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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

NOMINATION OF

FRANCIS J. WEST, JR., OF RHODE ISLAND, TO BE ASSISTANT  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY  
AFFAIRS)

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JUNE 25, 1981  
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**NOMINATION OF FRANCIS J. WEST, JR., TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)**

**THURSDAY, JUNE 25, 1981**

**U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
Washington D.C.**

The committee met at 2:25 p.m., in room 212, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John Tower (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Tower, Jepsen, Stennis, and Levin.

Also present: Senator John Chafee.

Staff present: Rhett B. Dawson, staff director and chief counsel; Francis J. Sullivan, minority staff director; Paul C. Besozzi, minority counsel; William L. Ball III, chief clerk; Christine E. Cowart, assistant chief clerk; Alton G. Keel, Jr., Edward B. Kenney, James R. Locher III, Anthony J. Principi, and George F. Travers, professional staff members, Richard D. Finn, Drew A. Harker, and Ralph O. White, research assistants and Tamara L. Jones, staff assistant.

Also present: Jim Dkystra, assistant to Senator Cohen; Jon Etherton, assistant to Senator Jepsen; Bill Furniss, assistant to Senator Quayle; Paul Schreiber, assistant to Senator Denton; Frank Krebs, assistant to Senator Cannon; Greg Pallas, assistant to Senator Exon; and Peter Lennon, assistant to Senator Levin.

**OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN TOWER, CHAIRMAN**

Chairman TOWER. The committee will come to order.

This afternoon we will consider the nomination of Mr. Francis J. West, Jr., to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

Without objection, your nomination reference and your biographical sketch will be entered in the hearing record at this point.

[The nomination reference and report form and biographical sketch of Mr. West follows.]

**NOMINATION REFERENCE**

**AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,  
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,  
June 15, 1981.**

*Ordered,* That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Francis J. West, of Rhode Island, to be an Assistant Secretary of Defense, vice David E. McGiffert, resigned.

**BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF FRANCIS J. WEST, JR.**

Francis J. (Bing) West, Jr., is the nominee for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

Mr. West was born in Boston, Mass. on May 2, 1940. He earned his B.A. in history from Georgetown University in 1961 and his M.A. in public affairs from Princeton University in 1967. Following graduation from Georgetown University, he joined the U.S. Marine Corps and served as an Infantry Officer, including duty in Vietnam, from 1962-66.

After his tour with the Marine Corps, Mr. West was a staff analyst and then project director with The Rand Corp., specializing in field research and reports on infantry and guerrilla warfare in Southeast Asia.

From 1971-72, he was Director of Program Planning in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis. In 1973, he joined the staff of the Naval War College in Newport, R.I., as professor of management.

Mr. West returned to the Department of Defense and served as Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense in 1974-1975.

From 1976 until assuming his present position, Mr. West was Dean of Advanced Research and Director, Strategic Research Center for Advanced Research at the Naval War College. Non-Department of Defense activities during this period have included the position of Visiting Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School, Tufts University, and regular lecture appearances at the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.

His publications include numerous articles dealing with military and foreign policy published in the United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Marine Corps Gazette, Naval War College Review, etc.; "The Village" (New York: Harper & Row, 1971); "Small Unit Action—Vietnam" (New York: Arno Press, 1967); "Sea Plan 2000—Naval Force Planning Study" (Washington: Department of the Navy, 1978).

Mr. West is married to the former Katharine Nugent and they have four children.

Chairman TOWER. Mr. West, we welcome you to the committee and congratulate you on your nomination. We are aware of the critical issues which, if you are confirmed, will confront you during your term in office.

Before I ask Senator Chafee to introduce Mr. West to the committee, I might note that the nominee has met with the committee staff and has agreed to take all actions necessary to comply with the committee's policies and procedures with respect to personal financial disclosures and conflicts of interest.

We are delighted to have our distinguished colleague, Senator Chafee of Rhode Island, here to present the nominee today.

