Advanced information technology available through the Interned 
allows extremists to communicate widely and efficiently. 
Additionally, publicly available databases serve as 
repositories for technical information relating to weapons 
production.
    Another important factor is that WMD, together with the 
materials and technology used to make them, are increasingly 
available. Many of these materials are widely available for 
legitimate commercial purposes. Moreover, the disintegration of 
the former Soviet Union increased concerns about the 
protection, control, and accountability of WMD, related 
materials and technologies, and the potential unemployment and 
proliferation of thousands of scientists skilled in this field. 
Transnational threats arising from the collapse of the eastern 
bloc, including the development of Chem-Bio capabilities by 
terrorist organizations, have increased the potential for 
attacks within our borders. A final factor is the relative ease 
of manufacture and delivery of WMD. Facilities required to 
produce radiological, biological, and chemical weapons are 
small and hard to detect, compared with those associated with 
nuclear weapons.
    The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act 
contains several findings which define the requirement for an 
enhanced domestic response capability. Among these findings 
are:

          ``. . . the capability of potentially hostile nations 
        and terrorist groups to acquire nuclear, radiological, 
        biological, and chemical weapons is greater than at any 
        time in history.''

          ``There is a significant and growing threat of attack 
        of weapons of mass destruction on targets that are not 
        military targets in the usual sense.''

          ``. . . the threat posed to the citizens of the 
        United States by nuclear, radiological, biological, and 
        chemical weapons delivered by unconventional means is 
        significant and growing.''

          ``The United States lacks adequate planning and 
        countermeasures to address the threat of nuclear, 
        radiological, biological, and chemical terrorism.''

                          planning principles

    The plan underscores the principle that domestic disaster 
relief is fundamentally a State mission falling with the 
State's broad authority/responsibility for public safety and 
welfare within its borders. Consequence management of a WMD 
incident is a category of disaster relief over which the State 
usually will have primary responsibility. Federal assistance in 
WMD consequence management situations generally will be in 
support of the State's disaster relief efforts, to include 
efforts in response to a WMD incident. Recognizing these basic 
principles, the plan focuses on filling the void in the State's 
initial assessment capability and the United States' ability to 
rapidly facilitate required assistance in excess of the State's 
capability to respond.
    Two organizing principles were considered in developing 
this plan:

  To structure the force based on the State disaster relief 
            mission
  To structure the force based on the Federal national defense/
            MSCA mission

    The team chose the Federal mission as the organizing 
principle. Under this organizing principle, the immediate 
response elements act as the tip of the Federal MSCA spear. 
Although immediate WMD response would be in a State status, 
under the control of the Governor, the unit's force structure 
would also support homeland defense, MSCA missions, and provide 
a secondary warfighting capability.
    This organizing principle is consistent with the use of 
Federal military funds and other resources in support of this 
plan, and the extension of Federal military personnel benefits 
to National Guard personnel assigned to units engaged in these 
operations. This choice also avoids the legal and policy 
difficulties inherent in Federally funding and organizing a 
National Guard unit solely to conduct a State mission and is 
consistent with the general organizing principle of the 
National Guard for other missions.

                          operational concept

    The operational concepts outlined in this plan are based on 
the principles noted above. The Rapid Assessment and Initial 
Detection (RAID) Elements, in their immediate response 
capacity, will assist in confirming the nature of a WMD attack. 
In most instances, the response elements will remain under 
State control. Under a worst-case scenario, Federal resources 
may also be requested very early in a WMD incident. We must 
anticipate these cases in planning for a coordinated local, 
state and federal response.

                         Chapter 2: The Problem

                      response capabilities today

    Terrorist attacks using Sarin gas (a nerve agent) in the 
Tokyo subway affected more than 5,000 people. Concern for 
similar or larger events using chemical, biological, or 
radiological weapons have spurred legislation and programs to 
prepare local firefighters, emergency medical technicians, and 
other first responders. Despite these commendable efforts, 
significant shortfalls remain in trained and equipped response 
capability throughout the United States. The relatively small-
area bombing in Oklahoma City required 11 of today's 27 
national Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces. Even these highly 
skilled teams are not prepared to operate in or around 
chemical, biological, or radiological hazards. The sheer size 
of WMD events may demand the support of many other properly 
trained and equipped personnel. First response organizations, 
state support agencies, and other federal agencies require 
major efforts to develop adequate capabilities. Until this 
occurs the DoD will continue to be tasked to support the WMD 
response. Even military units prepared to fight in a nuclear, 
biological, or chemical environment are not fully focused, 
trained, or equipped to support response to victims of attacks 
in the United States. Furthermore, our own ability to project 
combat power may be severely degraded by asymmetric attacks on 
sea and air ports of embarkation. Military units must also be 
prepared to respond to attacks on our facilities and 
installations.

                     level of current preparedness

    Local, state, and federal governments are applying 
tremendous resources in many ongoing efforts to improve their 
WMD response capabilities. All responder agencies of local, 
state, and the federal governments must prioritize resources to 
address deficiencies in their plans for responding to a 
domestic WMD event. Military units identified to perform 
functions in and around the hazard areas will require 
additional personal protective gear, special training, and 
periodic exercises to ensure their safety and ability for 
timely and effective responses. This plan highlights those 
areas and provides sound solutions to meet those needs.

                              assessments

    Results of the assessments conducted by the Catastrophic 
Disaster Response Group (CDRG) were highlighted in a report to 
the President in February 1997. These same shortfalls were 
identified in the SICG Strategic Plan produced in August 1997. 
The critical areas of concern which are highlighted below:
   Tailored and timely Federal Response to augment stat 
        and local responders.
   Specialized equipment and coordinated training.
   Capability to deal with a large number of victims.
   Adequate medical supplies and pharmaceuticals: 
        available and stockpiled.
   Baseline information of capability at federal, state 
        and local levels.
   Better planning interface among federal, state and 
        local authorities.
   Prioritization of transportation infrastructure for 
        rapid movement of time-sensitive response resources.
   Timely and accurate emergency information.
   Electronic information management and communications 
        capability.
   Manage stringent Public Safety measures.
   Finalize FRP Terrorism Incident Annex.

    In addition to the CDRG assessment, DoD has identified four 
additional areas not addressed in the existing NLD Domestic 
Preparedness Program highlighted below:

   Current NLD program targets 120 cities--11 states 
        and 4 territories are not included in this program.
   Federal assets are not well dispersed 
        geographically.
   Military personnel require additional equipment and 
        training to reach an adequate response capability.
   The RC has some statutory limitations that impede 
        response decisions.

             military preparedness to support wmd response

    While many military units possess basic skills and 
capabilities that can be applied to WMD response requirements, 
few have been specifically focused on the precise tasks or 
equipped with the appropriate assets to immediately respond to 
such an event. During the development of this plan, Services 
were asked to identify units that might perform the response 
tasks identified in the interagency WMD response plan and to 
indicate if those units were adequately organized, trained, and 
equipped to perform these specific tasks. This survey 
dramatically displayed existing gaps in procedures, training, 
and equipment necessary for appropriate response.
    For many of the WMD response tasks, focusing units on the 
missions they may be asked to perform and developing their 
awareness of the Incident Command System (ICS) is all that may 
be necessary. For others, specific tasks will require training. 
In a WMD scenario, selected members will be tasked to deploy to 
the Hot Zone and operate for extended periods of time, quite 
different from our wartime practices. Even more demanding, the 
tasks requiring total decontamination must be anticipated. 
These are very different practices when compared to our 
military doctrine today. Here again, the value of training to 
the same standards, using common terminology and exercising 
with first responders, we have the opportunity to prepare for 
this most demanding mission. In general terms today, the 
Department is not prepared for the WMD response. This plan 
addresses the areas requiring DoD attention and isolates in 
some detail the response options the Department may be asked to 
perform. In the end, the solution to the WMD response mission 
requires a partnership - military and civilian.

                        Chapter 3: The Response

                      integrated response concept

Local
    Local response to an emergency situation uses the Incident 
Command System (ICS) to ensure that all responders and their 
support assets are coordinated for an effective and efficient 
response. The Incident Commander is normally the senior 
responder of the organization with the preponderance of 
responsibility for the event (e.g., fire chief, police chief, 
or emergency medical). If local assets are not sufficient to 
meet the emergency response requirements, they request state 
(or regional) assets through the State Office of Emergency 
Services.
State
    The state's substantial resources, including the National 
Guard in state status, are coordinated through the state's 
response plan(s) and are normally coordinated by the state's 
Office of Emergency Services. If state assets are not 
sufficient to meet the emergency response requirements, they 
request federal assets through the FEMA Regional Operations 
Center.
Federal
    The Presidential Decision Directive 39 entitled ``U.S. 
Policy on Counterterrorism'' recognizes that there must be a 
rapid and decisive capability to protect U.S. citizens, defeat 
or arrest terrorists, respond against terrorist sponsors, and 
provide relief to victims. The goals during the immediate 
response phase of an incident are to terminate the terrorist 
attack so that terrorists do not accomplish their objectives or 
maintain their freedom, and to minimize loss of life and damage 
and to provide emergency assistance to the affected area. In 
responding to a terrorist incident, Federal departments and 
agencies rapidly deploy the needed Federal capabilities to the 
scene, including specialized elements for dealing with specific 
types of incidents resulting from the threat or actual use of 
WMD. To coordinate the Federal response, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and FEMA have been assigned lead agency 
responsibility for crisis and consequence management, 
respectively, in response to a domestic terrorist threat or 
incident.
    The FBI is the lead agency for crisis management response 
to acts of domestic terrorism, which includes measures to 
identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to 
anticipate, prevent, or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. 
The laws of the United States assign primary authority to the 
Federal government to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism; 
State and local governments provide assistance as required. 
Crisis management is predominantly a law enforcement response.
    Crisis management activities include active measures for 
prevention, immediate incident response, and post-incident 
response. Activities include command of the operational 
response as the on-scene manager for an incident in 
coordination with other Federal agencies and State and local 
authorities. The FBI provides guidance on the crisis management 
response in the FBI Nuclear Incident Contingency Plan 
(classified) and the FBI Chemical/Biological Incident 
Contingency Plan (classified).
    FEMA is the lead agency for consequence management, which 
entails both preparedness for and dealing with the consequences 
of a terrorist incident. Although the affected State and local 
governments have primary jurisdiction for emergencies, a 
terrorist attack involving weapons of mass destruction could 
create havoc beyond their capability to respond. If this were 
to happen, FEMA would coordinate consequence management 
activities including measures to alleviate damage, loss, 
hardship, or suffering caused by the incident; to protect 
public health and safety; to restore essential government 
services; and to provide emergency assistance. FEMA would 
implement the Federal Response Plan, cooperating with State and 
local emergency response agencies. Final authority to make 
decisions onscene regarding the consequences of the incident 
(rescue and treatment of casualties, protective actions for the 
affected community) rests with the local Incident Commander.
    The federal government, including the DoD, responds to 
emergency requests from the states through the FRP. After the 
President declares a major disaster or emergency, the resources 
of the federal government needed to support the state response 
are managed by the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCC). When the 
State Coordinating Officer makes specific requests for 
assistance, he or she certifies that the state does not have 
the capability to meet the requirements. The FCO assigns the 
request to one of the 12 Emergency Support Functions (ESF) 
represented within the Emergency Response Team. If the lead 
agency of any ESF is not able to meet the requirements, it may 
ask the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) to provide the 
necessary response. The DCO coordinates all federal military 
assistance provided during the consequence management response.
Military Support
    The DoD supports local, state, and federal government 
agencies in planning for and responding to domestic 
emergencies. Local units may respond under the immediate 
response doctrine when necessary to save lives, prevent human 
suffering, or mitigate great property damage. Many units 
execute memorandums of understanding for mutual support of 
emergency services with local jurisdictions or municipalities. 
National Guard units may also respond under state control when 
directed by appropriate state authorities. Upon the declaration 
of an emergency or major disaster by the President, the 
Secretary of Defense or his Executive Agent directs a supported 
CINC to provide federal military support to the FCO through a 
DCO and Defense Coordinating Element (DCE). For most domestic 
emergency responses requiring DoD assets, the DCO controls all 
DoD response elements. Because of the potentially large number 
of DoD requirements, the supported CINC may activate a Response 
Task Force to command and control all federal military 
personnel responding for consequence management (with the 
exception the Joint Special Operations Task Force). The RTF 
deploys to support the federal crisis and consequence 
management operations in support of the Lead Federal Agency 
(LFA) during domestic operations. A Chem-Bio Rapid Response 
Team (CBRRT) under the RTF has been established to provide 
technical expertise and assessment support to the local 
officials. A network of Reserve Emergency Preparedness Liaison 
Officers (EPLOs) from all Services in each state and federal 
region supports the DCO and provides the military interface to 
coordinate response requirements and activities with each state 
and federal region.
    At the local, state, and federal levels, a task force 
oriented structure and process responds to the emergency 
requirements. The missing elements in most structures are the 
task-oriented, trained and equipped task force elements that 
actually perform the required response functions. The local 
civil Incident Commander directs these response elements. Task-
organized elements that can be plugged into the task forces at 
the local, state, or federal level must be formed.
    Active Duty, National Guard, and Reserve forces possess 
expertise, trained manpower, and equipment that can support 
response to chemical, biological, radiological attacks at DoD 
installations and in civilian communities. As the Department of 
Defense supports all Emergency Support Functions identified in 
the FRP, we must be prepared to perform those functions which 
other agencies are not capable of supporting or simply do not 
have adequate resources to meet the demand. Specific response 
functions have been identified that may require substantial 
military augmentation for execution. Units capable of 
performing these functions must be focused, task organized, 
adequately trained, and properly equipped to work in and around 
nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards.
    Today's task organized response assets in the DoD are very 
limited. Expert and capable response organizations like 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams, the Army's Technical Escort 
Unit, and the Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident 
Response Force have been involved in the development of 
response plans and procedures. The RTF staffs have also been 
instrumental in organizing and employing military assets to 
support requests for assistance.
    Certain DoD laboratories can also be called upon to respond 
with specialized equipment and capabilities. One such 
laboratory is the AMC Treaty Laboratory that was established to 
verify compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). 
It is an ISO 9001 registered quality system that was pre-
deployed to support the FBI during the Olympics in Atlanta. The 
US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases 
(USAMRIID) is capable of deploying an Aeromedical Isolation 
Team consisting of physicians, nurses, medical assistants and 
laboratory technicians. These team members are specially 
trained to provide care for and transport of patients with 
diseases caused by either biological warfare agents or 
infectious diseases requiring high containment. Also, Edgewood 
Research, Development and Engineering Center (ERDEC) maintains 
a rapidly deployable mobile environmental monitoring and 
technical assessment system. This Mobile Analytical Response 
System (MARS) provides a state-of-the-art analytical assessment 
of chemical or biological hazards at incident sites. The Naval 
Medical Research Institute (NMRI), through their Biological 
Defense Research Program (BDRP), has designed reagents, assays 
and procedures for agents classically identified as biological 
threat, as well as non-classical threat agents in environmental 
and clinical specimens. This program has developed rapid, hand-
held screening assays that can be deployed globally. Though 
highly capable in their areas of expertise, these teams are 
extraordinarily limited in their response capacity and could be 
easily consumed by a WMD event.
    The Office of Naval Research Science & Technology Reserve 
Program (S&T Reserve Program, or Program 38) has a small cadre 
dedicated to chemical, biological, and radiological defense 
(CBRD). These include medical service corps officers, hospital 
corpsmen, and officers of assorted line designators. Program 
38's lead CBRD unit--NR NRL Chemical, Biological, and 
Radiological Defense Detachment 106 (NR NRL CBRD106)--drills at 
the headquarters of CBDCOM in the spaces of the Naval Research 
Laboratory's Detachment to CBDCOM. Program 38 members comprise 
the Navy's intellectual capital of military personnel in CBRD, 
and can help the National Team to deal with problems of an 
unexpected nature; (e.g., one might imagine generically 
engineered microbes being used against us in which case we can 
provide Ph.D. microbiologists with connections into academia 
and industry who could help deal with this problem.) The main 
contribution of Program 38 officers is probably in providing a 
reach back resource that responders can tap into to better 
assess the situation at hand, and formulate the best action to 
take.
    Overall, the group consensus was that the local 
preparedness for response to WMD terrorist incidents is 
nominal. To the extent that hazardous material preparedness 
applies to the NBC arena, some basic military skill levels 
exist. The group recognized that there are other programs that 
have specific statutory authority to provide support including 
the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program and the 
Non-Stockpile Chemical Material Program. Leveraging the 
resources provided by these programs as well as the National 
Disaster Medical System will improve the linkage between expert 
assistance and the first responders. However, much needed 
attention must be applied to resourcing, planning, and training 
for the unique nature of NBC terrorist incidents.

                            response policy

    The Stafford Act (P.L. 93-288) establishes the authority 
and process for ``all hazards'' response to natural and man-
made disasters in the United States. It is implemented through 
Executive Order 12656 and the FRP.
    Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 established the 
policy for crisis and consequence management of terrorist 
incidents involving the use of weapons of mass destruction.
    DoD has assigned the CINCs planning, coordinating, and 
execution authorities for responding to ``all hazards'' 
disasters in the United States and its territories. Response to 
the consequences of WMD should use the same process as response 
to other natural and man-made disasters, as specified in the 
``all-hazard'' concepts of the Stafford Act and the FRP and 
laid out in DoD Directive 3025.1. CINCs have developed plans to 
support this response as the DoD planning agents for their 
respective areas. They, in turn, have designated regional 
planning agents to interface with the other federal agencies 
and the states. A network of EPLO's from all Services has been 
established and trained to represent the federal military in 
each state and in each of the ten federal regions.
    DoD support of a federal response to a domestic terrorism 
incident will be personally managed by the Secretary of 
Defense, with the assistance of the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Secretary of the Army. The DoD 
crisis management response will be provided through the 
national interagency terrorism response system. DoD response 
forces will be employed either under the operational control of 
the Joint Special Operations Task Force or a Response Task 
Force assigned to the appropriate Unified Combatant Commander.
    The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Defense Against Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Act of 1996 mandates training and development of 
capability to respond to WMD attacks in the United States. 
Response to WMD attacks or accidents must be consistent with 
the concepts, response model, and responsibilities for other 
domestic emergencies. We may often be in the situation that we 
do not know who or what caused the event to which we are 
responding. Section 1414, Title IV of the Defense 
Appropriation, mandates that the SECDEF ``shall develop and 
maintain at least one domestic terrorism rapid response team 
composed of members of the Armed Forces and employees of DoD 
who are capable of aiding Federal, state, and local officials 
in the detection, neutralization, containment, dismantlement, 
and disposal of weapons of mass destruction containing 
chemical, biological, or related materials.'' The DoD has 
formed the RTF and the CBRRT to meet this requirement. The 
elements described in this plan further support this 
requirement.
    DoD has developed two consequence management RTFs under the 
command of U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM). The headquarters 
elements of these RTFs are assigned to First and Fifth U.S. 
Army for responses east and west of the Mississippi River 
respectively. Forces of the RTF will be tailored and assigned 
based on the situation. Central to these forces will be 
technical and specialized units capable of supporting a 
response to a chemical, biological or radiological incident. 
One concept being studied is the chemical and biological quick 
response cell.
    Responsibilities for oversight and execution of Title XIV, 
Subtitle A, Domestic Preparedness, are spread among several 
organizations. ASD(SO/LIC) has responsibility for policy and 
resource oversight. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 
(Nuclear, Chemical & Biological Defense Programs) provides 
resource oversight for equipment procurement. Additionally, in 
accordance with Section 1413, Title XIV, the Secretary of 
Defense (SECDEF) designated the Secretary of the Army (SECARMY) 
to serve as the Executive Agent for the coordination of DoD 
training assistance to Federal, state, and local officials to 
better assist them in responding to threats involving chemical 
and biological weapons or related materials or technologies, 
including assistance in identifying, neutralizing, dismantling, 
and disposing of biological and chemical weapons and related 
materials and technologies. As the Executive Agent, the 
Secretary is responsible for developing the planning guidance, 
plans, implementation, and procedures for the Domestic 
Preparedness Program. The SECARMY subsequently named the 
ASA(ILE) as the focal point for all matters in which the Army 
has executive agency, and the DOMS as the DoD Staff Action 
Agent. In a separate directive, the SECARMY directed the 
Commander, Army Materiel Command (AMC) to appoint a DoD Program 
Director. AMC subsequently directed Commander, CBDCOM to 
appoint a DoD Program Director with the primary responsibility 
to implement the basic elements of Title XIV. Also under Title 
XIV, for nuclear and radiological preparedness, the Secretary 
of Energy has specific responsibilities. The Secretary of 
Energy is responsible to test and improve the responses of 
Federal, State and local agencies involving nuclear and 
radiological weapons or related materials. Here again, agency 
responsibility must be communicated clearly and the value of 
PDD 39 becomes even more evident.
    Co-Chaired by FEMA, the Senior Interagency Coordination 
Group (SICG) on Terrorism was established to facilitate the 
interagency coordination of policy issues and program 
activities in support of Federal initiatives to assist Federal, 
state, and local first responders in responding to WMD 
incidents. The SICG is composed of senior members from DoD, 
FEMA, the FBI, the Public Health Service (PBS), the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Energy 
(DoE), the Department of Justice (DoJ), the Department of 
Transportation (DoT), United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), General Services Administration (GSA), and the National 
Communications System (NCS).

                   Chapter 4: Improving the Response

                 wmd response integration program goals

    The Interagency Strategic Plan laid out an ambitious list 
of objectives that are part of the overall goal to improve the 
nation's WMD response capability. A program to coordinate and 
integrate DoD's capabilities to support local, state, and 
federal consequence management response to WMD events must be 
established. This program supports the Military Support to 
Civil Authorities policies of the Department and the plans of 
the supported CINCs charged to execute that response. It must 
coordinate and orchestrate many on-going efforts throughout the 
DoD to meet requirements for response to WMD attacks at our 
installations and facilities and within civilian communities. 
The program should:

  1. Establish a fully operational DoD preparedness and 
        response capability to deal with potential effects of 
        domestic terrorism involving weapons of mass 
        destruction.
  2. Leverage Reserve Component preparedness and response 
        capabilities to deal with these threats.
  3. Enhance local, state, and other federal agency access to 
        military capabilities and expertise.

                      plan for improving response

Key actions required to implement this program
    1. Establish a Reserve Component Consequence Management 
Program Integration Office to implement this plan. Assign 
program management responsibility and transfer functions to the 
program office. A program office of at least 14 people will be 
established with contractor support to ensure the integration 
of research & development, procurement, training, and doctrine 
development for response to WMD. The program director should 
report to the Secretary of the Army, as the DoD Executive Agent 
for Military Support to Civil Authorities, through the DoD 
Director of Military Support and hold quarterly program reviews 
on project status.
    2. Review DoD Directives 3025.1, 3025.15, 3025.12, 3020.26, 
5160.54 and others that may require updating as the RC 
integration effort matures. Assist in the coordination of 
policy as applied to the many DoD organizations that may become 
involved in a WMD response.
    3. Coordinate the development of legislation that 
facilitates Reserve Component activation for WMD response.
    4. Modify Defense Planning Guidance and the Unified Command 
Plan to reflect WMD response requirements.
    5. Coordinate the development of an OPLAN to respond to 
terrorist on U. S. installations, facilities, ports, and the 
states and communities.
Reserve Component Consequence Management Program Integration Office 
        Functions
    1. Identify and task military response elements. The 
Departments will identify specific units to provide the 
response elements, so the program office can coordinate the 
training and equipment necessary for each. Each Service will 
task these units to be prepared to perform the response element 
mission.
    2. Develop and publish individual position descriptions and 
doctrine for integrated employment of the teams.
    3. Integrate WMD training for DCOs, EPLOs, RTFs, and 
military response elements. Leverage existing responder 
training programs as the core and develop required specialized 
training. The program office will coordinate training and 
exercises to ensure the identified response elements, EPLOs, 
DCOs, and RTFs receive training identified in the plan. The DoD 
Emergency Preparedness Course and other regional training 
programs provide a solid foundation for individual 
responsibilities of the command and liaison elements. 
Interagency exercises conducted at the state or regional levels 
will be used to validate concepts of employment and response 
integration with local, state, and federal response assets. 
This training will leverage existing federal training for WMD 
response (currently led by CBDCOM). Response elements will 
interface with local and state exercises and federal 
interagency response exercises. The program office will ensure 
crossflow of lessons learned and coordinate improvement 
recommendations between similar response elements.
    4. Purchase equipment for the military response elements. 
In year one, equipment will be purchased for the Rapid 
Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) Elements, the 
reconnaissance and decontamination elements, some of the 
medical personnel and the laptop computers for the Emergency 
Preparedness Liaison officers (EPLOs).
    5. Identify DoD WMD response assets and capabilities. U.S. 
Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) will include DoD's WMD response 
assets and capabilities in the DoD Resources Data Base and 
coordinate with FEMA to include appropriate information in the 
Rapid Response Information System. The program office will 
coordinate this effort with the Joint Staff and Unified 
Commands.
    6. Facilitate training exercises for the military response 
elements under the CINC's RTF. Coordinate these exercises with 
local, state, and federal agencies.
    7. Identify and coordinate the WMD related interests with 
the Advanced Concepts and Research & Development initiatives. 
The program office will identify equipment that requires 
prototyping, simulation, or testing. There are currently a 
number of Chemical Defense Equipment (CDE) initiatives of 
significant value to the WMD response effort. ASA(RDA) 
initiatives are of particular interest and require attention by 
the program office. The ASD(SO/LIC) Technical Support Working 
Group will be a key office to facilitate development of this 
equipment. The OSD Office for Counterproliferation will be an 
additional resource for testing advanced concepts and newly 
developed equipment.
    8. Establish and maintain linkages with the processes of 
the CJCS Readiness System to include:
The Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR)
   Joint Warfare Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) Teams
   Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)
   Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC)

    9. Coordinate with the Department of Health and Human 
Services, Veterans Affairs, FEMA, and other federal agencies in 
development of the Presidential Report on Preparations for a 
National Response to Medical Emergencies Arising From the 
Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and leverage the 
results of the report to ensure that the Reserve Components are 
trained and ready to provide this support.
    10. Work with the National Guard Bureau to develop a plan 
to reprogram current resources to fully resource RAID Elements 
if additional full time spaces are not authorized.
    11. Evaluate geographic dispersion of Reserve Component 
assets for support within the U.S.
    12. Develop or revise procedures and doctrine to address:

   Capability to deal with a large number of 
        contaminated victims.
   Use of chemical units to perform patient 
        decontamination
   Response element tactics, techniques, and procedures
   Response to attacks on U. S. facilities and 
        installations.
   Additional doctrinal shortfalls

    13. Ensure medical supplies and pharmaceuticals are rapidly 
available to military response elements for use in U. S. WMD 
incidents.
    14. Ensure that designated response elements have readily 
accessible Personal Protective Equipment for rapid deployment 
to respond within the United States.
    15. Develop and publish individual position descriptions 
and doctrine for integrated employment of the teams.
    16. Coordinate the new response capabilities into the 
ongoing interagency exercise program in order to validate 
concepts of employment and response integration with local, 
state, and federal response assets.
    17. Ensure communication of lessons learned and coordinate 
improvement recommendations between similar response elements.
    18. Establish at least a partial Rapid Assessment and 
Initial Detection Element in each State and Territory.
    19. Integrate Civilian Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) 
operations into existing Chemical Training programs.
    20. Develop FY00-03 POM requirements.
    21. Develop a program to train leaders on HAZMAT, ICS, the 
FRP and how all of the local, state, and federal agencies 
interrelate to support the operations.
    22. Leverage the existing NLD training programs to provide 
training to DoD responders.
    23. Provide Reserve Component medical personnel with 
additional specialized training in the management of nuclear, 
chemical, and biological agent casualties.
    24. Develop a rapid systematic notification process to 
notify military medical personnel when an incident occurs.
    25. Upgrade JANUS, Spectrum, or other simulations for use 
in WMD exercises and execute a proof of concept for using 
SPECTRUM and JANUS to conduct WMD response exercises.
    26. Fund participation by response elements including DCOs, 
EPLOs, and the RTF staffs in the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici city 
visits and training.
    27. Integrate WMD response elements and assets into the DoD 
Resources Database.
    28. Define requirements for additional number and types of 
military response elements.
    29. Document the authorization document for the RAID 
Elements and the requirements for any new force structure.
    30. Coordinate the development of training material for the 
NBC Defense Teams.
    31. Coordinate the DoD WMD training efforts using distance 
learning techniques.
5-Year Integration Concept for WMD Response
    The program office will develop a schedule of milestones to 
ensure that the elements identified in this plan are tasked, 
trained, and equipped in a smooth and efficient manner.
    The first year of the program will start with the RAID, 
reconnaissance, and decontamination elements. Training for 
medical personnel will also begin the first year. Follow on 
work will expand training to the other elements, analyze 
equipment requirements, and orchestrate integration of the 
response concepts and models.
    The chart below \2\ shows a phased approach that begins to 
develop domestic response in FY 99 and certifies coverage by FY 
02. The most critical elements to develop, task, train, and 
equip are the RAID Elements. This will ensure a minimal 
assessment and requirement definition capability in each state 
and territory. Additionally, the Reconnaissance and 
Decontamination Elements, which leverage the capabilities of 
Army Chemical Companies and Air Force Patient Decontamination 
Teams, will be trained and equipped over a two-year period. 
Medical Elements will begin their individual training and 
development of concepts for fielding and equipment purchases in 
the second and subsequent years. The other less technical 
elements may not require as much training to be fully prepared 
for a WMD response. By phasing in the element tasking, 
training, and equipping over time, less stress will be placed 
on doctrine development, training delivery, and procurement 
activities. Lessons learned from evolving military and civil 
assets will allow for review and improvement of element 
procedures and structures in the latter years.
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    \2\ See http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/wmdresponse/
chapter__4.html.
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    The program office will develop and integrate operational 
plans and doctrine for the domestic WMD response elements, 
working closely with the supported CINCs. The program office 
will prepare specific procedures for each response element and 
evolve those procedures as the response elements mature. These 
procedures will be based on established and evolving 
interagency plans and procedures. Integrated exercises and 
training will ensure elements can operate together as military 
units and with corresponding civilian responders.

                      Chapter 5: Response Elements

                                overview

    The Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) and other 
elements have been identified to support local, state, and 
federal agencies responding to a WMD. The basis for developing 
these elements is the four elements of the Incident Command 
System (Information and Planning, Operations, Logistics, and 
Finance) and the 12 Emergency Support Functions of the Federal 
Response Plan. Elements are designed to ``plug into'' existing 
task force structures required by the incident commander, the 
Governor, or the CINC responding in support of the FRP. A 
potential model response is portrayed in the figure below.

                                command

    Military command elements are established by the Adjutant 
General for the National Guard responding as state resources 
and by the CINC for the area (s) affected for federal military 
assets. In most cases, the pre-designated DCO coordinates for 
any federal military assets. A RTF may be deployed to provide 
command and control during a major federal response. The CINC's 
RTF is responsible for the command and control of all 
responding military elements, less the Joint Special Operations 
Task Force. It is comprised of command, staff, and technical 
experts required to support the WMD consequence management 
response.
    [Organization Chart] \3\
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    \3\ See http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/wmdresponse/
chapter__5.html.
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                           response elements

    Most military elements called to respond to a WMD attack 
will perform operations supporting the incident commander, 
state authorities, or federal agencies requiring their help. 
These elements include:
Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection Element
    The point of the military response spear is the National 
Guard Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection Element. This 
element is comprised of highly trained experts in a cross-
discipline of functional areas that can deploy and assess the 
situation, advise the local, state and federal response 
elements, define requirements, and expedite employment of state 
and federal military support.
    Mission: Provide early assessment, initial detection, and 
technical advice to the incident commander during an incident 
involving weapons of mass destruction. Facilitate 
identification of DoD asset requirements.
    [C2 Cell Organization Chart] \3\
    C2 Cell: Provides overall command and control of the 
assessment team and conducts hazard modeling.
    Recon Cell: Provides early detection, initial sample 
collection, and NBC reconnaissance.
    Medical Support Cell: Provides an initial DoD medical 
assessment.
    Security Cell: Provides initial assessment of security 
requirements and manages force protection/assessment element 
security.
    Logistics Cell: Determines initial resource requirements 
and provides supply and maintenance support for the assessment 
element.
    Air Liaison Cell: Coordinates for transportation and/or air 
movement of assessment element.
    Communications Cell: Provides internal communications 
within the assessment element, coordinates for communications 
connectivity with civilian responders, and maintains a reach 
back capability for additional technical expertise.
    Units Employed: The RAID Elements assigned to each state/
territory represent the first military responders. Regardless 
of the full-time and traditional member mix, the reconnaissance 
team will likely be the primary area that technical assistance 
will be requested. Given the goal of four-hour on-scene, the 
demands of the RAID Elements will be significant. While not 
ideal in terms of fully developed response capability, teams 
from surrounding states or even use of the regional assets may 
well be necessary if the disaster escalates quickly.
    Employment: The RAID Element is organized as an element 
under the peacetime control of the Adjutant General. Given its 
rapid response and assessment mission, the RAID Element is 
designed to assist incident commanders with the initial 
detection and the nature of the emergency. There is also a 
wartime RAID Element mission: to provide force protection 
support within the state during mobilization. As with the other 
elements of the response module, these elements can also be 
used as part of a federal (Title 10) response to support the 
National Military Strategy (NMS) requirements.
    The RAIDs have the capability to rapidly deploy to an 
incident site and provide initial support to the Incident 
Commander. The element has the capability to conduct 
reconnaissance, provide medical advice and assistance, perform 
detection, assessment, and hazard prediction, and can provide 
technical advice concerning WMD incidents and agents. Equipping 
the RAIDs requires both military standard and commercial-off-
the-shelf components. The equipment list can be found in Annex 
F.
Information and Planning Element
    Mission: Collect, process and disseminate information about 
WMD emergency to facilitate the overall response activities. 
The scope of this functional element is to coordinate the 
overall information activities. Provide an initial assessment 
of disaster impacts including the identification of boundaries 
of the affected area and distribution, type and severity of 
damages, including the status of critical facilities. The 
information and planning activities are grouped among the 
following functions:

   Information Processing function to collect and 
        process essential elements of information from the 
        State, and other sources, disseminate it for 
        operations, and provide input for reports, briefings, 
        displays and plans;
   Reports function to consolidate information into 
        reports and other materials to describe and document 
        overall response activities and to keep follow-on 
        support personnel informed of the status of the 
        response operations;
   Displays function to maintain displays of pertinent 
        information and facilitate briefings using maps, charts 
        and status boards other means, such as computer 
        bulletin boards or electronic mail, as available;
   Consolidate information to support the action 
        planning process initiated by ICS.

    Units Employed: Air Force Information Management staffs and 
Army Information Operations staffs.
    Employment: When activated, this functional element will 
provide information processing support to military response 
activities. Information may be obtained from a variety of 
sources to include but not limited to ICS representatives. This 
functional element will proactively seek information that is a 
viable to develop an accurate picture of the emergency 
condition. The collection and processing of critical 
information is forwarded to the operational element in order to 
create an overall perspective of the situation. The release of 
information directly to the public or media remains a Public 
Affairs function. These elements deploy to an incident site 
between 8-72 hours after an incident to assist the Incident 
Commander.
NBC Reconnaissance Element
    Mission: Provide NBC Reconnaissance Support to the local 
Incident Commander.
    NBC reconnaissance operations include search, survey, 
surveillance, and sampling missions.
    Search: Reconnaissance undertaken to obtain significant 
information about the NBC condition of routes, areas, and 
zones. This information confirms or denies the presence of NBC 
hazards with detection and identification equipment. Visual 
observation or the collection of samples in the specified 
location or region can also provide this information.
    Surveys: Missions conducted to collect detailed information 
of NBC contamination hazards. The survey determines the type of 
contamination, the degree (extent/intensity), and the 
boundaries.
    Surveillance: The systematic observation of an area to 
provide early warning.
    Sampling: Provides physical evidence of NBC attacks and 
technical intelligence concerning NBC weapons systems.
    Units Employed: Each National Guard and USAR Chemical 
Company will train a platoon-sized element to perform 
reconnaissance operations. (The Separate Brigade Chemical 
Platoons will also train to provide recon support.)
    Employment: These elements should be prepared to deploy to 
an incident site after an incident to assist the incident 
commander to:

   Confirm or deny contaminated areas.
   Confirm the area is clear of contamination.

    Units will operate primarily using standard MTOE and TDA 
equipment. Additional equipment requirements are attached 
(Annex F.)
NBC Patient Decontamination Element
    Mission: Provide patient decontamination support to the 
local Incident Commander. Prepare to:

   Perform casualty decontamination near the incident 
        site, prior to evacuation, or;
   Establish decontamination/detection stations at 
        community hospitals.

    Decontamination of non-ambulatory casualties is normally 
performed prior to evacuation. However, in a terrorist 
incident, many ambulatory casualties will self evacuate, 
arriving at the hospital still contaminated. Hospitals must 
have the capability to detect contamination, and decontaminate 
when necessary.
    Casualty decontamination is done by trained non-medical 
personnel under the supervision of the medical personnel in 
accordance with procedures outlined in FM 8-10-7.
    Units Employed: Each National Guard and USAR Chemical 
Company, and each Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve 
Medical Patient Decontamination Team will train platoon-sized 
elements to perform patient decontamination. (Separate Brigade 
Chemical Platoons will also train to provide decon support.) 
This training will be conducted during a weekend drill by the 
unit squad and platoon level leadership. A train-the-trainer 
program will be established and a program of instruction will 
be developed.
    Employment: Each decontamination team will consist of 
twenty non-medical personnel and is capable of decontaminating 
12 casualties per hour.
    Three teams are required per decontamination site to run 
24-hour operations (4 hours on and 8 hours off shifts).
    This team requires three to five medical personnel from 
either the supported hospital/EMS or a medical unit to 
supervise the process and perform triage and immediate 
treatment of casualties. Equipment requirements are defined in 
Annex F.
NBC Medical Response Element
   The Medical Response Elements require further study 
        and analysis. Noted below are the initial concepts for 
        tasking and element employment. The ongoing medical 
        studies must be considered before the DoD response plan 
        is finalized. With many initiatives in various stages 
        of fielding, a more detailed medical response element 
        missions and tasks will be developed further during the 
        first year of the program. The medical response plan 
        requires coordination with our partners, in both the 
        private and public sector.
    Mission: Provide medical advice to incident commander and 
local authorities on protection of first responders and health 
care personnel in an NBC environment. Provide advice on 
casualty decontamination procedures, first aid and initial 
medical treatment. Provide medical threat information and 
characterize the health risks to civilian and military 
populations. Provide initial medical advice to include signs, 
symptoms, and first aid.
    Units Employed: NBC Medical elements consist of 6 medical 
personnel and is capable of providing medical advice to include 
signs, symptoms, and first aid of NBC agents. Teams consist of: 
1 Preventative Medicine Officer, 1 Preventive Medicine NCO, 1 
Acute Care Physician, 1 Nurse, 1 Preventive Medicine Science 
Officer, 1 Practical Nurse, 1 NBC NCO, 1 Nuclear Medical 
Science Officer, 1 Nuclear Medical Officer, 1 Nuclear Medicine 
Specialist/Health Physics Specialist.
    Employment: After the initial assessment National Guard/
Reserve Component NBC medical elements will provide periodic 
updates to the incident commander and local authorities on 
protection of first responders and health care personnel in an 
NBC environment. Elements may elect to use telemedicine reach 
back capabilities to provide medical advice to local hospitals 
on appropriate management of care issues. These elements deploy 
to an incident site between 8-72 hours after an incident to 
assist the Incident Commander.
Triage Medical Response Element
    Mission: Provide triage support to the Incident Commander 
including the sorting and assignment of treatment priorities to 
various categories of wounded, and providing immediate 
emergency care.
    Units Employed: Each National Guard, USAR, AFRES, USNR 
triage team will be trained to perform triage using the Simple 
Triage and Rapid Treatment (START) system and deploy to an 
incident site within 72 hours to assist the Incident Commander 
with a Mass Casualty Incident (MCI).
    Employment: Each triage team will consist of 26 personnel 
and is capable of treating 100 patients per hour.
Trauma Medical Response Element
    Mission: Provide expertise in triage, resuscitation, and 
damage control medicine near the incident site or at a 
definitive care location. Specific tasks are:

   Perform damage control surgery for up to four 
        patients.
   Augment community hospital systems overwhelmed by 
        NBC casualties.
   Augment hospital/Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams 
        (MMST) after 24 hours to conduct sustainment 
        operations.
   Provide support to local hospitals or MMST triage 
        and immediate treatment of casualties.
   Provides Analgesia and anesthesia for patients under 
        their care.

    Units Employed: Each National Guard, USAR, and USNR, AFRES 
trauma team will be trained in the treatment of chemical, 
biological and radiological casualties and associated effects 
from blasts and crush injuries. Teams consist of: 2 General 
Surgeons, 1 Anesthesiologist, 1 Emergency Medical Physician/
Orthopedic Surgeon, 1 Critical Care Nurse, 1 ER Nurse
    Employment: These elements deploy to an incident site 
between 8-72 hours after an incident to assist the Incident 
Commander.
Preventive Medicine Element
    Mission: Provides initial disease and environmental health 
threat assessments during early or continuing assistance stages 
of a disaster. Specific tasks are:

   Provide medical threat information and characterize 
        the health risks to civilian and military populations.
   Prepare preventive medicine estimates; conduct rapid 
        hazard sampling, monitoring and analysis.
   Sampling including endemic and epidemic disease 
        indicators.
   Provide initial disease and environmental health 
        threat assessments prior to or in the initial stages of 
        a disaster.

    Units Employed: Each National Guard, USAR, and Naval 
Reserve preventive medicine team will be trained in initial 
disease and environmental health threat assessments. Teams may 
require information from the Center for Disease Control and 
other agencies with endemic disease and environmental effect 
information to prepare their database for the area. Teams 
consist of: 1 Preventative Medicine Officer, 1 Industrial 
Hygienist/Health Physicist, 1 Environmental Science/
Engineering, 1 Community Health Nurse, 1 Entomologist, 1 
Biologist, 1 Preventive Medicine NCO. This team should attend 
the HHS/FEMA public health aspects of natural disasters and 
civil emergencies.
    Employment: These elements deploy to an incident site 
between 8-72 hours after an incident to assist the Incident 
Commander. Personnel are alerted using pagers and deploy to 
incident site.
Stress Management Element
    Mission: Provides initial stress management for military 
and civilian responder and incident survivors.
    Units Employed: This element is highly trained in stress 
management and neuropsychiatry. It is capable of providing 
limited neuropsychiatric triage and stabilization of clinical 
cases in order to reduce the disabling effects associated with 
post traumatic stress disorder.
    Personnel: Each NBC element will consist of 6 medical 
personnel and is capable of providing medical advice to include 
signs, symptoms, and first aid of NBC agents. Teams consist of: 
1 Psychiatrist , 1 Clinical Psychologist, 1 Social Work 
Officer, 1 Psychiatric Nurse, 2 Mental Health NCOs, 1 Chaplain, 
1 Occupational Therapy Officer, 1 Occupational Therapy NCO and 
require training victim assistance, psychological trauma, post 
traumatic stress disorder, mental health risks associated with 
relief workers (burn out syndrome) critical events management 
course.
    Employment: These elements deploy to an incident site 
between 18 and 48 hours after an incident to assist the 
Incident Commander.
Security/Law Enforcement Element
    Mission: The National Guard provides support for the 
Incident Commander IAW state and local emergency response plans 
to assist in maintaining order, ensuring public safety and 
providing assistance to the law enforcement officials. Specific 
tasks and capabilities include:
    Access Control: The potential for mass panic following a 
WMD incident will overwhelm the ability of hospitals to 
function effectively without additional personnel to control 
access to the facilities. National Guard troops could be called 
upon to augment law enforcement and hospital security personnel 
to maintain efficient access control in the hospitals. Because 
arriving victims may be contaminated, the personnel assigned 
this function require both awareness level knowledge and 
training in performing security operations in personal 
protective equipment (PPE). The units assigned this 
responsibility need ready access to PPE which allows for rapid 
mobilization from a local armory to an incident site.
    Site Security: Once the limits of the contaminated area are 
established, a cordon will need to be established to prevent 
people from entering the area. Because this mission will be 
performed outside the hot zone and National Guard units 
regularly perform this type of mission in other disaster 
situations, no additional training beyond basic awareness will 
be required.
    Civil Disturbances: The potential for lawlessness and 
disorder will exist following any WMD incident. Units 
designated with on-street civil disturbance missions need to 
have awareness level training on WMD incidents.
    Quarantine: The National Guard could be called on to assist 
in the implementation of a quarantine if public health 
officials determine that a biological attack using a 
communicable disease agent occurs.
    Evacuation: National Guard units will be required to assist 
in any evacuation ordered by the local officials. Military 
Police and other types of units may be called upon to assist in 
managing the flow of traffic during an evacuation. Because this 
mission will be performed outside the hot zone and National 
Guard units regularly perform this type of mission in other 
disaster situations, no additional training beyond basic 
awareness will be required.
Mass Care Elements
    Mission: Provide support to the incident commander in 
providing shelter, feeding, emergency first aid, and bulk 
distribution of emergency relief supplies. Specific tasks and 
capabilities include:
    Shelter: The provision of emergency shelter for disaster 
victims includes the use of pre-identified shelter sites in 
existing structures; creation of temporary facilities such as 
tent cities, or the temporary construction of shelters; and use 
of similar facilities outside the disaster-affected area, 
should evacuation be necessary. Military installations and 
facilities such as the armories and reserve centers can be 
used. The military can also be tasked to provide tentage, cots, 
etc. in the event of an incident.
    Feeding: The provision for feeding disaster victims and 
emergency workers through a combination of fixed sites, mobile 
feeding units, and bulk food distribution. Such operations will 
be based on sound nutritional standards and will include 
provisions for meeting dietary requirements of disaster victims 
with special dietary needs. Mobile kitchens and MAE's may be 
requested from the military to support mass feeding operations.
    Emergency First Aid: Emergency first aid services will be 
provided to disaster victims and workers at mass care 
facilities and at designated sites within the disaster area. 
This emergency first aid service will be supplemental to 
emergency health and medical services established to meet the 
needs of disaster victims.
    Bulk Distribution of Emergency Relief Items: Sites will be 
established within the affected area for distribution of 
emergency relief items. The bulk distribution of these relief 
items will be determined by the requirement to meet urgent 
needs of disaster victims for essential items. Military units 
can be tasked to man these operations.
Mortuary Affairs Element
    Mission: Provide mortuary support to include 
identification, processing, storage, and disposition of remains 
following a mass casualty WMD incident. Specific tasks and 
capabilities include: assist in providing victim identification 
and mortuary services, temporary morgue facilities; victim 
identification utilizing latent fingerprint, forensic dental, 
and/or forensic pathology/anthropology methods; and processing, 
preparation, and disposition of remains.
Communications Element
    Mission: This function is to assure the provision of 
telecommunications support to the response forces following a 
WMD emergency. This functional element coordinates actions to 
assure the provision of required telecommunications support. 
This functional element will coordinate the establishment of 
required temporary telecommunications. Support includes 
Government-furnished telecommunications, commercially leased 
communications, and telecommunications.
    Units Employed: Tactical Army, Navy, and Air Force 
communications units may provide communications elements to 
link key command and control and deployed assets. Each NBC 
command element will consist of an information specialist.
    Employment: These elements deploy to an incident site 
between 8-72 hours after an incident to assist the incident 
commander. Personnel are alerted using pagers and deploy to 
incident site. This functional element serves as a basis for 
planning and use of military telecommunications assets and 
resources in a WMD emergency.
Engineering Element
    Mission: Public Works and Engineering support includes 
technical advice and evaluations, engineering services, 
construction management and inspection, emergency contracting, 
emergency repair of waste water and solid waste facilities, and 
real estate support for the stated purposes. The United States 
Army Corps of Engineers is the lead for this Emergency Support 
Function.
    Specific tasks include:

  Emergency clearance of debris for reconnaissance of the 
        damage areas and passage of emergency personnel and 
        equipment for lifesaving, life protecting, health and 
        safety purposes during the initial response phase,
  Temporary construction of emergency access routes which 
        include damaged streets, roads, bridges, ports, 
        waterways, airfields, and any other facilities 
        necessary for passage of rescue personnel,
  Emergency restoration of critical public services and 
        facilities including supply of adequate amounts of 
        potable water, temporary restoration of water supply 
        systems, and the provision of water for fire fighting,
  Emergency demolition or stabilization of damaged structures 
        and facilities designated by State or local government 
        as immediate hazards to the public health and safety, 
        or as necessary to facilitate the accomplishment of 
        life saving operations (undertake temporary protective 
        measures to abate immediate hazards to the public for 
        health and safety reasons until demolition is 
        accomplished),
  Technical assistance and damage assessment, including 
        structural inspection of structures.

    Units Employed: ARNG & USAR Engineer units and ANG/AFRES 
Civil Engineering units could be tasked.
Transportation Elements
    Mission: Provide support for the incident commander 
(through the SCO or FCO/DCO) IAW state and local emergency 
response plans and the Federal Response Plan to satisfy the 
requirements of Federal agencies, State and local governmental 
entities, and voluntary organizations requiring transportation 
capacity (service, equipment, facilities, and systems) to 
perform their assigned WMD response missions.
    Units Employed:
    Air (Fixed): The Air Force (including ANG and AFRES) will 
be tasked to transport both civil and military response assets 
and elements to the site of an incident. Pilots and aircrews 
require awareness training.
    Air assets may be tasked under the National Disaster 
Medical System to provide transport of patients (post-
decontamination) to medical facilities around the nation. 
Pilots and aircrews require only an awareness level of 
training.
    Air (Rotary): Military rotary wing assets will be critical 
to the operations of the other military response elements and 
in support of the local Incident Commander. Potential missions 
include:
    Transport of the RAID: In order to meet a four-hour 
response window, many of the RAID's will be stationed at or 
near air units. Rapid activation of pilots and crews will be 
necessary. The RAID air liaison cell needs to coordinate with 
the supporting aviation element to ensure that adequate cargo 
capacity is available. The pilots and crews will require an 
awareness level of training.
    Air Ambulance: The potential for mass casualties in a WMD 
incident will quickly overwhelm the hospital capacity in a 
local community. The use of aeromedical ambulance companies to 
transport patients to more distant treatment facilities can 
help to alleviate this problem. This transport capability is 
post decontamination and outside the hot zone. (Helicopters 
should not be used within a chemically contaminated area 
because their rotors tend to spread agents/contamination.) 
Pilots and crews will therefore only require an awareness level 
of training.
    Survey/Reconnaissance: Helicopters may be used to conduct 
an aerial reconnaissance of a radiologically contaminated area 
to determine the spread/level of contamination. Pilots need to 
receive training in the conduct of this type of operation.
    Ground: Military vehicles such as military busses, HMMWV's, 
trucks, etc. can be operated in support of ESF#1 if not 
otherwise required to carry out the unit's emergency mission. 
Potential assets include transportation units that can be 
activated to provide additional transportation support. Only an 
awareness level of training will be required for those vehicles 
operating outside the hot zone. The assigned drivers of 
vehicles operating within the hot zone (such as ambulances) 
will require training on vehicle operations while wearing 
protective clothing.
USCG National Strike Force
    The Coast Guard's National Strike Force's capabilities and 
responsibilities are available for responding beyond port 
areas. The Strike Teams are regularly deployed throughout the 
US on behalf of both USCG and EPA On-Scene Coordinators (OSCs). 
Further, the Strike Teams are key tactical response units for 
the EPA to call upon when responding under the Federal Response 
Plan Emergency Support Function #10. The potential exists that 
the Coast Guard OSCs could very well be the first Federal 
presence in a WMD scenario. Coast Guard OSCs have a pre-
established response organization in coastal areas (including 
rivers and Great Lakes) with state and local responders as well 
as fire and police. USCG OSCs have experience coordinating 
support services (NOAA Scientific Support Coordinators, CDC, 
etc.) and other government agencies with response capabilities 
into a cohesive unified command.

                    Chapter 6: Training Requirements

                           training overview

    Training and exercises are the two key components of the 
overall training program. Achieving a level of enhanced 
readiness is directly linked to both. The challenge is to 
utilize the limited resources available during the development 
phases through a rigorous training and exercise program. 
Training must be conducted to ensure an efficient and effective 
response. Exercises offer an opportunity to practice response 
operations and to validate training preparations. Ultimately 
the real test will be when the first unit responds to an 
event--turning victims into patients, rather than collecting 
casualties for body bags.
    This challenge is complicated by the fact that this effort 
is evolutionary. Instruction must focus on the unique aspects 
of a domestic WMD response. On the surface, responding to 
civilian casualties in a downtown metropolitan area would seem 
to have similar tasks that a soldier would perform when 
responding to a fellow member on the battlefield. The key 
difference is in the emergency operational environment. One is 
a wartime theater and the other is just as chaotic, just as 
lethal but CONUS based. Of course there is a correlation to the 
individual tasks and the circumstances surrounding the event, 
the response and the associated functions the unit will perform 
when it arrives on scene. Yet, the specific conditions may vary 
greatly given the unique nature of a WMD attack in a CONUS 
setting. Performance based objectives will define the overall 
training needed for these teams to effectively respond.
    Identification of the Performance Based Training Objectives 
for the first responder community has been an ongoing CBDCOM 
effort. This program should reap the benefits of that hard work 
by leveraging the already developed CBDCOM compendium of 
courses and program of instruction and then tailoring them to 
meet the training requirements of the state response teams. 
Orchestrating that effort will have to be accomplished by the 
program office. Concept development and rigorously exercising 
the response elements will help refine doctrine development. To 
meet the challenges of such an incident, an integrated training 
approach must be applied for both civilian and military 
personnel. Training for and response to a WMD incident is an 
interwoven process that must be viewed and analyzed as a total 
system.
    In addition to leveraging CBDCOM's programs of instruction, 
a ``Center for Excellence'' should be established as the 
accrediting body to oversee WMD training to ensure a complete 
crosswalk between both civilian and military training. One 
solution would leverage the seven Institutional Training 
Division's TRADOC approved chemical training battalions and 
medical training brigades to support the Center for Excellence. 
Another solution could include expanding the current training 
base through the use of mobile training teams to satisfy 
training requirements. The program office needs to determine 
the cost reduction potential realized through innovative 
training technologies such as distance learning and interactive 
CD-ROM. Utilizing these capabilities could dramatically reduce 
the costs associated with training large numbers of military 
response elements. TRADOC schools and courses should integrate 
the Incident Command System, Civilian HAZMAT procedures and the 
Federal Response Plan into lesson plans and programs of 
instruction.
    In addition, simulation exercises will provide city 
leaders, first responders and other federal partners a cost-
effective method of testing current response procedures. In 
conjunction with training objectives, exercises can be tailored 
to individual city or state needs, allowing them to improve 
their process to meet specific training requirements.

                          individual training

    In particular, first responder training is viewed as the 
single most critical area for enhancing the nation's capability 
to respond to domestic terrorism. This training addresses the 
competence of skills needed to execute WMD response missions. 
There does exist a training gap between battlefield skills and 
the unique response skills required for civil WMD missions. In 
addition to providing individual training for the teams 
outlined in this plan, awareness training to the entire Reserve 
Component community will enhance our nation's overall response 
capability. Awareness training linked to ongoing unit training 
delivered using distance learning technology or via interactive 
CDROM capability provides low cost solutions with a high impact 
yield. Course material developed by CBDCOM for training first 
responders under the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici program is a readily 
available training source.

           awareness chemical biological plus (abc+) program

    Early detection, identification and notification of the 
emergency management system is essential to saving lives and 
mitigating the effects of a WMD event. Situational awareness, 
recognizing symptoms and effects, knowing what to do and who to 
call, is the theme of the ABC+ training program. During the 
first year of this integration program, a small cadre at each 
installation, reserve center and armory will receive the ABC+ 
training. ABC+ is based on the NBC awareness course currently 
being taught in the NLD City Training Program. In addition to 
the awareness training, key leaders and individuals will 
receive training in WMD emergency procedures. These procedures 
will also reinforce the proper techniques, protocols, and 
references that are essential to first responders. The intent 
is to answer questions that might be asked and provide an 
awareness of particular items to be alert to as the events 
develop during a WMD event. An ABC+ checklist will be provided 
that will guide the person through a series of questions that 
provide a profile of a potential WMD attack. ABC+ training will 
be provided on an interactive CD-ROM. At a minimum, full time 
National Guard and Reserve Component staff members need to 
complete the ABC+ training.

                             unit training

    Preparing for a WMD response requires a focus on new and 
different tasks for some units. While many of these tasks are 
complementary to the unit's mission, some tasks have a new 
focus. Unit training builds on the individual skill proficiency 
to achieve unit domestic readiness. Rigorous training exercises 
are most appropriate for units with a WMD mission. These 
exercises require an understanding of the critical 
infrastructure nodes and emergency response protocols within 
the state and local communities to allow response units to 
refine ``battle drill'' techniques. The focus of unit training 
should provide immediate feedback to participants, which 
reinforces individual skills training. Also, measuring the 
effectiveness of completed training will identify areas that 
require further improvement. Unit NBC Defense Team's provide a 
WMD response capability as well. These teams are trained today 
for their military NBC mission and a basic orientation on the 
unique WMD tasks will be necessary. Annually, these defense 
teams exercise for their wartime mission, which is their 
primary orientation. With a minimum investment, a special 
training module could be developed that would provide a WMD 
track for the NBC Defense Teams. The Program will coordinate 
this initiative with the appropriate proponent school.

                   course evaluation and development

    The timely evaluation of training courses and materials is 
critical to ensuring that course content is properly focused. 
In this way emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures 
applicable to WMD responses will be made available to units.

                               exercises

    Exercises allow the teams, elements and units to practice 
for the WMD mission. A critical step in this process is 
learning the roles and responsibilities that individuals will 
assume should an actual incident occur. Exercises provide the 
opportunity to practice and develop skills as well as foster 
teamwork among responders and between agencies. Exercises 
ensure that a crisis is not the first opportunity for 
interagency coordination among responders. Lessons learned and 
opportunities to improve should be documented and shared with 
our interagency partners.
    Exercises complement and enhance training activities. Since 
the Regional Training Brigades have the mission to conduct 
exercises using simulation, WMD scenarios can be developed for 
this capability.

                           training objective

    The overarching training objective is to employ joint, 
interagency, and intergovernmental efforts to mitigate the 
effects of a WMD incident. The specific training objective may 
be broad or narrow in scope. A broad application of this 
training objective is focused on training interagency leaders 
and staffs in response management. A narrow application focuses 
on a specific sub-system not normally exercised by local 
emergency services such as planning decontamination of urban 
infrastructure assisting survivors, preventing additional 
casualties from chemical or radioactive agent drift, or 
restoration of public order.

                          simulation exercises

    WMD Simulation Training Exercises (WMD SIMEX) will be 
conducted after initial training has been completed. The WMD 
SIMEX is a modified SPECTRUM or JANUS driven training event 
focusing on key leaders and response agencies. A CD-ROM and/or 
Internet based interactive computer-assisted training program 
with learner controls, practical exercises, and comprehensive 
assessments will be developed to support this program. The 
concept behind a WMD SIMEX is similar to the military's use of 
simulation training prior to field training exercises in order 
to maximize scarce operational dollars.
    This methodology parallels the Army Battle Command Training 
Program. A read-ahead package made available provides selected 
materials appropriate to the training audience. Seminars bring 
interagency teams together to learn the process of reducing 
risk and mitigating the effects of a WMD attack. The exercise 
concludes with an Incident Command Post Exercise which brings 
interagency teams together in their actual operations centers 
to deal with issues, including fog and friction, generated by 
the separation in time and space from an event. The CBDCOM 
sponsored training provides a model for developing future 
training simulations.

                       regional training exercise

    This event brings all regional responders to a training 
incident and evaluates the entire response. The exercise is a 
joint, city, state, and federal effort. The leadership of these 
organizations should have completed a WMD SIMEX prior to a 
regional training exercise in order to maximize the benefit of 
the training event. Lessons learned will generate improvements 
in response.
    A read-ahead package provides selected materials 
appropriate to the training audience. Civic leaders choose 
tasks they wish to exercise. Training scenarios will pull 
together the interagency team in a focused training exercise 
that allows them to operate together to reduce and mitigate the 
effects of a WMD. Through realistic execution the teams will 
test emergency response plans and coordination of 
responsibilities which will serve as the basis for formulating 
and testing alternatives to developing capabilities. Finally, 
an after action review process emphasizes lessons learned from 
and a take home packet provides direction for future 
interagency training events.

                        modeling and simulations

    Many elaborate simulation models and simulation tools have 
been developed for Major Theater Warfare scenarios using 
current Active and Reserve Component data. These models can be 
adapted to scenarios which impact the civilian populace at 
large. Data generated from these models can produce hazard 
effects, which would be useful identifying ``hot zones'', 
evacuation areas and safe areas. Custom reports generated from 
these databases could instantaneously identify units within the 
geographic proximity of an event by zip code. This will be 
helpful for identifying gaps in the existing capability. More 
important, it will facilitate decisions about fielding force 
structure that could be used to fill current force structure 
gaps.
    Two agencies that provided invaluable help to the Tiger 
Team include the Concepts Analysis Agency and Defense Special 
Weapons Agency. Each organization has extensive experience in 
developing modeling and simulations for the Department of 
Defense. Furthermore, each organization has the technical 
expertise to assist the future efforts of the program office in 
many ways including doctrine and training development. Areas of 
interest for the program office include: determine WMD impact, 
number of casualties in a contaminated area, downwind hazard, 
areas to avoid and evacuate, neutralization procedures, analyze 
and determine tasks and their priority, and estimate response 
force size and composition.
    When used properly, simulations and models can create the 
environment and stress needed for effective response options. 
Proper use ensures quality training that can compensate for 
fiscal constraints that limit live exercises. In addition, 
simulations and modeling efforts will provide leaders at all 
levels effective training alternatives.

                nunn-lugar-domenici sustainment training

    The Senior Interagency Coordination Group Sustainment 
Training Process Action Team has recommended four Courses of 
Action for providing training to first responders following the 
initial 120 cities:
    1. Maintain the Domestic Preparedness Training Teams for 
the cities beyond the current mandate.
    2. Use or expand the existing training infrastructure to 
include NBC models.
    3. Enable the cities to train themselves.
    4. Empower the states to execute sustainment training by 
providing them a menu of approved Domestic Preparedness 
training courses.
    Their plan provides multiple options depending on funding 
availability. Integration of Reserve Component personnel into 
each of the courses of action could leverage the unique 
capabilities and geographic dispersion to provide a cost-
effective training opportunity.

                           Annex A: Acronyms

ACTD Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstration
AFNSEP Air Force National Security Emergency Preparedness 
    Office
AFRES Air Force Reserve
AMC Army Materiel Command
ANG Air National Guard
ARNG Army National Guard
ASA Assistant Secretary of the Army
ASD Assistant Secretary of Defense
BDRP Biological Defense Research Program
C2 Command and Control
CAM Chemical Agent Monitor
CB Chemical Biological
CB2010 Assessment of Chemical & Biological Agents on Joint
Operations in 2010
CBDCOM Chemical Biological Defense Command
CBIRF Chemical Biological Initial Response Force
CBRRT Chemical & Biological Rapid Response Team
CDC Centers for Disease Control
CDRG Catastrophic Disaster Response Group
CINC Commander in Chief
Commo Communications
CONPLAN Contingency plan
CONUS Continental United States
CWC Chemical Weapons Convention
DCO Defense Coordinating Officer
Decon Decontamination
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DoD Department of Defense
DoDRDB Department of Defense Resources Database
DoE Department of Energy
DoJ Department of Justice
DOMS Director of Military Support
DoT Department of Transportation
DPP Domestic preparedness Program
DSB Defense Science Board
DSWA Defense Special Weapons Agency
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
EPLO Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer
ER Emergency Room
ERDEC Edgewood Research, Development and Engineering Center
ESF Emergency Support Function
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCO Federal Coordinating Officer
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FORSCOM Forces Command
FRP Federal Response Plan
GSA General Services Administration
HAZMAT Hazardous Materials
HQDA Headquarters Department of the Army
IAW In Accordance With
ICS Incident Command System
ILE Installations, Logistics & Environment
I-TRAP Interagency Terrorism Response Awareness Program
LFA Lead Federal Agency
MARS Mobile Analytical Response System
MMST Metropolitan Medical Strike Team
MRE Meal, Ready to Eat
MRMC Medical Research and Materiel Command
MSCA Military Support to Civilian Authorities
MTOE Modified Table of Organization and Equipment
MTW Major Theater War
NBC Nuclear Biological Chemical
NC&B Nuclear, Chemical & Biological
NCO Non Commissioned Officer
NCS National Communications System
NDP National Defense panel
NG National Guard
NGA National Governors' Association
NGB National Guard Bureau
NICI National Interagency Counterdrug Institute
NLD Nunn-Lugar Domenici
NMRI Naval Medical Research Institute
NRC National Response Center
OCAR Office, Chief of the Army Reserve
OCONUS Outside of the Continental United States
P.L. Public Law
PAT Process Action Team
PC Personal Computer
PDD Presidential Decision Directive
PHS Public Health Service
PPE Personal Protective Equipment
PSRC Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up
QDR Quadrennial Defense Review
RA Reserve Affairs
RAID Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection
RC Reserve Component
Recon Reconnaissance
RTF Response Task Force
SCO State Coordinating Officer
SECARMY Secretary of the Army
SECDEF Secretary of Defense
SICG Senior Interagency Coordination Group
STARC State Area Command
TAG The Adjutant General
TDA Table of Distribution of Allowances
TEU Technical Escort Unit
USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers
USACOM United States Atlantic Command
USAMRICD United States Army Medical Research Institute for
Chemical Defense
USAMRIID United States Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Disease
USAR United States Army Reserve
USCG United States Coast Guard
USDA United States Department of Agriculture
USMCRC United States Marine Corps Reserve Component
USNR United States Naval Reserve
VA Department of Veterans Affairs
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

                          Annex B: References

                                statutes

Title 42 Sections 5121-5204c Stafford Act
Title 14 Sections 1402-1455 1997 Defense Authorization Act 
    Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction
Title 32 Section 502, 3500 Mobilization Statutes (Army and Air 
    National Guard)
Title 14 Section 712 Coast Guard
Title 10 Sections 12301-12304 Reserve Components
Title 50 Appendix 2251- 2303 Civil Defense Act
Title 18 Section 1385 Posse Comitatus Act
Title 10 Sections 331-335 Insurrection Act
Title 31 Section 1535 Economy Act
Title 42 Sections 9601-9675 CERCLA (Superfund)

                            executive orders

E.O. 12656 (53 FR 47491) Assignment of Emergency Preparedness 
    Responsibilities, 18 Nov 88
E.O. 12472 (49 FR 13471) Assignment of National Security and 
    Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications Functions, 3 Apr 
    84
E.O. 12148 (44 FR 43239) Federal Emergency Management, 20 Jul 
    79
E.O. 13010 Critical Infrastructure Protection, 15 Jul 96

         national security and presidential decision directives

NSD 66 Civil Defense, 16 Mar 92
PDD 39 U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism (Unclassified extract), 
    21 Jun 95

                             dod directives

DOD Directive 3020.26 Continuity of Operations Policies and 
    Planning, 26 May 95
DOD Directive 3020.36 Assignment of National Security
Emergency Preparedness (NSEP) Responsibilities to DoD 
    Components, 2 Nov 88
DOD Directive 3025.1 Military Support to Civil Authorities 
    (MSCA), 15 Jan 93
DOD Directive 3025.12 Military Assistance for Civil 
    Disturbances (MACDIS), 4 Feb 94
DOD Directive 3025.15 Military Assistance for Civil Authorities 
    (MACA), 18 Feb 97
DOD Directive 3150.5 DOD Response to Improvised Nuclear Device 
    (IND) Incidents, 24 Mar 87
DOD Directive 3150.8 DOD Response to Radiological Incidents, 13 
    Jun 96
DOD Directive 4000.19 Interservice and Intergovernmental 
    Support 9 Aug 95
DOD Directive 5030.41 Implementation of National Oil and 
    Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 1 Jun 77
DOD Directive 5160.54 DOD Key Asset Protection Program (KAPP), 
    26 Jun 89
DOD Directive 5525.5 DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law 
    Enforcement Officials, 15 Jan 86

                              dod manuals

DOD 3025.1-M Manual for Civil Emergencies, Jun 94
DOD 5100.52-M Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures 
    (NARP), Sep 90

                           joint publications

Joint Publication 5.0 Joint Operations

                                 plans

A National Security Strategy for A New Century prepared by the 
    White House, May 1997.
National Military Strategy of the United States of America. 
    Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New 
    Era prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
    September 97.
Strategic Plan for Developing a Weapons of Mass Destruction 
    Domestic Terrorism Preparedness and Response Capability 
    prepared by the Interagency Working Group on Domestic 
    Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism, 29 August 97.
Annex C to U.S Government Interagency CONPLAN: ``Combating 
    Domestic Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Terrorism,'' 
    Draft - 10 November 97.

                           government reports

Defense Reform Initiative Report, William S. Cohen, November 
    97.
GAO Report (GAO/NSIAD-97-129) Proposals to Expand Call-up 
    Authorities Should Include Numerical Limitations.
GAO Report (GAO/NSIA-97-254) Combating Terrorism: Federal 
    Agencies Effort to Implement National Policy and Strategy.
FEMA, Focus Group Report: NBC Terrorism Response Focus Group 
    For Local Government, 29 October 97.

                     Annex D: Studies and Analyses

    1. Department of Defense Report to Congress: Domestic 
Preparedness Program in the Defense Against Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (1 May 1997).
    2. An Assessment of Federal Consequence Management 
Capabilities for Response to Nuclear, Biological or Chemical 
(NBC) Terrorism - A Report to the President in coordination 
with the Catastrophic Disaster Response Group (February 1997).
    3. Chem-Bio 2010: Assessment of the impact of Chem/Bio 
Weapons on Joint Operations in 2010 (Joint Staff - September 
1997).
    4. The Role of the National Guard in Emergency Preparedness 
and Response for the United States Congress and Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (January 1997).
    5. Defense Science Board: DoD Responses to Transnational 
Threats (August 1997).
    6. Proliferation: Threat and Response. Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (November 1997).
    7. Report of the National Defense Panel: Transforming 
Defense National Security for the 21st Century (December 1997).
    8. NBC Terrorism Response Focus Group for Local Government 
Report (October 1996).
    9. National Governor's Association Workshop with 
Interagency Partners (FEMA, DoD, EPA, FBI, DHHS and DVA) 
(September 1996).
    Twenty six states participated in assessing capabilities to 
respond to and manage the consequences of nuclear, biological, 
or chemical (NBC) terrorism. These 26 states were chosen 
because their large urban areas and other factors could make 
them potential targets for a terrorist incident.
    10. FEMA--September 1996
    During September 1996, FEMA met with representatives from 
Boston, MA; Denver, CO; Los Angeles, CA; and Philadelphia, PA. 
They focused on the capabilities and needs of local government 
to respond to terrorist incidents involving WMD. Input and 
feedback from this sampling of U.S. metropolitan areas was 
intended to provide an indication of the spectrum of nationwide 
preparedness at the local level. Participants primarily 
represented emergency response and public health organizations 
from the respective state and local governments. Policy and 
subject matter experts included Federal officials from FEMA, 
the FBI, DHHS, and DoD.
     Overall, the group consensus was that the local 
preparedness for response to WMD terrorist incidents is 
nominal. To the extent that hazardous material preparedness 
applies to the NBC arena, some base level exists. However, a 
great deal of progress remains to be made on resource, 
planning, and training fronts regarding the unique nature of 
NBC terrorist incidents.
    11. FEMA/FBI Report to Congress (January 1997).
    FEMA and FBI submitted a Joint Report to Congress in 
January 1997. It addressed both crisis management/prevention 
and consequence management/response activities. This report 
focused on capabilities and interagency roles and 
responsibilities to respond to an incident involving WMD. In 
the assessment summary, the impact of a WMD incident and 
significant response requirement were recognized.
    A NBC terrorist incident may occur as a local event with 
potentially profound national implications. In responding to a 
NBC incident, first responders must be able to provide critical 
resources within minutes to mitigate the effects of the 
incident. Since the ability of the local government to deal 
with the immediate effects of an incident is essential to the 
success of any NBC response, enhancing and maintaining the 
local capability with trained and adequately equipped 
responders is a key component of a viable national terrorism 
response capability.
    12. DoD Focus Group Meetings (February 1997).
    DoD, with the support of other Federal agencies, conducted 
a series of focus group meetings with first responders during 
February 1997. The findings and recommendations of the groups 
formed the basis of a comprehensive set of training performance 
objectives. Based upon the focus group's review, a training 
course development program was begun to modify existing 
training courses, and develop programs of instruction and 
instructional material.
    13. DoD/DoE Report to Congress (April 1996).
    DoD and DoE, in consultation with FEMA, submitted a report 
to Congress in 1996 on current plans, resources, and 
capabilities to respond to a nuclear, radiological, biological, 
or chemical terrorist attack. The report covered consequence 
management plans and capabilities. Key points made were, first, 
there is a fundamental shift from the local or regional level 
of Federal involvement and decision-making authority to 
Washington, DC and the SECDEF's personal involvement during a 
WMD domestic terrorist incident. Second, there are some highly 
trained personnel available and excellent capabilities in many 
consequence management organizations to respond to a domestic 
NBC disaster. Finally, first responders need training, 
equipment, and supplies, yet there are limited quantities of 
DoD combat supplies available for NBC contingencies.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                         Annex G: Legal Issues

                          planning principles

    As mentioned in Chapter 1, the team selected the Federal 
mission as the principle to guide the organization of the 
response elements. Under this organizing principle, the 
immediate response elements act as the tip of the Federal MSCA 
spear. It is anticipated the initial WMD response would be in a 
State status, under the control of the Governor. Since the 
unit's outlined in this plan remain DoD assets, the unit's 
force structure would also be available to support the homeland 
defense and MSCA missions, and provide a secondary warfighting 
capability.

                    current legislative initiatives

    Status of full time personnel: The team analyzed a number 
of options regarding the status of full time personnel. These 
included: state active duty (SAD), full time National Guard 
duty for special work (Title 32), full time Active Guard and 
Reserve duty (AGR)(Title 32) and active duty for special work 
(Title 10). The team recommends full time Active Guard and 
Reserve duty (AGR)(Title 32), for National Guard personnel. 
This status best enables the personnel to perform required 
missions within the envisioned command and control structure 
and with federal military personnel benefits. This status 
provides a career track for soldiers who will be highly skilled 
and in high demand. A change to current statutes covering Title 
32 is necessary since the WMD mission is operational in nature. 
The specific language has been included in the fast-track 
legislative package being staffed separate from this plan.
    Stafford Act Amendments: The team also recommends amending 
provisions of the Stafford Disaster Assistance Act that concern 
Federal and State disaster preparedness programs and disaster 
response, to include WMD incidents within the definition of a 
disaster under the act and to authorize the use of the National 
Guard (as defined in section (101)(3) of Title 32) or the 
reserve components (as named in Section 10101 of Title 10) ``to 
take such actions that may be necessary to provide an immediate 
response to a disaster involving a weapon of mass destruction'' 
(as that term is defined in Section 102 of the Act, as it would 
be amended). The act would also be amended to also require that 
DoD be reimbursed for any expenses incurred by the department 
for disaster preparedness programs conducted by the National 
Guard or the reserve Components from funds ``appropriated for 
the purposes of the Act'' and to authorize the Secretary of 
Defense, at the request of the Director of FEMA, to direct the 
National Guard and Reserve Components to conduct training 
exercises, preposition equipment and other items, and to take 
such other actions that may be necessary to provide an 
immediate response to an incident involving a weapon of mass 
destruction (as that term is defined in Section 102 of the Act, 
as it would be amended). The Department of Defense would be 
reimbursed with funds made available for the purposes of 
disaster relief. These changes facilitate use of the reserve 
component in WMD response under the Stafford Act.

                         fast track legislation

    As mentioned previously in this document, WMD response 
activity will be quite different. In fact, federal resources 
may be required much earlier than during a typical disaster 
response. Given this potential, access to federal resources 
takes on a new and perhaps even demanding dimension. With quick 
access in mind, now is the time to work the accessibility 
issues, not after an event has occurred. Both have unique 
features but it appears that at a minimum, the amendment to 10 
USC 12301(b) deserves favorable consideration. The 10 USC 12304 
amendment addresses access but extends the current PSRC 
authority to WMD related incidents. The nature of just these 
amendments is an example of the issues requiring attention. 
More work remains necessary. Perhaps, in the end, a new status 
covering operational missions will be most appropriate for the 
type duty outlined in this plan. The two categories for 
consideration are listed below:
    1. Extension of Involuntary Call-up Authority to 30 Days: 
Amendment to 10 USC 12301(b). That section currently authorizes 
the Secretary of a military department to order, without the 
consent of the persons affected, any unit, and any member not 
assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in an active 
status in a reserve component under the jurisdiction of the 
Secretary to active duty for not more than 15 days a year. This 
amendment would increase a period of active duty from 15 to 30 
days a year. This authority would enable the military 
departments to initially respond more effectively to a domestic 
incident involving a weapon of mass destruction and to make 
members of the ready reserve more readily available to 
participate in other operational missions.
    2. Enhanced access to the Reserve Components: Amendment to 
10 USC 12304(b) concerning the authority of the President to 
authorize the Secretary of Defense to order members of the 
Selective Reserve to active duty not in time of war or during a 
national emergency declared by Congress and amendments to the 
Stafford Act to authorize and facilitate DoD preparation for 
and response in WMD consequence management situations. 
Currently, Section 12304(b) prohibits such an order to active 
duty ``to provide assistance to either the Federal Government 
or a State in time of a serious natural or manmade disaster, 
accident, or catastrophe.'' The amendment inserts a very 
limited exception to section 12304(b) that would allow a unit 
or member to be ordered to active duty to provide assistance in 
responding to an emergency involving a ``weapon of mass 
destruction.''

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


      

  b. Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Force 
     Overseas (Letter Report, July 21, 1997, GAO/NSIAD-97-207).\1\

    GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to 
protect U.S. forces from terrorist attacks, focusing on: (1) 
measures taken at overseas U.S. bases to enhance the security 
of deployed personnel; and (2) recent DOD initiatives to 
improve its antiterrorism program.
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    GAO reviewed that: (1) many deployed U.S. forces are better 
protected today from terrorist attacks similar to the one that 
occurred at Khobar Towers; (2) during March and April 1997, GAO 
visited 30 overseas sites and found that security improvements 
were most evident where the risk of terrorism is the greatest, 
such as Turkey and the Middle East; (3) DOD has placed less 
emphasis on addressing vulnerabilities in countries that are 
currently considered to have a lower threat; (4) senior 
military commanders and defense officials GAO met with 
emphasized that they can reduce, but not eliminate, 
vulnerabilities and that further terrorist attacks against U.S. 
forces should be expected; (5) they also observed that efforts 
to defend against terrorism are complicated by a number of 
factors, including the ability of terrorists to decide where 
and when to attack and to choose from a wide selection of 
targets; (6) nevertheless, the officials said, some risk must 
be accepted as the United States pursues its national security 
strategy abroad; (7) since the bombing at Khobar Towers, DOD 
has initiated a number of changes aimed at improving its 
antiterrorism program; (8) for example, DOD has established a 
new office for combating terrorism on the Joint Staff, enhanced 
the antiterrorism responsibilities of the geographic combatant 
commands, and instituted a vulnerability assessment process 
under the aegis of the joint staff; (9) these initiatives, 
however, have not resulted in a comprehensive, consistent 
approach to antiterrorism as called for by the Downing task 
force; (10) for instance, DOD's force protection focal point 
has not provided the geographic combatant commanders the 
guidance the commanders believe they need to carry out their 
expanded antiterrorism responsibilities; (11) such guidance 
would include establishing standards for assessing 
vulnerabilities and agencywide physical security requirements 
designed to provide a minimum level of protection to U.S. 
forces no matter where they are located; (12) a comprehensive, 
consistent approach to antiterrorism using common standards 
would give commanders a more objective basis for determining 
whether they are providing adequate protection to their 
facilities and personnel; and (13) DOD would have a capability 
to compare vulnerabilities at different sites on a worldwide 
basis and thus ensure that sufficient emphasis is being placed 
on the most vulnerable areas.

c. Domestic Preparedness Program in the Defense Against Weapons of Mass 
                      Destruction, May 1, 1997.\1\

                           Executive Summary

    This report summarizes the Department of Defense (DoD) 
actions as requested by Public Law 104-201, National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Title XIV: Defense 
Against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Subtitle A: Domestic 
Preparedness. The Conference Report accompanying Public Law 
104-208 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, 
requested DoD to submit a report to Congress by May 1, 1997 on 
four specific issues: assess the types and characteristics of 
chemical and biological threats; identify unmet training, 
equipment and other requirements for first responders; identify 
chemical/biological warfare information, expertise and 
equipment that could be adapted to civilian application; and 
present a detailed plan for DoD assistance in equipping, 
training and providing other necessary assistance for first 
responders to such incidents.
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    A threat assessment has been prepared and is contained in 
Volume II of this report. It assesses the types and 
characteristics of chemical and biological threats against U.S. 
citizens and Government assets in the United States.
    Over the past few years, several studies, discussions, 
workgroups, and focus groups have identified capabilities, 
specific requirements and shortfalls in requirements that are 
needed by first responders to meet the threat of a chemical, 
biological or nuclear terrorist attack. The findings of these 
studies and workgroups show a common trend in unmet training, 
equipment, and other resources, such as technical information 
for first responders.
    The DoD is using existing interagency programs as the 
foundation to build links between these programs and 
initiatives outlined in Title XIV. These programs include a 
nationwide training support plan with an initial focus on 27 
cities. Modular training courses will then be available to 
other cities throughout the nation. Through the Helpline in 
non-emergency, and the Hotline in emergency situations, first 
responders will have access to DoD chemical/biological agent/
warfare information and technical expertise to enhance their 
preparedness. Local Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams and their 
supporting systems are being geographically developed to 
respond to medical consequence management issues related to NBC 
terrorism. A Chemical-Biological Quick Response Force has been 
developed for rapid deployment to detect, neutralize, contain, 
dismantle, and dispose of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). 
Operational control of committed response forces will be 
provided by two geographically located Response Task Forces. 
Other Federal departments and agencies are enhancing their 
response capabilities. Lessons learned from completed exercises 
will be applied to developing exercises/tests to be executed in 
the next five successive fiscal years to improve the response 
of Federal, state, and local agencies to emergencies involving 
WMD incidents.
    All programs and initiatives outlined within this report 
are supported by congressional legislation. The overall success 
is dependent upon combined cooperation of all Federal agencies 
participating in efforts related to domestic preparedness for 
WMD. The key to success, however, is continued funding through 
the outyears to ensure that all agencies, local, state, 
regional and Federal, are adequately prepared to respond to a 
WMD terrorist attack.

                              VOLUMES 1-6

                            1. introduction

    This report summarizes the Department of Defense (DoD) 
actions as requested by Public Law 104-201, National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Title XIV: Defense 
Against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Subtitle A: Domestic 
Preparedness. The Conference Report accompanying Public Law 
104-208 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, 
requested DoD to submit a report to Congress on four specific 
issues that are outlined in the Scope of the Report.
1.1 Background
    Within the last five years at least eleven states as well 
as other nations have experienced terrorist incidents. Some of 
the most widely publicized incidents were the bombing of the 
World Trade Center in 1993, the chemical terrorist attack on 
the Tokyo Subway system in 1995, the bombing of the Alfred P. 
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, and the 
Centennial Park bombing in Atlanta in 1996. With the increasing 
availability of raw materials and technology from worldwide 
sources, the potential use of WMD by subversive groups has 
mounted dramatically. In response to the growing concern of the 
potential use of WMD in a terrorist attack, Title XIV was 
established.
1.2 Responsibilities
    Under Title XIV, Subtitle A, Domestic Preparedness, 
responsibilities for oversight and execution are as follows. 
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low 
Intensity Conflict) has responsibility for policy and resource 
oversight. The Assistant to The Secretary of Defense (Nuclear, 
Chemical & Biological Defense Programs) provides resource 
oversight for equipment procurement. Additionally, in 
accordance with Section 1413, Title XIV, the Secretary of 
Defense (SECDEF) designated the Secretary of the Army (SECARMY) 
to serve as the Executive Agent for the coordination of DoD 
training assistance to Federal, state, and local officials to 
better assist them in responding to threats involving chemical 
and biological weapons or related materials or technologies, 
including assistance in identifying, neutralizing, dismantling, 
and disposing of biological and chemical weapons and related 
materials and technologies. As the Executive Agent, the 
Secretary is responsible for developing the planning guidance, 
plans, implementation, and procedures for the Domestic 
Preparedness Program. The SECARMY subsequently named the 
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics and 
Environment) (ASA(IL&E)) as the focal point for all matters in 
which the Army has executive agency, and the Director of 
Military Support (DOMS) as the DoD staff action agent. In a 
separate directive, the SECARMY directed the Commander, Army 
Materiel Command (AMC) to appoint a DoD Program Director. AMC 
subsequently directed Commander, Chemical Biological Defense 
Command (CBDCOM) to appoint a DoD Program Director with the 
primary responsibility to implement the basic elements of Title 
XIV.
    The Senior Interagency Coordination Group (SICG) on 
Terrorism was established to facilitate the interagency 
coordination of policy issues and program activities in support 
of Federal initiatives to assist Federal, state, and local 
first responders in responding to WMD incidents. The SICG is 
composed of senior members from DoD, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), the Public Health Service (PHS), the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Energy (DoE), the 
Department of Justice (DoJ), the Department of Transportation 
(DoT), United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), General 
Services Administration (GSA), and the National Communications 
System (NCS).
1.3 Scope of the Report
    This report responds to four issues outlined by Congress. 
The report will assess the types and characteristics of 
chemical and biological threats against the U.S. and the 
capabilities of civilian agencies to respond to these threats; 
identify unmet training, equipment, and other requirements of 
civilian first responders necessary to provide a basic 
capability to respond to domestic chemical and biological 
attacks; identify DoD chemical/biological warfare information, 
expertise and equipment that could be adapted to civilian 
application to help meet identified requirements; and present a 
detailed plan for DoD assistance in equipping, training, and 
providing other necessary assistance for first responders to 
such incidents.
    This report provides information to Congress on the status 
of the existing programs and initiatives required to enhance 
Federal, state, and local capabilities to respond to terrorist 
incidents involving WMD. The overall initiative uses existing 
Federal agencies' chemical and biological assets and programs 
as the foundation for its program. The SICG members are 
building links between participating agencies to develop new 
programs to ensure that the intent of Congress is met as 
outlined in Title XIV and subsequent legislation. The DoD 
initiative is an evolving program. This report will provide 
information on the status of the individual components of the 
DoD program and plan. Volume I of this report is unclassified. 
Volume II provides an assessment which is classified SECRET US 
ONLY.

2. types and characteristics of chemical and biological threats against 
 u.s. citizens and government assets in the u.s. and the capability of 
             civilian agencies to respond to these threats

    This portion of the Report to Congress is contained in 
Domestic Preparedness Program, Volume II: Assessment of the 
Chemical and Biological Transnational Terrorist Threat in the 
Continental United States (U). The assessment is classified 
SECRET US ONLY.

3. unmet training, equipment, and other requirements of civilian first 
   responders necessary to provide basic capability to respond to a 
                 domestic chemical or biological attack

3.1 Introduction
    Several Federal agencies have conducted studies and focus 
group discussions with different local, state, and regional 
representatives over the past several years in an attempt to 
determine the needs of first responders in the event of a WMD 
incident. These studies focused on areas such as plans, 
capabilities, procedures, training, equipping and response 
integration at different levels. The findings from several of 
the studies/discussions are summarized below.
3.2 Studies
3.2.1 National Governors Association - September 1996
    In September 1996 the National Governors Association (NGA) 
conducted a workshop for the NGA policy advisors with 
representatives from FEMA, DoD, DoE, EPA, FBI, Department of 
Health and Human Services (DHHS), and the Department of 
Veterans Affairs (VA). The workshop sought to 1) identify the 
nature, impact, and response issues associated with a nuclear, 
biological or chemical terrorist incident; 2) discuss the 
adequacy of both Federal and state plans and response 
capabilities to an incident involving mass casualties; and 3) 
formulate the next steps for developing a coordinated Federal, 
state, and local response framework.
    In preparation for the workshop, NGA conducted a survey of 
the 26 participating states to assess the capabilities of these 
states to respond to and manage the consequences of nuclear, 
biological, or chemical (NBC) terrorism. These 26 states were 
chosen because their large urban areas and other factors could 
make them potential targets for a terrorist incident.
    Most states acknowledged they receive satisfactory 
intelligence about potential terrorist groups operating in 
their state and could adequately respond to a nuclear terrorist 
attack due to their planning and training for possible nuclear 
power plant accidents. However, in the arena of chemical and 
biological terrorism, the states felt they were not adequately 
resourced or trained. The NGA findings indicate a need for more 
information on the types of resources available to combat 
chemical or biological attacks and indicated a need for Federal 
assistance in areas of monitoring and detection equipment, 
technical assistance, manpower, and recovery efforts. FEMA 
recommended holding regional meetings to review resources and 
discuss issues of mutual concern between the Federal and state 
governments.
    First responder issues focused on the states capabilities 
to respond to an NBC terrorist incident, recognizing that first 
responders are essentially on their own for the first six to 
ten hours after an incident has occurred. Participants 
discussed resources the Federal government could provide and 
the role of Federal agencies during the early stages of the 
crisis; leveraging existing capabilities and expertise; 
improving interaction between emergency management 
organizations and first responders; acquiring low cost NBC 
equipment and protective clothing; improving decontamination 
capabilities; conducting specialized training; and providing 
opportunities for partnerships with industry to advance current 
expertise and develop tools and techniques.
    Public information issues explained the need to present 
fully coordinated, timely, and accurate emergency information 
to the public and the importance of considering the objectives 
in consequence management versus crisis management.
    Law enforcement and intelligence issues centered on the 
collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of 
terrorist intelligence information between state and Federal 
agencies. Participants also addressed public safety issues and 
agency roles regarding the responsibility for maintaining order 
and discipline during and after an incident.
    Health and medical service issues focused on the states 
capabilities and capacities, and the type and quantity of 
assistance available from the Federal government.
    When discussing how the states and Federal agencies could 
best work together on the issue of NBC terrorism, most states 
suggested that FEMA should hold regional meetings. To develop a 
coordinated framework for states and Federal agencies to work 
together, FEMA proposed the following: imitate the Federal 
Response Plan (FRP) review process at the state level; host a 
series of workshops at the regional level; establish a national 
information clearinghouse; visit/assist each reviewing state; 
pool Federal and state capabilities data; develop a national 
plan outlining state and Federal responsibilities, priorities, 
and approaches to develop/sustain capability; secure state and 
Federal funding support; and implement a multi-year plan.
3.2.2 FEMA--September 1996
    During September 1996 FEMA met with representatives from 
Boston, MA; Denver, CO; Los Angeles, CA; and Philadelphia, PA. 
They focused on the capabilities and needs of local government 
to respond to terrorist incidents involving WMD. Input and 
feedback from this sampling of U.S. metropolitan areas was 
intended to provide an indication of the spectrum of nationwide 
preparedness at the local level. Participants primarily 
represented emergency response and public health organizations 
from the respective state and local governments. Policy and 
subject matter experts included Federal officials from FEMA, 
the FBI, DHHS, and DoD.
    Four concurrent sessions were held to discuss the local 
response to terrorism scenarios involving NBC incidents 
tailored to reflect specifics of each city's jurisdiction. A 
surprising number of common response issues were identified 
among the four different types of incidents.
    Participants believed that local government had the ability 
to meet normal emergency response needs: performing the 
firefighting, law enforcement, emergency medical services and 
rescue tasks they do so effectively on a day-to-day basis. In 
addition, some personal protective equipment and some hazardous 
materials response equipment is generally in place at the local 
level and would be available to respond to a very small WMD 
incident. However, they identified a critical need for access 
to information and expert advice as well as training. They also 
thought that local government was ready, willing and able to do 
more with the proper training and equipment.
    The groups highlighted the need for subject matter experts 
to be identified and available within the first few hours of an 
incident. These subject matter experts would provide advice and 
reference materials describing the hazards, the effects and 
recommended protective response actions.
    Beyond technical experts, personnel resources would be 
required by local governments to assist with the potentially 
massive public impacts of such incidents - whether it be mass 
casualties or large-scale evacuation. National Guard (NG), 
state police, and additional fire and emergency medical 
personnel from outlying municipalities were noted as probable 
sources to meet these needs. The cities indicated that in many 
cases mutual aid agreements were in place to obtain resources 
from neighboring communities. In other cases, they recognized 
the need for such agreements and that this was a local 
responsibility.
    The need for hazard-specific procedures was uniformly 
supported. Local responders do not have enough knowledge of the 
requirements for response to NBC threats to develop their own 
procedures. Guidance from state and Federal experts is needed 
on procedures to monitor, treat, protect and decontaminate 
after release of NBC contaminants.
    Participants highlighted training as a key component in 
building local, state, and Federal response capabilities. First 
responders need awareness training specific to NBC hazards so 
that they could quickly recognize victim symptoms and other 
characteristics of such an incident which may distinguish them 
from other hazardous material incidents. Participants also felt 
that first responders needed training on routes of exposure, 
means of protection, health effects, treatment and monitoring, 
and decontamination methods. Training on handling of mass 
casualties and on the requirements of triage was also 
highlighted as a need for the emergency medical community.
    Multi-jurisdictional exercises were noted by the groups as 
another critical element of the preparedness program that was 
currently missing. They felt that local plans and procedures 
were evaluated on a frequent basis, but that opportunities to 
test integration and coordination with state and Federal 
agencies were lacking. The groups encouraged the Federal 
government to promote more full-scale integrated exercises.
    Overall, the group consensus was that the local 
preparedness for response to WMD terrorist incidents is 
nominal. To the extent that hazardous material preparedness 
applies to the NBC arena, some base level exists. However, a 
great deal of progress remains to be made on resource, 
planning, and training fronts regarding the unique nature of 
NBC terrorist incidents.
3.2.3 FEMA/FBI - January 1997
    FEMA and FBI submitted a Joint Report to Congress in 
January 1997. It addressed both crisis management/prevention 
and consequence management/response activities. This report 
focused on capabilities and interagency roles and 
responsibilities to respond to an incident involving WMD. In 
the assessment summary, the impact of a WMD incident and 
significant response requirement were recognized.
    A NBC terrorist incident may occur as a local event with 
potentially profound national implications. In responding to a 
NBC incident, first responders must be able to provide critical 
resources within minutes to mitigate the effects of the 
incident. Since the ability of the local government to deal 
with the immediate effects of an incident is essential to the 
success of any NBC response, enhancing and maintaining the 
local capability with trained and adequately equipped 
responders is a key component of a viable national terrorism 
response capability.
    While the assessment of the FRP and Federal capabilities 
found some deficiencies, it also identified several current 
capabilities being expanded to ensure a more viable national 
level NBC response capability. Current initiatives for 
supplementing existing plans, enhancing operational response 
capabilities, and increasing the availability of training are 
ongoing. These new efforts, coupled with ongoing preparedness 
efforts, will facilitate a better coordinated and more 
effective response by local, state, and Federal governments to 
the consequences of domestic NBC terrorist incidents.
3.2.4 DoD--February 1997
    DoD, with the support of other Federal agencies, conducted 
a series of focus group meetings with first responders during 
February 1997. The findings and recommendations of the groups 
formed the basis of a comprehensive set of training performance 
objectives (Annex A). Based upon the focus groups review, a 
training course development program was begun to modify 
existing training courses, and develop programs of instruction 
and instructional material.
3.2.5 DoD/DoE--April 1996
    DoD and DoE, in consultation with FEMA, submitted a report 
to Congress in 1996 on current plans, resources, and 
capabilities to respond to a nuclear, radiological, biological, 
or chemical terrorist attack. The report covered consequence 
management plans and capabilities. Key points made were, first, 
there is a fundamental shift from the local or regional level 
of Federal involvement and decision-making authority to 
Washington, DC and the SECDEF's personal involvement during a 
WMD domestic terrorist incident. Second, there are some highly 
trained personnel available and excellent capabilities in many 
consequence management organizations to respond to a domestic 
NBC disaster. Finally, first responders need training, 
equipment, and supplies, yet there are limited quantities of 
DoD combat supplies available for NBC contingencies.
    The shift in the level of involvement was due to 
recognizing the mass casualties, physical damage, and potential 
for civil disorder resulting from a WMD detonation. Simply 
stated, a terrorist use or potential use of a WMD is considered 
a vital threat to the national security of the United States.
    The interagency community found that including consequence 
management experts from the very beginning of a crisis 
management response was absolutely essential for minimizing 
casualties, reducing public panic, and ensuring a rapid Federal 
response to state and local communities. The interagency 
counterterrorism community has also taken steps to include 
senior policy decision-makers for consequence management in 
their Washington deliberations on crisis management.
    The FRP, involving 28 departments and agencies, provides a 
framework for response to most natural and manmade domestic 
civil emergencies. A recently published Terrorism Annex to the 
FRP, addresses how the various agencies, including DoD, would 
respond to a domestic NBC disaster. While DoD, DoE and other 
Federal agencies currently have some very highly trained and 
well equipped teams available to respond to such an event, NBC 
response personnel and equipment are limited compared to the 
potential threat. The Federal response community continues to 
work together to increase their capabilities but there is still 
much room for improvement.
    This report recognizes that state and local authorities, as 
first responders, are in need of their own NBC equipment and 
supplies, and greater access to up-to-date NBC training. DoD 
has an inventory of combat supplies for NBC contingencies, but 
in many cases this equipment is not suitable for civilian use 
during a terrorist incident. Additionally, the use of DoD 
stockpiles of NBC supplies and materials for domestic 
emergencies will have a direct adverse impact on military 
readiness and force protection.
3.3 Summary
    DoD has extensively used the findings of these studies and 
reports to formulate the Domestic Preparedness Program. The 
specific elements of the program are discussed in Section 5. 
The ongoing program of activities in FY 97 encompassing 
planning and guidance development, training and exercises, and 
capability enhancement involving Federal, state, and local 
governments will improve the current levels of preparedness and 
response.

    4. dod chemical/biological warfare information, expertise, and 
   equipment that could be adapted to civilian applications to meet 
                        identified requirements.

4.1 Information and Expertise
    DoD and other Federal agencies routinely provide support to 
first responders at the local, state, and Federal level in the 
form of expert advice and assistance. A major source of the 
information comes from a vast knowledge base at CBDCOM and the 
Medical Research and Materiel Command (MRMC). The Defense 
Technical Response Group, part of the Naval Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal (EOD) Technical Division, is a joint-service manager 
for explosive ordnance disposal. Finally, the 52nd Ordnance 
Group can be called upon for OD assistance. Specially trained 
EOD operators in DoD special mission units are the primary 
experts to be called upon by the FBI for access and device 
disablement operations involving weapons of mass destruction.
    The current process used to identify and link up first 
responders and technical expertise is somewhat cumbersome. The 
initiative of establishing a Helpline and a Hotline focuses on 
streamlining the process so first responders know how to obtain 
information in both non-emergency and emergency situations.
4.2 Equipment
    An annual report to Congress entitled ``Department of 
Defense Nuclear/ Biological/Chemical (NBC) Warfare Defense'' 
submitted as required by Section 1703 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 documents quantities, 
characteristics, and capabilities of fielded chemical and 
biological defense equipment which would be used in an NBC 
combat scenario. Although DoD does have a program for loaning 
equipment to civilian agencies, personal protective equipment 
such as the mask or protective suit, if adapted for civilian 
use, would require National Institute For Occupational Safety 
and Health or National Fire Protection Association approval.
    Equipment currently used by chemical depot workers is 
listed in Department of the Army Pam 385-61, Toxic Chemical 
Agent Safety Standards. However, commercial protective 
equipment alternatives have been tested and are currently in 
use at many locations. A program will begin in 4th Quarter of 
FY 97 to evaluate and test additional commercial protective 
equipment in a chemical agent environment in order to provide a 
much larger database on commercially available equipment. The 
test results will be available for use by the local, state, and 
Federal agencies as they go through the decision-making process 
in selecting various items of protective equipment for their 
use.

5. dod plan for assistance in equipping, training, and providing other 
         necessary assistance for first responders to incidents

5.1 General
5.1.1 Program Intent
    Under Title XIV, Congress directed a program to enhance the 
capability of the Federal Government to prevent and respond to 
terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, and 
provide enhanced support to improve the capabilities of state 
and local emergency response agencies to prevent and respond to 
such incidents at both the national and the local level. DoD 
will implement the necessary training and assistance programs, 
but intends to transition this responsibility to other agencies 
after FY 1999 as allowed for in Section 1412 of Title XIV.
5.1.2 Program Scope
    DoD's Domestic Preparedness Program encompasses the nine 
programs outlined in Title XIV. As shown in Figure 5.1, the 
program is aimed at improving the preparedness and the 
responsiveness of first responders and other elements that may 
support them in a time of crisis.
5.1.2.1 Preparedness
    The training and exercise programs shown in Figure 5.1 are 
intended to improve the local ability to respond to an incident 
involving WMD. In almost all cases, the local first responders 
will be the first on the scene and the actions that they take 
may significantly affect the overall success of the response. 
Accordingly, the major portion of the programs effort and 
funding is directed toward this end. In addition, the 
availability of Federal-level expert advice, data bases, and 
inventories will greatly assist planning at all levels.
5.1.2.2 Response
    If a WMD incident were to occur, the NG, serving in a Title 
32 status, provides the state a readily available asset to 
augment the first responders. Normally within 12 hours, NG 
units can be mobilized to their armory and prepare to deploy to 
an incident site. In all cases, NG plans call for mobilizing 
and being prepared to deploy within 24 hours.
    Additionally, when authorized to do so by statute or 
regulation, U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) units may also be 
available to provide prompt support and augmentation to the 
Chemical/Biological Quick Response Force (CBQRF) and other 
Federal agencies. However, before USAR units can be deployed to 
provide such support, the request must be made and approved in 
accordance with DoD Directive 3025.15, ``Military Assistance to 
Civil Authorities.'' Both components possess appropriate force 
structure to respond to a domestic terrorist incident involving 
WMD. The DoD policy for disaster support and response has 
established that the inherent command and control, and 
communications capabilities of a unit is of primary importance 
in a domestic response mission. The specific technical 
requirements of a WMD incident are best addressed by a CBQRF 
with augmentation support by the NG and other Army Reserve 
Components force structure that is locally in place or 
available under the provisions of an Emergency Management 
Assistance Compact (EMAC).
    Under existing agreements such as the EMAC, neighboring 
states can augment immediate response efforts during times of 
emergency. Compacts resolve fiscal and legal issues 
facilitating emergency response across state lines. The 104th 
Congress ratified EMAC as PL 104-321 in October 1996. To 
establish an EMAC, states must enact the necessary legislation. 
Once states pass new legislation to participate in an EMAC and 
comply with the necessary statutory requirement of submission 
to Congress for a 60 day review/approval process, no further 
Congressional action is required for the states to provide 
mutual support.
    Federal support to the local governments consequence 
management response will be greatly enhanced by fielding the 
CBQRF and the Public Health Services specially trained and 
equipped medical response teams. In addition, the availability 
of Federal-level expert advice, data bases, and inventories 
could greatly assist the local response and make the Federal 
support more responsive.
5.1.3 Program Implementation
5.1.3.1 Interagency Approach
    From the beginning of the program, DoD has sought the 
active participation of the other Federal agencies. This 
interagency approach has allowed a comprehensive and 
interagency Federal approach to meet the needs of local 
communities. In addition, the synergism of the interagency 
cooperation has started to meld several Federal programs 
related to WMD preparedness into a single Federal effort under 
the direction of the SICG.
5.1.3.2 The Senior Interagency Coordination Group
    The SICG on Terrorism was established to facilitate the 
interagency coordination of Federal policy issues and program 
activities in support of Federal consequence management 
training initiatives concerning terrorist incidents involving 
WMD. The SICG is chaired by FEMA.
    The SICG serves as the interagency policy level forum for 
identification, discussion, and resolution of issues involving 
the interagency strategy to provide guidance and training 
support to Federal, state and local first responders who may be 
called upon to respond to a terrorist WMD event. The SICG 
focuses on emergency response training in support of 
established US Government counterterrorism response procedures 
as directed by Presidential Decision Directive -39 (PDD-39). 
This includes coordination with other Federal agencies of DoD 
Domestic Preparedness Program activities under Title XIV, in 
conjunction with local and state governments. Since October 
1996, the SICG has met at least monthly with member agencies 
providing valuable input on the overall direction and focus of 
the training effort. It is expected that the SICG will continue 
to provide interagency coordination and assistance to DoD in 
implementing program activities as long as required.
5.1.3.3 Funding
    Approximately $52.6 million is provided for the Domestic 
Preparedness Program during FY97. It is allocated as follows:

   The Emergency Response Assistance Program to include 
        the training, expertise advice, Hotline and Helpline 
        programs described below: $16.4 million.
   The development and fielding of the Metropolitan 
        Emergency Medical Response Teams, which is called 
        Metropolitan Mobile Strike Team (MMST) Systems: $6.6 
        million.
   The coordination of the NBC response capability to 
        include the development and fielding of the CBQRF 
        described below: $9.8 million.
   The testing of preparedness for emergencies 
        involving nuclear, radiological, chemical, and 
        biological weapons: $9.8 million.
   The upgrade of equipment for the Marine Corps 
        Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), 
        including funds for prepositioned equipment at key 
        domestic locations: $10 million.

    The FY 1998/FY 1999 Presidents Budget includes $49.5 
million in FY 1998 and $52.1 million in FY 1999 to continue to 
provide emergency response preparedness first responder 
training and assistance to metropolitan area agencies, and to 
conduct exercises and preparedness tests in coordination with 
Federal, State, and local agencies. After
    FY 1999, DoD will no longer fund first responder training 
nor expert assistance, since we plan to transfer these 
responsibilities to another agency in accordance with Title 
XIV, Section 1412 provisions. Also, DoD support for exercises 
and preparedness tests will terminate after FY 2001.
5.2 Programs
5.2.1 Training Program
    Section 1412, Title XIV, directs the SECDEF to carry out a 
program that provides training to civilian personnel of 
Federal, state, and local agencies. The training program is to 
include the use, operation, and maintenance of equipment for 
detecting, monitoring, protecting, and decontaminating. It will 
also include other aspects regarding emergency responses to the 
use or threatened use of WMD or related materials. The training 
support programs outlined below include existing and new 
programs needed for first responders.
5.2.1.1 Training Support to 120 Cities
    Currently, the Federal government offers various programs 
to train agencies in responding to a WMD attack. For example, 
DoE offers 15 training programs to first responders that train 
them in various aspects of WMD. For instance, DoE offers a 
course that provides a basic knowledge of nuclear radiation, 
radiation health effects and medical considerations, and 
nuclear weapons effects. This course is primarily given to 
first responders such as physicians, Emergency Medical 
Technicians and firefighters. They also offer a joint course 
with the Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA) that teaches DoD 
and the intelligence community professionals how to identify 
technologies associated with weapons program and roles, and 
responsibilities and capabilities when responding to threats. 
The DoD also has provided training courses to first responders. 
These include first responder training prior to the 1996 Summer 
Olympics, and a course offered to civilian personnel in 
Federal, state and local agencies at the US Army Chemical 
School. The four day course, Chemical-Biological 
Countermeasures for First Responders, includes one day of live 
agent training at the Chemical Defense Training Facility. These 
courses, which have been taught to civilian agencies, are being 
incorporated into the overall training program.
    The DoD Program Director held four focus group meetings 
during February 1997 to determine core competencies and to 
develop comprehensive training performance objectives (Annex 
A). Firefighters, hazardous materials (HAZMAT) handlers, and 
on-scene incident commanders; emergency medical specialists and 
doctors; law enforcement officials; and 911 operators and call 
takers, as well as the appropriate Federal agencies, 
participated in this effort. In addition, a concurrent effort 
was initiated to identify existing NBC training modules within 
DoD and other Federal agencies to fulfill these training needs. 
Concurrent with the effort to develop the performance 
objectives and to identify the training modules to support 
them, the DoD Program Director developed a discussion document 
to assist local governments assess their level of training 
against stated performance objectives. The city's self 
assessment will drive the city's individual training plan.
    The proposed training is expected to provide a basic 
response capability for first responders. In most cases, it 
will be train-the-trainer type training to be embedded in 
existing local institutions. As the Federal Domestic 
Preparedness Program evolves, modifications will be made to the 
training program as necessary.
    Denver, Colorado has been selected as the pilot city for 
the program. It was selected because of its involvement in the 
Oklahoma City Bombing Trials and the Summit of 8 Conference in 
June 1997. An initial meeting was conducted with local and 
state leaders on March 19, 1997. Within this forum, they were 
provided an overview of the training and exercise program. 
First responder training is expected to be conducted prior to 
the June 20-22, 1997 Summit of 8 Conference. In addition, an 
integrated exercise will be conducted prior to the Summit of 8 
Conference.
    Using Denver as the benchmark, self assessments will be 
conducted by the remaining 26 targeted cities. An April 18, 
1997 ``Kick-Off'' meeting with Mayors, Governors, and other 
regional representatives of the 27 target cities and their 
representative states will provide an overview on the overall 
training program and self assessments. Also, each city will be 
given information and material for conducting a self 
assessment. In addition to Denver being the pilot city, New 
York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, the District of 
Columbia, Philadelphia, San Diego, and Kansas City should begin 
their training during FY 97. The training program will assess 
the requirements for the first 27 cities in 1997 and, 
contingent on funding, has a goal of providing training to 120 
cities by the end of 1999.
5.2.1.2 Nationwide Training Support
    In addition to the individual training plans designed for 
selected cities and states, the DoD Program Director is 
designing low cost training packages which will receive wide 
dissemination via an inexpensive media (e.g. Internet, etc). 
This training initiative should make training packages 
available to state and local agencies as rapidly and 
inexpensively as possible. The DoD has already produced a CD-
ROM in October 1996 entitled ``Management of Chemical Warfare 
Injuries'' which provides:

   technical information on chemical warfare agents 
        (i.e., nerve, blister, choking and riot control agents 
        and cyanides)
   self-test for evaluating mastery of key learning 
        objectives
   dramatized scenarios offering opportunities for 
        practicing differential diagnoses of patients
   extensive reference materials.

    Another CD-ROM will be available in October 1997 entitled 
``Medical Management of Biological Casualties'' which will 
provide:

   dual learning tracks (one for medical professionals; 
        e.g., physicians, nurses, and physician assistants, and 
        one for first responders; e.g., military medics, 
        emergency medical technicians, and paramedics)
   physiology of and signs and symptoms of exposure to 
        those biological warfare agents identified by United 
        States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious 
        Disease (USAMRIID) as posing the greatest threat to 
        military personnel (bacteria: anthrax, plague, 
        tularemia, Q fever; viruses: smallpox, Venezuelan 
        equine encephalitis, viral hemorrhagic fever; and 
        toxins: botulinum toxins, staphylococcal enterotoxin B, 
        ricin, trichothecene mycotoxins)
   self-test for evaluating mastery of key learning 
        objectives
   dramatized scenarios offering opportunities for 
        practicing differential diagnoses of patients
   extensive reference materials.

    In addition, DoD expects to publish the performance 
objectives (Annex A) on the Internet.
    The NG's Distance Learning Initiative at the National 
Interagency Counterdrug Institute (NICI) in California may also 
be included in the nationwide training support program. NICI is 
developing a course to train civilians and military leaders on 
the interagency processes necessary to plan for and coordinate 
with a joint response to a major terrorist incident. Their 
intent is to conduct one pilot and three more classes before 
the end of FY 97. The NG has trained over 6,000 soldiers in 
1996 and 1997 via their Distance Learning Initiative.
    Another alternative is for the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) to 
provide training to first responders through the seven USAR 
Divisions (Institutional Training) [DIV(IT)]. Organic to each 
DIV(IT) is a Chemical Training Battalion and a Medical Health 
Services Brigade. The DIV(IT)s are regionally located 
throughout the United States in Richmond, VA; Milwaukee, WI; 
Oklahoma City, OK; Rochester, NY; Louisville, KY; Vancouver, 
WA; and Charlotte, NC.
5.2.2 Chemical/Biological (CB) Hotline/Helpline
5.2.2.1 CB Hotline
    As stated in section 1412, Title XIV, DoD will establish 
``a designated telephone link to a designated source of 
relevant data and expert advice for the use of state or local 
officials responding to emergencies involving WMD or related 
materials.'' As depicted in Figure 5.3, DoD will tie into the 
National Response Center (NRC) to establish access to expert 
Chemical/Biological (CB) advice and assistance readily 
available to state and local agencies during emergency 
situations. To establish the Hotline, the existing NRC 
automated checklist will be modified to include chemical or 
biological incidents. The NRC will link the caller with 
personnel from CBDCOM's operations center. The NRC will 
concurrently notify the designated Federal On-Scene 
Coordinator/Regional Response Team and other supporting 
agencies. Access to nuclear expertise in DoE continues to be in 
place through the DoE's 24 hour emergency operations center.
    The NRC, located in Washington DC, is operational 24 hours 
a day. The NRC personnel scan incident reports and classify 
them according to a prescribed decision tree. Once the report 
is classified, the NRC executes the notification process to the 
prescribed Federal agencies. In the case of a WMD incident, a 
direct link would be made between NRC, CBDCOM, and U.S. Army 
Medical Research and Material Command (MRMC), or between NRC 
and DoE. These agencies would then respond directly to the 
local, state, or Federal agencies requesting assistance.
    To meet the requirements of Section 1412, additional 
personnel and software will be added to ensure that expert 
advice and timely response are given 24 hours a day. The 
Hotline is expected to be operational by July 1997.
5.2.2.2 CB Helpline
    DoD is establishing a Technical Assistance Chemical/
Biological (CB) Helpline to support Federal, state, and local 
agencies by assisting them as they prepare for emergencies. The 
Helpline is for non-emergency situations and is a pipeline to 
the vast knowledge base at CBDCOM and the MRMC. The Helpline 
provides access to technical experts who can advise or assist 
on a wide variety of subjects, including personal protective 
equipment, decontamination systems, medical treatment, sources 
of equipment, symptoms, detectability and detection equipment, 
organization of responders, and many other technical aspects of 
CB incident operations. As depicted in Figure 5.4, incoming 
calls will be checked against the CB database. If not covered 
by the database, then the calls will be forwarded to the 
appropriate technical expert. The Helpline will provide first 
responders and planners with single source access to required 
technical information. This Helpline is anticipated to be 
operational by July 1997.
5.2.3 Expert Advice
    DoD and other Federal agencies routinely provide expert 
advice to local, state and other Federal agencies. For 
instance, DoD's Technical Escort Unit (TEU), working with the 
EPA, recently provided technical assistance at the Evor-
Phillips Superfund Site in New Jersey to safely dispose of 
buried containers labeled ``Poisonous Gas''. The DoD will 
continue these efforts. The DoD intends to expand, and make 
more readily available, this level of assistance by 
establishing the CB Helpline.
5.2.4 Loan of Equipment
    DoD may loan ``appropriate equipment'' upon request. The 
loan of equipment will be accomplished under the normal DoD 
procedures established for Military Assistance to Civil 
Authorities (MACA), DoD Directive 3025.15. Additionally, by 
using EMACs states can provide cross-state border assistance 
without additional Congressional approval.
5.2.5 Metropolitan Medical Strike Team (MMST) Systems
    Through the assistance of DoD support in FY 1997, DHHS will 
be assisting 27 major cities throughout the United States in 
the initial planning and development of MMSTs and their related 
MMST systems, the procurement of special antidotes and 
pharmaceuticals, initiation of necessary special equipment 
procurements, and training of selected personnel. This will be 
done through direct contracts with the cities and is expected 
to be completed within 15 months after contract award. However, 
DoD intends to provide no funding to support these DHHS teams 
beyond FY 1997.
    The MMST is a highly trained, readily deployable, and fully 
equipped local response team organized and equipped to address 
WMD effects on human health. It would have specialized skills, 
pharmaceuticals, and equipment that would enable it to assist 
in identifying a WMD agent and initiating victim 
decontamination, conduct medical triage, and initiate 
appropriate therapy prior to transportation to emergency and 
definitive medical care facilities.
    Each MMST will operate within a system that not only 
provides an initial, on-site response, but also provides for 
safe patient transportation to hospital emergency rooms, 
provides definitive medical and mental health care to victims 
of this type of attack and can prepare patients for onward 
movement to other regions should local health care resources be 
insufficient to meet the total demand for health services. This 
complete local WMD health care response system is referred to 
as an MMST system. Experience with two MMSTs formed to support 
the 1996 Summer Olympics and 1997 Presidential Inaugural 
indicates the formation and training of each team could take 
between six and twelve months.
5.2.6 Rapid Response Team
    Section 1414, Title XIV, mandates that the SECDEF ``shall 
develop and maintain at least one domestic terrorism rapid 
response team composed of members of the Armed Forces and 
employees of Department of Defense who are capable of aiding 
Federal, state, and local officials in the detection, 
neutralization, containment, dismantlement, and disposal of 
weapons of mass destruction containing chemical, biological, or 
related materials.'' The DoD has formed the Response Task Force 
(RTF) and the CBQRF to fulfill this requirement. This CBQRF 
would fall under the RTF who is responsible for operational 
control of DoD response forces, less the Joint Special 
Operations Task Force. The RTF deploys to support the Federal 
crisis and consequence management operations in support of the 
Lead Federal Agency (LFA) during domestic operations.
5.2.6.1 Concept
    Currently there are established procedures for a U.S. 
Government response to a terrorist incident involving a weapon 
of mass destruction. Within the United States the Department of 
Justice, acting through the FBI, has lead responsibility for 
managing terrorist incidents. The FBI functions as the on-scene 
manager for the US Government. FEMA, with the support of the 
agencies within the Federal Response Plan, acts in support of 
the FBI in Washington, DC and on the scene of the crisis until 
such time as the Attorney General transfers lead Federal Agency 
role to FEMA. The Department of Justice and FBI have developed, 
with interagency concurrence, operational guidelines that 
further define procedures and responsibilities. DoJ/FBI as LFA 
may request DoD to deploy the CBQRF to assist under three 
distinct scenarios: no notice; credible threat; and planned 
event scenarios.
    The no-notice scenario assumes that an agent has been 
released. FEMA, acting in support of the DoJ/FBI, will request 
DoD assistance to manage the consequences of the incident in 
accordance with established interagency guidelines and DoD 
Directive 3025.15. DoD will utilize a quick response team to 
deploy and assess the incident site and coordinate for 
additional augmentation. Within this scenario, the CBQRF will 
be deployed upon notification and at the direction of the 
SECDEF to support the LFA. The number of individuals deployed 
may vary and the capabilities may change based on the location 
of the incident, existing assets available to first responders, 
and proximity of Federal assets.
    The credible threat scenario assumes that intelligence 
sources have indicated a high probability of a known threat and 
that deployment of a response force is warranted prior to the 
actual use of a WMD. Within this scenario, the FBI will request 
WMD EOD and technical assistance from DoD special mission units 
as defined under DoD plans and interagency guidelines. Those 
elements will be called upon by the FBI to detect, render safe, 
and turn over for disposition any rendered safe WMD devices 
with EOD potential. Upon request from FEMA, acting in support 
of the FBI, DoD will deploy the CBQRF, whose focus will be the 
consequence management aspects of the incident. This response 
will include a command and control element, appropriate forces 
from TEU, and the US Marine Corps CBIRF, reinforced as 
necessary with additional specialized teams for both crisis and 
consequence management. The task organization for this scenario 
is directed by the SECDEF, after coordination with the LFA, who 
will coordinate with local and state official.
    The planned event scenario assumes that predetermined WMD 
response elements will be prepositioned based upon coordination 
with the LFAs. This scenario is usually associated with special 
events such as political conventions, inaugurations or large 
public gatherings of personnel that would be vulnerable to a 
terrorist incident. The planned event scenario response may 
include a larger command and control element and will include 
an additional response team reinforced, if necessary, by 
trained medical, decontamination, and monitoring teams. The 
task organization for this response will also be directed by 
the SECDEF, after coordination with the LFA, who will 
coordinate with local and state official.
    Based on the threat scenario, a three-tiered consequence 
management organization and response capability will be 
deployed to augment existing first responders capabilities.
5.2.6.1.1 Phase 1/Tier I (NLT 4 hours)
    The lead elements of the CBQRF respond to a notification of 
an incident at the direction of the SECDEF. The team will be on 
24 hour alert status and ready to depart within 4 hours after 
receiving their orders. This small team will have a limited 
capability to detect, neutralize, contain, dismantle and 
dispose of a chemical or biological device. Their primary 
purpose is to assess the situation, and provide advice and 
assistance to the local officials until the response force 
arrives. This team will also provide advice to the LFA and 
local officials on the task organization of the follow-on 
elements.
5.2.6.1.2 Phase 2/Tier II (NLT 18 hours)
    The main element of the CBQRF will be ready to deploy 
within 18 hours after notification. In addition to command and 
control and liaison elements, the capabilities brought by this 
force will include decontamination stations, medical triage 
stations, agent detection, low level agent monitoring, 
perimeter entry control and support elements which are 
currently available for deployment. During June 1997 in Denver, 
DoD plans to validate the headquarters element. The exercise 
will also test the headquarters' interoperability with other 
DoD units and Federal agencies, as well as its ability to 
respond to a WMD incident.
5.2.6.1.3 Phase 3/Tier III (NLT 24-96 hours)
    Tier III response elements will be specialized units that 
augment the capabilities of the CBQRF. Configuration of these 
augmentation units will be driven by the local situation and 
assets available. For instance, certain DoD laboratories could 
be called upon to respond with specialized equipment and 
capabilities. One such laboratory is the AMC Treaty Laboratory 
that was established to verify compliance with the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC). It is a ISO 9001 registered quality 
system that was pre-deployed to support the FBI during the 
Olympics in Atlanta. The US Army Medical Research Institute of 
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) is capable of deploying an 
Aeromedical Isolation Team consisting of physicians, nurses, 
medical assistants and laboratory technicians. These team 
members are specially trained to provide care for and transport 
of patients with diseases caused by either biological warfare 
agents or infectious diseases requiring high containment. Also, 
Edgewood Research, Development and Engineering Center (ERDEC) 
maintains a rapidly deployable mobile environmental monitoring 
and technical assessment system, the Mobile Analytical Response 
System (MARS). The MARS provides a state-of-the-art analytical 
assessment of chemical or biological hazards at incident sites. 
The Naval Medical Research Institute (NMRI), through their 
Biological Defense Research Program (BDRP), has designed 
reagents, assays and procedures for agents classically 
identified as biological threat, as well as non-classical 
threat agents in environmental and clinical specimens. This 
program has developed rapid, hand-held screening assays that 
can be deployed globally. Other units that could be utilized 
would be Active Army, National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve 
chemical decontamination and medical units.
5.2.7 Exercises
5.2.7.1 Testing
    Section 1415, Title XIV mandates that the SECDEF, in 
conjunction with the FBI, FEMA, DoE and other Federal agencies, 
``shall develop and carry out a program for testing and 
improving the responses of the Federal, state, and local 
agencies to emergencies involving biological weapons and 
related materials and emergencies involving chemical weapons 
and related materials.'' The program will include exercises to 
be carried out during five successive fiscal years beginning 
with fiscal year 1997 and ending with FY 2001.
5.2.7.2 Exercise Approach
    Over the last two years, a wide variety of exercises have 
addressed accidents and incidents involving use of WMD. These 
include MIRRORED IMAGE, CALYPSO WIND, CAPITOL REACTION and 
TERMINAL BREEZE. The ILL WIND series of exercises and DISPLAY 
SELECT, a nuclear weapons accident exercise, have also provided 
valuable insights and a baseline for future exercise design. 
Additionally, there have been over a much longer period 
classified exercises dealing with WMD terrorism. There is an 
established interagency Counterterrorism exercise program that 
has been in existence since the early 1980's. Over the past 
four years there has been an increased emphasis on WMD 
terrorism exercises. The Counterterrorism interagency exercises 
committee is working to integrate various agency exercises to 
ensure synergism and efficiency. DoD's Program Director is 
examining how to meet the domestic preparedness program 
exercise requirements by coordination with the counterterrorism 
committee and FEMA on the National exercise schedule. The 
exercise approach is still evolving, given the many exercises 
already planned by other Federal agencies and state and local 
governments.
    The first component of the exercise program is to train-
the-trainers. Then, conduct tabletop exercises that lead to 
practical or ``muddy boots'' exercises for first responders. 
The underlying philosophy is to get the trainer trained and 
then build upon his/her growing experience base.
    The tabletop exercise would test city and state response to 
chemical or biological weapon incidents. The exercise would 
involve the local and state responders and would occur 
immediately after they were trained. A practical exercise for a 
WMD incident would emphasize city and state response functions 
unique to WMD incidents with simulation role playing of Federal 
support. This series of exercises will accomplish the follow 
objectives: 1) Provide immediate feedback to participants; 2) 
Reinforce training; and 3) Evaluate the effectiveness of 
training.
    A second component of the exercise program will involve 
conducting systematic preparedness testing in two model cities. 
The purpose of the test will be to conduct a systematic 
comprehensive evaluation of available and alternative concepts, 
procedures, approaches and equipment for responding to a range 
of terrorist WMD incidents in each city. The results of 
systematic preparedness testing would be to develop an 
integrated model or system of procedures, equipment, response 
approaches that could be applied throughout the nation at the 
Federal, state, and local levels. This integrated model could 
then be implemented in the United States to improve domestic 
preparedness. Results from the program will continually be 
transitioned to the on-going training program.
    The third component of the exercise program will seek to 
coordinate and integrate the WMD exercises through the 
interagency exercise program which are already planned by 
various Federal agencies. By the different Federal agencies 
participating in each others exercises and by involving state 
and local players, response force personnel could capitalize on 
the training potential of each exercise and gain an additional 
synergistic effect. In these situations where cross-level 
participation in exercises would occur, the response force 
personnel would sharpen their individual skills and be better 
prepared in the event of a WMD situation.
5.2.7.3 Exercises
    Two WMD-related exercises have occurred and two are planned 
during FY 97.
    The exercise CAPITOL REACTION was the first exercise to be 
conducted since the passage of the Defense Against Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Act of 1996. It addressed a local-state-
Federal response to a potential terrorist use of a WMD during 
the Inaugural. Overall, CAPITOL REACTION enhanced the 
interagency cooperation by providing a forum to discuss and 
resolve interagency policy issues resulting from a crisis and 
consequence response in support of the Inauguration. 
Furthermore, it provided the operating parameters for future 
interagency exercises. It also established a process for 
interagency communication in the events of an incident. In 
addition, the FBI sponsored and the DoE funded and organized a 
WMD Interagency Support Exercise (WISE) to assist interagency 
contingency preparation for a nuclear, chemical or biological 
terrorist incident during the Presidential Inauguration. The 
WISE included a WMD counterterrorism crisis response tabletop 
seminar and a field training exercise to rehearse current 
procedures for nuclear, chemical or biological terrorist 
incidents.
    In May 1997, the interagency community will conduct an 
Interagency Terrorism Response Awareness Program (I-TRAP) 
tabletop seminar which will focus on consequence management in 
response to a WMD incident. Just prior to the Summit of 8 
Conference in Denver (June 20-22, 1997), DoD will host a 
chemical-biological exercise to validate the Headquarters, 
CBQRF, improve local, state and Federal operational plans and 
to evaluate the domestic preparedness training provided to the 
first responders. The interagency community will conduct a 
tabletop and limited on-the-ground exercise to assist Denver 
and Colorado in preparing for the Summit of 8 Conference.
5.2.8 Military Assistance to Civil Law Enforcement Officials
    The DoD and DoJ are developing statutorily mandated 
regulations for DoD to support the DoJ during emergency 
situations involving NBC weapons. These regulations are based 
upon draft interagency guidelines implementing PDD-39 as well 
as agreed upon DoJ-DoD procedures used for the 1996 Summer 
Olympics and Presidential Inaugural. These regulations would 
apply to those situations where technical assistance is 
requested by the Attorney General in emergencies involving 
biological weapons, chemical weapons, nuclear material, or 
nuclear byproduct material. The DoD and DoJ have developed a 
draft which should be completed, coordinated, and approved this 
summer. The intent is to make these regulations an appendix to 
DoD Directive 3025.15, ``Military Assistance to Civil 
Authorities,'' and then examine the best method to disseminate 
these regulations to appropriate Federal agencies.
5.2.9 Rapid Response Information System
    The components required by section 1417, Title XIV, that 
form the Rapid Response Information System are covered below.
5.2.9.1 Master Inventory
    The FEMA is currently compiling a master inventory which 
will contain information on physical equipment and assets owned 
by each of the FRP agencies that could be made available for 
use to aid state and local officials in emergency situations 
involving WMD. The master inventory will include assets 
associated with search and rescue, detection and analysis, 
personnel protection, medical treatment, monitoring and 
decontamination. The compilation of the master inventory is 
scheduled to be completed by December 31, 1997.
5.2.9.2 Database on Chemical and Biological Materials
    The FEMA, with the support of DoD and other agencies, is 
preparing a database which will provide a source of information 
on chemical and biological agents, munitions characteristics 
and safety precautions for civilian use. DoD is supporting FEMA 
in the development of the database by providing technical 
expertise needed to prepare the database. Officials from DoD 
and FEMA are determining the design and specific information 
that will be included on the database. The initial design and 
compilation of the database will be completed not later than 
December 31, 1997, and updated annually thereafter.
6.0 Conclusions
    This report reflects the programs that are ongoing or 
planned in order to improve the domestic preparedness in 
response to WMD incidents. Provided adequate Congressional 
funding in the out-years is available, DoD and the interagency 
community will continue to provide direct training to 120 
cities over the next several years. DoD will continue to 
provide nationwide training and support to local, state and 
other Federal agencies to ensure that first responders as well 
as supporting agencies are prepared to react in the event of an 
emergency involving WMD.

        ANNEX A: First Responders Performance Objectives to the Domestic Preparedness Program in the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                 Performance Requirements Legend for requirements:  o--basic level  --advanced
                                                                                                 level  *--specialized
                                                             -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Competency Level                     Ref                       Awareness
                                                             --------------------------------------    Operations        Technician/        Incident
                                                                  Employees          Responders                          Specialist          Command
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Examples                                     Facility workers,  Initial            Incidents         Incident          Incident
                                                               hospital support   firefighters,      response teams,   response team     commanders.
                                                               personnel,         police officers,   EMS basic         specialists,
                                                               janitors,          HAZMAT personnel                     technicians,
                                                               security guards    on scene: 911                        EMS advanced,
                                                                                  operators/                           and medical
                                                                                  dispatchers                          specialsts

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Know the potential for terrorist use    C,F,M,m,G
 of NBC weapons:
  --what nuclear/biological/chemical                          o                                                 
   (NBC) weapons substances are,
  --their hazards, and risks associated                       o                                       *                 
   with them,
  --likely locations for their use,                           o                                                 
  --the potential outcomes of their use                       o                                                 
   by terrorists.
  --indicators of possible criminal or                                                                          
   terrorist activity involving such
   agents,
  --behavior of NBC agents                                                                                    *                 
2. Know the indicators, signs and          C, F,M,m           o                                       *                 
 symptoms for exposure to NBC agents, and
 identify the agents from signs and
 symptoms, if possible.
2a. Knowledge of questions to ask caller   G,m                                   
 to elicit critical information regarding                                        (911 only)
 an NBC incident.
2b. Recognize unusual trends which may     G,m                                                        *                 
 indicate an NBC incident
3. Understand relevant NBC response plans  C,F,M,m            o                                                 
 and SOPs and your role in them.
4. Recognize and communicate the need for  C,m,G              o                                                 
 additional resources during a NBC
 incident.
5. Make proper notification and            C,F,M,m            o                                                 
 communicate the NBC hazard.
6. Understand:                             C,F,m
  --NBC agent terms                                           o                                                 
  --NBC toxicology terms                                                                                                
                                                                                                    (EMS-B only)
7. Individual protection at a NBC          C,F,M,m
 incident:
  --Use self-protection measures                              o                                       *                 
  --Properly use assigned NBC protective                                                                      *                 
   equipment
  --Select and use proper protective
   equipment
8. Know protective measures, and how to    F,M                o                                                 
 initiate actions to protect other and
 safeguard property in an NBC incident.
8a. Know measures for evacuation of        M,G                                                                          
 personnel in a downwind hazare area for
 an NBC incident.
9. CB decontamination procedures for       C,F,M,m
 self, victims, site/equipment and mass
 casualties:
  --Understand & implement                                    o                                       *                 
                                                              (self)
  --Determine
10. Know crime scene and evidence          F,M,m              o                                                 
 preservation at an NBC incident.                                                (except 911)
10a. Know procedures and safety            F,G,m                                                      *                 
 precautions for collecting legal
 evidence at an NBC incident.
11. Know Federal and other support         C,F,M,m                               o                  o                           *
 infrastructure and how to access in an                                          (911 only)
 NBC incident.
12. Understand the risks of operating in   C,F,m                                 o                            *                 
 protective clothing when used at an NBC
 incident
13. Understand emergency and first aid     F,M                                   o                            *                 
 procedure for exposure to NBC agents,
 and principles of triage.
14. Know how to perform hazard and risk    C,F,M,m                                                                      
 assessment for NBC agents.
15. Understand termination/all clear       C,F,m                                                                        
 procedures for a NBC incident
16. Incident Command System/Incident       C,F,M
 Management System
  --Function within role in NBC incident                                                                        *
  --Implement for NBC incident                                                                                                          *
17. Know how to perform NBC contamination  C,F,M,m                                                            *                 
 control and containment operations,
 including for fatalities.
17a. Understand procedures and equipment   G,m                                                                *                 
 for safe transport of contaminated
 items.
18. Know the classification, detection,    C,F,M,m                                                  o                 *                 
 identification and verification of NBC
 materials using field survey instruments
 and equipment, and methodsfor collection
 of solid, liquid and gas samples.
19. Know safe patient extraction and NBC   F,m                                                                        *                 o
 antidote administration.                                                                           (Medical only)    (Medical only)
20. Know patient assessment and emergency  M,m,G                                                              *
 medical treatment in NBC incident.                                                                 (Medical only)    (Medical only)
21. Be familiar with NBC related Public    G                                                                            o
 Health & Local EMS Issues.                                                                         (Medical only)    (Medical only)
22.Know procedures for patient transport   F,G                                                                          o
 following NBC incident.                                                                            (Medical only)    (Medical only)
23. Execute NBC triage and primary care.   G                                                                  *
                                                                                                    (Medical only)    (Medical only)
24. Know laboratory identification and     G                                                                          *
 diagnosis for biological agents.                                                                                     (Medical only)
25. Have the ability to develop a site     C,F                                                                        *                 *
 safety plan and control plan for a NBC
 incident.
26. Have ability to develop NBC response   G,m                                                                                          
 plan and conduct exercise of response.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Legend for References:
C-29 CFR 1910.120 (OSHA Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response)
M--Macro objectives developed by a training subgroup of the Senior Interagency Coordinating Group
m--Micro objectives developed by CBDCOM
G--Focus Group Worshop
F--NFPA Standard 472 (Professional Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials Incidents) and/or NFPA Standard 473 (Competencies for EMS Personnel
  Responding to Hazardous Materials Incidents.


  ANNEX B: Acronym List to the Domestic Preparedness Program in the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction



AMC                          Army Materiel Command
ASA (IL&E)                   Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installation, Logistics, & Environment)
BDRP                         Biological Defense Research Program
CB                           Chemical Biological
CBDCOM                       Chemical Biological Defense Command
CBIRF                        Chemical Biological Initial Response Force
CBQRF                        Chemical Biological Quick Response Force
CDC                          Centers for Disease Control
CWC                          Chemical Weapons Convention
DIA                          Defense Intelligence Agency
DoE                          Department of Energy
DoJ                          Department of Justice
DoT                          Department of Transportation
DOMS                         Director of Military Support
DSWA                         Defense Special Weapons Agency
EOD                          Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EPA                          Environmental Protection Agency
ERDEC                        Edgewood Research, Development and Engineering Center
FBI                          Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA                         Federal Emergency Management Agency
FRP                          Federal Response Plan
GSA                          General Services Administration
HAZMAT                       Hazardous Materials
HQDA                         Headquarters Department of the Army
I-TRAP                       Interagency Terrorism Response Awareness Program
LFA                          Lead Federal Agency
MARS                         Mobil Analytical Response System
MMST                         System Metropolitan Medical Strike Team System
MRMC                         Medical Research and Materiel Command
MSCA                         Military Support to Civilian Authorities
NBC                          Nuclear Biological Chemical
NCS                          National Communications System
NG                           National Guard
NGA                          National Governors Association
NGB                          National Guard Bureau
NICI                         National Interagency Counterdrug Institute
NMRI                         Naval Medical Research Institute
NRC                          National Response Center
OD                           Ordnance Disposal
PHS                          Public Health Services
RC                           Reserve Component
SECARMY                      Secretary of the Army
SECDEF                       Secretary of Defense
SICG                         Senior Interagency Coordination Group
TEU                          Technical Escort Unit
USAMRIID                     United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease
USCG                         United States Coast Guard
USDA                         United States Department of Agriculture
VA                           Department of Veterans Affairs
WMD                          Weapons of Mass Destruction
WISE                         WMD Interagency Support Exercise



      

    d. The Protection of U.S. Forces Deployed Abroad: Report to the 
    President from the Secretary of Defense, September 15, 1996 \1\

    The attack on U.S. forces at Khobar Towers has dramatically 
underscored that for U.S. forces deployed overseas, terrorism 
is a fact of life. Every terrorist attack provides lessons on 
how to prevent further tragedies. However, the Khobar Towers 
attack should be seen as a watershed event pointing the way to 
a radically new mind-set and dramatic changes in the way we 
protect our forces deployed overseas from this growing threat. 
This report reviews the Khobar Towers attack, the context of 
our Persian Gulf force deployments, the force protection 
measures taken before and after the attack, and lessons learned 
for all of our military operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Source: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/downing__rpt/
report__f.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

             The Attack Against Khobar Towers on June 25th

    Khobar Towers is a compound built by the Saudi Government 
near Dhahran that housed the residential quarters of almost 
3,000 U. S. military personnel of the 4404th Air Wing 
(Provisional), along with military personnel from the United 
Kingdom, France, and Saudi Arabia. U.S. military personnel 
first occupied this compound in 1991 during the Coalition force 
buildup before the Gulf War.
    Shortly before 10:00 p.m. local time on Tuesday, June 25, 
1996, a fuel truck parked next to the northern perimeter fence 
at the Khobar Towers complex. Air Force guards posted on top of 
the closest building, Building 131, immediately spotted the 
truck and suspected a bomb as its drivers fled the scene in a 
nearby car. The guards began to evacuate the building, but were 
unable to complete this task before a tremendous explosion 
occurred. The blast completely destroyed the northern face of 
the building, blew out windows from surrounding buildings, and 
was heard for miles. Nineteen American service members were 
killed and hundreds more were seriously injured. Many Saudis 
and other nationals were also injured.
    The response of our forces at Khobar Towers to this tragedy 
reflected their thorough training and bravery. The buddy system 
worked, and every injured airman received on-the-spot first aid 
before being escorted to the clinics. Medical teams, both 
military and civilian, American and Saudi Arabian, performed 
commendably without rest for many hours and, in some cases, 
despite their own wounds.
    Once the immediate steps were taken to care for the 
injured, search for survivors, and account for everyone, the 
command of the 4404th Air Wing began to reconstitute itself to 
carry out its Southern Watch mission. In less than three days, 
the skies over southern Iraq once again were being patrolled by 
the Coalition in full force.
    The June 25 bombing attack remains under investigation by 
the Saudi Arabian Government, assisted by large numbers of 
forensic experts from the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
which has responsibility within the U. S. government for 
investigating terrorist attacks against Americans overseas. The 
Department of Defense (DoD) knows neither who the perpetrators 
of this attack are, nor who sponsored them.

                    Why Are We in The Persian Gulf?

    The attack on Khobar Towers has raised questions about the 
need for our presence in the Arabian Gulf Region, and Saudi 
Arabia in particular.
    Our security interests in Saudi Arabia date back to 1945 
when President Franklin Roosevelt met with King Abdul Aziz on 
his way home from the Yalta Conference. The United States has 
had a military presence in Saudi Arabia since the early 1950s. 
During most of this time, our presence has been well under 
1,000 uniformed personnel and civilian employees, in addition 
to their families, engaged in training and advising the Saudi 
Arabian military. The United States Military Training Mission 
to Saudi Arabia (USMTM) was established in 1953 to assist the 
regular Saudi military under the Ministry of Defense and 
Aviation. In 1965 a U.S. Army program manager's office (OPM/
SANG) was established to help in the modernization of the Saudi 
Arabian National Guard.
    Our presence in helping the Saudis modernize their military 
and absorb new equipment was welcomed and unobtrusive. The 
Kingdom was a benign environment in which tens of thousands of 
American civilians lived and worked, particularly since the oil 
boom of the 1970s. Since 1977, our military assistance, 
including the salaries and expenses of our uniformed personnel 
and civilian employees, has been fully funded by the Saudi 
Arabian Government.
    Saudi Arabia has never hosted foreign military bases of any 
nation. While Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbors generally 
welcomed an American military presence in the region after 
Great Britain ended its security responsibilities east of Suez 
in the early 1970s, they preferred that presence to be ``over 
the horizon.'' For the United States, this presence was 
manifested primarily by our naval Middle East Force in the 
Arabian Gulf. While the United States made use of the Saudi air 
base at Dhahran in the early years of the Cold War, U.S. 
combatant forces were rarely deployed to the Kingdom. The major 
exception before the Gulf War was during the Iran-Iraq war in 
the 1980s when American AWACs and tanker aircraft were deployed 
to Riyadh.
    The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, 
dramatically changed the security dynamics, and the U.S. 
presence, in the region. The United States, acting to protect 
its vital interests, led a coalition of Western and Islamic 
forces that deployed over half a million men and women to the 
Gulf to defend Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states and to 
free Kuwait from Iraq's brutal occupation. Through Operations 
Desert Shield and Desert Storm they won an impressive victory, 
although the threats to the region from aggressor states were 
not completely destroyed.
    The primary American interest that we acted decisively to 
protect in the Gulf War was access to the vast energy resources 
of the region, i.e., nearly two-third of the world's proven oil 
reserves upon which our own economy and those of the entire 
industrial world depend so heavily. This fact alone would have 
justified our actions in 1990-1991, but America also has other 
vital interests in the region. The security of Israel and Egypt 
and the Gulf states themselves was endangered by Iraq's 
aggression and desire to dominate the politics of the region. 
Coupled with the end of the Cold War, the Coalition victory 
allowed the United States to move forward on the Middle East 
peace process in a manner not previously possible. America also 
has vital interests in protecting U.S. citizens and property 
abroad, and in ensuring freedom of navigation through the air 
and sea lanes that connect Europe and the West with Africa, 
Asia, and the Indian Ocean, all of which pass through and 
alongside the Arabian Peninsula.

                   The Nature of Our Current Mission

    When President Bush sought King Fahd's permission to deploy 
American forces to Saudi Arabia in 1990 for the build-up to 
Desert Shield/Desert Storm, he made a commitment that we would 
depart when our wartime mission was concluded. The United 
States sought no permanent bases or operational presence on the 
Arabian Peninsula, and that continues to be our policy.
    However, the threat to U.S. vital interests in the region 
from Saddam Hussein's regime did not end with Desert Storm. 
While the Desert Storm coalition ejected the Iraqi army from 
Kuwait in 1991, the goal of the Coalition was not to dismember 
Iraq or advance to Baghdad to change the regime. Saddam Hussein 
has remained in power in Baghdad and continues to ignore or 
obstruct the U.N. Security Council resolutions that defined the 
terms of the cease-fire, particularly the requirement to 
disclose and destroy all weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 
nuclear, chemical, and biological, and their long-range means 
of delivery. Consequently, at the invitation of the Gulf 
countries, a coalition of forces, primarily from the United 
States, Great Britain and France, has remained in the region to 
enforce the U.N. Resolutions. These forces include the 4404th 
Air Wing, the unit that occupied the Khobar Towers facility.
    In the years since the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein's regime 
has undertaken overt acts threatening peace in the region. In 
1992, in response to Iraqi repression of the Shia, the 
Coalition created Operation Southern Watch. In 1993, the Iraqi 
regime plotted to assassinate former President George Bush 
during a visit to Kuwait. In response, the United States 
launched cruise missile strikes against the Iraqi intelligence 
headquarters. In 1994, the Iraqi regime again moved forces 
toward the Kuwaiti border with an intent to launch another 
invasion. U.S. forces responded with a rapid buildup, using 
host nation bases, including those in Saudi Arabia, and the 
Iraqis turned back. The U.N. subsequently passed UNSCR 949, 
which limits Iraq's right to deploy military forces in Southern 
Iraq--the area defined by the Coalition as south of 32 degrees 
North. In August 1996, Saddam Hussein, again in violation of 
U.N. resolutions, attacked without provocation the Kurdish city 
of Irbil. He then declared the two No Fly Zones, established in 
the terms of the cease-fire and after Saddam's repression of 
the Kurds, null and void. The United States and the United 
Kingdom extended the southern No Fly Zone to 33 degrees 
parallel and launched a series of missile attacks against Iraqi 
air defenses.
    We have been able to respond to Iraq's continued 
provocations and threats to the peace and stability of its 
neighbors because the United States, together with its 
coalition partners, France and the United Kingdom, has 
maintained a strong military presence on the Arabian Peninsula, 
principally Saudi Arabia, since the end of Operation Desert 
Storm. Our forward presence not only allows us to respond 
quickly, but to monitor Iraq's compliance with U.N. Security 
Council resolutions, with respect to both repression of the 
Kurds and direct military threats to the Gulf states. This 
forward presence includes:

Nearly 5,000 U.S. Air Force men and women in Operation Southern 
        Watch who conduct combat air missions from Saudi Arabia 
        and Kuwait, enforcing the No Fly Zone over southern 
        Iraq that restricts Saddam Hussein's ability to oppress 
        his people and threaten the peace and stability of the 
        region.
U.S. servicemen and women who support the work of the United 
        Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) charged with 
        discovering and destroying Saddam's programs to develop 
        and produce weapons of mass destruction, efforts which 
        Iraq continues to oppose. This effort includes U-2 
        surveillance missions over Iraq to assist with UNSCOM's 
        monitoring responsibilities.
U.S. Army PATRIOT air defense batteries that have been deployed 
        to protect our forces and major Saudi population 
        centers at Dhahran and Riyadh since 1991 and regular 
        rotations of battalion-sized armor units that exercise 
        in Kuwait.
The U.S. Navy Middle East Force that has been greatly expanded 
        from a few surface combatant ships to include the 
        presence of an Aircraft Carrier Battle Group and a 
        Marine Amphibious Ready Group throughout most of the 
        year.
Robust military exercise programs with every Gulf state, 
        unheard of before Desert Storm, that contribute to the 
        operational readiness of all our military forces and 
        help deter Iraq as well as Iran, which also has 
        hegemonic ambitions coupled with a military 
        modernization program that is out of all proportion to 
        its defensive needs.
Prepositioned equipment--a full brigade's worth in Kuwait, 
        another two brigades' worth afloat, and we are building 
        up to a fourth brigade's worth in Qatar. This equipment 
        allows us to insert a substantial deterrent force onto 
        the Arabian Peninsula in a fraction of the time that it 
        took us in 1990.

    Maintaining the U.S. military presence in the Arabian Gulf 
has not been easy for our uniformed personnel who have served 
repeated tours of duty in a harsh environment. It places a 
serious strain on ships, aircraft, and other equipment 
operating at high tempo. While the cost of our presence has 
been greatly eased through generous Host Nation Support 
contributions from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the other Gulf 
countries, the monetary cost to the United States remains high. 
But this residual cost and the other sacrifices associated with 
our presence, are justified because they protect vital U.S. 
national interests at stake in the region.
    Our experience clearly shows that an immediate and forceful 
response to Saddam Hussein's provocative actions has been 
effective in causing his regime to back off from threatening 
moves each time it has been foolish enough to try them. It is 
far more cost-effective to be in a position to deter Saddam 
Hussein than have to fight another war.
    In addition, should deterrence fail, we are, without 
question, in a better position to defeat aggression than we 
were in the Summer of 1990, prior to Desert Shield. Then, it 
took more than four weeks to place meaningful combat power 
ashore. Today, we can do so in four to five days, using the 
combination of forward presence and measures that we have taken 
to improve our ability to deploy rapidly. We demonstrated this 
potential in October 1994 with great success, and we continue 
to exercise with the equipment for both training and deterrent 
purposes.

                           Terrorist Attacks

    The terrorist attacks on the OPM/SANG in Riyadh last 
November and on Khobar Towers in Dhahran last June were not 
only attacks on American citizens and forces, they were also an 
assault on our security strategy in the region.
    Our military presence in the region is opposed by Iran and 
Iraq, obviously, but also by home-grown dissidents in some 
countries of the region. The opposition includes extremist 
groups who are not only coldblooded and fanatical, but also 
clever. They know that they cannot defeat us militarily, but 
they may believe they can defeat us politically, and they have 
chosen terror as the weapon to try to achieve this. They 
estimate that if they can cause enough casualties or threat of 
casualties to our forces, they can weaken support in the United 
States for our presence in the region, or weaken support in the 
host nations for a continued U.S. presence. They seek to drive 
a wedge between the U.S. security strategy in the Gulf and the 
American public, and between the United States and our regional 
allies.
    Before the terrorist attacks, Saudi Arabia had long been 
seen as an oasis of calm and safety in the turbulent Middle 
East. Americans, both military and civilians alike, felt secure 
and generally welcome, albeit within a very different and 
restrictive culture compared to the United States or in Western 
Europe and elsewhere our forces were stationed overseas. Our 
approach to security matters in the Kingdom reflected this 
attitude, which was the reality until recent years. We lived 
and worked in urban environments and considered them on a par 
with Europe or Japan. While U.S. military security practices 
around the world were tightened following the Beirut bombings 
in 1983, we felt little danger in Saudi Arabia. Our presence in 
Saudi Arabia after the Gulf War had been requested and agreed 
to by the Saudi Government. Indeed, our presence contributed 
significantly to our host's defense.
    The location of a large number of our personnel and our 
major combat air operations in the Dhahran region reflected 
this sense of well-being. The air facilities were excellent and 
the Saudi Government provided good quality residences and 
office facilities in the nearby Khobar Towers complex. That 
complex had been built by the Saudi Government and was offered 
to the U.S. military for use during the Gulf War. It continued 
to be used by U.S. military personnel after Operation Southern 
Watch began.
    The depth of feeling among strongly conservative Saudi 
elements that opposed inviting Western forces to the Kingdom in 
1990 and remained opposed to our continued presence was slow to 
emerge clearly. There was evidence of anti-regime activity and 
a rise in anonymous threats against American interests, 
especially following the additional troop deployment in October 
1994. Resentment over the costs of the Gulf War and the 
continued high costs of military modernization, and discontent 
over strains in the social fabric of the Kingdom, even from 
normally pro-Western Saudis, were recognized but not considered 
a threat to American military security. Since our personnel 
worked on Saudi military installations and lived in guarded 
compounds, any risks were seen as manageable by maintaining a 
low profile and following standard personal security practices. 
Force protection was actively pursued, but in the context of a 
stable and secure environment.
    Following the November OPM/SANG bombing, that environment 
was re-evaluated, the threat level assessment was raised to 
``High'' and extensive improvements were made in all our 
Arabian Gulf region facilities. In addition, we received a 
number of intelligence indications that new attacks were being 
contemplated against American forces and that Khobar Towers 
could be a target. What these indications lacked was warning of 
the specific kind of attack that occurred. However, they caused 
our commanders to put in place a wide variety of new security 
measures. At Khobar Towers alone, over 130 separate force 
protection enhancements were undertaken--barriers were raised 
and moved out, fences strengthened, entrances restricted, guard 
forces increased. The enhancements were aimed at a variety of 
potential threats, ranging from bombs to attempts to poison 
food and water supplies. The enhancements may well have saved 
hundreds of lives by preventing penetration by bombers into the 
center of the compound. The approach, however, was one of 
enhancing security of existing facilities despite their overall 
limitations, and this proved insufficient to protect our 
forces.
    The climate of calm and safety in Saudi Arabia vanished 
with the November 1995 bombing of the OPM/SANG office in Riyadh 
and the highly sophisticated attack on Khobar Towers, which 
used a bomb now estimated at more than 20,000 pounds. It became 
clear that we needed to radically re-think the issue of force 
protection in the region, and that our conclusions from this 
effort would carry implications for the protection of our 
forces around the world.

   Response to the Khobar Towers Bombing: Relocate, Restructure and 
                                Refocus

    Immediately following the Khobar Towers bombing attack, we 
undertook a fundamental re-evaluation of our force posture in 
the Arabian Gulf region. The guiding principles were: (1) We 
would continue to perform our missions; (2) Force protection 
would be a major consideration; and (3) Other tradeoffs could 
be made. Essentially, we looked at the mission tasks as if we 
were planning the operation from scratch within a very high 
threat environment. Consequently, we came to the conclusion 
that a far different force posture was appropriate. After 
extensive discussions with the senior Saudi leadership, I 
ordered a major realignment of our force posture in Saudi 
Arabia, an effort known as Operation Desert Focus. This new 
posture will greatly enhance force protection, while still 
permitting us to accomplish our missions. The effort, which is 
nearing completion, is two-pronged.
    First, with the full cooperation and support of the Saudi 
Arabian Government, we began immediately to relocate our 
deployed air forces (the 4404th Air Wing) from the Saudi air 
bases located in urban concentrations at Riyadh and Dhahran to 
an isolated location at the uncompleted Prince Sultan Air Base 
near Al Kharj, where many Coalition forces were located during 
the Gulf War. While our personnel will be living in tents 
initially, we will be able to construct very effective defenses 
against terrorist attacks. This relocation effort, which will 
require over 1,400 truck loads to accomplish, is well underway. 
More than 500 tents, most of them air-conditioned, have been 
erected to house more than 4,000troops and provide dining and 
recreation facilities, communications sites, and maintenance 
and operations facilities. The refueling tankers and 
reconnaissance aircraft from Riyadh were the first to arrive 
last month, and the move of the fighters and other aircraft 
from Dhahran is almost complete. More than 2,000 additional 
military personnel were deployed to Saudi Arabia temporarily to 
assist in this effort to provide security for the moves, erect 
facilities, and provide services at the base until permanent 
arrangements are in place. The Saudi Arabian Government has 
assumed responsibility for constructing permanent facilities. 
The isolated location and large size of the Prince Sultan Air 
Base allows for extensive perimeters and avoids intense 
concentrations of troops.
    Some of the units in Saudi Arabia cannot be relocated 
without degrading their effectiveness. Our USMTM and OPM/SANG 
security assistance personnel who train and advise the Saudi 
military must be in close proximity to their Saudi counterparts 
in the capital and at various bases. Our PATRIOT missile 
battery crews must be located near the urban areas and air 
bases that they defend. While these units must continue to work 
where they are now, we are taking steps to improve their 
security by consolidating them and moving them to more secure 
housing areas, providing more guards and barriers, and taking 
other steps to enhance their protection and lessen the impact 
of any future attacks.
    Second, the Department has re-examined its personnel 
assignment policies for Saudi Arabia. While the majority of the 
operational forces with the 4404th Air Wing are on temporary 
duty and deploy on rotational assignments for up to 179 days at 
a time before returning to their home bases, many of the DoD 
personnel permanently assigned to Saudi Arabia with OPM/SANG 
and USMTM are on multi-year tours accompanied by their family 
members. At the time of the Khobar Towers bombing, we sponsored 
nearly 800 military dependents in Saudi Arabia alone. This no 
longer seems prudent.
    At my request, the Department of State implemented an 
``authorized departure'' of all U.S. Government dependents from 
Saudi Arabia in July 1996, which provides monetary entitlements 
to any families who wish to leave. In addition, DoD has 
withdrawn command sponsorship for dependents of most 
permanently assigned military members, which had the practical 
effect of an orderly, mandatory return. Nearly 300 dependents 
arrived by charter aircraft in Charleston, South Carolina, on 
August 18. While families are disrupted and some are 
undoubtedly displeased by this change in policy, I believe it 
was the correct choice. Military members understand personal 
risk and accept it by the nature of their profession. That is 
not true of their dependents, especially children, and we 
cannot allow them to remain in harm's way.
    In the future, nearly all permanent assignments in Saudi 
Arabia will be one-year unaccompanied tours. There are some 
assignments where the nature of the job requires longer tours 
for continuity and familiarization with the host government, 
and we have identified 59 billets that will be permitted to be 
accompanied by dependents. School-aged children will not be 
allowed under any circumstance under current conditions.

