Department of Homeland Security

Border Security
Metrics Report: FY 2023

January 8, 2025

Message from the Assistant Secretary for Border and Immigration Policy in the Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans

The "Department of Homeland Security Border Security Metrics Report" is submitted pursuant to the Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which directs that "Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary [of Homeland Security] shall develop metrics, informed by situational awareness, to measure the effectiveness of security" between ports of entry, at ports of entry, in the maritime environment and to measure the effectiveness of the aviation assets and operations of Air and Marine Operations of U.S. Customs and Border Protection. The Act further directs the Secretary to annually assess, report, and implement the specified metrics.

The outcome-based performance metrics called for by the Act are the most comprehensive, rigorous set of border security metrics required of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to date. DHS has developed processes and procedures to collect and analyze essential data to meet most, but not all, of the Act's requirements. This FY 2023 report (with FY 2022 data) includes one new proxy measure for an unavailable metric and identifies three metrics that are still unavailable. DHS commits to continuing efforts to comply with all the measures of the Act.

Thank you for your continuing support and commitment to strengthening the operating effectiveness of DHS.

Pursuant to congressional requirements, this notification is being provided to the following Members of Congress:

> The Honorable Rand Paul
> Chairman, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
>
> The Honorable Gary C. Peters
> Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
>
> The Honorable Mark E. Green
> Chairman, House Committee on Homeland Security
>
> The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson
> Ranking Member, House Committee on Homeland Security

Inquiries relating to this report may be directed to the DHS Office of Legislative Affairs at (202) 447-5890.

Sincerely,

Royce B. Murray
Assistant Secretary
Border and Immigration Policy
Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans

DHS Border Security Metrics Report: FY 2023

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I. LEGISLATIVE LANGUAGE

Section 1092 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2017, signed into law December 23, 2016, directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to provide specific "Metrics for Securing the Border Between Ports of Entry," "Metrics for Securing the Border At Ports of Entry," "Metrics for Securing the Maritime Border," and "Air and Marine Security Metrics in the Land Domain" annually to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate. The NDAA further directs that the Secretary, "in accordance with applicable privacy laws, make data related to apprehensions, inadmissible aliens, drug seizures, and other enforcement actions available to the public, law enforcement communities, and academic research communities."[1]

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[1] Throughout this report, all references to the NDAA are to the FY 2017 NDAA, unless otherwise noted.

II. INTRODUCTION

This report, as directed by the FY 2017 NDAA, describes the efforts of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS or the Department) to measure its border security inputs, outputs, and outcomes. These metrics are essential to the effective and efficient management of border security by the Department, including management of new and ongoing activities and investments in border enforcement as the administration implements President Biden's comprehensive plan for orderly migration.

Comprehensive and rigorous performance management data provide Departmental leadership with the foundation to support responsible, evidence-based decision-making for resource allocation and investments and for operational and mission management. Further, DHS implementation of this approach provides unifying goals under the Department's mission to secure and manage U.S. borders. Ultimately, the border security metrics described in this report are designed to assess the ability of the Department's border security policies and investments to achieve these goals.

For analytic purposes, the metrics included in this report may be divided into three categories:

- Inputs: Resources acquired or expended to secure the border. Examples of border security inputs include the number of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Office of Field Operations (OFO) officers and U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) agents deployed, border infrastructure, and number of aircraft committed to the border security mission.

- Outputs: Specific actions taken to secure the border. Examples of border security outputs include border crossers apprehended, travelers admitted or denied admission at ports of entry (POEs), asylum seekers identified and referred for U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) protection screenings, and weight of narcotics seized. Outputs may also be defined as rates, such as the rate at which intending unlawful border crossers are apprehended or interdicted, and the accuracy of screening results for travelers and goods at POEs.

- Outcomes: The ultimate impacts of border security policies. The most important border security outcomes are the numbers of unlawful entries and quantities of illegal goods entering the United States, and the ease with which lawful travelers and goods pass through POEs.

In general, border security inputs and outputs are directly observable and can be measured with a high degree of reliability. Policymakers have direct control over resource allocation and data on inputs are available in budget and acquisitions documents. Operational agencies also track enforcement activities as part of their case management process. In short, the Department knows exactly how many agents it deploys, how many noncitizens[2] it apprehends, and how many

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[2] This report uses the word "noncitizen" to refer to individuals described under section 101(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Where "alien" was originally used in a title, statutory language, or name, it has been kept as such.

travelers it admits. *Input* and *output metrics* tend to provide insight into the level and type of enforcement effort undertaken—what the Department is doing—that are useful for workload management and tactical decision-making; but in and of themselves these metrics typically provide limited insight into the state of border security.

Outcome metrics often provide more insight than inputs and outputs when it comes to evaluating border security and may be powerful tools for policy and program evaluation. Many outcome metrics are difficult to measure directly because the whole universe of cases is not observed; for example, some intending border crossers evade detection and the full population of successful unlawful border crossers can never be measured directly. This challenge is nearly universal when measuring unlawful activities, which is why law enforcement agencies typically rely on output measures, such as crime reports, as indicators of total criminal activities, for example. Measuring border security outcomes is also difficult because of the diversity and complexity of the enforcement mission along the United States' 6,000 miles of land borders, 95,000 miles of coastline, and 350 POEs. Moreover, enforcement outcomes only partially depend on border security policies, since immigration flows also reflect numerous factors outside of enforcement agencies' control, including the broader set of U.S. immigration laws and policies, as well as numerous economic, demographic, and other structural factors in both countries of origin and the United States.

Historically, DHS and the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) addressed these measurement challenges by relying on noncitizen apprehensions (an output metric) as a proxy measure of unlawful entries between POEs (an outcome metric). More recently, CBP and DHS initiated new strategies to better understand and model unknown flows. These efforts have focused primarily on border security between POEs in the land domain (NDAA § 1092(b)), a domain that has been identified by Congress and the last several administrations as a top enforcement priority.

Our research and reporting continue to be refined as we update modeling methods, validate modeling assumptions, and quantify uncertainty around new estimation techniques. The Department continues to include measures of statistical uncertainty around metrics of the partial apprehension rate (PAR) and the sensitivity of DHS model-based estimates of unlawful entries. In addition, many of the metrics in this report remain limited to the Southwest Border. The Department's future work on border metrics will continue to refine these new indicators of border security between POEs and possibly expand data collection and methodologies to the Northern Border, while also developing additional indicators of border security, including those still identified as incomplete in this report.

Consistent with previous versions of the Border Security Metrics Report (BSMR), this FY 2023 report includes data running through the end of FY 2022.[3] Primarily due to the Coronavirus Disease of 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, many of the data related to border apprehensions reflect a steep drop in apprehensions and admissions through POEs occurring in 2020 compared to other years.

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[3] Throughout the rest of this report, years refer to the federal fiscal year (October 1–September 30), unless otherwise noted.

The DHS Office of Homeland Security Statistics (OHSS) model's estimates, referred to as the repeated trials model (RTM), were not provided for 2021 and are not provided for 2022 due to lack of survey data from the Government of Mexico's "La Encuesta sobre Migración" en la Frontera Norte De México (EMIF Norte, referred to as simply EMIF). The COVID-19 pandemic caused numerous challenges conducting surveys during calendar years 2020 to 2022. Survey operations were suspended from April 2020 to June 2020, as well as most of 2021 and 2022, while other months in 2020 had limited data collection. This resulted in 2020 RTM model-based estimates being heavily weighted towards Q1 data, while the lack of survey responses made estimating 2021 and 2022 deterrence rates and partial apprehension rates unfeasible using the current methodology. Imputation methods were considered but would have required untested assumptions and overextrapolation.

We include estimates from the RTM model in Table 1 and Figures 2, 4, 6, 7, and 8, though these are not available from 2021 onwards. Depending on data availability, these tables and figures include a mix of data from the RTM model, CBP observational estimates, and a new working estimation methodology (described later in the report), or they are marked as unavailable.

Pursuant to the NDAA, this report covers a mix of input, output, and outcome metrics between POEs, at POEs, in the maritime domain, and with respect to air and marine security in the land domain for 2022. This report includes the following information for each border security metric:

- Definition of the metric and a brief description of how the metric contributes to the Department's understanding of border security;
- Discussion of the Department's current methodology for producing the metric and related methodological limitations; and
- Statistics for 2022, along with historical statistics where possible, and brief discussion of implications for the current state of border security.

The following sections of this report provide this information for each metric directed by the NDAA. In addition to the specific metrics identified in NDAA § 1092(b)–(e), this report includes supplemental metrics that inform the Department's assessment of the state of border security between POEs, as directed by NDAA § 1092(g)(3)(D).

Numbers in the text of this report are rounded to the nearest hundred (for numbers between 1,000 and 10,000) or nearest thousand (for numbers between 10,001 and 1 million). To protect privacy, table cells are rounded to the nearest ten in all tables and figures that could potentially reveal personal identification.

III. SEC. 1092 BORDER SECURITY METRICS

§ 1092(b) METRICS FOR SECURING THE BORDER BETWEEN PORTS OF ENTRY

§ 1092(b)(1)(A)(i) Attempted unlawful border crosser apprehension rate

Definition

In general, the attempted unlawful border crosser apprehension rate is defined as the proportion of attempted border crossers apprehended by USBP:

$$Apprehension\ Rate = \frac{Apprehensions}{Unlawful\ Entry\ Attempts}$$

The apprehension rate is an output metric that describes the difficulty of unlawfully crossing the border successfully.

Unlike interdiction effectiveness rate, discussed below (see § 1092(b)(1)(C) Unlawful border crossing effectiveness rate), the apprehension rate focuses exclusively on the ratio of *apprehensions* to unlawful entry attempts and therefore does not account (in the numerator or denominator) for *turn backs* (subjects who, after making an unlawful entry into the United States, return to the country from which they entered, not resulting in an apprehension, or got away) (see further discussion of NDAA § 1092(b)(1)(A)(iv), below). In this sense, measures of the apprehension rate arguably understate USBP's overall enforcement success rate. On the other hand, some analysts consider information about turn backs difficult to interpret since unknown shares of turn backs make additional entry attempts and/or are intentional efforts by smugglers to cross temporarily and return to Mexico.

In addition, while USBP has reliable administrative data on apprehensions, the Department does not have an exact count of unlawful entry attempts since an unknown number of unlawful border crossers evade detection. As a result of this so-called "denominator problem," the Department must *estimate* the apprehension rate.

Previous versions of this report have included two apprehension rate estimates, the RTM model-based apprehension rate and the observational apprehension rate that have been calculated independently by DHS and USBP, respectively.

- *RTM model-based apprehension rate* (AR$_{RTM}$) – Based on statistical modeling, the estimated share of all attempted unlawful border crossers between land POEs that are apprehended. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, no RTM model-based estimates could be produced for 2021 or 2022.

- *Observational apprehension rate* (AR$_{Observational}$) – Based on direct (unlawful border crossers observed by USBP) and indirect (residual evidence of a border crosser (e.g.,

footprints) observations of attempted unlawful border crossers, the estimated share of observed attempted unlawful border crossers that are apprehended.

Beginning with the 2022 (2021 data) version of this report, the Department began reporting a single, synthesized metric that leverages the best available data from the RTM model-based and observational measures to supplement the years for which the model is unavailable:

- *Apprehension rate working estimate* ($AR_{Working\ estimate}$) – Equal to the RTM model-based apprehension rate for the years 2000-2013; equal to the weighted average of the RTM model-based and observational estimate for the years 2014 to 2020 with more weight given to the observational estimate[4]; equal to the observational estimate for the years 2021-2022 since the RTM model is unavailable

Methodology and Limitations

RTM model-based apprehension rate

The RTM model-based apprehension rate (AR_{RTM}) for 2000 to 2020 is based on the RTM methodology. As explained in detail in Appendix A in previous reports, the RTM methodology yielded an estimated PAR for Southwest Border crossings, which focuses on a relatively small share of attempted unlawful border crossers. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, no RTM model-based estimates could be produced for 2021 or 2022. The 2022 report included significant updates to the PAR methodology given COVID-19 and Title 42 (T42) policies (see Appendix A in previous reports).

Following the calculation of the PAR, the RTM model consists of four additional steps. First, all attempted unlawful border crossers are divided into two groups, which are labeled *impactable* and *non-impactable* by traditional DHS enforcement policies. Impactable border crossers include adults without children, who are not asylum seekers and (prior to 2017) who are not from Cuba. Noncitizens in this group are described as impactable because they are generally subject to the full range of DHS and Department of Justice (DOJ) enforcement consequences, and therefore potentially impacted by existing border enforcement. Non-impactable border crossers include unaccompanied children (UC), family units (FM), individuals who request asylum and USCIS finds a credible fear of persecution or torture, and (prior to 2017) Cubans. Noncitizens in this group have usually been released into the United States with a Notice to Appear in immigration court for removal proceedings on a future date.[5] These noncitizens are assumed generally to be non-impactable by traditional DHS enforcement activities at the border because even if they are apprehended, they are typically unlikely to be immediately removed.[6]

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[4] More importance is given to the observational estimate (multiplied by a weight of 66 percent) than the RTM model-based estimate (multiplied by a weight of 33 percent).
[5] UCs generally are issued a Notice to Appear and transferred to the Department of Health and Human Services as required by the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1232(a)(5)(D), (b)(3).
[6] Cubans were considered non-impactable between 1995 and January 2017 because they were routinely granted parole into the United States if they reached U.S. soil, under the "wet foot/dry foot" policy. The wet foot/dry foot policy was the name given to a former interpretation of the 1995 revision of the application of the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966. The Obama Administration terminated the special parole component of the wet foot/dry foot policy in January 2017.

Second, the AR_{RTM} methodology assumes an apprehension rate for each of these two groups: 1) all attempted unlawful border crossers in the impactable population are assumed to be apprehended at the PAR generated by the RTM methodology; and 2) all unlawful border crossers in the non-impactable population are assumed to intentionally present themselves to a USBP agent or OFO officer and therefore to have a 100 percent apprehension rate. Notably, these assumptions do not reflect the actual behavior of all border crossers, as noted below, but they serve to construct a probability model.

Third, the PAR is used to calculate the total number of impactable noncitizens making unlawful entry attempts. The methodology assumes (in the previous step) that all impactable noncitizens are apprehended at the PAR rate generated by the RTM methodology:

$$PAR = \frac{Apprehensions_{Impactable}}{Attempts_{Impactable}}$$

Mathematically, this equation can be rearranged to define the total number of impactable noncitizens making an unlawful entry attempt as follows:

$$Attempts_{Impactable} = \frac{Apprehensions_{Impactable}}{PAR}$$

Since non-impactable noncitizens are assumed to have a 100 percent apprehension rate, the number of entry attempts of non-impactable noncitizens is equal to the number of their apprehensions.

Finally, the total apprehension rate is calculated as a weighted average of the total numbers of impactable and non-impactable noncitizens attempting unlawful entry times their respective apprehension rates:

$$AR_{RTM} = \frac{(Attempts_{Impactable} \times PAR) + (Attempts_{Non-impactable} \times 100\%)}{(Attempts_{Impactable} + Attempts_{Non-impactable})}$$

The historic AR_{RTM} methodology makes assumptions that cannot be fully validated. First, the AR_{RTM} methodology builds on the RTM's PAR, and so incorporates all RTM methodology assumptions and associated limitations discussed in Appendix A in previous reports. In addition, the historic AR_{RTM} methodology also assumes the entire cohort of border crossers can be divided into impactable and non-impactable groups, that the entire impactable group is apprehended at the same rate as RTM noncitizens included in the PAR analysis, and that the entire non-impactable group is apprehended 100 percent of the time. Each of these additional assumptions introduces potential biases into the estimated apprehension rate. Assumptions about non-impactable noncitizens may have an especially large impact on AR_{RTM} in recent years as non-impactables have come to represent a larger share of all encounters than has historically been the case. A sensitivity analysis, included at the end of Appendix A in previous reports, quantifies the potential impact of these assumptions on the RTM model-based apprehension rate.
Observational apprehension rate

The observational apprehension rate is calculated as the ratio of USBP apprehensions to the sum of apprehensions and observed (directly or indirectly) *got aways*:

$$AR_{Observational} = \frac{Apprehensions}{Apprehensions + Got\ Aways}$$

Got aways are defined as subjects at the Southwest Border who, after making an unlawful entry, are not turned back or apprehended within the border zone, and are no longer being actively pursued by USBP agents.[7] Some subjects are observed directly as evading apprehension or turning back; others are acknowledged as got aways or turn backs after agents follow evidence that indicate entries have occurred, such as foot signs (i.e., tracks), sensor activations, interviews with apprehended subjects, camera views, and communication between and among stations and sectors. The scope of these data includes all areas of the Southwest Border at or below the northernmost law enforcement posture (typically a USBP checkpoint) within a given area of responsibility, and those individuals apprehended less than 30 days after entering the United States.

Prior to 2014, an important methodological limitation of the observational estimate is that the estimated count of got aways aggregated subjective observations from thousands of individual agents. Since 2014, USBP has implemented a standard, Southwest Border-wide methodology to determine when to report a subject as a got away, mitigating this problem.   In an effort to maintain reliable best practices, command staff at all Southwest Border stations ensure agents are aware of and utilize proper definitions for apprehensions, got aways, and turn backs at their respective stations. They also ensure the necessary communication takes place between and among sectors and stations to minimize double counting when subjects cross more than one station's area of responsibility. In addition to station-level safeguards, designated USBP Headquarters staff validate data integrity by utilizing various data quality reports. In 2022, USBP started reporting of both got aways and no arrests, where tracking is initiated in a non-border zone and does not result in an arrest or turn back. OHSS reports only on got aways.

The primary remaining limitation of USBP's $AR_{Observational}$ methodology is that the denominator excludes an unknown number of unobserved got aways. This problem may be exacerbated during periods of high inflows when agents may be pulled off the line to process encounters. Nonetheless, DHS has invested millions of dollars in technology over the past several years that has facilitated the ability to see and detect more at the border. These continuing improvements in situational awareness have increased DHS' real-time ability to identify and count unlawful activity that agents are encountering at the immediate border, as well as their ability to respond. As a result, while the number of Southwest Border encounters surged in 2019 to 2022, agents are interdicting slightly higher percentages of the total known flow. This increasing situational awareness narrows the gap between the known and unknown flow and puts DHS in a position to continue to enhance its observational estimates of border security.

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[7] See 6 U.S.C. §223(a)(3) for definition of got aways.

Apprehension Rate Working Estimate

As introduced in the opening section, DHS reports a combined working estimate of the apprehension rate that is designed to provide a single trend line reflecting the best available estimate of the apprehension rate in any given year. For the years 2000-2013, the Department's working estimate of the apprehension rate is strictly based on the RTM model-based estimate. The RTM model-based estimate is used for these years because this is the period for which encounter demographics were most closely aligned with the assumptions underlying the model-based estimate—i.e., that most intending crossers were single adults, primarily from Mexico, and that majorities of those apprehended made additional crossing attempts. At the same time, the observational estimate was not available prior to 2006, and it is considered relatively unreliable for the years 2006-2013 prior to USBP's implementation of a standardized methodology for reporting got aways.

For the years 2014-2020, the Department's working estimate of the apprehension rate is based on a weighted average of the RTM model-based estimate and the USBP observational estimate. The observational estimate is given more weight in this equation compared to the RTM model-based estimate. The AR_{RTM} and the $AR_{Observational}$ were calculated independently based on different assumptions and (in part) different data sources. The fact that there were still highly correlated lends credence to both measures. The Department believes the best available point estimates for apprehension rates during these years is a mixed-methods average of these two independent metrics.

For 2021 and 2022, the Department's best available working estimate is based on the USBP observational estimate. This period of the working estimate does not include the RTM model-based estimate. The primary reason is that one of the key data sources for the RTM model-based estimate, the EMIF survey, became unavailable beginning in 2020, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. While the Department was able to leverage pre-pandemic data to generate a 2020 RTM model-based estimate, OHSS determined that this approach was not viable for 2021-2022. Even without the missing data challenge beginning in 2020, OHSS views its RTM model-based estimate as increasingly problematic over the course of the 2010s. This is due to rising numbers of families and children and of non-Mexicans as shares of border encounters, all demographic groups that are poor fits to the RTM model-based methodology, as described above and in Appendix A in previous reports in previous reports.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 1 provides the estimated model-based apprehensions rate for 2000 to 2020, the years for which data are available without COVID-19 pandemic limitations, and the estimated observational apprehension rate for 2006 to 2022.

Table 1: Estimated SW Border Apprehension Rate by Estimation Methodology, FY 2000 to 2022

Fiscal Year	OHSS RTM Model-Based Rate	USBP Observational Rate	OHSS Best Working Estimate Rate
2000	42.5%	NA	42.5%
2001	41.1%	NA	41.1%
2002	35.7%	NA	35.7%
2003	32.5%	NA	32.5%
2004	36.1%	NA	36.1%
2005	35.7%	NA	35.7%
2006	37.7%	63.9%	37.7%
2007	38.5%	64.6%	38.5%
2008	41.0%	68.3%	41.0%
2009	42.9%	71.3%	42.9%
2010	42.4%	74.9%	42.4%
2011	42.3%	79.8%	42.3%
2012	45.6%	77.6%	45.6%
2013	50.6%	71.0%	50.6%
2014	63.2%	75.0%	71.1%
2015	66.9%	76.9%	73.5%
2016	76.4%	79.6%	78.5%
2017	71.9%	74.9%	73.9%
2018	77.0%	75.8%	76.2%
2019	89.5%	85.0%	86.5%
2020	66.2%	74.8%	71.9%
2021	NA	80.9%	80.9%
2022	NA	78.5%	78.5%

NA – no data available.
Notes: Working estimate based on RTM model-based estimates for 2000-2013; weighted average of OHSS RTM model-based estimates and CBP observational estimates for 2014-2020, where CBP estimate accounts for two-thirds and RTM estimate accounts for one-third of the final rate; and CBP observational estimates for 2021-2022. RTM model-based apprehension rate is only available prior to 2021.
Source: Office of Homeland Security Statistics analysis of USBP data and OHSS RTM.

All available estimates of the apprehension rate indicate that, since 2013, USBP apprehended the majority of intending border crossers, and that the apprehension rate has increased substantially as a share of intending crossings during that time.

According to the RTM model, USBP's apprehension rate decreased from 43 percent in 2000 to 33 percent in 2003, the lowest estimated apprehension rate for any year in this analysis. Beginning in 2004, USBP apprehension rates increased consistently year over year, peaking at 89 percent in 2019 and then falling to 66 percent in 2020. Increases in apprehensions have been sharpest since 2012, reflecting increases during this period in the estimated at-the-border deterrence rate, the estimated apprehension rate for impactable border crossers (i.e., the PAR), and an increase in the share of border crossers who are non-impactable and therefore assumed to

present themselves to agents and apprehended 100 percent of the time. (See discussion of NDAA § 1092(g)(3)(D) Other Appropriate Information for the deterrence rate and of non-impactables as a share of border crossers.)

The observational apprehension rate has also shown improvements since 2006. Despite its limitations, the upward trend in $AR_{Observational}$ is noteworthy because it independently reinforces the upward trend in apprehensions observed in the model-based estimates. Moreover, with increasing situational awareness along the border during this period, it is likely that CBP detects an increasing share of total got aways over time, as noted above. Because CBP is likely observing a greater proportion of all border crossers, the upward trend in $AR_{Observational}$ likely underestimates the actual increase in the total share of attempted border crossers that are apprehended.

CBP and USBP Modeling and Simulation Efforts

In partnership with Johns Hopkins University's Applied Physics Lab, USBP has invested in a new modeling effort that is expected to generate an additional independent estimate of the apprehension rate. The USBP model-based analysis is based on an agent-based simulation to examine each line station along the Southwest and Northern Border from an operational perspective. The Operational Performance Simulator (OPS) incorporates detailed operational data, terrain and environmental characteristics, and technical specifications related to surveillance technology capability and placement, as well as the deployment of resources including infrastructure and agents. The simulator uses those modeled inputs to mimic the movement of border threats along known trails and patrol routes toward the vanishing line, as well as USBP activities to mitigate those threats to produce an estimate of the total illicit, cross-border entries between ports of entry (detected and undetected).

Analysis was completed for all line stations along the Southwest Border for 2019, and teams refined the model with 2020 data. DHS's Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) completed an independent verification and validation (IV&V), determining the performance of OPS to be an appropriate way to capture the complex interactions and emergent behavior among the environment, sensors, USBP agents, and migrants that comprise the border system. S&T additionally concluded that the overall methodology of employing historical data to estimate the number of migrant groups and size of each group is sound. Refinement efforts continue to incorporate newly deployed border-security technologies, additional operational attributes, and updated threat characteristics. USBP is working with OHSS and the Department to validate the accuracy of the OPS results and expects to release its estimates of total illegal entries on the Southwest Border based on the OPS methodology in FY 2025.

§ 1092(b)(1)(A)(ii) Detected unlawful entries

Definition

Detected unlawful entries – The total number of attempted unlawful border crossers between land POEs who are directly or indirectly observed or detected by USBP.

Detected unlawful entries are an outcome metric that describes the numbers of noncitizens detected crossing or attempting to cross the border unlawfully. Detected unlawful entries are not a comprehensive outcome metric since they exclude undetected unlawful entries, as discussed below. The ratio of detected to undetected unlawful entries, also discussed below, is an output metric that describes the Department's ability to detect unlawful entries.

Methodology and Limitations

The number of detected unlawful entries is calculated as the sum of turn backs, got aways, apprehensions, and T42 encounters. Turn backs are defined as subjects who, after making an unlawful entry into the United States, return to the country from which they entered, not resulting in an apprehension, or got away. Got aways are defined as subjects who, after making an unlawful entry, are not turned back, or apprehended, and are no longer being actively pursued by USBP agents. Apprehensions are defined as inadmissible noncitizens arrested by USBP under U.S. Code Title 8 (T8) immigration enforcement authority. T42 "encounters" are expulsions from the United States of noncitizens specifically in accordance with orders from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) under its T42 public health authority. T42 expulsions are tracked separately from apprehensions.[8]

Turn backs and got aways are observational estimates; USBP records total and by-sector estimates of turn backs and got aways based on direct and indirect observations as described above. Apprehensions and T42 encounters are nationwide totals calculated based on CBP administrative records captured during enforcement processing; USBP apprehension and T42 data are considered a reliable count of law enforcement actions.

The primary limitation to detect unlawful entries is that this metric incorporates turn back and got away estimates that aggregate potentially subjective observations from thousands of individual agents. USBP has taken steps to address this problem by establishing consistent and reliable turn back and got away methodologies, as discussed earlier in this report.

Available Data and Discussion

Figure 1 depicts estimated detected unlawful entries for 2006 to 2022, the years for which data are available. Estimated detected unlawful entries (the sum of apprehensions, T42 encounters, observed turn backs, and observed got aways) fell from 2 million in 2006 to 548,000 in 2011. Between 2012 and 2018, estimated detected unlawful entries were consistently between 500,000 to 800,000 per year, before rising to 1.1 million. The following year detected unlawful entries dropped to 671,000 due to decreased border crossing during the COVID-19 pandemic, and then rose to nearly 3 million in 2022, the highest estimated unlawful entries (not necessarily unique encounters) since data became available.

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[8] *See* § 1092(b)(1)(I) for a detailed explanation for the exclusion of T42 encounters in our analysis.

Figure 1: Estimated Detected Unlawful Entries Between POEs, FY 2006 to 2022

Notes: T42s are included in 2020-2022, but not other years, as 2020 is the first year T42 encounters occurred. Previous versions of this report misreported nationwide apprehensions as Southwest Border apprehensions for some years; data have been corrected to reflect nationwide totals for all years.
Source: Office of Homeland Security Statistics analysis of USBP data.

§ 1092(b)(1)(A)(iii) Estimated undetected unlawful entries

Definition

Undetected unlawful entries – An estimate of the number of attempted unlawful border crossers between land POEs who are not directly or indirectly observed or detected by USBP. By assumption, both detected and undetected unlawful entries evade apprehension and enter the United States unlawfully.

Undetected unlawful entries are an outcome metric that describe the numbers of noncitizens who completely evade detection and successfully enter the United States unlawfully. Undetected unlawful entries are not a comprehensive outcome metric since the metric excludes detected unlawful entries, discussed above. The ratio of detected to total unlawful entries (i.e., the probability of detection) is an output metric that describes the Department's ability to detect unlawful entries, as discussed below. At present, this methodology only exists for the Southwest Border between POEs.

Methodology and Limitations

Historically, the Department has estimated undetected unlawful entries by building on the RTM methodology to produce a model-based estimate of total successful unlawful entries. The estimated number of undetected unlawful entries is calculated as the difference between the model-based estimate of total successful unlawful entries and USBP's observational estimate of got aways (i.e., *detected* successful unlawful entries):

$$Undetected\ Unlawful\ Entries$$
$$= Total\ Successful\ Unlawful\ Entries - Detected\ Got\ Aways$$

As explained in detail in Appendix A in previous reports in previous reports, the RTM methodology yields an estimated PAR for Southwest Border crossers. Following the calculation

of the PAR, the methodology for estimating total successful unlawful entries consists of three additional steps.

As in the calculation of the model-based apprehension rate discussed above, all attempted unlawful border crossers are divided into impactable and non-impactable groups (also see NDAA § 1092(g)(3)(D) Other Appropriate Information). Based on the assumption that impactable noncitizens are apprehended at the same rate as RTM noncitizens included in the PAR analysis, the PAR is used to estimate the odds of successful entry for noncitizens within the impactable population group.[9] The number of successful unlawful entries is estimated based on the number of impactable noncitizens apprehended multiplied by the odds of successful entry among this group. Because non-impactable noncitizens are assumed to be apprehended 100 percent of the time (i.e., no noncitizen successfully enters without being apprehended) only impactable noncitizens contribute to the estimated count of successful unlawful entries.

$$Total\ Successful\ Unlawful\ Entries$$
$$= Apprehensions\ of\ Impactable\ Noncitizens * Odds\ of\ Successful\ Entry$$

The estimated number of undetected unlawful entries is derived from the observational estimate of detected unlawful entries (with limitations discussed above) and the model-based estimate of total successful unlawful entries. This latter model-based estimate is in turn derived from the RTM methodology and the model-based apprehension rate with additional limitations discussed above. (See Appendix A in previous reports for further discussion of the assumptions involved in the estimate of total successful unlawful entries, including a sensitivity analysis for the most recent estimate.)

