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MILITARY AND TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED SALE TO SAUDI ARABIA OF AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEM (AWACS) AND F-15 ENHANCEMENTS

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BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 28, 30, 1981

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
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MILITARY AND TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED SALE TO SAUDI ARABIA OF AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEM AIRCRAFT (AWACS) AND F-15 ENHANCE- MENTS

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1981

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10:03 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 224, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John Tower (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Tower, Thurmond, Humphrey, Cohen, Jepsen, Quayle, Denton, Jackson, Cannon, Byrd, Nunn, Hart, Exon, and Levin.

Staff present: Rhett B. Dawson, staff director; Francis J. Sullivan, minority staff director; James F. McGovern, general counsel; Paul C. Besozzi, minority counsel; Christine E. Cowart, chief clerk; Michael B. Donley, Robert S. Dotson, Edward B. Kenney, James R. Locher III, Jose E. Martinez, Carl M. Smith, Kathleen Troia, professional staff members; Richard D. Finn, Drew A. Harker, research assistants; Ann E. Sauer, special assistant; and Brenda K. Hudson, staff assistant.

Also present: Dennis P. Sharon, assistant to Senator Goldwater; Buzz Heftri, assistant to Senator Warner; Jim Dykstra, assistant to Senator Cohen; Jon Etherton, assistant to Senator Jepsen; Bill Furniss, assistant to Senator Quayle; Paul Schreiber, assistant to Senator Denton; Frank Krebs, assistant to Senator Cannon; Gray Armistead, assistant to Senator Byrd; Arnold Punaro, assistant to Senator Nunn; Greg Pallas, assistant to Senator Exon; and Peter Lennon, assistant to Senator Levin.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN TOWER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman TOWER. Today's hearing is the first public presentation before the Senate of the administration's justification for the proposal to sell an enhanced air defense package to Saudi Arabia. This package includes AWACS aircraft, aerial refueling tankers, and conformal tankers, and AIM-9L missiles for Saudi F-15 aircraft.

The Armed Services Committee has been asked by the majority leader, Senator Baker, and the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Percy, to study the military and technical implications of the proposed sale to Saudi Arabia and to report its

findings prior to a vote by the Foreign Relations Committee on the resolution of disapproval.

This past Friday the committee met in executive session with witnesses from the Central Intelligence Agency and the technical experts from the Department of Defense. Testimony presented at that time was supportive of the President's sale proposal.

The Armed Services Committee's inquiry will focus on the military and technical implications of the sale. The membership is asked to keep this focus in mind when questioning the witnesses.

There are four basic questions that this committee must address: the legitimate defense requirements of Saudi Arabia, the threat posed by this air defense package to the security of Israel, the risk of compromise of U.S. military technology if this sale is approved, and the benefits of this sale for improving the potential of U.S. military forces to protect American interests in the Persian Gulf region.

The proposed sale of this air defense package to Saudi Arabia will be one of the most difficult foreign policy decisions that the Senate will be asked to make this year. The important U.S. relations with Israel and Saudi Arabia could be affected by the outcome, as could U.S. policies for the Middle East.

In that this is the first public hearing of the Senate devoted to this issue, I am dismayed that so many of my colleagues have already concluded that the proposed sale is not in the national interest of the United States. In addition, I am seriously concerned about the substantial misunderstandings of the capabilities of the AWACS aircraft and of the importance of the sale proposal to U.S. security interests. Today's hearing will provide the opportunity to overcome these misunderstandings.

On behalf of the committee, I extend a sincere welcome to today's witnesses: Hon. Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense; Gen. David C. Jones, U.S. Air Force, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Gen. P. X. Kelley, U.S. Marine Corps, Assistant Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps and former Commander of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.

The committee will proceed to hear statements by Secretary Weinberger and General Jones and a technical briefing before posing questions to the witnesses.

I should like to advise everyone here that you are guests of the committee and that we have to maintain decorum in this chamber, if we are to get our business done. We do not permit any expressions of approval or disapproval of anything that the witnesses or members of the committee may say.

I would like at this point to yield to the senior Democrat present today, Senator Jackson, for any opening statement that he would like to make.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I think you have outlined it quite well, that this is a major foreign and defense policy situation. I would hope that the witnesses would give us the history of this project from the previous administration and this administration. I think this is very important.

There are rumors going around that State knew nothing about it initially, that Defense has gone ahead and made commitments. I can say, Mr. Chairman, that I was briefed by the State Department

representatives, at their request, in late February this year. And I asked specifically if the proposed package related at that time to the F-15 and the tankers and certain enhancement features for the F-15. I asked specifically, what about AWACS? They said it is not involved. So I think that the most important thing we can do is to get the proper foundation, the background, to lay at rest any rumors as to how this program evolved.

And I would hope the witnesses, Mr. Chairman, would outline the history of that, and also the backdrop on what recommendations the Air Force, the Department of Defense or any element of the Department of Defense, made regarding turning the AWACS over to the Shah. I think we need that whole background and it would be helpful, because there are time limitations on asking questions.

So from there we can go on and address the larger question as to what kind of arrangement needs to be put together here. I do not know of anyone who disputes the usefulness of AWACS for the protection of the Middle East. There are four of them there now.

The argument is over the structure and management of them in terms of our basic national interests and I think that is what the country is asking. And I would hope the witnesses would address those questions, especially in the context of the way we lay down very stringent rules as far as NATO is concerned. But I would like to get the history of what happened on AWACS with the Shah right on down to the present time, when the decision and commitment was made to the Saudis.

Chairman TOWER. Mr. Secretary, you may proceed as you see fit. We will be glad to include any written or printed material that you would like placed in the record.

STATEMENT OF HON. CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ACCOMPANIED BY GEN. DAVID C. JONES, U.S. AIR FORCE, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; GEN. P. X. KELLEY, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS

Secretary WEINBERGER. Mr. Chairman and Senators, I appreciate the opportunity to be before the committee to present the administration's case for selling the AWACS aircraft and other air defense enhancements to Saudi Arabia.

With respect to Senator Jackson's question, I will certainly be glad, in responding to questions, to give the somewhat limited history that I know, which extends only a couple of weeks before Inauguration Day. General Jones, however, was here for much of the period that he described and can supplement the historical questions. I will be glad to consider with you and respond to questions about what has happened since January.

I would, if I might, say as a preface that at all times on these matters the State and Defense Departments, as well as the administration, have been united on the basic issues that are involved here.

The President's decision to sell this equipment to the Saudi Government has stimulated very deep emotions, and intense debate, which have obscured the core issues.

It is time that the real issues be put before the Congress and the American people to that they can be examined as dispassionately and fully as its importance requires.

The case for the sale of this air defense enhancement package to Saudi Arabia is very simple: AWACS and the other air defense equipment will make a significant and a necessary contribution to the security interests of the United States and all of our allies and friends, including specifically the NATO nations, Israel itself, Japan, and of course the Mideast countries, in what is a very volatile part of the world. The President's decision to proceed with this sale was based upon this central fact and was reached only after considerable review and agreement with the basic decision reached by prior administrations.

As you are aware, the Saudi air defense enhancement package consists of four components: the E-3A airborne warning and control system aircraft, or AWACS, to provide the necessary low-altitude surveillance and early warning of air attack, along with associated ground-based command, control, and communications equipment to provide a complete air defense surveillance and control network; conformal fuel tanks to extend the range and mission endurance of Saudi Arabia's F-15 fighter aircraft, AIM-9L Sidewinder air-to-air missiles to improve the F-15's defense aerial combat capability; and KC-707 aerial tankers to refuel both the F-15's and AWACS. The total cost of this equipment to Saudi Arabia will be some \$8.5 billion.

This Saudi equipment package is an important part of a comprehensive U.S. strategy for the Southwest Asia region designed to increase the security of friendly countries in an area of the world which is vital both to the United States and to our Western allies. In this context, we think the sale will directly serve the U.S. national interests in the following ways.

First, it will help the Saudis defend their vital oil facilities against surprise air attacks. In this manner, the sale responds to the legitimate security requirements of a country whose cooperation is central to the defense of the entire region's security and thus to our own.

Second, it will help to rebuild confidence in the United States as a reliable partner in the region. This sense of confidence and security is essential in encouraging countries in the area to take the political risks a durable peace in the Middle East demands.

Third, it will advance our goals of increasing the security of states in the Gulf region by providing a foundation for closer United States-Saudi defense cooperation and for Saudi efforts to develop cooperation with all of her Mideast neighbors in other security related areas.

Finally, it will increase the effectiveness of our own military capabilities if we were ever called upon to deploy U.S. forces to that area. The extensive logistics base and support infrastructure that will be a necessary part of this equipment package will be fully compatible with the defense needs of this whole vital area.

Saudi oil resources are vast and irreplaceable. We need them, and our allies need them. The flow of oil from Saudi Arabia and the region immediately bordering it in the gulf is crucial to the international finances, domestic production, employment around

the globe, and world trade. The destruction of the oil-gathering and loading facilities in Saudi Arabia, or their control by a hostile power, could tip the balance of power in the world.

The Saudi oil resources are vulnerable and threatened. Virtually all of their oil production facilities are located in the East, near the Arabian Gulf coast, easily accessible to attack from across the gulf. The conflict between Iran and Iraq disproved one widely held assumption: that oil-producing states acting in their own self-interest would not threaten each other's oil fields, refineries, or transport facilities. But as we have seen, Iran and Iraq have done just exactly that; each has been required to curtail oil exports vitally needed by the West.

I might add at this point that Saudi Arabia has increased its oil production to accommodate that oil loss while keeping prices below those of its OPEC colleagues. This is simply another of many instances of Saudi assistance to our national interests.

[As the anti-Communist leader of moderate Arab Gulf states and as the largest free world oil producer, Saudi Arabia needs a strong defense against potential military threats from unstable, revolutionary Iran; from radical Iraq; and from Marxist South Yemen. The Saudi Kingdom also must increase its defense against Soviet or Soviet-inspired military threats from Ethiopia, Soviet forces in Afghanistan, and from the U.S.S.R. itself. The new entente between Libya, Ethiopia, and South Yemen—each of which has significant amounts of Soviet military equipment and increasing numbers of Soviet and Soviet bloc advisers—introduces a new and a most unwelcome dimension into the threat calculus of the region.

Given this situation, the Saudis face several difficulties in deploying an adequate air defense. This very large country has widely scattered, concentrated population centers, military installations, ports, airfields, and oil facilities to protect. Most of these valuable targets are on or near the Arabian Gulf or Red Sea coasts, which means that it is not possible to place early warning radars and air defenses far forward—for example, between the oil facilities and potential threats from across the gulf—to provide adequate protection.

[With current Saudi capabilities, an attack by low-flying aircraft could not be detected by ground-based radar until it was within 2 to 4 minutes of the oil fields. Even under the best conditions, no air force could respond to this threat in time.]

✓ AWACS would allow the Saudi Air Force to detect low-level attacking enemy aircraft up to 200 miles from the oil fields, depending on the altitude, of course, of the Saudi plane. The Saudi Air Force would then have enough time to scramble and intercept enemy aircraft before they reach the oil fields. Without AWACS, this early warning capability would not exist, no matter how many ground radars might be employed.]

[The AIM-9L Sidewinder air-to-air missiles would give the Saudi Air Force the capability to intercept attacking aircraft head on. This capability would greatly improve the chances of shooting them down before they are able to bomb the oil facilities or other Saudi targets. Without the AIM-9L, Saudi interceptors would have to maneuver behind the attacking aircraft to fire their older, less capable Sidewinder missile, virtually assuring that hostile aircraft

could reach vital coastal targets before being engaged and shot down.]

[Conformal fuel tanks and KC-707 tankers would allow Saudi F-15s to be based in west central and southwestern Saudi Arabia, where they would not be vulnerable to a surprise enemy attack and from which they could sustain combat over the oil facilities even if bases in eastern Saudi Arabia were put out of action. The KC-707 tankers also would allow AWACS to remain on station for extended periods of time.]

So for all of these reasons and for another reason, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee—that is the threat from Yemen and Ethiopia and other areas that have been now so heavily infected by Soviet advances, are other areas where the AWACS is needed by Saudi Arabia to give them advanced early warning of possible threats from those directions.

[The air defense package would improve the Saudi capabilities to deter and, if necessary, defend against air attacks. The result would be a more secure Saudi Arabia which would be an anchor of stability within the region—and the region, of course, includes Israel—and a bulwark against challenges and coercion from outside the region.] Such a stable and secure Saudi Arabia clearly serves the security interests of the United States, and certainly serves the security interests of Israel, the NATO countries and Japan.

Last fall, soon after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraqi war, the U.S. Government responded to an urgent Saudi request for assistance by deploying four U.S. Air Force AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia to augment Saudi air defenses. They are still there today, providing the surveillance and early warning capability necessary to defend the oil facilities. This continuing response by the United States has helped in the process of rebuilding Saudi—and regional—confidence in the United States as a reliable security partner.

However, the Saudi Government, like any sovereign state, recognizes its right and responsibility to provide for its own legitimate defense requirements. It is in this spirit that the request to purchase AWACS and the other air defense items was made by Saudi Arabia. Consummation of the sale of this equipment, which both we and they agree they need urgently for their security requirements, will further reinforce the military-to-military relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. This in turn will strengthen the security of the entire region, and it will permit us to work with the Saudis toward a more peaceful and stable situation in the whole region, again specifically including Israel.

[On the other hand, there can be little doubt that future United States-Saudi relations would be very adversely affected if this sale is rejected. Such a rejection would cause the Saudis to doubt the reliability of U.S. commitment and the ability of American Presidents to conduct foreign policy. Such an impression will also make it far less likely that Saudi Arabia and others will agree to the kinds of security cooperation, joint planning, combined exercises, and advanced preparation for sharing of facilities and support which we feel are needed if the United States is to defend the shared security interests in Southwest Asia.]

Furthermore, rejection of the sale would confirm a too widely held opinion in the mid-East that the United States is solely concerned with the wishes of the Israeli Government, to the exclusion of all other interests.

This Saudi air defense enhancement package has been designed to meet the significant Saudi defense requirements I have discussed while improving the security of Israel and all the other states in the region. Israel has increased its margin of military superiority over its Arab adversaries since the 1973 war. With or without the AWACS and the F-15 enhancement, the Saudi Air Force realistically poses no significant threat to the security of Israel. This is true even in the context of a general regional conflict. This assessment is supported by the U.S. intelligence community.

These are the technical facts: AWACS is an unarmed flying radar platform which has no intelligence collection capabilities. It cannot detect ground targets such as tanks and it cannot operate effectively with the air forces of other countries without extensive joint training and a sophisticated communications network which only the United States could provide. The five AWACS aircraft which would be sold to Saudi Arabia are sufficient to maintain only one continuous 24 hours per day, surveillance orbit.

Israel's air defense system makes all these arguments against the AWACS academic. The Saudis fully recognize that Israel's air defense is extraordinarily capable. Saudi missions into Israeli airspace, either to engage Israeli aircraft or to strike Israeli targets, would be prohibitively costly and would leave Saudi Arabia vulnerable to air attack from every direction.

The simple fact is that this sale will not alter the Arab-Israeli balance of power materially nor jeopardize Israel's security. President Reagan is committed to protecting Israel's security and to preserving Israel's qualitative edge and its ability to defeat any combination of hostile forces in the region. The proposed Saudi sale neither casts doubt on that commitment nor compromises Israeli capabilities.

There is also an additional point, Mr. Chairman, which is related to the issue of Israeli security. The Saudis do not face a choice between the U.S. AWACS or nothing. The British Nimrod airborne early warning aircraft, currently under advanced development, has capabilities comparable to AWACS, which could be enhanced, which in some cases exceed it. Nimrod's will be operationally deployed very shortly, and the Saudis would turn to the British to purchase these aircraft should AWACS be denied, and we know of no limitations that would be placed upon their use.

Therefore, the issue is not whether the Saudis will obtain an enhanced air defense capability; rather, it is whether we lose all credibility with the Saudis, their moderate neighbors, and many other countries and the ability to develop a mid-East policy by refusing to sell. We have the choice of benefiting from the closer security cooperation and the economic benefits, including jobs, which would flow from the sale of the U.S. equipment package to Saudi Arabia, or of yielding the friendship of valuable allies. For the Israelis, the question is whether their long-term security interest are better served by a continuing and strengthened U.S. role in

Saudi Arabia, or by a Saudi Arabia with all the increased military capabilities the AWACS would bring, through the Nimrod purchase, but far less friendly to the United States and with continuing, perhaps unneeded hostility of Israel.

Before I conclude, let me address just one other point. The AWACS is a very capable system, but selling it to Saudi Arabia does not pose significant or serious risks that sensitive technology will be compromised. The AWACS does not represent the ultimate in U.S. radar or computer technology. The radar aboard is mid-1960's Pulse Doppler textbook technology. A comparable computer is available commercially. While these systems are superior to anything the Soviets currently have in their operational inventory, a new Soviet airborne early warning aircraft has been under development for some time and is expected to have a capability quite similar to our AWACS. This new Soviet system should be in the operational inventory quite soon, prior to the time the AWACS is delivered to Saudi Arabia in late 1985.

In any event, the Saudis have an outstanding record of protecting sensitive U.S. equipment and information, and the Saudis recognize and accept the need for special safeguards in this case. Consequently, they have agreed to extensive, jointly planned and monitored security arrangements that fully satisfy our stringent U.S. requirements for the safeguarding of our equipment.

I will conclude by saying that we are convinced—and the President is convinced—that detailed and dispassionate analysis shows that the proposed air defense enhancement package for Saudi Arabia will make an important contribution to the security of all states in the region—Israel as well as Saudi Arabia—and that it will promote our efforts to create a strategic consensus in the Southwest Asia region, and thereby further our national security interests.

The proposed sale successfully balances the imperative of Israeli security with the need to respond to threats to essential natural resources and regional stability. It provides equipment which meets the defensive requirements of a close friend and key state in the region in a way which also protects sensitive technology and makes a tangible contribution to U.S. military capabilities.

Mr. Chairman, I have appreciated very much the opportunity to present this statement. With your indulgence, General Jones has a statement that he would like to present, and we have the short technical briefing we mentioned at the beginning.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

General Jones?

STATEMENT OF GENERAL DAVID C. JONES, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify today, particularly to try to clear up some misunderstanding on how we get where we are and to discuss the capability of AWACS.

For the last few years the Joint Chiefs of Staff have spent more time on worrying about the increased threat to Southwest Asia, and the Persian Gulf in particular, than on any other subject. And we are all familiar with the great turmoil in that region: the fall of

the Shah, the Iran-Iraq war, the instability in Iran, the invasion of Afghanistan, and in some ways most importantly, of greatest concern is the great Soviet buildup opposite Iran. They are much more capable now than they were a couple of years ago. And we have been working hard to increase our capability.

Our presence in the region with our combatant ships of the Navy, with pre-positioning, with increasing our power projection capability, our organization, forming of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force which General Kelly first headed, and to work with nations in the region. We have construction going on in Oman, but the sine qua non of the entire operation is Saudi Arabia. And it is important that we do have good and close relationships with Saudi Arabia, and that there is increasing confidence in the United States, a willingness to work with us.

In March of 1979 when there was a conflict between North and South Yemen and concern in Saudi Arabia, they asked for and we deployed two AWACS to Saudi Arabia. They stayed there about 45 days and were very helpful in providing some potential air defense capability.

And then just about a year ago, early October 1980, we deployed four AWACS to Saudi Arabia just shortly after the breakout of the war between Iran and Iraq, and they have been there ever since. They have been performing in a magnificent way with extremely high reliability, very good coverage.

We have about a thousand U.S. military personnel in Saudi Arabia now, both in security assistance and in support of the AWACS radars and other equipment. Relationships are very good.

Saudi Arabia's resources are very vulnerable with most of the oil production on the Persian Gulf coast. If you look around the world at countries who have major resources, you can probably not find one that has greater vulnerability. Air defense is essential.

As Senator Jackson said, there is no question about the need for an airborne capability because of being very close to the gulf and potential enemies.

Saudi Arabia does not want to be totally dependent upon the United States. As the Secretary stated, there is an interest in having their own capability by various nations, and Saudi Arabia is one.

They need an air defense capability of their own, certainly not one that could cope with an entire Soviet threat—our particular concern is the Soviet threat—but some capability. We think it is in our best interest to help them with equipment and training and with the potential for augmentation very rapidly if required.

It is the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the proposal by the administration to enhance the air defense in Saudi Arabia is clearly in the best interests of the United States.

I will limit my comments to the AWACS because that is the controversial issue, the one that is of greatest interest. There is no question on the need; it has been pointed out. The question is how do we handle it. Later, I will address the issue of the background and how we get where we are.

But the two critical issues that have arisen, as pointed out by the chairman, are, one, the potential threat to Israel, and the other, the possible compromise of technology.

I would like to make it very clear that I have been a strong supporter of defense for Israel. I had a very close relationship when I was Chief of Staff of the Air Force. I was able to work out the early delivery of F-15's to Israel—aircraft that had been part of the U.S. Air Force.

I have been to Israel twice in the past year. I have personal, close relationships with the leadership of the Israeli military, and I am greatly interested in their having an adequate capability to meet any threat in the area.

There is no question in my mind that the Israelis today can meet any threat, any combination of threats except the Soviet threat, but any combination of threats even by proxies supported by the Soviet Union, and they are in a much better position today than they were in the 1960's and the 1970's, and we project they will be in good condition to handle any potential threat as far into the future as we can see.

I have been the strongest advocate of AWACS. I have testified before this committee for many years. I have used words like "breakthrough," "quantum jump," and I stand by those. AWACS is a very, very good system, and I am pleased that NATO is procuring the AWACS and that the United States continues to procure the AWACS.

I think there have been some overstatements about what five aircraft can do, particularly when you can only maintain one airplane in orbit continuously, but that does not in any way impact on my confidence in the AWACS being very, very capable.

[The AWACS would be delivered around the end of 1985, but it would be near the end of the decade before the crews would be trained by the Saudis to operate the AWACS according to the schedule that we have worked out. So we will be heavily involved with the AWACS in the training throughout this decade and continuing involvement as far as we can see in the future.]

There are no plans that the United States won't have some involvement with the AWACS. We are involved now with the F-5. The F-5's have been there many, many years. We have people there involved clearly with the F-5, with the Hawk missile, and with ground radars; we will with the F-15 and certainly with the AWACS.

Now, with regard to any threat to Israel, I think it would be very foolhardy on the part of the Saudis to use, in peace or war, the AWACS in any way that could be seen as a threat to Israel.

In peace, data-gathering. It is not an intelligence system, but theoretically it could stay off and look at airplanes flying in Israel. We operated the AWACS for months in Western Europe looking into East Germany and watching the Soviets and the East Germans and into Czechoslovakia, and we gained very little knowledge as to what they would do, their tactics, and we didn't already know. And I don't think the Saudis would gain much by trying to look into the west, into Israel.

Another one would be training with other nations such as Syria and Iraq. We would know that. It takes extensive training to make AWACS interoperable with large numbers of fighters. We would know it, and they would be jeopardizing the full support of AWACS, of the F-15's, of the F-5's, of the Hawks, the radars—our

whole support. And if we withdrew that support, their military capability would deteriorate very rapidly. So I would say it would be foolhardy on their part in peacetime to use it either to gather some data or to train with nations with whom we did not agree to their training.

With regard to conflict, first, there is the image that using the AWACS they could control aircraft of many nations. I have pointed out the great problem of doing that without training. To me it would be a very ineffective operation to try to do that without having the adequate training.

Furthermore, the Israelis could see the AWACS before the AWACS could see the Israelis in that passive receivers that could be on hills can see before the energy hits that and bounces back—I do not mean in the sense of the speed of light, but there is less power required to the passive receiver, so they could see the AWACS coming before the AWACS crew could see into Israel, and they could do something about it.

If the AWACS were up close where it would be looking into Israel, then it would be exposed to some jamming. The AWACS is difficult to jam, but the Israelis are very good at jamming; and I am sure the Israelis could counter with jamming and also could attack the AWACS.

I caution, as you hear testimony people will talk about the offensive capability of AWACS. Normally, that is in the context of looking into the enemy territory, but even there it is basically a defensive method of helping your own aircraft to defend themselves against attack by others.

If they are up close, the Israelis could destroy the AWACS very easily. People say, if it is so easy to do it there, then how come it is so good in Europe, and why is it not vulnerable in Europe?

First, we have found that with AWACS we get a very great synergistic effect by operating AWACS together and interlinking the two to counter jamming, to provide information for each to help in their defense. The Saudis would not have a capability to maintain the multiple patrols near Israel.

Second, we normally operate well back, over a hundred nautical miles, and in Europe you have many friendly surface-to-air missiles out front, you have many defensive fighters out front, and also it is a very dense air environment in which it would be extremely difficult to pick the AWACS out of those hundreds and maybe thousands of aircraft flying in the area. You do not have the dense traffic in Southwest Asia. So, in my judgment, it would be extremely foolhardy for them to attempt to use it as a threat against Israel, and the Israelis could counter it.

The Secretary mentioned alternatives and the Nimrod. The day before yesterday I visited Manchester, England and went aboard—didn't fly in it but went aboard—their breadboard model of the Nimrod AEW aircraft. I have been somewhat of a skeptic on the Nimrod—but it has been quite a while since I had much information on it—but I was impressed, very much impressed with the Nimrod.

The Nimrod aircraft, which is an outgrowth of the Comet, is somewhat smaller than our 707, and therefore has fewer consoles inside; and that may have an impact on the defense environment

in Western Europe, but certainly not where there is limited air traffic as in Southwest Asia. And in many ways the Nimrod is more advanced than the AWACS.

We basically froze the technology on the radar and the system in the AWACS in the early 1970's. This Nimrod is a new system. So I was very, very impressed.

I think it is in our best interests that the Saudis have our AWACS, that we would be involved with them in the AWACS operation. It would further our relationships with Saudi Arabia and help us in deterring the threat from the Soviet Union.

Briefly on the other issue of compromise, certainly we don't want any of our equipment to fall into the hands of the Soviets, whether it is AWACS or whatever the equipment, wherever in the world. We are working out very tight security arrangements with the Saudis, and they have done very well over the many years, the decades of our operating with them in their country.

But people ask, well, what if in the unlikely event it does go into the hands of the Soviets? It is hard to explain why something that has such great military worth to us, if the Soviets got their hands on that, they wouldn't compromise our capability and further their capability.

Reverse engineering is very difficult to do, much more difficult to do than most people think—taking a piece of equipment and taking it apart, and then engineer it so that you can build and improve your capability. Some could be done by the Soviets, but as the Secretary pointed out, they will have a good AWACS before we will have an AWACS operational in Saudi Arabia under this package, and also our technology was basically frozen for the next part on radar in the early 1970's.

With regard to the integration of the effort—and that is the most critical part of the AWACS—is the software, the computer which takes all of this information and integrates it and displays it. To try to take that information and to use it someone has equated to unscrambling scrambled eggs.

Now, with regard to the other part, that is, using the information gained to counter our AWACS, particularly in order to improve their electronic countermeasures against the AWACS, first the AWACS is difficult to jam, fundamentally because of side lobe suppression and other reasons. And second, they could in fact, particularly if we didn't do anything about it. But we're talking about the late 1980's, and also the most critical part of it is our computer software, and we can change that computer software and minimize the effect.

I am not saying that we would not have some concern. We certainly would be concerned if we lost it, but it is not a critical issue. I submit that if the conditions develop in Saudi Arabia to where the Soviets, with the cooperation of the Saudis end up getting our AWACS, one of the least of the problems of this country would be worrying about the compromise of that technology. The Soviet gain in control and influence in oil and other factors would be of much, much greater concern to us.

The AWACS we are providing is a good system and is adequate to the needs in the region. We are not providing an inferior system in the sense that it will not do the job. They just do not need some

of the capability and can go with commercial devices for some of the things such as IFF.

Clearly, to us it is in the best interest of the United States that we provide this package to Saudi Arabia. It is in the best interest of the region to include, in my judgment, Israel, that the United States has great influence in Saudi Arabia.

Finally, to answer Senator Jackson's question on how we got where we are, I will give it to the best of my recollection.

Our first involvement with the Saudis on AWACS was in March of 1979, as I mentioned, with the conflict between North and South Yemen. We deployed two AWACS to Saudi Arabia. But I know of no requirement that they raised with regard to their wanting to purchase AWACS, at least to my knowledge, I think it was early February of 1980.

It was about a year after March of 1979, that the Saudis made a request for AWACS, and it was not at our initiative; at least I was not involved in the request for AWACS. And they were told later that spring that we would need to study the problem. Studies were conducted, and there were meetings between the Ministers of Defense in the summer of 1980 and discussions of the study.

I happened to be on a trip to the Middle East to Oman, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel and so forth when the war broke out between Iran and Iraq. When I arrived in Saudi Arabia the war had broken out a few days earlier. There was great worry about the threat to the oilfields in the eastern region of Saudi Arabia. The Saudis made a request that we deploy some AWACS to Saudi Arabia in order to assist them in the air defense of the eastern region. I consulted then with Washington, and we were able to get approval, and we very rapidly deployed the four AWACS that are still there.

They did not discuss with me the purchase of AWACS, except as I was leaving they turned to me and said don't forget our enhancement package; but at that time I did not bring it up, and they did not bring up anything with regard to the sale of AWACS. Their concern developed shortly thereafter, because of the slowness of the U.S. response to their request for the enhancement package, including AWACS. I was visiting Turkey in November, and I was asked to go down and talk to the Saudis and to discuss their concerns and to say to them to help alleviate some of your concerns that we will be willing to deliver a few F-15 aircraft earlier than planned. They were desirous of getting an overall answer, and I told them it was being worked in Washington, and we would try to get an early answer back to them, but I made no commitment as to what that would be.

In late November the Saudis were told by the previous administration that we were favorably disposed to an early and positive decision on the future sale of the AWACS. There were discussions then with representatives of the new administration. The issue was addressed, particularly in February and in March, and the decision was made at that time and into early April to provide the AWACS to the Saudis; the initiatives on the sale came from the Saudis.

They knew all along that I would have been very pleased to have our AWACS stay there under the current arrangements and to even go further in the way of our enhancement. But they contin-

ually brought up the issue of sovereignty and their need for some air defense capability by themselves.

Mr. Chairman, that completes my statement.

Thank you.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, General Jones.

Mr. Secretary, you may present the technical briefing in any way that you see fit.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes; we have a technical briefing by Colonel Stamm which I think will be of interest to the committee. I think it will take about 15 minutes.

Chairman TOWER. Colonel Stamm, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF COLONEL STAMM

Colonel STAMM. Mr. Chairman, gentlemen. This is a technical briefing on all aspects of the items that are being proposed for sale to the Saudi Arabians. It has particular emphasis on the AWACS, and many of the items that I will be covering have already been discussed here, so I will go over those rather rapidly.

Colonel STAMM. The four items, as you know, are shown here. I would like to draw to your attention also, though, to the fact that we are upgrading the ground radar network in Saudi Arabia to, in other words, upgrade their entire air defense capability.

Some of these slides may be familiar, in that some of this literature has been circulated previously. What we are trying to point out, though, is the fact that we are talking about a large piece of geography when we describe the defense of Saudi Arabia.

Here we have it superimposed on the European land mass, and as you can see it basically dwarfs the European land mass. And in Europe we have in U.S. entities alone 10 main operating bases, plus NATO operating bases, to defend that amount of air space. And Saudi Arabia will do it from three bases. The point of this slide is that in Saudi Arabia we are defending the same amount of air space from three air bases, one at Dhahran, one at At Ta'if and one at Khamis Mushayt. There will be 20 F-15's at each of those bases, and that program starts in January of next year.

The same comparison is made here to the continental United States. The land mass of Saudi Arabia basically covers the same amount of land mass as from the Mississippi River east.

Most of the oil facilities and resources, as you know, are in the area of Dhahran. So if we postulated an attack on Dhahran—or, pardon me, on those oil facilities—we can assume that Dhahran will also be struck. In that instance, defense of those oil fields is going to have to come from Ta'if and Khamis Mushayt. That is quite a piece of geography, much the same as trying to defend Chicago from Wichita or Dallas.

In reality, it is about an hour to an hour and a half flying time, or about 3 hours round trip, just to and from the contested area. Consequently, we need to do something about the fuel situation for the F-15's. That is where the KC-707 comes into the proposed sale, in that we need to give the F-15's some increased range and endurance to be able to handle that defensive problem.

Additionally, with the KC-707, we have refueling pods on the wingtips for probe and drogue type refueling. That would be for the Saudi F-15's. But significantly, that would be the same system that

our U.S. Navy uses and gives us a good bit of interoperability as far as refueling would be concerned in the area.

We are only proposing the sale of six of those, though, with an option to buy two more, which says that in a protracted confrontation, with that limited number of resources, we can expect that the resources will be drawn thin in short order. And we have to give the F-15's some innate capability to do the job on their own.

And that is where the proposal for the conformal fuel tank comes in. The conformal fuel tank increases the internal fuel capacity of the F-15 by about 9,750 pounds and gives them the ability to make the cross-country junket, have some time on cap for defense of that area, and then be able to return to their home base.

The next item in the proposed sale, sir, is the AIM-9L. The AIM-9L is unique in that it has a supercooled seeker head that gives it the ability to launch from the front of the target aircraft. It can see a nonafterburning target from the front quadrant and get that missile off.

This part of the sale is necessary in that we have to do something to optimize the effectiveness of an F-15 against what we postulate as a superior force if they are going to have any hope of defending the oilfields.

First of all, however, and the item that has drawn the most visibility in the package, if they are going to have any hope whatsoever of defending the oilfields, they are going to have to see the threat in time to defend against it, and that is where the AWACS proposal comes from.

The AWACS is basically, as you know, a KC-707 that has been heavily modified: a 30-foot rotodome that is in fact 6 feet thick, has 141-type engines on it, the same as we have on our C-141 type aircraft, and a refueling receptacle.

As I mentioned, though, we are proposing upgrading the entire air defense network in Saudi Arabia. Presently they have five Marconi British-built antiquated radars, tube-type technology, that give them very little if any coverage in the area. Consequently we are proposing the upgrade of the ground system, some sort of generic message-processing capability to link the entire system together, with the AWACS superimposed on top of it.

This arrangement was derived after an extensive study done by the U.S. Government and is determined as the best way to address their problem. The thing that is important in this as far as we are concerned, though, is it then gives us the ability to link with U.S. Navy ships in the Gulf, Navy E2-C's when they come within range, as well as Task Force 70 out in the Arabian Sea. That gives us an immediate crisis capability in the area and is something highly desirable.

Some specifics on the aircraft: Orbiting altitude is 29,000 feet. That is the altitude that the aircraft is optimized for. If we deviate from that significantly we will degrade the radar, degrade endurance, and it is just obviously is the best place to be with the airplane.

Endurance, 9 to 11 hours depending on where you are operating, 22 hours if we augment and refuel the aircraft, 17 total people on board. Most significantly, though, and something that has been confused for some time on this aircraft, is that it has no ELINT or

SIGINT capability whatsoever. There is no equipment on board for that function. It was designed on a concept to defend the North American continent in the mid-1960's. Consequently there was no need for that type of equipment to fit that mission.

Very rapidly, some radar principles, just to describe the operation, so that I can get to some limitations. With a ground-based radar we simply emanate energy and look at whatever bounces, reflects energy back to our antenna, and interpret that on a scope to tell us what's inbound in the way of an aircraft.

Limitations on that: Since it is ground-based, we're limited by the curvature of the Earth, as well as terrain. Consequently, at 60 miles an aircraft below 10,000 feet will not be seen. At 17 miles an aircraft below 300 feet will not be seen. At 13 miles an aircraft below 100 feet will not be seen. So there are some definite limitations. Additionally, any aircraft that is using terrain masking, flying behind mountains or behind ridge lines, will not be seen whatsoever.

If we put that ground radar out there, due to that curvature of the Earth that I spoke to, we are limited to about 20 or 30 miles of capability. What we have done with the AWACS is elevated it to about 30,000 feet, and we have changed our radar line of sight to about 208 miles, out at the radar horizon.

When we elevate that radar and emanate energy at the ground with the normal radar, we will get so much reflected energy that we will not see anything for all the ground return. So we have gone to a pulse Doppler, which looks at the reflected energy for a shift in frequency caused when it hits a high-speed moving target. In other words, this system is optimized only for high-speed targets, and in pulse Doppler all we look for is movement. Consequently, we will not see anything on the ground that is not moving fast enough to cause that frequency shift.

Another limitation on radar is the size of whatever it is that I am reflecting off of. With an AWACS, a small size target will not be seen beyond about 175 miles just due to the reflective size of that target. A medium-size target is about 240 miles. And finally, a large-size target, out at about 360 miles. That is dependent, of course, on whether I am looking at it on the nose, what amount of reflective angle I have.

We have one additional capability that is a maritime mode, in that we can look at ships in the ocean, and the way we do that is that we can emanate pure pulse energy, not looking for movement, just pure pulse energy at a body of water. Water absorbs more energy than ground. Consequently, the software can sort out a ship on the water if it is of sufficient size and the water is calm enough.

One last point: Anything out beyond that radar horizon, below the radar line of sight, will not be seen at low level.

A quick summary, then: We can see low-level aircraft, but we do not see them beyond 200 miles. In Doppler we can see high-speed targets, but we do not see tanks, troops or ground targets. In maritime mode we can see ships at sea, but even on the desert we get too much reflected energy to see those types of items.

Radar-jamming is seen on the scope as a dotted line, but we have no capability to jam ourselves. We do have a command and control

capability on the aircraft, but once again no intelligence-gathering capability.

The need for this system in Saudi Arabia is easily pointed out if we take a quick look at the time and distance situation we face. With a ground-based radar, as I mentioned earlier, due to the curvature of the earth we are limited to about 20 or 30 miles detection. I can put 100 radars in there and never improve that capability. Consequently, a low-level inbound threat will not be seen until that point.

If he is at 400 to 600 knots, which he certainly will be, he has about 2 to 4 minutes, the normal figure that is used, until he gets to the oilfields at Dhahran. If he is seen at that point and identified as a threat and all the command and control functions are carried out, it is going to take at least a minute or two to do that; scramble the fighters, that takes about 5 minutes. At that 6 or 7 minute-point, the threat will have been in, hit the oilfields, and already be on his way home.

If I superimpose the AWACS on that same situation and use that 200 miles of low-level detection range that I spoke to earlier, I can orbit well back and still have adequate range to see the target in time to go through the command and control functions, scramble my aircraft, and at that 6- or 7-minute point the threat will still be 80 or 90 miles out. Intercept at this point takes place about 40 or 50 miles from the target.

An added point is that a low-level threat can underfly the Hawk radar that we might put around the oilfields as well as it could the ground radar, and they would not see the threat in time to react to it also. So we need that AWACS even interlinked with the Hawk's to make them effective.

Looking at the problem from a different angle, this circle represents the low level coverage of the AWACS, about 210 miles, with the AWACS at the center. If we orbited in the area we are talking about, the area of the oilfields, we get coverage all the way out to the Zagros Mountains, and in this defensive mode have adequate capability with our radios and with our look, to see the threat and defend ourselves from any inbound threat.

I would like to point out that we are in fact retracted from the threat at this point. However, if we project it into the northernmost corner of the area to try and take a look at the land mass of Israel, you can see that we have to get to that point to have any hope of in fact getting a look into Israeli.

In reality, there are mountains down the eastern border that preclude a complete look at that point, and I will talk to that in a bit. But the point is that once I get it up there I have a very large aircraft that is easily seen on radar. It emits massive amounts of energy, so that its signature is very easily determined. And it becomes, first of all, very easily seen so that it cannot collect intelligence covertly; second, very vulnerable since it is without defense in that position.

Just a quick look. This is a computer-generated line of sight projection of what would be seen by the AWACS up in that notch. These blank areas here are the masking or the shadows caused by the mountains. Those areas would not in fact be seen. Purple dots

represents the Israeli air bases. So at least half the Israeli air bases would be masked even in that furthestmost projection.

Another possibility would be to put it down to the south, but then I do not get full coverage to the north. Additionally, I am orbiting within sight of one of the main operating bases and that would hardly be the tactical place to put that aircraft.

