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# NOMINATION OF DAVID C. JONES

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## HEARING

BEFORE THE

## COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

## UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

NOMINATION OF

GEN. DAVID C. JONES, TO BE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT  
CHIEFS OF STAFF, FOR AN ADDITIONAL TWO-YEAR TERM,  
PURSUANT TO TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION  
142

JUNE 16, 1980

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(II)

## NOMINATION OF DAVID C. JONES

MONDAY, JUNE 16, 1980

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, D.C.*

The committee met at 2:10 p.m. in room 1114, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John C. Stennis (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Members present: Senators Stennis, Jackson, Cannon, Byrd, Nunn, Culver, Morgan, Exon, Levin, Tower, Thurmond, Goldwater, Warner, Humphrey, Cohen, and Jepsen.

Staff present: Francis J. Sullivan, staff director; John C. Roberts, general counsel; Rhett B. Dawson, counsel; John T. Ticer, chief clerk; Christine E. Cowart, assistant chief clerk; George H. Foster, Jr., Louise R. Hoppe, Alton G. Keel, Jr., Robert C. McFarlane, James C. Smith, professional staff members; and Judith P. Barr, clerical assistant.

Also present: Frank Gaffney, assistant to Senator Jackson; Frank Krebs, assistant to Senator Cannon; Quentin Crommelin, assistant to Senator Byrd; Arnold Punaro, assistant to Senator Nunn; Charles Stevenson, assistant to Senator Culver; Bill Lind, assistant to Senator Hart; Greg Pallas, assistant to Senator Exon; Tom Fagan, assistant to Senator Thurmond; Christopher Lehman, assistant to Senator Warner; David Sullivan, assistant to Senator Humphrey; Michael Hastings, assistant to Senator Cohen; Mike Donley, assistant to Senator Jepsen.

### OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN C. STENNIS, CHAIRMAN

Chairman STENNIS. Members of the committee, we will please come to order. I regret that we had a rollcall vote just about assembly time.

Gentlemen of the committee, you know our rule is to give the cameramen a few minutes here in the beginning to get all the pictures they need. They have been quite responsive to our request then that they absent themselves so that we can continue with the business of the committee.

I assumed that there was enough room in this large hearing room, gentlemen, to accommodate everyone. Unfortunately, I had a call about some of the television people being excluded. The committee would not have any purpose to let some in and keep others out. I hoped that the situation would be arranged where all of you who wanted to come in—I am talking about the television people and the other cameramen—could. I hope they got in. The television people can stay of

course if they wish to. I don't know what the situation is now. Did you find a way to let all of them come in who wanted to come in, the television people? That is fine. That is very fine.

Gentlemen, I have a very brief statement here concerning this important office of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I wasn't in the Senate during the writing of the law that pertains to this office. As I expressed it once, I came in on the next train after this office had been created and was still being talked about.

The National Security Act of 1947 was passed the year I was elected to the Senate but before I took office. It was still being discussed when I got here.

This is a unique office that was created by the Congress when they created the Department of Defense. The creation of the Department of Defense was the big part of the 1947 act, recognizing after World War II the need for such a department and also recognizing that the Air Force was a separate force of our military power.

I will read this statement, gentlemen, which is brief.

The committee meets today to consider the nomination of Gen. David C. Jones for an additional 2-year term as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under the law, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves at the pleasure of the President for a term of 2 years and may be reappointed for one additional term. General Jones was appointed to his current term on June 21, 1978, and this term expires June 20 of this year. General Jones had previously served a 4-year term from June 1974 to June 1978 as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his position as Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

Under our law, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the highest military office in the land. While holding office, he outranks all other officers of the Armed Forces. With our concept of civilian control, he is subject to the orders of the President and the Secretary of Defense. Also under the law, he is prohibited from exercising military command. This balance, which was carefully drawn after World War II, was an attempt to provide some centralized management of our Armed Forces while at the same time keeping the military forces clearly under civilian control.

Now another point is that the services then existing and up to now wanted to be certain that they had a military head of their forces or their department and that no one else would have a command in that service. They wound up in this legislative battle, and that is what it was, with those two points covered in the law and in the terms of the law.

An underlying concept to the arrangement is that American military personnel are kept separate from the political process and are subject to civilian control; that is, as far as humanly possible. Any President or Secretary of Defense should be able to turn to any military officer for his best professional judgment and advice. That goes without saying but it ought to be said, too, to make it clear, that the President is not confined to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as a sole source of counsel and advice but the office itself makes him the Chief so far as rating and ranking and position are concerned.

Although the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs wears the uniform of one of our military services he does not represent the Air Force, the

Army, the Navy, or the Marine Corps, whatever uniform he may wear. While holding office he outranks all the other officers of the military forces.

General Jones, while serving on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has seen a great deal of change in our country. When he began, we were still winding down the buildup that had taken place for the Vietnam war. About 4 or 5 years ago, the winding down ended and a gradual buildup of our military spending began. He has seen a much more aggressive Soviet role in the world highlighted by their invasion of Afghanistan and a use of Cuban troops in Africa and other places. During this period, we have also seen the volunteer force experiment tried which is now running into increasing difficulty. Thus, General Jones has served through a time of profound change which will likely continue for the additional 2-year term for which he has been nominated.

We are pleased to have General Jones here today and we look forward to his testimony and answers to any questions the members may have.

Gentlemen, I want to make this comment. I have certainly observed over and over that this office is a very difficult office to fill by its very nature. It has elements of legislative compromise written into the language that creates the office and describes it. That is almost necessary for this position.

There was objection to the Chairman having a vote on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. So it was agreed that he would be Chairman but would not have a vote unless there was a tie. That is an odd situation in a way but all of us who have served on conference committees know there has to be something to put it together. The question came up about their serving when the Presidents might be changed and that was covered in the very simplest possible way, that the Chairman would serve at the pleasure of whoever was President of the United States. Now that really augments the importance of the office and clarifies rather than makes uncertain just what is meant. It is inconceivable that we would have a President of the United States encumbered, so to speak, with a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he did not approve of and really wanted to seek the advice of someone else. So the very plain provision was written in here that this office is so important in its duties as adviser to the President of the United States that even though ordinarily he has a fixed term, nevertheless he can serve only at the pleasure of the President of the United States.

Frankly, someone said to me, "Well, why not just wait until after the election and then we will know for sure who is going to be President of the United States and we can elect the Chairman then." Right off, that would show that it won't work, it could not work under any circumstances. We already have the mechanics that will make the situation work when we go back to that language in any case, that all those occupying this position have to serve at the will and pleasure of the President of the United States. It was not wise to put off this appointment and I think every member of our committee agrees with that.

Gentlemen, I ask unanimous consent that certain quotations from the law relevant to this nomination be included at this point in the record.

[The information follows:]

## [10 § 142—GENERAL MILITARY LAW—Subt. A]

## § 142. Chairman

(a) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from the officers of the regular components of the armed forces. He serves at the pleasure of the President for a term of two years, and may be reappointed in the same manner for one additional term. However, in time of war declared by Congress there is no limit on the number of reappointments.

(b) In addition to his other duties as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman shall, subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense—

(1) preside over the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

(2) provide agenda for the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and assist them in carrying on their business as promptly as practicable; and

(3) inform the Secretary of Defense, and, when the President or the Secretary of Defense considers it appropriate, the President, of those issues upon which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not agreed.

(c) While holding office, the Chairman outranks all other officers of the armed forces. However, he may not exercise military command over the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any of the armed forces. Aug. 10, 1956, c. 1041, 70A Stat. 7; Sept. 7, 1962, Public Law 87-649, § 14c(1), 76 Stat. 501.

## HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES

<i>Revised Section</i>	<i>Source (U.S. Code)</i>
142(a)-----	5:171f(c) (less last sentence)
142(b)-----	5:171f(e)
	5:171f(a) (20th through 26th words of 1st sentence of 1st par.)
142(c)-----	5:171f(d) (less applicability to admiral in 1st sentence)
142(d) [rep.]-----	5:171f(c) (last sentence)

## SOURCE (STATUTES AT LARGE)

July 26, 1947, ch. 343, § 211(a), (20th through 26th words of 1st sentence of 1st par.), (c), (d) (less applicability to admiral in 1st sentence), (e); restated Aug. 10, 1949, ch. 412, § 7(b) (20th through 26th words of 1st sentence of 1st par., and 3d, 4th, and 5th pars.), 63 Stat. 581.

## EXPLANATORY NOTES

In subsection (a), the words "armed forces" are substituted for the words "armed services". The words "(hereinafter referred to as the 'Chairman')", "hereafter", and "except" are omitted as surplusage. The words "in the same manner" are substituted for the words "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate" (following the word "reappointment [reappointed]").

Effective Date of 1962 Amendment. Amendment of section by Public Law 87-649 effective Nov. 1, 1962, see section 15 of Public Law 87-649, set out as a note preceding section 101 of Title 37, Pay and Allowances of the Uniformed Services.

In subsection (b), the words "his other duties as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff" are substituted for the words "participating as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the performance of the duties assigned in subsection (b) of this section".

In subsection (c), the words "armed forces" are substituted for the words "armed services" and "military services". The word "outranks" is substituted for the words "shall take precedence over". 5:171f(d) (1st sentence, less applicability to admiral) is omitted, since the limitation on numbers in grade under 10:506b-(b) (3d proviso) is executed (see opinion of the Judge Advocate General of the Army (JAGA 1951/6180, 17 Oct. 1951)).

In [former] subsection (d), the words "basic and personal money" and "and such special pays and hazardous duty pays to which he may be entitled under other provisions of law" are omitted as surplusage.

1962 Amendment.—Subsec. (d). Public Law 87-649 repealed subsec. (d), which provided that the Chairman is entitled to the pay and allowances pro-

vided for the Chief of Staff of the Army, and is now covered by section 203 of Title 37, Pay and Allowances of the Uniformed Services.

Legislative History.—For legislative history and purpose of Public Law 87-649, see 1962 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 2390.

#### CROSS REFERENCES

Armed Forces Policy Council, member of, see section 171 of this title.

Management of Joint Staff and its director, see section 143 of this title.

Pay and allowances—

Chairman, see section 203 of Title 37, Pay and Allowances of the Uniformed Services.

Grade of general, see section 3034 of this title; sections 203, 402 and 403 of Title 37, Pay and Allowances of the Uniformed Services.

Personal money allowances of Chief of Staff of Army, see section 414 of Title 37, Pay and Allowances of the Uniformed Services.

Chairman STENNIS. General Jones, we are glad to have you here today. You have served this 2-year period following your 4 years, I believe it was, that you served as Chief of Staff of the Air Force, another highly important position. I remember saying when you were chosen for that office that you were going to live through the formative years following the war that had been vastly misunderstood, not culminating on a victorious note at least, and it set a different precedent and we had problems ahead that would take all of you and your cohorts to find ways to solve, and the way has been rugged. It has been rugged for most of us in the Senate, too, General.

Without objection, I will insert in the hearing record, your nomination reference and report and also your biographical sketch.

[Nomination reference and report follows:]

#### NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,  
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,  
May 28, 1980.

*Ordered*, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Gen. David C. Jones, U.S. Air Force, for reappointment as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for an additional term of 2 years.

—————, 1980.

Reported with the recommendation that the nomination be *confirmed*, subject to the nominee's commitment to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.

#### BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF DAVID CHARLES JONES, GENERAL, USAF

*Personal Data:* Born—July 9, 1921, Aberdeen, S.D. Father—Maurice (deceased). Mother—Helen Meade. Married—Jan. 23, 1942. Wife—Lois M. Tarbell. Children—Susan, Kathy, and David. Hometown—Minot, N.D.

*Education:* Graduated—High School, Minot, N.D., 1939. Attended—University of North Dakota and Minot State College. Graduated—Flying School, Roswell, N.M., 1943; National War College, Washington, D.C., 1960.

*Service:* April 1942—February 1943, Avn cadet, Roswell, N.M.

February 1943—August 1945, Adv fly instr, Roswell, N.M.; Yuma, Ariz.; Pecos, Texas; and Hobbs, N.M.

August 1945—May 1948, Plt; ops & tng off; Comdr, 3d Emerg Resc Sq, 5th AF, Japan.

May 1948—January 1949, Unit instr, 2235th AFRes Tng Cn, Godman Fld, Ky.

January 1949—April 1949, Stu, Air Tac Sch, Tyndall AFB, Fla.

April 1949—August 1949, Stu, Atomic Energy Crs, Keesler AFB, Miss.

August 1949—October 1949, Asst Ops & Tng Off, Godman Fld.

October 1949—January 1950, Stu, Spec Wpns Crs, Sandia Base, N.M.  
 January 1950—May 1953, Plt & ops off; Comdr, 19th Bomb Sq, March AFB, Calif.  
 May 1953—June 1954, Comdr, 22d Air Rflg Sq, March AFB.  
 June 1954—September 1954, Comdr, 33d Bomb Sq, March AFB.  
 September 1954—December 1954, Ops planner, Bomber Mission Br, HQ SAC, Offutt AFB, Neb.  
 January 1955—July 1957, Aide to CINCSAC, Offutt AFB.  
 July 1957—July 1959, Dir of Mat; Dep Comdr for Maint, 93d Bomb Wg, Castle AFB, Calif.  
 August 1959—June 1960, Stu, NWC, Washington, D.C.  
 July 1960—July 1964, Ch, Manned Sys Br; Dep Ch, Strat Div; Ch, Strat Div, DCS/OPS, HQ USAF, Washington, D.C.  
 August 1964—February 1965, Stu, USAF Ops Tng Crs, Luke & Davis-Monthan AFBs, Ariz.  
 March 1965—October 1965, Comdr, 33d Tac Ftr Wg, Eglin AFB, Fla.  
 October 1965—January 1969, IG, C/S & DCS/Plans & Ops, HQ USAFE, Wiesbaden AB, Germany.  
 February 1969—July 1969, DCS/Ops, HQ 7th AF & Vice Comdr, 7th AF, Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN.  
 August 1969—April 1971, Comdr, 2d AF, Barksdale AFB, La.  
 April 1971—August 1971, Vice CINCUSAFE, Wiesbaden AB, Germany.  
 September 1971—June 1974, CINCUSAFE, Wiesbaden AB (Ramstein AB, Germany after March 1973) & Comdr, 4th ATAF, Ramstein AB.  
 July 1974—June 1978, C/S, USAF, Washington, D.C.  
 June 1978—Present, Chairman, JCS, DOD, Washington, D.C.

*Decorations and Service Awards:* Defense Distinguished Service Medal with one oak leaf cluster, Distinguished Service Medal (Air Force) with one oak leaf cluster, Legion of Merit, Distinguished Flying Cross, Bronze Star Medal, Air Medal with one oak leaf cluster, Air Force Commendation Medal, Air Force Outstanding Unit Award, American Campaign Medal, Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal, World War II Victory Medal, Army of Occupation Medal (Japan), National Defense Service Medal with one bronze service star, and Korean Service Medal with two bronze service stars.

Also, Vietnam Service Medal with three bronze service stars, Air Force Longevity Service Award Ribbon with eight oak leaf clusters, National Order, Republic of Vietnam, 5th Class, Republic of Vietnam Air Force Distinguished Service Order, 1st Class, Grand Cross, 2d Class of the Order of Merit, Federal Republic of Germany, National Order of Security Merit (Tongil), Republic of Korea, French Legion of Honor, Grade of Commander, Venezuelan Air Force Cross, 1st Class, Venezuelan Legion of Merit Inter-American Aerial Brotherhood Degree of Officer, Italian Knight of the Grand Cross, Japanese First Class Order of the Rising Sun, Swedish Knights Grand Cross of the Order of the North Star, Colombian Antonio Ricaurte Aeronautical Order of Merit, Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with palm, United Nations Service Medal, Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal, and Missileman Badge.

## EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTIONS

Grade	Temporary	Permanent
2d lieutenant.....	Feb. 6, 1943.....	Feb. 6, 1943.
1st lieutenant.....	Feb. 28, 1944.....	Feb. 6, 1946.
Captain.....	Apr. 11, 1946.....	Oct. 25, 1948.
Major.....	Feb. 5, 1951.....	Jan. 23, 1952.
Lieutenant colonel.....	June 1, 1953.....	July 1, 1959.
Colonel.....	Apr. 23, 1957.....	Dec. 22, 1960.
Brigadier general.....	Dec. 1, 1965.....	Feb. 10, 1966.
Major general.....	Nov. 1, 1967.....	Jan. 24, 1969.
Lieutenant general.....	Aug. 1, 1969.....	
General.....	Sept. 1, 1971.....	

Note: Date of rank Sept. 1, 1971.

Chairman STENNIS. We will proceed now. If you have a formal statement we will be glad for you to present it or speak orally.

STATEMENT OF GEN. DAVID C. JONES, USAF, CHAIRMAN OF THE  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General JONES. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a pleasure to be with you today on the hearings for my renomination for 2 years as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I do not have a prepared statement. I would just like to make some very brief remarks and make two points. One with regard to the office in which I serve and second with regard to my concerns on the military trends facing the United States.

I view very seriously the integrity of the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under our constitutional system, we in the military are under and subject to the control of civilian authority. I believe it is absolutely essential that the discipline among the senior military, particularly in Washington, be as firm and dependable as the discipline among the military commanders in the field. In any military organization, when the commander issues an order he must have confidence that that order will be carried out without any criticism and without an attempt to circumvent it. The Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces must have the same confidence.

Therefore, I believe that a very critical responsibility of mine is to make the strongest possible case for national defense to the Secretary of Defense and the President. Having made that case, when a decision is rendered I have a clear obligation, by law and by personal conviction, to carry out that order even if I would have decided otherwise.

If I disagreed to the extent that I could not, in clear conscience, support that decision as a matter of judgment on which reasonable people could differ, then I would have the option, indeed the obligation, to step aside. I think it is very important both for the integrity of our governmental process and for military effectiveness that the Armed Forces be disciplined and that these standards of military professionalism be strictly observed.

We must all recognize that it would be impossible for military leaders to have the right to freely denounce the actions and decisions of a commander in chief without undermining the concept of civilian control which is so central to our constitutional process.

I also fully recognize a special responsibility to the Congress. While obliged by law to carry out the instructions of the President, when I appear before Congress and am asked for my personal views, I have a responsibility to express those in a straightforward and candid way even when they are at variance with official policy.

I see no conflict between my responsibility to the President and my responsibility to Congress for candid responses.

In my view the American people expect and demand discipline within the military. We are more disciplined today than we were at the end of the Vietnam war but we have a long way to go. We in senior positions must set the example. If confirmed I will continue to abide by the principles that I have just stated.

My second point is to stress my worries about the trends. For a number of years I have been expressing profound concerns about the protracted decline in resources being dedicated to the military for our own modernization and readiness needs. Now this is not just a recent

trend. It dates back to the early 1960's when the decision was made to shift priority away from our strategic forces. It continued for many years. During the war in Southeast Asia we financed much of that war by deferring modernization and, as a result, we had great aging of our military hardware.

In the aftermath of that experience in Southeast Asia, instead of proceeding vigorously to solve the problems of overdue modernization and to work harder on readiness, we experienced successive cuts in real terms in resources dedicated to national defense. At the same time in view of the need for equity and retention of personnel and even before the advent of the All-Volunteer Force a substantial increase in the allocation of funds to personnel was made from dwindling resources.

