[Senate Prints 105-67]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


105th Congress                                                  S. Prt.
2d Session                  COMMITTEE PRINT                      105-67
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     



 
                   THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS

                               __________

                      A N   E X P L A N A T I O N

                               __________

                        COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                                     
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13

                                     
                         REVISED DECEMBER 1998




           Printed for the use of the Committee on the Budget


                              --------

                      U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
 52-186                      WASHINGTON : 1998

            For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402


                        COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET

                 PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico, Chairman

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa            FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
DON NICKLES, Oklahoma                ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
PHIL GRAMM, Texas                    KENT CONRAD, North Dakota
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri        PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
SLADE GORTON, Washington             BARBARA BOXER, California
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire            PATTY MURRAY, Washington
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine              RON WYDEN, Oregon
SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan            RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
BILL FRIST, Tennessee                TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota                 RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
GORDON SMITH, Oregon

                  G. William Hoagland, Staff Director

              Bruce King, Staff Director for the Minority

                                  (ii)



                            C O N T E N T S

                               __________
                                                                   Page
Foreword.........................................................     v
  I. Introduction................................................     1
        The Constitution's Statement on the Budget...............     1
        Purposes of the Budget Process...........................     1
        Basic Budgetary Concepts.................................     1
 II. History of Budget Law.......................................     6
        Congressional Budgeting prior to 1974....................     6
        The Congressional Budget Act: Need for the law in the 
          1970's.................................................     8
        Changes to the Budget Act since 1974.....................     9
III. Development: Creating a Budget..............................    10
        Executive Actions........................................    10
        Congressional Action: Preparation of a Concurrent 
          Resolution.............................................    11
IV. Enforcement..................................................    16
        Budget Act Points of Order in the Senate.................    16
        Discretionary Spending Caps..............................    17
        Mandatory Spending.......................................    19
        Reconciliation in the Senate.............................    20
 V. Other Aspects of the Budget Process..........................    22
        The Government Performance and Results Act...............    22
        Title X: Impoundment Control and the Line Item Veto......    22
        The Unfunded Mandates Control Act........................    25
        Credit Reform............................................    27
29A. Budget Functions..................................................
29B. Statement of Congressional Budget Office Policy...................
31C. Sources of Jurisdiction of the Senate Committee on the Budget.....
35D. Membership of the Senate Committee on the Budget..................
37E. Budget Timetable..................................................
43F. The Appropriations and Budget Process.............................
44G. Completion Dates of Budget Resolutions............................
47H. Budget Act Points of Order in the Senate..........................
49 I. Completion Dates of Reconciliation Legislation...................
51 J. Glossary of Budget Terms.........................................
                                                                     53

                                 (iii)



                              I. FOREWORD

     The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 
1974, as amended, has played a central role in the formulation 
and implementation of Federal fiscal policy in the last quarter 
of this century. The purpose of that landmark legislation, to 
help guide and formulate macro fiscal policy, remains as 
important today, if not more so, than it was in 1974.
    This committee revised print provides an explanation of the 
budget process in the Senate, its history and evolution to 
today. It was prepared by the Committee's legal staff under the 
general direction of G. William Hoagland, Staff Director. Beth 
Felder, Committee Counsel, headed the development of this 
print, with the assistance of Austin Smythe, Carole McGuire, 
Anne Miller, Cheri Reidy, Jim Hearn, Jim Capretta, Lisa 
Cieplak, Maureen O'Neill and Alex Green.
    While this revised print does not represent the views of 
the Committee on the Budget or any of its members, it was 
prepared to be an accurate and objective explanation of the 
process.

                                             Pete V. Domenici, Chairman

                                  (v)

                                     
                            I. INTRODUCTION

The Constitution's Statement Regarding the Budget
    Article I, section 9, clause 7 of The Constitution of the 
United States provides:

        [n]o money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in 
        Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a 
        regular Statement and account of Receipts and 
        Expenditures of all public Money shall be published 
        from time to time.

From the early years of our country there was a recognized need 
to have a budget for our government. In addition, Article I, 
section 5, clause 2, of the Constitution reserves to each House 
of Congress the authority to determine the rules governing its 
procedures. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control 
Act of 1974 (the Budget Act), which contains several titles and 
sections that affect the internal procedures of the House and 
Senate, was enacted under this Constitutional rulemaking 
authority. Congress enacted the Budget Act with the full 
recognition that each House could change these rules at any 
time and in a manner consistent with past practice. Rules 
changes are usually accomplished upon adoption of either a 
simple resolution (for a change that affects one House) or a 
concurrent resolution (for changes that may affect both 
Houses).
Purposes of the Budget Process
    The Federal budget has two distinct but equally important 
purposes. The first is to provide a financial measure of 
federal expenditures, receipts, deficits, and debt levels and 
their impact on the economy in order to promote economic 
stability and growth. The second is to provide the means for 
the Federal Government to efficiently collect and allocate 
resources to meet national objectives.

    The congressional budget process, as set forth in the 
Budget Act, requires Congress to annually establish the level 
of total spending and revenues and how total spending should be 
divided among the 20 major functions of government such as 
defense, agriculture, and health. A list of the budget 
functions is set out in Appendix A. These functional levels are 
the sum of discretionary and mandatory spending for each fiscal 
year covered by a budget resolution. The Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) 
provides additional budget procedures.
Basic Budgetary Concepts
    In order to understand the budget process, it is useful to 
review some basic budgetary concepts.
            Budget Authority and Outlays
    Spending levels in congressional budget resolutions are 
measured in dollars in two ways: budget authority and outlays. 
Outlays represent actual disbursements by the Treasury. When 
the Treasury issues a check in fiscal year 1998, that is a 
fiscal year 1998 outlay. Budget authority, on the other hand, 
is the legal authority for an agency to enter into obligations 
of dollars in a certain amount that will result in outlays. 
When Congress appropriates funds for a particular program, it 
is enacting budget authority--not outlays.

    To illustrate the relationship of budget authority to 
outlays, assume that the Congress has decided to build an 
aircraft carrier starting in fiscal year 1997 and that the 
total cost is $4.0 billion. To do so, Congress would 
appropriate $4.0 billion of new budget authority for the ship 
in the defense appropriations bill for fiscal year 1997. Often 
such an appropriation is made with the under-standing that all 
the money will not actually be spent (result in outlays) in 
that fiscal year. The creation of this $4.0 billion of budget 
authority means that the Department of Defense has legal 
authority to enter into obligations (generally, contracts) 
totaling $4.0 billion during fiscal year 1997. Often, 
contractors are paid upon completion of each stage of the 
construction rather than the full amount in advance. The $4.0 
billion of budget authority would result in outlays when the 
contractors are actually issued checks by the Treasury, which 
might occur over several years. In this example (displayed in 
the table below) assume that $.50 billion is paid (results in 
outlays) in the first year (fiscal year 1997) to cover the 
costs of designing the carrier, $1.50 billion is paid (results 
in outlays) in the second year (fiscal year 1998) to begin 
construction, and the remaining $2.0 billion is paid (results 
in outlays) in the final year (fiscal year 1999) to complete 
construction.

                     PURCHASE OF AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER
                        [In billions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Fiscal year--
                                            ----------------------------
                                               1997      1998      1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Budget Authority (BA)......................      4.0       0.0       0.0
Outlays (OT)...............................      0.50      1.50      2.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In other cases, where the actual spending/payment is more 
immediate, new budget authority appropriated for a fiscal year 
results in outlays during the same fiscal year. An example of 
this type of appropriation would be for salaries of Federal 
workers.
            Federal Revenues
    Federal revenues consist of the money taken in by the 
Government through exercise of its sovereign taxing power. This 
includes individual and corporate income taxes, social 
insurance taxes (such as social security payroll taxes), excise 
taxes, estate and gift taxes, customs duties, and the like. 
Revenues are accounted for separately in the budget from budget 
authority and outlays.
            Offsetting Collections and Offsetting Receipts
    Revenues, however, do not represent all the money collected 
by the Government. They do not include income from the public 
that results from the government engaging in ``business-like'' 
activities with the public, such as the sale of products or the 
rendering of services or amounts collected by one Government 
account from another (intergovernmental collections and 
outlays). These collections are categorized as either 
offsetting collections or offsetting receipts. Examples of such 
activities include: proceeds from the sale of postage stamps 
and proceeds from the sale of timber from Federal lands. The 
difference between an offsetting collection and an offsetting 
receipt has more to do with the way the Federal budget records 
the transaction than the actual activity itself.

    Some laws authorize amounts collected to be credited 
directly to the account from which they will be expended. 
Usually such amounts may be spent for the purpose of the 
account without further action by Congress. These are known as 
offsetting collections and represent amounts collected from 
either the public or other expenditure accounts. For example, 
the law authorizes the Postal Service to use proceeds from the 
sale of postage stamps to finance its operations, without the 
need for an annual appropriation. Thus assume that it costs the 
Postal Service $100 million to operate in any fiscal year and 
that $45 million is collected from the sale of stamps. This $45 
million is represented in the budget not as $45 million of 
revenue or receipts but rather as a negative $45 million of 
budget authority. In this example, the receipts are deducted 
from the gross budget authority level of $100 million leading 
to a net budget authority level of $55 million. Generally, 
offsetting collections are associated with discretionary 
programs.

    In comparison, offsetting receipts, such as the proceeds 
from a timber sale or national parks entrance fees, are not 
credited against the spending for the Forest Service or the 
National Park Service. Rather, these funds are deducted from 
total budget authority and outlays, not from the program or 
project from which they are derived. For example, assume that 
the National Park Service collects $10 million in entrance fees 
at Yellowstone National Park. These funds, although deposited 
in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts, are shown in the 
budget as a reduction to the total level of spending for that 
year. Generally, offsetting receipts are associated with 
mandatory programs--that is, not subject to annual 
appropriations decisions.
            The Budget Deficit and the Federal Debt
    Budget deficits, or budget surpluses, are basic concepts 
critical to understanding the impact of fiscal policy on the 
nation's economy. In general, the budget takes into account all 
spending and revenue raising activities of the Federal 
Government. If total spending in any fiscal year exceeds total 
revenue, the excess spending is the deficit for that fiscal 
year. For example, in fiscal year 1996 receipts were $1,452.8 
billion and outlays were $1,560.1 billion, yielding a budget 
deficit of $107.3 billion. Conversely, if revenue exceeds 
spending, there is a budget surplus in that fiscal year. The FY 
1998 budget produced a $70 billion surplus, the first surplus 
since 1969 (prior to that, the last surplus was in 1960).

    The amount of any budget deficit is important because it 
largely determines the amount of funds the government must 
borrow from the private economy to pay for excess spending 
during a fiscal year. Any funds the government borrows from the 
private economy are therefore not available for private 
investment. This fact has significant implications for interest 
rates, inflation, and the long-run performance of the economy. 
To determine how much the Federal Government must borrow from 
the private economy in any fiscal year, the calculated budget 
deficit must be based on an assessment of total federal 
spending and total revenues. This is known as the unified 
budget concept. Any other definition of the budget will not 
accurately reflect the Federal Government's borrowing 
requirements.

    The Federal debt is the accumulated debt of the Federal 
Government. Whenever the Federal Government runs a budget 
deficit, the additional borrowing to finance the deficit adds 
to the Federal debt. By contrast, if the Federal Government 
runs a budget surplus, the Federal debt decreases because the 
Treasury uses the surplus to reduce the stock of outstanding 
debt.

    Federal law contains a statutory limit on the Federal debt, 
commonly called the debt ceiling or debt limit. If the 
activities of the Government require borrowing above the 
statutory ceiling, Congress must enact a law to raise the 
ceiling. For example, in August of 1997, Congress increased the 
debt ceiling from $5.5 trillion to $5.95 trillion. At the close 
of fiscal year 1998, the debt subject to limit had reached $5.4 
trillion.

    Debt subject to limit is made up of two parts: (i) debt 
held by Government accounts; and (ii) debt held by the public. 
Debt held by Government accounts represents the holdings of 
debt by Federal trust funds and other special government funds. 
This is debt that the Federal Government owes to itself. When 
trust funds are in surplus, as social security is now, the 
surplus funds are invested, as required by law, in Government 
securities. The annual change in the level of debt held by 
Government accounts is approximately equal to the amount of 
trust fund surpluses for that year.

    Debt held by the public represents the holdings of debt by 
individuals, institutions, other buyers outside the Federal 
Government, and the Federal Reserve System. The annual change 
in debt held by the public represents the amount of borrowing 
that the Federal Government must do to finance the excess of 
total Federal outlays over total Federal revenues. The change 
in debt held by the public in 1 year, therefore, closely tracks 
the unified budget deficit for that year.

    Although the unified budget concept is a critical resource 
for determining fiscal policy, the law requires both Congress 
and the Executive Branch to separate the unified budget into 
``on-budget'' and``off-budget'' components in their respective 
reports. In particular, section 13301 of the BEA requires that the 
Social Security trust funds be excluded from the budget for the 
purposes of the deficit estimates in the Congressional budget 
resolution. This was included in the BEA as a result of a long-standing 
concern that the surpluses accumulating in the Social Security trust 
funds tended to obscure the size of the deficits in the rest of the 
government. Similarly, the law also requires the exclusion of the 
Postal Service from the budget. As a consequence, Social Security and 
the Postal Service are ``off-budget'' whereas the remainder of 
government receipts and expenditures are ``on-budget.'' Because it is 
important in formulating overall fiscal policy, Congress and the 
President use the unified concept in developing budgets, but continue 
to make available both the unified budget totals and on-budget totals 
to comply with the law.
            Baseline
    In order to formulate a budget, Congress must have a 
starting point. This is known as the baseline. The baseline 
most often used is comprised of a set of projections showing 
the levels of spending and revenues that would occur for the 
upcoming fiscal year and beyond if existing programs and 
policies are continued unchanged. With respect to entitlement 
programs, the baseline adjusts for, among other things, the 
effects of inflation and demographic changes that alter the 
expected number of beneficiaries. These projections are known 
as the current policy (or current services) baseline. An 
alternative baseline that has been used by Congress from time 
to time adjusts programs for inflation only where required to 
do so by law. This is usually called a current law baseline. In 
considering proposed levels of spending and revenues, Members 
of the Senate and the House usually describe the cost of their 
proposals as being above, below, or equal to the baseline.
            Mandatory Spending, Direct Spending and Entitlement 
                    Spending
    Mandatory spending (which is synonymous with direct 
spending) generally includes all spending that is made pursuant 
to laws other than appropriations laws. The fundamental 
characteristic of mandatory spending is the lack of annual 
discretion to establish spending levels. Instead, mandatory 
spending usually involves a binding legal obligation by the 
Federal Government to provide funding for an individual, 
program, or activity. Another way of defining mandatory 
spending is that it is all spending that is not discretionary.

    Mandatory spending is frequently referred to as entitlement 
spending. Entitlement spending is a subset of mandatory 
spending and represents the largest component of mandatory 
spending. Most entitlement spending is pursuant to laws that 
provide all eligible individuals (or an entity or unit of 
government) with financial assistance or other benefits. An 
entitlement represents a binding obligation on the part of the 
Federal Government; eligible recipients have legal recourse to 
compel payment from the government if the obligation is not 
fulfilled.

    Usually, the laws providing for an entitlement contain 
formulas or criteria that specify who is eligible for Federal 
assistance. Unless the underlying law establishing the 
entitlement is modified, these individuals retain a legal right 
to benefits, regardless of the budget situation. For example, 
the Social Security law sets formulas under which retired 
workers receive benefits based on the length of time they have 
worked and their earnings. The cost of Social Security for a 
given fiscal year is thus determined by the number of 
qualifying retirees rather than by the amount of money in the 
Treasury or an annual appropriation.

    Some appropriations bills include funding for entitlement 
programs. Even though this funding is included in an 
appropriations bill, it is still considered mandatory spending 
rather than discretionary spending. For example, the Congress 
provides annual funding for the Medicaid program through an 
appropriations bill. However, the actual funding level for 
Medicaid is determined by criteria in Title XIX of the Social 
Security Act. This law provides an entitlement to low-income 
individuals to pay for a portion of their health care expenses. 
The appropriations bill simply liquidates this obligation by 
appropriating sums necessary to cover the cost of the Medicaid 
program. Congress, in the appropriations process, does not have 
the discretion to change the amount spent on Medicaid.
            Discretionary Spending
    By contrast, discretionary spending refers to those 
programs that are subject to annual funding decisions in the 
appropriations process. If the Congress decides to lower 
funding for a program of this type, it can simply reduce the 
annual appropriation. Unlike entitlement programs, generally no 
formulas need to be changed to alter funding levels.

