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HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 19, 1980

Serial No. 96-79

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1980

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
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Panel of administration officials: Civiletti, Hon. Benjamin, Attorney General; accompanied by Ambassador-at-large Victor Palmieri, U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, Department of State; Roger Winter, Director, Office of Refugee Resettlement, Department of Health and Human Services; Doris Meissner, Deputy Associate Attorney General; David Crosland, Acting Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service; Christian Holmes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau for Refugee Programs, and, Director, Cuban-Haitian Task Force, Department of State; John Negroponte, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Frank Loy, Director, Bureau for Refugee Programs, Department of State	5
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U.S. REFUGEE PROGRAMS, 1981

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1980

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room 2228, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Edward M. Kennedy, chairman, presiding.

Present: Senators Kennedy, Metzenbaum, Thurmond, Cochran, Simpson, and Dole.

Senator KENNEDY. The Committee on the Judiciary will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR KENNEDY

We meet today in the shadow of a refugee crisis that is global in its scope and staggering in its dimension of human misery. Over 13 million men, women, and children are refugees in the world today—homeless and helpless, destitute, totally dependent on others for the assistance essential to preserve life itself.

There are more refugees today than at any other time in modern history. In the past 3 years, the world total has grown by more than 2,000 new refugees each day. In the past 5 months, more than 2 million new refugees have fled war, famine, or persecution. Time and again, the mounting tide of refugees has overwhelmed the planet's ability to respond.

America can be proud of its humanitarian heritage. More than any other nation, this country has responded nobly to the call for help from refugees in every corner of the world.

How, in this difficult period in our effort to deal with the current crisis, a new law—the Refugee Act of 1980, approved by Congress and signed into law by President Carter earlier this year—is providing important new tools to accomplish our goals. In part, the purpose of this hearing is to explore what action the United States will take to help refugees under this far-reaching legislation.

But the task is not ours alone. If real progress is to be made, America's voice is not the only voice that must be heard. The refugee crisis is an international tragedy requiring international action. If massive human suffering is to be prevented, other nations in the world community must also work, and work together, to meet the need.

Last year, this committee issued a Library of Congress report calling for an international conference on refugees as the most effective possible step toward the goal of concerted action by the world community. Today, I renew that call for an international conference, to help strengthen the mandate and authority of such crucial agencies as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. I urge our Government and others to examine the recommendations in the committee's report for additional significant steps essential to improve the coordination of our global effort in behalf of refugees.

Today's witnesses will add to our understanding of the complex aspects of the issue.

Among the issues facing us are a number of pressing questions. We need to know what more can be done to cope with the continuing tragic flow of refugees in Indochina, and what more our diplomacy can do to improve conditions, especially in Cambodia.

We need to know why Jewish refugees are suddenly encountering new difficulties in leaving the Soviet Union.

We need to know what we can do to alleviate the plight of Afghanistan refugees in Pakistan, and to respond to the desperate pleas for food and relief in Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, and elsewhere in Africa.

These well-known issues are only the beginning of our concern. In many other regions of the globe, there are refugees living in fear and desperation. Their plight demands action from us all. Their faces are pressed against our windows, and they are waiting for our answers.

INTRODUCTION OF WITNESSES

This morning's hearing is the second under the new terms of the Refugee Act of 1980, signed into law March 17 of this year. Section 207(e) requires that appropriate consultation shall be undertaken by the President with the Congress on the admission of refugees and allocation of refugee admissions, and the discussions in person by the designated Cabinet level representatives of the President, with members of the Committee on the Judiciary, will be undertaken.

In fulfillment of that provision, we are pleased to welcome Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti and Ambassador Victor Plamieri, who is the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs. They are accompanied by Roger Winter, who is Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement, Department of Health and Human Services; Doris Meissner, Deputy Associate Attorney General; David Crosland, who is the Acting Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and Christian Holmes, Director of the Cuban/Haitian Task Force, Department of State. Are there others?

Mr. PALMIERI. Mr. Chairman, there are others. With your permission, may I introduce on my right John Negroponte, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; at the far end of the table is Frank Loy, Director, Bureau for Refugee Programs.

Senator KENNEDY. Very good. We welcome all of you. And we are particularly glad to welcome the Attorney General of the United States. We have your testimony, and we would be glad to hear it. We know you are here for a limited period of time—

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, may I put my statement in the record? I know we do not want to hold up the Attorney General. With your permission, I have a statement that ought to be included in the record at this point.

Senator KENNEDY. Excuse me. I apologize. Your remarks will be included.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Attorney General, I join in welcoming you, Ambassador Palmieri, and the others who are with you, to the Judiciary Committee.

You are here at a critical time. There has been a complete failure so far by this administration to cope with the problems of refugees and illegal immigrants.

I hope you can give us some reason or optimism that the implementation of the Refugee Act of 1980 will bring about a more coherent and praiseworthy handling of our policy.

As a matter of fact, it has been extremely difficult to ascertain exactly what the policy of this administration is in this area.

For over a year there has not even been anyone in the position of Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

What is the explanation for such a failure of leadership?

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THURMOND

Senator THURMOND. I welcome this opportunity for the American public to find out just exactly what this administration is doing to handle the present refugee situation.

I recognize the complexity of this problem and the difficulties inherent in finding a solution. In my opinion, it is imperative that there be a clear plan and procedure to deal with this problem.

The administration has not been able to propose a definite plan for handling the problems with refugees that we have seen in the past few months.

I hope that you will be able to explain to us today what you have done, what you plan to do, and why administration has followed the particular course it has.

As you know, I have been fairly critical of the administration's handling of the refugee situation in recent months. I would like to be able to change my view on that and in turn assure the American people that everything is being done to curb the Cuban refugee flow and at the same time deal effectively with those who are here.

I look forward to your testimony and any solutions you may have in regard to this problem and to refugee matters generally.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DOLE

Mr. DOLE. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to participate in today's hearing and welcome Attorney General Civiletti, Ambassador Palmieri, and our other distinguished witnesses. Today's hearing is the

second hearing of its kind under the new refugee act. It is a central part of the consultation process between the President and the Congress which is required under the act. This hearing is part of the effort of Congress to reassert a more dominant role in making immigration and refugee policy.

I feel that such hearings, when conducted vigorously, serve a vital purpose not only in setting our refugee policy, but in giving American citizens, through us, their elected representatives, some avenue for making their concerns known to the Government officials who administer our immigration and refugee system. And as we all know, Americans are increasingly concerned about our immigration and refugee policy, or our seeming lack of a policy.

The aliens we admit for residence in this country, whether they intend to become citizens or not, must be treated with the dignity due all human beings, and under our law, must be given the majority of rights due to American citizens. And certainly this Senator would not argue that they should be deprived of help if in need.

But what concerns Americans, and what we cannot fail to recognize, is the effect of the uncontrolled admission of aliens into this country on the well-being of this country for all who are here, whether they are established citizens or new immigrants attempting to make this land their home. With our economy in recession and unemployment rising, we as Members of Congress have the responsibility for making the hard judgments about how many aliens, whether immigrants or refugees, we allow to enter the United States for permanent residence.

And of course, the really fundamental problems do not necessarily involve the refugees or immigrants who are in need of the humanitarian services our State, local, and Federal governments provide. Even the newly admitted alien who can survive without such assistance contributes to most major problems we face just by virtue of the fact of being here in this country. Whether viewed as another individual seeking work in a job market plagued by unemployment or as another user of our depleting energy resources, a new immigrant compounds many of our major economic and social problems.

Furthermore, whatever logical analysis we wish to make about the problems resulting from the admission of new immigrants or refugees, we are talking about the fate of human beings, many of whom have close relatives already here, and many of whom, as in the case of refugees, are in dire plight. This Senator doesn't claim to have all the answers. But we cannot afford to be cavalier about these problems. The American people will not let us shirk the hard decisionmaking that is necessary.

I look forward to the testimony of all the witnesses and hope that we will soberly address all the tough issues which now must be confronted.

Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Civiletti, please proceed.

PANEL OF ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS:

STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN CIVILETTI, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE VICTOR PALMIERI, U.S. COORDINATOR FOR REFUGEE AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; ROGER WINTER, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; DORIS MEISSNER, DEPUTY ASSOCIATE ATTORNEY GENERAL; DAVID CROSLAND, ACTING COMMISSIONER, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE; CHRISTIAN HOLMES, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU FOR REFUGEE PROGRAMS, AND DIRECTOR, CUBAN-HAITIAN TASK FORCE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; JOHN NEGROPONTE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS AND FRANK LOY, DIRECTOR, BUREAU FOR REFUGEE PROGRAMS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. CIVILETTI. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Senator Cochran. I am pleased to have the opportunity to consult with this committee in accordance with the Refugee Act of 1980, regarding the proposals and plans of the administration for refugee admissions and resettlement for fiscal year 1981. And, as you have noted, there are other representatives of relevant agencies here with me this morning, including Victor Palmieri, the Ambassador and U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs.

As you have also noted, the Refugee Act of 1980 is a major step forward toward establishing a uniform, coherent, and manageable policy necessary for handling refugee admissions to this country.

As the administration and as Congress recognized at the time of the passage of the Refugee Act in 1980, and in our first consultation this past April, the act signals the beginning of the long and difficult task of formulating a more rational and equitable basis for our entire refugee program. The fiscal 1981 proposals and the progress we have made in implementation of the act since last spring are steps in that direction.

I would like to review briefly with you this morning the increasingly serious refugee problems we have experienced in these past several years and what we expect to see persist in the near future, as well as some of the details of our proposed fiscal year 1981 admissions and resettlement programs.

In accordance with the requirements of the act, the committee has received a comprehensive set of background materials which explain and support our program recommendations.¹

¹ See appendix I for these reports.

WORLD REFUGEE PROBLEM REMAINS SERIOUS

As you know, the worldwide refugee problem remains serious, widespread, long term, and in certain areas, growing. Several situations with refugee dimensions were resolved during the year, permitting voluntary refugee repatriation in Zimbabwe, for example. But developments in Southeast Asia, the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, and the Caribbean have continued to generate large numbers of refugees. Our overall approach remains the pursuit of active diplomacy, economic and security assistance programs, and practical support for progress in human rights, as a means of ameliorating the underlying conditions that give rise to large numbers of refugees. At the same time, it speaks well and truly of our national character, and it is in our national interest to respond generously where we can to mounting refugee problems.

BURDENS ON COUNTRIES OF FIRST ASYLUM

Since April, the United States has found itself in the position—which is, at least historically, somewhat unusual—of serving a first asylum nation. We have come to understand the enormous burden which falls on first asylum countries. We must bear our own burden with compassion, even though we would hope and expect and advocate that others would recognize the need to share it with us, just as we have consistently aided other countries of first asylum in their need.

Accordingly, the first objective of our refugee policy continues to be joining in international efforts to provide relief to refugees wherever they are and to facilitate voluntary repatriation wherever possible.

Where resettlement of refugees is a practical necessity, we are willing to continue responding generously, in an effort to relieve human suffering and encourage other countries, third countries, to do their share in providing resettlement opportunities.

FOUR PRINCIPLES GUIDING U.S. POLICY

There are four guiding principles which have shaped the decisions and proposals with regard to the fiscal year 1981 admissions levels and groups within those admission levels.

They include the following:

First, we continue to give priority to refugees with close ties to the United States through relatives in this country or past employment with the U.S. Government.

Second, where the United States has stood uniquely as a symbol of freedom from oppression for particular groups, we seek to respond to their aspirations for safe haven.

Third, we are mindful that refugee resettlement efforts can advance broader foreign policy objectives, in particular to promote stability in friendly, democratic countries of first asylum.

And last, we have taken into consideration the opportunities for resettlement in other countries and the practical limits on U.S. resources.

1981 ADMISSION LEVEL

For fiscal year 1981, we propose to admit to the United States 217,000 refugees. This figure is 14,700 less than our fiscal year 1980 admissions. The proposed 217,000 includes the following breakdown: 168,000 from Indo-China; 33,000 from the Soviet Union; 4,500 from Eastern Europe; 4,500 from the Near East; 4,000 from Latin America, and 3,000 from Africa.

INDOCHINESE REFUGEES

With regard to the Indochinese program, our proposal calls for continuing the approximately 14,000 monthly level that President Carter pledged to establish in June of 1979. The situation in Southeast Asia continues to be fraught with uncertainty and hardship, and there are at the present time, approximately 235,000 Indochinese refugees in first asylum countries, some of whom have been waiting for resettlement offers for more than 5 years. In addition to those very real and pressing humanitarian concerns, the political problems in the region and the need to maintain some stability and support for the ASEAN group are in the forefront of our concerns.

SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN REFUGEES

In addition, we propose to admit 37,500 refugees from areas that have long been of concern to the United States—the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. Emigration from the Soviet Union has unfortunately been subject to more stringent controls than usual in the past year, but we expect that the departure rates will rise again this coming year.

NEAR EAST

Our proposal for the Near East is set at 4,500. Numbers will be allocated to various groups depending on the emergence of special conditions or needs in that area. Afghans, Iraqi-Assyrians and Iraqi-Kurds have applied for admission as refugees from this area of the world. In addition, there are substantial numbers of people still fleeing the chaotic conditions in Iran, and while there is not yet a clear pattern of persecution, we are prepared to consider those applications for refugee admissions on a case-by-case basis.

LATIN AMERICA

The recommendation for Latin America is for 4,000 refugee admissions. These numbers would be used for 2,500 refugees, approximately one-half of whom would come from Madrid before we terminate that program. The remainder would be Cubans who have already been processed and who were ready to travel to the United States prior to the recent mass exodus from Mariel. Our first priority for the Latin American program will be given to political prisoners and their families and to former political prisoners.

The Latin American figure represents the biggest reduction of any of the groups for fiscal year 1981, as compared to fiscal year 1980. The

proposal for Latin America was 20,500, of which 19,500 was to be for Cubans. The reduction reflects the massive influx of Cubans to the United States in contravention of both U.S. law and our guiding principle of refugee admissions—orderly processing and departure to the United States from abroad.

AFRICA

With regard to Africa, the proposal calls for admission of 3,000 refugees, a number double the fiscal year 1980 level. This represents our best estimate of the number of eligible refugees who may wish to apply for admission to the United States. The largest proportion is likely to continue to be Ethiopians, but Africans from other regions of the continent are also expected to seek resettlement.

In addition to the refugee groups and numbers I have outlined, the act authorized adjustment to permanent resident status of up to 5,000 persons in the United States who have been granted political asylum in previous years. The adjustment of these 5,000 brings to 222,000 the total number of admissions and adjustment to permanent resident of refugees for fiscal year 1981.

Although there are large regional disparities in the numbers of proposed admissions, we have attempted to modify those disparities in this proposal in an evolutionary fashion. We are committed to a system which permits refugees in all parts of the world to apply freely for admission to the United States, and we believe we are taking reasonable steps toward that objective.

COSTS OF REFUGEE PROGRAM

Turning to cost, the cost to the Federal Government of processing, transporting, and initially resettling refugees for fiscal year 1981 approximates \$690 million. The Department of Health and Human Services administers the bulk of Federal assistance to refugees and is the lead Federal agency in domestic resettlement in consultation with the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs.

As you know, the private sector particularly voluntary agencies, contributes enormously to our refugee efforts, particularly with regard to resettlement. The Federal/private agency relationship is the centerpiece and essential to our efforts, and its role cannot be overemphasized in the success of our program to date.

Refugee problems are unpredictable, since their causes are usually beyond our control. The Cuban-Haitian crisis of recent months has presented a new and even more difficult challenge than ever. It has strained the compassion and generosity of the American people and the resources and capacity of government at all levels.

We remain committed, however, to upholding faithfully our humanitarian tradition to help those uprooted persons around the world who face real persecution. We recognize that this task is made considerably more difficult by circumstances in which our hospitality and values are abused.

I am confident we can meet this challenge and continue to contribute in important ways in relieving the misery and suffering of people

around the world, some of whom will begin new, useful, and productive lives in this great country.

Thank you. We will all be glad to try to respond to questions. Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Civiletti.

I think with the understanding of the committee, what we will try and do is run a 15-minute time limited for questions. So after my questions, we will go to Senator Thurmond and then Senator Cochran, if that is agreeable. So I will ask staff to watch the time.

CUBANS AND HAITIANS OUTSIDE OF REFUGEE ACT

Mr. Civiletti, we welcome this report to the committee. It is a report of enormous human tragedy. And listening to you review what is mandated by the Refugee Act, we should note at the outset that the act does not include the Haitian and Cuban refugees.

Mr. CIVILETTI. That is correct, Senator.

Senator KENNEDY. So although the act requires the report you have given to us today, and your statement is responsive to those particular needs, it doesn't deal with the Cubans and Haitians.

However, it is very difficult, I think, for someone who has followed this issue over a long period of time to really separate out homeless human beings in need. They are refugees, in a variety of different forms and shapes and conditions and their needs are just as real whether they are under the Refugee Act, or whether they are characterized by this administration as "entrants" and dealt with under other provisions of the immigration law. If we include the Cuban/Haitians, we are talking close to 134,000 refugees in addition to those listed in your report. It is my understanding they continue to come at the rate of 200 a day in southern Florida and along the coastal areas.

There is probably a greater movement of refugees today than any time in the history of this Nation. When we are talking about what the costs are, we are talking about the human tragedies and the human costs—families uprooted, people exploited, and in many instances, losing their lives. It is one of the great human tragedies of our time. And the United States, as you pointed out, really has, I think, demonstrated an extraordinary sense of humanity, and it has not been without difficulty and complexity, and it has not been without problems and without some ambiguity and some fault and some mismanagement and some serious miscalculations. I do not think any fair evaluation of the programs and our examination of the programs worldwide could escape that.

LACK OF PRIORITY IN DEALING WITH REFUGEE PROBLEMS

I have felt for a number of years, since that time I served as chairman of the Subcommittee on Refugees, that the problems of refugees never receive the priority and attention they deserve. We are constantly responding to crises—whether it is the serious problems now that particular States feel with the Cubans, like Florida; whether it is the crisis of the Vietnamese "boat people;" whether it is the crisis in Cambodia; whether it is the crisis in Africa, Ethiopia, Somalia, and many other parts of the world; or the continuing concern that all of

us feel about Soviet Jews. We are always caught behind, trying to catch up.

So I am interested in your statement that you think that this situation is going to improve over the period of the next year; and I would be interested in why you believe this to be so.

But in the limited time that we each have, I am more interested in what we are doing to try and get at some of the root causes behind some of these refugee problems, and what the American people can look forward to, in terms of our efforts within the international community, to have refugee issues receive the kind of priority and action they deserve.

I am sure you are going to be asked why we should accept 217,000 refugees next, although it is down 6 percent from last year; (see table I) and this 217,000 does not include the Cubans or Haitians. You will be asked what other countries are doing. We will also be talking about what it is going to cost the taxpayer next year, and we are going to be talking about resettlement problems. We will be talking about the slowness in the Federal response to what I think have been the legitimate concerns of many local communities, including Florida and many other communities, in getting financial relief so that they do not accept the burden caused by the Cubans and Haitians.

The American people are responsive and want to help refugees. We want to have open arms, but we cannot open our arms to the entire world. And we want to help those local communities facing these problems.

But at this point, I would like to ask how the administration is really dealing with these problems, and how are you getting ahead of these questions. Central America is becoming an increasing source of refugees; we have problems in El Salvador and Honduras, and the reported massacre of individuals there. Many of those countries are getting military and financial assistance from the United States.

TABLE I.—PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS
[Fiscal year 1981 compared to fiscal year 1980]

Area of origin	Admissions 1980	Proposed admissions, 1981	Percentage change
Indochina.....	168,000	168,000	Same
Asia.....	1,200	0	Eliminated
Soviet Union.....	33,000	33,000	Same.
Eastern Europe.....	5,000	4,500	9 percent lower.
Near East.....	2,500	4,500	92 percent higher.
Latin America.....	19,500		
Africa.....	1,000	4,000	400 percent higher.
	1,500	3,000	100 percent higher.
Total	231,700	217,000	6.3 percent lower.
Asylum status adjustments.....	5,000	5,000	Same.

¹ Cubans.

What kind of priority are we giving to this problem, so that over the period of future years, as we go through these consultations, we will not just be faced with, "Well, we have got 200,000 this year, 300,000 next year, 400,000 the next year"—not that we are not prepared to deal with human tragedy and misery; we are even on that scale. But it seems to me that we also have a very serious responsi-

bility to try and work in a humane way within the world community to give refugee problems greater priority and to ask other countries to respond in a constructive and positive way so we can play the kind of role that I think the United States should play in dealing effectively with refugee issues—by getting at the root causes and by creating conditions where there will not be these enormous flows of refugees, with all the human tragedy and anxiety they represent.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES IN REFUGEE PROBLEMS

Mr. CIVILETTI. I think your question reaches the very fundamentals of the American foreign policy. And the question with regard to root causes, interim and long-range objectives for solutions to refugee problems are interwoven with the American foreign policy attitudes, development, and objectives.

I think that, No. 1, we seek to achieve governmental stability in countries so that the citizens within those countries can have opportunity and have human rights and expression and an incentive to maintain their country of birth and citizenship.

Second, I think we seek to assist in every way possible, through either aid programs or trade programs in the economic development or redevelopment where that has been destroyed by upheaval or war or other causes.

And third, I think we seek, as you have indicated, what is so essential in this individual effort of the United States, but combined effort, and that is that it is not a U.S. problem alone or exclusively, but it is an international community problem. And we seek the assistance, conferences, the cooperation, and agreement in multiple ways with other nations including those as simple as third country acceptance of asylum and resettlement, but in the basic ways leading to stability, economic improvement, and the development of the rights associated with the human condition.

Now, as to details, what we are doing because I am not an expert in foreign policy, Mr. Palmieri and others will respond in a detailed way to that same question.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON REFUGEES

Senator KENNEDY. Well, let me just interrupt here, because I want to get into some specifics later, and we will run out of time otherwise.

It seems that the last international conference on refugees was over two decades ago—not that I believe conferences necessarily resolve such things; I think all of us have been around here for long enough and have seen too many commissions established, give their reports, and gather dust, to believe they are magic solutions. But some, on the contrary, have made proposals which have been of enormous value. We have had in recent years international conferences, and deservedly so, on world food problems—with the world food monitoring system and food reserve established because of some useful suggestions that came out of that conference; we have had the International Year of the Child and the International Conference on Women. But the last international conference on refugees was in 1959—basically in response to some of the problems we were facing in Eastern Europe and elsewhere.

My own sense is that the problems of refugees are getting more complicated; they are getting of greater magnitude than at any time in modern history. And I see the situation getting worse.

Again, we will be wrestling with you later on numbers and dollar amounts, but it does seem to me that this is an important opportunity for the United States to exercise its humanitarian concern and also to sensitize the world community to its responsibilities in trying to bring about an international conference on refugees. To date, we have targeted on one or two problems only. We went through this past year the Geneva Conference on the boat people," and then a conference on Cambodia was on, then off. But on the great movements of people worldwide, I think we have an extraordinary opportunity to give this the kind of visibility and the kind of concern it deserves. And I hope that you will consider this suggestion seriously. It is not a new one. I have talked about it for some time. But I think there is a crucial need for it now, as we look through your testimony and look at what is going to happen over the period of the next year and what we see today taking place in many countries of the world.

ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES IN FLORIDA

Let me just ask you—before my time runs out—we read in the newspaper this morning that the White House announces the plan to stem the refugee flow to Florida and to provide emergency assistance. There was no reference to this in your statement this morning. Could you maybe elaborate a bit on that. I know this does not relate to the consultations which this hearing is on, under the Refugee Act—but that of course, comes back again to what status we are going to give to Cubans and Haitians. But we are talking about human needs now. What is this announcement going to mean with regard to the Cubans, what is it going to mean with regard to the Haitians, and what is it going to mean with regard to the States that are involved—such as Florida? This appears to be a new policy, and I think we are interested in finding out exactly what it means.

Mr. PALMIERI. Mr. Chairman, the announcement that was made yesterday in Miami covers basically three points. First, with respect to financial support to Florida, Dade County, and the city of Miami, the administration is supporting legislation sponsored by Florida Representative—

Senator KENNEDY. Excuse me, Mr. Palmieri, if you would yield; Mr. Civiletti wanted to be excused, and if there were any particular questions of the members of the committee to be directed toward him now, we will hold the clock on my time. He has asked to be excused because he has some important engagements, so I would like to ask the members of the committee if they have particular questions for him, I would be glad to yield for that particular purpose, and then we can come back to my question of Mr. Palmieri.

Senator Metzenbaum?

CONCERNS OVER IMPACT OF REFUGEES IN UNITED STATES

Senator METZENBAUM. Mr. Chairman, I do have a question, because I think there are very few issues that are of greater concern to

people in my own constituency. They are unemployed, and they read about more and more refugees coming into the United States, about the problems the refugees are getting into. There is a kind of deep resentment. They do not have jobs, they are unemployed, and they say, "What is my Government doing, and what are you doing, Senator?" And frankly, I am not sure what we are doing.

I would hope that Mr. Civiletti could capsulize for us exactly what is the administration policy vis-a-vis the question of more refugees, vis-a-vis financial support for the refugees, because I am quite confused as to what that policy is; or frankly whether or not there is a policy.

Mr. CIVILETTI. Well, let me try to summarize it. I think that those feelings which you have expressed on behalf of your constituents are not limited to Ohio, but are felt by many Americans throughout the country. And I think that they are aggravated and exacerbated by the fact that since April 19, or so, we have seen come to the United States in that short period of time about 135,000 persons, which is a massive number of persons, primarily from Cuba. Whereas other programs over the last 3 or 4 years which were more modest and gradual and allowed processing and resettlement and the rest caused periodic difficulty at particular sites. They were handled and adjusted and the resources were developed in order to handle them. Here, because of those numbers in that short period of time, there has been a focus, and of course, the reactions here in the United States of inhospitality by the people who have come from time to time, and the nature and character of some of those people, about 1,700 of whom have been permanently detained because they are ineligible for admission to the United States, being serious criminals at the time of their admission or otherwise unqualified, that has directed attention to the balance between humanitarian, traditional, refugee concerns, and the fact that we do not have unlimited resources, that we have unemployment conditions of our own, and that we have law enforcement problems which are aggravated by disturbances at resettlement camps or whatever.

The policy with regard to refugees, I think, can be separated between an orderly refugee program, which this consultation treats on a worldwide basis, and special problems such as the Cuban and Haitian exodus which we suffered and what the administration's policy is with regard to it.

The policy regarding Cuban migration is to prohibit forced refugee exodus from Cuba to the United States by prosecution of those involved in the transportation of individuals from Cuba to the United States, knowingly and wilfully against the law, the seizure of their vessels, the felony prosecution of those as to whom we can produce the evidence, and in addition, an interdiction program by the U.S. Coast Guard, assisted in location and patrol by the U.S. Navy, in the area between south Florida and Cuba, in order to turn back vessels which would be going there to return with refugees or unprocessed immigrants from Cuba.

Second, we have resettled out of the approximately 125,000 Cubans who have entered in this exodus from April 19 to the present time, I think all but about 12,000 through resettlement programs which have been fairly massive in that 4-month period.

The original flow amounted to about 55,000 a month from mid-April through mid-June. Through deterrants, through seizures, through prosecution, through the interdiction line, and through a change—I believe we cannot take credit for it from the enforcement side entirely—but a change in the attitude of the Cuban Government, that flow has been reduced now to where it varies between about 100 a day, to about 3,000 a month, from the 50,000 a month heretofore.

The methods of return are more sophisticated. Instead of direct lines between Florida and Cuba, some vessels leave from the upper peninsula and go a round-about way to avoid the interdiction line, still seeking arrival at Mariel. The people who have been coming back over the last month or so in this much more limited flow, instead of being a grab-bag of people from jail, citizens from the street, applicants or whatever, are now almost exclusively relatives of persons already in the United States. But it is our objective and our intention to continue to enforce, through interdiction, through the patrols, through prosecutions, through seizures, through fines, and through the investigation of rings which may be developing in terms of financing these longer, more sophisticated methods of illegally bringing Cubans into the United States so that we may deter that and reduce the flow to as small a number as possible.

HAITIAN COURT CASE

With regard to the Haitians, we have particular difficulty because we are in litigation in two suits in the southern district of Florida, both of which are now on appeal to the fifth circuit, dealing with the Haitian right, essentially, under Judge King's order, once having set foot on Florida soil to claim asylum, not to be excludable and to have a very substantial due process proceeding with regard to such asylum, even though our evidence and judgment to date, as a general matter, has not shown that Haitians generally coming to the United States are all entitled to asylum under the traditional definitions of asylum, and that there is a realistic fear of political persecution in their home country.

Senator KENNEDY. Is that also true about the 55,000 Cubans?

Mr. CIVILETTI. Do you mean 55,000 a month?

Senator KENNEDY. I mean, of the Cubans that have come here, have you made the judgment or determination that they were in danger or fleeing persecution?

Mr. CIVILETTI. No. Two differences. One, prior to this exodus, I think the evidence was generally that the political prisoners both in prison in Cuba and those that were released were subject to a genuine fear of persecution.

Senator KENNEDY. That is prior; that goes back to the earlier agreements.

Mr. CIVILETTI. That is right.

Senator KENNEDY. Those were negotiated agreements with Cuba?

Mr. CIVILETTI. That is right. And in 1980, in the mass exodus, we adopted the same policy that we adopted with regard to the Haitians, with regard to those Cubans, and that was a case-by-case analysis, paroling them in temporarily under the Attorney General's parole authority, to evaluate whether or not they were indeed entitled to asylum or not, in the same manner as the Haitians.

So generally, that is the answer, Senator.
 Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman?
 Senator KENNEDY. Senator Cochran.

ADMINISTRATION POLICY TOWARD CUBAN EXODUS

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Attorney General, don't you really have to admit that there has been a total breakdown in leadership by the administration in the entire area? There really has been a zig-zag policy on refugees. First, we hear, when we decided that we would take in the Cuban and Haitian refugees, the administration said everybody would be accepted. That was the policy. Then, all of a sudden, we began patrolling the straits and arresting boatowners, and sent a different signal: There would not be an unlimited refugee policy.

Now we see that we are going to stem the flow entirely. There are a million refugees in Cuba now on a waiting list to come into the country.

I think the American people would just like to know what the policy is. The Senator from Ohio asked the question, and we heard a lot of words, but I do not think we really got an answer to the question. What does the administration intend to do? We know we want to be good neighbors. Everybody agrees with that. But there has to be a limit to our hospitality, and my question is, what is the limit. There are 14 million refugees around the world, looking for someplace to go. Are we going to accept them all? There are a million in Cuba, in addition to the over 130,000 we have accepted. Are we going to get the OAS to assume some responsibility? In June, we adopted an amendment to the foreign aid bill, which I offered on the floor of the Senate: suggesting that we try to get our neighbors in Latin America to accept more of that responsibility. In June, other countries agreed to accept 3,300 Cubans but we have now accepted close to 130,000. What is being done? This is your department.

Mr. CIVILETTI. The specific answer to your question is that I think the policy has been consistent, but it has been responsive to changes in circumstances.

Initially, when there was a substantial group who sought asylum in the U.S. Embassy for entrance into the United States, we followed the traditional pattern that has been followed over the last 15 years, of allowing asylum and allowing entry into the United States of those persons in Cuba seeking asylum who were political prisoners or relatives of political prisoners. And that may have amounted at that time to 3,500 or 3,000 of the 10,000 people. We followed at that time exactly the same policy of seeking international cooperation and agreement in South America, of 3,000 going to one South American country and 3,500 going to another South American country, of a sharing of that burden in the traditional attitude and response that we have followed for the last 15 years. That was reversed not by any policy of ours. That was turned around by a policy of just simply expulsion by Castro, of not simply political prisoners, but allowing, and forcing almost 115,000 people out of the country at 55,000 a month. We at that time had to change the policy. We accepted those people temporarily to examine and to evaluate their right to asylum, their conditions. We screened them. We have kept in prison close to 1,800 of those people who are unacceptable to the United States under any

circumstances, and we were burdened with and established resettlement camps and processing centers for the remainder of the people and presented to the Congress legislation which would deal with those people in what we think is a proper way.

When it became obvious to us that, aside from the human conditions of the people, this was an expulsive tactic by the Cuban Government, we adopted in June of 1980 a firm and forceful policy of interdiction, prosecution, investigation, boat seizure, and we have followed that policy since then. Although we have not been totally successful in reducing and having no entrants, the number of entrants has fluctuated between 100 and 150 periodically per day. We have more than 900 prosecutions under authorization. We have seized—I have the figures here—an enormous number of vessels. We have imposed and given notice of a very substantial number of fines. All of that is in litigation. We have a special prosecutive team of 18 attorneys to handle those cases assigned to them. We have the cooperation of the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, the INS people—there are more than 350 INS people in south Florida.

So I think the policy has been strongly stated, but it cannot be absolute because the factors have changed, and we have to appropriately react and get a jump on or ahead of actions by Cuba or foreign governments.

Senator COCHRAN. It also appears—

Senator KENNEDY. If the Senator would yield, there is a vote on the floor, so if our other members would like to go over and vote—I am not going to go over—then we can continue the hearing uninterrupted.

FOREIGN STUDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

Senator COCHRAN. It also may be true, in light of that response, that our policy is being controlled more by Castro than by Carter, in terms of how many Cuban refugees come into the country. Our foreign student situation presented problems in terms of trying to identify how many instatus foreign students were in the country some time ago. That situation indicated that our policy on this is dictated more by Tehran than by Washington.

These are questions that I think are in need of careful consideration and the best attention of the administration. I am not sure we are getting that kind of attention. For instance, we have not even had a head of the Immigration and Naturalization Service for a year now, who is supposed to be implementing whatever policy the administration has in that area. Does this mean that you, Mr. Attorney General, have to take more of a personal responsibility and devote more of your personal attention to this, or do you have someone in your office doing it in your behalf?

Mr. CIVILETTI. Both. I have taken, of course, more personal attention and interest in the refugee problem with regard to Haitians and Cubans and with their exodus or their parole status, and particularly in maintaining some degree of law and order in the camps, but so has the Deputy Attorney General's office and the Associate Attorney General's office. Mr. Schenefield and Judge Renfrew have both spent an enormous amount of time working on this problem, along with a

task force from the State Department, Mr. Palmieri, and Mr. Eidenberg in the White House. The Immigration and Naturalization Service has been headed in an acting capacity by Mr. Crosland who has devoted a substantial amount of time specifically to this problem, along with the other operations of INS, and Mr. Garcia, as you know is before the committee now for consideration.

ADEQUACY OF REFUGEE ACT

Senator COCHRAN. The Refugee Act, which is the specific topic under review this morning, was supposed to answer some of the questions that have already been asked today by the chairman and others on the committee. It is your judgment that the Refugee Act that was signed this spring is adequate to establish a framework within which to deal with these serious problems, or do we now need to amend what was done in March—or should we make some exceptions? Is that what you are asking the committee to support, making an exception, declaring a new kind of status—that if you are from Cuba or Haiti, then you are outside the terms of the Refugee Act, just as some are considered to be exceptions in terms of ceilings that have been established in the 1978 legislation, according to the recommendation of this committee?

Mr. CIVILETTI. I think, in part, both. I think the Refugee Act of 1980 generally is a sound framework and a substantial step forward in dealing with the refugee problem as compared to the pre-existing law, which allowed for an ad hoc determination without the necessity of consultations by exercise of the parole authority of the Attorney General based on the recommendations of the State Department. I think that the 1980 Refugee Act is a vast improvement over that. It was not foreseen, nor could it have been foreseen, that it would cover every situation, and it does not cover the mass exodus from Cuba in April of this year, and it does not satisfactorily deal with the Haitian accumulation problem over the last 8 months to somewhat longer.

That is why that problem was reviewed, studied, analyzed, and why we presented it to the Congress for your consideration, your improvements, your suggestions, the special status for persons who arrived from Haiti or Cuba during a set period of time.

We do not ask that you extend that special status, that parole status, to all persons in the future, nor that it be a permanent amendment to the Refugee Act of 1980, but that it be limited in its application for the special problem created by this mass exodus.

HOW MANY REFUGEES IS TOO MANY?

Senator COCHRAN. Is there an answer to the question of how many is too many? We saw in 1978, the last year for which figures are available, that we had approximately 470,000 nonrefugee immigrants enter the country. You are projecting in 1981 some 217,000 refugees. Congress is looking at legislation which talks about a ceiling of 400,000 immigrants in 1980.

How many is too many if we suggest that there may be 100,000 more from Cuba who are in a special status under this legislation and who

are granted permanent resident status? What is the limit to our hospitality?

Mr. CIVILETTI. Sure. And I think different people will provide different answers. I have no magic wand to say—

Senator COCHRAN. What is the recommendation of the administration, though, or is there a recommendation?

Mr. CIVILETTI. In all categories of immigration and refugees and remainder for 1981?

Senator COCHRAN. Yes.

Mr. CIVILETTI. I think our best recommendation is broken down into those various categories. I think for refugees, it is clear we are recommending 217,000. For immigrants, that is governed to a certain extent by past law, but might be in the neighborhood of 250,000 or 300,000.

We are not recommending any forced entrance into the United States or exodus proposals or acceptance of any quantities of persons from any country in the neighborhood of 50,000 or 60,000 per month.

I think that many members of the American public would suggest and argue—and I would agree with some of them—that any beyond an orderly process of admission, certification of their true status as immigrants helpful to the United States, or as refugees, to which we must take our share of humanitarian concern, that any beyond that category of persons would be unacceptable.

CONTROL OF IMMIGRATION

Senator COCHRAN. Is it your contention, then, that this administration is prepared to control and can control the number of refugees or illegal immigrants who come into this country?

Mr. CIVILETTI. Absolutely? No. I think it is perfectly clear that we do not have absolute control over the 1,800-mile southwest border; we do not have and cannot have, unless we want to be a police state, control over the whole Florida peninsula. So I cannot say absolutely that we have control. We are moving toward and trying to exercise a balance in resources and in enforcement and in some modicum of control, and to approach the problem from disincentives. And the select commission is working on such additional disincentives as employer sanctions, a worker card for identification, difficult issues with regard to an extension of an agricultural worker program. But the economic "push-pulls" between the United States and other nations are such that, unless you want to man the borders in a very severe way, with an enormous outpouring of resources, that you will not have absolute control.

Senator COCHRAN. It is interesting to me, Mr. Chairman, to observe that during the Vietnam war, we had the capability as a government to keep a check on people who were under educational deferments from the draft, to see whether they were in college, and whether they were making a certain grade-point average to be eligible for a continued deferment. Right now, the Veterans Administration checks on people who are receiving GI benefits, to see whether they are enrolled in school, and in my State, there was some indication that people were going to a college where attendance records were not being kept, and the Government checked into that and made people who were getting

benefits refund a certain amount of benefits because the school did not keep adequate records.

We do all that, but we cannot, under our INS, determine whether foreign students are in status or out of status, or how many are here from one country or another. There does not seem to be that interest or concern—and maybe there should not be. I am just curious, though. Is that the attitude of the Attorney General, or is that the attitude of the President, that this is not an important area where we need to devote more attention, more of our resource into trying to maintain some degree of control, if that is a goal. If it is not a goal, I think we need to discuss it.

IRANIAN STUDENTS

MR. CIVILETTI. The attitude before the Iranian crisis with regard to foreign students was an attitude not only in this administration, but in other administrations, that foreign students here in the United States were positive, that it was good for foreign relations, and it was good for American universities, the mixing of American students with foreign students from all over the world and other democracies, and that it was beneficial for the communities in which those foreign students contributed and lived and took back the freedoms, and hopefully, some of the principles of the United States to their foreign countries of origin.

So there was not an emphasis on the risk to the community or the danger, nor were there examples of gross abuse by foreign students of the privilege of coming to the United States. The record was kept, but the cost of that recordkeeping was largely borne by the institution which benefited from the foreign students, which were the universities and colleges, and they were allowed visas for educational purposes.

There was neither a need for nor the development of a substantial enforcement program to monitor those students. At the time of the Iranian crisis, and early in that crisis, with disturbances and violations by Iranian students subject to legal challenge, we took an affirmative program to determine precisely how many Iranian students were out of status, who were here illegally, who were not going to universities, but rather, were working or had changed their status unlawfully. The INS conducted that survey and study, and we issued orders which had all Iranian students report whether they be in or out of status and their exact condition. We were reasonably successful with regard to the reporting. I think somewhere around 60,000 Iranian students identified themselves. We determined how many of them were out of status, how many were in status. Those who were out of status are being proceeded against, with exclusionary hearings, and deportation. Some have left voluntarily. So we have monitored that very closely. Others have entered; additional Iranian students have entered who have been in some minority categories since that time.

I think the President's attitude with regard to foreign students and particularly, foreign students of a nation in which we have sharp disagreement and as to whom we have evidence are here, abusing the privilege of being in the United States, he and I share the attitude that they ought to be proceeded against and ought to comply with

the law and live up to the reason they are here. If they are going to abuse the privilege of being here, they ought to be removed.

CONTINUING ARRIVAL OF CUBANS AND HAITIANS

Senator COCHRAN. I have seen one estimate that there are still Cuban and Haitian refugees coming into the United States at the rate of maybe 250 per day. With respect to the blockade that has been established in the Gulf, to try to get at this problem, I want to ask you how effective is that, and is it true that that is costing our Government about a million dollars per day to maintain?

Mr. CIVILETTI. I do not know the cost. That is, I do not know what the Naval cost is and I do not know what the Coast Guard cost is.

Is the blockade effective? I think it has some efficiency and some significant effect. I think your figure is probably a little high.

Senator COCHRAN. I think it is, too. I misspoke. The estimate that I have seen is \$1 million per week instead of \$1 million per day.

Mr. CIVILETTI. I do not know what the cost is, but I meant the estimate.

Senator COCHRAN. The 250 persons per day?

Mr. CIVILETTI. Yes, that was a little high. It, I think, has been running between 100 and 200 depending upon how many ships were seized or turned back or whatever.

So I think it has had some effect. I think there have been 1,900 seizures of vessels; I think that has cut down on the flow. And I think that, at some of the peak periods, we were receiving between 2,000 and 3,000 a day. Now, the enforcement cannot take all the credit for that cut-down, because I think as a result of the enforcement, as a result of actions taken by the Government, that had a substantial influence on Castro changing his policy.

IMMIGRATION STATUS OF RECENT ARRIVALS

Senator COCHRAN. What is the immigration status of those people who are coming into the country today? Are they going to fit within the terms of this new status that has been created under the legislation the administration is proposing that we adopt, or are these people being deported? What is being done with them?

Mr. CIVILETTI. Temporarily, those new people, depending on which country they come from, are being treated differently, and our proposal was to treat them differently from the legislation pending before the Congress. That legislation has a particular cutoff date—I do not recall it exactly in my mind—

Senator KENNEDY. If the Senator would yield, I believe the date is June 19, 1980. So I think the Senator's question relates to those who are coming in today.

Senator COCHRAN. That is the question.

Senator KENNEDY. Even if we pass the legislation you have submitted how will the administration deal with the people who are coming in today? What is their status?

Mr. CIVILETTI. Well, the way we are treating them now, with regard to the Haitians, they are under the protection of the court order. So

we have been enjoined from treating them in any manner different than full asylum proceedings under a standard which we do not think is concluded to be lawful.

Senator COCHRAN. Which law is the court interpreting and enforcing with that injunction?

HAITIANS UNDER COURT ORDER

Mr. CIVILETTI. It is enforcing its own view of the immigration law and the requirements with regard to exclusionary hearings and the standard or test for a refugee; and its factual finding is, or has been, that the INS failed to give required due process asylum hearings to each and every Haitian and that it found substantial evidence in the record that Haitians generally as a class were entitled to—there was a presumption or inference of political persecution. That is on appeal. The fifth circuit is likely to rule on our exclusion basis within a few weeks.

As to Haitians who come to the United States who are not within the jurisdiction of the injunction of Judge King, they are being proceeded against under the current law with regard to asylum or exclusion on a case-by-case basis, temporarily in the United States, but without a legal status or right to remain in the United States.

Now, with regard to Cubans, Cubans are not under Judge King's protective order, which prevents us from acting with regard to Cubans. Cubans are being paroled in temporarily while their status, in the same manner as non-Florida Haitians, are being reviewed and analyzed to see whether they are political prisoners, relatives of political prisoners, former political prisoners, and are entitled under the law and regulations to asylum status.

Senator COCHRAN. That means we are going to have hearings every day for these people who are coming in—

Mr. CIVILETTI. We have hearings going on all the time now with regard to exclusions, for example, people who do not qualify, both pre- and post-June 19, and we have asylum hearings going on, which are a fairly elaborate process, involving the State Department, the recommendation from the State Department, the United Nations High Commission on Refugees. They are all in process.

Now, as a practical matter, Senator, you will have to review the evidence, and Congress will have to review the evidence and the considerations at the time you pass on the legislation which is before you for special status, to see and to determine the wisdom of adjusting the June 19 date to some other date or not adjusting it, or moving it back. And there will be arguments both ways.

ADMINISTRATIONS POSITION ON LEGISLATION

Senator KENNEDY. What is the administration's position, if the Senator would yield, on what legislation is needed?

Senator COCHRAN. Yes; I would be happy to yield to the chairman.

Mr. CIVILETTI. I do not think we have determined that as yet.

Senator KENNEDY. If the Senator would yield further; do you have any specific request for this committee today, other than just the notification which is required under the 1980 act? Do you have any new legislative proposals?

Mr. CIVILETTI. No.

Senator KENNEDY. Is there any legislative action that you want this committee to take in order to help and assist in trying to deal with what is a problem of enormous magnitude?

Mr. CIVILETTI. No, not today.

Senator KENNEDY. So you are relying, really, on this bill here—S. 3013, the Cuban-Haitians entrants bill?

Mr. CIVILETTI. Just on this narrow area of the Refugee Act and our best judgments under that act. But we have under review, and the select commission has under review questions of not only refugees generally, but permanent resident immigrants and also the possibility of a third category of immigrant, the review of exclusion and deportation proceedings, to determine in what manner the law ought to be reformed and revised to allow expedition, while maintaining the constitutional rights of due process in those respective cases. We have within INS a whole series of activities and audits to improve the INS service in both enforcement area and in the entitlement area.

FEDERAL ASSISTANCE FOR CUBANS AND HAITIANS

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Attorney General, I am looking at a clipping from today's paper which says, "The White House said its new plan would acknowledge Federal responsibilities for the burden on State and local governments" handling the Cuban and Haitian refugees. But at the same time, you are proposing that we classify these new status people in such a way that the Federal Government will pay only 75 percent of the cost to States for handling the services that have to be made available to these refugees. I think the administration is talking out of both sides of its mouth. You put out a news release saying one thing, but you are pushing legislation that provides entirely another thing.

Mr. CIVILETTI. I do not know that it is appropriate to say that because someone might feel entitled to 100 percent funding, total responsibility, that we are speaking out of both sides of our mouth because we are saying we are accepting responsibility for the Cubans by paying and allowing 75 percent of the cost or extraordinary burden which is placed on the local communities. I think in the comparative estimate of burdens, most localities or whatever would think that a 75-percent reimbursement or share of the burden was a very substantial assumption of responsibility.

Now, I cannot quarrel with you myself, as Attorney General, on whether the economics and the equities and the requirements of such ought to be 100 or 80 percent or 90 or 75 percent. That is a budgetary matter, it is a health and human services matter, and it is one that I am not competent to address in specifics.

Senator COCHRAN. Well, one thing is for sure—it is not the decision of the Governor of Florida to set our immigration policy, or that congressional delegation. It is a Federal decision that has been made here in Washington. And it certainly is arguable that the equities are on the side of the Federal Government assuming the responsibility for that expense that is caused. As a matter of equity and good conscience, I think we would agree with that.

But the point is that we are not just talking about Haitians. This has to do with Cuban and Haitian refugees. That is what the White House plan is directed to, or at least, that is what the press release apparently said. I am just curious. I do not know how we react to an administration proposal—you are not here with legislation that says anything about the Federal Government assuming the full responsibility for these expenses. You are here, talking in support of legislation that deals with only a part of that financial responsibility.

Mr. CIVILETTI. The other legislation, the special status legislation for Cubans and Haitians, does talk to and deal with the percentage of cost or cost burden which will be borne by the Federal Government, and I think that legislation provides that up to 100 percent of that burden will be borne by the Federal Government.

75 PERCENT VERSUS 100 PERCENT FEDERAL REIMBURSEMENT

Senator COCHRAN. I do not think that is true. I disagree with you. I think it is 75 percent.

Mr. PALMIERI. Let me clarify this, because, Mr. Attorney General, the Senator is referring to the announcement in Miami that the administration, in light of the drastic fiscal impacts on the south Florida community—

Senator COCHRAN. And the fact that the election is 6 weeks from now.

Mr. PALMIERI. Well, in light of the fact that we have a problem in south Florida, and the Congress has shown no inclination to move the Cuban/Haitian entry bill, we are supporting the Fascell-Stone amendment, which will allow up to 100 percent reimbursement.

Senator KENNEDY. Does Mr. Reagan support 100-percent reimbursement?

Senator COCHRAN. I do; this Senator does. I am speaking for this Senator. This is nonpartisan.

Senator KENNEDY. Everything always is on this committee. [Laughter.]

Senator COCHRAN. I have used way too much of the time, and I thank the chair for his generosity.

Senator KENNEDY. No, no, that was quite in order.

Senator Simpson, we are trying to follow the 15-minute rule. Mr. Palmieri is prepared to go into the details of this, but Mr. Civiletti notified the chair at the start of the hearing that he would be glad to respond to all questions, but was under a time limit. But whatever the Senators desire, this is an extremely important matter.

COMPLEX IMMIGRATION ISSUES

Senator SIMPSON. Mr. Chairman, I certainly will not take that long. I have been very fascinated with the line of questioning of my good colleague from Mississippi, and the responses.

I have a statement, Mr. Chairman, which I will enter into the record and ask unanimous consent that it be accepted into the record.

Senator KENNEDY. Without objection, so ordered.

Senator SIMPSON. Certainly, since you are here, Mr. Attorney General, I think you and I and the Chairman have been deeply in-

volved in this issue, because we all three sit as members of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy. This is an example of the kind of grappling we do among ourselves as we meet. Grapple time will end in March 1981 for us, because we have to come up with a report, which many people here and throughout the country are going to pay a great deal of attention to. But the things that you speak of, Thad and Howard, all of you, are the things that we really bat around when we get into these very intense Select Commission meetings, because there is so much of guilt, there is so much of racism, there is so much compassion fatigue that we nearly collapse on ourselves in that type of arena. And hopefully, we will get something done which we will be proud of so we can sign off on it.

But I was interested in several of your statements. No. 1, how we are suddenly getting the feeling of how it is to be a first asylum nation. We have not always had that. We have always kind of patted them on the back as we have observed first asylum nations, and said, "Good luck, and bully for you."

The one question—and you can furnish this for the record, if you would—you talk about the aspects of the tools that have been given to you and the tools you have fashioned yourself with regard to interdiction, fines, seizures, and prosecution. I would like to have the numbers on those, because I think that is what the American people have been led to believe that, by George, we do have a way of dealing with that, and we are told that, but they do not see it, or it is not communicated enough to allay their concern. And I think if you had that quickly, I would ask you to share that. What has been that activity, and to what degree?

The second question—I will just state them all, and then I will conclude my remarks. In your statement, you mentioned—and this is not in connection with the Cuban situation—you mentioned voluntary refugee repatriation for Zimbabwe and Nicaragua. Could you describe that for me, and tell me whether there is a formal or general policy with regard to repatriation, and did that take place at U.S. expense. That would be the second question.

Third question is: Have we entered into any negotiations with the Cuban Government about accepting the return of those who want to be repatriated? Would Government funds be available to pay transportation costs? What are we going to do with those some 2,000 in prison who now are "unacceptable" under any circumstances to the Government?

I realize that is a nice handful of stuff to throw out but those are my concerns, and can you respond?

ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS AGAINST CUBAN ENTRANTS

Mr. CIVILETTI. Let me give you some quick and approximate figures—I think they are fairly accurate, but in the quickness of them, I may either misread or misstate a couple.

The Coast Guard has undertaken approximately 1,400 search-and-rescue operations with regard to Cubans and Haitians. With regard to Cubans, we have issued almost 1,200 notifications of proposed penalties to operators of illegal refugee vessels, and we expect

more. We follow each of those notices up with the attempt to impose the penalties, and administratively if they are not unopposed, and then through court proceedings if they are opposed. In about three-quarters of those cases, we expect them to go to formal hearings. INS has issued, I think, some 1,900 notices of intent to fine the owners and operators of refugee boats, and each of those boat owners or operators is subject to up to a \$1,000 fine per illegal alien brought into this country. We have issued for felony cases, indictments against some 280 persons for the felony of intentionally and deliberately violating the immigration law by bringing in illegal aliens, and we have some almost 500 other cases which have been authorized for the same felony offense and which will be indicted and prosecuted. That gives you some idea.

With regard to the 2,000 folks who are in jail, in detention, in the Bureau of Corrections system—and there are different sites, depending on the needs of confinement—they will stay in jail until they can be either returned to Cuba or returned to some other country which will accept them. But they will not be admitted into the United States except in this prison or confinement environment.

Now, the cost of return of these 2,000 people, we would certainly like to have that cost borne by the country which expelled them, but if the question came down to tough negotiation, I think we would rather have them and their annual cost out of here than we would not remove them and not bear the cost of \$300 or whatever for a couple of shipments of 1,500 each.

COSTS OF IMPRISONING CUBAN CRIMINALS

Senator SIMPSON. What do we do when we would wish to deport an alien, and his home country and no other country will accept that person? How long will that "confinement" or imprisonment take place, then?

Mr. CIVILETTI. I do not know.

Senator SIMPSON. Well, then, at least, at what rate per year will it cost us while it does not take place? What is the cost of maintaining such a captive?

Mr. CIVILETTI. I think that varies, depending on the institution. For instance, we have some at McNeil Island on the west coast, and we had intended to close down McNeil Island. But we have, I think, some 300 prisoners there. The cost there per prisoner annually would be higher than at an institution which was fully occupied and in which the additional cost was reduced by the fact that you have all of the services and the cooking and the guards and everything available there, and it is simply a matter of vacancies.

We are somewhat fortunate in the cost area in that we have, I think, now a prison population of about 23,000, as compared to several years ago, when it was 32,000. We would have had to have either some special facilities established or taken over some other military bases, even for the secure confinement area.

Senator SIMPSON. I would assume that, based on national statistics, that annual cost of maintenance of such a person would be something, perhaps, between \$8,000 and \$12,000 per year.

Mr. CIVILETTI. That does not sound out of line.

Senator SIMPSON. Well, Mr. Chairman, the one question, then, the response, was about the voluntary refugee repatriation issue—

Mr. CIVILETTI. Mr. Palmieri will have to answer that, sir.

Senator SIMPSON. Well, I know you are in a little rush, so I think that concludes my remarks to you, and we will save Mr. Palmieri, then.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator METZENBAUM. Do you want to respond to that, Mr. Palmieri, before we go on, or do you want to hold your response until after we get back to you?

Mr. PALMIERI. It is the Senator's pleasure.

Senator METZENBAUM. Why don't we hold your answer.

Senator SIMPSON. That is fine, Mr. Chairman.

INABILITY TO STEM BOAT FLOW

Senator METZENBAUM. Mr. Civiletti, in response to one question that I asked you, you answered in a manner that has really been very disturbing to me. That is, you indicated that there are something like 100 Cuban refugees coming in each day, although I am informed the number is about 200, but I think that is a detail. The thing that concerns me is that this great Nation of ours is unable to stop 100 to 200 refugees coming in a day. The State of Israel finds three or four people in a rowboat trying to land on her shores. Our Nation, during the war with the Germans, was able to expose—I forget what they were called, but they were in divers' suits, and they had come onto our shores, and our Government was able to pick them up.

What I do not understand is, why is it that we are not able to lower the bars effectively against 100 to 200 persons who have to come across a body of water daily? Is there something inadequate with our system?

Mr. CIVILETTI. I think one reason is some we do not find—most, we do find—we are unwilling to risk the death of those 100 to 200 people at sea daily.

Senator METZENBAUM. Well, how do you risk their death if you turn them back? If they can bring their boats from Cuba to our country, they certainly ought to be able to take their boats from our country back to Cuba, as long as they have not landed on our shores and do not have refugee status, or claim to asylum.

Mr. CIVILETTI. Well, the judgment of the Navy and the Coast Guard is that attempt to return at sea a boat—Haitian boats, on the one hand, and Cuban boats—does risk, in most cases, great risk to their safety. It is not my judgment. It is the judgment of the experts who are out there, day in and day out.

Senator METZENBAUM. Well, I have difficulty in understanding why it is more dangerous going one way than the other.

Mr. CIVILETTI. It is not. But it is not our responsibility when they are coming toward the United States. They set out on their precarious course themselves. Many of the Haitian vessels, for instance, are makeshift vessels. We have seen the tragedies of some of them going down already. At least 50 people have died. When they arrive on the shores of Florida, many of them breakup, are already leaking, almost flooded. We have rescued, as my testimony indicated, we have had 1,200 rescue and search occasions over the last 4 months.

HAITIANS ARRIVING IN DANGEROUS BOATS

Senator METZENBAUM. Isn't it a fact that the Haitians are indeed coming in more rickety boats that are more likely to break up, but that the Cubans are coming in more substantial boats that could be turned back?

Mr. CIVILETTI. Often they are overcrowded. They have a boat designed for 25 people, and there are 50 people in the boat. They are precarious as it is. Their gasoline supplies are limited to a one-way trip. And it is the judgment of the Coast Guard that any interception which is a forceful one and an attempt to return just poses an enormous hazard to the lives of those people.

Senator METZENBAUM. But you would agree that we could very well intercept them.

Mr. CIVILETTI. I do not think so—I do not know it, I am not a sailor—but I think there is a substantial difference between a 50-man boat on the high seas and a rowboat and getting people out of a rowboat; and second, during a time of war, of course, if you have spies or infiltrators coming in, you can use deadly force at that time. That is one of the exigencies of the circumstances.

Here, as I say, the judgment simply is to try to interdict before boats go to Florida, do that severely, turn those around when you have only got one or two people in them, and we do that regularly, seize those boats and arrest them when they come back. But when a boat is coming over, a 40-foot launch or whatever, with 100 people in it, and is in the middle of the ocean, the Coast Guard's judgment is to try to turn that boat around or evacuate the people at sea in some manner is not wise.

Senator METZENBAUM. Isn't it a fact that the major problem has been one of Cuban refugees, that of the 100 to 200, whatever that number is, the majority are Cuban refugees and not Haitian refugees?

Mr. CIVILETTI. There are between 100 and 200 Cuban refugees on an average, that is correct, not Haitians. I do not know what the average Haitian number per day is.