Only recently has there been some increase but we have a lot of catching up to do.

I am convinced that the 1980's will be a period of increasing instability and turmoil in the world. There are many currents that are promoting that instability, but the overarching one is the growing might of the Soviet military capability and their willingness to use that might, as demonstrated in Afghanistan. That increase in capability is the greatest threat to our national security and peace in this world. It is imperative in my opinion that we increase the defense budgets year after year in real terms, that we get our allies to increase their defense budgets, but equally important, that we possess and clearly demonstrate the will as the leader of the free nations to defend our people, our institutions, our values and our vital interests.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to questions.

Chairman STENNIS. General, I did not bring it up, but I am glad that you did; to clearly state your belief, with emphasis, in the supremacy of the civilian authority over the military. I know enough about the Constitution of the United States. I am not a constitutional lawyer but I have studied it with love and vigor as a young man. There is not a more important clause in our system than that one, and there is not any group that has lived up to it better in our Nation than our own military personnel, and I am proud of that fact. I am proud to remember it in connection with literally thousands of names that come before us for confirmation in the course of the year. You are spending over \$150 billion a year militarily, and have a tremendous responsibility for the direction in which that money goes. Money is power. And you are in a responsible position with reference to living up to the letter and the spirit of that principle.

This office that you are holding, I believe, is the most difficult one of all in that respect. May you and all your cohorts continue to exercise the disciplines that must be necessary to have an effective military force. That has become an unpopular word in many segments of our society and carelessness is the cause of it now, but I want to continue to look to you gentlemen to furnish the example, the precept and example of the standards by which American youth can be attracted to discipline and its fruit.

God forbid, if we lost that, we are going to lose a lot of other fine things about our system.

Senator Tower, I turn to you now, sir, for your examination. Until we find a better rule, gentlemen, we will adhere to our 10 minute rule.

Senator TOWER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would be remiss if I did not comment on your emphasis on the necessity for maintaining, in principle and in practice, civilian control of the military in this country. That is something we all agree on. However, in our zeal to keep pristine the practice of civilian control, we have too often overlooked or treated with contempt the legitimate opinions and judgments of the professional military men of this country. I certainly do not suggest that military men in any way say anything that might demonstrate a lack of respect for civilian control of the military.

We have heard a great deal of talk for years about the American military-industrial complex and its inordinate political influence. I wish it had a little more. Indeed, if it did, we would not be facing the fact that the Soviets will have a greater military capability than the United States in a very short period of time. But the American people have been propagandized into believing that the influence of our defense industry operates against the best interests of the American people. Such is not the case. Quite the contrary has happened.

General Jones and his colleagues have testified that we will lose essential equivalence in strategic capability in 1982 and that we will be confronted by a window of vulnerability for some years. I would stress that not only the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Chiefs of Staff of the various services be responsive to their civilian Commander in Chief, but that we have a constitutional responsibility to maintain the Armed Forces of this country. In fulfilling the responsibility, we are entitled to the unvarnished and unqualified professional judgment of our uniformed personnel.

I fear that sometimes the uniformed officers have been less than forthright in presenting their views to this committee because of their zeal to avoid being thought insubordinate to their Commander in Chief.

Now, in our strategic program a few years back were IOC's for the following weapons: the MX, 1983; the Trident submarine, 1979; and the B-1 bomber, 1979.

I could name others, but each of these programs has slipped by at least 2 years. One has been canceled outright. This has occurred during the tenure of General Jones. Again, I don't believe that this is solely the result of his judgment but also that of the civilians who have governed his activities. By any standard of measure, during that period of time, we have seen one of the most serious shifts in the strategic military balance in modern history.

I would like to ask General Jones this question. Comparing the prognosis for balance right now as compared to the prognosis before these programs were delayed or canceled, are we better off or worse off today?

General JONES. Senator Tower, I don't think there is any question but that we are worse off today than we would have been had we had these programs. On the B-1, at the time of cancellation we had a 1982 IOC but I think that is a minor point. We would have been better off today and in the days ahead if these programs had proceeded with the operational dates—

Senator TOWER. With production in 1979, the IOC would have been 1982?

General JONES. At the time of the 1977 cancellation, if I remember right, the IOC would have been 1982 but I think that is a small point. I agree with your conclusion.

Senator TOWER. I will accept your IOC.

General JONES. I agree with your conclusion that we would have been better off today with those systems with the IOC that you cited rather than the IOC that we have now on the two systems and the cancellation of the B-1.

Senator TOWER. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions. I will yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman STENNIS. Thank you very much.

Senator JACKSON?

Senator JACKSON. General, I wonder if you could comment on the two stories that appeared in the Evening Star; one headed "General Jones Denies Deal To Resign," and the other one, "General Jones OKs Deal With Critics." You are familiar with the stories?

General JONES. Yes.

Senator JACKSON. I think in fairness to you and to the country we ought to know if any kind of deal was made and, if none was made, will you relate to us exactly what happened?

General JONES. I categorically deny, Senator Jackson, that there was any arrangement made or any so-called deal.

Senator JACKSON. Tell us what happened, how this came about?

General JONES. There was expressed to me some concern about the tenure of the Chairman. All I said was that I serve at the pleasure of the President, that at any time under any President if that President executes that provision, as a disciplined officer I would step aside. I even used the word "gracefully" but that has been misunderstood as though somehow I would slide off into the night. I think it would be totally inappropriate for the military to adopt the practice of political appointees of submitting a resignation.

I never used the word "resignation." I was very careful in saying that clearly I serve at the pleasure of the President. I do not foresee a conceivable circumstance under which I would, on change of administration, submit a resignation.

Senator JACKSON. You did not agree to step aside if a new President came in in January as a condition of getting confirmed?

General JONES. Absolutely not.

Senator JACKSON. I know you denied it earlier but I wanted to make it a part of the record because this was, as you know, on the front page of several major newspapers.

General JONES. A very inaccurate statement. I deplore the fact that when we heard that the article might be published, that we didn't have an opportunity to comment although we offered to make a comment on it. I just want to clear it up for everybody that I have made no agreement, implicit or otherwise. To repeat myself, I cannot conceive a circumstance under which I would submit my resignation upon a change of administration.

Any time any President wants to execute that portion of the law that says I serve at the pleasure of the President, that is his preroga-

tive. It would have to be at the initiative of the President, whoever he may be. It would have to be first-hand and it would have to be clear that he was executing that portion of the law.

Senator JACKSON. In connection with the pending nomination you did not, directly or indirectly offer, as an element of support for your confirmation, an agreement to resign if a new President should come in in January?

General JONES. I said that I serve at the pleasure of the President. The President could execute that and I would step aside.

Senator JACKSON. General, I was going through a number of your recent speeches. I was struck by a theme that runs through many of them, which I have here. "I am not sounding an alarm or suggesting we should embark on a crash program to improve our defense capabilities." This appeared over and over again in your prepared remarks. You are familiar with that line in your speeches?

General JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. The question that I guess comes to mind is: Do you feel that we now need to reverse that position and make a larger effort in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan? I noted your appearance before the House Armed Services Committee and for the first time I believe you came out and said, along with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the budget was not adequate.

General JONES. I think, if you will note those speeches, it has been quite a while since I made a reference to not sounding an alarm or crash programs but I don't have the comments in front of me.

Senator JACKSON. I read that quote from a speech dated September 6, 1979.

General JONES. OK. It has been almost a year. First, I am not a person of high rhetoric, using the words, "Let us sound the alarm" or "crash program." At the time of the discussion before this committee earlier this year I stated that, at the time the budget was put together, the 5-plus-percent real growth was consistent with what we had recommended during the SALT hearings.

You will recall during the SALT hearings there was very little growth in current military budgets. I can recall a discussion with Senator Nunn on the growth. We were anticipating almost no growth in the 1979 budget and we had advocated at that time 5-percent real growth which was more than the administration had proposed. Then at the time of the discussion of the budget earlier this year I said at the time that budget was put together it was not unreasonable, but the events in Afghanistan required us to do some additional things, take some additional action. The appearance before the House Armed Services Committee was not the first time that I have expressed concern about the defense level.

Senator JACKSON. In your response to Mr. Ichord at the May 29 hearing, and I read it here:

Mr. Ichord, at the time the budget was submitted it was not 5-percent real growth but a commitment to make up for anticipated inflation. I said it was not unreasonable. That was before Afghanistan. In my judgment we have a different situation in the post-Afghanistan period. Therefore, I have a different judgment now. I believe that this country does need to spend more on defense than is in that budget as a result of the Afghanistan situation. That is my personal view.

Have you made a request for a supplemental either for the current fiscal year or for fiscal year 1981?

General JONES. As you know, there is a supplemental and an amendment being addressed before the Congress. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in our deliberations with the Secretary of Defense, advocated a growth supplemental and amendment but they were restricted to offsetting for inflation and some no-growth items of offsets, some additions, some deletions. We had recommended there be real growth in both the supplemental and in the amendment.

Senator JACKSON. The way it is now, the supplemental that has been submitted represents zero growth in 1980?

General JONES. That is correct.

Senator JACKSON. Have you formally submitted a request for additional funds in fiscal year 1980 to back up those—

General JONES. We made a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense for additional funds for 1980.

Senator JACKSON. What happened to that request?

General JONES. The decision was made to not have real growth in the 1980 budget amendment.

Senator JACKSON. General, the thing that bothers me is that many of us here felt we needed and were trying to get an increase in the defense budget long before Afghanistan. I think that the American people want to know an answer to the basic problem: That is the Chiefs and yourself as Chairman knew, or certainly should have known, that given present military balance and the Soviet's incentives, something like Afghanistan would occur. Why, I wrote an article 24 years ago saying that this was an obvious area of expansion for the Soviet Union. And yet, the professional military leadership was not raising any alarms.

Today, we are faced with an extremely tenuous situation in Iran, as you know. Would you agree that there is always the possibility of the Russians moving into Iran—a danger which would become especially acute if the country starts to break up? Are we prepared to deal with that kind of problem if we have to?

General JONES. I think clearly there would be a temptation. In fact there is a treaty that the Soviets signed with Iran and Iran said it is null and void but the Soviets have stated it is still in effect, that they say would give them a right to go into at least Azerbaijan Province. I think there is always a temptation there for the Soviets to go in.

Senator JACKSON. How many times have they invaded Iran since the beginning of the 19th century?

General JONES. They clearly invaded Iran during World War II.

Senator JACKSON. I said the 19th century.

General JONES. I can't say offhand.

Senator JACKSON. They went in in 1804 and stayed until 1813 and came back again in 1826, and stayed until 1828.

General JONES. They clearly were in and out, mostly in, through much of the 19th century, no question about that.

Senator JACKSON. When did they go in, in the 20th century?

General JONES. Clearly they went in during World War II.

Senator JACKSON. When were they there the longest?

General JONES. Earlier in the century.

Senator JACKSON. 1911 to 1921. So isn't there a long history of Soviet involvement and intervention in Iran?

General JONES. Clearly. I am not denying that, Senator Jackson.

Senator JACKSON. What I am trying to get at is how you evaluate the threat to our interests in that area posed by Soviet forces across the Soviet and Afghanistan borders?

General JONES. Clearly a substantial threat and it has been there for a considerable period of time. They have motorized rifle divisions and an airborne division in the Transcaucasus area west of the Caspian Sea and some capability to the east. There is a very substantial Soviet capability to invade Iran, no question about it.

Senator JACKSON. Have you always taken the position that they have airborne divisions in the Transcaucasus area and is that the position you are now taking?

General JONES. They have an airborne division in the Transcaucasus. I read the intelligence reports. I have believed that ever since the intelligence reports came out on that.

Senator JACKSON. To recap then, your position has always been that the Russians have had an airborne division or divisions available for deployment in Iran; is that correct?

General JONES. That is correct. Every time I have discussed it I have discussed that they had airborne capability and motorized rifle divisions in the Transcaucasus area.

Chairman STENNIS. Senator, your time is up.

General JONES. If I may add one thing, Mr. Chairman, I do not want to leave any implication that all of a sudden with Afghanistan that we have discovered a big threat from the Soviet Union. Last summer we advocated strongly an increase in the defense budget. With Afghanistan we advocated a further increase in the defense budget.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Chairman STENNIS. Our committee will please come to order. I call on Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. General Jones, you have been Chairman now for 2 years and you have been nominated for 2 more years. I just wonder from the experience you have had so far, have you had a chance to change your perception of your role as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Would you mind elucidating or articulating a little bit on that point?

General JONES. Senator Thurmond, I don't believe I have changed my mind on the role of the Chairman. I think there are parts of it that have been sharpened. Clearly there is a need to be a very strong advocate for readiness. I deal more with the commanders in chief in the field than anyone else. I feel particularly the urgency of being able to respond to crises. I have stated a number of times, including before Congress, that I don't believe there is enough of a constituency for readiness. There is a constituency for major weapon systems, but there is not enough of a constituency for the spare parts and the training and the exercises and the rest. So I find increasingly that readiness is one example of an area in which my views have become stronger over a period of time.

Another one is that we need to be more joint. We need to continue to improve our ability to operate and interoperate among all the

services. We need to do much more in being an integrated fighting force in the days ahead. We are making progress in that regard.

Those are two examples of areas where my thinking has sharpened in the last 2 years.

Senator THURMOND. From your experience as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, do you have any recommendations to make concerning improved joint operations? We keep hearing there is still so much jealousy between the different services; who will be in charge in case of operations and so forth. Have you thought about this matter and do you intend to make some recommendations while you are Chairman about this or are you satisfied as it is?

General JONES. No; I am not satisfied, Senator Thurmond. We ought to recognize that the situation that we have now is a compromise. When the law was passed there was great debate whether to have totally separate services or to have a general staff or variations in between. We have a compromise system. We are trying to achieve the advantages of both separatism and sort of a single general staff but the compromise brings with it some disadvantages.

I do not recommend now major surgery to the system but I do think we have to refine and make sure—we have a lot of competent officers in the Joint Staff—to have even greater incentives for the best people to go into joint jobs. There are a number of actions, but I would not recommend, at least as of now, to try to have major surgery. Even though I can see some advantages to that there are also difficulties in doing so.

Senator THURMOND. The services are responsible for operations. Do you feel that the services now should have any responsibility for operations other than what they have at present or should it be shifted to the Joint Chiefs? This is a very important facet, it seems to me, of the office you hold.

General JONES. The services still have great influence on operations. Anyone who controls the purse strings has great influence on what goes on. The purse strings go down to the services—I am not advocating that we in the Joint Staff take over financial management—and that means they do continue to have a great say in what goes on in operations.

I would not move toward an increased role for the services. I would move toward an increased role for joint operations. I would like to see an increase in the exercise budget for the joint operations. This would help sharpen our readiness, our combat capability, it would help morale. It is one area in which I strongly advocate an increased amount of effort, to get in the field all four services together to work out some of the difficult problems that maybe we can't work out in Washington.

Senator THURMOND. If you had the power now to write procedures for improvement of your office, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, what would you recommend? Do you think your recommendations would be those that would require Congress to act or would the Secretary of Defense or the President have the power to act?

General JONES. I would strengthen the role of the Chairman. I am not talking about it from a personal standpoint because in this Government of ours before any change would take place in a major sense considerable time goes by, so I am talking more of a successor than myself.

We are restricted in the size of the Joint Staff. I do not have a programming shop. I have three people that work the budgetary aspects. There can be a greater role for the Chairman in the budget process.

I would advocate some increased independence for the Joint Staff from the services, but I am not suggesting major surgery now. I think that in an evolutionary way we can make some improvements.

Senator THURMOND. General Jones, do you feel that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should have greater access to the Congress through the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the House? Do you feel that would improve the situation or do you feel it still should go through the Secretary of Defense?

General JONES. We do have access, Senator Thurmond, in hearings. I do not believe that it would be appropriate though to come over here to the Armed Services Committee separate and independent, even though we give independent views. I think the process we have now, of hearings and discussions, is probably the right balance.

Senator THURMOND. Do you feel that an officer has a duty to respond to questions of the Congress, whether he is under oath or not, with regard to his military opinions concerning the security of the country?

General JONES. Yes, sir; and I think those views should be honestly and candidly expressed. But let me put a reservation on this. It is not a reservation about my sitting here or an officer sitting here and expressing his views. But I do think it is inappropriate for me to come to you or to anyone else and say, "Here is something I want to work that is at variance with the administration's position. If in the committee you will ask me this question I will respond with an answer that, according to the rules, gives my own views." Nor is it appropriate for others to entice views that are inconsistent or to come to me and say, "The President made this decision; join me in trying to overturn that decision by working with my colleagues." I believe that activity is inconsistent with the conduct of a disciplined military officer.

Certainly when I am sitting before this committee and you ask me a question, I have a full obligation and conviction to answer you candidly and directly and honestly with my own personal views regardless of what the administration's position is. But that is different from going around trying to work behind the scenes to get something changed.

Senator THURMOND. As I understand, you feel that the administration should set the direction and policy but that the military officer should respond truthfully before any committee before which he testifies?

General JONES. Yes. We have a say in that policy. We have an input in that policy. Once decided, we should support it. That does not mean, for example, on an issue such as the B-1, when a President makes a decision that all of a sudden I support his logic for the decision. I still have my rationale of why I would have recommended the B-1 in production.

But I do not go around behind the scenes and try to get that decision overthrown.

Chairman STENNIS. I am sorry, your time is up. Thank you, Senator. Senator Byrd?

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Jones, I thought you made an excellent opening statement and I want to commend you.

General JONES. Thank you, Senator.

Senator BYRD. I have 16 questions. Several may be in a classified category. If so, if you will just so indicate, we will handle it in executive session, with the chairman's permission.

General, you have testified in support of the SALT II Treaty with Russia, but your testimony was before the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. My question is: As a result of that invasion, have your views changed or been modified?

General JONES. Senator Byrd, I realize that the conditions of ratification have changed since Afghanistan, but from my personal standpoint on the question of whether SALT II is in our best interest or not, it is my belief and personal conviction that there is not any question that SALT II is in our best interest. It is modest but useful; it does not solve the strategic problem.

I am concerned though if SALT is not followed that the Soviet breakout can be much larger than ours as we initiate programs. It is a separate issue whether it ought to be brought up for ratification, but I have a deep personal conviction that SALT II is still in our best interest.

Senator BYRD. Would you describe the Soviet-Cuban penetration of the Caribbean?

General JONES. As you know, in infiltration operations it is very often hard to get solid proof of every action. They are covert, guerilla-type actions. But I am convinced that there is a heavy Cuban hand in the Caribbean and in Central America, even beyond what we can prove.

Senator BYRD. Do you regard that to be of major concern to the United States?

General JONES. It is a major concern that here in our backdoor we have instability.

Senator BYRD. Would you describe the Cuban military presence in Nicaragua?

General JONES. Their overt military presence is quite limited. They had, in my judgment, a substantial role in the change of government in Nicaragua. I have not had a chance to receive a debrief by the group that was led by Congressman Wright to see what their judgments would be as to our chances of having some government down there that is moderate. But I was and am deeply concerned about the Cuban role in Nicaragua, as well as in other parts of Latin America.

