[Senate Prints 105-45]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
105th Congress S. Prt.
2d Session COMMITTEE PRINT 105-45
_______________________________________________________________________
SUDAN TODAY: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY
__________
A STAFF REPORT
TO THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
FEBRUARY 1998
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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U.S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
45-883 CC WASHINGTON : 1998
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
James W. Nance, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ iv
Key Findings and Recommendations................................. 1
I. Introduction and Background................................. 3
Support for Terrorists....................................... 4
Persecution of Christians.................................... 6
II. The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and Resistance
Against the National Islamic Front............................. 6
The Sudan Alliance Force..................................... 6
The Beja Congress............................................ 8
The Sudan Federal Democratic Union........................... 9
Other NDA Members............................................ 9
NDA Operations Inside Sudan.................................. 10
III. U.S. Policy Toward Sudan.................................... 14
IV. Assessment of Humanitarian Conditions in Eastern Sudan....... 15
V. Long Term Development........................................ 17
Appendix
A. Letter from Senator Jesse Helms to U.S. Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright............................................. 23
B. Secretary of State Albright's Response to Senator Helms'
Letter of January 13, 1998..................................... 24
C. Agency for International Development Activity Data Sheet--
Regional Economic Development Services Office for East and
Southern Africa (REDSO/ESA) Effective Delivery of USAID's
Humanitarian Assistance........................................ 25
D. Assessment Mission and Proposal for Support to Togan.......... 31
E. Assessment of the Humanitarian Conditions in Eastern Sudan.... 41
F. S. 873--Prohibition on Financial Transactions With Countries
Supporting Terrorism Act of 1997............................... 48
G. November 4, 1997, Executive Order Blocking Sudanese Government
Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Sudan............... 50
H. November 4, 1997, Message to Congress Regarding Executive
Order Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting
Transactions with Sudan........................................ 52
I. November 4, 1997, Remarks by Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright on New Economic Sanctions Against Sudan............... 53
J. The Asmara Declaration........................................ 54
(iii)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
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February 9, 1998.
The Hon. Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman: Beginning December 2, 1997, we traveled
to Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan to assess political and military
opposition to Sudan's extremist Islamic regime, to examine the
humanitarian conditions of civilians in eastern Sudan, and to
understand regional perspectives of the Sudan question.
This investigation was timely in light of the Clinton
Administration's November 4, 1997, sanctions blocking assets
of, and prohibiting financial transactions with, Sudan. As you
know, the Administration imposed these sanctions as a result,
in part, of Congressional pressure from such initiatives as the
Ashcroft-Helms bill (S. 873) prohibiting financial transactions
with countries supporting terrorism, and similar provisions
contained in the Senate passed ``Foreign Affairs Reform and
Restructuring Act of 1997'' (S. 903).
According to U.S. State Department officials, our visit
inside territory held by the opposition Sudan Alliance Forces
in eastern Sudan was the first by any U.S. officials. We
traveled to Eritrea and Sudan from December 3-9, 1997, then
proceeded to Ethiopia until December 12 for additional meetings
with Ethiopian and U.S. officials on the situation in the
Sudan.
While in Eritrea, Sudan and Ethiopia, we met with Sudanese
opposition leaders (including John Garang, leader of the
Sudanese People's Liberation Army, Sadiq al-Mahdi, former
President of Sudan and head of the Umma Party, and General
Abdel Aziz Khaled, leader of the Sudan Alliance Forces),
Eritrean and Ethiopian military and security representatives,
and U.S. Embassy and AID officials. During the excursion into
opposition held territory in eastern Sudan, we were accompanied
by AID official, Gayle Smith.
U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia, David Shinn, U.S. Charge
D'Affairs to Eritrea, Don Yamamoto, and Gayle Smith of AID,
along with their staffs, provided outstanding support, without
which we could not have accomplished our objectives. We wish to
thank them for their cooperation and assistance.
Sincerely,
Christopher Walker
Michael Westphal
G. Garrett Grigsby
KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The radical National Islamic Front (NIF) regime
ruling Sudan threatens the United States and regional
security by its aggressive support for international
terrorist organizations in many of its neighboring
countries. The NIF foments regional unrest in Uganda,
Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia through surrogate
terrorists groups. Also, the NIF regime offers refuge
and training for Islamic fundamentalist terrorist
organizations Hamas, Abu Nidal, Hezbollah, the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Islamic Group, and Jihad
of Egypt; each of which targets Americans.
Religious intolerance and Christian persecution are
the hallmark of the NIF regime. Forced Islamization of
non-Muslims, primarily Christians, is a widely
recognized NIF government policy. Severe human rights
abuses--including slavery--are perpetuated by the NIF
regime. Despite international pressure, the NIF regime
has shown no interest in modifying this reprehensible
behavior.
U.S. policy toward Sudan should continue to be to
isolate the NIF regime, with the goal of replacing it
with a secular, democratic government brought to power
through popular elections. To help achieve this goal,
the U.S. should continue its military support for
neighboring governments in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and
Uganda. The U.S. should also support legitimate,
democratic opposition groups attempting to overthrow
the Government of Sudan.
Comprehensive U.S. economic sanctions against the
NIF regime--announced by President Clinton on November
4--while important symbolically, will not force the NIF
to fall. Total Sudanese investment in the U.S. blocked
by the sanctions is only $5,500,000; total trade
amounts to only $70,000,000 annually. Khartoum can
continue to rely heavily on financial support from
fellow terrorist states, Iran and Libya. Only when
vital economic links within Sudan are no longer
controlled by the NIF and only when internal opposition
to the NIF is widespread will the NIF face significant
political and economic crisis.
The United States Government has provided
approximately $20,000,000 in nonlethal military
assistance to Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda since fiscal
year 1996, to enhance their ability to defend their
borders. Unfortunately, the delivery of much of the
assistance was delayed because of bureaucratic tangles
and diplomatic misunderstandings between the U.S. and
the recipient nations. The Clinton Administration
should better ensure that such assistance is delivered
promptly in the future.
Popular opposition to the NIF regime is expanding
beyond southern Sudan. The recently formed National
Democratic Alliance, or NDA, which consists of diverse
political and military opposition groups, appears to be
the most viable opposition to the NIF in a generation.
The NDA, through its Asmara Declaration, has committed
itself to a democratic and secular Sudan. The formation
of the NDA could be a turning point for Sudanese
opposition parties because the coalition brings
together political and armed groups, southerners and
northerners, and Muslims and Christians for the first
time.
In recent months, NDA forces have driven NIF armed
forces from key areas of eastern Sudan, including
strategic points near the Port Sudan highway (the
supply lifeline for Khartoum), the Roseires Dam (which
provides most of the electricity to Khartoum), and
Kassala (the largest city in eastern Sudan). From a
military perspective, SFRC staff was told that SAF was
prepared to launch a major offensive in eastern Sudan
against each of these targets. If NDA forces are
successful in capturing and occupying these areas, it
would provide an enormous political, as well as
military, victory against the NIF regime.
Secretary of State Albright's meeting with the NDA
on December 10, 1997, in Uganda sends a clear message
that the U.S. can support the NDA as a legitimate
political and military alternative to the NIF.
Regrettably, significant political and personal
differences exist between NDA members which must be
resolved. Policy disputes include, for example, north-
south disagreements about a ``federated'' Sudan and a
resolution of questions regarding the autonomy of the
Nuba people. While the Asmara Declaration has been
agreed to by NDA members, it is unclear if its
principles will be adhered to in future years. Apparent
lack of trust and respect among NDA leaders is another
key concern. If the NDA is not successful in
reconciling its internal differences prior to the fall
of the NIF, the NDA itself may disintegrate. Leaders of
each of the NDA coalition's groups must work to foster
greater internal trust if the NDA is to succeed as a
viable long-term alternative to the NIF regime.
While governments in the region--Ethiopia, Eritrea,
Uganda and Kenya--appear willing to continue to support
the Sudanese peace process through the regional IGAD
talks in Nairobi, to hold out hope for success through
this venue appears unrealistic. According to one
Ethiopian government official, the Khartoum regime is
simply attempting to buy time through the IGAD process,
the next round of which has been suspended until April
1998.
While Sudan remains one of the poorest nations on
earth, conditions are desperate and deteriorating
rapidly in the territory controlled by the NDA. The
primary reason for this humanitarian crisis is that
fighting has caused thousands of individuals and
families to be internally displaced in an inhospitable,
semi-desert terrain. Furthermore, it appears that
thousands are fleeing government controlled areas
because NIF forces are reportedly committing severe
human rights abuses, killing livestock and destroying
villages of perceived NDA supporters.
There are no international nongovernmental or
private and voluntary organizations actively working in
territory controlled by the NDA in eastern Sudan. The
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other
United Nations agencies do not operate in areas
controlled by the NDA, because families driven from
their homes in these areas are ineligible to receive
aid because they are considered ``internally
displaced'' and not ``refugees''.
The Clinton Administration should consider
redirecting a small portion of U.S. humanitarian aid to
those areas in eastern Sudan under the control of the
NDA. Since 1988, the U.S. government has provided more
than $600,000,000 in humanitarian aid to the people of
Sudan; in Fiscal Year 1997 alone, U.S. aid amounted to
$39,774,378. Reallocating even a small portion of this
aid to eastern Sudan would provide desperately needed
medical and other assistance.
The Agency for International Development (AID) often
sends assessment teams into areas of humanitarian need
to make recommendations. However, in this case AID need
not spend scarce funds on such an assessment because
several credible assessments have already been made by
international NGOs familiar with the area. Furthermore
an AID official who accompanied SFRC staff on this
investigation has provided a detailed report of her
findings to AID/Washington. Funds that would otherwise
be used to prepare an assessment should instead be
targeted to displaced people in dire need.
The Clinton Administration recently reached inter-
agency agreement to begin a modest development program
inside Sudan to be administered by AID. The
Administration may allocate up to $3,000,000 during the
next three years for this effort. Since U.S. assistance
inside Sudan has been limited during the past decade to
only humanitarian medical and food supplies, this new
proposal represents a significant expansion of the U.S.
role in opposition-held areas in Sudan.
This assistance proposal is unique and inventive for
AID, but must be well-conceived, both at policy and
working levels, prior to implementation. The Clinton
Administration must answer key questions about
undertaking development projects in a country whose
rulers are hostile to such projects and AID must
consider several important operational questions,
including how it will monitor and audit the individual
projects carried out by NGOs both on performance and
financial grounds. Mishandling these issues could end
in the NIF regime's refusal to allow even basic
humanitarian projects elsewhere in Sudan to continue.
I. Introduction and Background
Sudan is the largest country in area in Africa (1,557,110
sq. miles) and has a population of 29,000,000. Sudan has
significant agricultural potential and natural resources (it
produces practically all of the world's supply of gum Arabic, a
starch used widely by U.S. food processing companies and other
industries), so it has held the possibility of being a stable
link between the Middle East and Africa. However, intermittent
civil war between the predominantly Christian and animist south
and the Muslim-Arab north has plagued Sudan for decades, taking
the lives of approximately 1,500,000 people in the past 15
years alone.
Sudan gained independence from Egypt and Great Britain in
1956, but during 41 years of self-rule, its leaders have often
mismanaged the economy and abused their own people. In 1989, a
military junta, the Revolutionary Command Council for National
Salvation--predecessor of the now-ruling National Islamic Front
(NIF)--overthrew the democratically-elected government of Sadiq
al-Mahdi (great-grandson of Mohammed Ahmed al-Mahdi, whose
Islamic Jihad in 1885 laid siege to Khartoum and had the
commanding British General Charles Gordon's head cut off).
The National Islamic Front-led government allows no
meaningful popular political participation and represses all
opposition in pursuit of its extremist-brand of Islam. The NIF
actively pursues a ``Jihad'' to protect its fundamentalist
brand of Islam in Sudan, and to promote its religion and
ideology in neighboring countries. Under the current regime,
Sudan has become a haven for international terrorists, and it
severely abuses the rights of the Christian and animist
southern Sudanese people, including allowing them to be sold
into slavery, both inside Sudan and for export to Libya. The
civil war has taken more than 1,500,000 lives, led to about
2,000,000 internally displaced persons, and created
destabilizing refugee flows around the region. The United
States Government has provided more than $600,000,000 in
humanitarian assistance to the Sudanese people since 1988.
In mid-1995, the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement
(SPLM) and its military arm, the Sudanese People's Liberation
Army (SPLA) and several northern opposition political parties
(including the Sudan Alliance Forces) formed a coalition group
under the umbrella of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) at
a meeting in Asmara, Eritrea.
The formation of the National Democratic Alliance could be
a turning point for Sudanese opposition parties because the
coalition brings political and armed groups, southerners and
northerners, and Muslims and Christians together for the first
time in decades with a united goal of bringing a secular,
democratic government to Sudan.
The NDA adopted a program known as the Asmara Declaration
(see Appendix J.) that, among other things, calls for the
formation of a unitary, secular state in Sudan. It also
recognizes the right of the southern Sudanese people to self
determination, although it is vague about how this would come
about.
Support for Terrorists
Sudan's support for fledgling terrorist movements in
neighboring Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and Somalia poses a
significant threat to regional stability and to U.S. interests.
In supporting these insurgent groups, Sudan has attempted to
spread Islamic extremism and overturn secular governments in
the Horn of Africa.
While the Sudanese economy crumbles, the NIF continues to
be propped up by external supporters. Iran remains the NIF's
largest benefactor, but Iraq and wealthy fundamentalist Muslims
from several of the Gulf States also provide significant
financial support to NIF leaders.
It should also be noted that France has apparently provided
significant assistance to the terrorist NIF regime. According
to author Dan Connell in his recent publication, Sudan Update:
In the Eye of the African Storm, the Government of France's
assistance, including military intelligence and training, is a
direct threat to the democratic opposition in Sudan.
According to Connell, ``France is widely thought to have
provided Sudan with intelligence on SPLA positions. Sudanese
opposition figures also claim France has provided various forms
of technical assistance and military or police-related training
to the NIF, and that it brokered arrangements between Sudan and
Zaire and Sudan and the Central African Republic to allow
Sudanese forces to use their territories to launch surprise
attacks against the SPLA.''
In Eritrea, the Sudan regime supports the insurgent
Eritrean Islamic Jihad. Sudan has also given sanctuary and
military support to the Lord's Resistance Army and the West
Nile Bank Front, two groups which seek to oust President
Museveni of Uganda. In Tunisia, Sudan has supported terrorist
activities against the government, and Sudanese embassy
officials based in Tunis have smuggled weapons into the
country. Sudan also supports the radical Armed Islamic Group
which is seeking the overthrow of the Algerian government,
allegedly supports the Islamic fundamentalist group Itahad in
Somalia, and is recruiting Muslim activists in Ethiopia.
In June 1995, members of the Islamic Group, an Egyptian
extremist group, attempted to assassinate Egyptian President
Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, after having been given
safe haven and logistical support in Sudan. The Sudanese
Government allegedly provided the passports and weapons for the
assassins, and Sudan still refuses to extradite three of the
suspects in the Mubarak assassination attempt.
The United Nations passed three separate Security Council
resolutions between January 1996 and August 1996, numbered
1044, 1054, and 1070, calling upon the NIF to extradite those
associated with the Mubarak assassination attempt and
encouraging all nations to deny Sudanese Government officials
entry visas. These U.N. resolutions have had no effect on the
Khartoum regime.
In response to this subversive activity, Ethiopia, Eritrea,
and Uganda have severed or downgraded diplomatic relations with
Sudan. The Government of Eritrea broke diplomatic relations
with Khartoum and has allowed the Sudanese National Democratic
Alliance (NDA) to locate its operations within the Sudanese
embassy in Asmara. In February 1996, the U.S. temporarily
relocated its diplomats to Kenya for security reasons and the
U.S. Ambassador to Sudan resides in Nairobi.
The State Department's 1996 Patterns of Global Terrorism
report noted that Sudan ``continued to serve as a refuge,
nexus, and training hub in 1995 for a number of international
terrorist organizations.'' The situation remains the same
today. Hamas, Abu Nidal, Hezbollah, the Palestinian Islamic
Jihad, the Islamic Group, and Jihad of Egypt are just a few
organizations operating freely in Sudan. Khartoum does not deny
the presence of these groups, but rejects Washington's
description of them as terrorist organizations.
Persecution of Christians
Religious intolerance and Christian persecution are the
hallmark of the ruling NIF. Forced Islamization of non-Muslims,
including Christians and animists, is a widely recognized
government policy. Non-Muslims are denied government
employment, access to public education and even medical care.
According to State Department testimony before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on September 25, 1997, ``Churches
have been closed, Christian children have been forced into
reeducation camps where they are given Arab names and raised as
Muslims. Many Christians have been victims of slave raids and
forced conversions.'' Further, according to the State
Department, Sudan's 1991 apostasy law states that, ``conversion
by Muslims to non-Islamic religions is punishable by death.''
In the same Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Baroness
Cox, President of Christian Solidarity International-U.K. and
Deputy Speaker of the House of Lords in London, England,
testified that many other Sudanese suffer persecution ``. .
.because the NIF totalitarian regime has declared a Jihad, not
only against Christians but against others who oppose it,
including Muslims and animists, who are fighting for freedom
from repression, for survival of their culture, and for
fundamental human rights, including religious liberty.
Therefore, many Arab Muslims from the north, the majority
of whom belong to opposition parties represented in the
previously democratically elected government, have suffered
arbitrary arrest, imprisonment, torture, and extrajudicial
killings.
II. The National Democratic Alliance and Resistance Against the
National Islamic Front
The Sudan Alliance Force
The Sudan Alliance Force (SAF) is a relatively new
opposition group--formed only three years ago--when compared
with the established Umma party and Democratic Unionist Party.
The SAF, which calls for a secular, democratic Sudan, is
considered by some to be the most credible military and
political opposition to the NIF because it is lead by Muslims,
not Christians as is the SPLA, and because SAF has a credible
military force. The SAF, with roughly 600-700 fighters, is
second only to the SPLA in military strength and receives
military assistance from the government of Eritrea.
General Abdel Aziz Khaled, leader of the Sudan Alliance
Forces, met SFRC staff at his residence in Asmara both before
and after our trip to eastern Sudan. The General was unable to
accompany SFRC staff to the field, because he was coordinating
with the U.S. State Department and Sudanese National Democratic
Alliance leaders a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright, which occurred on December 10, in Kampala,
Uganda.
