[Senate Prints 105-45]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


105th Congress                                                 S. Prt.
2d Session                  COMMITTEE PRINT                    105-45
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     

 
             SUDAN TODAY: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY

                               __________

                             A STAFF REPORT

                                 TO THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                                     
     

                              FEBRUARY 1998

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations



                                -----------

                        U.S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

45-883 CC                      WASHINGTON : 1998




                       COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                   JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman


  RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana                JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
  PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia                  PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
  CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska                    CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
  GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon                  JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
  CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming                    CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
  ROD GRAMS, Minnesota                     RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
  JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri                  DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
  BILL FRIST, Tennessee                    PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
  SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

                      James W. Nance, Staff Director
                  Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director

                                  (ii)




                            C O N T E N T S

                               __________
                                                                   Page

Letter of Transmittal............................................    iv
Key Findings and Recommendations.................................     1
  I. Introduction and Background.................................     3
    Support for Terrorists.......................................     4
    Persecution of Christians....................................     6
 II. The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and Resistance 
  Against the National Islamic Front.............................     6
    The Sudan Alliance Force.....................................     6
    The Beja Congress............................................     8
    The Sudan Federal Democratic Union...........................     9
    Other NDA Members............................................     9
    NDA Operations Inside Sudan..................................    10
III. U.S. Policy Toward Sudan....................................    14
IV. Assessment of Humanitarian Conditions in Eastern Sudan.......    15
 V. Long Term Development........................................    17

                                Appendix

A. Letter from Senator Jesse Helms to U.S. Secretary of State 
  Madeleine Albright.............................................    23
B. Secretary of State Albright's Response to Senator Helms' 
  Letter of January 13, 1998.....................................    24
C. Agency for International Development Activity Data Sheet--
  Regional Economic Development Services Office for East and 
  Southern Africa (REDSO/ESA) Effective Delivery of USAID's 
  Humanitarian Assistance........................................    25
D. Assessment Mission and Proposal for Support to Togan..........    31
E. Assessment of the Humanitarian Conditions in Eastern Sudan....    41
F. S. 873--Prohibition on Financial Transactions With Countries 
  Supporting Terrorism Act of 1997...............................    48
G. November 4, 1997, Executive Order Blocking Sudanese Government 
  Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Sudan...............    50
H. November 4, 1997, Message to Congress Regarding Executive 
  Order Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting 
  Transactions with Sudan........................................    52
I. November 4, 1997, Remarks by Secretary of State Madeleine 
  Albright on New Economic Sanctions Against Sudan...............    53
J. The Asmara Declaration........................................    54

                                 (iii)

  

 
                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                                                  February 9, 1998.
The Hon. Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

    Dear Mr. Chairman: Beginning December 2, 1997, we traveled 
to Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan to assess political and military 
opposition to Sudan's extremist Islamic regime, to examine the 
humanitarian conditions of civilians in eastern Sudan, and to 
understand regional perspectives of the Sudan question.
    This investigation was timely in light of the Clinton 
Administration's November 4, 1997, sanctions blocking assets 
of, and prohibiting financial transactions with, Sudan. As you 
know, the Administration imposed these sanctions as a result, 
in part, of Congressional pressure from such initiatives as the 
Ashcroft-Helms bill (S. 873) prohibiting financial transactions 
with countries supporting terrorism, and similar provisions 
contained in the Senate passed ``Foreign Affairs Reform and 
Restructuring Act of 1997'' (S. 903).
    According to U.S. State Department officials, our visit 
inside territory held by the opposition Sudan Alliance Forces 
in eastern Sudan was the first by any U.S. officials. We 
traveled to Eritrea and Sudan from December 3-9, 1997, then 
proceeded to Ethiopia until December 12 for additional meetings 
with Ethiopian and U.S. officials on the situation in the 
Sudan.
    While in Eritrea, Sudan and Ethiopia, we met with Sudanese 
opposition leaders (including John Garang, leader of the 
Sudanese People's Liberation Army, Sadiq al-Mahdi, former 
President of Sudan and head of the Umma Party, and General 
Abdel Aziz Khaled, leader of the Sudan Alliance Forces), 
Eritrean and Ethiopian military and security representatives, 
and U.S. Embassy and AID officials. During the excursion into 
opposition held territory in eastern Sudan, we were accompanied 
by AID official, Gayle Smith.
    U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia, David Shinn, U.S. Charge 
D'Affairs to Eritrea, Don Yamamoto, and Gayle Smith of AID, 
along with their staffs, provided outstanding support, without 
which we could not have accomplished our objectives. We wish to 
thank them for their cooperation and assistance.
        Sincerely,
                                 Christopher Walker
                                   Michael Westphal
                                 G. Garrett Grigsby




                    KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

   The radical National Islamic Front (NIF) regime 
        ruling Sudan threatens the United States and regional 
        security by its aggressive support for international 
        terrorist organizations in many of its neighboring 
        countries. The NIF foments regional unrest in Uganda, 
        Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia through surrogate 
        terrorists groups. Also, the NIF regime offers refuge 
        and training for Islamic fundamentalist terrorist 
        organizations Hamas, Abu Nidal, Hezbollah, the 
        Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Islamic Group, and Jihad 
        of Egypt; each of which targets Americans.

   Religious intolerance and Christian persecution are 
        the hallmark of the NIF regime. Forced Islamization of 
        non-Muslims, primarily Christians, is a widely 
        recognized NIF government policy. Severe human rights 
        abuses--including slavery--are perpetuated by the NIF 
        regime. Despite international pressure, the NIF regime 
        has shown no interest in modifying this reprehensible 
        behavior.

   U.S. policy toward Sudan should continue to be to 
        isolate the NIF regime, with the goal of replacing it 
        with a secular, democratic government brought to power 
        through popular elections. To help achieve this goal, 
        the U.S. should continue its military support for 
        neighboring governments in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and 
        Uganda. The U.S. should also support legitimate, 
        democratic opposition groups attempting to overthrow 
        the Government of Sudan.

   Comprehensive U.S. economic sanctions against the 
        NIF regime--announced by President Clinton on November 
        4--while important symbolically, will not force the NIF 
        to fall. Total Sudanese investment in the U.S. blocked 
        by the sanctions is only $5,500,000; total trade 
        amounts to only $70,000,000 annually. Khartoum can 
        continue to rely heavily on financial support from 
        fellow terrorist states, Iran and Libya. Only when 
        vital economic links within Sudan are no longer 
        controlled by the NIF and only when internal opposition 
        to the NIF is widespread will the NIF face significant 
        political and economic crisis.

   The United States Government has provided 
        approximately $20,000,000 in nonlethal military 
        assistance to Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda since fiscal 
        year 1996, to enhance their ability to defend their 
        borders. Unfortunately, the delivery of much of the 
        assistance was delayed because of bureaucratic tangles 
        and diplomatic misunderstandings between the U.S. and 
        the recipient nations. The Clinton Administration 
        should better ensure that such assistance is delivered 
        promptly in the future.

   Popular opposition to the NIF regime is expanding 
        beyond southern Sudan. The recently formed National 
        Democratic Alliance, or NDA, which consists of diverse 
        political and military opposition groups, appears to be 
        the most viable opposition to the NIF in a generation. 
        The NDA, through its Asmara Declaration, has committed 
        itself to a democratic and secular Sudan. The formation 
        of the NDA could be a turning point for Sudanese 
        opposition parties because the coalition brings 
        together political and armed groups, southerners and 
        northerners, and Muslims and Christians for the first 
        time.

   In recent months, NDA forces have driven NIF armed 
        forces from key areas of eastern Sudan, including 
        strategic points near the Port Sudan highway (the 
        supply lifeline for Khartoum), the Roseires Dam (which 
        provides most of the electricity to Khartoum), and 
        Kassala (the largest city in eastern Sudan). From a 
        military perspective, SFRC staff was told that SAF was 
        prepared to launch a major offensive in eastern Sudan 
        against each of these targets. If NDA forces are 
        successful in capturing and occupying these areas, it 
        would provide an enormous political, as well as 
        military, victory against the NIF regime.

   Secretary of State Albright's meeting with the NDA 
        on December 10, 1997, in Uganda sends a clear message 
        that the U.S. can support the NDA as a legitimate 
        political and military alternative to the NIF.

   Regrettably, significant political and personal 
        differences exist between NDA members which must be 
        resolved. Policy disputes include, for example, north-
        south disagreements about a ``federated'' Sudan and a 
        resolution of questions regarding the autonomy of the 
        Nuba people. While the Asmara Declaration has been 
        agreed to by NDA members, it is unclear if its 
        principles will be adhered to in future years. Apparent 
        lack of trust and respect among NDA leaders is another 
        key concern. If the NDA is not successful in 
        reconciling its internal differences prior to the fall 
        of the NIF, the NDA itself may disintegrate. Leaders of 
        each of the NDA coalition's groups must work to foster 
        greater internal trust if the NDA is to succeed as a 
        viable long-term alternative to the NIF regime.

   While governments in the region--Ethiopia, Eritrea, 
        Uganda and Kenya--appear willing to continue to support 
        the Sudanese peace process through the regional IGAD 
        talks in Nairobi, to hold out hope for success through 
        this venue appears unrealistic. According to one 
        Ethiopian government official, the Khartoum regime is 
        simply attempting to buy time through the IGAD process, 
        the next round of which has been suspended until April 
        1998.

   While Sudan remains one of the poorest nations on 
        earth, conditions are desperate and deteriorating 
        rapidly in the territory controlled by the NDA. The 
        primary reason for this humanitarian crisis is that 
        fighting has caused thousands of individuals and 
        families to be internally displaced in an inhospitable, 
        semi-desert terrain. Furthermore, it appears that 
        thousands are fleeing government controlled areas 
        because NIF forces are reportedly committing severe 
        human rights abuses, killing livestock and destroying 
        villages of perceived NDA supporters.

   There are no international nongovernmental or 
        private and voluntary organizations actively working in 
        territory controlled by the NDA in eastern Sudan. The 
        United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other 
        United Nations agencies do not operate in areas 
        controlled by the NDA, because families driven from 
        their homes in these areas are ineligible to receive 
        aid because they are considered ``internally 
        displaced'' and not ``refugees''.

   The Clinton Administration should consider 
        redirecting a small portion of U.S. humanitarian aid to 
        those areas in eastern Sudan under the control of the 
        NDA. Since 1988, the U.S. government has provided more 
        than $600,000,000 in humanitarian aid to the people of 
        Sudan; in Fiscal Year 1997 alone, U.S. aid amounted to 
        $39,774,378. Reallocating even a small portion of this 
        aid to eastern Sudan would provide desperately needed 
        medical and other assistance.

   The Agency for International Development (AID) often 
        sends assessment teams into areas of humanitarian need 
        to make recommendations. However, in this case AID need 
        not spend scarce funds on such an assessment because 
        several credible assessments have already been made by 
        international NGOs familiar with the area. Furthermore 
        an AID official who accompanied SFRC staff on this 
        investigation has provided a detailed report of her 
        findings to AID/Washington. Funds that would otherwise 
        be used to prepare an assessment should instead be 
        targeted to displaced people in dire need.

   The Clinton Administration recently reached inter-
        agency agreement to begin a modest development program 
        inside Sudan to be administered by AID. The 
        Administration may allocate up to $3,000,000 during the 
        next three years for this effort. Since U.S. assistance 
        inside Sudan has been limited during the past decade to 
        only humanitarian medical and food supplies, this new 
        proposal represents a significant expansion of the U.S. 
        role in opposition-held areas in Sudan.

   This assistance proposal is unique and inventive for 
        AID, but must be well-conceived, both at policy and 
        working levels, prior to implementation. The Clinton 
        Administration must answer key questions about 
        undertaking development projects in a country whose 
        rulers are hostile to such projects and AID must 
        consider several important operational questions, 
        including how it will monitor and audit the individual 
        projects carried out by NGOs both on performance and 
        financial grounds. Mishandling these issues could end 
        in the NIF regime's refusal to allow even basic 
        humanitarian projects elsewhere in Sudan to continue.

                     I. Introduction and Background

    Sudan is the largest country in area in Africa (1,557,110 
sq. miles) and has a population of 29,000,000. Sudan has 
significant agricultural potential and natural resources (it 
produces practically all of the world's supply of gum Arabic, a 
starch used widely by U.S. food processing companies and other 
industries), so it has held the possibility of being a stable 
link between the Middle East and Africa. However, intermittent 
civil war between the predominantly Christian and animist south 
and the Muslim-Arab north has plagued Sudan for decades, taking 
the lives of approximately 1,500,000 people in the past 15 
years alone.
    Sudan gained independence from Egypt and Great Britain in 
1956, but during 41 years of self-rule, its leaders have often 
mismanaged the economy and abused their own people. In 1989, a 
military junta, the Revolutionary Command Council for National 
Salvation--predecessor of the now-ruling National Islamic Front 
(NIF)--overthrew the democratically-elected government of Sadiq 
al-Mahdi (great-grandson of Mohammed Ahmed al-Mahdi, whose 
Islamic Jihad in 1885 laid siege to Khartoum and had the 
commanding British General Charles Gordon's head cut off).
    The National Islamic Front-led government allows no 
meaningful popular political participation and represses all 
opposition in pursuit of its extremist-brand of Islam. The NIF 
actively pursues a ``Jihad'' to protect its fundamentalist 
brand of Islam in Sudan, and to promote its religion and 
ideology in neighboring countries. Under the current regime, 
Sudan has become a haven for international terrorists, and it 
severely abuses the rights of the Christian and animist 
southern Sudanese people, including allowing them to be sold 
into slavery, both inside Sudan and for export to Libya. The 
civil war has taken more than 1,500,000 lives, led to about 
2,000,000 internally displaced persons, and created 
destabilizing refugee flows around the region. The United 
States Government has provided more than $600,000,000 in 
humanitarian assistance to the Sudanese people since 1988.
    In mid-1995, the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement 
(SPLM) and its military arm, the Sudanese People's Liberation 
Army (SPLA) and several northern opposition political parties 
(including the Sudan Alliance Forces) formed a coalition group 
under the umbrella of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) at 
a meeting in Asmara, Eritrea.
    The formation of the National Democratic Alliance could be 
a turning point for Sudanese opposition parties because the 
coalition brings political and armed groups, southerners and 
northerners, and Muslims and Christians together for the first 
time in decades with a united goal of bringing a secular, 
democratic government to Sudan.
    The NDA adopted a program known as the Asmara Declaration 
(see Appendix J.) that, among other things, calls for the 
formation of a unitary, secular state in Sudan. It also 
recognizes the right of the southern Sudanese people to self 
determination, although it is vague about how this would come 
about.

                         Support for Terrorists

    Sudan's support for fledgling terrorist movements in 
neighboring Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and Somalia poses a 
significant threat to regional stability and to U.S. interests. 
In supporting these insurgent groups, Sudan has attempted to 
spread Islamic extremism and overturn secular governments in 
the Horn of Africa.
    While the Sudanese economy crumbles, the NIF continues to 
be propped up by external supporters. Iran remains the NIF's 
largest benefactor, but Iraq and wealthy fundamentalist Muslims 
from several of the Gulf States also provide significant 
financial support to NIF leaders.

    It should also be noted that France has apparently provided 
significant assistance to the terrorist NIF regime. According 
to author Dan Connell in his recent publication, Sudan Update: 
In the Eye of the African Storm, the Government of France's 
assistance, including military intelligence and training, is a 
direct threat to the democratic opposition in Sudan.

    According to Connell, ``France is widely thought to have 
provided Sudan with intelligence on SPLA positions. Sudanese 
opposition figures also claim France has provided various forms 
of technical assistance and military or police-related training 
to the NIF, and that it brokered arrangements between Sudan and 
Zaire and Sudan and the Central African Republic to allow 
Sudanese forces to use their territories to launch surprise 
attacks against the SPLA.''

    In Eritrea, the Sudan regime supports the insurgent 
Eritrean Islamic Jihad. Sudan has also given sanctuary and 
military support to the Lord's Resistance Army and the West 
Nile Bank Front, two groups which seek to oust President 
Museveni of Uganda. In Tunisia, Sudan has supported terrorist 
activities against the government, and Sudanese embassy 
officials based in Tunis have smuggled weapons into the 
country. Sudan also supports the radical Armed Islamic Group 
which is seeking the overthrow of the Algerian government, 
allegedly supports the Islamic fundamentalist group Itahad in 
Somalia, and is recruiting Muslim activists in Ethiopia.

    In June 1995, members of the Islamic Group, an Egyptian 
extremist group, attempted to assassinate Egyptian President 
Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, after having been given 
safe haven and logistical support in Sudan. The Sudanese 
Government allegedly provided the passports and weapons for the 
assassins, and Sudan still refuses to extradite three of the 
suspects in the Mubarak assassination attempt.

    The United Nations passed three separate Security Council 
resolutions between January 1996 and August 1996, numbered 
1044, 1054, and 1070, calling upon the NIF to extradite those 
associated with the Mubarak assassination attempt and 
encouraging all nations to deny Sudanese Government officials 
entry visas. These U.N. resolutions have had no effect on the 
Khartoum regime.

    In response to this subversive activity, Ethiopia, Eritrea, 
and Uganda have severed or downgraded diplomatic relations with 
Sudan. The Government of Eritrea broke diplomatic relations 
with Khartoum and has allowed the Sudanese National Democratic 
Alliance (NDA) to locate its operations within the Sudanese 
embassy in Asmara. In February 1996, the U.S. temporarily 
relocated its diplomats to Kenya for security reasons and the 
U.S. Ambassador to Sudan resides in Nairobi.

    The State Department's 1996 Patterns of Global Terrorism 
report noted that Sudan ``continued to serve as a refuge, 
nexus, and training hub in 1995 for a number of international 
terrorist organizations.'' The situation remains the same 
today. Hamas, Abu Nidal, Hezbollah, the Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad, the Islamic Group, and Jihad of Egypt are just a few 
organizations operating freely in Sudan. Khartoum does not deny 
the presence of these groups, but rejects Washington's 
description of them as terrorist organizations.

                       Persecution of Christians

    Religious intolerance and Christian persecution are the 
hallmark of the ruling NIF. Forced Islamization of non-Muslims, 
including Christians and animists, is a widely recognized 
government policy. Non-Muslims are denied government 
employment, access to public education and even medical care. 
According to State Department testimony before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee on September 25, 1997, ``Churches 
have been closed, Christian children have been forced into 
reeducation camps where they are given Arab names and raised as 
Muslims. Many Christians have been victims of slave raids and 
forced conversions.'' Further, according to the State 
Department, Sudan's 1991 apostasy law states that, ``conversion 
by Muslims to non-Islamic religions is punishable by death.''
    In the same Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Baroness 
Cox, President of Christian Solidarity International-U.K. and 
Deputy Speaker of the House of Lords in London, England, 
testified that many other Sudanese suffer persecution ``. . 
.because the NIF totalitarian regime has declared a Jihad, not 
only against Christians but against others who oppose it, 
including Muslims and animists, who are fighting for freedom 
from repression, for survival of their culture, and for 
fundamental human rights, including religious liberty.
    Therefore, many Arab Muslims from the north, the majority 
of whom belong to opposition parties represented in the 
previously democratically elected government, have suffered 
arbitrary arrest, imprisonment, torture, and extrajudicial 
killings.