As noted previously, the RTM model-based estimate is not available after 2020. As a result, no estimates of total successful unlawful entries or of undetected unlawful entries are available for 2021or 2022 and estimates in this section are limited to the period 2006–2020, the years for which data were available.

Available Data and Discussion

Figure 2 depicts estimated undetected unlawful entries from 2006 to 2020. As the figure shows, RTM model-based estimates of undetected unlawful entries fell from over one million in 2006 to nearly zero in 2018 and 2019. However, the Department does not interpret these results to mean that *zero* noncitizens successfully crossed the border without being detected, as this represents limitations with the RTM model in recent years. The estimate of undetected entries is derived by calculating the difference (residual) between total and detected entries, which come from two distinct data sources: detected entries are based on CBP's observational estimate of turn backs and got aways (and administrative data on apprehensions); total entries is based on OHSS' RTM model. However, both of these statistics are estimates as opposed to exact counts. The depiction of zero undetected entries in 2018 and 2019 is a result of the RTM model producing a slightly lower estimate of total successful unlawful entries than CBP's observational estimate of got aways, which yields a negative number of undetected unlawful entries. This negative value is not possible, thus is rounded to "0" and reflects limitations with the current RTM model's

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[9] Mathematically, $odds\ of\ successful\ entry = \left(\frac{1-PAR}{PAR}\right).$

methodology. In addition, as a result of disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, OHSS was unable to provide an RTM model-based estimate for 2021 or 2022.

Figure 2: Estimated Southwest Border Undetected Unlawful Entries, FY 2006 to 2020

Notes: Data for years prior to 2020 update previously reported estimates; see Appendix A in previous reports for details. The lower and upper bounds are based on a 95 percent confidence interval.
Source: Office of Homeland Security Statistics analysis of USBP data and OHSS RTM.

§ 1092(b)(1)(A)(iv) Turn backs

Definition

Turn backs – An estimate of the number of subjects who, after making an unlawful entry into the United States, return to the country from which they entered, resulting in neither an apprehension, nor a got away.

Turn backs are an output metric that USBP uses for tactical decision-making.

Turn backs also contribute to several other border security metrics, including detected unlawful entries, discussed above, and the unlawful border crossing effectiveness rate, discussed below.

Methodology and Limitations

Turn backs are a nationwide observational estimate; USBP records total and by-sector estimates of turn backs based on direct and indirect observations as described above.

The primary limitation to detected turn backs is that the estimate aggregates potentially subjective observations from thousands of individual agents. USBP has taken steps to address this problem by establishing consistent and reliable turn back and got away methodologies, as discussed above. In addition, some unlawful border crossers might enter the United States to drop off drug loads or to act as decoys to lure agents away from a certain area and then return to

Mexico, and therefore may be misidentified as turn backs.[10] However, USBP believes these instances are too infrequent to have a substantial impact on the total number of estimated turn backs.

Available Data and Discussion

The estimated number of turn backs nationwide has decreased by 9.0 percent since 2013. Turn backs increased at the Coastal and Northern Borders but decreased at the Southwest Border from 2013 to 2022. Since 2021, turn backs on the Coastal Border increased by 80 percent and turn backs on the Northern Border increased 166 percent, while turn backs at the Southwest Border decreased by 18 percent.

Table 2a: USBP Turn Backs between POEs by Border, FY 2013 to 2022

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Coastal Border	1,800	3,000	3,440	5,670	1,960	410	1,440	1,180	1,230	2,210
Northern Border	30	20	30	10	60	120	230	220	120	310
Southwest Border	156,430	147,030	105,670	108,600	89,990	112,230	98,730	127,590	174,320	142,170
Nationwide Total	158,270	150,050	109,140	114,280	92,000	112,770	100,400	128,990	175,660	144,690

Notes: In order to protect privacy, table cells are rounded to the nearest ten. The totals may not sum due to rounding. Previous versions of this table misreported total turn backs as being only turn backs at the Southwest Border in some years; the current table corrects this error.
Source: USBP.

§ 1092(b)(1)(A)(v) Got aways

Definition

Got aways – An estimate of the number of subjects who, after making an unlawful entry, are not turned back, or apprehended, and are no longer being actively pursued by USBP agents.[11] USBP further defines got aways as any subject in a border zone who after making an illegal entry is not turned back or apprehended.

Total successful unlawful entries – An estimate of the total number of subjects who cross the border unlawfully and who enter the United States without being apprehended.

Methodology and Limitations
Got aways are an observational estimate; USBP records total and by-sector estimates of got aways based on direct and indirect observations as described above. Got aways are recorded by USBP at all borders; see Table 2b.

The number of got aways in 2022 increased 253 percent since 2013, and 55 percent since 2021, while over the same time period CBP observational apprehension rates fluctuated between 70 and 85 percent (see Table 1) While got aways increased at both the Northern and Southwest Borders since 2021, the Southwest Border increased by 55 percent, making up the vast majority (99.8 percent) of got aways. Meanwhile, though making up a small proportion of total got

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[10] U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), "Border Patrol: Goals and Measures Not Yet in Place to Inform Border Security Status and Resource Needs," GAO-13-330T, February 26, 2013, p. 15.
[11] See 6 U.S.C. §223(a)(3) for definition of got aways.

aways, Northern Border got aways increased by 211 percent from 2021 to 2022, while Coastal Border got aways decreased by 100 percent since 2021 to zero got aways. Coastal Border got aways reached their lowest recorded level, and Northern Border got aways reached their highest level since before 2013.

Table 2b: USBP Detected Got Aways between POEs by Border, FY 2013 to 2022

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Coastal Border	580	590	680	570	530	500	940	930	1,830	0
Northern Border	40	50	40	40	70	240	440	290	330	1,040
Southwest Border	171,050	161,420	100,770	106,030	103,690	127,940	150,090	135,590	389,160	605,120
Nationwide Total	**171,660**	**162,070**	**101,500**	**106,640**	**104,290**	**128,680**	**151,470**	**136,810**	**391,320**	**606,150**

Notes: In order to protect privacy, table cells are rounded to the nearest ten. The totals may not sum due to rounding.
Source: USBP.

Over 99 percent of detected got aways occur at the Southwest Border, the remainder of this section refers exclusively to the Southwest Border between POEs.

The primary methodological limitation of got aways is that the estimate aggregates potentially subjective observations from thousands of individual agents. USBP has taken steps to address this problem by establishing consistent and reliable turn back and got away methodologies for the past ten years, as discussed above.

Got aways are not a comprehensive measure of successful unlawful entries, as the metric is limited to observed flows. As USBP increases its situational awareness, including through the use of geospatial intelligence tools, the Department increases its ability to accurately measure the count of got aways. USBP and DHS are also working to refine USBP's observational methodology and to describe the gap more precisely between observed and unobserved got aways.

The figure below includes calculations including the estimated successful entries produced by the RTM model. The methodology for estimating total successful unlawful entries is based on the RTM methodology. As explained in detail in Appendix A in previous reports, the RTM methodology yields an estimated PAR for Southwest Border crossings, which focuses on a relatively small share of attempted unlawful border crossers. Following the calculation of the PAR, the methodology for estimating total successful unlawful entries consists of three additional steps, as described above: attempted border crossers are divided into impactable and non-impactable groups; the PAR is used to estimate the odds of successful entry; and the number of successful unlawful entries is estimated based on the odds of successful entry among this group multiplied by the number of apprehensions of impactable noncitizens.

Each assumption involved in using the PAR to estimate total successful unlawful entries introduces methodological limitations and potential biases. See Appendix A in previous reports for a discussion of the impact of these assumptions.

Available Data and Discussion

Figure 3 depicts detected got aways at the Southwest Border between POEs for 2006 to 2022; as well as the working estimate for undetected got aways, an average of detected got aways and RTM model-based estimated total of successful unlawful entries for 2006 to 2020.

Figure 3: Southwest Border Got Aways and Estimated Total Successful Unlawful Entries between POEs, FY 2006 to 2022

Notes: Working estimate for undetected got aways is based on RTM model-based estimates for 2010-2013; and weighted average of OHSS RTM model-based estimate and CBP observational estimates for 2014-2020. Data for estimated total successful unlawful entries for years prior to 2020 update previously reported estimates; see Appendix A in previous reports for details. The RTM model-based estimate of total successful unlawful entries is unavailable for 2021 to 2022.
Source: Office of Homeland Security Statistics analysis of USBP data and OHSS RTM

Notably, the working estimate of total successful unlawful entries declined at a faster rate than observed got aways, with the model-based estimate falling 88 percent between 2006 and 2020 (the period for which both data series are available) versus a 78 percent decrease for detected got aways during this period. Relatedly, the two series have substantially converged over this time-period, with observed got aways accounting for 35 percent of RTM model-based total estimated successful unlawful entries in 2006 versus 66 percent in 2020 and over 100 percent in 2018 and 2019.

As noted above, the use of separate methodologies to estimate observed got aways and total successful unlawful entries yields findings that cannot be fully reconciled for recent years, but DHS interprets the overall convergence of these trends to suggest that USBP detects an increasingly comprehensive share of all attempted unlawful border crossers.

§ 1092(b)(1)(B) A measurement of situational awareness achieved in each U.S. Border Patrol sector

Definition

Situational awareness – Knowledge and understanding of current unlawful cross-border activity.

Situational awareness is an output metric that describes the Department's awareness of unlawful cross-border activity.

USBP refines the NDAA definition of situational awareness as its ability to perceive elements within the environment, comprehend their meaning, and project future status. This definition is inclusive of unlawful activity as well as legitimate activity, as both can have an influence on operational performance.

Methodology and Limitations

USBP is refining measures for situational awareness as part of a larger effort to measure performance and success in securing the U.S. border between the ports of entry. This larger effort has led to USBP development effort toward a suite of metrics by which USBP can use several indicators to provide a more comprehensive picture of USBP's performance and operating environment.

To enhance situational awareness, USBP must consistently strive for two enduring states: increased perception of all factors in the operational environment; and the ability to comprehend the impact those factors have on operations, both currently and in the future. Achievement in these areas requires USBP to execute on mission-essential tasks, including its abilities to predict, detect, identify, classify, track, respond, and resolve.

USBP plans to meet the intent of NDAA § 1092(b)(1)(B) by further developing OPS, which includes an Estimated Detection Rate for each sector that compares detections with estimated total entries. OPS has the potential to address NDAA § 1092(b)(1)(A)–(D) as well. The OPS model will   satisfy Section 1092(b)(1)(D)'s requirement for a Probability of Detection Rate. Recognizing that there is no all-encompassing, single metric to quantify situational awareness as defined in Section 1092(a)(7), USBP is considering the use of a complementary collection of measures, metrics, indicators, and estimates (including some OPS outputs) that could collectively articulate its assessment of situational awareness.

USBP anticipates being able to report on situational awareness in future versions of the BSMR. In the interim, many of the Department's existing metrics are informed by the Department's awareness of migrants and other threats in the near border regions and approaches. (See discussion in report's sections for NDAA § 1092(b)(1)(A)(ii)–(v) and § 1092(b)(1)(D).)

§ 1092(b)(1)(C) Unlawful border crossing effectiveness rate

Definition

Unlawful border crossing effectiveness rate – The estimated percentage of all attempted unlawful border crossers interdicted by USBP, where interdictions include apprehensions, T42 encounters, and turn backs.

The unlawful border crossing effectiveness rate is an output metric that describes how difficult it is for unlawful border crossers to enter the United States without being interdicted.

Methodology and Limitations

The unlawful border crossing effectiveness rate is calculated by dividing the number of apprehensions, turn backs, and T42s between land POEs by the sum of the number of encounters, turn backs, and total estimated successful unlawful entries.

$$Effectiveness\ Rate = \frac{Apprehensions + Turn\ Backs + Title\ 42s}{Apprehensions + Turn\ Backs + Title\ 42s + \ Successful\ Unlawful\ Entries}$$

The NDAA calls for an effectiveness rate that incorporates USBP's observational estimate of turn backs and DHS's current model-based estimate of total estimated successful unlawful entries. This measure would confront the methodological challenges associated with each of its component parts, as discussed above.

The unlawful border crossing effectiveness rate is conceptually similar to the estimated apprehension rate, with the difference being that the effectiveness rate includes data on turn backs and encounters while the apprehension rate focuses exclusively on apprehensions. An advantage to examining the effectiveness rate, rather than the apprehension rate, is that the effectiveness rate more completely captures USBP's actual enforcement practices, including both efforts to turn back border crossers and efforts to apprehend them. However, some analysts consider the effectiveness rate (along with the interdiction effectiveness rate, or IER) to be an ambiguous indicator of enforcement success given an unknown share of turn backs make additional entry attempts.

The unlawful border crossing effectiveness rate is also conceptually similar to USBP's IER, which USBP reports in its Annual Performance Report pursuant to the Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act (GPRAMA) of 2010. The unlawful border crossing effectiveness rate differs from the IER in that the former includes total estimated successful unlawful entries in its denominator and IER only includes known got aways.

The calculation for IER was adjusted in 2020 to allow for inclusion of T42s in encounters, a significant portion of the population. In accordance with the Performance Measure Definition approved by DHS in August 2020, IER calculations include T42 encounters as a successful law-enforcement outcome to an unlawful entry.

$$Interdiction\ Effectiveness\ Rate\ (IER) = \frac{Apprehensions + Turn\ Backs + Title\ 42s}{Apprehensions + Turn\ Backs + Title\ 42s + Got\ Aways}$$

A limitation of IER is that changes in the Department's situational awareness make changes in IER somewhat difficult to interpret. In particular, increases in the share of noncitizens apprehended or turned back may be offset by gains in the share of the total population observed by USBP (i.e., in the accuracy of the observational got away estimate).

Despite its shortcomings as an analytic tool, only the IER is currently available for analysis at the sector level. While a Southwest Border-wide estimate has been developed for the model-based apprehension rate, sector-level estimates of unlawful entries and attempts for this metric have not yet been produced and validated by DHS.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 3 summarizes interdiction effectiveness rates by Southwest Border sector for 2014 to 2022.

Table 3: Interdiction Effectiveness Rate by Southwest Border Sector, FY 2014 to 2022

Fiscal Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	El Centro, CA	El Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	SW Border Total
2014	72%	76%	85%	92%	74%	80%	89%	75%	91%	80%
2015	77%	73%	83%	90%	74%	82%	88%	80%	95%	81%
2016	70%	79%	81%	89%	78%	83%	89%	82%	96%	83%
2017	67%	72%	81%	91%	72%	80%	87%	71%	96%	79%
2018	54%	73%	83%	91%	69%	81%	85%	75%	97%	80%
2019	61%	85%	86%	93%	70%	89%	81%	76%	99%	86%
2020	57%	74%	85%	88%	81%	80%	81%	72%	91%	79%
2021	64%	75%	87%	88%	93%	94%	74%	63%	94%	83%
2022	66%	75%	92%	80%	86%	92%	77%	60%	92%	80%

Note: T42s are included in 2020 to 2022, but not other years, as 2020 is the first year T42 encounters occurred.
Source: Office of Homeland Security Statistics analysis of USBP data.

The total Southwest Border interdiction effectiveness rate was 80 percent in 2022, one percentage point below the 2014-2021 average. The effectiveness rate decreased from 2021 to 2022 in El Paso, TX; Laredo, TX; Rio Grande Valley, TX; Tucson, AZ; and Yuma, AZ. The largest decrease was eight percentage points in El Paso, TX from 2021 to 2022; the largest decrease from the average of 2014-2021 to 2022 was 15 percentage points in Tucson, AZ. The effectiveness rate increased from 2021 to 2022 in Big Bend, TX; El Centro, CA; and San Diego, CA. El Centro, CA and San Diego, CA and both increased by four percentage points from 2021 to 2022.

On the Coastal and Northern Borders, the physical security concern does not focus on the apprehension rate of unlawful entrants, since the number of such attempted and successful entries is assumed small. Together, the Coastal and Northern Borders accounted for only a small percent of total turn backs and total got aways.

§ 1092(b)(1)(D) Probability of detection rate

Definition

Estimated probability of detection – The estimated probability that DHS detects attempted unlawful border crossers between land POEs.

The estimated probability of detection is an output metric that describes the ability of attempted unlawful border crossers to enter without being detected. Because successful unlawful entry estimates are available only for the Southwest Border between POEs, data in this section refer exclusively to this region.

Methodology and Limitations

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, no RTM model-based estimates are provided for 2021 onwards. Any description of methodology and limitations refer to years before 2021.

The estimated probability of detection is defined as the ratio of detected unlawful entries to estimated total unlawful entries:

$$Probability\ of\ Detection = \frac{Detected\ Unlawful\ Entries}{Estimated\ Total\ Unlawful\ Entries}$$

As described above, the number of detected unlawful entries is calculated as the sum of turn backs, got aways, and apprehensions, a mix of observational estimates and administrative data. The primary limitation to detected unlawful entries is that this metric incorporates turn back and got away estimates that aggregate potentially subjective observations from thousands of individual agents. USBP has taken steps to address this problem by establishing consistent and reliable turn back and got away methodologies, as discussed earlier.

Estimated total unlawful entries is calculated as the sum of turn backs, apprehensions, and the model-based estimate of total successful unlawful entries. As described above, the methodology for estimating total successful unlawful entries begins with the RTM methodology's partial apprehension rate, discussed in detail in Appendix A in previous reports. Following the calculation of the PAR, the methodology for estimating total successful unlawful entries consists of three additional steps: attempted border crossers are divided into impactable and non-impactable groups; the PAR is used to estimate the odds of successful unlawful entry; and the number of successful unlawful entries is estimated based on the odds of successful entry among this group multiplied by the apprehension count among impactable noncitizens.

Each additional assumption involved in using the PAR to estimate total successful unlawful entries introduces additional methodological limitations and potential biases. Appendix A in previous reports discusses the impact of these limitations on the Department's estimate of total successful unlawful entries.

Available Data and Discussion

Figure 4 depicts the estimated probability of detection for 2006 to 2020, the years for which data are available. Comparing 2017 to 2020, the estimated probability of detection slightly declined. As the figure indicates, in 2018 and 2019 the estimated probability of detection (technically) was 100 percent, but the Department does not interpret these results to mean that *zero* noncitizens successfully crossed the border without being detected (see earlier discussion). The finding of zero undetected entries in 2018 and 2019 simply reflects the fact that the RTM model-based methodology yields a slightly lower estimate of total successful unlawful entries than does CBP's observational estimate of got aways. Due to disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, updated data for Figure 4 are unavailable for 2021 onwards.

Figure 4: Southwest Border Between POEs Estimated Probability of Detection, FY 2006 to 2020

Notes: Data for estimated total successful unlawful entries for years prior to 2020 update previously reported estimates; see Appendix A in previous reports for details. The lower and upper bounds of the RTM model are based on a 95 percent confidence interval. Estimated probability of detection data from the RTM model are unavailable for 2021 onwards.
Source: Office of Homeland Security Statistics analysis of USBP data and OHSS RTM.

§ 1092(b)(1)I Apprehensions in Each U.S. Border Patrol Sector

Definition

Title 8 Apprehension (T8) – The arrest of an inadmissible noncitizen by USBP under T8 immigration enforcement authority.

Title 42 (T42) Encounter – The encounter of a noncitizen under T42 authority. CDC issued a series of orders under its authorities at 42 U.S.C. §§ 265 and 268, and 42 C.F.R. § 71.40 beginning on March 20, 2020, which suspended the right to introduce certain persons (covered noncitizens, as defined in the orders) into the United States from countries or places where COVID-19 exists in order to protect the public health from an increased risk of the introduction

of COVID-19. As a result of the CDC orders, USBP began expelling covered noncitizens who would otherwise be introduced into a congregate setting in a port of entry (POE) or USBP station at or near the land and adjacent coastal borders, subject to certain exceptions as outlined in the orders. Expulsions under T42 authority are tracked separately from apprehensions.

Total USBP Encounters – The sum of T8 apprehensions and T42 encounters.

This BSMR interprets the reporting requirement for apprehensions in each USBP sector to encompass total USBP encounters by sector. In the following "Available Data and Discussion" data tables of this section, apprehensions and T42s are together summarily referred to as "apprehensions."

Apprehensions and T42 encounters are output metrics which provide information used for program planning and operational purposes, among other uses. Historically, the Department has also used apprehensions as a proxy indicator of unlawful entries, an outcome metric.

For many years, DHS and the legacy INS also used apprehensions as a proxy indicator of successful unlawful border crossings, i.e., an outcome metric. Over the long-term and across multiple locations, apprehensions are a problematic indicator of enforcement outcomes given the relationship between apprehensions and successful unlawful entries depends on the apprehension rate, which changes over time and may also differ by location. But in the short term, and in a fixed geographic area, DHS continues to view changes in apprehensions (or apprehensions and T42 encounters) as a useful outcome indicator because short-term changes in total encounters are more likely to be driven by changes in the number of unlawful border crossing attempts than by changes in the apprehension rate.

Methodology and Limitations

Apprehensions and T42s are recorded in administrative record systems with a unique identifier created for each apprehension and T42. USBP's count of apprehensions and T42s is considered reliable.

The apprehensions and T42s displayed below are event counts, meaning each apprehension or T42 of the same noncitizen in a year is counted separately. In other words, these data do not represent the count of unique noncitizens apprehended.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 4 provides counts of total apprehensions and T42s by USBP sector for 2022, broken out by encounter type.

Table 4: USBP Total Apprehensions by Title, FY 2022

Title	T8	T42	Total
Total	**1,160,140**	**1,054,510**	**2,214,650**
Southwest Border			
Big Bend, TX	7,770	24,180	31,950
Del Rio, TX	313,630	167,300	480,930
El Centro, CA	36,850	35,530	72,380
El Paso, TX	141,500	166,350	307,840
Laredo, TX	9,390	97,460	106,840
Rio Grande Valley, TX	252,480	215,640	468,120
San Diego, CA	60,370	115,920	176,290
Tucson, AZ	57,400	194,580	251,980
Yuma, AZ	272,980	37,120	310,090
Northern Border			
Blaine, WA	360	50	410
Buffalo, NY	90	0	90
Detroit, MI	120	0	130
Grand Forks, ND	70	10	80
Houlton, ME	250	50	300
Havre, MT	50	30	80
Spokane, WA	80	10	90
Swanton, VT	800	270	1,070
Coastal Border			
Miami, FL	4,000	10	4,010
New Orleans, LA	330	0	330
Ramey, PR	1,640	0	1,640

Note: In order to protect privacy, table cells are rounded to the nearest ten. The totals may not sum due to rounding.
Source: Office of Homeland Security Statistics Statistical Immigration Data.

In 2022, T8 apprehensions were the majority of apprehensions (52 percent), compared to T42 encounters (48 percent).

Tables 4a–4c summarize Southwest, Northern, and Coastal Border T8 apprehensions and T42s by USBP sector.

Table 4a: USBP Southwest Border Apprehensions by USBP Sector, FY 2013 to 2022

Fiscal Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	El Centro, CA	El Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	Total
2013	3,680	23,510	16,310	11,150	50,750	154,450	27,500	120,940	6,110	414,400
2014	4,100	24,260	14,510	12,340	44,050	256,390	29,910	87,920	5,900	479,370
2015	5,030	19,010	12,820	14,500	35,890	147,260	26,290	63,400	7,140	331,330
2016	6,370	23,080	19,450	25,630	36,560	186,830	31,890	64,890	14,170	408,870
2017	6,000	13,480	18,630	25,190	25,460	137,560	26,090	38,660	12,850	303,920
2018	8,050	15,830	29,230	31,560	32,640	162,260	38,590	52,170	26,240	396,580
2019	9,640	57,270	35,140	182,140	38,380	339,140	58,050	63,490	68,270	851,510
2020	8,630	40,340	27,490	54,400	51,430	90,200	53,280	66,070	8,800	400,640
2021	37,270	259,290	59,230	193,920	112,240	549,080	142,460	191,230	114,490	1,659,210
2022	31,950	480,930	72,380	307,840	106,840	468,120	176,290	251,980	310,090	2,206,440

Notes: In order to protect privacy, table cells are rounded to the nearest ten. The totals may not sum due to rounding. T42s are included in 2020-2022, but not other years, as 2020 is the first year T42 encounters occurred.
Source: Office of Homeland Security Statistics Statistical Immigration Data.

Total Southwest Border apprehensions in 2022 were 279 percent above the 2013-2021 average and increased 33 percent from 2021 to 2022. The total number of apprehensions and T42 encounters at the Southwest Border is the largest since 2013. The largest increase from the 2013-2021 average was 957 percent in Yuma, AZ while the smallest increase was 108 percent in Rio Grande Valley, TX. However, Rio Grande Valley sector saw a decrease of 15 percent from 2021 to 2022. Big Bend, TX and Laredo, TX also saw decreases from 2021 to 2022, by 14 and 5.0 percent respectively.

Table 4b: USBP Northern Border Apprehensions by USBP Sector, FY 2017 to 2022

Fiscal Year	Blaine, WA	Buffalo, NY	Detroit, MI	Grand Forks, ND	Houlton, ME	Havre, MT	Spokane, WA	Swanton, VT	Total
2017	290	450	1,070	500	30	40	210	450	3,030
2018	360	380	1,930	460	50	50	350	740	4,320
2019	520	540	1,320	410	50	80	430	1,060	4,410
2020	230	300	460	230	100	30	240	570	2,160
2021	110	140	30	90	60	60	50	370	920
2022	410	90	130	80	300	80	90	1,070	2,240

Notes: In order to protect privacy, table cells are rounded to the nearest ten. The totals may not sum due to rounding. T42s are included in 2020-2022, but not other years, as 2020 is the first year T42 encounters occurred.
Source: Office of Homeland Security Statistics Statistical Immigration Data.

Northern Border apprehensions increased 144 percent between 2021 and 2022, though apprehensions at the Northern Border represented only 0.1 percent of total USBP apprehensions in 2022. Swanton, VT was the leading Northern Border sector with 1,065 noncitizens apprehended, closely followed by Blaine, WA, the next leading sector (407 apprehensions). Havre, MT reported the fewest apprehensions in 2022 (80).

Table 4c: USBP Coastal Border Apprehensions by USBP Sector, FY 2017 to 2022

Fiscal Year	Miami, FL	New Orleans, LA	Ramey, PR	Total
2017	2,280	920	390	3,590
2018	2,170	800	280	3,250
2019	1,890	1,130	560	3,590
2020	1,300	570	360	2,230
2021	1,030	340	670	2,050
2022	4,010	330	1,640	5,980

Notes: In order to protect privacy, table cells are rounded to the nearest ten. The totals may not sum due to rounding. T42s are included in 2020-2022, but not other years, as 2020 is the first year T42 encounters occurred. Source: Office of Homeland Security Statistics Statistical Immigration Data.

Coastal Border apprehensions increased 192 percent from 2021 to 2022, their highest point in the 2017-2022 period, while representing only 0.27 percent of total USBP apprehensions in 2022. Of nearly 6,000 coastal apprehensions, 67 percent occurred in the Miami Sector (4,000). New Orleans, LA reported the fewest apprehensions in 2022 (329).

§ 1092(b)(1)(F) Apprehensions of unaccompanied children

Definition

Unaccompanied child (UC) – A child who has no lawful immigration status in the United States; has not attained 18 years of age, and with respect to whom: 1) there is no parent or legal guardian in the United States; or 2) no parent or legal guardian in the United States is available to provide care and physical custody (6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2)).

This BSMR interprets the reporting requirement for apprehensions in each USBP sector to encompass total USBP encounters by sector. In the following "Available Data and Discussion" data tables of this section, apprehensions and T42s are together summarily referred to as "apprehensions."

UC apprehensions and T42 encounters are output metrics that provide information used for program planning and operational purposes, among other uses. Historically, the Department has also used apprehensions as a proxy indicator of unlawful entries, an outcome metric.

Methodology and Limitations

Apprehensions and T42s are recorded in administrative record systems with a unique identifier created for each apprehension. Since 2008, USBP systems have included a flag for children who are found to meet the legal definition of a UC. USBP's count of apprehensions and T42 encounters is considered reliable, but some outside analysts have raised questions about agents' ability to reliably distinguish among older children and young adults (e.g., to distinguish between individuals who are 17 and 18 years of age) and to confirm whether children are traveling alone or in family groups.[12]

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[12] OIG-10-12 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General. *Age Determination Practices for Unaccompanied Alien Children in ICE Custody*. November 2009

USBP began collecting data on UCs apprehended between POEs in 2008; data are unavailable for earlier years.

Data and Discussion

Table 5 provides counts of UC apprehensions and T42 encounters by citizenship and by USBP sector for 2022, broken out by type.

Table 5: USBP Total Apprehensions of UCs by Title, FY 2022

Title	T8	T42	Total
Total	**149,220**	**10**	**149,220**
Southwest Border			
Big Bend, TX	1,400	0	1,400
Del Rio, TX	11,400	0	11,410
El Centro, CA	1,420	0	1,420
El Paso, TX	23,820	0	23,820
Laredo, TX	3,990	0	3,990
Rio Grande Valley, TX	76,780	0	76,780
San Diego, CA	4,990	0	4,990
Tucson, AZ	19,010	0	19,010
Yuma, AZ	6,280	0	6,280
Northern Border			
Blaine, WA	10	0	10
Buffalo, NY	0	0	0
Detroit, MI	0	0	0
Houlton, ME	0	0	0
Spokane, WA	0	0	0
Coastal Border			
Miami, FL	90	0	90
New Orleans, LA	0	0	0
Ramey, PR	30	0	30

Note: In order to protect privacy, table cells are rounded to the nearest ten. The totals may not sum due to rounding.
Source: Office of Homeland Security Statistics Statistical Immigration Data.

The majority were T8s (over 99 percent) while T42s were 0.005 percent of UC apprehensions. Rio Grande Valley had the majority of both T8s (51 percent). El Paso, TX saw the next highest

proportion of UC apprehensions at 16 percent. The vast majority of UCs were apprehended at the Southwest Border (99 percent) while only 12 UCs were encountered at the Northern Border and 118 at the Coastal Border.

Tables 5a–5d provide counts of UC apprehensions and T42s at the Southwest Border by countries of citizenship and by USBP sector for 2013 to 2022.