Mr. PALMIERI. Just about half, Mr. Attorney General.

CAMP CONDITIONS OF HAITIANS IN FLORIDA

Senator METZENBAUM. Let me ask you one other question, and then I will yield to the ranking minority member. We have firsthand reports, some of which are very alarming, that at Krome, which is a camp for Haitian refugees, the conditions are extremely squalid. To quote a voluntary agency official, the camp in Florida is worse than the camps he has seen in Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia for Indo-Chinese refugees. He said he was shocked that such conditions could exist in the United States, much less be tolerated. He reported that the camp has inadequate housing, tents, and a few abandoned buildings, water unfit to drink, no tables to eat on, one bar of soap for every six persons, one volleyball as the sum total of recreational facilities, and serious health hazards.

My question is a twofold one. Do you know what the conditions are at Krome, and second, are we treating our Haitian refugees in far less comfortable circumstances than we are treating the Cuban refugees?

Mr. CIVILETTI. The INS processing of Haitian and Cuban refugees is exactly the same and is done as quickly as possible. The refugee camp conditions do vary from camp to camp. But part of the reason for the Watson announcement and commitment yesterday for an alternative site, and part of Ambassador Palmieri's work in finding a suitable site other than in the Miami area, Krome South or Krome North or whatever, has been our recognition that conditions at those camps are not what they should be and what we would want them to be for basic, fundamental human living conditions. That is why we are strenuously looking to alternative sites, particularly for Krome South.

Senator METZENBAUM. When do you think you will close those camps which are unfit for human habitation?

Mr. PALMIERI. The announcement that was made in Miami said that they would be closed within a month. But in the meantime, Senator, funds are being expended to improve those conditions. Most of the conditions, for instance, that you have cited, have been acted upon immediately by the task force. It has been in the process of spending about \$700,000 to improve those, on an emergency, short-term basis, pending getting those people out of there. The problem has been to find alternative sites. Nobody wants processing sites near them. The Haitians do not want to be moved out of South Florida.

There is, in short, a terrible problem of relocation. In the meantime, I agree with your statement. We are doing everything we can to improve those conditions and to resettle the Haitians that are there out of those camps. They are going out at the rate of about 50 to 100 a day, but they are coming in faster.

STRENGTHENING ENFORCEMENT

Senator METZENBAUM. I notice in the Florida statement, you say you are going to strengthen law enforcement efforts to bar additional illegal immigrants. Mr. Civiletti has indicated that when the boat is at sea, the Navy lets it keep proceeding.

How are you going to do this? What can you do and what will you do—because 100 to 200 immigrants a day is pretty heavy.

Mr. PALMIERI. Well, perhaps the Attorney General ought to continue. I will be willing to respond whenever you have finished. But as I understand it, you want the Attorney General to respond, sir.

Senator METZENBAUM. If he can, if he will, please.

Mr. CIVILETTI. Over the last 6 weeks, we have examined, along with the Navy and the Coast Guard and INS and the U.S. Attorneys Office there, every conceivable way to tighten down the enforcement program and have taken that action in steps, including the felony prosecutions and the seizures. We introduced some legislation which passed out of the House Judiciary Committee the other day to remove a wrinkle with regard to the effectiveness of seizures concerning the consent or lack of consent by the owner of the boat to the refugee operation or use for illegal entry.

So I think, at least to our present creativity within the prosecutive mold, and the investigative mold, we have done or are doing as much as we can do.

The one other area that we are exploring is joint investigations, more sophisticated investigations within the South Florida com-

munities, to see whether we can bring conspiracy cases or find evidence of conspiracy cases within the community that does not relate to the actual participation and movement, but forms the financial basis for the transportation—that is, strike at the financial sources of it.

Senator METZENBAUM. Senator Thurmond?

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent my opening statement follow the opening statement of the chairman.

Senator METZENBAUM. Without objection, so ordered.

WHY WAS THE REFUGEE ACT NOT USED?

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Civiletti, I have a few questions here I would like to ask. It looks like we meet at every turn, doesn't it?

Mr. Civiletti, why did the administration fail to follow the 1980 Refugee Act, which provides the procedures to screen refugees and determine who are political refugees and not economic refugees? Was it because President Carter made a speech saying the United States welcomes Cuban refugees with open arms?

Mr. CIVILETTI. No. We are trying to follow that procedure.

Senator THURMOND. Now, the 1980 Refugee Act, of which I have a copy here, and section 207(c)(4) reads this way:

The refugee status of any agent and of the spouse or child of the agent may be terminated by the Attorney General, pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney General may prescribe, if the Attorney General determines that the agent was not, in fact, a refugee within the meaning of Section 101(a)42 at the time of the agent's admission.

Do you feel that all these people that came from Cuba are refugees within the sense of the 1980 law?

Mr. CIVILETTI. A good many of them are, and some of them are not, and that is what those hearings and determinations are about, to find out which ones are properly here and properly not, and to treat them fairly. With regard to the Haitians, though, a good many who are not otherwise unqualified for admission to the United States on any grounds are being asked to be put in this special status, and the Congress is being asked to evaluate that.

ARE CUBANS "ECONOMIC REFUGEES?"

Senator THURMOND. I believe there are 125,000 Cubans that have come here.

Mr. CIVILETTI. That is about right.

Senator THURMOND. Don't you think that most of those really came to improve their economic situation?

Mr. CIVILETTI. I do not know, but I do not think so. I think they had many other motives.

PRESIDENT'S INVITATION TO CUBANS

Senator THURMOND. Don't you think when the President says, "We welcome with open arms"—open arms—"all you Cubans," that that was just a green light for them to bring more and more of them here?

Mr. CIVILETTI. No. I think that that related particularly to those people who were suffering from persecution and who believed in democracy and were under the heel of a Communist dictatorship.

And I think that that is the attitude that every President has had in the past and ought to take, is one of the basics of asylum and the meaning of America.

Senator THURMOND. And don't you think when we say, "We welcome with open arms," that that encouraged people with boats, who had no intention of going there, for fear they might be arrested for bringing these people, that since the President said, "We welcome you with open arms," that that was an open invitation for them to go with their boats and bring more Cubans here?

Mr. CIVILETTI. Oh, I think to the extent that you are speaking of family reunification or of escape from tyranny, that it was not a disincentive; it did not tell people not to do that.

Senator THURMOND. Don't you think that statement by the President was just the signal that Castro needed to start emptying the Cuban jails and the mental institutions?

Mr. CIVILETTI. No. I think that Castro was acting on his own misguided thoughts and was terribly embarrassed by the fact that 10,000 of his citizens had rushed in his own country to a symbol of democracy; the Peruvian Embassy, and he decided wrongly to try to counter that terrible blot on the Cuban way of government by expelling people from his country, which I think has contributed to that blot and shows that that system is a troubled one.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Attorney General, after that statement was made, you know how the rush with the Cubans was and how they came in. Could not the administration, and in particular, President Carter, know in advance that any official statement that the United States would accept Cuban refugees was just the thing to start the flow to America, and that is the reason we had so many coming here?

Mr. CIVILETTI. No; I do not think so.

MENTAL PATIENTS AMONG THE CUBANS

Senator THURMOND. It is my understanding that some of these Cuban refugees are mental cases, which will require them to be put in mental institutions at a cost of \$30,000 a year for the rest of their lives. Why should the American taxpayers be forced to bear that cost?

Mr. CIVILETTI. They should not, No. 1. No. 2, I think the cost may be high, but any cost of that kind is, it seems to me, too high.

Senator THURMOND. I believe these were the figures that were given out by the administration—in the news magazine, they quoted the administration on that.

Mr. CIVILETTI. I do not quibble with the figures. But certainly, it is our objective and intent to have those people removed as soon as we legally and lawfully can do so. And I would certainly hope they would not be here the rest of their lives.

Senator THURMOND. We have extended an invitation to them to come in, and now we have got to go to the trouble to try to do something about them, either support them, or find some other country to take them, or get some arrangement with Castro to take them back.

Mr. CIVILETTI. Yes; but I do not think it quite fair, Senator, to suggest that we said to Castro or to the public or to anybody else, "Send us your prisoners and your mental defectives."

Senator THURMOND. We did not say that, but when you said, "We welcome you with open arms," I guess Mr. Castro figured that meant any who wanted to come, and that was his chance to get rid of those he would have to support.

Mr. CIVILETTI. No. I think he is very Machiavellian, and unprincipled.

UNITED STATES ASSISTING CUBA?

Senator THURMOND. Well, a lot of members of the American public feel that way, because they have expressed it to me. I have gotten a lot of mail along that line. So my people have misconstrued, and I feel that people in other States have, too.

Aren't we simply providing back-door foreign aid to Cuba by paying for the care and keeping of these people?

Mr. CIVILETTI. That is perhaps an unusual way of putting it. Certainly, temporarily, we have a burden and a cost with regard to these folks that we hope we will not have any longer. I think our burden in cost per person is probably greater than what Castro would have otherwise provided to them had they been in Cuba. So he may have relieved his per-individual cost to some extent, but I think he probably overall in a cost analysis has had additional costs because of policing or increasing of enforcement or rounding up the people or proceeding against boats at Mariel and that system of discharge. So I do not know where the balance of net benefit goes. And I would think that there will be a reckoning day in the future.

INTERNATIONAL ACTION TOWARD CUBA?

Senator THURMOND. What efforts are being made to apply worldwide pressure on Cuba to take these refugees back, especially those who are not political refugees, but economic refugees?

Mr. CIVILETTI. I agree with that.

Senator THURMOND. I said what efforts are being made by the administration to apply this worldwide pressure on Cuba.

Mr. CIVILETTI. That is, I think, more properly answered by the State Department people.

Mr. PALMIERI. We are pressing in every international forum that is available to us. We are pressing on every bilateral or multilateral channel that we have, and we will be seeing it bear fruit, I hope, in this current session of the U.N. General Assembly.

Senator THURMOND. I mentioned long ago that this appeared to be a matter for the United Nations. What are they doing about it, and what is this administration doing to get them to do something about it?

Mr. PALMIERI. Senator, we are doing everything possible to activate our allies and our friends and to create a body of opinion not only in the United Nations, but in the Organization of American States, where Deputy Secretary Christopher has made an appearance to launch a particular program aimed at condemnation of countries which violate the immigration laws of other countries, countries which refuse to take back their own nationals, particularly criminals or other people who are legally inadmissible. So that I will tell you in summary form, while you are questioning the Attorney General,

that there is activity going along in every available channel to accomplish exactly what you are asking about.

Senator METZENBAUM. Just let me interject for a moment. Unless somebody has a pressing question for the Attorney General, I see no reason for him to have to remain. He had indicated he had wanted to get away. Is that all right with you, Senator Thurmond?

Senator THURMOND. Well, just let me ask him one more, then.

Mr. CIVILETTI. All right.

RATIONALE FOR 6-MONTH PAROLE

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Attorney General, is it not true that the administration, by creating this vague category of political asylees status, pending for 6 months, is just trying to put this problem off until after the election?

Mr. CIVILETTI. No. I think the problem escalated and had to be dealt with in June and July. The administration put a lot of effort into dealing with it, decided on a course of action, introduced the legislation, took the firm position, acted decisively regardless of the political consequences, and it is now pending before the Congress. So I do not think we ducked the issue or failed to do anything about it or treated it vaguely.

Senator THURMOND. You do not think they are playing politics with it?

Mr. CIVILETTI. No.

Senator THURMOND. You do not think they are trying to postpone until after the election coming up with a real solution to it, for fear they are going to cause the other Cubans of this country to get mad with them and lose their votes?

Mr. CIVILETTI. No. You know, there were two or three other alternatives that someone could argue were politically more beneficial, and some people on the merits argued, for example, that they ought to all be treated as refugees under the act with 100 percent financing. Now, that is an appealing argument for some. But I think we tried to look at it as to the consequences, the middle-range consequences, the problems that that might create in all the other nations of the world where there is economic deprivation and where you might be faced with an inability to distinguish circumstances, and so forth.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, I will not ask the Attorney General any further questions; as far as I am concerned, he may leave.

Mr. CIVILETTI. Thank you.

Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Civiletti.

INVOLVEMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator THURMOND. I would like to ask another question of the Ambassador.

Mr. PALMIERI. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. I believe you have the rank of Ambassador for Refugees, don't you, Mr. Palmieri?

Mr. PALMIERI. Yes, sir. The title is Ambassador at Large, United States Coordinator for Refugee Affairs.

Senator THURMOND. Now, that is a big title. In view of that big title, can't you get the United Nations to do something about this? Don't you feel this is a problem for the United Nations, just as much as the Cambodians immigrating into Thailand is a world problem? Isn't this a world problem?

Mr. PALMIERI. Senator, we could not agree more. In fact, I have made a trip to Geneva to discuss this with the United Nations agency that is most directly involved, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. Through the good offices of President Carazo of Costa Rica, we have participated in two international conferences in May and June, directed at finding means to being international pressure on Castro. We have, as I said, made a strong representation to the Organization of American States dealing with the violation of immigration laws of another country and the use of people as weapons for international harassment. We are in this United Nations session, Senator, proceeding with every means at hand, and hopefully, we will see some response from the nations who are our allies and friends.

I might also add that the communique that came out of the Costa Rica conferences was debated very strongly in the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations prior to the U.N. General Assembly and resulted in what is in international circles, I think, a fairly unprecedented and strong critique of the Cuban action, particularly with respect to the criminals.

So I agree, I think you are right. It has a very strong international dimension as a problem and it has to have one as a solution.

Senator METZENBAUM. Senator Thurmond, your time has expired.

ROLE OF U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES?

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, if you will give me 1 more minute, I will finish, I think.

What did the High Commissioner for Refugees at the United Nations have to say when you took it up with him? Did he acknowledge that it was a problem for the United Nations?

Mr. PALMIERI. Yes, sir. And in fact, we have involved the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees in various ways in this matter from the start of the problem. We were instrumental in working with the UNHCR when we started the airlift to Costa Rica from the Peruvian Embassy incident. We also got ICEM involved in that. This has been a policy to internationalize this problem right from the start. We have had UNHCR officers in the camps, finding people who are willing to go to third countries. So far, they have identified about 800 people in the camps who would be willing to accept resettlement offers in other countries.

We have had about 100 departures so far for other countries, principally Venezuela and Australia. We have hopes of a few hundred more, but it is a slow process, because most other countries are quite apprehensive about accepting Cuban emigrants under the situation that they have and their relations from Castro.

Senator THURMOND. Well, did you say the United Nations assumed responsibility for this problem?

Mr. PALMIERI. No, sir. I would say the U.N. does not as an institution assume responsibility for problems. It assumes responsibility for bringing nations together to find modes of dealing with problems.

Senator THURMOND. Well, I mean responsibility for bringing them together. But they have not done too much about it, have they?

Mr. PALMIERI. Well, the matter is right now being developed in the U.N. As to how and when it will be brought before this General Assembly, we will have to see. But in particular, there are several initiatives. The Federal Republic of Germany has one pending which I think the Cubans would be unhappy to see brought before the General Assembly.

Senator THURMOND. Well, let me ask you this, and I will close with this—

Senator METZENBAUM. Let me say, Senator Thurmond, the time has gone over substantially. Senator Dole is still here for questioning.

Senator THURMOND. Would Senator Dole yield me 1 minute while I finish up?

Senator DOLE. If I have 1 minute, I yield it.

REPATRIATION OF CUBANS

Senator THURMOND. Some Cubans want to return to their own country. I read in the paper that the United States intercepted them and would not let them return. If they want to return, why not let them return?

Mr. PALMIERI. The Coast Guard's position on that so far—and we are meeting to explore exactly the mechanism by which we could accomplish that—but so far, the Coast Guard's position has been that it would complicate and in many ways impair their effort to stop the flow of boats from Florida southbound to pick up people at Cuba, if they were forced to discriminate between boats which are going to pick up people and boats that are going to take back people.

Second, every boat that goes to take back people is a boat that will come back loaded at anywhere from three to four to five times the ratio of the people it brought over.

So it is not as simple as the newspapers would like to make it sound.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you.

BIPARTISAN WELCOME TO CUBANS?

Senator METZENBAUM. Senator Dole, I think it is your turn to ask questions. But I did want to point out to my good friend from South Carolina that when the President indicated that he welcomes Cuban refugees, Castro probably thought it was a bipartisan effort, because Reagan had just been advocating that we fly planes to Cuba to bring back the 12,000 Cubans who had taken over the Embassy. So he misunderstood our Nation's attitude—at least he thought it was a bipartisan attitude.

Senator THURMOND. Well, at least Reagan was trying to get those who stood for freedom.

Senator METZENBAUM. Well, I think it is rather difficult for him to have known who stood for freedom and who did not stand for freedom. I think it was an understandable kind of position for both of them to take, but in retrospect, maybe a reason to cause all of us some concern.

Senator DOLE, we always look forward to the gems of wisdom and inquiry that we know you are about to make. We have a 15-minute rule.

ECONOMIC IMPACT OF REFUGEES

Senator DOLE. Well, I will not take that long. We have been worrying about a problem out in the Midwest this morning, so I apologize for being late.

I want to get into some of the areas of economic impact of the refugees. On page 34 of the report you have submitted, it states, and I quote,

The economic impact of these refugees, while on occasion producing temporary local difficulties, is expected to be positive overall.

Is there hard evidence to support this rather sweeping conclusion? For example, you say in support of this conclusion on page 35, and I quote again,

Generally, refugees have been productive members of their own societies and are often experienced in leadership and have skills which demonstrate their abilities to learn and to achieve.

Now, how does this fact—and I assume it is a fact—have any relevance to the costs that American society and the State and local governments must bear to help absorb refugees? What is the hard evidence that permits a statement like that on page 34?

Mr. PALMIERI. Well, I would think, Senator, first of all, that American history is the hardest evidence in favor of that proposition. The fact is that groups that have come to this country seeking freedom and a new life have always, it seems to me, made an important contribution. I guess everybody in this room would bear witness to that.

In terms of hard data, we do see in the records of the Labor Department and the labor force statistics, in the health and welfare statistics, we do see a short-term impact on the communities from refugees and immigrants alike, which is highest, as you would expect, when they come in, but which, within a reasonably short period, all the records show that they are able to attain self-sufficiency. In fact, it is extraordinary to me that the Indochinese, for instance, whom we have been bringing over in the period of 1979 and 1980 have been not as highly educated as those who came over in 1975. They have not had the language skills. And yet, even in a period when our economy has been under stress, as I travel to the major cities of resettlement, those people are getting jobs, those people are working, they are learning English, and they are already making a contribution.

Now, there are numbers of studies that are being submitted to the select commission by economists in terms of hard data, which show both the short term, fiscal impacts, which are negative, and the longer term economic impacts, which are positive. But the statement itself, it seems to me, reflects our historical experience, and I think it is true.

IMPACT OF CUBANS AND HAITIANS ON FLORIDA

Senator DOLE. I do not suggest that it is not true, but I was just wondering what the hard evidence is, and I hope that that will be forthcoming.

For example, does anybody have any idea what the impact of 100,000 additional persons will have on the supply of energy in that part of Florida? Has there been any effort to determine that? Or what impact has increasing the population in this way have on inflation in that part of Florida. We have seen news stories indicating that in Dade County, for example, the school taxes increased by 68 percent. So there is an economic impact on the local and State communities.

Mr. PALMIERI. Yes, sir, there is, particularly in the short term, before people get self-sufficient, before they can pay taxes, there is a sharp impact. And we are doing some things to cushion that. The administration is supporting the bill introduced by Congressman Stack to provide substantial aid to school districts that are impacted, and about 80 percent of that will probably be distributed in south Florida.

75 PERCENT VERSES 100 PERCENT REIMBURSEMENT

Senator DOLE. In that same vein on the other side of the question, as I understand it, the administration's proposal, S. 3013, provides for only 75 percent Federal reimbursement for the money spent by States and localities in resettling refugees from Cuba or Haiti. Why is there a distinction drawn between these refugees, while under the Refugee Act, other refugees receive 100 percent Federal assistance for 3 years?

Mr. PALMIERI. Well, that gets back, Senator, to the basic issue of whether the Refugee Act contemplated a sudden mass influx of people whom we had no opportunity to screen and process abroad, as we would in a group refugee program, on the one hand—that would be one section of the act, which obviously did not come into play because they came here in a mass influx—or whether, under section 208, they would apply for asylum and be processed on an individual, case-by-case basis. And obviously, when you had 20,000 people a week come in, as we did in May when the Cuban-American community in Miami was sending boats for them faster than we could interdict the flow, then obviously the asylum provisions could not apply.

So it really is not a mystery as to one, why we could not apply the act, why it did not make sense, why it was not contemplated; or two, on the funding, why a decision was made in the early stages to try to find a halfway ground between what communities would be reimbursed if these people were simply immigrants, in which case they would only get what people get as residents; they do not get the special rich benefit package of the Refugee Act—something halfway between that and what they would get as refugees; namely, 100 percent reimbursement.

Senator DOLE. Does that amount to an admission by the administration that these people are not refugees?

Mr. PALMIERI. Sure. That is exactly what has been determined. What we would hope is that through the asylum process we could single out the political prisoners, and their relatives, who are the people who should qualify under the Refugee Act as it was formulated by Congress. With respect to the balance of the people—though excluding those who we want to return, because they do not qualify under any circumstances—the decision was to create a special status. We had a practical problem. They were here. They were being brought in by American residents. About 70 percent of them had relatives here. They could not be returned because we have no formal relations with Cuba. So we created a special status and proposed special funding. Now, in light of the fiscal emergency that we have in Florida, the Fascell-Stone bill will have the support of the administration and will make possible reimbursement up to 100 percent.

Senator DOLE. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Senator METZENBAUM. Senator Cochran?

ROLE OF COORDINATOR'S OFFICE

Senator COCHRAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, I wonder what role you played, if any, in the development of this three-point plan to reduce the influx of refugees into Florida that the White House announced yesterday?

Mr. PALMIERI. Well, if you are asking whether I was consulted on it, certainly I and others who are involved in various management phases of the program were consulted on it.

Senator COCHRAN. Did you approve of it, or were you asked to sign off on it? What does that mean, that you were consulted on it?

Mr. PALMIERI. Well, there are three points here—financial support, processing, resettlement—and on all of these issues, we have an inter-agency group working. And this announcement really does reflect the targets on which this interagency group is working.

So the only distinction I am trying to make—maybe it is not the same one you are making—but this is a White House announcement and was made, as you know, by White House people in Miami. But it fully reflects what we are trying to do in the Haitian-Cuban Task Force, I assure you of that. So I will stand behind it, if that is your question.

WHY NOT FULL FEDERAL SUPPORT?

Senator COCHRAN. Well, in that connection, then, are you asking this committee to support legislation that would provide only 75 percent of the cost to State and local governments, or are you suggesting that we ought to support this new plan which was just announced yesterday, which would acknowledge, according to the paper here, "Federal responsibility for the burden on State and local governments?" That suggests 100 percent of the responsibility to me. Does that suggest the same thing to you?

Mr. PALMIERI. Let there be no doubt we are asking for support for the Fascell-Stone bill.

Senator COCHRAN. Well, it is Fascell and Stone now, and it was Stack a while ago. Support for Stack comes a little late; he lost in the primary down there.

Mr. PALMIERI. Well, his bill may pass.

Senator COCHRAN. It may. We are supporting an effort here—some of us are, and this Senator is—for a full responsibility on the part of the Federal Government, because it is the Federal policy that has permitted this great influx of refugees into southern Florida.

It seems that this comes a little late, the announcement of a three-point plan to deal with the problem. The Attorney General stated that we have been trying to deal with the problem; the administration has been trying to stop this flow of refugees into the country, but it has not succeeded. There are 100 to 200 coming in every day, now. That does not sound like much success. So with the announcement of this plan—I am just curious about what new success we can expect.

Mr. PALMIERI. You know, Senator, the chairman was eloquent in his introduction about the human dimension of this total problem.

Senator COCHRAN. We are all concerned about that.

MOTIVES BEHIND CUBAN EXODUS

Mr. PALMIERI. I know you are. But I do not think in this hearing so far, we have taken note of what may be the strongest human dimension that is operating, and frustrating to some extent, the strong enforcement and interdiction effort that is going on. And that dimension is simply this—and you said yourself there are many people in Cuba who would like to come to this country. More importantly, there are many people in Cuba who have close relatives in this country. This country has taken over 900,000 people from Cuba in the past 20 years. Many of those people have succeeded in a spectacular way, particularly in south Florida. They have built a community, and they built a community of interest with the entire Caribbean and Latin American region, a trading empire, if you will.

Florida has had great benefits from the Cuban-American community. And what has developed is a system that is being driven by the strongest emotions of those people in the Cuban-American community who have relatives who signed up in Havana. When those people sign up they are very often classified as outcasts. They have their house taken from them, they lose their job, and they may lose their ration card. At that point, the drive on the part of their relatives in the Cuban-American community to get through our blockade, to take the risk posed by our enforcement effort, is a kind of a drive that I think any human being would find it difficult to ignore if his close family relation were beseeching him for help.

So it is that humanitarian factor which has caused this administration to try to balance the interests of our country, our people, and the interest in the enforcement of our immigration laws.

HANDLING OF CUBAN FLOW

Senator COCHRAN. Isn't it true, though, that the failure of the administration, and the mishandling and the failure of enforcement of the laws that we have, have struck hardest at those who do have strong desires to reunify families and that would evoke our most sensitive humanitarian concerns to do those things for people who cannot adequately provide for their own families—isn't the mis-

handling and the failure of enforcement of those laws partly the reason for our failure to take into the country those people that you are identifying right now?

Mr. PALMIERI. Well, I think from the perspective of one who has worked with this problem from the start, along with practically every Federal agency, that the balance has been difficult, but I think it has been achieved. I think we have done something that no other country in the world was either able or willing to do, and that is to try to live up to a humanitarian tradition and at the same time maintain the integrity of our immigration laws in a case in which we had 1,000 miles of coastline and thousands of boats out there. We had commercial interests and tourist interest to balance, and we had a difficult situation in which we had no diplomatic relations with the sending country. It is, I think, under the circumstances an accomplishment.

In the funding aspect, I think you need to recall also, Senator—and I am sure you do—that this Congress in this past summer was in a crisis mood, really, about the budget. And I think this mood really pervaded the question of whether, when we had as many difficult problems in Detroit with the autoworkers and with the steelworkers, and in our black neighborhoods and in our Hispanic neighborhoods, of whether it was justified, in a situation where we knew cutting off the flow was so difficult under the circumstances, whether it would be justified to provide refugee benefits. And the judgment was made at the time that it was not justified, that the balance should be struck as was reflected in the proposed legislation.

Now I think, in light of the drastic impact on south Florida, in light of all the factors we are, after consulting with the Congress and the delegations, we are convinced that the Fascell-Stone approach is necessary to meet the problem.

Senator COCHRAN. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator METZENBAUM. The Senator from Wyoming.

HOW ARE REFUGEE NUMBERS ALLOCATED?

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just a couple questions, Mr. Ambassador. Could you briefly review for me, as succinctly as possible, the process that is used to determine the total refugee admissions and allocations? I think that is the thing that has caused me a good deal of concern, both as a member of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy and here.

Do you start with the total, or do you start with the allocations? Exactly what is the process, and what criteria determines totals and allocations? Sometimes, we see a large fraction of one country's refugees are to be admitted, and then suddenly, we see a very small fraction of another country's to be admitted.

Certainly, I do not see anybody in the administration or the agencies being guided by the normal limits of the Refugee Act. I would like some kind of response to that.

Mr. PALMIERI. Senator, I would like to ask Mr. Frank Loy, Director, Bureau for Refugee Programs in the Department of State who, under some considerable self-sacrifice, wheeled himself in here today—I

will welcome your question, because it justifies my insistence that he do so, and his willingness to do so.

Mr. Loy, would you explain the basis for the numbers that are before the committee?

Mr. Loy. Senator, the number is built, if you will, from the bottom, rather than that there is determined a number and then it is carved up.

At the same time that I say it is built from the bottom by its constituent parts, we are very aware, generally, that there are various pressures that legitimately bear on those numbers, including an overall pressure not to let that number get too high.

When you look at the specific parts, Senator, their origin is not always the same. For example, in the case of the very largest number, the 168,000 refugees from Southeast Asia, that is a recognition on the part of the U.S. Government that there are in that part of the world a very substantial number of refugees who are not welcome to stay where they are, and where it is incumbent upon other nations, including the United States, to resettle them, and that if that does not happen, that there is a very substantial risk that the countries of first asylum in that part of the world will no longer accept refugees and possibly seek to deter them in a fairly brutal manner, and may even seek forceably to expel and repatriate some of the ones that are there.

So it is that humanitarian concern of ours, plus our desire to not permit those refugee populations to become a destabilizing foreign policy element, that drives that particular number.

The situations in other parts of the world are not entirely the same. For example, in Africa—where the number is, of course much smaller—there are not situations that are quite as drastic where there are refugees that are in immediate—or, I should not say “no situations”—there are few situations where the refugees are in immediate danger as they might be in Southeast Asia. Yet we do know that there are in Africa refugees that will have a difficult time staying where they are, are true, refugees—that is, they have a reasonable and well-founded fear of political persecution—and they cannot stay. That is a very small fraction of the total African refugee population. But the number for Africa, for example, is our estimate of that group, of that portion of the total African refugee population, that has a well-founded fear of persecution, is not able to stay where they are and falls into one of the categories that does concern us, either sometimes that they have certain ties to the United States, sometimes simply that there is no alternative place for them to linger.

Different parts of that have, as I suggest, different origins.

FINANCIAL IMPACT OF REFUGEES

Senator SIMPSON. That is of some interest.

At the hearing last April, I asked Secretary Vance—and members of the Department, staff of the Department were here—about the financial impact of refugees, that that impact was having on the most heavily involved areas such as San Francisco, Denver, Houston, New Orleans—I believe those were the cities. I wonder if that report was ever prepared? If it was, I never received a copy of it, and I would greatly appreciate having it.

Mr. PALMIERI. Yes, we have information on the economic impacts, which we will furnish you, Senator.

Senator SIMPSON. I would very much appreciate that, as soon as possible. Just send it right on up to my office. I would greatly appreciate that. April was the request, and I have made several since then. So if you have it, why, share it with me.

FAMILY REUNIFICATION CRITERIA

I have just one other question. In respect to family reunification, which has been discussed a good deal today, especially with the Cuban situation, we have regular immigration preference categories. Should not those be applied for all countries, for nonrefugees? It seems to me that we see that Cuban relatives are treated differently. Should that be the case?

Mr. PALMIERI. Well, I think that we have a difference in the refugee program and the immigration program. The refugee program does anticipate or contemplate groups of people who are in danger, and for that reason, because they have a well-founded fear of persecution, are thereby processed for admission to this country. And the priorities in that respect where we have more people who would come within that group than we could possibly take, as in Indochina, the priorities are determined with respect to their relationship to the United States. Now, that may mean that they have a relative here, or it may mean that they have worked for an agency of our Government.

Now, unless you were to say that refugees should have no priority over immigrants, then I think you have to stay with a system which recognizes that for clear, present humanitarian reasons, you are going to give priority to refugees in respect to admissions and resettlement, and within that, you are going to weigh family reunification heavily.

So I think that family reunification criteria are really derivative of the fundamental policy that gives a preference to peoples judged to be in fear of persecution abroad.

Senator SIMPSON. Well, it does seem to me that that element enters in a more weighted fashion with the Cuban situation than with others, and I question that decision. But certainly, as Senator Thurmond and others were saying this morning, and as Attorney General Civiletti was responding, how many really came here solely out of economic reasons, but cannot return because they certainly would have a well-founded fear of prosecution if they ever went back—that is the catch-22. They come out of economic reasons, without question, but they cannot go back simply because of the nature of that particular regime. So there we are, and that is the catch.

Mr. PALMIERI. But we did not make them refugees. We did not bring them under the act.

Senator SIMPSON. I am aware of that. I am well aware of that. But that is one of the vexatious parts of the problem.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS OF THE CHAIRMAN

Senator KENNEDY. I want to thank my colleagues for raising many valuable and worthwhile points during the course of this hearing. I think that this has been an extremely helpful hearing for the members of the committee, and hopefully, to the public as well.

My own sense of the problem is that we have to respond in a very complete and thorough way. As we pointed out earlier, the administration's request before this committee was for 75-percent reimbursement to local communities for Cubans and Haitians, but I think with the administration's statement and commitment now to give the full 100 percent, is something which is worthwhile and which we should undertake. That was the spirit of the Refugee Act. It has been a long time in coming, but that is where we are, and it seems to me that that is where we ought to end up with regard to the immediate problem of Cubans and Haitians.

HIGHER PRIORITY NEEDED ON REFUGEE PROBLEMS

I would just hope that besides the questions that we have heard here today, targeted on the immediate problem, that we would get back, within this administration or any future administration, to really place the issue of refugees high on the agenda of our foreign policy considerations. The American people are responsive, they are caring, and they are concerned, and they want to respond to the human tragedies which have afflicted people all over the world. We are basically a nation of immigrants and refugees, and it strikes at a very important chord of our humanity and of our national tradition.

But as has been pointed out during the course of the morning, we also want to have a national policy that is going to be measured against that humanitarian concern but also measured against what our resources and what our capabilities are within this Nation.

And what I have detected over 17 years on this committee, and about 13 or 14 years as chairman of the Refugee Subcommittee, is that this problem is becoming more significant, is becoming of greater dimension every single year, with vastly increased movements of people. And the United States as a world leader has attempted to respond, sometimes I think more effectively than at other times.

GREATER INTERNATIONAL ACTION

But it does seem to me imperative that we try and get ahead of the curve of the wave, and the only way that can be done is through international action. I think the United States ought to take the lead in this area, whether it is within an international conference, whether it is using some of the existing international machinery, so that we really sensitize the countries and the regions of the world, the various organizations which are already in existence—such as OAS with regards to the responsibilities within Central America—and that we exercise our capability and our power and our influence within the world community to start dealing with some of the root causes behind refugee problems. I think that is what has to be done. I think that is the most humane way, in keeping families together, in keeping families within communities together, in keeping nations together and eliminating the human misery and all of the human tragedies that are associated with refugees being shuttled from country to country, and separated and abused and exploited and many times losing their lives.

So I want to make it clear that I would hope that as we move through the process of consultations in the future—whatever the

future is going to be—that we are going to hear from the administration—this administration or future administrations—not just about what they are doing with existing problems, but about what we are doing to address the fundamental issues in a responsible, thoughtful, compassionate, sensible manner wherein I think lies the best hope for dealing with this worldwide problem.

We will continue to work with the administration, but I am going to, as long as I am chairman of this committee, insist that this administration and future administrations really start addressing these questions in the kind of world forum that is required. Not that we are expecting other countries to do the United States a favor by accepting some of their responsibilities towards refugees, or that we are asking them or pleading with them for help. Rather, this is a matter of humanity that goes across frontiers, and the United States, hopefully as the conscience of the world, ought to be sensitizing other countries around the world as to what the human dimensions of these problems are. I think we ought to really be taking the lead.

I think it is an opportunity for us, and a profound opportunity for us, and it is one which I hope we will take advantage of.

I hope, Mr. Palmieri, as you exercise your own influence within the administration, and as you consider your responsibilities in this area, that you will find that these suggestions have some merit and some value.

Mr. PALMIERI. I do indeed, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KENNEDY. I will be sending you some questions for the record. But I want to thank you and the others. The committee stands in recess.

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the committee was adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

[The response received on questions submitted for the record follows:]

QUESTIONS OF SENATOR KENNEDY AND RESPONSES OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1. INDOCHINESE REFUGEES

(a) The flow of Indochinese refugees continues unabated. Based upon the Department's report, the departure rate of Indochinese refugees, on an annual basis, has hardly changed over the past year. For every Indochinese refugee for whom the international community finds a resettlement opportunity in a third country, another moves to take his place in the countries of first asylum.

Question. Will the international community likely confront the same magnitude of a refugee problem in Southeast Asia next year?

Answer. The Department views the outlook with cautious concern. We have made progress, but the situation remains serious. As a result of the Geneva commitments, the international community resettled 300,000 refugees and the camp population in Southeast Asia was reduced from 372,000 in July 1979 to 220,000 at the end of August 1980. More striking however, is that since March of this year, the overall camp population dropped very slowly due to several factors. First, boat arrivals in first asylum countries started to climb in that month, the rate rising from 3,000 monthly in January and February to over 10,000 monthly in succeeding months. Coincidentally, land arrivals rose as well. For both types of refugees, monthly arrivals from April through August averaged 15,000 monthly against an average of 7,000 monthly in the five months preceding March. While this rate is diminishing, we do not believe that it is safe to accept optimistic forecasts since the fundamental causes of the Indochinese refugee flow have not changed. Secondly and coincidentally, in March the rate of resettlement in third countries began to drop. Following Geneva, the total average resettlement rate

ran at approximately 25,000 persons per month, but in March fell by 4,000 persons to an average monthly rate of 21,000 persons per month.

And a third factor which overhangs the situation is the indeterminate status of the 153,000 Khmer who remain in UNHCR holding centers near the Thai border. At the time of the tremendous influx of Khmer seeking relief and asylum from famine and warfare in Kampuchea last year, the High Commissioner rightly decided to await clarification of the situation within Kampuchea in the expectation that many of them would seek to return to their homeland. In June, the UNHCR sought to initiate a voluntary repatriation program which, unfortunately, was of only very limited success. Additionally, he has sought the resettlement in third countries of many who clearly want and deserve resettlement and at his urging, several thousand have found new homes. While these 153,000 Khmer in the holding centers are not entered in the statistics for the Indochinese refugees, they must be kept in mind as possibly deserving of resettlement in third countries.

Indeed, if we add them to the number of refugees seeking resettlement, we find that the total, 373,000, is unchanged from the time of Geneva. While we might expect the refugee situation to improve somewhat in the coming year, the need remains urgent and the situation volatile.

Question. What diplomatic steps are under way to deal with the root causes behind the refugee flow from Cambodia and Laos, and the implementation of an "orderly departure" program from Vietnam?

Answer. The fundamental causes of the refugee flows from Laos and Kampuchea (and Vietnam) lie principally with the policies of the communist regimes of those states in seeking to remake their societies in a new image. The United States is not in a position to influence them directly. We have, however, engaged in a number of bilateral and multilateral efforts designed to persuade the Vietnamese and their Soviet supporters to cease their aggression against the other nations of Indochina, withdraw their forces from Kampuchea and allow the Kampuchians to decide their own future. Most recently, the ASEAN resolution in the UNGA, which passed by a 97-23-22 majority and which we strongly supported, called for an international conference to address the unresolved questions concerning Kampuchea.

Additionally, over the past year we have been able, by working within the international community, to influence the flow of refugees from the Indochinese states. The 1979 Geneva Conference was instrumental in influencing the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to terminate its program of assisting the departure of unwanted peoples. Subsequently, we have made every effort to obtain agreement on an Orderly Departure Program for Vietnamese. Negotiations with the SRV on the Program continue to progress and are at a point where agreement on the modalities of the Program is attainable.

In Kampuchea, we and the international community have provided a major relief program to keep the Khmer alive and, not incidentally, to enable them to remain in Kampuchea. Rice seed assistance has, moreover, encouraged many Khmer to return to their home. While the food lift continues, most of the refugees who had come to the Thai border had returned, leaving 50,000 to 100,000 still on the border and 153,000 in UNHCR holding centers. We are hopeful many of them may consider voluntary repatriation to Kampuchea. A UNHCR effort to this end in June was successful in repatriating some 9,000 of these Khmer, but that program ended at the time of the Vietnamese incursion into Thailand. We have supported the UNHCR programs vis-à-vis the Khmer, including repatriation, but in the latter instance only after assuring ourselves that any repatriation will be truly voluntary.

From Laos there has been a steady stream of refugees, both Lao and Hmong tribespeople, over the years, seeking asylum in Thailand. As in the Khmer situation, local resettlement has been virtually ruled out by the Thai government, at least until the overall situation has reached a point when the flow and the numbers in Thailand are at lower levels. The UNHCR, with U.S. Government support, continues to seek opportunities for voluntary repatriation of the Lao people, particularly those of a rural background, and recently 65 persons were repatriated to agricultural areas in southern Laos. The Department supports the UNHCR's efforts in this regard, again with the proviso that the repatriation is truly voluntary. An earlier UNHCR attempt to repatriate Lao by differentiating between economic and political refugees was unsuccessful.

The Hmong tribespeople, who vigorously fought the communists, are under constant pressure, including military action from the Lao Government and its

Vietnamese allies, to relocate in lowland areas under control of the Lao Government. The Department does not consider it feasible to consider voluntary repatriation for them.

(b) Over the past year there has been concern in some quarters that the United States' high-level admission program for Indochinese refugees may be contributing to the high-level exodus of refugees.

Question. Is there any evidence that the well publicized international resettlement efforts in behalf of Indochinese refugees is now a significant factor in the decision of refugees to flee? Elaborate on this question for each of the sending countries: Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

Answer. The idea that the international resettlement program acts to draw refugees from their native lands, has been a constant factor in our deliberations. It is clear that the international resettlement effort is well known among potential refugees in all three countries concerned but the significance of this factor is difficult to evaluate. By their own testimony, the major factors impelling the Vietnamese, at an average of 6,000 persons monthly since August 1979 and predominantly ethnic Vietnamese, to continue to evade SRV moratorium controls in effecting clandestine departures by boat are political repression of the SRV and the fact that members of the former middle and upper classes are seriously disadvantaged in the new society. The tremendous hardships and physical danger which all refugees risk during their escape are a clear sign of the persecution from which they flee. While the economies of all three Indochinese countries are seriously depressed, the societies' former leaders are the most disadvantaged through persecution by economic means.

(c) Negotiations have been under way for several years to encourage, to the maximum extent possible, local resettlement of Indochinese refugees—especially in Thailand—with coordinated international assistance.

Question. What is the current status of these negotiations, particularly for Laotian refugees in Thailand?

Question. Has the increased effort to provide third country resettlement opportunities for Laotian villagers reduced the incentive for Thailand to undertake local settlement, and would a similar international resettlement effort in behalf of Cambodian refugees also reduce efforts to create conditions allowing for their voluntary repatriation or local settlement?

Question. What is the status of international funding for local settlement or the proposed Fund for Durable Solutions?

Answer. From the beginning of substantial refugee flows, the Royal Thai Government has been reluctant to accept refugees for local resettlement. The Government fears that not only would this encourage further flows, but that the resettled peoples would add new and disruptive elements to their present largely homogeneous citizenry. The Government has indicated, however, a willingness to consider some local resettlement in the future when the camp populations are substantially reduced and the situation stabilized.

In the meantime, third country resettlement not only provides the opportunity for Lao, Hmong, Khmer, and Vietnamese to obtain temporary asylum in Thailand, but holds out the hope of an eventual reduction of the refugee population to the point where the Thai will agree to initiate local resettlement. With regard to the Khmer, third country resettlement has been constrained in the expectation that many Khmer in the holding centers may wish to return voluntarily to their homeland. In all likelihood, the majority will not choose this route, however, and will have to be resettled in third countries.

Funding in substantial amounts is not readily available for local resettlement although the UNHCR has some limited resources. At present, there is no activity in attempting to realize the proposed Fund for Durable Solutions. The Department's reprogramming request for \$2 million was objected to by the Senate Appropriation Committee, and other countries await our lead. The UNHCR has investigated and proposed four possible resettlement projects in various parts of the world which could be financed by such a fund but no immediate action can be expected on this front.

(d) The United States has maintained its commitment from last year to resettle 14,000 Indochinese refugees each month. However, this figure was set at a time when the flow of refugees was reaching emergency proportions and in the context of the Geneva Conference where all countries were being asked to double their resettlement efforts.

Question. Why was 14,000 per month continued for another full year?

Answer. The quota of 14,000 Indochinese refugee admissions per month requested in these consultations continues at a level undertaken by the President in June 1979 at the time of the boat refugees crisis in Southeast Asia. That number was based on a judgment about the level at which it was believed Indochinese refugees could be satisfactorily absorbed within the American community, taking into account the capabilities of the resettlement structures maintained by the various private voluntary resettlement agencies which work with the Department on refugee programs. It was understood at that time that, if the outflow of boat refugees continued at 40,000 to 50,000 per month, such an admission rate would be wholly inadequate. Nevertheless, because of the then perceived limits on our absorptive capacity, this was the maximum figure set. At the same time vigorous efforts were made to seek increased resettlement in other resettlement nations. Efforts were also made to develop the concept of the refugee processing centers which were to be refugee camps in countries in the region less affected by the refugee problem. These camps, such as the one now in operation in the Philippines, were to relieve pressure on those nations of first asylum most sorely pressed by the large numbers of refugees arriving on their shores. Finally, efforts were made to seek greater opportunities for the resettlement of Indochinese refugees in developing nations.

Following the Geneva conference in July 1979, the Vietnamese government, which had been subjected to widespread criticism during the conference for its policy of expelling boat refugees forcibly, moved to cut back on the flow of refugees out of Vietnam. This resulted in a sharp drop in the rate of refugee escapes from Indochina.

At the same time, the doubling of the rate of refugee admissions from 84,000 to 168,000 per year was matched by a similar doubling in third country resettlement so that, within a few months after the Geneva conference, worldwide commitments for the resettlement of refugees totalled 290,000 on an annual basis, and actual admissions were proceeding at an even faster rate.

This led to a significant reduction in refugee population in the twelve months between September 1979 and August 1980. However, refugees in camps remain at a very high level, totalling 220,000 throughout Southeast Asia at the end of August, plus 153,000 Khmer in holding centers in Thailand, many of whom will be seeking resettlement. Thus, if first asylum countries were to be encouraged to continue to receive these refugees, a continuing high rate of resettlement would be required in order to effect significant continuing rates of reduction in camp populations. While third country resettlements had begun to fall off in the spring of 1980, it is the Administration's intent to continue intensive efforts to maintain such third country resettlement at a significant level. It is our hope that such resettlement will continue at least at the rate of 7,000 Indochinese refugees per month.

Question. Have other countries, which doubled their participation last year, agree to carry this commitment forward for another year? Which countries have, and which have not?

Answer. The Department maintains a continuing dialogue with the UNHCR and resettlement countries, both in Washington and through our Embassies, in an effort to assure that the Indochinese refugee problem continues to be dealt with on an international basis. Last spring, as a few countries fulfilled their Geneva pledges, the UNHCR urged them to renew the commitments they had made the previous year, and subsequently broadened his appeal to all those countries who had made pledges at Geneva whether they had completed their commitments or not. The Department consulted closely with UNHCR staff during this period, and at the direction of the United States Coordinator for Refugees, our Embassies in all resettlement countries followed up on the UNHCR's appeal, stressing that a reduction in the international effort could have tragic consequences for the refugees.

The responses to the Department's approaches have been mixed and cautious. This is a period of widespread economic difficulties and, much as in the United States, all countries have domestic problems of a recession in economic activity with a consequent rise in unemployment, budgetary limitations, housing shortages, and the need to accommodate refugees from other countries. No country has declined to fulfill its pledge at Geneva because of these problems but some have stretched their pledges out, and many are cautious about the future. In addition, the question of immigration and refugees is in every country a political question which cannot be quickly answered. Thus, historically, the first response to such an approach by foreign governments is reserved, since many countries still have to work their way through their own decision-making process on this subject.

Of the principal resettlement countries, the Australian government has completed its deliberations and has notified us that it intends to accept 15,000 refugees in its fiscal year 1981, the same number admitted in 1980. The Canadian Minister of Employment and Immigration, Lloyd Axworthy, consulted with United States officials in Washington in June, but must complete consultations with the Canadian Parliament this fall before a final decision can be taken. While the French government rarely announces its plans, or even acknowledges that it has such a program, France has had a steady continuing program since 1975, and we expect that its 1981 admission rate may continue at about 1,000 per month. The other European nations present a more mixed picture, and a number of nations which felt impelled to make substantial pledges during the 1979 boat refugee crisis appear less likely to do so now.

With consultations on the United States program for FY 1981 complete, we have inaugurated a new round of talks on this subject. We have found that a firm and substantial United States program plays a significant role in stimulating third country responses. When resettlement needs have been high and our program has been increased, third country resettlement pledges have risen accordingly.

At the UNHCR Executive Committee meeting in Geneva in early October, the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, Ambassador Palmieri, emphasized this point in his presentation to the Committee and in his bilateral meetings with senior refugee and immigration officials of interested nations. Shepard Lowman, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asian Refugee Programs, has travelled to Ottawa to consult with the Canadian government. Lionel Rosenblatt, Refugee Coordinator in Bangkok, visited London, Bonn and Geneva on his return to Thailand this month. Other approaches to European governments are planned.

We are continuing our major effort to keep other resettlement countries up to the mark and expect that third country resettlement can be maintained at the level of 7,000 per month in FY 1981.

2. SOVIET REFUGEES

(a) There has been a significant decline in the number of Jewish refugees permitted to leave the Soviet Union when contrasted with last year.

Question. Outline in some detail what diplomatic steps have been taken to indicate our government's concern over this trend. For example, has the United States indicated to the Soviet Union that this is a subject contrary to the provisions of Basket 3 of the Helsinki Final Act?

Answer. The U.S. Government has continued to press the Soviets on our deep concern for human rights, including the right to emigrate. We have persisted in this course at a time when communications with the Soviets have been made difficult by deeper tensions in bilateral relations.

Emigration of Soviet Jews, which reached the record level of over 50,000 last year, so far this year totals only about 17,000. This contrasts to some 34,000 during the comparable period of 1979, for a decline of about 50 percent. Our allocations for refugees demonstrates that we do not accept this sharp decline in the flow of Soviet Jews and that we fully expect that emigration restrictions will be eased during FY 1981.

U.S. Government spokesmen have made it clear publicly and privately that this is a fundamental and continuing concern which we will pursue by every appropriate means. On July 29 President Carter stated we will raise these serious concerns with the Soviets in Madrid and that we will seek an explanation for the decline of Soviet Jewish emigration and a commitment to reverse that decline.

3. HONG KONG REFUGEES

(a) Group refugee numbers have been eliminated for refugees from Hong Kong, which numbered 1,200 last year. Some voluntary agencies have expressed concern that this means no refugees from Hong Kong are eligible under the Act.

Question. Will individual refugee applications still be considered, on a case-by-case basis, from Hong Kong? What is the status of refugees from Hong Kong under the Administration's 1981 request?

Answer. Over the years a program had developed for the acceptance into the conditional entry program of refugees from the People's Republic of China who reached Hong Kong. The conditional entry, or 7th preference category of the Immigration and Nationality Act, provided for the acceptance of persons who were refugees from a communist or communist-controlled country and feared to

return because of the threat of political persecution. Most such persons would have been allowed to remain in Hong Kong but, based on findings that they were not finally resettled, they were allowed to apply for and come to the United States on a conditional entry document. The number of such refugees accepted for admission into the United States dwindled over the years and, until recently, has been continuing at the rate of about 100 per month with a waiting period of several years.

While findings were made that these refugees were not "firmly resettled," it is clearly a fact that the Government of Hong Kong has not returned any person who has managed to stay and live and work within Hong Kong for a significant period of time as is the case with all of these conditional entrants. Further, there is no political persecution practiced against these individuals in Hong Kong itself. Persons entering the United States on non-immigrant visas and then claiming political asylum are regularly returned to Hong Kong. China has permitted many of its citizens to emigrate legally to Hong Kong (as well as to other countries) and to return to visit their relatives in China if they wish. Illegal immigrants who successfully evade British border security and register at Hong Kong Government offices are permitted to remain indefinitely in the Colony. Many of these former illegal emigrants later return to China to visit for personal and business reasons. It seems clear that the vast majority of those currently leaving China for Hong Kong, whether legally or illegally, do not face persecution upon their return to the PRC.

There are, of course, millions of persons who have a legitimate claim to the status of political refugee who have reached an intermediate asylum point and who are considered, thereafter, as ineligible for the United States program. This, most commonly, is found in African refugee situations, where similar ethnic populations are often found on both sides of national borders. Such groups are readily accepted in first asylum for extended periods and often are allowed to resettle in such areas on a permanent basis.

The Refugee Act of 1980 broadens the test of refugee status geographically but adds the requirement that these refugees be of special humanitarian concern to the United States. A principal consideration in judging the question of special humanitarian concern necessarily must be the extent to which the refugee in question will be allowed to resettle legally in the country in which he or she first seeks asylum.

In the case of refugees leaving Mainland China for Hong Kong, we have found that once they are safely within the limits of Hong Kong and under no further danger of forcible return to the People's Republic of China, there is little argument for their inclusion in the United States program. It is true that some refugees, stopped at the border, are forcibly returned to the PRC by the Hong Kong authorities. In fact, however, such persons are unable to reach a U.S. refugee office or to be processed by such an office until they have already successfully eluded Hong Kong border controls and brought themselves to a point where they also have the option of remaining permanently in Hong Kong.

The number of refugees seeking admission to the United States is very large and growing. The broadening of the refugee designation in the new Refugee Act clearly expands the number of persons eligible to apply for admission to the United States program. The number of refugees which can be absorbed in the United States is a limited one. We must be alert to avoid allowing refugee programs to be converted into entitlement programs; thus, it was believed that no quota should be provided for refugees from the People's Republic of China reaching Hong Kong. Individuals from the PRC in Hong Kong may, of course, seek refugee status by applying to the UNHCR representative and the U.S. Consulate General. There is no provision for funding non-Indochinese refugees from Hong Kong in FY 1981. Individuals who qualify, however, could be considered for humanitarian parole.

4. LATIN AMERICAN REFUGEES

Question. What provisions are being made for refugee admissions from such countries as Bolivia and El Salvador where recent events have created bona fide refugees?

Answer. To date, there have been no overseas requests for refugee status from persons from Bolivia or El Salvador. In the event that such requests are made, the cases will be reviewed on an individual basis. Those persons determined to be eligible under the established criteria will be admitted as part of the Latin America program which has a ceiling of 1500 in fiscal year 1981.

APPENDIX I.

REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS AND ALLOCATIONS
FOR FISCAL YEAR 1981

September 1980

Prepared by the
Office of the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs
in Cooperation with the
Departments of
State, Justice, Health and Human Services, Labor, Education,
and the Office of Management and Budget

INTRODUCTION

This REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS AND ALLOCATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1981 is submitted in compliance with the Refugee Act of 1980. The Act requires that the Committees of the Judiciary of the House and the Senate be provided with information on six areas of concern. These areas which are indicated in the Contents and described extensively in the report are summarized in a separate Executive Summary.

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APPENDIX

Overview of the World Refugee Situation

(1) A DESCRIPTION OF THE NATURE
OF THE REFUGEE SITUATION

The numbers of refugees and displaced persons throughout the world have increased significantly during the past year.^{1/} As in previous years, armed conflict, civil disturbances, famine and human rights violations (which include persecution on ethnic, political, religious and racial grounds) were among the primary causes for the increase. Although some refugee problems diminished during the year, massive and long-term refugee problems continued to be generated in Southeast Asia, the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan and the Caribbean.

In Asia, approximately 1.25 million Indochinese have fled their homes since the fall of the Governments of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam in 1975. In 1980, from April through July, the average number of Indochinese reaching first asylum countries each month was close to 20,000, half of whom were boat refugees who effected clandestine escapes in fragile craft at great risk. Some 235,000 Indochinese refugees remain in countries of first asylum awaiting resettlement and hundreds of thousands of Khmer, some 160,000 of whom are in Thai holding centers, seek refuge in eastern Thailand and along the Thai-Kampuchea border. Their presence creates a condition which threatens the political stability of Thailand. The development of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)-sponsored Orderly Departure Program from Vietnam has been slow, and an even greater upsurge in the outflow of boat refugees from that country cannot be excluded. Thus, Indochinese resettlement needs are virtually as pressing as they were one year ago.

On the African continent, the resolution of the conflict in Zimbabwe enabled 250,000 people who fled to other countries of the region to return to their homeland while some 800,000 others who had suffered internal displacement were able to return to their former homes or look for homes elsewhere. Somalia, one of the world's poorest countries, is hard pressed to meet the needs of its own people but is providing a haven for over 1.3 million refugees. Djibouti provides a refuge for some 42,000 Ethiopians and the Sudan provides a haven for over 440,000 refugees from Ethiopia, Uganda, Zaire and Chad. The political and military conflicts and the numbers and needs of African refugees are not expected to decrease in the foreseeable future. There has not been a desire expressed by African refugees nor a need assessed by the international community for a massive effort to resettle Africans beyond the shores of Africa. The principal thrust of U.S. policy, therefore, has been to assist African countries of asylum in the care and maintenance of refugees until such time as they can return to their countries of origin or have been permanently resettled in their countries of asylum.

^{1/} See Appendix for an "Overview of the World Refugee Situation."

In the Americas, some 200,000 Nicaraguans who sought refuge in neighboring countries during the change of government have returned to their homeland and some 20,000 others identified with the previous government have fled. In the latest crisis in Latin America, a new and critical dimension developed in April when a flotilla of Cuban-Americans brought over 116,000 Cubans to our shores over a three month period. The number has now exceeded 120,000. This exodus disrupted plans for the orderly resettlement of Cubans of special humanitarian concern, principally former political prisoners and their families. Additionally, some 15,000 Haitians who were in INS proceedings prior to June 19, 1980 have been included in the newly created class of Cuban/Haitian entrants for whom the Administration has submitted special legislation to provide for their assistance and the adjustment of their status.

In the Near East, over 1,000,000 Afghans fled armed conflict in Afghanistan following the Soviet invasion and sought asylum in Pakistan, placing an additional drain on a country experiencing major economic difficulties. International efforts are providing care and maintenance for these refugees. Iraqi Christians, Kurds and other minority groups add to the numbers of refugees from this region.

In the Soviet Union, the climate for emigration is difficult this year, partly because of the changed character of U.S.-Soviet relations. As many as 200,000 invitations to emigrate, required by the Soviets as a precondition for emigration, are believed to be held by potential emigrants. Official harassment of many would-be emigrants is said to have increased. Although the number of Soviet Jews departing from the Soviet Union has decreased considerably from last year's record high of 50,000, refugee flows from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe continue.

The U.S. approach to refugee situations has been to work within the international community to provide life-support services to refugee populations when necessary, to promote voluntary repatriation wherever possible and to support third-country resettlement where appropriate. Resettlement needs must be shared by the international community. As a leading member of that community and in keeping with our long history of humanitarian concern and the provisions of the Refugee Act of 1980, we propose to offer resettlement opportunities for Fiscal Year 1981 as outlined in the document.