    II. The National Democratic Alliance and Resistance Against the 
                         National Islamic Front

                        The Sudan Alliance Force

    The Sudan Alliance Force (SAF) is a relatively new 
opposition group--formed only three years ago--when compared 
with the established Umma party and Democratic Unionist Party. 
The SAF, which calls for a secular, democratic Sudan, is 
considered by some to be the most credible military and 
political opposition to the NIF because it is lead by Muslims, 
not Christians as is the SPLA, and because SAF has a credible 
military force. The SAF, with roughly 600-700 fighters, is 
second only to the SPLA in military strength and receives 
military assistance from the government of Eritrea.
    General Abdel Aziz Khaled, leader of the Sudan Alliance 
Forces, met SFRC staff at his residence in Asmara both before 
and after our trip to eastern Sudan. The General was unable to 
accompany SFRC staff to the field, because he was coordinating 
with the U.S. State Department and Sudanese National Democratic 
Alliance leaders a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright, which occurred on December 10, in Kampala, 
Uganda.
    A Brigadier General in charge of the air defenses at 
Omdurman at the time of the June 1989 NIF-backed coup, General 
Abdel Aziz is in his 50s and a career professional military 
officer. He is married and has several children, one of whom 
attends a university in the United States.
    Reportedly popular among rank-and-file troops within the 
Sudanese Army, General Abdel Aziz was detained shortly after 
the coup, questioned and eventually arrested, and was 
imprisoned for 18 months in Kober Prison. He went to Cairo 
after his release from detention, moved to Asmara in 1994, and 
convened soon thereafter the first General Congress of the 
Sudan Alliance Forces. He later participated in the formation 
of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). He serves as the 
head of the Executive Council of SAF.
    Abu Ghossan, the Deputy Chairman and Chief of Staff of the 
Sudan Alliance Forces, accompanied SFRC staff while we were in 
Sudan. Abu Ghossan is in his late 40s or early 50s and has a 
wife and four children. A Lt. Colonel in the Sudanese army, Abu 
Ghossan was arrested on July 1, 1989, and accused of 
advocating, within the military, a peaceful solution to the war 
in the south. After two weeks in detention, he left Sudan for 
Cairo, and joined SAF. Seemingly well-versed in military 
matters, Abu Ghossan received training from the United States 
Armed Forces School of the Americas at Fort Benning, Georgia in 
the late 1970s.
    Representatives of the SAF-affiliated humanitarian 
organization, the Amal Trust or Sudan Future Care Trust, 
accompanied SFRC staff from and to Asmara, including into 
Sudan. While the Amal Trust has limited resources, it has 
submitted proposals to the U.S. Agency for International 
Development and other international aid organizations to fund 
various humanitarian projects in SAF-held territory.





                           The Beja Congress

    Sheikh Omar, Deputy Leader of the Beja Congress, also 
accompanied SFRC staff during the visit in Sudan. The Beja 
tribe are a culturally distinct and long-organized pastoral 
people who more closely resemble, in military terms, a people's 
militia than a guerrilla force. They are made up of ten 
distinct tribes occupying the north and east of Sudan numbering 
approximately 3,000,000. (For a historical perspective, the 
Beja people are descendants of the legendary so-called Fuzzy-
Wuzzies who, in 1885, defeated a British expeditionary force 
attempting to rescue General Charles Gordon, the British 
Governor General of Sudan, in Khartoum).
    Formed in 1952, during a period of relative political 
freedom in Sudan, the Beja Congress was intended to counter the 
long-standing disenfranchisement by the ruling center in 
Khartoum. The organization is structured along traditional 
lines; its leadership is elected from among ranking sheikhs or 
prominent Islamic religious leaders in the community. The Beja 
Congress, now led by Sheikh Suleiman, took up arms against 
Khartoum in the early 1990s and is reportedly an important 
member of the NDA. Sheikh Omar was accompanied on our visit to 
Sudan by the Beja Congress chief military officer and several 
members of the Beja Emergency Relief Organization.
    Beja troops reportedly operate alongside other NDA members 
in various sectors and bring important influence with their 
ability to conduct small-scale mobile guerrilla operations 
based on intimate knowledge of the terrain; to provide access 
to other NDA forces; and to mobilize militia-type forces when 
needed (assuming the availability of weaponry). Given their 
mobility, the Beja are difficult for the NIF to pin down in a 
military sense. It is difficult for outsiders to distinguish 
military from nonmilitary personnel. 





                   The Sudan Federal Democratic Union

    SFRC staff was also joined by Dr. Sharif Harir, a leader of 
the Sudan Federal Democratic Union (SFDU). Dr. Sharif is 
originally from Darfur in Sudan's far west, and resigned his 
position teaching anthropology at Bergen University in Norway 
in November 1997 to enlist in the struggle against the NIF-led 
government. He currently resides in NDA-held areas of Sudan. 
Dr. Sharif was accompanied by the SFDU's chief military 
officer, also from Darfur.
    SFDU is reportedly working to cement ties with the NDA and 
to recruit from among the many Darfurians and other westerners 
working as temporary laborers in the agricultural areas of 
Sudan's eastern regions. The SFDU maintains little if any 
military capacity at present but, according to SAF leader 
General Abdel Aziz, have some people operating with SAF. SAF 
leaders talked openly about their desire to expand and, over 
time, open an NDA front in the Darfur region. Dr. Sharif 
claimed that, assuming logistical capacity, there are several 
thousand western Sudanese within Sudan and in Libya, Chad and 
the Central African Republic who would willingly fight the NIF 
Government under NDA/SFDU auspices. Although given the existing 
ties between the Government of Chad and the NIF, the 
possibility of opening a credible military front in Western 
Sudan appears remote.
    Dr. Sharif, SAF leader General Abdel Aziz Khaled, and 
military professionals in the region made clear that the 
potential of the SFDU could be meaningful given that the west 
is the only region of Sudan in which there is not an NDA 
presence or an organized opposition to the NIF Government.

                           Other NDA Members

    The Umma Party is a religious, sect-based Islamic 
organization and is considered, with the Democratic Unionist 
Party, one of the ``establishment'' political parties in Sudan. 
The Umma Party is headed by Sadiq al-Mahdi (as referenced 
previously, he is the great-grandson of Sudan ruler Sadiq al-
Mahdi and, incidently, a brother-in-law of current NIF leader 
Hassan al-Turabi). The other establishment party and NDA member 
which has been calling for a constitutional government in Sudan 
since 1968, is the Democratic Unionist Party. The DUP, too, is 
an Islam-based political organization (representing the 
Khitmayia sect of Muslims). Both the Umma Party and the DUP 
maintain small armed forces which operate within the NDA. 
Finally, the Sudanese Communist Party, which is reportedly 
shrinking in membership, is also a member of the NDA.
    Regrettably, even if the NIF were to be removed from 
Khartoum in the near term, significant political and personal 
differences exist between NDA members which must be resolved if 
the NDA is to be a viable long-term alternative to the NIF. 
Policy disputes among NDA members include, for example, North-
South disagreements about a ``federated'' Sudan and a 
resolution of questions regarding the autonomy of the Nuba 
people. While the Asmara Declaration has been agreed to by NDA 
members, it is unclear if its principles will be adhered to in 
future years.
    Equally disturbing is the apparent lack of trust and 
respect among NDA leaders. According to senior Ethiopian and 
Eritrean military officials we met with, the NDA lacks true 
military and political cohesion. SPLA leader John Garang, for 
example, reportedly has little respect or confidence in other 
NDA members' armed forces. While the governments of Ethiopia 
and Eritrea continue to press the NDA leadership for heightened 
unity, the apparent lack of trust and confidence can only be 
resolved from within the NDA. If the NDA is not successful in 
reconciling its internal differences prior to the fall of the 
NIF, the NDA itself may disintegrate.

                      NDA Operations Inside Sudan

    The NDA controls five sectors on the Sudan border with 
Eritrea and Ethiopia. The northernmost sector is located on the 
Eritrean border at the Red Sea and includes Karora and the 
small port of Aqiq. The southernmost and largest occupied 
territory is in the Blue Nile Province nearby Damazin. In each 
area, the NDA is represented by at least two member 
organizations.
    The sector visited by SFRC staff is south of the Red Sea 
coast on the Eritrean border, and the smallest territory held 
by the NDA. Each sector was taken during the coordinated 
offensive initiated in January 1997, with the SPLA and SAF as 
the main military actors for the NDA. Combined, they provide 
limited rear-base facilities for the NDA along the border from 
the Red Sea coast to Damazin, as well as proximity to strategic 
government-controlled areas including the Port Sudan highway 
(the supply lifeline for Khartoum), the Roseires Dam (which 
provides most of the electricity for Khartoum), and Kassala 
(the largest city in eastern Sudan).
    According to its leaders, SAF maintains one battalion in 
this sector organized along ``modified'' British lines, with 
the primary modification being a greater emphasis on the 
operational rather than administrative aspects. All SAF forces 
are trained before entering service and are also provided with 
literacy and English-language training as needed. Troops are 
rotated between ``bases'' and front line positions or mobile 
guerrilla assignments, during which time training is often 
upgraded. All are equipped with light weapons, although 
ammunition is occasionally in short supply.
    SFRC staff observed that the SAF military forces acted in a 
professional manner, particularly for an insurgent army. The 
troops reflect the training and professionalism of their 
commanders. With uniformity throughout, and visibly clean 
weapons, the unit presented an impressive outward appearance. 
It is understood that the SAF military commanders would make 
every effort to present such an image, as well as the fact that 
these troops were observed in a rear area. However, this 
display of professionalism is validated by reports of the 
military success of SAF troops.
    Staff met with Dr. John Garang, leader of the SPLA, in 
Asmara, Eritrea, to discuss military and political developments 
in Sudan. According to Garang, 70 percent of all NDA combatants 
in Eastern Sudan were SPLA troops. While staff met only briefly 
with an SPLA military commander in the field, staff did witness 
the movement of about 30-40 SPLA troops in a truck inside 
eastern Sudan.
    SAF units have enjoyed continued military success against 
NIF offices and garrisons and against industrial and 
agricultural targets. The most active sector is reportedly the 
Blue Nile, where SAF mounted on December 5, a successful 
operation 37 miles from Damazin aimed at a facility that 
produces gum Arabic, which is an important export commodity for 
the NIF Government. According to General Abdel Aziz Khaled, NDA 
forces penetrated the site from positions behind enemy lines 
capturing three Massey-Ferguson tractors, one truck, one four-
wheel-drive vehicle, a gasoline tanker, radio communications 
equipment, and weapons. SAF reported no casualties, and claims 
to have captured four NIF soldiers.
    Significantly, SAF claims to have undertaken five small 
operations in and around Kassala during October, including a 
commando raid during which a small SAF team infiltrated Kassala 
itself (the largest city in eastern Sudan), raided the state 
security office, and escaped with government documents and 
weapons. No SAF casualties were reported.
    This and other SAF operations in October were aimed, in 
part, to signal NIF representatives at the regional IGAD-
sponsored peace talks in Nairobi that the war was no longer 
being waged solely against the SPLA in southern Sudan. (SAF 
military commanders reported that the small coastal port of 
Aqiq is now sporadically shelled by Sudanese naval forces. 
However, the front lines in the sector visited by SFRC staff 
were at present quiet, with government forces undertaking 
regular patrols and the two sides engaging in occasional 
skirmishes.)
    Villagers with whom we talked described NIF sporadic air 
assaults using Antonov cargo aircraft modified to carry 500 lb. 
iron bombs. Targets appeared to be chosen indiscriminately by 
NIF pilots, many of whom simply attacked the largest civilian 
populations possible rather than search for military targets. 
Since the NIF air force is in near total disrepair, the few 
flyable aircraft are required to operate on both the southern 
and eastern fronts in Sudan greatly limiting their 
effectiveness in both regions.
    Coordination between and among SAF, Beja Congress, SPLA and 
Sudanese Democratic Federal Union officials appeared to be 
cordial, if not clear cut in the Western military sense. In the 
case of the town of Telkok, both SAF and SPLA agreed that the 
civil administration should be led by a member of the Beja 
Congress, both as a means of building upon traditional local 
leadership and of ensuring that the civilian administration is 
comprised of people from a given area, both of these goals 
reflecting the policy of the NDA.
    According to the various organizations, the composition of 
the civilian administration in most areas controlled by NDA 
member organizations has been determined on a consensus basis, 
although there were reportedly NDA-administered elections in 
the Blue Nile area of Menza. It appears that, whatever the 
composition of the civil administration and agreed-upon 
military presence, NDA member organizations are free to open 
political offices in any NDA area of Sudan.
    On December 5, SFRC staff traveled to village of Telkok, 
Sudan (population 16,000, approximately 87 miles northeast of 
Kassala), crossing the border at Ribda. Telkok is the zonal 
headquarters for a population of approximately 250,000 of the 
Beja people.





    Telkok was captured by the combined forces of the SAF and 
SPLA on April 20, 1997, and, based on the consensus of NDA 
members, is administered by the Beja Congress as their people 
dominate the area. While SAF maintain the most visible military 
presence, including an office in the village itself, they 
claimed that the forward defenses are maintained by coordinated 
SAF, SPLA, and Beja Congress units.
    SFRC staff spoke with sheikhs from the Beja Congress, 
Muslim townspeople in Telkok, and several SAF soldiers, all of 
whom demonstrated consistency in their comments about the NIF 
regime. As Muslims, they said, they stand against the NIF 
because, in the first instance, they consider that the state 
should play no role in defining the relationship between people 
and their God. Second, they said, they vigorously object to the 
NIF ``doing bad things to people'' in the name of Islam--
including ``harassing other Muslims, oppressing non-Muslims and 
destabilizing neighboring countries.''
    This is consistent with the statement made by a U.S. State 
Department official who testified on September 25, 1997, before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ``Civilians have paid 
the greatest price in this war. Rape has been used as a tool of 
the war, land mines have been used indiscriminately around 
towns, and children have been abducted and used as soldiers . . 
.''
    In addition to these encounters, SFRC staff witnessed the 
tragic conditions of the camps of internally displaced families 
surrounding Telkok. We also toured Telkok's hospital and 
school, which are empty shells having been depleted of all 
supplies. The hospital should serve the village and surrounding 
region (including the thousands of displaced people), but there 
are no doctors or nurses, and the facilities are in such bad 
disrepair that it has been closed.





    After visiting Telkok, SFRC staff drove several miles to 
the SAF regional military headquarters at the Torgun garrison. 
Torgun supports SAF troops at the front lines 10-12 miles 
distant. The garrison was taken in an April 1997 battle, in 
which Sudanese Government forces reportedly suffered 120 killed 
and SAF taking 37 prisoners. 





    Three destroyed armored vehicles (one Soviet T-55 and two 
American B-113s) remained in the compound where SAF also stored 
approximately 1,300 captured Iranian and Russian-made anti-
armor and anti-personnel mines and dozens of rocket propelled 
grenades and ammunition left by the Sudanese military. The 
garrison and its immediate periphery had been cleared of land 
mines by SAF soldiers trained during earlier service in the 
Sudanese military.





                     III. U.S. Policy Toward Sudan

    At various times since its independence, Sudan has been an 
important ally to the United States. Its strategic position in 
East Africa made it central to U.S. opposition to the Soviet 
Union's efforts to spread communism in the region. From 1962-
1996, the United States provided more than $2,127,000,000 in 
assistance to Sudan, making it the recipient of the most U.S. 
foreign aid in Africa after Egypt. This amount includes 
$329,400,000 in military aid, $893,100,000 in economic aid, and 
$904,700,000 in humanitarian support.
    According to the State Department, United States interests 
in Sudan are: (1) terrorism; (2) regional stability; (3) human 
rights; and (4) internal reconciliation, between the Muslim 
north and the Christian and animist south. According to State 
Department briefing material, the United States seeks to 
contain Sudanese-sponsored aggression and to modify Sudanese 
Government behavior through calibrated pressure and dialogue.
    In August 1993, the State Department placed Sudan on its 
list of state sponsors of terrorism, joining the rogue regimes 
in Iran, Iraq, Cuba, Libya, Syria and North Korea. Terrorist 
nations are prohibited from nearly all political and economic 
relationships with the United States, including denial of all 
U.S. foreign aid (except humanitarian aid) and limitations on 
exports.
    The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
bars donations to U.S. persons from terrorist states. The 
United States supported United Nations resolutions condemning 
the NIF regime for its involvement in the assassination attempt 
on Hosni Mubarak, and also reduced the number of Sudanese 
diplomats in the United States. On November 4, 1997, President 
Clinton ordered that Sudanese Government property be blocked 
and prohibited financial transactions with Sudan (see 
Appendixes G and H).
    In an attempt to contain Sudan's regional destabilization 
campaign the United States has committed approximately 
$20,000,000 since 1996, in mostly non-lethal military aid (C-
130 aircraft were also provided) to Eritrea, Ethiopia, and 
Uganda to enhance each nations ability to defend its borders. 
Since 1993, the United States has supported the Sudan peace 
initiative launched by the sub-regional organization 
Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD). In fiscal 
year 1997, the United States government has provided 
$39,774,378 for relief efforts in southern Sudan and for 
internally displaced people around Khartoum (see Appendix C).
    Members of both the House and Senate introduced bills in 
1997 intended to tighten sanctions against Sudan, including the 
Ashcroft-Helms bill (S. 873) prohibiting financial transactions 
with countries supporting terrorism (see Appendix F), and 
similar provisions contained in the Senate passed ``Foreign 
Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1997'' (S. 903).

       IV. Assessment of Humanitarian Conditions in Eastern Sudan

    The humanitarian situation within the areas of Sudan 
visited by SFRC staff was extremely grave. Within Telkok 
itself, the hospital--which is supposed to serve some 250,000 
people within the region--has literally no medical supplies and 
no trained professional staff, most of whom fled when 
government forces withdrew. The school was similarly under-
equipped. Staff visited the sole school in Telkok and witnessed 
only a small percentage of the school-age children in 
attendance. The school has no teachers and teaching materials--
desks, books, pencils and paper--were virtually non-existent. 
Water supplies are short, and the harsh terrain cannot provide 
enough food for an adequate diet.
    Telkok has, during late November, received approximately 
3,600 displaced people--Beja from the Gash area who fled, they 
said, because of government harassment. Government forces had 
taken all of their herds. More people, they claimed, were on 
the way (150 people arrived the day before SFRC staff arrived 
in Telkok and 97 on the day visited). The displaced families 
live in miserable conditions reminiscent of those experienced 
by the Eritrean and Ethiopian victims of the 1984-85 Ethiopian 
famine who sought refuge in eastern Sudan. Both the townspeople 
and the displaced rely on a single well for water. It is clear 
that should food and medical assistance not be forthcoming, 
both the displaced and many of the townspeople will have to 
move again.





    Of note, civilians in Telkok said that their suffering was 
worth the freedom provided by the Beja Congress and SAF as 
opposed to the far more oppressive environment under Sudanese 
Government forces.
    According to AID officials, humanitarian assistance 
provided to the region has come primarily from Dutch 
Interchurch Aid (DIA) and Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), 
organizations which were prominent in the cross-border 
operation from Sudan into Eritrea and Tigray in the 1980s. AID 
gives high marks to these groups as they operate with low 
overhead, a high degree of professionalism and minimal 
expatriate staff (one each).
    While both DIA and NCA operate with the approval of the 
Government of Eritrea, they maintain a very low profile to 
comply with the Eritrean Government's desire that a large and 
visible cross-border operation not be established. SFRC staff 
did not see evidence of any humanitarian assistance efforts in 
the areas visited.
    The organizations reportedly work directly with the Beja 
Relief Organization and Amal (the humanitarian affiliate of 
SAF). At one point, medical supplies were also provided by the 
French NGO Medecins du Monde, although no supplies have been 
provided in recent months. The main medical problems are 
respiratory ailments, seasonal malaria, conjunctivitis, night 
blindness, arthritic diseases, diarrhoeal diseases, snake 
bites, tuberculous and various infections. Most of these 
illnesses are easily treatable and non-fatal with basic medical 
care. The only food distributions to the displaced have been 
those supported by Dutch Interchurch Aid and the Government of 
Eritrea.