Table 5a: USBP Total Southwest Border Apprehensions of UCs, FY 2013 to 2022

Fiscal Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	El Centro, CA	El Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	Total
2013	130	2,140	430	740	3,800	21,550	660	9,070	250	38,760
2014	260	3,270	660	1,030	3,800	49,960	950	8,260	350	68,540
2015	840	2,290	670	1,660	2,460	23,860	1,080	6,020	1,090	39,970
2016	950	2,690	1,380	3,890	2,950	36,710	1,550	6,300	3,270	59,690
2017	810	1,350	1,530	3,930	2,030	23,710	1,550	3,660	2,870	41,440
2018	990	1,300	2,720	5,460	2,880	23,760	2,490	5,020	5,420	50,040
2019	780	3,620	2,690	16,160	2,520	34,520	3,340	5,110	7,290	76,020
2020	530	2,200	1,610	4,840	2,640	10,260	1,860	5,950	690	30,550
2021	1,610	8,190	1,700	22,340	3,860	74,760	4,250	17,640	5,840	140,190
2022	1,400	11,410	1,420	23,820	3,990	76,780	4,990	19,010	6,280	149,090

Notes: In order to protect privacy, table cells are rounded to the nearest ten. The totals may not sum due to rounding. T42s are included in 2020-2022, but not other years, as 2020 is the first year T42 encounters occurred.
Source: Office of Homeland Security Statistics Statistical Immigration Data.

Table 5b: USBP Southwest Border Apprehensions of UCs from Mexico, FY 2013 to 2022

Fiscal Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	El Centro, CA	El Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	Total
2013	100	1,080	330	650	1,650	6,370	600	6,240	190	17,220
2014	100	820	280	700	1,350	7,080	740	4,390	170	15,630
2015	70	800	400	820	1,300	3,240	820	3,410	140	11,010
2016	120	870	610	1,150	1,520	3,390	850	3,290	130	11,930
2017	170	510	690	770	1,110	2,790	700	2,000	130	8,880
2018	190	540	1,160	810	1,550	2,470	1,160	2,120	140	10,140
2019	220	580	1,020	1,000	1,530	2,530	1,370	2,040	190	10,490
2020	290	920	1,330	1,960	2,020	3,120	1,650	2,830	220	14,360
2021	710	2,420	1,230	1,930	2,750	3,310	3,540	4,330	470	20,680
2022	900	4,000	850	3,310	3,000	3,950	3,830	5,280	830	25,950

Notes: In order to protect privacy, table cells are rounded to the nearest ten. The totals may not sum due to rounding. T42s are included in 2020-2022, but not other years, as 2020 is the first year T42 encounters occurred.
Source: Office of Homeland Security Statistics Statistical Immigration Data.

Table 5c: USBP Southwest Border Apprehensions of UCs from Northern Central American Countries, FY 2013 to 2022

Fiscal Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	El Centro, CA	El Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	Total
2013	20	1,040	100	80	2,030	14,700	50	2,730	40	20,790
2014	150	2,420	380	290	2,330	42,020	210	3,730	180	51,710
2015	760	1,480	270	820	1,110	20,260	260	2,500	930	28,390
2016	820	1,810	640	2,690	1,380	32,940	630	2,900	3,090	46,890
2017	630	820	670	3,090	860	20,620	700	1,640	2,720	31,750
2018	800	740	1,240	4,560	1,090	20,890	830	2,840	5,200	38,190
2019	540	2,860	1,380	14,660	940	30,870	1,670	2,980	6,840	62,750
2020	230	1,160	110	2,550	600	6,830	140	3,040	370	15,030
2021	840	4,520	230	19,040	1,080	69,090	560	12,950	4,300	112,600
2022	480	5,090	200	19,270	970	70,410	630	13,530	3,450	114,020

Notes: In order to protect privacy, table cells are rounded to the nearest ten. The totals may not sum due to rounding. T42s are included in 2020-2022, but not other years, as 2020 is the first year T42 encounters occurred. Northern Central American countries include El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
Source: Office of Homeland Security Statistics Statistical Immigration Data.

Table 5d: USBP Southwest Border Apprehensions of UCs from All Other Countries, FY 2013 to 2022

Fiscal Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	El Centro, CA	El Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	Total
2013	0	10	0	10	120	490	10	100	20	760
2014	0	30	10	40	120	860	10	140	10	1,200
2015	10	10	0	20	50	360	10	110	20	570
2016	10	20	130	50	60	390	80	110	40	870
2017	10	20	180	70	60	300	150	20	10	800
2018	0	20	320	90	240	400	500	70	80	1,710
2019	10	190	290	490	50	1,120	300	90	260	2,790
2020	10	110	170	320	20	300	70	80	100	1,170
2021	70	1,260	250	1,380	30	2,360	150	350	1,080	6,930
2022	20	2,310	380	1,250	10	2,420	540	190	2,010	9,120

Notes: In order to protect privacy, table cells are rounded to the nearest ten. The totals may not sum due to rounding. T42s are included in 2020-2022, but not other years, as 2020 is the first year T42 encounters occurred.
Source: Office of Homeland Security Statistics Statistical Immigration Data.

Total USBP UC apprehensions at the Southwest Border in 2022 reached its highest point since 2013 and increased 6.0 percent from 2021 and 146 percent from the 2013-2021 average. As seen in Table 5a, the Rio Grande Valley saw about half (51 percent) of all UC arrivals in 2022, which was a 3.0 percent increase in 2022 from 2021. A majority of these children (76 percent) were from the Northern Central American countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Apprehensions of UCs from Northern Central American countries (114,000) increased by just one percent between 2021 and 2022, and 151 percent from the 2013-2021 average. The number of UCs from Mexico (25,000) entering at the Southwest Border in 2022 was up 25 percent from 2021. Apprehensions of UCs from countries other than Mexico and Northern Central American countries represent just 6.0 percent of total UC Southwest Border apprehensions. However, the count of UCs from other countries (9,000) increased by 32 percent 2021-2022, reaching its highest number since 2013, the last year data was available.

A majority of UC apprehensions in 2022 (over 99 percent) occurred along the Southwest Border. Only 12 UCs were apprehended across the Northern Border, while 118 were apprehended along the Coastal Border; the Northern Border sector with the highest number of UC apprehensions was Blaine Buffalo with five UCs while the Miami and Ramey sectors saw 89 and 27 UCs, respectively.

§ 1092(b)(1)(G) Apprehensions of family unit aliens

Definition

Family unit member (FM) – A member of a group consisting of a noncitizen minor with his or her adult noncitizen parent or legal guardian. For example, a mother and child apprehended together are counted as two FM noncitizens.

This BSMR interprets the reporting requirement for apprehensions in each USBP sector to encompass total USBP encounters by sector. In the following "Available Data and Discussion" data tables of this section, apprehensions and T42s are together summarily referred to as "apprehensions."

FM apprehensions and T42 encounters are output metrics that provide information used for program planning and operational purposes, among other uses. Historically, the Department has also used apprehensions as a proxy indicator of unlawful entries, an outcome metric.

Methodology and Limitations

Apprehensions and T42s are recorded in administrative record systems with a unique identifier created for each apprehension and T42. USBP's count of apprehensions and T42s is considered reliable, but agents may not always be able to reliably identify FMs.

USBP began collecting data on FMs apprehended between POEs in 2012; data on FMs are unavailable for earlier years.

Data and Discussion

Table 6 provides counts of FM apprehensions and T42 encounters by citizenship and by USBP sector for 2022, broken out by type.

Table 6: USBP Total Apprehensions of FMs by Title, FY 2022

Title	T8	T42	Total
Total	970	70,140	45,690
Southwest Border			
Big Bend, TX	850	660	1,520
Del Rio, TX	88,360	17,390	105,760
El Centro, CA	11,300	1,160	12,460
El Paso, TX	46,180	15,430	61,600
Laredo, TX	380	2,390	2,780
Rio Grande Valley, TX	70,590	59,850	130,430
San Diego, CA	25,340	3,930	29,280
Tucson, AZ	9,940	6,660	16,600
Yuma, AZ	113,950	8,590	122,540
Northern Border			
Blaine, WA	80	0	80
Buffalo, NY	0	0	0
Grand Forks, ND	10	10	20
Houlton, ME	0	40	40
Havre, MT	30	0	30
Spokane, WA	0	0	0
Swanton, VT	90	30	120
Coastal Border			
Miami, FL	670	0	670
New Orleans, LA	0	0	0
Ramey, PR	80	0	80

Note: In order to protect privacy, table cells are rounded to the nearest ten. The totals may not sum due to rounding.
Source: Office of Homeland Security Statistics Statistical Immigration Data.

In 2022, about one-fourth of FM apprehensions were T42s (24 percent), while the remainder were T8s (76 percent). Yuma had the majority of T8s (31 percent) while Rio Grande Valley had the majority of T42s (52 percent). Big Bend had both the fewest T8s (less than 1.0 percent) and the fewest T42s (1.0 percent).

Tables 6a–6e provide counts of apprehensions and T42s by FM status and by USBP sector for 2012 to 2022.

Table 6a: USBP Southwest Border Apprehensions of FMs, FY 2013 to 2022

Fiscal Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	El Centro, CA	El Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	Total
2013	100	710	370	300	1,690	7,270	1,580	2,630	220	14,860
2014	180	4,950	630	560	3,590	52,330	1,720	3,810	680	68,450
2015	810	2,140	680	1,220	1,370	27,410	1,550	2,930	1,730	39,840
2016	1,050	3,550	1,590	5,660	1,640	52,010	2,860	3,140	6,170	77,670
2017	940	2,450	1,800	8,610	870	49,900	2,940	2,040	6,070	75,620
2018	740	2,830	3,540	12,310	600	63,280	4,410	4,950	14,550	107,210
2019	2,930	32,840	7,870	132,910	1,170	211,630	16,170	16,200	51,960	473,680
2020	380	7,700	1,060	10,560	1,890	11,670	5,010	11,030	2,940	52,230
2021	1,010	74,830	5,490	18,450	3,300	257,340	18,520	11,950	60,180	451,080
2022	1,520	105,760	12,460	61,600	2,780	130,430	29,280	16,600	122,540	482,960

Notes: In order to protect privacy, table cells are rounded to the nearest ten. The totals may not sum due to rounding. T42s are included in 2020-2022, but not other years, as 2020 is the first year T42 encounters occurred.
Source: Office of Homeland Security Statistics Statistical Immigration Data.

Table 6b: USBP Southwest Border Apprehensions of FMs from Mexico, FY 2013 to 2022

Fiscal Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	El Centro, CA	El Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	Total
2013	90	180	290	270	1,120	1,690	1,340	2,220	160	7,360
2014	60	140	260	210	780	1,830	1,210	1,060	80	5,640
2015	40	170	200	190	710	1,330	850	700	90	4,280
2016	40	230	160	220	520	1,390	350	490	80	3,480
2017	40	120	160	210	360	820	260	260	50	2,270
2018	60	140	230	170	290	710	370	230	60	2,260
2019	40	350	260	1,450	490	1,070	690	1,110	540	6,000
2020	90	660	330	1,640	1,530	1,190	1,290	2,480	730	9,920
2021	320	2,960	470	1,820	2,300	3,330	2,520	1,970	1,360	17,040
2022	440	3,530	600	4,650	2,260	3,710	2,210	4,210	1,700	23,300

Notes: In order to protect privacy, table cells are rounded to the nearest ten. The totals may not sum due to rounding. T42s are included in 2020-2022, but not other years, as 2020 is the first year T42 encounters occurred.
Source: Office of Homeland Security Statistics Statistical Immigration Data.

Table 6c: USBP Southwest Border Apprehensions of FMs from Northern Central American Countries, FY 2013 to 2022

Fiscal Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	El Centro, CA	El Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	Total
2013	10	520	40	20	520	5,350	40	250	20	6,780
2014	100	4,750	340	290	2,770	49,790	350	2,550	390	61,330
2015	760	1,930	470	1,000	600	25,300	620	2,130	1,560	34,360
2016	1,010	3,230	1,380	4,630	830	49,920	1,620	2,500	5,300	70,410
2017	900	2,290	1,500	7,130	480	48,730	2,410	1,760	5,940	71,150
2018	680	2,670	3,240	11,870	300	61,810	3,880	4,710	14,360	103,510
2019	2,870	28,550	7,100	111,670	590	201,270	14,160	14,560	49,770	430,550
2020	240	3,480	150	3,470	280	9,330	570	6,910	1,280	25,730
2021	530	10,320	410	10,610	880	228,270	2,380	5,320	4,600	263,320
2022	200	13,230	400	6,020	350	96,360	1,260	3,190	4,120	125,130

Notes: In order to protect privacy, table cells are rounded to the nearest ten. The totals may not sum due to rounding. T42s are included in 2020-2022, but not other years, as 2020 is the first year T42 encounters occurred.
Northern Central American countries are El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
Source: Office of Homeland Security Statistics Statistical Immigration Data.

Table 6d: USBP Southwest Border Apprehensions of FMs from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, FY 2013 to 2022

Fiscal Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	El Centro, CA	El Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	Total
2013	0	10	0	0	0	30	0	0	0	40
2014	0	20	0	10	20	120	0	0	0	170
2015	0	10	0	0	0	70	0	0	0	90
2016	0	0	0	20	0	170	0	10	10	200
2017	0	10	10	20	0	130	0	10	0	190
2018	0	0	0	120	0	430	20	10	60	650
2019	10	2,050	60	2,140	20	5,950	580	90	1,080	11,970
2020	30	2,090	50	410	10	410	2,280	730	200	6,210
2021	70	39,420	720	3,260	50	12,960	1,700	1,560	12,730	72,470
2022	780	66,420	3,740	23,300	90	20,820	3,350	3,330	44,120	165,940

Notes: In order to protect privacy, table cells are rounded to the nearest ten. The totals may not sum due to rounding. T42s are included in 2020-2022, but not other years, as 2020 is the first year T42 encounters occurred.
Source: Office of Homeland Security Statistics Statistical Immigration Data.

Table 6e: Southwest Border Apprehensions of FMs from All Other Countries, FY 2013 to 2022

Fiscal Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	El Centro, CA	El Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	Total
2013	0	0	30	10	50	190	190	160	40	680
2014	20	40	30	50	30	590	160	200	200	1,310
2015	0	30	10	30	60	710	80	110	90	1,110
2016	10	80	50	790	300	530	900	150	780	3,590
2017	0	30	130	1,240	20	220	270	20	80	2,020
2018	10	20	60	150	10	330	140	10	70	790
2019	10	1,880	450	17,650	60	3,340	750	440	580	25,160
2020	20	1,470	530	5,040	70	740	870	920	730	10,380
2021	90	22,140	3,890	2,760	70	12,780	11,930	3,110	41,500	98,260
2022	100	22,580	7,730	27,630	80	9,550	22,460	5,870	72,590	168,590

Notes: In order to protect privacy, table cells are rounded to the nearest ten. The totals may not sum due to rounding. T42s are included in 2020 and 2021, but not other years, as 2020 is the first year T42 encounters occurred.
Source: Office of Homeland Security Statistics Statistical Immigration Data.

Total FM apprehensions increased six-fold between 2012 (the first year for which data are available) and 2014, fell from 68,000 to 40,000 between 2014 and 2015, almost tripled between 2015 and 2018 (107,000), more than quadrupled between 2018 and 2019 (474,000), briefly fell significantly in 2020 (52,000) and returned to over 400,000 in 2021 and 2022. Increases in 2022 occurred across all Southwest Border sectors except Laredo, TX and Rio Grande Valley, TX, which decreased by 16 percent and 49 percent, respectively. Rio Grande Valley sector still saw the largest number of apprehensions of FMs (130,000), 27 percent of the total.

Unlike UC apprehensions, where apprehension from countries not including Mexico and Northern Central American countries accounted for 6.0 percent of the total Southwest Border encounters in 2022, 69 percent of FM apprehensions on the Southwest Border in 2022 were from all other countries. This is opposed to 2021, when 58 percent of FM apprehensions were from Northern Central American countries and just 38 percent were from all other countries not including Mexico and Northern Central America. In 2022, 26 percent of FMs are from Northern

Central American countries, a decrease of 32 percentage points. FMs from Northern Central America decreased 52 percent from 263,000 in 2021 to 125,000 in 2022. This is an especially noticeable change considering Northern Central American countries have made up over 85 percent of total FMs since 2013. Mexican FMs made up 5.0 percent of total FMs and increased 37 percent from 2021. In 2022, FM apprehensions from Cuba, Haiti, Nigeria, and Venezuela increased by 129 percent from 2021 and now account for 34 percent of total FM apprehensions and 50 percent of apprehensions of FMs from all other countries not including Mexico and Northern Central American countries.

Northern and Coastal Border apprehensions represented a small portion of FM apprehensions in 2021. Across the Coastal Border, 757 FMs were apprehended and 290 were apprehended at the Northern Border.

§ 1092(b)(1)(H) Between the ports illicit drugs seizure rate

Definition

Between the ports illicit drugs seizure rate – For each type of illicit drug seized by USBP between POEs, the ratio of the illicit drugs seized in any year relative to the average amount seized in the immediately preceding 5 years.

The illicit drug seizure rate is an output metric, which compares trends in activity over time.

Methodology and Limitations

Between the ports drug seizure data are obtained from USBP administrative records. These data are considered reliable.

Pursuant to the definition of the illicit drug seizure rate directed by NDAA § 1092(b)(1)(H), the drug seizure rate describes the ratio of each year's seizures relative to illicit drugs seizures in the preceding 5 years; the metric does not describe the rate at which illicit drugs are seized.

Available Data and Discussion

Drug seizure trends varied in 2022 by type of illicit drug. Marijuana seizures continued a 5-year pattern of decline, from 391,000 kilograms in 2017 to 35,000 kilograms in 2022, and an illicit drug seizure rate of 20 percent in 2022, a decrease of three percentage points from last year. Seizures of cocaine and heroin in 2022 decreased from 2021, both in terms to total seizures (which decreased by 39 percent and 42 percent, respectively) and in terms of 5-year averages (which decreased by 114 percentage points and 259 percentage points, respectively). Seizures of methamphetamines increased in 2022 from 2021 by 56 percent from 5,300 to 8,300, for an illicit drug seizure rate of 134 percent, 43 percentage points higher than 2021. Seizures of fentanyl continued a 5-year pattern of increase, from 82 kilograms in 2017 to 1,000 kilograms in 2022, with a 117 percent increase from 2021 to 2022, while the illicit drug seizure rate of 404 percent in 2022 was124 percentage points higher than 2021.

Table 7: Illicit Drugs Seized Relative to Preceding 5 Years (Illicit Drug Seizure Rate) between POEs, FY 2013 to 2022

		2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Marijuana	Rate	106%	78%	67%	60%	45%	29%	22%	29%	23.17%	19.63%
	Kg seized	1,102,285	872,052	697,764	586,972	390,648	209,120	120,803	116,773	66,013	35,458
Cocaine	Rate	44%	47%	144%	64%	123%	93%	157%	174%	212%	98%
	Kg seized	2,085	2,066	5,089	2,483	4,239	2,971	5,288	6,967	9,322	5,656
Heroin	Rate	19%	20%	26%	33%	177%	88%	126%	1281%	391%	132%
	Kg seized	16	17	15	16	27	16	23	248	258	151
Methamphetamines	Rate	226%	178%	197%	211%	199%	174%	179%	205%	90%	134%
	Kg seized	1,624	1,783	2,922	3,730	4,685	5,132	6,534	9,432	5,342	8,323
Fentanyl1	Rate	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	280%	404%
	Kg seized	NA	NA	NA	48	82	176	151	367	462	1,001

NA – no data available.
Notes: Data for prior years updated from to represent most recent numbers. USBP began tracking fentanyl seizures in July 2016, so it is not possible to calculate a drug seizure rate as defined by the NDAA for 2016 to 2020.
Source: Office of Homeland Security Statistics analysis of USBP data.

§ 1092(b)(1)(I) Estimates of the impact of the consequence delivery system on recidivism

Definition

Consequence delivery system (CDS) – A process implemented by USBP to uniquely evaluate each apprehended subject, identify the most effective and efficient consequences, and deliver these consequences to impede and deter further unlawful activity.

Recidivist rate – The share of subjects apprehended by USBP who are apprehended more than once in the same fiscal year.

The annual recidivist rate is an output metric that offers insight into what share of repatriated noncitizens are deterred from making additional unlawful entry attempts but does not account for unknown attempts/entries or who make such attempts/entries in a subsequent fiscal year. USBP uses the annual recidivist rate as one of its 13 metrics of the effectiveness of enforcement consequences under the CDS.

Methodology and Limitations

Since 2007, USBP has collected biometric data (including fingerprints and digital photographs) from most unlawful border crossers it apprehends. For the purpose of this report, these data are used to identify subjects apprehended more than once in the same fiscal year. USBP data on re-apprehensions in the same year are considered reliable. The annual recidivist rate is defined as the number of unique subjects apprehended multiple times in a fiscal year divided by the total number of unique subjects in the same fiscal year:

$$Annual\ Recidivist\ Rate = \frac{Number\ of\ Unique\ Subjects\ Apprehended\ Multiple\ Times}{Total\ Number\ of\ Unique\ Subjects}$$

The annual recidivism rate is an indicator of the probability that individuals previously apprehended make subsequent attempts at unlawful re-entry; a drop in the annual recidivism rate

very likely reflects a reduction in re-apprehensions. This measure has the further advantages that USBP can calculate annual recidivism based strictly on its own apprehension data and that the rate can be reliably calculated at the end of each year. These features make the annual recidivism rate a useful measure for USBP performance management and an important operational measure.

Nonetheless, as the GAO has argued, if the goal is to accurately describe the share of individuals previously apprehended who make additional unlawful entry attempts, the current measure of recidivism could be strengthened in at least two ways: 1) count re-apprehensions based on the date on which a subject is removed or returned, rather than that the date of apprehension; 2) count re-apprehensions that occur within a fixed period of time defined by the subject's repatriation date, rather than by the year.[13] When based on a one-year window, these refinements yield a more expansive definition of the recidivism rate that DHS refers to as the "Total One-Year Recidivism Rate;" DHS anticipates that in the future, this report will include estimates of the impact of CDS on both the annual recidivism rate and a longer-term recidivism rate.

Interpreting recidivism rates must be done with caution. While declines in recidivism may suggest greater deterrence and/or improvements by USBP, changes in the overall flow may be the result of more first-attempt border crossers, thus driving down the recidivism rate. Therefore, changes to the recidivism rate should be examined alongside the overall flow. Furthermore, changes to push factors over time may also play a role in decreasing subsequent entry attempts.

Additionally, the impact of CDS on recidivism within a given year is not solely a measure of USBP or DHS consequences and operations. All enforcement actions that occur after apprehension and processing subjects into a consequence are controlled and timed by other components and government agencies. Some subjects are never returned and therefore would not be represented in the metric. For example, a subject who remains in the United States, pending the conclusion of immigration court proceedings for several years, has been successfully prevented from re-entry—but that success results from the failure to complete a repatriation. Thus, recidivism, calculated as described here, is influenced by court schedules and the operational ability of other immigration components as well as USBP consequences.

Available Data and Discussion

Since the implementation of CDS in 2012, all Southwest Border sectors have seen decreases in annual recidivism rates in 2022, except in Laredo, TX, Rio Grande Valley, TX, and Yuma, AZ. The total Recidivism Rate across the Southwest Border decreased by 0.5 percentage points.

On the Coastal and Northern Borders, the physical security concern does not focus on the apprehension rate of unlawful entrants, since the number of such attempted and successful entries is assumed small. Together, the Coastal and Northern Borders accounted for 0.02 of total turn backs and 0.002 percent of the total got aways.

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[13] GAO, "Border Patrol: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of Post-Apprehension Consequences," GAO-17-66, January 2017, pp. 13-17.

Table 8: CDS Recidivism Rate by Sector, FY 2013 to 2022

Fiscal Year	Big Bend, TX	Del Rio, TX	El Centro, CA	El Paso, TX	Laredo, TX	Rio Grande Valley, TX	San Diego, CA	Tucson, AZ	Yuma, AZ	Total
2013	7.6%	7.3%	35.9%	10.2%	12.3%	11.6%	32.3%	21.2%	17.0%	**15.7%**
2014	6.7%	5.2%	32.6%	11.2%	11.6%	11.8%	32.5%	18.6%	13.3%	**14.1%**
2015	5.0%	6.1%	31.7%	8.6%	11.8%	12.7%	31.4%	15.7%	11.3%	**14.0%**
2016	5.6%	6.7%	24.5%	8.3%	13.0%	9.9%	27.3%	15.7%	5.4%	**12.3%**
2017	4.7%	5.5%	22.7%	6.2%	13.3%	8.3%	21.8%	12.5%	3.8%	**10.5%**
2018	7.7%	5.1%	22.7%	4.4%	14.0%	8.3%	21.4%	14.1%	2.7%	**10.8%**
2019	5.8%	3.3%	20.8%	3.0%	15.4%	4.9%	17.6%	11.5%	1.9%	**6.7%**
2020	5.9%	10.3%	23.5%	11.7%	15.3%	11.6%	25.4%	9.5%	5.6%	**13.3%**
2021	5.2%	1.0%	5.3%	1.9%	9.0%	1.0%	5.6%	3.9%	0.5%	**1.7%**
2022	5.1%	0.4%	1.4%	0.8%	9.2%	1.5%	2.5%	3.9%	1.1%	**1.2%**

Source: USBP.

Recidivism data are not available to calculate the impact of CDS at the Northern Border or coastal boundaries.

Understanding the Demands of Title 42 Encounters and the Effect on Recidivism

As of March 21, 2020, to provide the most accurate analysis of recidivism, the recidivism rate reported in accordance with the GPRAMA of 2010 includes subjects encountered and processed under Title 42 authority. That authority stems from administrative guidance related to public health efforts in support of the March 2020 order, *Order Suspending Introduction of Persons from a Country Where a Communicable Disease Exists,*[14] and related orders issued by the CDC and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). For FY 2020, to diminish the spread of COVID-19, the CDC/HHS order required noncitizens subject to it to be expelled from the United States as expeditiously as possible under Title 42 authority, rather than being apprehended and processed under Title 8 authority.

To implement the CDC/HHS order, the determination on whether a subject becomes a T42 encounter or a T8 apprehension is made after initial processing, which includes biometric collection such as fingerprints. If the initial processing and records check reveals no outstanding criminal warrants or indication of national-security threat, the subject is expelled from the United States to Mexico, Canada, or the subject's country of citizenship.

From a USBP standpoint, T42s do not face the CDS. In effect, no consequence is applied because the subject was not apprehended. USBP totals on T8 apprehensions and T42 encounters do not co-mingle; therefore, the CDS recidivism rate does not include T42s.

In 2021, T42s constituted 63 percent of the year's total Southwest Border encounters (1,040,695 of 1,662,167). In 2022, it accounted for 48 percent of the total Southwest Border encounters (1,054,509 of 2,214,652). When T42s are included in calculating a comprehensive recidivism

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[14] For full text of order, see order 85 FR 16567 at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/03/24/2020-06241/order-suspending-introduction-of-persons-from-a-country-where-a-communicable-disease-exists.

rate among all those encountered between the POEs, the number rises to 27 percent[15] in comparison to the CDS recidivism rate of 2.0 percent in 2021.

§ 1092(b)(1)(J) Examination of each consequence under the CDS

Definition

Consequence – An administrative, programmatic, or criminal justice process imposed on a subject following the subject's apprehension. CDS is designed to identify, for any given subject, the ideal consequences to deliver to impede and deter further unlawful activity.

Methodology and Limitations

USBP's current methodology for assessing the CDS involves analyzing the effectiveness and efficiency of each enforcement consequence. One of the key effectiveness metrics is the annual recidivism rate, which is calculated separately for each enforcement consequence.

Under the CDS, USBP specifically targets noncitizens with more extensive records of unlawful border crossing behaviors for consequences that are designed to have a greater deterrent impact. As a result, differences in recidivism rates by enforcement consequence may reflect differences in the propensity of the targeted population to make further re-entry attempts, in addition to the possible impact of each consequence on recidivism.

An additional limitation of currently available data is that they are based on apprehension data for a given year, not repatriation data. Depending on the consequence and the timing of the apprehension, some individuals may not be repatriated to their country of origin during the fiscal year of their apprehension, and therefore may not have an opportunity to attempt re-entry. For example, long waits to appear in immigration courts for non-detained noncitizens mean very few noncitizens issued warrants of arrest and notices to appear (WA/NTA) are removed in the same year as their apprehension, which results in artificially low recidivism rates for noncitizens subject to that consequence. DHS and CBP are working to refine their analysis of CDS and will seek to address these limitations in a subsequent version of this report.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 9 summarizes recidivism rates by different consequences for 2013 to 2022.

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[15] Based on USBP FY 2021 GPRAMA results.

Table 9: Annual Recidivism Rate by Consequence, FY 2013 to 2022

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Voluntary Return	28.6%	30.5%	27.0%	24.6%	24.7%	25.3%	29.2%	18.5%	28.6%	26.7%
Warrant of Arrest/Notice to Appear	1.4%	0.6%	0.9%	0.4%	0.4%	0.5%	1.3%	8.4%	0.4%	0.4%
Expedited Removal	16.7%	17.5%	18.1%	15.5%	13.5%	14.1%	13.0%	15.9%	1.0%	2.1%
Reinstatement of Removal	16.4%	15.8%	15.4%	16.6%	15.0%	15.6%	13.4%	13.6%	4.2%	3.9%
Alien Transfer Exit Program	25.5%	28.6%	27.2%	28.8%	27.9%	31.7%	16.7%	71.4%	NA	NA
Criminal Consequence Initiative	9.3%	8.2%	6.7%	8.4%	6.2%	9.3%	9.0%	9.2%	2.4%	2.1%
Standard Prosecution	10.2%	9.2%	8.8%	8.2%	7.0%	9.1%	11.2%	9.5%	4.2%	1.7%
Operation Against Smugglers Initiative on Safety and Security	18.0%	18.3%	23.0%	30.9%	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

NA – no data available.
Note: The Operation Against Smugglers Initiative on Safety and Security program was discontinued after 2016.
Source: USBP.

While these data should be interpreted with caution for the reasons identified above, some trends are noteworthy. For example, with the exception of WA/NTA for the reasons noted above, the more punitive consequence programs such as the Criminal Consequence Initiative[16] and Standard Prosecution[17] generally showed lower recidivism rates (both 2.0 percent) than less punitive programs like voluntary return (26 percent). Recidivism rates by consequence did not change significantly between 2021 and 2022; Warrant of Arrest/Notice to Appear[18] remained the same (0.4 percent) while Expedited Removal[19] increased one percentage point and Standard Prosecution decreased by three percentage points.