**STATEMENT OF JOHN CHAFEE, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND**

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to appear before you to introduce a distinguished citizen of our State. Francis J. (Bing) West. He has served a long and worthy apprenticeship in the Defense Department. For the past 5 years, since leaving the Department, he has been serving as Dean of Advanced Research and Director, Strategic Research Center for Advanced Research at the Naval War College which, as you well know, is located in Newport.

He served as a marine combat officer in Vietnam. Then he worked 2 years as Director of Program Planning in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis. Subsequently he was designated and served as Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger.

One of the significant things that I think Mr. West did, Mr. Chairman, is in 1977 at the request of the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. West led a team of 12 Navy and Marine Corps officers in a year long study of naval force planning, the so-called Sea Plan 2000, which Secretary Claytor looked on as a very significant effort in determining the range and uses of naval forces.

Mr. West has published numerous articles in respected journals on military strategy. He has lectured at the Fletcher School, at Tufts University.

The job of ISA, I think, is one of the more fascinating jobs in the Defense Department. Mr. West comes to this with the right credentials. I may say it is very refreshing that the job sought him out. He was innocently going about his duties at the War College, not pursuing this job in any way, when he received a call to come down and be interviewed.

Apparently his reputation caused those in charge of the Defense Department, Secretary Weinberger and Deputy Secretary Carlucci, to seek him out. This is a fine commentary on our leadership in the Department and an excellent commentary on Mr. West.

It is a great pleasure for me to enthusiastically endorse Mr. West to you and to the members of the committee, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, Senator Chafee.

Mr. West, with that magnificent endorsement I don't know if you can improve on your situation now by saying anything, but we will give you a chance to speak anyway.

#### STATEMENT OF FRANCIS J. WEST, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS) NOMINEE

Mr. WEST. Thank you Mr. Chairman and Senator Chafee.

I have no prepared remarks to make. I am honored that President Reagan has nominated me to this position. If the committee so decides and the Congress so decides, I will do my utmost to do the best job I can in the position.

Chairman TOWER. Mr. West, if you are confirmed, will you assure us that you will respond to any inquiries from this committee or any other appropriate committee of the Congress on matters relating to your position and responsibility in a forthright and expeditious manner to the best of your ability?

Mr. WEST. I certainly will, Mr. Chairman. I also would like, as I have already offered to your staff, to open up an informal link so that we can carry on a continuing dialog.

Chairman TOWER. We will, of course, be grateful if you would make yourself accessible to our professional staff here who do a great deal of work for us. To the extent you can be accessible to them we will be very grateful.

Senator Stennis, do you have any comments?

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome Mr. West. I have no comments and no questions for the time being.

Mr. Chairman, in a few minutes there is going to be a unanimous consent request in the Senate. I came back over here in deference to the committee and to the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel.

I want to be excused to go back over to the Senate as I have been vitally interested in some of the points involved in this matter. It is an institutional question. I will come back as soon as I can. I consider this a historical moment. Please excuse me.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you.

Senator Jepsen, do you have any questions you would like to ask of Mr. West?

Senator JEPSEN. Mr. Chairman, I have none, thank you.

Chairman TOWER. Mr. West, I have several questions here, as does Senator Levin, which I think can be answered for the record. If you will submit responses to those questions in writing at the earliest possible time, we will be grateful to you.

Mr. WEST. Yes, sir.

[The questions with answers supplied follow:]

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN TOWER

Senator TOWER. The committee has noted with great interest the creation of a new position, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy to which the nomination of Richard Berle is expected to be received shortly. We understand that many of the areas of responsibility of your predecessor have been shifted to this new position. Why did the administration feel it necessary to create a new position and how will jurisdiction be divided between International Security Affairs and International Security Policy?

Mr. WEST. The administration sought to strengthen the "Policy Cluster" in the Department of Defense in order to insure a close linkage between national security policies and resource allocation. Also, Southwest Asia had evolved into a major military theater, therefore, a second Assistant Secretary billet was assigned to the Under Secretary for Policy. International Security Affairs is responsible, inter alia, for the review of conventional forces and of contingency planning, international economics, security assistance, and regional programs related to South America, Africa, the Middle East, Southwest Asia and Asia. International Security Policy is responsible for NATO affairs and negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Senator TOWER. As Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, your responsibilities will include coverage of all regional programs, Law of the Sea, foreign base rights negotiations, technology transfer, international economic matters, and security assistance. I might say that this is quite a full menu of issue areas and so I trust that you know what you are getting into. With such a wide area of responsibility, what two or three areas will receive your greatest attention?