    Coordination and cooperation apparently exist between Amal 
and the Beja Relief organization, which have undertaken a 
division of labor whereby Amal handles medical and educational 
needs and the Beja Relief organization handles agricultural and 
water requirements. Amal appears to have more professionals on 
staff--being more sophisticated in terms of proposals, 
assessments, etc. Both have such limited resources, however, 
that their impact was not evident to SFRC staff in the areas 
visited.
    The Clinton Administration should consider redirecting a 
small portion of U.S. humanitarian aid from predominantly SPLM-
administered southern Sudan to those areas in eastern Sudan 
under the control of the NDA. Since 1988, the U.S. Government 
has provided more than $600,000,000 in humanitarian aid to the 
people of Sudan. Providing even a small portion of humanitarian 
aid--medical supplies or water well drilling assistance--in 
Telkok and the surrounding villages would improve the very 
desperate living conditions for thousands of families.
    For a more complete assessment of the humanitarian needs of 
the region, see Appendix E, ``Assessment of the Humanitarian 
Conditions in Eastern Sudan''.

                    V. Long-Term Development Program

    At some point, questions of the long-term development of 
Sudan must be contemplated. The ruling NIF has neither the 
financial resources nor the desire to provide the most basic 
social services for many areas of Sudan. Many regions are 
without basic health clinics and hospitals, schools and other 
government services. Government funded infrastructure, be it 
telecommunications or highways, to the extent they ever 
existed, have fallen into deep disrepair during years of civil 
war. Human infrastructure--accountants, lawyers, civil 
servants--is non-existent. Clearly, the government of a ``new 
Sudan'' will need to find creative ways to develop this 
infrastructure.
    The Clinton Administration recently reached inter-agency 
agreement to begin a modest development program inside Sudan to 
be administered by the Agency for International Development 
(AID). The Administration may attempt to allocate up to 
$3,000,000 for this effort. Since U.S. assistance inside Sudan 
has been limited during the past decade to humanitarian medical 
and food supplies, this new proposal represents a significant 
expansion of the U.S. role in opposition-held areas in Sudan. 
(The United Nations Development Program, UNDP, has recently 
expanded its Operation Lifeline Sudan effort to include a small 
civil society component, but UNDP has secured the Government of 
Sudan's tacit approval to do so).
    Details of the proposal have yet to be finalized, but the 
broad parameters consist of a multi-year assistance program to 
be carried out through grants to non-governmental organizations 
whose aim is to develop basic structures of civil society in 
opposition held areas. AID has not yet determined in which 
regions specific projects would be undertaken, but, obviously, 
only those areas in which the opposition maintains sustained 
control should be considered.
    Dr. John Garang, in his meeting with SFRC staff, insisted 
that all development assistance be targeted to areas under SPLA 
control, some of which have not been under NIF control for five 
or more years. He argued that the three zones of NDA occupation 
in Eastern Sudan have been held for only months, not years, and 
therefore are not yet ready for long-term institution building 
aid. Garang told staff that while the SPLM has not submitted a 
specific proposal to AID, he wrote AID Administrator Brian 
Atwood with a detailed seven point plan for local governance 
and infrastructure development. Garang's insistence that all 
funding be dedicated to SPLM controlled areas and his concept 
of how the funding would be utilized appears to be somewhat at 
odds with AID's view of the program. The humanitarian wing of 
the SAF, the Amal Trust, has not submitted any proposal to AID.
    This proposal is unique and inventive for AID, given that 
the agency operates almost exclusively in countries with which 
it has received official government support to do so. From 
Khartoum's perspective, through this initiative the U.S. 
Government will in this instance be directly assisting those 
whose goal is to overthrow it. The Clinton Administration will 
have to answer significant policy questions regarding this. AID 
must also consider several important operational questions. Key 
among these are: (1) how AID will monitor the program 
(currently all AID-supported humanitarian programs are 
coordinated through Nairobi, and this proposal may require AID 
missions in Addis Ababa and Asmara to play a role) and (2) how 
the individual projects carried out by NGOs will be audited 
both on performance and financial grounds.
    It should be noted that an international consensus is 
growing that long-term international aid is simply not the 
answer to developing countries' needs. In 1993, the Clinton 
Administration acknowledged these failures in a critical AID 
self-assessment (known as the ``Wharton Report''), which 
states, ``Despite decades of foreign assistance, most of 
Africa, and parts of Latin America, Asia and the Middle East 
are economically worse off today than they were 20 years ago.''
    Further evidence of these foreign aid failures can be found 
in a recent U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) audit of the 
World Bank's IDA programs. This audit makes public staggering 
statistics about widespread failure of IDA lending. After 
poring through documentation for 737 World Bank projects, the 
GAO unearthed data showing that between 1985 and 1993, 49 
percent of all IDA projects in Sub-Sahahran Africa had ``not 
made an acceptable contribution to development'', even by the 
World Bank's own lenient performance requirements.
    Worse yet, IDA's financial and technical reform projects in 
Africa--which Bank officials claim are critical to future 
economic development--failed 62 percent of the time. And the 
future for IDA projects remains bleak: World Bank data reveals 
that despite so-called reforms at IDA, ``virtually no 
improvement has been made in implementation or the prognosis 
for projects' eventual impact on development.''
    After the NIF is forced out of power, the leaders of a 
``new Sudan'' should resist this aid dependancy which will 
undoubtedly be encouraged by misguided international donor 
agencies.


                            A P P E N D I X

                              ----------                              

A. Letter from Senator Jesse Helms to U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine 
                                Albright

                                                  January 13, 1998.
The Hon. Madeleine Albright,
Secretary of State,
U.S. Department of State,
2201 ``C'' Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20520.
    Dear Madam Secretary: Genuine congratulations are certainly due 
you--and are hereby extended--for your important role in the 
President's November 4 decision to impose additional sanctions against 
the terrorist Government of Sudan. (The Foreign Relations Committee 
took a special interest in U.S. policy toward Sudan this past year, and 
that interest will continue in 1998.)
    I understand that Dick McCall accompanied you on your recent trip 
to East Africa; thus you are well informed about opposition gains in 
eastern Sudan. In December, the Foreign Relations Committee staff 
traveled to areas controlled by the Sudan Alliance Forces in eastern 
Sudan (the first Americans to do so in an official capacity.)
    Their descriptions of the tragic abuse suffered by local citizens 
at the hands of the Sudanese Government and the hardships caused by the 
civil war are almost beyond belief. Apparently, thousands of families 
are on the verge of a humanitarian disaster as a result of having been 
displaced from their homes in one of the most harsh environments on 
earth.
    In fiscal year 1997, the U.S. Government provided $39,774,378 in 
humanitarian aid to southern Sudan and for the camps of internally 
displaced people around Khartoum. Opposition held territory in eastern 
Sudan received no assistance from the United States, and a technicality 
blocks United Nations refugee assistance there because potential 
recipients are viewed as ``internally displaced'' and not genuine 
``refugees.''
    In view of the almost total lack of assistance for an increasing 
number of suffering people, I strongly urge that you devote at least a 
modest amount of humanitarian assistance funds already earmarked for 
Sudan in 1998 for opposition held territory in eastern Sudan. A small 
infusion of funds may prevent another humanitarian crisis in East 
africa, and it certainly would be in concert with U.S. national 
security interests. Furthermore, on the heels of the new U.S. 
sanctions, it will send an important signal that the United States 
wants to help the people of Sudan who have suffered at the hands of the 
Sudanese Government.
    I hope you agree that even a modest amount of humanitarian 
assistance could be greatly beneficial to the people of eastern Sudan, 
as well as furthering U.S. interests there.
    Kindest personal regards.
            Sincerely,
                                               Jesse Helms.
cc: The Honorable John Ashcroft

                               __________


 B. Secretary of State Albright's Response to Senator Helms' Letter of 
                            January 13, 1998

                             Madeleine K. Albright,
                                        Secretary of State,
                                                  January 30, 1998.
The Hon. Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter of January 13 
regarding Sudan and the President's decision to impose sanctions. Your 
continued interest in Sudan is greatly appreciated.
    I share your concern for the people of eastern Sudan. During my 
recent trip, I met with Sudanese opposition leaders, and we discussed 
our mutual concern for the suffering of people throughout Sudan.
    For ten years the United States has provided humanitarian aid in 
all parts of Sudan under very difficult circumstances. We have not 
concentrated assistance in the northeastern region, which was 
relatively peaceful and less needy than other parts of the country. 
However, in recent months as opposition to the regime in Khartoum has 
spread, parts of eastern Sudan have been taken over by rebel groups. 
The fighting in these areas has caused conditions to deteriorate.
    The Agency for International Development (USAID) is prepared to 
support humanitarian assistance programs in the northeast, as in all 
areas of Sudan, that address the urgent needs of war-affected 
civilians. In order to obtain a sound assessment of humanitarian needs 
and to determine support requirements, USAID has been talking to the 
few international non-governmental organizations which have permission 
from the government of Eritrea to conduct assistance operations in 
eastern Sudan. We will keep your staff informed on developments.
            Sincerely,
                              Madeleine K. Albright

                               __________


 C. Agency for International Development Activity Data Sheet--Regional 
   Economic Development Services Office for East and Southern Africa 
   (REDSO/ESA)--Effective Delivery of USAID's Humanitarian Assistance

                                         September 4, 1997,
                                                     Washington DC.

                   SUDAN--Complex Emergency Situation

          Report 2, Fiscal Year (FY) 1997. September 2, 1997.

Note: The last situation report was dated November 12, 1996.
U.S. Agency For International Development, Bureau for Humanitarian 
        Response (BHR), Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance 
        (OFDA).
    Background--Fighting began in 1983 between the Government of Sudan 
(GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) when the southern-
based rebels demanded more influence in the government and protested 
the GOS efforts to ``Islamize'' the Christian and animist south. In 
1991, the SPLA split into factions, and intensified fighting between 
SPLA factions erupted in areas of the south. The conflict continues 
today and civilians throughout the south and the transitional zone (the 
area of southern Darfur, southern Kordofan, northern Bahr el Ghazal, 
and the northern Upper Nile States) are directly affected by aerial 
bombings by the GOS and forced relocations due to fighting. Ongoing 
insecurity and population displacement in the south and the 
transitional zone have not only interrupted or destroyed most of the 
indigenous trading and productive systems, but have also been a major 
impediment to relief efforts. The United Nations (U.N.) and numerous 
non-governmental organizations (NGO) within and outside the framework 
of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) are delivering relief assistance by 
airlifts, airdrops, barges, trains, and truck convoys. In the more 
secure areas of southern Sudan, efforts to rehabilitate and restore 
self-sufficiency are underway.

    Total USAID Assistance for FY 1997 (to date) = $39,774,378
Numbers Affected: At a Glance
Figures listed are U.N. Humanitarian Coordination Unit and U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates.

  Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): 2.5 million, including 1.8 
        million in Khartoum, 350,000 in the transition zone and 
        government-held garrison towns, 150,000 in camps in Equatoria, 
        and additional tens of thousands elsewhere.
  Refugees: 209,000 Sudanese refugees in Uganda, 110,000 in the 
        Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), 78,000 in 
        Ethiopia, 28,000 in Kenya and 27,000 in the Central African 
        Republic. 349,000 Eritreans, 51,000 Ethiopians, 4,400 Chadians, 
        and 10,000 refugees of various origins currently in Sudan.
Current Situation
   Thousands Displaced as Rebels Advance: In January, the 
        united forces of the SPLA and the National Democratic Alliance 
        (NDA), an alliance of opposition groups in northern and 
        southern Sudan formed last October, launched a military 
        campaign in the northern regions of Sudan. The military 
        campaign, aimed at toppling the Sudanese government, initially 
        resulted in the capture of several strategic areas. The 
        offensive slowed down after a government call for general 
        mobilization, but NDA forces still reportedly control several 
        towns in the Red Sea and Blue Nile regions, including Kurmuk, 
        Qeissan, and Maban. The NDA, based in Asmara, the capital of 
        Eritrea, includes the country's main traditional parties and 
        the SPLA. In March, the military offensive shifted to the far 
        south after SPLA forces captured the town of Yei. The SPLA 
        subsequently seized Kaya and Kajo Keji in Western Equatoria and 
        Rumbek in Bahr el Ghazal/Lakes. The SPLA, under the leadership 
        of John Garang, now controls most of Western Equatoria and Bahr 
        el Ghazal/Lakes.

    The renewed military offensive generated major population 
movements, particularly in the south. A joint OLS assessment in late 
March identified a total of 100,000 returning refugees from northern 
Uganda and vulnerable persons among the resident population in Yei as 
requiring urgent relief food and non-food assistance. Many returnees 
eventually settled in or around their home villages, while others 
settled in three existing IDP camps located near Uganda. The mass 
exodus into southern Sudan coincided with increased rebel activity in 
northern Uganda.

   Restrictions Hamper Response: GOS-imposed restrictions on 
        relief operations hindered initial efforts to meet humanitarian 
        needs from April to June. In both May and June, the GOS 
        suspended all flights into southern Sudan for up to one week. 
        From March to June, the GOS also banned all C-130 flights to 
        Equatoria and Bahr el Ghazal from Lokichokio, the OLS base in 
        northern Kenya, and the use of high capacity C-130 Hercules 
        aircraft in areas controlled by the SPLA. OLS access improved 
        in July following the visit of the newly-appointed U.N. Special 
        Envoy for Humanitarian Affairs for the Sudan Ambassador Robert 
        Van Schaik. However, reports indicate that the restrictions on 
        OLS flights reduced food aid for more than 700,000 aid-
        dependent Sudanese and prevented the delivery of seeds and 
        tools, affecting timely planting. Minor restrictions imposed by 
        the SPLA also affected humanitarian access to some areas. 
        Recent SPLA gains have, however, allowed the OLS to transport 
        relief supplies and personnel to Western Equatoria and Lakes 
        regions by road via Uganda for the first time in many years.
   OLS Ground Rules Violations: In July, the United States 
        temporarily suspended all distribution of vegetable oil in 
        southern Sudan, northern Uganda, and northern Kenya. The 
        suspension was imposed after an estimated 300 MT of BHR/Office 
        of Food for Peace (FFP)-provided P.L. 480 Title II commodities 
        were diverted by SPLA officers and sold for personal gain in 
        northern Uganda in early May, in violation of OLS ground 
        agreements. The suspension was lifted in late August following 
        a field investigation by a team from BHR/FFP and the USAID 
        Office of the Inspector General's Special Audit Division that 
        took place from July 21 to August 4. In discussions with the 
        team, the SPLA's humanitarian wing, Sudan Relief and 
        Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), confirmed the diversions 
        took place but without SRRA/SPLA sanction. The team has 
        recommended several specific measures to reduce the potential 
        for future diversions.

    Donors and NGOs are also concerned about recent violations of OLS 
ground rules committed by SPLA forces in Western Equatoria, including 
the commandeering and use of NGO vehicles for military purposes. In 
late July, armed bandits forcibly entered the World Vision Relief and 
Development (WVRD) compound in Yambio, Western Equatoria, and robbed, 
beat, and held at gunpoint five international staff while SPLA military 
were nearby. All WVRD staff were subsequently evacuated. Some items 
looted have been recovered and four people were reportedly arrested 
later in connection with the attack. In late January, SPLA forces 
entered a Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)/France compound in Pochalla, 
forced the staff into a tent, and looted equipment. The staff were 
safely evacuated to Lokichokio, and U.N. World Food Program (WFP) and 
MSF/France equipment looted during this attack were later recovered.
    In July, Southern Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) faction forces 
looted radios and other property from an NGO compound in Ayod, Upper 
Nile Province, also in violation of OLS ground rules agreement. SSIM 
forces also occupied health units and looted medicines from a BHR/OFDA-
funded Mercy Corps International (MCI)/ACROSS health project in Akobo. 
While activities under this project continue in other areas, the Akobo 
portion was suspended.

   1996/97 Crop Outcome: According to a USAID Famine Early 
        Warning System bulletin released in late July, a dry spell that 
        affected parts of southern Sudan in May and June will severely 
        affect crop yields in Rumbek and Yirol in Bahr el Ghazal/Lakes 
        and Juba, Torit, and Kapoeta counties in Equatoria in the 
        coming weeks. Although pasture and herd conditions are 
        generally good, NGOs estimate that the dry spell, which also 
        rendered crops more susceptible to damage from insect pests and 
        disease, will reduce first-crop harvests for about 300,000 
        persons by as much as 65%. Prospects for the second, main-
        season crop, which represents 60-75% of annual production, 
        depend on the current rains, which arrived late at the end of 
        June and will last until October. Outstanding OLS relief food 
        requirements for 1997 are currently projected at 36,410 MT.
Political/Military Situation
   GOS Signs Peace Agreement with Rebel Groups: On April 22, 
        the GOS and five rebel factions, including the SSIM and the 
        SPLA/Bahr el Ghazal Group, signed a peace agreement in 
        Khartoum. Under the peace deal, a coordinating council would 
        run the affairs of southern Sudan for four years after which a 
        referendum on the future status of southern Sudan would be 
        held. Soon after, six factions, including all five signatories 
        to the peace agreement, signed an accord recognizing former 
        Garang ally and SSIM leader Riek Machar as their overall and 
        united militarily under the South Sudan Defense Force. The 
        United States commended the peace agreement as a positive first 
        step, but stressed the need for the GOS to seek a peaceful 
        settlement with other factions.
   IGAD Peace Negotiations: From July 8 to 9, President Daniel 
        arap Moi of Kenya hosted a regional summit of Intergovernmental 
        Authority on Development (IGAD) members to discuss the war in 
        southern Sudan and Somalia. The GOS, after some initial 
        resistance, finally accepted a declaration of principles as a 
        basis for discussion, clearing the way for the resumption of 
        talks which broke off nearly three years ago. The principles 
        lay the groundwork for discussions regarding the country's 
        return to a secular constitution and a four-year interim 
        administration to address issues surrounding self-
        determination. Al Bashir also called for a cease-fire with the 
        SPLA during an official visit to South Africa. Both the SPLA 
        and NDA rejected the call for a cease-fire, arguing that it was 
        just a ploy to give the GOS an opportunity to rebuild its 
        forces against advancing SPLA troops. In late August, South 
        African President Nelson Mandela held separate talks with al 
        Bashir and Garang and hosted a summit between al Bashir and 
        Ugandan President Yoweri Musevini. A meeting of East African 
        leaders under the auspices of IGAD, which was originally 
        scheduled for August 19, has been indefinitely postponed.
   USG Increases Involvement: The United States has stepped up 
        diplomatic efforts to pressure the GOS and other parties to 
        improve the country's poor human rights record and cease 
        hostilities. At the USG's urging, the U.N. Commission on Human 
        Rights is pressuring the GOS to comply with international human 
        rights laws and reduce restrictions on international relief 
        organizations. The USG also backed a recent U.N. Security 
        Council (UNSC) Resolution banning international flights by 
        aircraft owned, leased, or controlled by the already-bankrupt 
        Sudan Airways or another entity of the GOS. Other UNSC 
        sanctions on Sudan restrict international travel for GOS 
        officials and call on nations to reduce the size of Sudanese 
        diplomatic missions abroad and to not hold international 
        conferences in Sudan.
Relief Efforts
   IDPs and Returnees Assisted: Coordinated donor-funded relief 
        efforts continue to focus on the highly-variable needs of 
        returnees from Uganda, as well as those displaced by this 
        year's offensive. OLS delivered food and priority relief 
        supplies by road from Yambio and from WFP food stores in Uganda 
        and BHR/OFDA-funded NGOs have been active in the distribution 
        of agricultural inputs and relief kits, health activities, and 
        the rehabilitation of key road routes. WFP recently initiated 
        an airlift operation into Juba where over 20,000 returnees, 
        most of whom had arrived from Yei, required immediate 
        assistance. WFP barge convoys will deliver nearly 4,000 MT of 
        food and non-food supplies to Juba by the end of September. 
        Nutritional activities, implemented through the BHR/OFDA-funded 
        Action contre la Faim (ACF) grant, also continue. Three WFP 
        barge convoys successfully delivered over 2,400 MT of food to 
        beneficiaries along the Nile River corridor, despite the 
        looting and attack of one barge convoy in Jonglei reportedly 
        carried out by SSIM forces. Relief agencies are also responding 
        to rising humanitarian needs among displaced populations in 
        Bahr el Ghazal/Lakes Region.