    Most of the actual operations of the Federal Government are 
funded by discretionary spending. Examples of discretionary 
spending include funding for the Department of Defense, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

                       II. HISTORY OF BUDGET LAWS

Congressional Budgeting Prior to 1974

    Prior to the enactment of the Budget Act of 1974, Congress 
often wrestled with how to effectively oversee increasing 
government expenditures. In the late 19th century and the early 
20th century, Congress enacted a number of laws to control and 
coordinate spending by the executive branch. Similar efforts 
were made during the 1940's with respect to the legislative 
branch; however, none of these changes endured. In 1974, 
Congress enacted the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act to coordinate and control the legislative branch's 
budget activities and to curb the President's impoundment 
powers.
            The Anti-Deficiency Act
    In 1870, the legislative appropriations bill was the 
vehicle for a number of reforms relating to appropriations 
practices, including the section later known as the Anti-
Deficiency Act. This was the first major effort by Congress to 
exert more control over Government expenditures. At the time, 
agencies frequently obligated more funds than they had been 
appropriated and then submitted ``coercive deficiency'' 
requests to Congress to pay their bills. The Anti-Deficiency 
Act provided that no department could make greater expenditures 
during a fiscal year than had been provided by Congress. In 
addition, the departments could not enter into contracts for 
the future payment of money in excess of appropriations.
            The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921
    The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 was enacted in 
response to the consensus that developed shortly after the turn 
of the century that a more centralized approach to financial 
policy and processes was needed, in both the executive and 
legislative branches. The Act codified the submission of the 
President's budget and created the Bureau of the Budget (the 
predecessor to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)) to 
oversee the executive budget process. The Act also established 
the General Accounting Office (GAO) as the government's 
auditor, responsible only to Congress. The mission of GAO was 
to provide Congress with an independent audit of executive 
accounts and to report on violations of the fiscal statutes.
            Joint Committee on the Reduction of Federal Expenditures
    The Joint Committee was established by the Revenue Act of 
1941. Its membership was composed of the members of the House 
and Senate Appropriations Committees. The staff of the 
committee tracked Congressional action against the President's 
budget request, generally using Bureau of the Budget estimates. 
Scorekeeping reports of Congressional action were published on 
a regular basis when Congress was in session. The Joint 
Committee was replaced by the Congressional Budget Office 
following enactment of the 1974 Act.
            Joint Committee on the Legislative Budget
    The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 created the 
Joint Committee on the Legislative Budget. Its membership was 
comprised of members of the House and Senate Appropriations 
Committees, the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and 
Means Committee. The Joint Committee was to meet at the 
beginning of each session of Congress and report to their 
respective Houses a legislative budget for the ensuing fiscal 
year, including total estimated Federal receipts and 
expenditures. A concurrent resolution was to accompany the 
report adopting such a budget, which would fix the maximum 
amount to be appropriated during the year. If estimated 
expenditures were to exceed estimated receipts, the resolution 
was to include a statement that it was the sense of Congress 
that the public debt would be increased by that amount.

    Attempts were made in 1947 and 1948 to carry out the intent 
of the legislative budget provision. In 1947, conferees were 
unable to reach a final agreement. In 1948, a joint resolution 
was adopted by both Houses, but a strongly worded minority 
report noted basic defects in the procedure. No further 
attempts were made to comply with the Act after 1949.
            President's Commission on Budget Concepts
    In 1967, President Johnson appointed a commission to make a 
thorough study of the federal budget and the manner of its 
presentation. The Commission's most important recommendation 
was that a unified budget presentation replace the several 
competing and confusing measures of the total scope of federal 
financial activity. The report of the President's Commission on 
Budget Concepts serves as the foundation for most budgetary 
concepts used at the present time.

The Congressional Budget Act: Need for the law in the 1970's

    Two developments provided the impetus for the enactment of 
the Budget Act in 1974. One development was an increasing 
realization by Congress that it had no means to develop an 
overall budget plan. Prior to 1974, Congress responded to the 
President's budget (which contains the President's many 
spending and revenue proposals) each year in a piece-meal 
fashion. There existed no framework for Congress to establish 
its own spending priorities before work began on specific 
spending and revenue bills during the spring and summer.

    A second, and more immediate, cause for passage of the 
Budget Act was a dispute in the early 1970's regarding 
presidential authority to impound money appropriated by 
Congress. During this time, President Nixon repeatedly asserted 
authority (as had many of his predecessors) to withhold from 
Federal agencies money appropriated by Congress. By 1973, it 
was believed that President Nixon had impounded up to $15 
billion of spending previously approved by Congress. A large 
portion of these funds were to have gone towards the building 
of highways and pollution control projects. Many in Congress 
disputed these actions by the President.The authorization for 
the pollution control projects, for example, had been enacted by 
Congress in 1972 with a strong vote in both Houses overriding President 
Nixon's veto. Nonetheless, the President impounded much of this 
spending. These events led Members of Congress to seek a legislative 
solution.

    In 1974 Congress enacted the Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act to establish procedures for developing 
an annual congressional budget plan and achieving a system of 
impoundment control. The Budget Act also created, for the first 
time, congressional standing committees devoted solely to the 
budget. It also created the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
to serve as the ``scorekeeper'' for Congress. CBO is 
responsible for producing an annual economic forecast, 
formulating the baseline, reviewing the President's annual 
budget submission, scoring all spending legislation reported 
from committee and passed by the Congress, and preparing 
reports in compliance with the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. 
CBO's policy with respect to providing estimates is set out in 
Appendix B. The Joint Committee on Taxation scores all revenue 
measures.
            The Committee on the Budget
    The Budget Act created the Budget Committees of the Senate 
and House and gave them the responsibility to draft Congress' 
annual budget plan and monitor action on the budget for the 
Federal Government. For the first time, congressional 
institutions were in place whose unique concern would be 
Federal budgetary policy. As a result, the Budget Committee 
was, and remains today, uniquely focused on the details of our 
Federal budget, the drafting of the budget resolution, and the 
compilation of reconciliation legislation.

    The Budget Committee has jurisdiction over the 
congressional budget process and the operation of CBO. The 
jurisdiction of the Senate Budget Committee is set out in Rule 
25 of the Standing Rules of the Senate and in two standing 
orders adopted by unanimous consent of the Senate. The text of 
these sources of jurisdiction are set out in Appendix C. Most 
recently, the Budget Committee (along with the Committee on 
Governmental Affairs) has been responsible for the passage of 
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 and the Line Item Veto 
Act of 1996. The membership of the Senate Budget Committee, 
since its inception, is set out in Appendix D.

Changes to the Budget Act since 1974

            Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 1985 and 1987
    In the face of ever increasing budget deficits, in 1985 
Congress enacted the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act. This Act is known as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings--named 
after the Senate authors of the original bill (Senators Phil 
Gramm of Texas, Warren Rudman of New Hampshire, and Ernest F. 
Hollings of South Carolina).

    Gramm-Rudman-Hollings established ``maximum deficit 
amounts.'' If the deficit exceeded these statutory limits, the 
President was required to issue a sequester order that would 
reduce all non-exempt spending by a uniform percentage. Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings also made a number of changes to the 
congressional budget process to enforce maximum deficit amounts 
and to strengthen congressional budget enforcement procedures. 
The most significant change was to increase the margin 
necessary to waive certain points of order from a simple 
majority vote to a three-fifths margin in the Senate.

    In July of 1986 in Bowsher v. Synar (478 U.S. 714, 1986), 
the Supreme Court held that the provision of Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings which vested certain powers in the General Accounting 
Office violated the separation of powers doctrine of the 
Constitution. This was due to the Office's (a creature of 
Congress) role in implementing sequester orders. The Court 
found it unacceptable from a constitutional perspective for 
Congress to vest in a congressional entity a duty of the 
executive branch--the responsibility for executing a law. In 
1987, Congress enacted the Balanced Budget and Emergency 
Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act which corrected the 
constitutional flow in Gramm-Rudman-Hollings by assigning all 
the sequester responsibilities to the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB). OMB is part of the executive branch. The 1987 Act 
also extended the system of deficit limits through fiscal year 
1992.
            The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990
    It was not long, however, before Congress realized that 
despite Gramm-Rudman-Hollings procedures, the deficit continued 
to increase. In the spring of 1990, it became clear that the 
deficit was going to exceed the Gramm-Rudman's maximum deficit 
limit by nearly $100 billion. Later that year, OMB estimated 
that a sequester of $85 billion would be necessary to eliminate 
this excess deficit amount. Because Congress had exempted most 
of the budget from the sequester process, such a sequester 
order was going to require a 32 percent reduction in defense 
programs and a 35 percent reduction in non-defense programs. To 
respond to growing deficits, President Bush and the 
congressional leadership agreed to convene negotiations on the 
budget in May of 1990. Six months later, President Bush signed 
into law the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, which 
represented the budget agreement negotiated between the Bush 
Administration and Congress.

    Title XIII of this reconciliation act, the Budget 
Enforcement Act, constituted the enforcement provisions of the 
agreements. The 1990 Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) effectively 
replaced the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings system of deficit limits 
with two independent enforcement regimens: caps on 
discretionary spending and a pay-as-you-go requirement for 
direct spending and revenue legislation. The BEA also provided 
for enforcement by both the congressional and executive branch 
of the discretionary caps and the pay-as-you-go requirement.
            Amendments Since 1990
    The budget disciplines of the BEA were extended in the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 and the Balanced 
Budget Act of 1997 and are due to expire at the end of FY 2002. 
In addition to extending spending discipline through FY 2002, 
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 also made a number of changes 
to the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. These changes were 
largely technical in nature and were intended to conform the 
Act to current congressional practices and precedents.

                  III. DEVELOPMENT: CREATING A BUDGET

Executive Actions

            February: Receipt of the President's Budget Request
    One of the first things Congress needs to know in crafting 
a budget is what the executive branch believes is necessary to 
fund the operations of the Federal government. The President is 
therefore required to submit to Congress, by the first Monday 
in February, the Administration's budget request for the 
upcoming fiscal year (which begins the following October 1st). 
To meet this dead-line, the Administration must begin preparing 
its budget request during the previous spring and summer. For 
example, consider the budget process for fiscal year 1997. The 
President's budget request for fiscal year 1997 (October 1, 
1996--September 30, 1997) was transmitted to Congress on 
February 5, 1996. In order to do so, the Administration began 
working with Federal Agencies to prepare its budget request for 
fiscal year 1997 in the spring of 1995, nearly a year and a 
half prior to the start of fiscal year 1997.

Congressional Action_Preparation of a Concurrent Resolution

    The Budget Act established a new process and new 
institutions which enable Congress to develop, using expedited 
legislative procedures, its own budget plan each year. Unlike 
many state legislatures, Congress is no longer limited to 
acting on the executive's budget request on a piecemeal basis. 
The budget resolution allows Congress to put into place revenue 
and spending proposals within the framework of its own budget 
plan.

    The budget resolution is designed to guide Congress in its 
consideration of revenue and spending legislation throughout 
the year. It is in the form of a concurrent resolution, which 
is agreed to by both Houses and thus binding upon them. It is 
not a public law. The President is in no way bound by the 
content of the budget resolution. Therefore, like all other 
concurrent resolutions, a budget resolution is not sent to the 
President for signature. The Budget Act provides ``fast-track'' 
legislative procedures which allow Congress, the Senate in 
particular, to adopt a budget resolution with limitations on 
time for debate and the scope of amendments. In other words, a 
budget resolution may not be filibustered.

    Since the budget resolution is a concurrent resolution by 
form, it can also be the vehicle for rules changes for either 
House. The type of rules changes which may be included in a 
budget resolution (and still be accorded expedited 
consideration) is limited by the terms of section 301 of the 
Budget Act. Section 301(b)(4) permits a budget resolution to 
``set forth other matters, and such other procedures, relating 
to the budget, as may be appropriate to carry out the 
purposes'' of the Budget Act. Consequently, a budget resolution 
can supersede rules established in the Budget Act or can 
establish new rules or procedures relating to the budget. This 
authority has been exercised broadly in the past and budget 
resolutions have included numerous provisions making changes in 
the budget process: most notably, the creation of the pay-as-
you-go point of order and the discretionary caps/firewall point 
of order.
            February: Budget Committee Hearings, Committee Views and 
                    CBO Report
    After receiving the President's budget request, the Senate 
and House Budget Committees hold hearings to receive testimony 
from Administration officials, experts from academic and 
business communities, representatives of national 
organizations, members of Congress, and the general public. 
During the same period, the other committees of Congress review 
the President's budget submission with respect to programs 
within their jurisdictions. The committees then transmit to the 
Budget Committees within 6 weeks of the President's submission 
their ``views and estimates'' on appropriate spending or 
revenue levels for these programs. In addition, during 
February, CBO sends to the Budget Committees annual reports on 
the budget and economic outlook. In March, CBO sends to the 
Appropriations and Budget Committees its report analyzing the 
President's budget request.

    Unlike the formulation of the President's budget, the 
congressional budget is developed in public. This is true of 
the Budget Committee's hearings and mark-up, the Senate and 
House floor debates, and the conference meetings on budget 
resolutions and reconciliation bills.
            March: Budget Committees Draft Budget Resolutions
    Using the President's budget request, information from 
their hearings, views and estimates from other committees, and 
CBO's reports, the Budget Committee of each House drafts a 
congressional budget plan during March. This is done in a 
series of public committee meetings called ``mark-ups.'' It is 
during the mark-up that members of the committee may offer 
their own budget plans or amendments to budget plans laid 
before the committee. Once mark-up is completed, the committee 
reports to its respective House a concurrent resolution on the 
budget or budget resolution.

    Budget resolutions set forth budgetary levels for the 
upcoming fiscal year and planning levels for at least the 
following 4 fiscal years. Section 301 of the Budget Act sets 
out the basic components of a budget resolution: (1) budget 
totals, (2) spending broken down by budget function, (3) 
reconciliation instructions, (4) congressional budget 
enforcement mechanisms and (5) statements of budget policy 
(referred to as ``Sense of the Senate'' provisions). The budget 
totals set forth what Congress considers to be the appropriate 
amounts for total spending, total revenues, and the resulting 
deficit or surplus. In setting these budget totals, Congress 
considers the impact of the Federal budget on the national 
economy and establishes Federal fiscal policy for the coming 
fiscal year.

    Budget totals are provided in two ways in a budget 
resolution: budget aggregates and committee allocations. The 
budget aggregates (total revenues, total new budget authority, 
total outlays, and total revenues and outlays of Social 
Security) are set out in the text of the resolution for each 
fiscal year covered by the resolution.These aggregates are 
enforced by a \3/5\ths vote point of order contained in section 311 of 
the Budget Act. Section 311 prohibits the consideration of any 
legislation which will have the effect of exceeding the appropriate 
aggregate level as set out in the resolution for the first fiscal year 
and for the period of the fiscal years covered by the resolution.

    Committee allocations are required by section 302(a)(2) of 
the Budget Act. This section requires the conference report on 
the budget resolution to allocate to all Senate committees the 
appropriate levels of budget authority and outlays. Section 
302(b) requires the Appropriations committee of each House to 
subsequently subdivide its respective allocations among its 13 
subcommittees. These suballocations, commonly known as 
``302(b)'s'', are crucial to the work of the subcommittees as 
they prepare their bills for mark-up. Section 302(e) does, 
however, permit the Appropriations Committee to alter the 
302(b) allocation as work on the various bills progresses. The 
Committee must report these alterations to the Senate and is 
constrained by any action already taken by the committee and 
the overall allocation given to the full committee pursuant to 
section 302(a).

    The allocations to committees and the suballocations to 
appropriations subcommittees also are enforced by a \3/5\ths 
vote point of order contained in section 302(f) of the Budget 
Act. Section 302(f) prohibits the consideration of any 
legislation that provides budget authority or outlays in excess 
of the relevant allocation. The point of order associated with 
the statutory caps (discussed below) also serves as a 
discipline upon the appropriations process.

