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SHIP TRANSFERS

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HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GENERAL PROCUREMENT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

H.R. 5163

TO AUTHORIZE THE SALE TO CERTAIN FOREIGN NATIONS OF
CERTAIN EXCESS NAVAL VESSELS

NOVEMBER 2, 1979

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

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
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(III)



NAVAL SHIP TRANSFERS

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1979

U.S. SENATE,
GENERAL PROCUREMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met in open session, at 3 p.m. in room 224, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr. (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Byrd and Thurmond.

Also present: George H. Foster, Jr., Alton G. Keel, Jr., Edward B. Kenney, Don L. Lynch, professional staff members; Frank Krebs, assistant to Senator Cannon; Bill Lind, assistant to Senator Hart; and Helen Kalbaugh, clerical assistant.

Senator BYRD. The hour of 3 p.m. having arrived, the committee will come to order.

[The bill H.R. 5163 follows:]

[H.R. 5163, 96th Congress, 1st session]

AN ACT To authorize the sale to certain foreign nations of certain excess naval vessels

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That in accordance with section 7307 of title 10, United States Code, the Congress approves the sale of fourteen vessels of the United States Navy as follows:

(1) One tank landing ship of the Suffolk County class, one auxiliary repair drydock of the ARD-12 class, and one small auxiliary floating drydock of the AFDL-35 class, to the Government of Brazil.

(2) One auxiliary repair drydock of the ARD-12 class, to the Government of Colombia.

(3) One auxiliary repair drydock of the ARD-12 class, to the Government of Ecuador.

(4) One dock landing ship of the Cabildo class, to the Government of Greece.

(5) One destroyer tender of the Shenandoah class, to the Government of Indonesia.

(6) One auxiliary repair drydock of the ARD-12 class, to the Government of the Republic of Korea.

(7) One auxiliary repair drydock of the ARD-12 class, to the Government of Mexico.

(8) One auxiliary repair drydock of the ARD-2 class, to the Government of Peru.

(9) One cargo ship of the Kukui class and one small auxiliary floating drydock of the AFDL-35 class, to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.

(10) Two amphibious transports of the Paul Revere class, to the Government of Spain.

SEC. 2. (a) Any sale of a vessel under the first section of this Act shall be subject to such terms and conditions as the President may require and shall be for a price not less than the value in United States dollars of the vessel involved.

(b) Any expense of the United States in connection with the transfer of a vessel sold under the first section of this Act shall be charged to the Government involved.

SEC. 3. The approval of the Congress under the first section of this Act shall expire at the end of the two-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.

Senator BYRD. The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony regarding the sale of U.S. naval vessels. Title 10, United States Code, section 7307(b) requires congressional approval by law of the transfer of naval vessels over 3,000 tons or under 20 years of age. Under the same authority, the Navy may transfer other ships to foreign countries that are under 3,000 tons and over 20 years old through a 30-day notification process to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees.

This committee has had a very active role in legislation concerning the sale of naval vessels. The existing requirement for legislative approval stems from a committee amendment in fiscal year 1974.

The Navy has proposed the sale of 14 ships: to Brazil, 3; Columbia 1; Ecuador, 1; Mexico, 1; Peru, 1; Greece, 1; Indonesia, 1; Korea, 1; Philippines, 2; and Spain, 2. Eleven of these ships have been reported on lease to countries for some time, and this legislation is to formalize the transfer by sale. I want to come back to that in the question period.

The remaining ships have been recently inactivated or retired. The sale price of these vessels is usually a moderate amount as determined by the Defense property disposal ships sales office.

The last time legislation on the sale of ships was required was in 1976, when Congress passed a law approving the sale of 45 ships to foreign countries.

The Chair would observe for the record that over 4,000 naval vessels have been transferred by the United States to foreign nations since the end of World War II, and transfers from our Navy fleet are continuing at a faster rate than replenishments are forthcoming. During 1978 and 1979, the Navy transferred or requested transfer of 130 naval vessels to foreign countries.

The subcommittee continues its concern over the rapid depletion of our naval fleet, and today would expect to get a better understanding of how we are able to transfer significant numbers of our naval vessels to foreign countries and still maintain adequate naval capabilities.

The subcommittee is interested in hearing testimony on the transfer of five cargo or amphibious-type ships in this request at the same time that the Secretary of Defense is reporting to Congress a plan to purchase new cargo and amphibious ships for an enhanced mobility force for the Marine Corps.

The subcommittee is also interested in hearing testimony on the use that these foreign nations make of these ships and how this use may relate to requirements to meet similar treaty commitments that the United States may be required to meet. Stated another way, it is not clear how the receiving country can use the ships to meet its treaty commitments when the United States considers the ships to be obsolete and not capable of meeting those same treaty commitments. It seems to me that is a very important point for the witnesses to address today.

The subcommittee certainly does not object to the modernization of our naval forces and the weeding out of unfit ships. However, in this

era of tight fiscal constraints, the subcommittee will look closely for any potential alternate ways to retain adequate U.S. Naval Forces before we permit excessing and sale of these ships.

Today the subcommittee will be pleased to hear testimony from Adm. D. M. Altwegg, USN, Director, Security Assistance Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations. I understand that there are other witnesses here from the Department of Navy, Marine Corps, and Department of State as backup witnesses to answer questions as may be required. Please proceed with your statement.

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. D. M. ALTWEGG, USN, DIRECTOR, SECURITY ASSISTANCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS; ACCOMPANIED BY REAR ADM. H. C. SCHRADER, JR., USN, DIRECTOR, MLSF, AMPHIBIOUS, MINE AND ADVANCED NAVAL VEHICLES SHIP DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS; REAR ADM. R. K. FONTAINE, USN, DIRECTOR, SURFACE WARFARE DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS; COL. JOHN C. CONLIN, USMC, AMPHIBIOUS SHIP REQUIREMENTS BRANCH, OPERATIONS DIVISION, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS; MS. SHARON AHMAD, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Admiral ALTWEGG. With your concurrence, I will read my prepared statement. First, let me introduce Ms. Sharon Ahmad, who is Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear today in connection with the proposed legislation to authorize the sale of 14 ships and craft to allied and friendly countries. This legislation is being sought pursuant to title 10, United States Code, section 7307, which requires enabling legislation to authorize the transfer to another country of naval vessels which displace in excess of 3,000 tons or are less than 20 years old. The 94th Congress most recently enacted similar legislation authorizing the sale of 49 ships to 13 foreign countries.

The United States has transferred obsolescent and excess naval vessels to other countries as part of its security assistance program for over 25 years.

Ship transfers have their basis in the foreign policy of the United States under which security and economic assistance are structured to strengthen our mutual defense arrangements and to foster economic growth of friendly countries, many of which are developing nations.

Highly visible benefits accrue to the United States from the transfers of ships which can no longer meet the sophisticated threat which confronts us, and which are no longer economically usable. Ships which would otherwise be scrapped are instead providing a potential extension of our own seapower capabilities and constituting a significant reminder of our support to valued allies.

The common training, operations, and logistics efforts which attend the transfers serve further to coalesce customs, doctrine, and procedures. Such transactions also permit these countries to achieve a greater

degree of self-reliance, afford them the opportunity to manage their own resources, and influence them to remain aligned with the United States.

All U.S. Navy ship transfers are subject to congressional review pursuant to title 10, United States Code, section 7307. Under the terms of the present statute, naval vessels under 3,000 tons and over 20 years of age may be transferred only after written notification has been provided for 30 days of continuous session to the Armed Services Committees of both the Senate and the House of Representatives. This 30-day notification system has worked well.

It has provided efficient processing of noncontroversial transfers, saved excessive deactivation and custodial costs, and allowed effective planning for and implementation of mutually economic "hot ship" transfers. It has also eased the overall burden on the Congress and saved administrative costs associated with preparing and processing legislation in both the legislative and executive branches. Where there has been congressional objection, sustained at committee level, transfers have been stopped without further congressional action.

For transfers of ships over 3,000 tons or under 20 years of age, enabling legislation is required. All 14 naval vessels being considered today are over 20 years old, but each displaces more than 3,000 tons and therefore requires legislation.

All of the transfers in the proposed legislation are sales; 11 of the 14 ships and craft proposed for sale have been on lease for some time to the prospective purchasers, and their sale is part of our Government's policy to discontinue loans and leases wherever possible. The sale prices are based on the market appraisal value as obtained from the Defense Property Disposal Ship Sales Office in Newport, R.I. These in turn are based on recent experience in sales of the same or similar type ships.

The transfer of the amphibious transports to Spain deserves special note. These ships are being transferred to satisfy commitments of the United States undertaken in two bilateral agreements: An Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation entered into in 1970, and a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation ratified by the Senate in 1976. Agreement was recently reached between the U.S. Navy and the Spanish Navy that the transfer of these two transports would fulfill the remaining ship transfer obligations of both the agreement and the treaty. The United States now desires to effect an orderly transfer of the ships as they are phased out of U.S. Navy service.

Mr. Chairman, during previous hearings before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials of the House Armed Services Committee, several members of the subcommittee expressed concern about the loss of the two amphibious transports to the U.S. Navy's amphibious forces. Because I know you share this concern about our amphibious force levels, I want to explain how the transports came to be candidates for sale to Spain.

The two ships proposed for transfer to Spain are U.S.S. *Paul Revere* (LPA 248) and U.S.S. *Francis Marion* (LPA 249). Both were acquired by the Navy in 1953 during their construction as merchant ships. They subsequently were converted in the late 1950's to their present configuration as amphibious transports (LPA's). Both served in the active forces until 1975 when they were transferred to

the Naval Reserve Force, where they have been manned by a nucleus crew of active duty personnel who are augmented for operations by selected Naval Reserve personnel. Since 1975 they have been employed in exercises and have been available for contingency use, but because they were not fully crewed they were not deployed as our other amphibious ships are.