    In Khartoum, donors and relief organizations are working with the 
GOS to ensure that needs continue to be met, despite the demolition and 
relocation of several IDP camps in the area. BHR/OFDA and BHR/FFP 
programs continue to provide food, water, and health care for IDPs in 
Greater Khartoum. Access to IDPs in and around Khartoum has improved, 
allowing several therapeutic and supplementary feeding centers to 
address high levels of wasting.
    BHR/OFDA is also funding Save the Children Fund (SC)/US food 
security and health activities that benefit populations in areas of 
south Kordofan under GOS control and is funding a small water project 
through Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), implemented by the Nuba Relief, 
Rehabilitation, and Development Society (NRRDS) to provide water 
assistance in areas outside GOS control. SC/US is trying to secure an 
agreement from the GOS and SPLA to conduct measles vaccinations in 
rebel-controlled areas. Parts of northern and western Sudan, including 
Darfur, recently experienced heavy flooding. Casualty figures and 
details on the full extent of the flooding are unavailable.
    In the Red Sea Hills Region, the International Federation of the 
Red Cross (IFRC), the Sudanese Red Crescent Society (SRCS), and Oxfam 
are working to provide food to thousands of drought-stricken Beja 
nomads, despite numerous logistical and security problems. Oxfam and 
SRCS also provided supplementary feeding to vulnerable groups in Tokar 
and Sinkat provinces in response to reports of high levels of wasting 
and malnutrition in this area. Also, IDPs and war-affected people 
remain vulnerable and in need of assistance in areas of the Blue Nile 
that fell under NDA control in January. WFP recently delivered food to 
four IDP camps in the region.

   Disease Outbreaks: Surveys conducted by CARE, International 
        Medical Corps (IMC), and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control 
        have revealed an outbreak of sleeping sickness in Western 
        Equatoria. The team found an overall 19.3% prevalence of the 
        disease in Tambura County, with Ezo town, the epicenter of the 
        disease, reporting a very high 27% prevalence rate. IMC and 
        CARE hope to respond to the outbreak, among the worst 
        documented in this century. Sleeping sickness is a parasitical 
        vector-borne disease that is fatal if untreated. Relapsing 
        fever has also been reported in Mankien, Upper Nile, among new 
        IDPs from Gogrial. Efforts to treat existing cases and control 
        an outbreak of this vector-borne disease, which could cause 
        death if left untreated, are currently underway. An outbreak of 
        relapsing fever recently reported in Twic County is said to be 
        under control and treatment is ongoing. OLS NGOs recently 
        conducted several measles vaccination campaigns following 
        reported cases near Juba, Yei, and Bahr el Jebel, as well as in 
        western Upper Nile and northern Bahr el Ghazal. An outbreak of 
        gastrointenstitis and cholera reported in Eastern Equatoria is 
        now under control. OLS also conducted vaccinations against 
        rinderpest in Bahr el Ghazal and anthrax in Eastern Equatoria.
   OLS Funding Crisis: Despite urgent humanitarian needs, the 
        U.N. scaled back activities, particularly air operations, in 
        southern Sudan for several weeks when funding received for the 
        1997 U.N. Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Sudan fell short 
        of the amount requested. The Appeal, which was launched on 
        February 18, requested $120.8 million for 33 projects, of which 
        29 are OLS projects, in six priority areas. Priority activities 
        supported by the Appeal include emergency food aid and 
        essential health, nutritional, and water activities, as well as 
        overall logistics support, Lokichokio camp management, and 
        security. OLS is conducting a large fund-raising effort and has 
        established a cost-recovery system for air operations and for 
        food and lodging at the Lokichokio base camp. BHR/OFDA has 
        already contributed $2.25 million to UNICEF and $1.3 million to 
        WFP to support OLS operations.
   OLS Donors' Meeting: OLS's recent funding difficulties, 
        humanitarian conditions, and access difficulties were the 
        highlights of the U.N. Department of Humanitarian Affairs' 
        Second International Advisory Committee (IAC) meeting on OLS 
        held in Geneva on June 27. Senior U.N. representatives and 
        donor government representatives, including BHR/OFDA, attended. 
        The IAC invoked the 1994 OLS Agreements facilitated by IGAD as 
        providing a framework within which OLS should pursue its 
        activities in cooperation with the GOS and the rebel movements 
        rather than trying to negotiate a new access agreement in 
        Sudan. Participants also discussed the status of 1997 OLS 
        programs as well as progress achieved in efforts to reform OLS. 
        After the meeting, Ambassador Van Schaik sent a letter to the 
        GOS requesting action and clarification on access and clearance 
        issues.

    Before attending the Geneva meeting, Ambassador Van Schaik traveled 
to Sudan, Lokichokio, and Nairobi to discuss humanitarian access issues 
with OLS and representatives from the GOS and SPLA. Ambassador Van 
Schaik, former Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the U.N., 
succeeds Ambassador Vieri Traxler, who resigned last September on 
account of ill health.

   ICRC Suspension Continues: ICRC suspended its operations in 
        Sudan following the hijacking of an ICRC plane in November. The 
        aircraft was captured by forces of GOS-ally Kerubino Kwanyin 
        Bol upon landing in Wunrok in Bahr el Ghazal to return five 
        wounded SPLA soldiers. Four westerners who were on board, 
        including an American pilot, were released after 38 days, 
        following the intervention of former New Mexico Congressman 
        Bill Richardson, now U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. However, the 
        welfare of the five Sudanese who remain in captivity is 
        unknown. Nine ICRC staff in Juba, held under house arrest since 
        November 1, when this incident began, were released in 
        December. ICRC activities will remain suspended until GOS 
        accusations that the ICRC was transporting arms are put to 
        rest. However, the ICRC hospital in Lokichokio is operating at 
        full capacity and the ICRC continues to work with Sudanese 
        prisoners in Uganda and Sudan. ICRC recently sent food to Juba 
        hospital under the auspices of the SRCS.

    Later in March, an OLS aircraft was detained in Bor, Jonglei 
province, by GOS authorities claiming that flight clearance for the 
aircraft had not yet reached them. The GOS officials accused the pilot 
of carrying sensitive documents to rebels and held him for seven weeks 
until, following the intervention of senior U.N. officials, he was 
released on May 2. The documents in question reportedly were flight log 
books and aviation maps.

   Refugees: In line with an agreement between Sudan, Ethiopia, 
        and the UNHCR, the last 23,000 Ethiopian refugees in eastern 
        Sudan are expected to be voluntarily repatriated this year. Of 
        this group, about 7,000 Ethiopians were repatriated between May 
        and July. Effective May, Eritrea suspended UNHCR staff from 
        Eritrea over disagreements about the repatriation of refugees 
        from Sudan. UNHCR is currently investigating high mortality 
        rates among IDPs and refugees in Juba, particularly among 800 
        or so refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo.
USG Assistance to Sudan
    The USG has actively been providing humanitarian assistance to 
Sudan since 1988. On October 28, 1996, U.S. Ambassador to Sudan, 
Timothy Carney, renewed the disaster declaration for Sudan for FY 1997, 
stating that continued U.S. assistance is required to assist over 3 
million war-affected and displaced Sudanese. Currently, the USG's 
humanitarian response to the emergency in Sudan is provided through 
BHR/OFDA, BHR/FFP, and the State Department's Bureau for Population, 
Refugee, and Migration (PRM). USG-funded programs in Sudan promote 
continuing emergency relief to populations at risk, while at the same 
time providing rehabilitation assistance that builds local capacity to 
meet their own needs. This goal is captured under the recently-approved 
USG Integrated Strategy Plan for Sudan 1997-1999, which was developed 
within the context of the complex emergency in Sudan and takes into 
consideration current legislative restrictions on providing development 
aid to Sudan. The plan aims to meet urgent food needs in a way that 
increases food self-reliance and to address the major causes of 
mortality in Sudan by supporting comprehensive coverage by a basic 
primary health care network. It also promotes working with appropriate 
authorities and IDPs to develop local reintegration options and 
strengthening local capacities for peace as well as relationships and 
linkages that help reduce conflict.
    BHR/OFDA and BHR/FFP staff in Washington continue to work with the 
USAID/Regional Economic Development Services Offices/Sudan Field Office 
to plan and monitor relief and rehabilitation activities in southern 
Sudan and with USAID/Khartoum staff to monitor activities in northern 
Sudan and GOS-controlled areas of the south. In January 1996,the United 
States suspended its diplomatic presence in Khartoum, due to concerns 
for the safety of American Embassy personnel in Sudan. Subsequently, 
Ambassador Carney established a temporary office in Nairobi to maintain 
regular diplomatic communications with the GOS.

BHR/OFDA Assistance (to date)

                                                                        
                                                                        
                                                                        
                                                                        
ACF emergency aid to Juba.............................        $1,025,743
ACF/France food security program in Bahr el Ghazal....          $546,957
Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA)                          
 emergency health and food program in Eastern                           
 Equatoria and Greater Khartoum.......................        $2,144,267
American Red Cross nutrition program in the Red Sea                     
 Hills................................................           $68,090
American Refugee Committee emergency program in Kajo                    
 Keji.................................................          $736,842
CARE programs in Western Equatoria, west Kordofan, and                  
 Bor County...........................................        $1,040,243
International Aid Sweden water and road rehabilitation                  
 program in Equatoria and Lakes.......................          $565,513
MCI health program in Bor County......................           $93,694
MSF/Belgium emergency medical, nutrition, and                           
 sanitation program...................................          $344,134
MSF/Holland health program in Bor County..............          $575,840
NPA food relief and agriculture rehabilitation program                  
 in Equatoria and Lakes...............................        $1,453,079
NPA/NRRDS water program in Kordofan...................           $45,000
SC/US emergency relief activities in south Kordofan...          $241,565
UNICEF health/nutrition program in IDP camps in Bahr                    
 el Ghazal Region.....................................          $172,889
UNICEF OLS/Southern Sector support....................        $2,250,000
WFP food needs and logistics support..................        $1,300,000
WVRD emergency response...............................          $750,222
                                                                        

    Total FY 97 BHR/OFDA Assistance (to date) = $13,354,078


BHR/FFP Assistance (to date)
    To date in FY 1997, BHR/FFP has contributed 35,860 MT of Title II 
emergency Food to Sudan, valued at $26.4 million, to ADRA, Catholic 
Relief Services (CRS), NPA, and WFP for emergency programming and 
refugee assistance. In FY 1997, BHR/FFP also implemented CRS and WFP 
activities in food security and distribution that were funded in FY 
1996.
    Total FY 97 BHR/FFP Assistance (to date) = $26,420,300

State/PRM Assistance (to date)

    In FY 1997 to date, State/PRM has provided over $92 million to 
UNHCR, IFRC, ICRC, and International Rescue Committee for regional 
programs that supported Sudanese refugees and IDPs and the care and 
maintenance of Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees.

    Total FY 97 State/PRM Assistance (to date) = $92,000,000*

 *State/PRM funding to Sudan is regional and, therefore, not included 
in total USG assistance figures.


                                 Summary                                
                                                                        
                                                                        
                                                                        
BHR/OFDA Assistance FY 1997 (to date).................       $13,354,078
BHR/FFP Assistance FY 1997 (to date)..................       $26,420,300
USAID Assistance FY 1997 (to date)....................       $39,774,378
                                                                        


                               __________



        D. Assessment Mission and Proposal for Support to Togan

[Prepared by Sudan Future Care AMAL Trust/Regional Office for the Horn 
                               of Africa]

                                               Project Proposal [7]
                   Infrastructural Support for Togan, Eastern Sudan

                                          Assessment Mission Report
                                              Asmara, October, 1997

                                 ______
                                 

Project Summary
    1. Project Title: Infrastructural Support for Togan.

    2. Objective: To rehabilitate the basic infrastructural services in 
the non-government held area of Togan as a first phase to a 
comprehensive programme to be formulated during the implementation of 
this basic services project.

    3. Components:

          3.1 Health Services:

                  Target: Rehabilitation of (3) Primary Health Care 
                Units and (5) Dispensaries and their operation for one 
                year.

          3.2 Water Sanitation:

                  Target: The provision of potable water at the major 
                population centres in Togan by Establishing (10) water 
                points (wells, reservoirs, pumps) and installing one 
                incomplete water station.

          3.3 Education:

                  Target: The rehabilitation of (3) primary schools and 
                their functioning for this educational year 1997/98 
                without major constraints or shortages. This will serve 
                (500) students and (3) adult education classes at 
                least.

    4. Estimated Budget Summary:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Budget Item                    Total (US$)     Percent 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Institutional Support.......................          32,000       17.6 
Rehabilitation of the Health Services.......          68,760       37.9 
Water Sanitation............................          26,500       14.6 
Rehabilitation of the Education Services....          26,940       14.8 
Contingencies...............................          15,420       08.5 
Support to Amal Trust Main Office...........          11,873       06.5 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Total.................................         181,493        100 
------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Objectives of the Visit:
    1.1 Assessment of the situation of the health institutions in the 
area for more detailed and accurate information.
    1.2 Assessment of the general health problems and needs, 
prioritizing them, and defining affected population groups.
    1.3 Identification of the possible support needs in terms of 
rehabilitation, medicines, medical equipment, and other urgent health 
requirements.
    1.4 To assess the other needs of Togan area and the possible means 
for support and intervention.
2. The Mission and Data Collection:
    The mission to Togan area took place in the period between 17-20 
October 1997. The team was composed of two members from Amal Trust:

   Diab K. El-Zubeir , Country Office Administrator for 
        Eritrea.
   El-Hadi Abdalla Mohamed, Desk Officer for Development and 
        Humanitarian Emergency Operations, Main Office.

    The visit covered the villages of Togan, Talkuk, and Maman El-
Masgid as representative samples to the Togan area.
    The data collection methods included direct observation, semi 
structured interviews, and meetings with key figures in the area ( 
leaders and personnel of schools and health institutions . . . etc).

3. The General Characteristics:
    3.1 The Togan Area:
    This area lies at the Eastern borders of Sudan with Eritrea, c.e. 
75 km to the North-East of Kassala, it extends from Gadama-yeab in the 
North to Gir-Gir at the South. From the East its bordering Eritrea and 
is bordered by the Gash river from the West (near Aroma Town). The non-
government held area of Togan represent (70%) of the Hamishkoreeb 
District, 30% of it is still under the control of the Government 
including the religious town of Hamishkoreeb itself.

    3.2 The Land:
    The land in this area represent a vast valley crossed by several 
seasonal rivulets (the most famous ones are Togan, Talkuk, and Maman). 
There are several rocky mountains scattered in the North and South of 
the area as well.
    The climate of the area is semi-desert or poor savanna, with few 
scattered xerophytes, mainly acacia species. Seasonal grasses wilt 
shortly after the end of the brief rainy season. rain levels are very 
low (less than 400 mm annual precipitation).

    3.3. The Ethnic Composition:
    The population of the area is mainly composed of the Beja tribe. 
Within the Hamishkoreeb District there are (7) major sub-groups of this 
tribe, namely:

          1. El Gohabab
          2. El Jimailab
          3. El Williab
          4. El Himaisab
          5. El Gaidab
          6. El Bash-kwab
          7. El Beno Daynab.

    Within the non-government held area of Hamishkoreeb, targeted for 
Amal Trust operations, there are only three sub-groups of the sub-
groups mentioned above:

          1. El Jimailab: Their major concentration and residential 
        areas are in the villages of Elat Yot, Edarot, Talkuk, Gadama-
        yeab, and Kotanaib.
          2. El Bash-kwab: They are mainly in and around Togan and up 
        to Faghda.
          3. El Himaisab: Their population centres are in the areas of 
        Gir-Gir, Tumkeat, and their surroundings.

    3.4 Language and Religious:
    The main spoken languages in the area is the Bedaweet of the Beja, 
Arabic is spoken but not widely. The only religion is Islam.

    3.5 Population and Settlements:
    The population of the Hamishkoreeb District area is estimated to be 
68,000 people (including the Government held areas). The population of 
the non-government held areas of Togan is about 40,000 people. 
Population mobility is very high because of their pastoralist patterns. 
It is not surprising that movements to and from the government held 
areas and inside Eritrea do exist. Amal Trust, however, had started a 
population census to obtain accurate figure of the population based on 
the main settlement centres.
    There are two patterns of Settlements:
          a. The Religious Settlements (Masgid, sing.; Masgid, Pl. 
        Literally Mosque and Mosques).
    This is based on the characteristic religious education of the area 
i.e. that of Sheik Ali Betaye. The major sedentary settlements are 
called Masagid and are centred on a real mosque around which people 
live and get their religious education. The centre of the power and 
authority under this system is the Sheik, who is always a member of Ali 
Betaye family. Ali Betaye family ethnically belong to el Jimailab sub-
group of the Beja. The Beja formation, thus, is typical to the ethno-
political confederations of the Beni Amir and Tigre, who are both 
pastoralists, where the traditions of serfs and leaders are predominant 
characteristics.
    The main example to these mosque settlements are Talkuk el Masgid, 
Maman el Masgid, and Tehdaye el Masgid.
          b. The Nomads Settlements: These are temporary settlements, 
        usually around the seasonal streams and at the skirts of the 
        religious settlements.
    The nomads are in continuous movements in search for water and 
pasture for their animals.
    Generally speaking, there are (135) population centres (full list 
available), ranging from small nomadic settlements to religious 
villages. The major population centres of these, however, of the 
highest population that can be targeted by Amal Trust operations, are 
the following:

          1. Tehdaye
          2. Talkuk
          3. Maman
          4. Togan
          5. Elat-Yot
          6. Belestaf
          7. Gadama-yeab.

    Each of these major centres have several small settlements adjacent 
to it which are also going to be targeted for support. It is also 
necessary to emphasize that, the other areas which were not mentioned 
here are not going to be neglected by Amal Trust, although the 
organization will start its first phase of operation with the (5) 
centres mentioned above for clear practical reasons.

    3.6 The Economic Activities in the Area:
    Animal rearing and pastoralism is the major economic undertaking in 
the area. Animals include goats, sheep, and camels in addition to very 
few cattle. Agriculture is practiced at very small scale at the 
seasonal rivers' banks using diversion structures to flood the land. 
Main crop grown is sorghum. The main areas suitable for this type of 
farming are Maman, Elat-Yot, and Talkuk. Related to agriculture, there 
are small businesses of palm leaf products (mainly in Belestaf) which 
are usually traded at Kassala.


4. Infrastructural Services:
    4.1 Health Services:

        4.1.1 The Taikuk Hospital:
    The main health institution in the area is the Talkuk hospital. 
This hospital was established in 1982 by assistance from the Dutch 
government under the Kassala Area Development Activities (KADA), a 
joint project between the government of Sudan and the Netherlands. The 
buildings of this hospital consist of:

          1. Registration Room.
          2. First Aid Room.
          3. Pharmacy.
          4. Doctors Office.
          5. Dentist Office.
          6. Surgical Department consisting of sterilization room and 
        operations theatre.
          7. Men's ward.
          8. Women's ward.
          9. Incomplete children ward, (3) rooms.