    Federal spending broken down by function is the second 
basic part of the budget resolution. The budget resolution 
accomplishes this by dividing up Federal spending among 20 
different classifications such as national defense, 
agriculture, and health. These classifications, known as 
``budget functions,'' provide the Congress with a means of 
setting priorities for the allocation of Federal resources 
among broad categories of spending. It should be remembered 
that budget functions do not necessarily conform with committee 
jurisdiction or with specific programs. For example, function 
300, Natural Resources and Environment, includes programs 
within the jurisdiction of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, 
Nutrition and Forestry, the Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources, the Committee on Commerce, Science and 
Transportation, and the Committee on Environment and Public 
Works.

    In addition to budget totals and spending by function, 
budget resolutions may include instructions to authorizing 
committees directing them to draft changes to existing laws in 
order to achieve certain budgetary results. These are known as 
reconciliation instructions. These instructions are limited by 
statute to calling for specific changes in dollar amounts for 
programs within a committee's jurisdiction. The reconciliation 
process, which is set out in section 310 of the Budget Act, 
provides Congress with expedited procedures similar to those 
used to enact a budget resolution, to achieve changes in taxing 
and spending.

    Congressional budget enforcement mechanisms are also 
frequently found in budget resolutions. These have included the 
pay-as-you-go and the discretionary caps/firewall points of 
order as well as reserve funds. The aggregates and committee 
allocations which are set out in a budget resolution are 
binding and enforced separately. Consequently, absent a reserve 
fund, legislation which increases revenues to offset increases 
in direct spending would be subject to a Budget Act point of 
order if it caused the aggregates (section 311) or the 
committee allocations (section 302) to be breached--even if the 
overall legislation is deficit neutral. In practice, reserve 
funds are designed to facilitate the consideration of deficit 
neutral legislation and are specifically permitted by section 
301(b)(7). A reserve fund would, for instance, permit: (1) a 
tax cut to be ``paid for'' with reductions in spending, (2) a 
new entitlement program to be paid for by tax increases, or (3) 
a new entitlement program to be paid for by cuts in existing 
entitlement programs within another committee's jurisdiction.

    Generally, a reserve fund operates by authorizing the 
Chairman of the Budget Committee to revise the spending and 
revenue aggregates or the committee allocations so that deficit 
neutral legislation would not be vulnerable to the points of 
order discussed above. Reserve funds have varied in scope. Some 
have been limited to specific amounts and could only be 
triggered for specific legislative initiatives. Other have been 
more open-ended and broadly defined. For example, the fiscal 
year 1995 budget resolution contained reserve funds for 11 
separate categories of legislation while the fiscal year 1996 
resolution contained only two (one for taxes and another for 
welfare reform).

    Past budget resolutions have also contained other 
provisions pertaining to budget procedures such as: language 
governing the budgetary treatment of asset sales and the 
student loan program, creation of, and subsequent repeal of, an 
IRS allowance, and a government shutdown prevention allowance 
to provide additional spending for a continuing resolution.
            April 15: Congress Adopts a budget Resolution
    When the Budget Committees complete their mark-up of a 
budget resolution, they report their respective resolutions to 
the full Senate and full House. All Members of the Senate and 
House then have an opportunity to alter the work of the Budget 
Committees by offering amendments to the budget resolution as 
it is debated on the floor of each chamber.

    Under current law, the budget resolution must set out a 
plan that is within the statutory caps on discretionary 
spending. If a point of order is raised against a budget 
resolution or amendment to a budget resolution it can not be 
considered absent a \3/5\ths vote to waive the budgetary rules.
            Expedited Procedures in the Senate
    Consideration of a budget resolution in the Senate is 
governed by the expedited procedures set out in section 305 of 
the Budget Act. Time for debate on the resolution is limited to 
50 hours which is equally divided between the majority leader 
and the minority leader or their designees. The usual practice 
is for the leaders to designate the chairman of the Budget 
Committee and the ranking member as the managers. The 50 hours 
includes time spent in quorum calls and time spent debating 
amendments, motions, and appeals. It does not include the time 
taken for a roll call vote or for a quorum call immediately 
before a vote.

    Debate on any first degree amendment is limited to 2 hours. 
Debate on any second degree amendment and debatable motions or 
appeals are limited to 1 hour. The time on any amendment or 
motion is equally divided between the offeror of the amendment 
(or maker of the motion) and the manager. The total time used 
in debate on any particular amendment, motion, or appeal is 
divided equally between the majority and the minority 
regardless of the actual amount used by either side. If no 
amendment or motion is before the Senate, Senators may only 
debate the resolution if time is yielded to them by the leader 
or the manager of the resolution. It is important to remember 
that this 50 hours is a limit on debate--not on consideration. 
Consequently, it is possible that amendments and motions may be 
made after the end of the 50 hours. These, however, will be 
disposed of without any debate.

    In addition to time limits, section 305(b) of the Budget 
Act imposes restrictions on the substance of amendments to a 
budget resolution. Amendments offered from the floor must be 
germane. An amendment will likely be found to be germane if it: 
(1) only strikes language from the resolution; (2) changes a 
number (dollar amount) or date in the resolution; or (3) adds 
language to the resolution which expresses the ``Sense of the 
Senate'' or ``Sense of the Congress'' with respect to budgetary 
issues. As is the case with most points of order, the Presiding 
Officer will not take the initiative to evaluate the 
germaneness of amendments as offered, but rather will wait for 
an objection (a point of order) to be raised by a Senator from 
the floor. If a germaneness point of order is raised against an 
amendment any Senator may make a motion to waive the Budget Act 
for the consideration of the amendment. This requires an 
affirmative vote of \3/5\ths of the Senate.

    Senate procedures generally provide that a single amendment 
may not amend the underlying measure in more than one place 
(although this is often disregarded in practice). The Budget 
Act, however, waives the prohibition for amendments to a budget 
resolution if the additional changes are necessary to maintain 
mathematical consistency throughout the resolution. For 
example, this permits the funding for a particular function to 
be changed and the corresponding change in the aggregate levels 
to be made. It also permits spending to be increased in one 
function and paid for with a reduction in another function (an 
offset).
    In addition to the section 305(b) point of order regarding 
germaneness, other points of order also require a \3/5\ths 
vote. These points of order include: section 301(i) which 
prohibits consideration of a budget resolution or an amendment 
thereto that reduces the surplus in the Social Security trust 
fund; and section 312(b) which prohibits consideration of a 
budget resolution that provides funding which exceeds the 
statutory caps.

    In addition to the points of order set out in the Budget 
Act, budget resolutions themselves have established enforcement 
provisions (points of order) against future budget resolutions. 
For example, Senators Exon and Grassley successfully amended 
the budget resolution for fiscal year 1995 to reduce the then-
existing statutory discretionary spending limits. The Exon-
Grassley Amendment also created a \3/5\ths point of order 
against a budget resolution for fiscal years 1996, 1997 and 
1998 that recommended discretionary spending levels in the 
first year of that resolution that exceeded the Exon-Grassley 
levels. These levels were further reduced and the point of 
order retained in section 201 of the budget resolution for 
fiscal year 1996. Section 201 of the 1996 resolution also 
extended these caps through fiscal year 2002 and added the 
firewall between defense and non-defense discretionary spending 
for fiscal years 1996, 1997, and 1998.

    When the Senate and House have both passed their respective 
versions of the budget resolution, they appoint several of 
their Members to a conference committee to resolve the 
differences between the Senate- and House-passed resolutions. 
When differences have been resolved, each chamber must then 
vote on the compromise version--the conference report on the 
budget resolution. Debate in the Senate on the conference 
report on a budget resolution is limited to 10 hours. Again 
this is a limit on debate, not on consideration.

    While the Budget Act sets April 15 as the date for 
completion of this work, Congress often fails to meet this 
deadline. The timetable for completion of the various steps in 
the budget process is set out in Appendix E. A listing of the 
completion dates for congressional budget resolutions is set 
out in Appendix F.

                            IV. ENFORCEMENT

    Once Congress has agreed on its budget priorities by 
adopting the conference report on the budget resolution, there 
are a number of enforcement mechanisms which help Congress work 
within its means with respect to both discretionary and 
mandatory spending. These mechanisms include: congressional 
points of order against the enactment of legislation which 
would violate the budget; executive branch action known as 
sequestration; and expedited legislative procedures for the 
enactment of changes in mandatory spending or revenues, known 
as reconciliation. The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 divided 
the enforcement of the budget between the Appropriations 
Committee with responsibility for discretionary spending and 
the authorizing committees with responsibility for mandatory or 
direct spending and revenues.

Budget Act Points of Order in the Senate

    In order to help Congress legislate within the budgetary 
constraints set forth in the budget resolution, the Budget Act 
provides for a number of points of order. Budget Act points of 
order are a parliamentary device by which any member of 
Congress can object to an amendment or a piece of legislation 
on the grounds that it is not within the limits set out in the 
budget. The Presiding Officer of each house, in consultation 
with the Parliamentarian and the Budget Committees with respect 
to the ``scoring'', is responsible for determining if a Member 
has correctly raised a point of order. Although there are 
numerous other points of order contained in the Rules of the 
House and of the Senate which may come into play during 
consideration of revenue and spending legislation, the 
following paragraphs set out the major Budget Act points of 
order which enforce the revenue and spending levels contained 
in a budget resolution:

          Section 302(f). This section prohibits the 
        consideration of legislation that provides budget 
        authority, or outlays, in excess of a committee's 
        allocation. This point of order is often used to 
        enforce the spending limits applicable to each of the 
        13 annual appropriations bills. This point of order may 
        be waived or the ruling appealed only by a \3/5\ths 
        vote.

          Section 311(a). This section prohibits consideration 
        of legislation that would cause the total level of 
        budget authority or outlays to be exceeded or the 
        appropriate level of revenues to be reduced below that 
        which is set forth in the budget resolution. These 
        levels are often referred to as the aggregates. This 
        point of order may be waived or the ruling appealed 
        only by a \3/5\ths vote.

    A listing a additional points of order found in the Budget 
Act are set out in Appendix G.

Discretionary Spending Caps

    There are two means by which the overall level of 
discretionary spending has been controlled: the congressional 
caps, which were set out in a number of budget resolutions and 
enforced by a point of order and the statutory spending caps, 
which are required by law and enforced through the 
sequestration process and by points of order.
            The Congressional Caps
    Starting with the fiscal year 1994 budget resolution, the 
Congress included limits on discretionary spending. Section 
12(b) of H. Con. Res. 64, the fiscal year 1994 budget 
resolution, established overall discretionary spending limits 
for fiscal years 1996 through 1998 inclusive. There was no 
distinction made between defense and non-defense spending. The 
next year, in section 24 of H. Con. Res. 218, the fiscal year 
1995 budget resolution, the discretionary spending limits were 
further reduced. The limits set out in both section 12(b) and 
section 24 were enforceable in the Senate by a\3/5\ths vote 
point of order which prohibited the consideration of a budget 
resolution for the relevant fiscal year which exceeded the limits.

    In June of 1995, Congress extended this discipline. In 
section 201 of H. Con. Res. 67, the fiscal year 1996 budget 
resolution, Congress extended the discretionary limits through 
fiscal year 2002 and a specific limitation was put into place 
between defense and non-defense discretionary spending through 
fiscal year 1998. This breakdown between defense and non-
defense spending is referred to as the ``firewall.'' These 
limits were enforceable in the Senate by a point of order which 
prohibits the consideration of a budget resolutions or 
appropriation bills that would result in levels of 
discretionary spending that exceed any of these limits. By the 
terms of section 201(b)(2) however, the application of this 
point of order for fiscal years 1997 through 2002 was to only 
become effective upon the enactment of reconciliation 
legislation as called for in the budget resolution. A 
reconciliation bill was passed in Congress that session (H.R. 
2491, the Balanced Budget Act of 1995); however, due to the 
President's veto, it was never enacted.

    Similarly, in section 301 of H. Con. Res. 178, the fiscal 
year 1997 budget resolution, discretionary spending limits were 
set out through fiscal year 2002 with the defense/non-defense 
firewall in place through fiscal year 1998. Again the 
effectiveness of the point of order against future budget 
resolutions and appropriations bills was made contingent upon 
enactment of all three reconciliation bills envisioned by the 
budget resolution. During 1996, the Congress enacted only one 
of the three reconciliation bills: the Welfare Reform 
legislation (The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Act of 1996, Public Law 104-193). Consequently, by the terms of 
section 301(b)(2)(B) the only point of order in effect applies 
to appropriations bills for fiscal year 1997.
    H. Con. Res. 84, the fiscal year 1998 budget resolution, 
did contain ``Congressional caps.'' These caps were superseded 
by the statutory caps (discussed below) in the Balanced Budget 
Act of 1997.
            The Statutory Caps
    The Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1990 established 
statutory limits, or caps, on discretionary spending through 
fiscal year 1995. The BEA provides that if OMB estimates that 
an appropriations bill will cause the overall level of 
discretionary spending to exceed the limits set forth in law, 
then the President must issue a sequester order reducing all 
non-exempt discretionary accounts by a uniform percentage. Only 
a very few discretionary programs are exempt from sequester, 
while several discretionary programs operate under special 
rules limiting how much they can be reduced by a sequester 
order. Indian Health Services and Veterans' Medical Care are 
examples of programs that may not be reduced by more than 2 
percent by a sequester order.

    Since 1990 there have been only two sequester orders 
affecting discretionary spending. These occurred in November of 
1990 and April of 1991. The November sequester was due to a 
drafting error with respect to programs in the international 
affairs accounts. The $395 million overage was corrected by 
congressional action the next spring, therefore no sequester 
was actually implemented. The April overage of $2.4 million 
occurred in domestic accounts and triggered a reduction of 
.0013 percent.
            Firewalls
    The BEA also provided for what are known as firewalls. The 
BEA's so-called firewalls set separate caps on defense, 
international, and non-defense discretionary spending for 
fiscal years 1991-1993. For fiscal years 1994 and 1995, the BEA 
established a cap on total discretionary spending and did not 
provide separate firewalls for these two years

    The BEA also provided two enforcement mechanisms to hold 
spending at these cap levels. In the Senate, a \3/5\ths point 
of order lies against appropriations legislation that would 
cause spending to exceed any one of these caps. In addition, if 
appropriations legislation is enacted that causes spending to 
exceed one of these caps, the President is required to reduce 
spending through across-the-board reductions (a sequester 
order) in that category to bring spending back down to the cap 
level. In the past, for example, defense spending has been 
reduced in order to fund higher non-defense spending. As a 
result of these caps on subsets of discretionary spending, or 
firewalls, defense may not be further reduced in order to 
increase spending for non-defense programs if it would cause 
total non-defense spending to exceed its cap level.

    Since the 1990 BEA, a number of changes have been made to 
the discretionary caps and firewalls. In 1993, the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act extended the discretionary caps 
through fiscal year 1998. In 1994, the Violent Crime Control 
and Law Enforcement Act established a separate cap, or 
firewall, for crime reduction funding through fiscal year 1998. 
The budget resolutions for fiscal years 1996 and 1997 
reinstated the defense and non-defense firewalls for 
congressional enforcement purposes through fiscal year 1998. In 
1997, the Balanced Budget Act extended the discretionary caps 
through fiscal year 2002, reinstated a separate defense 
firewall for fiscal years 1998 and 1999, and extended the crime 
reduction firewall through fiscal year 2000.

    In 1998, the Congress established two new separate caps, or 
firewalls, for highway and mass transit funding through fiscal 
year 2003 in the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century 
(TEA-21). TEA-21's firewalls differ from the defense and crime 
reduction firewalls in several respects. Perhaps the most 
significant distinction are the consequences for exceeding the 
caps. In the case of the defense, non-defense, and crime 
reduction caps, if Congress provides spending in excess of one 
of these caps, spending in that category is reduced (or 
sequestered) by an across-the-board reduction to bring spending 
in that category back to the cap level. In the case of the 
highway and transit caps, if spending exceeds these caps it is 
charged against the non-defense or discretionary cap. As a 
result, TEA-21 effectively exempted highway and transit funding 
from a sequester and placed the burden for meeting the caps on 
all other discretionary spending.