Paul Revere and *Francis Marion* did not become candidates for sale to Spain until after the decision to retire them was taken in the course of the development of the fiscal year 1980 budget.

The draft "Defense Consolidated Guidance" for fiscal years 1980 through 1984 specifies an amphibious lift requirement for 1.15 Marine Amphibious Force (MAF). At this MAF lift level the two LPA's are excess to the Navy's amphibious force requirements, and consequently they were not funded in the fiscal year 1980 budget.

In the development of that budget it was, of course, necessary to achieve a balanced program to match commitments with capabilities, near-term readiness with long-term modernization, support with force levels, and people with hardware. In the face of a fiscally constrained budget and among competing warfare areas, no program sponsor is completely satisfied with the resources allocated in the budget, and the amphibious forces are no exception. It comes to a matter of priorities.

The decision to retire the LPA's was based on the following additional considerations:

Because they are relatively old and have limited capability, these ships would be of marginal utility as a hedge to buy back a level of lift in excess of 1.15 MAF if authorized in the future. One LPA provides approximately 4 percent of the MAF troop lift, 2 percent of the boat requirement, and 1 percent of the cube and square (cargo/vehicle) capacity requirement.

The LPA's have no wet well and consequently are not suited to the employment of the new generation of landing craft designed to provide a greater stand-off distance from shore for the Amphibious Task Force.

The LPA's are not capable of operating helicopters. They have only one helicopter spot, have no facilities for repair, and have no hangar.

The introduction into the fleet of the new *Tarawa* class amphibious assault ships (LHA's) has more than offset the troop lift loss represented by the retirement of the LPA's.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to emphasize that in this case, as in all other ship transfers, the ships were not identified for possible transfer until after the authoritative decision to retire them had been taken. There are many factors which enter into a decision to retire a ship—age, condition, and obsolescence of the ships; nature of the threat; fiscal constraints; manpower constraints; changing mission requirement; and others—but it is evident that these ship retirement decisions have become increasingly controversial as the fleet has decreased in size. That is all the more reason to believe that the decisions are not lightly taken, but are the result of rigorous study and often difficult choices.

Only after the process leading to the retirement decision, in which many participate, is a ship considered for transfer to a foreign country. The fact that many foreign countries would like to acquire ships

of the U.S. fleet is not and should not be a factor in any decision to retire a ship. Given our present force levels, this principle has never been more deliberately observed.

Mr. Chairman, the time has come to sell the ships and craft on lease, and the orderly transfer of the amphibious transports to Spain makes enactment of this legislation a matter of some urgency. Prompt authorization of these transfers will enable the U.S. Navy to avoid unnecessary costs and undesirable personnel actions which would be caused by a delay.

Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to answer questions the committee may have with respect to this proposed legislation.

Senator BYRD. Thank you.

Is it not true that the Secretary of Defense is planning to ask Congress for authority to purchase new cargo amphibious ships for the Marine Corps?

Admiral ALTWEGG. That subject is under active consideration at this time, but a final decision has not yet been taken.

Senator BYRD. I assume that while it is still under consideration the likelihood is the request will be made. Is that your judgment?

Admiral ALTWEGG. That would be my best judgment; yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. Why would we be in a position to transfer to other countries five ships at the same time we are seeking the purchase of new ships of the same type?

Admiral ALTWEGG. I would like Admiral Schrader, who is the Chief of Naval Operations, MLSF, Amphibious, Mine and Advanced Naval Vehicles Ship Division Director, to go into some detail on the contribution that various classes of ships might make to amphibious lift capability.

Admiral SCHRADER. I am not aware of the details of the proposals the Secretary of Defense will make when he does come to talk to you gentlemen. There have been some studies made and options investigated. However, I don't know what decisions and what options have evolved or how they will be resolved. But as I understand the—

Senator BYRD. Excuse me, I understand when the Secretary of Defense testified last week at the SALT hearings he brought this matter up. Are you not familiar with that?

Admiral SCHRADER. I am not familiar with what options are now being considered as the recommended options to go forth with. There were many options under study and several aspects are still being investigated such as what types of ships, what are the capabilities of the ships, what ships are available, what designs are available, but the bottom line is, when looking at the options in one area for an enhanced mobility lift, that type of ship is not an amphibious assault ship by any means.

The LPA's and LST's we are discussing here are old, outdated amphibious assault ships.

Senator BYRD. Dealing only now with the five cargo amphibious type ships which you gentlemen are recommending be transferred, give me the ages of each of those five ships and the tonnage.

Admiral SCHRADER. The *Grant County*—LST 1174.

Admiral ALTWEGG. That is proposed for sale to Brazil.

Admiral SCHRADER. 3,560 tons, 22 years old. It has been in the hands of the Brazilians since 1977.

The *Fort Mandan*—LSD 21, has been in the hands of the Greek Navy, Royal Hellenic Navy since January 1971. Displacement is 4,750 tons.

The LPA—

Senator BYRD. What is the age?

Admiral ALTWEGG. Constructed during World War II.

Admiral SCHRADER. 34 years old.

Two LPA's: *Paul Revere*—LPA 248, *Francis Marion*—LPA 249, were both launched in 1954. They are 25 years old. The *Revere* was commissioned as a U.S. Navy ship in 1958. It has been in service 21 years. The *Francis Marion* was commissioned as a U.S. Navy ship in July 1961 and has been in commissioned service 18 years. They have approximate tonnage of about 10,000. They are of the C-4 *Mariner* type.

Senator BYRD. Where would they go?

Admiral SCHRADER. They are the two recommended for sale to Spain.

Admiral ALTWEGG. WAK which we propose to transfer to the Philippines, 4,900 tons. Her service date is September 1945. She has been on lease since March 1972.

Senator BYRD. Will be on lease to the Philippine Government?

Admiral ALTWEGG. Yes.

Senator BYRD. How much?

Admiral ALTWEGG. I would assume, Mr. Chairman, that this is a no-cost lease to the Philippine Government.

Senator BYRD. So you use the term lease rather loosely.

Admiral ALTWEGG. I think at that time in our history there was very little differentiation between the term lease and loan. That has become a matter of law, that if a country was no longer eligible under grant aid—

Senator BYRD. In other words we get nothing from the lease of this ship to the Philippines?

Admiral ALTWEGG. That is correct.

Senator BYRD. Have we now leased these to Spain?

Admiral ALTWEGG. No, sir. They were just inactivated on September

1.

Senator BYRD. What about the one to Greece?

Admiral ALTWEGG. Greece has had custody of that ship since January 1971; a no cost lease.

Senator BYRD. What about the one to Brazil?

Admiral ALTWEGG. Same answer.

Senator BYRD. Do we have any knowledge of where payments are made?

Admiral ALTWEGG. No. All the ships we are considering that are currently on lease are no cost leases.

Senator BYRD. I think that it is misleading to the public to say it is under lease when in fact the Government gets no return from it. Or maybe I will ask you the question. Do you feel that is misleading?

Admiral ALTWEGG. I think that is consistent with our current policy which stems from 1972 in attempting to convert these leases to sales. So that the taxpayers would realize a fair return on these ships.

Senator BYRD. I am glad you mentioned that. What will the Philippine Government pay for this ship?

Admiral ALTWEGG. The Philippine Government will pay \$120,000.

Senator BYRD. What did it cost?

Admiral ALTWEGG. The acquisition cost was \$2.1 million.

Senator BYRD. And you feel that the taxpayers are being adequately compensated?

Admiral ALTWEGG. Yes, this is consistent with price established by the—

Senator BYRD. You are answering in the affirmative; taxpayers are getting an appropriate price?

Admiral ALTWEGG. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. What will Brazil pay?

Admiral ALTWEGG. Brazil will pay \$400,000 for the LST.

Senator BYRD. What did it cost?

Admiral ALTWEGG. \$11 million, sir.

Senator BYRD. In your judgment are the taxpayers being adequately compensated?

Admiral ALTWEGG. Yes.

Senator BYRD. Brazil will get a 22-year-old ship that cost \$11 million for \$400,000 and you say that is an adequate price?

Admiral ALTWEGG. I think that is an adequate price, yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. What about the one to Greece?

Admiral ALTWEGG. The one to Greece will be sold for \$325,000.

Senator BYRD. What did that cost?

Admiral ALTWEGG. \$6 million, sir.

Senator BYRD. Now let us go back to the Brazilian one which cost \$11 million. What would be the replacement cost?

Admiral ALTWEGG. I will have to provide that for the record, sir. We have not built any LST's in about 8 years so we will try and come up with a figure in today's dollars for the cost of a replacement ship. [The information follows:]

SHIP REPLACEMENT COST

Since there is no comparable follow-on to the LPA, it is estimated that a repeat of this design would cost approximately \$265 million for the lead ship in fiscal year 1980 dollars and \$220 million for the first follow-on ship. These costs reflect an assessment of original design specifications. In all probability these ships could not be procured in their original configuration because they contain equipment and systems which are obsolete and out of production. New equipment has not been considered in determining the above costs, however, the estimate does reflect current requirements for such items as:

- a. Quality assurance.
- b. Reliability/maintainability.
- c. Documentation.
- d. Testing.

The lead ship costs reflect a first ship cost that assumes a ship builder will update working drawings without considering major design improvements. The quality of these estimates is not sufficient to support a budget quality estimate.

Senator BYRD. Thank you.

What will be the sale price of the two to Spain?

Admiral ALTWEGG. The sale price is \$5.4 million.

Senator BYRD. For the two?