    The inpatients capacity of the hospital is (57) beds (men's ward 
[16 beds], women's ward [16 beds], and children's ward [25 beds]). This 
is despite the fact that, currently there are only (12) beds in total, 
(6) in the men's ward and (6) in the women's ward.
    Before the conflict, the health staff of the hospital consisted of 
the following:

           1. (1) Medical Doctor.
           2. (2) Medical Assistants.
           3. (1) Medical Assistant for the laboratory.
           4. (1) Pharmacist.
           5. (1) Senior Nurse.
           6. (9) Nurses.
           7. (8) Attendants.
           8. (8) Midwives.
           9. (5) Guards.
          10. (1) Cook.
          11. (1) Electric Generator Operator.
          12. (1) Cleaner

    Apart from the Medical Doctor, all the hospital staff are from the 
local community and are still available in the area. The Medical Doctor 
had left during the conflict to the government held areas, taking with 
him the only Ambulance vehicle which was previously used for out-
reaching the scattered population of the area.
    All the health staff in the area are working now on voluntary basis 
and are supported by the local community in covering their living 
expenses.
    Provided that the hospital is rehabilitated, it can provide 
adequate services to the whole area especially under the current 
conflict situation. There is a need for some medical staff namely a 
Medical Doctor, Dentist, Assistant Ophthalmologist, Anathesia and S. 
Operations Technicians.
    This hospital was the only referral institution in the area. Now, 
after the conflict patients are referred to the Hospital of Kassala 
(within the government held areas) and as such the situation is 
becoming very difficult. The health staff interviewed during this 
mission, however, had indicated that the most important obstacle now 
for patients referred to Kassala is the lack of transportation.

        4.1.2 The Other Health Institutions:
    There are (5) Dispensaries within the non-government held area of 
Togan namely in Yodorot, Tehdaye, Elat-Yot, Maman el Masgid, and Gir-
Gir. All these PHCUs are constructed by brick and composed of two rooms 
buildings. Each of these dispensaries practically serves a population 
of over (10,000) people, as with the case of Maman where its PHCU 
serves the (1840) people residing in Maman in addition to about (9) 
small settlements (all listed) with estimated population of around 
(1,000) people each. During their operations, these dispensaries 
receive about 5060 patients a day. Each dispensary is run by one nurse, 
one health worker, and one attendant.
    There are also a number of Primary Health Care Units PHCUs under 
the supervision of these dispensaries namely in Adardaib, Maman 
Baimock, Hashanait, Gadama-yeab el Masgid, Gadama-yeab Ad Kinat, 
Rabsim, Kotayneab, Timaykeet, Beialambay, Togan, Belestaf, Hamt-yay, 
and Aladait. The PHCUs are constructed of local materials. Each PHCU is 
run by one health worker and an attendant.
    All these health institutions need furniture, medical equipment, 
renovation of buildings, and medicines in order to be able to provide 
the required services to the rural areas of Togan. The health staff who 
are all available, are striving at their level best to run these 
institutions with the minimal supplies they receive from time to time.
    Up to April '97 there was a vaccination programme for children 
every month. It was discontinued due to the armed conflict that led to 
driving all the government presence from the area.

        4.1.3 The Common Diseases:
    The common diseases in the area are Malnutrition, Malaria, 
Respiratory Tract infections, Eye Diseases, Dysentery, Gardiasis, TB, 
and the Anemia.
    The main causes for children morbidity are said to be diarrhoea, 
pneumonia, and malnutrition and are responsible for 50% of the children 
deaths, according to the Taikuk hospital officials.

        4.1.4 Medical Supplies:
    Since the liberation of the area, no medical supplies were received 
from the Government side. Few endeavors, however, were made by some 
NGOs to provide medical supplies to these institutions, these included 
provisions by:

          1. Beja Congress during the months of July and September '97.
          2. Amal Trust/Doctors of the World, during August '97.
          3. B. Cox of Christian Solidarity International, During 
        August '97.


5. The Water Supply:
    Apart from few shallow wells, the whole population of the area 
depend on the seasonal rivulets in their water supply. Usually the 
water can be obtained from these seasonal rivulets and streams from 
June and up to the end of October, after which time the sandy river 
beds dry, and the people had to go to the nearest village with a well 
to get their water. Some times the nearest village can be more than 20 
km as the case with Belestaf village where its people usually get their 
water from Taikuk during the dry period.
    As far as the wells are concerned, there are three wells in Taikuk, 
two of them used by men, and the third is reserved for women use under 
the religious settlement regulations. In Togan there is one well in the 
military camp which is now shared with the local population. The third 
village which enjoys having a well is Maman el Masgid, the hand pump of 
this well had broken down and at the time of this mission it was 
awaiting repair at the town of Tessenei.
    In Talkuk itself, there is an incomplete water project which needs 
only minor efforts for its completion. All the well, the water tank, 
and the pump are available to be installed. The requirements are seen 
as mainly an expert and small funds to mobilize the communal labour, to 
build an stand for the tank, to procure some metal pipes, and to 
establish small basin with taps. It is perceived that this project will 
contribute very much in solving the water problems of Taikuk and its 
close surroundings.
    Maman Bemock and Belestaf as well as all the other major settlement 
within Togan area, with exception of the above three villages, have no 
any source of potable water apart from the contaminated water of the 
seasonal streams, and as such have to share with these three villages 
the water during the dry season.


6. The Education Services:
    Its amazing that in the whole of the Togan area, and the 
Hamishkoreeb District as well, that girls have no access to education 
at all. The only form of education the women can have is the religious 
education which is carried at monosexual Koranic schools (khalwa), by 
women instructors, with the sole purpose of teaching Koran.
    There are about (7) schools in the non-government held area of 
Togan. These schools are namely in the villages of Taikuk, Maman, 
Togan, Tehdaye, Elat-Yot, Yedarot, and Gir-Gir.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                            School                              No. of Classes  No. of Teachers  No. of Students
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Taikuk.......................................................               8                2              216 
Maman........................................................               6                3              160 
Togan........................................................               5                2              150 
Elat-Yot.....................................................               5                2              100 
Yedarot......................................................               5                2              100 
Tehdaye......................................................               5                2              100 
Gir-Gir......................................................               6                3              120 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Total..................................................              40               16              946 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Before the conflict, and to attract the students to education, all 
these schools were run under boarding system, (3) meals a day were 
provided to the students.
    Under the current situation, however, such arrangement had become 
extremely difficult. The schools had commenced operation this month 
(October '97), the local community had provided minimum support for one 
meal a day (at least for Taikuk students). For instance, in the case of 
Maman School, the monthly requirements for the students hostel were 
estimated at 720 kg of wheat, Amal Trust had managed to provide 100 kg 
of wheat just to start the process. In Addition Amal Trust had also 
provided 100 students' notebook, and 100 pens, but still there is great 
need for more of these items to meet the requirements of the (150) 
students of this school alone.


7. Suggested Intervetion for Amal Trust:
    7.1 Rehabilitation of the Health Delivery System and the Water 
Sanitation

          7.1.1 The objective of this project is the rehabilitation of 
        the rural health services delivery units that can provide 
        direct and accessible services to the different villages in 
        Togan area. This has been identified as a priority need for the 
        following reasons:

                  a. The initial idea of rehabilitating the Taikuk 
                hospital was postponed due to the fact that, Taikuk as 
                a referral hospital does not have the capacity to cover 
                the health needs of the area without the support of the 
                rural units, nor it has the location that make it 
                always accessible to the remote villages.
                  b. In terms of staff, to rehabilitate the hospital 
                will imply looking for a medical doctor, Dentist, 
                Assistant Ophthalmologist, Anathesia and S. Operations 
                Technicians. And since there are no doctors available, 
                it is not expected that a hospital lacking these 
                medical staff will function properly. With regard to 
                the PHCUs and the dispensaries, all the health staff 
                who are originally from the local community are 
                available to run these services as soon as the minimal 
                support is provided.
                  c. Considering both Amal Trust strategy of a rural 
                development that should start from the periphery, and 
                the need for a sequential and gradual process of 
                rehabilitation, it is quite logical that the project 
                should start by rehabilitating the rural health units 
                in its first phase, then it can undertake the 
                rehabilitation of the hospital as a second priority.
                  d. In terms of feasibility, its also less costly and 
                more socially beneficial to rehabilitate the rural 
                health units than the hospital.

    This been the strategy, Amal Trust had discussed with the local 
community the suggested units for rehabilitation by the first phase of 
the project. The following units were agreed as appropriate both in 
terms ofthe available infrastructure, and the geographical coverage and 
accessibility to the local communities:

          7.1.2 The Suggested Dispensaries:

            1. Tehdaye Dispensary
            2. Maman Dispensary
            3. Elat-Yot Dispensary

          7.1.3 The Suggested Primary Health Care Units:

            1. Gadama-yeab PHCU
            2. Rabsim PHCU
            3. Timaykeet PHCU
            4. Adardaib PHCU
            5. Belestaf PHCU

    The rehabilitation of these health institutions will include:

          a. Renovation of the Buildings
          b. Supply of Medical Equipment
          c. Supply of Drugs
          d. Provision of basic furniture
          e. Meeting the personnel cost of the health staff

    The local community will participate in the construction activities 
as well as expected to maintain their support to the health staff.

    7.2 The Water Sanitation:
    In almost all the villages visited by the team, water born diseases 
were mentioned as one of the major problems added to the fact of 
difficulties associated with fetching the water itself. The objective 
of this project is to provide sources of potable water to the major 
population centre. To help in the eradication of the water borne 
diseases, to reduce the water fetching burden from the women, and to 
assist in the settlement of the population and the improvement of their 
living.
    This project will include:

          1. The installment of the water project of Talkuk.
          2. The establishment of (2) wells in Maman.
          3. The establishment of (3) wells in Tehdaye.
          4. The establishment of (3) wells in Togan.
          5. The establishment of (2) wells in Belestaf.

    The local population are also expected to contribute labour for the 
digging of the wells. While the technical expertise and inputs are 
expected to be provided by the project.
    It should also be stated here that, these water services are seen 
as part of the health programme. A complete water supply project for 
Togan are is been submitted by the Beja Relief Organization (PRO) to 
the Dutch InterChurch Aid for funding, therefore, the provisions of 
this project, here, could be seen as primary phase of that wider 
project.

    7.3 The Rehabilitation of the Educational Services:
    This is a short term programme with the aim of providing support to 
the initiative already taken to open some of the schools in the Togan 
area with local support. On the long run, Amal Trust would look into 
the possibilities of supporting all the schools of the area, as well as 
looking into women education. However, the emphasis of this project, is 
to see that at least (50%) of the schools in the project area could 
function adequately, without major problems and shortages, to the end 
of the school year.
    The same infrastructures will be used for opening Adult Education 
classes at the respective schools to be rehabilitated.
    The form of the support is suggested to include:

          1. Essential renovation of the buildings.
          2. Supply of Educational Materials and Aids (pens, notebooks, 
        pencils . . . etc).
          3. Support to the Teaching Staff (each school should have at 
        least 4 teachers).
          4. Support of the Students Hostels (at least 1-2 meals a 
        day). The requirements per student per day could be calculated 
        as follows:

          a. Wheat or sorghum: 200gm
          b. Lentils: 25gm
          c. Oil: 25gm

    The selected schools for this project include:

          1. Talkuk el Masgid School.
          2. Maman School.
          3. Togan School.

    It is expected that these three schools will accommodate at least 
(500) students since more students are expected to come from adjacent 
villages and other schools.
  7.4 Project Requirements:
    For Amal Trust institutionally to be able to implement this 
project, support will be needed for both its Logistics offices at 
Tessenei, and the Field Office in Togan.


8. Organizational Structure and Implementation Strategy:
    It is suggested that the structure of the project will take the 
form of partnership between Amal Trust and the local community in 
Togan. The characteristics of the local community and their 
implications will be considered in the structuring of the project form.

    8.1 Loqistics Office (Tessenei)

        8.1.1 Functions of the Office:
          a. Supervision of the programme activities at the field level 
        (Tokan).
          b. Monitoring, assessment, and updating function on the 
        situation on the border, and at the project area.
          c. Logistical support to the programmes in Eastern Sudan.

        8.1.2. Office Staff

          a. Office Manager
          b. Office assistant
          c. Office Secretary
          d. Office cleaner/guard

    8.2 Field Office (Togan)

        8.2.1. Functions of the Office:
          a. To implement Amal Trust programmes and Activities at the 
        field level.
          b. To monitor, assess, and update, by reporting, Tessenei and 
        the Country office on the developments, problems, and arising 
        issues at the project area.
          c. To mobilize the local communities for self-help 
        activities, and to identify further areas for intervention by 
        Amal Trust.

        8.2.2. Office Staff

          a. Project Coordinator
          b. Community Development Worker
          c. Office Administrator.

    8.3 Local Community Structures:
      Amal Trust had already established the link and services 
committees as follows:

          1. Taikuk Committee (5-members)
          2. Maman El-Masgid Committee (3-members)
          3. Togan: Unlike Taikuk and Maman, Togan people are not based 
        in one place, in fact Togan itself is a market and transactions 
        place whereas the people of Togan are scattered over many small 
        pastoralist settlements (Furgan, Local) around Togan. For 
        practical reason the area is divided into two:

                  3.1 Togan East Committee (7-members): Extends from 
                Togan to the East up to the Eritrean Borders including 
                the main areas of Gebrayeet Glabinyou, Gebrayeet 
                Serarat, Gebrayeet Silky, Angatait Serarat, and 
                Angatait Belait, around the valleys of Gebrayeet and 
                Angatait. It covers the sub-tribes of Semendowab, 
                Hamfey, Yousab, Araray, and Berkey.
                  3.2 Togan West Committee (6-members): Covering the 
                sub-tribes of Reddey, Hadedwab, Omdab, Bushariab, 
                Simdir, and Bushnab. Their area extend from Togan to 
                the west up to the Gash River.

          4. Belestaf Committee (5-members): It covers the sub-tribes 
        of Shokab (Khor Shagloba), Hisay (Kadab), and the Masmar.
    These are committees are formed from the local communities at the 
major population centres level. Their membership includes teachers, 
health workers, religious leadership, tribal leadership, and ethnic 
groups representation all of whom are influential in the local 
community mobilization.
    Each committee is selected with the consensus of the local 
community and local leadership. The role of these committees is 
expected to link the project with the local community, to represent the 
local community as far as the identification of needs, prioritization 
of problems, formulation of projects, and mobilization of the support 
of the local community in the implementation and management of these 
projects is concerned.
    Considering the ethnic composition of the population and their 
relationship with their traditional tribal-religious leaders, Amal 
Trust had already discussed the possible project with the 
Administrative Commissioner, who is also the ethno-religious Beja 
leader (Betaye Family), who had in fact pleaded for Amal Trust 
intervention and support to the rehabilitation and development of the 
area. He promised to provide all possible support for the 
implementation of this project.
    The support of this leader (in addition to the local community 
structures or committees) is thought by Amal Trust as quite vital in 
smoothing the implementation of the project and in gaining maximum 
community participation, and in ensuring the sustainability of the 
services. Without the consensus and agreement of these local leaders 
Amal Trust believes that it would be quite impossible to implement any 
activities in this area.


9. Monitoring and Evaluation:
    Amal Trust will develop a close monitoring and follow up system for 
both the process and impact of the intervention. The project will 
develop together with the local community a set of basic indicators for 
the project to be used both for the monitoring of the implementation 
and the impact of the activities and to be used for reorientation of 
the activities whenever proved necessary by the periodical evaluation 
results.
    While Amal Trust will initiate its own monitoring system, both at 
Tessenei and the Togan field office levels, it will strive to meet the 
monitoring requirements of its donor and partner NGOs and institutions 
to the possible level, and to incorporate them in its own system.
    In principle Amal Trust, in accordance with its transparency 
strategy, will avail all the monitoring and evaluation results for its 
activities, as well as those related to the general project area 
context (economic, military, security . . . etc.), to its partners. And 
in principle there Amal Trust welcomes that some of the monitoring 
activities to be taken by the partners as long as they are permitted by 
the local authorities (i.e. our third partners in such Cross-Border-
Operation), Amal Trust will do its best that the partners get such 
access which is quite necessary for reflecting its efficiency and for 
building solid bases for cooperation and continued support with its 
partners.


10. Estimated Project Budget:
    As far as the renovation of the buildings and the establishment of 
the wells is concerned, this budget figures are tentative, and are 
based on figures of a similar programme to be implemented in Menza, 
North of Blue Nile. More accurate figures could be obtained by a 
technical team upon reaching an agreement of support to this project.

                        Estimated Project Budget                        
                             (U.S. Dollars)                             
                                                                        
                                                                        
                                                                        
A. Capital                                                              
  1. Establishment of Tessenei Logistics Office........          21,200 
  2. Support to Togan Field Office.....................          10,800 
                                                        ----------------
          Sub-Total (A)................................          32,000 
B. Support Components                                                   
  B.1 Rehabilitation of the Health Services                             
    a. Renovation of the Buildings                                      
      @ 3 PHCU x 2,000 US$.............................           6,000 
      @ 5 Dispensaries x 1,000 US$.....................           5,000 
    b. Supply of the Medical Equipment.................          10,000 
    c. Supply of Drugs.................................          24,000 
    d. Meeting the personnel cost of the health staff                   
      @ 3 Nurses x 50 US$ x 12 months..................           1,800 
      @ 8 H. Workers x 35 US$ x 12 months..............           3,360 
      @ 8 Attendants x 25 US$ x 12 months..............           2,400 
                                                        ----------------
          Sub-Total (B.1)..............................          68,760 
  B.2 Water Sanitation                                                  
    1. The installment of the water project of Talkuk..           1,500 
    2. The establishment of (2) wells in Maman.........           5,000 
    3. The establishment of (3) wells in Tehdaye.......           7,500 
    4. The establishment of (3) wells in Togan.........           7,500 
    5. The establishment of (2) wells in Belestaf......           5,000 
                                                        ----------------
          Sub-Total (B.2)..............................          26,500 
  B.3 Rehabilitation of the Education Services                          
    1. Renovation of the buildings.....................           6,000 
    2. Educational Materials and Aids                                   
      @ Notebooks 3 x 500 x 0.5 US$....................           0,750 
      @ Pens 2 x 500 x 0.14 US$........................           0,140 
      @ Pencils 2 x 500 x 0.07 US$.....................           0,070 
      @ Posters and Markers............................           0,150 
      @ Chalk..........................................           0,150 
      @ Teachers Aids..................................           0,350 
    3. Teaching Staff                                                   
      12 Teachers x 12 month x 50 US$..................           7,200 
    4. The Students Hostels                                             
      a. Wheat or Sorghum (2OOgm x 500 students x 9                     
       months = 27.0 MT)                                                
        @ 27.8 US$ x 270 Quintals......................           7,506 
      b. Lentils (25gm x 500 x 9 = 3.4 MT)                              
        @ 66 US$ x 34 Quintal..........................           2,244 
      c. Oil (25gm x 500 x 9 = 3.4 MT)                                  
        @ 0.7US$ x 3400 kg.............................           2,380 
                                                        ----------------
          Sub-Total (B.3)..............................          26,940 
                                                        ----------------
            Total......................................         154,200 
            10% Contingency............................          15,420 
                                                        ----------------
            Total Budget...............................         169,620 
            Support to Amal Trust Main Office (7%).....          11,873 
                                                        ================
              Grand Total..............................         181,493 
                                                                        


                              Appendix (1)                              
                             (U.S. Dollars)                             
                                                                        
                                                                        
                                                                        
Tessenei Office Budget:                                                 
  A. Capital:                                                           
    1. Rent of the office 200 X 12.....................           2,400 
    2. Furniture.......................................           1,500 
    3. Motorbike.......................................           3,500 
                                                        ----------------
      Sub-Total (A)....................................           7,400 
  B. Office Equipment                                                   
    1. Computer and Printer............................           2,500 
    2. Communication Radio.............................           2,500 
    3. Stationeries....................................           1,000 
                                                        ----------------
      Sub-Total (B)....................................           6,000 
  C. Personnel                                                          
    1. Office Manager 250 X 12.........................           3,000 
    2. Office Assistant 150 X 12.......................           2,400 
    3. Secretary 100 X 12..............................           1,200 
    4. Office Cleaner/Guard 100 X 12...................           1,200 
                                                        ----------------
      Sub-Total (C)....................................           7,800 
                                                        ================
      Total............................................          21,200 
Togan Office Budget:                                                    
  A. Capital                                                            
    1. Construction of Office (local Materials)........           0,500 
    2. Furniture.......................................           1,500 
    3. Typewriter + stationeries.......................           1,000 
                                                        ----------------
      Sub-Total (A)....................................           3,000 
  B. Personnel                                                          
    1. Field Office Manager @ 250 X 12.................           3,000 
    2. Community Development Worker @ 200 X 12.........           2,400 
    3. Relief Worker @ 200 X 12........................           2,400 
                                                        ----------------
      Sub-Total (B)....................................           7,800 
                                                        ================
        Total Budget...................................          10,800 
                                                                        

                               __________


     E. Assessment of the Humanitarian Conditions in Eastern Sudan

                            1. Introduction

The Land and the People

Geographical Location

    The Beja region accommodates more than 3.5 million Beja people. The 
region extends from Aswan, Southern Egypt, in the North up to the 
Eritrean plateau and the plains of Massawa in the East and along the 
coast of the Red Sea into the Sudanese territories up to the Atbara 
area and along the Nile riverside as their Western borders.