(2) NUMBER AND ALLOCATION
OF THE REFUGEES TO BE ADMITTED
AND CONDITIONS IN THEIR COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN

In response to urgent humanitarian needs and foreign policy concerns, it is proposed to admit 217,000 refugees to the United States during Fiscal Year 1981 and to adjust the status of up to 5,000 persons granted asylum in the United States in earlier years, pursuant to Title II, Section 209(b) of the Refugee Act of 1980.

Table I which follows provides a breakdown of the proposed refugee admissions for Fiscal Year 1981.

TABLE I
PROPOSED
REFUGEE ADMISSIONS
Fiscal Year 1981

<u>Area of Origin</u>	<u>Proposed Admissions Fiscal Year 1981</u>
INDOCHINA	168,000
SOVIET UNION	33,000
EASTERN EUROPE	4,500
NEAR EAST	4,500
LATIN AMERICA	4,000
<u>AFRICA</u>	<u>3,000</u>
TOTAL	217,000
Asylum Status Adjustments	5,000

ASIA

The proposed number of Indochinese refugees to be admitted for Fiscal Year 1981 is 168,000.

As of July 31, 1980, approximately 390,000 Indochinese had reached the United States under parole or other provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) during the more than five years since the collapse of the former governments of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The admissions projected for the remainder of Fiscal Year 1980 will bring the total to 416,000.

The Indochinese refugee situation continues to present problems of serious dimensions. In the summer of 1979, some 370,000 refugees were living in crowded, unsanitary sites on the periphery of the South China Sea or in a string of camps running along the Thai border. The plight of boat and land refugees and their impact on first asylum countries in the spring of 1979 attracted worldwide attention and galvanized the international community into action. United Nations Secretary General Waldheim convened a meeting in Geneva on July 20-21, 1979 to deal with the crisis. Following the President's decision in June 1979 to double the monthly rate of Indochinese refugee resettlement from 7,000 to 14,000, many nations pledged additional resettlement offers, and third country resettlement opportunities more than doubled. As a result, the monthly departures of refugees from the camps increased in September to a rate of 25,000 a month. At the same time, the arrivals of refugees dropped sharply after the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) suspended its program of facilitating, for payment, the departure of ethnic Chinese and imposed stricter measures to check escapes.

In the past four months, however, developments have occurred to prolong the crisis. Beginning in March, boat arrivals in the first asylum countries started to climb. The rate rose from 3,000 a month in January and February to over 10,000 a month in May, June and July. Coincidentally, land arrivals rose as well. For both types of refugees, monthly arrivals from April through July averaged 20,000, as against an average of 7,000 during the previous five months. From October 1979 through February 1980, third countries maintained a high rate of resettlement. The United States resettled an average of 14,000 refugees monthly and the total resettlement numbers of all other countries averaged almost 11,000 a month. In March 1980, just as the refugee flow into first asylum countries was rising, resettlement in other countries dipped so that their monthly average for five months through July fell to 7,000. ^{1/}

Additionally, the status and future of the Khmer remain unclear and unstable both in holding centers managed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and in the border concentrations supported by the United Nations Children's

^{1/} See Table II.

Fund (UNICEF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). In June of this year, the Royal Thai Government (RTG) and the UNHCR conducted a small voluntary repatriation program for the Khmer in holding camps: out of 165,000 people some 9,600 Khmer elected to move to Kampuchea. A Vietnamese attack on opposition elements along the border, however, disrupted the area, and not all of those people were able to reenter their homeland. The UNHCR also began to seek resettlement opportunities for some of the Khmer who were in the holding camps to reunify families and to resettle those who had other close associations with the United States and other resettlement countries. There are several thousand Khmer in this category. Their uncertain status in Thailand and the possibility that their resettlement may encourage additional movements of Khmer to the border areas poses difficulties.

Excluding the Khmer in holding centers, there are presently about 235,000 boat and land refugees in first asylum countries awaiting resettlement. Even though the Southeast Asian camp populations have been reduced over the past year, the number of those presently in camps is unacceptable to first asylum countries and they insist that the refugee population must be further and steadily reduced if new arrivals are to be granted asylum rather than be turned back to sea or forcibly repatriated.

Unless the communist governments in Indochina change their policies, continuing Indochinese refugee flows appear inevitable. Armed forces of the governments of Laos and of Vietnam continue to attack Hmong and other hill tribespeople of Laos. Those who have not yet abandoned their traditional way of life and been relocated in rigidly controlled areas have been subjected to air, artillery and infantry assaults and chemical warfare. Ethnic Lao, both farmers and tradespeople, are severely taxed and deprived of political liberty. From five to six thousand Hmong and Lao move into Thailand each month. The Hmong survivors who make up half of that number, often show evidence of brutal attacks.

The SRV also continues to penalize those associated with the former government of the Republic of Vietnam. Ethnic Chinese and those who previously were members of the middle class are also subject to severe persecution. Private business is confiscated and these groups are ordered to "New Economic Zones." The SRV makes it plain in innumerable ways that these groups, once the foundation of the society and the economy, now have no place in Vietnamese society, nor do their children. These groups suffer severe economic deprivation and discrimination as a form of political persecution. Political liberties are almost nonexistent for the entire society. The expense of military aggression in Kampuchea and Laos and the confrontation with the People's Republic of China (PRC) have compounded the economic problems including food production in the SRV and Kampuchea. Military recruitment to support aggression in Kampuchea has increased the incentives for escape from this rigid totalitarian

state. Even with the SRV's moratorium on forced departures and the intensified surveillance against covert escapes, the number fleeing by boat has risen to a monthly rate of 10,000 since March, despite the ever growing threat of encountering pirates in the Gulf of Thailand who rob, rape, kidnap and often murder the helpless refugees. A recent spot survey of 100 recently arriving heads of family in Malaysia showed 63 percent had spent time in an SRV "reeducation" prison.

Vietnamese authorities have made it quite clear in exchanges with other countries that the moratorium on the expulsion of its unwanted citizens will not be sustained unless resettlement countries accept people directly from Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) in addition to those who qualify under the normal immigration procedures of those countries. The United States Government has sought an understanding with the Vietnamese authorities for the orderly departure of Vietnamese from Vietnam under the procedures satisfactory to both sides. The UNHCR has undertaken to assist in these negotiations. While some progress has been made, large numbers of people have not yet been able to leave Vietnam legally and safely. Renewal of the officially sponsored expulsion program by the Vietnamese authorities, which refugee reports indicate could be reinstated very rapidly, would subject people to severe dangers.

The monthly U.S. admissions of Indochinese are drawn from the refugee populations in all the first-asylum countries and will also be drawn directly from Vietnam as soon as the SRV permits persons who qualify for admission to the United States to leave that country. Section 201 of the Refugee Act of 1980 states that the President, after appropriate Congressional consultation, may specify in special circumstances that a person within the country of his or her nationality is a refugee. Accordingly, following these consultations, the President plans to specify that persons in Vietnam who otherwise qualify for admission to the United States under the Refugee Act of 1980 and do not qualify for immigrant visas are refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States.

The decision concerning the allocation of movements from individual first-asylum countries is based on several factors including the rate of flow of new arrivals into specific countries, the composition of that flow in terms of our criteria for selection based on links to the United States and the political situation and refugee policies in those countries. At the present time, more than half of our monthly refugee intake is drawn from Thailand. Hmong, Lao, and Khmer now constitute approximately 50 percent of the monthly admissions to the United States and Vietnamese nationals make up the remainder. No more precisely fixed proportions can or should be set, however, because of the uncertainties of the situation which could require a shift of emphasis from one first asylum country to another.

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SOVIET UNION

The proposed number of refugees to be admitted from the Soviet Union in Fiscal Year 1981 is 33,000.

Approximately 26,600 Soviet refugees were approved for admission to the United States during the first eleven months of Fiscal Year 1980. We expect, at most, a total of about 30,000 persons to be actually admitted during Fiscal Year 1980, compared with the proposed admissions level of 33,000.

The refugees coming to the United States from the Soviet Union will continue to be principally Soviet Jews, with non-Jewish arrivals being mainly Armenians.

The pattern of distribution among Soviet Jews leaving the USSR is roughly comparable to that of the past several years. Approximately one-third of these refugees go to Israel, while the remainder go to other countries for permanent resettlement. About ten percent of the latter group go to Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Western Europe. The remainder come to the United States. Although we cannot predict the number of refugees who will leave the Soviet Union in Fiscal Year 1981, on the basis of the previous pattern of distribution, we expect that some 35,000 Soviet Jews and perhaps 7,000 Armenians will be able to leave the USSR in Fiscal Year 1981.

The United States makes a clear distinction between our strong commitment to the principle of freedom of emigration and the numbers of refugees whom we forecast the Soviet authorities will permit to leave. We have supported free emigration since the end of World War II and our commitment has been strengthened by Congressional action including the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974, and our adherence in 1975 to the Helsinki Final Act, as well as recent policy emphasis on human rights. In view of the U.S. commitment to freedom of movement for all people, the projected U.S. admissions levels for Soviet refugees should not be construed as an approval of the restrictive emigration policy of the Soviet Union.

EASTERN EUROPE

The proposed number of refugees to be admitted from Eastern Europe in Fiscal Year 1981 is 4,500.

1/ See Table III

Approximately 3,200 Eastern European refugees were admitted to the United States during the first nine months of Fiscal Year 1980. We expect a total of some 4,250 will come to the United States from this region during Fiscal Year 1980 compared with the proposed refugee admissions level of 5,000.

Romanians will probably continue to be the largest Eastern European group admitted into the United States during Fiscal Year 1981. The admissions program for Romanians is an integral part of our historical commitment to human rights and the principle of freedom of movement which has shaped United States policies toward Eastern Europe for more than three decades. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974, under which Romania was granted most favored nation treatment in commercial relations, reflects Congressional and public support for these principles. We believe the Romanian Government will continue to permit a moderate level of emigration of such persons to the West.

Refugees from other Eastern European countries continue to be of special humanitarian concern to the United States because they, too, flee from the oppressive and restrictive circumstances of life in these communist-dominated countries to be reunited with members of their families and communities in the United States. These refugees from Warsaw Pact countries will be considered for admission under this program.

NEAR EAST

The proposed number of refugees from the Near East to be admitted in Fiscal Year 1981 is 4,500.

Approximately 1,000 Near Eastern refugees were admitted to the United States during the first nine months of Fiscal Year 1980. We expect that almost all of the 2,500 refugee admissions proposed for Fiscal Year 1980 will be used by the end of this fiscal year.

The situation in the Near East continues to be fast moving and susceptible to unusual changes. As such, we have found it appropriate to establish a single numerical level for refugee admissions from this entire region. We will allocate such numbers to various groups depending on the emergence of special conditions or needs of refugees of special humanitarian concern to our country. These circumstances vary. Those relating to Iraqi Assyrians and Iraqi Kurds remain as described in the report on the proposed Fiscal Year 1980 admissions, i.e., some 2,000 Assyrian Christians who left Iraq during the past few years claim persecution and are temporarily in Greece, where they have applied for admission into this country as refugees. Many persons in this group have relatives in the Assyrian-American communities of Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, and Hartford. Representatives of these communities support the claims of the Iraqi Assyrians that they were subject to persecution in Iraq.

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We propose to take modest numbers from each of these groups during this coming year and will expedite the family reunification cases from among those who can demonstrate that they qualify under the Refugee Act.

Two other groups may be included in the 4,500 admissions allocated to refugees from the Near East.

(a) The continuing chaotic conditions in Iran are causing an increasing number of Iranians to flee their country to seek permanent resettlement elsewhere, including the United States. Although a clear general pattern of persecution facing Iranians of various political persuasions and minority groups has not yet emerged definitively, there are many instances of persecution and proven danger to individuals. While at the present time we do not have a program for admitting persons from Iran as refugees, we remain ready to consider at a later date the admission on a case-by-case basis of Iranians who can demonstrate compelling humanitarian reasons to come to the United States for the purpose of family reunification and who otherwise meet the admission requirements of the Refugee Act.

(b) We deplore the fact that conditions in Afghanistan continue to force large numbers of Afghans out of their homeland. More than one million Afghan refugees are living in tent villages in Pakistan. Additional numbers are now seeking permanent resettlement outside the region. Many fear political persecution because of their affiliation with the Afghan regime ousted by the communists in 1978. Several thousand Afghans are at present in the Federal Republic of Germany where they have applied for admission into the United States as refugees. We propose to continue admitting a number of those seeking permanent resettlement who meet all the requirements of the Refugee Act and who wish to be reunited with family members here or who otherwise have close ties to the United States.

LATIN AMERICA

The proposed number of refugees to be admitted from Latin America during Fiscal Year 1981 is 4,000.

Most refugee admissions to the United States from Latin America historically have come from Cuba. During the 1960's and early 1970's the United States followed a policy of accepting Cuban citizens fleeing their homeland as refugees. Internal opposition to the Cuban Government resulted in the arrest and sentencing of tens of thousands of Cubans for political reasons. Since 1959 almost one million Cubans have fled their homeland, and over 800,000 of them have been resettled in the United States.

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In the early 1970's, however, the Government of Cuba placed severe restrictions on the number of its citizens allowed to leave the island. This lasted until late 1978 when the Government of Cuba instituted a more liberal emigration policy and agreed to release several thousand political prisoners being held in Cuban jails. The Cuban Government also began to issue exit permits to political prisoners previously released from Cuban jails. In terms of actual departures from Cuba, the effect of the new Cuban policy was not felt until the second quarter of Fiscal Year 1979.

On April 21, 1980, following the seizure of the Peruvian Embassy in Havana by asylum seekers, the Cuban Government announced its willingness to permit Cubans to leave the island by boat from the Port of Mariel if they so wished. Members of the Cuban-American community in the United States promptly tried to transport their relatives out of Cuba in a massive boatlift. As a result of the flotilla activity, some 120,000 Cubans, not all of whom have relatives here, have entered the United States. They are being given six-month renewable paroles to allow time to work with the Congress to determine their legal status. The Administration has submitted special legislation that would grant them a new "Cuban/Haitian Entrant" status and permit them to apply for adjustment of status to permanent resident alien after two years.

In early May 1980 a disturbance took place in front of the U. S. Interests Section in Havana in which supporters of the Castro Government assaulted a number of Cuban nationals who were awaiting interviews for the purpose of coming to the United States. As a result of this disturbance, 389 persons sought safehaven inside our U. S. Interests Section. These individuals, together with their families, a total of over 1,000 people, have been processed and are ready to travel to the United States. A small number has already arrived here. Those who leave the island during this fiscal year will use Fiscal Year 1980 numbers for their admission as refugees. However, we cannot be certain that this problem will be resolved within the next few weeks and therefore it is necessary to set aside some numbers for their use in Fiscal Year 1981.

It is the Administration's hope that we can substitute an orderly departure program for the continuing disorderly exodus from Cuba which would establish a rate of flow of refugees which would be acceptable to the United States and provide for departures to countries which have offered to accept them.

In summary, in Fiscal Year 1981 we propose to admit 2,500 Cuban refugees for resettlement in the United States. Of this number approximately one-half will be used for the balance of the caseload of Cuban refugees who are being processed in Madrid hopefully by the end of the first quarter of Fiscal Year 1981. The remaining numbers will be used to admit those individuals and their families who sought refuge in the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. Other Cubans of special humanitarian concern to the United States will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

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Historically, the United States has also provided a haven from persecution to refugees from other Latin American countries. Prior to the 1970's, refuge was offered to those who qualified for political asylum. In recent years we have implemented several refugee programs designed to offer permanent resettlement to small groups of qualified refugees. Since the summer of 1978, the Hemispheric "500" Parole Program has assisted political detainees and other refugees from the area to enter the United States for resettlement. This past year we issued certificates of eligibility to 272 Argentinian political prisoners and their family members for a total of 670 persons. However, the Government of Argentina has failed to allow the departure of the great majority of these individuals.

During Fiscal Year 1981, we propose to admit up to 1,500 Latin American refugees, in addition to Cubans, for resettlement in the United States. We have included in this figure those individuals already approved but whose ability to move to the United States will depend on the willingness of their home governments to provide them with exit permits. Also included in this figure are individuals and their families from Caribbean and Central American countries who have fled violent civil strife, or who have been persecuted and have fled to neighboring countries.

Between September 1978 and July 1979, as many as 200,000 Nicaraguans fled their homeland as a result of the internal disturbances leading to the fall of President Somoza. Included in this group were approximately 80,000 in Costa Rica, 100,000 in Honduras and 10,000 in the United States. After the fall of Somoza, almost all Nicaraguan refugees in Honduras and Costa Rica as well as some in the United States, returned home. Those repatriated were, however, replaced by some 20,000 sympathizers of the Somoza regime. Of this latter group, approximately 15,000 fled to Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala and the rest came to the United States. The great majority of Nicaraguan refugees in Central American countries have been absorbed into local society or moved legally or illegally to third countries, including the United States. Currently those Nicaraguans in the United States have been granted voluntary departure status until September 28, 1980, while awaiting developments in Nicaragua which would indicate whether they may safely return. We are processing applications for asylum on a case-by-case basis.

AFRICA

The proposed number of African refugees to be admitted during Fiscal Year 1981 is 3,000.

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The Refugee Act of 1980 will enable many more Africans to apply for admission to the United States as refugees. Prior to the enactment of the Act, eligibility was restricted to Africans fleeing communist-dominated countries or coming from that portion of the Horn of Africa defined by law as part of the Middle East. After the Act was passed, lack of access to U.S. processing centers made it difficult for African refugees to enter the application process. New procedures for implementing the Refugee Act will make it possible for refugees to be processed in countries of first asylum within Africa.

Because most African governments view the problems of refugees as their own responsibility and provide asylum for African refugees within Africa, there has been limited demand for resettlement of African refugees outside the Continent. However, an increasing number of applications for admission to the United States from African refugees is expected from those who find it difficult to obtain asylum or assimilate in neighboring countries.

The proposed admission level for Africa is continent-wide rather than country-specific because of the difficulty of foreseeing precisely where conditions will create the needs for refugee admissions during Fiscal Year 1981. Nonetheless, certain regions throughout the continent already show signs of producing acute refugee problems:

-- African attention is focusing more sharply on Namibia and South Africa. South Africans and Namibians who oppose their governments' policies continue to look to the West in general, and to the United States in particular, for political asylum. The decision to seek resettlement as a refugee outside of Southern Africa is usually made when the situation becomes so intolerable that the extra-regional resettlement option is viewed as the only remaining one. Frequently those choosing this option are educated leaders and their families who already have suffered banning, house arrest and/or imprisonment, and whose safety cannot be assured in the southern Africa area.

-- By far the largest group of Africans seeking admission to the United States will continue to be Ethiopian. As a result of continued fighting over the Ogaden region, nearly 750,000 ethnic Somali from the Ogaden region of Ethiopia have fled that country and sought asylum in neighboring Somali refugee camps. Anywhere from 500,000-700,000 others are in Somalia though not in the camps. Some 350,000 Ethiopians from Eritrea have fled to Sudan as several Eritrean factions continue to struggle for independence. There are also an estimated 42,000 Ethiopian refugees presently living in Djibouti.

The number of Ethiopians admitted to the United States has increased as follows:

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<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Number Admitted</u>
1976	14
1977	25
1978	154
1979	342
1980 (to date)	347

-- In addition to admissions of refugees from the Horn and southern Africa, smaller numbers of admission are expected from other African countries where conditions have caused some to flee fearing persecution and where U.S. interests have developed those kinds of close family, employment, educational and other ties which could justify admission to the United States as refugees.

ASYLUM

In accordance with Title II, Section 209(b) of the Act, during Fiscal Year 1981 we intend to permit the adjustment of status to permanent resident alien of up to 5,000 persons who were previously granted asylum in the United States and have been in the United States as refugees for at least one year and meet the requirements of the Refugee Act.

Over 8,525 asylum requests (excluding Cuban and Haitian asylum seekers) were filed by aliens in the United States from January through June 1980. Of the 900 applications completed during this period, some 400 were approved.

Over 10,600 asylum requests (excluding Cuban and Haitian asylum seekers) were filed by aliens in the United States from October 1979 through June 1980. Of the 1,400 applications completed during this period some 725 were approved and 675 were denied.

TABLE II

U.S AND THIRD COUNTRY RESETTLEMENT
OF INDOCHINESE REFUGEES
(OCTOBER 1979 - JULY 1980)

	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>3rd Countries</u>	<u>Total</u>
October 1979	12,873	12,807	25,680
November	14,373	11,604	25,977
December	14,013	9,573	23,586
January 1980	14,512	12,648	27,160
February	14,437	11,209	25,646
March	14,057	6,158	20,215
April	13,902	7,801	21,703
May	14,385	8,633	23,018
June	13,559	7,622	21,181
July	<u>15,055</u>	<u>6,461</u>	<u>21,516</u>
TOTAL	141,166	94,516	235,682

TABLE III
REFUGEE FLOWS FROM THE SOVIET UNION

	Fiscal Year 1980		
	<u>Soviet Jews*</u>	<u>Non-Jews** (principally Armenians)</u>	<u>Monthly Total</u>
October	4,867	169	5,036
November	3,616	464	4,080
December	3,300	512	3,812
January	3,272	423	3,695
February	2,868	441	3,309
March	2,563	497	3,060
April	2,012	470	2,482
May	2,131	719	2,850
June	1,489	1,229	2,718
July	680	200	880
August (projected)	1,000	150	1,150
September (projected)	<u>1,000</u>	<u>250</u>	<u>1,250</u>
	28,798	5,524	
		GRAND TOTAL	34,322

* Source: Dept. of State. Note: Figures for August and September are considered conservative estimates.

** Source: U.S. Mission Geneva. Note: Figure for August is incomplete, and September figure is an estimate.

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(3) PROPOSED PLANS FOR THEIR
MOVEMENT AND RESETTLEMENT

The Refugee Act of 1980 provides a comprehensive and flexible framework for refugee admissions which enables the United States to respond to situations where compelling humanitarian and foreign policy concerns warrant moving refugees from first-asylum countries (and in some cases from their country of nationality) to the United States for resettlement. Because the Refugee Act eliminates the previous geographic and ideological criteria for admission, it enables a much larger pool of people to apply for refugee admission than were previously eligible. Given the expected number of applicants from around the world and the limit on our resources for absorbing refugees in this country, we have developed and are continuing to refine criteria for assigning priority to applicants from groups determined to be of special humanitarian concern to the United States.

The U. S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs will continue to work with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to develop additional procedures on refugee admissions necessary to implement the Refugee Act. In admitting refugees to the United States, we give preference to those with ties to the United States through close relatives, past employment with the U.S. Government or U.S. institutions (including training in the United States) and involvement in programs and policies supported by the U.S. Government. Preference is also given to refugees who are of special humanitarian concern to the United States such as former or current political prisoners.

We continue to welcome Congressional views on such criteria and ways to ease the transition to a more equitable and rational admissions system. It will clearly take additional time and careful consideration before new procedures can be fully implemented. In the meantime, our policies may reflect as much historical precedent as the spirit of the new Refugee Act. Thus, differences in admissions levels and the processing of applicants from various parts of the world do not necessarily indicate the importance we attribute to particular regions or groups of people. We must maintain the flexibility to respond to changing refugee needs and compelling national interests in specific areas.

While we are prepared to continue to provide leadership in supporting multilateral refugee relief and resettlement efforts, we believe it is imperative for other countries to do their share as well. We would hope that universal support for the principles of burden-sharing would lessen the need for the U.S. share of massive refugee assistance needs we foresee for the future.

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Respect for fundamental human rights which would make it possible for people to remain in their homelands is obviously the key to reducing the refugee problem worldwide.

Refugees will continue to be processed at the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) posts which have traditionally prepared refugees for movement to the United States or by other designated U. S. Government officials. Regardless of where refugees are processed, INS retains the ultimate statutory authority to determine refugee admissibility under the Refugee Act of 1980.

The following sections describe plans for selecting and processing refugees from various parts of the world, transporting them to the United States and assisting their resettlement in this country. Also included, where appropriate, is information on the projected cost of these services. Voluntary agencies (VOLAGS) will be reimbursed for all non-Indochinese refugees who are actually admitted to the United States in the fiscal year for which funds are appropriated. VOLAGS will be reimbursed for Indochinese refugees who are in the processing pipeline although not actually admitted up to 60 days into the next fiscal year for a transitional year only. After the year of transition, reimbursement to VOLAGS will be for all refugees who arrive in the fiscal year for which funds are appropriated. Under the Refugee Act, all refugees, regardless of country of origin, will be eligible for those basic services which help them become self-supporting and contributing members of society as soon as possible. Although these services were developed primarily with the Indochinese and Cubans in mind, with the passage of the new Act, the programs have become available to all refugees.

PRE-ARRIVAL

SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN REFUGEES

The majority of Soviet refugees leave the Soviet Union and enter the West by rail into Austria where those who wish to settle in Israel are processed by the Jewish Agency for Israel. To assist in this program of resettlement in Israel, the United States expects to grant \$25 million in Fiscal Year 1981 to the United Israel appeal.

Those not wishing resettlement in Israel are registered by voluntary refugee agencies under contract to the Department of State. Refugees then go by rail to Rome, Italy, where they are maintained at less expense and are processed for admission to other western countries, principally the United States. After the documentation process is completed, the Intergovernmental

1/ See Table IV

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Committee for European Migration (ICEM) arranges for the flight of those coming to the United States.

Other refugees from the Soviet Union, principally Armenians, are usually pre-processed by our Embassy in Moscow. They fly to Rome where the final steps of documentation are completed by INS. After a short stay, these refugees are flown to the United States under a loan fund arrangement through ICEM.

Eastern European refugees are divided into two groups. Those persons in the Romanian Third Country Processing (TCP) group are pre-processed in Bucharest, and then are flown at their own expense to Rome for final processing by INS after which ICEM moves them to the United States. The other group consists of refugees leaving Romania and other Eastern European countries without the permission of their governments to emigrate. They are received in refugee camps in countries of first asylum in Western Europe, principally Austria, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece and France. After reception in these countries, the refugees are registered by one of the voluntary agencies which are helpful in getting rapid permanent resettlement for the particular individual or family. After a sponsor is secured and admission documentation is completed, refugees who have been selected by the United States for admission are flown to the United States by ICEM under a loan fund arrangement.

REFUGEES FROM THE NEAR EAST

Refugees from the Near East who reach posts in Western Europe or elsewhere will either be processed in place, if local authorities permit, or will be moved to other countries for processing. They will be put in contact with refugee voluntary agencies of their choice and, in some instances, will be assisted by the country of first asylum, sojourn, or transit or by international relief organizations. In the past, some refugees from this region who were accepted for resettlement to the United States paid their own transportation to the United States. This practice will be continued wherever possible. ICEM loan fund transportation arrangements will be available, where necessary.

Our policy has been to consider the applications of those refugees from the Near East who have demonstrated that they have suffered persecution or have a well-founded fear of persecution, and who have close family or other ties to the United States or who are otherwise of special humanitarian concern to the United States. Processing will be completed by INS officers wherever possible or by other designated U.S. Government officials. INS retains the ultimate statutory authority to determine admissibility of such refugees under the Refugee Act of 1980.

REFUGEES FROM LATIN AMERICA

The Fiscal Year 1981 Cuban refugee program will be primarily concerned with the admission for resettlement in the United States of individuals and their families who sought refuge in the U. S. Interests Section in Havana and those Cuban refugees who are completing their processing in Madrid. The first group will be moved directly from Havana to the United States whenever possible. The arrival of additional Cuban refugees from Madrid during early Fiscal Year 1981 will complete the program from Spain. Historically, Cuban Americans have paid for transportation and have assisted with resettlement of family and friends. If necessary, transportation for the movement of Cuban refugees being resettled in the United States during Fiscal Year 1981 will be provided by ICEM on a loan basis.

With regard to other Latin American refugees, first priority will be given to political prisoners and their families including former political prisoners. Second priority will be given to Latin American refugees under UNHCR protection. Third priority will be given to family reunification cases. Within each priority, the cases will be processed on a first-come, first-served basis. Some of these refugees will be admitted to the United States directly from their countries of nationality and/or countries of normal residency. The movement of these refugees will be carried out individually and to the extent possible, financed by their own necessary, support from ICEM will be secured on a loan basis. Domestic voluntary agencies will assist in the resettlement of these individuals.

AFRICAN REFUGEES

During Fiscal Year 1981, we anticipate that Africans on the continent who qualify for admission to the United States under the Refugee Act of 1980 will be processed by designated U. S. Government officials with INS continuing to retain the ultimate statutory authority for admissions.

The majority of African refugees admitted to the United States in the recent past were from Ethiopia because of geographic and ideological restrictions now eliminated by the Refugee Act of 1980. The United States will consider for admission those African refugees who fit into the following general categories:

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(A) Close relatives of persons who are in the United States in a legal permanent status. Close relatives are defined as : spouse, parent, son, daughter, or unmarried sibling;

(B) Those persons in immediate danger, former political prisoners, persons whose rights have been proscribed by their governments because of political reasons (who come within Section 207(e)), persons who have suffered harassment in their countries of residence or for whom there are other obviously compelling humanitarian reasons to grant refugee status on humanitarian grounds;

(C) Those persons with special ties to the United States such as previous employment with the U.S. Government;

(D) Persons educated or trained in the United States or persons educated or trained abroad under U.S. auspices.

Applicants will generally be processed in this order of priority. Within each category, priorities are determined by date of filing an application with a Consular Section.

During Fiscal Year 1981, the UNHCR will continue to provide, with U.S. support, care and maintenance costs of African refugees in African countries of first asylum. Costs for required medical exams, documentation and placement grants will be provided by the U.S. Government under contracts with ICEM and American private resettlement agencies. Travel costs for the African refugees, if required, will be paid by ICEM under a loan fund arrangement.

The anticipated costs of direct U.S. assistance through processing, care and maintenance, transportation and initial reception and placement grants for refugees from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America is \$59,788,000. In addition, contributions made by the United States to the UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross can also help to finance certain assistance to some refugees resettled in the United States from Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere. The total of U.S. contributions for such programs affecting persons from these areas is expected to be an additional \$45 million in Fiscal Year 1981.

INDOCHINESE REFUGEES

The current and proposed methods of selecting Indochinese refugees to be admitted to the United States from first asylum camps and directly from Vietnam are based on two principal considerations: (1) life-threatening factors related to circumstances in which a particular refugee group finds itself; and (2) priority standing under established admission criteria.

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As a first step, a monthly determination is made of the number of refugees to be admitted from each of the first asylum countries, which include Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Hong Kong and Macau. Direct departures from Vietnam and from other Asian countries reached by refugees are also included. Quotas for each country are based on the refugee population of the country of first asylum, the resettlement program of other countries, the proportion of refugees in the asylum country qualifying for high priority status under U.S. program criteria and political factors within the country and the region including those affecting the status and safety of the refugees.

In the spring and summer of 1979, Malaysia and Indonesia were given higher quotas because of the heavy flow of boat refugees into those countries. More recently, the quota for Thailand with its growing number of land refugees has been increased. Country quotas are regularly reviewed and adjusted. Although we expect to adhere to the above principals during the period covered by this consultation, we believe that an advance U.S. Commitment to specify country quotas would be unwise.

Within the quota established for any first asylum country, priority in the selection of refugees to be admitted from that country is based on U.S. program criteria. These criteria are as follows: Category I consists of close relatives of people residing in the United States (spouse, son, daughter, unmarried sibling); Category II includes former U.S. Government employees; Category III is made up of persons with a former close association with the United States through their roles in the civil administration and armed forces or political, social, and economic activities or who played a meaningful role in the religious, intellectual and artistic life of those societies; and Category IV includes more distant relatives of people residing in the United States, and on humanitarian grounds, others not resettled elsewhere. Those in Categories III and IV are subject to the internationalization rule. When this rule is in force, these refugees cannot be considered if they have been offered resettlement opportunities in countries other than the United States. The purpose of this rule is to assure that other resettlement countries are able to fill their quota. When the refugee population is large, and the rule is not required for this purpose, it can be waived by the local U.S. Refugee Coordinator for Categories III and IV A (married siblings). The criteria to be used in admitting refugees directly from Vietnam will be similar to those used for refugees from first asylum countries but will be limited to relatives, former U.S. Government employees and other persons formerly closely associated with the United States. When, as was the case last summer, refugee populations are very large and out-movements are growing rapidly, the program criteria are less strictly applied. As refugee

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populations wind down and internationalization again becomes important, the criteria again becomes crucial. In respect to out-movement from Vietnam, criteria are essential to avoid being swamped with refugees selected by the SRV but of no special concern to the United States.

In order to select those who are to be included in the U.S. program from the larger refugee population, a full screening of all refugees seeking admission to the United States is conducted. The preliminary screening is undertaken by voluntary agency personnel under contract to the U.S. Government for this purpose. The total value of the contracts in Fiscal Year 1981 is expected to be \$9.5 million. In each major location where such processing takes place, one of the resettlement agencies is called upon to fulfill the role of Joint Voluntary Agency Representative (JVR). The agencies so designated are:

Thailand - International Rescue Committee (IRC)
Malaysia - Church World Service (CWS)
Indonesia - American Council for Nationalities Service (ACNS)
Hong Kong - Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service (LIRS)
Philippines, Singapore, and other sites - United States Catholic Conference (USCC)

The JVR in each first asylum country performs a multiplicity of tasks, which include:

- providing support to the U.S. Government refugee coordinator in the screening and processing of refugees;
- serving as the link between the field and the American Council of Voluntary Agencies (AVCA) for the continuation of sponsorship assurances; and
- representing all resettlement agencies in responding to individual case inquiries or other matters of interest to the resettlement agencies at the location in question.

The JVR staff interviews interested refugees and compiles biographical information which leads to a preliminary classification of the refugee into one of the program categories. Parallel activities are undertaken at this time, such as security checks, and verification that applicants have U.S. relatives or are former U.S. Government employees. As files near completion, a U.S. refugee officer from the Department of State reviews them to determine the categories of the refugees and to resolve outstanding questions. The refugees are then interviewed by an INS officer to determine admissibility under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and for final acceptance into the U.S. program contingent upon medical clearances and sponsorship agreements.

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The three interviews performed by the JVA, Refugee Officer and Immigration Officer are quite separate and distinct in function. The first, the JVA interview, is to gather extensive biographic information on the refugee both to determine eligibility and priority within the refugee program and to collect information relevant to the refugee's future resettlement. The second, the Refugee Officer interview, is a much shorter review of the case, often a review of the file only to pick up problem areas which need to be worked through. The third, the Immigration Officer interview, is the final close-out of the case resulting in acceptance or rejection and a swearing-in of the refugee. Files on approved refugees are then sent to the voluntary agencies for sponsorship assurances. Such assurances are in turn provided to the refugee office overseas.

An important new program, English as a Second Language (ESL)/Orientation program, to prepare the refugee selected for U.S. admission, is currently being inaugurated. This program will provide training that will enable a large number of U.S.-bound employable adults to hasten their achievement of self-sufficiency.

Many refugees now coming to the United States already have contacts here; the voluntary agencies have estimated that three-fourths of arriving refugees have friends or relatives already in the United States. The practice of the voluntary agencies has been to seek a sponsor in the location where such a friend or relative resides.

When the sponsorship assurance is received by the JVR in the country of first asylum, the case is turned over to the local staff of ICEM, which has a contract with the Department of State to provide out-processing and transportation and related short-term housing. The payments made pursuant to these agreements will total \$121.8 million in Fiscal Year 1981. Such services include health screening to determine whether a refugee will be allowed to immigrate to this country. Currently, refugees are screened for medical conditions which, under immigration law, may prevent them from immigrating to this country. The Center for Disease Control (CDC) of the U.S. Public Health Service, overseas the health screening procedures used by ICEM. Once medically cleared overseas, refugees travel to the United States carrying medical records which include chest X-rays. All refugees receive a visual inspection and medical records review at U.S. ports of entry by CDC quarantine officers. If necessary, refugees may be quarantined or assisted in gaining access to emergency medical treatment as required. CDC provides state and local health departments with prompt notification of refugees arriving within their area of jurisdiction.

Under the law, refugees with health conditions which do not endanger the American public are being admitted to the United States. Initially, the Attorney General suspended the

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excludability under the Immigration and Nationality Act of refugees with certain health conditions, particularly active but non-infectious tuberculosis. The CDC established procedures to ensure that such refugees were thoroughly checked both before and after they entered the United States.

Subsequently, the Refugee Act of 1980 allowed waivers to be authorized by the Attorney General (or his INS representative for refugees with any of the medical or physical conditions excludable under the INA. The CDC applied the same procedures to ensure that refugees now being granted waivers for such medical conditions were thoroughly checked both before and after coming to the United States.

Under the provisions of the Refugee Act the Attorney General may waive specified grounds of excludability including medical reasons for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest (Section 207 (c)(3)). The plight of the refugees in camps of Southeast Asia is such that, for all of these reasons, waivers are appropriate to admit refugees with excludable conditions under the INA, including those with physical defects, diseases, or disabilities which may affect their ability to earn a living. Indeed, many of those most deserving of U.S. assistance require a waiver, e.g., military personnel of the former governments of the Indochinese countries wounded in action against the communist forces or others who suffer impairments but who have no other hope of a future outside of a refugee camp if the U.S. bars them. If a refugee qualifies for admission under the criteria and operational principles of the program, exclusion on grounds which the Refugee Act expressly permits to be waived would of course work a hardship not intended by the Congress. Section 212(a)(7) will therefore be waived by the INS officers in the field when a voluntary agency or other appropriate sponsor provides assurance that it will attempt to assist the refugee so that he or she does not become a public charge.

Refugees arriving by commercial flights are often booked straight through to the airport nearest their sponsor's location. In the case of charters, flights land in the San Francisco Bay area facility and overnight accommodations are available as required in barracks at the former Hamilton Air Force Base which have been made available to the refugee program. Additionally, a small transit facility has been established at Los Angeles. Both ICEM and the individual voluntary agencies provide some assistance to the refugees in transit at ports of entry.

The final component of our Indochinese refugee assistance program involves U.S. cash and food contributions primarily to the international organizations to help assist these refugees abroad. In the case of the Indochinese refugees and the Kampuchean

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situation, contributions are expected to total \$87 million in Fiscal Year 1981, plus the currently unknown value of contributions of foodstuffs through the Food for Peace program.

Refugee Processing Centers have been established on Galang Island, Indonesia, and on Bataan, Philippines, with a joint capacity of about 27,000. The principal purposes of these centers is to take the pressure off first asylum nations and to provide a site where pre-settlement training and orientation can be given. Although some refugees bound for other countries are being sent to these centers, most places will be utilized initially by refugees proceeding to the United States. Even though U.S.-bound refugees in the RPCs would not increase the level of the United States program in Fiscal Year 1981, they would constitute an initial claim on normal flow numbers available in Fiscal Year 1981.

POST ARRIVAL

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

The lead Federal agency in domestic resettlement is the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which administers the great bulk of Federal assistance to refugees in the United States, in consultation with the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs.

OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT

HHS's Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), created by the Refugee Act of 1980, administers the provision of cash assistance, medical assistance and a broad array of social services to refugees. The principal goal of ORR-supported programs is to help refugees achieve economic self-sufficiency in the shortest possible time.

Cash Assistance

Needy refugees may receive cash assistance under Section 412(e) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. This line item in the HHS budget includes reimbursement of state costs for the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Program and aid to unaccompanied minors. Under current policies, need is determined under the standards of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program in the refugee's state of residence. The rules for refugee cash assistance approximate the rules for AFDC with the major exception that refugee cash assistance is available regardless of family composition. Refugees who qualify for the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program on the basis of age (65 or over), blindness or disability, and meet the national income and resource standards for eligibility applicable under that program, receive SSI benefits.

Under provisions of the Refugee Act of 1980, the Federal Government is authorized to pay up to 100 percent of the costs of providing cash assistance to eligible refugees during their first three years in the United States.

With respect to unaccompanied minors, most of these children are resettled in the United States through two voluntary resettlement agencies, the U.S. Catholic Conference (USCC) and the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service (LIRS). While the children are in the United States, or in transit to the United States -- but before they are placed under the laws of the state of resettlement -- the Director of ORR is assigned legal responsibility for them. Before a minor is placed in a community, the local office of USCC or LIRS consults with appropriate state or local child welfare authorities, and an arrangement is made whereby the state or local public agency establishes legal responsibility for the care and maintenance of the unaccompanied minor. ORR reimburses states for local costs incurred, pursuant to ORR guidelines, on behalf of care, maintenance, and social services to the child. More than 2,200 unaccompanied minor Indochinese refugees have been resettled in the United States since 1975; approximately 1,500 of them have arrived since January 1979. The provision of services to unaccompanied refugee minors is 100 percent federally funded through reimbursement to states by ORR until the child reaches his or her majority.

The anticipated Fiscal Year 1981 Federal reimbursement to states for Fiscal Year 1981 admissions will be \$60.6 million for cash assistance. Costs for all eligible refugees are \$269.4 million for cash assistance.

Medical Assistance

ORR reimburses states for 100 percent of the costs of medical assistance provided to needy and eligible refugees. Medical services provided to refugees are often covered by the Medicaid program which is administered by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA). Though the expense for Medicaid benefits is normally shared between the states and the Federal Government, the portion of Medicaid costs normally paid by the states is paid by ORR in the case of refugees. As with cash assistance, the Refugee Act of 1980 provides for up to 100 percent Federal reimbursement to states for the cost of providing medical services to refugees during their first three years in the United States. To qualify for the Medicaid program, refugees generally must be eligible for AFDC or SSI.

Refugees who do not meet the normal eligibility criteria for the AFDC or SSI programs may still receive Federally-funded medical assistance. Such medical assistance is technically not called Medicaid, though the financial services provided under this medical assistance program are the same as those offered under a state's Medicaid program. ORR pays the full cost of this non-Medicaid, medical assistance program. The cost to ORR for both Medicaid and non-Medicaid services is expected to be \$29.5 million for Fiscal Year 1981 refugee arrivals. Total medical assistance costs for all eligible refugees are \$139.4 million.

Social Services

Like non-refugees, refugees may be eligible -- if they meet income and resource criteria set by the states -- for the broad range of social services offered under Title XX of the Social Security Act.

In addition to the Title XX services, the provision of a wide range of services essential to refugee resettlement is authorized by an ORR action transmittal.

The Refugee Act of 1980 places strong emphasis on providing refugees with English language training and employment-related services in line with the program goal of helping them achieve self-sufficiency in the shortest possible time. Other social services include skills recertification, day care and transportation, information and referral services, home management and health-related services, and translation and interpreter services.

Social services for refugees are provided by the state or county social service agencies or by state purchase-of-service agreements with public or private non-profit agencies. The provision of these services to refugees, whether under Title XX or under ORR's action transmittal, is 100 percent Federally funded by HHS's Office of Refugee Resettlement through reimbursement to states for their costs of providing such services. ORR anticipates Fiscal Year 1981 obligations of \$70.4 million to this program to provide services to Fiscal Year 1981 refugee arrivals, and of \$93.7 million for all eligible refugees.

State Administrative Costs

ORR also fully reimburses states for their costs of administering the various refugee assistance programs. In Fiscal Year 1981, the total cost of such administrative reimbursements to states is expected to be \$11.3 million to assist Fiscal Year 1981 admissions, with a total administrative cost of \$49.6 million.

Aid to Non-Cuban, Non-Indochinese Refugees (Voluntary Agency Programs)

Under previous legislation the Executive Branch initiated a matching grant program in Fiscal Year 1979 to provide assistance to voluntary agencies for resettling Soviet and other non-Cuban, non-Indochinese refugees. Under the program, ORR reimburses national voluntary resettlement agencies for 50 percent of their costs, up to \$1,000 in Federal funds per refugee. Federal grant funds may be used for a wide range of assistance and services in order to assure employment and earnings objectives.

The cost of this program is expected to be \$26 million in Fiscal Year 1981. Exact costs will depend on how many voluntary agencies can meet the terms of the matching grant agreement.

ORR National Demonstration Projects

In Fiscal Year 1980, ORR is funding a number of national social services demonstration projects designed to strengthen the national resettlement effort. The projects are intended to respond specifically to program deficiencies identified in Congressional hearings, by the General Accounting Office, by HHS's Office of the Inspector General and in studies by other public and private agencies.

The ORR national demonstration projects are designed to coordinate available resources and minimize duplication, to foster new and innovative approaches to resettlement, to bolster the capacity of voluntary resettlement agencies and refugee mutual assistance organizations to assist in services provision and policy development, and to ensure participation by state and local government units in the resettlement effort.

The national demonstration projects include:

-- A grant to the Center for Applied Linguistics to establish and operate an Orientation Resource Center which will include the writing and dissemination of culturally appropriate orientation materials which will assist refugees and their sponsors.

-- An interagency agreement with ACTION to fund a project designed to mobilize voluntary support for the refugee resettlement effort, and to assist refugee mutual assistance organizations with training and technical assistance.

-- A grant to the American Public Welfare Association to publish a bi-weekly newsletter chronicling developments in the resettlement field, and to publish a quarterly journal to provide assistance and guidance to refugee program practitioners.

Funds for these and other National Demonstration Projects are included in ORR's social services budget. It is not possible to estimate how much will be spent for this purpose in Fiscal Year 1981 for refugees who arrive in Fiscal Year 1981.

Administrative and Total ORR Budget

The administrative budget for ORR for Fiscal Year 1981 servicing all arrivals is estimated at \$6.5 million. Overall, the projected ORR budget for Fiscal Year 1981 to provide assistance to Fiscal Year 1981 arrivals will total \$225.2 million. This includes the transfer of funds to other agencies in HHS such as the Center for Disease Control, and to other Departments such as the Department of Education to provide specific services. These

funding transfers are described in the appropriate sections of this report.

PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES

In addition to ORR's activities, HHS's Public Health Service (PHS) also performs specific services in support of the national refugee resettlement effort. The PHS is mandated by law to screen immigrants to the United States for health conditions that might imperil the public health.

Functions carried out by PHS component agencies include:

Center for Disease Control (CDC) (Preventive Health)

CDC health and medical personnel based abroad oversee the screening of would-be refugees for health conditions which, as a matter of law, may preclude their entry into the United States. In addition, CDC participates in immunization programs in refugee camps and transit stations and performs required health screening at U.S. ports of entry. Finally, through its national reporting network, CDC keeps state and local health departments up to date on refugee health conditions through its Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, which has a circulation of 90,000. From the ORR appropriation, \$3 million will be transferred to CDC for these services in Fiscal Year 1981 to aid Fiscal Year 1981 refugee arrivals.

Health Services Administration (HSA) (Preventive Health)

HSA's Bureau of Medical Services will provide direct health care to refugees in PHS facilities following their arrival in the United States. HSA will conduct health assessments and immediate follow-up care for a variety of conditions. For the provision of the initial health assessments and treatment of emergent medical conditions, ORR will transfer about \$4.8 million to PHS in Fiscal Year 1981 to assist Fiscal Year 1981 refugee arrivals.

Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA)

PHS's ADAMHA provides mental health services to eligible refugees through its some 700 Community Mental Health Centers. ADAMHA also has conducted a study by non-governmental mental health professionals and refugee community leaders to identify ways ADAMHA could respond to refugee needs.

Total Public Health Expenditures

The Fiscal Year 1981 cost of these programs for Fiscal Year 1981 admissions is estimated to be \$7.8 million.

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (DOL)

The Employment and Training Administration (ETA) is DOL's primary agency for assisting in the resettlement of Indochinese refugees. DOL's policy for providing employment and training services to refugees utilizes existing employment and training systems rather than establishing special refugee programming. The structure of existing systems allows refugee participation in the array of employment and training programs funded under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) because the refugees are considered an integral part of the disadvantaged population. Refugees also are eligible for and encouraged to seek employment assistance and labor market information through the affiliated State Employment Security Job Service offices of the United States Employment Service.

A basic policy principle in participating in the resettlement effort is that duplication of services must be avoided. Various directives to ETA Regional Offices and program operators have stressed the importance of developing appropriate linkages between ETA, volunteer agencies and other agencies. These directives provide specific information for coordination with State Welfare Agencies and other organizations providing services to refugees. Program operators also were provided with a listing of voluntary agencies and affiliates and encouraged to establish working relationships with those organizations.

DOL's strategy for serving Indochinese youth utilizes the existing employment and training system and provides knowledge development through demonstration projects. The Department's commitment to increase the quantity and quality of employment services to Indochinese youth is manifested in technical assistance to prime sponsors on how to meet the special employment needs of Indochinese youth, linkage efforts with organizations that currently assist refugees, incentives for prime sponsors most heavily impacted by Indochinese refugee youth, and knowledge development tasks regarding most effective methods for serving the youth and measuring their success.

Specific DOL activities include:

- Providing the most heavily impacted prime sponsors with direct supplements to Youth Employment Training Program grants to hire teams to coordinate the prime sponsor's efforts in serving refugee youth with other refugee-serving agencies;
- Providing small grants to permit selected sponsors which already are serving significant numbers of refugee youth to develop permanent refugee-serving capabilities;

-- Providing 2,000 positions in 26 Job Corps centers nationwide for Indochinese refugees who are eligible for the Job Corps, and providing the following support: a technical assistance guide, English as a Second Language and cultural awareness programs, translation services, ongoing technical assistance, and additional one-time funds to cover the extra costs of gearing up for refugees.

The ETA initiated several actions to encourage adult refugee participation within the existing employment and training system. Program operators (CETA Prime Sponsors and State Employment Security Agencies) were provided directives on the resettlement of Indochinese refugees and their eligibility for CETA, ESL Services and the Targeted Job Tax Credit Program (TJTC). In addition, each of ETA's ten regional offices has appointed a coordinator for refugee resettlement activities to provide technical assistance and support. The anticipated cost of these programs for Fiscal Year 1981 admissions is expected to be small. Total costs have been estimated at \$53 million.

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT (HUD)

Although HUD operates no refugee-specific housing programs, it does administer public housing, subsidized housing and other Federally assisted housing programs from which refugees, as low-income workers or welfare recipients, may benefit. Refugee benefits have been projected at \$17.6 million.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Refugees are eligible for the Department of Agriculture's food stamp program on precisely the same basis as U.S. citizens, i.e. if they meet the income and resource standards established under the program. Food stamp applications are available in Spanish as well as English. However, outreach and instructional materials have been distributed in all Indochinese languages, four Chinese dialects, Yiddish, and Tagalog. Additional supplies can be obtained from regional offices.

The children of refugees also may qualify for subsidized school breakfast and lunch programs administered by the Department of Agriculture, if they meet program standards as children of needy families.

Refugees also can benefit from the Women, Infants and Children (WIC) Program, which is a supplemental food program for pregnant and lactating women, infants, and children up to five years old who are determined to be at nutritional risk because of inadequate nutrition and inadequate income. Under

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WIC, participants receive vouchers which are exchanged for specific nutritious foods in retail markets. WIC is developing visual aids and other means of explaining to refugees the values of eating nutritious foods. Department of Agriculture programs for refugees admitted in Fiscal Year 1981 are expected to cost \$36.5 million. Total refugee participation is estimated at \$175.0 million.

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Through a series of separate authorizations, Congress has provided funding to state and local education agencies to help them meet the special educational needs of refugee children, primarily for English language training.

The HHS and the Department of Education have signed an interagency agreement under which the Department of Education will administer some \$44,268,000 in refugee educational assistance funds appropriated by Congress for Fiscal Year 1981. The agreement will direct the greatest degree of assistance to those school districts most heavily impacted by newly arrived refugee children. Of the total \$44,268,000, about \$17.8 million will aid refugee children admitted during Fiscal Year 1981.

In addition, the Department of Education is developing programs under several education authorizations to provide special assistance both to children and adults in mastering English language skills which are deemed necessary to facilitate their transition to American life.

Projections for refugee-related costs in other Federal programs are noted on Table IV.

TABLE IV
ESTIMATED COSTS OF
REFUGEE ASSISTANCE IN
FISCAL YEAR 1981

(in millions \$)

I. FEDERAL AGENCY PROGRAMS	COST	TOTAL
	FY-1981 ARRIVALS ^{1/}	FY-1981 COSTS
<u>Department of State:</u>		
Care & Maintenance of		
Refugees Abroad ^{2/}	169.0	169.0
Admissions Processing	14.75	14.75
Transportation to U.S.	132.4	132.4
Initial Reception & Placement Grants	105.95	105.95
Administrative & Operational	5.0	5.0
Other International Programs	-0-	105.2
Subtotal	427.1	532.3
<u>Department of Health & Human Services</u>		
Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR):		
Cash Assistance	60.6	269.4
Supplemental Security Income (State Supplementation)	(1.3)	(5.0)
Aid to Unaccompanied Minors	(2.0)	(4.8)
Medical Assistance	29.5	139.4
Social Services	70.4	93.7
State Admin. Costs	11.3	49.6
Educational Assistance ^{3/}	19.5	44.3
Voluntary Agency Program (Aid to Non-Cuban, Non-Indochinese)	26.0	26.0
Preventive Health	7.8	7.8
Center for Disease Control	(3.0)	(3.0)
Health Service Admin.	(4.8)	(4.8)
Applicants for Asylum	0	12.0
Federal Administration	-	6.5
Cuban Phasedown Program	-0-	44.8
Subtotal	225.2	693.6
Aid to Families With		
Dependent Children	9.2	41.0
Supplemental Security Income (Federal)	3.9	17.4
Medicaid	6.0	26.5
Other HHS Subtotal	19.1	84.9

^{1/} The 1981 appropriations now pending before the Congress provide funding for the admission of 210,000 refugees to the United States. The Administration will attempt to meet any additional costs associated with the revised admissions for Fiscal Year 1981 by reprogramming. If necessary, the Administration may have to seek supplemental appropriations.

^{2/} This figure may overstate the cost of care and maintenance for refugees resettled in the U.S. in FY 1981, since it represents U.S. contributions to international and private organizations whose caseloads also include refugees not destined for the U.S. However, in some areas such as Southeast Asia, the majority of the refugees resettled leave for the U.S., yet third-country contributions account for 70 percent of the UNHCR budget.

^{3/} Administered by Department of Education.

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<u>FEDERAL AGENCY PROGRAMS</u>	<u>COST FY-1981 ARRIVALS</u>	<u>TOTAL FY-1981 COSTS</u>
Department of Agriculture: Food Stamp Program and Other Programs	36.5	175.0
* Department of Education	-	33.0
Immigration & Naturalization Service	2.5	2.5
* Agency for International Development Food for Peace	-	87.1
* Department of Defense	-	4.0
* Department of Commerce	-	0.3
* Department of Housing & Urban Development	-	17.6
* Department of Labor	-	53.0
* Department of Justice	-	1.0
Security Clearance	1.5	1.5
ACTION	<u>-0-</u>	<u>1.5</u>
FEDERAL GOVT. TOTAL	711.9	1,687.3

*/ These figures are based on estimates by Federal agencies as of February 15, 1980. Funding is generally not earmarked specifically for refugees, nor is an estimate of costs for 1981 arrivals versus prior arrivals available.

(4) AN ANALYSIS OF THE ANTICIPATED SOCIAL,
ECONOMIC, AND DEMOGRAPHIC IMPACT OF REFUGEE ADMISSIONS
TO THE UNITED STATES

DEMOGRAPHIC IMPACT

During Fiscal Year 1981, it is anticipated that approximately 217,000 refugees will be admitted to the United States. This admission rate will increase the population of the country by less than one-tenth of one percent (0.1%), and will have less numerical effect than will the admission of normal flow immigrants during the same period. The total population of the United States as of July 1980 was about 222.1 million. The rate of increase of the American population is currently about 0.77 percent, or 1.7 million people, annually. As a result of the admission of refugees during Fiscal Years 1980 and 1981, the growth rate has been raised to .87 percent per year, an increase of one-tenth of one percent (0.1%).

The demographic characteristics of refugees to be admitted in Fiscal Year 1981 are expected to be similar to those admitted in Fiscal Year 1980. Refugee groups from various parts of the world will continue to be different from the total American population in terms of age and sex ratios within the admitted groups themselves. The same observation may be made, however, with regard to the various sub-groups of the already resident American population. Eastern European refugees generally have a higher mean age than the American population. Only about 20 percent of them are children, whereas 25 percent of the American population was under 15 years in 1975. The Southeast Asian refugees, on the other hand, are likely to be younger than the resident population. The average age of the earlier Indochinese arrivals, those coming in the 1975-77 period, was between 19 and 20 years. While reliable statistical data is not yet available for the most recent admissions, it appears that this general trend will continue. For those admitted under the Indochinese program between August 1977 and January 1979, 44.5 percent of the refugees admitted were under 18 years of age. The percentage of refugees in this same group who were 45 years of age or older decreased from 11.6 percent to 7.9 percent. For similar reasons, the proportion of males among the Southeast Asian refugees is also about 6 percent higher than that of the U.S. population, in which the male-female ratio is 48.7 percent to 51.3 percent.

Refugee Children

Because of the large proportion of children among the Indochinese refugees, the ratio of dependents to workers will continue to be higher in this population than in the population at large. The proportion of refugees entering schools will also be higher than would be the case for a comparable number of American residents. The new refugee pupils are expected to be largely concentrated in the 10-16 age group. This may pose

special problems because of the need to fit them into the middle or latter half of the elementary and secondary progression. Their lack of English and long periods without schooling may further complicate planning for these pupils. For the older pupils, job training also becomes an important consideration.

Geographic Distribution

The geographic distribution ^{1/} of the refugee population is similar to that of the resident population, and is influenced by many of the same factors, although on both counts there are notable exceptions. Refugees are placed, to a significant extent, according to the interest, capabilities, and willingness of voluntary resettlement agencies and sponsors in particular locations. The opportunities for such placements are often most available where population base, economic conditions, and ethnic pluralism are suitable for effective resettlement. Further, because the United States gives high priority for admission to family reunification cases, it should be expected that areas of current resettlement will continue to grow with the arrival of relatives of local refugee residents. To the extent that general conditions remain somewhat stable -- such as local economic opportunity and local receptivity -- geographic patterns will probably not change significantly during the upcoming fiscal year. This is true for refugees from Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, and Cuba. Basically, this means that conditions which might be attributed to refugee population density in local areas will continue; however, as local communities of refugees and refugee organizations become more established, their ability to provide support and leadership would be expected to increase, and the effectiveness of resettlement and resolution of difficulties should improve.

Secondary Migration

As evidenced in the current fiscal year, internal migration of refugees, particularly of Southeast Asian refugees, is expected to continue. Known as "secondary migration," the movement of refugees after initial resettlement to other locations is influenced by several major factors, including, in order of generally agreed importance: a desire for better economic opportunity, a desire to live near relatives, a desire to live in an area with a familiar ethnic community, and a desire to live in an area with a familiar climate. As these factors operate and refugees migrate within the United States, it becomes more difficult to determine the importance of these factors since the family and ethnic reunification influences increase with the size of the refugee community itself. It is true, however, that secondary migration of refugees has been generally in the same directions and for at least some of the same reasons as the movement of the mobile American population at large. For example, between January 1978 and January 1979, two States, California and Texas, received net inflows of secondary migrations of about 7,250 and 1,760 refugees, respectively.