A Brigadier General in charge of the air defenses at
Omdurman at the time of the June 1989 NIF-backed coup, General
Abdel Aziz is in his 50s and a career professional military
officer. He is married and has several children, one of whom
attends a university in the United States.
Reportedly popular among rank-and-file troops within the
Sudanese Army, General Abdel Aziz was detained shortly after
the coup, questioned and eventually arrested, and was
imprisoned for 18 months in Kober Prison. He went to Cairo
after his release from detention, moved to Asmara in 1994, and
convened soon thereafter the first General Congress of the
Sudan Alliance Forces. He later participated in the formation
of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). He serves as the
head of the Executive Council of SAF.
Abu Ghossan, the Deputy Chairman and Chief of Staff of the
Sudan Alliance Forces, accompanied SFRC staff while we were in
Sudan. Abu Ghossan is in his late 40s or early 50s and has a
wife and four children. A Lt. Colonel in the Sudanese army, Abu
Ghossan was arrested on July 1, 1989, and accused of
advocating, within the military, a peaceful solution to the war
in the south. After two weeks in detention, he left Sudan for
Cairo, and joined SAF. Seemingly well-versed in military
matters, Abu Ghossan received training from the United States
Armed Forces School of the Americas at Fort Benning, Georgia in
the late 1970s.
Representatives of the SAF-affiliated humanitarian
organization, the Amal Trust or Sudan Future Care Trust,
accompanied SFRC staff from and to Asmara, including into
Sudan. While the Amal Trust has limited resources, it has
submitted proposals to the U.S. Agency for International
Development and other international aid organizations to fund
various humanitarian projects in SAF-held territory.
The Beja Congress
Sheikh Omar, Deputy Leader of the Beja Congress, also
accompanied SFRC staff during the visit in Sudan. The Beja
tribe are a culturally distinct and long-organized pastoral
people who more closely resemble, in military terms, a people's
militia than a guerrilla force. They are made up of ten
distinct tribes occupying the north and east of Sudan numbering
approximately 3,000,000. (For a historical perspective, the
Beja people are descendants of the legendary so-called Fuzzy-
Wuzzies who, in 1885, defeated a British expeditionary force
attempting to rescue General Charles Gordon, the British
Governor General of Sudan, in Khartoum).
Formed in 1952, during a period of relative political
freedom in Sudan, the Beja Congress was intended to counter the
long-standing disenfranchisement by the ruling center in
Khartoum. The organization is structured along traditional
lines; its leadership is elected from among ranking sheikhs or
prominent Islamic religious leaders in the community. The Beja
Congress, now led by Sheikh Suleiman, took up arms against
Khartoum in the early 1990s and is reportedly an important
member of the NDA. Sheikh Omar was accompanied on our visit to
Sudan by the Beja Congress chief military officer and several
members of the Beja Emergency Relief Organization.
Beja troops reportedly operate alongside other NDA members
in various sectors and bring important influence with their
ability to conduct small-scale mobile guerrilla operations
based on intimate knowledge of the terrain; to provide access
to other NDA forces; and to mobilize militia-type forces when
needed (assuming the availability of weaponry). Given their
mobility, the Beja are difficult for the NIF to pin down in a
military sense. It is difficult for outsiders to distinguish
military from nonmilitary personnel.
The Sudan Federal Democratic Union
SFRC staff was also joined by Dr. Sharif Harir, a leader of
the Sudan Federal Democratic Union (SFDU). Dr. Sharif is
originally from Darfur in Sudan's far west, and resigned his
position teaching anthropology at Bergen University in Norway
in November 1997 to enlist in the struggle against the NIF-led
government. He currently resides in NDA-held areas of Sudan.
Dr. Sharif was accompanied by the SFDU's chief military
officer, also from Darfur.
SFDU is reportedly working to cement ties with the NDA and
to recruit from among the many Darfurians and other westerners
working as temporary laborers in the agricultural areas of
Sudan's eastern regions. The SFDU maintains little if any
military capacity at present but, according to SAF leader
General Abdel Aziz, have some people operating with SAF. SAF
leaders talked openly about their desire to expand and, over
time, open an NDA front in the Darfur region. Dr. Sharif
claimed that, assuming logistical capacity, there are several
thousand western Sudanese within Sudan and in Libya, Chad and
the Central African Republic who would willingly fight the NIF
Government under NDA/SFDU auspices. Although given the existing
ties between the Government of Chad and the NIF, the
possibility of opening a credible military front in Western
Sudan appears remote.
Dr. Sharif, SAF leader General Abdel Aziz Khaled, and
military professionals in the region made clear that the
potential of the SFDU could be meaningful given that the west
is the only region of Sudan in which there is not an NDA
presence or an organized opposition to the NIF Government.
Other NDA Members
The Umma Party is a religious, sect-based Islamic
organization and is considered, with the Democratic Unionist
Party, one of the ``establishment'' political parties in Sudan.
The Umma Party is headed by Sadiq al-Mahdi (as referenced
previously, he is the great-grandson of Sudan ruler Sadiq al-
Mahdi and, incidently, a brother-in-law of current NIF leader
Hassan al-Turabi). The other establishment party and NDA member
which has been calling for a constitutional government in Sudan
since 1968, is the Democratic Unionist Party. The DUP, too, is
an Islam-based political organization (representing the
Khitmayia sect of Muslims). Both the Umma Party and the DUP
maintain small armed forces which operate within the NDA.
Finally, the Sudanese Communist Party, which is reportedly
shrinking in membership, is also a member of the NDA.
Regrettably, even if the NIF were to be removed from
Khartoum in the near term, significant political and personal
differences exist between NDA members which must be resolved if
the NDA is to be a viable long-term alternative to the NIF.
Policy disputes among NDA members include, for example, North-
South disagreements about a ``federated'' Sudan and a
resolution of questions regarding the autonomy of the Nuba
people. While the Asmara Declaration has been agreed to by NDA
members, it is unclear if its principles will be adhered to in
future years.
Equally disturbing is the apparent lack of trust and
respect among NDA leaders. According to senior Ethiopian and
Eritrean military officials we met with, the NDA lacks true
military and political cohesion. SPLA leader John Garang, for
example, reportedly has little respect or confidence in other
NDA members' armed forces. While the governments of Ethiopia
and Eritrea continue to press the NDA leadership for heightened
unity, the apparent lack of trust and confidence can only be
resolved from within the NDA. If the NDA is not successful in
reconciling its internal differences prior to the fall of the
NIF, the NDA itself may disintegrate.
NDA Operations Inside Sudan
The NDA controls five sectors on the Sudan border with
Eritrea and Ethiopia. The northernmost sector is located on the
Eritrean border at the Red Sea and includes Karora and the
small port of Aqiq. The southernmost and largest occupied
territory is in the Blue Nile Province nearby Damazin. In each
area, the NDA is represented by at least two member
organizations.
The sector visited by SFRC staff is south of the Red Sea
coast on the Eritrean border, and the smallest territory held
by the NDA. Each sector was taken during the coordinated
offensive initiated in January 1997, with the SPLA and SAF as
the main military actors for the NDA. Combined, they provide
limited rear-base facilities for the NDA along the border from
the Red Sea coast to Damazin, as well as proximity to strategic
government-controlled areas including the Port Sudan highway
(the supply lifeline for Khartoum), the Roseires Dam (which
provides most of the electricity for Khartoum), and Kassala
(the largest city in eastern Sudan).
According to its leaders, SAF maintains one battalion in
this sector organized along ``modified'' British lines, with
the primary modification being a greater emphasis on the
operational rather than administrative aspects. All SAF forces
are trained before entering service and are also provided with
literacy and English-language training as needed. Troops are
rotated between ``bases'' and front line positions or mobile
guerrilla assignments, during which time training is often
upgraded. All are equipped with light weapons, although
ammunition is occasionally in short supply.
SFRC staff observed that the SAF military forces acted in a
professional manner, particularly for an insurgent army. The
troops reflect the training and professionalism of their
commanders. With uniformity throughout, and visibly clean
weapons, the unit presented an impressive outward appearance.
It is understood that the SAF military commanders would make
every effort to present such an image, as well as the fact that
these troops were observed in a rear area. However, this
display of professionalism is validated by reports of the
military success of SAF troops.
Staff met with Dr. John Garang, leader of the SPLA, in
Asmara, Eritrea, to discuss military and political developments
in Sudan. According to Garang, 70 percent of all NDA combatants
in Eastern Sudan were SPLA troops. While staff met only briefly
with an SPLA military commander in the field, staff did witness
the movement of about 30-40 SPLA troops in a truck inside
eastern Sudan.
SAF units have enjoyed continued military success against
NIF offices and garrisons and against industrial and
agricultural targets. The most active sector is reportedly the
Blue Nile, where SAF mounted on December 5, a successful
operation 37 miles from Damazin aimed at a facility that
produces gum Arabic, which is an important export commodity for
the NIF Government. According to General Abdel Aziz Khaled, NDA
forces penetrated the site from positions behind enemy lines
capturing three Massey-Ferguson tractors, one truck, one four-
wheel-drive vehicle, a gasoline tanker, radio communications
equipment, and weapons. SAF reported no casualties, and claims
to have captured four NIF soldiers.
Significantly, SAF claims to have undertaken five small
operations in and around Kassala during October, including a
commando raid during which a small SAF team infiltrated Kassala
itself (the largest city in eastern Sudan), raided the state
security office, and escaped with government documents and
weapons. No SAF casualties were reported.
This and other SAF operations in October were aimed, in
part, to signal NIF representatives at the regional IGAD-
sponsored peace talks in Nairobi that the war was no longer
being waged solely against the SPLA in southern Sudan. (SAF
military commanders reported that the small coastal port of
Aqiq is now sporadically shelled by Sudanese naval forces.
However, the front lines in the sector visited by SFRC staff
were at present quiet, with government forces undertaking
regular patrols and the two sides engaging in occasional
skirmishes.)
Villagers with whom we talked described NIF sporadic air
assaults using Antonov cargo aircraft modified to carry 500 lb.
iron bombs. Targets appeared to be chosen indiscriminately by
NIF pilots, many of whom simply attacked the largest civilian
populations possible rather than search for military targets.
Since the NIF air force is in near total disrepair, the few
flyable aircraft are required to operate on both the southern
and eastern fronts in Sudan greatly limiting their
effectiveness in both regions.
Coordination between and among SAF, Beja Congress, SPLA and
Sudanese Democratic Federal Union officials appeared to be
cordial, if not clear cut in the Western military sense. In the
case of the town of Telkok, both SAF and SPLA agreed that the
civil administration should be led by a member of the Beja
Congress, both as a means of building upon traditional local
leadership and of ensuring that the civilian administration is
comprised of people from a given area, both of these goals
reflecting the policy of the NDA.
According to the various organizations, the composition of
the civilian administration in most areas controlled by NDA
member organizations has been determined on a consensus basis,
although there were reportedly NDA-administered elections in
the Blue Nile area of Menza. It appears that, whatever the
composition of the civil administration and agreed-upon
military presence, NDA member organizations are free to open
political offices in any NDA area of Sudan.
On December 5, SFRC staff traveled to village of Telkok,
Sudan (population 16,000, approximately 87 miles northeast of
Kassala), crossing the border at Ribda. Telkok is the zonal
headquarters for a population of approximately 250,000 of the
Beja people.
Telkok was captured by the combined forces of the SAF and
SPLA on April 20, 1997, and, based on the consensus of NDA
members, is administered by the Beja Congress as their people
dominate the area. While SAF maintain the most visible military
presence, including an office in the village itself, they
claimed that the forward defenses are maintained by coordinated
SAF, SPLA, and Beja Congress units.
SFRC staff spoke with sheikhs from the Beja Congress,
Muslim townspeople in Telkok, and several SAF soldiers, all of
whom demonstrated consistency in their comments about the NIF
regime. As Muslims, they said, they stand against the NIF
because, in the first instance, they consider that the state
should play no role in defining the relationship between people
and their God. Second, they said, they vigorously object to the
NIF ``doing bad things to people'' in the name of Islam--
including ``harassing other Muslims, oppressing non-Muslims and
destabilizing neighboring countries.''
This is consistent with the statement made by a U.S. State
Department official who testified on September 25, 1997, before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ``Civilians have paid
the greatest price in this war. Rape has been used as a tool of
the war, land mines have been used indiscriminately around
towns, and children have been abducted and used as soldiers . .
.''
In addition to these encounters, SFRC staff witnessed the
tragic conditions of the camps of internally displaced families
surrounding Telkok. We also toured Telkok's hospital and
school, which are empty shells having been depleted of all
supplies. The hospital should serve the village and surrounding
region (including the thousands of displaced people), but there
are no doctors or nurses, and the facilities are in such bad
disrepair that it has been closed.
After visiting Telkok, SFRC staff drove several miles to
the SAF regional military headquarters at the Torgun garrison.
Torgun supports SAF troops at the front lines 10-12 miles
distant. The garrison was taken in an April 1997 battle, in
which Sudanese Government forces reportedly suffered 120 killed
and SAF taking 37 prisoners.
Three destroyed armored vehicles (one Soviet T-55 and two
American B-113s) remained in the compound where SAF also stored
approximately 1,300 captured Iranian and Russian-made anti-
armor and anti-personnel mines and dozens of rocket propelled
grenades and ammunition left by the Sudanese military. The
garrison and its immediate periphery had been cleared of land
mines by SAF soldiers trained during earlier service in the
Sudanese military.
III. U.S. Policy Toward Sudan
At various times since its independence, Sudan has been an
important ally to the United States. Its strategic position in
East Africa made it central to U.S. opposition to the Soviet
Union's efforts to spread communism in the region. From 1962-
1996, the United States provided more than $2,127,000,000 in
assistance to Sudan, making it the recipient of the most U.S.
foreign aid in Africa after Egypt. This amount includes
$329,400,000 in military aid, $893,100,000 in economic aid, and
$904,700,000 in humanitarian support.
According to the State Department, United States interests
in Sudan are: (1) terrorism; (2) regional stability; (3) human
rights; and (4) internal reconciliation, between the Muslim
north and the Christian and animist south. According to State
Department briefing material, the United States seeks to
contain Sudanese-sponsored aggression and to modify Sudanese
Government behavior through calibrated pressure and dialogue.
In August 1993, the State Department placed Sudan on its
list of state sponsors of terrorism, joining the rogue regimes
in Iran, Iraq, Cuba, Libya, Syria and North Korea. Terrorist
nations are prohibited from nearly all political and economic
relationships with the United States, including denial of all
U.S. foreign aid (except humanitarian aid) and limitations on
exports.
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
bars donations to U.S. persons from terrorist states. The
United States supported United Nations resolutions condemning
the NIF regime for its involvement in the assassination attempt
on Hosni Mubarak, and also reduced the number of Sudanese
diplomats in the United States. On November 4, 1997, President
Clinton ordered that Sudanese Government property be blocked
and prohibited financial transactions with Sudan (see
Appendixes G and H).
In an attempt to contain Sudan's regional destabilization
campaign the United States has committed approximately
$20,000,000 since 1996, in mostly non-lethal military aid (C-
130 aircraft were also provided) to Eritrea, Ethiopia, and
Uganda to enhance each nations ability to defend its borders.
Since 1993, the United States has supported the Sudan peace
initiative launched by the sub-regional organization
Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD). In fiscal
year 1997, the United States government has provided
$39,774,378 for relief efforts in southern Sudan and for
internally displaced people around Khartoum (see Appendix C).
Members of both the House and Senate introduced bills in
1997 intended to tighten sanctions against Sudan, including the
Ashcroft-Helms bill (S. 873) prohibiting financial transactions
with countries supporting terrorism (see Appendix F), and
similar provisions contained in the Senate passed ``Foreign
Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1997'' (S. 903).
IV. Assessment of Humanitarian Conditions in Eastern Sudan
The humanitarian situation within the areas of Sudan
visited by SFRC staff was extremely grave. Within Telkok
itself, the hospital--which is supposed to serve some 250,000
people within the region--has literally no medical supplies and
no trained professional staff, most of whom fled when
government forces withdrew. The school was similarly under-
equipped. Staff visited the sole school in Telkok and witnessed
only a small percentage of the school-age children in
attendance. The school has no teachers and teaching materials--
desks, books, pencils and paper--were virtually non-existent.
Water supplies are short, and the harsh terrain cannot provide
enough food for an adequate diet.
Telkok has, during late November, received approximately
3,600 displaced people--Beja from the Gash area who fled, they
said, because of government harassment. Government forces had
taken all of their herds. More people, they claimed, were on
the way (150 people arrived the day before SFRC staff arrived
in Telkok and 97 on the day visited). The displaced families
live in miserable conditions reminiscent of those experienced
by the Eritrean and Ethiopian victims of the 1984-85 Ethiopian
famine who sought refuge in eastern Sudan. Both the townspeople
and the displaced rely on a single well for water. It is clear
that should food and medical assistance not be forthcoming,
both the displaced and many of the townspeople will have to
move again.
Of note, civilians in Telkok said that their suffering was
worth the freedom provided by the Beja Congress and SAF as
opposed to the far more oppressive environment under Sudanese
Government forces.
According to AID officials, humanitarian assistance
provided to the region has come primarily from Dutch
Interchurch Aid (DIA) and Norwegian Church Aid (NCA),
organizations which were prominent in the cross-border
operation from Sudan into Eritrea and Tigray in the 1980s. AID
gives high marks to these groups as they operate with low
overhead, a high degree of professionalism and minimal
expatriate staff (one each).
While both DIA and NCA operate with the approval of the
Government of Eritrea, they maintain a very low profile to
comply with the Eritrean Government's desire that a large and
visible cross-border operation not be established. SFRC staff
did not see evidence of any humanitarian assistance efforts in
the areas visited.
The organizations reportedly work directly with the Beja
Relief Organization and Amal (the humanitarian affiliate of
SAF). At one point, medical supplies were also provided by the
French NGO Medecins du Monde, although no supplies have been
provided in recent months. The main medical problems are
respiratory ailments, seasonal malaria, conjunctivitis, night
blindness, arthritic diseases, diarrhoeal diseases, snake
bites, tuberculous and various infections. Most of these
illnesses are easily treatable and non-fatal with basic medical
care. The only food distributions to the displaced have been
those supported by Dutch Interchurch Aid and the Government of
Eritrea.