Admiral ALTWEGG. Let me clarify that, Mr. Chairman. Because these ships in our view have useful life remaining they are not being sold for scrap. We are selling them for \$2.4 million.

Senator BYRD. You gave me \$5.4 million a moment ago.

Admiral ALTWEGG. The *Francis Marion* had a collision this past winter. It is estimated it will cost \$3 million to repair that ship so the \$5.4 million equals the \$3 million to repair the *Francis Marion* plus \$2.4 million for the two ships.

Senator BYRD. Now how will Spain pay for this?

Admiral ALTWEGG. Upon the passage of legislation and signature by the President, we will then sign a contract with the Spanish Government for \$5.4 million. When the cash is received, we will then induct the *Francis Marion* into a private shipyard to effect repairs and make preparations to transfer the *Paul Revere* in Long Beach, Calif.

Senator BYRD. Now, will there be any U.S. funds involved in the payment of that \$5.4 million?

Admiral ALTWEGG. There will be no use of U.S. funds in this transaction. No ship transfers are made which involve the use of U.S. funds.

Senator BYRD. In terms of dollars, what military aid is Spain getting from the United States?

Admiral ALTWEGG. Spain, of course, is a grant aid recipient and in the fiscal year 1980 will receive some \$3.5 million. However this will be a cash sale.

Senator BYRD. What was the original cost of those two ships?

Admiral ALTWEGG. Each of those ships acquisition cost was \$10 million.

Senator BYRD. Is not the Navy requesting ships of this type to be purchased next year?

Admiral ALTWEGG. No, sir. If you would like us to I could have Admiral Schrader elaborate on that.

Senator BYRD. In just a moment. What would be the replacement cost of those ships?

Admiral ALTWEGG. We will have to provide that for the record. [The information follows:]

SHIP REPLACEMENT COST

The LST sold to Brazil was an 1171 class ship. If we were to replace this ship through procurement of a new LST, it would be a variant of the LST 1179 class, the follow-on to the 1171 class. An estimated cost for one LST 1179 class ship in fiscal year 1980 dollars is \$180 million for the lead ship and \$140 million for the first follow-on ship. These costs reflect an assessment of original design specifications. In all probability these ships could not be procured in their original configuration because they contain equipment and systems which are obsolete and out of production. New equipment has not been considered in determining the above costs, however, the estimate does reflect current requirements for such items as:

- a. Quality assurance.
- b. Reliability/maintainability.
- c. Documentation.
- d. Testing.

The lead ship costs reflect a first ship cost that assumes a ship builder will update working drawings without considering major design improvements. The quality of these estimates is not sufficient to support a budget quality estimate.

Senator BYRD. Admiral Schrader?

Admiral SCHRADER. The reason we don't have the numbers available for replacement cost of the LST as you asked earlier and LPA as you just asked, is that it is not in our plans to ever replace those classes of ships. Those ships are of a bygone era of amphibious warfare.

Senator BYRD. This is a former merchant ship.

Admiral SCHRADER. Yes, it was a C-4 Mariner built as a civilian ship. Under one of the subsidy programs, the Federal Government could take them back into Federal service and that ship was converted into a LPA or an APA as it was called then. That stands for personnel carrier. Their contribution to the amphibious assault echelon of an amphibious task force is basically people. They carried a large number of people, well over 1,000.

Senator BYRD. Is the Navy seeking merchant ships next year?

Admiral SCHRADER. I am not aware of our seeking any merchant ships. We are looking for amphibious assault ships.

Senator BYRD. Isn't it a part of the expeditionary plan for the Marine Corps? Maybe the Marine Corps representative could answer that.

Admiral SCHRADER. The amphibious assault forces and the enhanced mobility that we talked about earlier, I think, are getting confused with one another. These are two separate programs. The amphibious assault forces are traditionally for an assault in a hostile environment. The Marine enhanced mobility is an entirely different concept. These LPA's and the ships we are talking about disposing of now are ex-members of the amphibious assault forces.

Senator BYRD. The Navy has proposed the sale of 14 ships, 3 of those going to Brazil, and you have given me the information on one. What about the other two which are going to Brazil?

Admiral ALTWEGG. For Brazil the ARD 14, its acquisition cost was \$3 million. It was built in 1943. We will recover \$375,000 by the sale of this ship. The AFDL was acquired in 1944 at a cost of \$1.5 million. We will recover \$180,000 as a result of its sale.

For Colombia, the ARD was built in 1944 at an acquisition cost of \$3 million. We will realize \$375,000 from its sale.

The ARD for Ecuador was also built in 1944 at an acquisition cost of \$3 million and we similarly will recover \$375,000.

The ARD for Mexico was built in 1944 at an acquisition cost of \$3 million and we will realize \$375,000 from its sale.

The ARD for Peru was built in 1943 at a cost of \$3 million and we will realize \$375,000.

The tender for Indonesia was built in 1946 at a cost of \$9 million. We will recover \$525,000.

The ARD for Korea was built in 1944 for \$3 million and will be sold for \$425,000.

The AFDL for the Philippines was built in 1944 at a cost of \$1.5 million and will be sold for \$380,000.

That covers the 11 ships that we have not previously discussed.

Senator BYRD. Thank you.

Have all the 14 ships proposed for sale been declared excess to the U.S. Navy requirement?

Admiral ALTWEGG. They have, sir.

Senator BYRD. What are the determining factors used by the Navy that would allow recommendation of a ship to be retired and declared excess?

Admiral ALTWEGG. There are several reasons a ship may be declared excess and let me cover some of them, sir.

The ship could be obsolete. In fact, it could be excess to our needs and no longer needed for the public use.

Senator BYRD. Are either of those the case in regard to the two for the Philippines?

Admiral ALTWEGG. Yes, sir. In fact, most of these ships—of the 14 we are discussing, most of them are in the category of drydocks, built during World War II to support a Navy of some 2,900 ships with global commitments and most of those global commitments still obtain but where we had ships disbursed worldwide and they were ships of less than 4,000 tons, those are ships that we are no longer building.

Senator BYRD. Why was the *Grant County* declared excess? It is only 22 years old.

Admiral ALTWEGG. She was replaced by a new class of LST's.

Senator BYRD. Is she obsolete?

Admiral ALTWEGG. She would be obsolete not only under today's conditions but at the time that she was transferred to Brazil.

Senator BYRD. What is the other criteria you listed?

Admiral ALTWEGG. Inability to cope with modern day threat. None of those are combatants so that reason does not obtain to a great degree except that when it comes to mobility and the ability to steam in excess of 20 knots some of these ships we list here do have that capability.

Senator BYRD. Why were the two that you propose to go to Spain declared obsolete?

Admiral ALTWEGG. The major reason they were declared excess is that they were no longer needed to support the amphibious lift requirements of the Navy-Marine Corps team.

Senator BYRD. The understanding of the committee is that the Marine Corps needs ships like these. Can somebody answer that?

Admiral SCHRADER. Yes, sir. About a decade ago when the new LHA's were designed as large 40,000 ton ships, they were designed to replace a LPA, for personnel, they carry a lot of people, and to replace the LKA which is basically a bulk cargo carrier, plus they give you a flight deck the size of a World War II Essex class carrier. Three major fingerprints of the MAF lift, troops, cargo, and helos, are all in one ship.

Four of the five ships have delivered. The fifth ship will deliver early next year. They are magnificent large ships. As the LHA's are now becoming operational, we are in a position that the LPA's are no longer needed, nor will a number of LKA's be needed at some time in the future.

Senator BYRD. Where will they go?

Admiral SCHRADER. Five are being built, two are on the west coast, two on the east coast, and the fifth one to Long Beach, Calif., as its home port.

Senator BYRD. Does that take care of the Marine Corps requirements?

Colonel CONLIN. You have to look at what the requirements are. The Marine Corps determines its requirements on the basis of five fingerprints, actually four determined by the Marine Corps, one by Navy. They have to do with personnel lift, square, cube, and helicopter spots required. The Navy determines the number of boats required. All

these center on the ability to lift a Marine amphibious force. The consolidated guidance from the Secretary of Defense has established the program objective for amphibious lift at 1.15 MAF lift. Within that constraint these ships are excess to our requirement.

Senator BYRD. Is the committee to understand that the Marine Corps does not need any more ships of this type?

Colonel CONLIN. Given the 1.15 program objective, yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. I don't know what you mean by the 1.15 program objective.

Colonel CONLIN. Traditionally the Navy has 15 percent of their ships in overhaul. So when you take 1.15 percent of a MAF lift and put 15 percent in overhaul the remainder is what you have if you have to do something right away. So that one MAF lift is what we have.

Senator BYRD. If I recall correctly, earlier in our meeting you, Admiral, said additional ships for the Marine Corps are under consideration in the Defense Department.

Admiral SCHRADER. This is not part of our amphibious lift. We are still limited under consolidated guidance that stems from the Secretary of Defense of an assault echelon.

This is the 1.15 MAF that is to operate in a hostile environment. There is a different initiative that came from a different group within OSD that has to do with this Marine Corps enhanced mobility that is not dealing with the Navy amphibious forces. This is for a different, nonhostile type environment. This is how these ships are designed to operate.

Senator BYRD. Explain to the committee what is under consideration at the Department of Defense in regard to the Marine Corps?

Admiral SCHRADER. The Marine Corps enhanced mobility concept is, as I understand it,—and I am not sure what will come out of the Office of the Secretary of Defense at this time, when it does come forward—but as I understand it at this point in time it consists of air lifting in an unopposed environment troops to be met with equipment and supplies prepositioned on board merchant ships or nonmilitary ships, not amphibious ships.

This is an entirely separate scenario from an amphibious assault operation.

Senator BYRD. Are these not ships that could be utilized for that purpose?