1/ See Table V

These figures were obtained by comparing the INS Alien Registration Reports for those two years; an examination of more recent trends is anticipated when the annual Alien Registration of January 1980 becomes available from INS.

There are indications that the Southeast Asians, like other groups of newcomers to the United States, are tending to draw together in ethnic neighborhoods. Although analysis of the geographic location of the Indochinese alien population as of January 1979 showed that a majority of the refugees were living in zip-code areas with less than 100 other Indochinese, there has been an increasing proportion of population concentration in zip-code areas with 250 or more Indochinese: there were 38 zip-code areas with 250 or more refugees in January 1977 containing 13 percent of the total U.S. Indochinese population; 48 such areas in January 1978 containing 16 percent of the total; and 72 such areas in January 1979 containing 22 percent.

Ethnic and Linguistic Groups

Ethnically and linguistically the 1981 refugee arrivals in the United States will include eight major groups and many smaller groups. The major groups are:

- Cambodians, some of whom are illiterate in their own language, but increasingly and especially from the holding centers, urban educated Cambodians as well, some speaking French or English;
- Eastern Europeans speaking Russian or other languages;
- Vietnamese, mostly educated and frequently speaking English or French;
- Ethnic Chinese from Vietnam with varying literacy in both Vietnamese and Chinese;
- Lao Hmong, from a non-literate society, many of whom speak and some of whom read Lao;
- Other Laotians, most of whom are literate and have varying abilities in other languages;
- Spanish-speaking Cubans, who are literate in their own language, but few of whom speak English;
- Africans speaking several languages, including many with French or English as first or second languages.

ECONOMIC IMPACT

The economic impact of these refugees, while on occasion producing temporary local difficulties, is expected to be positive overall. Like immigrants, refugees have proved in the

past that they can become productive contributors to their new country. Generally, refugees have been productive members of their own societies, and are often experienced in leadership and have skills which demonstrate their abilities to learn and to achieve. Indeed, the rigors of escaping and surviving make up a process of natural selection that assures the future vitality of present refugee populations. However, the process of adjusting to a new country is not always as rapid as might be desired by either a host country or the refugees themselves.

Employment

Some data on employment participation is available for refugees from Southeast Asia. Participation rates are somewhat lower for this group, as compared with the native population, even after two years of residence in the United States. The history of refugee movements and resettlement would suggest that this phenomenon is temporary, and that over time, the rates will be comparable to other subgroups in the United States. A survey completed in June of 1979 showed that 58.4 percent of Indochinese adult males who arrived in 1977 were in the labor force, while 65.5 percent of those who arrived in 1976 and 69.1 percent of those arriving in 1975 were in the labor force. For females of the same group, the labor force participation rates were 29.6 percent for 1977, 34.4 percent for 1976, and 42.9 percent for 1975 (The parallel figures for Americans as a whole are 78.2 percent for males and 50.7 percent for females). Clearly, experience in the country of resettlement, a chance to become proficient in English, and an opportunity to adjust to American society and its economy are contributing factors to labor force participation.

There are positive economic results of refugee resettlement for both local communities and the nation. These are sometimes overlooked, since they occur after the initial and most complex period of resettlement, they are the result of successful achievement of the goal of self-sufficiency on the part of refugees, and they do not receive public attention to the degree that resettlement problems do. One of the more significant of these is the fact that many refugees pay Federal and state income taxes and contribute to the social security fund, although in many cases contributions are not very large because of large family size and relatively low income. Another positive aspect of the economic impact of refugee resettlement is the creation of new business, sometimes -- as current trends seem to indicate -- in areas which were economically slow prior to the influx of refugees. These new enterprises have themselves contributed to the tax base in paying sales and corporate taxes, and have brought gainful employment not only to the owners, but also to other refugees, enhancing the progress towards self-sufficiency of individuals and refugee communities. Data on these kinds of business activities are not available, except for a general recognition of the growth of refugee owned and/or operated businesses and the historical comparison of these to the

substantial Cuban-American element in the business community in South Florida which grew out of the resettlement of Cuban refugees there.

SOCIAL IMPACT

It is frequently the case that some social impact results from the displacement of large groups of people, and this is certainly true of the resettlement of refugees in the United States at a rate of approximately 18,000 per month (all groups combined). As is true of economic impact, public awareness and resources are generally directed to those social impacts which are negative and of some sensitivity. Over the past year, there have been problems associated with local resettlement of refugees in several parts of the country which have required the attention of local, state, or Federal authorities. However, in nearly all of these situations, two common and avoidable elements are found: refugees have acted in a manner rational to their own resettlement and attainment of self-sufficiency, but without guidance or knowledge of the appropriate rules and norms of behavior in doing so; and refugees have entered communities as newcomers and have been blamed for problems and situations which existed prior to their resettlement. Of course, there are real difficulties in many communities in terms of housing shortages, health care facilities and job opportunities. The most severe problems have generally occurred where these three aspects are present simultaneously: a genuine local problem, the addition of refugees to the situation, and a general lack of guidance for the adaptation of the refugees to the community. The development of English language/orientation pre-arrival training programs in Asian first asylum sites, an increase in domestic refugee orientation activities, local coordination of resettlement activities, and the development of refugee community leadership are factors which have been much more in evidence in recent months and are expected to alleviate many of the local tensions which were evident in some localities a year ago. While the admissions rate remains at its current level, resettlement program agencies, state and local communities, and the refugee communities themselves will likely be better able to cope with resettlement problems in Fiscal Year 1981. This will prevent many problems which have occurred in the past, and reduce the negative impact of resettlement which might otherwise result. This does not preclude future occurrences of local problems considering the increasing demand for low-cost housing in many areas and the current economic slump affecting some parts of the country. However, it does mean that, increasingly, these difficulties should not be viewed as solely caused by refugees, nor should they be allowed to be based on prejudice or the lack of knowledge on the part of those involved.

Not all social impacts of refugee resettlement are negative. Some urban neighborhoods have been revived as a result of resettlement, and in many areas, refugees have participated in, and contributed to, local ethnic community and pan-ethnic

activities. The United States has always benefited from the broadening of understanding and awareness which results from the admission of refugees and immigrants. With adequate guidance and support, refugees admitted to the United States in Fiscal Year 1981 should have an impact on this country similar to that of previous refugees.

TABLE V

INDOCHINESE REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES
(partially adjusted for secondary migration)

	<u>7/31/80</u>	<u>8/15/80</u>
1. Alabama	1,995	2,008
2. Alaska	292	298
3. Arizona	2,799	2,843
4. Arkansas	2,774	2,806
5. California	123,971	126,348
6. Colorado	7,636	7,758
7. Connecticut	3,565	3,609
8. Delaware	220	220
9. District of Columbia	4,827	5,001
10. Florida	7,866	7,974
11. Georgia	3,926	4,046
12. Hawaii	5,706	5,767
13. Idaho	701	706
14. Illinois	14,105	14,299
15. Indiana	3,575	3,582
16. Iowa	6,285	6,335
17. Kansas	4,914	4,993
18. Kentucky	1,869	1,884
19. Louisiana	10,296	10,369
20. Maine	596	605
21. Maryland	3,744	3,787
22. Massachusetts	5,391	5,508
23. Michigan	6,870	7,003
24. Minnesota	12,419	12,622
25. Mississippi	1,169	1,184
26. Missouri	3,644	3,673
27. Montana	1,093	1,042

	<u>7/31/80</u>	<u>8/15/80</u>
28. Nebraska	2,152	2,170
29. Nevada	1,969	2,007
30. New Hampshire	271	271
31. New Jersey	3,344	3,444
32. New Mexico	2,001	2,090
33. New York	11,332	11,545
34. North Carolina	3,470	3,518
35. North Dakota	667	673
36. Ohio	5,390	5,467
37. Oklahoma	5,839	5,919
38. Oregon	11,885	12,101
39. Pennsylvania	15,669	15,970
40. Rhode Island	2,329	2,351
41. South Carolina	1,315	1,317
42. South Dakota	729	762
43. Tennessee	3,867	3,921
44. Texas	34,944	35,450
45. Utah	5,052	5,203
46. Vermont	182	186
47. Virginia	10,159	10,256
48. Washington	15,816	16,138
49. West Virginia	391	391
50. Wisconsin	5,293	5,386
51. Wyoming	273	273
52. Virgin Islands	11	11
53. Guam	385	386
54. Puerto Rico	28	28
	UNKNOWN	1,475
	TOTALS	388,432
		394,979

Prepared by HHS

(5) EXTENT TO WHICH OTHER COUNTRIES
WILL ADMIT AND ASSIST IN THE
RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES

Third country participation in refugee resettlement is expected to continue during Fiscal Year 1981. ^{1/} A description of that participation follows:

INDOCHINESE REFUGEES

Prior to the United Nations meeting on Indochinese refugees held in July 1979, non-communist third countries had resettled approximately 100,000 Indochinese since 1975. France, Canada, and Australia accounted for three-fourths of that total. Since the July meeting, the number of refugees resettled in third countries has increased significantly to a total of about 498,000. In addition, at the July 1979 United Nations meeting China offered to accept an additional 10,000 refugees for resettlement from the camps in Southeast Asia and that effort is proceeding, though slowly. As to future third country resettlement programs, Australia has indicated that it will resettle 1,100-1,200 monthly. The traditional initial response from third countries to UNHCR and U.S. demarches over the years has been non-committal. Canada, second only to the United States in acceptance of Indochinese refugees, is expected to continue as a country of major resettlement. France will probably continue at an average of 1,000 a month. Of almost 800,000 Indochinese who have been resettled to date, nearly 390,000 have been resettled in the United States.

REFUGEES FROM THE SOVIET UNION

Assuming that the trends of past years continue, some 60-65 percent of the Soviet Jews leaving the USSR in Fiscal Year 1981 will seek resettlement in the United States. Israel will receive about 30 percent of the total. The remaining 5-10 percent are expected to resettle in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Western Europe.

The other principal group of refugees leaving the USSR in Fiscal Year 1981 will be the Armenians, principally bound for the United States.

^{1/} See Table VI

REFUGEES FROM EASTERN EUROPE

Roughly 10,000 Eastern Europeans can be expected to seek resettlement outside of their homelands in Fiscal Year 1981. Half are expected to settle in Western Europe, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. It is possible that somewhat larger numbers may seek to resettle in those countries other than the United States which welcome qualified immigrants.

REFUGEES FROM THE NEAR EAST

It is difficult to predict precisely how many Near Eastern refugees of the various categories will seek resettlement in other countries. However, we would expect that the process of family reunification would draw some of these refugees toward countries which accepted their relatives in earlier years. The principal difficulties will be with groups which have moved to Western Europe in relatively sizeable numbers. It clearly will not be possible for the United States to accept large numbers of these refugees within our overall ceiling of 4,500 from this region for Fiscal Year 1981. The United States will give special consideration to family reunification cases, cases of compelling humanitarian circumstances, and cases involving persons with other close ties to the United States. We would expect the other members of the international community to accept a reasonable number of refugees from this region.

LATIN AMERICA

The United States historically has accepted most Cuban refugees wishing to enter for permanent resettlement. In addition to the numbers resettled in the United States, thousands of Cubans have gone to Costa Rica, Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, other Latin American countries and Spain.

Most recently, several third countries have accepted Cubans who have been involved in the Peruvian Embassy incident in Havana. Although the great majority of these individuals came to the United States, over 2,000 went to third countries, primarily Peru, Spain, Costa Rica, Canada and Venezuela. Approximately 1,000 of those who came to the United States may also be resettled in third countries.

Some 21 countries have accepted over 400,000 refugees from other Latin American countries in recent years. Some 100,000 are estimated to have gone to Italy and some 97,000 to Spain. We believe that Latin American and European countries will continue to offer resettlement to Latin American refugees.

AFRICAN REFUGEES

Of the roughly 3 million refugees in Africa, 99 percent will eventually be repatriated, firmly resettled, or granted continued asylum in Africa. The remaining 1 percent, or 30,000 refugees, will require resettlement outside Africa. Within this group of 30,000, 10 percent or 3,000 refugees will be eligible for admission to the United States. The proposed refugee admissions level for Fiscal Year 1981 is 3,000. During the past 5 years, more than 10,000 Ethiopians have been granted resettlement in France and more than 15,000 have been granted resettlement in Germany.

TABLE VI

INDOCHINESE REFUGEES
CUMULATIVE
THIRD COUNTRY RESETTLEMENT - LAND AND BOAT REFUGEES
April 1975 - July 1980

<u>Resettlement Country</u>	<u>Cumulative Resettlement</u>
Argentina	1,281
Australia	39,464
Austria	1,136
Belgium	3,282
Brazil	68
Canada	60,625
China	265,554
Denmark	1,570
Finland	115
France	66,245
Germany (FRG)	14,297
Greece	95
Hong Kong	9,368
Iceland	34
Ireland	212
Israel	366
Italy	2,486
Japan	557
Luxembourg	70
Malaysia	2,142
Netherlands	3,022
New Zealand	2,825
Norway	1,931
Paraguay	31
Philippines	13
Spain	508
Sweden	1,727
Switzerland	7,192
United Kingdom	10,721
Other	794
TOTAL	497,731
United States	388,802
GRAND TOTAL	886,533 ^{1/}

^{1/} Based on UNHCR Reports through May 1980 and Department of State Reports for June and July 1980.

(6) IMPACT OF THE PARTICIPATION
OF THE UNITED STATES IN REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT
ON THE FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS
OF THE UNITED STATES

The acceptance of refugees for resettlement in the United States is of critical importance in furthering our humanitarian as well as political objectives.

INDOCHINESE REFUGEES

In Southeast Asia, the provision of first asylum to refugees fleeing Indochina is directly or implicitly dependent upon reasonable assurances that the refugees will be resettled in third countries. A variety of political, economic, and social factors preclude the first asylum countries of Southeast Asia from accepting for permanent settlement the large numbers of refugees who have fled Indochina. There are presently 235,000 Indochinese being provided first asylum in Southeast Asian countries, mostly in Thailand, in addition to the hundreds of thousands of Khmer who have sought refuge in eastern Thailand and along the Thai-Kampuchea border. The voluntary return of refugees to their homeland has, in some instances, resolved refugee problems. In 1978-1979, the UNHCR successfully arranged for the return of 200,000 people to Burma from Bangladesh. Similar efforts by UNHCR vis-a-vis Indochinese refugees, however, have either failed or had only modest results at best and prospects for significant progress in the future are uncertain. In June, a UNHCR attempt to arrange for the initiation of a return of Khmer from UNHCR-managed holding camps in Thailand was abruptly terminated at the time of the Vietnamese incursion into Thailand. Some 9,600 persons, however, did attempt to return to Kampuchea.

Some members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have on occasion refused to provide first asylum for refugees and have physically pushed them back across borders or towed them back out to sea at great cost in terms of human suffering. At present, the government in Thailand is confronted with the dilemma posed by the presence of large numbers of Khmer and other Indochinese refugees within and along that country's borders. A continuation of U.S. and third country resettlement efforts is essential if Thailand and the other first asylum countries are to continue to accept refugees entering their countries and refrain from physically ejecting those presently within their borders.

A reduction in the numbers of refugees the United States accepts from Southeast Asia could compromise our ability to develop the Orderly Departure Program being negotiated so laboriously with Vietnam. Failure to progress on that matter

might well result in the Vietnamese abandoning the moratorium on assisted departures of unwanted people and in a renewal of the rates of refugee arrivals in first asylum countries that occurred 14 months ago with such devastating effects. ASEAN unity would be strained, U.S. humanitarian leadership diminished, and probably tens of thousands of lives put in grave peril.

Another result of a reduction or a slowing down in the number of refugee departures from the first asylum countries of Southeast Asia could be to extend the time in which the refugees would be confined to unproductive and unhealthy lives in refugee camps. The prospect of a long-term refugee presence has always been a serious concern to first asylum countries of Southeast Asia and would directly add to pressures for those governments to deny entry to or expel the refugees.

The President's decision in June 1979 to double the U.S. Indochinese refugee intake to 14,000 per month has been among the most effective means of demonstrating our support for ASEAN countries in the face of the confrontation tactics of the Vietnamese. That rate of admission, in addition to being significant in absolute terms, sets an example for other refugee-receiving nations and, in large measure, has been responsible for similarly positive actions taken by those countries. Although there has been a decline in the average monthly resettlement rate by third countries in the last five months, the overall acceptances for the year have been extraordinarily high. A decline in the U.S. program would provide a negative example that would be interpreted by other nations as a judgment that the problem was less serious now. Just as third country resettlements accelerated along with U.S. admissions, they would surely turn down sharply if the U.S. program were to be reduced. Once the United States Fiscal Year 1981 program is fixed, a major initiative will be launched to encourage a continued high level of third country resettlements. U.S. refugee admissions are one of the most tangible, and to the nations of Southeast Asia, one of the most vital elements in the stated U.S. commitment to that region's stability and progress.

REFUGEES FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE

The traditional U.S. support for the principle of freedom of movement and respect for other human rights has been a pillar of U.S. foreign policy toward the Warsaw Pact States. The U.S. position has been buttressed by such highly publicized acts as the passage of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act, the U.S. adherence to the Helsinki Final Act and the continuing human rights element of our foreign policy. This thread has been woven into our basic approach toward the Warsaw Pact States since the end of World War II and the emergence of the Cold War. The implications of that basic policy on our refugee admissions levels have been consistently supported by the Congress and the public.

REFUGEES FROM THE NEAR EAST

The United States continues to support the development of free and stable nations in the Near East. That policy continues to be as important today as it was in the past. The reduction of the levels of unsettled refugee populations in the region and the prevention of the emergence of new refugee groups persecuted or displaced from their homelands is a necessary component of stability in the region and thus of United States foreign policy objectives.

LATIN AMERICAN REFUGEES

The admission of refugees from Latin America is an important element in U.S. foreign policy toward that region. Admitting refugees from Latin America who are of special concern to the United States who flee from persecution or other violations of human rights is in keeping with our long-standing traditions and supports our human rights policy which in this hemisphere has placed special emphasis on the safety and well-being of political dissidents.

AFRICAN REFUGEES

Although African refugees in most cases prefer resettlement within Africa, it is important for the United States to provide admission for Africans of special humanitarian concern who seek the opportunity to settle in the United States and who qualify for admission under the Refugee Act of 1980.

INDOCHINESE REFUGEE PROGRAM SUMMARY

APRIL 1975 THRU JULY 31, 1980

LAND	BOAT	TOTAL
583,948*	537,112**	1,118,308 (adjusted)
10,801	7,598	18,399
8,165	6,037	14,635
4,244	7,985	15,055
104,977	280,763**	388,802**
1,198	6,061	7,259
339,804	157,927	497,731
5,442	14,046	22,314
441,781	438,650	886,533*
		10,595
		232,606

* Including: Approximately 263,000 Vietnamese resettled in the PRC since late 1977.
 **Including: 130,000 direct to U.S. in 1975.

NOTE: We have not included in these figures neither the approximately 160,000 New Khmer in holding centers in Thailand nor the approximately 40,000 Khmer refugees in South Vietnam.

RP/OAR:DACert - 8/19/80

COMPARISON OF INDOCHINESE REFUGEES

ARRIVALS IN 1979 WITH

ARRIVALS THRU JULY 31, 1980*

MONTH	LAND		BOAT		TOTAL	
	1979	1980	1979	1980	1979	1980
January	7,200	4,520	10,500	2,364	17,700	6,884
February	3,330	10,970	8,360	2,971	11,960	13,941
March	5,670	9,336	17,190	5,394	22,860	14,730
April	5,640	2,974	32,320	6,434	37,960	9,408
May	4,980	7,642	46,320	10,349	51,300	17,991
June	14,940	10,917	43,450	10,174	58,390	21,091
July	9,570	10,801	20,500	7,578	30,070	18,399
August	3,190		8,790		11,980	
September	4,570		8,990		13,560	
October	3,480		3,540		7,020	
November	1,720		2,560		4,280	
December	320		2,770		3,090	
TOTAL	64,610	57,160	205,560	45,259	270,170	102,444

* Does not include the estimated 160,000 Khmer in holding centers in Thailand.

INDOCHINESE REFUGEE FLOWS

JANUARY 1, 1980 THRU JULY 31, 1980*

ASYLUM COUNTRY	JULY ARRIVALS	ARRIVALS YEAR TO DATE	JULY DEPARTURES FOR U.S.	YEAR TO DATE-U.S. DEPARTURES	JULY THIRD COUNTRY DEPARTURES	YEAR TO DATE-3RD CO. DEPT.	CURRENT REFUGEE POPULATION
THAILAND							
Land	10,801	57,160	4,244	43,224	1,198	23,425	135,364
Boat	777	12,602	2,921	7,706	261	3,158	7,098
Subtotal	11,578	69,762	7,165	50,930	1,459	26,583	142,462
MALAYSIA							
	1,416	11,374	1,500	14,249	1,493	9,659	20,452
HONG KONG							
	2,833	7,811	1,570	9,892	1,915	14,747	36,300
MACAU							
	91	2,179	17	287	118	702	4,534
INDONESIA							
	315	2,704	1,438	17,583	1,103	10,538	9,050
PHILIPPINES							
	913	1,951	240	2,186	127	1,068	3,292
SINGAPORE							
	1,177	6,011	245	1,424	1,030	2,549	3,899
JAPAN							
	74	599	40	350	14	81	1,423
KOREA							
	0	4	0	40	0	12	118
TAIWAN							
	2	49	14	202	0	2	331
OTHERS							
	0	0	0	0	0	0	150
SUB-TOTAL	18,399	102,444	12,229	97,143	7,259	65,941	222,011
RPCs			2,826	3,062			10,595
TOTAL	18,399	102,444	15,055	100,205	7,259	65,941	232,606

* Does not include the 160,000 Khmer in holding centers in Thailand.

RP/OAR:DACarr

SUMMARY OF INDOCHINESE REFUGEE POPULATION: APRIL 1975 THRU JULY 31, 1980

COUNTRIES OF ASYLUM	JULY ARRIVALS	CUMULATIVE POPULATION	CUMULATIVE DEPARTURES TO R/Cs		JULY DIRECT DEPARTURES TO U.S.	CUMULATIVE DEPARTURES TO U.S.	JULY 3RD COUNTRY DEPARTURES	CUMULATIVE 3RD COUNTRY DEPARTURES	CURRENT POPULATION
			Beaten	Canada					
MALAYSIA	1,416	135,882	2000 (0)	—	1500	64,199	1,424	49,172	70,452
HONG KONG	2,832	98,701	2488 (1459)	—	1570	24,648	1,882	35,265	36,300
MACAU	91	6,593	143 (143)	—	17	707	118	1,209	4,524
INDONESIA	315	57,621	—	—	1438	29,718	1103	18,863	9,050
THAILAND (BOAT)	777	40,590	2281 (525)	747 (747)	2921	19,789	261	10,625	7,098
PHILIPPINES	913	14,486	1029 (0)	—	240	5,924	127	4,231	3,292
SINGAPORE	1,172	16,620	—	335 (335)	245	2,938	326	9,448	3,859
JAPAN	74	3,528	—	—	40	1,453	14	662	1,422
KOREA	0	626	—	—	0	191	0	327	118
TAIWAN	2	1,424	—	—	14	1,022	0	70	331
OTHER	0	28,318*	—	—	0	183	0	28,003*	130
TOTAL BOAT	7,598	407,112	7941 (2127)	1,082 (1,082)	7,995	150,763	5,265	157,927	86,647
THAILAND (LAND)	10,801	370,948	3803 (0)	—	4,244	104,927	1,196	76,804	135,264
R/C Beaten	—	—	11,744 (2127)	—	2,773	3,009	—	—	8,821
R/C Canada	—	—	—	1,082 (1,082)	53	53	—	—	1,774
TOTAL	18,399	1,118,308**	11,744	—	15,025	388,802*	6,461	497,231**	232,606

*Includes direct departures from Vietnam to France and Canada

**Includes 100,000 Vietnamese who came direct to the U.S. in 1975 and 263,000 Vietnamese resettled in the PRC in 1977

***Includes 130,000 Vietnamese direct to the U.S. in 1975

****Includes 263,000 Vietnamese resettled in PRC in late 1977

Note: We have not included the approximate 160,000 New River in holding centers in Thailand nor the approximate 40,000 Klong refugees in South Vietnam.

REFUGEE CAMP POPULATIONS

AS OF JULY 31, 1980

<u>INDONESIA:</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>CAMP POPULATION</u>
	Galang Island	9,358
	Anambas Island/Jemadja Island/ Letung Town Area Kuku	419
	Bintan Island/Air Raja	
	Natuna/Bunguran/Pulau Laut	
	Sedanau	
	Pulau Kelarik	
	<u>GRAND TOTAL</u>	<u>9,777</u>

MALAYSIA:

Pulau Tengah	2,068
Pulau Bidong	9,880
Kota Baru	680
Kuantan	920
Sabah	CLOSED
Sarawak	197
Transit	6,819
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>20,564</u>

THAILAND:

	<u>LAO</u>	<u>HIGHLAND</u>	<u>KHMER</u>	<u>VIET</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Chonburi			6,500		6,500
Chiang Khong	912	5,419	0	0	6,331
Chiang Kham	689	1,466	0	0	2,155
Ban Nam Yao	798	11,206	0	0	12,004
Sob Thuang	327	8,549	0	0	8,876
Fak Tha					
Ban Vinai	0	30,781	0	0	30,781
Nongkhai	33,154	0	263	1,076	34,493
Ubon	21,931	0	0	0	21,931
Sikhiu	3	0	4	2,484	2,491
Aranyaprathet	0	0	2,838	0	2,838
Buriram	0	0	722	0	722
Trat					
Surin			4,547		4,547
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>57,814</u>	<u>57,421</u>	<u>14,874</u>	<u>3,560</u>	<u>133,669</u>

NOTE: Additionally, there are approximately 160,000 New Khmer in holding centers in Thailand.

RP/OAR:DACarr 8/19/80

CUMULATIVE DEPARTURES TO THIRD COUNTRIES FROM APRIL 1975 THRU JULY 31, 1980
(DEPARTURES FOR MONTH IN PARENTHESES)

	AUS- THRU		CANADA		FRANCE		GERMANY		NETHERLANDS		NEW- ZEALAND		NOR-		SWITZER-		OTHER		TOTAL		U.S.- TOTAL	
	THRU	THRU	THRU	THRU	THRU	THRU	THRU	THRU	THRU	THRU	THRU	THRU	THRU	THRU	THRU	THRU	THRU	THRU	THRU	THRU	THRU	THRU
MALAYSIA	0	17,102	452	16,321	323	3,988	3,768	518	1,280	1,038	22	2	973	2,009	331	825	49,172	64,199	113,371	(0)	(0)	(0)
	(0)	(1,614)	(0)	(4,664)	(2)	(33)	(13)	(14,6)	(6)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(1,38)	(0)	(0)	(4)	(1,434)	(1,500)	(2,934)	(0)	(0)	(0)
HONG KONG	29	1,673	137	11,021	416	650	2,087	111	298	249	269	0	8	429	8,073	9,815	35,265	24,648	59,913	(0)	(0)	(0)
	(0)	(78)	(0)	(866)	(71)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(1,67)	(14)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(4,89)	(10)	(1,882)	(1,570)	(3,452)	(0)	(0)	(0)
HONG KONG	0	94	0	1,000	44	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	22	1,009	1,029	(0)	(0)	(0)
	(0)	(14)	(0)	(1,000)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
HONG KONG	2	6,644	158	6,864	142	963	2,143	25	0	401	6	0	737	485	42	162	18,863	29,718	48,581	(0)	(0)	(0)
	(0)	(252)	(0)	(557)	(1)	(28)	(19)	(0)	(0)	(3)	(3)	(0)	(106)	(234)	(0)	(3)	(1,103)	(1,438)	(2,541)	(0)	(0)	(0)
THAILAND (BANGKOK)	0	3,300	43	2,532	221	2,084	868	144	156	238	328	5	1	214	333	190	10,675	19,789	30,464	(0)	(0)	(0)
	(0)	(115)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(121)	(0)	(0)	(2)	(0)	(4)	(0)	(6)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(261)	(2,921)	(3,182)	(0)	(0)	(0)
THAILAND (BANGKOK)	1,282	5,735	1,391	13,135	0	43,149	3,353	499	132	446	90	2,547	0	1,583	345	3,155	76,804	104,977	181,781	(0)	(0)	(0)
	(0)	(266)	(0)	(1,453)	(0)	(66)	(1,451)	(1,451)	(1,451)	(1,451)	(1,451)	(1,451)	(1,451)	(1,451)	(1,451)	(1,451)	(1,451)	(1,451)	(1,451)	(1,451)	(1,451)	(1,451)
PHILIPPINES	0	(35)	(0)	(92)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
SINGAPORE	1	622	198	496	181	1,753	1,039	1,006	840	14	1,012	0	4	1,518	279	475	9,448	2,938	12,386	(0)	(0)	(0)
	(0)	(24)	(0)	(28)	(21)	(4)	(52)	(31)	(125)	(0)	(20)	(0)	(0)	(5)	(0)	(16)	(326)	(245)	(571)	(0)	(0)	(0)
JAPAN	0	9	62	180	8	37	16	0	25	0	150	0	0	42	83	50	862	1,453	2,315	(0)	(0)	(0)
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(2)	(2)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
KOREA	0	(0)	1	171	0	119	18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(0)	(0)	(0)
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
TAIWAN	0	0	2	(0)	0	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
AUSTRALIA	0	2,067	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,089	0	2,089	(0)	(0)
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
OTHER*	7	1,539	814	7,152	199	12,824	544	177	155	260	0	263,000	0	781	1,006	478	288	316	163	289,079	(0)	(0)
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
TOTAL	1,281	39,464	3,282	60,625	1,570	66,245	16,297	2,486	3,022	2,825	1,931	865,554	1,727	7,192	10,721	15,305	497,731	(2,826)	(2,826)	(2,826)	(2,826)	(2,826)
	(0)	(1,381)	(90)	(2,007)	(97)	(828)	(120)	(218)	(136)	(171)	(41)	(0)	(106)	(420)	(770)	(176)	(6,451)	(388)	(802)	(886,533)	(0)	(0)

*Includes: 1) Direct departures from Vietnam to France and Canada
2) Approximately 263,000 Vietnamese resettled in the PRC since late 1977.

NET/UNIT DEPARTURES
DIRECT TO US
IN 1975

3,065 3,065
(2,826) (2,826)
130,000 130,000

	INDOCHINESE REFUGEES IN U.S. (partially corrected for secondary migration)		
	As of June 30, '80	July 31, '80	
1. Alabama	1,943	1,995	N.B. There has been a correction in the June figures as previously given.
2. Alaska	292	292	
3. Arizona	2,709	2,799	
4. Arkansas	2,685	2,774	
5. California	119,868	123,971	
6. Colorado	7,419	7,636	
7. Connecticut	3,418	3,565	
8. Delaware	220	220	
9. District of Columbia	4,444	4,827	
10. Florida	7,664	7,866	
11. Georgia	3,697	3,926	
12. Hawaii	5,532	5,706	
13. Idaho	651	701	
14. Illinois	13,434	14,105	
15. Indiana	3,463	3,575	
16. Iowa	6,158	6,285	
17. Kansas	4,706	4,914	
18. Kentucky	1,803	1,869	
19. Louisiana	10,112	10,296	
20. Maine	585	596	
21. Maryland	3,653	3,744	
22. Massachusetts	5,032	5,391	
23. Michigan	6,609	6,870	
24. Minnesota	11,962	12,419	
25. Mississippi	1,120	1,169	
26. Missouri	3,518	3,644	
27. Montana	1,027	1,039	
28. Nebraska	2,114	2,152	
29. Nevada	1,914	1,969	
30. New Hampshire	270	271	
31. New Jersey	3,177	3,344	
32. New Mexico	1,925	2,001	
33. New York	10,824	11,332	
34. North Carolina	3,403	3,470	
35. North Dakota	657	667	
36. Ohio	5,265	5,390	
37. Oklahoma	5,711	5,839	
38. Oregon	11,394	11,885	
39. Pennsylvania	15,073	15,669	
40. Rhode Island	2,251	2,329	
41. South Carolina	1,285	1,315	
42. South Dakota	708	729	
43. Tennessee	3,745	3,867	
44. Texas	33,982	34,944	
45. Utah	4,823	5,052	
46. Vermont	182	182	
47. Virginia	9,864	10,159	
48. Washington	15,275	15,816	
49. West Virginia	383	381	
50. Wisconsin	5,154	5,293	
51. Wyoming	264	273	
52. Virgin Islands	11	11	
53. Guam	382	385	
54. Puerto Rico	28	28	
	UNKNOWN	1,475	
	TOTALS	375,263	384,432

INDOCHINESE

1980

Total Flows:April-July

	<u>Arr.</u>	<u>US Dep.</u>	<u>Third Country Dep.</u>	<u>Total Dep.</u>	<u>Camp Pop.</u>
April	<u>9,408</u>	13,902	7,801	<u>21,703</u>	237,430
May	<u>17,991</u>	14,385	8,633	<u>23,018</u>	234,946
June	<u>21,091</u>	13,323	7,622	<u>20,945</u>	234,892
July	<u>18,399</u>	15,055	6,461	<u>21,516</u>	232,606

Thailand

	<u>Arr.</u>	<u>US Dep.</u>	<u>Third Country Dep.</u>	<u>Total Dep.</u>	<u>Camp Pop.</u>
April Land	2,974	7,552	2,706	10,252	126,537 (L)
Boat	<u>2,281</u>				<u>10,089 (B)</u>
	5,255				135,626
May Land	7,642	8,040	3,265	11,305	127,005 (L)
Boat	<u>2,773</u>				<u>10,929 (B)</u>
	10,415				137,934
June Land	10,917	7,046	3,245	10,291	130,003 (L)
Boat	<u>2,218</u>				<u>10,775 (B)</u>
	13,135				140,778
July Land	10,801	7,165	1,459	8,624	135,364 (L)
Boat	<u>777</u>				<u>7,098 (B)</u>
	11,578				142,462

APPENDIX II.

OVERVIEW
OF
WORLD REFUGEE SITUATION

Office of the United States Coordinator
for Refugee Affairs

August 1980

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

This is an up-date of the March 1980 "Overview of the World Refugee Situation." It includes a description of the nature of the refugee situation, an analysis of conditions within the countries from which they come and a description of the extent to which other countries will admit and assist in the resettlement of refugees. Main causes of refugee flows are identified and estimates of future trends are indicated. The scale and distribution of international resources now being devoted to the refugee relief effort are included.

The assessment is based upon information obtained from executive branch agencies with responsibilities in the United States refugee effort, international refugee organizations affiliated with the United Nations system, private voluntary agencies and recent reporting from the United States diplomatic missions.

Refugee numbers in the assessment are often estimates or approximations due to changes in the refugee flow, inadequate access to refugee populations, or the inability or unwillingness of governments to provide data. Precision is further impeded because of the difficulty in determining at what point refugees are considered to have been successfully integrated into their country of resettlement and no longer dependent upon international refugee relief programs for their care and maintenance. The refugee numbers contained herein take these factors into account and represent carefully considered best estimates.

Statistics concerning contributions to refugee programs are gathered at different time periods from different sources and should be taken only as estimates of pledges or contributions and not as definitive amounts.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNHCR ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES 1980
 Situation at 16 June 1980
 (in US dollars)

<u>DONOR</u>	<u>GENERAL PROGRAMMES</u>	<u>SPECIAL PROGRAMMES</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
A. GOVERNMENTS			
Algeria	26,620	-	26,620
Argentina	50,000	-	50,000
Australia	4,585,433	2,262,722	6,848,155
Austria	102,421	48,000	150,421
Bahamas	-	1,000	1,000
Bangladesh	-	3,000	3,000
Belgium	714,286	991,964	1,706,250
Botswana	1,280	-	1,280
Burundi	1,675	-	1,675
Canada	1,906,780	3,732,395	5,639,175
Chile	20,000	-	20,000
China	-	300,000	300,000
Colombia	12,000	-	12,000
Cyprus	5,943	-	5,943
Denmark	2,819,549	3,340,208	6,159,757
Djibouti	2,000	-	2,000
Dominica, Commonwealth of	1,000	-	1,000
Egypt	8,572	-	8,572
Finland	469,685	295,115	764,800
France	795,855	123,457	919,312
Germany, Federal Republic of	2,612,862	6,235,869	8,848,731
Guyana	391	-	391
Greece	60,000	15,000	75,000
Holy See	2,500	-	2,500
Honduras	1,000	-	1,000
Iceland	20,000	32,000	52,000
India	12,422	-	12,422
Indonesia	3,000	15,000	18,000
Iraq	12,018	100,000	112,018
Italy	60,241	970,008	1,030,249
Japan	50,000,000 ^{a/}	14,099,808	64,099,808
Kuwait	40,000	166,667	206,667
Lao People's Republic	4,000	-	4,000
Lebanon	20,000	-	20,000
Lesotho	2,000	-	2,000
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	50,000	-	50,000
Leichenstein	-	12,500	12,500
Luxembourg	11,429	17,544	28,973
Madagascar	2,475	-	2,475
Malaysia	1,500	-	1,500
Malta	1,209	-	1,209
Mexico	20,000	-	20,000
Monaco	729	-	729

a/ Part of a contribution of US\$60 million, the final distribution of which is still subject to negotiation.

<u>DONOR</u>	<u>GENERAL PROGRAMMES</u>	<u>SPECIAL PROGRAMMES</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Netherlands	5,421,053	3,622,453	9,043,506
New Zealand	-	181,136	181,136
Nigeria	46,865	-	46,865
Norway	3,018,109	6,547,827	9,565,936
Oman	6,000	-	6,000
Pakistan	2,380	-	2,380
Philippines	5,000	500	5,500
Portugal	7,500	-	7,500
Quatar	10,000	-	10,000
Republic of Korea	5,000	-	5,000
Saudi Arabia	10,000	5,000,000	5,010,000
Senegal	3,000	-	3,000
Singapore	-	3,333	3,333
Somalia	2,000	-	2,000
Spain	30,000	-	30,000
Sudan	6,042	-	6,042
Swaziland	1,852	-	1,852
Sweden	6,123,596	8,945,392	15,068,988
Switzerland	1,046,574	978,467	2,025,041
Togo	7,143	-	7,143
Trinidad and Tobago	2,073	-	2,073
Tunisia	3,450	-	3,450
Uganda	13,210	237,084	250,294
United Arab Emirates	-	1,000,000	1,000,000
United Kingdom	11,363,636	3,965,552	15,329,188
United Republic of Cameroon	3,713	-	3,713
United States of America	45,900,000	44,100,130	90,000,130
Uruguay	2,000	-	2,000
Venezuela	20,000	-	20,000
Vietnam	2,000	-	2,000
Yemen Arab Republic	2,000	-	2,000
Yugoslavia	30,000	25,000	55,000
Zambia	7,853	-	7,853
Sub-Total:	137,562,924	107,369,131	244,932,055
B. <u>INTER-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS</u>	4,997,750	35,304,129	40,301,879
C. <u>UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM</u>	-	250,000	250,000
D. <u>NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND OTHERS</u>	1,209,442	10,272,555	11,481,997
Total Contributions:	143,770,116	153,195,815	296,965,931

WORLD REFUGEE ASSESSMENTPRINCIPAL FINDINGS

1. Armed conflict, civil disturbances, famine and human rights violations were the primary causes for the continued growth of the world refugee population during the past year.
2. Refugees impose serious economic, political and social strains on countries of first asylum. Equally important to many governments is the destabilizing impact that large numbers of refugees have on the internal political, social and ethnic balance of their societies and the threat to peace in the region.
3. The industrialized countries, with the United States, Japan and the European Community in the lead, continue to provide most of the funds for the international refugee relief effort. The communist countries are sources of refugees and, except for Yugoslavia and Romania, have contributed virtually no funds.
4. Approximately 1.25 million persons have fled their homes in Indochina since the fall of the Governments of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam in 1975. Of those who fled, 388,000 Indochinese have been admitted to the United States, about 231,000 have resettled in other non-communist countries, and some 266,000 Vietnamese of Chinese ethnic origin have resettled in China. The flow of Indochinese refugees, which peaked in May and June 1979 with almost 60,000 arrivals a month in first asylum countries, dropped following the Vietnamese moratorium on illegal departures but began to rise again in 1980 and has averaged almost 20,000 monthly from April through July 1980. Some 230,000 refugees remain in countries of first asylum awaiting resettlement, and an additional 160,000 Khmer are in Thai holding centers, some tens of thousands of whom may be recommended for resettlement by the UNHCR. Resettlement needs are, therefore, virtually as pressing as they were one year ago. Development of the UNHCR sponsored Orderly Departure Program from Vietnam has been slow, and a renewed upsurge in refugee outflow from that country cannot be excluded.
5. More than a year after the Vietnamese invasion, Kampuchea is unable to provide adequate food for its population. Continued insecurity has forced major population shifts and disruption of the food production cycle. About 300,000 Khmer, whose presence poses a threat to the political stability of Thailand, have sought refuge along the Thai border and inside Thailand. Because of the continued disruption of planting and the ensuing food shortages, the need exists for the international community to continue to supply relief assistance in order to avoid further human tragedy in Kampuchea.

6. Estimates of refugees on the African continent range from 3.4 to 4 million persons. The need for refugee assistance is critical. The continuing political and military conflicts and the number and needs of African refugees are not expected to decrease in the foreseeable future. A unique feature of the African refugee situation is the agreement by most African countries that they bear primary responsibility for their refugees and their subsequent willingness to provide asylum for them wherever possible.

7. There are more than 1.3 million refugees who have fled to Somalia from southern and eastern Ethiopia. Of these, some 743,000 were in relief camps as of July 1980 and an estimated 1,000 additional refugees are arriving daily. There are another 500,000-700,000 refugees struggling to stay alive, living outside Somali camps.

8. The resolution of the conflict in Zimbabwe enabled 250,000 people who fled to Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique to return to their homes. Efforts are being made to resettle some 800,000 others who were internally displaced because of the conflict.

9. Approximately 1,000,000 Afghans have fled the disruption in Afghanistan and sought asylum in Pakistan, providing an additional drain on a country experiencing major economic difficulties.

10. The climate for emigration from the Soviet Union is more difficult this year. Reports indicate that official harassments for would-be emigrants has increased. The changed character of U.S.-Soviet relations has led to a sharp decline in the numbers of emigrants as compared with last year's high level.

11. In the aftermath of the Nicaraguan revolution close to 200,000 Nicaraguan refugees who sought refuge in neighboring countries have returned to their homeland. Some 20,000 others fled Nicaragua because of the change in government.

12. Between April and August 1980, about 120,000 undocumented Cubans entered the United States by boat from the Cuban port of Mariel, adding a critical new dimension to the refugee problem.

SECTION I

EUROPE AND CANADAREGIONAL OVERVIEW

Canada and the non-communist countries of Europe provide significant financial and resettlement support for international refugee relief efforts throughout the world. These countries have admitted approximately one quarter of the estimated 900,000 Indochinese refugees resettled to date. They also admit a continuing flow of refugees from Eastern Europe, Latin America, the Middle East and Africa. Europe's major maritime countries, furthermore, cooperate in international efforts to rescue boat refugees at sea.

With the exception of Yugoslavia and Romania, the communist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have not participated financially or otherwise in this global effort. On the contrary, they generate many times more refugees than they admit.

High points in the movement of Eastern Europeans to the West were the early post-World War II years, the 1948 communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the Hungarian revolt in 1956 and, to a lesser degree, the period of the "Prague Spring" and Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and early 1969. Comparatively small numbers of refugees have steadily left Eastern Europe and continue to do so. During 1979, the flow from the Soviet Union increased significantly as Soviet restrictions on emigration were relaxed and some 51,000 Soviet Jews left the country before the end of 1979. Departures of Jews from the USSR, while still high, show a sharp decline through the first half of 1980 in comparison to the record level of 1979.

Special historical, economic, political and cultural factors figure prominently in European refugee policies:

- ex-colonial powers are inclined to give priority to refugees from their former colonies;
- Spain has been a haven for Latin Americans and has been a key transit point for Cuban refugees;
- the West German Government continues its program to repatriate ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union;
- highly homogeneous societies question their ability to assimilate large numbers of people of markedly different ethnic and cultural backgrounds;

- 2 -

-- some European countries are already densely populated; others are experiencing serious economic difficulties.

As a result of the Tokyo Economic Summit and the UN Meeting on Indochinese Refugees, Canada and many of the non-communist countries of Europe have increased their support for international refugee relief efforts significantly.

COUNTRY PROFILES

The following profiles contain information about the actions and policies of those nations that figure prominently in the region as countries of refugee resettlement, temporary haven, transit, or as generators of refugees.

AUSTRIA

Austria granted asylum to 3,200 refugees in 1979, of whom 90 percent were from Eastern Europe. The current refugee population of Austria is 4,000 and includes refugees from some 20 countries. In recent years, Austria has resettled 400 Chilean refugees, 250 Indochinese, 200 Argentines and has agreed to do so again in 1980. The government is ready to increase the number to 1,000 as soon as sponsoring agencies are able to receive and settle them.

Austria continues to provide reception facilities and security for Soviet Jewish emigres who entered the country in transit to the United States, Israel and other countries. More than 50,000 Soviets arrived in Austria during the past year. Austria has expressed its willingness to carry on this program. The cost of support for Soviet and other East European refugees is nearly \$8 million per year.

Austria has pledged 1 million Austrian schillings for Kampchean relief and has contributed 1.5 million schillings for a hospital project in Nicaragua. The contributions for 1980 UNHCR General and Special Programs will reach \$140,000.

The priority that the Austrian Government accords to Eastern European refugees and the limitations of employment, housing and resources of this small country's capacity to absorb refugees make it unlikely that Austria will significantly increase its acceptance of refugees from other parts of the world in the years ahead.

BELGIUM

Belgium traditionally has been a haven for many thousands of refugees from Eastern Europe and other parts of the world. According to UNHCR figures, Belgium has resettled 2,739 Indochinese refugees. This number is expected to increase during 1980. Belgium has also informed the Singapore Government that it will guarantee up to 200 refugees from ships whose masters are unable to obtain guarantees from the countries of their flag.

Since 1974, Belgium has contributed \$1.7 million to special UNHCR programs in Cyprus, Angola, Indochina and elsewhere. In 1978 alone, it contributed over \$2.1 million to the UNHCR general and special funds. In 1979, Belgium's contribution to UNHCR General and Special Programs was \$785,715 and the contribution to UNHCR's program for Kampuchean relief was \$251,724. While Belgium can be expected to continue to support international refugee programs at current levels, it is not likely to increase them significantly.

CANADA

Canada historically has played an active role in efforts to deal with international refugee problems. Since World War II, Canada has accepted more than 350,000 refugees. In recent years, it has permanently resettled 7,000 Chileans and 7,000 Asian Ugandans. In July 1979, Canada announced a program to triple the rate of admission of Indochinese refugees with a target of accepting 50,000 Indochinese refugees from July 1979 until the end of 1980. In March 1980, the Canadian Government boosted the overall target for Indochinese refugees to 60,000 by the end of 1980.

The Canadian Government's refugee resettlement program continues to meet with a gratifying public response. By the end of January 1980, Canada's intake of Indochinese refugees exceeded 39,000, making Canada the third largest contributor to the Indochinese resettlement program after the United States and France.

In 1979, Canada accepted some 1,590 Soviet and Eastern European refugees. The 1980 Refugee Plan calls for increased numbers from the USSR and Eastern Europe and other countries. Up to 5,000 are to be admitted, in addition to the refugees coming from Indochina.

According to UNHCR reports, Canada has pledged some \$2 million for the Indochinese refugee program. In addition Canadian non-governmental organizations provided some \$45,000 for Kampuchean refugees.

Canada has been especially active in international diplomatic efforts to induce other nations to increase their involvement and contributions to the UNHCR. Despite the humanitarian interest and commitment of the Canadian Government and public, continuing high unemployment and inflation in Canada can be expected to limit Canada's ability to increase its present rate of intake of refugees.

CYPRUS

As a consequence of the 1974 coup against President Makarios and the subsequent Turkish military intervention, many thousands of Cypriots from both the Greek and Turkish communities were displaced from their homes. An estimated 160,000 Greek Cypriots moved from the northern to the southern part of the island and 40,000 Turkish Cypriots moved from the south to the north.

Both the Government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot administration have devoted substantial portions of their resources to resettling and otherwise caring for displaced persons of their respective communities. These efforts are now largely completed. There are reports of full employment in the government-controlled area of Cyprus. In the Turkish Cypriot area, there continues to be a high rate of unemployment. This has more to do with structural economic problems than with the displacement of population.

Since 1974, the United States has contributed \$117.5 million through the UNHCR for the relief and rehabilitation of displaced persons in both Cypriot communities. This assistance is disbursed to the Greek and Turkish communities for specified projects, in an 80:20 ratio commensurate with population. Other western governments have also contributed to the maintenance and resettlement of displaced persons through the UNHCR. Greece and Turkey have provided substantial amounts of assistance to the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. This has been used largely for general budget support rather than for the care of displaced persons.

The need for external assistance for displaced persons on Cyprus is expected to diminish appreciably during the coming year.

DENMARK, NORWAY, SWEDEN AND FINLAND

Although small in size and population, on a per capita basis, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden rank among the highest contributors to the UNHCR. In 1978, Denmark contributed over \$8 million, Norway over \$9 million, and Sweden over \$11 million. Neighboring Finland contributed \$367,000.

Denmark pledged \$4,473,684 to the 1980 UNHCR General and Special Programs, \$751,878 for the Zimbabwe repatriation operation, \$375,940 for Kampuchean refugees in Thailand, and has pledged \$100,000 for Cuban refugees. Norway contributed \$1,207,243 for Zimbabwe, \$804,198 for Kampuchean relief, \$1,207,243 for Afghan refugees and pledged \$100,000 for Cuban refugees. Sweden pledged \$7,142,857 for the UNHCR 1980 General and Special Programs, \$231,000 for Cuban refugees, \$1,190,476 for Zimbabwe, and \$1,190,476 for Afghan refugees. Finland pledged \$494,454 for UNHCR General and Special Programs for 1980.

Each country instructs its flag ships to rescue passengers on vessels in distress on the high seas. Denmark's normal refugee quota is 500 plus 100 additional spaces for refugees rescued at sea. The Danes, however, accepted 1,250 refugees in 1979, more than twice the number accepted in 1978 and four times more than 1977. Two hundred fifty of the 1979 total were rescued at sea by Danish ships. In 1980, Denmark is expected to return to a program closer to the normal quota of 500 plus 100. Norway is committed to accepting up to 3,000 refugees by August 31, 1980. Sweden will admit 2,250 Indochinese refugees in the 18-month period ending June 30, 1980.

These countries have tightly knit, homogeneous societies and, except for Sweden, have comparatively limited experience as havens for refugees and immigrants. Sweden has had an annual intake of some 2,500 refugees, mostly from Latin America. Sweden has taken an especially active role in efforts to provide assistance to Kampuchean refugees in Thailand and in Kampuchea.

EASTERN EUROPE

The emigration policies of the Eastern European Warsaw Pact countries are almost as restrictive as those of the Soviet Union. Non-aligned Yugoslavia allows generally free emigration. An exception has been the willingness of Poland, East Germany, Romania, and the Soviet Union to permit the emigration of some 100,000 ethnic Germans since 1976.

Romania and Yugoslavia have contributed financially to current international refugee relief efforts. Romania contributed \$10,000 to UNHCR programs in Southern Africa in 1977/1978, and pledged \$30,000 for the 1980 program. Few, if any, refugees are known to have been resettled in Eastern Europe through the UNHCR mechanism. Yugoslavia has received some refugees from Albania. Some political refugees from Iran, Greece, Turkey, Chile, and other countries have been given political asylum in Eastern European countries. Their numbers are believed to be small, however, and in some cases after a short stay, they have moved to other countries, mostly in Western Europe.

From 1973 to 1979, about 15,000 persons entered the United States from Eastern Europe under refugee programs.

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC)

Many of the West European countries contribute twice to international refugee programs: once through their national contributions to the UNHCR, ICEM, and the ICRC, and again through their financial support of EC budgetary contributions to these same international organizations.

In 1979, the EC allocated a total of almost \$57 million for refugee and disaster relief programs worldwide. During the first six months of 1980, the Community has donated a total of \$83.4 million for non-food aid emergency disaster relief, most of which is for refugee assistance; \$28.6 million was pledged for Kampuchean relief, \$14.3 for Afghan refugees in Pakistan, \$11.4 million for Zimbabwe refugee repatriation. The EC also has pledged \$10.6 million for Somali relief, \$4.3 million for Zimbabwe, \$4.3 million for the Sudan and \$1.2 million for Jamaica and Grenada.

FRANCE

France has a large and active refugee program that admits 14,000 to 16,000 refugees each year for permanent resettlement. Because of ties stemming from France's former role as a colonial power in Indochina, the great majority of the 1,000 to 2,000 refugees per month are from Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. On a per capita basis, France's Indochinese refugee program is roughly equivalent to that of the United States; in total numbers, it is second in the world only to the U.S. program. Since 1975, France has received 60,000-75,000 refugees from East Asia. In addition to its Indochinese program, France accepts approximately 1,000 refugees per year from Eastern Europe, Africa, and Latin America.

The French resettlement process is similar in many respects to the U.S. model. Voluntary agencies participate and are reimbursed by the government. Temporary holding centers are located throughout the country. A concerted effort is made to distribute the refugee population throughout the country rather than allow it to concentrate in Paris. The Indochinese are being assimilated without much difficulty. An estimated 80 to 90 percent of those admitted to date have found homes and employment.

France contributes substantially less to the UNHCR than most other countries of comparable resources. As already noted, however, it has accepted more Indochinese refugees than any other country except the United States.

Only a substantial rise in unemployment in France would be likely to lower current levels of refugees acceptance. It is unlikely that France will increase its refugee intake in the near future, however.

As of January 31, 1980, France pledged \$250,000 toward UNHCR's Zimbabwe repatriation operation and \$790,123 to UNHCR's 1980 General and Special Programs.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), with a population of 63 million in a country the size of Oregon, gives top resettlement priority to ethnic Germans from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe who wish to emigrate to the FRG. During the immediate postwar period, approximately 8 million Germans emigrated to the Federal Republic from Poland alone. About 38,000 non-German refugees entered West Germany in 1978. These included 33,000 Turkish and Pakistani nationals, 2,100 Chileans, and 3,000 Indochinese. In 1978, immigration into the Federal Republic of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union climbed to a 20-year high of approximately 70,000, and during the first four months of 1979 almost 15,000 ethnic Germans resettled in the FRG.

The FRG has also taken an active part in the resettlement of Indochinese refugees. It has fulfilled its pledge to resettle 20,000 of these refugees and earmarked 200 million DM in 1980 for that purpose. Also, an estimated 4,000 Afghan refugees have taken up residence in West Germany. Ethnic Germans continue to arrive from the East, with 750 million DM appropriated in 1980 to help them relocate. The number of asylum seekers from the Third World has grown markedly and is expected to reach 100,000 this year. Of these, about 35 percent come from Turkey, 15 percent from India and Pakistan and the rest from Eritrea, Zaire and other areas.

The FRG pledged \$3,160,919 for UNHCR 1980 General and Special Programs, \$1,149,425 for the Zimbabwe program, \$2,873,563 for Afghan refugees, \$2,210,145 for the Refugee Processing Center in Galang, and \$3,333,333 for the Refugee Processing Center in the Philippines.

GREECE

Greece is a temporary asylum and transit center for refugees. The UNHCR office in Athens processes refugees from the Middle East, primarily Iraq, Lebanon and Syria, and other areas for permanent resettlement in Greece or third countries.

Ethnic Greeks are free to return to Greece at any time and many do, although exact figures are not available. Language problems and relatively limited economic opportunities as compared with other possible countries of resettlement, constrain many refugees from choosing to resettle in Greece. Nevertheless, approximately 2,600 White Russians, Armenians, and Eastern Europeans now permanently reside there and have taken Greek citizenship.

The Greek Government contributed \$55,000 to the UNHCR in 1978. It advised Greek flag ships to rescue Indochinese boat refugees on the high seas. In January 1979, the government announced its intention to accept 50 Indochinese for permanent resettlement. It subsequently agreed to receive 150 additional Indochinese. The first group of 50 arrived and were resettled in Rhodes, primarily in semi-skilled occupations related to the hotel industry. Forty-one of this group are already self-supporting. The additional 150 refugees are to be selected from those in Hong Kong, and are slated for agricultural jobs in different areas of Greece. The Greek Government has indicated that if experience with the first 200 is satisfactory, Greece may allow an additional number to resettle here.

The Greek Government contributed \$60,000 to the UNHCR in 1979 and pledged \$5,000 for Kampuchean refugees.

ITALY

Italy has played an important role in international refugee efforts since World War II by serving as a country of transit for hundreds of thousands of Eastern European refugees. The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has processed some 90,000 in transit refugees in Rome since 1972. It processed about 40,000 in 1979. Some 6,000 refugees are normally in transit in Italy.

Italy contributed \$59,000 to the UNHCR in 1978 and more than doubled that amount in 1979. In addition, Italy pledged some \$120,000 for Kampuchean refugees and pledged \$60,241 for General and Special Programs. It also funds and operates two camps with a continuing combined population of 400 to 500 refugees. Italy has sought to be forthcoming with regard to Indochinese refugees. Two naval vessels dispatched to the Far East in July 1979 returned with about 900 "boat people" who were resettled in Italy along with others selected from refugee camps in Asia. The Italians promised at the Geneva Refugee Conference in July 1979 to resettle up to 8,000 Indochinese refugees over the following year. Italy has also begun to focus on African refugee problems and has donated 20,000 tons of rice to the Government of Somalia to assist in feeding refugees in that country.

THE NETHERLANDS

The Netherlands has absorbed thousands of Surinamese who have opted for Dutch nationality since Suriname's independence in 1975. It currently limits the number of refugees it will accept for permanent resettlement each year to 750. It admitted 475 refugees in 1978 from Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Latin America and Southeast Asia.

In 1979, responding to two appeals from the UNHCR, The Netherlands agreed to accept 1,300 Vietnamese from refugee camps, 1,000 of this number from Malaysian camps. There has been no limit placed on numbers to be accepted from Dutch flag vessels. The total of Vietnamese refugees admitted to The Netherlands for 1979 is approximately 1,800.

The Netherlands contributed nearly \$8.5 million to the UNHCR in 1978, pledged \$5,684,211 for UNHCR General and Special Programs for 1980, \$131,579 for Zimbabwe repatriation, and \$1,052,632 for Afghan refugees. It also contributed over \$2.5 million to private organizations for relief assistance to Indochinese boat people as well as refugees from the Western Sahara, the Ogaden, Uganda, and Shaba Province in Zaire.