Mandatory Spending

    As is the case with discretionary spending, there are also 
two enforcement mechanisms with respect to the level of 
mandatory spending: a congressional mechanism set out in budget 
resolutions and a statutory mechanism found in the Budget 
Enforcement Act of 1990.
            Pay-as-you-go in the Senate
    The budget resolution for fiscal year 1994, which 
implemented President Clinton's first budget, included a new 
pay-as-you-go rule in the Senate. This rule provided a \3/5\ths 
vote point of order in the Senate against consideration of 
legislation that would cause an increase in the deficit over 
the next 10 years. This has the effect of requiring Congress to 
pay for any changes to programs (or the creation of new 
programs) which result in an increase in direct spending. For 
example, if Congress were to enact a program providing new 
benefits to Medicare recipients, the increased costs would have 
to be ``paid for'' by a corresponding reduction in direct 
spending elsewhere or an increase in revenues. The fiscal year 
1996 budget resolution made some changes to the Senate's pay-go 
rule, but continued to require a ten-year deficit neutrality 
requirement.

    As the rule stands now, there is a \3/5\ths vote point of 
order in the Senate against consideration of legislation that 
would cause a net increase in the deficit over a ten-year 
period. The pay-as-you-go point of order applies to all 
legislation except appropriations legislation. To determine a 
violation, CBO measures the budget impact of a direct spending 
or revenue bill combined with the budget impact of all direct 
spending and revenue legislation enacted since the latest 
budget resolution's adoption. If CBO concludes a direct 
spending or revenue bill would result in a net deficit increase 
for any one of three time periods (the first year, the sum of 
years 1 through 5, and the sum of years 6 through 10), the 
direct spending or revenue bill is subject to a \3/5\ths vote 
point of order in the Senate. The pay-go rule sunsets at the 
end of fiscal year 2002.
            Pay-as-you-go and sequestration
    For direct spending and revenues, the BEA requires OMB to 
enforce a ``pay-as-you-go'' requirement. Here again the 
executive branch's pay-as-you-go rule has the same effect as 
the point of order: Congress is required to ``pay for'' any 
changes to programs which result in an increase in direct 
spending or risk a sequester. If OMB estimates that the sum of 
all direct spending and revenue legislation enacted since 
August 5, 1997 will result in a net increase in the deficit for 
the fiscal year, then the President is required to issue a 
sequester order reducing all non-exempt direct spending 
accounts by a uniform percentage in order to eliminate the net 
deficit increase. Unlike discretionary programs, most direct 
spending is either exempt from a sequester order or operates 
under special rules that minimize the reduction that can be 
made in direct spending. Social Security is an example of a 
program exempt from a pay-as-you-go sequester and Medicare, 
which cannot be reduced by more than 4 percent, represents an 
example of a program that operates under special rules.

Reconciliation in the Senate

            Why the Senate Needs Reconciliation Procedures
    When the Budget Act was first written it included a 
procedure known as reconciliation which was designed to allow 
Congress at the end of the fiscal year to enact legislation to 
fine tune revenue and spending levels through legislation which 
may not be filibustered. During the 1980's, reconciliation came 
to be used as a vehicle for implementing major economic/budget 
plans rather than simply fine tuning. In recent years, both 
Congress and the President have made it a high priority to 
reduce the federal deficit and reconciliation has been the 
favored vehicle. In such years, reconciliation instructions 
have become a critical component of most budget resolutions.

    The reconciliation process set forth in section 310 of the 
Budget Act provides Congress with expedited procedures to 
achieve changes in revenues and reductions in direct spending 
through an omnibus bill. Such a large and complicated bill 
might otherwise be difficult to  enact  under  normal  
legislative  processes.  These  changes  are considered 
difficult because the very nature of the programs involved 
often necessitates changing tax rates or placing restrictions 
on very popular social programs in order to achieve budgetary 
savings. The number of people qualifying for benefits--not 
annual appropriations--is one of the primary factors in 
determining the amount of money needed to fund most direct 
spending programs for a given year.

    Using the reconciliation procedures, Congress directs its 
committees to report legislation achieving specified changes in 
spending within their respective jurisdictions to the Budget 
Committees by a certain date. These instructions are limited by 
the Budget Act to specifying the total amount by which direct 
spending or revenues under existing laws is to be changed. With 
respect to spending, such changes are crucial to reducing the 
deficit because entitlements and other direct spending comprise 
about two-thirds of the Federal budget. An instruction may also 
specify the total amount by which the statutory limit on the 
public debt is to be changed.

    While the Budget Committees develop the instructions by 
making assumptions for changes in programs and laws, the actual 
instructions may dictate neither the specific program to be 
changed nor the substance of the change. After the committees 
have reported their recommendations to the Budget Committees, 
the Budget Committees package all the committee-reported 
legislation together into an omnibus reconciliation bill along 
with report language and CBO's and the Joint Committee on 
Taxation's cost estimates. This is purely a ministerial 
function: the Budget Committees may not make any substantive 
change to the other committees' work product.

    If legislation reported to the Budget Committee does not 
comply with any authorizing committee's instruction there are 
two consequences during floor consideration of the bill. First, 
if that committee's title of the bill contains any increases in 
spending (known as ``sweeteners''), those sweeteners are 
vulnerable to a point of order under the ``Byrd Rule'' (which 
is discussed below). In addition, that title of the bill is 
subject to being rewritten by the full Senate. This could be 
accomplished by the making of a motion to recommit the bill 
with instructions to report back forthwith with an amendment 
containing legislative language which satisfies the original 
instruction. A listing of the completion dates of 
reconciliation legislation is set out in Appendix H.
            Expedited Procedures in the Senate
    Once the Budget Committees have completed their work, the 
Congress then considers the reconciliation bill. Under the 
expedited procedures for the Senate set forth in the Act, total 
debate is limited to 20 hours. The actual time taken for 
consideration, however, may exceed the 20 hours. Motions and 
amendments may be offered and considered without debate at the 
end of the 20 hours. In addition, sections 305, 310 and 313 of 
the Act provide other restrictions with respect to the 
substantive content of the reconciliation measure and 
amendments thereto. For example, any amendment to the bill that 
is not germane, would add extraneous material, would cause 
deficit levels to increase, or that contains recommendations 
with respect to the old-age, survivors, and disability 
insurance program (OASDI) is not in order. If an amendment is 
objected to for any of these reasons, it cannot be considered 
absent a waiver of budgetary rules (which in the Senate 
requires a \3/5\ths vote.)

    Section 313 of the Budget Act, providing a prohibition 
against ``extraneous material'', is known as the Byrd Rule 
(after the Senator from West Virginia, Robert C. Byrd). It is 
significant that this rule applies to the bill itself as well 
as to amendments and conference reports. Unlike other points of 
order in the Senate, if the Presiding Officer sustains a point 
of order under the Byrd Rule against  a provision in a bill or 
conference report, that provision is stricken from the measure. 
The Byrd Rule may be waived by a \3/5\ths vote.

    The Byrd Rule provides that an amendment or provision is 
extraneous if it: (1) produces no change in outlays or revenues 
(and is not a term or condition of such change), (2) increases 
outlays or reduces revenues and the reporting committee fails 
to achieve its instructed dollar change, (3) is not within the 
jurisdiction of the committee reporting the title, (4) produces 
changes in outlays or revenues that are ``merely incidental'' 
to the non-budgetary components of the provision, (5) increases 
the deficit in any year beyond the years reconciled and such 
increase is not offset by other provisions in the same title, 
or (6) provides certain changes in the Social Security program. 
Whether or not an amendment, provision of a bill or conference 
report violates section 313 (or any other section of the Budget 
Act for that matter) is within the discretion of the Presiding 
Officer of the Senate who will consult with the Parliamentarian 
of the Senate. The Budget Committee, using CBO cost and JCT 
revenue estimates, is responsible for scoring of all provisions 
and amendments.

                 V. OTHER ASPECTS OF THE BUDGET PROCESS

The Government Performance and Results Act

    On August 3, 1993 the Government Performance and Results 
Act was signed into law, after having been passed by voice vote 
in both the House and the Senate (Public Law 103-62, 103rd 
Cong., 1st Sess.). The Results Act is the first management 
reform initiative rooted in law and tied directly to the budget 
structure. Under the law, agencies must develop performance 
measures for each program activity beginning with fiscal year 
1999. For example, a job training program could measure the 
change in the wages of its graduates. This performance 
information should help clarify what the federal government is 
actually accomplishing. If the law functions as intended, funds 
will be diverted from underachieving programs to high-achieving 
programs.

    The law requires four types of reports. Each agency must 
develop a five-year strategic plan to set the general direction 
of the agency. Agencies must also produce an annual performance 
plan which includes quantitative outcome goals compatible with 
the general goals of the strategic plan. In addition, agencies 
must produce a retrospective performance report each year, 
which compares the actual results to the stated goals. Finally, 
the OMB must construct a government-wide performance plan 
covering the entire Federal government. This plan is submitted 
each February along with the President's budget.

Title X: Impoundment Control and the Line Item Veto

            Rescissions and Deferrals
    Prior to the enactment of the Budget Act in 1974, the 
President would reduce federal spending after it was enacted by 
the Congress by impounding funds. An impoundment occurs when 
the President does not spend any or all of an enacted 
appropriation. Under title X of the Budget Act of 1974, the 
President can defer (delay) the obligation of appropriations or 
propose a rescission (cancellation) of appropriations. It is 
Congress' responsibility to review all proposed rescissions and 
deferrals. While the Budget Act provides for procedures to 
address proposed Presidential rescissions and deferrals in an 
expedited fashion (see section 1017), these procedures have 
never been invoked. Rescissions and deferrals (whether 
initiated by the President or the Congress) have, however, been 
enacted using regular Senate procedures. Frequently this has 
occurred as part of a supplemental appropriations bill.
            Rescissions and Rescission Bills
    A rescission is a proposal contained in a special message 
from the President canceling, in whole or in part, previously 
appropriated budget authority. The funds must, however, be 
obligated if the Congress does not approve the rescission 
within 45 days of receipt of the President's special message. 
If a President feels that funds should not be made available 
for general or fiscal policy reasons, a rescission is the 
appropriate vehicle. Funds made available by use of the 
procedures in title X of the Budget Act may not be proposed for 
rescission again. The Budget Act (in section 1017) provides 
expedited procedures for considering a rescission bill which 
approves some or all of the rescissions contained in the 
President's special message.
            Deferrals and Impoundment Resolutions
    A deferral is a proposal contained in a special message 
from the President temporarily withholding or delaying the 
obligation or expenditure of budget authority. A deferral may 
not extend beyond the end of the fiscal year in which the 
special message is transmitted. The Act provides that deferrals 
are not to be used to alter policy decisions regarding spending 
made by the Congress. If the President wishes to alter spending 
policy, the appropriate action is to propose a rescission 
rather than repeatedly defer the spending of those funds. In 
order to overturn a deferral, Congress must pass and the 
President must sign legislation specifically rejecting the 
President's deferral.
            The Line Item Veto: An Attempt to Control Spending
            Overview
    After almost an entire year in conference Congress passed 
and the President signed into law the Line Item Veto Act of 
1996 (Public Law 104-130). The law was designed to allow the 
President to cancel wasteful spending and special interest tax 
breaks to reduce the federal budget deficit. The law also 
included expedited legislative procedures which would have 
permitted Congress to review and respond, if necessary, to the 
President's use of this new authority by enacting a disapproval 
bill.

    The Line Item Veto Act delegated to the President the 
authority to cancel certain budget obligations provided by 
appropriation, direct spending, and tax laws. The law permitted 
the President to cancel any of the following:

          (1) any dollar amount of discretionary spending 
        (which would be found in an appropriations act);

          (2) any item of new direct spending (a provision 
        increasing direct spending would be found in 
        legislation dealing with entitlements such as Medicare 
        or Medicaid); or

          (3) any limited tax benefit (a provision benefitting 
        100 or fewer beneficiaries or a transition rule 
        benefitting 10 or fewer beneficiaries would be found in 
        a revenue act).

    Once the President exercised the cancellation authority 
provided in the Line Item Veto Act, the Congress had three 
options for its response: (i) Congress could accept the 
President's cancellation and take no further action; (ii) 
Congress could begin the legislative process anew and in the 
normal course enact again the canceled item (being mindful that 
this would be additional spending which may require an 
offsetting reduction elsewhere); or (iii) Congress could begin 
consideration of a disapproval bill pursuant to the expedited 
legislative procedures set out in the Line Item Veto Act. The 
Act also called for expedited review of any legal challenges to 
the line item by the Federal courts.
    The expedited judicial procedures were the first aspect of 
the new law to be used. These procedures culminated on June 25, 
1998 when the Supreme Court of the United States held (in a 6-3 
decision) that the Line Item Veto Act was unconstitutional as 
it violated the Presentment Clause of Article I, section 7 of 
the Constitution (see, Clinton v. City of New York, et al. 118 
U.S.C. 2091, (1998)). This decision was the culmination of 18 
months of litigation.

    The Line Item Veto Act became effective on January 1, 1997 
and the litigation began the very next day. On January 2, 1997 
a group of six former and current Members of Congress 
(Senators--Byrd, Levin, Moynihan, and Hatfield and 
Representatives Skaggs and Waxman) filed a lawsuit in Federal 
District Court challenging the constitutionality of the new 
law. Ultimately, on June 27, 1997, the Supreme Court held in 
this lawsuit that the plaintiff Members of Congress lacked 
standing to bring such a challenge before the federal courts 
and thus the lawsuit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction 
(see, Raines v. Byrd et al. 521 U.S. 811, 117 S. Ct. 2312, 2317 
(1997)).

    President Clinton then made use of his cancellation 
authority pursuant to the Line Item Veto Act during August and 
September of 1997: canceling a total of 82 items from various 
reconciliation and appropriations acts.\1\ Of these 82 items, 
38 (which had been part of the FY 1998 Military Construction 
Appropriations Act) were overturned by subsequent action of 
Congress (enactment of a disapproval bill--H.R. 2631--under the 
expedited procedures of the Line Item Veto Act).

    An additional item, relating to an ``open season'' with 
respect to the pensions of certain federal employees, was 
invalidated on January 6, 1998 by an order of the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia (see, Order in NTEU v. 
United States, No. 97-2399 (D.D.C. Jan. 6, 1998)). In the NTEU 
case, the Clinton administration conceded that the President 
had exceeded his authority under the Act and agreed with the 
plaintiff, the National Treasury Employees Union, that the 
cancellation was not valid.

    Two other canceled items, one relating to a Medicaid 
provision and the other a tax provision applicable to certain 
transactions entered into by agricultural cooperatives, became 
the source for the litigation which ultimately brought down the 
Line Item Veto Act. The plaintiffs in these two cases argued 
that the Line Item Veto was invalid because it violated both 
the Presentment Clause and the doctrine of Separation of Powers 
found in the Constitution. The two cases were consolidated at 
the District Court level and held to be unconstitutional (985 
F. Supp. 168, 177-82 (1998)). As in the Raines v. Byrd case, 
the Supreme Court again exercised expedited review as called 
for in the Line Item Veto Act. Oral arguments were heard in 
Clinton v. City of New York on April 27, 1998 and the Court 
issued its ruling on June 25, 1998. In its June 25th decision, 
the Supreme Court found that the Line Item Veto Act was 
unconstitutional because it violates the procedures for 
enacting legislation which are set out in the Presentment 
Clause of the Constitution (Article I, section 7). The Court 
felt that the Act permitted the President to unilaterally amend 
duly enacted laws (the law upon which he would exercise his 
cancellation authority) by repealing only a portion thereof. 
Because the Court found the law invalid on these grounds, the 
majority felt it was not necessary to address the Separation of 
Powers arguments which had also been propounded by the 
opponents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ An excellent discussion of the Line Item Veto Act and the 
President's use of the cancellation authority during its short life can 
be found in a Congressional Budget Office publication dated April 1998 
and entitled: The Line Item Veto Act After One Year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Unfunded Mandates Control Act

    In March of 1995, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 
was enacted (Public Law 104-4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.). The 
Unfunded Mandates Act amended the Budget Act to add a new Part 
B to title IV. The purposes of the Act are to limit the 
imposition of unfunded Federal mandates on state, local, and 
tribal governments and the private sector without full and 
informed congressional consideration of the effects of such 
mandates before their enactment. To fulfill these goals the 
Act: (i) requires CBO to provide a mandate analysis for all 
legislation reported from committee; (ii) provides a majority 
vote point of order; (iii) and requires that Federal agencies 
interact with state, local and tribal government with respect 
to the budgetary impact of Federal regulations which impose 
unfunded mandates.