§ 1092(c) METRICS FOR SECURING THE BORDER AT PORTS OF ENTRY

§ 1092(c)(1)(A)(i) Total inadmissible travelers at ports of entry

Definition

Inadmissible noncitizen– A noncitizen seeking admission at a POE who is ineligible for admission pursuant to INA § 212(a).

Known inadmissible noncitizens – Noncitizens seeking admission at a POE who are found by OFO to be inadmissible.

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[16] The Criminal Consequence Initiative (formerly known as Operation Streamline) is a criminal prosecutions program through which noncitizens are charged with unlawful entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1325 or unlawful re-entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 in an expedited criminal proceeding before a magistrate judge.
[17] Standard prosecution refers to CBP's referral of a noncitizen to the Department of Justice to face criminal charges for unlawful entry, unlawful re-entry, and/or another criminal offense through standard criminal proceedings.
[18] Warrant of Arrest/Notice to Appear (NTA) refers to I-862, a document that is the first step in starting removal proceedings under INA Section 240. The form identifies the grounds for removal under which the noncitizen is being charged and instructs them to appear before an immigration judge.
[19] Expedited removal refers to the process in which a noncitizen is administratively removed from the United States by DHS without being referred to an immigration judge.

Total attempted inadmissible noncitizens – The estimated number of inadmissible noncitizens who attempt to enter the United States. Total attempted inadmissible noncitizens include known inadmissible noncitizens and successful improper entries at POEs.

Inadmissible noncitizens and known inadmissible noncitizens are output metrics that describe OFO officer workload. Known inadmissible noncitizens may also be used as a proxy indicator of total attempted inadmissible noncitizens, which is an outcome metric.

Methodology and Limitations

Known inadmissible noncitizens are recorded in OFO administrative records with a unique identifier created for each inadmissibility determination. OFO's count of known inadmissible noncitizens is considered reliable.

The Department continues to improve the Compliance Examination (COMPEX) program. As of 2020, the program was capable of estimating undetected major infractions at POEs. However, it is unable to reliably estimate successful unlawful entries due to the nature of the survey. The hindrance is the sample size and number of positive COMPEX findings, which is currently not sufficient when it comes to reliably estimating successful unlawful entries. OFO cannot currently accommodate increased sampling due to CBP's responsibility of balancing the facilitation of legitimate trade and travel and our fiduciary responsibility to the American taxpayer. It is highly unlikely that we will ever be able to provide data for successful unlawful entries due to the nature of the survey.

Available Data and Discussion

An average of 276,000 noncitizens were identified as inadmissible at POEs between 2013 and 2022, with the highest numbers observed in 2022 (502,000). Inadmissible noncitizens increased 238,000 from 2021 to 2022.

Table 10: Known Inadmissible Noncitizens at POEs, FY 2013 to 2022

2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
205,920	224,930	254,640	292,610	216,160	279,010	288,520	232,370	263,970	502,470

Note: In order to protect privacy, table cells are rounded to the nearest ten. The totals may not sum due to rounding.
Source: OFO.

§ 1092(c)(1)(A)(ii) Refusal and interdiction rates at ports of entry

Definition

Refusal rate – The share of all travelers seeking admission at a POE found inadmissible. Refusal rate is an output metric that describes OFO officer workload.

POE interdiction rate – The share of attempted inadmissible noncitizens found inadmissible. POE interdiction rate is an output metric that describes the difficulty of entering the United States unlawfully through a POE.

Methodology and Limitations

The refusal rate is calculated by dividing known inadmissible noncitizens (i.e., noncitizens found inadmissible by OFO officers at POEs) by the total number of travelers (i.e., all persons seeking entry at POEs):

$$Refusal\ Rate = \frac{Inadmissibility\ Determinations}{Travelers}$$

Data on inadmissibility determinations and total travelers are obtained from OFO administrative records; these data are considered reliable.

Available Data and Discussion

The number of travelers at POEs continuously increased from 2013 to 2018 (from 362 million to 414 million) before declining slightly in 2019 (to 410 million) and experienced a large decrease in 2021 (to 180 million) before rising again in 2022 (to 320 million). The number of known inadmissible noncitizens has consistently been small compared to travelers coming through POEs, with the refusal rate hovering within a range of 0.05-0.09 percent from 2013 to 2020. The year 2022 had the highest refusal rate (0.16 percent) since 2013, an increase one basis point from 2021 (0.15 percent).

Table 11: Inadmissible Noncitizens and Refusal Rate at POEs,
FY 2013 to 2022

Fiscal Year	Passengers	Inadmissibles	Refusal Rate
2013	362,333,990	205,920	0.06%
2014	374,974,750	224,930	0.06%
2015	383,200,230	254,640	0.07%
2016	390,592,750	292,610	0.07%
2017	397,407,840	216,160	0.05%
2018	413,878,570	279,010	0.07%
2019	410,287,340	288,520	0.07%
2020	237,965,620	232,370	0.09%
2021	179,466,170	263,970	0.15%
2022	317,136,460	502,470	0.16%

Note: In order to protect privacy, table cells are rounded to the nearest ten. The totals may not sum due to rounding.
Source: OFO.

§ 1092(c)(1)(A)(iii) Unlawful entries at ports of entry

Definition

Successful unlawful entries – The estimated number of inadmissible noncitizens who improperly enter the United States through POEs.

Successful unlawful entries are an outcome metric.

Methodology and Limitations

As of the 2023 BSMR (2022 data), OFO cannot provide estimated unlawful entries. The Department plans to improve the COMPEX program to provide the specified metric as defined by the NDAA in future reports. As of 2020, the program could estimate undetected major infractions at POEs. However, it is unable to reliably estimate successful unlawful entries due to the nature of the survey. The hindrance is the sample size and number of positive COMPEX findings, which is currently not sufficient when it comes to reliably estimating the successful unlawful entries. OFO reports it cannot currently accommodate increased sampling due to CBP's responsibility of balancing the facilitation of legitimate trade and travel. As of February 2024, COMPEX will remain in suspension as OFO evaluates the program's current methodology.

OFO and OHSS considered using attempted and successful unlawful entries at POEs reported as incidents as a proxy for successful unlawful entries. However, the results were not considered an accurate proxy and more discussion is required.

§ 1092(c)(1)(B) Illicit drugs seized at ports of entry

Definition

Drug seizures – Seizures of illicit drugs by CBP officers at POEs.

Drug seizures are an output metric. Drug seizures may also be interpreted as a proxy indicator of illicit drug inflows through POEs, an outcome metric.

Methodology and Limitations

Drug seizure data are obtained from OFO administrative records, measured in kilograms. These data are considered reliable.

Available Data and Discussion

Detailed drug seizure data at POEs are contained in Appendix C. Total seizures fell from 401,000 kilograms in 2015 and 368,000 kilograms in 2016 to a recent low of 250,000 kilograms in 2018 and then rising to 274,000 kilograms in 2019 and 332,380 kilograms in 2021. OFO seized a grand total of 247,000 kilograms in 2022.

§ 1092(c)(1)(C) Port of entry illicit drug seizure rate

Definition

POE illicit drug seizure rate – For each type of illicit drug seized by OFO at POEs, the ratio of illicit drugs seized in a single year to the average amount seized in the immediately preceding 5 years.

Methodology and Limitations

POE drug seizure data are obtained from OFO administrative records. These data are considered reliable.

Pursuant to the definition of the illicit drug seizure rate directed by NDAA § 1092(c)(1)(C), the drug seizure rate describes recent seizure trends (i.e., current year compared to the previous 5 years); the measure does not describe the rate at which illicit drugs are seized.

The drug seizure rate is an output metric, which compares trends in activity data over time. Drug seizures may be interpreted as a proxy indicator of illicit drug inflows through POEs, an outcome metric.

Available Data and Discussion

Marijuana seizures at POEs declined from a high of 273,000 kilograms in 2015 to 35,000 kilograms in 2022, after a brief increase to 147,000 in 2020. Cocaine seizures increased to 35,000 kilograms in 2021 but decreased to 26,000 kilograms in 2022 after a record low of 19,000 kilograms in 2020. Heroin seizures have remained around 2,000 kilograms since 2018, with 2,200 kilograms seized in 2021, until decreasing to 700 in 2022. Methamphetamine seizures were at their highest levels since at least 2013 with 67,000 kilograms seized in 2021 and 2022. Fentanyl seizures were also at their highest levels in 2022 (5,700 kilograms).

Table 12: POE Illicit Drug Seizure Rate, FY 2013 to 2022

		2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Marijuana	Rate	82%	78%	119%	99%	72%	62%	65%	78%	48%	26%
	Kg seized	215,705	198,670	273,434	233,827	166,221	135,814	131,328	147,405	78,886	34,757
Cocaine	Rate	88%	85%	76%	116%	137%	105%	178%	72%	129%	90%
	Kg seized	20,976	20,559	17,396	23,958	28,275	23,407	40,464	19,344	34,966	26,229
Heroin	Rate	143%	134%	162%	97%	87%	116%	115%	106%	101%	31%
	Kg seized	1,822	1,963	2,732	1,916	1,758	2,361	2,461	2,369	2,192	698
Methamphetamines	Rate	260%	201%	190%	193%	201%	229%	160%	181%	228%	170%
	Kg seized	9,512	10,639	13,192	17,137	22,885	33,567	31,110	42,709	67,286	67,273
Fentanyl	Rate	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	281%	465%	304%
	Kg seized	NA	NA	32	270	882	860	1,154	1,799	4,619	5,667

Note: OFO began tracking fentanyl seizures partway through 2015 so it is not possible to calculate a drug seizure rate as defined by the NDAA for 2015 to 2019.
Source: Office of Homeland Security Statistics analysis of OFO data.

§ 1092(c)(1)(D) Major infractions at ports of entry

Definition

Major infractions – OFO defines major infractions to include all offenses subject to criminal arrest, including arrests related to terrorism, drugs, immigration crimes (including "zero tolerance" arrests[20]), currency, merchandise, and agriculture products. These major infractions are not equivalent to arrests of individuals, as each individual may be charged with multiple

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[20] All zero tolerance violations include arrests with any amount of a controlled substance that is not destroyed or is not completely destroyed during testing process, effective October 10, 2010.

infractions and not all infractions may ultimately lead to an arrest. In addition, OFO includes National Crime Information Center (NCIC) hits and Terrorist Screening Dataset (TSDS) hits, among others, as major infractions.

Known major infractions – The number of major infractions interdicted by OFO. Known major infractions are an output metric.

Undetected major infractions – The estimated number of major infractions not interdicted by OFO. Undetected major infractions are an outcome metric.

Methodology and Limitations

Known major infractions are recorded in OFO administrative records and are considered reliable. For the purpose of this report, OFO has updated its reporting methodology to limit data to passenger-related infractions, excluding infractions involving mailed goods and other non-passenger-related events.

Undetected major infractions are estimated through COMPEX, which conducts comprehensive audits on a statistical sample of travelers who were processed by CBP without secondary inspection and admitted into the United States. The randomly selected travelers undergo a systematic series of checks to reveal any admissibility, customs, or agriculture infractions. The rate of infractions found within the sample is applied to the population of travelers processed by CBP without secondary inspections. The program to develop these estimates operates at 19 airports and all privately owned vehicle (POV) crossings and is being expanded to pedestrian operations. Numbers reported below are for the airports and POV crossings within the program. Estimates are limited to the assumption that CBP secondary inspections and comprehensive audits find all infractions. This assumption is likely more valid for customs-related screenings at airports than passenger screening given the 100 percent search of all baggage. Additionally, true random sampling is more likely at POV lanes where automated systems select vehicles for additional screening–these automated systems do not yet exist for airports.

CBP implemented major enhancements to COMPEX in 2015 and 2016, but some reviewers still recommend that the program expand its audit sample size to produce more reliable findings.[21] Nonetheless, COMPEX provides the best available estimate of undetected major infractions. COMPLEX was suspended at land ports of entry and reduced examinations in the air environment on March 21, 2020, due to the substantial drop in travel due to COVID-19. No metric is provided for 2021.

Available Data and Discussion

OFO officers made 163,000 seizures based on major infractions at POEs in 2022, an increase of 128 percent from the average number of seizures 2013-2019. The infraction rate in 2022 decreased 0.06 percentage points from the highest recorded infraction rate in 2021.

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[21] Homeland Security Systems Engineering and Development Institute, "Compliance Measurement Examination (COMPEX) Refinement Recommendations: A Statistical Analysis," June 30, 2017.

Table 13: Known Major Infractions at POEs,
FY 2013 to 2022

Fiscal Year	Passengers	Seizure Counts	Infraction Rate
2013	362,333,990	51,391	0.01%
2014	374,974,750	42,190	0.01%
2015	383,200,230	44,380	0.01%
2016	390,592,750	53,545	0.01%
2017	397,407,840	45,601	0.01%
2018	413,878,570	54,420	0.01%
2019	410,287,340	208,711	0.05%
2020	237,965,620	196,629	0.08%
2021	179,466,170	195,943	0.11%
2022	317,136,460	162,861	0.05%

Notes: In order to protect privacy, table cells are rounded to the nearest ten. The totals may not sum due to rounding. This table updates previous versions of this report to align reported values with passenger-related known major infractions (i.e., excluding non-passenger-related incidents).
Source: OFO.

The substantial drop in travel due to COVID-19 related travel restrictions resulted in the suspension of the COMPEX program at land POEs and reduced examinations in the air environment on March 21, 2020. As of 2023, the COMPEX program remains suspended.

Table 14: Estimated Undetected Major Infractions at POEs, FY 2013 to 2022

Fiscal Year	Air	POV
2013	16,114	28,659
2014	13,334	12,376
2015	14,852	27,432
2016	16,158	29,251
2017	12,386	30,295
2018	8,736	29,879
2019	12,755	29,163
2020	10,538	23,999
2021	NA	NA
2022	NA	NA

Note: Undetected major infractions data are unavailable for 2021-2022 due to suspension of COMPEX.
Source: OFO.

§ 1092(c)(1)(E) Cocaine seizure effectiveness rate at ports of entry

Definition

Cocaine seizure effectiveness rate – The amount of cocaine seized by OFO at land POEs compared to the total estimated flow of cocaine through land POEs.

Cocaine seizures are an output metric. Some analysts also treat seizures as a proxy indicator of total attempts to import cocaine, an outcome metric. Seizure effectiveness rate (i.e., cocaine seized as compared to the total estimated cocaine flow) is an output metric.

Methodology and Limitations

Seizure data are obtained from OFO administrative records and is considered reliable. Estimates of the total cocaine flow are provided by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).[22] The U.S. Government does not have an estimate of the share of the total cocaine flow that passes through land POEs, but the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency's National Drug Threat Assessment states that the Southwest Border remains the key entry point for the majority of the cocaine entering the United States.

The DIA estimate is based on a U.S. Government estimate of cocaine departing South America towards the United States, and additionally incorporates estimates of cocaine movement, cocaine production, and U.S. consumption derived from various U.S. Government agencies. The estimated amount of cocaine available to enter the United States (estimated flow in Table 15) is derived by finding the difference between the estimated amount of cocaine departing South America toward the United States and the sum of documented cocaine removals, consumption in the Transit Zone, and documented departures from the Transit Zone towards non-United States destinations.

Available Data and Discussion

Total cocaine seizures at land ports of entry have not changed significantly between 2021 and 2022 compared to the changes between 2020 and 2021, where total cocaine seizures increased 80 percent from 19,000 kilograms in 2020 to 35,000 kilograms in 2021. Total seizures in 2022 were 25 percent lower than 2021. Land seizures increased to 10,600 in 2022, a 1.0 percent decrease from 2021. Estimated total flow (what would have been available to seize at land POEs) rose by 1.0 percent from 2021 to 1,187,000 kilograms in 2022. While total seizures of cocaine decreased 25 percent from 2021 to 2022, the seizure effectiveness rate also decreased from 3.0 to 2.2 percent.

Table 15: Cocaine Seizures and Estimated Flows at Land POEs, FY 2016 to 2022

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Total Seizures	24,017	28,299	25,800	40,500	19,344	34,966	26,229
Land Seizures	9,100	10,800	10,000	9,000	7,021	10,739	10,634
Estimated Flow	1,274,000	1,136,000	1,187,000	849,000	905,000	1,174,000	1,187,000
Seizure Effectiveness Rate	1.9%	2.5%	2.2%	4.8%	2.1%	3.0%	2.2%

Notes: Seizures and estimated flows in kilograms. DIA data on estimated flow does not provide a breakout for land flows, and seizure effectiveness rate is calculated as the ratio of total seizures to total estimated flow. Estimated Flow for 2019 was updated to account for events that were discovered/entered late in the DIA source database. Source: OFO and DIA.

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[22] Previous versions of this report included estimates of total cocaine flow provided by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP).

§ 1092(c)(1)(F)(i) Average wait times and traffic volume

Definition

Average wait time – Average minute wait time for vehicles to pass through a land POE.

Private vehicle volume – The number of private vehicles passing through a land POE per year.

Commercial vehicle volume – The number of commercial vehicles passing through a land POE per year.

Average wait time is an outcome metric describing the ease of crossing the border. Vehicle volume is an output metric.

Methodology and Limitations

OFO uses two primary methodologies for calculating vehicle wait times at the border: line-of-sight and automated technology such as Bluetooth and Radio Frequency Identification. Ports using line-of-site methodology manually record wait times once per hour at the top of each hour using the Border Wait Time Administrative Tool. For ports using automated technology, wait times are recorded automatically in 5–10-minute increments every hour, which OFO averages prior to reporting out. OFO records wait times for 72 land border crossings, excluding small border POEs with negligible wait times. In March 2018, OFO leadership updated CBP's policy guidance for measuring and recording wait times at CBP land border POEs. The updated policy consolidates all previously issued policy regarding manual and automated wait time reporting and further clarifies Active Land Management to more effectively manage traffic flow, primary inspections, and associated resource allocations. OFO records counts of Privately Owned Vehicles (POV) and Commercially Owned Vehicles (COV) as administrative data in its Operations Management Report (OMR); these data are considered reliable.

Available Data and Discussion

Data on average wait times and counts of private and commercial vehicles for each land POE for which data are available are contained in Appendix D1 and D2. Comparisons should be made with caution given the differences in flow and type of traffic at each port.

Notably, POV wait times remained relatively stable between 2019 and 2022, with no increase larger than 15 minutes at any POE, notable at San Ysidro, CA, where wait times increased by 15.8 minutes. The best improvement came in San Luis, AZ and Andrade, CA where wait times decreased by 30 minutes and 17 minutes, respectively.

COV wait times are consistently lower for each station when compared to POV wait times and very little change between 2021 and 2022.

§ 1092(c)(1)(F)(ii) Infrastructure capacity utilization rate

Definition

Infrastructure capacity utilization rate – Average number of vehicles processed per booth, per hour at each land POE.

The infrastructure capacity utilization rate is an output metric that describes OFO's ability to process traffic relative to the physical and staffing capacity.

Methodology and Limitations

Data are obtained from OFO administrative records. The data comes from CBP systems with booth hours and throughput as calculated fields. The hours serve as a proxy metric for the number of CBP officer hours spent processing and are measured on a one-for-one basis. Throughput is then calculated by summing all vehicles that passed through a site in one year and then dividing it by total booth hours.

Available Data and Discussion

Detailed infrastructure capacity utilization rate data are contained in Appendix E.

Each OFO land POE is unique in terms of staffing authorizations and physical layouts. Land POEs may be physically constrained by the available space around them and so unable to expand to yield greater capacity. Land POEs in the United States are also impacted by adjoining Canadian and Mexican land POE management decisions on staffing and physical layouts. Both the OFO Mission Support Facilities Division and the CBP Office of Facilities and Asset Management are working on establishing methods to determine resourcing decisions for land POEs.

Table 16: Average Infrastructure Capacity Utilization Rate, FY 2013 to 2022

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
OFO National Average	43.5%	45.3%	46.6%	47.4%	49.6%	51.1%	50.6%	48.8%	48.9%	47.2%
Northern Border	38.2%	39.0%	35.7%	34.6%	36.3%	37.2%	37.0%	35.6%	28.9%	28.9%
Southwest Border	46.8%	49.1%	53.0%	54.4%	56.6%	58.6%	58.2%	52.8%	51.0%	52.9%

Note: Table depicts average vehicles processed per lane, per hour.
Source: OFO.

In general, the Southwest Border reports higher utilization rates because of higher flows through POEs. The overall utilization rate in 2022 was approximately one less vehicle = than in 2021. Overall, CBP processed an average of 47.2 vehicles per lane, per hour in 2022 (28.9 on the Northern Border; 52.9 on the Southwest Border).

Stanton Street in the El Paso Field Office averaged 126 vehicles per hour, per lane in 2022— once again the highest in the country by a sizeable margin (see Appendix E) at 79 in San Diego, CA vehicles per lane more than the next highest location in 2022. However, Stanton Street only processes travelers eligible for the Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI) trusted traveler program, which are faster to process than other classes of travelers.

§ 1092(c)(1)(F)(iii) Secondary examination rate

Definition

Secondary examination rate – Percentage of passengers subject to secondary inspection at each land POE.

Secondary examination rate is an output metric that describes OFO workload and practices.

Methodology and Limitations

Data are obtained from OFO administrative records. Secondary examination rate is determined by the recorded number of passengers sent for secondary inspection versus the total number of recorded passengers.

Available Data and Discussion

Frequency of secondary inspections data is contained in Appendix F.

Among the Northern Border POEs, the average secondary inspection rate 4.7 percent in 2022, down from an average of 6.7 percent in 2021. The Southwest Border Secondary Inspection Rate averaged 3.1 percent in 2022, up from 4.3 percent in 2021. The highest secondary inspection rates were reported at Northern Border POEs, including the highest Westhope, ND (65 percent). Certain smaller land POEs have high secondary examination rates due to a low volume of traffic that allows officers increased time to thoroughly examine a larger share of passengers.

§ 1092(c)(1)(F)(iv) Secondary examinations effectiveness rate

Beginning in this 2023 BSMR, OFO provides arrests and seizures as proxies of the effectiveness of secondary examinations at detecting major violators. This meets the NDAA requirement to address an enforcement rate to measure effectiveness of secondary examinations at detecting major violators.

OFO conducts traveler and cargo-related secondary examinations for a variety of discretionary and mandatory investigative and enforcement reasons. Not all referred examinations are expected to result with enforcement results because they are not always initiated due to an issue in the primary exam. Secondary examinations are still considered fully effective when officers find no violations of any kind, as with compliance examinations or referrals due to subject complexity. Public awareness of CBP secondary inspection capabilities also serves as a deterrent to unlawful activity. For these reasons, CBP is unable to categorize a given secondary examination as "effective" or "ineffective" and does not calculate a secondary examinations effectiveness rate.

Instead, OFO has provided a proxy for secondary exam effectiveness rate as arrests (excluding inadmissibles) and percentage of arrests of seizure incidents, as well as a count of secondary referrals and a percentage of seizures as a percentage of secondary referrals. The effectiveness

cannot be strictly determined due to the reasons addressed above, as well as unknown count of successful entries of illegal items, reduced traveler count and impact to traveler behavior due to COVID, and, as stated above, seizures alone cannot determine the effectiveness of secondary examinations.

Table 17: Seizures as a Result of Secondary Referrals as a Proxy of Secondary Examinations Effectiveness Rate, FY 2019 to 2022

	2019	2020	2021	2022
Secondary Baggage and Agriculture Referrals All Modes	9,780,406	6,999,801	5,619,284	6,113,578
Seizure Incidents	208,711	196,629	195,943	162,861
Seizures as a % of Secondary Referrals	2.1%	2.8%	3.5%	2.7%

Source: OFO.

§ 1092(c)(1)(G)(i) Number of potentially "high-risk" cargo containers

Definition

Potentially high-risk cargo containers – Shipping containers carrying cargo shipments identified as potentially high-risk using National Targeting Center (NTC) CBP national security criteria.

Potentially high-risk cargo containers are an output metric that describes OFO workload.

Methodology and Limitations

All international cargo shipments coming to the United States via the sea, land, and air modes of transportation are screened by CBP using the Automated Targeting System (ATS) to identify shipments that may be considered potentially high-risk according to CBP national security criteria. Any cargo container traveling via the maritime environment carrying a shipment identified as potentially high-risk is identified for immediate review and assessed or scanned prior to lading at a Container Security Initiative member foreign port of origin or at arrival at a U.S. POE. Assessing, resolving, and when required, scanning, and physically inspecting cargo found to be potentially high-risk, ensures the safety of the public and minimizes the impact to the trade through the effective use of risk-focused targeting.

CBP's NTC continuously refines, improves, and revises the security criteria applied by the ATS, which in turn improves the focus and currency of the risk assessment applied.

Available Data and Discussion

The NTC's process of continual review and refinement of the security criteria applied and ATS methodology has led to realignment in the total number of maritime cargo containers identified as potentially high-risk since 2013. In 2022, the number of high-risk cargo containers decreased to the lowest level since 2013.

Table 18: Potentially High-Risk Cargo Containers at Seaports, FY 2013 to 2022

2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
89,598	74,509	72,974	71,815	36,209	18,625	6,667	8,683	7,111	4,798

Source: OFO.

§ 1092(c)(1)(G)(ii) Ratio of potentially high-risk cargo containers scanned relative to high-risk containers entering in previous fiscal year

Definition

Ratio of potentially high-risk cargo containers scanned – The ratio of potentially high-risk containers scanned relative to the number of potentially high-risk containers entering in the previous year.

The ratio of potentially high-risk containers scanned is an output metric, which compares trends in activity data over time. Ratio of high-risk containers scanned may also be interpreted as a proxy indicator of high-risk containers successfully scanned and entering through POEs, an outcome metric.

Methodology and Limitations

Inspection data are obtained from OFO administrative records. These data include potentially high-risk cargo containers reviewed, assessed, or scanned. These three methods of inspection are not currently distinguishable with available data sources.

The ratio compares potentially high-risk containers in one year to the number entering in the previous year and should not be confused with the percentage of potentially high-risk containers scanned relative to the number entering in the current year.

A container is considered "high-risk" if even one shipment within it is designated high-risk. One container may have multiple high-risk shipments within it, which could cause the same container to be reviewed or scanned multiple times.

Available Data and Discussion

The ratio of potentially high-risk containers reviewed, assessed, or scanned relative to the previous year's entries is contained in Appendix G.

Maritime POEs reported reviewing, assessing, or scanning 2,000 high-risk containers in 2022 (60 percent of high-risk sea containers), compared to 5,000 in 2021 (63 percent of high-risk sea containers).

§ 1092(c)(1)(G)(iii) Potentially high-risk cargo containers scanned upon arrival at a U.S. POE

Definition

Potentially high-risk containers scanned upon arrival at a U.S. POE – Shipping containers carrying cargo shipments identified as potentially high-risk using NTC security criteria that are reviewed, assessed, or scanned upon arrival at a U.S. POE.

The number of potentially high-risk containers scanned upon arrival at a POE is an output metric that describes OFO workload.

Methodology and Limitations

Inspection data are obtained from OFO administrative records. These data include potentially high-risk cargo containers reviewed, assessed, or scanned. These three methods of inspection are not currently distinguishable with available data sources.

The ATS targeting system provides an assessment of the security of shipments, as defined by bills of lading, not individual containers. A large shipment may span several containers or conversely one container may contain many individual shipments. A container is considered potentially "high-risk" if even one shipment within it is designated as high-risk. A single container may have multiple high-risk shipments within it, which could cause the same container to be flagged for review or scanning multiple times.

Available Data and Discussion

Data on high-risk containers may be found in Appendix G.

In 2022, a total of 4,000 high-risk containers arrived at POEs.

§ 1092(c)(1)(G)(iv) Potentially high-risk cargo containers scanned before arrival at a U.S. POE

Definition

Potentially high-risk containers scanned before arrival at a U.S. POE – Shipping containers carrying cargo shipments identified as potentially high-risk using NTC security criteria that are reviewed, assessed, or scanned before arrival at a U.S. POE.

The number of potentially high-risk containers scanned before arrival at a POE is an output metric that describes OFO workload.

Methodology and Limitations

Inspection data are obtained from OFO administrative records. In OFO/CSI's unique scope of operations, officers target, mitigate, and examine high-risk Bills of Lading (BOLs). Subsequently, CSI collects data and reports key performance metrics in terms of BOLs, not containers. Current data sources that report on BOLs scanned also include records of BOLs reviewed or assessed.

Available Data and Discussion

In 2022, 87,000 high-risk BOLs were scanned before arrival at a POE, a 12 percent decrease from 2021.

Table 19: High-Risk Bills of Lading Scanned Before Arrival at U.S. POE, FY 2013 to 2022

2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
103,999	117,453	126,223	113,326	117,453	81,397	103,670	91,629	98,934	86,658

Source: OFO.

§ 1092(d) METRICS FOR SECURING THE MARITIME BORDER

§ 1092(d)(1)(A) Situational awareness in the maritime environment

Definition

Situational awareness – The NDAA calls for DHS to develop a metric for situational awareness based on "knowledge and understanding of current unlawful cross-border activity," including "(A) Threats and trends concerning illicit trafficking and unlawful crossings; (B) The ability to forecast future shifts in such threats and trends; (C) The ability to evaluate such threats and trends at a level sufficient to create actionable plans; and (D) The operational capability to conduct persistent and integrated surveillance of the international borders of the United States."[23]

Situational awareness is an output metric.

Methodology and Limitations

To improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of DHS aviation programs, the Department is developing the ability to analyze and report flight hour data consistently across components and assess the contribution of aviation activity to DHS missions. In 2019, DHS Headquarters conducted a "Flight Hour Study" of historical U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and CBP Air and Marine Operations (AMO) data in accordance with the DHS Agency Reform Plan, a response to Executive Order 13781.[24] This is an ongoing and multi-year effort that the Department will continue to report on in future versions of this report.