It is the policy of The Netherlands that refugees picked up at sea by Dutch-registered vessels be taken to the closest port of call where guarantees are given that, if the refugees cannot be accepted locally within a three-week period, they will be transferred to The Netherlands for resettlement.

PORTUGAL

Portugal's principal role in refugee assistance since 1975 has been its absorption of between 500,000 and 700,000 residents of its former African colonies, principally Angola. Government programs to ease the plight of these refugees, primarily Portuguese citizens, have largely succeeded, although unemployment among them, at 20 percent, still runs almost 50 percent above average unemployment in Portugal. American grant assistance for refugee programs in Portugal, amounting to \$36 million, has been completely disbursed, and the returnees are no longer living in government camps. A repatriation program, under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Committee on European Migration (ICEM) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, allowed several thousand refugees to return to Angola during late 1978 and early 1979. There has been no substantial movement during the intervening period, although the program has not been discontinued.

An emerging problem is the question of emigration of East Timorese to Portugal. East Timor, a former dependency of

Portugal, was annexed by Indonesia in 1975. Significant numbers of East Timorese now desire to emigrate from Indonesian-governed East Timor. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is working with the Indonesian and Portuguese Governments to reunify Timorese families. Portuguese Foreign Minister Freitas do Amaral publicly acknowledged, May 9, that the humanitarian problems of East Timor cannot be solved without contacting Indonesian authorities. However, Portugal and Indonesia do not have diplomatic relations, and Portuguese willingness to enter into discussions about the refugee question is tempered by a desire not to appear to recognize Indonesian sovereignty in East Timor. Further steps are likely to be deferred until after the Portuguese national elections in October and December of 1980.

Portugal has assisted refugee efforts in Southeast Asia by allowing Macao, a Portuguese territory near Hong Kong, to be used as a transit camp for up to 5,000 refugees at any one time. The Portuguese Government has expressed concern about recent over crowding at the transit camp in Macao, and is hopeful that the countries of destination will be able to increase the rate at which refugees are admitted. The U.S. Government has responded positively to the Portuguese concern.

Portugal contributed \$7,500 to the UNHCR General and Special Programs as of January 1980.

SOVIET UNION

The Soviet Union permitted the emigration of 38,000 Soviet Jews in 1978 and about 51,000 in 1979. Reports reaching the West indicate that Soviet authorities continue receiving large numbers of requests for exit permission. It is estimated as many as 200,000 invitations to emigrate from relatives abroad, which Soviet emigration authorities require for application to emigrate, are still held by potential emigrants. The climate for emigration is more difficult this year. Reports indicate official harassment of would-be emigrants may have increased. The changed character of bilateral relations has led to a sharp decline in the number of emigrants as compared with last year's record high level. It is too early to predict the consequences of Soviet preparations for the Olympics and the Madrid CSCE Review on the 1980 level of emigration. But that level, while still high, may be considerably short of last year's record high mark.

The Dutch play an important role in the emigration of Soviet Jews. The Netherlands Embassy in Moscow represents Israeli Government interests in the Soviet Union and processes the applications for Israeli travel papers of Soviet Jews who have received Moscow's permission to emigrate. Most of these emigres travel directly to Vienna (see Austria section) for further processing and the

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completion of travel arrangements to their countries of resettlement. Approximately 30,000 out of the over 51,000 Soviet Jews who left the Soviet Union in 1979 chose the United States. While most of the remainder went to Israel, a few chose various West European countries.

The United States, through the Immigration and Naturalization Service and U.S. financial support of the voluntary agencies, plays a major role in the care, maintenance, travel and processing of Soviet refugees going to the United States. After their departure from the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government revokes their citizenship and, as stateless persons, they then qualify for refugee status under U.S. laws. Because they depart the Soviet Union bearing official Soviet exit permits, the refugees are not under UNHCR mandate. As a consequence, the UNHCR is not financially or administratively involved in their movement.

SPAIN

Spain traditionally has been a haven for Latin American political refugees and immigrants. An estimated 100,000 or more are believed to be permanently resettled in the country now, of whom some 24,000 were political refugees. Since 1960, Madrid also has been the main European point of egress for Cuban refugees, 80 to 90 percent of whom have proceeded on to the United States. The rate of Cuban refugee arrivals has risen markedly since July 1978: from July to December 1978 there were 844 arrivals, compared with 396 for the same period in 1977. In 1979, some 4,000 Cuban refugees arrived in Madrid. As of 1980, some 1,700 remain to be processed for resettlement in the United States. In addition, some 500 refugees who sought asylum in the Peruvian Embassy compound in Havana in 1980 have been settled in Spain.

In addition, Spain has received an estimated 5,000 refugees from Equatorial Guinea. Because of cultural and racial differences, they remain a largely unassimilated and indigent group. With the overthrow of the Macias regime in Equatorial Guinea in 1979, there is an increased likelihood that some of these refugees will return to their homeland. The first known group of 12 Indochinese refugees arrived in February 1979. The Spanish Government agreed to accept 1,000 Indochinese refugees for settlement in Spain beginning in late 1979.

The UNHCR, ICEM, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), the Spanish Red Cross, and the Spanish affiliate of the U.S. National Catholic Welfare Council maintain active refugee programs in Spain. In addition to its own programs, the UNHCR provides substantial grant assistance to these other organizations.

As of August 1980, Spain had pledged \$30,000 for UNHCR General and Special Programs.

SWITZERLAND

Switzerland is a small country with a relatively dense population. Despite this, it has a long tradition of providing haven for refugees from many parts of the world. The current refugee population is approximately 35,000. During the years leading up to the 1975 communist victories in Vietnam and Cambodia, Switzerland had already granted asylum to some 750 Indochinese. In 1979, Switzerland admitted some 3,000 Indochinese and will do so again in 1980. It recently announced it would admit an additional 300 refugees because of the undiminished flow of refugees from Southeast Asia.

Acceptance of hard-to-place refugees is a basic and financially burdensome element in Swiss refugee policy. In 1978, Switzerland accepted 140 physically, mentally and socially handicapped refugees. Since 1963, Switzerland has accepted some 800 Tibetans for permanent resettlement.

In 1979, in addition to \$13 million in aid to Indochinese refugees, Switzerland allocated \$1.8 million for humanitarian aid to the people of Kampuchea and \$2 million in assistance to Nicaragua. In 1980, Switzerland will provide \$1,320,000 to the UNHCR General and Special Programs and \$132,500 for Afghan refugees.

Under Swiss law, the government requires Swiss flag ships to rescue passengers in vessels in distress on the high seas. The Swiss Government has reminded Swiss steamship companies of their responsibilities in this regard. Switzerland has agreed to take 200 refugees rescued at sea.

TURKEY

Turkey has a major refugee program for ethnic Turks who wish to resettle in Turkey from neighboring countries. Turkey also offers temporary transit to persons seeking permanent settlement elsewhere. The flow of such persons into and through Turkey will probably continue.

Turkey is a developing country and its refugee program is a heavy economic burden. Turkey is also both ethnically homogeneous and ethnocentric. Given these considerations, Turkey is not likely to accept refugees from other parts of the world.

UNITED KINGDOM

The British Government estimates that some 153,000 refugees now reside in the United Kingdom. These include, among others: 22,000 Hungarians who arrived in 1956; 2,000 Czechoslovaks (1968); 30,000 Asian Ugandans (1972-73); 3,000 Latin Americans (mostly Chileans since 1973); 10,000 Cypriot nationals (since 1974); 3,000 Lebanese (since 1976); and 1,400 Indochinese (since 1975).

The British have been very active on the question of Indochinese refugees, particularly because of their impact on Hong Kong, where there are about 50,000. Prime Minister Thatcher took the initiative of organizing a UN conference on this problem which was held in Geneva in July 1979. At that conference, the UK announced an increase in resettlement spaces of 10,000 each in the United Kingdom and Hong Kong, and an additional financial contribution to the UNHCR of five million pounds (then about \$10.8 million). To date only slightly more than one-half of this pledge has been used up -- almost entirely by Vietnamese boat people in asylum in Hong Kong. The UK contributed \$17.2 million to the UNHCR in 1979.

The Government of Hong Kong has maintained its policy of granting first asylum to boat refugees. The British Government accepts ultimate responsibility for all refugees who are rescued on the high seas by British flag vessels.

Britain's long-standing receptiveness to political refugees and displaced persons remains strong. British authorities and the British public, however, generally consider that Britain has an obligation to give first priority to present and future refugees from traditional Commonwealth areas. The UK has been deeply involved in the return of refugees to Zimbabwe as part of the Lancaster House settlement and has pledged \$15 million to the UNHCR for refugee settlement.

The UK has participated in the San Jose conference on Cuban refugees and is prepared to consider favorably the resettlement of those Cubans who have some tangible relationship with Great Britain.

Like other members of the European Community, the UK also contributes to international refugee programs through the Community's financial support of them.

SECTION II

EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFICREGIONAL OVERVIEW

Over a million persons have fled Indochina since the fall of the Governments of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam in 1975. Although over 230,000 refugees remain in countries of first asylum awaiting offers of resettlement, some 388,000 Indochinese have been admitted to the United States, over 230,000 have resettled in other non-communist countries, and more than 265,000 Vietnamese, mainly of Chinese ethnic origin have found asylum in China. In addition, hundreds of thousands of Khmer have had temporary refuge in Vietnam and Thailand for various periods of time in the last five years.

The spring of 1979 saw a dramatic upsurge in the flow of refugees from the persecution, dislocation and starvation which threatened them in Indochina. Refugee numbers were increased dramatically by warfare in Kampuchea and by ethnic Chinese as well as Vietnamese fleeing by boat from both northern and southern Vietnam as a result of a concerted government policy under which they were offered the choice of going to the alien, harsh and restrictive New Economic Zones or of paying the regime for an arranged escape.

The flow of refugees reached monthly highs of almost 60,000 in May and again in June 1979. The refugee exodus was seen as a major threat to regional stability and posed increasingly difficult problems for host governments in the area. Moreover, tens of thousands of refugees died while fleeing by land and by sea.

The majority of those who left during this period did so because of membership in unwanted social or ethnic groups or to escape human rights violations stemming from the general restructuring of society by the Hanoi regime. The reasons for the exodus from Vietnam-dominated Laos were similar, and included the repression of minorities such as the Hmong hill tribes.

Recognizing that this international tragedy superseded any one country's involvement, the United States, the ASEAN governments (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), and an increasing number of other countries around the world, under the aegis of the UNHCR, have made a major effort to support the Indochinese refugee program. Following a UNHCR-sponsored conference in December 1978, the ASEAN governments met with other interested governments and the UNHCR to go over the ways and means to deal with the situation. After the dramatic outpouring of boat refugees from Vietnam into Malaysia and

Indonesia, the UN Secretary General, following a British initiative, convened another conference at Geneva on July 20-21, 1979. This meeting resulted in pledges of about 290,000 resettlement offers over the next 18 months and included Vice President Mondale's reiteration of President Carter's pledge to double the U.S. admission rate from 7,000 to 14,000 per month through Fiscal Year 1980.

Financial pledges at the conference amounted to some \$160 million, almost doubling the UNHCR's financial resources. The United States and other countries made major increases in contributions. Japan, not a major resettlement country but vitally interested in the peace and security of East Asia, indicated it would provide funds for 50 percent of the UNHCR budget for Indochinese refugees. The European Economic Community contributed about \$31 million for the UNHCR General Program and \$253,000 for refugee processing centers and other related funds.^{1/} Governments and entities in Europe and throughout the world have contributed or made pledges to contribute to the UNHCR's program. Not to be overlooked in this great endeavor, of course, are the commitments of resources and effort by governments in first asylum countries and resettlement countries in dealing directly with the refugees, as well as the tremendous contributions of private citizens and their organizations throughout the world.

A further initiative was taken by the Philippine Government, which offered its country as a site for a Refugee Processing Center (RPC) for refugees. The Indonesian Government had previously offered a site for another RPC. The Centers, under the general management of the UNHCR and the host governments, relieve strain on first asylum countries by holding refugees already approved for resettlement elsewhere but whose turn for departure has not yet come.

The Philippines RPC, officially dedicated in January 1980, holds 10,000 refugees, and further construction is underway to bring its capacity to 17,000 persons. The Indonesian RPC has also been opened. Additionally, the Centers will play an important role in easing domestic resettlement strains in the United States. As part of the UNHCR's mandate to provide educational opportunities, intensive English language instruction for refugees is being initiated in those Centers as well as at several locations in first asylum countries.

In convening the conference, the UNHCR emphasized that its purpose was humanitarian and that the policies of the situation should be eschewed. Vietnam, while denying responsibility for the refugee exodus, informed the UN Secretary General that it would undertake to attempt to stop what it termed "illegal" departures for a time. At the same time, Vietnam called for prompt implementation of a system of orderly departures from Vietnam directly to countries of permanent resettlement along lines it had been negotiating with the UNHCR. The United States

^{1/} Wide disparities in fiscal calendars make comparisons difficult.

and other countries are interested in establishing such a system, and discussions with the Vietnamese over the arrangements under which this program could be carried out are progressing slowly. Whether Vietnam will resume its practice of forcing out large numbers if direct resettlement does not take place, remains to be seen.

In mid-September 1979, Vietnamese forces launched a new offensive in Kampuchea. This offensive generated additional refugee pressures on Thailand, with hundreds of thousands of Kampucheans dependent on international relief, seeking safety on the Thai border to escape widespread famine and renewed conflict, and some 150,000 Khmer refugees in Thai holding centers. Disease and malnutrition took a heavy toll; and while international relief operations were successful in averting an even more tragic situation on the border and internally in Kampuchea, the threat of famine still exists. In June of this year, the UNHCR initiated a small voluntary repatriation program for the Khmer in holding camps. 9,600 Khmer returned to Kampuchea before a Vietnamese attack on perceived anti-Heng Samrin elements in the border areas ended the program for the time being.

As a result of the initiatives taken at the Geneva meeting on Indochinese refugees in July 1979, and the international community's successful famine relief efforts in Kampuchea, the life-threatening aspects of the situation in Southeast Asia have been relieved. The need to maintain a high level of resettlement opportunities and of food relief in Kampuchea, however, is virtually as great as it was a year ago. Beginning in March, when better weather conditions began to prevail in the South China Sea, boat arrivals in first asylum countries increased to 10,000 a month. Land arrivals are also now running at 10,000 a month, so that for both types of refugees, monthly arrivals from March through July averaged over 16,000, twice the figure during the previous seven months. From August 1979 through February, resettlement countries maintained a high rate of offtake with the United States taking close to 14,000 refugees monthly; and the total of other countries averaged almost 11,000 refugees monthly. In March other countries' offtake dipped and did not recover so that the monthly average through June was 7,550. Additionally, UNHCR began to seek resettlement opportunities for Khmer in the holding camps to reunify families and to resettle those who had other close associations with the United States and other resettlement countries. Tens of thousands of these 160,000 Khmer will probably have such associations. Therefore, although the immediate refugee situation in Southeast Asia, with the notable exception of Kampuchea, seems to be more stable than it was at the time of the Geneva meeting on Indochinese refugees, the situation remains volatile and virtually in the state of crisis which existed one year ago.

COUNTRY PROFILES

The following profiles provide information about the refugee situation in East Asia and the Pacific.

AUSTRALIA

Australia has permanently resettled over 38,000 Indochinese refugees since the spring of 1975 and is prepared to take an additional 14,000 Indochinese through September 1981. During 1979, Australia continued a long-standing tradition of providing a haven for other groups by receiving, among others, Soviet Jews, East Europeans, Lebanese and Timorese. Subject to the political and economic pressures in a democratic society, Australia can be expected to continue its current active support of international refugee relief programs. Australia's contribution to the UNHCR General Program for 1980 is \$4,200,000, for Kampuchean refugees in Thailand \$550,781, and for the Refugee Processing Center on Galang \$277,226.

BURMA

The UNHCR supported repatriation program from Bangladesh to Burma was completed successfully by the end of 1979. The last of the 200,000 persons who had crossed the Burmese border to Bangladesh in 1978 returned to their homes in remote frontier areas in Arakan in December.

CHINA

There are an estimated 265,000 Indochinese refugees resettled in China, 263,000 of these having fled Vietnam while the remainder came from first asylum countries in response to a Chinese offer to accept 10,000 refugees from Southeast Asia. The latter group of refugees consists mostly of lowland refugees now in Thailand as well as some ethnic Chinese in transition facilities in Malaysia and Hong Kong. The previous flow of Vietnamese refugees from China into Hong Kong has subsided due to stricter control measures by Chinese authorities; some refugees in Hong Kong, originally resettled in China, entered Hong Kong illegally and are being returned under arrangements between Hong Kong and China.

In a change from previous practice, China has requested and is now receiving international assistance valued at \$25 million in its refugee program. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees opened an office in Beijing in December 1979 to

coordinate distribution of the UNHCR contribution of about \$16 million. It is reported that China has spent some \$450 million of its refugee program. China, at the same time, contributed \$900,000 to the UNHCR for Indochinese refugees following the Geneva pledging conference in July 1979.

HONG KONG

Hong Kong has pursued a liberal and humanitarian refugee policy of granting first asylum to refugees from Indochina, who now number about 38,000. Its limited land space and high population density, however, preclude it from accepting large numbers of refugees from any country for permanent resettlement although it did accept 9,368 Indochinese. The remaining Indochinese refugees are resettled in the United States, the United Kingdom, and in other countries.

INDONESIA

Indonesia has provided first asylum for Vietnamese refugees fleeing their country by boat since the beginning of the refugee flow in 1975. However, the number of refugees seeking asylum in Indonesia was relatively small prior to late 1978 when restrictive first asylum policies were introduced by Malaysia and Thailand, causing more boat refugees to come to the Indonesian islands located east of Singapore. As a consequence, Indonesia granted temporary first asylum to some 53,000 boat refugees, 4,500 of whom arrived prior to January 1, 1979, with most of the rest arriving in the first eight months of 1979. Ethnic Chinese constituted a large portion of refugee boat arrivals. Since the Geneva refugee conference in August 1979, the number of refugees arriving in Indonesia has been quite small and the rate of third country resettlement has greatly exceeded the number of new arrivals. The present refugee population awaiting resettlement is 11,300.

Because of population pressures within Indonesia, serious unemployment in the major cities, and the political sensitivity of the Chinese minority issue, Indonesia does not allow permanent resettlement of Indochinese refugees within the country.

In 1979, Indonesia offered Galang Island, 40 miles south of Singapore, to the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) for the establishment of a Refugee Processing Center. The Center built for a population of 10,000 refugees, will be available in August to provide temporary asylum to refugees throughout Southeast Asia who already are guaranteed eventual resettlement in third countries. Galang is also the site of the primary camp for refugees coming directly to Indonesia, replacing camps in the Anambas Islands which were extremely isolated and difficult to maintain.

JAPAN

While the homogeneous nature of Japanese society has made assimilation of foreign refugees domestically difficult, the Japanese Government has doubled its target of admitting 500 Indochinese for resettlement to 1,000. 520 refugees have accepted resettlement in Japan. The Japanese Government offers first asylum to refugees arriving on ships and has advised shipowners to make positive efforts to rescue refugees in distress at sea. As of the end of June, the refugee population in Japan was 1,400.

Japan is a major financial contributor to the UNHCR for the Indochinese program. Its direct financial support exceeded all other countries except that of the United States, and at the Geneva meeting of July 1979 pledged to underwrite 50 percent of that year's UNHCR Indochinese refugee program budget, a figure which amounted to \$90 million. For 1980, Japan has announced it will contribute \$60 million to the UNHCR as well as \$20 million for the purchase of rice for Kampuchea and \$20 million for international relief organizations and Thai Government relief efforts.

KAMPUCHEA

Since Vietnam's December 1978 invasion and occupation of Kampuchea, already prostrated after more than a decade of civil war and brutal communist rule under Pol Pot, the international community has been actively involved in the welfare and ultimate survival of the Khmer people.

The invasion in 1979 was launched at the time of the primary annual harvest. Both the Vietnamese and the defending Democratic Kampuchea (DK) forces used crop destruction and crop denial tactics, resulting in the loss of most of the nation's rice supply. Continued fighting and Pol Pot's retreat to outlying regions led to massive shifts. Those who remained under DK control joined soldiers in remote areas, while many of those under the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) and Vietnamese control grouped in squatter settlements around Vietnamese troop concentrations and along major communication routes, or fled to and across the Thai border. This movement away from agricultural lands disrupted planting in May and June 1979. Only about ten percent of the arable land was planted in August for the annual harvest. Disease and malnutrition have taken a heavy toll. International observers in the fall of 1979 reported extreme malnutrition, rampant malaria, and hundred of deaths. Scores of thousands of Khmer civilians foraged for food across much of the country. Refugee pressure by October mounted with an initial 20,000 persons pressing against the Thai border.

The United States, having forecast the food shortages in March 1979, urged international organizations to begin contingency planning against the expected famine in Kampuchea. In July 1979, Secretary Vance called for an international humanitarian relief program to aid the Khmer people. The United States stressed that assistance should be made available to all needy Khmer regardless of which faction had political jurisdiction over them. Potential donor countries agreed that distribution of relief supplies should be made under effective international supervision, monitoring, and control to ensure against diversion of relief goods to military use and that it should be afforded to all Khmer in need regardless of the political control under which they existed.

In mid-September, Vietnamese forces intensified their military pressure against Khmer resistance elements. The fighting involved broad sweeps and ambushes in the central region of Kampuchea, and probing actions in the southwest mountainous areas. These operations, especially in the west, had as an objective the destruction of the remaining Pol Pot forces, estimated to number 30,000.

These combat operations continue to the present. Search for food and continued insecurity forced Khmer into Thailand where 160,000 remain in holding centers under the care of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Some 140,000 additional Khmer have congregated along the length of the Thai-Khmer border to await developments and to receive food. Beginning in October 1979, an intensive international feed and medical relief program for them was undertaken by the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Program (WFP), the UNHCR, and many private voluntary agencies. At one point, over 750 international volunteers were developed along and near the border. Up to 15,000 tons of food per month are provided not only to refugees along the border, but to Khmer who come from the interior to receive supplies and carry them back to villages. While most are from Battambang province, some come from as far east as Kampong Cham. Perhaps 450,000 people in the interior of Kampuchea have been fed by what has become known as the oxcart and bicycle brigade.

Since the opening of the joint ICRC/UNICEF mission in Phnom Penh on October 13, stocks of food and medical supplies have been rapidly built up in warehouses at Kampong Som and Phnom Penh. Their distribution is another matter. When it has occurred, it has gone in much greater quantities to government cadre and workers than to peasants. Additionally, the area in and around Phnom Penh has benefited more often than outlying regions.

As of March 1980, unless there are massive infusions of external food aid, famine again threatens to afflict Kampuchea. In addition to subsistence rice, there is a great need for seed rice to implement an agricultural rehabilitation program to

permit the country to expand food supplies and return to self-sustenance.

In June, the UNHCR initiated a voluntary repatriation program from the holding centers which ended when Vietnamese forces attacked suspected DK elements in border areas. Some 9,600 refugees, however, returned to Kampuchea.

From October 1979 through February 1980, the U.S. Government spent or obligated just under \$74 million for Khmer relief.

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

A racially homogeneous society, South Korea does not offer permanent resettlement to refugees from other countries. However, pending onward resettlement, it does offer asylum at the Korea National Red Cross Refugee Camp in Pusan to Indochinese boat refugees who land at its ports on vessels that have rescued them at sea. 118 refugees are in that camp. The government contributed \$45 million to the UNHCR in 1979-80 for Indochinese refugee assistance.

LAOS

The Communist government of Laos, in cooperation with Vietnamese forces, launched a military campaign in 1975 intended to control dissident elements, principally the Hmong tribes. During the period 1975-78 some Hmong were resettled in lowland areas of Laos, often by force. Thousands of others fled to Thailand, unable to return without facing repression and death.

Additionally, the new government has set about the transformation of Laos into a "socialist" state. Attempts to enforce rigorous political control measures and deteriorating economic conditions have impelled a massive outflow of lowland Lao. The number of Lao citizens who have sought refugee status abroad since 1975 probably amounts to seven to eight percent of the total population of 3.3 million people, most having gone to northeast Thailand.

The flow of land refugees to Thailand which averaged about 4,100 refugees monthly from August through February has risen to over 8,000 from March through July. The refugees consist primarily of Hmong tribespeople and ethnic Lao as well as Sino-Lao and ethnic Vietnamese from urban areas who were identified with the merchant class or had associations with the former regime. Fear of war with China, reprisals and hopelessness about the future were the primary reasons for flight.

Approximately 120,000 refugees from Laos are currently living in UNHCR-financed refugee camps in Thailand. The UNHCR has also assisted the Lao Government in resettling Lao citizens who became refugees or displaced persons within Laos during the war years. Tens of thousands of Lao have been relocated since 1975. The number of displaced persons relocated has steadily dropped from levels of previous years and is reflected in a phasing down of the program. In 1978, the UNHCR also helped to fund the resettlement of approximately 2,000 Lao who reportedly returned to Laos after initially seeking refugee status in Thailand.

MACAU

Portuguese authorities in Macau have extended temporary asylum to increasing numbers of Indochinese boat refugees over the past years, and the present population is 4,500. Lack of adequate space for refugees, however, occasionally impels Macau authorities to deny refugees' efforts to land with the result that they sail to Hong Kong.

MALAYSIA

During 1979, Malaysia bore the brunt of boat refugee arrivals in Southeast Asia, providing temporary asylum to 123,000 refugees. Although Malaysia considered the boat refugees to be illegal immigrants and confined them to camps, its refugee policy was essentially humane. The unprecedentedly heavy exodus of boat refugees from Vietnam in 1979, however, critically strained that policy and many refugee boats were prevented from landing and were sent back to sea. Since September, however, boats have been landing without harassment.

Resettlement of boat refugees is not a possibility in Malaysia owing to the sensitive relationships between Malays, Chinese, and Indians in Malaysia's multi-racial society. The large numbers of Vietnamese refugees who are ethnically Chinese would have the potential of upsetting this delicate balance but additionally, the Vietnamese themselves would not be welcome. However, Malaysia has accepted several thousand Moslem Kmer for resettlement.

As of July, the Indochinese refugee population in Malaysia was 20,000. The United States, Australia, Canada and other countries have since mid-1979 been resettling more refugees from Malaysia than new refugees reached that country. Unless there is a dramatic upsurge in numbers of boat refugees, the population in the camps of Malaysia should be relatively small by year's end.

There are other refugees in Malaysia, as well. Over 100,000 Filipino Moslem refugees are located in Sabah. They make up about ten percent of that State's population, and the State provides them with support.

The overall refugee effort in Malaysia is financed by the UNHCR. The Malaysian Red Crescent Society supervises the camps and has made large and effective expenditures of money and manpower from its own resources. Many other international voluntary organizations and other refugee-oriented organizations are involved in the processing of refugees.

NEW ZEALAND

New Zealand has permanently resettled 2,654 Indochinese refugees and plans to admit more. It is among the first five nations in per capita resettlement of Indochinese refugees: one refugee per 900 New Zealand citizens. New Zealand also maintains a revolving annual quota of 30 Chilean families, 40 Soviet Jewish families, and 35 Eastern European families.

New Zealand contributed \$209,180 to the UNHCR in 1979. On February 4, 1980, the New Zealand Cabinet decided to contribute NZ\$250,000 to programs for refugees from Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. There are several New Zealand Red Cross medical teams presently assisting Kampuchean refugees along the Thai border.

PHILIPPINES

The Philippines has provided first asylum to over 14,000 boat refugees since 1975. Over 10,000 have departed to the United States and third countries. Present camp population is 3,300.

In early 1979, the ASEAN countries, recognizing the seriousness of the refugee problem to the region, proposed the establishment of holding centers financed by the UNHCR for refugees guaranteed permanent resettlement elsewhere. The use of these centers would relieve the political, economic and social strains imposed on the countries of first asylum by the sudden influx of thousands of refugees. At the Geneva meeting in July, the Philippines offered a new site for a center under UNHCR auspices. This center, the Refugee Processing Center on Bataan, opened January 21, 1980. Some 10,000 refugees have been moved in, and space for 7,000 more is under construction.

Under the management of the UNHCR, intensive English language courses and orientation programs are being planned for U.S.-bound refugees.

SINGAPORE

Singapore does not accept refugees for resettlement because of its high population density. Singapore is the principal port of call in Southeast Asia for merchant ships in transit between East Asia and the Mid-East and Europe. Refugees rescued at sea may be disembarked in Singapore on condition that a guarantee of ultimate settlement within 90 days is provided. The UNHCR obtains this guarantee from either the flag country or country of ownership of the ship concerned. In instances where the country is unwilling or unable to provide such a guarantee, the UNHCR has recourse to its Sea Rescue Resettlement Reserve of resettlement places to which Austria, Belgium, France, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United States have contributed. Some 3,900 of these refugees are currently in refugee camps in Singapore.

THAILAND

Thailand has borne a heavy burden as the principal asylum for land refugees from Laos, Kampuchea, and Vietnam. At present, about 20 UNHCR-financed-and-administered camps hold approximately 135,000 land refugees from Laos and Kampuchea, and boat refugees from Vietnam. The land refugees from Laos include Hmong who have fled systematic military campaigns by the Lao Government and Vietnamese armed forces. Over 150,000 Kampuchean refugees entered Thailand in the wake of the early 1979 Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea. Over 30,000 of these new arrivals were forced by the Thai Government to return to Kampuchea in June 1979, but then in October, hundreds of thousands more fled famine and more warfare in Kampuchea and entered Thailand.

In addition to these recent refugees, there are also about 40,000 Vietnamese who entered Thailand before 1954. Despite official Thai efforts with Vietnamese governments over the years to return this unwanted minority, Vietnam has allowed only a few thousand to be repatriated. There are also some refugees from Burma in the Thai-Burma border area.

In view of the communist insurgency in Thailand, fear of an invasion across the Kampuchean border, and differences with Laos along the Mekong River, refugees have been handled as illegal immigrants by the police upon their arrival in Thailand. Border authorities frequently have tried to dissuade refugees from entering the country and on several occasions they have been forcibly repatriated on the grounds that they were economic refugees or illegal entrants. Central government policy with regard to refugees from Laos, however, is against forced repatriation. The overall record of the Thai Government has been humanitarian, despite the burden the refugees have imposed by the

current and prospective Khmer influx which subject this policy to unprecedented strains.

The Thai do not wish to consider permanent resettlement for refugees until the influx stops or the number in the country is substantially reduced. Like the Malaysians, the Thai are increasingly concerned about the net increase in camp population. Unlike boat refugees whose stay in camps is often a matter of months, great numbers of land refugees in Thai camps have been there for as long as four years. The Thais fear that international preoccupation with the plight of the boat people will undercut efforts to increase the rate of resettlement of land refugees to other countries. The Thais are aware that famine and renewed fighting in Kampuchea will create more refugees across the border. This could have an added serious impact on the refugee situation in Thailand.

Pirate attacks on Vietnamese refugee boats in the Gulf of Thailand have become an increasing source of concern. According to UNHCR statistics, from March through June, 150 of 166 boats which landed at Songkhla were attacked. 237 cases of rape, 21 cases of presumed murder, and eight kidnappings were registered.

The refugee population in Thailand for whom resettlement in third countries is being sought as of July 1980 is 140,000. In addition, 150,000 Khmer are in UNHCR-supported holding camps of whom tens of thousands may require resettlement. An UNHCR initiative in June to seek voluntary repatriation resulted in 9,600 returnees before the Vietnamese border incursion ended the program.

VIETNAM

Vietnam has been the major source of Indochinese refugees. A sharp increase in the number of refugees leaving Vietnam resulted from policies designed to impose the doctrinaire political, social and economic pattern of the North on the southern part of that country, particularly since the spring of 1978. These included regulations abolishing private business, measures designed to reduce urban population, and inscription of military age southern Vietnamese.

The business and professional middle class, which includes most of the Chinese community, as well as others considered surplus to the cities, were left with no options other than transfer to the remote and bleak New Economic Zones. Seeing no hope for survival in the new society, they seized what seemed to be a last chance to use their remaining assets to escape. The largest group of refugees came from the ethnic Chinese minority. As Vietnamese-Chinese tensions increased in 1978-79 and border warfare flared up, the Vietnamese promoted the departure of this minority, requiring them to pay substantial

sums of money in the process. They fled at the risk of their lives by land to China or by sea with only the hope that they might find new homes.

In 1978 and 1979, among the tens of thousands of refugees who left North and South Vietnam were ethnic Vietnamese who either bribed officials to obtain Chinese identity or escaped in defiance of policy sanctions against unauthorized escapes. As regional and international resentment grew over what was seen as Vietnamese expulsion of an unwanted population, with profit to the government greater than any other foreign exchange source, Hanoi, before the Geneva meeting in July 1979, began to curb departures it had previously assisted. The refugee boat outflow reached 46,000 in May 1979 and was down to approximately 2,400 in January 1980, but rose by June to over 10,000. Vietnam's moratorium on expulsions is still in effect, but there is widespread apprehension that it could be lifted with another dramatic surge in boat refugees. Indeed, despite the moratorium, there continues to be a steady flow of clandestine departures by boat. Additionally, several hundred Vietnamese have fled to Thailand through Kampuchea in recent months.

A number of countries, including the United States, have programs to accept persons directly from Vietnam. In May 1979, the UNHCR signed an agreement with the SRV, following a January announcement, to permit legal emigration. Implementing this understanding has been slow. Orderly departures will present a meaningful alternative to clandestine or assisted boat departures.

During the Pol Pot rule in Kampuchea, about 150,000 Khmer sought refuge in Vietnam. Most of these have returned to Kampuchea but some 30,000 remain in Vietnam. The UNHCR also provides financial support for the resettlement and rehabilitation of Khmer refugees in Vietnam.

TAIWAN

Taiwan has accepted about 11,000 Indochinese, the majority of whom are ethnic Chinese from Vietnam. A group of about 2,400 students from Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos were resettled in 1975 when they chose not to return to their home countries. Boat refugees picked up by Taiwanese vessels and taken to Taiwan number 1,450. The boat refugees have in effect been granted first asylum in Taiwan. We are aware of only 56 who have been resettled in Taiwan since March 1979. At the same time, Taiwan has declared its willingness to accept ethnic Chinese boat refugees picked up by its flag vessels. A recent offer by Taiwan to accept another 2,000 refugees involves ethnic Chinese from Vietnam for Bangkok, from where they are then transported by air to Taiwan. 316 first asylum refugees are in Taiwan awaiting resettlement.

During 1979, Taiwan donated 10,000 tons of rice for humanitarian relief in Southeast Asia, and in 1980, 30,000 tons were allocated.

SECTION III

AFRICAREGIONAL OVERVIEW

At mid-1980 African refugees numbered about three million. An equal number of Africans have been displaced within their own countries by war, civil strife and drought. There is little likelihood that the seemingly intractable mix of racial, ethnic, religious, political and economic factors which account for these migrations of African refugees and displaced people is susceptible to enduring solutions in the foreseeable future. While any particular refugee-producing situation may be resolved or ameliorated, another new situation will likely occur, with the result that the number of African refugees will remain at its current high level. The refugee population of Africa continued to grow in the last half of 1979, principally because of the flows of refugees from Ethiopia to Sudan, Djibouti and Somalia and from Chad to neighboring countries. The biggest return flow of refugees through 1979 consisted of Zairians from Angola and in 1980 of Zimbabweans from Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique. These repatriation efforts have been assisted through appeals by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

New flows will depend on the evolution of political developments on the continent, particularly in the Horn and in southern Africa. The human suffering, the economic dislocation, and the political destabilization that refugee situations bring in their wake will continue for a long time to come.

African countries take the problem seriously. Most nations of the continent were represented at a conference on refugees in Arusha, Tanzania in May 1979. They reaffirmed the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention on Refugees, which was concluded in 1969, and called for its ratification by all African states. They also called attention to the need scrupulously to observe universally recognized principles of human rights as they pertain to refugees. Tanzania's President Nyerere set the tone for the conference when he reminded his audience of the African tradition of hospitality and stated in his opening address that "the refugees of Africa are primarily an African problem, and an African responsibility." Although agreeing that they bear the primary responsibility for their refugees, most African nations have meager resources and great needs. They, therefore, feel that they should have a fair share of the resources allocated to the major international relief agencies.

The principal thrust of U.S. policy, therefore, is to assist African countries of asylum in the care and maintenance of refugees until such time as they can return to their countries of origin or they have been permanently resettled in their countries of asylum. The magnitude of the numbers of African refugees, the poverty of the African countries of asylum and the demonstrably successful options of eventual repatriation or of permanent resettlement argue strong United States support for multilateral assistance in the care and maintenance and, in some instances, the resettlement and rehabilitation of African refugees in African countries of asylum.

In Fiscal Year 1980 the U.S. Government will have contributed \$50.7 million to regular programs and special appeals of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, \$5 million to the International Committee of the Red Cross and \$10.7 million for a variety of bilateral programs directly to African governments or through American private voluntary organizations. In addition to this \$66.4 million of non-food assistance, Food for Peace will have contributed during Fiscal Year 1980 commodities valued at \$59.8 million, including ocean transport costs, for African refugee relief. The Fiscal Year 1980 contributions represent almost a doubling of the Fiscal Year 1979 contributions of \$44 million in non-food assistance and \$20 million in food assistance.

There has not been a desire expressed by African refugees nor a need assessed by the international community for a massive effort to resettle Africans beyond the shores of Africa. There has been, however, a steadily increasing number of applications for admission to the United States, especially by Ethiopians. Under the provisions of the new Refugee Act, an admission level of 1,500 has been designated for African refugees in Fiscal Year 1980.

COUNTRY PROFILES

The following profiles outline the refugee situation in the countries most heavily impacted by refugee populations at the present time and include, where appropriate, persons displaced within national boundaries by civil strife. South African refugees of various racial and ethnic groups live in many countries not specifically covered by the profiles. There are several hundred thousand former Guinean refugees in West Africa most of whom live in Senegal and the Ivory Coast. These people are largely assimilated in the local economies and not in need of substantial assistance. The same is true of the refugee populations in Rwanda and Burundi although in both those countries the UNHCR maintains residual assistance programs.

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ANGOLA

The UNHCR estimates that there are 54,900 refugees in Angola, of whom there are about 18,000 Zairians, 35,900 Namibians and 1,000 South Africans.

In the case of the Zairian refugees, some of them fear return to Zaire, despite President Mobutu's general amnesty, because of their involvement in the former Katangan army, their political activities, and/or crimes they may have personally committed. However, governments on both sides of the border continue their active efforts to encourage these Zairians to return home.

In the case of the Namibian refugees, it is not clear how many of those in Angola are South West African Peoples' Organization (SWAPO) guerrillas and how many are true refugees. If a Namibian settlement is achieved these refugees could return to Namibia. However, if the conflict drags on or intensifies, the number of Namibian refugees in Angola could well increase.

Both the ICRC and the UNHCR maintain representation in Luanda. The ICRC has budgeted \$3.3 million for refugee relief in Angola. UNHCR assistance in Angola amounted to \$5 million in 1979.

BOTSWANA

Botswana has long offered asylum to refugees and political exiles from neighboring countries. Over the years, refugees have come to Botswana from Angola, South Africa, Rhodesia, Lesotho, Namibia, and Malawi. They have been successfully resettled in northwestern Botswana and no longer require international assistance. Following the Soweto uprisings of 1976, some 700 to 1,000 South African political activists, primarily urban students, fled to Botswana. The placement of many of the South African students in local and overseas schools has reduced the number requiring full refugee support to a few hundred. Fighting in Rhodesia swelled Botswana's refugee population to over 24,000 by late 1979. With the coming to independence of Zimbabwe in early 1980, nearly all of the 23,000 Zimbabwean refugees in Botswana returned to Zimbabwe.

At present there are about 1,100 refugees in Botswana. They include an estimated 700 South Africans, 200 Angolans, 100 Basotho (from Lesotho), 80 Namibians, and a few Malawians.

Barring some new political upheaval in Botswana's neighboring countries, the number of refugees in Botswana is not expected to increase significantly over the next several months.

The UNHCR, the Lutheran World Federation, and several foreign countries are providing assistance to refugees in Botswana. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) closed its office in Botswana earlier this year following the return of the 23,000 Zimbabwean refugees. Some of the ICRC medical and other supplies, however, are still being used in refugee support. The UNHCR's assistance expenditures in Botswana are expected to total \$1.8 million in 1980, down from \$4.4 million in 1979.

U.S. assistance to refugees in Botswana has taken the form of grants to the UNHCR, the ICRC, and the World Food Program (PL 480). In 1978, the United States contributed \$6 million from AID's Section 533 funds to a special UNHCR fund for the construction of secondary schools and a 72 bed university hostel to expand the Botswana educational system so that it could absorb the young refugees. In addition two private U.S. programs which bring refugee students to the United States for university training are supported by AID's Section 533 funds.

CAMEROON

Cameroon has been a haven for both Equatorial Guinean and Chadian evacuees. It is estimated by the UNHCR that before the 1979 coup d'etat against President Macias, approximately 30,000 refugees from Equatorial Guinea were residing in Cameroon. Since the coup and subsequent invitation for all Equatorial Guinean exiles to return home, Equatorial Guinean citizens no longer enjoy refugee status in Cameroon. The UNHCR states that 20,000 of the exiles have in fact returned home. Those who do remain in Cameroon are being permitted to continue as permanent residents. There has been no U.S. refugee relief for former Equatorial Guinean refugees living in Cameroon except through our contribution to the UNHCR's general program in Africa.

The nearly two-decade long civil war in Chad erupted anew in March 1980 resulting in the exodus of numerous residents from N'djamena to neighboring Cameroon as well as Nigeria. The number of Chadian refugees in Cameroon is disputable. Estimates range from a low of 30,000 to the Government of Cameroon's one time high of 230,000. We believe that a reasonable number for those currently in Cameroon (most are in Kousseri, a small town across the Chari River from N'djamena) is about 60,000. A census sponsored by the UNHCR should provide a fairly accurate figure on the number of refugees in the Kousseri camp by September 1980. When the mass influx of Chadian refugees began in March, the Cameroon Government (GURC) immediately established relief efforts which included the assistance of foreign donor governments and organizations. The USG has been one of the most significant contributors to this effort, and one of the fastest to respond to the GURC call for help. Our direct immediate assistance amounted to \$2.9 million, consisting of over 6,000 mt of PL-480 grain,

with transport to Kousseri included, plus \$25,000 from the Ambassador's emergency fund. Other major donors have been UNICEF (tents, blankets, medicine), the European Development Fund (\$3,320,000), the GURC (\$750,000), and the French Embassy (\$240,000, medicine, field hospitals). When the UNHCR issued its Special Appeal for Cameroon in May, the United States Government responded with a \$1.7 million contribution. The U.S. Government has also made a \$700,000 grant to Catholic Relief Services in support of its maternal and child health program for the refugees.

The refugee situation in northern Cameroon has been characterized by one expert in the following manner: "Although the refugees in Kousseri undoubtedly will continue to require assistance for as long as they are not able to return home, their situation cannot be termed a crisis when compared to refugee emergencies elsewhere." The outlook for the remaining Chadian refugees in Cameroon is uncertain. Undoubtedly, most hope to return to their homeland, although the longer they remain in a friendly and hospitable nation, the more they may wish to become absorbed into the Cameroonian population. How long they feel they must remain here as refugees is not easy to predict, as right now there is no end in sight to the civil war in Chad which is the cause of the refugee problem.

DJIBOUTI

Based on a recent survey by the Government of Djibouti, the UNHCR estimates that there are 42,000 refugees in Djibouti, some 20,000 of whom are dispersed in Djibouti town. Most of these are ethnic Somalis from the Ogaden areas of Ethiopia who fled the fighting between Ethiopia and Somalia which began in 1977. Due to the continuing hostilities, it is estimated that an additional one to two thousand refugees will have entered Djibouti by the end of this year. The camp refugees obtain regular food assistance and health care. The urban refugees are not recipients of any formal food assistance and have little opportunity to earn a livelihood. When compared with Djibouti's own poor the bulk of this latter group are really the poorest of the poor.

The refugees constitute approximately ten percent of the population of the country and place a severe strain on Djibouti's embryonic infrastructure and static economy. Because there is little likelihood they will return soon to Ethiopia, the UNHCR is moving forward with plans to (1) develop agricultural projects for a very limited number of them (about 100) in the camps, (2) construct a transient vocational training center to upgrade the skills of some youths (400) who could eventually emigrate, (3) construct permanent housing in the camps, (4) provide schools for the camp refugees, and (5) assist wherever possible in the emigration of refugees. The total value of the above programs

will be \$3.5 million. To date the UNHCR, WFP, Red Cross and Caritas have donated an estimated \$2 million in supplemental food commodities. An additional \$1 million in WFP food commodities is expected to be donated over the ensuing two years.

To support the Catholic Relief Service (CRS) program distribution of Title II foods for refugees valued at \$1 million annually and CRS efforts to upgrade the local entity responsible for refugee feeding, an estimated \$1 million in U.S. Government funds will be made available over three years.

ETHIOPIA

Some 11,000 refugees, mostly from the southern Sudan, are believed to be located in the Gondar and Ilubabor regions of Ethiopia. In addition, it is estimated that more than two million Ethiopians are displaced, particularly in the southern administrative regions of Bale, Sidamo and Harerge.

In Fiscal Years 1979 and 1980, the U.S. Government provided approximately \$20 million to assist in the feeding or resettlement of displaced persons in southern Ethiopia. As a result of the Somali invasion of Ethiopia in 1977-78, and subsequent drought conditions, hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians have sought refuge across the border in Somalia. In the summer of 1980, the U.S. Government provided an additional 13,500 mt of instant corn soya milk and a small quantity of medicines to continue and supplement assistance programs to displaced persons in southern Ethiopia. UNHCR expenditures in Ethiopia totaled \$3 million in 1979 and are expected to amount to \$1.6 million in 1980.

GABON

Gabon has been a haven for Equatorial Guineans fleeing their homeland for several years. Until the coup d'etat against President Macias in August 1979, we, the UNHCR and the Government of Gabon (GOG) considered there to be some 60,000 to 70,000 Equatorial Guinean refugees in Gabon. Even at the time, however, there was relatively little attention to any refugee problem per se because most of the Equatorial Guineans were absorbed into the existing social structures. The GOG conferred refugee status on them, the UNHCR set up a small office in 1978 but there were never any refugee camps and only the most modest of refugee programs.

As a result of the August 1979 coup in Equatorial Guinea, the general amnesty and invitation for exiled citizens to return announced by the Obiang Nguema Government and the formal ending by the GOG of automatic refugee status for Equatorial Guineans on March 1, 1980, there are today relatively few refugees residing

in Gabon as defined in the Refugee Act of 1980. This is not to say that most of the Equatorial Guineans returned home. Our impression is that many, perhaps a majority, have not, although they appear to be free to do so and apparently readily cross back and forth over the frontier. Most have stayed on in Gabon for economic or family reasons. The UNHCR only received about 500 requests for repatriation help, although the number who returned on their own may be several times higher.

With the Equatorial Guineans no longer being considered as refugees in Gabon, they join the thousands of other expatriate Africans coming to this relatively rich, underpopulated country to find work and must meet the same document requirements -- work permit, residence permit, etc. That leaves only a handful of known refugees to include a few political exiles from Sao Tome and Principe, apparently a small community from Guinea (Conakry), one or two Angolans and perhaps other stray cases. In these cases, too, they generally have jobs and, while they may not be able to return home, they enjoy relative prosperity and freedom of movement in Gabon.

There was no direct U.S. assistance either public or private to refugee relief in Gabon in the past year. According to UNHCR figures, approximately \$95,000 was spent in Gabon in 1978. For 1979 and 1980, proposed allocations were \$105,000 and \$115,000, respectively. Earlier this year one of two resident UNHCR officers was reassigned to Cameroon and the other transferred without being replaced. However, the UNHCR has not yet decided to close its Libreville office.

KENYA

Kenya's refugee population has had a net decline during the past year as several thousand Ugandan refugees returned to their home country. At the beginning of May 1980 the refugee population stood at 3,500 consisting of 1,800 Ethiopians, 1,000 Rwandans, 500 Ugandans and a small group from various other countries. The predominantly urban and professional character of Kenya's refugee population has made it difficult and expensive to absorb.

UNHCR assistance during the past year has continued to concentrate on the local integration of individual refugees, payment of subsistence allowances, the provision of educational and vocational training and counseling services. Plans for a rural resettlement program for Ugandan refugees have been shelved with the return of most of the Ugandans to their homes. The UNHCR's total expenditures in 1979 were \$2.2 million and are expected to be only slightly lower in 1980.

LESOTHO

There are up to 2,000 persons in Lesotho who are registered with the Lesotho Government and the UNHCR as refugees. Most of these might be more accurately described as immigrants or students away from home, young South African blacks seeking alternatives to the "Bantu" education system and boarding with friends or relatives while they study in Lesotho. In addition to the students there is a small group of black South African adults who have come to Lesotho to seek employment, or to enjoy the more racially relaxed attitudes. Some estimate that in addition to the 2,000 officially registered refugees there are from three to five thousand additional persons that could be included in these two groups.

There is a smaller contingent of those who came to Lesotho out of fear of persecution or incarceration (perhaps four hundred), largely from South Africa. The remainder are from Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe (The Zimbabwe contingent shrank following elections there, but many have remained because of family and jobs).

There are no refugee camps in Lesotho. It is government policy that refugees be assimilated within Basotho society. Five hundred refugees receive subsistence allowances of forty dollars per month from the UNHCR.

U.S. assistance to refugees in Lesotho consists of a \$4,225,000 grant to the UNHCR for an education program in Lesotho. To date the account has been drawn down by \$2,480,300. The funds have been used for the construction of classrooms and accommodations for refugee students.

MOZAMBIQUE

With the cessation of hostilities in Zimbabwe Rhodesia in late 1979 many of the estimated 150,000 refugees who had sought sanctuary in Mozambique began returning to their country. Under the auspices of the UNHCR and informally, an estimated 60,000 refugees who had been in the five designated camps were believed to have returned to Zimbabwe by the end of July 1980. The Government of Zimbabwe has told the UNHCR that approximately 20,000 more former refugees have taken up life in the countryside and the remaining 70,000 intend to ultimately return to Zimbabwe but at some later time. (The Government of Zimbabwe, however, estimates that only 20,000 refugees remain in Mozambique and that the total number of refugees may never have been as high as 150,000). The Government of Mozambique dismantled the camps and the refugee servicing structure at the end of July 1980.

There are small numbers of refugees from other neighboring countries including the Republic of South Africa, Swaziland, Lesotho and Malawi. In addition, in mid-1980, eight refugees from East Timor reached Mozambique via Portugal. Reportedly, the Government of Mozambique is considering accepting several thousand East Timor refugees in an agricultural community to be created not far from the capital, Maputo.

The UNHCR estimates that the cost of its programs in Mozambique providing support and assistance for repatriation of Zimbabwean refugees will be approximately \$11.5 million in 1980. Other donors include the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Program, the Lutheran World Federation and the Governments of Switzerland and Yugoslavia. Under agreements with the Mozambican Government concluded in 1977, 1978 and 1979, the United States provided over \$4.18 million worth of foodstuffs under PL 480 Title II.

The Government of Mozambique provided land, material assistance and services from its domestic ministries over the period of the Rhodesian conflict (1975-1980). No figures are available on the magnitude of this considerable assistance. Mozambican wage earners were obliged to contribute to a fund earmarked for support of the Zimbabwe struggle and the persons displaced by it.

NIGERIA

Nigeria has not historically been afflicted with a serious refugee problem. Prior to the coup against Equatorial Guinea's President Macias, an undetermined number (although it is thought to be in the neighborhood of 500) of Equatorial Guineans fled to eastern Nigeria, primarily to the Calabar/Port Harcourt areas. Most of these refugees, however, were assimilated into the local economy and are not dependent on the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) for assistance. The UNHCR has received requests for assistance from only about 30 Equatorial Guineans.

More recently, the civil war in Chad has resulted in an exodus of refugees into neighboring states. Nigeria's boundary with Chad is drawn through the middle of Lake Chad and Chadians traditionally have passed freely back and forth, working in Maiduguri and environs and maintaining family connections on both sides of the border. Therefore, when Chadians began to flee the fighting, many came to Maiduguri and moved in with relatives and friends. In March 1980 the FGN sent a commission to investigate the situation and reported about 6,000 to 7,000 refugees. After March, however, the inflow increased substantially and the Nigerian Government has most recently estimated about 40,000 Chadian refugees in Borno State. Many are staying in makeshift

camps with little or no shelter. Work has only recently begun on a permanent refugee camp but has been hampered by the onset of the rainy season.

The FGN is anticipating both financial and political problems with the Chadians. At the outset when there were only 7-8,000 refugees the Government had allocated one naira a day for each person taken into private homes. At that rate, naira 1.2 million (\$1.07 million) is now required monthly for food alone, and additional millions are needed for construction, clothing and medical care.

The FGN has not yet requested any assistance from the U.S. Government or the UNHCR. The UNHCR is well briefed on the situation in the north and is ready to act if requested.

SOMALIA

The conflict in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia has continued to cause large numbers of refugees -- primarily pastoral nomads, but also settled small farmers -- to flee into Somalia. The current refugee population in Somalia is comprised of two groups: those living in camps, and perhaps an equal number outside of camps surviving off the countryside or living with relatives in urban centers. As of July 30, 1980 the Somali refugee office reported 765,000 refugees in camps. This represents an increase of approximately 292,000 over the last six months and 537,000 over 12 months. There are an estimated additional 500,000-700,000 refugees outside the camps. These latter are almost exclusively ethnic Somalis. The refugees in camps -- for whom the UNHCR appeal was issued and who are receiving Title II and other donated foods -- are composed of both Somalis and Oromos. UNHCR statistics indicate that as many as half of these refugees may be Oromo, although this figure may be somewhat high. The Oromos are generally farmers rather than nomads.

The 26 refugee camps now established are in four widely separated regions of the country. In Gedo, near Somalia's border with Kenya and Ethiopia, there are ten camps with a population of 332,000 (as of July 30). Hiran, near the Ethiopian border 250 kilometers due north of Mogadishu, has seven camps with 185,000 refugees, and the northwest region around Hargeisa has six camps containing 184,000 refugees. Lower Shabella region, 70 miles southwest of Mogadishu, contains the three oldest camps with 64,000 refugees. There are also transit camps near the border, but the population of these is now being kept to a minimum. The camp population is overwhelmingly women and children, with only about nine percent being males above the age of 15. In late July there were indications that the refugee influx might be slowing

somewhat. New arrivals tend to be in marginal or impaired nutritional condition. Many walk for as long as ten days to reach the border.

The 26 camps are managed by the Somali National Refugee Commission, with increasing assistance from private agencies coordinated by the UNHCR. There are at least 12 non-governmental organizations from the United States and Western Europe working with the refugees. These agencies have more than 120 expatriate personnel in Somalia, located mostly in the camps and the regional capitals. Their efforts are concentrated on medical, nutritional and logistical needs. The UNHCR now has an expatriate staff of ten and WFP has three people. All of these are solely involved with refugee relief and feeding.

Somalia is one of the world's poorest countries and is hard pressed to meet the needs of its own people. With the refugee influx over the last two years, the total population of the country has increased by about 1.3 million to an estimated 5.5 million. This has put great strains on the delivery of goods and services and is causing a serious adverse effect on the rural environment, especially in terms of fuel and forage. The refugee situation itself is serious, but is currently manageable because of the efforts of the Somali Government and the response of the international community. Death rates in the camps are down considerably from a few months ago. An adequate amount of food is reaching the refugees. Supplemental feeding programs for the medically identified malnourished are being established. There are continuing transport and logistical constraints that are being worked on. Any unforeseen development such as a sudden sharp rise in the refugee influx or an epidemic in the camps would pose a severe challenge to the capabilities of the Somali and expatriate relief agencies.

Agricultural activities are increasingly evident in many refugee camps. They depend predominantly on water from the Shabelle and Juba Rivers and, in the northwest, from sub-surface water found beneath the dry river beds. In addition to agriculture other self-help activities include hut construction, well-digging, and keeping the camps relatively clean.

The United States is by far the largest single donor to the refugee program. The Somali Refugee Commission has budgeted \$6.5 million in support this year but this amount has not yet been fully funded by the Somali Government. The United States is providing 102,521 mts of food commodities in Fiscal Year 1980 at an estimated value of \$26.4 million plus \$10.6 million for shipping costs. In addition, the United States has made a direct grant to WFP for the purchase of approximately 12,000 mts of corn and 300 mts of locally procured meat. The United States will have supplied close to two-thirds of the total tonnage provided to the refugees for the year. The EEC is the next most significant food donor, having pledged 31,153 mts for 1980. Other major donors are the FRG, Sweden, Italy and Iraq.

In response to the UNHCR appeal for \$40.7 million in non-food assistance, the United States had contributed \$11.9 million as of August 1980 and is planning to donate an additional \$6 million before the end of Fiscal Year 1980. This amount is financing an epidemiological survey; relief personnel; field hospitals; deep well pumps and generator sets for refugees outside camps; tents, medicines, and diverse supplies for refugee families such as eating and cooking utensils, water containers, plastic tarps and clothing.

The refugee problem in Somalia will remain for the indefinite future. At what number the camp population will level off cannot be estimated, but it could reach a million sometime in 1981. Most of the refugees will probably not return to Ethiopia until the conflict there is settled, and there is at present no sign of a settlement on the horizon. USAID, in conjunction with the Somali Government, is making plans for the deployment of a team of experts to devise a strategy for medium and long term solutions to this massive refugee influx.

SUDAN

Sudan's refugee population increased dramatically in 1979 as a result of the overthrow of Idi Amin in neighboring Uganda. There was also an increase in the number of Ethiopian refugees as fighting in Eritrea increased in late 1979 and early 1980. Current estimates place the total number of refugees in Sudan at approximately 440,000; of these approximately 390,000 are from Ethiopia (360,000 of Eritrean origin), 39,000 from Uganda, 5,000 from Zaire, and approximately 7,000 from Chad.

The recent refugees from Uganda were fleeing the new government and the violence surrounding Amin's overthrow. Many are expected to return home once the situation stabilizes. Most of the Ethiopian refugees are from Eritrea and have been driven from Ethiopia since 1975 by that country's civil war. Their numbers increased substantially in 1978 and 1979 as the Ethiopian government attempted to subdue Eritrea militarily. As long as the military conflict continues in Eritrea and other regions of Ethiopia near Sudan refugees will continue to flee into Sudan. Recent talks between the Ethiopian and Sudanese Governments, however, give some hope that improved relations between the two countries may help start a process that could lead eventually to a resolution of the conflict.