Significantly, if I withdraw from that point there about 50 miles, then the masking becomes extremely significant and blanks out the entire country.

I asked the computer how far forward I would have to go to see the entire land mass of Israel, and this is a point over Jordan, about Amman.

Already been alluded to, but I will cover it one more time, the possibility of an AWACS being used in a consolidated attack against Israel is really a difficult situation, as General Jones pointed out, in that none of the down-link equipment would be provided. Consequently they would be limited to voice-only type equipment, UHF or HF.

Additionally, they have problems in that most of the Arab nations do not possess aircraft with compatible radios or IFF, so they would be doing that without those type items. Even if they did have this down-like equipment, though, they still would not have the software that would make this program work.

But even if those communications problems were solved for them, they would still be faced with the problem that has given us the most difficulty to this point, and that is, as he pointed out, trying to orchestrate this entire battle with people from various nations, different dialects, different procedures, different types of aircraft. And trying to put that whole ball of wax together and employ it is extremely difficult and in fact impossible without extensive training.

The fact is that we are going to be in country with that weapons system throughout the life cycle. There is no way that that could take place without us knowing about it.

Technology transfer concerns have already been spoken to, but very briefly, in technology transfer we are talking about two items, as I see it. One is the hardware involved, the other are the techniques embedded in the hardware.

The hardware itself, as General Jones pointed out, was frozen on a concept developed in the mid-1960's. In 1972 it was frozen with off-the-shelf hardware from that point. Development went through delivery of the aircraft in 1977. So we are in fact talking about technology that is of an earlier stage. That does not degrade it, of course, because we do have a working system on board. It does say, however, that today that same technology level or greater does exist in many other nations in the world.

As far as the techniques that are embedded in that software, that is the situation we get into where if it were compromised we would in fact be able to modify the software and in fact have a system that would once again be jam-resistant.

AWACS delivery will not take place until 1985. The Soviets are expected to have one on line well in advance of that delivery date. Security arrangements will be extensive in country prior to that technology being placed in Saudi Arabia.

A quick look at the configuration. The joint tactical information distribution system is a jam-resistant, secure type communication system that will not be delivered. Additionally, additional consoles and radios will not be delivered. I point out those two items in that that is the area that would give them jam-resistance, and in a defensive mode it becomes very insignificant in that you are drawn back from the proximity of the jammer.

If I want to use that aircraft offensively, I would have to project it forward or project my fighters forward, and then the jammer becomes significant. So with those items removed from the aircraft, it is in fact defensive and effective as defensive mechanism, but ineffective as an offensive weapon.

This slide represents the contractor manning levels expected with the system throughout its life cycle, and in fact points out the umbilical cord that we have spoken to with the system. I say this with some assurance, in, that we intend to have contractor manning with the U.S. Air Force AWACS throughout its life cycle. Consequently, there are areas within the Saudi program that they would never be trained up to and will in fact be dependent on contractor manning throughout that life cycle.

This represents the Peace Hawk or the F-5 program, decline in contractor manning. Peace Sun is probably not going to be quite as steep a decline, but I would expect it to level off; AWACS, probably even further.

What I am pointing out is that hard core of technicians and engineers with the system will remain with the system throughout its life cycle. If it is used contrary to our desires at any point, of course, we can pull that plug and shut the system off in short order.

In summary, then, what we have looked at basically is the fact that we are proposing an upgrade of the entire air defense capability of Saudi Arabia, but more significantly, what we are looking at is the facilities, the prepositioned or, I might add, prepaid spares, supplies and maintenance that will be place in country that we can use with our weapons systems, such as F-15's and AWACS, if we intend to be able to employ them in those areas for extended periods of time.

Interoperability with the U.S. Navy was spoken to in terms of the immediate crisis capability we would have in the area with this situation. Joint operations with the U.S. Air Force were proposed and will be an ongoing thing if this sale were to be consummated. Data sharing is a natural outcome of this arrangement.

Finally, the fact that we would be in a country, able to improve the security on our vital oil interests and have an established presence in Saudi Arabia and the Middle East is of utmost interest to us.

That completes the briefing.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, Colonel.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Mr. Chairman, that completes our presentation. General Kelley, who had until very recently the command of the Rapid Deployment Force, one of whose primary missions would be in this area, and General Jones and I are at your disposal and will be glad to try to answer your questions.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Let me simply remind my colleagues on the committee that the foreign policy and geopolitical aspects of this issue will be dealt with fully by the Foreign Relations Committee, which does have jurisdiction over the resolution of disapproval. It is our function to concentrate on the military, the technical, and the geostrategic aspects of the issue. I would suggest that our questions be guided accordingly.

Senator JACKSON?

Senator JACKSON. Is General Kelley going to make a statement?

Chairman TOWER. General Kelley is there as a backup witness. If any member wants to address a question to General Kelley, he certainly may do so. I might say, General, you should feel free to comment if you choose to.

General KELLEY. Thank you, sir.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I have been a little bit amused in listening to this briefing. I got the impression, Mr. Secretary, that this is a pile of junk.

Secretary WEINBERGER. You should not have that impression, Senator. It is a very good airplane.

Senator JACKSON. Well, I am familiar with it, having defended it. And Senator Cannon and I were just talking here a moment ago. This is not the kind of briefing that was done when the appropriations were up and the authorization was up, clearly.

You know, I am just a country boy, but I read all through this argument by the administration that this is just another system, that it does not mean much, that it is not important.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, you should not have that impression.

Senator JACKSON. Well, the Colonel certainly led one to that belief, that this is not a highly sophisticated system, that if it fell into the hands of the Soviets that they would not gain much anyway. I have never seen such a downgrading of this system. In fact, I am just appalled by the briefing, to be very candid about it.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, you should not have the impression that there is anything lacking in value in this plane. It is a very valuable addition. My statement and General Jones' statement is replete with the importance of the necessity of the Saudi Government having it.

There has been a great deal of misinformation in the last few weeks put out to the effect that, should this plane fall into the hands of the Soviets, our entire defensive capability would somehow collapse. What we are trying to do is deal with that kind of misinformation.

It is a very valuable, very useful, very versatile plane. It is vital for the Saudis to have it. And all we are saying is that the Soviets have very similar kinds of technology and that there are safeguards that we take, as with all of our sophisticated equipment, to try to guard against that. We are perfectly satisfied that the Saudi Government would be able to protect that, and we mentioned that they have protected other highly sophisticated equipment which has been sold to them in the past.

There is nothing that is in any way inadequate about the plane. But it is, in the view of a lot of exaggerations that have been bandied about in the last few weeks, important to point out that

the plane does have some limitations and to point out exactly what it would do.

When some of our visitors were here recently, we had to counter an impression that the AWACS was able to look into one of the hotels in Israel and report on everything that was happening there. The simple fact of the matter is that, as you know, unless that hotel is moving at a very high speed along the ground, you cannot do that. But that is what the purpose of this briefing is, is to put some facts before the committee.

Senator JACKSON. But you agree that it is relevant, of course, to take a look and see what the security situation is in Saudi Arabia?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Of course.

Senator JACKSON. I am sure that the President has taken that position. As a matter of fact, may I just read what the President said in an article in the Washington Post on August 15, 1979, at the very time that General Jones referred to the concern about the need for this aircraft.

"The fall of Iran"—I am quoting now—"has increased Israel's value as perhaps the only remaining strategic asset in the region on which the United States can truly rely. Other pro-western states in the region, especially Saudi Arabia and smaller Gulf kingdoms, are weak and vulnerable."

Secretary WEINBERGER. It is for that reason that we want to add to their strength.

Senator JACKSON. Well, let me ask you specifically, what capability do the Saudis have right now of manning and operating this aircraft?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I think it would require an American presence for some time to assist in the training, assist particularly in the ground maintenance and the ground control technical support aspects of the operation. I think that it is late 1985 before the plane itself would be delivered, as you know, and it would be some time after that—I do not have a specific estimate, but some years after that—while both training and certainly maintenance and ground operations conducted by U.S. personnel would be required.

Senator JACKSON. Do you not agree, Mr. Secretary, that the situation in Saudi Arabia really is fragile from a political point of view? The Mecca incident is fresh in our minds, and certainly we on this side of the process have a responsibility to look at that. And Mecca was a complete surprise to our people and a complete surprise to the Saudis.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator Jackson, there is no question that Mecca was a surprise and a disagreeable incident. But it was an incident. We have, I think it is fair to say, complete confidence in the stability and soundness of the Saudi Arabian Government. They have been very careful to avoid the problems which beset Iran, which was allowing the civilian government, so to speak, to move so far away from what the religious leaders wanted and had in mind, and to do the modernization that has been done in Saudi Arabia.

[All of that has been done in very close coordination with the religious leaders, and you do not have that kind of a split that was very prevalent in Iran. I have no hesitancy in advising the commit-

tee that in my opinion, based on the information before us, Saudi Arabia has a very stable, very solid government.]

We have incidents at home that we regard as very difficult and unfortunate. There are incidents in Germany. There are incidents all over the world. But the simple fact of the matter is—

Senator JACKSON. But Mr. Secretary, you are not really seriously comparing the internal situation in Saudi Arabia with the United States?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No, sir, I am not. I am saying your pointing out of a single incident in Mecca is not a fair basis for challenging the stability of Saudi Arabia.

Senator JACKSON. But is it not a fact that our security people for a long time—and I have served on the Intelligence Committee for some time, and I am not going to get into those details—but clearly we have had a serious concern about what might happen in Saudi Arabia.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I think—

Senator JACKSON. I am just saying here that Mr. Reagan certainly was of that view in 1979.

Secretary WEINBERGER. He felt and feels now that the the defensive capabilities of Saudi Arabia, have to be strengthened. I think this plane will clearly do that. That is why it is so vital.

Senator JACKSON. No one disputes that. The question really gets down to the basic management of this system. And AWACS in NATO is under SACEUR, is it not?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. Well, that is an American officer. And why is it, other than an ego trip, that the Saudis want to have total control? This is the whole debate up here?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No, sir, it is far more than an ego trip. It is the simple matter of the sovereignty of a very proud and able nation, and it is an extremely important thing that that nation remain, in my opinion, in a very close and friendly relationship with the United States.

Senator JACKSON. But what capability—

Secretary WEINBERGER. May I just finish?

I think that would be destroyed if this resolution of disapproval should be approved. It would be a clear signal that the Saudis could not rely on the United States or the American President to make the kind of foreign policy that is required and was recommended strongly by prior administrations.

General Jones has a point that I think should be made.

Senator JACKSON. Let me just get on this point here. My time is limited.

Let me just ask this fundamental question. Here you have the AWACS system. You see all these planes coming. What capability, realistically now, would the Saudis have of intercepting enemy aircraft?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I think the capability is one that we have assisted with. They have a good, strong air force of their own and we believe that that air force needs strengthening and this is one of the ways in which that could be done.

Senator JACKSON. Let me just say can they do it right now in this foreseeable period without American help?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I think right now they and many other countries would need American help.

Senator JACKSON. Would the Israelis need it?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, sir, I think they would.

Senator JACKSON. How do you classify, General Jones, the Israeli Air Force with the Saudi Air Force?

Secretary WEINBERGER. It is clearly superior.

General JONES. The Israeli Air Force now, in the past, and as far as we could see into the future, certainly this century and well beyond that, the Israeli Air Force will be far superior to the Saudi Air Force.

Senator JACKSON. How would you rank the Saudi Air Force?

General JONES. It is a very small air force.

Senator JACKSON. Qualitywise?

General JONES. They are doing quite well with their F-5's. I have been quite impressed with the capability of the F-5. It is a small air force. They do quite well, not anywhere near as well as the Israelis.

Senator JACKSON. How about the Egyptians right across the border? Where do you rate them? That is what I want to know.

General JONES. Senator, I would not like to rate the Saudi Arabian Air Force versus Egyptian Air Force. The Egyptian Air Force has a lot of old Soviet equipment. It is larger.

Senator JACKSON. The Syrian Air Force?

General JONES. The Syrian Air Force is better. It's larger.

Senator JACKSON. Who are they superior to out there?

General JONES. I think to Oman, to—

Senator JACKSON. Oman?

General JONES. I'm not talking about a threat.

Senator JACKSON. Oman?

General JONES. Senator, realistically, if you are talking about a major attack on Saudi Arabia by major air force elements, wherever they come from, five AWACS with one up and a handful of F-15's are not going to be able to defend the whole kingdom. And, therefore, we anticipate working with them. We have ships in the gulf that have radars. We have ships outside the Strait of Hormuz with fighter aircraft.

There is no intent for Saudi Arabia to be able to defend itself against any threat of any major size. But it will give them a substantial capability.

I have two additional points. One is, I share your concern on the briefing because it tends to say why it is not a threat to the Israelis and I concur it is not a threat to the Israelis. But as I said before the development of AWACS was a major breakthrough. It has tremendous capability now and I continue to be a strong advocate of AWACS procurement for the U.S. Air Force as well as for others.

With regard to NATO, it is a different situation.

No. 1, we pay for a substantial portion of those aircraft. But, more importantly, we have an alliance with the NATO nations and we have said to them in that alliance that if you are attacked it is as though the United States were attacked and we will come to your assistance.

We do not have a treaty of that regard with Saudi Arabia. Therefore, they don't know under what conditions we would come to assist them and, therefore, they have a right to have a sovereign capability of a limited nature.

Senator JACKSON. But all AWACS planes all over are under American command and control, even today in Saudi Arabia.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Jackson, your time is up. I think we will have an opportunity to come back.

General JONES. I might say there are E-2C's which have much of the capability of the AWACS which are in the hands of other nations and we have no control or influence over their operation.

Senator JACKSON. AWACS I am talking about.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Humphrey?

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Mr. Secretary, gentlemen.

I want to say at the outset that I am not committed one way or another on this issue. I want to hear all of the evidence on both sides of the question, but I do have some concerns and if I probe you it is not because I have taken one point of view or another but that I want to ferret out some information.

One of my concerns is what will be the next slice of the salami. As you know, in 1978 the F-15 package was sold on the basis that there would be no attempt to enhance the package later on. And, of course, now we are looking at a significant enhancement. The whole AWACS package, including the F-15's and the ground radar are being sold on the basis of defense—air defense—and yet we know that the Saudis very much want, in addition to what we are proposing or the administration is proposing to give them, multiple ejection bomb racks, which I think would undoubtedly make the role of that airplane offensive rather than defensive. That is, unless they are planning to bomb MIG's in midair, which I realize they are not.

I am worried about what the next slice of the salami will be and how can we look for assurance that there will not be another slice should this package be approved. What is going to be the next slice of the salami?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I don't know of any other pending request or any possible future requests, Senator.

I would call your attention to the enormous changes that have occurred in the whole region since the 1978 sale. Afghanistan has been invaded. Iran has fallen. Iran and Iraq are at war. Ethiopia and Yemen have become virtually client states of the Soviets and Libya has enormously increased both its capabilities and its aggressiveness. The entire region has become a far more volatile tinderbox even than it was before.

I think this is a vitally needed strengthening of the Saudi capability, the Saudis have been and can be a major force for moderation and for working with us for the protection of the whole region, and the whole region specifically includes Israel.

General JONES. Senator, may I just add? They did request bomb racks. We have told them that we have not approved those but that we recognize they have a legitimate concern to cope with an invasion of Saudi Arabia and we would be willing to study with them

the problem of coping with such an invasion and address the various ways we could help.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, to be sure, things have changed in that part of the world, but I worry very much about the use of multiple-ejection bomb racks.

The AIM-9L is a very valuable asset. Do the Soviets have anything like that? How serious would it be if that missile fell into the hands of our adversaries?

Secretary WEINBERGER. They do not have anything quite as good as the AIM-9L, that is currently operational. I think General Jones explained and discussed the difficulties of their being able to duplicate it. They have the technology. They know the ways in which the heat-seeking missile operates and its guidance system. I don't think they have anything of that kind specifically.

General Jones?

General JONES. The AIM-9L, Senator Humphrey, is in the hands of a number of friends and allies and we even have coproduction. That is a more sensitive issue that you get into—how you coproduce as opposed to just getting your hands on the equipment. We do not want the AIM-9L to fall to Soviet hands just as we don't want our other equipment to fall into their hands.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, I have had some of our Air Force people tell me that they think this is the most critical part of the package, that if this technology fell into the hands of our adversaries it would pretty much wipe out our edge in fighter superiority.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, it is a very important capability. I don't think that we can be guided in our sales of military equipment to our friends solely by constantly worrying as to whether or not it is going to fall into enemy hands.

We had a great deal of our equipment fall into enemy hands in Vietnam. We have to recognize in the sales of military equipment that we are enhancing the security of the United States and helping to defend the United States whenever they are made. That is one of the reason why in many cases, they are quite properly referred to the Congress.

We do make sales to a large number of countries. We cannot in each case worry only about whether that country is going to be able to safeguard the equipment. It is not just the stability of the country. All kinds of agents and other people are involved in operating and you can never be sure when either we operate anything here at home or when we sell it to any of the people to whom we consider it most important in helping our policy that it may or may not be lost. A lot of our technological secrets have been lost right here at home. And none of it is something that should be either encouraged or that we shouldn't make every effort to work against.

[But you do have the AIM-9L which adds a very strong military capability to the Saudis, the ability to attack an incoming fighter going over the oilfields head-on without the necessity of trying to maneuver around behind it and all of the rest I don't have any doubt that it's an important and necessary addition to their arsenal.]

I do worry, as we all do about everything that is transferred to any country and we take all the precautions that we can to try to avoid that, as we do at home, too.

General JONES. Senator, briefly on this, I talked to some people who had the same concern on the AIM-9L technology, particularly the heat-seeking portion. And when I delve into their concerns it is that we lose it to the Soviets, and they immediately have the capability and, therefore, we lose our advantage.

✓ We have got to recognize it will be a few years before the Saudis could have the AIM-9L. If the Soviets got their hand on it they would have the great problems of reverse engineering. It would take considerable time to try to build it.

We estimate within this time period they will have a better missile with many of the characteristics of the AIM-9L and we are working on even more improved missiles that we can have out at the end of this decade.]

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, the problem of course, is if Saudi Arabia is successfully invaded, the weapons would fall into the hands of our adversaries, and they would be able to use them against us. The argument that it would be some years before the Soviets could figure it out and produce it themselves does not address this problem, the danger of these weapons falling into the hands of our adversaries.

General JONES. Well, we have seen in Iran the great difficulty they have in using our equipment against the Iraqis.

Senator HUMPHREY. The Soviet Union is a great deal more capable than either Iran or Vietnam.

General JONES. That's true, but the Iranians have some very good capability that they have not been able to use—for example, the Phoenix missile—as we expected they might be able to do.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes; but we are talking about different countries. Let me move on to something else and come back to this later, if I may.

Why, if the Saudis are looking for greater air defense, do we not upgrade their ground-to-air defenses? Why not rely more heavily on ground-to-air missiles in conjunction with some kind of AWACS, whether it is E-2 or E-3? Why do we have to upgrade these F-15 fighters such that without too much difficulty they could become offensive weapons? Why not, instead, encourage them to rely more heavily on ground-to-air missiles in conjunction with an airborne radar platform?

General JONES. They are increasing their capability with Hawks, but if you look at the deployment on the eastern shore, and aircraft coming in at low altitude comes into the Hawk range very close in.

Senator HUMPHREY. Are you talking about Hawk range in conjunction with AWACS or with the ground radar?

General JONES. You cannot use a Hawk until it comes within radar range of the Hawk. You can tell the Hawk it is coming, but the Hawk has to lock on itself and so at very low altitude you get very short range with a Hawk missile. The Hawk will be a good complementary part of the oilfields defense.

But if they came in at extremely low altitudes the Hawk would lock on about the time they got in very close to the oilfields.

Secretary WEINBERGER. [The AWACS, Senator, I think the quickest way to put it, adds something like 14 to 20 minutes of additional warning time to the 2 to 4 minutes that now exists and that is an enormously important advantage in the region.]

Senator HUMPHREY. Let me come back to that question as well. I want to explore that further.

As to the matter of the security of the AWACS software, the administration contends that the codes can be deciphered and that that would render the software of little value to our adversaries. I know a little about computers and programs, not a great deal, frankly, but a little, and is it not the programs themselves, the algorithms that are of value. By simply deciphering, rechanging or deciphering, changing the ciphers you don't in any way destroy the program itself, do you? I don't know what kind of a setup you have, but I am concerned about the security of the programs themselves.

General JONES. Senator, first, much of the most sensitive information is put into this system on construction. It is not even made available to the U.S. Air Force in the sense of the units or NATO or the rest. They don't need it in the basic operation of the system.

Second, when I talk to them about trying to do that backward, trying to decipher what it is, is much more of a problem than our making fundamental changes in the system in a shorter period of time.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if at this point in the record, in response to Senator Humphrey's question, if I could put in a 2-page paper which goes into substantial technical detail both about algorithms and the other points he has raised that might be useful as part of our answer to this question.

Chairman TOWER. It will be placed in the record as a part of the answer to your question.

[The information follows:]

[The information was not received in time for printing.]

Senator HUMPHREY. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Cannon?

Senator CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could tell us a little more specifically about what the agreement is. We have seen the proposals as to what is to be delivered. I would like to know a little more precisely about what controls are to be retained and what are not to be retained from the standpoint of people and training.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, I can't really go into any full detail about that. There are a number of different safeguards that are standard to the transfer of this equipment, the high technology equipment. Those are all incorporated.

General Jones can certainly go into detail about those. There have been a lot of discussions about other types of arrangements, but I do not have before me at this time any of the details of those. Many of those discussions are continuing.

But the standard clauses in these contracts are the same clauses that are in a lot of the contracts for equipment that we transferred to Israel and would also be included in these contracts.

Senator CANNON. I understand that. You would have the standard clauses about nontransfer of technology and all this sort of thing.

What I am really talking about is the operational control. We have four AWACS down there now. They are under our operational control, as I understand it, are they not, General?

General JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator CANNON. And are there some Saudis on board now? Give us the mix. You have got people there.

General JONES. Today we are there at the request of the Saudi government, working in the eastern region helping with the air defense and are linked in. A Saudi officer flies aboard our AWACS, normally, I think, on every flight. There may have been some flights that he has not been aboard. He is not a member of the crew, not a member of control. The basic system of control is by us.

As we look to the future in the program we do sell the AWACS to Saudi Arabia. They take control of the aircraft from an ownership standpoint. It will take many years while we work cooperatively in training, I think longer than projected, because in most cases we have found that it takes longer than we estimate to bring our own units up to operational readiness.

[For the life of the system we will have contractors there. Furthermore, we will have the security agreement that is very stringent and we will have inspections to determine that those security agreements were followed. They cannot pass information to a third country, they cannot have third country nationals work on the aircraft, in either case without our approval.]

These are the types of controls that we would have.

Senator CANNON. And when would we actually lose effective control of the aircraft—command and control responsibility?

Secretary WEINBERGER. It is very hard to estimate that. They would be delivered in 1985. Everyone I have talked to is in full agreement that a training capability of an indefinite time would be required because it is a complex machine and there would likely be a period of American maintenance and work with respect to the ground installations for several years thereafter.

So I think you are well into the 1990's, but I do not have any definite date.

[General JONES. Senator, we would have involvement, particularly in support, ad infinitum. At some point—I think it will be 1990—they could say Americans get lost; we will go operate the airplane.] Their capability would deteriorate very rapidly without our technical support, both our people and our spares and the other inputs to the AWACS.

So you have, in that way, very great influence and a deterrent on their not using the aircraft in a way that is inimical to our interests. It is not direct control but it is great influence on it and it would be foolhardy for them to go ahead and move our people out and say we're going to do what we want regardless of what you say. The AWACS would deteriorate very rapidly and their other military capability would deteriorate rapidly.

Senator CANNON. Where does the real problem arise? Isn't it the problem of where we lose control of that aircraft so that we do not exercise command and control over it? Isn't that what the Israelis are concerned about?

General JONES. Personally I don't know where the problem is, Senator, because I think it is one more of image than of fact.

Senator CANNON. Well, I do not know what the problem is after this briefing and, frankly, I do not know why they are concerned at all. If what you say is correct, I would like to ask you why you think the Israelis opposed this kind of a proposal.

General JONES. I don't know. I was surprised when they became so opposed to it. They had not expressed concerns earlier.

Senator CANNON. You mean they haven't expressed to you what their concerns were?

General JONES. Earlier. I say it was a surprise when they came out with their strong concerns about security. I do not see it as a threat to Israel. I think it is in their best interests.

Senator CANNON. Well, I must say that my strong concern is that of security and I went through this exercise in trying to defend the AWACS over a period of several years. I must say had I heard this briefing that I heard today and that I have heard in the past few days I would have been a little less enthusiastic about my support because I didn't know that I was going so strong in supporting a system that was of such little importance.

General JONES. Senator, as I stated earlier I share some of your concerns in clearly demonstrating that it is not a threat to Israel, other aspects of the capability, particularly in Europe and other parts of the world, are not pointed out in an adequate form.

I am the strongest advocate of AWACS and AWACS is very, very good. But five aircraft in the hands of the Saudis, heavily dependent on us for technical assistance, contractor assistance and spares, their taking those off and trying to do something with them against Israel is a very limited capability that would deteriorate very rapidly.

That doesn't mean the AWACS, properly supported, properly operated, fully equipped, isn't a great system, even in the dense environment of western Europe.

Senator CANNON. What is proposed or what is envisioned to take place in the period of now to 1985 when those five are supposedly to be delivered? Do our four remain down there under our command and control?

General JONES. No, sir. These are new production. They come off the production line.

Senator CANNON. No, I said do our four remain down there in the interim period under our command and control and operational control, during all that period up to 1985?

Secretary WEINBERGER. If the Saudis wish that, yes, sir.

Senator CANNON. Pardon.

Secretary WEINBERGER. If the Saudis wish that, that would be the case.

Senator CANNON. Well, we certainly ought to know by now with all of these negotiations whether they wish it or whether they don't.

Secretary WEINBERGER. They have indicated nothing at all to us or to me that indicates that they do not want them to stay. So I cannot say to you right now, Senator, that yes, I guarantee they will be there for 5 years. All I can say is that they wanted them very much earlier and there hasn't been the slightest indication that they do not wish them now.

General JONES. Senator, I clearly anticipate that they will stay there. Every indication we have had from them is that they will stay there even beyond the delivery of their aircraft, in that they won't become operational for a considerable period of time.

And until they become operational they are very worried about the threat to the oilfields and, therefore, we would stay, I anticipate, beyond 1985. And I do not foreclose some operation beyond that, because there are other areas, as you saw, down around to the south of there that we could be of some assistance in our operations of AWACS in the area.

So I clearly anticipate to, well, late in the 1980's, our presence there.

Senator CANNON. Do they have crews on those airplanes now in a training status?

General JONES. No, sir.

Senator CANNON. None at all?

General JONES. They generally have one officer aboard observing, maybe he gets some limited training out of observing. But he is not operating equipment as such. We do have a training program that will start before the delivery of the first aircraft, a training program here in the United States.

Senator CANNON. Are we reimbursed for the keeping of the four AWACS down there now?

General JONES. No, sir.

Senator CANNON. Pardon?

General JONES. No, sir, they are paying for the crews and providing for facilities and a lot of other things.

Senator CANNON. You say paying for the crews? You mean they are paying the salaries of our military personnel?

General JONES. No, sir, they are not paying their salaries, but to the best of my knowledge they are providing support, where people live, transportation, meals, and that, and they are providing fuel for the AWACS operations, but they are not paying for those aircraft being there.

Senator CANNON. Thank you, General. My time is up.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Cohen?

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Colonel Stamm, could you stand up for a moment? I think you indicated when you were standing at the board that if the AWACS were moved up into the northern tier they would be very exposed, you said, without defense in that position.

You do not mean to say those planes fly without defense?

Colonel STAMM. It is a completely defenseless system.

Senator COHEN. No F-15's will be flying with the AWACS?

Colonel STAMM. You could put a defense cap up with them.

Senator COHEN. You mean to say even down in the south toward the oil fields they will be flying without a defensive system? Don't they always fly with a defensive system?

Colonel STAMM. The aircraft we have over there right now do not fly with a defensive system. What we do is we keep them drawn back 70 to 100 miles so that they have adequate warning. They can see all the way out to 200 miles.

Senator COHEN. But if you put them up north with some F-15's they would not be as naked and exposed as you suggest?

Colonel STAMM. If I put them up north—may I put my slide back up?

Senator COHEN. No.

Colonel STAMM. If I'm withdrawn from the threat area I get full limit of my own protection and coverage to see the threat emanate, determine what it is, and take a response to it before it becomes a situation that I cannot escape from.

If I project it forward, looking into Israel, I have to project it so far forward that I've given up a good bit of that low-level coverage.

Senator COHEN. Could you put a few SAM missiles around the northern border?

Colonel STAMM. Saudi SAM missiles?

Senator COHEN. Sure. Is that a very difficult thing to do? For example, in Lebanon we have seen missiles lined up along the border. Would it be very difficult for the Saudis, who are not lacking in funds, certainly, to place some missiles along their border saying they need this kind of a defensive system to prevent possible attacks from right to left on the border?

Colonel STAMM. The problem is bigger than that. The aircraft that will be delivered to Saudi Arabia will not have jam-resistant equipment on board to transmit that warning to the SAM's. Consequently, even if those Saudis did get up there and see the threat emanate, if they were jammed at the same time they wouldn't be able to transmit that information to the SAM's and, in fact, effect a good defense. That also includes any F-15 fighters that they might put up there in conjunction with the SAM's and the AWACS.

Senator COHEN. Sure. Is that a very difficult thing to do? For Jackson's questions? I think you indicated that all the AWACS we currently have with our allies in NATO were under joint or under U.S. control. And I think you responded that the reason there's a distinction here is that Saudi Arabia is a sovereign, proud nation and that we are committed to defending Saudi Arabia if it were attacked.

If the President of the United States, supported by the Congress, were to indicate that we think it is in our vital interest to defend the Persian Gulf and have in fact earmarked a Rapid Deployment Force to carry out that mission of defending the Persian Gulf, would that not be an indication that we intend to put as much support as we do to our NATO Allies to defend the Government of Saudi Arabia?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I don't think automatically, Senator, no. You have to look at each situation on its face and the way it is at the moment that you are examining it.

We have, with NATO, not only treaties but we have joint operations provided from the beginning. The present Supreme Commander in Europe is an American, so you can say that the AWACS that will be assigned to NATO will be under American direction. But they are actually under joint direction of the NATO organization, of which he is a representative.

Senator COHEN. Is it fair to say that we could defend Saudi Arabia in the event of an attack?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes; I certainly hope so. I think it is vital to our interests to do so.

Senator COHEN. And I agree with that.

I want to read a statement to you, General Jones. It says that there are security implications. The AWACS versions intended for them will probably not be quite as heavily loaded with valuable electronic equipment as the AWACS version for the Air Force. Nevertheless, AWACS will carry considerable sophisticated equipment beyond the present U.S.S.R. state-of-the-art.

If the Soviets should gain access to the AWACS they could move ahead, in the opinion of the Director of Central Intelligence, some 5 to 7 years in certain technologies. More immediately, they could learn how to jam any now-contemplated AWACS version.

Would you agree with that?

General JONES. Could you tell me when the statement was written?

Senator COHEN. The statement was made in 1977 in testimony before both the Senate and the House on the proposed sale of AWACS to Iran.

General JONES. I recall that. That would mean—1977 would mean 1982 to 1984 if they got their hands on it in 1977. The Soviets have made major advances already and will, in our judgment, have a good lookdown AWACS before the 1985 time period. So that clock is different now than it was then.

Senator COHEN. So in other words, if the AWACS were to fall into the hands of the Soviet Union that is not of concern to you?

General JONES. No; that is not correct, Senator Cohen. I said it is of concern to me, the loss of any American equipment anyplace in the world to the Soviets.

Senator COHEN. If they have the capability, why are you worried about the Soviets acquiring this information?

General JONES. Well, as I pointed out, No. 1, they can make some marginal improvements in their own capabilities and, second, it would cause some problems to us in countering it through changing our AWACS to minimize particularly the electronic countermeasures by them.

So I don't want to minimize the fact that we do not want this to fall into the hands of the Soviets—we will do everything we can to prevent it. I am saying it is not catastrophic if it does.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, let me respond to that.

If the fear that you are properly expressing and the concern that we all share were carried to their logical extent it would simply mean that we never sold anything to anybody because we would always assume that everybody else was slightly less stable than we are.

And the simple fact of the matter is we aid our defensive capabilities enormously by getting it in the hands of various nations strategically located and friendly to us around the world. There is always the risk and there is going to be a risk. But if we allow that risk to paralyze us then we would simply be in the position where we would have to spend an infinitely greater amount of money on our own defense or else leave ourselves far more vulnerable.

Senator COHEN. Well, I thank you for that, Mr. Secretary.

I was just going to add that in that testimony in 1977, State, Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence were agreed that Iranian physical security was good and that the security risk was

probably no more than if AWACS were deployed in Europe. State and Defense said they believed the risk of compromise was minimal, even though the Soviets are adjacent neighbors.

I just wonder what the consequences would be if in fact AWACS had been transferred to Iran at the time.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Valuable equipment was lost in Iran, valuable equipment was lost in Vietnam. The simple fact of the matter is that it was important to us to have the kinds of region or area in which to operate that we used to have in Iran. It would have been enormously to our advantage to take steps to try to prevent the Iranian Government from falling.

The President is well aware of the peril and has expressed many times that he would not allow, to the greatest extent possible to him and to the American Government, a similar fall of Saudi Arabia should that even be threatened. We do not think it is threatened.

Senator COHEN. Mr. Secretary, at the time that the AWACS were being considered for sale to Iran one of the principal arguments at that time was the fear of a rejection of the sale as proposed.

Now let me read a response that was given, and I am paraphrasing now. Well, they would be left without what we consider a program for adequate air defense which I think is justifiably a military requirement. They would feel that we, in effect, were unconcerned about their ability to defend themselves against political threats in the future. They would think and interpret this as a signal of at least a lessening of our concern, of our interest, in their security and in the relationship between us. So there will be a multiplier effect, if you will, psychologically, politically, to a turn-down.

Now one of the major concerns at that time was that if we did not sell the AWACS to Iran, the British, our strong and good friends, were prepared to sell the Nimrod to the Iranians. And I would like to know, in the wake of not selling the AWACS to Iran, did the Shah purchase the Nimrod?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I don't know.

Senator COHEN. General Jones?

General JONES. No; because we had approval to sell the AWACS to Iran. I must say at that time the Nimrod capability was much, much less than the AWACS.

Senator COHEN. Now, all through the testimony that I have read during that sale, we heard about the presence of the British prepared to sell the Nimrod. I could point out the pages that were submitted for the record.

General JONES. Senator, I submit that the Nimrod at that time was a paper airplane in the sense of over-the-land AEW. Nimrod is much better today than at that time.

Senator COHEN. Tell me what the respective capabilities of the Nimrod versus the AWACs are.

General JONES. I can go into it in general in open session, but I would want to go into closed session to go into any specifics.

Chairman TOWER. General Jones, if you will yield on that point, if you will suspend for a moment, Senator Cohen, this will not be charged against Senator Cohen's time, it is likely that other ques-

tions will come up to be answered in full; would require a classified response. So in that instance we will try to arrange for a subsequent executive or closed session, either that or make classified briefings available to any Senator that requires them.

Senator COHEN. Mr. Chairman, let me withdraw the question for the time being and ask the question in a different way.

There is a notion that if we reject the sale as currently structured, this will result in somewhat of a lessening of our relationship with Saudi Arabia, that the British stand ready, willing, and able to move in with their own aircraft. They have their own notions about a mid-East settlement as such. They would be building much stronger ties to the Saudis, who would then be much less friendly toward Israel. And we have an opportunity to ameliorate that situation right now.

My question, assuming the British sell them the Nimrod, is it your judgment the Saudis will rely upon the British to defend them in case of attack?

General JONES. No.

Senator COHEN. Is it your judgement then that they would rely upon the French if they sell them the Mirage as opposed to the upgraded F-15?

General JONES. No.

Senator COHEN. The answer is ultimately the United States is the only country that has the capability of helping the Saudi Government to survive in the event that it would come under external attack, rather than any kind of subversive destabilization?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, it wouldn't require that. It would require a joint effort by a number of countries to defend the oil fields should they be invaded. Remember, the Soviets have a capability of moving in more than one arena at once with conventional forces that are very strong.

Senator COHEN. Has NATO agreed to join a deployment force?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No, they have not, but the subject has been discussed and is being discussed. There has been no agreement of any kind. But the obvious importance of the security of the oil fields to the Western World is such that I think that point is becoming more and more known to a great many countries.

Japan, Israel, all of these countries rely heavily on imported oil and the simple fact of the matter is there would be and would have to be a substantial, concerted effort to defend the oil fields.

And the important point, I think, is to insure that the desire and the will to defend the oilfields by the host countries, by the owners of the oilfields remains. I think that the sale of this plane and the demonstration of our attitude of support is an important factor and a part of the equation.

General JONES. Senator, I don't anticipate a break in relations. I think we will continue to work with the Saudis if the sale is rejected. I would anticipate, though, that they would turn to others for much more than military equipment. They already have turned to France for much of their naval equipment even though other countries couldn't give them full defense. We need a cooperative effort.

However, I think it would be more difficult for us to move into the area at a time of a threat or an invasion and to be able to

counter it if we didn't have our AWACS there and didn't have this close relationship with Saudi Arabia.

Chairman TOWER. The Senator's time is up.

Senator BYRD?

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As one who has not made a decision on this legislation, let me make two observations and then I have several questions.

First, let me say that during the years I have been in the Senate I have been a strong supporter of Israel. I think it is a consistent, firm friend to the United States. It is a democracy. I have great admiration for the people of Israel. It is remarkable and in a sense unbelievable how they have developed that country and especially what they have done in the way of developing the capability to defend themselves militarily. So I think Israel is important to the United States. It is strongly anti-Soviet and it is a democracy.

Second, the Saudis are also friends of the United States. Saudi Arabia, I feel, is an extremely important nation to our country and, indeed, to the entire free world. It is the largest producer of oil for the entire free world. It is the anti-Communist leader of the Arab Gulf States.

The Secretary of Defense this morning stated that the Saudi oil resources are vulnerable and threatened. I think that is certainly correct. When I was in Saudi Arabia last year, I was impressed by what I regarded as the vulnerability of the oil resources. I think that it is under threat from the Soviet Union. As I see it, the Soviets are perhaps more desirous of getting control, directly or indirectly, of the Middle East oilfields and southern Africa, or South Africa, I should say, than perhaps any other two areas in the world. So I think we are faced with a very difficult and important decision.

Now let me ask just a few questions. General Jones, are you convinced that the AWACS proposal, the entire package, the total package, will not jeopardize the security of Israel?

General JONES. Not only do I feel it will not jeopardize but in the long term it will contribute to the security of Israel as well as the United States.

Senator BYRD. Is that true of you, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Absolutely, and I would add to that the free nations of the world—the NATO nations, the rest of the mid-East and Japan.

Senator BYRD. Now, second, General Jones, are you convinced from the military point of view that the sale of the military hardware embodied in the proposal is important and necessary in safeguarding the Saudi oilfields?

General JONES. I do, yes, sir.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I certainly share that and we elaborated on that, Senator Byrd, in my statement as to the enhanced capability that it gives them, particularly against the new threats that are coming in from Yemen and Ethiopia, which is a considerable concern to them and justifiably so.

Senator BYRD. Now I am not clear on this next point. Did I understand one or both of you to say that it will be at least 10 years before the Saudis will get total and unilateral control of the AWACS?

Secretary WEINBERGER. If they buy the plane Senator, they would own the plane. The planes would not be delivered until 1985. Thereafter, there would be a training period because of the complexity of the plane and its equipment, the fact that it has not been conducted before, that would be required. Thereafter, even after that you would have an important American maintenance function as well as an American presence required with respect to the ground operations of the plane.

But I would see extending well into a period of 10 years from delivery, yes, sir. And General Jones, I think, puts it even a little longer.

Senator BYRD. So it is accurate to say, is it, that it would be at least 10 years before the Saudis get total and unilateral control of the AWACS operation?