Admiral SCHRADER. LPA's are personnel carriers. They would not constitute any portion of this enhanced mobility because the troops would not be carried by ship in any of the scenarios. The equipment would be carried by ships.

Senator BYRD. Could they be converted back to the original form?

Admiral SCHRADER. We are looking at one merchant ship that costs in excess of \$40 million to convert it and that is a relatively new ship. It is very expensive to do that. These ships are old and once again would be break bulk. We are looking at modern times with the roll-on, roll-off type concept or big barges.

I don't know what type ship we will decide on but the old-fashioned cargo ships with the kingposts and booms, lifting things out like we did in Korea and early days of Vietnam, we are not interested in living with that. We are trying to modernize that in speed, and mobility. Rapidity of off-load is the key element so these new container

ships are the candidates we are looking at. The old archaic bulk cargo ship does not meet our needs in either scenario.

Senator BYRD. What about the two ships to Spain? Do they meet some of the requirements?

Admiral SCHRADER. No, sir.

Admiral ALTWEGG. The only virtue the two LPA's for Spain have is they can carry people. What we are lacking, not only in our amphibious assault echelon capability but in the roll-on, roll-off or in the enhanced mobility exercise is the ability to carry things.

Senator BYRD. Some of these countries will be using these ships, if they are transferred, to carry out treaty commitments, as I understand it. Is that your understanding?

Admiral ALTWEGG. Of course, some of these countries we do not have treaty relationships with but to speak to the instant case, the LPA's for Spain, they use them for resupply and exchange of troops on their islands in the Atlantic as well as the Mediterranean. They cooperate and conduct joint exercises with the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. They will of course replace two amphibious ships that we transferred to Spain some years ago.

Senator BYRD. If they are obsolete, if we consider them to be obsolete, why would they not also be obsolete from the point of view of Spain?

Admiral SCHRADER. We are several decades ahead of them in our concepts of mobility and putting troops ashore in an amphibious environment. We are pointing toward modernization, high speed mobility in an effort to cause dispersion of a potential enemy. We are highly dependent upon helicopter lift for example and all of our new ships have large helicopter facilities. These LPA's have a flat deck in which one helicopter can hover and pick up people but it is not an air-capable ship.

Senator BYRD. Does not the United States rely on these ships, not with Spain but with other NATO countries, for the carrying out of their treaty commitments?

Admiral SCHRADER. The British amphibious forces deal greatly in helicopters. Their HMS *Bulwark* is an amphibious helicopter carrier. They have wet well ships. A wet well ship is like the LSD's and the LPD's in which we carry the boats internal to the ship and we ballast the ship down and sail the boats out of it. It gets people ashore much faster. The LPA relies on the boats on deck like they did for hundreds of years. The boats are put into the water. The Marines go over the side on cargo nets.

I am not aware that the British have any ships of that type at all. They are all either wet wells or helicopter capable.

Admiral ALTWEGG. I think what you were driving at is we continue to transfer obsolete excess ships to other countries. Oftentimes they are allies of ours. Turkey, Greece, what have you. Our Navy has global responsibilities. Those countries normally are only providing for the common defense in their contiguous waters and consequently a ship that would satisfy their needs would not be one to satisfy the needs of our global Navy.

Senator BYRD. I think that is reasonable. I always felt Spain is important. I am not arguing against Spain.

Admiral ALTWEGG. I think it might be helpful if we have Ms. Ahmad say a few words about the potential for Spain's entry into NATO and her progress toward democracy.

Ms. AHMAD. With respect to the specific treaty commitment, in the case of Spain the commitment is really one on our part to provide certain vessels for them. The Spanish Government and military and civilian elements of the Government have come to the conclusion that these would satisfy their requirements and would fulfill our obligations under the treaty so from that point of view we are quite interested in the approval of this transfer.

Spain has under consideration the question of whether and when it will join NATO. That will be a decision for the Spanish to make. We have been in touch with them on what NATO is all about.

Senator BYRD. I think they are well aware of what NATO is about. I talked with them many times through the years. They seem very familiar with NATO.

Ms. AHMAD. They are indeed. One of the reasons they are is we do consult with them frequently as to what is going on in NATO when they are not there.

Senator BYRD. The problem is this, with this country. We have refused to push the issue to get Spain into NATO. Isn't that correct?

Ms. AHMAD. As I said, that is a decision for Spain to make.

Senator BYRD. Technically, it is; but it is also a decision for this country to make, I have been contending. I have been advocating that Spain be admitted to NATO. I first made a speech in the Senate on that in 1967. I got nothing from the State Department at all. Down through the years we have not been able to get anything affirmative from the State Department because you are worried about other countries somewhere else in the world.

Ms. AHMAD. The State Department has not in any way stood in the way of Spain joining NATO. The point is, it is a decision Spain will have to make. The Alliance, of course, considers its request, but I know of no opposition to Spain joining NATO by the State Department or any other element in the U.S. Government.

Senator BYRD. I don't know of any opposition, but I know that the State Department has not been willing to take a strong stand in behalf of Spain, which I think is unfortunate. This is not something new to me; I have been urging this since 1967. I think Spain could be a great asset to NATO. It is strategically located; it has good potential, far more potential than many of the other NATO countries have.

Ms. AHMAD. There is some opposition within Spain to the proposition that Spain should join NATO. It is a decision for the Spanish people to make. The current Spanish Government has indicated its desire to achieve this, and it is up to the Spanish Government to decide how to proceed with this development.

Senator BYRD. What affirmative statement has the State Department made in regard to this?

Ms. AHMAD. For the record, I would have to submit that after this hearing; but certainly the State Department has made it clear that it supports the idea of Spain joining NATO, but acknowledges that it is Spain's decision.

Senator BYRD. If you have a public statement on that, just as a matter of interest, I wish you would let me know. Whenever I talk with

the various Secretaries of State they all say they would like to see it done and that it is a good idea. But they say it privately and so far as I know, they have not said it publicly.

Ms. AHMAD. I would have to check that, sir.

Senator BYRD. Thank you very much.

[The information follows:]

PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY U.S. OFFICIALS ON SPANISH ENTRY INTO NATO

1. Former Secretary Kissinger's Press Conference with former Foreign Minister Areilza, January 24, 1976: "The U.S. has supported and will, of course, increasingly support the participation of Spain in NATO."

2. McCloskey statement to Senate Foreign Relations Committee March 3, 1976: "The Treaty is intended to help Spain contribute even more effectively to Western defense efforts moving from a passive to an active role, and eventually leading, we hope, to Spain's entry into NATO."

3. Harry Bergold, Jr., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislature Affairs, statement to House Committee on International Relations, June 8, 1976: "The United States has long recognized Spain's potential for contribution to European security, and actively supports closer Spanish cooperation with NATO and eventually Spanish accession to full membership status in that organization."

4. Excerpt from Senate Resolution giving advice and consent to ratification of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, 21 June, 1976: "The U.S., while recognizing that this Treaty does not expand the existing U.S. defense commitment in the North Atlantic Treaty area or create a mutual defense commitment between the U.S. and Spain, looks forward to the development of such an expanded relationship between Western Europe and a democratic Spain as would be conducive to Spain's full cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its activities and mutual defense obligations."

5. Former Secretary Kissinger's Press Conference in Brussels, December 10, 1976: "The United States has favored the participation of Spain in NATO and the political progress that is being made in Spain—which we welcome—in our view should speed the day when that situation is possible."

6. Assistant Secretary Vest interview with ICA correspondent, released May 23, 1978: "Question: Is Spain any closer to NATO membership? Answer: Yes, in one sense. There are two sides to this: What does Spain want to do, What do the NATO allies want to do? When Spain moved to its present democratic structure, such objections as there might have been on the part of certain allies to NATO membership, I think, vanished. Spain, I think, knows that the NATO countries would welcome it. Spain certainly knows that we have always supported it. The question, then, is one for Spain, which is sorting out its own priorities."

7. Secretary Vance—Madrid Airport Press Conference June 2, 1979: "Insofar as the accession of Spain to NATO is concerned, that is clearly a subject for Spain to decide, if and when it chooses to do so. Let me say one more word on that. Contrary to some of the indications that have appeared in the press, the U.S. has in no way . . . tried to exert any pressure upon the decision which Spain may wish to make at some point with respect to this issue."

In addition, Article VI of the US-Spanish Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation provides for the harmonization of the bilateral (US-Spanish defense) relationship with security arrangements in the Atlantic area. To this end, an "ad hoc" committee was established whose mission is to propose to the two governments measures directed toward coordination with NATO. This "ad hoc" committee held meetings in March 1978 and January 1979 at which the US provided to the Spanish information relative to NATO. Additional meetings are planned for November and December of this year. Some of the subjects discussed are:

- a. NATO's structure, its several commands, and coordination among them;
- b. Current strategy of the United States in relation to European military problems;
- c. The state of European security;
- d. The relationship of the U.S.-Spanish geographic area of common interest to western defense;
- e. Logistics aspects of the Alliance, as well as infrastructure matters;

- f. Economic and budgetary procedures of the NATO organizations ;
- g. Geostrategic examination of the different zones of the Alliance.

Senator BYRD. Senator Thurmond?

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I think the House already passed this bill.

Ms. AHMAD. That is correct.

Senator THURMOND. They passed it in September by an affirmative vote.

Who is the highest ranking man here?

Admiral ALTWEGG. I am in charge, sir.

Senator THURMOND. Admiral, the Department of Defense Draft Consolidated Guidance for fiscal years 1980-84 presently calls for a Marine Amphibious Force—MAF—amphibious lift capability of 1.15. From your viewpoint, is a 1.15 MAF adequate?

If DOD determines that an MAF higher than 1.15 is required, then would the two amphibious troop transport ships—LPA's—still be judged excessive to the navy's amphibious life requirements?