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[23] National Defense Authorization Act of 2017 § 1092(a)(7).
[24] Executive Order 13781 of March 13, 2017, Comprehensive Plan for Reorganizing the Executive Branch

In the interim, the Department reports on the following operational activity metrics contributing to maritime domain situational awareness:

- CBP Aircraft Hours Flown for Situational Awareness or Interdiction Support
- USCG Aircraft Hours Flown for Situational Awareness or Interdiction Support
- USCG Cutter Hours Contributing to Situational Awareness or Interdiction
- CBP Boat Hours Contributing to Situational Awareness or Interdiction
- USCG Boat Hours Contributing to Situational Awareness or Interdiction
- CBP Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) Radar Operating Hours
- Number of Vessel Manifests Screened by Coastwatch

From the onset of reporting flight hour metrics in the Border Security Metrics Report, AMO's methodology for reporting mission hours inside/outside the transit zone is as follows:

- Inside Transit Zone – CBP: All mission hours flown by maritime patrol aircraft (B350; DHC-8; P-3) in coordination with Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S)

- Outside Transit Zone – CBP: All mission hours flown by maritime patrol aircraft (B350; DHC-8; P-3) in coordination with agencies other than JIATF-S

The USCG revised its methodology for reporting mission hours inside/outside the transit zone in 2020.

Mission hours inside the transit zone are defined to include:
- All mission hours for JIATF-S;
- Drug interdiction hours for Pacific Area, Atlantic Area, District 7, District 11, and Sector San Juan; and
- Migrant interdiction hours for Pacific Area, Atlantic Area, District 7, District 8, District 11, Sector Jacksonville, Sector Key West, Sector Miami, Sector San Juan, Sector St. Petersburg, Sector Los Angeles/Long Beach, Sector San Diego, and Sector Corpus Christi.

Mission hours outside the transit zone are defined to include:
- All drug interdiction hours *other* than Pacific Area, Atlantic Area, District 7, District 11, and Sector San Juan; and
- Migrant Interdiction hours *other* than Pacific Area, Atlantic Area, District 7, District 8, District 11, Sector Jacksonville, Sector Key West, Sector Miami, Sector San Juan, Sector St. Petersburg, Sector Los Angeles/Long Beach, Sector San Diego, and Sector Corpus Christi.

Available Data and Discussion

In comparison to 2021, CBP aircraft hours in 2022 increased by 914 hours inside the transit zone and decreased by 640 hours outside the transit zone.

Table 20a: CBP Aircraft Flight Hours Inside/Outside Transit Zone, FY 2016 to 2022

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2019	2020	2021	2022
Inside Transit Zone – CBP	6,420	6,273	6,528	6,583	6,583	6,319	6,630	7,544
Outside Transit Zone – CBP	13,188	12,422	17,576	11,711	11,711	14,080	14,817	14,177

Source: AMO.

The USCG reported over 11,000 aircraft flight hours inside the transit zone in 2022 and less than 680 aircraft flight hours outside the transit zone. The breakdown of hours flown inside and outside the transit zone cannot be compared to previous years because of the USCG's change to its reporting methodology.

Table 20b: USCG Aircraft Flight Hours Inside/Outside Transit Zone, FY 2013 to 2022

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
In Transit Zone	14,358	14,150	15,086	13,891	12,398	11,288	10,290	10,759	10,643	11,385
Other	2,135	2,754	3,719	3,409	2,117	2,322	2,658	2,341	2,241	678
Total Aircraft Hours	16,493	16,905	18,805	17,300	14,515	13,609	12,948	13,101	12,885	12,063

Note: In 2021, the USCG changed their methodology for reporting missions inside/outside the transit zone; see accompanying text.
Source: USCG.

The USCG reported 114,000 cutter underway hours inside the transit zone and 5,400 cutter underway hours outside the transit zone in 2021. The breakdown of hours inside and outside the transit zone cannot be compared to earlier years due to the changes in the USCG's reporting methodology.

Table 21: USCG Cutter Underway Hours Inside/Outside Transit Zone, FY 2013 to 2022

Cutter Hours	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
In Transit Zone	104,095	115,287	128,208	121,456	126,306	108,173	115,826	113,025	108,506	113,920
Other	2,999	1,931	3,474	11,189	9,057	7,178	2,611	9,391	5,586	5,415
Total Cutter Hours	107,094	117,218	131,681	132,645	135,363	115,350	118,437	122,416	114,092	119,335

Source: USCG.

In 2022, CBP recorded no (zero) boat underway hours within the transit zone, same as the 2021, 2020, 2016, and 2018. CBP's boat underway hours outside the transit zone totaled 39,000 hours in 2022, up 5.0 percent from 2021.

Table 22a: CBP Boat Underway Hours Inside/Outside Transit Zone, FY 2016 to 2022

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Inside Transit Zone	0	9	0	28	0	0	0
Outside Transit Zone	40,241	34,451	36,110	33,287	35,444	36,818	38,598

Note: CBP maritime hours include AMO underway hours.
Source: AMO.

The USCG reported 15,000 boat underway hours inside the transit zone in 2022 and 700 boat hours outside the transit zone. The breakdown of hours inside and outside the transit zone cannot be compared to earlier years due to the changes in the USCG's reporting methodology.

Table 22b: USCG Boat Underway Hours Inside/Outside Transit Zone, FY 2014 to 2022

Boat Hours	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
In Transit Zone	11,116	12,631	11,008	9,557	8,928	11,472	10,213	10,067	14,526
Other	4,551	3,520	3,137	2,949	2,884	1,549	1,503	924	717
Total Boat Hours	15,667	16,151	14,144	12,506	11,812	13,021	11,716	10,991	15,244

Source: USCG.

CBP's AMO uses TARS to provide long-range detection of low-altitude aircraft and maritime traffic at the radar's maximum range. The elevated sensor mitigates curvature of the earth and terrain-masking limitations. Following hurricane damage in 2017, TARS hours were lower 2018 to 2019, but began recovering in 2020. In 2021, CBP recorded 5,800 surveillance hours from Cudjoe Key, FL but only 3,000 hours from Lajas, PR (the lowest recorded hours since 2018). In 2022, CBP recorded 5,900 hours from Cudjoe Key, FL and 3,400 from Lajas, PR.

Table 23: Total Operational Hours for TARS Radars, FY 2012 to 2022

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Cudjoe Key, FL	5,752	6,289	6,165	6,306	4,886	5,728	2,448	3,239	6,140	5,816	5,933
Lajas, PR	0	0	12,301	5,049	4,559	3,922	2,105	5,449	5,251	3,016	3,355

Note: TARS site at Lajas, Puerto Rico crashed in 2011; CBP re-established operations in May 2014.
Source: CBP administrative records.

USCG Coastwatch screened 113,000 vessel manifests for National Security Concerns in 2022, a 10 percent increase from 2021 and a 3.0 percent decrease from the 2013 to 2021 average.

Table 24: Vessel Manifests Screened by Coastwatch for National Security Concerns Prior to Arrival at U.S. POEs, FY 2013 to 2022

2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
126,112	124,661	122,133	117,736	115,006	117,575	114,088	102,925	102,407	112,814

Source: USCG.

§ 1092(d)(1)(B) Known maritime migrant flow rate

Definition

Known maritime migrant flow – Total maritime migrant flow interdicted, identified directly or indirectly but not interdicted, or otherwise believed to have unlawfully entered the United States

Known maritime migrant interdiction rate – Total migrant interdictions in the maritime domain (as expressed by interdictions by DHS and partners) as a share of the known migrant flow.

Known maritime migrant flow is an outcome metric. Known maritime migrant interdiction rate is an output metric.

Methodology and Limitations

Migrant flow data are obtained from the USCG and CBP administrative records. The USCG maintains a robust accounting of USCG, international partner, and domestic partner interdictions and sightings of undocumented maritime migrants. The USCG relies upon its partners to report their interdictions to the USCG for compilation in the database. At times, undocumented

maritime migrants are counted by both the USCG and CBP (or other partners) when interdicted as agencies often cooperate during these operations. In certain limited cases, undocumented maritime migrant interdictions by partners are not reported to the USCG, and these cases are not accounted for in the tables below. Additionally, while partners report cases to the USCG when undocumented maritime migrants are apprehended on shore or evidence is found of their arrival on shore, some migrants arrive without being apprehended and leave no evidence. These cases are never reported and are also excluded from the known maritime migrant flow figures below. Total migrant interdiction data (i.e., interdictions by DHS and its international partners) are only available beginning in 2014; as a result, the known migrant interdiction rate is also limited to the years since 2014.

To improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of DHS aviation and marine programs, the Department will provide de-conflicted data when interdictions involve assets from multiple components in future versions of this report. The Department will also report metrics on coordinated operations. This effort may be coordinated through a working group already convened to validate maritime CBP seizure data.

Available Data and Discussion

The interdiction rate increased 9.0 percentage points in 2022 compared to 2021, and the known migrant flow increased by 139 percent from 2021. At the same time, the known flow in 2021 increased by almost 20,000 migrants (139 percent) compared to 2021.

Table 25: Migrant Interdictions in the Maritime Domain by DHS Component, Known Maritime Migrant Flow, and Known Maritime Migrant Interdiction Rate, FY 2013 to 2022

Fiscal Year	USCG	CBP	DHS and Partners	Known Migrant Flow	Interdiction Rate
2013	2,090	NA	NA	7,630	NA
2014	3,590	NA	7,750	10,630	72.9%
2015	3,830	NA	6,030	8,060	74.8%
2016	6,330	2,680	8,170	10,320	79.1%
2017	2,510	1,230	3,950	4,760	83.0%
2018	1,670	1,220	3,600	5,010	72.0%
2019	2,370	1,520	6,630	7,080	93.7%
2020	1,960	2,160	4,950	7,450	66.4%
2021	3,530	2,740	6,730	14,290	47.1%
2022	12,490	8,880	19,330	34,230	56.5%

Notes: In order to protect privacy, table cells are rounded to the nearest ten. The totals may not sum due to rounding. Some interdictions may be counted by both the USCG and CBP as some migrant interdictions involve assets from both agencies. Interdictions by DHS and partners include international partners. Data pulls are from the USCG Office of Maritime Law Enforcement's (CG-MLE) Migrant Data, but data from 2010-2016 cannot be replicated.
NA – no data available.
Source: USCG and CBP.

§ 1092(d)(1)(C) Illicit drugs removal rate

Definition

Illicit drugs removal rate – The ratio of illicit drugs removed by DHS maritime security in one year, including drugs abandoned at sea, relative to the average amount removed or abandoned in the immediately preceding five years.

The illicit drug removal rate is an output metric which compares trends in activity data over time.

Methodology and Limitations

Drug removals are obtained from USCG administrative records; these data are considered reliable.

Pursuant to the definition of the illicit drug removal rate directed by NDAA § 1092(d)(1)(C), the illicit drug removal rate describes recent trends in drugs removed or abandoned at sea (i.e., current year compared to previous 5 years); the metric does not describe the rate at which illicit drugs are removed.

Non-commercial maritime drug removals include those seized by the USCG, CBP, other law enforcement agencies, and international partners as well as those disrupted or abandoned by drug trafficking organizations. At present, only USCG data are reported, but the Department has convened a work group to validate maritime CBP seizure data, which will be included in future versions of this report.

Available Data and Discussion

The illicit drug removal rate varies significantly by year and drug type. After four straight years of decreasing seizure totals, marijuana removals rose in 2019, reaching the highest rate in 2021 since 2015. In 2022, Marijuana seizures saw a decrease of 15 percent to 27,000 kilograms. Methamphetamine seizures fell to 172.7 kilograms in 2021, a 68 percent decrease from a record 532 kilograms in 2020. The USCG removed 0.1 kilograms of heroin in 2021, down 97 percent from 2020 and down 99 percent from the 2011 to 2020 average. No measurable amount of heroin and methamphetamine were seized in the transit zone in 2022.

Table 26: Ratio of Drugs Removed or Abandoned at Sea Relative to Previous Five Fiscal Years (Illicit Drug Removal Rate), FY 2013 to 2022

		2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Marijuana	Rate	137%	154%	100%	61%	32%	36%	108%	142%	149%	117%
	Kg removed	36,745	49,231	35,499	23,865	12,743	11,434	28,704	31,920	32,383	27,336
Methamphetamine	Rate	0%	100%	75%	8,110%	291%	0%	300%	371%	69%	0%
	Kg removed	0	14.6	2.2	272.5	168.5	0.04	274.4	531.9	172.7	0.0
Heroin	Rate	157%	0%	578%	225%	351%	209%	14%	13%	0%	0%
	Kg removed	7.9	0	23.8	20.0	44.0	40.0	3.6	3.3	0.1	0.0

Notes: Data only includes removals by the USCG. OHSS defines the methamphetamine illicit drug removal rate for 2014 to be 100 percent on the basis of average seizures equaling zero for the previous 5 years.
Source: Office of Homeland Security Statistics analysis of USCG data.

§ 1092(d)(1)(D) Cocaine removal effectiveness rate

Definition

Cocaine removal effectiveness rate – The amount of cocaine removed by DHS inside and outside the maritime transit zone compared to total estimated flow of cocaine through the maritime domain.

Cocaine removals is an output metric. Removals may also be used as a proxy indicator of total attempts to import cocaine, an outcome metric. Cocaine removal effectiveness rate (i.e., cocaine seized as compared to the total estimated cocaine flow) is an output metric.

Methodology and Limitations

Drug removal data obtained from the JIATF-S and USCG administrative records through the Consolidated Counter Drug Database (CCDB) are considered reliable. Flow quantities provided by the DIA are considered the best estimates available based on intelligence reporting and case data.[25] Additionally, while other government estimates for production in major cocaine-producing countries in South America and consumption of cocaine within the United States do not align with the estimated non-commercial maritime flow figures inside the transit zone derived from the CCDB, this metric was derived based upon the non-commercial maritime flow estimates.

For the purposes of this metric, based upon where the data were gathered, the transit zone is defined by the JIATF-S area of responsibility. Non-commercial maritime drug removals include those seized by the USCG and other law enforcement agencies, and international partners, as well as those disrupted by anti-drug trafficking operations. The cocaine removal rate is based on estimates of non-commercial maritime cocaine flow from the CCDB. Outside the transit zone data are not considered as robust about intelligence on flow. As a result, the interdiction rate for cocaine outside the transit zone is not considered reliable.

The Department has convened a work group to validate maritime CBP seizure data, which will be included in future versions of this report.

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[25] Previous versions of this report included estimates of total cocaine flow provided by ONDCP.

Available Data and Discussion

Table 27 summarizes available data on cocaine removed by DHS for 2013 to 2022.

Table 27: Cocaine Removed by DHS Relative to the Total Estimated Flow in the Maritime Transit Zone, FY 2013 to 2022

Location		2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Inside Transit Zone	Rate	8.8%	13.5%	14.7%	8.7%	9.8%	8.5%	12.6%	10.9%	10.9%	7.0%
	Kg removed	118,000	146,500	199,300	254,800	28,300	257,500	281,800	213,800	301,000	201,861
	Estimated Flow	1,334,500	1,081,900	1,358,700	2,940,700	2,882,100	3,036,100	2,238,600	1,959,300	2,716,300	2,846,675
Outside Transit Zone	Rate	19%	50%	73%	28%	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
	Kg removed	15,100	13,200	39,000	17,700	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
	Estimated Flow	81,500	26,200	53,200	62,300	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

Notes: Derived from CCDB. Estimated flow (primary cocaine movement) in the transit zone is measured in kilograms, and includes commercial and non-commercial air, land, and maritime (all certainties). Data are limited to USCG and USG removals and data are not available (NA) for removals or estimate flow outside the transit zone after 2016. Data in prior years updated in 2020 due to maturing data. In 2020, CG-MLE developed a set of business rules to ensure the numbers remain standard across the board over time from 2020 onwards.
Source: The Interdiction Committee (TIC) via CCDB.

The breakdown of cocaine removal inside and outside the transit zone cannot be compared to earlier years due to the changes in the USCG's reporting methodology; see notes under Table 28 and Figure 5.

Documented non-commercial maritime cocaine flow in the transit zone increased significantly in 2016 to over 2.9 million kilograms, more than double the 1.4 million kilograms in 2015. Peace talks between the Government of Colombia and various insurgent groups in 2016 resulted in reductions or cessations of coca eradication efforts in Colombia. The reduced eradication efforts enabled a surge in cocaine production and subsequent maritime flow throughout the transit zone. Estimated cocaine flow remained at heightened levels through 2022.

Figure 5: Flow and Removal of Cocaine in the Maritime Transit Zone, FY 2013 to 2022

Notes: Partner nation cocaine removals are partner-nation-only seizures and losses in the transit zone (primary and subsequent movement). Data in prior years updated in 2020 due to maturing data. In 2020, CG-MLE developed a set of business rules to ensure the numbers remain standard across the board over time from 2020 onwards.
Source: TIC via CCDB.

§ 1092(d)(1)(E) DHS maritime threat response rate

Definition

DHS maritime threat response rate – The ability of DHS maritime security components to respond to and resolve known maritime threats, whether inside or outside a transit zone, by placing assets on-scene, relative to the total number of known threats.

Methodology and Limitations

The number of threats for migrant flow and counterdrug data are obtained from USCG administrative records. The USCG maintains accounting of USCG and reported international and domestic partner interdictions as well as sightings of undocumented maritime migrants. The USCG relies upon its partners to report their interdictions to the USCG for compilation in the administrative database. In certain cases, undocumented maritime migrant interdictions or counterdrug efforts by partners are not reported to the USCG and are not accounted for in the tables below. For reporting purposes, a migrant "interdiction" occurs at sea and "apprehended" threat occurs on shore. Interdictions are only counted and defined as a USCG or partner intercepting a threat. Each threat, whether interdicted or not, is defined as an event. Total interdiction threat data (i.e., interdictions by the USCG and its international partners) are only available beginning in 2020 due a change in reporting and documentation.

The below data only includes USCG data and does not include "outside" the transit zone data.

Missions inside the transit zone are defined to include:

- All missions for JIATF-S;
- Drug interdictions for Pacific Area, Atlantic Area, District 7, District 11, and Sector San Juan; and
- Migrant interdictions for Pacific Area, Atlantic Area, District 7, District 8, District 11, Sector Jacksonville, Sector Key West, Sector Miami, Sector San Juan, Sector St. Petersburg, Sector Los Angeles/Long Beach, Sector San Diego, and Sector Corpus Christi.

Available Data and Discussion

The number of events in the transit zone increased by 39 percent in 2022. In response, the USCG interdicted four percentage points more threats than in 2022. Response rates are perceived to be low due to the high and increasing number of known threats. Known threats are assumed to be targeting the United States. For reporting purposes, Migrant Interdiction Operations (MIO) and Counterdrug (CD) threats are considered events.

$$USCG\ Response\ Rate = \frac{Sum\ of\ USCG\ Events}{Sum\ of\ Total\ Events\ (MIO + CD)}$$

Table 28: Migrant Interdiction Operations, Counterdrug Threats, and Response Rate Inside Transit Zone, FY 2020 to 2022

Fiscal Year	USCG MIO Events	USCG CD Events	Sum USCG Events	Total MIO Events	Total CD Events	Sum Total Events	Response Rate
2020	181	205	386	523	1,995	5,218	7.4%
2021	212	258	470	756	3,080	3,836	12.3%
2022	713	202	915	1,826	3,494	5,320	17.2%

Note: In 2021, the USCG changed their methodology for reporting missions inside/outside the transit zone; see accompanying text. "Events" are threats and interdictions known to CG-MLE. The "Sum Total Events" is the aggregate of interdictions and known threats.
Source: USCG.

For Migrant Interdiction Ops (MIO), only interdictions are counted. Apprehensions are connected to land and not accounted for in interdiction rates. The data is maintained in the CG-MLE MIO data spreadsheet, which is validated with USCG Districts 7 and 11.

For CD, only interdictions that result in a drug removal are counted. Sources are the JIATF-S annual update brief and the validated CG-MLE drug data spreadsheet from the CCDB.

§ 1092(d)(1)(F) Intergovernmental maritime threat response rate

Definition

Intergovernmental maritime threat response rate – The ability of DHS maritime security components or other U.S. Government entities to respond to and resolve known maritime threats, whether inside or outside a transit zone, relative to the total number of known threats.

Methodology and Limitations

The number of threats for migrant flow and counterdrug data are obtained from USCG administrative records. The USCG maintains accounting of USCG interdictions and reported international and domestic partner interdictions as well as sightings of undocumented maritime migrants. The USCG relies upon its partners to report their interdictions to the USCG for compilation in the administrative database. In certain cases, undocumented maritime migrant interdictions or counterdrug efforts by partners are not reported to the USCG and are not accounted for in the tables below. For reporting purposes, a migrant "interdiction" occurs at sea and "apprehended" threat occurs on shore. Interdictions are only counted and defined as a USCG or partner agency intercepting a threat. Each threat whether interdicted or not is defined as an event. Total interdiction threat data (i.e., interdictions by USCG and its international partners) are only available beginning in 2020 due a change in reporting and documentation.

The below data only includes USCG data "inside" the transit zone only. The U.S. Government data includes limited data self-reported to the USCG by CBP, USBP, and JIATF-S and is not inclusive of all intergovernmental maritime threats or responses.

Missions inside the transit zone are defined to include:

- All missions for JIATF-S;
- Drug interdictions for Pacific Area, Atlantic Area, District 7, District 11, and Sector San Juan; and
- Migrant interdictions for Pacific Area, Atlantic Area, District 7, District 8, District 11, Sector Jacksonville, Sector Key West, Sector Miami, Sector San Juan, Sector St. Petersburg, Sector Los Angeles/Long Beach, Sector San Diego, and Sector Corpus Christi.

Available Data and Discussion

The number of events in the transit zone increased by 39 percent in 2022. In response, the USCG interdicted 1.5 percentage points less than the previous year. Response rates are perceived to be low due to the high and increasing number of known threats. Known threats are assumed to be targeting the United States. For reporting purposes, MIO and CD threats are considered events.

$$Total\ MIO\ Events = Coast\ Guard\ MIO\ Events + USG\ MIO\ Events$$

$$Total\ CD\ Events = Coast\ Guard\ CD\ Events + USG\ CD\ Events$$

$$Intergovernmental\ Response\ Rate = \frac{Total\ of\ MIO\ Events + Total\ CD\ Events}{Sum\ Total\ Events}$$

Table 29: Migrant Interdiction Operations, Counter Drug threats, and Intergovernmental Response Rate Inside Transit Zone, FY 2020 to 2022

Fiscal Year	US CG MIO Events	US CG CD Events	Sum US CG Events	USG MIO Events	USG CD Events	Sum USG Events	Total MIO Events	Total CD Events	Sum Total Events	US Gov't Response Rate
2020	181	205	386	199	238	437	523	1,995	5,218	8.4%
2021	212	258	470	367	342	709	756	3,080	3,836	18.5%
2022	713	202	915	566	335	901	1,826	3,494	5,320	16.9%

Notes: In 2021, the USCG changed their methodology for reporting missions inside/outside the transit zone; see accompanying text. "Events" are threats and interdictions known to CG-MLE. The "Sum Total Events" is the aggregate of interdictions and known threats.
Source: USCG.

For MIO, only interdictions are counted. Apprehensions are connected to land and not accounted for in interdiction rates. The data is maintained in the CG-MLE MIO data spreadsheet, which is validated with USCG Districts 7 and 11.

For CD, only interdictions that result in a drug removal are counted. Sources are the JIATF-S annual update brief and validated CG-MLE drug data spreadsheet from the CCDB.

§ 1092(e) AIR AND MARINE SECURITY METRICS IN THE LAND DOMAIN

§ 1092(e)(1)(A) Flight hour effectiveness rate

Definition

Flight hour effectiveness rate in the land domain – Number of flight hours flown by CBP AMO in the land domain as a percentage of AMO's unconstrained flight hour requirements.

Flight hour effectiveness rate is an output metric.

Methodology and Limitations

The flight hour effectiveness rate is determined by dividing the total hours flown by the number of flight hour requirements determined during the annual collection process. The flight hour requirements for the subsequent year are collected by CBP AMO operating locations based on unconstrained requirements collected from USBP, ICE, and other partner agencies, as well as internal CBP AMO requirements.

The AMO unconstrained flight hour requirement is not a validated DHS metric.

Available Data and Discussion

AMO flew 77,000 hours in the land domain in 2022, a decrease of just under 500 hours from 2021. The flight hour effectiveness rate (27 percent) increased one percentage point in 2021 from 2020 and remained the same in 2022.

Table 30: Flight Hour Effectiveness Rate, FY 2016 to 2022

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Unconstrained Flight Hour Requirement	295,225	242,185	284,644	284,644	284,644	284,644	284,644
Hours Flown	79,872	78,066	78,226	74,552	73,879	77,754	77,268
Unconstrained Flight Hour Effectiveness Rate	27%	32%	27%	26%	26%	27%	27%

Source: AMO.

§ 1092(e)(1)(B) Funded flight hour effectiveness rate

Definition

Funded flight hour effectiveness rate – Number of flight hours flown by AMO as a percentage of the number of flight hours funded by Congress.

Funded flight hour effectiveness rate is an output metric.

Methodology and Limitations

Flight hour data are obtained from AMO administrative records. The funded flight hour effectiveness rate is determined by dividing the total hours flown by the number of flight hours funded by Congress.

Available Data and Discussion

AMO's funded flight hour effectiveness rate was slightly over 100 percent for each year 2016 to 2022.

Table 31: Funded Flight Hour Effectiveness Rate, FY 2016 to 2022

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Hours flown	79,872	78,066	78,226	74,552	73,879	77,754	77,268
Hours funded	79,774	77,769	77,111	74,174	73,697	77,019	76,892
Effectiveness rate	100%	100%	101%	101%	100%	101%	100%

Source: AMO.

§ 1092(e)(1)(C) AMO readiness rate

Definition

AMO readiness rate – The percentage of mission requests that AMO was able to fulfill, excluding those requests that could not be fulfilled for reasons beyond AMO's control.

AMO readiness rate is an output metric.

Methodology and Limitations

Mission data are obtained from AMO administrative records. The rate is determined by dividing the missions flown by the total number of mission requests minus missions cancelled for weather-related reasons and other factors beyond AMO control.

AMO's readiness rate was 82 percent in 2022, with 6,000 out of 38,000 in-scope missions cancelled due to causes within AMO control.

Table 32: AMO Missions Cancelled and Readiness Rate, FY 2016 to 2022

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Total missions requested by partner agencies	36,615	36,740	37,205	38,531	38,060	38,085	38,670
Missions Launched	31,645	30,346	29,474	28,587	29,482	30,093	29,412
Missions cancelled within AMO control	2,510	3,754	4,790	6,299	4,502	4,557	6,413
Missions cancelled – asset availability	1,803	2,045	2,301	2,942	2,482	2,888	4,033
Missions cancelled – crew availability	707	1,709	2,489	3,357	2,020	1,669	2,380
Readiness rate due to causes within AMO control	93%	89%	86%	82%	87%	87%	82%

Note: Methodology of reporting missions launched was updated to be reflective of all launched flights in 2023 and applied retroactively.
Source: AMO.

§ 1092(e)(1)(D) AMO weather-related cancellation rate

Definition

AMO weather-related cancelation rate – The number of missions cancelled by AMO due to weather as a percentage of total planned AMO missions.

AMO weather-related cancelation rate is an output metric.

Methodology and Limitations

Mission data are obtained from AMO administrative records. The weather-related cancelation rate is calculated by dividing the number of missions cancelled due to weather by the total number of missions requested by AMO's partner agencies.

Available Data and Discussion

AMO was forced to cancel 2,400 missions in 2022 due to weather out of 39,000 total missions requested by partner agencies. This resulted in a weather-related cancellation rate of 6.0 percent.

Table 33: AMO Weather-Related Cancellation Rate, FY 2016 to 2022

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Total missions requested by partner agencies	36,615	36,740	37,205	38,531	38,060	38,085	38,670
Missions cancelled – weather	1,460	1,701	2,086	2,893	2,953	2,883	2,369
Cancellation rate due to weather	4%	5%	6%	8%	8%	8%	6%

Source: AMO.

§ 1092(e)(1)(E) AMO individuals detected

Definition

AMO individuals detected – Number of individuals detected by CBP AMO with unmanned aerial systems and manned aircraft.

AMO individuals detected is an output metric.

Methodology and Limitations

Data are obtained from AMO administrative records. The Department's currently available data on detections by unmanned aircraft are limited to the number of Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation Radar (VaDER) detections, and current data on detections from manned aircraft are limited to detections leading to apprehensions and arrests.

These data exclude certain detections because AMO does not presently track data from all sensors on unmanned and manned aircraft. For this reason, the Department considers the current AMO individuals detected metric to be a work in progress and expects to provide more comprehensive data on AMO detections as part of subsequent reports.

Available Data and Discussion

AMO detected 120,000 individuals via manned aircraft and 105,000 individuals via unmanned aircraft in 2022. Total detections in 2022 were up 25 percent compared to 2021 and up 280 percent compared to the 2016 to 2020 average.

Table 34: Individuals Detected by AMO by Aircraft Type, FY 2016 to 2022

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Manned	54,880	35,370	41,060	51,220	40,520	106,460	120,220
Unmanned	7,910	10,710	18,080	18,170	17,350	72,840	104,760
Total	62,790	46,090	59,140	69,390	57,870	179,300	224,980

Note: In order to protect privacy, table cells are rounded to the nearest ten. The totals may not sum due to rounding.
Source: AMO.

§ 1092(e)(1)(F) AMO apprehensions assisted

Definition

AMO apprehensions assisted – USBP apprehensions assisted by AMO using unmanned aerial systems and manned aircraft.

AMO apprehensions assisted is an output metric.

Methodology and Limitations

Data are obtained from AMO administrative records. The metric consists of AMO enforcement flight hours and arrests that are attributed to manned and unmanned aircraft operations. These data are based on Aircraft Enforcement Hours (non-maritime), therefore excluding DHC-8, P-3, and Maritime Enforcement Aircraft (MEA) operations occurring in the maritime domain.

Available Data and Discussion

In 2021, AMO flew 57,000 manned enforcement flight hours that assisted in the apprehension of 107,000 individuals, and 9,000 unmanned enforcement flight hours that assisted in the apprehension of 13,000 individuals. The number of manned flight hours in 2022 decreased by 3.0 percent and unmanned flight hours in 2022 increased by 18 percent from 2021. The number of apprehensions were up in both cases (1.0 percent for both) compared to 2022.