Coordination and cooperation apparently exist between Amal
and the Beja Relief organization, which have undertaken a
division of labor whereby Amal handles medical and educational
needs and the Beja Relief organization handles agricultural and
water requirements. Amal appears to have more professionals on
staff--being more sophisticated in terms of proposals,
assessments, etc. Both have such limited resources, however,
that their impact was not evident to SFRC staff in the areas
visited.
The Clinton Administration should consider redirecting a
small portion of U.S. humanitarian aid from predominantly SPLM-
administered southern Sudan to those areas in eastern Sudan
under the control of the NDA. Since 1988, the U.S. Government
has provided more than $600,000,000 in humanitarian aid to the
people of Sudan. Providing even a small portion of humanitarian
aid--medical supplies or water well drilling assistance--in
Telkok and the surrounding villages would improve the very
desperate living conditions for thousands of families.
For a more complete assessment of the humanitarian needs of
the region, see Appendix E, ``Assessment of the Humanitarian
Conditions in Eastern Sudan''.
V. Long-Term Development Program
At some point, questions of the long-term development of
Sudan must be contemplated. The ruling NIF has neither the
financial resources nor the desire to provide the most basic
social services for many areas of Sudan. Many regions are
without basic health clinics and hospitals, schools and other
government services. Government funded infrastructure, be it
telecommunications or highways, to the extent they ever
existed, have fallen into deep disrepair during years of civil
war. Human infrastructure--accountants, lawyers, civil
servants--is non-existent. Clearly, the government of a ``new
Sudan'' will need to find creative ways to develop this
infrastructure.
The Clinton Administration recently reached inter-agency
agreement to begin a modest development program inside Sudan to
be administered by the Agency for International Development
(AID). The Administration may attempt to allocate up to
$3,000,000 for this effort. Since U.S. assistance inside Sudan
has been limited during the past decade to humanitarian medical
and food supplies, this new proposal represents a significant
expansion of the U.S. role in opposition-held areas in Sudan.
(The United Nations Development Program, UNDP, has recently
expanded its Operation Lifeline Sudan effort to include a small
civil society component, but UNDP has secured the Government of
Sudan's tacit approval to do so).
Details of the proposal have yet to be finalized, but the
broad parameters consist of a multi-year assistance program to
be carried out through grants to non-governmental organizations
whose aim is to develop basic structures of civil society in
opposition held areas. AID has not yet determined in which
regions specific projects would be undertaken, but, obviously,
only those areas in which the opposition maintains sustained
control should be considered.
Dr. John Garang, in his meeting with SFRC staff, insisted
that all development assistance be targeted to areas under SPLA
control, some of which have not been under NIF control for five
or more years. He argued that the three zones of NDA occupation
in Eastern Sudan have been held for only months, not years, and
therefore are not yet ready for long-term institution building
aid. Garang told staff that while the SPLM has not submitted a
specific proposal to AID, he wrote AID Administrator Brian
Atwood with a detailed seven point plan for local governance
and infrastructure development. Garang's insistence that all
funding be dedicated to SPLM controlled areas and his concept
of how the funding would be utilized appears to be somewhat at
odds with AID's view of the program. The humanitarian wing of
the SAF, the Amal Trust, has not submitted any proposal to AID.
This proposal is unique and inventive for AID, given that
the agency operates almost exclusively in countries with which
it has received official government support to do so. From
Khartoum's perspective, through this initiative the U.S.
Government will in this instance be directly assisting those
whose goal is to overthrow it. The Clinton Administration will
have to answer significant policy questions regarding this. AID
must also consider several important operational questions. Key
among these are: (1) how AID will monitor the program
(currently all AID-supported humanitarian programs are
coordinated through Nairobi, and this proposal may require AID
missions in Addis Ababa and Asmara to play a role) and (2) how
the individual projects carried out by NGOs will be audited
both on performance and financial grounds.
It should be noted that an international consensus is
growing that long-term international aid is simply not the
answer to developing countries' needs. In 1993, the Clinton
Administration acknowledged these failures in a critical AID
self-assessment (known as the ``Wharton Report''), which
states, ``Despite decades of foreign assistance, most of
Africa, and parts of Latin America, Asia and the Middle East
are economically worse off today than they were 20 years ago.''
Further evidence of these foreign aid failures can be found
in a recent U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) audit of the
World Bank's IDA programs. This audit makes public staggering
statistics about widespread failure of IDA lending. After
poring through documentation for 737 World Bank projects, the
GAO unearthed data showing that between 1985 and 1993, 49
percent of all IDA projects in Sub-Sahahran Africa had ``not
made an acceptable contribution to development'', even by the
World Bank's own lenient performance requirements.
Worse yet, IDA's financial and technical reform projects in
Africa--which Bank officials claim are critical to future
economic development--failed 62 percent of the time. And the
future for IDA projects remains bleak: World Bank data reveals
that despite so-called reforms at IDA, ``virtually no
improvement has been made in implementation or the prognosis
for projects' eventual impact on development.''
After the NIF is forced out of power, the leaders of a
``new Sudan'' should resist this aid dependancy which will
undoubtedly be encouraged by misguided international donor
agencies.
A P P E N D I X
----------
A. Letter from Senator Jesse Helms to U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright
January 13, 1998.
The Hon. Madeleine Albright,
Secretary of State,
U.S. Department of State,
2201 ``C'' Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20520.
Dear Madam Secretary: Genuine congratulations are certainly due
you--and are hereby extended--for your important role in the
President's November 4 decision to impose additional sanctions against
the terrorist Government of Sudan. (The Foreign Relations Committee
took a special interest in U.S. policy toward Sudan this past year, and
that interest will continue in 1998.)
I understand that Dick McCall accompanied you on your recent trip
to East Africa; thus you are well informed about opposition gains in
eastern Sudan. In December, the Foreign Relations Committee staff
traveled to areas controlled by the Sudan Alliance Forces in eastern
Sudan (the first Americans to do so in an official capacity.)
Their descriptions of the tragic abuse suffered by local citizens
at the hands of the Sudanese Government and the hardships caused by the
civil war are almost beyond belief. Apparently, thousands of families
are on the verge of a humanitarian disaster as a result of having been
displaced from their homes in one of the most harsh environments on
earth.
In fiscal year 1997, the U.S. Government provided $39,774,378 in
humanitarian aid to southern Sudan and for the camps of internally
displaced people around Khartoum. Opposition held territory in eastern
Sudan received no assistance from the United States, and a technicality
blocks United Nations refugee assistance there because potential
recipients are viewed as ``internally displaced'' and not genuine
``refugees.''
In view of the almost total lack of assistance for an increasing
number of suffering people, I strongly urge that you devote at least a
modest amount of humanitarian assistance funds already earmarked for
Sudan in 1998 for opposition held territory in eastern Sudan. A small
infusion of funds may prevent another humanitarian crisis in East
africa, and it certainly would be in concert with U.S. national
security interests. Furthermore, on the heels of the new U.S.
sanctions, it will send an important signal that the United States
wants to help the people of Sudan who have suffered at the hands of the
Sudanese Government.
I hope you agree that even a modest amount of humanitarian
assistance could be greatly beneficial to the people of eastern Sudan,
as well as furthering U.S. interests there.
Kindest personal regards.
Sincerely,
Jesse Helms.
cc: The Honorable John Ashcroft
__________
B. Secretary of State Albright's Response to Senator Helms' Letter of
January 13, 1998
Madeleine K. Albright,
Secretary of State,
January 30, 1998.
The Hon. Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter of January 13
regarding Sudan and the President's decision to impose sanctions. Your
continued interest in Sudan is greatly appreciated.
I share your concern for the people of eastern Sudan. During my
recent trip, I met with Sudanese opposition leaders, and we discussed
our mutual concern for the suffering of people throughout Sudan.
For ten years the United States has provided humanitarian aid in
all parts of Sudan under very difficult circumstances. We have not
concentrated assistance in the northeastern region, which was
relatively peaceful and less needy than other parts of the country.
However, in recent months as opposition to the regime in Khartoum has
spread, parts of eastern Sudan have been taken over by rebel groups.
The fighting in these areas has caused conditions to deteriorate.
The Agency for International Development (USAID) is prepared to
support humanitarian assistance programs in the northeast, as in all
areas of Sudan, that address the urgent needs of war-affected
civilians. In order to obtain a sound assessment of humanitarian needs
and to determine support requirements, USAID has been talking to the
few international non-governmental organizations which have permission
from the government of Eritrea to conduct assistance operations in
eastern Sudan. We will keep your staff informed on developments.
Sincerely,
Madeleine K. Albright
__________
C. Agency for International Development Activity Data Sheet--Regional
Economic Development Services Office for East and Southern Africa
(REDSO/ESA)--Effective Delivery of USAID's Humanitarian Assistance
September 4, 1997,
Washington DC.
SUDAN--Complex Emergency Situation
Report 2, Fiscal Year (FY) 1997. September 2, 1997.
Note: The last situation report was dated November 12, 1996.
U.S. Agency For International Development, Bureau for Humanitarian
Response (BHR), Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
(OFDA).
Background--Fighting began in 1983 between the Government of Sudan
(GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) when the southern-
based rebels demanded more influence in the government and protested
the GOS efforts to ``Islamize'' the Christian and animist south. In
1991, the SPLA split into factions, and intensified fighting between
SPLA factions erupted in areas of the south. The conflict continues
today and civilians throughout the south and the transitional zone (the
area of southern Darfur, southern Kordofan, northern Bahr el Ghazal,
and the northern Upper Nile States) are directly affected by aerial
bombings by the GOS and forced relocations due to fighting. Ongoing
insecurity and population displacement in the south and the
transitional zone have not only interrupted or destroyed most of the
indigenous trading and productive systems, but have also been a major
impediment to relief efforts. The United Nations (U.N.) and numerous
non-governmental organizations (NGO) within and outside the framework
of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) are delivering relief assistance by
airlifts, airdrops, barges, trains, and truck convoys. In the more
secure areas of southern Sudan, efforts to rehabilitate and restore
self-sufficiency are underway.
Total USAID Assistance for FY 1997 (to date) = $39,774,378
Numbers Affected: At a Glance
Figures listed are U.N. Humanitarian Coordination Unit and U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates.
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): 2.5 million, including 1.8
million in Khartoum, 350,000 in the transition zone and
government-held garrison towns, 150,000 in camps in Equatoria,
and additional tens of thousands elsewhere.
Refugees: 209,000 Sudanese refugees in Uganda, 110,000 in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), 78,000 in
Ethiopia, 28,000 in Kenya and 27,000 in the Central African
Republic. 349,000 Eritreans, 51,000 Ethiopians, 4,400 Chadians,
and 10,000 refugees of various origins currently in Sudan.
Current Situation
Thousands Displaced as Rebels Advance: In January, the
united forces of the SPLA and the National Democratic Alliance
(NDA), an alliance of opposition groups in northern and
southern Sudan formed last October, launched a military
campaign in the northern regions of Sudan. The military
campaign, aimed at toppling the Sudanese government, initially
resulted in the capture of several strategic areas. The
offensive slowed down after a government call for general
mobilization, but NDA forces still reportedly control several
towns in the Red Sea and Blue Nile regions, including Kurmuk,
Qeissan, and Maban. The NDA, based in Asmara, the capital of
Eritrea, includes the country's main traditional parties and
the SPLA. In March, the military offensive shifted to the far
south after SPLA forces captured the town of Yei. The SPLA
subsequently seized Kaya and Kajo Keji in Western Equatoria and
Rumbek in Bahr el Ghazal/Lakes. The SPLA, under the leadership
of John Garang, now controls most of Western Equatoria and Bahr
el Ghazal/Lakes.
The renewed military offensive generated major population
movements, particularly in the south. A joint OLS assessment in late
March identified a total of 100,000 returning refugees from northern
Uganda and vulnerable persons among the resident population in Yei as
requiring urgent relief food and non-food assistance. Many returnees
eventually settled in or around their home villages, while others
settled in three existing IDP camps located near Uganda. The mass
exodus into southern Sudan coincided with increased rebel activity in
northern Uganda.
Restrictions Hamper Response: GOS-imposed restrictions on
relief operations hindered initial efforts to meet humanitarian
needs from April to June. In both May and June, the GOS
suspended all flights into southern Sudan for up to one week.
From March to June, the GOS also banned all C-130 flights to
Equatoria and Bahr el Ghazal from Lokichokio, the OLS base in
northern Kenya, and the use of high capacity C-130 Hercules
aircraft in areas controlled by the SPLA. OLS access improved
in July following the visit of the newly-appointed U.N. Special
Envoy for Humanitarian Affairs for the Sudan Ambassador Robert
Van Schaik. However, reports indicate that the restrictions on
OLS flights reduced food aid for more than 700,000 aid-
dependent Sudanese and prevented the delivery of seeds and
tools, affecting timely planting. Minor restrictions imposed by
the SPLA also affected humanitarian access to some areas.
Recent SPLA gains have, however, allowed the OLS to transport
relief supplies and personnel to Western Equatoria and Lakes
regions by road via Uganda for the first time in many years.
OLS Ground Rules Violations: In July, the United States
temporarily suspended all distribution of vegetable oil in
southern Sudan, northern Uganda, and northern Kenya. The
suspension was imposed after an estimated 300 MT of BHR/Office
of Food for Peace (FFP)-provided P.L. 480 Title II commodities
were diverted by SPLA officers and sold for personal gain in
northern Uganda in early May, in violation of OLS ground
agreements. The suspension was lifted in late August following
a field investigation by a team from BHR/FFP and the USAID
Office of the Inspector General's Special Audit Division that
took place from July 21 to August 4. In discussions with the
team, the SPLA's humanitarian wing, Sudan Relief and
Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), confirmed the diversions
took place but without SRRA/SPLA sanction. The team has
recommended several specific measures to reduce the potential
for future diversions.
Donors and NGOs are also concerned about recent violations of OLS
ground rules committed by SPLA forces in Western Equatoria, including
the commandeering and use of NGO vehicles for military purposes. In
late July, armed bandits forcibly entered the World Vision Relief and
Development (WVRD) compound in Yambio, Western Equatoria, and robbed,
beat, and held at gunpoint five international staff while SPLA military
were nearby. All WVRD staff were subsequently evacuated. Some items
looted have been recovered and four people were reportedly arrested
later in connection with the attack. In late January, SPLA forces
entered a Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)/France compound in Pochalla,
forced the staff into a tent, and looted equipment. The staff were
safely evacuated to Lokichokio, and U.N. World Food Program (WFP) and
MSF/France equipment looted during this attack were later recovered.
In July, Southern Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) faction forces
looted radios and other property from an NGO compound in Ayod, Upper
Nile Province, also in violation of OLS ground rules agreement. SSIM
forces also occupied health units and looted medicines from a BHR/OFDA-
funded Mercy Corps International (MCI)/ACROSS health project in Akobo.
While activities under this project continue in other areas, the Akobo
portion was suspended.
1996/97 Crop Outcome: According to a USAID Famine Early
Warning System bulletin released in late July, a dry spell that
affected parts of southern Sudan in May and June will severely
affect crop yields in Rumbek and Yirol in Bahr el Ghazal/Lakes
and Juba, Torit, and Kapoeta counties in Equatoria in the
coming weeks. Although pasture and herd conditions are
generally good, NGOs estimate that the dry spell, which also
rendered crops more susceptible to damage from insect pests and
disease, will reduce first-crop harvests for about 300,000
persons by as much as 65%. Prospects for the second, main-
season crop, which represents 60-75% of annual production,
depend on the current rains, which arrived late at the end of
June and will last until October. Outstanding OLS relief food
requirements for 1997 are currently projected at 36,410 MT.
Political/Military Situation
GOS Signs Peace Agreement with Rebel Groups: On April 22,
the GOS and five rebel factions, including the SSIM and the
SPLA/Bahr el Ghazal Group, signed a peace agreement in
Khartoum. Under the peace deal, a coordinating council would
run the affairs of southern Sudan for four years after which a
referendum on the future status of southern Sudan would be
held. Soon after, six factions, including all five signatories
to the peace agreement, signed an accord recognizing former
Garang ally and SSIM leader Riek Machar as their overall and
united militarily under the South Sudan Defense Force. The
United States commended the peace agreement as a positive first
step, but stressed the need for the GOS to seek a peaceful
settlement with other factions.
IGAD Peace Negotiations: From July 8 to 9, President Daniel
arap Moi of Kenya hosted a regional summit of Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD) members to discuss the war in
southern Sudan and Somalia. The GOS, after some initial
resistance, finally accepted a declaration of principles as a
basis for discussion, clearing the way for the resumption of
talks which broke off nearly three years ago. The principles
lay the groundwork for discussions regarding the country's
return to a secular constitution and a four-year interim
administration to address issues surrounding self-
determination. Al Bashir also called for a cease-fire with the
SPLA during an official visit to South Africa. Both the SPLA
and NDA rejected the call for a cease-fire, arguing that it was
just a ploy to give the GOS an opportunity to rebuild its
forces against advancing SPLA troops. In late August, South
African President Nelson Mandela held separate talks with al
Bashir and Garang and hosted a summit between al Bashir and
Ugandan President Yoweri Musevini. A meeting of East African
leaders under the auspices of IGAD, which was originally
scheduled for August 19, has been indefinitely postponed.
USG Increases Involvement: The United States has stepped up
diplomatic efforts to pressure the GOS and other parties to
improve the country's poor human rights record and cease
hostilities. At the USG's urging, the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights is pressuring the GOS to comply with international human
rights laws and reduce restrictions on international relief
organizations. The USG also backed a recent U.N. Security
Council (UNSC) Resolution banning international flights by
aircraft owned, leased, or controlled by the already-bankrupt
Sudan Airways or another entity of the GOS. Other UNSC
sanctions on Sudan restrict international travel for GOS
officials and call on nations to reduce the size of Sudanese
diplomatic missions abroad and to not hold international
conferences in Sudan.
Relief Efforts
IDPs and Returnees Assisted: Coordinated donor-funded relief
efforts continue to focus on the highly-variable needs of
returnees from Uganda, as well as those displaced by this
year's offensive. OLS delivered food and priority relief
supplies by road from Yambio and from WFP food stores in Uganda
and BHR/OFDA-funded NGOs have been active in the distribution
of agricultural inputs and relief kits, health activities, and
the rehabilitation of key road routes. WFP recently initiated
an airlift operation into Juba where over 20,000 returnees,
most of whom had arrived from Yei, required immediate
assistance. WFP barge convoys will deliver nearly 4,000 MT of
food and non-food supplies to Juba by the end of September.