    The Act contains a list of 7 specific items (legislative or 
regulatory) which are excluded from mandates scrutiny. Thus, 
the Act does not apply to provisions which: (i) enforce 
constitutional rights; (ii) prohibit discrimination; (iii) 
require compliance with accounting or auditing procedures with 
respect to grants or other money or property provided by the 
Federal Government; (iv) provide for emergency relief at the 
request of a state, local, or tribal government; (v) are 
necessary for national security or adherence to international 
agreements; (vi) the President designates as an emergency; or 
(vii) relate to the Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance 
program of title II of the Social Security Act.
            Federal Mandates
    In requiring congressional scrutiny of unfunded mandates, 
the Act makes an important distinction between those imposed 
upon state, local, and tribal governments (known as 
intergovernmental mandates) and those imposed upon the private 
sector (know as private sector mandates). Generally speaking, 
private sector mandates must be identified in report language 
for legislation, if and only if, the direct cost equals or 
exceeds $100 million in the fiscal year first effective and any 
of the 4 following fiscal years. There is a point of order with 
respect to the consideration of such legislation if the CBO 
mandates estimate has not been published (either in the 
committee's report or placed in the Congressional Record) prior 
to its consideration, but there is no requirement to mitigate 
or limit costs of a private sector mandate. With respect to 
intergovernmental mandates, the threshold is $50 million. In 
addition to the point of order with respect to the CBO mandates 
estimate, there is also a majority point of order against the 
consideration of any legislation containing such a mandate, 
unless the legislation contains language which provides 
spending authority or authorizes appropriations to cover the 
cost of the mandate (see section 425(a)(2)). Both of these 
points of order may be waived by a majority vote of the Senate.
            Role of the Congressional Budget Office
    In order for Congress to fully consider and appreciate the 
effects of Federal mandates, the Act created additional 
responsibilities for CBO. CBO must provide a statement to 
authorizing committees regarding whether reported bills contain 
Federal mandates. If the total direct costs of a mandate are 
above either the $50 million or $100 million thresholds in the 
fiscal year that the mandate is first effective or in any of 
the four following years, CBO must provide an estimate of these 
costs, if feasible, and the basis of the estimate. The CBO 
statement must also include an assessment of whether the bill 
authorizes or otherwise provides funding to cover the costs of 
the mandates. With respect to intergovernmental mandates, the 
cost statement must estimate the appropriations needed to fund 
such authorization for up to 10 years after the mandate becomes 
effective. In addition, CBO must ``to the greatest extent 
practicable'' prepare statements for conference agreements if 
they contain mandates not previously considered in either the 
House or the Senate if they impose greater direct costs than 
previously considered versions of the bill.

    If an individual Senator requests, CBO must prepare 
estimates of the costs of intergovernmental mandates contained 
in an amendment the Senator may wish to offer. The Congress may 
also call upon CBO to do more detailed analyses of federal 
mandates. The Chairman or ranking minority member of a 
committee may request CBO to compare an agency's estimate of 
the costs of proposed regulations implementing a federal 
mandate with CBO's estimate prepared when the law was enacted. 
The Act intends that CBO in effect critique the agency's 
estimate.

Credit Reform

    Credit Reform, enacted by the Federal Credit Reform Act of 
1990, strives to show the actual, long-term cost of programs 
where the Federal Government extends credit prior to the actual 
making of a direct loan or loan guarantee. It requires that the 
expected costs of defaults and interest subsidies be factored 
into the total cost of a loan, which is recorded in the budget 
on a present-value basis at the time credit is extended.

    Before the Credit Reform Act became law, the federal budget 
accounted for all credit transactions on a cash basis, meaning 
that spending (i.e. loan disbursements) and receipts (i.e. loan 
repayments) were recorded in the fiscal year in which they 
occurred. Such treatment made it difficult to compare on an 
equal footing the long-term costs associated with credit 
programs. For example, consider one key distinction between two 
credit programs which are not easily compared. For direct 
loans, the federal government actually provides the loan funds 
to and receives repayments from the borrower, but for 
guaranteed loans, a private entity actually makes and services 
the loan and the federal government has to make a payment only 
if the borrower defaults. Because the Federal Government does 
not have to disburse cash for guaranteed loans, such loans 
appeared to have no cost (at least in the near-term), so the 
cash treatment made them appear cheaper, and therefore more 
easily ``funded'', than direct loans. In addition, a direct 
loan program with high expected defaults would appear as no 
more expensive than one with low defaults, thereby denying 
lawmakers key information for making funding decisions.

    Credit reform attempts to account for all the expected 
costs associated with a credit program at the time credit is 
extended. By separately identifying the elements that account 
for the Federal subsidy in the program--such as expected 
delinquencies and defaults and interest rate reductions--credit 
reform allows lawmakers to appropriate funds to cover the 
entire subsidy at the time a loan is made. In most cases, 
credit reform also allows lawmakers to easily compare the costs 
of competing credit programs by comparing their subsidies. Now, 
loan programs with high expected default rates actually appear 
more expensive than ones with low default rates. And guaranteed 
loans no longer appear free.
                             VI. APPENDICES

                               Appendix A

                            BUDGET FUNCTIONS

    050: National Defense

    150: International Affairs

    250: General Science, Space, and Technology

    270: Energy

    300: Natural Resources and Environment

    350: Agriculture

    370: Commerce and Housing Credit

    400: Transportation

    450: Community and Regional Development

    500: Education

    550: Health

    570: Medicare

    600: Income Security

    650: Social Security

    700: Veterans Benefits and Services

    750: Administration of Justice

    800: General Government

    900: Net Interest

    920: Allowances

    950: Undistributed Offsetting Receipts
                               Appendix B

    CBO'S POLICIES FOR PREPARING AND DISTRIBUTING ITS ESTIMATES AND 
                                ANALYSES

                    (From CBO Document, Summer 1998)

    The mission of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) is to provide 
the Congress with the objective, timely, nonpartisan analysis needed 
for economic and budget decisions and the information and estimates 
required for the Congressional budget process. This document describes 
the policies and procedures that CBO follows as it prepares and 
distributes budget estimates and other analytic work for the Congress.

                    CBO'S STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITIES

    The basic statute setting forth the duties and functions of the 
Congressional Budget Office is title II of the Congressional Budget Act 
of 1974. Additional responsibilities for budget estimates are contained 
in titles III and IV of that act. Subsequent legislation has affected 
those responsibilities and has added further requirements for specific 
analyses.

    According to title II of the Budget Act, CBO's primary duty is to 
provide budget-related information to all committees of both Houses, 
with priority given first to the information needs of the Committees on 
the Budget and second to the information needs of the Committees on 
Appropriations, Ways and Means, and Finance. With respect to individual 
Members, the only CBO duty stipulated in the act is to provide 
information compiled for committees and additional related information 
that may be requested.

    Title II also requires CBO to prepare several specific reports to 
the Committees on the Budget each year, including periodic assessments 
of the economic and budget outlook, and to conduct continuing studies 
on budgetary matters.

    Titles III and IV of the Congressional Budget Act specify 
additional duties for CBO to carry out in reviewing bills or joint 
resolutions reported from committees of either House. Title III covers 
all bills or joint resolutions that provide new budget or spending 
authority, such as appropriation bills, or that provide an increase or 
decrease in revenues. Title IV covers all bills and joint resolutions 
other than appropriation bills and private relief bills.Under those 
titles, CBO must prepare estimates of new budget authority, outlays, or 
revenues provided by the bills or joint resolutions, or of the costs 
that the government would incur in carrying out the provisions of the 
proposed legislation. The CBO cost estimates are to be included in the 
reports accompanying such bills or resolutions if they are submitted to 
the committees before the reports are filed.

    For estimating the impact on revenues of legislation involving 
income, estate and gift, excise, and payroll taxes, the Congressional 
Budget Act directs CBO to use exclusively the revenue estimates of the 
Joint Committee on Taxation.

    The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, the 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 
1987, and the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 assign further duties to 
the Congressional Budget Office, such as providing budget estimates for 
the purpose of budget control. That function includes preparing the 
various sequestration reports to the Congress and the Office of 
Management and Budget. The Budget Enforcement Act also requires CBO to 
estimate changes in direct spending and revenues for private relief 
legislation as well as for public bills or joint resolutions.

    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 requires CBO to prepare 
estimates of the direct costs of all federal mandates that are 
contained in legislation reported by any authorizing committee in 
either House and that affect state, local, and tribal governments or 
the private sector. The act also authorizes CBO to prepare analyses and 
studies of the budgetary or financial impact of proposed legislation 
that may significantly affect state and local governments or the 
private sector, to the extent practicable, at the request of any 
committee.

    From time to time, statutes have directed CBO to prepare analytic 
reports on specific subjects. Such reports have included the treatment 
of administrative costs under credit reform accounting, the financial 
risks posed by government-sponsored enterprises, and the desirability 
and feasibility of privatizing the Federal National Mortgage 
Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation.

         HOW WORK ON CBO'S ESTIMATES AND ANALYSES IS INITIATED

    The Congressional Budget Office strives to provide federal budget 
and mandate cost estimates for all bills other than appropriation bills 
when they are reported by a full committee of either House. Committee 
staff should notify CBO when bills are about to be ordered reported and 
when cost estimates are needed.

    CBO also prepares cost estimates for proposals at other stages of 
the legislative process at the request of a committee of jurisdiction, 
a budget committee, or the Congressional leadership. For example, CBO 
may prepare cost estimates for a series of bills to be considered by a 
subcommittee, including draft bills not yet introduced, or for 
amendments to be considered during committee markups. Similarly, it may 
prepare cost estimates for floor amendments and for bills that pass one 
or both Houses.

    For appropriation bills, CBO provides estimates of outlays that 
would result from the provision of budget authority. CBO also provides 
the budget and appropriation committees with frequent tabulations of 
Congressional actions on both spending and revenue bills so that the 
Congress can know whether it is acting within the limits set by the 
annual budget resolution.

    In addition to statutory reports, or analyses done to directly 
support CBO's statutory work, the office undertakes a number of other 
analyses each year, although only at the request of the Chairman or 
Ranking Minority Member of the relevant committee or subcommittee or 
the Congressional leadership. Also, as time permits, CBO will honor 
requests of individual Members for cost information or other analysis 
or legislative proposals, but it must give priority to committee 
requests.

    By way of definition, a committee request consists of a written or 
oral request by the Chairman or Ranking Minority member of a committee 
or subcommittee. CBO asks that requests from individual Members be made 
in writing.

HOW CBO CONSULTS WITH COMMITTEES AND OTHER REQUESTERS OF ESTIMATES AND 
                                ANALYSES

    When undertaking a cost estimate or an analysis supporting such an 
estimate, CBO analysts contact the staff of the committee of 
jurisdiction and, when applicable, the staffs of the member sponsoring 
the proposal and the Member requesting the estimate to gather 
background information and discuss the schedule for completing the 
estimate. Budget and mandate cost estimates are based on the text of 
the proposed legislation. CBO analysts consult with the staff of the 
committee of jurisdiction (for a reported bill) or the sponsoring 
Member (for an introduced bill or amendment) when questions of 
interpretation arise, but they draw their own conclusions on an 
impartial and objective basis.

    CBO analysts contact the appropriate staff members if a forthcoming 
CBO estimate shows direct spending costs, mandates that exceed the 
legislative thresholds, or other significant findings. CBO, however, 
does not make judgments about the application of parliamentary points 
of order. After CBO cost estimates have been transmitted, they may be 
revised to correct errors or to incorporate new or updated information.

    When undertaking requested analyses of legislative proposals or 
issues, CBO staff members consult with the requester's staff to reach 
an understanding of the scope and nature of the work to be done. CBO 
analysts draw their own conclusions on an impartial and objective 
basis, as they do when preparing cost estimates. When appropriate, CBO 
staff inform other relevant committees of requests for analytic work 
after advising the requester's staff. As a final step in the 
consultation process, CBO informs the requester's staff of the results 
of the analysis before it releases the material.

            SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND PEER REVIEW PRACTICES

    In preparing its budget estimates and analyses, CBO uses the rich 
data sources available from the government's statistical agencies. 
Those sources include the national income and product accounts, the 
census of manufacturers, the Statistics of Income, the Current 
Population Survey, and various national health surveys. CBO also uses 
information provided by relevant government agencies and industry 
groups to meet specific needs.

    CBO employs standard methods of economic analysis and closely 
follows theoretical and empirical developments in the professional 
literature for economics and related disciplines. In addition, CBO 
frequently calls on outside experts for advice on specific analytic 
matters, such as the outlook for agriculture production, spending 
projections for Medicare and Medicaid, and business prospects in the 
telecommunications industry. For its economic forecasts and 
assumptions, CBO draws on the advice of a distinguished panel of 
advisers that meets twice a year.

    All CBO estimates and analytic products are reviewed internally for 
technical competence, accuracy of data, and clarity of exposition. CBO 
studies are also reviewed by experts outside CBO, and the preface to 
each study cites the many contributors who helped shape the final 
product. Although outside experts and advisers provide considerable 
assistance, CBO is solely responsible for the accuracy of the estimates 
and analyses that it produces. In keeping with its nonpartisan status 
and its mandate to provide objective analysis, CBO does not make policy 
recommendations in any of its analyses.

    CBO'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISCLOSING AND EXPLAINING ITS CRITICAL 
                     ASSUMPTIONS AND METHODOLOGIES

    Both the Congressional Budget Act and the Unfunded Mandates Reform 
Act direct CBO to disclose the basis for each budget and mandate cost 
estimate. CBO interprets that directive to include the disclosure of 
the critical assumptions and analytic methodologies used to prepare the 
estimate. All written cost estimates include explanations of the basis 
of the estimate, and CBO supplies further details on request. Similar 
explanations of critical assumptions and methodologies are given in 
CBO's analytic products. It is CBO's policy that its estimates and 
analyses be clearly presented and easy to understand.

               HOW CBO TRANSMITS ITS WORK TO THE CONGRESS

    CBO seeks to ensure that key parties in the Congress who are 
involved in any particular issue have equal access to its analytic 
work. Insofar as possible, CBO delivers its cost estimates and analyses 
to all interested parties simultaneously. Requests for confidentiality 
are honored only for cost estimates for legislative proposals that have 
not been made public.

    The Director of the Congressional Budget Office transmits by letter 
all formal budget and mandate cost estimates of legislative proposals 
and all requested analyses. CBO sends its formal cost estimates for 
reported bills and estimates prepared at committee request to the 
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the reporting or requesting 
committee. When the requester is a budget committee or individual 
Member, CBO sends a copy of its cost estimate simultaneously to the 
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the committee of jurisdiction; 
for an introduced bill or amendment, a copy of the estimate is sent to 
the sponsor as well as the requester. Cost estimates of legislative 
proposals that have not been introduced as a bill or made public are 
transmitted only to the sponsoring Member or requesting committee 
unless CBO is directed otherwise.

    In contrast, informal cost estimates may be transmitted directly by 
CBO staff. Informal estimates are preliminary because they do not 
undergo the same review procedures required for formal estimates.

             HOW CBO DISTRIBUTES ITS ESTIMATES AND ANALYSES

    CBO makes its analytic work widely available to Members of Congress 
and their staffs as well as to the public. The Publications Office 
sends a copy of all CBO reports and studies to each Member. Copies of 
CBO papers, memorandums, and other analyses are available to Members 
and Congressional staff on request.

    The Publications Office also handles requests from the general 
public, other government agencies, and the press. Single copies of CBO 
reports, studies, papers, and memorandums are available at no charge. 
In addition, the Superintendent of Documents at the U.S. Government 
Printing Office carries many CBO reports and studies.

    In September 1997, CBO launched its World Wide Web site 
(www.cbo.gov). The site now includes publications, testimony, and cost 
estimates issued since then as well as many publications from previous 
years. As time and resources permit, CBO will continue to post older 
products that remain relevant and useful. An index of publications 
issued since CBO began operating in 1975, arranged chronologically and 
by subject, will also be posted on the Web site.

    The documents on CBO's Web site are available in four formats: 
HTML, PDF, PostScript, and WordPerfect. The multiformat approach makes 
CBO's products accessible to a wide variety of users and for multiple 
purposes. Visitors can browse, search, download, and print documents 
that are on the Web. They can also subscribe to ListServer a feature 
that enables them to be notified by E-mail when CBO issues a 
publication on a subject of interest to them.