Senator BYRD. Does Russia have airborne capability to seize Iranian oilfields?

General JONES. It would depend on the circumstances. If we did nothing and the nations of the area did nothing, and we saw their airborne forces going on increased alert, deployment of the aircraft, movement into the area, and we did nothing, then, yes, they could move in quite rapidly.

It is a long way though from their airfields to the oilfields. It would be the longest airborne operation that I can recall, probably in history, and it would not be an easy operation if we could interdict.

For example, a few AWACS and a few fighters could just devastate an airborne operation at those distances. So it would depend on the circumstances as to whether or not they could be successful in an airborne operation.

Senator BYRD. Did Russian reconnaissance aircraft overfly Iran during the rescue attempt?

General JONES. I have no indication that there was any overflight by the Soviets during the rescue attempt.

Senator BYRD. Were any Russian aircraft present in Iran during or immediately after the rescue attempt?

General JONES. Not to my knowledge.

Senator BYRD. Did the National Command Authority have any hot-line communication with Russia before, during or in the 24-hour period immediately following the rescue mission?

General JONES. Not during or before. It would be more appropriate to ask the National Command Authority, but in the aftermath, after the abort, many nations were contacted with notification. I am convinced there was no contact before or during.

I don't have access to all the information, but I know that the channels normally used were not used, and I am convinced there was no contact before or during.

Senator BYRD. How many chemical production facilities does Russia possess and how many does the United States have?

General JONES. They have a very large chemical warfare production capability, multiple facilities. I know one in particular that is very large and capable.

We have no production capability today in being for chemical warfare.

Senator BYRD. What is the relative size of the Russian chemical warfare stockpile and what is the size of the U.S. stockpile?

General JONES. I think the best way to answer that, Senator Byrd, is that they have a much larger and much more modern stockpile than ours, by many factors.

Senator BYRD. What is the state of the Russian defenses against chemical weapons and the state of American defenses against chemical weapons?

General JONES. The Soviets put a tremendous amount of effort in defense against chemical weapons and also a great deal in the offense. They have large organizations; they have a lot of resources. It is substantially better than ours.

We have in recent years put additional resources into chemical defense. The problem is that if one has an offense and the other one doesn't, and the person who has to be on the defensive has to operate with the equipment, your effectiveness drops off very drastically, because it is very difficult to operate in protective gear.

Senator BYRD. In this case the United States is at a severe disadvantage?

General JONES. That is right.

Senator BYRD. Since the beginning of this year, how many overflights of Western Europe have occurred in which Russian aircraft penetrated NATO air space?

General JONES. I would have to check and give an answer, a classified answer to that, Senator Byrd.

But I don't recall extensive or any substantial overflight in Central Europe.

I also would have to check on flanks as to the amount of overflight.

Senator BYRD. To get back to the Caribbean, naval exercises had been scheduled for May 8. Those exercises, as I understand it, were canceled. Would you comment on that?

General JONES. There were two reasons for the decision to cancel the exercises: First—and I think the most compelling reason or the primary reason—was to keep the focus on Castro's problems that he was having internally. He was having great difficulty with his populace and we wanted to keep the focus of attention in the world on his difficulties.

Now, second, with the cancellation of that exercise, some of the ships were made available to operate between Cuba and the United States. That does not mean that we could not have used other ships at some disruption of schedule, but it did make it a little easier by their being available.

Senator BYRD. It is correct, is it not, that in a letter dated May 1, the President of Panama requested, if not demanded, that the exercises be canceled?

General JONES. I think there was a concern expressed on the part of Latin America that the exercise would give the Cubans an excuse to take the attention off their internal problems and therefore it was recommended that the exercise be canceled.

Senator BYRD. Thank you. My time is up.

Chairman STENNIS. I thank the Senator very much.

Senator Goldwater?

Senator GOLDWATER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I find myself in not an unusual position, but a position that one does not run into every day. I have known General Jones for many, many years. We are friends. We share the agreements and the disagreements of friendship, particularly within our mutual interests. For more years than he may care to remember, General Jones has been in the Air Force, an obvious interest of mine.

What I like about General Jones is the fact that when his Commander in Chief gives him an order, he in effect salutes and says, "Yes, sir."

Now, we can argue that when a lesser commander has a disagreement with a higher commander, the lesser does not have to follow the command; he can turn in his suit. I would hate to see that start in our military because we have agreeable ways to disagree that all commanders understand.

I have run into conflict and disagreement in my life as a commander, and I respect the general for having obeyed an order that I know he did not agree with.

For that reason, Mr. Chairman, if for no other reason, I consider him to be an officer and a gentleman, and I am going to vote for him.

That is all I have.

General JONES. Thank you, Senator Goldwater.

Chairman STENNIS. Are you yielding back your time?

Senator GOLDWATER. I did not keep my time.

General JONES. Take all the time you like. [Laughter.]

Chairman STENNIS. Senator Nunn, that brings us to you.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, I too intend to support General Jones' confirmation. He is a man of integrity, and a man of ability. I believe that he has always testified truthfully before this committee. I have not agreed with all his testimony, but I respect him. He has been in front on a good many issues of this administration and to some extent in front of congressional committees, particularly in the area of military spending.

General Jones testified strongly last year about the gaps that were developing between the United States and the Soviet Union both in strategic weapons and in conventional weapons. For a long time, he also has emphasized the gap that was developing in readiness. He has emphasized for quite a while, although perhaps not to the extent that I would desire, our manpower problems.

So I do intend to support him. I think that he has done a good job and will continue to do a good job.

General JONES. Thank you, Senator.

Senator NUNN. General Jones, in respect to the Iranian rescue mission independent panel, we in this committee knew nothing about it until it was announced in the newspapers. As you recall, I was very much in favor of an independent panel and said so when we had our hearings.

My concern is whether it is really independent. Senator Goldwater just mentioned about following order and the chain of command and so forth.

How can active duty officers, who are still under the Joint Chiefs, independently review the actions of the Joint Chiefs and give an objective analysis? If they were to conclude that the Joint Chiefs, for instance, were negligent, if they were to conclude that the Joint Chiefs did a shoddy job of planning—all of these are ifs; I have not come to such conclusions—but if they were to come out with findings adverse to the Joint Chiefs, how could the active duty officers even voice their opinion on that without endangering their career?

General JONES. Senator Nunn, I believe, first, in the integrity of the officer corps. These officers have been asked to look at the rescue attempt and call the shots as they are, and do it in an objective way. So I do not find any reason to doubt that the active duty officers on the group could be critical of what we did or what others did.

I will go one step further and that is, the three retired are all more senior than those on active duty; they are particularly well qualified for that assignment. We have said that anybody on the group that has a differing view is encouraged to put their own view in.

We are not looking for a directed unanimous report on it, and I am sure that Admiral Holloway and General Wilson and General Manor, the three retired, who have special expertise, will be objective in their evaluation as will the active duty people. But it is not an attempt to restrict it.

I think it would be inappropriate not to have someone on active duty who understands what is going on today in the military, has

a knowledge of procedures and has better access to information. Not that we deny it to retired people but they are a part of the system to get the information much more easily.

I think we can have a fair and objective report from the Holloway group despite the concern of there being active duty people on it.

Senator NUNN. What access to information will this panel have? Will they have complete access to all the information that the Joint Chiefs had about the planning for the hostage rescue attempt?

General JONES. We are being very forthcoming about giving them the planning information, execution information. From past experience, many of them are knowledgeable of the tactics used, for example, by the various assault teams. They are getting information in a very candid and forthright way in order to make their evaluation.

Senator NUNN. Will they have access to information denied this committee?

General JONES. They will have access to information that went on beyond Desert One, as other people in the military have had in the operation. We are talking about six individuals who will have the access.

Senator NUNN. Your answer then is yes. They will have access to information denied the committee?

General JONES. I think the answer to that is yes, but I think that it is the wise thing to do, and I believe that the group can report to the committee their findings with regard to the actions—

Senator NUNN. How can we judge those findings if we have never seen the information on which they are based and to which even a small group of this committee has been denied so far across? How can we make any analysis?

It seems to me we are on the horns of a dilemma. You have the Iranians releasing classified information which has been denied this committee. You have an independent panel consisting of active duty military people and some retired who are going to have access to that information. We are going to be asked, I assume, to accept their findings as being objective, and yet we ourselves are not going to have the information.

I don't think it ought to be made available to all the Congress, if it is sensitive, but I do think one branch of the Government is going to have to have that information.

What is your personal view about a small oversight group of this committee or another appropriate committee having access to all the information that would be necessary to make a judgment? What is your personal view on that?

General JONES. My personal view is that it would be worth exploring as to the procedures for access to that information.

Certainly, there is no intent to deny anything that the Iranians have, although a lot of the information they supposedly have they are interpreting in some cases incorrectly and in some cases correctly. Part of it is speculation on their part.

I think it is worth addressing that issue, but I think of overriding importance is the security of the tactics to be used by counterterrorist forces and with the minimum exposure of that information the better off this country will be. We all have difficulty protecting classified

information. We have been quite successful in protecting the classified information on the tactics to be used in the post-Desert One operation.

Senator NUNN. Except for the Iranians.

General JONES. They only have a piece of it: they only have a piece of it.

Senator NUNN. They have a lot more than we have, because I have learned a lot in reading from what they have released.

General JONES. What you learned was inaccurate as well as bits and pieces that are accurate.

Senator NUNN. And we can't judge which is which?

General JONES. That is good in the sense that we hope that everybody looks at those papers—

Senator NUNN. Somebody has to appropriate the money; somebody has to authorize the money.

General JONES. I don't mean you as a Member of Congress, but to the public and everyone who reads that information, it is good that some of it is inaccurate. I think it is worth looking at Senator Nunn, as to how to provide the information, but to do it in a way that insures adequate security.

Senator NUNN. I think it has to be looked at.

On the question that Senator Byrd was asking you about, the chemical capability, you described that the Soviets have more production capability than we do by a substantial amount—and more stockpiling, more defensive capability. What is your personal recommendation to this committee as to what we should be doing on chemical capability, both offensive and defensive?

General JONES. On defensive, we have money in the budget. With an increased budget, I would put some more in, but we are doing reasonably well on the defensive side of it. On offensive, I would recommend some construction money for a binary facility.

Senator NUNN. That is not in the budget, you mean?

General JONES. We are addressing it in the 1982 budget. It is not in the 1981 budget.

Senator NUNN. Would you recommend it this year?

General JONES. I did recommend it earlier in the budget process, and it is not a large amount of money.

Senator NUNN. Haven't we had the policy of unilateral restraint with chemical weapons in the last several years? Hasn't that been an avowed policy of ours?

General JONES. I think we have had unilateral restraint in chemical weapons probably for a decade or two.

Senator NUNN. For that long?

General JONES. Years ago we produced a limited capability. We have not done much about it for many, many years.

Senator NUNN. General Jones, General Ellis stated—I believe this was in February, 1980:

While our calculations agree that rough equivalence did exist in the late 1977 and early 1978 time frame, if that period is accepted as a departure point for subsequent years' assessment, then under today's measurement adverse strategic imbalance has developed and will continue for several years to come. This imbalance exists not only when our forces are in a day-to-day alert posture but also when fully generated. In other words, the worst case and the best case.

Do you personally agree with that assessment by General Ellis?

General JONES. Yes; if you read his words carefully, which say that if the first part of what he states is accepted, where he draws a conclusion that in 1977 we were essentially equivalent. There is no question that in a relative sense the Soviets have improved more than we have since 1977 in strategic weapon systems; so they are relatively better off now than they were in 1977 relative to the United States.

I think I agree with what Senator Jackson wrote in this month's Strategic Review, that we have moved from strategic superiority to where we have plunged to the edge of strategic inferiority. But we are at that very delicate time period right now.

Senator NUNN. General Jones, 2 years ago at your confirmation hearings I asked you to list the top three deficiencies in our military force. You stated that strategic forces were your No. 1 concern, followed by readiness and closely followed by quality and quantity of personnel.

How would you answer the same question today?

General JONES. I believe I also indicated readiness in that third category, broader than personnel.

Senator NUNN. You said strategic forces, readiness and then quality and quantity.

General JONES. Personnel and then conventional, I believe, capability. My recollection is that I said it is hard to list three—strategic forces and readiness and then I would move to personnel, quantity-quality, the capability of our conventional forces.

I am just adding a fourth one that I believe I used at that time. Rereading, also I referred to the maritime situation, but I would not change that a great deal.

I still am concerned about the overall strategic balance. I would hope that the MX would proceed and we could achieve the 1986 operational capability.

I feel even stronger today about the issue of readiness. With the strategic balance problem and with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, being ready is even more important.

Quality and quantity of people, particularly quality now. Quantity, we are not as bad off; but quality, we need to do better.

Conventional capability, maritime capability, all of those I would put in high priority.

Senator NUNN. Do you agree, maybe not with the details, but with the general thrust of this committee's efforts on the Army's trying to emphasize quality rather than quantity? As you know, the Army is stressing quantity over quality.

General JONES. I applaud the desire to go for quality. I have serious concerns about the method.

Senator NUNN. Are the Joint Chiefs making the decision about the quantity/quality tradeoff in the Army? We had the Assistant Secretary of Defense on Manpower testify that he left that entirely up to the Army. Is anybody over the Army in this regard? Do the Joint Chiefs have an influence on whether you go for quantity or quality in the U.S. Army?

General JONES. We do not have personnel directive authority from the Chiefs on any of the services.

Senator NUNN. So, the Secretary of Defense is not making this decision, according to the testimony. The Joint Chiefs are not making the decision. It is entirely up to the Secretary of the Army and the head of the Army; is that right?

General JONES. With regard to the management of the Army and acquisition of people and the breakout between high school and non-high school, that is determined through the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Army, Chief of Staff of the Army system. And we are not involved in that.

We are involved in the broader issues of recommendations for things such as registration or additional compensation, things of that nature.

Senator NUNN. The Secretary of Defense's top assistant on manpower said the Secretary of Defense deferred to the Army on that, and did not exercise it.

General Jones. Only on a few broad personnel issues do the Chiefs get involved. Our personnel shop was dissolved years ago.

Senator NUNN. One reason the Congress is moving in this area is that neither the Secretary of Defense nor the Joint Chiefs are exercising authority over this decision; it is strictly left up to the Army.

General JONES. We have no authority in the Chiefs.

Chairman STENNIS. We will recess for a floor vote. I hope it is the will of the committee to complete the hearing this afternoon, and all who wish to ask questions will, of course, return to the hearing.

Inquiry has been made as to when this matter will be concluded. It depends on how many Senators have questions to ask. We must have a quorum to report a bill or nomination.

I would hope that we could conclude the hearing this afternoon. General Jones' present term will expire June 20, which is this week, as you know. So there should not be any interruption. We can either complete the hearing this afternoon or sometime tomorrow morning. If we have a quorum, I believe we could complete the matter this afternoon.

We will begin questions again as soon as the committee members return.

[Brief recess.]

Chairman STENNIS. Gentlemen, I stated earlier that I hope it is the will of the committee that we proceed to finish the testimony this afternoon. It seems to me that we should have a discussion of it and perhaps vote on it, although I am not trying to rush it.

Senator Warner?

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Jones, since Senator Jackson has brought up the issue of the press reports, I feel obligated to have a follow-on. As you know, when this story came into the press I purposely refrained from getting involved for two reasons. One, in my judgment it was not beneficial to our overall national defense policy and, second, in respect to the office that you hold and as a personal courtesy to you, I felt that any public statement I wished to make on that subject should be made in your presence such that you could rebut any misunderstanding I might have had.

I, as you know, did call you by telephone. It is a common practice of mine to talk to all Presidential appointees coming before the Senate

committees on which I sit. I think I have an obligation when I have some questions to talk to the appointees.

So I talked with you by telephone rather than in person since we frequently see each other and know each other quite well.

Now my only purpose in bringing this up is to give you the opportunity to freely state whether or not in your judgment the conversation we had had any element of impropriety, any element of politization of your office or in any way strayed from or deviated from a clear and concise discussion of the law and the legislative history of the office of the Chairman.

General JONES. Senator Warner, I do not believe anything you did was improper. We have had a number of conversations on a number of subjects. We talked about the rescue operation we have had frequent conversations. Your inquiry as to how I understood the law was fully proper and I think my response was proper to say that I serve at the pleasure of the President. That is the law; and I follow laws.

Senator WARNER. My recollection is that at the close of the conversation I said that you and I had a common understanding of the law and legislative history dating back to the late forties when this post was first created. I made notes at that time which give rise to a word you used earlier. I would like to give you an opportunity to clarify it now if necessary.

In my notes I wrote, "Further, he (General Jones) freely advised me that if any time his relationship with any President"—my recollection there was no mention of any specific President—"was not working out in a manner satisfactory to both parties, he would gracefully and expeditiously step aside in a manner consistent with the Office of the Chairman and consistent with the right of the President to have a chairman of his choice."

That is against the background of a committee report, House of Representatives Report No. 221, dated May 1967, which is probably the most concise finding by Congress with respect to the term of your office.

I read as follows:

But each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff hereafter appointed will know that he can be removed by the President at any time and for any reason whatsoever. Under the proposed title a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be removable at the pleasure of the President and at the complete and sole discretion of the President. Thus, under the proposed title the President would not be required, forced or compelled to retain any officer as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In our discussion—that is the background of the law—we had a complete understanding of that and as far as I was concerned the matter was foreclosed and I think I indicated to you it was my intention in a second conversation, as I do now, to support your renomination.

General JONES. Thank you, Senator Warner.

I want to make sure, on the words used, that no one misinterprets. I know you did not misinterpret but others have misinterpreted, that somehow I would quietly sail off into the sunset at the slightest hint. That is a totally inappropriate conclusion, one that you have not drawn.

Just so that no one misunderstands, any action at any time would have to come at the initiative of the President and he would under

law implement the action and in that case I would be a good soldier and comply with the law. They may have misinterpreted the word "gracefully;" I withdraw that word if someone thinks that is sailing off in the sunset.

I mean by that I am not going to kick and scream and go to court to try to stop that type of action.

Senator WARNER. I think in keeping with the dignity of the Office and in recognition of the right of the President to have a person of his choice, that is the context in which you used the word, clearly understood by me. Thank you, General.

Senator Nunn raised a very important question and we have discussed it together about the responsibility of the Congress and indeed the President to publicly give a complete and detailed explanation about all factors of the raid into Iran. Now I was concerned, as was Senator Nunn, when we learned, with no forewarning whatsoever, of the establishment of this panel of retired and active duty military officers to make an analysis.

The first question is: What is the origin of the idea to have this panel? Did it come from the Joint Staffs, from you, or was it from the Secretary of Defense?

General JONES. I think the basic idea may have many fathers because it was discussed here in appearance before the committee. But basically it was the Joint Chiefs of Staff who decided, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, that they should have an objective look and we went out to pick the most competent people we could get, people who had not drawn judgments on the raid one way or the other, and we think we do have a competent group.