General JONES. Senator Byrd, I want to be careful as to the word "control." They will own AWACS upon delivery. There will be certain provisions with regard to security and operation. They will not be operational, though, until well after 1985, because of the training period.

Even beyond that, there will be continued U.S. assistance required in the way of support, people, and of supplies. There is the theoretical possibility, which I think it would be foolhardy on their part, to say we own them; therefore, we control them and we will do what we want with them. Because that would immediately jeopardize that whole support and they would deteriorate in their whole military capability very rapidly.

So even though technically they would have control, their capability with it would be nominal and would deteriorate very rapidly.

Senator BYRD. Now earlier it was mentioned about the AWACS and Iran. Did the Air Force, General Jones, recommend the sale of the AWACS to Iran?

General JONES. I think the Air Force supported that.

Senator BYRD. Supported the sale?

General JONES. Supported the sale. It was an administration position but the Air Force supported the sale.

Senator BYRD. And that was in 1977, was it?

General JONES. Roughly, the 1977 time period I think was when it was consummated.

Senator BYRD. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are you satisfied in your own mind that the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia would not unreasonably jeopardize the secrets contained therein, should we say, in the event it should fall into—

General JONES. I agree with that statement, Senator.

Senator BYRD. You agree with that statement.

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Thurmond?

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I want to compliment you and the administration for this decision that you made to sell the AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia. I have given considerable thought to this matter.

I am convinced it is in the best interest of the United States that we do this from our standpoint. We would be paralyzed without the oil we get from Saudi Arabia and, furthermore, I think it will add

to our security to have these planes over there to protect us from the Soviet threat either directly or through their proxies.

I am very interested in Israel. I don't want to see any step taken to hurt Israel. I am convinced that it is in their interest that we sell these planes. They will get the NIMROD from Great Britain or they will get a plane from France or elsewhere, in which event we would exercise no control whatever.

If we furnish these planes we will have some control and it is important, I think, that we do this. From the standpoint of Saudi Arabia I think it is best. Saudi Arabia is our friend, as Israel is our friend, and they are going to be terribly hurt, and their international pride will be hurt, if we do not furnish these planes.

And then, too, I think they need these planes to protect their oil interests, some of which they furnish us and some of which they furnish to Japan and other countries of the world.

So from any standpoint that you look at it, in my opinion, this sale should be made. I do not understand why Mr. Begin is opposed to this sale. I cannot imagine why he would be opposed. It seems to me he would be wise to recommend the sale because it protects not only Saudi Arabia, but it protects Israel. And Saudi Arabia knows of our interest in Israel too.

Mr. Begin ought to know, as much as we do for Israel, that this is going to embarrass the President of the United States if this does not go through. We do not have but one President and when he makes a decision on foreign policy I will lean over backward to support him. For the 27 years I have been in the Congress, whether it was a Democrat or a Republican President, I have backed that President on foreign policy. He speaks for this Nation. If we repudiate him here on this matter, it is going to hurt his influence throughout the entire world and his leadership that he can exert in the free world.

So for those reasons I am strongly in favor of selling these planes to Saudi Arabia. [Applause.]

Secretary WEINBERGER. Thank you, Senator. Those are the reasons that appeal to us.

Chairman TOWER. The Chair will have to advise our guests that we do not allow any expressions of approval or disapproval.

Senator Nunn?

Senator NUNN. Mr. Secretary, do you know of any other requests from any other nations now that would involve the sale of AWACS aircraft by the United States?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I do not know of any pending ones. General Jones may know of some.

General JONES. I don't know of any pending requests by nations, no, sir.

Senator NUNN. Can our NATO allies operate AWACS? Will they be able to in the near future? By that I mean, if we were to have a situation where U.S. technicians were not there and so forth, will our NATO allies be able to maintain and operate those planes without U.S. assistance?

Secretary WEINBERGER. The same conditions would apply, Senator. There would be substantial training periods. There would be substantial time involved in preparing ground crews, ground control operations, all of those things. Ultimately the answer, of

course, is yes. But that training period has not been requested because of the conditions in NATO under which we all participate under an alliance and under a series of treaties.

Senator NUNN. I understand that distinction. I am just saying will the operating procedures that are now envisioned lead at some point to our allies being able to operate and maintain AWACS without American participation.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I think the issue would not arise, but the individual people—the members of NATO nations, the non-American members of the NATO alliance—will undoubtedly in the course of the activities with NATO be receiving training on this. They will not be receiving training specifically as representatives of that country but they will be receiving training.

I think it is quite possible that at the end of the length of time that it takes, these individuals would have all of the skills that we would have. But we wouldn't specifically set out to train the Germans, so to speak, now to use it. We set out to have them integrate as an integral part of the NATO operation.

Senator NUNN. General Jones, Can you answer that as to at what stage would other nations within NATO that are our allies be able to handle these planes without American assistance if the circumstances at that time indicated that it was the chosen route?

General JONES. Senator, the best I understand it, about 40 percent of the personnel involved would be United States, so if all U.S. personnel pulled out it would degrade the capability very much.

The front-end crews will all be of one country. The rear-end, the mission people, will be international, with Americans and others mixed in. I know of no plan to try in Europe to duplicate all of the support that we provide and the spares from the United States.

Senator NUNN. Will the United States always have someone on board those planes?

General JONES. I could see circumstances where there would not be Americans on some of the missions.

Senator NUNN. Where there would not be Americans on board?

General JONES. I think the likelihood is, since we supply about 40 percent of the people, that there would be Americans aboard, but I know I can check on it and confirm it, but I know of no provision at all that requires a U.S. citizen aboard a NATO airplane.

We are certainly not going to have people from a dozen different nations on one airplane, on every airplane.

Senator NUNN. General Kelley, I do not know whether you can do this in an unclassified session—if you cannot just say so—but what do you consider as a high threat and a low threat to the Persian Gulf area as former head of the Rapid Deployment Force?

General KELLEY. I think the high threat, Senator, is quite obvious. It's the Soviet threat, which is represented by some double-digit numbers of divisions which are disposed in the Trans-Caucasus, North Caucasus, Turkistan, and Afghanistan. There's no question in my mind that, in this context, if the United States is to deploy meaningful combat power to that part of the world under any scenario, be it high threat or low threat, it is absolutely essential that we have free and willing—and I emphasize those two words, free and willing—access to Saudi land bases, Saudi ports,

Saudi host nation support, and a considerable labor pool from the Saudis.]

Senator NUNN. Can you defend the Saudi oilfields without having AWACS aircraft in that area?

General KELLEY. You cannot defend the Saudi airfields without—

Senator NUNN. Oilfields is what I am saying.

General KELLEY. Yes, sir, I understand. If you are talking about from an air threat, no, sir. I do not believe you can adequately defend the Saudi oilfields from an air threat without some AWACS capability.

Senator NUNN. What is the situation as far as Nimrods? What if we had Nimrods in there? How would Nimrods be able to correlate with the Rapid Deployment Force? Would you be able to set up a communication between the Nimrods and the American forces if that happened, if this sale is rejected?

General KELLEY. Because of the compatibility with U.S. equipment, I would suggest that it would be far more difficult. I cannot say impossible, sir, but I can provide that, possibly, for the record.

Technically, however, it is far more difficult to interface with the Nimrod system than it is with a system that is compatible to our current command and control system.

General JONES. Senator Nunn, if I could—

Senator NUNN. Yes.

General JONES. We are basically working for interoperability between the Nimrod and AWACS in Europe. So there are ways to interoperate, but it takes training, it takes procedures, so it would be more difficult even though basically you can interoperate.

Senator NUNN. So it would not preclude an air defense coordination with a Rapid Deployment Force if they were to have Nimrods rather than AWACS?

General JONES. You wouldn't preclude it, but it would be more difficult and also one orbit doesn't give sufficient total defense and you would want additional airborne early warning. Then you would have a mix of the two.

So it doesn't preclude it, but it would be more difficult.

Senator NUNN. General Kelley, when will the AWACS aircraft that are operating now—either General Jones or General Kelley can answer this—when were they put in Saudi Arabia?

General JONES. Early October 1980.

Senator NUNN. Early October 1980.

General JONES. About a year ago now.

Senator NUNN. About a year ago. When did the President declare the Persian Gulf to be in our vital interest?

General JONES. At least 2 years ago. But we had sent AWACS there earlier for 45—

Senator NUNN. I didn't understand that.

General JONES. We had sent AWACS there in 1979 for 45 days.

Senator NUNN. What I am trying to get at, what would we have done in that area of the world if we had had a contingency, let's say a low-threat contingency, not the Soviets directly but one of the other nations in that area that had sophisticated aircraft after the oilfields?

What would we have done with the Rapid Deployment Force in defending the Persian Gulf oilfields had that happened before AWACS were put there?

General KELLEY. Let me attempt to answer that, sir. The most critical element for the deployment of any U.S. force from the Rapid Deployment Force is to establish immediately an air superiority and air defense network. That is absolutely essential to any deployment because of the air threats in the area.

So, the first thing we would have had to do, at great expense in terms of strategic lift, would be to lift an air defense or air superiority network into the area, because, as a commander, I would never let a force move into an area without that kind of protection. That is the essential ingredient to any rapid deployment force move into that part of the world.

The success or failure, Senator, of subsequent deployments after you get your air superiority and air defense network into the area, may well hinge on how well it operates.

Senator NUNN. General Kelley, what would happen if we were to have AWACS aircraft? Let us assume that this sale is turned down for one reason or another and let us assume that we put AWACS aircraft into either Egypt or Israel. What does that do to your air situation as far as Rapid Deployment Force defending the oil in the Persian Gulf?

General KELLEY. Well, it really doesn't when you look at the geographic proximity of Israel and Egypt to what we're talking about.

We are still talking about great ranges and a threat to Saudi Arabia is not necessarily a threat to Egypt or to Israel.

Senator NUNN. Does that mean they would be of no value, some value?

General KELLEY. No, sir, they would be of some value to the Rapid Deployment Force. But whether or not you merely exacerbate the situation by having them in places outside of Saudi Arabia, I'm not sure I can comment on that.

Senator NUNN. How do you evaluate the increased risk, if there is any, to our rapid deployment mission if this sale is turned down and if the Saudis were to take out the interim aircraft and go to the Nimrod conversion? I'm asking General Kelley that.

General KELLEY. There is a much bigger issue, as you have alluded to, Senator, and I appreciate the fact that you recognize it.

First of all, let me say in a strategic and geopolitical dimension there is probably no country in this world, I feel, that is more important—that is a personal opinion but I am sure you share it—to the free world and our future than Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is, without question, as far as I am concerned, the lynchpin to a viable U.S. strategy in the region.

We must have a meaningful relationship in that area. The consequences of not having such a relationship with the Saudis, I think, are a great risk, a very serious risk, to this country. So I ask that the committee not only consider the technical aspects of the AWACS but also consider the geopolitical dimensions of our future relations, not only with the Saudis, Senator, but with the entire moderate Arab world.

Senator NUNN. Well, I wanted to get to the question. Let us assume the sale is turned down. Let us assume the Saudis decide to phase out the operation of the AWACS and go to the Nimrod in that conversion period. How do you assess the ability of the Rapid Deployment Force to defend those oilfields as compared to the present?

General KELLEY. Well, first of all, sir, I've got to get back to the context of defending it against an air threat because that is what AWACS and the Nimrod do. They don't defend it against a ground threat.

Also, it is very difficult to put a dimension on defending an oilfield. We don't defend oilfields per se. We defend critical elements of the oilfields—the refineries, the cracking points, the pumping stations. But you don't defend something that is hundreds of miles long and hundreds of miles wide.

So, in answer to your question, as far as interface is concerned with the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, it would be in our best interests to have a compatible U.S. piece of equipment in the region and not a piece of equipment that would not have a high degree of compatibility.

Chairman TOWER. I am sorry. Your time is up.

Senator Jepsen?

Senator JEPSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In the area of declaring oneself, I will declare myself. I am opposed to the sale of the AWACS. I am opposed to the sale because I believe it would not be in the best interest of the United States and also because I support Israel as an ally, as has been mentioned here before.

That doesn't mean we are anti-Saudi. In fact, I concur with the need to strengthen the defensive capabilities in the Middle East. I say why not build it on the Camp David agreement as a guide to developing a stable mid-East? But let us look at the facts and I want to ask this question to make sure I understand, Mr. Secretary, the facts as we have it proposed now to this Congress, to this Senate to sell the AWACS with ultimately no American involvement whatsoever, in other words, to sell it outright as the thing stands at this moment.

Secretary WEINBERGER. That is not correct, sir. The sale of the AWACS and the other enhancement portions of the package would be a final sale with complete ownership taken over. But there would always have to be, or at least for many, many years out into the future, an American presence that accompanies them. So it is not correct in any way to say that this sale contemplates no American presence.

Senator JEPSEN. But it is complete ownership, their complete control.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, sir, for which cash is being paid.

Senator JEPSEN. Out of curiosity I would ask General Jones or Colonel Stamm or whomever, I notice that in the frame depicting the KC-707 the markings were blotted out. Was this a photograph of an aircraft of the Iranian air force?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I don't believe so. We've got plenty of KC planes we can photograph of our own.

Senator JEPSEN. I think it is. I think it is inadvertently a reminder of the fall of Iran at a time when we are worried about Saudi instability.

They had KC-707's. I think if you wanted to put it back up, I think it is very clear and I hope you don't show it anywhere else.

Colonel STAMM. It was a prototype airplane with Iranian markings on that we took the markings off. This was the only available example of this KC-707 tanker adaptation.

Secretary WEINBERGER. It was a prototype that had Iranian markings.

Senator JEPSEN. Senator Jackson made some observations which I might comment on in that we find that we are talking about this equipment. It has been described in technical terms as 1960's technology, off-the-shelf technology and, of course, if the AWACS were so unsophisticated I don't know why the Soviets aren't flying something comparable at this time. And I would remind General Jones we have learned a great deal of AWACS from your previous testimonies.

February 5, 1976, the Senate Appropriations Committee, I quote, you said, "All the experts will agree that the AWACS radar is the hardest to jam that has ever been built."

General JONES. That is still true.

Senator JEPSEN. Pardon?

General JONES. I would say probably the Nimrod will be a little more difficult, but that statement is still very accurate, that it's extremely difficult to jam the radar.

Senator JEPSEN. Yet in line No. 4 of the slide, showing all the reasons why this is off-the-shelf technology and so on you say the communications link could be easily jammed.

General JONES. That's not the radar. That's the radio.

Senator JEPSEN. I will also point out you stated in 1978 we have also looked at the vulnerability of AWACS. I am quoting:

Foxbat cannot do anything to AWACS until they can find it, and its ability to find it in all of the clutter with all of the other things going on is quite limited. We are finding it a very difficult problem to shoot down an AWACS in our offensive programs. It is a great technical requirement.

General JONES. That is true. We are talking about western Europe.

Senator JEPSEN. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the threats to Saudi Arabia from Iran, Iraq, South Yemen, and the Soviet Union. Isn't it true that the Saudis will, and you have pretty much answered this but I want to get it again for the record, isn't it true that the Saudis will be unable to defend themselves against attack from any of these countries regardless if they have the arms package or not?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, Saudi Arabia, as I said, is a country with very long borders, very valuable assets and small defensive resources and it's going to take assistance to defend them against any kind of concerted external attack and I very much hope we would join in the assistance that is required to do that.

But there's no question either that at the moment, with respect, for example, to the points we went into earlier, that against the Israeli Air Force or Army the balance is heavily in favor of the Israelis. But as far as external attack on Saudi Arabia from any of

the countries you've mentioned with perhaps the exception of South Yemen, yes, it would take a concerted effort and this would be a part of that, a very vital part of it.

Senator JEPSEN. Mr. Secretary, early on we have been advised here we want to stay with the military aspects of this. However, the State Department makes remarks about technology in the military and the military makes remarks about the political aspects and so on of this.

I would just ask, in your opinion, does the fact that the Saudis have played a major role in financing the Syrians in Lebanon coincide with the U.S. interests?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, I don't know how much the Saudis have financed them, but the fact that that is important in my mind is that the Saudi Government played a major role in insuring that a conflict did not break out a few months ago and they played a major role in persuading the Syrian Government not to take steps that it was very close to being prepared to take.

And I think the Saudis have been a very important influence in maintaining peace in that very volatile region. I think it is vital that we continue to develop and maintain the kind of relationship with them that General Kelley described a moment ago that will enable us to perhaps have an even greater effect in bringing peace to that region.

One of the President's great hopes is that he would be able to work out with the Saudi Arabians and Israelis and others the kind of relationship that is starting to develop and has developed to a very considerable extent between Egypt and Israel, relationships that people a few years didn't even think were possible.

Since we have moved into that area of the discussion, I think that kind of consideration is enormously important and I think it would be a very considerable loss should this be rejected.

Senator JEPSEN. Well, we have heard a lot of reasons why the Saudis acted to protect Western interest and I think I concur with your remarks without minimizing the importance of these. I just think we should look at the other side of the coin.

Do the Saudis support the Camp David accords?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, I think that they would have to speak for themselves on that at this point. I have heard all kinds of different reports back and forth. You hear that the Saudi Government was very upset with Egypt at the time of that accord and so on.

But the information I have is that those countries—Egypt and Saudi Arabia—are working much more closely together and I think that, given time, you will get an opportunity, if this sale is not rejected and the relationships poisoned thereby, I think you will have an opportunity to bring together a lot of countries that have been at sword points for years and centuries. And that is an initiative which should not be lightly tossed away.

Senator JEPSEN. I agree. But on the other side of the coin, and this is military, do the Saudis permit Soviet overflights?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Soviet overflights? The Saudis?

Senator JEPSEN. Yes.

Secretary WEINBERGER. No, sir, not to my knowledge.

Senator JEPSEN. If I can have a little more time, I would like to ask, Mr. Secretary or General Jones, when do you expect the Soviets to have a system comparable to the AWACS? Now you alluded to that, Mr. Secretary. I have information that their IL-76, their NATO code name Candid, AWACS version that is under development now is going to be out sometime in 1983 or 1984. Is that correct?

General JONES. I think we would rather categorize it, Senator Jepsen, as before we deliver the AWACS rather than get into specifics of the intelligence estimate.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Probably before 1985.

Senator JEPSEN. Well, do they have anything that can in any way compare to the AWACS at this present time in operation?

General JONES. No.

Senator JEPSEN. No?

General JONES. They've got an AWACS-type aircraft that is an over-water type, but nothing to compare with our AWACS or E-2C.

Senator JEPSEN. Their aircraft is virtually useless over land, is that correct?

General JONES. The current airplane is, yes.

Senator JEPSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Hart?

Senator HART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, where did the idea for the sale originate?

Secretary WEINBERGER. To the best of my knowledge it originated with Saudi Arabia.

Senator HART. Is that your understanding also, General Jones?

General JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator HART. So you are both prepared to state categorically that the idea for the Saudis to purchase this aircraft did not originate in our Government or from the U.S. Air Force?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Certainly that's not my understanding, but you will have to understand, Senator, that my ability to testify on this date from about January 1981.

Senator HART. General?

General JONES. Senator, to my knowledge—and I went through it earlier—I don't believe you were here when I went through the sequence of events—

Senator HART. I was here and it was very vague. You said that in 1979 or 1980 the Saudis requested this. What I would like to know is whose idea it was.

General JONES. In February 1980 they made the request that we sell. I know of no—and I'm trying to recall any discussions or anything else—I know of no initiative on our side to persuade the Saudis to buy the airplane.

Senator HART. Well, leaving "persuaded" aside, as far as you know no member of the U.S. arms sales team offered the possibility to the Saudis that this might be one system they might want to consider, or something of that sort?

General JONES. I cannot vouch for what everybody said over the time period. I think it is quite evident after March 1979 when we deployed two AWACS to Saudi Arabia that the AWACS or an airborne early warning airplane was essential to the defense of Saudi Arabia and particularly the oil fields.

So I think it was an evident fact. But, to the best of my knowledge, the specific initiative was the Saudis', for them to purchase the airplane. We were interested in having U.S. AWACS aircraft in Saudi Arabia and that was one of the reasons they were deployed in March 1979 and one of the reasons, in October 1980.

But to the best of my knowledge it wasn't our people out trying to sell the AWACS to Saudi Arabia, to reduce the price of U.S. Air Force AWACS or whatever. I cannot vouch for everybody in the Defense Department, but to the best of my knowledge.

Senator HART. General, let me ask you a military question—first of all a factual one. How many tactical aircraft will the Saudis have when they have their full complement of F-15's, 60?

General JONES. They will have 60 total aircraft in-country, but a substantial number of those will be used in training.

Senator HART. And what other type of aircraft will they have, F-5's?

General JONES. They have some F-5's. They have some Lightnings. Those would be the fighter type aircraft.

Senator HART. All right now, we talked about the highest threat being the Soviets, to use Senator Nunn's and General Kelley's terms. If you were a Soviet air force general and you were going to attack the Saudi oil fields, how many tactical aircraft would you commit to that purpose?

General JONES. Senator, if I were the Soviets I wouldn't attack the Saudi oilfields. What I would want to do is to try to gain control of Saudi Arabia and the oil and rather than try to destroy the oil I would try to take control one way or the other, invasion or whatever, using air power.

Senator HART. How many aircraft would you commit for purposes of invasion?

General JONES. I probably couldn't commit as many as I would like because it is a long way from the Soviet Union, quite a few hundred miles down into the region. But it would be a substantial number.

Senator HART. More than 60?

General JONES. Oh, yes, more than 60.

Senator HART. Well, the whole situation is obvious, General. First of all, there are some of us who believe that maybe the highest threat is the Soviets, but the most likely threat is not the Soviets. It is internal disruption and insurrection, revolution, whatever. The same thing happened to the Shah, the same thing is happening in a lot of those countries. And AWACS is not going to solve that problem. It is not even going to come close.

But if the threat turned out to be from the Soviets, even with AWACS—first of all, I would parenthetically like to question a 2-to-4 hour break that I think Secretary Weinberger said earlier.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, I am glad you corrected that. That is not correct and I wanted to correct the record at an appropriate time for that. I was giving much too long a period of time. It is not 2 hours. It is a much shorter period of time.

Senator HART. All right. But in any case, General, realistically, even with AWACS, can the Saudis do anything substantial to counter a Soviet threat?

General JONES. As I stated earlier, Senator Hart, the Saudis alone, with the AWACS and 60 F-15's could not cope with a concerted major Soviet attack on Saudi Arabia and would need assistance in that regard.

There are, I think, other threats than Soviet or internal subversion. The latter one, to me, is not a high probability. I would not characterize it as so. I think the most likely event is some nation in the region—maybe the PDRY—taking some action. We can't tell what is happening in Iran, some limited action from Iran across the Persian Gulf. I think those things are more likely.

But clearly the Soviet Union has a capability with air to overwhelm Saudi Arabia regardless of what Saudi Arabia does.

Senator HART. So if you are of the view that the most difficult problem the Saudis face is internal political stability, the AWACS doesn't help. If you are concerned about the Soviet threat, then the AWACS is not going to cure that either.

General JONES. Oh, it helps tremendously, Senator Hart, to have AWACS there. Now we're not just talking about AWACS. We're talking about having an integrated air defense network in Saudi Arabia and an AWACS that is operating and interoperating with the ground entry points which can be expanded very rapidly if an immediate, imminent Soviet threat emerges.

Senator HART. And an overwhelming threat eventually. I mean, the Soviets are not going to try to take over that region without committing enough forces to accomplish that. Certainly 60 aircraft are not going to make the difference.

General JONES. No, but starting with the air defense capability that is projected for Saudi Arabia and immediately building up to cope with the Soviet threat is much easier than not having that capability to start with.

Senator HART. Finally, Mr. Secretary—and I understand this all began before your watch, so maybe General Jones should comment—I was again amazed, as others were, to find out from the slide presentation the colonel presented how inadequate these F-15's are without that enhancement. Having gone through that whole debate, having voted against the 1978 sale on the grounds that the representations being made at that time were clearly not accurate, we are now told here that without the enhancements contained in this package, the F-15's really cannot do the job.

That, I should point out, is almost directly contrary to the entire record of just 3 years ago. General Jones, if you would like to comment on this.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Let me just say briefly, Senator, that one of the things I cannot be responsible for is what happened prior to January or representations that were made then.

I did first hear about the Saudi request for the AWACS and the enhancement package in December of 1980 and it was very strongly supported by the prior administration. And after examination it seemed to me something that we should support too and we are.

But as far as the plane is concerned, it is a capable fighter plane. It is important for its range to be enhanced and it is important for the things that the United States uses with it to make it a more capable fighter plane be added because it is equally important for that region to have this kind of capability as it is for ourselves.

So what we are talking about is not an inadequate plane. What we are talking about is a more adequate plane given the acceptance of the assumption, which I certainly accept, that that kind of plane is necessary for the defense of that region.

General JONES. Senator Hart, just to add a point, it is a much different circumstance now than in 1978. In 1978, to the east Saudi Arabia had a country—there was a country that was friendly to the West—Iran—and we weren't concerned about a threat or major threat from that direction and Dhahran wasn't critical. And now Dhahran is very much exposed and much more heavily dependent on the rear bases in Saudi Arabia to handle any threat to the oilfields.

So it makes a much different geographical situation with Iran now not friendly to the West.

Senator HART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Quayle?

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, do you think the sale will go through without any modifications?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, I have long ago given up predicting what will happen in Congress or, indeed, among the electorate.

Senator QUAYLE. What kind of convincing evidence—let me rephrase that. Do you think that the administration is convinced that there is going to have to be some modification or compromise in order to gain the necessary votes?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I wouldn't be speaking for the administration on that, Senator. I just don't know. My own feeling is that the sale, as proposed to you, is of vital importance. I think it is very necessary that it go through with the concurrence of the Saudi Government and I very much hope that the majority of the Senate will see it that way.

Senator QUAYLE. Fifty people have signed the disapproval resolution. Another five have evidently indicated privately that they will go against it. There is probably another four or five that would likely vote against it if there are no changes, and I just want to know what we need to do to convince the administration—you are the Secretary of Defense—that the sale is not going to go through as is.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, I am not saying that there will not be any changes. All I am saying is that at this point I am not able to report to you any proposed changes or anything of that kind. I think the sale as proposed is very much in the national interest of the United States, but this is not to say that I am reporting to you that there are absolutely no changes or anything of that kind. I am saying that it is vital that the sale go through, and go through with the concurrence of the Saudi Government.

Chairman TOWER. If I may suggest to the Senator from Indiana, these are political questions that I am sure we would all like to have the answers to. As a matter of fact, we may be better able to provide the answers than the Secretary, but I would remind members of the committee that we are supposed to address ourselves to the military, technical, and geostrategic aspects of the issue.

Senator QUAYLE. Mr. Chairman, I will try to adhere to the guidelines, and to summarize the things that have been developed here, starting with Senator Jackson on control. People are concerned about the control of the AWACS. There is another paramount theme that runs through many of us, and that is that this enhancement package has been presented as a loyalty test to Saudi Arabia. I'd like to get into the whole quid pro quo issue.

So let me, as we explore compromises, because I think we should, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Secretary, look at some compromises. Let me ask you to critique a compromise, an idea that I personally have, to see the negative and positive sides, because I am convinced—and I believe that if you talk to many other Senators that they will agree—that unless there is a change, this sale is simply not going to go through.

If you are convinced and of the same opinion, to satisfy the control aspect and to get to the so-called loyalty test aspect to Saudi Arabia, what if we would say if, instead of selling five planes to Saudi Arabia, which is the proposed sale, that we would sell three, and that the United States would continue to operate at least three? It is my understanding and according to the testimony it takes four AWACS to have full coverage.

Secretary WEINBERGER. It takes five for full coverage.

Senator QUAYLE. It takes five, five to have full coverage, one is back here, four are over there?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No; it takes five to keep one in constant orbit for even a limited duration, which is the optimum way to use the capability.

Senator QUAYLE. All right, it takes five to have full coverage. to get better cooperation from Saudi Arabia, to have more control, more input and cooperation, what would be the negative sides of the argument against a compromise—and bear in mind that at this time we want the sale to go through and we want to improve our relationship to Saudi Arabia—where instead of selling five AWACS we will sell three, and then by, say, 1988, subject to the approval of the Congress, we could talk about the additional two or three AWACS?

Would you comment on that?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes; I would comment on that, Senator. You were asking a moment ago what was the matter with selling five or what was the matter with selling three? Well, the problem is that it takes two to sell one, and if the Saudis decline on the ground that we do not put restrictions of this kind on our sales to Israel, we do not put restrictions of this kind on our sales to Egypt, we do not put restrictions of this kind on our sales to many, many other countries, and they say we do not want anything to do with the downgrading of our sovereignty that is involved in that kind of an arrangement, we will go elsewhere and buy them.

And then you would be in a situation where they would have virtually the capability that seems to be of concern without any restrictions, without any kind of compromises, without any kind of arrangements of any sort.

For my part I would find it very difficult to blame them for taking that kind of a position should various so-called compromises of this type be offered. This is not to say that it is not perfectly

proper to work out safeguards for the sale of our arms and our material. We do that with other countries. We do that with Israel, we do it with a number of countries. but it is to say that there is no basis whatever for applying a totally different standard to Saudi Arabia, given their relationships to us in the past and given the very valuable contribution they have made just recently to preserving peace in that area.

Senator QUAYLE. Mr. Secretary, I do not think we would be placing any additional restrictions, although perhaps we should, by just reducing the sale from five to three planes.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Their military authorities would tell them that five planes are essential to keep one in the air at one time; that three, therefore, would be of very little use; their request, and indeed, their need is for five. This would be a compromise which would serve no purpose whatever but understandably to anger a close and good friend.

Senator QUAYLE. Well, if the alternative is not to have the sale go through, which would be your—

Secretary WEINBERGER. I would not want to start guessing in that kind of a game, Senator, because I do not think it is very profitable for any purpose. It is all hypothetical anyway. This is not based on a kind of a numbers game or trying to cut an offer down the middle or anything of the kind. It is based on military necessity, and the military necessity is that given the assumption that the AWACS capability is necessary in that part of the world for Saudi Arabia, then you do not want to sell them half a plane. You want to sell them enough so that they can keep one in the air 24 hours on continuous patrol for at least a limited period. That, plus the other parts of the enhancement package, is what they have concluded they need.

Senator QUAYLE. Mr. Secretary, in all due respect, if we want to see the sale go through for AWACS, it is going to have to be changed.

You want to take the position that it is not going to be changed, that we should not have it changed, that we should not even be talking about this, and I am just telling you that it is going to be a complete exercise in futility because it is simply not going to be approved unless there are some changes.

I would think it would be incumbent upon people such as yourself to explore some of the technical changes with Saudi Arabia, because if they are going to be an ally of ours—and we want to help them and they want to help us in this predicament that we find ourselves today—and if we want to support the President—and my inclinations are to support the President—we are not going to give carte blanche and automatically support the President. There are going to have to be some modifications.

And so I read in the newspapers about discussions of some modifications. I think we ought to actively explore this. And that is why I raised the question, and just to say Saudi Arabia is going to say “no.” Well, I think that if we want the sale to go through it is that important to us that we actively pursue some options and compromises.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, you are making several assumptions that really are not based on fact. What I am saying is that

this morning I am requested, prepared, and am trying to testify as to the military capabilities of the plane and the military necessities of the sale, I do think it is vital that the sale go through, and I do not think it is at all impossible that other arrangements can be developed. But I am suggesting to you from the point of view of the military necessities and the requirements of Saudi Arabia and ourselves, that selling three instead of five planes is not the kind of arrangement that I think holds any hope in it.

Senator QUAYLE. Mr. Secretary, I think I have gotten the point across and I would hope that there would be talk of compromise at some point.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Surely.

Senator QUAYLE. I mean, there is no alternative. That is the bottom line. If you look at the bottom line, you do not have to ask me, you can ask other Senators if there is any question.

Chairman TOWER. Do you want to ask me?

Senator QUAYLE. Yes; I will ask the chairman, not on my time, if you would like to comment on whether the sale, as is, is going to go through, if you would take a different position than myself.

I would strongly disagree and urge him to join in the process of coming up with some modification and compromise, because it must be done.

Chairman TOWER. Well, Senator, I do not think this is a matter that can be negotiated in a congressional committee. In fact the day-to-day conduct of diplomacy resides in the executive branch and not in the Congress.

Senator EXON?

Senator EXON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

There are several issues which I would like to explore.

First, I would like to ask whether or not any of you believe that it might be wise to separate the two issues, the F-15 enhancements, on one hand, and the AWACS on the other, or do you feel it must go forward as a package?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Personally, Senator, I feel that it is an appropriate and suitable combination of increased capabilities. The previous administration had that view, and I discussed it with them prior to inauguration, I share the view that that is the kind of capability as a whole that is vital to add to that region. General Jones obviously has his point, too.

General JONES. Senator Exon, I think the package is well supported from U.S. national interest, and I would go ahead with it as a package.

Senator EXON. General Kelley?

GENERAL KELLEY. I agree completely.

Senator EXON. Gentlemen, I heard on national television this morning an officer—I did not catch his name—who said that if we did not go ahead with the AWACS sale, the Saudis would be prone to purchase the Nimrod from the British, and that as a result they would have an airplane which would be more of a threat to Israel than the AWACS plane which we were proposing that the Saudis purchase.

Now, I want to ask whether or not you agree with an officer that said that on national television.

And second, I would ask you if, as has been stated around this table this morning, that we are primarily concerned about the security of Saudi Arabia, why would they want an inferior product if their primary interest is their own security?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, I do not think—and I want General Jones to answer this, too, because he has seen the Nimrod, and just as late as yesterday, I believe—I do not know who the officer was, and I did not hear the telecast—I will say parenthetically there has been a lot of general misinformation in all forms of—

Senator EXON. When you say general, do you mean rank or—

Secretary WEINBERGER. No. I do mean sort of rank, too, in a way, but in any event, I did not hear that particular telecast.

I suppose what was meant was that Israel would face a greater threat, not from the Nimrod or its inherent capabilities as opposed to the AWACS, but the fact that it would be sold in all likelihood without any of the kinds of arrangements that Senator Quayle was mentioning a moment ago, or that others have mentioned as being tried to work out in a way that would have in mind the security of all the countries in that region. I think that that must have been what was referred to.

The Nimrod is a good plane. I do not think it is as good a plane as the AWACS, but I think it is a very good plane, and I think it would be important that all of those additional capabilities be surrounded with such arrangements as could be worked out with the security of the whole region in mind.

General JONES. Senator Exon, I would not categorize it as an inferior airplane. In some regards it has less capability, in some areas more capability. It has a number of areas of more advanced technology as a result of being many years later in development. And you could argue the specifics of the details of whether it would be more of a threat to Israel.

I think the overriding consideration is the United States is clearly dedicated to the security of Israel, and it would be in Israel's best interest to have the country that has influence on the airborne early warning platform to be the country that also has a commitment to the security of Israel.

Senator EXON. General Kelley, do you agree?

GENERAL KELLEY. I completely agree, sir.

Senator EXON. Let's get into a matter which has come up on several occasions, and I believe February 1980 seems to be a key date here.

Before I ask the question, I just want to make one thing clear to my colleagues and you gentlemen. This Senator did not object when about three-fourths of the U.S. Senate last summer wrote a letter to President Carter objecting to the F-15 enhancements, because I wanted to listen and hear what the reason for that proposal was. But now it seems to me that I hear a very clear signal that not only was the Carter administration proposing to sell the F-15 enhancements to the Saudis, but indeed, they were also agreeing behind the scenes to furnish some AWACS.

Is that a fair assessment?

You would not know, I do not suppose, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I can only speak as of the period in late December 1980 when the former Secretary and the former Deputy

Secretary of Defense both spoke to me about their support of this package, and I discussed it with them. That was the first time I had had anything that could be remotely called an official discussion of it. General Jones, of course, has been here for many more years.

General JONES. Senator Exon, as I indicated earlier, in late November the Saudis were told by the previous administration that we are favorably disposed to an early and positive decision on the future sale of AWACS.

Senator EXON. I would have to say to you, General, that for one who stuck his neck out to some degree, which I am used to doing, I would not have indicated that I might support the F-15 enhancement sale had I known at that time, as it comes out now that the Carter administration was indeed plotting and planning to also come along with the AWACS sale. I am not sure that that is the best leveling with those of us who are supposed to share some of the decisionmaking duties with whoever is President of the United States.

General JONES. Senator, I know of no desire at that time, or effort, to try to hide what was being considered. It was fairly much public knowledge of the various items requested by the Saudis. I think it was an honest misunderstanding. When people talked about the air defense package, they equated that with F-15 enhancements and the air defense package included AWACS.

Senator EXON. All right, let's go into one other matter which I think has direct relationship technically on not only the safety of our advanced systems, but the overall chance of conflict in the area.

As nearly as I have been able to ascertain, there have been little if any detailed discussions or public explanation of arrangement which was made with Prime Minister Begin and President Reagan a couple of weeks ago with regard to arrangements for prepositioning of equipment and other things which have only been hinted at.

Is it possible in this testimony, Mr. Secretary, for you to give us and the public at large some details of what agreements were made between the President and the leader of Israel at the time?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, I cannot give you very many details because there was not any agreement made. There was a lot of discussion on the part of Mr. Begin and General Sharon with respect to various types of assistance or cooperative moves that the Israelis were prepared to offer to the United States in the event of some kind of attack on the region as a whole. Everything that he discussed he emphasized—both of them emphasized in their opening statements were in connection with possible attacks on the region as a whole.

I asked once specifically did that mean a Soviet threat, and the answer was: Of course.

What was discussed was the possibility of prepositioning some supplies and medical facilities, utilization of Israeli hospital facilities, prepositioning of troops, aerial cover, all of these things far down the road in some kind of a contingency aspect. I mention them in an open hearing because I have read about them in the newspaper, but I have read about them in the form that some kind of agreement was entered into, whereas what was actually taking

place was a discussion of a number of suggestions the Israelis were making as to ways in which the defense of the whole region could be enhanced.

Senator EXON. Was that tied in, Mr. Secretary, with failure or success of the administration's proposal to sell the F-15 enhancements and the AWACS to Saudi Arabia?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No. General Sharon and Prime Minister Begin raised the matter independently of any other discussions, and did link their offers to anything of the kind.

Senator EXON. Thank you.

No further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Denton?

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This question has been characterized as one constituting a test of loyalty to Saudi Arabia, a question of whether there is too much technology loss being risked, whether this poses too great a threat to Israel, whether or not the equipment—and this is the opposite argument of the technology loss—is so outmoded as to represent a farse, crass on our part and stupid on the Saudis' part, and the characterization has also been made to the Secretary and the Chairman and General Kelley, that this sale will be disapproved unless you change the agreement as it now stands.

I would implore my colleagues, knowing of their depth of interest in this country's security and of their expertise on this committee, and the colleagues in the Senate as a whole, to keep open minds until they get more facts. I believe we have prepositioned ourselves with more thrust than rudder, as we used to say in aviation, with more determination than information. Many have already taken positions that I think should be subject to change as we learn more.

This is one field in which I happen to have had personal involvement for a number of years. I tested both the aircraft for the Air Force and the Navy in the original AWACS configuration represented by the RC-121D and the WB-2. It so happened that I had had so much experience in the Navy testing program that I had a jump on everybody and was assigned to the Air Force test when the Air Force encountered problems that the Navy had not. An Air Force general assigned me the job of redoing the Air Force's evaluation, which turned out successful, all because I had a couple of good technicians and a lot of previous experience, no special smarts.

So I do know something about the technology involved, about whether it is outmoded, what it can do and what it cannot do. Consequently, I find some of the questions, although extremely well intended, indicating the need for further information, such as confusing radar jamming with communications jamming, the dichotomy between technology loss and outmoded technology, that sort of thing. I hope we will be open minded as we address this.

I yield to no one in my regard for Israel as a staunch ally, a friend to whom we have undying commitments, but I have, as some of the gentlemen at the table in front of us, witnessed what I considered to be a failure over a period of years to perceive accurately from the political point of view certain strategic situations in which we have come out grave losers.