Table 35: AMO Enforcement Flight Hours and Apprehensions Assisted by Aircraft Type, FY 2018 to 2022

	2018		2019		2020		2021		2022	
	Enforcement Flight Hours	Apprehensions	Enforcement Flight Hours	Apprehensions	Enforcement Flight Hours	Apprehensions	Enforcement Flight Hours	Apprehensions	Enforcement Flight Hours	Apprehensions
Manned	55,541	39,550	53,591	44,020	60,762	39,740	56,966	105,640	55,214	106,690
Unmanned	6,852	6,310	7,178	6,030	7,725	5,360	8,785	12,870	10,334	12,980
Total	62,393	45,860	60,769	50,050	68,487	45,100	65,751	118,510	65,548	119,670

Notes: In order to protect privacy, table cells are rounded to the nearest ten. The totals may not sum due to rounding.
Source: AMO.

§ 1092(e)(1)(G) Illicit drug seizures assisted by AMO

Definition

Illicit drug seizures assisted by AMO – The number and quantity of illicit drug seizures assisted by AMO using unmanned aerial systems and manned aircraft.

Illicit drug seizures assisted is an output metric.

Methodology and Limitations

Drug seizure data are obtained from AMO administrative records. The metric consists of the total number of events and quantity in pounds of drug seizures using manned and unmanned systems. A "drug event" is defined as a single law enforcement action resulting in a drug seizure(s). These data are based on non-maritime enforcement flight hours and therefore exclude DHC-8, P-3, and MEA operations occurring in the maritime domain.

Available Data and Discussion

AMO flew 55,000 manned enforcement flight hours and 10,000 unmanned hours in 2022. The number of manned flight hours in 2022 decreased by 3.0 percent and unmanned flight hours in 2022 increased by 18 percent from 2021. Drug events for both manned and unmanned flights decreased (by 29 percent and 33 percent, respectively). Kilograms of drugs seized decreased by 87 percent for manned flights and 70 percent for unmanned flights.

Table 36: AMO Enforcement Flight Hours, Illicit Drug Events, and Drug Seizures by Aircraft Type, FY 2018 to 2022

	2018			2019			2020			2021			2022		
	Enforcement Flight Hours	Drug Events	Drug Seizures (kg)	Enforcement Flight Hours	Drug Events	Drug Seizures (kg)	Enforcement Flight Hours	Drug Events	Drug Seizures (kg)	Enforcement Flight Hours	Drug Events	Drug Seizures (kg)	Enforcement Flight Hours	Drug Events	Drug Seizures (kg)
Manned	55,541	1,612	204,645	53,591	723	100,879	60,762	675	122,342	56,966	673	112,758	55,214	475	14,368
Unmanned	6,852	85	16,375	7,178	26	1,978	7,725	23	6,981	8,785	15	8,766	10,334	10	2,646
Total	62,393	1,697	221,021	60,769	748	102,857	68,487	698	129,323	65,751	688	121,524	65,548	485	17,014

Notes: Data are limited to non-maritime enforcement flight hours
Source: AMO.

§ 1092(e)(1)(H) AMO actionable intelligence

Definition

AMO actionable intelligence – The number of times that actionable intelligence related to border security was obtained using unmanned aerial systems and manned aircraft.

AMO is currently working with our partners in CBP's Office of Intelligence (OI) to develop a data visualization of historic VaDER detections collected from AMO's use of unmanned aerial systems on the Southwest Border. This will assist in identifying trends and opportunities for this detection data to be used as actionable intelligence for future operations. This visualization product was originally expected to be deployed in FY 2022 but was delayed for higher priority efforts. The current implementation date is July 2023, at which point, AMO and OI will use the product to determine its efficacy in producing actionable intelligence.

§ 1092(g)(3)(D) Other appropriate information

Pursuant to NDAA § 1092(g)(3)(D), this section provides three additional metrics of border security between POEs: 1) selected characteristics of USBP apprehensions; 2) the estimated at-the-border deterrence rate; and 3) estimated border crossing costs.

Selected Characteristics of Recent USBP Apprehensions

Definition

Historically, most individuals apprehended between POEs along the Southwest Border have been Mexican adults, and very few of them have sought asylum or other forms of humanitarian relief from removal. In recent years, the profile of USBP apprehensions has changed in important ways, as growing shares of individuals apprehended are: 1) from countries other than Mexico (including the Northern Central American countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras and an increasing number from other countries in the Western Hemisphere), 2) UCs or children and adults traveling together as FMs, and/or 3) seeking asylum or other forms of protection from removal by claiming fear of removal to their countries of citizenship.

These shifting characteristics have an important impact on border security and USBP border enforcement because existing enforcement policies were largely designed with the more traditional noncitizen profile in mind. For example, many consequences under CBP's Consequence Delivery Program such as the Mexican Interior Repatriation Program are only applicable to Mexican nationals. UCs, FMs, and noncitizens who express a fear of being returned to their home countries and have been considered "not impactable" by traditional USBP enforcement efforts, upon apprehension have typically been released into the United States with a NTA in immigration court on a future date, if not otherwise subject to the Title 42 public health Order and subsequently expelled. More generally, the drivers of migration from countries other than Mexico and for noncitizens who may seek humanitarian relief or protection from removal may be different from those that motivated earlier generations of unlawful border crossers, potentially causing U.S. policymakers to rethink their policy response.

To monitor these changing dynamics, the Department tracks two main sets of characteristics:

- *Apprehensions by citizenship* – The share of noncitizens apprehended by USBP from Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and all other countries.

- *Apprehensions by "non-impactable noncitizens"* – The share of noncitizens who are UCs, FMs, express a fear of being returned to their home countries (asylum seekers), or are Cubans arriving by land prior to January 2017 under the prior "wet foot/dry foot" policy. These groups of noncitizens are considered non-impactable for purposes of the Department's model-based estimate of unlawful entries because they have generally been exempted from many of the policy responses CBP undertakes at the border to prevent unlawful entries and deter repeat migration attempts, including most administrative forms of removal.[26] (See Appendix A in previous reports.)

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[26] The Trump Administration took a number of steps broadly designed to deter the three main groups of "non-impactable" noncitizens, including by imposing limits on when and where noncitizens arriving at the Southwest Border may apply for asylum, expanding family detention, adopting "zero tolerance" policies to increase border prosecutions (at one point resulting in a large number of family separations), imposing limits on UCs' ability to be reunified with family members in the United States, and requiring certain noncitizens to remain in Mexico during the pendency of their asylum proceedings. Despite these policies, OHSS has found that majorities of asylum seekers, FMs, and UCs apprehended at the Southwest Border in 2017 to 2019 remained in the United States in unresolved status as of March 31, 2020. *See* Marc Rosenblum and Hongwei Zhang, "FY 2021 Enforcement Lifecycle Report," DHS, December 2022.

Apprehensions is an output metric.

Methodology and Limitations

Apprehensions are recorded in administrative record systems with a unique identifier created for each apprehension. Apprehensions by citizenship, UC status, and FM status are generally considered reliable, though agents may not always be able to accurately identify UCs or FMs.

Available Data and Discussion

In recent years, the demographics of apprehensions have started to shift from consisting overwhelmingly of Mexican nationals to a growing share of border crossers from other areas, namely Northern Central American countries. As recently as 2009, Mexicans accounted for 92 percent of Southwest Border apprehensions. Their share fell below 50 percent for the first time ever in 2014, remained below 50 percent in each of the four years 2016 to 2019, and fell to an all-time low of 6 percent in 2022. Mexican nationals decreased 54 percent in 2021 compared to 2020 and decreased 50 percent in 2022 compared to 2021, while total apprehensions increased by 79 percent compared to 2021. El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras collectively accounted for 15 percent of the total apprehensions. The greatest increase occurred among apprehensions from all other countries, which saw an increase in 2021 of 710 percent compared to 2020 and increased in 2022 another 218 percent compared to 2021.

Table 37: USBP Southwest Border Apprehensions by Citizenship, FY 2013 to 2022

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Mexico	265,410	226,770	186,020	190,760	127,940	152,260	166,460	102,340	46,710	69,890
El Salvador	36,960	66,420	43,390	71,850	49,760	31,370	89,810	10,610	39,460	37,060
Guatemala	54,140	80,470	56,690	74,600	65,870	115,720	264,170	32,300	105,880	74,310
Honduras	46,450	90,970	33,450	52,950	47,260	76,510	253,800	23,200	142,010	65,420
All Other	11,440	14,740	11,790	18,710	13,090	20,720	77,280	35,170	284,940	905,690
Total	414,400	479,370	331,330	408,870	303,920	396,580	851,510	203,610	618,990	1,152,350

Note: In order to protect privacy, table cells are rounded to the nearest ten. The totals may not sum due to rounding.
Source: Office of Homeland Security Statistics Statistical Immigration Data.

Along with the shift from Mexico to Northern Central American countries, the other noteworthy trend in Southwest Border apprehensions in recent years has been the rising share of noncitizens with potential humanitarian claims who are therefore considered non-impactable by traditional border enforcement policies. Although 2020 interrupted this trend both in terms of count and share of total apprehensions, 2021 saw a return to previous norms and in some cases exceeded them.

Although the proportion of Mexican noncitizens apprehended by USBP and made fear claims (i.e., initiating the credible fear process) decreased more than half from 2020 to 2021, the total number of fear claimants increased threefold over the same period.

These significant changes to recent trends were due to a variety of factors, notably new policies such as T42, Migrant Protection Protocols, and COVID-19 border restrictions, each of which limited entry into the United States. In addition, 2020 was a year with record low numbers of non-impactable apprehensions, so comparison with 2021 is particularly stark. The numbers of

non-impactable continued to increase in 2022, increasing 12 percent, while total apprehensions increased 86 percent.

Table 38: USBP Southwest Border Apprehensions by Non-Impactable Status, FY 2013 to 2022

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Non-Impactables	68,940	162,370	97,980	168,750	137,880	188,410	597,550	70,570	529,780	590,760
Fear Claims	35,400	47,340	39,030	79,320	56,320	78,850	90,800	20,790	73,220	84,530
UC	38,760	68,540	39,970	59,690	41,440	50,040	76,020	30,550	140,190	149,100
FM	12,940	67,060	39,840	77,670	75,620	107,210	473,680	52,230	324,240	482,960
Cuban	70	100	110	80	30	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Total Apprehensions	**414,400**	**479,370**	**331,330**	**408,870**	**303,920**	**396,580**	**851,510**	**203,610**	**618,990**	**1,152,350**

Notes: In order to protect privacy, table cells are rounded to the nearest ten. The totals may not sum due to rounding. Table rows are not mutually exclusive categories; individuals may be counted as FM/UC as well as Cuban and/or fear claimants. OHSS updated methodology for calculating non-impactables and fear claims in 2021; all years in the table have been updated to match this methodology to improve accuracy and enable comparison between years.
NA – no data available.
Source: Office of Homeland Security Statistics Enforcement Lifecycle.

At-the-Border Deterrence

As of the 2023 BSMR, OHSS is no longer reporting on at-the-border deterrence. This metric has been included in previous additions of the BSMR (most recently in the 2022 BSMR) however it is not required by the NDAA. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, no RTM model-based estimates will be provided for this section.

IV. CONCLUSION

DHS recognizes that its ability to accurately measure its border security inputs, outputs, activities, and outcomes is essential to the effective and efficient management of the Department. The metrics contained in this report are the baseline that DHS uses to measure its progress towards meeting the border security mission. As such, the Department will continue to refine these metrics, including through engagement with Congress, and DHS looks forward to keeping Congress updated on the process.

Appendix A – RTM Methodology

As of the 2023 BSMR, OHSS is no longer reporting new RTM model-based estimates to our figures and tables. This appendix has been included in previous additions of the BSMR (most recently in the 2022 BSMR), for further information on the RTM methodology see those previous editions.

Appendix B – Drugs Seizures – All Ports of Entry

Table B1: OFO Drug Seizures at Ports of Entry (POEs), FY 2013 to 2022

DRUG	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Grand Total	342,010.0	311,159.3	401,114.0	367,979.4	305,296.8	250,280.7	273,730.6	346,177.7	332,380.3	246,754.6
AMPHETAMINE	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	17.2	50.7
COCA PRODUCTS, TEA BAGS OR LIQUOR	112.3	335.7	370.2	210.9	163.3	332.8	540.7	733.6	2,655.6	1,265.8
COCAINE	20,975.9	20,558.9	17,396.2	23,958.4	28,274.8	23,407.4	40,463.8	19,343.5	34,965.6	26,311.3
CRYSTAL METHAMPHETAMINES	1,526.5	1,742.4	1,627.5	2,129.0	1,925.1	7,512.9	26,735.3	28,459.5	13,945.4	NA
DIHYDROCODEINONE (HYDROCODONE)	4.3	11.2	3.0	14.4	7.8	19.1	14.9	27.3	22.1	27.3
DIMETHYLTRYPTAMINE	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	2,467.1	6,928.5	3,108.0
ECSTASY	104.3	111.0	104.0	708.1	521.6	514.0	1,005.9	961.6	543.4	562.7
EPHEDRINE	5.1	28.6	42.1	13.5	5.6	15.5	241.0	26.1	10.5	33.8
FENETHYLLINE-(CAPTAGON-AMPHETAMINE)	NA	NA	NA	1.2	0.0	1.7	1.8	0.1	0.1	NA
FENTANYL	NA	NA	31.9	270.4	881.7	859.5	1,154.3	1,799.4	4,618.9	5,650.4
GAMMA HYDROXY BUTYRATE	33.1	73.3	48.7	483.8	741.0	789.9	383.4	274.8	560.5	422.9
HASH,LIQUID (HASH OIL)	0.1	14.0	0.8	0.5	1.5	46.7	1,136.5	679.7	287.7	291.1
HASHISH	58.1	117.1	82.4	75.2	54.5	64.1	58.0	704.8	1,007.7	144.5
HEROIN	1,822.0	1,963.2	2,732.1	1,915.7	1,757.6	2,361.0	2,461.5	2,368.6	2,191.6	697.9
KETAMINE	88.6	77.8	43.7	150.6	144.5	286.7	432.1	514.2	4,920.4	6,239.5
KHAT (CATHA EDULIS)	84,023.0	67,478.2	66,953.9	70,087.1	61,856.3	26,854.0	15,451.8	50,783.7	91,997.5	79,174.6
KRATOM (MITRAGYNINE OR 7-HYDROXYMITRAGYNINE)	NA	NA	NA	NA	27.2	0.5	2,675.2	NA	NA	NA
LSD	3.0	7.0	3.6	2.4	9.5	50.4	254.0	328.8	17.3	16.3
MARIJUANA	215,705.4	198,669.6	273,433.7	233,827.2	166,221.3	135,814.3	131,328.2	147,405.4	78,885.9	34,750.7
MARIJUANA PLANTS	8.0	0.7	0.2	1.6	1.8	721.2	3.0	2.9	13.7	107.2
MDPV-(METHYLENEDIOXYPYROVALERONE)	336.1	225.7	233.1	41.7	27.3	19.1	23.4	20.4	8.2	2.0
MEPHEDRONE	11.8	9.1	5.7	2.7	26.8	1.1	2.5	3.8	11.7	5.1
METHAMPHETAMINE	7,985.0	8,896.5	11,564.2	15,008.0	20,959.6	26,054.2	31,109.7	42,709.4	67,286.2	67,191.5
METHAMPHETAMINE (IN SOLUTION)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	441.3	3,969.4
METHYLONE	322.3	829.4	315.7	40.4	13.9	101.0	19.1	10.6	3.9	1.2
METHYLPHENIDATE (RITALIN)	20.0	15.1	13.7	12.3	12.6	8.0	4.2	3.9	9.4	10.3
MORPHINE	31.5	213.7	19.3	520.2	20.5	31.3	137.2	69.8	67.4	25.6
N-BENZYLPIPERAZINE (BZP TABLETS)	87.8	1.6	1.3	0.1	1.0	NA	0.0	0.0	52.9	3.2
NEXUS/2 CB	0.1	0.1	1.3	0.1	1.4	1.0	1.8	2.3	10.7	4.7
OPIUM	1,289.8	1,637.3	653.0	905.9	1,065.3	1,148.1	1,111.4	1,704.7	2,372.1	286.1
OTHER DRUGS, PRESCRIPTIONS, CHEMICALS	4,134.4	5,117.2	22,328.4	12,985.9	11,446.0	11,147.0	14,039.4	10,204.7	13,885.5	2,967.8
OTHER DRUGS NOT SCHEDULED I/II	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	3,779.8
OTHER SCHEDULED I/II DRUGS	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	494.7
OXYCODONE (OXYCONTIN)	13.2	11.1	6.5	21.6	45.1	20.3	66.4	60.3	47.0	113.0
PARAMETHOXYAMPHETAMINE	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.0	NA	0.0	0.0	0.9	NA
PEYOTE	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.3	35.7	58.1	190.1	554.9	529.8
PHENYLCYCLOHEXYL PIPERDINE	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.2	0.7
POPPY SEEDS	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	48.5	2,118.8
PRECURSOR CHEMICALS EXCEPT EPHEDRINE	739.3	748.2	1,293.7	3,378.0	648.5	1,443.2	1,168.6	32,471.8	1,279.4	445.6
PSILOCYN OR PSILOCYBIN MUSHROOMS	23.4	24.1	16.2	45.8	54.0	59.0	169.1	487.2	268.2	629.6
ROHYPNOL	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
STEROIDS	470.1	554.5	581.2	613.2	1,394.3	1,592.9	1,255.0	1,163.1	1,719.0	2,356.2
SYNTHETIC CANNABINOIDS - ALL TYPES	2,074.4	1,686.7	1,206.8	550.8	6,984.8	8,965.0	222.9	194.4	345.3	51.1
TAPENTADOL	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	377.7	2,638.6
TRAMADOL	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	275.4
THAI STICKS	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.0	NA	NA
YABA	0.5	0.2	NA	2.5	0.0	2.0	0.5	NA	0.2	0.0

Notes: Drug seizures in kilograms. Tea bags included in this table are used to carry coca products. This table updates previous versions of this report with more current information.
NA – no data available.
Source: OFO.

Appendix C – Privately Owned Vehicle (POV) and Commercially Owned Vehicle (COV) Wait Times

Table C1: OFO POV Wait Times (minutes) and Total Annual Flow, FY 2013 to 2021

Port/Wait Time/POV Volume	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
ALEXANDRIA BAY, NY										
POV Wait Times[1]	3.5	3.0	2.1	1.3	1.0	1.1	2.1	0.7	0.2	1.3
POVs[2]	673,549	651,511	616,656	590,028	587,319	590,900	589,270	233,568	50,533	319,706
ANDRADE, CA										
POV Wait Times	30.7	24.0	24.3	27.6	26.9	31.5	40.6	47.6	44.0	26.6
POVs	391,430	432,810	507,060	507,775	577,425	581,576	579,707	386,083	228,582	470,504
BLAINE, WA										
POV Wait Times	13.7	14.7	10.0	9.0	9.2	12.3	13.0	6.5	3.6	7.9
POVs	4,943,096	4,922,160	4,428,536	3,958,264	3,780,471	4,130,656	3,957,432	1,668,658	267,622	1,664,818
BROWNSVILLE, TX										
POV Wait Times	16.8	16.8	14.8	15.7	14.0	23.7	36.0	33.6	33.1	30.3
POVs	4,270,287	4,290,311	4,333,905	4,560,557	4,848,508	4,784,458	4,520,679	3,383,828	3,297,769	4,428,476
BUFFALO-NIAGARA FALLS NY										
POV Wait Times	6.1	6.8	4.1	2.9	2.8	3.6	4.4	1.6	0.5	4.8
POVs	5,903,904	5,570,269	5,033,036	4,783,004	4,814,967	5,000,166	4,860,255	2,011,808	460,727	2,158,461
CALAIS, ME										
POV Wait Times	1.3	1.3	0.8	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.2
POVs	1,024,748	951,270	837,046	754,443	755,846	674,323	661,808	288,828	54,422	241,508
CALEXICO, CA										
POV Wait Times	44.3	51.0	45.1	49.6	53.1	58.5	51.3	58.9	66.9	62.1
POVs	4,162,467	4,061,872	4,248,230	4,345,665	4,383,164	4,469,030	4,876,600	4,240,445	4,431,385	4,930,344
CALEXICO-EAST										
POV Wait Times	38.0	38.3	31.4	39.0	43.6	44.7	42.7	45.1	43.5	50.5
POVs	3,099,340	3,317,290	3,585,327	3,765,429	3,883,571	3,688,968	3,278,842	2,046,324	1,340,590	2,464,596
CHAMPLAIN-ROUSES POINT										
POV Wait Times	3.0	2.3	2.7	1.7	1.6	2.1	3.3	1.3	0.4	2.8
POVs	1,152,220	1,144,152	1,051,232	1,015,105	1,004,351	1,031,529	1,011,173	396,711	90,130	578,615
COLUMBUS, NM										
POV Wait Times	5.2	5.5	5.0	5.1	4.3	5.1	9.2	9.8	12.2	10.9
POVs	324,216	347,209	398,242	420,004	395,718	353,225	358,294	307,231	287,129	349,885
DEL RIO, TX										
POV Wait Times	8.0	7.6	6.8	6.9	6.5	9.7	22.1	17.9	13.1	16.0
POVs	1,257,513	1,325,289	1,415,109	1,508,476	1,586,009	1,640,034	1,517,965	1,181,780	1,190,475	1,498,004

Table C1 (Continued)

Port/Wait Time/POV Volume	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
DERBY LINE, VT										
POV Wait Times	2.3	2.3	1.9	2.0	3.8	2.2	1.8	0.3	0.0	1.2
POVs	731,031	715,719	633,409	581,261	598,819	493,073	479,985	186,908	39,256	216,076
DETROIT, MI										
POV Wait Times	3.7	4.8	3.6	4.5	3.7	4.8	4.8	2.1	0.3	2.4
POVs	4,123,134	4,050,011	4,065,843	4,043,076	4,058,742	3,996,538	4,091,085	2,229,627	1,037,417	2,120,478
DOUGLAS, AZ										
POV Wait Times	11.8	9.3	11.2	12.2	11.7	16.6	23.9	31.7	27.2	16.8
POVs	1,438,842	1,559,934	1,576,761	1,610,973	1,707,958	1,785,264	1,599,791	1,112,007	1,077,116	1,489,564
EAGLE PASS, TX										
POV Wait Times	14.8	20.1	15.6	18.2	17.8	18.9	21.1	22.6	16.6	19.4
POVs	2,358,313	2,382,221	2,661,638	2,745,267	2,662,299	2,715,217	2,871,922	2,110,120	1,852,343	2,690,497
EL PASO, TX										
POV Wait Times	22.4	19.8	23.0	28.0	19.4	24.6	33.6	23.2	17.7	26.6
POVs	7,110,330	7,505,652	7,883,264	7,886,013	7,766,464	8,549,738	7,060,731	5,592,324	5,620,197	8,021,534
EL PASO, TX (Ysleta Only)[3]										
POV Wait Times	21.6	18.7	23.1	25.5	23.9	23.1	44.1	31.3	27.4	28.9
POVs	3,453,040	3,935,394	4,221,858	4,627,376	4,819,225	3,972,228	3,705,814	2,750,033	2,282,116	2,956,162
HIDALGO,TX										
POV Wait Times	19.9	22.7	23.3	21.2	18.0	17.5	31.4	28.5	25.1	33.7
POVs	4,801,943	4,616,193	4,555,289	4,709,838	4,539,801	4,343,664	4,125,596	2,890,585	2,705,296	3,944,977
HIGHGATE SPRINGS/ALBURG										
POV Wait Times	3.5	4.0	4.1	4.6	4.2	4.9	3.2	1.0	0.4	2.6
POVs	508,699	542,595	715,598	703,063	633,903	474,497	476,599	187,332	38,010	266,352
HOULTON, ME										
POV Wait Times	2.9	2.5	1.7	1.2	1.2	1.6	1.4	0.6	0.2	1.1
POVs	353,898	332,670	274,641	228,101	228,663	228,890	219,014	93,778	17,351	86,344
INTERNATIONAL FALLS, MN										
POV Wait Times	1.5	1.3	2.0	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3	0.1	0.0	0.6
POVs	528,065	520,066	475,435	438,938	413,508	371,358	366,644	147,538	28,553	130,870
JACKMAN, ME										
POV Wait Times	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.0	0.0	1.0
POVs	170,549	168,871	157,521	162,978	144,428	146,393	147,938	58,031	26,904	86,460
LAREDO, TX										
POV Wait Times	15.5	17.6	16.3	17.1	20.0	17.5	21.0	13.8	12.0	17.1
POVs	4,865,686	5,220,223	5,220,174	5,191,369	4,991,204	5,081,662	5,183,480	3,740,570	3,040,856	4,396,710

Table C1 (Continued)

Port/Wait Time/POV Volume	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
LUKEVILLE, AZ										
POV Wait Times	5.5	5.1	7.6	5.3	2.6	4.2	5.2	2.1	7.6	5.7
POVs	283,790	301,206	345,760	363,712	376,827	409,444	425,046	280,474	388,691	434,346
LYNDEN, WA										
POV Wait Times	11.1	9.8	6.9	6.1	6.0	6.3	7.2	5.0	0.9	5.5
POVs	785,818	770,393	586,913	514,823	491,420	582,792	575,240	232,649	27,730	197,769
MADAWASKA, ME										
POV Wait Times	3.0	3.4	1.3	0.7	1.0	1.0	0.7	0.3	0.0	0.0
POVs	621,258	576,490	509,814	439,970	404,221	382,828	367,403	173,806	22,283	87,792
MASSENA, NY										
POV Wait Times	0.6	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
POVs	909,705	907,255	856,281	826,625	855,787	875,867	874,503	627,194	528,902	657,229
NACO, AZ										
POV Wait Times	2.5	2.2	2.3	2.2	2.5	2.8	5.0	10.1	6.5	6.0
POVs	280,984	296,828	295,635	302,423	295,296	302,614	337,228	251,496	240,982	303,067
NOGALES, AZ										
POV Wait Times	16.7	15.7	18.4	24.6	24.5	32.1	47.4	44.6	29.5	18.9
POVs	3,063,822	3,297,865	3,426,736	3,487,436	3,728,827	3,686,058	3,401,852	2,425,247	2,238,657	3,550,228
NORTON, VT										
POV Wait Times	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
POVs	81,311	74,512	49,154	32,530	30,574	31,913	26,030	7,047	1,602	7,670
OGDENSBURG, NY										
POV Wait Times	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.2
POVs	387,000	375,022	320,537	287,061	292,808	300,233	292,973	127,488	25,108	121,959
OTAY MESA										
POV Wait Times	45.7	43.0	29.4	38.3	38.1	38.3	52.5	49.3	61.6	69.3
POVs	5,987,273	6,901,172	6,747,483	7,597,903	8,213,614	8,103,641	6,760,388	5,152,742	5,090,835	5,696,550
PEMBINA, ND										
POV Wait Times	1.8	1.9	1.7	1.6	1.6	2.0	2.4	0.8	0.0	1.7
POVs	375,628	369,328	330,996	289,745	277,247	264,732	253,682	100,748	24,949	125,262
POINT ROBERTS, WA										
POV Wait Times	5.7	6.1	5.5	5.1	4.3	6.9	4.7	3.1	3.5	3.7
POVs	1,190,608	1,201,275	1,071,337	945,103	912,239	1,012,392	973,659	406,929	79,365	420,886
PORT HURON, MI										
POV Wait Times	2.3	3.8	3.1	2.3	2.9	3.5	6.7	2.4	0.0	2.8
POVs	2,032,553	2,002,506	1,745,713	1,548,257	1,565,333	1,553,250	1,474,568	616,818	121,617	578,075

Table C1 (Continued)

Port/Wait Time/POV Volume	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
PRESIDIO, TX										
POV Wait Times	6.5	9.4	7.1	10.2	8.2	8.1	12.6	9.7	15.0	11.7
POVs	594,488	608,805	659,374	663,522	685,190	714,221	700,806	548,129	508,633	614,531
PROGRESO, TX										
POV Wait Times	10.7	10.2	9.0	10.0	9.1	11.6	29.7	30.5	26.9	24.2
POVs	1,050,675	1,160,275	1,120,611	1,231,782	1,244,424	1,240,840	1,250,485	994,358	841,693	1,160,174
RIO GRANDE CITY, TX										
POV Wait Times	6.7	5.6	4.9	5.1	3.4	4.6	14.8	12.4	13.9	8.3
POVs	350,796	354,036	371,252	412,908	402,949	413,914	427,898	320,496	265,334	381,517
ROMA, TX										
POV Wait Times	5.6	5.2	4.7	4.6	5.3	6.5	14.2	9.5	7.2	6.0
POVs	682,289	698,610	726,931	796,790	803,877	785,690	713,422	558,038	526,311	703,634
SAN LUIS, AZ										
POV Wait Times	31.9	27.6	35.7	45.9	51.1	46.5	78.2	79.3	72.7	43.3
POVs	2,906,578	2,952,286	3,100,024	3,036,398	3,157,647	3,336,725	2,894,655	2,332,379	2,673,661	3,240,784
SANTA TERESA										
POV Wait Times	11.8	8.2	10.8	14.5	13.8	48.6	36.3	34.9	27.2	25.0
POVs	403,158	459,875	513,207	595,354	617,641	554,948	573,975	426,919	411,436	621,798
SAN YSIDRO										
POV Wait Times	81.4	69.3	32.1	50.1	46.7	18.9	64.5	57.8	70.9	86.7
POVs	11,292,152	11,299,741	14,357,503	13,959,170	13,569,163	14,588,551	14,485,331	12,690,027	13,345,831	14,948,473
SAULT STE. MARIE, MI										
POV Wait Times	3.0	2.0	1.3	1.8	1.8	1.0	1.1	0.1	0.0	0.1
POVs	1,003,253	972,312	830,907	716,718	665,145	713,180	665,497	278,967	28,719	228,759
SUMAS, WA										
POV Wait Times	9.1	10.1	7.2	6.1	5.6	6.5	6.3	2.7	0.5	2.7
POVs	1,214,398	1,159,314	962,169	850,004	834,808	918,412	882,912	370,765	45,958	257,346
SWEETGRASS, MT										
POV Wait Times	5.1	4.0	4.5	5.7	6.0	6.0	6.4	4.1	1.8	4.4
POVs	310,011	305,537	286,072	268,807	233,922	197,349	188,327	95,687	34,581	115,383
TECATE, CA										
POV Wait Times	40.0	32.6	23.2	29.8	31.2	30.8	39.8	39.2	49.3	39.5
POVs	737,060	789,642	891,068	943,208	1,037,241	1,085,274	1,014,570	663,887	457,071	889,305
TORNILLO-FABENS,TX										
POV Wait Times	5.8	5.5	4.5	4.4	4.0	4.6	10.6	8.2	7.7	8.0
POVs	300,796	285,988	273,302	300,922	320,121	358,415	442,325	366,131	319,647	401,797

[1] BorderStat.
[2] Operations Management Report (OMR).
[3] Ysleta was categorized as its own port distinct from El Paso, TX starting in 2019. Data for prior years have been updated to reflect this split out.
Source: OFO.