Senator WARNER. I know a number of the persons and I think you did pick a competent team. I share the concerns of Senator Nunn and perhaps others about the independent nature of this panel. I ask why did you not include one or more civilians who have an expertise, recognized in crisis management, a former Secretary of Defense, a Deputy Secretary or someone of that nature, to give balance to the panel?

General JONES. I believe within the military we have a full capability and competency. That may have helped in terms of the perceptions of others, but I am sure this team is fully competent and well-rounded.

Senator WARNER. Was the decision made purposely to exclude anyone with a civilian background, yet having a military expertise? In other words, the thought being that throughout our laws and what we are dealing with today there is a delicate balance between civilian control and uniform officers.

The question is: Did you consider the civilians and exclude them?

General JONES. We discussed the composition of the group. I do not recall in any discussion saying we should have civilians or not. We talked about, should we have people from various organizations but I do not recall any specific discussion on civilian versus military.

We were looking for well-qualified people who could sit down and judge it from the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military as to our planning and our execution.

Senator WARNER. General, again we now have the Congress receiving one body of evidence, this panel will receive not only that body of

evidence but additional evidence. As you said, certain things will be excluded from the Congress. So we are going to have presumably two independent reports, one by the panel and one by the Congress.

If these reports are drawn from a different base of evidence and facts, the report will obviously contain some discrepancies, therein again raising public doubts and concern about the raid in Iran. I have a thought which I perhaps will eventually share with the chairman and the committee that maybe the seriousness of this problem is so great that we ought to establish a Warren type commission or a Blue Ribbon panel totally independent of the Pentagon, independent of the Congress, such that they can fulfill this very important obligation to the public to have a completely analytical, unbiased, independent report on this, perhaps the most important military mission in recent history.

What would be your recommendation to the President should the Congress begin to go forward with establishing a framework for that commission?

General JONES. My recommendation would be that it would not be justified.

Senator WARNER. Would not what?

General JONES. Would not be justified.

Senator WARNER. It would not be justified?

General JONES. It would not be justified. This subject has been discussed. I know you have talked to hundreds of people about it. There is only one aspect of the operation that we did not execute. To form a whole commission to look at that fairly small part—because it was only planning and it was not executed—I think would not be necessary.

Not that we are trying to hide anything. I would prefer an approach that tried to figure out a way to involve very limited access by the Congress to some of that information. Frankly, I have not seen to great a success in limiting the access but that to me would be preferable although I would have some concerns about it. But I do not see a need for a whole new Warren type commission.

Chairman STENNIS. Senator Warner, I am sorry but your time is up. Thank you, Senator.

Senator CULVER, that brings us to you.

Senator CULVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Jones, at your previous confirmation hearing 2 years ago we had a rather extensive discussion of the questions of civilian control and the responsibilities of senior officers in our system. You also told this committee at that time, and I quote, "I would be very concerned if we were to become politicized."

I believe that your comments both 2 years ago as well as on the occasion of your appearance here this afternoon indicate a very proper and responsible definition of your role and responsibility. It seems to me that you properly recognize more than most civilians, perhaps most politicians, your special obligations to Congress as well as to the Commander in Chief.

I think you realize that civilian control requires military commanders to be politically insulated, to be politically insulated for your

own protection as well as for the integrity of the professional military establishment so that their mission, so that their standing within our political system, is not degraded.

I was extremely disturbed then and have been again recently at apparent attempts by some Members of Congress to use you and your exalted position in their own disputes with the administration and to strip away your necessary insulation from such political controversies.

As far as I know, you have behaved properly. But I am deeply concerned about the dangerous consequences of these efforts to subvert the National Security Act itself and to make your office little more than a political pawn with changing political administrations.

As you know, your position as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was created in 1949 and given a specific term of office, a 2-year term, renewable once in peacetime, and the terms of the other Chiefs, I think it is very instructive to note, were not fixed at all until 1967 when they were given 4-year terms because of the concern that to do otherwise would subject them to undue political pressure and influence in the conduct of their professional responsibilities.

The previous practice for those other members of the Joint Chiefs, of appointments renewable for 1- or 2-year terms, was thought to have brought undue pressure on the Chiefs to conform to executive branch policy. That is why we made those changes.

Now I think that these fixed terms, subject always, of course, to the pleasure of the President of the United States, have served our Nation well. They have protected civilian control and they have protected your own independence. Therefore, any suggestion that your terms be concurrent with those of the President I think risks making the Chiefs nothing more than political appointees and involving them totally in the political controversies of the day, of the hour and of the moment.

Now if resignation and concurrent terms become the practice, as some would have us do, some who profess to be such friends of the military, the Chiefs would lose their independence, Congress would be less able to get your professional judgments unvarnished, and the whole process of promotion to senior positions in the military would be dangerously intertwined with politics every step of the way.

Now, General Jones, I believe it is very ironical indeed that those who now claim that the judgments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of you as Chairman are possibly in part politically motivated and politically influenced would be the very ones who now advocate an approach that would guarantee and indeed institutionalize that very political influence that they express so much concern about.

I just wonder whether you believe that routine resignations and concurrent terms with the President would enhance the confidence of the American people in the integrity of your recommendations or indeed serve the professional independence of the military at all well.

General JONES. Senator Culver, I appreciate your comments. I agree it would be totally inappropriate to establish a precedent where the terms would be concurrent or to adopt the tradition of the political appointees automatically submitting their resignations.

I think it would be totally inappropriate for the military and I agree with you it would move toward politicizing the military to have concurrent terms.

Senator CULVER. You said today and previously that there is no constituency for readiness. I hope you do recognize that this is one Senator, beginning in 1975, the first 2 months I was on this committee, who has been a persistent advocate and supporter of improved readiness and that this committee has always worked hard for such improvement.

General JONES. If I said no constituency, Senator Culver, I really meant not enough of a constituency because obviously there is some constituency—the people in the field, pilots without enough training, and so forth. So we do have some. We need to have greater constituency in the country and in Congress.

Senator CULVER. Including an amendment we had enacted into law by this committee in 1977 requiring the first annual materiel readiness report?

General JONES. I recall that.

Senator CULVER. Now, General Jones, earlier you said in response to Senator Jackson that we are worse off now because of some delays in some strategic programs, specifically the MX, Trident, and B-1. Putting aside the question as to the extent to which technical decisions and problems rather than policy actions accounted for some of those delays and whether or not having gone forward under previous IOC's would have been detrimental to our security interests, given some of those problems of a technical nature, putting all that aside, let me ask you about some other military issues.

Are we better or worse off now because of our greater emphasis on readiness even at the expense of some new procurement, our efforts to strengthen NATO with standardization, the long-term defense program, and the real growth pledge, our measures to increase retention of skilled military personnel by increased pay and benefits?

I just wondered whether or not in some of these areas we are better rather than worse off than we were a few years ago.

General JONES. Senator Culver, I think it is very mixed. We are better off in some areas and we are worse off in others. Clearly, getting a commitment by NATO to real growth, even though all nations have not met that, is a step in the right direction, as is the long-term defense program.

On readiness, we now have increased awareness of readiness that not enough has been done to cope with the problems, but at least it is a step in the right direction.

Senator CULVER. We are better off than we were before when we addressed these priorities?

General JONES. At least in recognition of the problem we are better off. In certain aspects of readiness we are better off than we were; in others, not as good.

Senator CULVER. But the picture is not so totally bleak, is it?

General JONES. No; it is not bleak.

Senator CULVER. This administration with the support of this Congress has turned around the Defense budget and has made genuine improvements, has it not?

General JONES. I indicated in my opening statement that it is only in the last few years—in outlays, what we really expend—only in

1977 and on, during those fiscal years, or the budget that was addressed in 1976 on have we had any real growth.

Senator CULVER. General Jones, one of your highest priority programs is the MX missile.

General JONES. Yes.

Senator CULVER. Do you think that program would be helped or hindered by a legal prohibition against building more than 2,300 shelters at the initial deployment site in Nevada and Utah and do you believe that advocates of such a legal prohibition are weakening or strengthening our defenses?

General JONES. That would depend, Senator Culver. If it prohibited forever any consideration beyond the 2,300, then I would have deep concerns. As time goes on if we can demonstrate that we can cope with the environmental issues and go beyond that number, then I am not as concerned. I think it does leave the door open.

Senator CULVER. Do you think the program will be helped or hindered by such a provision?

General JONES. In a direct sense it will not be helped unless it is the way to get support of people in the Western States.

Senator CULVER. You are getting into politics. We are trying to keep you out of politics. We want your unvarnished professional judgment which just a few moments ago you said you were extremely anxious to provide us. What is your technical military professional judgment in terms of the national security interests of America, that we have that amendment or not have it?

General JONES. Clearly I would rather not have the amendment.

Senator CULVER. Thank you very much.

Chairman STENNIS. Thank you very much. Your time has run out. Senator Humphrey, that brings us to you.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Jones, supposing you found yourself serving a President whose policies were weakening our defense, what would you do?

General JONES. Senator Humphrey, I stated in my opening remarks that if ever I was faced with a situation where on a Presidential decision or action that I thought was more than just a disagreement among reasonable men, then I would have the option and obligation to step aside.

Your question in stark terms, of a President weakening defense, what I try to do—my guiding light—is what would best serve my country and I would have to make a judgment at that time under the circumstances.

Senator HUMPHREY. Would you take no action under the circumstances short of resignation?

General JONES. I would see an opportunity to try to persuade. It is recognized that from 1969 through 1976 we had decreasing military budgets in this country. I do not say that the Chairman at that time should have resigned because the budgets were decreasing while the Soviet budgets were increasing.

Senator HUMPHREY. When you are testifying before Congress in general and you find yourself differing with the views of the President, do you feel bound to defend the President's views or is it your rule always to state your own professional opinion?

General JONES. I think when asked on an issue I am obligated to do both. One is to present the views and the issues and the arguments for the position and then express my personal views and if they are at variance, state those views and why.

Senator HUMPHREY. In all cases then your *modus operandi* is to try to present the President's view and then when your views are different you volunteer those views, is that correct?

General JONES. I do not think it is quite that clear cut. There are some questions that are yes or no, some that are very philosophical. It would depend on the question. I would not try to hide my personal views. On the other hand, I would not try to entice somebody to try to get me into an argument.

Senator HUMPHREY. Is it necessary for Members of Congress to draw out your differences or do you willingly volunteer them?

General JONES. If you ask me a question, I will be sure that my answer is not inconsistent with my personal views.

Senator HUMPHREY. But you do not ordinarily volunteer that information, is that what you are saying?

General JONES. If you ask me a question such as earlier asked, what did you recommend with regard to binary production, I would say that I recommended that we develop the facilities.

Senator HUMPHREY. I do not mean to split hairs here but it is important that we know how you intend to continue carrying out your responsibilities if you are confirmed. If I am reading your responses to these questions correctly, you are saying that you will respond, if asked, but you do not feel constrained to come forth unless you are asked.

General JONES. I had a qualification. I will not say anything that gives anybody the impression that what I say is inconsistent with my own views.

Senator HUMPHREY. General, according to published reports, Gen. Richard Ellis, who is the commanding officer of the Strategic Air Command, recently stated, "The United States has not only lost strategic superiority over the Soviet Union but has now lost essential equivalence."

In other words, using my own words, we are inferior to the Soviets in strategic power. Do you agree with General Ellis?

General JONES. I share General Ellis' concerns. I said earlier that I also agree with what Senator Jackson said, that we have moved from strategic superiority to the verge of strategic inferiority. I think "essential equivalence" is a very subjective statement. You can judge it many different ways.

It is clear that the Soviets have a number of advantages today. Some of those advantages will increase in the days ahead. The trends bother me more than where we stand today.

Senator HUMPHREY. Your reply in part is that you share the concern of General Ellis. Does that mean you agree with him or you do not agree with him on that question?

General JONES. I would use different words than General Ellis would use. I agree with General Ellis, with his concerns and with the trends. People misunderstand, Senator, these very simple questions about are we first or second or do we have essential equivalence.

My concern is that people would draw from a conclusion that the Soviets have some advantages over us in strategic weapons that a nuclear attack on the United States is likely. I do not think that is likely. I think what is more likely is they would try to intimidate us and to move in the conventional field.

Therefore, simple answers to complex questions can often result in people coming to the wrong conclusion.

Senator HUMPHREY. Let me pose the question this way. Is it your opinion that the United States has strategic superiority?

General JONES. No.

Senator HUMPHREY. Is it your opinion that we are still maintaining essential equivalence?

General JONES. I said in my posture statement that we are no better than equal. When I was in Vienna and sitting across the table from my counterpart, I did not want to give them any comfort by the senior military officer in the United States denigrating our military capability. We have a substantial capability. I do not want him to feel that the United States cannot live up to its obligations.

On the other hand, it is important that I be honest and candid with you in expressing the deep concerns I have with regard to trends and, therefore, I avoid, because of this first reason, the use of very simple terms as to who is first, who is second, not because I am trying to evade it but I am just trying not to send signals around the world that might be misread.

Senator HUMPHREY. It seems to me that at some point we have to come to grips with this measure. The commander in chief of the Strategic Air Command, a man with some 30 years' experience in strategic policies and doctrines, states unequivocally that we do not any longer have essential equivalence.

General JONES. I think if you would put it in context, he said that if you use 1977 as the measure of the time of essential equivalence and see the trend since then, we have lost essential equivalence. So, his answer was not an answer that did not have some phrases tied to it.

Senator HUMPHREY. In that context, do you agree with him?

General JONES. Well, no question about it, that in a relative sense we are not as well off today as we were in 1977.

Senator HUMPHREY. General, have you ever been pressured in any way by civilian superiors to present testimony before Congress which differs from your own professional opinion?

General JONES. I do not recall any case where I have been pressured to appear or have come and stated something that I could not honestly support.

Senator HUMPHREY. What would you do if you found yourself in that situation?

General JONES. I would decline to come or at least I would let people understand that when I came I would express my personal views on the issue even though it might be at variance with the position of the administration.

Senator HUMPHREY. General, recently you testified before the House Armed Services Committee. In response to a question of Mr. Ichord about the adequacy of the Defense budget—let me read Mr. Ichord's question and your response.

Mr. ICHORD. I think what I should ask, Mr. Chairman, is this question. These are the experts—

Speaking of the Chiefs—

and I believe I have asked General Jones this. I want to ask each member of the Chiefs in your personal opinion in view of the threat, does the budget that finally came out of the Defense budget process, after it went through OMB and through the National Security Council, even over to the State Department and out of the White House, did that budget, leaving aside the priority that we all have differences on, did that budget meet the military requirements of the United States? General Jones, I ask your personal opinion, did it?

General JONES. Mr. Ichord, at the time the budget was submitted, which was a five percent real growth plus the commitment to make up for anticipated inflation, I said it was not unreasonable. That was before Afghanistan. In my judgment we have a different situation in the post-Afghanistan period and, therefore, I have a different judgment now that this country does need to spend more on defense than is in the budget as a result of the Afghanistan invasion.

What changed between pre-Afghanistan and post-Afghanistan?

General JONES. Let me go back earlier in the SALT testimony, Senator Humphrey. I recommended 5 percent real growth when the real growth proposed was far less than that. So it is not a complete departure to make comments such as I did before the House. I think clearly when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan that one overall deterrent had evaporated, and that is the Soviet historical reluctance to use their own military forces outside of the Warsaw Pact area and that this increased the demand on the United States, particularly in South-west Asia, and the need to increase our capability, particularly in that area, prepositioning, additional ships in the area, facilities.

I hoped we could work this out. I am concerned about the amount of effort and frankly concerned about things like the military construction items for that area being deleted from the budget. I have concerns dealing with some of the congressional actions and concern about some of the action within the Defense Department.

Chairman STENNIS. Senator, I am sorry, your time is up.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Chairman, will there be a second round? I have a number of additional questions.

Chairman STENNIS. It seems to me that if we can, and I believe we can, we should finish this hearing this afternoon or tonight unless there is something of substance in addition to what has been said or developed.

The Chair likes to give every Senator assurance that he will not be cut off from asking questions. We will try to have a second round for anyone who wishes to ask more questions.

Senator HUMPHREY. I simply would like to state for my part that I think the importance of this particular hearing is such that every Senator ought to be given a reasonable accommodation to ask every question he may have. This is a very important nomination about which there is a great deal of controversy.

For my part, I would like to state respectfully that I would hope each Senator could have as much time within reasonable bounds as he might desire and beyond that I think it would be fitting, frankly, to have a closed session so that we could delve into some classified material.

Chairman STENNIS. We are on the same track here. Let us see how it works out. I think we can find the time that will satisfy you and provide what you need.

Senator Exon, may I call on you now.

Senator Exon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Jones, I want to compliment you on your opening statement. I want to compliment you on the discussion with Senators Jackson, Warner, and Culver regarding what I consider an unfortunate newspaper story. I was very pleased frankly to find on my desk your side of that story, that there was no truth to it, even before I had seen the story in the paper.

I think that by that action you went a long way to do away with the concerns that Senator Culver and I justifiably have with regard to keeping from politicizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have no concern whatsoever about the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you or any other member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, being loyal to the Commander in Chief.

I suspect as a soldier that that has been drilled into you time and time and time again.

I will also say that I am one Senator and you are Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. You are in my opinion part and parcel of the military-industrial complex. There are times when I have had different views as one Senator and I think that is the way it should be. I would just point out that the military-industrial complex and the concern that Americans in general have for that complex was best cited I think by one of our great military leaders, Gen. Dwight Eisenhower.

From time to time I have not agreed with you. Had I been here I suggest that I would not have agreed with you on the Panama Canal situation. Had I voted on the SALT II Treaty, I suspect that I would not have agreed with you. But that does not necessarily mean that I am always right and you are always wrong.

One of the great problems we have to deal with, especially freshman Senators, is that few of these issues are black or white. I think that as gentlemen and as good Americans we can have a difference of opinion and if you were nominated as Vice President on either of the political parties, I would not feel you were not qualified because you supported the Panama Canal or SALT II.

However, I want to say that I have some great concern with regard to the raid in Iran. I am not satisfied with the in-house study that has been proposed. I would like to explore that a little bit with you, if I could.

When we have had people from the Defense Department and from the military before this committee in closed session, we have been told time and time again that you would not, the military would not, go beyond Desert One. I suspect that we had hoped that this committee would be looking into that in the future because of its importance.

Do you think if we should go into closed session that you and others would be able to give the information to this committee in order to carry out our responsibilities, more information than you have currently supplied?

General JONES. Senator, I think maybe more on certain issues but we do have concerns about widespread information on tactics used beyond Desert One by counterterrorist units. It deeply concerns us as to the security of that issue.

Senator Exon. General, I can understand that. That also concerns members of the committee. I have not frankly appreciated the attitude

of the administration in general with the fact that the terrorists now in Iran know much more about the details of that mission than members of this committee.

General JONES. Senator Exon, they think they know more. They have some information but some of the information that they have stated is inaccurate and in a lot of cases I do not think they know what is accurate or what is inaccurate. They have drawn some conclusions that are not accurate.

Senator EXON. Have members of this committee been furnished with the information that the Iranian Government has with regard to what was taken off the equipment that was abandoned and left behind?

General JONES. I think either it has been provided or I would have no problem with supporting providing what they had access to.

Senator EXON. General, do you feel that the War Powers Act was violated by the administration not advising the leaders of Congress about that raid?

