[Senate Prints 105-67]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
105th Congress S. Prt.
2d Session COMMITTEE PRINT 105-67
_______________________________________________________________________
THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS
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A N E X P L A N A T I O N
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COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
UNITED STATES SENATE
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
REVISED DECEMBER 1998
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Budget
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
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COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico, Chairman
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
DON NICKLES, Oklahoma ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
PHIL GRAMM, Texas KENT CONRAD, North Dakota
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
SLADE GORTON, Washington BARBARA BOXER, California
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire PATTY MURRAY, Washington
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine RON WYDEN, Oregon
SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
BILL FRIST, Tennessee TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
GORDON SMITH, Oregon
G. William Hoagland, Staff Director
Bruce King, Staff Director for the Minority
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Foreword......................................................... v
I. Introduction................................................ 1
The Constitution's Statement on the Budget............... 1
Purposes of the Budget Process........................... 1
Basic Budgetary Concepts................................. 1
II. History of Budget Law....................................... 6
Congressional Budgeting prior to 1974.................... 6
The Congressional Budget Act: Need for the law in the
1970's................................................. 8
Changes to the Budget Act since 1974..................... 9
III. Development: Creating a Budget.............................. 10
Executive Actions........................................ 10
Congressional Action: Preparation of a Concurrent
Resolution............................................. 11
IV. Enforcement.................................................. 16
Budget Act Points of Order in the Senate................. 16
Discretionary Spending Caps.............................. 17
Mandatory Spending....................................... 19
Reconciliation in the Senate............................. 20
V. Other Aspects of the Budget Process.......................... 22
The Government Performance and Results Act............... 22
Title X: Impoundment Control and the Line Item Veto...... 22
The Unfunded Mandates Control Act........................ 25
Credit Reform............................................ 27
29A. Budget Functions..................................................
29B. Statement of Congressional Budget Office Policy...................
31C. Sources of Jurisdiction of the Senate Committee on the Budget.....
35D. Membership of the Senate Committee on the Budget..................
37E. Budget Timetable..................................................
43F. The Appropriations and Budget Process.............................
44G. Completion Dates of Budget Resolutions............................
47H. Budget Act Points of Order in the Senate..........................
49 I. Completion Dates of Reconciliation Legislation...................
51 J. Glossary of Budget Terms.........................................
53
(iii)
I. FOREWORD
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
1974, as amended, has played a central role in the formulation
and implementation of Federal fiscal policy in the last quarter
of this century. The purpose of that landmark legislation, to
help guide and formulate macro fiscal policy, remains as
important today, if not more so, than it was in 1974.
This committee revised print provides an explanation of the
budget process in the Senate, its history and evolution to
today. It was prepared by the Committee's legal staff under the
general direction of G. William Hoagland, Staff Director. Beth
Felder, Committee Counsel, headed the development of this
print, with the assistance of Austin Smythe, Carole McGuire,
Anne Miller, Cheri Reidy, Jim Hearn, Jim Capretta, Lisa
Cieplak, Maureen O'Neill and Alex Green.
While this revised print does not represent the views of
the Committee on the Budget or any of its members, it was
prepared to be an accurate and objective explanation of the
process.
Pete V. Domenici, Chairman
(v)
I. INTRODUCTION
The Constitution's Statement Regarding the Budget
Article I, section 9, clause 7 of The Constitution of the
United States provides:
[n]o money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a
regular Statement and account of Receipts and
Expenditures of all public Money shall be published
from time to time.
From the early years of our country there was a recognized need
to have a budget for our government. In addition, Article I,
section 5, clause 2, of the Constitution reserves to each House
of Congress the authority to determine the rules governing its
procedures. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control
Act of 1974 (the Budget Act), which contains several titles and
sections that affect the internal procedures of the House and
Senate, was enacted under this Constitutional rulemaking
authority. Congress enacted the Budget Act with the full
recognition that each House could change these rules at any
time and in a manner consistent with past practice. Rules
changes are usually accomplished upon adoption of either a
simple resolution (for a change that affects one House) or a
concurrent resolution (for changes that may affect both
Houses).
Purposes of the Budget Process
The Federal budget has two distinct but equally important
purposes. The first is to provide a financial measure of
federal expenditures, receipts, deficits, and debt levels and
their impact on the economy in order to promote economic
stability and growth. The second is to provide the means for
the Federal Government to efficiently collect and allocate
resources to meet national objectives.
The congressional budget process, as set forth in the
Budget Act, requires Congress to annually establish the level
of total spending and revenues and how total spending should be
divided among the 20 major functions of government such as
defense, agriculture, and health. A list of the budget
functions is set out in Appendix A. These functional levels are
the sum of discretionary and mandatory spending for each fiscal
year covered by a budget resolution. The Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings)
provides additional budget procedures.
Basic Budgetary Concepts
In order to understand the budget process, it is useful to
review some basic budgetary concepts.
Budget Authority and Outlays
Spending levels in congressional budget resolutions are
measured in dollars in two ways: budget authority and outlays.
Outlays represent actual disbursements by the Treasury. When
the Treasury issues a check in fiscal year 1998, that is a
fiscal year 1998 outlay. Budget authority, on the other hand,
is the legal authority for an agency to enter into obligations
of dollars in a certain amount that will result in outlays.
When Congress appropriates funds for a particular program, it
is enacting budget authority--not outlays.
To illustrate the relationship of budget authority to
outlays, assume that the Congress has decided to build an
aircraft carrier starting in fiscal year 1997 and that the
total cost is $4.0 billion. To do so, Congress would
appropriate $4.0 billion of new budget authority for the ship
in the defense appropriations bill for fiscal year 1997. Often
such an appropriation is made with the under-standing that all
the money will not actually be spent (result in outlays) in
that fiscal year. The creation of this $4.0 billion of budget
authority means that the Department of Defense has legal
authority to enter into obligations (generally, contracts)
totaling $4.0 billion during fiscal year 1997. Often,
contractors are paid upon completion of each stage of the
construction rather than the full amount in advance. The $4.0
billion of budget authority would result in outlays when the
contractors are actually issued checks by the Treasury, which
might occur over several years. In this example (displayed in
the table below) assume that $.50 billion is paid (results in
outlays) in the first year (fiscal year 1997) to cover the
costs of designing the carrier, $1.50 billion is paid (results
in outlays) in the second year (fiscal year 1998) to begin
construction, and the remaining $2.0 billion is paid (results
in outlays) in the final year (fiscal year 1999) to complete
construction.
PURCHASE OF AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER
[In billions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year--
----------------------------
1997 1998 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Budget Authority (BA)...................... 4.0 0.0 0.0
Outlays (OT)............................... 0.50 1.50 2.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
In other cases, where the actual spending/payment is more
immediate, new budget authority appropriated for a fiscal year
results in outlays during the same fiscal year. An example of
this type of appropriation would be for salaries of Federal
workers.
Federal Revenues
Federal revenues consist of the money taken in by the
Government through exercise of its sovereign taxing power. This
includes individual and corporate income taxes, social
insurance taxes (such as social security payroll taxes), excise
taxes, estate and gift taxes, customs duties, and the like.
Revenues are accounted for separately in the budget from budget
authority and outlays.
Offsetting Collections and Offsetting Receipts
Revenues, however, do not represent all the money collected
by the Government. They do not include income from the public
that results from the government engaging in ``business-like''
activities with the public, such as the sale of products or the
rendering of services or amounts collected by one Government
account from another (intergovernmental collections and
outlays). These collections are categorized as either
offsetting collections or offsetting receipts. Examples of such
activities include: proceeds from the sale of postage stamps
and proceeds from the sale of timber from Federal lands. The
difference between an offsetting collection and an offsetting
receipt has more to do with the way the Federal budget records
the transaction than the actual activity itself.
Some laws authorize amounts collected to be credited
directly to the account from which they will be expended.
Usually such amounts may be spent for the purpose of the
account without further action by Congress. These are known as
offsetting collections and represent amounts collected from
either the public or other expenditure accounts. For example,
the law authorizes the Postal Service to use proceeds from the
sale of postage stamps to finance its operations, without the
need for an annual appropriation. Thus assume that it costs the
Postal Service $100 million to operate in any fiscal year and
that $45 million is collected from the sale of stamps. This $45
million is represented in the budget not as $45 million of
revenue or receipts but rather as a negative $45 million of
budget authority. In this example, the receipts are deducted
from the gross budget authority level of $100 million leading
to a net budget authority level of $55 million. Generally,
offsetting collections are associated with discretionary
programs.
In comparison, offsetting receipts, such as the proceeds
from a timber sale or national parks entrance fees, are not
credited against the spending for the Forest Service or the
National Park Service. Rather, these funds are deducted from
total budget authority and outlays, not from the program or
project from which they are derived. For example, assume that
the National Park Service collects $10 million in entrance fees
at Yellowstone National Park. These funds, although deposited
in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts, are shown in the
budget as a reduction to the total level of spending for that
year. Generally, offsetting receipts are associated with
mandatory programs--that is, not subject to annual
appropriations decisions.
The Budget Deficit and the Federal Debt
Budget deficits, or budget surpluses, are basic concepts
critical to understanding the impact of fiscal policy on the
nation's economy. In general, the budget takes into account all
spending and revenue raising activities of the Federal
Government. If total spending in any fiscal year exceeds total
revenue, the excess spending is the deficit for that fiscal
year. For example, in fiscal year 1996 receipts were $1,452.8
billion and outlays were $1,560.1 billion, yielding a budget
deficit of $107.3 billion. Conversely, if revenue exceeds
spending, there is a budget surplus in that fiscal year. The FY
1998 budget produced a $70 billion surplus, the first surplus
since 1969 (prior to that, the last surplus was in 1960).
The amount of any budget deficit is important because it
largely determines the amount of funds the government must
borrow from the private economy to pay for excess spending
during a fiscal year. Any funds the government borrows from the
private economy are therefore not available for private
investment. This fact has significant implications for interest
rates, inflation, and the long-run performance of the economy.
To determine how much the Federal Government must borrow from
the private economy in any fiscal year, the calculated budget
deficit must be based on an assessment of total federal
spending and total revenues. This is known as the unified
budget concept. Any other definition of the budget will not
accurately reflect the Federal Government's borrowing
requirements.
The Federal debt is the accumulated debt of the Federal
Government. Whenever the Federal Government runs a budget
deficit, the additional borrowing to finance the deficit adds
to the Federal debt. By contrast, if the Federal Government
runs a budget surplus, the Federal debt decreases because the
Treasury uses the surplus to reduce the stock of outstanding
debt.
Federal law contains a statutory limit on the Federal debt,
commonly called the debt ceiling or debt limit. If the
activities of the Government require borrowing above the
statutory ceiling, Congress must enact a law to raise the
ceiling. For example, in August of 1997, Congress increased the
debt ceiling from $5.5 trillion to $5.95 trillion. At the close
of fiscal year 1998, the debt subject to limit had reached $5.4
trillion.
Debt subject to limit is made up of two parts: (i) debt
held by Government accounts; and (ii) debt held by the public.
Debt held by Government accounts represents the holdings of
debt by Federal trust funds and other special government funds.
This is debt that the Federal Government owes to itself. When
trust funds are in surplus, as social security is now, the
surplus funds are invested, as required by law, in Government
securities. The annual change in the level of debt held by
Government accounts is approximately equal to the amount of
trust fund surpluses for that year.
Debt held by the public represents the holdings of debt by
individuals, institutions, other buyers outside the Federal
Government, and the Federal Reserve System. The annual change
in debt held by the public represents the amount of borrowing
that the Federal Government must do to finance the excess of
total Federal outlays over total Federal revenues. The change
in debt held by the public in 1 year, therefore, closely tracks
the unified budget deficit for that year.
Although the unified budget concept is a critical resource
for determining fiscal policy, the law requires both Congress
and the Executive Branch to separate the unified budget into
``on-budget'' and``off-budget'' components in their respective
reports. In particular, section 13301 of the BEA requires that the
Social Security trust funds be excluded from the budget for the
purposes of the deficit estimates in the Congressional budget
resolution. This was included in the BEA as a result of a long-standing
concern that the surpluses accumulating in the Social Security trust
funds tended to obscure the size of the deficits in the rest of the
government. Similarly, the law also requires the exclusion of the
Postal Service from the budget. As a consequence, Social Security and
the Postal Service are ``off-budget'' whereas the remainder of
government receipts and expenditures are ``on-budget.'' Because it is
important in formulating overall fiscal policy, Congress and the
President use the unified concept in developing budgets, but continue
to make available both the unified budget totals and on-budget totals
to comply with the law.
Baseline
In order to formulate a budget, Congress must have a
starting point. This is known as the baseline. The baseline
most often used is comprised of a set of projections showing
the levels of spending and revenues that would occur for the
upcoming fiscal year and beyond if existing programs and
policies are continued unchanged. With respect to entitlement
programs, the baseline adjusts for, among other things, the
effects of inflation and demographic changes that alter the
expected number of beneficiaries. These projections are known
as the current policy (or current services) baseline. An
alternative baseline that has been used by Congress from time
to time adjusts programs for inflation only where required to
do so by law. This is usually called a current law baseline. In
considering proposed levels of spending and revenues, Members
of the Senate and the House usually describe the cost of their
proposals as being above, below, or equal to the baseline.
Mandatory Spending, Direct Spending and Entitlement
Spending
Mandatory spending (which is synonymous with direct
spending) generally includes all spending that is made pursuant
to laws other than appropriations laws. The fundamental
characteristic of mandatory spending is the lack of annual
discretion to establish spending levels. Instead, mandatory
spending usually involves a binding legal obligation by the
Federal Government to provide funding for an individual,
program, or activity. Another way of defining mandatory
spending is that it is all spending that is not discretionary.
Mandatory spending is frequently referred to as entitlement
spending. Entitlement spending is a subset of mandatory
spending and represents the largest component of mandatory
spending. Most entitlement spending is pursuant to laws that
provide all eligible individuals (or an entity or unit of
government) with financial assistance or other benefits. An
entitlement represents a binding obligation on the part of the
Federal Government; eligible recipients have legal recourse to
compel payment from the government if the obligation is not
fulfilled.
Usually, the laws providing for an entitlement contain
formulas or criteria that specify who is eligible for Federal
assistance. Unless the underlying law establishing the
entitlement is modified, these individuals retain a legal right
to benefits, regardless of the budget situation. For example,
the Social Security law sets formulas under which retired
workers receive benefits based on the length of time they have
worked and their earnings. The cost of Social Security for a
given fiscal year is thus determined by the number of
qualifying retirees rather than by the amount of money in the
Treasury or an annual appropriation.
Some appropriations bills include funding for entitlement
programs. Even though this funding is included in an
appropriations bill, it is still considered mandatory spending
rather than discretionary spending. For example, the Congress
provides annual funding for the Medicaid program through an
appropriations bill. However, the actual funding level for
Medicaid is determined by criteria in Title XIX of the Social
Security Act. This law provides an entitlement to low-income
individuals to pay for a portion of their health care expenses.
The appropriations bill simply liquidates this obligation by
appropriating sums necessary to cover the cost of the Medicaid
program. Congress, in the appropriations process, does not have
the discretion to change the amount spent on Medicaid.