                Other Regional and Worldwide Initiatives

    We also looked beyond Saudi Arabia, first to the other 
countries on the Arabian Peninsula where we have DoD personnel, 
both combatants and noncombatants alike. In Kuwait, we will 
move exposed Air Force personnel onto the Ali Al Salem Air Base 
where they will live temporarily in tents, as at Prince Sultan 
Air Base at Al Kharj in Saudi Arabia. In the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), we have completed moving our Air Force 
personnel from an urban hotel onto a UAE air base where they 
will also live in temporary facilities. In both cases we have 
received strong support from the host countries.
    The situation in each country in the Gulf is different in 
terms of dependent numbers, threat, and security exposure. We 
decided to reduce the number of family members in Kuwait 
through a program of accelerated attrition. In the future, 
there will be only about 30 billets designated for accompanied 
tours. In Bahrain we are looking at reducing our numbers 
through gradual attrition matching the normal rotation cycles 
of personnel. We have decided to leave the dependent status as 
is in the UAE, Qatar, Oman, and Yemen, affecting approximately 
65 family members.
    After the Khobar Towers bombing, I also undertook a process 
to examine more closely the adequacy of our force protection 
measures for our troops around the world. On July 17 I sent a 
message directing all Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) to look at 
force protection in their areas of responsibility and report 
back to me by August 1 on how best to deal with the rapidly 
escalating threat to U.S. forces. I urged them to be innovative 
in their approaches to dealing with the terrorist problem. As a 
minimum, I asked that they answer the following questions:

   Should our troops remain in all present locations?
   Should they be moved from urban areas?
   Is an adjustment required in dependent status?
   How much should force protection interfere with the 
        mission?
   Is intelligence focused to deal with the terrorist 
        threat?
   How can we work more effectively with host nations 
        on force protection measures?

    I have incorporated many of the recommendations and ideas 
from the CINCs in the force protection initiative the 
Department is undertaking. Each of the CINCs responded 
personally with detailed suggestions of additional force 
protection improvements that could be undertaken without 
compromising the mission. The CINCs suggestions fell into the 
following key categories:

   Establish location of forces as a critical factor in 
        force protection considerations. Cross check with 
        dependent security assessment.
   Tailor anti-terrorism training to increase 
        situational awareness of deploying personnel.
   Provide more focused anti-terrorism intelligence to 
        field units.
   Improve interchange with host nations on 
        intelligence and security matters.

    I have incorporated many of the recommendations and ideas 
in the force protection initiative the Department is 
undertaking. Terrorists will always search out and strike at 
the weakest link in our chain of defenses. Our goal is to find 
and strengthen those weak spots and we are doing just that.

                      Force Protection vs. Mission

    The relocation of our forces in Saudi Arabia and the change 
in personnel assignment policies are just two examples of the 
need to rethink fundamentally our approach to force protection 
around the world. Prior to the Khobar Towers bombing, our force 
protection measures focused on incremental fixes to existing 
arrangements, rather than consideration of radical changes in 
force posture. Incremental fixes in force protection can always 
be trumped by attacks of greater magnitude.
    To stay ahead of the threat, we now see that we must always 
put force protection up front as a major consideration with key 
other mission goals as we plan operations, and that that parity 
must be maintained throughout the operation. Changes in threat 
level must trigger fundamental reconsiderations of force 
protection and cause commanders to reexamine this issue as if 
they were designing a new mission. Moreover, commanders must be 
empowered to do this.
    The task of protecting our forces would be easy if we were 
willing to abandon or compromise our missions, but that is not 
an option. We have global interests and global 
responsibilities. Those require our forces to be deployed 
overseas to protect our national security interests. And our 
troops cannot successfully complete their tasks if they are 
required to live in bunkers 24 hours a day.
    How then can we accomplish our missions without 
compromising their success or abandoning them altogether? The 
answer is that we will require tradeoffs in other areas, such 
as cost, convenience, and quality of life. This is a tough 
answer for our men and women in uniform who will live in less 
comfortable surroundings and spend more time avoiding and 
defending against terrorism, and it is a tough answer for them 
and their families, who must experience the loneliness of 
unaccompanied tours. We will have to compensate for these 
changes and greater hardships in order to continue to maintain 
the superb quality force we have today.
    Putting force protection up front as a major consideration 
along with other mission objectives around the world will 
require a fundamental change in the mind-set with which we plan 
and carry out operations. It also requires structural changes 
in the Department. Many of the initial actions we are taking 
are directed only in part at the Southwest Asia theater. They 
all have global implications.

                  Commissioning of Downing Assessment

    On June 28, three days after the Khobar Towers bombing, I 
issued a charter for an assessment of the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the tragedy and appointed General 
Wayne A. Downing, United States Army (Retired), to head the 
assessment effort. I asked General Downing to give me a fast, 
unvarnished and independent look at what happened there and 
offer ideas on how we can try to prevent such a tragedy in the 
future. The final report was delivered to me on August 30.
    General Downing has given me that unvarnished and 
independent review of the Khobar Towers bombing and a tough 
critique of past practices and attitudes. His report confirms 
my belief that we must make a fundamental change in our mind-
set. On the whole, I accept General Downing's recommendations 
and I believe we can take effective action to deal with each of 
the problems identified in his comprehensive report. His 
conclusions have by and large validated the initiatives we have 
already launched, and many of his recommendations already have 
been implemented through the changes we have made. Where his 
recommendations have identified additional changes that should 
be considered, we have a process underway either to implement 
them or to put them on a fast track to decision. General 
Downing's report is an important contribution to changing our 
entire approach to force protection and provides evidence of 
the need for changes in the way we do business.
    Annex (B) contains a detailed response to each 
recommendation included in the Downing report. We have taken 
the following actions in response to the principal 
recommendations regarding force protection in the report.

        issue dod-wide standards for providing force protection

    DoD has maintained a variety of directives and standards 
related to force protection. These documents have been of great 
use to organizations and have served us well. However, as 
General Downing has indicated, the diversity of these 
documents, and their ``advisory'' rather than ``directive'' 
nature, may have caused confusion. In my judgment, this is 
largely a result of the continuing transition the Department is 
making under Goldwater-Nichols to joint operations under 
combatant commands. To correct this situation, I have revised 
and am reissuing this day DoD Directive 2000.12, ``DoD 
Combating Terrorism Program.'' This new directive requires that 
the approaches previously set forth as suggestions in DoD 
Handbook O-2000.12-H be implemented as the DoD standard. In 
applying this standard, commanders and managers must take 
account of the mission, the threat, and specific circumstances. 
The new directive also implements other new initiatives I have 
identified elsewhere in this report.

    give local commanders operational control with regard to force 
                          protection matters.

    Under the traditional peacetime command and control 
arrangements, force protection is the responsibility of the 
CINC, through the service component commanders, to the local 
commanders in the field. In the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), 
whose area of responsibility includes Saudi Arabia, the service 
component commanders exercised operational control of deployed 
forces from their headquarters, including for force protection. 
But the Commander, Joint Task Force Southwest Asia (CJTF-SWA) 
exercised tactical control over forces in theater that are 
operating specific missions in support of Operation Southern 
Watch. Thus force protection responsibilities and tactical 
control were not in the same hands.
    Following the attack on OPM/SANG in Riyadh last November, 
the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command (CINCCENT) gave 
additional responsibilities to the Commander, JTF-SWA, for 
coordination of force protection in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. Following the subsequent attack on Khobar Towers in 
June, CINCCENT has directed the Commander, CJTF-SWA, to assume 
full responsibility for force protection of all combatant 
forces deployed in support of Operation Southern Watch. With 
respect to force protection, CJTF-SWA now has authority and 
responsibility to establish policy, and directive authority to 
implement and enforce the CINCCENT force protection policies 
and directives. Tactical control and force protection are now 
in the same hands. Service component commanders continue to 
maintain operational control of combatant forces deployed in 
support of JTF-SWA. CENTCOM will also investigate the 
feasibility and advisability of establishing a CENTCOM forward 
headquarters that could assume responsibilities for all forces 
on the Arabian Peninsula. I have also directed all CINCs to 
review and make recommendations on similar command structure 
changes for force protection in their areas of responsibility.
    The DoD directive I have issued establishing DoD-wide 
standards for providing force protection now requires that each 
CINC review the command arrangements for every Joint Task Force 
when it is established and periodically thereafter with regard 
to force protection responsibilities. The directive also 
requires that the CINCs report to me any decisions to vest 
operational control for force protection matters outside a 
Joint Task Force Commander and to detail the reasons why this 
decision has been made.

 designate the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff as the principal 
   advisor and the single dod-wide focal point for force protection 
activities. general downing's report correctly recognizes the need for 
 a stronger centralized approach to force protection within dod. there 
  indeed should be a single individual designated as responsible for 
  ensuring that our policies will result in adequate force protection 
  measures being taken and for auditing the performance of our units.

    Because force protection measures must be carried out by 
our uniformed military organizations, I have therefore 
designated the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the 
principal advisor and the single DoD-wide focal point for force 
protection activities. He will review and coordinate these 
activities in the context of broader national security policy 
matters with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The 
Chairman will establish an appropriate force protection element 
within the Joint Staff to perform this function.
    As the primary, high-level advocate for force protection, 
the Chairman will help ensure that this requirement is placed 
as a major consideration along with other mission goals as we 
plan military operations, and that focus on force protection is 
maintained throughout the operation. The Chairman will also 
ensure that adequate force protection is a top priority for 
every commander at every level within our military 
organization, and that commanders will be empowered to ensure 
that force protection measures respond to the unique situation 
on the ground. As the key military advisor to the President and 
the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman can also ensure that 
force protection receives a high priority in budgetary 
allocations. And as the representative of the joint forces, the 
Chairman is also in the position to ensure a joint and uniform 
approach to force protection throughout the Service components.
    The instructions carrying out this recommendation are 
included in DoD Directive 2000.12 being issued today.

move force protection responsibilities from the department of state to 
               the department of defense where possible.

    In some cases, the Department of State, rather than the 
Department of Defense, is responsible for the security of 
military forces overseas, including force protection. This 
division of responsibilities can result in different standards 
of force protection, as highlighted by the bombing of the OPM/
SANG in Riyadh, in November 1995.
    Immediately following that event, I directed that the 
Chairman create a DoD Anti-Terrorism Task Force to assess DoD 
anti-terrorism worldwide and to provide a report with 
recommendations to improve anti-terrorism readiness. The Task 
Force highlighted the bifurcated responsibilities for security 
of DoD personnel. In particular, combatant forces were under 
the authority of the CINCCENT, but U.S. military personnel 
assigned to OPM/SANG and USMTM were under the control of the 
U.S. Ambassador for security matters. The final report and 
recommendations, completed just days before the bombing of 
Khobar Towers, called for a clarification of the division of 
responsibilities, including consideration of changes to the 
President's Letter to Chiefs of Mission.
    Because the Department of State was responsible for 
security at OPM/SANG, the Secretary of State, in accordance 
with the law, created an Accountability Review Board to review 
the security procedures in effect at the time of the bombing. 
The Board's report also highlighted the bifurcation of 
responsibilities and noted it caused a confusion and a lack of 
clear guidance as to security responsibilities.
    In light of that report, and the subsequent attack on 
Khobar Towers (a facility under the security cognizance of the 
regional CINC) DoD has, working closely with the Department of 
State, undertaken to realign security responsibilities on the 
Saudi Arabian Peninsula.
    The Secretary of State and I have agreed that he should 
delegate force protection responsibility and authority to me 
for all DoD activities within the Arabian Peninsula that are 
not already assigned to, or otherwise under the command of, the 
CINCCENT. I will, in turn, delegate this responsibility to the 
CINCCENT. The only DoD elements that will remain under the 
security responsibility of the Chief of Mission will be the 
integral elements of the country team (i.e. the Defense Attach@ 
Office, the USMC Security Detachment, and the Security 
Assistance Offices that are located within or in close 
proximity to their respective U. S. Embassies, in Qatar, the 
UAE, Bahrain and Oman), those sensitive intelligence and 
counterintelligence activities that are conducted under the 
direction and control of the Chief of Mission/Chief of Station, 
and any DoD personnel detailed to other U.S. Government 
agencies or departments.
    As force protection and anti-terrorism requirements are 
addressed in more detail by the other regional CINCs, similar 
realignments of force protection responsibility may need to be 
worked out with the Secretary of State.
    This arrangement balances the requirement for protecting 
DoD forces with the overall mission of the U.S. Government 
overseas. The Ambassador must be in charge of all activities 
that have a direct impact on the conduct of our nation's 
foreign policy. However, in those high threat instances where 
the number of DoD forces in country assigned to the embassy 
exceeds the country team's ability to provide for their 
security, the regional CINC will be charged with ensuring their 
safety from terrorist attack.

 improve the use of available intelligence and intelligence collection 
                             capabilities.

    Passive protective measures are always important, but the 
real key to better, more effective force protection against 
terrorism is to take active measures against the terrorists. 
This brings me to another major action we are taking in Saudi 
Arabia--improving our intelligence capabilities. We do not want 
to simply sit and wait for terrorists to act. We want to seek 
them out, find them, identify them, and do what we can to 
disrupt or preempt any planned operation. The key to this is 
better intelligence.
    In Saudi Arabia, the U.S. intelligence community was 
providing 24-hour a day coverage of terrorist and terrorist 
related activity. All of the available intelligence was widely 
distributed in theater. This intelligence support for force 
protection was very good in some areas, sufficient in others, 
and lacking in at least one key area--that of providing 
tactical warning of impending attack.
    There was a strong relationship between intelligence threat 
reporting and the theater security posture. The physical and 
personnel security enhancements that were in place at the time 
of the bombing were based on vulnerability analysis that came 
from general intelligence threat reporting. The linkage between 
intelligence reporting and the operational commander's action 
is critically important whether it involves intelligence threat 
information feeding physical security improvements or 
supporting target selection for precision weapons. In the case 
of the threat to U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia, the available 
intelligence clearly formed the basis for security planning and 
procedures. Intelligence reports drove the extensive security 
enhancements that were completed prior to the attack. We must 
not lose sight of the fact that U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia 
acted on the general threat intelligence available prior to the 
bombing and that information saved lives and injuries. We had 
intelligence and we acted on it, but we lacked the specificity 
necessary that would have made the critical difference in this 
incident. What was missing was the hard tactical warning of 
impending attack--the information we needed to thwart the 
operation before it reached fruition.
    There is no doubt that we can always have better and more 
precise intelligence and we are continuously striving for that 
level of detail. I am reviewing the Department's ability to 
meet this long-term requirement and I have the active 
assistance of the Director of Central Intelligence in reviewing 
intelligence policies and capabilities to acquire better 
tactical threat information from all intelligence assets.
    I am also taking steps to address General Downing's 
specific recommendations that we look at both how we make 
intelligence available and how we use it at small unit levels. 
I will work with CENTCOM and the Military Departments to 
implement those recommendations.
    The goal is not only to have better intelligence 
collection, but to be better able to use it. We need to sort 
out the real and useful intelligence from the misinformation 
and disinformation that is also collected. One key to improved 
analysis at the Washington level is the Counter Terrorist 
Center, which is now receiving higher priority in the face of 
the higher threat. But even with improved analysis in 
Washington, we still have to make this intelligence available 
in a timely way to the forces threatened, and to combine 
national intelligence with the local intelligence being 
collected. Among the steps we are taking to improve 
intelligence in the Gulf region is augmentation of the Southern 
Watch fusion cell with counter-terrorism analysts. We developed 
the model for intelligence fusion cells in Bosnia. We are 
replicating this model now not only in the Gulf region, but 
around the world wherever our forces are deployed. A fusion 
cell combines, in a timely way, national strategic 
intelligence, which we gather around the world, with local or 
tactical intelligence. That allows us to quickly ``fuse'' 
together the global picture and the regional picture to help us 
see patterns, keep information from falling through the cracks, 
and to focus U.S. and our allies' intelligence services on the 
same pieces of information at the same time. Equally important, 
it emphasizes the timely delivery of useful information to the 
tactical commander. We also are leveraging technology to build 
the tools we need to manage information better over the long 
term.
    General Downing rightly identified that we must commit 
ourselves to sustained in-depth, long-term analysis of trends, 
intentions, and capabilities of terrorists. This is a systemic 
issue, not just in terrorism analysis, that we must address 
across the board in our intelligence analysis and reporting. In 
recognition of this systemic problem, the Department developed 
an initiative earlier this year for the intelligence community 
that will make a career-long investment in selective 
intelligence analysis to provide the skills and expertise the 
community needs to sustain proficiency against hard target 
problems.

 establish a workable division of responsibilities on force protection 
          matters between the united states and host nations.

    General Downing correctly identified close and cooperative 
relationships with the host government as a key component of 
successful force protection programs in peacetime environments 
overseas. Without strong working relationships at all levels 
between U.S. and host nation officials, many force protection 
measures cannot be implemented.
    Formal, structured relationships have their place and 
should be established where appropriate and possible. It is 
most important that those U.S. officials with responsibility 
for force protection, including all commanders responsible for 
activities in the field, work consciously to build personal 
relationships of trust and confidence with their foreign 
counterparts.
    The Department is examining its personnel policies and 
practices to ensure that they support this important objective. 
For example, we are increasing tour length for additional key 
U.S. personnel in Saudi Arabia, including the commanders of the 
USAF Office of Special Investigations and Security Police 
allowing them to form deeper relationships with their 
counterparts.

 raise the funding level and priority for force protection and get the 
  latest technology into the field and into the department of defense.

    Since force protection is an integral part of every 
military mission, the costs are dispersed among the various 
mission expenditures such as training, equipment, and 
operations and maintenance. As a consequence, force protection 
expenditures traditionally are not isolated and treated as 
separate budget items. Moreover, when we are faced with unique 
force protection requirements, we fund them on an ad hoc basis. 
For example, on August 9, after the Khobar Towers attack, 
Deputy Secretary White invoked the Food and Forage authority to 
pay for moving our forces in Saudi Arabia and improving 
security. And on August 23, I requested additional funding for 
FY 1996 and FY 1997 force protection and anti-terrorism 
requirements in Saudi Arabia and around the world.
    However, with force protection now given a higher overall 
mission priority, we need to ensure force protection also is 
given a higher overall budget priority in the allocation of 
defense resources. To do so, we must be able to collect, 
consolidate and track our disparate expenditures for force 
protection, and measure our total expenditures against the 
requirements.
    I have initiated a comprehensive review of future funding 
for force protection and I have designated force protection as 
a major issue for the FY 1998-2003 program review. All DoD 
components are scrubbing the latest budget estimates to ensure 
that no key projects related to force protection and anti-
terrorism were omitted. Based on the responses received, the 
Program Review Group will assemble options to augment spending 
for force protection activities in the defense program. The 
Defense Resources Board is scheduled to review the proposals 
and make decision recommendations to me in October.
    Based on these budget reviews, the standard procedures for 
preparation of the program budget will be amended to facilitate 
the review of force protection requirements in future budgets. 
First, the existing procedures will be used to emphasize the 
high priority I am placing on force protection and counter 
terrorism. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council will 
continue to evaluate force protection and provide 
recommendations to me. I will ask the CINCs to include force 
protection programs in the Integrated Priority Lists they 
submit to me. This process will insure that specific programs 
or program areas highlighted by the CINCs will be included in 
the Program Objective Memoranda prepared by the Services for 
the next defense program (FY 1999-2003). To enhance further 
this process, detailed program and budget displays will be 
required for all force protection and anti-terrorism programs 
to track funding patterns and to provide a solid basis for 
reviewing proposed force protection enhancements.
    I have designated the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition and Technology as responsible for anti-terrorism 
technology development and asked him to expedite the adoption 
of new advanced technologies to meet force protection needs. 
This effort includes working with our allies, especially Israel 
and Great Britain, who have extensive experience in countering 
terrorism.

 determine culpability of individuals responsible for force protection 
                    matters in the chain of command.

    On August 30, 1996, without prior review, I transmitted the 
Downing report to the Secretary of the Air Force for evaluation 
and appropriate action. Specifically, the Air Force was asked 
to examine issues raised in the report concerning how the Air 
Force organizes, trains, and equips in order to support forces 
deployed to combatant commands. Additionally, I deferred to 
Secretary Widnall on any issues regarding the adequacy of 
individual acts or omissions. In turn, the Secretary of the Air 
Force and Chief of Staff designated the Commander, 12th Air 
Force, as the disciplinary review authority and General Court-
Martial Convening Authority regarding any actions or omissions 
by Air Force personnel associated with the Khobar Towers 
bombing. He is charged with reporting findings and 
recommendations to the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of 
Staff within 90 days.
    Additionally, the Air Force is pursuing a top-to-bottom 
review of force protection policies that include procedures for 
physical security, training and equipment available for 
security police, intelligence support and personnel practices.
    As we look at questions of accountability we also need to 
concentrate on learning lessons for the future. The U.S. 
military has a long, and admirable, record of self-examination 
and correction. That process must not be sacrificed. Nor must 
we lose sight of the fact that the bombing at Khobar Towers was 
not an accident. It was a heinous act of murder committed by 
persons as yet unknown.

                        Summary and Conclusions

    We live in an era of great hope. Our hopes are nurtured by 
the emergence of democracies around the globe, by the growth of 
global trade relationships and by expansion of global 
communications.
    Terrorism hangs over this bright future like a dark cloud, 
threatening our hope for a future of freedom, democracy and 
cooperation among all nations. It is the antithesis of 
everything America stands for. It is an enemy of the 
fundamental principles of human rights--freedom of movement, 
freedom of expression and freedom of religion. Perpetrators and 
sponsors of terrorist acts reject the rule of law and basic 
human decency. They seek to impose their will on others through 
acts of violence. Terrorism is a tool of states, a vehicle of 
expression for organizations and even a way of life for 
individuals. We can expect the terrorists to continue to seek 
out vulnerabilities and attack. Terrorists normally prey on the 
weak, but even militaries have vulnerabilities and present 
targets with high publicity value.
    America has global interests and responsibilities. Our 
national security strategy for protecting those interests and 
carrying out those interests requires deployment of our forces 
to the far reaches of the globe. When terrorists aim their 
attacks at U.S. military forces overseas, they are attacking 
our ability to protect and defend our vital interests in the 
world. Our military presence in many areas provides the crucial 
underpinning that has made progress towards democracy and 
economic growth possible. We have the ability to project power 
far from our borders and influence events on a scale unmatched 
by any other country or organization. But as General Downing 
points out in his report, terrorism provides less capable 
nations, or even organizations, the means to project a 
particularly insidious form of power, even across borders, and 
contest U.S. influence.
    But terrorists cannot win unless we let them. Sacrificing 
our strategic interests in response to terrorist acts is an 
unacceptable alternative. We cannot be a great power and live 
in a risk-free world. Therefore we must gird ourselves for a 
relentless struggle in which there will be many silent 
victories and some noisy defeats. There will be future 
terrorist acts attempted against U.S. military forces. Some 
will have tragic consequences. No force protection approach can 
be perfect, but the responsibility of leaders is to use our 
nation's resources, skills, and creativity to minimize them. We 
must learn from the Khobar Towers tragedy, taking advantage of 
the U.S. military's tradition of strengthening itself out of 
adversity. The actions outlined in this report, the lessons 
articulated by General Downing and the ideas we have garnered 
from our military commanders around the world, will strengthen 
our defenses.

                       5. Department of Commerce

           1999 Report on Foreign Policy Export Controls \1\

Partial text of the Bureau of Export Administration's Annual Report to 
                                Congress

                     FOREIGN POLICY EXPORT CONTROLS

                            1. Introduction

    Export controls maintained for foreign policy purposes 
require annual extension according to the provisions of Section 
6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended (the 
Act). Section 6(f) of the Act requires the Secretary of 
Commerce, through authority delegated by the President, to 
submit a report to Congress to extend the controls. Sections 
6(b) and 6(f) of the Act require the report to include certain 
considerations \2\ and determinations \3\ on the criteria 
established in that section. This report complies with all the 
requirements set out in the Act for extending, amending or 
imposing foreign policy controls.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Pursuant to sections 6(b) and 6(f) of the Export Administration 
Act of 1979, as amended (Public Law 96-72 [S. 737], 93 Stat. 503). The 
full text of this report can be found on the World Wide Web at http://
www.bxa.doc.gov/PRESS/99/Repts/ForeignPolicyTOC.html.
    \2\ Section 6(b)(2) requires the Department to consider the 
criteria set forth in Section 6(b)(1) when extending controls in effect 
prior to July 12, 1985. In addition, the report must include the 
elements set forth in Sections 6(f)(2)(A) (purpose of the controls); 
6(j)(2)(C) (consultation with industry and other countries); 6(f)(2)(D) 
(alternative means attempted); and 6(f)(2)(E) (foreign availability).
    \3\ Section 6(b)(1) requires the Department to make determinations 
regarding the criteria set forth therein when extending controls in 
effect after July 12, 1985. The report must also contain the additional 
information required in Section 6(f)(2)(A), (C)-(E) (as set forth in 
endnote 1, supra.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Department of Commerce is acting under the authority 
conferred by Executive Order No. 12924 of August 19, 1994, and 
continued by notices of August 15, 1995, August 14, 1996, 
August 13, 1997 and August 13, 1998. Therein, the President, by 
reason of the expiration of the Act, invoked his authority, 
including authority under the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act, to continue in effect the system of controls that 
had been maintained under the Act. Under a policy of conforming 
actions under the Executive Order to those under the Act, the 
Department of Commerce, insofar as appropriate, is following 
the provisions of Section 6 of the Act with regard to extending 
foreign policy controls.
    With this report, the United States is extending all 
foreign policy controls in effect on December 31, 1998. The 
Department of Commerce is taking this action at the 
recommendation of the Secretary of State. As further provided 
by the Act, foreign policy controls remain in effect for 
replacement parts and for parts contained in goods subject to 
such controls. The controls administered in accordance with 
procedures established pursuant to Section 309(c) of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 likewise remain in 
effect.
    Each chapter that follows describes a particular category 
of foreign policy controls and delineates modifications that 
have taken place over the past year. One particular category of 
foreign policy controls has attracted additional attention in 
the last year. This is the use of unilateral sanctions by the 
United States. Since 1993, the United States has turned to 
sanctions with increasing frequency. More than half of the 
sanctions that the United States has applied since World War 11 
have been levied in the past five years. While the United 
States has imposed broad unilateral economic sanctions only in 
the most egregious cases, such as North Korea, Iran, Cuba and 
Sudan, as the use of sanctions has increased, the effectiveness 
of sanctions and of the guidelines by which the United States 
applies them have come under increasing review.
    Multilateral sanctions are generally more effective in 
enforcing international norms, advancing U.S. interests and 
defending U.S. values. Sanctions seem to be moderately to 
highly effective when the United States is able to garner the 
support and participation of a significant number of countries 
with economic and political weight to impose sanctions based on 
shared multilateral norms related to international peace, non-
proliferation or prevention of a military buildup. Multilateral 
sanctions maximize international pressure on the offending 
state while minimizing damage to U.S. competitiveness. Examples 
of multilateral financial or trade sanctions which have been 
effective include Iraq, Libya, the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, and South Africa.
    However, there are also times when important national 
interests or core values are at stake, and the United States 
must show leadership by acting unilaterally in imposing 
sanctions on another State whose behavior warrants it. 
Unilateral sanctions against Cuba for the past 37 years, Iran 
for the past four years, as well as Sudan and Burma for the 
past two years, serve vital U.S. interests.
    Unilateral sanctions are of varying degrees of 
effectiveness, depending on their goal and the nature of the 
country they are targeted against. In general, they are less 
likely to be effective than are multilateral sanctions. In 
today's interdependent, global economy, the ability of the 
United States to unilaterally deny certain trade or financial 
benefits to a target country is limited. Within the realm of 
unilateral sanctions, some measures which are not subject to 
foreign substitution such as denial of a U.S. quota, withdrawal 
of port privileges or landing rights, and actions in 
international financial institutions to withhold loans and 
assistance cannot be undone or overcome by the target country. 
Unilateral financial or trade sanctions, however, appear much 
less likely to advance United States goals.
    Financial sanctions seem to be somewhat more effective than 
trade sanctions, given the central position of the United 
States in international finance. The United States plays a 
pivotal role in the international financial market, so the 
nonparticipation of U.S. financial institutions in a given 
transaction make it relatively more difficult for sanctioned 
countries to gain foreign financing. It is yet unclear whether 
the European Union's adoption of a single currency, the Euro, 
and the emergence of foreign financial centers will diminish 
the effect of U.S. financial sanctions. Increasing resort to 
unilateral financial sanctions could, however, erode 
international confidence in the U.S. financial system and its 
international role.
    Since there are few products or services for which the 
United States is the sole provider, the economic effectiveness 
of trade sanctions in most cases is measured in terms not of 
denial but of a potentially higher price to an end-user in a 
sanctioned country. Removing U.S. firms from the market could 
restrict supply, especially for large projects or high-
technology items. For widely available items, such as trucks or 
personal computers, the large number of alternative suppliers 
probably results in no increase in purchase price for the 
sanctioned country. Trade sanctions could impose a cost on the 
sanctioned country by making it pay more for imports of less 
widely available items such as power plants, earth moving 
equipment, and commercial aircraft, and there has been some 
evidence that end-users in sanctioned countries may pay a 
higher price to acquire items from a foreign supplier who faces 
less competition for the sale as a result of sanctions. This 
potential increase in cost to the sanctioned country could be 
weighed against the cost to the U.S. in lost sales to provide 
one measure of the utility of sanctions.
    Unilateral sanctions are not only less likely than 
multilateral sanctions to be effective, but they also impose 
costs on other U.S. interests ranging from conflicts with key 
allies to losses for American businesses and U.S. workers. With 
regard to the recently imposed unilateral trade sanctions on 
India and Pakistan, for example, exporters have provided 
examples of Indian companies who have announced they will no 
longer do business with U.S. companies and are designing out 
U.S. parts or components. This ``designing out'' phenomenon, as 
has been frequently noted, can damage the position of U.S. 
exporters beyond the loss of markets in the sanctioned country 
itself.
    Most of the statistical data presented in the report are 
based on fiscal year export licensing statistics, unless 
otherwise noted. Commerce generates that data from the computer 
automated system it uses to process and track export license 
activity. Due to the tabulating procedures used by the system 
in accounting for occasional license applications that list 
more than one country or destination, the system has certain 
limitations as a means of gathering data. In addition, Commerce 
based the data in the report on values contained in export 
licenses it issued. Such values may not represent the values of 
actual shipments made against those licenses, because in some 
cases an exporter may ship only a portion of the value of an 
approved license.

                           Highlights of 1998

                   embargoed countries and entities:

    On March 20, 1998, the President announced that the United 
States would take a number of steps to expand the flow of 
humanitarian assistance to the people of Cuba, and to help 
strengthen independent civil society and religious freedom in 
that country. On May 13, 1998, Commerce helped implement these 
measures of resuming licensing of direct humanitarian flights 
to Cuba and streamlining procedures for the sale of medicines 
and medical equipment to Cuba. [Note: The President imposed the 
ban in 1996 and lifted it partially in 1998 for humanitarian 
flights.]
    On July 29, 1998, Commerce revised the Entity List in 
Supplement 1 to Part 744 of the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR) to add seven Russian entities under 
investigation by the Russian government for suspected export 
control violations involving weapons of mass destruction and 
missile technology. Exports or reexports of all items subject 
to the EAR to these entities require a license, and 
applications will be reviewed with a presumption of denial.

                              encryption:

    In July 1998, Secretary Daley announced that the Clinton 
Administration had finalized guidelines to allow the export of 
encryption under a license exception to 45 eligible countries. 
This affects encryption exports for the world's 100 largest 
banks and almost 70 percent of the world's financial 
institutions. On September 22, 1998, Commerce issued 
regulations implementing these changes.
    On September 16, 1998, Vice President Gore announced an 
update to the encryption policy which was based on input from 
industry groups but consistent with the protection of national 
security and law enforcement interests. This update will permit 
the export of strong encryption when used to protect sensitive 
financial, health, medical, and business proprietary 
information in electronic form. The new export guidelines will 
further streamline exports of key recovery products and other 
recoverable encryption products. In particular, for exports of 
non-recovery 56-bit products, the new guidelines eliminate the 
requirement for a commitment and business plan to develop key 
recovery encryption.

                         commerce control list:

    In January 1998, Commerce published comprehensive changes 
to the Export Administration Regulations to implement the 
Wassenaar Arrangement's List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies 
into the Commerce Control List (CCL). To simplify the 
classification process for exporters, Commerce also harmonized 
items on the CCL to conform to the European Union dual-use list 
and lists of other international control regimes to which the 
United States belongs. This January 1998 rule also imposed new 
requirements on exporters to report to Commerce exports of 
certain items made under the authority of certain license 
exceptions. BAA provides this information, excluding the 
exporter's name and dollar value of the export, to other 
participating countries to enhance international security and 
stability through the sharing of information. This rule also 
removed the ability for some Wassenaar Arrangement Very 
Sensitive List dual-use items to be exported from the United 
States without a license.
    On July 14, 1998, the United States imposed an arms embargo 
on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 
in reaction to the use of excessive force by Serbian police 
forces against civilians in Kosovo and the acts of violence by 
the Kosovar Albanian extremists, consistent with United States 
obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1160. Working in concert with the Department of State, the 
Department of Commerce maintains new license requirements and a 
policy of denial on the export on arms-related items and 
``crowd control'' items that could be used in support of 
terrorist activities or to repress civilian populations. 
``Crowd Control'' items consist of all items already controlled 
for crime control reasons plus three new U.N.-based controls on 
water cannons (ECCN OA989), bomb detection equipment (ECCN 
2A993) and explosives (ECCN IC998).
    On December 15, 1998, Commerce notified Congress, via a 
Foreign Policy Report, on revisions to the Export 
Administration Regulations to strengthen controls on exports 
and reexports to Specially Designated Terrorists (STDS) and 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). A license is required 
for all exports and reexports by any person to SDTs and FTOs of 
items on the Commerce Control List (CCL) and for all exports 
and reexports by a U.S. person of an item subject to the EAR. 
License applications will be reviewed under a general policy of 
denial. The interim rule was published in the Federal Register 
on January 8, 1999.
    On December 31, 1998, Commerce notified Congress, via a 
Foreign Policy Report, that the Department was expanding 
controls on firearms items based on the Organization of 
American States (OAS) Model Regulations for the Control of the 
International Movement of Firearms. These regulations are 
designed to harmonize import and export controls over the legal 
international movement of firearms and to establish procedures 
to prevent the illegal trafficking of firearms among OAS member 
countries. Commerce anticipates publication of the interim rule 
in the Federal Register in the first quarter of 1999.
    Under these provisions, the Commerce will require a license 
for the export of certain firearms, including shotguns, and 
parts, buckshot shotgun shells and parts, shotgun shells and 
parts, and optical sighting devices for firearms to all OAS 
member countries, including Canada, to prevent illegal 
trafficking in firearms. The Commerce already requires a 
license for export of all these items to all OAS member 
countries for human rights reasons, with the exception of 
Canada. In support of the OAS Model Regulations, the Commerce 
imposed a Import Certificate requirement on the export to all 
OAS member countries of those items affected by the 
regulations. In general, Commerce will approve license 
applications for the export of firearms to OAS member countries 
if the application is supported by an Import Certificate. 
Commerce will deny applications that involve end uses linked to 
drug trafficking, terrorism, international organized crime, and 
mercenary and other criminal activities.

                      unilateral nuclear controls:

    In January 1998, a major decontrol of nuclear items took 
effect with the liberalization of unilateral U.S. controls on 
exports of pipes, valves, cranes, and pipe fittings that are 
used in the non-nuclear, or ``balance of plant'' portion of 
civilian nuclear power plants. Before this liberalization took 
effect, the turbines and generators in the non-nuclear portion 
of nuclear power plants did not require a license for export, 
while the export of the pipes, valves, and related equipment 
required to install them were subject to a license requirement.
    On March 18, 1998, the President certified that China had 
complied with the nuclear nonproliferation conditions required 
for implementation of the 1985 U.S.-China Agreement for 
Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation and for lifting the 1989 Tiananmen 
Square Sanctions on nuclear technology exports to China. The 
certification allows the Commerce to approve the export of 
items to China controlled by the Department under the EAR, 
technology controlled by the Department of Energy (DOE) under 
10 CFR part 810 and equipment and materials controlled by the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) under 10 CFR part 110. 
Lifting the sanctions had no direct effect on the Department's 
export control program. Items controlled for nuclear 
proliferation reasons still require a license and continue to 
be subject to interagency review by the Departments of 
Commerce, State, Energy, and Defense and the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency. The licensing process is the same as that 
accorded license applications for similar goods to other 
destinations.

                          legislative events:

    In 1998, Commerce implemented provisions of the National 
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) which require advance 
notification and post-shipment verification of exports or 
reexports of high performance computers above 2000 million 
theoretical operations per second (MTOPS) to end users in 
countries known in the EAR as Tier 3 countries (See Appendix 
IV). Exporters are required to submit notices to Commerce which 
are evaluated in conjunction with the Departments of Defense, 
Energy and State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 
If an agency raises an objection to the proposed export within 
ten days, the Commerce requires an export license; otherwise 
the exporter may ship. The Act also requires a post-shipment 
visit in each case, whether or not we required a license.
    Signed into law on October 27, 1998, the International 
Religious Freedom Act of 1998 provides for the imposition of 
one or more diplomatic or economic sanctions against countries 
that have engaged in violations of religious freedom. The act 
also provides for the imposition of one or more economic 
sanctions against countries the President determines have 
engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of 
religious freedom. For such countries, the act also provides 
that the Commerce Department, with State Department 
concurrence, shall include on the Commerce Control List for 
reasons of crime control or detection and require export 
licenses for, items that are being used or are intended for use 
directly to carry out particularly severe violations of 
religious freedom. A general policy of denial for such items 
will apply to license applications to export to any country the 
government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross 
violations of internationally recognized human rights, pursuant 
to a determination under the Foreign Assistance Act.
    In the 1998 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress 
mandated that all commercial communications satellites, 
including both those transferred by Presidential decision in 
1992 and those transferred by Presidential decision in 1996, be 
returned to the U.S. Munitions List by March 15, 1999.

                          india and pakistan:

    President Clinton reported to the Congress on May 13th with 
regard to India and May 30th with regard to Pakistan his 
determinations that those non-nuclear weapon states had each 
detonated a nuclear explosive device. The President directed 
Department of Commerce to take the necessary actions to impose 
the sanctions described in section 102 (b)(2) of the Arms 
Export Control Act. On June 18, 1998, consistent with the 
President's directive, Commerce announced certain sanctions on 
India and Pakistan, as well as certain supplementary export 
control measures. On November 19, 1998, Commerce amended the 
EAR to codify the June announcement. Consistent with section 
102 (b)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act, Commerce added 
Sec. 742.16 to the EAR codifying a license review policy of 
denial for the export and reexport of items controlled for 
nuclear proliferation (N-P) and missile technology (MT) reasons 
to all end-users in India and Pakistan.
    To supplement the sanctions of Sec. 742.16, Commerce added 
certain Indian and Pakistani government, parastatal, and 
private entities determined to be involved in nuclear, missile, 
or conventional weapons activities to the Entity List in 
Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of the EAR. License requirements 
for these entities are set forth in the newly added Sec. 744.11 
and Sec. 744.12. Exports and reexports of all items subject to 
the EAR to government, parastatal, and private entities listed 
for their involvement in nuclear or missile activities require 
a license. Exports and reexports of all items subject to the 
EAR having a classification other than EAR99 require a license 
to listed military entities. The license applications will be 
reviewed with a presumption of denial, with limited exceptions.

        export control program description and licensing policy

    This part defines the export controls maintained for a 
particular foreign policy purpose that are imposed or extended 
for the year 1999. The licensing requirements and policy 
applicable to a particular control are described in this 
section.

       analysis of control as required by section 6(f) of the act

    This part outlines the considerations or determinations, as 
required by Section 6(f)(2) of the Act, on the purpose of the 
control, criteria, alternative means, consultation efforts, and 
foreign availability. For each control program, the 
Department's conclusions are based on the following required 
criteria:
A. The Purpose of the Control
    This section provides the foreign policy purpose and 
rationale for each particular control.
B. Considerations and/or Determinations of the Secretary of Commerce
    1. Probability of Achieving the Intended Foreign Policy 
Purpose. This section considers or determines whether such 
controls are likely to achieve the intended foreign policy 
purpose, in light of other factors, including the availability 
from other countries of the goods or technology subject to 
control, and whether the foreign policy purpose can not be 
achieved through negotiations or other alternative means.
    2. Compatibility with Foreign Policy Objectives. This 
section considers or determines whether the controls are 
compatible with foreign policy objectives of the United States 
and with overall U.S. policy toward the country or the 
proscribed end-use subject to the controls.
    3. Reaction of Other Countries. This section considers or 
determines whether the reaction of other countries to the 
extension of such export controls by the United States is 
likely to render the controls ineffective in achieving the 
intended foreign policy purpose or to be counterproductive to 
other U.S. foreign policy interests.
    4. Economic Impact on United States Industry. This section 
considers or determines the effect of the controls on the 
export performance of the United States, its competitive 
position in the international economy, the international 
reputation of the United States as a reliable supplier of goods 
and technology, or the economic well-being of individual U.S. 
companies and their employees and communities exceeds the 
benefit to U.S. foreign policy objectives.\4\
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    \4\ Limitations exist when assessing the economic impact of certain 
controls because of the unavailability of data or because of the 
prevalence of other factors, e.g., currency values, foreign economic 
activity, or foreign political regimes, which may restrict imports of 
U.S. products more stringently than the United States restricts 
exports.
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    5. Enforcement of Control. This section considers or 
determines the ability of the United States to enforce the 
controls. Some enforcement problems are common to all foreign 
policy controls.\5\ Others are associated with only one or a 
few controls. Each individual control has been assessed to 
determine if it has presented, or is expected to present, an 
uncharacteristic enforcement problem.
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    \5\ When controls are implemented without the imposition of 
corresponding restrictions by other countries, it is difficult to guard 
against reexports from third countries to the target country, to secure 
third country cooperation in enforcement efforts, and to detect 
violations abroad and initiate proper enforcement action. The relative 
ease or difficulty of identifying the movement of controlled goods or 
technical data is also a factor. Controls on items that are small, 
inexpensive, easy to transport or conceal, or that have many producers 
and end-users, are harder to enforce.
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C. Consultation with Industry
    This section discusses the results of consultations with 
industry leading up to the extension or imposition of controls. 
It also includes comments provided to Commerce by the Technical 
Advisory Committees (TACs); such comments are attributed to the 
TAC unless otherwise indicated.
D. Consultation with Other Countries
    This section reflects consultations on the controls with 
countries that cooperate with the United States on multilateral 
controls, as well as with other countries as appropriate.
E. Alternative Means
    This section specifies the nature and results of any 
alternative means attempted to accomplish the foreign policy 
purpose, or the reasons for extending the controls without 
attempting any such alternative means.
F. Foreign Availability
    This section considers the availability from other 
countries of goods or technology comparable to those subject to 
the proposed export control. It also describes the nature and 
results of the efforts made pursuant to Section 6(h) of the Act 
to secure the cooperation of foreign governments in controlling 
the foreign availability of such comparable goods or 
technology. In accordance with the Act, foreign availability 
considerations do not apply to export controls in effect prior 
to June 12, 1985, to controls maintained for human rights and 
anti-terrorism reasons, or to controls in support of the 
international obligations of the United States.

                     general comments from industry

    On October 13, 1998, the Department of Commerce, via the 
Federal Register, solicited comments from Industry on the 
effectiveness of export policy. In general, the comments 
indicated that Industry does not feel that unilateral sanctions 
are effective. A more detailed review of the comments is 
available in Appendix I.
    4. Anti-Terrorism Controls (Section 742.8, 742.9, 742.10, 
744.10)

        Export Control Program Description and Licensing Policy

    These controls reflect U.S. opposition to acts of 
international terrorism supported by a foreign government.
    Pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, 
the Secretary of State has designated seven countries Cuba, 
Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria as nations 
whose governments have repeatedly provided support for acts of 
international terrorism. As noted below, Commerce controls 
multilateral list items destined to military or other sensitive 
end-users in designated terrorist countries for anti-terrorism 
reasons under Section(j) of the Act. Commerce also controls 
additional items to Iran, Sudan and Syria for anti-terrorism 
reasons under the general authority of Section 6(a) of the Act.
    The Department of the Treasury maintains comprehensive 
trade embargoes against Cuba, Libya, Iran, Iraq, North Korea 
and Sudan under other provisions of law. To avoid duplicate 
licensing requirements, Commerce and Treasury have allocated 
licensing responsibilities for exports and reexports to these 
countries. Broadly speaking, Commerce has licensing 
responsibility for exports and reexports to Cuba and North 
Korea and for reexports to Libya; Treasury has licensing 
responsibilities for exports and reexports to Iran and Iraq. 
Both Treasury and Commerce maintain license requirements for 
exports and reexports to Sudan. This report does not describe 
the restrictions administered by Treasury against Iran, Iraq 
and Sudan. See chapter 5 for a more complete discussion of 
controls on Cuba and North Korea and chapter 6 for a 
description of controls on Libya.
    This chapter describes the anti-terrorism controls that 
apply to all designated terrorist countries, but focuses on the 
additional anti-terrorism controls maintained against Iran, 
Syria and Sudan under the EAR. This chapter also summarizes 
briefly a revision of the EAR which prohibits exports and 
certain reexports to Specially designated Terrorists and 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations, wherever located.
    On December 15, 1998, Commerce notified Congress, via a 
Foreign Policy Report, on revisions to the Export 
Administration Regulations to strengthen controls on exports 
and reexports to Specially Designated Terrorists (SDTs) and 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). A license is required 
for all exports and reexports to SDTs and FTOs by any person of 
items on the Commerce Control List (CCL) and for all exports 
and reexports by a U.S. person of an item subject to the EAR. 
License applications will be reviewed under a general policy of 
denial. The interim rule was published in the Federal Register 
on January 8,1999.
    EAA Section 6(i) determinations: The Secretary of State has 
determined that Libya (in 1979), Syria (1979), Cuba (1982), 
Iran (1984) \6\, North Korea (1988), Iraq (1990) and Sudan 
(1993) \7\ are countries whose governments have repeatedly 
provided support for acts of international terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ On August 19, 1997, the President issued Executive Order 13059 
to confirm that the embargo on Iran prohibits all trade and investment 
activities by United States persons, wherever located, and to 
consolidate in one Order the various prohibitions previously imposed to 
deal with the national emergency declared on March 15, 1995. Executive 
Order 12957 of March 5, 1995, prohibits U.S. persons from entering into 
contracts for the financing or the overall management or supervision of 
the development of petroleum resources located in Iran or over which 
Iran claims jurisdiction. Executive Order 2959 of May 6, 1995, imposed 
a comprehensive trade and investment embargo on Iran.
    \7\ On November 3, 1997, the President issued Executive Order 
13067, which imposed an embargo on Sudan, effective November 4, 1997. 
The President delegated to the Treasury Department the authority to 
promulgate regulations to administer the embargo on Sudan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Effective December 28, 1993, the Acting Secretary of State 
determined the United States would control five categories of 
dual-use items subject to multilateral controls to certain 
sensitive government end-users under Section 6(j) of the Act, 
since these items meet the criteria set forth in Section 
6(j)(1)(B). Specifically, the Acting Secretary determined that 
these items, when exported to military, police or intelligence 
organizations or to other sensitive end-users in a designated 
terrorist country, could make a significant contribution to 
that country's military potential or could enhance its ability 
to support acts of international terrorism. These anti-
terrorism controls apply to all designated terrorist-list 
countries.
    The Acting Secretary also advised that the United States 
should continue to control other items not specifically 
controlled under Section 6(j) for general foreign policy 
purposes under Section 6(a) to terrorist-list countries, and 
that the United States will continue to review the export of 
such items prior to approval to evaluate whether, under the 
circumstances of the application, the requirements of Section 
6(j) apply. These measures are described in detail below.
    Paragraph A below reflects the Section 6(j) controls; 
paragraphs (B), (C) and (D) reflect the Section 6(a) controls 
on Iran, Sudan, and Syria.
    A. The Acting Secretary of State determined, effective 
December 28, 1993, that the export of certain categories of 
goods and technologies when destined to military, police, 
intelligence entities and other sensitive end-users, as 
determined by the Department of State, in any country 
designated under Section 6(j) of the Act as a country that has 
repeatedly provided support for acts of international 
terrorism, ``could make a significant contribution to the 
military potential of such country, including its military 
logistics capability, or could enhance the ability of such 
country to support acts of international terrorism.'' As a 
result of this determination, the Secretaries of State and 
Commerce will notify Congress thirty days prior to the issuance 
of any license for the export of any item from the five 
categories listed below to sensitive end-users in the terrorist 
countries.
    Pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Act, Commerce requires a 
license for the export of the following items to military or 
other sensitive end-users in designated terrorist countries:
    1) All items subject to national security controls, except 
computers with a performance level of less than 500 million 
theoretical operations per second (MTOPS) (Wassenaar 
Arrangement); \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ The Department of Commerce requires a license under Section 
6(a) of the Act for all computers going to Iran, Sudan or Syria with a 
CTP of 6 MTOPS or above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2) All items subject to chemical and biological weapons 
proliferation controls (Australia Group);
    3) All dual-use items subject to missile-proliferation 
controls (Missile Technology Control Regime);
    4) All items subject to nuclear weapons-proliferation 
controls (Nuclear Referral List); and
    5) All military-related items (items controlled by Commerce 
Control List (CCL) entries ending with the number 18).
    B. Pursuant to Section 6(a) of the Act, the Commerce 
requires a license for the categories of items listed below for 
Iran, Sudan, and Syria to promote U.S. foreign policy goals. 
Sudan (as of November 4, 1997) and Iran (as of May 7, 1995) are 
also subject to comprehensive trade and investment embargoes 
administered by the Department of the Treasury under the 
authority granted by the President under IEEPA.\9\ The 
Department of State reviews license applications for items 
controlled under Section 6(a) of the Act before approval to 
determine whether the requirements of Section 6(j) apply. If 
the Secretary of State determines that the particular export 
``could make a significant contribution to the military 
potential of such country, including its military logistics 
capability, or could enhance the ability of such country to 
support acts of international terrorism,'' Commerce and State 
will notify the appropriate congressional committees thirty 
days before issuing a license. The categories of items 
controlled under Section 6(a) are as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Categories of items listed in paragraph A to non-
        military or non-sensitive end-users
   Aircraft, Including Helicopters, Engines and Parts
   Heavy Duty On-Highway Tractors
   Off-Highway Wheel Tractors (>10 tons)
   Cryptographic, Cryptanalytic and Cryptologic 
        Equipment
   Navigation, Direction Finding and Radar Equipment
   Electronic Test Equipment
   Mobile Communications Equipment
   Acoustic Underwater Detection Equipment
   Vessels and Boats (Including Inflatable Boats)
   Marine and Submarine Engines
   Underwater Photographic Equipment
   Submersible Systems
   CNC Machine Tools
   Vibration Test Equipment
   Certain Digital Computers (CTP*)
   Certain Telecommunications Transmission Equipment
   Certain Microprocessors (Clock Speed >25 MHZ)
   Certain Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment
   Software Specially Designed for CAD/CAM IC 
        Production
   Packet Switches
   Software Specially Designed for Air Traffic Control 
        Applications
   Gravity Meters (Static Accuracy <100 Microgal or 
        with Quartz Element)
   Certain Magnetometers with Sensitivity <1.0 nt rms 
        per root Hertz
   Certain Fluorocarbon Compounds for Cooling Fluids 
        for Radar and Supercomputers
   High-Strength Organic and Inorganic Fibers
   Certain Machines for Gear-Cutting (Up to 1.25 
        Meters)
   Certain Aircraft Skin and Spar Milling Machines
   Certain Manual Dimensional Inspection Machines 
        (Linear Positioning Accuracy  3+L/300)
   Robots Employing Feedback Information in Real Time
   Explosive device detectors, used in airports
    C. Exports of the following additional items to Iran and 
Sudan are subject to a license requirement under the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR) for foreign policy reasons:
   Large Diesel Engines (>400 hp)
   Scuba Gear
   Pressurized Aircraft Breathing Equipment
    D. Exports of the following additional items to Iran are 
subject to a license requirement under the EAR for foreign 
policy reasons:
   Portable Electric Power Generators
    E. Licensing Policy
    1. The Commerce has a policy of denial for all items 
controlled for national security or foreign policy reasons that 
require a license for export to Iran. All exports and certain 
specified reexports are also subject to the comprehensive trade 
and investment embargo, which the Department of the Treasury 
administers.
    2. Pursuant to Executive Order 13067 of November 3, 1997 
(effective November 4, 1997), exports and reexports to Sudan 
are subject to comprehensive trade restrictions administered by 
the Department of the Treasury. The Commerce maintains a 
general policy of denial for items requiring a license to 
Sudan.
    3. Commerce will generally deny items subject to chemical 
and biological weapons proliferation controls proposed for 
export to Sudan.
    4. Commerce will general deny military-related items 
controlled for national security reasons proposed for export to 
Sudan.
    5. Commerce will generally deny items controlled for 
missile proliferation reasons proposed for export to Sudan.
    6. Commerce will generally deny all aircraft, helicopters, 
engines and related spare parts and components proposed for 
export to Sudan.
    7. The Commerce will generally deny cryptographic, 
cryptanalytic and Cryptologic items proposed for export to 
Sudan.
    8. Commerce will generally deny explosive device detectors 
controlled under ECCN 2A993 proposed for export to Sudan.
    9. Commerce will generally deny all other controlled items 
destined for military end-users or end-use proposed for export 
to Sudan.
    10. Commerce will generally deny applications for export to 
Syria of national security-controlled items if the export is 
destined to a military or other sensitive end-user or end-use. 
Commerce will consider applications for other end-users or end-
uses in Syria on a case-by-case basis.
    11. Commerce will generally deny all items subject to 
chemical and biological weapons (CBS) proliferation controls 
proposed for export to Syria.
    12. Commerce will generally deny applications for export to 
Syria of all items subject to missile technology controls.
    13. Commerce will generally deny applications for export to 
Syria of military-related items (CCL entries ending in the 
number 18).
    14. Commerce will generally deny applications to export 
Nuclear Referral List items to military end-users in Syria. 
Commerce will consider applications for export of such items to 
civilian end-users on a case-by-case basis.
    15. There is a presumption of denial for applications for 
export to military end-users and end-uses in Syria of other 
items. For other end-users and end-uses in Syria, Commerce will 
review license applications on a case-by-case basis.
    16. Commerce will consider applications for export and 
reexport to Syria on a case-by-case basis if they meet the 
following conditions:
    a. the transaction involves the reexport to Syria of items 
where Syria was not the intended ultimate destination at the 
time of original export from the United States, provided that 
the export from the United States occurred prior to the 
applicable contract sanctity date;
    b. the U.S. content value of foreign-produced commodities 
is 20 percent or less; or
    c. the commodities are medical equipment.
    17. Applicants wishing to have contract sanctity considered 
in reviewing their applications must submit adequate 
documentation demonstrating the existence of a contract that 
predates the imposition or expansion of controls on the item(s) 
intended for export.

       Analysis of Control as Required by Section 6(f) of The Act

                     a. the purpose of the control

    The controls effectively distance the United States from 
nations that have repeatedly supported acts of international 
terrorism. Further, the controls demonstrate the firm resolve 
of the United States not to conduct unrestricted export trade 
with nations or entities that do not adhere to acceptable norms 
of international behavior. The licensing mechanism provides the 
United States with the means to control any U.S. goods or 
services that might contribute to the military potential of 
designated countries and to limit the availability of such 
goods for use in support of international terrorism.
    Iran. These controls respond to continued Iranian 
sponsorship of terrorism. The purposes of the controls are to 
restrict equipment that would be useful in enhancing Iran's 
military or terrorist-supporting capabilities, and to address 
other U.S. foreign policy concerns, including human rights, 
non-proliferation and regional stability.
    The controls also allow the United States to prevent 
shipments of U.S.-origin equipment for uses that could pose a 
direct threat to U.S. interests. Iran continues to support 
groups that practice terrorism, including terrorism to disrupt 
the Middle East Peace Process. By restricting items with 
military use, the controls demonstrate the resolve of the 
United States not to provide any direct or indirect military 
support for Iran and to support other U.S. foreign policy 
concerns.
    Syria. Although there is no evidence of direct Syrian 
Government involvement in the planning or implementing of 
terrorist acts since 1986, Syria continues to provide support 
and safe haven to groups that engage in terrorism. The groups 
include the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
General Command; Hamas; Hizballah; the Abu Nidal Organization; 
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; the 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine; the Japanese 
Red Army; the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK); DHKP/C (formerly 
known as Dev Sol); and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The trade 
controls reflect U.S. opposition to Syria's support and safe-
haven to terrorist groups and prevent a significant U.S. 
contribution to Syria's military capabilities.
    Sudan. Evidence indicates that Sudan allows the use of its 
territory as sanctuary for terrorists including the Abu Nidal 
Organization, Hizballah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and 
components of the Usama bin Ladin organization. Safe houses and 
other facilities used to support radical groups exist in Sudan 
with the apparent approval of the Sudanese Government's 
leadership. Further, some extremists who commit acts of 
sabotage in neighboring countries receive training in Sudan. 
The embargo and the export controls demonstrate U.S. opposition 
to Sudan's support for international terrorism, while 
restricting access to items that could make a significant 
contribution to Sudan's military capability or ability to 
support international terrorism.
    Specially Designated Terrorists (SDT) and Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations (FTO). The purpose of the new regulation is to 
further the general counterterrorism policy of the United 
States by expanding restrictions on exports and reexports of 
dual-use items to SDT and FTO, wherever located. These new 
controls will enable Commerce to use its enforcement mechanisms 
to investigate supplies to such entities of U.S.-origin goods 
and technology and to use its resources to increase public 
awareness of U.S. counterterrorism measures.

  b. considerations and/or determinations of the secretary of commerce

    1. Probability of Achieving the Intended Foreign Policy 
Purpose. Although widespread availability of comparable goods 
form foreign sources greatly limits the economic effect of 
these controls, they do restrict access by these countries and 
persons to U.S.-origin commodities, technology and software, 
and demonstrate the determination of the United States to 
oppose and distance itself from acts of international 
terrorism. In extending controls toward Iran, Syria and Sudan, 
the Secretary has determined that they are likely to achieve 
the intended foreign policy purpose.
    Iran. The controls on Iran restrict its access to specified 
items of U.S.-origin that could be used to threaten U.S. 
interests. The United States has sought, and will continue to 
seek, the cooperation of other countries in cutting off the 
flow of military and military-related equipment to Iran.
    Sudan. The controls on Sudan affirm the commitment of the 
United States to oppose international terrorism by limiting 
Sudan's ability to obtain and use U.S.-origin items in support 
of terrorist or military activity. These controls send a clear 
message to Sudan of strong U.S. opposition to its support for 
terrorist groups.
    Syria. These controls are an important means of 
demonstrating U.S. resolve by limiting Syria's ability to 
obtain U.S.-origin items that could be used to support 
terrorist activities or contribute significantly to Syria's 
military potential. Although other nations produce many of the 
items subject to U.S. anti-terrorism controls, this does not 
obviate the need to send a strong signal to the Syrian 
Government of U.S. disapproval of its support for groups 
involved in terrorism.
    Specially Designated Terrorists (SDT) and Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations (FTO): The Secretary of Commerce has determined 
that the SDT and FTO controls are likely to achieve their 
intended foreign policy objectives of the United States. 
Imposing a license requirement under the EAR on both exports 
and reexports to SDT and FTO and enabling the Commerce 
Department to enforce these controls will further the policy of 
counterterrorism of the United States.
    2. Compatibility with Foreign Policy Objectives. In 
extending these controls, the Secretary determined that they 
are compatible with the foreign policy objectives of the United 
States toward nations and persons who support terrorism. They 
are also compatible with overall U.S. policy toward Iran, 
Sudan, Syria, FTOs and SDTS. In addition, the controls are 
consistent with U.S. efforts to restrict the flow of items that 
these countries could use for military or terrorist purposes.
    3. Reaction of Other Countries. Most other countries are 
generally supportive of U.S. efforts to fight terrorism and the 
stop proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in countries 
of concern. However, almost none have imposed embargoes similar 
to those imposed by the U.S. for civil goods. One aspect of 
U.S. controls--their extraterritorial application--has excited 
opposition in may of our major trading partners, including some 
close allies and has become a point of contention with EU 
countries. This reaction to extraterritorial application has 
had a counterproductive effect as foreign firms design out U.S. 
components or cite the lack of their own national sanctions as 
a marketing tool. In some instances, foreign firms are 
instructed by their governments to ignore U.S. re-export 
controls as extraterritorial.
    Iran. Regarding the controls on specific product 
categories, other countries share the U.S. concern over Iran's 
support of terrorism, human rights abuses, and attempts to 
acquire weapons of mass destruction. The thirty-three members 
of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Conventional Arms and Dual-Use 
Goods and Technologies (including the United States) have 
recognized Iran as a country whose behavior is a cause of 
concern. Most other nations, however, do not have as stringent 
a policy of denial for commercial goods as does the United 
States and Iran's trade partners include Germany, Japan, the 
United Kingdom and many other OECD nations.
    Sudan. The United States imposed these controls (and the 
subsequent embargo) in response to credible evidence that Sudan 
assists international terrorist groups. The President imposed 
the embargo after finding that Sudan has continued to support 
international terrorism, destabilized neighboring governments 
and violated human rights. The United States has consulted with 
key allies and urged them to take all possible measures to 
convince Sudan to halt its support for terrorism. Some 
countries have shown their disapproval of Sudan's support for 
terrorism. For example, the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU), in an unprecedented action criticizing a member, passed 
a resolution in September 1995 calling on Sudan to extradite to 
Ethiopia three suspects charged with the June 1995 
assassination attempt against President Mubarak of Egypt. In 
1996, the United Nations Security Council adopted three 
resolutions reaffirming the OAU resolution, calling on Sudan to 
desist from supporting terrorism, and imposing diplomatic and 
travel sanctions.
    Syria. The United States maintains controls in response to 
Syria's lack of concrete steps against international terrorist 
groups that maintain a presence in Syria and Syrian controlled 
areas of Lebanon.
    Specially Designated Terrorists (SDT) and Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations (FTO): The Secretary has determined that the 
reaction of other countries to these controls is not likely to 
render the controls ineffective in achieving their intended 
foreign policy purpose or be counterproductive to U.S. foreign 
policy interests. A number of other countries recognize the 
need to restrict exports and reexports of items that could 
contribute to terrorist activities.
    4. Economic Impact on United States Industry

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Specially Designated Terrorists (SDT) and Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations (FTO): The Secretary has determined that the 
economic impact of these controls is likely to be minimal. The 
Department of Treasury already prohibits the U.S. persons from 
engaging in transactions involving SDT, which include the 
making or receiving of any contribution of funds, goods or 
services to or for the benefit of such persons. Treasury also 
requires U.S. financial institutions to block all financial 
transactions involving the assets of FTO within the possession 
or control of U.S. financial institutions. This new rule 
imposes license requirements on exports and reexports by U.S. 
persons to designated FTO, and new license requirements on non-
U.S. persons who wish to export from third countries items 
subject to the EAR on the Commerce Control List to SDT or FTO. 
Commerce anticipates that the additional burden this regulation 
will impose on U.S. industry will be negligible.
    5. Enforcement of Control. In general, unauthorized 
reexports of unilaterally controlled goods to these 
destinations is a continuing enforcement concern in this area 
and one which the U.S. is very hard pressed to prevent, absent 
an embargo imposed by our major trading partners in the 
European Union and Asia. The large number of items exported in 
normal trade to other countries--including some aircraft items 
and consumer goods that have many producers and end-users 
around the world create procurement opportunities for brokers, 
agents, and front companies working for these countries. In 
addition, differences in export laws and standards of evidence 
for violations also complicate law enforcement cooperation 
between countries. Control over direct exports to Iran are 
aided by the general negative public perception of the country. 
In the case of Sudan, the United States has a limited number of 
direct exports and reexports of controlled items to track which 
eases any enforcement problems. In regard to SDT and FTO, 
Commerce recognizes that enforcement of these controls will 
require special coordination with other countries to help 
identify certain items subject to the EAR that may be 
reexported to SDT and FTO. Because certain persons on the SDT 
FTO lists are well-known and because the U.S. public generally 
supports U.S. counterterrorism policies, Commerce expects that 
the majority of U.S. industry will cooperate with enforcement 
efforts.
    Commerce views these controls as a key enforcement target, 
using regular outreach efforts to keep businesses informed of 
concerns. Visits to verify end-use and end-users of U.S. 
commodities and other programs to maintain a strong enforcement 
effort. Commerce is also moving aggressively to develop a 
strong program to deal with procurement by or for terrorist 
groups. This program includes enhanced agent training, 
development of a targeted outreach program to familiarize U.S. 
business with concerns, and close cooperation with lead 
agencies working terrorism issues.

                     c. consultation with industry

    On October 13, 1998, the Department of Commerce, via the 
Federal Register, solicited comments from Industry on the 
effectiveness of export policy. In general, the comments 
indicated that Industry does not feel that unilateral sanctions 
are effective. A more detailed review of the comments is 
available in Appendix I.
    Commerce has also received comments from the President's 
Export Council and the Regulations and Procedures Technical 
Advisory Committee regarding streamlining the Commerce Control 
List unilateral anti-terrorism entries.

                  d. consultation with other countries

    The United States has also consulted with other nations 
regarding Iran and Sudan's support for terrorism, as well as 
their dismal human rights record. The United States has 
provided specific information to interested countries on the 
justification for designating Sudan a state sponsor of 
terrorism and urged them to do what they can to influence 
Sudan's behavior favorably.

                          e. alternative means

    The United States has taken a wide range of diplomatic, 
political, and security-related steps, in addition to economic 
measures such as export controls, in an effort to persuade 
countries supporting terrorism to drop their backing for 
terrorist activities. The exact combination has varied 
according to circumstances and judgments as to the best 
approaches at a particular time. International fora, G-7/8 
meetings and summits are all used as opportunities to multi-
lateralize export controls on states which support terrorism.

                        f. foreign availability

    The foreign availability provision does not apply to items 
determined by the Secretary of State to require control under 
Section 6(j) of the Act.\10\ Cognizant of the value of such 
controls in emphasizing the U.S. position toward countries 
supporting international terrorism, Congress specifically 
excluded them from foreign availability assessments otherwise 
required by the Act. However, the Department has considered the 
foreign availability of the items controlled to terrorist-
designated countries under Section 6(a). For Syria and Iran, 
there are numerous foreign sources for commodities similar to 
those subject to these controls. While most of Sudan's imports 
are low-technology items for which foreign sources exist, the 
poor health of Sudan's economy and thus its inability to import 
these goods makes foreign availability less of an issue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Provisions pertaining to foreign availability do not apply to 
export controls in effect before July 12, 1985, under sections 6(i) 
(International Obligations), 6(j) (Countries Supporting International 
Terrorism), and 6(n) (Crime Control Instruments). See the Export 
Administration Amendments Act of 1985, Public Law 99-64, section 
108(g)(2), 99 Stat. 120, 134-35. Moreover, sections 6(i), 6(j) and 6(n) 
require that controls be implemented under certain conditions without 
consideration of foreign availability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    5. Embargoed Countries and Entities (Part 746)

        Export Control Program Description and Licensing Policy

    The United States maintains comprehensive economic 
embargoes against Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and 
Sudan. (These are six of the seven countries designated by the 
Secretary of State as state sponsors of international 
terrorism.) The United States also maintains arms embargoes on 
Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro) and an arms and other commodity embargo 
on UNITA (in Angola).
    On July 14, 1998, the United States imposed an arms embargo 
on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 
in reaction to the use of excessive force by Serbian police 
forces against civilians in Kosovo and the acts of violence by 
the Kosovar Albanian extremists and in compliance with United 
States obligations under United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1160. Supplementing the arms ban maintained by the 
Department of State, the Department of Commerce maintains new 
license requirements and a policy of denial on the export on 
arms-related items and ``crowd control'' items that could be 
used in support of terrorist activities or to repress civilian 
populations. ``Crowd Control'' items consist of all items 
already controlled for crime control reasons plus three new 
U.N.-based controls on water cannons (ECCN OA989), bomb 
detection equipment (ECCN 2A993) and explosives (ECCN lC998).
    The Department of Commerce and the Department of the 
Treasury jointly administer the trade embargoes against Cuba 
and North Korea, under the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, 
the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, and other statutes. Commerce 
licenses U.S. exports and reexports to both countries; Treasury 
licenses travel by U.S. persons to Cuba and North Korea, and 
financial transactions by U.S. persons with those countries.
    The Department of the Treasury administers the embargoes 
against Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and UNITA in Angola under the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and, in 
some cases, the United Nations Participation Act. Commerce 
maintains comprehensive restrictions against Iran, Iraq, Libya 
and Sudan, and exercises licensing responsibility for exports 
and reexports to Sudan and reexports to Libya. Treasury has 
licensing responsibility for exports of arms-related and other 
specific commodities to UNITA in Angola; Commerce licenses such 
items to non-UNITA entities in Angola. Commerce maintains 
comprehensive export and reexport controls against Libya and 
exercises licensing responsibility for reexports to Libya, 
which are discussed in Chapter 6 of this report.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    The Department of Commerce and other agencies formed an 
interagency group to consider export requests made in 
conjunction with the visit to Cuba of Pope John Paul 11 in 
January of 1998. The United States considered such license 
requests on a case-by-case basis, consistent with existing 
regulations and the humanitarian needs of the Cuban people. 
Exceptions to the Presidential ban on direct flights from the 
United States to Cuba were also considered on a case-by-case 
basis if in conjunction with the Pope's visit.
    More recently, the President on March 20, 1998 announced 
that the United States would take a number of steps to expand 
the flow of humanitarian assistance to the people of Cuba, and 
to help strengthen independent civil society and religious 
freedom in that country. Commerce implemented measures by 
resuming licensing of aircraft for direct humanitarian flights 
to Cuba, and streamlining procedures for the sale of medicines 
and medical equipment to Cuba.
    The resumption of direct humanitarian cargo flights enables 
assistance to reach the Cuban people more expeditiously at a 
reduced cost. The United States requires a license for all 
aircraft bound on such flights that do not qualify under Export 
Administration Regulation (EAR) License Exception AVS. Commerce 
reviews license applications involving flights for humanitarian 
reasons on a case-by-case basis. The United States has also 
streamlined its procedures for exporting medicines and medical 
equipment to Cuba, either for sale or donation and reduced 
license processing time. Commerce is taking steps to facilitate 
compliance with the on-site verification and monitoring 
requirement for medical sales and certain donations to Cuba. 
On-site monitors in Cuba can include, but are not limited to, 
representatives of the license applicant, religious or 
charitable groups, western diplomats and international 
nongovernmental organizations.
    The following paragraphs outline existing licensing 
policies for Cuba and North Korea:
    A. The Department of Commerce requires a license for export 
to Cuba and North Korea of virtually all commodities, 
technology and software, except:

   technology generally available to the public and 
        informational materials;
   some types of personal baggage, crew baggage, 
        vessels and certain aircraft on temporary sojourn, ship 
        stores (except as prohibited by the CDA to Cuba) and 
        plane stores under certain circumstances;
   certain foreign-origin items in transit through the 
        United States;
   shipments for U.S. Government personnel and 
        agencies;
   gift parcels not exceeding $400 for North Korea of 
        commodities such as food, clothing (non-military), 
        medicines, and other items normally given as gifts by 
        an individual; and
   gift parcels for Cuba are limited to food, clothing 
        (non-military), vitamins, seeds, medicines, medical 
        supplies and devices, hospital supplies and equipment, 
        equipment for the handicapped, personal hygiene items, 
        veterinary medicines and supplies, fishing equipment 
        and supplies, soap making equipment, certain radio 
        equipment, and batteries for such equipment. The value 
        of the gift parcels may not exceed $200 per month, 
        excluding the value of any food in the package. There 
        are no limits on the frequency or dollar value on food 
        contained in gift parcels to Cuba.

    (NOTE: The Department of the Treasury licenses cash 
donations from U.S. citizens for humanitarian assistance, 
channeled through U.N. agencies, the International Federation 
of the Red Cross (IFRC) and U.S. non-overnmental organizations; 
and humanitarian related commodities obtained from sources in 
third countries and donated to North Korea through the above 
organizations.)
    B. The Department of Commerce generally denies export 
license applications for exports to Cuba and North Korea; 
however, Commerce will consider applications for the following 
on a case-by-case basis:

   exports to meet basic human needs;
   exports to Cuba from foreign countries of non-
        strategic foreign-made products containing 20 percent 
        or less United States-origin parts, components or 
        materials, provided the exporter is not a United 
        States-owned or controlled subsidiary in a third 
        country;
   exports to Cuba of telecommunications equipment, to 
        the extent permitted as part of a telecommunications 
        project approved by the Federal Communications 
        Commission, necessary to deliver a signal to an 
        international telecommunications gateway in Cuba;
   exports to support projects under the U.S.-North 
        Korea Agreed Framework of 1994 (including Korean Energy 
        Development Organization initiatives).
   Certain exports to Cuba intended to provide support 
        for the Cuban people.

    C. The Department of Commerce reviews applications for 
exports of donated and commercially-supplied medicine or 
medical items to Cuba on a case-by-case basis. The United 
States will not restrict exports of these items, except in the 
following cases:

   to the extent Section 5(m) of the Export 
        Administration Act of 1979 or Section 203(b)(2) of the 
        IEEPA would permit such restrictions;
   in a case in which there is a reasonable likelihood 
        that the item to be exported will be used for purposes 
        of torture or other human rights abuses;
   in a case in which there is a reasonable likelihood 
        that the item to be exported will be reexported; or
   in a case in which the item to be exported could be 
        used in the production of any biotechnological product; 
        and
   in a case where the U.S. Government determines that 
        it would be unable to verify, by on-site inspection and 
        other appropriate means, that the item to be exported 
        will be used for the purpose for which it was intended 
        and only for the use and benefit of the Cuban people. 
        This exception does not apply to donations of medicine 
        for humanitarian purposes to a nongovernmental 
        organization in Cuba.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    The licensing policies for the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (FRY) are as follows:
    A. The Department of Commerce requires a license for the 
export of arms-related items and certain other items on the CCL 
that could be used for terrorist activities or to repress the 
civilian population to FRY. Items requiring licenses include 
shotguns, ammunition, military vehicles, equipment for the 
production of military explosives, bulletproof vests, night 
vision equipment, crime and crowd control equipment, and items 
that may be used to arm and train individuals for terrorist 
activities. Many of these items are already subject to license 
application requirements under the EAR for export to FRY. 
However, this action imposes export license requirements on 
additional items, including water cannons bomb detection 
equipment and explosives.
    B. The Department of Commerce reviews all license 
applications to export the items listed above to FRY under a 
policy of denial.

       Analysis of Control as Required by Section 6(f) of The Act

    The United States has administered the embargoes on exports 
to Cuba and North Korea under the Act and other statutes, in a 
manner consistent with Treasury sanctions adopted under the 
Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended. The latter authority 
continues in effect by virtue of Sections 101(b) and (c), and 
207, of Public Law 95-223, which the President has extended 
annually, pursuant to national interest determinations.

                     a. the purpose of the control

    Originally, the United States imposed embargoes on each of 
these countries for foreign policy purposes, among other 
reasons. Although the original circumstances that prompted the 
United States to impose controls have changed, these controls 
continue. These embargoes demonstrate the unwillingness of the 
United States to maintain normal trade with these countries 
until they take steps to change their policies to conform to 
recognized international standards.
    Cuba. This embargo was imposed several decades ago when 
Cuban actions seriously threatened the stability of the Western 
Hemisphere, and the Cuban Government had expropriated property 
from U.S. citizens without compensation. Because of Cuba's 
support for insurgent groups that have engaged in terrorism, 
the Secretary of State designated it as a state sponsor of 
terrorism under Section 6(j) of the Act in March 1982.
    North Korea. North Korea continues to maintain an offensive 
military capability and to suppress human rights. The planting 
of a bomb aboard a South Korean airliner by North Korean agents 
in November 1987 prompted the Secretary of State to designate 
North Korea as a state sponsor of international terrorism, 
under Section 6(j) of the Act, in January 1988. This 
designation has not been revoked.
    Rwanda. The controls remain in place to prevent any U.S. 
contribution to potential conflict in that country and to 
conform to United Nations-mandated sanctions.
    The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro): 
The controls remain in place to prevent U.S. contribution to 
potential conflict and the repression of the civilian 
population in that country and to conform with United Nations-
mandated sanctions.

 b. considerations and/or determinations of the secretary of commerce:

    1. Probability of Achieving Intended Foreign Policy 
Purpose. The embargoes have denied these nations the 
substantial benefits of normal trade relations with the United 
States. The controls continue to put pressure on the 
governments of these countries to modify their policies, since 
the United States will not lift these embargoes without a 
general improvement in relations. For Rwanda and the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, the applicable controls may serve to 
reduce the potential for conflict.
    2. Compatibility with Foreign Policy Objectives. The 
controls complement U.S. foreign policy in other aspects of 
U.S. relations with these countries. They encourage the 
governments to modify their policies, thereby improving their 
relations with the United States. For Rwanda and the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, these controls are consistent with U.S. 
foreign policy goals of promoting peace and stability and 
preventing human rights abuses.
    3. Reaction of Other Countries. Although most countries 
recognize the right of the United States to determine its own 
foreign policy and security concerns, many countries, 
particularly Canada, Mexico and the members of the European 
Union, opposed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity 
(Libertad) Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton), which they perceive as 
an extraterritorial application of U.S. law. Most countries 
respect U.S. unilateral controls toward North Korea in light of 
the unresolved situation on the Korean peninsula and the 
aggressive nature of North Korean support for international 
terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
The U.S. arms embargoes on Rwanda and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia are consistent with the objectives of the United 
Nations; the United States has received no significant 
objections to these controls.
    4. Economic Impact on United States Industry.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                        f. foreign availability

    Since Cuba and North Korea are also designated terrorism-
supporting countries, as well as embargoed destinations, the 
foreign availability provision does not apply to items 
determined by the Secretary of State to require control under 
Section 6(j) of the Act.\10\ Cognizant of the value of such 
controls in emphasizing the U.S. position toward countries 
supporting international terrorism, Congress specifically 
excluded them from foreign availability assessments otherwise 
required by the Act. For Rwanda and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, the U.S. human rights policies and concerns about 
the situation in those countries outweigh foreign availability 
considerations.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    6. Libya (Section 746-4)

        Export Control Program Description And Licensing Policy

    On August 5, 1996, the President signed into law the Iran 
and Libya Sanctions Act in an effort to deny Iran and Libya the 
ability to support acts of international terrorism and to 
develop and acquire weapons of mass destruction. The Act 
requires the President to sanction a person who made an 
investment of $40 million or more that directly and 
significantly contributed to Libya's ability to develop its 
petroleum resources, and to sanction persons who provide Libya 
with certain goods and services proscribed under United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions 748 and 883 that significantly and 
materially contribute to Libya's military, aviation, or certain 
petroleum development capabilities. ILSA requires the 
imposition of at least two sanctions from six available 
sanctions categories (one of which is an export sanction) 
against an entity determined to have engaged in sanctionable 
activity described in ILSA.
    ILSA is one action in a long history of action the United 
States has taken against Libya. Libya is one of the countries 
designated by the Secretary of State as a repeated state 
sponsor of acts of international terrorism. In January 1986, 
the President imposed a comprehensive embargo against Libya 
under the authority of the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act (IEEPA). The Department of the Treasury is 
responsible for licensing exports under the Libyan Sanctions 
Regulations (31 CFR Part 550). Since February 1, 1986, exports 
from the United States and transshipments via third countries 
to Libya require authorization in the form of a general or 
specific license from Treasury.\11\ All direct trade with Libya 
is prohibited and certain Libyan Government-owned or -
controlled assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction--estimated at $1 
billion--are frozen by the Department of the Treasury.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Though Treasury's Libyan Sanctions Regulations duplicate the 
restrictions in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) on exports 
from the United States to Libya, all the Department of Commerce 
controls are being extended. These controls can be reevaluated in the 
event the Treasury regulations issued under IEEPA authorities are 
revoked.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On November 14, 1991, a grand jury in the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia returned an indictment 
against two Libyan nationals accused of bombing Pan Am Flight 
103 en route from London to New York. On the same day, Scottish 
authorities obtained a petition warrant for the two Libyans on 
similar charges.
    On January 21, 1992, the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) adopted Resolution 731, which condemned the Pan Am 
bombing, as well as the bombing of a French UTA flight, and 
urged Libya to fully and effectively respond to requests that 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and France had made upon 
it in connection with the investigation, apprehension, and 
prosecution of those responsible for the bombings. On March 31, 
1992, after concluding that Libya had not made satisfactory 
responses to such requests, the UNSC adopted Resolution 748, 
which imposed mandatory sanctions on Libya, effective April 15, 
1992, until such time as the Security Council determined that 
Libya had complied with the requests made by the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and France, and renounced terrorism. 
Resolution 748 requires U.N. member states to prohibit, by 
their nationals or from their territory, inter alia, the supply 
of any aircraft or aircraft components to Libya or the 
provision of engineering and maintenance servicing of Libyan 
aircraft. Resolution 748 also requires member states to 
prohibit, by their nationals or from their territory, the 
provision of arms and related material of all types, including 
the sale or transfer of weapons and ammunition, military 
vehicles and equipment, paramilitary police equipment and spare 
parts for such equipment. Finally, Resolution 748 requires 
member states to deny any flight in their airspace, or landing 
or taking off in their territory, by aircraft which are flying 
to or from Libya, to prevent operation of Libyan Arab Airlines 
and to reduce significantly Libyan diplomatic representation 
abroad.
    Continued Libyan non-compliance with UNSC demands resulted 
in the adoption by the UNSC of Resolution 883 on November 11, 
1993, which imposed additional sanctions, including a limited 
assets freeze, and provisions closing certain gaps in the civil 
aviation sanctions provided for in Resolution 748. Resolution 
883 requires States to freeze any funds or financial resources 
owned or controlled by the Government of Libya or a Libyan 
undertaking and ensure that such funds, or any other funds or 
financial resources, are not made available to the Government 
of Libya or any Libyan undertaking. Also, Resolution 883 
requires member states to prohibit the provision to Libya, by 
their nationals or from their territory of materials destined 
for the construction, improvement or maintenance of Libyan 
civilian or military airfields and associated facilities and 
equipment, of any engineering or other services or components 
destined for the maintenance of any Libyan civil or military 
airfields, with certain exceptions, and of certain oil terminal 
and refining equipment, as listed in Appendix III. Furthermore, 
Resolution 883 required that States immediately close all 
Libyan Arab Airlines offices, and prohibit any commercial 
transactions with Libyan Arab Airlines, and prohibit, by their 
nationals or from their territory, the entering into or renewal 
of arrangements for the making available for operation within 
Libya of any aircraft or aircraft components.
    In December 1993, the President instructed the Commerce 
Department to reinforce the trade embargo on the reexport to 
Libya of U.S.-origin items. The Commerce Department thereupon 
tightened licensing policy on the reexport of items covered by 
UNSC Resolutions 748 and 883. Furthermore, in 1995, the U.S. 
Government adopted a general policy of denial for all exports 
and reexports to Libya, except for those with a humanitarian 
purpose.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


       Analysis Of Control As Required By Section 6(f) of The Act

                     a. the purpose of the control

    The purpose of export and reexport controls toward Libya is 
to demonstrate United States opposition to, and to distance the 
United States from, that nation's support for acts of 
international terrorism, international subversive activities, 
and intervention in the affairs of neighboring states. The 
controls also reinforce implementation of UNSC resolutions.

 b. considerations and/or determinations of the secretary of commerce:

    1. Probability of Achieving Intended Foreign Policy 
Purpose. The controls deny Libya U.S.-origin national security-
controlled items, oil and gas equipment unavailable from 
outside sources, and items for the Ras Lanuf Petrochemical 
complex. The controls restrict Libyan capability to use U.S.-
origin aircraft, aircraft components and accessories, and off-
highway tractors in military ventures, or in its efforts to 
destabilize nations friendly to the United States. Consistent 
with UN resolutions 748 and 883, the United States reinforced 
the reexport, prohibitions for certain oil terminal and 
refining equipment, plus items used to service or maintain 
Libyan aircraft and airfields, and all other items subject to 
the EAR. The combined effect of these controls has been to 
prevent a United States contribution to Libya's ability to 
engage in activities detrimental to United States foreign 
policy. Furthermore, they send a clear signal that the United 
States is unwilling to permit trade in light of Libya's 
behavior.
    2. Compatibility with Foreign Policy Objectives. Because 
these controls are intended to prevent a U.S. contribution to 
Libyan economic activities, force Libya to abide by 
international law, and thereby diminish Libya's ability to 
undermine regional stability and support international 
terrorism, they are consistent with U.S. foreign policy goals 
and with policies on sales to Libya.
    3. Reaction of Other Countries. As indicated by the 
adoption of UNSC Resolutions 73 1, 748 and 883, there is a 
general understanding by other countries of the threat posed by 
Libya's policies of subversion, terrorism, and military 
aggression. When the United States imposed the bulk of its 
controls in 1986, the United States explained its policies to 
other governments and urged them to adopt comparable policies. 
There was some favorable response, but no country has matched 
the extent of U.S. controls. In 1986, the European Union and 
the Group of Seven approved unanimous steps against Libya, 
including restrictions on Libyan officials in Europe and a ban 
on new arms sales. The international community has effectively 
implemented the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council. 
The United States closely monitors all trade with Libya and 
swiftly brings any noncompliance with the most recent UN 
resolutions to the attention of appropriate foreign 
authorities.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    5. Enforcement of Control. In light of the widespread 
perception of Libya as a supporter of international terrorism, 
along with UN sanctions, there is substantial voluntary 
compliance on the part of U.S. companies and their subsidiaries 
overseas. Nonetheless, the Department of Commerce remains 
concerned about the continuing potential for unauthorized re-
export of goods controlled for national security/
nonproliferation reasons. It is virtually impossible to monitor 
the full extent to which such transfers may occur, given the 
variety of goods involved, the opportunities created by 
differences in export laws between countries, and the ease of 
transshipment through free ports such as Malta. In particular, 
control of U.S. origin aircraft parts, components, and avionics 
or foreign-manufactured aircraft with any U.S. content requires 
a major commitment of enforcement resources. Commerce will 
continue to aggressively enforce these controls.

                     c. consultation with industry

    The Department of Commerce published a notice in the 
Federal Register on October 8, 1997, requesting public comments 
on its foreign policy-based export controls. As of the date of 
publication of this report, Commerce had received no comments 
on its export controls on Libya.

                  d. consultation with other countries

    On October 13, 1998, the Department of Commerce, via the 
Federal Register, solicited comments from industry on the 
effectiveness of export policy. In general, the comments 
indicated that industry does not feel that unilateral sanctions 
are effective. A more detailed review of the comments is 
available in Appendix I.
    Extensive consultation with other nations has taken place 
under UN auspices. The United States also intends to continue 
consulting friendly governments in order to achieve full 
compliance with UN sanctions.

                          e. alternative means

    U.S. controls complement diplomatic measures that we have, 
and will continue to use, to influence Libyan behavior.

                        f. foreign availability

    The foreign availability provision does not apply to items 
determined by the Secretary of State to require control under 
Section 6(j) of the Act.\10\ Cognizant of the value of such 
controls in emphasizing the U.S. position toward countries 
supporting international terrorism, Congress specifically 
excluded them from foreign availability assessments otherwise 
required by the Act. The foreign availability of items 
controlled under Section 6(a) has been considered by the 
Department of Commerce. In general, numerous foreign sources of 
commodities similar to those subject to these controls are 
known, especially for items controlled by the United States.
    7. Chemical Precursors and Associated Equipment, Technology 
and Software (Sections 742.2, 744.4 and 744.6)

        Export Control Program Description And Licensing Policy

    The United States maintains export controls over certain 
chemicals, equipment, materials, software, technology and whole 
plants to further U.S. foreign policy opposing the 
proliferation and use of chemical weapons.\12\ The United 
States implements these controls in coordination with the 
Australia Group (AG), an informal forum of 30 nations 
cooperating to halt the proliferation of chemical and 
biological weapons. (See table in Appendix II for complete list 
of members.) The Department of Commerce has primary 
responsibility for overseeing the compliance of industry with 
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which bans the 
development, production, stockpiling, and retention of chemical 
weapons, and provides for an extensive verification regime.\13\ 
Chemical warfare agents deemed to have direct military 
application are controlled by the State Department under the 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ Anti-terrorism controls also apply to exports of these items 
to countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism by the Secretary 
of State.
    \13\ The CWC was ratified by the United States on April 25, 1997 
and entered into force on April 29, 1997. As of September 30, 1997, 100 
nations were States Parties to the treaty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Pursuant to passage of the CWC Implementation Act (CWCIA) 
on October 21, 1998, Commerce expects to be responsible for 
industry compliance with the Convention and will promulgate two 
regulations in the near future: (1) amendment to the EAR 
addressing new export controls and end-use requirements; and 
(2) Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (CWCR) addressing 
data declaration and inspection requirements. After publication 
of the final CWCR, Commerce will collect industry declarations 
regarding production, processing, consumption, import, and 
export of toxic chemicals for purposes not prohibited by the 
Convention (e.g., industrial, agricultural, and other peaceful 
purposes) and will forward the information to the Organization 
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Commerce will 
also escort inspections of certain U.S. chemical production 
facilities by the OPCW.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


       Analysis of Control as Required by Section 6(f) of The Act

                     a. the purpose of the control

    These controls are to prevent a U.S. contribution to, and 
to support multilaterally coordinated efforts to control, the 
proliferation and use of chemical weapons. They also provide 
regulatory authority to control the export of any item from the 
United States when there is a significant risk that it will be 
used for chemical weapon purposes. These controls implement 
certain measures specified in Executive Order 12735 of November 
16, 1990, and its successor, Executive Order 12938 of November 
14, 1994, and the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative 
(EPCI) announced by President Bush on December 13,1990 (and 
endorsed by President Clinton).
    These controls advance U.S. implementation of multilateral 
export control commitments made by members of the AG to further 
non-proliferation objectives. The AG works to accomplish this 
objective through the harmonization of export controls, the 
exchange of information, and other diplomatic means. In 
addition, these controls assist the United States in 
implementing its obligation under the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and 
Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (the Chemical 
Weapons Convention, or CWC) not to assist anyone, in any way, 
in chemical weapons activities. The controls also support the 
goals of the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the 
Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, which prohibits the use of 
chemical or biological weapons.

  b. considerations and/or determinations of the secretary of commerce

    1. Probability of Achieving the Intended Foreign Policy 
Purpose. These export controls demonstrate U.S. commitment to 
curtail the spread of chemical weapons and to uphold 
multilateral agreements to cooperate in this effort. However, 
many of the items covered by these controls are available in 
chemical producing nations that are not members of the AG. 
These controls, however, continue to be a significant part of 
the United States' overall strategy to prevent the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Accordingly, the 
Secretary has determined that these controls are likely to 
achieve the intended foreign policy purpose.
    2. Compatibility with Foreign Policy Objectives. In 
extending these controls, the Secretary has determined that the 
controls are compatible with the foreign policy objectives of 
the United States. The United States has a strong interest in 
remaining in the forefront of international efforts to stem the 
proliferation of chemical weapons. These controls are 
compatible with the multilateral export controls for chemicals 
and related equipment and technology agreed to by the AG. 
Moreover, the United States has a binding international 
commitment under the CWC to the complete prohibition and 
elimination of all chemical weapons and of assistance to 
chemical weapons programs.
    3. Reaction of Other Countries. The Secretary has 
determined that the reaction of other countries to these 
controls by the United States is not likely to render the 
controls ineffective in achieving the intended foreign policy 
purpose or to be counterproductive to U.S. foreign policy 
interests. Some non-aligned countries, that are parties to the 
CWC and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), have voiced 
opposition to the export controls of the AG and have called for 
its elimination claiming that it discriminates against 
developing economies. They falsely imply that the AG's export 
controls deprive nonproliferating States of economic and 
technological development in the chemical field. They state 
that the CWC should be looked to as the governing legal 
instrument for the elimination of chemical weapons, and 
therefore, incorrectly claim that AG export controls are 
obsolete. The United States in coordination with its AG 
partners has sought to dispel this perception in international 
fora by clarifying the purpose of the controls.
    4. Economic Impact on United States Industry.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                          e. alternative means

    The United States continues to address the problem of the 
proliferation of chemical weapons on a number of fronts. Direct 
negotiations with countries intent on acquiring chemical 
weapons are not likely to prevent the use of U.S.-origin 
materials in such activities, nor are such negotiations likely 
to affect the behavior of these countries.
    Alternative means to curtail the acquisition and 
development of chemical warfare capabilities, such as 
diplomatic negotiations, do not obviate the need for controls. 
The following are some examples of additional means that the 
United States has used and will continue to use in an attempt 
to curb the use and spread of chemical weapons:

   U.S. legislation: The Chemical and Biological 
        Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 
        (Title III, Pub. L. 102-182) provides for the 
        imposition of sanctions on foreign entities and 
        countries for certain kinds of chemical and biological 
        weapons related activity. The United States has imposed 
        sanctions on certain entities for chemical weapons-
        related activities;
   The Chemical Weapons Convention: As another tool for 
        stemming the proliferation of chemical weapons, the 
        Convention imposes a global ban on the development, 
        production, stockpiling, retention and use of chemical 
        weapons (CW). The Convention also prohibits the direct 
        or indirect transfers of CW as well as restricting 
        trade in chemicals to non-Parties, and creates an 
        international organization to monitor the destruction 
        of CW and the production of toxic chemicals for 
        industrial, agricultural, medical and other peaceful 
        purposes in countries party to the Convention.

    The Department has participated in international fora to 
negotiate positions which minimize burdens and maximize 
protections to industry.
    Pursuant to passage of the CWC Implementation Act (CWCIA) 
on October 21, 1998, Commerce expects to be responsible for 
industry compliance with the Convention and will promulgate two 
regulations in the near future: (1) amendment to the EAR 
addressing new export controls and end-use requirements; and 
(2) Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (CWCR) addressing 
data declaration and inspection requirements. After publication 
of the final CWCR, Commerce will collect industry declarations 
regarding production, processing, consumption, import, and 
export of toxic chemicals for purposes not prohibited by the 
Convention (e.g., industrial, agricultural, and other peaceful 
purposes) and will forward the information to the Organization 
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Commerce will 
also escort inspections of certain U.S. chemical production 
facilities by the OPCW.

                        f. foreign availability

    Past reviews conducted by Commerce revealed that there was 
availability from non-AG countries for a wide range of AG 
chemical precursors and production equipment. Non-AG suppliers 
of precursors and/or related production equipment include 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, India, Mexico, China (PRC), South 
Africa, the countries of the former Soviet Union, Taiwan, 
Thailand, and Turkey. However, most of these countries are 
parties to the CWC and will take steps under this treaty to 
prevent CW proliferation.
    8. Biological Agents and Associated Equipment and Technical 
Data (Sections 742.2, 744.4 and 744.6)

        Export Control Program Description And Licensing Policy

    The Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) exercises export 
controls over certain microorganisms and toxins and biological 
equipment and related technology, to further U.S. foreign 
policy opposing the proliferation and use of biological 
weapons. The United States implements these export controls 
multilaterally in coordination with the Australia Group (AG), 
an informal forum of 30 nations cooperating to halt the 
proliferation of chemical an biological weapons. The United 
States also participates in international efforts to effect a 
total ban on biological weapons in compliance with the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons 
and on Their Destruction (BWC).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


       Analysis of Control as Required by Section 6(f) of The Act

                     a. the purpose of the control

    These controls are to prevent U.S. contribution to the 
proliferation and use of biological weapons, and to support 
multilaterally coordinated control efforts. The controls also 
provide the regulatory authority to stop the export of any item 
from the United States when there is a significant risk that it 
will be used for biological weapons purposes. The controls 
implement certain measures directed in Executive Order 12735 of 
November 16, 1990, and its successor, Executive Order 12938 of 
November 14, 1994, and the Enhanced Proliferation Control 
Initiative of December 13, 1990.
    The United States implements these controls in coordination 
with the AG, a forum of thirty nations that cooperate to halt 
the spread of chemical and biological weapons. The AG works to 
accomplish this objective through the harmonization of export 
controls, the exchange of information, and other diplomatic 
means. In addition, these controls demonstrate the United 
States' commitment to its obligation under the BWC \14\ not to 
develop, produce, stockpile, acquire or retain biological 
agents, weapons, equipment or the means of delivery for warfare 
purposes and not in any way assist such activities. The 
controls also advance the goals of the 1925 Geneva Protocol for 
the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, 
or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, to 
prohibit the use of chemical or biological weapons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ The full title of the BWC is the ``Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their 
Destruction. The treaty was signed in 1972 and ratified by the United 
States in 1975.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

  b. considerations and/or determinations of the secretary of commerce

    1. Probability of Achieving the Intended Foreign Policy 
Purpose. The Secretary has determined that the control is 
likely to achieve the intended foreign policy purpose even in 
light of other factors, including availability of these items 
from other sources. These controls continue to affirm U.S. 
opposition to the development, proliferation and use of 
biological weapons and serves to distance the United States 
from such activities.
    2. Compatibility with Foreign Policy Objectives. In 
extending these controls, the Secretary has determined that the 
controls are compatible with the foreign policy objectives of 
the United States. The United States has a strong interest in 
remaining in the forefront of international efforts to stem the 
proliferation of biological weapons. These controls are 
compatible with the multilateral export controls for biological 
materials agreed to by the AG. Moreover, the United States has 
a binding international commitment under the BWC and the Geneva 
Protocol to the complete prohibition and elimination of all 
biological weapons and to their nonproliferation.
    3. Reaction of Other Countries. Some non-aligned 
countries--those which are party to the BWC and the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC), but not the AG--have voiced 
opposition to the AG's export controls incorrectly claiming 
they discriminate against developing countries. Countries claim 
to be concerned that the controls could hinder their right, 
under Article X of the BWC, to participate in the fullest 
possible exchange of equipment, materials and technology for 
the agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. In international 
fora, the U.S. Government has sought to dispel this perception 
by clarifying the purpose of the controls.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    5. Enforcement of Control. Enforcing controls on biological 
weapons materials poses problems similar to the enforcement of 
chemical controls, but with additional difficulties. Biological 
materials are microscopic organisms that require technical 
expertise and specialized facilities to identify and to handle. 
Because of their size, the biological agents can be concealed 
and transported with ease.
    To meet the challenge of effective enforcement of these 
proliferation controls, Commerce has redirected resources 
towards preventive enforcement. Enforcement personnel have 
recently begun conducting an extensive on-going outreach 
program to educate appropriate industries about export 
controls. The program is also designed to increase the 
industry's awareness of suspicious orders for products or 
equipment that could be used for biological weapons 
proliferation. A significant number of investigations have been 
opened into allegations of illegal activity related to these 
concerns. In cases when unlicensed shipments of biological 
materials have already taken place, Commerce has found that 
investigations and prosecutions are successfully conducted on 
the basis of routine documentation, as in other export control 
enforcement cases.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                  d. consultation with other countries

    The United States continues to address the problem of 
biological weapons proliferation through a variety of 
international fora, and urges other AG members to pursue export 
control cooperation with non-members on a bilateral or regional 
basis.
    Recognizing that multilateral coordination of export 
controls and enforcement actions is the most effective means of 
restricting proliferation activities, the United States 
coordinates its controls on biological items with 29 other 
countries in the AG. At the annual AG plenary, held last 
October 12-15, 1998, members reviewed export controls on 
certain biological agents and toxins and biological equipment 
items.
    The U.S. continues to urge key non-AG countries to adopt AG 
biological export controls. In 1998, BXA interacted with 
several of the Newly Independent States, including Russia, to 
raise awareness about the problems of proliferation and the 
need to develop export control systems that support 
nonproliferation goals.
    In addition, during 1998, there was further discussion on 
completing a protocol to the BWC. The BWC, which entered into 
force in 1975, is an international arms control agreement among 
140 nations that bans the development, production, stockpiling, 
acquisition, or retention of biological agents or toxins that 
have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other 
peaceful purposes. Discussions on a protocol included mandatory 
data declarations, on-site inspections, enhanced information 
exchange, and a permanent BWC international oversight 
organization.

                          e. alternative means

    The United States continues to address the problem of 
proliferation of biological weapons on a number of fronts. 
Direct negotiations with countries intent on acquiring 
biological weapons are not likely to prevent the use of U.S.-
origin materials in such activities. Neither are such 
negotiations likely to affect the behavior of these countries.
    Alternative means to curtail the acquisition and 
development of biological warfare capabilities, such as 
diplomatic negotiations, do not obviate the need for controls. 
The following examples demonstrate additional means that have 
been and will continue to be used in an attempt to curb the use 
and spread of biological weapons:

   U.S. Legislation--Regulations issued by the Public 
        Health Service (42 CFR Part 72) pursuant to the ``The 
        Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996'' 
        (Sec. 511 of Pub. L.104-132), places additional 
        shipping and handling requirements on laboratory 
        facilities that transfer or receive select infectious 
        agents capable of causing substantial harm to human 
        health.
      The Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare 
        Elimination Act of 1991 (Title III, Pub. L.102-182) 
        provides for the imposition of sanctions on foreign 
        persons and countries for certain kinds of chemical and 
        biological weapons related activity. To date, no 
        sanctions have been imposed for biological weapons 
        related activities.
   Trilateral US/UK/Russian Statement--In September 
        1992, the United States, United Kingdom and Russia 
        confirmed their commitment to full compliance with the 
        Biological Weapons Convention and agreed to a number of 
        steps including data exchanges, visits to sites, and 
        further consultations to enhance cooperation and 
        confidence.
   Biological Weapons Convention--An Ad Hoc Group 
        continues to work to develop a protocol to strengthen 
        the effectiveness and build confidence in compliance 
        with the BWC.

                        f. foreign availability

    Past reviews conducted by BXA identified the availability 
of AG-controlled viruses and bacteria in the non-AG countries 
of Brazil, Bulgaria, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Mexico, 
PRC, Senegal, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand and related AG-
controlled equipment items available in Brazil, Bulgaria, Hong 
Kong, India, Israel, Malaysia, Pakistan, PRC, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan and Ukraine. (Most of 
this equipment has application in the food processing and 
pharmaceutical industries.) Many of the countries listed above 
are parties to the BWC and BXA is working with other U.S. 
agencies as part of ongoing international efforts to strengthen 
the effectiveness of this Convention.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    10. High Performance Computers (Section 742.12)

        Export Control Program Description And Licensing Policy

    The revision of export controls on computers will continue 
to be a high priority for the Administration as improvements in 
computer technology continue to enhance system performance. 
Major revisions occurred in February 1994, and again in January 
1996. In April 1998, an independent study was completed under a 
contract funded by the Commerce Department to review computer 
system improvements and the parameters for measuring 
performance. The United States Government is reviewing the 
results of this study for its implications for U.S. export 
control policy.
    Congress added provisions to the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (NDAA), which President 
Clinton signed on November 18, 1997, requiring exporters to 
notify the Department of Commerce of their intent to export or 
reexport high performance computers (HPCS) with a performance 
capability of between 2,000 and 7,000 million theoretical 
operations per second (MTOPS) to end-users in countries known 
in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) as Tier 3 
countries. On February 3, 1998, Department of Commerce revised 
the EAR through a Federal Register notice to implement this new 
legal requirement. Under the new procedures, the Secretaries of 
Commerce, Defense, Energy and State, and the Director of the 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency have ten days to review 
each notification. If no agency raises a specific objection to 
the proposed export or reexport, the exporter may ship. If an 
agency objects to the transaction, the United States will 
require a license application. The law also requires the 
Department of Commerce to perform post-shipment visits on 
exports of HPCs with a performance capability over 2,000 MTOPS 
to Tier 3 countries, whether or not a license was required.
    The controls in force during 1998, listed by Tier group 
limits and requirements, are as follows (See Appendix IV for a 
list of the countries in each Tier group):
    Computer Country Tier 1--The first level of the sliding 
scale allows exports to most of the industrialized democracies 
to proceed without prior government review (i.e., export under 
a license exception), and with no limitation on MTOPS. 
Exporters are required to maintain records of shipments. 
Reexport and retransfer restrictions also apply.
    Computer Country Tier 2--The second level applies to 
countries with low risk proliferation and export control 
records. There is no prior government review for exports of up 
to 10,000 MTOPS. Reexport and retransfer restrictions apply. 
Exports above 10,000 MTOPS to these countries require prior 
government review (an export license).
    Computer Country Tier 3--The third level applies to 
countries posing proliferation or other security risks. 
Licenses are required for computers with a capability above 
2,000 MTOPS for military and proliferation end-uses and users, 
and at 7,000 MTOPS for all other end-uses and users. As stated 
above, prior government review under the ``NDAA'' notification 
process, is now required for all exports of computers between 
2,000 and 7,000 MTOPS intended for civil end users and uses. 
These computers may be exported without a license, provided no 
reviewing government agency raises an objection within the 
first ten days of the reviewing process. If an objection is 
raised, a license is required. Exporters are required to 
provide a written report to the government within 30 days of 
the export of a computer without a license. Using this 
information and licensing data, the government will perform 
post-shipment visits on exports of HPCS over 2,000 MTOPS to 
Tier 3 countries, regardless of whether a license was issued. 
Reexport and retransfer restrictions apply.
    Computer Country Tier 4--The fourth level applies to 
terrorism-supporting countries (Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North 
Korea, Sudan and Syria). The President decided to continue to 
deny high performance computers to these destinations. A 
license is required from Commerce to export or reexport to any 
end-user in Syria computers with a CTP greater than or equal to 
6 MTOPS. Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Sudan are 
subject to comprehensive trade embargoes and hence U.S. 
government authorization is required for exports of any 
computer, regardless of MTOP level, to Cuba, Libya, Iran, Iraq, 
North Korea, and Sudan, and for reexport of computers with a 
CTP equal to or above 6 MTOPS to Iran.\15\ (The Department of 
the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control administers 
these trade embargoes. However, to avoid duplication in license 
requirements, Commerce and Treasury have allocated licensing 
responsibility in many instances. Commerce exercises licensing 
responsibility for exports and reexports to Cuba and North 
Korea and for reexports to Libya; Treasury exercises licensing 
responsibility for exports and reexports to Iran and Iraq and 
for exports to Libya.) Applications to export or reexport 
controlled computers to designated terrorist supporting 
countries will generally be denied.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ The scope of the embargo as pertains to reexports to Sudan has 
not been determined as of the submission of this report.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    11. Encryption (Section 742.15)

Export Control Program Description and Licensing Policy

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


       Analysis of Control as Required by Section 6(f) of the Act

    A. The Purpose of the Control
    These controls are maintained to protect U.S. national 
security and foreign policy interests, including the safety of 
U.S. citizens here and abroad. Encryption can be used to 
conceal the communications or data of terrorists, drug 
smugglers, or others intent on taking hostile action against 
U.S. facilities, personnel, or security interests. Policies 
concerning the export control of cryptographic products are 
based on the fact that the proliferation of such products will 
make it more difficult for the U.S. Government to have access 
to information vital to national security and foreign policy 
interests. Also, cryptographic products and software have 
military and intelligence applications. These controls are 
consistent with E.O. 13026 of November 15, 1996, and a 
Presidential Memorandum of the same date.
    B. Considerations and/or Determinations of the Secretary of 
Commerce:
    1. Probability of Achieving the Intended Foreign Policy 
Purpose. Consistent with Executive Order 13026 of November 15, 
1996, and a Presidential Memorandum of the same date, the 
Secretary has determined that the control achieves the intended 
purpose of restricting the export of commercial encryption 
items, including products with key recovery features, if their 
export would be contrary to U.S. national security or foreign 
policy interests.
    2. Compatibility with Foreign Policy Objectives. The 
Secretary has also determined that the controls are compatible 
with the foreign policy objectives of the United States. The 
control is consistent with U.S. foreign policy goals to promote 
peace and stability and to prevent U.S. exports that might 
contribute to destabilizing military capabilities and 
international terrorist or criminal activities against the 
United States. The controls also contribute to public safety by 
promoting the protection of U.S. citizens overseas.
    3. Reaction of Other Countries. The Secretary has 
determined that the reaction of other countries to this control 
has not rendered the control ineffective in achieving its 
intended foreign policy purpose or counterproductive to U.S. 
foreign policy interests. Other allied countries recognize the 
need to control exports of encryption products for national 
security and law enforcement reasons. These countries also 
recognize the desirability of restricting goods that could 
compromise shared security and foreign policy interests.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                               APPENDIX I

             Summary of Comments on Foreign Policy Controls

    In the Federal Register of October 13, 1998, the Department 
of Commerce requested comments from the public on existing 
foreign policy-based controls maintained under Section 6 of the 
Export Administration Act. In the notice, the Department sought 
comments on how existing foreign policy-based controls have 
affected exporters and the overall public. Specifically, the 
notice invited public comments about the effectiveness of 
controls where foreign availability exists; whether the goals 
of the controls can be achieved through other means such as 
negotiations; the compatibility of the overall U.S. policy 
toward the country in question; the effect of controls on U.S. 
economic performance; and the enforceability of the controls. 
The Department also requested comments from the member 
companies of its Technical Advisory Committees (TACS) and the 
President's Export Council Subcommittee on Export 
Administration (PECSEA).
    The Department received eight responses to this request, 
from the Regulations and Procedures Technical Advisory 
Committee (RPTAC), MTS Systems Corporation, William A. Root, 
Electronic Industries Alliance (EIA), the Industry Coalition on 
Technology Transfer (ICOTT), Semiconductor Equipment and 
Materials International (SEMI) the National Association of 
Manufacturers (NAM), and Balzers und Leybold Deutschland 
Holding AG. The Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) makes the 
comments available for public review upon request. This 
Appendix summarizes the comments received and some of the 
various reports issued in 1998 on unilateral sanctions.

                           industry comments

    MTS System Corporation's response centered on the negative 
effects of unilateral export controls and embargoes. MTS System 
believes that unilateral controls and embargoes do not deny 
equipment to the sanctioned entity and result in a significant 
losses of business and reputation for U.S. companies. Business 
opportunities lost in China, India and Iran were used to 
illustrate MTS System's comments.
    William Root wrote urging complete harmonization of U.S. 
controls with multilateral regimes. Mr. Root advocates 
revamping U.S. export controls to include multilateral items 
not currently on the CCL, to bring CCL items currently above 
and/or below the standard of multilateral controls in line, and 
to remove unilateral controls. Additionally, his letter 
identifies fifteen unilateral ECCNs that are identified by 
numbers indicating that they are multilateral, and 105 ECCNs 
listed with their respective unilateral and multilateral 
portions incorrectly identified.
    ICOTT wrote in support of William Root's comments in regard 
to accurate identification of controls on the CCL and 
harmonization of the CCL with multilateral regimes. In 
addition, ICOTT opposes the imposition of export controls for 
symbolic reasons (such as distancing the United States from the 
actions of other countries) and urges the Administration to 
fulfill its promise that controls should not be imposed on 
items with demonstrated foreign availability. Finally, ICOTT 
urges the Administration to fulfill its promise to publish the 
names of all suspect end-users in the Federal Register.
    Electronic Industries Alliance focused its response on two 
negative effects of unilateral controls: first, their negative 
impact on the international competitiveness of American 
industry, and second, the inability of unilateral controls to 
prevent sanctioned states from engaging in prohibited 
activities. EIA believes that when formulating export policy, 
the Department of Commerce should identify the actual effect of 
the controls on the target country, the potential effect of the 
proposed controls on U.S. industry, and the level of 
multilateral cooperation (catchalls, etc.) available to support 
the controls. Development of these criteria to analyze the 
effectiveness of the controls would establish the rationale (or 
lack thereof) of the controls and therefore lead to a better 
balance between the level of international competition needed 
to maintain the health of the U.S. economy and the protection 
of foreign policy and national security interests.
    The comments submitted by SEMI were also in opposition to 
unilateral export controls. In particular, SEMI believes that 
the continuation of unilateral EPCI controls penalizes U.S. 
business through the loss of sales revenues that could support 
domestic research and development efforts. SEMI urges the 
Department of Commerce to assess the costs of unilateral 
controls and to work in tandem with U.S. allies in pursuit of 
effective multilateral sanction policies.
    The RPTACs comments promote the use of unilateral controls 
when the control is demonstrably effective in achieving its 
intended purpose. RPTAC believes that unilateral controls 
should be regulated within specific parameters, including 
design of the control to meet specific objectives and the use 
of unilateral controls only when the control's objective can 
(as compared to may) be achieved. The India-Pakistan sanctions, 
NDAA computer controls, the Department of Commerce's 
relationship with China (PRC), the deemed export rule and the 
lack of conformity of some EAR revisions with multilateral 
requirements are all cited as examples of foreign-policy based 
controls that do not address their objective and result in 
unintended consequences for U.S. industry.
    Balzer und Leybold Deutschland Holding AG (BLDH) commented 
that under the EAR, U.S. firms have a great number of 
advantages in exporting controlled goods as compared to their 
European counterparts. As an example, BLDH cited ECCNs 2B350 
through 2B352, under which the U.S. Government allows exports 
from the United States to 154 countries under ``No License 
Required'' standards but requires licenses for the same goods 
being reexported from Germany to all but 21 countries. 
Additionally, BLDH stated that the EAR is too complicated, 
citing Section 744 (Control Policy: End-User and End-Use Based) 
as an overly complex section, the whole of which is contained 
in a few lines in the European Community's Council Regulation 
No. 3381/94.

                          unilateral sanctions

    Much attention in 1998 focused on the issue of U.S. 
unilateral sanctions. Many industry associations and research 
institutes published reports on sanctions. In addition, the 
USDA released a report analyzing the impact of U.S. sanctions 
on U.S. agricultural trade. This Appendix, while not inclusive, 
summarizes some of the reports published this year and 
highlights their major conclusions.
    The report released by USDA during the summer of 1998 
concluded that U.S. sanctions on six specific countries cost 
the United States a minimum of $500 million in lost trade 
during 1996. Industry response to the report estimates the loss 
as much higher. The Foreign Agricultural Service's contribution 
to the report included an analysis of sanctions concluding that 
normalization of investment flows and the ability to get 
foreign investment into sanctioned countries (i.e., Cuba, North 
Korea, Iran, Iraq, etc.) would do more to expand consumption of 
U.S. agricultural products than would simply lifting 
agricultural sanctions.
    In July, 1998, the Council on Foreign Relations published a 
book--Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy, edited by 
Richard N. Haass, exploring the paradoxical role of sanctions 
in American foreign policy. The book focuses on the concept 
that although sanctions are often ineffective, they have become 
one of the foreign policy tools of choice for the United States 
in the post-Cold War world. In addition to exploring the role 
that sanctions play in American foreign policy, the book 
suggests reforms that would enable Congress and the 
Administration to make better decisions about sanctions and to 
implement them more effectively.
    A policy brief released by The Brookings Institution in 
June, 1998, ``Economic Sanctions: Too Much of a Bad Thing,'' 
explores the increasing use of sanctions to promote the full 
range of American foreign policy objectives. The brief 
concludes that sanctions too often turn out to be expressions 
of U.S. preferences that hurt American business interests 
without positively changing the target's behavior.
    The Center for Strategic and International Studies released 
the interim report from its Steering Committee on Economic 
Sanctions in June, 1998. The theme of the report is that 
unilateral economic sanctions are ineffective and damage U.S. 
national interests.
    NAM provided the Department of Commerce with two of its 
reports: ``A Catalog of New U.S. Unilateral Economic Sanctions 
for Foreign Policy Purposes, 1993-96'', and ``Unilateral 
Economic Sanctions 1997-98.'' Although NAM recognizes the 
necessity of multilateral controls, it does not believe that 
the EPCI items the U.S. controls unilaterally are controllable 
and/or are sufficiently critical to proliferation programs to 
justify controls. Additionally, NAM believes that unilateral 
controls are an impediment to the international competitiveness 
of U.S. business.

                     6. Department of the Treasury

                       a. Terrorist Assets Report

   1998 Annual Report to the Congress on Assets in the United States 
      Belonging to Terrorist Countries or International Terrorist 
                      Organizations, January 1999

                                Summary

    More than $3.4 billion of assets of seven state sponsors of 
terrorism are located within U.S. jurisdiction. Of that amount, 
more than $3.3 billion are blocked by the U.S. Department of 
the Treasury pursuant to economic sanctions imposed by the 
United States against six of the terrorist countries. In 
addition, approximately $675,000 in assets of international 
terrorist organizations which were identified and blocked 
within the United States in 1995, remain blocked in 1998. 
Approximately $23.6 million in funds are currently blocked 
based upon an interest of Usama Bin Ladin.

                               Background

    Section 304 of Public Law 102-138, as amended by Public Law 
103-236 (22 U.S.C. Sec. 2656g), requires the Secretary of the 
Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General and 
appropriate investigative agencies, to provide annual reports 
to the Congress concerning the nature and extent of assets held 
in the United States by terrorist countries and organizations 
engaged in international terrorism. The Department of the 
Treasury submitted its first Terrorist Assets Report to the 
Congress in April 1993. The current report, covering calendar 
year 1998, is the seventh successive Terrorist Assets Report. 
The Terrorist Assets Report on Foreign Relations and the 
Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Finance in 
the Senate and to the Committee on International Relations and 
the Committee on Ways and Means in the House. It was prepared 
by the Department of the Treasury's office of Foreign Assets 
Control (``OFAC''), which has the responsibility for 
administering and enforcing economic sanctions programs 
mandated by the President pursuant to his declaration of a 
national emergency with respect to particular foreign countries 
and non-state parties. Almost ninety-nine percent of the 
identified U.S.-based assets of state sponsors of terrorism and 
all blocked assets of international terrorist organizations are 
under the sanctions controls of OFAC.
    More than a dozen Federal agencies and offices were polled 
in developing the report. They included:

  Department of State Joint Chiefs of Staff
  Department of Justice U.S. Customs Service
  Federal Bureau of Investigation Internal Revenue Service
  U.S. Secret Service Department of Defense
  Intelligence Community Office of Foreign Assets Control
  Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
  Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)
  Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (U.S. Treasury)

    State Sponsors of Terrorism: State sponsors of terrorism 
are those countries designated by the Secretary of State under 
Section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act, Title 22, U.S.C. 
Sec. 2780(d). States currently listed as sponsors of terrorism 
are: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria, 
however blockings are only available for the first six 
countries, and not for Syria. The existing asset freezes, 
financial prohibitions, trade embargoes, and travel and 
transportation-related restrictions are promulgated under the 
authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act, Title 50, U.S.C., 
Appendix, Sec. Sec. 1-44 (Cuba and North Korea), the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Title 50 U.S.C., 
Sec. Sec. 1701-1706 (``IEEPA'') (Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Sudan), 
the United Nations Participation Act, Title 22, U.S.C., 
Sec. 287c (Iraq andLibya), the International Security and 
Development Cooperation Act, Title 22, U.S.C., Sec. 2349aa-8 & 
9 (Iran and Libya), and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214-1319 (the 
``Antiterrorism Act'') (Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, 
Sudan, and Syria). Section 321 of the Antiterrorism Act (18 
U.S.C. 2332d) makes it a criminal offense for United States 
persons, except as provided in regulations issued by the 
Secretary of the Treasury in consultation with the Secretary of 
State, to engage in financial transactions with the governments 
of countries designated under section 6(j) of the Export 
Administration Act (50 U.S.C. App. 2405) as supporting 
international terrorism.
    Information concerning the known holdings in the United 
States of the seven state sponsors of terrorism is reported 
below in Part I. It should be noted that, with the exception of 
Syria, the totals represent amounts frozen under United States 
sanctions programs which, in most cases, block all property in 
which the target is believed to have any interest. In some 
instances the interest may be partial, or fall short of 
undisputed title to the property. Determinations concerning 
these interests are made based on all relevant information 
before OFAC. Many of the assets are also the subject of other 
claims, sometimes by, multiple parties. Blocked assets may not 
be attached, however, by any claimant unless authorized by OFAC 
consistent with U.S. policy.
    International Terrorist Organizations: Section 304 of 
Public Law 102-138 also requires the Secretary of the Treasury 
to report to the Congress annually on those assets of 
international terrorist organizations that are held within the 
United States. For purposes of this report, Treasury has used 
three documents to establish a baseline for determining which 
groups may fall within the definition of ``international 
terrorist organization.''
    Section 302 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (``Antiterrorism Act'') authorizes the 
Secretary of State to designate organizations meeting stated 
requirements as foreign terrorist organizations, with prior 
notification to the Congress of the intent to designate. Upon 
that notification to the Congress, the Secretary of the 
Treasury may require U.S. financial institutions to block 
certain financial transactions involving assets of the foreign 
organizations proposed for designation. Section 303 of the Act 
makes it a crime for persons within the U.S. or subject to U.S. 
jurisdiction to knowingly provide material support or resources 
to a foreign terrorist organization designated under section 
302. Additionally, except as authorized by the Treasury 
Department, institutions in possession or control of funds in 
which a foreign terrorist organization or its agent has an 
interest are required to block such funds and file reports in 
accordance with Treasury Department regulations.
    The first baseline document (Tab 1) is the list of Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations (``FTOs'') designated by the Secretary 
of State on October 8, 1997 pursuant to the Antiterrorism Act, 
which became effective on April 24, 1996 (Tab 2). The 
Antiterrorism Act authorizes the Secretary of State, in 
consultation with the Departments of the Treasury and Justice, 
to designate certain organizations as foreign terrorist 
organizations. Thirty groups worldwide were designated by the 
Secretary of State as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Notice 
of the groups that comprise the Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
(Tabs 1 and 14) are discussed in more detail in Part II.
    The second baseline document (Tab 2) is Executive Order 
12947, which became effective on January 24, 1995, and which 
blocks assets in the United States or within the possession or 
control of U.S. persons of terrorists who threaten to disrupt 
the Middle East Peace Process. Twelve Middle East terrorist 
groups were identified in the Executive order. Accompanying and 
subsequent notices of the groups and individuals who comprise 
the ``List of Specially Designated Terrorists Who Threaten To 
Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process'' (Tab 4), are discussed 
in more detail in Part II, which addresses international 
terrorists organizations, assets in the United States, and are 
included as individual attachments.
    The third baseline document (Tab 3) is Executive order 
13099, which became effective on August 25, 1998, and amended 
Executive Order 12947 by blocking the assets of three 
additional terrorists and one organization. Specifically, this 
order identifies Usama bin Muhammad bin Awad bin Ladin, the 
Islamic Army (and it's aliases), Abu Hafs al-Masri, and Rifa' i 
Ahmad Taha Musa as the individuals and organization added to 
the Annex of E.O. 12947.

          Part I--Known Assets of State Sponsors of Terrorism

    The following information describes the nature and extent 
of assets within United States jurisdiction that belong to 
countries identified as state sponsors of terrorism. These 
countries and the gross amounts of their reported U.S.-based 
assets are (in millions): Cuba--$170.6; Iran--$22.5; Iraq--
$2,200.2; Libya--$951.3; North Korea--$26.3; Sudan--$17.3; and 
Syria--$51.0. The total of their gross assets within U.S. 
jurisdiction is $3.439 billion dollars.
    The assets reported for Iran in Exhibit A are diplomatic 
properties remaining blocked since the 1979-81 hostage crisis. 
A variety of other obligations to Iran may ultimately be 
determined to exist, depending on the outcome of cases before 
the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.
    Almost ninety-nine percent of the known assets within U.S. 
jurisdiction of state sponsors of terrorism are blocked by the 
Department of the Treasury. However, not all of the blocked 
assets are literally within the United States. Substantial 
amounts, identified further below, are in foreign branches of 
U.S. banks. They are blocked because, under U.S. law, those 
bank branches are subject to United States jurisdiction. 
Consequently, those assets are not blocked at institutions 
within the United States.
    Changes in the value, location, and composition of the 
blocked assets identified below occur over time as OFAC 
receives reports from holders of blocked assets identifying 
additional assets of sanctioned countries, updates information 
received from holders of blocked accounts on accrued interest 
and fluctuating market values, or licenses various transactions 
in accordance with U.S. foreign policy objectives and 
applicable law.

                             Exhibit A: Known Assets of State Sponsors of Terrorism
                                      (amounts in millions of U.S. dollars)

           Country                       Amount                                 Explanation
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cuba                          $170.6                       Government of Cuba's blocked assets. Primarily bank
                                                            accounts Source: OFAC, Treasury.
                              (0.0)                        (Blocked in U.S. banks' foreign branches.)
                              $170.6                       Net Blocked Cuban Assets in U.S.

Iran                          $22.5                        Government of Iran's diplomatic properties remaining
                                                            blocked since the 1979-1981 hostage crisis.
                                                            Primarily real estate. Source: OFAC, Treasury.

Iraq                          $2,200.2                     Government of Iraq's blocked assets. Primarily bank
                                                            deposits. Source: OFAC, Treasury.
                              ($540.5)                     (Blocked in U.S. banks, foreign branches.)
                              ($211.0)                     (Loan to the United Nations in compliance with UNSCR
                                                            778.)
                              $1,448.7                     Net Blocked Iraqi Assets in U.S.

Libya                         $951.3                       Government of Libya's blocked assets. Primarily bank
                                                            deposits. Source: OFAC, Treasury.
                              ($1.1)                       (Blocked in U.S. banks' foreign branches.)
                              $950.2                       Net Blocked Libyan Assets in U.S.

North Korea                   $26.3                        North Korea's blocked bank deposits. Source: OFAC,
                                                            Treasury.
                              ($2.8)                       (Blocked in U.S. banks' foreign branches.)
                              $23.5                        Net Blocked North Korean Assets in U.S.

Sudan                         $17.3                        Sudan's blocked bank deposits. Source: OFAC,
                                                            Treasury.
                              (0.4)                        (Blocked in U.S. banks' foreign branches.)
                              $16.9                        Net Blocked Sudan Assets in U.S.

Syria                         $51.0                        Total liabilities of U.S. banking and non-banking
                                                            institutions to Syrian institutions. Source:
                                                            Treasury Bulletin, December 1998.

TOTALS:                       $3,439.2                     Total state sponsor assets within U.S. jurisdiction.
                              ($51.0)                      (Unencumbered assets of Syria.)
                             -----------------------------
                              $3,388.2                     Total blocked state sponsor assets within U.S.
                                                            jurisdiction.
                              ($544.8)                     (Total blocked in U.S. banks' foreign branches.)
                              ($211.0)                     (UNSCR 778 loan [Iraq].)
                             =============================
                              $2,632.4                     Total blocked state sponsor assets within the United
                                                            States.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Part II--Assets of International Terrorist Organizations

    On January 23, 1995, President declared a national 
emergency pursuant to IEEPA (50 U.S.C. Sec. 1701 et seq.) and 
other authorities and signed Executive Order 12947, 
``Prohibiting Transactions With Terrorists Who Threaten To 
Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process.'' Twelve Middle East 
terrorist organizations were named in the annex to the 
Order.\1\ The Order prohibits transfers, including ``charitable 
contributions,'' of funds, goods, or services to any 
organizations or individuals designated under its authority; 
and it blocks all property in the United States or within the 
possession or control of a U.S. person in which there is an 
interest of any designated terrorist.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Tab 2--Executive Order 12947, 60 Federal Register 5-79 (January 
25, 1995). The terrorist organizations identified in the Annex as 
originally published are: (1) Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), (2) 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), (3) Hizballah, 
(4) Islamic Gama' at (IG), (5) Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS), (6) 
Jihad, (7) Kach, (8) Kahane Chai, (9) Palestinian Islamic Jihad--
Shiqaqi faction (PIJ), (10) Palestine Liberation Front--Abu Abbas 
faction (PFL-Abu Abbas), (11) Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP), and (1) Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine--General Command (PFLP-GC).
    On January 18, 1996, and again on January 21, 1997, January 21, 
1998, and January 21, 1999 President Clinton signed a Notice that 
continues the national emergency with respect to foreign terrorists who 
threaten to disrupt the Middle East Peace Process. Those Notices (Tabs 
8, 9, 10, and 11 of this report) were published on January 21, 1996, 
(61 Federal Register 1695), January 23, 1997, (62 Federal Register 
3439), January 22, 1998, (63 Federal Register 3445), and January 22, 
1999, (64 Federal Register 3393), respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Order also applies to persons determined by the 
Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary 
of State and the Attorney General, to be owned or controlled 
by, or to act for or on behalf of, any person designated under 
the order. Collectively, these prohibited persons are known as 
``Specially Designated Terrorists'' or ``SDTs.'' A concurrent 
notice from Treasury published 31 pseudonyms and name 
variations for the twelve terrorist organizations and added the 
identities of 18 individuals who have important roles with the 
terrorist groups.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Tab 4--60 Federal Register 5084 (January 25, 1995). This 
Federal Register Notice of the Specially Designated Terrorists List 
included the 12 organizations named in E.O. 12947, 31 pseudonyms and 
name variations for the groups, and 18 key individuals, including 9 
aliases for them. See Tabs 5, 6 and 7 for additional individuals who 
have been added to the SDT list.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Order also blocks the property and interests in 
property of persons found by the Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury and the 
Attorney General, (1) to have committed, or to pose a 
significant risk of committed acts of violence that have the 
purpose or effect of disrupting the Middle East Peace, or (2) 
to be assisting in, sponsoring or providing financial, 
material, or technological support for, or services in support 
of, terrorist activities.
    On August 20, 1998, President Clinton signed Executive 
Order 13099, ``Prohibiting Transactions With Terrorists Who 
Threaten To Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process'' (Tab 3) to 
amend E.O. 12947 by adding three individuals and one 
organization to the annex of E.O. 12947:

  Usama bin Muhammad bin Awad bin Ladin
  Islamic Army (and it's aliases)
  Abu Hafs al-Masri
  Rifa' i Ahmad Taha Musa

Executive Order 13099 was issued under the same authority as 
E.O. 12947.
    SDT Blockings under E.O. 12947 and E.O. 13099. Total 
current blockings by OFAC under the terrorism Executive orders 
are $24.4 million. These blockings involve assets of 
individuals added to the list of Specially Designated 
Terrorists subsequent to the publication of the first SDT list 
in January 1995. Accounts of agents acting on behalf of the 
terrorist organization HAMAS \3\ are blocked in U.S. banks; and 
$200,000 \4\ of their U.S. real estate holdings are blocked. On 
June 9, 1998, the Department of Justice seized both the real 
estate holdings and the bank accounts of an SDT under an asset 
forfeiture statute. The matter is still pending in the Northern 
District of Illinois.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Tab 5--The designation of Mohammad Abd El-Hamid Khalil SALAH as 
a Specially Designated Terrorist was published in the Federal Register 
on August 11, 1995. (60 Federal Register 41152).
    Tab 6--The designation of Mousa Mohammed ABU MARZOOK as Specially 
Designated Terrorist was published in the Federal Register on August 
29, 1995. (60 Federal Register 44932). The Israeli government had 
requested MARZOOK's extradition, but after the Israelis dropped their 
request, he was released from a jail in New York and went to Jordan.
    \4\ Two properties valued at $260,000 and that were blocked in 
August 1995, were sold in the summer of 1998. OFAC learned of the sale 
subsequently. OFAC enforcement action is pending.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Furthermore, a bank account belonging to Ramadan Abdullah 
SHALLAH,\5\ the head of the terrorist organization Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad (PIJ), has been blocked; and a related 
organization's account over which SHALLAH has held signature 
authority has been blocked. In addition, approximately $23.6 
million in funds are currently blocked based upon an interest 
of Usama Bin Ladin.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Tab 7--The designation of Dr. Ramadan Abdullah SHALLAH as a 
Specially Designated Terrorist was published in the Federal Register on 
November 27, 1995. (60 Federal Register 58435).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The following chart (Exhibit B) details the assets of 
international terrorist organizations that have been blocked 
pursuant to E.O. 12947 and E.O. 13099.

                                 Exhibit B: Blocked Assets Under the SDT Program

       SDT Organization                   Description                       Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hamas                           Bank Accounts                   $196,116.26
                                Credit/Debit Cards              $671.83
                                Real Estate                     $460,000.00
                                                               ---------------------------------
                                Total (Hamas)                   $656,788.09

Palestinian Islamic Jihad       Bank Accounts                   $18,293.31

Usama bin Ladin                 ..............................  $23,685,731.30
                                                               ---------------------------------
Total blocked assets of SDTs                                    $24,360,812.70
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On April 24, 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (``Antiterrorism Act'') 
(Tab 12) which in part prohibits persons within the U.S. or 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States from knowingly 
providing material support or resources to a foreign terrorist 
organization.\6\ Pursuant to the Antiterrorism Act, on October 
8, 1997, 30 organizations were designated by the Secretary of 
State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and 
the Attorney General, as Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
(``FTOs'') (Tab 1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Tab 12, Section 303.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The 30 FTOs include the 12 Middle East terrorist 
organizations previously designated under Executive Order 12947 
and 18 other foreign organizations in South America, Europe, 
and Asia. Subsequent to the State Department's designation, the 
Treasury Department published a duplicate list of the 30 FTOs 
(Tab 14) in the Federal Register \7\ in furtherance of section 
303 of the Antiterrorism Act which was implemented in part by 
the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations (31 
CFR Part 597) published on October 8, 1997 (62 Federal Register 
52493).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Tab 1--62 Federal Register 52650 (October 8, 1997). The 30 
Foreign Terrorists Organizations designated by the Department of State 
are: (1) Abu Nidal Organization, (2) Abu Sayyaf Group, (3) Armed 
Islamic Group, (4) Aum Shinrikyo, (5) Democratic Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine, (6) Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna, (7) Gama'a al-
Islamiyya, (8) HAMAS, (9) Harakat ul-Ansar, (10) Hizballah, (11) 
Japanese Red Army, (12) al-Jihad, (13) Kach, (14) Kahane Chai, (15) 
Khmer Rouge, (16) Kurdistan Worker's Party, (17) Liberation Tigers, 
(18) Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front Dissidents, (19) Mujahedin-e 
Khalq Organization, (20) National Liberation Army, (21) Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad--Shaqaqi Faction, (22) Palestine Liberation Front--Abu 
Abbas Faction, (23) Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, (24) 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine--General Command, (25) 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, (26) Revolutionary Organization 
17 November, (27) Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front, (28) 
Revolutionary People's Struggle, (29) Shining Path, and (30) Tupac 
Amaru Revolutionary Movement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Section 302 of the Antiterrorism Act requires U.S. 
financial institutions to block financial transactions 
involving a proposed FTO's assets pursuant to an order of the 
Secretary of the Treasury. Pursuant to Section 303 of the 
Antiterrorism Act, financial institutions must retain or 
control those funds in which an FTO has an interest and report 
that information to the Treasury Department.
    FTO Blockings under the Antiterrorism Act. To date, the 
Treasury Department has not blocked any financial transactions 
under the Antiterrorism Act. All blockings of foreign terrorist 
assets to date have occurred in the SDT program under the 
authority of IEEPA and Executive Orders 12947 and 13099. The 
Treasury Department continues to work closely with other 
agencies in seeking information concerning possible assets 
within the jurisdiction of the United States in which there may 
be an interest of any of the 30 FTOs.

                  b. Office of Foreign Assets Control

       (1) Terrorism: What You Need to Know about U.S. Sanctions

A summary of the ``Terrorism Sanctions Regulations,'' Title 31 Part 595 
     of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, the ``Terrorism List 
Governments Sanctions Regulations,'' Title 31 Part 596 of the U.S. Code 
   of Federal Regulations, and the ``Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
Sanctions Regulations,'' Title 31 Part 597 of the U.S. Code of Federal 
                              Regulations.

                    Terrorism Sanctions Regulations

    On January 23, 1995, President Clinton signed Executive 
Order 12947, ``Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists Who 
Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process.'' The Order 
blocked all property subject to U.S. jurisdiction in which 
there is any interest of 12 Middle East terrorist organizations 
included in an Annex to the Order. On August 21, 1998, the 
President amended Executive Order 12947, adding additional 
names. Executive Order 12947 blocks the property and interests 
in property of persons designated by the Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the Secretary of Treasury and the Attorney 
General, who are found (1) to have committed or to pose a 
significant risk of disrupting the Middle East peace process, 
or (2) to assist in, sponsor or provide financial, material, or 
technological support for, or services in support of, such acts 
of violence. The Order further blocks all property and 
interests in property subject to U.S. jurisdiction in which 
there is any interest of persons determined by the Secretary of 
the Treasury, in coordination with the Secretary of State and 
the Attorney General, to be owned or controlled by, or to act 
for or on behalf of any other person designated pursuant to the 
Order (collectively ``Specially Designated Terrorists'' or 
``SDTs''), designated by an ``[SDT]'' in the list at the end of 
this publication. The Order prohibits any transaction or 
dealing by a United States person or within the United States 
in property or interests in property of SDTs, including the 
making or receiving of any contribution of funds, goods, or 
services to or for the benefit of such persons. In 
implementation the Treasury Department has issued the Terrorism 
Sanctions Regulations.
    Blockings must be reported within 10 days by fax to OFAC's 
Compliance Programs Division at 202/622-1657. Blocked accounts 
must be interest-bearing, at rates similar to those currently 
offered other depositors on deposits of comparable size and 
maturity. Maturities on blocked accounts may not exceed 90 
days. Debits to blocked customer accounts are prohibited, 
although credits are authorized.
    Corporate criminal penalties for violations of the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act range up to 
$500,000; individual penalties range up to $250,000 and 10 
years in jail. Civil penalties of up to $11,000 may also be 
imposed administratively.

            Terrorism List Governments Sanctions Regulations

    On April 24, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Public 
Law 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214-1319. Section 321 of the Act makes 
it a criminal offense for U.S. persons, except as provided in 
regulations issued by the Secretary of the Treasury in 
consultation with the Secretary of State, to engage in 
financial transactions with the governments of countries 
designated under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act 
of 1979, 50 U.S.C. App. 2405, as supporting international 
terrorism. U.S. persons who engage in such transactions are 
subject to criminal penalties under title 18, United States 
Code. In implementation of section 321, the Treasury Department 
has issued the Terrorism List Governments Sanctions 
Regulations.
    The countries currently designated under section 6(j) of 
the Export Administration Act are Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, 
North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. The provisions of existing OFAC 
regulations governing Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea 
continue in effect with the added authority of section 321. 
Financial transactions of U.S. persons with the governments of 
those five countries are governed by the separate parts of 
Title 31 Chapter V of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations 
imposing economic sanctions on those countries and information 
about those programs is available in separate OFAC brochures.
    Regarding the governments of countries designated under 
section 6(j) that are not otherwise subject to economic 
sanctions administered by OFAC, at present the government of 
Syria, the Terrorism List Governments Sanctions Regulations 
prohibit U.S. persons from receiving unlicensed donations and 
from engaging in financial transactions with respect to which 
the U.S. person knows or has reasonable cause to believe that 
the financial transaction poses a risk of furthering terrorist 
acts in the United States. Banks located in the United States 
and U.S. banks located offshore must reject transfers in the 
form of gifts or charitable contributions from the government 
of Syria, or from entities owned or controlled by the 
government of Syria, unless the bank knows or has reasonable 
cause to believe that the transaction poses a risk of 
furthering terrorism in the United States, in which case the 
funds must be retained by the bank. Banks should immediately 
notify OFAC Compliance about any retained items. Reject items 
must be reported within 10 business days of rejection. For the 
purposes of this program only, a financial transaction not 
originated by the government of Syria (including its central 
bank and government owned-or-controlled banks acting for their 
own accounts), but transferred to the United States through one 
of those banks, is not considered to be a prohibited financial 
transaction with the government of Syria.

         Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations

    Section 302 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 also authorizes the Secretary of State to 
designate organizations as ``Foreign Terrorist Organizations'' 
(``FTOs''). The Act makes it a criminal offense for U.S. 
persons to provide material support or resources to FTOs and 
requires financial institutions to block all funds in which 
FTOs or their agents have an interest. The term ``financial 
institutions'' comes from 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(2) and is defined 
very broadly. Among the types of businesses covered by 
Treasury's Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions 
Regulations, which implement Section 302 of the Act, are banks, 
securities and commodities broker/dealers, investment 
companies, currency exchanges, issuers, redeemers, and cashiers 
of traveler's checks, checks, money orders, or similar 
instruments, credit card system operators, insurance companies, 
dealers in precious metals, stones or jewels, pawnbrokers, loan 
and finance companies, travel agencies, licensed money 
transmitters, telegraph companies, businesses engaged in 
vehicle sales, including automobile, airplane or boat sales, 
persons involved in real estate closings or settlements, and 
casinos. Such ``financial institutions'' must notify OFAC 
Compliance about any blocked funds within ten days of blocking. 
The Act provides for civil penalties to be assessed against 
financial institutions for failing to block or report the 
blocking of FTO funds in an amount equal to $50,000 per 
violation or twice the amount which ought to have been blocked 
or reported, whichever is greater. Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations and their agents are identified by an ``[FTO]'' 
in the list which follows.
    Named Terrorist Organizations
17 NOVEMBER (a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION 17 NOVEMBER; 
        a.k.a. EPANASTATIKI ORGANOSI 17 NOEMVRI) [FTO]
A.I.C. COMPREHENSIVE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (a.k.a. AUM SUPREME 
        TRUTH; a.k.a. A.I.C. SOGO KENKYUSHO; a.k.a. AUM 
        SHINRIKYO) [FTO]
A.I.C. SOGO KENKYUSHO (a.k.a. AUM SUPREME TRUTH; a.k.a. AUM 
        SHINRIKYO; a.k.a. A.I.C. COMPREHENSIVE RESEARCH 
        INSTITUTE) [FTO]
ABU GHUNAYM SQUAD OF THE HIZBALLAH BAYT AL-MAQDIS (a.k.a. PIJ-
        SHAQAQI FACTION; a.k.a. PIJ; a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD IN 
        PALESTINE; a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD OF PALESTINE; a.k.a. 
        PALESTINE ISLAMIC JIHAD - SHAQAQI FACTION) [SDT] [FTO]
ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION (a.k.a. ANO; a.k.a. BLACK SEPTEMBER; 
        a.k.a. FATAH REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL; a.k.a. ARAB 
        REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL; a.k.a. ARAB REVOLUTIONARY 
        BRIGADES; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION OF 
        SOCIALIST MUSLIMS) [SDT] [FTO]
ABU SAYYAF GROUP (a.k.a. AL HARAKAT AL ISLAMIYYA) [FTO] AIG 
        (a.k.a. GIA; a.k.a. GROUPEMENT ISLAMIQUE ARME; a.k.a. 
        ARMED ISLAMIC GROUP; a.k.a. AL-JAMA'AH AL-ISLAMIYAH AL-
        MUSALLAH) [FTO]
AIIB (a.k.a. NIPPON SEKIGUN; a.k.a. NIHON SEKIGUN; a.k.a. ANTI-
        IMPERIALIST INTERNATIONAL BRIGADE; a.k.a. HOLY WAR 
        BRIGADE; a.k.a. ANTI-WAR DEMOCRATIC FRONT; a.k.a. JRA; 
        a.k.a. JAPANESE RED ARMY) [FTO]
AL-FARAN (a.k.a. HUA; a.k.a. AL-HADID; a.k.a. AL-HADITH; a.k.a. 
        HARAKAT UL-ANSAR) [FTO]
AL-GAMA'AT (a.k.a. ISLAMIC GROUP; a.k.a. IG; a.k.a. EGYPTIAN 
        AL-GAMA'AT AL-ISLAMIYYA; a.k.a. ISLAMIC GAMA'AT; a.k.a. 
        GAMA'A AL-ISLAMIYYA) [SDT] [FTO]
AL-HADID (a.k.a. HUA; a.k.a. HARAKAT UL-ANSAR; a.k.a. AL-
        HADITH; a.k.a. AL-FARAN) [FTO]
AL-HADITH (a.k.a. HUA; a.k.a. AL-HADID; a.k.a. HARAKAT UL-
        ANSAR; a.k.a. AL-FARAN) [FTO]
AL HARAKAT AL ISLAMIYYA (a.k.a. ABU SAYYAF GROUP) [FTO]
AL-JAMA'AH AL-ISLAMIYAH AL-MUSALLAH (a.k.a. GIA; a.k.a. 
        GROUPEMENT ISLAMIQUE ARME; a.k.a. AIG; a.k.a. ARMED 
        ISLAMIC GROUP) [FTO]
AL-JIHAD (a.k.a. EGYPTIAN AL-JIHAD; a.k.a. VANGUARDS OF 
        CONQUEST; a.k.a. VANGUARDS OF VICTORY; a.k.a. TALAI'I 
        AL-FATH; a.k.a. TALA'AH AL-FATAH; a.k.a. TALA'AL AL-
        FATEH; a.k.a. TALA' AL-FATEH; a.k.a. TALAAH AL-FATAH; 
        a.k.a. TALA'AL-FATEH; a.k.a. NEW JIHAD; a.k.a. EGYPTIAN 
        ISLAMIC JIHAD; a.k.a. JIHAD GROUP) [SDT] [FTO]
AL-QAIDA (a.k.a. ISLAMIC ARMY; a.k.a. ISLAMIC SALVATION 
        FOUNDATION; a.k.a. THE GROUP FOR THE PRESERVATION OF 
        THE HOLY SITES; a.k.a. THE ISLAMIC ARMY FOR THE 
        LIBERATION OF THE HOLY PLACES; a.k.a. THE WORLD ISLAMIC 
        FRONT FOR JIHAD AGAINST JEWS AND CRUSADERS) [SDT]
ANO (a.k.a. ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION; a.k.a. BLACK SEPTEMBER; 
        a.k.a. FATAH REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL; a.k.a. ARAB 
        REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL; a.k.a. ARAB REVOLUTIONARY 
        BRIGADES; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION OF 
        SOCIALIST MUSLIMS) [SDT] [FTO]
ANSAR ALLAH (a.k.a. HIZBALLAH; a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD; a.k.a. 
        ISLAMIC JIHAD ORGANIZATION; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY 
        JUSTICE ORGANIZATION; a.k.a. ORGANIZATION OF THE 
        OPPRESSED ON EARTH; a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD FOR THE 
        LIBERATION OF PALESTINE; a.k.a. ORGANIZATION OF RIGHT 
        AGAINST WRONG; a.k.a. PARTY OF GOD; a.k.a. FOLLOWERS OF 
        THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD) [SDT] [FTO]
ANTI-IMPERIALIST INTERNATIONAL BRIGADE (a.k.a. NIPPON SEKIGUN; 
        a.k.a. NIHON SEKIGUN; a.k.a. JAPANESE RED ARMY; a.k.a. 
        HOLY WAR BRIGADE; a.k.a. ANTI-WAR DEMOCRATIC FRONT; 
        a.k.a. JRA; a.k.a. AIIB) [FTO]
ANTI-WAR DEMOCRATIC FRONT (a.k.a. NIPPON SEKIGUN; a.k.a. NIHON 
        SEKIGUN; a.k.a. ANTI-IMPERIALIST INTERNATIONAL BRIGADE; 
        a.k.a. HOLY WAR BRIGADE; a.k.a. JAPANESE RED ARMY; 
        a.k.a. JRA; a.k.a. AIIB) [FTO]
ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES (a.k.a. ANO; a.k.a. BLACK 
        SEPTEMBER; a.k.a. FATAH REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL; a.k.a. 
        ARAB REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL; a.k.a. ABU NIDAL 
        ORGANIZATION; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY ORGAIZATION OF 
        SOCIALIST MUSLIMS) [SDT] [FTO]
ARAB REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL (a.k.a. ANO; a.k.a. BLACK SEPTEMBER; 
        a.k.a. FATAH REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL; a.k.a. ABU NIDAL 
        ORGANIZATION; a.k.a. ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES; 
        a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION OF SOCIALIST MUSLIMS) 
        [SDT] [FTO]
ARMED ISLAMIC GROUP (a.k.a. GIA; a.k.a. GROUPEMENT ISLAMIQUE 
        ARME; a.k.a. AIG; a.k.a. AL-JAMA'AH AL-ISLAMIYAH AL-
        MUSALLAH) [FTO]
AUM SHINRIKYO (a.k.a. AUM SUPREME TRUTH; a.k.a. A.I.C. SOGO 
        KENKYUSHO; a.k.a. A.I.C. COMPREHENSIVE RESEARCH 
        INSTITUTE) [FTO]
AUM SUPREME TRUTH (a.k.a. AUM SHINRIKYO; a.k.a. A.I.C. SOGO 
        KENKYUSHO; a.k.a. A.I.C. COMPREHENSIVE RESEARCH 
        INSTITUTE) [FTO]
BASQUE FATHERLAND AND LIBERTY (a.k.a. ETA; a.k.a. EUZKADI TA 
        ASKATASUNA)[FTO]
BLACK SEPTEMBER (a.k.a. ANO; a.k.a. ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION; 
        a.k.a. FATAH REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL; a.k.a. ARAB 
        REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL; a.k.a. ARAB REVOLUTIONARY 
        BRIGADES; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION OF 
        SOCIALIST MUSLIMS) [SDT] [FTO]
COMMITTEE FOR THE SAFETY OF THE ROADS (a.k.a. REPRESSION OF 
        TRAITORS; a.k.a. KACH; a.k.a. DIKUY BOGDIM; a.k.a. 
        STATE OF JUDEA; a.k.a. DOV; a.k.a. SWORD OF DAVID; 
        a.k.a. JUDEA POLICE) [SDT] [FTO]
DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (a.k.a. 
        DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE - 
        HAWATMEH FACTION; a.k.a. DFLP; a.k.a. RED STAR FORCES; 
        a.k.a. RED STAR BATTALIONS) [SDT] [FTO]
DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE - HAWATMEH 
        FACTION (a.k.a. DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF 
        PALESTINE; a.k.a. DFLP; a.k.a. RED STAR FORCES; a.k.a. 
        RED STAR BATTALIONS) [SDT] [FTO]
DEV SOL (a.k.a. DEVRIMCI HALK KURTULUS PARTISI-CEPHESI; a.k.a. 
        DHKP/C; a.k.a. DEVRIMCI SOL; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY LEFT; 
        a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S LIBERATION PARTY/FRONT; 
        a.k.a. DEV SOL SILAHLI DEVRIMCI BIRLIKLERI; a.k.a. DEV 
        SOL SDB; a.k.a. DEV SOL ARMED REVOLUTIONARY UNITS) 
        [FTO]
DEV SOL ARMED REVOLUTIONARY UNITS (a.k.a. DEVRIMCI HALK 
        KURTULUS PARTISI-CEPHESI; a.k.a. DHKP/C; a.k.a. 
        DEVRIMCI SOL; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY LEFT; a.k.a. DEV 
        SOL; a.k.a. DEV SOL SILAHLI DEVRIMCI BIRLIKLERI; a.k.a. 
        DEV SOL SDB; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S LIBERATION 
        PARTY/FRONT) [FTO]
DEV SOL SDB (a.k.a. DEVRIMCI HALK KURTULUS PARTISI-CEPHESI; 
        a.k.a. DHKP/C; a.k.a. DEVRIMCI SOL; a.k.a. 
        REVOLUTIONARY LEFT; a.k.a. DEV SOL; a.k.a. DEV SOL 
        SILAHLI DEVRIMCI BIRLIKLERI; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY 
        PEOPLE'S LIBERATION PARTY/FRONT; a.k.a. DEV SOL ARMED 
        REVOLUTIONARY UNITS) [FTO]
DEV SOL SILAHLI DEVRIMCI BIRLIKLERI (a.k.a. DEVRIMCI HALK 
        KURTULUS PARTISI-CEPHESI; a.k.a. DHKP/C; a.k.a. 
        DEVRIMCI SOL; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY LEFT; a.k.a. DEV 
        SOL; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S LIBERATION PARTY/
        FRONT; a.k.a. DEV SOL SDB; a.k.a. DEV SOL ARMED 
        REVOLUTIONARY UNITS) [FTO]
DEVRIMCI HALK KURTULUS PARTISI-CEPHESI (a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY 
        PEOPLE'S LIBERATION PARTY/FRONT; a.k.a. DHKP/C; a.k.a. 
        DEVRIMCI SOL; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY LEFT; a.k.a. DEV 
        SOL; a.k.a. DEV SOL SILAHLI DEVRIMCI BIRLIKLERI; a.k.a. 
        DEV SOL SDB; a.k.a. DEV SOL ARMED REVOLUTIONARY UNITS) 
        [FTO]
DEVRIMCI SOL (a.k.a. DEVRIMCI HALK KURTULUS PARTISI-CEPHESI; 
        a.k.a. DHKP/C; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S LIBERATION 
        PARTY/FRONT; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY LEFT; a.k.a. DEV SOL; 
        a.k.a. DEV SOL SILAHLI DEVRIMCI BIRLIKLERI; a.k.a. DEV 
        SOL SDB; a.k.a. DEV SOL ARMED REVOLUTIONARY UNITS) 
        [FTO]
DFLP (a.k.a. DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE; 
        a.k.a. DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE 
        - HAWATMEH FACTION; a.k.a. RED STAR FORCES; a.k.a. RED 
        STAR BATTALIONS) [SDT] [FTO]
DHKP/C (a.k.a. DEVRIMCI HALK KURTULUS PARTISI-CEPHESI; a.k.a. 
        REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S LIBERATION PARTY/FRONT; a.k.a. 
        DEVRIMCI SOL; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY LEFT; a.k.a. DEV 
        SOL; a.k.a. DEV SOL SILAHLI DEVRIMCI BIRLIKLERI; a.k.a. 
        DEV SOL SDB; a.k.a. DEV SOL ARMED REVOLUTIONARY UNITS) 
        [FTO]
DIKUY BOGDIM (a.k.a. REPRESSION OF TRAITORS; a.k.a. KACH; 
        a.k.a. DOV; a.k.a. STATE OF JUDEA; a.k.a. COMMITTEE FOR 
        THE SAFETY OF THE ROADS; a.k.a. SWORD OF DAVID; a.k.a. 
        JUDEA POLICE) [SDT] [FTO]
DOV (a.k.a. REPRESSION OF TRAITORS; a.k.a. KACH; a.k.a. DIKUY 
        BOGDIM; a.k.a. STATE OF JUDEA; a.k.a. COMMITTEE FOR THE 
        SAFETY OF THE ROADS; a.k.a. SWORD OF DAVID; a.k.a. 
        JUDEA POLICE) [SDT] [FTO]
EGP (a.k.a. SENDERO LUMINOSO; a.k.a. SL; a.k.a. PARTIDO 
        COMUNISTA DEL PERU EN EL SENDERO LUMINOSO DE JOSE 
        CARLOS MARIATGUI (COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU ON THE 
        SHINING PATH OF JOSE CARLOS MARIATEGUI); a.k.a. PARTIDO 
        COMUNISTA DEL PERU (COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU); a.k.a. 
        PCP; a.k.a. SOCORRO POPULAR DEL PERU (PEOPLE'S AID OF 
        PERU); a.k.a. SPP; a.k.a EJERCITO GUERRILLERO POPULAR 
        (PEOPLE'S GUERRILLA ARMY); a.k.a. SHINING PATH; a.k.a. 
        EJERCITO POPULAR DE LIBERACION (PEOPLE'S LIBERATION 
        ARMY); a.k.a. EPL) [FTO]
EGYPTIAN AL-GAMA'AT AL-ISLAMIYYA (a.k.a. ISLAMIC GROUP; a.k.a. 
        IG; a.k.a. AL-GAMA'AT; a.k.a. ISLAMIC GAMA'AT; a.k.a. 
        GAMA'A AL-ISLAMIYYA) [SDT] [FTO]
EGYPTIAN AL-JIHAD (a.k.a. AL-JIHAD; a.k.a. VANGUARDS OF 
        CONQUEST; a.k.a. VANGUARDS OF VICTORY; a.k.a. TALAI'I 
        AL-FATH; a.k.a. TALA'AH AL-FATAH; a.k.a. TALA'AL AL-
        FATEH; a.k.a. TALA' AL-FATEH; a.k.a. TALAAH AL-FATAH; 
        a.k.a. TALA'AL-FATEH; a.k.a. NEW JIHAD; a.k.a. EGYPTIAN 
        ISLAMIC JIHAD; a.k.a. JIHAD GROUP) [SDT] [FTO]
EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD (a.k.a. EGYPTIAN AL-JIHAD; a.k.a. 
        VANGUARDS OF CONQUEST; a.k.a. VANGUARDS OF VICTORY; 
        a.k.a. TALAI'I AL-FATH; a.k.a. TALA'AH AL-FATAH; a.k.a. 
        TALA'AL AL-FATEH; a.k.a. TALA' AL-FATEH; a.k.a. TALAAH 
        AL-FATAH; a.k.a. TALA'AL-FATEH; a.k.a. NEW JIHAD; 
        a.k.a. AL-JIHAD; a.k.a. JIHAD GROUP) [SDT] [FTO]
EJERCITO DE LIBERACION NACIONAL (a.k.a. NATIONAL LIBERATION 
        ARMY; a.k.a. ELN) [FTO]
EJERCITO GUERRILLERO POPULAR (PEOPLE'S GUERRILLA ARMY) (a.k.a. 
        SENDERO LUMINOSO; a.k.a. SL; a.k.a. PARTIDO COMUNISTA 
        DEL PERU EN EL SENDERO LUMINOSO DE JOSE CARLOS 
        MARIATEGUI (COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU ON THE SHINING PATH 
        OF JOSE CARLOS MARIATEGUI); a.k.a. PARTIDO COMUNISTA 
        DEL PERU (COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU); a.k.a. PCP; a.k.a. 
        SOCORRO POPULAR DEL PERU (PEOPLE'S AID OF PERU); a.k.a. 
        SPP; a.k.a SHINING PATH; a.k.a. EGP; a.k.a. EJERCITO 
        POPULAR DE LIBERACION (PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY); 
        a.k.a. EPL) [FTO]
EJERCITO POPULAR DE LIBERACION (PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY) 
        (a.k.a. SENDERO LUMINOSO; a.k.a. SL; a.k.a. PARTIDO 
        COMUNISTA DEL PERU EN EL SENDERO LUMINOSO DE JOSE 
        CARLOS MARIATEGUI (COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU ON THE 
        SHINING PATH OF JOSE CARLOS MARIATEGUI); a.k.a. PARTIDO 
        COMUNISTA DEL PERU (COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU); a.k.a. 
        PCP; a.k.a. SOCORRO POPULAR DEL PERU (PEOPLE'S AID OF 
        PERU); a.k.a. SPP; a.k.a EJERCITO GUERRILLERO POPULAR 
        (PEOPLE'S GUERRILLA ARMY); a.k.a. EGP; a.k.a. SHINING 
        PATH ; a.k.a. EPL) [FTO]
ELA (a.k.a. POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE; a.k.a. 
        EPANASTATIKOS LAIKOS AGONAS; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY 
        POPULAR STRUGGLE; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S 
        STRUGGLE) [FTO]
ELLALAN FORCE (a.k.a. LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM; a.k.a. 
        LTTE; a.k.a. TAMIL TIGERS) [FTO]
ELN (a.k.a. NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY; a.k.a. EJERCITO DE 
        LIBERACION NACIONAL) [FTO]
EPANASTATIKI ORGANOSI 17 NOEMVRI (a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY 
        ORGANIZATION 17 NOVEMBER; a.k.a. 17 NOVEMBER) [FTO]
EPANASTATIKOS LAIKOS AGONAS (a.k.a. POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY 
        STRUGGLE; a.k.a. ELA; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY POPULAR 
        STRUGGLE; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE) [FTO]
EPL (a.k.a. SENDERO LUMINOSO; a.k.a. SL; a.k.a. PARTIDO 
        COMUNISTA DEL PERU EN EL SENDERO LUMINOSO DE JOSE 
        CARLOS MARIATEGUI (COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU ON THE 
        SHINING PATH OF JOSE CARLOS MARIATEGUI); a.k.a. PARTIDO 
        COMUNISTA DEL PERU (COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU); a.k.a. 
        PCP; a.k.a. SOCORRO POPULAR DEL PERU (PEOPLE'S AID OF 
        PERU); a.k.a. SPP; a.k.a EJERCITO GUERRILLERO POPULAR 
        (PEOPLE'S GUERRILLA ARMY); a.k.a. EGP; a.k.a. EJERCITO 
        POPULAR DE LIBERACION (PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY); 
        a.k.a. SHINING PATH) [FTO]
ETA (a.k.a. EUZKADI TA ASKATASUNA; a.k.a. BASQUE FATHERLAND AND 
        LIBERTY) [FTO]
EUZKADI TA ASKATASUNA (a.k.a. BASQUE FATHERLAND AND LIBERTY; 
        a.k.a. ETA) [FTO]
FARC (a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA; a.k.a. 
        FUERZAS ARMADAS REVOLUCIONARIAS DE COLOMBIA) [FTO]
FATAH REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL (a.k.a. ANO; a.k.a. BLACK 
        SEPTEMBER; a.k.a. ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION a.k.a. ARAB 
        REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL; a.k.a. ARAB REVOLUTIONARY 
        BRIGADES; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION OF 
        SOCIALIST MUSLIMS) [SDT] [FTO]
FOLLOWERS OF THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD (a.k.a. HIZBALLAH; a.k.a. 
        ISLAMIC JIHAD; a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD ORGANIZATION; 
        a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE ORGANIZATION; a.k.a. 
        ORGANIZATION OF THE OPPRESSED ON EARTH; a.k.a. ISLAMIC 
        JIHAD FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE; a.k.a. 
        ORGANIZATION OF RIGHT AGAINST WRONG; a.k.a. PARTY OF 
        GOD; a.k.a. ANAR ALLAH) [SDT] [FTO]
FPMR (a.k.a. MANUEL RODRIGUEZ PATRIOTIC FRONT DISSIDENTS; 
        a.k.a. FRENTE PATRIOTICO MANUEL RODRIGUEZ - AUTONOMOS; 
        a.k.a. FPMR/A; a.k.a. MANUEL RODRIGUEZ PATRIOTIC FRONT; 
        a.k.a. FRENTE PATRIOTICO MANUEL RODRIGUEZ; a.k.a. FPMR/
        D) [FTO]
FPMR/A (a.k.a. MANUEL RODRIGUEZ PATRIOTIC FRONT DISSIDENTS; 
        a.k.a. FRENTE PATRIOTICO MANUEL RODRIGUEZ - AUTONOMOS; 
        a.k.a. FPMR/D ; a.k.a. MANUEL RODRIGUEZ PATRIOTIC 
        FRONT; a.k.a. FRENTE PATRIOTICO MANUEL RODRIGUEZ; 
        a.k.a. FPMR) [FTO]
FPMR/D (a.k.a. MANUEL RODRIGUEZ PATRIOTIC FRONT DISSIDENTS; 
        a.k.a. FRENTE PATRIOTICO MANUEL RODRIGUEZ - AUTONOMOS; 
        a.k.a. FPMR/A; a.k.a. MANUEL RODRIGUEZ PATRIOTIC FRONT; 
        a.k.a. FRENTE PATRIOTICO MANUEL RODRIGUEZ; a.k.a. FPMR) 
        [FTO]
FRENTE PATRIOTICO MANUEL RODRIGUEZ (a.k.a. MANUEL RODRIGUEZ 
        PATRIOTIC FRONT DISSIDENTS; a.k.a. FRENTE PATRIOTICO 
        MANUEL RODRIGUEZ - AUTONOMOS; a.k.a. FPMR/D ; a.k.a. 
        MANUEL RODRIGUEZ PATRIOTIC FRONT; a.k.a. FPMR/A; a.k.a. 
        FPMR) [FTO]
FRENTE PATRIOTICO MANUEL RODRIGUEZ - AUTONOMOS (a.k.a. MANUEL 
        RODRIGUEZ PATRIOTIC FRONT DISSIDENTS; a.k.a. FPMR/D ; 
        a.k.a. FPMR/A; a.k.a. MANUEL RODRIGUEZ PATRIOTIC FRONT; 
        a.k.a. FRENTE PATRIOTICO MANUEL RODRIGUEZ; a.k.a. FPMR) 
        [FTO]
FUERZAS ARMADAS REVOLUCIONARIAS DE COLOMBIA (a.k.a. 
        REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA; a.k.a. FARC) 
        [FTO]
GAMA'A AL-ISLAMIYYA (a.k.a. ISLAMIC GROUP; a.k.a. IG; a.k.a. 
        AL-GAMA'AT; a.k.a. ISLAMIC GAMA'AT; a.k.a. EGYPTIAN AL-
        GAMA'AT AL-ISLAMIYYA) [SDT] [FTO]
GIA (a.k.a. ARMED ISLAMIC GROUP; a.k.a. GROUPEMENT ISLAMIQUE 
        ARME; a.k.a. AIG; a.k.a. AL-JAMA'AH AL-ISLAMIYAH AL-
        MUSALLAH) [FTO]
GROUP FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE HOLY SITES, THE (a.k.a. AL-
        QAIDA; a.k.a. ISLAMIC ARMY; a.k.a. ISLAMIC SALVATION 
        FOUNDATION; a.k.a. THE ISLAMIC ARMY FOR THE LIBERATION 
        OF THE HOLY PLACES; a.k.a. THE WORLD ISLAMIC FRONT FOR 
        JIHAD AGAINST JEWS AND CRUSADERS) [SDT] GROUPEMENT 
        ISLAMIQUE ARME (a.k.a. GIA; a.k.a. ARMED ISLAMIC GROUP; 
        a.k.a. AIG; a.k.a. AL-JAMA'AH AL-ISLAMIYAH AL-MUSALLAH) 
        [FTO]
HALHUL GANG (a.k.a. PFLP; a.k.a. RED EAGLES; a.k.a. RED EAGLE 
        GROUP; a.k.a. RED EAGLE GANG; a.k.a. POPULAR FRONT FOR 
        THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE; a.k.a. HALHUL SQUAD) [SDT] 
        [FTO]
HALHUL SQUAD (a.k.a. PFLP; a.k.a. RED EAGLES; a.k.a. RED EAGLE 
        GROUP; a.k.a. RED EAGLE GANG; a.k.a. HALHUL GANG; 
        a.k.a. POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE) 
        [SDT] [FTO]
HAMAS (a.k.a. ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT; a.k.a. HARAKAT AL-
        MUQAWAMA AL-ISLAMIYA; a.k.a. STUDENTS OF AYYASH; a.k.a. 
        STUDENTS OF THE ENGINEER; a.k.a. YAHYA AYYASH UNITS; 
        a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSIM BRIGADES; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN 
        AL-QASSIM FORCES; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSIM 
        BATTALIONS; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL QASSAM BRIGADES; 
        a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL QASSAM FORCES; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN 
        AL QASSAM BATTALIONS) [SDT] [FTO]
HARAKAT AL-MUQAWAMA AL-ISLAMIYA (a.k.a. ISLAMIC RESISTANCE 
        MOVEMENT; a.k.a. HAMAS; a.k.a. STUDENTS OF AYYASH; 
        a.k.a. STUDENTS OF THE ENGINEER; a.k.a. YAHYA AYYASH 
        UNITS; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSIM BRIGADES; a.k.a. IZZ 
        AL-DIN AL-QASSIM FORCES; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSIM 
        BATTALIONS; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL QASSAM BRIGADES; 
        a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL QASSAM FORCES; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN 
        AL QASSAM BATTALIONS) [SDT] [FTO]
HARAKAT UL-ANSAR (a.k.a. HUA; a.k.a. AL-HADID; a.k.a. AL-
        HADITH; a.k.a. AL-FARAN) [FTO]
HIZBALLAH (a.k.a. PARTY OF GOD; a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD; a.k.a. 
        ISLAMIC JIHAD ORGANIZATION; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY 
        JUSTICE ORGANIZATION; a.k.a. ORGANIZATION OF THE 
        OPPRESSED ON EARTH; a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD FOR THE 
        LIBERATION OF PALESTINE; a.k.a. ORGANIZATION OF RIGHT 
        AGAINST WRONG; a.k.a. ANSAR ALLAH; a.k.a. FOLLOWERS OF 
        THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD) [SDT] [FTO]
HOLY WAR BRIGADE (a.k.a. NIPPON SEKIGUN; a.k.a. NIHON SEKIGUN; 
        a.k.a. ANTI-IMPERIALIST INTERNATIONAL BRIGADE; a.k.a. 
        JAPANESE RED ARMY; a.k.a. ANTI-WAR DEMOCRATIC FRONT; 
        a.k.a. JRA; a.k.a. AIIB) [FTO]
HUA (a.k.a. HARAKAT UL-ANSAR; a.k.a. AL-HADID; a.k.a. AL-
        HADITH; a.k.a. AL-FARAN) [FTO]
IG (a.k.a. ISLAMIC GROUP; a.k.a. GAMA'A AL-ISLAMIYYA; a.k.a. 
        AL-GAMA'AT; a.k.a. ISLAMIC GAMA'AT; a.k.a. EGYPTIAN AL-
        GAMA'AT AL-ISLAMIYYA) [SDT] [FTO]
ISLAMIC ARMY (a.k.a. AL-QAIDA; a.k.a. ISLAMIC SALVATION 
        FOUNDATION; a.k.a. THE GROUP FOR THE PRESERVATION OF 
        THE HOLY SITES; a.k.a. THE ISLAMIC ARMY FOR THE 
        LIBERATION OF THE HOLY PLACES; a.k.a. THE WORLD ISLAMIC 
        FRONT FOR JIHAD AGAINST JEWS AND CRUSADERS) [SDT]
ISLAMIC ARMY FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE HOLY PLACES, THE (a.k.a. 
        AL- QAIDA; a.k.a. ISLAMIC ARMY; a.k.a. ISLAMIC 
        SALVATION FOUNDATION; a.k.a. THE GROUP FOR THE 
        PRESERVATION OF THE HOLY SITES; a.k.a. THE WORLD 
        ISLAMIC FRONT FOR JIHAD AGAINST JEWS AND CRUSADERS) 
        [SDT]
ISLAMIC GAMA'AT (a.k.a. ISLAMIC GROUP; a.k.a. IG; a.k.a. AL-
        GAMA'AT; a.k.a. GAMA'A AL-ISLAMIYYA; a.k.a. EGYPTIAN 
        AL-GAMA'AT AL-ISLAMIYYA) [SDT] [FTO]
ISLAMIC GROUP (a.k.a. EGYPTIAN AL-GAMA'AT AL-ISLAMIYYA; a.k.a. 
        IG; a.k.a. AL-GAMA'A; a.k.a. ISLAMIC GAMA'AT; a.k.a. 
        GAMA'A AL-ISLAMIYYA) [SDT] [FTO]
ISLAMIC JIHAD (a.k.a. PARTY OF GOD; a.k.a. HIZBALLAH; a.k.a. 
        ISLAMIC JIHAD ORGANIZATION; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY 
        JUSTICE ORGANIZATION; a.k.a. ORGANIZATION OF THE 
        OPPRESSED ON EARTH; a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD FOR THE 
        LIBERATION OF PALESTINE; a.k.a. ORGANIZATION OF RIGHT 
        AGAINST WRONG; a.k.a. ANSAR ALLAH; a.k.a. FOLLOWERS OF 
        THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD) [SDT] [FTO]
ISLAMIC JIHAD FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (a.k.a. PARTY OF 
        GOD; a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD; a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD 
        ORGANIZATION; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE 
        ORGANIZATION; a.k.a. ORGANIZATION OF THE OPPRESSED ON 
        EARTH; a.k.a. HIZBALLAH; a.k.a. ORGANIZATION OF RIGHT 
        AGAINST WRONG; a.k.a. ANSAR ALLAH; a.k.a. FOLLOWERS OF 
        THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD) [SDT] [FTO]
ISLAMIC JIHAD IN PALESTINE (a.k.a. PIJ-SHAQAQI FACTION; a.k.a. 
        PIJ; a.k.a. PALESTINE ISLAMIC JIHAD - SHAQAQI FACTION; 
        a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD OF PALESTINE; a.k.a. ABU GHUNAYM 
        SQUAD OF THE HIZBALLAH BAYT AL-MAQDIS) [SDT] [FTO]
ISLAMIC JIHAD OF PALESTINE (a.k.a. PIJ-SHAQAQI FACTION; a.k.a. 
        PIJ; a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD IN PALESTINE; a.k.a. 
        PALESTINE ISLAMIC JIHAD - SHAQAQI FACTION ; a.k.a. ABU 
        GHUNAYM SQUAD OF THE HIZBALLAH BAYT AL-MAQDIS) [SDT] 
        [FTO]
ISLAMIC JIHAD ORGANIZATION (a.k.a. PARTY OF GOD; a.k.a. 
        HIZBALLAH; a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY 
        JUSTICE ORGANIZATION; a.k.a. ORGANIZATION OF THE 
        OPPRESSED ON EARTH; a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD FOR THE 
        LIBERATION OF PALESTINE; a.k.a. ORGANIZATION OF RIGHT 
        AGAINST WRONG; a.k.a. ANSAR ALLAH; a.k.a. FOLLOWERS OF 
        THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD) [SDT] [FTO]
ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT (a.k.a. HAMAS; a.k.a. HARAKAT AL-
        MUQAWAMA AL-ISLAMIYA; a.k.a. STUDENTS OF AYYASH; a.k.a. 
        STUDENTS OF THE ENGINEER; a.k.a. YAHYA AYYASH UNITS; 
        a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSIM BRIGADES; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN 
        AL-QASSIM FORCES; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSIM 
        BATTALIONS; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL QASSAM BRIGADES; 
        a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL QASSAM FORCES; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN 
        AL QASSAM BATTALIONS) [SDT] [FTO]
ISLAMIC SALVATION FOUNDATION (a.k.a. AL-QAIDA; a.k.a. ISLAMIC 
        ARMY; a.k.a. THE GROUP FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE HOLY 
        SITES; a.k.a. THE ISLAMIC ARMY FOR THE LIBERATION OF 
        THE HOLY PLACES; a.k.a. THE WORLD ISLAMIC FRONT FOR 
        JIHAD AGAINST JEWS AND CRUSADERS) [SDT]
IZZ AL-DIN AL QASSAM BATTALIONS (a.k.a. ISLAMIC RESISTANCE 
        MOVEMENT; a.k.a. HARAKAT AL-MUQAWAMA AL-ISLAMIYA; 
        a.k.a. STUDENTS OF AYYASH; a.k.a. STUDENTS OF THE 
        ENGINEER; a.k.a. YAHYA AYYASH UNITS; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN 
        AL-QASSIM BRIGADES; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSIM FORCES; 
        a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSIM BATTALIONS; a.k.a. IZZ AL-
        DIN AL QASSAM BRIGADES; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL QASSAM 
        FORCES; a.k.a. HAMAS) [SDT] [FTO]
IZZ AL-DIN AL QASSAM BRIGADES (a.k.a. ISLAMIC RESISTANCE 
        MOVEMENT; a.k.a. HARAKAT AL-MUQAWAMA AL-ISLAMIYA; 
        a.k.a. STUDENTS OF AYYASH; a.k.a. STUDENTS OF THE 
        ENGINEER; a.k.a. YAHYA AYYASH UNITS; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN 
        AL-QASSIM BRIGADES; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSIM FORCES; 
        a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSIM BATTALIONS; a.k.a. HAMAS; 
        a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL QASSAM FORCES; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN 
        AL QASSAM BATTALIONS) [SDT] [FTO]
IZZ AL-DIN AL QASSAM FORCES (a.k.a. ISLAMIC RESISTANCE 
        MOVEMENT; a.k.a. HARAKAT AL-MUQAWAMA AL-ISLAMIYA; 
        a.k.a. STUDENTS OF AYYASH; a.k.a. STUDENTS OF THE 
        ENGINEER; a.k.a. YAHYA AYYASH UNITS; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN 
        AL-QASSIM BRIGADES; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSIM FORCES; 
        a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSIM BATTALIONS; a.k.a. IZZ AL-
        DIN AL QASSAM BRIGADES; a.k.a. HAMAS; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN 
        AL QASSAM BATTALIONS) [SDT] [FTO]
IZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSIM BATTALIONS (a.k.a. ISLAMIC RESISTANCE 
        MOVEMENT; a.k.a. HARAKAT AL-MUQAWAMA AL-ISLAMIYA; 
        a.k.a. STUDENTS OF AYYASH; a.k.a. STUDENTS OF THE 
        ENGINEER; a.k.a. YAHYA AYYASH UNITS; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN 
        AL-QASSIM BRIGADES; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSIM FORCES; 
        a.k.a. HAMAS; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL QASSAM BRIGADES; 
        a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL QASSAM FORCES; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN 
        AL QASSAM BATTALIONS) [SDT] [FTO]
IZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSIM BRIGADES (a.k.a. ISLAMIC RESISTANCE 
        MOVEMENT; a.k.a. HARAKAT AL-MUQAWAMA AL-ISLAMIYA; 
        a.k.a. STUDENTS OF AYYASH; a.k.a. STUDENTS OF THE 
        ENGINEER; a.k.a. YAHYA AYYASH UNITS; a.k.a. HAMAS; 
        a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSIM FORCES; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN 
        AL-QASSIM BATTALIONS; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL QASSAM 
        BRIGADES; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL QASSAM FORCES; a.k.a. 
        IZZ AL-DIN AL QASSAM BATTALIONS) [SDT] [FTO]
IZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSIM FORCES (a.k.a. ISLAMIC RESISTANCE 
        MOVEMENT; a.k.a. HARAKAT AL-MUQAWAMA AL-ISLAMIYA; 
        a.k.a. STUDENTS OF AYYASH; a.k.a. STUDENTS OF THE 
        ENGINEER; a.k.a. YAHYA AYYASH UNITS; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN 
        AL-QASSIM BRIGADES; a.k.a. HAMAS; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL-
        QASSIM BATTALIONS; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL QASSAM 
        BRIGADES; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL QASSAM FORCES; a.k.a. 
        IZZ AL-DIN AL QASSAM BATTALIONS) [SDT] [FTO]
JAPANESE RED ARMY (a.k.a. NIPPON SEKIGUN; a.k.a. NIHON SEKIGUN; 
        a.k.a. ANTI-IMPERIALIST INTERNATIONAL BRIGADE; a.k.a. 
        HOLY WAR BRIGADE; a.k.a. ANTI-WAR DEMOCRATIC FRONT; 
        a.k.a. JRA; a.k.a. AIIB) [FTO]
JIHAD GROUP (a.k.a. EGYPTIAN AL-JIHAD; a.k.a. VANGUARDS OF 
        CONQUEST; a.k.a. VANGUARDS OF VICTORY; a.k.a. TALAI'I 
        AL-FATH; a.k.a. TALA'AH AL-FATAH; a.k.a. TALA'AL AL-
        FATEH; a.k.a. TALA' AL-FATEH; a.k.a. TALAAH AL-FATAH; 
        a.k.a. TALA'AL-FATEH; a.k.a. NEW JIHAD; a.k.a. EGYPTIAN 
        ISLAMIC JIHAD; a.k.a. AL-JIHAD) [SDT] [FTO]
JRA (a.k.a. NIPPON SEKIGUN; a.k.a. NIHON SEKIGUN; a.k.a. ANTI-
        IMPERIALIST INTERNATIONAL BRIGADE; a.k.a. HOLY WAR 
        BRIGADE; a.k.a. ANTI-WAR DEMOCRATIC FRONT; a.k.a. 
        JAPANESE RED ARMY; a.k.a. AIIB) [FTO]
JUDEA POLICE (a.k.a. REPRESSION OF TRAITORS; a.k.a. KACH; 
        a.k.a. DIKUY BOGDIM; a.k.a. COMMITTEE FOR THE SAFETY OF 
        THE ROADS; a.k.a. DOV; a.k.a. STATE OF JUDEA; a.k.a. 
        SWORD OF DAVID) [SDT] [FTO]
JUDEAN VOICE (a.k.a. KAHANE CHAI; a.k.a. KAHANE LIVES; a.k.a. 
        KFAR TAPUAH FUND) [SDT] [FTO]
KACH (a.k.a. REPRESSION OF TRAITORS; a.k.a. DIKUY BOGDIM; 
        a.k.a. DOV; a.k.a. STATE OF JUDEA; a.k.a. COMMITTEE FOR 
        THE SAFETY OF THE ROADS; a.k.a. SWORD OF DAVID; a.k.a. 
        JUDEA POLICE) [SDT] [FTO]
KAHANE CHAI (a.k.a. KAHANE LIVES; a.k.a. KFAR TAPUAH FUND; 
        a.k.a. JUDEAN VOICE) [SDT] [FTO]
KAHANE LIVES (a.k.a. KAHANE CHAI; a.k.a. KFAR TAPUAH FUND; 
        a.k.a. JUDEAN VOICE) [SDT] [FTO]
KFAR TAPUAH FUND (a.k.a. KAHANE CHAI; a.k.a. KAHANE LIVES; 
        a.k.a. JUDEAN VOICE) [SDT] [FTO]
KHMER ROUGE (a.k.a. PARTY OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA; a.k.a. 
        NATIONAL ARMY OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA) [FTO]
KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY (a.k.a. PKK; a.k.a. PARTIYA KARKERAN 
        KURDISTAN) [FTO]
LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM (a.k.a. LTTE; a.k.a. TAMIL 
        TIGERS; a.k.a. ELLALAN FORCE) [FTO]
LTTE (a.k.a. LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM; a.k.a. TAMIL 
        TIGERS; a.k.a. ELLALAN FORCE) [FTO]
MANUEL RODRIGUEZ PATRIOTIC FRONT (a.k.a. FPMR/D; a.k.a. FRENTE 
        PATRIOTICO MANUEL RODRIGUEZ - AUTONOMOS; a.k.a. FPMR/A; 
        a.k.a. MANUEL RODRIGUEZ PATRIOTIC FRONT DISSIDENTS; 
        a.k.a. FRENTE PATRIOTICO MANUEL RODRIGUEZ; a.k.a. FPMR) 
        [FTO]
MANUEL RODRIGUEZ PATRIOTIC FRONT DISSIDENTS (a.k.a. FPMR/D; 
        a.k.a. FRENTE PATRIOTICO MANUEL RODRIGUEZ - AUTONOMOS; 
        a.k.a. FPMR/A; a.k.a. MANUEL RODRIGUEZ PATRIOTIC FRONT; 
        a.k.a. FRENTE PATRIOTICO MANUEL RODRIGUEZ; a.k.a. FPMR) 
        [FTO]
MEK (a.k.a. MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ ORGANIZATION; a.k.a. MKO; a.k.a. 
        MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ; a.k.a. PEOPLE'S MUJAHEDIN 
        ORGANIZATION OF IRAN; a.k.a. PMOI; a.k.a. ORGANIZATION 
        OF THE PEOPLE'S HOLY WARRIORS OF IRAN; a.k.a. SAZEMAN-E 
        MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ-E IRAN) [FTO]
MKO (a.k.a. MEK; a.k.a. MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ ORGANIZATION; a.k.a. 
        MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ; a.k.a. PEOPLE'S MUJAHEDIN 
        ORGANIZATION OF IRAN; a.k.a. PMOI; a.k.a. ORGANIZATION 
        OF THE PEOPLE'S HOLY WARRIORS OF IRAN; a.k.a. SAZEMAN-E 
        MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ-E IRAN) [FTO]
MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO TUPAC AMARU (a.k.a. TUPAC AMARU 
        REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT; a.k.a. MRTA) [FTO]
MRTA (a.k.a. TUPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT; a.k.a. 
        MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO TUPAC AMARU) [FTO]
MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ (a.k.a. MEK; a.k.a. MKO; a.k.a. MUJAHEDIN-E 
        KHALQ ORGANIZATION ; a.k.a. PEOPLE'S MUJAHEDIN 
        ORGANIZATION OF IRAN; a.k.a. PMOI; a.k.a. ORGANIZATION 
        OF THE PEOPLE'S HOLY WARRIORS OF IRAN; a.k.a. SAZEMAN-E 
        MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ-E IRAN) [FTO]
MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ ORGANIZATION (a.k.a. MEK; a.k.a. MKO; a.k.a. 
        MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ; a.k.a. PEOPLE'S MUJAHEDIN 
        ORGANIZATION OF IRAN; a.k.a. PMOI; a.k.a. ORGANIZATION 
        OF THE PEOPLE'S HOLY WARRIORS OF IRAN; a.k.a. SAZEMAN-E 
        MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ-E IRAN) [FTO]
NATIONAL ARMY OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA (a.k.a. PARTY OF 
        DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA; a.k.a. KHMER ROUGE) [FTO]
NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (a.k.a. ELN; a.k.a. EJERCITO DE 
        LIBERACION NACIONAL) [FTO]
NEW JIHAD (a.k.a. EGYPTIAN AL-JIHAD; a.k.a. VANGUARDS OF 
        CONQUEST; a.k.a. VANGUARDS OF VICTORY; a.k.a. TALAI'I 
        AL-FATH; a.k.a. TALA'AH AL-FATAH; a.k.a. TLA'AL AL-
        FATEH; a.k.a. TALA' AL-FATEH; a.k.a. TALAAH AL-FATAH; 
        a.k.a. TALA'AL-FATEH; a.k.a. AL-JIHAD; a.k.a. EGYPTIAN 
        ISLAMIC JIHAD; a.k.a. JIHAD GROUP) [SDT] [FTO]
NIHON SEKIGUN (a.k.a. NIPPON SEKIGUN; a.k.a. JAPANESE RED ARMY; 
        a.k.a. ANTI-IMPERIALIST INTERNATIONAL BRIGADE; a.k.a. 
        HOLY WAR BRIGADE; a.k.a. ANTI-WAR DEMOCRATIC FRONT; 
        a.k.a. JRA; a.k.a. AIIB) [FTO]
NIPPON SEKIGUN (a.k.a. JAPANESE RED ARMY; a.k.a. NIHON SEKIGUN; 
        a.k.a. ANTI-IMPERIALIST INTERNATIONAL BRIGADE; a.k.a. 
        HOLY WAR BRIGADE; a.k.a. ANTI-WAR DEMOCRATIC FRONT; 
        a.k.a. JRA; a.k.a. AIIB) [FTO]
ORGANIZATION OF RIGHT AGAINST WRONG (a.k.a. PARTY OF GOD; 
        a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD; a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD 
        ORGANIZATION; a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD FOR THE LIBERATION 
        OF PALESTINE; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE 
        ORGANIZATION; a.k.a. HIZBALLAH; a.k.a. ORGANIZATION OF 
        THE OPPRESSED ON EARTH ; a.k.a. ANSAR ALLAH; a.k.a. 
        FOLLOWERS OF THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD) [SDT] [FTO]
ORGANIZATION OF THE OPPRESSED ON EARTH (a.k.a. PARTY OF GOD; 
        a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD; a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD 
        ORGANIZATION; a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD FOR THE LIBERATION 
        OF PALESTINE; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE 
        ORGANIZATION; a.k.a. HIZBALLAH; a.k.a. ORGANIZATION OF 
        RIGHT AGAINST WRONG; a.k.a. ANSAR ALLAH; a.k.a. 
        FOLLOWERS OF THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD) [SDT] [FTO]
ORGANIZATION OF THE PEOPLE'S HOLY WARRIORS OF IRAN (a.k.a. MEK; 
        a.k.a. MKO; a.k.a. MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ; a.k.a. PEOPLE'S 
        MUJAHEDIN ORGANIZATION OF IRAN; a.k.a. PMOI; a.k.a. 
        MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ ORGANIZATION; a.k.a. SAZEMAN-E 
        MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ-E IRAN) [FTO]
PALESTINE ISLAMIC JIHAD - SHAQAQI FACTION (a.k.a. PIJ-SHAQAQI 
        FACTION; a.k.a. PIJ; a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD IN PALESTINE; 
        a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD OF PALESTINE; a.k.a. ABU GHUNAYM 
        SQUAD OF THE HIZBALLAH BAYT AL-MAQDIS) [SDT] [FTO]
PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT (a.k.a. PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT - 
        ABU ABBAS FACTION; a.k.a. PLF; a.k.a. PLF-ABU ABBAS) 
        [SDT] [FTO]
PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT - ABU ABBAS FACTION (a.k.a. 
        PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT; a.k.a. PLF; a.k.a. PLF-ABU 
        ABBAS) [SDT] [FTO]
PARTIDO COMUNISTA DEL PERU (COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU) (a.k.a. 
        SENDERO LUMINOSO; a.k.a. SL; a.k.a. PARTIDO COMUNISTA 
        DEL PERU EN EL SENDERO LUMINOSO DE JOSE CARLOS 
        MARIATEGUI (COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU ON THE SHINING PATH 
        OF JOSE CARLOS MARIATEGUI); a.k.a. SHINING PATH; a.k.a. 
        PCP; a.k.a. SOCORRO POPULAR DEL PERU (PEOPLE'S AID OF 
        PERU); a.k.a. SPP; a.k.a EJERCITO GUERRILLERO POPULAR 
        (PEOPLE'S GUERRILLA ARMY); a.k.a. EGP; a.k.a. EJERCITO 
        POPULAR DE LIBERACION (PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY); 
        a.k.a. EPL) [FTO]
PARTIDO COMUNISTA DEL PERU EN EL SENDERO LUMINOSO DE JOSE 
        CARLOS MARIATEGUI (COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU ON THE 
        SHINING PATH OF JOSE CARLOS MARIATEGUI) (a.k.a. SENDERO 
        LUMINOSO; a.k.a. SL; a.k.a. SHINING PATH; a.k.a. 
        PARTIDO COMUNISTA DEL PERU (COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU); 
        a.k.a. PCP; a.k.a. SOCORRO POPULAR DEL PERU (PEOPLE'S 
        AID OF PERU); a.k.a. SPP; a.k.a EJERCITO GUERRILLERO 
        POPULAR (PEOPLE'S GUERRILLA ARMY); a.k.a. EGP; a.k.a. 
        EJERCITO POPULAR DE LIBERACION (PEOPLE'S LIBERATION 
        ARMY); a.k.a. EPL) [FTO]
PARTIYA KARKERAN KURDISTAN (a.k.a. KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY; 
        a.k.a. PKK) [FTO]
PARTY OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA (a.k.a. KHMER ROUGE; a.k.a. 
        NATIONAL ARMY OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA) [FTO]
PARTY OF GOD (a.k.a. HIZBALLAH; a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD; a.k.a. 
        ISLAMIC JIHAD ORGANIZATION; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY 
        JUSTICE ORGANIZATION; a.k.a. ORGANIZATION OF THE 
        OPPRESSED ON EARTH; a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD FOR THE 
        LIBERATION OF PALESTINE; a.k.a. ORGANIZATION OF RIGHT 
        AGAINST WRONG; a.k.a. ANSAR ALLAH; a.k.a. FOLLOWERS OF 
        THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD) [SDT] [FTO]
PCP (a.k.a. SENDERO LUMINOSO; a.k.a. SL; a.k.a. PARTIDO 
        COMUNISTA DEL PERU EN EL SENDERO LUMINOSO DE JOSE 
        CARLOS MARIATEGUI (COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU ON THE 
        SHINING PATH OF JOSE CARLOS MARIATEGUI); a.k.a. PARTIDO 
        COMUNISTA DEL PERU (COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU); a.k.a. 
        SHINING PATH; a.k.a. SOCORRO POPULAR DEL PERU (PEOPLE'S 
        AID OF PERU); a.k.a. SPP; a.k.a EJERCITO GUERRILLERO 
        POPULAR (PEOPLE'S GUERRILLA ARMY); a.k.a. EGP; a.k.a. 
        EJERCITO POPULAR DE LIBERACION (PEOPLE'S LIBERATION 
        ARMY); a.k.a. EPL) [FTO]
PEOPLE'S MUJAHEDIN ORGANIZATION OF IRAN (a.k.a. MEK; a.k.a. 
        MKO; a.k.a. MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ; a.k.a. MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ 
        ORGANIZATION; a.k.a. PMOI; a.k.a. ORGANIZATION OF THE 
        PEOPLE'S HOLY WARRIORS OF IRAN; a.ka. SAZEMAN-E 
        MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ-E IRAN) [FTO]
PFLP (a.k.a. POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE; 
        a.k.a. RED EAGLES; a.k.a. RED EAGLE GROUP; a.k.a. RED 
        EAGLE GANG; a.k.a. HALHUL GANG; a.k.a. HALHUL SQUAD) 
        [SDT] [FTO]
PFLP-GC (a.k.a. POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE - 
        GENERAL COMMAND) [SDT] [FTO]
PIJ (a.k.a. PIJ-SHAQAQI FACTION; a.k.a. PALESTINE ISLAMIC JIHAD 
        - SHAQAQI FACTION; a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD IN PALESTINE; 
        a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD OF PALESTINE; a.k.a. ABU GHUNAYM 
        SQUAD OF THE HIZBALLAH BAYT AL-MAQDIS) [SDT] [FTO]
PIJ-SHAQAQI FACTION (a.k.a. PALESTINE ISLAMIC JIHAD - SHAQAQI 
        FACTION; a.k.a. PIJ; a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD IN PALESTINE; 
        a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD OF PALESTINE; a.k.a. ABU GHUNAYM 
        SQUAD OF THE HIZBALLAH BAYT AL-MAQDIS) [SDT] [FTO]
PKK (a.k.a. KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY; a.k.a. PARTIYA KARKERAN 
        KURDISTAN) [FTO]
PLF (a.k.a. PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT - ABU ABBAS FACTION; 
        a.k.a. PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT; a.k.a. PLF-ABU 
        ABBAS) [SDT] [FTO]
PLF-ABU ABBAS (a.k.a. PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT - ABU ABBAS 
        FACTION; a.k.a. PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT; a.k.a. PLF) 
        [SDT] [FTO]
PMOI (a.k.a. MEK; a.k.a. MKO; a.k.a. MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ; a.k.a. 
        PEOPLE'S MUJAHEDIN ORGANIZATION OF IRAN; a.k.a. 
        MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ ORGANIZATION; a.k.a. ORGANIZATION OF 
        THE PEOPLE'S HOLY WARRIORS OF IRAN; a.k.a. SAZEMAN-E 
        MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ-E IRAN) [FTO]
POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (a.k.a. PFLP; 
        a.k.a. RED EAGLES; a.k.a. RED EAGLE GROUP; a.k.a. RED 
        EAGLE GANG; a.k.a. HALHUL GANG; a.k.a. HALHUL SQUAD) 
        [SDT] [FTO]
POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE - GENERAL COMMAND 
        (a.k.a. PFLP-GC) [SDT] [FTO]
POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE (a.k.a. EPANASTATIKOS LAIKOS 
        AGONAS; a.k.a. ELA; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY POPULAR 
        STRUGGLE; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE) [FTO]
RED EAGLE GANG (a.k.a. PFLP; a.k.a. RED EAGLES; a.k.a. RED 
        EAGLE GROUP; a.k.a. POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF 
        PALESTINE; a.k.a. HALHUL GANG; a.k.a. HALHUL SQUAD) 
        [SDT] [FTO]
RED EAGLE GROUP (a.k.a. PFLP; a.k.a. RED EAGLES; a.k.a. POPULAR 
        FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE; a.k.a. RED EAGLE 
        GANG; a.k.a. HALHUL GANG; a.k.a. HALHUL SQUAD) [SDT] 
        [FTO]
RED EAGLES (a.k.a. PFLP; a.k.a. POPULAR FRONT FOR THE 
        LIBERATION OF PALESTINE; a.k.a. RED EAGLE GROUP; a.k.a. 
        RED EAGLE GANG; a.k.a. HALHUL GANG; a.k.a. HALHUL 
        SQUAD) [SDT] [FTO]
RED STAR BATTALIONS (a.k.a. DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION 
        OF PALESTINE; a.k.a. DFLP; a.k.a. RED STAR FORCES; 
        a.k.a. DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE 
        - HAWATMEH FACTION) [SDT] [FTO]
RED STAR FORCES (a.k.a. DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF 
        PALESTINE; a.k.a. DFLP; a.k.a. DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE 
        LIBERATION OF PALESTINE - HAWATMEH FACTION; a.k.a. RED 
        STAR BATTALIONS) [SDT] [FTO]
REPRESSION OF TRAITORS (a.k.a. KACH; a.k.a. DIKUY BOGDIM; 
        a.k.a. DOV; a.k.a. STATE OF JUDEA; a.k.a. COMMITTEE FOR 
        THE SAFETY OF THE ROADS; a.k.a. SWORD OF DAVID; a.k.a. 
        JUDEA POLICE) [SDT] [FTO]
REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA (a.k.a. FARC; a.k.a. 
        FUERZAS ARMADAS REVOLUCIONARIAS DE COLOMBIA) [FTO]
REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE ORGANIZATION (a.k.a. PARTY OF GOD; a.k.a. 
        ISLAMIC JIHAD; a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD ORGANIZATION; 
        a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE; 
        a.k.a. ORGANIZATION OF THE OPPRESSED ON EARTH; a.k.a. 
        HIZBALLAH; a.k.a. ORGANIZATION OF RIGHT AGAINST WRONG; 
        a.k.a. ANSAR ALLAH; a.k.a. FOLLOWERS OF THE PROPHET 
        MUHAMMAD) [SDT] [FTO]
REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (a.k.a. DEVRIMCI HALK KURTULUS PARTISI-
        CEPHESI; a.k.a. DHKP/C; a.k.a. DEVRIMCI SOL; a.k.a. 
        REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S LIBERATION PARTY/FRONT; a.k.a. 
        DEV SOL; a.k.a. DEV SOL SILAHLI DEVRIMCI BIRLIKLERI; 
        a.k.a. DEV SOL SDB; a.k.a. DEV SOL ARMED REVOLUTIONARY 
        UNITS) [FTO]
REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION OF SOCIALIST MUSLIMS (a.k.a. ANO; 
        a.k.a. BLACK SEPTEMBER; a.k.a. FATAH REVOLUTIONARY 
        COUNCIL; a.k.a. ARAB REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL; a.k.a. ABU 
        NIDAL ORGANIZATION; a.k.a. ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES) 
        [SDT] [FTO]
REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION 17 NOVEMBER (a.k.a. 17 NOVEMBER; 
        a.k.a. EPANASTATIKI ORGANOSI 17 NOEMVRI) [FTO]
REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S LIBERATION PARTY/FRONT (a.k.a. DEVRIMCI 
        HALK KURTULUS PARTISI-CEPHESI; a.k.a. DHKP/C; a.k.a. 
        DEVRIMCI SOL; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY LEFT; a.k.a. DEV 
        SOL; a.k.a. DEV SOL SILAHLI DEVRIMCI BIRLIKLERI; a.k.a. 
        DEV SOL SDB; a.k.a. DEV SOL ARMED REVOLUIONARY UNITS) 
        [FTO]
REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE (a.k.a. EPANASTATIKOS LAIKOS 
        AGONAS; a.k.a. ELA; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY POPULAR 
        STRUGGLE; a.k.a. POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE) [FTO]
REVOLUTIONARY POPULAR STRUGGLE (a.k.a. EPANASTATIKOS LAIKOS 
        AGONAS; a.k.a. ELA; a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S 
        STRUGGLE; a.k.a. POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE) [FTO]
SAZEMAN-E MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ-E IRAN (a.k.a. MEK; a.k.a. MKO; 
        a.k.a. MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ; a.k.a. PEOPLE'S MUJAHEDIN 
        ORGANIZATION OF IRAN; a.k.a. PMOI; a.k.a. ORGANIZATION 
        OF THE PEOPLE'S HOLY WARRIORS OF IRAN; a.k.a. 
        MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ ORGANIZATION) [FTO]
SENDERO LUMINOSO (a.k.a. SHINING PATH; a.k.a. SL; a.k.a. 
        PARTIDO COMUNISTA DEL PERU EN EL SENDERO LUMINOSO DE 
        JOSE CARLOS MARIATEGUI (COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU ON THE 
        SHINING PATH OF JOSE CARLOS MARIATEGUI); a.k.a. PARTIDO 
        COMUNISTA DEL PERU (COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU); a.k.a. 
        PCP; a.k.a. SOCORRO POPULAR DEL PERU (PEOPLE'S AID OF 
        PERU); a.k.a. SPP; a.k.a EJERCITO GUERRILLERO POPULAR 
        (PEOPLE'S GUERRILLA ARMY); a.k.a. EGP; a.k.a. EJERCITO 
        POPULAR DE LIBERACION (PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY); 
        a.k.a. EPL) [FTO]
SHINING PATH (a.k.a. SENDERO LUMINOSO; a.k.a. SL; a.k.a. 
        PARTIDO COMUNISTA DEL PERU EN EL SENDERO LUMINOSO DE 
        JOSE CARLOS MARIATEGUI (COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU ON THE 
        SHINING PATH OF JOSE CARLOS MARIATEGUI); a.k.a. PARTIDO 
        COMUNISTA DEL PERU (COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU); a.k.a. 
        PCP; a.k.a. SOCORRO POPULAR DEL PERU (PEOPLE'S AID OF 
        PERU); a.k.a. SPP; a.k.a EJERCITO GUERRILLERO POPULAR 
        (PEOPLE'S GUERRILLA ARMY); a.k.a. EGP; a.k.a. EJERCITO 
        POPULAR DE LIBERACION (PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY); 
        a.k.a. EPL) [FTO]
SL (a.k.a. SENDERO LUMINOSO; a.k.a. SHINING PATH; a.k.a. 
        PARTIDO COMUNISTA DEL PERU EN EL SENDERO LUMINOSO DE 
        JOSE CARLOS MARIATEGUI (COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU ON THE 
        SHINING PATH OF JOSE CARLOS MARIATEGUI); a.k.a. PARTIDO 
        COMUNISTA DEL PERU (COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU); a.k.a. 
        PCP; a.k.a. SOCORRO POPULAR DEL PERU (PEOPLE'S AID OF 
        PERU); a.k.a. SPP; a.k.a EJERCITO GUERRILLERO POPULAR 
        (PEOPLE'S GUERRILLA ARMY); a.k.a. EGP; a.k.a. EJERCITO 
        POPULAR DE LIBERACION (PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY); 
        a.k.a. EPL) [FTO]
SOCORRO POPULAR DEL PERU (PEOPLE'S AID OF PERU) (a.k.a. SENDERO 
        LUMINOSO; a.k.a. SL; a.k.a. PARTIDO COMUNISTA DEL PERU 
        EN EL SENDERO LUMINOSO DE JOSE CARLOS MARIATEGUI 
        (COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU ON THE SHINING PATH OF JOSE 
        CARLOS MARIATEGUI); a.k.a. PARTIDO COMUNISTA DEL PERU 
        (COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU); a.k.a. PCP; a.k.a. SHINING 
        PATH; a.k.a. SPP; a.k.a EJERCITO GUERRILLERO POPULAR 
        (PEOPLE'S GUERRILLA ARMY); a.k.a. EGP; a.k.a. EJERCITO 
        POPULAR DE LIBERACION (PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY); 
        a.k.a. EPL) [FTO]
SPP (a.k.a. SENDERO LUMINOSO; a.k.a. SL; a.k.a. PARTIDO 
        COMUNISTA DEL PERU EN EL SENDERO LUMINOSO DE JOSE 
        CARLOS MARIATEGUI (COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU ON THE 
        SHINING PATH OF JOSE CARLOS MARIATEGUI); a.k.a. PARTIDO 
        COMUNISTA DEL PERU (COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU); a.k.a. 
        PCP; a.k.a. SOCORRO POPULAR DEL PERU (PEOPLE'S AID OF 
        PERU); a.k.a. SHINING PATH; a.k.a EJERCITO GUERRILLERO 
        POPULAR (PEOPLE'S GUERRILLA ARMY); a.k.a. EGP; a.k.a. 
        EJERCITO POPULAR DE LIBERACION (PEOPLE'S LIBERATION 
        ARMY); a.k.a. EPL) [FTO]
STATE OF JUDEA (a.k.a. REPRESSION OF TRAITORS; a.k.a. KACH; 
        a.k.a. DIKUY BOGDIM; a.k.a. COMMITTEE FOR THE SAFETY OF 
        THE ROADS; a.k.a. DOV; a.k.a. SWORD OF DAVID; a.k.a. 
        JUDEA POLICE) [SDT] [FTO]
STUDENTS OF AYYASH (a.k.a. ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT; a.k.a. 
        HARAKAT AL-MUQAWAMA AL-ISLAMIYA; a.k.a. HAMAS; a.k.a. 
        STUDENTS OF THE ENGINEER; a.k.a. YAHYA AYYASH UNITS; 
        a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSIM BRIGADES; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN 
        AL-QASSIM FORCES; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSIM 
        BATTALIONS; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL QASSAM BRIGADES; 
        a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL QASSAM FORCES; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN 
        AL QASSAM BATTALIONS) [SDT] [FTO]
STUDENTS OF THE ENGINEER (a.k.a. ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT; 
        a.k.a. HARAKAT AL-MUQAWAMA AL-ISLAMIYA; a.k.a. STUDENTS 
        OF AYYASH; a.k.a. HAMAS; a.k.a. YAHYA AYYASH UNITS; 
        a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSIM BRIGADES; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN 
        AL-QASSIM FORCES; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSIM 
        BATTALIONS; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL QASSAM BRIGADES; 
        a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL QASSAM FORCES; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN 
        AL QASSAM BATTALIONS) [SDT] [FTO]
SWORD OF DAVID (a.k.a. REPRESSION OF TRAITORS; a.k.a. KACH; 
        a.k.a. DIKUY BOGDIM; a.k.a. COMMITTEE FOR THE SAFETYOF 
        THE ROADS; a.k.a. DOV; a.k.a. STATE OF JUDEA; a.k.a. 
        JUDEA POLICE) [SDT] [FTO]
TALA' AL-FATEH (a.k.a. EGYPTIAN AL-JIHAD; a.k.a. VANGUARDS OF 
        CONQUEST; a.k.a. VANGUARDS OF VICTORY; a.k.a. TALAI'I 
        AL-FATH; a.k.a. TALA'AH AL-FATAH; a.k.a. TALA'AL AL-
        FATEH; a.k.a. AL-JIHAD; a.k.a. TALAAH AL-FATAH; a.k.a. 
        TALA'AL-FATEH; a.k.a. NEW JIHAD; a.k.a. EGYPTIAN 
        ISLAMIC JIHAD; a.k.a. JIHAD GROUP) [SDT] [FTO]
TALA'AH AL-FATAH (a.k.a. EGYPTIAN AL-JIHAD; a.k.a. VANGUARDS OF 
        CONQUEST; a.k.a. VANGUARDS OF VICTORY; a.k.a. TALAI'I 
        AL-FATH; a.k.a. AL-JIHAD ; a.k.a. TALA'AL AL-FATEH; 
        a.k.a. TALA' AL-FATEH; a.k.a. TALAAH AL-FATAH; a.k.a. 
        TALA'AL-FATEH; a.k.a. NEW JIHAD; a.k.a. EGYPTIAN 
        ISLAMIC JIHAD; a.k.a. JIHAD GROUP) [SDT] [FTO]
TALAAH AL-FATAH (a.k.a. EGYPTIAN AL-JIHAD; a.k.a. VANGUARDS OF 
        CONQUEST; a.k.a. VANGUARDS OF VICTORY; a.k.a. TALAI'I 
        AL-FATH; a.k.a. TALA'AH AL-FATAH; a.k.a. TALA'AL AL-
        FATEH; a.k.a. TALA' AL-FATEH; a.k.a. AL-JIHAD; a.k.a. 
        TALA'AL-FATEH; a.k.a. NEW JIHAD; a.k.a. EGYPTIAN 
        ISLAMIC JIHAD; a.k.a. JIHAD GROUP) [SDT] [FTO]
TALA'AL AL-FATEH (a.k.a. EGYPTIAN AL-JIHAD; a.k.a. VANGUARDS OF 
        CONQUEST; a.k.a. VANGUARDS OF VICTORY; a.k.a. TALAI'I 
        AL-FATH; a.k.a. TALA'AH AL-FATAH; a.k.a. AL-JIHAD; 
        a.k.a. TALA' AL-FATEH; a.k.a. TALAAH AL-FATAH; a.k.a. 
        TALA'AL-FATEH; a.k.a. NEW JIHAD; a.k.a. EGYPTIAN 
        ISLAMIC JIHAD; a.k.a. JIHAD GROUP) [SDT] [FTO]
TALA'AL-FATEH (a.k.a. EGYPTIAN AL-JIHAD; a.k.a. VANGUARDS OF 
        CONQUEST; a.k.a. VANGUARDS OF VICTORY; a.k.a. TALAI'I 
        AL-FATH; a.k.a. TALA'AH AL-FATAH; a.k.a. TALA'AL AL-
        FATEH; a.k.a. TALA' AL-FATEH; a.k.a. TALAAH AL-FATAH; 
        a.k.a. AL-JIHAD; a.k.a. NEW JIHAD; a.k.a. EGYPTIAN 
        ISLAMIC JIHAD; a.k.a. JIHAD GROUP) [SDT] [FTO]
TALAI'I AL-FATH (a.k.a. EGYPTIAN AL-JIHAD; a.k.a. VANGUARDS OF 
        CONQUEST; a.k.a. VANGUARDS OF VICTORY; a.k.a. AL-JIHAD; 
        a.k.a. TALA'AH AL-FATAH; a.k.a. TALA'AL AL-FATEH; 
        a.k.a. TALA' AL-FATEH; a.k.a. TALAAH AL-FATAH; a.k.a. 
        TALA'AL-FATEH; a.k.a. NEW JIHAD; a.k.a. EGYPTIAN 
        ISLAMIC JIHAD; a.k.a. JIHAD GROUP) [SDT] [FTO]
TAMIL TIGERS (a.k.a. LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM; a.k.a. 
        LTTE; a.k.a. ELLALAN FORCE) [FTO]
TUPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (a.k.a. MOVIMIENTO 
        REVOLUCIONARIO TUPAC AMARU; a.k.a. MRTA) [FTO]
VANGUARDS OF CONQUEST (a.k.a. EGYPTIAN AL-JIHAD; a.k.a. AL-
        JIHAD; a.k.a. VANGUARDS OF VICTORY; a.k.a. TALAI'I AL-
        FATH; a.k.a. TALA'AH AL-FATAH; a.k.a. TALA'AL AL-FATEH; 
        a.k.a. TALA' AL-FATEH; a.k.a. TALAAH AL-FATAH; a.k.a. 
        TALA'AL-FATEH; a.k.a. NEW JIHAD; a.k.a. EGYPTIAN 
        ISLAMIC JIHAD; a.k.a. JIHAD GROUP) [SDT] [FTO]
VANGUARDS OF VICTORY (a.k.a. EGYPTIAN AL-JIHAD; a.k.a. 
        VANGUARDS OF CONQUEST; a.k.a. AL-JIHAD; a.k.a. TALAI'I 
        AL-FATH; a.k.a. TALA'AH AL-FATAH; a.k.a. TALA'AL AL-
        FATEH; a.k.a. TALA' AL-FATEH; a.k.a. TALAAH AL-FATAH; 
        a.k.a. TALA'AL-FATEH; a.k.a. NEW JIHAD; a.k.a. EGYPTIAN 
        ISLAMIC JIHAD; a.k.a. JIHAD GROUP) [SDT] [FTO]
WORLD ISLAMIC FRONT FOR JIHAD AGAINST JEWS AND CRUSADERS, THE 
        (a.k.a. AL-QAIDA; a.k.a. ISLAMIC ARMY; a.k.a. ISLAMIC 
        SALVATION FOUNDATION; a.k.a. THE GROUP FOR THE 
        PRESERVATION OF THE HOLY SITES; a.k.a. THE ISLAMIC ARMY 
        FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE HOLY PLACES) [SDT]
YAHYA AYYASH UNITS (a.k.a. ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT; a.k.a. 
        HARAKAT AL-MUQAWAMA AL-ISLAMIYA; a.k.a. STUDENTS OF 
        AYYASH; a.k.a. STUDENTS OF THE ENGINEER; a.k.a. HAMAS; 
        a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSIM BRIGADES; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN 
        AL-QASSIM FORCES; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSIM 
        BATTALIONS; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL QASSAM BRIGADES; 
        a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL QASSAM FORCES; a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN 
        AL QASSAM BATTALIONS) [SDT] [FTO]

                           Named Individuals

ABBAS, Abu (a.k.a. ZAYDAN, Muhammad); Director of PALESTINE 
        LIBERATION FRONT - ABU ABBAS FACTION; DOB 10 Dec 1948 
        (individual) [SDT]
'ABD-AL-'IZ (a.k.a. ABD-AL-WAHAB, Abd-al-Hai Ahmad; a.k.a. ABU 
        YASIR; a.k.a. 'ABD ALLAH, 'Issam 'Ali Muhammad; a.k.a. 
        AL-KAMEL, Salah 'Ali; a.k.a. MUSA, Rifa'i Ahmad Taha; 
        a.k.a. TAHA, Rifa'i Ahmad; TAHA MUSA, Rifa'i Ahmad; 
        a.k.a. THABIT 'IZ); DOB 24 Jun 1954; POB Egypt; 
        Passport No. 83860 (Sudan), 30455 (Egypt), 1046403 
        (Egypt) (individual) [SDT]
'ABD ALLAH, 'Issam 'Ali Muhammad (a.k.a. 'ABD-AL-'IZ; a.k.a. 
        ABD- AL-WAHAB, Abd-al-Hai Ahmad; a.k.a. ABU YASIR; 
        a.k.a. AL-KAMEL, Salah 'Ali; a.k.a. MUSA, Rifa'i Ahmad 
        Taha; a.k.a. TAHA, Rifa'i Ahmad; TAHA MUSA, Rifa'i 
        Ahmad; a.k.a. THABIT 'IZ); DOB 24 Jun 1954; POB Egypt; 
        Passport No. 83860 (Sudan), 30455 (Egypt), 1046403 
        (Egypt) (individual) [SDT]
ABDALLAH, Ramadan (a.k.a. ABDULLAH, Dr. Ramadan; a.k.a. 
        SHALLAH, Dr. Ramadan Abdullah; a.k.a. SHALLAH, Ramadan 
        Abdalla Mohamed), Damascus, Syria; Secretary General of 
        the PALESTINIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD; DOB 01 Jan 1958; POB 
        Gaza City, Gaza Strip; SSN XXX-XX-XXXX (U.S.A.); 
        Passport No. 265 216 (Egypt) (individual) [SDT]
ABD-AL-WAHAB, Abd-al-Hai Ahmad (a.k.a. 'ABD-AL-'IZ; a.k.a. ABU 
        YASIR; a.k.a. 'ABD ALLAH, 'Issam 'Ali Muhammad; a.k.a. 
        AL-KAMEL, Salah 'Ali; a.k.a. MUSA, Rifa'i Ahmad Taha; 
        a.k.a. TAHA, Rifa'i Ahmad; TAHA MUSA, Rifa'i Ahmad; 
        a.k.a. THABIT 'IZ); DOB 24 Jun 1954; POB Egypt; 
        Passport No. 83860 (Sudan), 30455 (Egypt), 1046403 
        (Egypt) (individual) [SDT]
ABDULLAH, Dr. Ramadan (a.k.a. ABDALLAH, Ramadan; a.k.a. 
        SHALLAH, Dr. Ramadan Abdullah; a.k.a. SHALLAH, Ramadan 
        Abdalla Mohamed), Damascus, Syria; Secretary General of 
        the PALESTINIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD; DOB 01 Jan 1958; POB 
        Gaza City, Gaza Strip; SSN XXX-XX-XXXX (U.S.A.); 
        Passport No. 265 216 (Egypt) (individual) [SDT]
ABDULLAH, Sheikh Taysir (a.k.a. ABU HAFS; a.k.a. AL-MASRI, Abu 
        Hafs ; a.k.a. ATEF, Muhammad; a.k.a. EL KHABIR, Abu 
        Hafs el Masry; a.k.a. TAYSIR), DOB 1956; POB Egypt 
        (individual) [SDT]
ABU HAFS (a.k.a. ABDULLAH, Sheikh Taysir; a.k.a. AL-MASRI, Abu 
        Hafs; a.k.a. ATEF, Muhammad; a.k.a. EL KHABIR, Abu Hafs 
        el Masry; a.k.a. TAYSIR), DOB 1956; POB Egypt 
        (individual) [SDT]
ABU MARZOOK, Mousa Mohammed (a.k.a. ABU-MARZUQ, Dr. Musa; 
        a.k.a. ABU-MARZUQ, Sa'id; a.k.a. ABU-'UMAR; a.k.a. 
        MARZOOK, Mousa Mohamed Abou; a.k.a. MARZUK, Musa Abu), 
        Political Leader in Amman, Jordan and Damascus, Syria 
        for HAMAS; DOB 09 Feb 1951; POB Gaza, Egypt; SSN XXX-
        XX-XXXX (U.S.A.); Passport No. 92/664 (Egypt) 
        (individual) [SDT]
ABU-MARZUQ, Dr. Musa (a.k.a. ABU MARZOOK, Mousa Mohammed; 
        a.k.a. ABU-MARZUQ, Sa'id; a.k.a. ABU-'UMAR; a.k.a. 
        MARZOOK, Mousa Mohamed Abou; a.k.a. MARZUK, Musa Abu), 
        Political Leader in Amman, Jordan and Damascus, Syria 
        for HAMAS; DOB 09 Feb 1951; POB Gaza, Egypt; SSN XXX-
        XX-XXXX (U.S.A.); Passport No. 92/664 (Egypt) 
        (individual) [SDT]
ABU-MARZUQ, Sa'id (a.k.a. ABU MARZOOK, Mousa Mohammed; a.k.a. 
        ABU-MARZUQ, Dr. Musa; a.k.a. ABU-'UMAR; a.k.a. MARZOOK, 
        Mousa Mohamed Abou; a.k.a. MARZUK, Musa Abu), Political 
        Leader in Amman, Jordan and Damascus, Syria for HAMAS; 
        DOB 09 Feb 1951; POB Gaza, Egypt; SSN XXX-XX-XXXX 
        (U.S.A.); Passport No. 92/664 (Egypt) (individual) 
        [SDT]
ABU-'UMAR (a.k.a. ABU MARZOOK, Mousa Mohammed; a.k.a. ABU-
        MARZUQ, Dr. Musa; a.k.a. ABU-MARZUQ, Sa'id; a.k.a. 
        MARZOOK, Mousa Mohamed Abou; a.k.a. MARZUK, Musa Abu), 
        Political Leader in Amman, Jordan and Damascus, Syria 
        for HAMAS; DOB 09 Feb 1951; POB Gaza, Egypt; SSN XXX-
        XX-XXXX (U.S.A.); Passport No. 92/664 (Egypt) 
        (individual) [SDT]
ABU YASIR (a.k.a. 'ABD-AL-'IZ; a.k.a. ABD-AL-WAHAB, Abd-al-Hai 
        Ahmad; a.k.a. 'ABD ALLAH, 'Issam 'Ali Muhammad; a.k.a. 
        AL-KAMEL, Salah 'Ali; a.k.a. MUSA, Rifa'i Ahmad Taha; 
        a.k.a. TAHA, Rifa'i Ahmad; TAHA MUSA, Rifa'i Ahmad; 
        a.k.a. THABIT 'IZ); DOB 24 Jun 1954; POB Egypt; 
        Passport No. 83860 (Sudan), 30455 (Egypt), 1046403 
        (Egypt) (individual) [SDT]
AHMAD, Abu (a.k.a. AHMED, Abu; a.k.a. SALAH, Mohammad Abd El-
        Hamid Khalil; a.k.a. SALAH, Mohammad Abdel Hamid Halil; 
        a.k.a. SALAH, Muhammad A.), 9229 South Thomas, 
        Bridgeview, Illinois 60455, U.S.A.; P.O. Box 2578, 
        Bridgeview, Illinois 60455, U.S.A.; P.O. Box 2616, 
        Bridgeview, Illinois 60455-6616, U.S.A.; Israel; DOB 30 
        May 1953; SSN XXX-XX-XXXX; Passport No. 024296248 
        (U.S.A.) (individual) [SDT]
AHMED, Abu (a.k.a. AHMAD, Abu; a.k.a. SALAH, Mohammad Abd El-
        Hamid Khalil; a.k.a. SALAH, Mohammad Abdel Hamid Halil; 
        a.k.a. SALAH, Muhammad A.), 9229 South Thomas, 
        Bridgeview, Illinois 60455, U.S.A.; P.O. Box 2578, 
        Bridgeview, Illinois 60455, U.S.A.; P.O. Box 2616, 
        Bridgeview, Illinois 60455-6616, U.S.A.; Israel; DOB 30 
        May 1953; SSN XXX-XX-XXXX; Passport No. 024296248 
        (U.S.A.) (individual) [SDT]
AL BANNA, Sabri Khalil Abd Al Qadir (a.k.a. NIDAL, Abu); 
        Founder and Secretary General of ABU NIDAL 
        ORGANIZATION; DOB May 1937 or 1940; POB Jaffa, Israel 
        (individual) [SDT]
AL-KAMEL, Salah 'Ali (a.k.a. 'ABD-AL-'IZ; a.k.a. ABD-AL-WAHAB, 
        Abd- al-Hai Ahmad; a.k.a. ABU YASIR; a.k.a. 'ABD ALLAH, 
        'Issam 'Ali Muhammad; a.k.a. MUSA, Rifa'i Ahmad Taha; 
        a.k.a. TAHA, Rifa'i Ahmad; TAHA MUSA, Rifa'i Ahmad; 
        a.k.a. THABIT 'IZ); DOB 24 Jun 1954; POB Egypt; 
        Passport No. 83860 (Sudan), 30455 (Egypt), 1046403 
        (Egypt) (individual) [SDT]
AL-MASRI, Abu Hafs (a.k.a. ABDULLAH, Sheikh Taysir; a.k.a. ABU 
        HAFS; a.k.a. ATEF, Muhammad; a.k.a. EL KHABIR, Abu Hafs 
        el Masry; a.k.a. TAYSIR), DOB 1956; POB Egypt 
        (individual) [SDT]
AL RAHMAN, Shaykh Umar Abd; Chief Ideological Figure of ISLAMIC 
        GAMA'AT; DOB 03 May 1938; POB Egypt (individual) [SDT]
AL ZAWAHIRI, Dr. Ayman; Operational and Military Leader of 
        JIHAD GROUP; DOB 19 Jun 1951; POB Giza, Egypt; Passport 
        No. 1084010 (Egypt) (individual) [SDT]
AL-ZUMAR, Abbud (a.k.a. ZUMAR, Colonel Abbud); Factional Leader 
        of JIHAD GROUP; Egypt; POB Egypt (individual) [SDT]
ATEF, Muhammad (a.k.a. ABDULLAH, Sheikh Taysir; a.k.a. ABU 
        HAFS; a.k.a. AL-MASRI, Abu Hafs; a.k.a. EL KHABIR, Abu 
        Hafs el Masry; a.k.a. TAYSIR), DOB 1956; POB Egypt 
        (individual) [SDT]
AWDA, Abd Al Aziz; Chief Ideological Figure of PALESTINIAN 
        ISLAMIC JIHAD - SHIQAQI; DOB 1946 (individual) [SDT]
BIN LADIN, USAMA (a.k.a. BIN LADIN, USAMA BIN MUHAMMAD BIN 
        AWAD); DOB 30 Jul 1957; POB Jeddah, Saudi Arabia 
        (individual) [SDT]
BIN LADIN, USAMA BIN MUHAMMAD BIN AWAD (a.k.a. BIN LADIN, 
        USAMA); DOB 30 Jul 1957; POB Jeddah, Saudi Arabia 
        (individual) [SDT]
EL KHABIR, Abu Hafs el Masry (a.k.a. ABDULLAH, Sheikh Taysir; 
        a.k.a. ABU HAFS; a.k.a. AL-MASRI, Abu Hafs; a.k.a. 
        ATEF, Muhammad; a.k.a. TAYSIR), DOB 1956; POB Egypt 
        (individual) [SDT]
FADLALLAH, Shaykh Muhammad Husayn; Leading Ideological Figure 
        of HIZBALLAH; DOB 1938 or 1936; POB Najf Al Ashraf 
        (Najaf), Iraq (individual) [SDT]
HABASH, George (a.k.a. HABBASH, George); Secretary General of 
        POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE 
        (individual) [SDT]
HABBASH, George (a.k.a. HABASH, George); Secretary General of 
        POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE 
        (individual) [SDT]
HAWATMA, Nayif (a.k.a. HAWATMEH, Nayif; a.k.a. HAWATMAH, Nayif; 
        a.k.a. KHALID, Abu); Secretary General of DEMOCRATIC 
        FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE - HAWATMEH 
        FACTION; DOB 1933 (individual) [SDT]
HAWATMAH, Nayif (a.k.a. HAWATMA, Nayif; a.k.a. HAWATMEH, Nayif; 
        a.k.a. KHALID, Abu); Secretary General of DEMOCRATIC 
        FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE - HAWATMEH 
        FACTION; DOB 1933 (individual) [SDT]
HAWATMEH, Nayif (a.k.a. HAWATMA, Nayif; a.k.a. HAWATMAH, Nayif; 
        a.k.a. KHALID, Abu); Secretary General of DEMOCRATIC 
        FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE - HAWATMEH 
        FACTION; DOB 1933 (individual) [SDT]
ISLAMBOULI, Mohammad Shawqi; Military Leader of ISLAMIC 
        GAMA'AT; DOB 15 Jan 1955; POB Egypt; Passport No. 
        304555 (Egypt) (individual) [SDT]
JABRIL, Ahmad (a.k.a. JIBRIL, Ahmad); Secretary General of 
        POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE - GENERAL 
        COMMAND; DOB 1938; POB Ramleh, Israel (individual) 
        [SDT]
JIBRIL, Ahmad (a.k.a. JABRIL, Ahmad); Secretary General of 
        POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE - GENERAL 
        COMMAND; DOB 1938; POB Ramleh, Israel (individual) 
        [SDT]
KHALID, Abu (a.k.a. HAWATMEH, Nayif; a.k.a. HAWATMA, Nayif; 
        a.k.a. HAWATMAH, Nayif); Secretary General of 
        DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE - 
        HAWATMEH FACTION; DOB 1933 (individual) [SDT]
MARZOOK, Mousa Mohamed Abou (a.k.a. ABU MARZOOK, Mousa 
        Mohammed; a.k.a. ABU-MARZUQ, Dr. Musa; a.k.a. ABU-
        MARZUQ, Sa'id; a.k.a. ABU-'UMAR; a.k.a. MARZUK, Musa 
        Abu), Political Leader in Amman, Jordan and Damascus, 
        Syria for HAMAS; DOB 09 Feb 1951; POB Gaza, Egypt; SSN 
        XXX-XX-XXXX (U.S.A.); Passport No. 92/664 (Egypt) 
        (individual) [SDT]
MARZUK, Musa Abu (a.k.a. ABU MARZOOK, Mousa Mohammed; a.k.a. 
        ABU-MARZUQ, Dr. Musa; a.k.a. ABU-MARZUQ, Sa'id; a.k.a. 
        ABU-'UMAR; a.k.a. MARZOOK, Mousa Mohamed Abou), 
        Political Leader in Amman, Jordan and Damascus, Syria 
        for HAMAS; DOB 09 Feb 1951; POB Gaza, Egypt; SSN XXX-
        XX-XXXX (U.S.A.); Passport No. 92/664 (Egypt) 
        (individual) [SDT]
MUGHNIYAH, Imad Fa'iz (a.k.a. MUGHNIYAH, Imad Fayiz); Senior 
        Intelligence Officer of HIZBALLAH; DOB 07 Dec 1962; POB 
        Tayr Dibba, Lebanon; Passport No. 432298 (Lebanon) 
        (individual) [SDT]
MUGHNIYAH, Imad Fayiz (a.k.a. MUGHNIYAH, Imad Fa'iz); Senior 
        Intelligence Officer of HIZBALLAH; DOB 07 Dec 1962; POB 
        Tayr Dibba, Lebanon; Passport No. 432298 (Lebanon) 
        (individual) [SDT]
MUSA, Rifa'i Ahmad Taha (a.k.a. 'ABD-AL-'IZ; a.k.a. ABD-AL-
        WAHAB, Abd-al-Hai Ahmad; a.k.a. ABU YASIR; a.k.a. 'ABD 
        ALLAH, 'Issam 'Ali Muhammad; a.k.a. AL-KAMEL, Salah 
        'Ali; a.k.a. TAHA, Rifa'i Ahmad; TAHA MUSA, Rifa'i 
        Ahmad; a.k.a. THABIT 'IZ); DOB 24 Jun 1954; POB Egypt; 
        Passport No. 83860 (Sudan), 30455 (Egypt), 1046403 
        (Egypt) (individual) [SDT]
NAJI, Talal Muhammad Rashid; Principal Deputy of POPULAR FRONT 
        FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE - GENERAL COMMAND; DOB 
        1930; POB Al Nasiria, Palestine (individual) [SDT]
NASRALLAH, Hasan; Secretary General of HIZBALLAH; DOB 31 Aug 
        1960 or 1953 or 1955 or 1958; POB Al Basuriyah, 
        Lebanon; Passport No. 042833 (Lebanon) (individual) 
        [SDT]
NIDAL, Abu (a.k.a. AL BANNA, Sabri Khalil Abd Al Qadir); 
        Founder and Secretary General of ABU NIDAL 
        ORGANIZATION; DOB May 1937 or 1940; POB Jaffa, Israel 
        (individual) [SDT]
QASEM, Talat Fouad; Propaganda Leader of ISLAMIC GAMA'AT; DOB 
        02 Jun 1957 or 03 Jun 1957; POB Al Mina, Egypt 
        (individual) [SDT]
SALAH, Mohammad Abd El-Hamid Khalil (a.k.a. AHMAD, Abu; a.k.a. 
        AHMED, Abu; a.k.a. SALAH, Mohammad Abdel Hamid Halil; 
        a.k.a. SALAH, Muhammad A.), 9229 South Thomas, 
        Bridgeview, Illinois 60455, U.S.A.; P.O. Box 2578, 
        Bridgeview, Illinois 60455, U.S.A.; P.O. Box 2616, 
        Bridgeview, Illinois 60455-6616, U.S.A.; Israel; DOB 30 
        May 1953; SSN XXX-XX-XXXX; Passport No. 024296248 
        (U.S.A.) (individual) [SDT]
SALAH, Mohammad Abdel Hamid Halil (a.k.a. AHMAD, Abu; a.k.a. 
        AHMED, Abu; a.k.a. SALAH, Mohammad Abd El-Hamid Khalil; 
        a.k.a. SALAH, Muhammad A.), 9229 South Thomas, 
        Bridgeview, Illinois 60455, U.S.A.; P.O. Box 2578, 
        Bridgeview, Illinois 60455, U.S.A.; P.O. Box 2616, 
        Bridgeview, Illinois 60455-6616, U.S.A.; Israel; DOB 30 
        May 1953; SSN XXX-XX-XXXX; Passport No. 024296248 
        (U.S.A.) (individual) [SDT]
SALAH, Muhammad A. (a.k.a. AHMAD, Abu; a.k.a. AHMED, Abu; 
        a.k.a. SALAH, Mohammad Abd El-Hamid Khalil; a.k.a. 
        SALAH, Mohammad Abdel Hamid Halil), 9229 South Thomas, 
        Bridgeview, Illinois 60455, U.S.A.; P.O. Box 2578, 
        Bridgeview, Illinois 60455, U.S.A.; P.O. Box 2616, 
        Bridgeview, Illinois 60455-6616, U.S.A.; Israel; DOB 30 
        May 1953; SSN XXX-XX-XXXX; Passport No. 024296248 
        (U.S.A.) (individual) [SDT]
SHALLAH, Dr. Ramadan Abdullah (a.k.a. ABDALLAH, Ramadan; a.k.a. 
        ABDULLAH, Dr. Ramadan; a.k.a. SHALLAH, Ramadan Abdalla 
        Mohamed), Damascus, Syria; Secretary General of the 
        PALESTINIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD; DOB 01 Jan 1958; POB Gaza 
        City, Gaza Strip; SSN XXX-XX-XXXX (U.S.A.); Passport 
        No. 265 216 (Egypt) (individual) [SDT]
SHALLAH, Ramadan Abdalla Mohamed (a.k.a. ABDALLAH, Ramadan; 
        a.k.a. ABDULLAH, Dr. Ramadan; a.k.a. SHALLAH, Dr. 
        Ramadan Abdullah), Damascus, Syria; Secretary General 
        of the PALESTINIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD; DOB 01 Jan 1958; POB 
        Gaza City, Gaza Strip; SSN XXX-XX-XXXX (U.S.A.); 
        Passport No. 265 216 (Egypt) (individual) [SDT]
SHAQAQI, Fathi; Secretary General of PALESTINIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD 
        -SHIQAQI (individual) [SDT]
TAHA MUSA, Rifa'i Ahmad (a.k.a. 'ABD-AL-'IZ; a.k.a. ABD-AL-
        WAHAB, Abd-al-Hai Ahmad; a.k.a. ABU YASIR; a.k.a. 'ABD 
        ALLAH, 'Issam 'Ali Muhammad; a.k.a. AL-KAMEL, Salah 
        'Ali; a.k.a. MUSA, Rifa'i Ahmad Taha; a.k.a. TAHA, 
        Rifa'i Ahmad; a.k.a. THABIT 'IZ); DOB 24 Jun 1954; POB 
        Egypt; Passport No. 83860 (Sudan), 30455 (Egypt), 
        1046403 (Egypt) (individual) [SDT]
TAHA, Rifa'i Ahmad (a.k.a. 'ABD-AL-'IZ; a.k.a. ABD-AL-WAHAB, 
        Abd- al-Hai Ahmad; a.k.a. ABU YASIR; a.k.a. 'ABD ALLAH, 
        'Issam 'Ali Muhammad; a.k.a. AL-KAMEL, Salah 'Ali; 
        a.k.a. MUSA, Rifa'i Ahmad Taha; TAHA MUSA, Rifa'i 
        Ahmad; a.k.a. THABIT 'IZ); DOB 24 Jun 1954; POB Egypt; 
        Passport No. 83860 (Sudan), 30455 (Egypt), 1046403 
        (Egypt) (individual) [SDT]
TAYSIR (a.k.a. ABDULLAH, Sheikh Taysir; a.k.a. ABU HAFS; a.k.a. 
        AL-MASRI, Abu Hafs; a.k.a. ATEF, Muhammad; a.k.a. EL 
        KHABIR, Abu Hafs el Masry), DOB 1956; POB Egypt 
        (individual) [SDT]
THABIT 'IZ (a.k.a. 'ABD-AL-'IZ; a.k.a. ABD-AL-WAHAB, Abd-al-Hai 
        Ahmad; a.k.a. ABU YASIR; a.k.a. 'ABD ALLAH, 'Issam 'Ali 
        Muhammad; a.k.a. AL-KAMEL, Salah 'Ali; a.k.a. MUSA, 
        Rifa'i Ahmad Taha; a.k.a. TAHA, Rifa'i Ahmad; TAHA 
        MUSA, Rifa'i Ahmad); DOB 24 Jun 1954; POB Egypt; 
        Passport No. 83860 (Sudan), 30455 (Egypt), 1046403 
        (Egypt) (individual) [SDT]
TUFAYLI, Subhi; Former Secretary General and Current Senior 
        Figure of HIZBALLAH; DOB 1947; POB Biqa Valley, Lebanon 
        (individual) [SDT]
YASIN, Shaykh Ahmad; Founder and Chief Ideological Figure of 
        HAMAS; DOB 1931 (individual) [SDT]
ZAYDAN, Muhammad (a.k.a. ABBAS, Abu); Director of PALESTINE 
        LIBERATION FRONT - ABU ABBAS FACTION; DOB 10 Dec 1948 
        (individual) [SDT]
ZUMAR, Colonel Abbud (a.k.a. AL-ZUMAR, Abbud); Factional Leader 
        of JIHAD GROUP; Egypt; POB Egypt (individual) [SDT]

    This document is explanatory only and does not have the 
force of law. Executive Order 12947, as amended, and the 
implementing Terrorism Sanctions Regulations (31 C.F.R Part 
595) contain the legally binding provisions governing the 
sanctions against terrorists who threaten to disrupt the Middle 
East peace process. Section 321 (18 U.S.C. 2332d) of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. 
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214-1319 (the ``Antiterrorism Act'') and 
the implementing Terrorism List Governments Sanctions 
Regulations (31 C.F.R. Part 596) contain the legally binding 
provisions governing sanctions against the governments of 
countries designated under section 6(j) of the Export 
Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. App. 2405, as supporting 
international terrorism. Sections 302 and 303 of the 
Antiterrorism Act (new 8 U.S.C. 1189 and 18 U.S.C. 2339B, 
respectively) and the implementing Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations Sanctions Regulations (31 C.F.R. Part 597) 
contain the legally binding provisions governing the sanctions 
against foreign terrorist organizations. This document does not 
supplement or modify Executive Order 12947, as amended, the 
Antiterrorism Act, or 31 C.F.R. Parts 595, 596, or 597.
    The Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control 
also administers sanctions programs involving Libya, Iraq, the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and 
Bosnian Serb-controlled areas of the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Cuba, the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA), North Korea, Iran, Burma 
(Myanmar), Sudan, narcotics traffi ckers centered in Colombia, 
and designated foreign persons who have engaged in activities 
related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
For additional information about these programs or about 
sanctions involving transactions with terrorists, terrorist 
organizations, or their agents, please contact the:

  OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL
  U.S. Department of the Treasury
  Washington, D.C. 20220
  202/622-2520

[06-25-99]

         (2) Cuba: What You Need To Know About The U.S. Embargo

An overview of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations--Title 31 Part 515 
                of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations

                              Introduction

    The Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 15 CFR Part 515 (the 
``Regulations'') were issued by the U.S. Government on 8 July 
1963 under the Trading With the Enemy Act in response to 
certain hostile actions by the Cuban government. They are still 
in force today and affect all U.S. citizens and permanent 
residents wherever they are located, all people and 
organizations physically in the United States, and all branches 
and subsidiaries of U.S. organizations throughout the world. 
The Regulations are administered by the U.S. Treasury 
Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control. The basic goal 
of the sanctions is to isolate the Cuban government 
economically and deprive it of U.S. dollars. Criminal penalties 
for violating the sanctions range up to 10 years in prison, 
$1,000,000 in corporate fines, and $250,000 in individual 
fines. Civil penalties up to $55,000 per violation may also be 
imposed. Please note that the Regulations require those dealing 
with Cuba to maintain records and, upon request from the U.S. 
Treasury Department, to furnish information regarding such 
dealings.

                           Exporting to Cuba

    Except for publications, other informational materials 
(such as CDs and works of art), certain donated food, and 
certain goods licensed for export by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce (such as medicine and medical supplies, food, and 
agricultural commodities), no products, technology, or services 
may be exported from the United States to Cuba, either directly 
or through third countries, such as Canada or Mexico. This 
prohibition includes dealing in or assisting the sale of goods 
or commodities to or from Cuba, even if done entirely offshore. 
Such brokering is considered to be dealing in property in which 
Cuba has an interest. Provision of consulting services is also 
prohibited. Thus, no U.S. citizen or permanent resident alien, 
wherever located, and no foreign subsidiary or branch of a U.S. 
organization may export products, technology, or services to 
Cuba or to any Cuban national, wherever they may be located, or 
broker the sale of goods or commodities to or from Cuba or any 
Cuban national.
    The Commerce Department may authorize the sale and export 
of food and agricultural commodities (including fertilizers, 
seeds, pesticides, insecticides, and herbicides) to independent 
nongovernmental entities (including religious groups and 
private sector undertakings such as family restaurants and 
private farmers) in Cuba. Although certain sales may be 
licensed, U.S. banks are not authorized to provide trade 
financing for the transactions.
    Section 1705(b) of the Cuban Democracy Act (the ``CDA'') 
provides for donations of food to independent non-governmental 
organizations or individuals in Cuba. Shipments of food can be 
donated to non-governmental organizations from the U.S. or from 
third countries without the need for a license from the U.S. 
government. Under Section 1705(c) of the CDA, exports of 
medicines and medical supplies are allowed, but require a 
license issued by the U.S. Commerce Department. The Act 
specifically provides that payments to Cuba involving 
telecommunications may be made pursuant to specific license. In 
the mid-1970s, Section 515.559 was added to the Regulations to 
allow OFAC to license foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms to 
conduct trade in commodities with Cuba so long as several 
specific criteria were met. Section 1706(a) of the CDA, 
however, prohibits the issuance of a license that would have 
been issued pursuant to 515.559, except where a contract was 
entered into prior to enactment of the CDA or where the exports 
at issue are medicines or medical supplies.
    Unless otherwise authorized, no vessel carrying goods or 
passengers to or from Cuba or carrying goods in which Cuba or a 
Cuban national has any interest may enter a U.S. port. The 
prohibition also applies to vessels which enter only to take on 
fuel and supplies (bunker), whether from U.S. fuel providers 
within the port limits or at offshore points, as well as 
vessels discharging or loading merchandise offshore, by lighter 
or otherwise. In addition, vessels which enter a port or place 
in Cuba to engage in the trade of goods or services are 
prohibited from loading or unloading any freight at any place 
in the U.S. for 180 days. Prohibited entry does not apply to 
vessels engaging in trade with Cuba authorized by license or 
exempt from the Regulations (e.g., vessels carrying donations 
of food to nongovernmental organizations or individuals).

                Importing Cuban-Origin Goods or Services

    Goods or services of Cuban origin may not be imported into 
the United States either directly or through third countries, 
such as Canada or Mexico. The only exceptions are: $100 worth 
of Cuban merchandise which may be brought into the United 
States as accompanied baggage by authorized travelers arriving 
from Cuba; publications, artwork, or other informational 
materials; merchandise other than tobacco or alcohol and not in 
commercial quantities carried as accompanied baggage by foreign 
persons legally entering the United States; and merchandise for 
which a specific license has been received.

 Transactions Involving Property in which Cuba or a Cuban National has 
                              an Interest

    In addition to the prohibitions on exports to and imports 
from Cuba, the Regulations prohibit any person subject to U.S. 
jurisdiction from dealing in any property in which Cuba or a 
Cuban national has an interest. Under the Regulations, 
``property'' includes but is not limited to contracts and 
services. For example, unless otherwise authorized, persons 
subject to U.S. jurisdiction (including U.S. overseas 
subsidiaries) may not purchase Cuban cigars in Mexico; may not 
sign a contract with a U.K. firm if the contract terms include 
Cuba-related provisions (even if those provisions are 
contingent upon the lifting of the embargo); and may not 
provide accounting, marketing, sales, or insurance services to 
a Cuban company or to a foreign company with respect to the 
foreign company's Cuba-related business.

                     Specially Designated Nationals

    The Regulations prohibit buying from or selling to Cuban 
nationals whether they are physically located on the island of 
Cuba or doing business elsewhere on behalf of Cuba. Individuals 
or organizations who act on behalf of Cuba anywhere in the 
world are considered by the U.S. Treasury Department to be 
``Specially Designated Nationals'' of Cuba. A non-exhaustive 
list of their names is published in the Federal Register, an 
official publication of the U.S. Government. This list may be 
obtained by calling the Office of Foreign Assets Control at 
202/622-2490. The listing, however, is a partial one and any 
individual or organization subject to U.S. jurisdiction 
engaging in transactions with foreign nationals must take 
reasonable care to make certain that such foreign nationals are 
not acting on behalf of Cuba. Individuals and organizations 
subject to U.S. jurisdiction who violate the Regulations by 
transacting business with Specially Designated Nationals of 
Cuba are subject to criminal prosecution or civil monetary 
penalties.

                          Accounts and Assets

    There is a total freeze on Cuban assets, both governmental 
and private, and on financial dealings with Cuba; all property 
of Cuba, of Cuban nationals, and of Specially Designated 
Nationals of Cuba in the possession or control of persons 
subject to U.S. jurisdiction is ``blocked.'' Any property in 
which Cuba has an interest which comes into the United States 
or into the possession or control of persons subject to U.S. 
jurisdiction is automatically blocked by operation of law. 
Banks receiving unlicensed wire transfer instructions in which 
there is a Cuban interest, or any instrument in which there is 
a Cuban interest, must freeze the funds on their own books or 
block the instrument, regardless of origin or destination. 
``Suspense accounts'' are not permitted. Blocking imposes a 
complete prohibition against transfers or transactions of any 
kind. No payments, transfers, withdrawals, or other dealings 
may take place with regard to blocked property unless 
authorized by the Treasury Department. Banks are permitted to 
take normal service charges. Blocked deposits of funds must be 
interest-bearing. ``Set-offs'' are not allowed.
    Persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction are required to 
exercise extreme caution in order not to knowingly involve 
themselves in unlicensed transactions in which Cuba has an 
interest. Except as authorized, no bank in the U.S. or overseas 
branch or subsidiary of a U.S. bank may advise a letter of 
credit involving Cuba nor may it process documents referencing 
Cuba. All such ``property'' must be blocked as soon as it comes 
within the bank's possession or control. All persons in 
possession of blocked property are required to register with 
the Office of Foreign Assets Control. Persons subject to U.S. 
jurisdiction who engage in any commercial dealings that involve 
unauthorized trade with Cuba, either directly or indirectly, 
risk substantial monetary penalties and criminal prosecution.

                             Sending Gifts

    Gift parcels may be sent or carried by an authorized 
traveler to an individual or to a religious, charitable, or 
educational organization in Cuba for the use of the recipient 
or of the recipient's immediate family (and not for resale), 
subject to the following limitations: the combined total 
domestic retail value of all items in the parcel must not 
exceed $200 (with the exception of donations of food, which are 
not so restricted); not more than one parcel may be sent or 
given by the same person in the U.S. to the same recipient in 
Cuba in any one calendar month; and the content must be limited 
to food, vitamins, seeds, medicines, medical supplies and 
devices, hospital supplies and equipment, equipment for the 
handicapped, clothing, personal hygiene items, veterinary 
medicines and supplies, fishing equipment and supplies, soap-
making equipment, or certain radio equipment and batteries for 
such equipment. Organizations that consolidate and send 
multiple gift parcels in single shipments must obtain a 
validated license from the U.S. Department of Commerce. Each 
gift parcel in the single shipment must meet commodity, dollar-
value, and frequency limitations. If a parcel being shipped or 
carried to Cuba fails to meet these standards, it is subject to 
seizure by the U.S. Government.

                    Cuba-Related Travel Transactions

    Only persons whose travel falls into the categories 
discussed below are authorized to spend money related to travel 
to, from, or within Cuba. Persons licensed to engage in travel-
related transactions in Cuba may spend up to the State 
Department Travel Per Diem Allowance for Havana, Cuba 
(currently $183 per day) for purchases directly related to 
travel in Cuba, such as hotel accommodations, meals, local 
transportation, and goods personally used by the traveler in 
Cuba (travelers can check the current per diem rate on the 
Internet at <>). 
Most licensed travelers may also spend additional money for 
transactions directly related to the activities for which they 
received their license. For example, journalists traveling in 
Cuba under the journalism general license (described below) may 
spend money over and above the current per diem for extensive 
local transportation, the hiring of cable layers, and other 
costs that are directly related to covering a story in Cuba. 
Licensed travelers may also spend an additional $100 on the 
purchase of Cuban merchandise to be brought back with them to 
the United States as accompanied baggage, but this $100 
authorization may be used only once in any 6-month period. 
Purchases of services unrelated to travel or a licensed 
activity, such as non-emergency medical services, are 
prohibited. The purchase of publications and other 
informational materials is not restricted.
    General license: The following categories of travelers are 
permitted to spend money for Cuban travel and to engage in 
other transactions directly incident to the purpose of their 
travel under a general license without the need to obtain 
special permission from the U.S. Treasury Department:

   Official Government Travelers - U.S. and foreign 
        government officials, including representatives of 
        international organizations of which the United States 
        is a member, who are traveling on official business.
   Persons regularly employed as journalists by a news 
        reporting organization and persons regularly employed 
        as supporting broadcast or technical personnel who 
        travel to Cuba to engage in journalistic activities.
   Persons who are traveling to visit close relatives 
        in Cuba in circumstances of humanitarian need. This 
        authorization is valid without a specific license from 
        the Office of Foreign Assets Control only once every 
        twelve months. Persons traveling under this general 
        license may not spend money on transactions that will 
        cause them to exceed the current per diem allowance.
   Full-time professionals whose travel transactions 
        are directly related to professional research in their 
        professional areas, provided that their research (1) is 
        of a noncommercial, academic nature; (2) comprises a 
        full work schedule in Cuba; and (3) has a substantial 
        likelihood of public dissemination.
   Full-time professionals whose travel transactions 
        are directly related to attendance at professional 
        meetings or conferences in Cuba organized by an 
        international professional organization, institution, 
        or association that regularly sponsors such meetings or 
        conferences in other countries. The organization, 
        institution, or association sponsoring the meeting or 
        conference may not be headquartered in the United 
        States unless it has been specifically licensed to 
        sponsor the meeting. The purpose of the meeting or 
        conference cannot be the promotion of tourism in Cuba 
        or other commercial activities involving Cuba, or to 
        foster production of any biotechnological products.
   Amateur or semi-professional athletes or teams 
        traveling to participate in Cuba in an athletic 
        competition held under the auspices of the relevant 
        international sports federation. The athletes must have 
        been selected for the competition by the relevant U.S. 
        sports federation, and the competition must be one that 
        is open for attendance, and in relevant situations 
        participation, by the Cuban public.

    Specific licenses for educational institutions: Specific 
licenses authorizing travel transactions related to certain 
educational activities by any students or employees affiliated 
with a licensed academic institution may be issued by the 
Office of Foreign Assets Control. Such licenses are only 
available to U.S. academic institutions accredited by an 
appropriate national or regional accrediting association, and 
such licenses must be renewed after a period of two years. Once 
an academic institution has applied for and received such a 
specific license, the following categories of travelers 
affiliated with that academic institution are authorized to 
engage in travel-related transactions incident to the following 
activities without seeking further authorization from the 
Office of Foreign Assets Control:

   Undergraduate or graduate students participating in 
        a structured educational program as part of a course 
        offered at a licensed college or university. Students 
        planning to engage in such transactions must carry a 
        letter from the licensed institution stating 1) the 
        institution's license number, 2) that the student is 
        enrolled in an undergraduate or graduate degree program 
        at the institution, and 3) that the travel is part of 
        an educational program of the institution.
   Persons doing noncommercial Cuba-related academic 
        research in Cuba for the purpose of qualifying 
        academically as a professional (e.g., research toward a 
        graduate degree). Students planning to engage in such 
        transactions must carry a letter from the licensed 
        institution stating 1) the institution's license 
        number, 2) that the student is enrolled in a graduate 
        degree program at the institution, and 3) that the Cuba 
        research will be accepted for credit toward that 
        graduate degree.
   Undergraduate or graduate students participating in 
        a formal course of study at a Cuban academic 
        institution, provided the Cuban study will be accepted 
        for credit toward a degree at the licensed U.S. 
        institution. A student planning to engage in such 
        transactions must carry a letter from the licensed U.S. 
        institution stating 1) the institution's license 
        number, 2) that the student is currently enrolled in an 
        undergraduate or graduate degree program at the 
        institution, and 3) that the Cuban study will be 
        accepted for credit toward that degree.
   Persons regularly employed in a teaching capacity at 
        a licensed college or university who plan to teach part 
        or all of an academic program at a Cuban academic 
        institution. An individual planning to engage in such 
        transactions must carry a letter from the licensed 
        institution stating 1) the institution's license 
        number, and 2) that the individual is regularly 
        employed by the licensed institution in a teaching 
        capacity.
   Cuban scholars teaching or engaging in other 
        scholarly activities at a licensed college or 
        university in the United States. Licensed institutions 
        may sponsor such Cuban scholars, including payment of a 
        stipend or salary.
   Secondary school students participating in 
        educational exchanges sponsored by Cuban or U.S. 
        secondary schools and involving the students' 
        participation in a formal course of study or in a 
        structured educational program offered by a secondary 
        school or other academic institution and led by a 
        teacher or other secondary school official. A 
        reasonable number of adult chaperones may accompany the 
        students to Cuba. A secondary school group planning to 
        engage in such transactions in Cuba must carry a letter 
        from the licensed secondary school sponsoring the trip 
        stating 1) the school's license number, and 2) the list 
        of names of all persons traveling with the group.
   Full-time employees of a licensed institution 
        organizing or preparing for the educational activities 
        described above. An individual engaging in such 
        transactions must carry a letter from the licensed 
        institution stating 1) the institution's license 
        number, and 2) that the individual is regularly 
        employed there.

    Specific licenses for religious organizations: Specific 
licenses authorizing travel transactions related to religious 
activities by any individuals or groups affiliated with a 
religious organization may be issued by the Office of Foreign 
Assets Control. Such licenses are only available to religious 
organizations located in the United States, and such licenses 
must be renewed after a period of two years. Once a religious 
organization has applied for and received such a specific 
license, travelers affiliated with that religious organization 
are authorized to engage in travel-related transactions 
incident to a full-time program of religious activities in Cuba 
under the auspices of the licensed religious organization 
without seeking further authorization from the Office of 
Foreign Assets Control. Individuals planning to engage in such 
transactions must carry a letter from the licensed religious 
organization stating 1) the organization's license number, 2) 
that they are affiliated with the licensed organization, and 3) 
that they are traveling to Cuba to engage in religious 
activities under the auspices of the licensed organization.
    Other specific licenses: Specific licenses may be issued by 
the Office of Foreign Assets Control on a case-by-case basis 
authorizing travel transactions by the following categories of 
persons in connection with the following activities:

   Humanitarian Travel - (1) persons, and persons 
        traveling with them who share a common dwelling with 
        them, traveling to Cuba more than once in a twelve-
        month period to visit close relatives in cases 
        involving humanitarian need; (2) persons traveling to 
        Cuba to accompany licensed humanitarian donations 
        (other than gift parcels) or exempt donations of food; 
        (3) persons traveling in connection with activities of 
        recognized human rights organizations investigating 
        specific human rights violations; and (4) persons whose 
        travel transactions are directly related to certain 
        humanitarian projects in or related to Cuba that are 
        designed to directly benefit the Cuban people. Licenses 
        authorizing transactions for multiple trips over an 
        extended period of time are available for travel under 
        (3) and (4) above.
   Free-Lance Journalism - Persons with a suitable 
        record of publication who are traveling to Cuba to do 
        research for a free-lance article. Licenses authorizing 
        transactions for multiple trips over an extended period 
        of time are available for applicants demonstrating a 
        significant record of free-lance journalism.
   Professional Research and Professional Meetings - 
        Persons traveling to Cuba to do professional research 
        or to attend a professional meeting that does not meet 
        the requirements of the relevant general license 
        (described above). Licenses authorizing transactions 
        for multiple trips over an extended period of time are 
        available.
   Educational Activities - Persons traveling to engage 
        in educational activities that are not authorized 
        pursuant to an academic institution's specific license, 
        including educational exchanges not involving academic 
        study pursuant to a degree program when those exchanges 
        take place under the auspices of an organization that 
        sponsors and organizes such programs to promote people-
        to-people contact.
   Religious Activities - Persons traveling to Cuba to 
        engage in religious activities that are not authorized 
        pursuant to a religious organization's specific 
        license. Licenses authorizing transactions for multiple 
        trips over an extended period of time are available.
   Public Performances, Clinics, Workshops, Athletic 
        and Other Competitions, and Exhibitions - Persons 
        traveling to participate in a public performance, 
        clinic, workshop, athletic or other competition (that 
        does not meet the requirements of the general license 
        described above), or exhibition. The event must be open 
        for attendance, and in relevant situations 
        participation, by the Cuban public, and all profits 
        from the event after costs must be donated to an 
        independent nongovernmental organization in Cuba or a 
        U.S.-based charity, with the objective, to the extent 
        possible, of promoting people-to-people contacts or 
        otherwise benefitting the Cuban people.
   Activities of Private Foundations or Research or 
        Educational Institutions - Persons traveling to Cuba on 
        behalf of private foundations or research or 
        educational institutes that have an established 
        interest in international relations to collect 
        information related to Cuba for noncommercial purposes. 
        Licenses authorizing transactions for multiple trips 
        over an extended period of time are available.
   Exportation, Importation, or Transmission of 
        Information or Informational Materials - Persons 
        traveling to engage in activities directly related to 
        the exportation, importation, or transmission of 
        information or informational materials.
   Licensed Exportation - Persons traveling to Cuba to 
        engage in activities directly related to marketing, 
        sales negotiation, accompanied delivery, or servicing 
        of exports of health care products or other exports 
        that may be considered for authorization under existing 
        Department of Commerce regulations and guidelines with 
        respect to Cuba or engaged in by U.S.-owned or -
        controlled foreign firms.

    Applying for a specific license: Persons wishing to travel 
to Cuba under a specific license should send a letter 
specifying the details of the proposed travel, including any 
accompanying documentation, to Steven Pinter, Chief of 
Licensing, Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of 
the Treasury, 1500 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20220. 
Academic institutions wishing to obtain one of the two-year 
specific licenses described above should send a letter to the 
same address requesting such a license and establishing that 
the institution is accredited by an appropriate national or 
regional accrediting association. Religious organizations 
wishing to obtain one of the two-year specific licenses 
described above should send a letter to the same address 
requesting such a license and setting forth examples or 
religious activities to be undertaken in Cuba.
    Provision of travel services: U.S. travel service 
providers, such as travel agents and tour operators, who handle 
travel arrangements to, from, or within Cuba must hold special 
authorizations from the Office of Foreign Assets Control to 
engage in such activities. These authorizations are issued 
based on written applications from the service providers, 
subject to appropriate checks by the Treasury Department. A 
traveler should not use any travel service provider that does 
not hold valid Treasury authorization. If in doubt about the 
status of a service provider's authorization, travelers should 
call the Office of Foreign Assets Control at 305/810-5140. Only 
carrier service providers that have been authorized by OFAC may 
operate direct humanitarian passenger charter flights between 
Miami and Havana.
    Unauthorized travel-related transactions: Unless otherwise 
exempted or authorized, any person subject to U.S. jurisdiction 
who engages in any travel-related transaction in Cuba violates 
the Regulations. Persons not licensed to engage in travel- 
related transactions may travel to Cuba without violating the 
Regulations only if all Cuba-related expenses are covered by a 
person not subject to U.S. jurisdiction and provided that the 
traveler does not provide any service to Cuba or a Cuban 
national. Such travel is called ``fully-hosted'' travel. Travel 
to Cuba may be considered fully hosted even if the traveler 
pays for a plane ticket provided that the travel is not aboard 
a Cuban carrier. Travel to Cuba is not fully hosted if a person 
subject to U.S. jurisdiction pays--before, during, or after the 
travel--any expenses relating to the travel, including travel 
to Cuba on a Cuban carrier, even if the payment is made to a 
third-country person or entity that is not subject to U.S. 
jurisdiction. Examples of costs commonly incurred by persons 
traveling to, from, and within Cuba are expenses for meals, 
lodging, transportation, bunkering of vessels or aircraft, 
visas, entry or exit fees, and gratuities. Fully-hosted travel 
to and from Cuba cannot be aboard a direct flight between the 
United States and Cuba. The authorization for licensed 
travelers to purchase and return to the United States with $100 
worth of Cuban merchandise does not apply to fully-hosted 
travelers.
    Any person subject to U.S. jurisdiction determined to have 
traveled to Cuba without an OFAC general or specific license is 
presumed to have engaged in prohibited travel-related 
transactions. In order to overcome this presumption, any 
traveler who claims to have been fully hosted or not to have 
engaged in any travel-related transactions may be asked by 
Federal enforcement agencies to provide a signed explanatory 
statement accompanied by any relevant supporting documentation.

                   Sending or Carrying Money to Cuba

    U.S. persons aged 18 or older may send to the household of 
any individual in Cuba ``individual-to-household'' cash 
remittances of up to $300 per household in any consecutive 
three-month period, provided that no member of the household is 
a senior-level Cuban government or senior-level Cuban communist 
party official.
    U.S. persons aged 18 or older may send to the household of 
any close relative of the remitter or the remitter's spouse 
``family'' cash remittances of up to $300 per household in any 
consecutive three-month period. No more than a combined total 
of $300 of individual-to-household and family remittances may 
be sent by a remitter to any one household in any consecutive 
three-month period, regardless of the number of close relatives 
or other persons residing in that household. A close relative 
means a spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent, great-
grandparent, uncle, aunt, brother, sister, nephew, niece, first 
cousin, mother-in-law, father-in-law, daughter-in-law, son-in-
law, sister-in-law, brother-in-law, or spouse, widow, or 
widower of any of those people.
    U.S. persons also may send up to $1,000 per payee on a one-
time basis as an ``emigration-related'' remittance to a Cuban 
national to enable the payee to emigrate from Cuba to the 
United States. Specifically, up to $500 may be remitted to a 
Cuban national prior to the payee's receipt of a valid U.S. 
visa or other U.S. immigration document, and up to $500 may be 
remitted to the Cuban national after the payee receives a valid 
U.S. visa or other U.S. immigration document.
    Remittances may be transferred through a financial 
institution or through an OFAC-licensed remittance forwarder. 
Service providers, including financial institutions originating 
transfers on behalf of non-aggregating customers, must obtain 
an affidavit from the remitter certifying that each individual-
to-household and family remittance does not exceed $300 in any 
consecutive three month period and that each emigration-related 
remittance meets the requirements of the Regulations (see TD F 
90-22.52 at the end of this brochure). Remitters can expect to 
have their identity, date of birth, address, and telephone 
number verified.
    Persons licensed to engage in travel-related transactions 
(this does not include fully-hosted travelers) may carry their 
own remittances, provided that they may carry no more than a 
combined total of $300 of individual-to-household and family 
remittances, and provided that no emigration-related 
remittances may be carried before the payee has received a 
valid U.S. visa or other immigration document and the traveler 
can supply the visa number and the date of issuance.
    Specific licenses may be issued on a case-by-case basis 
authorizing remittances:

   to independent nongovernmental organizations in 
        Cuba;
   by Cuban scholars authorized to teach or engage in 
        scholarly activity at a U.S. college or university who 
        wish to repatriate earnings in excess of $300;
   to households of Cuban nationals living outside of 
        Cuba in excess of $300 per quarter from blocked 
        accounts; or
   to individuals in Cuba to facilitate their non-
        immigrant travel to the United States under 
        circumstances where humanitarian need is demonstrated, 
        including illness or medical emergency.

                        Fair Business Practices

    Anyone authorized by the U.S. Department of the Treasury to 
provide Cuban travel services or services in connection with 
sending money to Cuba is prohibited from participating in 
discriminatory practices of the Cuban government against 
individuals or particular classes of travelers. The assessment 
of consular fees by the Cuban government, which are applicable 
worldwide, is not considered to be a discriminatory practice. 
However, requiring the purchase of services not desired by the 
traveler is not permitted. Persons wishing to provide 
information on such activities should call 305/810-5170. All 
information regarding arbitrary fees, payments for unauthorized 
purposes, or other possible violations furnished to the U.S. 
Treasury Department will be handled confidentially.

                     Estates and Safe Deposit Boxes

    An estate becomes blocked whenever a Cuban national is an 
heir or is the deceased; money from a life insurance policy is 
blocked whenever the deceased is a Cuban resident. The heir of 
a person who died in Cuba, or the beneficiary of a life 
insurance policy of a person who died in Cuba, may apply for a 
license from the Office of Foreign Assets Control to unblock 
the estate or insurance proceeds. Persons administering or 
interested in a blocked estate should contact the Office of 
Foreign Assets Control at 202/622-2480 for more information. A 
safe-deposit box is blocked whenever a Cuban has an interest in 
the property contained in the box. Access to a blocked safe 
deposit box for inventory purposes may be granted under certain 
conditions, but the contents of the box remain blocked and may 
not be removed without the permission of the Office of Foreign 
Assets Control.

                        Payments for Overflights

    Private and commercial aviators must obtain a specific 
license authorizing payments for overflight charges to Cuba. 
Banks will ask to see the originals of such licenses before 
executing transfers and keep a copy for their files. Such 
transfers must be in a currency other than U.S. dollars.
    If you have information regarding possible violations of 
the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, please call the Office of 
Foreign Assets Control at 305/810-5170. Your call will be 
handled confidentially.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    This document is explanatory only and does not have the 
force of law. The statutes, Executive Orders, and implementing 
regulations relating to Cuba contain the legally binding 
provisions governing the sanctions and this document does not 
supplement or modify those statutes, Executive Orders or 
regulations.
    The Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control 
also administers sanctions programs involving Iraq, Libya, the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the 
Republic of Serbia, North Korea, the National Union for the 
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the Taliban in 
Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, Sudan, Burma (Myanmar), Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations, designated terrorists and narcotics 
traffickers, and designated foreign persons who have engaged in 
activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. For additional information about these programs or 
about the Cuban sanctions program, please contact the:

  OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL
  U.S. Department of the Treasury
  Washington, D.C. & Miami, Florida
  202-622-2520 / 305-810-5140
  <>

(07-26-99)

     (3) Iran: What You Need to Know about U.S. Economic Sanctions

  An overview of O.F.A.C. Regulations involving Sanctions against Iran

          Iranian Transactions Regulations--31 C.F.R. Part 560

    As a result of Iran's support for international terrorism 
and its aggressive actions against non-belligerent shipping in 
the Persian Gulf, President Reagan, on October 29, 1987, issued 
Executive Order 12613 imposing a new import embargo on Iranian-
origin goods and services. Section 505 of the International 
Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (``ISDCA'') 
was utilized as the statutory authority for the embargo which 
gave rise to the Iranian Transactions Regulations (Title 31 
Part 560 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations).
    Effective March 16, 1995, as a result of Iranian 
sponsorship of international terrorism and Iran's active 
pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, President Clinton 
issued Executive Order 12957 prohibiting U.S. involvement with 
petroleum development in Iran. On May 6, 1995, he signed 
Executive Order 12959, pursuant to the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act (``IEEPA'') as well as the ISDCA, 
substantially tightening sanctions against Iran.
    On August 19, 1997, the President signed Executive Order 
13059 clarifying Executive Orders 12957 and 12959 and 
confirming that virtually all trade and investment activities 
with Iran by U.S. persons, wherever located, are prohibited. 
Corporate criminal penalties for violations of the Iranian 
Transactions Regulations can range up to $500,000, with 
individual penalties of up to $250,000 and 10 years in jail. 
Civil penalties of up to $11,000 may also be imposed 
administratively.
    This fact sheet provides general information about the 
Iranian sanctions program under the Iranian Transactions 
Regulations, and incorporates sanctions imposed by Executive 
Orders 12957, 12959 and 13059. The sanctions are administered 
by the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (``OFAC'').

                           imports from iran

    Other than gifts valued at $100 or less and information or 
informational materials, goods or services of Iranian origin 
may not be imported into the United States, either directly or 
through third countries. U.S. persons are prohibited from 
providing financing for prohibited import transactions.

                         iranian-origin carpets

    Iranian-origin carpets may not be imported into the United 
States unless the carpet:
    (a) is sent to or brought as a gift for a person in the 
United States and the value of the carpet, along with any other 
items of Iranian-origin, is not more than $100.00; or
    (b) is imported as part of the household and personal 
effects of persons relocating their household and place of 
residence to the United States. To qualify for this exception, 
it must be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the U.S. Customs 
Service that such Iranian-origin carpets: (i) were actually 
used abroad by persons arriving in the United States or by 
other family members arriving from the same foreign household, 
(ii) are not intended for any other person or for sale, and 
(iii) are not otherwise prohibited from importation. In the 
case of U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens relocating 
to the United States, Iranian-origin carpets must not have been 
acquired after May 6, 1995.
    Persons claiming the right to import Iranian-origin carpets 
as gifts or household and personal effects, as described above, 
must satisfy the U.S. Customs Service at the port of 
importation that these conditions have been met. In accordance 
with current U.S. Government policy, the Office of Foreign 
Assets Control generally does not issue licenses to authorize 
importations of Iranian-origin carpets which the U.S. Customs 
Service has determined do not qualify for importation under 
these two exceptions.

                            exports to iran

    In general, unless licensed by OFAC, goods, technology 
(including technical data or other information subject to 
Export Administration Regulations), or services may not be 
exported, reexported, sold or supplied, directly or indirectly, 
from the United States or by a U.S. person, wherever located, 
to Iran or the Government of Iran. The ban on providing 
services includes any brokering function from the United States 
or by U.S. persons, wherever located. For example, a U.S. 
person, wherever located, or any person acting within the 
United States, may not broker offshore transactions that 
benefit Iran or the Government of Iran, including sales of 
foreign goods or arranging for third-country financing or 
guarantees.
    In general, a person may not export from the U.S. any 
goods, technology or services, if that person knows or has 
reason to know such items are intended specifically for supply, 
transshipment or reexportation to Iran. Further, such 
exportation is prohibited if the exporter knows or has reason 
to know the U.S. items are intended specifically for use in the 
production of, for commingling with, or for incorporation into 
goods, technology or services to be directly or indirectly 
supplied, transshipped or reexported exclusively or 
predominately to Iran or the Government of Iran. A narrow 
exception is created for the exportation from the United States 
or by U.S. persons wherever located of low-level goods or 
technology to third countries for incorporation or substantial 
transformation into foreign-made end products, provided the 
U.S. content is insubstantial, as defined in the regulations, 
and certain other conditions are met.
    Donations of articles intended to relieve human suffering 
(such as food, clothing, and medicine), gifts valued at $100 or 
less, licensed exports of agricultural commodities and 
products, medicine, and medical equipment, and trade in 
``informational materials'' are permitted. ``Informational 
materials'' are defined to include publications, films, 
posters, phonograph records, photographs, microfilms, 
microfiche, tapes, compact disks, CD ROMs, artworks, and news 
wire feeds, although certain Commerce Department restrictions 
still apply to some of those materials. To be considered 
informational material, artworks must be classified under 
chapter subheadings 9701, 9702, or 9703 of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States.
    With certain exceptions, foreign persons who are not U.S. 
persons are prohibited from reexporting to Iran sensitive U.S.-
origin goods, technology or services to Iran or the Government 
of Iran. Foreign persons involved in such reexports may be 
placed on the U.S. Commerce Department's ``Export Denial 
Orders'' list.
    U.S. persons may not approve, finance, facilitate or 
guarantee any transaction by a foreign person where that 
transaction by a foreign person would be prohibited if 
performed by a U.S. person or from the United States.

              dealing in iranian-origin goods or services

    U.S. persons, including foreign branches of U.S. banks and 
trading companies, are prohibited from engaging in any 
transactions, including purchase, sale, transportation, swap, 
financing, or brokering transactions related to goods or 
services of Iranian origin or owned or controlled by the 
Government of Iran.
    Services provided in the United States by an Iranian 
national already resident in the United States are not 
considered services of Iranian origin.
    These prohibitions apply to transactions by United States 
persons in locations outside the United States with respect to 
goods or services which the United States person knows, or has 
reason to know, are of Iranian origin or are owned or 
controlled by the Government of Iran. U.S. persons may not 
import such goods or services into or export them from foreign 
locations. A U.S. person may, however, engage in transactions 
in third countries necessary to sell, dispose of, store, or 
maintain goods located in a third country which were legally 
acquired by that U.S. person prior to May 7, 1995 on the 
condition that the transactions do not result in an importation 
into the United States of goods of Iranian origin.

                      financial dealings with iran

    New investments by U.S. persons, including commitments of 
funds or other assets, loans or any other extensions of credit, 
in Iran or in property (including entities) owned or controlled 
by the Government of Iran are prohibited. For your information, 
Appendix A contains a list of banks owned or controlled by the 
Government of Iran. While U.S. persons may continue to charge 
fees and accrue interest on existing Iranian loans, a specific 
license must be obtained to reschedule or otherwise extend the 
maturities of existing loans.
    Payments for licensed sales of agricultural commodities and 
products, medicine and medical supplies must reference an 
appropriate OFAC license and may not involve a debit or credit 
to an account of a person in Iran or the Government of Iran 
maintained on the books of a U.S. depository institution. 
Payments for and financing of such licensed sales may be 
accomplished by cash in advance, sales on open account 
(provided the account receivable is not transferred by the 
person extending the credit), or by third country financial 
institutions that are neither U.S. persons nor government of 
Iran entities. Any other arrangements must be specifically 
authorized by OFAC. U.S. banks may advise and confirm letters 
of credit issued by third country banks covering licensed sales 
of agricultural commodities and products, medicine and medical 
supplies.

                           letters of credit

    Letters of credit and other financing arrangements with 
respect to trade contracts in force as of May 6, 1995 may be 
performed pursuant to their terms provided that the underlying 
trade transaction was completed prior to June 6, 1995 (February 
2, 1996 for ``agricultural commodities'') or as specifically 
licensed by the Office of Foreign Assets Control. Standby 
letters of credit that serve as performance guarantees for 
services to be rendered after June 6, 1995 cannot be renewed 
and payment may not be made after that date without 
authorization by OFAC.

                         other banking services

    U.S. banks, including foreign branches, are prohibited from 
servicing accounts of the Government of Iran, including banks 
owned or controlled by the Government of Iran (as in Appendix 
A) or persons in Iran. However, they are authorized to pay 
interest, deduct reasonable and customary service charges, 
process transfers related to exempt transactions, such as the 
exportation of information or informational material, a travel-
related remittance, or a payment for the shipment of a donation 
of articles to relieve human suffering or, at the request of an 
account holder, effect a lump sum closure of an account by 
payment to its owner. They may not otherwise directly credit or 
debit Iranian accounts.
    U.S. banks may handle ``U-turn'' transactions--cover 
payments involving Iran that are by order of a third country 
bank for payment to another third country bank provided they do 
not directly credit or debit an Iranian account. They are also 
permitted to handle non-commercial family remittances involving 
Iran and non-commercial remittances involving humanitarian 
relief (such as for the victims of the earthquake in Khorasan), 
provided the transfers are routed to or from non-U.S. non-
Iranian offshore banks.
    U.S. banks initiating or receiving payment orders involving 
Iran on behalf of customers must determine prior to processing 
such payments that they do not involve transactions prohibited 
by the Iranian Transactions Regulations.

                                 travel

    All transactions ordinarily incident to travel to or from 
Iran, including the importation of accompanied baggage for 
strictly personal use, payment of maintenance and living 
expenses and acquisition of goods or services for personal use 
are permitted.

                          overflights payments

    Payments to Iran for services rendered by the Government of 
Iran in connection with the overflight of Iran or emergency 
landing in Iran of aircraft owned by United States persons or 
registered in the U.S. are authorized.

    personal communications, information and informational materials

    The receipt or transmission of postal, telegraphic, 
telephonic or other personal communications, which does not 
involve the transfer of anything of value, between the United 
States and Iran is authorized. The exportation from the United 
States to Iran of information and informational materials, 
whether commercial or otherwise, regardless of format or medium 
of transmission, and any transaction incident to such 
exportation is authorized.

                 transactions involving u.s. affiliates

    No U.S. person may approve or facilitate the entry into or 
performance of transactions or contracts with Iran by a foreign 
subsidiary of a U.S. firm that the U.S. person is precluded 
from performing directly. Similarly, no U.S. person may 
facilitate such transactions by unaffiliated foreign persons.

                       iranian petroleum industry

    U.S. persons may not trade in Iranian oil or petroleum 
products refined in Iran, nor may they finance such trading. 
Similarly, U.S. persons may not perform services, including 
financing services, or supply goods or technology, that would 
benefit the Iranian oil industry.

                               Appendix A

          Banks Owned or Controlled by the Government of Iran

AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE BANK OF IRAN (a.k.a. BANK TAAVON 
        KESHAVARZI IRAN), No. 129 Patrice Lumumba Street, 
        Jalal-Al-Ahmad Expressway, P.O. Box 14155/6395, Tehran, 
        Iran
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF IRAN (a.k.a. BANK JOSIAIYI 
        KESHAHVARZI), Farahzad Expressway, Tehran, Iran
BANK JOSIAIYI KESHAHVARZI (a.k.a. AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK 
        OF IRAN), Farahzad Expressway, Tehran, Iran
BANK MARKAZI JOMHOURI ISLAMI IRAN (a.k.a. THE CENTRAL BANK OF 
        IRAN), Ferdowsi Avenue, P.O. Box 11365-8551, Tehran, 
        Iran
BANK MASKAN (a.k.a. HOUSING BANK (of Iran)), Ferdowsi St., 
        Tehran, Iran
BANK MELLAT, Park Shahr, Varzesh Avenue, P.O. Box 11365/5964, 
        Tehran, Iran, and all offices worldwide, including, but 
        not limited to:
  BANK MELLAT (Branch), Ziya Gokalp Bulvari No. 12, Kizilay, 
            Ankara, Turkey
  BANK MELLAT (Branch), Binbir Cicek Sokak, Buyukdere Caddesi, 
            P.O. Box 67, Levant, Istanbul, Turkey
  BANK MELLAT (Branch), 48 Gresham Street, London EC2V 7AX, 
            England
BANK MELLI, P.O. Box 11365-171, Ferdowsi Avenue, Tehran, Iran, 
        and all offices worldwide, including, but not limited 
        to:
  BANK MELLI (Branch), 4 Moorgate, London EC2R 6AL, England
  BANK MELLI (Branch), Schadowplatz 12, 4000 Dusseldorf 1, 
            Germany
  BANK MELLI (Branch), Friedenstrasse 4, P.O. Box 160 154, 6000 
            Frankfurt am Main, Germany
  BANK MELLI (Branch), P.O. Box 112129, Holzbruecke 2, 2000 
            Hamburg 11, Germany
  BANK MELLI (Branch), Odeonsplatz 18, 8000 Munich 22, Germany
  BANK MELLI (Branch), 43 Avenue Montaigne, 75008 Paris, France
  BANK MELLI (Branch), 601 Gloucester Tower, The Landmark, 11 
            Pedder Street, P.O. Box 720, Hong Kong
  BANK MELLI (Representative Office), 333 New Tokyo Building, 
            3-1 Marunouchi, 3-chome, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, Japan
  BANK MELLI (Representative Office), 818 Wilshire Boulevard, 
            Los Angeles, California 90017, U.S.A
  BANK MELLI (Representative Office), 767 Fifth Avenue, 44th 
            Floor, New York, New York 10153, U.S.A
  BANK MELLI (Representative Office), Smolensky Boulevard 22/
            14, Kv. S., Moscow, Russia
  BANK MELLI (Branch), Flat No. 1, First Floor, 8 Al Sad El-
            Aaly, Dokki, P.O. Box 2654, Cairo, Egypt
  BANK MELLI (Branch), Ben Yas Street, P.O. Box No. 1894, Riga 
            Deira, Dubai, U.A.E
  BANK MELLI (Branch), P.O. Box 2656, Shaikha Maryam Building, 
            Liwa Street, Abu Dhabi, U.A.E
  BANK MELLI (Branch), B.P.O. Box 1888, Clock Tower, Industrial 
            Road, Al-Ain Club Building in from Emertel Al Ain, 
            Al Ain, Abu Dhabi, U.A.E
  BANK MELLI (Branch), P.O. Box 1894, Riqa, Ban Yas Street, 
            Deira, Dubai, U.A.E
  BANK MELLI (Branch), Mohd-Habib Building, Al-Fahidi Street, 
            P.O. Box 3093, Bur Dubai, Dubai, U.A.E
  BANK MELLI (Branch), P.O. Box 248, Fujairah, U.A.E
  BANK MELLI (Branch), Sami Sagar Building Oman Street Al-
            Nakheel, P.O. Box 5270, Ras-Al Khaimah, U.A.E
  BANK MELLI (Branch), P.O. Box 459, Al Bory Street, Sharjah, 
            U.A.E.
  BANK MELLI (Branch), P.O. Box 785, Government Road, Shaikh 
            Mubarak Building, Manama, Bahrain
  BANK MELLI (Branch), P.O. Box 23309, Shaikh Salman Street, 
            Road No. 1129, Muharraq 211, Bahrain
  BANK MELLI (Branch), P.O. Box 5643, Mossa Abdul Rehman Hassan 
            Building, 238 Al Burj St., Ruwi, Muscat, Oman
BANK OF INDUSTRY AND MINE (of Iran) (a.k.a. BANK SANAT VA 
        MADAN), Hafez Avenue, P.O. Box 11365/4978, Tehran, Iran
BANK REFAH KARGARAN (a.k.a. WORKERS WELFARE BANK (of Iran)), 
        Moffettah No. 125, P.O. Box 15815 1866, Tehran, Iran
BANK SADERAT IRAN, Bank Saderat Tower, P.O. Box 15745-631, 
        Somayeh Street, Tehran, Iran, and all offices 
        worldwide, including, but not limited to:
  BANK SADERAT IRAN (Branch), Hamdam Street, Airport Road 
            Intersection, P.O. Box 700, Abu Dhabi, U.A.E
  BANK SADERAT IRAN (Branch), Al-Am Road, P.O. Box 1140, Al 
            Ein, Abu Dhabi, U.A.E
  BANK SADERAT IRAN (Branch), Liwara Street, P.O. Box 16, 
            Ajman, U.A.E
  BANK SADERAT IRAN (Branch), 3rd Floor Dom Dasaf Building, 
            Mejloka Street 7A, Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan
  BANK SADERAT IRAN (Branch), 25-29 Panepistimiou Street, P.O. 
            Box 4308, GR-10210, Athens 10672, Greece
  BANK SADERAT IRAN (Branch), Imam Ali Street, Sahat Yaghi, Ras 
            Elain-Alektisad Building 2nd Floor, Baalbeck, 
            Lebanon
  BANK SADERAT IRAN (Branch and Offshore Banking Unit), 106 
            Government Road, P.O. Box 825, Manama Town 316, 
            Bahrain
  BANK SADERAT IRAN (Branch), Hamra Pavillion Street, Savvagh 
            and Daaboul Building 1st Floor, P.O. Box 113-6717, 
            Beirut, Lebanon
  BANK SADERAT IRAN (Branch), Alghobairi Boulevard, Beirut, 
            Lebanon
  BANK SADERAT IRAN (Branch), 28 Sherif Street, P.O. Box 462, 
            Cairo, Egypt
  BANK SADERAT IRAN (Branch), Old Ben-Ghanem Street (next to 
            God Market), P.O. Box 2256, Doha, Qatar
  BANK SADERAT IRAN (Branch), Almaktoum Road, P.O. Box 4182, 
            Deira, Dubai, U.A.E
  BANK SADERAT IRAN (Branch), Bazar Murshid, P.O. Box 4182, 
            Deira, Dubai, U.A.E
  BANK SADERAT IRAN (Branch), Alfahid Road, P.O. Box 4182, Bur 
            Dubai, Dubai, U.A.E
  BANK SADERAT IRAN (Branch), Sherea Shekikh Zayad Street, P.O. 
            Box 55, Fujairah, U.A.E
  BANK SADERAT IRAN (Branch), Wilhelm Leuschner Strasse 41, 
            P.O. Box 160151, W-6000 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
  BANK SADERAT IRAN (Branch), P.O. Box 112227, Hopfenhof 
            Passage, Kleiner Bustah 6-10, W-2000 Hamburg 11, 
            Germany
  BANK SADERAT IRAN (Branch), Lothbury, London EC2R 7HD, 
            England
  BANK SADERAT IRAN (Representative Office), 707 Wilshire 
            Boulevard, Suite 4880, Los Angeles, California 
            90017, U.S.A
  BANK SADERAT IRAN (Representative Office), 55 East 59th 
            Street, 16th Floor, New York, New York 10022
  BANK SADERAT IRAN (Branch), P.O. Box 4269, Mutrah, Muscat, 
            Oman
  BANK SADERAT IRAN (Branch), 16 rue de la Paix, Paris 2eme, 
            75002 Paris, France
  BANK SADERAT IRAN (Branch), Alaroba Road, P.O. Box 316, 
            Sharjah, U.A.E
BANK SANAT VA MADAN (a.k.a. BANK OF INDUSTRY AND MINE (of 
        Iran)), Hafez Avenue, P.O. Box 11365/4978, Tehran, Iran
BANK SEPAH, Emam Khomeini Square, P.O. Box 11364, Tehran, Iran, 
        and all offices worldwide, including, but not limited 
        to:
  BANK SEPAH (Branch), Muenchener Strasse 49, P.O. Box 10 03 
            47, W-6000 Frankfurt am Main 1, Germany
  BANK SEPAH (Branch), 5/7 Eastcheap, EC3M 1JT London, England
  BANK SEPAH (Representative Office), 650 Fifth Avenue, New 
            York, New York 10019, U.S.A
  BANK SEPAH (Branch), 17 Place Vendome, 75001 Paris, France.
  BANK SEPAH (Branch), Via Barberini 50, 00187 Rome, Italy
  BANK SEPAH (Representative Office), Ufficio di Rappresentan 
            Za, Via Ugo Foscolo 1, 20121 Milan, Italy
BANK TAAVON KESHAVARZI IRAN (a.k.a. AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE 
        BANK OF IRAN) No. 129 Patrice Lumumba Street, Jalal-Al-
        Ahmad Expressway, P.O. Box 14155/6395, Tehran, Iran
BANK TEJARAT, 130 Taleghani Avenue, Nejatoullahie, P.O. Box 
        11365-5416, Tehran, Iran, and all offices worldwide, 
        including, but not limited to:
  BANK TEJARAT (Branch), 6/8 Clements Lane, London EC4N 
            7AP,England
  BANK TEJARAT (Branch), 44 Avenue des Champs Elysees, 75008 
            Paris, France
DEUTSCH-IRANISCHE HANDELSBANK AG (n.k.a. EUROPAEISCH-IRANISCHE 
        HANDELSBANK AG) Depenau 2, W-2000 Hamburg 1, Germany, 
        and all offices worldwide, including, but not limited 
        to:
  DEUTSCH-IRANISCHE HANDELSBANK AG (n.k.a. EUROPAEISCH-
            IRANISCHE HANDELSBANK AG) (Representative Office), 
            23 Argentine Square, Beihaghi Bulvard, P.O. Box 
            15815/1787, Tehran 15148, Iran
EUROPAEISCH-IRANISCHE HANDELSBANK AG (f.k.a. DEUTSCH-IRANISCHE 
        HANDELSBANK AG) Depenau 2, W-2000 Hamburg 1, Germany, 
        and all offices worldwide, including, but not limited 
        to:
  EUROPAEISCH-IRANISCHE HANDELSBANK AG (f.k.a. DEUTSCH-
            IRANISCHE HANDELSBANK AG) (Representative Office), 
            23 Argentine Square, Beihaghi Bulvard, P.O. Box 
            15815/1787, Tehran 15148, Iran
HOUSING BANK (of Iran) (a.k.a. BANK MASKAN), Ferdowsi St., 
        Tehran, Iran
IRAN OVERSEAS INVESTMENT BANK LIMITED (f.k.a. IRAN OVERSEAS 
        INVESTMENT CORPORATION LIMITED), 120 Moorgate, London 
        EC2M 6TS, England, and all offices worldwide, 
        including, but not limited to:
  IRAN OVERSEAS INVESTMENT BANK LIMITED (Representative 
            Office), 1137 Avenue Vali Asr off Park-e-SAll, P.O. 
            Box 15115/531, Tehran, Iran
  IRAN OVERSEAS INVESTMENT BANK LIMITED (Agency), Suite 3c 
            Olympia House, 61/63 Dame Street, Dublin 2, Ireland
  IRAN OVERSEAS INVESTMENT BANK LIMITED (Agency), Improgetti, 
            Via Germanico 24, 00192 Rome, Italy
  IRAN OVERSEAS TRADING COMPANY LIMITED (Subsidiary), 120 
            Moorgate, London EC2M 6TS, England
  IRAN OVERSEAS INVESTMENT CORPORATION LIMITED (n.k.a. IRAN 
            OVERSEAS INVESTMENT BANK LIMITED), 120 Moorgate, 
            London EC2M 6TS, England
THE CENTRAL BANK OF IRAN (a.k.a. BANK MARKAZI JOMHOURI ISLAMI 
        IRAN), Ferdowsi Avenue, P.O. Box 11365-8551, Tehran, 
        Iran
WORKERS WELFARE BANK (of Iran) (a.k.a. BANK REFAH KARGARAN), 
        Moffettah No. 125, P.O. Box 15815 1866, Tehran, Iran

         Iranian Assets Control Regulations--31 C.F.R Part 535

    Separate Iranian sanctions regulations appear at 31 C.F.R. 
Part 535. On November 14, 1979, the assets of the Government of 
Iran in the United States were blocked in accordance with 
IEEPA, following the seizure of the American Embassy in Teheran 
and the taking of U.S. diplomats as hostages. Under the Iranian 
Assets Control Regulations (Title 31 Part 535 of the U.S. Code 
of Federal Regulations), some US$12 billion in Iranian 
Government bank deposits, gold, and other properties were 
frozen, including $5.6 billion in deposits and securities held 
by overseas branches of U.S. banks. The assets freeze was 
eventually expanded to a full trade embargo, which remained in 
effect until the Algiers Accords were signed with Iran on 
January 19, 1981. Pursuant to the Accords, most Iranian assets 
in the United States were unblocked and the trade embargo was 
lifted. The U.S. Government also canceled any attachments that 
U.S. parties had secured against Iranian assets in the United 
States, so that the assets could be returned to Iran or 
transferred to escrow accounts in third countries pursuant to 
the Accords. This action was upheld by the Supreme Court in 
1981 in Dames & Moore v. Regan. Although greatly modified in 
scope, the old Iranian Assets Control Regulations remain in 
effect. Many U.S. nationals have claims against Iran or Iranian 
entities for products shipped or services rendered before the 
onset of the 1979 embargo or for losses sustained in Iran due 
to expropriation during that time. These claims are still being 
litigated in the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal at The 
Hague established under the Algiers Accords. Certain assets 
related to these claims remain blocked in the United States and 
consist mainly of military and dual-use property.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    This document is explanatory only and does not have the 
force of law. The Executive Orders and implementing regulations 
dealing with Iran contain the legally binding provisions 
governing the sanctions. This document does not supplement or 
modify those Executive Orders or regulations.
    The Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control 
also administers sanctions programs involving Libya, Iraq, the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, theRepublic of Serbia, Cuba, 
the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
(UNITA), the Taliban in Afghanistan, North Korea, Syria, Sudan, 
international terrorists, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 
international narcotics traffickers, and designated foreign 
persons who have engaged in activities related to the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. For additional 
information about these programs or about the Iranian sanctions 
programs, please contact the:

  OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL
  U.S. Department of the Treasury
  Washington, D.C. 20220
  202/622-2520

  http://www.treas.gov/ofac

[07-27-99]

         (4) Iraq: What You Need to Know about the U.S. Embargo

 An overview of the Iraqi Sanctions Regulations--Title 31 Part 575 of 
                  the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations

                              introduction

    On August 2, 1990, upon Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, former 
President Bush issued Executive Order No. 12722 declaring a 
national emergency with respect to Iraq. The order, issued 
under the authority of the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701), the National Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1601), and section 301 of title 3 of the U.S. Code, 
imposed economic sanctions, including a complete trade embargo, 
against Iraq. In keeping with United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 661 of August 6, 1990 and the United Nations 
Participation Act (22 U.S.C. 287c), the President also issued 
Executive Order 12724 on August 9, 1990, which imposed 
additional restrictions. Similar sanctions were imposed on 
Kuwait to ensure that no benefit from the United States flowed 
to the Government of Iraq in military-occupied Kuwait. The 
Iraqi Sanctions Regulations implement Executive Orders No. 
12722 and 12724. They were issued and are administered by the 
Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (FAC). 
The summary which follows is intended as a broad overview of 
the Regulations.
    Criminal penalties for violating the Iraqi Sanctions 
Regulations range up to 12 years in jail and $1,000,000 in 
fines. In addition, civil penalties of up to $275,000 per 
violation may be imposed administratively.

                             assets blocked

    Effective August 2, 1990, the President blocked all 
property and interests in property of the Government of Iraq, 
its agencies, instrumentalities, and controlled entities, in 
the United States or within the possession or control of U.S. 
persons. Persons and organizations determined by the Secretary 
of the Treasury to fall within any of those categories are 
subject to treatment as if they were the government of Iraq 
itself. This enables Treasury to designate Iraqi ``front'' 
organizations that may be operating in third countries as 
``Specially Designated Nationals of Iraq,'' thus subjecting 
them to the Iraqi sanctions. Blocked accounts in U.S. financial 
institutions must earn interest at commercially reasonable 
rates; funds are not to be held in instruments with a maturity 
exceeding 90 days. Setoffs against blocked accounts are 
prohibited.
    The following activities are prohibited, unless licensed by 
the Office of Foreign Assets Control:

                            buying from iraq

    Except as provided for under UNSC Resolution 986 (see 
below) goods or services cannot be imported into the United 
States either directly or through third countries. Any activity 
that promotes or is intended to promote such importation is 
prohibited.

                            selling to iraq

    Goods, technology or services cannot be exported from the 
United States, or, if subject to U.S. jurisdiction, exported or 
reexported from a third country, to Iraq (notwithstanding 
authorization from another government agency) with the 
exception of OFAC-licensed food, medical supplies intended to 
relieve human suffering and certain other humanitarian goods. 
In no circumstances has the use of blocked funds been 
authorized for humanitarian sales. Any activity that promotes 
or is intended to promote a prohibited exportation or 
reexportation, or the transshipment of goods, services, or 
technology subject to U.S. jurisdiction through a third 
country, is also prohibited.
    An exporter who shipped merchandise to Iraq prior to August 
2, 1990 and who is the beneficiary of a letter of credit, 
issued or confirmed by a U.S. bank, or a letter of credit 
involving a reimbursement confirmed by a U.S. bank may apply to 
OFAC for a specific license authorizing payment under the 
letter of credit. A specific license authorizing payment under 
such a letter of credit will only be issued for a delivery to 
Iraq which occurred after August 2 if the exporter made a good 
faith effort to divert the delivery.

                         offshore transactions

    Generally, U.S. persons are prohibited from dealing in 
Iraqi-origin goods or in any other goods exported from Iraq to 
any country after August 6, 1990. U.S. persons are also 
prohibited from dealing in property intended for exportation to 
Iraq from any country.
    Performance of contracts in support of industrial, 
commercial, public utility or governmental projects in Iraq is 
also generally prohibited. Provisions prohibiting performance 
are very broadly construed to prohibit any financial, sales, or 
service contract that will have an impact on projects in Iraq. 
U.S. persons may not, for example, provide financing or 
consulting services to a third-country company, where those 
services would inure to the benefit of a project in Iraq. Banks 
need to be very careful that their foreign corporate accounts 
are not used in connection with Iraqi projects or commercial 
activities.
    While foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms are not subject to 
the Regulations, U.S. parent corporations and all U.S. citizens 
or residents, wherever located, are strictly prohibited from 
approving or providing financial assistance, advice, consulting 
services, goods, or any other support to subsidiaries in 
connection with Iraqi projects.

                          unsc resolution 986

    On April 14, 1995, the United Nations Security Council 
adopted Resolution 986 (``UNSCR 986'') which, subject to 
certain conditions, established a program to allow the 
Government of Iraq a six month window in which to sell $2 
billion of petroleum and petroleum products, the proceeds of 
which would be used to purchase humanitarian supplies. Proceeds 
are to be deposited into a special account at Banque Nationale 
de Paris' New York branch which will be used to fund the 
purchases. The Secretary General of the United Nations has now 
announced the implementation of the program and the Regulations 
have been amended accordingly.
    U.S. persons are authorized to enter into executory 
contracts with the Government of Iraq relating to the following 
authorized transactions: the purchase and exportation from Iraq 
of Iraqi-origin petroleum and petroleum products; the trading, 
importation, exportation or other dealings in or related to 
Iraqi-origin petroleum and petroleum products outside Iraq; the 
sale and exportation to Iraq of parts and equipment that are 
essential for the safe operation of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik 
pipeline system in Iraq; and the sale and exportation to Iraq 
of medicines, health supplies, foodstuffs, and materials and 
supplies for essential civilian needs.
    All executory contracts must meet the following 
requirements: the executory contracts and all other related 
contracts must be consistant with the requirements of UNSCR 
986, any other applicable UNSC Resolutions, memoranda, and any 
further guidance issued by the 661 Sanctions Committee and 
executory contracts involving any transactions subject to 
license application requirements by another Federal agency must 
be contingent upon prior authorization of such agency. Actual 
performance under any executory contract requires the issuance 
of a separate specific license by OFAC (see below). The 
authorization for executory contracts by U.S. persons includes 
contracts with third parties incidental to permissible 
executory contracts with the Government of Iraq.
    Section 575.523 of the Regulations now provides a statement 
of licensing policy for U.S. persons seeking to purchase 
petroleum and petroleum products from the Government of Iraq or 
Iraq's State Oil Marketing Organization (``SOMO'') pursuant to 
UNSCR 986. A specific license must be issued by OFAC to 
authorize a licensee to deal directly with the United Nations 
661 Committee or its designee (the ``overseers'') appointed by 
the UN Secretary-General. Applications for specific licenses 
from OFAC must include the following information: (1) 
applicant's full legal name; (2) applicant's mailing and street 
addresses; (3) name of the individual(s) responsible for the 
license application and related commercial transactions and the 
individual's telephone and facsimile numbers; (4) if the 
applicant is a business entity, the state or jurisdiction of 
incorporation and principal place of business; (5) a written 
certification that the applicant has entered into an executory 
contract for the purchase of Iraqi-origin petroleum or 
petroleum products with the Government of Iraq, that the 
contract accords with normal arms-length commercial practice, 
and that the applicant is familiar with the Regulations, 
particularly Sections 575.601 and 575.602, and will make its 
executory contract and other documents related to the purchase 
of Iraqi-origin petroleum or petroleum products available to 
OFAC; and (6) a written certification that the applicant 
understands that issuance of a license does not authorize a 
licensee to provide goods, services, or compensation of any 
kind to the Government of Iraq other than that specifically 
provided in contracts entered into by the applicant and the 
Government of Iraq and submitted to and approved by the UN 661 
Committee or its designee. Following the issuance of a specific 
license OFAC will coordinate with the U.S. State Department the 
provision of a list of licensed ``national oil purchasers'' to 
the UN 661 Committee. OFAC licensees whose contracts are 
ultimately approved by UN overseers will be permitted to 
perform those contracts in accordance with their terms. Section 
575.526 of the Regulations provides a general license for 
dealing in, and importation into the United States of, Iraqi-
origin petroleum and petroleum products, the purchase and 
exportation of which have been authorized in accordance with 
UNSCR 986.
    Section 575.524 of the Regulations provides a statement of 
licensing policy for the exportation to Iraq of pipeline parts 
and equipment necessary for the safe operation of the Iraqi 
portion of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline system. Applications 
for such specific licenses must be made to OFAC in advance of 
the proposed sale and exportation and provide the following 
information: (1) identification of the applicant, including 
full legal name, mailing and street addresses, the name of the 
individual(s) responsible for the application and related 
commercial transactions and the individual's telephone and 
facsimile numbers, and, if the applicant is a business entity, 
the state or jurisdiction of incorporation and principal place 
of business; (2) the name and address of all parties involved 
in the transactions and their role, including financial 
institutions and any Iraqi broker, purchasing agent, or other 
participant in the purchase of the pipeline parts or equipment; 
(3) the nature, quantity, value and intended use of the 
pipeline parts and equipment; (4) the intended point(s) of 
entry into Iraq, proposed dates of entry and delivery, and the 
final destination in Iraq of the pipeline parts and equipment; 
(5) a copy of the concluded contract with the Government of 
Iraq and other relevant documentation, all of which must comply 
with the provisions of UNSC Resolution 986, other applicable 
Security Council resolutions, the Memorandum of Understanding, 
and applicable guidance issued by the 661 Committee; and (6) a 
statement that the applicant is familiar with the requirements 
of the above-referenced documents, particularly Memorandum of 
Understanding paragraph 24 and Guidelines paragraphs 35 and 45, 
and will conform the letter of credit and related financing 
documents to their terms.
    Section 575.525 of the Regulations provides a statement of 
licensing policy for the sale of humanitarian items to Iraq. 
Applications for specific licenses must be made to OFAC in 
advance of the proposed sale and exportation and provide the 
following information: (1) identification of the applicant, 
including full legal name, mailing and street addresses, the 
name of the individual(s) responsible for the application and 
related commercial transactions and the individual's telephone 
and facsimile numbers, and, if the applicant is a business 
entity, the state or jurisdiction of incorporation and 
principal place of business; (2) the name and address of all 
parties involved in the transactions and their role, including 
financial institutions and any Iraqi broker, purchasing agent, 
or other participant in the purchase of the humanitarian aid; 
(3) the nature, quantity, value and the intended use of the 
humanitarian aid; (4) the intended point(s) of entry into Iraq, 
proposed dates of entry and delivery, and the final destination 
in Iraq of the humanitarian aid; (5) a copy of the concluded 
contract with the Government of Iraq or the United Nations 
Inter-Agency Humanitarian Programme and other relevant 
documentation, all of which must comply with the provisions of 
UNSCR 986, other applicable Security Council resolutions, the 
Memorandum of Understanding, and applicable guidance issued by 
the 661 Committee; and (6) a statement that the applicant is 
familiar with the requirements of UNSCR 986, other applicable 
Security Council resolutions, the Memorandum of Understanding, 
and applicable guidance issued by the 661 Committee, 
particularly Memorandum of Understanding paragraph 24 and 
Guidelines paragraphs 35 and 45, and will conform the letter of 
credit and related financing documents to their terms.
    Transactions related to travel to Iraq or activities within 
Iraq by U.S. persons are not authorized by the Regulations nor 
are debits to blocked accounts or direct financial transactions 
with the Government of Iraq. U.S. persons may, however, enlist 
and pay the expenses of non-U.S. nationals to travel to Iraq on 
their behalf for the purpose of assisting in obtaining an 
executory contract under UNSCR 986. Banking transfers into Iraq 
to persons in Iraq continue to be prohibited by Section 575.210 
of the Regulations.

                                 travel

    All transportation-related transactions and services, or 
the use by U.S. persons of vessels or aircraft registered in 
Iraq, are prohibited. All travel-related transactions by U.S. 
persons are also prohibited, with narrow exceptions related to 
journalistic activity, official U.S. Government or United 
Nations business, reimbursement for the UNSCR 986 activities 
referenced above, or one's own departure from Iraq.

                               financial

    All transfers of funds by U.S. persons to the Government of 
Iraq or to persons in Iraq are prohibited, as are all 
commitments or transfers of credit, financial transactions, or 
contracts. Banks may not execute transfer instructions 
involving sending money to persons in Iraq, except as licensed, 
and must block any funds coming into their possession in which 
there is an interest of the Government of Iraq, including 
Specially Designated Nationals of Iraq or Iraqi financial 
institutions located anywhere in the world. ``Suspense 
accounts'' are not permitted. If banks receive instructions to 
transfer funds involving an interest of the Government of Iraq, 
they must block them on their own books.
    Among other items, the Regulations provide the following 
guidance:

                       standby letters of credit

    A number of companies were required to open bid, 
performance, or warranty bonds in the form of standby letters 
of credit to do business in or with Iraq before the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait. Special procedures have been established 
with regard to payment demands under standby letters of credit 
in favor of Iraq. Banks must ``give prompt notice'' to the 
party who opened the letter of credit (the account party) when 
there is an attempted drawing. The account party then has five 
days to apply to the Office of Foreign Assets Control for a 
specific license to prevent ``payment'' of the letter of credit 
into a blocked account. A bank may not make any payment, even 
into a blocked account, on behalf of an Iraqi beneficiary 
unless the account party fails to secure a Treasury Department 
license within 10 business days of notification from the bank. 
If the account party receives a license from the Treasury 
Department, the original of the license should be presented to 
the bank and a special blocked reserve account must be 
established on the account party's corporate ledger to reflect 
its outstanding obligation to Iraq in lieu of the bank 
``paying'' the letter of credit. The account party must certify 
to the Treasury Department that it has established the blocked 
reserve account. Nothing in this procedure precludes the 
account party or any other person from at any time contesting 
the legality of the demand from the beneficiary or raising any 
other legal defense to payment. Moreover, the issuing bank must 
continue to maintain the letter of credit as a contingent 
liability on its own books, despite any reserve account 
established by the account party. The obligations of the 
various parties under the letter of credit remain in effect as 
long as the Iraqi assets are blocked. They may be reevaluated 
and renegotiated to the extent permitted by law once the assets 
have been unblocked.

                            special reports

    All parties engaging in transactions involving Iraq must 
keep accurate and comprehensive records. The Office of Foreign 
Assets Control may require reports on such activities at any 
time. The Treasury Department has required the filing of 
special census data on claims by U.S. nationals against Iraq 
(TDF 90-22.41) and on blocked Iraqi government property (TDF 
90-22.40).
    If you have information regarding possible violations of 
any of these regulations, please call the Treasury Department's 
Office of Foreign Assets Control at 202/622-2430. Your call 
will be handled confidentially.
    This document is explanatory only and does not have the 
force of law. The Executive Orders and implementing regulations 
dealing with Iraq contain the legally binding provisions 
governing the sanctions and this document does not supplement 
or modify those Executive Orders or regulations.
    The Office of Foreign Assets Control also administers 
sanctions programs involving Libya, The Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Serb-Controlled Bosnia, 
Cuba, North Korea, the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA), Iran, Syria, Sudan, Burma 
(Myanmar), designated international terrorists and narcotics 
traffickers, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, and designated 
foreign persons who have engaged in activities relating to the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. For additional 
information about these programs or about the Iraqi sanctions 
program, please contact the:

  OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL
  U.S. Department of the Treasury
  Washington, D.C. 20220
  202/622-2520

(02-23-99)

        (5) Libya: What You Need to Know about the U.S. Embargo

 An overview of the Libyan Sanctions Regulations--Title 31 Part 550 of 
                  the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations

                              introduction

    The Libyan Sanctions Regulations, authorized under the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the 
International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, 
established economic sanctions against Libya in January 1986. 
Citing terrorist attacks against the Rome and Vienna airports 
in December 1985, former President Reagan emphasized that he 
had authorized the sanctions in response to Libya's repeated 
use and support of terrorism against the United States, other 
countries, and innocent persons. The Regulations are still in 
force and affect all U.S. citizens and permanent residents 
wherever they are located, all people and organizations 
physically in the United States, and all branches of U.S. 
organizations throughout the world. They are administered by 
the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets 
Control.
    Criminal penalties for violating the sanctions range up to 
10 years in prison, $500,000 in corporate and $250,000 in 
individual fines. In addition, civil penalties of up to $11,000 
per violation may be imposed administratively.
    This fact sheet is a broad overview of the Libyan Sanctions 
Regulations.

                           buying from libya

    Goods or services of Libyan origin may not be imported into 
the United States either directly or through third countries. 
There are two exceptions: (1) Libyan merchandise up to $100 in 
value in non-commercial quantities may be brought into the 
United States either for strictly personal use as accompanied 
baggage by an authorized traveler or sent as a gift to a person 
in the United States and (2) qualifying informational material 
may be imported without restriction.

                            selling to libya

    Except for informational materials, such as books, 
magazines, films, and recordings and donated articles such as 
food, clothing, medicine, and medical supplies intended to 
relieve human suffering, and the licensed export of 
agricultural commodities and products, medicine and medical 
equipment, no goods, technology, or services may be exported 
from the United States to Libya, either directly or through 
third countries. No U.S. bank or foreign branch of a U.S. bank 
may finance, or arrange offshore financing for, third-country 
trade transactions where Libya is known to have an interest in 
the trade as its ultimate beneficiary. The U.S. Treasury 
Department takes the view that arranging transactions which 
ultimately benefit Libya (for example, brokering third-country 
sales of Libyan crude oil or transportation for Libyan cargo) 
constitutes an exportation of brokerage services to Libya and a 
dealing in Libyan governmental property in violation of the 
Regulations. Banks should be careful, for example, not to 
become involved in transactions relating to shipments to or 
from South Korea involving ultimate delivery of merchandise to 
the Great Man-Made River Project in Libya. The only areas of 
trade that may involve Libya and still be permissible are: (1) 
the sale of parts and components to third countries, where the 
U.S. goods will be ``substantially transformed'' into new and 
different articles of commerce prior to shipment to Libya, and 
(2) the sale of goods which come to rest in the inventory of a 
third-country distributor whose sales are not predominantly to 
Libya. Even the first of those exceptions is not available if 
the finished product of the third country is destined for use 
in any aspect of the Libyan petroleum or petrochemical 
industries.

                     specially designated nationals

    Individuals or organizations who act on behalf of the 
Government of Libya anywhere in the world are considered by the 
U.S. Treasury Department to be ``Specially Designated 
Nationals'' of Libya. Their names are published in the Federal 
Register, an official publication of the U.S. Government. A 
listing of such Specially Designated Nationals may be obtained 
by calling the Office of Foreign Assets Control at 202/622-
2420. The listing, however, is a partial one and any U.S. 
individual or organization engaging in transactions with 
foreign nationals must take reasonable care to make certain 
that such foreign nationals are not acting on behalf of Libya. 
The list includes certain banks domiciled in Europe and Africa 
as well as the names of individuals who are officers and 
directors of substantial international corporations. U.S. 
individuals or organizations who violate the Regulations by 
transacting business with Specially Designated Nationals of 
Libya may be subject to civil or criminal prosecution.

                    libyan government assets blocked

    On January 8, 1986, the President blocked all Government of 
Libya assets in the United States or in the possession or 
control of U.S. persons anywhere in the world. This action 
prohibits all transfers of Libyan governmental assets without a 
specific license from the Office of Foreign Assets Control. All 
contracts, loans, and financial dealings with Libya are 
prohibited. The freeze covers all properties of the Libyan 
Government, and of entities owned or controlled by it, 
including all Libyan-organized and Libyan-owned or controlled 
banks (all banks in Libya are considered Government-controlled) 
and includes deposits held in banks in the United States and in 
U.S. banks' overseas branches. The prohibition against any 
transfer of property or interest in the property of Libya 
includes property that is now or in the future is located in 
the United States or is in or comes into the possession or 
control of U.S. persons. Any unlicensed funds transfer 
involving a direct or indirect interest of the Government of 
Libya (including any transfer routed through or to Libyan banks 
which are all considered Specially Designated Nationals of 
Libya), for which banks subject to U.S. jurisdiction receive 
instructions, must be deposited into a blocked account on the 
books of the bank receiving the instructions. Such funds may 
not be returned to a remitter without a specific license from 
the Office of Foreign Assets Control. No unlicensed debits may 
be made to blocked Libyan accounts to pay obligations of U.S. 
or other persons, whether the obligations arose before or after 
the sanctions against Libya were imposed. Even payments from 
blocked accounts for goods, services, or technology exported 
prior to the sanctions program are prohibited.

                     financial dealings with libya

    Financial transactions, including trade financing, are 
generally prohibited. Payments for and financing of licensed 
sales of agricultural commodities and products, medicine and 
medical equipment may be accomplished by cash in advance, sales 
on open account (provided the account receivable is not 
transferred by the person extending the credit), or by third 
country financial institutions that are neither U.S. persons 
nor government of Libya entities. Any other arrangements must 
be specifically authorized by OFAC. U.S. banks may adise and 
confirm letters of credit issued by third country banks 
covering licensed sales.
    Payments for licensed sales of agricultural commodities and 
products, medicine and medical equipment, which must reference 
an appropriate OFAC license, may not involve a debit to a 
blocked account on the books of a U.S. depository institution. 
Before a U.S. bank initiates a payment, or credits its customer 
for a licensed transaction, it must determine that the transfer 
is authorized.

                       contracts benefiting libya

    No U.S. person may perform any contract in support of an 
industrial or other commercial or governmental project in 
Libya. The prohibition includes sales or service agreements 
with non-Libyan persons located anywhere in the world, if it is 
known that Libya or a Libyan project will benefit from the 
transaction. Banks subject to U.S. jurisdiction must exercise 
extreme caution not to operate accounts for even non-U.S. 
companies which use those accounts for transactions connected 
with Libyan projects or commercial activities. Any such 
accounts must be blocked under U.S. law.

                transactions involving u.s. subsidiaries

    Independent transactions with Libya by foreign subsidiaries 
of U.S. firms are permitted if no U.S. person or permanent 
resident has a role. It should be emphasized that the 
facilitating actions of the U.S. parent, or of U.S. citizens 
(wherever resident) who manage or work for the subsidiary, are 
fully subject to the prohibitions of the Regulations.

                       standby letters of credit

    A number of companies were required to open bid, 
performance, advance payment, or warranty bonds in the form of 
standby letters of credit to do business with Libya before the 
Libyan sanctions were imposed. Special procedures have been 
established with regard to payment demands under standby 
letters of credit in favor of Libya. Banks must ``give prompt 
notice'' to the party who opened the letter of credit (the 
account party) when there is an attempted drawing. The account 
party then has five days to apply to the Office of Foreign 
Assets Control for a specific license to prevent ``payment'' of 
the letter of credit into a blocked account. A bank may not 
make any payment, even into a blocked account, on behalf of a 
Libyan beneficiary unless the account party fails to secure a 
Treasury license within 10 business days of notification from 
the bank. If the account party receives a license from the 
Treasury Department, the original of the license should be 
presented to the bank and a special blocked reserve account 
must be established on the account party's corporate books to 
reflect its outstanding obligation to Libya in lieu of the bank 
``paying'' the letter of credit. The account party must certify 
to the Treasury Department that it has established the blocked 
reserve account. Neither the bank nor the account party are 
relieved from giving any notice of defense against payment or 
reimbursement that is required by applicable law. Moreover, the 
issuing bank must continue to maintain the letter of credit as 
a contingent liability on its own books, despite any reserve 
account established by the account party and, in the event the 
embargo is lifted, both the bank and the account party will be 
expected to negotiate concerning their outstanding obligation.