Mr. WEST. Managerial attention is, of course, driven as much by the demands of the daily crises as by a management philosophy and game plan. Currently, planning for Southwest Asia, security assistance and a major Policy and Capabilities Study of Conventional Forces are receiving the greatest attention.

Senator TOWER. Threats to U.S. interests have grown substantially in the last decade. Would you please provide your assessment of trends in the international security environment and basic U.S. defense strategies for countering these emerging threats?

Mr. WEST. Trends in the international security environment have been adverse for over a decade. We and our allies have come to depend critically on some parts of the world which are intensely unstable and where some countries are both hostile and formidably armed. The Soviets sometimes stir up these instabilities. But even where they do not, they may benefit from the opportunities these instabilities offer. Moreover, the possibility of Soviet intervention raises the risk of the U.S. in protecting a regional ally against a regional antagonist.

Soviet military power has grown in virtually all categories of arms. Even at the sharply higher fiscal year 1982 level of U.S. defense spending, the Soviets will still be allocating to weapons investment 50-60 percent more than we. Soviet power has grown also as a result of the systematic use of diplomacy, military aid, proxies, the support of terror, and implicit threats of force to obtain wider access to facilities overseas and to intervening air space. The resulting increased capability of the

Soviet Union to project its power abroad presents the United States with challenges of enormous scope. These challenges are particularly serious because they occur after a long term decline in American, British and other allied access to bases and air space in, or enroute to, many areas critical for the alliance.

We and our allies may now have to cope with bolder Soviet military initiatives, carried out both directly and through proxies in many parts of the world. We face the possibility of conflicts in many widely separated areas: in the center of Europe and on either or both flanks, in the Persian Gulf, in Africa, in East Asia, or the Western Hemisphere. We may have to deal with more than one conflict at a time, and be able to deal with a conflict in one area without opening up critical vulnerabilities elsewhere.

In short, the possibilities for direct confrontation between American forces and those of the Soviet Union have increased. Moreover, any such confrontation would take place against the backdrop of a nuclear and conventional balance which is much less favorable than in the past.

**Senator Tower:** The United States is now engaged in a revitalization of its defense effort. As part of this revitalization, I understand there is an attempt underway within the Reagan administration to improve defense planning. What measures are being planned to improve the comprehensive strategic planning of our defense efforts—by this I mean long-range planning?

**Mr. West:** The trends I have just described underscore the necessity for a global strategic approach in the development of U.S. defense policy, one that emphasizes the complementarity of U.S. Military Services and United States and allied forces, and stresses the importance of identifying and taking advantage of, Soviet vulnerabilities. We and our allies can no longer rely on a conflict being a "short war" if we are unable to end it except by raising the level of violence in a way that would drastically worsen our position. Indeed, escalation to the nuclear level would no longer necessarily favor the United States.

To meet these requirements, new guidance has been given to the Military Services that redirects defense planning toward the potential that a war might be global, and of indefinite duration. To relate that guidance more directly to the 1983-87 budget review cycle, a review of current capabilities and a detailed development of the defense guidance has been conducted within the Office of the Secretary of Defense within the last two months. The implications of the new guidance as developed by that review of defense policy and capabilities should start being realized before the fiscal year 1983 budget is made public.

**Senator Tower:** As you may know, this committee has been concerned about the current command and control relationships between the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) and the National Command Authority. On April 24, 1981, Secretary Weinberger announced that the RDJTF should evolve within several years into a separate unified command—a decision that this committee applauded. Would you give us your views on mission priorities for the RDJTF in the Persian Gulf and on the appropriateness of accelerating the creation of a separate unified command?