Admiral ALTWEGG. Senator, it would be determined by what figure you establish as the requirement, but let me give you some numbers: The contribution of an LPA to troop lift—and I emphasize the word "troop lift"—is 4 percent. In other words, if we kept one LPA, we would have 1.19 MAF lift. If we kept both of them, we would have 1.23 MAF lift, all other things being considered equal.

The problem is that the capability to carry people is not the biggest problem: it is rather bulk. To date we have the capability to lift personnel of about $1\frac{1}{3}$ or 1.33 MAF.

Senator THURMOND. When you speak of that, one means one division?

Admiral ALTWEGG. That is correct. We need 115 ships to keep 100 at sea; that is where we get the 1.15. The other 15 or 15 percent would be undergoing maintenance and regular overhaul, et cetera.

Senator THURMOND. And reserves in case you need them?

Admiral ALTWEGG. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. Now, Admiral, what is the Navy's position regarding what is required for an adequate Marine Amphibious Force amphibious lift capability?

Admiral ALTWEGG. The current policy says we want the lift capability for 1.15 MAF. That is the executive branch decision.

Senator THURMOND. Do the Marines have a comment on that?

Colonel CONLIN. The admiral is correct; that is an executive branch decision, that the program objective for amphibious lift is 1.15; however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have consistently said that the lift requirement for prudent risk force is 2.33 amphibious lift, and the Marine Corps has consistently said in order to meet national strategy the Marine Corps needs a $1\frac{1}{3}$ lift immediately available. So if you wanted to have 15 percent in overhaul, that is an additional 15 percent.

Given that the current guidance from the Secretary of Defense the program objective is 1.15. As I said earlier, the Marine Corps interposes no objection to the transfer of these two ships, LPA's, because they are, in fact, in excess of the 1.15 lift program objective.

Admiral ALTWEGG. I would like to emphasize, of course, in all of these decisionmaking processes tradeoffs must be made to balance our forces. What I am saying is, if we perhaps had 1.33 lift, we might have

to have one less aircraft carrier. There is a finite amount of dollars available for national security and within that dollar constraint a balanced program is developed by the Department of Defense. Within that balanced program, 1.15 MAF lift is the contribution of amphibious warfare in the nine U.S. Navy warfare areas.

Senator THURMOND. Are all your witnesses here together?

Admiral ALTWEGG. We are all here together.

Senator THURMOND. Is your thinking together? Do the Marines agree with your thinking?

Admiral ALTWEGG. I think what the colonel said is totally consistent with what I just said.

Senator THURMOND. What has been your request, and what has the administration approved? Is there any difference in the request and approval by the administration?

Admiral ALTWEGG. No, sir. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, which includes the Commandant of the Marine Corps, agreed to 1.15 MAF lift in fiscal year 1980 guidance.

Senator THURMOND. Have they approved the sale of these ships?

Admiral ALTWEGG. Affirmatively.

Senator THURMOND. Did they agree to the decision made by the administration?

Admiral ALTWEGG. Are we discussing the ships?

Senator THURMOND. Yes. Did the Joint Chiefs agree with this prior to the decision by the administration?

Admiral ALTWEGG. The need for the ships was the decision taken before any thought of transferring or selling the ships to Spain.

Senator THURMOND. What would be the mix of amphibious lift forces in terms of troop transport, cargo transport, tank transport, boat transport and so on?

Admiral ALTWEGG. Admiral Schrader is the CNO's amphibious warfare officer and he will address that.

Admiral SCHRADER. The MAF would consist of approximately 50 ships, depending on which ones we choose. We have 67 ships in our amphibious forces now. Our capacity now exceeds the MAF 1.15 lift capability in all five fingerprints, the fingerprints being people, square footage, cubic footage, boats and helicopter spots.

I must say we are very close in helicopter spots. Helicopters are a critical fingerprint at this time, and will continue to be so in the coming years.

The 50 ships—we have more than 50, so there is a number of ways we could get that mix. We would probably want all five of our LAH's. Those are the big new ships, very fine ships. We would probably want 20 LST's; 13 LSD's, probably 13 LPD's, an LKA or possibly two, our command-and-control ship for the flag officers and our seven LPH's.

That would give us all 12 flight decks. We need the helicopter spots. That would move a MAF very nicely. Those are all 20-knot plus capable ships, and we have them in our Active Force today.

Senator THURMOND. In terms of this mix of ships required for an adequate amphib lift capability, where are our deficiencies or projected deficiencies?

Admiral SCHRADER. Our projected deficiencies first show up in 1984, starting with the reaching expected service life, the 30-year mark, of the LSD-28 class. We have eight of those ships. One of them is

scheduled to go out in 1984, three in 1985, two in 1986, and two in 1987. That is when they reach the 30-year mark.

I am not saying they will go out of commission then. The impact is basically on boat lift. We have plans and programs to replace them; but these ships are not tied to these LPA's that we are talking about selling to the Spanish. The LPA's are basically troop carriers.

Senator THURMOND. Admiral Schrader, the Department of Defense is currently reevaluating our rapid deployment force capability. Are you involved in this reassessment?

Admiral SCHRADER. I was involved in some of the preliminary studies last week.

Senator THURMOND. It is anticipated that construction of a number of new amphibious ships may be proposed in the next 5-year shipbuilding plan—fiscal year 1981-85. Would our retention of the LPA's preclude the requirement for these new amphibious ships?

Admiral SCHRADER. No, sir.

Senator THURMOND. Admiral Schrader, in repeated testimony this committee has heard that the Marines face a critical "block obsolescence" problem with its LSD-28's in the mideighties. Would you explain to this subcommittee the nature of this projected deficiency in our amphibious lift capability and how it differs from the troop transport amphibious lift role of the LPA ships being proposed for sale to Spain?

Admiral SCHRADER. The eight ships of LSD-28 class are basically boat carriers and they move heavy equipment to sea. They carry few troops onboard. Their contribution to the assault is moving equipment and stores ashore on boats. They have some small amount of helicopter space.

We are proposing the LSD-41 class as a replacement to LSD-28's. We need those LSD-41's, and authorization for those ships, as soon as possible.

The troops have been taken care of with the LHA class. As I earlier mentioned, LHA's were designed to replace two ships: the LPA for people and the LKA for bulk cargo. The LHA does that. Its total fingerprint equals the sum of those two other ships.

In addition, you get spots for 8 helicopters, so the LHA covers the need for the LPA's.

Senator THURMOND. Do you have anything to add to that?

Colonel CONLIN. No; I would agree and make a strong endorsement on the part of the commandant for LSD-41's. It is an absolute necessity. Looking at it in short term, 5 or 8 years, the problem is not as big, but if you look to the expected life of these ships and talk in terms of the year 2000 and beyond, it is a critical situation. If we don't start now, we may well mortgage our ability to ever recover and get adequate ships for our amphibious assault capability. I make a strong plea for this.

Senator THURMOND. What options are being considered to address this obsolescence problem for the LSD's?

Admiral SCHRADER. New construction and a service life extension program of yet to be determined magnitude on the ships.

Senator THURMOND. Are these options part of the so-called USMC mobility enhancement being considered?

Admiral SCHRADER. No, sir, they are two entirely separate endeavors. The LSD's, the LPA's, the ships we have been talking about, are part of our Navy-Marine Corps amphibious assault team designed to operate in a hostile environment. The enhanced mobility that you refer to is an entirely different program dealing with nonhostile environments.

Senator THURMOND. Admiral, in the final analysis, would our retention of the LPA's in any way address the problem we are faced with regarding LSD obsolescence?

Admiral SCHRADER. No, sir.

Senator THURMOND. Do you feel the same way?

Colonel CONLIN. That is right; they will not.

Senator THURMOND. Admiral, would you explain how the sale of these LPA ships to Spain is related to our commitments in connection with the 1970 Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation and the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain?

Admiral SCHRADER. Our ships were declared obsolete and programmed several years ago for replacement with the commissioning of the LHA's. They were not declared obsolete in any way or fashion to satisfy a treaty. This was based strictly on the ships' condition, the cost of manpower, and the dollars to maintain them, as well as the operational requirements for those ships.

Senator THURMOND. If we are determined that these ships not be sold to Spain, then how, in your opinion, would we meet the treaty commitments?

Admiral ALTWEGG. I will take that, Senator. Could I go back in time briefly and describe why we are where we are vis-a-vis satisfying these treaty commitments?

The Treaty of Cooperation of 1970 required us to transfer to Spain one oiler. We have not been able to find a ship of that description to satisfy that treaty commitment. Here we are, 7 years later. Similarly, from the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, we agreed to provide four minesweepers and a minesweeper tender. Again, we have been unable in the ensuing 3 years to satisfy that treaty commitment. That is how we have arrived at the situation in 1979, where the U.S. Navy and the Spanish Navy have agreed that these previously excess two LPA's will satisfy those prior treaty commitments, prior treaty commitments that have not been met.

Senator THURMOND. Admiral, what does DOD see as the consequences of the Congress blocking the sale of these ships to Spain?

Admiral ALTWEGG. The most serious aspect that I can foresee from blocking the sale of the two LPA's is that it would certainly complicate the negotiations which will begin in the fall of 1980, which will lead to the follow-on to the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation which, in turn, of course, gives us our base rights in Spain, very important bases, I might add.

Senator THURMOND. Ms. Ahmad, how long have you been with the State Department?

Ms. AHMAD. For 18 years.

Senator THURMOND. You don't look much older than that. Perhaps you could answer the question from the point of view of the Department of State.