Discretionary Spending
By contrast, discretionary spending refers to those
programs that are subject to annual funding decisions in the
appropriations process. If the Congress decides to lower
funding for a program of this type, it can simply reduce the
annual appropriation. Unlike entitlement programs, generally no
formulas need to be changed to alter funding levels.
Most of the actual operations of the Federal Government are
funded by discretionary spending. Examples of discretionary
spending include funding for the Department of Defense, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
II. HISTORY OF BUDGET LAWS
Congressional Budgeting Prior to 1974
Prior to the enactment of the Budget Act of 1974, Congress
often wrestled with how to effectively oversee increasing
government expenditures. In the late 19th century and the early
20th century, Congress enacted a number of laws to control and
coordinate spending by the executive branch. Similar efforts
were made during the 1940's with respect to the legislative
branch; however, none of these changes endured. In 1974,
Congress enacted the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act to coordinate and control the legislative branch's
budget activities and to curb the President's impoundment
powers.
The Anti-Deficiency Act
In 1870, the legislative appropriations bill was the
vehicle for a number of reforms relating to appropriations
practices, including the section later known as the Anti-
Deficiency Act. This was the first major effort by Congress to
exert more control over Government expenditures. At the time,
agencies frequently obligated more funds than they had been
appropriated and then submitted ``coercive deficiency''
requests to Congress to pay their bills. The Anti-Deficiency
Act provided that no department could make greater expenditures
during a fiscal year than had been provided by Congress. In
addition, the departments could not enter into contracts for
the future payment of money in excess of appropriations.
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 was enacted in
response to the consensus that developed shortly after the turn
of the century that a more centralized approach to financial
policy and processes was needed, in both the executive and
legislative branches. The Act codified the submission of the
President's budget and created the Bureau of the Budget (the
predecessor to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)) to
oversee the executive budget process. The Act also established
the General Accounting Office (GAO) as the government's
auditor, responsible only to Congress. The mission of GAO was
to provide Congress with an independent audit of executive
accounts and to report on violations of the fiscal statutes.
Joint Committee on the Reduction of Federal Expenditures
The Joint Committee was established by the Revenue Act of
1941. Its membership was composed of the members of the House
and Senate Appropriations Committees. The staff of the
committee tracked Congressional action against the President's
budget request, generally using Bureau of the Budget estimates.
Scorekeeping reports of Congressional action were published on
a regular basis when Congress was in session. The Joint
Committee was replaced by the Congressional Budget Office
following enactment of the 1974 Act.
Joint Committee on the Legislative Budget
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 created the
Joint Committee on the Legislative Budget. Its membership was
comprised of members of the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees, the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and
Means Committee. The Joint Committee was to meet at the
beginning of each session of Congress and report to their
respective Houses a legislative budget for the ensuing fiscal
year, including total estimated Federal receipts and
expenditures. A concurrent resolution was to accompany the
report adopting such a budget, which would fix the maximum
amount to be appropriated during the year. If estimated
expenditures were to exceed estimated receipts, the resolution
was to include a statement that it was the sense of Congress
that the public debt would be increased by that amount.
Attempts were made in 1947 and 1948 to carry out the intent
of the legislative budget provision. In 1947, conferees were
unable to reach a final agreement. In 1948, a joint resolution
was adopted by both Houses, but a strongly worded minority
report noted basic defects in the procedure. No further
attempts were made to comply with the Act after 1949.
President's Commission on Budget Concepts
In 1967, President Johnson appointed a commission to make a
thorough study of the federal budget and the manner of its
presentation. The Commission's most important recommendation
was that a unified budget presentation replace the several
competing and confusing measures of the total scope of federal
financial activity. The report of the President's Commission on
Budget Concepts serves as the foundation for most budgetary
concepts used at the present time.
The Congressional Budget Act: Need for the law in the 1970's
Two developments provided the impetus for the enactment of
the Budget Act in 1974. One development was an increasing
realization by Congress that it had no means to develop an
overall budget plan. Prior to 1974, Congress responded to the
President's budget (which contains the President's many
spending and revenue proposals) each year in a piece-meal
fashion. There existed no framework for Congress to establish
its own spending priorities before work began on specific
spending and revenue bills during the spring and summer.
A second, and more immediate, cause for passage of the
Budget Act was a dispute in the early 1970's regarding
presidential authority to impound money appropriated by
Congress. During this time, President Nixon repeatedly asserted
authority (as had many of his predecessors) to withhold from
Federal agencies money appropriated by Congress. By 1973, it
was believed that President Nixon had impounded up to $15
billion of spending previously approved by Congress. A large
portion of these funds were to have gone towards the building
of highways and pollution control projects. Many in Congress
disputed these actions by the President.The authorization for
the pollution control projects, for example, had been enacted by
Congress in 1972 with a strong vote in both Houses overriding President
Nixon's veto. Nonetheless, the President impounded much of this
spending. These events led Members of Congress to seek a legislative
solution.
In 1974 Congress enacted the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act to establish procedures for developing
an annual congressional budget plan and achieving a system of
impoundment control. The Budget Act also created, for the first
time, congressional standing committees devoted solely to the
budget. It also created the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
to serve as the ``scorekeeper'' for Congress. CBO is
responsible for producing an annual economic forecast,
formulating the baseline, reviewing the President's annual
budget submission, scoring all spending legislation reported
from committee and passed by the Congress, and preparing
reports in compliance with the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act.
CBO's policy with respect to providing estimates is set out in
Appendix B. The Joint Committee on Taxation scores all revenue
measures.
The Committee on the Budget
The Budget Act created the Budget Committees of the Senate
and House and gave them the responsibility to draft Congress'
annual budget plan and monitor action on the budget for the
Federal Government. For the first time, congressional
institutions were in place whose unique concern would be
Federal budgetary policy. As a result, the Budget Committee
was, and remains today, uniquely focused on the details of our
Federal budget, the drafting of the budget resolution, and the
compilation of reconciliation legislation.
The Budget Committee has jurisdiction over the
congressional budget process and the operation of CBO. The
jurisdiction of the Senate Budget Committee is set out in Rule
25 of the Standing Rules of the Senate and in two standing
orders adopted by unanimous consent of the Senate. The text of
these sources of jurisdiction are set out in Appendix C. Most
recently, the Budget Committee (along with the Committee on
Governmental Affairs) has been responsible for the passage of
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 and the Line Item Veto
Act of 1996. The membership of the Senate Budget Committee,
since its inception, is set out in Appendix D.
Changes to the Budget Act since 1974
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 1985 and 1987
In the face of ever increasing budget deficits, in 1985
Congress enacted the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act. This Act is known as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings--named
after the Senate authors of the original bill (Senators Phil
Gramm of Texas, Warren Rudman of New Hampshire, and Ernest F.
Hollings of South Carolina).
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings established ``maximum deficit
amounts.'' If the deficit exceeded these statutory limits, the
President was required to issue a sequester order that would
reduce all non-exempt spending by a uniform percentage. Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings also made a number of changes to the
congressional budget process to enforce maximum deficit amounts
and to strengthen congressional budget enforcement procedures.
The most significant change was to increase the margin
necessary to waive certain points of order from a simple
majority vote to a three-fifths margin in the Senate.
In July of 1986 in Bowsher v. Synar (478 U.S. 714, 1986),
the Supreme Court held that the provision of Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings which vested certain powers in the General Accounting
Office violated the separation of powers doctrine of the
Constitution. This was due to the Office's (a creature of
Congress) role in implementing sequester orders. The Court
found it unacceptable from a constitutional perspective for
Congress to vest in a congressional entity a duty of the
executive branch--the responsibility for executing a law. In
1987, Congress enacted the Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act which corrected the
constitutional flow in Gramm-Rudman-Hollings by assigning all
the sequester responsibilities to the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB). OMB is part of the executive branch. The 1987 Act
also extended the system of deficit limits through fiscal year
1992.
The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990
It was not long, however, before Congress realized that
despite Gramm-Rudman-Hollings procedures, the deficit continued
to increase. In the spring of 1990, it became clear that the
deficit was going to exceed the Gramm-Rudman's maximum deficit
limit by nearly $100 billion. Later that year, OMB estimated
that a sequester of $85 billion would be necessary to eliminate
this excess deficit amount. Because Congress had exempted most
of the budget from the sequester process, such a sequester
order was going to require a 32 percent reduction in defense
programs and a 35 percent reduction in non-defense programs. To
respond to growing deficits, President Bush and the
congressional leadership agreed to convene negotiations on the
budget in May of 1990. Six months later, President Bush signed
into law the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, which
represented the budget agreement negotiated between the Bush
Administration and Congress.
Title XIII of this reconciliation act, the Budget
Enforcement Act, constituted the enforcement provisions of the
agreements. The 1990 Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) effectively
replaced the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings system of deficit limits
with two independent enforcement regimens: caps on
discretionary spending and a pay-as-you-go requirement for
direct spending and revenue legislation. The BEA also provided
for enforcement by both the congressional and executive branch
of the discretionary caps and the pay-as-you-go requirement.
Amendments Since 1990
The budget disciplines of the BEA were extended in the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 and the Balanced
Budget Act of 1997 and are due to expire at the end of FY 2002.
In addition to extending spending discipline through FY 2002,
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 also made a number of changes
to the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. These changes were
largely technical in nature and were intended to conform the
Act to current congressional practices and precedents.
III. DEVELOPMENT: CREATING A BUDGET
Executive Actions
February: Receipt of the President's Budget Request
One of the first things Congress needs to know in crafting
a budget is what the executive branch believes is necessary to
fund the operations of the Federal government. The President is
therefore required to submit to Congress, by the first Monday
in February, the Administration's budget request for the
upcoming fiscal year (which begins the following October 1st).
To meet this dead-line, the Administration must begin preparing
its budget request during the previous spring and summer. For
example, consider the budget process for fiscal year 1997. The
President's budget request for fiscal year 1997 (October 1,
1996--September 30, 1997) was transmitted to Congress on
February 5, 1996. In order to do so, the Administration began
working with Federal Agencies to prepare its budget request for
fiscal year 1997 in the spring of 1995, nearly a year and a
half prior to the start of fiscal year 1997.
Congressional Action_Preparation of a Concurrent Resolution
The Budget Act established a new process and new
institutions which enable Congress to develop, using expedited
legislative procedures, its own budget plan each year. Unlike
many state legislatures, Congress is no longer limited to
acting on the executive's budget request on a piecemeal basis.
The budget resolution allows Congress to put into place revenue
and spending proposals within the framework of its own budget
plan.
The budget resolution is designed to guide Congress in its
consideration of revenue and spending legislation throughout
the year. It is in the form of a concurrent resolution, which
is agreed to by both Houses and thus binding upon them. It is
not a public law. The President is in no way bound by the
content of the budget resolution. Therefore, like all other
concurrent resolutions, a budget resolution is not sent to the
President for signature. The Budget Act provides ``fast-track''
legislative procedures which allow Congress, the Senate in
particular, to adopt a budget resolution with limitations on
time for debate and the scope of amendments. In other words, a
budget resolution may not be filibustered.
Since the budget resolution is a concurrent resolution by
form, it can also be the vehicle for rules changes for either
House. The type of rules changes which may be included in a
budget resolution (and still be accorded expedited
consideration) is limited by the terms of section 301 of the
Budget Act. Section 301(b)(4) permits a budget resolution to
``set forth other matters, and such other procedures, relating
to the budget, as may be appropriate to carry out the
purposes'' of the Budget Act. Consequently, a budget resolution
can supersede rules established in the Budget Act or can
establish new rules or procedures relating to the budget. This
authority has been exercised broadly in the past and budget
resolutions have included numerous provisions making changes in
the budget process: most notably, the creation of the pay-as-
you-go point of order and the discretionary caps/firewall point
of order.
February: Budget Committee Hearings, Committee Views and
CBO Report
After receiving the President's budget request, the Senate
and House Budget Committees hold hearings to receive testimony
from Administration officials, experts from academic and
business communities, representatives of national
organizations, members of Congress, and the general public.
During the same period, the other committees of Congress review
the President's budget submission with respect to programs
within their jurisdictions. The committees then transmit to the
Budget Committees within 6 weeks of the President's submission
their ``views and estimates'' on appropriate spending or
revenue levels for these programs. In addition, during
February, CBO sends to the Budget Committees annual reports on
the budget and economic outlook. In March, CBO sends to the
Appropriations and Budget Committees its report analyzing the
President's budget request.
Unlike the formulation of the President's budget, the
congressional budget is developed in public. This is true of
the Budget Committee's hearings and mark-up, the Senate and
House floor debates, and the conference meetings on budget
resolutions and reconciliation bills.
March: Budget Committees Draft Budget Resolutions
Using the President's budget request, information from
their hearings, views and estimates from other committees, and
CBO's reports, the Budget Committee of each House drafts a
congressional budget plan during March. This is done in a
series of public committee meetings called ``mark-ups.'' It is
during the mark-up that members of the committee may offer
their own budget plans or amendments to budget plans laid
before the committee. Once mark-up is completed, the committee
reports to its respective House a concurrent resolution on the
budget or budget resolution.
Budget resolutions set forth budgetary levels for the
upcoming fiscal year and planning levels for at least the
following 4 fiscal years. Section 301 of the Budget Act sets
out the basic components of a budget resolution: (1) budget
totals, (2) spending broken down by budget function, (3)
reconciliation instructions, (4) congressional budget
enforcement mechanisms and (5) statements of budget policy
(referred to as ``Sense of the Senate'' provisions). The budget
totals set forth what Congress considers to be the appropriate
amounts for total spending, total revenues, and the resulting
deficit or surplus. In setting these budget totals, Congress
considers the impact of the Federal budget on the national
economy and establishes Federal fiscal policy for the coming
fiscal year.
Budget totals are provided in two ways in a budget
resolution: budget aggregates and committee allocations. The
budget aggregates (total revenues, total new budget authority,
total outlays, and total revenues and outlays of Social
Security) are set out in the text of the resolution for each
fiscal year covered by the resolution.These aggregates are
enforced by a \3/5\ths vote point of order contained in section 311 of
the Budget Act. Section 311 prohibits the consideration of any
legislation which will have the effect of exceeding the appropriate
aggregate level as set out in the resolution for the first fiscal year
and for the period of the fiscal years covered by the resolution.
Committee allocations are required by section 302(a)(2) of
the Budget Act. This section requires the conference report on
the budget resolution to allocate to all Senate committees the
appropriate levels of budget authority and outlays. Section
302(b) requires the Appropriations committee of each House to
subsequently subdivide its respective allocations among its 13
subcommittees. These suballocations, commonly known as
``302(b)'s'', are crucial to the work of the subcommittees as
they prepare their bills for mark-up. Section 302(e) does,
however, permit the Appropriations Committee to alter the
302(b) allocation as work on the various bills progresses. The
Committee must report these alterations to the Senate and is
constrained by any action already taken by the committee and
the overall allocation given to the full committee pursuant to
section 302(a).
The allocations to committees and the suballocations to
appropriations subcommittees also are enforced by a \3/5\ths
vote point of order contained in section 302(f) of the Budget
Act. Section 302(f) prohibits the consideration of any
legislation that provides budget authority or outlays in excess
of the relevant allocation. The point of order associated with
the statutory caps (discussed below) also serves as a
discipline upon the appropriations process.