**Mr. West:** A central objective of Defense policy planning is to assure continued access to the gulf. As part of our strategy to achieve this objective, the RDJTF is tailored to provide a force structure and a concept for its deployment consistent with the peculiar military and geo-political circumstances of the area. Specifically, we must maintain a military presence in the region consisting primarily of naval forces, and a capability to reinforce rapidly that presence with a credible force. This should deter the Soviets, for example, from executing a lightning-like thrust into the gulf region. Should deterrence fail, the RDJTF could blunt the Soviet attack and cause them to calculate the consequences of a long, costly war and the possibility of a U.S. flexible response in other areas.

Secretary Weinberger's decision on the RDJTF command arrangements is being implemented as quickly as practical. As you know, the RDJTF will evolve into a separate unified command with its own geographic responsibilities, forces, intelligence, communications and other support elements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have prepared an implementation plan, and already changes have occurred. The Commander, RDJTF now has operational control of the Service components assigned to the task force. Other details are being worked out. We hope to have the command in full effect well within the 3-to 5-year time frame announced by the Secretary.

**Senator Tower:** Yesterday, 54 Senators, including 7 members of this committee, signed a letter to President Reagan advising him not to send to the

Congress the proposal to sell AWACS aircraft and F-15 enhancement items to Saudi Arabia. Would you please provide your views on Saudi Arabia's requirement for these systems and possible conditions for these sales that may eliminate congressional concerns?

Mr. WEST. I enthusiastically support the administration's decision to provide the AWACS aircraft and the F-15 enhancements (tanker aircraft, conformal fuel tanks, and AIM-9L advanced Sidewinder missiles) to Saudi Arabia. Our review of Saudi defensive requirements in light of the new and seriously threatening situation in the Middle-East evidenced by the fall of the Shah of Iran, the present Iran-Iraq conflict, and the move of the Soviet Union into Afghanistan, has convinced me and the administration of the need for improving the Saudi's defenses with U.S. equipment which would simplify interoperation with U.S. forces in a crisis. A close security relationship with the Saudis is fundamental to our strategic interests in the region.

As formal testimony will be presented soon on this sale, congressional concern about conditions can best be treated then in detail. I would only note here that, first, they have assured us that they will use U.S.-supplied equipment only for defensive purposes. Second, they have agreed to provide security precautions for classified equipment and information equal to those which would be provided if the classified items were to remain under U.S. control. Third, the Saudis agree not to transfer any U.S. supplied equipment to any third parties without the prior approval of the U.S. Government.

Senator TOWER. The Reagan administration increased the aggregate funding level of the U.S. security assistance program by about 25 percent in fiscal year 1982. Can we expect that security assistance to our allies and friends will continue to receive increasing emphasis? Does the Department of Defense plan to seek greater intergration of the U.S. defense program and the U.S. security assistance program?

Mr. WEST. The answer to both questions is yes, but I should immediately point out that we plan a systematic approach to defining the dimensions of the security assistance problem and then to solving the problems. First of all, I believe it is valuable to recognize that, in constant dollar terms, our security assistance program has been declining since the 1950's. The harsh reality is that in the hard, military component of security assistance we are now playing catch-up ball, just as we are in other areas of defense. To my thinking, the world we live in today is more perilous than ever. If we are to succeed in the broadest sense in executing the missions of the Defense Department, we are going to need the help and assistance of our friends and allies more than ever. In the simplest terms, we need to have the soldier in the next foxhole—or in the next corps area—able to move, shoot, and communicate with us. Not only that, we also need to be able to get into position successfully to project U.S. power. We do that through a global set of access, overflight, and base rights. Security assistance is important in the obtaining of those rights, without which we may be hard pressed to execute, or to implement our regional strategies for NATO or Southwest Asia or for any other region. What we seek, of course, is a security assistance program that is supportive of our national strategy and of our own national security objectives, and we seek the funding levels we need to implement that program.