                            travel to libya

    All transportation-related transactions involving Libya by 
U.S. persons are prohibited, including the sale in the United 
States of any transportation by air which includes any stop in 
Libya. All travel-related transactions are prohibited for U.S. 
citizens or residents with regard to Libya, except for (1) 
travel by close family members of Libyan nationals when the 
U.S. citizen or resident has registered with Treasury's Office 
of Foreign Assets Control or with the Embassy of Belgium in 
Tripoli, or (2) travel by journalists regularly employed in 
such capacity by a newsgathering organization, or (3) travel 
transactions for the sole purpose of negotiating executory 
contracts in connection with licensed sales or agricultural 
commodities and products, medicine, and medical equipment. 
Travel transactions related to the installation or servicing of 
medical equipment exported pursuant to OFAC license may be 
authorized by specific license.
    If you have information regarding possible violations of 
any of these regulations, please call the Treasury Department's 
Office of Foreign Assets Control at 202/622-2430. Your call 
will be handled confidentially.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    This document is explanatory only and does not have the 
force of law. The Executive Orders and implementing regulations 
relating to Libya contain the legally binding provisions 
governing the sanctions and this document does not supplement 
or modify those Executive Orders or regulations.
    The Office also administers sanctions programs involving 
Iraq, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Republic of 
Serbia, North Korea, Cuba, the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA), the Taliban in Afghanistan, 
Iran, Syria, Sudan, Burma (Myanmar), designated international 
terrorists and narcotics trafickers, Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations, and designated foreign persons who have engaged 
in activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. For additional information about these programs or 
about the Libyan sanctions programs, please contact the:

  OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL
  U.S. Department of the Treasury
  Washington, D.C. 20220
  202/622-2520

  http://www.treas.gov/ofac

(07-27-99)

     (6) North Korea: What You Need to Know about the U.S. Embargo

An overview of the Foreign Assets Control Regulations as they relate to 
 North Korea--Title 31 Part 500 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations

                              introduction

    The Foreign Assets Control Regulations, authorized under 
the Trading with the Enemy Act, established economic sanctions 
against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (``North 
Korea'') in 1950. Although recently modified as a result of 
commitments made to begin normalization of relations, the 
Regulations are still in force and affect all U.S. citizens and 
permanent residents wherever they are located, all people and 
organizations physically in the United States, and all 
branches, subsidiaries and controlled affiliates of U.S. 
organizations throughout the world. They are administered by 
the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets 
Control. Penalties for violating the sanctions range up to 10 
years in prison, $1,000,000 in corporate fines, and $250,000 in 
individual fines.
    This fact sheet is a broad summary of the Regulations for 
all individuals intending to travel to or otherwise deal with 
North Korea.

                         selling to north korea

    Except for information and informational materials, such as 
books, magazines, films, compact disks, CD ROMs, artworks, news 
wire feeds and recordings. U.S. products, technology or 
services generally may not be exported to North Korea, either 
directly or through third countries, unless licensed by the 
Bureau of Export Administration of the U.S. Department of 
Commerce. This prohibition includes dealing in or assisting the 
sale of goods or commodities to or from North Korea, since such 
brokering is considered to be the export of a service. Exports 
of commercially-supplied goods to meet basic human needs may be 
authorized under individual validated licenses by the U.S. 
Commerce Department on a case-by-case basis.
    Licenses are also granted to U.S. persons by the U.S. 
Treasury Department to enable them to participate in 
transactions that further North Korea's transition to light-
water reactor (``LWR'') power plants. Such projects include LWR 
power plant design, site preparation, excavation, delivery of 
essential nonnuclear components (including turbines and 
generators), building construction, the disposition of spent 
nuclear fuel and the provision of heavy oil for heating and 
electricity generation pending completion of the first LWR 
unit. For information regarding licensing criteria, please 
contact the Licensing Division of the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control at 202/622-2480.

                        buying from north korea

    Goods or services of North Korean origin generally may not 
be imported into the United States either directly or through 
third countries, without authorization from the Office of 
Foreign Assets Control. The only exceptions are non-commercial 
quantities of North Korean merchandise up to $100 in value, 
which may be brought into the United States for strictly 
personal use as accompanied baggage by a person traveling to 
North Korea and informational materials, which may be imported 
without limitation. Receipts should be kept to document any 
goods purchased in North Korea and those receipts should be 
made available to U.S. Customs when entry is made into the 
United States.
    Specific licenses may be issued by the Office of Foreign 
Assets Control to allow the importation into the United States 
of North Korean-origin Magnesite or magnesia. For further 
information regarding licensing criteria, please contact the 
Licensing Division of the Office of Foreign Assets Control at 
202/622-2480.

                     specially designated nationals

    The Regulations prohibit buying from or selling to North 
Korean nationals whether they are physically located in North 
Korea or doing business elsewhere. Individuals or organizations 
who act for or on behalf of North Korea anywhere in the world 
are considered by the U.S. Treasury Department to be 
``Specially Designated Nationals'' of North Korea. Their names 
are published in the Federal Register, an official publication 
of the U.S. Government. A listing of such Specially Designated 
Nationals may be obtained by calling the Office of Foreign 
Assets Control at 202/622-2420. The listing, however, is a 
partial one and any U.S. individual or organization engaging in 
transactions with foreign nationals must take reasonable care 
to make certain that such foreign nationals are not acting for 
or on behalf of North Korea. Specially Designated Nationals of 
North Korea operating in the United States are subject to 
criminal prosecution and U.S. individuals or organizations who 
violate the Regulations by transacting business with them are 
also subject to criminal prosecution.

                             sending gifts

    Gift parcels may only be shipped or carried to an 
individual, or to a religious, charitable, or educational 
organization in North Korea for the use of the recipient or of 
the recipient's immediate family, subject to the following 
limitations: the combined total domestic retail value of all 
the items in the parcel must not exceed $400; not more than one 
parcel may be sent or given by the same person in the U.S. to 
the same recipient in North Korea in any month; and only items 
normally sent as gifts, such as food, clothing, toilet 
articles, or medicine, may be included in the gift parcel. Gold 
coins and gold bullion are not eligible for gift parcel 
treatment. Organizations that consolidate and send multiple 
gift parcels in single shipments must obtain a validated 
license from the U.S. Department of Commerce. Each gift parcel 
must meet commodity, dollar-value, and frequency limitations. 
If a parcel being shipped or carried to North Korea fails to 
meet these standards, the parcel, and any parcel in a 
consolidated shipment with it, are subject to seizure by the 
U.S. Government.

                        traveling to north korea

    U.S. passports are valid for travel to North Korea and 
individuals do not need U.S. Government permission to travel 
there. All transactions ordinarily incident to travel to, from 
and within North Korea and to maintenance within North Korea 
are authorized. U.S. travel service providers are authorized to 
organize group travel to North Korea, including transactions 
with North Korean carriers. However, individuals may only spend 
money in North Korea to purchase items related to travel, such 
as hotel accommodations, meals, and goods for personal 
consumption by the traveler in North Korea. There is no longer 
any per diem restriction on these expenses, and the use of 
credit cards for these transactions is also authorized. A 
traveler returning from North Korea may bring back into the 
United States as accompanied baggage $100 worth of merchandise 
in non-commercial quantities, as well as informational 
materials without limitation. Because the sanctions program 
prohibits business dealings with North Korea unless licensed by 
the U.S. Treasury Department, purchases of other goods or 
services unrelated to travel are prohibited. At the present 
time, individuals who wish to travel to North Korea must obtain 
North Korean entry visas in third countries. Travelers should 
consult the U.S. State Department for any special travel 
advisories.

                          accounts and assets

    As a general rule, no U.S. person may have any dealings in 
North Korean assets, either governmental or private; nor may 
they have any financial dealings with North Korea, except for 
financial transactions incident to authorized activities, such 
as travel-related transactions and licensed trade. All property 
of North Korea, of North Korean nationals, and of Specially 
Designated Nationals of North Korea controlled by or in the 
possession of persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction is 
``blocked.''
    U.S. financial institutions may now rely on originators or 
beneficiaries of funds transfers with regard to compliance with 
the sanctions against North Korea and are authorized by general 
license to process the post-February 14, 1995 transfer of funds 
in which North Korea or a national thereof has an interest. 
Persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction who are originators or 
ultimate beneficiaries of such funds transfers, however, 
including U.S. banking institutions that are themselves 
originators or beneficiaries, may not initiate or receive such 
transfers if the underlying transactions to which they relate 
are prohibited.
    Specific licenses may be issued on a case-by-case basis to 
authorize the unblocking of funds that were blocked by 
financial institutions pursuant to this part because of an 
interest of North Korea or a national thereof, that came into 
the financial institution's possession or control by wire 
transfer or check remittance prior to the effective date of the 
general license authorizing such activity. Such licenses will 
only authorize the return of funds to remitting parties, 
provided that no funds are released to the Government of North 
Korea, to any entity controlled by the Government, to any 
person located in or controlled from North Korea, or to any 
entity organized under the laws of that country.

                     estates and insurance policies

    An estate is blocked whenever a North Korean resident is an 
heir or is the deceased; money from a life insurance policy is 
blocked whenever the deceased or the beneficiary is a North 
Korean resident. It is possible for the heir of a person who 
died in North Korea, or the beneficiary of a life insurance 
policy of a person who died in North Korea, to apply for a 
license from the U.S. Treasury Department to unblock the estate 
or the insurance proceeds, provided the heir or beneficiary is 
not a North Korean national. Persons administering or 
interested in blocked estates or life insurance proceeds should 
contact the Licensing Division of the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control at 202/622-2480 to obtain further information 
concerning procedures for requesting a Treasury license.

         donations of funds and goods to meet basic human needs

    Donations of funds for the purpose of contributing to the 
provision of humanitarian assistance to victims of natural 
disasters in North Korea are authorized, provided that such 
donations may only be made through the United Nations, related 
UN programs and specialized agencies, the American Red Cross 
and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Transactions 
incident to the donation to North Korea from third countries of 
goods to meet basic human needs are also authorized.

                          overflight payments

    Effective April 7, 1997, a general license has been issued 
authorizing payments to North Korea for services rendered by 
the Government of North Korea in connection with overflights of 
North Korea or emergency landings in North Korea by aircraft 
registered in the United States or owned or controlled by 
persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The 
publication date in the Federal Register is April 10, 1997.

                            census of claims

    The Regulations were amended on December 9, 1997 to require 
the reporting, no later than March 9, 1998, of all outstanding 
claims held by U.S. nationals against the Government of North 
Korea or any North Korean government entity.
    This document is explanatory only and does not have the 
force of law. The Executive Orders and implementing regulations 
relating to North Korea contain the legally binding provisions 
governing the sanctions and this document does not supplement 
or modify those Executive Orders or regulations.
    The Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control 
also administers sanctions programs involving Iraq, Libya, the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Cuba, 
the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
(UNITA), Iran, Syria, Sudan, Burma (Myanmar), designated 
international terrorists and narcotics traffickers, Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations, and designated foreign persons who 
have engaged in activities related to the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. For additional information about 
these programs or about the North Korean sanctions program, 
please contact the:

  OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL
  U.S. Department of the Treasury
  Washington, D.C. 20220

  202/622-2520

(02-23-99)

        (7) Sudan: What You Need to Know about the U.S. Embargo

An overview of the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations--Title 31 Part 538 of 
                  the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations

                              introduction

    On November 3, 1997, after finding that the policies and 
actions of the Government of Sudan, including continued support 
for international terrorism, ongoing efforts to destabilize 
neighboring governments, and the prevalence of human rights 
violations, including slavery and the denial of religious 
freedom, constituted an unusual and extraordinary threat to the 
national security and foreign policy of the United States, 
President Clinton issued Executive Order No. 13067, declaring a 
national emergency to deal with that threat. The order, issued 
under the authority of International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-1706) (``IEEPA''), the National Emergencies 
Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) and section 301 of title 3, United 
States Code, imposed a trade embargo against Sudan and a total 
asset freeze against the Government of Sudan. The Sudanese 
Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 538 (the ``Regulations'') 
implement Executive Order No. 13067.
    Criminal penalties for violating the Regulations range up 
to 10 years in jail, $500,000 in corporate, and $250,000 in 
individual fines. In addition, civil penalties of up to $11,000 
per violation may be imposed administratively.
    This fact sheet is a broad overview of the Regulations.

                           buying from sudan

    Goods or services of Sudanese origin may not be imported 
into the United States either directly or through third 
countries without a license. Exceptions include: (1) Sudanese 
merchandise up to $100 in value in non-commercial quantities 
may be brought into the United States either for strictly 
personal use as accompanied baggage or sent as a gift to a 
person in the United States and (2) information or 
informational materials may be imported without restriction. 
All other imports of Sudanese origin must be authorized by the 
Office of Foreign Assets Control.
    Importation into the United States from third countries of 
goods containing raw materials or components of Sudanese origin 
is not prohibited if those raw materials or components have 
been incorporated into manufactured products or otherwise 
substantially transformed in a third country.

                            selling to sudan

    Except for information or informational materials and 
donated articles intended to relieve human suffering, such as 
food, clothing and medicine, and the licensed export of 
agricultural commodities and products, medicine and medical 
equipment, no goods, technology, or services may be exported 
from the United States to Sudan, either directly or through 
third countries, without a license. Exportation of goods or 
technology from the United States to third countries is 
prohibited if the exporter knows, or has reason to know, that 
the goods or technology are intended for transshipment to 
Sudan. The exportation of goods or technology intended 
specifically for incorporation or substantial transformation 
into a third-country product is also prohibited if the 
particular product is to be used in Sudan, is being 
specifically manufactured to fill a Sudanese order, or if the 
manufacturer's sales of the particular product are 
predominantly to Sudan.
    No U.S. bank, including its foreign branches, may finance, 
or arrange offshore financing for, third-country trade 
transactions where Sudan is known to be the ultimate 
destination of, or the Government of Sudan is the purchaser of, 
the goods. Arranging transactions which ultimately benefit 
Sudan (for example, brokering third-country sales to Sudan) 
constitutes an exportation of brokerage services to Sudan in 
violation of the Regulations. The Regulations also prohibit 
non-U.S. persons from unauthorized re-exportation of U.S. 
origin goods to Sudan.

                     specially designated nationals

    Individuals or organizations that are owned or controlled 
by, or act on behalf of, the Government of Sudan anywhere in 
the world may be named by the U.S. Treasury Department as 
``Specially Designated Nationals'' (``SDNs'') of Sudan. U.S. 
persons are prohibited from transacting business with these 
individuals and entities, and all of their property in the 
United States or in the possession or control of a U.S. person 
is blocked. Their names are published in the Federal Register, 
an official publication of the U.S. Government. A listing of 
such SDNs may be obtained by calling the Office of Foreign 
Assets Control (``OFAC'') at 202/622-2490. The listing, 
however, is a partial one and any U.S. individual or 
organization engaging in transactions with foreign nationals 
must take reasonable care to make certain that such foreign 
nationals are not owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of 
Sudan. U.S. individuals or organizations who violate the 
Regulations by transacting business with Specially Designated 
Nationals may be subject to civil or criminal prosecution.

                   sudanese government assets blocked

    Effective November 4, 1997, all property and interests in 
property of the Government of Sudan, including its agencies, 
instrumentalities and controlled entities and SDNs, in the 
United States or in the possession or control of a U.S. person, 
including their overseas branches, are blocked. All transfers 
of such property must be authorized by the OFAC. Any unlicensed 
funds transfer involving a direct or indirect interest of the 
Government of Sudan (including any transfer routed to a 
Sudanese Government-controlled bank) for which banks subject to 
U.S. jurisdiction receive instructions must be deposited into a 
blocked account on the books of the bank receiving the 
instructions. Such funds may not be returned to a remitter 
without a specific license from the OFAC. No unlicensed debits 
may be made to blocked accounts to pay obligations of U.S. or 
other persons, whether the obligations arose before or after 
the sanctions against Sudan were imposed. Setoffs against 
blocked accounts are prohibited.

                     financial dealings with sudan

    Payments for and financing of licensed sales of 
agricultural commodities and products, medicine and medical 
equipment may be accomplished by cash in advance, sales on open 
account (provided the account receivable is not transferred by 
the person extending the credit), opr by third country 
financial institutions that are neither U.S. persons nor 
government of Sudan entities. U.S. banks may advise or confirm 
letters of credit issued by third country banks covering such 
licensed sales.
    Payments for licensed sales of agriculural commodities and 
products, medicine and medical equipment, which must reference 
an appropriate OFAC license, may not involve a debit to a 
blocked account on the books of a U.S. depository institution. 
Before a U.S. bank initiates a payment, or credits its customer 
for a licensed transaction, it must determine that the transfer 
is authorized.
    As a rule, all other financial dealings with Sudan are 
prohibited, including the performance by any U.S. person of any 
contract, including a financing contract, in support of an 
industrial, commercial, public utility, or governmental project 
in Sudan.
    U.S. persons are authorized to send and receive personal 
remittances to and from Sudan, provided that such transfers are 
not processed through a bank owned or controlled by the 
Government of Sudan. Financing related to trade contracts 
involving Sudan which were in place prior to November 4, 1997, 
and for which underlying transactions were completed by 
December 4, 1997, may be completed in accordance with their 
terms, provided that no debits are made to a blocked account.

                        prohibited facilitation

    The Regulations prohibit the facilitation by a U.S. person 
of the direct or indirect exportation or reexportation of 
goods, technology or services to or from Sudan. Facilitation of 
a trade or financial transaction that could be lawfully engaged 
in directly by a U.S. person or from the United States is not 
prohibited. Likewise, performance of services of a purely 
clerical or reporting nature that does not further trade or 
financial transactions with Sudan or the Government of Sudan 
will not violate the prohibition on exportation of services to 
Sudan.

                     non-governmental organizations

    Registration numbers may be issued by OFAC on a case-by-
case basis to nongovernmental organizations (``NGOs'') involved 
in humanitarian or religious activities in Sudan. This 
registration number will enable the NGO to continue authorized 
operations in Sudan. Applications for registration must include 
the name and address of the NGO's headquarters; the name, 
title, and telephone number of a person to be contacted in 
connection with the registration; the NGO's local address in 
Sudan and name, if different; and a detailed description of its 
humanitarian or religious activities and projects in Sudan. 
Registrants conducting transactions for their Sudanese 
operations should reference their registration number on all 
funds transfer, purchase, shipping, and financing documents.
    If you have information regarding possible violations of 
any of these regulations, please call the Treasury Department's 
Office of Foreign Assets Control at 202/622-2430. Your call 
will be handled confidentially.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    This document is explanatory only and does not have the 
force of law. Executive Order 13067 and implementing 
regulations and directives contain the legally binding 
provisions governing the sanctions against Sudan. This document 
does not supplement or modify Executive Order 13067 or 
implementing regulations and directives.
    The Office also administers sanctions programs involving 
Iraq, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montengro), North Korea, Cuba, the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA), the Taliban in Afghanistan, 
Iran, Syria, Libya, Burma (Myanmar), designated Terrorists and 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations, international Narcotics 
Traffickers, and designated foreign persons who have engaged in 
activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. For additional information about these programs or 
about the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations, please contact the:

  OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL
  U.S. Department of the Treasury
  Washington, D.C. 20220
  202/622-2520

  http://www.treas.gov/ofac

(07-27-99)

       (8) Taliban: What You Need to Know about the U.S. Embargo

   An overview of U.S. Sanctions against the Taliban (in Afghanistan)

    President Clinton has issued the following Executive Order 
imposing an asset freeze and trade embargo against the Taliban 
in Afghanistan effective 12:01 a.m. Eastern Daylight time on 
July 6, 1999:

                           ``Executive Order

    Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with the Taliban

    ``By the authority vested in me as President by the 
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, 
including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)(``IEEPA''), the National Emergencies Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United 
States Code,
    I, WILLIAM J. CLINTON, President of the United States of 
America, find that the actions and policies of the Taliban in 
Afghanistan, in allowing territory under its control in 
Afghanistan to be used as a safe haven and base of operations 
for Usama bin Ladin and the Al-Qaida organization who have 
committed and threaten to continue to commit acts of violence 
against the United States and its nationals, constitute an 
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and 
foreign policy of the United States, and hereby declare a 
national emergency to deal with that threat.
    I hereby order:
    Section 1. Except to the extent provided in section 203(b) 
of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)) and in regulations, orders, 
directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this 
order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any 
license or permit granted prior to the effective date:
    (a) all property and interests in property of the Taliban; 
and
    (b) all property and interests in property of persons 
determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation 
with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General:
    (i) to be owned or controlled by, or to act for or on 
behalf of the Taliban; or
    (ii) to provide financial, material, or technological 
support for, or services in support of, any of the foregoing;
    that are in the United States, that hereafter come within 
the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the 
possession or control of United States persons, are blocked.
    Sec. 2. Except to the extent provided in section 203(b) of 
IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)) and in regulations, orders, 
directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this 
order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any 
license or permit granted prior to the effective date:
    (a) any transaction or dealing by United States persons or 
within the United States in property or interests in property 
blocked pursuant to this order is prohibited, including the 
making or receiving of any contribution of funds, goods, or 
services to or for the benefit of the Taliban or persons 
designated pursuant to this order;
    (b) the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, 
directly or indirectly, from the United States, or by a United 
States person, wherever located, of any goods, software, 
technology (including technical data), or services to the 
territory of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban or to the 
Taliban or persons designated pursuant to this order is 
prohibited;
    (c) the importation into the United States of any goods, 
software, technology, or services owned or controlled by the 
Taliban or persons designated pursuant to this order or from 
the territory of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban is 
prohibited;
    (d) any transaction by any United States person or within 
the United States that evades or avoids, or has the purpose of 
evading or avoiding, or attempts to violate, any of the 
prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited; and
    (e) any conspiracy formed to violate any of the 
prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.
    Sec. 3. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with 
the Secretary of State, is hereby directed to authorize 
commercial sales of agricultural commodities and products, 
medicine, and medical equipment for civilian end use in the 
territory of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban under 
appropriate safeguards to prevent diversion to military, 
paramilitary, or terrorist end users or end use or to political 
end use.
    Sec. 4. For the purposes of this order:
    (a) the term ``person'' means an individual or entity;
    (b) the term ``entity'' means a partnership, association, 
corporation, or other organization, group, or subgroup;
    (c) the term ``the Taliban'' means the political/military 
entity headquartered in Kandahar, Afghanistan that as of the 
date of this order exercises de facto control over the 
territory of Afghanistan described in paragraph (d) of this 
section, its agencies and instrumentalities, and the Taliban 
leaders listed in the Annex to this order or designated by the 
Secretary of State in consultation with the Secretary of the 
Treasury and the Attorney General. The Taliban is also known as 
the ``Taleban,'' ``Islamic Movement of Taliban,'' ``the Taliban 
Islamic Movement,'' ``Talibano Islami Tahrik,'' and ``Tahrike 
Islami'a Taliban'';
    (d) the term ``territory of Afghanistan controlled by the 
Taliban'' means the territory referred to as the ``Islamic 
Emirate of Afghanistan,'' known in Pashtun as ``de Afghanistan 
Islami Emarat'' or in Dari as ``Emarat Islami-e Afghanistan,'' 
including the following provinces of the country of 
Afghanistan: Kandahar, Farah, Helmund, Nimruz, Herat, Badghis, 
Ghowr, Oruzghon, Zabol, Paktiha, Ghazni, Nangarhar, Lowgar, 
Vardan, Faryab, Jowlan, Balkh, and Paktika. The Secretary of 
State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, is 
hereby authorized to modify the description of the term 
``territory of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban'';
    (e) the term ``United States person'' means any United 
States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized 
under the laws of the United States (including foreign 
branches), or any person in the United States.
    Sec. 5. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with 
the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, is hereby 
authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation of 
rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to me 
by IEEPA as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this 
order. The Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any of 
these functions to other officers and agencies of the United 
States Government. All agencies of the United States Government 
are hereby directed to take all appropriate measures within 
their authority to carry out the provisions of this order.
    Sec. 6. Nothing contained in this order shall create any 
right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any 
party against the United States, its agencies or 
instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other 
person.
    Sec. 7.
    (a) This order is effective at 12:01 a.m. Eastern Daylight 
Time on July 6, 1999.
    (b) This order shall be transmitted to the Congress and 
published in the Federal Register.''

THE WHITE HOUSE,
July 4, 1999

                                 ANNEX

    Mohammed Omar (Amir al-Mumineen [Commander of the 
Faithful])

         State Determinations (in Consultation with Treasury):

    Effective July 22, 1999, the term ``territory of 
Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban'' in the Executive Order 
was modified to include the city of Kabul, Afghanistan.
    The Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control 
also administers sanctions programs involving, Cuba, Iran, 
Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, Syria, the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia & Montenegro), the National Union for the 
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), designated international 
terrorists and narcotics traffickers, foreign terrorist 
organizations, and designated foreign persons who have engaged 
in activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. For additional information about these programs or 
about sanctions against the Taliban, please contact the:

  OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL
  U.S. Department of the Treasury
  Washington, D.C. 20220
  202/622-2520

September 1, 1999

                    7. Department of Transportation

                   a. Federal Aviation Administration

             (1) Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation--1998

    Partial text of the 1988 report on Criminal Acts Against Civil 
Aviation, published by the Federal Aviation Administration's Office of 
                      Civil Aviation Security \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ The complete text of this publication can be viewed at the FAA 
Office of Civilian Security web site at: http://cas.faa.gov/crimacts/
crim98/

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                Foreword

    Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation is a publication of 
the Federal Aviation Administration's Office of Civil Aviation 
Security. This document records incidents that have taken place 
against civil aviation aircraft and interests worldwide. 
Criminal Acts has been published each year since 1986. 
Incidents recorded in this report are summarized in regional 
geographic overviews. Feature articles focus on case histories 
or on specific aviation-related issues. Incidents are also 
sorted into one of seven categories and compared over a five-
year period. In addition, charts and graphs have been prepared 
to assist the reader in interpreting the data. The cutoff date 
for information in this report is December 31, 1998.
    A new appendix, Appendix G, appears in this year's Criminal 
Acts report. This appendix identifies which aviation incidents 
in the past five years are considered politically motivated 
acts. Incidents for 1998 in this category are so identified in 
the individual incident summaries contained in the geographic 
regional reports.
    The information contained in this publication is derived 
from a variety of foreign and domestic sources. In many cases, 
however, specific details of a particular incident may not be 
available, especially if it occurs outside the United States. 
While every effort has been made to provide complete and 
accurate information, it is not always possible to verify 
accounts of some incidents.
    The FAA maintains records of aircraft hijackings, bombing 
attacks, and other significant criminal acts against civil and 
general aviation interests worldwide, which are used to compile 
this report. Offenses such as these represent serious threats 
to aviation safety and, in those incidents involving U.S. air 
carriers or facilities outside the United States, are often 
intended as symbolic attacks against the United States.
    Hijacking and commandeering incidents are viewed within the 
context of the U.S. Federal criminal statute (49 USC 1472 (i)), 
which defines air piracy as any seizure or exercise of control, 
by force or violence or threat of force or violence, or by any 
other form of intimidation, and with wrongful intent, of any 
aircraft. This report does not distinguish between an act of 
air piracy and an attempted act of air piracy for statistical 
purposes.
    The 1998 issue of Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation [is] 
available on the world wide web at HTTP://SECURITY.FAA.GOV/
CRIMACTS.\2\ The 1996 and 1997 Crimacts reports are also 
available on this web site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Should probably read http://cas.faa.gov/crimacts/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                             1998 in Review

    [Image] \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ The pie chart graphic which appeared at this point can be seen 
at: http://cas.faa.gov/crimacts/crim98/2.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Twenty-two incidents involving attacks against civil 
aviation interests worldwide were recorded in 1998. This is one 
fewer than the number of incidents recorded in 1997 and also 
the fewest recorded in Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation 
since the report was first published in 1986. The sub-Saharan 
Africa region recorded the most incidents in 1998 with seven, 
while Europe ranked second with six incidents. Latin America 
and the Caribbean geographical area accounted for five 
incidents, three were recorded in Asia, and one was recorded in 
North America. Neither Central Eurasia nor the Middle East and 
North Africa region had any incidents during the year. The 
Democratic Republic of the Congo experienced the most incidents 
(four) of any one country in 1998; three of these were 
commandeerings that occurred between August 2 and 4. The 
highest percentage of incidents in 1998 (41% or nine incidents) 
were hijackings.
    The three incidents recorded in Asia in 1998 included two 
hijackings and an airport attack. Both hijackings occurred on 
domestic flights. The first incident occurred in Pakistan when 
three hijackers attempted to divert the plane to India. This is 
considered a politically motivated incident. The second 
incident took place in China when the pilot himself diverted 
the plane to Taiwan. The airport attack occurred in Japan when 
three projectiles were launched at Tokyo's Narita Airport. This 
incident is also considered to have been politically motivated.
    No incidents occurred in Central Eurasia during 1998.
    Europe had the second highest number of incidents in 1998 
with five hijackings and an off-airport facility attack. The 
off-airport attack, a bombing of an Olympic Airways office, was 
the only incident in that category during 1998. This bombing is 
considered a politically motivated incident. Europe had the 
most hijacking incidents during the year. One hijacking took 
place in Spain on an international flight. Of the remaining 
four hijackings, one began in Cyprus and three began in Turkey. 
All four incidents ended in Turkey. The three hijackings from 
Turkey are considered politically motivated incidents.
    [Image] \3\
    Five incidents took place in the Latin America and the 
Caribbean region during 1998. These incidents included two 
hijackings, a charter aviation commandeering, a shooting of an 
in-flight aircraft, and an airport attack. Both hijackings 
involved planes on domestic routes: one in Nicaragua and one in 
Venezuela. The other incidents occurred in Colombia: 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas 
stormed an airstrip and commandeered a chartered plane, a 
helicopter was shot down during heavy fighting, and a car bomb 
exploded at the Medellin Airport.
    No incidents were recorded in the Middle East and North 
Africa geographic region. North America, which had no incidents 
in the previous two years, was the site of a commandeering. In 
Canada, a man claiming to have a bomb locked himself in the 
cockpit of the plane and ordered the crew to fly him to 
Illinois. No incidents were recorded in the United States 
during 1998.
    The most incidents in 1998 occurred in the sub-Saharan 
Africa region. Four incidents occurred in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DROC) and three in Angola. Three of the 
DROC incidents were commandeerings that occurred between August 
2 and 4. In all three incidents, civilian aircraft were 
commandeered to ferry troops and supplies. The fourth incident 
in the DROC was the shooting down of a plane that had been 
evacuating civilians. Tutsi-led rebels admitted to shooting 
down the plane with a missile. Two of the incidents in Angola 
occurred when planes were shot down in an area of heavy 
fighting between government troops and National Union for the 
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebels. The total number 
of casualties is unknown. The third Angolan incident was a 
bombing of the Cabinda airport in which two people were killed 
and three injured. None of the incidents are considered to have 
been politically motivated.

                          Geographic Overviews

            Significant Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation

                                  asia

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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
January 28                       Shooting at Jakarta Airport                  Indonesia*
February 2                       Attack--Narita Airport                       Japan
March 23                         Incident on Aircraft                         Taiwan*
May 24                           Hijacking--Pakistan International Airlines   Pakistan
October 28                       Hijacking--Air China                         China to Taiwan
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Incident Not Counted in Statistics

January 28, 1998--Shooting at Jakarta Airport--Indonesia *
    Two incoming passengers who had just deplaned at Terminal F 
at the Soekarno-Hatta International Airport were shot by an 
unidentified assailant. One victim, a Japanese national, was 
shot in the shoulder, while the other, an Indonesian national, 
was shot in the face. The attackers have not been identified.
February 2, 1998--Attack--Narita Airport--Japan
    Three projectiles were launched at Tokyo's Narita Airport 
slightly injuring a cargo handler and prompting airport 
officials to temporarily shut down the airport runway. The 
steel-tube launchers were discovered embedded in the ground at 
a parking lot behind a Holiday Inn located near the airport. 
While police were investigating the site and before the 
launchers were rendered safe, three ten-inch projectiles were 
automatically fired by a timer. Two of the projectiles exploded 
on a paved area of the airport's apron near the hangers for 
cargo aircraft, while the third failed to explode and was found 
intact near the launch site. The runway was closed for just six 
minutes while airport authorities checked for damage. The 
Japanese radical group Kakurokyo (Revolutionary Worker's 
Association), Hazama faction, subsequently claimed 
responsibility for the attack, boasting that they had overcome 
the increased security put into effect for the Winter Olympic 
Games at Nagano.
    This attack is considered a politically motivated incident.
March 23, 1998--Incident on Aircraft--Taiwan *
    A Taiwanese man attempted to set fire to a Great China 
Airlines de Havilland Dash 8-300 aircraft carrying 16 
passengers and four crew during a domestic flight from Taipei 
to Chiayi. Eleven minutes after takeoff, the passenger suddenly 
got out of his seat and began to douse the cabin with gasoline, 
which he carried in two plastic tea bottles. After noticing the 
odor, a flight attendant saw the man preparing to light the 
gasoline with a cigarette lighter. A security officer aboard 
the flight and three other passengers subdued the man, however, 
before he was able to start a fire. The plane made an emergency 
landing at the Taichung Airport, and the suspect was taken into 
custody. He reportedly told police that he had been trying to 
kill himself. There were no injuries in this incident.
May 24, 1998--Hijacking--Pakistan International Airlines--Pakistan
    Pakistan International Airlines flight 554 was hijacked 
during a domestic flight to Karachi from Turbat, a town in 
Baluchistan Province near the Iranian border. The plane, a 
twin-engine Fokker Friendship aircraft, carried 29 passengers 
and four crew members. Three hijackers armed with handguns and 
claiming to have explosives ordered the crew to fly to India. 
The hijackers also demanded (U.S.) $20 million for development 
in their native Baluchistan Province. Rather than fly to India, 
however, the crew took the plane to the airport in Hyderabad, 
Pakistan, located 90 miles from Karachi. The hijackers were led 
to believe that they had landed at a remote airstrip in Bhoj, 
India. Upon landing, the plane was immediately surrounded by 
security forces and vehicles were parked in front to prevent it 
from leaving. More than five hours later the hijackers 
reportedly told the ``Indian negotiators'' that Baluchistan 
needed development funds rather than nuclear tests by the 
Pakistani government in response to five Indian nuclear tests 
two weeks before. The hijackers agreed to release the women and 
children aboard the aircraft. As the passengers were deplaning, 
Pakistani commandos overpowered the hijackers. A hijacker and 
an army officer were slightly injured in the ensuing scuffle.
    This hijacking is considered a politically motivated 
incident.
October 28, 1998--Hijacking--Air China--China to Taiwan
    Air China flight 905 was diverted by its pilot to Taiwan 
during a flight from Beijing to Kunming. The Boeing 737 
aircraft was carrying nine crew members and 94 passengers, 
including the pilot's wife and child. The pilot reportedly made 
the diversion because of his dissatisfaction with his life on 
mainland China. The Taiwanese government dispatched four air 
force fighters to intercept and follow the plane to Taipei's 
Chiang Kai-Shek International Airport. The pilot, upon landing, 
then surrendered to Taiwanese officials without incident. On 
December 8 Taiwanese prosecutors indicted the pilot on 
hijacking-related charges, which carry a maximum penalty of 
death.

                            central eurasia

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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
August 9                         Incident on Aircraft                         Russia*
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Incident Not Counted in Statistics

August 9, 1998--Incident on Aircraft--Russia *
    A flight attendant on an East Line Aviation flight found an 
anonymous note demanding 651,000 rubles (approximately $100,000 
U.S.) and fuel to fly the plane to another country. The note 
also explained that the airplane would be blown up if the 
demands were not met. The Tupolev TU-154 aircraft with 97 
passengers was on a domestic flight from Irkutsk to Moscow. The 
plane landed at Moscow's Domodedovo Airport and was taken to a 
remote location where security forces had been positioned. No 
one on the plane came forward to claim the note or negotiate 
with authorities. Women and children were allowed to deplane; 
luggage and the 70 male passengers were checked for weapons and 
explosives but nothing was found. The men were taken to a 
terminal where handwriting samples were unsuccessfully compared 
to the note. Passengers later said that they were not told of 
the note but were advised that the plane was being held by 
health officials because someone with cholera was suspected of 
being aboard.

                                 europe

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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
February 24                      Hijacking--Turkish Airlines                  Turkey
March 30                         Hijacking--Cyprus Turkish Airlines           Cyprus to Turkey
May 17                           Bombing--Olympic Airways Office              Greece
June 23                          Hijacking--Iberia                            Spain
September 14                     Hijacking--Turkish Airlines                  Turkey
October 2                        Corporate Aircraft Hijacking                 France*
October 29                       Hijacking--Turkish Airlines                  Turkey
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Incident Not Counted in Statistics

February 24, 1998--Hijacking--Turkish Airlines--Turkey
    A lone hijacker seized control of a Turkish Airlines (THY) 
Avro RJ100 aircraft with 63 passengers and five crew members 
shortly after takeoff from Adana. The plane was on a domestic 
flight en route to Ankara. The hijacker, a Turkish male, 
claimed to have an explosive device hidden in a toy panda bear 
and demanded to be taken to Tehran, Iran. The pilot told the 
hijacker that Tehran's airport was closed and persuaded him to 
allow the plane to land at Diyarbakir Airport in Turkey for 
refueling. Shortly after the plane landed, 20 passengers were 
released by the hijacker, but Turkish officials refused to 
refuel the plane. The hijacker then demanded a separate plane 
to fly him and seven hostages--the pilot, copilot, and five 
passengers--to Tehran. As Turkish security forces were 
preparing to assault the plane, several passengers overpowered 
the hijacker and he was taken into custody. No explosives or 
weapons were found on the plane, and no one was injured. The 
hijacker's motive is unknown, but he reportedly said that he 
was protesting the oppression of Muslims in Algeria. On 
December 15 the hijacker was sentenced to a prison term of 
eight years and four months.
    This hijacking is considered a politically motivated 
incident.
March 30, 1998--Hijacking--Cyprus Turkish Airlines--Cyprus to Turkey
    A Turkish male passenger hijacked a Cyprus Turkish Airlines 
Boeing 727 aircraft, carrying 97 passengers and eight crew 
members, shortly after takeoff from the Turkish-controlled part 
of Cyprus. The plane was en route to Ankara, Turkey. The 
hijacker, who acted alone and claimed to have a bomb, demanded 
to be flown to Bonn, Germany. The pilot told the hijacker that 
the aircraft did not have enough fuel and persuaded him to 
allow the plane to land at Esenboga Airport in Ankara. Turkish 
security forces surrounded the plane when it landed and, after 
a brief period of negotiations, stormed the plane and 
overpowered the hijacker. No weapons or explosives were found 
on the plane. There were no injuries to passengers or crew 
members.
May 17, 1998--Bombing--Olympic Airways Office--Greece
    An improvised explosive device detonated in front of the 
Olympic Airways ticket office in central Athens. The blast 
caused considerable damage to the facility, but no injuries 
were reported. At approximately 7:30 p.m. local time, an 
unidentified caller notified an Athens television station that 
bombs would explode at an Olympic Airways ticket office and an 
Ionian Bank branch at 8:00 p.m. The caller claimed solidarity 
with the employees of both targets. The devices detonated at 
approximately 8:20 p.m. at the ticket office and several 
minutes later at the bank. A short time after the bombings two 
phone calls to different privately-owned television stations 
claimed credit for both attacks. The first call claimed the 
bombings on behalf of ``May 98,'' and the second caller claimed 
them for the ``Fighting Guerrillas of May.'' Neither group was 
previously known. Although the motive for the ticket office 
attack is unknown, it may be linked to an announcement earlier 
in the day by the Greek Economic Minister calling for the 
partial privatization of Olympic Airways, the national air 
carrier of Greece.
    This bombing is considered a politically motivated 
incident.
June 23, 1998--Hijacking--Iberia--Spain
    Approximately one hour after departing Seville, Iberia 
flight 1121 was hijacked and diverted to Valencia Airport. The 
hijacking occurred while the B-727 aircraft was flying from 
Seville to Barcelona, Spain, en route to Amsterdam, the 
Netherlands. It was initially thought that there were three 
hijackers, but there was only one. The hijacker told the pilot 
that he had a remote control device and could detonate a bomb 
in a suitcase in the plane's cargo hold. He initially demanded 
to be flown to Athens, Greece, but then requested to be taken 
to Tel Aviv, Israel. The aircraft landed in Valencia for fuel, 
and the hijacker began demanding food and drink and fuel for 
the flight to Israel. Approximately an hour later the hijacker 
agreed to release 18 people, mostly children. After several 
more hours, the Spanish National Police determined that only 
one hijacker was involved and they identified him as a 
psychiatric patient. The hijacker, after speaking to his 
psychiatrist, surrendered approximately four hours after 
seizing the plane. None of the 124 passengers and seven crew 
members were injured during the incident. A search of the plane 
found no bomb on board; the device held by the hijacker was a 
television remote control.
September 14, 1998--Hijacking--Turkish Airlines--Turkey
    THY flight 145 was hijacked during a domestic flight from 
Ankara to Istanbul and diverted to the Black Sea coastal city 
of Trabzon. The Airbus A-310 aircraft carried 76 passengers and 
eight crew members. The plane landed safely, the passengers 
were released, and the hijacker surrendered to airport 
authorities. There were no injuries. According to a THY 
spokesman the hijacker claimed to have a package bomb; however, 
the Turkish Minister of Transportation stated that he had a 
plastic toy gun. Press reports indicate that the hijacker's 
motive was to protest the Turkish government's ban on women 
wearing the traditional Islamic head covering, the chador, at 
Turkish universities.
    This hijacking is considered a politically motivated 
incident.
October 2, 1998--Corporate Aircraft Hijacking--France *
    A corporate jet belonging to the French aircraft 
manufacturer Dassault Aviation was hijacked during a routine 
flight shuttling employees between Marseille and Paris. The 
hijacker reportedly was a disgruntled former employee armed 
with a pump-action shotgun and a hand grenade. The plane left 
the Istres military base in the morning and landed at the 
Marseille Airport at 12:30 p.m. local time. After demanding to 
speak to a lawyer, the hijacker began to negotiate. He 
eventually released all 15 passengers and three crew members 
unharmed and surrendered.
October 29, 1998--Hijacking--Turkish Airlines--Turkey
    A man with a handgun and a grenade hijacked THY flight 487, 
which had departed Adana at approximately 7:45 p.m. en route to 
Ankara. The B-737 aircraft carried approximately 40 passengers 
and crew. The hijacker demanded to be taken to Lausanne, 
Switzerland, but agreed to the pilot's request to land at 
Sofia, Bulgaria, for refueling. The pilot, however, landed at 
Ankara's Esenboga Airport at approximately 9:00 p.m., while the 
hijacker believed they were in Sofia. The hijacker told the 
passengers that he was protesting the Turkish government's 
``dirty war'' against ethnic Kurds in Turkey. The pilot also 
read a statement from the hijacker demanding to be taken to 
Lausanne because it was there that the modern Turkish state was 
created in a treaty signed 75 years earlier. (The hijacking 
occurred during the 75th anniversary celebration of the Turkish 
Republic.) The hijacker's statement also praised ``Chairman 
Apo,'' Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the Kurdistan Worker's 
Party (PKK). Although negotiations were conducted, the hijacker 
did not release any passengers. Approximately seven hours after 
the plane landed (4:00 a.m.) Turkish National Police special 
action teams stormed the plane through the rear door, evacuated 
some passengers, and killed the hijacker in the cockpit. There 
were no other injuries. It is not known whether the hijacker 
acted on his own or on behalf of the PKK. Coincidentally, one 
week earlier this same plane was prevented from taking off in 
Strasbourg, France, by protesters trying to prevent the 
deportation of a Kurd to Turkey.
    This hijacking is considered a politically motivated 
incident.

                    latin america and the caribbean

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January 31                       Hijacking--Atlantic Airlines                 Nicaragua to Costa Rica
March 12                         Charter Aviation Commandeering               Colombia
July 25                          Hijacking--Aviones de Oriente                Venezuela
October 27                       Shooting at Helicopter                       Colombia
November 25                      Bombing--Medellin Airport                    Colombia
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

January 31, 1998--Hijacking--Atlantic Airlines--Nicaragua to Costa Rica
    A Nicaraguan hijacked an Atlantic Airlines twin-engine 
aircraft with 21 persons on board shortly after takeoff from 
Bluefields, Nicaragua. The aircraft was on a scheduled domestic 
flight to Little Corn Island. Shortly after takeoff, the 
hijacker doused a passenger and a portion of the aircraft's 
interior with gasoline and threatened to ignite it if the plane 
did not divert to San Andres Island, Colombia. The pilots told 
the hijacker they did not have sufficient fuel to reach San 
Andres and convinced him to go to Puerto Limon, Costa Rica. 
According to local press reports, the hijacker was arrested 
without incident by Costa Rican authorities upon his arrival. 
There were no injuries to passengers or crew members during 
this incident. The hijacker reportedly is mentally unstable and 
is an unemployed drug addict.
March 12, 1998--Charter Aviation Commandeering--Colombia
    Twenty Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
guerrillas reportedly stormed the airstrip at Palmerito, 
Cumbaribo Municipality, and seized control of a Cessna 182 
aircraft that had just landed. The plane was to pick up 
officials from the Office of the National Registrar. The pilot 
and copilot were forced from the plane, and it was taken over 
by the guerrillas. The plane reportedly was flown to Llanos del 
Yari to pick up a wounded FARC leader and then used to take him 
to an unidentified country for medical treatment. The plane is 
owned by the Llanera de Aviacion air company and had been 
leased to mobilize electoral delegates throughout several 
municipalities. There is no additional information.
July 25, 1998--Hijacking--Aviones de Oriente--Venezuela
    Four armed, masked hijackers seized control of an Aviones 
de Oriente plane during a domestic flight. The hijackers were 
among 22 people on board the Beechcraft 1900 aircraft, which 
was en route from Caracas to Barinas State. The hijackers 
forced the plane to divert to a remote airstrip at a cattle 
ranch. They released the passengers and crew and took the plane 
to Colombia, where it was recovered in early August. It is 
believed that drug traffickers were responsible for this 
hijacking as they have a history of stealing small and medium-
sized aircraft for use in smuggling operations. Two people were 
arrested in Arauca Department, Colombia, in connection with 
this hijacking.
October 27, 1998--Shooting at Helicopter--Colombia
    According to press reports, a helicopter was shot down 
during heavy fighting between FARC guerrillas and the Colombian 
military in southern Putumayo Department. The helicopter, owned 
by the private company Helicol, was flying near the town of 
Orito when it reportedly was shot down with a rocket (not 
further identified). The helicopter crashed, and an unknown 
number of people were killed.
November 25, 1998--Bombing--Medellin Airport--Colombia
    A stolen car packed with approximately 130 pounds of 
dynamite exploded outside a cargo warehouse at Medellin's 
Enrique Olaya Herrerra Airport. The explosion caused nearly 
$250,000 damage to air courier offices, a fire station, and six 
parked cars. The blast also injured nine people. It is believed 
that the attack was directed against offices of a local air 
courier service.

                      middle east and north africa

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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
July 2                           Arrests of Persons with Explosives at        Sudan*
                                  Khartoum Airport
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Incident Not Counted in Statistics

July 2, 1998--Arrests of Persons with Explosives at Khartoum Airport--
        Sudan*
    Sudanese security forces arrested two individuals who were 
allegedly planning to detonate an explosive device at 
Khartoum's Civil Airport. The arrests came at the end of a 
week-long series of explosions at electric plants, petroleum 
depots, hospitals, and other installations around Khartoum. No 
group claimed responsibility for the attacks, but authorities 
suspect the National Democratic Alliance, a coalition of banned 
Sudanese political parties.

                             north america

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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
February 6                       Possible Prevented Hijacking                 United States*
May 10                           Commandeering--Air Luxor                     Canada
November 13                      Incident at Atlanta Airport                  United States*
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Incidents Not Counted in Statistics

February 6, 1998--Possible Prevented Hijacking--United States *
    A plan to hijack an airplane may have been thwarted at a 
security checkpoint at the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood 
International Airport in Florida. A handgun was discovered in a 
carry-on bag when the bag went through X-ray screening. No one 
claimed the bag, and when it was opened an unloaded .38 caliber 
revolver was found in addition to several notes. One note read: 
``Warning . . . I am a revolutionary and willful martyr . . . 
this is a hijacking to Cuba! I'm willing to die, are you?'' The 
person who had placed the bag on the security conveyor belt 
could not be identified at the time of the incident. Several 
hours later, however, an individual came to claim the bag. 
Although initially refusing to identify himself, the individual 
said that he was a member of a ``Muslim faction'' and had been 
sent by the elders of his organization to pick up the bag which 
contained church documents. He also said he did not know that a 
gun was in the bag.
    Police determined the man's identity and found that he had 
a series of prior arrests, was a convicted felon, and had been 
charged with first degree murder in New Mexico but fled while 
on bail. He was detained as a material witness for a federal 
grand jury investigation of the handgun episode at the airport 
and was subsequently indicted as a felon in possession of a 
firearm.
May 10, 1998--Commandeering--Air Luxor--Canada
    A lone individual commandeered a Portuguese Air Luxor 
aircraft as passengers were being enplaned at Toronto's Pearson 
International Airport. The Lockheed L-1011 aircraft was being 
prepared for a flight to Lisbon, Portugal. The individual, a 
Toronto resident, forced his way past a security check point 
and onto the plane. He claimed to have a bomb, locked himself 
in the cockpit, and ordered the crew to fly him to Chicago, 
Illinois. The man became distracted enough to allow a crew 
member to unlock the door permitting police officers to subdue 
him. There were no injuries. The plane was searched for weapons 
or explosives, but none were found. A gym bag carried by the 
suspect contained only clothes and other innocuous items. The 
man was charged with assault, attempted hijacking, and 
endangering the safety of an aircraft.
    On August 7, 1998, the suspect appeared in court to answer 
the charges. His psychiatric record was reviewed and he was 
found to be not criminally responsible. Charges against him 
were subsequently dropped.
November 13, 1998--Incident at Atlanta Airport--United States *
    An individual approached the main domestic checkpoint at 
Atlanta's Hartsfield International Airport and placed a loaded 
.45 caliber handgun at the back of a ticketed passenger. He 
told the passenger to keep walking and not turn around. When a 
checkpoint screener challenged the man holding the gun, he 
doused the back of his hostage with lighter fluid and tried to 
force his way through. He was immediately apprehended and 
arrested by police. The handgun was loaded with eight bullets, 
and the individual had matches and a knife in his pocket. The 
individual was charged with several offenses, including 
aggravated assault, terroristic threats, and carrying an 
incendiary device, and was incarcerated at the Clayton County 
Jail in Jonesboro, Georgia. There is no information on the 
motive for his action.

                           sub-saharan africa

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August 2 and 4                   Aircraft Commandeerings                      Democratic Republic of Congo
                                                                              (Three Incidents)
October 10                       Shooting at Aircraft                         Democratic Republic of Congo
October 22                       Bombing--Cabinda Airport                     Angola
December 14                      Shooting at Aircraft                         Angola
December 26                      Shooting at Aircraft                         Angola
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

August 2 and 4, 1998--Aircraft Commandeerings--Democratic Republic of 
        Congo (Three Incidents)
    During fighting between rebel forces and government troops, 
civilian aircraft were commandeered and the pilots forced to 
ferry troops and supplies in the planes. In each incident the 
plane was seized in Goma. In the August 2 incident Congolese 
rebels seized a Boeing 727 aircraft owned by Kinshasha-based 
Blue Airlines. Two days later, rebels commandeered a Congo Air 
Cargo B-707 aircraft and forced the pilot to fly soldiers to 
the Kitona military air base in the western part of the 
country. A third plane, belonging to Air Atlantic Cargo and 
chartered to Lina Congo (LAC), was also seized and forced to 
fly to Kitona after stopping to refuel and pick up ammunition 
in Kinshasha. There were also reports of private planes and 
transport aircraft being seized.
October 10, 1998--Shooting at Aircraft--Democratic Republic of Congo
    An LAC B-727 aircraft crashed in the jungle near the town 
of Kindu after a missile, possibly a SA-7, struck a rear 
engine. There were no survivors among the reported 40 persons 
on board. A spokesman for LAC reported that the plane was 
evacuating civilians to Kinshasha from Kindu. Tutsi-led rebels 
admitted to shooting down the plane but claimed that it was 
landing and carrying government reinforcements and supplies. 
The rebels also stated that they had prior knowledge that the 
plane would be arriving with soldiers, but no civilians, on 
board.
    This attack is not considered politically motivated because 
it occurred in a conflict zone and the plane may have been 
perceived as being used for military purposes.
October 22, 1998--Bombing--Cabinda Airport--Angola
    An improvised explosive device detonated in an airline 
passenger guest house at Cabinda Airport, killing two people 
and injuring three others. There were no claims of 
responsibility, although local officials believe that the 
explosives may have belonged to local smugglers. A second 
theory is that the device was placed by a faction of the Front 
for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda.
December 14, 1998--Shooting at Aircraft--Angola
    During fighting between Angolan government forces and 
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) 
rebels near the town of Kuito, an Antonov-12 cargo/passenger 
aircraft was shot down by rebel forces. The plane, apparently 
privately-owned and under contract to the provincial 
government, was carrying an unknown number of women, children, 
and wounded government troops. It had taken off from Kuito en 
route to Luanda and was flying at a low altitude when it was 
struck. Reports differ as to whether the plane was hit by 
antiaircraft fire or an ``unspecified'' surface-to-air missile. 
The exact number of casualties is unclear but, according to one 
report, five crew members and five passengers were killed.
    This attack is not considered politically motivated because 
it occurred in a conflict zone and the plane may have been 
perceived as being used for military purposes.
December 26, 1998--Shooting at Aircraft--Angola
    A C-130 aircraft was shot down near the village of Vila 
Nova during a flight between Huambo and Suriname. The plane was 
owned by TransAfric and chartered by the United Nations. 
Fourteen people--ten of whom were U.N. Observer Mission in 
Angola personnel--were reportedly on the plane. Despite reports 
of possible survivors there were none; a U.N. search team 
concluded that the plane had apparently disintegrated as it hit 
the ground and burst into flames. The area where the crash 
occurred had been the scene of heavy fighting between 
government troops and UNITA rebels for nearly a month. Each 
side blamed the other for shooting down the plane. There is no 
information regarding the type of weapon used to bring the 
plane down.
    This attack is not considered politically motivated because 
it occurred in a conflict zone and the plane may have been 
perceived as being used for military purposes.

                            Feature Articles

           shooting at in-flight aircraft incidents in angola

    Two planes were shot down in the central highlands of 
Angola during the last two weeks of December 1998. Both planes 
went down in an area between the cities of Kuito and Huambo. At 
the time of the crashes, this area was the site of heavy 
fighting between National Union for the Liberation of Angola 
(UNITA) rebels and the Angolan government.
    On December 14, an Antonov 12 turbo-prop aircraft was shot 
down by UNITA rebels shortly after it took off from the airport 
in Kuito. The privately-owned plane had been contracted out to 
the provincial government and was being used to deliver relief 
aid to Kuito. The plane was approximately 18 miles north of 
Kuito en route to Luanda when it was shot down. Reports differ 
as to whether antiaircraft fire or an ``unspecified'' surface-
to-air missile was used in the attack. The plane went down in 
UNITA-controlled territory. Because the area was the site of 
heavy fighting it was difficult to reach the aircraft. However, 
it is believed that there were no survivors among the unknown 
number (but possibly ten) of women, children, and wounded 
government troops aboard the plane.
    On December 26, a C-130 aircraft owned by TransAfric and 
chartered by the United Nations was struck by antiaircraft fire 
as it left Huambo en route to Saurime. The plane crashed near 
the village of Vila Nova, less than five miles from Huambo. 
There were 14 people reportedly on board: ten members of the 
U.N. Observer Mission in Angola and four crew members. The 
government and UNITA rebels accused the other of shooting down 
the plane. The government also accused UNITA of holding the 
survivors hostage, but UNITA, which controlled the area, 
contended that there were no survivors. A U.N. search team 
which briefly inspected the crash site concluded that the plane 
disintegrated as it hit the ground and burst into flames. The 
search team found charred bodies with the plane and further 
concluded that there had been no survivors. Further 
investigation could not be carried out because of heavy 
fighting in the area.
    Because of the shoot-downs, the U.N. mission in Angola 
temporarily suspended all flights to and from Huambo. The U.N. 
also threatened to pull out some 1,000 observers deployed 
throughout Angola to oversee the implementation of peace 
accords. These incidents also illustrate the dangers posed to 
aircraft flying in areas where significant fighting or civil 
unrest is occurring.

              the hijacking of turkish airlines flight 487

    On October 29, 1998, a Kurdish male armed with a pistol and 
a hand grenade hijacked Turkish Airlines flight 487 shortly 
after takeoff and demanded that the plane be diverted to 
Lausanne, Switzerland. Carrying 34 passengers and six crew, the 
Boeing 737 aircraft departed at approximately 7:45 p.m. from 
Adana International Airport in southern Turkey en route to 
Esenboga Airport in the capital of Ankara.
    The hijacker forced the pilot-in-command to read a 
statement that made his motive clear. The Kurdish hijacker 
chose October 29 to coincide with Turkey's nationwide 75th 
anniversary celebrations, which included visits by 13 foreign 
leaders. He tried to divert the aircraft to Lausanne as an act 
of protest against a treaty signed there 75 years earlier that 
created the Turkish nation. The treaty has symbolic importance 
to Kurdish activists and insurgents because it denied Kurdish 
independence promised in an earlier treaty and gave territorial 
control to the Turkish government. The statement concluded by 
praising Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the Kurdistan Workers' 
Party (PKK), an insurgent group and international terrorist 
organization.
    The pilot convinced the hijacker to allow the plane to land 
in Sofia, Bulgaria, for refueling. However, the pilot circled 
over Ankara to add air time in an effort to convince the 
hijacker that the flight was still en route to Sofia. The 
aircraft landed at Esenboga Airport at approximately 10:00 p.m. 
local time and stopped on the tarmac in front of Terminal C. 
Turkish National Police set up a crisis post in the control 
tower and began negotiations. As an additional security 
measure, Turkish security officials instructed local mosques to 
postpone their calls to prayer so that the hijacker would not 
suspect he was in Turkey. The hijacker reportedly warned the 
flight crew that he would detonate the hand grenade if any type 
of operation or rescue attempt were launched on the plane. He 
apparently did not threaten any of the passengers and spent 
most of the time in the cockpit. Negotiators pretended to be 
Bulgarian officials and spoke only English.
    As negotiations through the night proved unsuccessful, a 
Turkish National Police Special Actions Team, comprised of 
officers specially trained to respond to aviation incidents, 
prepared to storm the aircraft. At approximately 4:35 a.m. on 
October 30, the team boarded the aircraft through the rear 
door, evacuated some of the passengers, and then fatally shot 
the hijacker, who was in the cockpit. None of the passengers or 
crew were injured in the incident.
    The Special Actions Team found forged Turkish 
identification, a 7.65 mm pistol with five rounds, and a 
Russian T1 hand grenade with the pin still in place on the 
hijacker's body. Although the 33-year-old hijacker's statement 
praised the PKK, he most likely was a lone sympathizer acting 
in support of the Kurdish cause and not a trained PKK member.
    Following this fourth hijacking in Turkish airspace in 
1998, Turkey's Transport Minister Arif Ahmet Denizolgun 
announced a review of security measures at all Turkish 
airports. Turkish authorities also launched an investigation 
into how the hijacker was able to smuggle his weapons through 
screening at Adana and onto the aircraft.

                                 Trends

                               1994-1998

                              introduction

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    This section contains an examination of trends for the 
five-year period 1994-1998. Significant incidents involving 
civil aviation are separated into one of the following 
categories:

   ``Hijackings of Civil Aviation Aircraft,''
   ``Commandeerings of Civil Aviation Aircraft,''
   ``Bombings/Attempted Bombings/ Shootings on Civil 
        Aviation Aircraft,''
   ``Shootings at In-Flight Aircraft,''
   ``Attacks at Airports,''
   ``Off-Airport Facility Attacks,'' and
   ``Incidents Involving Charter and General Aviation 
        Aircraft.''

    Charts are included to present a visual perspective of 
incidents in these categories. One fewer incident was recorded 
in 1998 than in 1997 (22 vice 23), which continues the trend of 
four out of the past five years. The only exception was in 
1996, when more incidents were recorded than in the previous 
year. The 22 incidents in 1998 were also the fewest in the 
five-year period; the most were in 1994 (50 incidents). The 
total number of incidents for the five-year period is 154.
    In comparing 1998 statistics with those of the previous 
year, increases occurred in two categories--``Commandeerings of 
Civil Aviation Aircraft'' and ``Shootings at In-Flight 
Aircraft.'' Two commandeering incidents were recorded in 1997, 
but four were recorded for 1998. Four shooting at aircraft 
incidents occurred in 1998 compared to none the previous year. 
Decreases were noted in four of the seven incident categories. 
There were three fewer ``Attacks at Airports'' incidents (3), 
two fewer ``Off-Airport Facility Attacks'' (1), one less 
``Hijacking of Civil Aviation Aircraft'' incident (9), and one 
less ``Bombings/Attempted Bombings/Shootings on Aircraft'' 
incident (0). One ``Charter/General Aviation Aircraft'' 
incident was also recorded, the same as in 1997.
    The 22 incidents in 1998 were slightly less than one-half 
of the 50 incidents recorded in 1994. The overall decline for 
the five-year period is shown quite distinctly on the chart on 
the previous page. Interpretation of the data is necessary, 
however, to avoid reaching incorrect conclusions.
    The fact that the number of incidents against civil 
aviation has declined over the past five years, and longer, may 
be interpreted as an indication that the threat is decreasing. 
This, however, is not true, as several events in the past few 
years attest. The September 1996 conviction of Ramzi Yousef for 
his plan to place explosive devices on as many as 12 U.S. 
airliners flying out of the Far East in 1995 is proof that a 
threat to aviation exists. Yousef was also convicted of placing 
a device on a Philippine Airlines plane in December 1994 as a 
test for his more elaborate plan. One person was killed in this 
incident. Other examples of the continuing threat include the 
bombing of the Alas Chiricanas Airline plane in Panama in July 
1994, in which 21 people died; the commandeering of the Air 
France flight in Algeria in December 1994 by members of the 
Armed Islamic Group; and the hijacking of the Ethiopian 
Airlines plane which crashed into the Indian Ocean in November 
1996.
    There is every reason to believe that civil aviation will 
continue to be an attractive target to terrorist groups. The 
publicity and fear generated by a terrorist hijacking or 
bombing of an airplane can be a powerful attraction to a group 
seeking to make a statement or promote a particular cause. 
Civil aviation will also continue to be used by individuals who 
are acting to further personal goals, such as asylum seekers. 
It matters not to them that most individuals who hijack an 
airplane for personal goals are prosecuted for their actions. 
So long as factors such as these exist, the threat to civil 
aviation will remain significant; that some years pass with 
fewer incidents does not necessarily indicate that the threat 
has diminished. Increased awareness and vigilance are necessary 
to deter future incidents--be they from terrorists like Ramzi 
Yousef or non-terrorists bent on suicide, as occurred in Brazil 
in 1997. It is important to do the utmost to prevent such acts 
rather than to lower security measures by interpreting the 
statistics as an indication of a decreasing threat.

                 hijackings of civil aviation aircraft

    An incident is defined as a hijacking rather than a 
commandeering when the aircraft is in an in-flight status, that 
is, once the doors are closed. By this definition, a hijacking 
can occur on the ground. Hijackings are distinguished from 
other in-flight situations (such as those involving unruly 
passengers) by one or more of the following criteria: the act 
involves the claim or use of a weapon; it is committed by a 
terrorist group or someone acting on behalf of a terrorist 
group; there are deaths or injuries to passengers or crew; or 
there is premeditation (hoax device, fake weapon, previously 
prepared note, more than one hijacker, etc.). There is no 
distinction made between incidents in which a plane does not 
divert from its flight plan and those which do. Hijacking 
incidents involving general aviation or charter aircraft are 
recorded separately and are not included in this category.
    Between 1994 and 1998, sixty-five hijackings of civil 
aviation aircraft were recorded worldwide. Nine hijackings 
occurred in 1998, one fewer than in the previous year and the 
lowest total (by one incident) in the five-year period. Twenty-
three incidents in 1994 were the highest for the period. 
Hijackings accounted for the majority of incidents for each 
year in the five-year period.
    Five of the nine hijackings in 1998 were recorded in 
Europe; two were recorded in Asia and two in Latin America and 
the Caribbean. No hijackings occurred in North America (the 
last was in the United States in 1991). The number of 
hijackings in Europe and in Latin America and the Caribbean 
were more than occurred in these regions in 1997. Fewer 
hijackings were recorded in all other geographic regions except 
sub-Saharan Africa, where no incidents were recorded--the same 
as in 1997.
    Seven of the nine hijacking incidents in 1998 took place on 
planes flying domestic routes, and 45 of the 65 hijackings 
between 1994 and 1998 occurred during domestic flights. In 
1998, seven of the nine hijacked planes diverted from their 
original flight plan and landed in a location different from 
its intended destination. Three of the hijackings took place in 
Turkey--the most for any country in 1998--and involved Turkish 
Airlines aircraft--the most for any single carrier.
    Of all geographic regions in the 1994-1998 period, Asia 
recorded the highest number of hijackings (18 incidents or 
27.6%), with China having the most incidents (11). Europe had 
the second highest number of hijackings (14 incidents or 21.5%) 
with Spain and Turkey each recording three. The Middle East/
North Africa region ranks third with 12 hijackings (18.4%), of 
which Saudi Arabia and Sudan each recorded four. The sub-
Saharan Africa region and the Latin America and Caribbean 
region each recorded eight hijackings (12.3%); the four 
incidents in Ethiopia and three in Brazil were the most in 
these regions. Five incidents (7.6%) were recorded in Central 
Eurasia, of which four occurred in Russia. North America had 
the fewest number of incidents (0) in the five-year period. 
China had the highest number of incidents (11) of any country 
in the five-year period; Ethiopia, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and 
Sudan each recorded four hijackings.
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    Personal factors, such as seeking to escape social, 
political or economic conditions in one's homeland, are often 
motives for hijacking aircraft. Forty-three of the 65 
hijackings between 1994 and 1998 were committed for personal 
reasons. Eight incidents were criminally motivated, seven were 
politically motivated, and seven were committed for reasons 
that are unknown. Four politically-motivated incidents occurred 
in 1998. In each incident a lone hijacker was either protesting 
or bringing publicity to some issue. Among other incidents in 
1998, only one was committed for personal reasons. In this 
incident the pilot of an Air China flight diverted the plane to 
Taiwan by himself. One of the 1998 incidents was criminally 
oriented (narcotics), and the motives behind three are unknown.
    The most noteworthy hijacking of the five-year period was 
the incident involving an Ethiopian Airlines plane in November 
1996. Three Ethiopians seeking to escape conditions of poverty 
demanded to be taken to Australia. The hijackers did not 
believe the pilot when told that the plane needed to be 
refueled. The plane ran out of fuel and crashed into the Indian 
Ocean killing 123 people, including the hijackers. 
Approximately 130 people (hostages, crew, hijackers) were 
killed in hijacking incidents between 1994 and 1998.

    bombings/attempted bombings/shootings on civil aviation aircraft

    Between 1994 and 1998, three bombings and two attempted 
bombings occurred on civil aviation aircraft. Three incidents 
were recorded in 1994 and one each in 1996 and 1997.
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    The three incidents in which explosive devices detonated on 
in-flight aircraft involved an Alas Chiricanas Airlines plane 
(Panama, July 1994), a Philippine Airlines plane (Philippines, 
December 1994), and a Transporte Aereo Mercosur (TAM ) plane 
(Brazil, July 1997). In the Alas Chiricanas incident, the plane 
crashed and all 21 people on board were killed. The Philippine 
Airlines explosion killed one passenger, but the plane landed 
safely. The TAM plane also landed safely, but a passenger was 
killed from the explosion. In this incident, a passenger had 
placed the device for an apparent suicide attempt; however, he 
was not the individual killed in the blast, which tore a hole 
in the plane's fuselage.
    The two attempted bombing incidents involved an Orbi 
Georgian Airways plane in the Republic of Georgia in September 
1994 and an All Nippon Airways (ANA) flight in Japan in 
November 1996. In the first incident, the device was in luggage 
which the bomber had asked another passenger to take on-board. 
The ANA device was in checked luggage and was found when the 
bag could not be matched with a passenger on the flight.
    The Philippine Airlines bombing was a test for a more 
elaborate plan, which involved placing explosive devices on as 
many as 12 U.S.-registered aircraft flying routes out of the 
Far East. Fortunately, the plot was uncovered before it could 
be implemented. Ramzi Yousef, convicted in the 1993 World Trade 
Center bombing in New York City, was behind the plot. He was 
apprehended in Pakistan, extradited to the United States, and 
convicted in both the Far East plot and the Philippine Airlines 
bombing. Had Yousef's plan succeeded, even partially, the 
results would have been catastrophic. The Philippine Airlines 
bombing and the Alas Chiricanas bombing are considered 
politically motivated incidents, and they are the only 
incidents of this type in this category.

                    shootings at in-flight aircraft

    These incidents include acts in which in-flight aircraft 
(commercial and general/charter aviation) are fired upon either 
from the ground (surface-to-air missiles, antiaircraft 
artillery, small arms fire, etc.) or the air. This category 
does not include all incidents of this type but only those 
judged to be of significance. This is determined by the target, 
the type of attack, or any resulting casualties. Attacks 
against law enforcement aircraft, such as drug eradication 
planes, are not counted. Similarly, attacks against military 
aircraft, even if carrying civilian passenger loads, or non-
military aircraft serving a military function over an area 
where there is significant fighting, are not counted.
    Eleven incidents have been recorded during the past five 
years in which civil and general aviation aircraft have been 
fired upon. Eight of these aircraft crashed, killing more than 
80 people. Two people were killed in the three incidents in 
which the plane did not crash. The highest number of fatalities 
occurred in 1998 when four crashes killed at least 65 people, 
although exact figures are unknown. Four incidents were 
recorded in 1994 and 1998; two incidents occurred in 1996 and 
one in 1995. No incidents were recorded in 1997. Four incidents 
have been determined to be politically motivated.
    More than half of the attacks (six of 11) between 1994 and 
1998 occurred in sub-Saharan Africa. Antigovernment rebels are 
either credited with or believed responsible for the majority 
of these incidents. The planes crashed in five of the six 
incidents accounting for nearly all the known fatalities in the 
five-year period.
    1998 was by far the deadliest year of the five-year period. 
Four aircraft were shot down claiming at least 64 of the 80+ 
fatalities recorded between 1994 and 1998. Three of the four 
incidents took place in sub-Saharan Africa. The most fatalities 
occurred in the Democratic Republic of Congo in October 1998 
when at least 40 people were reported killed after 
antigovernment rebels shot down a plane with a missile. The 
rebels claimed the plane was bringing government troops and 
supplies into a war zone, but there were other claims that the 
plane was evacuating civilians. Two planes were also shot down 
during fighting in Angola in December 1998, in which at least 
24 people died. An unknown number of people were also killed 
when a helicopter was shot down by rebels in Colombia in 
October 1998. In one other multi-fatality incident, the 
presidents of Rwanda and Burundi and eight others were killed 
when their plane was shot down in Rwanda in April 1994.
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                      off-airport facility attacks

    Incidents in this category include attacks against civil 
aviation assets that are not located within the perimeter of an 
airport, such as air navigational aid equipment and airline 
ticket offices. These targets are attractive because they are 
usually unguarded and/or easily accessible. Thirteen such 
attacks have been recorded in the past five years. The greatest 
number of incidents in one year (5) occurred in 1995; the 
fewest (1) in 1994 and 1998. Three incidents were recorded in 
both 1996 and 1997.
    All but two of the 13 off-airport facility attacks have 
been against ticket offices. These attacks include bombings 
(explosives or incendiary devices), attempted bombings, arsons, 
and various assaults. Aeroflot, Alitalia, and Turkish Airlines 
interests were each attacked twice in the past five years. 
Other targets included interests of Air France, Air India, 
Olympic Airlines, Singapore Airlines, and Swissair. The two 
non-ticket office attacks included a cut airport transmission 
line in Pakistan and a bombing of a navigation aid in the 
United States, both in 1995. Eight of the 13 incidents between 
1994 and 1998 took place in Europe; four were recorded in Asia 
and one in North America.
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    Seven of the 13 incidents are considered politically 
motivated incidents. Seven of the eight incidents occurred in 
Europe; the other was in Asia. Three incidents were recorded in 
Greece, the most for any one country. No group claimed or is 
believed responsible for more than one attack. Three incidents 
were recorded in both 1995 and 1997; one incident was recorded 
in both 1996 and 1998.

                          attacks at airports

    Thirty-six attacks have been recorded at airports 
throughout the world during the past five years. These attacks 
include 17 bombings; 10 attempted bombings; and 9 other 
incidents such as shootings, shellings (artillery or mortar 
attacks), arsons, and similar incidents. Three incidents were 
recorded in 1998, one-half of the number recorded the previous 
year. These three incidents include two bombings (Angola and 
Colombia) and an attack in which explosive projectiles were 
fired (Japan). Two people were killed and three injured in the 
Angola incident, and nine were injured in the Colombia bombing; 
there were no injuries in the attack in Japan. The most 
incidents in one year (14) were recorded in 1994; the fewest 
(3) in 1998. Twenty-one people have been reported killed and 
more than 120 injured in attacks at airports during the five-
year period.
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    The majority of the attacks in the past five years occurred 
in Europe (10 incidents). Eight incidents were recorded in 
Asia, seven in the Latin America and Caribbean region, seven in 
sub-Saharan Africa, three in Central Eurasia, and one in the 
Middle East/North Africa region. Worldwide, Colombia recorded 
the most incidents (5) for any one country in the five-year 
period. Three incidents were also recorded in both England and 
Spain during this time.
    Twenty of the 36 airport attacks in the five-year period 
are considered politically motivated incidents. Eight of the 20 
incidents were claimed. Among the groups claiming incidents 
were the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the Basque 
Fatherland and Liberty, the Revolutionary Worker's Association, 
the Alex Boncayao Brigade, and the Corsican National Liberation 
Front. Thirteen of the politically motivated incidents occurred 
in 1994; three were in 1996, two in 1995, and one each in 1997 
and 1998. Colombia was the site of four of the politically 
motivated incidents; three incidents occurred in England and 
three in Spain.
    The deadliest airport attack occurred in Pakistan in 
November 1994. Rebels had attacked and seized Saidu Sherif 
Airport, and at least 15 people died and 17 others were wounded 
when Pakistani forces counterattacked and regained control of 
the facility.

               commandeerings of civil aviation aircraft

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    Commandeerings occur when the aircraft is on the ground and 
the doors are open. There is no distinction made between 
commandeered aircraft that remain on the ground and those which 
become airborne. The criteria for determining a commandeering 
as opposed to other on-board situations are the same as those 
concerning a hijacking. Incidents of commandeered general 
aviation or charter aircraft are not included in this category.
    Nine civil aviation aircraft were commandeered between 1994 
and 1998. Four incidents were recorded in 1998, two incidents 
each were recorded in 1994 and 1997, and one incident was 
recorded in 1996. There were no commandeering incidents 
recorded in 1995. Of these nine incidents, the plane remained 
on the ground in four. The most noteworthy commandeering of the 
five-year period occurred on December 24, 1994, when four armed 
terrorists seized an Air France plane in Algiers, Algeria, and 
took it to Marseilles, France. The incident ended when French 
commandos stormed the plane and killed the gunmen. Other 
incidents of note included those in 1998 in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DROC). Three aircraft flying in a war zone 
were commandeered during fighting between government soldiers 
and rebels. The planes and their crews were then used to ferry 
troops and supplies into the war zone.
    The Air France incident was the only politically motivated 
commandeering in the five-year period. One commandeering was 
committed for personal reasons, one was criminally motivated, 
and the motives for three others are unknown. The three 
incidents in the DROC were for military purposes.

         incidents involving general aviation/charter aviation

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    During the past five years, 15 incidents involving general 
or charter aviation aircraft have been recorded. The majority 
of the incidents (11) were hijackings, and two were 
commandeerings. In addition, one instance of an aircraft being 
deliberately damaged and one robbery were recorded. Six 
incidents were recorded in 1996, four in 1995, three in 1994, 
and one in both 1997 and 1998.
    The Latin America and Caribbean region recorded the most 
incidents (5) of any geographic area in the five-year period; 
Nicaragua and Papua New Guinea both recorded the most incidents 
(2 each) of any country. The single incident in 1998 was a 
commandeering in Colombia in which the plane was used to take a 
rebel guerrilla leader for medical treatment.

Appendices

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                               Appendix E

                    Chronology of Significant Acts Against Civil Aviation In 1998 By Category


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   HIJACKINGS

January 31                       Atlantic Airlines                            Nicaragua to Costa Rica
February 24                      Turkish Airlines                             Turkey
March 30                         Cyprus Turkish Airlines                      Cyprus to Turkey
May 24                           Pakistan International Airlines              Pakistan
June 23                          Iberia                                       Spain
July 25                          Aviones de Oriente                           Venezuela
September 14                     Turkish Airlines                             Turkey
October 28                       Air China                                    China to Taiwan
October 29                       Turkish Airlines                             Turkey

                                                 COMMANDEERINGS

May 10                           Air Luxor                                    Canada
August 2 and 4                   Aircraft Commandeerings                      Democratic Republic of Congo
                                                                              (Three Incidents)

                                                 AIRPORT ATTACKS

February 2                       Attack--Narita Airport                       Japan
October 22                       Bombing--Cabinda Airport                     Angola
November 25                      Bombing--Medellin Airport                    Colombia

                                            GENERAL/CHARTER AVIATION

March 12                         Charter Aviation Commandeering               Colombia

                                          OFF-AIRPORT FACILITY ATTACKS

May 17                           Bombing--Olympic Airways Office              Greece

                                              SHOOTINGS AT AIRCRAFT

October 10                       Shooting at Aircraft                         Democratic Republic of Congo
October 27                       Shooting at Aircraft                         Colombia
December 14                      Shooting at Aircraft                         Angola
December 26                      Shooting at Aircraft                         Angola

                                             INCIDENTS NOT COUNTED *

January 28                       Shooting at Jakarta Airport                  Indonesia
February 6                       Possible Prevented Hijacking                 United States
March 23                         Incident on Aircraft                         Taiwan
July 2                           Arrests of Persons with Explosives at        Sudan
                                  Khartoum Airport
August 9                         Incident on Aircraft                         Russia
October 2                        Corporate Aircraft Hijacking                 France
November 13                      Incident at Atlanta Airport                  United States
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* These incidents are not included in the statistics for 1998. Because they are of interest, however, summaries
  are included in the regional areas. It is not to be inferred that these are the only incidents of this type
  that occurred.

  

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
                              Appendix G *

                       Politically-Motivated Incidents Involving Civil Aviation, 1994-1998
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Date                      Incident                      Location                     Remarks
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                      1994

March 7           Attempted Bombing-- Cali Airport      Colombia             No claim; possible disruption of
                                                                              elections
March 9           Mortar Attack-- Heathrow Airport      England              Claim; Provisional Irish Republican
                                                                              Army (PIRA)
March 11          Mortar Attack-- Heathrow Airport      England              Claim-- PIRA
March 13          Mortar Attack-- Heathrow Airport      England              Claim-- PIRA
April 7           Shooting Down Presidential Aircraft   Rwanda               No claim; Rwandan Patriotic Front
                                                                              rebels suspected; assassination
April 27          Bombing-- Johannesburg Airport        South Africa         No claim: right-wing extremists
                                                                              suspected
May 1             Arson-- Frankfurt Airport             Germany              No claim; leftist extremists
                                                                              suspected
May 14            Attempted Bombing-- Malaga Airport    Colombia             National Liberation Army suspected;
                                                                              possible assassination attempt
July 17           Bombing-- Puerto Asis Airport         Colombia             No claim; suspected Revolutionary
                                                                              Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
July 17           Bombing-- Villa Garzon Airport        Colombia             No claim; suspected FARC
July 19           Bombing-- Alas Chiricanas 901         Panama               Claim-- Ansar Allah
August 16         Attempted Bombing-- Alexandroupolis   Greece               Claim-- Turks of Western Thrace
                   Airport
November 3        Attack-- Saidu Sharif Airport         Pakistan             Muslim militants; imposition of
                                                                              sharia law
November 3        Hijacking-- Scandinavian Airlines     Norway               Individual; humanitarian aid for
                   System                                                     Bosnia
November 6        Arson-- Frankfurt Airport             Germany              No claim; leftist extremists
                                                                              suspected
November 17       Bombing-- Lagos Airport               Nigeria              No claim; possibly anti-President
                                                                              Abacha
December 11       Bombing-- Philippines Airlines 434    Philippines          Ramzi Yousef
December 24       Commandeering-- Air France 8969       Algeria              Armed Islamic Group members

                                                      1995

February 21       Shooting at Airlink Aircraft          Papua New Guinea     Bougainville Revolutionary Army
                                                                              suspected
March 26          Attempted Bombing-- Singapore         Philippines          Claim-- Alex Boncayao Brigade
                   Airlines Office
April 15          Firebombing-- Turkish Airlines        Austria              Revolutionary People's Liberation
                   Office                                                     Front literature found at scene
May 2             Firebombing-- Turkish Airlines        Denmark              No claim; Kurdistan Workers' Party
                   Office                                                     (PKK) suspected
May 12            Bombing-- Narita Airport              Japan                Claim-- Revolutionary Worker's
                                                                              Association
July 29           Attempted Bombing-- Alicante Airport  Spain                No claim; Basque Fatherland and
                                                                              Liberty (ETA) suspected
September 3       Hijacking-- Air Inter                 Spain                Individual-- protest against French
                                                                              nuclear tests

                                                      1996

February 24       Shooting at Cessna Aircraft (Two      Cuba                 Cuban exile group aircraft
                   incidents)
March 8           Hijacking-- Cyprus Turkish Airlines   Cyprus               Individual-- to win sympathy for
                                                                              Chechen separatists
April 28          Bombing-- Aeroflot Russian            Turkey               Claim-- Organization for Solidarity
                   International Airlines Office                              with the Turkey Chechen Resistance
                                                                              Fighters
June 6            Bombing-- Lusaka Airport              Zambia               No claim; political opposition
                                                                              groups suspected
July 20           Bombing-- Reus Airport                Spain                Claim-- ETA
October 20        Mortar Attack-- Algeria Algiers       No claim; Islamic
                   Airport                               militants
                                                         suspected

                                                      1997

January 6         Grenade Attack-- Madrid Airport       Spain                Claim-- ETA
January 28        Bombing-- Air France Office           France               Claim-- Corsican National
                                                                              Liberation Front
April 4           Attempted Bombing-- Alitalia Office   Greece               Claim-- Fighting Guerrilla
                                                                              Formation
October 19        Bombing-- Alitalia Office             Greece               Claim-- Team of International
                                                                              Revolutionary Struggle

                                                      1998

February 2        Attack-- Narita Airport               Japan                Claim-- Revolutionary Worker's
                                                                              Association
February 24       Hijacking-- Turkish Airlines          Turkey               Individual; allegedly to protest
                                                                              oppression of Muslims
May 17            Bombing-- Olympic Airways Office      Greece               Two claims: May 98 and Fighting
                                                                              Guerrillas of May
May 24            Hijacking-- Pakistan International    Pakistan             Three individuals; to protest
                   Airlines                                                   nuclear testing
September 14      Hijacking-- Turkish Airlines          Turkey               Individual; to protest ban on
                                                                              Islamic clothing
October 29        Hijacking-- Turkish Airlines          Turkey               Individual; to protest treatment of
                                                                              ethnic Kurds
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* This list includes incidents carried out by perpetrators having known or suspected political motivation. The
  following principles have been used to compile the list of incidents:
  in cases in which the motivation has not been conclusively established, but political motivation is a
  possibility, the incident has been included;
  acts by insurgent groups in open conflict with government forces are included only if they occur outside the
  theatre of conflict;
  acts by individuals or groups carried out purely to improve personal circumstances (e.g., hijackers seeking
  political refuge in another country) are not included.


  

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
      (2) Study and Report to Congress on Civil Aviation Security 
                   Responsibilities and Funding, 1998

  Report of the Federal Aviation Administration to the United States 
       Congress pursuant to section 301 of the Federal Aviation 
Reauthorization Act of 1996

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                           Executive Summary

    This report is provided to Congress by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) in response to the requirement for a study 
of and report regarding allocating civil aviation security 
responsibilities established by section 301 of the Federal 
Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-264).
    The study examines the evolution of aviation security 
responsibilities and finds that a consensus exists to retain 
the current system of shared responsibilities. The report does 
not recommend a transfer of air carrier responsibilities to 
either airport operators or the Federal Government. As a 
result, the report does not contain methodologies for such a 
transfer.
    The study recognizes the incremental increases in Federal 
Government involvement that have taken place and predicts that 
such increases will continue, perhaps in the field of aviation 
security training.
    The study examines discussions of funding for aviation 
security and considers a number of views. The report contains 
options for aviation security funding and states the 
Administration's position that any FAA activities, including 
security activities, be derived from charges paid by users of 
the National Airspace System. The report offers no 
recommendations in the absence of a consensus on the source of 
funding. The FAA believes that there should be no change to the 
current system of shared responsibilities or funding at this 
time and therefore offers no legislative proposals.

                 I. Background on the Study and Report

    The Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 (Public 
Law 104-264) was approved by the President on October 9, 1996. 
Title III (AVIATION SECURITY) begins with the following 
provision:

          ``SEC. 301. REPORT INCLUDING PROPOSED LEGISLATION ON 
        FUNDING FOR AIRPORT SECURITY.
          (a) IN GENERAL.--Not later than 90 days after the 
        date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of 
        the Federal Aviation Administration, in cooperation 
        with other appropriate persons, shall conduct a study 
        and submit to Congress a report on whether, and if so 
        how, to transfer certain responsibilities of air 
        carriers under Federal law for security activities 
        conducted onsite at commercial service airports to 
        airport operators or to the Federal Government or to 
        provide for shared responsibilities between air 
        carriers and airport operators or the Federal 
        Government.
          (b) CONTENTS OF REPORT.--The report submitted under 
        this section shall--
          (1) examine potential sources of Federal and non-
        Federal revenue that may be used to fund security 
        activities, including providing grants from funds 
        received as fees collected under a fee system 
        established under subtitle C of title II of this Act 
        and the amendments made by that subtitle; and
          (2) provide legislative proposals, if necessary, for 
        accomplishing the transfer of responsibilities referred 
        to in subsection (a).''

    In January 1997, the FAA notified the House Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure and the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation that this report would be 
delayed pending receipt of final recommendations from the White 
House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security (White House 
Commission). Time would be needed to review and analyze those 
recommendations and to formulate implementation plans, as 
appropriate.
    The White House Commission recommendations, as well as 
those of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) 
Baseline Working Group (BWG), would provide a foundation for 
the study of responsibilities for security required by the Act. 
Based on the need to consider the findings of the Commission, 
the BWG, and the National Civil Aviation Review Commission 
(NCARC) and the time anticipated to complete analytical work, 
the FAA notified Congress as indicated above that it would be 
unable to meet the reporting deadlines specified in the law. 
However, the FAA pledged to complete the report as 
expeditiously as possible.
    The required elements of the study and report to Congress 
are as follows:

   Transfer air carrier security responsibilities to 
        airport operators;
   Transfer air carrier security responsibilities to 
        the Federal Government;
   Methodology for the transfer of air carrier security 
        responsibilities to airport operators;
   Methodology for the transfer of air carrier security 
        responsibilities to the Federal Government;
   Methodology for the provision of shared security 
        responsibilities among air carriers and airport 
        operators or the Federal Government;
   Potential sources of Federal and non-Federal revenue 
        to fund security activities; and, if necessary,
   Legislative proposals for the transfer of 
        responsibilities.

    The scope of this study is the security of U.S. and foreign 
air carriers at airports within the United States. 
International aviation security will be discussed only insofar 
as it directly relates to the performance of domestic aviation 
security. A brief review of the responsibilities involved and 
the system in which they are performed is provided below.

              II. The U.S. Aviation Transportation System

    The U.S. domestic system is a highly concentrated hub and 
spoke system that includes 14 of the world's top 20 busiest 
airports. Ninety-eight percent of all U.S. passengers pass 
through the 50 busiest hubs. Connection times are down to 25 
minutes or less.
    Since 1990, annual U.S. air carrier passenger enplanements 
in the domestic system have increased from 424 million to 523 
million in 1996, with 546 million forecast for 1997. The U.S. 
large commercial aircraft fleet increased from 4,007 in 1990 to 
4,916 in January 1997. Including international traffic, 
systemwide U.S. air carrier enplanements grew from 465 million 
in 1990 to a forecast of 600 million in 1997. Passengers on 
U.S. and foreign flag carriers flying to and from the United 
States increased from 70 million in 1990 to over 100 million 
anticipated in 1997. Regional and commuter enplanements 
increased from 37 million in 1990 to a forecast of over 62 
million for 1997, while the aircraft fleet increased from 1,819 
in 1990 to 2,148 in January 1997. \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Federal Aviation Administration, ``FAA Aviation Forecasts: 
Fiscal Years 1997-2008,'' March 1997, pp. I-1,2,11,13. See also White 
House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, ``Final Report to 
President Clinton,'' Washington, DC, February 12, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The basic regulations for aviation security apply to 165 
U.S. air carriers, 164 foreign air carriers, and several 
thousand cargo forwarders at 459 U.S. airports and 244 foreign 
airports. For example, in fiscal year (FY) 1996, FAA aviation 
security special agents conducted 6,317 U.S. air carrier 
inspections both overseas and at home, as well as 643 foreign 
air carrier inspections at U.S. airports. The FAA performed 870 
U.S. airport inspections, 267 facility security inspections, 
and 123 foreign airport assessments overseas while inspecting 
indirect air carriers, better known as air freight forwarders, 
223 times.
    As part of overall civil aviation system security, the FAA 
is also responsible for protecting nearly 10,000 FAA 
facilities. Of these, there are about 1,100 FAA facilities, 
such as control towers at airports and air route traffic 
control centers, staffed by FAA employees. The protection of 
these employees, their equipment, and the data and 
communications they exchange with aircraft in flight is vital 
to the security and operational integrity of the aviation 
system as a whole.

               III. The Current Aviation Security System

    The aviation system within the United States has been on 
security alert for the past 3 years, and protective measures 
overseas have been increased and adjusted a number of times 
over the same period. Increased security measures contained in 
previously designed contingency plans have been in effect 
within the United States since the spring of 1995. This is an 
unprecedented situation.
    The events in Asia and the Pacific in 1995, coupled with 
the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988 and the French 
airline UTA Flight 772 in 1989, remind us that aviation 
security is an international concern. Even though the threat of 
terrorism within the United States has increased, the threat 
still remains greater overseas.
    On October 1, 1995, the Secretary of Transportation asked 
the FAA to direct airports and air carriers within the United 
States to begin implementation of more stringent measures than 
those that had been announced by the Secretary just 2 months 
earlier, on August 9, 1995. Many adjustments to measures have 
been made in the intervening months.
    Stringent security measures have been in place for flights 
departing the United States for overseas locations for many 
years. Although the details of the security program cannot be 
revealed in a published study, it may be stated that all items 
transported on board commercial passenger aircraft flying 
overseas have been subjected to security controls. As the 
President directed in July 1996, air carriers are performing 
preflight security inspections on all overseas international 
flights: ``every plane, every cabin, every cargo hold, every 
time.'' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ White House Office of the Press Secretary, ``Statement by the 
President at Hangar 12, JFK International Airport,'' July 25, 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During 1995 and 1996, the FAA and the Office of the 
Secretary of Transportation worked through the National 
Security Council to focus Government attention on the need to 
revise the domestic aviation security baseline, culminating in 
the creation by the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) 
of the Baseline Working Group (BWG) on July 17, 1996. The 
destruction of TWA Flight 800, which followed by only a few 
hours the BWG's creation, accelerated a process already 
underway.
    The President established the White House Commission on 
July 25, 1996. A preliminary report by the BWG was completed 
and provided to the Commission on August 30, 1996, in support 
of the President's call for an initial Commission report by 
September 9, 1996. The BWG was able to provide important data 
and analyses on aviation security to the Commission from its 
inception to its final report. The final report of the Baseline 
Working Group was published on December 12, 1996. \3\ The White 
House Commission published its final report on February 12, 
1997. \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ BWG, ``Domestic Security Baseline Final Report,'' Washington, 
DC, December 12, 1996, pp. 78-79. This report contains sensitive 
information and is not available to the public. It is subject to the 
provisions of 14 CFR part 191. No part of it may be released without 
the express written permission of the Associate Administrator for Civil 
Aviation Security (ACS-1), Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, 
DC 20591.
    \4\ White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, ``Final 
Report to President Clinton,'' Washington, DC, February 12, 1997, p. 
27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      IV. Responsibilities in the Current Aviation Security System

                        a. faa responsibilities

    The mission for the FAA in civil aviation security is to 
protect the traveling public in air transportation throughout 
the world and provide for the integrity of the civil aviation 
system. FAA oversees a complex system composed of trained 
Government and private sector personnel, properly maintained 
and calibrated equipment, and appropriate procedures to provide 
multiple layers of security from the airport perimeter to the 
aircraft.
    The Office of the FAA Associate Administrator for Civil 
Aviation Security develops and implements regulatory policies, 
programs, and procedures to prevent criminal, terrorist, and 
other disruptive acts against civil aviation; protect FAA 
employees, facilities, and equipment; ensure FAA employees' 
suitability to serve in positions of trust; ensure the safe 
transportation of hazardous materials by air; assist in 
interdicting unlawful drugs and narcotics coming into the 
United States; and support national security.
    The FAA is responsible for establishing and enforcing 
regulations, policies, and procedures; identifying potential 
threats and appropriate countermeasures; deploying Federal Air 
Marshals on selected U.S. air carrier flights; and providing 
overall guidance to ensure the security of passengers, crew, 
baggage, cargo, and aircraft. FAA personnel monitor and inspect 
air carrier and airport security, taking compliance and 
enforcement measures, such as finding violations and assessing 
civil penalties when necessary to maintain discipline in the 
system.
    The FAA also has a responsibility to protect its own 
assets, thereby contributing to the maintenance of the safety 
and security of the commercial aviation system. FAA facility 
and National Airspace System security issues support the 
ability of the FAA to accomplish its mission. These latter 
security responsibilities are among those addressed by the 
President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, 
which was established in July 1996, \5\and published its final 
report in October 1997. \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Executive Order 13010 of July 15, 1996, Critical Infrastructure 
Protection, 61 Fed. Reg. 37347 (1996).
    \6\ The Report of the President's Commission on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection, ``Critical Foundations: Protecting America's 
Infrastructures,'' Washington, DC, October 13, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, the FAA must ensure that designated personnel 
at air route traffic control centers, terminal radar approach 
control facilities, and other staffed facilities are properly 
trained and equipped in matters related to security and that 
they meet the standards of integrity necessary for them to 
perform their security duties in support of the National 
Airspace System. Security is taken into account during the 
design and refurbishment of FAA facilities. The FAA strives to 
provide for effective air traffic control voice and data 
communications security, and ensure effective navigation system 
security, including that of the Global Positioning System.
    The Office of the Associate Administrator for Civil 
Aviation Security maintains close ties to its customers: 
private sector air carriers; State and local governments and 
airport authorities; facility and air traffic control elements 
of FAA; and the traveling public. The current organizational 
structure is the result of exhaustive review and analysis by 
many entities since 1989. Many functions are codified in law. 
In addition to policy, intelligence, and operations functions, 
the organization's work includes aviation security training at 
the FAA's Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center, Oklahoma City, and 
the responsibility for guiding the aviation security research 
and development program conducted at the FAA's William J. 
Hughes Technical Center, Atlantic City.
    The Office of Intelligence and Security in the Office of 
the Secretary of Transportation coordinates security and 
intelligence within the Department of Transportation. \7\ 
Consultation and coordination between the Associate 
Administrator for Civil Aviation Security and the Director of 
the Office of Intelligence and Security is close and 
continuous. \8\ Cooperation among modal security elements has 
been encouraged and improved by the formation of a Department 
of Transportation Security Working Group under the leadership 
of the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Section 101 of the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, 
Public Law 101-604, November 16, 1990.
    \8\ Id., section 103.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The FAA's Office of Civil Aviation Security Intelligence 
provides intelligence analysis of the threat to civil aviation 
as the basis for determining the application of aviation 
security measures. This is accomplished by synthesizing 
intelligence and threat information into products such as 
security directives, information circulars, and threat 
assessments. These products are needed by the operations and 
planning offices for ruling on carrier amendments to approved 
security programs, determinations of foreign airport security 
effectiveness, and support in changing regulations. The highest 
level of security is applied in specific situations when there 
is credible and specific threat information. The FAA, in 
consultation with the aviation industry, has developed 
contingency plans that make it possible to implement only those 
security measures applicable to specific threat situations.
    The Office of Civil Aviation Security Intelligence receives 
and analyzes all information regarding potential or direct 
threats to civil aviation. The information can be original or 
from other centers of analysis, classified and open source. It 
comes from agencies of the U.S. intelligence and law 
enforcement communities, foreign government authorities, and 
private sector elements. To keep abreast of rapidly changing 
threat situations worldwide and to determine their relevance to 
civil aviation, FAA intelligence analysts stay in contact with 
their counterparts in other agencies and with FAA special 
agents in field offices. Decisions to impose additional 
security measures result from coordinated effort among 
operations, policy, and intelligence specialists, U.S. and 
foreign air carriers, and airport operators.
    Aviation security threat information and additional 
security requirements are disseminated to U.S. airlines and 
airports by official FAA communications called ``information 
circulars'' and ``security directives,'' respectively, under 
section 108.18 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 
Sec. 108.18), as well as other written and oral communications. 
The Department of State, pertinent U.S. Embassies, foreign 
government security officials, and others may also receive 
these communications. FAA information is passed to airline 
crews by their companies. If a specific and credible threat 
cannot be thwarted and security measures cannot counter it, 
either the specific flight(s) will be canceled or public 
notification will be made by both the Department of 
Transportation (DOT) and the Department of State for 
international flights, or by DOT for domestic flights.
    Finally, to review FAA's responsibilities in customer 
service terms, the services listed on the next page are those 
provided by the FAA to industry in the field of aviation 
security.

                                                                         TABLE I
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    The FAA's Responsibilities for Aviation Security
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          Establish and enforce aviation security and hazardous materials regulations, policies, and
                          procedures;
                          Approve security programs and amendments to those programs;
                          Identify threats and appropriate countermeasures;
                          Provide guidance and assistance to ensure the safety and security of passengers, crew,
                          baggage, cargo, and aircraft, particularly during times of increased threat;
                          Chair the Aviation Security Advisory Committee, an advisory body whose membership is drawn
                          from the aviation industry, consumer advocacy and citizen's groups, unions, and U.S. Government
                          agencies;
                          Determine requirements, conduct aviation security research and development, and provide
                          assistance to equipment manufacturers;
                          Test, evaluate, and approve security equipment and certify explosives detection systems;
                          Provide funding and support for the canine explosives detection program;
                          Provide aviation security technical assistance, advice, education, and training;
                          Conduct foreign airport security assessments and make recommendations to foreign authorities
                          for improvements;
                          Deploy Federal air marshals on selected U.S. air carrier flights; and
                          Represent U.S. aviation security interests abroad, including those of industry, in
                          negotiations and discussions with foreign governments, air carriers, airport authorities, and
                          international organizations.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These services enhance the overall security posture of U.S. 
air carriers through deterrence and many other ancillary 
benefits not directly related to terrorism prevention or 
Federal regulations.

              b. air carrier and airport responsibilities

    Air carriers bear the primary responsibility for applying 
security measures to passengers, service and flight crews, 
baggage, and cargo. Airports, run by State or local government 
authorities, are responsible for maintaining a secure ground 
environment and for providing law enforcement support for 
implementation of airline and airport security measures.
    There are about 100 entities conducting screening at 
airports in the United States. These include units conducting 
screening at small airports, air carriers that conduct their 
own screening, and the large screening companies. \9\ Five of 
the largest screening companies employ approximately 64 percent 
of the estimated 18,000 screeners nationwide. At least 16 
different companies, including 2 air carriers, conduct 
screening at the 19 Category X \10\ airports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ An Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) on 
Certification of Screening Companies was published in the ``Federal 
Register'' at 62 Fed. Reg. 12724 (1997) on March 17, 1997; the comment 
period closed on May 1, 1997. Comments were received and analyzed, a 
draft NPRM prepared, and concurrence scheduled for February 20, 1998. 
The critical element in this process is having a reliable and 
consistent way to measure actual screening performance. It was decided 
to add more specific screening improvements to the rule based on data 
gathered by threat image projection (TIP) systems. On March 4, the FAA 
decided to withdraw the ANPRM, and a notice to that effect was 
published on May 13, 1998. Special evaluations by field agents are 
being conducted to validate data gathered by TIP. Results in 1998 were 
promising; the NPRM should be published in 1999.
    \10\ Category X airports are generally among the busiest and most 
complex of all U.S. airports. Category I airports are also among the 
busiest airports, followed by progressively smaller airports in 
Categories II, III, and IV. The precise definitions of each category 
and the identification and location of airports within each category 
are sensitive information subject to the provision of 14 CFR Sec. 191.1 
et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The baseline security required of air carriers and U.S. 
airport operators represents an effort to match the level of 
security with FAA's best estimate of the level of threat. The 
goal is to allocate industry and government resources 
efficiently to protect the critical entity, commercial air 
carrier operations. The Aviation Security Contingency Plan 
allows the FAA and the aviation industry to respond promptly to 
security emergencies, focusing on those measures that 
effectively counter threats while taking into account local 
conditions. Any change in the prevailing threat must be 
addressed by an adjustment to the baseline.

  V. Discussion of Responsibilities and Costs in the Current Aviation 
             Security System: An Examination of the Mandate

    When hijacking was an all too frequent occurrence in the 
late 1960's and 1970-71, air carriers voluntarily cooperated 
with the Federal Government on measures to counter the threat, 
but not without some concern. One history describes the 
situation at the time as follows:

        ``The airlines as a group had consistently argued that 
        combatting hijacking and airport security were largely 
        Federal responsibilities. They had therefore fought for 
        Federal operation and payment for anti-hijacking 
        programs. The airlines were especially unhappy about 
        the prospect of their employees physically searching 
        passengers or engaging in any other activities normally 
        assigned to law enforcement officials. Most were, 
        therefore, pleased with the infusion of Federal agents 
        under the sky marshal program. When it became clear 
        that security systems would have to be extended to 
        virtually all of their boarding areas, the airlines 
        began an intensive lobbying campaign for an expansion 
        of the existing Federal security force to handle the 
        operation.'' \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Kent, Richard J., Jr., ``Safe, Separated and Soaring: A 
History of Federal Civil Aviation Policy 1961-1972,'' U.S. Department 
of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, 1980, pp. 349-50.

    For 25 years, the executive branch of the Federal 
Government has maintained that providing security is a cost of 
doing business, which should be borne by the air carriers and 
airports just as they bear the cost of ensuring safe 
operations. The most authoritative statement of this position 
was recorded during the hearings in February and March 1973, 
which led to amendments to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 
now codified in title 49, United States Code. These amendments 
were contained in two related titles of Public Law 93-366: 
title I--the Antihijacking Act of 1974, and title II--the Air 
Transportation Security Act of 1974.
    In those hearings, the views of a high-ranking 
Transportation Department official clearly indicated that the 
users of civil aviation should bear its costs, and those costs 
explicitly included those derived from the application of 
security measures. \12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ ``Anti-Hijacking Act of 1973'': Hearings on H.R. 3858, H.R. 
670, H.R. 3953, and H.R. 4287 (and all identical or similar bills) 
before the Subcommittee on Transportation and Aeronautics, House 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93rd Cong. 222 (1973) 
(statement of Hon. Egil Krogh, Jr., Under Secretary, Department of 
Transportation), February 27, 1973. See also Kent, supra note 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

         a. aviation security, national security, and terrorism

    In 1986, a new aspect emerged in the executive branch's 
views on the cost of dealing with terrorism. In the 1986 report 
of his task force on terrorism, then Vice President George Bush 
asserted that the United States views terrorism as a threat to 
the national security. \13\ A logical evolution of this view 
may lead to the conclusion that the Federal Government should 
be responsible for the costs of combating terrorism, just as it 
pays for the cost of providing for the common defense of the 
Nation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Bush, George, ``Public Report of the Vice President's Task 
Force on Combatting Terrorism,'' Washington, DC, February 1986, p. 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the late 1980's, a former Administration official 
extended this view further, including ``freedom of the air,'' 
meaning the maintenance of civil aviation security, as a vital 
national interest. \14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ ``The Bombing of Pan Am Flight 103: A Critical Look at 
American Aviation Security'': Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Government Activities and Transportation of the House Committee on 
Government Operations, 101st Cong. 34 (1989) (statement of Mr. Noel 
Koch, President, International Security Management, Inc.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Several years later, Senator Lautenberg, who had been a 
member of the post-Pan Am Flight 103 President's Commission on 
Aviation Security and Terrorism, expressed similar views in his 
opening statement at a hearing of the Senate Commerce, Science, 
and Transportation Committee on August 1, 1996:

        ``Congress, our Nation's airlines, and our airports 
        have been unwilling to make the investments necessary 
        to protect the public. Terrorism is an act of war 
        against an entire nation, with civilians on the tragic 
        front lines, and we have got to confront it with the 
        same commitment and fervor that we must reserve for 
        other threats to our national security.'' \15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ ``Aviation Security'': Hearings before the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 104th Cong. 13 (1996) (statement 
of Senator Lautenberg).

    Ambassador Morris Busby, former U.S. Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism at the Department of State, agreed during 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
testimony at the same hearing, saying:

        ``. . . the idea that aviation security is a national 
        security issue has received a lot of support around 
        this room today, and I am absolutely 100 percent in 
        support of that.'' \16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ Id., p.86 (statement of Morris D. Busby, President, BGI Inc.).

    President Clinton and members of his Administration have 
recently made statements of policy indicating that the security 
of civil aviation should be treated as a matter of national 
security. In a speech at George Washington University on August 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5, 1996, President Clinton stated:

        ``We cannot reduce the threats to our people without 
        reducing threats to the world beyond our borders. 
        That's why the fight against terrorism must be both a 
        national priority and a national security priority. We 
        have pursued a concerted national and international 
        strategy against terrorism on three fronts: First, 
        beyond our borders, by working more closely than ever 
        with our friends and allies; second, here at home, by 
        giving law enforcement the most powerful 
        counterterrorism tools available; and, third, in our 
        airports and airplanes by increasing aviation 
        security.'' \17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ White House Press Release, ``Remarks by the President on 
American Security in a Changing World,'' at George Washington 
University, Washington, DC, August 5, 1996.

    On September 9, 1996, when receiving the initial report of 
the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security from 
Vice President Gore, the President reiterated this theme by 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
saying:

        ``We know we can't make the world risk-free, but we can 
        reduce the risks we face and we have to take the fight 
        to the terrorists. If we have the will, we can find the 
        means. We have to continue to fight terrorism on every 
        front by pursuing our three-part strategy: First, by 
        rallying a world coalition with zero tolerance for 
        terrorism; second, by giving law enforcement the strong 
        counterterrorism tools they need; and, third, by 
        improving security in our airports and on our 
        airplanes.'' \18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ White House Press Release, ``Remarks by the President during 
White House Commission on Aviation Safety Announcement,'' the Oval 
Office at the White House, September 9, 1996.

    The White House Commission, in recommendation 3.1 of its 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
final report, stated:

        ``The federal government should consider aviation 
        security as a national security issue, and provide 
        substantial funding for capital improvements. The 
        Commission believes that terrorist attacks on civil 
        aviation are directed at the United States, and that 
        there should be an ongoing federal commitment to 
        reducing the threats that they pose.'' \19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ White House Commission, ``Final Report to President Clinton,'' 
Washington, DC, February 12, 1997, p. 27.

    In section 314 of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act 
of 1996 (Public Law 104-264), the Senate appears to endorse 
these views, stating the ``Sense of the Senate Regarding Acts 
of International Terrorism.'' After finding that ``. . . there 
has been an increase in attempts by criminal terrorists to 
murder airline passengers through the destruction of civilian 
airliners and the deliberate fear and death inflicted through 
bombings of buildings and the kidnapping of tourists and 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Americans residing abroad,'' section 314 states:

        ``It is the sense of the Senate that if evidence 
        establishes beyond a clear and reasonable doubt that 
        any act of hostility towards any United States citizen 
        was an act of international terrorism sponsored, 
        organized, condoned, or directed by any nation, a state 
        of war should be considered to exist or to have existed 
        between the United States and that nation, beginning as 
        of the moment that the act of aggression occurs.'' \20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ Section 314 of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 
1996, Public Law 104-264, October 9, 1996.

    Again, the President's words are reflected in the White 
House publication, A National Security Strategy for a New 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Century:

        ``We further seek to uncover, reduce or eliminate 
        foreign terrorist capabilities in our country; 
        eliminate terrorist sanctuaries; counter state-
        supported terrorism and subversion of moderate regimes 
        through comprehensive program of diplomatic, economic 
        and intelligence activities; improve aviation security 
        worldwide and at U.S. airports; ensure better security 
        for all U.S. transportation systems; and improve 
        protection for our personnel assigned overseas.'' \21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ The White House, ``A National Security Strategy for a New 
Century,'' May 1997, p.10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

              b. aviation security and other criminal acts

    Given that aviation security measures are designed to 
prevent acts of terrorism and thereby enhance national 
security, the Federal Government implicitly accepts increased 
responsibility for improving aviation security. Nevertheless, 
it is important to remember when discussing who should be 
responsible for security, that criminal acts against civil 
aviation are not committed exclusively by terrorists. Most 
crimes against civil aviation have been committed by mentally 
deranged persons, or fugitives and would-be refugees who 
resorted to hijacking only as a means of transportation with no 
clear intention of harming the aircraft or its occupants. 
Others are more deadly.
    In 1955, a United Airlines aircraft disintegrated in flight 
11 minutes after takeoff near Longmont, Colorado. A dynamite 
bomb detonated in a baggage compartment, Killing 39 passengers 
and 5 crew. One J. Graham was arrested, tried, and executed for 
the crime, for which the motive was insurance fraud. \22\ 
Another incident of sabotage over Bolivia, North Carolina, in 
early 1960 killed 34 passengers and crew and was also related 
to insurance fraud. A ceiling on the amount of airline trip 
insurance passengers can purchase was imposed, and baggage 
screening was improved. Domestic airline sabotage declined 
until there were no fatal incidents in the 1970's. \23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, 
``Report to the President,'' Washington, DC, May 15, 1990, p.160.
    \23\ Rochester, Stuart I., ``Takeoff at Mid-century: Federal Civil 
Aviation Policy in the Eisenhower Years 1953-1961,'' U.S. Department of 
Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Washington DC, 1976, 
pp. 262-3 & 275.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Air carriers also must counter other crimes unrelated to 
terrorism, such as theft and fraud. \24\ Air carriers'' 
security interests are inherently broader than the prevention 
of terrorism, and their security programs deal with more than 
is required by Federal Aviation Regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, 
supra note 22, 1990, p. 46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 VI. The Transfer of Air Carrier Security Responsibilities to Airport 
                               Operators

        a. early discussions, debates, and directions: 1960-1990

    From the first implementation of security screening, nearly 
everyone agreed that the screening of passengers should be a 
responsibility of the airlines. In 1969, Eastern Air Lines 
voluntarily agreed to an FAA test of an ``operational screening 
system for boarding airline passengers'' with ``weapon-
detection devices'' used in conjunction with ``FAA's evolving 
psychological profile to identify and isolate suspicious 
individuals for further surveillance or search.'' \25\ Eastern 
was joined later in that year by TWA, Pan Am, and Continental 
in ``using the screening system.'' \26\ The sharing of the 
costs of passenger screening was then and has continued to be a 
topic of debate and divided opinions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Kent, Richard J., Jr., ``Safe, Separated and Soaring: A 
History of Federal Civil Aviation Policy 1961 - 1972,'' U.S. Department 
of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC, 
1980, p. 338. The recommendations and the test were devised by the FAA 
Task Force on Deterrence of Air Piracy, created by Acting Administrator 
Dave Thomas on February 17, 1969.
    \26\ Id., p. 340.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A solution found in 1972 was to require air carriers to 
provide screening personnel and the airport operators to 
provide law enforcement support. In the 93rd Congress, 1st 
Session, Senator Cannon, Chairman of the Aviation Subcommittee 
of the Senate Committee on Commerce, introduced the ``Air 
Transportation Security Act of 1973'' as S.39, ``A Bill to 
amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to provide a more 
effective program to prevent aircraft piracy and for other 
purposes.'' \27\ The Air Transportation Security Force proposal 
in S.39 envisioned Federal law enforcement officers as 
supporting air carrier screeners, not performing the screening 
functions themselves. They would only search after a bag or 
person alarmed a metal detection device and then only after 
consent was given. Everyone participating in the hearings 
seemed to believe that many more than 5,000 Federal agents 
would be needed to perform all functions envisioned. The 
airlines supported S.39.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ S.39 was introduced on January 4, 1973. Senator Cannon then 
noted that there were more than 1,700 Federal security officers on duty 
at U.S. airports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Most of the arguments against a Federal force revolved 
around the philosophy of federalism; that this was a State and 
local police protection function. In his statement before the 
Aviation Subcommittee of the Senate Commerce Committee on 
January 10, 1973, then Secretary of Transportation John Volpe 
said:

        ``To require the creation of a new Federal police force 
        for the sole purpose of satisfying the security needs 
        at airports, regardless of their size and level of 
        operations is unnecessarily costly and wasteful. . . . 
        The FBI will exhaustively investigate all air piracy 
        incidents and subsequently bring to justice all 
        violators. On the other hand, we do not feel the 
        Federal Government should get into the day-to-day crime 
        prevention business at our airports. This should 
        properly be managed by local law enforcement 
        officers.'' \28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ ``Emergency Antihijacking Regulations'': Hearings before the 
Aviation Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 93rd Cong. 
75 (1973) (statement of Hon. John A. Volpe, Secretary of 
Transportation).

    None of the arguments suggested that there was a ``national 
security'' aspect to aviation security. While there were 134 
domestic hijackings between 1961 and 1972, and 7 explosions 
aboard commercial aircraft between 1955 and 1976 in the United 
States, these domestic security incidents did not contain 
clearly ``terrorist'' elements until a hijacking at LaGuardia 
Airport in September 1976. A group called ``Fighters for Free 
Croatia'' hijacked a TWA flight bound for Chicago. After stops 
in Montreal, Quebec; Gander, Newfoundland; and Iceland for 
refueling, they dropped leaflets over London and Paris, landed 
in Paris and surrendered. \29\ Ironically, the perpetrators 
believed that security screening was tight at LaGuardia and 
decided to use simulated explosives made from material smuggled 
on board rather than traditional weapons, which probably would 
have been discovered. The group met the profile and triggered 
more than usual rigorous searching. The ruse was bolstered by a 
genuine bomb that had been planted in a New York subway locker; 
the hijackers notified police, and the bomb exploded during 
examination. \29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ St. John, Peter, ``Air Piracy, Airport Security, and 
International Terrorism,'' Quorum Books, New York, Westport, 
Connecticut, and London, 1991, p. 31.
    \30\ Preston, Edmund, ``Troubled Passage: The Federal Aviation 
Administration During the Nixon-Ford Term 1973-1977,'' U.S. Department 
of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, 1987, pp. 215-17. 
This incident should not be confused with the self-service baggage 
locker bombing at LaGuardia Airport in New York on December 29, 1975. 
See also: Moore, Kenneth C., ``Airport, Aircraft, and Airline 
Security,'' Second Edition, Butterworth-Heinemann, a division of Reed 
Publishing (USA), Inc., Boston, London, Oxford, Singapore, Sydney, 
Toronto, and Wellington, 1991, pp. 28, 165, and 389.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The 1980's saw a change in the nature of criminal acts 
against aviation. Hijacking, seemingly the preferred form of 
criminal and terrorist activity, was joined once again by the 
placement of explosive devices aimed at the total destruction 
of aircraft, passengers, and crew. The vast majority of 
criminal and terrorist acts against civil aviation during this 
decade occurred overseas rather than in the United States. The 
decline in hijacking may have been due to more effective 
security at airports. \31\ The events of the 1980's may have 
stimulated some observers to suggest a large role for airport 
operators in aviation security. Still others disagreed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ Simon, Jeffrey D., ``The Terrorist Trap: America's Experience 
with Terrorism,'' Indiana University Press, Bloomington and 
Indianapolis, 1994, pp. 349-50 and 396-99.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The hearings of the House Subcommittee on Government 
Activities and Transportation on September 25, 1989, allowed 
for the presentation of opposing views about the security roles 
of air carriers and airport operators. Speaking to Isaac 
Yeffet, former Director of Security of El Al Airlines, then 
Congresswoman Boxer said:

        ``Mr. Koch says in his testimony-and I am quoting--`The 
        carriers should be responsible for safety, and they 
        are. They do it superbly. Security is a separate 
        problem far beyond their competence, and it shows.' He 
        goes on to say that what we need to do-and I am 
        quoting--`The terminal operator ought to have at least 
        as large, if not a larger responsibility for security 
        than the carriers.' Do you agree with that?''

    Mr. Yeffet replied:

        ``No. I disagree. I believe the airlines must be 
        responsible for the security. They have to get help 
        from the government by asking them what kind of 
        procedures we have to follow; somebody has to teach the 
        airlines how to build a security system if they don't 
        know how. But it is their business as they run their 
        airlines to make sure that the flight will always 
        remain safe and secure, and not to think that somebody 
        else has to run their security.'' \32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ ``The Bombing of Pan Am Flight 103: A Critical Look at 
American Aviation Security'': Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Government Activities and Transportation of the House Committee on 
Government Operations, 101st Cong. 56 (1989).

    The continuation of the debate and the diversity of views 
on the delineation of responsibilities for security between air 
carriers and airport operators prompted a reexamination of the 
issues by the FAA in 1991.

    b. faa study on the transfer of security responsibilities: 1991

    An unpublished FAA study evaluated three alternatives for a 
shift in security responsibilities with respect to passengers, 
baggage, and cargo from the air carriers to airport operators 
to determine whether or not any alternative was likely to 
improve performance. The basic framework and content of the 
study, including conclusions reached at that time, are 
presented at appendix A without substantive modification. The 
options examined in 1991 reflect alternatives to the system 
then in place, and are reiterated in this paper as they were 
written in 1991. Most elements of these options remain valid 
today.
    The study concluded that the system in 1991 was well 
understood and accepted by most major participants. Although 
the system had both pros and cons, it was fundamentally 
effective and efficient. While the study saw advantages to each 
of the three alternatives, there were also considerable 
disadvantages to shifting any of the major security functions 
from the air carriers to airport operators. The study concluded 
that there did not appear to be a net benefit in adopting any 
of the alternatives over the system current at the time. 
Consequently, it was recommended that the current system be 
continued. However, in recognition of the need for further 
analysis to study ways that the security system might be 
improved, the study recommended that the FAA consider running a 
trial at a selected domestic airport to test the viability of 
transferring certain security functions, particularly the 
screening checkpoints, from air carriers to the airport 
authority.

                   c. airport operators' views: 1996

    In his testimony before the White House Commission on 
Aviation Safety and Security on September 5, 1996, Richard 
Marchi, Senior Vice President for Technical and Environmental 
Affairs for the Airports Council International-North America 
(ACI-NA), speaking for his organization and for the American 
Association of Airport Executives (AAAE), presented the airport 
operators' opinion when he stated:

        ``An important underlying aspect of controlling 
        passenger flow and suspect baggage is continuity. The 
        first point of contact is provided by airline agents at 
        the check in point. Airline agents currently use a 
        battery of relevant information to determine if a 
        passenger or their baggage should be subjected to a 
        more intense screening regime. This information is 
        provided by the intelligence community and FAA directly 
        to the airline security personnel, thus limiting the 
        information to those with the quote-need to know-
        unquote and facilitating the dissemination of 
        information to those employees who will be responsible 
        for implementing the selection process. It is at this 
        point that a suspect passenger and their baggage, 
        either carry on or checked, can be removed from the 
        standard screening process and subjected to more 
        intense scrutiny. By interposing another controlling 
        entity--an airport or federal employee--into the midst 
        of the check-in process continuity is lost, and the 
        suspect person and/or their baggage would have the 
        opportunity to evade security control measures such as 
        a positive passenger/baggage match. Currently, if a 
        passenger is determined to be a risk, that individual 
        is escorted to the gate and remains under the control 
        of an agent until he boards the aircraft. That 
        passenger's checked baggage is scrutinized and is 
        placed aboard the aircraft only when the passenger 
        boards. This system works because a single entity--in 
        this case, the airline--is responsible for controlling 
        all aspects of that passenger's screening process. If 
        airport or federal government employees were to become 
        responsible for effective screening of suspect 
        passengers and/or baggage, they would multiply the 
        number of points in the system where there must be a 
        hand-off of responsibility and, in turn, multiply the 
        number of opportunities for a miscue.'' \33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ Statement of Richard F. Marchi before the White House 
Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, Washington, DC, September 
5, 1996.

    Finally, moving responsibilities from air carriers to 
airport authorities could present a number of difficulties. An 
attempt had been made to exempt aviation safety and security 
from the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Public Law 104-
4), but the attempt failed. \34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ 141 Cong. Rec. H509-H512 (January 23, 1995). Representatives 
Mineta and Oberstar strongly supported Representative Collins' 
amendments Nos. 69 and 70, which were defeated 169 to 256.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A certain percentage of Airport Improvement Program (AIP) 
grant money from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund is allocated 
by airport authorities for security measures. Under current 
law, air carriers are ineligible for such grant funding. \35\ A 
legislative approach to this issue could be to permit AIP funds 
to be used by air carriers for security purposes, a solution 
unlikely to be supported by airport operators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ Section 308 of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 
1966 (P.L. 104-264) may modify air carries eligibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Again, Mr. Marchi, speaking for airport operators:

        ``While airports appreciate the provision found in H.R. 
        3953 expanding Passenger Facility Charge (PFC) and 
        Airport Improvement Program (AIP) eligibility to help 
        pay for explosive detection equipment and operational 
        costs for activities to enhance aviation security, this 
        departure from current PFC and AIP eligibility, which 
        restricts these funds to capital improvements, should 
        not be undertaken lightly. The use of Trust Fund 
        resources for on-going and growing operating expenses 
        puts these operations at grave risk when the inevitable 
        Federal cost-cutting ax falls on DOT/FAA/Airport 
        appropriations. And, while expanded eligibility may be 
        helpful at the margins, it will only have real benefit 
        if additional AIP funds are made available and the 
        federal cap on PFCs is lifted. We need to remember that 
        airport security investments are among the multitude of 
        airport capital improvement programs that we have 
        estimated will require at least $10 billion a year 
        through the year 2002. (Source: ACI-NA/AAAE 1996 
        Capital Needs Survey.) AIP funding for airports has 
        suffered major reductions, from $1.9 billion annually 
        to only $1.45 billion, currently. Congress must address 
        the need to invest in our nation's airports to provide 
        greater capacity, safety and security for air 
        travelers--by giving airports the means to generate 
        needed funding through the time-tested and effective 
        local Passenger Facility Charge program. For smaller 
        airports, we must be willing to consider new options 
        for providing the necessary investment.'' \36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ Statement of Richard F. Marchi, supra note 33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

   VII. The Transfer of Air Carrier Security Responsibilities to the 
                           Federal Government

    Few have recommended the transfer of screening and other 
air carrier responsibilities to the Federal Government. \37\ As 
stated in the next section on shared responsibilities, the BWG 
clearly opposed the transfer of air carrier responsibilities to 
the Federal Government for many of the same reasons raised over 
20 years ago. Since the failure of their arguments in 1970-71 
to transfer responsibility in this manner, the air carriers 
have repeatedly expressed the desire to retain screening duties 
and have opposed their transfer to ``government'' personnel, 
primarily so that airlines can facilitate passenger movement 
and better control customer services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ One such discussion is in Nader, Ralph and Smith, Wesley J., 
``Collision Course: The Truth about Airline Safety,'' TAB Books, a 
division of McGraw-Hill, Inc., Blue Ridge Summit, Pennsylvania, 1994, 
pp. 230-31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In testimony submitted to the Senate Aviation Subcommittee 
on January 9, 1973, Paul Ignatius, Executive Vice President of 
the Air Transport Association (ATA), wrote:

        ``The airlines have consistently taken the position 
        that law enforcement is a government responsibility. 
        First, the behavioral profile is an important aspect of 
        the screening process and this must be handled by 
        airline personnel and coordinated with the metal-
        detecting operations. Secondly, the screening process 
        must be carried out as part of the boarding of 
        passengers. The airlines must be responsible for timely 
        boarding and would lack the necessary control over it 
        if the screening process were operated by government 
        personnel.'' \38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \38\ ``Emergency Antihijacking Regulations'': Hearings before the 
Aviation Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 93rd Cong. 
167 (1973) (statement of Paul Ignatius, ATA).

    Senator Hollings expressed a different view over 20 years 
later in his prepared statement for the aviation security 
hearing of the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Committee on August 1, 1996:

        ``. . . the public deserves the best technology 
        operated by the best trained individuals, to reduce the 
        risks of a terrorist attack. Another thing is clear-
        security is going to be costly. The Federal Aviation 
        Administration (FAA) has estimated that it will cost as 
        much as $2.2 billion to install up to 1,800 machines at 
        75 airports. The FAA should be authorized to collect a 
        fee to pay for the machines. Today, there are 
        approximately 14,000-18,000 screeners, paid an average 
        of $10,000 to $15,000 per year. These screeners are one 
        line of defense, but a critical one in the fight 
        against terrorism. They need training, and they need to 
        be paid in accordance with their responsibilities. The 
        present turnover rate among these employees is 
        extremely high. Unless we change the way we provide 
        security, we cannot upgrade it . . . I am considering 
        whether the FAA should provide the screeners, thereby 
        relieving the air carriers of this responsibility; this 
        also will cost money.'' \39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ ``Aviation Security'': Hearings before the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 104th Cong. 93 (1996) (statement 
of Senator Hollings).

    In contrast, and also on August 1, 1996, Senator McCain, 
speaking about legislation that became the FAA Reauthorization 
Act (which requires this study) during the Senate hearing, said 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
that the bill would:

        ``. . . require the FAA to study whether airports 
        should be responsible-or who should be responsible-for 
        airport security functions. We are in agreement, and 
        the airlines are in agreement, that it should not be 
        the airlines that are responsible for the security, 
        especially passenger security.'' \40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ Id., p. 9. (statement of Senator McCain).

    In his prepared statement, Senator McCain broadened the 
mandate by saying that the legislation would: ``require FAA to 
study whether airports should be responsible for most or all 
security functions. . . .'' \41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \41\ Id., p. 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Captain J. Randolph Babbitt, president of the Air Line 
Pilots Association, before the White House Commission on 
September 5, 1996, offered yet another alternative when he 
said:

        ``We believe the FAA's role in overseeing aviation 
        security should be reviewed by the Commission, with a 
        view toward making certain of its responsibilities a 
        function of the Department of Justice. The 
        establishment of aviation security policy and 
        procedures by law enforcement professionals within the 
        DOJ, working with their own intelligence officers, 
        would enhance the ability of the U.S. to quickly adapt 
        security measures to new and changing threats.'' \42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ Statement of Captain J. Randolph Babbitt, president, Air Line 
Pilots Association, before the White House Commission, Washington, DC, 
September 5, 1996.

    Captain John J. O'Donnell, then president of the Air Line 
Pilots Association, accompanied at the Senate Aviation 
Subcommittee hearing on January 9, 1973, by two pilots who had 
been hijacked, supported the then current division of 
responsibilities, but for a different reason and with a 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
significant caveat:

        ``This committee is well aware of the action taken 
        recently by the Secretary of Transportation which makes 
        airport authorities and the airlines responsible for 
        passenger screening, carry-on baggage search and the 
        presence of law enforcement officers. We concurred in 
        that action because little else was being done to 
        develop airport security. However, we are greatly 
        concerned that the fragmentation of responsibility will 
        mean that training will be inconsistent, equipment 
        maintenance will become lax and monitoring of the law 
        enforcement presence will be subject to the whims of 
        local government and airline budgets. The overall 
        responsibility for the air transportation security 
        system should be at a high governmental level in order 
        to give consistency of training and competency to the 
        total system.'' \43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\ ``Emergency Antihijacking Regulations'': Hearings before the 
Aviation Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 93rd Cong. 
187 (1973) (statement of Captain John J. O'Donnell, president, Air Line 
Pilots Association).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                         a. screening overseas

    Two significant questions are who would perform screening 
overseas when foreign entities are incapable or their 
performance is insufficient, and who would perform such 
(sometimes redundant) screening in any case? The most logical 
answer would be the air carriers, as now required by the FAA of 
U.S. air carriers in such cases. Even if carriers cease doing 
screening in the United States, they will most likely continue 
to do redundant screening \44\ abroad as required by FAA 
regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \44\ ``Redundant screening'' refers to any additional or secondary 
screening that may be required after a passenger passes through a 
primary screening checkpoint, but prior to boarding the aircraft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Foreign governments are willing to let private sector 
entities do redundant screening, but are loathe to allow 
foreign government employees to perform the same function. A 
request to foreign governments to allow U.S. Federal Government 
employees to perform screening overseas would most likely be 
rejected as an infringement on the national sovereignty of the 
host governments. Therefore, even if the Federal Government 
assumed air carrier responsibilities within the United States, 
air carriers would still need to develop and maintain expertise 
to perform screening services overseas.
    The only Federal assistance that might be agreeable to 
foreign governments would perhaps be more civil aviation 
security liaison officers stationed at or near each airport to 
assist in the interface with foreign governments. The 
responsibility for the effective and efficient performance of 
screening functions would have to remain with either the host 
government or the air carriers.

                       b. economic considerations

    The argument against Federal Government responsibility for 
security screening overseas is primarily legal or 
jurisdictional in nature. The argument against the Federal 
Government assuming air carrier security responsibilities at 
home contains some of those same concerns but major economic 
considerations as well.
    There are approximately 18,000 screeners working for over 
100 entities, including air carriers and screening companies. 
These individuals would be the minimum number hired as Federal 
Government employees or as contract employees if the Federal 
Government chose to ``contract out'' security services 
currently provided by air carriers.
    Provision for Federal Government screening personnel costs 
alone could exceed a half billion dollars a year. If costs for 
training are added to those operational costs, then combined 
with advanced security equipment procurements under the 
Facilities and Equipment account and research and development 
costs, the total could approach a billion dollars a year. 
Whether financed by the U.S. Treasury's General Fund as a 
national security expenditure or through the Airport and Airway 
Trust Fund as a cost of doing business or traveling, that is a 
substantial amount of money that the Federal Government would 
have to expend to assume air carrier screening 
responsibilities. \45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \45\ Personnel costs are not based on the prevailing salaries paid 
to screeners under the current system. The assumption is that it will 
be necessary to increase screeners' salaries and benefits to increase 
the quality and professionalism of the screener work force, and a key 
reason for the Federal Government assuming screening responsibilities 
would be to ensure this change. Therefore, the personnel cost estimate 
is based on the postulation of 15,000 screeners in Federal Aviation 
Service Grades (FG) 5/7; 3,000 screening supervisors at FG-9/11; and 
429 managers/program, policy, and support staff personnel (a ratio of 1 
per 7 screening supervisors) ranging from FG-11 through FG-15, at an 
average grade of FG-13. Costs estimates are in 1997 dollars and are 
based on the Washington, DC, locality pay schedule for 1997 General 
Schedule/FG employees:
          $25,897 (FG-7 Step 1) x .35 benefits x 15,000 screeners = 
$524,414,250
          $31,680 (FG-11 Step 1) x .35 benefits x 3,000 supervisors = 
$128,304,000
          $54,629 (FG-13 Step 1) x .35 benefits x 429 managers/staff = 
$31,638,385
          $524,414,250 + $128,304,000 + $31,638,385 = $684,356,635
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On the other hand, a major benefit could be an increase in 
the professionalism of the security screening work force if 
sufficient funds were made available to conduct proper training 
for them at centralized locations; e.g., at the FAA Academy, in 
Oklahoma City.
    Recent FAA personnel reform measures may allow for the 
creation of a professional FAA security screening force with 
career paths, appropriate compensation, a variety of 
assignments, and a sense of service commensurate with their 
responsibilities. Another perhaps more practical possibility 
could be the creation of a quasi-governmental work force 
independent of, although regulated by, the FAA.
    In this case, the FAA could still arrange for the training 
of such a force. The certification of screening companies, as 
required by section 302 of P.L. 104-264, is a similar approach. 
The FAA expects to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking on 
this issue in 1999.

   VIII. Shared Security Responsibilities: Air Carriers and Airport 
                  Operators or the Federal Government

    Possible methodologies to provide for shared security 
responsibilities among air carriers and airport operators or 
the Federal Government will be discussed in this section. As 
has already been noted, the regulatory framework established by 
the FAA to ensure efficient and effective civil aviation 
security is currently based upon a system of shared 
responsibilities.
    The FAA is responsible for: establishing and enforcing 
regulations, policies, and procedures; identifying potential 
threats and appropriate countermeasures; conducting research; 
and providing overall guidance to ensure the safety and 
security of the passengers, crew, baggage, cargo, and aircraft. 
The air carriers bear the primary responsibility for applying 
screening and other security measures to passengers, service 
and flight crews, baggage, and cargo. Airport operators are 
responsible for maintaining a secure ground environment and for 
providing local law enforcement support for the implementation 
of airline and airport security measures. The challenge of 
properly allocating responsibilities among the three groups to 
ensure effective and efficient civil aviation security has been 
difficult. Some views are presented below.

  a. president's commission on aviation security & terrorism (1990): 
                      comments on responsibilities

    The 1990 President's Commission on Aviation Security and 
Terrorism did not specifically recommend that the FAA or the 
Federal Government assume the responsibility for passenger and 
baggage screening, or other security measures. Some statements 
seemed to endorse the existing division of responsibilities. 
However, while not suggesting an actual transfer of 
responsibility, the Commission did recommend changes to clarify 
accountability and made strong statements about the Federal 
role.
    The Report of the President's Commission stated:

        ``To ensure accountability, a clear line of 
        responsibility for security must be established.
          Since the federal government is ultimately 
        responsible for the safety and security of the 
        traveling public, it must provide the leadership and 
        take the responsibility for security at the airports.'' 
        \46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \46\ President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, 
supra note 22, p. 59.

    This passage from the report was in the context of security 
at both U.S. and overseas airports. The report continued, 
stating that the ``Commission agrees with the premise'' 
expressed by an airline chairman that ``Governments of all 
nations must accept and implement their direct responsibility 
for security, as distinguished from a passive, regulatory 
role.'' \47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\ Id., p.60.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To achieve this greater responsibility and enhance 
accountability, the President's Commission recommended the 
creation at each category X airport of a ``federal security 
manager'' who:

        ``should have the ultimate responsibility for security. 
        These officials would work with the air carriers and 
        airport operators in designing one security plan for 
        each airport, based upon the known and potential 
        threat. This plan will identify the role and 
        responsibilities of the air carriers, the airport 
        operator, and the local law enforcement participation 
        in terms of what each will do, how they will do it, and 
        what resources will be committed to security, including 
        the qualifications of the security personnel. The 
        federal manager must approve this plan. Furthermore, 
        the federal security manager will oversee air carrier 
        and airport operators in the implementation of this 
        plan. This will include requiring the redirection of 
        air carrier or airport security resources should the 
        federal manager decide. . . .'' \48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \48\ Id.

    The President's Commission report did not recommend the 
transfer of air carrier screening responsibilities to the 
Federal Government. It did recommend a more direct, more active 
role for the Federal Government in directing the deployment of 
air carrier and airport operator resources as they perform 
their identified functions. It endorsed the concept of a shift 
for the Federal Government from ``a passive, regulatory role'' 
to ``direct responsibility for security'' because it was 
``ultimately responsible for the safety and security of the 
traveling public'' and should therefore ``take the 
responsibility for security at the airports.''
    The 1990 Commission did not, however, recommend relieving 
the air carriers or the airport operators of their 
responsibilities and instead endorsed enhanced Federal 
oversight of their performance.

   b. asac baseline working group recommendation on responsibilities 
                                 (1996)

    The following is a statement from the BWG report:

        ``The BWG considered a transfer of primary 
        responsibility for aviation security, and in particular 
        the screening of passengers and baggage, to the airport 
        operator or the Federal government. However, the 
        current structure is well understood and accepted by 
        the parties involved. The various advantages and 
        disadvantages of a transfer of responsibility do not 
        offer a compelling benefit from a shift of 
        responsibility, particularly when major changes in the 
        domestic security baseline are anticipated. 
        Transferring responsibility for screening passengers 
        and baggage to an airport or Federal agency would also 
        transfer liability, disrupt the continuity of air 
        carrier processing, and could raise Fourth Amendment 
        issues regarding the legality of a security search by a 
        government entity. Government hiring and personnel 
        practices are also less flexible than those used by 
        industry. The fundamental consideration is that 
        aviation security itself must be improved. Merely 
        shifting responsibility will not remedy deficiencies in 
        personnel, procedures, or equipment.'' \49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\ BWG, supra note 3, pp. 78-79.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. white house commission on aviation safety and security: comments on 
                       responsibilities (1996-97)

    In the conclusions of its final report, the White House 
Commission made several comments that seem to support the 
concept of shared responsibilities.

        ``The Commission believes that each of its 
        recommendations is achievable. But, the Commission has 
        no authority to implement its recommendations. That 
        responsibility lies with government and industry. Many 
        of the proposals will require additional funding. Some 
        of them will require legislation. Each of them requires 
        sustained attention. We now urge the President to make 
        these recommendations his own. We urge Congress to 
        provide the necessary legislation and funding. We urge 
        the incoming leadership of the DOT and the FAA to make 
        fulfillment of these recommendations a cornerstone of 
        their work. We urge the commercial aviation industry to 
        take up the technical and organizational challenges. 
        . . .''
          ``There are few areas in which the public so 
        uniformly believes that government should play a strong 
        role as in aviation safety and security. Aviation is an 
        area over which the average person can exert little 
        control; therefore, it becomes government's 
        responsibility to work with industry to make sure that 
        Americans enjoy the highest levels of safety and 
        security when flying. Problems in these areas 
        contribute to an erosion of public faith in aviation, 
        and in government itself. The Commission has laid out 
        an aggressive agenda to help address those concerns, 
        and believes that the implementation of this course of 
        action must be the top priority for all those involved 
        in aviation.'' \50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \50\ White House Commission, supra note 4, p.53.

    Like its 1990 predecessor, the White House Commission of 
1996-97 did not explicitly recommend the transfer of 
responsibilities from air carriers to the Federal Government or 
to airport operators. It did, however, like its predecessor, 
endorse a stronger role for the Federal Government in aviation 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
security:

        ``In the area of security, the Commission believes that 
        the threat against civil aviation is changing and 
        growing, and that the federal government must lead the 
        fight against it. The Commission recommends that the 
        federal government commit greater resources to 
        improving aviation security, and work more 
        cooperatively with the private sector and local 
        authorities in carrying out security 
        responsibilities.'' \51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \51\ Id., p.4.

    One element of that stronger role will be the continuing 
purchase of security equipment for use by air carriers and 
airport authorities to assist them in the performance of their 
aviation security responsibilities.

           d. aviation industry comments on responsibilities

    The airline industry seems to agree that there is no need 
to depart from the shared responsibilities system in place for 
so many years. In testimony before the White House Commission 
on September 5, 1996, Carol Hallett, president of the Air 
Transport Association of America (ATA), stated:

        ``It has been suggested by some that we must radically 
        alter our nation's air transportation system in order 
        to make it secure from terrorism. Based upon our 
        understanding of the threat presented, this is not the 
        case - the measured and deliberate steps to enhanced 
        security which we have put forward are responsive to 
        the need.'' \52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \52\ Statement of Carol B. Hallett before the White House 
Commission, Washington, DC, September 5, 1996.

    In the ``Statement of Aviation Security Principles,'' 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
attachment 2 to her prepared testimony, Ms. Hallett added:

        ``Only with regard to countermeasures, which are 
        deployed by airlines and airports at the direction of 
        the USG in the aviation environment, is there a sharing 
        of this governmental responsibility.'' \53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \53\ Id.

    Walter Coleman, president of the Regional Airline 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Association (RAA), on the same day said:

        ``The regional airline industry recognizes that we must 
        participate and contribute to the safety and security 
        of the traveling public in establishing practical 
        security procedures which will achieve the national 
        objectives and also permit the airlines to continue to 
        provide service to the communities they presently 
        serve.'' \54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \54\ Statement of Walter S. Coleman before the White House 
Commission, Washington, DC, September 5, 1996.

    The airport authorities also seem to support the 
continuation of the current division of responsibilities among 
airlines, airport operators, and the Federal Government. In his 
testimony at the same meeting, Mr. Marchi spoke for his 
organization and also for the American Association of Airport 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Executives (AAAE) when he stated:

        ``The current system can be seen as a natural and 
        logical split of responsibilities based on the 
        evolution of airport and air carrier duties and 
        obligations, which includes the airport acting as 
        property managers and the airlines acting as 
        transporters of people and property. Simply changing 
        the assignment of responsibilities for passenger and 
        baggage security screening will not improve a flawed 
        system; rather the system, itself, and the employees 
        who operate it should be changed.
          Incentives to improve performance should also be 
        offered to the pre-board screeners themselves. That is 
        not to say that other parties have no role to play in 
        improving today's operations. Currently, wages are low, 
        positions are often part-time with no benefits, 
        advancement opportunities are limited, and there are no 
        consequences related to making mistakes other than the 
        possible loss of an already-less-than-desirable 
        position. The overall quality of the applicant pool 
        reflects the drawback of the positions offered.
          We recommend that all pre-board screeners be 
        subjected to criminal background checks, and employment 
        history verifications. That the FAA develop a standard 
        training curriculum to certify screeners. FAA certified 
        screeners would then be invested with a valuable and 
        transferable skill and would be compensated 
        accordingly. FAA should also develop hiring and 
        training criteria for commercial entities that provide 
        screening personnel. It may also be appropriate to 
        require certification of the companies, themselves, 
        who, in any event, should be responsible for conducting 
        background investigations and should be subject to 
        civil penalties for violation of FAA procedures.'' \55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \55\ ``Statement of Richard F. Marchi, supra note 33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                             e. partnership

    The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security 
recommended greater use of partnerships between government and 
the aviation industry in meeting safety and security goals. The 
Commission stated in its final report:

        ``The premise behind these partnerships is that 
        government can set goals, and then work with industry 
        in the most effective way to achieve them. Partnership 
        does not mean that government gives up its authorities 
        or responsibilities. Not all industry members are 
        willing to be partners. In those cases, government must 
        use its full authority to enforce the law. But, through 
        partnerships, government works with industry to find 
        better ways to achieve its goals, seeking to replace 
        confrontation with cooperation. Such partnerships hold 
        tremendous promise for improving aviation safety and 
        security. A shift away from prescriptive regulations 
        will allow companies to take advantage of incentives 
        and reach goals more quickly.'' \56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \56\ White House Commission, supra note 4.

    In 1996, Congress eliminated the FAA's dual mandate of 
promoting air commerce and ensuring safety, making it clear 
that safety and security are FAA's highest priority. \57\ Since 
then, FAA and industry have worked together to identify 
potential improvements in aviation safety and regulation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \57\ Section 223 of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 
1996, Public Law 104-264, October 9, 1996, amending 49 U.S.C. Sec. 106.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In response to the White House Commission's call for 
partnership in the areas of security and safety, the FAA 
convened consortia at 41 major U.S. airports during September 
1996. By mid-December 1996, 39 of these consortia had completed 
vulnerability assessments and developed action plans with 
recommended procedural changes and requirements for advanced 
security technology. FAA found that airport consortia have the 
potential to resolve local issues effectively because they 
involve more local players in a collective effort. The FAA is 
now attempting to secure voluntary agreements to make the 
consortia permanent and extend them to smaller airports, with 
one of their primary functions being the continuing assessment 
of vulnerabilities and the identification of corrective action.
    While the BWG report did not recommend a major change in 
the responsibilities for aviation security, it did recommend a 
change in the partnership between the FAA and the aviation 
industry:

        ``Greater demands on the civil aviation system require 
        an enhanced partnership between the agency and the 
        aviation industry. In its initial recommendations the 
        White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security 
        stressed the need for a fundamental change in the way 
        government and the private sector carry out their 
        responsibilities. The BWG supports this conclusion and 
        recommendation. In its 1990 report, the President's 
        Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism 
        recommended that Federal Security Managers be put in 
        place at major domestic airports to become the 
        accountable entity for security at that location. 
        Federal Security Managers work with the air carriers 
        and airport operators to design and approve security 
        systems, and oversee the carrier's and airport 
        operators' implementation of the security system to 
        ensure compliance. The BWG is recommending that the 
        FSM's program be extended to selected Category I 
        airports.'' \58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \58\ BWG, supra note 3 , p. 77. (14 CFR Sec. 191 applies.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 f. responsibility for security research, engineering, and development 
                                (r,e&d)

    For many years, the Federal Government and the FAA have 
been fulfilling a major responsibility by fostering and funding 
security research, engineering and development, which was 
accelerated by the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990. 
From 1991 to 1996, the FAA spent over $209 million on R,E&D on 
explosives and weapons detection technology development, 
airport security technology, security systems integration, 
aircraft and container hardening, and human factors. This 
effort will continue.
    Following the recommendations of the White House 
Commission, the Federal Government returned to an area not 
visited since the height of the hijacking threat in the mid-
1970's: the capital purchase of security equipment for use by 
private sector air carriers to enhance their ability to screen 
passengers and baggage effectively and efficiently prior to 
boarding.
    On October 30, 1996, the FAA established an integrated 
product team (IPT) to acquire and deploy advanced security 
equipment through ``non-competitive contracts or cooperative 
agreements with air carriers and airport authorities, which 
provide for the FAA to purchase and assist in installation of 
advanced security equipment for the use of such entities.'' 
\59\ The equipment acquisition has been funded in the FAA 
Facilities and Equipment account derived from the Airport and 
Airway Trust Fund. The team includes working representatives of 
air carriers and airport authorities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \59\ This was authorized and funded by title V of the Omnibus 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Public Law 104-208.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The following table depicts planned expenditures for 
various types of equipment selected by the integrated product 
team for purchase and deployment during FY's 1997-99:

                                                    TABLE II
                     FAA Expenditures in FY 1997-98 for Acquisition of Security Technologies


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Explosives Detection Systems                                                    $ 68,313,400
Other Automated Technologies                                                    $ 15,550,000
Explosives Trace Detectors                                                      $ 45,036,600
Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening (CAPS)                                    $ 10,000,000
Screener Proficiency Evaluation & Reporting System (SPEARS)                     $ 5,300,000
Total                                                                           $144,200,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                     g. aviation security training

    Changes in the current system, which have been debated for 
years, have occurred only incrementally, often in response to a 
crisis or loss of an aircraft. One of the common threads 
weaving throughout all reports, books, hearings, articles, and 
recommendations over the years has been the need for better and 
more standardized aviation security training and an increased 
role for the Federal Government in both.
    This is particularly important now, since many new, more 
complicated but effective types of equipment are being deployed 
at U.S. airports. The operators of advanced security equipment 
need far more detailed training, management attention, and 
motivation to ensure that devices are properly and effectively 
operated. Much more in the way of following operational 
procedures and making decisions needs to be done by the 
screeners. This places additional burdens on the selection, 
training, and maintenance of at least this part of the screener 
work force.
    As long ago as the September 1989 hearings of the House 
Government Activities and Transportation Subcommittee on the 
bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, Mr. Noel Koch, formerly Principal 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 
Security Affairs, in his prepared statement said:

        ``. . . we have to pay much closer attention to the 
        personnel side of the security equation. At the present 
        time, the economics of security appear to militate in 
        favor of hiring entry-level minimum wage people. They 
        often get little or no training, they have frequently 
        the most limited ``people skills,'' and the turnover 
        rates among them are wholly inconsistent with the 
        requirements of an effective security system. Put 
        minimum wage people on a million dollar machine, give 
        them little or no training, manage them like entry 
        level people, and you will get minimum wage performance 
        out of your million dollar machine. . . . Coupled to a 
        more imaginative hiring philosophy, we will benefit 
        from a systematic approach to training security 
        personnel. This is an area in which the FAA may need 
        additional authority, to standardize training 
        requirements for security personnel, and to assist in 
        bringing training regimes up to those standards.'' \60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \60\ The Bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 (statement of Mr. Noel Koch), 
supra note 14.

    Mr. Koch's comments are still pertinent today. The 
``Certification of Screening Companies'' rulemaking \61\ offers 
an opportunity for FAA to present to the public for comment 
both selection criteria and training standards and seek ideas 
for improving aviation security training.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \61\ See note 9, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In his 1993 book Combatting Air Terrorism, Rodney Wallis, 
former director of security for the International Air Transport 
Association, also suggested an increased role for the FAA in 
the area of training:

        ``Training is a truly vital part of air 
        transportation's fight against terrorism, yet too many 
        governments, airport administrations, and airline 
        managements fail to ensure their staff are adequately 
        prepared for their roles . . . A role the FAA might 
        well enlarge is the physical monitoring of U.S. based 
        airlines' training and security implementation at home 
        and abroad.'' \62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \62\ Wallis, Rodney, ``Combatting Air Terrorism,'' Brassey's (US), 
Washington, New York, London, 1993, p.117.

    There is broad, although not universal, agreement that the 
regime of shared responsibilities should stay the same. 
However, it could be argued that the Federal Government should 
increase its involvement by setting training standards, thereby 
adding to its other responsibilities for capital equipment 
purchases, R,E&D, intelligence assessments, testing 
countermeasures, standard setting, and compliance and 
enforcement of regulations. Air carriers would still be 
responsible for screening, but their employees, the screeners 
and their supervisors, would be trained to standards set by the 
FAA in accordance with White House Commission recommendations 
3.2 and 3.10.
    Commissioner Victoria Cummock introduced and supported 
recommendation 3.2 at the final meeting of the White House 
Commission on February 12, 1997. Later, she went further in her 
discussion of training under recommendation 3.10 in her 
dissent, contained in appendix I of the final report:

        ``This recommendation contains a number of admirable 
        objectives but it, like its predecessor recommendation 
        in President Bush's Commission on Aviation Security and 
        Terrorism lacks teeth. Following President Bush's 
        Commission of Aviation Security and Terrorism and the 
        follow-on Aviation Security Improvement Act in 1990, 
        the FAA established standards for the selection and 
        training of aviation security personnel. Those 
        standards were, and still are, totally inadequate. 
        There is nothing to prevent the same inadequate actions 
        by the FAA to this recommendation. The Commission 
        should specifically recommend that the FAA mandate 80 
        hours of intensive classroom/laboratory and 40 hours of 
        on-the-job training before performance certification 
        for all airline security screening personnel.'' \63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \63\ White House Commission, supra note 4, Appendix I, dated 
February 19, 1997, unnumbered p.8.

    An identical recommendation for 80 hours of classroom and 
40 hours of on-the-job training had been made by Patricia 
Friend, international president of the Association of Flight 
Attendants, AFL-CIO, at the White House Commission meeting on 
September 5, 1996. These discussions, contained in the final 
report and its dissent, and in testimony, all support the need 
for improved, more comprehensive training. Again, the 
certification of screening companies rulemaking offers an 
opportunity to improve training and thereby improve screener 
performance. Investment in training and requirements for 
improved performance will offer an economic incentive for 
airlines to retain the most productive, efficient, and 
effective screeners which will, in turn, lead to higher wages 
and better benefits.
    The FAA takes human factors into account (as required by 
the provisions of Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990) 
\64\ by providing appropriate training and developing 
utilization standards, clear guidance, and operational 
procedures in partnership with the airlines to ensure the 
effective use of security equipment by trained and properly 
motivated air carrier and contractor personnel. FAA is already 
taking steps to improve initial and recurrent training 
curricula for checkpoint screeners and their supervisors. Such 
FAA involvement will increase.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \64\ Sections 105 and 107 of Public Law 101-604, November 16, 1990, 
adding sections 316(d) and (g) to the former Federal Aviation Act of 
1958, now U.S.C. 44912(a) and 44935(b), respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    All of us must be concerned with how to help people do the 
difficult job of screening baggage for explosive devices better 
by improving the human factors engineering of their work 
environment. Lessons learned from the operational deployment of 
explosives detection systems (EDS) substantiate the need for 
screeners who use the machines to be properly trained and 
highly motivated. Personnel selection criteria and training 
standards are important considerations receiving particular 
attention by all concerned.
    The FAA developed and is currently deploying the Screener 
Proficiency Evaluation and Reporting System (SPEARS), which can 
help train air carrier screeners and maintain their 
proficiency. One SPEARS component, a computer-based training 
(CBT) system for screeners, was successfully tested in 1996 in 
Chicago. CBT modules for training security screening checkpoint 
x-ray machine operators are now operational at 36 major 
airports, including Seattle, Miami, Los Angeles, St. Louis, 
Baltimore, Detroit, Houston, Dallas, New York, Denver, Orlando, 
San Juan, Atlanta, and San Francisco, with additional airport 
installations continuing throughout 1998 in about 77 of the 
busiest U.S. airports. Specialized modules will soon be 
available for training operators of explosives detection 
systems and will be installed on all deployed systems.
    Another component of SPEARS is the Threat Image Projection 
(TIP) system, which displays artificial images of improvised 
explosive devices and dangerous articles in baggage, as though 
they were part of an actual item being screened by an x-ray 
device or EDS. The screeners' decisions are tabulated and 
recorded to provide feedback for effectiveness monitoring and 
use as a training tool. After final evaluations and adjustments 
are completed, several hundred TIP modules will be installed in 
checkpoint x-ray machines and explosives detection systems at 
the busiest airports in the United States.
    The FAA provides formal training through airport security 
seminars for law enforcement officers and airport personnel 
with aviation security responsibilities. Aviation security 
special agents are also asked by individual airlines to provide 
1- or 2-hour blocks of instruction in airline training courses. 
Similar participation occurs in industry association-sponsored 
schools and conferences as part of FAA's partnership efforts. 
Specialized courses of instruction on specific topics have been 
prepared by the FAA and are presented on request.
    The White House Commission called for an additional 114 
canine explosives detection teams to be trained and deployed at 
the Nation's busiest airports, and Congress appropriated $8.9 
million for that purpose. During 1997, the FAA trained 54 
handlers and 60 dogs. The first ``FAA exclusive'' class of K-9 
handlers graduated from the Military Working Dog School at 
Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, on March 25, 1997. The FAA will 
continue to cover canine procurement costs and training, 
evaluation, and certification for explosives detection team 
dogs and handlers as the program is expanded.
    At the time the White House Commission's initial report was 
published in September 1996, there were 87 teams deployed at 31 
locations. In June 1997, there were 116 canine teams at 33 
major airports, then 130 teams at 38 airports across the 
country by early 1998. As program expansion continues, by the 
end of 1998, there will be about 154 teams at about 40 
airports.
    In one of many interagency partnerships, the FAA and the 
Treasury Department's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 
(BATF) signed an agreement in 1997 outlining the principles 
governing a joint research pilot project, then began the 
project, using one FAA trained and certified team working in 
parallel with a BATF trained and certified team.
    It is important to note that the teams will be doing more 
and operating longer. In addition to clearing terminals and 
airplanes after bomb threats, they will search suspect bags and 
cargo, and perform visible patrols and training to increase 
deterrence. The FAA has worked closely with industry to 
establish a reimbursement process to cover allowable 
operational expenses, such as handler salaries, kenneling, dog 
food, vehicles and associated maintenance, and routine 
veterinary care. The program remains voluntary on the part of 
airports. Those not in the current program are unlikely to join 
without adequate cost sharing by the Federal Government. Future 
growth is therefore a function of available funding.

                   ix. funding for aviation security

    One purpose of this study is to ``examine potential sources 
of Federal and non-Federal revenue that may be used to fund 
security activities,'' a matter of continuing controversy for 
the last 30 years. Section 301 of the Federal Aviation 
Reauthorization Act of 1996 states that one potential source of 
revenue to be considered is ``providing grants from funds 
received as fees collected under a fee system established under 
subtitle C of title II of this Act and the amendments made by 
that subtitle.'' Both the White House Commission and the 
Aviation Security Advisory Committee Baseline Working Group 
discussed funding issues and identified potential sources of 
revenue.
    In introducing the discussion of chapter 3 on aviation 
security during the final public hearing of the White House 
Commission on February 12, 1997, Commissioner Brian Jenkins 
said:

        ``Most importantly, we now recommend that the federal 
        government should consider aviation security as a 
        national security issue and provide substantial funding 
        for capital improvements. Specifically, we recommend 
        $100 million annually. We recognize that this is not 
        enough and therefore we also recommend that the 
        National Civil Aviation Review Commission established 
        by Congress consider a variety of options to pay for 
        further implementation and operation of these vital 
        security measures.'' \65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \65\ Transcript of the Final Public Hearing of the White House 
Commission, Washington, DC, February 12, 1997.