Federal spending broken down by function is the second
basic part of the budget resolution. The budget resolution
accomplishes this by dividing up Federal spending among 20
different classifications such as national defense,
agriculture, and health. These classifications, known as
``budget functions,'' provide the Congress with a means of
setting priorities for the allocation of Federal resources
among broad categories of spending. It should be remembered
that budget functions do not necessarily conform with committee
jurisdiction or with specific programs. For example, function
300, Natural Resources and Environment, includes programs
within the jurisdiction of the Senate Committee on Agriculture,
Nutrition and Forestry, the Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources, the Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, and the Committee on Environment and Public
Works.
In addition to budget totals and spending by function,
budget resolutions may include instructions to authorizing
committees directing them to draft changes to existing laws in
order to achieve certain budgetary results. These are known as
reconciliation instructions. These instructions are limited by
statute to calling for specific changes in dollar amounts for
programs within a committee's jurisdiction. The reconciliation
process, which is set out in section 310 of the Budget Act,
provides Congress with expedited procedures similar to those
used to enact a budget resolution, to achieve changes in taxing
and spending.
Congressional budget enforcement mechanisms are also
frequently found in budget resolutions. These have included the
pay-as-you-go and the discretionary caps/firewall points of
order as well as reserve funds. The aggregates and committee
allocations which are set out in a budget resolution are
binding and enforced separately. Consequently, absent a reserve
fund, legislation which increases revenues to offset increases
in direct spending would be subject to a Budget Act point of
order if it caused the aggregates (section 311) or the
committee allocations (section 302) to be breached--even if the
overall legislation is deficit neutral. In practice, reserve
funds are designed to facilitate the consideration of deficit
neutral legislation and are specifically permitted by section
301(b)(7). A reserve fund would, for instance, permit: (1) a
tax cut to be ``paid for'' with reductions in spending, (2) a
new entitlement program to be paid for by tax increases, or (3)
a new entitlement program to be paid for by cuts in existing
entitlement programs within another committee's jurisdiction.
Generally, a reserve fund operates by authorizing the
Chairman of the Budget Committee to revise the spending and
revenue aggregates or the committee allocations so that deficit
neutral legislation would not be vulnerable to the points of
order discussed above. Reserve funds have varied in scope. Some
have been limited to specific amounts and could only be
triggered for specific legislative initiatives. Other have been
more open-ended and broadly defined. For example, the fiscal
year 1995 budget resolution contained reserve funds for 11
separate categories of legislation while the fiscal year 1996
resolution contained only two (one for taxes and another for
welfare reform).
Past budget resolutions have also contained other
provisions pertaining to budget procedures such as: language
governing the budgetary treatment of asset sales and the
student loan program, creation of, and subsequent repeal of, an
IRS allowance, and a government shutdown prevention allowance
to provide additional spending for a continuing resolution.
April 15: Congress Adopts a budget Resolution
When the Budget Committees complete their mark-up of a
budget resolution, they report their respective resolutions to
the full Senate and full House. All Members of the Senate and
House then have an opportunity to alter the work of the Budget
Committees by offering amendments to the budget resolution as
it is debated on the floor of each chamber.
Under current law, the budget resolution must set out a
plan that is within the statutory caps on discretionary
spending. If a point of order is raised against a budget
resolution or amendment to a budget resolution it can not be
considered absent a \3/5\ths vote to waive the budgetary rules.
Expedited Procedures in the Senate
Consideration of a budget resolution in the Senate is
governed by the expedited procedures set out in section 305 of
the Budget Act. Time for debate on the resolution is limited to
50 hours which is equally divided between the majority leader
and the minority leader or their designees. The usual practice
is for the leaders to designate the chairman of the Budget
Committee and the ranking member as the managers. The 50 hours
includes time spent in quorum calls and time spent debating
amendments, motions, and appeals. It does not include the time
taken for a roll call vote or for a quorum call immediately
before a vote.
Debate on any first degree amendment is limited to 2 hours.
Debate on any second degree amendment and debatable motions or
appeals are limited to 1 hour. The time on any amendment or
motion is equally divided between the offeror of the amendment
(or maker of the motion) and the manager. The total time used
in debate on any particular amendment, motion, or appeal is
divided equally between the majority and the minority
regardless of the actual amount used by either side. If no
amendment or motion is before the Senate, Senators may only
debate the resolution if time is yielded to them by the leader
or the manager of the resolution. It is important to remember
that this 50 hours is a limit on debate--not on consideration.
Consequently, it is possible that amendments and motions may be
made after the end of the 50 hours. These, however, will be
disposed of without any debate.
In addition to time limits, section 305(b) of the Budget
Act imposes restrictions on the substance of amendments to a
budget resolution. Amendments offered from the floor must be
germane. An amendment will likely be found to be germane if it:
(1) only strikes language from the resolution; (2) changes a
number (dollar amount) or date in the resolution; or (3) adds
language to the resolution which expresses the ``Sense of the
Senate'' or ``Sense of the Congress'' with respect to budgetary
issues. As is the case with most points of order, the Presiding
Officer will not take the initiative to evaluate the
germaneness of amendments as offered, but rather will wait for
an objection (a point of order) to be raised by a Senator from
the floor. If a germaneness point of order is raised against an
amendment any Senator may make a motion to waive the Budget Act
for the consideration of the amendment. This requires an
affirmative vote of \3/5\ths of the Senate.
Senate procedures generally provide that a single amendment
may not amend the underlying measure in more than one place
(although this is often disregarded in practice). The Budget
Act, however, waives the prohibition for amendments to a budget
resolution if the additional changes are necessary to maintain
mathematical consistency throughout the resolution. For
example, this permits the funding for a particular function to
be changed and the corresponding change in the aggregate levels
to be made. It also permits spending to be increased in one
function and paid for with a reduction in another function (an
offset).
In addition to the section 305(b) point of order regarding
germaneness, other points of order also require a \3/5\ths
vote. These points of order include: section 301(i) which
prohibits consideration of a budget resolution or an amendment
thereto that reduces the surplus in the Social Security trust
fund; and section 312(b) which prohibits consideration of a
budget resolution that provides funding which exceeds the
statutory caps.
In addition to the points of order set out in the Budget
Act, budget resolutions themselves have established enforcement
provisions (points of order) against future budget resolutions.
For example, Senators Exon and Grassley successfully amended
the budget resolution for fiscal year 1995 to reduce the then-
existing statutory discretionary spending limits. The Exon-
Grassley Amendment also created a \3/5\ths point of order
against a budget resolution for fiscal years 1996, 1997 and
1998 that recommended discretionary spending levels in the
first year of that resolution that exceeded the Exon-Grassley
levels. These levels were further reduced and the point of
order retained in section 201 of the budget resolution for
fiscal year 1996. Section 201 of the 1996 resolution also
extended these caps through fiscal year 2002 and added the
firewall between defense and non-defense discretionary spending
for fiscal years 1996, 1997, and 1998.
When the Senate and House have both passed their respective
versions of the budget resolution, they appoint several of
their Members to a conference committee to resolve the
differences between the Senate- and House-passed resolutions.
When differences have been resolved, each chamber must then
vote on the compromise version--the conference report on the
budget resolution. Debate in the Senate on the conference
report on a budget resolution is limited to 10 hours. Again
this is a limit on debate, not on consideration.
While the Budget Act sets April 15 as the date for
completion of this work, Congress often fails to meet this
deadline. The timetable for completion of the various steps in
the budget process is set out in Appendix E. A listing of the
completion dates for congressional budget resolutions is set
out in Appendix F.
IV. ENFORCEMENT
Once Congress has agreed on its budget priorities by
adopting the conference report on the budget resolution, there
are a number of enforcement mechanisms which help Congress work
within its means with respect to both discretionary and
mandatory spending. These mechanisms include: congressional
points of order against the enactment of legislation which
would violate the budget; executive branch action known as
sequestration; and expedited legislative procedures for the
enactment of changes in mandatory spending or revenues, known
as reconciliation. The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 divided
the enforcement of the budget between the Appropriations
Committee with responsibility for discretionary spending and
the authorizing committees with responsibility for mandatory or
direct spending and revenues.
Budget Act Points of Order in the Senate
In order to help Congress legislate within the budgetary
constraints set forth in the budget resolution, the Budget Act
provides for a number of points of order. Budget Act points of
order are a parliamentary device by which any member of
Congress can object to an amendment or a piece of legislation
on the grounds that it is not within the limits set out in the
budget. The Presiding Officer of each house, in consultation
with the Parliamentarian and the Budget Committees with respect
to the ``scoring'', is responsible for determining if a Member
has correctly raised a point of order. Although there are
numerous other points of order contained in the Rules of the
House and of the Senate which may come into play during
consideration of revenue and spending legislation, the
following paragraphs set out the major Budget Act points of
order which enforce the revenue and spending levels contained
in a budget resolution:
Section 302(f). This section prohibits the
consideration of legislation that provides budget
authority, or outlays, in excess of a committee's
allocation. This point of order is often used to
enforce the spending limits applicable to each of the
13 annual appropriations bills. This point of order may
be waived or the ruling appealed only by a \3/5\ths
vote.
Section 311(a). This section prohibits consideration
of legislation that would cause the total level of
budget authority or outlays to be exceeded or the
appropriate level of revenues to be reduced below that
which is set forth in the budget resolution. These
levels are often referred to as the aggregates. This
point of order may be waived or the ruling appealed
only by a \3/5\ths vote.
A listing a additional points of order found in the Budget
Act are set out in Appendix G.
Discretionary Spending Caps
There are two means by which the overall level of
discretionary spending has been controlled: the congressional
caps, which were set out in a number of budget resolutions and
enforced by a point of order and the statutory spending caps,
which are required by law and enforced through the
sequestration process and by points of order.
The Congressional Caps
Starting with the fiscal year 1994 budget resolution, the
Congress included limits on discretionary spending. Section
12(b) of H. Con. Res. 64, the fiscal year 1994 budget
resolution, established overall discretionary spending limits
for fiscal years 1996 through 1998 inclusive. There was no
distinction made between defense and non-defense spending. The
next year, in section 24 of H. Con. Res. 218, the fiscal year
1995 budget resolution, the discretionary spending limits were
further reduced. The limits set out in both section 12(b) and
section 24 were enforceable in the Senate by a\3/5\ths vote
point of order which prohibited the consideration of a budget
resolution for the relevant fiscal year which exceeded the limits.
In June of 1995, Congress extended this discipline. In
section 201 of H. Con. Res. 67, the fiscal year 1996 budget
resolution, Congress extended the discretionary limits through
fiscal year 2002 and a specific limitation was put into place
between defense and non-defense discretionary spending through
fiscal year 1998. This breakdown between defense and non-
defense spending is referred to as the ``firewall.'' These
limits were enforceable in the Senate by a point of order which
prohibits the consideration of a budget resolutions or
appropriation bills that would result in levels of
discretionary spending that exceed any of these limits. By the
terms of section 201(b)(2) however, the application of this
point of order for fiscal years 1997 through 2002 was to only
become effective upon the enactment of reconciliation
legislation as called for in the budget resolution. A
reconciliation bill was passed in Congress that session (H.R.
2491, the Balanced Budget Act of 1995); however, due to the
President's veto, it was never enacted.
Similarly, in section 301 of H. Con. Res. 178, the fiscal
year 1997 budget resolution, discretionary spending limits were
set out through fiscal year 2002 with the defense/non-defense
firewall in place through fiscal year 1998. Again the
effectiveness of the point of order against future budget
resolutions and appropriations bills was made contingent upon
enactment of all three reconciliation bills envisioned by the
budget resolution. During 1996, the Congress enacted only one
of the three reconciliation bills: the Welfare Reform
legislation (The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Act of 1996, Public Law 104-193). Consequently, by the terms of
section 301(b)(2)(B) the only point of order in effect applies
to appropriations bills for fiscal year 1997.
H. Con. Res. 84, the fiscal year 1998 budget resolution,
did contain ``Congressional caps.'' These caps were superseded
by the statutory caps (discussed below) in the Balanced Budget
Act of 1997.
The Statutory Caps
The Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1990 established
statutory limits, or caps, on discretionary spending through
fiscal year 1995. The BEA provides that if OMB estimates that
an appropriations bill will cause the overall level of
discretionary spending to exceed the limits set forth in law,
then the President must issue a sequester order reducing all
non-exempt discretionary accounts by a uniform percentage. Only
a very few discretionary programs are exempt from sequester,
while several discretionary programs operate under special
rules limiting how much they can be reduced by a sequester
order. Indian Health Services and Veterans' Medical Care are
examples of programs that may not be reduced by more than 2
percent by a sequester order.
Since 1990 there have been only two sequester orders
affecting discretionary spending. These occurred in November of
1990 and April of 1991. The November sequester was due to a
drafting error with respect to programs in the international
affairs accounts. The $395 million overage was corrected by
congressional action the next spring, therefore no sequester
was actually implemented. The April overage of $2.4 million
occurred in domestic accounts and triggered a reduction of
.0013 percent.
Firewalls
The BEA also provided for what are known as firewalls. The
BEA's so-called firewalls set separate caps on defense,
international, and non-defense discretionary spending for
fiscal years 1991-1993. For fiscal years 1994 and 1995, the BEA
established a cap on total discretionary spending and did not
provide separate firewalls for these two years
The BEA also provided two enforcement mechanisms to hold
spending at these cap levels. In the Senate, a \3/5\ths point
of order lies against appropriations legislation that would
cause spending to exceed any one of these caps. In addition, if
appropriations legislation is enacted that causes spending to
exceed one of these caps, the President is required to reduce
spending through across-the-board reductions (a sequester
order) in that category to bring spending back down to the cap
level. In the past, for example, defense spending has been
reduced in order to fund higher non-defense spending. As a
result of these caps on subsets of discretionary spending, or
firewalls, defense may not be further reduced in order to
increase spending for non-defense programs if it would cause
total non-defense spending to exceed its cap level.
Since the 1990 BEA, a number of changes have been made to
the discretionary caps and firewalls. In 1993, the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act extended the discretionary caps
through fiscal year 1998. In 1994, the Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act established a separate cap, or
firewall, for crime reduction funding through fiscal year 1998.
The budget resolutions for fiscal years 1996 and 1997
reinstated the defense and non-defense firewalls for
congressional enforcement purposes through fiscal year 1998. In
1997, the Balanced Budget Act extended the discretionary caps
through fiscal year 2002, reinstated a separate defense
firewall for fiscal years 1998 and 1999, and extended the crime
reduction firewall through fiscal year 2000.
In 1998, the Congress established two new separate caps, or
firewalls, for highway and mass transit funding through fiscal
year 2003 in the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century
(TEA-21). TEA-21's firewalls differ from the defense and crime
reduction firewalls in several respects. Perhaps the most
significant distinction are the consequences for exceeding the
caps. In the case of the defense, non-defense, and crime
reduction caps, if Congress provides spending in excess of one
of these caps, spending in that category is reduced (or
sequestered) by an across-the-board reduction to bring spending
in that category back to the cap level. In the case of the
highway and transit caps, if spending exceeds these caps it is
charged against the non-defense or discretionary cap. As a
result, TEA-21 effectively exempted highway and transit funding
from a sequester and placed the burden for meeting the caps on
all other discretionary spending.
Mandatory Spending
As is the case with discretionary spending, there are also
two enforcement mechanisms with respect to the level of
mandatory spending: a congressional mechanism set out in budget
resolutions and a statutory mechanism found in the Budget
Enforcement Act of 1990.