I do not mean to say that I or any of the military have not made errors, too. I am saying that the political perception and the failure to deal with it properly politically resulted in many of these issues going down the drain. I refer to after the Cuban missile crisis, which I think we handled extremely well. Specifically, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, many parts of Africa, and Iran, and I do not blame any of these on any of the gentlemen or what they represent in front of this table; I blame it on us. I think the Executive usually knew what the initiative was that should be applied, and in spite of inconsistencies, apparent inconsistencies such as one agreement 2 years ago and now we are coming on with the AWACS, the fact is that the security problem confronting the United States is the No. 1 issue. It is not loyalty to the United States, because all of us are loyal to the United States, but it is a clarity of perception regarding what is in our national interests, and I do not mean just partially as was the case in Vietnam. I mean absolutely as in the case with the oilfields in Saudi Arabia wherein our very way of life and the very existence of the rest of the democratic nations in Europe, Japan, and so forth would actually go down the drain.

We have a vital national interest here. It has both diplomatic and military proportions of the highest order. I beg my colleagues to desist from an insistence that they will not change positions, because they do not have all the information as yet.

The oil in Saudi Arabia is something we cannot do without. I am in no way suggesting that we bargain away our interest in the oil in Saudi Arabia for our integrity with respect to our relationship with Israel. I believe this arrangement is in the long range security and economic interests of Israel.

The direness of the military consequences of this to us could be phrased as follows: We are now playing desperate catchup ball in an area where our vital interests are involved, and we have not even come up with an idea or a policy much less a commitment as to how to deal with it. That is why General Kelley is sitting here, Rapid Deployment Force, but we do not have, as I see it, even the men for that. We do not have a consensus of perspective out there in the United States among the public, nor here in Congress, about why that force must come into being.

We are dependent on Mideast oil. We have no specific plan or policy to counter a military cutoff of that oil, Soviet inspired or otherwise. We cannot launch ICBM's against the Soviet Union because of that. We simply die on the vine because General Kelley cannot land on a hostile shore in the eastern Mediterranean with any reasonable chance of success.

In this situation, with the typical defensive positions, the Khyber Pass, areas like that where 1 man can defend against 40, it is absolutely essential that we develop some kind of means of establishing not a "firstest with the mostest" but at least a "firstest" on that landmass over there, and Saudi Arabia is one of the keys to that. Israel is another. And they both recognize that. And we can make arrangements with both which are unilateral on the one hand and bilateral on the other that succeed in promoting our mutual interests.

Aside from that, I agree 100 percent with the validity of our President and our Secretary of State in proceeding toward that

which personally I have been advocating for about 7 years: The development of a consensus among the Arab, Israeli, and Christian nations in that area. We need to develop an awareness that the U.S.S.R. is such a threat to them that it should transcend the longstanding grievances that they feel one toward the other. I believe that the development of this consensus has made progress, as Secretary Weinberger mentioned. I believe not to continue in that direction would be a critical error on our part.

The failure to honor this agreement at this point would represent a lack of awareness on our part. I think the Secretary dwelt on the positive aspects with regard to the United States, but I would ask this question: Is it now in the agreement that the AWACS which they would own and use would or would not relay to USN ships, E-2C's, and on to the Task Force 70 carriers?

Is that a hope or is that a fact within the deal?

General JONES. We intend to continue that relay, and we have had no indication from the Saudis that they would not do it because it would be in their interests as well as ours. We do not have a signed agreement that says under every circumstance, ad infinitum, that we will have it there.

Senator DENTON. In other words, pragmatically, it is inevitable that the Saudis would pursue that.

Secretary WEINBERGER. It is happening now, and we have no reason to suppose that they would not want that capability to continue. We certainly would want it to continue.

Senator DENTON. I would strongly recommend that if my colleagues have not looked at the means which can be set up, AWACS to USN ships, to E-2C's, on back to Task Force 70 carriers for substantial intervention in the event of an air attack against those airfields, there is an immediate military advantage. In the long term this cooperation serves as a foundation to the establishment of some kind of commitment and confluence of policy over there. I see this arrangement as in our national interest, in the Saudis' national interest, in Israel's national interest, and an extremely important matter in which I hope my colleagues will remain receptive to further information.

Thank you.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Levin?

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I first of all would hope that colleagues who have taken a position to support of this sale would likewise keep an open mind in terms of additional information which I am sure will be supplied to this committee by people who oppose this sale, and I trust the committee will be listening to such people. But that is a two-way street, and I would agree that all of us should make the best assessment of this policy as we can.

First, I want to ask the Secretary relative to statements that he made which I believe seriously downgrade the need to protect our sensitive equipment.

Mr. Secretary, you said, for instance, earlier this morning that we cannot be guided in sales of sensitive equipment by being constantly worried about whether or not it will fall into enemy hands. Those are your words. You also said if the fears of this were

carried to their logical extreme, we would not sell anything to anybody.

First, I would like to ask you whether or not it is not true that there is classified equipment aboard the AWACS plane, and if so, would you identify that equipment?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, Senator, there can be classified equipment put aboard it, or there can be classified equipment that is not aboard it. The degrees of classification vary, and there is an ability to put in or take out various pieces of equipment, some of them of great importance, all of them, really, of great importance to the United States.

My statements were simply not that we should not take every precaution to prevent the possibility of any of our equipment or any of our technology falling into Soviet or unfriendly hands, but my statement was also to the effect that if that is the sole consideration, and if we demand 100 percent guarantees that anything we have will not fall into enemy hands, then we are put in the position of not really being able to place it in any country, and we have even had some losses from within continental United States.

Senator LEVIN. Well, I will let your statements stand for themselves.

But is it not true that you intend, if this sale is approved, to sell classified equipment on the AWACS planes to the Saudis?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Some classified equipment would be sold with it.

Senator LEVIN. Would you identify that classified equipment briefly?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I will in closed session. I will not here.

Chairman TOWER. I do not mean to intervene, but I do not think we should ask the Secretary to answer that in open session. I can guarantee that you will get an answer to his question in a closed session. That should be for the committee's classified record.

Senator LEVIN. That was provided to us over the telephone from the Pentagon by lines that are unprotected.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, Senator, I am sure we all make mistakes, and we all try to err on the side of being as secure as possible, and if you have had some conversations about classified matters over nonsecure lines with Pentagon people, we will have to make our instructions to them somewhat more explicit. But we do make every effort to safeguard that classified equipment and classified information. And we will do that under any circumstances. My only point earlier was that if you follow these procedures that you are talking about, nothing could ever be sold to anybody, and that would be very much worse for our national security.

Senator LEVIN. Do we have a policy, Mr. Secretary, relative to the sale of classified military information and hardware with foreign governments which is known as the national disclosure policy?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. And under this policy is there not an Interagency Civilian-Military National Disclosure Policy Committee which is set up to implement it?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. And is it not true that exceptions to the policy which are set forth are normally considered and decided by that committee?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, normally they are, however there are exceptions to that exception, Senator.

Senator LEVIN. I understand, but I said normally, is it not true that—

Secretary WEINBERGER. I do not know that I would characterize any of the practices as normal. There are provisions for some exceptions. There are provisions for actions outside that particular exception and outside that particular committee.

Senator LEVIN. Would you acknowledge that usually, the great, vast majority of such sales are handled by said committee?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No; only those that require approval of an exception to policy. The whole point of having the exception is that there are exceptional circumstances, and that was the situation with this sale.

Senator LEVIN. Well, was there an exception needed to the national disclosure policy for the sale of the AIM-9L's to the Saudis, whether it was to be granted by that committee or yourself? Was there an exception required to the national disclosure policy for that sale that was—

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, there was an exception made, yes, Senator.

Senator LEVIN. So that presumes there was one needed.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. And that exception to our national disclosure policy was made by the committee or by you?

Secretary WEINBERGER. It was made by the President of the United States.

Senator LEVIN. By the President, all right.

Secretary WEINBERGER. On recommendation from me.

Senator LEVIN. Without getting into what items are classified, would you agree that there are also classified systems on the AIM-9L?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. And would you agree with the letter which was received by Congressman Lantos from some F-15's pilots that those AIM-9L missiles—and now I am quoting them—the pilots wrote:

We are at a user level and can attest that the AIM-9L thrust the American fighter pilot a very large step ahead in air combat over any other military force. The AIM-9L is superior because it is a point and shoot weapon with excellent probabilities of success. The AIM-9L is so superior that it gives the American fighter pilot a believable chance of survival when confronted with the overwhelming numbers of Soviet aircraft we must face.

Would you agree with that assessment by those user pilots?

General JONES. Senator, as I indicated earlier that in talking to people that have this concern I did not talk to these specific individuals. I do not agree with them in the context of what the Soviets could do. As I said, the image is they would immediately get their hands on a large number and could use them against us. Even if they got hold of the missiles, it would be very difficult for them to use those specific missiles. They will not be provided to Saudi Arabia for a number of years. The Soviets are making good progress in comparable missiles.

So when you talk about the difficulties to the Soviet Union, most understand the problem and their concerns are lessened.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Let me answer, if I could, Senator, also, from a nontechnical point of view. I think it is an exceptionally good and valuable weapon, and I think we want it where it will do the most good for us under the proper safeguards, and I think that this sale to Saudi Arabia constitutes full qualification under both fronts.)

Senator LEVIN. All right.

Now, we are going to be asking you either in executive session or for a written answer the question about what equipment on that AWACS plane is secret, is classified, and I am not going to pursue that because of the chairman's comments.

But my question is slightly different.

If in fact the radar, including its computer, is classified, if that is your answer—and each of us on this committee will read your answer or hear it at a later time—would you think it would be fair to describe the radar as follows, as you did in your testimony? The radar is mid-1960's pulse doppler textbook technology. A comparable computer is available commercially.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I think that is a fair statement, but I think that the combinations and the additional things that are available on the plane make it very, very valuable. But there have been considerable questions raised as to the radar specifically, and a lot of misinformation about it.

Senator LEVIN. I understand. And you would think that would be a fair answer—

Secretary WEINBERGER. May I finish, Senator?

Senator LEVIN. You would think that would be a fair answer even if it turns out that you tell us in executive session that that same radar which you call mid-1960's technology, and the comparable computers available in Radio Shack, you think that would be a fair answer even if it turns out that these are classified materiel?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, let me complete the answer to the previous question, and then I will answer that one.

The simple fact is that the particular radar involved is of the kind correctly described in my statement. There are a great many other things on the plane, and there are a great many other things that in combination together make it an extremely valuable and important instrument.

But there has been a great deal of misinformation in the last few weeks about the vital necessity of this particular radar that is used on the plane, and I think it was important, and it is essential, and so far as I know it is correct to describe the radar as I have described it.

And in executive session or in classified answers to any questions you may have, we will be glad to elaborate on some of the additional equipment that is there on the plane and would be intended to be sold.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

You made a statement earlier, Mr. Secretary, that the Saudis recognize and accept the need for special safeguards in this case. Consequently, they have agreed to extensive, jointly planned and

monitored security arrangements that satisfy stringent U.S. requirements for safeguarding our equipment.)

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. Have you actually seen those agreements with your own eyes?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I have seen a lot of them, and a lot of them are of the same general kinds that we apply to other nations such as Israel, Egypt, and others when they buy our equipment.

Senator LEVIN. No; you were talking about special safeguards in this case.

Have you seen the agreements you referred to which embody the special safeguards in this case?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I have seen some drafts of things that I am advised are considered acceptable for the safeguarding of the equipment, yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN. Are these written, signed agreements?

Secretary WEINBERGER. They are not signed because the discussions have not been completed, but there are drafts of clauses that I would consider adequate for the protection and safeguarding of the items that are covered by the sale.

Senator LEVIN. Is there any reason why we should not have signed agreements to make sure there is no mistake this time—

Secretary WEINBERGER. No.

Senator LEVIN [continuing]. Before we finally vote on this?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I do not know to what you have reference when you say make a mistake this time, but the agreements, once they are completed, are documents that so far as I know are available.

Senator LEVIN. Will be available.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Will be available and would be, if they contained classified material, why, they would be so marked and transmitted to you with those protections, but transmitted to you.

Senator LEVIN. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Much has been made of what apparently some seem to think is the internal fragility of the Saudi Arabian Government, and very often the analogy is drawn between the government of the Shah of Iran and the Government of Saudi Arabia. I would like to submit the situations are not analogous, that in fact the government of the royal family in Saudi Arabia is far more firmly institutionalized than was the more autocratic government of the Shah.

Further, the Shah's regime was threatened by Muslim orthodoxy. In fact, that is not the case in Saudi Arabia because the Government of Saudi Arabia is a very orthodox Muslim government.

I would further note that there is a great deal more homogeneity among the native population of Saudi Arabia than there is in the case of Iran; that there is no strong, well-organized and well-disciplined Marxist infrastructure in Saudi Arabia; and that further, the wealth of Saudi Arabia has been, to use an old term in this country, very successfully trickled down to the lesser elements of society.

I would like to ask the Secretary and anybody else that would want to comment, if that is not a fair statement?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I think that is a very fair statement, Mr. Chairman, and I think comparisons with the former Iranian Government are very poorly taken. I also think that we have that example before us, that that did happen, and we have a President of the United States who declares his determination not to let that happen in Saudi Arabia, to the greatest extent and using the full authority of his office to try to prevent it. And that we did not have in Iran, and I think that that is an essential difference.

But I also think the way in which the entire Saudi society has been structured and the way the modernization into the 20th century has come in conjunction with, in cooperation with the religious leaders, and the way in which, as you have correctly pointed out, the homogeneity of the population make very significant differences.

I think we have been dealing with a very strong, very stable, very able government, and I also think that there are—certainly the episode of the Grand Mosque was a surprise, it was an episode. It again taught, a very healthy lesson, and we will see that in connection with some of the protective measures, security measures will have been taken.

Chairman TOWER. Mr. Secretary, much has also been made of the fact that Saudi Arabia does not recognize the Camp David accords.

Is it not true, however, that Saudi Arabia has not rejected the Camp David approach so long as it produces a comprehensive solution?

Secretary WEINBERGER. That is correct, we should also bear in mind that Prince Fahd, the crown prince, presented a plan designed to bring peace to the entire region, as early, I believe, as late as August of this year, that had some features in it that seemed to many to be particularly hopeful, with a full recognition for the security and continued sovereignty of all of the nations of the region, had other elements in it. It is not automatically the agreement that everybody may want to support right now, but it had elements that I thought contained substantial hope for the future stability and peace in the region.

Chairman TOWER. Mr. Secretary, is it true that President Sadat has enthusiastically endorsed the AWACS sale and characterized it as being essential to the peace process in the Middle East?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, that is correct.

Chairman TOWER. General Kelley, would you discuss in more detail how the Saudi AWACS capability would enhance the capability of U.S. military forces in any operations to protect our interests in the region?

General KELLEY. Mr. Chairman, could I answer that in either closed session or provide an answer for the record?

[The information follows:]

AWACS

General KELLEY. If and when U.S. forces did deploy to the Gulf region, the existence of an AWACS-compatible air defense net in Saudi Arabia would greatly facilitate that deployment and enhance the effectiveness of U.S. forces.

We presently have inadequate facilities, maintenance equipment, and spare parts in the Gulf area to support the exercise or deployment of such forces. If, however, the AWACS/F-15 equipment package is approved, the Saudis would be far more

able to provide material support for RDF forces if they were required to assist in their defense.)

It must be constantly remembered that current and projected U.S. airlift and sealift cannot respond in a timely manner to support fully the level of effort required for a major contingency in the region. The development of Saudi capabilities and facilities related to AWACS/F-15 could prove a critical element to our Arabian Gulf strategy.)

Chairman TOWER. We would be delighted to have you provide an answer for the record.

General KELLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. We will put that in the classified record.

Mr. Secretary, if the NATO AWACS aircraft were not owned by NATO, not purchased out of infrastructure funds or NATO funds, would the United States have objected to outright sales to individual NATO member states?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Not that I know of. I certainly would not, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. General Jones, what would your view on that be?

General JONES. It was clear to me that there are many nations in the world that we would have been willing to sell AWACS to including our NATO Allies outside of the Alliance.

Chairman TOWER. Let's talk about the balance of risk a little more.

I think we have to confess that there are some risks involved. Certainly we do not want our equipment to fall into Soviet hands. But, in fact, do we not always take some kind of risk when we transfer sophisticated systems to another country?

In fact, Saudi Arabia does not have diplomatic relations with Moscow.

Secretary WEINBERGER. That is correct.

Chairman TOWER. Which means that Moscow does not maintain the kind of intelligence network in Saudi Arabia that we even find in Western European countries, perhaps even our own.

Secretary WEINBERGER. That is right.

Chairman TOWER. And is it true that actually most information that the Soviets have on American systems has come from sources other than from captured equipment?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Generally that is so, yes, Senator.

Chairman TOWER. General Jones, would you agree with that assessment?

General JONES. I think that is correct, Senator.

Chairman TOWER. Is it not true that aside from Egypt, the only Muslim country that maintains diplomatic relations with Israel is Turkey?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I did not hear the first part.

Chairman TOWER. The only Muslim country that maintains diplomatic relations with Israel, aside from Egypt, is Turkey.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, sir, I believe that is correct. I would want to verify that. I know Turkey does. I believe that is the only one.

Chairman TOWER. There are, of course, obviously some who do not that are very good friends of ours, including some of the black African nations, is that not true?

Secretary WEINBERGER. That is correct.

Chairman TOWER. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that it is essential that we establish military cooperation with Saudi Arabia as a means of bringing not just military stability or military security, but also political stability to the area?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, I do indeed. I think that if the Saudis were viewed by the Soviets or Soviet agent countries as a country that was not supported strongly by a number of people, including ourselves, their position would be more vulnerable, to our enormous disadvantage.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Senator JACKSON?

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I have great respect for your knowledge of history, but I did want to take exception to the contention of homogeneity of the people in Saudi Arabia.

How many Yemenis, Mr. Secretary, are there in Saudi Arabia out of 5 million people?

Chairman TOWER. I said native population.

Senator JACKSON. No, these are not natives. That's my point.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, there are a large number of different populations that come and go and work on the projects there and so on, and there is a Shiite element, but there—

Senator JACKSON. Well, that is religious. I am talking about separate people.

There are over a million Yemenis there. There are over 200,000 Palestinians, and the Bedouin is virtually a minority.

Secretary WEINBERGER. The important point, I think, to bear in mind, Senator, is that the number—I do not—

Chairman TOWER. Wait. Let me clarify that I made a distinction between the native population and the foreign workers that are in Saudi Arabia in rather substantial numbers.

Secretary WEINBERGER. These are a floating population, Senator. They come in and work on particular projects and leave. The Koreans have a large representation from time to time, but the country itself, the people who are under the Government of Saudi Arabia generally speaking has a high degree of homogeneity, much more so than many of the other countries of the mid-East, except, perhaps, Kuwait, which also has a very large number of foreign workers in and out from time to time.

Senator JACKSON. And a very large Russian representation right on their Saudi border.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, on their borders, yes.

Senator JACKSON. No; I say they have a very large Russian embassy in Kuwait.

Secretary WEINBERGER. In Kuwait. Yes, they have a large Russian embassy there.

Senator JACKSON. I suggest, Mr. Chairman, we get for the record the actual demographics and how long they have been there and so on, because the Paks have come in recently, and the Koreans, but the Yemenis have been there a long, long time.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Jackson, I believe that has already been provided for the record in a previous briefing.

Senator JACKSON. All right.

Secretary WEINBERGER. It is a little hard to identify—the Yemenis would indicate that they are all the same people. There are a

lot of people from Yemen who are in and out, and I would not know how long any one of them had been there for any length of time.

Senator JACKSON. Well, let's let the experts get that in. I could not let stand the idea that Saudi Arabia's population is fundamentally homogeneous because I do not think that is the case. But let's get the facts in the record.

General Jones, I would like to have you supply for the record all documents, studies, memoranda, recommendations relating to AWACS for Iran. I think the phrase that you have used all the way through here is that you were favorably disposed in support of AWACS for Iran.

I think it is important for this committee to find out actually what went to the Secretary of Defense or to the President, because it does have relevancy in this situation.

If you will supply that information.

[The information follows:]

[The information was not received in time for printing.]

Senator JACKSON. And likewise, I would like to know just exactly what went on during the transition between the Carter administration and Reagan administration.

It is common talk, Mr. Secretary, in this town that you got stuck with a commitment to the Saudis. Well, let's get it all in the record.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I will be glad to tell you right now, Senator. I had two or three conversations with Secretary Brown, including one from Tokyo asking if I would meet with Secretary Claytor, which I was glad to do. I met with Secretary Brown when he returned. There was never the slightest doubt as to their strong support, and the reasons for their strong support of this entire package.

Senator JACKSON. You mean AWACS.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I mean everthing. I mean the whole package.

Senator JACKSON. When was this?

Secretary WEINBERGER. It was in mid-December and early January.

Senator JACKSON. I was having trouble finding out myself about it, and I want to say to you that I was briefed by the State Department in February, at their request, and I asked about AWACS and they said it is in no way being considered. That was on February 26.

Secretary WEINBERGER. You asked me about the way in which I became familiar with it during the transition period.

Senator JACKSON. And beyond? When did you come to the conclusion in your own mind that it ought to be recommended to the President?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Sometime between January 20 when I had access to all the materials. I do not remember the precise date it was recommended to the President, but it was in February, I believe, in early February.

I think one point should be very clear in the record, and that is there was never the slightest disagreement by any members within the administration of the importance of this package being sold to

Saudi Arabia. There was no disagreement about that at all. I understand some of the common wisdom in this town. I understand some of the newspaper articles. I have to tell you, sir, they are wrong.

Senator JACKSON. Well, may I tell you what is right, though?

In February when they came up I asked specifically about AWACS, and I was told it is not under consideration.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Did you talk to Secretary Haig?

Senator JACKSON. No, sir, he sent these people up.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, I talked to Secretary Haig, and I know there was never any doubt about the importance—

Senator JACKSON. You can ask Secretary Buckley. He came up. I did not ask for the briefing.

Secretary WEINBERGER. There was never any doubt as to the recommendations that went to the President, nor was there any dispute. There were differences of agreement with respect to some of the timing or some of the very technical aspects of the submission, but there was never any doubt about the idea that this sale as a whole was in the vital interests of the United States, should be recommended to the President, was recommended to the President.

Senator JACKSON. But let us get the facts in here because what you are saying is, I assume, that the State Department knew at all times what was going on here.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, I certainly assume so.

Senator JACKSON. Was Secretary Haig briefed all during this period?

Secretary WEINBERGER. To the best of my knowledge. He and I discussed it, and there was never any disagreement about anything except one portion of one part of the timing of the actual submission.

Senator JACKSON. But do you not agree that it is a little bit unique having a request for a briefing come from the State Department—I did not ask for it—saying that I ought to be briefed on it and saying AWACS was not under consideration.

You see, let me just say why we are in this confusion.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I am not familiar with that aspect of it at all.

Senator JACKSON. Well, I gave you the date and I gave you the time.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I am not disputing. I am just saying I am not familiar.

Senator JACKSON. Well, look, what really happened here is that the administration violated the fundamental Arthur Vandenberg rule. Arthur Vandenberg, as you recall, in the 80th Congress, laid the rule down. He said we Republicans want to be in on the takeoffs, not just the crash landings.

Why was the Congress, knowing the history of all of this, not brought into it? I understand that even the majority leader on the Republican side was not brought in in the Senate until after the fact.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I have no knowledge of that, Senator. To the best of my knowledge, it was a matter of common knowledge among a lot of people that the proposal was before the previous administration, and while the proceedings of the National Security

Council are, of course, classified, the National Security action following that action, recommending it to the President, was widely known, and there was never any reason in my mind to question whether anybody else in the administration knew about it at all.

Senator JACKSON. But do you not agree that if there is a lesson to be learned from this, that it would have been wise to consult at least with the majority and minority leaders? That is all I am saying.

Secretary WEINBERGER. My understanding was there had been consultation.

Senator JACKSON. Before the decision was made?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I do not know the timing, sir.

Senator JACKSON. Could you supply that for the record?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We can certainly try to find it out. It will have to come from other sources besides the Defense Department because we followed simply the basic idea that we were asked to give our views to the Council, did give our views, and did give them to the President.

Senator JACKSON. You see, the tragedy is that we all want to have AWACS deployed out there, but there was a lot of confusion going on.

Clearly the consultation should have taken place. This was a major matter of foreign policy. Anyone who has been around here knew or should have known that.

Secretary WEINBERGER. No question about it.

Senator JACKSON. And I just hate to see this kind of fractious situation develop. But there it is.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, I would just like to remind you most respectfully that assuming all of that is correct, and assuming you are correct—and I never have any problem with that—advance consultation, and I am always for it, but assuming that it was not properly done in this case—and I do not know that it was not—I certainly do not think that that is a reason for not supporting the sale. The sale has independent validity, totally aside from any of those considerations.

Chairman TOWER. Gentlemen, as the risk of being fractious myself, I think we had better limit the return questions to 5 minutes to give everybody an opportunity. If there is time after that, then we can go to a third round.

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, may I make a brief comment on Senator Jackson's request for information on Iran, to clear up any misunderstanding.

He indicated that I used the words "favorably disposed." Those were words with regard to the previous administration's discussions on AWACS to Saudi Arabia, with no equivocation on our part with regard to the recommendation on the sale to Iran. It was supported, and I do not hold those documents. I can work with the Defense Department, but if that clears up—

Senator JACKSON. But you recommended it unequivocally.

General JONES. For Iran there was no question.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Humphrey?

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, what will be the effect on the fleet in the Indian Ocean on the cut proposed in military spending for 1982 through 1984?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We will have to go down to a one-carrier group in the Indian Ocean.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, what do we have now? What magnitude of change does that represent?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I know what we have. I am asking if it is classified.

We maintain between one and two carrier groups in the Indian Ocean at the present time. My problem is, Senator, everything that crosses my desk practically is classified and I never remember what I should be talking about and what I should not in open session.

But the budget cuts you refer to will require us to go down to one carrier group in the Indian Ocean.

Senator HUMPHREY. From two at this time?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. So we are talking about a 50-percent reduction?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, 50 percent, one and a half groups, somewhere between 35 and 50 percent.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is a very substantial decrease in our capability—

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. In the Indian Ocean. This includes the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. So at the very time when we are rattling our sword and threatening to defend with force if necessary our vital interest in that part of the world, we are reducing our naval presence, which is our only meaningful presence in terms of projecting force, by 30 or 40 percent, is that correct?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes.

General JONES. Senator, now that we can go through the Suez Canal with most of our ships, we have much greater flexibility between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. So we are now maintaining about one and a half carrier groups. We will be down to something probably over one in the future in the Indian Ocean, but a quicker capability than we had before to augment.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, are you satisfied with what is proposed?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, I think it is entirely fair to say that if we had additional resources of the type that we initially had planned, which we agreed should be reduced after discussions with the President in view of the economic situation—the original request we put in was the one that we felt was proper, and that would have maintained one and a half carrier groups in that area at all times.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, it sounds to me pretty draconian. Is not the Navy's budget capable of absorbing these cuts without this reduction in forces?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, there is almost no way in which you can make cuts involving \$2 billion in the fiscal year 1982 and

\$5 billion in 1983 without reducing the capabilities of the United States. Now, we believe that what we have with these cuts will enable us to do a very considerably greater amount than we have been able to do before.

But you cannot reduce the budgets of the Defense Department by these amounts, which as I have said on other occasions, it is only in Washington where these would be considered trifling reductions. You cannot reduce them by these amounts without getting into the bone and muscle of the Department's activities.

The way we save money is to try to do things that are authorized for less money. But when you make reductions in outlays and have their consequent reflections in the authorization figures, which are very high, then yes, you are going to reduce the capabilities of the United States. And everybody understands that.

We also have the obligation of trying to restore the economy. Senator HUMPHREY. That is true, that is a valid consideration. But it seems to me, at a time when we have acknowledged so clearly our interests in the Middle East, it is a very serious matter indeed, for us to be reducing our naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and in the Arabian Gulf.

And I think the question which we are considering today ought to be considered in that context, among others.

Secretary WEINBERGER. The sale was considered in that context. The sale adds substantially to the security of the United States, and it is a point I have made repeatedly and it is a point that I am absolutely convinced of. We help ourselves enormously by this sale, and I do not think that—I think that is a primary, and it has to be a major consideration.

Now, in the Indian Ocean, General Jones said we can get back and forth from the Mediterranean a lot more rapidly than we could a few years ago. We have air cover, all the rest. But this capability with the AWACS of being able to give greater warning time and greater information gathering in connection with the flight of aircraft and all is a vitally important addition to our strength, and I think it is very, very necessary that we keep that in mind as we consider this sale and what the rejection of the sale would mean to that capability.

Senator HUMPHREY. I am not necessarily in favor of that. Do not misunderstand me. What I am opposed to is this reduction in our preparedness. I am very upset about that.

General JONES. Senator Humphrey, I would like to clarify that, because I would hate for people to leave the room thinking that we are making major reductions in our presence in the Indian Ocean.

Senator HUMPHREY. Oh, we are not?

General JONES. Let me explain what we are doing. In the budget so far, we are reducing the steaming hours within the Navy. They have been hard pressed, the personnel issues and others, and this kind of problem reduces somewhat the number of ships we have deployed forward. We will still have the flexibility to move them around from time to time. Now, quite frequently, where part of the time we will have only one carrier battle group in the Indian Ocean, sometimes we will put in two. We might put in two a little less often in the future.

Clearly, if there is any tension, we will have the numbers in there. So I would not try to make it as big a change or an implication of change as what might be implied here.

Senator HUMPHREY. I disagree with you. I wish I had more time, but unfortunately my time is up. But you can only go so far with mobility. You cannot substitute mobility entirely for presence on the scene. And certainly aircraft can fly a lot faster from the Soviet Union or from Iran than ships can travel from the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal and so on up the Persian Gulf.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, there are a lot of difficult choices involved in those reductions. We believe we made the ones that reflect the best professional and civilian judgments, and there is no question that without the necessities of the economic aspects of the situation the Soviet threat has not changed, nor have the considerations that led us to submit the original budget have changed.

Senator HUMPHREY. I do not fault your motives. I am sure you have done your best. But I do want the American people to know, while they are hearing these cries for further cuts, what the practical effects are. We are stretched to the breaking point today, especially with regard to the Navy.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I agree with you completely and I think it is the height of irresponsibility to call for these cuts, up to \$9, \$10 billion in 1982 and consequent additional cuts, without any realization of what that will actually mean in reduction of our forces and our strengths.

Chairman TOWER. I might assure the Senator from New Hampshire that, as a member of the Budget Committee, I will do everything I can do to keep them from being cut more.

Senator Cannon?

Senator CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Jones, when the first enhancement package was talked about, did that include the AWACS? I was talking about the first one after the sale of the F-15's had been approved. That was at the time they asked for the bomb racks, and that was not approved. And my recollection is they did not ask for the AWACS in that package; they asked for bomb racks, which was not approved. They asked for radar, ground radar, as I recall in the northern part of Saudi Arabia; is that correct?

General JONES. To the best of my recollection, Senator Cannon, the AWACS has been in from the start with regard to the enhancement package. There may have been individual items discussed earlier, but to my recollection it has been in from the start.

The bomb racks issue is still being addressed in the sense, as I addressed earlier about their concerns about coping with an invasion. But I believe what it became a package, to the best of my recollection AWACS was in that.

Senator CANNON. I see. but the bomb racks have never been settled upon as being a part of the package, nor the ground-based radar up next to Israel, in the northern part of Saudi Arabia?

General JONES. There are ground-based radars in the package. It is part of the radar package.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Those are used in conjunction.

Senator CANNON. Pardon?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Those are to be used in conjunction with the AWACS.

Senator CANNON. But that was not the ground-based radar system up near the Israeli border, up in the northern part of Saudi Arabia, as was originally requested; isn't that correct?

General JONES. There are two types of radar being provided, Senator Cannon, under two controls. One is for air traffic control, civilian, and one military. And because of the very limited range of the ground radars, a deployment on the western and northwestern part of Saudi Arabia would not pose any threat to Israel. So I would see no problem with the deployment of radar.

Senator CANNON. The only point I was trying to get at, was there not a request for the Saudis for ground-based radar up in the northern part of Saudi Arabia up near the Israeli border, and that request has not been approved?

General JONES. I know of no separate requests for radars for that area. It is not necessarily excluded from the provision of the broader ground-radar network. In fact, I think it would be included in the ground-radar network of Saudi Arabia for some ground radars in west and northwest Saudi Arabia as a part of the overall package. But as a separate request I do not recall any for radars for the northwest.

Secretary WEINBERGER. There was nothing of that kind ever discussed with me by Secretary Brown and Secretary Claytor, sir.

Senator CANNON. The point I was trying to get at is, the Israelis do have a concern about the possible use of this equipment, along with other equipment, against them. And you pointed out on the map that was shown here how far it was away, how illogical it would be for them to be used to go against Israel.

And you, General Jones, said in response to a question from Senator Byrd that it would be in the best interests of Israel to have this sale go through as well. That statement makes me a little uneasy, in light of a statement here that I have from Sheik Yamani's speech to the Foreign Policy Association in New York on April 24 of this year. It says:

[Sheik Yamani defined the source of the threat to the world as international communism as Israel. He added that Israel is regarded as a definite threat and much worse than the Communist threat. However, Israel is the point from which the Russians infiltrate the Arab world.]

If you are concerned about Israel, would that not make you a little uneasy about the possible use of this equipment in that part of the world?

General JONES: No; because I am aware of the capability of ground radar. The range, even in the northwest, would be so limited that you are talking about sovereign territory, essentially, of Saudi Arabia. (And as I pointed out earlier, I think it would be foolhardy on their part to use AWACS in an offensive way up near Israel, in the sense of looking into Israel and trying to control aircraft in Israel.)

I do not agree with what Yamani said with regard to Israel being a threat and so forth. I do not imply to agree with that. But I do not believe that what he said is any reason for us to reject the sale.

Senator CANNON. I was just pointing out that if that is an attitude that they hold, then this could certainly give the Israelis some cause for concern.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Cohen?

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Senator.

General Kelley, your principal role has now been in developing the Rapid Deployment Force. I was wondering what your military judgment is with respect to Israel's offer to make available its bases to the United States. Would you from a military point of view support that?

General KELLEY. Yes, sir. From a military point of view, the bases in the Sinai, both Etam and Etzion, have certain appeal. They are fully developed, fully mature bases that are in the region.

However, as you are well aware, there are political impediments to any satisfaction of that problem.

Senator COHEN. Aside from whether the sale is approved as written or rejected, would you still make a recommendation from a military point of view that those bases be made available for U.S. presence?

General KELLEY. As the former commander of the Rapid Deployment Task Force, I find those bases to be very appealing, yes, sir, because of their strategic position.

Senator COHEN. And that would be your judgment, irrespective of what takes place with respect to the sale of AWACS?

General KELLEY. That does not hinge at all on any sale of AWACS.

Senator COHEN. Would you agree with that, General Jones?

General JONES. But those will soon be Egyptian air bases, and it is not the Israelis' problem of using those bases. It is the concern of the Egyptians and Sadat.

Senator COHEN. Is there any indication that Sadat would make those available to us?

General JONES. He has indicated availability of other bases, but not those.

Senator COHEN. Have the Saudis made any recommendation to allowing a U.S. land presence in the territory?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Not to my knowledge. They have not been asked and they have not made any suggestion.

Senator COHEN. Mr. Secretary, first I should have indicated in the opening I did not want to be entirely disagreeable. I wanted to compliment you on your Maine tie that you are wearing this morning.

We hear this, we are being evenhanded in the Middle East. If we really want to have an evenhanded policy, why do we not recommend to the Saudis that they have the same thing the Israelis have, the E2-C?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Again it is a matter of the needs, the defensive needs and their requests. We have taken these requests as they have come in and analyzed them on the basis of the needs and measured them against the national security of the United States and reached certain conclusions, and those conclusions are reflected in the recommended sales to the Israelis based on their

requests and the recommended sales to the Saudis based on their requests.

There has never been a request for an AWACS during the time I have been here by the Israelis that has been turned down.

Senator COHEN. Were you aware that the GAO offered some criticism about the proposed sale of AWACS to Iran? One of the criticisms was that we did not fully explore the alternative of E2-C's to the Iranians. That was one of the principal objections.

Secretary WEINBERGER. No; I was not aware of that. I do not know how relevant it is, but I am not aware of it.

Senator COHEN. Relevant in the sense that if a less capable aircraft would service the needs of protecting the oilfields and perhaps if we are looking for not only a military solution but also a political solution.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Again, Senator, it takes two to make a sale.

Senator COHEN. I understand.

Secretary WEINBERGER. We can tell everybody what is best for them, but if they feel that something else is best for them then we analyze that, and if we find that that request is in the best interests of the United States then we recommend it. And that is the process that was followed here by the last administration and by this administration.

Senator COHEN. That is precisely the point I want to make, that we are put in a take it or leave it position by this country that says to us, we either have the AWACS as is, without joint U.S. control, without U.S. presence, as we dictate or determine in our own national interest, or if you do not like this agreement we will turn to the British or we will turn to the Soviet Union.

If the United States does not supply us with the things we want, we will turn to the Soviet Union. That was in the Saudi news agency from January 10, 1980.

Which brings me to a final point. I think, General Jones, you indicated you were surprised that Israel had any concern about the Saudis having AWACS. And I was surprised that you were surprised, from a military point of view.

General JONES. I did not say that, Senator.

Senator COHEN. Would you agree that the Israelis depend a great deal upon the doctrine of preemptive strike for their survival?

General JONES. First, I did not say that I was surprised that they had any concern. I was surprised as to the strength of that concern.

Clearly, the Israelis have relied on preemption.

Senator COHEN. All right. Let us assume the sale were to go through and they have possession not only of the AWACS, but of the upgraded F-15. And you have public statements being issued by the Saudi press agency, we shall not rest until our usurped land is liberated, until the Palestinian people return to their homeland and set up their independent state with Jerusalem as its capital.

Given those sort of statements, do you agree with Israeli concern that their ability to launch a preemptive attack, since they are outnumbered 10 to 1 militarily, 100 million to 3 million by population, that this reduces somewhat at least their ability to move in a preemptive fashion?

General JONES. I think from a preemption standpoint, it does not interfere with their preemption into Syria or Lebanon.

Senator COHEN. But you are assuming with the AWACS, they are going to be up near the oil fields. If they were in any other area—you say it is not realistic, but assuming they were—would that in any way reduce their ability to move preemptively?

General JONES. They would only have to wait a few days after the Saudis decided and to operate on their own up there and risk loss of our support. That capability would deteriorate. Also, in a preemptive attack of a large nature a few more minutes' warning is not going to make all that much difference even if the Saudis were up there and even if they were looking.

Senator COHEN. You do not think a few minutes' warning time makes a difference to Israeli survival?

General JONES. I think a few minutes' warning time under many circumstances is important. I just do not see the Saudis having the AWACS up in that area. The Israelis would know the AWACS was there and if they were going to preempt they could take action against that AWACS.

Senator COHEN. Would that not itself deny them preemptive strike—you are not only telling what the punch is going to be, you are taking out AWACS. It sort of denies you the preemptive strike, does it not?

General JONES. No, I think you could attack and destroy the AWACS without the AWACS ever getting the word out as to what happened. I think we are talking about such remote circumstances of their putting the airplane up there which would have such a serious impact on Saudi Arabian capability, their military capability. If they tried to do something that is against the best interests of the United States they would jeopardize all of our support just to be up there for a very short period.

So if I were the Israelis, I would not worry too much about their doing it. I might take some deceptive measures during that period, but it would degrade Saudi Arabia's military capability very substantially and very quickly.

Senator COHEN. I will stop here, Mr. Chairman. The only problem I have is, suppose that you have exacerbation of the existing situation in Lebanon, that suddenly tensions start to increase. You have the problem with the missiles on the border. The Israelis start to launch some attacks into Lebanon suddenly.

The Arab nations who look at these words that we see about Arab solidarity saying, you know, we need some help; the Israelis just might launch some preemptive strikes up in Lebanon and we need a little help from you, our friend, Saudi Arabia, and this will be a test of your friendship to the Arab cause.

Now, what kind of pressure do you think that will bring to bear on Saudi Arabia, which has not had that capability to date?