    The wording of Recommendation 3.1 of the White House 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commission's final report is even more direct:

        ``The federal government should consider aviation 
        security as a national security issue, and provide 
        substantial funding for capital improvements. The 
        Commission believes that terrorist attacks on civil 
        aviation are directed at the United States, and that 
        there should be an ongoing federal commitment to 
        reducing the threats that they pose.'' \66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \66\ White House Commission, supra note 4.

    The FAA Aviation Security Advisory Committee's Baseline 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Working Group (BWG) in its final report went further:

        ``A majority of the BWG concluded that the full cost of 
        implementing and maintaining an improved domestic 
        security baseline should be funded by a Congressional 
        appropriation from the General Fund. Such costs 
        include, but are not limited to, the acquisition, 
        installation, training, and implementation of 
        equipment, facilities, personnel, and procedures. A 
        dedicated funding stream should be identified to fund 
        the operating costs associated with continuing to 
        maintain the elevated domestic security baseline 
        prescribed by the BWG recommendations. Operating costs 
        associated with the domestic security baseline include, 
        but are not limited to, costs associated with the 
        continuing operation, maintenance, and staffing of 
        programs identified by the BWG recommendations and as 
        may be required by Federal mandate.'' \67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \67\ BWG, supra note 3, p.90.

    The BWG's majority opinion on funding sources discussed the 
issue in greater depth than indicated in the recommendations 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
above. The Group also said:

        ``Federal resources certainly exist to fund any program 
        if the national will is to do so. The money could be 
        made available rapidly as no new collection mechanism 
        would be needed. However, such an outlay may also be 
        subject to shifting agendas and priorities from year to 
        year which could be disruptive to the coherence and 
        continuity of a major plan to increase security. The 
        Federal government could, in principle, fund all 
        aviation security costs out of general revenues. If the 
        threat of terrorism is viewed as a national security 
        issue requiring a concerted national response, then 
        there is no fundamental distinction between 
        expenditures for aviation security and other counter-
        terrorism programs funded directly through 
        appropriations.
          The mechanism of collecting and disbursing funds for 
        aviation security can assume many forms but the source 
        of those funds must inevitably be the public. The basic 
        difference is whether to assess the necessary expenses 
        selectively to the air traveling public or generally to 
        all taxpayers. The current mechanisms of collection 
        that could be used are: Congressional Appropriation 
        (General Fund); PFC Capital/Operating Fund; AIP 
        Capital/Operating Fund; Security Surcharge; and Ticket 
        Tax.
          Whichever collection mechanism is considered, it must 
        be federally mandated to avoid competitive pressures 
        and require stringent accounting procedures to assure 
        that the funds will be disbursed only for aviation 
        security purposes. Such funds must be subject to 
        federal audit procedures. The total, 10-year cost of 
        the new security baseline is estimated at $9.9 billion. 
        Costs associated with interim security measures are not 
        included in this figure but are detailed in the full 
        BWG report.'' \68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \68\ Id., pp. 90-91.

    In May 1997, the FAA estimated that the total 10-year cost 
to the Federal Government, airport authorities, and airlines 
for security programs at Category X airports alone would be 
close to $3 billion. The total includes capital costs for new 
equipment as well as added personnel and their training. This 
averages out to $154 million per Category X airport, or 
slightly over $15 million annually for the next 10 years.
    The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) representative on 
the BWG strongly disagreed with the views expressed by the 
majority of the Group on funding from sources other than 
prospective users (i.e., passengers). The following dissenting 
view was received from the OMB:

        ``OMB staff strongly disagree with these 
        recommendations. They are inconsistent with the current 
        practice of FAA programs, contradicting long standing 
        government-wide budget policy, and reflect an 
        unrealistic outlook regarding the availability of 
        discretionary funds. First, aviation system users 
        currently pay for on-going aviation security costs. 
        These are considered to be costs incurred by the 
        private aviation industry for doing business in modern 
        society. There is no fundamental difference between 
        these programs and those being considered by the BWG.
          Second, OMB Circular A-25, which establishes Federal 
        policy regarding user charges, states that such charges 
        should be assessed for Federal activities that convey 
        special benefits to recipients beyond those accruing to 
        the general public. The BWG's recommendation that 
        start-up aviation security costs be funded from the 
        General Fund is inconsistent with this policy.
          Third, continuing efforts to balance the budget will 
        significantly limit the amount of General Fund monies 
        available to support this, or other, potentially worthy 
        expenditures. Given the demands on those funds and the 
        number of actors involved in allocating them, it is 
        unrealistic to think that a protected pot of money 
        could be set aside for this purpose. Finally, a 
        dedicated funding stream for operating costs, if not 
        paid by the users, provides little incentive for cost 
        discipline in the provisions of these services and will 
        result in waste and increased cost to the public.'' 
        \69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \69\ Id., Appendix A, p.1.

    On March 27, 1997, the Acting FAA Administrator responded 
to the BWG recommendations approved and forwarded by the ASAC 
in a memo stating: ``I have received the recommendations 
developed by the ASAC for the Domestic Security Baseline. I am 
pleased that the ASAC continues to provide FAA with balanced 
and insightful recommendations. However, I do not concur with 
the following three specific recommendations . . . Full Federal 
funding of the baseline recommendations (page 11) was objected 
to by OMB in a dissenting opinion. The White House Commission 
has referred further funding issues to the National Civil 
Aviation Review Commission.''
    In addition to creating the National Civil Aviation Review 
Commission (NCARC) and requiring this study, section 274 of the 
Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 directed the FAA 
to ``contract with an entity independent of the Administration 
and the Department of Transportation to conduct a complete 
independent assessment of the financial requirements of the 
Administration through the year 2002.'' \70\ Coopers & Lybrand 
L.L.P., a professional services firm, was selected to conduct 
the independent study.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \70\ Public Law 104-264, October 9, 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Safety and security programs have the highest priority in 
FAA budgets. The 1998 budget requested significant increases 
for safety, including funding for an increase of 500 air 
traffic controllers, 326 flight standards and certification 
personnel, and 173 security staff. The 1998 budget also 
included a request for an advance appropriation of $100 million 
in 1999 as a follow-on to the $144.2 million appropriated in 
1997 to fund White House Commission recommended security 
equipment deployments.
    Coopers & Lybrand also concluded, on the basis of 
interviews conducted with FAA staff, user groups, and White 
House Commission members, that the impact on the FAA's budget 
of Commission and BWG recommendations ``could be substantial'' 
though the White House Commission's final report had not been 
completed. \71\ The OMB's FY 1998 passback on the FAA 
Facilities and Equipment budget, which is also noted in the 
Coopers & Lybrand report, stated: ``The Gore Commission staff 
are interested in additional 1998 security equipment purchases. 
Any such purchases are to be user fee financed or financed by 
airports or airlines in response to FAA regulation.'' This is, 
of course, not what the Commission finally recommended.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \71\ Coopers & Lybrand L.L.P., ``Federal Aviation Administration 
Financial Assessment,'' Washington, DC, February 28, 1997, pp. VII-16, 
17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    NCARC and its aviation funding task force were tasked to 
``submit a report setting forth a comprehensive analysis of the 
Administration's budgetary requirements through fiscal year 
2002, based upon the independent assessment . . . that analyzes 
alternative financing and funding means for meeting the needs 
of the aviation system through the year 2002.'' \72\ 
Congressional deliberations in response to the NCARC and 
Administration proposals concerning the structure and content 
of any system for funding FAA through user fees, now possibly 
including capital expenditures for security equipment that 
would be used by air carriers, have not yet been completed. The 
setting of user fees is one of the options that was examined. A 
goal of user fee financing would be to balance collections and 
expenditures so that all needed improvements in safety and 
security systems could be financed and implemented promptly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \72\ Section 274 of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 
1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The NCARC's December 1997 report recommended that the air 
traffic services portion of the FAA be financed by user fees 
but that security and safety oversight be funded by general 
fund appropriations. The Administration's subsequent budget and 
reauthorization proposals for the FAA, while consistent with 
the NCARC recommendations in many ways, differed in that they 
proposed no general fund appropriations after 1999.
    Others have suggested sources and methods of funding. 
Notably, Senator Lautenberg introduced the Aviation Security 
Act of 1996 (S.2037) on August 2, 1996, many aspects of which 
were incorporated into the Reauthorization Act. Speaking about 
this bill during the hearing held on August 1, the Senator 
said:

        ``ASA [S.2037] proposes that a security assessment fee, 
        or small surcharge of no more than $4, be added to each 
        round trip ticket to pay for needed improvements . . . 
        An alternative financing mechanism would be to 
        authorize the Department of Defense to transfer such 
        funds as may be necessary to implement provisions of 
        the act. In drawing on defense funds, we would 
        recognize that terrorism is a national security 
        threat.'' \73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \73\ ``Aviation Security'': Hearings before the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 104th Cong. 14 (1996) (statement 
of Senator Lautenberg).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                        X. Legislative Proposals

    There is no need at this time for the FAA to initiate 
legislation to transfer responsibilities for aviation security 
among the major parties. Both Presidential commissions, 
however, saw a need to clarify authority and responsibility in 
certain areas. Some clarification may be accomplished through 
the proposed revision of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, 
Part 107, Airport Security, and Part 108, Airplane Operator 
Security. \74\ These are the two basic regulations governing 
civil aviation security provisions required to be implemented 
by U.S. airports and air carriers. Individuals are also 
affected by portions of both regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \74\ Notices of Proposed Rulemaking on the revision of Federal 
Aviation Regulations parts 107 and 108 were published in the Federal 
Register on August 1, 1997, 62 Fed. Reg. 41730, 41760 (1997). Because 
both rulemakings had been in development for several years, predating 
1996-97 legislative initiatives, preambular language notes that the 
proposals do not reflect changes based upon the most recent 
legislation, or the recommendations of the White House Commission. 
Changes resulting from these recent initiatives will be made after the 
final rules have been published.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The rulemakings propose a number of changes, which are 
intended to update the regulations to reflect the current 
approach to security better. For example, some proposed changes 
seek to clarify air carrier and airport security personnel 
training requirements, more clearly define the most critical 
security areas in an airport, and clarify the role of the 
airport security coordinator.

                         XI. Study Conclusions

                          a. responsibilities

    There appears to be a consensus in the civil aviation 
community to retain the current system of shared 
responsibilities for security. In contrast, there appears to be 
no consensus ``to transfer certain responsibilities of air 
carriers under Federal law for security activities conducted 
onsite at commercial service airports to airport operators or 
to the Federal Government.'' \75\ Some argue that airport 
operators should assume screening responsibilities \76\, but 
most seem content with recommending that airport authorities 
become more involved in some manner, citing specific examples 
or areas in which more assistance may be usefully offered. 
There is little support for the Federal Government's assuming 
all air carrier responsibilities. There is significant support 
for more Federal Government involvement and funding.
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    \75\ Section 301 of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 
1996.
    \76\ For example, on June 20, 1996, the Deputy Commissioner, 
Department of Aviation, City of Chicago, proposed assuming pre-board 
passenger screening responsibilities after receiving a report of a 
study by the Conley Group Inc., on such screening at O'Hare 
International Airport. The FAA responded that the proposal was ``not 
feasible under applicable law'' at that time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Incremental increases in Federal Government involvement in 
aviation security are inevitable given the recognition that the 
primary justification for security measures is antiterrorist in 
nature, with aviation security now seen more clearly as a 
component of national security. Increased involvement means 
increased investment of personnel and other resources. Most 
representatives of the airport and airline industry believe 
that the General Fund should be the financial source for future 
aviation security Federal expenditures rather than the Airport 
and Airway Trust Fund. The Administration disagrees with this 
position and has proposed instead that funding for FAA 
activities, including security activities, be derived from 
charges paid by users of the National Airspace System.
    The Federal Government intends to continue capital 
purchases of aviation security equipment to be used by the 
airlines. Given that commitment and the strong support for 
better training that was so apparent during the study, it seems 
logical for the next incremental Federal involvement to be in 
developing more comprehensive training standards for the people 
who use the equipment that has been purchased, rather than in 
making equipment operations and maintenance subsidy payments to 
the airlines. Better training is a better investment. Air 
carriers should not have to bear all the costs of security, but 
they should bear a substantial portion of the personnel costs 
to provide security screening and the operational costs of 
using the advanced security equipment that the Federal 
Government provides.
    Air carriers should be inclined to protect their 
investments in hiring and training their personnel by providing 
better compensation and benefits to keep them on the job and 
lower turnover rates. This applies particularly to screeners. 
In the absence of consensus to change the existing system, the 
airlines retain the responsibility for screening, and retain 
control of passenger movement and the quality of customer 
service. The U.S. Government continues to control the quality 
of aviation security and security screening by setting higher, 
but realistically achievable, standards for screener selection, 
training, and performance.

                               b. funding

    There are several options for funding aviation security 
activities such as those recommended by the BWG and the White 
House Commission. One possibility is for the Federal Government 
simply to pay for all expenses out of the general revenue fund. 
The principal rationale would be that aviation security is a 
national security issue and that therefore the National 
Government should be responsible for the costs. This position 
has been advocated by many in the aviation industry but is 
likely to be politically impossible, given fiscal constraints.
    A second option would be to use AIP or PFC funds. This 
would have the advantage of requiring the users of aviation 
security to pay for it, resulting in higher ticket prices. 
Increased prices would impact negatively on the financial 
health of air carriers and airport operators, and those who do 
not fly but receive economic and other benefits from a safe, 
secure, and efficient air transportation system would not be 
paying their fair share. Further, AIP funding levels have been 
significantly lower in recent years than they were previously, 
and there are many other demands placed upon it to fund safety 
improvements.
    A third avenue would be to apply a security user fee or 
surcharge to the cost of a ticket, similar to a passenger 
facility charge but dedicated to funding security. Care would 
have to be taken to ensure that the collected funds were used 
only for security purposes. This option would also have the 
advantage of collecting costs from those who use a service, but 
it could also reduce passenger volume.
    The same arguments also apply to the last option, a 
dedicated security ticket tax, whose proceeds would be reserved 
for security costs. Note that a $2-per-enplanement surcharge 
would have brought in about $1.2 billion in revenues in 1997, 
which would be sufficient for the additional expenses 
envisioned in the BWG recommendations.
    The NCARC studied recommendations for funding FAA 
requirements, including security needs. The Administration 
disagrees with the conclusions of the NCARC report in this 
regard, specifically ``that the security functions of the FAA 
be paid for through a general fund contribution \77\.'' The 
Administration has proposed instead that funding for all FAA 
activities, including security activities, be derived from 
charges paid by users of the National Airspace System. The 
NCARC report included no broad discussion of funding for the 
entire aviation security system, including private sector air 
carriers and public sector airport operators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \77\ NCARC, ``Avoiding Aviation Gridlock & Reducing the Accident 
Rate: A Consensus for Change,'' Washington, DC, December 1997, p. II-
31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There is no apparent consensus for changing the overall 
system of funding for aviation security, particularly funding 
for that portion provided by private sector air carriers and 
public sector airport operators. There is also no definitive 
answer to the longstanding question of ``who should pay'' for 
security; the current system as described in the foregoing 
pages remains in place. Therefore, the FAA will not at this 
time make additional recommendations regarding funding sources 
to Congress.

      XII. Appendix: FAA Study on Security Responsibilities: 1991

    An internal, unpublished FAA study conducted in 1991 
evaluated three alternatives for a shift in security 
responsibilities with respect to passengers, baggage, and cargo 
from the air carriers to airport operators to determine whether 
or not any alternative was likely to improve security system 
performance. The basic framework and content of the study, 
including the conclusions reached at that time, are presented 
below without substantive modification. The alternatives 
examined in 1991 were in addition to the system then in place 
and are presented here as they were then written. The essential 
elements of these options remain valid today.
    Alternative 1. Airports assume the responsibility for the 
sterile areas \78\ and screen all persons and their personal 
property (sterile area screening); air carriers retain their 
other security responsibilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \78\ The sterile area is an area to which access is controlled by 
the inspection of persons and property in accordance with an approved 
security program or a security program used in accordance with FAR 
Sec. 129.25 (49 CFR Sec. 129.25). Normally, this is the area one enters 
after passing through the security screening checkpoint and its metal 
detectors, x-ray devices, and hopefully, advanced security equipment 
such as trace explosives detection devices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Alternative 2. Airports conduct sterile area screening, 
screen checked baggage; air carriers retain their other 
security responsibilities.
    Alternative 3. Airports conduct sterile area screening, 
screen checked baggage, and screen cargo and mail; air carriers 
retain their other security responsibilities.
    The following criteria were used to evaluate the 
alternatives:

   Effectiveness in improving security;
   General acceptance of an alternative by airport 
        operators, air carriers, and system users as well as 
        the level of political support;
   Economic efficiency;
   Need for statutory and/or regulatory changes;
   Impact on overall quality of air transportation 
        service; and
   Ease of enforcement and oversight.

    The following factors are important for understanding the 
implications of the alternatives as discussed in 1991:
    Threat management. Coordinating overlapping 
responsibilities for the implementation of certain security 
measures, in particular the response to anonymous telephoned 
``bomb threats'' to aircraft, was complicated by conflicting 
views and actions of air carriers, airports, and local law 
enforcement officials. These conflicts should be lessened by a 
restatement of responsibilities in the rewrite of FAR parts 107 
and 108, both published in the Federal Register as a notice of 
proposed rulemaking on August 1, 1997. \79\ The 1991 report did 
not analyze transferring or adding threat management 
responsibilities to the airport operator that were not 
explicitly defined in the then-current regulations.
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    \79\ Note 72, supra.
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    Passenger/baggage positive identification and 
reconciliation. In 1991, positive passenger/baggage match was 
required for all international flights, but not for domestic 
flights. A positive passenger/baggage match would be greatly 
affected by a transfer of this responsibility to airport 
operators. The air carriers would still need to provide the 
information to perform the match and hold or pull bags from 
aircraft. With the added delay of processing by the airport 
operators, on-time departures would be more difficult, and hubs 
could be disrupted by the delays.
    Air carrier security responsibilities. No conceivable 
alternative can vest total security responsibility with the 
airport because air carriers will still be responsible for 
securing aircraft, challenging persons without appropriate 
identification who approach an aircraft, providing security 
training for crewmembers, and dealing with in-flight security 
issues. Shifting these functions was not considered an 
alternative. Because some FAA requirements go beyond those 
administered by the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO), and are typically not performed by foreign airport/
government authorities, shifting certain security functions 
within the United States would not relieve air carriers of 
their duty to perform those same functions overseas.
    Airport profiling of passengers. In 1991, air carrier 
ticket agents profiled passengers when they checked in and 
checked their baggage. Based on specific profiling criteria, 
actions were taken with respect to selected passengers 
including a more careful screening of their checked baggage. 
Use of the ticket agent as the focal point was the most 
efficient and effective way to profile passengers. Having 
airport operators profile passengers would still require 
information that can only be obtained from air carriers. This 
information would then have to be communicated to airport 
personnel. Establishing airport proficiency in this area would 
likely add personnel costs without improving effectiveness.
    Carriers continue to screen passengers and carry-on 
baggage. Establishment of a separate program by airport 
operators to perform this function was considered problematic 
because of a need to collocate screening gates, resulting in 
added expenses and additional oversight requirements. Such a 
program would have all the disadvantages of Alternative 1 
without most of its advantages. Thus, this proposition as an 
alternative was rejected from further analysis.
    The baseline case to which all the alternatives were 
compared is the system as it existed in 1991. The pros and cons 
of this option follow, and are followed in turn by the pros and 
cons of the three alternatives.

                    Keeping the 1991 Security System

                                  pro:

   The 1991 system was proven to be effective in 
        maintaining a secure air transportation system (as the 
        study authors believed at the time).
   The system of allocating responsibilities was well 
        understood, was accepted by all major participants, and 
        had supporters.
   The system was a natural and logical division of 
        responsibilities based on the evolution of airport and 
        air carrier duties and obligations, which included 
        airports acting as property owners and air carriers 
        acting as transporters of persons and property.
   The system had developed as an integration of 
        responsibilities that have been logically assigned.
   Maintaining the 1991 system would not have required 
        statutory changes or a major restructuring of 
        regulations and security programs. Updating Parts 107 
        and 108 will make the system more efficient.
   Maintaining the status quo would have the advantage 
        of avoiding a series of potentially confusing 
        reorganizations with the possibility of temporary 
        security lapses.
   Most of the aviation threats in 6 of the last 7 
        years (through the late 1980's) were received by air 
        carriers and directed at aircraft. Thus, it would be 
        inefficient to shift the responsibility of evaluating 
        the response to those threats away from the air 
        carriers and to the airports.
   There would be no disruptive financial changes to 
        the air carriers or the airport authorities and no 
        adverse changes in the overall quality of 
        transportation service.

                                  con:

   In the 1991 system, there was no single focal point 
        for all sterile area screening at each airport. Making 
        the airport operator accountable for all such screening 
        functions would integrate this responsibility and might 
        improve managerial oversight and accountability.
   It is more difficult to organize and then implement 
        coordinated contingency plans to meet threat conditions 
        when major security responsibilities are fragmented 
        among several entities.
   Originally, passenger and carry-on baggage screening 
        were performed only at the air carrier gate. Over time, 
        these tasks have evolved so that in many airports the 
        sterile area encompasses much or all of the entire 
        terminal. If much or all of the terminal is to remain a 
        sterile area, it might be better for the airport 
        operator to manage sterile area screening.
   Requirements for specialized equipment (explosives 
        detection systems and other devices) might impose 
        future expenses on air carriers.

                       1991 Evaluation of Options

    Alternative 1. Airports assume the responsibility for the 
sterile areas and screen all persons and their personal 
property (sterile area screening); air carriers retain their 
other security responsibilities.

                                  pro:

   Security efficiency may improve at some airports 
        with multiple sterile area screening checkpoints. There 
        may be a consolidation of security screening personnel 
        and their training.
   Flight schedules suggested in 1991 that airport 
        operators sometimes may have been able to move security 
        personnel under their control from one section of the 
        airport to another section and screen passengers for 
        less cost than the air carriers. At some airports, air 
        carriers were structuring screening to obtain these 
        efficiencies.
   At many airports in 1991, there were many air 
        carriers responsible for maintaining one screening 
        checkpoint. In such cases, the air carriers rotated, on 
        a periodic basis, the responsibility for screening. 
        This led to a lack of air carrier involvement in 
        managing these checkpoints. Having the airport 
        operators in charge of these checkpoints could 
        potentially improve the effectiveness of oversight.
   Some airports believed they could improve the 
        effectiveness of the passenger and carry-on baggage 
        screening process by hiring, training, and adequately 
        compensating professional screeners. Nearly all air 
        carriers contracted out this function, while a few used 
        their own staff.
   The public often incorrectly assumed that airport 
        operators were responsible for screening efforts, which 
        were sometimes perceived as less effective than they 
        should have been. Airports could therefore improve 
        their public image in some cases by assuming screening 
        responsibilities and then improving screening 
        effectiveness and procedures.

                                  con:

   Based on conversations with airport personnel in 
        1991, their previous experiences had shown that 
        increasing salaries alone would not increase screener 
        effectiveness. Further, any air carrier had then and 
        has today a direct interest in protecting its expensive 
        aircraft and company image as a safe carrier.
   Sterile area screening costs were judged likely to 
        increase: airports may want remuneration for screening 
        over their fixed and variable costs. While screening is 
        purely an overhead cost to the air carriers, who 
        struggle to keep airfares low and competitive, it may 
        be viewed as a profit-making ``service'' not subject to 
        the cost discipline of economic competition, if 
        conducted by the airports. At the very least, each 
        airport may be expected to differ on the cost of 
        screening.
   Air carriers would still have a vested interest in 
        the efficiency of the screening conducted by the 
        airports. Given their large investments in aircraft and 
        public relations, air carriers were seen as likely to 
        insist on maintaining a screening oversight function to 
        ensure safety and minimize inconvenience to passengers; 
        this would duplicate the oversight program established 
        by the airports.
   Increases in screening costs might result in higher 
        ticket prices. This would be viewed negatively by the 
        air carriers and passengers unless there were a 
        corresponding and noticeable improvement in screening 
        effectiveness.
   Airports are government entities that may have less 
        financial flexibility to pay fines for noncompliance; 
        the assessing of violations and fines by the FAA would 
        also have political ramifications.
   This alternative would require statutory changes to 
        49 U.S.C. 44901, formerly section 315(a) of the Federal 
        Aviation Act of 1958, unless an airport operator were 
        designated as an agent for the air carriers. At 
        present, air carriers have the legal responsibility for 
        ensuring the security of passengers and carry-on 
        baggage and, when necessary, to perform various levels 
        of searches.
   This alternative would require major restructuring 
        of Federal Aviation Regulations parts 107 and 108 as 
        well as the Air Carrier Standard Security Program 
        (ACSSP) and the Airport Security Program (ASP).
   Airport operators generally do not wish to take on 
        the security responsibilities of the air carriers and 
        the associated liability.
   FAA security staff have indicated that it would be 
        easier to monitor the actual security operational 
        responsibilities of a relatively small number of air 
        carriers, each with a standardized security program, 
        than to review many airports, each with a unique 
        security management system.
   Air carriers will likely resist any shift of control 
        over the sterile area screening process because of 
        residual security responsibility and liability.

    Alternative 2. Airports conduct sterile area screening, 
screen checked baggage; air carriers retain their other 
security responsibilities.

                                  pro:

   If an airport responsibility, security-related 
        equipment could be purchased with Airport Improvement 
        Program (AIP)/Passenger Facility Charge (PFC) funds. 
        Air carriers, however, are not eligible for these 
        funds.
   There may be some potential cost savings due to 
        economies of scale at some large airports, where the 
        physical layout would support a centralized checked 
        baggage screening system. For example, if the FAA were 
        to require the use of explosives detection systems 
        (EDS), fewer machines would be needed to serve air 
        carriers, especially those with few flights. (Note: 
        this could be arranged among air carriers as well.)
   There could be some improvement in efficiency 
        (reduction in cost) at an airport if the airport took 
        over responsibility for both sterile area screening and 
        checked baggage screening, because some air carrier 
        security management responsibilities could be 
        consolidated with the airport security 
        responsibilities.
   Consolidation could streamline the channels of 
        communication between airport personnel conducting 
        checked baggage screening and airport police, thus 
        resulting in a potentially shorter response time to 
        security threats.

                                  con:

   Airports would assume increased liability for losses 
        resulting from security-related events. Joint 
        responsibility could lead to confusion. The net result 
        is that airport operator liability would expand as 
        airports take on more security responsibilities while 
        air carrier liability may not decrease.
   Under this alternative, airports would share partial 
        liability for lost, stolen, or mishandled baggage since 
        both the airport and air carriers would handle baggage.
   Airports may decide to consolidate checked baggage 
        handling at one or more centralized areas to reduce 
        airport costs. This could cause several problems. One 
        is that it would be more likely for checked baggage to 
        be lost or sent to the wrong air carrier. Another is 
        that such a centralized system would slow down the 
        checked baggage sorting and screening process. Baggage 
        may be conveyed to this centralized area by baggage 
        carts, which would increase the opportunity for 
        security problems. Any improvements in efficiency and 
        effectiveness would be site specific and would not 
        occur on a larger nationwide scale.
   Airports would want remuneration for handling 
        checked baggage, thus raising overall carrier operating 
        costs.
   Passengers are profiled when they check in at the 
        ticket counter and check their baggage. The most 
        efficient party to profile passengers would be the air 
        carrier ticket agent, rather than an airport employee.
   This alternative would encounter strong resistance 
        from air carriers and most airports.

    Alternative 3. Airports conduct sterile area screening, 
screen checked baggage, and screen cargo and mail; air carriers 
retain their other security responsibilities.

                                  pro:

   Airports could use AIP/PFC funds to purchase 
        specialized equipment, such as x-ray machines, to 
        assist in screening cargo and mail.

                                  con:

   Involving the airport in screening cargo is 
        redundant and extremely inefficient. In 1991, freight 
        forwarders and indirect air carriers took cargo 
        directly to the air carrier that handled the cargo. 
        Either the airport would have to have representatives 
        at multiple cargo facilities at each airport or all air 
        cargo would have to be funneled through a centrally 
        established cargo entry point. For the airports to 
        handle and screen the cargo and then provide it to the 
        air carriers would introduce an inefficient additional 
        layer of bureaucracy.
   A major cargo security measure is the documentation 
        that cargo shippers provide. Air carriers have 
        information about known shippers; new or unknown 
        shippers get scrutinized more carefully. If airports 
        took over screening cargo, each airport would have to 
        establish and maintain a record of each of the air 
        shippers; currently, an air carrier can share this 
        information with its security personnel at each airport 
        it services.
   The United States Postal Service and the air 
        carriers have an established relationship. If air mail 
        security procedures were to change, adding airports to 
        this process would likely make the situation more 
        complex.

               conclusions as presented in the 1991 study

    The 1991 system was well understood and accepted by most 
major participants. Although the system had both pros and cons, 
it was fundamentally an effective and efficient security 
system. While there were advantages to each of the three 
alternatives, there also were some major disadvantages to 
shifting any of the major security functions from the air 
carriers to airport operators. On balance, there did not appear 
to be a net benefit in adopting any of the alternatives over 
the 1991 system. Consequently, it was recommended that that 
system be continued. However, in recognition of the need for 
further analysis to study ways that security might be improved, 
the FAA should consider running a trial at a selected domestic 
airport to test the viability of transferring certain security 
functions, particularly screening at checkpoints, from air 
carriers to the airport authority.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


 (3) Report to Congress--Aviation Security: Aircraft Hardening Program

 Report of the Federal Aviation Administration to the House and Senate 
 Committee on Appropriations pursuant to Senate Report 102-351 on the 
Department of Transportation FY 1993 Appropriations Act

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                          I. Executive Summary

    This report is submitted in response to language in Senate 
Report 102-351 accompanying the Department of Transportation 
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1993. The Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) was asked to study different types of 
technology designed to protect aircraft against certain 
explosives and to report to the Appropriations Committees on 
its findings. The FAA was also asked to consider investment and 
operating costs, acceptable safety margins, passenger 
convenience, and any other relevant factors. Interim reports 
were submitted to the Appropriations Committees in September 
1994 and March 1996.
    This report provides a current assessment and review of the 
research work completed to date regarding one such technology, 
hardened containers.

                         II. Program Background

    The aircraft hardening program was initiated in 1991 in 
response to recommendations of the President's Commission on 
Aviation Security and Terrorism and in compliance with 
direction set forth in the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 
1990. The goal of the program is to protect commercial aircraft 
from catastrophic structural damage or critical system failure 
due to in-flight explosions.
    Aircraft hardening analysis generally consists of two 
distinct elements: susceptibility and vulnerability. 
Susceptibility is the probability that explosives of a 
particular nature and amount can be successfully placed on 
board an aircraft. Vulnerability is the conditional probability 
that an aircraft will be destroyed or suffer some specific 
level of damage if an explosion takes place on board. This 
latter probability is a function of the characteristics of the 
explosive charge (e.g., weight, type, and placement) and the 
design capacity of the aircraft to withstand the explosive 
forces and resulting consequences. The aircraft hardening 
program addresses the vulnerability aspects of aircraft 
security by determining the vulnerability of aircraft and their 
occupants to onboard explosions and the methods of reducing 
this vulnerability through modifications to aircraft structures 
and/or components, such as luggage containers.
    To accomplish the program objectives, tasks were designed 
to determine and identify: (1) the minimum amount of explosives 
that will result in aircraft loss; and (2) the methods and 
techniques that can be applied to the current and future fleets 
of commercial aircraft to decrease their vulnerability to 
explosive effects. The program is divided into two separate 
projects to address the objectives and requirements: explosive 
vulnerability and mitigation techniques.
    The program draws on experts in the fields of engineering 
and explosives research from Government agencies within the 
Departments of Defense and Energy; from private industry such 
as aircraft manufacturers, luggage container manufacturers, and 
advanced materials experts; and from other governments/
international organizations, such as the United Kingdom's Civil 
Aviation Authority, the French Direction Generale De L' 
Aviation Civile in France, and the Government of Israel.
    The focus of potential mitigation techniques has been the 
development of blast-resistant airline luggage containers. The 
hardening of aircraft luggage containers offers an attractive 
option as a blast-mitigating technique because a performance-
based specification already exists for aircraft luggage 
containers. A draft appendix to the specification that 
specifies the FAA's requirements for blast-mitigating 
containers has been developed. The development of the hardened 
container specification also allows for the transition of 
hardened container technology to private industry. However, 
even with the development of a viable hardened luggage 
container, research into other mitigation techniques still will 
be required, because only wide-body aircraft currently use 
containers. In addition, the possibility exists that other 
hardening and explosives detection techniques can be developed 
that could make container hardening unnecessary. Finally, it is 
critical to determine the effects of blast and possible 
solutions across the spectrum of aircraft designs as a means of 
maintaining a technological advantage over future advances in 
criminal/terrorist explosives technology. The hardened 
container, however, provides the best opportunity for a near-
term solution.

                        III. Container Hardening

    The objectives of this project are to assess the structural 
and functional readiness of selected hardened luggage container 
designs and to investigate the operational effectiveness and 
cost effectiveness of such designs. Ideally, the hardened 
container would need to have a life-cycle cost that approaches 
the life-cycle costs of containers currently used by airlines. 
For example, increases in acquisition and maintenance costs 
should be balanced by the extended container lifetime of the 
hardened container.
    Hardened containers could be introduced into the airline 
industry through rulemaking or other regulatory means. Since 
current luggage containers are replaced on an average of every 
2 to 5 years, the introduction of hardened containers into the 
market might be accomplished through attrition over some 
agreed-upon period of time.

           a. blast resistance of existing baggage containers

    In order to determine the blast resistance of containers 
currently in use, tests were conducted on containers of the LD-
3 classification, beginning with low charge weights and then 
increasing charge weights until failure took place. Pressure 
and strain measurements were taken for each test, along with 
high-speed film for post-test analysis of the explosive event. 
The test results indicated that the blast loading on the LD-3 
structure was dependent on the density of the luggage that 
contained the explosive, the location of the explosive in the 
container, and the arrangement of the luggage surrounding the 
test article. Final analysis revealed that the current 
generation of LD-3 containers had very little inherent blast 
resistance capability.

              b. potential container-hardening techniques

    Eight different techniques to harden luggage containers 
were studied initially. These techniques consisted of both 
blast containment and blast management concepts. A blast 
containment design completely suppresses the effects of an 
explosion within a container. The blast containment concept 
offers the best alternative for suppressing the potentially 
catastrophic effects of post-blast fires. In addition, the 
blast containment container is considered an independent 
element within the cargo bay environment and requires no 
special handling procedures for placement and positioning on 
aircraft on the part of an airline. Conversely, a blast 
management design considers the container as part of a system 
within the aircraft cargo bay. In general, the blast management 
container is designed to allow a controlled failure of the 
container during the blast, while venting the detonation 
products (overpressure, fragmentation) into an adjacent 
container. The disadvantage of the blast management technique 
is that it requires special handling on the part of an airline. 
In addition, the blast management concept does not fully 
address the potentially catastrophic effects of a post-blast 
fire within a container and container/aircraft structural 
interaction. Based on the hardening techniques investigated in 
this study, the results indicated that an explosion could be 
mitigated best within a blast containment container constructed 
of high-strength composite materials.

               c. hardened container development program

    Proof of Concept: Under an FAA research project conducted 
from 1991-1994, several prototype blast-hardened containers 
were manufactured using a lightweight, high-strength composite 
material. This material also was chosen for its fragment-
penetration resistance and fire-retardant characteristics. The 
prototypes were of the LD-3 classification, which is the most 
common type of container used by wide-bodied passenger 
airlines.
    Initial, full-scale tests were performed in January 1992 on 
two prototype containers to demonstrate the feasibility of the 
hardened container. In each test, the prototype containers were 
packed with representative luggage and a plastic explosive 
charge was placed in a piece of baggage in a controlled 
location. The containers were instrumented with pressure and 
strain gages and the blast events were recorded with both 
normal and high-speed movie cameras. Although the preliminary 
results were good in terms of the blast containment properties 
of the hardened containers, the container door on the first 
test article failed before the maximum resistive capacity of 
the new design could be determined. Consequently, the door of 
the container was redesigned. A second test series was 
performed in April 1992. In the first two tests of the 
container with the new composite door, the blast was 
successfully contained. In the third test at a considerably 
higher charge level, partial venting occurred as the capacity 
of the container-door connection was exceeded. All charge 
weights used were considerably higher than those withstood by 
current containers.
    Using the data obtained from the earlier tests, another 
prototype container was designed incorporating design 
refinements from the previous tests. The container weighed 392 
pounds, which is within the bounds of current container tare 
weights. Tested in November 1992 in the same manner as were the 
previous two designs, the container withstood an explosive 
charge size that closely approximates the current explosives 
detection system standard.
    Two additional LD-3 prototypes were designed to exhibit an 
improved strength-to-weight ratio based on insight gained in 
the testing performed to date. The containers were constructed 
at a decreased tare weight over previous designs, making them 
more attractive to the airline industry while they maintained 
their blast-resistant properties. From 1993-1994, each of the 
prototypes was tested. The final prototype was successfully 
tested at an explosive charge size that was equivalent to the 
existing detection standard with a tare weight of 284 pounds.
    Development of Hardened Container Technical Specifications: 
The Society of Automotive Engineers, developer of the current 
baggage container specifications, has assisted the FAA in the 
development of a performance-based appendix to its 
specification for cargo unit load devices (ULD) that applies to 
LD-3 class blast-resistant airline baggage containers. This 
draft specification is dated January 1996. In addition to 
delineating the required design criteria for a blast-resistant 
container, the specification also covers the airworthiness and 
operational requirements with which hardened container 
designers would need to comply to have their containers 
certified for use. The explosive size that is required to be 
contained by the specification exceeds the charge size 
specified in the Criteria for Certification of Explosives 
Detection Systems (published in September 1993) to provide a 
margin of safety.
    Development of Hardened Containers Meeting Specifications: 
The FAA solicited potential developers for hardened container 
design proposals to meet the FAA-established requirements for 
blast resistance. The designs were also evaluated for their 
ability to meet existing FAA airworthiness requirements and 
conform to airline operational requirements. The solicitation 
was conducted in two phases. During the first phase (1995-
1996), four potential container designs were chosen from a 
field of 12 respondents. Of the four vendors selected, none of 
the container concepts tested was able to meet the FAA's 
requirements for blast resistance.
    As a result of the respondents' failure to meet the 
requirements of the first solicitation, a phase II solicitation 
was conducted in 1997. As with phase I, vendor's designs 
submitted under phase II were evaluated based on the blast 
resistance capability of their designs in addition to 
airworthiness and airline operational requirements. Two vendors 
were selected from a field of eight respondents. The two 
designs selected were tested for compliance to FAA blast-
resistance requirements and conformance to FAA airworthiness 
certification requirements. In March 1998, blast validation 
testing was conducted on both designs. Of the two designs 
tested, one container fully met the FAA's blast requirements. 
The tare weight for the successful container was 340 pounds. 
The successful container design was submitted to the FAA 
certification office for airworthiness approval. In July 1998, 
the design was granted an FAA design letter of approval. Based 
on available funding, current plans call for the construction 
of 11 units of the certified container design. The 11 units are 
scheduled to be delivered by January 1999. Concurrent with this 
effort, in January 1999, the FAA plans to blast test two more 
hardened container designs for potential in-service evaluation. 
Pending airline participation for the operational evaluation 
phase, it is estimated that enough operational data can be 
collected to assess the operational viability of blast-
mitigating airline baggage containers as outlined in the 
following section.
    In addition, a study of container composite materials 
manufacturing and repair considerations is underway to obtain 
an assessment of factors, such as practical and acceptable 
weight, manufacturing processes, operability, repair and 
maintenance capability, and associated costs. Work began in the 
last quarter of fiscal year 1998 and will continue through 
fiscal year 2000. Those designs that are deemed the most viable 
will be candidates for study under this activity.

                d. air carrier operational demonstration

    The purpose of this task is to determine the economic and 
operational impacts of hardened luggage containers. It will 
address the explosive resistance and viability of each 
container, the container tare weight, the manufacturing cost 
and repair capability of the container, and issues relating to 
operability. These issues must be addressed before 
recommendations for rulemaking can be made to ensure that the 
specifications for hardened containers can be met at a 
reasonable cost.
    As previously mentioned, 11 units of the hardened container 
meeting the FAA's requirements for blast resistance are 
scheduled to be delivered by January 1999. These units have 
been offered by the FAA to Air Transport Association (ATA) 
member U.S. air carriers for operation on regularly scheduled 
flights for the purpose of collecting operational, cost, and 
repair data on hardened containers. With the exception of 
Northwest Airlines, the ATA member air carriers will not accept 
these units based on anticipated operational problems because 
of the container door location and operation. The container 
currently is being redesigned to address air carrier 
operational concerns. However, it is anticipated that several 
design iterations will be necessary, because blast validation 
is required for each significant design change. ATA member 
carriers have agreed to have handling personnel evaluate units 
for operation of the door mechanisms in winter conditions. This 
will occur in February 1999.
    Tower Air (which operates out of John F. Kennedy 
International Airport), Northwest Airlines, and the Government 
of Israel have agreed to employ operationally the units. Tower 
Air will receive four units, and Northwest Airlines and the 
Government of Israel will each receive one unit in February 
1999. During this deployment, data regarding the functionality, 
durability of both the panel material and the closure 
mechanisms, and repair and maintenance will be evaluated. 
Additionally, units will be destructively tested at established 
intervals to ensure that degradation of the containers' blast 
resistance capability has not occurred. The remaining five 
units will be held in reserve to replace those that are 
destructively tested.
    The cost of the 11 units that currently are being 
constructed is $38,000 each. If the units are purchased in 
quantities of more than 1,000 units, the price per unit is 
estimated to be between $16,000 and $24,000. The price of each 
aluminum unit used by the airline industry ranges from $1,000 
to $2,000, depending on the design and manufacturer.

                              iv. summary

    The feasibility of blast-resistant baggage containers has 
been demonstrated under the prototype effort and subsequent FAA 
solicitation resulting in the successful testing and 
certification of a unit developed by private industry. This 
unit is capable of mitigating an explosive threat in excess of 
the current explosives detection system certification criteria. 
The development of hardened container design criteria has been 
completed, resulting in a draft specification for LD-3-type 
hardened baggage containers. This draft specification provides 
a vehicle by which the FAA could mandate the use of hardened 
containers if they are proven to be operationally viable and 
ensure that these containers will meet or exceed required blast 
resistance and airworthiness requirements.
    Prototype containers will continue to be developed and 
tested in order to refine existing design requirements and 
address airline operational issues. Analysis of the operational 
considerations is being initiated. This includes assessing 
those factors with which the airlines are most concerned; i.e., 
container cost, tare weight, repair, operability, and 
maintainability. This analysis will ensure that specifications 
for a hardened container can meet a reasonable life-cycle cost. 
Further work with industry will help ensure that the existing 
specification is appropriate.

                         Appendix A. References

Aviation Security Research and Development Program for Aircraft 
        Hardening, Federal Aviation Administration Technical 
        Center, Atlantic City International Airport, New 
        Jersey, February 1993.
Blast-Resistant Baggage Container Phase I Study, Prepared for 
        the Federal Aviation Administration, January 1994.
Chan, P.C. et al., Hardened Aircraft Unit Load Devices: Step I 
        Interim Report, Analytic Investigation of the Blast 
        Resistance of Existing ULD'S, prepared for the Federal 
        Aviation Administration, October 1990.
Chan, P.C. et al., Hardened Aircraft Unit Load Devices: Step 11 
        Interim Report, Experimental Investigation of the Blast 
        Resistance of Existing ULD's, prepared for the Federal 
        Aviation Administration, January 1991.
Chan, P.C. et al., Hardened Aircraft Unit Load Devices: Step 
        III Interim Report, Analytic Investigation of Hardening 
        Countermeasures to Increase the Blast Resistance of 
        Unit Load Devices, prepared for the Federal Aviation 
        Administration, March 1991.
Chan, P.C. et al., Hardened Aircraft Unit Load Devices: Step IV 
        Interim Report, Proof-of-Concept Development and 
        Testing of Hardened ULD'S, prepared for the Federal 
        Aviation Administration, February 1992.
Container Hardening Program Phase I, Final Report, Prepared for 
        the Federal Aviation Administration, December 1995.
Container Hardening Program, Phase II Interim Technical Report 
        No. 1, Prepared for the Federal Aviation 
        Administration, September 1996.
Container Hardening Program, Phase II Interim Technical Report 
        No. 2, Prepared for the Federal Aviation 
        Administration, February 1998.
Corn, G.D. Jr., et al., Hardened Aircraft Unit Load Devices: 
        Refabrication and Testing of HULD No. I and HULD No. 2, 
        prepared for the Federal Aviation Administration, May 
        1992.
Hardened Luggage Container Design Survey, Federal Aviation 
        Administration Technical Center, Atlantic City 
        International Airport, New Jersey, September 1993.
Mlaker, Paul F. et al., Hardened Aircraft Unit Load Devices: 
        Development and Testing, HULD3, prepared for the 
        Federal Aviation Administration, December 1992.
Mlaker, Paul F. et al., Hardened Aircraft Unit Load Devices, 
        prepared for the Federal Aviation Administration, 
        January 1993.

 (4) Annual Report to Congress on Civil Aviation Security, January 1, 
                         1997-December 31, 1997

  Report of the Federal Aviation Administration to the United States 
Congress pursuant to section 44938, Title 49, U.S.C.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                           Executive Summary

    This report presents a summary of events, programs, and 
accomplishments in civil aviation security in 1997. The year 
continued the significant changes in direction and emphasis in 
civil aviation security in the United States that began in 1996 
in the aftermath of the ValuJet Flight 592 and TWA Flight 800 
tragedies. The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and 
Security recommended several measures to improve aviation 
safety and security and ensure that the U.S. aviation system 
remains the safest and most secure aviation system in the 
world. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) made 
significant progress this year in implementing many of the 
White House Commission's recommendations and related 
legislation.

               significant events and activities of 1997

January
    The FAA Security Equipment Integrated Product Team (SEIPT) 
began installations of explosives detection systems for 
screening checked baggage in Chicago and New York.
February
    February 12, the White House Commission issued its final 
report, which included 31 recommendations related specifically 
to aviation security. The FAA has primary responsibility for 21 
of these recommendations.
    The FAA joined with the Department of Transportation Office 
of Inspector General to conduct special emphasis testing of air 
carrier and indirect air carrier unknown shipper packages.
    The FAA completed technology training for airport consortia 
members.
March
    March 19, the FAA published a notice of proposed rulemaking 
(NPRM) to extend background investigations to include 
screeners.
    March 25, the first FAA-exclusive class of K-9 handlers 
graduated from the Military Working Dog School at Lackland Air 
Force Base, Texas.
    The FAA published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking 
(ANPRM) on certifying screening companies and improving 
screener training, which subsequently was delayed until more 
data become available.
    The FAA published the final rule ``Sensitive Security 
Information,'' to require airports, air carriers, foreign air 
carriers, and indirect air carriers to restrict the 
distribution, disclosure, and availability of sensitive 
security information to persons with a need to know.
April
    The FAA and Northwest Airlines completed final programming 
changes to, and Northwest conducted tests of, the computer-
assisted passenger screening (CAPS) system.
May
    May 12, the Department of Defense convened and the FAA 
participated in the Civil Aviation Anti-Missile Defense Task 
Force in response to a recommendation of the White House 
Commission on Aviation Safety and Security.
    May 14, the FAA issued for comment proposed amendments to 
the standard security programs for U.S. air carriers, couriers, 
freight forwarders, and cargo consolidators as well as the 
model security program for foreign air carriers to enhance 
aviation cargo security.
    May 19, the FAA and the National Academy of Sciences Panel 
on Assessment of Technologies for Aviation Security signed an 
agreement to study advanced security equipment deployments and 
hardened cargo container tests and planned deployments.
    May 26, the FAA submitted a report to Congress on its use 
of additional funding provided for the Dangerous Goods and 
Cargo Security Program.
June
    June 3, the FAA completed a pilot program to examine the 
feasibility of matching bags with passengers to ensure that the 
bags of individuals who do not board aircraft are removed from 
the aircraft in response to the White House Commission's 
recommendation that passenger-bag matching be implemented for 
domestic flights.
August
    August 1, the FAA publisheed \1\ NPRM's to revise parts 107 
and 108 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Typo in original document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    August 5, the FAA issued a proposal to incorporate security 
procedures for passengers into the Air Carrier Standard 
Security Program. This implemented a White House Commission 
recommendation to ensure that all passengers are positively 
identified and subjected to security procedures before they 
board aircraft.
    August 19, the FAA Administrator presented the third annual 
Screener of the Year award to Ms. Betty Jean Davis from Chicago 
O'Hare International Airport.
October
    October 1, the Department of Justice's Civil Rights 
Division issued its report on its review of automated and 
manual passenger screening systems, which concluded that the 
systems did not violate individuals' civil liberties.
    October 10, the Vulnerability Assessment of the National 
Airspace System Architecture of the Final Report for the 
President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection 
was issued.
December
    December 11, the National Civil Aviation Review Commission 
(NCARC), which was created by the 1996 FAA Reauthorization Act 
to examine FAA requirements and financing, issued its final 
report and funding and safety recommendations to the Secretary 
of Transportation.
    December 23, the FAA Administrator and leading U.S. 
airlines announced that passenger-bag matching would be 
expanded using passenger screening to apply explosives 
detection systems or bag matching to domestic passengers' 
luggage.
    The FAA issued a proposal to amend the ACSSP to strengthen 
passenger screening and clearance procedures for selectee \1\ 
bags.
    The FAA and the FBI conducted their first joint airport 
vulnerability assessments at Baltimore-Washington International 
Airport as required by the Reauthorization Act of 1996.

                              Introduction

    The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) submits this 
report pursuant to title 49 of the United States Code, sections 
44938 and 44907 (formerly sections 315(a), 316(b), and 1115(a) 
of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended). The report 
presents a summary of events, programs, and accomplishments in 
civil aviation security in 1997, including passenger, baggage, 
and cargo screening and domestic and foreign air carrier and 
airport security.

                  faa civil aviation security mission

    The FAA's aviation security mission is to protect the users 
of commercial air transportation against terrorist and other 
criminal acts. Because terrorists seek to destroy public 
confidence in the safety of air travel and disrupt this vital 
segment of the U.S. and world economies, the continued growth 
of commercial air transportation hinges on the effectiveness of 
aviation security measures. Protecting the infrastructure--FAA 
facilities and equipment and the employees who operate them--is 
a critical part of the FAA's aviation security mission.
    The FAA mission includes preventing passengers and cargo 
shippers from transporting hazardous materials or other 
dangerous goods in a manner that could jeopardize flight 
safety. The FAA also assists other Federal Government agencies 
in the interdiction of drugs coming into the United States by 
air.
    The FAA in 1997 continued to improve its baseline civil 
aviation security system by progressing toward implementation 
of the recommendations of the White House Commission on 
Aviation Safety and Security (final report issued February 12), 
the 1996 Baseline Working Group of the Aviation Security 
Advisory Committee, the National Civil Aviation Review 
Commission (NCARC) (final report issued December 11), the 
President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection 
(final report October 10), and the Federal Aviation 
Reauthorization Act of 1996 and other legislation. The FAA 
hired 299 special agents and 67 support personnel; entered into 
partnerships with other Federal Government agencies, airports, 
and air carriers; conducted research, engineering, and 
development of advanced explosives detection technology and 
other advanced security technologies; and procured and deployed 
new aviation security equipment.

                Summary of Programs and Accomplishments

    This section summarizes key aviation security program areas 
and highlights the new and expanded program activities driven 
by the recommendations of the White House Commission on 
Aviation Safety and Security and the Baseline Working Group of 
the Aviation Security Advisory Committee, legislative mandates, 
and the aviation security environment of 1997.

                              partnerships

    The responsibility for aviation security is a shared one. 
The FAA assesses threats and develops, communicates, and 
enforces appropriate security measures. Air carriers are 
responsible for applying security measures to passengers, 
service and flight crewmembers, baggage, and cargo--in short, 
everyone and everything that enters aircraft. Airports are 
responsible for maintaining a secure ground environment and for 
providing local law enforcement support. Other Federal 
agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the 
U.S. Customs Service, have jurisdiction at airports and the 
responsibility to contribute to aviation security. Also 
important is the cooperation of passengers and shippers.
Airport Consortia
    The FAA formed consortia involving airport and air carrier 
officials and law enforcement agencies with responsibility for 
aviation security at 41 major U.S. airports in 1996 in response 
to a recommendation by the White House Commission on Aviation 
Safety and Security. The FAA delayed forming additional 
consortia during much of 1997 to resolve some compliance and 
enforcement policy issues. Plans are underway to convene 
voluntary consortia at over 100 airports.
    Technology training was provided to over 500 airport 
consortia members in four locations across the country in 1997. 
The training gave the consortia members an overview of 
explosives detection systems and capabilities to help prepare 
the members for FAA deployments of security equipment. The 
training was videotaped to allow further distribution of the 
information.
Aviation Security Advisory Committee
    The Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) is an 
important partnership of the DOT and FAA, other Federal 
Government agencies, the aviation industry, and the flying 
public. The Secretary of Transportation established the ASAC in 
1989 in the aftermath of the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 as a 
forum for improving civil aviation security. In 1997, the ASAC 
chartered working groups to address issues like cargo security, 
public education, consultation, employee utilization and 
recognition, critical infrastructure protection, and airport 
categorizations. The full ASAC met in March and July 1997.

                    air carrier and airport security

    The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) requires the 
implementation of security programs by airports and air 
carriers. These security programs contain procedures to prevent 
or deter aircraft hijackings, sabotage, and other criminal 
acts. The FAA and the aviation industry constantly review the 
procedures to ensure their effectiveness in countering threats 
to civil aviation.
Air Carrier Security
    In 1997, 152 U.S. scheduled or charter air carriers were 
required to follow FAA-approved security programs. Each of 
these carriers has adopted the Air Carrier Standard Security 
Program (ACSSP), developed by the FAA in consultation with the 
industry. The program requires each air carrier to implement 
standard security procedures. The FAA has the authority to 
amend the ACSSP when safety and the public interest require it, 
after providing air carriers time to review and comment on 
proposed amendments. If immediate action is necessary, the FAA 
may issue emergency amendments to the ACSSP that are effective 
upon receipt. Under CFR 108.18, the FAA also may issue 
temporary requirements for immediate action through security 
directives.
    In July 1997, the FAA revised and reissued for comment a 
proposal to incorporate security procedures for passengers into 
the ACSSP. The final revision was issued August 5. In December, 
the FAA proposed a further change that also implemented a White 
House Commission recommendation to strengthen passenger 
screening and clearance procedures for selectee bags. The 
change would require airlines to perform identification and 
passenger questioning and to apply computer-assisted passenger 
screening or domestic selection criteria, an additional random 
selection percentage, and clearance procedures for selectee 
bags.
Principal Security Inspector (PSI)
    Principal security inspectors (PSI) are assigned to 
certificated U.S. air carriers that are required to adopt 
security programs under part 108 of title 14 of the CFR (14 
CFR) and to each foreign air carrier subject to 14 CFR part 
129. The PSI's serve as liaisons between the FAA and the air 
carriers' corporate security offices, representing the 
Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security and all FAA 
security field elements. The PSI's work closely with the 
carriers' corporate security representatives to address areas 
of concern and to ensure the carriers' compliance with FAA 
requirements. The PSI's also are responsible for approving and 
issuing amendments to the air carriers' individual security 
programs as well as providing FAA policy guidance to the air 
carriers when regulations are developed or revised. The PSI's 
also approve and monitor the air carriers' security training 
curricula.
Model Vulnerability Assessments
    The FAA contracted with private sector firms to conduct 
vulnerability assessments in 1997 using various models to 
determine which model is really the best and most appropriate 
for use at airports.
    Eight contractors have been assigned 14 major airports to 
assess. The planning stage has been completed, and teams at 6 
airports have completed onsite data collection activities. 
Fourteen out of 28 volunteer candidate airports will be engaged 
in helping to test and evaluate the models used in these 
assessments. The FAA expects the assessments to be completed in 
1998.
Airport Security
    U.S. and foreign scheduled and charter air carriers serve 
459 airports within the United States that are regulated under 
14 CFR part 107. Each airport is required to adopt and use a 
security program to provide a secure operating environment for 
air carriers. Of the regulated airports, 19 are designated as 
category X based on passenger traffic, complexity, and other 
special considerations.
    The Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 mandated 
that the FAA and the FBI regularly conduct joint threat and 
vulnerability assessments of high-risk airports. The FBI also 
must designate aviation security liaisons in or near cities 
served by these airports. An FAA/FBI working group was formed 
in November 1996 to identify airports where the vulnerability 
assessments should be conducted on a priority basis.
    An initial group of such airports has been identified and 
is being assessed as part of this program. The FAA and the FBI 
conducted their first joint airport vulnerability assessment at 
Baltimore-Washington International Airport in December 1997. 
Efforts to finalize a draft FAA/FBI security liaison agreement 
continue.
Federal Security Manager (FSM)
    Federal security managers (FSM) represent the Associate 
Administrator for Civil Aviation Security at the 19 category X 
airports. FSM positions were created by law and have been 
maintained by the FAA since October 1, 1991. As the FAA's 
designated security representatives, the FSM's maintain direct 
communication with key airport officials, airline managers, and 
law enforcement authorities. Their principal responsibilities 
are coordination and oversight of all operational security 
activities at their respective airports.

                       compliance and enforcement

    The FAA has an ongoing and aggressive compliance and 
enforcement program that is carried out by regional offices 
under national direction. While striving to achieve compliance 
through cooperation, the FAA must ensure that regulated parties 
such as air carriers, airports, and shippers of dangerous goods 
are in compliance with applicable regulations and security 
programs.
Assessments and Testing
    The compliance and enforcement program includes regularly 
scheduled comprehensive assessments. During the assessments, 
special agents identify security violations and weaknesses and 
work with industry personnel to correct deficiencies. Special 
agents also conduct supplemental assessments, including special 
emphasis assessments that target specific areas or procedures 
in the aviation security system. All assessments include any 
one method or a combination of methods: surveillance, 
interviews, documentation reviews, and testing.
    The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security 
recommended that the FAA require industry to conduct security 
audits and that the FAA then perform unannounced and aggressive 
testing (realistic operational testing). The FAA conducted 
seven nationally directed systemwide rounds of this testing to 
determine compliance with specific security requirements. The 
rounds tested passenger screening, positive passenger-bag 
matching procedures, and questioning and resolution procedures. 
The rounds were unannounced (with the exception of one test) 
and were covert. The results indicated that the air carriers 
needed to improve in the areas tested.
Voluntary Disclosure Encourages Problem Fixing
    To achieve maximum participation and encourage complete 
disclosures of vulnerabilities, the FAA revised its voluntary 
disclosure policy to apply to disclosures made by airports, air 
carriers, indirect air carriers, and foreign air carriers 
(under their FAA-approved security programs), including 
disclosures that are made during airport consortia activities. 
This policy will become effective in 1998. When a disclosure 
that satisfies the requirements of the voluntary disclosure 
policy is made during a consortium activity, all parties to the 
consortium can participate in the development of a 
comprehensive fix plan--with participation by the FAA--without 
the threat of legal enforcement action against the disclosing 
entity unless the comprehensive fix plan is not satisfactorily 
implemented. In every case, immediate but temporary corrective 
action is required until the comprehensive fix is in place.
Enforcement
    The FAA strives to gain industry compliance with aviation 
security requirements through performance-based partnerships, 
which encompass cooperation and communication before violations 
occur. When there are violations, the FAA seeks to ensure 
immediate corrective action by: encouraging voluntary 
disclosure of problems; working with industry in a counseling 
mode to help resolve problems and identify ways to prevent 
future violations; and, in instances where warranted, pursuing 
enforcement actions, including issuing warning notices, letters 
of correction, civil penalties, or other orders of the 
Administrator that might be appropriate.
    A 1-year pilot of the Streamlined Enforcement Test and 
Evaluation Program (STEP), prompted by a recommendation of the 
1993 National Performance Review, concluded in 1996. The pilot 
program tested an alternative method of processing civil 
penalties for certain violations by individuals attempting to 
pass weapons through screening checkpoints. Positive results 
were so immediate that the FAA adopted the program nationwide 
before the test period ended. Under STEP, the average time to 
process a case decreased over 90 percent, 31 percent more 
people paid their sanctions, and the payments were over 60 
percent higher than expected.
    In 1997, the Office of Civil Aviation Security, in 
conjunction with other FAA lines of business, began working on 
ways to streamline the enforcement investigative reports to 
make the reports less redundant and easier to write and to 
provide better information to the legal offices in case 
proposed actions are appealed.
Violations at the Checkpoint
    Individuals who attempt to bring weapons, explosive 
devices, or other dangerous articles through screening 
checkpoints are subject to enforcement actions. They may also 
be subject to arrest by local law enforcement officials. The 
following table summarizes the estimated number of people 
screened through checkpoints, the number of weapons detected, 
and the number of people arrested between 1993 and 1997.

 Civil Aviation Security Airline Passenger Screening Results, 1993-1997
------------------------------------------------------------------------
         Year            CY 1993   CY 1994   CY 1995   CY 1996   CY 1997
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Persons Screened         1,150.0   1,261.3   1,263.0   1,496.9   1,659.7
 (Millions)
Weapons Detected:
Firearms                 2,798     2,994     2,390     2,155     2,067
 Handguns                2,707     2,860     2,230     1,999     1,905
 Long guns                  91       134       160       156       162
Persons Arrested:
Carriage of firearms/    1,354     1,433     1,194       999       924
 explosives
Giving false                31        35        68       131        72
 information
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       aviation security: people

    The effectiveness of the aviation security system depends 
on the capabilities and integrity of the people who screen 
passengers and their possessions.
    In 1987, the FAA amended the ACSSP to require air carriers 
to detect FAA weapons and simulated explosive devices. The 
agency began taking enforcement actions against air carriers 
failing to detect FAA test objects.
    Screeners should not be trained merely to detect FAA test 
objects; the FAA requires that they be trained to detect actual 
weapons, firearms, and explosive devices. But because they were 
tested with a small number of approved test objects, an 
unintended consequence was that screeners specifically looked 
for those test objects. New and more challenging test objects 
and methods were necessary to portray more realistically the 
explosives and techniques used by terrorist groups.
    To drive up screener performance further, the FAA is 
preparing a rulemaking on certifying screening companies and 
improving screener training. The FAA is gathering data from 
automated testing with threat image projection to develop 
performance standards for screeners.
    The FAA expects to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking 
that includes certification standards in 1999.
    In August 1997, the FAA initiated a nationally focused 
special emphasis assessment of screener evaluation testing. The 
main aspect of the assessment was to implement realistic 
testing and to ensure that bags were packed consistently by 
special agents using common items carried by passengers.
    The assessment included approximately 950 tests (including 
weekend testing) conducted by agents who were not known to the 
screeners.
Screener of the Year
    Individuals working on the front lines of aviation security 
were recognized by the FAA during the third annual Screener of 
the Year award ceremony on August 19. Betty Jean Davis, a 
checkpoint security supervisor at Chicago O'Hare International 
Airport, received this year's award. She was selected from 
among nine regional winners. Nominees for the award displayed 
specific and sustained superior performance in aviation 
security.
    The FAA, the Air Transport Association, the Regional 
Airline Association, the Air Line Pilots Association, and the 
National Air Transportation Association cosponsored the awards.
Improving Performance
    The FAA Human Factors Program began an extensive research 
effort to enhance screener capabilities. The FAA developed the 
Screener Proficiency Evaluation and Reporting System (SPEARS), 
which contains several components, including computer-based 
training (CBT) and threat image projection (TIP). CBT automates 
screener training and tests screeners on the material learned, 
including the ability to detect images of bombs in baggage. TIP 
electronically projects fictitious images of bags containing 
bombs or other threat objects on x-ray screens. This training 
device keeps screeners alert, provides real-world conditions, 
and measures screener performance.
    Screener performance will be assessed in the field for both 
carry-on bags and checked bags. CBT was introduced in 1997 to 
category X airports. In 1998, SPEARS will be deployed to select 
category 1 airports.
Information and Access Control
    Aviation security is as dependent on the integrity of 
people who have access to secure areas and information as it is 
on the capabilities of those people who are associated with the 
passenger screening process. Rulemaking activities in 1997 
included efforts to control unescorted access to restricted 
areas of airports and restrict the release of sensitive 
security information.
    The FAA published a notice of proposed rulemaking on March 
19 to extend employment background checks to include screeners 
and their supervisors. The rule would require employment 
history investigations of these individuals and fingerprint-
based criminal records checks of some of them. The comment 
period closed on May 19. The final rule will be published in 
1998.
    Also in March, the FAA published a final rule, ``Sensitive 
Security Information,'' to require airports, air carriers, 
foreign air carriers, and indirect air carriers to restrict the 
distribution, disclosure, and availability of sensitive 
security information to persons with a need to know.
Universal Access System
    In May 1993, Congress appropriated $2 million for the FAA 
to develop and initiate the implementation of a universal 
access system (UAS) to eliminate problems associated with 
multiple airport security systems, without unnecessary 
duplication or costly reconfiguration.
    While a portion of allocated funds was used to develop 
functional specifications, technical standards, and a test 
plan, the majority of the funds were used to conduct 
operational tests and evaluations of the most promising 
configurations.
    Operational testing began in January 1996 at Miami 
International Airport with Delta Air Lines transient employees. 
In March 1996, the UAS Test Program began at Detroit Wayne 
County Airport with Northwest Airlines transient employees. 
There were approximately 50,000 active air carrier employees in 
the UAS centralized data base.
    While testing was completed in 1997, the UAS doors at Miami 
and Detroit and the centralized data base at Atlanta remained 
operational. Throughout the year, several other airports and 
airlines decided to participate in the UAS based on the body of 
work that was generated.
Domestic Aviation Security Training
    The FAA develops and manages an extensive training program 
for FAA personnel and others with responsibility for civil 
aviation security. Aviation security training for FAA 
specialists is conducted as resident training at the FAA 
Academy in Oklahoma City, in regional locations, and via 
interactive video training. The Department of Defense, the 
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, and other vendors 
provide specialized training in physical security, criminal 
investigations, and other topics at various locations 
throughout the country. The FAA trained 944 FAA students in 
basic and advanced aviation security and internal security 
programs in 1997.
    The FAA also conducts seminars and training for State and 
local law enforcement officers and for airport and air carrier 
managers and security personnel to encourage successful 
implementation of policy and regulations and to counter the 
terrorist threat to air transportation. In 1997, the FAA 
trained 131 non-FAA students in 5 locations in the continental 
United States.
    Appendix I lists the FAA training courses and student 
distributions.

                     aviation security: technology

    The skills and integrity of the people involved with 
aviation security are only part of what makes the aviation 
system secure. The people must have effective equipment to do 
their jobs. The FAA and its partners in aviation and other 
industries work together to pursue advancements in technology 
and integrate them into the civil aviation security system to 
enhance the security of the flying public.
Safe Skies
    Under an agreement between the FAA and an alliance of 
industry, academia, and Government organizations, the agency 
will gain an airport operational testing site for newly 
developed security technologies.
    A 1997 memorandum of understanding (MOU) provided about $1 
million to the National Safe Skies Alliance, a nonprofit group 
that includes the McGhee Tyson Knoxville Airport, Oak Ridge 
National Laboratories, Honeywell Corporation, American 
Engineering, Inc., and the University of Tennessee. The 
centerpiece of the cooperative agreement is the creation of a 
site for testing new checkpoint screening technologies at 
McGhee Tyson Knoxville Airport. The program is designed to 
gauge reactions from the flying public while monitoring the 
performance of security equipment under actual operating 
conditions.
    The MOU also includes several research and development 
projects, including studies of airport vulnerability 
assessments; system integration for security equipment and 
procedures; explosives detection systems development and 
testing; and airport and air carrier security operations 
simulation and modeling.
FAA Integrated Product Team
    In October 1996, FAA formed a Security Equipment Integrated 
Product Team (SEIPT) of acquisition and security experts 
representing the FAA, airport authorities, and air carriers. 
The team's objective is to plan, purchase, and install 
explosives detection devices and other advanced security 
equipment at U.S. airports.
    In 1997, the team began deploying equipment purchased with 
$144 million provided by the Omnibus Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 1997 to implement the recommendations of 
the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security.
Bulk Explosives Detection
    Technology today offers different kinds of equipment 
designed to detect bulk explosives that may be concealed in 
checked baggage. The equipment varies in the types and amounts 
of explosives it may detect. Section 108.20 of 14 CFR requires 
air carriers to use explosives detection systems approved by 
the FAA to screen checked baggage on international flights when 
the Administrator so requires. The InVision CTX 5000, which 
uses computed tomography, was approved in 1994 and remained the 
only FAA-certified EDS in 1997.
    The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security 
recommended checked baggage screening for domestic flights and 
funding for checked baggage screening equipment. In December 
1996, the FAA purchased 54 certified EDS for screening checked 
baggage. The SEIPT began installation of the equipment in 
Chicago and New York in January 1997. By December, EDS's were 
operational in six U.S. cities, with deployments to several 
more cities planned for 1998. In line with the Commission 
recommendations, FAA is supplementing the deployment of 
certified EDS with deployment of other advanced technology for 
checked baggage screening. These 22 units include enhanced x-
rays and other commercially available devices.
Explosives Trace Detection
    Explosives trace detection devices have been used to screen 
carry-on bags and electronic items at airport screening 
checkpoints since November 1996. Using various technologies, 
explosives trace detectors can detect explosive vapors and 
particles. By the end of 1997, the FAA had purchased 220 trace 
detectors and deployed 128 of these to 30 airports. The FAA 
plans to purchase 260 more trace detectors by the end of 1998 
to use at screening checkpoints and to assist in resolving 
checked baggage screening alarms from EDS's.
Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening (CAPS)
    The large numbers of passengers and bags moving through the 
aviation system require the use of existing technology to apply 
time-consuming but necessary security measures. Passenger 
screening makes the most of limited security resources to keep 
the aviation system functioning close to current capacity. The 
computer-assisted passenger screening (CAPS) system was 
developed by the FAA through a grant to Northwest Airlines in 
September 1996, which included exporting CAPS to other 
airlines' reservation systems. CAPS was tested operationally on 
selected flights in Northwest's system in March and April 1997. 
All other major airlines covering all major reservations 
systems were given CAPS profiling factors and weights on May 7. 
A 1997 Department of Justice report on CAPS found that it does 
not violate individuals' civil liberties.
Passenger Bag Matching Using CAPS
    On December 23, the Administrator of the FAA and leading 
U.S. airlines announced that passenger-baggage matching will be 
expanded using CAPS to apply either examination by explosives 
detection systems or bag matching to domestic passengers' 
luggage. This is in response to a recommendation by the White 
House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security that full 
passenger-baggage matching with automated or manual passenger 
screening be implemented by December 1997. This process 
includes matching passengers to baggage to ensure that no 
unaccompanied bags enter the system. Implementing rulemaking is 
underway.
Aircraft and Container Hardening
    The Aircraft Hardening Program was initiated in 1990 in 
response to the directives of the President's Commission on 
Aviation Safety and Security and the mandates set forth in the 
Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990.
    The goal of the FAA Aircraft Hardening Program is to 
protect commercial aircraft from catastrophic structural damage 
or critical system failure resulting from in-flight explosions. 
Secondary objectives are to investigate vulnerabilities from 
the interference of electromagnetic or high-energy signals with 
aircraft electronic systems and to assess the threat presented 
by manually operated, highly mobile surface-to-air missiles.
    The Hardening Program has included implementing 
vulnerability studies, explosives testing of current and 
hardened luggage/cargo containers, and researching 
manufacturing and maintenance issues associated with hardened 
structures.
    Major program accomplishments for 1997 include: (1) 
completed operational assessment of LD-3 hardened containers; 
(2) identified and validated new aircraft vulnerability 
techniques; (3) identified possible mitigation techniques to 
counter projected energy and other threats; and (4) developed 
procedures and rules for man-portable air defense systems 
(MANPADS).
Aircraft Vulnerability Testing
    The FAA, along with the United Kingdom's Civil Aviation 
Authority, blew up a Boeing 747 on May 17 as part of a joint 
effort to study the effects of bomb blasts on commercial wide 
body aircraft and how to protect against them. Specifically 
studied were baggage containers and liners developed for cargo 
areas that would allow aircraft to survive bombings without 
ruptured fuselage. Four simultaneous explosions were set off in 
the front and rear cargo holds of the retired 747, which had 
been pressurized to simulate flight at approximately 35,000 
feet.
    The results were expected, but startling all the same, as 
the section behind the wing sheared off near the unprotected 
rear cargo area. The test results provided important 
information on methods to protect aircraft from blast events.
National Academy of Sciences Panel
    In response to a requirement of the Federal Aviation 
Reauthorization Act of 1996, the National Academy of Sciences 
Panel on Assessment of Technologies for Aviation Security was 
established in 1997. The panel will assess the results of the 
current advanced security equipment deployments, hardened cargo 
container tests, and planned future deployments and will 
recommend how to deploy explosives detection systems and 
hardened containers more effectively to improve security.

                            other safeguards

    Programs and measures other than screening also offer 
safeguards to protect the flying public and the personnel and 
facilities that keep the aviation system running smoothly.
Interference with Flightcrews Pilot Project
    A pilot program designed to deal more effectively with 
unruly passengers made favorable progress in 1997. The pilot 
program was begun in November 1996. It is a comprehensive 
effort led by selected FAA civil aviation security field 
offices in the Western-Pacific and Eastern Regions and 
involving air carriers, crewmembers, airport law enforcement 
agencies, the FBI, and U.S. attorneys to ensure proper and 
adequate handling of serious in-flight interference with 
crewmembers (including criminal prosecution if warranted). 
Approximately 56 incidents on approximately 16 domestic and 10 
foreign flag air carriers in specific locations were reported 
under the program in 1997.
K-9 Explosives Detection
    The FAA instituted a program to reimburse partially 
airports that volunteer to participate in the FAA's Explosives 
Detection K-9 Team Program. This is in response to the White 
House Commission's recommendation that the FAA significantly 
expand the use of bomb-sniffing dogs through the deployment of 
114 additional K-9 teams. Approximately $8.9 million from the 
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act provided partial 
reimbursements to the original 87 K-9 teams and the additional 
teams. The FAA is continuing to work with airports in an effort 
to expand the K-9 program at each of the 76 largest U.S. 
airports. By the end of fiscal year 1998, 40 airports are 
expected to be participating in this voluntary program. The 
first FAA-exclusive class of K-9 handlers graduated from the 
Military Working Dog School at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, 
on March 25.
    In May 1997, the FAA instituted the requirement that all 
FAA K-9 coordinators participate in FAA K-9 Trained-on-System 
(KATS) training. KATS is an automated system that provides up-
to-date information concerning K-9 proficiency training 
conducted onboard domestic aircraft. The FAA's goal is to 
expand this program to encompass all explosives detection 
training conducted on U.S. aircraft.
Federal Air Marshal
    The Federal Air Marshal (FAM) Program provides an armed 
security force whose mission is to protect the traveling public 
and flightcrews on U.S. air carriers by deterring criminal and 
terrorist acts that target aircraft in flight. FAM's undergo 
specialized law enforcement training and maintain very 
stringent physical fitness and firearms proficiency standards. 
The FAM operational training facility is located at the FAA 
William J. Hughes Technical Center, Atlantic City, New Jersey. 
The FAM force is capable of rapid deployment worldwide. During 
1997, FAM's provided in-flight security on flights of all major 
U.S. air carriers to and from 82 cities in more than 50 
countries. Just knowing that FAM's could be on board aircraft 
may deter individuals planning to interfere with flights.
Dangerous Goods and Cargo Security Program
    The Dangerous Goods and Cargo Security (DG/CS) Program is 
responsible for ensuring that shipments of dangerous goods 
(hazardous materials) and other cargo by air are made safely 
and in accordance with established regulations.
    The DG/CS Program has approached the problem of compliance 
through a combination of enforcement, trend analysis, and 
outreach. Dangerous goods and cargo security inspections are 
being conducted at air freight forwarder facilities, aircraft 
repair stations, and air shipper facilities as well as at air 
carrier facilities.
    Inspections and other program activities are underway at 
foreign locations for air carriers and others involved in the 
air transport of dangerous goods and cargo. Data systems have 
been developed to target shippers or carriers who are repeat 
offenders or who handle materials that present a higher degree 
of danger. In addition, outreach efforts are focusing on 
particular groups demonstrating lax attitudes or ignorance or 
misunderstanding of dangerous goods regulations.
    Focused inspections were conducted in four major cities in 
1997, targeting air carrier repair stations, indirect air 
carriers, air carriers, and shippers. A cargo security special 
emphasis assessment on air carrier small package acceptance was 
performed as well as three cargo security special emphasis 
assessments conducted jointly with the DOT Office of the 
Inspector General. Depending on the violations uncovered, 
responses ranged from consultation and information to proposals 
of civil penalties or even criminal charges.
    A major emphasis in 1997 was the use of conferences, safety 
advisories, brochures, and a new video to educate the public 
and the regulated industry on shipping dangerous goods. The FAA 
has become increasingly involved in ongoing meetings and 
discussions with all major air transport trade associations. 
The FAA distributed a safety advisory that outlined 
requirements for transporting air carrier company materials and 
oxygen generators to approximately 5,000 air carrier repair 
stations. Also, the FAA produced jointly with the DOT Research 
and Special Programs Administration a new video entitled 
``Ensuring Safety: Transporting Hazardous Materials by Air.'' 
The video offers a comprehensive overview of dangerous goods 
regulations to help educate the regulated public.
Courier Shipments Reviewed
    Security controls over accompanied commercial air courier 
shipments underwent closer scrutiny in 1997. The FAA and the 
DOT Office of the Inspector General have been performing 
intensive oversight inspections of such shipments presented for 
flight aboard passenger-carrying aircraft to ensure that: (1) 
air carriers and indirect air carriers are following FAA-
approved security programs; (2) indirect air carriers are 
declaring and documenting all shipments, including hazardous 
materials; and (3) shippers are properly packaging, marking, 
labeling, and documenting all hazardous materials. The FAA 
Office of Civil Aviation Security has been reviewing FAA 
requirements and procedures for accompanied commercial air 
courier shipments.
Cargo Baseline Working Group
    The Cargo Baseline Working Group (CBWG) of the Aviation 
Security Advisory Committee (ASAC), formerly the Cargo Working 
Group (CWG), was formed in September 1996 to develop an 
effective and efficient security baseline for air cargo. Its 
membership includes representatives from all elements of the 
cargo industry. The group provided recommendations to the ASAC 
that were included in the ``ASAC Domestic Security Baseline 
Final Report,'' submitted in September 1996.
    After the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and 
Security recommended that the FAA implement a comprehensive 
plan to address the threat of explosives and other threat 
objects in cargo and that it work with industry to develop new 
cargo security initiatives, the group was reconvened. The CBWG 
compared the White House Commission recommendations with those 
of the ASAC and provided amplified recommendations to the ASAC.
    In May 1997, the FAA issued proposed amendments to the 
standard security programs for U.S. air carriers, couriers, 
freight forwarders, and cargo consolidators as well as the 
model security program for foreign carriers to enhance aviation 
cargo security. Several major changes are being proposed as a 
result of recommendations made by cargo industry 
representatives, including ``known'' versus ``unknown'' shipper 
criteria and specific cargo screening procedures. The revised 
proposed amendments are expected to be published for comment in 
1998.
Drug Interdiction
    Investigations conducted by special agents in the Drug 
Investigations Support Program (DSIP) resulted in 248 airmen 
certificate revocations in 1997. The 248 revocations are due to 
the success of the FAA/Federal Bureau of Prisons and Federal 
Probation and Parole match programs in which inmate, probation, 
and parole records are matched against the Airmen Registry. 
Airmen convicted for drug smuggling are subject to certificate 
action.
    There were also 45 airmen certificate suspensions and 4 
aircraft registration certificate revocations in 1997.
Protecting the Infrastructure
    The FAA continued in 1997 the steady development of its 
Security Risk Management (SRM) Program to implement the 
standards called for in the Department of Justice (DOJ) report 
of June 28, 1995, the recommendations of the President's 
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, and other 
national policy guidance to reduce the vulnerability of the 
agency's employees and critical infrastructure to criminal and 
terrorist attacks.
    In its full scope, the SRM Program is designed to be a 
joint effort on the part of all lines of business within the 
agency to address on a continuing basis the security risk 
management needs of the FAA's more than 47,000 employees and 
contractor personnel. It also ensures the integrity of the 
FAA's critical infrastructure and National Airspace System 
support capability by establishing and maintaining through 
security risk management an acceptable level of risk of 
criminal and terrorist attacks at the agency's more than 1,000 
staffed facilities and 8,500 unstaffed facilities.
    The Administrator created the Facility Security Risk 
Management Committee (FSRMC) in 1995, with representation from 
all FAA lines of business, to oversee and monitor the SRM 
Program and to report to and advise the Administrator on the 
status and conduct of SRM agencywide.
    Joint SRM assessments of the FAA's assets are continuing, 
with priority emphasis on identifying the vulnerabilities and 
risks to FAA personnel and to the agency's other most critical 
assets.
President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP)
    The PCCIP was established in July 1996 to conduct a 
comprehensive review of and recommend a national policy and 
implementation strategy for protecting critical infrastructures 
against physical and cyber threats and ensuring their continued 
operation.
    The PCCIP submitted its report, ``Critical Foundations 
Protecting America's Infrastructures,'' in October 1997. The 
report contains the recommendations of the Vulnerability 
Assessment of the National Airspace System (NAS) to protect the 
modernized NAS from information-based and other attacks.

                    international aviation security

    Aviation security is a worldwide concern. The FAA's 
security efforts are focused primarily on U.S. airports, U.S. 
air carriers, wherever they fly, and foreign air carriers that 
service the United States. But the FAA and other governments 
work together to raise the levels of security provided by all 
air carriers and airports. Global aviation requires global 
cooperation to ensure aviation security.
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
    ICAO is a specialized agency of the United Nations that was 
established by the Chicago Convention in December 1944. ICAO 
establishes international aviation security Standards and 
Recommended Practices (SARP) for its 183 Member States. The 
Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security works 
closely with ICAO to strengthen these standards and to ensure 
compliance with them throughout the international aviation 
system. Amendment 9 to Annex 17 of the Chicago Convention, 
which raises cargo security, was approved by the ICAO council 
to become effective on April 1, 1997, with an implementation 
date of August 1, 1997. The Aviation Security Panel, comprising 
representatives from 15 Member States and a number of industry 
observers, met in September 1997.
    Recognizing the importance of aviation security in ICAO and 
the needs of its expanded aviation security office, the United 
States continues to provide two FAA security specialists for 
ICAO at no expense to the organization. ICAO uses these 
specialists to conduct security surveys and training for 
countries in need throughout the world.
European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC)
    The ECAC is an intergovernmental consultative organization 
that was established in 1955 by the Council of Europe with the 
active support of ICAO. ECAC's objectives are to encourage the 
safe and orderly development of civil aviation to, from, and 
within Europe. The Conference in 1997 comprised 37 Member 
States.
    In the field of security, ECAC's objective is to ensure the 
maximum level of security possible within ECAC and with its 
partners serving its airports. ECAC Member States apply ICAO 
Annex 17 standards and recommended practices. In addition, 
supplementary measures appropriate to the conditions pertaining 
to Europe are promulgated by ECAC through its frequently 
revised security manual. While the aviation security measures 
contained in the manual are not mandatory, the expectation 
within ECAC is that all Member States will comply. The United 
States (FAA), Canada, and Israel have been granted permanent 
observer status on the ECAC Security Committee.
Civil Aviation Security Liaison Officers (CASLO)
    Civil aviation security liaison officers, in all but four 
instances, are located overseas. There currently are 20 CASLO's 
who report directly to the Associate Administrator for Civil 
Aviation Security. They are the primary FAA contacts with U.S. 
embassies and host governments on civil aviation security 
matters. Primary responsibilities include helping U.S. and 
foreign air carriers implement FAA security requirements, the 
exchange of threat information, and onsite FAA coordination 
during aviation security incidents. Appendix II lists CASLO 
locations and the geographic areas covered.
Foreign Air Carrier (FAC) Security
    CFR part 129 requires foreign air carriers operating to the 
United States to submit security programs to the FAA for 
acceptance for their operations to, from, and within the United 
States. The foreign air carriers may adopt the model security 
program (MSP) prepared by the FAA, submit their own security 
programs for review, or refer the FAA to foreign governments 
that perform security procedures at last points of departure to 
the United States.
    At the end of 1997, there were 173 foreign air carriers 
operating to and from the United States that were required to 
have security programs acceptable to the FAA Administrator. All 
foreign air carriers have been required since September 1992 to 
adopt a security program acceptable to the FAA Administrator 
for operations to and from the United States. Foreign air 
carriers have adopted either the FAA's MSP or have submitted 
acceptable programs that meet the performance standards 
contained in the MSP.
    The FAA continuously assesses threats against all foreign 
air carriers and will not hesitate to discuss and, if 
necessary, impose additional security measures to meet any 
threat.
Identical Measures
    The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, passed 
by Congress in April 1996, changed 49 U.S.C. section 44906. 
Formerly, the FAA was required to ensure that passengers were 
provided a level of protection when flying to or from the 
United States on foreign air carriers similar to that provided 
when flying on U.S. air carriers from those same airports. The 
Act changed section 44906 to require foreign air carriers 
traveling to and from U.S. airports to have security measures 
identical to those for U.S. air carriers flying from those same 
airports. A notice of proposed rulemaking on identical security 
measures for foreign air carriers was forwarded in April 1997 
to the Office of the Secretary of Transportation for final 
review.
Foreign Airport Assessments
    Chapter 449 of title 49 of the United States Code requires 
the Secretary of Transportation to assess the effectiveness of 
the security measures maintained at foreign airports: 1) served 
by U.S. airlines; 2) from which foreign airlines provide 
service to the United States; 3) that pose a high risk of 
introducing danger to international travel; 4) and at other 
airports considered appropriate by the Secretary of 
Transportation.
    In 1997, approximately 225 foreign airports qualified for 
assessment under the law; this number fluctuates as changes in 
air carrier service occur. The number of FAA assessments 
conducted at each foreign airport is determined by criteria 
like current resources and threat conditions.
    The FAA focuses resources on those airports that may have 
difficulty sustaining effective security measures. These 
focused efforts include interagency actions to alert aviation 
officials to potential vulnerabilities. This enables the 
respective host governments to take action to resolve security 
concerns before serious deficiencies develop. When the 
determination has been made that a foreign airport does not 
administer and maintain effective security measures, the 
Secretary of Transportation may initiate action such as public 
notification or suspension of service.
    The FAA conducted 80 foreign airport assessments in 1997. 
As a result of these assessments, the FAA sought to strengthen 
the international civil aviation security system by offering 
security enhancement recommendations to airport and government 
officials from multiple countries. Most of the recommendations 
fell into the categories of access control, airport 
administration, passenger screening, airport emergency 
planning, national administration, baggage and cargo security 
controls, and law enforcement support. Onsite training and 
technical assistance were offered on numerous occasions.
    In 1997, a secretarial action for Lagos, Nigeria, was in 
effect. On October 8, 1992, an assessment of Murtala Muhammed 
International Airport in Lagos resulted in the issuance of 
immediate public notification without the usual 90-day action 
notice. As a result of public notification, the FAA provided 
technical assistance and security training to the Nigerian 
Government for 9 months.
    In July 1993, a second assessment was conducted in Lagos. 
On August 11, 1993, the Secretary of Transportation suspended 
air service between the United States and Lagos, citing the 
failure of cognizant authorities to correct deficiencies 
satisfactorily. Another assessment was conducted in April 1994, 
and the Secretary determined that the suspension should remain 
in effect. An interagency team returned to Lagos in November 
1995 to evaluate the impact of corruption on aviation security. 
As of the end of 1997, the Secretary's suspension order 
remained in place.
International Aviation Security Training
    The FAA provides aviation security training to 
international airport managers from developing countries. In 
1997, 187 students from 5 countries attended training at the 
FAA Academy in Oklahoma City and in Saudi Arabia. Courses and 
student distribution are listed in Appendix I.
    The FAA also participates in the Department of State (DOS) 
Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (ATAP). This program provides 
technical assistance to foreign countries by conducting 
training needs surveys of foreign airports. The results may 
lead to ATAP's providing either the aviation security training 
or technical support, or both, necessary to bring the airport 
into compliance with ICAO standards.
    Senior foreign government officials responsible for 
aviation security participate in intensive training programs 
that enhance their ability to administer comprehensive programs 
designed to prevent or deter violent criminal acts against 
aviation. This cooperative effort with DOS ensures that the 
security concepts and techniques are integrated and applied 
worldwide to enhance aviation safety and security.
    In 1997, ATAP provided technical assistance to Ethiopia, 
and training needs surveys were conducted in Saudi Arabia, 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Yemen, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, 
and Kuwait. Also, ATAP provided training for students from El 
Salvador, Senegal, Malaysia, Honduras, and Saudi Arabia in 
airport security management at the FAA Academy in Oklahoma City 
and in Saudi Arabia.

            Conclusion: Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation

    During 1997, the FAA continued its efforts to implement the 
recommendations of the White House Commission on Aviation 
Safety and Security, demonstrating its commitment to 
strengthening the security of the U.S. civil aviation system. 
Aviation security partnerships, legislation, funding, and the 
application of additional and enhanced security measures have 
made the U.S. aviation system less vulnerable to criminal and 
terrorist acts. Continuing to apply additional Federal, State, 
local, and aviation industry resources to combating criminal 
and terrorist acts against U.S. civil aviation should help 
ensure that the U.S. civil aviation will remain the safest and 
most secure aviation system in the world.
    When TWA flight 800 exploded in midair off Long Island in 
July 1996, a bomb explosion or a missile attack was suspected. 
Although the National Transportation Safety Board has not 
determined the exact cause of the crash, it has ruled out the 
possibility of a bomb or a missile and believes that 
catastrophic mechanical failure was to blame.
    Nearly 10 years have passed since the last bombing of a 
U.S. civil aviation aircraft--Pan Am flight 103 in 1988. The 
threat of such an attack against U.S. civil aviation has not 
disappeared, however, as proven by events of several years ago.
    In January 1995, Philippine police uncovered a plot to blow 
up as many as 12 U.S. airliners operating from the Pacific 
region. This plot involved the placing of explosive devices on 
U.S. air carriers operating from overseas locations. The 
mastermind of the plot, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, was convicted in a 
U.S. court in September 1996 for his role in this conspiracy 
and for placing a device on a Philippine Airlines plane in 
December 1994. The device exploded while the plane was in 
midair, killing one passenger.
    Yousef was convicted in November 1997 on conspiracy and 
bombing-related charges stemming from the 1993 World Trade 
Center bombing. This attack, as well as a separate and 
unrelated 1993 plot to bomb a number of targets in New York 
City, demonstrated that foreign terrorists have the capability 
and intention to target the United States.
    In 1997, there was one incident worldwide involving the 
detonation of a bomb aboard an aircraft. The incident occurred 
in September in Brazil on a domestic airliner during an 
internal flight. A passenger who apparently was suicidal 
brought the bomb on the plane. He reportedly was injured in the 
midair explosion, but another passenger fell through a hole in 
the fuselage created by the blast and was killed.
    There were no hijackings recorded either in the United 
States or aboard U.S.-registered aircraft in 1997. The last 
hijacking in the United States, and the most recent incident 
involving a U.S. air carrier, occurred in 1991. Only one 
hijacking incident has occurred aboard a U.S.-bound, foreign-
registered aircraft in the past 5 years. In December 1993, an 
Air China flight from Beijing, China, to New York's John F. 
Kennedy International Airport was diverted to Shanghai after a 
passenger claimed to have a bomb and demanded to be taken to 
Taiwan.
    During the past 5 years, 87 hijackings have been recorded 
worldwide. The majority of these incidents took place on 
domestic (internal) routes; only 25 aircraft were on 
international flights. Ten hijackings were recorded in 1997, 
including eight on domestic flights.
    The overall number of incidents can serve as a rough index 
of the level of criminal activity involving commercial 
aircraft. Because of the differences in situations specific to 
individual countries and varying motivations among 
perpetrators, any generalizations must be very carefully drawn.

                               APPENDIX I

                        FAA Training Distribution
------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Course Title                 FAA        Non-FAA       Int'l
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CAS Instructor Development          55
 Workshop (70000)
CAS On-the-Job Instructor Training  12
 (70001)
FAA Investigations (70020)          46
FAA Facilities Inspections (70023)  18
International Airport Assessments   44
 and Inspections (70026)
CAS Special Agent (CORE) Training   192
 (70028)
CAS Countermeasures Technology-     117
 CORE (70029)
Security Countermeasures/           141
 Technology Seminar for Current
 Sup/Mgr/CASI (70030)
Airport and Air Carrier Compliance  41
 and Enforcement (70034)
Air Transportation of Dangerous     65
 Goods-Basic (70401)
Cargo Security-Basic (70402)        50
DG-Cargo Coordinators Seminar-DC    23
 (70403)
DG Attorney Course-Basic Overview   20
 (70404)
Technical Briefing for DG Outreach  11
 (70470)
Canine Coordinators Seminar-CMD     39
 (70500)
DG Refresher-IVT (75200)            91
Civil Aviation Security-            ..........  .............  19
 International (70013)
CAS Seminar for International       ..........  .............  27
 (Tuition) (72100)
Communications Security (COMSEC)    9
 Account Management/STU III
 (70300)
Civil Aviation Security Seminar     ..........  131
 (70012) 1
DOS ATAP Airport Security           ..........  .............  93
 Management Course-Oklahoma City 2
DOS ATAP Airport Security           ..........  .............  48
 Management Seminar-Saudi Arabia
Total Students                      974         131            187
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Five classes were conducted at the following locations: Dulles/
  Washington, DC; Palm Beach, Florida; Grand Rapids, Michigan; Columbus,
  Ohio; San Francisco, California.
2 Four classes were conducted for participants from the following
  countries: El Salvador; Senegal; Malaysia; Honduras.

                              Appendix II

                      Civil Aviation Security Liaison Officers Locations and Areas Covered
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Location                                               Area Covered
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paris                                 France, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Senegal
Vienna                                Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Slovenia, Bosnia-
                                       Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro
Rome                                  Italy, Israel, Turkey, Lebanon, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait
Copenhagen                            Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland
Athens                                Greece, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania, Cyprus, Egypt
Frankfurt                             Germany, South and East Africa
London                                United Kingdom, Ireland, Iceland
Madrid                                Spain, Portugal, Cape Verde, Ghana
Brussels                              Switzerland, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg
Brussels                              Poland, Commonwealth of Independent States, Baltic States, Ukraine,
                                       Russian Federation
Sydney                                Australia, New Zealand, Pacific Islands, Micronesia
Bangkok                               Thailand, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Taiwan, China, Laos, Cambodia
Singapore                             Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Brunei, India, Pakistan
Tokyo                                 Japan, Korea
Buenos Aires                          Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay
Manila                                Philippines
Miami (3)                             1) Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua; 2)
                                       Colombia, Ecuador, French Guiana, Guyana, Panama, Peru, Suriname,
                                       Venezuela; 3) Caribbean Islands
Dallas-Ft. Worth                      Mexico
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


b. Office of the Inspector General Audit Report--Security for Passenger 
                Terminals and Vessels, U.S. Coast Guard

 Memorandum from the Office of the Inspector General for Maritime and 
Departmental Programs (MA-1988-204), to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Coast 
Guard, September 11, 1998

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    This report presents the results of our audit of U.S. Coast 
Guard oversight of security for passenger terminals and 
vessels. The objective of our audit was to determine whether 
the Coast Guard ensures operators of passenger terminals and 
passenger vessels have security plans intended to safeguard 
passengers and property.
    Security plans are intended to prevent or deter 
unauthorized access and the introduction of prohibited weapons, 
incendiaries, and explosives into/onto passenger terminals and 
vessels. The plans must provide the means to meet requirements 
for low, medium, and high security threat levels. At low threat 
levels, an unlawful act against a terminal or vessel is 
possible but not likely. This is the level for which operators 
must maintain security indefinitely, i.e., these are normal, 
everyday security measures. Comparatively, during high threat 
levels, operators must increase security measures because an 
unlawful act against a terminal or vessel is considered 
probable or imminent, and intelligence indicates terrorists 
have chosen specific targets. At the time of our audit, the 
Department of Transportation's Office of Intelligence and 
Security considers the overall threat of maritime terrorism in 
the United States as low.

                            Results-In-Brief

    The Coast Guard has been effective in ensuring that 
operators of passenger terminals and vessels have security 
plans intended to safeguard passengers and property. The Coast 
Guard identified 66 passenger terminal facilities and 133 
passenger vessels, all cruise ships, requiring security plans. 
We found the Coast Guard had security plans for each of the 
cruise ships and all but one of the terminal facilities. The 
Coast Guard was working with the Government of Samoa to obtain 
a security plan for the remaining terminal facility.
    From January 1997-August 1998, the Coast Guard issued 11 
Domestic Threat Advisories based on information from the 
Department of Transportation's Office of Intelligence and 
Security regarding potential terrorist threats. None of the 
Threat Advisories resulted in an increased threat level for 
passenger facilities and vessels.
    The Coast Guard also made cursory assessments of compliance 
with security plans at passenger terminals and onboard 
passenger vessels while performing other required inspections. 
We confirmed that at the time of our visit, security practices 
for four cruise ships were consistent with security plans.
    We also confirmed a previous Coast Guard determination that 
security practices at the Port of Miami were not consistent 
with security plans. As a result, the Captain of the Port for 
the Marine Safety Office directed all operators of passenger 
terminals within its jurisdiction to update their security 
surveys and provide any proposed changes to their terminal 
security plans for review.

                               Background

    In 1985, terrorists killed a United States citizen during 
the seizure of the cruise ship Achille Lauro. The following 
year, Congress enacted the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and 
Antiterrorism Act. Title IX, which constitutes the 
International Maritime and Port Security Act, provides the 
Coast Guard with the authority to prevent or respond to acts of 
terrorism on navigable waters, at ports, and on vessels subject 
to U.S. jurisdiction. Also, in 1986 the United Nation's 
International Maritime Organization published Circular 443 
``Measures to Prevent Unlawful Acts Against Passengers and 
Crews on Board Ships'' to provide member governments with 
guidance for reviewing and strengthening port and onboard 
security.
    In subsequent years, the Coast Guard encouraged voluntary 
compliance with International Maritime Organization Circular 
443. However, the Coast Guard found that voluntary compliance 
did not produce the industry-wide level of security necessary 
to ensure that acts of terrorism are deterred, or responded to, 
in the best possible manner. Consequently, in 1996, the Coast 
Guard published Title 33 Code of Federal Regulations Part 120, 
Security of Passenger Vessels, and Part 128, Security of 
Passenger Terminals, as an interim rule. These regulations 
require operators of passenger vessels and passenger terminals 
to submit security plans, implementing the measures included in 
International Maritime Organization Circular 443, to the Coast 
Guard by October 16, 1996, or at least 60 days before embarking 
or transferring passengers, whichever is later. The final rule 
will be effective on October 1, 1998 with little change from 
the interim rule.
    As of January 1998, the Coast Guard had identified 66 
passenger terminal facilities and 133 passenger vessels, all 
cruise ships, requiring security plans. Cruise ships can 
accommodate up to 3,000 passengers. In 1997, the North American 
cruise ship market served 5 million passengers, according to 
statistics kept by the Cruise Lines International Association. 
By the year 2000, this market is expected to serve 7 million 
passengers annually.

                         Scope and Methodology

    We conducted our audit during January through June 1998 in 
the Coast Guard Marine Safety and Environmental Protection 
Directorate, Office of Compliance in Washington, D.C.; the 
National Maritime Center in Arlington, Virginia; and marine 
safety offices in Long Beach, California and Miami, Florida. 
Also, we conducted our audit in the Department of 
Transportation's Office of Intelligence and Security; in 
passenger terminal facilities for the World Cruise Center in 
Los Angeles, California and the Port of Miami in Miami, 
Florida; onboard the cruise ships Jubilee, Viking Serenade, 
Leeward, and Grandeur of the Seas; and in offices for the 
Federal Bureau of Investigations in Long Beach, California. 
Further, we discussed terminal and cruise ship security with 
the Vice President of International Operations for the 
International Council of Cruise Lines. The audit covered the 
period October 1996 through June 1998.
    We conducted our audit in accordance with Government 
Auditing Standards prescribed by the Comptroller General of the 
United States. To address our objectives, we reviewed 
legislation, regulations, and Coast Guard guidance, procedures, 
and management controls. Also, we reviewed 17 security plans (2 
terminal facilities and 15 cruise ships) to determine whether 
they met regulatory requirements. Further, we observed security 
practices for a low threat level at both of the terminal 
facilities and onboard 4 of the 15 cruise ships to determine 
whether operators followed security plans. We did not observe 
security practices that would be required at medium or high 
threat levels.
    Exhibit A identifies the facilities and vessels included in 
our audit. We reviewed personnel rosters, training records, and 
security reports at terminal facilities and onboard cruise 
ships. We also reviewed security surveys, vulnerability 
assessments, and other records kept by Coast Guard marine 
safety offices in Long Beach and Miami.

                                Results

    The Coast Guard ensured that operators of passenger 
terminals and passenger vessels had security plans intended to 
safeguard passengers and property against unlawful acts. The 
Coast Guard also made cursory assessments of compliance with 
security plans at passenger terminals and onboard passenger 
vessels while performing other required inspections. We 
confirmed that at the time of our visit, security practices for 
the four cruise ships visited were consistent with security 
plans. Further, we confirmed Coast Guard findings that security 
practices need strengthening at the Port of Miami.

        operators had security plans examined by the coast guard

    Coast Guard Captains of the Port and the Coast Guard 
National Maritime Center examine security plans for passenger 
terminals and vessels, respectively, to determine whether they 
articulate the security program required by Federal 
regulations. The Coast Guard does not approve security plans. 
However, the Coast Guard requires Captains of the Port and the 
National Maritime Center to return plans not meeting Federal 
requirements to terminal and vessel operators, with an 
explanation of why the plans do not meet the requirements. 
Further, Captains of the Port may terminate operations if a 
passenger terminal or passenger vessel does not have a plan, or 
a letter from the Coast Guard stating normal operations may 
continue until the Coast Guard examines the plan.
    Title 33 Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 120 and 128, 
state that security plans must conform to International 
Maritime Organization Circular 443. Coast, Guard Navigation and 
Inspection Circular 3-96 includes the Security Plan Evaluation 
Guide, which the Coast Guard developed using the guidelines 
contained in International Maritime Organization Circular 443. 
This circular provides the Coast Guard and industry with 
guidance regarding the examination of plans and security 
measures that passenger terminals and vessels should take at 
low, medium, and high threat levels.
    In January 1998, we contacted each of the Coast Guard's 
marine safety offices to identify passenger terminal facilities 
requiring security plans. We identified 66 terminal facilities. 
Captains of the Port had examined security plans for 65 of 
these facilities, finding the plans met the requirements of 33 
Code of Federal Regulations 128. As of July 1998, the marine 
safety office in Honolulu, Hawaii was working with the 
Government of Samoa to develop a security plan for the 
remaining facility, which processes about 10,000 passengers 
annually.
    Also in January 1998, the National Maritime Center had 
identified 133 passenger vessels, all cruise ships, requiring 
security plans. The National Maritime Center found each of 
these plans met the requirements of 33 Code of Federal 
Regulations 120. The Coast Guard relies on Captains of the Port 
to verify, during annual safety examinations, that passenger 
vessels have security plans. According to the Chief for the 
Center's Passenger Vessel Security Division, Captains of the 
Port have not identified any passenger vessels operating 
without a security plan examined by the Coast Guard.
    The Coast Guard's Security Plan Evaluation Guide identifies 
the areas - 12 for terminals and 11 for vessels - that 
operators should cover in their security plans. To confirm 
whether operators covered these areas, we reviewed security 
plans for the World Cruise Center in Los Angeles, the Port of 
Miami, and 15 cruise ships. We found that, with few exceptions, 
security plans conformed to the Security Plan Evaluation Guide. 
Specifically, the World Cruise Center did not cover the use of 
barriers for security, neither the World Cruise Center nor the 
Port of Miami covered lighting for security during darkness, 
and one cruise ship did not cover the use of alarms.
    However, these omissions did not adversely affect security 
for the terminals and the cruise ship. During our on-site 
visits, we observed that the World Cruise Center used barriers 
to keep people away from restricted areas; the World Cruise 
Center and the Port of Miami provided security lighting between 
sunset and sunrise; and the cruise ship used closed circuit 
television to monitor restricted areas as an alternative to 
alarms. Exhibit B summarizes the results of our review.

                    threat levels are considered low

    In addition to examining security activities for passenger 
terminals and vessels, Coast Guard Captains of the Port conduct 
port vulnerability assessments annually for every passenger 
vessel terminal within their areas of responsibility. For 1997, 
the vulnerabilities for the World Cruise Center and the Port of 
Miami were assessed at the midpoint of a five point scale (Very 
Low-Very High). The vulnerability assessments look at factors 
such as the location and layout of the terminal, dependence on 
essential services, access points, security staff, and existing 
security measures. The Department of Transportation's Office of 
Intelligence and Security includes the results of the 
assessments in its annual report to Congress on the threat from 
acts of terrorism to the maritime community.
    Further, the Department of Transportation Office of 
Intelligence and Security issues Information Circulars to 
inform the various transportation modes about potential 
terrorist threats. Based on the Information Circulars, the 
Coast Guard issued 11 Domestic Threat Advisories during January 
1997- August 1998. None of the Threat Advisories resulted in an 
increased threat level.
    The Navigation and Inspection Circular 3-96, notes that at 
high threat levels Captains of the Port and other appropriate 
Federal agencies will be actively involved in assuring the 
security of affected vessels and terminals. The Federal Bureau 
of Investigation is the designated lead agency for response to 
domestic maritime terrorist incidents.

 coast guard made cursory assessments of compliance with security plans

    Navigation and Inspection Circular 3-96 requires Captains 
of the Port to annually ``examine'' security activities for 
passenger terminals and vessels. The scope of these 
examinations is intended to be limited. These examinations are 
in addition to other routine inspections required to be made by 
the Coast Guard. According to a 1994 Coast Guard assessment, 
the ``examination'' for a passenger terminal should take 25 
minutes: 5 minutes to verify a security plan, 5 minutes to 
review reports of unlawful acts, and 15 minutes to observe 
security practices. The ``examination'' for a vessel should 
take 10 minutes: 5 minutes to verify a security plan and 5 
minutes to review reports of unlawful acts.
    World Cruise Center: The Coast Guard's marine safety office 
in Long Beach was examining security activities for passenger 
terminal facilities at the World Cruise Center. To illustrate, 
in August 1997, inspectors examined the process used by the 
World Cruise Center to check-in passengers. At the same time, 
the inspectors examined measures for identifying people using 
the World Cruise Center, such as baggage handlers and security 
forces. Further, in January 1998, inspectors examined terminal 
lighting and night time security, and security when passengers, 
visitors, and crewmembers transferred to/from three different 
ships. These examinations did not disclose significant security 
deficiencies.
    During our visit, we confirmed that security practices, 
employed during our visit, were consistent with security plans 
at the World Cruise Center. We observed security forces testing 
screening equipment, placing vehicle and pedestrian traffic 
flow devices, and testing gates and doors. During the 
disembarking and boarding of passengers, security guards kept 
vehicles from accessing restricted terminal facilities such as 
piers, warehouse areas, and the ship gangways. Also, security 
guards kept us from entering restricted areas. We observed 
security guards processing all passengers through a metal 
detector, and X-raying all hand-carried property as well as 
randomly selected cabin baggage. Additionally, security guards 
observed ship stores and provisions being loaded aboard ships.
    Port of Miami: The Coast Guard's marine safety office in 
Miami was examining security activities for passenger terminal 
facilities at the Port of Miami. To illustrate, in January 
1998, inspectors examined terminal facilities and tested 
shoreside and shipboard security. The examination disclosed 
security deficiencies such as unlocked doors to restricted 
areas, inadequate screening of persons seeking access to 
terminal facilities, and inadequate or damaged fencing and 
gates. Further, the inspectors gained unauthorized access to a 
cruise ship, including the ship's bridge. As a result of the 
Coast Guard's examination, the Port of Miami agreed to take 
various actions to correct security deficiencies, such as 
equipping doors with locks to prevent unauthorized opening, 
reviewing procedures for screening persons, installing higher 
fencing, and repairing gates.
    During our visit in June 1998, we found security practices 
at the Port of Miami were still not consistent with security 
plans. We gained entry, unchallenged, through several 
restricted areas to ship gangways. However, security guards 
kept us from boarding the ships. Also, terminal personnel such 
as stevedores, porters, and truck drivers frequently did not 
display required identification cards. Further, metal detection 
equipment, operated in terminal facilities for one of the two 
ships visited, did not work properly for hand-carried property. 
To illustrate, the equipment did not identify a heavy metal 
belt buckle worn by a Coast Guard inspector accompanying us 
during our visit. We also found security personnel did not 
randomly screen cabin baggage--one cruise line informed us they 
first began screening cabin baggage the day of our visit and 
the other has never screened cabin baggage.
    As a result of our findings of continuing security 
deficiencies at the Port of Miami, the Captain of the Port for 
the Coast Guard Marine Safety Office in Miami directed all 
operators of passenger terminals within its jurisdiction to 
update their security surveys. Further, operators were directed 
to provide the Captain of the Port with proposed changes to 
their terminal security plans for review.
    Passenger Vessels: Coast Guard inspection activity reports 
show marine safety offices made safety inspections for the 
cruise ships Jubilee, Viking Serenade, Leeward, and Grandeur of 
the Seas within the past year. These inspections did not 
identify any security deficiencies. We found security practices 
for the four cruise ships, on the day we visited, were 
consistent with security plans. We observed staff screening 
passengers through the use of non-picture identification cards 
that were cross-matched to passenger rosters; visitors through 
a sign in/out log; and ship's crew through picture 
identification cards. Also, staff kept daily records of 
security routines and incidents. While each of the four ships 
experienced incidents such as quarrels between passengers and/
or ship's crew, only one ship experienced an unlawful act that 
required reporting to the Coast Guard. The operator properly 
reported this act.

                 Government Performance and Results Act

    The Government Performance and Results Act requires each 
agency to develop a strategic plan that includes objective, 
quantifiable, and measurable performance goals for 
accomplishing major program activities. The Coast Guard's 1998 
Performance Plan for the Marine Safety and Environmental 
Protection Program includes a goal to ``Reduce risk from 
terrorism to U.S. passengers at foreign and domestic ports and 
designated waterfront facilities.'' The Coast Guard is 
developing performance measures, strategies, and activities to 
achieve this goal.

                             Recommendation

    We recommend that the Chief of Staff direct the Captain of 
the Port for the Marine Safety Office in Miami to conduct a 
followup inspection to ensure that operators of passenger 
terminals at the Port of Miami take necessary actions to 
correct security practices.

                            Action Required

    Please provide a written response to our recommendation 
within 30 days. We appreciate the courtesies and cooperation of 
Coast Guard representatives. Please call me at (202) 493-0331 
or Jerome Persh at (202) 366-1504, if you have any questions 
concerning this report.

                               Exhibit A

       Passenger Terminal Facilities and Vessels Included in Audit
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      Plans Reviewed   Security Observed
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Terminals
Port of Los Angeles (World Cruise   x                  x
 Center)
Port of Miami                       x                  x

Operators/Vessels
Carnival Cruise Lines
  MS Celebration                    x
  MS Jubilee                        x                  x
Norwegian Cruise Line
  MS Norwegian Majesty              x
  MS Leeward                        x                  x
  MS Windward                       x
Royal Caribbean International
  MS Nordic Empress                 x
  MS Grandeur of the Seas           x                  x
  MS Viking Serenade                x                  x
Costa Cruise Lines
  MV Costa Victoria                 x
Premier Cruises
  SS Seabreeze                      x
Holland American Line
  MS Noordam                        x
  MS Ryndam                         x
Celebrity Cruises Inc.
  MS Century                        x
Princess Cruises
  Dawn Princess                     x
International Shipping Partners
  MS Regal Empress                  x
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               Exhibit B

                    Summary: Review of Security Plans
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             Vessels         Terminals
     Development of Security Plans      --------------------------------
                                           YES      NO      YES     NO
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Does the plan identify the Security   15       0       2       0
 Officer?
2. Does the security plan contain        15       0       2       0
 standard operating procedures for
 responding to security violations?
3. Does the plan specify that alarms,    14       1       2       0
 when used, are to activate an audible
 or visual alarm in a permanently
 manned station?
4. Does the plan address lighting for    15       0       0       2
 security during darkness?
5. Does the plan specify the kind of     15       0       2       0
 communications to be used for a breach
 of security, an unlawful act, or other
 emergency?
6. Does the plan require that            15       0       2       0
 screening, when conducted, be done
 manually, electronically, or by an
 equivalent means acceptable to the
 Coast Guard?
7. Does the plan require that each       15       0       2       0
 piece of baggage be marked, labeled or
 tagged, or otherwise identified as
 belonging to a particular passenger?
8. Does the plan describe the system     15       0       2       0
 used to identify and control
 personnel?
9. Does the plan outline designated      15       0       2       0
 restricted areas?
10. Does the plan outline coordination   15       0       2       0
 plans and procedures between vessels
 and terminal facilities?
11. Does the plan include required       15       0       2       0
 actions for low, medium, and high
 threat levels?
12. Does the plan include a requirement  N/A      N/A     1       1
 that barriers and their boundaries,
 when used between restricted and
 unrestricted areas in the terminal
 area, be clearly defined by walls,
 fences, environmental design, or other
 security barriers that are either
 permanent or temporary?
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NA--Not applicable.


  c. White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security--The DOT 
                             Status Report

Partial text of the DOT Status Report implementing the recommendations 
   of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security \1\

                           Executive Summary

    One year ago, the White House Commission on Aviation Safety 
issued its final report. The Department of Transportation 
(DOT), the Departments of Defense, Justice, State, and 
Treasury, the National Transportation Safety Board, the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration and numerous 
other Federal agencies have made significant progress 
implementing the Commission's recommendations. Together, with 
our partners in the aviation community, the federal government 
has worked to change the way we do business.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The full text of this report is available on the DoT Web site 
at http://www.dot.gov.affairs/whcoasas.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The federal government has established the Commission's 
proposed safety goal as our primary safety goal. We are 
committed to reduce the aviation fatal accident rate by a 
factor of five within 10 years (Recommendation 1.1). Both the 
DOT and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) have adopted the goal in their new strategic plans, and 
incorporated means of measuring the progression of this goal in 
their performance agreements. The Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) has set out a strategic goal of reducing 
the aviation fatal accident rate 80 percent by 2007. NASA has 
also set a longer-range goal of reducing the fatal accident 
rate by a factor of 10 within 20 years. FAA and NASA are 
tailoring their research and program plans to achieve these 
goals.
    Aviation security has been established as a national 
security priority (Recommendation 3.1). The President has 
publicly recognized aviation as a major element of our strategy 
against terrorism, and the White House publication A National 
Security Strategy for a New Century includes aviation security 
as a critical element. The DOT Strategic Plan specifically 
recognizes aviation security as a key component in advancing 
the nation's vital security interests. The National Security 
Council has established a subgroup, headed by the DOT and 
including all agencies involved in aviation security, to 
address the White House Commission security recommendations 
specifically.
    Over the past year, the following White House Commission 
recommendations have been completed.

   The Department has instituted into its rulemaking 
        practices a policy to ensure that costs alone are not 
        dispositive in the rulemaking process (Recommendation 
        1.5). The new policy recognizes the importance of both 
        tangible and intangible benefits of rules, the need for 
        risk analysis and examination of potential mitigation 
        measures, and the need to identify and act on high-risk 
        potential accident causes before accidents occur.
   The FAA is continuing to explore innovative means to 
        accelerate the installation of advanced avionics in 
        general aviation aircraft (Recommendation 2.3) as part 
        of its Advanced General Aviation Transport Experiments 
        (AGATE). The goal is to improve general aviation safety 
        and improve access to the airspace system. FAA is 
        revising two Advisory Circulars (AC) on certification, 
        and a new RTCA task force is reviewing avionics 
        certification processes. Flight 2000, FAA's program to 
        demonstrate and validate new National Airspace System 
        (NAS) capabilities, also will validate avionics, 
        including low-cost weather data link systems for 
        general aviation aircraft.
   In September 1997, the National Civil Aviation 
        Review Commission (NCARC) released its Recommendations 
        on ways for the users of the National Airspace System 
        (NAS) to fund its development and operation 
        (Recommendation 2.5). A new FAA reauthorization 
        proposal will address those recommendations.
   The FAA identified and justified the frequency 
        spectrum necessary for the transition to a modernized 
        air traffic control system (Recommendation 2.6) and 
        released its study in July 1997. The results will be 
        incorporated into the next Federal Radionavigation 
        Plan. FAA is continuing to address the sufficiency of 
        the radio frequency spectrum to support the 
        communication needs of the NAS.
   The Department of Transportation issued on February 
        12, 1997, a final rule to improve passenger manifests 
        (Recommendation 3.26) by requiring more information on 
        passenger manifests for flights to or from the United 
        States.
   In June 1997 FAA submitted a proposed resolution, 
        through the U.S. Representative, that the International 
        Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) begin a program to 
        verify and improve compliance with international 
        security standards (Recommendation 3.8). ICAO has not 
        yet adopted the resolution, which the United States 
        continues to support.
   DOT strengthened its working relationship with the 
        Departments of Defense, Energy, and other Federal 
        agencies and local authorities to assess the possible 
        use of chemical and biological weapons as tools of 
        terrorism (Recommendation 3.9). Interagency activities 
        are ongoing.
   The Department of Defense (DOD) has established an 
        interagency task force to assess the potential use of 
        surface-to-air missiles against commercial aircraft 
        (Recommendation 3.17.) DOD convened the task force and 
        held its first meeting on May 12, 1997.
   FAA has given properly cleared airline and airport 
        security personnel access to needed classified 
        information (Recommendation 3.23). Industry officials, 
        with appropriate security clearances, are now routinely 
        provided classified information regarding threats.
   The FBI significantly increased the number of agents 
        assigned to counter-terrorism investigations to improve 
        intelligence and crisis response (Recommendation 3.27). 
        Congress provided funding and FBI deployed 644 Special 
        Agents, 620 support positions, and additional funding 
        for investigations, intelligence gathering, forensic 
        analysis, and crisis management.
   The FAA has been a full partner with the Department 
        of State in providing anti-terrorism assistance through 
        airport security training to countries where there are 
        airports served by airlines flying to the United States 
        (Recommendation 3.28). The Department of State and FAA 
        provide airport security training through the Anti-
        Terrorism Assistance Training Program (ATAP.)
   The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
        finalized a coordinated federal response plan to 
        aviation disasters (Recommendation 4.1). The plan has 
        been implemented in four aviation disasters, including 
        the Korean Air 801 disaster in August 1997 at Guam.
   The Department of Transportation and the NTSB have 
        implemented key provisions of the Aviation Disaster 
        Family Assistance Act of 1996 (Recommendation 4.3.) The 
        Secretary's Task Force on the Assistance to Families of 
        Aviation Disasters was appointed in March 1997. It 
        issued its report, containing 61 recommendations, to 
        Congress and the Vice President in October 1997. The 
        government and industry are implementing many of the 
        Task Force's recommendations.

    Beyond the fully completed recommendations, DOT, FAA, and 
other agencies have made substantial progress toward 
implementing virtually all the remaining recommendations. 
Highlights include:

   The new passenger screening system, Computer 
        Assisted Passenger Screening (CAPS), was prototyped, 
        tested with Northwest Airlines in 1997, and is being 
        phased in by U.S. airlines in 1998. FAA tested 
        passenger bag matching in 1997 and, on January 1, 1998, 
        augmented the bag-matching program in conjunction with 
        both manual screening and CAPS. After a thorough 
        review, the Department of Justice concluded that the 
        screening system did not violate the civil rights of 
        any individuals.
   FAA hired 375 new safety inspectors and created a 
        group to provide analytical support to field offices 
        and target inspector oversight where it is most needed.
   Some 79 certified explosives detection systems and 
        advanced technologies for screening of checked bags 
        were purchased in 1997. Deployment will be completed in 
        1998. In addition, over 50 trace explosives detection 
        devices were deployed in 1997, bringing the total in 
        place from 78 to 128. About 365 more trace detection 
        devices will be purchased and installed by the end of 
        1998.
   NASA has reprogrammed $500 million to invest in 
        safety research over the next five years. They have 
        identified a lead research center for safety research 
        and established a program management staff throughout 
        NASA Centers.
   The FAA and NASA are working as partners to develop 
        a research plan to achieve the national aviation safety 
        goal of an 80 percent reduction in aviation fatal 
        accidents in 10 years. Both agencies will work with 
        industry to create and install new safety technology as 
        quickly as possible. This work will assist FAA in 
        implementing many of the safety recommendations.
   Notices of Proposed Rulemakings (NPRM) have been 
        drafted or issued on Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning 
        Systems in aircraft; improved standards for 
        certification of foreign aircraft repair stations 
        worldwide; amended criteria for certification of 
        explosives detection systems to include detonators; 
        computer assisted passenger screening; and expanded 
        applicability of rules concerning criminal background 
        checks and FBI fingerprint checks to all screeners and 
        their supervisors. An Advanced NPRM was published on 
        the certification of security screening companies.
   The FAA and NASA have developed a human factors plan 
        to address the implementation of items included in 
        three key reports: The National Human Factors Plan; the 
        1997 Aviation Safety Plan; and a report on flight deck 
        human factors. In addition, FAA coordinated an FAA/
        NASA/DOD Aviation Safety Program, strengthened 
        collaborative safety research efforts, identified new 
        safety research requirements, and are executing a 
        research plan for a flight deck automation study.
   The FAA and the National Academy of Sciences signed 
        an agreement to create a panel for the Assessment of 
        Technologies for Aviation Security.
   Cooperative research agreements and partnerships 
        have been established to develop new security 
        technology.
   The DOT is continuing its efforts to ensure the 
        accuracy, availability, and reliability of the Global 
        Positioning System (GPS) as part of a worldwide Global 
        Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). This includes 
        measures to provide secure uninterrupted civilian 
        access to the GPS carrier; work with the Department of 
        Defense on a plan for a second GPS frequency; and work 
        with international organizations on how to detect and 
        protect GNSS from potential interference. The DOT and 
        the Departments of State and Commerce are encouraging 
        worldwide use of GPS in international forums. FAA has 
        agreements with 14 nations that ensure the use of U.S. 
        GPS standards around the world.
   The Administration is supporting legislation 
        introduced in Congress to ensure equitable treatment 
        for families of passengers involved in international 
        aviation disasters. It is also is supporting 
        legislation to amend the Death on the High Seas Act 
        which would enable the family members of those killed 
        in international aviation disasters to obtain fair 
        compensation.
    This report summarizes accomplishments toward achieving the 
57 recommendations in the White House Commission report and 
discusses some of the issues that will affect implementation in 
the future. The federal government and its partners in the 
aviation community are fully committed to continuing 
implementation in the years ahead.

White House Commission Recommendations:

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                  3. improving security for travelers

3.1--The federal government should consider aviation security as a 
        national security issue, and provide substantial funding for 
        capital improvements.
   The President recognized aviation security as a 
        major element of our strategy against terrorism, and 
        then sought funding for the deployment of advanced 
        security equipment. The Congress did its part by 
        passing two important laws authorizing and funding the 
        initial recommendations: the Omnibus Consolidated 
        Appropriations Act signed by the President on September 
        30, and the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act signed 
        October 9, 1996.
   By the end of October 1996, FAA had formed a team of 
        acquisition and security experts from government, 
        airport authorities and air carriers to plan, purchase 
        and install explosives detection devices and other 
        advanced security equipment at many of the busiest U.S. 
        airports. Continued federal funding at a minimum level 
        of $100 million a year for several years is necessary 
        to efficiently continue capital improvements that are 
        more fully described under recommendations 3.15 and 
        3.20. To continue this effort the FAA is requesting 
        $100 million in funding in FY 1999.
3.2--The FAA should establish federally mandated standards for security 
        enhancements.
   Standards for the certification and use of 
        equipment, and the training and performance of security 
        personnel are an integral part of improvements required 
        by many other recommendations. The Aviation Security 
        Improvement Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-604) states that 
        prior to a requirement for deployment of explosives 
        detection systems (EDS), the FAA must certify that EDS 
        performance meets standards based upon the amount and 
        types of explosives likely to be used to cause 
        catastrophic damage to commercial aircraft, derived 
        from test results using independently developed test 
        protocols. The Act further requires that certified 
        equipment must be able to detect such amounts under 
        realistic air carrier operating conditions. All of this 
        has been done.
   In November 1992, FAA issued the draft EDS standard 
        and the National Academy of Sciences completed final 
        certification test protocols in May 1993. FAA developed 
        coordinated standards with the scientific and 
        intelligence communities, the aviation industry, and 
        properly cleared manufacturers and vendors, then 
        published final unclassified portions on September 10, 
        1993. In December 1994, the InVision CTX-5000 was 
        certified as the first, and so far the only, explosives 
        detection system. In addition, a proposal was published 
        in August 1996 to amend existing standards for FAA 
        certification of explosives detection systems to detect 
        detonators as well as bulk explosives. The proposal's 
        comment period closed on January 6, 1997, comments have 
        been analyzed, and a draft final standard is being 
        prepared.
   Operational procedures for trace detection equipment 
        have been developed and are being applied in the field 
        as part of the deployment of the equipment under 
        recommendations 3.1 and 3.15. Trace detection 
        performance criteria standards for the amounts and 
        types of explosives to be detected are under 
        development.
   Training is more fully covered under recommendations 
        3.10, 3.20 and 3.30.
3.3--The Postal Service should advise customers that all packages 
        weighing over 16 ounces will be subject to examination for 
        explosives and other threat objects in order to move by air.
   The United States Postal Service (USPS) has reviewed 
        recommendations 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 and is very concerned 
        about the potential impacts of the recommendations. If 
        implemented, they would seriously impede USPS ability 
        to provide timely, reliable, low cost mail service to 
        both domestic and international customers. Also, full 
        implementation will impede USPS capability to compete 
        with other companies who are not subject to the same 
        stringent screening requirements as proposed for the 
        USPS. The slow throughput rates of currently certified 
        explosives detection systems make their application 
        impractical for screening large volumes of mail. 
        Regarding the legal issues, legislation would be 
        required to implement recommendation 3.3.
   Aside from the need for legislative authority to 
        intrude into mail that is sealed against inspection, 
        the USPS remains concerned as to how it would implement 
        the screening of parcels weighing 16 ounces or more. 
        The FAA-certified explosives detection system was 
        designed for screening checked bags with an appropriate 
        system throughput for that purpose. It was not designed 
        or certified to process over 1 million pounds of 
        parcels per day weighing 16 ounces or more that fly in 
        passenger aircraft. The USPS fears that screening mail 
        as provided for in the recommendation may not be 
        feasible without extensive delay of the mail. To 
        minimize delays and ensure effective screening, the 
        USPS would have to acquire a large number of these 
        systems whose total acquisition and operational cost is 
        estimated to exceed one billion dollars, immediately 
        translating into higher postal rates for customers.
   The USPS's Aviation Mail Security Committee 
        continues to examine the current and emerging 
        technologies to determine their potential application 
        in postal operations. Further, the Committee will soon 
        visit European Postal Administrations, who are 
        screening mail, to learn if any of the technologies and 
        procedures used by them can be adapted to USPS 
        operations. Thus far, a system with characteristics 
        that would be required for deployment in the U.S. 
        postal operating environment has not been found.
   The USPS does not believe the public would, in the 
        interest of enhancing aviation security, understand and 
        accept the need to relax the sanctity and privacy of 
        the mail and Fourth Amendment protection against 
        warrantless search. The USPS strongly doubts that the 
        public will accept such routine intrusion into the mail 
        by government agencies to detect items in which they 
        may be interested. The USPS believes this kind of 
        activity would be strongly contested in any public 
        hearings held by Congress.
3.4--Current law should be amended to clarify the U.S. Customs 
        Service's authority to search outbound international mail.
   U.S. Customs has proposed a legislative change to 
        amend Title 19, clarifying outbound search authority. 
        Key legislative staffs on both the House and Senate 
        Banking Committees have been briefed and have expressed 
        support. Close coordination between U.S. Customs 
        Service and U.S. Postal Service personnel will be 
        essential to avoid duplicative efforts.
   The Postal Service continues to take exception to 
        this recommendation, and has held meetings with the 
        General Accounting Office, Office of Management and 
        Budget, and Customs. It contends this recommendation 
        would adversely affect its ability to provide timely, 
        low cost service and would be a waste of money due to 
        duplication of efforts recommended under 3.3. The 
        Postal Service believes giving Customs the authority to 
        inspect outbound international mail is not legal and in 
        any case would not be operationally practical or 
        efficient.
3.5--The FAA should implement a comprehensive plan to address the 
        threat of explosives and other threat objects in cargo and work 
        with industry to develop new initiatives in this area.
   Perhaps more than in any other aspect of security, 
        the need for new partnerships in exploring innovative 
        improvements in cargo security were obvious to the 
        Commission immediately. Advice from the Aviation 
        Security Advisory Committee Baseline Working Group, 
        which needed to form a cargo subgroup to deal with this 
        complicated problem, made that clear.
   To implement this recommendation, FAA proposed 
        amendments to standard security programs for U.S. 
        carriers, couriers, freight forwarders and cargo 
        consolidators, as well as the model security program 
        for foreign air carriers. These proposals were issued 
        for comment on May 14, 1997. Changes to the voluntary, 
        ``domestic security integrated program'' for all cargo 
        carriers were also proposed. Since that time, FAA 
        listening sessions have been held, and major 
        substantive recommendations to clarify further the 
        intent of cargo acceptance and handling procedures have 
        been made by several groups.
   The Cargo Baseline Working Group recommended that 
        the proposed amendments be rewritten. Comments made at 
        listening sessions on June 3 and July 28, 1997, in 
        addition to written comments received from the industry 
        prompted reexamination of the proposed amendments, and 
        a completely rewritten version. Several major changes 
        are being proposed, particularly regarding ``known'' 
        versus ``unknown'' shipper criteria and specific cargo 
        screening procedures. The proposed amendments will be 
        published for comment this year.
3.6--The FAA should establish a security system that will provide a 
        high level of protection for all aviation information systems.
   Information security is important not only to comply 
        with this recommendation but also with the 
        recommendations of the President's Commission on 
        Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP). As the 
        National Airspace System evolves from a custom-made, 
        highly specialized array of equipment and services, to 
        a more open system comprised of commercial off-the-
        shelf products and services the planned information 
        security system will more effectively protect air 
        traffic control information and systems from the 
        increasing risk of ``information-based attacks,'' an 
        area of special concern to the PCCIP. GAO is currently 
        circulating a report on FAA's air traffic control 
        computer security. The Department is preparing 
        comments, and will use the final report to help improve 
        information security. GAO is circulating a report on 
        FAA's air traffic control computer security. The 
        Department is preparing comments, and will use the 
        final report to help improve physical and information 
        security.
   FAA is planning on FY98 funding of $3.2 million and 
        FY99 funding of $27.1 million for its information 
        security program. FAA's information security initiative 
        will combine efficient system development and 
        operations with sound security risk management policy 
        and procedures throughout the life cycle of new and 
        existing automated air traffic systems. It will work 
        hand-in-hand with improvements in the physical security 
        of critical FAA facilities, such as air route traffic 
        control centers and airport control towers.
3.7--The FAA should work with airlines and airport consortia to ensure 
        that all passengers are positively identified and subjected to 
        security procedures before they board aircraft.
   FAA continues to work with airlines and airport 
        operators to ensure that all passengers are effectively 
        screened prior to boarding. The initial proposed 
        amendment to the air carrier standard security program 
        addressing Commission concerns was issued for comment 
        to regulated parties on March 28, 1997. The proposal 
        included: revised procedures for applying a computer 
        assisted or manual passenger screening system for all 
        flights originating in the United States; clearance 
        procedures for selectee bags, articles and suspicious 
        items, including a provision for the use of explosives 
        detection systems and devices; air carrier self-
        auditing of screening checkpoint operations; and, 
        checked baggage acceptance operations.
   Comments were received, analyzed and a revised 
        proposal was issued on August 5, 1997. Airlines 
        requested and were granted an extension of the comment 
        period until October 10, 1997. Running in parallel, a 
        related proposal to amend the air carrier standard 
        security program was issued for comment in December 
        1997 with a comment period closing January 31, 1998. In 
        general, the proposal modifies the August 1997 
        clearance procedures for selectee bags; and 
        incorporates an additional random selection percentage 
        for those air carriers applying the ``manual'' 
        passenger screening. A final amendment to the air 
        carrier standard security program will not be issued 
        until its contents are carefully reviewed and fully 
        coordinated with initiatives detailed here and under 
        recommendations 3.15, 3.19 and 3.24.
3.8--Submit a proposed resolution, through the U.S. Representative, 
        that the International Civil Aviation Organization begin a 
        program to verify and improve compliance with international 
        security standards.
   The U.S. mission to ICAO made a proposal to ICAO 
        regarding enhancements to the ICAO Security mechanism. 
        The ICAO Council considered the issue at its June 4, 
        1997 meeting and decided to table it and discuss it at 
        the last session of the Council in the fall of 1997. 
        Currently, the resolution has not been adopted. The 
        U.S. mission will continue to pursue the proposal.
3.9--Assess the possible use of chemical and biological weapons as 
        tools of terrorism.
   The FAA works closely with the Departments of 
        Defense, Energy, and other federal agencies to ensure 
        awareness of the plans and activities of other 
        organizations assessing the use of chemical and 
        biological agents by terrorist groups. For example, FAA 
        knows that local airport authorities have been involved 
        and many of them have scheduled ``first responder 
        training'' for their fire and police departments to 
        increase the awareness of problems associated with the 
        use of chemical and biological agents.
   In general, aviation security planning and specific 
        security measures are based, among other things, on 
        assessments from law enforcement and intelligence 
        agencies. Threat assessment and coordinated planning 
        for prevention as well as research and development has 
        been continuous since required by the Aviation Security 
        Improvement Act of 1990.
3.10--The FAA should work with industry to develop a national program 
        to increase the professionalism of the aviation security 
        workforce, including screening personnel.
   The FAA continues to take human factors into account 
        by providing appropriate training, and developing 
        utilization tandards, clear guidance and operational 
        procedures in partnership with the airlines to ensure 
        the effective use of security equipment by trained and 
        properly motivated air carrier personnel. FAA is also 
        taking steps to improve initial and recurrent training 
        curricula for both checkpoint supervisors and 
        screeners.
   The Supervisory Effectiveness Training program 
        provides screening supervisors and managers with the 
        basic skills necessary to properly control the day-to-
        day operations under their charge. The program would 
        establish standards for training to provide such 
        essential skills as interpersonal relations, conflict 
        resolution, leadership, and performance improvement.
   The FAA and airlines are deploying elements of the 
        Screener Proficiency Evaluation and Reporting System 
        (SPEARS), a major FAA effort to improve training and 
        monitor screener effectiveness. SPEARS has computer-
        based training modules, which are effective and 
        efficient methods for training screeners. Training 
        systems for screeners using x-ray machines at security 
        checkpoints have been installed at 17 major airports. 
        They will soon be available for explosives detection 
        systems and trace detection devices.
   The other SPEARS component, Threat Image Projection 
        (TIP), is a system whereby artificial images of 
        improvised explosives devices and other threat objects 
        are presented to the screener during the performance of 
        normal duties as if objects actually were in baggage. 
        The screener's decisions are tabulated and recorded to 
        furnish real-time feedback for effectiveness monitoring 
        and as a training tool. Approximately 300 TIP systems 
        are being deployed to the 19 busiest airports. 
        Deployment should be completed this summer. We expect 
        air carriers who helped FAA develop this equipment will 
        embrace its deployment as full partners and ensure its 
        effective use. See also 3.20.
3.11--Access to airport controlled areas must be secured and the 
        physical security of aircraft must be ensured.
   Revision of the basic code of federal regulations 
        for airport and air carrier security, published in the 
        Federal Register on August 1, 1997, will include 
        strengthening access controls and aircraft security. 
        Research has begun on more efficient and effective use 
        of existing perimeter and sensitive area surveillance 
        systems. The FAA is conducting research on radio 
        frequency identification tags that could possibly 
        assist in tracking checked baggage movement in secure 
        areas of the airport.
3.12--Establish consortia at all commercial airports to implement 
        enhancements to aviation safety and security.
   In September 1996, immediately after the 
        Commission's initial recommendations were announced, 
        the FAA established consortia at 41 major U.S. 
        airports--our busiest airports. The FAA, the airline 
        industry and other agencies, including the Federal 
        Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Bureau of 
        Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) have used 
        consortia to find and fix problems cooperatively. By 
        mid-December 1996, these consortia completed 
        vulnerability assessments and submitted action plans 
        with recommended procedural changes and specific needs 
        for advanced security technology identified. To 
        increase their effectiveness and numbers as recommended 
        by the Commission, FAA will soon issue an advisory 
        circular containing a revised voluntary disclosure 
        policy that encourages people to come forward, reveal 
        problems and fix them. Voluntary security consortia 
        will be expanded to 200 airports by the end of 1998.
   BATF agents are visiting all major airports to offer 
        assistance in conducting explosives threat assessments 
        and other vulnerability assessments relating to 
        explosives.
3.13--Conduct airport vulnerability assessments and develop action 
        plans.
   The FAA has contracted with several private sector 
        firms, including one that participated in the 
        development of the model used by Sandia National 
        Laboratory, to conduct several vulnerability 
        assessments supported by onsite FAA agents, using 
        various models and methodologies. FAA is using several 
        vulnerability assessment models to determine which is 
        really the best and most appropriate for use at 
        airports.
   Eight contractors have been assigned to assess 14 
        major airports. The planning stage has been completed, 
        and teams at 6 airports have completed onsite data 
        collection activities. Fourteen out of 28 volunteer 
        candidate airports will be engaged in helping to test 
        and evaluate the models used in these assessments. 
        Final analysis will begin in March 1998, and all 14-
        airport assessments will be completed by August. A 
        panel of experts will be used to evaluate the results 
        of these assessments, and to develop guidelines for 
        future airport vulnerability assessment in terms of 
        best methodologies and tools to be used. Additional 
        funding planned for FY99 and beyond will be used to 
        continue assessments at other major airports. The final 
        award will go to the contractor(s) determined to 
        provide the most cost effective assessment process.
   The Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 
        includes a requirement for FAA and the Federal Bureau 
        of Investigation to conduct joint threat and 
        vulnerability assessments of airports designated as 
        high risk. In order to fulfill this requirement, FAA 
        has been working closely with the FBI to develop a 
        methodology for these assessments. The model relies on 
        a national-level threat assessment of selected U.S. 
        airports, conducted by the FBI at a Headquarters level, 
        and a local, criminal threat assessment conducted by 
        the appropriate Bureau field office. Concurrently, the 
        FAA will conduct a comprehensive vulnerability 
        assessment and a validation of the result. FAA plans to 
        utilize the information gathered in a relational 
        database to identify and relate key vulnerability 
        issues and assign threat factors for all airports 
        throughout the United States.
   The FBI and FAA conducted a joint assessment at 
        Baltimore-Washington International Airport in December 
        1997. A validation of the assessment questionnaire was 
        performed and the FBI provided an analysis of the 
        trends in criminal activity at the airport. Washington-
        Dulles International Airport was assessed in January 
        1998, and beginning in February, two airports per month 
        will be jointly assessed.
3.14--Require criminal background checks and FBI fingerprint checks for 
        all screeners and all airport and airline employees with access 
        to secure areas.
   Perhaps more than any other single security issue, 
        background checks have been discussed and debated in 
        great detail for nearly 15 years, largely because of 
        the need to proceed cautiously to insure the protection 
        of individual rights to privacy so strongly prized by 
        Americans. Each incremental step toward greater 
        authority to review an individual's background prior to 
        granting access to restricted areas of airports has 
        been taken only after close examination and careful 
        consideration of all viewpoints. The FAA published a 
        Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on March 19, 1997, to 
        extend background check regulations to include 
        screeners. The comment period closed on May 19, 1997. 
        Analysis of comments received and the drafting of the 
        final rule is being conducted in the context of other 
        initiatives on passenger screening, with publication 
        planned for this year. Full implementation of the 
        Commission recommendation, however, would require 
        additional legislation to further extend application of 
        criminal history record checks.
   The FBI's Criminal Justice Information Services 
        Complex in Clarksburg, W. Va., is processing 
        fingerprint examples submitted by the FAA pursuant to 
        Federal Regulation. The FBI has cut turnaround time in 
        half. Approximately 20,000 fingerprint cards have been 
        or are in process. Full implementation of this 
        recommendation is also dependent upon FBI fingerprint 
        turnaround time and deployment of the automated 
        Electronic Fingerprint Image Print Server (EFIPS). The 
        goal is to deploy technology that will be fully 
        operational by mid-1999 and reduce turnaround time to 
        2-3 days and eventually only 24 hours.
3.15--Deploy existing technology.
   As required by recommendation 3.1 and in the spirit 
        of partnership for enhancing security endorsed by the 
        Commission, the federal government is funding air 
        carrier security improvements by subsidizing the 
        capital expenses of the air carriers, including some 
        training and installation costs, through the purchase 
        of advanced security equipment. The air carriers' role 
        in this partnership is to use the equipment purchased 
        effectively and pay for its operation and maintenance 
        after one year. The President's FY99 budget contains 
        $100 million for continued federal funding and 
        deployment of all types of advanced security 
        technologies.
   In December 1996, FAA purchased 54 certified 
        explosives detection systems for screening checked 
        baggage, using a portion of $144 million for equipment 
        provided by Congress in the Omnibus Consolidated 
        Appropriations Act of 1997. The joint government and 
        industry integrated product team described under 3.1 
        began installation of the equipment in Chicago and New 
        York in January 1997 and will continue deploying these 
        devices through FY98 with current funds. Certified 
        explosives detection systems are operational in six 
        cities with deployment to several more cities planned 
        for the spring of 1998.
   The use of trace explosives' detection devices at 
        screening checkpoints began in November 1996. Since 
        then, additional trace devices were deployed to 18 
        airports in FY97. More have been sent to 14 other 
        airports so far this fiscal year. A total of 128 
        devices are in place and being used to provide better 
        security and deterrence. Over 60 more will be purchased 
        and installed at dozens of additional checkpoints and 
        in many more airports during 1998. As specifically 
        recommended by the Commission, 18 advanced automated x-
        ray devices and 4 other advanced technology devices 
        have also been purchased for FY98 deployment to achieve 
        the broadest possible mix of effective technologies in 
        airports.
3.16--Establish a joint government-industry research and development 
        program. The FAA is encouraged to use the best available 
        technology to solve security and safety challenges throughout 
        the air transportation system.
   In response to a requirement in the Federal Aviation 
        Reauthorization Act of 1996, an agreement to create a 
        National Academy of Sciences Panel on Assessment of 
        Technologies for Aviation Security was signed by FAA 
        and the Academy on May 19, 1997. The panel's statements 
        of work and membership have been approved. It will 
        assess the results of the advanced security equipment 
        deployments, hardened cargo container tests and planned 
        deployments, and then recommend how to more effectively 
        deploy explosives' detection systems and hardened 
        containers to improve security. The first panel meeting 
        was held on January 29, 1998.
3.17--Establish an interagency task force to assess the potential use 
        of surface-to-air missiles against commercial aircraft.
   In 1992, the FAA convened an Off Site Threat Working 
        Group to examine this threat. The group has conducted 
        tests to develop target acquisition capabilities using 
        simulators and resources provided by the Department of 
        Defense. The FAA is developing exercises to evaluate 
        the effectiveness of existing policies and procedures 
        to counter and manage such a threat to civil aviation.
   The Commission recommended the creation of an 
        interagency effort headed by the Department of Defense 
        to evaluate the risk posed by surface-to-air missiles 
        to civil aviation. The DOT is directly involved in the 
        Civil Aviation Anti-Missile Defense Task Force. Besides 
        DOD and DOT, the Task Force also includes 
        representatives from the State Department and the FBI. 
        The Task Force's objective is to develop a plan to 
        identify security procedures for use in managing, 
        countering, and resolving man-portable surface-to-air 
        missile threat at all major airports in the United 
        States. The Task Force has formed three working groups: 
        aircraft protection; civil aviation protection 
        (including threat reaction planning); and international 
        agreements.
3.18--Significantly expand the use of bomb-sniffing dogs.
   The canine explosives detection team concept has 
        been an important part of aviation security strategy 
        for many years. FAA and operators of nearly 40 of the 
        largest airports have signed a comprehensive, 
        cooperative agreement on canine explosives detection 
        teams. It asks airport authorities to place more teams 
        on-site to screen suspicious bags, packages and cargo, 
        and to search airliners and terminals after bomb 
        threats. The Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 
        1997 provided $8.9 million for reimbursement to 
        airports that signed the agreement to cover specified 
        direct costs up to specific limits.
   In one of many interagency partnerships, the FAA and 
        the Treasury Department's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco 
        and Firearms (BATF) signed an agreement last year 
        outlining the principles governing a joint research 
        pilot project. They then began the project, using one 
        FAA certified trained dog and handler team and one BATF 
        certified trained dog and handler team working in 
        parallel with each team combining with a Washington 
        Metropolitan Airport Authority officer. Teams are 
        composed of two dogs per team. Protocols to govern 
        testing and other procedures are being formulated to 
        make sure the teams can reliably detect explosives and 
        to develop information concerning the merits of the 
        different training approaches from the standpoint of 
        the operational use of such teams.
   Separately, BATF is expanding its explosives 
        detection canine program infrastructure at Front Royal, 
        Virginia, to train additional canines for various 
        customers and applications. An Odor Proficiency 
        Standard was published in the Federal Register on 
        January 19, 1998. BATF is working with FAA and a number 
        of other federal agencies to develop and refine this 
        basic odor recognition standard for use by various 
        agencies in evaluating canines throughout the United 
        States. Odor Proficiency Standards were published in 
        the January 19, 1998 Federal Register and are still 
        being refined.
   During 1997, the FAA trained 54 handlers and 60 
        dogs. The first ``FAA exclusive'' class of K-9 handlers 
        graduated from the Military Working Dog School at 
        Lackland Air Force Base, Texas on March 25, 1997. The 
        most recent class began on January 8, 1998 with three 
        more classes scheduled this year in a program that can 
        produce up to 52 handlers per year. FAA expanded the 
        program from 87 canine explosives detection teams in 
        1996 to 130 teams at 38 airports across the country so 
        far this year. As program expansion continues, by the 
        end of 1998, there will be about 154 teams at 
        approximately 40 airports.
   The program remains voluntary on the part of 
        airports. Those not in the current program are unlikely 
        to join without adequate cost sharing by the federal 
        government. Future growth is therefore a function of 
        available funding.
3.19--Complement technology with automated passenger profiling.
   One of the greatest success stories in implementing 
        Commission recommendations is the cooperative effort to 
        produce and deploy an effective automated passenger 
        profiling system without compromising individual civil 
        liberties.
   By mid-1996, FAA, through a grant to Northwest 
        Airlines, had developed a prototype automated passenger 
        profiling system known as Computer-Assisted Passenger 
        Screening or CAPS. In September 1996, a follow-on grant 
        was awarded to Northwest both to refine the program to 
        achieve operational capability and to assist in 
        adapting CAPS to other airlines' reservation systems. 
        Northwest met with other air carriers in the fall, 
        conducted preliminary system tests during the winter, 
        and progressed to operational tests on selected flights 
        in its system in April 1997. Northwest has completed 
        the process of phasing in CAPS throughout its domestic 
        system with over 150 stations on-line today.
   American, Continental, US Airways, Delta, TWA, and 
        United Airlines, covering all major reservation 
        systems, began work on developing their CAPS systems in 
        May 1997. On February 5, 1998, United Airlines 
        implemented CAPS at all 225 of its domestic stations 
        (including United Express). Some other carriers have 
        begun field-testing CAPS. FAA is helping fund these 
        efforts through cooperative agreements, which will 
        disburse to the carriers funding appropriated by 
        Congress for CAPS.
   It is anticipated that all major carriers will have 
        phased in CAPS voluntarily before new federal 
        regulation mandates its use as the method of 
        determining which passengers' bags must be subjected to 
        additional security measures, such as bag matching or 
        screening with explosives detection systems. As the use 
        of CAPS expands, security improves, since CAPS offers 
        numerous advantages over its manual alternative, 
        including greater sophistication, speed, protection 
        against the compromise of sensitive security 
        information, and objectivity.
   The Departments of Transportation and Justice are 
        sensitive to public concerns about the potential for 
        discriminatory treatment whenever a process is in place 
        that results in more rigorous security measures applied 
        to some passengers than to others. Great care has been 
        taken to ensure that CAPS does not infringe civil 
        liberties. In accordance with a recommendation of the 
        Commission, DOT submitted the profiling elements to the 
        Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division for 
        review. On October 1, 1997, the Department of Justice 
        issued its report, which found that CAPS: (1) ``fully 
        complies with the equal protection guarantee 
        incorporated in the Fifth Amendment to the 
        Constitution''; (2) ``does not violate the Fourth 
        Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and 
        seizures''; and (3) ``does not involve any invasion of 
        passengers' personal privacy.''
3.20--Certify screening companies and improve screener performance.
   To begin the regulatory process required by law, the 
        FAA issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on 
        March 17, 1997, to solicit comments on certification of 
        screening companies and other particular issues. The 
        comment period closed on May 1, 1997, and FAA received 
        and reviewed 20 substantive comments. After careful 
        coordination with other efforts to improve security 
        through implementation of these recommendations, the 
        next step is publication in the Federal Register of a 
        Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, scheduled for April 
        1998, followed by a final rule.
   The draft rule proposes to certificate all companies 
        conducting aviation screening, carriers that conduct 
        their own screening, and indirect air carriers that 
        choose to conduct their own cargo screening. Other 
        screening improvements being proposed include 
        establishing management and instructor qualification 
        and training standards, implementing screening company 
        quality assurance and testing programs, and improving 
        the professionalism of screener training programs.
   FAA continues to provide appropriate training, and 
        to develop utilization standards, clear guidance, and 
        operational procedures in partnership with the airlines 
        to ensure the effective use of equipment by trained and 
        properly motivated air carrier personnel. FAA is also 
        taking steps to improve initial and recurrent training 
        curricula for both checkpoint supervisors and screeners 
        in addition to the certification rulemaking.
   The Supervisory Effectiveness Training (SET) program 
        intends to provides screening supervisors and managers 
        with basic skills necessary to properly control day-to-
        day operations. The program will establish standards 
        for training such essential skills as interpersonal 
        relations, conflict resolution, leadership, and 
        performance improvement.
   The FAA developed the Screener Proficiency 
        Evaluation and Reporting System (SPEARS) that can help 
        train air carrier screeners through computer-based 
        training and maintain their operational proficiency by 
        projecting the images of dangerous articles on the x-
        ray monitor during the screening process. It can then 
        track how often the screener correctly detects the 
        projected threat.
   Computer based training systems for checkpoint 
        screeners have been deployed and are now operational at 
        17 major airports with two more coming on-line soon and 
        additional airport installations planned for this year. 
        They are also available for explosives detection 
        systems. The threat image projection component for 
        conventional x-ray devices and explosives detection 
        systems are also being deployed, as noted under 
        recommendation 3.10.
3.21--Aggressively test existing security systems.
   Since 1991, FAA has used increasingly more realistic 
        tests of security measures, such as those designed to 
        control access, prevent unknown shipments from getting 
        on airplanes, and screen passengers and their bags. 
        Comprehensive and specific procedures for inspecting 
        security systems have been developed. Using a 
        combination of these procedures, including unannounced 
        testing, surveillance, interviews and surprise record 
        reviews, security systems will continue to be 
        aggressively evaluated.
   FAA is steadily increasing the number of its field 
        inspectors and their direct support personnel---119 of 
        the 300 security personnel authorized by Congress in 
        1996 were brought on board in FY97. They will be 
        focusing not only on doing more comprehensive 
        fieldwork, but also on aggressively testing security 
        systems. This testing can be done in two ways. First, 
        field agents unknown to air carrier and airport 
        security personnel simulate attacks based on standard 
        protocols, and brief the results immediately to 
        screeners and others so they can learn on-the-spot. 
        Second, tests can also be classic ``red team'' tests in 
        which, except in extreme cases, results are withheld 
        and briefed later to the industry so that a more 
        complete picture of total security system performance 
        can be obtained.
   Red Teams, which are also being increased, started 
        in 1991. Aggressive testing by field agents began in 
        1995 with tests to determine how well the industry was 
        applying the required profile and conducting baggage 
        searches. With the new resources being provided by 
        Congress and the Administration, tests have already 
        been expanded to the screening of small cargo packages, 
        the matching of passengers and bags, and the screening 
        of passengers and their carry-on items. Literally 
        thousands of tests have been done at screening 
        checkpoints, for example. More types of testing will 
        soon take place, including indirect air carriers, and 
        compliance with background check requirements. FAA is 
        also requiring the airlines and the airports to test 
        their own systems and report the results to the FAA.
   All testing is used to improve performance and 
        achieve compliance. Where performance is only 
        marginally deficient, FAA prefers to use the power of 
        information in a working partnership with industry. But 
        where there are significant problems with critical 
        security systems, FAA will take much more immediate 
        action, hopefully in partnership, but if not, then by 
        using the full force of its enforcement authority.
3.22--Use the Customs Service to enhance security.
   The U.S. Customs Service is deploying 140 positions 
        authorized under anti-terrorism legislation: 100 
        inspectors, 6 intelligence analysts, 33 special agents, 
        and 1 technical support position. All positions were 
        deployed to major international airports to assist 
        aviation security efforts and to perform increased 
        searches of passengers, baggage, and cargo departing 
        the United States. In addition, analysts and 
        investigators will work with the FBI at its airport 
        offices and Headquarters Counter Terrorism Center to 
        provide specific expertise to anti-terrorism 
        investigations. The Office of Field Operations has 
        developed a national Anti-terrorism/Aviation Safety and 
        Security training program for the 100 inspectors that 
        will begin at the Federal Law Enforcement Training 
        Center in the spring of 1998. The Customs Service is in 
        the process of evaluating, selecting, and deploying 
        high technology equipment such as mobile baggage and 
        cargo x-ray units. FAA and Customs Service are studying 
        the technical issues associated with converting 
        Customs' Automated Targeting System (ATS), which is 
        designed for contraband analysis in marine cargo. It 
        may be possible to adapt it for antiterrorism purposes 
        in air cargo.
   Customs equipment deployment plans for FY98 and 
        beyond includes:

      24 mobile x-ray vans [with radiation/explosives/drug 
            detection capabilities] are scheduled to be 
            delivered by July 1998. Seven additional vans to be 
            purchased in FY98.

      Delivery in August of 11 portable x-ray systems and 
            explosives/drug detectors [cart mounted] for mail 
            and courier use.