Pay-as-you-go in the Senate
The budget resolution for fiscal year 1994, which
implemented President Clinton's first budget, included a new
pay-as-you-go rule in the Senate. This rule provided a \3/5\ths
vote point of order in the Senate against consideration of
legislation that would cause an increase in the deficit over
the next 10 years. This has the effect of requiring Congress to
pay for any changes to programs (or the creation of new
programs) which result in an increase in direct spending. For
example, if Congress were to enact a program providing new
benefits to Medicare recipients, the increased costs would have
to be ``paid for'' by a corresponding reduction in direct
spending elsewhere or an increase in revenues. The fiscal year
1996 budget resolution made some changes to the Senate's pay-go
rule, but continued to require a ten-year deficit neutrality
requirement.
As the rule stands now, there is a \3/5\ths vote point of
order in the Senate against consideration of legislation that
would cause a net increase in the deficit over a ten-year
period. The pay-as-you-go point of order applies to all
legislation except appropriations legislation. To determine a
violation, CBO measures the budget impact of a direct spending
or revenue bill combined with the budget impact of all direct
spending and revenue legislation enacted since the latest
budget resolution's adoption. If CBO concludes a direct
spending or revenue bill would result in a net deficit increase
for any one of three time periods (the first year, the sum of
years 1 through 5, and the sum of years 6 through 10), the
direct spending or revenue bill is subject to a \3/5\ths vote
point of order in the Senate. The pay-go rule sunsets at the
end of fiscal year 2002.
Pay-as-you-go and sequestration
For direct spending and revenues, the BEA requires OMB to
enforce a ``pay-as-you-go'' requirement. Here again the
executive branch's pay-as-you-go rule has the same effect as
the point of order: Congress is required to ``pay for'' any
changes to programs which result in an increase in direct
spending or risk a sequester. If OMB estimates that the sum of
all direct spending and revenue legislation enacted since
August 5, 1997 will result in a net increase in the deficit for
the fiscal year, then the President is required to issue a
sequester order reducing all non-exempt direct spending
accounts by a uniform percentage in order to eliminate the net
deficit increase. Unlike discretionary programs, most direct
spending is either exempt from a sequester order or operates
under special rules that minimize the reduction that can be
made in direct spending. Social Security is an example of a
program exempt from a pay-as-you-go sequester and Medicare,
which cannot be reduced by more than 4 percent, represents an
example of a program that operates under special rules.
Reconciliation in the Senate
Why the Senate Needs Reconciliation Procedures
When the Budget Act was first written it included a
procedure known as reconciliation which was designed to allow
Congress at the end of the fiscal year to enact legislation to
fine tune revenue and spending levels through legislation which
may not be filibustered. During the 1980's, reconciliation came
to be used as a vehicle for implementing major economic/budget
plans rather than simply fine tuning. In recent years, both
Congress and the President have made it a high priority to
reduce the federal deficit and reconciliation has been the
favored vehicle. In such years, reconciliation instructions
have become a critical component of most budget resolutions.
The reconciliation process set forth in section 310 of the
Budget Act provides Congress with expedited procedures to
achieve changes in revenues and reductions in direct spending
through an omnibus bill. Such a large and complicated bill
might otherwise be difficult to enact under normal
legislative processes. These changes are considered
difficult because the very nature of the programs involved
often necessitates changing tax rates or placing restrictions
on very popular social programs in order to achieve budgetary
savings. The number of people qualifying for benefits--not
annual appropriations--is one of the primary factors in
determining the amount of money needed to fund most direct
spending programs for a given year.
Using the reconciliation procedures, Congress directs its
committees to report legislation achieving specified changes in
spending within their respective jurisdictions to the Budget
Committees by a certain date. These instructions are limited by
the Budget Act to specifying the total amount by which direct
spending or revenues under existing laws is to be changed. With
respect to spending, such changes are crucial to reducing the
deficit because entitlements and other direct spending comprise
about two-thirds of the Federal budget. An instruction may also
specify the total amount by which the statutory limit on the
public debt is to be changed.
While the Budget Committees develop the instructions by
making assumptions for changes in programs and laws, the actual
instructions may dictate neither the specific program to be
changed nor the substance of the change. After the committees
have reported their recommendations to the Budget Committees,
the Budget Committees package all the committee-reported
legislation together into an omnibus reconciliation bill along
with report language and CBO's and the Joint Committee on
Taxation's cost estimates. This is purely a ministerial
function: the Budget Committees may not make any substantive
change to the other committees' work product.
If legislation reported to the Budget Committee does not
comply with any authorizing committee's instruction there are
two consequences during floor consideration of the bill. First,
if that committee's title of the bill contains any increases in
spending (known as ``sweeteners''), those sweeteners are
vulnerable to a point of order under the ``Byrd Rule'' (which
is discussed below). In addition, that title of the bill is
subject to being rewritten by the full Senate. This could be
accomplished by the making of a motion to recommit the bill
with instructions to report back forthwith with an amendment
containing legislative language which satisfies the original
instruction. A listing of the completion dates of
reconciliation legislation is set out in Appendix H.
Expedited Procedures in the Senate
Once the Budget Committees have completed their work, the
Congress then considers the reconciliation bill. Under the
expedited procedures for the Senate set forth in the Act, total
debate is limited to 20 hours. The actual time taken for
consideration, however, may exceed the 20 hours. Motions and
amendments may be offered and considered without debate at the
end of the 20 hours. In addition, sections 305, 310 and 313 of
the Act provide other restrictions with respect to the
substantive content of the reconciliation measure and
amendments thereto. For example, any amendment to the bill that
is not germane, would add extraneous material, would cause
deficit levels to increase, or that contains recommendations
with respect to the old-age, survivors, and disability
insurance program (OASDI) is not in order. If an amendment is
objected to for any of these reasons, it cannot be considered
absent a waiver of budgetary rules (which in the Senate
requires a \3/5\ths vote.)
Section 313 of the Budget Act, providing a prohibition
against ``extraneous material'', is known as the Byrd Rule
(after the Senator from West Virginia, Robert C. Byrd). It is
significant that this rule applies to the bill itself as well
as to amendments and conference reports. Unlike other points of
order in the Senate, if the Presiding Officer sustains a point
of order under the Byrd Rule against a provision in a bill or
conference report, that provision is stricken from the measure.
The Byrd Rule may be waived by a \3/5\ths vote.
The Byrd Rule provides that an amendment or provision is
extraneous if it: (1) produces no change in outlays or revenues
(and is not a term or condition of such change), (2) increases
outlays or reduces revenues and the reporting committee fails
to achieve its instructed dollar change, (3) is not within the
jurisdiction of the committee reporting the title, (4) produces
changes in outlays or revenues that are ``merely incidental''
to the non-budgetary components of the provision, (5) increases
the deficit in any year beyond the years reconciled and such
increase is not offset by other provisions in the same title,
or (6) provides certain changes in the Social Security program.
Whether or not an amendment, provision of a bill or conference
report violates section 313 (or any other section of the Budget
Act for that matter) is within the discretion of the Presiding
Officer of the Senate who will consult with the Parliamentarian
of the Senate. The Budget Committee, using CBO cost and JCT
revenue estimates, is responsible for scoring of all provisions
and amendments.
V. OTHER ASPECTS OF THE BUDGET PROCESS
The Government Performance and Results Act
On August 3, 1993 the Government Performance and Results
Act was signed into law, after having been passed by voice vote
in both the House and the Senate (Public Law 103-62, 103rd
Cong., 1st Sess.). The Results Act is the first management
reform initiative rooted in law and tied directly to the budget
structure. Under the law, agencies must develop performance
measures for each program activity beginning with fiscal year
1999. For example, a job training program could measure the
change in the wages of its graduates. This performance
information should help clarify what the federal government is
actually accomplishing. If the law functions as intended, funds
will be diverted from underachieving programs to high-achieving
programs.
The law requires four types of reports. Each agency must
develop a five-year strategic plan to set the general direction
of the agency. Agencies must also produce an annual performance
plan which includes quantitative outcome goals compatible with
the general goals of the strategic plan. In addition, agencies
must produce a retrospective performance report each year,
which compares the actual results to the stated goals. Finally,
the OMB must construct a government-wide performance plan
covering the entire Federal government. This plan is submitted
each February along with the President's budget.
Title X: Impoundment Control and the Line Item Veto
Rescissions and Deferrals
Prior to the enactment of the Budget Act in 1974, the
President would reduce federal spending after it was enacted by
the Congress by impounding funds. An impoundment occurs when
the President does not spend any or all of an enacted
appropriation. Under title X of the Budget Act of 1974, the
President can defer (delay) the obligation of appropriations or
propose a rescission (cancellation) of appropriations. It is
Congress' responsibility to review all proposed rescissions and
deferrals. While the Budget Act provides for procedures to
address proposed Presidential rescissions and deferrals in an
expedited fashion (see section 1017), these procedures have
never been invoked. Rescissions and deferrals (whether
initiated by the President or the Congress) have, however, been
enacted using regular Senate procedures. Frequently this has
occurred as part of a supplemental appropriations bill.
Rescissions and Rescission Bills
A rescission is a proposal contained in a special message
from the President canceling, in whole or in part, previously
appropriated budget authority. The funds must, however, be
obligated if the Congress does not approve the rescission
within 45 days of receipt of the President's special message.
If a President feels that funds should not be made available
for general or fiscal policy reasons, a rescission is the
appropriate vehicle. Funds made available by use of the
procedures in title X of the Budget Act may not be proposed for
rescission again. The Budget Act (in section 1017) provides
expedited procedures for considering a rescission bill which
approves some or all of the rescissions contained in the
President's special message.
Deferrals and Impoundment Resolutions
A deferral is a proposal contained in a special message
from the President temporarily withholding or delaying the
obligation or expenditure of budget authority. A deferral may
not extend beyond the end of the fiscal year in which the
special message is transmitted. The Act provides that deferrals
are not to be used to alter policy decisions regarding spending
made by the Congress. If the President wishes to alter spending
policy, the appropriate action is to propose a rescission
rather than repeatedly defer the spending of those funds. In
order to overturn a deferral, Congress must pass and the
President must sign legislation specifically rejecting the
President's deferral.
The Line Item Veto: An Attempt to Control Spending
Overview
After almost an entire year in conference Congress passed
and the President signed into law the Line Item Veto Act of
1996 (Public Law 104-130). The law was designed to allow the
President to cancel wasteful spending and special interest tax
breaks to reduce the federal budget deficit. The law also
included expedited legislative procedures which would have
permitted Congress to review and respond, if necessary, to the
President's use of this new authority by enacting a disapproval
bill.
The Line Item Veto Act delegated to the President the
authority to cancel certain budget obligations provided by
appropriation, direct spending, and tax laws. The law permitted
the President to cancel any of the following:
(1) any dollar amount of discretionary spending
(which would be found in an appropriations act);
(2) any item of new direct spending (a provision
increasing direct spending would be found in
legislation dealing with entitlements such as Medicare
or Medicaid); or
(3) any limited tax benefit (a provision benefitting
100 or fewer beneficiaries or a transition rule
benefitting 10 or fewer beneficiaries would be found in
a revenue act).
Once the President exercised the cancellation authority
provided in the Line Item Veto Act, the Congress had three
options for its response: (i) Congress could accept the
President's cancellation and take no further action; (ii)
Congress could begin the legislative process anew and in the
normal course enact again the canceled item (being mindful that
this would be additional spending which may require an
offsetting reduction elsewhere); or (iii) Congress could begin
consideration of a disapproval bill pursuant to the expedited
legislative procedures set out in the Line Item Veto Act. The
Act also called for expedited review of any legal challenges to
the line item by the Federal courts.
The expedited judicial procedures were the first aspect of
the new law to be used. These procedures culminated on June 25,
1998 when the Supreme Court of the United States held (in a 6-3
decision) that the Line Item Veto Act was unconstitutional as
it violated the Presentment Clause of Article I, section 7 of
the Constitution (see, Clinton v. City of New York, et al. 118
U.S.C. 2091, (1998)). This decision was the culmination of 18
months of litigation.
The Line Item Veto Act became effective on January 1, 1997
and the litigation began the very next day. On January 2, 1997
a group of six former and current Members of Congress
(Senators--Byrd, Levin, Moynihan, and Hatfield and
Representatives Skaggs and Waxman) filed a lawsuit in Federal
District Court challenging the constitutionality of the new
law. Ultimately, on June 27, 1997, the Supreme Court held in
this lawsuit that the plaintiff Members of Congress lacked
standing to bring such a challenge before the federal courts
and thus the lawsuit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
(see, Raines v. Byrd et al. 521 U.S. 811, 117 S. Ct. 2312, 2317
(1997)).
President Clinton then made use of his cancellation
authority pursuant to the Line Item Veto Act during August and
September of 1997: canceling a total of 82 items from various
reconciliation and appropriations acts.\1\ Of these 82 items,
38 (which had been part of the FY 1998 Military Construction
Appropriations Act) were overturned by subsequent action of
Congress (enactment of a disapproval bill--H.R. 2631--under the
expedited procedures of the Line Item Veto Act).
An additional item, relating to an ``open season'' with
respect to the pensions of certain federal employees, was
invalidated on January 6, 1998 by an order of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia (see, Order in NTEU v.
United States, No. 97-2399 (D.D.C. Jan. 6, 1998)). In the NTEU
case, the Clinton administration conceded that the President
had exceeded his authority under the Act and agreed with the
plaintiff, the National Treasury Employees Union, that the
cancellation was not valid.
Two other canceled items, one relating to a Medicaid
provision and the other a tax provision applicable to certain
transactions entered into by agricultural cooperatives, became
the source for the litigation which ultimately brought down the
Line Item Veto Act. The plaintiffs in these two cases argued
that the Line Item Veto was invalid because it violated both
the Presentment Clause and the doctrine of Separation of Powers
found in the Constitution. The two cases were consolidated at
the District Court level and held to be unconstitutional (985
F. Supp. 168, 177-82 (1998)). As in the Raines v. Byrd case,
the Supreme Court again exercised expedited review as called
for in the Line Item Veto Act. Oral arguments were heard in
Clinton v. City of New York on April 27, 1998 and the Court
issued its ruling on June 25, 1998. In its June 25th decision,
the Supreme Court found that the Line Item Veto Act was
unconstitutional because it violates the procedures for
enacting legislation which are set out in the Presentment
Clause of the Constitution (Article I, section 7). The Court
felt that the Act permitted the President to unilaterally amend
duly enacted laws (the law upon which he would exercise his
cancellation authority) by repealing only a portion thereof.
Because the Court found the law invalid on these grounds, the
majority felt it was not necessary to address the Separation of
Powers arguments which had also been propounded by the
opponents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ An excellent discussion of the Line Item Veto Act and the
President's use of the cancellation authority during its short life can
be found in a Congressional Budget Office publication dated April 1998
and entitled: The Line Item Veto Act After One Year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Unfunded Mandates Control Act
In March of 1995, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995,
was enacted (Public Law 104-4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.). The
Unfunded Mandates Act amended the Budget Act to add a new Part
B to title IV. The purposes of the Act are to limit the
imposition of unfunded Federal mandates on state, local, and
tribal governments and the private sector without full and
informed congressional consideration of the effects of such
mandates before their enactment. To fulfill these goals the
Act: (i) requires CBO to provide a mandate analysis for all
legislation reported from committee; (ii) provides a majority
vote point of order; (iii) and requires that Federal agencies
interact with state, local and tribal government with respect
to the budgetary impact of Federal regulations which impose
unfunded mandates.