Ethnic Origin and Composition

    The Beja are widely believed to be descendants from the Hamiatic 
people of Asia who crossed the Red Sea and inhabited their current 
location some 4000 years B.C.

    The distribution of the Beja as one ethnic group in the areas of 
Southern Egypt, North-East and Eastern Sudan, and the Eastern and 
Western lowlands of Eritrea, and before the setting of the current 
political boundaries of these states, is confirmed through the tribes 
that constitute the Beja ethnic group. The Beja are divided into 10 
distinct tribes namely El-Artega, El-Bushareyeen, El-Amar-er, El-
Ashraf, El-Kemailab, El-Hedandawa, El-Melhetkanat, El-Habab, El-Halanga 
and El-Beni-Amir.

The Beja of the Sudan

    The Beja of the Sudan occupy an area that extends from Halayeb in 
the Northeast along the Eastern borders of Sudan up to the Atbara 
river, and are bordered from the West by the river Nile. Their main 
population settlements are Halayeb, Tokar, Mohamed Goal, Hamash Koraib, 
Sinkat, Port Sudan, Karora and Kassala.

    The population of the Beja of the Sudan is estimated to be three 
million people.

The Ecological Description of the Beja Area

    The region of the Beja lies just above the (600) isohyet with 
rainfall ranging between 500 mm in the Southern parts, to 0.0 mm annual 
precipitation in the Northern areas. The coastal areas receive the 
winter rains between November and January in the range of 150-200 mm.

    The land is mostly bare and rocky with few scattered xerophyte 
vegetation namely Acacia ssp., Ziziphus spina christie, Prospis 
chilensis, and some wild cactus ssp., seasonal grasses are associated 
with the rainy seasons.

    The terrain is generally rough, mountainous and is crossed with a 
multitude of dried and seasonal rivulets. The Beja land is also crossed 
by two major rivers, Gash and Toker both bringing water and fertile 
soil from the highlands of Ethiopia and Eritrea, thus, their respective 
deltas and flood plains are considered to be among the most fertile 
schemes in Sudan. The climatic zones of the Beja areas thus, vary from 
dry savanna in the Southern parts, to a typical desert zone to the far 
North. It is generally characterized by very low temperatures during 
the night, and extreme hotness during the day.

The Nomadic Patterns

    The Beja tribes are mostly pastoralists with some of them 
practicing agropastoralism. Their pasture land and routes extends, as 
indicated by one of them, from Halayeb in the North-east of Sudan to 
the mountains of Rura Habab in the Sahel province of Eritrea. Their 
livestock consist mainly of camels and goats, which best suit the tough 
environment of the region. Farming is practiced at various levels along 
the pasture route as a supplementary activity.

    The nomadic pattern of the Beja, which necessitate a continuously 
mobile pattern of living characterized by the non-existence of 
permanent settlement forms--in most cases, has had its clear 
implications and consequences, historically, on the development of this 
ethnic group and that of the area they inhabit.

    This lifestyle has led to an underdevelopment of adequate 
infrastructural services such as health, education, . . . etc. This 
state continuously maintained by environmental pressures necessitating 
migrations in search of water, pasture, and farming lands, the aspect 
that put the Beja in a historical dialectic and a vicious circle of 
poverty, underdevelopment, and high vulnerability to external 
environmental elements.

The Historical Suffering of the Beja--An Old Plight, New Concern

    The present suffering of the Beja people is a result of a long 
process of deprivation and marginalization which has characterized the 
contemporary history of this group.

    This has been mainly due to successive mal-policies adopted by the 
various governments in Sudan which have neglected and overlooked the 
existence of the Beja, and possible negative impacts and adverse 
effects of these policies on their survival. Such policies include 
taking of vast grazing areas and their conversion into agricultural 
schemes, forcing the people to move with their animals into poor 
grazing land, mostly mountainous, areas of the Red Sea coast.

    The Gash and Tokar agricultural schemes stand as a conspicuous 
example for such depriving policies. Both schemes had taken land which 
was vital for the Beja in terms of resources and pattern of their 
economic activity. These areas used to provide the Beja with good 
pasture land and water for their livestock in their seasonal migration 
from East to West.

    Other plantation schemes in the Eastern region as a whole have also 
sprung up using intensive mechanization and taking large areas which 
were once a resort for the nomads and their animals. The horticultural 
gardens occupy all the land around the Gash river.

    The remaining areas, resource poor as they were, have also been 
used for building of roads such as the roads connecting the capital 
Khartoum with Port Sudan, coupled with the recent ongoing war and the 
economic decline nationwide, have aggravated the situation even more.

    Thus, the end result is a loss of wealth and impoverishment of the 
Beja people as well as accelerating environmental degradation and 
desertification. Both the land and its people have suffered 
tremendously from such mal-policies adopted by the different groups 
that have come to power in the contemporary Sudan.

    Some studies carried out in the area described a previous situation 
where animals were traded for sorghum and other consumer goods, and 
agriculture was also practiced along the seasonal wadies and khores. 
This practice no longer exist, the loss of natural pasture land 
combined with the drying-up of wells in the area, and the resent 
droughts have all led to the loss of livestock and the decrease of 
nomadism in the area. Accordingly, the area witnessed a large influx of 
rural people into the urban centres especially during the famine years 
of 1984, 85, 90, 93 and 1996. Large scattered settlements started to 
emerge around these urban centres indicating the magnitude of poverty 
and displacement that have since taken place within the Beja.

    Poverty, disease, hunger, illiteracy have all been permanent and 
persistent phenomenon and is characteristic of the Beja life during the 
last years.

                   2. The Present Political Situation

    A subsequent era in the process of deprivation and impoverishment 
followed, however, this time with marked differences in terms of 
methods and impact. This era also witnessed a growing concern, however 
limited, from the international community about the excessive human 
rights violations. The phase is closely linked to the present 
government of Sudan (GOS) practices and ruthless suppression of the 
Beja people.

    The attitude of GOS towards the Beja can be explained by political 
developments in the region in general and the Beja in particular. 
Presently the different fractions of Sudanese opposition opposing the 
Khartoum regime are operating from the Eastern Sudan border with 
Eritrea, an area which is dominantly Beja. The Beja after long periods 
of suppression have decided to take arms and revolt against this 
situation. Demanding economics and political rights. Consequently, the 
GOS reacted aggressively and indiscriminately against the whole Beja 
population in Sudan.

    This reaction in addition to other measures taken by the GOS has 
led to the displacement of a large number of people. Some of these 
measures and practices which have been reported by many concerned 
bodies and circles can be summarized in the following:



  I. Direct confiscation of the Beja land to be either sold or given to 
        other more favoured groups.

  II. Levy of heavy taxes, which lead to loss of the little possessions 
        people have.

  III. The GOS has detained, tortured and harassed many people accusing 
        them of assisting or being members of the Beja Congress.

  IV. Young men are taken by the thousands and sent to fight, against 
        their will, in the South of Sudan.

Situation of human rights in Sudan

(UN Commission on human rights in Sudan, April 1997)



    Recalling General Assembly resolution 51/112 of 12 December 1996 on 
the human rights situation in the Sudan and its own resolution 1996/73 
of April 1996, also on the human rights situation in the Sudan. Noting 
with deep concern reports of grave human rights violations and abuses 
in the Sudan, particularly detentions without trial, forced 
displacement of persons and torture, as described inter alla in 
numerous reports submitted to the General Assembly and the Commission 
on Human Rights--expresses its deep concern at continued serious rights 
violations by the GOS, including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary 
arrests, detentions without due process, enforced or involuntary 
disappearances, violations of the rights of women and children, slavery 
and slavery-like practices, forced displacement of persons and 
systematic torture, and denial of the freedom of religion, expression, 
association and peaceful assembly, and emphasizes that it is essential 
to put an end to violations of human rights in the Sudan.


    All accusations mentioned above, are confirmed by the Beja 
population, during my field visit in July 1997.

                 3. The Beja Relief Organisation (BRO)

    The Beja Relief Organisation (BRO) was formed in October 1996 by 
conscientious Sudanese nationals wishing to address the current plight 
of the Sudanese people in general, and of the Beja nationality in 
particular. BRO is registered in Eritrea as a non-profit making 
humanitarian and a political agency, having its headquarters in Asmara, 
and with field offices inside Sudan in areas liberated by the Beja 
Congress. The Beja Congress recognizes and extends full support to BRO 
in its operations to monitor, assess and assist the vulnerable Beja 
communities.

Objectives of the BRO

    BRO, as a relief association, aims to address all economic and 
social problems, created not only by the present regime in the Sudan, 
but also by the chronic effects of droughts and land degradation to 
which the region, as part of the Sahelian zone, has been exposed for 
decades. The initial and immediate objective of BRO is, however, to 
provide relief support to the Beja people suffering from the crude and 
rude policies of the NIF, and, thereby, contain and rehabilitate them 
in the land of their forefathers by arresting forced migration to 
neighbouring Eritrea and Ethiopia. As such, BRO has the following 
specific objectives;



     make the international community aware of the plight and 
needs of the Beja people,

     solicit material and financial assistance for relief 
programs from the international community on behalf of the Beja people,

     assume responsibility for the implementation of all relief 
activities in the Beja region, and

     mobilize activities designed to prevent man-made and 
natural disasters in the region inhabited by the Bejas.

Functions of the BRO

    As stated above, BRO functions as a humanitarian organisation 
working closely with all war-affected peoples of the Sudan. But, under 
the present circumstances, it gives priority to conducting relief 
operations to those Bejas in areas controlled by the armed wing of the 
Beja Congress; it, thus, assumes the following functions;



     formulate policies required to achieve the organisation's 
stated objectives,

     conduct surveys to detect signs of impending natural and 
man-made disasters in the Beja areas, and on this basis to formulate 
and implement preventive measures,

     negotiate and sign agreements with international and 
national organisations, on behalf of the Beja people, and implement 
approved relief and rehabilitation programmes and projects in agreed 
manner,

     conduct nutritional and food needs surveys and disseminate 
the results obtained to donor communities,

     prepare plans, and budget proposals regarding relief 
requirements for the Beja people,

     distribute relief assistance to the affected social 
sectors of the Beja population, and

     issue official statements, communiques and other documents 
pertaining to relief situation in Beja region.

Organisational Structure of the BRO

    In order to effectively bear its mandate and strengthen its 
capacity to fulfill its immediate objectives and functions. BRO is 
currently instituting an organisational structure that can reach most 
of the vulnerable groups of the Beja people through cross-border 
operations. At the same time, it is laying the ground for an eventual 
evolvement of the organisation into a rehabilitation and development 
agency. The General Assembly of Association, the supreme authority of 
BRO, has already elected its Board of Directors for a term of three 
years, which is responsible for general policy and other strategic 
guidelines. The Board of Directors, led by a Chairperson, in turn, has 
appointed the Secretary General, also for a term of three years, and 
vested with executive powers of the organization. There are three 
departments and one field coordinating office, viz., Finance 
Department, Relief Department, Projects' Department, and a Field 
Coordinating Office. The Field Coordinator, stationed inside the 
liberated areas, is responsible for Four Regional Offices set up to 
operate in the liberated areas of the Beja territory; these Regional 
Offices are located in Tahday, Ghedamayabe, Rabasien and Karora. The 
Field Coordinator will work in close collaboration with the Civil 
Administrator of the liberated areas already appointed by the Beja 
Congress.

                      4. Humanitarian Consequences

Food security

    During my field trip I visited the following villages: Tailkook, 
Tahadia Osies, Aladyoy, El Maskiet, Gadamayabe Elmasgid, Rabasien, 
Akedie, Ogmayate Elmasgid, Hashanate Elmasgid, Maman Biamoke, Manan 
Sharic, and Balhastuf.

    Traditionally the Beja are goat herders, although many still follow 
this way of life, some are also crop farmers. The economic crisis in 
Sudan has adversely affected the Beja. The majority of the people are 
depending on Sorghum for their staple food, and are very susceptible to 
a poor harvest, high inflation, and government taxes on produce.

    The totalitarian policies of the Sudanese government that has 
harmed the Beja in recent years are:

    (a) Discrimination, particularly in land ownership. The 
confiscation of prime land by the government has forced many previous 
owners to become tenants on their own land. They are subject to pay 
taxes to graze animals and on any produce sold.

    (b) The obstruction of humanitarian assistance to the Beja 
population in the Sudan.

    (c) Harassment and extortion of Beja Communities by government 
officials and military is reported to be widespread.

    The current fighting between the Sudan forces and the Beja Congress 
has escalated during the recent months. This has made the region far 
less secure for the Beja who are exposed to widespread destruction such 
as aerial bombardment, landmines, burning of villages by Sudan ground 
forces, looting, etc. This has affected the availability of, or access 
to, normal sources of food. People's lives and health are at risk 
directly from the destructive effects.

    The present situation is that the Beja in the liberated areas 
depend largely on wild fruits and their livestock. They are trapped 
between the Eritrean border and the front line, which also makes it 
impossible for them to follow their normal traditional nomadic pattern. 
The Beja Relief Organization (BRO) estimate 635,000 people live in the 
area, out of these, 35% of the, i.e. 222,250 are expected to be 
effectively displaced and requiring urgent relief support (see also 
food aid request from DIA, Head Office in Utrecht the Netherlands).

Discussions at village level

    In all mentioned villages above, we held discussions with the 
elders. In all discussions the same problems came up. First, the food 
situation, secondly, water, third, health and as last, housing. The 
food situation is very urgent, people are living on wild fruits and 
their last animals; they cannot cultivate, because the surrounding area 
is not suitable for cultivation and irrigation systems are not 
available. Beside the problems mentioned there are no farmers and 
little experience is available among them. Water is also a big problem, 
in most places they have to walk several hours to collect drinking 
water, most people are collecting surface water of poor quality. Health 
care is not available at all, the hospital in Tailkook is operating, 
but without any drugs. For many people shelter is a problem, in most 
cases they lack the money to buy the necessary building materials. 
Several villages have been bombed or destroyed by the Sudanese army and 
the people lost their housing, others had to escape their area and are 
in need for housing. The Beja are very proud people and they do not 
complain about their situation (but if no action is taken the situation 
of the people will become more difficult). Also mentioned is the 
complete lack of education for their children.

    Discussions with the different elders in the villages have made it 
very clear that humanitarian relief, at this moment, is the only way of 
survival for the Beja population in the liberated areas. With the total 
breakdown of the economic system, and the present frontline, which has 
stopped their normal pattern to migrate with the different seasons, 
they are no longer able to survive on their own resources. Money is 
hardly available among them. (The price for a goat is Birr 25.) Due to 
lack of water and fodder their livestock is decreasing rapidly and they 
do not have the funds to replace them. This will lead to starvation if 
assistance is not forthcoming.

    In the current situation there is little prospect to return to 
normality, let alone an improvement upon normality as long as they are 
locked between the frontline and the Eritrean border. They also made it 
clear that as soon as the situation changes, or their area will be 
extended, they hope that the international community is prepared to 
assist them to replace their lost animals, to avoid long dependency on 
relief food.

Water situation

    During my field visit it rained almost every day, which helps the 
Beja population to find water. Two main rivers are crossing the area, 
the Gash and Tokar. Both rivers are important suppliers of drinking 
water. All water collected by the population is surface water, which is 
of a very poor quality and in many cases the people, especially the 
children, are suffering from diarrhea. In the area there are no water 
pumps in working condition and with the dry season coming the water 
situation will make it impossible for the people to stay in this 
region.

Health situation

    The main pathologies in the region are: Malaria (hyperendemic), 
Respiratory tract infection, Conjunctivitis and night blindness (linked 
to vitamin deficiencies), Infected wounds, Arthritic diseases (linked 
to vitamin deficiencies), Diarrhoeal diseases (linked to poor drinking 
water situation), Intestinal complaints, and Snake bites.

    The only hospital available for the whole North Kassala region is 
located in Tailkook. This means that many people have to travel two or 
three days by camel to reach it. The hospital was built in 1982 with 
Dutch funding. Today the health care in the hospital is very limited 
due to the lack of essential drugs, staff, materials and diagnostic 
facilities. The limited medical service provided by the hospital is the 
only access people have to health care. The medical facilities in the 
surrounding villages are no longer in use, because there is no medical 
equipment or drugs available.

Shelter

    Except in the semi-urban areas, the Beja people are largely nomads 
practicing long distance migration in search of grass and water for 
their livestock. They live in tents made of mats, clothes, and tree 
branches. They call them Bedaygaw. The Bedaygaw can easily be 
dismantled and transported by camel between their wet and dry season 
camps. Since most of them live in hot areas where the annual average 
temperature is about 39-42 degrees centigrade, the Bedaygaw is 
constructed in such a way that a maximum of air flow is possible.

    The target population is about 250,000 people, the BRO estimated 
that out of these 250,000 people about 44,000 people are in need for 
shelter. In several areas the population is making the necessary mats 
from palm leafs and they were selling them in Kassala, but because of 
the economic boycott by the Sudanese government this is no longer 
possible. To activate the market again, the BRO wants to buy the mats 
and distribute them in other areas, where needed.

    This will partly bring the necessary cash flow back into the local 
economy. It will be much cheaper than imported tents. Although there 
will not be sufficient material available some tents should be 
purchased.

                           5. Recommendations

Food aid

    Out of the 250,000 people living in the areas controlled by the 
Beja Congress, about 90,000 people are in urgent need of food aid.

    Total needed for the first six months:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Six months' need                                    
                        Food items                                in MT           Price/Ton         Cost USD    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sorghum/rice..............................................             8,100            210.00      1,701,000.00
Edible oil................................................               408          1,300.00        530,400.00
Pulses (Lentils)..........................................               810            480.00        388,800.00
Powdered milk.............................................               810          2,005.26      1,624,260.60
Sugar.....................................................               408            340.00        138,720.00
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Total...............................................            10,536                        4,383,180.60
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



    It is requested to purchase the first two months supply locally.