General JONES. I am saying, regardless of the pressure, that it is for a very short time period that they could maintain an orbit up in that region. And their military capability in Saudi Arabia would deteriorate quite rapidly during that time period. And I do not think the Saudis would be foolhardy enough to jeopardize their military capability with AWACS and with the other systems.

I could conceive of circumstances where it might even be in the best interests of Israel to have AWACS up there and have that capability degraded.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Exon?

Senator EXON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary and General Jones, I would like to ask this question, which is a key one. I am trying to stay away from a situation, where I might have to vote against giving the President of the United States a "black eye" in international affairs. But I think you picked up the fact that I have some reservations about this proposal.

On August 24 last, the President notified the Senate on an informal basis of the AWACS sale. Prior to that date, had the executive branch proposed U.S. crews to be a part of the AWACS aircraft which might be sold to the Saudis? In other words, what was the specific arrangement, or was there talk of our crews being a part of the planes which would be owned by the Saudis? Or was that question ever raised?

General JONES. I do not recall it having been phrased in exactly that way, Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. How was it?

General JONES. It was clear that the Saudis were talking about their purchase and their operation, with their crews and with no indication of an interest or a willingness to have U.S. crews. We discussed the support arrangements, which will be continuous for the life of the system. But it was clear that providing U.S. crews or crew members aboard Saudi Arabian airplanes at that time was not a viable alternative.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, it was always understood, as General Jones said, that there would be an American presence required on the ground, that there would be a substantial American training requirement, and this was just assumed to take place.

I do not think anybody ever put a year limit on it or anything of that kind. On the other hand, there was never any question at all but that this was to be an outright sale and that title would pass to the Saudi Government and the arrangements that were made, whatever they were, would be those with the consent of the Saudi Government.

Senator EXON. With the suggestions which we are now hearing that the administration might indeed be trying to work out some kind of a compromise whereby some of our personnel would be on the aircraft, do you not think it would have been wise to at least have some attempted understanding with the Saudis back then, rather than now?

General JONES. Senator, I think it was clearly understood then. We do not have American officers aboard the Israeli E2-Cs, which is a smaller version of an AWACS, or with the other E2-Cs around the world possessed by others. It was clear to me that in my judgment our involvement and influence are adequate under the current arrangement, and it is not a threat to Israel.

Senator EXON. Then what you are saying, General, is the present suggestions which have been made by Senator Glenn and others, and with the reports we are hearing that the White House wants some Senators to go to Saudi Arabia to try to work something out,

basically along the lines of some of our people being on the AWACS that they own, that you do not think that is a very smart consideration?

General JONES. Senator, you cannot anticipate what people might do under certain circumstances. The Saudis may or may not agree to some arrangements now that they would not have agreed to before. So I cannot prejudice what may happen.

Senator EXON. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Jepsen?

Senator JEPSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

On April 22, 1974, there was a hearing chaired by Senator Jackson, sitting on this panel at that hearing. The material was brought out that on November 4, 1973, in a meeting between officials of the Arabian-American Oil Co.—that is, Exxon, Standard Oil of California, Mobil, and Texaco—and members of the Saudi Government, and in that meeting those companies were told that under a decision by King Faisal, who is not the same king but the same family, Aramco member companies were ordered to cut off supply of products derived from Saudi oil to U.S. forces stationed around the world.

And according to Business Week this caused a serious clot in the very bloodstream of the American military, needless to say. I need not lecture anyone here on the military consequence of such an oil cutoff.

Mr. Secretary, do you honestly feel that you have any evidence to give that would assure us that in a crisis where Saudi and American interests differ that the Saudis would not order American technical personnel that you are talking about, around the same way they ordered American oil workers in 1973?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, there was a blockade, an embargo at that time, and I do not think anyone was happy with the result. I do not have any guarantees that we might not be similarly treated in any country of the world where we have a presence. I cannot in any honesty make that kind of a guarantee to you. These are part of the risks that we always take when we operate abroad, and it is necessary for us to operate abroad if we want to have in a global sense the forward defense of this country. So there is always a risk that something might happen. I think it is a minimal risk and I think that to the extent we can maintain the kind of good relationships we have had with Saudi Arabia that that risk would be even more minimized.

But if we reject the sale, I would think that we would be in a situation in which we could not predict what kinds of relationships we would have. I think it would be a very unfortunate thing for our own future, for the President's desire to bring peace to that region, if the sale is rejected.

Senator JEPSEN. Mr. Secretary, if there is a coup by forces unfriendly to the United States or if there is a change of personnel in Saudi Arabia, without going into any details, which I am sure you could not do if there were some, what would happen to the AWACS and the AIM-9L's? What plans have been made?

You are asking us to approve carte blanche a sale, turn over ownership of our most advanced technology. Can you tell me, are there—have there been plans made and secured and gone over,

reviewed and put in place, to take care of AWACS and all of this technology in case something went awry?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We do have plans to safeguard American equipment on foreign soil, and we have standard provisions that apply to all of the sales of aircraft and other military weapons. We would certainly want to insure that the safety and security of the planes, missiles, and all of the other things that were sold was preserved.

These matters have been the subject of discussions for a very considerable length of time with the Saudi Government. The arrangements and agreements are not completed. But as I mentioned earlier, there is no question that the agreements of this kind would be signed to preserve and safeguard the equipment itself, and would be, of course, available to the Congress for their full inspection.

Senator JEPSEN. I believe you, and I would just point out, so you know where some of us come from, that knowing that 50 percent of the Saudi workers are Shiites like Khomeini—and sitting on this same committee day after day after day when the Iran situation was unfolding, we were all told, yes, we have got monitoring stations, two of them, top secret and top technology, but we have a plan, they are safe, no problem.

Then one day, after many days of this day after day briefing, they came in and said, whoops, they have out equipment, they have our people, they are holding them for ransom. And that is, for some of us who have some not very long memories, it is just not too long ago that that has happened.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I am not prepared to defend any of those actions, Senator.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Levin?

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to go back for one moment to our national disclosure policy, which sets forth criteria before we disclose to foreign governments our secrets. You indicated that in this case there was an exception required of this policy, presumably because all of the criteria were not met, and you personally recommended that the exception be made to the President.

I am wondering if you could tell me——

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, I wonder if I could elaborate on that for you.

Senator LEVIN. Let me ask a question first.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Surely.

Senator LEVIN. My specific question is—I do not need elaboration. I just want to know which of the criteria required the waiver which you recommended to the President?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I think the national interest of the United States, which is the broad language in which the matter is phrased. Let me run through the facts on it. The exception was granted on March 16 by a record of action that was based upon my recommendation that the decision be made to sell the AIM-9L as part of this package. And in a February 6 memorandum to the President, Secretary Haig and I jointly recommended approval of the sale of the AIM-9L missiles to the President. The President

approved it, and following that approval the record of action was issued.

Senator LEVIN. My specific question was, Which of the criteria was not met so that a waiver was required? That is my question.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I do not have that specific information. I know that at the time there was a very fair consideration to it and a conclusion that the national interest of the United States required it. I can go back and get the documentation and send it to you.

[The information was not received in time for printing.]

Senator LEVIN. Would you supply that to the committee, because it is important which of these criteria. These are public criteria. Criteria one is the disclosure of the secret is consistent with foreign policy. I would presume you would agree that that does not need a waiver.

The second, the military security of the United States permits disclosure. I presume you argue here that that would not require a waiver, that that was met.

The third one, recipient of information will afford substantially the same security protection. That is the one I am interested in.

Maybe the general knows. Is that the one that required the waiver?

General JONES. No.

Secretary WEINBERGER. You keep referring to the term "waiver." I am talking about the method or procedure that was used, and I would not describe that as a waiver. Those criteria were all felt to be met.

Senator LEVIN. Why was an exception required?

Secretary WEINBERGER. If I can just finish. What we were talking about was the procedure used to record the approval, and that procedure, you indicated, sometimes can be done by the National Disclosures Policy Committee and sometimes by the President.

But there was never any question that any of those conditions for the release were not met. It was the procedure by which they were utilized.

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Secretary, are you then telling us that an exception was not needed for approval of this sale, to these criteria? Is that what you are telling us?

Secretary WEINBERGER. What I am telling you is that the conditions necessary were felt to be met and the recommendation for the procedure that was used was made by me and by Secretary Haig to the President and approved by the President.

Senator LEVIN. Would you let us know for the record whether an exception was requested?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Let you know what?

Senator LEVIN. My question was, Was there an exception recommended to the President because these criteria were not all met? It is a simple question, whether or not.

Secretary WEINBERGER. It was not a question of those criteria being met. It was a question of whether or not the particular procedure to record and to take the action to make the release was done, and that is the procedure I was describing.

Senator LEVIN. Would you check back in the records and tell us whether or not an exception—

Secretary WEINBERGER. There are certain other aspects to the transactions that I can put to you in classified material. But there was no question but that the required thresholds for making this kind of a sale were met.

[The classified information is retained in committee files.]

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Secretary, thank you.

My next question relates again to these agreements, because in the words of Secretary Haig, they are so critical to us that he says these agreements, these arrangements, as he put it, the agreements in your testimony are extremely significant, the ones that have been reached in the Saudis.

In his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, he repeated that the transfer arrangements are very, very important, in his words. And I really want to get some more specific understanding from you about these arrangements.

Some you told us were in writing, some were in draft form, some were in discussion stage. Can you tell us precisely which agreements have been signed, which agreements are in draft stage, which agreements you saw, which agreements, when they were signed, by whom? I think if they were so important to us, as you have testified here today, if they were so important as Secretary Haig has testified, I would like to know what all of these agreements are.

Can you just list them for us right now, one by one, which are in writing, which you have seen drafts of, which are in discussion stage, the ones that are in writing, who signed them for the Saudis, when were the signatures?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, you are assuming there are a number of different kinds of agreements. What I am talking about and what I think Secretary Haig is talking about is a general agreement between the countries covering the sale, at the time the sale takes place, of these weapons and of these systems.

Those agreements are in the process of being drafted and they will include a lot of language that is very customary for the sales of all of this equipment, equipment of this type, to other countries. They have not been completed because the sale has not been completed.

At the time that they are, they will be submitted. And I am sure that you will find that they contain very familiar language that was used at the time other sales of this kind are made. But there are not 85 different pieces of paper that set forth all of these different kinds of agreements that you keep mentioning. They are provisions that cover the sale of this equipment.

And you are familiar with the fact that, on the sale of the F-15's to Israel, there are several pages of the contract which govern the conditions that underlie such a sale. That is to say, that they were to be used for self-defensive purposes only and a number of things of that kind. And that is the kind of thing that Secretary Haig is talking about. That is the kind of thing that I was talking about.

They have not been completed because the sale has not yet been finished.

Chairman TOWER. Senator, your time is up.

Senator Denton?

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Jones, from the point of view of a man with great experience at the top of our military organization and with a perspective that would include the psychological military effects, granted that Saudi Arabia is not perfectly stable, it might fall somewhere between the United States and Iran. We would not want to characterize it as unstable as Iran or as stable as ourselves.

On the question of the stability of Saudi Arabia, the good or bad effect of recognizing the technical seizure of classified material, changes in policy regarding oil prices, what they might even do with AWACS, that sort of thing, do you see the agreement, with respect to the AWACS as favorably or unfavorably affecting the future prospects for stability in Saudi Arabia?

General JONES. Senator Denton, there is no question in my mind, I think it will help stability in Saudi Arabia.

Senator DENTON. Help in terms of stability?

General JONES. I am not implying that it is unstable, but I think that it will further not only our relationship with Saudi Arabia, but their internal operations in convincing their people and their other leaders within Saudi Arabia that they do have a reasonable defense capability.

Senator DENTON. Respecting their vulnerability to attack from the south from the Yemens, how would you view the psychological effect of this, the completion of this sale, on the likelihood that there would be a further organized leftist Yemen ambition, or a commitment to pursue an ambition into Saudi Arabia?

General JONES. It was clear in 1979, when the conflict broke out between South Yemen and North Yemen, that the Saudis were very worried that it might spill over into Saudi Arabia, and were very concerned about having particularly an air defense capability against that.

I believe by having the AWACS and the other enhancements, which gives them a good air defense capability, the likelihood of South Yemen moving against Saudi Arabia is much less, and therefore there is greater stability for that reason.

Senator DENTON. If we made this arrangement and also were successful in doing what appears to me to be the other part of a two-pronged approach, namely establishing with Israel a closer bilateral military cooperation, how would you see the deal as affecting Soviet intentions or estimates of their success in that area?

General JONES. Clearly, the better relations we have with the nations of the area and the better capability that they have to provide for defense should impact on the Soviet actions and should provide a greater deterrent to any aggressive action by them.

Senator DENTON. How far have we gone—and I will address this to the three of you. I have not been able to follow what is firm, what has been tried, what has not been tried but is planned with respect to agreements like that with Israel. And a parallel question: Have we had any success with NATO nations in getting a multilateral policy commitment with respect to defense of the oil fields?

General JONES. There is increasing concern within the NATO meetings about the threat to Southwest Asia and the oil. There is no movement as of now for NATO as such to take any military

operations outside of the NATO boundaries. We have had some bilateral discussions, for example, with the British, who have some capability in the region. So I think it is more likely that individual nations will be involved down there, as opposed to NATO as an organization.

We also have told our allies that if we become deeply involved in Southwest Asia that will impact on our capability in Western Europe and they need to take up some of that slack.

Senator DENTON. Well, of course, General Kelley in his former capacity looked at the problem from a joint U.S. perspective. I wonder what your feelings would be, General Kelley, considering the apparent political realities of the next few years, whether it would not be very efficacious to pursue to the degree possible if not a combined organization, at least a policy commitment that would result in a multilateral commitment in that area.

General KELLEY. With Saudi Arabia, Senator?

Senator DENTON. With the NATO nations or any of our allies, including Israel.

General KELLEY. The more help we could get in that regard, the better off we are. I am sure you are probably aware of the fact that the Arabs themselves have just recently formed a council of cooperation. That, hopefully, will bring about some regional cooperation in such things as air defense, which would give them a far more viable military capability and also will develop a cohesiveness which has not been there before.

Yes, I would support, in any way, any outside support that we can get, either in terms of physically, or military capability, or in terms of backfilling, where we could use units that would have otherwise been committed to an arrangement of one sort or another; or in any other way enhancing our capability to project meaningful and rapid power into that area.

Senator DENTON. Mr. Secretary, in view of the self-evident greater dependence of our NATO allies upon that oil are you as Secretary of Defense trying to persuade thinking in that direction? Have they come up with an ante on this?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I am. I am hoping that I will be more persuasive than perhaps I have been in the past. But I think that it is self-evident that they have an enormous interest akin to ours, in the case of some of the nations much greater than ours, because we rely on about 10 percent of our supply from that area.

But I am hopeful that this will become evident and that it will become evident that it is an integral part of the NATO responsibility, of ours as well as other countries. They have problems, as you know, with the NATO obligations, the obligations within the NATO alliance. And there have been a number of people who have pointed in the past and said that the NATO alliance is for those countries only and they should not consider moving outside the area.

But more and more I think the realities of the situation are becoming apparent, and I would be hopeful that in the years ahead they would see the same necessity we do for making—for increasing our capability to defend the oil fields.

And as General Kelley pointed out, it is infinitely easier to defend an area of that kind, which is a difficult assignment at best, in front of the objective than behind it.

Senator DENTON. I will conclude by saying gentlemen, that on the one-on-one contacts I have made with other Senators, I have found them to be justifiably concerned about previous expressions to them about what arrangements would be made in the future. They have made commitments to constituents regarding the qualifications, about why they supported such and such an agreement, and this places them in a very difficult position at this point.

And I would certainly agree with Senator Jackson that some of our great disasters of the last 20 years' history have been due to failure of sufficiently early consultation with Congress, sufficiently candid consultation with Congress.

I do hope we would judge this particular case of this point in time on its own merits and continue to pursue these other initiatives which I will support with enthusiasm.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I fully share your feelings about more and earlier consultation, Senator. I have no problems with that at all.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I just have one question.

Chairman TOWER. Gentlemen, we do have a record vote ongoing on the floor, the Dole motion to table the Melcher amendment on interest rates.

I would yield to Senator Jackson for 1 minute on my time and then I intend to conclude the hearing.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Secretary, as I understand it the Saudis have refused to give us facilities or bases in Saudi Arabia. Is that not a fact?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Sir, they have not been requested. The issue has not arisen.

Senator JACKSON. But have they not made it clear that they would not do that?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Not to me, because the issue has never arisen.

Senator JACKSON. We have no need for it?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We do not know whether we will or not. At the moment we do not, but we have not made any request.

Senator JACKSON. What about Oman?

Secretary WEINBERGER. In Oman we have facilities.

Senator JACKSON. Have they been very cooperative?

Secretary WEINBERGER. They have been very cooperative.

Senator JACKSON. And Mr. Sadat has also offered—I am not saying bases now.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Facilities.

Senator JACKSON. Facilities, is that not correct?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Mr. Sadat has been very cooperative and has offered the use of Ras Banas and other areas.

Senator JACKSON. And the Israelis likewise have offered bases or facilities.

Secretary WEINBERGER. It is, as I mentioned in response to one of the Senators' questions earlier, that is certainly correct, particularly in the last few weeks.

Senator JACKSON. Is there not a need for facilities in Saudi Arabia for American forces?

Secretary WEINBERGER. There may be. We hope there will not be. There has not been any request made by us and there has not been any refusal as a result.

Senator JACKSON. So the inference is that if we request, the Saudis will grant facilities. My information has just been the reverse. They are adamant against it.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I do not have any information, Senator, because we have not made any request. And at the moment we do not have any intention to make a request.

Senator JACKSON. And finally, the relations between Oman, in which the Sultan has been very cooperative, and Saudi Arabia are not good, is that not fair to say?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I would not characterize it that way.

Senator JACKSON. Favorable, good?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We have had a very good relationship with Oman and I am not aware of any permanent problem between Oman and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Senator JACKSON. No real difficulties?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Not that I am aware of.

Senator JACKSON. I just read a long report yesterday that is totally opposite to that—a classified report.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I would be interested in seeing it. I do not have any information of that kind. In fact, I have some information that indicates that there are no major permanent problems between the two.

General JONES. Senator, I might mention one point there. There are more uniformed U.S. military in Saudi Arabia than any other country in the region. That is the only place where we have an operational capability with AWACS.

Senator JACKSON. Well, I know. But I hope that after almost a year now we are getting together some kind of an overall Mideast strategy.

Secretary WEINBERGER. We are doing our best, Senator. From the general's remark, we already have a major presence in Saudi Arabia.

Chairman TOWER. I might submit that the sale of the AWACS is a part of the Mideast strategy. It is an extension of our strategy in the Middle East.

Gentlemen, today's hearing has been, I think, very helpful and a useful illumination of vital issues. I would like to thank the witnesses for their testimony.

The presentations that were made today, in combination with the testimony received by the committee in executive session on Friday, September 25, have led me to the following conclusions: Saudi Arabia has a legitimate requirement for this air defense package. This is not merely a symbol of U.S. reliability, as some opponents of the sale proposal have claimed.

Acquisition of this air defense package, including AWACS aircraft, by Saudi Arabia will have a negligible impact on the Arab-Israeli military balance, which heavily favors Israel. For the foreseeable future, Israel will be capable of defeating any combination of Arab military forces at any level of conflict. In sum, Israeli

objections to the sale must be governed by political and not military considerations.)

(If the sale is approved, the risk of compromise of advanced U.S. military technology is extremely low. The technology of AWACS systems is not sensitive and is not easily exploitable. Moreover, the staunchly anti-Communist, anti-Soviet stance of the Saudi people makes it highly unlikely that events would occur in Saudi Arabia that would provide Soviet access to these systems.)

(The sale of this air defense package, especially AWACS aircraft, to Saudi Arabia will substantially enhance the ability of U.S. military forces to protect American interests in the Persian Gulf region. The United States will benefit from early warning of threats to the vulnerable oilfields, as well as greater coordination of air defense assets in the Persian Gulf region. In addition improved defense cooperation with Saudi Arabia will result.)

This sale is a logical extension of U.S. policy, that holds the Soviets are the principal threat to the security of the region. We are obliged to do all that we can to enhance the capability of indigenous forces to meet that threat.)

The facts that have been placed before the committee on the military and technical issues in my view fully and clearly support the President's sale proposal.

May I ask one final question: What would be the consequences of our being isolated in the Middle East to the extent that Israel remained our only strategic partner?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I think, Senator, it would result in trouble in bringing peace back to the entire region. And I think from a military point of view it would be very unfortunate for the national security of this country. I think it would be unwise and an unhappy position for Israel to be in, too.

The greatest hope for the security and safety of that whole region is a strong and friendly relationship of the United States with all of the countries of that region that are willing to join in. And certainly with the modern Arab States and Israel, it is, I think, essential that we maintain very cordial and very warm and supportive relationships.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And I assume that the generals at your table concur?

General JONES. Yes, sir.

General KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I would like to express our appreciation for your courtesy and patience at this hearing. We have always been so very nicely treated here, and we find this morning not only no exception, but again a great pleasure to have the opportunity to be before you.

Chairman TOWER. I must say, Mr. Secretary, you are very good at these endurance contests.

[Questions with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAM NUNN

Senator NUNN. The administration focuses a great deal on U.S.-Saudi relations in discussions of the sale. What advantages are there for the United States, outside the military arena, in this sale. For instance, what about access to Saudi oil and prices over the mid to long term?

[The answer was not received in time for printing.]

FOUNDATION FOR UNITED STATES-SAUDI COOPERATION

Senator NUNN. The administration discusses the sale as "a positive foundation for more extensive U.S./Saudi cooperation over time". What does this mean and could it include further military sales?

Answer. This sale vividly highlights our commitment to Saudi security by providing the Saudi Arabian Government with a badly needed capability to meet legitimate and serious defense needs. It is also specifically tied to our broader strategy of countering Soviet and Soviet-proxy threats in the region by providing us with an extensive logistics base and support infrastructure in Saudi Arabia which is fully compatible with U.S. needs in the event U.S. forces should be deployed to the region in time of crisis.

These two aspects of the sale form the basis for "more extensive U.S./Saudi cooperation over time". The extensive U.S. involvement in all aspects of this sale program in Saudi Arabia—training, operations, maintenance, and support—for many years to come will of necessity expand and deepen U.S./Saudi security cooperation. The complete and continuous sharing of AWACS and other air defense information by U.S. and Saudi forces in the Persian Gulf/Southwest Asia region will further institutionalize this cooperation.

The fact that this sale demonstrates the credibility of the U.S. as a reliable security partner not only to Saudi Arabia but to other states in the region as well—something that is essential if the Saudis or others in the region are to believe that the benefits of embracing our strategy outweigh the costs—provides the political rationale and impetus for expanded cooperation, not just in the security area but in other areas as well. The Saudi Arabian Government will be able to show its neighbors that the U.S. is willing and able to make significant contributions to both Saudi and regional security needs, that a "special relationship" between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia does in fact exist, and, consequently, that expanded U.S./Saudi cooperations is not just in the interest of the United States but in the interest of Saudi Arabia and other friendly states in the region as well.

Given the expanded cooperation with Saudi Arabia anticipated throughout the security area, further sales of U.S. military equipment, services, and support to the Saudi Arabian Government can be expected in the years ahead.

Senator NUNN. The administration stresses the U.S. influence in use of equipment purchased from the United States. Would the United Kingdom sell the Nimrod, and France the Mirage 2000 and R. 550 missile as replacements "without strings"?

[The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator NUNN. What type of assistance is Saudi Arabia providing directly and in coordination with the United States to provide stability in the Persian Gulf area and Southwest Asia? For instance, did the Saudis help in the Syrian missile crisis? What about Pakistan-Afghanistan? What about the Horn of Africa? How much financial assistance is Saudi Arabia providing to Turkey?

[The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator NUNN. What additional roles could/should the Saudis play and what have we asked/expected them to do?

[The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator NUNN. How have the Saudis sought to limit Soviet and Communist influence in the Arab world?

[The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator NUNN. Should Saudi Arabia take a more active role in the peace process and how can this be accomplished since they have rejected the Camp David process?

[The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator NUNN. What is the Saudi relationship to the PLO and what type of assistance has been provided?

[The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator NUNN. What do you see as the role of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which has as one of its major objectives the enhancement of Gulf defense?

[The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator NUNN. What do you consider the most demanding military contingency the U.S. might have to deal with in the Persian Gulf area? What do you consider a medium and low capability contingency?

Answer. The major threats to U.S. interests in Southwest Asia include (a) regional conflict or instability, (b) Soviet-supported subversion or invasion by surrogate forces, and (c) Soviet armed intervention. [Deleted.] The actual deployment of U.S. forces to Southwest Asia would depend upon the nature and the size of the crisis and would be treated on a case-by-case basis.

Senator NUNN. What do you consider our major military deficiencies in dealing with Persian Gulf scenarios? How important is our own strategic mobility, as well

as pre-positioning and support infrastructure in the region? Considering our deficiencies, how would the Saudi sale assist our military in these possible three levels of conflict?

Answer. [Deleted.]

MARITIME PREPOSITIONING SHIPS

Senator NUNN. If the need for "quick response" with supportable forces is important, why did DOD, as part of the budget reductions, recommend deleting \$392 million for three maritime prepositioning ships you added in March that would be used in Persian Gulf scenarios?

Answer. The Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) contained in the amended fiscal year 1982 budget submissions have not been deleted. There has been, however, a change in the acquisition strategy.

The revised acquisition strategy is one of convert and charter wherein a contractor, who may or may not be the shipowner, agrees to provide a ship that has been converted to meet Navy specifications for an agreed upon annual fee over a specified period of time. This change of strategy resulted in the deletion of \$392 million from the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) appropriation and the establishment of a funding line in the Operations and Maintenance, Navy (O&MN) appropriation.

AWACS

Senator NUNN. As the former RDF commander, walk us through a general scenario requiring U.S. forces and the assets of the Saudi sale, as well as other facilities in the region.

General KELLEY. A general scenario could involve a Soviet invasion of Iran. This, however, would require the Soviets to upgrade their combat forces in the region. If we took advantage of the warning time which could be anticipated, we could move considerable combat forces into the area prior to the actual movement of Soviet forces. Hopefully, these forces would act as a deterrent. If deterrence wasn't successful, however, they could be used as appropriate for combat operations. In this regard, perhaps the most critical period for any deployment of forces is the initial arrival, i.e., before adequate air superiority is established. The in-place AWACS aircraft could provide the RDF with an immediate air surveillance capability which would be compatible with the establishment of an effective air defense network. Relative to other facilities, I must continue to stress the importance of Saudi Arabia. The strategic and geopolitical significance of Saudi Arabia is quite likely second to no other nation on the face of the earth in its importance to the future well-being of the free world. The AWACS is far more than a mere hardware issue. As has been pointed out, the Saudis do, in fact, have alternatives. The major issue, as I see it, has a massive geopolitical dimension which could influence adversely our future relations with not only the Saudis, but with all moderate Arab states. How we got to this juncture could prove irrelevant. The fact is that we are at a historical crossroad, and nothing we can do or say will turn back the sands of time. I recognize the dilemma as much as many, but I know the potential consequences far more than most. Unless we are forthcoming with the Saudis on a mutually agreed to AWACS solution, we stand the risk of losing a staunch friend in the region.

Senator NUNN. From strictly a military standpoint, could the Persian Gulf and the oilfields be defended from other countries in the region, say from either Egypt or Israel?

Answer. [Deleted.]

Senator NUNN. On a specific relating to the sale, the official briefing book "AWACS, Background Material" states that "three years of spares for F-15's and AWACS, which would be compatible with U.S. equipment, would be stockpiled in Saudi Arabia." Would this material be available to U.S. forces in a contingency? Will we have access to the F-15 Avionics Intermediate Shops in Saudi Arabia? How will we provide three years of spares for the F-15 when our own Air Force does not have this level?

Answer. This answer is in two parts. Part one: It is our view that if the Government of Saudi Arabia perceived a serious threat to the Kingdom, the Government of the United States would be invited into Saudi Arabia, as in the case of the current deployment of four USAF AWACS to assist the Saudis in defending their territory. In this scenario, the Saudis would make available for our use any spare parts, bases, munitions, facilities, (including the F-15 Avionics Intermediate Shops) and support equipment, quite possibly even to the detriment of their own fighting capability. Part two: The RSAF F-15 spares are being purchased from new procurements with

RSAF with FASF funds; thus there are no impacts to USAF stock levels. The AWACS spares would also be purchased from new procurement with RSAF funds.

Senator NUNN. The administration states that this sale would not enable Saudi Arabia and other Arab states to coordinate an attack against Israel, citing the technical and operational problems. Yet, the administration also states the sale would contribute to a Gulf Air Defense system in which air defense networks could be linked, data transmitted, and air defense interceptors controlled. Are there any inconsistencies in these two statements?

[The answer was not received in time for printing.]

CHANGES IN REGIONAL SECURITY SITUATION SINCE 1978

Senator NUNN. What shifts have occurred in the regional security situation and military balance since 1978?

Answer. The security situation in the Persian Gulf/Southwest Asia region has worsened significantly since 1978. The Iranian revolution has turned a nation which once was a strong friend and important factor in maintaining regional security into a major element of instability in the area. We are, of course, concerned about the potential for Soviet exploitation of the unstable situation in Iran. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, involving tens of thousands of Russian troops, has demonstrated Soviet willingness to use their own military forces directly in this region of the world. As a result, Soviet tactical aircraft are within range of the Strait of Houmuz, through which two-thirds of the World's oil exports must pass. Beyond Afghanistan, Soviet power projection capabilities have been upgraded, and Soviet military and naval presence has increased in Libya, Syria, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and the Indian Ocean. The use of proxy forces by the Soviets clients has expanded. The entente of radical, pro-Soviet Libya, Ethiopia, and South Yemen, aimed at moderate, pro-Western States in the area, has introduced a new and disturbing element into the threat calculus of the region. And finally, the Iran-Iraq war has demonstrated again the volatility of the region, and the propensity of two major states there to resort to military force and to attacks on critical oil facilities.

SAUDI REACTION TO JOINT COMMAND PROPOSAL

Senator NUNN. There is a significant amount of discussion on the impact of the failure of the sale on Saudi Arabia and much discussion about Saudi prestige and sovereignty. In your view, how could/would the Saudis deal with the joint command proposal as Senator Glenn has suggested, in terms of both their internal situation as well as role in the Arab states?

Answer. We can say with great certainty that the Saudis would react quite negatively to the joint command proposal as suggested by Senator Glenn. They feel that such an explicit arrangement would be viewed by Saudi citizens and other Arab states alike as an unwarranted and unacceptable infringement on Saudi national sovereignty—a view the Saudi Government shares. The Saudi leadership believe that acceptance of such an explicit joint command agreement would make it impossible for them to perform in a leadership role in the Arab world, and could also weaken their internal legitimacy and support.

U.S. REGIONAL INFLUENCE UNDER JOINT COMMAND

Senator NUNN. Would the U.S. still be able to exercise the same degree of influence in the moderate Arab world, support our regional strategy and enhance regional security under such a joint command relationship?

Answer. It is difficult to speculate as to the impact such a joint command relationship would have. If it were possible for the Saudi Arabian Government to freely and willingly accept joint command of AWACS, our ability to support U.S. regional strategy and enhance regional security could be increased. However, imposition of such a joint command arrangement upon a reluctant, unenthusiastic Saudi Arabia could degrade our ability to exercise influence within the moderate Arab world, and could adversely affect our ability to support U.S. strategy in the Persian Gulf/Southwest Asia region and enhance regional security. Under such a situation, the Saudis could well adhere only to the exact letter of the agreement, and be unwilling to go beyond to engage in the type of broad regional security cooperation we believe is necessary to make our regional strategy effective. Furthermore, other moderate states in the region probably would be disinclined to cooperate closely on regional security matters with the U.S., or even with Saudi Arabia. Pressures from within their societies and from other Arab states would be strong against the type of close involvement with the U.S. that our strategy seeks.

RESTRICTIONS ON AWACS FLIGHT OPERATIONS

Senator NUNN. What are the "terms of sale" in the following areas: are there any restrictions on what airspace the planes can operate in? How do we intend to enforce these provisions?

Answer. The Saudi Arabian Government has agreed not to operate their AWACS aircraft outside of the physical borders of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia without prior mutual consent of the U.S. and Saudi Governments. This assurance will be incorporated into the Letter of Offer and Acceptance for the AWACS, which will be signed by representatives of both the U.S. and Saudi Governments. Beyond this agreement, the Saudi Air Force will be trained to operate the AWACS in accordance with standard Air Force AWACS doctrine and procedures, which call for AWACS to remain a "safe distance" behind political borders at all times—normally 100 miles or more—to ensure AWACS security and survivability. We are confident that, in accordance with traditional practice in our military training relationship with Saudi Arabia, the Saudis will adopt the U.S. Air Force procedures and doctrine with respect to AWACS operations.

Provisions within the agreement of sale for the AWACS will stipulate that the sale will be cancelled and that no equipment or services will be delivered in the event that any of the conditions or agreements, including the agreement not to fly outside Saudi Arabian borders, is breached. This means that all U.S. military and contractor assistance and support, which will be an absolute necessity for Saudi AWACS operations for the life of the system, could be immediately terminated, resulting in the rapid termination of effective Saudi AWACS surveillance operations within a very few days.

U.S. ACCESS TO AWACS INFORMATION

Senator NUNN. Will the U.S. have access to the aircraft and/or information if needed? How is this insured?

Answer. The Saudi Arabian Government has agreed to periodic inspections of AWACS and all associated equipment by teams of U.S. experts to ensure that adequate security protection is being provided. Additionally, U.S. military and contractor personnel will provide extensive operational and maintenance training for Saudi AWACS aircrews and support personnel well into the 1990s. This will require daily access to the aircraft and associated equipment. Finally, the Saudi Government has agreed that we will have complete and continuous access to all information gathered by the Saudi AWACS.

The same provisions within the government-to-government agreement of sale for the AWACS governing sale cancellation and termination of U.S. support services will ensure that these agreements on access to equipment and information are honored.

Senator NUNN. How is the arrangement with Saudi Arabia different from that we have with NATO?

[The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator NUNN. How would the Saudis support the U.S. with the AWACS and F-15 infrastructure if we had to deploy forces to the Gulf, including our own AWACS and F-15's? What are the restrictions here, if any, and where is the agreement on making the support equipment available in a contingency?

Answer. This question is in two parts. Part one: The answer to Question 64 Part One applies to how the Saudis would support U.S. deployed military forces.

Part two: There are no written agreements specifying Saudi support of U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia, hence no guarantees and no restrictions. However, we feel strongly that the Saudis will welcome any U.S. assistance in the face of a serious threat to the Kingdom which is beyond their capacity to deal with, and in turn, provide all support available.

Senator NUNN. There has been much discussion about the question of the various technology involved in the sale and what would happen if it fell into unfriendly hands. If the Soviets did get the AWACS or AIM-9L, what would be of use to them and how significant is it?

Answer. This is in two parts. Part one: Concerns over loss or compromise of sensitive AWACS technology fall into two categories: possible Soviet exploitation of U.S. AWACS technology to counter AWACS operations through jamming, and application of U.S. technology to advance Soviet airborne early warning systems. The basic AWACS subsystems are not extremely sensitive, and do not incorporate the latest state-of-the-art technologies. The AWACS radar is a mature system based on mid-1960's technology; its computer is similar to those commercially available.

[Deleted.]

Senator NUNN. The official briefing book "AWACS Background Material" provided to me by DOD states on page 3 that the Saudis "have agreed to security arrangements that go far beyond normal procedures and satisfy stringent U.S. standards." What are they? How are they above normal and how do they compare to say our security procedures for nuclear weapons technology or some other sophisticated systems?

Answer. This answer is in three parts.

Part one: The existing security agreement between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia was signed in November 1973. It is similar to our security agreement with NATO. It provides for security procedures for protection of U.S. classified information commensurate with U.S. security requirements.

Part two: In addition to the procedures under the 1973 agreement, the following above normal security measures will be required for the AWACS:

(a) A joint U.S. and Saudi Arabia review of security will begin after LOA signature.

(b) A joint AWACS security plan will be developed to cover (1) entry control of restricted areas, (2) detection of unauthorized individuals in restricted areas (3) ability to intercept intruders, and (4) ability to minimize damage to or loss of specific equipment.

(c) Facility protection including fencing, lighting, intrusion detection, and 24 hour/7 day a week coverage by security personnel.

(d) Minimum of two joint USG/Saudi security inspections per year.

(e) All security arrangements must be in effect by arrival of first aircraft.

(f) Joint U.S./Saudi security conference will be held one year prior to equipment delivery.

(g) No third country national will be permitted to work on equipment.

Part three: The nuclear security procedures require similar boundary security systems and entry control procedures. Security procedures at nuclear sites fall into three major categories: manpower, boundary security systems and entry control procedures.

(a) DOD requires the following manpower:

(1) There must be sufficient security guards to control entry into areas containing nuclear weapons.

(2) One or more 15 member response forces capable of responding within 5 minutes to attempted site penetrations and preventing unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.

(3) One or more backup forces of at least 15 members, capable of forming and reinforcing the on duty security force.

(4) An augmentation force of personnel other than the on duty security or backup force, capable of augmenting the on duty security and reserve force.

(b) DOD requires the following boundary security systems:

(1) Dual chain link perimeter fences.

(2) Clear zones which include and extend 30 feet each side of the barrier.

(3) Perimeter and area lighting.

(4) Entry control facilities.

(5) Detection (alarm) and assessment systems.

(6) Warning signs.

(7) Perimeter defensive (fighting) positions.

(c) DOD requires that entry of personnel to nuclear sites be restricted to the minimum required for performance of duty and that entry control procedures assume positive identification of all personnel prior to entry.

Senator NUNN. What is the capability of the Soviet Union to break our codes that are used by our State and Defense Departments? Why are we so certain that it would "take several years" to decipher the magnetic tape program? Why could they not just run "trial and error" procedures using the radar to determine how the system works without having to "break" the software?

[The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator NUNN. What is the current status of the Soviet AWACS and, when deployed, how will it compare to Saudi AWACS? How does its radar and computer capability compare?

Answer. [Deleted.]

Senator NUNN. Do the Soviets have the capability to jam/disrupt the operations of the AWACS the Saudis may receive?

Answer. Yes, any radar system can be jammed at some point in time under ideal situations. However, the AWACS radar system is not easily jammable. Such things as constant movement of the targets of interest to the AWACS and the movement of the AWACS itself inhibit the jamming of the radar system over any period of time. The testing of the AWACS radar involved analysis of its radar capabilities over the

full spectrum of distances as well as the identification of objects at the maximum distance. No conclusion regarding vulnerability could be drawn from tests such as these about the capability of enemy aircraft to penetrate the AWACS flight envelop.

Senator NUNN. Are the security procedures for the AIM-9L the same or more stringent than those released to NATO, Japan, and the other countries? Which versions of the AIM-9 do the Soviets have? Did not the first AIM-9 make its way to Soviet Union via NATO in a Volkswagen going across the border with the missile sticking out the window? Do the Soviets have front-seeking missiles and would AIM-9L technology assist?

Answer. This answer is in two parts.

[Deleted.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN FOR SECRETARY WEINBERGER

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Secretary, I understand that you and Secretary Haig personally and jointly decided to grant the exception to the National Disclosure Policy to permit the transfer of the sophisticated AIM-9L air to air missiles to SA, thus circumventing the normal process for assessing the national security risks of such a transfer.

What led you to do this?

Secretary WEINBERGER. [The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator LEVIN. In granting the exception, did you formally consult with the Navy, Air Force and Army about their assessments of the risks of technological compromise of the missile in Saudi Arabia and how such a compromise might affect the ability of each of the services to accomplish their combat missions?

Secretary WEINBERGER. [The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator LEVIN. Because the normal procedures afforded each of the services to protest a proposed sale—through the National Disclosure Policy Committee structure—were circumvented by your decision, were special provisions made to consider the military's opinions before you approved the exception to sell the AIM-9L?

Secretary WEINBERGER. [The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator LEVIN. Did you consult the CIA's Counter-Intelligence Risk Assessment about Saudi Arabia before you approved the exception?