The Act contains a list of 7 specific items (legislative or
regulatory) which are excluded from mandates scrutiny. Thus,
the Act does not apply to provisions which: (i) enforce
constitutional rights; (ii) prohibit discrimination; (iii)
require compliance with accounting or auditing procedures with
respect to grants or other money or property provided by the
Federal Government; (iv) provide for emergency relief at the
request of a state, local, or tribal government; (v) are
necessary for national security or adherence to international
agreements; (vi) the President designates as an emergency; or
(vii) relate to the Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance
program of title II of the Social Security Act.
Federal Mandates
In requiring congressional scrutiny of unfunded mandates,
the Act makes an important distinction between those imposed
upon state, local, and tribal governments (known as
intergovernmental mandates) and those imposed upon the private
sector (know as private sector mandates). Generally speaking,
private sector mandates must be identified in report language
for legislation, if and only if, the direct cost equals or
exceeds $100 million in the fiscal year first effective and any
of the 4 following fiscal years. There is a point of order with
respect to the consideration of such legislation if the CBO
mandates estimate has not been published (either in the
committee's report or placed in the Congressional Record) prior
to its consideration, but there is no requirement to mitigate
or limit costs of a private sector mandate. With respect to
intergovernmental mandates, the threshold is $50 million. In
addition to the point of order with respect to the CBO mandates
estimate, there is also a majority point of order against the
consideration of any legislation containing such a mandate,
unless the legislation contains language which provides
spending authority or authorizes appropriations to cover the
cost of the mandate (see section 425(a)(2)). Both of these
points of order may be waived by a majority vote of the Senate.
Role of the Congressional Budget Office
In order for Congress to fully consider and appreciate the
effects of Federal mandates, the Act created additional
responsibilities for CBO. CBO must provide a statement to
authorizing committees regarding whether reported bills contain
Federal mandates. If the total direct costs of a mandate are
above either the $50 million or $100 million thresholds in the
fiscal year that the mandate is first effective or in any of
the four following years, CBO must provide an estimate of these
costs, if feasible, and the basis of the estimate. The CBO
statement must also include an assessment of whether the bill
authorizes or otherwise provides funding to cover the costs of
the mandates. With respect to intergovernmental mandates, the
cost statement must estimate the appropriations needed to fund
such authorization for up to 10 years after the mandate becomes
effective. In addition, CBO must ``to the greatest extent
practicable'' prepare statements for conference agreements if
they contain mandates not previously considered in either the
House or the Senate if they impose greater direct costs than
previously considered versions of the bill.
If an individual Senator requests, CBO must prepare
estimates of the costs of intergovernmental mandates contained
in an amendment the Senator may wish to offer. The Congress may
also call upon CBO to do more detailed analyses of federal
mandates. The Chairman or ranking minority member of a
committee may request CBO to compare an agency's estimate of
the costs of proposed regulations implementing a federal
mandate with CBO's estimate prepared when the law was enacted.
The Act intends that CBO in effect critique the agency's
estimate.
Credit Reform
Credit Reform, enacted by the Federal Credit Reform Act of
1990, strives to show the actual, long-term cost of programs
where the Federal Government extends credit prior to the actual
making of a direct loan or loan guarantee. It requires that the
expected costs of defaults and interest subsidies be factored
into the total cost of a loan, which is recorded in the budget
on a present-value basis at the time credit is extended.
Before the Credit Reform Act became law, the federal budget
accounted for all credit transactions on a cash basis, meaning
that spending (i.e. loan disbursements) and receipts (i.e. loan
repayments) were recorded in the fiscal year in which they
occurred. Such treatment made it difficult to compare on an
equal footing the long-term costs associated with credit
programs. For example, consider one key distinction between two
credit programs which are not easily compared. For direct
loans, the federal government actually provides the loan funds
to and receives repayments from the borrower, but for
guaranteed loans, a private entity actually makes and services
the loan and the federal government has to make a payment only
if the borrower defaults. Because the Federal Government does
not have to disburse cash for guaranteed loans, such loans
appeared to have no cost (at least in the near-term), so the
cash treatment made them appear cheaper, and therefore more
easily ``funded'', than direct loans. In addition, a direct
loan program with high expected defaults would appear as no
more expensive than one with low defaults, thereby denying
lawmakers key information for making funding decisions.
Credit reform attempts to account for all the expected
costs associated with a credit program at the time credit is
extended. By separately identifying the elements that account
for the Federal subsidy in the program--such as expected
delinquencies and defaults and interest rate reductions--credit
reform allows lawmakers to appropriate funds to cover the
entire subsidy at the time a loan is made. In most cases,
credit reform also allows lawmakers to easily compare the costs
of competing credit programs by comparing their subsidies. Now,
loan programs with high expected default rates actually appear
more expensive than ones with low default rates. And guaranteed
loans no longer appear free.
VI. APPENDICES
Appendix A
BUDGET FUNCTIONS
050: National Defense
150: International Affairs
250: General Science, Space, and Technology
270: Energy
300: Natural Resources and Environment
350: Agriculture
370: Commerce and Housing Credit
400: Transportation
450: Community and Regional Development
500: Education
550: Health
570: Medicare
600: Income Security
650: Social Security
700: Veterans Benefits and Services
750: Administration of Justice
800: General Government
900: Net Interest
920: Allowances
950: Undistributed Offsetting Receipts
Appendix B
CBO'S POLICIES FOR PREPARING AND DISTRIBUTING ITS ESTIMATES AND
ANALYSES
(From CBO Document, Summer 1998)
The mission of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) is to provide
the Congress with the objective, timely, nonpartisan analysis needed
for economic and budget decisions and the information and estimates
required for the Congressional budget process. This document describes
the policies and procedures that CBO follows as it prepares and
distributes budget estimates and other analytic work for the Congress.
CBO'S STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITIES
The basic statute setting forth the duties and functions of the
Congressional Budget Office is title II of the Congressional Budget Act
of 1974. Additional responsibilities for budget estimates are contained
in titles III and IV of that act. Subsequent legislation has affected
those responsibilities and has added further requirements for specific
analyses.
According to title II of the Budget Act, CBO's primary duty is to
provide budget-related information to all committees of both Houses,
with priority given first to the information needs of the Committees on
the Budget and second to the information needs of the Committees on
Appropriations, Ways and Means, and Finance. With respect to individual
Members, the only CBO duty stipulated in the act is to provide
information compiled for committees and additional related information
that may be requested.
Title II also requires CBO to prepare several specific reports to
the Committees on the Budget each year, including periodic assessments
of the economic and budget outlook, and to conduct continuing studies
on budgetary matters.
Titles III and IV of the Congressional Budget Act specify
additional duties for CBO to carry out in reviewing bills or joint
resolutions reported from committees of either House. Title III covers
all bills or joint resolutions that provide new budget or spending
authority, such as appropriation bills, or that provide an increase or
decrease in revenues. Title IV covers all bills and joint resolutions
other than appropriation bills and private relief bills.Under those
titles, CBO must prepare estimates of new budget authority, outlays, or
revenues provided by the bills or joint resolutions, or of the costs
that the government would incur in carrying out the provisions of the
proposed legislation. The CBO cost estimates are to be included in the
reports accompanying such bills or resolutions if they are submitted to
the committees before the reports are filed.
For estimating the impact on revenues of legislation involving
income, estate and gift, excise, and payroll taxes, the Congressional
Budget Act directs CBO to use exclusively the revenue estimates of the
Joint Committee on Taxation.
The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of
1987, and the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 assign further duties to
the Congressional Budget Office, such as providing budget estimates for
the purpose of budget control. That function includes preparing the
various sequestration reports to the Congress and the Office of
Management and Budget. The Budget Enforcement Act also requires CBO to
estimate changes in direct spending and revenues for private relief
legislation as well as for public bills or joint resolutions.
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 requires CBO to prepare
estimates of the direct costs of all federal mandates that are
contained in legislation reported by any authorizing committee in
either House and that affect state, local, and tribal governments or
the private sector. The act also authorizes CBO to prepare analyses and
studies of the budgetary or financial impact of proposed legislation
that may significantly affect state and local governments or the
private sector, to the extent practicable, at the request of any
committee.
From time to time, statutes have directed CBO to prepare analytic
reports on specific subjects. Such reports have included the treatment
of administrative costs under credit reform accounting, the financial
risks posed by government-sponsored enterprises, and the desirability
and feasibility of privatizing the Federal National Mortgage
Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation.
HOW WORK ON CBO'S ESTIMATES AND ANALYSES IS INITIATED
The Congressional Budget Office strives to provide federal budget
and mandate cost estimates for all bills other than appropriation bills
when they are reported by a full committee of either House. Committee
staff should notify CBO when bills are about to be ordered reported and
when cost estimates are needed.
CBO also prepares cost estimates for proposals at other stages of
the legislative process at the request of a committee of jurisdiction,
a budget committee, or the Congressional leadership. For example, CBO
may prepare cost estimates for a series of bills to be considered by a
subcommittee, including draft bills not yet introduced, or for
amendments to be considered during committee markups. Similarly, it may
prepare cost estimates for floor amendments and for bills that pass one
or both Houses.
For appropriation bills, CBO provides estimates of outlays that
would result from the provision of budget authority. CBO also provides
the budget and appropriation committees with frequent tabulations of
Congressional actions on both spending and revenue bills so that the
Congress can know whether it is acting within the limits set by the
annual budget resolution.
In addition to statutory reports, or analyses done to directly
support CBO's statutory work, the office undertakes a number of other
analyses each year, although only at the request of the Chairman or
Ranking Minority Member of the relevant committee or subcommittee or
the Congressional leadership. Also, as time permits, CBO will honor
requests of individual Members for cost information or other analysis
or legislative proposals, but it must give priority to committee
requests.
By way of definition, a committee request consists of a written or
oral request by the Chairman or Ranking Minority member of a committee
or subcommittee. CBO asks that requests from individual Members be made
in writing.
HOW CBO CONSULTS WITH COMMITTEES AND OTHER REQUESTERS OF ESTIMATES AND
ANALYSES
When undertaking a cost estimate or an analysis supporting such an
estimate, CBO analysts contact the staff of the committee of
jurisdiction and, when applicable, the staffs of the member sponsoring
the proposal and the Member requesting the estimate to gather
background information and discuss the schedule for completing the
estimate. Budget and mandate cost estimates are based on the text of
the proposed legislation. CBO analysts consult with the staff of the
committee of jurisdiction (for a reported bill) or the sponsoring
Member (for an introduced bill or amendment) when questions of
interpretation arise, but they draw their own conclusions on an
impartial and objective basis.
CBO analysts contact the appropriate staff members if a forthcoming
CBO estimate shows direct spending costs, mandates that exceed the
legislative thresholds, or other significant findings. CBO, however,
does not make judgments about the application of parliamentary points
of order. After CBO cost estimates have been transmitted, they may be
revised to correct errors or to incorporate new or updated information.
When undertaking requested analyses of legislative proposals or
issues, CBO staff members consult with the requester's staff to reach
an understanding of the scope and nature of the work to be done. CBO
analysts draw their own conclusions on an impartial and objective
basis, as they do when preparing cost estimates. When appropriate, CBO
staff inform other relevant committees of requests for analytic work
after advising the requester's staff. As a final step in the
consultation process, CBO informs the requester's staff of the results
of the analysis before it releases the material.
SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND PEER REVIEW PRACTICES
In preparing its budget estimates and analyses, CBO uses the rich
data sources available from the government's statistical agencies.
Those sources include the national income and product accounts, the
census of manufacturers, the Statistics of Income, the Current
Population Survey, and various national health surveys. CBO also uses
information provided by relevant government agencies and industry
groups to meet specific needs.
CBO employs standard methods of economic analysis and closely
follows theoretical and empirical developments in the professional
literature for economics and related disciplines. In addition, CBO
frequently calls on outside experts for advice on specific analytic
matters, such as the outlook for agriculture production, spending
projections for Medicare and Medicaid, and business prospects in the
telecommunications industry. For its economic forecasts and
assumptions, CBO draws on the advice of a distinguished panel of
advisers that meets twice a year.
All CBO estimates and analytic products are reviewed internally for
technical competence, accuracy of data, and clarity of exposition. CBO
studies are also reviewed by experts outside CBO, and the preface to
each study cites the many contributors who helped shape the final
product. Although outside experts and advisers provide considerable
assistance, CBO is solely responsible for the accuracy of the estimates
and analyses that it produces. In keeping with its nonpartisan status
and its mandate to provide objective analysis, CBO does not make policy
recommendations in any of its analyses.
CBO'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISCLOSING AND EXPLAINING ITS CRITICAL
ASSUMPTIONS AND METHODOLOGIES
Both the Congressional Budget Act and the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act direct CBO to disclose the basis for each budget and mandate cost
estimate. CBO interprets that directive to include the disclosure of
the critical assumptions and analytic methodologies used to prepare the
estimate. All written cost estimates include explanations of the basis
of the estimate, and CBO supplies further details on request. Similar
explanations of critical assumptions and methodologies are given in
CBO's analytic products. It is CBO's policy that its estimates and
analyses be clearly presented and easy to understand.
HOW CBO TRANSMITS ITS WORK TO THE CONGRESS
CBO seeks to ensure that key parties in the Congress who are
involved in any particular issue have equal access to its analytic
work. Insofar as possible, CBO delivers its cost estimates and analyses
to all interested parties simultaneously. Requests for confidentiality
are honored only for cost estimates for legislative proposals that have
not been made public.
The Director of the Congressional Budget Office transmits by letter
all formal budget and mandate cost estimates of legislative proposals
and all requested analyses. CBO sends its formal cost estimates for
reported bills and estimates prepared at committee request to the
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the reporting or requesting
committee. When the requester is a budget committee or individual
Member, CBO sends a copy of its cost estimate simultaneously to the
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the committee of jurisdiction;
for an introduced bill or amendment, a copy of the estimate is sent to
the sponsor as well as the requester. Cost estimates of legislative
proposals that have not been introduced as a bill or made public are
transmitted only to the sponsoring Member or requesting committee
unless CBO is directed otherwise.
In contrast, informal cost estimates may be transmitted directly by
CBO staff. Informal estimates are preliminary because they do not
undergo the same review procedures required for formal estimates.
HOW CBO DISTRIBUTES ITS ESTIMATES AND ANALYSES
CBO makes its analytic work widely available to Members of Congress
and their staffs as well as to the public. The Publications Office
sends a copy of all CBO reports and studies to each Member. Copies of
CBO papers, memorandums, and other analyses are available to Members
and Congressional staff on request.
The Publications Office also handles requests from the general
public, other government agencies, and the press. Single copies of CBO
reports, studies, papers, and memorandums are available at no charge.
In addition, the Superintendent of Documents at the U.S. Government
Printing Office carries many CBO reports and studies.
In September 1997, CBO launched its World Wide Web site
(www.cbo.gov). The site now includes publications, testimony, and cost
estimates issued since then as well as many publications from previous
years. As time and resources permit, CBO will continue to post older
products that remain relevant and useful. An index of publications
issued since CBO began operating in 1975, arranged chronologically and
by subject, will also be posted on the Web site.