Ms. AHMAD. I mentioned before you were able to come in that the Department of State is very strongly supportive of this proposed

transfer, because as the admiral mentioned, the Spanish Government and military have agreed we would be fulfilling our treaty commitments to Spain with the transfer of these two vessels. If we were not to be able to transfer these two vessels, we would have outstanding obligations under our 1976 treaty and our 1970 agreement that would have to be met in some fashion.

I fully agree with the admiral, that our failure to live up to the obligations of the treaty in force now clearly has adverse implications for the possibility of continuing our relationship and any arrangements that will follow when the treaty does expire in 1981.

Senator THURMOND. As I understand your statement, the Department recommends the sale of these ships?

Ms. AHMAD. From the point of view of meeting our commitments with Spain, we would recommend the sale of these ships. The transfer of the ships first has to be decided, obviously, on the merits of the need by the U.S. Navy. As I understand from the admiral, that has been done.

Senator THURMOND. Through the Navy recommendations?

Admiral ALTWEGG. That is correct.

Senator THURMOND. Is there any objection on the part of anybody in the Department, or was there consensus?

Admiral ALTWEGG. There is unanimity in this matter, sir.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Senator Thurmond.

I think Spain is a very important country and it would be even more important to the free world. Tell me, what is the situation at Rota now? We don't have the same facilities there now that we had 5, 6, or 7 years ago?

Admiral ALTWEGG. Our fleet ballistic missile submarines were withdrawn, in accordance with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1976. As of July 1, 1979, however, we still have continued access to facilities at Rota.

Senator BYRD. How many military personnel do we have at Rota?

Admiral ALTWEGG. I will have to provide that for the record, but it is not an insignificant number.

[The information follows:]

MILITARY PERSONNEL IN ROTA

There are approximately 3,000 military personnel assigned to activities located in Rota.

Senator BYRD. What is our situation at Saragosa?

Admiral ALTWEGG. It is still being utilized by the U.S. Air Force.

Senator BYRD. The treaty, our present treaty, with Spain ends when, in 5 years?

Ms. AHMAD. September of 1981.

Senator BYRD. I was in Spain when it was being negotiated. The ambassador asked me to go to the Spanish state department and talk with those top people there, to give them the viewpoint of the Congress in regard to some of the requests or demands that the Spanish Government was making in trying to negotiate this new treaty. I think that the treaty that was finally negotiated was a reasonable, appropriate one, and I hope we can continue our good relations with Spain.

Let me ask the State Department this question: If I were to assert in the Senate that the U.S. Government would like Spain to become a member of NATO and would affirmatively support such a request, that is, would that be an accurate statement?

Ms. AHMAD. Yes, that would be an accurate statement. The United States would support a request from Spain to join NATO, yes.

Senator BYRD. Just another brief question: Admiral, how many ships has the Navy retired and declared excess in the past 2 years?

Admiral ALTWEGG. I will have to provide that for the record.

[The information follows:]

SHIP RETIREMENTS

The Navy has permanently retired a total of 37 ships from the ship operating forces in the past 2 years, including 13 destroyers, 3 diesel submarines, 3 patrol type ships, and 18 auxiliaries.

Senator BYRD. How many ships has the Navy added to the fleet in the past 2 years?

Admiral ALTWEGG. Similarly, I will have to provide that.

[The information follows:]

SHIP DELIVERIES

Twenty-eight ships have been delivered to the ship operating forces during fiscal year 1978 and fiscal year 1979, including: 1 CGN, 15 DDs, 1 FFG, 2 LHAs, 6 SSNs, and 3 auxiliaries.

Senator BYRD. Third, in view of the Navy's reported shortfall in numbers of ships, what reconsideration has been given during the past 2 years to delay or defer retirement of Navy ships?

Admiral ALTWEGG. I think it might be appropriate that perhaps we could provide that for the record, but I have Admiral Fontaine here, who is the Director of Surface Warfare Division, Chief of Naval Operations Office.

There has been, of course, some contention in recent months over the retention of Naval Reserve destroyers in our fleet, as opposed to deactivating them and making them available for foreign military sales.

With your concurrence, Mr. Chairman, I would like Admiral Fontaine to say a few words.

Admiral FONTAINE. Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, I am Rear Adm. Richard K. Fontaine, USN, Director, Surface Warfare Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. I would like to discuss the situation pertaining to the 20 Naval Reserve Force—NRF—FRAM destroyers which we had planned to decommission in fiscal year 1980 as set forth in the fiscal year 1980 President's budget.

These planned decommissioning actions are entirely consistent with actions taken in fiscal year 1976, 1977, and 1978 with respect to FRAM destroyers in the Active Fleet. During that period 16 such ships were decommissioned and either transferred to foreign countries or scrapped.

We have already decommissioned eight of the 20 NRF FRAM destroyers—U.S.S. *Highbee* (DD-805), U.S.S. *Meredith* (DD-890), U.S.S. *Craig* (DD-885), U.S.S. *Hollister* (DD-788), the U.S.S. *Cecil* (DD-835), U.S.S. *Hamner* (DD-718), U.S.S. *Hawkins* (DD-873)

and the U.S.S. *Fox* (DD-829). These eight ships were the ones in the worst material condition and which would have been the most costly to overhaul and retain.

Concerning the 12 remaining FRAM destroyers, in late September, 1979, we commenced fiscal year 1979 overhauls for three—U.S.S. *McKean* (DD-784), U.S.S. *Cone* (DD-866) and U.S.S. *Lowe* (DD-763), in accordance with the desires of the Defense Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations. However, the Navy does not desire to retain these ships, and if not required to retain them by Congress would terminate the overhauls and decommission the ships.

Of the other nine ships—U.S.S. *Southerland* (DD-743), U.S.S. *Ellison* (DD-864), U.S.S. *Damato* (DD-871), U.S.S. *Rogers* (DD-876), U.S.S. *McCard* (DD-822), U.S.S. *Fiske* (DD-842), U.S.S. *Johnston* (DD-821) and U.S.S. *Dyess* (DD-880) are now scheduled for decommissioning, in mid-January 1980 and U.S.S. *Carpenter* (DD-825) in mid-February, 1980.

Decommissioning dates were delayed from October, 1979, in the cases of eight of the ships due to uncertainty as to the outcome of congressional action on the fiscal year 1980 budget. This action, unfortunately, has created a difficult situation for many of the ships' crewmembers, many of whom had made personal plans in anticipation of transfers incident to the previously announced October decommissioning dates. We are managing that situation to the best of our ability.

The Navy proposed to decommission 20 NRF FRAM-I ships in fiscal year 1980 as part of an accelerated phaseout of ships which the Navy considers to be no longer mission capable against the threats the U.S. Navy faces now and will meet in the future.

In addition to the advanced ages of the ships, which average 35 years of age, the ships are in a material condition that reflects this age. Spare parts support is poor for many items of installed equipment. The cost to modernize the ships to make them capable and to significantly extend their service lives would be prohibitive; at an estimated cost of \$190 million to \$200 million per ship, modernization is not a realistic alternative.

Additionally, to perform a modernization and service-life extension—

Senator BYRD. What consideration has been given during the past 2 years to delay or defer retirement of Navy ships?

Admiral ALTWEGG. Mr. Chairman, he is addressing directly why we are not retaining the Naval Reserve force destroyers, some 20 ships.

Senator BYRD. I wonder if I could just get an answer to my question here? What consideration, if any, has been given during the past 2 years, in view of the shortfall, to delay or defer retirements of Navy ships?

Admiral ALTWEGG. Admiral Schrader can discuss where we are.

Admiral SCHRADER. In addition to the amphibious forces, the mobile logistics force in the Navy is in my division. We are now and have continued extended on active duty several classes of ships beyond their normal expected service life of most ships, that is, 30 years. These are auxiliaries, such as tenders, repair ships, oilers, that do not require an expensive and complicated combat system to be upgraded. It is relatively simple to upgrade the machine shops to do thorough overhaul on an oiler or mobile logistics ship.

We have a very severe block obsolescence problem with our mine-sweepers in the mid-1980's. We are now working—we have been for the past 6 months—to study various options to extend their active duty beyond their expected service life. We are also proposing several other ships in this next year, I think a total of three ships, for a total of four ship years extended beyond their expected service life.

Senator BYRD. Thank you. I have a letter from Secretary Vest who strongly supports transfer of these ships to Spain.

I will insert this letter in the record at this point.

[The letter follows:]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C.

HON. HARRY F. BYRD, JR.,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on General Procurement, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I understand that your subcommittee is examining the planned transfer to Spain of two U.S. Navy Amphibious Troop Transports (LPA's) retired from our Naval Reserve Force.

The United States made ship transfer commitments to Spain under the 1970 Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation and the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. We have reached an agreement with the Spanish which would satisfy our outstanding obligations, and which would permit Spain to bolster the security of the Mediterranean.

The resolution of the ship transfer question is important to the future of our military relationship with Spain, which is critical to the defense interests of the United States. We have been working hard to strengthen our political and military ties in support of Spain's new democratic government, and in order to improve our general defense posture vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact. Increased Spanish Naval strength can contribute significantly to Western defense efforts. Spain's new democratic government has stated repeatedly that Spanish political and defense interests are with the West.

Mr. Chairman, I am sure that you share my desire to meet our obligations to Spain in an equitable manner consistent with our security commitments and defense needs. My staff and I stand ready to assist you in whatever way you believe will bring this treaty commitment to an expeditious and successful conclusion.

Sincerely,

GEORGE S. VEST,
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs.

Senator BYRD. Admiral Fontaine, you may continue.

Admiral FONTAINE. Life extension would first involve 2 to 3 years for necessary feasibility studies and planning, followed by an additional 1½ to 2 years for the actual accomplishment of the modernization. By the time of completion of modernization, the ships would be nearly 40 years of age.