Did you consult the National Disclosure Policy Committee's Security Survey Team Report on Saudi Arabia, dated October, 1980, before you approved the exception?

Secretary WEINBERGER. [The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator LEVIN. The National Disclosure Policy Committee also issued a Policy Statement in 1979 regarding Saudi Arabia and which pointed out special facts to be weighed when disclosure of classified information to that nation is being considered. Did you consult this guidance before issuing the exception?

Secretary WEINBERGER. [The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator LEVIN. I have a copy of the draft agreement which is normally used as a basis for discussions with all potential recipient governments about signing a General Security of Information Agreement. It is all fairly broad boilerplate language. Why are the Saudis balking at signing it?

Secretary WEINBERGER. [The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator LEVIN. Is this type of general agreement one of the four agreements Secretary Haig was referring to in his testimony to Senate Foreign Relations that would restrict Saudi Arabia from using the AWACS aircraft in ways threatening to Israel? If so, I have been told that there is nothing special about this type of agreement, and that every recipient is asked to sign one similar to it.

Secretary WEINBERGER. [The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator LEVIN. What agreements have been reached with the Saudis relative to limitations on the use of the AWACS aircraft? Who signed these agreements, and when and where were they signed? If not yet signed, will they be signed before Congress votes on the AWACS package?

Secretary WEINBERGER. [The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator LEVIN. Secretary Haig broadly outlined these agreements to the Foreign Relations Committee by stating, as reported in the Washington Post: "... they involve limitations on transfer of the equipment and intelligence information collected by the AWACS to third parties, access by the United States to the collected information, provisions for the physical security of the equipment and technology and limitations on the geographic areas where the Saudis would operate the planes."

Is the agreement involving the "provisions for the physical security of the equipment and technology" this "General Security of Information Agreement" to which I referred?

Secretary WEINBERGER. [The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator LEVIN. Is the agreement involving "limitations on transfer of the equipment and intelligence information collected by the AWACS to third parties" the usual requirement imposed by U.S. law against "third party" transfers of any U.S. supplied weapons system, or is there a special and more detailed agreement involving the AWACS?

Secretary WEINBERGER. [The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator LEVIN. How do the statements by Secretary Haig, and Undersecretary of State James Buckley, about these four secret restrictive agreements between ourselves and the Saudis, square with statements by the Saudi defense minister, Prince Sultan bin Abdul-Aziz, who according to Riyadh radio said: "Let me be very clear. If we had AWACS on June 7, and we saw the Israelis on their way to attack Iraq, sure we would tell Iraq?"

Prince Sultan also reportedly rejected limits on AWACS operating areas, which also would seem to contradict Secretary Haig. Have the Saudis changed their position on this since June?

Secretary WEINBERGER. [The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator LEVIN. In late August, the New York Times also reported that if the AWACS sale goes through, the U.S. "will have no power to prevent them from being used against Israel", and that "we will not exercise operational control or command." Don't these statements contradict those of Secretary Haig?

The article further quotes American officials as follows: "The officials add that, under the plan put forward by President Reagan to sell the Airborne Warning and Control System planes, known as AWACS, the United States will have no explicit or legal control over their use. Nor has the Saudi Government agreed to restrictions on the use of the planes or on high performance fighters that are also being sold, the officials say."

Have the Saudis somehow had a rapid change of heart in the past month, even though they have been unwilling to agree to a more General Security of Information Agreement for the past year?

Secretary WEINBERGER. [The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator LEVIN. One theme which has consistently run through the Administration's defense of the AWACS component of this sale is that the planes really do not represent a threat to Israel because if they fly too close to Israel, then the Israelis can shoot them down with relative ease. I want to explore that theme with you for a few moments.

Would you agree that such a line of argument has been attributed to the Administration?

What specific conditions or deployments of the AWACS would, in the mind of the Administration, justify such Israeli action?

Secretary WEINBERGER. [The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator LEVIN. Is there any guarantee that the Saudis would not deploy the planes in ways which would invite/sanction an attack by Israel?

Secretary WEINBERGER. [The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator LEVIN. Lets see if there aren't some other ways in which the AWACS might not be provocative and threatening. For example, after the Israeli attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor, the Saudis were said to have indicated that if they had picked up signals of Israeli planes flying against Iraq, then of course they would have communicated that information to Iraq. Would that lead Israeli military planners, in any future situation of that kind, to target the AWACS as a part of the military planning?

Secretary WEINBERGER. [The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator LEVIN. One of the fears concerning the AWACS is that they could be used to coordinate an Arab attack against Israel. Now without getting into the technical argument about whether or not such coordination is easy or hard, wouldn't it be relatively easy for the AWACS to be deployed in ways which suggest that they are in fact playing that kind of coordinative role? And wouldn't that have the effect of drawing Israeli planes away from other missions in order to protect against that possibility?

Secretary WEINBERGER. [The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator LEVIN. Assume for a moment that an agreement was reached which called for some American presence on the AWACS planes and further assume that despite the presence of American personnel, the AWACS did fly in ways which were clearly provocative—they did fly close to Israel—and the Israelis responded by attacking the planes. If that attack involved the loss of American lives, what would be the response of the government of the United States?

Secretary WEINBERGER. [The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator LEVIN. Can you give me any other examples of where we have sold arms to a state and then assured its neighbors that those arms do not represent any real threat because they can knock them out at will?

Secretary WEINBERGER. [The answer was not received in time for printing.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN TO GENERAL DAVID C. JONES

Senator LEVIN. On P. 1 of White House package, it is stated that the AWACS package sale will: "serve our broader strategic interests, enhancing Gulf security by laying the groundwork for greater overall U.S.-Saudi defense cooperation and for a more effective Gulf air defense network."

What do you mean specifically—by "laying the groundwork for greater overall U.S.-Saudi defense cooperation?" Do you mean joint exercises, joint use of "facilities" or "bases" in Saudi Arabia, pre-positioning of U.S. equipment in the country? Other forms of cooperation?

General JONES. [The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator LEVIN. Have there been any discussions with the Saudis, in conjunction with the AWACS sale, about the prospects of agreement by them for each of these forms of cooperation? If so, to what have the Saudis agreed? If not, when will you begin such discussions?

General JONES. [The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator LEVIN. Absent such agreements—absent a tangible "quid pro quo" from the Saudis, isn't your statement about the "groundwork" without substantiation?

General JONES. [The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator LEVIN. It is my understanding that, based on my discussions with American officials during my own trip to Saudi Arabia last December, that the Saudis remain extremely reluctant to even discuss such matters as expanding defense cooperation through prepositioning equipment—a relatively low profile form of cooperation. They are reluctant out of fear that any greater cooperation with the US would undermine their internal stability with radicals such as the Palestinians and their influence over the more extreme Arab states. Has this situation changed since December?

General JONES. [The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator LEVIN. If not, isn't this "groundwork" a "pipe dream" or the figment of an overly-optimistic imagination in the State Department?

General JONES. [The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator LEVIN. Referring to the second part of your statement, which deals with laying the groundwork for a more effective Gulf air defense network, what other nations would you envision participating in such a network?

Have we begun any discussions with these governments about such prospects? If so, to what have they agreed? If not, upon what do you base this statement?

General JONES. [The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator LEVIN. To effectively work with the AWACS, wouldn't any aircraft in such a network be required to have compatible equipment—at the very least in the communications area but also possibly in other areas as well, such as avionics?

Considering the tactical air forces of all the Gulf nations we might expect to join a regional air defense network, how many of them have equipment compatible with the AWACS proposed for sale to Saudi Arabia? What type of equipment? For those air forces without such equipment, how would they work effectively with AWACS to defend the Gulf? Do you envision selling them such equipment? Have you discussed this with any of these nations?

General JONES. [The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator LEVIN. Is it not true that the AIM-9L is the most advanced air-to-air missile in the world?

General JONES. [The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator LEVIN. The White House's justification for the F-15 enhancements and the AWACS sale states the following about the security risks to the U.S. of selling the AIM-9L to SA: "While compromise of the AIM-9L missile technology could have a negative impact, the Soviets are believed to have a missile in development that will give them an AIM-9L class capability in the near future."

What kind of "negative" impact do you believe the compromise of AIM-9L technology would have on our national security?

General JONES. [The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator LEVIN. Would it not mean that the Soviets could learn the secrets of the seeker of the missile—its most sensitive component—and thus learn clues as to how to develop methods to defeat the missile? Wouldn't this degrade the combat capabilities of all U.S. and allied jet aircraft carrying these missiles?

General JONES. [The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator LEVIN. Wouldn't it require us to spend time and money to develop countermeasures to offset the possibility of compromise—to restore the combat capabilities of the AIM-9L?

General JONES. [The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator LEVIN. Even if we think the Soviets are working on a similar missile, why should we help them in this effort by increasing the chances they will learn our secrets of making such an advanced missile?

General JONES. [The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator LEVIN. The Saudis intend to rely heavily on Pakistani assistance for aircraft maintenance we have been told. Is this report accurate?

General JONES. [The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator LEVIN. Why shouldn't we be concerned that the AIM-9L technology would not be compromised in this way, either through transfer to Pakistanis or to the Soviets by their agents in Pakistan?

General JONES. [The answer was not received in time for printing.]

Senator LEVIN. Would you recommend this sale if the following were not removed: Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS), Electronic Counter Counter Measures (ECCM) enhancement and sensitive intelligence information, HAVE QUICK UHF communications modifications and three additional display consoles included in the latest USAF version, the U.S. Government Mode IV Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) and U.S. Government encryption systems?

General JONES. [The answer was not received in time for printing.]

REQUESTS FOR EXCEPTIONS TO THE NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY

Senator LEVIN. Exceptions to the National Disclosure Policy are considered and decided by this Committee, where representatives of the Army, Navy and Air Force can assess the risks to the military capabilities of each of their services from the compromise of the particular technology proposed for transfer, is that not so?

ANSWER. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. The committee also can consider what limitations could be imposed in the proposed transfer which would protect American secrets and minimize the prospects for compromise, such as by not including certain sensitive components or information as part of the transfer, correct?

ANSWER. Yes.

NDPC SECURITY SURVEYS

Senator LEVIN. Under the National Disclosure Policy, the Committee conducts overseas inspections of the security capabilities, procedures and personnel of recipient nations to assist it in evaluating proposed exceptions. To prepare for such an inspection, the Committee asks the CIA for a Counter-Intelligence Risk Assessment, and after the on-site investigation, the inspection results are issued in a Security Survey Report.

Based on the results of the overseas surveys and intelligence information, the Committee can issue general guidance about what levels of classified information a particular nation is eligible to receive, or it can decide a particular request for an exception.

Mr. Secretary, are you familiar with these particular documents used in this sensitive process?

ANSWER. Yes.

BASIS FOR REQUESTS TO EXCEPTIONS TO POLICY

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Secretary, I understand that exceptions to the National Disclosure Policy must be requested normally "where it is determined that the information proposed for release exceeds the intended recipient's eligibility or it cannot be ascertained that the recipient has the capability to protect the information." Would you agree with this statement, which was quoted from a Defense Department document?

ANSWER. Yes. However, when it cannot be ascertained that the recipient has the capability to protect the information, the policy provides that this requirement may be set aside in exceptional cases upon a finding that the advantage resulting to the United States from the proposed disclosure may be expected to outweigh the risk of compromise of US military secrets.

AUTHORITY TO GRANT EXCEPTIONS TO POLICY

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Secretary, under the National Disclosure Policy, I understand that you and the Secretary of State, or your immediate deputy secretaries, have the

authority to personally grant exceptions to the policy, but that this authority is exercised only rarely—perhaps only five times annually. Would you agree with this statement?

ANSWER. Yes. However, The Secretary of State and his deputy must have the consent of the originating or responsible National Disclosure Policy Committee department or agency, normally Defense, to authorize an exception to policy.

REQUEST FOR NDPC DOCUMENTATION

Senator LEVIN. Please provide all three of these documents to the Congress so we might better assess for ourselves the possibilities for compromise of both the AIM-9L and AWACS technology if these sensitive technologies and hardware are sold to Saudi Arabia.

ANSWER. It is our understanding that the Risk Assessment for Saudi Arabia is to be provided by CIA. The other documents requested are attached.

SUBJECT—DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED UNITED STATES MILITARY INFORMATION TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (U)

(U) White House memorandum, dated 6 June 1978, subject as above, contains the below listed guidance.

(U) This directive reaffirms the policy, objectives and implementing responsibilities prescribed by National Security Decision Memorandum 119 of July 20, 1971. The basic policy of the United States governing the disclosure of classified United States military information to foreign governments and international organizations remains unchanged; however, certain additional requirements to augment existing policy have been authorized. In order to implement fully this policy and better to achieve its intended purpose, the following has been specifically authorized:

(U) the National Military Information Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC) to develop and promulgate instructional guidance to be uniformly applied by all personnel involved in any manner with international programs through which classified United States military information may be disclosed; and;

(U) The Secretaries of State and Defense to initiate with recipient governments the negotiation of General Security of Information Agreements or other bilateral security arrangements outlining the responsibilities of both parties pertaining to the safeguarding of classified United States military information. These agreements should contain provisions requiring (1) foreign governments to whom United States classified military information has been, or will be entrusted, to report promptly and fully any known or suspected compromises of such information and corrective action taken to preclude recurrence, and (2) provisions for reciprocal on-site security surveys for purposes of determining the capability of the foreign government or international organization to provide to U.S. classified military information the requisite degree of security protection.

In view of United States foreign policy considerations, the President has stressed that classification eligibility levels established by the NDPC [deleted].

[National Security Decision Memorandum 119]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL,
Washington, D.C., July 20, 1971.

To: The Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Director of Central Intelligence, and Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.
Subject: Disclosure of classified United States Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations.

The President has approved the following statement of policy governing the disclosure of classified United States military information to foreign governments and international organizations. This policy statement supersedes those provisions of previous national security directives pertaining to the disclosure of classified U.S. military information to foreign recipients, namely (1) the directive "Basic Policy Governing the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments", approved by the President, February 27, 1946; (2) the directive "Basic Policy Governing the Release of Classified Defense Information to Foreign Governments", approved by the President September 23, 1958; and (3) NSC Action 2125, approved by the President on September 14, 1959.

The issuance of this National Security Decision Memorandum takes into account the foreign policy implications and national defense aspects of disclosures of classified U.S. military information to foreign governments and international bodies, and the mutual interest and responsibilities of the Secretaries of State and Defense with respect to such disclosures.

"CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION" DEFINED

Classified military information of the United States is information which (a) is under the control or jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, its departments or agencies, or is of primary interest to them; (b) may be embodied in written, oral or other form; and (c) requires protection in the interest of national defense and security in one of the three classification categories—TOP SECRET, SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL—as described in Executive Order 10501, as amended.

GENERAL POLICY OBJECTIVES

It is the policy of the United States Government to treat classified military information as a national security asset which must be conserved and protected and which may be disclosed to foreign governments and international organizations only where there is a clearly defined advantage to the United States. Such disclosures must be consistent with United States foreign policy objectives and military security requirements, and limited to information necessary to the purpose of the disclosure. Disclosures will be contingent upon a determination that the recipient of the information will afford it substantially the same degree of security protection given to it by the United States. (This requirement may be set aside in exceptional cases authorized jointly by the Secretaries of State and Defense, or by their representatives specifically designated for this purpose, upon a finding that the advantage resulting to the United States from the proposed disclosure may be expected to outweigh the risk of the compromise of U.S. military secrets. Instances of such exceptions will be centrally recorded and included in annual reports to the National Security Council concerning the implementation of this policy statement.)

Nothing in this policy statement shall be construed to authorize the disclosure of classified U.S. military information contrary to: (a) provisions of Federal statutes, including the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 or international agreements thereunder; (b) proprietary rights of private firms or citizens, unless disclosure is authorized by relevant legislation; or (c) disclosure authority vested in the United States Intelligence Board structure and in the United States Communications Security Board. Nothing contained herein shall affect or modify authority or responsibility vested in the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director of Central Intelligence (pursuant to Federal law, National Security Council Intelligence Directives, Executive Orders or other Presidential authorizations) to make specific determinations concerning disclosures of classified U.S. military information to foreign recipients.

Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize the disclosure of any naval nuclear propulsion information, classified or unclassified, except under an Agreement for Cooperation executed in accordance with Section 123 (d) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

IMPLEMENTING RESPONSIBILITY

The Secretaries of State and Defense—consulting as appropriate with the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the heads of other departments and agencies—are hereby assigned the responsibility for controlling the releases of U.S. classified military information in accordance with the provisions of this policy statement. This assignment of responsibility includes:

The establishment and management of such interagency mechanism and procedures as are required for the effective implementation of this policy;

The promulgation of specific disclosure criteria and limitations, definitions of terms, release arrangements and other guidance required by U.S. departments and agencies having occasion to release classified U.S. military information to foreign recipients;

The continuing review of pertinent intelligence information, and the conduct of periodic on-site surveys, for the purpose of determining the capability of particular foreign governments and international organizations to provide to classified U.S. military information the requisite degree of security protection; and

The submission to the National Security Council of an annual report covering the highlights of the program including (a) an assessment of the effectiveness of the program in meeting the general policy objectives and implementing responsibilities set forth in this policy statement; (b) information concerning any security compromises or other noteworthy problems encountered, and remedial actions taken; and (c) the circumstances of any exceptional instances wherein disclosures of classified military information were made to foreign recipients not known to possess the capability to afford the information protection substantially equal to that provided it by the United States.

This assignment of implementing responsibility jointly to the Secretaries of State and Defense does not preclude continuation of their existing agreement that a representative of the Secretary of Defense provide executive direction and chairmanship of the interdepartmental committee utilized in the implementation of previous national policy on the subject.

HENRY A. KISSINGER.

NDPC SECURITY SURVEY REPORT—SAUDI ARABIA

Senator LEVIN. I understand that the October, 1980 Security Survey Team Report showed great differences between our own security procedures and those of the Saudis, especially regarding the granting of security clearances to individuals.

Are you familiar with this aspect of the report?

ANSWER. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. How can you promise the Congress that the AIM-9L will be afforded the same degree of protection in Saudi Arabia as it is in this country?

ANSWER. I should make clear that the purpose of the National Disclosure Policy Committee security survey is to make a determination as to whether the foreign government's particular laws and security practices and procedures are adequate to protect US classified military information entrusted to that government. Whether such practices are identical to those of the United States is not the principal consideration. However, [deleted].

Senator LEVIN. Isn't one of the criteria for disclosure under the National Disclosure Policy that information transferred will be afforded "substantially the same security protection" as is provided in the US?

ANSWER. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. In granting the exception to the sale of the AIM-9L, did you waive this criterion?

ANSWER. [Deleted.]

GENERAL SECURITY OF INFORMATION AGREEMENT—SAUDI ARABIA

Senator LEVIN. Under the National Disclosure Policy, according to your own department, "in order to protect the information, the recipient must have not only the capability, but the intent. We (the department) establish intent by executing a written General Security of Information Agreement. This is a reciprocal agreement negotiated between the US and foreign governments. . . ."

Mr. Secretary I understand that such an agreement has yet to be signed between the US and SA, and that this is despite the fact that recommendations that such an agreement be consummated "as soon as possible" were made at least one year ago.

How can you assure us that the secrets of the AIM-9L and AWACS will be protected adequately if the Saudi Arabian government is not even willing yet to sign an agreement signifying the intent of the Saudis to safeguard this classified material?

ANSWER. As noted, the General Security of Information Agreement, when executed, establishes the intent of a foreign government to protect our classified information. The General Security of Information Agreement is negotiated by the Department of State through diplomatic channels. The process oftentimes is time consuming. [Deleted.]

NDPC RECORD OF ACTION—AIM-9L

SENATOR LEVIN. Returning to the AIM-9L exception, I understand that, after your decision, the National Disclosure Policy Committee did draft a statement, known as a "Record of Action." This is the announcement of the decision as well as a statement setting forth the limitations we are imposing on the transfer of the AIM-9L technology to Saudi Arabia.

I understand this statement, dated March 16, 1981, is only 1½ pages long, and that it outlines the limitations in only broad terms. I understand further that even more detailed instructions restricting AIM-9L disclosures—on the basis of this broader Record of Action—will not even be drafted until after Congress approves the sale, if it does.

Shouldn't Congress have access to both documents before it votes to determine for itself the adequacy of the security safeguards on this missile, which has been described as the most advanced air to air missile we have in our inventory?

ANSWER. The National Disclosure Policy Committee "Records of Action" authorizing the release of classified military information are, without exception, classified. Because these issuances involve exceptions to the National Disclosure Policy and unauthorized disclosure of their content would seriously impact on our foreign relations, they are disseminated only to those officials having a need to carry out

their provisions. Appropriate Committees of the Congress are notified of proposed sales under 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act. If, upon such notification, these Committees request information on the security aspects of any such sale, we would provide such information in the form of these Records of Action.

IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY SURVEY TEAM RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator LEVIN. I understand that the October, 1980 Security Survey Team Report about SA contained at least four recommendations for improving Saudi capabilities to protect American classified information and hardware. Yet I have been informed that at least two of these four recommendations still have not been implemented, despite the passage of a year. What explanation can you give for this, and why should the Congress accept Executive Branch assurances about the safety of US secrets in light of this past record of ignoring the advice of its own experts?

ANSWER. [Deleted.] Actions were initiated immediately to implement all of the security survey teams recommendations. [Deleted.]

SALE OF AIM-9L MISSILE TO OTHER COUNTRIES

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Secretary, in supporting the sale of the AIM-9L missiles, the White House listed the following nations as already purchasers of this equipment: Israel, UK, West Germany, Norway, Italy, Japan, Australia and Greece.

Are there other prospective purchasers for the AIM-9L which already have been acted upon by the National Disclosure Policy Committee—especially Third World nations with the same security capabilities to protect American secrets as SA?

ANSWER. Yes, [deleted].

RESULTS OF COMMITTEE REVIEW—SWEDEN AND EGYPT

Senator LEVIN. What have been the results of the Committee's review in these cases?

ANSWER. [Deleted.]

RECORDS OF ACTION ON AIM-9L AND AWACS

Senator LEVIN. Please provide the Committee the February 1981 "Record of Action" on the AIM-9L and the August 1981 "Request of Action" on AWACS.

ANSWER. The Records of Action on the AIM-9L and the AWACS are enclosed. [Deleted.]


BASIS FOR EXCEPTION TO POLICY FOR AIM-9L

Senator LEVIN. Why was an exception to the National Disclosure Policy required to sell the AIM-9L to Saudi Arabia? Which of the five Policy criteria for disclosure were not met by the sale and therefore required an exception? If all five criteria were met, was an exception required because Saudi Arabia was not eligible under the National Disclosure Policy Committee's implementation Guidance to receive information classified at the level of some aspects of the missile?

ANSWER. [Deleted.]

Senator TOWER. We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:36 p.m., the committee was adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]



MILITARY AND TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED SALE TO SAUDI ARABIA OF AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEM (AWACS) AND F-15 ENHANCEMENT

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1981

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10:50 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 6226 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Tower, chairman, presiding.

Present: Senators Tower, Warner, Humphrey, Cohen, Quayle, Denton, Jackson, Byrd and Nunn.

Staff present: Rhett B. Dawson, staff director; Francis J. Sullivan, minority staff director; James F. McGovern, general counsel; Paul C. Besozzi, minority counsel; Christine E. Cowart, chief clerk; Robert S. Dotson, Edward B. Kenney, Ronald F. Lehman, James R. Locher III, Carl M. Smith, Kathleen Troia, professional staff members; Drew A. Harker, research assistant; and Brenda K. Hudson, staff assistant.

Also present: Dennis P. Sharon, assistant to Senator Goldwater; Buzz Hefti, assistant to Senator Warner; James Dykstra, assistant to Senator Cohen; Herman Pirchner, assistant to Senator Jepsen; Paul Schreibner, assistant to Senator Denton; Robert Nichols, assistant to Senator Jackson; Gray Armistead, assistant to Senator Byrd; and Greg Pallas, assistant to Senator Exon.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN TOWER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman TOWER. The committee will come to order.

Today's session is the second public hearing by the Armed Services Committee concerning the Reagan administration's proposal to sell an enhanced air defense package to Saudi Arabia. This includes AWACS aircraft, an aerial refueling tanker, conformal fuel tanks for the F-15's and AIM-9L missiles for Saudi F-15 aircraft.

The Armed Services Committee focuses on the military and technical implications of the sale. The membership is asked to keep this focus in mind in questioning the witness.

In the previous session, the committee met with witnesses from the Department of Defense, including Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. David Jones; and witnesses from the Central Intelligence Agency.

Today the committee has invited Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan, Jr., U.S. Air Force, retired, an active opponent of the sale, to

present his views on the military and technical implications of the President's proposal.

General Keegan, we are happy to have you with us today.

I might note, General Keegan's last assignment was as head of Air Force Intelligence. We welcome you to the committee. You may proceed as you see fit. You can submit a written statement for the record and summarize it or you can read a statement. In any case, any material you want to submit will be included in the record.

**STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. GEORGE J. KEEGAN, JR., USAF,
RETIRED, FORMER CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE, U.S. AIR FORCE**

General KEEGAN. Fine.

Chairman TOWER. First, let me yield to Senator Jackson.

Senator JACKSON. I am delighted that General Keegan can be here and we have an opportunity to give us his professional views of the proposed sale of the AWACS system.

General KEEGAN. Thank you, Senator.

I am opposed to the sale of the AWACS and enhanced package for the F-15, the AIM-9L Sidewinder and the tankers, for a number of compelling political, strategic, tactical, and technical reasons.

While I will try to focus on the more narrow and stricter needs of the committee in the military and the technical areas, there is no way to escape some of the political overtones.

I would like to say at the outset that I am in complete sympathy with, and I share this administration's hopes about, achieving greater stability in the Middle East and bringing about greater Arab unity in their capability to defend themselves against direct Soviet or indirect Soviet aggression and to cope with the more threatening of their radical neighbors.

I think I appreciate the complexity and the sensitivity of U.S. aspirations, as well as the difficulty of achieving our objectives; however, there are a number of very compelling problems that lead me to the position that I have taken in this matter.

First of all is the question of the defense needs of the Saudis. I consider those needs to be legitimate. I consider the package proposed by the Department of Defense for minimizing the external threat to the Saudi oilfields to be, in fact, one of the most brilliant air-defense proposals for a small number of equipments to achieve a high order of defense capability that I have ever seen. Were there no Arab-Israeli conflict, I would support the administration's proposals.

What concerns me most, however, is the fact that the AWACS, in concert with the F-15, with conformal tanks to extend its range and the AIM-9L missile, constitutes what is probably the most potent offensive team of weapon systems ever developed for use in regional and theater warfare.

I regret very much some of the misimpressions that have glossed over this offensive potential due to the very heavy and, I think, exaggerated, stress upon the purely defensive capabilities of these weapon systems.

There is one option on the offensive use of these equipments that I think drives the Israelis up the wall and tends to destabilize the continuing and ongoing relationships which now obtain in the area.

In 1975 we became aware, that several of the confrontation states, in discussing the results of Yom Kippur, the 1973 war, came to a pretty common consensus that this last Arab offensive through the Sinai would, in fact, be the last effort of this kind, that after four wars, approaches through the Sinai had failed and were destined to fail in the future. Therefore, a number of additional options were looked at.

One of those that was actively discussed was the mounting of a massive tank offensive through Jordan, wherein the Iraqis, the Syrians, the Jordanians, and the Saudis would contribute whatever tank forces they could, with a potential of over 10 divisions, at night, through the Jordan Valley and across the West Bank and thence across the narrow waist of Israel.

To those of us professionals who have stood on the West Bank, as I have many times, there is a general awareness that a couple of brigades of tanks, ably commanded, vigorously led by subalterns, could slice Israel in two at the narrows of Israel, 8 miles wide, roughly, in one morning of combat. In general, there is no effective Israeli defense against such a possibility save through the introduction of fighter-bombers at dawn at low level and their committal against such a tank offensive.

Now, of course, I don't for a moment question the difficulty the Arabs would have in coordinating such a strike, but nonetheless it is a serious option which the Israeli professionals have considered for years.

Now, the AWACS and the F-15/AIM-9L package make an absolutely unique contribution in the furtherance of such a plan if it is to be attempted and undertaken by the Saudis and their Arab friends.

The AWACS, by standing off at a distance to the rear at about 30,000 feet, somewhere along the eastern Jordanian border, can very quickly spot the incoming Israeli aircraft.

Now, while much has been said in testimony, I understand, about the mountains from the Golan Heights running south, masking from AWACS' view any Israeli aircraft that might be committed to the attack, I think this has been somewhat overblown. Almost all of the Israeli fighters would have to come in over the West Bank at altitudes of 2,000 to 4,000 feet, then descending low to meet the tank assault directly.

The AWACS is perfectly capable of detecting these fighters as they approach, then directing the counterattack by the F-15 fighters.

The significance here of the F-15 is that it has a look-down/shoot-down radar weapon capability that challenges even that of the AWACS. The F-15's, in a matter of 7 minutes, from a forward base in Saudi Arabia, can be over the West Bank at altitudes of 40,000 to 50,000 feet where their extraordinary radar capability can spot the Israeli fighter-bombers with ease, and from that position of great height advantage proceed to fire the AIM-9L missiles to defeat the Israeli counterattack. The tactic is feasible; it is a very practical one to carry out and is one that would be almost immune to Israeli counterattack unless the AWACS were destroyed on the ground.

It has been alleged that the AWACS is equipped with older equipment, that the technology is well known and that the AWACS aircraft is very vulnerable to intercept. I regret those statements and find them very misleading. In hundreds of tests of which I am aware that we have conducted in Europe, the AWACS has been found to be almost immune to attack when all the systems onboard are operating as they should and the aircraft is used in a proper tactical mode. The aircraft can detect incoming fighters with ease. It is a jet aircraft itself and by turning away at a range of 100 to 150 miles can evade almost any counterattacking force. In fact, it has been found in our tests to date that an attacking force 10 to 20 times the size of the defending force would have to be expended by an enemy in order to get one AWACS aircraft.

So, I would like to make that point of view very clear.

Second, is the question of having addressed the legitimacy of the Saudi need and the offensive potential of the combination of those weapons as the Israelis see this. Third, there is the question of the fragility of the balance which now obtains in that part of the world.

Here I would like to note parenthetically one of the unique weaknesses of U.S. governmental intelligence estimates of the past. It has been traditional for the intelligence community annually to assess the ability of the Israelis to defend themselves from attack by their Arab neighbors. In most of those assessments of the past, many of which I have been a party to, and a participant in, the intelligence community has considered the tanks, the anti-aircraft weapons, the stocks of munitions, the men in uniform, and so forth, and concluded that the Arabs outnumber the Israelis anywhere from 10 to 1 in manpower to 5 or 6 to 1 or 3 to 1 in categories of weapons and fighters; but the conclusion in every case has been that because of superior Israeli will, motivation, leadership, training, and confidence, the Israelis maintain a superiority.

I am certain I don't have to remind the members of this committee that in 1973, Yom Kippur, as is not generally appreciated, the superior Israeli force was almost defeated and Israel came to within hours of being brought to its knees in a massive defeat. Only an extraordinary circumstance of luck, great, great bravery beyond the call of defense duty is what saved Israel.

There were five tank columns going through the Golan from Syria. Because of the failure of the commanders of those tank units to coordinate their attack properly and because of the failure to heed the advice of the Soviet advisers who were flying in helicopters overhead to help direct those Syrian columns, Israel was not sliced in two within a day as it could have been had the Syrians not commanded their tank forces so ineptly.

The lesson has not been lost on Israel and I think it is in this context that we must view the Israeli perception of the sale of the AWACS, F-15/AIM-9L package, and it is the perception in the final analysis that we are going to have to deal with.

Nothing has been said so far about the AWACS operational intelligence collection capability. It is one of the most able such vehicles that I know of anywhere in the world. It is unique in character. It vanishes very quickly; it is of a sensitive, immediate operational nature and less long-lasting. The AWACS can gather a

great deal of very useful intelligence for the Arab confrontation States on a day-to-day basis without coming anywhere near Israel.

Then there is the question of the security of the equipment and the question of its possible compromise through the overthrow of Saudi Arabia or by capture or subversive penetration.

I would remind the committee that I believe I was the only former official of Government who predicted almost to the date when Iran would fall, when our diplomats and our national intelligence community were claiming that Iran would stand for a long time. They were all in error, those estimates, simply because I don't think they were paying attention to the information which was coming out of Iran and passing through service channels, in my case Air Force channels.

It has been my judgment for a time that Saudi Arabia is destined to suffer the same fate as Iran. I would give the time parameters of this at about somewhere between 2 to 5 years. Saudi Arabia, for better or for worse, and whatever the friendship basis between its leaders and our own have been now for more than 25 years, Saudi Arabia remains as the last great feudal and despotic state in the world. There are no human rights in the country. What is dispensed by way of justice is dispensed under the guidance of a few princelings. This is not very well known.

I have spoken in the last 3 years with many Saudi Arabian students being trained in this country and abroad. The first group of students was all chosen from the royal family. I noticed among them an almost messianic commitment to jidda—holy war—against Israel as their *raison d'être*.

With successive classes I have noticed quite a change. A significant majority of these people, many of whom bring their wives here and live here for a year, leave this country and Western European countries in a state of shock about the condition of freedom, this being their first exposure.

I believe these are the people who are going to make revolution in Saudi Arabia. This will be exploited, of course, by the radical states, states like Syria, possibly Egypt, depending on who is ruling Egypt.

For these reasons or reasons along these lines, I consider the instability of Saudi Arabia to be very serious and a grave problem for us to face, and an important consideration in the transferring of some of the world's most high-value and most advanced high-technology defensive equipment.

I think the overthrow of the House of Saud in Saudi Arabia is inevitable and I think this is a matter of somewhere in the next few years. I don't have a plan; I don't know who the players will be; but I think the inevitability of this weighs very heavily in any decision of us to commit such high technology.

I think the compromise of AWACS equipment, which could be minimized by the continuing presence of U.S. Air Force and military personnel, is occasioned by the mere fact that many hundreds of Pakistanis, Syrians, Egyptians, and PLO are working in Saudi Arabia. The risk of penetrating to U.S. equipments through such channels is one that I don't think we are adequately protected against. >

Now, as to the downgrading of the equipment which has been alluded to in a number of press articles in recent weeks, yes, I have to agree, the equipment onboard is old and it was designed in the late 1950's and the early 1960's. (However, that equipment as it is, whether downgraded or not, constitutes the greatest single advance in radar and air defense technology since World War II.)

(There is no foreign nation, not even Britain with its Nimrod, that comes close to matching the competence of even downgraded equipment aboard the AWACS.) We view the AWACS as the key to the successful early defense of Europe. I think that consideration obtains today and I do have some concern about the accuracy of the statements which have been made and about the misleading implications of statements that we would deny our aircrews and the Saudis our latest technology.

I am not certain that those statements are true, to begin with, but I would hope this would be a matter of deep inquiry by this committee and other congressional bodies.

Now, in the final analysis, what do the AWACS and F-15 weapon systems do for the Saudis? Against a determined Soviet low-level bomber attack against the oilfields, their contribution would be virtually nil unless those F-15's and the AWACS were exclusively manned by U.S. Air Force personnel.

It seems to me if the Saudis are genuinely concerned about this option being exercised by the Soviets, they would accept our willingness to contribute our men, our personnel, our equipment and make the bases available to us on some kind of more permanent basis.

I think the contribution to be made with those equipments in Saudi Arabian hands would be minimal at best. Against the border radical states, I think that the deterrent capability of the AWACS/F-15 team would be somewhat greater, and there is no question that any neighboring state would have to think very carefully about facing such a team with its own national pilots.

Were the Pakistani, on the other hand, to man the F-15 fighters, then I would raise the capability of the systems to defend Saudi Arabia somewhat. I am more concerned with how the Saudis will use these against their small neighboring states whom they have been intimidating for more than 45 years.

(The Saudis have been a very threatening presence to most of the small border states in the Arab Peninsula now for better than 50 years. Subversion, assassination, manipulations, and a broad range of indirect means have been used to threaten and to coerce these states.)

Against such states the AWACS/F-15 combination would be potent indeed.

Finally, were the Saudis to allow continued manning and some sort of acceptable joint ownership, firm U.S. control arrangement, then I think our Rapid Deployment Force would be well served; our naval carriers serving in the gulf would be most effectively supported, and with direct U.S. control we could make an important contribution to the legitimate defense needs of Saudi Arabia.

Short of those terms, then I must take very seriously, as I do, the perceptions by the Israelis of the threats that those equipments will constitute.

So, for those strategic, technical, tactical reasons, I am opposed to the present arrangement and proposed sale as it is presently conceived and planned.

I would fall off that opposition very quickly were the Saudis to make some gesture in writing openly guaranteeing the United States adequate control to secure these equipments, adequate manning to assure their effective use against the Soviet or Soviet proxy options.

I see no evidence as of yet that the Saudis are so inclined. Thank you.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, General Keegan.

Senator Jackson?

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to compliment General Keegan for an excellent articulation of the key issues.

I share your willingness to provide the protection, General, in that area. We all agree it is absolutely vital that we have early warning and also to be able to use the AWACS team in the event of an attack.

I want to ask you, we have command and control over AWACS in NATO, is that right; is that not correct?

General KEEGAN. That is correct.

Senator JACKSON. It is under SACEUR?

General KEEGAN. Yes.

Senator JACKSON. It is always under an American general; I believe a major general holds that spot at the present time as it relates to AWACS. You would be willing to deploy the forces under an arrangement in which there would be effective American control?

General KEEGAN. Yes, I think that is absolutely essential. The terms of that control, of course, we could be very flexible about. The NATO arrangement is one.

Some consider that because of the absence of a formal treaty, such as binds us within NATO, in the Middle East, then that approach would be difficult for us to achieve, but I think there are any number of forms in which the granting of control could be arranged with the Saudis.

Senator JACKSON. One of the key roles of AWACS, of course, is not just passive in terms of acquiring the necessary intelligence and information, but to be able to direct the air battle. Now, if they are going to direct the air battle, you are going to have to have in that battle competent aircraft manned by competent people who can professionally deal with any such attack; is that not correct?

General KEEGAN. That is correct.

Senator JACKSON. In your judgment, do the Saudis have that capability?

General KEEGAN. There are differences of opinion on this. Of course, the Saudis have never been tested. It has been my impression and that of many of my Air Force colleagues over the years who have had extensive exposure to Saudi pilots that in the main they are not competent, in the main they are not heavily motivated to fight one way or the other; and therefore I would expect that the F-15, which is easily the world's hottest fighter plane, would be used in a barely effective way, in an ineffective way.

Senator JACKSON. It would not be the best use of the aircraft if it were not properly manned?

General KEEGAN. I agree with that.

Senator JACKSON. This is the most sophisticated fighter in the world today if it is piloted by people who are professionally competent to utilize that equipment?

General KEEGAN. And motivated.

Senator JACKSON. And motivated.

General KEEGAN. And we have the experience of the Saudi pilots with the British Lightnings over a 20-year period. It is a record of incompetence that just simply is awesome to read about and to perceive. I think with Pakistani mercenaries, with American pilots, or, in fact, I believe, the State of Israel would be willing to guarantee the protection of the Arab oilfields, were they called upon to do so, because in a number of instances, as you know, it is Israeli intelligence that has saved the lives of one and possibly two Saudi Arabian kings from assassination.

The Israelis were motivated solely by an understanding of the need for stability in that area and how vital the oilfields and the Western access was.

We have another case, again possibly two, where the life of President Sadat may have been saved by intercession as a consequence of Israeli intelligence which they possessed about an impending assassination attempt.

I think the Israelis could defend those airfields for Saudi Arabia probably better than anyone else in the Middle East. I think the essential condition we must strive for is American pilots and American crews and service teams in command, control, and support in the manning of those equipments.

If the Saudis are serious, I cannot conceive of their agreeing to any other condition for the deployment and acceptance of those remarkable equipments.

Senator JACKSON. And we are doing that now; the four AWACS planes that are assigned to cover the Persian Gulf area are under American command and control at the present time; is that not correct?