    For further information on CBO policies, contact the Administration 
and Information Division at (202) 226-2600 or visit CBO's Web site 
(www.cbo.gov). For copies of CBO's analyses, call the Publications 
Office at 226-2809 or write to the following: Congressional Budget 
Office, Administration and Information Division, Ford House Office 
Building, Second and D Streets, SW, Washington, DC 20515.
                               Appendix C

           JURISDICTION OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET

A. From Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate
    (e)(1) Committee on the Budget, to which committee shall be 
referred all concurrent resolutions on the budget (as defined in 
section 3(a)(4) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974) and all other 
matters required to be referred to that committee under titles III and 
IV of that Act, and messages, petitions, memorials, and other matters 
relating thereto.

    (2) Such committee shall have the duty--

          (A) to report the matters required to be reported by it under 
        titles III and IV of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974;

          (B) to make continuing studies of the effect on budget 
        outlays of relevant existing and proposed legislation and to 
        report the results of such studies to the Senate on a recurring 
        basis;

          (C) to request and evaluate continuing studies of tax 
        expenditures, to devise methods of coordinating tax 
        expenditures, policies, and programs with direct budget 
        outlays, and to report the results of such studies to the 
        Senate on a recurring basis; and

          (D) to review, on a continuing basis, the conduct by the 
        Congressional Budget Office of its functions and duties.
B. Unanimous consent agreement of January 30, 1975 (as modified on 
        April 11, 1986) with respect to Rescissions and Deferrals 
        (which had the effect of adopting the language of Senate 
        Resolution 45 which is set forth below):
    Resolved,

    1. That messages received pursuant to title X of the Congressional 
Budget and Impoundment Control Act be referred concurrently to the 
Appropriations Committee, to the Budget Committee, and to any other 
appropriate authorizing committee.

    2. That bills, resolutions and joint resolution introduced with 
respect to rescissions and deferrals shall be referred to the 
Appropriations Committee, and Budget Committee, and pending 
implementations of section 401 of the Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act and subject to section 401(d), to any other 
committee exercising jurisdiction over contract and borrowing authority 
programs as defined by section 401(c)(2) (A) and (B). The Budget 
Committee and such other committees shall report their views, if any, 
to the Appropriations Committee within 20 days following referral of 
such messages, bills, resolutions, or joint resolutions. The Budget 
Committee's consideration shall extend only to macroeconomic 
implications, impact on priorities and aggregate spending levels, and 
the legality of the President's use of the deferral and rescission 
mechanism under title X. The Appropriations and authorizing committees 
shall exercise their normal responsibilities over programs and 
priorities.

    3. If any Committee to which a bill or resolution has been referred 
recommends its passage, the Appropriations Committee shall report the 
bill or resolution together with its views and reports of the Budget 
and any appropriate authorizing committees to the Senate within:

          (A) the time remaining under the act in the case of 
        rescissions, or

          (B) within 20 days in the case of deferrals.

    4. The 20 day period referred to herein means 20 calendar days; and 
for the purposes of computing the 20 days, recesses or adjournments of 
the Senate for more than 3 days, to a day certain shall not be counted; 
and for recesses and adjournments of more than 30 calendar days, 
continuous duration or the sine die adjournment of a session, the 20 
day period shall begin anew on the day following the reconvening of the 
Senate.

    (Agreed to January 30, 1975 (94th Cong., 1st Sess.), found at page 
S1917 of the Congressional Record and as modified on April 11, 1986 
(99th Cong., 2nd Sess.), found on pages S7318-19 of the Congressional 
Record).
C. Unanimous consent agreement of August 4, 1977 regarding legislation 
        affecting the budget process (the text of which is set forth 
        below):
    . . . [t]hat legislation affecting the congressional budget 
process, as described below, be referred jointly to the committees on 
the Budget and on Governmental Affairs. If one committee acts to report 
a jointly referred measure, the other must act within 30 calendar days 
of the continuous possession, or be automatically discharged.

    Legislative proposals affecting the congressional budget process to 
which this order applies are:

    First. The functions, duties, and powers of the Budget Committee-as 
described in title I of the act;

    Second. The functions, duties, and powers of the Congressional 
Budget Office--as described in titles III and IV of the act;

    Third. The process by which Congress annually establishes the 
appropriate levels of budget authority, outlays, revenues, deficits or 
surpluses, and public debt--including subdivisions thereof. That 
process includes the establishment: mandatory ceilings on spending and 
appropriations; a floor on revenues; timetables for congressional 
action on concurrent resolutions, on the reporting on authorization 
bills, and on the enactment of appropriations bills; and enforcement 
mechanisms for the limits and timetables, all as described in titles 
III and IV of the act;

    Fourth. The limiting of backdoor spending devices--as described in 
title IV of the act;

    Fifth. The timetables for Presidential submission of appropriations 
and authorization request--as described in title IV of the act;

    Sixth. The definitions of what constitutes impoundment--such as 
``rescissions'' and ``deferrals'' as provided in the Impoundment 
Control Act, title X;

    Seventh. The process and determination by which impoundments must 
be reported to and considered by Congress--as provided in the 
Impoundment Control Act, title X;

    Eighth. The mechanisms to insure Executive compliance with the 
provisions of the Impoundment Control Act, title X--such as GAO review 
and lawsuits; and

    Ninth. The provisions which affect the content or determination of 
amounts included in or excluded from the congressional budget or the 
calculation of such amounts, including the definition of terms provided 
by the Budget Act--as set forth in title I thereof.

    (Agreed to August 4, 1997 (95th Cong., 1st Sess.), found at pages 
S26709-10 of the Congressional Record.

                               Appendix D

   MEMBER ROSTERS OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET, BY CONGRESS

                           93rd Congress 1974

                       Chairman Edmund S. Muskie

        Majority                      Minority
Mangnuson, Warren G.
Moss, Frank E.
Mondale, Walter F.
Hollings, Ernest F.
Cranston, Alan
Chiles, Lawton M. Jr.
Abourezk, James G.
Biden, Joseph R. Jr.
(RM) Dominick, Peter H.
Young, Milton R.
Hruska, Roman L.
Javits, Jacob K.
Fannin, Paul J.
Dole, Robert J.
  
  

Departures from the Senate:                      Majority                         Minority

Defeated for Reelection                          None                             Dominick, Peter H.

Departures from Committee:
No new assignment                                None                             Fannin, Paul J.
                                                                                  Hruska, Roman L.
                                                                                  Javits, Jacob K.
                                                                                  Young, Milton R.


    *Created as a standing committee 7/12/74. No budget legislation was 
produced during the few remaining months of this Congress. The 
committee concentrated on laying the groundwork for the activities of 
future budget committees.

                        94th Congress 1975-1976

                       Chairman Edmund S. Muskie

        Majority                      Minority
Mangnuson, Warren G.
Moss, Frank E.
Mondale, Walter F.
Hollings, Ernest F.
Cranston, Alan
Chiles, Lawton M. Jr.
Abourezk, James G.
Biden, Joseph R. Jr.
Nunn, Samuel A.
(RM) Bellmon, Henry
Dole, Robert J.
Beall, J. Glenn Jr.
Buckley, James L.
McClure, James A.
Domenici, Pete V.
  
  
  

Changes:

Majority:
    Mondale, Walter F.                                        12/30/76 Resigned; elected Vice President



Departures from the Senate:                      Majority                         Minority

Defeated for Reelection                          Moss, Frank E.                   Beall, J. Glenn Jr.
                                                                                  Buckley, James L.


    *RM denotes Ranking Member.
    **The first budget ever was completed during this Congress.

                        95th Congress 1977-1978

                       Chairman Edmund S. Muskie

        Majority                      Minority
Mangnuson, Warren G.
Moss, Frank E.
Hollings, Ernest F.
Cranston, Alan
Chiles, Lawton M. Jr.
Abourezk, James G.
Biden, Joseph R. Jr.
Nunn, Samuel A.
(RM) Bellmon, Henry
Dole, Robert J.
McClure, James A.
Domenici, Pete V.
Chafee, John H.
Lugar, Richard G.
  
  

Additions:
Majority:

    Anderson, Wendell R.                                      1/11/77 (temporary assignment)
    Moynihan, Daniel Patrick                                  1/11/77 (temporary assignment)

Changes:
Majority:

    Nunn, Samuel A.                                           2/11/77 Left committee, no new assignment
    Johnston, J. Bennett, Jr.                                 2/11/77 Replaced Nunn
    Moynihan, Daniel P.                                       2/11/77 Moved to EPW
    Sasser, James R.                                          2/11/77 Replaced Moynihan
    Anderson, Wendell R.                                      12/29/78 Resigned, lost special election

Minority:

    Chafee, John H.                                           2/22/77 Moved to EPW
    Lugar, Richard G.                                         2/22/77 Moved to Banking, Housing and Urban
                                                               Affairs
    Hayakawa, S.I. (Sam)                                      2/22/77 Replaced Chafee
    Heinz, H. John III                                        2/22/77 Replaced Lugar



Departures from the Senate:                      Majority                         Minority

Retired                                          Abourezk, James G.               None

Departures from Committee:

Moved to Judiciary                               None                             Dole, Robert J.
Moved to Appropriations                          None                             McClure, James A.
Moved to Foreign Relations                       None                             Hayakawa, S.I. (Sam)
Moved to Finance                                 None                             Heinz, H. John III
No new assignment                                Cranston, Alan                   None


                        96th Congress 1979-1980

                       Chairman Edmund S. Muskie

        Majority                      Minority
Mangnuson, Warren G.
Hollings, Ernest F.
Chiles, Lawton M. Jr.
Biden, Joseph R. Jr.
Johnston, J. Bennett Jr.
Sasser, James R.
Hart, Gary W.
Metzenbaum, Howard M.
Riegle, Donald W. Jr.
Moynihan, Daniel Patrick
Exon, J. James
(RM) Bellmon, Henry
Domenici, Pete V.
Packwood, Robert W.
Armstrong, William L.
Kassebaum, Nancy Landon
Boschwitz, Rudolf E.
Hatch, Orrin G.
Pressler, Larry L.
  
  
  

Changes:

Chair:
    Muskie, Edmund S.                                         5/7/80 Resigned, appointed Secretary of State
    Hollings, Ernest F.                                       5/13/80 Succeeded Muskie as Chair

Majority:

    Muskie, Edmund S.                                         5/7/80 Resigned, appointed Secretary of State
    Mitchell, George J.                                       5/19/80 Replaced Muskie



Departures from the Senate:                      Majority                         Minority

Defeated for Reelection                          Mangnuson, Warren G.             None
Retired                                          None                             Bellmon, Harry

Departures from Committee:

Moved to Finance                                 Mitchell, George J.              None
Moved to Foreign Relations                       None                             Pressler, Larry L.
No new assignment                                None                             Packwood, Robert W.


                        97th Congress 1981-1982

                       Chairman Pete V. Domenici

        Majority                      Minority

Armstrong, William L.
Kassebaum, Nancy Landon
Boschwitz, Rudolf E.
Hatch, Orrin G.
Tower, John G.
Andrews, Mark
Symms, Steven D.
Grassley, Charles E.
Kasten, Robert W. Jr.
Quayle, J. Danforth
Gorton, Slade
(RM) Hollings, Ernest F.
Chiles, Lawton J. Jr.
Biden, Joseph R. Jr.
Johnston, J. Bennett Jr.
Sasser, James R.
Hart, Gary W.
Metzenbaum, Howard M.
Riegle, Donald W. Jr.
Moynihan, Daniel Patrick
Exon, J. James
  

                        98th Congress 1983-1984

                       Chairman Pete V. Domenici

        Majority                      Minority

Armstrong, William L.
Kassebaum, Nancy Landon
Boschwitz, Rudolf E.
Hatch, Orrin G.
Tower, John G.
Andrews, Mark
Symms, Steven D.
Grassley, Charles E.
Kasten, Robert W. Jr.
Quayle, J. Danforth
Gorton, Slade
(RM) Chiles, Lawton M. Jr.
Hollings, Ernest F.
Biden, Joseph R. Jr.
Johnston, J. Bennett Jr.
Sasser, James R.
Hart, Gary W.
Metzenbaum, Howard M.
Riegle, Donald W. Jr.
Moynihan, Daniel Patrick
Exon, J. James
  

Departures from the Senate:                      Majority                         Minority

Retired                                          Tower, John G.                   None

Departures from Committee:
No new assignment                                None                             Biden, Joseph R. Jr.


                        99th Congress 1985-1986

                       Chairman Pete V. Domenici

        Majority                      Minority
Armstrong, William L.
Kassebaum, Nancy Landon
Boschwitz, Rudolf E.
Hatch, Orrin G.
Andrews, Mark
Symms, Steven D.
Grassley, Chalres E.
Kasten, Robert W. Jr.
Quayle, J. Danforth
Gorton, Slade
Danforth, John C.
(RM) Chiles, Lawton M. Jr.
Hollings, Ernest F.
Johnston, J. Bennett Jr.
Sasser, James R.
Hart, Gary W.
Metzenbaum, Howard M.
Riegle, Donald W. Jr.
Moynihan, Daniel Patrick
Exon, J. James
Lautenberg, Frank R.


Departures from the Senate:                      Majority                         Minority

Defeated for Reelection                          Andrews, Mark                    None
                                                 Gorton, Slade
Retired                                          None                             Hart, Gary W.

Departures from Committee:

Moved to Foreign Relations; Rules and            None                             Moynihan, Daniel Patrick
 Administration
No new assignment                                Hatch, Orrin G.                  Metzenbaum, Howard M.


                        100th Congress 1987-1988

                     Chairman Lawton M. Chiles, Jr.

        Majority                      Minority
Hollings, Ernest F.
Johnston, J. Bennett Jr.
Sasser, James R.
Riegle, Donald W. Jr.
Exon, J. James
Lautenberg, Frank R.
Simon, Paul M.
Sanford, Terry
Wirth, Timothy E.
Fowler, Wyche Jr.
Conrad, Kent
Dodd, Christopher J.
(RM) Domenici, Pete V.
Armstrong, William L.
Kassebaum, Nancy Landon
Boschwitz, Rudolf E.
Symms, Steven D.
Grassley, Charles E.
Kasten, Robert W. Jr.
Quayle, J. Danforth
Danforth, John C.
Nickles, Don
Rudman, Warren B.


Changes:

Minority:
    Quayle, J. Danforth                                       1/2/89 Resigned, elected Vice President



Departures from the Senate:                      Majority                         Minority

Retired                                          Chiles, Lawton M., Jr.           None

Departures from Committee:

Moved to Select Intelligence                     None                             Danforth, John C.
Moved to Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs;       None                             Kassebaum, Nancy Landon
 Labor & Human Resources


                        101st Congress 1989-1990

                        Chairman James R. Sasser

        Majority                      Minority
Hollings, Ernest F.
Johnston, J. Bennett Jr.
Riegle, Donald W. Jr.
Exon, J. James
Lautenberg, Frank R.
Simon, Paul M.
Sanford, Terry
Wirth, Timothy E.
Fowler, Wyche Jr.
Conrad, Kent
Dodd, Christopher J.
Robb, Charles S.

(RM) Domenici, Pete V.
Armstrong, William L.
Boschwitz, Rudolf E.
Symms, Steven D.
Grassley, Charles E.
Kasten, Robert W. Jr.
Nickles, Don
Rudman, Warren
Gramm, W. Phil
Bond, Christopher S.
  
  

Departures from the Senate:                      Majority                         Minority

Defeated for Reelection                          None                             Boschwitz, Rudolf E.
Retired                                          None                             Armstrong, William L.

Departures from Committee:

Moved to Select Intelligence                     None                             Rudman, Warren
No new assignment                                Robb, Charles S.                 None


                        102nd Congress 1991-1992

                        Chairman James R. Sasser

        Majority                      Minority
Hollings, Ernest F.
Johnston, J. Bennett Jr.
Riegle, Donald W. Jr.
Exon, J. James
Lautenberg, Frank R.
Simon, Paul M.
Sanford, Terry
Wirth, Timothy E.
Fowler, Wyche Jr.
Conrad, Kent
Dodd, Christopher J.
(RM) Domenici, Pete V.
Symms, Steven, D.
Grassley, Charles E.
Kasten, Robert W. Jr.
Nickles, Don
Gramm, W. Phil
Bond, Christopher S.
Lott, Trent
Brown, Hank
  
  

Departures from the Senate:                      Majority                         Minority

Retired                                          Wirth, Timothy E.                Symms, Steven D.
Defeated for Reelection                          Sanford, Terry                   Kasten, Robert W.
                                                 Fowler, Wyche Jr.                  Jr.