Sudan is one of the world's poorest countries and is hard pressed to meet its own needs. The influx of refugees has added tension to an already fragile political situation and has severely strained the country's ailing economy. Sudan stepped up its search for international assistance for its refugee problem by hosting a donor conference in June 1980 to raise funds for refugee resettlement projects. The conference was successful in

increasing international understanding of Sudan's refugee problem and produced some financial pledges of support as well as general agreement to carefully review the refugee resettlement projects for future funding. Even with the Sudanese push for bilateral refugee assistance, international donor agencies, especially the UNHCR, whose 1980 programs in Sudan are expected to total \$11.1 million, are likely to continue playing a dominant role in Sudanese refugee matters.

U.S. refugee assistance has, heretofore, been channeled through the UNHCR, with the exception of some PL 480 food aid which has been distributed by PVOs and the Section 495F funding of the transport to Sudan of a PVO financed mobile medical clinic. We are now reviewing how we might provide bilateral refugee assistance within the context of our overall development goals for Sudan. In Fiscal Year 1980 we will provide \$1 million from Section 495F funds for refugee project assistance.

SWAZILAND

There are three main groups of refugees in Swaziland. Black South African refugees from urban areas receiving UNHCR assistance now number slightly over 200. Only a few of the South Africans who fled to Swaziland after the Soweto riots of 1976 remain in the country. Recently, however, a trickle of new South African refugees has begun to flow into Swaziland as a result of police repression in South Africa following the school boycott and riots there.

Some 150 Mozambicans in Swaziland are formally classified as refugees and receive support from the UNHCR. Several hundred more Mozambicans resident in Swaziland are more properly described as economic migrants seeking employment. They are not technically refugees and their status in Swaziland is uncertain, particularly since the recent signing of an agreement between Mozambique and Swaziland providing for the repatriation from one country of citizens of the other country. Over 60 Mozambicans have thus far been repatriated from Swaziland under the terms of this agreement.

Approximately 4,000 members of two Swazi clans situated in South Africa fled to Swaziland in 1977 and 1978 following disputes over the leadership of the clans. The ultimate fate of these people remains unsettled, but they are currently receiving UNHCR assistance and some of them at least will probably remain settled in Swaziland.

There are no bilateral U.S assistance programs in Swaziland aimed specifically at refugees. The United States contributes to the support of UNHCR programs in Southern Africa.

TANZANIA

Virtually since gaining independence in 1961, Tanzania has hosted refugees, mostly from neighboring countries -- particularly Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Mozambique. As of mid 1980 the UNHCR counted 155,700 refugees in Tanzania: 129,500 from Burundi, 26,000 from Rwanda and the remainder consisting of small numbers from Zaire, Uganda and southern African countries. Except for about 1,500 living in urban centers, these refugees are predominantly rural people who have been settled on land donated by the Tanzanian Government and who are being assisted by the UNHCR and other organizations to become self-sufficient.

The UNHCR has resettled 28,000 Burundi refugees at Mishamo in Rukwa region. These refugees were moved from older settlements, principally Ulyankulu and Katumba, because of limited water supplies and insufficient arable land. Mishamo is expected eventually to house 37,000 refugees settled in 21 villages and is scheduled to be turned over to the Tanzanian Government at the end of 1983. The UNHCR and the Lutheran World Federation are jointly financing the Mishamo project which is expected to cost \$22 million over the period 1978-1983. The World Food Program will provide \$5 million in food aid until the settlers become self-sufficient. During the past year the UNHCR repatriated 4,000 Ugandans and 122 Zimbabweans. Virtually all 26,000 Rwanda refugees are scheduled to become Tanzanian citizens in October 1980. During 1980 the UNHCR proposes to spend \$6.6 million in Tanzania and the Lutheran World Federation \$1.9 million.

Due to the 1978-1979 war with Uganda, about 50,000 Tanzanians in the Kagera River area were displaced because of the fighting. Forty thousand of these have since returned to their home areas, the remainder are receiving resettlement assistance from a number of donor countries and organizations. The United States donated \$300,000 from Section 495F funds to be used for the construction of 35 classrooms and two dispensaries in the Kagera River area.

UGANDA

Uganda has a relatively stable refugee population of about 113,000, of which some 80,000 are from Rwanda. Most of the rest are from Zaire. These are generally refugees of long standing who have been in Uganda since the early 1960's.

Some 25,000 of the Rwandan refugees were displaced from settlements in southwestern Uganda during the 1978-1979 war that toppled President Amin. These refugees were temporarily moved to

Fort Portal, near the Zaire border, but are mostly all now back in their former settlement area where the UNHCR is rebuilding facilities.

The UNHCR has also been called upon to assist in relief for internally displaced persons. Drought, famine and internal security problems have added significantly to the dislocations caused by Amin's eight-year rule. The problem is worst in northeastern Uganda. Because of large population movements it is difficult to place a figure on the number of people affected, but a survey in late February and early March 1980 undertaken by the Ugandan Government and relief agencies (including the UNHCR) put at 476,000 the number of people requiring food assistance. The number of people in need of assistance as internally displaced persons is probably increasing.

The UNHCR in July 1979 made a special appeal for \$13.3 million for refugees and displaced persons in Uganda. Five and a half million dollars had been received by late July 1980, including a \$2.5 million contribution from the United States. An additional U.S. contribution of \$1 million will be made in mid-September. The Intergovernmental Committee on Europe Migration (ICEM) started an experimental program in early 1980 to assist Ugandans to return from exile in Western Europe.

WESTERN SAHARA

Since the beginning of the Sahel drought in the early 1970's, Saharan populations have taken refuge in Southern Algerian towns such as Tamanrasset. Since Spain's withdrawal from the Western Sahara in favor of Morocco and Mauritania in 1975, additional refugees have been generated by fighting between the forces of the Algerian-backed Polisario liberation movement and those of Morocco and Mauritania. In 1979, Mauritania relinquished its claim to the southern portion of the Western Sahara and withdrew from the conflict, and Morocco extended its claim to the entire territory.

Except for the several thousand in the Tamanrasset region, most of the refugees are reported to be in 19 camps in the Tindouf region of southwestern Algeria. According to independent western visitors, these camps, operated by the Polisario with Algerian and other assistance, provide refugees with basic social services such as housing, foodstuffs, education and health care. They also constitute the principal base for the Polisario's political and military activity.

There is no consensus about the origins and number of refugees in the camps of the Tindouf region or about the motives for their presence. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and other donors have not been permitted regular access

to the refugee camps or allowed to conduct a census. Estimates of the number of refugees have ranged widely in the past five years from a low of 12,000 to a high of 120,000. Independent western visitors gave credence to the latter figure in 1980.

The last census of the Western Sahara, conducted by Spain in 1974, reported a population of 74,000. The Polisario, which claims that this census deliberately undercounted the population and that large numbers had fled into Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania, asserts that all of the refugees in the camps have come there freely from the Western Sahara to escape Moroccan administration. The Moroccan Government, which claims that the territory still has a sizeable population, asserts that most of the refugees in the camps are from drought-stricken regions of Algeria, Mauritania, Mali and Niger and that most of those from the Western Sahara have been forced into exile by the Polisario.

International assistance totalling some \$5 million had been channeled mostly through the UNHCR and the Algerian Red Crescent. UNHCR assistance totaled \$2.4 million in 1976; \$1.3 million in 1977; and \$.6 million in 1978. In 1979 the UNHCR allocated \$1.2 million but only spent \$.4 million. The bulk of this allocation to the UNHCR's special program (consisting largely of Spanish in kind contributions) was carried over to 1980. The decline in UNHCR assistance is due to its continuing problems with obtaining free access to the refugee camps for its representatives, the absence of a reliable refugee census, and the failure of the Algerian Red Crescent to provide adequate accounting for the UNHCR assistance. The Algerian Government has on a number of occasions also declined prospective direct donations tied to satisfactory audit procedures and procurement from sources in the donating countries. In March-April 1980, however, the Algerian Government facilitated the work of a UNHCR team which visited 13 of the 19 camps, and which may pave the way for an increase in international donor assistance when the results are made public. The United States contributed \$100,000 to the refugees in response to an UNHCR appeal in 1976. It has since indicated that, while it is concerned about their plight, it believes the difficulties encountered by the UNHCR should be resolved before it considers further contributions of food or money.

ZAIRE

The Government of Zaire (GOZ) and the UNHCR use the figure of 300,000 for the total number of refugees in Zaire. Other estimates range up to 750,000. There are widely differing definitions of what constitutes a refugee, and inflation of figures is common for a variety of reasons. In any event, the majority of persons included in the total number of refugees in Zaire have been there for many years, are now economically self-sufficient, and are no longer included in the official figures.

This report focuses on the over 200,000 refugees who, according to the UNHCR, are eligible for aid, having arrived in Zaire since November 1977. Other groups are mentioned to give a more complete picture of the situation in Zaire. The following list summarizes the various groups of refugees in Zaire according to 1980 UNHCR figures:

<u>Nationality</u>	<u>Estimated Number</u>
Angolans	215,000
Ugandans	52,000
Rwandans and Barundi	33,000
Zambians and others	1,000
TOTAL	301,000

The UNHCR currently provides assistance to about 132,000 refugees throughout Zaire. Protestant and Catholic aid organizations, the principal PVO's in the country, aid some 93,000 refugees. One foreign office source estimates that there are an additional 37,000 refugees who still need aid but do not now receive it, although the UNHCR reports that the GOZ is generally responsive to the needs of refugees in Zaire.

Angolans (Cabindans): Cabindan refugees in the three Bas-Zaire zones of Tshela, Lukula and Muanda number 39,000. Of this number, there are 27,000 housed and fed in three camps under the auspices of the UNHCR. They are expected to be self-sufficient in food by the end of 1981. The remaining 12,000 Cabindans are settled among Zairians or in small villages largely within the 20 kilometer-wide belt along the Cabindan frontier where the UN will not operate. Pressures for emergency assistance for Bas-Zaire refugees and the local population eased with the end of the devastating 1977-78 drought.

The Cabindan population in Zaire is likely to remain stable in the foreseeable future. Few new refugees are coming out of Angola, and none are officially leaving the UNHCR camps (although there is quite a bit of clandestine movement back and forth across the border). Despite the rapprochement between Zaire and Angola, the majority of the Cabindan refugees still reportedly support the idea of a Cabinda independent of Angolan control, regardless of who rules in Luanda.

Angolans in Bas-Zaire: The largest number of Angolan refugees, almost 500,000 (both new and old), live in eastern Bas-Zaire province along the highway between Matadi and Kinshasa. Approximately 400,000 of them already were settled in that area and were generally self-sufficient when the most recent wave of refugees began entering Zaire in November 1977. By January 1978, 100,000 of these new refugees had arrived because of a new offensive against long-time rebel strongholds in northern Angola by forces of the Luanda regime and their Cuban allies. This most recent wave of refugees ended in May 1978. In February 1978, the UN decided to end all aid to Angolan refugees who entered Zaire

before November 1977. One reason for the reluctance of the Angolan refugees in western Zaire to return home has been the dismal living conditions within Angola itself, which are reportedly poor even when compared with Zaire's own currently depressed economic state. The Angolan Government (GOA) claims that of an estimated 400,000 white and black Angolans who left the country during the independence period some 180,000 have already returned.

Shaba - Repatriates and Refugees: Between 120,000 and 150,000 Zairian refugees in Angola have returned home under UNHCR auspices since mid 1978. The UNHCR mandate in Shaba has been extended several times and the organization now plans to retain some presence in Shaba until September 1980 for the purpose of completing distribution of food and supplies to the returnees, although the UNHCR's mandate may be extended again to deal with the anticipated return of former secessionist forces.

Between 8,000 and 10,000 of the 40,000 Angolan refugees in Shaba have stated that they would like to return to Angola. They have been in Shaba since the 1974-75 struggle surrounding Angolan independence and therefore no longer qualify for UNHCR refugee aid. Though the Government of Angola has stated that Angolans who had fled the country to avoid the war could come back, the GOA has proclaimed no general amnesty or otherwise tried to persuade its citizens to return to Angola. However, a joint communique issued after a July 3, 1980 meeting in Luanda between Presidents Mobuto and Dos Santos stated that the two parties now intend to make every effort to facilitate repatriation of refugees.

Ugandans: There are approximately 52,000 Ugandans in Zaire. Almost all have arrived since the fall of the Amin regime. Many of them managed to flee Uganda with money, cars and other saleable commodities and are therefore not as destitute as most of Zaire's refugees.

The UNHCR aids these refugees and is currently investigating the logistics of adhering to a Zairian government request to move the Ugandans further away from the border where they now are settled. UNHCR officials say that many of the refugees are awaiting the outcome of the elections later this year in Uganda before deciding whether to take steps to return.

Rwandans and Barundi: There are about 33,000 Rwandan and Barundi refugees in northern Zaire. The UNHCR is currently involved only in funding scholarships. These refugees have been in Zaire as long as fifteen years and have become assimilated and self-sufficient.

Zambians: About 1,000 members of a repressed Zambian religious group, the Lumpa Church, have been in Shaba since 1973 and are farming in two villages near Lubumbashi.

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Funding: In 1979, UNHCR expenditures for refugees in Zaire were \$15.6 million. It expects to spend about \$7.1 million in 1980. The Church of Christ in Zaire (ECZ) cooperates with other voluntary organizations and acts as the operational arm of the UNHCR in Shaba. In 1979, the ECZ received a total of \$147,000 in funds from international PVO's for refugees.

The breakdown of U.S. Government aid to refugees in Zaire (not including our contributions to the UNHCR's regular programs for Africa) for Fiscal Years 1978 and 1979 is as follows:

Public Law 480 Title I through UNHCR	\$ 680,500
World Food Program contribution from USG for refugee relief program in Bas-Zaire Phase I	\$ 833,000
World Food Program contribution from USG for refugee relief program in Bas-Zaire Phase II	\$1,755,000
Grants to International Rescue Committee (IRC) for refugee relief operation in Bas-Zaire	\$ 275,000
Grants to UNHCR Special Appeal for Zairians returning to Zaire	\$5,000,000

ZAMBIA

Zambia has traditionally opened its doors to refugees from neighboring countries. Over the last sixteen years Zambia has provided refuge to people fleeing Angola, Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire and Zimbabwe. The refugee population peaked at an estimated 80,000 at the end of 1978.

With the successful transition to independence in Zimbabwe the repatriation of Zimbabwe refugees in Zambia began in earnest, thereby substantially reducing the number of refugees in the country. An estimated 25,500 refugees remained in Zambia in mid-1980 consisting of the following major groups:

Zimbabwean:	11,000
Angolan:	10,500
Namibian:	3,000
Others (i.e., Malawian, South African and Zairian):	1,000

The UNHCR plans to complete the repatriation of all Zimbabweans by the end of 1980. The number of remaining refugees is unlikely to change significantly in the months ahead barring drastic political or economic changes in the countries bordering Zambia.

The UNHCR, the ICRC, the Lutheran World Federation, Catholic Relief Service and Africare are the principal voluntary agencies conducting refugee relief programs in Zambia. National governments, including the United States, provide support to these programs. Total UNHCR expenditures in 1979 were \$6.6 million, and the organization's 1980 expenses are projected to be \$6.9 million.

ZIMBABWE

The Government of Zimbabwe estimates that there are over 1.2 million Zimbabweans who left the country or had been displaced as a result of the war, which concluded at the end of 1979. About 60,000 have been repatriated from Botswana, Zambia, and Mozambique by the Zimbabwe Government with assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and an equal number are estimated to have returned on their own without official assistance. Another 30,000 refugees, largely school children, remain in Mozambique and Zambia, and will be repatriated by the end of 1980.

About 400,000 Zimbabweans, who had been moved by the former government into protected villages, are now free to return to their previous homes, and are gradually doing so. About half, however, are still in the protected village sites, until homes and services can be rebuilt in the tribal trust lands where they lived. Another 500,000 or more moved to urban areas during the war. Many of them have returned to their former homes now that the fighting has stopped, but the majority are, to various degrees, being absorbed into city life, and apparently do not plan to return unless forced or motivated to do so by the government.

The UNHCR budgeted \$22 million for the repatriation and initial support for refugees, of which the United States pledged \$5 million. For the resettlement and rehabilitation of refugees and war damaged areas, the Zimbabwe Government and the UNHCR developed a \$110 million program to be completed by April 1, 1981. The United States has contributed \$15 million to this effort, which has been largely covered by international pledges.

The International Committee for the Red Cross, which was the chief international voluntary organization operating in Rhodesia during the war, has scaled down its operations since the

independent government was formed April 18, 1980. Most of its responsibilities have been taken over by the government's Department of Social Services.

With the installation of a black-majority government in Salisbury, a small number of South African refugees have found their way to Zimbabwe. No formal programs have yet been established to assist them.

SECTION IV

NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIAREGIONAL REVIEW

Border disputes, political upheavals, civil strife, human rights violations and armed conflict have generated about three million refugees in broadly dispersed groups within the region.

Among the refugee groups are the Palestinian population of approximately two million, the Soviet Jews arriving in Israel (over 17,000 in 1979), an estimated 30,000 to 35,000 Kurds in Iran, and about 250,000 Pakistani Biharis located in Bangladesh. Estimates of Western Saharan refugees in the Tindouf region range widely from 17,000 to 35,000. This is a decline from early 1978 estimates of 120,000 for this group.

A majority of additional refugees were created during the past year by the political upheaval in Afghanistan. As of July 1980, the Government of Pakistan had registered over one million Afghan refugees in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province and Baluchistan. This number could increase further if fighting in Afghanistan continues.

New or increased refugee flows will depend on political developments in other parts of the world as well as in the region.

The international community is actively involved in caring for and maintaining these broadly dispersed groups through the UNHCR, the UNRWA for Palestinian Refugees, and other private and official programs. The United States contributes substantially to the funding of these programs.

In the 30 years since UNRWA was established to deal with the Palestinian refugee problem, the United States has contributed over \$764 million or 50 percent of total national government contributions. UNRWA's other major financial supporters have been the same western countries that also contribute heavily to refugee efforts in other parts of the world. Until recently, the Arab countries contributed only a small portion of the total.

In addition to the sizeable contributions made to the Jewish Agency for Resettlement Programs in Israel, as well as to the UNHCR, the United States made a special contribution of \$500,000 to the UNHCR Arakanese project.

COUNTRY PROFILES

The following sections provide information about refugees who have figured prominently in the Near East and South Asian region..

AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN

As a result of the April 1978 coup in Afghanistan and the invasion of that country a year and a half later by troops of the USSR, a large number of refugees crossed the border into Pakistan. As of June 1980, the UNHCR estimates that there were over 750,000 Afghans temporarily residing in the provinces of the Northwest Frontier and Baluchistan. Many of these refugees are Pushtun tribal people from ethnic groups which straddle both sides of the porous Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Although exact figures are not available, thousands of Afghans have also fled across the border into Iran. The refugees are a considerable drain on Pakistan, a country experiencing the major difficulties of economic and political development.

The Pakistani Government has provided humanitarian aid to the refugees and has asked the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for additional assistance. By February 1980 UNHCR assigned relief personnel to Islamabad, Peshawar and Quetta. It launched an appeal for \$55 million for material and food. This appeal was subsequently expanded to \$100 million. To this appeal the United States has indicated its intention to contribute up to \$7.5 million in cash and kind. The U.S. is also providing \$39 million worth of food and \$2.3 million worth of rupees for local purchases for the Afghan refugee relief effort. In the coming year the U.S. plans an additional \$17 million in food aid, subject to Congressional approval. Plans for cash contributions are not yet firm. Japan and a number of other countries in the industrialized and Islamic worlds have also announced contributions, which amounted to \$42.7 million by July 1980.

BIHARI REFUGEES IN BANGLADESH

The Biharis, originally from India prior to partition, are non-Bengali speaking residents of Bangladesh who claim to be citizens of Pakistan. After Bangladesh won its independence in 1971, over 275,000 Biharis opted to retain their Pakistani citizenship and asked to be "repatriated" to Pakistan where most had never lived. Bangladesh refused to integrate the Biharis into Bangladeshi society on the grounds that they claimed citizenship in Pakistan. Many Biharis were accused of collaborating with Pakistan in the war of independence and all were initially forced into refugee camps. Some Biharis were

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repatriated several years ago and Pakistan agreed in 1977 to accept an additional 25,000, and some of this number have been repatriated. The number who remain in camps is uncertain but this is diminishing as many inhabitants reenter Bangladesh society. The UNHCR is directly involved in repatriation and resettlement efforts in Pakistan.

The Bangladesh Government provides food to the Bihari refugee camps through its ration system. Some U.S. PL 480 food aid is used in Bangladesh's ration system and thus finds its way to the Bihari camps. The United States has urged Pakistan and Bangladesh to resolve the Bihari question through bilateral negotiations.

Pakistan is unlikely to accept any additional Biharis beyond the 25,000 already agreed to. Little change in the situation is expected in the near future.

KURDISH REFUGEES

After the collapse of the 1974-75 Kurdish rebellion against the Iraqi central government, approximately 100,000 Kurds fled from Iraq to Iran, many of whom subsequently returned to Iraq. Current estimates place the number of Iraqi Kurdish refugees in Iran at approximately 30,000 to 35,000. The UNHCR has helped resettle some 1,400 Iraqi Kurdish refugees who wished to be resettled outside the Middle East, of whom some 700 were accepted by the United States during 1977 and 1978.

PALESTINIAN REFUGEES

An estimated two million Palestinian refugees live in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and under Israeli military occupation on the West Bank and Gama. According to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), 1,800,000 of them are currently registered with UNRWA. UNRWA was established in 1950 to assist the Palestinian refugees. Its mandate is renewed periodically by the U.N. General Assembly. An estimated 250,000 additional Palestinians who were displaced by the 1967 Arab-Israeli war are provided some assistance by UNRWA as called upon by resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly.

Jordan grants Palestinian refugees passports and citizenship rights. The other Arab countries allow this type of assistance on a highly selective basis only. Most Palestinians reject integration because they consider it inconsistent with their goal of achieving self determination.

UNRWA's operations are financed by annual national government contributions. During the 28-year period (1950-1978), UNRWA received \$1.4 billion, of which the United States contributed \$764 million, or over 50 percent of total contributions. UNRWA's major financial backers are the same countries that give substantial support to various refugee programs in other regions of the world. After the United States, the leading contributions to UNRWA during the 28-year period were: The United Kingdom (\$163 million); the European Community (\$94 million); Sweden (\$55 million); Germany (\$42 million); Japan (\$31 million); and France (\$27 million). Until recently Arab countries contributed to only a small percentage of the UNRWA budget. This trend has been changing; Saudi Arabia contributed \$33 million and other Arab countries have increased their contributions, albeit on an uneven basis -- some years more, others less. Israel contributed \$9 million.

In 1978, the United States contributed \$51.5 million to UNRWA's budget of \$140 million. Toward a 1979 UNRWA budget of \$151.8 the U.S. contributed \$52 million of which \$9.5 million was earmarked by Congress to be matched by OPEC countries. For 1980 the U.S. pledged the same amount toward an estimated budget of \$185 million.

Until there is a comprehensive settlement of the Middle Eastern problem the refugees will continue to require major assistance from the international community.

SOVIET JEWISH REFUGEES

Ever since its founding as the Jewish homeland, Israel has been a haven for Jewish refugees and immigrants from many parts of the world. Under the Law of Return, any Jew can emigrate to Israel at any time. The Law of Return and Israel statutes granting special privileges to immigrants and refugees apply only to people of the Jewish faith. Israel also accepts non-Jewish immigrants who satisfy the statutory conditions of its laws. The number is believed to be small, however. Responsibility for refugee resettlement is divided between the Ministry of Absorption and the Jewish Agency. The primary role of the former is to provide housing for all immigrants. The Jewish Agency, a quasi-official agency, is responsible for all aspects of the refugee migration to Israel as well as assistance in overall integration and employment within Israel.

The Ministry of Absorption's 1979 budget, mostly for housing for immigrants, was \$14.4 million. This figure is expected to increase by about 10 percent according to the recently submitted Israeli Government budget. The Jewish Agency's budget for immigration and absorption for 1979 was \$99 million. The

Agency's budget includes an annual U.S. grant of around \$20 million which is used exclusively for the resettlement of refugees from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The remainder of the budget provides for temporary housing and language and other training to help immigrants adjust to their new environment.

Of the 51,351 Soviet Jewish refugees who arrived in Vienna during 1979, 17,275 departed to Israel, and 34,076 departed for countries other than Israel.

SECTION V

LATIN AMERICAREGIONAL OVERVIEW

Latin America continues to generate significant numbers of refugees and displaced persons. The main causes include flight from violent civil strife, escape from political persecution or restrictions on civil liberties, and the search for a better life through increased economic opportunities.

Since 1959, Cuba has generated the largest movement of refugees in Latin America, creating special problems for the United States and other countries of the hemisphere. Approximately one million Cubans are estimated to have fled the island. Of this number, more than 800,000 have sought refuge in the United States. Between April and August 1980, about 120,000 undocumented Cubans entered the United States by boat from the Cuban port of Mariel. This unforeseen influx from Cuba disrupted U.S. hopes for the planned, orderly resettlement of refugees as outlined in the 1980 Refugee Act.

In addition, during the first half of 1980, an unprecedented number of Haitians (15,000) entered the United States and requested political asylum. Those in INS proceedings before June 19, 1980 have had their parole into the country extended for six months.

Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher called upon the OAS this past July to develop an inter-American formula designed to discourage governments from inducing displacements and to cope with massive waves of displaced people should they occur.

Although detailed figures are not available, the total number of refugees in Latin American countries is in the tens of thousands, including Salvadorans, Chileans, Cubans, Argentines, Uruguayans, and Nicaraguans. In 1979-80, approximately 200,000 Nicaraguans who had fled to neighboring countries during the civil war in their country returned home. From 10-20,000 Salvadorans fled to other Central American countries.

While language and cultural similarities make refugee resettlement within the area an attractive possibility, governments have traditionally viewed large-scale refugee inflows with alarm. This attitude has not, however, precluded humanitarian responses in emergency situations like that of El Salvador and Cuba. Costa Rica, Peru, Venezuela, and Argentina have each offered to accept some Cuban refugees. Although most

Latin American refugees have found haven in the neighboring countries, not all have been absorbed into the local population and economy.

Over the past decade approximately 4,000 Latin American refugees other than Cubans have resettled in the United States. Over the past year, approximately 140 Latin American refugees other than Cubans and Haitians entered the United States. The entry of another 650 individuals from Argentina has been approved by the United States, but their departure has yet to be approved by the Argentine Government.

The world community, through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), is paying for a major share of the refugee relief effort in Latin America. Latin America, furthermore, accepted only a comparative handful of refugees from other parts of the world.

When urged to shoulder a larger share of the world refugee burden, Latin American governments cite the limitations that unemployment, cultural differences, and severe budgetary problems impose on their ability to accept refugees from outside the region. These conditions, when added to the uncertainties that stem from political instability in a number of countries, make resettlement in Latin America less than attractive for many refugees. Immigration to Latin America is thus generally limited to persons with needed skills and professional qualifications. Some of the leading Latin American countries, however, have the resources, levels of development and growth potential that would enable them to make a greater contribution than they are making now. The UNHCR is now considering a fund for refugee resettlement designed to assist developing countries in Latin America and elsewhere in meeting the costs of permanently resettling refugees.

In cooperation with other interested hemispheric countries, the United States is seeking to develop an awareness that refugee problems are the concern of everyone, and not just the receiving country and that what is needed is a coordinated hemispheric mechanism to deal with refugee problems.

At two conferences held in May and June 1980 in San Jose, Costa Rica, and again before the Permanent Council of the OAS in July, the United States called for a reaffirmation of international norms concerning migration and for a humanitarian response on the part of all countries to the tragic plight of the recent Cuban refugees.

COUNTRY PROFILESARGENTINA

Argentina has long followed a policy of accepting refugees from Europe and other Latin American countries. The number of refugees arriving from Europe has dwindled since the post-World War II period. Some 6,000 of the approximately 18,000 persons who fled to Argentina from nearby countries since the beginning of 1973, principally Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay, have been allowed to stay permanently. The Argentine Government has regarded refugees who arrived after August 1976 as immigrants.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is assisting refugees with the approval and limited financial support of the Argentine Government. In 1979, the UNHCR resettled 1,838 in third countries. Argentina offers schooling and medical services to persons in UNHCR refugee status and contributed \$50,000 to the UNHCR in 1980.

Argentina agreed to accept 1,000 Indochinese refugee families, or up to 4,000 or 5,000 persons, and has asked for financial support for its resettlement efforts. As of February 29, 1980, 1,233 Indochinese have been resettled in Argentina, though many individuals have had some problems in adjusting. Argentina can be expected to continue to offer refuge to Europeans and other Latin Americans who are willing to accept immigrant status. Argentina has offered to accept 300 persons who recently fled Cuba.

The human rights situation in Argentina has generated a small but significant flow of refugees from that country, primarily political detainees. During 1979, less than 100 individuals entered the United States from Argentina through the Hemispheric 500 Parole Program; an additional 650 detainees already approved for entry by this program have not been granted permission to leave prison by the Government of Argentina.

BRAZIL

Brazil provisionally accepts Latin American refugees for eventual resettlement elsewhere. The UNHCR representative in Brazil processes these refugees for resettlement. However, the fact that most of the refugees in Brazil, including an estimated 30,000 Argentines whom it considers to be political refugees, are unregistered remains a serious problem for the GOB.

Brazil did in the past accept qualified refugees from other areas for permanent resettlement on a case-by-case basis. This policy changed in November 1978, when the Government of Brazil

decided to withdraw from the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) effective January 1, 1980. The reasons cited for this move were the lack of a Brazilian need for immigrants, skilled or unskilled, Brazilian dissatisfaction with the management of the organization, and ICEM's shift in focus from European migrants to Far Eastern refugees.

In January of 1979, Brazil accepted 35 Vietnamese refugees rescued by a Brazilian tanker and offered to provide some financial support for the Indochinese refugee program. Otherwise Brazil has consistently rejected proposals for refugee resettlement and considers that refugees are primarily the responsibility of the region from which they come. It has cited its current economic situation of high inflation and equally high unemployment, as well as its difficulty with the assimilation of several thousand Koreans and Taiwanese who have entered the country illegally, as reasons for rejecting resettlement proposals.

CHILE

Chile has accepted only a few refugees in recent years, including some six Nicaraguan families who were accepted following the change in the Nicaraguan Government. Since the early 1979's, Chile has had a net out-migration of both skilled and unskilled labor, including an estimated several hundred thousand Chileans who went to Argentina primarily for economic reasons. As the Chilean economy has grown rapidly in recent years, the number returning for economic reasons is on the upswing.

While GNP, real wages and unemployment have grown rapidly during the period 1976 to 1979, unemployment remains high. The government has provided resettlement services to Chileans expelled by Argentina in connection with the Beagle Channel disputes. There are hundreds, perhaps thousands of exiles awaiting return to the country after the political upheavals of the past decade. It has been Chilean policy to deny reentry to political exiles who might conceivably cause trouble.

Chile contributes about \$85,000 annually to ICEM for both out-bound migrants and returning Chileans. It contributed \$12,000 to the UNHCR in 1978, \$15,000 in 1979, and will contribute \$20,000 in 1980. Last year the UNHCR office in Chile processed about 700 individuals who were migrating to join their families in other countries and some 600 individuals who were returning to Chile.

COLOMBIA

Although a mid-level developing country, Colombia sees itself as a poor country with a high unemployment rate. It has a relatively homogenous population and is uncomfortable with the thought of any significant influx of foreigners. Colombia is encouraging emigration rather than immigration, although some refugees are accepted on an ad hoc basis.

About 30 refugees were accepted in 1978 and a similar amount in 1979. Nearly all of them were Nicaraguans who either sought political asylum in the Colombian Embassy in Managua or who made unauthorized landings on Colombian islands off the coast of Nicaragua. The Government of Colombia indicated, at the June 1978 meeting of the Executive Committee of the UNHCR, that it might consider accepting some Indochinese refugees on a case-by-case basis. Three or four Vietnamese refugees are believed to have been accepted in 1978. Colombia hesitated to participate actively in the San Jose conferences to consider the Cuban refugee situation.

Neither the 1979 nor 1980 Colombian budgets specifically allocated funds for refugee resettlement. Colombia finds it difficult to keep up with its regular contributions to international organizations and does not consider that it is in a position to take on any additional financial obligations. It contributed \$4,320 to the UNHCR in 1978, nothing in 1979 after making a conditional pledge of \$12,000, and pledged \$12,000 in 1980.

COSTA RICA

Costa Rica has a long-standing policy of granting asylum to political refugees and has resettled several hundred Cuban political prisoners and their families. Last year's civil insurrection in Nicaragua brought 45,000 refugees to Costa Rica, many of whom received assistance from international organizations. The United States had no direct part in the effort. A considerable number of Nicaraguans have relocated in Costa Rica for political and economic reasons, and have no intention of returning to Nicaragua in the near future. In addition, some Nicaraguans have sought and received political asylum in Costa Rica.

In the spring of 1980, the Costa Ricans became actively involved in processing Cuban refugees who had sought asylum in the Peruvian Embassy in Havana. Of those, the Costa Ricans offered to permanently resettle 300 persons.

During the summer of 1980, Costa Rica's problems have come increasingly from El Salvador, and refugees of a self-sustaining

nature as well as those seeking political asylum and refugee aid are increasing in number.

Given the continuing levels of violence and political unrest in Central America, it is highly unlikely that Costa Rica will be able to carry out earlier plans to assist Indochinese refugees.

CUBA

Between April and August 1980, about 120,000 undocumented Cubans entered the United States by boat from the Cuban port of Mariel. These persons have been temporarily housed in several camps while being processed for resettlement. The Administration has proposed special legislation for most of these Cubans and the Attorney General has granted employment authorization. So far, about 90 percent have been processed and resettled in U.S. communities or third countries.

Prior to the 1980 wave of immigration from Cuba, more than 700,000 Cuban refugees had left their homeland for the United States. Domestic assistance to Cuban refugees was initiated by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) in 1961 in order to help new arrivals resettle and find employment. The refugee program budget reached a high of \$143.6 million in 1973 when the Cuban Government halted refugee flights. During the next several years, Cubans were able to reach the United States only in small boats or by going to Spain and applying there for entry through the Conditional Entry Program. With Cuban arrivals down to a trickle in the late 1970s, the HEW program also declined. By Fiscal Year 1978, its budget had dropped to \$71.8 million. The \$57.3 million budget for Fiscal Year 1979 has further declined to \$54 million in Fiscal Year 1980.

During 1979, Cubans could avail themselves of either of two refugee programs. By going to Spain, a Cuban national could apply for participation in the Conditional Entry Program for which he would qualify as a resident of a Communist-controlled country. If the individual Cuban was either a political prisoner or former political prisoner, he could apply for participation in the Special Political Parole Program requested by the Attorney General in November 1978 and authorized the same month. Under this program the United States paroled in 3,500 political prisoners and their families, approximately 10,000 persons in all. These programs have been completed. They were to have been superceded by the Refugee Act of 1980, under which we had planned to admit several thousand Cubans during the fiscal year, giving priority to former political prisoners and those with close friends in the United States. Given the flood of undocumented Cubans which began in April 1980, we have held these plans in abeyance.

Over the years, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Spain have accepted several thousand Cuban refugees. Costa Rica played an important role in attempts to resolve the 1980 Cuban refugee crisis, first offering to fly the 10,000 Cubans who sought asylum in the Peruvian Embassy in Havana out of the country and setting up resettlement camps in San Jose, and later by convoking two international conferences on the problem. At the first San Jose conference, 13 European and Western European nations made pledges to accept Cuban refugees totaling more than 3,000. The UNHCR and ICEM have both assisted with handling the 1980 exodus. ICEM also assisted at times in making arrangements for Cubans moving to or from third countries prior to 1980.

While Cuba permits the emigration of some citizens it considers undesirable, it also provided asylum to some political refugees from Chile, Uruguay, and other area countries. Cuba has not been active in international refugee relief efforts and does not contribute to the UNHCR.

ECUADOR

About 200 refugees are registered in Ecuador. They entered the country as political refugees and have been given indefinite refugee visas by the Ecuadorean Government. In addition, several times that number of Chilean, Argentine, and Uruguayan citizens now live in Ecuador who either cannot or do not wish to return home. Most of them entered Ecuador on tourist visas and subsequently regularized their status. Others remain in the country illegally.

The Ecumenical Committee for Refugees is the main refugee organization in Ecuador. It receives most of its funds from the UNHCR, which it represents in Ecuador, and the balance from the Catholic Church and some Protestant groups. The Committee sponsors refugees and seeks their permanent resettlement either in Ecuador or elsewhere. The Ecuadorean Government provides no financial assistance to refugees. Its contribution is confined to providing refugees with legal status and work permits.

Last April, after the Peruvian Embassy in Havana was overrun by refugees, the Ecuadorean Government announced it would accept 200 Cuban refugees for resettlement in Ecuador. As of August 1980, no Cuban refugees had actually been accepted for resettlement.

EL SALVADOR

As the civil strife increases in El Salvador, refugees have begun to flee to neighboring Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, Belize and even to the United States. No precise fix on the

numbers of refugees involved has been made at this date. An estimated 1,500 Salvadorans have fled to Honduras, perhaps the same amount to Guatemala and Costa Rica, and some 2,000 may have gone to Belize, and there are approximately 4,000 in Mexico. In addition several hundred Salvadorans presently in the United States may eventually apply for refugee status.

The number of refugees could increase significantly if the strife in El Salvador worsens.

HAITI

Haiti is the poorest and the most overpopulated country in the hemisphere. Economic and demographic pressures have prompted thousands of illegal emigrants to leave for neighboring Caribbean countries and the United States. Close to 15,000 Haitian arrivals have applied for political asylum in the United States. Most came to southern Florida aboard small boats directly from Haiti or after being expelled from the Bahamas.

After review of each individual case by the INS, the Department of State, and the UNHCR, a few hundred of the Haitian applicants have been granted asylum in the United States. With the unprecedented influx of Haitians in the spring of 1980, President Carter ordered all who were in INS proceedings as of June 19 to be paroled into the United States for a six-month period under the general category of "Cuban-Haitian entrants (status pending)."

The vast majority of the Haitians who emigrate to the United States and other countries seek to escape severe economic deprivation rather than political persecution. The distinction, however, is legally contentious, and court-ordered injunctions against deportation proceedings have effectively prolonged Haitians' stay in the United States. This in turn has encouraged other Haitians to come to this country.

The Haitian Government has been helpful in trying to curb illegal boat departures, and in accepting returnees. However, given Haiti's high unemployment, shortage of arable land, and dearth of economy resources, illegal emigration will be a problem for the United States and other Caribbean countries for the foreseeable future.

HONDURAS

After refugee numbers which reached to a hundred thousand during the Nicaraguan civil insurrection, the number of Nicaraguans in Honduras as refugees has fallen to only a few thousand, with perhaps some 2,000 receiving UNHCR assistance.

However, because of severe civil strife in neighboring El Salvador, Honduras now fears an invasion of refugees from that country. From 1,500 to 2,000 recently arrived Salvadorans are located in camps along border areas, and may soon receive UNHCR help. Honduras, because of its own underdevelopment, would be hard pressed to cope with any large numbers of refugees without outside assistance.

Talks were held during the first half of 1980 between a Texas-based Christian organization and Honduran officials aimed at convincing the Hondurans to receive 200,000 Hmong (Meo) tribesmen. After some initial interest, the Hondurans appear to have had second thoughts in the matter after learning that the Hmong, instead of raising rice as the Hondurans had expected, would probably take to the hills to pursue their traditional slash and burn agriculture.

MEXICO

Mexico has a long tradition of providing a haven for Latin American and Spanish Republican political refugees. With some exceptions, such as post-Allende Chile, Mexico's policy since the early 1950's has been to consider individual requests for asylum on a case-by-case basis. The Government of Mexico has no formal refugee program, is not a party to any legally binding international convention on refugees, and does not participate in the work of the UNHCR.

Mexico's large population growth and high rate of unemployment limit its capacity to absorb refugees. While Mexico's financial situation is improving with increased petroleum revenues, there are no indications that Mexico is contemplating any change in its refugee policy or that it is interested in receiving any significant number of refugees.

NICARAGUA

The change in government brought about by the civil insurrection of 1978-79 has allowed large numbers of Nicaraguan refugees to return home, just as it caused a new but smaller exodus of refugees. The roughly 20,000 Nicaraguans who left their country upon Somoza's fall have taken up residence in the other countries of Central America, the United States, and in smaller numbers have gone to Europe and South America. Nicaraguans in the United States have received voluntary departure status pending improvements in Nicaraguan conditions which would allow their return. The most recent extension of that status was granted on June 30 for 90 days. We contemplate no further extensions. All Nicaraguans now in the United States must prepare to leave or apply for political asylum. All

applications for political asylum are being individually reviewed.

Within Nicaragua, U.S. AID programs have been generous in efforts to feed and house the populace in the aftermath of the war; and in recent months, moderate numbers of Salvadorans have taken refuge in Nicaragua.

PANAMA

For the past several years, Panama provided temporary refuge to Cubans seeking to settle in the United States. The annual figure is estimated at 75 to 100 individuals. Panama does not have a formal refugee program but has accepted a limited number of refugees on a case-by-case basis. In recent months the government seemed to follow a less open policy with respect to Cuban refugees, and has moved to cancel the Panamanian registry of ships carrying Cuban refugees, a practice it followed previously with Indochinese refugees. A government/Catholic Church initiative has been under discussion with the UNHCR to accept for permanent residence an as yet undertermined number of refugees from Vietnam.

PARAGUAY

Paraguay has traditionally accepted large numbers of refugees and immigrants from Europe, Japan, and Latin America. A recent modest experience with Korean and Indochinese refugees has not been markedly successful, however. The commercial competitiveness and desire to live in an urban environment of some Korean refugees has been resented. These persons were intended to settle the sparsely populated Chaco region and pursue careers in agriculture when admitted to Paraguay. Ten Japanese Government-sponsored Vietnamese families were unable to carry on their vocation as fishermen and had difficulty adjusting to new occupations. Approximately 12 ethnic Chinese from Laos and Vietnam have also settled in Paraguay in addition to an unknown number of white Rhodesians. Despite some previous difficulties, Food for the Hungry is pursuing an ambitious plan to resettle several hundred ethnic Lao in the northern Chaco. Thus far, they have found the government's response encouraging.

Paraguay is relatively under-populated and probably could absorb additional refugees if the government were given assurances that future refugees would be settled in the agricultural regions of the country. Any such effort as that of Food for the Hungry would require long-term international support.

PERU

Peru provided temporary refuge to approximately 3,000 Chileans following the overthrow of Chilean President Allende in 1973. Not permitted to work in Peru, they were supported by the UNHCR. Only about 50 of the least educated and unskilled remain. The others, including some 400 who came to the United States, have been permanently resettled elsewhere. Peru's own financial and economic difficulties seriously limit its ability to contribute to international refugee relief efforts.

However, in the spring of 1980 Peru accepted about 730 Cuban refugees, most of whom had sought asylum in the Peruvian Embassy in Havana. The refugees are being housed in tents set up in a Lima public park. The UNHCR and the Peruvian Catholic Migration Committee have given financial and other assistance to the Peruvian Red Cross to help feed, clothe, and house the refugees. Most of the refugees want to come to the United States and reportedly are resisting Peruvian efforts to find them jobs and otherwise aid in their permanent resettlement in Peru. The Cubans could only emigrate to the United States under normal immigration procedures, having already received first asylum in Peru.

VENEZUELA

Venezuela continues to be a haven for political and economic refugees from the Western Hemisphere. Estimates of the number of foreigners in Venezuela vary widely. President Herrera stated in January 1980 that Venezuela has given refuge to two million from Central America, South America, and the Caribbean. Large communities of Cubans, Chileans, Argentines, and others live in Venezuela, having sought political freedom and economic opportunity there. Unconfirmed estimates of undocumented aliens, mostly Colombians, range up to several million. This influx of foreigners has caused the Venezuelan Government to reexamine its immigration policies and tighten its entrance requirements. Still, Venezuela continues to accept political refugees. President Herrera stated in June 1980 that Venezuela had received several thousand Cubans in the early months of the year. Venezuela has granted political asylum to about 20 Cubans who forcefully entered the Venezuelan Embassy in Peru in December 1979 and January 1980 and to about 100 persons at its Embassy in Bolivia following the July 1980 coup. Venezuela offered to accept 500 Cubans from among the 10,000 at the Peruvian Embassy in Havana and is now considering the cases of Cubans who sought first refuge in the United States from Mariel and have expressed a desire to go to Venezuela.

Venezuela has indicated that it is not in a position to receive refugees from outside the hemisphere. At the November 1979 UNHCR pledging conference, Venezuela increased its pledge from \$5,000 to \$20,000.

A REPORT PREPARED BY U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES:

Who helps the world's refugees?

1980 is a year of alarming increase in the number of refugees, worldwide. Since January 1st a total of 1.3 million men, women and children have fled their home countries, forced out by war or oppression. Fearfully they have made their way from Afghanistan, Cambodia, Chad, Ethiopia, Cuba . . . The new refugees joined millions of others, living precariously and waiting.

Requests to national governments to help with food, shelter and resettlement offers multiplied dramatically. Within a few months the 1980 budget of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ballooned 143 per cent -- from \$234 million to \$568 million.

Consistent with its strong traditions of concern for human rights and people in need, the United States has responded to the refugee crisis with millions of dollars in aid and with the resettlement of over 360,000 in 1980*.

The United States is the single largest contributor to aid for refugees and sometimes it appears to the American Congress and the public that the U.S. carries a disproportionate amount of the load.

This brief report is an attempt to show that many countries share the concern to help refugees, and to preserve their right to live free from fear of oppression. The U.S., single largest contributor, is also by far the largest of the assisting countries, and its national wealth -- Gross National Product -- is the largest in the world.

Data on what is contributed by governments to help refugees is not easy to compile. The most readily available information -- contributions to the U.N. efforts -- only reveals part of the story. Assistance also comes in the form of other gifts by nations, international and national voluntary agencies, of money, staff and food. Sometimes such assistance is part of existing national systems, extended to accommodate refugees, but not reported separately as "refugee aid."

The information on page 2, on contributions, is based on 1979, the latest

* In the year ended September 30, 1980, the U.S. received 231,700 refugees under the new Refugee Act. In addition 122,000 Cubans and 6,000 Haitians were permitted to stay as "entrants".

year available. In a further report, in the forthcoming 1981 World Refugee Survey, the editors expect to add more information about sources of aid.

MONEY FOR INTERNATIONAL AID: Help reaches refugees from different sources-- international agencies, national governments, non-governmental agencies. Information here is limited to assistance through international channels, consisting of 1979 contributions to four United Nations Agencies and one outside U.N. (ICEM). As will be seen, the United States is the largest contributor, but when measured in per capita terms, Scandinavian countries lead.

1979 CONTRIBUTIONS* TO INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE AID AGENCIES

Top 10 countries, ranked by Contribution Per Capita

Population ** (Millions)	COUNTRY	Contribution * (In Mil. of \$)	Contribution Per Capita	Gross National Product Per Capita **
8.3	Sweden	\$ 28.6	\$3.44	\$10,210
4.1	Norway	11.2	2.73	9,510
5.1	Denmark	13.3	2.61	9,920
6.3	Switzerland	10.5	1.66	12,100
14.1	Netherlands	22.7	1.60	8,390
61.1	Germany - FRG	62.8	1.02	9,600
222.5	U.S.A.	165.8	.74	9,700
55.8	U.K.	38.8	.69	5,030
8.2	Saudi Arabia	5.6	.68	8,040
116.8	Japan	75.9	.64	7,330

* Amounts reported by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees - UNHCR, United Nations Relief and Works Agency - UNRWA (Palestinian refugees), U.N. Food Programme (for refugees), UNICEF (for refugees) and Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration - ICEM. Contributions by European Economic Community totaling \$66 million have been assigned to countries in proportion to members' budget support. The top 10 countries contributed 83% of the total of \$522 million received.

** Population and GNP figures from Population Reference Bureau, Washington, D.C.

RESETTLEMENT OPPORTUNITY: Although the majority of refugees eventually return to their home country, or settle where they are, new homes in countries of resettlement are a necessity for many of them. United States has responded generously to this need, and other countries also have. The following table shows the numbers of refugees resettled by various countries in a five-year period. The top 10 countries are ranked by total of refugees received, compared to the country's population.

5-YEAR RESETTLEMENT TOTALS OF RECEIVING COUNTRIES
Top 10 Countries, Ranked by Ratio of Refugees to Population

Population (Millions)	COUNTRY	5-Year Resettlement Total *	Ratio of Refugees to Population
24	Canada	74,000	1: 324
14.6	Australia	44,000	1: 332
222.5	U.S.A.	595,200	1: 374
53.6	France	68,700	1: 780
6.3	Switzerland	5,300	1: 1,189
8.3	Sweden	6,100	1: 1,361
4.1	Norway	2,300	1: 1,783
7.5	Austria	3,700	1: 2,027
61.1	Germany - FRG	28,300	1: 2,159
55.8	U.K.	23,800	1: 2,345

* From spring, 1975, to May 31, 1980, totals taken from reports by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs. The majority of the refugees were from Indochina; others came from the Soviet Union, Cuba and other Latin American countries.

PRESENT LOCATION: Refugees are on every continent. Their arrival in large numbers can cause serious economic, political and social problems for the receiving country, whose resources often are limited. International help may be slow in coming, which adds to the strain. The table which follows shows the impact on countries of residence, in ratio of refugees to local population and Gross National Product per capita.

REFUGEES IN PRESENT LOCATIONS, LOCAL POPULATION, G.N.P.
Top 10 Countries Ranked by Ratio of Refugees to Local Population

Population ** (Millions)	COUNTRY	Refugees, As of 4/30/80 *	Ratio, Refugees to Pop.	Gross National Product Per Capita
3.6	Somalia	1.5 million	1: 2.4	\$ 130
3.2	Lebanon	1.2 million	1: 2.6	460
3.2	Jordan	682,600	1: 4.7	1,050
18.7	Sudan	441,000	1: 42	320
8.5	Cameroon	200,000	1: 43	460
8.6	Syria	198,500	1: 43	930
86.5	Pakistan	1 million	1: 87	230
29.3	Zaire	299,000	1: 98	210
47.3	Thailand	460,800	1: 103	490
18.6	Tanzania	156,000	1: 119	230

* Figures are from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the UN Relief and Works Agency, which aids Palestine refugees, and other sources.

** Population and GNP figures from Population Reference Bureau Inc., Washington.

1980 World Refugee Statistics

1980 REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

Africa	4,045,200
Asia	7,292,500
Europe	229,750
Latin America	1,085,300
Middle East	3,312,500
Worldwide Total	15,965,250

Africa

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	NUMBER OF REFUGEES ¹
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COUNTRY OF ASYLUM	
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From

ANGOLA	
Botswana	7,000
Namibia	4,000
Zaire	141,000 ²
Zambia	26,000

From BURUNDI

Rwanda	8,500
Tanzania	135,000
Zaire	11,000

From CHAD

Cameroon, Niger, Sudan	9,000
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From EQUATORIAL GUINEA

Cameroon	30,000
Gabon	80,000
Spain	5,000

From ETHIOPIA

Djibouti	50,000
Kenya	1,500
Somalia	1,174,300 ³
Sudan	303,000
Internally displaced ⁴	850,000

From LESOTHO

Botswana	150
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From NAMIBIA

Angola	30,000
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Botswana	600
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Zambia	5,500
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From RWANDA

Burundi	50,000
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Tanzania	25,000
Uganda	78,000
Zaire	22,000

From

WESTERN SAHARA

Algeria	50,000
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From

SOUTH AFRICA

Angola	1,000
Botswana	1,000
Lesotho	1,000
Swaziland	3,700
Tanzania	100
Zambia	150

From

SUDAN

Ethiopia	11,000
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From

TANZANIA

Internally displaced ⁵	40,000
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From

UGANDA

Canada	7,000
Kenya	5,000
Sudan	35,000
Tanzania	8,000

Kingdom	30,000
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Zaire	20,000
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From

ZAIRE

Angola	30,000
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Sudan	5,000
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Uganda	34,000
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From

ZIMBABWE⁶

Botswana	23,000
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Kenya	200
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Mozambique	150,000
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Tanzania	500
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Zambia	43,000
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Internally displaced	500,000
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Africa

Subtotal 4,045,200

¹Statistics are current as of January 1, 1980 when possible, or are based on the latest figure available in the second half of 1979.

²Of this total, 100,000 are from Angola and 41,000 are from Cabinda.

³474,300 are in refugee camps and 700,000 outside camps in surrounding area.

⁴Displaced from the Ogaden region to the Bale and Sidamo regions.

⁵Displaced from the Kagera River area because of fighting between Tanzania and Uganda in late 1978 and early 1979.

⁶Nearly all refugees from Zimbabwe returned early in 1980.

Asia

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	NUMBER OF REFUGEES ¹
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COUNTRY OF ASYLUM	
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From

AFGHANISTAN

Iran	300,000
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Pakistan	402,100
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From

CHINA (People's Republic of China)

Hong Kong, Macao, U.S.A.	183,500
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From

EAST TIMOR/INDONESIA

Australia	200
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Internally displaced	200,000
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From

INDOCHINA

Australia	27,150
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Austria	350
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Belgium	1,400
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Brazil	50
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Canada	27,200
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China	230,000
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Denmark	600
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France	57,700
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Germany (FRG)	8,900
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Hong Kong	300
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Hong Kong, Macao ²	65,900
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Indonesia ²	43,500
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Israel	200
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Italy	350
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Japan	50
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Malaysia	2,300
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Malaysia ²	42,300
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Netherlands	600
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Norway	900
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Philippines ²	6,500
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Singapore, Korea,	
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Taiwan ²	3,400
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Sweden	250
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Switzerland	3,000
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Thailand ²	164,550 ³
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United Kingdom	4,750
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U.S.A.	260,400
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Viet Nam ²	30,000
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Internally displaced

Cambodians	4,000,000
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Internally displaced

Laotians	1,000,000
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Indochina

Subtotal 5,982,600

From

PAKISTAN

Bangladesh	55,000
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From

PHILIPPINES

Malaysia	90,000
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From

TIBET/CHINA

Canada	250
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India, Nepal,	
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Bhutan	76,200
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Switzerland	1,250
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U.S.A.	200
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Western Europe,

Japan	200
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From

WEST IRIAN/INDONESIA

Papua	
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New Guinea	1,000
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Asia

Subtotal 7,292,500

¹Statistics are current as of January 1, 1980 when possible, or are based on the latest figure available in the second half of 1979.

²Refugees in camps.

³Does not include Cambodians in camps along the Thai-Cambodian border. (See special article on Cambodia — Ed.)

(Continued on Next Page)

1980 World Refugee Statistics (Continued)

Europe

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	NUMBER OF REFUGEES ¹
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COUNTRY OF ASYLUM

From BULGARIA	
Turkey ²	60,000
U.S.A.	700

From CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Austria	600
Germany (FRG) ³	850
Germany (FRG) ⁴	1,950
Italy	100
United Kingdom	2,000
U.S.A.	700
Western Europe	100

From GERMANY (German Democratic Republic)	
Germany (FRG)	12,100

From HUNGARY

Austria	650
Germany (FRG)	900
Germany (FRG) ⁴	350
Italy	300
United Kingdom	22,000
U.S.A.	2,300
Western Europe	150

From POLAND	
Austria	1,150
Germany (FRG)	950
Germany (FRG) ⁴	36,250
Italy	150
U.S.A.	2,400
Western Europe	400

From ROMANIA	
Germany (FRG) ⁴	9,650
U.S.A.	4,850

From U.S.S.R.	
Australia ⁵	3,550
Canada ⁵	1,750
Germany (FRG) ⁴	7,250
Israel ⁵	19,000
U.S.A. ⁵	30,000
U.S.A. ⁶	4,750

From YUGOSLAVIA	
Germany (FRG) ⁴	200

From EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES	
Greece	2,600

Europe Subtotal	229,750
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¹Statistics are current as of January 1, 1980 when possible, or are based on the latest figure available in the second half of 1979. In several instances the total represents migration for four or five years in the 1970's.

²Ethnic Turks.

³Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). All statistics for Germany are for 1979 only.

⁴Ethnic Germans.

⁵Soviet Jews.

⁶Ethnic Armenians.

Latin America

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	NUMBER OF REFUGEES ¹
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COUNTRY OF ASYLUM

From ARGENTINA	
Austria	200
Brazil	30,000
Canada	500
Colombia	200
Ecuador	400
France	200
Israel	300
Italy	100,000
Mexico	5,000
Netherlands	150
New Zealand	100
Spain	95,000
Sweden	650
Switzerland	100
United Kingdom	150
U.S.A.	100
Venezuela	2,000

From BRAZIL	
France	150
Netherlands	100
Sweden	450
Switzerland	50

From CHILE	
Algeria	2,000
Argentina	20,000
Australia	250
Austria	400
Belgium	600
Bolivia	100
Canada	7,000
Colombia	200

Costa Rica	150
Cuba	450
Denmark	600
Finland	150
France	1,900
Germany (GDR)	450
Germany (FRG)	2,500
Honduras	100
Hungary	100
Italy	850
Mexico	900
Netherlands	800
Norway	350
Panama	1,000
Peru	50
Romania	1,000
Spain	100
Switzerland	550
United Kingdom	1,750
U.S.A.	1,300
U.S.S.R.	50
Venezuela	30,000

From CUBA	
Spain	2,000
U.S.A.	665,050
Venezuela	20,000

From EL SALVADOR	
Costa Rica	300

From HAITI²	
Bahamas	1,000
Canada	2,000
Costa Rica	50
Dominican Republic	30,000
U.S.A.	8,000

From NICARAGUA	
Costa Rica	25,000
El Salvador	1,100
Honduras	13,000
Panama	800
U.S.A.	350

From unspecified Latin American countries	
Argentina	5,000
Ecuador	200

Latin American Subtotal	1,085,300
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¹Statistics are current as of January 1, 1980 when possible, or are based on the latest figure available in the second half of 1979.

²Figures on the number of Haitians in the countries concerned are substantially higher. Numbers here reflect a proportion cited by observers as "probably political refugees."

Middle East

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	NUMBER OF REFUGEES ¹
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COUNTRY OF ASYLUM

From CYPRUS	
United Kingdom	10,000
Italy	850
Internally displaced ²	193,450

From IRAQ	
Austria	100
Iran	30,000
U.S.A.	700
Internally displaced	300,000

From LEBANON	
United Kingdom	3,000
Internally displaced	1,000,000

From PALESTINE	
East Jordan	682,550
Gaza Strip	354,100
Lebanon	211,900
Syria	198,450
West Bank	310,250
Palestine Subtotal	1,757,250

From YEMEN (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen)	
Oman	3,000

Yemen (Arab Republic of Yemen)	15,000
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Middle East Subtotal	3,312,500
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¹Statistics are current as of January 1, 1980 when possible, or are based on the latest figure available in the second half of 1979.