The documents on CBO's Web site are available in four formats:
HTML, PDF, PostScript, and WordPerfect. The multiformat approach makes
CBO's products accessible to a wide variety of users and for multiple
purposes. Visitors can browse, search, download, and print documents
that are on the Web. They can also subscribe to ListServer a feature
that enables them to be notified by E-mail when CBO issues a
publication on a subject of interest to them.
For further information on CBO policies, contact the Administration
and Information Division at (202) 226-2600 or visit CBO's Web site
(www.cbo.gov). For copies of CBO's analyses, call the Publications
Office at 226-2809 or write to the following: Congressional Budget
Office, Administration and Information Division, Ford House Office
Building, Second and D Streets, SW, Washington, DC 20515.
Appendix C
JURISDICTION OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
A. From Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate
(e)(1) Committee on the Budget, to which committee shall be
referred all concurrent resolutions on the budget (as defined in
section 3(a)(4) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974) and all other
matters required to be referred to that committee under titles III and
IV of that Act, and messages, petitions, memorials, and other matters
relating thereto.
(2) Such committee shall have the duty--
(A) to report the matters required to be reported by it under
titles III and IV of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974;
(B) to make continuing studies of the effect on budget
outlays of relevant existing and proposed legislation and to
report the results of such studies to the Senate on a recurring
basis;
(C) to request and evaluate continuing studies of tax
expenditures, to devise methods of coordinating tax
expenditures, policies, and programs with direct budget
outlays, and to report the results of such studies to the
Senate on a recurring basis; and
(D) to review, on a continuing basis, the conduct by the
Congressional Budget Office of its functions and duties.
B. Unanimous consent agreement of January 30, 1975 (as modified on
April 11, 1986) with respect to Rescissions and Deferrals
(which had the effect of adopting the language of Senate
Resolution 45 which is set forth below):
Resolved,
1. That messages received pursuant to title X of the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act be referred concurrently to the
Appropriations Committee, to the Budget Committee, and to any other
appropriate authorizing committee.
2. That bills, resolutions and joint resolution introduced with
respect to rescissions and deferrals shall be referred to the
Appropriations Committee, and Budget Committee, and pending
implementations of section 401 of the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act and subject to section 401(d), to any other
committee exercising jurisdiction over contract and borrowing authority
programs as defined by section 401(c)(2) (A) and (B). The Budget
Committee and such other committees shall report their views, if any,
to the Appropriations Committee within 20 days following referral of
such messages, bills, resolutions, or joint resolutions. The Budget
Committee's consideration shall extend only to macroeconomic
implications, impact on priorities and aggregate spending levels, and
the legality of the President's use of the deferral and rescission
mechanism under title X. The Appropriations and authorizing committees
shall exercise their normal responsibilities over programs and
priorities.
3. If any Committee to which a bill or resolution has been referred
recommends its passage, the Appropriations Committee shall report the
bill or resolution together with its views and reports of the Budget
and any appropriate authorizing committees to the Senate within:
(A) the time remaining under the act in the case of
rescissions, or
(B) within 20 days in the case of deferrals.
4. The 20 day period referred to herein means 20 calendar days; and
for the purposes of computing the 20 days, recesses or adjournments of
the Senate for more than 3 days, to a day certain shall not be counted;
and for recesses and adjournments of more than 30 calendar days,
continuous duration or the sine die adjournment of a session, the 20
day period shall begin anew on the day following the reconvening of the
Senate.
(Agreed to January 30, 1975 (94th Cong., 1st Sess.), found at page
S1917 of the Congressional Record and as modified on April 11, 1986
(99th Cong., 2nd Sess.), found on pages S7318-19 of the Congressional
Record).
C. Unanimous consent agreement of August 4, 1977 regarding legislation
affecting the budget process (the text of which is set forth
below):
. . . [t]hat legislation affecting the congressional budget
process, as described below, be referred jointly to the committees on
the Budget and on Governmental Affairs. If one committee acts to report
a jointly referred measure, the other must act within 30 calendar days
of the continuous possession, or be automatically discharged.
Legislative proposals affecting the congressional budget process to
which this order applies are:
First. The functions, duties, and powers of the Budget Committee-as
described in title I of the act;
Second. The functions, duties, and powers of the Congressional
Budget Office--as described in titles III and IV of the act;
Third. The process by which Congress annually establishes the
appropriate levels of budget authority, outlays, revenues, deficits or
surpluses, and public debt--including subdivisions thereof. That
process includes the establishment: mandatory ceilings on spending and
appropriations; a floor on revenues; timetables for congressional
action on concurrent resolutions, on the reporting on authorization
bills, and on the enactment of appropriations bills; and enforcement
mechanisms for the limits and timetables, all as described in titles
III and IV of the act;
Fourth. The limiting of backdoor spending devices--as described in
title IV of the act;
Fifth. The timetables for Presidential submission of appropriations
and authorization request--as described in title IV of the act;
Sixth. The definitions of what constitutes impoundment--such as
``rescissions'' and ``deferrals'' as provided in the Impoundment
Control Act, title X;
Seventh. The process and determination by which impoundments must
be reported to and considered by Congress--as provided in the
Impoundment Control Act, title X;
Eighth. The mechanisms to insure Executive compliance with the
provisions of the Impoundment Control Act, title X--such as GAO review
and lawsuits; and
Ninth. The provisions which affect the content or determination of
amounts included in or excluded from the congressional budget or the
calculation of such amounts, including the definition of terms provided
by the Budget Act--as set forth in title I thereof.
(Agreed to August 4, 1997 (95th Cong., 1st Sess.), found at pages
S26709-10 of the Congressional Record.
Appendix D
MEMBER ROSTERS OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET, BY CONGRESS
93rd Congress 1974
Chairman Edmund S. Muskie
Majority Minority
Mangnuson, Warren G.
Moss, Frank E.
Mondale, Walter F.
Hollings, Ernest F.
Cranston, Alan
Chiles, Lawton M. Jr.
Abourezk, James G.
Biden, Joseph R. Jr.
(RM) Dominick, Peter H.
Young, Milton R.
Hruska, Roman L.
Javits, Jacob K.
Fannin, Paul J.
Dole, Robert J.
Departures from the Senate: Majority Minority
Defeated for Reelection None Dominick, Peter H.
Departures from Committee:
No new assignment None Fannin, Paul J.
Hruska, Roman L.
Javits, Jacob K.
Young, Milton R.
*Created as a standing committee 7/12/74. No budget legislation was
produced during the few remaining months of this Congress. The
committee concentrated on laying the groundwork for the activities of
future budget committees.
94th Congress 1975-1976
Chairman Edmund S. Muskie
Majority Minority
Mangnuson, Warren G.
Moss, Frank E.
Mondale, Walter F.
Hollings, Ernest F.
Cranston, Alan
Chiles, Lawton M. Jr.
Abourezk, James G.
Biden, Joseph R. Jr.
Nunn, Samuel A.
(RM) Bellmon, Henry
Dole, Robert J.
Beall, J. Glenn Jr.
Buckley, James L.
McClure, James A.
Domenici, Pete V.
Changes:
Majority:
Mondale, Walter F. 12/30/76 Resigned; elected Vice President
Departures from the Senate: Majority Minority
Defeated for Reelection Moss, Frank E. Beall, J. Glenn Jr.
Buckley, James L.
*RM denotes Ranking Member.
**The first budget ever was completed during this Congress.
95th Congress 1977-1978
Chairman Edmund S. Muskie
Majority Minority
Mangnuson, Warren G.
Moss, Frank E.
Hollings, Ernest F.
Cranston, Alan
Chiles, Lawton M. Jr.
Abourezk, James G.
Biden, Joseph R. Jr.
Nunn, Samuel A.
(RM) Bellmon, Henry
Dole, Robert J.
McClure, James A.
Domenici, Pete V.
Chafee, John H.
Lugar, Richard G.
Additions:
Majority:
Anderson, Wendell R. 1/11/77 (temporary assignment)
Moynihan, Daniel Patrick 1/11/77 (temporary assignment)
Changes:
Majority:
Nunn, Samuel A. 2/11/77 Left committee, no new assignment
Johnston, J. Bennett, Jr. 2/11/77 Replaced Nunn
Moynihan, Daniel P. 2/11/77 Moved to EPW
Sasser, James R. 2/11/77 Replaced Moynihan
Anderson, Wendell R. 12/29/78 Resigned, lost special election
Minority:
Chafee, John H. 2/22/77 Moved to EPW
Lugar, Richard G. 2/22/77 Moved to Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs
Hayakawa, S.I. (Sam) 2/22/77 Replaced Chafee
Heinz, H. John III 2/22/77 Replaced Lugar
Departures from the Senate: Majority Minority
Retired Abourezk, James G. None
Departures from Committee:
Moved to Judiciary None Dole, Robert J.
Moved to Appropriations None McClure, James A.
Moved to Foreign Relations None Hayakawa, S.I. (Sam)
Moved to Finance None Heinz, H. John III
No new assignment Cranston, Alan None
96th Congress 1979-1980
Chairman Edmund S. Muskie
Majority Minority
Mangnuson, Warren G.
Hollings, Ernest F.
Chiles, Lawton M. Jr.
Biden, Joseph R. Jr.
Johnston, J. Bennett Jr.
Sasser, James R.
Hart, Gary W.
Metzenbaum, Howard M.
Riegle, Donald W. Jr.
Moynihan, Daniel Patrick
Exon, J. James
(RM) Bellmon, Henry
Domenici, Pete V.
Packwood, Robert W.
Armstrong, William L.
Kassebaum, Nancy Landon
Boschwitz, Rudolf E.
Hatch, Orrin G.
Pressler, Larry L.
Changes:
Chair:
Muskie, Edmund S. 5/7/80 Resigned, appointed Secretary of State
Hollings, Ernest F. 5/13/80 Succeeded Muskie as Chair
Majority:
Muskie, Edmund S. 5/7/80 Resigned, appointed Secretary of State
Mitchell, George J. 5/19/80 Replaced Muskie
Departures from the Senate: Majority Minority
Defeated for Reelection Mangnuson, Warren G. None
Retired None Bellmon, Harry
Departures from Committee:
Moved to Finance Mitchell, George J. None
Moved to Foreign Relations None Pressler, Larry L.
No new assignment None Packwood, Robert W.
97th Congress 1981-1982
Chairman Pete V. Domenici
Majority Minority
Armstrong, William L.
Kassebaum, Nancy Landon
Boschwitz, Rudolf E.
Hatch, Orrin G.
Tower, John G.
Andrews, Mark
Symms, Steven D.
Grassley, Charles E.
Kasten, Robert W. Jr.
Quayle, J. Danforth
Gorton, Slade
(RM) Hollings, Ernest F.
Chiles, Lawton J. Jr.
Biden, Joseph R. Jr.
Johnston, J. Bennett Jr.
Sasser, James R.
Hart, Gary W.
Metzenbaum, Howard M.
Riegle, Donald W. Jr.
Moynihan, Daniel Patrick
Exon, J. James
98th Congress 1983-1984
Chairman Pete V. Domenici
Majority Minority
Armstrong, William L.
Kassebaum, Nancy Landon
Boschwitz, Rudolf E.
Hatch, Orrin G.
Tower, John G.
Andrews, Mark
Symms, Steven D.
Grassley, Charles E.
Kasten, Robert W. Jr.
Quayle, J. Danforth
Gorton, Slade
(RM) Chiles, Lawton M. Jr.
Hollings, Ernest F.
Biden, Joseph R. Jr.
Johnston, J. Bennett Jr.
Sasser, James R.
Hart, Gary W.
Metzenbaum, Howard M.
Riegle, Donald W. Jr.
Moynihan, Daniel Patrick
Exon, J. James
Departures from the Senate: Majority Minority
Retired Tower, John G. None
Departures from Committee:
No new assignment None Biden, Joseph R. Jr.
99th Congress 1985-1986
Chairman Pete V. Domenici
Majority Minority
Armstrong, William L.
Kassebaum, Nancy Landon
Boschwitz, Rudolf E.
Hatch, Orrin G.
Andrews, Mark
Symms, Steven D.
Grassley, Chalres E.
Kasten, Robert W. Jr.
Quayle, J. Danforth
Gorton, Slade
Danforth, John C.
(RM) Chiles, Lawton M. Jr.
Hollings, Ernest F.
Johnston, J. Bennett Jr.
Sasser, James R.
Hart, Gary W.
Metzenbaum, Howard M.
Riegle, Donald W. Jr.
Moynihan, Daniel Patrick
Exon, J. James
Lautenberg, Frank R.
Departures from the Senate: Majority Minority
Defeated for Reelection Andrews, Mark None
Gorton, Slade
Retired None Hart, Gary W.
Departures from Committee:
Moved to Foreign Relations; Rules and None Moynihan, Daniel Patrick
Administration
No new assignment Hatch, Orrin G. Metzenbaum, Howard M.
100th Congress 1987-1988
Chairman Lawton M. Chiles, Jr.
Majority Minority
Hollings, Ernest F.
Johnston, J. Bennett Jr.
Sasser, James R.
Riegle, Donald W. Jr.
Exon, J. James
Lautenberg, Frank R.
Simon, Paul M.
Sanford, Terry
Wirth, Timothy E.
Fowler, Wyche Jr.
Conrad, Kent
Dodd, Christopher J.
(RM) Domenici, Pete V.
Armstrong, William L.
Kassebaum, Nancy Landon
Boschwitz, Rudolf E.
Symms, Steven D.
Grassley, Charles E.
Kasten, Robert W. Jr.
Quayle, J. Danforth
Danforth, John C.
Nickles, Don
Rudman, Warren B.
Changes:
Minority:
Quayle, J. Danforth 1/2/89 Resigned, elected Vice President
Departures from the Senate: Majority Minority
Retired Chiles, Lawton M., Jr. None
Departures from Committee:
Moved to Select Intelligence None Danforth, John C.
Moved to Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs; None Kassebaum, Nancy Landon
Labor & Human Resources
101st Congress 1989-1990
Chairman James R. Sasser
Majority Minority
Hollings, Ernest F.
Johnston, J. Bennett Jr.
Riegle, Donald W. Jr.
Exon, J. James
Lautenberg, Frank R.
Simon, Paul M.
Sanford, Terry
Wirth, Timothy E.
Fowler, Wyche Jr.
Conrad, Kent
Dodd, Christopher J.
Robb, Charles S.
(RM) Domenici, Pete V.
Armstrong, William L.
Boschwitz, Rudolf E.
Symms, Steven D.
Grassley, Charles E.
Kasten, Robert W. Jr.
Nickles, Don
Rudman, Warren
Gramm, W. Phil
Bond, Christopher S.
Departures from the Senate: Majority Minority
Defeated for Reelection None Boschwitz, Rudolf E.
Retired None Armstrong, William L.
Departures from Committee:
Moved to Select Intelligence None Rudman, Warren
No new assignment Robb, Charles S. None
102nd Congress 1991-1992
Chairman James R. Sasser
Majority Minority
Hollings, Ernest F.
Johnston, J. Bennett Jr.
Riegle, Donald W. Jr.
Exon, J. James
Lautenberg, Frank R.
Simon, Paul M.
Sanford, Terry
Wirth, Timothy E.
Fowler, Wyche Jr.
Conrad, Kent
Dodd, Christopher J.
(RM) Domenici, Pete V.
Symms, Steven, D.
Grassley, Charles E.
Kasten, Robert W. Jr.