Table C2: OFO COV Wait Times (minutes) and Total Annual Flow, FY 2013 to 2022

Port/Wait Time/COV Volume	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
CBP-WELLESLEY ISLAND, POE										
COV Wait Times[1]	0.8	0.9	1.1	1.0	0.6	0.6	0.8	1.4	1.0	0.4
COVs[2]	179,788	189,229	200,287	207,309	204,264	198,288	192,050	182,766	191,354	192,623
BLAINE, BORDER CROSSING, CARS										
COV Wait Times	7.5	7.8	8.6	9.2	9.0	9.4	8.6	10.8	9.3	13.2
COVs	349,315	363,622	379,487	366,821	367,121	372,040	373,326	337,663	369,576	378,218
CBP-LOS INDIOS, BORDER STATION										
COV Wait Times	3.2	3.2	0.9	0.5	0.9	1.1	6.7	2.2	6.9	8.1
COVs	30,398	32,305	25,031	26,971	24,754	33,563	59,552	52,001	87,866	122,781
CBP-LOS TOMATES, PASENGER XING										
COV Wait Times	12.2	16.3	18.0	11.7	12.4	16.4	17.2	7.3	19.1	22.7
COVs	178,944	178,303	178,876	188,244	197,127	214,595	225,147	215,680	237,716	234,768
BUFFALO, PEACE BRIDGE										
COV Wait Times	6.2	7.5	6.7	6.7	6.4	6.6	6.8	4.1	3.5	4.8
COVs	613,651	557,340	578,345	615,681	573,721	557,609	522,691	494,332	565,768	557,574
CBP-LEWISTON, QUEENSTON BRIDGE										
COV Wait Times	1.4	3.2	2.3	2.0	3.2	3.9	4.6	3.5	4.0	4.0
COVs	319,971	342,855	336,203	344,598	387,059	386,233	393,703	341,476	326,033	339,918
CBP-CALAIS, POE PASSENGER										
COV Wait Times	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
COVs	64,448	61,437	64,576	65,112	62,861	64,737	64,529	63,208	66,489	61,003
CBP-CALEXICO, EAST BORDER XING										
COV Wait Times	12.7	8.4	6.7	6.3	9.0	11.4	13.8	11.9	13.8	17.5
COVs	322,648	324,855	333,640	349,411	356,368	373,631	386,324	384,289	433,168	449,315
CBP-CHAMPLAIN, PORT OF ENTRY										
COV Wait Times	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.2	1.1	1.9	0.7	1.0	0.7
COVs	275,042	280,008	295,032	310,599	309,327	309,757	300,857	280,193	290,823	286,032
COLUMBUS, BORDER CROSSING										
COV Wait Times	1.7	3.3	3.2	3.3	2.8	3.6	7.7	9.1	12.6	14.1
COVs	11,192	14,242	13,849	13,842	15,299	16,401	17,577	18,726	21,784	23,213
CBP-DEL RIO, INTL BRIDGE POE										
COV Wait Times	1.7	1.5	1.2	1.0	0.8	1.5	7.3	1.6	1.6	0.4
COVs	67,282	68,358	69,854	73,163	74,904	76,796	73,300	67,603	73,407	76,869

Table C2 (Continued)

Port/Wait Time/COV Volume	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
DERBY LINE, PORT OF ENTRY										
COV Wait Times	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.5	1.5	1.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0
COVs	91,767	94,862	97,948	100,367	95,469	89,905	88,719	88,155	89,727	85,828
CBP-DETROIT, AMBASSADOR BRIDGE										
COV Wait Times	7.8	10.1	7.6	7.7	5.7	7.9	7.9	6.5	5.7	10.0
COVs	1,479,931	1,501,712	1,495,532	1,566,289	1,555,472	1,557,632	1,520,248	1,352,415	1,384,678	1,392,007
DETROIT, WINDSOR TUNNEL										
COV Wait Times	2.8	3.6	2.2	2.3	2.4	3.2	3.8	2.0	0.1	1.7
COVs	43,407	39,217	35,188	34,350	26,367	22,336	19,855	13,400	10,287	19,131
DOUGLAS, BORDER CROSSING										
COV Wait Times	2.1	1.7	5.5	3.9	3.3	1.6	2.3	0.7	6.0	1.1
COVs	32,053	33,319	32,286	30,896	31,098	28,148	26,917	25,633	28,217	29,927
CBP-EAGLE PASS, BRIDGE 2										
COV Wait Times	9.0	10.5	8.1	4.9	4.9	4.1	2.2	1.6	2.8	2.4
COVs	116,281	133,050	140,813	154,253	167,503	172,720	179,323	149,865	169,848	203,932
CBP-EL PASO, YSLETA PORT ENTRY										
COV Wait Times	10.2	9.1	6.9	17.0	17.1	18.9	27.1	25.4	20.9	24.8
COVs	421,523	440,468	315,245	402,902	506,370	529,394	561,437	585,162	651,252	660,046
EL PASO, BOTA POE										
COV Wait Times	13.1	12.9	19.5	22.2	16.9	17.3	25.9	17.8	29.8	27.4
COVs	312,332	314,394	436,697	353,831	273,013	267,243	241,291	159,570	183,473	169,305
PHARR, PORT OF ENTRY										
COV Wait Times	15.6	20.0	18.5	20.6	27.1	32.8	43.1	27.9	40.1	34.4
COVs	505,137	523,472	541,352	561,428	591,362	642,706	649,300	653,083	696,685	667,558
CBP-HIGHGATE SPRINGS, POE										
COV Wait Times	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.3	1.4	0.0
COVs	86,583	90,496	90,606	92,173	35,094	95,933	94,583	95,396	98,704	NA
CBP-HOULTON, PASSENGER PROC										
COV Wait Times	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.9	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.1
COVs	84,035	85,061	82,476	88,443	92,477	92,836	89,267	88,181	86,509	98,964
CBP-INTL FALLS, BORDER CROSSNG										
COV Wait Times	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
COVs	18,228	17,081	14,793	16,905	18,935	17,678	17,025	14,949	17,856	17,061
CBP-JACKMAN, BORDER STATION										
COV Wait Times	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
COVs	35,592	35,475	37,380	34,182	35,094	33,843	31,986	28,285	28,387	29,050
COLUMBIA, LAREDO VEH-PED XING										
COV Wait Times	5.3	4.6	5.0	5.4	3.9	1.1	9.4	4.1	5.8	7.1
COVs	368,168	375,511	358,162	352,896	483,020	394,395	420,803	380,560	634,434	708,081

Table C2 (Continued)

Port/Wait Time/COV Volume	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
INS-LAREDO BRIDGE #4 *HIST*										
COV Wait Times	22.5	20.8	23.3	16.8	14.7	22.0	26.2	18.9	10.7	18.8
COVs	1,450,247	1,551,526	1,642,833	1,714,408	1,646,107	1,889,268	1,947,314	1,877,219	1,905,154	2,052,239
LUKEVILLE, BORDER CROSSING										
COV Wait Times	2.0	11.4	0.0	0.4	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.4	0.0
COVs	26	75	93	152	196	268	301	422	605	858
LYNDEN, BORDER CROSSING										
COV Wait Times	4.7	4.1	5.1	5.4	5.0	4.8	5.0	3.6	1.5	3.3
COVs	46,100	43,566	43,069	46,651	44,279	42,968	43,418	51,147	43,752	47,698
CBP-MADAWASKA, BORDER CROSSING										
COV Wait Times	3.0	3.4	1.3	0.7	0.9	1.0	0.7	0.3	0.0	0.0
COVs	25,250	21,557	16,006	16,609	15,539	3,403	2,144	1,847	1,581	1,349
CBP-MASSENA, PORT OF ENTRY										
COV Wait Times	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
COVs	29,024	24,214	22,241	24,552	27,256	26,967	26,092	24,298	25,422	24,411
CBP-NACO, BORDER CROSSING										
COV Wait Times	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	1.8	2.6	0.5	2.2	1.0
COVs	3958	3661	3018	3201	3579	3124	3289	3429	4,091	3,058
NOGALES WEST, BORDER CROSSING										
COV Wait Times	12.2	19.0	11.9	16.7	17.0	15.9	17.9	14.8	15.3	13.4
COVs	312536	310239	320554	328921	334661	337468	349101	342197	381,556	368,154
NORTON, BORDER CROSSING, POE										
COV Wait Times	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
COVs	10,581	10,831	11,390	11,512	12,609	12,219	11,646	8,997	6,679	6,770
OGDENSBURG, PORT OF ENTRY										
COV Wait Times	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2
COVs	34,912	37,455	37,818	37,918	39,279	41,133	40,848	37,078	42,231	38,756
OTAY MESA, EXPORT OUTBOUND										
COV Wait Times	32.9	35.3	31.7	33.8	37.0	34.3	55.3	38.4	40.2	40.6
COVs	831,836	800,493	822,691	873,599	927,111	961,736	953,782	887,758	1,005,456	1,051,070
CBP-PEMBINA, BORDER CROSSING										
COV Wait Times	4.2	4.1	4.2	4.2	3.9	3.9	4.8	4.3	5.2	7.3
COVs	218,493	228,966	218,095	215,866	214,214	222,710	221,051	213,689	237,662	232,554
POINT ROBERTS, BORDER CROSSING										
COV Wait Times	1.4	1.2	1.1	1.5	1.0	1.7	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
COVs	17,174	17,748	18,286	15,449	13,560	14,608	12,303	6,236	1,549	4,001
CBP-PORT HURON, BLUE WATER BRG										
COV Wait Times	2.6	5.0	4.6	3.4	6.0	7.1	11.3	5.9	2.3	10.1
COVs	719,204	760,651	797,688	833,276	830,905	818,994	821,917	723,797	834,374	884,584

Table C2 (Continued)

Port/Wait Time/COV Volume	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
PRESIDIO, BORDER CROSSING										
COV Wait Times	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	1.1	4.7	2.8
COVs	9,610	10,194	9,490	7,407	8,551	8,807	9,812	9,482	10,682	11,051
PROGRESO, INTERNATIONAL BRIDGE										
COV Wait Times	15.8	11.0	8.9	5.9	4.3	2.3	33.9	23.3	27.9	20.8
COVs	45,103	39,928	37,965	45,580	53,223	50,065	52,874	52,847	54,931	48,479
RIO GRANDE CITY, POE INTL BR										
COV Wait Times	0.2	0.4	0.1	0.7	0.2	1.0	1.8	2.2	2.6	2.1
COVs	26,878	31,733	30,673	34,722	37,545	37,608	40,666	40,042	44,225	52,782
ROMA, BORDER CROSSING										
COV Wait Times	0.6	0.7	1.2	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.5	1.7	2.3	1.7
COVs	7,029	7,778	7,949	7,455	7,638	7,677	10,956	19,732	30,991	38,419
SAN LUIS, II POE LAND BORDER										
COV Wait Times	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.6	1.7	1.6	2.0	2.6	3.4	4.4
COVs	34,133	31,658	33,699	31,499	32,808	28,105	34,228	39,803	47,256	50,120
SANTA TERESA, PASSENGER OPS										
COV Wait Times	8.2	8.3	10.7	14.6	14.3	14.9	9.3	8.6	14.6	16.6
COVs	80,692	84,615	95,932	106,708	113,357	116,064	127,443	134,701	155,359	160,946
CBP-SAULT ST MARIE, POE										
COV Wait Times	3.0	2.0	1.3	1.4	1.8	0.9	0.9	0.1	0.0	0.1
COVs	40,827	39,255	37,323	39,636	41,501	40,979	39,951	38,418	38,565	33,349
SUMAS, PORT OF ENTRY										
COV Wait Times	3.7	4.3	4.3	5.7	4.7	3.9	2.5	2.9	2.7	4.3
COVs	141,337	148,016	152,845	157,690	156,956	159,024	153,942	152,118	164,329	144,562
CBP-SWEETGRASS, BORDER LANE										
COV Wait Times	4.7	4.1	3.6	4.5	3.8	3.4	4.6	5.0	6.4	4.2
COVs	133,295	143,836	134,786	127,829	127,310	128,527	140,195	131,089	147,541	142,668
TECATE, PORT OF ENTRY										
COV Wait Times	9.6	13.7	12.6	16.3	17.1	12.2	17.0	7.9	20.9	22.1
COVs	45,625	51,736	51,965	55,414	58,221	61,713	63,484	64,739	68,185	67,446

[1] Wait Times for COVs in regular COV Lanes.
[2] All COVs processed in regular COV and FAST Lanes.
Source: OFO.

Appendix D – Infrastructure Capacity Utilization Rate at Each Land POE

Table D1: Number of Vehicles Processed by OFO Field Office per Booth-Hour, FY 2013 to 2022

Field Office	Port	Crossing	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Boston	BEECHER FALLS, VT	Beecher	21.5	21.7	24.1	27.3	30.5	28	28.3	NA	NA	NA
		Canaan	16	16.4	14.8	15.2	15.8	15.8	15.5	18.1	NA	15.7
		Pittsburg	30.2	36.5	38.5	39	46.5	43.5	NA	NA	NA	NA
	BRIDGEWATER, ME	Bridgewater	20.1	19.1	16.1	14.9	14.9	14.7	15.0	16.6	NA	28.9
	CALAIS, ME	Ferry Pt	58.7	54.5	48.6	45.2	46.3	46.7	46.4	42.2	21.2	29.2
		Int'l Ave	29.7	28.2	21.8	20.9	21.3	20.4	20.6	19.4	26.1	17.7
		Milltown	36.9	35	30.5	24.7	24.9	24.7	24.2	23.4	NA	18.9
	DERBY LINE, VT	Beebe	17.2	17.3	15.3	15	17.1	15.6	15.4	18.2	NA	21.0
		Derby Line	28.5	30.6	28	27.7	29	25.6	26.8	24.6	24.5	21.8
		Derby Line 5	37.8	37.6	30.7	26.5	27.4	29.1	26.9	25.8	NA	17.9
		North Troy	18.6	18.7	16.4	15.8	18	16.6	16.0	16.9	NA	15.7
	EASTPORT, ME	Eastport	19.9	14.6	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
		Lubec	28.1	28.4	27.1	27.2	27.5	27.4	26.6	20.0	17.3	20.8
	FORT FAIRFIELD, ME	Easton	55.6	55.8	92.7	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
		Ft Fairfield	28	26.9	21.3	19.5	19.6	19.3	19.1	20.5	NA	16.3
	FORT KENT, ME	Estcourt	17.9	18.8	20.2	29.4	69.4	NA	NA	52.5	NA	NA
		Ft Kent	30.9	29.8	25.7	21.8	21.1	21.5	20.8	22.4	NA	18.1
	HIGHGATE SPRINGS/ALBURG	Alburg	17.6	18.3	16.4	16	16.8	17.3	17.4	21.0	NA	16.6
		Highgate	34.1	34.4	32.8	32.8	32.9	28.0	29.4	29.7	24.4	24.6
		Morses Line	16.3	17.9	16.3	16.2	16.2	17.2	17.7	23.6	NA	16.3
	HOULTON, ME	Houlton	37.4	37.6	31.1	29.5	34.8	33.9	29.9	27.8	27.4	19.6
		Monticello	75	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
		Orient	27.2	27.1	24	25.1	43.7	41.6	NA	NA	NA	NA
	JACKMAN, ME	Coburn Gore	16	16.2	14.4	14.6	15.1	15.6	15.7	17.1	NA	16.9
		Jackman	17.1	20	15.7	15.9	17.4	17.6	17.8	16.9	NA	16.4
		St Aurelie	27.8	24.3	22.7	21.5	23.3	21.7	20.9	19.8	20.5	19.0
		St Just	70.5	60.1	69.7	63.2	59.4	41.4	NA	46.7	45.9	47.3
		St Pamphile	41.4	36.8	41.8	44.8	53.7	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
		St Zacharie	28.1	27.5	32.9	31.4	40.4	NA	NA	43.1	32.3	36.7
	LIMESTONE, ME	Limestone	15.2	15.8	18.7	21.6	24.2	24.6	24.6	38.5	NA	NA
	MADAWASKA, ME	Madawaska	55.9	51.7	45.5	41.6	43.8	45.1	45.5	44.2	42.3	26.6
	NORTON, VT	Norton	19.4	19.3	16.3	16.8	17.9	18.1	19.5	32.2	NA	20.8
	RICHFORD, VT	E Richford	36.1	36.3	38.2	31.1	37.1	56.8	NA	28.0	NA	27.4
		Pinnacle	30	29.1	28.5	30	35.4	32.4	NA	NA	NA	33.0
		Richford	20	20.9	17.1	15.7	14.9	15.1	14.8	16.0	NA	18.7
		W Berkshire	14.8	16.6	15.4	15.7	15.3	14.7	14.2	14.3	NA	14.9
	VAN BUREN, ME	Hamlin	24.7	24.1	19.1	15.3	15.5	15.7	16.8	18.3	NA	22.2
		Van Buren	25.7	25.1	21.3	18.5	18.8	18.6	18.5	19.8	NA	20.3
	VANCEBORO, ME	Vanceboro	14	14.3	14.8	17.6	20.2	20.3	21.0	36.4	NA	NA

Table D1 (continued)

Field Office	Port	Crossing	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Buffalo	ALEXANDRIA BAY, NY	1000 Island Br	32.4	33	27.9	28.8	30.7	30.5	28.5	26.3	22.5	22.9
	BUFFALO-NIAGARA FALLS NY	Lewiston	40.8	41.9	38.1	38	40.4	42.0	43.8	39.4	18.5	29.4
		Peace Bridge	40.9	41.5	38.3	37.3	36.6	35.9	36.4	33.7	22.5	30.1
		Rainbow	39.8	41	35.3	33.7	36.8	38.3	39.6	37.2	18.6	28.9
		Whirlpool	59.4	59.5	49.9	45.3	47.2	49.7	47.9	44.2	33.1	25.2
	CAPE VINCENT, NY	Cape Vincent	12.1	14.1	13	12.5	13.3	12.8	13.2	25.4	NA	15.6
	CHAMPLAIN-ROUSES POINT	Cannons	16.7	17.3	17	18.3	17.9	17.7	19.2	33.6	NA	18.5
		Champlain	34	35	32.9	31.2	32.4	33.5	34.9	29.8	15.8	27.7
		Mooers	17.5	17.4	15.3	15.1	15.1	15.7	15.8	17.1	NA	18.1
		Overtons	20.1	20.3	18.3	17.3	17.7	17.6	18.5	17.8	NA	18.0
		Rouses Pt	21.7	22.2	19.3	18.7	20.1	20.3	20.7	17.4	NA	18.9
	MASSENA, NY	Massena	45.5	47	45.5	42.2	46.2	44.7	46.8	44.2	43.3	48.2
	OGDENSBURG, NY	Ogdensburg	40.6	40.3	34.7	34.8	35.9	35.6	36.3	34.6	23.9	23.2
	TROUT RIVER, NY	Burke	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
		Chateaugay	14.4	15.1	14	14.2	14.5	14.3	14.5	16.3	NA	17.4
		Churubusco	18.9	21.3	23.7	27.2	36.6	40.6	NA	NA	NA	NA
		Ft Covington	18.5	19.2	17.4	16.2	16.4	17.3	16.3	16.1	NA	15.8
		Trout River	14.5	14.9	14.2	13.8	14.4	14.7	14.8	16.9	NA	18.3
Chicago	TOLEDO, OH	Sandusky	NA	12.6	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	9.4
Detroit	ALGONAC, MI	Algonac	10.7	15.7	13.4	13.3	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	12.3
	DETROIT, MI	Ambassador	36	36.1	36.6	37.9	39	41.9	42.9	39.9	37.1	30.1
		Windsor	36.9	39.5	42.7	43.9	46.9	50.0	51.8	47.4	36.6	41.2
	PORT HURON, MI	Marine City	14.1	20.5	16	16.2	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
		Port Huron	42.8	42.2	38	34.8	38.9	41.5	42.4	39.1	20.0	26.8
	SAULT STE. MARIE, MI	SSM	41	42	38.6	40.2	40.9	41.6	41.7	37.7	25.9	26.7
El Paso	COLUMBUS, NM	Antelope	5.4	7.5	6.6	7	8.1	8.7	9.1	8.9	NA	8.5
		Columbus	32.7	28.4	29.9	32.6	37.7	41.1	42.2	35.5	31.5	34.1
	EL PASO, TX	BOTA	44.2	48.3	50.3	51	54.3	55.5	52.5	47.5	44.3	45.1
		PDN	38	39.9	44	43.5	46.5	47.9	45.8	40.9	39.6	41.2
		Stanton St	110.1	119.6	114.9	123.2	132	133.0	148.8	131.2	127.4	126.4
		Ysleta	45.9	49.7	53.4	56.3	59.7	62.5	65.9	57.5	55.1	56.5
	PRESIDIO, TX	Presidio	41.1	40.9	43.5	44.1	45.7	47.5	48.7	47.3	45.3	40.6
	SANTA TERESA	St Teresa	30.4	32.5	35.2	36.6	37.4	38.3	38.9	37.2	33.9	36.3
	TORNILLO,TX	Ft Hancock	14.9	15	14.5	15.2	15.7	17.1	20.8	19.6	18.8	18.5
		Tornillo	32.9	29	29.8	33.1	34.3	35.1	41.1	35.5	30.6	38.4

Table D1 (continued)

Field Office	Port	Crossing	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Laredo	BROWNSVILLE, TX	B&M	52.7	57.6	56.8	58	67	67.2	63.1	57.7	52.4	63.2
		Gateway	42.7	42.3	41.8	46.1	51.1	50.8	48.3	49.1	50.1	54.5
		Los Indios	35.5	36.4	34.1	39.1	42.6	44.5	45.0	44.1	42.4	45.6
		Veterans	50.1	51.2	49.5	52.1	58.1	61.0	59.6	53.4	53.0	66.3
	DEL RIO, TX	Amistad	25.6	24.6	25.7	21.9	23	29.3	44.0	44.2	NA	23.2
		Del Rio	47.5	48.2	51.8	56.2	62.5	64.1	64.2	53.5	52.0	48.4
	EAGLE PASS, TX	Eagle Pass I	51.9	51.5	51.4	52.5	54.5	54.2	52.5	46.4	40.6	48.9
		Eagle Pass II	47.2	49.5	49.3	51	52.5	51.0	48.1	39.7	34.3	34.6
	HIDALGO,TX	Anzalduas	57.7	55.9	51.5	52.1	52.3	50.1	52.1	47.3	44.9	42.0
		Hidalgo	46.3	47.6	49.6	48.2	48.9	47.7	49.5	44.8	46.0	50.5
		Pharr	53.1	50.7	47.4	46.8	48.7	47.8	52.1	43.2	41.3	39.7
	LAREDO, TX	Col Solidarity	29.2	30.4	29.8	32	34.7	37.2	35.0	26.4	26.3	32.3
		Convent	26.2	29.7	34.8	37.3	NA	64.9	68.5	60.9	59.9	57.1
		Lincoln-J	41.2	41.6	45.7	46	46.8	44.0	33.7	28.3	28.3	33.4
	PROGRESO, TX	Donna	41.2	42.5	42.2	42.8	44.1	46.6	49.4	45.2	41.2	44.3
		Progreso	33.7	33.8	33.2	36.6	37.2	38.1	38.2	33.9	33.0	35.2
	RIO GRANDE CITY, TX	Los Ebanos	16.2	15.8	14.8	15.4	14.7	14.8	14.5	14.6	15.4	15.9
		Rio Grande	32.6	32.5	33.6	37.6	41.5	43.6	45.1	41.8	39.5	40.6
	ROMA, TX	Falcon Dam	14.7	15.1	15.4	17.3	18.7	20.0	21.6	21.5	22.7	22.9
		Roma	35.3	35.9	37.7	40.7	41.4	43.4	40.7	39.4	36.1	40.9
Portland	ALCAN, AK	Alcan	16.3	16.3	13.8	17.5	20.6	20.9	16.8	23.1	20.1	15.5
	DALTON CACHE, AK	Dalton	17.2	17.6	16.6	15.7	14.4	14.1	14.2	30.2	NA	13.7
	KETCHIKAN, AK	Ketchikan	12.9	13.6	13.3	13.5	14	14.4	13.6	11.7	NA	15.7
	SKAGWAY, AK	Skagway	23.4	24.6	20.5	20.6	22	24.2	25.3	25.3	NA	16.2
San Diego	ANDRADE, CA	Andrade	32.5	35.6	39.8	42.6	45.8	49.6	49.6	43.4	40.9	42.0
	CALEXICO-EAST	Calexico/E	60.8	65.2	71.1	74.9	78.7	74.2	71.5	61.9	61.4	64.7
	CALEXICO, CA	Calexico/W	48.9	49.3	53.1	55.1	57.6	57.6	65.2	63.4	61.9	65.3
	OTAY MESA	Otay Mesa	63.7	74.3	76.9	81.4	79.2	84.9	83.9	75.1	68.3	79.4
	SAN YSIDRO	San Ysidro	52.4	56.9	72.2	69.6	71.1	77.5	78.6	74.6	69.7	71.1
	TECATE, CA	Tecate	55.7	57.7	59.5	65.3	73.2	75.8	74.6	71.6	71.8	77.7
San Juan	MAYAGUEZ, PR	Mayaguez	NA	33	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

Table D1 (continued)

Field Office	Port	Crossing	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Seattle	AMBROSE, ND	Ambrose	88	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	59.7	NA	NA
	ANTLER, ND	Antler	15	17.1	22.2	22.6	27.3	25.9	NA	33.2	NA	NA
	BAUDETTE, MN	Baudette	28.8	29.7	28.3	28.3	29.9	30.6	29.0	28.2	NA	19.8
	BLAINE, WA	Pacific Hwy	65.4	68.7	59.7	55.4	59.3	64.2	58.4	49.4	21.6	38.2
		Peace Arch	79.3	83.1	70.6	63.5	66.4	64.7	60.7	54.4	22.6	40.1
	BOUNDARY, WA	Border Patrol	24.8	23.1	18.1	15.6	15	15.4	15.9	16.4	NA	19.6
	CARBURY, ND	Carbury	12.1	13.2	14.7	16.3	15.4	15.7	15.5	16.6	NA	NA
	DANVILLE, WA	Danville	17	16.9	15.7	15.3	15.1	14.8	14.6	15.8	NA	NA
	DEL BONITA, MT	Del Bonita	12.6	15.6	15.6	15.4	15.6	15.7	14.1	14.7	NA	13.0
	DUNSEITH, ND	Dunseith	15	15.5	13.8	13.6	13.8	13.6	13.8	13.1	18.2	14.8
	EASTPORT, ID	Eastport ID	20.3	23.7	21.1	23.1	21.9	23.9	20.0	15.9	29.6	17.7
	FERRY, WA	Ferry	17.4	17.8	21.3	16.4	17.2	16.7	15.1	27.6	NA	18.0
	FORTUNA, ND	Fortuna	18.5	22.1	18.4	19.9	19.5	16.9	17.5	23.9	NA	NA
	FRONTIER, WA	Frontier	14.6	15.2	14.2	13.8	13.9	13.9	13.7	14.5	NA	15.1
	GRAND PORTAGE, MN	Grand Portage	38.5	39.6	36.8	34.4	35	35.4	34.0	28.7	NA	21.8
	HANSBORO, ND	Hansboro	21.4	25.9	32.2	29.3	31.5	26.3	NA	37.9	NA	NA
	INTERNATIONAL FALLS, MN	Int'l Falls	38.3	41.1	39.5	38.4	40.6	38.7	37.0	39.5	31.3	27.3
	LANCASTER, MN	Lancaster	14.2	14.1	13.1	12.7	13	12.5	12.5	13.0	NA	12.8
	LAURIER, WA	Laurier	16.2	16.3	16.5	15.5	14.9	15.5	15.2	14.6	NA	14.9
	LYNDEN, WA	Lynden	51.7	53.1	43.4	40.8	42.2	47.3	45.8	47.2	26.4	31.8
	MAIDA, ND	Maida	17.3	18.4	20.7	23	27.8	23.7	NA	44.1	NA	NA
	METALINE FALLS	Metaline	12.1	12.7	12.7	12.8	13.1	13.3	12.2	12.2	NA	12.9
	MORGAN, MT	Morgan	16.6	18.3	19.9	22.8	21.9	21.7	NA	28.3	NA	NA
	NECHE, ND	Neche	16.5	16.4	14.9	14.8	14.6	14.6	14.7	16.9	NA	NA
	NIGHTHAWK, WA	Nighthawk	15.2	17.3	22.1	22.5	24.7	26.4	NA	NA	NA	NA
	NOONAN, ND	Noonan	13.1	13.3	12.8	12.9	13.7	13.9	13.8	16.6	NA	NA
	NORTHGATE, ND	Northgate	12.4	12.8	13.1	14.1	15.3	15.5	16.3	17.7	NA	21.2
	OPHEIM, MT	Opheim	60.4	54.7	60.5	68.9	63.7	65.2	NA	NA	NA	NA
	OROVILLE, WA	Oroville	24.9	23.8	20.6	20.9	20.5	20.0	19.2	16.5	NA	17.8
	PEMBINA, ND	Pembina	28	29.9	26.8	26.9	27.9	28.6	28.5	27.7	22.2	21.5
	PIEGAN, MT	Piegan	19.9	22	19.9	21.1	20	20.6	22.1	16.6	21.1	21.2
	PINECREEK, MN	Pine Creek	29.7	34.1	43.3	48.1	65.2	69.7	NA	NA	NA	NA
	POINT ROBERTS, WA	Pt Roberts	78.4	82.6	84.2	78.7	77.4	83.9	79.4	58.0	20.2	49.7
	PORTAL, ND	Portal	17	17.4	15.3	14.5	14.7	14.8	14.3	16.5	NA	14.3
	PORTHILL, ID	Porthill	35.1	35.4	30.1	26.2	25.9	28.5	26.2	24.3	NA	15.6
	RAYMOND, MT	Raymond	13.1	14.3	14.3	13.7	14	14.0	14.6	17.3	NA	19.0
	ROOSVILLE, MT	Roosville	28.6	30.1	26.8	24.9	25.7	26.5	26.7	22.3	NA	21.1
	ROSEAU, MN	Roseau	12.6	12.9	12.2	12.3	12.7	12.6	12.5	15.0	NA	19.0
	SARLES, ND	Sarles	39.8	51.8	53.8	41.4	44.8	33.3	NA	41.4	NA	NA
	SCOBEY, MT	Scobey	29	26.6	33.8	42.4	42.2	40.0	NA	NA	NA	NA
	SHERWOOD, ND	Sherwood	13.6	14.7	14.6	15.2	15.9	15.4	16.2	18.3	NA	NA
	ST JOHN, ND	St. John	13.3	14.1	16.1	17.7	18.8	19.8	17.9	26.0	NA	NA
	SUMAS, WA	Sumas	51.8	53.7	49.5	46.1	47.7	49.2	44.0	38.5	20.2	25.5
	SWEETGRASS, MT	Sweetgrass	27.9	30.3	27.1	27.4	28.6	28.5	26.5	24.8	16.6	20.4
	TURNER, MT	Turner	13.4	15	17.2	18.8	19.9	21.0	19.0	17.4	NA	20.8
	WALHALLA, ND	Walhalla	13.8	14.4	13.2	13.1	13.1	13.0	13.1	14.8	NA	NA
	WARROAD, MN	OARS	NA	13.8	24.5	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
		Warroad	17.5	17.8	17.6	17.7	19.2	19.2	17.8	17.8	NA	16.6
	WESTHOPE, ND	Westhope	14.2	15.9	16.9	19.5	21.6	22.2	20.3	25.2	NA	NA
	WHITLASH, MT	Whitlash	59.6	NA	55.4	72.3	NA	55.2	NA	NA	NA	NA
	WILDHORSE, MT	Wildhorse	12.3	13.2	12.6	12.9	13	13.1	14.1	19.4	NA	16.9
	WILLOW CREEK, MT	Willow Creek	17.1	19.1	35.5	41.1	49	39.2	NA	44.2	NA	33.5
Tucson	DOUGLAS, AZ	Douglas	42.9	40.6	40.2	40.2	42.3	43.2	41.9	35.5	37.1	37.3
	LUKEVILLE, AZ	Lukeville	28	29.6	30.5	33.6	37.4	38.9	38.7	31.6	39.0	38.2
	NACO, AZ	Naco	33.6	37	38.7	37.9	37.8	40.0	41.5	34.8	38.5	41.7
	NOGALES, AZ	Deconcini	44.4	46.1	48.7	51.7	52.3	54.6	49.9	41.9	41.4	42.2
		Mariposa	36.6	39.2	39.9	40.4	41.7	44.4	38.4	32.2	29.5	32.3
	SAN LUIS, AZ	San Luis	40.2	43.3	45.4	48.2	48.6	51.8	53.1	49.9	49.9	56.5
	SASABE, AZ	Sasabe	18	16.8	15.3	15.1	16	15.6	15.1	15.9	18.1	15.3

Notes: As of 2019, OFO no longer reports on the crossings of Burke at Trout River, NY, Sandusky at Toledo, OH, Mayaguez at Mayaguez, PR, and OARS at Warroad, MN. These crossings are retained for historical purposes.
Source: OFO.