The addition of new combat systems and components would undoubtedly impact on the already substandard habitability due to space limitations. To perform such a modernization we would have to give component procurement precedence to the FRAM's, to the detriment of planned upgrading of our newer ships.

We have recently analyzed and updated cost estimates for a fairly routine type of overhaul, without any significant modernization or upgrading of combat systems. Costs to overhaul the nine remaining of the 20 ships which are now scheduled for decommissioning in January and February, 1980, range from \$18.5 million to \$20 million per ship.

Such an overhaul would merely enable us to continue to operate them for another 2 to 3 years. Approximate annual operating costs previously provided to the House Armed Services Committee are as

follows, for each ship: OMNR, operating costs, \$3.3 million; MPN, 12 officer/176 enlisted, \$2.1 million; and RPN, six officer, 112 enlisted, \$200,000; totaling \$5.6 million. The cost impact to retain these ships is therefore significant.

The increased overhaul costs are reflection of the fact that the material condition of the ships is generally poor. As a class, the ships have severe hull and structural deterioration, deteriorated wiring and cabling, large numbers of engineering problems and magazine sprinkler systems which do not meet current requirements.

Sonars, electronic communications, and weapon systems are old and difficult to maintain in the necessary state of readiness. Habitability is substandard, with inadequate headroom, vertical clearance between bunks, ventilation and lounge areas.

Ships design characteristics prevent significant improvements in habitability. Pollution control—CHT—is not installed. While some of the material problems could be corrected in a routine type of overhaul, many could not. Such an overhaul would not solve the basic problem, that the ships have extremely limited effectiveness against the threats we must face.

The destroyers cannot operate LAMPS helicopters, which is an effective delivery tactic for our ASW torpedoes at longer ranges. Communications are old, marginally reliable and incompatible with systems entering the fleet. Guns are manpower intensive, have relatively short firing rates and ranges, and gunfire control systems can track only one target at a time.

Guided projectile capability cannot be installed with the present gunfire control system. There is no viable ship's self-defense capability against antiship attacks from air, surface, or subsurface missile attacks, nor for torpedo attacks. Electronic warfare suites do not provide favorable detection or countermeasures opportunity.

The primary reason for having Naval Reserve force ships is to have readily available mission-capable ships that are in excess of our current peacetime requirements so that given a crisis of sufficient magnitude NRF ships would be available to augment our peacetime force levels. Since the FRAM-1 DD's have been assessed as not mission capable for the threats of the 1980's, their continued operation is no longer cost effective in accomplishing our Navy's total mission.

I realize that there is some concern over the fact that the Navy appears to be decommissioning the FRAM-1 NRF destroyers with no apparent intention to replace them in kind. I would like to emphasize and note that although the NRF destroyer force has contributed greatly to the Navy's total mission over their splendid history, the FRAM-1 NRF ships are only one element of the surface warfare Selected Reserve Program. In fact, the Selected Reservists serving in the NRF FRAM-1 DD's comprise only about 10 percent of the 20,000 surface warfare Selected Reservists serving in the surface warfare reserve program.

The majority of the SW Selected Reservists—some 18,000—are assigned to important but lower visibility surface programs, for example, NRF MSO's, NRF LKA, NRF ATF's and the extremely important role of augmenting our active fleet ships and staffs in time of national emergency.

However, I would not want to leave you with the idea that we are abandoning the NRF concept.

During fiscal year 1980, six ships will be introduced into the Naval Reserve Force. This includes the first introduction of the modern *Charleston*-class LKA's and two ammunition ships—AE's.

A Navy salvage ship—ARS—will also be introduced for the first time. Additionally, we are continually reviewing the feasibility of transferring other ship types that can be appropriately manned and maintained in the Naval Reserve Force.

Naval Reservists who augment our active fleet ships and staffs continue to play an increasingly meaningful role in the surface naval reserve. The 16,000 reservists are the backbone of our surface warfare naval reserve and well represent the Naval Reserve's primary strength—its people.

The entire surface warfare Selected Reserve community, in excess of 20,000 drilling reservists, are playing an ever-increasing and important role in Navy's total force.

A breakdown of the surface warfare Selected Reserve is as follows:

FISCAL YEAR 1979 SURFACE WARFARE (SW) SELECTED RESERVE (SELRES) MANNING PROFILE FOR PROGRAMS SPONSORED BY THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, SURFACE WARFARE (OP-03)¹

	SW Selected Reserve allowance	Percent of total SW SelRes allowance authorized	ONBD as of June 1979	Percent of allowance ONBD
Surface combatant program:				
NRF ²	3,047	13	2,149	71
Augmentation ³	9,507	40	9,283	98
Mine forces program:				
NRF	1,110	5	836	75
Augmentation ³	472	2	438	93
Amphibious forces program:				
NRF	444	2	342	77
Augmentation ³	3,727	16	2,772	74
Mobile logistics support forces program:				
NRF	203	1	162	80
Augmentation ³	2,334	10	2,471	100
Special warfare program:				
NRF	721	3	508	70
Augmentation ³	1,960	8	1,278	65
Total surface warfare Selected Reserve program:				
NRF	5,525	23	3,997	72
Augmentation ³	18,007	77	16,242	90
Total	23,525		20,239	

¹ As of June 1979.

² Augmentation to reinforce active fleet ships and staffs.

³ 25 NRF Fram destroyers, 1-DD-946 class, and 5 COMDESRON (NRF) staffs.

The shortfalls in surface warfare Selected Reserve manning shown in other important units will be reduced as a result of the destroyer decommissionings. The Chief of Naval Reserve has developed a plan to insure that reservists who are assigned to the destroyers are afforded continued participation opportunity in other units.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee. Senator BYRD. Thank you.

I will have additional questions that I would like to have answered for the record, and Senator Hart has questions he would like to have answered for the record.

[Questions with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR HARRY F. BYRD

Senator BYRD. How many ships has the Navy retired and declared excess in the past two years?

Admiral ALTWEGG. The Navy has permanently retired a total of 37 ships from the total Ship Operating Force in the past 2 years including 13 destroyers, three diesel submarines, three patrol type ships and 18 auxiliaries.

Senator BYRD. How many ships has the Navy added to the fleet in the past two years?

Admiral ALTWEGG. 28 ships have been delivered to the Ship Operating Forces of the Navy during fiscal years 1978 and 1979 including: 1 CGN, 15 DDs, 1 FFG, 2 LHAs, 6 SSNs and 3 auxiliaries.

Senator BYRD. In view of the Navy's reported shortfall in number of ships, what reconsideration has been given during the past 2 years to delay or defer retirements of Navy ships?

Admiral ALTWEGG. Annually, during the planning cycle, the Navy carefully assesses the utility of ships which will attain expected service life during the planning period. This assessment considers the Navy's inventory, the potential utility of the ship(s) in question, the material condition of the ship(s), and the cost to retain the ship(s) in active service. All decisions to retire ships are carefully reviewed at all levels within the Department of the Navy before finally approved.

Senator BYRD. Provide for the record all Navy ships where retirements or excessing has been delayed during the past 2 years and the reason for the delay?

Admiral ALTWEGG. Decisions to delay retirements of ships nearing the end of their normal expected service lives are made during the planning cycle. Factors considered when making these decisions are requirements, material condition, cost to repair and operate as well as the effectiveness of the ship.

At the end of fiscal year 1979, a total of 53 ships were in active service in excess of their normal expected service lives.

Senator BYRD. What purpose will these ships serve for the foreign nations if they are in such condition as to be excess to U.S. Navy requirements?

Admiral ALTWEGG. The ships and craft proposed for sale are suited to the force structures of the friendly navies in which they will serve; for several reasons, they are no longer a necessary part of the U.S. Navy's force structure, regardless of their material condition. The drydocks are suited to the repair and maintenance of small ships which are prevalent in friendly foreign navies but which no longer constitute a large portion of the U.S. Navy. The amphibious ships are useful in amphibious and logistics support roles in navies which have only local commitments, but are not suited to deployment requirements of the U.S. Navy.

Senator BYRD. Does the United States retain any control or direction over the use that can be made of these ships after they are sold to foreign nations?

Admiral ALTWEGG. Yes. The terms of the sale contracts will include certain restrictions as to the foreign navy's use of the ships and craft: The purchaser may, except as may otherwise be mutually agreed, use the ships only (a) for the purposes specified in mutual defense agreements or bilateral or regional defense treaties to which the USG and Purchaser are both parties, or (b) for internal security, self defense, and/or civic action. Further, the country may not transfer title to, or possession of the ship, components and associated support material furnished under the sales agreement to any other government unless the written consent of the USG has first been obtained. It may not disclose, dispose of, or permit use of any plans, specifications or information furnished in connection with this transaction, except to the extent authorized in writing by the USG.

Senator BYRD. Could these U.S. Navy ships, if sold to foreign nations, be used against the U.S. forces in the future?

Admiral ALTWEGG. Such use is conceivable, of course, but the types of ships and craft proposed for sale (none are combatants) and their obsolescence suggest that the threat is not significant.

Senator BYRD. Are there any indications that these countries will use these ships to meet treaty commitments where the U.S. has similar treaty commitments? Provide for the record a listing of all U.S. naval vessels transferred to foreign countries during the past 5 years that are used to meet naval commitments where the United States has part of the same naval commitment.