The greater integration of the U.S. security assistance program with the U.S. defense program is the other side of the coin. We want to identify those foreign requirements that best serve the execution of U.S. defense strategy and, to the extent we can, focus security assistance on meeting those requirements. We want to do a better job of looking ahead to forecast what foreign requirements are likely to arise and when. Then we want to do a better job of production planning in order to rationalize the acquisition of major systems by the Military Departments and their foreign counterparts. Closely connected with these objectives is the Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF) we have asked the Congress to authorize in legislation for fiscal year 1982. The SDAF will enable us to procure in anticipation of foreign requirements, leading to more orderly production schedules, better response to our friends and allies, and diminished impact on U.S. force readiness in meeting foreign needs on an urgent basis.

Senator TOWER. Recently the administration has made decisions to sell F-16 aircraft to Pakistan and Venezuela. There is concern about the impact of these sales on equipping U.S. Air Force squadrons. Would you please comment on this issue?

Mr. WEST. The administration is also concerned with the need to equip U.S. Air Force squadrons with the F-16. In recognition of the increased threat to Pakistan posed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the administration has agreed in principle to Islamabad's request to purchase F-16 aircraft. The timing and terms of this transaction have yet to be negotiated. We intend to discuss these particulars further with a Pakistan military delegation in Washington 13-15 July. No decision as yet has been made on the sale of F-16 aircraft to Venezuela.

One of the principle considerations shaping the U.S. position will be the need to pursue the possibility of an adverse impact on U.S. efforts to equip expeditiously USAF squadrons with the F-16. However, we recognize also that early deliveries to Pakistan could have a beneficial impact on our national security interests in the gulf region. We in DOD are currently reviewing our own requirements, Pakistani needs, and production and acquisition schedules to determine the best approach to meet our security interests and requirements.

Senator TOWER. Secretary Haig's trip to East Asia has revealed new administration policies with respect to arms sales to the PRC and Taiwan. Would you provide your understanding of these policies?

Mr. WEST. It is my understanding that no decision has been made to sell lethal weapons to the PRC. However, some adjustments are being made to our export control procedures so that the People's Republic of China is treated as a friendly, non-allied nation rather than as an adversary of the United States. These changes will widen the PRC's eligibility for U.S. technology, but any sales would be—as they are for other nations in that category—decided on a case-by-case basis. Both our allies and the Congress will be appropriately consulted on PRC requests.

With respect to military sales to Taiwan, our policy has not changed. The United States stated at the time of normalization that it would continue to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character on a restrained basis.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator LEVIN. Mr. West as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, you will have responsibility for the formulation of our policies with respect to urging Japan to increase its contributions to the mutual defense. As you know, I have been very active in this area, and our committee has twice expressed its concern that the Japanese are not doing enough by sense of the Senate language and a provision requiring a report measuring "fair shares" among our allies and what our Government is doing to push our allies to do more.

Recently, at the joint United States-Japan security committee meeting in Hawaii, which you attended, I understand that the United States was quite direct in telling the Japanese we did not think they were contributing enough. I also understand that we asked the Japanese to take some specific actions to increase their contributions.

Could you give the committee some idea of what the United States asked the Japanese to do to increase their defense contributions?

Mr. WEST. During his visit to Washington in May, Prime Minister Suzuki stated that Japan would make greater efforts on behalf of its own defense in order to achieve the capability to defend its own territory, the seas and skies around Japan, and the sealanes out to 1,000 miles. It is our judgment that the present and projected Japanese force structures are not adequate to provide for those missions. We thus provided specific recommendations of what we felt was necessary to fulfill the missions mentioned by the Prime Minister.

Senator LEVIN. I also understand that the Japanese rejected our statements and suggestions, is that correct?

Mr. WEST. The Japanese said they would take our recommendations into consideration staying within the political and financial constraints which they have.

Senator LEVIN. Last year, the Japanese Cabinet agreed to raise defense spending by 9.7 percent—not including a 2.2 percent increase in personnel costs—in 1981, according to reports received in Washington, D.C.

With the Japanese announcement late last year only to raise defense spending about 7.5 percent—including personnel costs—and their rejection of increased contributions to the common defense at the joint security committee meeting

2 weeks ago, what specific actions is the executive branch going to take to obtain Japan's compliance with its previous specific commitment to increase defense spending by a total of 11.9 percent?