                        103rd Congress 1993-1994

                        Chairman James R. Sasser

        Majority                      Minority
Hollings, Ernest F.
Johnston, J. Bennett Jr.
Riegle, Donald W. Jr.
Exon, J. James
Lautenberg, Frank R.
Simon, Paul S.
Conrad, Kent
Dodd, Christopher J.
Sarbanes, Paul S.
Boxer, Barbara
Murray, Patty

(RM) Domenici, Pete V.
Grassley, Charles E.
Nickles, Don
Gramm, W. Phil
Bond, Christopher S.
Lott, Trent
Brown, Hank
Gorton, Slade
Gregg, Judd
  
  

Departures from the Senate:                      Majority                         Minority

Retired                                          Riegle, Donald W. Jr.            None
Defeated for Reelection                          Sasser, James R.                 ..............................


                        104th Congress 1995-1996

                       Chairman Pete V. Domenici

Majority

Grassley, Charles E.
Nickles, Don
Gramm, W. Phil
Bond, Christopher S.
Lott, Trent
Brown, Hank
Gorton, Slade
Gregg, Judd
Snowe, Olympia J.
Abraham, Spencer
Frist, Bill
Minority

(RM) Exon, J. James
Hollings, Ernest F.
Johnston, J. Bennett Jr.
Lautenberg, Frank R.
Simon, Paul M.
Conrad, Kent
Dodd, Christopher J.
Sarbanes, Paul S.
Boxer, Barbara
Murray, Patty
  

Additions:
Majority:
    Grams, Rod                                                3/29/96

Minority:
    Wyden, Ron                                                3/29/96

Changes:
Majority:
    Lott, Trent                                               6/20/96 Left committee, became Senate Majority
                                                               Leader
    Mack, Connie                                              6/20/96 Replaced Lott



Departures from the Senate:                      Majority                         Minority
Retired                                          Brown, Hank                      Exon, J. James
                                                                                  Johnston, J. Bennett Jr.
                                                                                  Simon, Paul

Departures from Committee:
                                                 Mack, Connie                     Dodd, Christopher J.


                        105th Congress 1997-1998

                     Pete V. Domenici, NM, Chairman

Majority

Charles E. Grassley, IA
Don Nickles, OK
Phil Gramm, TX
Christopher S. Bond, MO
Slade Gorton, WA
Judd Gregg, NH
Olympia J. Snowe, ME
Spencer Abraham, MI
Bill Frist, TN
Rod Grams, MN
Gordon Smith, OR
Minority

Frank R. Lautenberg, NJ
Ernest F. Hollings, SC
Kent Conrad, ND
Paul S. Sarbanes, MD
Barbara Boxer, CA
Patty Murray, WA
Ron Wyden, OR
Russell D. Feingold, WI
Tim Johnson, SD
Richard J. Durbin, IL
  
                               Appendix E

                            BUDGET TIMETABLE

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   Date                                Action
------------------------------------------------------------------------
5 days before President's budget            CBO sequester preview
 submission.                                 report.

1st Monday in February....................  President's budget
                                             submission (includes OMB
                                             sequester preview report
                                             and adjustments to spending
                                             caps).

February 15...............................  CBO budget and economic
                                             outlook report.

Within 6 weeks of President's budget......  Committees submit views and
                                             estimates to the Budget
                                             Committees.

April 1...................................  Senate Budget Committee
                                             reports budget resolution.

April 15..................................  Congress completes budget
                                             resolution. If not,
                                             Chairman of House Budget
                                             Committee files 302(a)
                                             allocations; Ways and Means
                                             is free to proceed with pay-
                                             as-you-go measures.

May 15....................................  Appropriation bills may be
                                             considered in the House.

June 10...................................  House Appropriations reports
                                             last bill.

End of previous session to June 30........  If an appropriations bill
                                             violates caps, OMB
                                             sequesters 15 days after
                                             enactment.

June 30...................................  House completes action on
                                             annual appropriation bills.

July 15...................................  President submits mid-
                                             session review.

August 10.................................  President's notification on
                                             military personnel
                                             exemption.

August 15.................................  CBO sequester update report.

August 20.................................  OMB sequester update report
                                             (with adjustments to caps).

October 1.................................  Fiscal year begins.

10 days after end of session..............  CBO final sequester report.

15 days after end of session..............  OMB final sequester report.

15 days after end of session..............  GAO compliance report.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                            [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3104.001
                                            
                                            [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3104.002
                                            
                               Appendix G

                 COMPLETION DATES OF BUDGET RESOLUTIONS

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Fiscal Year                   Budget resolution adopted
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1976......................................  May 14, 1975 (H. Con. Res.
                                             218)

1977......................................  May 13, 1976 (S. Con. Res.
                                             109)

1978......................................  May 17, 1977 (S. Con. Res.
                                             19)

1979......................................  May 17, 1978 (S. Con. Res.
                                             80)

1980......................................  May 24, 1979 (H. Con. Res.
                                             107)

1981......................................  June 12, 1980 (H. Con. Res.
                                             307)
1982......................................  May 21, 1981 (H. Con. Res.
                                             115)
1983......................................  June 23, 1982 (S. Con. Res.
                                             92)
1984......................................  June 23, 1983 (H. Con. Res.
                                             91)
1985......................................  October 1, 1984 (H. Con.
                                             Res. 280)
1986......................................  August 1, 1985 (S. Con. Res.
                                             32)
1987 \1\..................................  May 15, 1986 (H. Con. Res.
                                             337)
1988......................................  June 25, 1987 (H. Con. Res.
                                             93)
1989......................................  June 6, 1988 (H. Con. Res.
                                             268)
1990......................................  May 18, 1989 (H. Con. Res.
                                             106)
1991......................................  October 9, 1990 (H. Con.
                                             Res. 310)
1992......................................  May 22, 1991 (H. Con. Res.
                                             121)
1993......................................  May 21, 1992 (H. Con. Res.
                                             287)
1994......................................  April 1, 1993 (H. Con. Res.
                                             64)
1995......................................  May 12, 1994 (H. Con. Res.
                                             218)
1996......................................  June 29, 1995 (H. Con. Res.
                                             67)
1997......................................  June 13, 1996 (H. Con. Res.
                                             178)
1998......................................  June 4, 1997 (H. Con. Res.
                                             84)
1999......................................  April 2, 1998 (Senate passes
                                             S. Con. Res. 86) \2\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ From fiscal year 1976 through fiscal year 1986 May 15 was the
  deadline for adoption of a budget resolution. The enactment of Gramm-
  Rudman-Hollings in fiscal year 1987 changed the deadline date to April
  15.
\2\ Conference never completed with the House of Representatives on the
  FY 1999 Budget Resolution. April 2, 1998: Senate passes S. Res. 209
  deeming section 302(a) allocation for Senate Committee on
  Appropriations. October 21, 1998: Senate passes S. Res. 312, amending
  S. Res. 209 to deem budgetary levels for Senate enforcement of points
  of order pursuant to the Congressional Budget Act during FY 1999.
Bold indicates that Congress met the statutory deadline for completion
  of the budget resolution.

                               Appendix H

                BUDGET ACT POINTS OF ORDER IN THE SENATE

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Section                                 Description                       Waiver requirement
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
301(g)...............................  More than one set of economics in a budget  Majority
                                        resolution
301(i)...............................  Prohibits consideration of budget           60
                                        resolutions that reduce the Social
                                        Security surplus.
302(c)...............................  Prohibits consideration of Appropriations   60
                                        legislation until committee has filed
                                        Sec.  302(b) suballocation report.
302(f)...............................  Prohibits consideration of legislation      60
                                        providing budget authority, outlays, or
                                        Social Security outlays in excess of
                                        committee's Sec.  302(a) or 302(b)
                                        allocation.
303(a)...............................  Prohibits consideration of any new          Majority
                                        spending, revenue or debt legislation for
                                        a fiscal year (except for appropriations)
                                        prior to adoption of budget resolution
                                        for that fiscal year.
303(c)...............................  Prohibits consideration of any              Majority
                                        appropriations legislation prior to
                                        adoption of a budget resolution and
                                        section 302(a) allocation for the
                                        Appropriations Committee. Exception:
                                        advance appropriation for the 1st or 2nd
                                        fiscal year after a year for which a
                                        section 302(a) allocation has been made.
305(b)(2)............................  Prohibits nongermane amendments to budget   60
                                        resolutions and reconciliation bills.
305(c)(4)............................  Prohibits consideration of nongermane       60
                                        amendments between the Houses to a budget
                                        resolution and, by reference in 310(e),
                                        to reconciliation legislation.
305(d)...............................  Prohibits consideration of budget           Majority
                                        resolutions that are not mathematically
                                        consistent.
306..................................  Prohibits consideration of legislation in   60
                                        Budget Committee's jurisdiction if not
                                        reported from the committee.
310(d)(2)............................  Prohibits consideration of amendments to    60
                                        reconciliation bills that are not deficit
                                        neutral.
310(g)...............................  Prohibits consideration of any amendment    60
                                        to reconciliation legislation that
                                        recommends changes in Social Security.
311(a)...............................  Prohibits legislation that would violate    60
                                        budget authority ceiling, outlay ceiling,
                                        revenue floor, or Social Security surplus/
                                        deficit levels.
312(b)...............................  Prohibits consideration of legislation      60
                                        which exceeds the discretionary spending
                                        limits set out in section 251(c) of the
                                        Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
                                        Control Act.
312(c)...............................  Prohibits consideration of a budget         60
                                        resolution which exceeds the maximum
                                        deficit amount (if any) set out in the
                                        Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
                                        Control Act.
313..................................  Byrd rule (extraneous matter in             60
                                        reconciliation)
401(a)...............................  Prohibits consideration of legislation      Majority
                                        providing new contract authority, new
                                        indebtedness, or new credit authority not
                                        limited to appropriations.
401(b)(1)............................  Prohibits consideration of legislation      Majority
                                        providing new entitlement authority that
                                        becomes effective during the current
                                        fiscal year.
425(a)(1)............................  Prohibits consideration of reported         Majority
                                        legislation unless it includes a CBO
                                        mandate cost estimate.
425(a)(2)............................  Prohibits consideration of legislation      Majority
                                        imposing an unfunded intergovernmental
                                        mandate.
202*.................................  ``Pay-as-you-go'': prohibits consideration  60
                                        of legislation that would increase
                                        deficit for first year, years 1-5, or
                                        years 6-10.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* This point of order was established by Sec.  202 of the Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year
  1996 (H. Con. Res. 67)

                               Appendix I

           COMPLETION DATES OF THE RECONCILIATION LEGISLATION

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Reconciliation bills                Dates passed by Congress                      Enactment
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of  December 3, 1980                      December 5, 1980.
 1980.
H.R. 7765; Pub. L. No. 96-499.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of  July 31, 1981                         August 13, 1981.
 1981.
H.R. 3982; Pub. L. No. 97-35.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of  August 18, 1982                       September 8, 1982.
 1982.
H.R. 6955; Pub. L. No. 97-253.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of  April 5, 1984                         April 18, 1984.
 1983.
H.R. 4169; Pub. L. No. 98-270.
Consolidated Omnibus Budget           March 20, 1986                        April 7, 1986.
 Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA).
H.R. 3128; Pub. L. No. 99-272.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of  October 17, 1986                      October 21, 1986.
 1986.
H.R. 5300; Pub. L. No. 99-509.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of  December 22, 1987                     December 22, 1987.
 1987.
H.R. 3545; Pub. L. No. 100-203.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of  November 22, 1989                     December 19, 1989.
 1989.
H.R. 3299; Pub. L. No. 101-239.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of  October 27, 1990                      November 5, 1990.
 1990.
H.R. 5835; Pub. L. No. 101-508.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of  August 6, 1993                        August 19, 1993.
 1993.
H.R. 2264; Pub. L. No. 103-66.
Balanced Budget Act of 1995.........  November 20, 1995                     Vetoed, December 6, 1995.
H.R. 2491.
The Personal Responsibility and Work  August 1, 1996                        August 22, 1996.
 Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
 1996.
H.R. 3734; Pub. L. No. 104-193.
Balanced Budget Act of 1997.........  July 31, 1997                         August 5, 1997
H.R. 2015; P.L. No. 105-33
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.........  July 31, 1997                         August 5, 1997
H.R. 2014; P.L. No. 105-34
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* In 1985 the deadline for enactment of reconciliation bills was changed from September 25 to June 15.
** Section 13210(2) of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 amended section 310(f) to repeal the June 15 deadline
  for the completion of reconciliation. However, the timetable in Sec.  300 of the Budget Act calls for
  completion of reconciliation legislation by June 15.

                               Appendix J

                                GLOSSARY

Appropriations Act: A statute, under the jurisdiction of the House and 
Senate Appropriations Committees, that generally provides authority for 
Federal agencies to incur obligations and to make payments out of the 
Treasury for specified purposes. An appropriation act is the most 
common means of providing budget authority. Currently, there are 13 
regular appropriations acts for each fiscal year. From time to time, 
Congress also enacts supplemental appropriations acts. (See 
Appropriations under Budget Authority; Continuing Resolution; 
Supplemental Appropriation.)

Authorizing Committee: A committee of the House or Senate with 
legislative jurisdiction over laws that set up or continue the 
operations of Federal programs and provide the legal basis for making 
appropriations for those programs. Authorizing committees also have 
direct control over spending for mandatory programs since the 
Government's obligation to make payments for such program is contained 
in the authorizing legislation (See Entitlement.)

Authorizing Legislation: Legislation enacted by Congress that sets up 
or continues the operation of a Federal program or agency indefinitely 
or for a specific period of time. Authorizing legislation may limit the 
amount of budget authority which can be appropriated for a program or 
may authorize the appropriation of ``such sums as are necessary.'' (See 
Budget Authority; Entitlement.)

Backdoor Spending: (See Direct Spending or Mandatory Spending.)

Budget Authority: The authority Congress gives to Government agencies, 
permitting them to enter into obligations which will result in 
immediate or future outlays.

    Budget authority may be classified in several ways. It may be 
classified by the form it takes: appropriations, borrowing authority, 
or contract authority. Budget authority may also be classified by the 
determination of amount: definite authority or indefinite authority. 
Finally budget authority may be classified by the period of 
availability: 1-year authority, multi-year authority, or no-year 
authority (available until used).

                       Forms of Budget Authority

    Appropriations.--An act of Congress that permits Federal agencies 
to incur obligations and to make payments out of the Treasury for 
specified purposes. An appropriations act is the most common means of 
providing budget authority.

    Borrowing Authority.--Statutory authority that permits a Federal 
agency to incur obligations and to make payments for specified purposes 
out of money borrowed from the Treasury, the Federal Financing Bank, or 
the public. The Budget Act in most cases requires that new authority to 
borrow must be approved in advance in an appropriation act.

    Contract Authority.--Statutory authority that permits a Federal 
agency to enter into contracts in advance of appropriations. Under the 
Budget Act, most new authority to contract must be approved in advance 
in an appropriation act.

    Offsetting collections and receipts.--Income from the public which 
is displayed in the budget as negative budget authority. (See 
Offsetting Collections and Offsetting Receipts.

Budget Baseline: Projected Federal spending, revenue and deficit levels 
based on the assumption that current policies will continue unchanged 
for the upcoming fiscal year.

    In determining the budget baseline under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, the 
Directors of OMB and CBO estimate revenue levels and spending levels 
for entitlement programs based on continuation of current laws. For 
estimating discretionary spending amounts (both defense and non-
defense), the Directors assume an adjustment for inflation (GNP 
deflator) added to the previous year's discretionary spending levels. 
The baseline also includes sufficient appropriations to cover a Federal 
pay comparability raise (without absorption).

Budget Deficit: The amount by which the Government's total outlays 
exceed its total revenues for a given fiscal year. (See Outlays; 
Revenues.)

Budget Resolution: A concurrent resolution passed by both Houses of 
Congress setting forth, reaffirming, or revising the congressional 
budget for the U.S. Government for a fiscal year. A budget resolution 
is a concurrent resolution of Congress. Concurrent resolutions do not 
require a presidential signature because they are not laws. Budget 
resolutions do not need to be laws because they are a legislative 
device for the Congress to regulate itself as it works on spending and 
revenue bills.