General KEEGAN. That is correct. But the Saudis could order us out overnight.

Senator JACKSON. That is right. They have control; we have no lease arrangement for facilities or bases as such?

General KEEGAN. None.

Senator JACKSON. We are on a sort of ad hoc, temporary basis, as I understand it?

General KEEGAN. Yes.

Senator JACKSON. Depending on their wishes.

Now, I was pleased with your comment about the sophistication of the AWACS system in terms of representing the best in American technology. We had testimony on Monday which would leave one with the impression that, you know, you could get a big part of the equipment in a Radio Shack. I was a bit appalled by it and I think some of my colleagues were.

Again, I want to ask you this because of the stories that we wouldn't lose much if the Russians did get the AWACS. In your judgment, if that sophistication should fall into the hands of the

Soviets or adversaries of our country what would it do in terms of our own capability in this area?

General KEEGAN. And I would throw in the F-15 and AIM-9L.

Senator JACKSON. And the air-to-air missile?

General KEEGAN. The fact that F-15 pilots would write a letter to the U.S. Senate complaining about the sale of the AIM-9L, that is one of the most important pieces of technology and one of the very few advantages that we retain in the United States, granted it may be for a short time, in the question of air combat with the Soviet Union.

With regard to the AWACS, I share the thrust of your comment very much, Senator. (Those equipments may be old; they may have been designed years ago; there is not a foreign airplane flying that would have anything comparable, including the Nimrod, in my judgment, over the next 10 to 20 years.) I don't think the Soviets will be flying, although they are about to fly a IL-76, I understand, configured as an AWACS aircraft, I don't think the Soviets will come anywhere near achieving the capability and the competence of those supposedly aging equipments aboard the AWACS aircraft. I will be the first to acknowledge that the Air Force, in its effort to sell the AWACS and to demonstrate its competence to the Congress, has been guilty of very severe compromises in opening up access to Soviet interception of those unique and extraordinary signals.

But granting all that kind of compromise, I would come back to the position that those equipments are absolutely extraordinary; they are in the forefront of the defensive capability of the free world. I would protect them; I would be willing to go to considerable extremes to keep them from falling into Soviet hands.

Senator COHEN. Senator Jackson, would you allow him to expand on why he believes they have been compromised by the Air Force?

General KEEGAN. There was a great deal of congressional opposition early to the AWACS, if you will recall, and in our zealousness to demonstrate the extraordinary potential of this new technology we did demonstrate the AWACS in a number of rather open electronic environments in which, in my judgment, as chief of intelligence at the time, there were inadequate measures taken to encrypt or to conceal or to protect or to limit the exposure.

There is no question in my mind that Soviet electronic intelligence gathering gained a great deal from that exposure, but that does not bring them really anywhere near to duplicating what is aboard that aircraft which involves computer programs of extraordinary sensitivity and difficulty to duplicate, which involves radar antenna design and signal characteristics which, while generally well understood in the technical literature, I think would be very difficult to produce and to duplicate on the Soviet side.

We were careless, I think, in our zealousness to broaden the understanding of the capabilities of this equipment.

Senator JACKSON. Just one last question, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.

What is your assessment of the Nimrod vis-a-vis AWACS? The statement is made, as you know, "that if the Saudis don't get AWACS they can get Nimrod, which is practically the same thing."

General KEEGAN. The Nimrod is a very competent aircraft and I would not want its technology to be compromised to the Soviets. I don't think the Nimrod begins to approach the technical potential of the AWACS. You will notice that the Nimrod proposal, the latest one to go into independent production, came after the British had had years of study of the AWACS and had access to much of its technology, and as has been the case in previous industrial competitions, the British decided, after they had acquired the data they wanted, to go it on their own and ultimately compete, although I must say the British seem to be very evenhanded about the Saudi Arabian thing. It is quite clear they would be happy to sell the Nimrod. However, I don't think that aircraft begins to compare with the capabilities of the AWACS.

The British Nimrod is most competent against naval traffic, where its radar is optimized against the surface detection of ships. I think there it has a capability as good as or probably superior to that of the AWACS. It also has a number of intel-gathering systems onboard that I think are duplicates of American equipment which greatly enhance the potential of the Nimrod.

So, in any case, the Nimrod would be a valuable addition to the Saudis; it would be very difficult to work with the F-15 and it doesn't come anywhere near the potential, in my judgment, of the AWACS.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Humphrey?

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, General.

General KEEGAN. Good morning, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. You stated in your view the F-15/AWACS package would be largely ineffective against a determined Soviet attack on Saudi oilfields, apparently because you do not rate very highly the piloting skills of the Saudis; is that the basis of that statement?

General KEEGAN. In the main, yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. If that is true, then does it not also argue against the threat to Israel? Obviously, the Israeli pilots are among the best in the world. If, in your view, the Saudi pilots are not that skilled at present, does that not downplay the Saudi threat against Israel?

General KEEGAN. It certainly does. But, on the other hand, the requirement in the tank option which I discussed, the tank offensive through Jordan and the West Bank, I don't think a great deal of skill would be called for.

I can see the Saudis having considerable impact. In any case, the Israeli perception, I am certain, would be much worse than the actual threat. That is a personal judgment. On the other hand, it would remain a serious threat.

I think what the Saudis are going to do is recruit Pakistani mercenaries who have flown in a number of previous wars and who volunteered to fly in Syria in Yom Kippur and to fly Saudi aircraft and to fly Egyptian aircraft during the 1973 war. The Pakistani pilots are among the finest in the world. They are aggressive; they have that quality that you find in the Israeli, American, German and Royal Air Force pilots—they are fighters.

Senator HUMPHREY. Suppose the AIM-9L were eliminated from the package or in some way meaningful control could be kept over their use, how would you rate the threat in the scenario that you envision, the attack through Jordan?

General KEEGAN. The AIM-9L is the most potent air-defense weapon in the world, which makes it potent in an offensive mode. That technology is so crucial to retaining a technical and operational advantage on the U.S.-NATO side for the few years of whatever time that advantage will obtain, that I would go to extremes to keep that missile from falling into Soviet hands.

As a matter of fact, I rather deplore the fact that we have been so generous in the sale of this AIM-9L Sidewinder missile to some of our NATO allies who I don't think meet the standards of trustworthiness and security consciousness that are required in that environment which is heavily penetrated, as you know.

Senator HUMPHREY. If some sort of effective control over the use of the AIM-9L could be implemented, would that not significantly reduce the threat of the scenario you envision, this coordinated air attack through Jordan?

General KEEGAN. Yes, it could, except the AIM-9P Sidewinder which the Saudis already possess would still pose a formidable threat against a counterattacking Israeli low-level fighter-bomber force.

Senator HUMPHREY. I don't want to get into classified material.

General KEEGAN. No, I can't. I no longer have access.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Chairman, stop me if I get into a sensitive area.

Does the AIM-9P have the capability of being fired head on?

General KEEGAN. No; it does not.

Senator HUMPHREY. That would require considerable maneuvering, would it not?

General KEEGAN. Yes, except in the case of protecting a tank assault moving toward Israel, you would be firing principally in a direction that you could control because of your high altitude advantage, which would allow you to maneuver yourself.

[You know, the thrust of your first point is a very good one. I think the Israeli concern would have to be reduced somewhat if the AIM-9L were not advanced to the Saudis.] I can understand the American point of view. We are recommending to the Saudis a very small package to defend an area half the size of the United States against some very sophisticated threats, and if the United States intends to be in that area when that attack takes place, it would be very nice to have those weapons in place. Therefore, I think the Saudi assurances that they give us in writing, whether classified or not, are very central to my concerns, particularly about the Israelis.

Senator HUMPHREY. You are also concerned about the security of the AWACS aircraft itself. What is your opinion of the adequacy of the E-2 as a substitute?

General KEEGAN. The E-2 lacks the range. The E-2 as a sales package would create some problems, because we have some extremely sensitive intelligence capability onboard which compensates somewhat for the E-2's lack of adequate range. But the E-2, except for the range factor, would be a very satisfactory aircraft,

but it cannot be refueled and it doesn't have the range to meet the Saudi needs.

<The AIM-9L and the proposed American package for the defense of Saudi Arabia is an ideal one; it is one that I would very much push were I asked to develop an optimized defense capability for Saudi Arabia; but in view of Saudi Arabia's propensity for continuing at least its open opposition, and bankrolling that opposition to Israel, then I must take issue because of the political sensitivity, to giving these weapons to Saudi Arabia without guarantees that go beyond those that I know of.>

Senator HUMPHREY. What is your opinion of the potential of an improved SAM system as opposed to greater emphasis on aircraft air defense?

General KEEGAN. On the surface of it, it is a very attractive option. I think Saudi Arabia ought to have the best SAM's that money and technology can provide. While SAM's do provide a distinctive and attractive option for the Saudis, to defend that amount of geography and particularly those oilfields so vital to all in the West, you need an air defense package that is mobile and can move rapidly and that can be focused upon the most threatening of the various points. You also need aircraft.

I think you need both for a competent defense.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you think these farflung facilities can be defended? It seems to have been admitted that at best the refineries can be defended, but not the oilfields themselves, or the pipelines?

General KEEGAN. Can the pipelines be defended; is that the thrust of your question?

Senator HUMPHREY. No. My impression has been that almost everyone has given up on defending anything except the refineries themselves, so it is not a matter of defending farflung facilities; it is mostly a matter of centralized facilities, the refineries. In that case, wouldn't an improved air defense system based on surface-to-air missiles be satisfactory, versus increased aircraft capability?

General KEEGAN. I don't think it would be entirely satisfactory in the context of trying to assuage Israeli fears and perceptions. I think it would add measurably to Saudi capability. I am sure you recall that by 1986 the Saudis will have a much larger number of very expensive areas and points on the ground which they will be compelled to defend, because their command networks, their communications, their control, their intelligence monitoring, will be housed in a lot of those centers and they will require protection.

Missiles would be ideal in many respects.

Senator HUMPHREY. Assuming the AWACS deal goes through, how can we prevent its conversion to intelligence-gathering purposes?

General KEEGAN. Some of the equipments in the rear of the aircraft can be removed, but I would like to make clear my concern about the implications of that.

First of all, I guess we don't talk about these things, but something ought to be said, and with your permission I will say it, avoiding any security implications.

Chairman TOWER. May I say at this point, General, that if you want to submit anything for the record that is classified, we can include that in the committee's classified record.

General KEEGAN. Thank you.

Chairman TOWER. We do want to be very careful that we don't tread on classified ground.

General KEEGAN. These equipments, regardless of what any testimony suggests to the contrary, are absolutely essential to the protection of the AWACS. I for one could not conceive of a single American crewman being deployed to defend Saudi Arabia without the full protection acquired from the maximum technology that could be put onboard for intelligence-gathering, for early warning, for radar detection and for other command-and-control communication purposes.

∟ I think it would be a borderline criminal case for us to deploy American personnel aboard those aircraft, to take all those risks, without the most enhanced package of equipments and sensing capability possible. >

So, when somebody says we are going to be flying those aircraft but so long as the Saudis have their hand on them, too, we are going to downgrade the equipments, I think that is unconscionable. >

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you. My time is up.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Nunn?

Senator NUNN. I will pass for the moment.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Cohen?

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Comparing the AWACS or the AIM-9L falling into the hands of the Soviet Union, which would be the worst case for you, General, between the two? In other words, there is some talk about the possibility of splitting the package. Which is the worst threat to Israel or what would be worse to have fall in the hands of the Soviet Union? Within that Hobson's choice, what would be the worst case?

General KEEGAN. I am not certain that I know how to split that hair, Senator. Both of those packages would be of such enormous utility for the Soviets that I can't conceive allowing either.

There are extraordinary disadvantages to the AIM-9L warhead falling quickly into Soviet hands. I think there would be an extraordinary impact within 2 to 3 years, ending up with Soviet missiles copying the U.S. missiles and deploying them throughout the periphery. Such was the case with the earlier Sidewinder. From a long-term point of view, I consider the AWACS to be more important because of the many other functions that it can perform.

Senator COHEN. At the last hearing we had, General, I had an opportunity to read some language from a 1977 congressional report, during a hearing, at which time we were proposing to sell AWACS to the Iranians. I have read the following language:

∟ If the Soviets should gain access to the AWACS, they could move ahead, in the opinion of the Director of Central Intelligence, in 5 to 7 years in certain technologies and could learn how to jam any contemplated AWACS version. >

General Jones, in response to that particular statement indicated that was some 5 years ago—and, of course, the Soviets have made great leaps forward during that period of time—the implications being that we, of course, have done nothing during that time to

upgrade our own capability with the AWACS. Would you still agree with the essential statement made as far as the proposed sale to the Iranians of AWACS, that should they fall in the hands of the Soviets it would give them a 5- to 7-years jump in technology?

General KEEGAN. I lean toward the latter judgment. I think the radar technology, the command and control communications technology proposed for the AWACS and onboard the present AWACS constitute the single most jamproof systems of their kind in the world today. I think their seizure, capture, direct access to, by the Soviets would help the Soviets immeasurably.

There is a new ingredient, one which must be recognized, and maybe what General Jones was alluding to: The software programs which go into the computers for the use of those systems onboard the aircraft are not duplicable readily. Should they fall into Soviet hands, it would take the Soviets some considerable time to exploit, whereas we could change those programs rather quickly.

But I don't think this diminishes the essential fact that it is the basic design of the radar itself and some of the communications technology that contributes to the extraordinary jamproof potential of those equipments. I think to allow those to fall into Soviet hands, not really knowing how quickly the Soviets could exploit them, is something that must be avoided at all costs.

Senator COHEN. If the AWACS were to detect a Soviet airborne thrust at the oilfields, on what forces could the Saudis call?

General KEEGAN. I am not sure I understand the thrust of your question.

Senator COHEN. If the AWACS should detect a Soviet airborne thrust toward the oilfields, how would the Saudis defend against that? Whom would they call upon for help? Could they defend against a Soviet thrust themselves?

General KEEGAN. They could not, in my judgment.

Senator COHEN. With the United States some 6,000 miles away, would we be in a position—

General KEEGAN. Too little, too late. I think the first people who would respond would be the Israelis, and I think the Israelis would respond to a Saudi call of a frantic nature.

Senator COHEN. You said the British are very evenhanded with respect to the Saudis. What did you mean by that?

General KEEGAN. I mean they were evenhanded toward the United States, in that I sense from some of the public statements which have been made that they have given us some parole or some promissory considerations that they are not going to push the Nimrod so long as we are trying to work our resolution of the AWACS problem with the Saudis. But given a rejection by the Saudis or the United States, then the British would not at all be averse to selling the Nimrod.

Senator COHEN. Wasn't that the same position the British had with respect to the sale of AWACS to Iran?

General KEEGAN. I don't recall, Senator.

Senator COHEN. If you look back through the debate, as I have, you will find that the alternative was in the event the AWACS package should be rejected for Iran, that the Nimrod was going to be offered to the Iranians as a substitute.

Let me ask you: Would it be more difficult for the Nimrod to work with the French Mirage? You indicated it might be more difficult to work with the F-15. There was a suggestion that if the package was defeated as such, the French are more than willing to sell the Mirage, and the Saudis are willing to buy. Would the Nimrod be able to intergrate with the French Mirage?

General KEEGAN. Integration would be achieved with difficulty. All you need is a narrow band UHF radio you can broadcast on and you can make do with that. There is no question that the Nimrod can make do with that and the French Mirage can. It would be difficult and not too sophisticated.

Senator COHEN. You touched on the testimony. Secretary of Defense Weinberger indicated during his presentation that there is a difference between our security arrangement with NATO and what we have with the Saudis. With on NATO allies, we have an obligation to come to their rescue. We don't have such an obligation with the Saudis. I suggest that could be rectified rather easily by the President's declaring we intend to defend at all costs the Saudi oilfields, should they be attacked.

We are, in fact, planning to spend billions of dollars to create a Rapid Deployment Force in order to defend the Persian Gulf area. It would seem to me that that might be an indication clearly enough to the Saudis that we do have an interest, a vital interest, in protecting those oilfields, and that we intend to keep that commitment.

Under those circumstances, would that not be a significant enough arrangement, to say that we ought to have some joint command and control?

General KEEGAN. We are 6,000 miles away. I cannot conceive of the Saudis not granting the United States permanent rights access, manning, and adequate command and control for those equipments. As is, the Rapid Deployment Force is not going to be able to do anything, in my judgment, to defend those oilfields. However, I think the most serious threat to those oilfields will come from internal operations, sabotage, subversive operations, and in that context I don't see the sales package offering anything to the Saudis that will help them.

The question is, Will the Saudis protect themselves and will they go out and fight? The answer is I think not.

Senator COHEN. That is all I have right now, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Byrd?

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, your testimony is interesting and important. I have just two questions.

Do you consider that the sale of the AWACS to Saudi Arabia would jeopardize the security of Israel?

General KEEGAN. Yes; I do, sir.

Senator BYRD. Under what conditions would you feel that the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia would be justified?

General KEEGAN. Certainly in the case where the Saudis allowed us to retain control, allowed us to man, and allowed us to base, predeploy a substantial permanent force and presence in the Middle East that is denied for the express purpose of guaranteeing Free World access to those oilfields and for protecting the pipelines

to the optimum extent that we can contribute to their protection, I would insist on some of those terms provided for in secret agreements or in treaty form, but there are any number of variations in which this can take place.

The key is Americans who are willing to commit themselves ought to be allowed to commit themselves in a useful and guaranteed manner.

<The Saudis seem not to have been willing to do that, which raises my suspicions as to their long-range intentions and certainly must raise the suspicions of the Israelis.>

Senator BYRD. I am not clear on your response. Are you speaking of U.S. ground personnel?

General KEEGAN. Both, sir.

Senator BYRD. One of the conditions you would place on the sale would be that Saudi Arabia permit the deployment of U.S. ground personnel in Saudi Arabia?

General KEEGAN. That would be desirable, but not necessary, but the airmen would be an absolute necessary precondition.

Senator BYRD. I gather from what you say that you would not favor the sale unless the United States had complete control of the aircraft?

General KEEGAN. That is correct, sir. I fear that ultimately the Israelis, if we do go ahead with the sale package as presently configured politically and strategically, I think inevitably the Israelis are going to have to consider preempting and destroying those assets on the ground.>

I would deplore that from every point of view and I don't think it would serve our cause of stabilizing relations in that area of the world. As an Israeli planner, I could not tolerate the existence of those aircraft, both F-15, AIM-9L and AWACS, in Saudi Arabia under the terms of the present arrangement. I could not abide by that as an Israeli planner.

Senator BYRD. You are saying then that if these aircraft were sold to Saudi Arabia under the conditions of the proposed sale, that you as an Israeli planner would be forced to destroy those aircraft?

General KEEGAN. I would attach the highest national priority to their destruction and the timing of such a preemptive act would be a function of my perception of what the Saudis and their friends were up to by way of military movements, military maneuvers.

If there were a sudden gathering of tanks in deployment, the Israeli air force being very small and seriously overtaxed, especially when the fighting starts, there are more calls for their service than they could achieve, it would be a matter of the first priority for the Israeli air force to destroy those assets as rapidly as possible.

While I agree with the basic objectives of this administration, I think the specifics of the strategy that we are following are such that they invite misjudgment on the part of the Israelis and thus expose all parties to a preemptive act by the Israelis which would not serve anyone's interests, in my judgment.

Senator BYRD. Thank you.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Denton?

Senator DENTON. Good morning, General Keegan.

General KEEGAN. Good morning, sir.

Senator DENTON. I want to first express my respect for your most distinguished service to your country in the Air Force and your obvious expertise in the field of intelligence.

I wonder if you would agree that from the point of view of this present proposal, from the administration's point of view, counting in the administration all elements of the executive department, including the military, there appears to be more unanimity regarding the efficacy of the sale than in almost every other proposal that I can recall. This prompts me to believe that in spite of your own individual exceptions taken to this, that we have a great many other intelligence officers who do not share your opinion with respect to technology and the implications to Israel's security, and so forth. I make this statement based on the briefings I have received to date on the Saudi air defense proposal.

I want to share with you my determination that Israel's security be protected. I don't believe the sale compromises it, but I want to look into it with you.

We need, I am sure you would agree, when we are talking about such an important matter as this, relatively unbiased points of view. First and foremost, it should be looked at from the U.S. security point of view, and we should look at Israel and Saudi Arabia in a more judicious manner than those who have attached themselves to either cause after their military careers.

I want to ask you, have you been associated with Israeli fund drive dinners, and if so, have you been associated with any Arab or Saudi fund drive dinners?

General KEEGAN. I have in the Israeli case. I have never been asked by the Arabs or Saudis. My reasons in the Israeli case for speaking at their Israeli bond dinners have always been expressed very clearly at the outset, that I am neither pro Israeli nor pro Arab. What I am doing in speaking for a strong Israeli defense capability, I am speaking for the security interests of the United States, and that remains my sole consideration. I have spoken before hundreds of non-Jewish groups, including a great many religious groups. I have the same message for all audiences—my main theme always being the inadequacy of our land, sea, air, and strategic forces.

At such time as the Israelis in their own defense cease serving our own national interest, I shall cease supporting an active and effective defense for Israel. Thus far, that has not been the case. (I would remind you, in the context of your question, sir, that I was the recipient for many years of millions of dollars worth of intelligence from the State of Israel. It is a matter that I regret is not publicly understood more than it is. We have received untold quantities of aircraft equipments, of top secret Soviet manuals and handbooks, of important Soviet radars.) I doubt very much that the 6th Fleet could have maintained its posture forward over the past 20 years except for the passage of information on Soviet naval forces to our own fleet.

Chairman TOWER. Would you please yield at this point?

I think it is not wise to discuss sources and methods in an open hearing.

Senator DENTON. Yes, sir. I regard Israel as a very good friend and strong anchor of mutual interdependence in terms of security.

I was on the 6th Fleet staff and a member of the Command Strike Force South, and am intimately familiar with what you are talking about.

General KEEGAN. I mention that in the context that without this information our ability to carry out our defense functions in NATO would be infinitely more complicated than they have been, and if I may, sir, I would add, for your consideration, a larger question—

Senator DENTON. I want to pursue the question, if I may, of your involvement with Israel since retirement. I would rather, if I may, since I only have 10 minutes for questions and answers.

General KEEGAN. Very well. I have answered that question.

Senator DENTON. Have you been involved with the Israelis on security matters? Have you had visits to Israel on that basis?

General KEEGAN. I have visited prior to my retirement.

Senator DENTON. But not since your retirement?

General KEEGAN. I had one visit immediately following my retirement, in which I was a guest of the Israeli defense chief during which they went to considerable lengths to answer a number of questions that had remained unanswered in my mind while on active duty, about the nature of the evolving threat after Yom Kippur. I was shown a great deal. I toured most of the military sites and installations, talked to many Israeli commanders in the field. I used to do that throughout the Arab world, but I have not been privileged to do that in more than 10 years. That is the only visit that I have had since.

Senator DENTON. You have raised a number of issues this morning regarding scenarios for attacks on Israel by tanks and so forth, which I think you would agree would require several weeks of discussion, even between two experts in the field, to resolve. Some discussions took place during the last hearing in which it was postulated that perhaps the AWACS sale would result in some harm or some threat to the preemptive war capability of Israel as if perhaps it is a U.S. obligation to insure that Israel retain a preemptive strike capability and we not interfere with that. I just mention that in passing.

Sir, when you talk, from your intelligence background, about the difficulty to jam the radar and communications of the AWACS, I would have to respectfully take exception. I do not believe that the AWACS communications equipment which the Saudis would possess would be difficult to jam at all.

General KEEGAN. Except that the package we have had under development for 7 years, which we had initially proposed be sold to Saudi Arabia, has one of the most sophisticated communications technologies devised.

Senator DENTON. I refer to the present version that would go to them.

General KEEGAN. I have no knowledge that this technology is not going to be provided to the Saudis because we would require it for our own crews.

Senator DENTON. That has been the assurance given the Senate and it is my understanding that that is not classified information.

General KEEGAN. I hope you have received such an assurance, but I would very much like to see the fine print.

Senator DENTON. Do you believe that the Israeli intelligence forces regard as seriously as you do this AWACS matter? Frankly, I don't. I say that the AWACS could not hang up there and help coordinate a defense against Israeli aircraft while a coordinated international tank attack was made against Israel to split it in half. I would have to note that as a flier for many years, that in an environment which requires it to remain forward deployed, the chances of AWACS remaining airborne that close to Israeli airfields, 200 miles, in order to negate the terrain masking that does exist, would result in about zero probability of that AWACS surviving that type of mission. That is my operational opinion.

General KEEGAN. I would not share that view.

Senator COHEN. Mr. Chairman, if we are going to get into a discussion what the Israeli intelligence feels about the AWACS, I would suggest that we have to be in a closed session.

Chairman TOWER. I have already cautioned the witness about discussing sources and methods here. I now caution members.

Senator DENTON. We do agree to disagree that with the Israeli capability with aircraft and missiles, that the Saudi AWACS wouldn't last very long. I don't think it would. I don't think anyone operationally familiar with the situation would believe so either. That has been the testimony of individuals presently in the armed services, and knowledgeable about this proposal.

My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Nunn?

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, do you believe that having the AWACS in Saudi Arabia as we do now under American control is desirable from the point of view of protecting the Persian Gulf?

General KEEGAN. Yes, sir, I do.

Senator NUNN. So, you would like to see the AWACS there?

General KEEGAN. I would.

Senator NUNN. But you would like to see it under American control; is that correct?

General KEEGAN. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. What is your view of the Nimrod compared to the AWACS in effectiveness? Maybe you have already answered this.

General KEEGAN. I think the Nimrod has a slightly greater potential in the maritime area but if and when all of the enhancement packages that we had designed years ago for the AWACS are installed, I think then the AWACS will become the single most effective naval surveillance system in the world.

Senator NUNN. If this sale doesn't go through and if the Saudis turn to the Nimrod, would you then find it desirable from an American military point of view to maximize our efforts so that we can coordinate with the Nimrod?

General KEEGAN. We would have to, if we are serious about what it is we intend to do.

Senator NUNN. We would have to coordinate with the Nimrod if it were there?

General KEEGAN. Yes.

Senator NUNN. We have to have the Nimrod or AWACS or some kind of capability there in order to protect the Persian Gulf?

General KEEGAN. Yes, sir; I agree with that.

Senator NUNN. Would you agree with Gen. P. X. Kelley; who has said without air cover—air superiority, any Rapid Deployment Force mission in the Middle East would be foredoomed?

General KEEGAN. Yes, sir, I do agree.

Senator NUNN. Putting yourself in the place of an Israeli military planner, you mentioned if AWACS was there, one of your high priorities under certain contingencies would be preemptive strikes. Putting that Israeli planner's hat on, if the Nimrod is there, what would be your view toward that capability?

General KEEGAN. If the conditions of the Saudi employment of the Nimrod were such that the Saudis have exclusive control, their own manning and are in charge all the way, then I think the Israelis would take a dim view of that, but I think their perception would be somewhat less than it would be in the case of the AWACS deployment. I don't think the Israelis would be quite as concerned.

Senator NUNN. Does that mean they would go after it 1 minute later in a preemptive strike, or does it mean they would wait an hour, or does it mean it would no longer be on their preemptive strike list?

General KEEGAN. I think they would wait a prudent amount of time, which would be 1 minute or 1 hour.

Senator NUNN. It would still be on the preemptive hit list?

General KEEGAN. Yes, sir; it would have to be.

Senator NUNN. If the Saudis control their own Nimrod or control their own AWACS, as is proposed in this sale, either way, unless there is some kind of dual control, do you see that system, whichever it may be, as being high on the Israeli preemptive hit list?

General KEEGAN. I do, sir.

Senator NUNN. General, as far as sale of the AWACS to Israel by the United States, if we were to sell the AWACS to Israel, would you view that as also being a dangerous step unless U.S. control were retained?

General KEEGAN. Here I have to shift gears. I think if we really mean to stabilize the regional situation in the Middle East, I would be delighted to see the AWACS go to Israel, whether flown by American personnel or not. In the first place, the Israelis are much more trustworthy from a security point of view. Their security is first rate.

No. 2, while we have a lot of evidence that the Israelis will go their own way and very much push the agreements they have with us not to use some of their equipments in certain types of actions that are interpreted to be offensive in nature, I can't measure the reliability of the Israelis there when it comes to determining that in their own national interest they must take an action against a neighbor that we would consider inimical to our own interests. I can't answer that question. But if our objective is to help stabilize the regional problems in the Middle East, the deterrence of another series of Arab aggressions against Israel, which is much to our interest, would be enhanced markedly by the sale of the AWACS aircraft solely because of the endurance capability that it provides.

The E-2C we are now providing is really providing much of what they sought from the AWACS.

Senator NUNN. You would make a fundamental distinction, you would not insist on U.S. control or U.S. manning if we were to sell that same equipment to the Israelis?

General KEEGAN. I would not, but, on the other hand, I would want some tightly woven fine print that carefully specified what the Israelis could and could not do, and I would insist upon some assurance that the Israelis are not free to take any initiative action against any neighbor that would be inimical to the security interests of the region and those of the United States or to those of our allies in Japan and Western Europe as regards the oilfields.

Senator NUNN. What would you place in the agreement in the fine print that is not already in the agreement on the weapons that are there?

General KEEGAN. I don't know. I would have to think about it, Senator, but I would insist on some rather airtight conditions.

Senator NUNN. Well, General, let me ask you this: Do you think that the United States should or should not try to take an evenhanded approach in the Middle East, say, between Israel and Saudi Arabia and Egypt and those kinds of countries?

General KEEGAN. The answer to that question, again, is a subjective one; it is a function of the perceptions of the parties involved. I happen to believe that U.S. aid and sales programs to Israel and to the Arab countries which have always had as an intent evenhandedness—questions can be raised about whether those actions were evenhanded or not—as I look back over the past years, whatever our efforts were on both sides, they contributed to five wars.

◁When you see a small country of 3½ million people facing an array of 210 million, with a mobilization potential of 10 million people under arms, and an array of people whose nation by 1985 or 1986 will possess as much advanced weaponry as all of NATO, what this does is drive the Israeli pressure factor up. Then we have a situation such as we had in 1967, where Israel considered itself so vulnerable that on the acquisition of the first intelligence inkling that she was about to be assaulted, she preempted.▷

Senator NUNN. I certainly agree with that. I don't discount that at all. I think you make a very valid point. I think you have made a number of valid points here.

My difficulty is how we protect the oilfields of a country that we deem to be in the Western security interests without the good will of that particular country. Can we really protect the Saudi oilfields and the Persian Gulf without Saudi cooperation?

General KEEGAN. We can't in the final analysis.

Senator NUNN. We cannot?

General KEEGAN. We cannot, in my judgment. Yes, I would agree that we have to retain the good will of the Saudis in order to be able to make an optimum contribution; but then I have to raise the larger question: What happens when we try to raise the support and the popular acceptance of a regime that is feudal, oligarchic, nonrepresentative and that exists at the whim of two or three rulers? What then is the legitimacy and the solidity of any agreement that we make with a nation like that, and how do you achieve acceptance in dealing with people like that?

It wasn't my intention today, but since you have raised the question, I take a bit of umbrage at the many historians who look

at our relations with the Saudis in the past 20 years and continue to write and publish and declaim the solidarity and the friendship and the receptivity between the two of us. We have had good relations.

I read history also, as you do, sir, and I do not view that at all. I don't think the Saudis are our friends. I think the Saudis hold as much responsibility as anyone else in the world for exacerbating the oil prices, the trade embargoes that have almost crippled the Third World and deeply oppressed the economies of the major industrial nations of the world.

I think it is the Saudis who have double-dealt us while attempting to appear publicly as our friends in the OPEC oil embargoes. The fact that they say, "Look, we are your friends; we are overproducing; we are holding the price \$2 a barrel below the rest of the OPEC level"; the fact of the matter is that the Saudis have been the prime instigators and prime movers, and I have been unaware they have been our friends in any of these major ventures.

Senator NUNN. What would you think about selling the AWACS to Egypt, if that came up?

General KEEGAN. I absolutely would not sell the AWACS to Egypt.

Senator NUNN. Do you think we have any friends in the Arab World, any reliable friends?

General KEEGAN. Not really.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Warner?

Senator WARNER. The driving force behind this whole equation is the protection of the oilfields. Would you give your strategic evaluation of those oilfields to the free world?

General KEEGAN. I think the security of these oilfields in terms of guaranteed western access at the present time is essential and is a vital requirement for all of the countries of NATO, Japan, and ourselves. That is why I said at the outset that I am in complete sympathy with the objectives and the goals of this administration from a national security point of view.

I think the protection of those assets is high on the priority list of this administration and I support our efforts to do something meaningful. But I think the premises and the assumptions under which our policies are evolving seem to me quite faulty in a number of respects, which I have outlined here this morning.

Unless we proceed in a more realistic way, I foresee failure in U.S. policies, because neither the Rapid Deployment Force nor the provision of the F-15/AWACS team, whether it be manned by the Saudis, ourselves, or mercenaries like the Pakistanis, will make a meaningful contribution in the event the Soviets decide to assault those oilfields. I don't think the Soviets will do that.

Senator WARNER. That brings to mind the question you raised earlier. If those fields are a very big priority to the West, and then my notes reflect that you said that the most serious threat to the fields are internal as opposed to external, how do we participate in the protection of the fields?

General KEEGAN. Then I think our approach would have to be entirely different.

Senator WARNER. What would that be?

General KEEGAN. That would entail countersubversive, counter-sabotage operations that call for the skills of Green Beret-type operators. It calls for counterinsurgency experience; it calls for that whole lesser dimension of indirect warfare. I think this is where the main threat comes from.

Senator WARNER. Are we moving in the wrong direction now in terms of these strategic assets, AWACS, F-15? We should be putting emphasis on the Green Beret subversive type of protection?

General KEEGAN. No, sir. You have to have both, in my judgment. The air attack threat is a realistic option and it is one of great importance. The Saudis have to have an ability to protect themselves and those oilfields. But concomitantly, if the Saudis are unwilling to mount what I consider to be prudent operations to protect those assets and resources from sabotage, from ground-borne penetration and infiltration, from insurgency, they are not going to succeed.

This is why I would like to see our land forces play a much larger role, at least in an advisory and training capacity, with the Saudis, if we are to succeed.

Senator WARNER. Does Israel benefit in any way from these oilfields?

General KEEGAN. Yes; she does.

Senator WARNER. Now, you mentioned in response to Senator Nunn's question that you would not want to see the AWACS go to Egypt. Is there a possible solution here where AWACS goes both to Saudi Arabia and to Israel?

General KEEGAN. Provided they are manned and controlled by American personnel or adequate security arrangements are made.

Senator WARNER. Would you have that manning situation parallel in both countries, or would you differentiate?

General KEEGAN. It could be parallel, but I would have to study that to give you a well-thought-through answer.

Senator WARNER. Your proposed solution, as I noted here, was that the United States retain control over the aircraft, man them, base and predeploy such supplies and manpower as necessary to protect them; is that the framework?

General KEEGAN. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. The question is, what is the Saudi participation under that format?

General KEEGAN. Anything you want to make it, anything you feel is essential. They can share in the decisions; they can have exclusive control in a number of areas. They can have a number of consultative arrangements so that they be assured that we are not going to operate irresponsibly.

The Saudis have concerns that are legitimate from their point of view and obviously those are going to have to be answered and assuaged in some form. So, without going into more particulars than that, I think I would be very openminded about the sort of arrangements that could be worked out, so that the national aspirations, legitimate ones, of the Saudis are fulfilled and protected, as is the case with those of the Egyptians.

But in the ultimate answer—and I have said this many times publicly—until such day as every Arab in every Arab nation has the same rights as private citizens, as do the Israelis, the right to

vote, the right to express free will, until such time there will never be peace in the Middle East. >

The Arabs are among the most peaceloving people in the world, and that I have ever dealt with, but they don't get a chance to make those aspirations felt through their leadership, which in the main in the past 1,000 years has been represented by dictatorships of the left and the right.

That is the ultimate solution and I think is what the United States could be doing a great deal about in its diplomacy to push short of the very important immediate military appreciations we have discussed.

Senator WARNER. Are you indicating a human rights program should be an integral part of any arms transaction with the modern Arab World?

General KEEGAN. No, sir. I would not correlate them, but I wouldn't separate them either.

Senator WARNER. In your proposal you refer to secret agreements, perhaps treaties, between the United States and the Saudi Government. That concerns me. What would be the nature of these secret agreements? Would they draw us into a conflagration with another third party against our will?

General KEEGAN. I think that would depend on the circumstances. The secret provisions might affect operational details of how we operate together to defend against Soviet attack on which both sides are agreed as to the nature of the common enemy.

I think we would have to have some agreements regarding the radical Arab state threat that could be reflected in treaty, the operational details of which might have to be secret; but with regard to other power relationships within the Middle East, we would have to look at it on a case-by-case basis. Of course, the U.S. Congress ultimately would have to be very careful and judicious about protecting the United States from unwarranted intervention.

Senator WARNER. Let us take a practical application of this theory of yours, whereby U.S. pilots fly the planes, say, the F-15's, supposing U.S. pilots were operating the F-15's and a third-party nation, antagonistic toward the Saudis, were to engage those planes, would our pilots then presumably protect themselves or the sovereignty of Saudi Arabia?

General KEEGAN. Depending on the preagreed upon guidance of the Congress.

Senator WARNER. What do you mean by that?

General KEEGAN. Any threat would have to be approved by the U.S. Congress and there might be a number of circumstances in which the Congress would be unwilling to see the United States involved in a war involving a third party that was not to our interests to be involved in and in a war which might or might not affect the oilfield interests.

>The alternative, of course, is to see mercenaries fly those aircraft. The Saudis, in my judgment, will not use them effectively except in a bumbling offensive role.>

Senator WARNER. Take, for example, the incident recently in the Meditterrean where our pilots engaged Libyan aircraft. There were split second decisions made there by our pilots. I find it difficult to understand how our pilots flying F-15's as cover for the AWACS

system could make those split second decisions in terms of all the potential adversaries against Saudi Arabia.

General KEEGAN. They could not. The principal contingencies would have to be preagreed. The Mediterranean contingency has been in the planning for 10 years.

Senator WARNER. I agree with you on that.

General KEEGAN. It was very clear to all personnel down to the pilots themselves what the conditions of involvement would be. So, when the actual moment came we were optimized, we were ready, and we were at the trigger.

Senator WARNER. Right. Is there the same clarity in situation in the air spaces over Saudi Arabia?

General KEEGAN. Not at present, in my thinking.

Senator WARNER. When will it be in the future?

General KEEGAN. Only as a function of our making it so. When that will be, I don't know. It would involve Soviet attacks, direct attack by an Arab radical power, direct attack by a consortium of third parties against the oilfields. We could preagree on a set of those circumstances; but on the question of the Saud family continuing some of their tribal enmities against some of their neighbors, we would probably draw the line.

Senator WARNER. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Quayle?

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General, would you oppose this sale if the AWACS part of it were dropped? Would you support the sale of the enhancement of the F-15 package?

General KEEGAN. If the AWACS were dropped, I would be willing to support the F-15 sale minus the AIM-9L Sidewinder.

Senator QUAYLE. The Sidewinder is part of the enhancement package, so that would be your remaining reservation?

General KEEGAN. Yes.

Senator QUAYLE. In listening to your discussion—and I am sorry I was not here for all of it—I understand that your reluctance comes down to the control issue which, quite frankly, has been the issue that has generated opposition and lack of support in the Senate.

When you talk about the need for American control over AWACS, are you essentially recommending that we continue operating it as is, maintaining the present status quo, and if that is the case, would you be in a position to support this sale?

General KEEGAN. I would have to know what the status quo is. I do not.

Basically, what we have right now. I don't know what responsibility we have for the protection of the security of Egypt. I don't know what responsibilities have been assigned to our operational commanders in determining what counteroffensive actions they would be allowed to take, and against whom. I don't know what has transpired in that respect.

My understanding, which may be in error, is that those forces are deployed there principally to protect the oilfields from attack by the Soviets, by Soviet proxies or Arab radical groupings of a threatening nature. That is newspaper source; I do not know what

the terms of the agreements are on the authorities of the American personnel that are manning those equipments.