Transport

    For the transportation of the above mentioned food, local transport 
in Eritrea can be hired from ERREC. For the transportation inside Sudan 
lorries should be purchased, if possible four wheel drive Mercedes. 
Secondhand or new.

    Current price information indicates that the minimum cost of 
transporting one ton of cargo by truck is approximately USD 0.14 per 
km. In total, transport cost to the border would amount to about US 
$737,520.00. In addition, as the experience of ERREC shows, loading/
unloading and other handing cost usually reach about 3% of the total 
transport cost, i.e., approximately US $22,126.00

    For the transport inside Sudan there are approximately 10 trucks 
needed, five in the North Kassala region and five in Karora region. 
Prices approximately US $40,000.00 per truck, secondhand price. New 
price for 4 wd Mercedes trucks US $95,000.00 per pcs.

Water project

    The water situation in the region in extremely difficult, beside 
some hand-dug wells along the river side, which are often open wells 
and made of poor material. They are susceptible to damage after each 
flood. Secondly, the total number of people living in the area at this 
moment is far more than during the normal situation. The water table is 
often more than 30-40 meters below the surface, which makes hand-dug 
wells impossible.

    Total price of the water project, including operation cost for one 
year, approximately US $1,500,000.00.

    Included in the water project there should be a training course for 
four Sudanese operators. The Beja Congress has a technical department, 
from this unit technical people can be selected.

Health project

    Danida, through LWF in Asmara, has provided the BRO with the 
requirements of a months supply of medicine and medical equipment. 
According to LWF they intend to continue supplying medicine for the 
first six months. This will help the BRO with their basic needs of 
medicine and some medical equipment. Beside the above mentioned 
supplies, medical training for their field personnel is urgently 
required. This training should be given in Eritrea, is possible in 
cooperation with the ministry of health in Asmara or any other 
organisation/NGO specialized in health care. At this stage it is 
impossible to give any budget figures.

Shelter project

    To stimulate the economic activities in the area controlled by the 
Beja Congress, local made mats should be purchased from the Beja, which 
can be used for distribution among the population in need for shelter. 
Total budget US $100,000.00. In addition, beside this local purchase, 
tents will be needed to provide shelter. Proposed is an Indian-made 
Bell tent, this is a round tent, which can be easily open at the sides 
and comes close to their own houses the Bedaygaw.



  Total budget one thousand tents US $155  1000 (US 
        $155,000.00)

  Local purchase of mats (US $100,000.00)

  Transport cost (US $20,000.00)

      Total US $275,000.00

Organisational support to the BRO

    The activities from the BRO are increasing daily, the 
responsibilities are beyond the current capacity of the organisation. 
Urgently needed is the following:

    (a) Transport, Two Toyota Land Cruisers, with anti-mine protection 
mats. US $80,000.00.

    (b) Communication equipment. US $30,000.00.

    (c) Office supplies for one year. US $10,000.00.

    (d) Running cost for the two field offices and main office in 
Asmara. US $25,000.00.



    Total request US $145,000.00
                               __________


    F. S. 873: Prohibition on Financial Transactions With Countries 
      Supporting Terrorism Act of 1997 (Introduced in the Senate)

      [Note: Chairman Helms was a co-sponsor of this legislation.]

                                 ______
                                 

                                                    105th CONGRESS,
                                                        1st Session

                                 S. 873

   To amend the prohibition of title 18, United States Code, against 
 financial transactions with state sponsors of international terrorism.

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             June 10, 1997

   Mr. Ashcroft introduced the following bill; which was read twice 
             andreferred to the Committee on the Judiciary

                               __________

                                 A BILL

   To amend the prohibition of title 18, United States Code, against 
 financial transactions with state sponsors of international terrorism.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
    This Act may be cited as the `Prohibition on Financial Transactions 
With Countries Supporting Terrorism Act of 1997'.
SEC. 2. FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS WITH STATE SPONSORS OF INTERNATIONAL 
        TERRORISM.
    (a) PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS--Section 2332d(a) of title 18, United 
States Code, is amended----
          (1) by striking `Except as provided in regulations issued by 
        the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the 
        Secretary of State, whoever' and inserting `(1) Except as 
        provided in paragraph (2) or (3), whoever';
          (2) by inserting `of 1979' after `Export Administration Act'; 
        and
          (3) by adding at the end the following:
    `(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply to any financial transaction----
          `(A) engaged in by an officer or employee of the United 
        States acting within his or her official capacity;
          `(B) for the sole purpose of providing humanitarian 
        assistance in a country designated under section 6(j) of the 
        Export Administration Act of 1979;
          `(C) involving travel or other activity by any journalist or 
        other member of the news media in a country designated under 
        section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979; or
          `(D) within a class of financial transactions, and with a 
        specified country, covered by a determination of the President 
        stating that it is vital to the national security interests of 
        the United States that financial transactions of that class and 
        with that country be permitted.
    `(3) Each determination under paragraph (2)(D) shall be published 
in the Federal Register at least 15 days in advance of the transaction 
and shall include a statement of the determination, a detailed 
explanation of the types of financial transactions permitted, the 
estimated dollar amount of the financial transactions permitted, and an 
explanation of the manner in which those financial transactions would 
further the national interests of the United States.
    `(4) The President shall submit a report to the Committees on 
Foreign Relations and Appropriations of the Senate and the Committees 
on International Relations and Appropriations of the House of 
Representatives and the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
containing any determination under paragraph (2)(D) at least 30 days 
before the determination is to take effect. Any such determination 
shall be effective only for a period of 12 months but may be extended 
for an additional period or periods of 12 months each.'.
    (b) DEFINITION--Section 2332d(b) of title 18, United States Code, 
is amended----
          (1) by striking `and' at the end of paragraph (1);
          (2) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); and
          (3) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following:
          `(2) the term `humanitarian assistance' includes, but is not 
        limited to, the provision of medicines and religious materials; 
        and'.
    (c) EFFECTIVE DATE--The amendments made by this section shall apply 
to financial transactions entered into on or after the date of 
enactment of this Act.

                               __________


     G. Executive Order Blocking Sudanese Government Property and 
                  Prohibiting Transactions With Sudan

                                                   The White House.
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release, November 4, 1997.
    By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and 
the laws of the United States of America, including the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the 
National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of 
title 3, United States Code;
    I, William J. Clinton, President of the United States of America, 
find that the policies and actions of the Government of Sudan, 
including continued support for international terrorism; ongoing 
efforts to destabilize neighboring governments; and the prevalence of 
human rights violations, including slavery and the denial of religious 
freedom, constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national 
security and foreign policy of the United States, and hereby declare a 
national emergency to deal with that threat. I hereby order:
    Section 1. Except to the extent provided in section 203(b) of IEEPA 
(50 U.S.C. 1702(b)) and in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses 
that may be issued pursuant to this order, all property and interests 
in property of the Government of Sudan that are in the United States, 
that hereafter come within the United States, or that hereafter come 
within the possession or control of United States persons, including 
their overseas branches, are blocked.
    Sec. 2. The following are prohibited, except to the extent provided 
in section 203(b) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)) and in regulations, 
orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this 
order:

  (a) the importation into the United States of any goods or services 
        of Sudanese origin, other than information or informational 
        materials;
  (b) the exportation or reexportation, directly or indirectly, to 
        Sudan of any goods, technology (including technical data, 
        software, or other information), or services from the United 
        States or by a United States person, wherever located, or 
        requiring the issuance of a license by a Federal agency, except 
        for donations of articles intended to relieve human suffering, 
        such as food, clothing, and medicine;
  (c) the facilitation by a United States person, including but not 
        limited to brokering activities, of the exportation or 
        reexportation of goods, technology, or services from Sudan to 
        any destination, or to Sudan from any location;
  (d) the performance by any United States person of any contract, 
        including a financing contract, in support of an industrial, 
        commercial, public utility, or governmental project in Sudan;
  (e) the grant or extension of credits or loans by any United States 
        person to the Government of Sudan;
  (f) any transaction by a United States person relating to 
        transportation of cargo to or from Sudan; the provision of 
        transportation of cargo to or from the United States by any 
        Sudanese person or any vessel or aircraft of Sudanese 
        registration; or the sale in the United States by any person 
        holding authority under subtitle 7 of title 49, United States 
        Code, of any transportation of cargo by air that includes any 
        stop in Sudan; and
  (g) any transaction by any United States person or within the United 
        States that evades or avoids, or has the purpose of evading or 
        avoiding, or attempts to violate, any of the prohibitions set 
        forth in this order.

    Sec. 3. Nothing in this order shall prohibit:

  (a) transactions for the conduct of the official business of the 
        Federal Government or the United Nations by employees thereof; 
        or
  (b) transactions in Sudan for journalistic activity by persons 
        regularly employed in such capacity by a news-gathering 
        organization.

    Sec. 4. For the purposes of this order:

  (a) the term ``person'' means an individual or entity;
  (b) the term ``entity'' means a partnership, association, trust, 
        joint venture, corporation, or other organization;
  (c) the term ``United States person'' means any United States 
        citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under the 
        laws of the United States (including foreign branches), or any 
        person in the United States; and
  (d) the term ``Government of Sudan'' includes the Government of 
        Sudan, its agencies, instrumentalities and controlled entities, 
        and the Central Bank of Sudan.

    Sec. 5. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the 
Secretary of State and, as appropriate, other agencies, is hereby 
authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules 
and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to me by IEEPA, as 
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order. The Secretary 
of the Treasury may redelegate any of these functions to other officers 
and agencies of the United States Government. All agencies of the 
United States Government are hereby directed to take all appropriate 
measures within their authority to carry out the provisions of this 
order.
    Sec. 6. Nothing contained in this order shall create any right or 
benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any party against 
the United States, its agencies or instrumentalities, its officers or 
employees, or any other person.
    Sec. 7. (a) This order shall take effect at 12:01 a.m. eastern 
standard time on November 4, 1997, except that trade transactions under 
contracts in force as of the effective date of this order may be 
performed pursuant to their terms through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard 
time on December 4, 1997, and letters of credit and other financing 
agreements for such underlying trade transactions may be performed 
pursuant to their terms.
  (b) This order shall be transmitted to the Congress and published in 
        the Federal Register.
                                William J. Clinton,
                         The White House, November 3, 1997.
                               __________


  H. November 4, 1997, Message to Congress Regarding Executive Order 
Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions With 
                                 Sudan

                                                    The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release, November 4, 1997.
    To The Congress of The United States:
    Pursuant to section 204(b) of the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1703(b), I hereby report to the Congress that I 
have exercised my statutory authority to declare that the policies of 
the Government of Sudan constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat 
to the national security and foreign policy of the United States and to 
declare a national emergency to deal with the threat.
    Pursuant to this legal authority, I have blocked Sudanese 
governmental assets in the United States. I have also prohibited 
certain transactions, including the following: (1) the importation into 
the United States of any goods or services of Sudanese origin, other 
than information or informational materials; (2) the exportation or 
reexportation to Sudan of any nonexempt goods, technology, or services 
from the United States; (3) the facilitation by any United States 
person of the exportation or reexportation of goods, technology, or 
services from Sudan to any destination, or to Sudan from any 
destination; (4) the performance by any United States person of any 
contract, including a financing contract, in support of an industrial, 
commercial, public utility, or governmental project in Sudan; (5) the 
grant or extension of credits or loans by any United States person to 
the Government of Sudan; and (6) any transaction by any United States 
person relating to transportation of cargo to, from, or through Sudan, 
or by Sudanese vessel or aircraft.
    We intend to license only those activities that serve U.S. 
interests. Transactions necessary to conduct the official business of 
the United States Government and the United Nations are exempted. This 
order and subsequent licenses will allow humanitarian, diplomatic, and 
journalistic activities to continue. Other activities may be considered 
for licensing on a case-by-case basis based on their merits. We will 
continue to permit regulated transfers of fees and stipends from the 
Government of Sudan to Sudanese students in the United States. Among 
the other activities we may consider licensing are those permitting 
American citizens resident in Sudan to make payments for their routine 
living expenses, including taxes and utilities; the importation of 
certain products unavailable from other sources, such as gum arabic; 
and products to ensure civilian aircraft safety.
    I have decided to impose comprehensive sanctions in response to the 
Sudanese government's continued provision of sanctuary and support for 
terrorist groups, its sponsorship of regional insurgencies that 
threaten neighboring governments friendly to the United States, its 
continued prosecution of a devastating civil war, and its abysmal human 
rights record that includes the denial of religious freedom and 
inadequate steps to eradicate slavery in the country.
    The behavior of the Sudanese government directly threatens 
stability in the region and poses a direct threat to the people and 
interests of the United States. Only a fundamental change in Sudan's 
policies will enhance the peace and security of people in the United 
States, Sudan, and around the world. My Administration will continue to 
work with the Congress to develop the most effective policies in this 
regard.
    The above-described measures, many of which reflect congressional 
concerns, will immediately demonstrate to the Sudanese government the 
seriousness of our concern with the situation in that country. It is 
particularly important to increase pressure on Sudan to engage 
seriously during the current round of negotiations taking place now in 
Nairobi. The sanctions will also deprive the Sudanese government of the 
material and financial benefits of conducting trade and financial 
transactions with the United States.
    The prohibitions set forth in this order shall be effective as of 
12:01 a.m., eastern standard time, November 4, 1997, and shall be 
transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal Register. The 
Executive order provides 30 days in which to complete trade 
transactions with Sudan covered by contracts that predate the order and 
the performance of preexisting financing agreements for those trade 
initiatives.
                                William J. Clinton,
                         The White House, November 3, 1997.
                               __________


    I. November 4, 1997, Remarks by Secretary of State Madeleine K. 
            Albright on New Economic Sanctions Against Sudan

                     State Department Briefing Room
                           Washington, DC, November 4, 1997

  As released by the Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State

    Secretary Albright: Good afternoon. I am here to announce that the 
United States has imposed sweeping new economic sanctions against the 
government of Sudan because of its continued sponsorship of 
international terror, its effort to destabilize neighboring countries, 
and its abysmal record on human rights-- including religious 
persecution.
    Under an executive order signed yesterday by President Clinton, 
pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Sudanese 
Government assets in the United States are now blocked. United States 
trade with Sudan is prohibited, as are most financial transactions 
between the United States and the government of Sudan.
    We take these steps because the government of Sudan has failed to 
respond to repeated expressions of concern, or to the imposition of 
lesser sanctions. Instead, it has earned international condemnation by 
persisting in its objectionable policies, causing us to conclude that 
more dramatic action is required.
    I stress that the new sanctions are targeted against the government 
of Sudan. They are not designed, nor are they expected to add to the 
hardships faced by Sudanese civilians. Since 1988, the United States 
has provided more than $650 million in humanitarian assistance to the 
victims of Sudan's civil war. And under the executive order and the 
licensing system it will put in place, humanitarian, diplomatic and 
journalistic activities will continue.
    The purpose of the sanctions is to deprive the regime in Khartoum 
of the financial and material benefits of US trade and investment, 
including investment in Sudan's petroleum sector. To ensure 
flexibility, the Administration will consider issuing licenses on a 
case-by-case basis for activities that are in the US interest.
    I hope that the President's action will contribute to a fundamental 
change of policy and behavior on the part of the Sudanese Government. 
We appreciate and share the concern that many members of Congress have 
expressed regarding this issue, and we will continue to consult closely 
with the Congress as we implement our policies of opposition to 
terrorism and support for democracy, law and human rights around the 
world.
    Thank you all very much.

                               __________


                       J. The Asmara Declaration

  The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) Conference on the Issues of 
                                Destiny

The Final Communique
    Friday, June 6, 1995.

    The NDA held a historic meeting in Asmara, the capital of the State 
of Eritrea, from June 15 to June 23, 1993. The conference, held under 
the banner of ``Issues of Destiny'', was attended by all the leaders of 
the political, trade unions, and military formations in the NDA as well 
as the national personalities, viz:
    (1) The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP);
    (2) The Umma Party;
    (3) The SPLM/SPLA;
    (4) The Union of the Sudan African Parties (USAP);
    (5) The Sudan Communist Party;
    (6) Trade Unions;
    (7) The Legitimate Command;
    (8) The Beja Congress;
    (9) The Sudanese Allied Forces;
    (10) and non-partisan national personalities.

    The Conference discussed the following issues:
    (1) stopping the War and restoration of peace;
    (2) the right of Self-determination;
    (3) religion and politics;
    (4) system of rule during the interim period;
    (5) programme and mechanisms for escalating the struggle to 
overthrow the NIF regime;
    (6) interim arrangements and responsibilities;
    (7) The Sudan of the future;
    (8) the structure of the NDA; and
    (9) humanitarian issues.
    The NDA convened its conference under difficult and severe 
conditions imposed by the NIF fascist regime on our people. The regime 
has devalued the dignity of the Sudanese citizen, destroyed the 
national economy, abused Sudanese foreign relations by threatening 
regional and international stability and by exporting terrorism and 
discord to the neighbouring countries and other countries in the world 
as well. The regime has amply demonstrated its bellicose nature by 
aborting all the peace initiatives and by intensifying the war in the 
South. The NDA would therefore like to re-affirm the continuity of the 
political, military and popular struggle against the regime.
    On the basis of the principles of the NDA, and by way of continuing 
the struggle of our people against successive dictatorships, and 
inspired by its experience in the consolidation of national unity, and 
fully believing in a new democratic system based on political pluralism 
and respect for human rights, the conference hereby resolves as 
follows:
A--Ending the War and Restoration of Peace
    1. The right of self-determination:
    (a) affirmation of the right to self-determination as a basic, 
original and democratic right of all peoples;
    (b) recognition that the exercise of the right to self-
determination shall bring the war to an end and shall facilitate the 
retrieval and consolidation of democracy, peace and development;
    (c) the right to self-determination should be, however, exercised 
under conditions of legitimacy, democracy and under regional and 
international supervision;
    (d) the areas affected by war are South Sudan, Abyei District, the 
Nuba Mountains and Ingessina Hills;
    (e) the citizens of Southern Sudan (within its boundaries as they 
stood on 1/1/1956) shall exercise the right to self-determination 
before the end of the interim period;
    (f) the people of Abyei shall be consulted, in a referendum to be 
held before the end of the interim period, to ascertain whether they 
wish to continue with the administrative arrangements within Southern 
Kordofan or to join Bahr El Ghazal. If the majority choose to join Bahr 
El Ghazal, then they will exercise their right to self-determination 
together with the citizens of South Sudan.
    (g) With regard to the Nuba Mountains and the Ingessina Hills, a 
political solution, aimed at removing the existing grievances in these 
two areas, shall be sought and implemented by the government of the 
day, after which a referendum shall be held, during the interim period, 
to ascertain the wishes of the peoples of these areas over their 
political and administrative future.
    (h) Affirmation of the NDA's commitment to the realisation of a 
just and democratic peace and unity based on the free choice of the 
Sudanese people, and a just and effective peaceful resolution of the 
ongoing armed conflict. In this regard, the NDA hereby announces its 
acceptance of the IGADD's Declaration of Principles (DOP) as 
constituting a reasonable and practical basis for achieving a just and 
lasting peace.
    (i) Affirmation that real peace in Sudan cannot be achieved by 
viewing the problem as the Southern Problem, but by comprehending the 
national origins of the problem.
    (j) Convinced that the national problems of Sudan cannot be solved 
except through a serious, open dialogue among all the national groups, 
and that the nature and history of the Sudanese conflict has proved 
that just peace and stability in the county cannot be achieved by 
military means.
    2. The Conference hereby affirms that all NDA members shall 
seriously work to adopt a common stand on the issues of the referendum, 
which are:

        (a) unity (confederal or Federal) and;
        (b) independence.