Nutritional activities, implemented through the BHR/OFDA-funded
Action contre la Faim (ACF) grant, also continue. Three WFP
barge convoys successfully delivered over 2,400 MT of food to
beneficiaries along the Nile River corridor, despite the
looting and attack of one barge convoy in Jonglei reportedly
carried out by SSIM forces. Relief agencies are also responding
to rising humanitarian needs among displaced populations in
Bahr el Ghazal/Lakes Region.
In Khartoum, donors and relief organizations are working with the
GOS to ensure that needs continue to be met, despite the demolition and
relocation of several IDP camps in the area. BHR/OFDA and BHR/FFP
programs continue to provide food, water, and health care for IDPs in
Greater Khartoum. Access to IDPs in and around Khartoum has improved,
allowing several therapeutic and supplementary feeding centers to
address high levels of wasting.
BHR/OFDA is also funding Save the Children Fund (SC)/US food
security and health activities that benefit populations in areas of
south Kordofan under GOS control and is funding a small water project
through Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), implemented by the Nuba Relief,
Rehabilitation, and Development Society (NRRDS) to provide water
assistance in areas outside GOS control. SC/US is trying to secure an
agreement from the GOS and SPLA to conduct measles vaccinations in
rebel-controlled areas. Parts of northern and western Sudan, including
Darfur, recently experienced heavy flooding. Casualty figures and
details on the full extent of the flooding are unavailable.
In the Red Sea Hills Region, the International Federation of the
Red Cross (IFRC), the Sudanese Red Crescent Society (SRCS), and Oxfam
are working to provide food to thousands of drought-stricken Beja
nomads, despite numerous logistical and security problems. Oxfam and
SRCS also provided supplementary feeding to vulnerable groups in Tokar
and Sinkat provinces in response to reports of high levels of wasting
and malnutrition in this area. Also, IDPs and war-affected people
remain vulnerable and in need of assistance in areas of the Blue Nile
that fell under NDA control in January. WFP recently delivered food to
four IDP camps in the region.
Disease Outbreaks: Surveys conducted by CARE, International
Medical Corps (IMC), and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control
have revealed an outbreak of sleeping sickness in Western
Equatoria. The team found an overall 19.3% prevalence of the
disease in Tambura County, with Ezo town, the epicenter of the
disease, reporting a very high 27% prevalence rate. IMC and
CARE hope to respond to the outbreak, among the worst
documented in this century. Sleeping sickness is a parasitical
vector-borne disease that is fatal if untreated. Relapsing
fever has also been reported in Mankien, Upper Nile, among new
IDPs from Gogrial. Efforts to treat existing cases and control
an outbreak of this vector-borne disease, which could cause
death if left untreated, are currently underway. An outbreak of
relapsing fever recently reported in Twic County is said to be
under control and treatment is ongoing. OLS NGOs recently
conducted several measles vaccination campaigns following
reported cases near Juba, Yei, and Bahr el Jebel, as well as in
western Upper Nile and northern Bahr el Ghazal. An outbreak of
gastrointenstitis and cholera reported in Eastern Equatoria is
now under control. OLS also conducted vaccinations against
rinderpest in Bahr el Ghazal and anthrax in Eastern Equatoria.
OLS Funding Crisis: Despite urgent humanitarian needs, the
U.N. scaled back activities, particularly air operations, in
southern Sudan for several weeks when funding received for the
1997 U.N. Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Sudan fell short
of the amount requested. The Appeal, which was launched on
February 18, requested $120.8 million for 33 projects, of which
29 are OLS projects, in six priority areas. Priority activities
supported by the Appeal include emergency food aid and
essential health, nutritional, and water activities, as well as
overall logistics support, Lokichokio camp management, and
security. OLS is conducting a large fund-raising effort and has
established a cost-recovery system for air operations and for
food and lodging at the Lokichokio base camp. BHR/OFDA has
already contributed $2.25 million to UNICEF and $1.3 million to
WFP to support OLS operations.
OLS Donors' Meeting: OLS's recent funding difficulties,
humanitarian conditions, and access difficulties were the
highlights of the U.N. Department of Humanitarian Affairs'
Second International Advisory Committee (IAC) meeting on OLS
held in Geneva on June 27. Senior U.N. representatives and
donor government representatives, including BHR/OFDA, attended.
The IAC invoked the 1994 OLS Agreements facilitated by IGAD as
providing a framework within which OLS should pursue its
activities in cooperation with the GOS and the rebel movements
rather than trying to negotiate a new access agreement in
Sudan. Participants also discussed the status of 1997 OLS
programs as well as progress achieved in efforts to reform OLS.
After the meeting, Ambassador Van Schaik sent a letter to the
GOS requesting action and clarification on access and clearance
issues.
Before attending the Geneva meeting, Ambassador Van Schaik traveled
to Sudan, Lokichokio, and Nairobi to discuss humanitarian access issues
with OLS and representatives from the GOS and SPLA. Ambassador Van
Schaik, former Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the U.N.,
succeeds Ambassador Vieri Traxler, who resigned last September on
account of ill health.
ICRC Suspension Continues: ICRC suspended its operations in
Sudan following the hijacking of an ICRC plane in November. The
aircraft was captured by forces of GOS-ally Kerubino Kwanyin
Bol upon landing in Wunrok in Bahr el Ghazal to return five
wounded SPLA soldiers. Four westerners who were on board,
including an American pilot, were released after 38 days,
following the intervention of former New Mexico Congressman
Bill Richardson, now U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. However, the
welfare of the five Sudanese who remain in captivity is
unknown. Nine ICRC staff in Juba, held under house arrest since
November 1, when this incident began, were released in
December. ICRC activities will remain suspended until GOS
accusations that the ICRC was transporting arms are put to
rest. However, the ICRC hospital in Lokichokio is operating at
full capacity and the ICRC continues to work with Sudanese
prisoners in Uganda and Sudan. ICRC recently sent food to Juba
hospital under the auspices of the SRCS.
Later in March, an OLS aircraft was detained in Bor, Jonglei
province, by GOS authorities claiming that flight clearance for the
aircraft had not yet reached them. The GOS officials accused the pilot
of carrying sensitive documents to rebels and held him for seven weeks
until, following the intervention of senior U.N. officials, he was
released on May 2. The documents in question reportedly were flight log
books and aviation maps.
Refugees: In line with an agreement between Sudan, Ethiopia,
and the UNHCR, the last 23,000 Ethiopian refugees in eastern
Sudan are expected to be voluntarily repatriated this year. Of
this group, about 7,000 Ethiopians were repatriated between May
and July. Effective May, Eritrea suspended UNHCR staff from
Eritrea over disagreements about the repatriation of refugees
from Sudan. UNHCR is currently investigating high mortality
rates among IDPs and refugees in Juba, particularly among 800
or so refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo.
USG Assistance to Sudan
The USG has actively been providing humanitarian assistance to
Sudan since 1988. On October 28, 1996, U.S. Ambassador to Sudan,
Timothy Carney, renewed the disaster declaration for Sudan for FY 1997,
stating that continued U.S. assistance is required to assist over 3
million war-affected and displaced Sudanese. Currently, the USG's
humanitarian response to the emergency in Sudan is provided through
BHR/OFDA, BHR/FFP, and the State Department's Bureau for Population,
Refugee, and Migration (PRM). USG-funded programs in Sudan promote
continuing emergency relief to populations at risk, while at the same
time providing rehabilitation assistance that builds local capacity to
meet their own needs. This goal is captured under the recently-approved
USG Integrated Strategy Plan for Sudan 1997-1999, which was developed
within the context of the complex emergency in Sudan and takes into
consideration current legislative restrictions on providing development
aid to Sudan. The plan aims to meet urgent food needs in a way that
increases food self-reliance and to address the major causes of
mortality in Sudan by supporting comprehensive coverage by a basic
primary health care network. It also promotes working with appropriate
authorities and IDPs to develop local reintegration options and
strengthening local capacities for peace as well as relationships and
linkages that help reduce conflict.
BHR/OFDA and BHR/FFP staff in Washington continue to work with the
USAID/Regional Economic Development Services Offices/Sudan Field Office
to plan and monitor relief and rehabilitation activities in southern
Sudan and with USAID/Khartoum staff to monitor activities in northern
Sudan and GOS-controlled areas of the south. In January 1996,the United
States suspended its diplomatic presence in Khartoum, due to concerns
for the safety of American Embassy personnel in Sudan. Subsequently,
Ambassador Carney established a temporary office in Nairobi to maintain
regular diplomatic communications with the GOS.
BHR/OFDA Assistance (to date)
ACF emergency aid to Juba............................. $1,025,743
ACF/France food security program in Bahr el Ghazal.... $546,957
Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA)
emergency health and food program in Eastern
Equatoria and Greater Khartoum....................... $2,144,267
American Red Cross nutrition program in the Red Sea
Hills................................................ $68,090
American Refugee Committee emergency program in Kajo
Keji................................................. $736,842
CARE programs in Western Equatoria, west Kordofan, and
Bor County........................................... $1,040,243
International Aid Sweden water and road rehabilitation
program in Equatoria and Lakes....................... $565,513
MCI health program in Bor County...................... $93,694
MSF/Belgium emergency medical, nutrition, and
sanitation program................................... $344,134
MSF/Holland health program in Bor County.............. $575,840
NPA food relief and agriculture rehabilitation program
in Equatoria and Lakes............................... $1,453,079
NPA/NRRDS water program in Kordofan................... $45,000
SC/US emergency relief activities in south Kordofan... $241,565
UNICEF health/nutrition program in IDP camps in Bahr
el Ghazal Region..................................... $172,889
UNICEF OLS/Southern Sector support.................... $2,250,000
WFP food needs and logistics support.................. $1,300,000
WVRD emergency response............................... $750,222
Total FY 97 BHR/OFDA Assistance (to date) = $13,354,078
BHR/FFP Assistance (to date)
To date in FY 1997, BHR/FFP has contributed 35,860 MT of Title II
emergency Food to Sudan, valued at $26.4 million, to ADRA, Catholic
Relief Services (CRS), NPA, and WFP for emergency programming and
refugee assistance. In FY 1997, BHR/FFP also implemented CRS and WFP
activities in food security and distribution that were funded in FY
1996.
Total FY 97 BHR/FFP Assistance (to date) = $26,420,300
State/PRM Assistance (to date)
In FY 1997 to date, State/PRM has provided over $92 million to
UNHCR, IFRC, ICRC, and International Rescue Committee for regional
programs that supported Sudanese refugees and IDPs and the care and
maintenance of Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees.
Total FY 97 State/PRM Assistance (to date) = $92,000,000*
*State/PRM funding to Sudan is regional and, therefore, not included
in total USG assistance figures.
Summary
BHR/OFDA Assistance FY 1997 (to date)................. $13,354,078
BHR/FFP Assistance FY 1997 (to date).................. $26,420,300
USAID Assistance FY 1997 (to date).................... $39,774,378
__________
D. Assessment Mission and Proposal for Support to Togan
[Prepared by Sudan Future Care AMAL Trust/Regional Office for the Horn
of Africa]
Project Proposal [7]
Infrastructural Support for Togan, Eastern Sudan
Assessment Mission Report
Asmara, October, 1997
______
Project Summary
1. Project Title: Infrastructural Support for Togan.
2. Objective: To rehabilitate the basic infrastructural services in
the non-government held area of Togan as a first phase to a
comprehensive programme to be formulated during the implementation of
this basic services project.
3. Components:
3.1 Health Services:
Target: Rehabilitation of (3) Primary Health Care
Units and (5) Dispensaries and their operation for one
year.
3.2 Water Sanitation:
Target: The provision of potable water at the major
population centres in Togan by Establishing (10) water
points (wells, reservoirs, pumps) and installing one
incomplete water station.
3.3 Education:
Target: The rehabilitation of (3) primary schools and
their functioning for this educational year 1997/98
without major constraints or shortages. This will serve
(500) students and (3) adult education classes at
least.
4. Estimated Budget Summary:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Budget Item Total (US$) Percent
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Institutional Support....................... 32,000 17.6
Rehabilitation of the Health Services....... 68,760 37.9
Water Sanitation............................ 26,500 14.6
Rehabilitation of the Education Services.... 26,940 14.8
Contingencies............................... 15,420 08.5
Support to Amal Trust Main Office........... 11,873 06.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total................................. 181,493 100
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Objectives of the Visit:
1.1 Assessment of the situation of the health institutions in the
area for more detailed and accurate information.
1.2 Assessment of the general health problems and needs,
prioritizing them, and defining affected population groups.
1.3 Identification of the possible support needs in terms of
rehabilitation, medicines, medical equipment, and other urgent health
requirements.
1.4 To assess the other needs of Togan area and the possible means
for support and intervention.
2. The Mission and Data Collection:
The mission to Togan area took place in the period between 17-20
October 1997. The team was composed of two members from Amal Trust:
Diab K. El-Zubeir , Country Office Administrator for
Eritrea.
El-Hadi Abdalla Mohamed, Desk Officer for Development and
Humanitarian Emergency Operations, Main Office.
The visit covered the villages of Togan, Talkuk, and Maman El-
Masgid as representative samples to the Togan area.
The data collection methods included direct observation, semi
structured interviews, and meetings with key figures in the area (
leaders and personnel of schools and health institutions . . . etc).
3. The General Characteristics:
3.1 The Togan Area:
This area lies at the Eastern borders of Sudan with Eritrea, c.e.
75 km to the North-East of Kassala, it extends from Gadama-yeab in the
North to Gir-Gir at the South. From the East its bordering Eritrea and
is bordered by the Gash river from the West (near Aroma Town). The non-
government held area of Togan represent (70%) of the Hamishkoreeb
District, 30% of it is still under the control of the Government
including the religious town of Hamishkoreeb itself.
3.2 The Land:
The land in this area represent a vast valley crossed by several
seasonal rivulets (the most famous ones are Togan, Talkuk, and Maman).
There are several rocky mountains scattered in the North and South of
the area as well.
The climate of the area is semi-desert or poor savanna, with few
scattered xerophytes, mainly acacia species. Seasonal grasses wilt
shortly after the end of the brief rainy season. rain levels are very
low (less than 400 mm annual precipitation).
3.3. The Ethnic Composition:
The population of the area is mainly composed of the Beja tribe.
Within the Hamishkoreeb District there are (7) major sub-groups of this
tribe, namely:
1. El Gohabab
2. El Jimailab
3. El Williab
4. El Himaisab
5. El Gaidab
6. El Bash-kwab
7. El Beno Daynab.
Within the non-government held area of Hamishkoreeb, targeted for
Amal Trust operations, there are only three sub-groups of the sub-
groups mentioned above:
1. El Jimailab: Their major concentration and residential
areas are in the villages of Elat Yot, Edarot, Talkuk, Gadama-
yeab, and Kotanaib.
2. El Bash-kwab: They are mainly in and around Togan and up
to Faghda.
3. El Himaisab: Their population centres are in the areas of
Gir-Gir, Tumkeat, and their surroundings.
3.4 Language and Religious:
The main spoken languages in the area is the Bedaweet of the Beja,
Arabic is spoken but not widely. The only religion is Islam.
3.5 Population and Settlements:
The population of the Hamishkoreeb District area is estimated to be
68,000 people (including the Government held areas). The population of
the non-government held areas of Togan is about 40,000 people.
Population mobility is very high because of their pastoralist patterns.
It is not surprising that movements to and from the government held
areas and inside Eritrea do exist. Amal Trust, however, had started a
population census to obtain accurate figure of the population based on
the main settlement centres.
There are two patterns of Settlements:
a. The Religious Settlements (Masgid, sing.; Masgid, Pl.
Literally Mosque and Mosques).
This is based on the characteristic religious education of the area
i.e. that of Sheik Ali Betaye. The major sedentary settlements are
called Masagid and are centred on a real mosque around which people
live and get their religious education. The centre of the power and
authority under this system is the Sheik, who is always a member of Ali
Betaye family. Ali Betaye family ethnically belong to el Jimailab sub-
group of the Beja. The Beja formation, thus, is typical to the ethno-
political confederations of the Beni Amir and Tigre, who are both
pastoralists, where the traditions of serfs and leaders are predominant
characteristics.
The main example to these mosque settlements are Talkuk el Masgid,
Maman el Masgid, and Tehdaye el Masgid.
b. The Nomads Settlements: These are temporary settlements,
usually around the seasonal streams and at the skirts of the
religious settlements.
The nomads are in continuous movements in search for water and
pasture for their animals.
Generally speaking, there are (135) population centres (full list
available), ranging from small nomadic settlements to religious
villages. The major population centres of these, however, of the
highest population that can be targeted by Amal Trust operations, are
the following:
1. Tehdaye
2. Talkuk
3. Maman
4. Togan
5. Elat-Yot
6. Belestaf
7. Gadama-yeab.
Each of these major centres have several small settlements adjacent
to it which are also going to be targeted for support. It is also
necessary to emphasize that, the other areas which were not mentioned
here are not going to be neglected by Amal Trust, although the
organization will start its first phase of operation with the (5)
centres mentioned above for clear practical reasons.
3.6 The Economic Activities in the Area:
Animal rearing and pastoralism is the major economic undertaking in
the area. Animals include goats, sheep, and camels in addition to very
few cattle. Agriculture is practiced at very small scale at the
seasonal rivers' banks using diversion structures to flood the land.
Main crop grown is sorghum. The main areas suitable for this type of
farming are Maman, Elat-Yot, and Talkuk. Related to agriculture, there
are small businesses of palm leaf products (mainly in Belestaf) which
are usually traded at Kassala.
4. Infrastructural Services:
4.1 Health Services:
4.1.1 The Taikuk Hospital:
The main health institution in the area is the Talkuk hospital.
This hospital was established in 1982 by assistance from the Dutch
government under the Kassala Area Development Activities (KADA), a
joint project between the government of Sudan and the Netherlands. The
buildings of this hospital consist of:
1. Registration Room.
2. First Aid Room.
3. Pharmacy.
4. Doctors Office.
5. Dentist Office.
6. Surgical Department consisting of sterilization room and
operations theatre.
7. Men's ward.
8. Women's ward.
9. Incomplete children ward, (3) rooms.
The inpatients capacity of the hospital is (57) beds (men's ward
[16 beds], women's ward [16 beds], and children's ward [25 beds]). This
is despite the fact that, currently there are only (12) beds in total,
(6) in the men's ward and (6) in the women's ward.