Budget Surplus: The amount by which the Government's revenues exceed 
its outlays for a given fiscal year. (See Outlays; Revenues.)

Capital Budget: A budget that segregates capital spending from all 
other spending, what is usually considered the ``operating budget.'' In 
a capital budget, spending and receipts in the capital budget are 
excluded from the operating budget and are not included in the 
operating budget's deficit or surplus calculations. A capital budget 
would include spending only for capital assets. Capital assets are 
usually defined to be limited to land, structures, equipment, and 
intellectual property that are owned and used by the Federal government 
and have a useful life of more than 2 years. However, some proponents 
of capital budgeting have suggested that capital should be defined to 
include Federal ``investment'' spending that yields long-term benefits. 
President Clinton established a Commission to Study Capital Budgeting 
by issuing Executive Order 13037 on March 3, 1997. The Commission is 
required to issue its report by December 17, 1998.

Congressional Budget: (See Budget Resolution.)

Continuing Resolution: Appropriations legislation enacted by Congress 
to provide temporary budget authority for Federal agencies to keep them 
in operation when their regular appropriation bill has not been enacted 
by the start of the fiscal year. A continuing resolution is a joint 
resolution, which has the same legal status as a bill.

    A continuing resolution frequently specifies a maximum rate at 
which obligations may be incurred, based on the rate of the prior year, 
the President's budget request, or an appropriation bill passed by 
either or both chambers of Congress. However, there have been instances 
when Congress has used a continuing resolution as an omnibus measure to 
enact a number of appropriation bills.

    A continuing resolution is a form of appropriation act and should 
not be confused with the budget resolution.

Credit Authority: Authority to incur direct loan obligations or to 
incur primary loan guarantee commitments. Under the Budget Act, new 
credit authority must be approved in advance in an appropriation act.

Crosswalk: Also known as ``committee allocation'' or ``section 302 
allocation.'' The means by which budget resolution spending totals are 
translated into binding guidelines with respect to budget authority and 
outlays for committee action on spending bills. The Budget Committees 
allocate the budget resolution totals among the committees by 
jurisdiction, Crosswalk allocations of budget authority and outlays to 
the committee appear in the joint explanatory statement accompanying a 
conference report on the budget resolution.

Current Services Budget: A section of the President's budget, required 
by the Budget Act, that sets forth the level of spending or taxes that 
would occur if existing programs and policies were continued unchanged 
through the fiscal year and beyond, with all programs adjusted for 
inflation so that existing levels of activity are maintained. (See 
Baseline.)

Deferral of Budget Authority: An action by the executive branch that 
delays the obligation of budget authority beyond the point it would 
normally occur. Pursuant to the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act of 1974, the President must provide advanced notice to the 
Congress of any proposed deferrals. A deferral may not extend beyond 
the end of the fiscal year in which the President's message proposing 
the deferral is made. Congress may overturn a deferral by passing a law 
disapproving the deferral.

Deficit: The amount by which the government's total budget outlays 
exceeds its total receipts for a fiscal year.

Direct Spending: A term defined in the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 
to include entitlement authority, the food stamp program, and budget 
authority provided in law other than appropriations acts. From the 
perspective of the appropriations process, all direct spending is 
classified as mandatory as opposed to discretionary spending. New 
direct spending is subject to pay-as-you-go requirements. Direct 
spending is synonymous with mandatory spending. (See Mandatory Spending 
and Entitlement.)

Discretionary Spending: A category of spending (budget authority and 
outlays) subject to the annual appropriations process. (See 
Appropriations Acts.)

Entitlement: Programs that are governed by legislation in a way that 
legally obligates the Federal government to make specific payments to 
qualified recipients. Payments to persons under the Social Security, 
Medicare, and veterans' pensions programs are considered to be 
entitlements. (See Direct Spending and Mandatory Spending.)

Emergency Spending: As provided in the Budget Enforcement Act, a 
provision of legislation designated as an emergency by both the 
President and the Congress. As a result, this additional spending is 
not subject to the discretionary caps or the pay go requirements and 
thus will not cause a sequester. In addition, emergency legislation is 
effectively exempt from Budget Act points of order.

    There is no specific criteria in the law for emergency spending. 
However, the following criteria were contained in a June 1991 report 
prepared by the Office of Management and Budget--as required by Pub. L. 
No. 102-55 for the determination of whether to designate spending as an 
emergency spending:

          Necessary expenditure.--an essential or vital expenditure, 
        not one that is merely useful or beneficial;

          Sudden.--quickly coming into being, not building up over 
        time;

          Urgent.--pressing and compelling need requiring immediate 
        action;

          Unforseen.--not predictable or seen beforehand as a coming 
        need (an emergency that is part of an aggregate level of 
        anticipated emergencies, particularly when normally estimated 
        in advance, would not be ``unforseen''); and

          Not permanent.--the need is temporary in nature.

Expenditures: (See Outlays.)

Federal Debt: Consists of all Treasury and agency debt issues 
outstanding. Current law places a limit or ceiling on the amount of 
debt. Debt subject to limit has two components: debt held by the 
government and debt held by the public.

          Debt held by the government.--Represents the holdings of debt 
        by federal trust funds and other special government funds. For 
        example, when a trust fund is in surplus as is presently the 
        case with Social Security, the law requires that this surplus 
        be invested in government securities.

          Debt held by the public.--Represents the holdings of debt by 
        individuals, institutions, other buyers outside the federal 
        government, and the Federal Reserve System. The change in debt 
        held by the public in any given year closely tracks the unified 
        budget deficit for that year.

Fiscal Policy: Federal government policies with respect to taxes, 
spending, and debt management intended to promote the nations' 
macroeconomic goals, particularly with respect to employment, gross 
national product, price level stability, and equilibrium in balance of 
payments. The budget process is a major vehicle for determining and 
implementing Federal fiscal policy. The other major component of 
Federal macroeconomic policy is monetary policy. (See Monetary Policy.)

Fiscal Year: A fiscal year is a 12-month accounting period. The fiscal 
for the Federal Government begins October 1 and ends September 30. The 
fiscal year is designated by the calendar year in which it ends; for 
example fiscal year 1997 is the year beginning October 1, 1996, and 
ending September 30, 1997.

Functional Classification: A system of classifying budget resources by 
major purpose so that budget authority, outlays, and credit activities 
can be related in terms of the national needs being addressed (for 
example, national defense, health) regardless of the agency 
administrating the program. There are currently 20 functions. A 
function may be divided into two or more subfunctions depending upon 
the complexity of the national need addressed by that function. (See 
Budget Authority; Outlays.) (See Appendix A.)

Impoundment: A generic term referring to any action or inaction by an 
officer or employee of the U.S. Government that precludes the 
obligation or expenditure of budget authority in the manner intended by 
Congress. (See Deferral of budget Authority; Rescission of Budget 
Authority.)

Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT.): Section 8001 of the Internal 
Revenue Code authorized the creation of the Joint Committee on 
Taxation. By statute, it is composed of five members from the Committee 
on Finance (three majority, two minority) chosen by such Committee and 
five members from the Committee on Ways and Means (three majority, two 
minority) chosen by such Committee. In practice, the Chairmanship and 
Vice Chairmanship of the Joint Committee on Taxation has rotated 
between the Chairman of the Committee on Finance and the Chairman of 
the Committee on Ways and Means with each new Congress. Among other 
things, the JCT's duties are to investigate the operation and effects 
of the federal tax system.

Mandatory Spending: Refers to spending for programs the level of which 
is governed by formulas or criteria set forth in authorizing 
legislation rather than by appropriations. Examples of mandatory 
spending include: Social Security, Medicare, veterans' pensions, 
rehabilitation services, Members' pay, judges pay and the payment of 
interest of the public debt. Many of these programs are considered 
entitlement. (See Direct Spending.)

Mark-Up: Meetings where congressional committees work on language of 
bills or resolutions. At Budget Committee mark-ups, the House and 
Senate Budget Committees work on the language and numbers contained in 
budget resolutions and legislation affecting the congressional budget 
process.

Monetary Policy: Management of the money supply, under the direction of 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve system, with the aim of 
achieving price stability and full employment. Government actions in 
guiding monetary policy, include currency revaluation, credit 
contradiction or expansion, rediscount policy, regulationof bank 
reserves and the purchase and sale of Government securities. (See 
Fiscal Policy.)

Net Deficit Reduction: Savings below the defined budget baseline 
achieved for the upcoming fiscal year because of laws enacted or final 
regulations promulgated since January 1. CBO and OMB independently 
estimate these savings in their initial and final sequester reports.

Offsetting Collections: Income from the public that results from the 
government engaging in ``business-like'' activities with the public, 
such as the sale of products or the rendering of a service. Examples 
include proceeds funds derived from the sale of postage stamps. 
Offsetting collections are credited against the level of budget 
authority or outlays associated with a specific program or account. 
(See offsetting receipts.)

Offsetting Receipts: Income from the public that results from the 
government engaging in ``business-like'' activities with the public 
such as the sale of products or the rendering of services. Examples 
include proceeds from the sale of timber from Federal lands or entrance 
fees paid at national parks. Rather than being credited against the 
spending of a particular program or account, (as in the case with 
offsetting collections) offsetting receipts are deducted from total 
budget authority and outlays rather than added to Federal revenues even 
though they are deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. 
Generally offsetting receipts are associated with mandatory spending. 
(See offsetting collections.)

Off-budget Federal Entity: Any Federal fund or trust fund whose 
transactions are required by law to be excluded from the totals of 
President's budget submission and Congress' budget resolution, despite 
the fact that these are part of the government's total transactions. 
Current law requires that the Social Security trust funds (the Federal 
Old Age, Survivors, and Disability trust fund) and the Postal Service 
be off-budget. However, these entities are reflected in the budget in 
that they are included in calculating the deficit in order to derive 
the total government deficit that must be financed by borrowing from 
the public or by other means. All other federal funds and trust funds 
are on budget. (See Unified Budget.)

Outlays: Outlays are disbursements by the Federal Treasury in the form 
of checks or cash. Outlays flow in part from budget authority granted 
in prior years and in part from budget authority provided for the year 
in which the disbursements occur.

Outlay Rates: The ratio of outlays (actual government disbursements) in 
a fiscal year relative to new budgetary resources in that fiscal year. 
In estimating the budget baseline and baseline deficit for their 
sequestration reports, CBO and OMB use outlay rates for projecting 
levels of spending resulting from available budget authority.

Pay-as-you-go: Arises in two separate contexts: a point of order in the 
Senate and a sequester order from OMB.

    Pay-as-you-go in the Senate.--Since fiscal year 1994, the budget 
resolution has included a pay-as-you-go rule in the Senate. The rule 
provides a \3/5\ths vote point of order in the Senate against 
consideration of legislation that would cause a net increase in the 
deficit over a ten year period. It applies to all legislation except 
appropriations legislation. To determine a violation, CBO measures the 
budget impact of a direct spending or revenue bill combined with the 
budget impact of all direct spending and revenue legislation enacted 
since the latest budget resolution's adoption to see if the legislation 
would result in a net deficit increase for any one of three time 
periods (the first year, the sum of years 1 through 5, and the sum of 
years 6 through 10.) The pay-go rule sunsets at the end of fiscal year 
2002.

    Pay-as-you-go and sequestration under the BEA.--The Budget 
Enforcement Act requires OMB to also enforce a ``pay-as-you-go'' 
requirement which has a similar effect as the Senate's point of order: 
Congress is required to ``pay for'' any changes to programs which 
result in an increase in direct spending, or in this case risk a 
sequester. If OMB estimates that the sum of all direct spending and 
revenue legislation enacted since 1990 will result in a net increase in 
the deficit for the fiscal year, then the President is required to 
issue a sequester order reducing all non-exempt direct spending 
accounts by a uniform percentage in order to eliminate the net deficit 
increase. Most direct spending is either exempt from a sequester order 
or operates under special rules that minimize the reduction that can be 
made in direct spending. Social Security is exempt from a pay-as-you-go 
sequester and Medicare cannot be reduced by more than 4 percent.

President's Budget: The document sent to Congress by the President in 
January or February of each year, requesting new budget authority for 
Federal programs and estimating Federal revenues and outlays for the 
upcoming fiscal year.

Revenues: Collections from the public arising from the Government's 
sovereign power to tax. Revenues include individual and corporate 
income taxes, social insurance taxes (such as social security payroll 
taxes), excise taxes, estate and gift taxes, customs duties and the 
like.

Reconciliation Process: A process by which Congress includes in a 
budget resolution ``reconciliation instructions'' to specific 
committees, directing them to report legislation which changes existing 
laws, usually for the purpose of decreasing spending or increasing 
revenues by a specified amount by a certain date. The legislation may 
also contain an increase in the debt limit. The reported legislation is 
then considered as a single ``reconciliation bill under expedited 
procedures.''

Reserve Fund: A provision in a budget resolution that grants the 
Chairman of the Budget Committee the authority to make changes in 
budget aggregates and committee allocations once some condition or 
conditions have been met. Since a budget resolution establishes a 
binding ceiling on aggregate budget authority and outlay levels and a 
binding floor on revenues, budget resolutions frequently include 
reserve funds for deficit-neutral legislation that would otherwise 
violate the budget resolution and be subject to a point of order under 
the Budget Act. For example, the FY 1997 budget resolution included a 
tax reduction reserve fund that allowed the Chairman to reduce the 
revenue floor and the relevant spending allocations to accommodate 
legislation that reduced taxes if that legislation also contained 
offsetting spending reductions.

Rescission of Budget Authority: Cancellation of budget authority before 
the time when the authority would otherwise cease to be available for 
obligation. The rescission process begins when the President proposes a 
rescission to the Congress for fiscal or policy reasons. Unlike the 
deferral of budget authority which occurs unless Congress acts to 
disapprove the deferral, rescission off budget authority occurs only if 
Congress enacts the rescission. (See Deferral of Budget Authority; 
Impoundment.)

Scoring or Scorekeeping: The process for estimating budget authority, 
outlay, revenue and deficit levels which result from congressional 
budgetary actions. Scorekeeping data prepared by the Congressional 
Budget Office include status reports on the effect of congressional 
actions and comparisons of these actions to targets and ceilings set by 
Congress in budget resolutions. These reports are published in the 
Congressional Record on a regular basis. OMB is responsible for scoring 
legislation to determine if a sequester is necessary.

Sequester: Pursuant to Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, a presidential spending 
reduction order that occurs by reducing spending by uniform 
percentages.

Sequestrable Resource: Pursuant to Gramm-Rudman-Hollings federal 
funding authority (budgetary resources) subject to reductions under a 
presidential sequester order for achieving required outlay reductions 
(in non-exempt programs).

Supplemental Appropriation: An act appropriating funds in addition to 
those in the 13 regular annual appropriations acts. Supplemental 
appropriations provide additional budget authority beyond the original 
estimates for programs or activities (including new programs authorized 
after the date of the original appropriation act) in cases where the 
need for funds is too urgent to be postponed until enactment of the 
next regular appropriation bill. (See Appropriation Act.)

Tax Expenditures: Revenue losses attributable to a special exclusion, 
exemption, or deduction from gross income or to a special credit, 
preferential rate of tax, or deferral of tax liability.

Unfunded Mandates: A Federal Intergovernmental Mandate is any provision 
in legislation, statute, or regulation that would impose an enforceable 
duty upon State, local or tribal government, except as conditions of 
assistance or duties arising from participation in a voluntary federal 
program. Exceptions to this rule are: enforcing constitutional rights; 
statutory prohibitions against discrimination; emergency assistance 
requested by states; accounting/auditing for federal assistance; 
national security; Presidential designated emergencies; and Social 
Security. Provisions that increase stringency of conditions of 
assistance or decrease federal funding for large state entitlement 
programs (greater than $500 million) if states lack authority to 
decrease their responsibilities are considered mandates as well.

    A Federal Private Sector Mandate is any provision in legislation, 
statute, or regulation that would impose an enforceable duty upon the 
private sector. The exceptions are a condition of Federal assistance or 
a duty arising from participation in a voluntary Federal program.

Unified Budget: A comprehensive display of the Federal budget. This 
display includes all revenues and all spending for all regular Federal 
programs and trust funds. The 1967 President's Commission on Budget 
Concepts recommended the unified budget and it has been the basis for 
budgeting since 1968. The unified budget replaced a system of the 
budgets that existed before 1968 (an administrative budget, a 
consolidated cash budget, and a national income accounts budget).