   675 out of 1700 radiation pagers will be delivered 
        to the field in FY98. Customs and DOE have developed a 
        radiation detection training program. Implementation is 
        being coordinated with FAA and airport authorities.
3.23--Give properly cleared airline and airport security personnel 
        access to the classified information they need to know.
   FAA has worked closely with industry to ensure that 
        security clearances are granted to those in industry 
        who have a need and meet the requirements for a 
        clearance. This long-standing program continues. The 
        FAA has once again reaffirmed its policy to collaborate 
        with airlines and airports in developing responses to 
        threat information, and disseminate vulnerability 
        assessments to appropriately cleared officials.
3.24--Begin implementation of full bag-passenger match.
   On December 23, 1997, FAA Administrator Jane Garvey 
        and leading U.S. airlines announced that passenger bag 
        matching will be expanded, using passenger screening to 
        apply either examination by explosives detection 
        systems or bag matching to domestic passengers' 
        luggage. Bag matching is a security measure in which a 
        passenger's bags will not be transported unless the 
        passenger is on the flight. It already is done for 
        travelers on international flights and has been done on 
        a limited basis for domestic flights.
   Expanded bag matching will be based upon both 
        computer and manual passenger screening systems during 
        the transition to fully computerized passenger 
        screening. The Computer Assisted Passenger Screening 
        (CAPS) system (see Recommendation 3.19) is being used 
        to select passengers whose checked baggage will be 
        subjected to explosives detection examination or 
        expanded bag matching. CAPS uses information from the 
        reservation system to screen out passengers for whom 
        additional security procedures are unnecessary. If not 
        enough is known about a passenger to make a judgment, 
        then additional security measures in the form of 
        explosives detection device screening or bag matching 
        will be applied. CAPS will also select some passengers 
        at random for these additional security measures.
   CAPS is now being instituted. Use of CAPS will 
        increase throughout 1998 while the manual process is 
        phased out for those carriers having access to 
        computerized reservation systems. The new computerized 
        system is more efficient for airlines to use and 
        protects against the release of sensitive security 
        information. As the airlines voluntarily implement 
        CAPS, the FAA will issue regulations requiring its use. 
        The proposed rule for the automated system is being 
        drafted and the final rule is targeted for completion 
        this year.
3.25--Provide more compassionate and effective assistance to families 
        of victims.
   See actions taken in Chapter 4.
3.26--Improve passenger manifests.
   The Department of Transportation issued on February 
        12, 1998, a final rule to require enhanced passenger 
        manifests for flights to or from the United States. The 
        rule will require U.S. and foreign air carriers to 
        collect a full name from U.S citizens, as well as to 
        solicit a contact name and phone number. Implementation 
        of the rule will permit the Department of State to 
        carry forth its responsibility to notify families of 
        U.S. citizens killed overseas in a timely manner. In 
        March 1997, DOT issued an ANRM to collect information 
        on an enhanced passenger manifest system for domestic 
        flights. DOT will review the implementation of the 
        international rule during its consideration of the 
        comments to the ANPRM.
3.27--Significantly increase the number of FBI agents assigned to 
        counterterrorism investigations, to improve intelligence, and 
        to crisis response.
   The FBI has expanded its counterterrorism program. 
        Congress has provided funding for 644 Special Agents, 
        620 Support positions, and additional funding for 
        investigations, intelligence gathering, forensic 
        analysis, and crisis management. These additional 
        personnel will be assigned to field offices throughout 
        the United States to focus added resources in this 
        critical area, improve our intelligence collection, and 
        expand our management capabilities. It is anticipated 
        that these field agents and support employees will be 
        under transfer to the Counterterrorism Program by April 
        30, 1998.
3.28--Provide anti-terrorism assistance in the form of airport security 
        training to countries where there are airports served by 
        airlines flying to the U.S.
   The FAA has been a full partner with the Department 
        of State in support of its anti-terrorist assistance 
        program for many years. FAA performs training need 
        surveys and conducts training in airport security 
        management. The FAA Academy's international training 
        service center in Oklahoma City provides airport 
        security training on a fee-for-service basis to foreign 
        countries.
   Since 1986, the U.S. Department of State and FAA 
        have been providing anti-terrorism assistance in the 
        form of airport security training through the Anti-
        Terrorism Assistance Program (ATAP). Additional 
        training is provided to personnel at selected foreign 
        airports where specialized assistance, as determined by 
        the results of the FAA foreign airport assessments, is 
        needed.
   Since the Commission's recommendations were 
        released, over 270 people from 35 countries have been 
        trained.
3.29--Resolve outstanding issues relating to explosive taggants and 
        require their use.
   BATF is preparing to submit to Congress a report 
        regarding the status, progress, findings and 
        recommendations regarding the use of explosive 
        taggants. The draft report has been reviewed by 
        Treasury, OMB and others and has now been revised by 
        BATF. The report was resubmitted to Treasury for final 
        approval.
3.30--Provide regular, comprehensive explosives detection-training 
        programs for foreign, federal, state, and local law 
        enforcement, as well as FAA and airline personnel.
   The FAA has two explosives' specialists and nine 
        regional coordinators who specialize in explosives 
        related threat analysis, countermeasures development 
        and training tailored to the needs of civil aviation 
        security. Training has been conducted for law 
        enforcement officers, consortia, airport managers, and 
        security checkpoint screeners on a broad range of 
        explosives' detection topics for both domestic and 
        international audiences. Civil aviation security 
        training was provided to military joint service 
        Explosive Ordnance Disposal classes and regional 
        conferences of the International Association of Bomb 
        Technicians and Investigators, and at the Annual 
        European Bomb Technician's Symposium. During FY97 the 
        Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) 
        conducted 9 explosives related courses for state and 
        local law enforcement and prosecutors as well as 6 
        international post-blast classes on behalf of Federal 
        Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC). Eight 
        additional international classes are planned for FY98. 
        BATF also conducted 3 certification and 5 
        recertification schools for explosive specialists, 1 
        class for certified fire investigators, and 10 post-
        blast schools for BATF agents.
   BATF and the FAA jointly produced four explosives 
        security-training videos with instructor and student 
        guides for both aviation industry and law enforcement 
        use in their training programs. These videos cover an 
        introduction to explosives and such topics as 
        improvised explosive devices, airport bomb threat 
        management, and dealing with suspected explosive 
        devices discovered in the cabin of aircraft in-flight. 
        The FAA's 8th annual conference on canine explosives 
        detection was attended by 165 federal, state, and local 
        law enforcement personnel who received 20 hours of 
        training on explosives detection topics ranging from 
        detection technology R&D to safety and other 
        operational issues.
3.31--Create a central clearinghouse within government to provide 
        information on explosives crime.
   The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) 
        is working in partnership with the Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation's (FBI) Bomb Data Center, all Federal, 
        State, and local law enforcement and fire agencies to 
        develop parameters and protocol for the repository 
        information on arson and the criminal use of 
        explosives. A number of coordinating meetings has been 
        held and a system design company, Performance 
        Engineering Contractors, has conducted interviews. FBI 
        and BATF are discussing leadership roles in the central 
        repository. Ultimately, this program will allow 
        different levels of access to a central database of 
        information through the Internet.
   The National Repository concept is based on BATF's 
        Explosives Incidents System (EXIS) and will now be 
        called AEXIS for Arson and Explosives Incidents System. 
        EXIS information is available to state, local, federal, 
        and foreign enforcement agencies and can be used to 
        match targets, motives, and similar incidents for 
        incendiary and explosive devices. The system developer 
        interviews have been completed and the AEXIS is 
        currently being tested by BATF to resolve pre-
        operational problems.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                            Looking Forward

    Much was accomplished in the first year of implementing the 
recommendations of the White House Commission. A total of 15 
recommendations have been fully implemented, and substantial 
progress has been made on the remainder. Much more will be 
accomplished in the second year. Among the recommendations to 
be fully implemented in 1998 are:

                      1. improving aviation safety

    1.4--The Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) should be 
simplified and, as appropriate, rewritten as plain English, 
performance-based regulations. FAA has developed and 
distributed guidance handbooks for writing in plain English. 
The agency is currently reviewing planned and existing 
regulations for candidates for change.
    1.10--The FAA should develop better quantitative models and 
analytic techniques to inform management decision-making. FAA 
developed and will begin implementing a long-term plan for 
coordinated model development, documentation, and utilization; 
FAA will also make its new cost accounting system, now 
baselined, fully operational.

         2. making air traffic control safer and more efficient

    2.2--The FAA should develop plans to ensure that 
operational and airport capacity needs are integrated into the 
modernization of the NAS. A Concept of Operations has been 
incorporated; FAA will identify and integrate airport capacity 
needs.

                  3. improving security for travelers

    3.2--The FAA should establish federally mandated standards 
for security enhancements. Standards have been established for 
certification of explosives detection systems, the use of trace 
explosives detection devices, and canine teams; standards are 
in process for certification of trace explosives detection 
devices, and the use of manual and automated profiling programs 
and automated bag match technology.
    3.5--The FAA should implement a comprehensive plan to 
address the threat of explosives and other threat objects in 
cargo and work with industry to develop new initiatives in this 
area. A Report submitted, and FAA is incorporating changes into 
its Air Carrier Standard Security Program.
    3.7--The FAA should work with airlines and airport 
consortia to ensure that all passengers are positively 
identified and subjected to security procedures before they 
board aircraft. Comments were received on proposed changes to 
Air Carrier Standard Security Program and the program will now 
be finalized.
    3.10--The FAA should work with industry to develop a 
national program to increase the professionalism of the 
aviation security workforce, including screening personnel. FAA 
is improving training curricula and working with airlines to 
deploy the Screener Proficiency Evaluation and Reporting System 
(SPEARS).
    3.12--Establish consortia at all commercial airports to 
implement enhancements to aviation safety and security. 
Consortia have been established at 41 major airports and will 
be expanded to 200 airports by the end of 1998.
    3.15--Deploy existing technology. FAA has begun deployment 
of trace explosives detection devices and SPEARS; deployment of 
79 explosives detection systems and advanced automated security 
devices will continue through 1998.
    3.19--Complement technology with automated passenger 
profiling. Deployment of Computer Assisted Passenger Screening 
[CAPS] System has begun to all airline reservation systems.
    There are several factors that will affect implementation 
of all the White House Commission recommendations, including 
those described above.
    First, new recommendations have been made and new 
directions set over the last year. The National Civil Aviation 
Review Commission (NCARC), established by Congress, evaluated 
FAA financing and aviation safety. The main financing 
conclusion was that FAA cannot continue ``business as usual'', 
but must pursue innovative financing, including user charges to 
finance a ``Performance-Based Organization'' to provide air 
traffic management services. NCARC's main safety recommendation 
was for FAA to develop a ``Safety Strategic Plan'' that 
prioritizes safety initiatives such as those proposed by the 
White House Commission.
    At the same time, the Department of Transportation and each 
of its operating administrations have developed new Strategic 
Plans. For aviation, the key mission areas are the same: 
safety, security, and an efficient aviation system that serves 
mobility and economic development. FAA's plan in particular 
focuses on a core set of priority areas and projects that it 
will track corporately. Many of the White House Commission's 
recommendations form the basis for that top priority list.
    Another factor that has influenced the speed at which some 
key White House Commission recommendations are implemented is 
financing. Congress provided $144 million in supplemental 
funding in FY 1997 toward the deployment of 54 explosives 
detection systems, which is proceeding. The White House 
Commission recommended funding of $100 million per year. A 
request for $100 million is included in the President's FY 1999 
budget request.
    Other key recommendations where funding is crucial include 
accelerated modernization of the National Airspace System 
(NAS), the related recommendation to ensure the accuracy, 
availability, and reliability of the Global Positioning System 
(GPS) for satellite navigation, and conducting research 
emphasizing human factors and training. No new funding was 
provided in FY 1997 or 1998. The President's FY 1999 budget 
proposes a $90 million increase in the Research, Engineering, 
Development account and a $254.5 million increase in Facilities 
and Equipment FY 1998 levels. The President's budget allows us 
to keep modernization of the air traffic control system on 
track.
    It is here that the financial recommendations of NCARC will 
come into play, as carried forward in new FAA reauthorization 
legislation to be introduced in Congress. A key NCARC principle 
is that, while FAA's safety functions should be paid for by the 
general public, direct users of air traffic management services 
should be charged the costs of a separate, performance-based 
organization to provide those services. The NCARC recommended 
funding of the safety function should be kept separate, to 
preserve objectivity and promote safety throughout the aviation 
system. Those should be goals of Congress, the aviation 
community, and the Executive Branch in considering the next FAA 
reauthorization.
    Many White House Commission recommendations have been and 
will be implemented with little or no new external funding. 
Most are on target to be implemented as planned. In a few 
cases, issues have been raised that must be considered in 
implementing recommendations. The Postal Service, for example, 
has some concerns about screening mailed packages weighing over 
a pound. These, however, will be addressed. The Federal 
Government remains committed to timely implementation of the 
far-reaching recommendations of the White House Commission on 
Aviation Safety and Security.

       d. Security for Passenger Vessels and Passenger Terminals

Navigation and vessel inspection circular no. 3-96, U.S. Department of 
            Transportation, United States Coast Guard, 1996

COMDTPUB P16601
NVIC 3-96

           NAVIGATION AND VESSEL INSPECTION CIRCULAR NO. 3-96

Subj: SECURITY FOR PASSENGER VESSELS AND PASSENGER TERMINALS
Ref: (a) Title 33 CFR parts 120 and 128

(b) COMDTINST M16000.12 Marine Safety Manual Vol. VII, Port 
Security

(c) International Maritime Organization MSC/Circ. 443, 
``Measures To Prevent Unlawful Acts Against Passengers And 
Crews On Board Ships''

(d) COMDTINST M5530.1A, Physical Security Program
    1. PURPOSE. This Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular 
(NVIC) describes the procedures required to implement the new 
passenger vessel security regulations of Title 33 CFR parts 120 
and 128 (reference (a)), that were published on July 18, 1996. 
Guidance is provided for processing Terminal and Vessel 
Security Plans, assessing the adequacy of those plans, and 
establishing annual reporting requirements, incident reporting, 
and threat dissemination procedures.
    2. ACTION. Director, National Maritime Center (NMC), 
Commanding Officers of Marine Safety Offices, and Captains of 
the Port (COTP) shall comply with the requirements of this 
circular.
    3. DIRECTIVES AFFECTED. The NVIC affects COMDTINST 
M16000.12, Marine Safety Manual Vol. VII, Port Security, 2-
C.1.b ``Physical Security Assessments,''and 2-D ``Physical 
Security Standards'' (reference (b)). The information contained 
in this instruction will be incorporated into the next change 
to the Marine Safety Manual Vol. II, COMDTINST M16000.12.
    4. BACKGROUND.
    a. In 1985, a U.S. citizen was killed during the seizure of 
the ACHILLE LAURO. Since then, the vulnerability of passenger 
vessels and associated passenger terminals to acts of terrorism 
has been a significant concern for the international community.
    b. To address this threat, the President signed into law 
the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 
(Pub. L. 99-399; 100 Stat. 889). Title IX of this law 
constitutes the International Maritime and Port Security Act. 
This act amended the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, which then 
provided the Coast Guard authority to ``carry out or require 
measures, including inspections, port and harbor patrols, the 
establishment of security and safety zones, and the development 
of contingency plans and procedures, to prevent or respond to 
acts of terrorism.'' This law also required a proposed plan of 
action for implementation of security measures at U.S. ports 
and passenger vessels operating from those ports.
    c. Also in 1986, the International Maritime Organization 
published MSC/Circ. 443 ``Measures To Prevent Unlawful Acts 
Against Passengers And Crews On Board Ships'' (reference (c)). 
This document was the basis for much of the U.S. legislation 
and rulemaking that followed. In April 1987, the Coast Guard 
published a notice in the Federal Register which listed 
voluntary security measures based upon reference (c). Since 
then, the Coast Guard has observed varying degrees of 
implementation of these measures aboard passenger ships and at 
passenger terminals. This inconsistency, coupled with the 
rising spectre of domestic terrorism, indicated that 
establishment of minimum mandatory security requirements was 
necessary. As a result, reference (a) was published on July 18, 
1996.
    5. APPLICABILITY.
    a. Passenger Vessels. Reference (a) applies to all 
passenger vessels over 100 gross tons, carrying more than 12 
passengers for hire; making voyages lasting more than 24 hours, 
any part of which is on the high seas; and for which passengers 
are embarked or disembarked in the United States or its 
territories; except, ferries that hold Coast Guard Certificates 
of Inspection endorsed for ``Lakes, Bays, and Sounds'', and 
that transit international waters for only short periods of 
time on frequent schedules.
    b. Passenger Terminals. All passenger terminals used for 
the assembling, processing, embarking, or disembarking of 
passengers or baggage for passenger vessels to which reference 
(a) applies must also comply.
    6. DEFINITIONS. For the purpose of interpreting the 
requirements of reference (a), the following terms are defined:
    a. High Seas. ``High seas'' means all waters that are 
neither territorial nor internal waters of the United States or 
of any foreign country.
    b. Operator. ``Operator'' means the person, company, or 
governmental agency or the representative of a company or 
governmental agency, that maintains operational control over a 
passenger vessel or passenger terminal.
    c. Passenger Terminal. ``Passenger terminal'' means any 
structure used for the assembling, processing, embarking, or 
disembarking of passengers or baggage for passenger vessels. 
The passenger terminal includes piers, wharves, and similar 
structures to which a vessel may be secured; land and water 
under or in immediate proximity to these structures; buildings 
on or contiguous to these structures; and equipment and 
materials on or in these structures.
    d. Unlawful Act. ``Unlawful Act'' means an act that is a 
felony under U.S. Federal law, under the laws of the State 
where the vessel is located, or under the laws of the country 
in which the vessel is registered.
    e. Voyage. ``Voyage'' means the passenger vessels entire 
course of travel, from the first port at which the vessel 
embarks passengers until its return to that port or another 
port where the majority of the passengers are disembarked and 
terminate their voyage.
    f. Low threat. ``Low threat'' means the threat of an 
unlawful act against a passenger vessel or terminal is, though 
possible, not likely.
    g. Medium threat. ``Medium threat'' means the threat of an 
unlawful act against a passenger vessel or terminal is possible 
and that intelligence indicates that terrorists are likely to 
be active within a specific area, or against a type of vessel 
or terminal.
    h. High threat. ``High threat'' means the threat of an 
unlawful act against a passenger vessel or terminal is probable 
or imminent and that intelligence indicates that terrorists 
have chosen specific targets.
    7. PROCEDURES. Security plans for passenger vessels and 
terminals must be examined by the Coast Guard. These plans are 
law enforcement documents and as such are not releasable 
through the Freedom of Information Act. Passenger Vessel 
Security Plans are reviewed by the NMC and Passenger Terminal 
Security Plans are reviewed by the cognizant COTP. No vessel 
shall embark from or disembark to a terminal which does not 
hold an examined Terminal Security Plan or a letter from the 
COTP stating that normal operations may continue until plan 
review is completed. Likewise, no terminal shall transfer 
passengers to or from a passenger vessel unless it holds either 
an examined Vessel Security Plan or a letter from the NMC 
stating that normal operations may continue until plan review 
is completed.
    a. Vessel Plans.
    (1) Vessel operators are responsible for preparing and 
holding a security plan which meets the requirements of 
reference (a). Operators must submit two copies of the plan to 
the NMC at least 60 days before embarking passengers on any 
voyages which cause the vessel to fall under this regulation, 
or before October 16, 1996, whichever is later.
    (2) If, within 30 days of receipt of a Vessel Security 
Plan, the NMC is unable to complete the review, a letter will 
be issued to the vessel operator stating that the Vessel 
Security Plan is currently under review and granting permission 
for vessel operations to continue until the examination is 
completed. The NMC then has an additional 150 days (a total of 
180 days from receipt of the plan) to complete an examination 
and provide a response.
    (3) If the NMC finds that the plan meets the requirements 
of reference (a), the NMC shall mark both copies ``Examined by 
the Coast Guard'', return one copy to the vessel operator, and 
retain the second copy.
    (4) If the NMC finds the Vessel Security Plan does not meet 
the requirements of reference (a), the NMC shall return the 
plan with an explanation of why it does not meet the 
requirements to the vessel operator. The second copy of the 
plan, along with a copy of the response, will be retained by 
the NMC. Except in emergencies, the NMC will allow the vessel 
operator 60 days to comply with the requirements.
    (5) Each proposed amendment to the plan initiated by the 
operator of apassenger vessel, including changes to enclosures, 
must be submitted to the NMC for review at least 30 days before 
the amendment is to take effect. The NMC has the discretion to 
allow a shorter period of time. Copies of accepted amendments 
shall be retained by the NMC.
    (6) If the COTP determines that implementation of the plan 
is not providing effective security, the COTP shall advise the 
NMC. The NMC will evaluate the plan based on the COTPs report, 
and, except in an emergency, will issue to the vessel operator 
a written notice of matters to address and will allow the 
vessel operator at least 60 days to submit proposed amendments.
    (7) The COTP may give the vessel operator an order to 
implement increased security measures immediately. The order 
will incorporate an explanation of the reasons for which the 
additional measures are necessary.
    (8) The COTP shall annually make a brief examination of the 
vessel's security activities during visits for other purposes, 
such as control verification examinations. The purpose of the 
review is to ensure the vessel's security operations are 
consistent with the plan and will include verifying the 
presence of an examined security plan on board the vessel, 
reviewing reports of unlawful acts, and observing the security 
practices actually in place.
    b. Terminal Plans.
    (1) Terminal operators are responsible for preparing and 
holding a security plan which meets the requirements of 
reference (a). Operators must submit two copies of the plan to 
the COTP at least 60 days before passengers embark or disembark 
to or from a vessel, or by October 16, 1996, whichever is 
later.
    (2) If, within 30 days of receipt of a Terminal Security 
Plan, the COTP is unable to complete the review, a letter will 
be issued to the terminal operator stating that the Terminal 
Security Plan is currently under review and granting permission 
for terminal operations to continue until the examination is 
completed. The COTP then has an additional 150 days (a total of 
180 days from receipt of the plan) to complete an examination 
and provide a response.
    (3) If the COTP finds that the Terminal Security Plan meets 
the requirements of reference (a), the COTP shall mark both 
copies ``Examined by the Coast Guard'', return one copy to the 
terminal operator, and retain the second copy.
    (4) If the COTP finds the Terminal Security Plan does not 
meet the requirements of reference (a), the COTP shall return 
the plan with an explanation of why it does not meet the 
requirements to the terminal operator. The second copy of the 
plan, along with a copy of the response, will be retained by 
the COTP. Except in emergencies, the COTP will allow the 
terminal operator 60 days to comply with the requirements.
    (5) The COTP may direct passenger terminal operators to 
initiate amendmentsto the Terminal Security Plan if the COTP 
determines that implementation of the plan is not providing 
effective security. Except in an emergency, the COTP will issue 
to the operator a written notice of matters to address and will 
allow the operator at least 60 days to submit proposed 
amendments.
    (6) Each proposed amendment to the plan initiated by the 
operator of a passenger terminal, including changes to 
enclosures, must be submitted to the COTP for review at least 
30 days before the amendment is to take effect. The COTP has 
the discretion to allow a shorter period of time. Copies of 
accepted amendments shall be retained by the COTP.
    (7) The COTP may give the terminal operator an order to 
implement increased security measures immediately. The order 
will incorporate an explanation of the reasons for the COTP 
order.
    (8) The COTP shall ensure that the plan reflects the 
procedures actually in place by conducting annual onsite 
assessments. The assessment shall consist of verifying the 
presence of an approved security plan at the terminal, 
reviewing reports of unlawful acts, and observing the security 
practices actually in place. The port physical security 
checklist (enclosure 2-3 to reference (b)) is not required. 
This process supersedes the annual reporting requirement 
established by 2-C.1.b ``Physical Security Assessments'' in 
reference (b).
    c. Enforcement. The COTPs and Commanding Officers of Marine 
Safety Offices are authorized use of enforcement tools such as 
Letters of Warning, Notices of Violation, and COTP Orders to 
gain compliance with this regulation. Civil and criminal 
penalties are authorized under the provisions of 33 U.S.C. 
1221.
    d. Right of Appeal. Any person directly affected by a 
decision or action taken by the NMC may appeal that action or 
decision to the Chief, Marine Safety and Environmental 
Protection (Commandant (G-M)) according to the procedures in 46 
CFR 1.03-15. Any person directly affected by a decision or 
action taken by the COTP may appeal that action or decision to 
the cognizant District Commander according to the procedures in 
46 CFR 1.03-15; the District Commander's decision may be 
further appealed to the Commandant according to the procedures 
in 46 CFR 1.03-25.
    8. INCIDENT REPORTING. Passenger vessels and terminal 
operators are required to report each breach of security, 
unlawful act, or the threat of an unlawful act against a 
vessel, terminal, or the persons aboard them. For incidents 
that occur within the jurisdiction of the United States, the 
operator or the operator's representative shall make the report 
to the cognizant COTP and to the local office of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation as soon as possible. Incidents that 
occur outside of the jurisdiction of the United States shall be 
reported as soon as practicable to Commandant (G-MOR), 2100 
Second Street, SW., room 2100, Washington, DC 20593. Each 
report must include, to the extent known, the following 
information:
    (1) The vessel's name;
    (2) The vessel's flag;
    (3) The name of the vessel's master;
    (4) If the vessel is moored to a passenger terminal, the 
name of the terminal security officer;
    (5) An account of the incident;
    (6) The date, time, and place of the incident;
    (7) The number of alleged offenders;
    (8) The method used to introduce any prohibited weapon, 
incendiary, or explosive into or onto the vessel;
    (9) A description of any weapon, incendiary, or explosive 
involved;
    (10) A description of how any weapon, incendiary, or 
explosive involved was concealed and used;
    (11) A description of how security was breached;
    (12) A statement of what measures have been taken or will 
be taken to prevent another such incident; and
    (13) Each report must stay on file with the security plan 
for a period of two years. All reports shall be used by the 
person preparing the ship security survey.
    9. THREAT LEVELS.
    a. In conjunction with the U.S. Department of 
Transportation's Office of Intelligence and Security, the 
Commandant shall direct the implementation of nationwide and 
local threat levels. The primary means of communicating threat 
information will be through Domestic Threat Advisories. These 
advisories will summarize the nature of the threat and will 
specify changes, if any, to nationwide or local threat levels. 
The COTPs are expected to share the contents of these 
advisories with local industry either directly or through 
appropriate forums such as the port readiness committee.
    b. Area Commanders, District Commanders, and COTPs may 
declare a higher threat level within their respective areas of 
responsibility, but may not lower a threat level imposed by a 
higher authority. A change in the local threat level shall be 
reported to Commandant (G-MOR) via message. The message shall 
specify the new threat level and reasons for the change.
    c. Terrorist Threat Conditions (THREATCONS) (see reference 
(d)) are used to describe Coast Guard and inter-service support 
of U.S. military anti-terrorism activities. In other words, 
THREATCONS describe military security conditions. These 
THREATCONS are not, in any way, related to thethreat levels 
described in reference (a), which describe security conditions 
that affect passenger terminals and vessels.
    d. A Security Plan Evaluation Guide (enclosure (1)) was 
developed using the guidelines in IMO Circular 443. It provides 
guidance to the industry, COTPs, and the NMC regarding the 
examination of plans and the security measures that passenger 
vessels and terminals should take at low, medium, and high 
threat levels. The COTPs and District Commanders are encouraged 
to review local contingency plans to ensure that they are 
complementary to the measures that will be taking place within 
industry. An underlying assumption in the development of the 
regulation and this circular is that at high threat levels (or 
earlier, if warranted) the COTP and other appropriate Federal 
agencies will be actively involved in assuring the security of 
affected vessels and terminals. Coordination between the 
terminals, vessels, COTPs and other local, state, and Federal 
agencies is imperative for effective security.

J. C. CARD
Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard
Chief, Marine Safety and Environmental Protection
Encl: (1) Security Plan Evaluation Guide

                     SECURITY PLAN EVALUATION GUIDE

    The National Maritime Center (NMC) and Captains of the Port 
(COTP) should consider the guidelines contained herein when 
reviewing security plans.
    A. TERMINAL SECURITY PLAN.
    1. Objectives. The plan should cover procedures for periods 
of low, medium, and high threats that--
    a. Deter unauthorized access to the terminal and its 
restricted areas and to any passenger vessel moored at the 
terminal;
    b. Deter the introduction of prohibited weapons, 
incendiaries, and explosives into the terminal and its 
restricted areas and onto any passenger vessels moored at the 
terminal;
    c. Encourage vigilance, as well as general awareness of 
security, at the terminal;
    d. Provide adequate training to employees of the terminal 
for security at the terminal;
    e. Coordinates responsibilities for security between the 
operator of each vessel that embarks or disembarks passengers 
and the terminal operator;
    f. Provide information to employees of the terminal and to 
law-enforcement personnel, in case of an incident affecting 
security;
    g. Provide for amendment of the plan to address any known 
deficiencies; and
    h. Restrict the distribution, disclosure, and availability 
of information contained in the plan to those persons with an 
operational need to know.
    2. Contents. The COTPs should ensure that security plans 
contain at least the following information and actions:
    a. Terminal Security Officer. The terminal security officer 
should be identified in the security plan. A list of 
responsibilities for the terminal security officer and all 
other security functions should be clearly outlined.
    b. Security Survey. Security surveys should be updated at 
least yearly, or more frequently as needed. The survey should 
include the date of the survey; names of the owner and operator 
of the terminal; the name, business address, and telephone 
number of the terminal security officer; a description of the 
terminal that includes general layout and access points; 
intensity of security lighting; restricted areas; emergency 
equipment; location of firearms and ammunition at the terminal; 
list of persons authorized to carry firearms and type of 
firearms carried; number of security personnel employed; and 
number of other employees normally at the terminal when a 
vessel embarks and disembarks passengers.
    c. Standard Operating Procedures. Any standard operating 
procedures related to security should be included in the plan. 
These may include reporting procedures, watchstanding 
instructions, basic relief schedules, and etc.
    d. Barriers. Barriers and their boundaries, when used 
between restricted and unrestricted areas in the terminal area, 
should be clearly defined by walls, fences, environmental 
design, or other security barriers that are either permanent or 
temporary in nature. They should be designed, located, and 
constructed to--
    (1) Delineate the area protected;
    (2) Create a physical and psychological deterrent to 
persons attempting unauthorized entry;
    (3) Delay intruders and enable security personnel to detect 
intruders;
    (4) Have a minimum number of openings that provide readily 
identifiable places for the controlled entry of persons and 
vehicles into the restricted area;
    (5) Be secured when not watched by security personnel;
    (6) When near roadways, must be reinforced to deter 
penetration by motor vehicles; and
    (7) Be kept clear of trees, bushes, and other obstructions.
    e. Alarms. Alarms, when used, should activate an audible or 
visual alarm when an intrusion is detected. The alarm should 
sound in a place which is continuously staffed by personnel 
with security responsibilities.
    f. Lighting. Passenger terminal operators should provide 
security lighting between sunset and sunrise. All external 
lighting should be located or shielded so that it will not be 
confused with an aid to navigation and will not interfere with 
safe navigation. Illumination should light each exterior door, 
gate, fence, pier, wharf, or other point of access to the 
boarding area for passenger vessels.
    g. Communications. Communications should specify the kind 
of communications to use for a breach of security, an unlawful 
act or other emergency.
    (1) Security personnel of the terminal should be provided a 
means of continuous communications, such as radio, telephone, 
or intercom, that enables them to communicate with the terminal 
security officer, the communications center, or security 
personnel of the passenger vessel from their duty stations.
    (2) Communications should be established immediately with 
each passenger vessel that docks at the terminal.
    (3) A distress signal peculiar to security, indicating a 
security alert, should be established.
    h. Screening. When screening is conducted, it may be done 
manually, electronically, or by an equivalent means acceptable 
to the COTP. One or more guards should watch each screening 
point, whenever passengers or baggage are being assembled, 
processed, embarked, or disembarked at the terminal. Screening 
systems should be capable of detecting prohibited weapons, 
incendiaries, and explosives in accordance with the Terminal 
Security Plan.
    (1) No person refusing to submit to a security screening at 
a point of access should enter the boarding area.
    (2) Each person denied entry for refusing to submit to a 
security screening should be identified and reported to 
appropriate authorities.
    (3) Security equipment should be kept in good working 
condition and checked monthly. Records of checks should be 
maintained for at least 30 days after the date of the check.
    (4) Procedures should be in place to ensure any defective 
or missing security equipment is reported immediately to the 
terminal security officer.
    i. Baggage. Each piece of baggage should be marked, labeled 
or tagged, or otherwise identified as belonging to a particular 
passenger. During mediumand high threat periods, it should be 
compared against the official passenger list of the vessel 
prior to being loaded aboard the vessel. No unidentified 
baggage should enter the boarding area.
    j. Identification. Each passenger terminal operator should 
establish a system of identification and control of personnel 
for the terminal. The plan should cover the following 
procedures for:
    (1) Identifying each person authorized access to a 
restricted area in the terminal;
    (2) Issuing an identification card to each employee of the 
terminal (permanent identification cards shall contain the 
cardholder's name, age, height, weight, eye color, expiration 
date, name of the company that employs the cardholder and an 
unique number);
    (3) Providing a temporary identification card to each 
contractor, vendor, and other visitor authorized access to a 
restricted area; and
    (4) Identifying each passenger, each time a passenger 
enters the boarding area.
    k. Designated restricted areas. Designated restricted areas 
should be outlined in the security plan. Restricted areas 
should be appropriately secured with access limited to 
authorized personnel. Each restricted area should be secured 
and conspicuously marked stating that the area has restricted 
access. Passenger terminals should designate the following 
areas as restricted areas:
    (1) Points of access to the boarding area;
    (2) Boarding area for passengers adjacent to where such 
vessels moor, inside the security barriers and screening 
points;
    (3) Areas for the handling and storage of baggage and 
cargo;
    (4) Areas used to store weapons;
    (5) Control rooms for security alarms and monitoring 
devices; and
    (6) Any other areas, as determined by the operator, to 
which access must be restricted to maintain the security of the 
terminal and passenger vessels moored at the terminal.
    l. Coordination. The Terminal Security Plan should outline 
all coordination plans and procedures established with the 
operator of each passenger vessel. The terminal need not 
duplicate any security provisions fulfilled by the vessel. All 
responsibilities should be clearly outlined in the plan stating 
who is responsible for which actions. Copies of agreements 
should be contained in the security plan.
    m. Threat levels. There are three required levels, low, 
medium, and high.The Terminal Security Plan shall include 
required actions for each threat level. As a minimum, the 
following measures should be included:
    (1) Low threat level.
    --Restricted areas should be included as part of the normal 
watch routine.
    --Baggage, cargo, and stores should be randomly screened.
    --Temporary or permanent barriers to maintain segregation 
between cleared and uncleared passengers and baggage should be 
utilized.
    --Each passenger should show a valid ticket issued by the 
cruise line to enter the boarding area.
    --Each piece of baggage should be marked, labeled or 
tagged, or otherwise identified as belonging to a particular 
passenger.
    (2) Medium threat level.
    --The frequency of security rounds should be double that of 
the normal watch routine.
    --Fifty percent of all baggage, cargo and stores should be 
screened.
    --All passengers and carry-on items should be screened.
    --Temporary or permanent barriers to maintain segregation 
between cleared and uncleared passengers and baggage should be 
utilized.
    --Passengers 18 years of age or older should have a valid 
ticket and a valid photo identification document, such as a 
driver's license, passport, or armed forces identification card 
to enter the boarding area.
    --Baggage should be compared against the official passenger 
list of the vessel prior to being loaded aboard the vessel.
    (3) High threat level.
    --Restricted areas should have detection systems that 
activate an audible visual alarm or guards must be posted 
outside.
    --All baggage, cargo and stores should be screened.
    --All passengers and carry-on items should screened.
    --Buildings and natural barriers such as water, or ravines 
should be augmented by additional safeguards such as fences, 
walls, patrols or surveillance.
    --Each entering passenger should be compared to official 
passenger list prior to being allowed in the boarding area.
    --Baggage should be compared against the official passenger 
list of the vessel prior to being loaded aboard the vessel.
    o. Amendments. Amendments to the security plan must be 
included in the security plan. All amendments must bear the 
notation ``Examined by the Coast Guard COTP (port name)'' and 
the date of examination.
    B. VESSEL SECURITY PLAN.
    1. Objectives. The plan should cover procedures for periods 
of low, medium, and high threats that--
    a. Deter unauthorized access to the vessel and its 
restricted areas;
    b. Deter the introduction of prohibited weapons, 
incendiaries, and explosives aboard the vessel;
    c. Encourage vigilance, as well as general awareness of 
security, aboard the vessel;
    d. Provide adequate training to members of the crew for 
security aboard the vessel;
    e. Coordinate responsibilities for security between the 
vessel operator and the operator of each terminal at which the 
vessel embarks or disembarks passengers;
    f. Provide information to members of the crew and to law-
enforcement personnel, in case of an incident affecting 
security;
    g. Provide for amendment of the plan to address any known 
deficiencies; and
    h. Restrict the distribution, disclosure, and availability 
of information contained in the plan to those persons with an 
operational need to know.
    2. Contents. The NMC should ensure that security plans 
contain at least the following information and actions:
    a. Vessel Security Officer. The terminal security officer 
should be identified in the security plan. A list of 
responsibilities for the terminal security officer and all 
other security functions should be clearly outlined.
    b. Security Survey. Security surveys should be updated at 
least yearly, or more frequently as needed. The survey should 
include the date of the survey; names of the owner and operator 
of the vessel; the name, business address, and telephone number 
of the vessel security officer; a description of the vessel 
that includes general layout of the ship; location of areas 
which have restricted areas; the open deck arrangement 
including the height of the deck above the ship; emergency and 
standby equipment available to maintain essential services; 
number of ships crew.
    c. Standard Operating Procedures. Any standard operating 
procedures related to security should be included in the plan. 
These may include reporting procedures, watchstanding 
instructions, basic relief schedules, etc.
    d. Alarms. Alarms, when used, should activate an audible or 
visual alarm when an intrusion is detected. The alarm should 
sound in a place which is continuously staffed by personnel 
with security responsibilities.
    e. Lighting. While in port, at anchor, or underway the 
ship's deck and overside should be illuminated in periods of 
darkness and restricted visibility, but not so as to interfere 
with required navigation lights and safe navigation.
    f. Communications. Communications should specify the kind 
of communications to use for a breach of security, an unlawful 
act or other emergency.
    (1) Security personnel of the vessel should be provided a 
means of continuous communications, such as radio, telephone, 
or intercom, that enables them to communicate with the vessel 
security officer, the navigational bridge, communications 
center, or security personnel shoreside from their duty 
stations.
    (2) Communications should be established with each terminal 
at which the vessel docks immediately after mooring.
    (3) A distress signal peculiar to security, indicating a 
security alert, should be established.
    g. Screening. When screening is conducted, it may be done 
manually, electronically, or by an equivalent means acceptable 
to the NMC. Screening systems should be capable of detecting 
prohibited weapons, incendiaries, and explosives in accordance 
with the Vessel Security Plan.
    (1) No person refusing to submit to a security screening at 
a point of access should board the vessel.
    (2) Each person denied entry for refusing to submit to a 
security screening should be identified and reported to 
appropriate authorities.
    (3) Security equipment should be kept in good working 
condition and checked monthly. Records of checks should be 
maintained for at least 30 days after the date of the check.
    (4) Procedures should be in place to ensure any defective 
or missing security equipment is reported immediately to the 
terminal security officer.
    h. Baggage. Each piece of baggage should be marked, labeled 
or tagged, or otherwise identified as belonging to a particular 
passenger. During medium and high threat periods, it should be 
compared against the official passenger list of the vessel 
prior to being loaded aboard the vessel. No unidentified 
baggage should be permitted aboard the vessel.
    i. Identification. Each passenger vessel operator should 
establish a system of identification and control of personnel 
for the vessel. The plan should cover the following procedures 
for:
    (1) Identifying each category of persons authorized to be 
aboard the vessel and each person authorized access to a 
restricted area aboard the vessel;
    (2) Issuing an identification card to each member of the 
crew or other employee of the vessel (permanent identification 
cards should contain the cardholder's name, age, height, 
weight, eye color, expiration date, name of the company that 
employs the cardholder and an unique number);
    (3) Providing a temporary identification card to each 
contractor, vendor, and other visitor authorized access to a 
restricted area; and
    (4) Identifying each passenger authorized to board the 
vessel by comparison against the official passenger list.
    j. Designated Restricted Areas. Designated restricted areas 
should be outlined in the security plan. Restricted areas 
should be appropriately secured with access limited to 
authorized personnel. Each restricted area should be secured 
and conspicuously marked stating that the area has restricted 
access. Passenger vessels should designate the following areas 
as restricted areas:
    (1) The navigational bridge;
    (2) The communications center or radio room
    (3) The engine room; and
    (4) Any other areas as determined by the operator, to which 
access must be restricted to maintain the security of the 
vessel.
    k. Coordination. The Vessel Security Plan should outline 
all coordination plans and procedures established with the 
operator of each passenger terminal. The vessel need not 
duplicate any security provisions fulfilled by the terminal. 
All responsibilities should be clearly outlined in the plan 
stating who is responsible for which actions on a port by port 
basis. Copies of agreements should be contained in the security 
plan.
    l. Threat levels. There are three required levels, low, 
medium, and high. The Terminal Security Plan shall include what 
is required and what actions must be taken at each threat 
level. As a minimum, the following measures should be included:
    (1) Low threat level.
    --Restricted areas should be included as part of the normal 
watch routine.
    --Baggage, cargo and stores should be randomly screened.
    --Temporary or permanent barriers to maintain segregation 
between cleared and passengers and baggage should be utilized.
    --Each piece of baggage should be marked, or tagged, or 
otherwise identified as belonging to a particular passenger.
    (2) Medium threat level.
    --The frequency of security rounds should be double that of 
the normal watch routine.
    --Fifty percent of all baggage, cargo and stores should be 
screened.
    --All passengers and carry-on items should be screened.
    --Temporary or permanent barriers to maintain segregation 
between cleared and uncleared passengers and baggage should be 
utilized.
    --Passengers 18 years of age or older should have a valid 
ticket and a valid photo identification document, such as a 
driver's license, passport, or armed forces identification card 
to board the vessel.
    --Baggage should be compared against the official passenger 
list of the vessel prior to being loaded aboard the vessel.
    (3) High threat level.
    --Restricted areas should have intrusion detection systems 
that activate an audible or visual alarm or guards should be 
posted outside.
    --All baggage, cargo and stores should be screened.
    --All passengers and carry-on items should be screened.
    --Each entering passenger should be compared to official 
passenger list prior to being allowed to board the vessel.
    --Baggage should be compared against the official passenger 
list of the vessel prior to being loaded aboard the vessel.
    n. Amendments. Amendments to the security plan must be 
included in the security plan. All amendments must bear the 
notation ``Examined by the Coast Guard COTP (port name)'' and 
the date of examination.
=======================================================================




                        K. BILATERAL AGREEMENTS

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

1. Counter terrorism.............................................  1237
      a.  United States and South Africa Declaration on Mutual 
          Anti-Crime Prevention, July 23, 1996...................  1237
      b.  Counterterrorism Cooperation Accord between the United 
          States and Israel, April 30, 1996......................  1239
2. Aviation Security.............................................  1242
      a. Sample Open Skies Agreement: Republic of Korea..........  1242
      b. Sample Aviation Security Agreements.....................  1268
          (1) Bahrain (Signed November 15, 1992).................  1268
          (2) Republic of Korea (Signed September 15, 1988)......  1274
      c. List of Open Skies Agreements Not Entered into Force....  1281
      d. List of Initialed Open Skies Agreements (not yet 
          formally signed).......................................  1282
      e. List of Open Skies Agreements in Force..................  1283
      f. List of Aviation Agreements Signed, but Not Entered into 
          Force..................................................  1284
      g. List of Aviation Agreements Containing a Security 
          Article in Force.......................................  1285
      h. Model Aviation Security Article.........................  1287
3. Extradition...................................................  1289
      a. List of Agreements in Force.............................  1289
      b. List of Agreements Signed, Not Entered Into Force.......  1293
      c. Samples of Recent Agreements............................  1294
          (1) India (Signed June 25, 1997).......................  1294
          (2) Luxembourg (Signed October 1, 1996)................  1320
          (3) Philippines (Signed November 13, 1994).............  1353
4 Mutual Legal Assistance........................................  1380
      a. List of Agreements in Force.............................  1380
      b. List of Agreements Signed, Not Entered into Force.......  1381
      c. Sample Recent Agreement: United Kingdom (Signed January 
          6, 1994)...............................................  1382

=======================================================================

                          1. Counterterrorism

a. U.S.-South Africa Declaration on Mutual Anti-Crime Prevention, July 
                              23, 1996 \1\

    The Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Republic of South Africa,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Source: USIA, 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Recognizing the impact of crime on democracy, stability, 
and human rights;
    Aware that organized criminal elements are attracted to 
open, free societies with highly developed infrastructures;
    Convinced that the illicit use and trafficking in drugs 
constitute a problem which affects the communities of both 
countries;
    Realizing that money laundering, corruption, and related 
international criminal activities undermine democratic 
societies;
    Believing that the international nature of most organized 
criminal activity necessitates that governments coordinate 
their law enforcement efforts;
    Alert to the need for worldwide cooperation in combating 
international terrorism;
    Mindful of the South African Government's National Crime 
Prevention Strategy of May 1996; and
    Observing the recommendations of the March 1996 document of 
the South African Department of Safety and Security, entitled 
``Requests for International Assistance;''
    Agree on the desirability, and indeed the necessity of 
mutual cooperation in combating international crime, including 
international terrorism.
    Such cooperation may include but need not be limited to the 
following:

  --assignment of representatives of the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
        Administration to the U.S. Embassy in Pretoria to 
        coordinate intelligence, training, and possible joint 
        operations in combating transnational drug trafficking;
  --provision for training and support for drug demand 
        reduction and preventive education outreach;
  --establishment of an FBI Legal Attache office in Pretoria to 
        liaise with host country law enforcement organizations 
        in support of law enforcement activities including, but 
        not limited to, the exchange of intelligence 
        information and investigation of international 
        terrorism, financial/computer crimes, kidnappings and 
        other transnational crimes, as well as to facilitate 
        the location, arrest, and extradition of international 
        fugitives within the FBI's jurisdiction;
  --development by South Africa of a police training program to 
        enhance professional capabilities in fighting organized 
        crime, financial crimes, and alien smuggling, which may 
        include specialized courses offered by U.S. law 
        enforcement training programs such as ICITAP 
        (International Criminal Investigative Training 
        Assistance Program);
  --inclusion of South African participants in U.S.-
        administered courses for professionals assigned to the 
        fields of Customs and Immigration, narcotics 
        interdiction, VIP protection, and financial crimes;
  --promotion of exchange visits by teams of law enforcement 
        officials ranging from working-level police to public 
        defenders, prosecutors, and judges, up to officials at 
        the ministerial level; and
  --pursuit of other exchanges of information, training 
        programs, and international cooperation as may be 
        mutually desirable.

    The United States and South Africa are convinced that their 
mutual cooperation in fighting the scourges of organized crime, 
drug trafficking, and international terrorism can result in a 
tangible benefit to their mutual societies, the surrounding 
regions, and the world.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA:

Washington, July 23, 1996

 b. Counterterrorism Cooperation Accord between the Government of the 
       United States of America and the Government of Israel \1\

    The Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the State of Israel (``the Parties''):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Source: U.S. Department of State, April 30, 1996
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Unequivocally condemning all acts, methods and practices of 
terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by 
whomever committed and whatever the motivation, in particular 
the recent heinous acts perpetrated against civilians in 
Israel;
    Recalling the declaration of the participants in the 
historic Middle East Summit of the Peacemakers on March 13, 
1996 that acts of terror are ``alien to the moral and spiritual 
values shared by the peoples of the region'' and urging all 
governments to join in condemning and opposing such acts;
    Convinced that the suppression of acts of international 
terrorism, including those in which States are directly or 
indirectly involved, is an essential element for the 
maintenance of international peace and security;
    Calling upon all states to renounce terrorism and to deny 
financial support, the use of their territory, the provision of 
arms and equipment, or any other means of support to terrorist 
organizations;
    Convinced that those responsible for acts of international 
terrorism must be brought to justice through prosecution, 
extradition, or other legal mechanisms;
    Sharing the view that international cooperation is an 
essential factor in halting the scourge of international 
terrorism and that states that support terrorism should be 
subject to sanctions;
    Recalling their long-standing and fruitful cooperation on 
this and other topics of mutual security concern;
    Resolved to strengthen their own cooperation in combatting 
international terrorism and in encouraging and assisting other 
states to join in this effort;
    Have agreed as follows:

                               Article 1

                         Spheres of Cooperation

    1. With a view to enhancing their capabilities to deter, 
prevent, respond to and investigate international terrorist 
acts or threats of international terrorist acts against the 
United States or Israel, and to enlist the cooperation of 
others in combatting international terrorism, the Parties agree 
to share expertise and otherwise assist each other in the 
following spheres, among others:
        1) sharing of information and analyses regarding 
        terrorists and terrorist organizations;
        2) training;
        3) exchange of experts;
        4) exchange of experience in dealing with terrorist 
        incidents, including crisis management;
        5) exchange of information regarding terrorism-related 
        investigations;
        6) exchange of information on transfers of funds to 
        organizations involved in international terrorism;
        7) extradition, prosecution and other legal mechanisms;
        8) research and development;
        9) consulting closely on counterterrorism policy, 
        including regional and global counterterrorism 
        initiatives; and
        10) enhancing the counterterrorism capabilities of 
        others.
    2. This agreement is intended to supplement existing 
agreements and arrangements between the Parties to address 
international terrorism. Nothing in this agreement shall be 
construed as derogating from the provisions of such agreements 
or arrangements.

                               Article 2

             Establishment of Joint Counterterrorism Group

    1. In order to strengthen further their cooperation on 
counterterrorism the Parties hereby establish the United 
States-Israel Joint Counterterrorism Group (JCG). The JCG will 
serve as a forum for regular consultations and development and 
facilitation of programs of counterterrorism cooperation in the 
spheres listed in Article 1 as well as on other mutually agreed 
counterterrorism topics.
    2. The JCG will be composed of representatives from each 
Party, including as appropriate representatives from the 
various relevant agencies and departments of each Party that 
work on counterterrorism issues. The JCG will be co-chaired by 
senior counterterrorism officials of each Party.
    3. The JCG will normally meet annually, alternately in the 
United States and Israel. In addition, special meetings of the 
JCG may be held to deal with particular issues or at the 
request of either Party. At the request of the JCG, experts of 
the Parties may meet and be in direct communication at any 
other time to assist in fulfilling the purposes of this 
agreement.
    4. The JCG may from time to time enter into written 
understandings or implementing arrangements setting forth 
specific activities to be conducted under this agreement.
    5. Between meetings of the JCG, participants will maintain 
contacts with their counterparts as required to carry out the 
purposes of this agreement.

                               Article 3

                        Security of Information

    To the extent that any items, plans, specifications or 
information furnished in connection with the implementation of 
this agreement are classified by either Party for security 
purposes, the General Security of Information Agreement dated 
10 December 1982 between the Parties and that Agreement's 
Industrial Security Annex, dated 3 March 1983, shall apply, 
unless the Parties agree upon alternative arrangements for 
protecting the material from unauthorized disclosures.

                               Article 4

                           General Provision

    All undertakings of the Parties under this agreement are to 
be carried out in accordance with their national laws, 
obligations and policies, and are subject to the availability 
of appropriated funds, resources and personnel.

                               Article 5

                      Interpretation and Amendment

    1. All questions or disputes related to the interpretation 
or implementation of this agreement shall be settled 
exclusively through the diplomatic channel to the mutual 
satisfaction of the Parties.
    2. Either Party may, at any time, request revision of this 
agreement by giving the other Party written notice. Each Party 
should be prepared to discuss the proposal within 90 days 
thereafter.

                               Article 6

                     Entry into Force and Duration

    This agreement will enter into force on the date of the 
second of the diplomatic notes by which the two Parties notify 
each other of the completion of any necessary internal 
procedures for entry into force of the agreement. It will 
remain in force until 6 months after either Party provides 
written notice to the other through the diplomatic channel of 
its intention to terminate the agreement.

DONE at Washington, D.C., in duplicate, in English and Hebrew, 
both texts being equally authentic, this 30th day of April, 
1996, corresponding to the 11th day of Iyar, 5756.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE STATE OF ISRAEL:

                          2. Aviation Security

                     a. Sample Open Skies Agreement

      

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      c. Signed Open Skies Agreements, Not Entered into Force \1\

      
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ U.S., Department of State, Office of the Legal Advisor for 
Treaty Affairs.




 1. Aruba                    Signed:          September 18, 1997
 2. Belgium                  ...............  September 5, 1995
 3. Costa Rica               ...............  May 8, 1997
 4. El Salvador              ...............  May 8, 1997
 5. Germany                  ...............  May 24, 1996
 6. Guatemala                ...............  May 8, 1997
 7. Honduras                 ...............  May 8, 1997
 8. Nicaragua                ...............  May 8, 1997
 9. Panama                   ...............  May 8, 1997
10. Taiwan \2\               ...............  March 18, 1998
11. Uzbekistan               ...............  February 27, 1998


      
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ ``On January 1, 1979, the United States recognized the 
Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal 
Government of China. The United States acknowledges the Chinese 
position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. The 
United States does not recognized the `Republic of China' as a state or 
government . . . . [This] agreement relationship . . . is administered 
on a nongovernmental basis by the American Institute in Taiwan, a 
nonprofit District of Columbia corporation, [and the Taipei Economic 
and Cultural Representative Office] and constitute neither recognition 
of the Taiwan authorities nor the continuation of any official 
relationship with Taiwan.'' U.S., Department of State, Office of the 
Legal Advisor, Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other 
International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 
1997, August 1997, p. 315. The Taipei Economic and Cultural 
Representative Office was formerly the Coordination Council for North 
American Affairs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      

                        d. Initialed Agreements

      




1. Chile                                                  Initialed:             October 28, 1997
2. Korea                                                  .....................  April 23, 1998
3. Netherlands Antilles                                   .....................  December 9, 1997
4. Romania                                                .....................  December 5, 1997


      

                  e. List of Open Skies Agreements \1\

      
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Recent aviation agreements that reduce commercial air 
restrictions are known as Open Skies agreements.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Country                       Date Signed           Entered into force            Citation
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Austria..............................  June 14,1995...........  Aug. 1, 1995...........  TIAS.
Brunei Darussalam....................  June 20, 1997..........  June 20, 1997..........  TIAS.
Czech Republic.......................  Sept. 10, 1996.........  Sept. 10, 1996.........  TIAS.
Denmark..............................  June 16, 1995..........  June 16, 1995..........  TIAS.
Finland..............................  June 9, 1995...........  June 9, 1995...........  TIAS.
Iceland..............................  June 14, 1995..........  Oct. 12, 1995..........  TIAS.
Jordan...............................  Nov. 10, 1996..........  Nov. 10, 1996..........  TIAS.
Luxembourg...........................  June 6, 1995...........  Jan. 9, 1998...........  TIAS.
Malaysia.............................  June 21, 1997..........  June 21, 1997..........  TIAS.
Netherlands..........................  Oct. 14, 1992..........  May 11, 1993...........  TIAS.
New Zealand..........................  June 18, 1997..........  June 18, 1997..........  TIAS.
Nicaragua............................  May 8, 1997............  Dec. 5, 1997...........  TIAS.
Norway...............................  June 16 1995...........  June 16 1995...........  TIAS.
Singapore............................  April 8, 1997..........  April 8, 1997..........  TIAS.
Sweden...............................  June 16, 1995..........  June 16, 1995..........  TIAS.
Switzerland..........................  June 15, 1995..........  Sept. 27, 1996.........  TIAS.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


 f. List of Aviation Agreements Signed, but Not Entered into Force \1\

      
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ U.S., Department of State, Office of the Assistant Legal 
Advisor for Treaty Affairs.




1. Chile                                           Signed:                   September 27, 1989
2. Dominican Republic                              ........................  July 22, 1986
3. Ecuador                                         ........................  September 26, 1986
4. Egypt                                           ........................  May 27, 1991
5. Panama                                          ........................  January 12 and 13, 1994



 g. List of Aviation Agreements in Force Containing A Security Article 
                        Based on Model Language

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Country                       Date Signed           Entered into force            Citation
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Antigua and                            Aug. 19, 1991..........  .......................  TIAS 11794.
  Barbuda............................  Oct. 7, 1991...........  Oct. 7, 1991...........  TIAS 11794.
Aruba................................  Nov. 7, 1986...........  Aug. 17, 1987..........  TIAS.
Australia............................  Dec. 22, 1987..........  Dec. 22, 1987..........  TIAS 11922.
Austria..............................  Mar. 16, 1989..........  June 2, 1989...........  TIAS 11256.
Bahrain..............................  Nov. 15, 1992..........  Nov. 15, 1992..........  TIAS 11912.
Bangladesh...........................  Nov. 23, 1992..........  .......................  TIAS 12160.
                                       Aug. 23, 1993..........  Aug. 23, 1993..........  TIAS 12160.
Belgium..............................  Sept. 22, 1986.........  .......................  TIAS.
                                       Nov. 12, 1986..........  Nov. 12, 1986..........  TIAS.
Bolivia..............................  June 28, 1988..........  .......................  TIAS. 11642.
                                       Aug. 23, 1988..........  Aug. 23, 1988..........  TIAS. 11642.
Brazil...............................  Mar. 21, 1989..........  Jan. 13, 1992..........  TIAS 11780.
Bulgaria.............................  Apr. 24, 1991..........  Apr. 24, 1991..........  TIAS 11984.
Canada...............................  Feb. 24, 1995..........  Feb. 24, 1995..........  TIAS.
Cape Verde...........................  Oct. 11, 1989..........  Oct. 11, 1989..........  TIAS 11705.
Czech Republic.......................  June 29, 1987..........  June 29, 1987..........  TIAS 11162.
Gambia...............................  Sept. 14, 1992.........  .......................  TIAS 11910.
                                       Sept. 15, 1992.........  Sept. 15, 1992.........  TIAS 11910.
Germany..............................  Apr. 25, 1989..........  Aug. 6, 1992...........  TIAS 11942.
Greece...............................  July 31, 1991..........  May 15, 1992...........  TIAS.
Grenada..............................  Mar. 19, 1987..........  .......................  TIAS 11279.
                                       May 11, 1987...........  May 11, 1987...........  TIAS 11279.
Honduras.............................  Aug. 5, 1991...........  Aug. 5, 1991...........  TIAS 11804.
Hungary..............................  July 12, 1989..........  Feb. 8, 1990...........  TIAS 11260.
India................................  May 4, 1989............  May 4, 1989............  TIAS 11775.
Indonesia............................  Apr. 12, 1990..........  .......................  TIAS 11760.
                                       June 19, 1990..........  June 19, 1990..........  TIAS 11760.
Ireland..............................  Jan. 25, 1988..........  .......................  TIAS 11692.
                                       Sept. 29, 1989.........  Sept. 29, 1989.........  TIAS 11692.
Israel...............................  Dec. 16, 1986..........  .......................  TIAS 11524.
                                       Jan. 5, 1987...........  Jan. 5, 1987...........  TIAS 11524.
Italy................................  Oct. 25, 1988..........  Mar. 28, 1991..........  TIAS 11634.
Japan................................  Apr. 20, 1998..........  Apr. 20, 1998..........  TIAS.
Kuwait...............................  Nov. 22, 1987..........  .......................  TIAS 12023.
                                       Jan. 11, 1988..........  July 5, 1988...........  TIAS 12023.
Luxembourg...........................  Aug. 19, 1986..........  Aug. 3, 1988...........  TIAS 11249.
Malaysia.............................  Nov. 11, 1990..........  .......................  TIAS 11796.
                                       Aug. 26, 1991..........  Aug. 26, 1991..........  TIAS 11796.
Mali.................................  June 25, 1993..........  June 25, 1993..........  TIAS 12155.
Mexico...............................  Sept. 23, 1988.........  Sept. 23, 1988.........  TIAS.
Netherlands..........................  June 11, 1986..........  Feb. 2, 1987...........  TIAS 11365.
Nicaragua............................  Dec. 4, 1991...........  .......................  TIAS 11846.
                                       Dec. 12, 1991..........  Dec. 12, 1991..........  TIAS 11846.
Oman.................................  June 28, 1994..........  .......................  TIAS.
                                       June 30, 1994..........  June 30, 1994..........  TIAS.
Peru.................................  Dec. 16, 1986..........  June 12, 1987..........  TIAS 11174.
Philippines..........................  May 29, 1987...........  .......................  TIAS 11564.
                                       Jan. 13, 1988..........  Jan. 13, 1988..........  TIAS 11564.
Poland...............................  Feb. 1, 1988...........  Oct. 11, 1988..........  TIAS.
Qatar................................  June 27, 1994..........  June 30, 1994..........  TIAS.
Romania..............................  Mar. 19, 1990..........  Mar. 19, 1990..........  TIAS 11730.
Russian Fed..........................  Jan. 14, 1994..........  Jan. 14, 1994..........  TIAS.
Saint Christopher                      Aug. 11, 1987..........  .......................  TIAS 11545.
  and Nevis..........................  Nov. 30, 1987..........  Nov. 30, 1987..........  TIAS 11545.
Saudi Arabia.........................  Oct. 2, 1993...........  Oct. 2, 1993...........  TIAS.
Senegal..............................  Apr. 1, 1998...........  Apr. 1, 1998...........  TIAS.
Singapore............................  May 18, 1990...........  .......................  TIAS 11761.
                                       June 15, 1990..........  June 15, 1990..........  TIAS 11761.
South Africa.........................  Aug. 19, 1991..........  .......................  TIAS 11788.
                                       Oct. 3, 1991...........  .......................  TIAS 11788.
                                       Oct. 11, 1991..........  .......................  TIAS 11788.
                                       Oct. 30, 1991..........  Oct. 30, 1991..........  TIAS 11788.
Spain................................  May 31, 1989...........  Sept. 26, 1990.........  TIAS 11672.
Switzerland..........................  July 14, 1987..........  Feb. 9, 1993...........  TIAS 11552.
Taiwan \1\...........................  May 8, 1986............  .......................  TIAS.
                                       July 28, 1986..........  July 28, 1986..........  TIAS.
Trinidad and Tobago..................  May 23, 1990...........  May 23, 1990...........  TIAS 11724.
Turkey...............................  Nov. 7, 1990...........  Oct. 22, 1993..........  TIAS.
United Arab                            Dec. 26, 1993..........  .......................  TIAS.
  Emirates...........................  Feb. 17, 1994..........  Feb. 17, 1994..........  TIAS.
United Kingdom.......................  May 25, 1989...........  May 25, 1989...........  TIAS 11674.
Yugoslavia*..........................  Jan. 15, 1987..........  .......................  TIAS 11547.
                                       July 6, 1987...........  Apr. 5, 1988...........  TIAS 11547.
Zambia...............................  Feb. 16, 1988..........  .......................  TIAS 11573.
                                       Mar. 2, 1988...........  Mar. 28, 1988..........  TIAS 11573.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* For the successor States of Yugoslavia, inquire of the Treaty Office of the United States Department of State.

      
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ ``On January 1, 1979, the United States recognized the 
Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal 
Government of China. The United States acknowledges the Chinese 
position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. The 
United States does not recognized the ``Republic of China'' as a state 
or government . . . . [This] agreement relationship . . . is 
administered on a nongovernmental basis by the American Institute in 
Taiwan, a nonprofit District of Columbia corporation, [and the 
Coordination Council for North American Affairs,] and constitute 
neither recognition of the Taiwan authorities nor the continuation of 
any official relationship with Taiwan.'' U.S., Department of State, 
Office of the Legal Advisor, Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and 
Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 
1, 1997, August 1997, p. 315. The Coordination Council for North 
American Affairs has since been renamed the Taipei Economic and 
Cultural Representative Office.

           h. Model Aviation Security Article 1,2

    (1) In accordance with their rights and obligations under 
international law, the Parties reaffirm that their obligation 
to each other to protect the security of civil aviation against 
acts of unlawful interference forms an integral part of this 
Agreement. Without limiting the generality of their rights and 
obligations under international law, the Parties shall in 
particular act in conformity with the provisions of the 
Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on 
Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo on September 14, 1963, the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 
signed at The Hague on December 16, 1970, and the Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on September 23, 1971.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The United States uses a model aviation security article to 
protect civil aviation against unlawful acts of interference.
    \2\ U.S., Department of State, Office of the Assistant Legal 
Advisor for Economic and Business Affairs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (2) The Parties shall provide upon request all necessary 
assistance to each other to prevent acts of unlawful seizure of 
civil aircraft and other unlawful acts against the safety of 
such aircraft, of their passengers and crew, and of airports 
and air navigation facilities, and to address any other threat 
to the security of civil air navigation.
    (3) The Parties shall, in their mutual relations, act in 
conformity with the aviation security provisions established by 
the International Civil Aviation Organization and designated as 
Annexes to the Convention; they shall require that operators of 
aircraft of their registry, operators of aircraft who have 
their principal place of business or permanent residence in 
their territory, and the operators of airports in their 
territory act in conformity with such aviation security 
provisions.
    (4) Each Party agrees to observe the security provisions 
required by the other Party for entry into, for departure from, 
and while within the territory of that other Party and to take 
adequate measures to protect aircraft and to inspect 
passengers, crew, and their baggage and carry-on items, as well 
as cargo and aircraft stores, prior to and during boarding or 
loading. Each Party shall also give positive consideration to 
any request from the other Party for special security measures 
to meet a particular threat.
    (5) When an incident or threat of an incident of unlawful 
seizure of aircraft or other unlawful acts against the safety 
of passengers, crew, aircraft, airports or air navigation 
facilities occurs, the Parties shall assist each other by 
facilitating communications and other appropriate measures 
intended to terminate rapidly and safely such incident or 
threat.
    (6) When a Party has reasonable grounds to believe that the 
other Party has departed from the aviation security provisions 
of this Article, the aeronautical authorities of that Party may 
request immediate consultations with the aeronautical 
authorities of the other Party. Failure to reach a satisfactory 
agreement within 15 days from the date of such request shall 
constitute grounds to withhold, revoke, limit, or impose 
conditions on the operating authorization and technical 
permissions of an airline or airlines of that Party. When 
required by an emergency, a Party may take interim action prior 
to the expiry of 15 days.

                        3. Extradition Treaties

                     a. List of Agreements in Force

           U.S. CODE, TITLE 18--CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

                      PART II--CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

                        CHAPTER 209--EXTRADITION

Sec. 3181. Scope and limitation of chapter
    The provisions of this chapter relating to the surrender of 
persons who have committed crimes in foreign countries shall 
continue in force only during the existence of any treaty of 
extradition with such foreign government.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 822.)

                      TREATIES OF EXTRADITION \1\

     The United States currently has bilateral extradition 
treaties with the following countries:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3181; U.S., Department of State, Office of the 
Assistant Legal Advisor for Treaty Affairs.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Country                       Date Signed           Entered into force            Citation
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Albania..............................  Mar. 1, 1933...........  Nov. 14, 1935..........  49 Stat. 3313.
Antigua and Barbuda..................  June 3, 1996...........  July 1, 1999...........
Argentina............................  Jan. 21, 1972..........  Sept. 15, 1972.........  23 UST 3501.
Australia............................  May 14, 1974...........  May 8, 1976............  27 UST 957.
                                       Sept. 4, 1990..........  Dec. 21, 1992..........
Austria..............................  Jan. 8, 1998...........  Jan. 1, 2000...........
Bahamas..............................  Mar. 9, 1990...........  Sept. 22, 1994.........  TIAS.
Barbados.............................  Dec. 22, 1931..........  June 24, 1935..........  47 Stat. 2122.
Belgium..............................  Apr. 27, 1987..........  Sept. 1, 1997..........
Belize...............................  June 8, 1972...........  Jan. 21, 1977..........  28 UST 227.
Bolivia..............................  June 27, 1995..........  Nov. 21, 1996..........
Brazil...............................  Jan. 13, 1961..........  Dec. 17, 1964..........  15 UST 2093
                                       June 18, 1962..........  Dec. 17, 1964..........  15 UST 2112.
Bulgaria.............................  Mar. 19, 1924..........  June 24, 1924..........  43 Stat. 1886.
                                       June 8, 1934...........  Aug. 15, 1935..........  49 Stat. 3250.
Burma................................  Dec. 22, 1931..........  Nov. 1, 1941...........  47 Stat. 2122.
Canada...............................  Dec. 3, 1971...........  Mar. 22, 1976..........  27 UST 983.
                                       June 28, July 9, 1974..  Mar. 22, 1976..........  27 UST 1017.
                                       Jan. 11, 1988..........  Nov. 26, 1991..........  TIAS.
Chile................................  Apr. 17, 1900..........  June 26, 1902..........  32 Stat. 1850.
Colombia.............................  Sept. 14, 1979.........  Mar. 4, 1982...........  TIAS.
Congo................................  Jan. 6, 1909...........  July 27, 1911..........  37 Stat. 1526.
                                       Jan. 15, 1929..........  May 19, 1929...........  46 Stat. 2276.
                                       Apr. 23, 1936..........  Sept. 24, 1936.........  50 Stat. 1117.
                                       .......................  Aug. 5, 1961...........  13 UST 2065.
Costa Rica...........................  Dec. 4, 1982...........  Oct. 11, 1991..........  TIAS.
Cuba.................................  Apr. 6, 1904...........  Mar. 2, 1905...........  33 Stat. 2265
                                       Dec. 6, 1904...........  Mar. 2, 1905...........  33 Stat. 2273.
                                       Jan. 14, 1926..........  June 18, 1926..........  44 Stat. 2392.
Cyprus...............................  June 17, 1996..........  Sept. 14, 1999.........
Czech Republic.......................  July 2, 1925...........  Mar. 29, 1926..........  44 Stat. 2367.
                                       Apr. 29, 1935..........  Aug. 28, 1935..........  49 Stat. 3253.
Denmark..............................  June 22, 1972..........  July 31, 1974..........  25 UST 1293.
Dominica.............................  June 8, 1972...........  Jan. 21, 1977..........  28 UST 227.
Dominican Republic...................  June 19, 1909..........  Aug. 2, 1910...........  36 Stat. 2468.
Ecuador..............................  June 28, 1872..........  Nov. 12, 1873..........  18 Stat. 199.
                                       Sept. 22, 1939.........  May 29, 1941...........  55 Stat. 1196.
Egypt................................  Aug. 11, 1874..........  Apr. 22, 1875..........  19 Stat. 572.
El Salvador..........................  Apr. 18, 1911..........  July 10, 1911..........  37 Stat. 1516.
Estonia..............................  Nov. 8, 1923...........  Nov. 15. 1924..........  43 Stat. 1849.
                                       Oct. 10, 1934..........  May 7, 1935............  49 Stat. 3190.
Fiji.................................  Dec. 22, 1931..........  June 24, 1935..........  47 Stat. 2122.
                                                                Aug. 17, 1973..........  24 UST 1965.
Finland..............................  June 11, 1976..........  May 11, 1980...........  31 UST 944.
France...............................  Jan. 6, 1909...........  July 27, 1911..........  37 Stat. 1526.
                                       Feb. 12, 1970..........  Apr. 3, 1971...........  22 UST 407.
Gambia...............................  Dec. 22, 1931..........  June 24, 1935..........  47 Stat. 2122.
Germany..............................  June 20, 1978..........  Aug. 29, 1980..........  32 UST 1485.
                                       Oct. 21, 1986..........  Mar. 11, 1993..........
Ghana................................  Dec. 22, 1931..........  June 24, 1935..........  47 Stat. 2122.
Greece...............................  May 6, 1931............  Nov. 1, 1932...........  47 Stat. 2185.
                                       Sept. 2, 1937..........  Sept. 2, 1937..........  51 Stat. 357.
Grenada..............................  May 30, 1996...........  Sept. 14, 1999.........
Guatemala............................  Feb. 27, 1903..........  Aug. 15, 1903..........  33 Stat. 2147.
                                       Feb. 20, 1940..........  Mar. 13, 1941..........  55 Stat. 1097.
Guyana...............................  Dec. 22, 1931..........  June 24, 1935..........  47 Stat. 2122.
Haiti................................  Aug. 9, 1904...........  June 28, 1905..........  34 Stat. 2858.
Honduras.............................  Jan. 15, 1909..........  July 10, 1912..........  37 Stat. 1616.
                                       Feb. 21, 1927..........  June 5, 1928...........  45 Stat. 2489.
Hong Kong............................  Dec. 20, 1996..........  Jan. 21, 1988..........
Hungary..............................  Dec. 1, 1994...........  Mar. 18, 1997..........
Iceland..............................  Jan. 6, 1902...........  .......................  32 Stat. 1096.
                                       Nov. 6, 1905...........  Feb. 19, 1906..........  34 Stat. 2887.
India................................  June 25, 1997..........  July 21, 1999..........
Iraq.................................  June 7, 1934...........  Apr. 23, 1936..........  49 Stat. 3380.
Ireland..............................  July 13, 1983..........  Dec. 15, 1984..........  TIAS 10813.
Israel...............................  Dec. 10, 1962..........  Dec. 5, 1963...........  14 UST 1707.
                                       .......................  Apr. 11, 1967..........  18 UST 382.
Italy................................  Oct. 13, 1983..........  Sept. 24, 1984.........  TIAS 10837.
Jamaica..............................  June 14, 1983..........  July 7, 1991...........
Japan................................  Mar. 3, 1978...........  Mar. 26, 1980..........  31 UST 892.
Jordan...............................  Mar. 28, 1995..........  July 29, 1995..........
Kenya................................  Dec. 22, 1931..........  June 24, 1935..........  47 Stat. 2122.
                                       .......................  Aug. 19, 1965..........  16 UST 1866.
Kiribati.............................  June 8, 1972...........  Jan. 21, 1977..........  28 UST 227.
Korea................................  June 9, 1998...........  Dec. 20, 1999..........
Latvia...............................  Oct. 16, 1923..........  Mar. 1, 1924...........  43 Stat. 1738.
                                       Oct. 10, 1934..........  Mar. 29, 1935..........  49 Stat. 3131.
Lesotho..............................  Dec. 22, 1931..........  June 24, 1935..........  47 Stat. 2122.
Liberia..............................  Nov. 1, 1937...........  Nov. 21, 1939..........  54 Stat. 1733.
Liechtenstein........................  May 20, 1936...........  June 28, 1937..........  50 Stat. 1337.
Lithuania............................  Apr. 9, 1924...........  Aug. 23, 1924..........  43 Stat. 1835.
                                       May 17, 1934...........  Jan. 8, 1935...........  49 Stat. 3077.
Luxembourg...........................  Oct. 29, 1883..........  Aug. 13, 1884..........  23 Stat. 808.
                                       Apr. 24, 1935..........  Mar. 3, 1936...........  49 Stat. 3355.
Malawi...............................  Dec. 22, 1931..........  June 24, 1935..........  47 Stat. 2122.
                                         .....................  Apr. 4, 1967...........  18 UST 1822.
Malaysia.............................  Aug. 3, 1995...........  June 2, 1997...........
                                       Aug. 3, 1995...........  June 2, 1997...........  TIAS.
Malta................................  Dec. 22, 1931..........  July 31, 1939..........  47 Stat. 2122.
Mauritius............................  Dec. 22, 1931..........  June 24, 1935..........  47 Stat. 2122.
Mexico...............................  May 4, 1978............  Jan. 25, 1980..........  31 UST 5059.
Monaco...............................  Feb. 15, 1939..........  Mar. 28, 1940..........  54 Stat. 1780.
Nauru................................  Dec. 22, 1931..........  Aug. 30, 1935..........  47 Stat. 2122.
Netherlands..........................  June 24, 1980..........  Sept. 15, 1983.........  TIAS 10733.
New Zealand..........................  Jan. 12, 1970..........  Dec. 8, 1970...........  22 UST 1.
Nicaragua............................  Mar. 1, 1905...........  July 14, 1907..........  35 Stat.1869.
Nigeria..............................  Dec. 22, 1931..........  June 24, 1935..........  47 Stat. 2122.
Norway...............................  June 9, 1977...........  Mar. 7, 1980...........  31 UST 5619.
Pakistan.............................  Dec. 22, 1931..........  Mar. 9, 1942...........  47 Stat. 2122.
Panama...............................  May 25, 1904...........  May 8, 1905............  34 Stat. 2851.
Papua New Guinea.....................  Dec. 22, 1931..........  Aug. 30, 1935..........  47 Stat. 2122.
Paraguay.............................  May 24, 1973...........  May 7, 1974............  25 UST 967.
Peru.................................  Nov. 28, 1899..........  Feb. 22, 1901..........  31 Stat. 1921.
Philippines..........................  Nov. 13, 1994..........  Nov. 22, 1996..........
Poland...............................  July 10, 1996..........  Sept. 17, 1999.........
Portugal.............................  May 7, 1908............  Nov. 14, 1908..........  35 Stat. 2071.
Romania..............................  July 23, 1924..........  Apr. 7, 1925...........  44 Stat. 2020.
                                       Nov. 10, 1936..........  July 27, 1937..........  50 Stat. 1349.
Saint Christopher and Nevis..........  June 8, 1972...........  Jan. 21, 1977..........  28 UST 227.
Saint Lucia..........................  Apr. 18, 1996..........  Feb. 2, 2000...........
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.....  Aug. 15, 1996..........  Sept. 8, 1999..........
San Marino...........................  Jan. 10, 1906..........  July 8, 1908...........  35 Stat. 1971.
                                       Oct. 10, 1934..........  June 28, 1935..........  49 Stat. 3198.
Seychelles...........................  Dec. 22, 1931..........  June 24, 1935..........  47 Stat. 2122.
Sierra Leone.........................  Dec. 22, 1931..........  June 24, 1935..........  47 Stat. 2122.
Singapore............................  Dec. 22, 1931..........  June 24, 1935..........  47 Stat. 2122.
                                         .....................  June 10, 1969..........  20 UST 2764.
Slovac Republic......................  July 2, 1925...........  Mar. 29, 1926..........  44 Stat. 2367.
                                       Apr. 29, 1935..........  Aug. 28, 1935..........  49 Stat. 3253.
Solomon Islands......................  June 8, 1972...........  Jan. 21, 1977..........  28 UST 277.
South Africa.........................  Dec. 18, 1947..........  Apr. 30, 1951..........  2 UST 884.
Spain................................  May 29, 1970...........  June 16, 1971..........  22 UST 737.
                                       Jan. 25, 1975..........  June 2, 1978...........  29 UST 2283.
                                       Feb. 9, 1988...........  July 2, 1993...........
                                       Mar. 12, 1996..........  July 25, 1999..........
Sri Lanka............................  Dec. 22, 1931..........  June 24, 1935..........  47 Stat. 2122.
Suriname.............................  June 2, 1887...........  July 11, 1889..........  26 Stat. 1481.
                                       Jan. 18, 1904..........  Aug. 28, 1904..........  33 Stat. 2257.
Swaziland............................  Dec. 22, 1931..........  June 24, 1935..........  47 Stat. 2122.
                                       .......................  July 28, 1970..........  21 UST 1930.
Sweden...............................  Oct. 24, 1961..........  Dec. 3, 1963...........  14 UST 1845.
                                       Mar. 18, 1983..........  Sept. 24, 1984.........  TIAS 10812.
Switzerland..........................  Nov.14, 1990...........  Sept. 10, 1997.........
Tanzania.............................  Dec. 22, 1931..........  June 24, 1935..........  47 Stat. 2122.
                                       .......................  Dec. 6, 1965...........  16 UST 2066.
Thailand.............................  Dec. 30, 1922..........  Mar. 24, 1924..........  43 Stat. 1749.
Tonga................................  Dec. 22, 1931..........  Aug. 1, 1966...........  47 Stat. 2122.
                                         .....................  Apr. 13, 1977..........  28 UST 5290.
Trinidad and Tobago..................  Mar. 4, 1996...........  Nov. 29, 1999..........
Turkey...............................  June 7, 1979...........  Jan. 1, 1981...........  32 UST 3111.
Tuvalu...............................  June 8, 1972...........  Jan. 21, 1977..........  28 UST 227.
                                       .......................  Apr. 25, 1980..........  32 UST 1310.
United Kingdom.......................  June 8, 1972...........  Jan. 21, 1977..........  28 UST 227.
                                       June 25, 1985..........  Dec. 23, 1986..........  TIAS 12050.
Uruguay..............................  Apr. 6, 1973...........  Apr. 11, 1984..........  TIAS 10850.
Venezuela............................  Jan. 19, 1922..........  Apr. 14, 1923..........  43 Stat. 1698.
                                       Jan. 21, 1922..........  Apr. 14, 1923..........  43 Stat. 1698.
Yugoslavia *.........................  Oct. 25, 1901..........  June 12, 1902..........  32 Stat. 1890
Zambia...............................  Dec. 22, 1931..........  June 24, 1935..........  47 Stat. 2122.
Zimbabwe.............................  July 25, 1997..........  Apr. 26, 2000..........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* For the successor States of Yugoslavia, inquire of the Treaty Office of the United States Department of State.

                       Convention on Extradition

    The United States is a party to the Multilateral Convention 
on Extradition signed at Montevideo on Dec. 26, 1933, entered 
into force for the United States on Jan. 25, 1935. 49 Stat. 
3111.
    Other states which have become parties: Argentina, Chile, 
Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama.

      b. List of Agreements Signed, but Not Entered into Force \2\

      
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ U.S., Department of State, Office of the Assistant Legal 
Advisor for Treaty Affairs.




 1. Argentina                                      Signed:                   June 10, 1997
 2. Austria                                        ........................  January 8, 1998
 3. Barbados                                       ........................  February 28, 1996
 4. Cyprus                                         ........................  June 17, 1996
 5. Dominica                                       ........................  October 10, 1996
 6. France                                         ........................  April 23, 1996
 7. Grenada                                        ........................  May 30, 1996
 8. India                                          ........................  June 25, 1997
 9. Luxembourg                                     ........................  October 1, 1996
10. Mexico                                         ........................  November 13, 1997
11. Poland                                         ........................  July 10, 1996
12. Saint Christopher                              ........................  September 18, 1996
      and Nevis
13. Saint Lucia                                    ........................  April 18, 1996
14. Saint Vincent and                              ........................  August 15, 1996
      the Grenadines
15. Spain                                          ........................  March 12, 1996
16. Trinidad and Tobago                                                      March 4, 1996
17. Zimbabwe                                       ........................  July 25, 1997


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                (2) Luxembourg (Signed October 1, 1996)
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                4. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties \1\

                     a. List of Agreements in Force

      
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ U.S., Department of State, Office of the Assistant Legal 
Advisor for Treaty Affairs. Mutual legal assistance treaties facilitate 
cooperation and collaboration between the law enforcement officials of 
signatory states. These treaties are used in conjunction with 
extradition treaties to aid in criminal investigations, prosecutions, 
and judicial proceedings. Legal assistance such as taking testimony or 
statements, providing documents, transferring persons in custody, 
executing searches and seizures, and furnishing evidentiary items is 
included in these treaties.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Country                       Date Signed           Entered into force            Citation
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Argentina............................  Dec. 4, 1990...........  Feb. 9, 1993...........  TIAS.
Bahamas..............................  June 12, 1987..........  .......................  TIAS.
                                       Aug. 18, 1989..........  July 18, 1990..........  TIAS.
Barbados.............................  Feb. 26, 1997..........  Sept. 3, 1997..........  TIAS.
Canada...............................  Mar. 18, 1985..........  Jan. 24, 1990..........  TIAS.
Haiti................................  Aug. 15, 1986..........  Aug. 15,1986...........  TIAS 11389.
Hungary..............................  Dec. 1, 1994...........  Mar. 18, 1997..........  TIAS.
Italy................................  Nov. 9, 1982...........  Nov. 13, 1985..........  TIAS.
Jamaica..............................  July 7, 1989...........  July 25, 1995..........  TIAS.
Korea................................  Nov. 23, 1993..........  May 23, 1997...........  TIAS.
Mexico...............................  Dec. 9, 1987...........  May 3, 1991............  TIAS.
Morocco..............................  Oct. 17, 1983..........  June 23, 1993..........  TIAS.
Netherlands..........................  June 12, 1981..........  Sept. 15, 1983.........  TIAS 10734.
Nigeria..............................  Nov. 2, 1987...........  Nov. 2, 1987...........  TIAS 11540.
Panama...............................  Apr. 11, 1991..........  Sept. 6, 1995..........  TIAS.
Philippines..........................  Nov. 13, 1994..........  Nov. 23, 1996..........  TIAS.
Russian Fed..........................  June 30, 1995..........  Feb. 5, 1996...........  TIAS.
Spain................................  Nov. 20, 1990..........  June 30, 1993..........  TIAS.
Switzerland..........................  May 25, 1973...........  Jan. 23, 1977..........  27 UST 2019.
                                       Nov. 10, 1987..........  Nov. 10, 1987..........  TIAS.
                                       Nov. 3, 1993...........  Nov. 3, 1993...........  TIAS.
Thailand.............................  Mar. 19, 1986..........  June 10, 1993..........  TIAS.
Turkey...............................  June 7, 1979...........  Jan. 1, 1981...........  32 UST 3111.
United Kingdom.......................  Jan. 6, 1994...........  Dec. 2, 1996...........  TIAS.
Cayman Islands.......................  July 3, 1986...........  Mar. 19, 1990..........  TIAS.
 Anguilla............................  Nov. 9, 1990...........  Nov. 9, 1990...........  TIAS 11765.
 British Virgin Islands..............  Nov. 9, 1990...........  Nov. 9, 1990...........  TIAS 11765.
 Turks and Caicos Islands............  Nov. 9, 1990...........  Nov. 9, 1990...........  TIAS 11765.
 Montserrat..........................  Apr. 26, 1991..........  Apr. 26, 1991..........  TIAS.
Uruguay..............................  May 6, 1991............  Apr. 15, 1994..........  TIAS.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


      b. List of Agreements Signed, but Not Entered into Force \1\

      
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ U.S., Department of State, Office of the Assistant Legal 
Advisor for Treaty Affairs.




 1. Antigua and Barbuda                                 Signed:                October 23, 1996
 2. Australia                                           .....................  April 30, 1997
 3. Austria                                             .....................  February 23, 1995
 4. Belgium                                             .....................  January 28, 1988
 5. Brazil                                              .....................  October 14, 1997
 6. Colombia                                            .....................  August 20, 1980
 7. Czech Republic                                      .....................  February 4, 1998
 8. Dominica                                            .....................  October 10, 1996
 9. Egypt                                               .....................  May 2, 1998
10. Estonia                                             .....................  April 2, 1998
11. Grenada                                             .....................  May 30, 1996
12. Hong Kong                                           .....................  April 15, 1997
13. Israel                                              .....................  January 26, 1998
14. Latvia                                              .....................  June 13, 1997
15. Lithuania                                           .....................  January 16, 1998
16. Luxembourg                                          .....................  March 13, 1997
17. Poland                                              .....................  July 10, 1996
18. Saint Christopher                                   .....................  September 18, 1997
      and Nevis
19. Saint Lucia                                         .....................  April 18, 1996
20. Saint Vincent                                       .....................  January 8, 1998
      and the Grenadines
21. Trinidad and Tobago                                 .....................  March 4, 1996
22. Venezuela                                           .....................  October 12, 1997



 c. Sample of Recent Agreement: United Kingdom (Signed January 6, 1994)

      
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=======================================================================




                        L. MULTILATERAL TREATIES

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

1. Treaties in Force to Which the United States is a Party.......  1425
      a. Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the 
          Purpose of Identification (Signed March 1, 1991).......  1425
      b. I.M.O. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
          Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, with Related 
          Protocol (Signed March 10, 1988).......................  1433
      c. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages 
          (Signed December 17, 1979).............................  1452
      d. Vienna Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
          Material (Signed October 26, 1979).....................  1462
      e. U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
          Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, 
          Including Diplomatic Agents (Signed December 14, 1973).  1473
      f. Moscow Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
          Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
          (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction 
          (Signed April 10, 1972.................................  1479
      g. Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
          Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, (Signed September 
          23, 1971); and Protocol (Signed February 24, 1988).....  1484
      h. OAS Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of 
          Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and 
          Related Extortion That Are of International 
          Significance (Signed February 2, 1971).................  1493
      i. Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure 
          of Aircraft (Signed December 16, 1970).................  1497
      j. Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Acts Committed 
          on Board Aircraft (Signed September 14, 1963)..........  1502
2. Treaties Signed by the United States, But Not Yet in Force--
    International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
    Bombings (Signed December 15, 1997)..........................  1512
3. Treaties to Which the United States is Not a Party............  1521
      a. Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism of the South 
          Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 
          (Signed November 4, 1987)..............................  1521
      b. European Communities: Agreement Concerning the 
          Application of the European Convention on the 
          Suppression of Terrorism Among the Member States 
          (Signed December 4, 1979)..............................  1525
      c. Council of Europe: European Convention on the 
          Suppression of Terrorism (Signed January 27, 1977).....  1528

=======================================================================

       1. Treaties In Force to Which the United States is a Party

 a. Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of 
                    Identification, March 1, 1991 *

      
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * Entered into force, including for the United States, June 21, 
1998. No TIAS number exists. Status information appears at Document 
M.5.q., following.
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 b. I.M.O. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
 Safety of Maritime Navigation, with Related Protocol, March 10, 1988 *

      
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    * Source: Treaty Document 101-1; Entered into force March 1, 1992; 
for the United States March 6, 1995. No TIAS Number. Status information 
appears at Document M.5.q., following.
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 d. Vienna Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 
                           October 26, 1979 *

      
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    * Source: 96th Congress, 2d Session, Senate, Executive H. Entered 
into force, including for the United States, February 8, 1987. TIAS 
11080. Information on status appears at Document M.5.q., following.
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 e. U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against 
    Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents *

   Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly December 14, 1973; 
  Signed on behalf of the United States of America December 28, 1973; 
  Ratification advised by the Senate of the United States of America 
    October 28, 1975; Instrument of ratification deposited with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations October 27, 1976; Entered into 
                        force February 20, 1977

  The States Parties to this Convention,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * 28 UST 1975; TIAS 8532; 1035 UNTS 167. For states which are 
parties to the Convention, see Department of State publication, 
Treaties in Force and at Document M.5.q., following.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Having in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of 
the United Nations concerning the maintenance of international 
peace and the promotion of friendly relations and co-operation 
among States,
  Considering that crimes against diplomatic agents and other 
internationally protected persons jeopardizing the safety of 
these persons create a serious threat to the maintenance of 
normal international relations which are necessary for co-
operation among States,
  Believing that the commission of such crimes is a matter of 
grave concern to the international community,
  Convinced that there is an urgent need to adopt appropriate 
and effective measures for the prevention and punishment of 
such crimes,
  Have agreed as follows:

                               Article 1

  For the purposes of this Convention:
  1. ``internationally protected person'' means:
          (a) a Head of State, including any member of a 
        collegial body performing the functions of a Head of 
        State under the constitution of the State concerned, a 
        Head of Government or a Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
        whenever any such person is in a foreign State, as well 
        as members of his family who accompany him;
          (b) any representative or official of a State or any 
        official or other agent of an international 
        organization of an intergovernmental character who, at 
        the time when and in the place where a crime against 
        him, his official premises, his private accommodation 
        or his means of transport is committed, is entitled 
        pursuant to international law to special protection 
        from any attack on his person, freedom or dignity, as 
        well as members of his family forming part of his 
        household.
  2. ``alleged offender'' means a person as to whom there is 
sufficient evidence to determine prima facie that he has 
committed or participated in one or more of the crimes set 
forth in article 2.

                               Article 2

  1. The international commission of:
          (a) a murder, kidnapping or other attack upon the 
        person or liberty of an internationally protected 
        person;
          (b) a violent attack upon the official premises, the 
        private accommodation or the means of transport of an 
        internationally protected person likely to endanger his 
        person or liberty;
          (c) a threat to commit any such attack;
          (d) an attempt to commit any such attack; and
          (e) an act constituting participation as an 
        accomplice in any such attack shall be made by each 
        State Party a crime under its internal law.
  2. Each State Party shall make these crimes punishable by 
appropriate penalties which take into account their grave 
nature.
  3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article in no way derogate from 
the obligations of States Parties under international law to 
take all appropriate measures to prevent other attacks on the 
person, freedom or dignity of an internationally protected 
person.

                               Article 3

  1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be 
necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the crimes set 
forth in article 2 in the following cases:
          (a) when the crime is committed in the territory of 
        that State or on board a ship or aircraft registered in 
        that State;
          (b) when the alleged offender is a national of that 
        State;
          (c) when the crime is committed against an 
        internationally protected person as defined in article 
        1 who enjoys his status as such by virtue of functions 
        which he exercise on behalf of that State.
  2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may 
be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over these crimes in 
cases where the alleged offender is present in its territory 
and it does not extradite him pursuant to article 8 to any of 
the States mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article.
  3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction 
exercised in accordance with internal law.

                               Article 4

  States Parties shall co-operate in the prevention of the 
crimes set forth in article 2, particularly by:
          (a) taking all practicable measures to prevent 
        preparations in their respective territories for the 
        commission of those crimes within or outside their 
        territories;
          (b) exchanging information and co-ordinating the 
        taking of administrative and other measures as 
        appropriate to prevent the commission of those crimes.

                               Article 5

  1. The State Party in which any of the crimes set forth in 
article 2 has been committed shall, if it has reason to believe 
that an alleged offender has fled from its territory, 
communicate to all other States concerned, directly or through 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, all the pertinent 
facts regarding the crime committed and all available 
information regarding the identity of the alleged offender.
  Whenever any of the crimes set forth in article 2 has been 
committed against an internationally protected person, any 
State Party which has information concerning the victim and the 
circumstances of the crime shall endeavor to transmit it, under 
the conditions provided for in its internal law, fully and 
promptly to the State Party on whose behalf he was exercising 
his functions.

                               Article 6

  1. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, 
the State Party in whose territory the alleged offender is 
present shall take the appropriate measures under its internal 
law so as to ensure his presence for the purpose of prosecution 
or extradition. Such measures shall be notified without delay 
directly or through the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
to:
          (a) the State where the crime was committed;
          (b) the State or States of which the alleged offender 
        is a national or, if he is a stateless person, in whose 
        territory he permanently resides;
          (c) the State or States of which the internationally 
        protected person concerned is a national or on whose 
        behalf he was exercising his functions;
          (d) all other States concerned; and
          (e) the international organization of which the 
        internationally protected person concerned is an 
        official or an agent.
  2. Any person regarding whom the measures referred to in 
paragraph 1 of this article are being taken shall be entitled:
          (a) to communicate without delay with the nearest 
        appropriate representative of the State of which he is 
        a national or which is otherwise entitled to protect 
        his rights or, if he is a stateless person, which he 
        requests and which is willing to protect his rights; 
        and
          (b) to be visited by a representative of that State.

                               Article 7

  The State Party in whose territory the alleged offender is 
present shall, if it does not extradite him, submit, without 
exception whatsoever and without undue delay, the case to its 
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through 
proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State.

                               Article 8

  1. To the extent that the crimes set forth in article 2 are 
not listed as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty 
existing between States Parties, they shall be deemed to be 
included as such therein. States Parties undertake to include 
those crimes as extraditable offenses in every future 
extradition treaty to be concluded between them.
  2. If a State Party which makes extradition conditional on 
the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition 
from another State Party with which it has no extradition 
treaty, it may, if it decides to extradite, consider this 
Convention as the legal basis for extradition in respect of 
those crimes. Extradition shall be subject to the procedural 
provisions and the other conditions of the law of the requested 
State.
  3. States Parties which do not make extradition conditional 
on the existence of a treaty shall recognize those crimes as 
extraditable offenses between themselves subject to the 
procedural provisions and the other conditions of the law of 
the requested State.
  4. Each of the crimes shall be treated, for the purpose of 
extradition between States Parties, as if it had been committed 
not only in the place in which it occurred but also in the 
territories of the States required to establish their 
jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph 1 of article 3.

                               Article 9

  Any person regarding whom proceedings are being carried out 
in connexion with any of the crimes set forth in article 2 
shall be guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the 
proceedings.

                               Article 10

  1. States Parties shall afford one another the greatest 
measure of assistance in connexion with criminal proceedings 
brought in respect of the crimes set forth in article 2, 
including the supply of all evidence at their disposal 
necessary for the proceedings.
  2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this article shall not 
affect obligations concerning mutual judicial assistance 
embodied in any other treaty.

                               Article 11

  The State Party where an alleged offender is prosecuted shall 
communicate the final outcome of the proceedings of the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit the 
information to the other States Parties.

                               Article 12

  The provisions of this Convention shall not affect the 
application of the Treaties on Asylum, in force at the date of 
the adoption of this Convention, as between the States which 
are parties to those Treaties; but a State Party to this 
Convention may not invoke those Treaties with respect to 
another State Party to this Convention which is not a party to 
those Treaties.

                               Article 13

  1. Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning 
the interpretation or application of this Convention which is 
not settled by negotiation shall, at the request of one of 
them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six months from 
the date of the request for arbitration the parties are unable 
to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of 
those parties may refer the dispute to the International Court 
of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the 
Court.
  2. Each State Party may at the time of signature or 
ratification of this Convention or accession thereto declare 
that it does not consider itself bound by paragraph 1 of this 
article. The other States Parties shall not be bound by 
paragraph 1 of this article with respect to any State Party 
which has made such a reservation.
  3. Any State Party which has made a reservation in accordance 
with paragraph 2 of this article may at any time withdraw that 
reservation by notification to the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations.

                               Article 14

  This Convention shall be open for signature by all States, 
until 31 December 1974 at United Nations Headquarters in New 
York.

                               Article 15

  This Convention is subject to ratification. The instruments 
of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations.

                               Article 16

  This Convention shall remain open for accession by any State. 
The instruments of accession shall be deposited with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations.

                               Article 17

  1. This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth 
day following the date of deposit of the twenty-second 
instrument of ratification or accession with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations.
  2. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Convention 
after the deposit of the twenty-second instrument of 
ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter into 
force on the thirtieth day after deposit by such State of its 
instrument of ratification or accession.

                               Article 18

  1. Any State Party may denounce this Convention by written 
notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
  2. Denunciation shall take effect six months following the 
date on which notification is received by the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations.

                               Article 19

  The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all 
States, inter alia:
          (a) of signatures to this Convention, of the deposit 
        of instruments of ratification or accession in 
        accordance with articles 14, 15 and 16 and of 
        notifications made under article 18.
          (b) of the date on which this Convention will enter 
        into force in accordance with article 17.

                               Article 20

  The original of this Convention, of which the Chinese, 
English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally 
authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, who shall send certified copies thereof to all 
States.
  In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized 
thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this 
Convention, opened for signature at New York on 14 December 
1973.

f. Moscow Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production 
 and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and 
                         on Their Destruction.

 Signed at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10,1972; Ratification 
 advised by U.S. Senate December 16, 1974; Ratified by U.S. President 
 January 22, 1975; U.S. ratification deposited at Washington, London, 
  and Moscow, March 26, 1975; Proclaimed by U.S. President March 26, 
                1975; Entered into force March 26, 1975;

    The States Parties to this Convention,
    Determined to act with a view to achieving effective 
progress towards general and complete disarmament, including 
the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass 
destruction, and convinced that the prohibition of the 
development, production and stockpiling of chemical and 
bacteriological (biological) weapons and their elimination, 
through effective measures, will facilitate the achievement of 
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective 
international control,
    Recognizing the important significance of the Protocol for 
the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or 
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed 
at Geneva on June 17, 1925, and conscious also of the 
contribution which the said Protocol has already made, and 
continues to make, to mitigating the horrors of war,
    Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and 
objectives of that Protocol and calling upon all States to 
comply strictly with them,
    Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations 
has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles 
and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of June 17, 1925,
    Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of confidence 
between peoples and the general improvement of the 
international atmosphere,
    Desiring also to contribute to the realization of the 
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
    Convinced of the importance and urgency of eliminating from 
the arsenals of States, through effective measures, such 
dangerous weapons of mass destruction as those using chemical 
or bacteriological (biological) agents,
    Recognizing that an agreement on the prohibition of 
bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons represents a 
first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on 
effective measures also for the prohibition of the development, 
production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and determined 
to continue negotiations to that end,
    Determined, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude 
completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) 
agents and toxins being used as weapons,
    Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the 
conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to 
minimize this risk,
    Have agreed as follows:

                               Article I

    Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any 
circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise 
acquire or retain:
    (1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins 
whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in 
quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, 
protective or other peaceful purposes;
    (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use 
such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed 
conflict.

                               Article II

    Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy, 
or to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but not 
later than nine months after the entry into force of the 
Convention, all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of 
delivery specified in article I of the Convention, which are in 
its possession or under its jurisdiction or control. In 
implementing the provisions of this article all necessary 
safety precautions shall be observed to protect populations and 
the environment.

                              Article III

    Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to 
transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, 
and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, 
group of States or international organizations to manufacture 
or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, 
equipment or means of delivery specified in article I of the 
Convention.

                               Article IV

    Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance 
with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures 
to prohibit and prevent the development, production, 
stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of the agents, toxins, 
weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I 
of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under 
its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere.

                               Article V

    The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult 
one another and to cooperate in solving any problems which may 
arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of 
the provisions of, the Convention. Consultation and cooperation 
pursuant to this article may also be undertaken through 
appropriate international procedures within the framework of 
the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

                               Article VI

    (1) Any State Party to this Convention which finds that any 
other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving 
from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint 
with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a 
complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its 
validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the 
Security Council.
    (2) Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to 
cooperate in carrying out any investigation which the Security 
Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the 
Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint 
received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the 
States Parties to the Convention of the results of the 
investigation.

                              Article VII

    Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide 
or support assistance, in accordance with the United Nations 
Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so requests, if 
the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed 
to danger as a result of violation of the Convention.

                              Article VIII

    Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any 
way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any 
State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War 
of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on June 
17, 1925.

                               Article IX

    Each State Party to this Convention affirms the recognized 
objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to 
this end, undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith 
with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures 
for the prohibition of their development, production and 
stockpiling and for their destruction, and on appropriate 
measures concerning equipment and means of delivery 
specifically designed for the production or use of chemical 
agents for weapons purposes.

                               Article X

    (1) The States Parties to this Convention undertake to 
facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest 
possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and 
technological information for the use of bacteriological 
(biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. Parties 
to the Convention in a position to do so shall also cooperate 
in contributing individually or together with other States or 
international organizations to the further development and 
application of scientific discoveries in the field of 
bacteriology (biology) for prevention of disease, or for other 
peaceful purposes.
    (2) This Convention shall be implemented in a manner 
designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological 
development of States Parties to the Convention or 
international cooperation in the field of peaceful 
bacteriological (biological) activities, including the 
international exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents 
and toxins and equipment for the processing, use or production 
of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful 
purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.

                               Article XI

    Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. 
Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party 
accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of 
the States Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each 
remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it.

                              Article XII

    Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, 
or earlier if it is requested by a majority of Parties to the 
Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the 
Depositary Governments, a conference of States Parties to the 
Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the 
operation of the Convention, with a view to assuring that the 
purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, 
including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical 
weapons, are being realized. Such review shall take into 
account any new scientific and technological developments 
relevant to the Convention.

                              Article XIII

    (1) This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
    (2) Each State Party to this Convention shall in exercising 
its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the 
Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to 
the subject matter of the Convention, have jeopardized the 
supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such 
withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Convention and to 
the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. 
Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary 
events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

                              Article XIV

    (1) This Convention shall be open to all States for 
signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before 
its entry into force in accordance with paragraph (3) of this 
Article may accede to it at any time.
    (2) This Convention shall be subject to ratification by 
signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments 
of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the 
United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary 
Governments.
    (3) This Convention shall enter into force after the 
deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-two 
Governments, including the Governments designated as 
Depositories of the Convention.
    (4) For States whose instruments of ratification or 
accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of 
this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the 
deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
    (5) The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all 
signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, 
the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of 
accession and the date of the entry into force of this 
Convention, and of the receipt of other notices.
    (6) This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary 
Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the 
United Nations.

                               Article XV

    This Convention, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and 
Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be 
deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly 
certified copies of the Convention shall be transmitted by the 
Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and 
acceding states.
    IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have 
signed this Convention.
    DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and 
Moscow, this tenth day of April, one thousand nine hundred and 
seventy-two.

g. Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
                       Safety of Civil Aviation *

  Done at Montreal September 23, 1971; Entered into Force January 26, 
                                  1973

    The States Parties to the Convention
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * 24 UST 567; TIAS 7570. For states which are parties to the 
Convention, see Department of State publication, Treaties in Force and 
at Document M.5.q, following.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Considering that unlawful acts against the safety of civil 
aviation jeopardize the safety of persons and property, 
seriously affect the operation of air services, and undermine 
the confidence of the peoples of the world in the safety of 
civil aviation;
    Considering that the occurrence of such acts is a matter of 
grave concern;
    Considering that, for the purpose of deterring such acts, 
there is an urgent need to provide appropriate measures for 
punishment of offenders;
    Have agreed as follows:

                               Article 1

    1. Any person commits an offence if he unlawfully and 
intentionally:
    (a) performs an act of violence against a person on board 
an aircraft in flight if that act is likely to endanger the 
safety of that aircraft; or
    (b) destroys an aircraft in service or causes damage to 
such an aircraft which renders it incapable of flight or which 
is likely to endanger its safety in flight; or
    (c) places or causes to be placed on an aircraft in 
service, by any means whatsoever, a device or substance which 
is likely to destroy that aircraft, or to cause damage to it 
which renders it incapable of flight, or to cause damage to it 
which is likely to endanger its safety in flight; or
    (d) destroys or damages air navigation facilities or 
interferes with their operation, if any such act is likely to 
endanger the safety of aircraft in flight; or
    (e) communicates information which he knows to be false, 
thereby endangering the safety of an aircraft in flight.
    2. Any person also commits an offence if he:
    (a) attempts to commit any of the offences mentioned in 
paragraph 1 of this Article; or
    (b) is an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to 
commit any such offence.

                               Article 2

    For the purposes of this Convention:
    (a) an aircraft is considered to be in flight at any time 
from the moment when all its external doors are closed 
following embarkation until the moment when any such door is 
opened for disembarkation; in the case of a forced landing, the 
flight shall be deemed to continue until the competent 
authorities take over the responsibility for the aircraft and 
for persons and property on board;
    (b) an aircraft is considered to be in service from the 
beginning of the preflight preparation of the aircraft by 
ground personnel or by the crew for a specific flight until 
twenty-four hours after any landing; the period of service 
shall, in any event, extend for the entire period during which 
the aircraft is in flight as defined in paragraph (a) of this 
Article.

                               Article 3

    Each Contracting State undertakes to make the offences 
mentioned in Article 1 punishable by severe penalties.

                               Article 4

    1. This Convention shall not apply to aircraft used in 
military, customs or police services.
    2. In the cases contemplated in subparagraphs (a), (b), (c) 
and (e) of paragraph 1 of Article 1, this Convention shall 
apply, irrespective of whether the aircraft is engaged in an 
international or domestic flight, only if:
    (a) the place of take-off or landing, actual or intended, 
of the aircraft is situated outside the territory of the State 
of registration of that aircraft; or
    (b) the offence is committed in the territory of a State 
other than the State of registration of the aircraft.
    3. Notwithstanding paragraph 2 of this Article, in the 
cases contemplated in subparagraphs (a), (b), (c) and (e) of 
paragraph 1 of Article 1, this Convention shall also apply if 
the offender or the alleged offender is found in the territory 
of a State other than the State of registration of the 
aircraft.
    4. With respect to the States mentioned in Article 9 and in 
the cases mentioned in subparagraphs (a), (b), (c) and (e) of 
paragraph 1 of Article 1, this Convention shall not apply if 
the places referred to in subparagraph (a) of paragraph 2 of 
this Article are situated within the territory of the same 
State where that State is one of those referred to in Article 
9, unless the offence is committed or the offender or alleged 
offender is found in the territory of a State other than that 
State.
    5. In the cases contemplated in subparagraph (d) of 
paragraph 1 of Article 1, this Convention shall apply only if 
the air navigation facilities are used in international air 
navigation.
    6. The provisions of paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 of this 
Article shall also apply in the cases contemplated in paragraph 
2 of Article 1.

                               Article 5

    1. Each Contracting State shall take such measures as may 
be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences in 
the following cases:
    (a) when the offence is committed in the territory of that 
State;
    (b) when the offence is committed against or on board an 
aircraft registered in that State;
    (c) when the aircraft on board which the offence is 
committed lands in its territory with the alleged offender 
still on board;
    (d) when the offence is committed against or on board an 
aircraft leased without crew to a lessee who has his principal 
place of business or, if the lessee has no such place of 
business, his permanent residence, in that State.
    2. Each Contracting State shall likewise take such measures 
as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the 
offences mentioned in Article 1, paragraph 1 (a), (b) and (c), 
and in Article 1, paragraph 2, in so far as that paragraph 
relates to those offences, in the case where the alleged 
offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite 
him pursuant to Article 8 to any of the States mentioned in 
paragraph 1 of this Article.
    3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal 
jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law.

                               Article 6

    1. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, 
any Contracting State in the territory of which the offender or 
the alleged offender is present, shall take him into custody or 
take other measures to ensure his presence. The custody and 
other measures shall be as provided in the law of that State 
but may only be continued for such time as is necessary to 
enable any criminal or extradition proceedings to be 
instituted.
    2. Such State shall immediately make a preliminary enquiry 
into the facts.
    3. Any person in custody pursuant to paragraph 1 of this 
Article shall be assisted in communicating immediately with the 
nearest appropriate representative of the State of which he is 
a national.
    4. When a State, pursuant to this Article, has taken a 
person into custody, it shall immediately notify the States 
mentioned in Article 5, paragraph 1, the State of nationality 
of the detained person and, if it considers it advisable, any 
other interested State of the fact that such person is in 
custody and of the circumstances which warrant his detention. 
The State which makes the preliminary enquiry contemplated in 
paragraph 2 of this Article shall promptly report its findings 
to the said States and shall indicate whether it intends to 
exercise jurisdiction.

                               Article 7

    The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged 
offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be 
obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not the 
offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case to 
its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those 
authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in 
the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the 
law of that State.

                               Article 8

    1. The offences shall be deemed to be included as 
extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing 
between Contracting States. Contracting States undertake to 
include the offences as extraditable offences in every 
extradition treaty to be concluded between them.
    2. If a Contracting State which makes extradition 
conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for 
extradition from another Contracting State with which it has no 
extradition treaty, it may at its option consider this 
Convention as the legal basis for extradition in respect of the 
offences. Extradition shall be subject to the other conditions 
provided by the law of the requested State.
    3. Contracting States which do not make extradition 
conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognize the 
offences as extraditable offences between themselves subject to 
the conditions provided by the law of the requested State.
    4. Each of the offences shall be treated, for the purpose 
of extradition between Contracting States, as if it had been 
committed not only in the place in which it occurred but also 
in the territories of the States required to establish their 
jurisdiction in accordance with Article 5, paragraph 1 (b), (c) 
and (d).

                               Article 9

    The Contracting States which establish joint air transport 
operating organizations or international operating agencies, 
which operate aircraft which are subject to joint or 
international registration shall, by appropriate means, 
designate for each aircraft the State among them which shall 
exercise the jurisdiction and have the attributes of the State 
of registration for the purpose of this Convention and shall 
give notice thereof to the International Civil Aviation 
Organization which shall communicate the notice to all States 
Parties to this Convention.

                               Article 10

    1. Contracting States shall, in accordance with 
international and national law, endeavour to take all 
practicable measure for the purpose of preventing the offences 
mentioned in Article 1.
    2. When, due to the commission of one of the offences 
mentioned in Article 1, a flight has been delayed or 
interrupted, any Contracting State in whose territory the 
aircraft or passengers or crew are present shall facilitate the 
continuation of the journey of the passengers and crew as soon 
as practicable, and shall without delay return the aircraft and 
its cargo to the persons lawfully entitled to possession.

                               Article 11

    1. Contracting States shall afford one another the greatest 
measure of assistance in connection with criminal proceedings 
brought in respect of the offences. The law of the State 
requested shall apply in all cases.
    2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not 
affect obligations under any other treaty, bilateral or 
multilateral, which governs or will govern, in whole or in 
part, mutual assistance in criminal matters.

                               Article 12

    Any Contracting State having reason to believe that one of 
the offences mentioned in Article 1 will be committed shall, in 
accordance with its national law, furnish any relevant 
information in its possession to those States which it believes 
would be the States mentioned in Article 5, paragraph 1.

                               Article 13

    Each Contracting State shall in accordance with its 
national law report to the Council of the International Civil 
Aviation Organization as promptly as possible any relevant 
information in its possession concerning:
    (a) the circumstances of the offence;
    (b) the action taken pursuant to Article 10, paragraph 2;
    (c) the measures taken in relation to the offender or the 
alleged offender and, in particular, the results of any 
extradition proceedings or other legal proceedings.

                               Article 14

    1. Any dispute between two or more Contracting States 
concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention 
which cannot be settled through negotiation, shall, at the 
request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within 
six months from the date of the request for arbitration the 
Parties are unable to agree on the organization of the 
arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer the dispute to 
the International Court of Justice by request in conformity 
with the Statute of the Court.
    2. Each State may at the time of signature or ratification 
of this Convention or accession thereto, declare that it does 
not consider itself bound by the preceding paragraph. The other 
Contracting States shall not be bound by the preceding 
paragraph with respect to any Contracting State having made 
such a reservation.
    3. Any Contracting State having made a reservation in 
accordance with the preceding paragraph may at any time 
withdraw this reservation by notification to the Depositary 
Governments.

                               Article 15

    1. This Convention shall be open for signature at Montreal 
on 23 September 1971, by States participating in the 
International Conference on Air Law held at Montreal from 8 to 
23 September 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Montreal 
Conference). After 10 October 1971, the Convention shall be 
open to all States for signature in Moscow, London and 
Washington. Any State which does not sign this Convention 
before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of 
this Article may accede to it at any time.
    2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by the 
signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments 
of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of 
America, which are hereby designated the Depositary 
Governments.
    3. This Convention shall enter into force thirty days 
following the date of the deposit of instruments of 
ratification by ten States signatory to this Convention which 
participated in the Montreal Conference.
    4. For other States, this Convention shall enter into force 
on the date of entry into force of this Convention in 
accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article, or thirty days 
following the date of deposit of their instruments of 
ratification or accession, whichever is later.
    5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all 
signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, 
the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or 
accession, the date of entry into force of this Convention, and 
other notices.
    6. As soon as this Convention comes into force, it shall be 
registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 
102 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago, 
1944).

                               Article 16

    1. Any Contracting State may denounce this Convention by 
written notification to the Depositary Governments.
    2. Denunciation shall take effect six months following the 
date on which notification is received by the Depositary 
Governments.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, being 
duly authorized thereto by their Governments, have signed this 
Convention.
 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports 
        Serving International Civil Aviation--February 4, 1988 *


 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports 
 Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention 
   for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil 
            Aviation, Done at Montreal on 23 September 1971

    The States Parties to this Protocol:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * Source: Treaty Document 100-19; Entered into force August 6, 
1989; for the United States November 18, 1994. No TIAS number. Status 
information appears at Document M.5.q., following.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Considering that unlawful acts of violence which endanger 
or are likely to endanger the safety of persons at airports 
serving international civil aviation or which jeopardize the 
safe operation of such airports undermine the confidence of the 
peoples of the world in safety at such airports and disturb the 
safe and orderly conduct of civil aviation for all States;
    Considering that the occurrence of such acts is a matter of 
grave concern to the international community and that, for the 
purpose of deterring such acts, there is an urgent need to 
provide appropriate measures for punishment of offenders;
    Considering that it is necessary to adopt provisions 
supplementary to those of the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at 
Montreal on 23 September 1971, to deal with such unlawful acts 
of violence at airports serving international civil aviation;
    Have agreed as follows:

                               Article I

    This Protocol supplements the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation, done at Montreal on 23 September 1971 (hereinafter 
referred to as ``the Convention''), and, as between the Parties 
to this Protocol, the Convention and the Protocol shall be read 
and interpreted together as one single instrument.

                               Article II

    In Article 1 of the Convention, the following shall be 
added as new paragraph 1 bis:
    ``1 bis. Any person commits an offense if he unlawfully and 
intentionally using any device, substance or weapon:
          (a) performs an act of violence against a person at 
        an airport serving international civil aviation which 
        causes or is likely to cause serious injury or death; 
        or
          (b) destroys or seriously damages the facilities of 
        an airport serving international civil aviation or 
        aircraft not in service located thereon or disrupts the 
        services of the airport.
if such an act endangers or is likely to endanger safety at 
that airport.''
    2. In paragraph 2(a) of Article 1 of the Convention, the 
following words shall be inserted after the words ``paragraph 
1'':
        ``or paragraph 1 bis''.

                              Article III

    In Article 5 of the Convention, the following shall be 
added as paragraph 2 bis:
    ``2 bis. Each Contracting State shall likewise take such 
measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over 
the offences mentioned in Article 1, paragraph 1 bis, and in 
Article 1, paragraph 2, in so far as that paragraph relates to 
those offences, in the case where the alleged offender is 
present in its territory and it does not extradite him pursuant 
to Article 8 to the State mentioned in paragraph 1(a) of this 
Article.''

                               Article IV

    This Protocol shall be open for signature at Montreal on 24 
February 1988 by States participating in the International 
Conference on Air Law held at Montreal from 9 to 24 February 
1988. After 1 March 1988, the Protocol shall be open for 
signature to all States in London, Moscow, Washington and 
Montreal, until it enters into force in accordance with Article 
VI.

                               Article V

    1. This Protocol shall be subject to ratification by the 
signatory States.
    2. Any State which is not a Contracting State to the 
Convention may ratify this Protocol if at the same time it 
ratifies or accedes to the Convention in accordance with 
Article 15 thereof.
    3. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the 
Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
United States of America or with the International Civil 
Aviation Organization, which are hereby designated the 
Depositaries.

                               Article VI

    1. As soon as ten of the signatory States have deposited 
their instruments of ratification of this Protocol, it shall 
enter into force between them on the thirtieth day after the 
date of the deposit of the tenth instrument of ratification. It 
shall enter into force for each State which deposits its 
instrument of ratification after that date on the thirtieth day 
after deposit of its instrument of ratification.
    2. As soon as this Protocol enters into force, it shall be 
registered by the Depositaries pursuant to Article 102 of the 
Charter of the United Nations and pursuant to Article 83 of the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago, 1944).

                              Article VII

    1. This Protocol shall, after it has entered into force, be 
open for accession by any non-signatory State.
    2. Any State which is not a Contracting State to the 
Convention may accede to this Protocol if at the same time it 
ratifies or accedes to the Convention in accordance with 
Article 15 thereof.
    3. Instruments of accession shall be deposited with the 
Depositaries and accession shall take effect on the thirtieth 
day after the deposit.

                              Article VIII

    1. Any Party to this Protocol may denounce it by written 
notification addressed to the Depositaries.
    2. Denunciation shall take effect six months following the 
date on which notification is received by the Depositaries.
    3. Denunciation of this Protocol shall not of itself have 
the effect of denunciation of the Convention.
    4. Denunciation of the Convention by a Contracting State to 
the Convention as supplemented by this Protocol shall also have 
the effect of denunciation of this Protocol.

                               Article IX

    The Depositaries shall promptly inform all signatory and 
acceding States to this Protocol and all signatory and acceding 
States to the Convention:
          (a) of the date of each signature and the date of 
        deposit of each instrument of ratification of, or 
        accession to, this Protocol, and
          (b) of the receipt of any notification of 
        denunciation of this Protocol and the date thereof.
    2. The Depositaries shall also notify the States referred 
to in paragraph 1 of the date on which this Protocol enters 
into force in accordance with Article VI.
    In Witness Whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, being 
duly authorized thereto by their Governments, have signed this 
protocol.
    Done at Montreal on the twenty-fourth day of February of 
the year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Eighty-eight, in four 
originals, each being drawn up in four authentic texts in the 
English, French, Russian and Spanish languages.

 h. OAS Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking 
 the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion That Are of 
                      International Significance *

    Adopted at the 3d Special Session of the OAS General Assembly, 
Washington, D.C., January 25-February 2, 1971; Ratification advised by 
the Senate of the United States of America June 12, 1972; Instrument of 
 ratification deposited in the General Secretariat of the Organization 
of American States October 20, 1976; Entered into force with respect to 
             the United States of America October 20, 1976

  Whereas, The defense of freedom and justice and respect for 
the fundamental rights of the individual that are recognized by 
the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are primary duties of 
states;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * 27 UST 3949; TIAS 8413. For states which are parties in the 
Convention, see Department of State publication, Treaties in Force and 
at Document M.5.1., following.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  The General Assembly of the Organization, in Resolution 4, of 
June 30, 1970, strongly condemned acts of terrorism, especially 
the kidnapping of persons and extortion in connection with that 
crime, which it declared to be serious common crimes;
  Criminal acts against persons entitled to special protection 
under international law are occurring frequently, and those 
acts are of international significance because of the 
consequences that may flow from them for relations among 
states;
  It is advisable to adopt general standards that will 
progressively develop international law as regards cooperation 
in the prevention and punishment of such acts; and
  In the application of those standards the institution of 
asylum should be maintained and, likewise the principle of 
nonintervention should not be impaired,

 The Member States of the Organization of American States have agreed 
                      upon the following articles:

                               Article 1

  The contracting states undertake to cooperate among 
themselves by taking all the measures that they may consider 
effective, under their own laws, and especially those 
established in this convention, to prevent and punish acts of 
terrorism, especially kidnapping, murder, and other assaults 
against the life or physical integrity of those persons to whom 
the state has the duty according to international law to give 
special protection, as well as extortion in connection with 
those crimes.

                               Article 2

  For the purposes of this convention, kidnapping, murder, and 
other assaults against the life or personal integrity of those 
persons to whom the state has the duty to give special 
protection according to international law, as well as extortion 
in connection with those crimes, shall be considered common 
crimes of international significance, regardless of motive.

                               Article 3

  Persons who have been charged or convicted for any of the 
crimes referred to in Article 2 of this convention shall be 
subject to extradition under the provisions of the extradition 
treaties in force between the parties or, in the case of states 
that do not make extradition dependent on the existence of a 
treaty, in accordance with their own laws.
  In any case, it is the exclusive responsibility of the state 
under whose jurisdiction or protection such persons are located 
to determine the nature of the acts and decide whether the 
standards of this convention are applicable.

                               Article 4

  Any person deprived of his freedom through the application of 
this convention shall enjoy the legal guarantees of due 
process.

                               Article 5

  When extradition requested for one of the crimes specified in 
Article 2 is not in order because the person sought is a 
national of the requested state, or because of some other legal 
or constitutional impediment, that state is obliged to submit 
the case to its competent authorities for prosecution, as if 
the act had been committed in its territory. The decision of 
these authorities shall be communicated to the state that 
requested extradition. In such proceedings, the obligation 
established in Article 4 shall be respected.

                               Article 6

  None of the provisions of this convention shall be 
interpreted so as to impair the right of asylum.

                               Article 7

  The contracting states undertake to include the crimes 
referred to in Article 2 of this convention among the 
punishable acts giving rise to extradition in any treaty on the 
subject to which they agree among themselves in the future. The 
contracting states that do not subject extradition to the 
existence of a treaty with the requesting state shall consider 
the crimes referred to in Article 2 of this convention as 
crimes giving rise to extradition, according to the conditions 
established by the laws of the requested state.

                               Article 8

  To cooperate in preventing and punishing the crimes 
contemplated in Article 2 of this convention, the contracting 
states accept the following obligations:
          a. To take all measures within their power, and in 
        conformity with their own laws, to prevent and impede 
        the preparation in their respective territories of the 
        crimes mentioned in Article 2 that are to be carried 
        out in the territory of another contracting state.
          b. To exchange information and consider effective 
        administrative measures for the purpose of protecting 
        the persons to whom Article 2 of this convention 
        refers.
          c. To guarantee to every person deprived of his 
        freedom through the application of this convention 
        every right to defend himself.
          d. To endeavor to have the criminal acts contemplated 
        in this convention included in their penal laws, if not 
        already so included.
          e. To comply most expeditiously with the requests for 
        extradition concerning the criminal acts contemplated 
        in this convention.

                               Article 9

  This convention shall remain open for signature by the member 
states of the Organization of American States, as well as by 
any other state that is a member of the United Nations or any 
of its specialized agencies, or any state that is a party to 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, or any other 
state that may be invited by the General Assembly of the 
Organization of American States to sign it.

                               Article 10

  This convention shall be ratified by the signatory states in 
accordance with their respective constitutional procedures.

                               Article 11

  The original instrument of this convention, the English, 
French, Portuguese, and Spanish texts of which are equally 
authentic, shall be deposited in the General Secretariat of the 
Organization of American States, which shall send certified 
copies of the signatory governments for purposes of 
ratification. The instruments of ratification shall be 
deposited in the General Secretariat of the Organization of 
American States, which shall notify the signatory governments 
of such deposit.

                               Article 12

  This convention shall enter into force among the states that 
ratify it when they deposit their respective instruments of 
ratification.

                               Article 13

  This convention shall remain in force indefinitely, but any 
of the contracting states may denounce it. The denunciation 
shall be transmitted to the General Secretariat of the 
Organization of American States, which shall notify the other 
contracting states thereof. One year following the 
denunciation, the convention shall cease to be in force for the 
denouncing state, but shall continue to be in force for the 
other contracting states.
Statement of Panama
  The Delegation of Panama states for the record that nothing 
in this convention shall be interpreted to the effect that the 
right of asylum implies the right to request asylum from the 
United States authorities in the Panama Canal Zone, or that 
there is recognition of the right of the United States to grant 
asylum or political refuge in that part of the territory of the 
Republic of Panama that constitutes the Canal Zone.
  In witness whereof, the undersigned plenipotentiaries, having 
presented their full powers, which have been found to be in due 
and proper form, sign this convention on behalf of their 
respective governments, at the city of Washington this second 
day of February of the year one thousand nine hundred seventy-
one.

i. Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 
                                   *

Done at The Hague December 16, 1970; Ratification advised by the Senate 
 September 8, 1971; Ratification by the President of the United States 
  of America September 14, 1971; Ratification of the United States of 
 America deposited at Washington September 14, 1971; Proclaimed by the 
  President of the United States of America October 18, 1971; Entered 
                      into force October 14, 1971 

     Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft

                                Preamble

    The States Parties to This Convention
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * 22 UST 1641; TIAS 7192. For a list of states which are parties to 
the Convention, see Department of State publication, Treaties in Force 
and at Document M.5.q. following.

    Considering that unlawful acts of seizure or exercise of 
control of aircraft in flight jeopardize the safety of persons 
and property, seriously affect the operation of air services, 
and undermine the confidence of the peoples of the world in the 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
safety of civil aviation;

    Considering that the occurrence of such acts is a matter of 
grave concern;

    Considering that, for the purpose of deterring such acts, 
there is an urgent need to provide appropriate measures for 
punishment of offenders;

    Have agreed as follows:

                               Article 1

    Any person who on board an aircraft in flight:
    (a) unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any other 
form of intimidation, seizes, or exercises control of, that 
aircraft, or attempts to perform any such act, or
    (b) is an accomplice of a person who performs or attempts 
to perform any such act
    commits an offence (hereinafter referred to as ``the 
offence'').

                               Article 2

    Each Contracting State undertakes to make the offence 
punishable by severe penalties.

                               Article 3

    1. For the purposes of this Convention, an aircraft is 
considered to be in flight at any time from the moment when all 
its external doors are closed following embarkation until the 
moment when any such door is opened for disembarkation. In the 
case of a forced landing, the flight shall be deemed to 
continue until the competent authorities take over the 
responsibility for the aircraft and for persons and property on 
board.
    2. This Convention shall not apply to aircraft used in 
military, customs or police services.
    3. This Convention shall apply only if the place of take-
off or the place of actual landing of the aircraft on board 
which the offence is committed is situated outside the 
territory of the State of registration of that aircraft; it 
shall be immaterial whether the aircraft is engaged in an 
international or domestic flight.
    4. In the cases mentioned in Article 5, this Convention 
shall not apply if the place of take-off and the place of 
actual landing of the aircraft on board which the offence is 
committed are situated within the territory of the same State 
where that State is one of those referred to in that Article.
    5. Notwithstanding paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article, 
Articles 6, 7, 8 and 10 shall apply whatever the place of take-
off or the place of actual landing of the aircraft, if the 
offender or the alleged offender is found in the territory of a 
State other than the State of registration of that aircraft.

                               Article 4

    1. Each Contracting State shall take such measures as may 
be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offence and 
any other act of violence against passengers or crew committed 
by the alleged offender in connection with the offence, in the 
following cases:
    (a) when the offence is committed on board an aircraft 
registered in that State;
    (b) when the aircraft on board which the offence is 
committed lands in its territory with the alleged offender 
still on board;
    (c) when the offence is committed on board an aircraft 
leased without crew to a lessee who has his principal place of 
business or, if the lessee has no such place of business, his 
permanent residence, in that State.
    2. Each Contracting State shall likewise take such measures 
as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the 
offence in the case where the alleged offender is present in 
its territory and it does not extradite him pursuant to Article 
8 to any of the States mentioned in paragraph 1 of this 
Article.
    3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal 
jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law.

                               Article 5

  The Contracting States which establish joint air transport 
operating organizations or international operating agencies, 
which operate aircraft which are subject to joint or 
international registration shall, by appropriate means, 
designate for each aircraft the State among them which shall 
exercise the jurisdiction and have the attributes of the State 
of registration for the purpose of this Convention and shall 
give notice thereof to the International Civil Aviation 
Organization which shall communicate the notice to all States 
Parties to this Convention.

                               Article 6

  1. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, 
any Contracting State in the territory of which the offender or 
the alleged offender is present, shall take him into custody or 
take other measures to ensure his presence. The custody and 
other measures shall be as provided in the law of that State 
but may only be continued for such time as is necessary to 
enable any criminal or extradition proceedings to be 
instituted.
  2. Such State shall immediately make a preliminary enquiry 
into the facts.
  3. Any person in custody pursuant to paragraph 1 of this 
Article shall be assisted in communicating immediately with the 
nearest appropriate representative of the State of which he is 
a national.
  4. When a State, pursuant to this Article, has taken a person 
into custody, it shall immediately notify the State of 
registration of the aircraft, the State mentioned in Article 4, 
paragraph 1(c), the State of nationality of the detained person 
and, if it considers it advisable, any other interested States 
of the fact that such person is in custody and of the 
circumstances which warrant his detention. The State which 
makes the preliminary enquiry contemplated in paragraph 2 of 
this Article shall promptly report its findings to the said 
States and shall indicate whether it intends to exercise 
jurisdiction.

                               Article 7

  The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged 
offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be 
obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not the 
offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case to 
its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those 
authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in 
the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the 
law of that State.

                               Article 8

  1. The offence shall be deemed to be included as an 
extraditable offence in any extradition treaty existing between 
Contracting States. Contracting States undertake to include the 
offence as an extraditable offence in every extradition treaty 
to be concluded between them.
  2. If a Contracting State which makes extradition conditional 
on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition 
from another Contracting State with which it has no extradition 
treaty, it may at its option consider this Convention as the 
legal basis for extradition in respect of the offence. 
Extradition shall be subject to the other conditions provided 
by the law of the requested State.
  3. Contracting States which do not make extradition 
conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognize the 
offence as an extraditable offence between themselves subject 
to the conditions provided by the law of the requested State.
  4. The offence shall be treated, for the purpose of 
extradition between Contracting States, as if it had been 
committed not only in the place in which it occurred but also 
in the territories of the States required to establish their 
jurisdiction in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 1.

                               Article 9

  1. When any of the acts mentioned in Article 1(a) has 
occurred or is about to occur, Contracting States shall take 
appropriate measures to restore control of the aircraft to its 
lawful commander or to preserve his control of the aircraft.
  2. In the cases contemplated by the preceding paragraph, any 
Contracting State in which the aircraft or its passengers or 
crew are present shall facilitate the continuation of the 
journey of the passengers and crew as soon as practicable, and 
shall without delay return the aircraft and its cargo to the 
persons lawfully entitled to possession.

                               Article 10

  1. Contracting States shall afford one another the greatest 
measure of assistance in connection with criminal proceedings 
brought in respect of the offence and other acts mentioned in 
Article 4. The law of the State requested shall apply in all 
cases.
  2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not 
affect obligations under any other treaty, bilateral or 
multilateral, which governs or will govern, in whole or in 
part, mutual assistance in criminal matters.

                               Article 11

  Each Contracting State shall in accordance with its national 
law report to the Council of the International Civil Aviation 
Organization as promptly as possible any relevant information 
in its possession concerning:
          (a) the circumstances of the offence;
          (b) the action taken pursuant to Article 9;
          (c) the measures taken in relation to the offender or 
        the alleged offender, and, in particular, the results 
        of any extradition proceedings or other legal 
        proceedings.

                               Article 12

  1. Any dispute between two or more Contracting States 
concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention 
which cannot be settled through negotiation shall, at the 
request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within 
six months from the date of the request for arbitration the 
Parties are unable to agree on the organization of the 
arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer the dispute to 
the International Court of Justice by request in conformity 
with the Statute of the Court.
  2. Each State may at the time of signature or ratification of 
this Convention or accession thereto, declare that it does not 
consider itself bound by the preceding paragraph. The other 
Contracting States shall not be bound by the preceding 
paragraph with respect to any Contracting State having made 
such a reservation.
  3. Any Contracting State having made a reservation in 
accordance with the preceding paragraph may at any time 
withdraw this reservation by notification to the Depositary 
Governments.

                               Article 13

  1. This Convention shall be open for signature at The Hague 
on 16 December 1970, by States participating in the 
International Conference on Air Law held at The Hague from 1 to 
16 December 1970 (hereinafter referred to as The Hague 
Conference). After 31 December 1970, the Convention shall be 
open to all States for signature in Moscow, London and 
Washington. Any State which does not sign this Convention 
before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of 
this Article may accede to it at any time.
  2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by the 
signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments 
of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of 
America, which are hereby designated the Depositary 
Governments.
  3. This Convention shall enter into force thirty days 
following the date of the deposit of instruments of 
ratification by ten States signatory to this Convention which 
participated in The Hague Conference.
  4. For other States, this Convention shall enter into force 
on the date of entry into force of this Convention in 
accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article, or thirty days 
following the date of deposit of their instruments of 
ratification or accession, whichever is later.
  5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all 
signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, 
the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or 
accession, the date of entry into force of this Convention, and 
other notices.
  6. As soon as this Convention comes into force, it shall be 
registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 
102 of the Charter of the United Nations \1\ and pursuant to 
Article 83 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation 
(Chicago, 1944).\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ TS 993; 59 Stat. 1052.
    \2\ TIAS 1591; 61 Stat. 1203.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               Article 14

  1. Any Contracting State may denounce this Convention by 
written notification to the Depositary Governments.
  2. Denunciation shall take effect six months following the 
date on which notification is received by the Depositary 
Governments.

  In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, being 
duly authorised thereto by their Governments, have signed this 
Convention.

  Done at The Hague, this sixteenth day of December, one 
thousand nine hundred and seventy, in three originals, each 
being drawn up in four authentic texts in the English, French, 
Russian and Spanish languages.

  j. Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Acts Committed on Board 
                     Aircraft, September 14, 1963 *

      
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * Source: 20 UST 2941; TIAS 6768; Ratification advised by the 
Senate May 13, 1969; Ratified by the President June 30, 1969; 
Ratificiation deposited September 5, 1969; Proclaimed by President 
October 1, 1969; Entered into force December 4, 1969.
    Note: Status information appears at Document M.5.1., following.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2838.326
    
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    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2838.335
    

      

     2. Treaties Signed by the United States, But Not Yet in Force

  International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 
                         December 15, 1997 \1\

    The States Parties to this Convention,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-second 
Session, Supplement No. 49 (A/52/49((Vol. 1)); New York, United 
Nations, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Having in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter 
of the United Nations concerning the maintenance of 
international peace and security and the promotion of good-
neighbourliness and friendly relations and cooperation among 
States,
    Deeply concerned about the worldwide escalation of acts of 
terrorism in all its forms and manifestations,
    Recalling the Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth 
Anniversary of the United Nations of 24 October 1995, \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ See resolution 50/6. Status information appears at Document 
M.5.a.2, following.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Recalling also the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism, annexed to General Assembly resolution 
49/60 of 9 December 1994, in which, inter alia, ``the States 
Members of the United Nations solemnly reaffirm their 
unequivocal condemnation of all acts, methods and practices of 
terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by 
whomever committed, including those which jeopardize the 
friendly relations among States and peoples and threaten the 
territorial integrity and security of States'',
    Noting that the Declaration also encouraged States ``to 
review urgently the scope of the existing international legal 
provisions on the prevention, repression and elimination of 
terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, with the aim of 
ensuring that there is a comprehensive legal framework covering 
all aspects of the matter'',
    Recalling further General Assembly resolution 51/210 of 17 
December 1996 and the Declaration to Supplement the 1994 
Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism 
annexed thereto,
    Noting that terrorist attacks by means of explosives or 
other lethal devices have become increasingly widespread,
    Noting also that existing multilateral legal provisions do 
not adequately address these attacks,
    Being convinced of the urgent need to enhance international 
cooperation between States in devising and adopting effective 
and practical measures for the prevention of such acts of 
terrorism and for the prosecution and punishment of their 
perpetrators,
    Considering that the occurrence of such acts is a matter of 
grave concern to the international community as a whole,
    Noting that the activities of military forces of States are 
governed by rules of international law outside the framework of 
this Convention and that the exclusion of certain actions from 
the coverage of this Convention does not condone or make lawful 
otherwise unlawful acts, or preclude prosecution under other 
laws,
    Have agreed as follows:

                               Article 1

    For the purposes of this Convention:
    1. ``State or government facility'' includes any permanent 
or temporary facility or conveyance that is used or occupied by 
representatives of a State, members of Government, the 
legislature or the judiciary or by officials or employees of a 
State or any other public authority or entity or by employees 
or officials of an intergovernmental organization in connection 
with their official duties.
    2. ``Infrastructure facility'' means any publicly or 
privately owned facility providing or distributing services for 
the benefit of the public, such as water, sewage, energy, fuel 
or communications.
    3. ``Explosive or other lethal device'' means:
    (a) An explosive or incendiary weapon or device that is 
designed, or has the capability, to cause death, serious bodily 
injury or substantial material damage; or
    (b) A weapon or device that is designed, or has the 
capability, to cause death, serious bodily injury or 
substantial material damage through the release, dissemination 
or impact of toxic chemicals, biological agents or toxins or 
similar substances or radiation or radioactive material.
    4. ``Military forces of a State'' means the armed forces of 
a State which are organized, trained and equipped under its 
internal law for the primary purpose of national defence or 
security and persons acting in support of those armed forces 
who are under their formal command, control and responsibility.
    5. ``Place of public use'' means those parts of any 
building, land, street, waterway or other location that are 
accessible or open to members of the public, whether 
continuously, periodically or occasionally, and encompasses any 
commercial, business, cultural, historical, educational, 
religious, governmental, entertainment, recreational or similar 
place that is so accessible or open to the public.
    6. ``Public transportation system'' means all facilities, 
conveyances and instrumentalities, whether publicly or 
privately owned, that are used in or for publicly available 
services for the transportation of persons or cargo.

                               Article 2

    1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this 
Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally 
delivers, places, discharges or detonates an explosive or other 
lethal device in, into or against a place of public use, a 
State or government facility, a public transportation system or 
an infrastructure facility:
    (a) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily 
injury; or
    (b) With the intent to cause extensive destruction of such 
a place, facility or system, where such destruction results in 
or is likely to result in major economic loss.
    2. Any person also commits an offence if that person 
attempts to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 of 
the present article.
    3. Any person also commits an offence if that person:
    (a) Participates as an accomplice in an offence as set 
forth in paragraph 1 or 2 of the present article; or
    (b) Organizes or directs others to commit an offence as set 
forth in paragraph 1 or 2 of the present article; or
    (c) In any other way contributes to the commission of one 
or more offences as set forth in paragraph 1 or 2 of the 
present article by a group of persons acting with a common 
purpose; such contribution shall be intentional and either be 
made with the aim of furthering the general criminal activity 
or purpose of the group or be made in the knowledge of the 
intention of the group to commit the offence or offences 
concerned.

                               Article 3

    This Convention shall not apply where the offence is 
committed within a single State, the alleged offender and the 
victims are nationals of that State, the alleged offender is 
found in the territory of that State and no other State has a 
basis under article 6, paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, of this 
Convention to exercise jurisdiction, except that the provisions 
of articles 10 to 15 shall, as appropriate, apply in those 
cases.

                               Article 4

    Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be 
necessary:
    (a) To establish as criminal offences under its domestic 
law the offences set forth in article 2 of this Convention;
    (b) To make those offences punishable by appropriate 
penalties which take into account the grave nature of those 
offences.

                               Article 5

    Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be 
necessary, including, where appropriate, domestic legislation, 
to ensure that criminal acts within the scope of this 
Convention, in particular where they are intended or calculated 
to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a 
group of persons or particular persons, are under no 
circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, 
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other 
similar nature and are punished by penalties consistent with 
their grave nature.

                               Article 6

    1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be 
necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences set 
forth in article 2 when:
    (a) The offence is committed in the territory of that 
State; or
    (b) The offence is committed on board a vessel flying the 
flag of that State or an aircraft which is registered under the 
laws of that State at the time the offence is committed; or
    (c) The offence is committed by a national of that State.
    2. A State Party may also establish its jurisdiction over 
any such offence when:
    (a) The offence is committed against a national of that 
State; or
    (b) The offence is committed against a State or government 
facility of that State abroad, including an embassy or other 
diplomatic or consular premises of that State; or
    (c) The offence is committed by a stateless person who has 
his or her habitual residence in the territory of that State; 
or
    (d) The offence is committed in an attempt to compel that 
State to do or abstain from doing any act; or
    (e) The offence is committed on board an aircraft which is 
operated by the Government of that State.
    3. Upon ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this 
Convention, each State Party shall notify the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations of the jurisdiction it has established 
under its domestic law in accordance with paragraph 2 of the 
present article. Should any change take place, the State Party 
concerned shall immediately notify the Secretary-General.
    4. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as 
may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the 
offences set forth in article 2 in cases where the alleged 
offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite 
that person to any of the States Parties which have established 
their jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph 1 or 2 of the 
present article.
    5. This Convention does not exclude the exercise of any 
criminal jurisdiction established by a State Party in 
accordance with its domestic law.

                               Article 7

    1. Upon receiving information that a person who has 
committed or who is alleged to have committed an offence as set 
forth in article 2 may be present in its territory, the State 
Party concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary 
under its domestic law to investigate the facts contained in 
the information.
    2. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, 
the State Party in whose territory the offender or alleged 
offender is present shall take the appropriate measures under 
its domestic law so as to ensure that person's presence for the 
purpose of prosecution or extradition.
    3. Any person regarding whom the measures referred to in 
paragraph 2 of the present article are being taken shall be 
entitled to:
    (a) Communicate without delay with the nearest appropriate 
representative of the State of which that person is a national 
or which is otherwise entitled to protect that person's rights 
or, if that person is a stateless person, the State in the 
territory of which that person habitually resides;
    (b) Be visited by a representative of that State;
    (c) Be informed of that person's rights under subparagraphs 
(a) and (b).
    4. The rights referred to in paragraph 3 of the present 
article shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and 
regulations of the State in the territory of which the offender 
or alleged offender is present, subject to the provision that 
the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be 
given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under 
paragraph 3 are intended.
    5. The provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the present 
article shall be without prejudice to the right of any State 
Party having a claim to jurisdiction in accordance with article 
6, subparagraph 1 (c) or 2 (c), to invite the International 
Committee of the Red Cross to communicate with and visit the 
alleged offender.
    6. When a State Party, pursuant to the present article, has 
taken a person into custody, it shall immediately notify, 
directly or through the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, the States Parties which have established jurisdiction 
in accordance with article 6, paragraphs 1 and 2, and, if it 
considers it advisable, any other interested States Parties, of 
the fact that that person is in custody and of the 
circumstances which warrant that person's detention. The State 
which makes the investigation contemplated in paragraph 1 of 
the present article shall promptly inform the said States 
Parties of its findings and shall indicate whether it intends 
to exercise jurisdiction.

                               Article 8

    1. The State Party in the territory of which the alleged 
offender is present shall, in cases to which article 6 applies, 
if it does not extradite that person, be obliged, without 
exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was 
committed in its territory, to submit the case without undue 
delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of 
prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the laws of 
that State. Those authorities shall take their decision in the 
same manner as in the case of any other offence of a grave 
nature under the law of that State.
    2. Whenever a State Party is permitted under its domestic 
law to extradite or otherwise surrender one of its nationals 
only upon the condition that the person will be returned to 
that State to serve the sentence imposed as a result of the 
trial or proceeding for which the extradition or surrender of 
the person was sought, and this State and the State seeking the 
extradition of the person agree with this option and other 
terms they may deem appropriate, such a conditional extradition 
or surrender shall be sufficient to discharge the obligation 
set forth in paragraph 1 of the present article.

                               Article 9

    1. The offences set forth in article 2 shall be deemed to 
be included as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty 
existing between any of the States Parties before the entry 
into force of this Convention. States Parties undertake to 
include such offences as extraditable offences in every 
extradition treaty to be subsequently concluded between them.
    2. When a State Party which makes extradition conditional 
on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition 
from another State Party with which it has no extradition 
treaty, the requested State Party may, at its option, consider 
this Convention as a legal basis for extradition in respect of 
the offences set forth in article 2. Extradition shall be 
subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the 
requested State.
    3. States Parties which do not make extradition conditional 
on the existence of a treaty shall recognize the offences set 
forth in article 2 as extraditable offences between themselves, 
subject to the conditions provided by the law of the requested 
State.
    4. If necessary, the offences set forth in article 2 shall 
be treated, for the purposes of extradition between States 
Parties, as if they had been committed not only in the place in 
which they occurred but also in the territory of the States 
that have established jurisdiction in accordance with article 
6, paragraphs 1 and 2.
    5. The provisions of all extradition treaties and 
arrangements between States Parties with regard to offences set 
forth in article 2 shall be deemed to be modified as between 
State Parties to the extent that they are incompatible with 
this Convention.

                               Article 10

    1. States Parties shall afford one another the greatest 
measure of assistance in connection with investigations or 
criminal or extradition proceedings brought in respect of the 
offences set forth in article 2, including assistance in 
obtaining evidence at their disposal necessary for the 
proceedings.
    2. States Parties shall carry out their obligations under 
paragraph 1 of the present article in conformity with any 
treaties or other arrangements on mutual legal assistance that 
may exist between them. In the absence of such treaties or 
arrangements, States Parties shall afford one another 
assistance in accordance with their domestic law.

                               Article 11

    None of the offences set forth in article 2 shall be 
regarded, for the purposes of extradition or mutual legal 
assistance, as a political offence or as an offence connected 
with a political offence or as an offence inspired by political 
motives. Accordingly, a request for extradition or for mutual 
legal assistance based on such an offence may not be refused on 
the sole ground that it concerns a political offence or an 
offence connected with a political offence or an offence 
inspired by political motives.

                               Article 12

    Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing 
an obligation to extradite or to afford mutual legal 
assistance, if the requested State Party has substantial 
grounds for believing that the request for extradition for 
offences set forth in article 2 or for mutual legal assistance 
with respect to such offences has been made for the purpose of 
prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that person's 
race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion 
or that compliance with the request would cause prejudice to 
that person's position for any of these reasons.

                               Article 13

    1. A person who is being detained or is serving a sentence 
in the territory of one State Party whose presence in another 
State Party is requested for purposes of testimony, 
identification or otherwise providing assistance in obtaining 
evidence for the investigation or prosecution of offences under 
this Convention may be transferred if the following conditions 
are met:
    (a) The person freely gives his or her informed consent; 
and
    (b) The competent authorities of both States agree, subject 
to such conditions as those States may deem appropriate.
    2. For the purposes of the present article:
    (a) The State to which the person is transferred shall have 
the authority and obligation to keep the person transferred in 
custody, unless otherwise requested or authorized by the State 
from which the person was transferred;
    (b) The State to which the person is transferred shall 
without delay implement its obligation to return the person to 
the custody of the State from which the person was transferred 
as agreed beforehand, or as otherwise agreed, by the competent 
authorities of both States;
    (c) The State to which the person is transferred shall not 
require the State from which the person was transferred to 
initiate extradition proceedings for the return of the person;
    (d) The person transferred shall receive credit for service 
of the sentence being served in the State from which he was 
transferred for time spent in the custody of the State to which 
he was transferred.
    3. Unless the State Party from which a person is to be 
transferred in accordance with the present article so agrees, 
that person, whatever his or her nationality, shall not be 
prosecuted or detained or subjected to any other restriction of 
his or her personal liberty in the territory of the State to 
which that person is transferred in respect of acts or 
convictions anterior to his or her departure from the territory 
of the State from which such person was transferred.

                               Article 14

    Any person who is taken into custody or regarding whom any 
other measures are taken or proceedings are carried out 
pursuant to this Convention shall be guaranteed fair treatment, 
including enjoyment of all rights and guarantees in conformity 
with the law of the State in the territory of which that person 
is present and applicable provisions of international law, 
including international law of human rights.

                               Article 15

    States Parties shall cooperate in the prevention of the 
offences set forth in article 2, particularly:
    (a) By taking all practicable measures, including, if 
necessary, adapting their domestic legislation, to prevent and 
counter preparations in their respective territories for the 
commission of those offences within or outside their 
territories, including measures to prohibit in their 
territories illegal activities of persons, groups and 
organizations that encourage, instigate, organize, knowingly 
finance or engage in the perpetration of offences as set forth 
in article 2;
    (b) By exchanging accurate and verified information in 
accordance with their national law, and coordinating 
administrative and other measures taken as appropriate to 
prevent the commission of offences as set forth in article 2;
    (c) Where appropriate, through research and development 
regarding methods of detection of explosives and other harmful 
substances that can cause death or bodily injury, consultations 
on the development of standards for marking explosives in order 
to identify their origin in post-blast investigations, exchange 
of information on preventive measures, cooperation and transfer 
of technology, equipment and related materials.

                               Article 16

    The State Party where the alleged offender is prosecuted 
shall, in accordance with its domestic law or applicable 
procedures, communicate the final outcome of the proceedings to 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit 
the information to the other States Parties.

                               Article 17

    The States Parties shall carry out their obligations under 
this Convention in a manner consistent with the principles of 
sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and that 
of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States.

                               Article 18

    Nothing in this Convention entitles a State Party to 
undertake in the territory of another State Party the exercise 
of jurisdiction and performance of functions which are 
exclusively reserved for the authorities of that other State 
Party by its domestic law.

                               Article 19

    1. Nothing in this Convention shall affect other rights, 
obligations and responsibilities of States and individuals 
under international law, in particular the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations and 
international humanitarian law.
    2. The activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, 
as those terms are understood under international humanitarian 
law, which are governed by that law, are not governed by this 
Convention, and the activities undertaken by military forces of 
a State in the exercise of their official duties, inasmuch as 
they are governed by other rules of international law, are not 
governed by this Convention.

                               Article 20

    1. Any dispute between two or more States Parties 
concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention 
which cannot be settled through negotiation within a reasonable 
time shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to 
arbitration. If, within six months from the date of the request 
for arbitration, the parties are unable to agree on the 
organization of the arbitration, any one of those parties may 
refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice, by 
application, in conformity with the Statute of the Court.
    2. Each State may at the time of signature, ratification, 
acceptance or approval of this Convention or accession thereto 
declare that it does not consider itself bound by paragraph 1 
of the present article. The other States Parties shall not be 
bound by paragraph 1 with respect to any State Party which has 
made such a reservation.
    3. Any State which has made a reservation in accordance 
with paragraph 2 of the present article may at any time 
withdraw that reservation by notification to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations.

                               Article 21

    1. This Convention shall be open for signature by all 
States from 12 January 1998 until 31 December 1999 at United 
Nations Headquarters in New York.
    2. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance 
or approval. The instruments of ratification, acceptance or 
approval shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations.
    3. This Convention shall be open to accession by any State. 
The instruments of accession shall be deposited with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations.

                               Article 22

    1. This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth 
day following the date of the deposit of the twenty-second 
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession 
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
    2. For each State ratifying, accepting, approving or 
acceding to the Convention after the deposit of the twenty-
second instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the 
thirtieth day after deposit by such State of its instrument of 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

                               Article 23

    1. Any State Party may denounce this Convention by written 
notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
    2. Denunciation shall take effect one year following the 
date on which notification is received by the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations.

                               Article 24

    The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, 
Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally 
authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, who shall send certified copies thereof to all 
States.

    IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized 
thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this 
Convention, opened for signature at United Nations Headquarters 
in New York on 12 January 1998.

         3. Treaties to Which the United States is not a Party

   a. Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism of the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) (Signed November 4, 1987) 
                                   *

                            DOCUMENT NO. 16

     CONVENTION ON THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM OF THE SOUTH ASIAN 
              ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION (SAARC)

                           (4 November 1987)

     THE MEMBER STATES OF THE SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL 
                          COOPERATION (SAARC)

    MINDFUL of the principles of cooperation enshrined in the 
SAARC Charter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * Source: Levie, Howard S., Terrorism: Documents of International 
and Local Control, Vol. 10. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Oceana Publications, 
1996. p. 313-318. (Permission granted by Oceana Publications). Entered 
into force, August 22, 1988. Status information appears at Document 
M.5.q., following.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    RECALLING that at the Dhaka Summit on December 7-8, 1985, 
the Heads of State or Government of the member States of the 
SAARC recognized the seriousness of the problem of terrorism as 
it affects the security and stability of the region.
    ALSO RECALLING the Bangalore Summit Declaration of 17 
November 1986, in which the Heads of State or Government of 
SAARC agreed that cooperation among SAARC States was vital if 
terrorism was to be prevented and eliminated from the region; 
unequivocally condemned as acts, methods and practices of 
terrorism as criminal and deplored their impact on life and 
property, socio-economic development, political stability, 
regional and international peace and cooperation; and 
recognized the importance of the principles laid down in UN 
Resolution 2625 (XXV) which among others required that each 
state should refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or 
participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in 
another state or acquiescing in organized activities within its 
territory directed towards the commission of such acts.
    AWARE of the danger posed by the spread of terrorism and 
its harmful effect on peace, cooperation, friendship and good 
neighborly relations and which could also jeopardize the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of states.
    HAVE RESOLVED to take effective measures to ensure that 
perpetrators of terroristic acts do not escape prosecution, and 
to this end,
    HAVE AGREED as follows:--

                               Article I

    Subject to the overall requirements of the law of 
extradition, conduct constituting any of the following 
offences, according to the law of the Contracting State, shall 
be regarded as terroristic and for the purpose of an offence 
connected with a political offence or as an offence inspired by 
political motives:--
          (a) An offence within the scope of the Convention for 
        the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed 
        at the Hague on December 16, 1970;
          (b) An offence within the scope of the Convention for 
        the Suppression of Unlawful acts against the Safety of 
        Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on September 23, 
        1971;
          (c) An offence within the scope of the Convention on 
        the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 
        Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic 
        Agents, signed at New York on December 14, 1973;
          (d) An offence within the scope of any Convention to 
        which the SAARC member States concerned are parties and 
        which obliges the parties to prosecute or grant 
        extradition;
          (e) Murder, manslaughter, assault causing bodily 
        harm, kidnapping, hostage-taking and offences relating 
        to firearms, weapons, explosives and dangerous 
        substances when used as a means to perpetrate 
        indiscriminate violence involving death or serious 
        bodily injury to persons or serious damage to property;
          (f) An attempt or conspiracy to commit an offence 
        described in sub-paragraphs (a) to (e), aiding, 
        abetting or counselling the commission of such an 
        offence or participating as an accomplice in the 
        offences so described.

                               Article II

    For the purpose of extradition between SAARC member States, 
any two or more Contracting States may, by agreement, decide to 
include any other serious offence involving violence, which 
shall not be regarded as a political offence or an offence 
connected with a political offence or an offence inspired by 
political motives.

                              Article III

    1. The provisions of all extradition treaties an 
arrangements applicable between Contracting States are hereby 
amended as between Contracting States to the extent that they 
are incompatible with this Convention.
    2. For the purpose of this Convention and to the extent 
that any offence referred to in Article I or agreed to in terms 
of Article II is not listed as an extraditable offence in any 
extradition treaty existing between Contracting States, it 
shall be deemed to be included as such therein.
    3. Contracting States undertake to include these offences 
as extraditable offences in any future extradition treaty to be 
concluded between them.
    4. If a Contracting State which makes extradition 
conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for 
extradition from another Contracting State with which it 
option, consider this Convention as the basis for extradition 
in respect of the offences set forth in Article I or agreed to 
in terms of Article II Extradition shall be subject to the law 
of the requested State.
    5. Contracting States which do not make extradition 
conditional on the existence of a treaty, shall recognize the 
offences set forth in Article I or agreed to in terms of 
Article II as extraditable offences between themselves, subject 
to the law of the requested State.