Before the conflict, the health staff of the hospital consisted of
the following:
1. (1) Medical Doctor.
2. (2) Medical Assistants.
3. (1) Medical Assistant for the laboratory.
4. (1) Pharmacist.
5. (1) Senior Nurse.
6. (9) Nurses.
7. (8) Attendants.
8. (8) Midwives.
9. (5) Guards.
10. (1) Cook.
11. (1) Electric Generator Operator.
12. (1) Cleaner
Apart from the Medical Doctor, all the hospital staff are from the
local community and are still available in the area. The Medical Doctor
had left during the conflict to the government held areas, taking with
him the only Ambulance vehicle which was previously used for out-
reaching the scattered population of the area.
All the health staff in the area are working now on voluntary basis
and are supported by the local community in covering their living
expenses.
Provided that the hospital is rehabilitated, it can provide
adequate services to the whole area especially under the current
conflict situation. There is a need for some medical staff namely a
Medical Doctor, Dentist, Assistant Ophthalmologist, Anathesia and S.
Operations Technicians.
This hospital was the only referral institution in the area. Now,
after the conflict patients are referred to the Hospital of Kassala
(within the government held areas) and as such the situation is
becoming very difficult. The health staff interviewed during this
mission, however, had indicated that the most important obstacle now
for patients referred to Kassala is the lack of transportation.
4.1.2 The Other Health Institutions:
There are (5) Dispensaries within the non-government held area of
Togan namely in Yodorot, Tehdaye, Elat-Yot, Maman el Masgid, and Gir-
Gir. All these PHCUs are constructed by brick and composed of two rooms
buildings. Each of these dispensaries practically serves a population
of over (10,000) people, as with the case of Maman where its PHCU
serves the (1840) people residing in Maman in addition to about (9)
small settlements (all listed) with estimated population of around
(1,000) people each. During their operations, these dispensaries
receive about 5060 patients a day. Each dispensary is run by one nurse,
one health worker, and one attendant.
There are also a number of Primary Health Care Units PHCUs under
the supervision of these dispensaries namely in Adardaib, Maman
Baimock, Hashanait, Gadama-yeab el Masgid, Gadama-yeab Ad Kinat,
Rabsim, Kotayneab, Timaykeet, Beialambay, Togan, Belestaf, Hamt-yay,
and Aladait. The PHCUs are constructed of local materials. Each PHCU is
run by one health worker and an attendant.
All these health institutions need furniture, medical equipment,
renovation of buildings, and medicines in order to be able to provide
the required services to the rural areas of Togan. The health staff who
are all available, are striving at their level best to run these
institutions with the minimal supplies they receive from time to time.
Up to April '97 there was a vaccination programme for children
every month. It was discontinued due to the armed conflict that led to
driving all the government presence from the area.
4.1.3 The Common Diseases:
The common diseases in the area are Malnutrition, Malaria,
Respiratory Tract infections, Eye Diseases, Dysentery, Gardiasis, TB,
and the Anemia.
The main causes for children morbidity are said to be diarrhoea,
pneumonia, and malnutrition and are responsible for 50% of the children
deaths, according to the Taikuk hospital officials.
4.1.4 Medical Supplies:
Since the liberation of the area, no medical supplies were received
from the Government side. Few endeavors, however, were made by some
NGOs to provide medical supplies to these institutions, these included
provisions by:
1. Beja Congress during the months of July and September '97.
2. Amal Trust/Doctors of the World, during August '97.
3. B. Cox of Christian Solidarity International, During
August '97.
5. The Water Supply:
Apart from few shallow wells, the whole population of the area
depend on the seasonal rivulets in their water supply. Usually the
water can be obtained from these seasonal rivulets and streams from
June and up to the end of October, after which time the sandy river
beds dry, and the people had to go to the nearest village with a well
to get their water. Some times the nearest village can be more than 20
km as the case with Belestaf village where its people usually get their
water from Taikuk during the dry period.
As far as the wells are concerned, there are three wells in Taikuk,
two of them used by men, and the third is reserved for women use under
the religious settlement regulations. In Togan there is one well in the
military camp which is now shared with the local population. The third
village which enjoys having a well is Maman el Masgid, the hand pump of
this well had broken down and at the time of this mission it was
awaiting repair at the town of Tessenei.
In Talkuk itself, there is an incomplete water project which needs
only minor efforts for its completion. All the well, the water tank,
and the pump are available to be installed. The requirements are seen
as mainly an expert and small funds to mobilize the communal labour, to
build an stand for the tank, to procure some metal pipes, and to
establish small basin with taps. It is perceived that this project will
contribute very much in solving the water problems of Taikuk and its
close surroundings.
Maman Bemock and Belestaf as well as all the other major settlement
within Togan area, with exception of the above three villages, have no
any source of potable water apart from the contaminated water of the
seasonal streams, and as such have to share with these three villages
the water during the dry season.
6. The Education Services:
Its amazing that in the whole of the Togan area, and the
Hamishkoreeb District as well, that girls have no access to education
at all. The only form of education the women can have is the religious
education which is carried at monosexual Koranic schools (khalwa), by
women instructors, with the sole purpose of teaching Koran.
There are about (7) schools in the non-government held area of
Togan. These schools are namely in the villages of Taikuk, Maman,
Togan, Tehdaye, Elat-Yot, Yedarot, and Gir-Gir.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
School No. of Classes No. of Teachers No. of Students
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Taikuk....................................................... 8 2 216
Maman........................................................ 6 3 160
Togan........................................................ 5 2 150
Elat-Yot..................................................... 5 2 100
Yedarot...................................................... 5 2 100
Tehdaye...................................................... 5 2 100
Gir-Gir...................................................... 6 3 120
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.................................................. 40 16 946
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Before the conflict, and to attract the students to education, all
these schools were run under boarding system, (3) meals a day were
provided to the students.
Under the current situation, however, such arrangement had become
extremely difficult. The schools had commenced operation this month
(October '97), the local community had provided minimum support for one
meal a day (at least for Taikuk students). For instance, in the case of
Maman School, the monthly requirements for the students hostel were
estimated at 720 kg of wheat, Amal Trust had managed to provide 100 kg
of wheat just to start the process. In Addition Amal Trust had also
provided 100 students' notebook, and 100 pens, but still there is great
need for more of these items to meet the requirements of the (150)
students of this school alone.
7. Suggested Intervetion for Amal Trust:
7.1 Rehabilitation of the Health Delivery System and the Water
Sanitation
7.1.1 The objective of this project is the rehabilitation of
the rural health services delivery units that can provide
direct and accessible services to the different villages in
Togan area. This has been identified as a priority need for the
following reasons:
a. The initial idea of rehabilitating the Taikuk
hospital was postponed due to the fact that, Taikuk as
a referral hospital does not have the capacity to cover
the health needs of the area without the support of the
rural units, nor it has the location that make it
always accessible to the remote villages.
b. In terms of staff, to rehabilitate the hospital
will imply looking for a medical doctor, Dentist,
Assistant Ophthalmologist, Anathesia and S. Operations
Technicians. And since there are no doctors available,
it is not expected that a hospital lacking these
medical staff will function properly. With regard to
the PHCUs and the dispensaries, all the health staff
who are originally from the local community are
available to run these services as soon as the minimal
support is provided.
c. Considering both Amal Trust strategy of a rural
development that should start from the periphery, and
the need for a sequential and gradual process of
rehabilitation, it is quite logical that the project
should start by rehabilitating the rural health units
in its first phase, then it can undertake the
rehabilitation of the hospital as a second priority.
d. In terms of feasibility, its also less costly and
more socially beneficial to rehabilitate the rural
health units than the hospital.
This been the strategy, Amal Trust had discussed with the local
community the suggested units for rehabilitation by the first phase of
the project. The following units were agreed as appropriate both in
terms ofthe available infrastructure, and the geographical coverage and
accessibility to the local communities:
7.1.2 The Suggested Dispensaries:
1. Tehdaye Dispensary
2. Maman Dispensary
3. Elat-Yot Dispensary
7.1.3 The Suggested Primary Health Care Units:
1. Gadama-yeab PHCU
2. Rabsim PHCU
3. Timaykeet PHCU
4. Adardaib PHCU
5. Belestaf PHCU
The rehabilitation of these health institutions will include:
a. Renovation of the Buildings
b. Supply of Medical Equipment
c. Supply of Drugs
d. Provision of basic furniture
e. Meeting the personnel cost of the health staff
The local community will participate in the construction activities
as well as expected to maintain their support to the health staff.
7.2 The Water Sanitation:
In almost all the villages visited by the team, water born diseases
were mentioned as one of the major problems added to the fact of
difficulties associated with fetching the water itself. The objective
of this project is to provide sources of potable water to the major
population centre. To help in the eradication of the water borne
diseases, to reduce the water fetching burden from the women, and to
assist in the settlement of the population and the improvement of their
living.
This project will include:
1. The installment of the water project of Talkuk.
2. The establishment of (2) wells in Maman.
3. The establishment of (3) wells in Tehdaye.
4. The establishment of (3) wells in Togan.
5. The establishment of (2) wells in Belestaf.
The local population are also expected to contribute labour for the
digging of the wells. While the technical expertise and inputs are
expected to be provided by the project.
It should also be stated here that, these water services are seen
as part of the health programme. A complete water supply project for
Togan are is been submitted by the Beja Relief Organization (PRO) to
the Dutch InterChurch Aid for funding, therefore, the provisions of
this project, here, could be seen as primary phase of that wider
project.
7.3 The Rehabilitation of the Educational Services:
This is a short term programme with the aim of providing support to
the initiative already taken to open some of the schools in the Togan
area with local support. On the long run, Amal Trust would look into
the possibilities of supporting all the schools of the area, as well as
looking into women education. However, the emphasis of this project, is
to see that at least (50%) of the schools in the project area could
function adequately, without major problems and shortages, to the end
of the school year.
The same infrastructures will be used for opening Adult Education
classes at the respective schools to be rehabilitated.
The form of the support is suggested to include:
1. Essential renovation of the buildings.
2. Supply of Educational Materials and Aids (pens, notebooks,
pencils . . . etc).
3. Support to the Teaching Staff (each school should have at
least 4 teachers).
4. Support of the Students Hostels (at least 1-2 meals a
day). The requirements per student per day could be calculated
as follows:
a. Wheat or sorghum: 200gm
b. Lentils: 25gm
c. Oil: 25gm
The selected schools for this project include:
1. Talkuk el Masgid School.
2. Maman School.
3. Togan School.
It is expected that these three schools will accommodate at least
(500) students since more students are expected to come from adjacent
villages and other schools.
7.4 Project Requirements:
For Amal Trust institutionally to be able to implement this
project, support will be needed for both its Logistics offices at
Tessenei, and the Field Office in Togan.
8. Organizational Structure and Implementation Strategy:
It is suggested that the structure of the project will take the
form of partnership between Amal Trust and the local community in
Togan. The characteristics of the local community and their
implications will be considered in the structuring of the project form.
8.1 Loqistics Office (Tessenei)
8.1.1 Functions of the Office:
a. Supervision of the programme activities at the field level
(Tokan).
b. Monitoring, assessment, and updating function on the
situation on the border, and at the project area.
c. Logistical support to the programmes in Eastern Sudan.
8.1.2. Office Staff
a. Office Manager
b. Office assistant
c. Office Secretary
d. Office cleaner/guard
8.2 Field Office (Togan)
8.2.1. Functions of the Office:
a. To implement Amal Trust programmes and Activities at the
field level.
b. To monitor, assess, and update, by reporting, Tessenei and
the Country office on the developments, problems, and arising
issues at the project area.
c. To mobilize the local communities for self-help
activities, and to identify further areas for intervention by
Amal Trust.
8.2.2. Office Staff
a. Project Coordinator
b. Community Development Worker
c. Office Administrator.
8.3 Local Community Structures:
Amal Trust had already established the link and services
committees as follows:
1. Taikuk Committee (5-members)
2. Maman El-Masgid Committee (3-members)
3. Togan: Unlike Taikuk and Maman, Togan people are not based
in one place, in fact Togan itself is a market and transactions
place whereas the people of Togan are scattered over many small
pastoralist settlements (Furgan, Local) around Togan. For
practical reason the area is divided into two:
3.1 Togan East Committee (7-members): Extends from
Togan to the East up to the Eritrean Borders including
the main areas of Gebrayeet Glabinyou, Gebrayeet
Serarat, Gebrayeet Silky, Angatait Serarat, and
Angatait Belait, around the valleys of Gebrayeet and
Angatait. It covers the sub-tribes of Semendowab,
Hamfey, Yousab, Araray, and Berkey.
3.2 Togan West Committee (6-members): Covering the
sub-tribes of Reddey, Hadedwab, Omdab, Bushariab,
Simdir, and Bushnab. Their area extend from Togan to
the west up to the Gash River.
4. Belestaf Committee (5-members): It covers the sub-tribes
of Shokab (Khor Shagloba), Hisay (Kadab), and the Masmar.
These are committees are formed from the local communities at the
major population centres level. Their membership includes teachers,
health workers, religious leadership, tribal leadership, and ethnic
groups representation all of whom are influential in the local
community mobilization.
Each committee is selected with the consensus of the local
community and local leadership. The role of these committees is
expected to link the project with the local community, to represent the
local community as far as the identification of needs, prioritization
of problems, formulation of projects, and mobilization of the support
of the local community in the implementation and management of these
projects is concerned.
Considering the ethnic composition of the population and their
relationship with their traditional tribal-religious leaders, Amal
Trust had already discussed the possible project with the
Administrative Commissioner, who is also the ethno-religious Beja
leader (Betaye Family), who had in fact pleaded for Amal Trust
intervention and support to the rehabilitation and development of the
area. He promised to provide all possible support for the
implementation of this project.
The support of this leader (in addition to the local community
structures or committees) is thought by Amal Trust as quite vital in
smoothing the implementation of the project and in gaining maximum
community participation, and in ensuring the sustainability of the
services. Without the consensus and agreement of these local leaders
Amal Trust believes that it would be quite impossible to implement any
activities in this area.
9. Monitoring and Evaluation:
Amal Trust will develop a close monitoring and follow up system for
both the process and impact of the intervention. The project will
develop together with the local community a set of basic indicators for
the project to be used both for the monitoring of the implementation
and the impact of the activities and to be used for reorientation of
the activities whenever proved necessary by the periodical evaluation
results.
While Amal Trust will initiate its own monitoring system, both at
Tessenei and the Togan field office levels, it will strive to meet the
monitoring requirements of its donor and partner NGOs and institutions
to the possible level, and to incorporate them in its own system.
In principle Amal Trust, in accordance with its transparency
strategy, will avail all the monitoring and evaluation results for its
activities, as well as those related to the general project area
context (economic, military, security . . . etc.), to its partners. And
in principle there Amal Trust welcomes that some of the monitoring
activities to be taken by the partners as long as they are permitted by
the local authorities (i.e. our third partners in such Cross-Border-
Operation), Amal Trust will do its best that the partners get such
access which is quite necessary for reflecting its efficiency and for
building solid bases for cooperation and continued support with its
partners.
10. Estimated Project Budget:
As far as the renovation of the buildings and the establishment of
the wells is concerned, this budget figures are tentative, and are
based on figures of a similar programme to be implemented in Menza,
North of Blue Nile. More accurate figures could be obtained by a
technical team upon reaching an agreement of support to this project.
Estimated Project Budget
(U.S. Dollars)
A. Capital
1. Establishment of Tessenei Logistics Office........ 21,200
2. Support to Togan Field Office..................... 10,800
----------------
Sub-Total (A)................................ 32,000
B. Support Components
B.1 Rehabilitation of the Health Services
a. Renovation of the Buildings
@ 3 PHCU x 2,000 US$............................. 6,000
@ 5 Dispensaries x 1,000 US$..................... 5,000
b. Supply of the Medical Equipment................. 10,000
c. Supply of Drugs................................. 24,000
d. Meeting the personnel cost of the health staff
@ 3 Nurses x 50 US$ x 12 months.................. 1,800
@ 8 H. Workers x 35 US$ x 12 months.............. 3,360
@ 8 Attendants x 25 US$ x 12 months.............. 2,400
----------------
Sub-Total (B.1).............................. 68,760
B.2 Water Sanitation
1. The installment of the water project of Talkuk.. 1,500
2. The establishment of (2) wells in Maman......... 5,000
3. The establishment of (3) wells in Tehdaye....... 7,500
4. The establishment of (3) wells in Togan......... 7,500
5. The establishment of (2) wells in Belestaf...... 5,000
----------------
Sub-Total (B.2).............................. 26,500
B.3 Rehabilitation of the Education Services
1. Renovation of the buildings..................... 6,000
2. Educational Materials and Aids
@ Notebooks 3 x 500 x 0.5 US$.................... 0,750
@ Pens 2 x 500 x 0.14 US$........................ 0,140
@ Pencils 2 x 500 x 0.07 US$..................... 0,070
@ Posters and Markers............................ 0,150
@ Chalk.......................................... 0,150
@ Teachers Aids.................................. 0,350
3. Teaching Staff
12 Teachers x 12 month x 50 US$.................. 7,200
4. The Students Hostels
a. Wheat or Sorghum (2OOgm x 500 students x 9
months = 27.0 MT)
@ 27.8 US$ x 270 Quintals...................... 7,506
b. Lentils (25gm x 500 x 9 = 3.4 MT)
@ 66 US$ x 34 Quintal.......................... 2,244
c. Oil (25gm x 500 x 9 = 3.4 MT)
@ 0.7US$ x 3400 kg............................. 2,380
----------------
Sub-Total (B.3).............................. 26,940
----------------
Total...................................... 154,200
10% Contingency............................ 15,420
----------------
Total Budget............................... 169,620
Support to Amal Trust Main Office (7%)..... 11,873
================
Grand Total.............................. 181,493
Appendix (1)
(U.S. Dollars)
Tessenei Office Budget:
A. Capital:
1. Rent of the office 200 X 12..................... 2,400
2. Furniture....................................... 1,500
3. Motorbike....................................... 3,500
----------------
Sub-Total (A).................................... 7,400
B. Office Equipment
1. Computer and Printer............................ 2,500
2. Communication Radio............................. 2,500
3. Stationeries.................................... 1,000
----------------
Sub-Total (B).................................... 6,000
C. Personnel
1. Office Manager 250 X 12......................... 3,000
2. Office Assistant 150 X 12....................... 2,400
3. Secretary 100 X 12.............................. 1,200
4. Office Cleaner/Guard 100 X 12................... 1,200
----------------
Sub-Total (C).................................... 7,800
================
Total............................................ 21,200
Togan Office Budget:
A. Capital
1. Construction of Office (local Materials)........ 0,500
2. Furniture....................................... 1,500
3. Typewriter + stationeries....................... 1,000
----------------
Sub-Total (A).................................... 3,000
B. Personnel
1. Field Office Manager @ 250 X 12................. 3,000
2. Community Development Worker @ 200 X 12......... 2,400
3. Relief Worker @ 200 X 12........................ 2,400
----------------
Sub-Total (B).................................... 7,800
================
Total Budget................................... 10,800
__________
E. Assessment of the Humanitarian Conditions in Eastern Sudan
1. Introduction
The Land and the People
Geographical Location
The Beja region accommodates more than 3.5 million Beja people. The
region extends from Aswan, Southern Egypt, in the North up to the
Eritrean plateau and the plains of Massawa in the East and along the
coast of the Red Sea into the Sudanese territories up to the Atbara
area and along the Nile riverside as their Western borders.