    (3) The NDA government recognises that the exercise of the right of 
self-determination, aside from being a human, democratic and peoples' 
right, is also an instrument for putting an immediate end to the civil 
war and for opening up a unique and historic challenge to build a new 
restructured Sudan of justice, democracy and free choice. The NDA is 
committed to leading the Sudanese to a successful exercise of this 
historic right.
B--Religion and Politics in Sudan
    (1) All human rights norms and standards enshrined in the regional 
and international human rights instruments, charters and covenants 
shall be deemed to be an integral part of any constitution of Sudan, 
and any law, decree, executive order or action or policy measure 
contrary thereto shall be null and void for being unconstitutional.
    (2) Laws shall guarantee full equality of citizens on the basis of 
citizenship, respect for the religious beliefs and traditions and 
without discrimination on grounds of religion, race, gender or culture. 
Any law contrary to the foregoing stipulations shall be null and void 
and unconstitutional.
    (3) No political party shall be based on religion.
    (4) The State recognises the plurality of religions and noble 
spiritual beliefs and is committed to ensuring a peaceful co-existence 
and interaction, equality and tolerance among religions and the noble 
spiritual beliefs. The State permits freedom of ``proselytisation'' by 
peaceful means and forbids compulsion or any act or measure which may 
lead to religious sedition, racial hatred in any place, forum or 
location.
    (5) The NDA is committed to upholding the dignity of the Sudanese 
woman and affirms her role in the Sudanese national movement and 
recognises her rights and duties stipulated in the international human 
rights covenants and instruments to the extent that they don't 
contradict religious tenets.
    (6) National enlightenment, education and cultural programmes shall 
be based on the commitment to the international human rights covenants 
and instruments.
C--System of Rule
    (1) The Sudan shall be run on a system of decentralisation during 
the interim period. The Transitional Constitution shall determine the 
distribution of powers and functions between the Central Authority and 
the regional entities.
D--The Decentralisation Act
    (1) Decentralisation shall be based on the distribution of the 
powers and functions agreed upon between the Central Authority and the 
Northern Entities on the one hand and between the Central Authority and 
the Southern Entity on the other and deferring the naming of the system 
to a later stage.
    (2) Local government systems and native administration should also 
be catered for in the Decentralisation Act.
    (3) The following factors should be considered in the 
decentralisation arrangements during the interim period:
    (a) redressing of grievances and removal of the causes of the war 
and the creation of an atmosphere conducive to national reconstruction;
    (b) ascertainment of people's wishes in various areas in the 
process of developing democratic structures; and
    (c) taking into account the economic circumstances of the country 
and the need for retrenchment.
    Emphasis shall therefore be on mobilisation of the masses, and the 
provision of adequate opportunities for popular participation in the 
democratic structures of the decentralisation arrangements.
E--On the Programmes and Mechanisms for the Intensification of the 
        Struggle to Overthrow the System:
    (1) Legitimacy of the armed struggle being currently waged by some 
formations in the NDA to overthrow the system. Armed struggle is by 
agreement one of the mechanisms for overthrowing the system.
    (2) Provision of the necessary support.
    (3) Establishment of a High Military and Political Committee to co-
ordinate and supervise the implementation of the programmes for 
intensification of the struggle to overthrow the system.
F--Interim Military and Security Arrangements
    The conference adopted all the recommendations made by the relevant 
specialised committee.
G--The Sudan of the Future
    To lay the foundations of the New Sudan, the conference adopted the 
following:
    (a) the economic programme for the interim period;
    (b) programme for foreign policy, regional and international co-
operation;
    (c) programme for the removal of the vestiges of the NIF regime;
    (d) Political Parties Bills;
    (e) Trade Unions Charter; and
    (f) Press and Publications Bill.
H--Humanitarian Issues
    The wrong-headed economic policies of the regime and its escalation 
of the war have aggravated internal displacement, heavily damaged the 
environment, and have created tragic conditions of life for the 
ordinary Sudanese citizen, especially the women. In addition to the 
war, instability, political repression and violation of human rights 
have driven thousands of Sudanese into exile. In pursuit of its 
commitment to the security and safety of the Sudanese people and their 
freedom of movement within and outside the Sudan, the Conference has 
adopted a practical programme for relief during the interim period, all 
in co-operation and co-ordination with the international community and 
the relevant establishments in Sudan.
I--Structures of the NDA and Amendment of the Charter
    The conference adopted the new structure of the NDA which consists 
of:
    (1) The Conference;
    (2) The Leadership Councilium;
    (3) The Executive Office; and
    (4) The General Secretariat;
    (5) Specialised Secretariats; and
    (6) Centres for the subsidiaries.
    The Conference also adopted amendments to the Charter in keeping 
with the changing political scene.

Signatures:
  1. Mohamed Osman El Mirghani, DUP;
  2. Dr. Omer Nur El Dayem, Umma Party;
  3. Dr. Colonel John Garang de Mabior, SPLM/SPLA;
  4. Eliaba James Surur, Leader, the Union of Sudan African Parties 
            (USAP);
  5. Tighani El Tayeb, Sudan Communist Party;
  6. Engineer Hashim Mohamed Ahmend, Trade Unions;
  7. Lieutenant General Fatih Ahmend Ali, Legitimate Command of the 
            Armed Forces;
  8. Mohamed al Tahir Abu Bakr, the Beja Congress;
  9. Brigadier Abdel Aziz Khalid, the Sudanese Allied Forces;
  10. Bona Malwal, independent Sudanese personality;
  11. Farouk Abu Eissa, independent Sudanese personality;
  12. Al-Wathiq al-Kameir, independent Sudanese personality; and
  13. Mansour al-Agab, independent Sudanese personality.
                                 ______
                                 

     National Democratic Alliance Conference on Fundamental Issues

Resolution on the Issue of Religion and Politics in the Sudan
    The National Democratic Alliance (NDA);
   Recognising that the relationship between religion and 
        politics has a direct bearing on nation-building;
   Aware of the reality of religious, cultural and national 
        diversity in the Sudan;
   Cognisant of the role of scriptural religious and noble 
        spiritual beliefs as sources of moral values and spiritual 
        tenets that can help promote tolerance, brotherhood, justice 
        and peaceful coexistence;
   Conscious of the terrible human rights abuses committed by 
        the National Islamic Front (NIF) regime through its diabolical 
        manipulation of religion to perpetrate genocide and ethnic 
        cleansing falsely in the name of jihad;
   Determined to achieve a just and lasting peace and national 
        unity based on justice and the free will of the Sudanese 
        people; and
   In adherence to the principle of non-exploitation of 
        religion for political purposes, hereby make the following 
        constitutional dispositions:
    1. All human rights norms and principle enshrined in regional and 
international human rights instruments and covenants shall be an 
integral part of the constitution of the Sudan, and any law, decree, 
executive order or policy measure contrary thereto shall be considered 
null and void and unconstitutional.
    2. All laws shall guarantee full equality of citizens on the basis 
of citizenship, respect for religious beliefs and traditions and 
without discrimination on grounds of religion, race, gender or culture. 
Any law contrary to the foregoing stipulation shall be considered null 
and void and unconstitutional.
    3. No political party shall be established on religious basis.
    4. The State shall acknowledge and respect religious pluralism in 
the Sudan and shall undertake to promote and bring about peaceful 
interaction and coexistence, equality and tolerance among religious and 
noble spiritual beliefs, and shall permit peaceful religious 
proselytisation and prohibit coercion in religion, or the perpetration 
in any place, forum or location in the Sudan of any act or measure 
intended to arouse religious sedition or racial hatred.
    5. The NDA undertakes to preserve and promote the dignity of the 
Sudanese woman, and affirms her role in the Sudanese national movement 
and her rights and duties as enshrined in international instruments and 
covenants without prejudice to the tenets of prevailing religious and 
noble spiritual beliefs.
    6. National programmes in the fields of information, education and 
culture shall be formulated and disseminated in accordance with the 
regional and international instruments and covenants on human rights.

Signed:
  1. Democratic Unionist Party
  2. Umma Party
  3. Sudan Communist Party
  4. Union of Sudan African Parties
  5. Sudan People's Liberation Movement & Sudan People's Liberation 
            Army
  6. Trades Unions
  7. Legitimate Command
  8. Sudanese Alliance Forces
  9. Independent National Personalities
Resolution on the Issue of Self-Determination
Preamble:
            The National Democratic Alliance
   Deeply committed to an immediate ending of the current armed 
        conflict through a just and lasting settlement;
   Fully aware that the attainment of such a just and lasting 
        settlement requires political courage, statesmanship and 
        farsightedness on the part of the leadership of its constituent 
        members;
   Convinced that our preferred option is unity, based on 
        diversity, and the recognition that the Sudan is a multi-
        ethnic, multi-religious, multi-cultural and multi-linguistic 
        country, and that this unity shall also be based on the right 
        of citizenship and equality in rights and responsibilities in 
        acoordance with the norms and standards enshrined in 
        international conventions on human rights;
   Fully cognizant of the fact that the unity of the Sudan 
        cannot be durably based on force or coercion, but on justice 
        and the free consent of all the various groups in the Sudan;
   Conscious of the existence of other issues and problems 
        caused by the interaction among tribes living in contiguous 
        areas, which problems and issues shall be addressed and 
        resolved during the national constitutional conference; and
   Mindful of the fact that the resolution of the present 
        Sudanese conflict requires a comprehensive approach in order to 
        bring peace and justice to all the marginalised people of the 
        Sudan and build the New Sudan; hereby:
    I. 1. Affirms that the right of self-determination is a basic 
human, democratic and people's right which may be exercised at any time 
by any people.
    2. Recognizes that the exercise of the right of self-determination 
constitutes a solution to the on-going civil war, and facilitates the 
restoration and enhancement of democracy in the Sudan.
    3. Affirms that this right shall be exercised in an atmosphere of 
democracy and legitimacy and under regional and international 
supervision.
    4. Affirms that the areas afflicted by war are Southern Sudan, 
Abyei District, the Nuba Mountains and Ingessena Hills.
    5. Declares that the people of Southern Sudan (within its borders 
as they stood on 1.1.1956) shall exercise the right of self-
determination before the expiration of the interim period.
    6. Resolves that the views of the people of Abyei District as 
regards their wish to either remain within the administrative set up of 
Southern Kordofan region or join Bahr El Ghazal region shall be 
ascertained in a referendum to be held within the interim period but 
before the exercise of the right of self-determination for the South. 
If the outome of the referendum establishes that the majority of the 
people of this district wish to join Bahr El Ghazal, the people of 
Abyei shall accordingly exercise the right of self-determination as 
part of the people of Southern Sudan.
    7. Resolves that with respect to the Nuba Mountains and Ingessena 
Hills, a political solution to redress the injustices suffered by the 
people of these areas shall be sought by the interim government and 
that a referendum to ascertain their views on their political and 
administrative future shall be organized and carried out within the 
interim period.
    8. Reaffirms its commitment to a just peace, democracy and unity, 
based on the free will of the people of the Sudan, and to resolving the 
present conflict by peaceful means through a just and lasting 
settlement. To this end the NDA endorses the IGADD Declaration of 
Principles (DOP) as a viable basis for such a just and lasting 
settlement.
    9. Reiterates that true peace in the Sudan cannot be viewed within 
the framework of the problem of the South but rather from the 
standpoint that our problem is of a national origin.
    10. Affirms that our national problems cannot be solved except 
through clear, serious and continuous dialog among all Sudanese 
national groups.
    11. Asserts that the nature and history of the Sudanese conflict 
has proved that permanent peace and stability in the country can not be 
achieved through a military solution.
    II. The constituent members of the NDA shall adopt a common stand 
on the options to be presented in the referendum in the South, which 
options shall be (a) unity (confederation/federation) and (b) 
independent statehood.
    III. The NDA affirms that the Central Authority shall within the 
interim period devise and implement the necessary confidence-building 
measures and the appropriate restructuring of the State and socio-
economic institutions and processes, so that the exercise of the right 
of self-determination could have the best chances of upholding the 
unity option.

Signed:
  1. Umma Party
  2. Sudan Communist Party
  3. Union of Sudan African Parties
  4. Sudan People's Liberation Movement & Sudan People's Liberation 
            Army
  5. Trades Unions
  6. Legitimate Command
  7. Sudanese Alliance Forces
  8. Independent National Personalities
                                 ______
                                 
Resolution on the System of Rule
    Whereas the Sudan has been in a State of war against itself for 
four decades,
    Whereas this unremitting war is a result of historical injustices 
with political, economic, social, cultural, religious and 
administrative dimensions; and
    Whereas the continuation of war throughout this period has created 
a great mistrust among compatriots; and
    Whereas the hegemony of the Centre (Khartoum) on most regions in 
the Sudan has led to the perpetuation of underdevelopment in, and 
marginalization of, those regions; and
    Whereas the National Democratic Alliance, representing the Sudanese 
people in the South, North, East and West is determined to remove all 
historical injustices and eliminate all causes of war in order to 
create conditions conducive to the birth of a new Sudan united through 
the free will of its people and in which every citizen shall enjoy 
peace, security and happiness; and
    Whereas the creation of those conditions requires the adoption of 
all political and administrative measures necessary to restore 
confidence,

Decided:
    1. The Sudan shall be ruled in the interim period as a 
decentralized state. The powers and competence of the central authority 
and decentralized entities shall be provided for in the constitution.
    2. Immediate attention should be given, in view of the nature of 
the interim period, to the definition of those powers, leaving the 
appellation of the entities to a later date.
    3. The NDA shall give due consideration, in promulgating 
decentralization laws, to the role of local government and native 
administration within the new set-up.
    4. Due regard should be given in the regional administrative 
divisions to:
    (a) the wishes of the people in accordance with democratic 
processes,
    (b) keeping in mind that the division of power between the Centre 
and the Entities at this critical point of our history is meant to end 
historical injustices that have led to war and marginalization, restore 
confidence and consolidate peace, stability and a unity based on 
people's free will.
    5. In view of the difficult economic conditions of the country 
administrative costs of decentralization should be reduced to the 
minimum necessary.
Powers of Entities in Northern Sudan
    The legislative and executive organs of Northern Regional Entities 
shall have competence over:
    1. Economic planning in alignment with national development plans
    2. Finance including the levying and collection of taxes (according 
to an agreed upon schedule)
    3. Telecommunication (within the Entity)
    4. Town planning and construction of feeder roads
    5. Police, prisons, fire brigade and game wardens
    6. Promotion of local culture and arts
    7. Health services
    8. Education up to higher secondary level
    9. Industry, intra-Entity commerce and supply
    10. Agriculture, forests, pastures and plant protection
    11. Animal wealth and fisheries
    12. Sustainable land use and development
    13. Water use with due regard to national water policies and 
international obligations
    14. Intra-Entity river, land and air transport
    15. Radio, television and print media within the Entity
Powers of Central Authority (CA) Vis-a-vis Northern Entities (NE)
    1. National defence and national security
    2. Foreign affairs and regional and international cooperation
    3. Nationality, passports, immigration and aliens
    4. Auditor General
    5. Judiciary, attorney generalship and regulation of private legal 
practice
    6. Currency and coinage
    7. Regulation of interstate waterways and national electricity grid
    8. Mineral resources without prejudice to the right of the host 
Entity to fix a reasonable percentage of the returns of the revenue 
accruing from the exploitation of that resource
    9. Customs and foreign trade excepting of borders trade
    10. Commission for National Elections
    11. National Education Planning
    12. National Health Planning
    13. National Economic Planning
    14. National census (Concurrent)
    15. Railways
    16. Regulation of river and air transport
    17. Levying and collection of taxes (according to the established 
schedule)
    18. Posts and telecommunication
    19. Weights and measures
    20. National statistics
    21. National Radio and Television and regulation of technical 
matters pertaining to radio and television stations in the Entities
    22. Higher education
    23. Any other power that is not specifically allocated to the 
Entity
Concurrent Powers (CA & NA)
    1. Environment protection
    2. Water use
    3. Economic development planning
            Institute of NE
    Legislative:
    Executive: made up of Governor, Executive Council and Secretariat
Competence of the Southern Entity (SE)
    The legislate and executive organs of the SE shall have competence 
on following matters:
    1. Maintenance of peace security and good governance
    2. Police, prison wardens, game wardens, fire brigade
    3. SPLA armed forces in accordance with the interim military and 
security arrangement
    4. Agriculture, forestry, pastures and fisheries
    5. Animal husbandry
    6. Industry
    7. Wildlife and tourism
    8. Commission for Elections within the SE
    9. Water use without prejudice to international obligations and 
national policies
    10. Administration of justice including the establishment, 
maintenance and organization of courts and attorney generalship
    11. Exploration, developments and management of non-renewable 
natural resources subject to arrangements with the CA over taxation, 
revenue sharing and development needs of disadvantaged regions
    12. Radio and TV and print media
    13. Art and culture
    14. Education up to senior secondary school level
    15. Levying and collection of taxes according to agreed upon 
schedule
    16. Intra-entity commerce and supply
    17. Intra-entity water, land and air transport
    18. Intra-entity telecommunication
    19. Trade with neighbouring countries and levying of customs on 
goods entering SE from those countries
    20. Personal law, property law and the incorporation, registration 
licensing of companies
    21. Public health services
    22. Any other issue that does not come under the competence of CA 
and under concurrent powers
Section B
            Special Dispositions:
    1. For the purpose of reconstruction and rehabilitation the SE 
shall solicit financial and material assistance from, and conclude 
cultural and economic agreements with, the international community and 
foreign entities.
    2. SPLA Forces shall remain in the SE under their present command 
and subject to the authority and overall command of the SE government 
and in accordance with the interim security and military arrangements. 
The government of the SE shall discuss with the CA the formation, 
functions and composition of the National Security Council after a 
common understanding over national security and threats to it has been 
achieved.
Concurrent Powers (between CA and SE)
    1. Environmental protection
    2. Reconstruction in the war-affected areas and rehabilitation of 
the war disabled
    3. Higher education
    4. Licensing and regulation of private professional practice
    5. Cost of translation of official proceedings, documents, notices, 
minutes
    6. Location and establishment of CA courts
            Institutions of SE
    1. Legislature
    2. Executive: made up of President, Cabinet and Secretariat
    3. Judiciary up to the supreme court of the Entity
            Competence of CA vis-a-vis Southern Entity
    1. National defence subject to interim security arrangements
    2. Foreign affairs as qualified by the special powers given to the 
SE in relation to mobilization of resources for reconstruction and 
rehabilitation
    3. (CA) judiciary
    4. Currency and coinage
    5. Foreign trade subject to qualifications regarding trade with 
neighbouring countries
    6. Coordination of national economic policy
    7. Coordination of national health policy
    8. Railways
    9. National electricity grid
    10. Levying and collection of taxes (according to schedule)
    11. Posts and telecommunication
    12. Weights and measures
    13. Supervision of national Radio and regulation of national TV and 
Print media
    14. Regulation of radio and television stations within the Entities
    15. Civil Aviation and ports
            Subject to 3 Requirements
    1. Institutions which exercise competence over these powers should 
be restructured in terms of personnel, orientation and functions so as 
to effectively reflect the decentralized and pluralistic character of 
the Sudan.
    2. Decentralization of those institutions dealing with 
naturalization, immigration, passports and visas so that they are 
reasonably accessible to citizens all over the Sudan.
    3. Decentralization and deconcentration of development and 
financial institutions and services.
            Interim Period
    The interim period shall be 4 years starting from the day of the 
official inauguration of the interim government.

Signed:
  1. Democratic Unionist Party
  2. Umma Party
  3. Sudan Communist Party
  4. Union of Sudan African Parties
  5. Sudan People's Liberation Movement & Sudan People's Liberation 
            Army
  6. Trades Unions
  7. Legitimate Command
  8. Sudanese Alliance Forces
  9. Independent National Personalities