                               Article IV

    A Contracting State in whose territory a person suspected 
of having committed an offence referred to in Article I or 
agreed to in terms of Article II is found and which Contracting 
State, shall, if it does not extradite that person, submit the 
case without exception and without delay, to its competent 
authorities shall take their decisions in the same manner as in 
the case of any offence of a serious nature under the law of 
that State.

                               Article V

    For the purpose of Article IV, each Contracting State may 
take such measure as it deems appropriate, consistent with its 
national laws, subject to reciprocity, to exercise its 
jurisdiction in the case of an offence under Article I or 
agreed to in terms of Article II.

                               Article VI

    A Contracting State in whose territory an alleged offender 
is found, shall, upon receiving a request for extradition from 
another Contracting State, take appropriate measures, subject 
to its national laws, so as to ensure his presence for purposes 
of extradition or prosecution. Such measure shall immediately 
be notified to the requesting State.

                              Article VII

    Contracting States shall not be obliged to extradite, if it 
appears to the requested State that by reason of the trivial 
nature of the case or by reason of the request for the 
surrender or return of a fugitive offender not being made in 
good faith or in the interests of justice or for any other 
reason it is unjust or inexpedient to surrender or return the 
fugitive offender.

                              Article VIII

    1. Contracting States shall, subject to their national 
laws, afford one another the greatest measure of mutual 
assistance in connection with proceedings brought in respect of 
the offences referred to in Article I or agreed to in terms of 
Article II, including the supply of all evidence at their 
disposal necessary for the proceedings.
    2. Contracting States shall cooperate among themselves, to 
the extent permitted by their national laws, through 
consultations between appropriate agencies, exchange of 
information, intelligence and expertise and such other 
cooperative measures as may be appropriate, with a view to 
prevention terroristic activities through precautionary 
measures.

                               Article IX

    1. The Convention shall be open for signature by the member 
States of SAARC at the SAARC Secretariat in Kathmandu.
    2. It shall be subject to ratification. Instruments of 
Ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of 
SAARC.

                               Article X

    The Convention shall enter into force on the fifteenth day 
following the date of the deposit of the seventh Instrument of 
Ratification with the Secretary-General of SAARC.

                               Article XI

    The Secretary-General of SAARC shall be the depository of 
this Convention and shall notify member States of signatures to 
this Convention and all deposits of Instruments of 
Ratification. The Secretary-General shall transmit certified 
copies of such Instruments to each member State. The Secretary-
General shall also inform member States of the date on which 
this Convention will have entered into force in accordance with 
Article X.
    IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized 
thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this 
Convention.
    DONE at Kathmandu on this Fourth Day of November One 
Thousand Nine Hundred and Eighty Seven in eight Originals in 
the English language all texts being equally authentic.

HUMAYUN RASHEED CHOUDHURY
Minister of Foreign Affairs
People's Republic of Bangladesh

K. NATWAR-SINGH
Minister of State for External Affairs
Republic of India

SHAILENDRA KUMAR UPADHYAYA
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Land Reforms
His Majesty's Government of Nepal

DAWA TSERING
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Kingdom of Bhutan

FATHULLA JAMEEL
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Republic of Maldives

ZAIN NOORANI
Minister of States for Foreign Affairs
Islamic Republic of Pakistan

A.C. SHAHUL HAMEED
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka

 b. European Communities: Agreement Concerning the Application of The 
 European Convention on The Suppression of Terrorism Among The Member 
                                States.

                 Done at Dublin, December 4, 1979. \1\

    Agreement concerning the application of the European 
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism among the Member 
States of the European Communities:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Reproduced from the text in the Bulletin of the European 
Communities Vol. 12, No. 12 [1979], at pp. 90-91. The Ministers of 
Justice of the nine Member States signed the Agreement on Dec. 4, 1979.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Member States of the European Communities, Concerned to 
strengthen judicial cooperation among these States in the fight 
against acts of violence; While awaiting the ratification 
without reservations of the European Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism signed at Strasbourg on 27 January 
1977, described below as ``the European Convention'', by all 
the Member States of the European Communities, described below 
as ``the Member States'',
    Have agreed as follows:

                               Article 1

    This Agreement shall apply in relations between two Member 
States of which one at least is not a party to the European 
Convention or is a party to that Convention, but with a 
reservation.

                               Article 2

    1. In the relations between two Member States which are 
parties to the European Convention, but of which one at least 
has made a reservation to that Convention, the application of 
the said Convention shall be subject to the provisions of this 
Agreement.
    2. In the relations between two Member States of which one 
at least is not a party to the European Convention, Articles 1 
to 8 and 13 of that Convention shall apply subject to the 
provisions of this Agreement.

                               Article 3

    1. Each Member State which has made the reservation 
permitted under Article 13 of the European Convention shall 
declare whether, for the application of this Agreement, it 
intends to make use of this reservation.
    2. Each Member State which has signed the European 
Convention but has not ratified, accepted or approved it, shall 
declare whether, for the application of this Agreement, it 
intends to make the reservation permitted under Article 13 of 
that Convention.
    3. Each Member State which has not signed the European 
Convention may declare that it reserves the right to refuse 
extradition for an offense listed in Article 1 of that 
convention which it considers to be a political offence, an 
offence connected with a political offence or an offence 
inspired by political motives, on condition that it undertakes 
to submit the case without exception whatsoever and without 
undue delay, to its competent authorities for the purpose of 
prosecution. Those authorities shall take their decision in the 
same manner as in the case of any offence of a serious nature 
under the law of that State.
    4. For the application of this Agreement, only the 
reservations provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article and in 
Article 13 of the European Convention are permitted. Any other 
reservation is without effect as between the Member States.
    5. A Member State which has made a reservation may only 
claim the application of this Agreement by another State to the 
extent that the Agreement itself applies to the former State.

                               Article 4

    1. The declarations provided for under Article 3 may be 
made by a Member State at the time of signature or when 
depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance or 
approval.
    2. Each Member State may at any time, wholly or partially, 
withdraw a reservation which it has made in pursuance of 
paragraphs 1, 2 or 3 of Article 3 by means of a declaration 
addressed to the Department of Foreign Affairs of Ireland. The 
declaration shall have effect on the day it is received.
    3. The Department of Foreign Affairs of Ireland shall 
communicate the declarations to the other Member States.

                               Article 5

    Any dispute between Member States concerning the 
interpretation or application of this Agreement which has not 
been settled by negotiation shall, at the request of any party 
to the dispute, be referred to arbitration in accordance with 
the procedure laid down in Article 10 of the European 
Convention.

                               Article 6

    1. This Agreement shall be open for signature by the Member 
States of the European Communities. It shall be subject to 
ratification, acceptance or approval. Instruments of 
ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with 
the Department of Foreign Affairs of Ireland.
    2. The Agreement shall enter into force three months after 
the deposit of the instruments of ratification, acceptance or 
approval by all States which are members of the European 
Communities on the day on which this Agreement is opened for 
signature.

                               Article 7

    1. Each Member State may, at the time of signature or when 
depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance or 
approval, specify the territory or territories to which this 
Agreement shall apply.
    2. Each Member State may, when depositing its instrument of 
ratification, acceptance or approval or at any later date, by 
declaration addressed to the Department of Foreign Affairs or 
Ireland extend this Agreement to any other territory specified 
in the declaration and for whose international relations it is 
responsible or on whose behalf it is authorized to give 
undertakings.
    3. Any declaration made in pursuance of the preceding 
paragraph may, as regards any territory specified in that 
declaration, be denounced by means of a notification addressed 
to the Department of Foreign Affairs of Ireland. The 
denunciation shall have effect immediately or at such later 
date as may be specified in the notification.
    4. The Department of Foreign Affairs of Ireland shall 
communicate these declarations and notifications to the other 
Member States.

                               Article 8

    This Agreement shall cease to have effect on the date when 
all the Member States become parties without reservation to the 
European Convention.

    Done at Dublin, this 4th day of December 1979 in German, 
English, Danish, French, Irish, Italian and Dutch, all texts 
being equally authoritative, in a single copy, which shall 
remain deposited in the archives of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs of Ireland, which shall transmit certified copies to 
each of the Member States.

    c. Council of Europe: European Convention on the Suppression of 
                     Terrorism, January 27, 1977 *

      
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    * Status information appears at Document M.5.q., following.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2838.336
    
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    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2838.341
    
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=======================================================================




                    M. OTHER MULTILATERAL DOCUMENTS

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

1. Economic Summits of the G-7/G-8 and Related Meetings..........  1537
      a. Denver Summit: Meeting of the Eight Foreign Ministers...  1537
          (1) Communique, June 22, 1997..........................  1537
          (2) Progress Report, June 21, 1997.....................  1538
      b. Lyon Summit: Meeting of the G-7 Member Countries........  1541
          (1) Paris Ministerial Conference on Terrorism: 
              Agreement on Twenty-Five Measures, July 30, 1996...  1541
          (2) G-7 Declaration on Terrorism, June 27, 1996........  1546
      c. Ottawa: Ministerial Declaration on Countering Terrorism, 
          December 12, 1995......................................  1547
      d. Halifax: Chairman's Statement, June 17, 1995 (Partial 
          text)..................................................  1552
      e. Naples: Chairman's Statement (excerpt), July 10, 1994...  1555
      f. Tokyo: Political Declaration (excerpt), July 8, 1993....  1557
      g. Munich: Chairman's Statement (excerpt), July 8, 1992....  1558
      h. Houston: Statement on Terrorism, July 10, 1990..........  1559
      i. Toronto: Statement on International Terrorism, June 20, 
          1988...................................................  1560
      j. Venice: Statement on Terrorism, June 9, 1987............  1561
      k. Tokyo: Statement on International Terrorism, May 5, 1986  1563
2. Other Conferences.............................................  1565
      a. Sharm El-Sheikh Summit of Peacemakers, March 13, 1996...  1565
          (1) Co-Chairmen's Statement............................  1565
          (2) Communique.........................................  1567
      b. Baguio Communique, Baguio City, Philippines, February 
          22, 1996...............................................  1570
3. Hemispheric Documents.........................................  1572
      a. Second Inter-American Specialized Conference on 
          Terrorism, Mar de Plata, Argentina, November 23-24, 
          1998...................................................  1572
          (1) Commitment of Mar del Plata........................  1572
          (2) The Inter-American Committee on Terrorism (CICTE)..  1577
          (3) Guidelines for Inter-American Cooperation Regarding 
              Terrorist Acts and Activities......................  1579
          (4) Measures to Eliminate Terrorist Fundraising........  1582
      b. Hemispheric Cooperation to Prevent, Combat, and 
          Eliminate Terrorism (OAS General Assembly Resolution, 
          June 7, 1996)..........................................  1584
      c. First Inter-American Specialized Conference on 
          Terrorism, Lima, Peru, April 23-26, 1996...............  1586
          (1) Declaration of Lima to Prevent, Combat, and 
              Eliminate Terrorism................................  1586
          (2) Plan of Action on Hemispheric Cooperation to 
              Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism...........  1589
      d. Summit of the Americas, Miami, Florida, December 9-11, 
          1994: Declaration of Principles (excerpts).............  1592
4. International Civil Aviation Organization Documents...........  1593
      a. International Standards and Recommended Practices: 
          Security; Safeguarding International Civil Aviation 
          Against Acts of Unlawful Interference, Annex 17 to the 
          Convention on International Civil Aviation, Sixth 
          Edition, March 1997....................................  1593
      b. A-31-A: Consolidated Statement of Continuing ICAO 
          Policies Related to the Safeguarding of International 
          Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference...  1619
5. United Nations Documents......................................  1627
      a. General Assembly: Measures to Eliminate International 
          Terrorism..............................................  1627
          (1) A/RES/53/108, December 8, 1998.....................  1627
          (2) A/53/314, August 13, 1998..........................  1630
          (3) A/RES/52/165, December 15, 1997....................  1640
          (4) A/RES/51/210, December 17, 1996....................  1643
          (5) A/RES/49/60, December 9, 1994......................  1650
          (6) A/RES/46/51, December 9, 1991......................  1655
          (7) A/RES/40/61, December 9, 1985......................  1659
      b. General Assembly/Security Council: A/46/831 S/2317, 
          December 23, 1991 (Indictment in Connection with the 
          Bombing of Pan Am Flight 103)..........................  1662
      c. Security Council: Resolutions on Terrorism..............  1682
          (1) S/RES/1192, August 27, 1998........................  1682
          (2) S/RES/1189, August 13, 1998........................  1684
          (3) S/RES/1070, August 16, 1996........................  1686
          (4) S/RES/1054, April 26, 1996.........................  1688
          (5) S/RES/1044, January 31, 1996.......................  1690
          (6) S/RES/883, November 11, 1993.......................  1692
          (7) S/RES/748, March 31, 1992..........................  1696
          (8) S/RES/731, January 21, 1992........................  1699

=======================================================================

        1. Economic Summits of the G-7/G-8 and Related Meetings

            a. Denver Summit of the Eight Foreign Ministers

(1) Communique, June 22, 1997 \1\

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                               Terrorism

    44. We reaffirm our determination to combat terrorism in 
all forms, irrespective of motive. We oppose concessions to 
terrorist demands and are determined to deny hostage-takers any 
benefits from their acts. We welcome the growing consensus on 
adopting effective and legitimate means of countering 
terrorism.
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archives/1997/pdq.97
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    45. Last year, our Ministers adopted 25 recommendations to 
combat terrorism. We have received a positive response 
worldwide, in particular in the U.N. General Assembly. Together 
we have made substantial progress on many of these 
recommendations, including: drafting and negotiating a U.N. 
convention on terrorist bombing; promoting improved 
international standards for airport security, explosives 
detection, and vehicle identification; promoting stronger laws 
and export controls on the manufacture, trade and transport of 
explosives; initiating a directory of counter-terrorism 
competencies; inviting all States to promote the use of 
encryption which may allow, consistent with OECD guidelines, 
lawful government access to combat terrorism.
    46. We have asked our Ministers to intensify diplomatic 
efforts to ensure that by the year 2000 all States join the 
international counterterrorism conventions specified in the 
1996 U.N. resolution on measures to counter terrorism. We have 
instructed our officials to take additional steps: to 
strengthen the capability of hostage negotiation experts and 
counterterrorism response units; to exchange information on 
technologies to detect and deter the use of materials of mass 
destruction in terrorist attacks; to develop means to deter 
terrorist attacks on electronic and computer infrastructure; to 
strengthen maritime security; to exchange information on 
security practices for international special events; and to 
strengthen and expand international cooperation and 
consultation.

                          (2) Progress Report

                           June 21, 1997 \1\

    1. We are committed to a strategy of global integration 
aimed at fostering international peace and prosperity. To that 
end, we have continued to build on the decisions we have 
already taken and agreed to broaden our common efforts. Since 
our last meeting in Lyon, we have strengthened our cooperation 
on nonproliferation, anti-personnel landmines, transnational 
crime, counterterrorism, and UN reform. This Progress Report 
highlights our achievements in these areas and decisions for 
further joint action. We will continue to discuss these issues 
over the course of the coming year and review them again in 
Birmingham. In keeping with our strong commitment to advance 
international peace and security, we discussed a full range of 
political situations which both complemented and supplemented 
discussions by the Heads of the Eight.
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archives/1997/pdq.97

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

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                            Counterterrorism

    26. Terrorist bombings in France, Russia, the United 
Kingdom, the Middle East and South Asia, the seizure of 
hostages at the Japanese Ambassador's residence in Lima and 
other vicious terrorist attacks against innocents during the 
last year demonstrate that terrorism remains a threat to civil 
society. The increase in hostage taking by terrorists for the 
purpose of political extortion or ransom was an additional 
cause for concern. By making substantial progress in 
implementing the 25 recommendations of the 1996 Ministerial 
Conference on Terrorism in Paris, our governments have taken 
important steps to counter the terrorist threat. For example:

  --To strengthen cooperation to combat and eliminate 
        terrorism, the United Nations, at the initiative of our 
        governments, has begun negotiations on a draft 
        Convention on Suppression of Terrorist Bombing. To 
        broaden further such cooperation, we have called on all 
        states to join the international conventions on 
        terrorism specified in the 1996 UN resolution on 
        measures to eliminate international terrorism by the 
        year 2000, and will intensify diplomatic efforts to 
        achieve universal accession and adherence to these 
        conventions.
  --To strengthen our capability to investigate terrorist 
        attacks on ground transportation, our experts held a 
        series of technical and security consultations. To 
        assist states in investigating terrorist crimes 
        involving motor vehicles, we have, in international 
        conferences, pressed for a strengthened international 
        regime of vehicle identification numbers.
  --To improve the safety of air travelers, we have worked with 
        others in the International Civil Aviation Organization 
        (ICAO) Council to gain adoption of higher security 
        standards, including for explosive detection and 
        associated equipment; ICAO members signaled their 
        intention to seek Council approval of agreed airport 
        security standards and of more consistent and uniform 
        implementation of these standards.
  --To prevent terrorists from abusing legitimate rights of 
        asylum, enshrined in international law, we initiated a 
        United Nations General Assembly Declaration serving 
        this purpose.
  --To counter, inter alia, the use of strong encryption by 
        terrorists, we have endorsed acceleration of 
        consultations and adoption of the OECD guidelines for 
        cryptography policy and invited all states to develop 
        national policies on encryption, including key 
        management, which may allow, consistent with these 
        guidelines, lawful government access to prevent and 
        investigate acts of terrorism and to find a mechanism 
        to cooperate internationally in implementing such 
        policies.
  --To improve the exchange of counterterrorism information, 
        the United Kingdom initiated a Directory of 
        Counterterrorism Competencies among the Eight; and the 
        United States offered to share its counterterrorism 
        forensic data bases through bilateral arrangements with 
        members of the Eight.
  --To prevent terrorist access to biological and toxin 
        weapons, the participants of the Fourth Review 
        Conference of the Bacteriological (Biological) and 
        Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), at the urging of our 
        governments, recognized the need to ensure, through the 
        review and/or adoption of national measures, the 
        effective fulfillment of their obligations under the 
        Convention in order, inter alia, to exclude the use of 
        biological and toxin weapons for terrorist or criminal 
        activity.
  --To promote further cooperation, our governments will 
        compare their domestic legislation related to terrorist 
        fund-raising, and ensure strong domestic laws and 
        controls over the manufacture, trading and transport of 
        explosives.
    27. We will continue these efforts in the coming year and 
extend our counterterrorist cooperation to other critical 
spheres.
    28. To protect our electronic and computer systems from 
disruption by terrorist attacks, we will share information and 
methodologies to prevent such attacks and to prevent the use of 
computer networks for terrorist and criminal purposes.
    29. To address the continuing danger from acts of terror 
using high explosives and other sophisticated technologies, and 
from potential use by terrorists of materials of mass 
destruction, our experts will intensify the exchange of 
information in research and development of counterterrorism 
technologies.
    30. Because of terrorist and other threats to the security 
of major international events, we will share information and 
experiences in providing security for such events. The U.S. 
will hold a conference of experts on this subject in Honolulu 
in September 1997, in order to exchange information on the most 
effective security practices for major international special 
events.
    31. To heighten vigilance against acts of terror directed 
at maritime vessels and their passengers, our governments will 
encourage the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to 
strengthen maritime security measures and to improve the 
awareness and implementation of IMO standards.
    32. In response to a growing international desire for 
closer cooperation, we will strengthen and expand international 
cooperation and consultation and reach out bilaterally and 
multilaterally, on counterterrorism issues. In this regard we 
welcomed the initiative by Japan to convene a Seminar on 
Counterterrorism for the Asia and Pacific Region in December, 
1996.

          b. Lyon Summit: Meeting of the G-7 Member Countries

(1) Paris Ministerial Conference on Terrorism: Agreement on 25 Measures

Text of agreement released at the Ministerial Conference on Terrorism, 
                   Paris, France, July 30, 1996. \1\

    The participants at the Lyon Summit voiced their 
determination to give absolute priority to the fight against 
terrorism. They decided to examine and implement, in 
cooperation with all States, all measures likely to strengthen 
the capacity of the international community to defeat 
terrorism. To that end, they called for a meeting of their 
Foreign Ministers and their Ministers responsible for security 
to be held without delay to recommend further actions.
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    In line with this decision, we met in Paris on July 30, 
1996.
    We undertook a thorough review of new trends in terrorism 
throughout the world. We noted with deep concern the use in 
1996 of powerful explosive weapons by terrorists. We reiterate 
our fundamental view that there can be no excuse for terrorism. 
Our discussions underscored our agreement on the need to find 
solutions that take account of all the factors likely to ensure 
a lasting settlement of unresolved conflicts and on the need 
for attending to conditions which could nurture the development 
of terrorism.
    We noted that there is a growing commitment within the 
international community to condemn terrorism in whatever shape 
or form, regardless of its motives; to make no concessions to 
terrorists; and to implement means, consistent with fundamental 
freedoms and the rule of law, to effectively fight terrorism. 
We are determined to work with all States, in order to achieve 
the goal of eliminating terrorism, as affirmed in the 
Declaration adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 
December 1994. To this end, we have, with the course laid down 
in our Ottawa Declaration of December 12, 1995 and the work 
that followed the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit, framed a body of 
practical measures which we are resolved to implement among 
ourselves.
    We also invite all States to adopt these measures so as to 
impart greater efficiency and coherence to the fight against 
terrorism. In order to harness our own capacities more tightly 
we decided to establish among our countries a directory of 
counter-terrorism competences, skills and expertise to 
facilitate practical cooperation.

           I. Adopting Internal Measures To Prevent Terrorism

        improving counter-terrorism cooperation and capabilities

    We call on all States to:
    1. Strengthen internal cooperation among all government 
agencies and services concerned with different aspects of 
counter-terrorism.
    2. Expand training of personnel connected with counter-
terrorism to prevent all forms of terrorist action, including 
those utilizing radioactive, chemical, biological or toxic 
substances.
    3. In line with the efforts carried out in the fields of 
air and maritime transportation and in view of widespread 
terrorist attacks on modes of mass ground transportation, such 
as railway, underground and bus transport systems, we recommend 
that transportation security officials of interested States 
urgently intensify consultations to improve the capability of 
governments to prevent, investigate, and respond to terrorist 
attacks on means of public transportation, and to cooperate 
with other governments in this respect. These consultations 
should include standardization of passenger and cargo manifests 
and adoption of standard means of identifying vehicles to aid 
investigations of terrorist bombings.
    4. Accelerate research and development of methods of 
detection of explosives and other harmful substances that can 
cause death or injury, and undertake consultations on the 
development of standards for marking explosives in order to 
identify their origin in post-blast investigations, and promote 
cooperation where appropriate.

          deterrence, prosecution and punishment of terrorists

    We call on all States to:
    5. When sufficient justification exists according to 
national laws, investigate the use of organizations, groups or 
associations, including those with charitable, social, or 
cultural goals, by terrorists using them as cover for their own 
activities.
    6. Note the risk of terrorists using electronic or wire 
communications systems and networks to carry out criminal acts 
and the need to find means, consistent with national law, to 
prevent such criminality.
    7. Adopt effective domestic laws and regulations including 
export controls to govern manufacture, trading, transport, and 
export of firearms, explosives, or any device designed to cause 
violent injury, damage, or destruction in order to prevent 
their use for terrorists' acts.
    8. Take steps within their power to immediately review and 
amend as necessary their domestic anti-terrorist legislation to 
ensure, inter alia, that terrorists' acts are established as 
serious criminal offenses and that the seriousness of 
terrorists' acts is duly reflected in the sentence served.
    9. Bring to justice any person accused of participation in 
the planning, preparation, or perpetration of terrorist acts or 
participation in supporting terrorist acts.
    10. Refrain from providing any form of support, whether 
active or passive, to organizations or persons involved in 
terrorist activity.
    11. Accelerate consultations, in appropriate bilateral or 
multilateral fora, on the use of encryption that allows, when 
necessary, lawful government access to data and communications 
in order to, inter alia, prevent or investigate acts of 
terrorism, while protecting the privacy of legitimate 
communications.

                  asylum, borders and travel documents

    We call on all States to:
    12. Take strong measures to prevent the movement of 
terrorist individuals or groups by strengthening border 
controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel 
documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting, 
forgery, or use of false papers.
    13. While recognizing that political asylum and the 
admission of refugees are legitimate rights enshrined in 
international law, make sure that such a right should not be 
taken advantage of for terrorist purposes and seek additional 
international means to address the subject of refugees and 
asylum seekers who plan, fund, or commit terrorist acts.

     II. Strengthening International Cooperation To Fight Terrorism

        expanding international treaties and other arrangements

    We call on all States to:
    14. Join international conventions and protocols designed 
to combat terrorism by the year 2000; enact domestic 
legislation necessary to implement them; affirm or extend the 
competence of their courts to bring to trial the authors of 
terrorist acts; and if needed, provide support and assistance 
to other governments for their purposes.
    15. Develop, if necessary, especially by entering into 
bilateral and multilateral agreements and arrangements, mutual 
legal assistance procedures aimed at facilitating and speeding 
investigations and collecting evidence, as well as cooperation 
between law enforcement agencies in order to prevent and detect 
terrorist acts.
    In cases where a terrorist activity occurs in several 
countries, States with jurisdiction should coordinate their 
prosecutions and the use of mutual assistance measures in a 
strategic manner so as to be more effective in the fight 
against terrorist groups.
    16. Develop extradition agreements and arrangements, as 
necessary, in order to ensure that those responsible for 
terrorists acts are brought to justice; and consider the 
possibility of extradition even in the absence of a treaty.
    17. Promote the consideration and development of an 
international convention on terrorist bombings or other 
terrorist acts creating collective danger for persons, to the 
extent that the existing multilateral counter-terrorism 
conventions do not provide for cooperation in these areas. 
Examine, also, the necessity and feasibility of supplementing 
existing international instruments and arrangements to address 
other terrorist threats and adopt new instruments as needed. 
Accelerate in the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) consultations to establish uniform and strict 
international standards for bomb detection and the ongoing 
consultations to elaborate and adopt additional heightened 
security measures at airports, and urge early implementation of 
screening procedures and all other ICAO standards already 
agreed upon.
    18. We recommend to States Parties to the Biological 
Weapons Convention that they confirm at the forthcoming Review 
Conference their commitment to ensure, through adoption of 
national measures, the effective fulfillment of their 
obligations under the convention to take any necessary measures 
to prohibit and prevent the development, production, 
stockpiling, acquisition or retention of such weapons within 
their territory, under their jurisdiction or under their 
control anywhere, in order, inter alia, to exclude use of those 
weapons for terrorist purposes.

                         terrorist fund raising

    We call on all States to:
    19. Prevent and take steps to counteract, through 
appropriate domestic measures, the financing of terrorists and 
terrorist organizations, whether such financing is direct or 
indirect through organizations which also have, or claim to 
have charitable, social or cultural goals, or which are also 
engaged in unlawful activities such as illicit arms 
trafficking, drug dealing, and racketeering. These domestic 
measures may include, where appropriate, monitoring and control 
of cash transfers and bank disclosure procedures.
    20. Intensify information exchange concerning international 
movements of funds sent from one country or received in another 
country and intended for persons, associations, or groups 
likely to carry out or support terrorist operations.
    21. Consider, where appropriate, adopting regulatory 
measures in order to prevent movements of funds suspected to be 
intended for terrorist organizations, without impeding in any 
way the freedom of legitimate capital movements.

              improving information exchange on terrorism

    We call on all States to:
    22. Facilitate exchange of information and the transmission 
of legal requests through establishing central authorities so 
organized as to provide speedy coordination of requests, it 
being understood that those central authorities would not be 
the sole channel for mutual assistance among states. Direct 
exchange of information among competent agencies should be 
encouraged.
    23. Intensify exchange of basic information concerning 
persons or organizations suspected of terrorist-linked 
activities, in particular on their structure, their ``modus 
operandi'' and their communications systems in order to prevent 
terrorist actions.
    24. Intensify exchange of operation information, especially 
as regards:

   the actions and movements of persons or groups 
        suspected of belonging to or being connected with 
        terrorist networks.
   travel documents suspected of being forgeries or 
        falsified.
   traffic in arms, explosives, or sensitive materials.
   the use of communications technologies by terrorist 
        groups.
   the threat of new type of terrorist activities 
        including those using chemical, biological, or nuclear 
        materials and toxic substances.
    25. Find ways of accelerating these exchanges of 
information and making them more direct, while at the same time 
preserving their confidentiality in conformity with the laws 
and regulations of the State supplying the information.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    We commit ourselves to ensure implementation of these 
measures without delay. To this end, we call upon our 
appropriate experts to hold the necessary meetings very 
rapidly.
    We ask our experts on terrorism to meet before the end of 
the year to assess the progress of the work undertaken to 
implement these measures.

                    (2) G-7 Declaration on Terrorism

  Released at the G-7 Economic Summit, Lyon, France, June 27, 1996 \1\

    In the aftermath of the cowardly attack in Dhahran, which 
took the lives of a large number of American citizens and 
injured hundreds of innocent people, we, the member countries 
of the G-7, condemn this barbarous and unjustifiable act and 
express our wholehearted solidarity with the United States and 
Saudi Arabia in their terrible ordeal. We pay tribute to the 
memory of the victims and convey our deepest sympathy to their 
families, as well as to the American and Saudi peoples. We also 
condemn other recent terrorist outrages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Source: Released at the Lyon Summit, 27 June 1996 and provided 
by the University of Toronto Library. (http://utl.1library.utoronto.ca/
disk1/www/documents/g7/96terror.htm)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These tragedies strengthen us in our conviction that 
terrorism is a major challenge to all our societies and states 
today. We reaffirm our absolute condemnation of terrorism in 
all its forms and manifestations, regardless of its 
perpetrators or motives. Terrorism is a heinous crime, and 
there must be no excuse or exception in bringing its 
perpetrators to justice.
    We proclaim our common resolve to unite our efforts and our 
determination to fight terrorism by all legal means. In keeping 
with the guidelines for action adopted by the Eight in Ottawa, 
we strongly urge all states to deny all support to terrorists. 
We rededicate ourselves and invite others to associate with our 
efforts in order to thwart the activities of terrorists and 
their supporters, including fund-raising, the planning of 
terrorist acts, procurement of weapons, calling for violence, 
and incitements to commit terrorist acts. Special attention 
should be paid to the threat of utilization of nuclear, 
biological, and chemical materials, as well as toxic 
substances, for terrorist purposes.
    We consider the fight against terrorism to be our absolute 
priority, and reiterate the necessity for all states to adhere 
to the relevant international conventions. When implemented, 
many of the recommendations the Eight will be considering 
tomorrow to deal with crime will better equip our law 
enforcement authorities to work together to combat terrorism. 
And we are resolved to do more: to examine and implement, in 
cooperation with all states, all measures liable to strengthen 
the capacity of the international community to defeat 
terrorism. To that end, we have decided that a ministerial 
meeting to consider and recommend further actions will be held 
in Paris, as early as the month of July.

c. Ottawa Ministerial Declaration on Countering Terrorism December 12, 
                                1995 \1\

                                Preamble

    1. We met in Ottawa on December 12, as agreed upon at the 
Halifax Summit in June 1995 by the Heads of State and 
Government of the seven most industrialized nations and Russia, 
to discuss specific, cooperative measures to deter, prevent and 
investigate terrorist acts. We fulfilled our mandate and are 
united in our determination to work together with the entire 
international community to combat terrorism in all its forms.
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    \1\ Source: http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/ottawa--
declaration.html
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                            G-7/P-8 History

    2. Since 1978, the G-7 partners have worked together to 
counter terrorism. Their cooperation has been instrumental in 
obtaining agreements in many fora on issues such as 
transportation security and the exchange of information. There 
has also been extensive work by the G-7, over the course of the 
last two decades on ensuring that loopholes in national 
legislation are closed, and that countries act in concert in 
denying arms and free movement to terrorists. These efforts 
have shown leadership to the international community as a 
whole. Russia's experience and participation is of great 
assistance in supporting the efforts of Summit partners in 
combating terrorism.

                        Review of Recent Trends

    3. We began by exchanging views on recent major terrorist 
events including the Tokyo subway attacks, the bombing in 
Oklahoma City, the hostage taking in Budennovsk, major 
terrorist attacks against the Middle East peace process 
(including the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin), the persistent 
attacks by the ETA, the bombing campaign in France, and the 
bombings in Riyadh and Islamabad. These and other events point 
to a number of trends including an upsurge in domestic 
terrorism, an increase in hostage taking and indiscriminate 
violence by religious extremists and apocalyptic groups which 
practice terrorism, as well as continuing examples of attacks 
on tourists and the export regional conflicts. These 
developments have been accompanied by a continuing use of 
conventional weapons, in particular those designed for massive 
explosions, and by a new and worrying use of non-conventional, 
for example chemical, weapons. We call for political groups to 
use dialogue, exercise tolerance and repudiate the use of 
terrorism. We offer dialogue to those who reject violence and 
respect the law. Those who attempt to achieve their aims 
through violence will, however, meet with our strongest resolve 
and be held accountable for their criminal acts.

                   Improved International Cooperation

    4. We are determined to work together in the international 
community, with international organizations, institutions and 
other fora to fight terrorism. We will work in all 
organizations of the UN family, the General Assembly and all 
other appropriate fora to identify and adopt practical measures 
to fight terrorism, including where necessary legal 
instruments. We will work bilaterally and multilaterally, 
taking full advantage of such organizations as Interpol, to 
improve measures against terrorism. We will propose and support 
information sharing with and among members of other regional 
organizations. We welcome, for example, the efforts made in the 
context of the recent sub-regional meeting in Buenos Aires, and 
the prospects for the OAS Ministerial meetings on terrorism.

               International and Domestic Legal Framework

    5. We call on all states to strive to become party to the 
existing international conventions concerned with countering 
terrorism and urgently bring their domestic legislation into 
harmony with those conventions by the year 2000. It is our view 
that strong laws, effectively enforced, continue to be a 
convincing deterrent in combating terrorism. We call upon all 
States that assist terrorists to renounce terrorism and to deny 
financial support. All perpetrators of terrorist acts must be 
brought to swift justice. Stronger law enforcement cooperation 
and mutual legal assistant are among the measures best suited 
to deter and prevent international terrorist acts and punish 
terrorists. We have decided to have our experts continue to 
explore new ways of enhancing the current international legal 
regime, in particular to address new forms of terrorism. To 
avoid terrorists escaping punishment we call on all States to 
strengthen their domestic, bilateral or international 
extradition arrangements and to consider adoption of additional 
instruments.

    Exchange of Expertise and Information to Prevent Terrorist Acts

    6. One of the more effective tools we have to counter 
terrorism is sharing information among ourselves and with 
others. Terrorists operate secretively. Intelligence concerning 
terrorists, their movements, their support and their weapons 
are essential for countering their activities and enforcing 
laws against terrorism. Increasing the sharing of expertise, 
information, and intelligence between our countries and among 
the international community, is essential for countering 
terrorism. With an aim to preventing terrorist acts we propose 
to:

   share our technical knowledge, intelligence, 
        forecasts of threats and activities and information on 
        different tactics and methods, means, of terrorists 
        through closer bilateral and other forms of co-
        operation among police and security agencies and other 
        relevant authorities;
   share more widely information, including consular 
        travel advisories, on countries where there is a threat 
        to our citizens abroad;
   share expertise on the protection of public 
        buildings and facilities;
   share information on fanatical and apocalyptic 
        terrorist groups;
   increase counter-terrorism training and assistance;
   improve procedures for the tracing and tracking of 
        suspected terrorists; and
   enhance information sharing on major terrorist 
        incidents in a timely fashion.

                           Taking of Hostages

    7. We noted the sinister increase in the taking of hostages 
by terrorists and other criminals. We call on all states that 
have not already done so to adhere to the 1979 International 
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages. We call on all 
States to condemn the practice of hostage-taking; to refuse to 
make substantive concessions to hostage-takers; to work for the 
safety of those taken hostage; to deny to hostage takers any 
benefits from their criminal acts; to work tirelessly together 
to resolve ongoing hostage cases, and to bring to justice those 
responsible.

           New Threats Related to Weapons of Mass Destruction

    8. We intend to strengthen measures to prevent the use of 
weapons designed to induce high casualty rates and encourage 
others to do likewise. We also noted with deep concern the 
chemical gas attacks on the Tokyo subway system which caused 
deaths and widespread injury. We urge all Governments to take 
the strongest measures to prevent toxic chemicals and 
biological agents from getting into the hands of terrorists and 
to adopt appropriate national legislation and controls in line 
with the Chemical Weapons and Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Conventions. We invite countries who have already taken such 
measures to share their expertise with those who wish to take 
such measures. We have agreed to exchange information among 
ourselves and with others. We will implement measures to deter 
and respond to chemical and biological terrorist threats and 
incidents and to investigate and prevent the illicit 
production, trafficking, possession and use of such substances. 
We encourage other governments to join in this effort. We ask 
our experts in this area to meet and further pursue development 
of these measures. We have asked the experts concerned with the 
preparation of the Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security 
to be held in spring of 1996 to also consider measures, taking 
into account the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Materiel, to prevent nuclear materiel falling into the 
hands of terrorists.

                 Preventing the Movement of Terrorists

    9. Effective entry controls, assisted by new and emerging 
technologies, will help prevent the spread of terrorism. We, 
therefore, propose to cooperate further in the development of 
travel documents which are more difficult to falsify and to 
increase joint training and information sharing among 
ourselves, and with others, on fraudulent travel document 
detection and immigration control. In this regard we recognized 
the importance of the ICAO standards being adopted and urge all 
countries to implement them. We also call on all States to 
enforce sanctions against the use of false and fraudulent 
documents. Within the framework of international law and in our 
own jurisdictions we will deny entry to all those, including 
diplomats, who, on the basis of available information, are 
involved in terrorist activities and thereby pose a threat to 
national security.

                        Transportation Security

    10. We have agreed to work together and with others to 
continue to improve security of all forms of transportation 
around the world. To date there are seven international 
conventions and treaties related to transportation security 
which have had a marked impact on maritime and aviation 
security. We encourage the current work of the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) to develop common standards for 
security procedures to boost security in the aviation and 
maritime fields. Their resolutions must be implemented by the 
entire international community with an aim of fighting 
international mechanisms in the fight against terrorism.

                           Public Facilities

    11. Terrorists take advantage of the openness and 
vulnerability of public facilities, particularly in free 
societies. As anti-terrorist measures have become more 
successful, terrorists are looking to new targets of 
opportunity in their attacks. In order to reduce the risks to 
our citizens, we pledge to cooperate further and to share 
information and experiences concerning the protection and 
securing of possible targets such as transport systems, 
information systems, public utilities, and public buildings 
including diplomatic premises.

                           Terrorism Funding

    12. We have agreed to pursue measures aimed at depriving 
terrorists of their sources of finance. We encourage all States 
to take action in cooperation with other States, to prevent 
terrorists from raising funds that in any way support terrorist 
activities and explore the means of tracking and freezing 
assets used by terrorist groups.

                  Conclusion and Guidelines for Action

    13. We are determined as a group to continue to provide 
leadership on this issue to the international community, using 
bilateral and multilateral measures and agreements to counter 
terrorism. We will continue to develop specific, cooperative 
measures to deter, prevent, and investigate terrorist acts and 
to bring terrorist to justice. We will take action to implement 
the guidelines set forth in this declaration and summarized as 
follows:

   calling on all states to strive to join existing 
        international treaties on terrorism by the year 2000;
   promoting mutual legal assistance and extradition;
   strengthening the sharing of intelligence and 
        information on terrorism;
   pursuing measures to prevent terrorist use of 
        nuclear, chemical and biological materials;
   urging all States to refuse to make substantive 
        concessions to hostage takers and to ensure those 
        responsible are brought to justice;
   inhibiting the movement of terrorists and enhancing 
        measures to prevent the falsification of documents;
   strengthening protection of aviation, maritime and 
        other transportation systems against terrorism;
   countering terrorist attacks against public 
        facilities and infrastructures; depriving terrorists of 
        funds; and
   increasing counter-terrorism training and 
        assistance.

          d. Halifax: Chairman's Statement, June 17, 1995 \1\

  Partial text of statement issued at Halifax, Nova Scotia, June 17, 
                                 1995.

    1. In this 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World 
War and the birth of the United Nations, we discussed in a 
spirit of cooperation political issues of global importance. 
Noting with satisfaction what has been achieved through 
reconciliation and cooperation, we confirmed our desire to work 
together ever more closely in finding solutions.
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    \1\ Source: U.S. Department of State: G-7 Economic Summit Page 
(http://www.state.gov/www/issues/economic/chairman.html).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 Commitment to Multilateral Engagement

    2. We reaffirm our commitment to the UN, whose Charter lays 
down the fundamental principles for an international order 
based on peace and security, sustainable development, and 
respect for human rights. We support measures to strengthen the 
UN, which is called upon to play an ever more important role in 
the post Cold War period, and will work with other Member 
States to build, through concrete reforms of the institutions, 
a more effective and efficient organization to meet the 
challenges of the next half-century. We call upon Member States 
to meet their financial obligations and urge early agreement on 
reform of the system of assessment.
    3. The United Nations must be able to act more quickly and 
effectively to address threats to international peace and 
security. We, for our part, are determined to coordinate more 
closely our individual efforts to assist in the prevention, 
management and resolution of conflicts. A high priority should 
be placed on the early warning of crises, political mediation 
and, in accordance with realistic mandates, the rapid 
deployment of UN civilian and military personnel, including 
peacekeepers, to areas of conflict. We encourage further 
efforts to improve operational planning and procedures for 
peacekeeping missions as well as to modernize command and 
control equipment, logistical arrangements and facilities. We 
also stress the need for measures to ensure the security of UN 
personnel, including the early entry into force of the 
recently-adopted UN Convention for the Safety of United Nations 
and Associated Personnel. We welcome the growing role of 
regional organizations and arrangements in building stability 
and security, in the prevention and management of conflicts, 
and we attach special importance to reinforcing cooperation 
between such organizations and the United Nations.

                      Arms Control and Disarmament

    4. We welcome the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty and the commitment of States party to the 
universalisation of the Treaty as well as their decisions to 
strengthen the review process and adopt a set of principles and 
objectives for non-proliferation and disarmament. The entry 
into force of START I is a major landmark in the process of 
nuclear arms control, which was greatly helped by the decision 
of Ukraine to accede to the NPT. We now look forward to the 
early ratification of START II. We support the safe and secure 
dismantlement of the nuclear weapons eliminated under START I 
and we welcome the work of the United States and Russia on 
measures that the fissile material from these weapons is 
rendered unusable for weapons purposes. The disposal of 
weapons-grade plutonium deserves particular attention and we 
encourage its further study.
    5. We are encouraged by the growing international 
recognition of the need to complete without delay universal, 
comprehensive and verifiable treaties to ban nuclear weapons 
tests and to cut off the production of fissile material for 
nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. 
Recognizing the continuing dangers posed worldwide by criminal 
diversion and illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, and 
drawing on the decisions taken in Naples and the practical work 
undertaken by our experts since then, we resolve to work 
together to strengthen systems of control, accounting and 
physical security for nuclear materials; to expand our 
cooperation in the area of customs, law enforcement and 
intelligence and to strengthen through venues such as the IAEA 
and INTERPOL the international community's ability to combat 
nuclear theft and smuggling. We emphasize the importance of 
bringing the Chemical Weapons Convention into force at the 
earliest possible date, and call for rapid progress in 
developing verification systems for the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention.
    6. The excessive transfer of conventional arms, in 
particular to areas of conflict, is one of our main 
preoccupations. We are appalled by the continuing injuries to 
civilians caused by anti-personnel landmines. We urge States to 
become party to the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention and to 
participate in its review conference this fall in an effort to 
strengthen multilateral controls over anti-personnel landmines. 
We urge all countries to support full implementation of the UN 
Register of Conventional Arms, and note that Article 26 of the 
UN Charter calls for ``the least diversion for armaments of the 
world's human and economic resources''. Regional organizations 
can help promote transparency and confidence-building measures 
that reduce excessive stockpiling of conventional weapons. We 
shall work with others for effective and responsible export 
controls on arms and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies.

Promoting New Approaches

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    9. We restate our resolve to defeat all forms of terrorism. 
Following recent outrages, we agree to share more intensively 
our experiences of, and lessons learned from, major terrorist 
incidents, and to strengthen our cooperation in all areas of 
counter-terrorism, including research and technology. We call 
upon all States that assist terrorists to renounce terrorism 
and to deny financial support, the use of their territory or 
any other means of support to terrorist organizations. We 
attach particular importance to measures to impede the ability 
of terrorist organizations to raise funds, and urge other 
governments to strenuously enforce laws against terrorist 
activity and join existing treaties and conventions against 
terrorism. In pursuit of these shared aims, we charge our 
terrorism experts group to report to a ministerial level 
meeting on specific, cooperative measures to deter, prevent, 
and investigate terrorists acts. These sessions should be held 
prior to our next meeting.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Middle East and Africa

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    19. We call upon the Government of Iran to participate 
constructively in regional and world affairs, and to desist 
from supporting radical groups that seek to destroy the Middle 
East Peace Process and destabilize the region. We also call on 
the Iranian Government to reject terrorism and, in particular, 
to withdraw its support from the continuing threats to the life 
of Mr. Salman Rushdie and others associated with his work. We 
call on all States to avoid any collaboration with Iran which 
might contribute to the acquisition of a nuclear weapons 
capability.
    20. We reiterate our resolve to enforce full implementation 
of each and every relevant UN Security Council resolution 
concerning Iraq and Libya until they are complied with, and 
recall that such implementation would entail the reassessment 
of sanctions. We urge Iraq to reconsider its rejection of UN 
Security Council Resolution 986 which would permit the sale of 
oil and purchase of humanitarian goods.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                                Americas

    29. We encourage implementation by the States of the 
Americas of the Miami Summit Plan of Action to strengthen 
democratic institutions, eliminate the threat of terrorism, 
eradicate poverty and discrimination, conserve their natural 
environment, and negotiate the Free Trade Area of the Americas. 
We support the Government of Mexico's bold steps towards 
political reform and dialogue. We commend the efforts of the 
Guarantor Group of the Rio Protocol to help Peru and Ecuador 
achieve a permanent peace between them. We support 
international cooperation in Haiti's economic and democratic 
development, and look forward to free and open legislative 
elections scheduled for June 25.
    Thank you.

      e. Naples: Chairman's Statement (excerpt), July 10, 1994 \1\



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
    4. We have welcomed the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of 
Principles and the signing of the Gaza-Jericho agreement as a 
first step in its implementation. We recognize the need to 
speed up the delivery of assistance and create the 
circumstances for a real improvement of living conditions. 
Progress on the other bilateral tracks and in the multilateral 
negotiations is now essential in order to achieve a lasting and 
comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute and a 
wider process of peace and cooperation in the whole Middle 
East/ Mediterranean region. We call upon the League of Arab 
States to end their boycott of Israel. We support the efforts 
of reconstruction of a prosperous and independent Lebanon.
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    \1\ Source: University of Toronto Library and the G8 Research Group 
Web site at http://www.library.utoronto.ca/g7/summit/1994naples/
chairman.html
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    We reiterate our resolve to enforce full implementation of 
each and every relevant UN Security Council resolution 
concerning Iraq and Libya until they are complied with, and 
recall that such implementation would entail the reassessment 
of sanctions.
    We call upon the government of Iran to participate 
constructively in international efforts for peace and stability 
and to modify its behavior contrary to these objectives, inter 
alia with regard to terrorism.
    We support the Algerian government's decision to move 
forward on economic reforms, which must be pursued with 
determination, while urging Algerian centsleaders to continue a 
political dialogue with all elements of Algerian society 
rejecting violence and terrorism. We condemn the recent 
massacre of Italian sailors and other victims, and express our 
condolences to their families.
    We call upon the government of the Republic of Yemen to 
resolve political differences within the country through 
dialogue and by peaceful means, and to ensure that the 
humanitarian situation, particularly in and around Aden, is 
addressed. International obligations, including sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, should be respected.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    10. We condemn terrorism in all its forms, especially when 
state-sponsored, and reaffirm our resolve to cooperate in 
combating it with determination. We call upon all countries 
involved to renounce support for terrorism, including financial 
support, and to take effective action to deny the use of their 
territory to terrorist organization.
    We stress that all organized crime and narcotics 
trafficking are a threat to political as well as economic and 
social life, and we call for increased international 
cooperation. We have agreed that the proposed world ministerial 
conference to be held in October in Naples at the initiative of 
the Italian government will be a most important occasion to 
advance such cooperation.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


      f. Tokyo: Political Declaration (excerpt), July 8, 1993 \1\



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
    4. The protection of human rights is the obligation of all 
nations, as affirmed at the World Conference on Human Rights in 
Vienna. The increased number of refugees and displaced persons 
as well as the problems of uncontrolled migration and 
difficulties confronted by national minorities require urgent 
attention by the international community, and should be tackled 
taking account of their root causes. Terrorism, particularly 
when sponsored by states, poses a grave danger which we will 
oppose energetically.
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    \1\ Source: http://www.g8kyushu-okinawa.go.jp/e/past__summit/19/
e19__b.html.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      g. Munich: Chairman's Statement (excerpt), July 7, 1992 \1\

                               Terrorism

    We condemn terrorism in all its forms and reaffirm our 
resolve to cooperate in combatting it. We call upon all 
countries involved to renounce support for terrorism, including 
financial support, and to take effective action to deny the use 
of their territory to terrorist organizations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Source: http://www.g8kyushu-okinawa.go.jp/e/past__summit/18/
e18__d.html.
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    We denounce equally strongly the taking of hostages. We 
welcome the recent release of two hostages in Lebanon. We call 
again for the immediate and unconditional release of all 
hostages who may still be held and for an accounting for all 
persons taken hostage who may have died while being held.
    We underline the need for Libya to comply with [UN] 
Security Council Resolutions 731 and 748 promptly and fully. We 
call upon all countries to enforce rigorously the sanctions 
against Libya so that those responsible for the bombings of PA 
[Pan Am flight] 103 and UTA [flight] 772 may be brought to 
justice and Libya's support for terrorism is ended.
    We support the measures of the International Civil Aviation 
Organization aimed at increased security in Civil Aviation. We 
consider the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives 
for the Purposes of Detection to be a significant step towards 
this aim.

         h. Houston: Statement on Terrorism, July 10, 1990 \1\

  Houston Economic Summit Statement on Transnational Issues, July 10, 
                                  1990

                               Terrorism

    We, the Heads of State or Government, reaffirm our 
condemnation of terrorism in all its forms, our commitment to 
make no concessions to terrorists or their sponsors, and our 
resolve to continue to cooperate in efforts to combat 
terrorism. We demand that those governments which provide 
support to terrorists end such support immediately. We are 
determined not to allow terrorists to remain unpunished, but to 
see them brought to justice in accordance with international 
law and national legislation.
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    \1\ Source: http://www.g8kyushu-okinawa.go.jp/e/past__summit/16/
e16__c.html.
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    We welcome the recent release of several hostages, but 
remain deeply concerned that hostages are still being held, 
some for more than five years. Their ordeal and that of their 
families must end. We call for the immediate, unconditional and 
safe release of all hostages and for an accounting of all 
persons taken hostage who may have died while being held. We 
call on those with influence over hostage-takers to use their 
influence to this end.
    We note with deep concern the continuing threat presented 
to civil aviation by terrorist groups, as demonstrated by such 
outrages as the sabotage of civil aircraft over Lockerbie, 
Scotland on December 21, 1988, above Niger on September 19, 
1989, and over Colombia on November 27, 1989. We reiterate our 
determination to fight terrorists assaults against civil 
aviation.
    Accordingly, we will continue our cooperation to negotiate 
a convention requiring the introduction of additives into 
plastic explosives to aid in their detection. We pledge to work 
to strengthen international civil aviation security standards. 
Consistent with this objective, we note the importance of 
making available training and technical assistance to other 
nations. We support initiatives undertaken through the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) regarding this 
issue. We will work together with ICAO to expand such 
assistance.

   i. Toronto: Statement on International Terrorism June 20, 1988 \1\

     Toronto Economic Summit: Political Declaration, June 20, 1988

                               Terrorism



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
    11. We strongly reaffirm our condemnation of terrorism in 
all its forms, including the taking of hostages. We renew our 
commitment to policies and measures agreed at previous Summits, 
in particular those against state-sponsored terrorism.
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    \1\ From Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Monday, June 
27, 1988, Vol. 24, No. 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    12. We strongly condemn recent threats to air security, in 
particular the destruction of a Korean airliner and the 
hijacking of a Kuwaiti airliner. We recall the principle 
affirmed in previous declarations that terrorists must not go 
unpunished. We appeal to all countries who are not party to the 
international conventions on civil aviation security, in 
particular the Hague Convention, to accede to those 
conventions.
    13. We express support for work currently under way in the 
International Civil Aviation Organization aimed at 
strengthening international protection against hijackings. We 
welcome the most recent declaration adopted by the ICAO Council 
which endorses the principle that hijacked aircraft should not 
be allowed to take off once they have landed, except in 
circumstances as specified in the ICAO declaration.
    14. We welcome the adoption this year in Montreal and Rome 
of two international agreements on aviation and maritime 
security to enhance the safety of travellers.
    15. We affirm our determination to continue the fight 
against terrorism through the application of rule of law, the 
policy of no concessions to terrorists and their sponsors, and 
international cooperation.

          j. Venice: Statement on Terrorism, June 9, 1987 \1\

                               Terrorism

    We, the heads of state or government of seven major 
democracies and the representatives of the European Community 
assembled here in Venice, profoundly aware of our peoples' 
concern at the threat posed by terrorism:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ From ``Venice Statements on East-West Relations, Terrorism and 
the Persian Gulf'', New York Times, June 10, 1987.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Reaffirm our commitment to the statements on terrorism made 
at previous summits, in Bonn, Venice, Ottawa, London and Tokyo:
    Resolutely condemn all forms of terrorism, including 
aircraft hijackings and hostage-taking, and reiterate our 
belief that whatever its motives, terrorism has no 
justification;
    Confirm the commitment of each of us to the principle of 
making no concessions to terrorists or their sponsors;
    Remain resolved to apply, in respect of any state clearly 
involved in sponsoring or supporting international terrorism, 
effective measures within the framework of international law 
and in our own jurisdictions;
    Welcome the progress made in international cooperation 
against terrorism since we last met in Tokyo in May 1986, and 
in particular the initiative taken by France and Germany to 
convene in May in Paris a meeting of ministers of nine 
countries, who are responsible for counterterrorism;
    Reaffirm our determination to combat terrorism both through 
national measures and through international cooperation among 
ourselves and with others, when appropriate, and therefore 
renew our appeal to all like-minded countries to consolidate 
and extend international cooperation in all appropriate fora;
    Will continue our efforts to improve the safety of 
travelers. We welcome improvements in airport and maritime 
security, and encourage the work of I.C.A.O. and I.M.O. in this 
regard. Each of us will continue to monitor closely the 
activities of airlines which raise security problems. The heads 
of state or government have decided to measures, annexed to 
this statement, to make the 1978 Bonn Declaration more 
effective in dealing with all forms of terrorism affecting 
civil aviation;
    Commit ourselves to support the rule of law in bringing 
terrorists to justice. Each of us pledges increased cooperation 
in the relevant fora and within the framework of domestic and 
international law on the investigation, apprehension and 
prosecution of terrorists. In particular we reaffirm the 
principle established by relevant international conventions of 
trying or extraditing, according to national laws and those 
international conventions, those who have perpetrated acts of 
terrorism.

                                 Annex

    The heads of state and government recall that in their 
Tokyo statement on international terrorism they agreed to make 
the 1978 Bonn Declaration more effective in dealing with all 
forms of terrorism affecting civil aviation. To this end, in 
cases where a country refuses extradition or prosecution of 
those who have committed offenses described in the Montreal 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Civil Aviation and/or does not return the aircraft 
involved, the heads of state or government are 
jointly centsresolved that their Governments shall take 
immediate action to cease flights to that country as stated in 
the Bonn Declaration.
    At the same time, their governments will initiate action to 
halt incoming flights from that country or from any country the 
airlines of the country concerned as stated in the Bonn 
Declaration.
    The heads of state or government intend also to extend the 
Bonn Declaration in due time to cover any future relevant 
amendment to the above convention or any other aviation 
conventions relating to the extradition or prosecution of the 
offenders.
    The heads of state or government urge other governments to 
join them in this commitment.

    k. Tokyo: Statement on International Terrorism, May 5, 1986 \1\

                         Tokyo Economic Summit

           Statement on International Terrorism. May 5, 1986

    1. We, the Heads of State or Government of seven major 
democracies and the representatives of the European Community, 
assembled here in Tokyo, strongly reaffirm our condemnation of 
international terrorism in all its forms, of its accomplices 
and of those, including governments, who sponsor or support it. 
We abhor the increase in the level of such terrorism since our 
last meeting, and in particular its blatant and cynical use as 
an instrument of government policy. Terrorism has no 
justification. It spreads only by the use of contemptible 
means, ignoring the values of human life, freedom and dignity. 
It must be fought relentlessly and without compromise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ From Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Monday, May 
12, 1986, Vol. 22, No. 19.
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    2. Recognizing that the continuing fight against terrorism 
is a task which the international community as a whole has to 
undertake, we pledge ourselves to make maximum efforts to fight 
against that scourge. Terrorism must be fought effectively 
through determined, tenacious, discreet and patient action 
combining national measures with international cooperation. 
Therefore, we urge all like-minded nations to collaborate with 
us, particularly in such international fora as the United 
Nations, the International Civil Aviation Organization, drawing 
on their expertise to improve and extend countermeasures 
against terrorism and those who sponsor or support it.
    3. We, the Heads of State or Government, agree to intensify 
the exchange of information in relevant fora on threats and 
potential threats emanating from centsterrorist activities and 
those who sponsor or support them, and on ways to prevent them.
    4. We specify the following as measures open to any 
government concerned to deny to international terrorists the 
opportunity and the means to carry out their aims, and to 
identify and deter those who perpetrate such terrorism. We have 
decided to apply these measures within the framework of 
international law and in our own jurisdictions in respect of 
any state which is clearly involved in sponsoring or supporting 
international terrorism, and in particular of Libya, until such 
time as the state concerned abandons its complicity in, or 
support for, such terrorism. These measures are:

  --refusal to export arms to states which sponsor or support 
        terrorism;
  --strict limits on the size of the diplomatic and consular 
        missions and other official bodies abroad of states 
        which engage in such activities, control of travel of 
        members of such missions and bodies, and, where 
        appropriate, radical reductions in, or even the closure 
        of, such missions and bodies;
  --denial of entry to all persons, including diplomatic 
        personnel, who have been expelled or excluded from one 
        of our states on suspicion of involvement in 
        international terrorism or who have been convicted of 
        such a terrorist offence;
  --improved extradition procedures within due process of 
        domestic law for bringing to trial those who have 
        perpetrated such acts of terrorism;
  --stricter immigration and visa requirements and procedures 
        in respect of nationals of states which sponsor or 
        support terrorism;
  --the closest possible bilateral and multilateral cooperation 
        between police and security organizations and other 
        relevant authorities in the fight against terrorism.

    Each of us is committed to work in the appropriate 
international bodies to which we belong to ensure that similar 
measures are accepted and acted upon by as many other 
governments as possible.
    5. We will maintain close cooperation in furthering the 
objectives of this statement and in considering further 
measures. We agree to make the 1978 Bonn Declaration more 
effective in dealing with all forms of terrorism affecting 
civil aviation. We are ready to promote bilaterally and 
multilaterally further action to be taken in international 
organizations or fora competent to fight against international 
terrorism in any of its forms.

                          2. Other Conferences

    a. Summit of Peacemakers, Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, March 13, 1996

                    (1) Co-Chairmen's Statement \1\

    The Summit of Peacemakers has just concluded. This meeting 
took place at a time when the peace process confronts serious 
threats. The Summit had three fundamental objectives: to 
enhance the peace process, to promote security and to combat 
terror. Accordingly, the participants here today:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Source: U.S. Department of State.

  --Express their full support for the Middle East peace 
        process and their determination that this process 
        continue in order to accomplish a just, lasting and 
        comprehensive peace in the region;
  --Affirm their determination to promote security and 
        stability and to prevent the enemies of peace from 
        achieving their ultimate objective of destroying the 
        real opportunity for peace in the Middle East.
  --Reemphasize their strong condemnation of all acts of terror 
        in all its abhorrent forms, whatever its motivation, 
        and whoever its perpetrator, including recent terrorist 
        attacks in Israel, consider them alien to the moral and 
        spiritual values shared by all the peoples of the 
        region and reaffirm their intention to stand staunchly 
        against all such acts, and to urge all governments to 
        join them in this condemnation and opposition.

    To that end, we decided:
    a) To support the Israeli-Palestinian agreements, the 
continuation of the negotiating process and to politically and 
economically reinforce it to enhance the security situation for 
both, with special attention to the current and pressing 
economic needs of the Palestinians.
    b) To support continuation of the negotiating process in 
order to achieve a comprehensive settlement.
    c) To work together to promote security and stability in 
the region by developing effective and practical means of 
cooperation and further assistance.
    d) To promote coordination of efforts to stop acts of 
terror on bilateral, regional and international levels; 
ensuring instigators of such acts are brought to justice; 
supporting efforts by all parties to prevent their territories 
from being used for terrorist purposes; and preventing 
terrorist organizations from engaging in recruitment, supplying 
arms, or fund raising.
    e) To exert maximum efforts to identify and determine the 
sources of financing for these groups and to cooperate in 
cutting them off, and by providing training, equipment and 
other forms of support to those taking steps against groups 
using violence and terror to undermine peace, security or 
stability.
    f) To form a working group, open to all Summit 
participants, to prepare recommendations on how best to 
implement the decisions contained in this statement, through 
ongoing work and to report to the participants within thirty 
days.




President Bill Clinton               President Hosni Mubarak
United States of America             Arab Republic of Egypt
Co-Chairman                          Co-Chairman



                           (2) Communique \1\

    The Co-Chairmen's Statement of the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit 
of the Peacemakers called upon all participants to form a 
working group to prepare recommendations on how best to 
implement the decisions taken at the Summit. Regional and 
security experts representing all 29 Summit participants met in 
Washington, D.C. on March 28 and 29 to prepare those 
recommendations. In plenary sessions and sub-groups focused on 
counterterrorism cooperation, the experts considered specific 
and concrete steps they will take to respond to the call of the 
Sharm el-Sheikh parties. On April 22, the recommendations were 
delivered to the Sharm el-Sheikh participants at a ministerial-
level meeting hosted by the European Union in Luxembourg. In 
Luxembourg, the Sharm el-Sheikh parties unanimously re-
confirmed their strong support for the peace process and 
against those who would disrupt this process through violence 
and terrorism. The parties resolved to back this stance with a 
new level of commitment, cooperation, and effectiveness, as 
demonstrated by the following plan of action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Source: U.S. Department of State.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At Sharm el-Sheikh, the parties committed themselves to 
``support the Israeli-Palestinian agreements, the continuation 
of the negotiation process and to reinforce it politically and 
economically to enhance the security for both, with special 
attention to the current and pressing economic needs of the 
Palestinians.'' To this end, the Sharm el-Sheikh parties:

   welcomed steps to address the Palestinians' 
        difficult economic situation.
   supported the U.S. emergency economic plan steps to 
        provide for Palestinian economic needs.
   acknowledged the key role played by the April 12 
        special meeting in Brussels of the Ad Hoc Liaison 
        Committee.
   affirmed their commitment to help the Palestinians, 
        Israel and the donor community explore the economic 
        situation in the West Bank and Gaza, measures to 
        facilitate the movement of Palestinian imports and 
        exports, and the emergency employment program.
   acknowledged the advances made by the Palestinians 
        over the period since the DOP was signed in September 
        1993, in particular the Palestinian elections.
   recognized the contribution of the Sharm el-Sheikh 
        process to supporting the peace process and restoring 
        productive peace negotiations.
   committed themselves to help restore confidence and 
        establish the basis for practical political re-
        engagement and continuing respect for the Israeli-
        Palestinian agreements and their implementation.

    At Sharm el-Sheikh, the parties agreed to ``support 
continuation of the negotiating process in order to achieve a 
comprehensive settlement.'' To this end, the Sharm el-Sheikh 
parties:

   reaffirmed support for the negotiating process to 
        secure a comprehensive peace.
   recognized the importance both of continuing the 
        Israeli-Palestinian negotiating process and of 
        encouraging Syrian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli 
        negotiations.
   recognized the desirability of bringing Syria and 
        Lebanon into the Sharm el-Sheikh and multilateral 
        processes.

    At Sharm el-Sheikh, the parties agreed to ``work together 
to promote security and stability in the region by developing 
effective and practical means of cooperation and further 
assistance.'' To this end, the Sharm el-Sheikh parties:

   agreed that terrorism is a crime which cannot be 
        condoned or excused for political reasons and that this 
        policy is a strong deterrent to terrorism.
   agreed to increase exchanges of information and 
        analysis on security and terrorism issues, including 
        terrorist groups, threats, and movement of terrorists, 
        arms and explosives.
   committed to intensify consultations on 
        counterterrorism, through diplomatic, law enforcement, 
        and intelligence channels, and to develop procedures 
        for mutual legal assistance to facilitate the 
        collection of evidence.
   agreed on the need to increase assistance to the 
        Palestinian Authority to strengthen its 
        counterterrorism and law enforcement capabilities.
   agreed that concerned Sharm el-Sheikh parties would 
        consult on assistance to the Palestinian Authority, to 
        coordinate contributions, and to ensure that priority 
        needs are met.
   agreed that all possible means should be used to 
        enhance the counterterrorism capabilities of other 
        Sharm el-Sheikh parties, in such areas as 
        investigation, forensics, crisis management, analysis, 
        and information handling.
   agreed that Sharm el-Sheikh parties interested in 
        improving counterterrorism capabilities hold experts 
        consultations on training, assistance, resources and 
        capabilities, and to share information and broaden 
        contacts in this area.
   agreed on the importance of simulated exercises to 
        practice counterterrorism and crisis management.

    At Sharm el-Sheikh, the parties agreed ``to promote 
coordination of efforts to stop acts of terror in bilateral, 
regional and international levels; ensuring instigators of such 
acts are brought to justice; supporting efforts by all parties 
to prevent their territories from being used for terrorist 
purposes; and preventing terrorist organizations from engaging 
in recruitment, supplying arms, or fundraising.'' To this end, 
the Sharm el-Sheikh parties:

   agreed that all states should adhere to and 
        implement international conventions relating to 
        terrorism, incorporate into domestic laws the crimes 
        defined in those conventions, and establish the 
        competence of the courts to judge such crimes.
   agreed to intensify prosecution, extradition, or 
        rendition of terrorists in order to deny them safe 
        haven, and to expand negotiation of bilateral 
        extradition agreements.
   agreed that concerned Sharm el-Sheikh parties and 
        other interested states should study the need for a new 
        international legal instrument to prevent terrorists 
        from abusing the rights of asylum of refugee status.
   agreed that concerned parties would hold 
        consultations to share information, methodologies, and 
        technical data on the control and security of 
        documents.
   emphasized the importance of programs to educate 
        personnel involved in transportation and the control of 
        borders.

    At Sharm el-Sheikh, the parties agreed to ``exert maximum 
efforts to identify and determine the sources of financing for 
those groups and to cooperate in cutting them off, and by 
providing training, equipment and other forms of support to 
those taking steps against groups using violence and terror to 
undermine peace, security or stability.'' To this end, the 
Sharm el-Sheikh parties:

   agreed that greater efforts are needed to stop 
        terrorist fundraising, to educate their publics, and to 
        prevent the misuse of charitable fundraising.
   agreed to continue discussions on this important 
        issue, bilaterally and multilaterally.

    We support continued holding of international meetings 
whether in the multilaterals or the economic summit process, or 
among parties to the Sharm el-Sheikh process, which all provide 
valuable reinforcement for the peace process and for the 
community of states and organizations represented here to 
demonstrate our ongoing support for the core parties and the 
bilateral negotiation process.

 b. Baguio Communique, Baguio City, Philippines, February 21, 1996 \1\

                           Baguio Communique

    Representatives of nineteen States from different parts of 
the world came together on 18-21 February 1996 at Baguio City, 
Philippines, to enhance international cooperation against all 
forms of terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Source: U.S. Department of State.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After intensive discussions, the delegates expressed their 
collective commitment to combat terrorism taking into 
consideration the following fundamental principles:

  --Terrorist acts are crimes and all legally available means 
        should be used to counter them;
  --Combating terrorism requires cooperative efforts;
  --There must be no sanctuary for terrorists;
  --There must be no compromise in the fight against terrorism;
  --Counter-terrorism measures must be in accordance with the 
        relevant provisions of international law and 
        international standards of human rights, and
  --Countries that have not yet acceded to treaties and 
        conventions on terrorism are urged to do so as a matter 
        of highest priority.

    The delegates shared the view that there is an urgent need 
to promote the following:

  --the strengthening of multilateral and bilateral cooperation 
        on coordination of policy and action against terrorism;
  --the enhancement of international cooperation and 
        coordination in law enforcement, intelligence sharing, 
        and in preventing the illicit traffic in and use of 
        explosives, weapons, and nuclear, chemical and 
        biological materials;
  --the enhancement of mechanisms for effective immigration 
        control and protection of the integrity of travel 
        documents;
  --development of international means of intelligence exchange 
        to facilitate the flow of critical information, in 
        particular, on terrorists and terrorist organizations, 
        their movement and funding, and also information needed 
        to protect life, property and security of 
        transportation;
  --cooperation in the fields of training and exchange of 
        information on technologies needed to combat terrorism; 
        and
  --effective policies and laws to ensure prompt apprehension, 
        investigation, bringing to justice or extradition of 
        terrorists by means of bilateral, regional, or 
        multilateral agreements or other arrangements by 
        concerned States.

    The meeting was characterized by the spirit of utmost 
cordiality and friendship among the delegates and close 
international cooperation.

22 February 1996
Baguio City
Philippines

                        3. Hemispheric Documents

 a. Second Inter-American Specialized Conference on Terrorism, Mar de 
               Plata, Argentina, November 23-24, 1998 \1\

                     (1) Commitment of Mar de Plata

    The ministers and heads of delegation of the member states 
of the Organization of American States (OAS), meeting in Mar 
del Plata, Argentina, on November 23 and 24, 1998, for the 
Second Inter-American Specialized Conference on Terrorism, to 
evaluate the progress made and define future courses of action 
to prevent, combat, and eliminate terrorism, pursuant to the 
mandate contained in the Plan of Action of the Second Summit of 
the Americas, held in Santiago, Chile, in April 1998,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Source: http://www.oas.org/en/prog/juridico/english/Docu1.htm
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CONSIDERING the intention of the heads of state and 
government to combat, using all legal means, terrorist acts 
anywhere in the Hemisphere with unity and vigor, as affirmed in 
the Declaration of Principles of the First Summit of the 
Americas, held in Miami, in December 1994, and their decision, 
reiterated at the Second Summit of the Americas, in Santiago, 
Chile, to lend new impetus to the struggle against these 
criminal activities;
    BEARING IN MIND the results of the First Inter-American 
Specialized Conference on Terrorism, held in Lima, Peru, from 
April 23 to 26, 1996, which adopted the Declaration and the 
Plan of Action of Lima to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate 
Terrorism;
    BEARING IN MIND the recommendations of the Meeting of 
Government Experts to Examine Ways to Improve the Exchange of 
Information and Other Measures for Cooperation among Member 
States to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism, held in 
Washington, D.C., on May 5 and 6, 1997, pursuant to the General 
Assembly mandate contained in resolution AG/RES. 1399 (XXVI-O/
96);
    RECALLING resolution AG/RES. 1492 (XXVII-O/97), through 
which the General Assembly instructed the Permanent Council to 
study the recommendations and proposals made at the above-
mentioned Meeting of Government Experts and, particularly, the 
proposals on the exchange of information aimed at improving 
cooperation among the member states in order to prevent, 
combat, and eliminate terrorism;
    BEARING IN MIND, also, that resolution AG/RES. 1553 
(XXVIII-O/98) instructed the Permanent Council to continue to 
consider appropriate ways and mechanisms for follow-up and 
implementation, as appropriate, of the measures recommended in 
the Plan of Action on Hemispheric Cooperation to Prevent, 
Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism, adopted at the Inter-American 
Specialized Conference on Terrorism, held in Lima, Peru, in 
April 1996, including a study of the necessity and advisability 
of a new inter-American convention on the subject, in the light 
of the evaluation of existing international instruments;
    TAKING INTO ACCOUNT the provisions of resolution 51/210, 
``Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism,'' which has as 
an annex the Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on 
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly on December 17, 1996; and the 
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombings, open for signature as of January 12, 1998, at United 
Nations headquarters;
    TAKING INTO ACCOUNT the progress made in the Hemisphere 
since the first Inter-American Specialized Conference on 
Terrorism in obtaining a concerted and effective response to 
the terrorist threat, as well as the need to strengthen 
existing regional cooperation to achieve the objectives of the 
Plan of Action of Lima;
    CONVINCED of the urgency of adopting specific measures to 
obtain a concerted and effective response to the terrorist 
threat, within the framework of respect for state sovereignty 
and the principle of nonintervention, in order to ensure 
peaceful and civilized coexistence in the Hemisphere, the rule 
of law, and the stability and consolidation of representative 
democracy itself as the form of government of the member 
states;
    DETERMINED to promote the establishment of an effective 
institutional framework for concerted action and development of 
hemispheric cooperation to prevent, combat, and eliminate 
terrorism;
    PURSUANT to the principles and purposes embodied in the 
Charter of the Organization of American States,
    DECIDE TO ADOPT THE FOLLOWING COMMITMENT:
    (i) To reiterate their most emphatic condemnation and 
repudiation of all terrorist acts, which they recognize as 
serious common crimes that erode peaceful and civilized 
coexistence, affect the rule of law and the exercise of 
democracy, and endanger the stability of democratically elected 
constitutional governments and the socioeconomic development of 
our countries.
    (ii) To strengthen cooperation among the member states to 
combat terrorism, with full respect for the rule of 
international law and for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, respect for the sovereignty of states and the 
principle of nonintervention, and strict compliance with the 
rights and duties of states embodied in the Charter of the 
Organization of American States.
    (iii) To emphasize the effectiveness and significance of 
the general objectives and actions set forth in the Declaration 
and the Plan of Action of Lima, and to reiterate their firm 
intention to achieve them.
    (iv) To improve the exchange of information and other 
measures for cooperation among member states to prevent, 
combat, and eliminate terrorism, taking into account and 
welcoming the results of the Meeting of Government Experts.
    (v) To note with satisfaction the progress made in the area 
of bilateral, subregional, and multilateral cooperation, and, 
taking into consideration especially the subregional 
coordination efforts to prevent acts of terrorism reflected in 
the Framework Treaty on Democratic Security in Central America, 
and the agreement between Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, 
known as the Tripartite Agreement, to express, also, their 
determination to increase and strengthen initiatives such as 
those mentioned above.
    (vi) To note with satisfaction the entry into force on July 
1, 1998, of the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit 
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, 
Explosives, and Other Related Materials, and to urge states 
that have not yet done so to sign or ratify this instrument, as 
appropriate.
    (vii) To recommend to the General Assembly at its twenty-
ninth regular session that it establish an appropriate 
institutional framework, in keeping with the Charter of the 
Organization of American States and bearing in mind respect for 
state sovereignty and the principle of nonintervention, that 
shall be called Inter-American Committee on Terrorism (CICTE). 
It shall be formed by the competent national authorities in the 
member states of the Organization for the development of 
cooperation to prevent, combat, and eliminate terrorist acts 
and activities, and it shall hold at least one session a year.
    The Inter-American Committee on Terrorism will be guided by 
international conventions on the subject, the principles and 
objectives of the Declaration and Plan of Action of Lima, the 
recommendations of the May 1997 Meeting of Government Experts 
to Examine Ways to Improve the Exchange of Information and 
Other Measures for Cooperation among the Member States in order 
to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism, the provisions of 
this Commitment to inter-American action and those that may be 
adopted in the future to prevent, combat, and eliminate 
terrorism.
    (viii) To propose that, at the time of establishing the 
terms of reference and functions of the Inter-American 
Committee against Terrorism, consideration be given to the 
guidelines contained in Appendix I to this Commitment, aimed at 
establishing effective mechanisms for cooperation among the 
member states to prevent, combat, and eliminate terrorism.
    (ix) To request the OAS General Assembly to instruct the 
General Secretariat to designate, within its sphere of 
competence, an instance to provide technical and administrative 
support to the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism, in 
keeping with the resources allotted in the program-budget of 
the Organization and other resources, taking into account the 
process of modernization and strengthening of the OAS.
    (x) To transmit to CICTE, for implementation, proposals on 
the ways and means such as the ``Directory of Competences for 
the Prevention, Combating, and Elimination of Terrorism,'' and 
the ``Inter-American Database on Terrorism,'' proposed at the 
Meeting of Government Experts held at OAS headquarters in May 
1997, as well as the establishment of a framework for technical 
cooperation that takes into account the guidelines contained in 
Appendices I, II, and III to this Commitment.
    (xi) To recommend the adoption of specific measures to 
respond in a concerted and effective manner to the terrorist 
threat and to agree, for these purposes, on guidelines for 
coordinated action among the member states, such as those 
envisaged in Appendices I, II, and III to this Commitment.
    (xii) To examine the possibility of designating, in 
accordance with the domestic legislation of each state, 
National Liaison Agencies for purposes of facilitating 
cooperation among the organs of the member states responsible 
for preventing, combating, and eliminating terrorism.
    (xiii) To encourage member states to continue to develop 
bilateral, subregional, or multilateral cooperation mechanisms, 
which does not preclude the competent organs of the OAS from 
considering the proposals contained in this Commitment.
    (xiv) To urge the member states that have not yet done so 
to promptly sign, ratify, or accede to, in conformity with 
their respective domestic legislation, the international 
conventions on terrorism referred to in United Nations 
resolution 51/210, namely the Convention on Offences and 
Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed in Tokyo 
on September 14, 1963; the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed in The Hague on December 
16, 1970; the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Civil Aviation, concluded in Montreal on 
September 23, 1971; the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, 
including Diplomatic Agents, adopted in New York on December 
14, 1973; the International Convention against the Taking of 
Hostages, adopted in New York on December 17, 1979; the 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 
signed in Vienna on March 3, 1980; the Protocol for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving 
International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Civil Aviation, signed in Montreal on February 24, 1988; the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation, done in Rome on March 10, 1988; 
the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf, 
done in Rome on March 10, 1988; and the Convention on the 
Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, 
done in Montreal on March 1, 1991, and the International 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, available 
for signature at United Nations headquarters as of January 12, 
1998.
    (xv) To make the greatest possible effort to make available 
to the Organization of American States sufficient funds to 
develop the joint programs and activities adopted by CICTE.
    (xvi) To seek the supplementary financial support required 
to conduct counterterrorism activities successfully within the 
framework of CICTE from external sources, including the OAS 
permanent observer states and other states and financial 
institutions, particularly the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB).
    (xvii) To recommend to the General Assembly that, at its 
twenty-ninth regular session, it consider the adoption of 
appropriate financing mechanisms, in particular the 
establishment of a specific fund for implementation of the 
programs and activities approved within the framework of CICTE.
    (xviii) To recommend to the General Assembly that it 
entrust the Permanent Council with continuing to study the need 
and advisability of a new inter-American convention on 
terrorism, in light of existing international instruments.
    (xix) To recommend to the General Assembly that it instruct 
the OAS General Secretariat to:
    a. Collaborate with CICTE in preparing the draft Statute 
and Rules of Procedure. The Statute should be approved by the 
General Assembly and the Rules of Procedure by CICTE itself.
    b. Collaborate in the preparation of the reports that CICTE 
shall have to present to the General Assembly through the 
Permanent Council.
    (xx) To recommend to the Permanent Council that, when 
presenting its observation and recommendations to the General 
Assembly regarding the CICTE report, in accordance with Article 
91.f of the Charter, it include references to the need to 
coordinate the activities of that Committee with the work of 
the other bodies in the Organization.
    (xxi) To recommend to the Inter-American Juridical 
Committee that it study the strengthening of juridical and 
judicial cooperation, including extradition, as a form of 
combating terrorism, and that it collaborate with CICTE in 
devising norms on this subject.

       (2) The Inter-American Committee on Terrorism (CICTE) \1\

                 Nature, powers, and functions of CICTE

    1. The Inter-American Committee on Terrorism (CICTE) shall 
be an entity established by the General Assembly of the 
Organization of American States (OAS) in conformity with 
Article 53 of the Charter of the Organization, which shall 
enjoy technical autonomy. It will be composed of the competent 
national authorities of all the member states and be governed 
in the exercise of its functions by the provisions of Article 
91.f of the Charter.
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    2. In the exercise of its functions, CICTE shall promote 
the development of inter-American cooperation on the basis of 
international conventions on this matter and the Declaration of 
Lima to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism. It shall be 
empowered to encourage, develop, coordinate, and evaluate 
implementation of the Plan of Action of Lima, the 
recommendations of the Meeting of Government Experts to Examine 
Ways to Improve the Exchange of Information and Other Measures 
for Cooperation among Member States to Prevent, Combat, and 
Eliminate Terrorism, as well as the recommendations contained 
in this Commitment.
    3. CICTE will provide assistance to member states 
requesting it , in order to prevent, combat, and eliminate 
terrorism, while promoting, in accordance with the domestic 
laws of the member states, the exchange of information and 
experiences with the activities of persons, groups, 
organizations, and movements linked to terrorist acts as well 
as with the methods, sources of finance and entities directly 
or indirectly protecting or supporting them, and their possible 
links to other crimes.
    4. In order to ensure an adequate exchange of information 
on the issue of illicit trafficking in arms, munitions, 
explosives, materials, or technology capable of being used to 
perpetrate terrorist acts or activities, CICTE will coordinate 
with the Consultative Committee established by the 1997 Inter-
American Convention against the Illicit Production of and 
Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other 
Related Materials.
    5. CICTE will hold at least one annual session. During its 
first session, CICTE will draw up its work schedule designed to 
implement the following guidelines:
    a. To create an inter-American network for gathering and 
transmitting data via the competent national authorities, 
designed to exchange the information and experiences referred 
to in paragraph 3, including the creation of an inter-American 
database on terrorism issues that will be at the disposal of 
member states.
    b. To compile the legal and regulatory norms on preventing, 
combating, and eliminating terrorism in force in member states.
    c. To compile the bilateral, subregional, regional, or 
multilateral treaties and agreements signed by member states to 
prevent, combat, and eliminate terrorism.
    d. To study the appropriate mechanisms to ensure more 
effective application of international legal norms on the 
subject, especially the norms and provisions contemplated in 
the conventions against terrorism in force in states parties to 
those conventions mentioned in paragraph xiv of this 
Commitment.
    e. To formulate proposals designed to provide assistance to 
states requesting it in drafting national antiterrorist laws.
    f. To devise mechanisms for cooperation in detecting forged 
identity documents.
    g. To devise mechanisms for cooperation among competent 
migration authorities.
    h. To design technical cooperation programs and activities 
for training staff assigned to tasks related to preventing, 
combating, and eliminating terrorism in each of the member 
states that request such assistance.
    6. The above-mentioned guidelines do not preclude the 
possibility of CICTE carrying out other activities should the 
General Assembly so determine.
    7. With the acquiescence of the competent authorities, 
CICTE may establish mechanisms for coordinating with other 
competent international entities, such as INTERPOL.

(3) Guidelines for Inter-American Cooperation Regarding Terrorist Acts 
                           and Activities \1\

                               Principles

    1. Inter-American cooperation in dealing with terrorist 
acts and activities will be guided by full respect for domestic 
laws and regulations and for international law and will be 
carried out exclusively at the express request of the affected 
state.
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    2. Inter-American cooperation shall respect the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of states, as well as the principle 
of nonintervention in domestic affairs under the jurisdiction 
of the state, in accordance with the Charter of the 
Organization of American States.
    3. Pursuant to inter-American norms on the subject, each 
state has the exclusive right to determine the nature of 
occurrences that could qualify as terrorist acts or activities. 
The states shall cooperate closely as regards extradition in 
accordance with their domestic laws and the extradition 
treaties in force, without prejudice to the right of states to 
grant asylum under the appropriate circumstances.
    4. Each state has the fundamental and principal 
responsibility of preventing, combating, and eliminating 
terrorism, a goal that inter-American cooperation pursues 
according to the following guidelines.

                                Purposes

    5. The member states will seek to cooperate in the fight 
against all forms of terrorism, to the fullest extent permitted 
by their national laws and regulations, in accordance with 
their legal obligations arising from existing international 
conventions on terrorism, and as set out in these guidelines.
    6. The member states will seek to cooperate, to the extent 
that they find mutually beneficial, in the development and 
implementation of joint programs and activities to facilitate 
the full realization of the intent of these guidelines.
    7. The member states will seek to cooperate, by mutual 
consent, in the event of a terrorist act. Cooperation under 
these guidelines may include assistance with: weapons detection 
and deactivation, hostage negotiations, intelligence gathering, 
communications systems, search and rescue for victims, and 
criminal investigations.

                               Procedures

    8. Irrespective of bilateral mechanisms, member states will 
seek, insofar as possible within the context of domestic 
legislation, through CICTE, to exchange information regarding 
the laws, regulations, plans, and administrative procedures 
concerned with preventing, combating, and eliminating terrorist 
acts and activities.
    9. Member states will seek to cooperate in dealing with 
terrorist acts and activities. To that end, member states may 
provide assistance, when such assistance is expressly 
requested, to another state in order to prevent, combat, and 
eliminate terrorism. That cooperation may include technical, 
scientific, and logistical assistance, depending on the 
agreement reached by the states involved. Member states will 
seek to prepare operational plans and crisis management 
procedures within their respective governments in response to 
terrorist activities.
    10. Member states will seek to keep other states up to date 
regarding occurrences that, in their view, could be classified 
as terrorist acts and activities.

                              Notification

    11. Whenever a member state becomes aware of occurrences 
that it considers could be classified as terrorist acts or 
activities with a transnational impact, it will seek to notify, 
as soon as possible, the state or states that could be 
affected.
    12. The member states will seek to notify each other of any 
request or acceptance of assistance from a third party 
regarding a terrorist activity or act that has affected or 
could directly affect another member state.
    13. The member states will seek to inform CICTE or any 
other competent organ in the OAS, whenever possible, of the 
events referred to in paragraph 4.

                                Response

    14. In the event of occurrences that could be classified as 
terrorist acts and activities with a transnational impact, 
member states will seek in a manner compatible with their 
domestic laws and regulations and applicable international 
conventions:
    a. To authorize and facilitate the presence of liaison 
representatives at locations agreed to by the member states, 
consistent with domestic crisis management procedures, who will 
be responsible for maintaining channels of communication 
between the member states and for facilitating accurate 
exchanges of information on operational and policy decisions;
    b. To the extent appropriate, to share information 
concerning the materials, devices, and/or weapons used in that 
terrorist act or activity; likely perpetrators; their possible 
sources of support; and any other relevant information.
    c. To afford one another the greatest measure of assistance 
in judicial cooperation, including assistance in obtaining 
evidence at their disposal necessary for such investigations or 
proceedings.

                            Confidentiality

    15. The member states will seek to safeguard the 
confidentiality of information that is not a matter of public 
record, exchanged pursuant to these guidelines, and to prevent 
the disclosure of such information to third parties in 
accordance with their national laws and regulations.
    16. Information and materials exchanged under these 
guidelines may be disclosed to third states only with the 
explicit consent of the member state that provided it.

          (4) Measures to Eliminate Terrorist Fundraising \1\

                          Contextual Framework

    1. Countermeasures against terrorism must include effective 
actions to impede the flow of funds that terrorist 
organizations depend on to secure and maintain weapons, 
equipment, and other materials, and to pay for training, 
travel, false documentation, recruiting, salaries, 
communications, and/or any other activity intended to finance 
acts pursuing terrorist goals. A significant portion of the 
fiscal needs of terrorist organizations are met from the 
proceeds of traditional criminal activity and from the 
solicitation of ostensibly charitable, humanitarian, and 
philanthropic contributions, some of which are diverted to fund 
terrorist operations.
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    2. The effectiveness of measures to counter transnational 
terrorist fundraising will be enhanced through cooperative 
action among OAS member states.
    3. OAS member states recognize that states that seek to 
disrupt financial flows to terrorist organizations make it 
possible to move ahead in cooperation with other states to 
prevent, combat, and eliminate terrorism.
    Execution of measures against terrorist fundraising
    4. Through CICTE or other competent entities, OAS member 
states agree to consider adopting the following measures to 
counter terrorist fundraising, evaluating, where necessary, the 
desirability of strengthening national laws:
    a. Promote the necessary measures to discern and then block 
the capital flows financing terrorism, within the framework of 
the laws already in force in each state, or by devising norms 
that are compatible with them and make it possible to achieve 
objectives.
    b. Ensure that law enforcement officials are trained in the 
prevention and detection of terrorist fundraising and, in the 
performance of their duties, encourage them to cooperate in 
international training efforts designed to address terrorist 
fundraising;
    c. Ensure that records of financial transactions are 
available to law enforcement officials and that each member 
state has the legal and logistical means to enable their law 
enforcement officials to share with their counterparts in other 
member states documentary, financial and other information 
useful in criminal investigations and/or civil and 
administrative matters related to terrorist fundraising;
    d. Cooperate, in a manner consistent with national laws and 
states' international commitments, with other member states in 
international investigations and prosecutions of terrorist 
fundraising violations, including assisting with locating and 
interviewing witnesses and with obtaining financial and other 
relevant documents;
    e. Apply norms that create the bases and effective 
mechanisms to reinforce agreements and treaties on extradition 
for criminal offenses involving terrorist fundraising;
    f. Apply norms that require financial institutions to 
maintain records of financial transactions for at least five 
years;
    g. Apply norms that require financial institutions to 
obtain, and maintain records of, information that allows them 
to identify, verify, and know their customers;
    h. Apply norms that ensure that financial institutions 
bring financial activities presumed to be intended to fund 
terrorist acts or activities to the timely attention of the 
competent authorities;
    i. Apply norms that protect against the misuse of currency 
in transactions involving financial institutions and in cross-
border transportation;
    j. Apply norms that compel financial institutions to comply 
with the requirements to protect a member state's financial 
system from abuse by terrorist fundraisers.

b. Hemispheric Cooperation to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism 
                                  \1\

                        AG/RES. 1399 (XXVI-O/96)

  (Resolution adopted at the eighth plenary session, held on June 7, 
                                 1996)

    THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
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    HAVING SEEN resolution AG/RES. 1350 (XXV-O/95), which 
convened an Inter-American Specialized Conference on Terrorism;
    BEARING IN MIND that the Specialized Conference was held in 
Lima from April 23 to 26, 1996, and that it adopted the 
``Declaration of Lima to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate 
Terrorism'' and the ``Plan of Action on Hemispheric Cooperation 
to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism'';
    TAKING INTO ACCOUNT the Secretary General's proposals on 
new forms of inter-American cooperation to confront terrorism 
with all due effectiveness, which have been included in the 
Declaration of Montrouis: A New Vision of the OAS and presented 
in the document ``The Law in a New Inter-American Order,'' 
which is under consideration by the governments; and
    CONSIDERING:
    That the Plan of Action on Hemispheric Cooperation to 
Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism recommends, among 
other measures, that the Organization of American States (OAS) 
should follow up on the progress made in implementing that Plan 
of Action, and that the OAS General Assembly should consider 
convening a meeting of experts to examine ways to improve the 
exchange of information among the member states, in order to 
prevent, combat, and eliminate terrorism;
    That, in addition, resolution CEITE/RES. 2/96 recommends 
that the General Assembly of the Organization consider 
appropriate ways and means to follow up on the measures agreed 
upon in the Declaration and the Plan of Action adopted at the 
Specialized Conference; and
    The Final Report of the Inter-American Specialized 
Conference on Terrorism (CEITE/doc.28/96),
    RESOLVES:
    1. To reiterate its strongest condemnation of all forms of 
terrorism by whatever agent or means and to repudiate the grave 
consequences of such acts which, as stated at the Summit of the 
Americas, ``constitute a systematic and deliberate violation of 
the rights of individuals.''
    2. To express its satisfaction with the holding of the 
Inter-American Specialized Conference on Terrorism and the 
adoption of the Declaration of Lima to Prevent, Combat, and 
Eliminate Terrorism and the Plan of Action on Hemispheric 
Cooperation to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism.
    3. To instruct the Permanent Council to consider 
appropriate ways and means to follow up on the measures 
recommended in the Plan of Action and submit a progress report 
on its work to the General Assembly at its next regular 
session.
    4. To request the Permanent Council to consider convening a 
meeting of government experts to examine ways to improve the 
exchange of information and other measures for cooperation 
among the member states to prevent, combat, and eliminate 
terrorism.
    5. To draw the attention of all the organs of the 
Organization of American States and, in particular, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights to the importance of the 
Declaration of Lima and the Plan of Action.
    6. To instruct the Inter-American Juridical Committee to 
continue its study of the topic ``Inter-American Cooperation to 
Confront Terrorism,'' in light of the documents approved at the 
Specialized Conference.

c. First Inter-American Specialized Conference on Terrorism, Lima Peru, 
                           April 23-26, 1996

(1) Declaration of Lima to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism \1\

                    (Revised by the Style Committee)

    The ministers and the heads of delegation of the member 
states of the Organization of American States (OAS), meeting in 
Lima, Peru, from April 23 to 26, 1996, for the Inter-American 
Specialized Conference on Terrorism,
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    TAKING AS A BASIS the principles and purposes enshrined in 
the Charter of the Organization of American States;
    RECALLING that the Convention to Prevent and Punish the 
Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes against Persons and 
Related Extortion That Are of International Significance, 
signed in Washington, D.C., in 1971; resolutions AG/RES. 4 (I-
E/70), AG/RES. 775 (XV-O/85), AG/RES. 1112 (XXI-O/91), and AG/
RES. 1213 (XXIII-O/93); and the Declarations of Asuncion (1990) 
and Belom do Paris (1994) attest to an evolution in the 
treatment by the Organization of American States of the serious 
and disturbing phenomenon of terrorism;
    CONSIDERING that, in the Declaration of Principles of the 
Summit of the Americas (Miami, December 1994), the heads of 
state and government said: ``We condemn terrorism in all its 
forms, and we will, using all legal means, combat terrorist 
acts anywhere in the Americas with unity and vigor,'' and that, 
in the Plan of Action under the section entitled ``Eliminating 
the Threat of National and International Terrorism'' (item 7), 
they affirmed that this scourge constitutes ``a systematic and 
deliberate violation of the rights of individuals and an 
assault on democracy itself'' and decided that ``a special 
conference of the OAS on the prevention of terrorism'' should 
be held;
    BEARING IN MIND that the ministers of foreign affairs of 
the Hemisphere noted in the Declaration of Montrouis: A New 
Vision of the OAS, adopted by the OAS General Assembly at its 
twenty-fifth regular session (June 1995), that ``terrorism is a 
serious criminal phenomenon of deep concern to all member 
states, and that it has devastating effects on civilized 
coexistence, democratic institutions, and the lives, safety, 
and property of human beings,'' and that at that session the 
General Assembly convened an Inter-American Specialized 
Conference on Terrorism [AG/RES. 1350 (XXV-O/95)];
    RECALLING the Declaration of Quito, signed at the IX 
Meeting of the Rio Group (September 1995), in which the heads 
of state and government said: ``We reiterate our condemnation 
of terrorism in all its forms as well as our determination to 
make vigorous, united efforts to combat this scourge by all 
available legal means, since it violates basic human rights";
    RECALLING also the Framework Treaty on Democratic Security 
in Central America (December 1995), signed by Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama, in which 
the parties undertake to prevent and combat, without exception, 
all types of criminal activity with a regional or international 
impact, such as terrorism;
    TAKING NOTE of the Final Declaration of the States 
Participating in the Meeting of Consultation on Cooperation to 
Prevent and Eliminate International Terrorism, adopted in 
Buenos Aires (August 1995) by Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
Paraguay, the United States, and Uruguay, which, inter alia, 
reiterated that ``the cooperation that exists between our 
governments must be enhanced,'' in the context of which an 
agreement was signed in March 1996 among Argentina, Brazil, and 
Paraguay to implement effective measures in response to the 
criminal phenomenon of terrorism;
    TAKING INTO ACCOUNT the recent work of the United Nations 
and noting the documents issued by the Ottawa P-8 Ministerial 
Conference on Terrorism (December 1995) and the International 
Conference on Counterterrorism, held in Baguio (February 1996);
    MINDFUL that terrorist acts are an assault on the rule of 
law and democratic institutions and are often intended to 
destabilize democratically elected constitutional governments;
    CONCERNED by the detrimental effects terrorism can have on 
efforts to attain the common objective of regional integration 
and to promote economic and social development in the countries 
of the Hemisphere;
    RECOGNIZING that terrorist acts, by whomever and wherever 
perpetrated and whatever their forms, methods, or motives, are 
serious common crimes or felonies;
    DEEPLY ALARMED at the persistence of this scourge and at 
its occasional links to the illicit production and use of drugs 
and trafficking therein, to trafficking in chemical precursors, 
and to money laundering, as well as its possible ties to other 
criminal activities;
    RECOGNIZING the importance to the fight against terrorism 
of eliminating the illicit production and use of arms, 
munitions, and explosive materials and trafficking therein; and
    CONVINCED that existing regional cooperation must be 
intensified and that concerted and effective measures must be 
adopted urgently in response to the threat of terrorism,
    DECLARE:
    1. That observance of international law, full respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the 
sovereignty of states, the principle of nonintervention, and 
strict observance of the rights and duties of states embodied 
in the Charter of the OAS constitute the global framework for 
preventing, combating, and eliminating terrorism.
    2. That terrorist violence erodes peaceful and civilized 
coexistence, affects the rule of law and the exercise of 
democracy, and endangers the stability of national institutions 
and the socioeconomic development of our countries.
    3. That terrorism, as a serious form of organized and 
systematic violence, which is intended to generate chaos and 
fear among the population, results in death and destruction and 
is a reprehensible criminal activity.
    4. Their most emphatic condemnation of all terrorist acts, 
wherever and by whomever perpetrated, and all methods used to 
commit them, regardless of the motivation invoked to justify 
the acts.
    5. That terrorist acts are serious common crimes or 
felonies and, as such, should be tried by national courts in 
accordance with domestic law and the guarantees provided by the 
rule of law.
    6. Their resolve to cooperate fully on matters of 
extradition, in conformity with their domestic law and treaties 
in force on the subject, without prejudice to the right of 
states to grant asylum when appropriate.
    7. That terrorism, as noted by the heads of state and 
government at the Summit of the Americas, is a violation of the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals and an assault 
on democracy itself.
    8. Their decision to study, on the basis of an evaluation 
of existing international instruments, the need for and 
advisability of concluding a new inter-American convention on 
terrorism.
    9. That it is important for OAS member states to ratify or 
accede to international instruments on terrorism as soon as 
possible and, when necessary, to implement them through their 
domestic laws.
    10. Their decision to increase cooperation among member 
states in combating terrorist acts, while fully observing the 
rule of law and international norms, especially with regard to 
human rights.
    11. That it is essential to adopt all bilateral and 
regional cooperation measures necessary to prevent, combat, and 
eliminate, by all legal means, terrorist acts in the 
Hemisphere, with full respect for the jurisdiction of member 
states and for international treaties and conventions.

 (2) Plan of Action on Hemispheric Cooperation to Prevent, Combat, and 
                        Eliminate Terrorism \1\

                    (Revised by the Style Committee)

    The ministers and the heads of delegation of the member 
states of the Organization of American States (OAS), meeting in 
Lima, Peru, at the Inter-American Specialized Conference on 
Terrorism, firmly resolved to achieve the overall objectives 
set forth in the Declaration of Lima to Prevent, Combat, and 
Eliminate Terrorism, agree to the following Plan of Action:
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    The governments
    1. Shall endeavor to establish terrorist acts as serious 
common crimes or felonies under their domestic laws, if they 
have not yet done so.
    2. Shall promote the prompt signing and ratification of 
and/or accession to international conventions related to 
terrorism, in accordance with their domestic laws.
    3. Shall periodically share updated information on domestic 
laws and regulations adopted in the area of terrorism and on 
the signing and ratification of and/or accession to relevant 
international conventions.
    4. Shall provide pertinent legal information and other 
background data on terrorism to the General Secretariat, which 
shall keep them organized and up-to-date.
    5. Shall promote measures for mutual legal assistance to 
prevent, combat, and eliminate terrorism.
    6. In keeping with relevant domestic and international 
laws, shall extend their utmost cooperation with respect to 
criminal proceedings initiated against alleged terrorists, by 
providing to the state that has exercised jurisdiction any 
evidence in their possession. If appropriate, they shall 
facilitate direct communication among the jurisdictional bodies 
to expedite the presentation of evidence of the crime.
    7. As an expression of their firm political will to employ 
all legal means to prevent, combat, and eliminate terrorism, 
shall promote strict and timely compliance with applicable 
extradition treaties or, if appropriate, shall deliver the 
alleged perpetrators of terrorist acts to their competent 
authorities for prosecution, in accordance with their domestic 
laws, if sufficient legal grounds for doing so exist.
    8. In keeping with their domestic laws, shall adopt the 
necessary measures to refuse to make concessions to terrorists 
who take hostages and to ensure that they are brought to 
justice.
    9. When they deem it appropriate, shall report to each 
other and take measures to prevent and address any abuses, 
related to terrorist acts, of the privileges and immunities 
recognized in the Vienna conventions on diplomatic and on 
consular relations and in the applicable agreements concluded 
between states and international organizations and agencies.
    10. Shall endeavor, in keeping with their domestic laws, to 
exchange information concerning terrorist individuals, groups, 
and activities. In this context, when a state finds that there 
are sufficient grounds for believing that a terrorist act is 
being planned, that state shall provide as soon as possible any 
pertinent information to those states potentially affected in 
order to prevent the commission of that act.
    11. Shall endeavor to promote and enhance bilateral, 
subregional, and multilateral cooperation in police and 
intelligence matters to prevent, combat, and eliminate 
terrorism.
    12. Shall extend, when possible, their utmost cooperation 
and technical assistance for the regular and advanced training 
of personnel entrusted with counterterrorism activities and 
techniques.
    13. Shall coordinate efforts and examine measures to 
improve cooperation in the areas of border security, 
transportation, and travel documents in order to prevent 
terrorist acts. They shall also promote the modernization of 
border control and information systems to prevent the passage 
of persons involved in terrorist acts as well as the transport 
of equipment, arms, and other materials that could be used to 
commit such acts.
    14. Shall make special efforts to adopt, in their 
territories and in keeping with their domestic laws, measures 
to prevent the provision of material or financial support for 
any kind of terrorist activity.
    15. Shall adopt measures to prevent the production of, 
trafficking in, and use of weapons, munitions, and explosive 
materials for terrorist activities.
    16. Shall adopt measures to prevent the terrorist use of 
nuclear, chemical, and biological materials.
    17. When appropriate, shall share information on the 
findings of and experience afforded by investigations of 
terrorist activities.
    18. Shall endeavor to assist the victims of terrorist acts 
and shall cooperate among themselves to that end.
    19. Where appropriate and in keeping with their domestic 
laws, shall furnish to the state of which the victims are 
nationals, in a complete and timely manner, the information in 
their possession regarding such victims and the circumstances 
of the crime.
    20. Shall endeavor to provide humanitarian and all other 
forms of assistance to member states upon request following the 
commission of terrorist acts in their territories.
    21. Shall begin to study, within the framework of the OAS 
and on the basis of an evaluation of existing international 
instruments, the need for and advisability of a new inter-
American convention on terrorism.
    22. Shall hold meetings and consultations to afford one 
another their utmost assistance and cooperation in preventing, 
combating, and eliminating terrorist activities in the 
Hemisphere and, within the framework of the OAS, shall follow 
up on the progress made in implementing this Plan of Action.
    23. Shall recommend to the General Assembly of the 
Organization of American States that it consider convening a 
meeting of experts to examine ways to improve the exchange of 
information among the member states in order to prevent, 
combat, and eliminate terrorism.

             d. Summit of the Americas December 9-11, 1994

                       DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES

    To Preserve and Strengthen the Community of Democracies of 
the Americas

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    We condemn terrorism in all its forms, and we will, using 
all legal means, combat terrorist acts anywhere in the Americas 
with unity and vigor.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                             PLAN OF ACTION

  I. Preserving and Strengthening the Community of Democracies of the 
Americas

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    7. eliminating the treat of national and international terrorism

    National and international terrorism constitute a 
systematic and deliberate violation of the rights of 
individuals and an assault on democracy itself. Recent attacks 
that some of our countries have suffered have demonstrated the 
serious threat that terrorism poses to security in the 
Americas. Actions by governments to combat and eliminate this 
threat are essential elements in guaranteeing law and order and 
maintaining confidence in government, both nationally and 
internationally. Within this context, those who sponsor 
terrorist acts or assist in their planning or execution through 
the abuse of diplomatic privileges and immunities or other 
means will be held responsible by the international community.
    Governments will--
   Promote bilateral and subregional agreements with 
        the aim of prosecuting terrorists and penalizing 
        terrorist activities within the context of the 
        protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
   Convene a special conference of the OAS on the 
        prevention of terrorism.
   Reaffirm the importance of the extradition treaties 
        ratified by the states of the Hemisphere, and note that 
        these treaties will be strictly complied with as an 
        expression of the political will of governments, in 
        accordance with international law and domestic 
        legislation.

         4. International Civil Aviation Organization Documents

    a. International Standards and Recommended Practices: Security; 
  Safeguarding International Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful 
    Interference, Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil 
                  Aviation, Sixth Edition, March 1997
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2838.342

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2838.343

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2838.344

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2838.345

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2838.346

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2838.347

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2838.348

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2838.349

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b. A31-A: Consolidated Statement of Continuing ICAO Policies Related to 
   the Safeguarding of International Civil Aviation Against Acts of 
                       Unlawful Interference \1\

    Whereas the development of international civil aviation can 
greatly help to create and preserve friendship and 
understanding among the nations and peoples of the world, yet 
its abuse can become a threat to general security;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Source: International Civil Aviation Organization homepage: 
http/www.cam.org/icao/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Whereas the threat of terrorist acts, unlawful seizure of 
aircraft and other acts of unlawful interference against civil 
aviation, including acts aimed at destruction of aircraft, have 
a serious adverse effect on the safety, efficiency and 
regularity of international civil aviation, endanger the lives 
of aircraft passengers and crews and undermine the confidence 
of the peoples of the world in the safety of international 
civil aviation;
    Whereas it is considered desirable to consolidate Assembly 
resolutions on the policies related to the safeguarding of 
international civil aviation against acts of unlawful 
interference in order to facilitate their implementation and 
practical application by making their texts more readily 
available, understandable and logically organized;
    Whereas in Resolution A29-5 the Assembly resolved to adopt 
at each session a consolidated statement of continuing ICAO 
policies related to the safeguarding of international civil 
aviation against acts of unlawful interference; and
    Whereas the Assembly has reviewed proposals by the Council 
for the amendment of the consolidated statement of continuing 
ICAO policies in Resolution A29-5, Appendices A to H inclusive, 
and has amended the statement to reflect the decisions taken 
during the 31st Session;
    The Assembly:
    1. Resolves that the Appendices attached to this resolution 
constitute the consolidated statement of continuing ICAO 
policies related to the safeguarding of international civil 
aviation against acts of unlawful interference, up to date as 
these policies exist at the close of the 31st Session of the 
Assembly;
    2. Resolves to request the Council to submit at each 
ordinary session for review a consolidated statement of 
continuing ICAO policies related to the safeguarding of 
international civil aviation against acts of unlawful 
interference; and
    3. Declares that this resolution supersedes Resolution A29-
5.

                               Appendix A

                             General policy

    Whereas acts of unlawful interference against international 
civil aviation have become the main threat to its safe and 
orderly development;
    Recognizing that all acts of unlawful interference against 
international civil aviation constitute a grave offence in 
violation of international law; and
    Endorsing actions taken so far by the Council, in 
particular by adopting new preventive measures, strengthening 
the means available to the Organization and assuming functions 
related to the implementation of the Convention on the Marking 
of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection;
    The Assembly:
    1. Strongly condemns all acts of unlawful interference 
against civil aviation wherever and by whomsoever and for 
whatever reason they are perpetrated;
    2. Reaffirms the important role of the International Civil 
Aviation Organization to facilitate the resolution of questions 
which may arise between Contracting States in relation to 
matters affecting the safe and orderly operation of 
international civil aviation throughout the world;
    3. Reaffirms that aviation security must continue to be 
treated as a matter of highest priority by the International 
Civil Aviation Organization and its Member States;
    4. Notes with abhorrence acts of unlawful interference 
aimed at the total destruction in flight of civil aircraft in 
commercial service and the death of all on board;
    5. Calls upon all Contracting States to confirm their 
resolute support for the established policy of ICAO by applying 
the most effective security measures individually and in co-
operation with one another, to suppress acts of unlawful 
interference and to punish the perpetrators of any such acts; 
and
    6. Directs the Council to continue its work relating to 
measures for prevention of acts of unlawful interference.

                               Appendix B

International legal instruments for the suppression of acts of unlawful 
                    interference with civil aviation

    Whereas the protection of civil aviation from acts of 
unlawful interference has been enhanced by the Convention on 
Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft 
(Tokyo, 1963), by the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (The Hague, 1970), by the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal, 1971), as well as by the 
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at 
Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to 
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Civil Aviation, Done at Montreal on 23 September 1971 
(Montreal, 1988) and by bilateral agreements for the 
suppression of such acts;
    Whereas terrorist acts aimed at the destruction of aircraft 
and the use of plastic explosives for such acts led to the need 
for ICAO to intensify, in accordance with United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 635 of 14 June 1989, its work on 
devising an international regime for the marking of plastic 
explosives for the purpose of detection; and
    Whereas for the purpose of preventing such acts, the 
International Conference on Air Law adopted on 1 March 1991 a 
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose 
of Detection;
    The Assembly:
    1. Calls upon Contracting States which have not yet done so 
to become parties to the Convention on Offences and Certain 
Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo, 1963), to the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 
(The Hague, 1970), to the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal, 
1971), and to the 1988 Supplementary Protocol to the Montreal 
Convention;
    2. Urges all States to become parties as soon as possible 
to the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the 
Purpose of Detection which was signed at Montreal on 1 March 
1991;
    3. Invites States not yet parties to the 1991 Convention on 
the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection 
to give effect, even before ratification, acceptance, approval 
or accession, to the principles of that instrument and calls 
upon States which manufacture plastic explosives to implement 
the marking of such explosives as soon as possible;
    4. Directs the Secretary General to continue to remind 
States of the importance of becoming parties to the Tokyo, The 
Hague and Montreal Conventions and to the 1988 Supplementary 
Protocol to the Montreal Convention and the Convention on the 
Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection and 
to provide assistance requested by States encountering any 
difficulties in becoming parties to these instruments;
    5. Condemns any failure by a Contracting State to fulfil 
its obligations to return without delay an aircraft which is 
being illegally detained or to extradite or submit to competent 
authorities without delay the case of any person accused of an 
act of unlawful interference with civil aviation;
    6. Calls upon Contracting States to intensify their efforts 
to suppress acts of unlawful seizure of aircraft or other 
unlawful acts against the security of civil aviation by 
concluding appropriate agreements for the suppression of such 
acts which would provide for extradition or submission of the 
case to competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution of 
those who commit them; and
    7. Calls upon Contracting States to continue to assist in 
the investigation of such acts and in the apprehension and 
prosecution of those responsible.

                               Appendix C

                            Action by States

    a) Enactment of national legislation and bilateral 
agreements
    Whereas deterrence of acts of unlawful interference with 
civil aviation can be greatly facilitated through the enactment 
by Contracting States of national criminal laws providing 
severe penalties for such acts;
    The Assembly:
    1. Calls upon Contracting States to give special attention 
to the adoption of adequate measures against persons committing 
acts of unlawful seizure of aircraft or other acts of unlawful 
interference against civil aviation, and in particular to 
include in their legislation rules for the severe punishment of 
such persons;
    2. Calls upon Contracting States to take adequate measures 
relating to the extradition or prosecution of persons 
committing acts of unlawful seizure of aircraft or other acts 
of unlawful interference against civil aviation by adopting 
appropriate provisions in law or treaty for that purpose or by 
strengthening existing arrangements for the extradition of 
persons making criminal attacks on international civil 
aviation.
    b) Information to be submitted to the Council
    The Assembly:
    1. Reminds States parties of their obligations under 
Article 11 of The Hague Convention and Article 13 of the 
Montreal Convention, following occurrences of unlawful 
interference, to forward all relevant information required by 
those Articles to the Council;
    2. Directs the Secretary General, within a reasonable time 
from the date of a specific occurrence of unlawful 
interference, to ask that States parties concerned forward to 
the Council in accordance with their national law all relevant 
information required by those Articles concerning such 
occurrence, including particularly information relating to 
extradition or other legal proceedings.

                               Appendix D

                      Technical security measures

    Whereas the safety of the peoples of the world who benefit 
from international civil aviation requires continued vigilance 
and development and implementation of positive safeguarding 
action by the Organization and its Contracting States;
    Whereas a clear need exists for the strengthening of 
security to be applied to all phases and processes associated 
with the international carriage of persons, their cabin and 
checked baggage, cargo, mail, courier and express parcels;
    Whereas the responsibility for ensuring that security 
measures are applied by government agencies, airport 
authorities and aircraft operators rests with the Contracting 
States;
    Whereas the safety of persons and property at airports 
serving international civil aviation requires continued 
vigilance, development and implementation of positive 
safeguarding actions by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization and all States to prevent and suppress unlawful 
acts of violence at such airports; and
    Whereas the implementation of the security measures 
advocated by ICAO is an effective means of preventing acts of 
unlawful interference with civil aviation;
    The Assembly:
    1. Urges the Council to continue to attach high priority to 
the adoption of effective measures for the prevention of acts 
of unlawful interference and to keep up to date the provisions 
of Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention to this end;
    2. Urges the Council to study, as a high priority, issues 
relating to the security control of transit passengers and the 
detection of explosive devices;
    3. Requests the Council to complete, as a matter of high 
priority, studies into methods of detecting explosives or 
explosive materials, especially into the marking of those 
explosives of concern, other than plastic explosives, whose 
detection would be aided by the use of marking agents, with a 
view to the evolution, if needed, of an appropriate 
comprehensive legal regime;
    4. Urges all States on an individual basis and in co-
operation with other States to take all possible measures for 
the suppression of acts of violence at airports serving 
international civil aviation including such preventive measures 
as are required or recommended under Annex 17 to the Convention 
on International Civil Aviation;
    5. Calls upon Contracting States to intensify their efforts 
for the implementation of existing Standards, Recommended 
Practices, and Procedures relating to aviation security, to 
monitor such implementation, and to take all necessary steps to 
prevent acts of unlawful interference against international 
civil aviation;
    6. Further calls on Contracting States, while respecting 
their sovereignty, to substantially enhance co-operation and 
co-ordination between them in order to improve such 
implementation;
    7. Invites Contracting States to exchange, as they consider 
appropriate, information through ICAO, or directly where 
desirable, related to increasing physical security controls in 
the plans and designs of existing and new airports, the design 
of aircraft to make the placement of explosives more difficult 
and research and development on weapons and explosive 
detection, as well as to undertake joint efforts in the 
development and refinement of promising concepts in detection 
of weapons and explosives;
    8. Urges member States to expedite research and development 
on detection of explosives and security equipment, to continue 
to encourage research and development into improved and 
economic means of detecting all the marking agents specified in 
the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the 
Purpose of Detection, and to continue to exchange such 
information;
    9. Requests the Council to ensure, with respect to the 
technical aspects of aviation security, that:
    a) the subject of aviation security continues to be given 
adequate attention, with priority commensurate with the current 
threat to the security of international civil aviation, 
particularly by keeping up to date and developing, as 
necessary, appropriate Standards, Recommended Practices, 
Procedures and guidance material;
    b) when considered necessary, the agenda of ICAO meetings 
include items dealing with aviation security which are relevant 
to the subject of such meetings;
    c) regional aviation security seminars are convened by ICAO 
after consultation with or at the request of States concerned; 
and
    d) the ICAO Training Programme for Aviation Security 
comprising Standardized Training Packages (STPs) for use by 
States continues to be developed;
    10. Urges Contracting States to ensure that it is possible 
for facilities to be made available at their airports for the 
inspection/screening of passengers and their cabin and checked 
baggage on international air transport services;
    11. Urges Contracting States which have not already done so 
to implement the Standards, Recommended Practices and 
Procedures on aviation security measures, and to give 
appropriate attention to the guidance material contained in the 
ICAO Security Manual; and
    12. Directs the Secretary General to continue to update and 
amend at appropriate intervals the Security Manual designed to 
assist Contracting States in implementing the specifications 
and procedures related to civil aviation security.

                               Appendix E

   Action of States with respect to unlawful seizure of aircraft in 
                                progress

    Whereas acts of unlawful seizure continue seriously to 
compromise the safety, regularity and efficiency of 
international civil aviation;
    Whereas the Council has adopted Standards and Recommended 
Practices on aviation security in accordance with ICAO policy;
    Whereas the safety of flights of aircraft subjected to an 
act of unlawful seizure may be further jeopardized by the 
denial of navigational aids and air traffic services, the 
blocking of runways and taxiways and the closure of airports; 
and
    Whereas the safety of passengers and crew of an aircraft 
subjected to an act of unlawful seizure may also be further 
jeopardized if the aircraft is permitted to take off while 
still under seizure;
    The Assembly:
    1. Recalls in this regard the relevant provisions of the 
Chicago, Tokyo and The Hague Conventions;
    2. Recommends that States take into account the above 
considerations in the development of their policies and 
contingency plans for dealing with acts of unlawful seizure;
    3. Urges each Contracting State to provide, as it may find 
practicable, such measures of assistance to an aircraft 
subjected to an act of unlawful seizure, including the 
provision of navigational aids, air traffic services and 
permission to land, as may be necessitated by the 
circumstances;
    4. Urges each Contracting State to take measures, as it may 
find practicable, to ensure that an aircraft subjected to an 
act of unlawful seizure which has landed in its territory is 
detained on the ground unless its departure is necessitated by 
the overriding duty to protect human life; and
    5. Recognizes the importance of consultations, wherever 
practicable, between the State where an aircraft subjected to 
an act of unlawful seizure has landed and the State of the 
operator of that aircraft.

                               Appendix F

 Assistance to States in the implementation of technical measures for 
             the protection of international civil aviation

    Whereas the implementation of technical measures for 
prevention of acts of unlawful interference with international 
civil aviation requires financial investment and training of 
personnel;
    Whereas, notwithstanding assistance given, some countries, 
in particular developing countries, still face difficulties in 
fully implementing preventive measures including the means of 
detecting explosives because of insufficient financial, 
technical and material resources; and
    Whereas aviation security is vital to all Contracting 
States for the proper operation of their airlines all around 
the world;
    The Assembly:
    1. Invites developed countries to give assistance to the 
countries which are not able to implement programmes of 
suggested technical measures for the protection of aircraft on 
the ground and in the processing of passengers, their cabin and 
checked baggage, cargo, mail, courier and express parcels;
    2. Invites Contracting States to bear in mind the 
possibility offered by the Mechanism for financial, technical 
and material assistance to States with regard to aviation 
security, the United Nations Development Programme and the 
Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries to meet their 
technical assistance requirements arising from the need to 
protect international civil aviation;
    3. Urges all States that have the means to do so to 
increase technical, financial and material assistance to 
countries in need of such assistance to improve aviation 
security through bilateral and multilateral effort, in 
particular, through the ICAO Mechanism for financial, technical 
and material assistance to States with regard to aviation 
security; and
    4. Urges the international community to consider increasing 
technical, financial and material assistance to States in need 
of such assistance in order to be able to benefit from the 
achievement of the aims and objectives of the Convention on the 
Marking of Plastic Explosives, in particular through the 
technical co-operation programmes of ICAO.

                               Appendix G

  Action by the Council with respect to multilateral and bilateral co-
              operation in different regions of the world

    Whereas the rights and obligations of States under the 
international conventions on aviation security and under the 
Standards and Recommended Practices adopted by the Council of 
ICAO on aviation security could be complemented and reinforced 
in bilateral co-operation between States;
    Whereas the bilateral agreements on air services represent 
the main legal basis for international carriage of passengers, 
baggage, cargo and mail;
    Whereas provisions on aviation security should form an 
integral part of the bilateral agreements on air services; and
    Whereas Annex 17 to the Convention of International Civil 
Aviation contains a recommendation that each Contracting State 
should include in its bilateral agreements on air transport a 
clause related to aviation security;
    The Assembly:
    1. Notes with satisfaction the strong support of States for 
the model clause on aviation security, elaborated by the 
Council and attached to the Council Resolution of 25 June 1986;
    2. Notes the wide acceptance by States of the model 
agreement on aviation security for bilateral or regional co-
operation adopted by the Council on 30 June 1989;
    3. Urges all Contracting States to insert into their 
bilateral agreements on air services a clause on aviation 
security, taking into account the model clause adopted by the 
Council on 25 June 1986;
    4. Recommends that Contracting States take into account the 
model agreement adopted by the Council on 30 June 1989; and
    5. Recommends that the Council continue to:
  --gather the results of States' experience in co-operation to 
        suppress acts of unlawful interference with 
        international civil aviation;
  --analyse the existing situation in the fight against acts of 
        unlawful interference with international civil aviation 
        in different regions of the world; and
  --prepare recommendations for strengthening measures to 
        suppress such acts of unlawful interference.

                               Appendix H

Co-operation with international organizations in the field of aviation 
                                security

    The Assembly:
    1. Invites the International Criminal Police Organization 
(ICPO/INTERPOL), the Universal Postal Union (UPU), the 
International Air Transport Association (IATA), Airports 
Council International (ACI), and the International Federation 
of Air Line Pilots' Associations (IFALPA) to continue their co-
operation with ICAO, to the maximum extent possible, to 
safeguard international civil aviation against acts of unlawful 
interference.

                      5. United Nations Documents

   a. General Assembly: Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism

                   (1) A/RES/53/108, December 8, 1998

               RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

             Measures To Eliminate International Terrorism

    The General Assembly,
    Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations,
    Recalling all its relevant resolutions, including 
resolution 49/60 of 9 December 1994, by which it adopted the 
Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, 
and resolutions 50/53 of 11 December 1995, 51/210 of 17 
December 1996 and 52/165 of 15 December 1997,
    Recalling also the Declaration on the Occasion of the 
Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ See resolution 50/6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Deeply disturbed by the persistence of terrorist acts, 
which have been carried out worldwide,
    Stressing the need to strengthen further international 
cooperation between States and between international 
organizations and agencies, regional organizations and 
arrangements and the United Nations in order to prevent, combat 
and eliminate terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, 
wherever and by whomsoever committed,
    Mindful of the need to enhance the role of the United 
Nations and the relevant specialized agencies in combating 
international terrorism, and of the proposals of the Secretary-
General to enhance the role of the Organization in this 
respect,
    Recalling that in the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism, contained in the annex to resolution 
49/60, the General Assembly encouraged States to review 
urgently the scope of the existing international legal 
provisions on the prevention, repression and elimination of 
terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, with the aim of 
ensuring that there was a comprehensive legal framework 
covering all aspects of the matter,
    Bearing in mind the possibility of considering in the near 
future the elaboration of a comprehensive convention on 
international terrorism,
    Bearing in mind also that the Twelfth Conference of Heads 
of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at 
Durban, South Africa, from 29 August to 3 September 1998, 
reaffirmed its collective position on terrorism and as a recent 
initiative called for an international summit conference under 
the auspices of the United Nations to formulate a joint 
organized response of the international community to terrorism 
in all its forms and manifestations, \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ See A/53/667-S/1998/1071.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Recognizing the urgent need to enhance international 
cooperation to prevent terrorist financing and to develop an 
appropriate legal instrument,
    Having examined the report of the Secretary-General, \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ A/53/314 and Corr.2 and Add.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    1. Strongly condemns all acts, methods and practices of 
terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by 
whomsoever committed;
    2. Reiterates that criminal acts intended or calculated to 
provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of 
persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any 
circumstances unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a 
political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, 
religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them;
    3. Reiterates its call upon all States to adopt further 
measures in accordance with the relevant provisions of 
international law, including international standards of human 
rights, to prevent terrorism and to strengthen international 
cooperation in combating terrorism and, to that end, to 
consider in particular the implementation of the measures set 
out in paragraphs 3 (a) to (f) of its resolution 51/210;
    4. Also reiterates its call upon all States, with the aim 
of enhancing the efficient implementation of relevant legal 
instruments, to intensify, as and where appropriate, the 
exchange of information on facts related to terrorism and, in 
so doing, to avoid the dissemination of inaccurate or 
unverified information;
    5. Reiterates its call upon States to refrain from 
financing, encouraging, providing training for or otherwise 
supporting terrorist activities;
    6. Reaffirms that international cooperation as well as 
actions by States to combat terrorism should be conducted in 
conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations, international law and relevant international 
conventions;
    7. Urges all States that have not yet done so to consider, 
as a matter of priority, becoming parties to relevant 
conventions and protocols as referred to in paragraph 6 of 
resolution 51/210, as well as the International Convention for 
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, \4\ and calls upon all 
States to enact, as appropriate, domestic legislation necessary 
to implement the provisions of those conventions and protocols, 
to ensure that the jurisdiction of their courts enables them to 
bring t o trial the perpetrators of terrorist acts, and to 
cooperate with and provide support and assistance to other 
States and relevant international and regional organizations to 
that end;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Resolution 52/164, annex.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    8. Reaffirms the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism contained in the annex to resolution 
49/60 and the Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on 
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism contained in the 
annex to resolution 51/210, and calls upon all States to 
implement them;
    9. Takes note of the measures aimed at strengthening the 
capacity of the Centre for International Crime Prevention of 
the Secretariat to enhance international cooperation and 
improve the response of Governments to terrorism in all its 
forms and manifestations;
    10. Decides to address at its fifty-fourth session the 
question of convening a high-level conference in 2000 under the 
auspices of the United Nations to formulate a joint organized 
response of the international community to terrorism in all its 
forms and manifestations;
    11. Decides also that the Ad Hoc Committee established by 
General Assembly resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996 shall 
continue to elaborate a draft international convention for the 
suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism with a view to 
completing the instrument, shall elaborate a draft 
international convention for the suppression of terrorist 
financing to supplement related existing international 
instruments, and subsequently shall address means of further 
developing a comprehensive le gal framework of conventions 
dealing with international terrorism, including considering, on 
a priority basis, the elaboration of a comprehensive convention 
on international terrorism;
    12. Decides further that the Ad Hoc Committee shall meet 
from 15 to 26 March 1999, devoting appropriate time to the 
consideration of the outstanding issues relating to the 
elaboration of a draft international convention for the 
suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism, and that it shall 
initiate the elaboration of a draft international convention 
for the suppression of terrorist financing, and recommends that 
the work continue during the fifty-fourth session of the 
General Assembly from 27 September to 8 October 1999, within 
the framework of a working group of the Sixth Committee, and 
that the Ad Hoc Committee be convened in 2000 to continue its 
work as referred to in paragraph 11 above;
    13. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to provide 
the Ad Hoc Committee with the necessary facilities for the 
performance of its work;
    14. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to report to the General 
Assembly at its fifty-third session in the event of the 
completion of the draft convention for the suppression of acts 
of nuclear terrorism;
    15. Also requests the Ad Hoc Committee to report to the 
General Assembly at its fifty-fourth session on progress made 
in the implementation of its mandate;
    16. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its 
fifty-fourth session the item entitled ``Measures to eliminate 
international terrorism''.

83rd plenary meeting
8 December 1998

                              (2) A/53/314

                    REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

             Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism

    status of international conventions pertaining to international 
                               terrorism

                                EXCERPTS
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                  (3) A/RES/52/165, December 15, 1997

               RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

             Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism

    The General Assembly,
    Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United
    Nations,
    Recalling all its relevant resolutions, including 
resolution 49/60 of 9 December 1994, by which it adopted the 
Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, 
and resolutions 50/53 of 11 December 1995 and 51/210 of 17 
December 1996,
    Recalling also the Declaration on the Occasion of the 
Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ See resolution 50/6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Deeply disturbed by the persistence of terrorist acts, 
which have taken place worldwide,
    Stressing the need further to strengthen international 
cooperation between States and between international 
organizations and agencies, regional organizations and 
arrangements and the United Nations in order to prevent, combat 
and eliminate terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, 
wherever and by whomsoever committed,
    Mindful of the need to enhance the role of the United 
Nations and the relevant specialized agencies in combating 
international terrorism, and of the proposals of the Secretary-
General to enhance the role of the Organization in this 
respect,
    Recalling that in the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism contained in the annex to resolution 
49/60 the General Assembly encouraged States to review urgently 
the scope of the existing international legal provisions on the 
prevention, repression and elimination of terrorism in all its 
forms and manifestations, with the aim of ensuring that there 
was a comprehensive legal framework covering all aspects of the 
matter,
    Bearing in mind the possibility of considering in the near 
future the elaboration of a comprehensive convention on 
international terrorism,
    Having examined the report of the Secretary-General, \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ A/52/304 and Corr.1 and Add.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    1. Strongly condemns all acts, methods and practices of 
terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by 
whomsoever committed;
    2. Reiterates that criminal acts intended or calculated to 
provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of 
persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any 
circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a 
political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, 
religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them;
    3. Reiterates its call upon all States to adopt further 
measures in accordance with the relevant provisions of 
international law, including international standards of human 
rights, to prevent terrorism and to strengthen international 
cooperation in combating terrorism and, to that end, to 
consider, in particular, the implementation of the measures set 
out in paragraphs 3 (a) to (f) of its resolution 51/210;
    4. Also reiterates its call upon all States, with the aim 
of enhancing the efficient implementation of relevant legal 
instruments, to intensify, as and where appropriate, the 
exchange of information on facts related to terrorism and, in 
so doing, to avoid the dissemination of inaccurate or 
unverified information;
    5. Further reiterates its call upon States to refrain from 
financing, encouraging, providing training for or otherwise 
supporting terrorist activities;
    6. Urges all States that have not yet done so to consider, 
as a matter of priority, becoming parties to relevant 
conventions and protocols as referred to in paragraph 6 of 
resolution 51/210, and calls upon all States to enact, as 
appropriate, domestic legislation necessary to implement the 
provisions of those conventions and protocols, to ensure that 
the jurisdiction of their courts enables them to bring to trial 
the perpetrators of terrorist acts and to cooperate with and 
provide support and assistance to other States and relevant 
international and regional organizations to that end;
    7. Reaffirms the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism contained in the annex to resolution 
49/60 and the Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on 
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism contained in the 
annex to resolution 51/210, and calls upon all States to 
implement them;
    8. Reaffirms also the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee 
established by General Assembly resolution 51/210 of 17 
December 1996;
    9. Decides that the Ad Hoc Committee shall meet from 16 to 
27 February 1998 to continue its work in accordance with the 
mandate provided in paragraph 9 of resolution 51/210, and 
recommends that the work continue during the fifty-third 
session of the General Assembly from 28 September to 9 October 
1998 within the framework of a working group of the Sixth 
Committee;
    10. Requests the Secretary-General to invite the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to assist the Ad Hoc 
Committee in its deliberations;
    11. Also requests the Secretary-General to continue to 
provide the Ad Hoc Committee with the necessary facilities for 
the performance of its work;
    12. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to report to the General 
Assembly at its fifty-third session on progress made in 
accomplishing its mandate;
    13. Recommends that the Ad Hoc Committee be convened in 
1999 to continue its work as referred to in paragraph 9 of 
resolution 51/210;
    14. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its 
fifty-third session the item entitled ``Measures to eliminate 
international terrorism''.

72nd plenary meeting
15 December 1997

                  (4) A/RES/51/210, December 17, 1996

               RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

             Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism

    The General Assembly,
    Recalling its resolution 49/60 of 9 December 1994, by which 
it adopted the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism, and its resolution 50/53 of 11 
December 1995,
    Recalling also the Declaration on the Occasion of the 
Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ See resolution 50/6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations,
    Deeply disturbed by the persistence of terrorist acts, 
which have taken place worldwide,
    Stressing the need further to strengthen international 
cooperation between States and between international 
organizations and agencies, regional organizations and 
arrangements and the United Nations in order to prevent, combat 
and eliminate terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, 
wherever and by whomsoever committed,
    Mindful of the need to enhance the role of the United 
Nations and the relevant specialized agencies in combating 
international terrorism,
    Noting, in this context, all regional and international 
efforts to combat international terrorism, including those of 
the Organization of African Unity, the Organization of American 
States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, the European Union, 
the Council of Europe, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries 
and the countries of the group of seven major industrialized 
countries and the Russian Federation,
    Taking note of the report of the Director-General of the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization on educational activities under the project 
entitled ``Towards a culture of peace'', \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ A/51/395, annex.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Recalling that in the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism the General Assembly encouraged States 
to review urgently the scope of the existing international 
legal provisions on the prevention, repression and elimination 
of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, with the aim 
of ensuring that there was a comprehensive legal framework 
covering all aspects of the matter,
    Bearing in mind the possibility of considering in the 
future the elaboration of a comprehensive convention on 
international terrorism,
    Noting that terrorist attacks by means of bombs, explosives 
or other incendiary or lethal devices have become increasingly 
widespread, and stressing the need to supplement the existing 
legal instruments in order to address specifically the problem 
of terrorist attacks carried out by such means,
    Recognizing the need to enhance international cooperation 
to prevent the use of nuclear materials for terrorist purposes 
and to develop an appropriate legal instrument,
    Recognizing also the need to strengthen international 
cooperation to prevent the use of chemical and biological 
materials for terrorist purposes,
    Convinced of the need to implement effectively and 
supplement the provisions of the Declaration on Measures to 
Eliminate International Terrorism,
    Having examined the report of the Secretary-General, \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ A/51/336 and Add.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                   I

    1. Strongly condemns all acts, methods and practices of 
terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by 
whomsoever committed;
    2. Reiterates that criminal acts intended or calculated to 
provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of 
persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any 
circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a 
political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, 
religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them;
    3. Calls upon all States to adopt further measures in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of international law, 
including international standards of human rights, to prevent 
terrorism and to strengthen international cooperation in 
combating terrorism and, to that end, to consider the adoption 
of measures such as those contained in the official document 
adopted by the group of seven major industrialized countries 
and the Russian Federation at the Ministerial Conference on 
Terrorism, held in Paris on 30 July 1996, \4\ and the plan of 
action adopted by the Inter-American Specialized Conference on 
Terrorism, held at Lima from 23 to 26 April 1996 under the 
auspices of the Organization of American States, \5\ and in 
particular calls upon all States:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ A/51/261, annex.
    \5\ See A/51/336, para. 57.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (a) To recommend that relevant security officials undertake 
consultations to improve the capability of Governments to 
prevent, investigate and respond to terrorist attacks on public 
facilities, in particular means of public transport, and to 
cooperate with other Governments in this respect;
    (b) To accelerate research and development regarding 
methods of detection of explosives and other harmful substances 
that can cause death or injury, undertake consultations on the 
development of standards for marking explosives in order to 
identify their origin in post-blast investigations, and promote 
cooperation and transfer of technology, equipment and related 
materials, where appropriate;
    (c) To note the risk of terrorists using electronic or wire 
communications systems and networks to carry out criminal acts 
and the need to find means, consistent with national law, to 
prevent such criminality and to promote cooperation where 
appropriate;
    (d) To investigate, when sufficient justification exists 
according to national laws, and acting within their 
jurisdiction and through appropriate channels of international 
cooperation, the abuse of organizations, groups or 
associations, including those with charitable, social or 
cultural goals, by terrorists who use them as a cover for their 
own activities;
    (e) To develop, if necessary, especially by entering into 
bilateral and multilateral agreements and arrangements, mutual 
legal assistance procedures aimed at facilitating and speeding 
investigations and collecting evidence, as well as cooperation 
between law enforcement agencies in order to detect and prevent 
terrorist acts;
    (f) To take steps to prevent and counteract, through 
appropriate domestic measures, the financing of terrorists and 
terrorist organizations, whether such financing is direct or 
indirect through organizations which also have or claim to have 
charitable, social or cultural goals or which are also engaged 
in unlawful activities such as illicit arms trafficking, drug 
dealing and racketeering, including the exploitation of persons 
for purposes of funding terrorist activities, and in particular 
to consider, where appropriate, adopting regulatory measures to 
prevent and counteract movements of funds suspected to be 
intended for terrorist purposes without impeding in any way the 
freedom of legitimate capital movements and to intensify the 
exchange of information concerning international movements of 
such funds;
    4. Also calls upon all States, with the aim of enhancing 
the efficient implementation of relevant legal instruments, to 
intensify, as and where appropriate, the exchange of 
information on facts related to terrorism and, in so doing, to 
avoid the dissemination of inaccurate or unverified 
information;
    5. Reiterates its call upon States to refrain from 
financing, encouraging, providing training for or otherwise 
supporting terrorist activities;
    6. Urges all States that have not yet done so to consider, 
as a matter of priority, becoming parties to the Convention on 
Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 
\6\ signed at Tokyo on 14 September 1963, the Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, \7\ signed at 
The Hague on 16 December 1970, the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation, \8\ concluded at Montreal on 23 September 1971, the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, 
\9\ adopted in New York on 14 December 1973, the International 
Convention against the Taking of Hostages, \10\ adopted in New 
York on 17 December 1979, the Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material, \11\ signed at Vienna on 3 
March 1980, the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, 
supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, \12\ signed at 
Montreal on 24 February 1988, the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation, \13\ done at Rome on 10 March 1988, the Protocol 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf, \14\ done at 
Rome on 10 March 1988, and the Convention on the Marking of 
Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, \15\ done at 
Montreal on 1 March 1991, and calls upon all States to enact, 
as appropriate, domestic legislation necessary to implement the 
provisions of those Conventions and Protocols, to ensure that 
the jurisdiction of their courts enables them to bring to trial 
the perpetrators of terrorist acts and to provide support and 
assistance to other Governments for those purposes;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 704, No. 10106.
    \7\ Ibid., vol. 860, No. 12325.
    \8\ Ibid., vol. 974, No. 14118.
    \9\ Ibid., vol. 1035, No. 15410.
    \10\ Resolution 34/146, annex.
    \11\ United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1456, No. 24631.
    \12\ International Civil Aviation Organization, document DOC 9518.
    \13\ International Maritime Organization, document SUA/CONF/15/
Rev.1.
    \14\ Ibid., document SUA/CONF/16/Rev.2.
    \15\ S/22393, annex I; see Official Records of the Security 
Council, Forty-sixth year, Supplement for January, February and March 
1991.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                   II

    7. Reaffirms the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism contained in the annex to resolution 
49/60;
    8. Approves the Declaration to Supplement the 1994 
Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, 
the text of which is annexed to the present resolution;

                                  III

    9. Decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee, open to all 
States Members of the United Nations or members of specialized 
agencies or of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to 
elaborate an international convention for the suppression of 
terrorist bombings and, subsequently, an international 
convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism, to 
supplement related existing international instruments, and 
thereafter to address means of further developing a 
comprehensive legal framework of conventions dealing with 
international terrorism;
    10. Decides also that the Ad Hoc Committee will meet from 
24 February to 7 March 1997 to prepare the text of a draft 
international convention for the suppression of terrorist 
bombings, and recommends that work continue during the fifty-
second session of the General Assembly from 22 September to 3 
October 1997 in the framework of a working group of the Sixth 
Committee;
    11. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the Ad Hoc 
Committee with the necessary facilities for the performance of 
its work;
    12. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to report to the General 
Assembly at its fifty-second session on progress made towards 
the elaboration of the draft convention;
    13. Recommends that the Ad Hoc Committee be convened in 
1998 to continue its work as referred to in paragraph 9 above;

                                   IV

    14. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its 
fifty- second session the item entitled ``Measures to eliminate 
international terrorism''.

88th plenary meeting
17 December 1996

                                 ANNEX

Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate 
                        International Terrorism

    The General Assembly,
    Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations,
    Recalling the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism adopted by the General Assembly by its 
resolution 49/60 of 9 December 1994,
    Recalling also the Declaration on the Occasion of the 
Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, \1\
    Deeply disturbed by the worldwide persistence of acts of 
international terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, 
including those in which States are directly or indirectly 
involved, which endanger or take innocent lives, have a 
deleterious effect on international relations and may 
jeopardize the security of States,
    Underlining the importance of States developing extradition 
agreements or arrangements as necessary in order to ensure that 
those responsible for terrorist acts are brought to justice,
    Noting that the Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees, \16\ done at Geneva on 28 July 1951, does not provide 
a basis for the protection of perpetrators of terrorist acts, 
noting also in this context articles 1, 2, 32 and 33 of the 
Convention, and emphasizing in this regard the need for States 
parties to ensure the proper application of the Convention,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189, No. 2545.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Stressing the importance of full compliance by States with 
their obligations under the provisions of the 1951 Convention 
\16\ and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 
\17\ including the principle of non-refoulement of refugees to 
places where their life or freedom would be threatened on 
account of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group or political opinion, and affirming 
that the present Declaration does not affect the protection 
afforded under the terms of the Convention and Protocol and 
other provisions of international law,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ Ibid., vol. 606, No. 8791.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Recalling article 4 of the Declaration on Territorial 
Asylum adopted by the General Assembly by its resolution 2312 
(XXII) of 14 December 1967,
    Stressing the need further to strengthen international 
cooperation between States in order to prevent, combat and 
eliminate terrorism in all its forms and manifestations,
    Solemnly declares the following:
    1. The States Members of the United Nations solemnly 
reaffirm their unequivocal condemnation of all acts, methods 
and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, 
wherever and by whomsoever committed, including those which 
jeopardize friendly relations among States and peoples and 
threaten the territorial integrity and security of States;
    2. The States Members of the United Nations reaffirm that 
acts, methods and practices of terrorism are contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations; they declare 
that knowingly financing, planning and inciting terrorist acts 
are also contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations;
    3. The States Members of the United Nations reaffirm that 
States should take appropriate measures in conformity with the 
relevant provisions of national and international law, 
including international standards of human rights, before 
granting refugee status, for the purpose of ensuring that the 
asylum-seeker has not participated in terrorist acts, 
considering in this regard relevant information as to whether 
the asylum-seeker is subject to investigation for or is charged 
with or has been convicted of offences connected with terrorism 
and, after granting refugee status, for the purpose of ensuring 
that that status is not used for the purpose of preparing or 
organizing terrorist acts intended to be committed against 
other States or their citizens;
    4. The States Members of the United Nations emphasize that 
asylum-seekers who are awaiting the processing of their asylum 
applications may not thereby avoid prosecution for terrorist 
acts;
    5. The States Members of the United Nations reaffirm the 
importance of ensuring effective cooperation between Member 
States so that those who have participated in terrorist acts, 
including their financing, planning or incitement, are brought 
to justice; they stress their commitment, in conformity with 
the relevant provisions of international law, including 
international standards of human rights, to work together to 
prevent, combat and eliminate terrorism and to take all 
appropriate steps under their domestic laws either to extradite 
terrorists or to submit the cases to their competent 
authorities for the purpose of prosecution;
    6. In this context, and while recognizing the sovereign 
rights of States in extradition matters, States are encouraged, 
when concluding or applying extradition agreements, not to 
regard as political offences excluded from the scope of those 
agreements offences connected with terrorism which endanger or 
represent a physical threat to the safety and security of 
persons, whatever the motives which may be invoked to justify 
them;
    7. States are also encouraged, even in the absence of a 
treaty, to consider facilitating the extradition of persons 
suspected of having committed terrorist acts, insofar as their 
national laws permit;
    8. The States Members of the United Nations emphasize the 
importance of taking steps to share expertise and information 
about terrorists, their movements, their support and their 
weapons and to share information regarding the investigation 
and prosecution of terrorist acts.

                   (5) A/RES/49/60, December 9, 1994

               RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

             Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism

    The General Assembly,
    Recalling its resolution 46/51 of 9 December 1991 and its 
decision 48/411 of 9 December 1993,
    Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General, \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ A/49/257 and Add.1-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Having considered in depth the question of measures to 
eliminate international terrorism,
    Convinced that the adoption of the declaration on measures 
to eliminate international terrorism should contribute to the 
enhancement of the struggle against international terrorism,
    1. Approves the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism, the text of which is annexed to the 
present resolution;
    2. Invites the Secretary-General to inform all States, the 
Security Council, the International Court of Justice and the 
relevant specialized agencies, organizations and organisms of 
the adoption of the Declaration;
    3. Urges that every effort be made in order that the 
Declaration becomes generally known and is observed and 
implemented in full;
    4. Urges States, in accordance with the provisions of the 
Declaration, to take all appropriate measures at the national 
and international levels to eliminate terrorism;
    5. Invites the Secretary-General to follow up closely the 
implementation of the present resolution and the Declaration, 
and to submit to the General Assembly at its fiftieth session a 
report thereon, relating, in particular, to the modalities of 
implementation of paragraph 10 of the Declaration;
    6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its 
fiftieth session the item entitled ``Measures to eliminate 
international terrorism'', in order to examine the report of 
the Secretary-General requested in paragraph 5 above, without 
prejudice to the annual or biennial consideration of the item.

84th plenary meeting
9 December 1994

                                 ANNEX

    Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International 
Terrorism
    The General Assembly,
    Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations,
    Recalling the Declaration on Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, \2\ the 
Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, \3\ 
the Definition of Aggression, \4\ the Declaration on the 
Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining 
from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations, \5\ 
the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, Adopted by the 
World Conference on Human Rights, \6\ the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights \7\ and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Resolution 2625 (XXV), annex.
    \3\ Resolution 2734 (XXV).
    \4\ Resolution 3314 (XXIX), annex.
    \5\ Resolution 42/22, annex.
    \6\ Report of the World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 14-25 
June 1993 (A/CONF.157/24 (Part I)), chap. III.
    \7\  See resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Deeply disturbed by the world-wide persistence of acts of 
international terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, 
including those in which States are directly or indirectly 
involved, which endanger or take innocent lives, have a 
deleterious effect on international relations and may 
jeopardize the security of States,
    Deeply concerned by the increase, in many regions of the 
world, of acts of terrorism based on intolerance or extremism,
    Concerned at the growing and dangerous links between 
terrorist groups and drug traffickers and their paramilitary 
gangs, which have resorted to all types of violence, thus 
endangering the constitutional order of States and violating 
basic human rights,
    Convinced of the desirability for closer coordination and 
cooperation among States in combating crimes closely connected 
with terrorism, including drug trafficking, unlawful arms 
trade, money laundering and smuggling of nuclear and other 
potentially deadly materials, and bearing in mind the role that 
could be played by both the United Nations and regional 
organizations in this respect,
    Firmly determined to eliminate international terrorism in 
all its forms and manifestations,
    Convinced also that the suppression of acts of 
international terrorism, including those in which States are 
directly or indirectly involved, is an essential element for 
the maintenance of international peace and security,
    Convinced further that those responsible for acts of 
international terrorism must be brought to justice,
    Stressing the imperative need to further strengthen 
international cooperation between States in order to take and 
adopt practical and effective measures to prevent, combat and 
eliminate all forms of terrorism that affect the international 
community as a whole,
    Conscious of the important role that might be played by the 
United Nations, the relevant specialized agencies and States in 
fostering widespread cooperation in preventing and combating 
international terrorism, inter alia, by increasing public 
awareness of the problem,
    Recalling the existing international treaties relating to 
various aspects of the problem of international terrorism, 
inter alia, the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts 
Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo on 14 September 
1963, \8\ the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970, 
\9\ the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against 
the Safety of Civil Aviation, concluded at Montreal on 23 
September 1971, \10\ the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, 
including Diplomatic Agents, adopted in New York on 14 December 
1973, \11\ the International Convention against the Taking of 
Hostages, adopted in New York on 17 December 1979, \12\ the 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 
adopted at Vienna on 3 March 1980, \13\ the Protocol for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving 
International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 24 February 1988, \14\ 
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at Rome on 10 March 1988, 
\15\ the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against 
the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf, 
done at Rome on 10 March 1988, \16\ and the Convention on the 
Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, 
done at Montreal on 1 March 1991, \17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 704, No. 10106.
    \9\ Ibid., vol. 860, No. 12325.
    \10\ Ibid., vol. 974, No. 14118.
    \11\ Ibid., vol. 1035, No. 15410.
    \12\ Resolution 34/146, annex.
    \13\ International Atomic Energy Agency, document INFCIRC/225; to 
be published in United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1456, No. 24631.
    \14\ International Civil Aviation Organization, document DOC 9518.
    \15\ International Maritime Organization, document SUA/CONF/15/
Rev.1.
    \16\ Ibid., document SUA/CONF/16/Rev.2.
    \17\ See S/22393 and Corr.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Welcoming the conclusion of regional agreements and 
mutually agreed declarations to combat and eliminate terrorism 
in all its forms and manifestations,
    Convinced of the desirability of keeping under review the 
scope of existing international legal provisions to combat 
terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, with the aim of 
ensuring a comprehensive legal framework for the prevention and 
elimination of terrorism,
    Solemnly declares the following:

                                   I

    1. The States Members of the United Nations solemnly 
reaffirm their unequivocal condemnation of all acts, methods 
and practices of terrorism, as criminal and unjustifiable, 
wherever and by whomever committed, including those which 
jeopardize the friendly relations among States and peoples and 
threaten the territorial integrity and security of States;
    2. Acts, methods and practices of terrorism constitute a 
grave violation of the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations, which may pose a threat to international peace and 
security, jeopardize friendly relations among States, hinder 
international cooperation and aim at the destruction of human 
rights, fundamental freedoms and the democratic bases of 
society;
    3. Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state 
of terror in the general public, a group of persons or 
particular persons for political purposes are in any 
circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a 
political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, 
religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify 
them;

                                   II

    4. States, guided by the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations and other relevant rules of 
international law, must refrain from organizing, instigating, 
assisting or participating in terrorist acts in territories of 
other States, or from acquiescing in or encouraging activities 
within their territories directed towards the commission of 
such acts;
    5. States must also fulfil their obligations under the 
Charter of the United Nations and other provisions of 
international law with respect to combating international 
terrorism and are urged to take effective and resolute measures 
in accordance with the relevant provisions of international law 
and international standards of human rights for the speedy and 
final elimination of international terrorism, in particular:
    (a) To refrain from organizing, instigating, facilitating, 
financing, encouraging or tolerating terrorist activities and 
to take appropriate practical measures to ensure that their 
respective territories are not used for terrorist installations 
or training camps, or for the preparation or organization of 
terrorist acts intended to be committed against other States or 
their citizens;
    (b) To ensure the apprehension and prosecution or 
extradition of perpetrators of terrorist acts, in accordance 
with the relevant provisions of their national law;
    (c) To endeavour to conclude special agreements to that 
effect on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis, and to 
prepare, to that effect, model agreements on cooperation;
    (d) To cooperate with one another in exchanging relevant 
information concerning the prevention and combating of 
terrorism;
    (e) To take promptly all steps necessary to implement the 
existing international conventions on this subject to which 
they are parties, including the harmonization of their domestic 
legislation with those conventions;
    (f) To take appropriate measures, before granting asylum, 
for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum seeker has not 
engaged in terrorist activities and, after granting asylum, for 
the purpose of ensuring that the refugee status is not used in 
a manner contrary to the provisions set out in subparagraph (a) 
above;
    6. In order to combat effectively the increase in, and the 
growing international character and effects of, acts of 
terrorism, States should enhance their cooperation in this area 
through, in particular, systematizing the exchange of 
information concerning the prevention and combating of 
terrorism, as well as by effective implementation of the 
relevant international conventions and conclusion of mutual 
judicial assistance and extradition agreements on a bilateral, 
regional and multilateral basis;
    7. In this context, States are encouraged to review 
urgently the scope of the existing international legal 
provisions on the prevention, repression and elimination of 
terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, with the aim of 
ensuring that there is a comprehensive legal framework covering 
all aspects of the matter;
    8. Furthermore States that have not yet done so are urged 
to consider, as a matter of priority, becoming parties to the 
international conventions and protocols relating to various 
aspects of international terrorism referred to in the preamble 
to the present Declaration;

                                  III

    9. The United Nations, the relevant specialized agencies 
and intergovernmental organizations and other relevant bodies 
must make every effort with a view to promoting measures to 
combat and eliminate acts of terrorism and to strengthening 
their role in this field;
    10. The Secretary-General should assist in the 
implementation of the present Declaration by taking, within 
existing resources, the following practical measures to enhance 
international cooperation:
    (a) A collection of data on the status and implementation 
of existing multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements 
relating to international terrorism, including information on 
incidents caused by international terrorism and criminal 
prosecutions and sentencing, based on information received from 
the depositaries of those agreements and from Member States;
    (b) A compendium of national laws and regulations regarding 
the prevention and suppression of international terrorism in 
all its forms and manifestations, based on information received 
from Member States;
    (c) An analytical review of existing international legal 
instruments relating to international terrorism, in order to 
assist States in identifying aspects of this matter that have 
not been covered by such instruments and could be addressed to 
develop further a comprehensive legal framework of conventions 
dealing with international terrorism;
    (d) A review of existing possibilities within the United 
Nations system for assisting States in organizing workshops and 
training courses on combating crimes connected with 
international terrorism;

                                   IV

    11. All States are urged to promote and implement in good 
faith and effectively the provisions of the present Declaration 
in all its aspects;
    12. Emphasis is placed on the need to pursue efforts aiming 
at eliminating definitively all acts of terrorism by the 
strengthening of international cooperation and progressive 
development of international law and its codification, as well 
as by enhancement of coordination between, and increase of the 
efficiency of, the United Nations and the relevant specialized 
agencies, organizations and bodies.