Appendix E – Frequency of Secondary Inspections at Each Land POE

Table E1: OFO Northern Land Border Passenger Inspection Rate, FY 2013 to 2022

Secondary Exam Rate	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Northern Land	**7.7%**	**7.7%**	**7.5%**	**7.3%**	**7.2%**	**3.4%**	**3.5%**	**4.1%**	**6.7%**	**4.7%**
Alcan, AK	1.0%	0.9%	5.2%	5.5%	6.7%	2.7%	4.2%	2.8%	5.2%	1.7%
Alexandria Bay, NY	6.9%	7.1%	7.7%	8.4%	4.8%	4.4%	5.0%	4.5%	9.4%	3.0%
Ambrose, ND	3.5%	4.2%	2.5%	2.7%	3.1%	1.7%	6.0%	1.8%	28.7%	NA
Anacortes, WA	2.2%	2.3%	2.4%	2.1%	NA	2.4%	6.8%	5.5%	NA	NA
Antler, ND	3.5%	3.4%	2.4%	2.4%	2.7%	26.0%	3.1%	8.1%	4.1%	26.3%
Bar Harbor, ME	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1.7%	NA	2.7%	NA	NA
Baudette, MN	5.8%	5.7%	6.0%	7.1%	3.8%	4.4%	6.0%	4.3%	6.2%	15.7%
Beecher Falls, VT	10.0%	11.1%	11.2%	10.8%	3.5%	1.9%	2.0%	2.3%	2.6%	2.6%
Blaine, WA	10.7%	10.1%	9.4%	8.1%	7.9%	3.4%	3.5%	4.2%	8.0%	7.4%
Boundary, WA	9.9%	9.0%	11.8%	8.8%	3.6%	3.3%	2.0%	2.2%	0.8%	NA
Bridgewater, ME	1.9%	2.2%	2.2%	2.1%	2.1%	2.0%	2.5%	3.2%	2.2%	NA
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY	6.0%	6.0%	6.1%	6.9%	5.7%	2.8%	2.7%	2.9%	5.4%	6.3%
Calais, ME	3.3%	3.2%	3.5%	4.0%	3.8%	2.6%	2.7%	2.8%	3.9%	4.4%
Cape Vincent, NY	2.2%	2.5%	2.3%	1.5%	1.9%	0.6%	0.6%	0.8%	NA	NA
Carbury, ND	25.1%	24.8%	25.6%	25.9%	4.7%	3.8%	2.5%	2.5%	5.7%	NA
Champlain-Rouses Point, NY	20.0%	21.4%	21.9%	15.4%	7.5%	4.4%	4.0%	4.6%	7.6%	6.3%
Dalton Cache, AK	2.9%	1.7%	2.9%	1.4%	3.8%	1.1%	1.4%	1.1%	1.0%	NA
Danville, WA	2.9%	5.9%	1.4%	1.7%	2.2%	1.4%	2.5%	2.7%	1.1%	NA
Del Bonita, MT	3.1%	2.5%	2.5%	2.6%	3.8%	2.2%	3.9%	4.8%	17.4%	20.0%
Derby Line, VT	3.4%	3.7%	3.9%	4.2%	4.7%	2.4%	3.1%	3.7%	6.5%	3.1%
Detroit, MI	8.3%	8.8%	7.6%	6.6%	3.8%	3.0%	2.8%	3.2%	4.7%	3.8%
Dunseith, ND	4.8%	3.7%	2.6%	3.3%	4.8%	5.5%	6.1%	6.1%	5.4%	0.6%
Eastport, ID	7.0%	15.0%	6.9%	10.8%	8.6%	5.6%	6.1%	5.4%	3.0%	0.8%
Eastport, ME	1.2%	1.9%	2.7%	3.3%	2.9%	1.4%	1.3%	1.0%	0.4%	8.3%
Ferry, WA	7.4%	13.0%	4.2%	5.0%	4.5%	2.3%	4.0%	3.8%	2.6%	NA

Table E1 (Continued)

Secondary Exam Rate	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Fort Fairfield, ME	1.3%	1.1%	1.6%	1.7%	1.9%	1.1%	1.1%	1.1%	1.4%	1.3%
Fort Kent, ME	3.6%	3.1%	3.6%	3.9%	3.5%	2.1%	2.1%	2.0%	2.3%	3.2%
Fortuna, ND	9.2%	9.3%	7.4%	7.1%	4.3%	3.9%	4.2%	7.6%	21.8%	33.3%
Friday Harbor, WA	9.6%	11.1%	10.1%	8.4%	0.6%	30.5%	21.2%	NA	NA	NA
Frontier, WA	5.8%	4.9%	7.7%	3.3%	4.5%	3.2%	3.4%	2.1%	1.5%	1.4%
Grand Portage, MN	2.7%	1.7%	1.5%	1.4%	3.1%	3.0%	3.4%	4.4%	6.0%	7.3%
Hannah, ND	10.0%	8.1%	15.1%	8.4%	13.5%	9.7%	8.5%	9.3%	NA	NA
Hansboro, ND	5.7%	6.1%	3.4%	3.0%	5.3%	4.8%	4.0%	5.4%	10.0%	10.0%
Highgate Springs-Alburg, VT	2.8%	4.8%	5.3%	4.1%	7.9%	4.9%	4.7%	5.0%	5.7%	6.2%
Houlton, ME	3.4%	3.1%	3.3%	3.9%	3.9%	2.4%	2.9%	2.8%	3.9%	7.1%
International Falls-Ranier, MN	7.6%	5.6%	6.4%	5.4%	2.8%	2.7%	4.3%	5.1%	7.3%	3.5%
Jackman, ME	4.1%	4.2%	4.4%	5.4%	5.0%	3.4%	5.4%	6.2%	3.3%	2.5%
Ketchikan, AK	3.0%	1.4%	1.4%	3.4%	1.1%	1.7%	2.3%	2.3%	NA	NA
Lancaster, MN	8.9%	9.4%	11.1%	11.1%	6.6%	3.3%	4.6%	7.9%	4.4%	NA
Laurier, WA	1.8%	1.8%	2.6%	7.8%	4.0%	2.1%	2.2%	2.1%	1.1%	NA
Limestone L, ME	2.0%	1.6%	2.4%	2.0%	2.2%	1.7%	1.4%	1.0%	1.2%	NA
Lynden, WA, WA	3.2%	3.4%	5.5%	4.4%	6.3%	5.9%	5.8%	12.3%	47.9%	3.1%
Madawaska, ME	1.8%	1.8%	2.2%	1.9%	2.5%	1.5%	1.5%	1.5%	1.4%	NA
Maida, ND	12.5%	16.9%	18.0%	16.5%	7.6%	5.1%	8.5%	9.8%	10.6%	NA
Massena, NY	2.6%	2.9%	2.6%	2.9%	1.9%	2.9%	2.8%	3.4%	4.3%	2.0%
Metaline Falls, WA	12.4%	10.3%	6.8%	6.3%	6.2%	4.2%	4.9%	6.7%	3.7%	NA
Morgan, MT	11.5%	7.8%	10.7%	7.7%	16.9%	44.8%	37.4%	28.3%	11.0%	53.8%
Neche, ND	6.1%	8.9%	12.3%	13.1%	6.8%	5.5%	5.8%	6.8%	1.8%	20.6%
Nighthawk, WA	1.3%	1.6%	0.8%	1.1%	4.1%	2.3%	2.2%	4.1%	10.5%	NA
Noonan, ND	9.0%	6.9%	9.2%	10.1%	3.2%	2.5%	4.6%	3.3%	3.4%	NA
Northgate, ND	2.1%	3.3%	3.2%	2.8%	3.7%	2.9%	3.0%	5.2%	3.3%	12.9%

Table E1 (Continued)

Secondary Exam Rate	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Norton, VT	13.0%	13.8%	17.1%	23.2%	2.8%	1.5%	1.5%	1.7%	1.7%	NA
Ogdensburg, NY	7.8%	8.3%	8.5%	9.2%	4.1%	5.6%	5.8%	10.5%	39.4%	5.0%
Opheim, MT	0.5%	1.1%	5.5%	5.0%	11.4%	8.7%	5.6%	6.0%	6.8%	NA
Oroville, WA	16.3%	18.9%	18.7%	15.7%	11.5%	15.4%	15.6%	21.0%	48.2%	11.1%
Pembina, ND	14.0%	7.5%	7.0%	7.1%	7.6%	7.2%	6.4%	7.1%	8.6%	6.1%
Piegan, MT	10.6%	13.5%	6.3%	5.9%	6.3%	2.2%	1.5%	3.1%	12.7%	9.7%
Pinecreek, MN	9.5%	10.0%	13.0%	13.1%	7.3%	6.8%	8.5%	15.6%	31.8%	NA
Point Roberts, WA	9.3%	9.3%	6.6%	5.0%	4.0%	2.0%	1.8%	1.6%	1.7%	2.4%
Port Angeles, WA	1.9%	2.5%	2.4%	2.7%	NA	28.1%	8.5%	28.6%	NA	NA
Port Huron, MI	7.5%	7.3%	7.9%	11.4%	3.9%	12.5%	3.0%	0.6%	6.6%	3.0%
Portal, ND	12.8%	15.9%	12.0%	12.7%	10.9%	3.2%	22.3%	10.1%	34.3%	6.5%
Porthill, ID	14.8%	14.6%	14.2%	15.0%	3.9%	3.2%	11.3%	4.8%	7.4%	4.7%
Portland, ME	NA	4.1%	4.0%	2.1%	1.5%	1.7%	1.1%	NA	NA	NA
Raymond, MT	5.8%	4.1%	6.6%	16.7%	15.4%	5.6%	3.2%	5.4%	3.2%	2.6%
Richford, VT	13.1%	3.1%	5.8%	6.0%	5.3%	2.8%	2.8%	2.7%	3.6%	NA
Roosville, MT	3.4%	3.1%	3.4%	4.1%	6.1%	3.6%	3.2%	3.9%	3.5%	5.2%
Roseau, MN	9.6%	10.4%	9.4%	8.1%	7.1%	6.6%	8.4%	9.8%	4.8%	6.3%
Sarles, ND	17.6%	17.2%	20.6%	15.8%	9.8%	5.5%	8.3%	9.4%	5.2%	NA
Sault Sainte Marie, MI	4.0%	2.7%	3.2%	2.7%	2.3%	2.1%	2.0%	2.6%	8.6%	3.8%
Scobey, MT	1.8%	1.8%	2.0%	3.9%	11.7%	9.2%	8.2%	6.3%	1.7%	NA
Sherwood, ND	1.7%	2.8%	1.9%	2.2%	1.7%	1.4%	1.6%	2.0%	3.0%	NA
Skagway, AK	2.1%	1.7%	4.1%	4.0%	8.1%	3.0%	4.4%	5.6%	3.2%	NA
St. John, ND	32.2%	32.3%	32.2%	32.3%	3.1%	5.2%	3.8%	7.4%	10.5%	NA
Sumas, WA	7.0%	8.1%	8.7%	10.2%	4.8%	2.4%	2.5%	2.5%	2.3%	3.7%
Sweetgrass, MT	10.3%	5.8%	2.7%	2.4%	9.3%	5.1%	6.2%	7.1%	7.4%	8.6%
Trout River, NY	1.7%	1.5%	1.5%	1.5%	2.1%	1.3%	1.4%	1.8%	1.0%	5.2%
Turner, MT	5.9%	4.8%	5.9%	7.8%	4.9%	3.6%	8.7%	10.1%	15.8%	26.7%
Van Buren, ME	3.2%	2.7%	3.2%	3.8%	3.1%	2.2%	2.0%	2.4%	4.8%	3.3%
Vanceboro, ME	3.8%	7.1%	15.9%	29.8%	12.3%	3.1%	3.0%	2.4%	3.5%	NA
Walhalla, ND	12.3%	15.4%	16.0%	12.6%	6.7%	4.5%	5.1%	5.8%	4.5%	NA
Warroad, MN	10.2%	8.7%	5.9%	4.3%	3.4%	3.4%	3.4%	2.9%	2.4%	3.2%
Westhope, ND	13.0%	8.0%	6.7%	10.8%	2.4%	3.8%	4.1%	3.8%	3.2%	65.0%
Whitlash, MT	1.1%	1.3%	1.3%	1.9%	3.3%	3.6%	2.8%	3.1%	18.6%	NA
Wildhorse, MT	1.3%	1.4%	2.4%	2.5%	5.5%	3.5%	3.3%	6.7%	15.6%	8.3%
Willow Creek, MT	NA	NA	NA	NA	8.2%	12.4%	7.7%	11.1%	29.4%	NA

Source: OFO.

Table E2: OFO Southwest Land Border Passenger Inspection Rate, FY 2013 to 2022

SW POEs Secondary Exam Rate	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Southwest Land	12.6%	11.8%	12.1%	11.9%	12.2%	3.4%	3.0%	3.8%	4.3%	3.1%
Andrade, CA	4.7%	6.7%	7.1%	4.0%	3.6%	2.6%	2.7%	2.7%	2.9%	6.2%
Boquillas, TX	NA	NA	NA	NA	1.1%	0.7%	1.2%	0.6%	NA	NA
Brownsville, TX	15.6%	14.9%	15.5%	16.0%	5.3%	4.7%	4.2%	5.2%	5.5%	3.2%
Calexico East, CA	5.7%	5.3%	4.2%	3.7%	2.8%	2.5%	2.3%	2.9%	4.7%	3.2%
Calexico, CA	16.5%	15.2%	16.3%	12.8%	3.3%	3.1%	2.8%	3.7%	3.4%	4.0%
Columbus, NM	28.4%	28.1%	22.9%	27.4%	5.9%	6.4%	3.5%	5.0%	7.9%	3.3%
Del Rio, TX	6.5%	6.5%	4.6%	4.4%	2.5%	5.5%	4.8%	5.9%	6.3%	1.9%
Douglas, AZ	6.3%	5.7%	5.7%	6.7%	3.9%	3.8%	3.7%	5.1%	5.3%	3.3%
Eagle Pass, TX	10.8%	11.7%	12.1%	13.8%	3.5%	3.7%	3.3%	3.9%	4.3%	4.5%
El Paso, TX	13.2%	14.3%	18.0%	16.8%	2.9%	2.5%	2.2%	2.7%	3.2%	2.4%
Hidalgo, TX	19.1%	16.3%	16.8%	16.8%	5.3%	5.0%	4.1%	5.0%	5.0%	3.7%
Laredo, TX	34.3%	30.8%	28.2%	28.2%	3.0%	3.3%	3.3%	4.8%	5.9%	3.0%
Lukeville, AZ	2.6%	2.2%	1.9%	2.1%	6.0%	4.2%	4.0%	4.6%	4.3%	4.2%
Naco, AZ	4.2%	5.3%	4.9%	4.3%	4.4%	4.0%	3.5%	5.6%	4.3%	3.7%
Nogales, AZ	9.7%	9.7%	9.8%	9.8%	3.7%	3.1%	3.0%	3.7%	4.9%	3.8%
Otay Mesa, CA	6.1%	4.6%	4.7%	4.6%	3.9%	3.4%	3.1%	1.4%	4.3%	2.8%
Otay-Cross Border, CA (UFA[1])	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1.5%	1.2%	3.6%	1.8%	3.4%
Presidio, TX	9.6%	11.9%	9.6%	8.3%	3.5%	3.1%	2.8%	2.8%	3.0%	3.2%
Progreso, TX	8.0%	8.7%	9.2%	8.0%	3.6%	3.1%	3.3%	4.4%	5.1%	2.9%
Rio Grande City, TX	12.7%	10.9%	8.6%	8.7%	4.5%	4.8%	4.9%	7.4%	14.0%	4.1%
Roma, TX	18.9%	17.4%	16.2%	15.1%	4.6%	3.3%	3.1%	3.9%	4.5%	2.1%
San Luis, AZ	15.1%	14.3%	16.1%	16.7%	3.1%	2.7%	2.8%	2.9%	3.0%	2.7%
San Ysidro, CA	2.4%	2.1%	2.0%	2.8%	4.5%	5.9%	4.6%	4.6%	3.5%	5.2%
Santa Teresa, NM	15.6%	9.8%	8.0%	7.7%	4.0%	3.2%	2.7%	3.3%	7.1%	3.0%
Sasabe, AZ	6.1%	5.7%	5.4%	5.5%	6.1%	6.7%	11.6%	17.3%	7.3%	6.6%
Tecate, CA	6.6%	6.7%	6.4%	5.4%	4.4%	3.1%	2.7%	2.9%	3.3%	2.2%
Tornillo, TX	NA	NA	NA	NA	8.8%	7.5%	6.6%	7.6%	6.9%	6.7%
Valley International Airport, TX (UFA)	NA	NA	NA	NA	1.0%	NA	1.3%	NA	NA	NA
Ysleta, TX	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	2.4%	2.9%	3.2%	1.8%

[1] User Fee Airport.

Source: OFO.

Appendix F – Potentially High-Risk Containers Reviewed, Assessed, or Scanned – Maritime POE

Table F1: Potentially High-Risk Containers Reviewed, Assessed, or Scanned from FY 2016 to 2022 (with comparison of Ratio of FY 2022 to 2021)

Port of Unloading	Total Number of High-Risk Containers							Ratio of 2022-2021
	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	
1401 - NORFOLK, VA	2,411	1,313	687	170	240	214	389	1.8
1404 - RICHMOND-PETERSBURG, VA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
1409 - CHARLESTON, WV	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	NA
1501 - WILMINGTON, NC	111	76	19	4	8	2	4	2.0
1511 - BEAUFORT-MOREHEAD CTY, NC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
1512 - CHARLOTTE, NC	2	0	4	0	0	0	0	NA
1601 - CHARLESTON, SC	2,563	1,734	1,095	257	330	124	92	0.7
1604 - COLUMBIA, SC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
1701 - BRUNSWICK, GA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
1703 - SAVANNAH, GA	2,910	1,619	933	222	359	355	278	0.8
1704 - ATLANTA, GA	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
1101 - PHILADELPHIA, PA	333	947	248	90	21	13	38	2.9
1102 - CHESTER, PA	22	25	16	0	1	1	0	0.0
1103 - WILMINGTON, DE	23	47	0	3	0	1	0	0.0
1104 - PITTSBURGH, PA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
1105 - PAULSBORO, NJ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
1107 - CAMDEN, NJ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
1108 - PHIL. INTERNATIONAL AIR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
1195 - UPS HUB, PHILADELPHIA, PA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
1303 - BALTIMORE, MD	1,673	930	333	185	186	391	371	0.9
1305 - BWI AIRPORT	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
0101 - PORTLAND, ME	31	13	19	3	0	1	1	1.0
0103 - EASTPORT, ME	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
0105 - VANCEBORO, ME	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
0107 - FORT FAIRFIELD, ME	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
0131 - PORTSMOUTH, NH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
0132 - BELFAST, ME	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
0152 - SEARSPORT, ME	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
0401 - BOSTON, MA	551	681	105	31	47	51	27	0.5
0403 - WORCESTER, MA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
0405 - NEW BEDFORD, MA	0	24	0	0	0	0	0	NA
0406 - PLYMOUTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
0407 - FALL RIVER, MA	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	NA
0408 - SALEM, MA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
0410 - BRIDGEPORT, CT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
0412 - NEW HAVEN, CT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
0413 - NEW LONDON, CT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA

Table F1 (Continued)

Port of Unloading	Total Number of High-Risk Containers							Ratio of 2022-2021
	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	
0501 - NEWPORT, RI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
0502 - PROVIDENCE, RI	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
0701 - OGDENSBURG, NY	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
0715 - TROUT RIVER, NY	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
0901 - BUFFALO-NIAGARA FALLS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
0903 - ROCHESTER, NY	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
0904 - OSWEGO, NY	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
1002 - ALBANY, NY	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
3327 - VANCOUVER, BC, CANADA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
3501 - MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL, MN	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.0
3510 - DULUTH, MN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
3701 - MILWAUKEE, WI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
3702 - MARINETTE, WI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
3703 - GREEN BAY, WI	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	NA
3901 - CHICAGO, IL	64	2	3	0	2	2	0	0.0
4101 - CLEVELAND, OH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
4102 - CINCINNATI, OH	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
4103 - COLUMBUS, OH	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
4105 - TOLEDO, OH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
4106 - ERIE, PA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
4110 - INDIANAPOLIS, IN	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
4115 - LOUISVILLE, KY	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
4122 - ASTABULA/CONNEAUT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
4501 - KANSAS CITY, MO	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
3801 - DETROIT, MI	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
3802 - PORT HURON, MI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
3803 - SAULT STE. MARIE, MI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
3804 - SAGINAW/BAY CITY, MI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
3806 - GRAND RAPIDS, MI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
3808 - ESCANABA, MI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
3809 - MARQUETTE, MI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
3815 - MUSKEGON, MI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
2101 - PORT ARTHUR, TX	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
2102 - SABINE, TX	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
2103 - ORANGE, TX	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
2104 - BEAUMONT, TX	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
5301 - HOUSTON, TX	7,003	4,224	2,539	779	887	1,310	639	0.5
5306 - TEXAS CITY, TX	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
5310 - GALVESTON, TX	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
5311 - FREEPORT, TX	9	1	4	0	0	0	0	NA
5312 - CORPUS CHRISTI, TX	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	NA
5313 - PORT LAVACA, TX	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
5501 - DALLAS/FT WORTH, TX	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA

Table F1 (Continued)

| Port of Unloading | Total Number of High-Risk Containers | | | | | | | Ratio of |
	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2022-2021
5504 - OKLAHOMA CITY, OK	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
2301 - BROWNSVILLE, TX	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
2704 - LOS ANGELES, CA	10,673	3,308	1,751	590	878	345	344	1.0
2709 - LONG BEACH, CA	7,631	3,658	1,598	588	707	443	223	0.5
2711 - EL SEGUNDO, CA		0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
2713 - PORT HUENEME, CA	16	130	55	0	0	0	0	NA
2720 - LOS ANGELES INT AIRPORT	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
2722 - LAS VEGAS, NV	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
5201 - MIAMI, FL	5,649	3,838	1,590	403	304	272	161	0.6
5203 - PORT EVERGLADES, FL	3,200	2,327	1,277	181	321	93	176	1.9
5204 - WEST PALM BEACH, FL	303	147	17	10	44	19	27	1.4
5205 - FORT PIERCE, FL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
5210 - FT LAUDERDALE INTL AIRPORT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
1901 - MOBILE, AL	85	56	18	1	2	4	7	1.8
1902 - GULFPORT, MS	22	4	0	0	0	0	0	NA
1903 - PASCAGOULA, MS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
2001 - MORGAN CITY, LA	27	0	0	0	3	1	26	26.0
2002 - NEW ORLEANS, LA	350	295	145	34	23	50	26	0.5
2004 - BATON ROUGE, LA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
2006 - MEMPHIS, TN	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
2007 - NASHVILLE, TN	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
2010 - GRAMERCY, LA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
2017 - LAKE CHARLES, LA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
2097 - NASHVILLE, TN CARTAGE-CON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
1001 - NEW YORK, NY	6,069	450	389	230	200	322	154	0.5
4601 - NEW YORK/NEWARK AREA	10,773	5,562	3,749	1,621	2,845	2,565	1,523	0.6
4602 - PERTH AMBOY, NJ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
2901 - ASTORIA, OR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
2902 - NEWPORT, OR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
2903 - COOS BAY, OR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
2904 - PORTLAND, OR	4	0	0	0	2	9	2	0.2
2905 - LONGVIEW, WA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
2908 - VANCOUVER, WA	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
3101 - JUNEAU, AK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
3102 - KETCHIKAN, AK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
3103 - SKAGWAY, AK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
3106 - DALTON CIRCLE, AK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
3115 - SITKA, AK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
3126 - ANCHORAGE, AK	21	12	0	1	0	0	0	NA
3127 - KODIAK, AK	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	NA
3307 - DENVER, CO	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
2501 - SAN DIEGO, CA	56	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA

Table F1 (Continued)

Port of Unloading	Total Number of High-Risk Containers							Ratio of
	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2022-2021
2805 - MONTEREY, CA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
2809 - SAN FRANCISCO, CA	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
2810 - STOCKTON, CA	0	1,816	0	0	0	0	0	NA
2811 - OAKLAND, CA	3,235	0	782	318	521	64	21	0.3
2812 - RICHMOND, CA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
2820 - MARTINEZ, CA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
2830 - CAQUINEZ STRAIT, CA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
2835 - SACRAMENTO INTL AIRPORT	0	219	0	0	0	0	0	NA
3201 - HONOLULU, HI	352	0	71	32	41	2	34	17.0
3202 - HILO, HI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
3203 - KAHULUI, HI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
3303 - SALT LAKE CITY, UT	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	NA
4904 - FAJARDO, PR	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
4907 - MAYAGUEZ, PR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
4908 - PONCE, PR	0	685	0	0	0	0	0	NA
4909 - SAN JUAN, PR	1,560	0	193	276	174	262	143	0.5
5101 - CHARLOTTE AMALIE, VI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
5104 - CHRISTIANSTED, VI	0	819	0	0	0	0	0	NA
3001 - SEATTLE, WA	1,934	783	502	265	241	96	35	0.4
3002 - TACOMA, WA	2,015	0	407	333	279	70	27	0.4
3003 - ABERDEEN, WA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
3004 - BLAINE, WA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
3005 - BELLINGHAM, WA	0	19	0	0	0	0	0	NA
3006 - EVERETT, WA	10	0	7	0	0	0	0	NA
3007 - PORT ANGELES, WA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
3008 - PORT TOWNSEND, WA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
3010 - ANACORTES, WA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
3029 - SEATTLE-TACOMA INTL AIRPORT	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
3604 - INTERNATIONAL FALLS, MN	0	44	0	0	0	0	0	NA
1801 - TAMPA, FL	136	143	18	4	1	4	1	0.3
1803 - JACKSONVILLE, FL	375	1	37	23	13	18	27	1.5
1805 - FERNANDINA BEACH, FL	7	14	7	4	0	0	0	NA
1816 - PORT CANAVERAL, FL	37	6	0	0	0	0	0	NA
1818 - PANAMA CITY, FL	22	0	0	1	1	2	1	0.5
1819 - PENSACOLA, FL	0	235	0	0	0	0	0	NA
1821 - PORT MANATEE, FL	7	0	7	3	2	5	1	0.2
1822 - FORT MYERS	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
2605 - PHOENIX, AZ	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA

Notes: Potentially high-risk containers are identified based on the maximum (highest) score within the Best Arrival Date and Best Arrival Date +1 day. The container counts are for the containerized shipments only (non-containerized data are excluded). The report provides a distinct count of containers at individual port level. The rolled-up totals across the ports or field office(s) may include duplicate container counts.
Source: OFO.