Ethnic Origin and Composition
The Beja are widely believed to be descendants from the Hamiatic
people of Asia who crossed the Red Sea and inhabited their current
location some 4000 years B.C.
The distribution of the Beja as one ethnic group in the areas of
Southern Egypt, North-East and Eastern Sudan, and the Eastern and
Western lowlands of Eritrea, and before the setting of the current
political boundaries of these states, is confirmed through the tribes
that constitute the Beja ethnic group. The Beja are divided into 10
distinct tribes namely El-Artega, El-Bushareyeen, El-Amar-er, El-
Ashraf, El-Kemailab, El-Hedandawa, El-Melhetkanat, El-Habab, El-Halanga
and El-Beni-Amir.
The Beja of the Sudan
The Beja of the Sudan occupy an area that extends from Halayeb in
the Northeast along the Eastern borders of Sudan up to the Atbara
river, and are bordered from the West by the river Nile. Their main
population settlements are Halayeb, Tokar, Mohamed Goal, Hamash Koraib,
Sinkat, Port Sudan, Karora and Kassala.
The population of the Beja of the Sudan is estimated to be three
million people.
The Ecological Description of the Beja Area
The region of the Beja lies just above the (600) isohyet with
rainfall ranging between 500 mm in the Southern parts, to 0.0 mm annual
precipitation in the Northern areas. The coastal areas receive the
winter rains between November and January in the range of 150-200 mm.
The land is mostly bare and rocky with few scattered xerophyte
vegetation namely Acacia ssp., Ziziphus spina christie, Prospis
chilensis, and some wild cactus ssp., seasonal grasses are associated
with the rainy seasons.
The terrain is generally rough, mountainous and is crossed with a
multitude of dried and seasonal rivulets. The Beja land is also crossed
by two major rivers, Gash and Toker both bringing water and fertile
soil from the highlands of Ethiopia and Eritrea, thus, their respective
deltas and flood plains are considered to be among the most fertile
schemes in Sudan. The climatic zones of the Beja areas thus, vary from
dry savanna in the Southern parts, to a typical desert zone to the far
North. It is generally characterized by very low temperatures during
the night, and extreme hotness during the day.
The Nomadic Patterns
The Beja tribes are mostly pastoralists with some of them
practicing agropastoralism. Their pasture land and routes extends, as
indicated by one of them, from Halayeb in the North-east of Sudan to
the mountains of Rura Habab in the Sahel province of Eritrea. Their
livestock consist mainly of camels and goats, which best suit the tough
environment of the region. Farming is practiced at various levels along
the pasture route as a supplementary activity.
The nomadic pattern of the Beja, which necessitate a continuously
mobile pattern of living characterized by the non-existence of
permanent settlement forms--in most cases, has had its clear
implications and consequences, historically, on the development of this
ethnic group and that of the area they inhabit.
This lifestyle has led to an underdevelopment of adequate
infrastructural services such as health, education, . . . etc. This
state continuously maintained by environmental pressures necessitating
migrations in search of water, pasture, and farming lands, the aspect
that put the Beja in a historical dialectic and a vicious circle of
poverty, underdevelopment, and high vulnerability to external
environmental elements.
The Historical Suffering of the Beja--An Old Plight, New Concern
The present suffering of the Beja people is a result of a long
process of deprivation and marginalization which has characterized the
contemporary history of this group.
This has been mainly due to successive mal-policies adopted by the
various governments in Sudan which have neglected and overlooked the
existence of the Beja, and possible negative impacts and adverse
effects of these policies on their survival. Such policies include
taking of vast grazing areas and their conversion into agricultural
schemes, forcing the people to move with their animals into poor
grazing land, mostly mountainous, areas of the Red Sea coast.
The Gash and Tokar agricultural schemes stand as a conspicuous
example for such depriving policies. Both schemes had taken land which
was vital for the Beja in terms of resources and pattern of their
economic activity. These areas used to provide the Beja with good
pasture land and water for their livestock in their seasonal migration
from East to West.
Other plantation schemes in the Eastern region as a whole have also
sprung up using intensive mechanization and taking large areas which
were once a resort for the nomads and their animals. The horticultural
gardens occupy all the land around the Gash river.
The remaining areas, resource poor as they were, have also been
used for building of roads such as the roads connecting the capital
Khartoum with Port Sudan, coupled with the recent ongoing war and the
economic decline nationwide, have aggravated the situation even more.
Thus, the end result is a loss of wealth and impoverishment of the
Beja people as well as accelerating environmental degradation and
desertification. Both the land and its people have suffered
tremendously from such mal-policies adopted by the different groups
that have come to power in the contemporary Sudan.
Some studies carried out in the area described a previous situation
where animals were traded for sorghum and other consumer goods, and
agriculture was also practiced along the seasonal wadies and khores.
This practice no longer exist, the loss of natural pasture land
combined with the drying-up of wells in the area, and the resent
droughts have all led to the loss of livestock and the decrease of
nomadism in the area. Accordingly, the area witnessed a large influx of
rural people into the urban centres especially during the famine years
of 1984, 85, 90, 93 and 1996. Large scattered settlements started to
emerge around these urban centres indicating the magnitude of poverty
and displacement that have since taken place within the Beja.
Poverty, disease, hunger, illiteracy have all been permanent and
persistent phenomenon and is characteristic of the Beja life during the
last years.
2. The Present Political Situation
A subsequent era in the process of deprivation and impoverishment
followed, however, this time with marked differences in terms of
methods and impact. This era also witnessed a growing concern, however
limited, from the international community about the excessive human
rights violations. The phase is closely linked to the present
government of Sudan (GOS) practices and ruthless suppression of the
Beja people.
The attitude of GOS towards the Beja can be explained by political
developments in the region in general and the Beja in particular.
Presently the different fractions of Sudanese opposition opposing the
Khartoum regime are operating from the Eastern Sudan border with
Eritrea, an area which is dominantly Beja. The Beja after long periods
of suppression have decided to take arms and revolt against this
situation. Demanding economics and political rights. Consequently, the
GOS reacted aggressively and indiscriminately against the whole Beja
population in Sudan.
This reaction in addition to other measures taken by the GOS has
led to the displacement of a large number of people. Some of these
measures and practices which have been reported by many concerned
bodies and circles can be summarized in the following:
I. Direct confiscation of the Beja land to be either sold or given to
other more favoured groups.
II. Levy of heavy taxes, which lead to loss of the little possessions
people have.
III. The GOS has detained, tortured and harassed many people accusing
them of assisting or being members of the Beja Congress.
IV. Young men are taken by the thousands and sent to fight, against
their will, in the South of Sudan.
Situation of human rights in Sudan
(UN Commission on human rights in Sudan, April 1997)
Recalling General Assembly resolution 51/112 of 12 December 1996 on
the human rights situation in the Sudan and its own resolution 1996/73
of April 1996, also on the human rights situation in the Sudan. Noting
with deep concern reports of grave human rights violations and abuses
in the Sudan, particularly detentions without trial, forced
displacement of persons and torture, as described inter alla in
numerous reports submitted to the General Assembly and the Commission
on Human Rights--expresses its deep concern at continued serious rights
violations by the GOS, including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary
arrests, detentions without due process, enforced or involuntary
disappearances, violations of the rights of women and children, slavery
and slavery-like practices, forced displacement of persons and
systematic torture, and denial of the freedom of religion, expression,
association and peaceful assembly, and emphasizes that it is essential
to put an end to violations of human rights in the Sudan.
All accusations mentioned above, are confirmed by the Beja
population, during my field visit in July 1997.
3. The Beja Relief Organisation (BRO)
The Beja Relief Organisation (BRO) was formed in October 1996 by
conscientious Sudanese nationals wishing to address the current plight
of the Sudanese people in general, and of the Beja nationality in
particular. BRO is registered in Eritrea as a non-profit making
humanitarian and a political agency, having its headquarters in Asmara,
and with field offices inside Sudan in areas liberated by the Beja
Congress. The Beja Congress recognizes and extends full support to BRO
in its operations to monitor, assess and assist the vulnerable Beja
communities.
Objectives of the BRO
BRO, as a relief association, aims to address all economic and
social problems, created not only by the present regime in the Sudan,
but also by the chronic effects of droughts and land degradation to
which the region, as part of the Sahelian zone, has been exposed for
decades. The initial and immediate objective of BRO is, however, to
provide relief support to the Beja people suffering from the crude and
rude policies of the NIF, and, thereby, contain and rehabilitate them
in the land of their forefathers by arresting forced migration to
neighbouring Eritrea and Ethiopia. As such, BRO has the following
specific objectives;
make the international community aware of the plight and
needs of the Beja people,
solicit material and financial assistance for relief
programs from the international community on behalf of the Beja people,
assume responsibility for the implementation of all relief
activities in the Beja region, and
mobilize activities designed to prevent man-made and
natural disasters in the region inhabited by the Bejas.
Functions of the BRO
As stated above, BRO functions as a humanitarian organisation
working closely with all war-affected peoples of the Sudan. But, under
the present circumstances, it gives priority to conducting relief
operations to those Bejas in areas controlled by the armed wing of the
Beja Congress; it, thus, assumes the following functions;
formulate policies required to achieve the organisation's
stated objectives,
conduct surveys to detect signs of impending natural and
man-made disasters in the Beja areas, and on this basis to formulate
and implement preventive measures,
negotiate and sign agreements with international and
national organisations, on behalf of the Beja people, and implement
approved relief and rehabilitation programmes and projects in agreed
manner,
conduct nutritional and food needs surveys and disseminate
the results obtained to donor communities,
prepare plans, and budget proposals regarding relief
requirements for the Beja people,
distribute relief assistance to the affected social
sectors of the Beja population, and
issue official statements, communiques and other documents
pertaining to relief situation in Beja region.
Organisational Structure of the BRO
In order to effectively bear its mandate and strengthen its
capacity to fulfill its immediate objectives and functions. BRO is
currently instituting an organisational structure that can reach most
of the vulnerable groups of the Beja people through cross-border
operations. At the same time, it is laying the ground for an eventual
evolvement of the organisation into a rehabilitation and development
agency. The General Assembly of Association, the supreme authority of
BRO, has already elected its Board of Directors for a term of three
years, which is responsible for general policy and other strategic
guidelines. The Board of Directors, led by a Chairperson, in turn, has
appointed the Secretary General, also for a term of three years, and
vested with executive powers of the organization. There are three
departments and one field coordinating office, viz., Finance
Department, Relief Department, Projects' Department, and a Field
Coordinating Office. The Field Coordinator, stationed inside the
liberated areas, is responsible for Four Regional Offices set up to
operate in the liberated areas of the Beja territory; these Regional
Offices are located in Tahday, Ghedamayabe, Rabasien and Karora. The
Field Coordinator will work in close collaboration with the Civil
Administrator of the liberated areas already appointed by the Beja
Congress.
4. Humanitarian Consequences
Food security
During my field trip I visited the following villages: Tailkook,
Tahadia Osies, Aladyoy, El Maskiet, Gadamayabe Elmasgid, Rabasien,
Akedie, Ogmayate Elmasgid, Hashanate Elmasgid, Maman Biamoke, Manan
Sharic, and Balhastuf.
Traditionally the Beja are goat herders, although many still follow
this way of life, some are also crop farmers. The economic crisis in
Sudan has adversely affected the Beja. The majority of the people are
depending on Sorghum for their staple food, and are very susceptible to
a poor harvest, high inflation, and government taxes on produce.
The totalitarian policies of the Sudanese government that has
harmed the Beja in recent years are:
(a) Discrimination, particularly in land ownership. The
confiscation of prime land by the government has forced many previous
owners to become tenants on their own land. They are subject to pay
taxes to graze animals and on any produce sold.
(b) The obstruction of humanitarian assistance to the Beja
population in the Sudan.
(c) Harassment and extortion of Beja Communities by government
officials and military is reported to be widespread.
The current fighting between the Sudan forces and the Beja Congress
has escalated during the recent months. This has made the region far
less secure for the Beja who are exposed to widespread destruction such
as aerial bombardment, landmines, burning of villages by Sudan ground
forces, looting, etc. This has affected the availability of, or access
to, normal sources of food. People's lives and health are at risk
directly from the destructive effects.
The present situation is that the Beja in the liberated areas
depend largely on wild fruits and their livestock. They are trapped
between the Eritrean border and the front line, which also makes it
impossible for them to follow their normal traditional nomadic pattern.
The Beja Relief Organization (BRO) estimate 635,000 people live in the
area, out of these, 35% of the, i.e. 222,250 are expected to be
effectively displaced and requiring urgent relief support (see also
food aid request from DIA, Head Office in Utrecht the Netherlands).
Discussions at village level
In all mentioned villages above, we held discussions with the
elders. In all discussions the same problems came up. First, the food
situation, secondly, water, third, health and as last, housing. The
food situation is very urgent, people are living on wild fruits and
their last animals; they cannot cultivate, because the surrounding area
is not suitable for cultivation and irrigation systems are not
available. Beside the problems mentioned there are no farmers and
little experience is available among them. Water is also a big problem,
in most places they have to walk several hours to collect drinking
water, most people are collecting surface water of poor quality. Health
care is not available at all, the hospital in Tailkook is operating,
but without any drugs. For many people shelter is a problem, in most
cases they lack the money to buy the necessary building materials.
Several villages have been bombed or destroyed by the Sudanese army and
the people lost their housing, others had to escape their area and are
in need for housing. The Beja are very proud people and they do not
complain about their situation (but if no action is taken the situation
of the people will become more difficult). Also mentioned is the
complete lack of education for their children.
Discussions with the different elders in the villages have made it
very clear that humanitarian relief, at this moment, is the only way of
survival for the Beja population in the liberated areas. With the total
breakdown of the economic system, and the present frontline, which has
stopped their normal pattern to migrate with the different seasons,
they are no longer able to survive on their own resources. Money is
hardly available among them. (The price for a goat is Birr 25.) Due to
lack of water and fodder their livestock is decreasing rapidly and they
do not have the funds to replace them. This will lead to starvation if
assistance is not forthcoming.
In the current situation there is little prospect to return to
normality, let alone an improvement upon normality as long as they are
locked between the frontline and the Eritrean border. They also made it
clear that as soon as the situation changes, or their area will be
extended, they hope that the international community is prepared to
assist them to replace their lost animals, to avoid long dependency on
relief food.
Water situation
During my field visit it rained almost every day, which helps the
Beja population to find water. Two main rivers are crossing the area,
the Gash and Tokar. Both rivers are important suppliers of drinking
water. All water collected by the population is surface water, which is
of a very poor quality and in many cases the people, especially the
children, are suffering from diarrhea. In the area there are no water
pumps in working condition and with the dry season coming the water
situation will make it impossible for the people to stay in this
region.
Health situation
The main pathologies in the region are: Malaria (hyperendemic),
Respiratory tract infection, Conjunctivitis and night blindness (linked
to vitamin deficiencies), Infected wounds, Arthritic diseases (linked
to vitamin deficiencies), Diarrhoeal diseases (linked to poor drinking
water situation), Intestinal complaints, and Snake bites.
The only hospital available for the whole North Kassala region is
located in Tailkook. This means that many people have to travel two or
three days by camel to reach it. The hospital was built in 1982 with
Dutch funding. Today the health care in the hospital is very limited
due to the lack of essential drugs, staff, materials and diagnostic
facilities. The limited medical service provided by the hospital is the
only access people have to health care. The medical facilities in the
surrounding villages are no longer in use, because there is no medical
equipment or drugs available.
Shelter
Except in the semi-urban areas, the Beja people are largely nomads
practicing long distance migration in search of grass and water for
their livestock. They live in tents made of mats, clothes, and tree
branches. They call them Bedaygaw. The Bedaygaw can easily be
dismantled and transported by camel between their wet and dry season
camps. Since most of them live in hot areas where the annual average
temperature is about 39-42 degrees centigrade, the Bedaygaw is
constructed in such a way that a maximum of air flow is possible.
The target population is about 250,000 people, the BRO estimated
that out of these 250,000 people about 44,000 people are in need for
shelter. In several areas the population is making the necessary mats
from palm leafs and they were selling them in Kassala, but because of
the economic boycott by the Sudanese government this is no longer
possible. To activate the market again, the BRO wants to buy the mats
and distribute them in other areas, where needed.
This will partly bring the necessary cash flow back into the local
economy. It will be much cheaper than imported tents. Although there
will not be sufficient material available some tents should be
purchased.
5. Recommendations
Food aid
Out of the 250,000 people living in the areas controlled by the
Beja Congress, about 90,000 people are in urgent need of food aid.
Total needed for the first six months:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Six months' need
Food items in MT Price/Ton Cost USD
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sorghum/rice.............................................. 8,100 210.00 1,701,000.00
Edible oil................................................ 408 1,300.00 530,400.00
Pulses (Lentils).......................................... 810 480.00 388,800.00
Powdered milk............................................. 810 2,005.26 1,624,260.60
Sugar..................................................... 408 340.00 138,720.00
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total............................................... 10,536 4,383,180.60
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is requested to purchase the first two months supply locally.
Transport
For the transportation of the above mentioned food, local transport
in Eritrea can be hired from ERREC. For the transportation inside Sudan
lorries should be purchased, if possible four wheel drive Mercedes.