Mr. WEST. It is not technically correct to say the Japanese agreed to raise defense spending by 9.7 percent. That figure was announced as a ceiling above which the GOJ would not go. Also the Japanese did not reject outright our suggestions at Hawaii. The specific actions the executive branch is going to take are to point out to the Japanese on every occasion at every level the extraordinary efforts we are making at the cost of domestic programs. We point out that these efforts serve Japan as well as ourselves and that we evaluate the present Japanese efforts as inadequate both in content and in timing for what is required to contribute a fair share and to provide for Japan's own self-defense.

Senator LEVIN. Did the U.S. Representatives articulate to the Japanese that the American taxpayers, and their elected representatives in the Senate and House of Representatives, do not have unlimited patience and resources to contribute to help defend their interests in the Far East and Persian Gulf?

Mr. WEST. That view was articulated very clearly.

Senator LEVIN. In what areas in addition to those you mentioned before do you think the Japanese should, and can, increase their contributions to the common defense?

Mr. WEST. In addition to increasing efforts for their own self-defense, the Japanese need to give attention to increased efforts on behalf of U.S. forces in Japan. These efforts as well as increased Japanese foreign aid are appropriate since Japan cannot make defense efforts outside of its self-defense owing to constitutional considerations.

Senator LEVIN. If quiet diplomacy fails to work, as it appears it has failed so far, why shouldn't Congress threaten to reduce our defense efforts which only benefit Japan—such as cut some troops on station in Japan and allocate them to other areas in which they more directly defend us and our other allies who are paying more of a fair share?

Mr. WEST. The United States bases very few combat forces in Japan. Our forces structure there supports our base presence. Our bases in Japan support our presence in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean rather than aiding Japan's defense specifically. Thus threats to reduce our presence in Japan would hurt the United States as much or more than it would "punish" Japan directly.

Senator LEVIN. Are you familiar with the Levin amendment—as passed in both the fiscal year 1981 and fiscal year 1982 Defense Authorization Act?

What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of the amendment and its requirements and how might it be improved in future legislation to assist you and the Reagan administration to more effectively impress upon the Japanese the need for them to do more for the common defense?

Mr. WEST. The report to Congress as a result of the Levin amendment as passed in the fiscal year 1981 and proposed in the fiscal year 1982 Defense Authorization Act provided a useful tool for compilation and analysis of data concerning burdensharing and actions taken by the United States to encourage our allies to do more.

We are concerned, however, that the requirement in the fiscal year 1982 Authorization Act to provide the report to Congress by February 1, 1982, will seriously degrade the usefulness of the report.

The statistical data necessary for the production of the burdensharing report is not available in time to compute, verify, scrub down and analyze it in time to meet a February deadline. If we are held to a February 1 deadline, we will probably be restricted to refining data already presented to Congress in the March 1980 report rather than updating it a year.

For this reason we would be able to produce a much better and more useful report to Congress if the due date was changed back to March 1, or preferably made March 16.

Senator LEVIN. How else might this committee and the new administration work together to convince the Japanese of our seriousness in these matters of "burden sharing?"

Mr. WEST. The Congress and the administration can best work together by speaking with one voice on the necessity of significantly increased defense efforts in view of the threat we face and in view of the nondivisibility of security measures throughout the world.

Senator TOWER. The Chair is prepared to entertain a motion that Mr. West be reported favorably and that absent members of the committee be polled on the nomination of Mr. West.

Senator JEPSEN. I so move, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. If there is no objection, then we will order Mr. West's nomination favorably reported subject to the poll of absent members. The record will be held open until 5 o'clock this evening.

We know of your splendid qualifications. We think the President has made a wise choice in nominating you to this position, and we wish you the very best. It is the intention of this committee to cooperate with you in every way we can.

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 2:35 p.m. the committee hearing adjourned.]

[The nomination of Mr. Francis J. West, Jr., was reported to the Senate by Senator John Tower on June 25, 1981, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was also confirmed by the Senate on June 25, 1981.]