²155,500 are Greek Cypriots and 700 are Maronite Cypriots in the south; 37,250 are Turkish Cypriots in the north.

(Refugee totals have been rounded off to the nearest 50. No figure is available on the number of "internally displaced" people in Viet Nam. — Ed.)

APPENDIX IV.

REPORT TO THE CONGRESS REGARDING CUBAN AND HAITIAN ENTRANTS

SEPTEMBER 1980

PREPARED BY THE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COORDINATOR FOR REFUGEE
AFFAIRS IN COOPERATION WITH THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE, JUSTICE,
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, LABOR, EDUCATION AND THE OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

BACKGROUND

Since April 21, 1980, the U.S. Government has been dealing with the extraordinary emergency in South Florida caused by the sudden influx of over 122,000 Cubans and 6,000 Haitians. This massive wave of migrants is having a drastic impact on the city of Miami, Dade County and the entire community of South Florida.

The recent Cuban/Haitian influx has been complicated by several factors:

-- The passage in March of 1980 of the Refugee Act of 1980. The Act did not contemplate sudden mass arrivals on our shores under circumstances which deny us the opportunity to enforce our immigration laws either by the screening and processing of groups determined to qualify as refugees while abroad, or by the careful case-by-case processing required for asylum applicants who reach this country;

-- Several court cases enjoining the government from excluding or deporting Haitians pending court approval of revised INS procedures;

-- the arrival of the migrants in small, overcrowded and unsafe boats, the bulk of them provided by citizens or residents of the United States seeking to reunite families in South Florida;

-- The refusal of the Cuban Government to accept the return of any of its emigrants, including those who wish to return, and

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particularly the criminals, mentally handicapped persons and others who do not qualify for admission to the United States.

In addition to these special factors, other longer-term, more fundamental conditions are affecting the Cuban/Haitian emergency in South Florida:

-- Over the past two decades, Miami has become a major port of entry for Cubans. During that period, over 900,000 Cubans have arrived in the United States, reflecting persistent troubles with Cuba's economy, growing frustration on the part of large segments of the population, and the steadily increasing drive for family reunification fed by the success of the early waves of Cuban emigres in Miami;

-- At the same time, mounting political, economic and social tensions in the Caribbean region and in Central America, are expanding the flows into the U.S. from the island countries -- the Dominican Republic, Haiti, the Bahamas, Jamaica, etc. -- as well as from Nicaragua, El Salvador and Colombia;

-- Until the beginning of the crisis, Cubans were welcomed in our tradition as a haven for the victims of Communist repression. Haitian and other Caribbean migrants, however, arrived as illegal entrants, except for a few who could qualify under the immigration laws primarily because of their relationship to residents of the United States.

-- The U.S. and Cuba have no formal diplomatic relations, making bilateral negotiations extraordinarily difficult.

FEDERAL RESPONSE

With the commencement of the Mariel boat lift on April 21, only a month after the passage of the Refugee Act, all of these factors complicated the U.S. response to the emergency, particularly the determination of the Cuban-American community to assist the immigration of relatives in Cuba. Under these conditions, the Federal Government had no choice but to seek a balance in its response between policies aimed at protecting human lives and those aimed at enforcing our immigration laws. It later became clear that many of the entrants were not relatives of U.S. residents and the U.S. accordingly acted to cut off the flow. In response to the flow the Federal government has:

-- Increased the federal law enforcement presence in Florida with special units of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Civil and Criminal Divisions of the Department of Justice and the United States Attorney in Miami, the F.B.I., and major elements of the Coast Guard and the Navy, the Customs Service and U.S. Marshals;

-- Received, processed and released for resettlement over 110,000 Cubans and over 5,000 Haitians;

-- Processed Cubans who arrived in the U.S. during the period April 21 to June 19, 1980 and who were in INS proceedings as of

June 19, 1980, together with all Haitians in the INS proceedings as of June 19, 1980, as Cuban/Haitian entrants (status pending). This status has provided eligibility for AFDC, Medicaid, and Supplemental Security Income under the same rules as for citizens;

-- Sought to internationalize the unregulated flow of Cuban entrants through bilateral and multilateral channels, including two conferences in San Jose involving over 20 nations convened by President Carazo of Costa Rica, a special session of the Organization of American States (OAS) in Washington, D.C., and the current session of the UN General Assembly, and meetings in Geneva of the nations which are donors to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. In addition, we have involved the UNHCR in screening Cubans for third country resettlement opportunities, in the voluntary repatriation of Cubans, and in the asylum processing of Haitians.

-- Proposed special legislation in the Cuban/Haitian Entrant Act.

FEDERAL AGENCIES

Presently the Federal Government's efforts are being coordinated by the Cuban/Haitian Task Force, a special interagency unit under the direction of Christian Holmes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Refugee Program Bureau of the Department of State, working under the supervision of Ambassador Victor H. Palmieri, U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs.

The roles of the various Federal lead agencies are as follows:

Department of State

- international diplomatic activities, initial resettlement and Task Force administrative support

Department of Justice

- coordination of Federal law enforcement in Miami, staffing and direction of civilian control units in the processing centers, and processing of new arrivals (INS)

Department of Health and Human Services

- payment of Federal share of AFDC, SSI and Medicaid for those who qualify, care of unaccompanied minors, health screening and medical care

Department of Defense

- security at the processing centers (Army and Air Force), maritime enforcement (Navy)

Department of Transportation

- maritime enforcement and safety efforts (Coast Guard)

Department of the Treasury

- maritime enforcement (U.S. Customs Service)

Department of Education

- training programs

Department of Agriculture

- food stamps

Federal Emergency Management Agency

- logistical planning and funding

General Services Administration

- logistical support

INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS

Beginning with the Peruvian Embassy incident where up to 10,000 Cubans sought sanctuary, the United States began to apply its policy of developing international solutions. We urged the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross to offer their good offices to address the plight of the individuals within the embassy. Cuba rejected their offers. In response to the Peruvian request for assistance, we pledged to finance and accept for resettlement up to 3,500 of the asylum seekers, marking the first time that the U.S. had not accepted sole responsibility for all Cuban refugees.

The establishment of the Mariel boat lift, however, has made internationalization very difficult. The international community basically views the problem in terms of a bilateral Cuba-U.S. question. Moreover, the numbers of Cuban entrants and their general desire to remain in the U.S., and the reluctance of other nations to offer resettlement opportunities, has made the third country resettlement of any major portion of them impractical. In view of this, our major international efforts are aimed at seeking support of our objective of stopping the flow from Mariel and returning to Cuba the criminals and others who do not qualify for admission under our laws.

As a result of these efforts, two conferences of interested nations met in San Jose, Costa Rica, in May and again in June to seek methods to secure Cuba's cooperation in ending the flow. The first conference formed a three-nation group charged with approaching Cuba for the purpose of negotiating an end to the flow and establishment of an orderly departure program for close relatives of U.S. residents. The Cuban authorities refused to

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meet with that group. The second conference again called on Cuba to end the flow and issued a strong communique condemning the exportation of criminals and other undesirables. Cuba ignored the communique.

At the annual meeting of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the San Jose communique was widely distributed and Cuba was severely criticized. Cuba again rejected the international critics of this policy.

The United States, with the assistance of several other countries, is currently seeking further international action in the OAS and the UN with a view toward restating the long-held international principles of respect for other countries' immigration laws, the right of individuals to return to their country of nationality and condemnation of the practice of exporting criminals and other undesirables. The process of international organizations is a slow one and, while we are confident that the above principles will be reaffirmed, we cannot be sure that such action will result in any change of policy on Cuba's part.

In addition to our efforts to bring international attention to the problem and pressure upon Cuba to stop the flow, we have also enlisted the assistance of the UNHCR in securing third country resettlement offers for those Cubans wishing to resettle elsewhere and use of UNHCR's good offices for the return to Cuba of individuals who voluntarily wish to return or who are excludable or deportable under our laws. The UNHCR has identified through interviews held in the camps approximately 800 persons wishing to resettle in third countries.

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They are actively working in securing resettlement offers on behalf of these individuals. To date some 88 Cubans have been accepted by other nations for resettlement, 36 to Australia, 12 to Argentina, and 40 to Venezuela, and there are now prospects for 100 to 200 more.

The UNHCR has also identified a number of individuals who voluntarily wish to return to Cuba and has requested that Cuba accept these persons back. Thus far, Cuba has rejected both the UNHCR's requests as well as the separate demands made directly by the U.S.

ENFORCEMENT

The present policy and practice of the Justice Department and the other agencies engaged in law enforcement activities is to take action against those persons involved in illegally importing undocumented aliens from Cuba. Pursuant to this policy, the following actions are now taken with regard to every boat arriving at Key West:

- (1) Fines of \$1,000 per alien are levied against the operator of the boat;
- (2) These civil fines are being secured by seizure of the boat itself by the United States Customs Service (usually this seizure is only constructive).
- (3) In all cases, whether or not it has been established that the owner consented to the use of his vessel to land illegal aliens, the vessel is seized by INS for purpose of forfeiture.* These seizures involve taking actual physical custody of the boat. More than 106 boats have been taken over by INS pursuant to such seizures.

* The statute precludes forfeiture unless the owner consented to or knew of the use of his boat to land illegal entrants but allows seizure without proof of consent or privity, provided the owner is given an opportunity to show non-consent.

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- (4) The boat captain, members of the crew, the owner, if he is aboard, and anyone else implicated in the illegal importation are arrested and charged with a criminal offense. The arrests are actual arrests and are made on the spot.

With regard to southbound boats, the Coast Guard is interdicting and inspecting every boat which it detects and which appears to be headed for Mariel. In those cases in which there is substantial specific evidence of such an intention, arrests are authorized by the United States Attorney's office and the boat is seized for purposes of forfeiture. The prosecutors have worked with Coast Guard personnel, providing guidance to the Coast Guard as to requirements for physical and testimonial evidence. Although prosecutions for southbound boats cannot be brought in every case, they are being brought in a substantial portion of the cases and this portion has recently increased from about 20% to more than fifty percent.

The law enforcement actions in the field are being supported through the filing of papers in the District Court in Miami as follows:

- (1) Indictments are obtained from the Grand Jury for all persons arrested. To date, there have been more than seventy such indictments charging more than 300 people.* Prosecutions have been authorized for more than 700 people who may be indicted.

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- (2) Except where civil fines are paid voluntarily, lawsuits are being filed to compel the payment of the civil fines. Scores of these cases are in process at this time and will be filed at the rate of more than one dozen per day, starting shortly.
- (3) With regard to vessels seized for forfeiture, papers will be filed with the court to perfect the forfeiture and make it permanent.

The Department of Justice is investigating whether the flotilla activity is the product of significant criminal conspiracies among the Cuban-American community in Southern Florida, and pursuing all investigative leads in this regard. A specially selected team of investigators is working full time on this matter, and a Grand Jury has been convened to investigate possible conspiracies. The earliest visible actions will be the subpoenaing of owners and their records.

To strengthen and accelerate Justice Department field enforcement and court activity, additional investigators were recently added to the office in Miami and a special Cuban boat unit was created within the United States Attorney's office.

Despite the policy of arrests and seizures for forfeiture, the number of boats detected headed for Mariel, the number at Mariel and the number arriving back at Key West continues.

Returning Cuban convicts presents numerous practical difficulties. The process for obtaining final rulings on the asylum claims filed by virtually all the convicts is slow and cumbersome.

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The initial phase of the process takes a minimum of three to six months. In all cases where the claimant appeals from an adverse determination and is prepared to pursue all possible remedies, the process takes up to a year. Our experience has been that about one half of the claimants are appealing.

At present, there are approximately 100 Cubans who have been the subject of final orders and have chosen not to appeal. More than a thousand Cuban convicts are in various stages of the process. At the present rate, final determination in all of these cases cannot be completed until the end of the year. Each week five or ten additional convicts have their asylum claims rejected and choose not to appeal, thereby becoming available for exclusion. To date, no one has been excluded and we cannot do it under present law.

INS has undertaken to accelerate the process greatly by recruiting 15-20 administrative law judges from other agencies. Their addition would triple the number of judges currently hearing these matters and enable INS to conclude determinations in all cases in approximately 5 - 7 weeks.

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LEGISLATIONFiscal Year-80 Supplemental Appropriations

The Administration requested supplemental appropriations to deal with the financial costs involved in the Cuban/Haitian entrant situation. This appropriation request included:

- Federal Emergency Management Agency - \$249 million to operate the federal processing facilities.
- Department of State - \$39 million for the United States Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund to finance the initial resettlement of Cuban and Haitian entrants.
- Department of Health and Human Services - \$36 million for health screening and medical care and related costs of Cuban/Haitian entrants.
- Department of Education - \$25.3 million for adult and children's education programs for Cuban and Haitian entrants.

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- Department of Justice - \$20.8 million for operating expenses associated with its processing and security and enforcement functions at Cuban and Haitian processing centers.
- Department of Transportation - \$18.0 million to cover Coast Guard operations involving Cuban and Haitian entrants.
- Department of the Treasury - \$600,000 for Customs Service operations associated with the Cuban/Haitian entrant program.

Congress appropriated \$346 million, deleting the \$39 million requested for State Department resettlement expenses.

FY-81 Legislation for Resettlement of Cuban/Haitian Entrants and for Continuation of Processing Center Operations

The Administration is seeking approximately \$65 million to cover FY-81 expenses for the operation of the processing centers for the Cuban and Haitian entrants and for the resettlement of the entrants; \$30 million is sought for center operations and \$35 million for resettlement.

Funds for State and Local Communities

The FY-80 Supplemental Appropriations Act appropriated \$50 million in FY-80 and \$50 million in FY-81 to reimburse state and local governments for the costs of cash and medical assistance and social services provided to Cuban/Haitian entrants (status pending). These appropriations require specific authorizing

language.

Congressman Fascell and Senator Stone have proposed authorizing legislation for these funds as part of the Foreign Aid bill which is pending in a House-Senate conference. In view of the current emergency in South Florida and the drastic fiscal impact of the Cuban/Haitian entrants on the community, the Administration supports such an authorization as a way to begin payment for costs incurred.

CUBAN/HAITIAN ENTRANT ACT

The Cuban/Haitian Entrant Act proposed by the Administration would establish in law the Cuban/Haitian entrant status for recently arrived Cubans and Haitians, and define benefits available to the entrants as well as the availability of Federal reimbursement to the states for those benefits.

While passage of an authorization for the \$100 million supplemental appropriation will begin to fund benefits and reimburse states, we will continue to seek enactment of the Administration's proposed legislation, in addition to more clearly delineating the applicable benefit provisions. The Cuban/Haitian Entrant Act of 1980 would:

- Establish in law the "Cuban/Haitian Entrant" status for Cubans and Haitians arriving prior to June 20;
- Strengthen present seizure laws;
- Provide for conversion to Permanent Resident Alien status after two years;

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- Improve future asylum processing, both to expedite case-by-case review, including exclusion and deportation, and to reduce the likelihood of future problems of this nature.

AID TO SCHOOL DISTRICTS

The Congress is now considering the Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980. This bill, which has the support of the Administration, will authorize aid to school districts. We believe this bill could be an appropriate vehicle for the authorization of the \$100 million supplemental appropriation and for the directive authority for the Task Force to operate the processing centers.

AID TO SOUTH FLORIDA AND OTHER AREAS

The Administration has taken, or is undertaking, the following actions:

- The provision of \$6.8 million for physical and mental health services to Cubans and Haitians in the Miami area;
- The commitment of \$30 million for transportation costs and resettlement grants to voluntary agencies to relocate Cubans and Haitians;

- The provision of approximately \$10 million for adult education programs for Cubans/Haitians in the Miami area;
- The funding of a \$179,500 demonstration project to assist unaccompanied minors in the Miami area;
- The provision of \$264,700 to identify specific social and health service needs for Haitians in Miami and to assist in the delivery of these services;
- The provision of an emergency grant of \$150,000 to Dade County officials for use in bringing Haitians in to local service agencies to receive services;
- A grant of \$500,000 to the Dade County Community Action Agency to assist in the resettlement of Haitians;
- A grant of \$50,000 to the State of Florida to help its Office of Volunteer Services to meet the emergency needs of the undocumented Haitian population;
- The funding of a City of Miami project to help meet the needs created by sponsorship breakdowns;
- Funding of \$700,000 for costs of improving holding centers for Cubans and Haitians (Krome North and Krome South) in the Miami area.

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RESETTLEMENT

Since the beginning of the Mariel boat lift on April 21, approximately 110,000 Cubans have been resettled in the United States (50,000 with sponsors developed by the agencies operating at the four Federal processing centers and the balance in Miami). Over the same period, 5,500 Haitians have been resettled in Miami out of 6,614 arrivals.

Since the inception of the Cuban flotilla, the resettlement agencies have been deeply involved in assisting the United States Government in processing and placing the Cuban entrants. The agencies participating, some who have been active in refugee resettlement for over thirty years, have been a major contributor to our ability to react quickly to the problem and deserve commendation for our resettlement progress.

For the most part, the Haitians have been assisted by the local Community Action Agency of Dade County which is the recipient of a \$500,000 grant from the State Department for this purpose. Some of the resettlement agencies have expressed an interest in assisting Haitians but have been reluctant to begin resettlement operations until the Haitians' status is clarified.

At the commencement of the boat lift, the resettlement agencies agreed to participate in placing the Cubans without guarantees of reception and placement grants, and most of the agencies set up operations in each of the camps with Federal assistance for personnel costs. Soon, however, the lack of resettlement funding became a problem because of the number of Cubans arriving and the nature of the caseload, which became progressively

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more heavily weighted with single males without relatives in the U.S. In response to the agencies' request, the State Department has committed reception and placement grants for the pre-June 20 arrivals from the Migration and Refugee Emergency Fund.

The grants fall into two categories:

- (1) For resettlement out of the camps after June 19, 1980, and for out placement from the South Florida area after that date at \$300 per capita; and
- (2) For entrants released from the camps June 19, 1980 or before, or released directly into the South Florida area at \$100 per capita.

For both categories of grants, it is understood that the agencies will not be able to provide the full range of services which they do under the larger Indochinese grant program. At this time, the State Department has obligated \$7 million to reimburse the agencies for approximately one-half of their costs incurred to date.

The agencies participating in the resettlement program have shared the caseload as follows:

United States Catholic Conference	58 %
Church World Service	17.3%
International Rescue Committee	10.4%
Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service	5.9%
World Relief	5 %
Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society	1.7%
American Council for Nationalities Service	1.1%

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Tolstoy Foundation	.3%
Southern Baptist Convention	.2%

Additionally, the Task Force is working with the agencies on developing proposals to assist special populations such as those needing intensive rehabilitation services, the elderly, and the handicapped.

Several problems exist in resettlement. Sponsorship breakdowns continue. This is most obvious in Maimi's Tent City where we are now developing a secondary resettlement program. There is a decline in departures from the camps. This is reflective of a number of factors including progress in family reunification cases and reduced interest from the general population.

Regardless of the intensive effort to develop an orderly resettlement program, state and local governments, particularly in Florida, New Jersey, New York, and California, will have to service this population in their public assistance program and finance the costs until satisfactory legislation is enacted. As with the resettlement agencies, state and local governments have extended themselves to assist this unanticipated population and we greatly appreciate their contribution.

PROCESSING CENTERS

Of the roughly 64,000 Cubans who have been airlifted from Key West, there are presently approximately 11,000 awaiting resettlement at four federal processing centers: 600 at Eglin AFB,

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Florida; 3,200 at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas; 3,300 at Fort Indian-town Gap, Pa.; and 4,000 at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. In addition, there are over 700 new Cuban arrivals presently being processed in the Miami area. Haitian arrivals being processed in Miami now total approximately 1,500.

Despite the accomplishment represented by the resettlement program, the enforced stay in the processing centers has generated continuing frustration and disorder among segments of the population. At least four basic factors are involved:

- (1) The presence of large numbers of single males, many hardened by their experience in Cuba, some with a demonstrated tendency to victimize vulnerable individuals, particularly women and children;
- (2) The continuing outflow of those easiest to resettle, thereby concentrating the most difficult elements of the caseload, including unaccompanied minors -- most of them physically mature and representing difficult behavioral problems -- persons with mental and physical disabilities, and others that require special rehabilitative or other institutional arrangements;
- (3) The difficulty of providing adequate security in these temporary facilities;

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- (4) The inefficiencies and delays in processing and resettlement procedures, coupled with the cultural gap and communication problems between federal and voluntary agency administrative personnel and the Cuban population.

With respect to unaccompanied minors, the issues which have complicated the resettlement process involve matters of legal responsibility for the minors and the availability to states of funding for needed services through the age of majority. The successful release of a minor to a local community involves assuring that some entity is legally responsible under law for the provision of necessary resettlement services, e.g., signing a minor into school, signing for needed medical attention, etc., a responsibility that does not enter into resettlement of entrants over the age of majority. Various remedies to resolve this issue to the satisfaction of states have largely failed until now. The Administration has recently adopted a new policy whereby placement of minors will be effected by HHS with INS retaining legal responsibility until enactment of legislation providing for a Congressional authorization for needed services. Negotiations with states and private agencies indicate that sufficient placement under the new procedure will be available to avoid the need for continuing detention of minors.

NEW ARRIVALS

While the massive influx of Cubans -- which averaged over 20,000 per week in May -- has decreased substantially, the flow continues at a rate of approximately 100 per day with almost 9,000 Cubans having arrived since June 19. During the same period, some 4,300 Haitians have arrived and they continue to come at the rate of about 50 per day.

Enforcement is directed at the crews and boats. The arrivals are accepted by INS for processing, subject to future exclusion proceedings. The small overcrowded boats cannot be turned back out to sea without an unacceptable risk of loss of life.

These new arrivals are not now being sent to any of the four major federal processing centers. Rather, after preliminary screening by INS, they are held at former missile sites outside Miami -- Cubans at Krome North and Haitians at Krome South. There are substantial environmental and overcrowding problems at both sites.

There are presently over 1000 Haitians at Krome South. To meet these problems, the Task Force has:

- Made continuing efforts to find more suitable facilities so that new arrivals can be moved out of the Krome sites;
- Taken over management of both sites from INS; and
- Taken steps to correct some of the worst deficiencies pending agreement of local authorities on new locations.

At Krome North, there are presently about 800 Cubans. While most of the new Cuban arrivals are family reunification cases and are able to obtain release within 72 hours, a backlog is building of single males who have been awaiting resettlement.

BROKEN SPONSORSHIPS

Instances of sponsorships that have broken down, either by decision of the sponsor or the sponsored individual, are small in number compared to the tens of thousands of entrants who have been successfully resettled. Nevertheless, as the Cuban influx grew and the resettlement effort was accelerated, so did the frequency of sponsorship breakdowns, and in many cases, these previously resettled individuals have found their way back to Miami.

In order to accommodate these individuals, Miami city officials decided to open the Orange Bowl as a temporary holding center.

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Later, in order to avoid disruption of Orange Bowl activities tied to the 1980 football season, these individuals were transferred with the assistance of Federal funds to a new site known as Tent City. It consists of an area underneath several highway overpasses in downtown Miami near Little Havana, which city officials paved to make way for the installation of tents. Over 4,000 people have thus far been processed through Tent City and some 800 are currently residing there. We are committed to phasing out this temporary arrangement by September 30, when Tent City will be closed. The first tent was taken down last week.

Tent City residents, meanwhile, are being processed on an accelerated basis by the voluntary agencies, which have set up offices adjoining Tent City, and it is hoped that nearly all of the individuals who lost sponsorships will find new ones outside the state of Florida.

The Federal Government has provided grants totalling more than \$450,000 to Metropolitan Dade County, the City of Miami, and the North Hudson Community Action Agency of Union City, New Jersey, to help overcome the problems of food, clothing and shelter which have followed sponsorship breakdowns in these two areas of heavy Cuban - American concentration and resettlement of new arrivals.

As of midnight 9/17/80

	<u>CUBANS</u>	<u>HAITIANS</u>
Arrivals last 24 hours	<u>190</u>	<u>266</u>
Cumulative arrivals	<u>124,535</u>	<u>6,993</u>
Resettlements last 24 hours	<u>260</u>	<u>83</u>
Cumulative resettlements	<u>110,705</u>	<u>5,721</u>
Percent resettled	<u>88.9%</u>	<u>81.8%</u>
Current Population at Centers	<u>11,972</u>	<u>1,227</u>

	Miami	Eglin	Chaffee	Indian- town	McCoy	Total Cubans	Krome South and other locations
Current population	876	649	3,132	3,187	4,128	11,972	1,227
Change in camp popula- tion	- 0.2%	- 0%	- 0.4%	- 0.7%	- 0.8%	- 0.6%	+ 10.9%
Arrivals last 24 hours	190	0	0	0	0	190	266
Cumulative arrivals	61,994	10,025	19,060	19,094	14,362	124,535	6,993
Resettlements last 24 hours	192	0	13	23	32	260	83
Cumulative resettlements	60,856	9,283	15,771	15,544	9,251	110,705	5,721
Transfers to Chaffee	0	0		0	0	0	

CUBAN/HAITIAN TASK FORCE
CUBAN ENTRANT DATA REPORT
August 31, 1980

A. Arrivals

1. Inflow

The total number of Cuban arrivals as of August 31 was 122,004. Nearly 80 per cent of this total came in late April and May. In the three months since, almost 27,000 Cubans have arrived; 63 per cent of whom came in the first week of June.

Monthly totals show the flow of arrivals starting April 21. Weekly totals, however, indicate the shifting flow pattern even more dramatically:

	<u>Mon-Sun Weekly Total</u>	<u>Calendar Monthly Total</u>
April 21-30	6,333	6,333
May 1-10	24,408	
11-20	35,861	
21- June 1	28,548	88,817
June 2-8	17,009	
9-15	1,684	
16-22	564	
23-29	872	
30-July 6	315	20,444
July 7-13	649	
14-20	660	
21-27	405	
28-August 3	1,187	2,901
August 4-10	280	
11-17	709	
18-24	1,203	
25-31	1,317	3,509

During the months of June and July, daily arrival figures show Cubans coming in "mini-cycles". For each of two or three days, 150-200 entrants will arrive then two or three days will pass with no or very few arrivals wherein the cycle starts again. August, however, has shown a slightly different pattern with a more steady flow of arrivals, averaging about 130 per day. The total number of arrivals during August is also up from July by over 52 per cent. For the past eleven weeks, since the week of June 19, Cuban arrivals have averaged 739 per week. The July weekly average was 656 while August was 1,000 -- up 52 per cent.

2. Sociodemographics

AGE	SEX		Unknown	Total
	Male	Female		
0 - 5	3,950	2,796	952	7,698
6 - 11	3,439	2,998	13	6,450
12 - 17	3,915	3,070	20	7,005
18 - 29	29,985	7,746	71	37,802
30 - 59	33,650	11,613	72	45,335
60+	2,939	3,070	14	6,023
Unknown	7,437	1,238	0	8,675
Total	85,315	32,531	1,142	118,988

Note: Sociodemographics data as of August 13.

As indicated by the age and sex distributions, approximately 71 per cent of the Cuban arrivals are male with 29 per cent female. In terms of age categories, about 6 per cent are in each of the youth groups, 0 - 5, 6 - 11, and 12 - 17. Cuban adults form the bulk of the entrants with 32 per cent in the 18 - 29 group and 38 per cent 30 - 59 years old. About 5 per cent of the Cubans are 60 years and over with 7 per cent of unknown ages.

No data is currently available on other social characteristics; however, camp officials estimate only about 2 - 5 per cent of the Cubans speak English. A sizable proportion of arrivals, especially the males are single. Educational level is still undetermined but estimates suggest a 5th to 8th grade average. Occupational background for many working age Cubans is thought to be manual labor.

WEEKLY CUMULATIVES

	Sept. 8 to Sept. 14	CUBANS	HAITIANS
Arrivals		1,353	441
Cumulative Arrivals		123,825	6,614
Resettlements		2,041	488
Cumulative Resettlements		109,798*	5,435
Percent Resettled		88.7%	82.2%
Military personnel:			
As of Sept. 14		3,868	
Change from last week		+ 461	
Current Population at Centers		12,167	1,478

WEEKLY TRENDS

Average Cuban daily arrivals for this week has been 193.3 per day, up 188.9% from last week's rate of 66.9 per day. Average Cuban daily resettlement for this week has been 181.4 per day, down 1.8% from last week's rate of 184.6 per day. Overall Cuban camp population is down 5.4%. Average Haitian daily arrivals for this week has been 63.0 per day, up 36.7% from last week's rate of 39.9 per day. Average Haitian daily resettlement is 69.7 per day. Comparison figures are not available for last week. Overall camp population is down 1.1%.

	Miami	Eglin	Chaffee	Indian- town	McCoy	Total Cubans	Krome South and othe location
Current Population	731	661	3,215	3,281	4,279	12,167	1,478
Change in Population	+9.4%	-7.0%	5.7%	-6.7%	-6.3%	-5.4%	-1.1%
Arrivals last week	1,353	0	0	0	0	1,353	441
Cumulative Arrivals	61,284	10,025	19,060	19,094	14,362	123,825	6,614
Resettlements last week	1,289	57	195	215	285	2,041	488
Cumulative Resettlements	60,291*	9,269	15,688	15,450	9,100	109,798*	5,435
Transfers to Chaffee	0	0		0	0	0	

* includes correction of September 13 report - cumulative resettlements for Miami were 59,999, not 59,991 as previously reported.

CUBAN PROCESSING STATUS

	Miami	Eglin	Chaffee	Indian- town	McCoy	Tota
In-process	381	0	485	13	74	953
Awaiting clearance	0	0	0	51	308	359
Post-processed	350	656	2,699	2,973	3,224	9,902
Ready for resettlement	0	5	31	244	673	953
Current totals at centers	731	661	3,215	3,281	4,279	12,167

CUBAN FAMILY STATUS

	Miami	Eglin	Chaffee	Indian- town	McCoy	Total
Unaccompanied Minors	N/A	0	156	157	237	550
Single Adults	N/A	648	2,934	3,077	3,367	10,026
Family members	N/A	13	125	47	675	860
Totals	N/A	661	3,215	3,281	4,279	11,436

HAITIAN PROCESSING STATUS

	Krome South	FCI	Other
Pre-processed	0	0	0
In-processed	544	45	0
Post-processed	500	125	0
Released to holding center	264	0	0
Resettlements- last 24 hrs	141	0	0
Totals	1,449	170	0

N/A = not available today

VOLUNTARY AGENCY RESETTLEMENTS

	Miami	Eglin	Chaffee	Indian- town	** McCoy	Total Cubans	Krome South and other locations
USCC	N/A		106	93	28		--
CWS	N/A		36	36	17		--
IRC	N/A		15	55	26		--
LIRS	--	--	23	9	20		--
WRRS	N/A		13	25	--		--
HIAS	--	--	--	0	20		--
ACNS	--	--	--	--	26		--
TOLSTOY	--	--	--	--	--		--
SB	--	--	--	--	--		--
SDA	--	--	--	--	--		--
CAA	--	--	--	--	--		488

USCC - U.S. Catholic Conference
 CWS - Church World Service
 IRC - Int'l Rescue Committee
 LIRS - Lutheran Immigration and
 Refugee Service
 WRRS - World Relief Refugee
 Services
 HIAS - Hebrew Immigrant Aid
 Society, Inc.

ACNS - American Council for
 Nationalities Service
 TOLSTOY - Tolstoy Foundation
 SB - Southern Baptist
 SDA - Seventh Day Adventists
 CAA - Community Action Agency

* - Actual departures
 ** - Sponsor verifications, not actual departures
 *** - Sponsor-matches, not actual departures
 N/A - Not available

MILITARY PERSONNEL

Military sources report a total of 3,868 military personnel at the camps today, an increase/decrease of 461 from last week.

	Eglin	Chaffee	Indiantown	McCoy	Total
U.S. Army	2	1,005	1,171	1,473	3,651
U.S. Air Force	217	0	0	0	217
U.S. Marine Corps	0	0	0	0	0
National Guard	0	0	0	0	0
Total	219	1,005	1,171	1,473	3,868

Detention Report

As of Sept. 14

INS reports an increase/decrease of 37 people in detention today.
 This brings the total to 1,731.

Terre Haute, Indiana	FCI	32
Atlanta, Georgia	FCI	796
Butner, North Carolina	FCI	1
Florence, Arizona	FCI	10
Leavenworth, Kansas	FCI	234
Lexington, Kentucky	FCI	3
McNeil Island, Washington	FCI	317
Miami, Florida	FCI	1
Oxford, Wisconsin	FCI	53
Springfield, Missouri	FCI	19
Talladega, Alabama	FCI	177
Brooklyn, New York	SPC	27
New York, New York	MCC	10
Bernalillo County Juvenile Detention Center, Albuquerque, New Mexico		9
Bexar County Juvenile Detention Center, San Antonio, Texas		1
Emerson House Juvenile Detention Center, Denver, Colorado		19
Cambria County, Pennsylvania (county jail)		0
Carville, Louisiana (hospital)		1
Fort McCoy, Wisconsin		15
Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania		6
		<u>1,731</u>

	Miami	Eglin	Chaffee	Indian- town	McCoy	Total Cubans
INS Detention- change since previous report	+1	+6	0	+25	+5	+37
Cumulative INS detention	230	99	95	299	1,008	1,731
Camp detention*	--	0	104	112	279	495
Change since previous report	--	-7	+15	-1	+130	+137
Hospitalizations	--	N/A	N/A	35	N/A	N/A
Change since previous report	--	N/A	N/A	-12	N/A	N/A

*This figure includes all camp detention areas

N/A = Not available today

BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL

Report To The Congress

OF THE UNITED STATES

Indochinese Refugees: Protection, Care, And Processing Can Be Improved

The continuous exodus of refugees from Communist Indochina in 1979 strained the willingness and the ability of Asian asylum countries to accept refugees and to assist in providing protection and temporary care. GAO reported in 1979 that because of political restraints and the humanitarian plight of these people, the Department of State should seek more active participation of international and voluntary agencies in refugee resettlement. In the past year, conditions at the transit centers and resettlement camps have improved somewhat.

GAO makes additional recommendations to alleviate the continuing problems associated with refugee protection, care, and resettlement.



ID-80-46
AUGUST 19, 1980



COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548


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To the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives

In April 1979, we reported on the nature and growth of the Indochinese refugee problem; how the problem was being addressed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, first-asylum countries, the United States, and other resettlement nations; and the U.S. program for selecting and resettling refugees.

This report updates that information and describes (1) changes that are needed in U.S. procedures for refugee processing, (2) improvements needed in the protection and care of refugees, (3) obstacles being encountered in implementing an orderly departure program, and (4) the establishment of refugee processing centers.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of State; the Attorney General; and to cognizant congressional committees.


Comptroller General
of the United States

COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S
REPORT TO THE CONGRESSINDOCHINESE REFUGEES:
PROTECTION, CARE, AND
PROCESSING CAN BE IMPROVEDD I G E S T

Since the Communist governments were established in Indochina in 1975, more than 1.2 million refugees have fled their homelands to other Asian asylum countries due to political persecution, human rights abuses, warfare, and famine. The refugee exodus reached a peak of 58,000 a month in June 1979, but has since subsided to about 3,100 a month. In April 1979, GAO reported on the international efforts to resettle these refugees; this report describes the current situation.

CURRENT RESETTLEMENT CONDITIONS

Although conditions had improved slightly, approximately 284,000 refugees remained in camps at the end of 1979 despite extensive international efforts at resettlement. Over 254,000 refugees have been resettled since August 1977--mostly in the United States, France, Australia, and Canada. In addition, international and voluntary agencies are more involved in refugee care and resettlement. Following the unexpected surge in the number of people fleeing Indochina in early 1979, however, camps became overcrowded. As a result, refugees were not adequately cared for or protected. A doubled U.S. commitment to refugee resettlement--from 7,000 to 14,000 refugees a month--and the use of questionable processing procedures, combined to intensify existing problems. (See p. 9.)

The refugees' medical conditions and delays in treatment further impeded resettlement. Because of language barriers, incomplete and/or inaccurate documentation supporting refugee assertions, problems were encountered in applying the provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act to the increased number of refugees scheduled for resettlement in the United States.

ID-80-46

Monthly quotas of refugee movements were frequently shifted between asylum countries, further complicating resettlement. GAO questions the applicability of certain processing procedures and cites examples where abbreviated procedures could speed resettlement. Streamlining security verification procedures by the Department of State is especially needed. (See p. 27.)

THE ORDERLY DEPARTURE PROGRAM

To curtail the large number of refugees fleeing Vietnam by boat, Vietnam and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reached an agreement in May 1979 for a direct emigration or orderly departure program. The program was intended to allow persons "who want to work abroad or for the purpose of family reunification" to legally travel to resettlement countries.

Although the United States and other countries welcomed the program, difficulties have arisen that are hampering its implementation. By early 1980, only 226 persons had departed Vietnam for the United States under the program. (See p. 29.)

Success of the orderly departure program is essential if the inherent risks and hardships experienced by the 1979 boat people are to be avoided in the future. A number of obstacles must be overcome, particularly those imposed by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The Secretary of State should give special attention to resolving these problems and seeking ways to guarantee the success of the orderly departure program. (See p. 30.)

REFUGEE PROCESSING CENTERS

The 1979 GAO report pointed out the need for additional temporary care facilities. Two refugee processing centers are now under construction to accommodate 60,000 refugees. Moving refugees to these centers will relieve some of the burden on asylum countries. (See p. 36.)

Because most center inhabitants will be refugees guaranteed U.S. resettlement, these centers may lose their intended international character. In addition, those refugees guaranteed resettlement in the United States are not included in the current commitment to resettle 14,000 a month, and their subsequent resettlement could potentially increase future U.S. funding and commitments to resettlement of Indochinese refugees.

GAO recommends that the Secretary of State take a lead role in assessing the manner in which the centers are being established and the extent to which the United States and other countries are expected to use and financially support the centers. (See p. 39.)


PROTECTION AND CARE

Although conditions have improved since the 1979 GAO review, in many cases camps and transit centers are not adequately protecting refugees from crime and abuse. In addition, not all the camps are providing adequate care, including: food, medical care, shelter, water and sanitation facilities, supplies, safety, education, recreation, and self-reliance projects. (See p. 40.)

The absence of these essential services creates discontent among refugees, severely hampers resettlement, and may make other solutions, such as voluntary repatriation or local integration, impossible. Accordingly, GAO recommends that the Secretary of State encourage the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to provide better protection and care for these people. Monitoring the expenditure of funds for refugee care also needs to be stepped up to make sure that funds are used as intended. (See p. 55.)

AGENCY COMMENTS

GAO requested the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to comment on a draft of this report on May 19, 1980. They did not provide comments within the 30-day time limitation allowed under the GAO Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-226) and did not request an extension of the time period. Accordingly, there are no agency comments in this report.




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ABBREVIATIONS

GAO	General Accounting Office
ICEM	Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration
INA	Immigration and Naturalization Act
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Service
JVA	Joint Voluntary Agency
OAR	Office of Asian Refugees
RPC	refugee processing center
SRV	Socialist Republic of Vietnam
U.N.	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees



BOAT PEOPLE FROM VIETNAM AT WESTERN QUARANTINE ANCHORAGE, HONG KONG. JUNE 1, 1979.
(PHOTO COURTESY OF THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT.)

CHAPTER 1DEVELOPMENTS ON THEINDOCHINESE REFUGEE PROBLEM

The flow of refugees from Vietnam, Kampuchea (formerly Cambodia), and Laos into other Asian countries is continuing although in substantially lesser numbers than in early 1979. Although the flow has lessened, there are still thousands of refugees in countries of first asylum awaiting resettlement. In addition, the United States and the international community continue to share the burdens associated with refugee protection, care, and resettlement.

In our April 1979 report,^{1/} we described the nature and growth of the Indochinese refugee problem. Our report outlined how the problem was addressed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), by first-asylum countries, by the United States, and by other resettlement nations. The U.S. program of refugee selection and resettlement was also described in our 1979 report. This report is an update, describing some current problems in the resolution of refugee resettlement and asylum. The massive influx of Kampucheans into Thailand in October 1979 is not, however, discussed in this document.

REFUGEE EXODUS AND RESETTLEMENT

Since the Communist governments were established in Indochina in 1975, more than 1.2 million refugees have fled their homelands in Indochina due to political persecution, human rights abuses, warfare, and famine in their countries. After 1977, the number of refugees increased substantially because of increased restrictions on civil and personal liberties in all of the countries, accelerated arms conflict in Vietnam and Kampuchea, and economic and political measures in Vietnam aimed at forcing the departure of unwanted citizens. Because of these conditions, refugee populations in first-asylum countries increased from about 200,000 to about 385,000 from January to July 1979.

The exodus of large numbers of refugees from Indochina reached a peak of 58,000 a month in June 1979. By December 1979, however, the number of refugees from Indochina greatly declined

^{1/}"The Indochinese Exodus: A Humanitarian Dilemma," (ID-79-20, Apr. 24, 1979).




GOVERNMENT DOCKYARD, HONG KONG, JULY, 1979. (PHOTO COURTESY OF THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT.)

to about 3,100. (See app. II.) The principal reason for the decreased arrivals in first-asylum countries was the Vietnam moratorium on assisting the departure of its people, as a result of international criticism and concern which culminated in July 1979, at the U.N.-convened international conference on Indochinese refugees in Geneva.

Despite the extensive international efforts of resettling over 254,000 refugees since August 1977, over 284,000 refugees remained in camps of first-asylum countries at the end of 1979. International organizations and third countries are still attempting resettlement for those remaining in the camps.



SCENE INSIDE LIVING QUARTERS, CHERATING REFUGEE CAMP, MALAYSIA
NOVEMBER, 1979.



INTERIOR SCENE OF LIVING QUARTERS AT GALANG REFUGEE CAMP, INDONESIA. NOVEMBER, 1979.

ATTITUDES OF COUNTRIES
OF FIRST ASYLUM

The principal countries to which Indochinese refugees flee are Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Hong Kong. The attitudes of these countries about receiving and providing temporary asylum, or resettling refugees has varied widely. Although some countries viewed the large number of arrivals as a threat to their security and racial balances, others followed a policy of according temporary asylum largely on the strength of the humanitarian aspects of the problem.

During the major influx of refugees during early and mid-1979, refugees were often denied entry to some of these countries. In some cases, boats carrying refugees were pushed off and towed back out to sea. Although the total number of those refused entry is not known, a UNHCR official estimated that between January and October 1979, some 17,000 were denied entry in one country. In mid-1979, these countries relaxed their no-admittance policies, largely due to the decrease in the refugee population that resulted from increased resettlements and fewer arrivals.

Attitudes toward refugee resettlement within first-asylum countries also vary. Fundamentally, the countries of Southeast Asia do not accept these refugees for resettlement except

in limited numbers and under unusual circumstances--reunification of families or religious links. These attitudes are influenced largely by consideration of racial balances and population levels within these countries.

Indonesia does not accept refugees for resettlement but does afford temporary asylum for refugees pending their onward movement to resettlement countries. Hong Kong has resettled less than 300 refugees and has no plans to settle more. Unlike the other countries, the Hong Kong Government has substantially funded the cost of caring for its refugees--spending \$14 million for this purpose between January and October 1979. Of the Indochinese refugees reportedly resettled between August 1977 and December 1979, over half went to the United States, as indicated below.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Refugees</u>	<u>Percent</u>
United States	143,202	56
Australia	27,224	11
Canada	26,489	10
France	25,585	10
Others	<u>31,577</u>	<u>13</u>
Total	<u>254,077</u>	<u>100</u>

Refugees entered the United States primarily under two provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA): conditional entry and parole. The conditional-entry provision authorizes the annual admission of a maximum of 17,400 refugees who flee from Communist countries or the Middle East because of persecution or who are victims of natural disasters. The parole provision authorizes the Attorney General, at his discretion, to temporarily parole aliens into the United States under prescribed conditions. The parole provision can be used in emergencies or for reasons in the public interest. Refugees entering the United States on parole are selected on the basis of a priority system. Because of its flexibility, it has been used on many occasions to admit groups of refugees who would otherwise be ineligible for admission because of limitations of the conditional-entry provision.

Two actions under the parole provision were authorized during 1979. On April 13, the Attorney General authorized the parole of 40,000 Indochinese refugees to be admitted through September 30, 1979. In July 1979, the United States announced that it would admit 14,000 Indochinese refugees a month--or 210,000 for the 15-month period from July 1, 1979,

to September 30, 1980. The Attorney General authorized the parole for the announced 14,000 monthly rate on October 18, 1979.

The Refugee Act of 1980 (1) raises the annual limitation on conditional-entry refugee admission to 50,000; (2) redefines and clarifies the application of the term, "refugee"; and (3) provides procedures for meeting emergency situations if resettlement needs cannot be met within the 50,000 ceiling.

ROLE OF THE UNHCR

Since July 1975, the UNHCR has been the international focal point for mobilizing resources and for efforts in resolving the Indochinese refugee problem. One of its most important responsibilities is the international protection of refugees. The UNHCR encourages governments to follow liberal practices in opening their frontiers to refugees and in granting them temporary asylum. Stressing that the problem is one of international concern, the UNHCR also encourages other nations to provide contributions and resettlement offers.

The UNHCR also provides financial assistance for the care of refugees through governments of asylum countries and voluntary agencies. This assistance includes support for food, water, shelter, medical care, supplies, education, and self-sufficiency projects. In addition, the UNHCR coordinates assistance from voluntary agencies which provide relief supplies and services. The UNHCR follows three basic approaches to solving the refugee problem: (1) voluntary repatriation, (2) local integration in first-asylum countries, and (3) resettlement in third countries.

Voluntary repatriation is the most desirable solution to the refugee problem, provided conditions in countries of origin make it possible. Repatriation to Kampuchea and Vietnam is not viable at present because of government hostility in those countries to the refugees. However, the UNHCR is exploring such a program with Laos. As noted earlier, first-asylum country governments are not generally receptive to local integration.

Since the Indochinese refugee problem began, permanent resettlement has been the most workable solution. The UNHCR has sought to bring the Indochinese refugee problem to the world's attention in the hope of finding new homes for the refugees. In the asylum countries, the UNHCR coordinates and assists the resettlement efforts of the United States and other nations. For permanent resettlement in most countries

other than the United States, the UNHCR provides funds to the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) for the transportation of refugees from asylum countries.

The UNHCR will also administer the refugee processing centers (RPCs) planned for construction in the Philippines and Indonesia. These centers will hold refugees who may have to wait up to 3 years to resettle in the country which has accepted them. Moreover, the UNHCR coordinates a program which provides for the departure of persons directly from Vietnam--"the orderly departure program"--to resettle in other countries.

The UNHCR believes that increases in third-country resettlements are essential before resettlement in first-asylum countries can occur. Third-country resettlements pledged at a refugee conference in Geneva, Switzerland, in July 1979, resulted in some 260,000 resettlement opportunities in almost 30 countries. The conference did not generate commitments from countries that had not previously agreed to accept refugees, but countries which had made prior commitments increased their quotas.

COST OF REFUGEE ASSISTANCE

Refugee assistance is provided by the UNHCR, ICEM, various voluntary agencies, and the governments of asylum and resettlement countries, in the form of land for camp sites, protection, care (food, water, shelter, medical care, supplies, and education), resettlement, transportation, etc. The United States and other nations contribute to the UNHCR, ICEM, and voluntary agencies to provide relief and resettlement assistance.

During 1979, the UNHCR estimated that general program expenditures for assistance to Indochinese refugees were about \$109 million. (This amount includes the former special program for Indochinese refugees which was incorporated into the general program after February 1979.) Of the \$109.0 million, the United States has contributed about \$23.5 million--about 22 percent. In addition, the UNHCR estimated that it would spend an additional \$10.5 million on special programs related to the Indochinese refugees. This includes \$10.0 million for the planned construction and operation of the RPCs and \$.5 million for implementation of the departure program.

For 1980, the UNHCR general program expenditures for the Indochinese refugees are estimated to be about \$133 million. Its special programs are estimated to be \$62 million, of which \$60 million is for the planned construction and operation of the RPCs; \$2 million is for the departure program.

During 1979, ICEM spent about \$83 million to arrange transportation, medical examinations, and to provide other services for Indochinese refugees. Of that amount, ICEM received about \$68 million from the United States for refugees being resettled there. The United States also contributed an additional \$3.5 million for the ICEM administrative and operations budget. ICEM also received about \$7.8 million from the UNHCR. The United States paid about \$2.3 million of that amount which was based on its share of contributions to the UNHCR. For 1980, the ICEM estimated budget for the Indochinese refugee program is about \$113 million.

CHAPTER 2CHANGES ARE NEEDED INPROCEDURES FOR REFUGEE PROCESSING

The United States did not see an immediate need to change its procedures for processing Indochinese refugees when its resettlement commitment was dramatically increased in 1979. The existing procedures were adopted when refugee movements were about half of this new commitment. Emphasis was placed on meeting the increased quotas but the procedures did not always permit efficient and speedy refugee processing. For instance, undue emphasis has been placed on a priority category system resulting in much time being spent in proving or otherwise verifying refugee assertions. Also, circumstances surrounding medical examinations, diagnosis, and treatment contributed to delays in refugee processing. Difficulties were experienced in applying the INA provisions to the increased number of refugees that had to be resettled in the United States.

The frequent shifting of monthly quotas between refugee offices in first-asylum countries took place in an attempt to meet the increased quotas and to maximize refugee movements out of high-priority countries of asylum but added to the frustrations of managing larger numbers of refugees.

INCREASED REFUGEE RESETTLEMENTS
CAUSED PROCESSING PROBLEMS

In July 1979, the United States doubled its commitment for resettling Indochinese refugees--from 7,000 to 14,000 a month--during the 15-month period from July 1, 1979, through September 30, 1980. Past experiences disclosed that between the spring of 1976, and June 30, 1979, only about 74,000 refugees--an average of 1,900 per month--had been moved to the United States. During the 3 months prior to the increase, a monthly average of only about 4,500 had been achieved.

Even in light of this earlier refugee movement experience, the State Department Office of Asian Refugees (OAR), attempted to meet the quotas by utilizing existing procedures and by rapidly building a refugee case load pipeline to sponsoring voluntary agencies. This ambitious attempt to achieve a goal of processing and moving 14,000 refugees a month--without simplifying its procedures--created a crisis situation.




REFUGEES AWAITING PROCESSING AT UBON REFUGEE CAMP, THAILAND.
NOVEMBER, 1979.

Monthly refugee movement quotas were tentatively allocated to the various first-asylum countries by OAR. When these allocations were first made, however, some refugee offices were unable to meet their quotas at the increased levels. As a result, OAR shifted quotas between the country offices in an attempt to achieve the overall monthly goal.

The OAR requirement to rapidly increase direct departures to the United States precluded any meaningful managerial analysis and treatment of existing problems associated with the movement of the large number of refugees. Considerable time was spent trying to document and assign categories when, in reality, the categories did not always apply to the order in which refugees were selected and processed. Further, the capability to conduct medical examinations and arrange transportation to final destinations was, in the short term, affected. Agencies often duplicated each other's efforts and records. On occasion, refugees were shuffled back and forth between camps and transit centers. During the start-up, inadequate notice was given to ICEM to prepare for and schedule medical examinations.

In its quest to meet its quota, for example, the refugee office in Thailand allowed over 4,000 refugees to be brought to a 750-person capacity transit center for medical examinations and transportation arrangements. The facility was, therefore, greatly overcrowded and processing became virtually chaotic. An additional 1,000 refugees having Canadian destinations, further increased the already crowded conditions there. Although the refugees were only intended to spend a few days in the transit center, many were there for months.

Some refugees who did not pass their medical examinations were transferred to a camp about 150 miles away. That camp was not able to handle the sudden influx. Food, shelter, and medical care were inadequate. Refugees with identified medical problems were not always treated, and records of those treated were not maintained.



STOCKADE APPEARANCE OF CHERAS TRANSIT CENTER, MALAYSIA. NOVEMBER 1979.



TENT SHELTERS AT CHERAS TRANSIT CENTER, MALAYSIA. NOVEMBER, 1979.

Scheduling transportation was often hectic. Inadequate notice was sometimes given in transferring refugees from camps to transit centers. Refugees were booked on outgoing flights, and sponsors in the United States were advised of their arrival times before refugees were given medical examinations. If the refugees did not pass the medical examinations, the transportation bookings had to be canceled, and the U.S. sponsors were sometimes not notified. Refugees were also placed in a standby status for flights in the event that other refugees were unable to travel at the last minute. If those on standby departed, their sponsors sometimes received less than 8 hours notice before their arrival. Because of these last-minute changes, some refugees were reportedly not met at their destinations by their sponsors.

The refugee coordinator for Indonesia, for example, continually exhorted those involved in the refugee program to do more to reach their quotas. When only a portion of their quotas had been met, crises occasionally occurred. Numerous requests were made to obtain assurances of additional sponsors, and ICEM was under pressure to process medical examinations and to arrange transportation as quickly as possible. The first month this office met its quota was November 1979 when it reported that 3,014 refugees had departed. However, at the end of November, 846 refugees that had been reported as having departed, were still in transit camps in Singapore. We were advised that all of them did depart within a matter of 1 or 2 weeks.

Each office was advised of its movement allocation for an ensuing month. However, these numbers were frequently changed during the month. Indonesia, and Malaysia, for example, had their quotas changed three times. In one month, Thailand had its quota changed five times. OAR maintains that adjustments in country allocations were necessary not only due to the relative size of refugee populations in first-asylum countries, but also due to the political, economic, and social pressures caused in those countries by the sudden influx of large numbers of refugees. However, officials more directly involved in processing refugees told us that the numerous changes were very disruptive and adversely affected their ability to process refugees. They told us that staffing levels established to handle projected processing loads were at times found to be either insufficient or excessive. The voluntary agencies which locate refugee sponsors in the United States told us that the shifting of quotas between countries also disrupted their operations.

QUESTIONABLE APPLICABILITY
OF PRIORITY CATEGORIES

Existing procedures were difficult to apply in the selection and processing of large numbers of refugees. They were intended to serve as a means of identifying and moving refugees on an equitable basis, from the thousands awaiting resettlement. The procedures require refugees to be designated in one of four principal categories which are supposed to resettle refugees by priority.

The four priority categories are as follows:

Category

- | | |
|-----|---|
| I | Refugees with close relatives living in the United States. |
| II | Refugees who were former employees of the U.S. Government in Indochina. |
| III | Refugees who were closely associated with U.S. policies or programs because of previously held positions in the former Indochinese governments or armed forces, employment with American firms or organizations, or training received in or by the United States. |
| IV | Refugees not accepted by a third country--not within Category I, II, or III--and because of obviously compelling reasons, should be granted parole on humanitarian grounds. |

Note: Some of these categories had sub-components which allowed refugees to be assigned to 1 of 13 categories within this priority system.

In actual practice--before the July 1979 resettlement increase occurred--the priority categories were not systematically adhered to in some instances. Priorities were applied more on a country-by-country basis and, as a result, boat refugees with lower priorities were processed faster than land refugees who had higher priorities and who had also spent more time in camps. As noted earlier some of this may have resulted from OAR decisions that were influenced by conditions in asylum countries.

After the 1979 increase in the U.S. resettlement commitment, the priority categories played a lesser role in determining the order in which refugees were processed. In addition, getting access to some remote refugees camps was difficult and necessitated selections that might not otherwise have been made.

Of the thousands of refugees departing Thailand, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Indonesia, only an estimated 25 percent or less were in the two highest categories. In Hong Kong, where most of the refugees are from North Vietnam, over 70 percent of

those leaving for the United States were in the lowest category. An estimated 88 percent of the refugees from Thailand and 76 percent from Malaysia were in the two lowest categories. Most refugees moved from Indonesia were also in the lowest two categories, however, that refugee office did not maintain statistics showing the exact percentage.

During their discussions with refugees, the Joint Voluntary Agency (JVA) personnel (under contract with the Department of State) involved in processing stressed the importance of priority categories. Their basic approach was to place refugees as high in the priority system as possible. Because the refugees themselves believed that priority categories were important, they made every effort--even to the extent of being dishonest--to be placed in higher categories.

STEPS INVOLVED IN PROCESSING REFUGEES

Several steps are involved in processing refugees for resettlement and although they may differ between locations, the objectives are the same. The majority of the processing effort involved determining assigned categories for individual refugees and in documenting those assignments through the following steps.

1. JVA staff members screen the refugees through interviews at the camps. During the interviews, biographical information--including language capabilities, education, and work experience--as well as information about relatives in the United States and other third countries is also obtained. Based on the data gathered, tentative priority categories are assigned. The prescreening interview data is then returned to the refugee office for further processing.

2. Cables are sent by JVA staff members to various organizations in the United States to (1) verify any relationships claimed with persons residing in the United States for refugees in Category I, (2) obtain security clearances if the refugees are 14 to 16 years or older (the age varies between refugee offices), and (3) to verify claimed employment with the U.S. Government for refugees in Category II. U.S. refugee officers also review the accuracy of information provided to place refugees in Categories II and III. JVA staff members assemble gathered data in refugee files and the case files are then returned to the camps.

3. JVA staff members or U.S. refugee officers conduct pre-INS interviews to assure that the information contained in the refugee files is accurate and complete.

4. Refugee cases are presented to INS officers who are responsible for assuring that the refugees are admissible under the INA. The INS officers test the accuracy of the file information by interviewing the refugees. The INS officers then either approve or disapprove the cases and determine the assigned priority category number.

5. Refugees are interviewed again by JVA staff members. The purpose of these interviews is to obtain information required by the U.S. voluntary agencies who locate and assure sponsors for the refugees.

6. Refugees receive medical examinations after sponsors are assured.

7. Transportation is arranged, refugee belongings are packed, and necessary documents are assembled. Refugees depart on scheduled or chartered aircraft.



REFUGEE PROCESSING AT KUKU REFUGEE CAMP, ANAMBAS ISLAND, INDONESIA. DECEMBER, 1979.

Refugee categories
prolonged processing

Program personnel told us that concern over categories prolonged the processing of some refugees. They said higher categories required more work and processing time to develop than those in the lower categories. They described the case processing and development as perfunctory, time-consuming, and sometimes unnecessary, because lower category cases frequently left for the United States before the higher ones did. We were also told that Category I and II cases required affidavits, documents, and data verifications which caused delays, while the lower Category III and IV cases required minimal documentation and encountered few delays. While acknowledging that lower priority categories are less troublesome to process, OAR contends that documenting the cases, to the extent presently done, is to satisfy the requirements of the voluntary agencies and INS.