                   (6) A/RES/46/51, December 9, 1991

             Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism

               RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

    The General Assembly,
    Recalling its resolutions 3034 (XXVII) of 18 December 1972, 
31/102 of 15 December 1976, 32/147 of 16 December 1977, 34/145 
of 17 December 1979, 36/109 of 10 December 1981, 38/130 of 19 
December 1983, 40/61 of 9 December 1985, 42/159 of 7 December 
1987 and 44/29 of 4 December 1989,
    Recalling also the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee 
on International Terrorism contained in its report to the 
General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session,
    Recalling further the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, the Declaration on the Strengthening of International 
Security, the Definition of Aggression and relevant instruments 
on international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict,
    Recalling moreover the existing international conventions 
relating to various aspects of the problem of international 
terrorism, inter alia, the Convention on Offences and Certain 
Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo on 14 
September 1963, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970, 
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Civil Aviation, concluded at Montreal on 23 September 
1971, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic 
Agents, adopted in New York on 14 December 1973, the 
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, 
adopted in New York on 17 December 1979, the Convention on the 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted at Vienna on 3 
March 1980, the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, 
supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal 
on 24 February 1988, the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done 
at Rome on 10 March 1988, the Protocol for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on 
the Continental Shelf, done at Rome on 10 March 1988 and the 
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose 
of Detection, done at Montreal on 1 March 1991,
    Convinced that a policy of firmness and effective measures 
should be taken in accordance with international law in order 
that all acts, methods and practices of international terrorism 
may be brought to an end,
    Bearing in mind Security Council resolution 638 (1989) of 
31 July 1989 on the taking of hostages,
    Deeply disturbed by the world-wide persistence of acts of 
international terrorism in all its forms, including those in 
which States are directly or indirectly involved, which 
endanger or take innocent lives, have a deleterious effect on 
international relations and may jeopardize the territorial 
integrity and security of States,
    Calling attention to the growing connection between 
terrorist groups and drug traffickers,
    Convinced of the importance of the observance by States of 
their obligations under the relevant international conventions 
to ensure that appropriate law enforcement measures are taken 
in connection with the offences addressed in those conventions,
    Convinced also of the importance of expanding and improving 
international cooperation among States, on a bilateral, 
regional and multilateral basis, which will contribute to the 
elimination of acts of international terrorism and their 
underlying causes and to the prevention and elimination of this 
criminal scourge,
    Convinced further that international cooperation in 
combating and preventing terrorism will contribute to the 
strengthening of confidence among States, reduce tensions and 
create a better climate among them,
    Mindful of the need to enhance the role of the United 
Nations and the relevant specialized agencies in combating 
international terrorism,
    Mindful also of the necessity of maintaining and protecting 
the basic rights of, and guarantees for, the individual in 
accordance with the relevant international human rights 
instruments and generally accepted international standards,
    Reaffirming the principle of self-determination of peoples 
as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,
    Reaffirming also the inalienable right to self-
determination and independence of all peoples under colonial 
and racist regimes and other forms of alien domination and 
foreign occupation, and upholding the legitimacy of their 
struggle, in particular the struggle of national liberation 
movements, in accordance with the purposes and principles of 
the Charter and the Declaration on Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
    Noting the efforts and important achievements of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization and the International 
Maritime Organization in promoting the security of 
international air and sea transport against acts of terrorism,
    Recognizing that the effectiveness of the struggle against 
terrorism could be enhanced by the establishment of a generally 
agreed definition of international terrorism,
    Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General,
    1. Once again unequivocally condemns, as criminal and 
unjustifiable, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism 
wherever and by whomever committed, including those which 
jeopardize the friendly relations among States and their 
security;
    2. Deeply deplores the loss of human lives which results 
from such acts of terrorism, as well as the pernicious impact 
of these acts on relations of cooperation among States;
    3. Calls upon all States to fulfil their obligations under 
international law to refrain from organizing, instigating, 
assisting or participating in terrorist acts in other States, 
or acquiescing in or encouraging activities within their 
territory directed towards the commission of such acts;
    4. Urges all States to fulfil their obligations under 
international law and take effective and resolute measures for 
the speedy and final elimination of international terrorism and 
to that end, in particular:
    (a) To prevent the preparation and organization in their 
respective territories, for commission within or outside their 
territories, of terrorist and subversive acts directed against 
other States and their citizens;
    (b) To ensure the apprehension and prosecution or 
extradition of perpetrators of terrorist acts;
    (c) To endeavour to conclude special agreements to that 
effect on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis;
    (d) To cooperate with one another in exchanging relevant 
information concerning the prevention and combating of 
terrorism;
    (e) To take promptly all steps necessary to implement the 
existing international conventions on this subject to which 
they are parties, including the harmonization of their domestic 
legislation with those conventions;
    5. Appeals to all States that have not yet done so to 
consider becoming party to the international conventions 
relating to various aspects of international terrorism referred 
to in the preamble to the present resolution;
    6. Urges all States, unilaterally and in cooperation with 
other States, as well as relevant United Nations organs, to 
contribute to the progressive elimination of the causes 
underlying international terrorism and to pay special attention 
to all situations, including colonialism, racism and situations 
involving mass and flagrant violations of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and those involving alien domination and 
foreign occupation, that may give rise to international 
terrorism and may endanger international peace and security;
    7. Firmly calls for the immediate and safe release of all 
hostages and abducted persons, wherever and by whomever they 
are being held;
    8. Calls upon all States to use their political influence 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the 
principles of international law to secure the safe release of 
all hostages and abducted persons and to prevent the commission 
of acts of hostage-taking and abduction;
    9. Expresses concern at the growing and dangerous links 
between terrorist groups, drug traffickers and their 
paramilitary gangs, which have resorted to all types of 
violence, thus endangering the constitutional order of States 
and violating basic human rights;
    10. Welcomes the efforts undertaken by the International 
Civil Aviation Organization aimed at promoting universal 
acceptance of, and strict compliance with, international air 
security conventions, and welcomes also the recent adoption of 
the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the 
Purpose of Detection;
    11. Requests the other relevant specialized agencies and 
intergovernmental organizations, in particular the 
International Maritime Organization, the Universal Postal 
Union, the World Tourism Organization, the International Atomic 
Energy Agency and the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization, within their respective spheres of 
competence, to consider what further measures can usefully be 
taken to combat and eliminate terrorism;
    12. Requests the Secretary-General to continue seeking the 
views of Member States on international terrorism in all its 
aspects and on ways and means of combating it, including the 
convening at an appropriate time, under the auspices of the 
United Nations, of an international conference to deal with 
international terrorism in the light of the proposal referred 
to in the penultimate preambular paragraph of resolution 44/29;
    13. Also requests the Secretary-General to seek the views 
of Member States on the proposals contained in his report or 
made during the debate on this item in the Sixth Committee, and 
on the ways and means of enhancing the role of the United 
Nations and the relevant specialized agencies in combating 
international terrorism;
    14. Further requests the Secretary-General to follow up, as 
appropriate, the implementation of the present resolution and 
to submit a report in this respect to the General Assembly at 
its forty-eighth session;
    15. Considers that nothing in the present resolution could 
in any way prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom 
and independence, as derived from the Charter of the United 
Nations, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right referred to 
in the Declaration of Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, particularly 
peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of 
alien domination, or the right of these peoples to struggle 
legitimately to this end and to seek and receive support in 
accordance with the principles of the Charter, the above-
mentioned Declaration and the relevant General Assembly 
resolutions, including the present resolution;
    16. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its 
forty-eighth session an item entitled ``Measures to eliminate 
international terrorism''.

                   (7) A/RES/40/61, December 9, 1985

               RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

             Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism

    Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers 
or takes innocent human lives or jeopardizes fundamental 
freedoms and study of the underlying causes of those forms of 
terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, 
frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people 
to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to 
effect radical changes
    The General Assembly,
    Recalling its resolutions 3034 (XXVII) of 18 December 1972, 
31/102 of 15 December 1976, 32/147 of 16 December 1977, 34/145 
of 17 December 1979, 36/109 of 10 December 1981 and 38/130 of 
19 December 1983,
    Recalling also the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, the Declaration on the Strengthening of 
International Security, the Definition of Aggression and 
relevant instruments on international humanitarian law 
applicable in armed conflict,
    Further recalling the existing international conventions 
relating to various aspects of the problem of international 
terrorism, inter alia, the Convention on Offences and Certain 
Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo on 14 
September 1963, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970, 
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 23 September 
1971, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic 
Agents, signed at New York on 14 December 1973, and the 
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, 
adopted at New York on 17 December 1979,
    Deeply concerned about the world-wide escalation of acts of 
terrorism in all its forms, which endanger or take innocent 
human lives, jeopardize fundamental freedoms and seriously 
impair the dignity of human beings,
    Taking note of the deep concern and condemnation of all 
acts of international terrorism expressed by the Security 
Council and the Secretary-General,
    Convinced of the importance of expanding and improving 
international co-operation among States, on a bilateral and 
multilateral basis, which will contribute to the elimination of 
acts of international terrorism and their underlying causes and 
to the prevention and elimination of this criminal scourge,
    Reaffirming the principle of self-determination of peoples 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,
    Reaffirming also the inalienable right to self-
determination and independence of all peoples under colonial 
and racist regimes and other forms of alien domination, and 
upholding the legitimacy of their struggle, in particular the 
struggle of national liberation movements, in accordance with 
the purposes and principles of the Charter and of the 
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations,
    Mindful of the necessity of maintaining and safeguarding 
the basic rights of the individual in accordance with the 
relevant international human rights instruments and generally 
accepted international standards,
    Convinced of the importance of the observance by States of 
their obligations under the relevant international conventions 
to ensure that appropriate law enforcement measures are taken 
in connection with the offences addressed in those Conventions,
    Expressing its concern that in recent years terrorism has 
taken on forms that have an increasingly deleterious effect on 
international relations, which may jeopardize the very 
territorial integrity and security of States,
    Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General,
    1. Unequivocally condemns, as criminal, all acts, methods 
and practices of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed, 
including those which jeopardize friendly relations among 
States and their security;
    2. Deeply deplores the loss of innocent human lives which 
results from such acts of terrorism;
    3. Also deplores the pernicious impact of acts of 
international terrorism on relations of co-operation among 
States, including co-operation for development;
    4. Appeals to all States that have not yet done so to 
consider becoming party to the existing international 
conventions relating to various aspects of international 
terrorism;
    5. Invites all States to take all appropriate measures at 
the national level with a view to the speedy and final 
elimination of the problem of international terrorism, such as 
the harmonization of domestic legislation with existing 
international conventions, the fulfilment of assumed 
international obligations, and the prevention of the 
preparation and organization in their respective territories of 
acts directed against other States;
    6. Calls upon all States to fulfil their obligations under 
international law to refrain from organizing, instigating, 
assisting or participating in terrorist acts in other States, 
or acquiescing in activities within their territory directed 
towards the commission of such acts;
    7. Urges all States not to allow any circumstances to 
obstruct the application of appropriate law enforcement 
measures provided for in the relevant conventions to which they 
are party to persons who commit acts of international terrorism 
covered by those conventions;
    8. Also urges all States to co-operate with one another 
more closely, especially through the exchange of relevant 
information concerning the prevention and combating of 
terrorism, the apprehension and prosecution or extradition of 
the perpetrators of such acts, the conclusion of special 
treaties and/or the incorporation into appropriate bilateral 
treaties of special clauses, in particular regarding the 
extradition or prosecution of terrorists;
    9. Further urges all States, unilaterally and in co-
operation with other States, as well as relevant United Nations 
organs, to contribute to the progressive elimination of the 
causes underlying international terrorism and to pay special 
attention to all situations, including colonialism, racism and 
situations involving mass and flagrant violations of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and those involving alien 
occupation, that may give rise to international terrorism and 
may endanger international peace and security;
    10. Calls upon all States to observe and implement the 
recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee on International 
Terrorism contained in its report to the General Assembly at 
its thirty-fourth session;
    11. Also calls upon all States to take all appropriate 
measures as recommended by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization and as set forth in relevant international 
conventions to prevent terrorist attacks against civil aviation 
transport and other forms of public transport;
    12. Encourages the International Civil Aviation 
Organization to continue its efforts aimed at promoting 
universal acceptance of and strict compliance with the 
international air security conventions;
    13. Requests the International Maritime Organization to 
study the problem of terrorism aboard or against ships with a 
view to making recommendations on appropriate measures;
    14. Requests the Secretary-General to follow up, as 
appropriate, the implementation of the present resolution and 
to submit a report to the General Assembly at its forty-second 
session;
    15. Decides to include the item in the provisional agenda 
of its forty-second session.

  b. General Assembly/Security Council: A/46/831 S/2317, December 23, 
                                  1991

            LETTER FROM THE ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE

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             c. Security Council: Resolutions on Terrorism

                    (1) S/RES/1192, August 27, 1998

                         RESOLUTION 1192 (1998)

  Adopted by the Security Council at its 3920th meeting, on 27 August 
                                  1998

    The Security Council,
    Recalling its resolutions 731 (1992) of 21 January 1992, 
748 (1992) of 31 March 1992 and 883 (1993) of 11 November 1993,
    Noting the report of the independent experts appointed by 
the Secretary-General (S/1997/991),
    Having regard to the contents of the letter dated 24 August 
1998 from the Acting Permanent Representatives of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of the United 
States of America to the Secretary-General (S/1998/795),
    Noting also, in light of the above resolutions, the 
communications of the Organization of African Unity, the League 
of Arab States, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Islamic 
Conference (S/1994/373, S/1995/834, S/1997/35, S/1997/273, S/
1997/406, S/1997/497, S/1997/529) as referred to in the letter 
of 24 August 1998,
    Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations,
    1. Demands once again that the Libyan Government 
immediately comply with the above-mentioned resolutions;
    2. Welcomes the initiative for the trial of the two persons 
charged with the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 (``the two 
accused'') before a Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands, 
as contained in the letter dated 24 August 1998 from the Acting 
Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and of the United States of 
America (``the initiative'') and its attachments, and the 
willingness of the Government of the Netherlands to cooperate 
in the implementation of the initiative;
    3. Calls upon the Government of the Netherlands and the 
Government of the United Kingdom to take such steps as are 
necessary to implement the initiative, including the conclusion 
of arrangements with a view to enabling the court described in 
paragraph 2 to exercise jurisdiction in the terms of the 
intended Agreement between the two Governments, attached to the 
said letter of 24 August 1998;
    4. Decides that all States shall cooperate to this end, and 
in particular that the Libyan Government shall ensure the 
appearance in the Netherlands of the two accused for the 
purpose of trial by the court described in paragraph 2, and 
that the Libyan Government shall ensure that any evidence or 
witnesses in Libya are, upon the request of the court, promptly 
made available at the court in the Netherlands for the purpose 
of the trial;
    5. Requests the Secretary-General, after consultation with 
the Government of the Netherlands, to assist the Libyan 
Government with the physical arrangements for the safe transfer 
of the two accused from Libya direct to the Netherlands;
    6. Invites the Secretary-General to nominate international 
observers to attend the trial;
    7. Decides further that, on the arrival of the two accused 
in the Netherlands, the Government of the Netherlands shall 
detain the two accused pending their transfer for the purpose 
of trial before the court described in paragraph 2;
    8. Reaffirms that the measures set forth in its resolutions 
748 (1992) and 883 (1993) remain in effect and binding on all 
Member States, and in this context reaffirms the provisions of 
paragraph 16 of resolution 883 (1993), and decides that the 
aforementioned measures shall be suspended immediately if the 
Secretary-General reports to the Council that the two accused 
have arrived in the Netherlands for the purpose of trial before 
the court described in paragraph 2 or have appeared for trial 
before an appropriate court in the United Kingdom or the United 
States, and that the Libyan Government has satisfied the French 
judicial authorities with regard to the bombing of UTA 772;
    9. Expresses its intention to consider additional measures 
if the two accused have not arrived or appeared for trial 
promptly in accordance with paragraph 8;
    10. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

                 (2) S/RES/1189 (1998), August 13, 1998

                         RESOLUTION 1189 (1998)

  Adopted by the Security Council at its 3915th meeting, on 13 August 
                                  1998

    The Security Council,
    Deeply disturbed by the indiscriminate and outrageous acts 
of international terrorism that took place on 7 August 1998 in 
Nairobi, Kenya and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania,
    Condemning such acts which have a damaging effect on 
international relations and jeopardize the security of States,
    Convinced that the suppression of acts of international 
terrorism is essential for the maintenance of international 
peace and security, and reaffirming the determination of the 
international community to eliminate international terrorism in 
all its forms and manifestations,
    Also reaffirming the obligations of Member States under the 
Charter of the United Nations,
    Stressing that every Member State has the duty to refrain 
from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in 
terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized 
activities within its territory directed towards the commission 
of such acts,
    Mindful of General Assembly resolution 52/164 of 15 
December 1997 on the International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings,
    Recalling that, in the statement issued on 31 January 1992 
(S/23500) on the occasion of the meeting of the Security 
Council at the level of Heads of State and Government, the 
Council expressed its deep concern over acts of international 
terrorism, and emphasized the need for the international 
community to deal effectively with all such criminal acts,
    Also stressing the need to strengthen international 
cooperation between States in order to adopt practical and 
effective measures to prevent, combat and eliminate all forms 
of terrorism affecting the international community as a whole,
    Commending the responses of the Governments of Kenya, 
Tanzania and the United States of America to the terrorist bomb 
attacks in Kenya and Tanzania,
    Determined to eliminate international terrorism,
    1. Strongly condemns the terrorist bomb attacks in Nairobi, 
Kenya and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania on 7 August 1998 which 
claimed hundreds of innocent lives, injured thousands of people 
and caused massive destruction to property;
    2. Expresses its deep sorrow, sympathy and condolences to 
the families of the innocent victims of the terrorist bomb 
attacks during this difficult time;
    3. Calls upon all States and international institutions to 
cooperate with and provide support and assistance to the 
ongoing investigations in Kenya, Tanzania and the United States 
to apprehend the perpetrators of these cowardly criminal acts 
and to bring them swiftly to justice;
    4. Expresses its sincere gratitude to all States, 
international institutions and voluntary organizations for 
their encouragement and timely response to the requests for 
assistance from the Governments of Kenya and Tanzania, and 
urges them to assist the affected countries, especially in the 
reconstruction of infrastructure and disaster preparedness;
    5. Calls upon all States to adopt, in accordance with 
international law and as a matter of priority, effective and 
practical measures for security cooperation, for the prevention 
of such acts of terrorism, and for the prosecution and 
punishment of their perpetrators;
    6. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

                   (3) S/RES/1070, August 16, 1996 *

                        RESOLUTION 1070 (1996)*

  Adopted by the Security Council at its 3690th meeting, on 16 August 
                                  1996

    The Security Council,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * Reissued for technical reasons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Recalling its resolutions 1044 (1996) of 31 January 1996 
and 1054 (1996) of 26 April 1996,
    Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 10 
July 1996 (S/1996/541 and Add.1, 2 and 3),
    Taking note of the letters of 31 May 1996 (S/1996/402), 24 
June 1996 (S/1996/464) and 2 July 1996 (S/1996/513) from the 
Permanent Representative of the Sudan,
    Taking note also of the letter of 10 July 1996 (S/1996/538) 
from the Permanent Representative of the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia,
    Gravely alarmed at the terrorist assassination attempt on 
the life of the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, in 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 26 June 1995, and convinced that 
those responsible for that act must be brought to justice,
    Taking note that the statements of the Central Organ of the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution of 11 September 1995, and 
of 19 December 1995 (S/1996/10, annexes I and II) considered 
the attempt on the life of President Mubarak as aimed, not only 
at the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and not only at 
the sovereignty, integrity and stability of Ethiopia, but also 
at Africa as a whole,
    Regretting the fact that the Government of Sudan has not 
yet complied with the requests of the Central Organ of the OAU 
set out in those statements,
    Taking note of the continued efforts of the OAU to ensure 
Sudan's compliance with the requests of the Central Organ of 
the OAU, and regretting that the Government of Sudan has not 
responded adequately to the efforts of the OAU,
    Deeply alarmed that the Government of Sudan has failed to 
comply with the requests set out in paragraph 4 of resolution 
1044 (1996) as reaffirmed in paragraph 1 of resolution 1054 
(1996),
    Reaffirming that the suppression of acts of international 
terrorism, including those in which States are involved is 
essential for the maintenance of international peace and 
security,
    Determining that the non-compliance by the Government of 
Sudan with the requests set out in paragraph 4 of resolution 
1044 (1996) as reaffirmed in paragraph 1 of resolution 1054 
(1996) constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security,
    Determined to eliminate international terrorism and to 
ensure the effective implementation of resolutions 1044 (1996) 
and 1054 (1996), and to that end acting under Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations,
    1. Demands once again that the Government of Sudan comply 
fully and without further delay with the requests set out in 
paragraph 4 of resolution 1044 (1996) as reaffirmed in 
paragraph 1 of resolution 1054 (1996);
    2. Notes the steps taken by some Member States to give 
effect to the provisions set out in paragraph 3 of resolution 
1054 (1996), and requests those States that have not yet done 
so to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible on 
the steps they have taken to that end;
    3. Decides that all States shall deny aircraft permission 
to take off from, land in, or overfly their territories if the 
aircraft is registered in Sudan, or owned, leased or operated 
by or on behalf of Sudan Airways or by any undertaking, 
wherever located or organized, which is substantially owned or 
controlled by Sudan Airways, or owned, leased or operated by 
the Government or public authorities of Sudan, or by an 
undertaking, wherever located or organized, which is 
substantially owned or controlled by the Government or public 
authorities of Sudan;
    4. Further decides that it shall, 90 days after the date of 
adoption of this resolution, determine the date of entry into 
force of the provisions set out in paragraph 3 above and all 
aspects of the modalities of its implementation, unless the 
Council decides before then, on the basis of a report presented 
by the Secretary-General, on the compliance of Sudan with the 
demand in paragraph 1 above;
    5. Requests the Secretary-General, by 15 November 1996, to 
submit a report on the compliance of Sudan with the provisions 
of paragraph 1 above;
    6. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

                     (4) S/RES/1054, April 26, 1996

                         RESOLUTION 1054 (1996)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3660th meeting, on 26 April 1996

    The Security Council,
    Reaffirming its resolution 1044 (1996) of 31 January 1996,
    Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General of 11 
March 1996 (S/1996/179) submitted pursuant to paragraph 7 of 
resolution 1044 (1996) and the conclusions contained therein,
    Gravely alarmed at the terrorist assassination attempt on 
the life of the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, in 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 26 June 1995, and convinced that 
those responsible for that act must be brought to justice,
    Taking note that the statements of the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management and Resolution of 11 September 1995, and of 19 
December 1995 (S/1996/10, annexes I and II) considered the 
attempt on the life of President Mubarak as aimed, not only at 
the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and not only at 
the sovereignty, integrity and stability of Ethiopia, but also 
at Africa as a whole,
    Regretting the fact that the Government of Sudan has not 
yet complied with the requests of the Central Organ of the OAU 
set out in those statements,
    Taking note of the continued effort of the OAU Secretary-
General to ensure Sudan's compliance with the requests of the 
Central Organ of the OAU,
    Taking note also, with regret, that the Government of Sudan 
has not responded adequately to the efforts of the OAU,
    Deeply alarmed that the Government of Sudan has failed to 
comply with the requests set out in paragraph 4 of resolution 
1044 (1996),
    Reaffirming that the suppression of acts of international 
terrorism, including those in which States are involved is 
essential for the maintenance of international peace and 
security,
    Determining that the non-compliance by the Government of 
Sudan with the requests set out in paragraph 4 of resolution 
1044 (1996) constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security,
    Determined to eliminate international terrorism and to 
ensure effective implementation of resolution 1044 (1996) and 
to that end acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations,
    1. Demands that the Government of Sudan comply without 
further delay with the requests set out in paragraph 4 of 
resolution 1044 (1996) by:
    (a) Taking immediate action to ensure extradition to 
Ethiopia for prosecution of the three suspects sheltered in 
Sudan and wanted in connection with the assassination attempt 
of 26 June 1995 on the life of the President of the Arab 
Republic of Egypt in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; and
    (b) Desisting from engaging in activities of assisting, 
supporting and facilitating terrorist activities and from 
giving shelter and sanctuary to terrorist elements; and 
henceforth acting in its relations with its neighbours and with 
others in full conformity with the Charter of the United 
Nations and with the Charter of the OAU;
    2. Decides that the provisions set out in paragraph 3 below 
shall come into force at 00.01 Eastern Standard Time on 10 May 
1996, and shall remain in force until the Council determines 
that the Government of Sudan has complied with paragraph 1 
above;
    3. Decides that all States shall:
    (a) Significantly reduce the number and the level of the 
staff at Sudanese diplomatic missions and consular posts and 
restrict or control the movement within their territory of all 
such staff who remain;
    (b) Take steps to restrict the entry into or transit 
through their territory of members of the Government of Sudan, 
officials of that Government and members of the Sudanese armed 
forces;
    4. Calls upon all international and regional organizations 
not to convene any conference in Sudan;
    5. Calls upon all States, including States not members of 
the United Nations and the United Nations specialized agencies 
to act strictly in conformity with this resolution, 
notwithstanding the existence of any rights granted or 
obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement 
or of any contract entered into or any licence or permit 
granted prior to the entry into force of the provisions set out 
in paragraph 3 above;
    6. Requests States to report to the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations within 60 days from the adoption of this 
resolution on the steps they have taken to give effect to the 
provisions set out in paragraph 3 above;
    7. Requests the Secretary-General to submit an initial 
report to the Council within 60 days of the date specified in 
paragraph 2 above on the implementation of this resolution;
    8. Decides to re-examine the matter, 60 days after the date 
specified in paragraph 2 above and to consider, on the basis of 
the facts established by the Secretary-General, whether Sudan 
has complied with the demands in paragraph 1 above and, if not, 
whether to adopt further measures to ensure its compliance;
    9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

                    (5) S/RES/1044, January 31, 1996

                         RESOLUTION 1044 (1996)

 Adopted by the Security Council at its 3627th meeting, on 31 January 
                                  1996

    The Security Council,
    Deeply disturbed by the world-wide persistence of acts of 
international terrorism in all its forms which endanger or take 
innocent lives, have a deleterious effect on international 
relations and jeopardize the security of States,
    Recalling the statement made by the President of the 
Security Council on 31 January 1992 (S/23500) when the Council 
met at the level of Heads of State and Government in which the 
members of the Council expressed their deep concern over acts 
of international terrorism and emphasized the need for the 
international community to deal effectively with all such acts,
    Recalling also the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, 
including Diplomatic Agents, opened for signature at New York 
on 14 December 1973,
    Stressing the imperative need to strengthen international 
cooperation between States in order to make and adopt practical 
and effective measures to prevent, combat and eliminate all 
forms of terrorism that affect the international community as a 
whole,
    Convinced that the suppression of acts of international 
terrorism, including those in which States are involved, is an 
essential element for the maintenance of international peace 
and security,
    Gravely alarmed at the terrorist assassination attempt on 
the life of the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, in 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 26 June 1995, and convinced that 
those responsible for that act must be brought to justice,
    Taking note that the Third Extraordinary Session of the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution of 11 September 1995, 
considered that attack as aimed, not only at the President of 
the Arab Republic of Egypt, and not only at the sovereignty, 
integrity and stability of Ethiopia, but also at Africa as a 
whole,
    Taking note also of the statements of the Central Organ of 
the OAU Mechanism of 11 September 1995 and of 19 December 1995 
and supporting the implementation of the requests contained 
therein,
    Regretting the fact that the Government of the Sudan has 
not yet complied with the requests of the Central Organ of the 
OAU set out in those statements,
    Noting the letter from the Permanent Representative of 
Ethiopia of 9 January 1996 (S/1996/10) to the President of the 
Security Council,
    Noting also the letters from the Permanent Representative 
of the Sudan of 11 January 1996 (S/1996/22) and 12 January 1996 
(S/1996/25) to the President of the Council,
    1. Condemns the terrorist assassination attempt on the life 
of the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, on 26 June 1995;
    2. Strongly deplores the flagrant violation of the 
sovereignty and integrity of Ethiopia and the attempt to 
disturb the peace and security of Ethiopia and the region as a 
whole;
    3. Commends the efforts of the Government of Ethiopia to 
resolve this issue through bilateral and regional arrangements;
    4. Calls upon the Government of the Sudan to comply with 
the requests of the Organization of African Unity without 
further delay to:
    (a) Undertake immediate action to extradite to Ethiopia for 
prosecution the three suspects sheltering in the Sudan and 
wanted in connection with the assassination attempt on the 
basis of the 1964 Extradition Treaty between Ethiopia and the 
Sudan;
    (b) Desist from engaging in activities of assisting, 
supporting and facilitating terrorist activities and from 
giving shelter and sanctuaries to terrorist elements and act in 
its relations with its neighbours and with others in full 
conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and with the 
Charter of the Organization of African Unity;
    5. Urges the international community to encourage the 
Government of the Sudan to respond fully and effectively to the 
OAU requests;
    6. Welcomes the efforts of the Secretary-General of the OAU 
aimed at the implementation of the relevant provisions of the 
statements of the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism of 11 
September 1995 and of 19 December 1995, and supports the OAU in 
its continued efforts to implement its decisions;
    7. Requests the Secretary-General in consultation with the 
OAU to seek the cooperation of the Government of the Sudan in 
the implementation of this resolution and to report to the 
Council within 60 days;
    8. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

                    (6) S/RES/883, November 11, 1993

                         RESOLUTION 883 (1993)

 Adopted by the Security Council at its 3312th meeting, on 11 November 
                                  1993

    The Security Council,
    Reaffirming its resolutions 731 (1992) of 21 January 1992 
and 748 (1992) of 31 March 1992,
    Deeply concerned that after more than twenty months the 
Libyan Government has not fully complied with these 
resolutions,
    Determined to eliminate international terrorism,
    Convinced that those responsible for acts of international 
terrorism must be brought to justice,
    Convinced also that the suppression of acts of 
international terrorism, including those in which States are 
directly or indirectly involved, is essential for the 
maintenance of international peace and security,
    Determining, in this context, that the continued failure by 
the Libyan Government to demonstrate by concrete actions its 
renunciation of terrorism, and in particular its continued 
failure to respond fully and effectively to the requests and 
decisions in resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 (1992), constitute 
a threat to international peace and security,
    Taking note of the letters to the Secretary-General dated 
29 September and 1 October 1993 from the Secretary of the 
General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and 
International Cooperation of Libya (S/26523) and his speech in 
the General Debate at the forty-eighth session of the General 
Assembly (A/48/PV.20) in which Libya stated its intention to 
encourage those charged with the bombing of Pan Am 103 to 
appear for trial in Scotland and its willingness to cooperate 
with the competent French authorities in the case of the 
bombing of UTA 772,
    Expressing its gratitude to the Secretary-General for the 
efforts he has made pursuant to paragraph 4 of resolution 731 
(1992),
    Recalling the right of States, under Article 50 of the 
Charter, to consult the Security Council where they find 
themselves confronted with special economic problems arising 
from the carrying out of preventive or enforcement measures,
    Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,
    1. Demands once again that the Libyan Government comply 
without any further delay with resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 
(1992);
    2. Decides, in order to secure compliance by the Libyan 
Government with the decisions of the Council, to take the 
following measures, which shall come into force at 00.01 EST on 
1 December 1993 unless the Secretary-General has reported to 
the Council in the terms set out in paragraph 16 below;
    3. Decides that all States in which there are funds or 
other financial resources (including funds derived or generated 
from property) owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by:
    (a) the Government or public authorities of Libya, or
    (b) any Libyan undertaking,
shall freeze such funds and financial resources and ensure that 
neither they nor any other funds and financial resources are 
made available, by their nationals or by any persons within 
their territory, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit 
of the Government or public authorities of Libya or any Libyan 
undertaking, which for the purposes of this paragraph, means 
any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking which 
is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by
    (i) the Government or public authorities of Libya,
    (ii) any entity, wherever located or organized, owned or 
controlled by (i), or
    (iii) any person identified by States as acting on behalf 
of (i) or (ii) for the purposes of this resolution;
    4. Further decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 3 
above do not apply to funds or other financial resources 
derived from the sale or supply of any petroleum or petroleum 
products, including natural gas and natural gas products, or 
agricultural products or commodities, originating in Libya and 
exported therefrom after the time specified in paragraph 2 
above, provided that any such funds are paid into separate bank 
accounts exclusively for these funds;
    5. Decides that all States shall prohibit any provision to 
Libya by their nationals or from their territory of the items 
listed in the annex to this resolution, as well as the 
provision of any types of equipment, supplies and grants of 
licensing arrangements for the manufacture or maintenance of 
such items;
    6. Further decides that, in order to make fully effective 
the provisions of resolution 748 (1992), all States shall:
    (a) require the immediate and complete closure of all 
Libyan Arab Airlines offices within their territories;
    (b) prohibit any commercial transactions with Libyan Arab 
Airlines by their nationals or from their territory, including 
the honouring or endorsement of any tickets or other documents 
issued by that airline;
    (c) prohibit, by their nationals or from their territory, 
the entering into or renewal of arrangements for:
    (i) the making available, for operation within Libya, of 
any aircraft or aircraft components, or
    (ii) the provision of engineering or maintenance servicing 
of any aircraft or aircraft components within Libya;
    (d) prohibit, by their nationals or from their territory, 
the supply of any materials destined for the construction, 
improvement or maintenance of Libyan civilian or military 
airfields and associated facilities and equipment, or of any 
engineering or other services or components destined for the 
maintenance of any Libyan civil or military airfields or 
associated facilities and equipment, except emergency equipment 
and equipment and services directly related to civilian air 
traffic control;
    (e) prohibit, by their nationals or from their territory, 
any provision of advice, assistance, or training to Libyan 
pilots, flight engineers, or aircraft and ground maintenance 
personnel associated with the operation of aircraft and 
airfields within Libya;
    (f) prohibit, by their nationals or from their territory, 
any renewal of any direct insurance for Libyan aircraft;
    7. Confirms that the decision taken in resolution 748 
(1992) that all States shall significantly reduce the level of 
the staff at Libyan diplomatic missions and consular posts 
includes all missions and posts established since that decision 
or after the coming into force of this resolution;
    8. Decides that all States, and the Government of Libya, 
shall take the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall 
lie at the instance of the Government or public authorities of 
Libya, or of any Libyan national, or of any Libyan undertaking 
as defined in paragraph 3 of this resolution, or of any person 
claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or 
undertaking, in connection with any contract or other 
transaction or commercial operation where its performance was 
affected by reason of the measures imposed by or pursuant to 
this resolution or related resolutions;
    9. Instructs the Committee established by resolution 748 
(1992) to draw up expeditiously guidelines for the 
implementation of paragraphs 3 to 7 of this resolution, and to 
amend and supplement, as appropriate, the guidelines for the 
implementation of resolution 748 (1992), especially its 
paragraph 5 (a);
    10. Entrusts the Committee established by resolution 748 
(1992) with the task of examining possible requests for 
assistance under the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter of 
the United Nations and making recommendations to the President 
of the Security Council for appropriate action;
    11. Affirms that nothing in this resolution affects Libya's 
duty scrupulously to adhere to all of its obligations 
concerning servicing and repayment of its foreign debt;
    12. Calls upon all States, including States not Members of 
the United Nations, and all international organizations, to act 
strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present 
resolution, notwithstanding the existence of any rights or 
obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement 
or any contract entered into or any licence or permit granted 
prior to the effective time of this resolution;
    13. Requests all States to report to the Secretary-General 
by 15 January 1994 on the measures they have instituted for 
meeting the obligations set out in paragraphs 3 to 7 above;
    14. Invites the Secretary-General to continue his role as 
set out in paragraph 4 of resolution 731 (1992);
    15. Calls again upon all Member States individually and 
collectively to encourage the Libyan Government to respond 
fully and effectively to the requests and decisions in 
resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 (1992);
    16. Expresses its readiness to review the measures set 
forth above and in resolution 748 (1992) with a view to 
suspending them immediately if the Secretary-General reports to 
the Council that the Libyan Government has ensured the 
appearance of those charged with the bombing of Pan Am 103 for 
trial before the appropriate United Kingdom or United States 
court and has satisfied the French judicial authorities with 
respect to the bombing of UTA 772, and with a view to lifting 
them immediately when Libya complies fully with the requests 
and decisions in resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 (1992); and 
requests the Secretary-General, within 90 days of such 
suspension, to report to the Council on Libya's compliance with 
the remaining provisions of its resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 
(1992) and, in the case of non-compliance, expresses its 
resolve to terminate immediately the suspension of 
thesemeasures;
    17. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

                                 Annex

    The following are the items referred to in paragraph 5 of 
this resolution:

    I. Pumps of medium or large capacity whose capacity is 
equal to or larger than 350 cubic metres per hour and drivers 
(gas turbines and electric motors) designed for use in the 
transportation of crude oil and natural gas
    II. Equipment designed for use in crude oil export 
terminals:
    --Loading buoys or single point moorings (spm)
    --Flexible hoses for connection between underwater 
            manifolds (plem) and single point mooring and 
            floating loading hoses of large sizes (from 12" to 
            16")
    --Anchor chains
    III. Equipment not specially designed for use in crude oil 
export terminals but which because of their large capacity can 
be used for this purpose:
    --Loading pumps of large capacity (4,000 m3/h) and small 
            head (10 bars)
    --Boosting pumps within the same range of flow rates
    --Inline pipe line inspection tools and cleaning devices 
            (i.e. pigging tools) (16" and above)
    --Metering equipment of large capacity (1,000 m3/h and 
            above)
    IV. Refinery equipment:
    --Boilers meeting American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
            1 standards
    --Furnaces meeting American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
            8 standards
    --Fractionation columns meeting American Society of 
            Mechanical Engineers 8 standards
    --Pumps meeting American Petroleum Institute 610 standards
    --Catalytic reactors meeting American Society of Mechanical 
            Engineers 8 standards
    --Prepared catalysts, including the following:
        Catalysts containing platinum
        Catalysts containing molybdenum
    V. Spare parts destined for the items in I to IV above.

                     (7) S/RES/748, March 31, 1992

                         RESOLUTION 748 (1992)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3063rd meeting, on 31 March 1992

    The Security Council,
    Reaffirming its resolution 731 (1992) of 21 January 1992,
    Noting the reports of the Secretary-General (S/23574) and 
S/23672),
    Deeply concerned that the Libyan Government has still not 
provided a full and effective response to the requests in its 
resolution 731 of 21 January 1992,
    Convinced that the suppression of acts of international 
terrorism, including those in which States are directly or 
indirectly involved, is essential for the maintenance of 
international peace and security,
    Recalling that in the statement issued on 31 January 1992 
on the occasion of the meeting of the Security Council at the 
levels of Heads of State and Government the members of the 
Council expressed their deep concern over acts of international 
terrorism and emphasized the need for the international 
community to deal effectively with all such acts,
    Reaffirming that, in accordance with the principle in 
Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, 
every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, 
instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in 
another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its 
territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when 
such acts involve a threat or use of force,
    Determining in this context that the failure by the Libyan 
Government to demonstrate, by concrete actions its renunciation 
of terrorism and in particular its continued failure to respond 
fully and effectively to the requests in resolution 731 (1992), 
constitute a threat to international peace and security,
    Determined to eliminate international terrorism,
    Recalling the right of States, under Article 50 of the 
Charter, to consult the Security Council where they find 
themselves confronted with special economic problems arising 
from the carrying out of preventive or enforcement measures,
    Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations,
    1. Decides that the Libyan Government must now comply 
without any further delay with paragraph 3 of resolution 731 
(1992) regarding the requests contained in documents S/23306, 
S/23308 and S/23309;
    2. Decides also that the Libyan Government must commit 
itself definitively to cease all forms of terrorist action and 
all assistance to terrorist groups and that it must promptly, 
by concrete actions, demonstrate its renunciation of terrorism;
    3. Decides that on 15 April 1992 all States shall adopt the 
measures set out below, which shall apply until the Security 
Council decides that the Libyan Government has complied with 
paragraphs 1 and 2 above:
    4. Decides that all States shall:
    (a) Deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land 
in or overfly their territory if it is destined to land in or 
has taken off from the territory of Libya, unless the 
particular flight has been approved on grounds of significant 
humanitarian need by the Committee established by paragraph 9 
below;
    (b) Prohibit, by their nationals or from their territory, 
the supply of any aircraft or aircraft components to Libya, the 
provision of engineering and maintenance servicing of Libyan 
aircraft or aircraft components, the certification of air-
worthiness for Libyan aircraft, the payment of new claims 
against existing insurance contracts, and the provision of new 
direct insurance for Libyan aircraft;
    5. Decides further that all States shall:
    (a) Prohibit any provision to Libya by their nationals or 
from their territory of arms and related material of all types, 
including the sale or transfer of weapons and ammunition, 
military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary police equipment 
and spare parts for the aforementioned, as well as the 
provision of any types of equipment, supplies and grants of 
licensing arrangements, for the manufacture or maintenance of 
the aforementioned;
    (b) Prohibit any provision to Libya by their nationals or 
from their territory of technical advice, assistance or 
training related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance, or 
use of the items in (a) above;
    (c) Withdraw any of their officials or agents present in 
Libya to advise the Libyan authorities on military matters;
    6. Decides also that all States shall:
    (a) Significantly reduce the number and the level of the 
staff at Libyan diplomatic missions and consular posts and 
restrict or control the movement within their territory of all 
such staff who remain; in the case of Libyan missions to 
international organizations, the host State may, as it deems 
necessary, consult the organization concerned on the measures 
required to implement this subparagraph;
    (b) Prevent the operation of all Libyan Arab Airlines 
offices;
    (c) Take all appropriate steps to deny entry to or expel 
Libyan nationals who have been denied entry to or expelled from 
other States because of their involvement in terrorist 
activities;
    7. Calls upon all States, including States not Members of 
the United Nations, and all international organizations, to act 
strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present 
resolution, notwithstanding the existence of any rights or 
obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement 
or any contract entered into or any licence or permit granted 
before 15 April 1992;
    8. Requests all States to report to the Secretary-General 
by 15 May 1992 on the measures they have instituted for meeting 
the obligations set out in paragraphs 3 to 7 above;
    9. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its 
provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security 
Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to 
undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the 
Council with its observations and recommendations:
    (a) To examine the reports submitted pursuant to paragraph 
8 above;
    (b) To seek from all States further information regarding 
the action taken by them concerning the effective 
implementation of the measures imposed by paragraphs 3 to 7 
above;
    (c) To consider any information brought to its attention by 
States concerning violations of the measures imposed by 
paragraphs 3 to 7 above, and in that context, to make 
recommendations to the Council on ways to increase their 
effectiveness;
    (d) To recommend appropriate measures in response to 
violations of the measures imposed by paragraphs 3 to 7 above 
and provide information on a regular basis to the Secretary-
General for general distribution to Member States;
    (e) To consider and to decide upon expeditiously any 
application by States for the approval of flights on grounds of 
significant humanitarian need in accordance with paragraph 4 
above;
    (f) To give special attention to any communications in 
accordance with Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations 
from any neighbouring or other States with special economic 
problems which might arise from the carrying out of the 
measures imposed by paragraphs 3 to 7 above;
    10. Calls upon all States to cooperate fully with the 
Committee in the fulfilment of its task, including supplying 
such information as may be sought by the Committee in pursuance 
of the present resolution;
    11. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary 
assistance to the Committee and to make the necessary 
arrangements in the Secretariat for this purpose;
    12. Invites the Secretary-General to continue his role as 
set out in paragraph 4 of resolution 731 (1992);
    13. Decides that the Security Council shall, every 120 days 
or sooner should the situation so require, review the measures 
imposed by paragraphs 3 to 7 above in the light of the 
compliance by the Libyan Government with paragraphs 1 and 2 
above taking into account, as appropriate, any reports provided 
by the Secretary-General on his role as set out in paragraph 4 
of resolution 731 (1992);
    14. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

                    (8) S/RES/731, January 21, 1992

                         RESOLUTION 731 (1992)

 Adopted by the Security Council at its 3033rd meeting, on 21 January 
                                  1992

    The Security Council,
    Deeply disturbed by the world-wide persistence of acts of 
international terrorism in all its forms, including those in 
which States are directly or indirectly involved, which 
endanger or take innocent lives, have a deleterious effect on 
international relations and jeopardize the security of States,
    Deeply concerned by all activities directed against 
international civil aviation and affirming the right of all 
States, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
and relevant principles of international law, to protect their 
nationals from acts of international terrorism that constitute 
threats to international peace and security,
    Reaffirming its resolution 286 (1970) in which it called on 
States to take all possible legal steps to prevent any 
interference with international civil air travel,
    Reaffirming also its resolution 635 (1989) in which it 
condemned all acts of unlawful interference against the 
security of civil aviation and called upon all States to 
cooperate in devising and implementing measures to prevent all 
acts of terrorism, including those involving explosives,
    Recalling the statement made on 30 December 1988 by the 
President of the Council on behalf of the members of the 
Council strongly condemning the destruction of Pan Am flight 
103 and calling on all States to assist in the apprehension and 
prosecution of those responsible for this criminal act,
    Deeply concerned over results of investigations which 
implicate officials of the Libyan Government and which are 
contained in Security Council documents that include the 
requests addressed to the Libyan authorities by France 
\1\,\2\ the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland \2\,\3\ and the United States of 
America \2\,\4\,\5\ in connection with 
the legal procedures related to the attacks carried out against 
Pan Am flight 103 and UTA flight 772,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ S/23306.
    2 S/23309.
    \3\ S/23307.
    \4\ S/23308.
    5 S/23317.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Determined to eliminate international terrorism,
    1. Condemns the destruction of Pan Am flight 103 and UTA 
flight 772 and the resultant loss of hundreds of lives;
    2. Strongly deplores the fact that the Libyan Government 
has not yet responded effectively to the above requests to 
cooperate fully in establishing responsibility for the 
terrorist acts referred to above against Pan Am flight 103 and 
UTA flight 772;
    3. Urges the Libyan Government immediately to provide a 
full and effective response to those requests so as to 
contribute to the elimination of international terrorism;
    4. Requests the Secretary-General to seek the cooperation 
of the Libyan Government to provide a full and effective 
response to those requests;
    5. Urges all States individually and collectively to 
encourage the Libyan Government to respond fully and 
effectively to those requests;
    6. Decides to remain seized of the matter.



                                APPENDIX

      Legislative Requirements for Reports to Congress Concerning 
                      International Terrorism \1\

           1) Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations

LEGISLATION: Immigration and Nationality Act
  PL 82-414, sec. 219(a)(2)(A)(i)

FREQUENCY: Seven days before making determination

FROM WHOM: Secretary of State, in consultation with Secretary 
of Treasury and Attorney General

REQUIREMENT: Notification, in classified format, of intent to 
designate an organization as a foreign terrorist organization, 
together with the factual basis for such findings. (Added by PL 
104-132, sec. 302 and amended by PL 104-208, sec. 356).

  2) Rewards for Information Relating to International Narcoterrorism

LEGISLATION: State Department Basic Authorities Act
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ These are current active reporting requirements selected from 
Foreign Relations and Related Legislation, arranged by Public Law. All 
Public Laws are as amended.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  PL 84-885, sec. 36(g)(1)

FREQUENCY: 30 days after paying any reward

FROM WHOM: Secretary of State

REQUIREMENT: Specify amount of terrorism rewards paid, to whom 
the reward was paid, and the acts with respect to which the 
reward was paid. (PL 98-533, sec. 102 added sec. 36) Title 18, 
sec. 3076, authorizes participation in the Justice Department's 
Witness Security Program to any individual who furnishes 
information which would justify a reward by the Secretary of 
State under this section. In classified form if necessary. 
(Added by PL 99-399, sec. 502(d)).

                   3) Operation of the Reward Program

LEGISLATION: State Department Basic Authorities Act
  PL 84-885, sec. 36(g)(2)

FREQUENCY: Not later than 60 days after the end of each fiscal 
year

FROM WHOM: Secretary of State, in consultation with Attorney 
General

REQUIREMENT: Report concerning the operation of the rewards 
program, providing the total amounts expended during the fiscal 
year ending that year and including amounts expended to 
publicize the availability of rewards. (Added by PL 105-277, 
sec. 2202.)

       4) Regulations on Provision of Terrorism-Related Services

LEGISLATION: State Department Basic Authorities Act
  PL 84-885, sec. 40(g)(1)

FREQUENCY: 30 days prior to issuing

FROM WHOM: Secretary of State

REQUIREMENT: Proposed regulations under authority in sec. 40 to 
impose controls on services if Secretary determines such 
services would aid and abet international terrorism. (Added by 
PL 99-399, sec. 506.)

  5) Licenses Granted and Denied Concerning Terrorism-Related Services

LEGISLATION: State Department Basic Authorities Act
  PL 84-885, sec. 40(g)(2)

FREQUENCY: Every six months

FROM WHOM: Secretary of State

REQUIREMENT: Number and character of licenses granted and 
denied and other information relative to the accomplishment of 
the objectives of sec. 40 on authority to control certain 
terrorism-related services. (Added by PL 99-399, sec. 506.)

                           6) Denial of Visas

LEGISLATION: State Department Basic Authorities Act
  PL 84-885, sec. 51(a)

FREQUENCY: On a timely basis

FROM WHOM: Secretary of State

REQUIREMENT: Report each time a consular post denies a visa on 
the grounds of terrorist activities or foreign policy, with 
name and nationality of each person and a statement for basis 
for denial. Information contained in report may be classified 
to extent necessary. (Added by PL 102-138, sec. 127(a)).

                       7) Transportation Security

LEGISLATION: Federal Aviation Act, 1958
  PL 85-726, sec. 315(b)

FREQUENCY: Annually, not later than March 31

FROM WHOM: Secretary of Transportation

REQUIREMENT: The Secretary of Transportation submit a report on 
transportation security, in unclassified and classified parts. 
Such report shall include--(1) an assessment of trends and 
developments in terrorist activities, methods, and other 
threats to transportation; (2) an evaluation of deployment of 
explosive detection devices; (3) recommendations for research, 
engineering, and development activities related to 
transportation security; (4) identification and evaluation of 
cooperative efforts with other departments, agencies, and 
instrumentalities of the U.S. Government; (5) an evaluation of 
cooperation with foreign transportation and security 
authorities; (6) the status of the extent to which the 
recommendations of the President's Commission on Aviation 
Security and Terrorism have been carried out and the reasons 
for any delay in carrying out those recommendations; (7) a 
summary of the activities of the Director of Intelligence and 
Security in the 12-month period ending on the date of this 
report; (8) financial and staffing requirements of the 
Director; (9) an assessment of financial and staffing 
requirements, and attainment of existing goals, for carrying 
out duties and powers of the Administrator related to security; 
and (10) appropriate legislative and regulatory 
recommendations.

       8) Screening and Foreign Air Carrier and Airport Security

LEGISLATION: Federal Aviation Act, 1958
  PL 85-726, sec. 316(a)

FREQUENCY: Annually

FROM WHOM: Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration

REQUIREMENT: The Administrator shall submit a report--(1) on 
the effectiveness of procedures for screening all passengers 
and property that will be carried on a cabin of an aircraft to 
ensure security against criminal violence and aircraft piracy; 
(2) that includes a summary of the assessments conducted to 
establish the extent to which a foreign airport effectively 
maintains and carries out security measures; and (3) that 
includes an assessment of the steps being taken and the 
progress being made, to ensure that foreign air carrier 
security programs for airports outside of the United States are 
in compliance with this subsection.

 9) Sanctions Imposed on Foreign Airports for not Maintaining Security

LEGISLATION: Federal Aviation Act of 1958
  PL 85-726, sec. 1115(d)(3)

FREQUENCY: Promptly

FROM WHOM: Secretary of Transportation

REQUIREMENT: Report on any action taken to impose sanctions on 
foreign airports that do not maintain and administer effective 
security measures. Include information on attempts made to 
obtain the cooperation of the government of the foreign country 
in meeting the standards used in assessing the airport under 
subsection (a). If necessary, may include a classified annex.

 10) Lifting of Sanctions Imposed on Airports Not Maintaining Security

LEGISLATION: Federal Aviation Act, 1958
  PL 85-726, sec. 1115(f)

FREQUENCY: Notify when sanctions are lifted

FROM WHOM: Secretary of Transportation

REQUIREMENT: Notification when any sanction imposed on a 
foreign airport for not maintaining and carrying out effective 
security measures is lifted.

              11) Assistance for Counterterrorism Efforts

LEGISLATION: Foreign Assistance Act, 1961
  PL 87-195, sec. 573(c)

FREQUENCY: 15 days in advance

FROM WHOM: President

REQUIREMENT: Notification that assistance will be provided for 
counterterrorism efforts to a foreign country for the purpose 
of protecting U.S. property, the life and property of any U.S. 
citizen, or for furthering the apprehension of any individual 
involved in an act of terrorism against such property or 
persons. (Added by PL 104-132, sec. 328(c)).

       12) Certification that Country is Not Supporting Terrorism

LEGISLATION: Foreign Assistance Act, 1961
  PL 87-195, sec. 620A(c)(1) or (2)

FREQUENCY: Para. (1): Prior to proposed rescission; or Para. 
(2): At least 45 days before proposed rescission would take 
effect

FROM WHOM: President

REQUIREMENT: Determination made by State Department that 
country supports terrorism, thus prohibiting assistance under 
sec. 620A(a), may be rescinded if (1) certified that there has 
been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the 
government concerned and assurances are provided that the 
government is not and will not support acts of terrorism in the 
future, or (2) report justifying the rescission of the 
determination with certification that the government concerned 
has not provided support for terrorism during the preceding 6-
month period and has provided assurances that it will not 
support terrorism in the future. (Amended by PL 101-222, sec. 
5).

  13) Consultation on Proposed Waiver on Prohibition of Assistance to 
              Countries Supporting International Terrorism

LEGISLATION: Foreign Assistance Act, 1961
  PL 87-195, sec. 620A(d)(1)and(2)

FREQUENCY: 15 days before waiver takes effect

FROM WHOM: President

REQUIREMENT: Determination and notification that national 
security interests or humanitarian reasons justify the proposed 
waiver, with report containing the name of recipient country; 
description of reasons; type and amount of and justification 
for assistance, and period of time such waiver will be 
effective. (Amended by PL 101-222, sec. 5)

     14) Waiver of Prohibition of Exports to Countries Supporting 
                        International Terrorism

LEGISLATION: Arms Export Control Act
  PL 90-629, sec. 40(b)
FREQUENCY: Upon waiver

FROM WHOM: President

REQUIREMENT: Determination that it is important to the national 
interests of the United States to export item on U.S. Munitions 
List to country that Secretary of State has determined has 
repeatedly provided support for acts of international 
terrorism, with justification and description of proposed 
export. Waiver expires at the end of 90 days unless Congress 
enacts law extending the waiver. (Added by PL 99-399, sec. 
509(a)). (Amended by PL 101-222).

 15) Rescission of Prohibition of Assistance to Countries that Support 
                           Acts of Terrorism

LEGISLATION: Arms Export Control Act
  PL 90-629, sec. 40(f)(1)

FREQUENCY: (1) Prior to proposed rescission or (2) at least 45 
days before proposed rescission would take effect

FROM WHOM: President

REQUIREMENT: (1) Determination made by State Department under 
subsection (d) may not be rescinded unless certified that there 
has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of 
the government concerned, is not presently supporting 
terrorism, and has provided assurances it will not in the 
future. (2) or certification that government has not provided 
any support for terrorism during the preceding 6-month period 
and will not provide support in the future. (Added by PL 102-
222, sec. 2).

    16) Waiver of Prohibitions on Arms Transactions with Countries 
                          Supporting Terrorism

LEGISLATION: Arms Export Control Act
  PL 90-629, sec. 40(g)(1)

FREQUENCY: Upon determination

FROM WHOM: President

REQUIREMENT: Determination to waive prohibitions to a specific 
transaction if that transaction is essential to the national 
security interests of the United States. (Added by PL 101-222, 
sec. 2)

   17) Waiver of Specific Arms Transaction with Countries Supporting 
                               Terrorism

LEGISLATION: Arms Export Control Act
  PL 90-629, sec. 40(g)(2)

FREQUENCY: 15 days prior to the proposed transaction

FROM WHOM: President

REQUIREMENT: Consult with the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the waiver 
of prohibition on the proposed transaction involving munitions. 
(Added by PL 101-222, sec. 2).

    18) Transactions with Countries not Fully Cooperating with U.S. 
                         Antiterrorism Efforts

LEGISLATION: Arms Export Control Act
  PL 90-629, sec. 40A(a)

FREQUENCY: By May 15 of calendar year in which that FY begins

FROM WHOM: President

REQUIREMENT: Determination and certification that a foreign 
country is not fully cooperating with United States 
antiterrorism efforts. (Added by PL 104-132, sec. 330).

 19) Waiving the Prohibition on Transactions with Countries Not Fully 
              Cooperating with U.S. Antiterrorism Efforts

LEGISLATION: Arms Export Control Act
  PL 90-629, sec. 40A(b)

FREQUENCY: Upon determination

FROM WHOM: President

REQUIREMENT: Determination that it is in the national interest 
of the United States to waive the prohibition under the Arms 
Export Control Act on assistance to countries not fully 
cooperating with U.S. antiterrorism efforts. (Added by PL 104-
132, sec. 330).

      20) U.S. Government Efforts To Prevent Nuclear Proliferation

LEGISLATION: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978
  PL 95-242, sec. 601(a)

FREQUENCY: Annually

FROM WHOM: President

REQUIREMENT: Review of all activities of U.S. Government 
departments and agencies relating to preventing nuclear 
proliferation; report to include: a determination as to which 
non-nuclear weapon states have detonated a nuclear device, 
refused to accept the safeguards of the IAEA, or refused to 
give specific assurances that they will not manufacture or 
otherwise acquire nuclear explosive devices; an assessment of 
whether any policies have been counterproductive; a description 
of progress toward establishing procedures to facilitate the 
timely processing of requests for subsequent arrangements and 
export licenses; progress toward combatting international 
nuclear terrorism; and on adherence to the Convention on the 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adequacy of IAEA 
physical security guidelines, minimizing weapons-grade nuclear 
material in international transit and an agreement in the U.N. 
Security Council for international sanctions against nuclear 
terrorism and coordinating recovery of stolen nuclear material. 
Include the following: a description of the implementation of 
nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use export controls in the 
preceding calendar year, including a summary by type of 
commodity and destinations and the progress of those 
independent states of the former Soviet Union that are non-
nuclear weapons states and of the Baltic States towards 
achieving the objective of applying full scope safeguards to 
all their peaceful nuclear activities. Portions may be in 
classified form. (Added by PL 103-236, sec. 811). Describe 
steps taken to implement sections 841 and 842 of PL 103-236 and 
any progress made and any obstacles that have been encountered 
in seeking to meet the objectives set forth in those sections. 
(Added by PL 103-236, sec. 843(a)).

  21) Export of Goods to Countries Supporting International Terrorism

LEGISLATION: Export Administration Act, 1979
  PL 96-72, sec. 6(j)(2)

FREQUENCY: 30 days prior to approval of license FROM WHOM: 
Secretary of State and Secretary of Commerce

REQUIREMENT: Notification of approval of licenses for the 
export of goods or technology to any country for which the 
Secretary of State has determined (1) such country repeatedly 
provides support for acts of international terrorism; and (2) 
such exports would contribute significantly to the country's 
military potential, including military logistics, or would 
enhance the ability of the country to support acts of 
international terrorism. (Amended by PL 101-222, sec. 4). 
(First added by PL 102-391, sec. 553). Instructs Executive 
Directors of all International Financial Institutions to vote 
against any loan or use of funds to or for any country for 
which the Secretary of State has made a determination under 
this section. (Added by PL 103-87, sec. 528). The International 
Fund for Agricultural Development was added to list of 
international financial institutions. (Added by PL 103-236, 
sec. 736). Include a detailed description of the goods or 
services to be offered, the reasons why the foreign country or 
international organization needs the goods or services,the 
reasons why the proposed export or transfer is in the national 
interest, an analysis of the impact on the military 
capabilities of the recipient, an analysis of how export would 
affect military strengths of countries in region and analysis 
of the impact of proposed export on U.S. relations with 
countries in region.

 22) Rescission of Determination of Countries Supporting International 
                               Terrorism

LEGISLATION: Export Administration Act, 1979
  PL 96-72, sec. 6(j)(4)

FREQUENCY: Before proposed rescission would take effect

FROM WHOM: President

REQUIREMENT: Report rescinding determination that a specified 
country has repeatedly provided support for acts of 
international terrorism, including certification that there has 
been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the 
government of that country, that the government is not 
supporting terrorism and has provided assurances that it will 
not support terrorism in the future. Section (B) requires a 
report at least 45 days before proposed rescission takes effect 
justifying rescission and certifying that the government 
concerned has not provided any support for terrorism during the 
preceding six month period and will not support terrorism in 
the future. (Amended by PL 101-222, sec. 4). (Added by PL 102-
391, sec. 553) Instructs Executive Directors of all 
International Financial Institutions and the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development to vote against any loans or use 
of funds to or for any country for which the Secretary of State 
has made a determination under this section. (Continued in PL 
103-87, sec. 528).

 23) Coordination of All U.S. Terrorism-Related Assistance to Foreign 
                               Countries

LEGISLATION: International Security and Development Cooperation 
Act, 1985
  PL99-83, sec. 502(b)

FREQUENCY: Annually, by February 1

FROM WHOM: Secretary of State, in consultation with Other 
Agencies

REQUIREMENT: An accounting of all assistance related to 
international terrorism provided to foreign countries by the 
United States during the preceding year. May be provided on a 
classified basis.

   24) Consultation Before Banning Imports From Countries Supporting 
                               Terrorism

LEGISLATION: International Security and Development Cooperation 
Act, 1985
  PL 99-83, sec. 505(b)

FREQUENCY: Before and while exercising authority

FROM WHOM: President

REQUIREMENT: Consultation, in every possible instance, before 
banning imports of goods or services from any country that 
supports terrorism or terrorist organizations; regular 
consultation when authority is being used.

    25) Ban on Imports from Countries that are Supporting Terrorism

LEGISLATION: International Security and Development Cooperation 
Act, 1985
  PL 99-83, sec. 505(c)

FREQUENCY: Upon occurrence and every succeeding 6 months

FROM WHOM: President

REQUIREMENT: Report specifying the country from which the 
President is banning imports into the U.S. due to such 
countries' support of terrorism or terrorist organizations. 
Report to include imports to be banned, circumstances and 
reasons for the ban. Subsequent reports stating actions taken 
pursuant to this authority and any changes in the situation.

  26) Findings of Accountability Review Board on Diplomatic Security 
                                Incident

LEGISLATION: Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act, 1986
  PL 99-399, sec. 304(d)

FREQUENCY: In any case a Board transmits findings of reasonable 
cause

FROM WHOM: Head of federal agency appropriate in each case

REQUIREMENT: Summary of nature of case and evidence transmitted 
to the Accountability Review Board on facts surrounding serious 
injury or destruction related to U.S. Government mission 
abroad; together with decision by the federal agency to take 
disciplinary or other appropriate action or reasons not to take 
such actions against individual involved.

     27) Request for Appropriations for Diplomatic Security Program

LEGISLATION: Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act, 1986
  PL 99-399, sec. 401(b)

FREQUENCY: With any request for appropriations for program in 
sec. 401(a)

FROM WHOM: Secretary of State

REQUIREMENT: Notification of request for appropriation with 
justification of each item listed. (Amended by PL 103-265, sec. 
122(b)).

         28) Insufficient Funds for Diplomatic Security Program

LEGISLATION: Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act, 1986
  PL 99-399, sec. 401(f)

FREQUENCY: In event of insufficient funds

FROM WHOM: Secretary of State

REQUIREMENT: Report on effect that insufficiency of funds will 
have on Department of State and other foreign affairs agencies, 
if sufficient funds are not available for all the diplomatic 
security construction, acquisition, and operations justified to 
Congress for any fiscal year.

              29) Travel Advisory for U.S. Citizens Abroad

LEGISLATION: Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act, 1986
  PL 99-399, sec. 505

FREQUENCY: Promptly advise

FROM WHOM: Secretary of State

REQUIREMENT: Notification that Department of State has issued a 
travel advisory or other public warning notice for U.S. 
citizens traveling abroad, because of a terrorist threat or 
other security concern.

           30) Threat of Terrorism to U.S. Ports and Vessels

LEGISLATION: Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act, 1986
  PL 99-399, sec. 905

FREQUENCY: Feb. 28, 1987, and annually thereafter

FROM WHOM: Secretary of Transportation

REQUIREMENT: Report on threat from acts of terrorism to U.S. 
ports and vessels operating from those ports. To be 
consolidated with reports under secs. 903 and 907, with any 
classified material submitted separately as addendum.

31) Change in Status of Travel Advisory Concerning Security at Foreign 
                                 Ports

LEGISLATION: Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act, 1986
  PL 99-399, sec. 908(c)

FREQUENCY: Immediately upon any change

FROM WHOM: Secretary of State

REQUIREMENT: Notification of any change in the status of a 
travel advisory imposed after Secretary of Transportation has 
determined that a condition exists that threatens the safety or 
security of passengers, passenger vessels, or crew traveling to 
or from a foreign port that does not maintain and administer 
effective security measures.

                32) Annual Country Reports on Terrorism

LEGISLATION: Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FYs 1988-89
  PL 100-204, sec. 140

FREQUENCY: April 30 each year to cover preceding calendar year

FROM WHOM: Secretary of State

REQUIREMENT: Full and complete report providing (1) detailed 
assessments with respect to each foreign country (A) in which 
acts of international terrorism occur of major significance; 
and (B) about which Congress was notified during the preceding 
5 years pursuant to sec. 6(j) of Export Administration Act, 
1979; (2) all relevant information about the advocates of any 
terrorist groups responsible for the kidnapping or death of an 
American during the preceding year. Added by PL 104-208, sec. 
578: (3) with respect to each foreign country from which the 
U.S. Government has sought cooperation during the previous five 
years, information on the investigation or prosecution of an 
act of international terrorism against U.S. citizens or 
interests or in the prevention of further acts of terrorism. 
Report to review major counterterrorism efforts undertaken, 
response of judicial system and significant support for 
international terrorism by each country, and efforts by the 
United States to eliminate international financial support 
provided to those groups directed or provided in support of 
their activities. Information received with respect to a 
foreign country in classified form is preferred if cooperation 
is more likely.

          33) Report on Terrorist Assets in the United States

LEGISLATION: Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FYs 1992-1993
  PL 102-138, sec. 304(a)

FREQUENCY: January 28, 1992; then every 365 days thereafter

FROM WHOM: Treasury, in consultation with Attorney General and 
Appropriate Investigative Agencies

REQUIREMENT: Report describing the nature and extent of assets 
held in the United States by terrorist countries and any 
organization engaged in international terrorism. (Added by PL 
103-236, sec. 133(b)(2)). Each such report shall provide a 
detailed list and description of specific assets.

       34) Activities in Support of Counterproliferation Programs

LEGISLATION: National Defense Authorization Act, FY 1994
  PL 103-160, sec. 1603(d)

FREQUENCY: Annually, by April 30

FROM WHOM: Secretary of Defense

REQUIREMENT: Report on activities carried out for the preceding 
twelve-month period with a description of the studies and 
analysis and amounts spent; list of organizations that 
conducted studies and analysis; an explanation of the extent to 
which such studies and analysis contribute to the U.S. 
counterproliferation policy and military capabilities to deter 
and respond to terrorism, theft and proliferation involving 
weapons of mass destruction; and a description of the measures 
being taken to ensure that management of such studies and 
analysis are handled effectively and coordinated 
comprehensively. Frequency changed from semi-annually.

(Amended by PL 104-106 and PL 103-337, sec. 1505(b)).

             35) Multilateral Sanctions Regime Against Iran

LEGISLATION: Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, 1996

PL 104-172, sec. 4(b)(1)(2)

FREQUENCY: By August 5, 1997; and periodically thereafter

FROM WHOM: President

REQUIREMENT: Report on extent to establish, both in 
international fora such as the United Nations, and bilaterally 
with our allies, a multilateral sanctions regime against Iran, 
including provisions limiting the development of petroleum 
resources, that will inhibit Iran's efforts to carry out 
terrorist activities. Each report shall list--(1) the countries 
that have agreed to undertake measures to further the 
objectives of section 3 with respect to Iran, and a description 
of those measures, and (2) the countries that have not agreed 
to measures described in paragraph (1), and, with respect to 
those countries, other measures (in addition to that provided 
in subsection (d)) the President recommends that the United 
States take to further the objectives of section 3 with respect 
to Iran.

 36) Notification of Intent to Waive the Application of Imposition of 
                               Sanctions.

LEGISLATION: Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, 1996
  PL 104-172, sec. 4(c)

FREQUENCY: At least 30 days before waiver takes effect

FROM WHOM: President

REQUIREMENT: Notification of intent to waive the application of 
section (5)(a) with respect to nationals of a country if that 
country has agreed to undertake substantial measures, including 
economic sanctions, that will inhibit Iran's efforts to carry 
out activities described in section 2 and information required 
by subsection (b)(1) has been included in a report submitted 
under section (4)(b).

           37) Termination of Sanctions with Respect to Iran

LEGISLATION: Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, 1996
  PL 104-172, sec. 8(a)

FREQUENCY: Upon determination

FROM WHOM: President

REQUIREMENT: The requirement under section 5(b) to impose 
sanctions against Libya shall no longer have force or effect 
with respect to Iran if determined and certified that Iran--(1) 
has ceased its efforts to design, develop, manufacture, or 
acquire--(A) a nuclear explosive device or related materials 
and technology; (B) chemical and biological weapons; and (C) 
ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launch technology; and 
(2) has been removed from the list of countries the government 
of which have been determined, for purposes of section 6(j) of 
the Export Administration Act of 1979, to have repeatedly 
provided support for acts of international terrorism.

               38) Termination of Sanctions Against Libya

LEGISLATION: Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, 1996
  PL 104-172, sec. 8(b) FREQUENCY: Upon determination and 
certification

FROM WHOM: President

REQUIREMENT: The requirement under section 5(b) to impose 
sanctions shall no longer have force or effect if the President 
determines and certifies that Libya has fulfilled the 
requirements of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
731, 748, and 833.

      39) Consultations with Foreign Government to Delay Sanctions

LEGISLATION: Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, 1996
  PL 104-172, sec. 9(a)(1)(2)(3)

FREQUENCY: Immediately

FROM WHOM: President

REQUIREMENT: The President may waive imposition of sanctions 
under this Act for up to 90 days in order to initiate 
consultations with affected government. Sanctions may be 
imposed immediately unless a determination and certification is 
made that such government has taken specific and effective 
actions, including, as appropriate, the imposition of 
appropriate penalties, to terminate the involvement of the 
foreign person in the activities that resulted in the 
determination. Paragraph (3) permits an additional 90 day 
waiver to be granted if determined and certified that the 
government is in the process of taking actions described in 
paragraph (2).

  40) Determination and Certification Regarding Duration of Sanctions

LEGISLATION: Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, 1996
  PL 104-172, sec. 9(b)(1) or (2)

FREQUENCY: (1) for a period of not less than 2 years from date 
sanction was imposed or (2) upon Presidential certification and 
determination

FROM WHOM: President

REQUIREMENT: A sanction imposed under section 5 shall remain in 
effect for at least two years or until such time as it is 
determined and certified that the person whose activities were 
the basis for imposing the sanction is no longer engaging in 
such activities and that the President has received reliable 
assurances that such person will not knowingly engage in such 
activities in the future, except that such sanction shall 
remain in effect for a period of at least one year.

       41) Report on Use of Waiver Authority on Imposed Sanctions

LEGISLATION: Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, 1996
  PL 104-172, sec. 9(c)

FREQUENCY: Thirty days after determination

FROM WHOM: President

REQUIREMENT: The President may waive the requirement in section 
5 to impose sanctions and waive the continued imposition of 
sanctions under subsection (b) of this section, if he 
determines that it is important to the United States national 
interest to exercise such authority. If such waiver is granted 
on a person described in section 5(c), sanctions need not be 
imposed under section 5(a) or (b) on that person during the 30-
day period referred to in paragraph (1).

            42) Report on Certain International Initiatives

LEGISLATION: Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, 1996
  PL 104-172, sec. 10(a)

FREQUENCY: By February 1997, and every six months thereafter

FROM WHOM: President

REQUIREMENT: Report describing--(1) efforts to mount a 
multilateral campaign to persuade all countries to pressure 
Iran to cease its nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile 
weapons programs and its support of acts of international 
terrorism; (2) efforts to persuade other governments to ask 
Iran to reduce the presence of Iranian diplomats and 
representatives of other governments and military or quasi-
governmental institutions of Iran and to withdraw any such 
diplomats or representatives who participated in the takeover 
of the U.S. embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979, or the 
subsequent holding of U.S. hostages for 444 days; (3) extent to 
which the IAEA has established regular inspections of all 
nuclear facilities in Iran, including those presently under 
construction; and (4) Iran's use of Iranian diplomats and 
representatives of other government and military or quasi-
governmental institutions of Iran to promote acts of 
international terrorism or to develop or sustain Iran's 
nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile weapons programs. 
This Act shall cease to be effective after August 5, 2001.

     43) Threat to the United States by Weapons of Mass Destruction

LEGISLATION: National Defense Authorization Act, FY 1998
  PL 105-85, sec. 234

FREQUENCY: Annually, by January 30

FROM WHOM: Secretary of Defense

REQUIREMENT: Report on the threats posed to the United States 
and allies--(1) by weapons of mass destruction, ballistic 
missiles, and cruise missiles; and (2) by the proliferation of 
such weapons of mass destruction.

    44) Budget for Carrying Out Counterterrorism and Antiterrorism 
                               Activities

LEGISLATION: National Defense Authorization Act, FY 1998
  PL 105-85, sec. 1051

FREQUENCY: Annually, by March 1

FROM WHOM: President

REQUIREMENT: Report containing information on (A) the budget 
and expenditures of funds by executive agencies during the 
current fiscal year for purposes of carrying out 
counterterrorism and antiterrorism programs and activities; and 
(B) the specific programs and activities for which such funds 
were expended.

   45) Determination to Waive Prohibition on Bilateral Assistance to 
                          Terrorist Countries

LEGISLATION: Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, 2000
  PL 106-113, sec. 527(b)

FREQUENCY: Fifteen days prior to waiver

FROM WHOM: President

REQUIREMENT: Determination that national security or 
humanitarian reasons justify a waiver of the prohibition on 
bilateral assistance to any country that grants sanctuary from 
prosecution to any individual or group which has committed an 
act of international terrorism or otherwise supports terrorism, 
with justification for waiver.

   46) Waiver on Prohibition on Assistance to Foreign Countries that 
   Export Lethal Military Equipment to Countries Supporting Terrorism

LEGISLATION: Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, 2000
  PL 106-113, sec. 549(b),(c)

FREQUENCY: Upon determination

FROM WHOM: President

REQUIREMENT: Determination that to waive restriction on 
furnishing assistance to a foreign government that exports 
lethal military equipment to countries that support terrorism 
is important to the national interests of the United States. 
Include a detailed explanation of the assistance provided with 
dollar amounts, and an explanation of how the assistance 
furthers United States national interests.
                               I N D E X

                                 ______

                                   A

Act for the Protection of Foreign 
  Officials and Official Guests of the 
  United States......................... PL 92-539...............   210
Act to Combat International Terrorism, 
  1984.................................. PL 98-533...............   213
Administration of Justice Program
 Andean countries....................... PL 101-623 Sec 2........    46
Advisory Panel on Overseas Security
 Report to Congress..................... PL 99-399 Sec 407.......   136
Afghan Taliban
 Threat to the United States
  Declaration of a national emergency... Report to Congress......   616
Afghanistan
 Taliban
  Sanctions against..................... OFAC....................  1091
Africa
 Terrorism incidents
  Overview for 1998..................... Report PGT..............   762
Air carriers (foreign)
 Airplane security
  Definitions........................... 14 CFR Part 129.........   528
 Operating within the United States
  Rules and regulations................. 14 CFR Part 129.........   524
  Security program...................... 14 CFR Part 129.........   524
Air carriers
 Aviation disasters
  Department of State policies.......... PL 101-604 Sec 204-210..   353
  Lockerbie, Scotland experience........ PL 101-604 Sec 209......   355
 Domestic
  Security assessment................... 49 USC 44904............   323
 Flights to and from Libya
  Landing in or flying over the United 
   States............................... EO 12801................   423
 Foreign
  Security programs..................... 49 USC 44906............   325
 Pan American Airways flight 103
  Department of State response.......... PL 101-604 Sec 209......   355
 Security
  Applicability and definitions......... 14 CFR Part 108.........   505
  Congressional findings................ PL 101-604 Sec 2........   351
  Rules and regulations................. 14 CFR Part 108.........   505
 Security measures
  Proposals for......................... PL 101-604 Sec 215......   357
 Terrorism
  Security against...................... PL 101-604 Sec 2........   351
Aircraft
 Convention for the Suppression of 
   Unlawful Seizure of.................. Treaty..................  1497
 Convention on Offenses and Certain Acts 
   Committee on Board................... Treaty..................  1502
 Destruction of
  Criminal penalties.................... 18 USC 32...............   161
 Hijacking
  Agreements on......................... 49 USC 44910............   328
Airports
 Airport security
  Applicability and definitions......... 14 CFR Part 107.........   489
  Rules and regulations................. 14 CFR Part 107.........   489
 Federal Security Managers.............. 49 USC 44933............   333
 Foreign
  Inadequate security consequences...... 49 USC 44908............   327
  Security measures..................... 49 USC 44907............   325
 Foreign Security Liaison Officers...... 49 USC 44934............   334
 Inadequate security
  United States response to............. 49 USC 44907(d).........   326
 International civil
  Violence at........................... 18 USC 37...............   162
 Security
  Agreements on......................... 49 USC 44910............   328
  International cooperation............. PL 101-604 Sec 201......   352
  Reports to Congress................... 49 USC 44938............   341
 Security against terrorism............. PL 99-83 Sec 551........    37
 Security measures
  Proposals for......................... PL 101-604 Sec 215......   357
 Security program....................... 14 CFR Part 107.........   489
Alien terrorists
 Removal procedures..................... PL 82-414 Sec 501-507...   369
Aliens
 Classes of
  Deportable............................ PL 82-414 Sec 237.......   369
  Visa or admissions ineligibility...... PL 82-414 Sec 212.......   364
 Terrorist activities
  Deportable classes.................... PL 82-414 Sec 237.......   369
  Visa or admissions ineligibility...... PL 82-414 Sec 212.......   364
 Terrorists information
  Attorney General's determination...... PL 82-414 Sec 
                                          101(a)(15)(S)..........   363
Andean countries
 Terrorism
  Authorization of appropriations....... PL 101-623 Sec 2........    46
Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987.............. PL 100-204 Sec 1001.....   390
Anti-terrorism assistance program
 Authorization of appropriations........ PL 87-195 Sec 574.......     3
Anti-terrorism programs
 Foreign aid
  Appropriations, 1999.................. PL 105-277 Title II.....    47
Antiterrorism
 Defense Department protection of forces 
   overseas
  GAO review of......................... Letter Report...........   929
Antiterrorism activities
 Defense Department
  Authorization of appropriations....... PL 104-201 Sec 306......   248
Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
  Penalty Act of 1996................... PL 104-132..............   105
Antiterrorism assistance
 Procuring explosive detection devices.. PL 104-132 Sec 328......   109
Antiterrorism Assistance Program, FY 
  1997.................................. Report..................   841
 Country participation.................. Report..................   851
Arms control
 Authorization of appropriations
  Counter proliferation activities...... PL 103-337 Sec 1504.....   251
 Iran-Iraq
  U.S. policy........................... PL 102-484 Sec 1602.....    30
Arms Export Control Act................. PL 90-629...............    11
Arms sales
 Certain persons
  Economic sanctions against............ PL 102-484 Sec 1604.....    31
 Countries not supporting U.S. 
   antiterrorism efforts
  Prohibited activities................. PL 90-629 Sec 40A.......    17
 Countries supporting international 
   terrorism
  Prohibited activities................. PL 90-629 Sec 40........    12
 End-use monitoring..................... PL 90-629 Sec 40A.......    17
 Export controls........................ PL 90-629 Sec 38........    11
 Foreign countries
  Economic sanctions against............ PL 102-484 Sec 1605.....    31
 Foreign intimidation or harassment
  Export prohibitions................... PL 90-629 Sec 6.........    11
 Iraq
  Report to Congress.................... PL 102-484 Sec 1607.....    32
Asia
 Terrorism incidents
  Overview for 1998..................... Report PGT..............   767
Asia, South
 Convention on the Suppression of 
   Terrorism............................ Treaty..................  1521
Attorney General
 Alien
  Defined............................... PL 82-414 Sec 
                                          101(a)(15)(S)..........   363
Aviation disasters
 Terrorism
  Responding to......................... Report to the President.   699
Aviation Safety and Security, Report of 
  the White House Commission on......... Report to the President.   663
Aviation Safety and Security, White 
  House Commission on
 Department of Transportation report.... Report DoT..............  1199
Aviation security
 Air carriers
  Report to Congress.................... Report FAA..............  1172
  Responsibilities...................... Report FAA..............  1125
 Air transport agreement between the 
   United States and the Republic of 
   Korea................................ Agreement...............  1242
 Air transport services agreement 
   between the United States and the 
   Republic of K........................ TIAS....................  1274
 Air travelers
  White House recommendations........... Report DoT..............  1203
 Aircraft hardening program............. Report FAA..............  1161
 Airports
  Report to Congress.................... Report FAA..............  1173
  Responsibilities...................... Report FAA..............  1125
  Transfer of responsibilities.......... Report FAA..............  1130
 Antiterrorism assistance
  Authorization of appropriations....... PL 101-604 Sec 213......   356
 Antiterrorism measures
  Travel guidelines..................... PL 101-604 Sec 214......   356
 Assessments and evaluations............ 49 USC 44916............   331
 Bahrain-United States
  Agreement between..................... TIAS....................  1268
 Civil aviation
  Criminal acts against................. Report FAA..............  1094
                                         Report FAA..............  1187
 Convention ... Suppression of Unlawful 
   Acts Against the Safety of Civil 
   Aviation............................. Treaty..................  1484
 Customs Service
  Use of................................ Report DoT..............  1215
 Department of Transportation status 
   report............................... Report DoT..............  1199
 Domestic air carriers
  Information about threats............. 49 USC 44905............   324
 Explosive detection equipment 
   deployment........................... 49 USC 44913............   330
 FAA
  Anti-terrorism assistance............. Report DoT..............  1217
  Responsibilities...................... Report FAA..............  1122
 FBI
  Counterterrorism investigations....... Report DoT..............  1217
 Federal Government
  Transfer of responsibilities.......... Report FAA..............  1134
 Foreign
  Reports to Congress................... 49 USC 44938............   341
 Foreign air carriers
  Security programs..................... 49 USC 44906............   325
 International
  Report to Congress.................... Report FAA..............  1184
 Model aviation security article........ Agreements..............  1287
 Passengers and property
  Refusal to transport.................. 49 USC 44902............   321
  Screening of.......................... 49 USC 44901............   320
 People
  Report to Congress.................... Report FAA..............  1173
 Programs............................... 49 USC 44903............   321
 Technology
  Report to Congress.................... Report FAA..............  1177
 Terrorism.............................. Report FAA..............  1127
  Intelligence reports.................. 49 USC 44911............   328
  Programs to counteract................ 49 USC 44912............   329
 Terrorism prevention................... Report FAA..............  1129
 Terrorism White House Commission on 
   Aviation Safety and Security......... Report to the President.   682
 Terrorist activities
  Report to Congress.................... 49 USC 44938............   341
 Training responsibilities.............. Report FAA..............  1144
 Travelers
  Threat of terrorism................... Report to the President.   682
 U.S. military aircraft
  Emergency powers...................... 49 USC 40106............   319
 White House Commission
  Future recommendations................ Report DoT..............  1219
 White House Commission on Aviation 
   Safety and Security
  Dissent letter........................ Report to the President.   704
  Established........................... EO 13015................   703
  Report on............................. Report to the President.   663
Aviation Security Improvement Act of 
  1990.................................. PL 101-604..............   351

                                   B

Baguio Communique Combating Terrorism... Communique..............  1570
Bahrain
 Aviation security
  Agreement with the United States...... TIAS....................  1268
Beneficiary developing countries
 Designation of
  Congressional notification............ PL 93-618 Sec 502(f)....   280
  Mandatory graduation.................. PL 93-618 Sec 502(e)....   280
  Withdrawal or suspension of........... PL 93-618 Sec 502(d)....   280
 Ineligible countries................... PL 93-618 Sec 502(b)....   277
 Presidential designation
  Factors affecting..................... PL 93-618 Sec 502(c)....   279
 Presidential designation of............ PL 93-618 Sec 502.......   277
Bilateral agreements
 Aviation security
  Entered into force.................... Agreements..............  1285
  Signed but not entered into force..... Agreements..............  1284
 Bahrain-United States
  Aviation security..................... TIAS....................  1268
 Extradition treaties
  Entered into force.................... Agreements..............  1289
  Signed but not entered into force..... Agreements..............  1293
  United States-India................... Agreements..............  1294
  United States-Luxembourg.............. Agreements..............  1320
  United States-Philippines............. Agreements..............  1353
 Israel-United States counterterrorism 
   cooperation accord................... Agreements..............  1239
 Model aviation security article........ Agreements..............  1287
 Mutual legal assistance
  United States-United Kingdom.......... Agreements..............  1382
 Mutual legal assistance treaties
  Entered into force.................... Agreements..............  1380
  Signed but not entered into force..... Agreements..............  1381
 Open Skies
  Entered into force.................... Agreements..............  1283
  Initialed but not signed.............. Agreements..............  1282
  Signed but not entered into force..... Agreements..............  1281
 Sample aviation security agreement..... TIAS....................  1274
 Sample Open Skies agreement
  United States and the Republic of 
   Korea................................ Agreement...............  1242
 United States-South Africa Declaration 
   on Mutual Anti-Crime Prevention...... Agreements..............  1235
Biological and chemical weapons use
 Sanctions against foreign countries.... EO 12938 Sec 5..........   418
Biological weapons
 Control of
  Findings of Congress.................. PL 104-132 Sec 511......   112
 Department of Commerce
  Foreign policy export controls........ Report BXA..............  1006
 Moscow convention on the Prohibition of Treaty..................  1479
 Prohibitions on........................ 18 USC 175..............   164
  Civil actions......................... 18 USC 175..............   164
 Terrorists tools
  Assessment of......................... Report DoT..............  1206
 Use by terrorists
  Findings of Congress.................. PL 104-132 Sec 511......   112
  Restrictions on....................... PL 104-132 Sec 511......   112
 Use in urban and suburban areas
  Training facility for personnel....... PL 104-132 Sec 521......   114
Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 
  1989.................................. PL 101-298..............   212
Biological Weapons Convention
 Implementation of...................... PL 101-298..............   212
Biological weapons proliferation
 Security threat to the United States
  National emergency declared........... EO 12938................   416
Bolivia
 Terrorism
  Assistance to......................... PL 101-623 Sec 2........    46
  Narco-terrorist attacks............... PL 101-623 Sec 2........    46
Bosnia
 Peacekeeping operations
  Authorization of appropriations, FY 
   1999................................. PL 105-261 Sec 1004.....   554
Bretton Woods Agreements Act Amendments, 
  1978.................................. PL 95-435...............   312
Business records
 International terrorism
  Access to............................. 50 USC 1861-1863........   271

                                   C

Center for Excellence in Disaster 
  Management and Humanitarian Assistance 10 USC 182..............   229
Chemical weapons
 Department of Commerce
  Foreign policy export controls........ Report BXA..............  1004
 Inspectors
  Terrorists activities................. PL 105-277 Division I...   398
 Terrorists tools
  Assessment of......................... Report DoT..............  1206
 Use against U.S. citizens abroad....... 18 USC 2332c............   195
  Assistance from the Secretary of 
   Defense.............................. 18 USC 2332e............   196
 Use in urban and suburban areas
  Training facility for personnel....... PL 104-132 Sec 521......   114
Chemical Weapons Convention 
  Implementation Act of 1998............ PL 105-277 Division I...   398
Chemical weapons proliferation
 Security threat to the United States
  National emergency declared........... EO 12938................   416
Citizens abroad (U.S.)
 Aviation disasters
  Department of State policies.......... PL 101-604 Sec 204-210..   353
 Terrorist acts against................. 18 USC 2331.............   189
Civil aircraft
 Pan Am flight 103
  Indictment in connection with bombing 
   of................................... A/RES/46/831 S/2317.....  1662
Civil aviation
 Convention for the Suppression of 
   Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of.. Treaty..................  1484
 Criminal acts against
  Airport attacks....................... Report FAA..............  1113
  Asia.................................. Report FAA..............  1096
  Bombings and shootings................ Report FAA..............  1111
  Central Asia.......................... Report FAA..............  1098
  Chronology of significant acts........ Report FAA..............  1115
  Latin America and the Caribbean....... Report FAA..............  1101
  Middle East and North Africa.......... Report FAA..............  1103
  Report to Congress.................... Report FAA..............  1187
  Sub-Saharan Africa.................... Report FAA..............  1105
 International
  Convention on......................... Document................  1593
  Safeguards against unlawful acts...... Document................  1593
 Protocol for the Suppression of ... 
   Acts of Violence at Airports Serving 
   ..................................... Treaty..................  1484
 Safeguards against unlawful acts
  ICAO consolidated statement of 
   policies............................. Resolution A31-A........  1619
 Security
  Allocation of responsibilities........ Report FAA..............  1119
  Chronology of significant activities, 
   1997................................. Report FAA..............  1168
  Report to Congress.................... Report FAA..............  1168
Colombia
 Terrorism
  Assistance to......................... PL 101-623 Sec 2........    46
  Narco-terrorist attacks............... PL 101-623 Sec 2........    46
Commerce, Department of
 Foreign policy export controls
  Report to Congress.................... Report BXA..............   977
Commerce, Secretary of
 Terrorism
  Foreign policy export controls........ Report BXA..............   991
Comprehensive Readiness Program for 
  Countering Proliferation of Weapons of 
  Mass Destruction...................... H Doc 105-79............   562
Computers
 Department of Commerce
  Foreign policy export controls........ Report BXA..............  1010
Congress
 National emergency powers.............. PL 94-412 Sec 202.......   394
                                         PL 94-412 Sec 401.......   395
Consular officers
 Passports
  Punishable violations................. 18 USC 1541.............   182
Contracts
 Defense contractors
  Transactions with terrorist countries. PL 103-160 Sec 843......   252
                                         PL 103-160 Sec 843......   252
Convention for the Suppression of 
  Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
  Civil Aviation........................ Treaty..................  1484
Convention for the Suppression of 
  Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
  Maritime Navigation................... Treaty..................  1433
Convention for the Suppression of 
  Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft.......... Treaty..................  1497
Convention on International Civil 
  Aviation
 Safeguards against unlawful acts
  Annex 17.............................. Document................  1593
Convention on Offenses and Certain Acts 
  Committee on Board Aircraft........... Treaty..................  1502
Convention on the Marking of Plastic 
  Explosives for the Purpose of 
  Detection............................. PL 104-132 Sec 601......   115
Convention on the Marking of Plastic 
  Explosives for the Purpose of 
  Identification........................ Treaty..................  1425
Convention on the Physical Protection of 
  Nuclear Material...................... Treaty..................  1462
Convention on the Prevention and 
  Punishment of Crimes Against 
  Internationally Protected Persons..... Treaty..................  1473
Convention on the Prohibition of ... 
  Bacteriological, (Biological) and 
  Toxin Weapons ........................ Treaty..................  1479
Convention on the Suppression of 
  Terrorism of the South Asian 
  Association for Regional Cooperation.. Treaty..................  1521
Convention to Prevent and Punish the 
  Acts of Terrorism ... Against Persons 
  and Related Extortion ................ Treaty..................  1493
Council of Europe: European Convention 
  on the Suppression of Terrorism Among 
  Member States......................... Treaty..................  1528
Counter-terrorism operations
 Defense Department personnel
  Equipment operators................... 10 USC 374(b(1)(C)......   230
Counter-terrorism Rewards Program
 Information on......................... Document................   881
Counter-Terrorism, Office of the 
  National Coordinator for Security, 
  Infrastructure Protection and......... PDD-62..................   539
Counterterror Technical Support
 Obligation of funds.................... PL 105-262 Sec 8129.....   243
Counterterrorism
 Agreement between South Africa and the 
   United States........................ Agreements..............  1235
 Denver Summit of the Eight Foreign 
   Ministers
  Progress report....................... Report..................  1538
 Federal response plan
  Department of Justice................. PDD-39..................   555
  Federal agencies support.............. PDD-39..................   557
  Federal Bureau of Investigation....... PDD-39..................   556
  Federal Emergency Management Agency... PDD-39..................   556
  Terrorism Incident Annex.............. PDD-39..................   549
 Strategy
  Department of Defense resource 
   requirements......................... Report..................   859
  Department of Justice resource 
   requirements......................... Report..................   855
  Department of State resource 
   requirements......................... Report..................   858
  Intelligence agencies resource 
   requirements......................... Report..................   860
 U.S. policy on
  Federal Emergency Management Agency 
   abstract............................. PDD-39..................   546
  Presidential Directive................ PDD-39..................   541
Counterterrorism and Antiterrorism 
  activities
 Oversight of
  Report to Congress.................... PL 105-85 Sec 1051......   244
Counterterrorism Cooperation Accord 
  between Israel and the United States.. Agreements..............  1239
Counterterrorism fund
 Appropriations, 1999................... PL 105-277 Title I......    58
Counterterrorism Fund
 Department of Justice resource 
   requirements......................... Report..................   857
Counterterrorism programs
 Attorney General
  Obligation of funds................... PL 105-277 Title I......    60
Counterterrorism Protection Fund
 Authorization of appropriations........ PL 84-885 Sec 39........    75
Counterterrorism technology
 Research and development
  Authorization of appropriations....... PL 104-132 Sec 821......   119
Counterterrorism, Office of the 
  Coordinator for
 Foreign terrorists organizations....... Report..................   852
Countries
 Civil actions against.................. 28 USC Ch 97............   215
  Removal............................... 28 USC Ch 97............   215
 Counterterrorism assistance
  Conditions under...................... PL 104-93 Sec 310.......    78
 Counterterrorism technology
  U.S. assistance with.................. PL 104-132 Sec 820......   119
 Debt relief
  Terrorism support conditions.......... PL 105-277 Sec 559......    51
 Explosive detection devices
  U.S. assistance....................... PL 104-132 Sec 820......   119
 Immunities from United States courts
  Validity.............................. 28 USC Ch 97............   215
 Restricted state or entity
  Acquiring weapons of mass destruction. PL 105-261 Sec 1306.....   238
 Sanctions against
  Weapons proliferation or use.......... EO 12938 Sec 5..........   418
 State sponsored terrorism
  Overview.............................. Report PGT..............   791
 Terrorist designated
  Opposing loans to or for.............. PL 95-118 Sec 1621......   314
Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation, 
  1998.................................. Report FAA..............  1094
Criminal code (U.S.)
 Diplomatic or consular buildings in the 
   United States........................ 18 USC 970..............   177
 Diplomatic or consular officials in the 
   United States........................ 18 USC 112..............   163
 Foreign officials
  Threats and extortion against......... 18 USC 878..............   170
 Foreign officials in the United States
  Kidnaping............................. 18 USC 1201.............   180
  Murder conspiracy..................... 18 USC 1117.............   180
  Murder or manslaughter of............. 18 USC 1116.............   178
 Passports.............................. 18 USC 1541-46..........   182
 Violations of
  Penalties............................. 18 USC 924..............   171
Cuba
 Department of Commerce
  Foreign policy export controls........ Report BXA..............   995
 Terrorism List Government
  Prohibited financial transactions..... 31 CFR Part 596.201.....   468
 U.S. embargo against
  Regulations on........................ OFAC....................  1050
Cuban Assets Control Regulations
 Overview............................... OFAC....................  1050

                                   D

Declaration of Lima to Prevent, Combat, 
  and Eliminate Terrorism............... Declaration.............  1586
 Plan of action......................... Plan....................  1589
Defense, Department of
 Chemical/Biological hot line........... Report..................   943
 Contract proposals
  Restrictions on....................... 10 USC 2327(b)..........   234
 Contracts
  Waivers............................... 10 USC 2327(c)..........   234
 Counter-terrorism activities
  Authorization of appropriations, FY 
   1999................................. PL 105-261 Sec 1023(d)..   238
  Training funds........................ PL 105-261 Sec 1023(d)..   238
 Defense contracts
  Foreign government interest disclosure 10 USC 2327(a)..........   234
 Department of Defense Appropriations 
   Act, 1999............................ PL 105-262..............   243
 Department of Defense Authorization 
   Act, 1986............................ PL 99-145...............   261
 Department of Defense Authorization 
   Act, 1987............................ PL 99-661...............   260
 Excess personal property
  Transfer to state and federal agencies 10 USC 2576a............   235
 National Defense Authorization Act for 
   Fiscal Year 1994..................... PL 103-160..............   252
 National Defense Authorization Act for 
   Fiscal Year 1995..................... PL 103-337..............   249
 National Guard and Reserve Component
  WMD Response.......................... Plan....................   886
 Personnel
  Assisting in counter-terrorism 
   operations........................... 10 USC 374(b(1)(C)......   230
 Protection of forces overseas
  Review of by GAO Letter............... Report..................   929
 Strom Thurmond National Defense 
   Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
   1999................................. PL 105-261..............   237
 Terrorist attacks
  Emergency supplemental appropriations, 
   1999................................. PL 105-277 Title II.....    63
 Terrorist countries
  Aid prohibition....................... 10 USC 2249(a)..........   233
 Weapons of mass destruction
  Emergency supplemental appropriations, 
   1999................................. PL 105-277 Title II.....    63
 Weapons of Mass Destruction Reserve 
   Component Integration Plan........... Plan....................   886
 WMD
  Domestic preparedness program......... Report..................   929
 WMD information and expertise
  Civilian applications................. Report..................   937
 WMD reserve component integration plan
  Acronyms.............................. Plan....................   921
 WMD use against the United States
  Component integration plan............ Plan....................   887
  Federal response...................... Plan....................   898
  Force structure to address............ Plan....................   890
  Overview.............................. Plan....................   893
  Response elements..................... Plan....................   907
  Training requirements................. Plan....................   916
Defense, Secretary of
 Counterterror Technical Support
  Obligation of funds................... PL 105-262 Sec 8129.....   243
 Protection of U.S. forces abroad....... Report..................   959
  Worldwide initiatives................. Report..................   966
Denver Summit of the Eight Foreign 
  Ministers Communique.................. 1537....................
 Progress report........................ Report..................  1538
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and 
  State, the Judiciary . . . 
  Appropriations Act, 1997.............. PL 104-208..............    68
Developing countries
 Special operations forces
  Report to Congress.................... 10 USC 2011(e)..........   232
  Training paid by the United States.... 10 USC 2011.............   232
Diplomatic and Consular Programs
 Emergency supplemental appropriations, 
   1999................................. PL 105-277 Title II.....    91
 Terrorism rewards
  Appropriations, 1999.................. PL 105-277 Title IV.....    90
Diplomatic and Consular Service
 Diplomatic Security Program
  Authorization of appropriations....... PL 99-399 Sec 401.......   132
 Promoting security..................... PL 99-399 Sec 102.......   123
 Security
  Role of Secretary of State............ PL 99-399 Sec 103.......   124
Diplomatic or consular buildings in the 
  United States
 Protection of.......................... 18 USC 970..............   177
Diplomatic Security Act................. PL 99-399 Sec 101.......   123
Diplomatic Security Program
 Authorization of appropriations, 1986 
   and 1987............................. PL 99-399 Sec 401.......   132
Diplomatic Security, Bureau of
 Overseas Security Electronic Bulletin 
   Board................................ PL 101-604 Sec 212......   355
Downing report
 Secretary of Defense
  Protection of U.S. forces abroad...... Report..................   959

                                   E

Egypt
 Airport security equipment and 
   commodities
  Assistance............................ PL 99-399 Sec 508.......   139
 Summit of the Peacemakers
  Combating terrorism................... Statement...............  1565
Electronic surveillance
 Definitions............................ 50 USC 1841.............   265
 International terrorism
  Pen registers or trap and trace 
   devices.............................. 50 USC 1842-1846........   266
Enterprise for the Americas Facility
 Country eligibility
  Presidential determination............ PL 87-195 Sec 703(b)....    10
 Country eligibility requirements....... PL 87-195 Sec 703(a)....    10
 Eligibility............................ PL 87-195 Sec 703.......    10
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative.. PL 87-195 Sec 701.......     9
Espionage
 Acts of
  Rewards for information on............ 18 USC 3071(b)..........   202
Ethiopia
 Terrorism
  Security Council resolutions.......... S/RES/1070..............  1686
                                         S/RES/1054..............  1688
                                         S/RES/1044..............  1690
Eurasia
 Terrorism incidents
  Overview for 1998..................... Report PGT..............   772
Europe
 Terrorism incidents.................... Report PGT..............   775
European Convention on the Suppression 
  of Terrorism Among Member States...... Treaty..................  1528
 Agreement on........................... Agreement...............  1525
 Application of......................... Agreement...............  1525
Executive-legislative relations
 National emergency..................... PL 95-223 Sec 204.......   300
Explosive materials
 Instructions on making
  Report to Congress.................... PL 104-132 Sec 709......   116
 Plastics
  Convention on......................... PL 104-132 Sec 601......   115
 Thefts from military arsenals
  Report to Congress.................... PL 104-132 Sec 503......   112
Export Administration Act of 1979....... PL 96-72 Sec 1..........   282
 Administration of...................... EO 12002................   432
 Section 6(j)
  Terrorism List Government............. 31 CFR Part 596.310.....   470
 Sudan
  Section 6(j) list inclusion........... Notice..................   880
Export controls
 Administration of...................... EO 12002................   432
 Export Administration Review Board..... EO 12002 Sec 3-4........   432
 Missile technology..................... PL 96-72 Sec 6(l).......   287
 Policy declaration..................... PL 96-72 Sec 3..........   288
 Regulations
  Continuation of....................... EO 12924................   421
 Report to Congress..................... PL 96-72 Sec 6(f).......   283
                                         PL 96-72 Sec 14.........   288
 Terrorism supporting countries......... PL 96-72 Sec 6(j).......   285
 Violations
  Penalties for......................... PL 96-72 Sec 11.........   282
Export-Import Bank
 Democracy
  Assisting............................. PL 79-173 Sec 2(b)(1)(H)   307
 East European countries
  Assisting............................. PL 79-173 Sec 2(b)(1)(H)   307
 Economic impact in the United States... PL 79-173 Sec 2(b)(1)...   303
 Foreign Credit Insurance Association... PL 79-173 Sec 2(b)(1)(F)   307
 Objectives of.......................... PL 79-173 Sec 2(b)(1)...   303
 Reports to Congress.................... PL 79-173 Sec 2(b)(1)...   303
 SEED
  Market based economies................ PL 79-173 Sec 2(b)(1)(H)   307
 Services
  Export of............................. PL 79-173 Sec 2(b)(1)(D)   305
 Small businesses
  International economic participation.. PL 79-173 Sec 2(b)(1)(E)   305
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945.......... PL 79-173...............   303
Exports
 Iran
  Regulations on........................ OFAC....................  1062
 To terrorism supporting countries
  Foreign aid funds prohibition......... PL 105-277 Sec 551......    50
Extradition treaties
 Bilateral agreements
  Entered into force.................... Agreements..............  1289
                                         Agreements..............  1293
 India and the United States............ Agreements..............  1294
 Luxembourg and the United States....... Agreements..............  1320
 Philippines and the United States...... Agreements..............  1353

                                   F

Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 
  1996.................................. PL 104-264..............   343
                                         PL 104-264..............   769
Federal Bureau of Investigation
 Counterterrorism expenses
  Appropriations, 1999.................. PL 105-277 Title I......    59
  Emergency supplemental appropriations, PL 105-277 Title II.....    61
 Persons engaged in international 
   terrorism
  Consumer report disclo................ PL 104-93 Sec 610.......    79
Federal Emergency Management Agency
 Response to terrorism.................. PL 103-160 Sec 1704.....   253
 U.S. policy on Counterterrorism
  Unclassified abstract................. PDD-39..................   546
Federal-State jurisdiction (U.S.)
 Criminal code.......................... 18 USC 1116.............   178
 Protection over foreign officials...... 18 USC 1116.............   178
Foreign aid
 Anti-terrorism assistance program...... PL 87-195 Sec 571-574...     3
 Anti-terrorism program
  Appropriations, 1999.................. PL 105-277 Title II.....    47
 Bilateral assistance to terrorist 
   countries
  Prohibition on........................ PL 105-277 Sec 528......    48
 Terrorism supporting countries
  Prohibition on assistance to.......... PL 87-195 Sec 620A......     6
Foreign Assets Control, Office of
 Sanctions regulations.................. OFAC....................  1024
  Cuba.................................. OFAC....................  1050
  Iran.................................. OFAC....................  1061
  Iraq.................................. OFAC....................  1071
  Libya................................. OFAC....................  1077
  North Korea........................... OFAC....................  1082
  Sudan................................. OFAC....................  1087
  Taliban............................... OFAC....................  1091
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
 Antiterrorism assistance............... PL 87-195 Chapter 8.....     3
Foreign dignitaries
 Protecting
  Designating Security officers......... 22 CFR Part 2...........   437
Foreign officials in the United States
 Attacks against........................ 18 USC 112..............   163
 Kidnapping............................. 18 USC 1201.............   180
 Murder or manslaughter of.............. 18 USC 1116.............   178
 Protection of.......................... 18 USC 112..............   163
 Threats and extortion against.......... 18 USC 878..............   170
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, 
  and Related Programs Appropriations 
  Act, 1997............................. PL 104-208..............    68
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, 
  and Related Programs Appropriations 
  Act, 1999............................. PL 105-277..............    47
Foreign policy
 Export controls........................ PL 96-72 Sec 6..........   288
  Program description and analysis...... Report BXA..............   983
  Report to Congress.................... Report BXA..............   977
  Terrorism............................. Report BXA..............   990
 Terrorism
  Export controls analysis.............. Report BXA..............   990
Foreign Policy Export Controls
 Annual report.......................... Report BXA..............   977
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
  Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989............ PL 100-204..............    87
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
  Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991............ PL 101-246..............   385
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
  Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993............ PL 102-138..............    86
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
  Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995............ PL 103-236..............    82
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
  Fiscal Years 1998 and 1999............ PL 105-277 Sec 2001.....    80
Foreign Security Liaison Officers....... 49 USC 44934............   334
Foreign Service
 Buildings
  Diplomatic construction program....... PL 99-399 Sec 402.......   133
 Danger pay............................. PL 98-533 Sec 304.......   214
 International terrorism
  Security against...................... PL 98-533 Sec 301.......   214
Foreign Service buildings
 Security
  Advisory Panel on..................... PL 98-533 Sec 301.......   214
Foreign Sovereign Immunities
 Actions against foreign states......... 28 USC Ch 85............   215
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs)
 Department of Commerce
  Export controls....................... Report BXA..............   981
                                         Report BXA..............   986
 List of................................ OFAC....................  1025
Foreign terrorist organizations
 Defined................................ 31 CFR Part 597.309.....   480
Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
  Sanctions Regulations................. 31 CFR Part 597.........   475
                                         OFAC....................  1025
Foreign terrorists
 Opposition to
  Foreign policy export controls........ Report BXA..............   985
Foreign terrorists organizations
 Designated as.......................... PL 82-414 Sec 219.......   366
Former Soviet Union Demilitarization Act 
  of 1992............................... PL 102-484 Sec 1401.....   254

                                   G

G-7 Declaration on Terrorism............ Declaration.............  1546
General Accounting Office
 Defense Department protection of 
   overseas forces
  Review of Letter...................... Report..................   929
Governments
 Airport security....................... PL 99-83 Sec 551........    37
 Defense Department contract proposals
  Significant interest disclosure....... 10 USC 2327(a)..........   234
 Lethal weapons exports
  Foreign aid funds prohibition......... PL 105-277 Sec 551......    50
 Use of armed force in self defense
  International terrorism consideration. PL 101-222 Sec 10.......   211

                                   H

Hague Convention for the Suppression of 
  Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft.......... Treaty..................  1497
Halifax
 Statement of the Chairman
  Combating terrorism................... Statement...............  1552
Hemispheric Cooperation to Prevent, 
  Combat, and Eliminate terrorism....... AG/RES. 1399............  1584
Hijackings
 TWA flight 847
  Sense of Congress..................... PL 99-83 Sec 558........    38
Hostage Relief Act of 1980.............. PL 96-449...............    93
 Delegation of authority................ EO 12268................   431
Hostages (U.S.)
 Civil Relief Act of.................... 1940....................
  Application extension................. PL 96-449 Sec 105.......    96
 Education benefits..................... PL 96-449 Sec 104.......    95
 In Iraq
  Benefits for.......................... 22 CFR Part 193.........   465
 In Kuwait
  Benefits for.......................... 22 CFR Part 193.........   465
 In Lebanon
  Benefits for.......................... 22 CFR Part 193.........   465
 Iran
  Red Cross visits...................... PL 96-449 Sec 301.......   100
 Medical care........................... PL 96-449 Sec 103.......    94
 Pay and allowances..................... PL 96-449 Sec 102.......    94
 Relief assistance...................... 22 CFR Part 191.........   440
 Taxes
  Compensation excluded................. PL 96-449 Sec 201.......    97
Hostages
 International Convention Against the 
   Taking of............................ Treaty..................  1452
Houston
 Statement of the Chairman condemning 
   Terrorism............................ Statement...............  1559
Human rights
 MDBs
  Enhancement of........................ PL 95-118 Sec 701.......   314

                                   I

ICAO
 Resolution A31-A
  Safeguarding international civil 
   aviation............................. Resolution A31-A........  1619
 Safeguarding international civil 
   aviation
  Statement of policies................. Resolution A31-A........  1619
IMF
 Supplemental Financing Facility
  Opposing terrorism.................... PL 95-435 Sec 6.........   312
 Terrorism supporting countries
  Opposing assistance to................ PL 95-435 Sec 6.........   312
Immigrant
 Alien
  Defined............................... PL 82-414 Sec 
                                          101(a)(15)(S)..........   363
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. PL 82-414...............   363
Income tax
 United States military and civilian 
   employees killed overseas
  Tax forgiveness....................... 26 USC 692(c)...........   308
India
 Foreign policy export controls......... Report BXA..............   983
Information exchange
 Combating terrorism.................... Conference..............  1544
Intelligence
 Surveillance
  Definitions........................... 50 USC 1801.............   264
Intelligence and Security, Director of.. 49 USC 44931............   332
Intelligence Authorization Act for 
  Fiscal Year 1996...................... PL 104-93...............    78
Inter-American Committee on Terrorism... CICTE...................  1577
Inter-American Development Bank Act..... PL 86-147...............   315
Inter-American Specialized Conference on 
  Terrorism
 Declaration............................ Declaration.............  1586
International Anti-Terrorism Committee
 Establishment of....................... PL 99-83 Sec 506........    36
International Antiterrorism Committee
 Proposal for........................... PL 99-399 Sec 701.......   141
International civil airports
 Violence at
  Criminal penalties.................... 18 USC 37...............   162
International Civil Aviation 
  Organization
 (see ICAO)
 Secretary of State
  Aviation security proposals........... PL 101-604 Sec 215......   357
International Committee of the Red Cross
 Visiting American hostages in Iran..... PL 96-449 Sec 301.......   100
International Convention Against the 
  Taking of Hostages.................... Treaty..................  1452
International Convention for the 
  Suppression of Terrorist Bombings..... Treaty..................  1512
International Criminal Court
 United States participation in......... PL 103-236 Sec 518-519..    84
International Emergency Economic Powers 
  Act................................... PL 95-223 Sec 201.......   298
International Explosives Technical 
  Convention
 Established............................ Treaty..................  1427
International financial institutions
 Opposing loans to or for terrorist 
   countries............................ PL 95-118 Sec 1621......   314
International Financial Institutions Act PL 95-118...............   313
International Maritime and Port Security 
  Act................................... PL 99-399 Sec 901.......   153
International Maritime Organization
 Maritime security
  Convention on......................... Treaty..................  1433
 Seaport and shipboard security against 
   terrorists........................... PL 99-399 Sec 902.......   153
International Narcotics Control Act of 
  1990.................................. PL 101-623 Sec 1........    46
International Security and Development 
  Cooperation Act of 1981............... PL 97-113...............    40
International Security and Development 
  Cooperation Act of 1985............... PL 99-83................    35
Iran
 American hostages
  Treatment of.......................... PL 96-449 Sec 301.......   100
 Arms control
  U.S. policy toward.................... PL 102-484 Sec 1602.....    30
 Continuation of national emergency with 
   respect to........................... Notice..................   629
 Continuation of national emergency with 
   respect to (under EO 12170).......... Notice..................   661
 Department of Commerce
  Anti-terrorism controls............... Report BXA..............   986
 Goods or services
  Prohibited transactions............... EO 13059................   406
 Halifax Summit
  Statement of the Chairman on terrorism Statement...............  1552
 Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990
  Applicability......................... PL 102-484 Sec 1603.....    30
 National emergency with respect to 
   (under 12170)
  Report on developments................ Report to Congress......   659
 National emergency with respect to
  Report on developments................ Report to Congress......   624
 Oil resources
  Development prohibitions.............. EO 12957................   412
  Prohibiting certain transactions...... EO 12957................   412
 Sanctions
  Multilateral sanctions regime......... PL 104-172 Sec 4........    20
 Sanctions against
  Description of........................ PL 104-172 Sec 6........    23
  Duration of........................... PL 104-172 Sec 9........    24
  Imposition of......................... PL 104-172 Sec 5........    21
  Regulations on........................ OFAC....................  1061
  Secretary of State advisories......... PL 104-172 Sec 7........    24
  Termination of........................ PL 104-172 Sec 8........    24
 Security threat to the United States
  National emergency declared........... EO 12959................   410
                                         EO 13957................   412
 Terrorism List Government
  Prohibited financial transactions..... 31 CFR Part 596.201.....   468
 Terrorism support
  Sense of Congress..................... PL 105-277 Sec 586......    52
 Threat to United States national 
   security
  National emergency declared........... EO 13059................   406
 Transactions involving
  Revocation of prohibitions against.... EO 12282................   430
 Transactions with
  Prohibited............................ EO 12959................   410
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996.... PL 104-172..............    19
 Definitions............................ PL 104-172 Sec 14.......    27
Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 
  1992.................................. PL 102-484 Title XVI....    30
Iranian Assets Control Regulations...... OFAC....................  1069
Iranian Transactions Regulations
 Overview............................... OFAC....................  1061
Iraq
 Arms control
  U.S. policy toward.................... PL 102-484 Sec 1602.....    30
 Continuation of national emergency with 
   respect to........................... Notice..................   652
 International terrorism
  Support for........................... PL 101-513 Sec 586F(c)..    43
 National emergency with respect to
  Report on developments................ Report to Congress......   647
 Sanctions against
  Regulations on........................ OFAC....................  1071
 Support for acts of terrorism.......... PL 101-513 Sec 586F(c)..    43
 Terrorism List Government
  Prohibited financial transactions..... 31 CFR Part 596.201.....   468
 United States hostages in
  Benefits for.......................... 22 CFR Part 193.........   465
Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990.............. PL 101-513 Sec 586......    42
 Iran
  Applicability......................... PL 102-484 Sec 1603.....    30
Iraqi Sanctions Regulations
 Overview............................... OFAC....................  1071
Israel-United States Counterterrorism 
  Cooperation Accord.................... Agreements..............  1239
Israel, Jerusalem, or the West Bank
 Facilities in
  Funds prohibition..................... PL 99-399 Sec 414.......   138

                                   J

Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 
  1996.................................. PL 104-132 Sec 231......   105
Justice, Department of
 Counterterrorism strategy
  Resource requirements................. Report..................   855
Justice, Department of Department of 
  Justice Appropriations Act, 1999...... PL 105-277 Title I......    58

                                   K

Kenya
 Terrorism
  Security Council resolutions.......... S/RES/1189..............  1684
Khobar Towers
 Terrorist attack
  Against U.S. forces abroad............ Report..................   959
Korea, North
 Department of Commerce
  Foreign policy export controls........ Report BXA..............   996
 Foreign Assets Control Regulations..... OFAC....................  1082
 Nuclear weapons development
  Sense of Congress..................... PL 103-337 Sec 1324.....   249
 Sanctions against
  Regulations on........................ OFAC....................  1082
 Terrorism List Government
  Prohibited financial transactions..... 31 CFR Part 596.201.....   469
Korea, Republic of
 Aviation security
  Air transport agreement with the 
   United States........................ Agreement...............  1242
  Air transport services agreement with 
   the United States.................... TIAS....................  1274
Kuwait
 United States hostages in
  Benefits for.......................... 22 CFR Part 193.........   465

                                   L

Latin America
 Terrorism incidents
  Overview for 1998..................... Report PGT..............   781
Least-developed beneficiary developing 
  countries
 Presidential designation of............ PL 93-618 Sec 502.......   277
Lebanon
 United States hostages in
  Benefits for.......................... 22 CFR Part 193.........   465
Libya
 Air carriers
  United States flight restrictions..... EO 12801................   423
 Continuation of national emergency with 
   respect to........................... Notice..................   657
 Department of Commerce
  Foreign policy export controls........ Report BXA..............  1001
 National emergency with respect to
  Report on developments................ Report to Congress......   647
 Petroleum products
  Import prohibition.................... EO 12538................   429
 Property and interests in the United 
   States
  Blocking.............................. EO 12544................   426
 Sanctions
  Multilateral sanctions regime......... PL 104-172 Sec 4........    20
 Sanctions against
  Description of........................ PL 104-172 Sec 6........    23
  Duration of........................... PL 104-172 Sec 9........    24
  Imposition of......................... PL 104-172 Sec 5........    21
  Regulations on........................ OFAC....................  1077
  Secretary of State advisories......... PL 104-172 Sec 7........    24
  Termination of........................ PL 104-172 Sec 8........    24
 Terrorism
  Air carrier flight restrictions....... EO 12801................   423
  Prohibition on imports and exports.... PL 99-83 Sec 504........    36
  Security Council resolutions.......... S/RES/1192..............  1682
                                         S/RES/833...............  1692
                                         S/RES/748...............  1696
                                         S/RES/731...............  1699
 Terrorism List Government
  Prohibited financial transactions..... 31 CFR Part 596.201.....   468
 Terrorist support
  Congressional condemnation............ PL 97-113 Sec 718.......    40
 Trade and other transactions
  Prohibitions on....................... EO 12543................   427
Libya Sanctions Regulations
 Overview............................... OFAC....................  1077
Lima, Peru
 Declaration of Lima to Prevent, Combat, 
   and Eliminate Terrorism
  Plan of action........................ Plan....................  1589
 Inter-American Specialized Conference 
   on Terrorism
  Declaration........................... Declaration.............  1586
Lyon summit of the G-7 Foreign Ministers Conference..............  1541
Lyon, France
 G-7 Declaration on Terrorism........... Declaration.............  1546

                                   M

Mar de Plata, Argentina
 Second Inter-American Specialized 
   Conference on Terrorism.............. Document................  1576
Maritime and territorial jurisdiction
 United States
  Defined............................... 18 USC 7................   160
Maritime fixed platforms
 Violence against
  Criminal penalties.................... 18 USC 2281.............   187
Maritime security
 Compliance with plans
  Coast Guard assessments............... Memorandum MARAD........  1195
 Convention for the Suppression of 
   Unlawful Acts Against................ Treaty..................  1433
 Terminals
  Evaluation guide...................... NVIC 3-96...............  1227
 Terrorism
  Audit report.......................... Memorandum MARAD........  1191
  Background............................ Memorandum MARAD........  1192
 Terrorism against vessels and passenger 
   terminals
  Threat of............................. NVIC 3-96...............  1222
 Vessels
  Evaluation guide...................... NVIC 3-96...............  1231
 Vessels and passenger terminals
  Implementation of..................... NVIC 3-96...............  1222
MDBs
 Human rights
  Enhancement of........................ PL 95-118 Sec 701.......   314
Middle East
 Peace process
  Disruption of......................... EO 12947................   413
 Terrorism
  Percentage of total in 1985........... PL 100-204 Sec 1002.....   390
 Terrorism incidents
  Overview for 1998..................... Report PGT..............   784
Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 
  1994.................................. PL 103-236 Sec 581......   381
Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 
  1995.................................. PL 104-107 Title VI.....   374
Middle East peace process
 Disruption by foreign terrorists
  National emergency declared........... EO 13947................   413
  Prohibiting transactions with......... EO 13099................   636
 Terrorists disrupting
  Amendment to national emergency 
   declaration.......................... Report to Congress......   635
  Report on national emergency 
   developments......................... Report to Congress......   624
Military (U.S.)
 Protection against terrorism........... PL 99-145 Sec 1452......   261
 Special operations forces
  Responding to terrorism............... PL 99-145 Sec 1453......   261
 Stationed abroad
  Security against terrorist actions.... PL 99-399 Sec 1101......   157
Military equipment (U.S.)
 Missiles
  Export controls....................... PL 96-72 Sec 6(l).......   287
Military equipment
 Terrorist countries receiving
  Prohibitions.......................... PL 87-195 Sec 620H......     9
 Thefts of
  Report to Congress.................... PL 104-132 Sec 503......   112
Military training
 Special operations forces
  Expenses paid by the United States.... 10 USC 2011.............   232
Ministerial meetings
 G-7 countries
  Lyon summit........................... Conference..............  1541
 G-7/G-8 countries
  Denver Summit of the Eight Foreign 
   Ministers............................ Communique..............  1537
 Halifax Summit
  Statement of the Chairman............. Statement...............  1552
 Houston
  Statement of the Chairman condemning 
   terrorism............................ Statement...............  1559
  Terrorism declaration................. Statement...............  1559
 Japan
  Terrorism declaration................. Declaration.............  1557
 Munich
  Statement of the Chairman condemning 
   terrorism............................ Statement...............  1558
 Naples
  Statement of the Chairman condemning 
   terrorism............................ Statement...............  1555
 OAS
  Inter-American Specialized Conference 
   on Terrorism......................... Declaration.............  1586
 Ottawa Summit
  Declaration on countering terrorism... Declaration.............  1547
 Second Inter-American Specialized 
   Conference on Terrorism.............. Document................  1576
 Sharm el-Sheikh
  Recommendations of the working group.. Communique..............  1567
 Tokyo
  International terrorism condemnation.. Statement...............  1563
  International terrorism declaration... Statement...............  1563
  Terrorism declaration................. Declaration.............  1557
 Toronto
  Statement of the Chairman condemning 
   terrorism............................ Statement...............  1560
  Terrorism declaration................. Statement...............  1560
 Venice
  Statement of the Chairman condemning 
   terrorism............................ Statement...............  1561
  Terrorism declaration................. Statement...............  1561
Missile Technology Control Regime Annex
 Export controls........................ PL 96-72 Sec 6(l).......   287
  Presidential sanctions................ PL 90-629 Sec 72-73.....    18
 Foreign persons
  Export controls....................... PL 90-629 Sec 73........    18
 United States persons
  Export controls....................... PL 90-629 Sec 72........    18
Montreal Convention for the Suppression 
  of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
  Civil Aviation........................ Treaty..................  1484
Moscow Convention on the Prohibition of 
  ... Bacteriological, (Biological) and 
  Toxin Weapons ........................ Treaty..................  1479
Multilateral Investment Fund
 Authorization of appropriations........ PL 86-147 Sec 37(b).....   315
 U.S. contribution to................... PL 86-147 Sec 37........   315
Munich
 Statement of the Chairman condemning 
   Terrorism............................ Statement...............  1558
Mutual legal assistance treaties
 Bilateral agreements
  Entered into force.................... Agreements..............  1380
  Signed but not entered into force..... Agreements..............  1381
 United Kingdom and the United States... Agreements..............  1382

                                   N

Naples
 Statement of the Chairman
  Combating terrorism................... Statement...............  1555
Narcoterrorism
 Information on
  Rewards for........................... Report..................   878
National Commission on Terrorism
 Establishment of....................... PL 105-277 Sec 591......    52
National Coordinator for Security, 
  Infrastructure Protection and Counter-
  Terrorism, Office of.................. PDD-62..................   539
National Defense Authorization Act for 
  Fiscal Year 1993...................... PL 102-484..............   254
National Defense Authorization Act for 
  Fiscal Year 1994...................... PL 103-160..............   252
National Defense Authorization Act for 
  Fiscal Year 1995...................... PL 103-337..............   249
National Defense Authorization Act for 
  Fiscal Year 1997...................... PL 104-201..............   248
National Defense Authorization Act for 
  Fiscal Year 1998...................... PL 105-85...............   244
National Emergencies Act................ PL 94-412...............   393
National emergency
 Afghan Taliban
  Report on declaration of.............. Report to Congress......   616
 Declaration of......................... PL 94-412 Sec 201.......   393
                                         EO 12938................   416
 Executive-Congressional consultation... PL 95-223 Sec 204.......   300
 Iran
  Prohibited transactions............... EO 13059................   406
                                         EO 12959................   410
 Presidential authority................. PL 95-223 Sec 202-203...   298
 Statutory authority.................... PL 94-412 Sec 301.......   395
 Sudan
  Prohibited transactions............... EO 13067................   404
 Termination............................ PL 94-412 Sec 101.......   393
 Trading with the enemy................. PL 95-223 Sec 101.......   298
 With respect to Iran (under EO 12170)
  Continuation of....................... Notice..................   661
  Report on developments................ Report to Congress......   659
 With respect to Iran
  Continuation of....................... Notice..................   629
  Report on developments................ Report to Congress......   624
 With respect to Iraq
  Continuation of....................... Notice..................   652
  Report on developments................ Report to Congress......   647
 With respect to Libya
  Continuation of....................... Notice..................   657
  Report on developments................ Report to Congress......   647
 With respect to Sudan
  Continuation of....................... Notice..................   622
  Report on declaration of.............. Report to Congress......   619
 With respect to terrorists disrupting 
   Middle East peace process
  Amendment to.......................... Report to Congress......   635
  Continuation of....................... Notice..................   637
  Report on............................. Report to Congress......   624
 With respect to Weapons of mass 
   destruction
  Continuation of....................... Notice..................   646
  Report on............................. Report to Congress......   639
National security
 Export violations
  Import prohibitions................... PL 87-794 Sec 233.......   293
 Trade concessions...................... PL 87-794 Sec 232.......   291
National Security Council
 Committee on Transnational Threats..... 50 USC 402..............   263
Nationality
 Criminality
  Statute of limitations for prosecution 18 USC 3291.............   205
NATO
 Common funded budgets
  U.S. contribution, FY 1999............ PL 105-261 Sec 1006.....   555
Nonproliferation and anti-terrorism 
  programs
  Emergency supplemental appropriations, 
   1999................................. PL 105-277 Title II.....    65
Nuclear material
 Prohibited transactions................ 18 USC 831..............   166
 Vienna Convention on the Physical 
   Protection of........................ Treaty..................  1462
Nuclear weapons
 Nonproliferation
  International activities assistance... PL 102-484 Sec 1505.....   257
 Use by terrorists
  Findings of Congress.................. PL 104-132 Sec 501......   110
  Restrictions on....................... PL 104-132 Sec 501......   110
Nuclear weapons proliferation
 Security threat to the United States
  National emergency declared........... EO 12938................   416

                                   O

OAS Convention to Prevent and Punish the 
  Acts of Terrorism ... Against Persons 
  ...................................... Treaty..................  1493
Office of Emergency Planning
 Trade agreements....................... PL 87-794 Sec 232.......   291
Oil
 Import adjustment...................... PL 87-794 Sec 232(f)....   293
 Iran resources
  Prohibiting certain transactions...... EO 12957................   412
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and 
  Antiterrorism Act of 1986............. PL 99-399...............   121
Omniubus Consolidated and Emergency 
  Supplemental Appropriations Act for 
  Fiscal Year 1999...................... PL 105-277 Title II.....    61
Organization of American States
 Combating terrorism.................... AG/RES. 1399............  1584
 Inter-American Committee on Terrorism.. CICTE...................  1577
 Inter-American Specialized Conference 
   on Terrorism......................... Declaration.............  1586
 Terrorism
  Final Report of the Specialized 
   Conference........................... AG/RES. 1399............  1584
 Terrorist fund raising
  Elimination of........................ Guidelines..............  1582
Ottawa
 Declaration on Countering Terrorism.... Declaration.............  1547

                                   P

Pakistan
 Foreign policy export controls......... Report BXA..............   983
Palestine Authority
 Gaza and West Bank
  Terrorists acts control............... Report..................   867
Palestine Liberation Organization
 (see also PLO)
Pan Am flight 103
 Bombing of
  Indictment in connection with......... A/RES/46/831 S/2317.....  1662
  Security Council resolutions.......... S/RES/1192..............  1682
 Trial of bombing suspects
  Sense of Congress..................... PL 105-277 Sec 596......    55
Paris Ministerial Conference on 
  Terrorism
 Agreement on 25 measures............... Conference..............  1541
Partnership for Peace Information 
  Management System
 Authorization of appropriations, FY 
   1999................................. PL 105-261 Sec 1005.....   555
Passports
 Consular officers
  Punishable offenses................... 18 USC 1541.............   182
 Counterfeited or forged................ 18 USC 1543.............   183
 Criminal misuse........................ 18 USC 1541-46..........   182
  Statute of limitations for prosecution 18 USC 3291.............   205
 Place of birth
  Report to Congress on deleting........ PL 99-399 Sec 703.......   141
 Processing fees
  Deterring terrorists entry into the 
   United States........................ PL 105-277 Sec 2221.....    80
Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1998...... Report PGT..............   755
 Africa overview........................ Report PGT..............   762
 Asia overview.......................... Report PGT..............   767
 Chronology of incidents................ Report PGT..............   798
 Definitions............................ Report PGT..............   755
 Eurasia overview....................... Report PGT..............   772
 Europe overview........................ Report PGT..............   775
 Latin America overview................. Report PGT..............   781
 Middle East overview................... Report PGT..............   784
 State sponsored terrorism.............. Report PGT..............   791
 Terrorist groups information........... Report PGT..............   814
 Year in review......................... Report PGT..............   759
Peacekeeping activities
 Bosnia
  Authorization of appropriations, FY 
   1999................................. PL 105-261 Sec 1004.....   554
Peru
 Terrorism
  Assistance to......................... PL 101-623 Sec 2........    46
  Narco-terrorist attacks............... PL 101-623 Sec 2........    46
Philippines
 Baguio Communique
  Combating terrorism................... Communique..............  1570
Plastic explosives
 Convention on the Marking of for the 
   Purpose of Detection................. PL 104-132 Sec 601......   115
 Convention on the Marking of for the 
   Purpose of Identification............ Treaty..................  1425
PLO
 Canceling prohibitions
  Presidential Certification............ PL 100-204 Sec 1005(b)..   392
 Commitments compliance
  Report on activities, 1997............ Report..................   861
 Conditions for United States 
   recognition.......................... PL 99-83 Sec 1302(b)....    35
 Covenant
  Palestine National Council............ Report..................   872
 Dialog with the United States
  Report to Congress.................... PL 101-246 Sec 804......   387
 Findings of Congress regarding......... PL 101-246 Sec 802......   385
 Furthering interests of
  Prohibitions against.................. PL 100-204 Sec 1003.....   391
 Israel
  Arab League boycott................... Report..................   874
 Middle East Peace Process
  Consultation with Congress............ PL 104-107 Sec 604(b)(1)   376
  Findings of Congress.................. PL 104-107 Sec 602......   374
  Foreign aid requirements.............. PL 104-107 Sec 604(c)...   378
  PLO commitments....................... PL 104-107 Sec 604(b)(3)   376
  PLO compliance........................ PL 104-107 Sec 604(b)(4)   376
                                         PL 104-107 Sec 604(b)(3)   376
  Presidential certification............ PL 104-107 Sec 604(b)(2)   376
  Provisions eligible for suspension.... PL 104-107 Sec 604......   374
  Sense of Congress..................... PL 104-107 Sec 603......   374
  Suspension of certain provisions...... PL 104-107 Sec 604(d)...   379
 Recognition by the United States
  Policies on........................... PL 101-246 Sec 803......   386
 Suspension of certain provision........ PL 103-236 Sec 582......   381
  Presidential authority................ PL 103-236 Sec 583......   381
 Terrorism incidents
  Report on activities, 1997............ Report..................   861
 Terrorism renunciation
  Report on activities, 1997............ Report..................   865
PLO Commitments Compliance Act of 1989.. PL 101-246 Sec 801......   385
 Report on activities, 1997............. Report..................   861
Ports (U.S.)
 Terrorism
  Protecting passengers and crews....... PL 99-399 Sec 905.......   154
President
 Beneficiary developing countries
  Designation factors................... PL 93-618 Sec 502(c)....   279
 Export controls
  Delegation of authority............... EO 12002................   432
 National emergency
  Accountability requirements........... PL 94-412 Sec 401(a)....   395
  Report to Congress.................... PL 94-412 Sec 401(b)-(c)   396
 National emergency powers.............. PL 94-412...............   393
 Sanctions against Iraq or Iran
  Waiver of............................. PL 102-484 Sec 1606.....    32
 Trading with the enemy
  Regulating............................ PL 65-91 Sec 5..........   295
President, Vice
 White House Commission on Aviation 
   Safety and Security
  Report on............................. Report to the President.   663
Presidential Directive
 Counterterrorism
  U.S. policy on........................ PDD-39..................   541
 National Coordinator for Security ... 
   and Counter-Terrorism................ PDD-62..................   539
Privileges and immunities
 Foreign states......................... 28 USC Ch 97............   215
Protocol for the Suppression of ... 
  Violence at Airports Serving 
  International Civil Aviation.......... Treaty..................  1490
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful 
  Acts Against the Safety of Fixed 
  Platforms ............................ Treaty..................  1448
Public Report of the Vice President's 
  Task Force on Combating Terrorism..... Report..................   719
 Recommendations........................ Report..................   743

                                   R

Reports to Congress
 Advisory Panel on Overseas Security.... PL 99-399 Sec 407.......   136
 Advisory Panel on Security of United 
   States Missions Abroad............... PL 98-533 Sec 301.......   214
 Assets of terrorist countries or 
   organizations in the United States... PL 102-138 Sec 304......    86
                                         Report TAR..............  1016
 Aviation security...................... 49 USC 44938............   341
  Aircraft hardening program............ Report FAA..............  1161
 Civil aviation security
  Air carrier and airport security...... Report FAA..............  1172
  Annual report, 1997................... Report FAA..............  1168
  Responsibilities and funding.......... Report FAA..............  1119
 Counterterrorism and antiterrorism 
   activities
  Oversight of.......................... PL 105-85 Sec 1051......   244
 Defense contractors
  Transactions with terrorist countries. PL 103-160 Sec 843......   252
                                         PL 103-160 Sec 843......   252
 Department of Defense
  Antiterrorism activities.............. PL 105-85 Sec 1052(e)...   246
 Developing countries
  Special operations forces training.... 10 USC 2011(e)..........   232
 Explosive materials
  Instructions on making................ PL 104-132 Sec 709......   116
 Export controls........................ PL 96-72 Sec 14.........   288
 Export-Import Bank..................... PL 79-173 Sec 2(b)(1)...   303
 Foreign airport
  Security.............................. 49 USC 44938............   341
 Foreign Policy Export Controls......... Report BXA..............   977
 International terrorism................ Appendix................  1701
 Iraq
  Arms sales............................ PL 102-484 Sec 1607.....    32
 Military equipment thefts
  Useful to terrorists.................. PL 104-132 Sec 503......   112
 National emergency
  Presidential authorities exercised.... PL 95-223 Sec 204.......   300
 Nonimmigrants
  Terrorists acts prevented............. PL 82-414 Sec 214(k)(5).   366
 PLO-U.S. dialog
  Compliance with commitments........... PL 101-246 Sec 804......   387
 President
  National emergency.................... PL 94-412 Sec 401(b)-(c)   396
 Readiness Program for Countering 
   Proliferation of WMD................. H Doc 105-79............   562
 Rewards for information on terrorism or 
   illicit drug trafficking............. PL 84-885 Sec 36(h).....    74
 Sanctions
  Against Iran and Libya................ PL 104-172 Sec 10.......    26
 Terrorism
  Annual country report on.............. PL 100-204 Sec 140......    87
  Measures to protect ship passengers 
   and crews............................ PL 99-399 Sec 903.......   153
  Measures to protect United States 
   ports and ships...................... PL 99-399 Sec 905.......   154
 Terrorism-related assistance........... PL 99-83 Sec 502........    35
 Visas
  Denial of............................. PL 84-885 Sec 51........    77

                                   S

Sanctions
 Against certain persons................ PL 102-484 Sec 1604.....    31
 Against foreign countries.............. PL 102-484 Sec 1605.....    31
  Weapons proliferation................. EO 12938 Sec 5..........   418
 Against foreign persons
  Weapons proliferation................. EO 12938 Sec 4..........   417
 Against Iran
  Regulations on........................ OFAC....................  1062
 Against Iran and Libya
  Description of........................ PL 104-172 Sec 6........    23
  Duration of........................... PL 104-172 Sec 9........    24
  Imposition of......................... PL 104-172 Sec 5........    21
  Multilateral sanctions regime......... PL 104-172 Sec 4........    20
  Reports to Congress................... PL 104-172 Sec 10.......    19
  Secretary of State advisories......... PL 104-172 Sec 7........    24
  Termination of........................ PL 104-172 Sec 8........    24
 Against Iraq
  Regulations on........................ OFAC....................  1071
 Against Iraq or Iran
  Waiver of............................. PL 102-484 Sec 1606.....    32
 Against Libya
  Regulations on........................ OFAC....................  1077
 Against North Korea
  Regulations on........................ OFAC....................  1082
 Against Sudan
  Regulations on........................ OFAC....................  1087
 Against the Taliban
  Regulations on........................ OFAC....................  1091
 Department of Commerce
  Foreign policy........................ Report BXA..............  1014
 Import prohibitions
  Against export violators.............. PL 87-794 Sec 233.......   293
 International
  Against terrorists.................... PL 99-399 Sec 910.......   156
 Iran and Libya
  Findings of Congress.................. PL 104-172 Sec 2........    27
  Multilateral regimes against.......... PL 104-172 Sec 4........    20
  U.S. policy towards................... PL 104-172 Sec 3........    20
 Missiles and missile technology
  Export controls....................... PL 90-629 Sec 73........    18
 Terrorism sanctions regulations........ OFAC....................  1024
Second Inter-American Specialized 
  Conference on Terrorism............... Document................  1576
Security of United States Missions 
  Abroad, Advisory Panel on
 Report to Congress..................... PL 98-533 Sec 301.......   214
Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt
 Combating terrorism
  Working group recommendations......... Communique..............  1568
 Summit of the Peacemakers
  Combating terrorism................... Statement...............  1565
Ships
 Terrorism
  Protecting passengers and crews....... PL 99-399 Sec 902.......   153
 Violence against
  Criminal penalties.................... 18 USC 2280.............   185
South Africa-United States
 Mutual anti-crime prevention 
   declaration.......................... Agreements..............  1235
Soviet Union (former)
 Demilitarization
  Findings of Congress.................. PL 102-484 Sec 1411.....   254
 Demilitarization programs
  Presidential authority................ PL 102-484 Sec 1412.....   255
 Removing weapons of mass destruction... PL 105-261 Sec 1306.....   238
Specially Designated Terrorists (STDs)
 Assets in the United States
  Blocked............................... Report TAR..............  1022
 Department of Commerce
  Export controls....................... Report BXA..............   981
                                         Report BXA..............   986
 Sanctions regulations.................. OFAC....................  1024
Spoils of war
 Possessed by United States
  Transfer to terrorism supporting 
   countries............................ PL 103-236 Sec 553......    85
Spoils of War Act of 1994............... PL 103-236 Sec 551......    85
State, Department of
 Advisory Panel on Overseas Security
  Report to Congress.................... PL 99-399 Sec 407.......   136
 Counter-terrorism Rewards Program
  Information on........................ Document................   881
 Counterterrorism, Office of the 
   Coordinator for...................... PL 103-236 Sec 161(e)...    82
 Department of State and Related 
   Agencies Appropriations Act, 1997.... PL 104-208 Title IV.....    68
 Diplomatic and Consular Programs
  Appropriations, 1997.................. PL 104-208 Title IV.....    68
 Foreign affairs
  Appropriations, 1997.................. PL 104-208 Title IV.....    68
 Inspector General
  Establishment of...................... PL 99-399 Sec 413.......   137
 Office of Antiterrorism Assistance
  Annual report......................... Report..................   841
  Country participation................. Report..................   851
 Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1998..... Report PGT..............   755
 State Department Basic Authorities Act 
   of 1956.............................. PL 84-885...............    71
State, Secretary of
 Accountability Review Board............ PL 99-399 Sec 302.......   129
 Diplomatic Security Service............ PL 99-399 Sec 201.......   127
 Foreign terrorist oqganizations
  Designation of........................ PL 82-414 Sec 219.......   366
 Foreign terrorist organizations
  Designated............................ 31 CFR Part 597.309.....   480
 Foreign terrorists organizations
  Designation and list of............... Report..................   852
 Placing Sudan on terrorism list........ Notice..................   880
 Terrorism-related assistance........... PL 99-83 Sec 502........    35
 Terrorism-related services
  Control of............................ PL 84-885 Sec 40........    75
Statute of limitations
 Act of terrorism....................... 18 USC 3286.............   204
 Nationality............................ 18 USC 3291.............   205
 Passports.............................. 18 USC 3291.............   205
Strom Thurmond National Defense 
  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 PL 105-261..............   237
Sudan
 Business activities
  Prohibited transactions............... EO 13067................   404
 Continuation of national emergency with 
   respect to........................... Notice..................   622
 Department of Commerce
  Anti-terrorism controls............... Report BXA..............   986
 Export Administration Act
  Section 6(j) list inclusion........... Notice..................   880
 Property in the United States
  Blocking of........................... EO 13067................   404
 Sanctions against
  Regulations on........................ OFAC....................  1087
 Security threat to the United States
  National emergency declared........... EO 13067................   404
 Supporting terrorism
  Section 6(j) list inclusion........... Notice..................   880
 Terrorism
  Security Council resolutions.......... S/RES/1070..............  1686
                                         S/RES/1054..............  1688
                                         S/RES/1044..............  1690
 Terrorism List Government
  Prohibited financial transactions..... 31 CFR Part 596.201.....   469
 Threat to the United States
  Declaration of a national emergency... Report to Congress......   619
Sudanese Sanctions Regulations
 Overview............................... OFAC....................  1087
Summit of the Americas
 Combating terrorism
  Declaration of principles............. Declaration.............  1592
Summit of the Peacemakers
 Combating terrorism.................... Statement...............  1565
Syria
 Department of Commerce
  Anti-terrorism controls............... Report BXA..............   986
 Terrorism List Government
  Prohibited financial transactions..... 31 CFR Part 596.201.....   469

                                   T

Taliban
 Sanctions against
  Regulations on........................ OFAC....................  1091
 Security threat to the United States
  National emergency declared........... EO 13129................   401
Tanzania
 Terrorism
  Security Council resolutions.......... S/RES/1189..............  1684
Tax credits
 Foreign
  Denial of............................. 26 USC 901(j)...........   310
Taxation (U.S.)
 American hostages
  Excluded income....................... PL 96-449 Sec 201.......    97
Terrorism
 Against civil aviation
  Programs to counteract................ 49 USC 44912............   329
 Against U.S. persons or property
  Assisting foreign countries........... PL 104-93 Sec 310.......    78
  Rewards for information on............ PL 84-885 Sec 36(a).....    71
 Agreements on combating
  Summit of the Americas................ Declaration.............  1592
 Annual country report on
  Report to Congress.................... PL 100-204 Sec 140......    87
 Captives
  Benefits for.......................... PL 99-399 Sec 803-806...   142
 Captives of
  Benefits for.......................... EO 12598................   425
 Combating
  Role of Congress...................... Report..................   737
  Summit of the Peacemakers, Egypt...... Statement...............  1565
  Task Force's recommendations.......... Report..................   743
 Condemnation of........................ PL 99-83 Sec 508........    37
  Houston Summit........................ Statement...............  1559
  Munich Summit......................... Statement...............  1558
  Naples Summit......................... Statement...............  1555
  Tokyo Summit.......................... Statement...............  1563
  Toronto Summit........................ Statement...............  1560
  Venice Summit......................... Statement...............  1561
 Consequences of
  Management............................ 10 USC 182(a)(3)(B).....   229
 Declaration on
  Tokyo Summit.......................... Declaration.............  1557
 Definitions
  Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1998.... Report PGT..............   758
 Drug trafficking and narcoterrorism
  Rewards for information on............ PL 84-885 Sec 36(b).....    72
 Foreign ports
  Travel advisories..................... PL 99-399 Sec 908.......   155
 G-7 Declaration on..................... Declaration.............  1546
 International
  Findings of Congress.................. PL 104-132 Sec 324......   106
  Fundraising prohibition............... PL 104-132 Sec 301......   106
  Sense of Congress..................... PL 104-132 Sec 301......   106
 International Antiterrorism Committee
  Proposal for.......................... PL 99-399 Sec 701.......   141
 International cooperation.............. PL 98-533 Sec 201.......   213
 International cooperation to combat.... PL 99-399 Sec 701.......   141
 International nuclear
  Actions to combat..................... PL 99-399 Sec 601.......   139
  Reports to Congress................... PL 99-399 Sec 601.......   139
 Media practices
  Responsibilities...................... Report..................   741
 Misuse of diplomatic privileges and 
   immunities for....................... PL 99-399 Sec 704.......   142
 Passports and visas
  International information sharing on.. PL 99-399 Sec 702.......   141
  Place of birth information............ PL 99-399 Sec 703.......   141
 Related assistance
  Coordinated by Secretary of State..... PL 99-83 Sec 502........    35
  Report to Congress.................... PL 99-83 Sec 502........    35
 Required reports to Congress........... Appendix................  1701
 Rewards for information on............. PL 99-399 Sec 501.......   139
                                         PL 98-533 Sec 101.......   213
  Authorization of appropriations....... PL 103-236 Sec 133......    82
  Protection for persons providing 
   assistance........................... PL 84-885 Sec 39........    75
 Seaport and shipboard security
  International measures for............ PL 99-399 Sec 902.......   153
 Spoils of war
  Prohibition on transfers.............. PL 103-236 Sec 553......    85
 State Department
  Travel advisories on.................. PL 99-399 Sec 505.......   139
 State sponsored
  Civil liability....................... PL 104-208 Sec 589......    68
 Threat levels
  Implementation of..................... NVIC 3-96...............  1227
 Threats
  Prompt reporting of intelligence on... PL 99-661 Sec 1353......   260
 Transnational threats
  National Security Council committee on 50 USC 402..............   263
 Treaty to control...................... PL 99-83 Sec 507........    37
 United States citizens involved in
  Sense of Congress..................... PL 97-113 Sec 719.......    41
 Vice President's Task Force on 
   Combating............................ Report..................   719
 Victims of
  Compensation.......................... PL 99-399 Sec 801.......   142
                                         22 CFR Part 192.........   450
Terrorism Incident Annex
 Federal Emergency Management Agency.... PDD-39..................   549
Terrorism List Governments
 Defined................................ 31 CFR Part 596.310.....   470
 Schedule of countries.................. 31 CFR Part 596.201.....   468
                                         OFAC....................  1025
Terrorism List Governments Sanctions 
  Regulations........................... 31 CFR Part 596.........   468
Terrorism Sanctions Regulations
 Summary................................ OFAC....................  1024
Terrorism supporting countries
 Aid prohibition........................ PL 87-195 Sec 620A......     6
                                         PL 87-195 Sec 620G......     8
                                         PL 87-195 Sec 620H......     9
 Assistance waiver authority............ PL 87-195 Sec 620A(d)...     8
 Aviation boycott....................... PL 99-83 Sec 555........    38
 Ban on importation of good and services PL 99-83 Sec 505........    36
 Bilateral aid prohibition.............. PL 105-277 Sec 528......    48
 Defense Department aid prohibition..... 10 USC 2249(a)..........   233
 Defense Department contract prohibition 10 USC 2327(b)..........   234
 Export controls........................ PL 96-72 Sec 6(j).......   285
 Financial transactions with............ 18 USC 2332d............   195
 Foreign aid prohibition................ PL 105-277 Sec 551......    50
 Known assets in the United States...... Report TAR..............  1018
 Prohibition on transactions with....... PL 90-629 Sec 40........    12
 Report on assets in the United States.. PL 102-138 Sec 304......    86
                                         Report TAR..............  1016
Terrorism, anti
 Biological weapons
  Protection against.................... 18 USC 175..............   164
 Countries not supporting U.S. efforts
  Prohibited transactions............... PL 90-629 Sec 40A.......    17
Terrorism, Director of the Office for 
  Combating
 Functions delegated to................. 45 FR 11655 Sec 1(i)....   480
Terrorism, international
 Activities defined..................... 50 USC 1801(c)..........   264
 Against U.S. citizens abroad
  Acts of............................... 18 USC 2331 189 2332b...   192
  Penalties............................. 18 USC 2332.............   190
  Weapons of mass destruction........... 18 USC 2332a............   191
 Agreement between South Africa and the 
   United States........................ Agreements..............  1235
 Agreements on.......................... PL 99-399 Sec 1201......   158
 Business records access................ 50 USC 1861-1863........   271
 Convention to prevent and control
  Negotiation of........................ PL 99-399 Sec 1201......   158
 Countries supporting
  GSP designation ineligibility......... PL 93-618 Sec 
                                          502(b)(2)(F)...........   279
 Defined................................ 18 USC 2331.............   189
 Electronic surveillance................ 50 USC 1842-1846........   266
 Persons engaged in
  Disclosing consumer report information PL 104-93 Sec 610.......    79
 Report to Congress..................... PL 99-399 Sec 705.......   142
 Required reports to Congress........... Appendix................  1701
 Sense of the Senate.................... PL 104-264 Sec 314......   343
                                         PL 104-264 Sec 314......   347
 Support by Libya
  Congressional condemnation............ PL 97-113 Sec 718.......    40
 Transcending national boundaries....... 18 USC 2332b............   192
Terrorism, International Act to Combat, 
  1984.................................. PL 98-533...............   213
Terrorism, National Commission on....... PL 105-277 Sec 591......    52
Terrorist acts
 Against Americans
  Chronology of events.................. Document................   882
  Rewards program....................... Document................   881
 Government use of armed force
  Considered under international law.... PL 101-222 Sec 10.......   211
 Nuclear, radiological, biological, and 
   chemical weapons
  Defense against....................... Plan....................   887
 Rewards for information on............. 18 USC 3071(a)..........   202
 Statute of limitations for prosecution. 18 USC 3286.............   204
Terrorist attacks
 Khobar Towers.......................... Report..................   959
 WMD
  Domestic preparedness program......... Report..................   930
Terrorist bombings
 International Convention for the 
   Suppression of....................... Treaty..................  1512
Terrorist crimes
 Sentencing guidelines.................. PL 103-322 Sec 120004...   209
Terrorist organizations
 "15 May''.............................. Report..................   878
 Assets in the United States............ Report TAR..............  1020
 Supporting
  Criminal penalties.................... 18 USC 2339B............   198
Terrorist Threat Conditions (THREATCONS) NVIC 3-96...............  1227
Terrorists
 Aliens
  Removal procedures.................... PL 82-414 Sec 501-507...   369
 Arrest of
  Rewards for information on............ Report..................   878
 Deterring entry into the United States
  Using passport processing fees........ PL 105-277 Sec 2221.....    80
 Disrupting Middle East peace process
  Continuation of national emergency.... Notice..................   637
  National emergency declared........... EO 13947................   413
  Prohibiting transactions with......... EO 13099................   636
 Extraditions and renditions to the 
   United States........................ Report PGT..............   840
 Fund raising elimination
  OAS member states cooperation......... Guidelines..............  1582
 Groups
  Background information on............. Report PGT..............   814
 Middle East peace process
  Amendment to national emergency 
   declaration.......................... Report to Congress......   635
  Disrupting............................ EO 12947................   413
  Disruptive organizations.............. EO 12947................   413
  Report on national emergency 
   developments......................... Report to Congress......   631
 Movements
  Restricting........................... Declaration.............  1549
 Providing material support to
  Criminal penalties.................... 18 USC 2339A............   198
 Using weapons of mass destruction
  Domestic preparedness................. PL 105-261 Sec 1402.....   240
  Domestic response capabilities........ PL 105-261 Sec 1405.....   241
  Threat and risk assessments........... PL 105-261 Sec 1404.....   240
Terrorists organizations
 Designated as.......................... PL 82-414 Sec 219.......   366
 Designation and list of................ Report..................   852
Tokyo
 Declaration on Terrorism............... Declaration.............  1557
 International terrorism
  Statement of the Chairman condemning.. Statement...............  1563
Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain 
  Acts Committee on Board Aircraft...... Treaty..................  1502
Toronto
 Statement of the Chairman condemning 
   Terrorism............................ Statement...............  1560
Trade
 With the enemy
  Presidential authority................ PL 65-91 Sec 5(b)(4)....   297
Trade Act of 1974....................... PL 93-618...............   210
Trade agreements
 National security considerations....... PL 87-794 Sec 232.......   291
Trade Expansion Act of 1962............. PL 87-794...............   291
Trading with the Enemy Act.............. PL 65-91................   295
Transnational terrorists
 WMD use against the United States
  Federal response...................... Plan....................   898
  Force structure to address............ Plan....................   890
  Overview.............................. Plan....................   893
  Response elements..................... Plan....................   907
  Training requirements................. Plan....................   916
Transportation, Secretary of Director of 
  Intelligence and Security............. 49 USC 44931............   332
Treasury, Department of
 Foreign terrorist governments
  Prohibited financial transactions..... 31 CFR Part 597.........   475
 Office of Foreign Assets Control
  Sanctions regulations................. OFAC....................  1024
 Terrorism List Governments
  Prohibited financial transactions..... 31 CFR Part 596.........   468
Treasury, Secretary of
 Trade agreements....................... PL 87-794 Sec 232.......   291
Treaties
 International
  Combating terrorism................... Conference..............  1543

                                   U

United Nations
 General Assembly
  Measures to eliminate terrorism....... A/RES/53/108............  1627
                                         A/RES/52/165............  1640
                                         A/RES/51/210............  1643
                                         A/RES/49/60.............  1650
                                         A/RES/46/51.............  1655
                                         A/RES/40/61.............  1659
  Pan Am flight 103..................... A/RES/46/831 S/2137.....  1662
 Measures to eliminate terrorism
  Status of international conventions... A/53/314................  1630
 Security Council
  Pan Am flight 103..................... A/RES/46/831 S/2137.....  1662
  Terrorism resolutions................. S/RES/1192..............  1662
                                         S/RES/1192..............  1682
                                         S/RES/1189..............  1684
                                         S/RES/1054..............  1688
                                         S/RES/1044..............  1690
                                         S/RES/833...............  1692
                                         S/RES/748...............  1696
                                         S/RES/731...............  1699
 Terrorism
  Measures to eliminate................. A/RES/53/108............  1627
                                         A/RES/52/165............  1640
                                         A/RES/51/210............  1643
                                         A/RES/49/60.............  1650
                                         A/RES/46/51.............  1655
                                         A/RES/40/61.............  1659
  Security Council resolutions.......... S/RES/1192..............  1662
                                         S/RES/1192..............  1682
                                         S/RES/1070..............  1684
                                         S/RES/1054..............  1688
                                         S/RES/1044..............  1690
                                         S/RES/833...............  1692
                                         S/RES/748...............  1696
                                         S/RES/731...............  1699
  Status of international conventions... A/53/314................  1630
United Nations Convention ... Prevention 
  and Punishment of Crimes Against ... 
  Protected Persons..................... Treaty..................  1473
United States missions abroad
 Injury, death, or property destruction
  Accountability Review Board........... PL 99-399 Sec 301.......   128
 Security
  Advisory Panel on..................... PL 98-533 Sec 301.......   214
 Security improvements.................. PL 99-399 Sec 408.......   136
United States-Israel Joint 
  Counterterrorism Group
 Established............................ Agreements..............  1240
United States-Republic of Korea
 Aviation security
  Air transport agreement............... Agreement...............  1242
United States-South Africa Declaration 
  on Mutual Anti-Crime Prevention....... Agreements..............  1235
Usama bin Ladin
 Afghan Taliban
  Threat to the United States........... Report to Congress......   616
USIA
 Inspector General
  Authorization of appropriations....... PL 99-399 Sec 412.......   137
UTA flight 772
 Attacks against
  Security Council resolutions.......... S/RES/731...............  1699

                                   V

Venice
 Statement of the Chairman condemning 
   Terrorism............................ Statement...............  1561
Victims of Terrorism Compensation Act... PL 99-399 Sec 801.......   142
                                         EO 12598................   425
Vienna Convention on the Physical 
  Protection of Nuclear Material........ Treaty..................  1462
Violent Crime Control and Law 
  Enforcement Act of 1994............... PL 103-322..............   209
Visas
 Denial of
  Report to Congress.................... PL 84-885 Sec 51........    77
 Place of birth
  Report to Congress on deleting........ PL 99-399 Sec 703.......   141
 Processing for admission to the United 
   States............................... PL 103-236 Sec 
                                          140(c)(1(B)............    82

                                   W

Weapons
 Nuclear, biological, and chemical
  Sense of Congress..................... PL 102-484 Sec 1502.....   256
Weapons of mass destruction
 (see also WMD)
 Domestic preparedness program.......... Report..................   930
  Acronyms.............................. Report..................   957
  Performance objectives................ Report..................   951
 Export controls
  Imposition of......................... EO 12938 Sec 2..........   416
 International negotiations to control.. EO 12938 Sec 1..........   416
 National emergency
  Declaration of........................ EO 12938................   416
 National emergency with respect to
  Continuation of....................... Notice..................   646
  Report on............................. Report to Congress......   639
 Proliferation of
  Threat to national security........... EO 12938................   416
 Readiness program for countering 
   proliferation of
  Report to Congress.................... H Doc 105-79............   562
 Responding to
  Emergency supplemental appropriations, 
   1999................................. PL 105-277 Title II.....    63
 Security threat to the United States
  National emergency declared........... EO 12938................   416
 Terrorist use against U.S. citizens 
   abroad............................... 18 USC 2332a............   191
 Threats against the United States
  Types and characteristics............. Report..................   933
Weapons of Mass Destruction Control Act 
  of 1992............................... PL 102-484 Sec 1501.....   256
Weapons of Mass Destruction Reserve 
  Component Integration Plan............ Plan....................   886
 Acronyms............................... Plan....................   921
White House Commission on Aviation 
  Safety and Security................... Report to the President.   663
 Department of Transportation report.... Report DoT..............  1199
 Established............................ Report to the President.   665
                                         EO 13015................   703
 Recommendations........................ Report to the President.   666

                                   Y

Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of
 Department of Commerce
  Foreign policy export controls........ Report BXA..............   997

                                    

      
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