General JONES. Senator Exon, that may be a political question, so I am not sure I am competent to answer. My own personal view is that it was not violated.

Senator EXON. Let us go on to the future. We have been talking about the past. I assume that you are in strong support of the initiative of the administration on the Rapid Deployment Force? It seems to me as one Senator that the Rapid Deployment Force by its name, by its design, is extending a trigger mechanism or trip mechanism all around the world that could involve the United States of America, inadvertently perhaps, in acts that would be war-like or could lead to war.

Have you, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reviewed at all how the administration would be advising the Congress under that act with regard to involvement of the Rapid Deployment Force? Let us take it out of the Indian Ocean right now. Let us say it is in the Philippines or Korea or Singapore.

I envision the Rapid Deployment Force in the hands of any President as a rather dangerous mechanism. It is good from the standpoint of being able to deploy and impose what we think is our will and our interest, but does it not in your mind present us with a situation where we could become involved, inadvertently perhaps, without consultation with Congress, in war-like acts?

If that is true, would you agree under the new law that was passed that at least the Intelligence Committee of the House and the Senate should be advised on any use of Rapid Deployment Forces in the future?

General JONES. Senator Exon, we have forces around the world already that could respond in many areas much more quickly than the Rapid Deployment Force. I do not think the Rapid Deployment Force by itself is a trigger mechanism to get us involved in areas. It does give us capability to go into areas where we have not had sufficient capability in the past. But we already have forces up front.

Clearly the Congress has the right and we have every intent to discuss the capability of a Rapid Deployment Force and although I am not specifically involved in the decision on the War Powers Act I know that it is an important consideration in any actions we might take and I believe that the administration will abide by the War Powers Act.

There may be some differences of opinion as to its application but I think there will be a sincere attempt to comply with that act.

Senator EXON. I am interested in your statement that you did not feel that this possibly would involve us any more than we are now. Don't you feel that ships prepositioned with war materials in the Persian Gulf are a new trip mechanism that could involve us? Now that has been announced.

General JONES. We do not intend to put them in the Persian Gulf. They would be well down in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. It is a number of days. If you were concerned about the application of force, with our two carrier battle groups in the area you could apply a force much more rapidly than you could by moving marines to marry up with equipment that we have pre-positioned.

So it in itself does not mean our initial capability to get involved within the first few hours is increased. We already have that capability in the area.

Senator EXON. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman STENNIS. Senator Cohen?

Senator COHEN. General Jones, I think you have gathered from the questions here that there is a feeling that an inquiry conducted by the military into essentially military operations would have about as much credibility as a group or panel of lawyers conducting an investigation in a charge of negligence by another lawyer or a panel of doctors investigating a charge of malpractice by another doctor.

It is not a question of whether or not those lawyers or doctors might reach in fact a fair decision or assessment, but whether it would have credibility in the eyes of those who would be reviewing it.

It seems to me that we have a familiar expression that justice will be done but there also must be an appearance of justice being done as well.

I think the suggestion made by Senator Nunn has a good deal of merit, that you should have at least some limited form of congressional participation. I would simply take one issue with your statement. I believe you said that limiting access to Congress has never been very successful.

General JONES. I include the Congress with a lot of other agencies in the difficulty of security. We have a problem too.

Senator COHEN. All of the leaks to date have not come from Congress but in fact have been coming from the Pentagon, itself.

General JONES. On the other hand, we had a great record for 51½ months.

Senator COHEN. In response to your question from Senator Tower you indicated that had not the B-1 been delayed or killed in 1977, it would have had an IOC in 1982. I gather from your testimony that you would be willing to support the rebirth of the B-1, should a new administration come to power next January?

General JONES. I would not draw that conclusion, Senator. I regret the decision in 1977. We are talking 1980 or 1981 now. If you would give me an unlimited budget, then I would include the rebirth of the B-1. I would not with any of the budget projections that people have been discussing so far for 1981.

Senator COHEN. At this moment, are you for building the B-1 or not?

General JONES. I would have preferred having the B-1. If the question is right now would I put money in the 1981 budget within the first concurrent resolution ceiling for the B-1, the answer would be no because I have greater priorities on readiness and some other areas even though I have been a long time consistent supporter of the B-1.

Senator COHEN. If you could respond to a couple of questions I have with "yes" or "no" and amplify later. There was in the Washington Post this morning reference made to statements made by some of Governor Reagan's defense advisers concerning what they would do in the way of trying to catch up on defense.

The reference was to reopening the Minuteman III production line. Would you agree with that?

General JONES. Not within the budget levels we have discussed.

Senator COHEN. Would you comment on the acceleration of the MX and acceleration of cruise missiles?

General JONES. Not within the budget limit we have discussed.

Senator COHEN. Would you build up anti-aircraft defenses and civil defenses?

General JONES. I would put some more money in civil defense, maybe some limited in air defense. Again you have to go on and discuss what budget level before I say yes or no. Obviously if the budget was not a consideration, there would be a lot of yeses to these questions.

Senator COHEN. That brings me to the budget itself. I would like to call your attention to a Washington Star piece by Henry Brandon entitled "Precarious Balance But It Still Works," in which you are quoted as saying that it is important that growth be well above the 3-percent NATO commitment.

Now, in order for a growth to be well above the 3-percent NATO commitment for NATO countries, it seems to me imperative growth be well above 3 percent for the United States. Last November, or December, you came before the committee with Secretary of Defense Brown and urged a 5-plus-percent increase. At that time it was stated that this increase was absolutely essential for the defense of this country and that it was not an effort to sell SALT; it was not an effort to pick up a few votes in this committee in favor of SALT, but it was imperative for our security.

Then 3 months later there was roughly \$1 billion cut by the President or the administration. There was also another reduction totaling \$600 million for post-Afghanistan Indian Ocean operations. These activities were funded out of offsets by reductions in previously requested programs.

Then in April President Carter indicated that he strongly supported the Obey amendment in the House which was considerably under the President's January request. Subsequently on the deck of the *Nimitz* President Carter got religion and suddenly was in support of the Nunn-Warner amendment which he had opposed actively for a year in this committee. He said he was going to support a \$1 billion program.

Unfortunately there is only about \$300 million in his budget for the \$1 billion program. We had witnesses who came before the committee a week or 10 days ago, one of whom indicated all things being equal he would like to see the money added. I was not sure what that phrase meant, "all things being equal."

Secretary Brown was even more opaque in his statement. He would await the mystical or mysterious Ways and Means of Congress before commenting on whether we should add more money to pay for it.

In view of these very stark and dramatic inconsistencies, do you think that is, and I quote from your military posture statement, "the kind of comprehensive and cohesive world vision that has to be shared by the American people and their leaders"? Is this the kind of comprehensive and cohesive program that will instill confidence in our allies and will build a sense of respect among our adversaries?

I am asking for your personal judgment now since you want to be candid with Members of Congress.

General JONES. Senator Cohen, you have stated a trail through there very selectively discussing certain actions and, therefore, I am not going to get into a remark that would be interpreted as a personal criticism of the President. I do not in this uniform criticize my Commander in Chief either in private or publicly.

Obviously I believe this Nation needs a more coherent policy but I think this takes action both in the administration and in the Congress as to not only our defense policy but the broader national security issues. There is a lot we have to do. I was talking to Mr. Brandon who is based in Europe. When I talked about the increase of 3 percent, I specifically wanted—

Senator COHEN. This was in the Washington Star.

General JONES. He writes primarily for Europe. Much of what he has is published in Europe. That 3 percent—we need to get our allies to do more than 3 percent.

Senator COHEN. Should there be, in your judgment, a sharp reversal in planning for American defense?

General JONES. There has been a reversal; we are having real growth now. I have advocated even greater real growth than is in the current budget.

Senator COHEN. I am talking about a sharp change in planning policy, not a moderate one. I am talking about a sharp reversal in declining American defense strength.

General JONES. I think we need an increase and I think it needs to be consistent and it has to be year after year. I am concerned about some programs that are proposed that have low near-term costs but very high long-term costs, and we have a bow wave. We have a serious bow wave. We have to look more to the 1982-86 budgets, because actions in the 1981 budget, although I may support them, create problems in the outyears.

I would say we need an increase in the defense budget. We were successful in turning it around last year. The discussion a year ago was on an almost no growth. We advocated 5 percent. We advocate now some increase over that 5 percent.

Senator COHEN. Has there been any change in the relative posture in strategic or conventional terms between the Soviet Union and the United States since you submitted your posture statement of 1979?

General JONES. The trends continue to be adverse.

Senator COHEN. Adverse to us?

General JONES. Yes.

Senator COHEN. Now we are complying with the provisions of SALT II voluntarily. Is it your understanding and judgment that the Soviet Union is voluntarily complying?

General JONES. At least they have taken no actions that I have seen that you could say are completely inconsistent.

Senator COHEN. Has there been an increase in the encryption activity on the part of the Soviet Union since, let us say, January when the President placed SALT II on the shelf?

General JONES. With regard to the provisions of SALT, no. In other areas, yes—we are getting into classified areas—but not in regard to the items included under SALT. There is one reservation. It is not a major issue but on the No. 1 system we are concerned about, the SS-18, no.

Senator COHEN. Senator Nunn asked you a question last year on page 99 of the hearing. He asked, "Do the Chiefs have a position on what degradation in verification capability, if any, the United States will suffer if we should lose the use of our fixed site stations in Iran?"

Your answer was, "The United States has capability to compensate for some of these losses."

Is it your judgment that we have compensated for the loss of those stations in Iran?

General JONES. Not totally.

Senator COHEN. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman STENNIS. Thank you, Senator. Thank you very much.

Senator Levin?

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, you described a conversation which you had with Senator Warner. I am wondering, other than that conversation, have you had any discussions with Governor Reagan and/or anyone representing him or any other Member of the Senate or persons representing them relative to what you would do in the event that Governor Reagan were elected President?

General JONES. I had about a 15-second discussion with Senator Tower that preceded the call from Senator Warner. It is totally consistent with everything I have said here. But, no, in regard to any contact by anybody, Governor Reagan's camp or anyone else.

Senator LEVIN. Last year you pointed out some disturbing military elements and trends in your posture statement. You then wrote the following:

Placing these disturbing military elements into the broader context of the global power balance, I would summarize the situation this way: There is too much pessimism about our current capability. I would not swap our present military capability with that of the Soviet Union, nor would I want to trade the broader problems each country faces.

Do you still believe that?

General JONES. I would not want to swap the broader problems. I still believe that in many respects there is too much pessimism. When I talk about that, it is hard to do it in a balanced way because people say then I am too optimistic about our capability. We have spent a lot of money on defense and we ought to give you a pretty good capability for that \$130 billion, or whatever we spend on defense a year.

With regard to swapping, there are aspects of their force I would swap for ours and there are other parts I would not swap. Some time ago I would not have swapped anything. Now it would be a mixed bag.

Senator LEVIN. Putting together the whole bag, the Soviet bag for the U.S. bag, would you swap our present military capability for that of the Soviet Union?

General JONES. No; I don't believe so, because I would have to swap our people and that is one of our big advantages.

Senator LEVIN. You are talking about our military people?

General JONES. Military people. Even though people question the quality of our military people, I don't think there is any comparison, when compared with the Soviets, in the innovativeness of our people. I would not swap. That does not mean that there aren't areas that I would rather have the Soviet capability than ours. I try to avoid oversimplification in any statement.

I may in that case be too simplified on the issue of swap.

Senator LEVIN. Is it fair to say, given all the elements of military capability, quality of equipment, R. & D., all the factors that go into a military position, you would still stick with your statement about not wanting to swap our military capability for the Soviet military capability?

General JONES. I think so. Again, we have different demands on our military capability. We need a better maritime capability in order to protect the sealanes. So there is a difference in requirements with regard to the two nations. When you take that into account, I would not swap.

Senator LEVIN. The statement was made here today that the Soviets will soon have military superiority in every area. Do you agree with that?

General JONES. Not in every area.

Senator LEVIN. Do you agree that the size of the Defense budget increase is only one indicator of growth in the military and how we spend the increase could be just as important?

General JONES. How we spend can be very important.

Senator LEVIN. Along that line, this committee has approved a budget which presumably is within the first concurrent resolution. Assuming that, and including in those expenditures money for the FB-111 R. & D., given the level of funding in the first concurrent budget resolution, would you recommend funding of the FB-111?

General JONES. I would have to look at the outyear funding, Senator Levin. We have a real outyear bow wave already.

Senator CULVER. Would the Senator yield?

It is \$8 billion in the outyears.

General JONES. It gets to a fairly large number early. I think the Congress has to recognize in a number of these programs that we already have a very substantial bow wave and we are having difficulty in the budget we are putting together right now funding the programs that are already approved.

So it is not easy, even though I would like to have the FB-111 modification. I recommended in 1977 when the B-1 was canceled that we take the remaining B-1 money and go ahead with the development of the FB-111H. That was not approved.

I would like to see the FB-111B/C but, again, within the context of not only available 1981 money but also 1982, 1983, 1984 money, where it gets very substantial. If it came at the expense of the spare parts and readiness and training and exercises needed to let us use better what we already have, I probably would put it at a lower priority.

Senator LEVIN. Given the level of funding in the first concurrent budget resolution, would you recommend funding reactivation of the *Oriskany*?

General JONES. That one I would have to also look at with regard to the availability of the sailors and ability to man the ships in the days ahead and the other personnel actions that we would take.

We have to recognize that we have a great backlog of high-priority readiness items and that when this budget goes before the Appropriations Committee, there are some substantial increases in readiness and O. & M. that I would put ahead of some of the capital investment items.

Senator LEVIN. Would you give us an answer to my question about the *Oriskany* for the record?

General JONES. Yes. Let me take a look at it.

Senator LEVIN. Now with the F-14 and F-15 aircraft that we added to the budget request, the Air Force is still short \$1.7 billion for spare parts. Despite that, would you add the F-14's and F-15's, given the funding level of the first concurrent budget resolution?

General JONES. I am trying not to be evasive on this. All I have seen is your press release on the overall budget actions that you have taken, and therefore to try to add things up and come to a decision on individual items within a certain program would not be fair to you for me to give offhand.

Senator LEVIN. Would you give it for the record and also give for the record your feelings about adding the 100 Minuteman III ICBM's to replace the Minuteman II ICBM's?

General JONES. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,  
*Washington, D.C., June 24, 1980.*

HON. CARL LEVIN,  
*U.S. Senate,*  
*Washington, D.C.*

DEAR SENATOR LEVIN: During my confirmation hearing and in your letter of 17 June,\* you asked for my views on several spending proposals relating to the fiscal year 1981 defense budget. When considering such questions, especially in light of the wide range of urgently needed readiness and modernization programs, there is a temptation to indorse almost any initiative that holds out the prospect for an increment of improved capability. However, as you know, not all increments are of equal value or equal cost, so even within the higher defense ceiling of the First Concurrent Resolution we are confronted with the broader questions of priorities and tradeoffs.

In my view, the serious challenges our nation is likely to face in the years ahead will place a premium on in-being military capability. Very substantial increases are required in readiness and compensation if we are to maintain such a capability and maximize the effectiveness of forces we have already bought. Therefore, we must be especially selective in deciding priorities for funding procurement items and new programs.

From that perspective, I would support increased funding for the F-14 and F-15 along the lines suggested in your letter. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have cited

\*Letter of Senator Carl Levin, dated June 17, 1980, attached.

the urgent need for additional Navy and Air Force tactical aircraft procurement and, so long as the resources to support this modernization are not drawn from other defense programs, I believe the priority attached to these systems warrants increased near term funding and a more efficient procurement rate.

From this same perspective, however, I do not believe that reactivating the 36-year old *Oriskany* is the best use of \$300-plus million in the face of far graver shortfalls in naval readiness. I recognize the appeal of additional carrier capability in the relatively near term, but I consider the advantages outweighed by the "opportunity cost" of foregoing investment in a number of personnel and material readiness initiatives which I view as more fundamental and far reaching in improving our overall maritime capability than reactivating a ship with 1940's-vintage technology.

I stated my major reservations on the deployment of 100 additional Minuteman IIIs during my confirmation hearing, but let me quickly summarize them again here. We have many pressing strategic requirements in the 1980s. One of the most critical of these will be to reduce the vulnerability of our land based ICBM force. Spending many millions of dollars to put additional Minuteman IIIs into fixed and increasingly vulnerable Minuteman II silos to achieve a very marginal increase in survivable warheads is not consistent with my view of the appropriate priority. It would be more prudent, in my judgment, to apply additional strategic resources toward improved command and control and force survivability.

The case of the FB-111B/C is somewhat less clearcut. On the one hand, the substantial near term increase in retaliatory capability is an attractive prospect and an option we should keep open. On the other hand, in view of the large bow wave we already face in funding high priority modernization programs in the outyears and the importance I attach to compensation and readiness improvements, we have to think through carefully the tradeoffs involved in any such additive investment.

On balance, my serious concern about the trends in the strategic balance and about the Soviet capacity to exceed our projections of their force levels convinces me that we need to preserve this option for adding quickly to our strategic capability. I would not recommend against including the FB-111B/C in the Authorization Bill and, depending upon the final appropriation level, would support an R.&D. appropriation sufficient to permit a rapid shift to production if future circumstances warrant this step.

Finally, with regard to your question about the Army and strength reduction, I am convinced this is an undesirable way to try to achieve a desirable objective. There is absolutely no doubt in my mind that a cut of this magnitude would have a serious negative impact on the combat readiness, sustainability, resource management, and overall efficiency of the U.S. Army. I strongly support the goal of increased recruitment of high school graduates. However, the way to do this is not by a counterproductive indexing mechanism, but rather by providing positive incentives such as equitable compensation and a form of educational assistance that would be attractive to a high school graduate seeking to further his education.

I trust that these views will be helpful to you as the Senate continues its important deliberations on the appropriate level and allocation of defense resources for fiscal year 1981.

Sincerely,

DAVID C. JONES,  
*General, USAF.*

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED FORCES,  
*Washington, D.C., June 17, 1980.*

Gen. DAVID C. JONES, USAF,  
*Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,  
The Pentagon,  
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR GENERAL JONES: Pursuant to our colloquy yesterday during your confirmation hearing, I would appreciate receiving your answer to the following question:

(1) The First Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for fiscal 1981 (fiscal year 1983), as finally approved by Congress, establishes a budget limit for

defense spending in fiscal year 1981 of \$170.5 billion in Budget Authority. Given this limit, would you recommend spending:

- \$297.1 million for 18 more F-15's in fiscal year 1981 and for long-lead for 12 more F-15's in fiscal year 1982 above the projected budget request;
- \$138.4 million for six more F-14's in fiscal year 1981 and for long-lead for six more F-14's in fiscal year 1982 above the projected budget request;
- \$304 million for reactivation of the *Oriskany*;
- \$91 million to begin R. & D./procurement of the F/FB-111B/C;
- \$10.4 million to begin deployment of 100 more Minuteman III ICBM's?