For example, in December 1979, there were some 1,200 refugee cases in Thailand that were deferred because of category-related problems. We were told that if the categories were eliminated, most of the deferred cases could be processed without delay. Caseworkers said their only alternative was to either wait for required documentation or to reclassify the cases to a lower category. We noted that this had been done in some instances to meet quotas.

All of the refugee offices attempted to process refugees with higher priorities first. The Malaysia and Hong Kong refugee offices attempted to move refugees in order of priority. In Malaysia, for example, files were prepared first for refugees in Categories I and II. In Hong Kong, refugees in the first three categories were processed before those in Category IV. The Hong Kong office also requested assurances of sponsors for the refugees in the first three categories before the cases were presented to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Sponsors for those in Category IV were requested after INS had approved the cases. In both countries, cases were presented to INS in the order of priority. However, because the number of refugees with high-priority categories in both of these countries was limited, many refugees in lower-priority categories were processed just as fast.

Refugee processing in Indonesia and Thailand contrasted markedly with the efforts in Malaysia and Hong Kong. Processing in Indonesia was done by individual camp, according to refugee arrival dates. Adhering to this practice was not always possible because some camps were in remote areas and access to the refugees was difficult. Categories were

assigned and documented and attempts were made to move those by camp in order of their priorities. Refugees in the lowest two categories were selected and moved first in Thailand because these cases involved less work and fewer problems.

Strict compliance with the priority categories often conflicted with the desire to meet monthly quotas. We observed cases where refugees who had high priorities, in effect, were penalized because they had to wait for data verification before they could be moved. At the same time, however, refugees with lower priorities were processed because their cases required little or no documentation. We also noted instances where the categories were changed from a higher to a lower priority to speed movement. When the choice of meeting quotas or following the priority system was encountered, action to meet the quotas usually prevailed.

Data verification was difficult

Some procedures used to prove or disprove refugee claims were often time-consuming and costly to accomplish, but were viewed as being essential to comply with the provisions of the INA and OAR refugee policies. Some of the procedures impeded processing and were, in our opinion, of questionable value.

Many refugees arrive in camps with incomplete or no identification and without necessary documents. Consequently, subjective decisions on the validity of refugee claims must be made. For example, some refugees appear older than they actually are and, either do not know or are unable to prove their true ages. Since verification is not possible in these cases, birthdates are assigned by the caseworkers. In addition, refugee claims of relationship to persons residing in the United States are troublesome to verify and can delay processing for months. Verifying refugee claims of past employment with the U.S. Government was similarly difficult. Although cables are sent to Government departments in the United States to verify claimed employment, agency records are frequently incomplete. Responses to these cables, if any, often take from 4 to 6 weeks. In the absence of supporting documents, claims have to be verified through individual interviews with the refugees.

As a practical matter, the value of these steps appeared questionable to us because refugee names, birthdates, and other assertions were not always verifiable. Some refugees were uncertain of the spelling of their names or applied for resettlement using aliases. Further, refugee data in verification cables was sometimes in error.

Security clearance problems

The practice of obtaining security clearances for all refugees is of questionable value and is an impediment to timely movement and resettlement. Refugee data in cables for these clearances was not always accurate. Secondly, there were very few "hits"--instances whereby either positive or negative information regarding refugees is contained in a data base. Only negative hits are relayed to the overseas posts. Finally, the fact that negative responses to security clearances are received does not necessarily mean that the refugees will be denied resettlement in the United States. For most requested clearances, resettlement has to be delayed by about 20 working days from the date cables are dispatched to allow time for response. For emergencies, this delay can be reduced to 11 days.

Clearance cables are sent to the State Department, INS, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Defense Intelligence Agency. The purpose of the clearances is to determine whether refugees are ineligible to enter the United States under excludable conditions contained in the INA. The clearances are done through both manual and computerized comparisons of refugee names to files maintained at each agency. Records are based on information obtained from Federal, State and local governments, foreign governments, and Interpol. Much of the information contained in the data banks at each agency is outdated because it covers the pre-1975 period. We were told that although the data bases contain information on Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam, none is available on North Vietnam. We noted that security clearances were being requested for North Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong even though there were no records available upon which to base such clearances.

We discussed the security clearance process with officials of the State Department, DEA, and INS. INS officials told us that the security clearance process has resulted in few hits. These officials told us that INS is advised of all hits, but statistics are not kept on the numbers involved. DEA officials provided an estimate of the number of hits encountered from 1975 to 1979. Of the approximate 201,000 clearances that DEA processed during that period, there were only 359 hits--less than .2 percent of those processed. State Department officials told us that there had been very few, if any, hits on women and children--a large majority of the refugee population.

Opinions as to the value of the clearances varied among the officials we contacted. One official doubted whether the clearances were still useful because 5 years had passed since the fall of the South Vietnam Government. Another official told us there was doubt about whether records existed on all persons who were considered potential security risks to the United States. He also told us that the use of aliases by the refugees could affect the usefulness of the clearances. Other officials believed the security checks were useful, but suggested that the age be raised and the idea of eliminating clearances for females be considered. Finally, one official told us that running the security checks was worthwhile to insure U.S. security. This particular official added that all immigrants should undergo security checks regardless of the procedures and said that the low percentage of hits was not important.

Many officials involved in processing at the overseas posts also expressed doubts about the value of the clearance process because of the limited number of hits and the unreliability of the data base. In addition, they told us that the process to prepare the cables was very time-consuming and costly. For example, one large post estimated that during a 4 and 1/2-month period, about 11,400 clearance cables were sent. The cost of preparing and transmitting clearance cables at the overseas posts was not available. However, the State Department estimated that it would cost about \$2.2 million to carry out the procedure in the United States during fiscal year 1980.

The INS role in refugee processing

The purpose of INS involvement in refugee processing is to assure that refugees approved for entry into the United States are admissible under the provisions of the INA. However, the manner in which they carry out their role, in our opinion, does not provide such an assurance and is, therefore, of questionable value. We believe the following factors limited INS in assuring that the INA provisions were satisfied:

- INS officers had to interrogate refugees through interpreters, who were themselves refugees.
- INS officers relied on the documentation in refugee case files, which was often incomplete or inaccurate.
- Refugees were not always told the importance of telling the truth or assuring that information in their case files was correct.

--INS officers were encouraged to approve refugees to help meet the monthly quotas.

--INS officers generally could not identify refugees who would be inadmissible for medical reasons because interviews were conducted prior to the medical examinations.

Refugees and all aliens must meet legal requirements for admission into the United States. Refugees inadmissible under INA include Communists, criminals, polygamists, the mentally retarded or insane, those with dangerous, contagious diseases, and those who have attempted admission to the United States by fraud or misrepresentation. INS officers rely heavily on refugee interviews and information presented in case files to determine admissibility to the United States.

Verifying the accuracy of translated questions and answers during interviews was difficult for INS officers. Refugees acted as interpreters and could be sympathetic to those being interviewed. Furthermore, some refugees generally knew the questions which would be asked and the types of responses which would help assure INS approval. We were also told that these interpreters were subject to threats or abuse if the INS officers disapproved the refugees being interviewed.

Documentation in refugee case files was often unreliable in determining refugee admissibility. Many of the INA concerns (on criminal or moral grounds) could not be determined in the



INS INTERVIEWING LOEI REFUGEES AT REFUGEE CAMP, THAILAND.
NOVEMBER, 1979.

interviews if nothing was found in the files to refute the refugee statements. In Indonesia and Thailand, case files were sometimes presented to INS officers that were either incomplete or contained inaccurate information. INS officers checked the files for responses to security clearance cables sent to U.S. agencies. If responses were not received within 20 days, the officers assumed that the refugees had no adverse records and the cases were presented to INS. During pre-INS interviews which we observed, refugees were not cautioned against actions which would jeopardize their acceptance to the United States--such as being dishonest with the INS officers and not correcting erroneous information in their files.

In Malaysia and Indonesia, all cases were presented to the INS officers even though rejection was expected in some cases because of derogatory information in the files. INS officers were aware of the emphasis being placed on meeting monthly resettlement quotas and were encouraged by U.S. refugee offices to help achieve them.

In Thailand, INS interviews with each refugee averaged about 6 minutes, compared to the 20 minutes JVA caseworkers spent on each case. JVA caseworkers essentially functioned as INS officers. The day before the INS officers arrived, JVA staff members (1) administered oaths to the refugees to tell the truth and (2) screened applicants to detect and eliminate Thais and other false refugee applicants. To



REFUGEES BEING SWORN IN BY A JOINT VOLUNTARY AGENCY STAFF MEMBER AT UBON REFUGEE CAMP, THAILAND. NOVEMBER, 1979.

speed up resettlement, INS officers reviewed the efforts of JVA caseworkers, conducted short interviews with the refugees, and usually approved the cases for U.S. admission.

Refugee officers and caseworkers reported that refugees have entered the United States illegally or through fraudulent methods. Caseworkers told us that in several cases, information regarding false applications had been discovered after the refugees departed for the United States. A refugee coordinator reported that friends in the United States who entered as refugees admitted to filing false applications and family relationship forms to gain entry. Voluntary agencies have also reported similar cases.

INS officers generally shared the view that, in attempting to meet quotas, the U.S. priority system had become meaningless. To help meet quotas, potential Category I or II refugees were approved in lower categories if the U.S. refugee officers and the INS officers believed that the refugees were honestly representing their histories, but verification had not yet been received. As an example, the INS officer with whom we spoke in Indonesia told us that he approved Category I or II refugees without lowering their categories if he thought they were telling the truth.

There were no assurances that INS officers were rejecting those refugees who were inadmissible for medical reasons under the INA. Because refugees were medically examined after INS approval, the INS officers could unknowingly approve refugees who were mentally retarded, insane, or who had dangerous, contagious diseases.

On the basis of our review and observations, there can be some question as to whether there was adequate assurance that refugees approved for U.S. entry were admissible under INS terms. It also brings into question whether INS, or anyone else, can assure that the provisions of the act are met because all exclusions contained in the act are not applicable to refugees. The likelihood of assuring that the INA provisions are met for Indochinese refugees is reduced, in our opinion, because (1) many refugees use aliases, (2) some refugees misrepresent their status, or (3) the system is unable to disapprove false claims. The estimated cost of the INS role in resettling Indochinese refugees is estimated to be about \$2 million for fiscal year 1980/

MEDICAL PROCESSING
UNNECESSARILY DELAYED RESETTLEMENT

As specified in Section 212 of the INA, a refugees are to be excluded from entry into the United States for mental

disorders and certain dangerous contagious diseases which have been defined by regulation as including venereal disease, active tuberculosis, and infectious leprosy. Refugees having one or more of these conditions were placed in a medical hold status. Those with treatable conditions could be removed from medical hold after successful completion of treatment. The act also provides that waivers can be obtained for some otherwise excludable conditions.

Medical examinations are given to determine refugee fitness for admission into the United States. Because identification of some excludable conditions was difficult, and proper treatment was not always provided, processing was, therefore, unnecessarily delayed.

It did not appear to us that the medical examinations were adequate to identify some excludable conditions. Medical processing was expedited partly because of the pressure to meet quotas. As a result, many refugees only received visual examinations to identify obvious medical problems and excludable conditions (named above). Blood tests were done to test for syphilis, however, tests for other forms of venereal disease were not routinely given. X-rays were given to test for tuberculosis.

ICEM is under contract with the United States to examine refugees for any excludable condition. Refugees were brought from camps to transit centers, ICEM offices, or hospitals for their examinations. They were then returned to camps and remained in transit centers. If it was determined that the refugees had excludable conditions which could be cured or for which waivers could be obtained, the refugees were placed on medical hold.

Refugees on medical hold were exposed to adverse conditions and sometimes contributed to the overcrowding of transit centers. Some refugees on medical hold in Thailand and Malaysia were housed in transit camps designed primarily to process refugees just prior to departure. Space in these facilities was extremely limited. Refugees with infectious diseases were crowded in with those without illnesses, including those that were medically approved and awaiting departure.

Some refugees on medical hold received inadequate attention. Their conditions were not promptly diagnosed and there was no assurance that they would receive proper treatment. As a result, some refugees were kept on medical hold. This problem was compounded because the families of these refugees stayed with them. In October, for example, 288 refugees were on medical hold in Thailand. These refugees and their families accounted for 1,449 persons in the transit centers; some

had been there over 4 months. Of the 288 on medical hold, 133 were awaiting results of tuberculosis tests. Over half of the 133 cases had been waiting for over 2 weeks and some had waited more than 3 months without being diagnosed. Refugee officials did not know the status of the medical hold cases. In addition, these officials and ICEM personnel acknowledged that they did not know what medical treatment, if any, the refugees on medical hold were receiving.

ICEM sometimes encountered problems in carrying out its function largely because of inadequate staffing and pressures to expedite medical processing of refugees. Further, because of the frequent shifting of refugee quotas between countries, it was difficult for ICEM to have the proper staff at any given location. In May and June 1979, for example, 1,160 refugees were in a transit center in Malaysia--20 to 26 percent of the center's population--who were not reported as being on medical hold or scheduled for departure. These refugees stayed in the transit center for longer than necessary, causing overcrowding and aggravating the already bad conditions there. In August, almost 800 refugees were unaccounted for either by medical hold memoranda or departure booking lists--an indication that ICEM did not have a good grasp on the status of the refugees.

Medical conditions
impeded resettlement

Placing refugees who did not have threatening conditions on medical hold significantly impeded resettlement. In addition to contributing to the overcrowding of transit centers, this practice also impeded voluntary-agency efforts to provide sponsors and hindered ICEM in arranging for transportation.

As discussed earlier, the INA provides that persons with certain excludable conditions can be granted waivers which allow admission to the United States, despite their medical conditions. Waivers can be obtained for non-infectious tuberculosis, mental retardation, or previous insanity if there has been a 1-year recovery period.

The process of obtaining waivers, however, is complex and time-consuming. The voluntary agency coordinating group is notified of the problem which in turn notifies the refugee sponsors. The sponsors must (1) reconfirm their willingness for sponsorship, (2) prepare waiver documents, and (3) arrange to have medical care available when the refugees arrive. The Center for Disease Control in Atlanta receives completed waiver requests and, if acceptable, grants the waivers. Notification of waivers is sent to the responsible refugee offices.

During the process, some sponsors have withdrawn support or have been slow in preparing waiver requests. If sponsors withdraw, new ones willing to accept refugees with medical problems must be located. The waiver process may take from about 6 weeks to several months. For example, of 66 waiver requests for refugees in Indonesia, only 1 had been granted over a 3-month period. Of 300 waiver requests in Thailand, 224 were outstanding after almost 3 months.

Because refugees and their families were medically detained, the impact on resettlement was significant. Although collectively, only about 4 to 5 percent of the refugees have medical problems, the medically detained refugees and their families reduce the number of those available for resettlement by approximately 40 percent. Therefore, to resettle 1,000 refugees, 1,400 must be medically processed.

To help alleviate the impact of medical holds on resettlement, only family members with medical problems were held back until medical clearances, either through treatment or waivers, were obtained. Another family member usually stayed behind to keep them company which helped lessen the adverse effect that medical holds had on the refugees and on U.S. sponsors. However, some refugees were reluctant to be resettled before other members of their families, so this option could not always be used.

During a visit to refugee camps in Thailand in November 1979, the Surgeon General of the United States and the Director of the Center for Disease Control were apprised of delays in refugee processing due to the large number that were being detained because of the policy on excludable health conditions. In December 1979, the Surgeon General issued an assessment of the health consequences of suspending medical excludability for Indochinese refugees immigrating to the United States. He concluded that

"* * * the health interests of the refugees and the American public would be better served if the current policies on medical excludability for Indochinese refugees were suspended and replaced with more appropriate procedures * * *."

On the basis of this conclusion, the Secretary of State requested that the Attorney General exercise this parole authority to suspend the excludability of those Indochinese refugees having active non-infectious tuberculosis, mental retardation, previous attacks of insanity, and infectious leprosy. The Attorney General approved this request on March 15, 1980, subject to procedures to be provided by the Surgeon General.

Procedures for processing refugees covered by the suspension were dispatched to overseas posts in March and April 1980. We have not evaluated the effectiveness of these newly established procedures.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The existing procedures for processing refugees should be simplified. These procedures contain several steps which disrupt resettlement; some, we believe, are of questionable value. Undue emphasis has been placed on a priority category system that is not always followed in ascertaining the order by which refugees are resettled. Much time is spent attempting to prove, or otherwise verify, refugee assertions or in obtaining security clearances from questionable data.

On the basis of problems that were encountered, we believe undue emphasis has been placed on meeting high monthly resettlement goals without recognizing the need to assess and streamline the procedures. The frequent shifting of refugee quotas between countries may have been necessary, and in some instances, added to the frustrations in managing the selection and movement of refugees.

Many refugee resettlements were unnecessarily delayed because the medical waiver system, which allows them to enter the United States, was ineffective and time-consuming. This resulted in the overcrowding of transit facilities, the exposure of medically detained refugees to those who were not, and problems in arranging transportation and in providing refugee sponsors.

In our opinion, an assessment of the existing procedures is essential. This assessment should resolve questions regarding the need for, and validity of, certain procedures which prolong and complicate refugee resettlement. Recognizing the limitations in verifying much of the data related to Indochinese refugees, we believe:

- The priority system should either be eliminated or reduced to two categories: (1) refugees having close relatives in the United States and former U.S. employees and (2) all other refugees.
- A waiver of U.S. verification of relationships and employment should be allowed in special cases.
- The requirement for security clearances should be eliminated or, alternatively, clearances for females should be discontinued and the ages for males being cleared should be raised.

--The INS role in the process should be eliminated in view of its inability to meet the intent of the INA, and should allow U.S. refugee officers to perform this approval process.

We further believe that monthly quotas assigned to offices in countries of asylum should be stabilized within the constraints of asylum countries so that resettlement can be more effectively managed.

Accordingly, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and INS, where appropriate,

--assess the existing procedures and eliminate the extraneous procedures with a view to expediting resettlement.

We further recommend that the Secretary of State direct OAR to minimize the practice of frequent shifting of monthly quotas between countries of asylum.

CHAPTER 3OBSTACLES IN IMPLEMENTING AN ORDERLYDEPARTURE PROGRAM FROM VIETNAM

In an attempt to curtail the large number of refugees fleeing Vietnam by boat, the UNHCR and Vietnam reached an agreement in May 1979 for a direct emigration ("orderly departure") program. The program was intended to allow the legal emigration from Vietnam to resettlement countries for persons "who want to work abroad or for the purpose of family reunification."

Although the United States and other countries welcomed the program, difficulties have arisen that are hampering its implementation. By early 1980, only 226 persons had departed Vietnam for the United States under this program.

ORIGIN AND NEED FOR
THE DEPARTURE PROGRAM

During 1978 and 1979, thousands of persons fled Vietnam by boat, and many died before being allowed to land in a country of temporary asylum. Although many refugees fled secretly to avoid deplorable conditions, many were assisted in their



REFUGEE BOATS USED TO FLEE VIETNAM. AIR RAYA REFUGEE CAMP, ANAMBAS ISLAND, INDONESIA. NOVEMBER, 1979. (U.S. REFUGEE BARGE IN BACKGROUND.)

departures by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) which wanted to rid itself of an unwanted ethnic group. At least one-third of those who reached safety were ethnic Chinese.

As part of its effort to provide a solution to the large exodus of Indochinese refugees, the UNHCR consulted with interested governments in December 1978. On January 12, 1979, SRV announced that Vietnamese who wanted to emigrate could do so. The Deputy UNHCR went to Vietnam on February 26, 1979, to develop departure procedures. On March 6, 1979, a plan was announced for the departure of family members and "special humanitarian cases." The UNHCR believed that implementation of this plan would (1) allow families to be reunited, (2) save the lives of some people who might otherwise be expelled or might flee Vietnam by boat, (3) relieve some of the problems and pressures on first-asylum countries by reducing the flow of refugees, and (4) help relieve the problems associated with providing protection and temporary care of the Indochinese refugees in countries of temporary asylum.

The UNHCR and SRV agreed to a seven-point memorandum of understanding in May 1979. This memorandum provided that those persons with relatives in other countries and "other humanitarian cases" would be allowed to leave. According to the memorandum, Vietnam would provide the UNHCR lists of persons who wanted to emigrate. The resettlement countries would give SRV the lists of those they would admit. It was proposed that these lists would be matched; the names which appeared on both lists would be qualified to leave. The names which appeared only on the SVR lists or on those of other countries would be subject to further discussion.

SUCCESS OF DEPARTURE
PROGRAM IS ESSENTIAL

Responding to pressure from the international community, in July 1979, the SRV placed a moratorium on illegal departures. Since that time, the influx of boat refugees has decreased significantly. The amount of this decrease which can be attributed to the moratorium or to other reasons, such as to hopes for safe passage under an orderly departure program or to inclement weather, is unknown. This decrease significantly reduced the pressures on asylum and resettlement countries. We believe that the SRV willingness to continue the moratorium and the willingness of some potential refugees to delay departures and to await safe emigration will depend upon the success of the departure program.

U.S. and UNHCR officials anticipate that under current U.S. immigration law and authorizations for the admission of Indochinese refugees, the orderly departure program from Vietnam to the United States could initially provide for the movement of 2,000 persons per month which is expected to be a significant proportion of the total departures to all resettlement countries. Accordingly, we believe the success of the total program will depend largely on the ability of the successful establishment of a program for increased departures to the United States.

THE U.S. ROLE
IN THE PROGRAM

After the SRV was established in 1975, the Embassy's Consular Section in Bangkok, Thailand, began receiving petitions for potential immigrants from Vietnam. Under immigration procedures, citizens and permanent resident aliens can file petitions on behalf of certain relatives eligible for immigrant visas. Petitions can be filed with any INS office or consular section abroad. After INS approval, petitions and supporting documents are normally forwarded to the consular office in the country where the potential immigrant resides. Immigrants then have to: submit required documents, particularly for family members of the person who is the beneficiary of a petition; pass medical examinations; and be personally interviewed by a U.S. consular officer. If approved, visas are granted, subject to numerical limitations. Because the United States does not have diplomatic relations with Vietnam, petitions have been forwarded to the Embassy in Bangkok.

Many of the petitions received in Bangkok lack documents required by law, such as affidavits of support, and evidence of the relationships of the family members to the petition beneficiaries. To obtain missing documents, the Embassy frequently has to communicate with U.S. petitioners and request that they, in turn, write to their relatives in Vietnam. The relatives in Vietnam are then supposed to obtain the documents and send them to the U.S. petitioners who then forward them to the Embassy. Thus far, interviews and medical examinations have been conducted in Bangkok for Vietnamese emigrants who reach that city and want to resettle in the United States. From August 1978 through May 1979, less than 50 people immigrated to the United States under these procedures.

Following the UNHCR/SRV seven-point agreement in May 1979, the United States declared its willingness to cooperate with those parties in implementing an orderly departure program. The United States initially envisioned that its program would

emphasize family reunification of immigrants entering the United States under regular immigration procedures. Even though the United States does not have consular offices in Vietnam, the United States envisioned that (1) consular officers and other necessary staff would be allowed entry and (2) that medical examinations would be given in Vietnam. The SRV has not cooperated, however, and the less desirable procedures of processing in Bangkok have continued for the few cases the SRV has allowed to leave. This has been possible because those cases have been documented substantially enough for the Embassy in Bangkok to be confident that they will be finally approved for admission to the United States and, therefore, will be able to guarantee to the Thai Government that they will leave Thailand for the United States within the 15-day time limit set by the Thais.

As a result of the obstacles encountered, the United States has achieved only limited success in the number of people it has been able to process under this program. Between June 1979 and February 26, 1980, only 226 individuals had departed Vietnam for the United States. Of the total, 220 traveled under immigration visas and 6 were parolees who entered under the same authority as refugees discussed previously in this report.

OBSTACLES IN IMPLEMENTING THE PROGRAM

Although the United States wants to increase the number of departures, its efforts to do so have been hampered by several obstacles: there have been relatively few matches of the names on the U.S. and SRV lists; the SRV has been unwilling to allow voluntary agency representatives or U.S. Government officials to go into Vietnam to interview applicants for admission, even under UNHCR auspices; and decisions on policy matters and staffing needs have been difficult to obtain. Solutions to the first two of these problems depend upon the cooperation of Vietnamese officials.

Few matches of names on the U.S. and SRV lists

The main obstacle to be overcome is that of limited matches between the names on the U.S. and SRV lists. Through December 1979, two U.S. lists containing about 9,000 names of persons for which INS petitions had been approved were compared with SRV lists which contained the names of about 31,000 persons who had requested and been approved by the SRV to emigrate. The comparison resulted in 74 matches.

U.S. officials noted that the SRV lists contained large numbers of Chinese names with addresses in the Chinese section of Ho Chi Minh City. They said that the lists did not indicate whether these persons had any ties with the United States and, thus, the United States could not make an initial determination of whether they appeared eligible for admission. A UNHCR official speculated that the SRV might require that a substantial number of these persons be taken before family reunification cases would be considered. A U.S. official believed that the SRV may have interpreted the program to mean that all persons it wanted to leave would be admitted by the United States or other countries.

Following the Geneva meeting, the moratorium on illegal departures, and accompanying reiteration of the orderly departure program, the SRV began to take the position, with increasing sharpness, that the resettlement countries should accept not only the Vietnamese they wanted, but also some of those the SRV wanted to leave. The SRV frequently refuses departure approval to people the resettlement countries want, unless those countries accept others whom the SRV wants to leave. This appears to be a major element in the continuing impasse on the orderly departure program.

The United States wanted to admit from Vietnam not only persons eligible for immigrant visas, but others who are not eligible, having close ties to the United States such as relatives, former U.S. Government employees, or other American institutions, and those associated with U.S. Government policies or programs. The State Department, therefore, recommended and the Attorney General authorized--after consultations with the Congress--the admission of up to 1,000 such persons a month as part of the Indochinese refugee parole program. By allowing the United States to admit more persons than would have been eligible under only an immigrant visa program, the United States was able to accept additional persons from the SRV lists for interviews.

In fact, after the United States asked the SRV, through the UNHCR, to provide additional information about the ties to the United States of persons on its lists, the SRV, in early 1980, provided two lists of about 1,100 and 1,000 giving information on the names and addresses of relatives in the United States. The United States was able to accept over 700 from the first of these two lists for interviews.

UNHCR officials are negotiating with the SRV on behalf of the United States for permission to use voluntary agency personnel to obtain documents and any other required informa-

tion in interviews with the potential immigrants and parolees in Ho Chi Minh City. The SRV had allowed only one voluntary agency representative to go to Hanoi but not to Ho Chi Minh City.

Problems in obtaining medical examinations and conducting consular interviews

Thailand limits Vietnamese in transit in Thailand to only 15 days. Some persons, however, have failed to pass their medical examinations, causing delays in transit. Although this may only be a temporary condition which can be solved by treatment or waiver, the inability to meet Thailand's 15-day limitation has caused problems. Thai officials threatened to arrest one individual who had been there almost 2 months because of medical reasons.

Arrangements have been made to perform the medical examinations in Vietnam. In October 1979, the U.S. regional medical officer from Bangkok visited Ho Chi Minh City to determine the adequacy of existing medical facilities. He also described U.S. standards for testing, screening, and treating persons for tuberculosis and venereal disease. The medical officer found the facilities at the Cho Ray Hospital to be adequate but some supplies, such as X-ray film, were needed. Supplies necessary for 1,000 medical examinations were provided by the United States. The Cho Ray Hospital facilities have been used to examine Vietnamese going to Canada, and no problems have been reported. Nonetheless, the SRV has not permitted medical examinations of Vietnamese going to the United States to commence.

UNHCR and SRV officials were also discussing procedures which would allow consular officers to interview individuals at the Tan Son Nhut Airport in Ho Chi Minh City. Under the arrangements being discussed, the U.S. consulate officers would work under the auspices of the UNHCR during their visits to Vietnam and would only be allowed to stay a few hours during each visit.

Other problems related to the departure program

Problems have been encountered in handling the volume of petitions received at the consular office in Bangkok. Since early 1979, approximately 300 petitions have been received each week. At the end of May there were about 3,500 petitions on file in Bangkok. By the end of December, the number had increased to about 13,500.

From about May through August 1979, the U.S. orderly departure program was operated by a foreign service officer, an American dependent employee, and five clerks on loan from ICEM. As the number of petitions increased, a backlog of cases needing review developed. The staff was later increased to four foreign service officers, eight local nationals, and several voluntary agency representatives, but the backlog continued. In November 1979, six third-country national U.S. Government employees from other posts were brought to Thailand for a 30-day period to help review cases. At the end of December, about 9,200 of the 13,500 had been reviewed.

U.S. officials in Bangkok told us that decisions on policy and staffing matters related to the departure program must be cleared by several different offices within the State Department for action. They believe it would be helpful if a central point for handling all matters related to the departure program could be established.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

The agreement for the direct emigration of persons from Vietnam is, we believe, a landmark achievement and one that could contribute greatly to a lasting solution to the Vietnamese refugee problem. Although there may be valid reasons for skepticism about its continuation and degree of success, the experiences in dealing with the 1978-79 era of massive departures--their inherent risks and hardships--dictate that every effort be expended to encourage its continuation and to make it workable. Actions by U.S. officials have clearly been in that direction; however, many obstacles still need to be resolved, particularly those imposed by the SRV. We are concerned about the difficulty being experienced by overseas offices in obtaining policy and staffing decisions from Washington.

We believe these obstacles deserve special attention. Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of State

- give special attention to resolve these problems, and equally important, to seek potential ways and means for implementing and assuring the success of this program.

CHAPTER 4REFUGEE PROCESSING CENTERS

The RPCs that are planned for construction in the Philippines and Indonesia will accommodate up to 60,000 refugees. These centers are being established to lessen the refugee populations in, and pressures on, first-asylum countries. Initially, and into the foreseeable future, most of the refugees transferred to the centers will be those guaranteed resettlement in the United States. As a result, questions are surfacing about potential for

- increased U.S. financial support of the RPCs,
- future U.S. commitments to resettle an increased number of refugees, and
- attitudes within the international community toward the use and support of the RPC concept.

THE RPC CONCEPT

The U.S. State Department was a principal supporter of the RPC concept at a UNHCR-convened meeting held in Indonesia in May 1979 and attended by representatives from 30 nations. RPCs were proposed as a means of relieving some of the pressures on first-asylum countries by moving large numbers of refugees from overcrowded camps to holding centers on islands or other remote locations.


State and other supporters believed the RPCs would encourage other countries to commit themselves to long-range resettlement programs, by having a place to hold refugees they selected, but which could not immediately be resettled. Such an arrangement would allow the more rapid transfer of refugees from regular camps, and even though they might have to wait awhile, their eventual resettlement would be guaranteed. The arrangement was also designed to provide space in existing camps of first-asylum countries if another large influx of refugees occurred. During the May meeting, Australia, Canada, Japan, and New Zealand strongly supported the RPC concept as did the Association of Southeast Asian nations.

The Indonesian and Philippine Governments volunteered to provide sites for RPCs. However, they required that refugees had to be guaranteed resettlement in a third country before they would be accepted. At the conclusion of our review in November 1979, neither center was yet under construction. In

our prior report,^{1/} we recommended that the Secretary of State, through the U.S. Mission in Geneva, press to establish additional temporary care holding camps on islands in the South China Sea or at other locations in the Far East to (1) make the refugee population less visible to local populations and (2) relieve the pressures on the first-asylum countries.

PLANNED USE OF RPCs

Even though there was widespread initial support for the RPC concept by other third countries, the United States is the only country that currently plans to use them. One UNHCR official commented the RPCs will not be "processing" facilities, but holding camps for low-category refugees awaiting immigration to the United States. This view on the use of the RPCs was also expressed by an official of the U.S. Mission in Geneva.



GALANG REFUGEE CAMP, INDONESIA. (CAMP LOCATED NEAR SITE OF REFUGEE PROCESSING CENTER.) NOVEMBER, 1979.

^{1/}"The Indochinese Exodus: A Humanitarian Dilemma," (ID-79-20, Apr. 24, 1979).

A State Department official told us that the Philippines center would become international even if the non-U.S. program constituted only a small percentage of the population. He said about 95 percent of the refugees transferred to the Philippines RPC would have guaranteed resettlement in the United States. The balance would be refugees selected by countries such as Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, where processing takes a long time. The Philippines UNHCR representative told us, however, that the first 10,000 refugees transferred to that RPC would have guaranteed resettlement in the United States. He said that, as yet, no other countries have expressed an interest in using the RPC because most countries prefer using transit centers within their own countries.

The U.S.-guaranteed refugees which will be transferred to the RPCs will be comprised generally of recent arrivals with low categories who would have little chance of immediate movement to the United States. Included in those eligible to be sent to the Philippines RPC, for example, are about 500 North Vietnamese, located in Hong Kong, whose association with the United States is such that they would only be accepted by the United States if quotas could not be filled by lowcategory refugees from South Vietnam. If they are transferred to the RPC, however, they will be guaranteed resettlement in the United States. It is planned that refugees transferred to the RPCs will be provided pre-resettlement orientation, language instruction, and job training.

POTENTIAL GROWTH IN THE
U.S. REFUGEE COMMITMENT

It appears that the future U.S. commitment to resettle Indochinese refugees will be influenced by whatever number of refugees it selects and has transferred to RPCs. As noted earlier, from July 1, 1979, through September 30, 1980, the United States has a commitment to accept 210,000 Indochinese refugees (14,000 per month). Refugees selected and sent to RPCs are not included in this quota. Accordingly, the U.S. commitment could be increased by 60,000 or more if the two RPCs are constructed and occupied at full capacity, and used exclusively by the United States.

The cost of transporting refugees to the RPCs will be borne by the countries guaranteeing resettlement, as this move is regarded as the first part of that process. Under the existing arrangements, the United States is committed to pay about 30 percent of the total RPC construction costs and for

refugee care for the first year of operation. The commitment for construction costs is about \$13 million out of an estimated \$41 million. The U.S. portion of refugee care is estimated at about \$7.4 million out of \$28.0 million. The United States has advanced \$9 million to construct the initial phase of the Philippines RPC.

The Japanese Government is expected to pay 50 percent of the Indonesia RPC costs and the UNHCR, another 20 percent. Japan's contribution, however, had not been confirmed at the time of our visit, and the UNHCR had not been successful in obtaining its share of the funding.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The manner in which the RPC concept is being implemented may result in the United States assuming an ever-increasing responsibility for solving what is generally viewed to be an international problem. We believe there is sufficient cause to reassess the manner in which RPCs are established and funded, and to reassess the responsibility of the international community in sharing the refugee problem. To this end, the initially envisioned concept of establishing international centers should be nurtured. To do otherwise might shift an unreasonable burden on the United States and discourage essential financial contributions and increased refugee resettlements from other countries.

We, therefore, recommend that the Secretary of State take a lead role in assessing

- whether the RPCs are indeed being established as international refugee facilities and
- the extent to which the United States and other countries are expected to use and financially support these international centers.

This assessment should also deal with the questions of (1) whether, and to what extent, the United States may become burdened with increased costs associated with the RPCs and (2) the impact that U.S.-guaranteed refugees in RPCs will have on present and future U.S. resettlement commitments.

CHAPTER 5PROTECTION AND CARE

Primary responsibility for the protection and care of refugees is borne by the UNHCR. The difficulty in fulfilling this responsibility was identified in our April 1979 report. Although improvements have been observed, we have noted many instances and specific conditions where essential services were either lacking or inadequate. UNHCR efforts have been hampered by insufficient personnel, the inability to take appropriate actions in some instances, and the indifferent reaction of some asylum countries toward refugees. Consequently, the UNHCR has not adequately (1) protected refugees from some crimes and abuses, (2) assured refugees proper care, and (3) monitored expenditures for refugee food and supplies.

REFUGEES AND THEIR RIGHTS

Two U.N. agreements define the term "refugees" and stipulate international standards for their treatment: the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol. In addition to being guided by these agreements, the UNHCR operates under a specific U.N. statute that is similar to the Convention provisions. These documents state that refugees are persons who have left or are outside their countries of nationality or residence and that their return to those countries is impossible because of persecution or fear of persecution.

Provisions for standards of treatment provide that asylum countries

- shall not impose penalties because of the illegal entry or presence of refugees coming directly from territories where their lives or freedom were threatened (and enter or are present in these territories with authorization) provided they immediately present themselves to authorities good cause for their illegal entry or presence;
- will not expel or return refugees to frontiers or territories where their lives or freedom would be threatened;
- will not expel or return refugees from their territories (except in accordance with due process of law) and will allow refugees a reasonable period to seek legal admission into another country;

--shall, as far as possible, facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees; and

--shall accord to those refugees lawfully staying in their territories the most favorable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country in the same circumstances regarding the right to engage in wage-earning employment.

Disputes arising from interpretation or application of these provisions, which cannot otherwise be settled, are to be referred to the International Court of Justice.

Asylum countries have wide latitude in determining whether potential refugees meet the defined criteria. Nations have often been reluctant to accept a general definition for refugees because some fear that a future commitment of unknown dimensions might be implied. In addition, many nations have not signed the international agreements and, therefore, the UNHCR has no legal basis for refugee protection in those countries.

The countries of Thailand, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Indonesia generally provide temporary asylum, although they have not adopted the Convention or Protocol. People seeking asylum in these countries are considered illegal immigrants, illegal aliens, or displaced persons and are, therefore, afforded only whatever rights the asylum countries are willing to grant. UNHCR officials believe, however, that they have the right, under the terms of the statute, to provide protection to refugees regardless of whether or not asylum countries are party to the Convention or Protocol.

THE UNHCR SHOULD IMPROVE REFUGEE PROTECTION

The UNHCR recognizes that international protection of refugees is its most important responsibility, however, in instances of Indochinese refugees seeking asylum, this responsibility has not always been met. Many Indochinese refugees encountered and suffered unconscionable crimes and abuses en route to first-asylum countries, within these countries, and after being denied asylum. Responsibility for this can be attributed to a variety of sources, including some criminal elements in the countries in which asylum was being sought. However, the UNHCR assumed the task of refugee protection in Malaysia, Thailand, Hong Kong, and Indonesia as if these these countries were partners in the international accords. In our opinion, the UNHCR did not provide adequate staff to protect the refugees, especially in Thailand and Malaysia.

ATTITUDES OF FIRST-ASYLUM COUNTRIES

Although there have been instances of unpopular actions toward refugees by some first-asylum countries, we believe these countries should generally be commended for providing temporary havens within their boundaries. Thousands of refugees were granted asylum, and more are still being accepted. Had these countries not granted such asylum, the human suffering would have been worse.

Of the countries we visited, refugees in Hong Kong and Indonesia were receiving the best protection and most humane treatment. Persons accepted as refugees in Hong Kong receive essentially the same benefits as local residents. Even though refugees in Indonesia have no legal rights or status, they are permitted to land and remain in camps until resettled. The attitudes of these countries have been of considerable benefit to the refugees, particularly in Indonesia where the UNHCR was slow in responding to the rapidly expanding refugee population. Very little, if any, harassment of the refugees by government officials or the local populations in Hong Kong or Indonesia was reported.

In Thailand and Malaysia, we observed a greater incidence in the reported abuse of refugees. Some abuse was characterized as resulting from actions by government officials or by their inattention in preventing it. There was some speculation that Thailand's attitude may have been influenced, in part, by the lack of recognition by the international community that, at the time, there were more than twice as many land refugees in Thailand as boat refugees in all other asylum countries. In addition, international focus was centered around the plight of the boat refugees.

Refugees arriving by boat have been attacked while at sea and have been subjected to great abuse. Rape, robbery, and killing have been frequent. Cases were also reported that some boat refugees were being raped and robbed after reaching land. Some boats were towed back out to sea. Further, when refugees land in remote areas, they may be placed in jails when detected or allowed to languish for indefinite periods of time on the beaches.

Thailand

Most of the refugees in Thailand come from Laos and Kampuchea, but some also come by boat from Vietnam. Thailand considers them displaced persons or illegal immigrants, and as

such, they have no legal rights. Many refugees have been intercepted at the borders and forced to return.

At different times during 1979, there were only four or five UNHCR field representatives in Thailand. They were responsible for carrying out the UNHCR role of refugee protection and temporary care in 16 Thai camps. UNHCR and U.S. officials believe refugees will be granted asylum more rapidly if authorities other than those of the host countries are present when refugees arrive and such arrivals can be publicized. In Thailand, the UNHCR is aware of the major crossings or the landing places refugees use, but has not had sufficient field staff available to adequately oversee those areas.

In addition, UNHCR representatives do not always take immediate action when aware of refugees being denied entry into the country. In one instance, the UNHCR was informed that refugees were stranded on an island in the Meikong River and were being denied entry into Thailand. The UNHCR representative did not take any action. Consequently, the refugees were granted entry only through the efforts of U.S. officials.

Further, UNHCR representatives do not seek refugees detained in jails or detention centers to assist them in gaining entry into camps. In addition, refugees regarded their protection in some camps to be inadequate. In the camps we visited, many refugees feared for their safety, contending that robberies and murders were frequent. Their fears were substantiated by reports that, at one camp, 5 murders had occurred within 5 days; at another camp, 2 murders had occurred within 1 week.

Malaysia

Refugees seeking asylum in Malaysia are boat people from Vietnam. Many were granted asylum in Malaysia, but during the summer of 1979, others were rejected and were towed back out to sea. In addition to forcing these refugees to face additional risks and hardships, they were also subjected to other crimes while at sea. These refugees are considered to be illegal immigrants and have no legal rights.

Refugees who were able to land were sometimes detected and placed in temporary detention centers on the beaches where they landed. Many were detained in these centers for periods up to several months before being allowed to enter camps. The UNHCR was denied protective access to these refugees, although the Malaysian Red Crescent Society was allowed to distribute UNHCR-provided food and water.

As in the case of Thailand, the presence of UNHCR representatives appeared to have a positive effect in that refugees were allowed to land or were better treated after landing. As in Thailand, however, there were not enough UNHCR representatives to adequately cover the refugee landings.

Because of these circumstances, there is little doubt that the amount of protection provided refugees by the UNHCR in Thailand and Malaysia is being largely influenced by the policies and attitudes of the central and local governments of these countries and is being hampered because there are not enough UNHCR field representatives to do the job.

We recognize that the UNHCR cannot be expected to provide protection while refugees are on the high seas, nor can the UNHCR physically patrol the entire borders of Thailand and Malaysia. However, the UNHCR has sole responsibility for providing international protection to refugees--a responsibility which cannot be delegated. In view of the numerous problems associated with providing protection to Indochinese refugees, we believe it is imperative that the UNHCR provide the necessary staff and insure that refugees will be adequately protected.

THE UNHCR SHOULD IMPROVE REFUGEE CARE

The UNHCR care being provided Indochinese refugees should be improved in many of the camps. Refugee care encompasses the provision of food, medical care, shelter, water and sanitation facilities, supplies, safety, education, recreation, and self-reliance projects. Some of these items were adequately provided only at some camps. The absence of essential care creates discontent among refugees, severely hampers resettlement, and may make other solutions, such as voluntary repatriation or local integration impossible.

In the total camp operations, we observed a need for better control and accountability of the resources provided for refugee care, especially in the UNHCR operations in Thailand. There was little assurance, under the present methods used by the UNHCR, that the resources were being effectively used for the intended purposes.

The quality of care and the manner in which it is provided is, like refugee protection, largely dependent upon the attitudes and policies of the first-asylum countries. The UNHCR, however, could improve the care by providing adequate staff in the first-asylum countries and could better coordinate the amount of UNHCR assistance.

We visited 11 camps and 2 transit centers to observe conditions and to determine how well the refugees were being cared for. Overall, we found the care provided in Thailand to be most in need of attention. Refugee care in Hong Kong and Macau was the best.

Inadequate care

Many refugees complained about both the quantity and quality of the food provided in the two Thai camps we visited. We were told some refugees in one Thai camp were not getting their own food rations because they were not registered with the camp officials. These refugees may have entered the camp without the officials' knowledge to avoid the admission process. There were also allegations at that camp that local Thais had refugee identification cards which enabled them to receive food rations. In countries other than Thailand, refugees we interviewed said that food was adequate. Some refugees in Malaysia expressed a preference for more variety in their diets; those in Indonesia wanted more fresh fruit and vegetables, but recognized that such items were in short supply in that country.




DISTRIBUTION OF MEAT AT UBON REFUGEE CAMP, THAILAND, NOVEMBER, 1979. / THE OPEN AREA EXPOSED THE FOOD TO DIRT, INSECTS AND OTHER CONTAMINANTS.

Medical care of refugees in Thailand was a problem. At the two camps we visited, we noted shortages of medical personnel, medicine, supplies, and diagnostic equipment. The medical staff told us these conditions had existed for some time. They said that the shortages had become worse since the mass influx of Kampuchean on the border began and also told us that because much attention was being directed to the border area, their problems were being ignored or forgotten. Respiratory ailments were prevalent in one camp, and it was estimated that about 70 percent of the children were suffering from malnutrition. Medical care at other locations we visited was considered inadequate.



AIR RAYA REFUGEE CAMP, ANAMBAS ISLAND, INDONESIA. NOVEMBER, 1979.

Overcrowded living conditions were found at all the locations we visited. Some of the housing provided its occupants little protection. Further, because some of the materials used in constructing most of the housing in these camps is flammable and because of the close proximity of the structures, a fire would be disastrous. This condition has improved, or will improve at some camps when additional housing is constructed and/or the number of refugees is reduced as a result of resettlement.




HOUSING CONSTRUCTION AT UBON REFUGEE CAMP, THAILAND. NOVEMBER 1979.



CONTRAST BETWEEN OLD AND NEW HOUSING--LOEI REFUGEE CAMP, THAILAND. LATRINES IN FOREGROUND. NOVEMBER, 1979.

The water supply was a problem at two of the camps we visited, and refugees had to carry water long distances at several camps. The supply of water had been a significant problem at other camps, but had been corrected by the time of our visit. Water quantity was still a problem. In addition, significant sanitation problems existed at several locations, including inadequate latrines, poor drainage which resulted in stagnant or polluted water in living areas, and inadequate garbage disposal.



SOURCE OF WATER SUPPLY, AIR RAYA REFUGEE CAMP, ANAMBAS ISLAND, INDONESIA. NOVEMBER, 1979.

Shortages of necessary supplies, such as blankets, mosquito nets, cooking equipment, and kerosene for stoves and lanterns existed at several locations. Although many of these items were available for purchase, some refugees could not afford to buy them. During our visit to two camps in Thailand, overnight temperatures were frequently in the low 50s, and many refugees did not have blankets. We saw very few mosquito nets, although mosquitos and flies were a big problem at several locations.




WATER WELL AT UBON REFUGEE CAMP, THAILAND. NOVEMBER, 1979.




BATHING AREA AT GALANG REFUGEE CAMP, INDONESIA. NOVEMBER, 1979.

Educational facilities and opportunities were lacking at nine locations. Most of the education opportunities that were available in the camps were language classes taught by refugees. Where classes were available, fees were usually charged for some of these classes. A shortage of books and other educational supplies existed at many locations. At one camp in Thailand, a large UNHCR-financed school had been constructed and was in operation. This school was located just outside the camp, but we were told that very few children from the camp attended. We were also told that teachers frequently did not show up for work, even though they were being paid. We were informed that during a surprise inspection, the Provincial Governor found only 14 of 94 teachers present.



SCHOOL AT LOEI REFUGEE CAMP, THAILAND. NOVEMBER, 1979.



UNHCR- FINANCED SCHOOL AT UBON REFUGEE CAMP, THAILAND. NOVEMBER, 1979.

Self-sufficiency projects were not evident at eight locations. Some refugees were making clothes, selling food products or other items, or growing vegetables for their own use or to sell. For the majority of the refugees, however, there was little to do. The ability to initiate large community projects was hampered. For example, growing vegetables was hampered by the lack of seeds, garden equipment, land, and/or the cooperation of local authorities.

Recreational outlets were limited at almost all the camps we visited. We found volleyball areas and ping pong tables in some camps; at other camps we saw checker and chess games made by the refugees. Overall, however, there was very little for most refugees to do to overcome the boredom of camp life.

Need for better control
and accountability of funds

Fundamental accounting procedures should be improved to better control and account for the resources the UNHCR expends for the protection and care of refugees. For the areas our review covered, these expenditures were estimated to be about \$101 million in 1979 and about \$133 million in 1980.

Procedurally, the UNHCR advances funds to first-asylum country governments or their designees to carry out agreed-upon programs for refugee care. Recipients are required to periodically submit supporting documentation for the expended funds. Most recipients submit such documentation or have it available for inspection. We noted, however, in the case of Thailand, that reports stating only its expenditures were submitted.

Even if documents supporting all the expenditures were provided to the UNHCR, we do not believe that this alone provides adequate control and accountability. Invoices and other documentary support can be invalid. What we believe is needed, is independent verification that the goods and/or services paid for were actually received and used for the intended purposes. Such independent monitoring of UNHCR expenditures does not exist at the distribution points for goods and services.

Although we are precluded from examining UNHCR records, we have heard numerous allegations of abuses in one country. For example:

- inferior quality rice in inadequate quantities was received;
- substandard meat was provided;
- blankets paid for were not received; and
- two trucks, a refrigerator, and a duplicating machine purchased for camp use in one camp were diverted elsewhere.

Although similar allegations were not heard in other countries, the opportunity for such abuses exists. Accordingly, we believe the United States--as a major UNHCR contributor--should insist that the UNHCR improve its basic control and accountability of expenditures.

In a prior report, 1/ we recommended that the Secretary of State, through the U.S. Mission in Geneva, inform the UNHCR of the need for better field monitoring and of the need to insure suitable refugee care. In our opinion, having an adequate staff, willing to take aggressive action in carrying out the UNHCR role in dealing with the Indochinese refugees, still remains a major problem.

Comments of UNHCR officials

In December 1979, we met with UNHCR representatives in Geneva. At that time, we discussed our concern about (1) the adequacy of the protection and care being provided to Indochinese refugees and (2) the lack of basic control over UNHCR expenditures. These officials agreed that improvements were needed and promised to take corrective action. They told us that historically the UNHCR had functioned as a nonoperational entity and as such had tried to carry out its role through others. They said that over the years, the UNHCR has recognized the need to become more involved and has adopted that role in some situations, such as its involvement in negotiating and implementing the orderly departure program (see ch. 3), and in its recent involvement with the large influx of Kampuchean into Thailand. Officials said the UNHCR is actively involved in establishing and operating several holding centers to assist in the Kampuchean situation. They further told us that the UNHCR would have a more operational role in the refugee processing centers planned for the Philippines and Indonesia.

The UNHCR officials told us that they have been hampered to some degree in getting adequate staff to carry out their role because of U.N. personnel policies. They also said that they do not always have the flexibility needed to react quickly to situations that develop regarding refugees. They further told us that the UNHCR ability to operate is closely tied to the support of its actions by the U.N. General Assembly. Finally, they said there has to be a recognition of the need for and support of changes in the way the UNHCR has traditionally carried out its responsibilities.

Protection

During 1980, the UNHCR Regional Protection Officer plans to start promoting refugee law throughout the Southeast Asian countries, making contacts and promoting public opinion about refugee rights to protection.

1/"The Indochinese Exodus: A Humanitarian Dilemma," (ID-79-20, Apr. 24, 1979).

The UNHCR has also proposed a new protection network for Thailand. When implemented, this network will provide

- a country legal officer to coordinate all protection activities in Thailand on broad issues--not individual cases;
- two assistant legal officers to handle individual cases; (these officers will rotate between camps to insure protection and will be supported by at least three Thai assistants with legal backgrounds and necessary secretarial support); and
- a legal consultant to identify local Thai lawyers in all parts of Thailand to serve as legal consultants for specific cases.

Further, a regional protection seminar was planned under the sponsorship of the Institute of Humanitarian Studies and the Philippines University Law Center. The seminar would emphasize the need for providing refugee protection and to educate the participants in how to do it. Legal experts from Asian countries were to participate. UNHCR officials were hopeful that this seminar would help achieve agreement among the Southeast Asian countries regarding refugee protection.

UNHCR officials told us that they continue to work toward getting Asian countries to become signers of the Convention and Protocol. They said discussions are currently being held with Japan and China. They also expressed the hope that Thailand's recent membership in the UNHCR Executive Committee would lead to Thailand becoming a signer.

Care

UNHCR officials told us they recognized that the types of assistance provided varied within the countries. They said a multidisciplinary volunteer agency team under the aegis of the UNHCR had been studying refugee living conditions to develop uniform standards for Southeast Asia. They also told us that they plan to have full-time representatives at the three largest camps in Thailand: Loei, Nong Khai, and Ubon. Further, UNHCR officials believe that their Southeast Asian operations should be improved because a UNHCR Regional Coordinator is now stationed in Bangkok. They said that this individual is able to make decisions and react to situations that, in the past, had to be referred to Geneva.

Control and accountability

UNHCR officials told us that they were aware that problems in control and accountability exist. They said problems in each country have to be dealt with specifically because of differences in the policies of each country. They told us that adding more people would not completely solve the problems, and said the UNHCR also needed to improve its techniques. They agreed that there is a growing sensitivity to accountability problems and acknowledged that the UNHCR needs to be accountable to its donors. They also said serious consideration would be given as to what methods could be added at the camp level to improve accountability and still achieve their program objectives.

The UNHCR officials told us that after extensive negotiations, their concern for accountability resulted in the establishment of a UNHCR Controller position at the refugee processing center in the Philippines. Finally, they told us that evolving into a more operational agency has been a problem, however, many positive changes have taken place over the past 5 years in the way the UNHCR carries out its role.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

We believe many of the actions taken or planned by the UNHCR are positive steps toward solving the problems we identified. We recognize the delicacy and complexity of their negotiations with the Southeast Asian countries and encourage their continued efforts. The planned protection network should help improve conditions in Thailand. Other planned actions by the UNHCR should also help improve the protection in Southeast Asia. We believe, however, that the UNHCR needs to be prepared and should react more aggressively, and with sufficient force, to any gross violations of refugee protection that may occur.

Although conditions have improved in some camps, much still needs to be done. In our opinion, the health and well-being of refugees has a direct bearing on the ability to resettle or repatriate them. We believe that the UNHCR needs to improve its coordination of refugee care activities by becoming more involved. The assignment of full-time representatives at three large camps in Thailand should help. However, in our opinion, there are several other camps in Thailand that warrant full-time representatives to coordinate and oversee the protection and care activities.

We believe the UNHCR should extend its involvement to encompass contingency planning and staffing for the efficient administration of its activities. Accordingly, we recommend that the Secretary of State, through the U.S. Mission in Geneva, encourage the UNHCR to

- continue to improve the quality of protection and temporary care for Southeast Asian refugees and
- make certain that the expenditure of funds is more closely monitored.

We further recommend that the Secretary of State continue to recognize that the UNHCR needs flexibility in the manner in which it carries out its activities, and we urge it to take a more active and aggressive role in the operational aspects of the Indochinese refugee program.

CHAPTER 6SCOPE OF REVIEW AND AGENCY COMMENTS

Our April 1979 report described the Indochinese refugee situation in the first-asylum countries of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore. The report also discussed the roles of the various agencies, particularly the UNHCR, in providing assistance to refugees and the U.S. program for selecting and processing refugees for resettlement in the United States. The process and the problems refugees encountered upon arrival in the United States were also addressed.

This review is essentially a follow-up study and is directed primarily toward assessing the growth of the refugee problem during 1979 in the first-asylum countries of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Hong Kong, and Macau. We added Hong Kong and Macau to our scope because their collective refugee populations had increased to almost 70,000 at August 31, 1979, from about 6,000 at the time of our prior review.

We again reviewed the role of the UNHCR in dealing with the refugee problem; the conditions under which the refugees were living in camps; and the procedures for selecting and processing refugees for admission to the United States. This review did not address the efforts to resettle refugees after their arrival in the United States. We also reviewed authorizing legislation, accumulated and reviewed pertinent data on protection, care, and processing activities, and discussed program operations with responsible officials of the Department of State.

During the period October through December 1979, we visited the headquarters of the UNHCR in Geneva and the UNHCR regional offices in Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Hong Kong, and a branch office in Jakarta. During that period, we also visited and observed UNHCR protection and care as well as U.S. processing programs at selected refugee camps in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Hong Kong, and Macau. In those countries and Singapore where the U.S. Refugee Office for Indonesia was located, we reviewed pertinent data and talked with responsible officials of the U.S. Embassy who deal with refugee matters; JVA staffs who process refugees for the U.S. program; and INS officials who approve refugees for admission to the United States. We discussed refugee policies and problems with high-level Government officials of those countries--with the exception of Macau. We also talked with representatives of voluntary agencies carrying out activities in the refugee camps. In

addition, we talked to officials at the headquarters offices of U.S. voluntary agencies which find U.S. sponsors for refugees and provide other resettlement assistance.

VERIFICATION OF COST
AND STATISTICAL DATA

We obtained the cost and statistical data presented in this report from many sources including U.S. Government agencies, the Hong Kong Government, voluntary agencies, and the UNHCR. In most instances, we did not have access to the source records and could not verify the data provided.

OUR PRIOR REPORTS ON
INDOCHINESE REFUGEES

We previously issued five reports dealing with Indochinese refugees. The initial report to the Senate Appropriations Committee, "Review of Preliminary Estimates of Evacuation and Cambodian Refugees," (ID-75-68, May 27, 1975), dealt with preliminary estimates of evacuation costs and our views regarding their validity. Our second report to the Congress, "U.S. Provides Safe Haven for Indochinese Refugees," (ID-75-71, June 16, 1975), included information on estimated program costs and the handling of the flow of refugees from the Western Pacific restaging areas to the U.S. reception centers. Our third report to the Congress, "Evacuation and Temporary Care Afforded Indochinese Refugees--Operation New Life," (ID-76-63, June 1, 1976), provided current information on temporary care at the U.S. reception centers and included certain cost data. The fourth report to the Congress, "Domestic Resettlement of Indochinese Refugees--Struggle for Self-Reliance," (HRD-77-35, May 10, 1977), describes our observations on resettlement, including placement of refugees with sponsors and initial steps toward integration into American society. Our fifth report to the Congress, "The Indochinese Exodus: A Humanitarian Dilemma," (ID-79-20, Apr. 24, 1979), described (1) the nature and growth of the Indochinese refugee problem, (2) our observations of camp conditions in first-asylum countries, (3) how refugees were selected and resettled, and (4) the efforts of Federal, State, and local governments and voluntary agencies to resettle them in the United States.

AGENCY COMMENTS

Comments on the draft report were requested from the Secretary of State and the Attorney General on May 19, 1980. These comments were not provided within the 30-day time limitation allowed under the GAO Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-226), and an extension of the time period was not requested. For this reason, agency comments are not contained in this report.

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