Nickles, Don
Gramm, W. Phil
Bond, Christopher S.
Lott, Trent
Brown, Hank
Departures from the Senate: Majority Minority
Retired Wirth, Timothy E. Symms, Steven D.
Defeated for Reelection Sanford, Terry Kasten, Robert W.
Fowler, Wyche Jr. Jr.
103rd Congress 1993-1994
Chairman James R. Sasser
Majority Minority
Hollings, Ernest F.
Johnston, J. Bennett Jr.
Riegle, Donald W. Jr.
Exon, J. James
Lautenberg, Frank R.
Simon, Paul S.
Conrad, Kent
Dodd, Christopher J.
Sarbanes, Paul S.
Boxer, Barbara
Murray, Patty
(RM) Domenici, Pete V.
Grassley, Charles E.
Nickles, Don
Gramm, W. Phil
Bond, Christopher S.
Lott, Trent
Brown, Hank
Gorton, Slade
Gregg, Judd
Departures from the Senate: Majority Minority
Retired Riegle, Donald W. Jr. None
Defeated for Reelection Sasser, James R. ..............................
104th Congress 1995-1996
Chairman Pete V. Domenici
Majority
Grassley, Charles E.
Nickles, Don
Gramm, W. Phil
Bond, Christopher S.
Lott, Trent
Brown, Hank
Gorton, Slade
Gregg, Judd
Snowe, Olympia J.
Abraham, Spencer
Frist, Bill
Minority
(RM) Exon, J. James
Hollings, Ernest F.
Johnston, J. Bennett Jr.
Lautenberg, Frank R.
Simon, Paul M.
Conrad, Kent
Dodd, Christopher J.
Sarbanes, Paul S.
Boxer, Barbara
Murray, Patty
Additions:
Majority:
Grams, Rod 3/29/96
Minority:
Wyden, Ron 3/29/96
Changes:
Majority:
Lott, Trent 6/20/96 Left committee, became Senate Majority
Leader
Mack, Connie 6/20/96 Replaced Lott
Departures from the Senate: Majority Minority
Retired Brown, Hank Exon, J. James
Johnston, J. Bennett Jr.
Simon, Paul
Departures from Committee:
Mack, Connie Dodd, Christopher J.
105th Congress 1997-1998
Pete V. Domenici, NM, Chairman
Majority
Charles E. Grassley, IA
Don Nickles, OK
Phil Gramm, TX
Christopher S. Bond, MO
Slade Gorton, WA
Judd Gregg, NH
Olympia J. Snowe, ME
Spencer Abraham, MI
Bill Frist, TN
Rod Grams, MN
Gordon Smith, OR
Minority
Frank R. Lautenberg, NJ
Ernest F. Hollings, SC
Kent Conrad, ND
Paul S. Sarbanes, MD
Barbara Boxer, CA
Patty Murray, WA
Ron Wyden, OR
Russell D. Feingold, WI
Tim Johnson, SD
Richard J. Durbin, IL
Appendix E
BUDGET TIMETABLE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Action
------------------------------------------------------------------------
5 days before President's budget CBO sequester preview
submission. report.
1st Monday in February.................... President's budget
submission (includes OMB
sequester preview report
and adjustments to spending
caps).
February 15............................... CBO budget and economic
outlook report.
Within 6 weeks of President's budget...... Committees submit views and
estimates to the Budget
Committees.
April 1................................... Senate Budget Committee
reports budget resolution.
April 15.................................. Congress completes budget
resolution. If not,
Chairman of House Budget
Committee files 302(a)
allocations; Ways and Means
is free to proceed with pay-
as-you-go measures.
May 15.................................... Appropriation bills may be
considered in the House.
June 10................................... House Appropriations reports
last bill.
End of previous session to June 30........ If an appropriations bill
violates caps, OMB
sequesters 15 days after
enactment.
June 30................................... House completes action on
annual appropriation bills.
July 15................................... President submits mid-
session review.
August 10................................. President's notification on
military personnel
exemption.
August 15................................. CBO sequester update report.
August 20................................. OMB sequester update report
(with adjustments to caps).
October 1................................. Fiscal year begins.
10 days after end of session.............. CBO final sequester report.
15 days after end of session.............. OMB final sequester report.
15 days after end of session.............. GAO compliance report.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3104.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3104.002
Appendix G
COMPLETION DATES OF BUDGET RESOLUTIONS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year Budget resolution adopted
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1976...................................... May 14, 1975 (H. Con. Res.
218)
1977...................................... May 13, 1976 (S. Con. Res.
109)
1978...................................... May 17, 1977 (S. Con. Res.
19)
1979...................................... May 17, 1978 (S. Con. Res.
80)
1980...................................... May 24, 1979 (H. Con. Res.
107)
1981...................................... June 12, 1980 (H. Con. Res.
307)
1982...................................... May 21, 1981 (H. Con. Res.
115)
1983...................................... June 23, 1982 (S. Con. Res.
92)
1984...................................... June 23, 1983 (H. Con. Res.
91)
1985...................................... October 1, 1984 (H. Con.
Res. 280)
1986...................................... August 1, 1985 (S. Con. Res.
32)
1987 \1\.................................. May 15, 1986 (H. Con. Res.
337)
1988...................................... June 25, 1987 (H. Con. Res.
93)
1989...................................... June 6, 1988 (H. Con. Res.
268)
1990...................................... May 18, 1989 (H. Con. Res.
106)
1991...................................... October 9, 1990 (H. Con.
Res. 310)
1992...................................... May 22, 1991 (H. Con. Res.
121)
1993...................................... May 21, 1992 (H. Con. Res.
287)
1994...................................... April 1, 1993 (H. Con. Res.
64)
1995...................................... May 12, 1994 (H. Con. Res.
218)
1996...................................... June 29, 1995 (H. Con. Res.
67)
1997...................................... June 13, 1996 (H. Con. Res.
178)
1998...................................... June 4, 1997 (H. Con. Res.
84)
1999...................................... April 2, 1998 (Senate passes
S. Con. Res. 86) \2\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ From fiscal year 1976 through fiscal year 1986 May 15 was the
deadline for adoption of a budget resolution. The enactment of Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings in fiscal year 1987 changed the deadline date to April
15.
\2\ Conference never completed with the House of Representatives on the
FY 1999 Budget Resolution. April 2, 1998: Senate passes S. Res. 209
deeming section 302(a) allocation for Senate Committee on
Appropriations. October 21, 1998: Senate passes S. Res. 312, amending
S. Res. 209 to deem budgetary levels for Senate enforcement of points
of order pursuant to the Congressional Budget Act during FY 1999.
Bold indicates that Congress met the statutory deadline for completion
of the budget resolution.
Appendix H
BUDGET ACT POINTS OF ORDER IN THE SENATE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section Description Waiver requirement
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
301(g)............................... More than one set of economics in a budget Majority
resolution
301(i)............................... Prohibits consideration of budget 60
resolutions that reduce the Social
Security surplus.
302(c)............................... Prohibits consideration of Appropriations 60
legislation until committee has filed
Sec. 302(b) suballocation report.
302(f)............................... Prohibits consideration of legislation 60
providing budget authority, outlays, or
Social Security outlays in excess of
committee's Sec. 302(a) or 302(b)
allocation.
303(a)............................... Prohibits consideration of any new Majority
spending, revenue or debt legislation for
a fiscal year (except for appropriations)
prior to adoption of budget resolution
for that fiscal year.
303(c)............................... Prohibits consideration of any Majority
appropriations legislation prior to
adoption of a budget resolution and
section 302(a) allocation for the
Appropriations Committee. Exception:
advance appropriation for the 1st or 2nd
fiscal year after a year for which a
section 302(a) allocation has been made.
305(b)(2)............................ Prohibits nongermane amendments to budget 60
resolutions and reconciliation bills.
305(c)(4)............................ Prohibits consideration of nongermane 60
amendments between the Houses to a budget
resolution and, by reference in 310(e),
to reconciliation legislation.
305(d)............................... Prohibits consideration of budget Majority
resolutions that are not mathematically
consistent.
306.................................. Prohibits consideration of legislation in 60
Budget Committee's jurisdiction if not
reported from the committee.
310(d)(2)............................ Prohibits consideration of amendments to 60
reconciliation bills that are not deficit
neutral.
310(g)............................... Prohibits consideration of any amendment 60
to reconciliation legislation that
recommends changes in Social Security.
311(a)............................... Prohibits legislation that would violate 60
budget authority ceiling, outlay ceiling,
revenue floor, or Social Security surplus/
deficit levels.
312(b)............................... Prohibits consideration of legislation 60
which exceeds the discretionary spending
limits set out in section 251(c) of the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act.
312(c)............................... Prohibits consideration of a budget 60
resolution which exceeds the maximum
deficit amount (if any) set out in the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act.
313.................................. Byrd rule (extraneous matter in 60
reconciliation)
401(a)............................... Prohibits consideration of legislation Majority
providing new contract authority, new
indebtedness, or new credit authority not
limited to appropriations.
401(b)(1)............................ Prohibits consideration of legislation Majority
providing new entitlement authority that
becomes effective during the current
fiscal year.
425(a)(1)............................ Prohibits consideration of reported Majority
legislation unless it includes a CBO
mandate cost estimate.
425(a)(2)............................ Prohibits consideration of legislation Majority
imposing an unfunded intergovernmental
mandate.
202*................................. ``Pay-as-you-go'': prohibits consideration 60
of legislation that would increase
deficit for first year, years 1-5, or
years 6-10.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* This point of order was established by Sec. 202 of the Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year
1996 (H. Con. Res. 67)
Appendix I
COMPLETION DATES OF THE RECONCILIATION LEGISLATION
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reconciliation bills Dates passed by Congress Enactment
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of December 3, 1980 December 5, 1980.
1980.
H.R. 7765; Pub. L. No. 96-499.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of July 31, 1981 August 13, 1981.
1981.
H.R. 3982; Pub. L. No. 97-35.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of August 18, 1982 September 8, 1982.
1982.
H.R. 6955; Pub. L. No. 97-253.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of April 5, 1984 April 18, 1984.
1983.
H.R. 4169; Pub. L. No. 98-270.
Consolidated Omnibus Budget March 20, 1986 April 7, 1986.
Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA).
H.R. 3128; Pub. L. No. 99-272.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of October 17, 1986 October 21, 1986.
1986.
H.R. 5300; Pub. L. No. 99-509.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of December 22, 1987 December 22, 1987.
1987.
H.R. 3545; Pub. L. No. 100-203.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of November 22, 1989 December 19, 1989.
1989.
H.R. 3299; Pub. L. No. 101-239.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of October 27, 1990 November 5, 1990.
1990.
H.R. 5835; Pub. L. No. 101-508.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of August 6, 1993 August 19, 1993.
1993.
H.R. 2264; Pub. L. No. 103-66.
Balanced Budget Act of 1995......... November 20, 1995 Vetoed, December 6, 1995.
H.R. 2491.
The Personal Responsibility and Work August 1, 1996 August 22, 1996.
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996.
H.R. 3734; Pub. L. No. 104-193.
Balanced Budget Act of 1997......... July 31, 1997 August 5, 1997
H.R. 2015; P.L. No. 105-33
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997......... July 31, 1997 August 5, 1997
H.R. 2014; P.L. No. 105-34
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* In 1985 the deadline for enactment of reconciliation bills was changed from September 25 to June 15.
** Section 13210(2) of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 amended section 310(f) to repeal the June 15 deadline
for the completion of reconciliation. However, the timetable in Sec. 300 of the Budget Act calls for
completion of reconciliation legislation by June 15.
Appendix J
GLOSSARY
Appropriations Act: A statute, under the jurisdiction of the House and
Senate Appropriations Committees, that generally provides authority for
Federal agencies to incur obligations and to make payments out of the
Treasury for specified purposes. An appropriation act is the most
common means of providing budget authority. Currently, there are 13
regular appropriations acts for each fiscal year. From time to time,
Congress also enacts supplemental appropriations acts. (See
Appropriations under Budget Authority; Continuing Resolution;
Supplemental Appropriation.)
Authorizing Committee: A committee of the House or Senate with
legislative jurisdiction over laws that set up or continue the
operations of Federal programs and provide the legal basis for making
appropriations for those programs. Authorizing committees also have
direct control over spending for mandatory programs since the
Government's obligation to make payments for such program is contained
in the authorizing legislation (See Entitlement.)
Authorizing Legislation: Legislation enacted by Congress that sets up
or continues the operation of a Federal program or agency indefinitely
or for a specific period of time. Authorizing legislation may limit the
amount of budget authority which can be appropriated for a program or
may authorize the appropriation of ``such sums as are necessary.'' (See
Budget Authority; Entitlement.)
Backdoor Spending: (See Direct Spending or Mandatory Spending.)
Budget Authority: The authority Congress gives to Government agencies,
permitting them to enter into obligations which will result in
immediate or future outlays.
Budget authority may be classified in several ways. It may be
classified by the form it takes: appropriations, borrowing authority,
or contract authority. Budget authority may also be classified by the
determination of amount: definite authority or indefinite authority.
Finally budget authority may be classified by the period of
availability: 1-year authority, multi-year authority, or no-year
authority (available until used).
Forms of Budget Authority
Appropriations.--An act of Congress that permits Federal agencies
to incur obligations and to make payments out of the Treasury for
specified purposes. An appropriations act is the most common means of
providing budget authority.
Borrowing Authority.--Statutory authority that permits a Federal
agency to incur obligations and to make payments for specified purposes
out of money borrowed from the Treasury, the Federal Financing Bank, or
the public. The Budget Act in most cases requires that new authority to
borrow must be approved in advance in an appropriation act.
Contract Authority.--Statutory authority that permits a Federal
agency to enter into contracts in advance of appropriations. Under the
Budget Act, most new authority to contract must be approved in advance
in an appropriation act.
Offsetting collections and receipts.--Income from the public which
is displayed in the budget as negative budget authority. (See
Offsetting Collections and Offsetting Receipts.
Budget Baseline: Projected Federal spending, revenue and deficit levels
based on the assumption that current policies will continue unchanged
for the upcoming fiscal year.
In determining the budget baseline under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, the
Directors of OMB and CBO estimate revenue levels and spending levels
for entitlement programs based on continuation of current laws. For
estimating discretionary spending amounts (both defense and non-
defense), the Directors assume an adjustment for inflation (GNP
deflator) added to the previous year's discretionary spending levels.
The baseline also includes sufficient appropriations to cover a Federal
pay comparability raise (without absorption).
Budget Deficit: The amount by which the Government's total outlays
exceed its total revenues for a given fiscal year. (See Outlays;
Revenues.)
Budget Resolution: A concurrent resolution passed by both Houses of
Congress setting forth, reaffirming, or revising the congressional
budget for the U.S. Government for a fiscal year. A budget resolution
is a concurrent resolution of Congress. Concurrent resolutions do not
require a presidential signature because they are not laws. Budget
resolutions do not need to be laws because they are a legislative
device for the Congress to regulate itself as it works on spending and
revenue bills.
Budget Surplus: The amount by which the Government's revenues exceed
its outlays for a given fiscal year. (See Outlays; Revenues.)