I also would appreciate your response to the following:

What would be the effects of a reduction in the fiscal year 1981 Army end-strength authorization of 25,000 below the budget request on the Army's capabilities to carry out its national security missions, especially on its combat readiness, sustainability, management of resources and overall efficiency? Would there be different effects if this reduction is connected with a mechanism providing for an automatic increase in the authorized end-strength of 1,250 for every percentage point increase in the proportion of high school graduates inducted above 52 percent in fiscal year 1981? Would you recommend such a reduction in fiscal year 1981, connected or not connected with this type of conditional mechanism for increasing Army end-strength dependent on recruitment of high school graduates?

Since the Senate is expected to consider these issues very soon, I would appreciate receiving your responses to these questions no later than close of business on Tuesday, June 25, 1980.

My thanks in advance for your assistance.

Sincerely,

CARL LEVIN.

Senator LEVIN. You have indicated we are not as well off relatively now as we were in 1977. Were we as well off relatively in 1977 as we were in 1970?

General JONES. No, sir. We were not.

Senator LEVIN. You have indicated that whatever details of phase II and beyond of the Iranian hostage rescue operation which were left behind in the desert, will be shared with this committee; is that correct?

General JONES. That would be my recommendation.

Senator LEVIN. To whom would that recommendation be made?

General JONES. To the Secretary of Defense.

Senator LEVIN. I would like to go over some comparisons of static measures of the conventional military balance.

If you are not familiar with the figures offhand, you can give us a response for the record.

First in terms of men under arms, does NATO or the Warsaw Pact have more men under arms?

General JONES. They are very close. When you add both together, they are very close.

Senator LEVIN. In the category of antitank guided weapons, who is ahead, NATO or the Warsaw Pact?

General JONES. NATO is ahead.

Senator LEVIN. In the category of major surface combatants?

General JONES. NATO.

Senator LEVIN. Do you know if that continues to be true in the 1980's?

General JONES. It will continue for a considerable period of time, depending on programs.

Senator LEVIN. Do you know whether that is also true in the category of nuclear submarines? Are we ahead in nuclear submarines?

General JONES. The Soviets have far more submarines than we have. It is a little different balance in nuclear submarines, depending on whether you are talking SSBN's, but in submarines they are well ahead.

Senator LEVIN. On the nuclear side?

General JONES. It is different on the nuclear submarines. But total submarines is a more important measure.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, I also commend you for your opening statement.

General JONES. Thank you.

Chairman STENNIS. Senator Jepsen?

Senator JEPSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Jones, I too wish to echo the comments that have been made about your opening statement, and your personal conduct here today. It has not been an easy time.

My remarks and questions will be brief.

I would like for the record to establish several things: One, as you know from our hearing, I am concerned that someone must be accountable for the failure of our rescue mission in Tehran. Not only internationally must the signal be sent that failure is not acceptable; more important, failure is not an acceptable characteristic of a democracy. That story needs to be told and given to our young people in this country, especially those under the age of 45.

For the record, from what you have said today, General, is this a correct statement: Are you concerned that the loss of essential equivalence would be interpreted as meaning an attack on the United States is possible or might be interpreted as that?

General JONES. I do not believe that the shift in strategic capability, relative capability, means that it is likely that we will have nuclear war. I think other consequences are more likely: an attempt to intimidate, a greater feeling of freedom of action in other areas, conventional weapons, for example.

Senator JEPSEN. Are you concerned that if that were admitted, that might be interpreted as meaning an attack on the United States would be possible?

General JONES. No; I don't think so.

Senator JEPSEN. Do you believe that with the loss of this essential equivalence the Soviets would use the advantages in the strategic areas to press longstanding advantages in the conventional area?

General JONES. I think it is more likely they will try to press conventional advantages. Whether or not the strategic field has much of an impact depends on our courage, our willingness not to be intimidated.

Senator JEPSEN. In your personal opinion, would the following statement be true or false: Soviet strategic advance in the next several years is likely to be by increasing assaults on areas of interest to the United States?

General JONES. Yes; we will see an increasing likelihood of the Soviets attacking our vital interests.

Senator JEPSEN. Thank you.

General, could you expand a little bit for me, please, where you feel you have had the most influence on the President's policies with

regard to defense since you have been Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General JONES. I think we have achieved a number of things on policies. One, on the overall defense budget. I don't want to try to take credit for it, but we had no growth, then we got the 3 percent, and then we got 5 percent. We are trying hard to have real growth. We have had supplementals in the last couple of years larger than we have had previously. That is one area.

I think that some of the other accomplishments, we have been working well with our allies on defense requirements. We have had considerable influence on getting approval for the procurement and deployment of the MX, working with our allies on theater nuclear forces, getting the acceptance of the Pershing II and the ground-launched cruise missile in Europe.

The Chiefs collectively, I think, had great influence on the reversal of the decision to withdraw troops from Korea.

We advocated registration a number of years ago. I think we have had considerable influence on getting acceptance of registration.

These are just a number of areas that I think we have had influence within the administration and within the Congress.

Senator JEPSEN. Thank you, General.

In what particular area has your chairmanship been of greatest benefit to this country?

General JONES. It would be hard for me to draw a conclusion. It's been the attempt, I would say, to focus on readiness. It is an area that I have not achieved all I wanted to, but at least we have obtained increased recognition. I did not do it alone, by any stretch of the imagination; a lot of people have been working on that problem.

Senator JEPSEN. You feel that is the area where you have had the most influence on the President's military policy?

General JONES. The one item probably that we have had the greatest influence on is in the reversal of the trend in the defense budget—25 percent real growth over 5 years. Hopefully, it will be real. We recommend even more than that, but that is much greater than was considered a year or two ago.

Senator JEPSEN. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman STENNIS. Thank you very much, Senator.

Gentlemen, I feel like we have a fine spirit of cooperation here. It may make it possible to finish this up.

Senator Humphrey and I have conferred about this matter a good bit. He wrote me a letter about the hearings, and we tried to find an agreeable time in which the committee could do its work and he would have time to be ready. I know we first talked about a date last week, but we could not schedule it then.

Committee members will remember it took us all week to get the authorization bill out. It was finally reported out Thursday afternoon. We mentioned Friday as a possible date for this hearing but he could not be ready then. He readily agreed to be ready this afternoon. So he certainly has been cooperating.

However long he wants to stay here, I am going to stay with him, as far as that is concerned; but June 20 is approaching and that is

when General Jones' term expires. I thought if General Jones were going to be approved, which I thought would be the case, it should be taken up before June 20. You know a nomination can lie over a certain time on the Executive Calendar. So we may not have as much time as it seems from now to the 20th.

I have just a couple of minutes that I want to take. Could we see if we have others? We have a quorum here now. It takes nine members present to pass on a matter and report it out.

Senator Tower, do you have more questions?

Senator TOWER. I have no more questions.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, I will forgo any further questions.

Senator WARNER. I have two questions.

Chairman STENNIS. Senator Humphrey, would you mind indicating how much time you wish?

Senator HUMPHREY. It is difficult, since I have no idea how long General Jones will take in responding to the questions. Have you roughly 15 minutes?

Chairman STENNIS. That is very good.

Senator COHEN. I have two more questions.

Senator BYRD. I have two quick questions.

Senator CULVER. I have no questions, but I would like to reserve questions.

Senator EXON. I reserve my time.

Chairman STENNIS. That puts us within range. I will pass for the time being, if I may.

Senator Tower, you said you didn't have further questions?

Senator TOWER. I will reserve my time, Mr. Chairman, if possible.

Chairman STENNIS. Senator Warner, are you ready now?

Senator WARNER. I am ready, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.

General Jones, we will soon be on the floor with the Defense authorization bill. Our committee supported the FB-111 program. The House as you know supported the B-1 program and the third option which was before the subcommittee on R. & D. and the one which I supported was continuation of research and development on a new manned bomber, a new generation. This question has been asked. You answered it first in terms of budgetary consideration. Let us ask it now in terms of threat.

Can we proceed with our defense programs for the next 5 years into this window of vulnerability and stick to the administration's recommendation, namely, continuation of our R. & D. on the new manned bomber and not go forward with either the FB-111 or an adaptation of the B-1?

General JONES. First, Senator Warner, under any condition I would advocate money on a new manned penetrating bomber even if you went with the B-1 or the FB-111. It is difficult to answer a question without any context of the overall defense budget. Taking into account, at least partially, budgetary considerations and the views of the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command I would recommend going with the FB-111 modification as opposed to a restarting of the B-1 line. I am a strong advocate of continuing with a penetrating bomber and in this case I would side with the Strategic Air Command

commander, despite my strong support for the B-1. Part of that, I must say, is dictated by the very high price in early years of the B-1 production.

Senator WARNER. And also the uncertainty in these figures. I think they are very soft at the moment. Would your first option be to go forward with the new generation of manned bombers and neither the FB-111 or B-1 and use those funds for other programs of a higher priority?

General JONES. Within the first concurrent resolution, there are so many unfunded areas, in particular in the broad readiness area and in personnel, that I would advocate putting it there before some of those programs that have been mentioned. That does not mean that I am not concerned about some of these other programs.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, General.

Chairman STENNIS. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Byrd?

Senator BYRD. I have two quick questions. The second one deals with Iran. First, General Jones, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, do you favor or oppose a major U.S. effort in developing chemical warfare capability?

General JONES. Senator Byrd, I would advocate the authorization and appropriation of the money to start with the construction of a facility in which to produce binary chemicals. I would not advocate right now going beyond that because that buys us some leadtime. Very frankly I want to be sure that we have the long-range theater nuclear weapon system deployment decisions totally ratified in the NATO environment before we bring up another highly controversial issue which might jeopardize the long range TNF program. I would do some work on the production facility. I would defer the decision as to what to do with that facility.

You do not lose any time by deferring and you don't create a big problem in the alliance which might result in the LRTNF program—which is proceeding well but in a fragile way—being jeopardized.

Senator BYRD. My second question deals with Iran. General Jones, how do you as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff see the likelihood of Russia taking over Iran either directly or indirectly?

General JONES. I am concerned that as days go by and that country becomes more fragmented that there is an increased possibility, even the likelihood, that the Soviets will have very great influence in that country in the days ahead. They probably would like to achieve that influence by indirect methods with that country coming apart and their being able to take control in certain areas.

It is a trend that is very worrisome. Although I don't think it is quite as likely, they may introduce direct military forces. I think it is more likely they will try to undermine the country from within.

Senator BYRD. I agree with you in that regard.

May I say, Mr. Chairman, that I support the confirmation of General Jones and if I am not present I would like to leave my proxy with the Chairman.

Chairman STENNIS. Thank you, Senator. Thank you very much.

Senator Humphrey, that brings us to you, please.

Senator HUMPHREY. General, I would like to go back to your judgment about defense budgets and how the advent of the Afghanistan invasion bears on it. Of course the President openly stated that he learned more about Soviet duplicity and hostile intentions from what happened in Afghanistan than he had in all the previous 3 years, a statement that was generally taken as a sign of his naivete. Now you are essentially saying the same thing.

Before Afghanistan you recommended that you felt one way about the funding levels of the defense budget and after Afghanistan you felt a different way. I find that a disturbing indication of your own failure to properly understand the longstanding evidence of Soviet intentions.

Should we not base our military doctrine and expenditure levels on both the capabilities and the intentions of the Soviet Union? How do you feel about that?

General JONES. I think you are drawing the wrong conclusion. I agree we ought to base it on military capability. You can't ignore actions though such as the invasion of Afghanistan. Before the invasion of Afghanistan we had advocated an increase in the defense budget. We had achieved 5 percent in real growth. We had said it is not unreasonable although we had recommended higher than that number of 5 percent. With the invasion of Afghanistan I don't conclude that all of a sudden the Soviets turned from good guys to the bad guys. We always knew about their capability. It did indicate a willingness to take increased risk by the Soviets to project their power in areas that they have not projected before, a greater threat in Southwest Asia.

Therefore, my recommendations on increasing the defense budget were primarily related to Southwest Asia, particularly the Rapid Deployment Force, readiness, areas to increase our capability in that area.

Senator HUMPHREY. Certainly the Soviets possessed the capability to invade Afghanistan before they did it?

General JONES. They have a capability to invade Western Europe, too.

Senator HUMPHREY. So their capability has not increased unless you consider their increasing forward deployment capability, which they obviously have. Given the whole picture, their capability did not increase markedly after Afghanistan. It sounds to me as though in commenting on funding levels, you, at least in the past, should have based your judgment at least in part on estimates of Soviet intent, rather than just on capability.

General JONES. Not intent. Invading Afghanistan was not an intent; it was an action.

Senator HUMPHREY. The point I am trying to make is that their capability was there before they invaded Afghanistan. You should have anticipated an intention to invade as well. Referring again to your statement before the House Armed Services Committee, responding to the question of Mr. Daniel who asked this question about the funding level, he said:

Let me put it in a form you can respond to. If there were no budget constraints, what sort of budget for the military would you request?

The answer:

We spend about 5 percent of our GNP on defense. I would expect something like 6 or 7 percent would be reasonable over the long term as to the amount of the defense budget.

What did you mean if there were no budget constraints? What constraints are you talking about there?

General JONES. Would you repeat it? I missed that phrase.

Senator HUMPHREY. Perhaps I should have made copies of this.

Mr. DANIEL. Let me put it in a form you can respond to. If there were no budget constraints; what sort of budget for the military would you request?

General JONES. We spend about five percent of our GNP now on defense. I would expect something like six or seven percent would be reasonable over the long term as to the amount of the defense budget.

General JONES. What is the question?

Senator HUMPHREY. If you feel, as you state, that you think we ought to be spending something like 6 or 7 percent, why did you not testify earlier that 6 or 7 percent of GNP was reasonable or give expression earlier that 5 percent was inadequate?

General JONES. I did not say five percent was adequate. I said it was not unreasonable and that 25 percent real growth over the 5 years was not unreasonable. Over the long term—I am not talking about overnight, all of a sudden jumping to 6 or 7—but if the Soviets stay at their percentage of GNP and continue to grow, then I would recommend 6 or 7.

Senator HUMPHREY. What constraints are you under not to strongly urge Congress to reorder the Nation's priorities such that we spend an adequate amount? Do you feel you are under some constraint to not voice that opinion?

General JONES. Only the ones I mentioned earlier, the rules which I follow very carefully to try to carry out the decisions to the best of my ability. But when you ask me my personal views, I will give you my personal views. The Nation would be better off spending 6 or 7 percent of the GNP from a pure national defense standpoint. It is up to others to determine in the overall distribution of the budget how much should go to national defense.

I am just not advocating an immediate increase of that much, but I am talking about the long term. We look back 10, 15, or 20 years; we ought to be looking forward 10, 15, or 20 years. We were up at 6, 7, or 8 percent before. I think at some time out in the future, we ought to get back up to that 6 or 7 percent.

Senator HUMPHREY. If we were to raise our expenditures to 6 or 7 percent of the GNP at this point, by how many billions of dollars approximately would that increase the defense budget?

General JONES. It would be many billions. In the context of that question, I would not advocate an increase as of now up to 6 or 7 percent. That is long term. We have had a long-term downward trend; we need a long-term upward trend to 6 or 7 percent.

Senator HUMPHREY. At what point would you recommend that we reach those levels and when should we begin?

General JONES. We should begin now and we are increasing our percentage of GNP by a fairly small amount. We have recommended an additional amount. We are going up a little in GNP in the next year or two.

Senator HUMPHREY. In your 1980 military posture statement, you alluded to the deteriorating strategic balance and the fact that future trends are adverse, and I quote you :

The Soviets have been outpacing us by a wide margin for many years. In some areas they have already surpassed us. I am concerned because their momentum will allow them to gain an advantage over the United States in most of the major static indicators of strategic force by the early 1980's. Moreover, because of lead times in modern weapons programs, this progressive shift in the strategic balance will continue into the latter part of the 1980's when our current modernization programs are far enough along to restore full strategic parity.

What do you propose to do about the loss of strategic parity during the decade of the 1980's, during the window of vulnerability?

General JONES. I think that was a very candid statement that I made. I would proceed with the MX, with the cruise missile, getting on with the new penetrating bomber, deployment of the Trident, deployment of the ground-launched cruise missile and the Pershing II, and I would shore up my conventional forces because that is the area where we are going to have the greatest risk, and I would improve the readiness of those forces.

Senator HUMPHREY. On the subject of the manned penetrating bomber, you then do not share the view of some persons, some experts, who feel that Soviet air defense capability, look-down/shoot-down and advanced low-altitude SAM's, would be such that the manned penetrator will be virtually useless by the late 1980's?

General JONES. I do not share that view.

Senator WARNER. Would the Senator yield on that question?

Senator HUMPHREY. Certainly.

Senator WARNER. I think we should have a little clarification there. With the present design of the B-1 and the FB-111, wouldn't they render themselves rather vulnerable to Soviet air defenses in that time frame?

General JONES. There would be some degree of vulnerability, but I believe their penetration capability would still be very substantial.

Senator WARNER. Through what period, General?

General JONES. It is hard to say because the Soviets—

Senator WARNER. I am pressing on this because this is going to be a key question in Congress. This testimony is most important.

General JONES. I have always been one who has had greater confidence in the offense than the defense. I have been in the offensive business. In most of our analytical work, when we followed up on it we did better on penetration than most of our estimates indicated. It would depend on which B-1 you are speaking about. If you are speaking about a fixed wing B-1, the strategic weapon launcher, and use it partially for penetration, then it would have greater difficulty, because it would not have all of the defensive features. If it were the swept wing version, it would have a good capability.

The FB-111, I think, would have a good capability—it is arguable. There are some who make the other case that it will be highly vulnerable but I think that not for many years to come. It is hard to predict an end date, particularly since the Soviets control it so much by how much they put into defenses.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Senator.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, I have to leave at this time; we are running longer than we intended to. I have another engagement. I would like to leave my proxy with Senator Tower, and if he is not here, to Senator Warner, for the confirmation of General Jones.

General JONES. Thank you, Senator Thurmond.

Senator CULVER [presiding]. Senator Exon?

Senator EXON. I have no further comments.

Senator HUMPHREY. I still have the floor I believe. I am perfectly willing to rotate this but I do have a few more questions.

Senator CULVER. Go ahead.

Senator HUMPHREY. General, as you are undoubtedly aware, the Armed Services Committee last week recommended the deployment of 100 Minuteman III missiles to replace Minuteman II missiles in the silos. General Ellis has provided the committee or provided me with a letter which I have provided to the committee stating his view that such a program would increase the number of survivable warheads, that is hard target warheads, by at least 10 percent, perhaps a greater percentage in the early years.

Given your stated concerns about the increased vulnerability during the early and middle years of the 1980's, why have the Joint Chiefs not supported this proposal?

General JONES. The Chiefs have not recently addressed that proposal, therefore I will give my personal view.

I advocated in 1976 or early 1977, that we deploy some additional Minuteman III's. Time has passed now. The Minuteman is more vulnerable today than we had estimated at that time. It is going to become more vulnerable earlier than we thought. I would not expend those resources to put the Minuteman III in to replace Minuteman II. I would use it as an option to have in the pocket but I would not expend that money to put it in. I would use it in different areas.

Senator HUMPHREY. I am informed that my time is beginning to expire. I do have several additional questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman STENNIS. We will get to you, Senator. I think I should call on Senator Culver.

Senator CULVER. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman STENNIS. Senator Exon?