Secondhand or new.
Current price information indicates that the minimum cost of
transporting one ton of cargo by truck is approximately USD 0.14 per
km. In total, transport cost to the border would amount to about US
$737,520.00. In addition, as the experience of ERREC shows, loading/
unloading and other handing cost usually reach about 3% of the total
transport cost, i.e., approximately US $22,126.00
For the transport inside Sudan there are approximately 10 trucks
needed, five in the North Kassala region and five in Karora region.
Prices approximately US $40,000.00 per truck, secondhand price. New
price for 4 wd Mercedes trucks US $95,000.00 per pcs.
Water project
The water situation in the region in extremely difficult, beside
some hand-dug wells along the river side, which are often open wells
and made of poor material. They are susceptible to damage after each
flood. Secondly, the total number of people living in the area at this
moment is far more than during the normal situation. The water table is
often more than 30-40 meters below the surface, which makes hand-dug
wells impossible.
Total price of the water project, including operation cost for one
year, approximately US $1,500,000.00.
Included in the water project there should be a training course for
four Sudanese operators. The Beja Congress has a technical department,
from this unit technical people can be selected.
Health project
Danida, through LWF in Asmara, has provided the BRO with the
requirements of a months supply of medicine and medical equipment.
According to LWF they intend to continue supplying medicine for the
first six months. This will help the BRO with their basic needs of
medicine and some medical equipment. Beside the above mentioned
supplies, medical training for their field personnel is urgently
required. This training should be given in Eritrea, is possible in
cooperation with the ministry of health in Asmara or any other
organisation/NGO specialized in health care. At this stage it is
impossible to give any budget figures.
Shelter project
To stimulate the economic activities in the area controlled by the
Beja Congress, local made mats should be purchased from the Beja, which
can be used for distribution among the population in need for shelter.
Total budget US $100,000.00. In addition, beside this local purchase,
tents will be needed to provide shelter. Proposed is an Indian-made
Bell tent, this is a round tent, which can be easily open at the sides
and comes close to their own houses the Bedaygaw.
Total budget one thousand tents US $155 1000 (US
$155,000.00)
Local purchase of mats (US $100,000.00)
Transport cost (US $20,000.00)
Total US $275,000.00
Organisational support to the BRO
The activities from the BRO are increasing daily, the
responsibilities are beyond the current capacity of the organisation.
Urgently needed is the following:
(a) Transport, Two Toyota Land Cruisers, with anti-mine protection
mats. US $80,000.00.
(b) Communication equipment. US $30,000.00.
(c) Office supplies for one year. US $10,000.00.
(d) Running cost for the two field offices and main office in
Asmara. US $25,000.00.
Total request US $145,000.00
__________
F. S. 873: Prohibition on Financial Transactions With Countries
Supporting Terrorism Act of 1997 (Introduced in the Senate)
[Note: Chairman Helms was a co-sponsor of this legislation.]
______
105th CONGRESS,
1st Session
S. 873
To amend the prohibition of title 18, United States Code, against
financial transactions with state sponsors of international terrorism.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
June 10, 1997
Mr. Ashcroft introduced the following bill; which was read twice
andreferred to the Committee on the Judiciary
__________
A BILL
To amend the prohibition of title 18, United States Code, against
financial transactions with state sponsors of international terrorism.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the `Prohibition on Financial Transactions
With Countries Supporting Terrorism Act of 1997'.
SEC. 2. FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS WITH STATE SPONSORS OF INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM.
(a) PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS--Section 2332d(a) of title 18, United
States Code, is amended----
(1) by striking `Except as provided in regulations issued by
the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
Secretary of State, whoever' and inserting `(1) Except as
provided in paragraph (2) or (3), whoever';
(2) by inserting `of 1979' after `Export Administration Act';
and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
`(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply to any financial transaction----
`(A) engaged in by an officer or employee of the United
States acting within his or her official capacity;
`(B) for the sole purpose of providing humanitarian
assistance in a country designated under section 6(j) of the
Export Administration Act of 1979;
`(C) involving travel or other activity by any journalist or
other member of the news media in a country designated under
section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979; or
`(D) within a class of financial transactions, and with a
specified country, covered by a determination of the President
stating that it is vital to the national security interests of
the United States that financial transactions of that class and
with that country be permitted.
`(3) Each determination under paragraph (2)(D) shall be published
in the Federal Register at least 15 days in advance of the transaction
and shall include a statement of the determination, a detailed
explanation of the types of financial transactions permitted, the
estimated dollar amount of the financial transactions permitted, and an
explanation of the manner in which those financial transactions would
further the national interests of the United States.
`(4) The President shall submit a report to the Committees on
Foreign Relations and Appropriations of the Senate and the Committees
on International Relations and Appropriations of the House of
Representatives and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
containing any determination under paragraph (2)(D) at least 30 days
before the determination is to take effect. Any such determination
shall be effective only for a period of 12 months but may be extended
for an additional period or periods of 12 months each.'.
(b) DEFINITION--Section 2332d(b) of title 18, United States Code,
is amended----
(1) by striking `and' at the end of paragraph (1);
(2) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following:
`(2) the term `humanitarian assistance' includes, but is not
limited to, the provision of medicines and religious materials;
and'.
(c) EFFECTIVE DATE--The amendments made by this section shall apply
to financial transactions entered into on or after the date of
enactment of this Act.
__________
G. Executive Order Blocking Sudanese Government Property and
Prohibiting Transactions With Sudan
The White House.
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release, November 4, 1997.
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and
the laws of the United States of America, including the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the
National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of
title 3, United States Code;
I, William J. Clinton, President of the United States of America,
find that the policies and actions of the Government of Sudan,
including continued support for international terrorism; ongoing
efforts to destabilize neighboring governments; and the prevalence of
human rights violations, including slavery and the denial of religious
freedom, constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national
security and foreign policy of the United States, and hereby declare a
national emergency to deal with that threat. I hereby order:
Section 1. Except to the extent provided in section 203(b) of IEEPA
(50 U.S.C. 1702(b)) and in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses
that may be issued pursuant to this order, all property and interests
in property of the Government of Sudan that are in the United States,
that hereafter come within the United States, or that hereafter come
within the possession or control of United States persons, including
their overseas branches, are blocked.
Sec. 2. The following are prohibited, except to the extent provided
in section 203(b) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)) and in regulations,
orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this
order:
(a) the importation into the United States of any goods or services
of Sudanese origin, other than information or informational
materials;
(b) the exportation or reexportation, directly or indirectly, to
Sudan of any goods, technology (including technical data,
software, or other information), or services from the United
States or by a United States person, wherever located, or
requiring the issuance of a license by a Federal agency, except
for donations of articles intended to relieve human suffering,
such as food, clothing, and medicine;
(c) the facilitation by a United States person, including but not
limited to brokering activities, of the exportation or
reexportation of goods, technology, or services from Sudan to
any destination, or to Sudan from any location;
(d) the performance by any United States person of any contract,
including a financing contract, in support of an industrial,
commercial, public utility, or governmental project in Sudan;
(e) the grant or extension of credits or loans by any United States
person to the Government of Sudan;
(f) any transaction by a United States person relating to
transportation of cargo to or from Sudan; the provision of
transportation of cargo to or from the United States by any
Sudanese person or any vessel or aircraft of Sudanese
registration; or the sale in the United States by any person
holding authority under subtitle 7 of title 49, United States
Code, of any transportation of cargo by air that includes any
stop in Sudan; and
(g) any transaction by any United States person or within the United
States that evades or avoids, or has the purpose of evading or
avoiding, or attempts to violate, any of the prohibitions set
forth in this order.
Sec. 3. Nothing in this order shall prohibit:
(a) transactions for the conduct of the official business of the
Federal Government or the United Nations by employees thereof;
or
(b) transactions in Sudan for journalistic activity by persons
regularly employed in such capacity by a news-gathering
organization.
Sec. 4. For the purposes of this order:
(a) the term ``person'' means an individual or entity;
(b) the term ``entity'' means a partnership, association, trust,
joint venture, corporation, or other organization;
(c) the term ``United States person'' means any United States
citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under the
laws of the United States (including foreign branches), or any
person in the United States; and
(d) the term ``Government of Sudan'' includes the Government of
Sudan, its agencies, instrumentalities and controlled entities,
and the Central Bank of Sudan.
Sec. 5. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
Secretary of State and, as appropriate, other agencies, is hereby
authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules
and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to me by IEEPA, as
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order. The Secretary
of the Treasury may redelegate any of these functions to other officers
and agencies of the United States Government. All agencies of the
United States Government are hereby directed to take all appropriate
measures within their authority to carry out the provisions of this
order.
Sec. 6. Nothing contained in this order shall create any right or
benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any party against
the United States, its agencies or instrumentalities, its officers or
employees, or any other person.
Sec. 7. (a) This order shall take effect at 12:01 a.m. eastern
standard time on November 4, 1997, except that trade transactions under
contracts in force as of the effective date of this order may be
performed pursuant to their terms through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard
time on December 4, 1997, and letters of credit and other financing
agreements for such underlying trade transactions may be performed
pursuant to their terms.
(b) This order shall be transmitted to the Congress and published in
the Federal Register.
William J. Clinton,
The White House, November 3, 1997.
__________
H. November 4, 1997, Message to Congress Regarding Executive Order
Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions With
Sudan
The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release, November 4, 1997.
To The Congress of The United States:
Pursuant to section 204(b) of the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1703(b), I hereby report to the Congress that I
have exercised my statutory authority to declare that the policies of
the Government of Sudan constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat
to the national security and foreign policy of the United States and to
declare a national emergency to deal with the threat.
Pursuant to this legal authority, I have blocked Sudanese
governmental assets in the United States. I have also prohibited
certain transactions, including the following: (1) the importation into
the United States of any goods or services of Sudanese origin, other
than information or informational materials; (2) the exportation or
reexportation to Sudan of any nonexempt goods, technology, or services
from the United States; (3) the facilitation by any United States
person of the exportation or reexportation of goods, technology, or
services from Sudan to any destination, or to Sudan from any
destination; (4) the performance by any United States person of any
contract, including a financing contract, in support of an industrial,
commercial, public utility, or governmental project in Sudan; (5) the
grant or extension of credits or loans by any United States person to
the Government of Sudan; and (6) any transaction by any United States
person relating to transportation of cargo to, from, or through Sudan,
or by Sudanese vessel or aircraft.
We intend to license only those activities that serve U.S.
interests. Transactions necessary to conduct the official business of
the United States Government and the United Nations are exempted. This
order and subsequent licenses will allow humanitarian, diplomatic, and
journalistic activities to continue. Other activities may be considered
for licensing on a case-by-case basis based on their merits. We will
continue to permit regulated transfers of fees and stipends from the
Government of Sudan to Sudanese students in the United States. Among
the other activities we may consider licensing are those permitting
American citizens resident in Sudan to make payments for their routine
living expenses, including taxes and utilities; the importation of
certain products unavailable from other sources, such as gum arabic;
and products to ensure civilian aircraft safety.
I have decided to impose comprehensive sanctions in response to the
Sudanese government's continued provision of sanctuary and support for
terrorist groups, its sponsorship of regional insurgencies that
threaten neighboring governments friendly to the United States, its
continued prosecution of a devastating civil war, and its abysmal human
rights record that includes the denial of religious freedom and
inadequate steps to eradicate slavery in the country.
The behavior of the Sudanese government directly threatens
stability in the region and poses a direct threat to the people and
interests of the United States. Only a fundamental change in Sudan's
policies will enhance the peace and security of people in the United
States, Sudan, and around the world. My Administration will continue to
work with the Congress to develop the most effective policies in this
regard.
The above-described measures, many of which reflect congressional
concerns, will immediately demonstrate to the Sudanese government the
seriousness of our concern with the situation in that country. It is
particularly important to increase pressure on Sudan to engage
seriously during the current round of negotiations taking place now in
Nairobi. The sanctions will also deprive the Sudanese government of the
material and financial benefits of conducting trade and financial
transactions with the United States.
The prohibitions set forth in this order shall be effective as of
12:01 a.m., eastern standard time, November 4, 1997, and shall be
transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal Register. The
Executive order provides 30 days in which to complete trade
transactions with Sudan covered by contracts that predate the order and
the performance of preexisting financing agreements for those trade
initiatives.
William J. Clinton,
The White House, November 3, 1997.
__________
I. November 4, 1997, Remarks by Secretary of State Madeleine K.
Albright on New Economic Sanctions Against Sudan
State Department Briefing Room
Washington, DC, November 4, 1997
As released by the Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State
Secretary Albright: Good afternoon. I am here to announce that the
United States has imposed sweeping new economic sanctions against the
government of Sudan because of its continued sponsorship of
international terror, its effort to destabilize neighboring countries,
and its abysmal record on human rights-- including religious
persecution.
Under an executive order signed yesterday by President Clinton,
pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Sudanese
Government assets in the United States are now blocked. United States
trade with Sudan is prohibited, as are most financial transactions
between the United States and the government of Sudan.
We take these steps because the government of Sudan has failed to
respond to repeated expressions of concern, or to the imposition of
lesser sanctions. Instead, it has earned international condemnation by
persisting in its objectionable policies, causing us to conclude that
more dramatic action is required.
I stress that the new sanctions are targeted against the government
of Sudan. They are not designed, nor are they expected to add to the
hardships faced by Sudanese civilians. Since 1988, the United States
has provided more than $650 million in humanitarian assistance to the
victims of Sudan's civil war. And under the executive order and the
licensing system it will put in place, humanitarian, diplomatic and
journalistic activities will continue.
The purpose of the sanctions is to deprive the regime in Khartoum
of the financial and material benefits of US trade and investment,
including investment in Sudan's petroleum sector. To ensure
flexibility, the Administration will consider issuing licenses on a
case-by-case basis for activities that are in the US interest.
I hope that the President's action will contribute to a fundamental
change of policy and behavior on the part of the Sudanese Government.
We appreciate and share the concern that many members of Congress have
expressed regarding this issue, and we will continue to consult closely
with the Congress as we implement our policies of opposition to
terrorism and support for democracy, law and human rights around the
world.
Thank you all very much.
__________
J. The Asmara Declaration
The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) Conference on the Issues of
Destiny
The Final Communique
Friday, June 6, 1995.
The NDA held a historic meeting in Asmara, the capital of the State
of Eritrea, from June 15 to June 23, 1993. The conference, held under
the banner of ``Issues of Destiny'', was attended by all the leaders of
the political, trade unions, and military formations in the NDA as well
as the national personalities, viz:
(1) The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP);
(2) The Umma Party;
(3) The SPLM/SPLA;
(4) The Union of the Sudan African Parties (USAP);
(5) The Sudan Communist Party;
(6) Trade Unions;
(7) The Legitimate Command;
(8) The Beja Congress;
(9) The Sudanese Allied Forces;
(10) and non-partisan national personalities.
The Conference discussed the following issues:
(1) stopping the War and restoration of peace;
(2) the right of Self-determination;
(3) religion and politics;
(4) system of rule during the interim period;
(5) programme and mechanisms for escalating the struggle to
overthrow the NIF regime;
(6) interim arrangements and responsibilities;
(7) The Sudan of the future;
(8) the structure of the NDA; and
(9) humanitarian issues.
The NDA convened its conference under difficult and severe
conditions imposed by the NIF fascist regime on our people. The regime
has devalued the dignity of the Sudanese citizen, destroyed the
national economy, abused Sudanese foreign relations by threatening
regional and international stability and by exporting terrorism and
discord to the neighbouring countries and other countries in the world
as well. The regime has amply demonstrated its bellicose nature by
aborting all the peace initiatives and by intensifying the war in the
South. The NDA would therefore like to re-affirm the continuity of the
political, military and popular struggle against the regime.
On the basis of the principles of the NDA, and by way of continuing
the struggle of our people against successive dictatorships, and
inspired by its experience in the consolidation of national unity, and
fully believing in a new democratic system based on political pluralism
and respect for human rights, the conference hereby resolves as
follows:
A--Ending the War and Restoration of Peace
1. The right of self-determination:
(a) affirmation of the right to self-determination as a basic,
original and democratic right of all peoples;
(b) recognition that the exercise of the right to self-
determination shall bring the war to an end and shall facilitate the
retrieval and consolidation of democracy, peace and development;
(c) the right to self-determination should be, however, exercised
under conditions of legitimacy, democracy and under regional and
international supervision;
(d) the areas affected by war are South Sudan, Abyei District, the
Nuba Mountains and Ingessina Hills;
(e) the citizens of Southern Sudan (within its boundaries as they
stood on 1/1/1956) shall exercise the right to self-determination
before the end of the interim period;
(f) the people of Abyei shall be consulted, in a referendum to be
held before the end of the interim period, to ascertain whether they
wish to continue with the administrative arrangements within Southern
Kordofan or to join Bahr El Ghazal. If the majority choose to join Bahr
El Ghazal, then they will exercise their right to self-determination
together with the citizens of South Sudan.
(g) With regard to the Nuba Mountains and the Ingessina Hills, a
political solution, aimed at removing the existing grievances in these
two areas, shall be sought and implemented by the government of the
day, after which a referendum shall be held, during the interim period,
to ascertain the wishes of the peoples of these areas over their
political and administrative future.
(h) Affirmation of the NDA's commitment to the realisation of a
just and democratic peace and unity based on the free choice of the
Sudanese people, and a just and effective peaceful resolution of the
ongoing armed conflict. In this regard, the NDA hereby announces its
acceptance of the IGADD's Declaration of Principles (DOP) as
constituting a reasonable and practical basis for achieving a just and
lasting peace.
(i) Affirmation that real peace in Sudan cannot be achieved by
viewing the problem as the Southern Problem, but by comprehending the
national origins of the problem.
(j) Convinced that the national problems of Sudan cannot be solved
except through a serious, open dialogue among all the national groups,
and that the nature and history of the Sudanese conflict has proved
that just peace and stability in the county cannot be achieved by
military means.
2. The Conference hereby affirms that all NDA members shall
seriously work to adopt a common stand on the issues of the referendum,
which are:
(a) unity (confederal or Federal) and;
(b) independence.
(3) The NDA government recognises that the exercise of the right of
self-determination, aside from being a human, democratic and peoples'
right, is also an instrument for putting an immediate end to the civil
war and for opening up a unique and historic challenge to build a new
restructured Sudan of justice, democracy and free choice. The NDA is
committed to leading the Sudanese to a successful exercise of this
historic right.