Capital Budget: A budget that segregates capital spending from all
other spending, what is usually considered the ``operating budget.'' In
a capital budget, spending and receipts in the capital budget are
excluded from the operating budget and are not included in the
operating budget's deficit or surplus calculations. A capital budget
would include spending only for capital assets. Capital assets are
usually defined to be limited to land, structures, equipment, and
intellectual property that are owned and used by the Federal government
and have a useful life of more than 2 years. However, some proponents
of capital budgeting have suggested that capital should be defined to
include Federal ``investment'' spending that yields long-term benefits.
President Clinton established a Commission to Study Capital Budgeting
by issuing Executive Order 13037 on March 3, 1997. The Commission is
required to issue its report by December 17, 1998.
Congressional Budget: (See Budget Resolution.)
Continuing Resolution: Appropriations legislation enacted by Congress
to provide temporary budget authority for Federal agencies to keep them
in operation when their regular appropriation bill has not been enacted
by the start of the fiscal year. A continuing resolution is a joint
resolution, which has the same legal status as a bill.
A continuing resolution frequently specifies a maximum rate at
which obligations may be incurred, based on the rate of the prior year,
the President's budget request, or an appropriation bill passed by
either or both chambers of Congress. However, there have been instances
when Congress has used a continuing resolution as an omnibus measure to
enact a number of appropriation bills.
A continuing resolution is a form of appropriation act and should
not be confused with the budget resolution.
Credit Authority: Authority to incur direct loan obligations or to
incur primary loan guarantee commitments. Under the Budget Act, new
credit authority must be approved in advance in an appropriation act.
Crosswalk: Also known as ``committee allocation'' or ``section 302
allocation.'' The means by which budget resolution spending totals are
translated into binding guidelines with respect to budget authority and
outlays for committee action on spending bills. The Budget Committees
allocate the budget resolution totals among the committees by
jurisdiction, Crosswalk allocations of budget authority and outlays to
the committee appear in the joint explanatory statement accompanying a
conference report on the budget resolution.
Current Services Budget: A section of the President's budget, required
by the Budget Act, that sets forth the level of spending or taxes that
would occur if existing programs and policies were continued unchanged
through the fiscal year and beyond, with all programs adjusted for
inflation so that existing levels of activity are maintained. (See
Baseline.)
Deferral of Budget Authority: An action by the executive branch that
delays the obligation of budget authority beyond the point it would
normally occur. Pursuant to the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974, the President must provide advanced notice to the
Congress of any proposed deferrals. A deferral may not extend beyond
the end of the fiscal year in which the President's message proposing
the deferral is made. Congress may overturn a deferral by passing a law
disapproving the deferral.
Deficit: The amount by which the government's total budget outlays
exceeds its total receipts for a fiscal year.
Direct Spending: A term defined in the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990
to include entitlement authority, the food stamp program, and budget
authority provided in law other than appropriations acts. From the
perspective of the appropriations process, all direct spending is
classified as mandatory as opposed to discretionary spending. New
direct spending is subject to pay-as-you-go requirements. Direct
spending is synonymous with mandatory spending. (See Mandatory Spending
and Entitlement.)
Discretionary Spending: A category of spending (budget authority and
outlays) subject to the annual appropriations process. (See
Appropriations Acts.)
Entitlement: Programs that are governed by legislation in a way that
legally obligates the Federal government to make specific payments to
qualified recipients. Payments to persons under the Social Security,
Medicare, and veterans' pensions programs are considered to be
entitlements. (See Direct Spending and Mandatory Spending.)
Emergency Spending: As provided in the Budget Enforcement Act, a
provision of legislation designated as an emergency by both the
President and the Congress. As a result, this additional spending is
not subject to the discretionary caps or the pay go requirements and
thus will not cause a sequester. In addition, emergency legislation is
effectively exempt from Budget Act points of order.
There is no specific criteria in the law for emergency spending.
However, the following criteria were contained in a June 1991 report
prepared by the Office of Management and Budget--as required by Pub. L.
No. 102-55 for the determination of whether to designate spending as an
emergency spending:
Necessary expenditure.--an essential or vital expenditure,
not one that is merely useful or beneficial;
Sudden.--quickly coming into being, not building up over
time;
Urgent.--pressing and compelling need requiring immediate
action;
Unforseen.--not predictable or seen beforehand as a coming
need (an emergency that is part of an aggregate level of
anticipated emergencies, particularly when normally estimated
in advance, would not be ``unforseen''); and
Not permanent.--the need is temporary in nature.
Expenditures: (See Outlays.)
Federal Debt: Consists of all Treasury and agency debt issues
outstanding. Current law places a limit or ceiling on the amount of
debt. Debt subject to limit has two components: debt held by the
government and debt held by the public.
Debt held by the government.--Represents the holdings of debt
by federal trust funds and other special government funds. For
example, when a trust fund is in surplus as is presently the
case with Social Security, the law requires that this surplus
be invested in government securities.
Debt held by the public.--Represents the holdings of debt by
individuals, institutions, other buyers outside the federal
government, and the Federal Reserve System. The change in debt
held by the public in any given year closely tracks the unified
budget deficit for that year.
Fiscal Policy: Federal government policies with respect to taxes,
spending, and debt management intended to promote the nations'
macroeconomic goals, particularly with respect to employment, gross
national product, price level stability, and equilibrium in balance of
payments. The budget process is a major vehicle for determining and
implementing Federal fiscal policy. The other major component of
Federal macroeconomic policy is monetary policy. (See Monetary Policy.)
Fiscal Year: A fiscal year is a 12-month accounting period. The fiscal
for the Federal Government begins October 1 and ends September 30. The
fiscal year is designated by the calendar year in which it ends; for
example fiscal year 1997 is the year beginning October 1, 1996, and
ending September 30, 1997.
Functional Classification: A system of classifying budget resources by
major purpose so that budget authority, outlays, and credit activities
can be related in terms of the national needs being addressed (for
example, national defense, health) regardless of the agency
administrating the program. There are currently 20 functions. A
function may be divided into two or more subfunctions depending upon
the complexity of the national need addressed by that function. (See
Budget Authority; Outlays.) (See Appendix A.)
Impoundment: A generic term referring to any action or inaction by an
officer or employee of the U.S. Government that precludes the
obligation or expenditure of budget authority in the manner intended by
Congress. (See Deferral of budget Authority; Rescission of Budget
Authority.)
Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT.): Section 8001 of the Internal
Revenue Code authorized the creation of the Joint Committee on
Taxation. By statute, it is composed of five members from the Committee
on Finance (three majority, two minority) chosen by such Committee and
five members from the Committee on Ways and Means (three majority, two
minority) chosen by such Committee. In practice, the Chairmanship and
Vice Chairmanship of the Joint Committee on Taxation has rotated
between the Chairman of the Committee on Finance and the Chairman of
the Committee on Ways and Means with each new Congress. Among other
things, the JCT's duties are to investigate the operation and effects
of the federal tax system.
Mandatory Spending: Refers to spending for programs the level of which
is governed by formulas or criteria set forth in authorizing
legislation rather than by appropriations. Examples of mandatory
spending include: Social Security, Medicare, veterans' pensions,
rehabilitation services, Members' pay, judges pay and the payment of
interest of the public debt. Many of these programs are considered
entitlement. (See Direct Spending.)
Mark-Up: Meetings where congressional committees work on language of
bills or resolutions. At Budget Committee mark-ups, the House and
Senate Budget Committees work on the language and numbers contained in
budget resolutions and legislation affecting the congressional budget
process.
Monetary Policy: Management of the money supply, under the direction of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve system, with the aim of
achieving price stability and full employment. Government actions in
guiding monetary policy, include currency revaluation, credit
contradiction or expansion, rediscount policy, regulationof bank
reserves and the purchase and sale of Government securities. (See
Fiscal Policy.)
Net Deficit Reduction: Savings below the defined budget baseline
achieved for the upcoming fiscal year because of laws enacted or final
regulations promulgated since January 1. CBO and OMB independently
estimate these savings in their initial and final sequester reports.
Offsetting Collections: Income from the public that results from the
government engaging in ``business-like'' activities with the public,
such as the sale of products or the rendering of a service. Examples
include proceeds funds derived from the sale of postage stamps.
Offsetting collections are credited against the level of budget
authority or outlays associated with a specific program or account.
(See offsetting receipts.)
Offsetting Receipts: Income from the public that results from the
government engaging in ``business-like'' activities with the public
such as the sale of products or the rendering of services. Examples
include proceeds from the sale of timber from Federal lands or entrance
fees paid at national parks. Rather than being credited against the
spending of a particular program or account, (as in the case with
offsetting collections) offsetting receipts are deducted from total
budget authority and outlays rather than added to Federal revenues even
though they are deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.
Generally offsetting receipts are associated with mandatory spending.
(See offsetting collections.)
Off-budget Federal Entity: Any Federal fund or trust fund whose
transactions are required by law to be excluded from the totals of
President's budget submission and Congress' budget resolution, despite
the fact that these are part of the government's total transactions.
Current law requires that the Social Security trust funds (the Federal
Old Age, Survivors, and Disability trust fund) and the Postal Service
be off-budget. However, these entities are reflected in the budget in
that they are included in calculating the deficit in order to derive
the total government deficit that must be financed by borrowing from
the public or by other means. All other federal funds and trust funds
are on budget. (See Unified Budget.)
Outlays: Outlays are disbursements by the Federal Treasury in the form
of checks or cash. Outlays flow in part from budget authority granted
in prior years and in part from budget authority provided for the year
in which the disbursements occur.
Outlay Rates: The ratio of outlays (actual government disbursements) in
a fiscal year relative to new budgetary resources in that fiscal year.
In estimating the budget baseline and baseline deficit for their
sequestration reports, CBO and OMB use outlay rates for projecting
levels of spending resulting from available budget authority.
Pay-as-you-go: Arises in two separate contexts: a point of order in the
Senate and a sequester order from OMB.
Pay-as-you-go in the Senate.--Since fiscal year 1994, the budget
resolution has included a pay-as-you-go rule in the Senate. The rule
provides a \3/5\ths vote point of order in the Senate against
consideration of legislation that would cause a net increase in the
deficit over a ten year period. It applies to all legislation except
appropriations legislation. To determine a violation, CBO measures the
budget impact of a direct spending or revenue bill combined with the
budget impact of all direct spending and revenue legislation enacted
since the latest budget resolution's adoption to see if the legislation
would result in a net deficit increase for any one of three time
periods (the first year, the sum of years 1 through 5, and the sum of
years 6 through 10.) The pay-go rule sunsets at the end of fiscal year
2002.
Pay-as-you-go and sequestration under the BEA.--The Budget
Enforcement Act requires OMB to also enforce a ``pay-as-you-go''
requirement which has a similar effect as the Senate's point of order:
Congress is required to ``pay for'' any changes to programs which
result in an increase in direct spending, or in this case risk a
sequester. If OMB estimates that the sum of all direct spending and
revenue legislation enacted since 1990 will result in a net increase in
the deficit for the fiscal year, then the President is required to
issue a sequester order reducing all non-exempt direct spending
accounts by a uniform percentage in order to eliminate the net deficit
increase. Most direct spending is either exempt from a sequester order
or operates under special rules that minimize the reduction that can be
made in direct spending. Social Security is exempt from a pay-as-you-go
sequester and Medicare cannot be reduced by more than 4 percent.
President's Budget: The document sent to Congress by the President in
January or February of each year, requesting new budget authority for
Federal programs and estimating Federal revenues and outlays for the
upcoming fiscal year.
Revenues: Collections from the public arising from the Government's
sovereign power to tax. Revenues include individual and corporate
income taxes, social insurance taxes (such as social security payroll
taxes), excise taxes, estate and gift taxes, customs duties and the
like.
Reconciliation Process: A process by which Congress includes in a
budget resolution ``reconciliation instructions'' to specific
committees, directing them to report legislation which changes existing
laws, usually for the purpose of decreasing spending or increasing
revenues by a specified amount by a certain date. The legislation may
also contain an increase in the debt limit. The reported legislation is
then considered as a single ``reconciliation bill under expedited
procedures.''
Reserve Fund: A provision in a budget resolution that grants the
Chairman of the Budget Committee the authority to make changes in
budget aggregates and committee allocations once some condition or
conditions have been met. Since a budget resolution establishes a
binding ceiling on aggregate budget authority and outlay levels and a
binding floor on revenues, budget resolutions frequently include
reserve funds for deficit-neutral legislation that would otherwise
violate the budget resolution and be subject to a point of order under
the Budget Act. For example, the FY 1997 budget resolution included a
tax reduction reserve fund that allowed the Chairman to reduce the
revenue floor and the relevant spending allocations to accommodate
legislation that reduced taxes if that legislation also contained
offsetting spending reductions.
Rescission of Budget Authority: Cancellation of budget authority before
the time when the authority would otherwise cease to be available for
obligation. The rescission process begins when the President proposes a
rescission to the Congress for fiscal or policy reasons. Unlike the
deferral of budget authority which occurs unless Congress acts to
disapprove the deferral, rescission off budget authority occurs only if
Congress enacts the rescission. (See Deferral of Budget Authority;
Impoundment.)
Scoring or Scorekeeping: The process for estimating budget authority,
outlay, revenue and deficit levels which result from congressional
budgetary actions. Scorekeeping data prepared by the Congressional
Budget Office include status reports on the effect of congressional
actions and comparisons of these actions to targets and ceilings set by
Congress in budget resolutions. These reports are published in the
Congressional Record on a regular basis. OMB is responsible for scoring
legislation to determine if a sequester is necessary.
Sequester: Pursuant to Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, a presidential spending
reduction order that occurs by reducing spending by uniform
percentages.
Sequestrable Resource: Pursuant to Gramm-Rudman-Hollings federal
funding authority (budgetary resources) subject to reductions under a
presidential sequester order for achieving required outlay reductions
(in non-exempt programs).
Supplemental Appropriation: An act appropriating funds in addition to
those in the 13 regular annual appropriations acts. Supplemental
appropriations provide additional budget authority beyond the original
estimates for programs or activities (including new programs authorized
after the date of the original appropriation act) in cases where the
need for funds is too urgent to be postponed until enactment of the
next regular appropriation bill. (See Appropriation Act.)
Tax Expenditures: Revenue losses attributable to a special exclusion,
exemption, or deduction from gross income or to a special credit,
preferential rate of tax, or deferral of tax liability.
Unfunded Mandates: A Federal Intergovernmental Mandate is any provision
in legislation, statute, or regulation that would impose an enforceable
duty upon State, local or tribal government, except as conditions of
assistance or duties arising from participation in a voluntary federal
program. Exceptions to this rule are: enforcing constitutional rights;
statutory prohibitions against discrimination; emergency assistance
requested by states; accounting/auditing for federal assistance;
national security; Presidential designated emergencies; and Social
Security. Provisions that increase stringency of conditions of
assistance or decrease federal funding for large state entitlement
programs (greater than $500 million) if states lack authority to
decrease their responsibilities are considered mandates as well.
A Federal Private Sector Mandate is any provision in legislation,
statute, or regulation that would impose an enforceable duty upon the
private sector. The exceptions are a condition of Federal assistance or
a duty arising from participation in a voluntary Federal program.
Unified Budget: A comprehensive display of the Federal budget. This
display includes all revenues and all spending for all regular Federal
programs and trust funds. The 1967 President's Commission on Budget
Concepts recommended the unified budget and it has been the basis for
budgeting since 1968. The unified budget replaced a system of the
budgets that existed before 1968 (an administrative budget, a
consolidated cash budget, and a national income accounts budget).