Senator EXON. I have no questions at this time, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman STENNIS. Senator Nunn?

Senator NUNN. No questions.

Chairman STENNIS. Senator Cohen?

Senator COHEN. General, Senator Levin on the last round of questions started to get into a comparison between Warsaw Pact countries and NATO and was ticking off a series of weapon systems or force structures that seemed to have some superiority as far as the Western side was concerned.

I again refer to this article by Henry Brandon in which you are quoted as saying "But it is not a good situation in Western Europe. The Warsaw Pact forces have a substantial advantage over the West." I assume you reiterate that particular position today?

General JONES. Yes.

Senator COHEN. Both in terms of conventional forces and also theater nuclear capability.

General JONES. Particularly in the long-range theater nuclear systems, such as the SS-20.

Senator COHEN. Precisely. General Meyer is quoted as saying we have a hollow Army. Admiral Hayward has testified on many occasions that we have a manpower hemorrhage in the Navy. We have similar problems that have been articulated before this committee with respect to the Air Force's loss of planes, pilots.

In short, we have a very serious situation, as you described in this piece. In view of that, I would like to turn for a moment to how do we rectify what you talked about in your posture statement and your testimony this afternoon? Senator Tower has expressed the opinion that simply talking in terms of 3 percent or 5 percent is really rather artificial, superficial, and almost irrelevant; what we ought to be doing is talking about what our needs are.

Several months ago he wrote a letter to Senator Bellmon outlining what he believed were several options available to this country:

Option 1 which required a funding of \$7.15 billion over and above the President's request; option 2, \$13.1 billion; and option 3, \$22.85. During a hearing that we had before this committee on March 31, I asked each of the Joint Chiefs if, for the record, they would specifically identify, with respect to each one of those options, where they agreed or disagreed.

I must tell you that although the document is classified it is not terribly illuminating. What I would like is for you to personally review options 1, 2, and 3, as submitted by Senator Tower, and indicate to the committee for the record at some future time, hopefully not too far away, in what areas you disagree with the needs as outlined by Senator Tower.

In other words, in what areas would you disagree with Senator Tower's analysis? That would be most helpful to me and the other members of the committee.

[The information follows:]

The levels of spending and the broad categories of allocation proposed by Senator Tower in his March 25, 1980 letter to Senator Bellmon are consistent with my view that this country needs to commit substantially more to defense than we have for a number of years now. We must achieve a trend of stability involving not simply agreement on a single year's budget or even on five-year programs, but on steady, sustainable rates of increase which accommodate the longer-term requirements associated with near-term decisions, within an alliance framework.

With respect to the specifics of the Senator's proposals, the program detail in the letter is insufficient to permit comprehensive item-by-item assessment. However, I can indicate where my priorities would lie at the incremental levels of increase that he addresses.

At all levels, I would counsel doing more to improve the pocketbook and quality-of-life aspects of the military manpower situation.

Option 1. At the level of spending in Option 1, I would recommend focusing more on short-run reduction measures, e.g., spending more for operations and maintenance, for spares and war reserves, for munitions, for exercises and training, for military construction (especially in the Indian Ocean region), and for enhancing our lift capability. I also would recommend doing more in the strategic area, especially in upgrading command and control. I would be inclined at this level toward procurement add-ons only when they clearly could be translated within a reasonably short time into better combat capability or into improved mobility (e.g., SL-7s). As for longer-term modernization departures, I would support some enhanced research and development for programs including a manned penetrating bomber.

Option 2. At Option 2's spending level, I would move toward more balance in commitment of additional resources between shorter-run measures and longer-run modernization activities. I would especially focus on achieving more efficient production rates for systems already well into production. I would want to insure, however, that such increased spending did not drain resources away from the critical shorter-run readiness measures.

Option 3. At the level associated with Option 3, I would entertain proposals for limited expansion of force structure. However, before I could recommend any specific course of action (such as the ones suggested by Senator Tower), I would have to look critically and comprehensively at impacts on available manpower, associated logistic and mobility requirements, outyear fundings, and other such broader considerations. And as before, I would want to avoid impeding progress on readiness measures.

The logic behind these priorities is that we and our allies face serious challenges in the near term which place a high premium on improving in-being military capability. The hostile environment of the next several years demands that we be highly selective in allocating today's resources, and that we give an edge in near-term priorities to reducing the more immediate risks.

Senator COHEN. I would also like to go back to a statement that you made to Mr. Brandon in which you said :

We do have a dilemma of knowing that power on the one hand has a great psychological deterrent impact on others and that creating an image of impotence and low capability has a negative impact on stability and deterrence.

Do you feel the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan coupled with our failure in the desert of Iran juxtaposes a perception of power on the one hand and impotence on the other?

General JONES. I do not think it is that clearcut. We did not do in the desert anywhere near what we wanted to. Also, I think the Soviets have had greater difficulties in Afghanistan than they anticipated. I do not believe they are in a quagmire but I am not impressed with the efficiency of their operation in Afghanistan.

Senator COHEN. Do you recall the failure in conducting that operation had a negative impact on our allies as far as their perception of our capability in defending their interests and their security?

General JONES. I think for those who look at it superficially it had a negative impact. I had quite a discussion with my counterparts who recognized the great complexity of the operation and that the United States was the only nation in the world that could even try that.

I do not believe they concluded the same thing as did someone who just looked at it superficially.

Senator COHEN. In the piece that Brandon did, you indicated "I do not believe this means an attack on the West," meaning the substantial buildup by the Soviet Union. Are you saying that it does not have to be an attack on the West for a shift in balance of power to occur?

General JONES. That is what I was saying.

Senator COHEN. It does not have to be an attack on the West for our allies to start drifting over in a sphere of neutrality, or France starting to deal separately with the Soviet Union, or West Germany now to be publicly talking about a separate détente with the Soviet Union, or various allies to start watering down, for example, requests we have made for economic sanctions by not making them retroactive, or for various countries to ignore our requests for a boycott of the Olympics?

It is not a question so much that we are going to be attacked, as we are perceived to have slipped off in a state of inferiority or whether

there will be a realignment of this balance of power or a drifting away from the United States. Isn't that the real danger we face right now?

General JONES. I think that is a danger. In my statement where I made a comment about an attack being unlikely, I said that it looks more likely that they will try to intimidate us or our allies.

Senator COHEN. There is an excellent article written by William Kaufman that appears in a Brookings Institute publication entitled "Setting Priorities for the 1980's." He talks about defense policy, I think just what you have been trying to say here today.

He said in talking about the estimate of relative power:

Such estimate can cause an unnecessary deflection from what really needs to be done. Worst of all, it can result in the appeasement they are intending to avoid. Accordingly, it is vital to be realistic about the present as well as the future.

I think what all the members of this committee have tried to do is to conform to what you are saying, alerting the people, the country, the Congress as to what has to be done in a very realistic way.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman STENNIS. Gentleman, I lay before you a list of military nominations. They have been here the required time during which no objection has been filed. I lay them on the desk where anyone can further examine them if they wish.

Senator HUMPHREY. We are ready to come back to you now please.

Senator HUMPHREY. We were discussing the Minuteman III proposal. Your feeling is that it is not an effective use of scarce funds? Is that a fair summary of your answer?

General JONES. I think there are many factors. One is, the Minuteman is vulnerable and becoming more vulnerable. When you look at the capability you would achieve by putting Minuteman III into vulnerable Minuteman II holes, to me it is not very impressive.

We do not have a good time urgent hard target kill capability today. When you increase that by a few percent it still is not very good even though the percentages might be impressive. If you look at the survivable total capability, they are down less than 1 percent in the overall capability. It is not where I would put my money.

Senator HUMPHREY. There is no doubt our fixed Minuteman silos are becoming increasingly vulnerable. But are we not nevertheless better off with some additional warheads and some of the missiles in place? Given a Soviet first strike, we will have some additional warheads, 10 percent more. We will also have 14 percent more hard target kill capability.

General JONES. Not when you ask me in the context of would I spend it there versus something else. There are other areas I would put that money in.

Senator HUMPHREY. I can understand that but we are talking about a mere \$44 million, which may seem to be a lot of money from the standpoint of most of us, but in the overall context of the defense budget it is not that great an amount. In my personal opinion, if we can very quickly increase our surviving hard target warheads by 10 percent during this dangerous period when our vulnerability is going to increase markedly in the next few years, then we have to be better

off. A 10-percent increase in surviving ICBM warheads and a 14-percent increase in counterforce capability for only \$44 million is a bargain. Are your concerns over this proposal rooted in the SALT Treaty?

General JONES. I would draw the same judgment independent of SALT because of putting effort into vulnerable systems. There is a SALT consideration and my judgment on the SALT issue is that we ought to look at each and every case as to any action we would take that would be inconsistent with SALT II.

If that action is in our best interest, then I would advocate taking it. I would not ignore the fact that the Soviets then would also take action. So I take that into my equation. My basic recommendation to not go ahead with Minuteman III is not driven by the SALT consideration. I would just not spend money on a system that is becoming increasingly vulnerable.

Senator HUMPHREY. Obviously we disagree on the point. Here we have 143 Minuteman III's lying in a warehouse, superior to the Minuteman II's, which by expenditure of \$44 million can be used to replace the Minuteman II's and increase our survivable warheads by 10 percent and our hard target warheads by 14 percent.

General JONES. I do not believe that is survivable. I think that is pre-exchange.

Senator HUMPHREY. According to General Ellis' letter, pre-change hard target capability would be increased by 14 percent, and survivable 10 percent, post exchange.

That completes my questioning, Mr. Chairman. I simply want to express to General Jones that I understand he is in a very difficult spot. It is a very thin line to walk, no doubt about that. We hear one thing in committee rooms, but when we talk to high-ranking officers outside the committee rooms we hear a completely different thing.

I see some very disturbing trends, I see very disturbing situations. I believe personally we are being drawn toward war by our weakness in the same way that the West was drawn into war in the decade of the 1930's. Something is wrong. It is many things I suppose, but I believe we need a change.

With all due respect to you as a person and officer, I am going to vote against your renomination.

General JONES. May I respond to that?

Senator Humphrey, obviously under our constitution that is your full right.

With regard to your statement about people saying the things to you privately that they would not here in the committee room, one of the areas that I can guarantee is that I will not tell you privately what I do not say in the committee room. I will not be inconsistent.

Senator HUMPHREY. I did not mean you.

General JONES. You are implying that others privately tell you things that they would not tell you here in the committee room. I am consistent. I do not say one thing here and say something else some other place. I will be honest and candid and forthcoming with you.

I am not an alarmist. I am deeply concerned about where this country is going. I am pragmatic. We are making progress. There is an

understanding in the country. I would be worried about some of the programs that are proposed that are supposedly quick-fix items which will cause us deeper problems downstream.

I would focus on the ability to fight our forces with what we have today more effectively than to try to come up with a whole bunch of quick fixes. I do not think we are inconsistent with our overall concerns but maybe in the methods.

Senator HUMPHREY. I did not mean to imply—

General JONES. You are not implying me but others.

Senator HUMPHREY. The point I am trying to make is that people outside this committee room are pulling out their hair. Yet from the President and from his spokesmen we hear nothing but soothing assurances.

Chairman STENNIS. General, I want to thank you for your attendance here, for your attention to this matter and it is an important matter. This is the most in-depth hearing that I have ever seen here with reference to an appointment for this position and more particularly coming at a time when it does, following 2 years of your service there as Chairman, 4 years preceding it as Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

Senator Cannon, you have come in. I know that you have made a favorable comment about the general in connection with this position on the floor. Do you have something further to say now? You could not get here earlier.

Senator CANNON. I regret I had to be away during much of the hearing today. I am in support of General Jones. I have had the opportunity to observe him in the years that he was on the Joint Chiefs as Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and more recently as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and I have found him to be a fair and honest representative of the military services that he represents and a good spokesman on their behalf and I have full confidence in him.

General JONES. Thank you very much.

Chairman STENNIS. If you look at this law I read earlier during the hearing you would laugh yourself almost to death and say it will never work, but it does work; it has worked these 30 years. This man, as I have said, has had two plus four and this hearing today is quite a tribute to him.

Nothing of grave consequence has been registered against his record. I think it reflects credit on the officer corps as a whole, as well as yourself.

You know, you and I barely know each other. I saw you pointed out to me in 1974. Someone said, "There is the forthcoming new Chief of Staff for the Air Force." I said, "Well, I will look him over."

[Laughter.]

Chairman STENNIS. You are still in motion. You are still going strong.

Is there any further discussion, gentlemen? I appreciate some of you coming back to make a quorum. I especially appreciate that.

Senator TOWER. The only concern I have is when he moved out of that lovely headquarters in Weisbaden to move to Ramstein.

Senator WARNER. As I indicated earlier, I intend to vote favorably for his nomination.

General, I know we share many differences of opinion on critical defense issues but nevertheless I respect the law and respect how you have done your best.

General JONES. Thank you very much.

Senator HUMPHREY. I would like to have the opportunity to file what is obviously going to be a minority report.

Chairman STENNIS. All right, Senator.

[The report follows:]

MINORITY REPORT: VIEWS OF SENATOR GORDON HUMPHREY

AMERICA'S MILITARY DECLINE OCCURRED ON GENERAL JONES' WATCH

The "global crisis of the 1980's" began well before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and there is perilous danger ahead for our nation. We are weaker now and more vulnerable to aggression than at any time since 1941. Nuclear blackmail and war with the Soviet Union and its proxies could be imminent sometime in the next few years of the darkening decade of the 1980's. General Douglas MacArthur once said this about preventing war:

The history of failure in war can be summed up in two words: too late. Too late in comprehending the deadly purpose of a potential enemy; too late in uniting all possible forces for resistance; too late in standing with one's friends.

The nation's military leaders have been allowing the weakening of America's defenses for years. Time is now running out, and it is indeed almost too late to take corrective action.

Today America is in desperate peril. Since the McNamara era ended in 1967, our strategic posture compared to the Soviets has been in constant decline, and strategic nuclear forces are the key modern index of overall military power.

By 1967, we had just lived through our last year of strategic superiority over the Soviets. As we began our historic slide down the slope to military inferiority to the Soviets and impotence to the Soviet threat, the world watched with fascination as the greatest shift in the military balance in all of world history proceeded during the decade of the 1970's, barely noticed by the American people.

The Soviets are way ahead of us now in strategic forces, theatre nuclear forces, conventional general purpose forces, and even in naval forces. We sank from clear military superiority over the Soviets in 1967 to first "sufficiency," then to "parity." Next came "rough equivalence," which became rougher and rougher as our decline continued and the massive Soviet military buildup was ongoing. Then came "essential equivalence." The true meaning of "essential equivalence" has been inferiority, although our military leaders have admitted this reality only recently.

We must now begin to face up to this stark reality of American weakness. Last year the Joints Chiefs of Staff wrote that the strategic and military balance had already shifted against America, and could not be improved by our modernization programs until the *mid*-1980's. This year the Strategic Air Command says that "essential equivalence" has been lost, and that it cannot be restored until the *late* 1980's. This year the Joint Chiefs have concurred with General Ellis: the balance has shifted until 1990.

Several clear conclusions have emerged from recent Senate hearings on SALT II and our strategic posture:

Our ICBMs are already unacceptably vulnerable; this year they will be totally vulnerable to first strike destruction from ever improving Soviet ICBM capabilities.

Our strategic bombers will likewise be vulnerable by 1985 or sooner, due to Soviet advances in SLBM and air defense capabilities.

The vulnerability of our strategic forces is unprecedented, and our most urgent strategic problem is to enhance their survivability.

We are now and will continue throughout the 1980's to be unduly reliant on our sea-based SLBM force for most of our deterrence, due to the erosion of ICBM and bomber survivability.

But instead of increasing the size of the SLBM leg of the Triad, we are actually reducing it by deactivating our Polaris submarines and failing to

ensure SLBM survivability by deploying the extremely low frequency (ELF) submarine communication system.

Our intelligence estimates for over a decade have consistently underestimated Soviet strategic capabilities, both in terms of quantity and technological quality of forces deployed. Over the years we have been repeatedly surprised by unexpected Soviet strategic deployments and qualitative developments.

Let us fully awaken to the reality. Since about 1975, we have been inferior to the U.S.S.R. in almost every measure of strategic and overall military power.

The Secretary of Defense told us last summer in SALT hearings that our military posture, already shamefully bad, will actually get worse before it gets better.

Last year William Hyland, a former deputy to Henry Kissinger, stated that we are now witnessing the political effects of the shifting military balance against us. This statement came even before the Soviet Combat Brigade in Cuba was discovered, and before the Soviet provocations in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Henry Kissinger himself has forecast that the future ahead of us in the 1980's is one of great peril.

The dangers are unprecedented. Recently our NATO Commander, General Bernard Rogers, stated the problem with ominous and stark clarity. He said the military balance has now shifted against the entire West. The Free World may not survive unless we begin now to act.

How did this decline of American military power occur, and what were its causes?

How can we explain the fact that U.S. spending in 1980 on national defense as a percentage of Gross National Product is much smaller in real terms than what we were spending in 1963?

How can we explain this continuing U.S. military decline, in the face of the Soviet doubling of their real military spending in the same period?

How have the Soviets been able to spend over \$100 billion more than the U.S. on strategic weapons alone since 1969? They have spent over \$250 billion more than the U.S. on military programs since 1969, enough to finance a vast array of weaponry if spent by the United States.

How has the U.S. been able to ignore the long standing Soviet goal of military superiority over the U.S., in the face of overwhelming evidence? Did General David Jones warn us, or argue effectively in the Executive Branch for increased U.S. defense spending?

I oppose the nomination of General David Jones to be extended for another full two year term as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. My main reason for opposing General Jones is the fact that America's military power has seriously declined under Jones' stewardship, yet he has failed to be effective in reversing the unfavorable strategic and military trends. Never before in American history has there been such a dramatic decline in our military power over so short a time as during the Jones chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Jones failed to persuade the Secretary of Defense, the President, and Congress to buildup our defenses. We can assume that he will be equally ineffective in the future. Moreover, Jones has seriously contradicted himself in testimony to Congress. Any Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, no matter how able, would warrant harsh criticism for allowing the Soviets to gain military superiority over America. My criticism of General Jones is not based on his personality, but upon his performance and effectiveness.

The Carter Administration's defense policies so artfully defended by General Jones have grievously weakened America's security. President Carter and General Jones have deliberately, consciously, and calculatingly weakened America's military posture. By 1985, under the Carter defense plan, the strategic forces of the United States will have 7,000 fewer nuclear weapons than were planned under the Ford Administration, and those additional weapons would have been carried by the most modern of our strategic delivery systems. Meanwhile, while deceptively negotiating SALT II, the Soviets will have actually added over 7,000 new warheads to their strategic forces since the Carter Administration came into office.

President Carter killed the B-1 bomber, and General Jones did not effectively object. General Jones quickly became a critic of the B-1.

President Carter delayed the development of the MX ICBM over three years, but General Jones could not prevent that decision. The MX is supposed to be our

number one priority defense program, but Carter and Jones have delayed its first deployment from 1983 to 1986.

President Carter delayed Trident submarine construction over three years, but General Jones did nothing effective to prevent that delay. The first Trident submarine was supposed to be operational in 1978, but Carter and Jones have delayed it until 1981.