B--Religion and Politics in Sudan
(1) All human rights norms and standards enshrined in the regional
and international human rights instruments, charters and covenants
shall be deemed to be an integral part of any constitution of Sudan,
and any law, decree, executive order or action or policy measure
contrary thereto shall be null and void for being unconstitutional.
(2) Laws shall guarantee full equality of citizens on the basis of
citizenship, respect for the religious beliefs and traditions and
without discrimination on grounds of religion, race, gender or culture.
Any law contrary to the foregoing stipulations shall be null and void
and unconstitutional.
(3) No political party shall be based on religion.
(4) The State recognises the plurality of religions and noble
spiritual beliefs and is committed to ensuring a peaceful co-existence
and interaction, equality and tolerance among religions and the noble
spiritual beliefs. The State permits freedom of ``proselytisation'' by
peaceful means and forbids compulsion or any act or measure which may
lead to religious sedition, racial hatred in any place, forum or
location.
(5) The NDA is committed to upholding the dignity of the Sudanese
woman and affirms her role in the Sudanese national movement and
recognises her rights and duties stipulated in the international human
rights covenants and instruments to the extent that they don't
contradict religious tenets.
(6) National enlightenment, education and cultural programmes shall
be based on the commitment to the international human rights covenants
and instruments.
C--System of Rule
(1) The Sudan shall be run on a system of decentralisation during
the interim period. The Transitional Constitution shall determine the
distribution of powers and functions between the Central Authority and
the regional entities.
D--The Decentralisation Act
(1) Decentralisation shall be based on the distribution of the
powers and functions agreed upon between the Central Authority and the
Northern Entities on the one hand and between the Central Authority and
the Southern Entity on the other and deferring the naming of the system
to a later stage.
(2) Local government systems and native administration should also
be catered for in the Decentralisation Act.
(3) The following factors should be considered in the
decentralisation arrangements during the interim period:
(a) redressing of grievances and removal of the causes of the war
and the creation of an atmosphere conducive to national reconstruction;
(b) ascertainment of people's wishes in various areas in the
process of developing democratic structures; and
(c) taking into account the economic circumstances of the country
and the need for retrenchment.
Emphasis shall therefore be on mobilisation of the masses, and the
provision of adequate opportunities for popular participation in the
democratic structures of the decentralisation arrangements.
E--On the Programmes and Mechanisms for the Intensification of the
Struggle to Overthrow the System:
(1) Legitimacy of the armed struggle being currently waged by some
formations in the NDA to overthrow the system. Armed struggle is by
agreement one of the mechanisms for overthrowing the system.
(2) Provision of the necessary support.
(3) Establishment of a High Military and Political Committee to co-
ordinate and supervise the implementation of the programmes for
intensification of the struggle to overthrow the system.
F--Interim Military and Security Arrangements
The conference adopted all the recommendations made by the relevant
specialised committee.
G--The Sudan of the Future
To lay the foundations of the New Sudan, the conference adopted the
following:
(a) the economic programme for the interim period;
(b) programme for foreign policy, regional and international co-
operation;
(c) programme for the removal of the vestiges of the NIF regime;
(d) Political Parties Bills;
(e) Trade Unions Charter; and
(f) Press and Publications Bill.
H--Humanitarian Issues
The wrong-headed economic policies of the regime and its escalation
of the war have aggravated internal displacement, heavily damaged the
environment, and have created tragic conditions of life for the
ordinary Sudanese citizen, especially the women. In addition to the
war, instability, political repression and violation of human rights
have driven thousands of Sudanese into exile. In pursuit of its
commitment to the security and safety of the Sudanese people and their
freedom of movement within and outside the Sudan, the Conference has
adopted a practical programme for relief during the interim period, all
in co-operation and co-ordination with the international community and
the relevant establishments in Sudan.
I--Structures of the NDA and Amendment of the Charter
The conference adopted the new structure of the NDA which consists
of:
(1) The Conference;
(2) The Leadership Councilium;
(3) The Executive Office; and
(4) The General Secretariat;
(5) Specialised Secretariats; and
(6) Centres for the subsidiaries.
The Conference also adopted amendments to the Charter in keeping
with the changing political scene.
Signatures:
1. Mohamed Osman El Mirghani, DUP;
2. Dr. Omer Nur El Dayem, Umma Party;
3. Dr. Colonel John Garang de Mabior, SPLM/SPLA;
4. Eliaba James Surur, Leader, the Union of Sudan African Parties
(USAP);
5. Tighani El Tayeb, Sudan Communist Party;
6. Engineer Hashim Mohamed Ahmend, Trade Unions;
7. Lieutenant General Fatih Ahmend Ali, Legitimate Command of the
Armed Forces;
8. Mohamed al Tahir Abu Bakr, the Beja Congress;
9. Brigadier Abdel Aziz Khalid, the Sudanese Allied Forces;
10. Bona Malwal, independent Sudanese personality;
11. Farouk Abu Eissa, independent Sudanese personality;
12. Al-Wathiq al-Kameir, independent Sudanese personality; and
13. Mansour al-Agab, independent Sudanese personality.
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National Democratic Alliance Conference on Fundamental Issues
Resolution on the Issue of Religion and Politics in the Sudan
The National Democratic Alliance (NDA);
Recognising that the relationship between religion and
politics has a direct bearing on nation-building;
Aware of the reality of religious, cultural and national
diversity in the Sudan;
Cognisant of the role of scriptural religious and noble
spiritual beliefs as sources of moral values and spiritual
tenets that can help promote tolerance, brotherhood, justice
and peaceful coexistence;
Conscious of the terrible human rights abuses committed by
the National Islamic Front (NIF) regime through its diabolical
manipulation of religion to perpetrate genocide and ethnic
cleansing falsely in the name of jihad;
Determined to achieve a just and lasting peace and national
unity based on justice and the free will of the Sudanese
people; and
In adherence to the principle of non-exploitation of
religion for political purposes, hereby make the following
constitutional dispositions:
1. All human rights norms and principle enshrined in regional and
international human rights instruments and covenants shall be an
integral part of the constitution of the Sudan, and any law, decree,
executive order or policy measure contrary thereto shall be considered
null and void and unconstitutional.
2. All laws shall guarantee full equality of citizens on the basis
of citizenship, respect for religious beliefs and traditions and
without discrimination on grounds of religion, race, gender or culture.
Any law contrary to the foregoing stipulation shall be considered null
and void and unconstitutional.
3. No political party shall be established on religious basis.
4. The State shall acknowledge and respect religious pluralism in
the Sudan and shall undertake to promote and bring about peaceful
interaction and coexistence, equality and tolerance among religious and
noble spiritual beliefs, and shall permit peaceful religious
proselytisation and prohibit coercion in religion, or the perpetration
in any place, forum or location in the Sudan of any act or measure
intended to arouse religious sedition or racial hatred.
5. The NDA undertakes to preserve and promote the dignity of the
Sudanese woman, and affirms her role in the Sudanese national movement
and her rights and duties as enshrined in international instruments and
covenants without prejudice to the tenets of prevailing religious and
noble spiritual beliefs.
6. National programmes in the fields of information, education and
culture shall be formulated and disseminated in accordance with the
regional and international instruments and covenants on human rights.
Signed:
1. Democratic Unionist Party
2. Umma Party
3. Sudan Communist Party
4. Union of Sudan African Parties
5. Sudan People's Liberation Movement & Sudan People's Liberation
Army
6. Trades Unions
7. Legitimate Command
8. Sudanese Alliance Forces
9. Independent National Personalities
Resolution on the Issue of Self-Determination
Preamble:
The National Democratic Alliance
Deeply committed to an immediate ending of the current armed
conflict through a just and lasting settlement;
Fully aware that the attainment of such a just and lasting
settlement requires political courage, statesmanship and
farsightedness on the part of the leadership of its constituent
members;
Convinced that our preferred option is unity, based on
diversity, and the recognition that the Sudan is a multi-
ethnic, multi-religious, multi-cultural and multi-linguistic
country, and that this unity shall also be based on the right
of citizenship and equality in rights and responsibilities in
acoordance with the norms and standards enshrined in
international conventions on human rights;
Fully cognizant of the fact that the unity of the Sudan
cannot be durably based on force or coercion, but on justice
and the free consent of all the various groups in the Sudan;
Conscious of the existence of other issues and problems
caused by the interaction among tribes living in contiguous
areas, which problems and issues shall be addressed and
resolved during the national constitutional conference; and
Mindful of the fact that the resolution of the present
Sudanese conflict requires a comprehensive approach in order to
bring peace and justice to all the marginalised people of the
Sudan and build the New Sudan; hereby:
I. 1. Affirms that the right of self-determination is a basic
human, democratic and people's right which may be exercised at any time
by any people.
2. Recognizes that the exercise of the right of self-determination
constitutes a solution to the on-going civil war, and facilitates the
restoration and enhancement of democracy in the Sudan.
3. Affirms that this right shall be exercised in an atmosphere of
democracy and legitimacy and under regional and international
supervision.
4. Affirms that the areas afflicted by war are Southern Sudan,
Abyei District, the Nuba Mountains and Ingessena Hills.
5. Declares that the people of Southern Sudan (within its borders
as they stood on 1.1.1956) shall exercise the right of self-
determination before the expiration of the interim period.
6. Resolves that the views of the people of Abyei District as
regards their wish to either remain within the administrative set up of
Southern Kordofan region or join Bahr El Ghazal region shall be
ascertained in a referendum to be held within the interim period but
before the exercise of the right of self-determination for the South.
If the outome of the referendum establishes that the majority of the
people of this district wish to join Bahr El Ghazal, the people of
Abyei shall accordingly exercise the right of self-determination as
part of the people of Southern Sudan.
7. Resolves that with respect to the Nuba Mountains and Ingessena
Hills, a political solution to redress the injustices suffered by the
people of these areas shall be sought by the interim government and
that a referendum to ascertain their views on their political and
administrative future shall be organized and carried out within the
interim period.
8. Reaffirms its commitment to a just peace, democracy and unity,
based on the free will of the people of the Sudan, and to resolving the
present conflict by peaceful means through a just and lasting
settlement. To this end the NDA endorses the IGADD Declaration of
Principles (DOP) as a viable basis for such a just and lasting
settlement.
9. Reiterates that true peace in the Sudan cannot be viewed within
the framework of the problem of the South but rather from the
standpoint that our problem is of a national origin.
10. Affirms that our national problems cannot be solved except
through clear, serious and continuous dialog among all Sudanese
national groups.
11. Asserts that the nature and history of the Sudanese conflict
has proved that permanent peace and stability in the country can not be
achieved through a military solution.
II. The constituent members of the NDA shall adopt a common stand
on the options to be presented in the referendum in the South, which
options shall be (a) unity (confederation/federation) and (b)
independent statehood.
III. The NDA affirms that the Central Authority shall within the
interim period devise and implement the necessary confidence-building
measures and the appropriate restructuring of the State and socio-
economic institutions and processes, so that the exercise of the right
of self-determination could have the best chances of upholding the
unity option.
Signed:
1. Umma Party
2. Sudan Communist Party
3. Union of Sudan African Parties
4. Sudan People's Liberation Movement & Sudan People's Liberation
Army
5. Trades Unions
6. Legitimate Command
7. Sudanese Alliance Forces
8. Independent National Personalities
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Resolution on the System of Rule
Whereas the Sudan has been in a State of war against itself for
four decades,
Whereas this unremitting war is a result of historical injustices
with political, economic, social, cultural, religious and
administrative dimensions; and
Whereas the continuation of war throughout this period has created
a great mistrust among compatriots; and
Whereas the hegemony of the Centre (Khartoum) on most regions in
the Sudan has led to the perpetuation of underdevelopment in, and
marginalization of, those regions; and
Whereas the National Democratic Alliance, representing the Sudanese
people in the South, North, East and West is determined to remove all
historical injustices and eliminate all causes of war in order to
create conditions conducive to the birth of a new Sudan united through
the free will of its people and in which every citizen shall enjoy
peace, security and happiness; and
Whereas the creation of those conditions requires the adoption of
all political and administrative measures necessary to restore
confidence,
Decided:
1. The Sudan shall be ruled in the interim period as a
decentralized state. The powers and competence of the central authority
and decentralized entities shall be provided for in the constitution.
2. Immediate attention should be given, in view of the nature of
the interim period, to the definition of those powers, leaving the
appellation of the entities to a later date.
3. The NDA shall give due consideration, in promulgating
decentralization laws, to the role of local government and native
administration within the new set-up.
4. Due regard should be given in the regional administrative
divisions to:
(a) the wishes of the people in accordance with democratic
processes,
(b) keeping in mind that the division of power between the Centre
and the Entities at this critical point of our history is meant to end
historical injustices that have led to war and marginalization, restore
confidence and consolidate peace, stability and a unity based on
people's free will.
5. In view of the difficult economic conditions of the country
administrative costs of decentralization should be reduced to the
minimum necessary.
Powers of Entities in Northern Sudan
The legislative and executive organs of Northern Regional Entities
shall have competence over:
1. Economic planning in alignment with national development plans
2. Finance including the levying and collection of taxes (according
to an agreed upon schedule)
3. Telecommunication (within the Entity)
4. Town planning and construction of feeder roads
5. Police, prisons, fire brigade and game wardens
6. Promotion of local culture and arts
7. Health services
8. Education up to higher secondary level
9. Industry, intra-Entity commerce and supply
10. Agriculture, forests, pastures and plant protection
11. Animal wealth and fisheries
12. Sustainable land use and development
13. Water use with due regard to national water policies and
international obligations
14. Intra-Entity river, land and air transport
15. Radio, television and print media within the Entity
Powers of Central Authority (CA) Vis-a-vis Northern Entities (NE)
1. National defence and national security
2. Foreign affairs and regional and international cooperation
3. Nationality, passports, immigration and aliens
4. Auditor General
5. Judiciary, attorney generalship and regulation of private legal
practice
6. Currency and coinage
7. Regulation of interstate waterways and national electricity grid
8. Mineral resources without prejudice to the right of the host
Entity to fix a reasonable percentage of the returns of the revenue
accruing from the exploitation of that resource
9. Customs and foreign trade excepting of borders trade
10. Commission for National Elections
11. National Education Planning
12. National Health Planning
13. National Economic Planning
14. National census (Concurrent)
15. Railways
16. Regulation of river and air transport
17. Levying and collection of taxes (according to the established
schedule)
18. Posts and telecommunication
19. Weights and measures
20. National statistics
21. National Radio and Television and regulation of technical
matters pertaining to radio and television stations in the Entities
22. Higher education
23. Any other power that is not specifically allocated to the
Entity
Concurrent Powers (CA & NA)
1. Environment protection
2. Water use
3. Economic development planning
Institute of NE
Legislative:
Executive: made up of Governor, Executive Council and Secretariat
Competence of the Southern Entity (SE)
The legislate and executive organs of the SE shall have competence
on following matters:
1. Maintenance of peace security and good governance
2. Police, prison wardens, game wardens, fire brigade
3. SPLA armed forces in accordance with the interim military and
security arrangement
4. Agriculture, forestry, pastures and fisheries
5. Animal husbandry
6. Industry
7. Wildlife and tourism
8. Commission for Elections within the SE
9. Water use without prejudice to international obligations and
national policies
10. Administration of justice including the establishment,
maintenance and organization of courts and attorney generalship
11. Exploration, developments and management of non-renewable
natural resources subject to arrangements with the CA over taxation,
revenue sharing and development needs of disadvantaged regions
12. Radio and TV and print media
13. Art and culture
14. Education up to senior secondary school level
15. Levying and collection of taxes according to agreed upon
schedule
16. Intra-entity commerce and supply
17. Intra-entity water, land and air transport
18. Intra-entity telecommunication
19. Trade with neighbouring countries and levying of customs on
goods entering SE from those countries
20. Personal law, property law and the incorporation, registration
licensing of companies
21. Public health services
22. Any other issue that does not come under the competence of CA
and under concurrent powers
Section B
Special Dispositions:
1. For the purpose of reconstruction and rehabilitation the SE
shall solicit financial and material assistance from, and conclude
cultural and economic agreements with, the international community and
foreign entities.
2. SPLA Forces shall remain in the SE under their present command
and subject to the authority and overall command of the SE government
and in accordance with the interim security and military arrangements.
The government of the SE shall discuss with the CA the formation,
functions and composition of the National Security Council after a
common understanding over national security and threats to it has been
achieved.
Concurrent Powers (between CA and SE)
1. Environmental protection
2. Reconstruction in the war-affected areas and rehabilitation of
the war disabled
3. Higher education
4. Licensing and regulation of private professional practice
5. Cost of translation of official proceedings, documents, notices,
minutes
6. Location and establishment of CA courts
Institutions of SE
1. Legislature
2. Executive: made up of President, Cabinet and Secretariat
3. Judiciary up to the supreme court of the Entity
Competence of CA vis-a-vis Southern Entity
1. National defence subject to interim security arrangements
2. Foreign affairs as qualified by the special powers given to the
SE in relation to mobilization of resources for reconstruction and
rehabilitation
3. (CA) judiciary
4. Currency and coinage
5. Foreign trade subject to qualifications regarding trade with
neighbouring countries
6. Coordination of national economic policy
7. Coordination of national health policy
8. Railways
9. National electricity grid
10. Levying and collection of taxes (according to schedule)
11. Posts and telecommunication
12. Weights and measures
13. Supervision of national Radio and regulation of national TV and
Print media
14. Regulation of radio and television stations within the Entities
15. Civil Aviation and ports
Subject to 3 Requirements
1. Institutions which exercise competence over these powers should
be restructured in terms of personnel, orientation and functions so as
to effectively reflect the decentralized and pluralistic character of
the Sudan.
2. Decentralization of those institutions dealing with
naturalization, immigration, passports and visas so that they are
reasonably accessible to citizens all over the Sudan.
3. Decentralization and deconcentration of development and
financial institutions and services.
Interim Period
The interim period shall be 4 years starting from the day of the
official inauguration of the interim government.
Signed:
1. Democratic Unionist Party
2. Umma Party
3. Sudan Communist Party
4. Union of Sudan African Parties
5. Sudan People's Liberation Movement & Sudan People's Liberation
Army
6. Trades Unions
7. Legitimate Command
8. Sudanese Alliance Forces
9. Independent National Personalities