Senator QUAYLE. I would like to ask you to objectively outline some concepts that we could pursue to reach a compromise on the issue before us. In general, my personal inclinations are to support the President in the area of foreign policy; however, with the way this situation has been handled to date, and particularly the control aspect, it would be very difficult for me, as with a majority of the U.S. Senate, to support the sale.

If our interest is to allow flexibility and we approach the problem on the premise that we want to support the President in foreign policy matters, we have several parties to be satisfied. We have U.S. interests, Saudi Arabian concerns on the sovereignty issue, and we have the protection and security of Israel to consider. Those are three distinct competing entities.

I wonder if you could try to outline areas of AWACS control that would be perhaps satisfactory to Saudi Arabia and the United States, and would mute some of the opposition from Israel? Could you define for us some of the concepts that we ought to be exploring—a compromise agreement, a modification, if you will—to see this sales package passed?

General KEEGAN. I have no illusions about my ability from the top of my head to do a balanced job. I would say the most essential precondition to this administration is being able to fulfill the objective which it holds for that area, which I support fully. My quarrel is with the premises and the assumptions underlying the proposed agreements that we have in the making with Saudi Arabia. The one precondition that dominates all of these is that involving the Saudi's continued public expression that their principal priority securitywise remains, as it has always been, the recovery of the city of Jerusalem and the extermination of the State of Israel in a holy war; their continued financial support of the PLO, whom they loathe and despise and fear; their continued massive support of the Syrians who continue to get an equal share of their principal support from the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia; the continued support of the regime in Iraq; and the role that the Saudis continue to play with the other Arab States.

◁Now, unless the Saudis are willing to forswear publicly and clearly and convincingly the fact that their principal priority in life and principal determination is to see the extermination of the State of Israel, I cannot see any condition under which the present package of arrangements is likely to work or assuage the fears and concerns of the Israelis.▷

◁If the Saudis genuinely want our protection, they can get it willingly because our larger commitment, which is typical for the United States, as to the greater good of the free world and the industrial nations, we genuinely want to see Europe secure. We don't want to see NATO threatened by the loss of access to oil. Those are all sincere, important objectives that I share and hold. They are truly meaningless in the light of the continued Saudi commitment to their national objectives, as frequently expressed publicly.▷

As a matter of fact, I find that what we are doing is not unlike the manner in which we have handled the Soviet Union in the last

20 years, acquiring many treaties and arriving at a number of agreements and accords which the Soviets have repeatedly violated, a fact long covered up by some of our intelligence agencies, by maintaining agreements that have unilaterally disadvantaged the United States in spite of all the facts.

That is how we got into SALT. That is how we got into the unequal arrangements of détente. That is how we got into the technology giveaway. That is how we got into the faulty politicized intelligence assessments of the U.S.S.R.

I find that our assumptions and perceptions about the realities in the Arab world are comparable to the faulty assumptions that have characterized U.S. relations with the Soviets all these years.

If you want the bottom line to your question, sir, and I dislike putting this on the record, but I will, I think the reason for this deal fundamentally is dollars, petrodollars, and the earning potential of the United States to recover some of these dollars amounting to \$30, \$40, \$50 billion downstream. We want our fair share.

I think as much pressure is quietly coming behind the scenes toward our doing what we have done and are now trying to do as anything that I know. I think it is dollars and I think it is intimidation of the United States by the Saudis, knowing what they can do if they decide to behave irresponsibly as they have done on the question of oil prices.>

Senator QUAYLE. Whose idea do you think it was to sell AWACS to Saudi Arabia?

General KEEGAN. I can't pinpoint it.

Senator QUAYLE. Give us your opinion.

General KEEGAN. All right, if you promise not to hold it against me, sir.

Senator QUAYLE. We would not do that, General.

General KEEGAN. I think the AWACS deal was borne out of, one, a sincere Saudi effort to seek help from the United States through the auspices of the U.S. Air Force, to survey, surveil, overview, examine, and consider Saudi Arabia's legitimate defense needs for the protection of the oilfields against Soviet direct attacks, proxy attacks, radical Arab nations. In a number of Air Force surveys I consider the Department of Defense's work a little short of brilliant. We came up with a package that considered a small number of aircraft, limited assets, small means, and we proposed a set of packages for the defense of Saudi Arabia's airspace that is one of the best, most comprehensive packages that I have ever seen.

<I think there was reached a point in which the Congress was being very negative about the AWACS. The Air Force, knowing that this was one of the truly great breakthroughs in technology in defense since World War II, in which the Air Force foresaw the volume of sales would be very limited, unit costs would be very high, at some juncture the proposals to the Saudis became advocacy within the Department of Defense. That is my judgment> I can't prove it. I don't think it is necessarily a relevant part of our discussion, but I responded to your question.

I think there has been that element that has crept into this business and I think it is unfortunate that all that hard work of many, many years should bring me to the point of being here. I am a very reluctant witness, you know; I really had not wanted to

express myself publicly on this whole matter, because I am not certain about the rights and the wrongs and what all the conditions ought to be to protect the essential interest of all; but so long as the Saudis continue to oppress us economically, to blackmail and intimidate us, as I believe they have done since 1970, when they first began considering raising oil prices, long before OPEC on the oil price question, so long as they have continued to bankroll the forces of aggression in the Middle East, then so long as those conditions prevail, I can see no agreements of the kind you are asking me to define that will solve the needs of either the United States or the Saudis or the Israelis.

Short of that, from an Israeli point of view, the strongest possible defense they can maintain is going to be essential.

What I do deplore very much is that in the way we have been trying to treat both parties to this terrible conflict equally, I think we have helped to bring about the last four of the five wars, because there is no way that we can be equitable.

So, you have to consider who is the more responsible party and that comes down to the question that Senator Warner raised, and my response.

At such time as there is in the Arab world, from Morocco to Iraq, some form of representative government in which the free will of the average Arab can be expressed through some form of parliamentary, constitutional system, it matters not, then you shall have all of the requirements for the making and the reaching of peace.

So long as you have these messianic regimes of the right and of the left, taking these decisions in their hands, I don't see that we have any equitable basis for arriving at a fair resolution of these very legitimate objectives of ours.

Senator QUAYLE. My time is up, General.

In summary, you have said that basically the idea for selling the AWACS generated from a sincere study to one of advocacy?

General KEEGAN. I think advocacy grew out of that.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you very much.

Chairman TOWER. General, you said earlier that Saudi Arabia constituted a threat to neighboring states. I assume you are referring to Oman and the emirates?

General KEEGAN. Yes, sir.

Chairman TOWER. Do you have any evidence that any members of the Gulf Corporation Council, which has been formed by Saudi Arabia, Oman, the emirates, the three other gulf states, have any opposition to this sale?

General KEEGAN. No; no recent evidence at all, sir.

Chairman TOWER. So, you have no evidence that the other states in the region that are a member of that Gulf Corporation Council oppose the sale?

General KEEGAN. No, sir, I do not. (What I was alluding to was historical and older evidence of the enmities between the Saud family and the princelings of the various sheikdoms and emirates.)

Chairman TOWER. You also said the Arabs have been exploiting us since 1970. I happen to remember that in 1970 they were selling us oil for \$1.50 a barrel. We could only produce it in Texas for \$3 a barrel and we were stacking rigs. I don't understand what the

exploitation was at that time, except poor old Texas oilmen were going broke. They are getting well now, I might add. [Laughter.]

General KEEGAN. There is published historical evidence, I believe, that the Saudis were actively considering sharp price increases as early as 1970.

Chairman TOWER. In response to a question by Senator Cohen, you said, I quote, and check me if I am not right on this, "Will the Saudis protect themselves, go out and fight? The answer is no."

General KEEGAN. I don't believe that they will, sir.

Chairman TOWER. Then why do you believe that they would join a pan-Arab attack on Israel?

General KEEGAN. Because it is a matter of messianic—

Chairman TOWER. In other words, they would not protect themselves, but they would mount an offensive war against Israel?

General KEEGAN. Yes, sir.

Chairman TOWER. You don't think there is any inconsistency in this?

General KEEGAN. No sir, I question the amount of stomach they have. They will furnish the dollars and they will be delighted to do so. The brigade they inserted into Syria through Jordan in the 1973 war got punched in the nose one morning by the Israelis. They got punched very hard and that was the end of the Saudi effort, and they withdrew very quickly.

Chairman TOWER. That still seems to be inconsistent with your scenario of the Saudis manning a pan-Arab war, using their equipment, 8 billion dollars' worth of AWACS plus the F-15's, putting all that at risk.

Let me refer to a statement that you made before the House Appropriations Committee. Congressman Livingston read to you a quotation from the U.S. Defense Department AWACS briefing. That statement asserted that AWACS could not see targets on the ground, could not even differentiate between cities and deserts; AWACS cannot collect electronic signal intelligence data, see tanks, troops on the ground or ground targets, see much beyond 200 miles to detect low-flying planes, take photos, perform jamming.

Now, you answered Mr. Livingston by saying the statements were essentially untrue.

Now, let us focus on the various elements of those statements, to determine where you and the Department of Defense disagree.

First, can the AWACS be used to collect electronic signal intelligence?

General KEEGAN. The answer is yes, sir.

Chairman TOWER. The Department of Defense says no.

General KEEGAN. I think they are wrong.

Chairman TOWER. That the AWACS has no capability for gathering SIGINT, in fact not even the fully equipped AWACS will have signal gathering capability.

General KEEGAN. That is not so. Of course we would have to get into a classified discussion but the answer to the question is we had such equipment aboard that aircraft flying in 1977.

Chairman TOWER. I think that is something that we will check out.

General KEEGAN. I don't think we can go into details publicly but we had those equipments on board in 1977.

Chairman TOWER. Can the AWACS see ground troops or ground targets?

General KEEGAN. It cannot see troops on the ground. It can detect movement on the ground.

Chairman TOWER. At what speed?

General KEEGAN. Well, in 1976 I was able to detect, while flying over Andrews Air Force Base at 30,000 feet, aircraft taking off at John F. Kennedy and LaGuardia Airports in New York.

Chairman TOWER. That is aircraft. Can it pick up a tank?

General KEEGAN. We do not see tanks unless they are friendly tanks with a beacon on board.

Chairman TOWER. Are there any tanks that are capable of exceeding 80 miles an hour?

General KEEGAN. No, there are not but we can detect movements of vehicles at speeds well under 80 miles an hour, and have.

Chairman TOWER. Can AWACS detect low-flying aircraft much beyond 200 miles?

General KEEGAN. It depends on the size of the aircraft. Large aircraft beyond 200 miles, yes, sir.

Chairman TOWER. Large aircraft would not be a threat, would it, General?

General KEEGAN. It would be a bomber of some kind, light bomber, heavy bomber, medium bomber. I think smaller aircraft 200 miles is very close to the threshold.

Chairman TOWER. The information provided by the Defense Department holds that with the AWACS operating at an altitude of 29,000 to 30,000 feet the curvature of the Earth limits the radar horizon to approximately 220 miles. That is not a radar power, it is a function of geometry.

General KEEGAN. I would suggest, if I may, Senator, that you ask the Department of Defense that question in a classified mode.

Chairman TOWER. Can the AWACS take photos?

General KEEGAN. No, sir, there is no need for it to do so.

Chairman TOWER. Can the AWACS be used to jam communications on other radar transmissions?

General KEEGAN. It can if the jamming packages are added to the AWACS.

Chairman TOWER. The AWACS has no jamming capability?

General KEEGAN. It depends on the equipments that are onboard.

Chairman TOWER. Currently, ours don't have it. It is not likely we would provide it for the Arabs.

General KEEGAN. I am unaware of that today. It is merely a function of the packages you put onboard. Initially we saw little need for electronic jamming capability.

Chairman TOWER. General, have you ever flown in a Nimrod?

General KEEGAN. Yes, sir, I have.

Chairman TOWER. How long ago?

General KEEGAN. Late 1976.

Chairman TOWER. Are you familiar with the current version of Nimrod and the equipment in it? Have you been briefed on it? Have you seen it?

General KEEGAN. Not in any classified detail. I do talk to a number of British senior aviators every year and I read all their technical publications that are not classified. Those have discussed Nimrod capability at length.

Chairman TOWER. You stated that high on the target list for the Israelis, indeed imperative for them in a preemptive strike situation, would be to get the AWACS. Is that correct?

General KEEGAN. Yes, sir.

Chairman TOWER. Do you think Israel will be deterred from that if there were American crew members aboard?

General KEEGAN. To an extent. You will recall the *Liberty* incident of course, which I happen to think was a deliberate Israeli effort to sink an American manned ship when they determined in their judgment that that ship was passing signal data that it did not want passed, on the Israeli forces.

(So it is difficult to tell what the Israelis are capable of doing in their own self-interest, but I do think they would be deterred significantly by the presence of American airmen onboard.)

Chairman TOWER. General, do you believe that Israel should be our only strategic partner in the Middle East?

General KEEGAN. No, sir, I do not.

Chairman TOWER. You stated, I believe, that there are 10 million men under arms in the Moslem world. Is that correct?

General KEEGAN. That is their mobilization potential. I don't think anyone knows precisely.

Chairman TOWER. My understanding is that there are only a million such men. Can you give us the source for your estimate?

General KEEGAN. Basically it is the information on the reservists which come from our own attachés which have been based throughout the Middle East for years. Those were the estimates on mobilization potential at the time I left the service. I have seen nothing in the public print since to change those.

Chairman TOWER. I will supply figures for the record that show that the aggregate of regular forces is 1,049,000. If you can provide any contrary material for the record, we would be delighted to have it. I will just note some of those.

Iran has 320,000, Jordan 67,000, Syria 22,000, Saudi Arabia 45,000 plus the national guard of 20,000, et cetera. I will provide that for the record.

[The information follows:]

TOTAL MILITARY FORCES IN THE ARAB WORLD

| | |
|----------------------------------|---------|
| Syria..... | 247,500 |
| Jordan..... | 67,200 |
| Egypt..... | 367,000 |
| Lebanon..... | 23,000 |
| Saudi Arabia ¹ | 65,000 |
| Iraq..... | 242,250 |
| Sudan..... | 68,000 |
| Kuwait..... | 12,400 |
| Bahrain..... | 2,500 |
| Qatar..... | 4,700 |
| United Arab Emirates..... | 25,150 |
| Yemen Arab Republic (North)..... | 32,100 |
| PDRY (South)..... | 23,800 |
| Oman..... | 14,200 |
| Tunisa..... | 28,600 |

| | |
|--------------|-----------|
| Algeria..... | 101,000 |
| Morocco..... | 116,500 |
| Total..... | 1,440,900 |

¹ Consisting of 45,000 regular armed forces and 20,000 National Guard troops.

Source: The Military Balance, 1980-81; The International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Chairman TOWER. Can the command and control system aboard the AWACS be jammed?

General KEEGAN. I suppose it could, Senator.

Chairman TOWER. It is UHF radio.

General KEEGAN. But as of now, as of the systems that we had on board in 1977, the command and control system was very difficult to jam. It was the most jam-proof command and control system in the free world.

Chairman TOWER. The command and control system aboard the AWACS is UHF radio, and it is the contention of the Defense Department that it is very easily jammed by equipment that the Israelis already have.

My time is up.

Senator COHEN. I yield some of my time to you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Go ahead.

Senator COHEN. General, the Chairman has asked you the question whether Israel should be our only partner in the Middle East. You said no, there should be other partners. I assume, for example, Egypt would be one of those partners.

General KEEGAN. Yes.

Senator COHEN. Saudi Arabia might be another partner.

General KEEGAN. Yes.

Senator COHEN. By posing the question, the answer also would include that partnership has obligations in joint efforts and cooperation. You can't have a partnership by having people who are not committed to the same ultimate goal, can you?

General KEEGAN. Well, there would be partnerships of a limited nature at first. You know, one has to agree with the present administration's efforts to step by step improve those relationships and mutual commitments. The difficulty that we have in any agreement that we make with the Arabs is that an agreement made with a man who in effect is a dictator is subject to a great many vagaries and possible sudden changes.

Senator COHEN. What I am suggesting to you is that you can't have a partnership composed of individual nations, nor can you have partnerships composed of individuals, if there is not at least some underlying assumption that you are striving for the same goal.

If you have one proposed member of that partnership declaring a Holy War against the other partner, it is very difficult to have a partnership in that particular case.

General KEEGAN. I agree. That is why I attacked our presumptions under which our approach to the Saudis is being made.

Senator COHEN. The question is raised as to whether or not your military objectivity has been compromised, whether your military objectivity has been in fact purchased by the Jewish community. I think you ought to answer clearly and categorically; has in fact, your military objectivity been purchased by the Jewish community of this country?

General KEEGAN. It has not in any way.

Senator COHEN. Thank you.

I don't think that kind of question or implication should be left hanging. Frankly, I must tell you and tell the people who are here that I think this debate about the AWACS is being cast or miscast as a popularity contest between Jewish Israel and oil rich Saudi Arabia.

I see, for example, highly paid lawyers on behalf of Saudi Arabia issuing that kind of statement, the choice between Begin or Reagan, between Jewish Israel and oil rich Saudi Arabia. That to me is an insidious suggestion. It is destructive. I think it is without merit. I think we ought to forget about Israel in this debate, assume Israel does not exist for the moment, and then ask ourselves the question: With or without Israel how does the transfer of this system better protect the oil fields?

How does this advance American interests? If we take Americans out of the AWACS, allow the Saudis to operate them solely on their own, how does this advance and protect Saudi Arabian interests? That to me ought to be the question raised not only by this committee but by this Congress.

General KEEGAN. If you answer that question on its merit, sir, as you have raised it, there is only one answer that can be given. Yes; it is to the interest of the United States as it is to the Saudi interest to obtain this package of aid from the United States.

Unfortunately you cannot consider that question, as you well understand, sir, in a vacuum. We have to deal with the perceptions of the Israelis. You have to deal with a lower perceptual problem of who have been our real friends and supporters of U.S. security interests and aims in the Middle East in the past 25 to 30 years. < I have no illusion about the fact that what the Israelis have done has been in their own national self-interest but because those national self-interests happen to coincide with our own and our long-term aims and objectives, it has worked and redounded much to our advantage on a number of occasions. >

Senator COHEN. What I am asking you is, forget about the Israeli situation, forget about their vulnerability for the moment. If you were to transfer this system, which you described as the most sophisticated that we have available, which is still years ahead of the Soviet Union, if we are to transfer the upgraded F-15, the AIM-9L missile and we have nothing other than that transfer to the Saudis, and remove American technicians and American military personnel, does that, in the long run, advance U.S. interests, given the danger of its falling in the hands of the Soviet Union?

General KEEGAN. With one proviso, yes. That proviso is that we be wholly satisfied about the security agreements that are reached to keep those equipments from falling into unfriendly hands.

Senator COHEN. But you said earlier that they didn't have those security capabilities.

General KEEGAN. No; but this could be fixed.

Senator COHEN. How? Can Saudi Arabia defend itself against a Soviet attack?

General KEEGAN. No; not effectively, not without the help of the Pakistani or some such, or the United States.

Senator COHEN. Could they defend against a Soviet attack with the aid and assistance of the British?

General KEEGAN. Yes, they could, but only to a limited extent.

Senator COHEN. Without the United States?

General KEEGAN. Without the United States. I am not saying it would be effective but it would be far more effective than the Saudis operating unilaterally.

Senator COHEN. In other words, if the British were to go forward and transfer the Nimrod to the Saudis to build a relationship which would exclude the United States, and assuming further there were an airborne attack upon the Saudi oil fields, you are saying that the Saudis, given their military capability today or within 5 years, coupled with the British assistance, would be able to defend those oil fields?

General KEEGAN. Not against an airborne paratroop attack but against a bomber and fighter attack they could significantly improve the present Saudi capabilities, which are virtually nil.

Senator COHEN. I understand that if they are virtually nil, they might improve them. In your judgment would the Saudis within a 5-year time frame, along with the British Nimrod, be able to defend the oil fields?

General KEEGAN. They would be capable of defending them up to a certain level of effectiveness, not nearly as great as the effectiveness that would be reached and obtained with American equipment.

Senator COHEN. Does the Nimrod have an air refueling capability?

General KEEGAN. I am afraid you have caught me on that one. I don't know whether that has been installed in the current new Nimrod.

Senator COHEN. My understanding is that it doesn't, but I can check that for the record. We had Air Force personnel testifying earlier, on the first day of hearings, that AWACS really does not pose much of a significant threat to Israel, because it would be used in a mode which would be nonthreatening, if they were to move the AWACS up in the northern tier of Saudi Arabia, that they would then be naked, exposed, vulnerable and completely open to attack by the Israelis.

My understanding is that the AWACS are not sent up alone without some escort, or are at least capable of calling for escort assistance on a moment's notice. Would your military judgment be that if the AWACS could be used up in the northern tier, it would pose an almost automatic destruction of the AWACS by the Israelis?

General KEEGAN. By northern tier you mean what, sir?

Senator COHEN. Up closer to the Israeli border away from the oil fields.

General KEEGAN. I think the risk increases in direct proportion to the proximity to Israeli territory. It would be insanity and folly for the Saudis to employ the AWACS in an unsound tactical mode, which means F-15's to accompany or be within near proximity to protect, the maintenance of an adequate separation distance between where Israeli fighters might first appear.

If the AWACS has a separation of 100 to 150 nautical miles at the speed and altitude at which it is flying and it detects that incoming attacking Israeli fleet, then the AWACS can turn tail and thus protect itself quite effectively.

◁I am aware that hundreds of intercept tests have been run in this country and throughout NATO Western Europe and the AWACS, when proper attention to tactics and defensive requirement is carried out, is an extremely difficult aircraft to shoot down.▷

Senator COHEN. General Jones, in his testimony to this committee, said he found it difficult or he was somewhat surprised that Israel was so concerned about its vulnerability with this particular package. I take it you would stand in strong disagreement? In other words, he did not see how the AWACS combined with the F-15 and enhancement package posed a significant threat to the State of Israel.

General KEEGAN. Generally speaking, it does not. I share a part of General Jones' view; however, in the context of the scenario that I outlined, an effort by the Arabs to sneak a large force of tanks into the West Bank under cover of night, there was direct evidence of the Iraqis warehousing Soviet tanks near the Jordan border in 1975 for that presumed purpose.

Who else would they attack? Syria? Saudi Arabia? In the context of an Arab effort to sneak tanks in in large numbers and to get them through the West Bank in the early hours of the morning and make a strong thrust toward the Mediterranean, that is a tactic that can almost not be defended against. That is not my judgment. That is the judgment of Israeli professionals.

The one antidote which the Israelis have at hand other than building massive defenses and deploying new bulwarks along the West Bank is the fighter-bomber, which is a very lethal weapon against tanks if the fighter-bomber is properly equipped with the right kind of munitions.

◁The defeat of the Israeli fighter-bombers by a package of AWACS operating near the Jordanian border and F-15's deployed forward at high altitude with their lookdown-shutdown radar equipment, and package of AIM-9L's, would constitute a formidable threat to the counterattacking and defending Israeli fighters.▷

Now, that option which I have discussed at length with senior Israeli officers, not in recent years, was a matter that drove them up the wall, and I understand still does.◁Now, beyond that consideration I don't really believe the Israelis would be all that concerned about the AWACS and the F-15 posing a threat. The fact that it is in Saudi Arabia, a confrontation state, raises the perception of the Israelis that those equipments will be turned over to some competent hands like the Pakistanis and could be used to effect Israeli operations in the first moments of a very difficult war in which Israeli fighters and aviation is severely overtaxed.▷

But on balance, excepting this one option, I would think the Israelis privately are not all that concerned because they are professional enough to know that they can dispatch that AWACS on the ground very quickly and the Israelis have demonstrated time and again the skill with which they do that kind of dispatching.

◁The F-15 is a bit of another matter. I think the Israelis will dance very tenderly against any F-15 in the air but would rely in

the main on destroying them on the ground by surprise attack. This is a threat the Israelis can cope with, in my judgment. I don't think the Israelis in my perception can cope with the use of the AWACS and F-15 combination in the type of scenario I have described.>

Senator COHEN. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Quayle.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, I believe you stated, and correct me if I am wrong, that the biggest threat to Saudi Arabia is not external but internal. Is that correct? Is that the principal threat to its security?

General KEEGAN. First of all, there is the threat to the Government that is simply a product of a Government that lives by force, that has disaffected elements in the population such as was the case in Iran. My exposure to many, many Saudi Arabian students studying here and abroad in the past 4 or 5 years has been that they go back home in a state of cultural shock, as did the Latin American professionals going to Europe or to our schools over the past century, as did the Russian officers in the period from 1945 on through this century attending schools in Western Europe and bringing back the winds of dissent to their own country. The Octoberist and Decemberist revolutions against the Czars were revolutions of that kind.

In the context I think there is a latent instability that exists in Saudi Arabia as a function of its being nonrepresentative. So long as the Saudis are able to control that force and continue to have the kind of vigorous leaders they have, one could say this risk for the time being is marginal. There are serious risks in my judgment that come from the extensive access that Libyans still have, Koreans have, Egyptians, Iraqis, and Syrians have as part of construction forces, training forces, a number of aid packages, and these do constitute a subversive risk of some undefined dimension.

I rather think that in terms of protecting our equipment, particularly manuals, which are very valuable to get their hands on, that this is a risk that can be handled but it must be handled.

Senator QUAYLE. On balance then, would you say that the risks to the Saudi Government in the future is more from internal problems than external threats, say, from the Soviet Union or Soviet proxies? Would that be a fair assessment?

General KEEGAN. No; it is not because it oversimplifies the problem. Many of the revolutionary forces within Saudi Arabia will no doubt receive support from external sources, the Soviet Union, their proxies. You know I have said publicly on a number of occasions in the last 30 years had it not been for the existence of a strong Israel, that Egypt, and Syria would long since have carved up Saudi Arabia. There is a great deal of historical information to suggest that, not recent information.

Senator QUAYLE. What kind of vulnerability do the oilfields have to sabotage, from insurrection from within rather than from external threat such as the Soviet Union or its proxies? Is that a risk of any magnitude?

General KEEGAN. It is a risk. I don't know how to assess the magnitude. Many of the workers in the oilfields are foreign. You will recall in Iran that many of the oilworkers in the southern

oilfields were numbers of the Tudeh Party, that this was the result of well-known and massive efforts to proselyte and penetrate by the KGB the Tudeh Party members within the country of Iran. That always poses a serious latent potential threat to oilfields and refineries.

I think in the case of Saudi Arabia this is a function of prudent internal security measures such as we normally take in the United States in which we are fairly careful about whom we hire and whom we employ and in which we are fairly careful about the needs for physical police protection type of activities. Those means are open to the Saudis. I don't know what they have done in the last year or two to assuage this potential problem area.

Senator QUAYLE. Do we need an AWACS in the area of the Persian Gulf to provide adequate security for the oilfields?

General KEEGAN. Yes, we do, sir.

Senator QUAYLE. Now, if this sale doesn't go through will the United States continue to fly AWACS there or not? What would you suggest?

General KEEGAN. That would depend on who gives us access.

Senator QUAYLE. Who would give us access?

General KEEGAN. Egypt would, Israel would.

Senator QUAYLE. Can we operate the AWACS out of Egypt?

General KEEGAN. Yes, we can. Not as desirable as it would be flying them from Saudi Arabia which would put us very close to the target area. We face a very difficult problem of how to optimize the defense of that regional area, the protection of the access to the oilfields and the gulf under the present arrangements that must obtain between all the various Arab countries with whom we deal, and Israel. There is no easy solution to this.

Senator QUAYLE. Is the optimum arrangement one where we would have American control of AWACS?

General KEEGAN. Yes.

Senator QUAYLE. In that area?

General KEEGAN. Yes.

Senator QUAYLE. Apparently total American control is not acceptable to the Saudis. What would be the next best alternative? What I am trying to pursue—the line of questioning I want to develop—is this. What degree of control are we going to be able to have. Can we accommodate the Saudis, while simultaneously alleviating some of the fears of Israel and satisfying the apprehension on Capitol Hill and within the administration?

General KEEGAN. I don't think we are ever likely to achieve what is really desirable.

Senator QUAYLE. You don't see any compromise emerging that will satisfy all arguments and concerns about control? In your opinion, from an objective point of view, are you not seeking, or do you see a compromise emerging on this issue?

General KEEGAN. I don't see any compromises emerging within the present context, which is not to say that through a great deal of diplomatic skill and patience that we could not evolve a set of compromises that would assuage the concerns of various parties in conflict and that would give us the reasonable means for the protection of equipment that we must have and that would give us a

reasonable degree and modicum of control under certain crisis conditions.

I think any variation of such compromise is possible. I hope and pray that the United States will continue as it has been trying to mount all the effort and pressure that it can to attain such reasonable compromises. So long as the Saudis insist on the current continuance of a situation where they remain openly an avowed protagonist of the State of Israel—I do hear the statements in the press that that is merely for publicity, that is merely for the Saudis maintaining access to the other Arab societies, I don't know—I do think it exacerbates the matter a great deal. I think compromises are essential in that area and would go a long way toward assuaging our own requirements and those of other parties.

Senator QUAYLE. In other words, you are saying that the compromises should be twofold, one would be the attitude of Saudi Arabia toward Israel, the PLO, and other elements that you mentioned?

General KEEGAN. Yes.

Senator QUAYLE. Plus the control aspect?

General KEEGAN. Yes.

Senator QUAYLE. And that is twofold. You may or may not be right. I am somewhat of the opinion that, if we can get a compromise on the control aspect of this package, there will in fact be a sufficient amount of support for the package to go through. I think that is what I and a number of others have been searching for. That is the reason for the line of questioning, trying to extract from you your recommendations on the element of control.

What are we really talking about on joint control? I suggested the other day—and you can shoot this down—that instead of selling five planes to Saudi Arabia we sell them three planes and we continue to operate three planes to show the allegiance and alliance that we want to develop, the cooperation. It takes five AWACS to maintain total surveillance. This compromise would be a step in the direction that both sides would be willing to give up a bit. These are the types of issues we are trying to grapple with to see if there is a middle ground on the control aspect.

General KEEGAN. I find that a very attractive option which ought to be pursued vigorously.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you very much.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Denton.

Senator DENTON. In view of the comment of the Senator from Maine I want to repeat that I am fully devoted and committed to the survival, the security, the well-being of Israel, as I know you are, sir. I believe that the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense are similarly committed. I am confident that whatever arrangement is finally worked out will assure Israel's nonthreat status with respect to the AWACS. I believe we can do that.

I would have to say, however, that anyone who believes that there is not some partisanship, conscientious partisanship, on the part of people who see more Israeli's point of view would be naive. I can't say whether you are in that class or not, sir. If you are I would not condemn you for it because you would be in a conscientious status at which you might have arrived and I might have arrived if I had been through that same sort of experience.

I tried to avoid getting it. You have pointed out a number of very serious charges about the information we have received from the Department of Defense. For example, no ELINT, no SIGINT, no jamability, which you assert with respect to the communications. They assure us otherwise. I was UCM officer for Command Pacific Fleet staff. I know about that too. The aircraft you saw taking off from JFK and LaGuardia concurs with the capability that the Department of Defense has assigned the aircraft with respect to an MPI. Moving Target Implication of aircraft. They said 80 knots. The big jets exceed 80 knots on takeoff. On the shootdown defense capability of the AWACS, yours and mine and the Department of Defense's judgments differ. With that, we do have a major set of conspicuous disagreements. I believe the chairman has mentioned a couple of them but I assert the need that we clear those up, Mr. Chairman, because they are extremely important elements in the efficacy or nonefficacy of this agreement.

Sir, would you believe that the interest of Israel would be better served if the Nimrod were sold with no technology protections as are built into ours with the United States there, with intermediate and depot level maintenance personnel and so forth? Do you believe that it would be more in Israel's interests to move in that direction than to move in the direction that the United States I think is responsible moving to insure defense for both?

We are trying to get into mutual defense situations with Israel regarding prepositioned equipment. I believe with good will we are proceeding in that direction. Do you really believe it would be better for the Nimrod and French fighter aircraft to go to Saudi Arabia with the lack of leverage as compared to ours?

General KEEGAN. No, I do not. I am very much in favor of American equipment going in with the proper kind of safeguards. I think that would serve Israel's interests far more than would the sale of the other foreign equipment. We have a great deal invested in this and I would like to see it succeed but not under the premises that at present exist.

Senator DENTON. You have made the comparison to NATO and talked about joint managing or flying over other people's territory with nonnational aircraft. I understand that analogy.

You recall the big argument which really broke France away from us after the Bermuda Conference where they wanted their finger on the trigger and we gave Britain a special deal on nuclear. In other words, all the European nations have insisted in NATO that they at least be given a semblance of self-protection and control over that self-protection. We have a German general controlling parts of Europe on the land on which American arms are stocked. It is true that you can have interconnection in a joint arrangement or combined arrangement but it is not the practice for a nation such as Saudi Arabia, vulnerable as she is, to have, say, joint manning of aircraft.

They are permitting our aircraft to fly over their sovereign nations, but you must agree, I find it difficult to believe, that the messianic urge that some religious leaders are promoting exceeds their will to survive. I can't believe that that is the case. But if they did have the will to survive, it would seem they are justified

in asking that these aircraft be manned by them, these particular aircraft, aircraft that I submit would also safeguard Israel.

But I can see the logic and ego, if you will, in wanting to man their own airplanes with minimum air defense capability over their own nation. We tried, as you remember, in the multilateral force to have a multimanned ship for NATO. We failed in that. We now have a multilateral force composed of individual nationally manned ships. This is the kind of arrangement that we are approaching here with Saudi Arabia, so, it is not in contrast with the experiences in NATO. It conforms to it, sir.

General KEEGAN. I am in complete sympathy with what you say, Senator. I would like to make very clear for the record that I regret very much statements that have been made in the past that suggest the vulnerability of the AWACS is greater than I know it to be in fact. Now, that can be a matter of differences in judgment, professional access to what is going on today, which I don't have. But all the test results that I have seen, and they have been many, suggest that the AWACS properly manned, properly equipped, properly flown, with attention to sound tactics, is an extraordinarily difficult aircraft to shoot down.

<If the Israelis are determined they must neutralize the AWACS because it threatens them, there is only one really practical answer, and that is to destroy it on the ground. I don't doubt for a moment that the Israelis would so do if they felt in their better judgment that that was required.>

With regard to what the AWACS can see and what it cannot see, I have no major disagreements. I have been aboard an AWACS when we detected vehicles on the ground moving at 35 knots. Whether the standard production line vehicles are doing that today I don't know. Eighty miles an hour seems like a reasonable figure.

As to the question of jamming potential capability, ECM, electronic counter measures, it was never felt originally that there was much call for the AWACS to invest in major ECM resources and capability because the radar was virtually jamproof in terms of the technology at our command. I have heard no reason why I should change that or why that judgment has changed in any way.>

As to the communications on board the AWACS that we would sell, if we are going to sell the standard UHF, yes, it can be jammed and it is critically vulnerable in that respect.<I cannot conceive of the United States deploying an AWACS without the very best and most jamproof communications system that we have designed as far back as 1976 and tested which was virtually jamproof. If the U.S. personnel are going to fly those aircraft, then that equipment must be on board.>

It seems to me that we must continue pressing for arrangements with the Saudis that will satisfy those many conflicting requirements, security of equipment, security of technology, assuaging of the Israeli concerns which in the case of that one tank option from the Israeli point of view are very serious and very real. It is in that context that I am opposed to the sale of the AWACS to Saudi Arabia and the enhancement package until I see the United States emerge with some refined agreements with the Saudis that give us the highest assurance that the Saudis will not misuse those aircraft against Israel or their neighbors, inviting an Israeli reaction

that will not serve the interest of the Arabs. And in the bottom analysis and finer line I think in the past 20 years, part of which I spent as a Middle East war planner, I have then and retain today an equal interest in seeing that the Arab citizens of the Arab world are protected from the vagaries of unjustified warfare and that the Israelis are so protected. I think that both sides require that.

Until such time as the Arab nations have a system of government which allows the vast bulk of the population to have some sort of expression of free will in this equation I don't see the prospects for peace as being very good. It is in that context that I am inclined to disapprove any major action or initiative by the United States that would destabilize that equation.

I want you to understand very clearly that I am equally committed to the security of Israel and the Arabs, among whom I have as many friends as I do Israelis.

Senator DENTON. I am informed my time is up. I do believe it was answered by the Secretary of Defense, and I feel the same, that the security and the stability of Saudi Arabia would be increased by a greater interrelationship with us regarding their own defense. I believe this is a step in that direction.

Chairman TOWER. General, you stated that we have no reliable allies in the Arab world. Is that correct?

General KEEGAN. I don't think that we do, sir.

Chairman TOWER. Would you include Tunisia?

General KEEGAN. To the extent that you answer this on a sliding scale, Tunisia has certainly been one of the better friends of the United States. But Tunisia has little or nothing to offer except in a diplomatic or political area on this question.

Chairman TOWER. Of course the United Arab League is headquartered in Tunisia.

General KEEGAN. Yes.

Chairman TOWER. Would you include Oman?

General KEEGAN. That is a nondefense situation. I think Oman basically shares with Saudi Arabia enormous antipathy toward the State of Israel. Given the conflicting situation where that came up, I think Oman would side with the confrontation states, although Oman has been a better friend than most.

Chairman TOWER. Would you include Egypt in that category of unreliable allies?

General KEEGAN. I think Anwar Sadat for tactical reasons, of his own perception, has become a friend of the United States. I think since Sadat must leave power one of these days, we may overnight revert back to the situation which existed during Yom Kippur. I don't consider Egypt a reliable and trustworthy ally in view of the succession problem with President Sadat.

Chairman TOWER. General, I might note that the AIM-9L technology is not unknown in the Soviet Union. I would suggest that if you had access to current intelligence, you would not be quite so worried about potential compromise.

Now, General, throughout your testimony there seems to be a recurring bias against the whole Arab world. Do you really oppose the sale primarily on military grounds or because you fear that approval of the sale to some people might symbolize improved relationship with Saudi Arabia to the detriment of Israel, perhaps?

General KEEGAN. My disapproval is on the military ground. I want you to know, sir, as I am sure you do, that I support fully every effort to bring about a closer and ever-improving relationship with the Saudis.

Chairman TOWER. General, which situation do you find more desirable, one in which the United States is privy to all data and maintains a substantial measure of control over the aircraft through the Saudi dependence on U.S. maintenance and spare parts, or one in which the Saudis acquire and operate the Nimrod system, in which the United States receives no data, maintains no control over the operation of the aircraft?

General KEEGAN. That is a very difficult one to decide, Senator. On balance, I would probably favor the American arrangement which gave us some access and some control.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Denton, you wanted to make a statement.

Senator DENTON. I have one final question, the answer to which I will request the general to submit in writing because I believe it will be classified.

General, in recent testimony before the House Appropriations Committee you said:

Nearly 5 years ago after the conclusion of the 1973 Yom Kippur war some of us were in possession of intelligence about meetings between Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Iraq about where do they go next in their persistent war against Israel.

According to a transcript of that hearing, you also said:

The planning that came out of these meetings some 5 years ago was that Saudi Arabia would bankroll the confrontation states and the insertion of American command and control technology in Jordan at several bases to permit Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan to commit their tanks and air weapons into a command and control system that would allow coordination of all those operations.

I would ask that you inform this committee when these meetings took place, who were present at them, and what documentary evidence of this intelligence, if any, is available.

General KEEGAN. I no longer have access to that intelligence and without disclosing sources in a sensitive way we had some special intelligence regarding some conversations and exchanges.

Second, I received personally from the Israeli intelligence structure a number of briefings which they acquired by both clandestine and special intelligence means concerning these deliberations. My source was Israel.

Then there were a number of briefings here to me in the United States that I believe came from Israeli sources initially regarding the construction and the financial support rendered by Saudi Arabia toward the building of a command and control system. I believe you have that data in your own files here. I no longer have access to any of this information. But that gives you what my background of access was while I was on active duty.

Senator DENTON. That concludes my questioning.

Chairman TOWER. General Keegan, we want to thank you for agreeing to testify today and for spending so much of your time with the committee. We appreciate your testimony very much.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:25 p.m. the committee was adjourned.]