President Carter delayed our cruise missile programs over 3 years, and General Jones accepted it. Our air launched cruise missiles have been cut back in number and range, our ground launched cruise missiles have been delayed to become operational after the SALT II Protocol would expire in 1981, and our sea-launched cruise missiles with nuclear warheads have been delayed over 5 years, until 1984. Carter and Jones are responsible.

President Carter refused timely development of the Trident II SLBM, but General Jones went along. The Trident II was originally scheduled to be operational in 1983, but now it will not come until 1989 or later, if at all, thanks to Carter and Jones.

President Carter terminated production of our most advanced missile, the Minuteman III ICBM, while General Jones did not effectively object. The Minuteman III carried multiple, accurate warheads, but Carter and Jones stopped production.

President Carter actually destroyed the Minuteman III ICBM production line while the Soviets were producing 8 types of ICBMs, but General Jones did not interpose any effective resistance. The Free World's only ICBM production was curtailed under orders from Carter and Jones.

President Carter canceled Ford Administration plans to deploy 50 Minuteman III ICBMs in place of Minuteman IIs, and General Jones actually supported this unilateral disarmament measure, even though the Soviets have been deploying over 200 new multiwarhead ICBMs with over 1,000 warheads each year since 1974.

President Carter ended Minuteman II modernization, but General Jones did not effectively resist. This measure was consistent with the Carter-Jones defense doctrine of unilateral disarmament.

President Carter bowed to strident Soviet propaganda and cancelled the neutron warhead, but General Jones went along.

President Carter delayed the Pershing II IRBM, and General Jones could not stop it. Jones is certainly not a general of the mold of General Pershing, victor of World War I.

President Carter terminated Lance I missile production, but General Jones accepted it.

President Carter stymied the development of the Lance II follow-on missile, but General Jones did not capably protest.

President Carter vetoed a nuclear carrier which could have eventually been of use in an Indian Ocean crisis, and General Jones actively supported the veto. He even opposes bringing out the old U.S. carrier *Oriskany* to bolster our carrier battle groups.

President Carter cut naval warship building in half, and General Jones went along. General Jones might live to see our shrinking naval fleets sent by Soviet torpedos to "Davy Jones locker" at the bottom of the sea.

President Carter cut the size of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and General Jones demurred. Why not shrink our forces, when General Jones can be so easily over-ruled on the issues of adequate pay, housing, allowances, and medical care for the troops?

Carter allowed our munitions production and stockpiles to sink so low that we can only wage war for 30 days or less. General Jones could not stop it.

Carter has reduced our military aircraft production so low that we can not maintain existing force levels. General Jones could not carry the argument for the Air Force and the Navy.

President Carter withdrew troops from Korea, and General Jones agreed. After all, General Jones had to help Carter to fulfill his campaign pledge of cutting defense expenditures.

President Carter relinquished the Panama Canal, and General Jones actively supported the giveaway. Perhaps General Jones has forgotten that American power previously kept the Caribbean and the Americas peaceful, but now Castro prevails.

Since the Carter Administration came to Washington, the Soviet missile threat grew by a factor of five in terms of its ability to destroy American targets. But

General Jones did not sound the alarm, and America continued to sleep in peril. While massively deploying its new 4th generation ICBMs and SLBMs, Russia has continued development of five new 5th generation ICBMs, and several new SLBMs, recently being deceptively tested. General Jones can not convince our leaders that these are intolerable trends.

Through selective use of power and proxies, Russia has made enormous gains in the Persian Gulf region, in Africa, and in Central America and the Caribbean. Europe, perceiving American weakness, has moved toward neutrality and Finlandization.

The Carter Administration and General Jones, by their actions and inactions, have thus helped the Soviets to satisfy one of their most important long-term foreign policy objectives—the paralysis of NATO.

While President Carter was unilaterally disarming America with General Jones' support, he negotiated the SALT II Treaty. General Jones played a key role in granting the American concessions embodied in SALT II. SALT II is fatally flawed; it is unequal, unbalanced, destabilizing, unverifiable, and unenforceable. Yet General Jones helped negotiate such a dangerous treaty, and actively supported it in Senate testimony. Such generals as we now have are more interested in arms control concessions to the Soviets than in planning military capabilities and operations.

We come now to General Jones' contradictory statements. Last August, General Jones made several unusual statements to the Senate. In actually lobbying against the still proposed 5 percent increase in the defense budget, the uniformed General Jones actually worked against the best interest of a strong national defense.

First, the initiative for the 5 percent increase did not come from JCS Chairman Jones, it came from a bipartisan coalition of Senators Nunn, Jackson, and Tower. Second, in arguing against the defense budget increase, Jones said on August 9, 1979:

A large share of an increased defense budget would not go for strategic systems, but to overcome the deficiencies in the nation's conventional forces.

He added that:

A lot of mundane things would eat up the extra money. The glamor weapons, such as new strategic bombers and missiles do not need the extra money . . . instead, the conventional forces are going begging . . . There is no strategic "quick fix" to make the US-Soviet strategic balance tilt more favorably to the U.S. side . . .

But on Monday, June 16th, 1980, Jones sang a different tune to the Senate. He was seeking reconfirmation. He was asked by a skeptical Senator Tower if the United States would be better or worse off if the delays in the M-X and Trident programs and the cancellation of the B-1 bomber program, made during Jones' first term of JCS Chairman, had instead not been made. Jones said this in reply to Senator Tower:

I don't think there is any question we are worse off today than if we had those programs.

We are entitled to ask what General Jones said when President Carter made his decisions to weaken America by unilaterally cutting back the B-1, the Trident, the M-X, and the cruise missiles, in the face of an unprecedented growth in the Soviet threat. Did General Jones effectively speak out or resist? No. General Jones went along, he did not capably argue for a strong America, he accepted unilateral disarmament through one-sided arms control. Yet he wears our once proud military uniform.

What is even more remarkable about the strange leadership record of General Jones is the fact that he has always been aware of the danger of the real Soviet threat. He can not claim ignorance or to be a "born again hawk," as in the case of Jimmy Carter after Afghanistan. Jones made the following stark, realistic statement in his Military Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 1981, published in January, 1980:

The Soviets . . . have been outspending us by a wide margin for many years. In some areas, they have already surpassed us, and I am concerned because their momentum will allow them to gain an advantage over the

United States in most of the major static indicators of strategic force by the early 1980's. Moreover, because of lead times in modern weapons programs, this progressive shift in the strategic balance will continue into the latter part of the 1980's when our current modernization programs are far enough along to restore full strategic parity.

But in light of General Jones' clear realization of the present and future national danger, did he propose any remedies to our loss of strategic parity? No, quite the contrary, General Jones believes we should merely press on with our already delayed strategic modernization programs and continue our self defeating arms control efforts, as if the "window of vulnerability" did not exist and as if the Soviets will not push us around during the next six long years before we begin initial deployment of the M-X in 1986.

Moreover, General Jones has rejected consideration of all strategic "quick fixes" which might be operational by 1982-1983 and which could alleviate our vulnerability. General Jones even opposes deploying 100 already produced Minuteman III ICBMs in place of single warhead Minuteman IIs. He also opposes converting Polaris submarines for sea-launched cruise missiles, which could be operational by 1983. He opposes stretching the FB-111 bomber for intercontinental operational use by 1983. He opposes the Cannon Amendment to adapt the M-X to the valid environmental concerns of Utahans and Nevadans, all the while accepting Carter's stonewalling on the vitally needed, Extremely Low Frequency Submarine Communications system in Wisconsin and Michigan.

On May 18, 1978, in his original confirmation hearings, General Jones stated that the U.S. then had "rough" strategic equivalence with the Soviets. But since then, General Ellis, Commander in Chief of the Strategic Air Command, has testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that the U.S. has lost essential equivalence, which is itself a euphemism for inferiority. Further, General Ellis has testified that we will not regain essential equivalence with the Soviets even in the late 1980s, after full M-X deployment. Most strategic experts agree with General Ellis. What this means is that Jones has allowed the U.S. to fall into an inferior strategic position from which we may never be able to recover. Jones has not lifted a finger or raised his voice over the American descent into inferiority to our mortal enemy the Soviets.

Also on May 18, 1978, General Jones stated in his original confirmation hearings that he would forcefully express the views of the Joint Chiefs in their military recommendations to the President and to the Congress. But has General Jones spoken forcefully of America's growing peril? No, General Jones has forsaken his solemn promise, and has meekly acceded to the Carter Administration's legions of arms controllers, detentists and appeasers.

On May 18, 1978, General Jones stated in his original confirmation hearings that:

If we lose strategic equivalence, I do not think we can make up for it with conventional forces.

What Jones seemed to be saying was that American strategic inferiority was of enormous adverse consequence to our conventional military posture, and therefore to our foreign policy and geopolitical position. But did Jones effectively prevent or noticeably protest our loss of strategic essential equivalence? No. He accepted it like the docile, peacetime, political general that he is. In accepting the loss of strategic essential equivalence, Jones was accepting overall military inferiority to the Soviet Union.

In May, 1978, General Jones stated clearly that he preferred not to have a draft. We can ask why, in these perilous times for our national security, did Jones allow a bipartisan coalition of patriotic Senators and Congressmen to carry the burden of arguing in favor of draft registration and an eventual conscription system? Why is America, the leader of the Free World, almost the only one of the Free World nations without a draft?

In May, 1978, General Jones stated that his most urgent concern was the pace of modernization of our strategic forces. Yet, since 1977, no additional warheads have been added to our forces, and we have allowed dangerous delays in these same strategic modernization programs. Jones has done nothing to accelerate or even maintain the pace of our strategic modernization.

In May 1978, Jones also stated that in the days ahead, we would have to allocate more funds to our strategic forces. But Jones has in fact recommended minimal funding for our strategic forces in fiscal year 1979, fiscal year 1980, and

fiscal year 1981. Meanwhile, the Soviets have spent well over 100 billion dollars more than the U.S. on strategic forces alone since 1969, a constant yearly rate of over 2.5 to 1. Yet Jones remains complacent.

In May 1978, General Jones stated that the Soviets will have a substantial edge over the U.S. in the 1980s in ballistic missile quick hard target kill capability. But Jones is incapable of reducing this important Soviet advantage, and he has actually opposed the addition of 100 Minuteman III MIRVed ICBMs which would have increased our hard target capability by 14 percent.

In May 1978, Jones stated that the pace of Soviet strategic modernization had significantly outstripped our own. But Jones could not increase the pace of U.S. strategic modernization as chairman of the JCS.

In May 1978, General Jones stated that the Soviets were producing far more strategic weapons than the U.S., which was at that time producing none. Jones therefore said that the Soviets had a much greater capability to "breakout" of SALT. He added that the Soviets could actually *win* an arms race in the short term. But Jones has done nothing to increase the U.S. SALT breakout capability, a grievous dereliction of his duty.

In May 1978, General Jones stated that the Soviets should be held to the surprisingly high standard of complying with the actual language of the SALT Treaties. But he surely must be aware of the fact that the Soviets did not comply with the actual language of the SALT I agreements in the following areas:

Heavy ICBMs replacing light ICBMs.

Deactivating old ICBMs according to solemnly agreed procedures.

Building more than the allowed number of strategic submarines.

Building mobile ICBMs in violation of a solemn pledge from Brezhnev.

Keeping ICBMs operational at a test range, illegally.

Testing SAMs in an ABM mode.

Building a new ABM test range without the required prior notification.

Deliberate camouflage, concealment, and deception activities related to *all* strategic offensive and defensive forces.

Did General Jones do anything effective to enforce Soviet compliance with the actual language of the SALT I agreements? No. This was a grievous dereliction of his duties to preserve the security of the American people. He even aided the Carter Administration coverup of Soviet SALT violations.

In May 1978, General Jones stated that the SALT negotiations had much more constraining impact on American strategic programs than on any Soviet strategic programs. Jones agreed with several Senators that America deliberately held back on strategic programs in anticipation of SALT agreements. He also agreed, however, that in contrast, the Soviets deliberately plan their strategic programs far in advance and then defend them carefully in SALT negotiations. Yet Jones has strangely allowed the SALT negotiations to continue to constrain U.S. strategic programs more than Soviet programs. This situation is clearly unacceptable.

In his fiscal year 1981 military posture statement, General Jones suggested that it actually may not be possible to preserve American national security and the American way of life during the 1980s. But Jones has done nothing useful to bring about a fundamental re-examination of U.S. national security priorities and assumptions in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a leadership responsibility which can not be avoided.

There are of course contrasting examples of great military leadership, despite the dismal example of Jones. In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on May 29th, Marine Corps Commandant General Barrow stated bravely that:

I believe that defense at this time transcends all else.

Yet at the same hearing, Jones stated:

I believe we (the JCS) are competent to address the national security side of the house. We are not competent to address the allocation of the budget between security and other actions in specifics or in the total budget area . . . we have a narrower responsibility.

But General Barrow and many previous members of the JCS have traditionally taken strong positions on overall national budgetary priorities. Moreover, in past years, our military leaders have addressed the question of overall national resource allocation priorities, and in times of national security crisis such as the

years 1950 and 1961 they have tried to shift national priorities in resource allocations for national defense. But General Jones is not of the same caliber as Generals George Marshall, Omar Bradley, Dwight Eisenhower, Admirals Radford, Rickover and Moorer, and Generals Twining, LeMay, Gavin and Taylor. General Jones just is not in the same league as our other great statesmen-generals. He has abstained from seeking more funds for defense, just when we need them the most.

We could go on and on, and discuss Jones' role in the disastrous Huyser mission to Iran in 1979, leading to the shameful downfall of the Shah. We could describe the Jones responsibility for all aspects of the disastrous, ill-planned Iran rescue mission of April. We could discuss Jones' failure to uphold our nation's military preparedness, readiness, munitions production, logistics, maintenance, and personnel recruiting and retention. In sum, many Senators believe that in this unprecedentedly dangerous period for our national security, our nation needs new, more firm and courageous leadership from our military chiefs. We need the tradition of Generals Washington, Grant, Sherman, Lee, Admirals Mahan, Nimitz, Halsey, and Generals MacArthur, Eisenhower, Clark, Ridgeway, Lemay and Taylor.

General Jones is like our courageous naval hero Admiral John Paul Jones in only one way: he too has not yet begun to fight.

If we are not careful, General Jones could be responsible for writing the following epitaph for America:

Here lies the only Civilization that perished at the peak of its Power, with its Power unused.

Here lies a decent people who wanted Love, not Empire, and got neither; who tried to trade Power for Popularity and lost both.

Here lies a Nation of Advertisers who knew how to change consumer tastes in cigarettes, but were themselves manipulated on the issues that really mattered to their salvation.

Here died a sort of Lancelot in the Court of Nations who, granting all his grievous flaws, was still perhaps the noblest Knight of all—except this Lancelot—crippled with an undeserved Guilt Complex—let his weapons and Ideals fall unused—and so condemned all Mankind to the thousand-year Winter of the Russian Bear.

*Frank R. Barnett.*  
1963

In sum, President Carter campaigned in 1976 on an anti-defense platform, pledging to cut over 6 billion dollars for defense.

His anti-defense cutbacks while in office have amply fulfilled his campaign pledge. His record in office is strongly anti-defense.

Carter and Jones have cut naval warships, canceled strategic missiles and bombers, cut fighters, reduced manpower, research and development, cut war munitions stocks, reduced readiness, maintenance and training, and cut back procurement of necessary spare parts. Because of Carter and Jones, our military dangerously lacks enough ammunition, shells, missiles and bombs for more than a one-month war! Our soldiers desperately lack bullets!

Imagine that; we will have to ask the Soviets for a "time-out" after only a month of war, because we will have run out of ammunition.

Moreover, Carter and Jones are not procuring combat aircraft at a rate which even replaces aircraft lost in accidents—our air forces are therefore shrinking like our navy's fleet and our army.

Finally, the ultimate irony is that Carter and Jones recently appeared to reverse themselves being dragged by Senators Nunn, Jackson, and Tower into calling for only a miniscule 5 percent increase in the defense budget last December, before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. But Carter's apparent reversal was deceptive. It was only a temporary ploy intended to buy key Senate votes for the unequal, destabilizing SALT II Treaty. After Afghanistan has exposed Soviet aggressive objectives, Carter even made new military commitments to defend our oil supplies coming out of the Persian Gulf from Soviet aggression.

Now, almost incredibly, despite Soviet aggression and the "Carter Doctrine" of added security commitments, the President is actively lobbying publicly in both houses of Congress against all defense budget increases, even those intended to make real his pledge of only a 5 percent increase. Carter's duplicity and blatant hypocrisy were also clearly exposed recently when he visited the aircraft carrier

*Nimitz* returning from prolonged deployment in the Indian Ocean. Abroad the *Nimitz*, Carter claimed credit for a military pay raise, which he is still lobbying against. He also has vetoed an additional aircraft carrier for the Navy, thereby requiring prolonged deployment of the *Nimitz*. This veto reduced retention of our key naval technical personnel.

Meanwhile, under General Jones' ill-starred leadership, America has gotten 10 years behind the Soviets in defense spending and military capability. The Soviets have spent over \$250 billion more than America on defense during the last decade, and increased their annual defense spending at a rate of over 6 percent each year. The Soviets are spending over 16 percent of their much smaller Gross National Product on defense, while we spend only 5 percent. The military balance has shifted against us for over a decade.

We simply cannot afford to reconfirm General Jones, after his dismal record of weakness, appeasement and abdication.

Chairman STENNIS. Any further discussion? If not let us call the roll.

The motion is that he be confirmed for a 2-year appointment.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Jackson.

Senator JACKSON. Aye.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Cannon.

Senator CANNON. Aye.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Aye.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Culver.

[No response.]

Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Hart.

[No response.]

Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Morgan.

Senator MORGAN. Aye.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Aye.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Tower.

Senator TOWER. Aye.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Thurmond.

VOICE. Aye, by proxy.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Goldwater.

VOICE. Aye, by proxy.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Warner.

Senator WARNER. Aye.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Humphrey.

Senator HUMPHREY. No.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Aye.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Jepsen.

Senator JEPSEN. Aye.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Aye.

Do we have a—

Mr. SULLIVAN. 12 ayes and 1 nay.

The CHAIRMAN. By a vote of 12 for and 1 against the nomination is confirmed.

Without objection, these other routine military nominations are confirmed.

We will see that everyone is recorded who wants to be recorded.

Senator COHEN. General Jones, do I understand that you will furnish the analysis of the Tower options I, II, and III so that in our future budget discussions we can look at those?

General JONES. Yes, sir.

Chairman STENNIS. With the thanks of the Chair the committee will take a recess subject to the call of the Chair and, gentlemen, we thank you for your attention.

General JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your courtesy. It may sound strange but I have enjoyed being with you. I think it is good to get these things out in the open. If there were no controversy I would not think I was doing anything.

Chairman STENNIS. We will say to you what President Coolidge said to the man who brought him his paycheck, "You come again."  
[Laughter.]

[Whereupon, at 5:50 p.m., the hearing adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

[General David C. Jones' nomination was reported to the Senate on June 17, 1980, and confirmed on June 19, 1980.]