Admiral ALTWEGG. Yes, most of these ships and craft become part of force structures committed to mutual defense agreements (the U.S. has mutual defense agreements with each of the countries except Indonesia and Spain). In the past 5 years, the following U.S. Navy ships and craft have been transferred to foreign countries with which the U.S. has mutual defense agreements (an asterisk indicates sale of a vessel previously on lease or loan) :

Dukes County (LST-735),* Pluckett (DD-431),* Benson (DD-421),* Jones (DD-427),* Sharps (AKL-10),* Brule (AKL-28),* AKL-35,* Trillium (AKL-170),* Holt (DE-706),* Muir (DE-770),* Sutton (DE-771),* LSM-17,* LSM-19,* LSM-30,* LSM-54,* LSM-57,* LSM-84,* APD-128,* LSM-96,* LSM-268,* LSM-316,* LSM-462,* LSM-547,* LST-227,* Berkshire Cty (LST-288),* LST-1010,* Curlew (MSCO-8),* Kite (MSCO-22),* Mockingbird (MSCO-27),* PCE-873,* PCE-882,* LST-218,* APL-53,* YO-221,* Dry Tortugas (ATF),* Sombbrero Key (ATF),* Salish (ATA-187),* Catawba (ATA-210),* Luiseno (ATF-156),* Chewaucan (AOG-50),* Derrick (YO-59),* YO-179,* MSB-2,* LCU-531,* YOG-61,* YO-115,* YO-116,* YW-103,* YW-111,* YW-130,* LST-689,* LST-835,* Crestview (PCE-895),* Brattleboro (PCER-852),* Gayety (MSF-239),* Shelter (MSF-301),* Marion County (LST-975),* Cayuga County (LST-529),* Lapon (SS-260),* Scabbardfish (SS-397),* Camp (DER-251),* Bering Strait (WHEC-382),* Yakutat (WHEC-380),* Castle Rock (WHEC-383).

Cook Inlet (WHEC-384),* Chincoteague (WHEC-375),* McCulloch (WHEC-386),* Amherst (PCER-853),* Jerome County (LST-848),* Harnet County (AGP-821),* Garrett County (AGP-786),* YOG-80,* Placerville (PC-1087),* Hanford (PC-1142),* Susanville (PC-1149),* Eklhorn (AOG-7),* Namakagon (AOG-53),* Pecatonica (AOG-57),* Cahokia (ATA-186),* Mahopac (ATA-196),* Chickasaw (ATF-83),* Mark (AKL-12),* Nansemond County (LST-1064),* Tench (AGSS-417),* Amick (DE-168),* Atherton (DE-169),* LST-74,* LST-287,* LST-230,* LST-491,* LST-566,* LST-607,* LST-692,* LST-822,* LST-1069,* LST-1072,* Hermann (DD-532),* Stembel (DD-644),* Dortch (DD-670),* Satyr (ARL-23),* Whitemarsh (LSD-8),* ARD-9,* Powell (DD-686),* Erben (DD-631),* Hickox (DD-673),* Larson (DD-830),* Chevalier (DD-805),* Minotar (ARL-15),* Summit County (LST-1146),* New (DD-818),* Richard E. Kraus (DD-849),* Hale (DD-642),* Gurke (DD-783).

Terrell County (LST-1157),* Whitefield County (LST-1169),* Ringold (DD-500),* Claxton (DD-571),* Wadsworth (DD-516),* Dyson (DD-572),* Fort Marion (LSD-22),* Bradford (DD-545),* Brown (DD-546),* Aulick (DD-569),* Charrette (DD-581),* Conner (DD-582),* Hall (DD-583),* R. B. Anderson (DD-786),* Rowan (DD-782),* Gibbs (AGOR-1),* YTL-426,* YTL-441,* YTL-443,* YTL-444,* YTL-445,* YTL-448,* Sarsfield (DD-837),* Power (DD-839),* Chowanoc (AF-100),* Capitaine (SS-336),* Volador (SS-490),* Pickerel (SS-524),* Marieta (AN-82),* Tunxis (AN-90),* Waxsaw (AN-91),* ARD-13,* Quirinus (ARL-39),* Utina (ATF-163),* Vernon County (LST-1161),* YTM-193,* YTM-385,* YTM-778,* YR-48,* Grapple (ARS-7),* Helios (ARB-12),* YFN-903,* Hale (DD-642),* Leonard F. Mason (DD-852),* Grasp (ARS-24),* Kalmia (ATA-184),* Choctaw (ATF-70),* Ruchamkin (LPR-89),* YFND-6,* YFR-443,* YTL-231,* YFND-19,* LCU's 1212, 1218, 1244, 1367, 1397, 1429, 1452,* Tawakoni (ATF-114),* William R. Rush (DD-714),* Rupertus (DD-851),* Arnold J. Isbell (DD-869),* Tombigbee (AOG-11),* Page County (LST-1076),* YTM-767,* AFDL-28,* Park County (LST-1077),* YD's 156, 157, 180, 183, and 203,* Molala (ATF-106),* AN-27,* Enright (APD-66),* Cusabo (ATF-155),* FS-525,* Eunice (PCE-846),* Pascagoula (PCE-874),* YR-34,* YW-131,* Booth (DE-170),* Nettle (WAK-169),* Nipmuc (ATF-157),* Salinan (ATF-161),* Holder (DD-819),* Abnaki (ATF-96),* Cocopa (ATF-101),* Hitchiti (ATF-103),* Samoset (ATA-190),* Carib (ATF-82),* Hidatsa (ATF-102),* Hicarilla (ATF-104),* Bannock (ATF-81),* Lizardfish (SS-373),* Deliver (ARS-23),* Safeguard (ARS-25).

Senator BYRD. How is the sale price of these ships determined? Have these ships been offered for sale to any United States agencies or scrap dealers prior to disposal to foreign countries?

Admiral ALTWEGG. The sale prices of the ships and craft have been established using the current DOD guidance which implements the Arms Export Control Act. This is also consistent with the language in the ship transfer bill under consideration. The prices are based on the current market appraisal value computed by the Defense Property Disposal Ship Sales Office (DPDSSO), Newport, Rhode Island. This appraisal reflects the price of scrap metal

in the area of the world in which the asset is located, and, if appropriate, is adjusted according to the experience of the DPSSO in sales (by a bidding procedure) of similar type ships. The prices exceed the expected return by the alternative disposal method of scrapping. The ships and craft have not been offered to any U.S. agencies or scrap dealers.

Senator BYRD. Where are the funds for these ship sales deposited?

Admiral ALTWEGG. Current policy directs the proceeds of ship sales to the miscellaneous receipts account of the U.S. Treasury.

Senator BYRD. How many U.S. naval vessels are still on loan or lease to foreign countries? Provide for the record a list of ships still on loan or lease indicating the type ship, age of ship, tonnage, and year the ship was put on loan or lease?

Admiral ALTWEGG. Thirty-three ships, 28 craft, and 70 boats of the U.S. Navy are on lease or loan to foreign countries. These are, by country:

Country: Ship: Description	Age date	Tonnage	Year leased or loaned
Argentina: ARD-23: Auxiliary repair drydock.....	1944	5,200	1961
Brazil:			
AFDL-39: Small auxiliary floating drydock.....	1944	8,300	1966
ARD-14: Auxiliary repair drydock.....	1943	5,200	1962
Grant County (LST-1174): Tank landing ship.....	1957	3,560	1973
Sands 'AGOR-6): Oceanographic research ship.....	1964	1,200	1974
Chile:			
Genessee (AOG-8): Gasoline tanker.....	1944	1,850	1972
ARD-32: Auxiliary repair drydock.....	1949	5,200	1960
Aventinus (ARVE-3): Aircraft engine repair ship.....	1945	2,110	1963
Wadleigh (DD-689): Destroyer.....	1944	2,120	1962
Rooks (DD-804): Destroyer.....	1945	2,120	1962
LSM-444: Medium landing ship.....	1945	570	1960
Tekesta (ATF-93): Fleet ocean tug.....	1943	1,240	1960
Arikara (ATF-98): Fleet ocean tug.....	1943	1,240	1971
Spot (SS-413): Diesel submarine.....	1944	1,490	1962
Colombia: ARD-28: Auxiliary repair.....	1944	5,200	1960
Costa Rica: 30407: Hydro sound boat.....	1956	30	1971
Dominican Republic:			
Sagamore (ATA-208): Auxiliary ocean tug.....	1943	690	1972
Kiowa (ATF-72): Fleet ocean tug.....	1943	1,240	1972
YO-213: Fuel oil barge.....	1945	370	1964
YO-215: Fuel oil barge.....	1945	370	1964
YTL-600: Harbor tug (small).....	1945	70	1971
Ecuador: ARD-17: Auxiliary repair drydock.....	1944	5,200	1951
El Salvador: 30412: Hydro sound boat.....	1956	30	1971
Greece:			
Fort Mandan (LSD-21): Dock landing ship.....	1945	4,960	1971
MSL-33: Minesweeping launch.....	1965	9	1971
MSL-35: Minesweeping launch.....	1965	9	1971
MSL-39: Minesweeping launch.....	1966	9	1971
MSL-40: Minesweeping launch.....	1966	9	1971
Honduras: 30408: Hydro sound boat.....	1956	30	1972
Iceland: 30411: Hydro sound boat.....	1956	30	1972
Indonesia: Tidewater (AD-31): Destroyer tender.....	1946	9,800	1971
Italy:			
Desoto County (LST-1171): Tank landing ship.....	1958	3,560	1972
York County (LST-1175): Tank landing ship.....	1957	3,560	1972
Republic of Korea: Benicia (PG-96): Patrol combatant.....	1970	180	1971
Malta:			
PCF C-6823: Patrol craft.....	1968	20	1971
PCF C-6824: Patrol craft.....	1968	20	1971
Mauritius: 26PE664: 26-ft personnel boat.....	1969	6	1970
Mexico:			
ARD-15: Auxiliary repair drydock.....	1944	5,200	1971
YPD-43: Floating pile driver.....	1957	544	1968
New Zealand: Davis (T-AGOR-8): Oceanographic research ship.....	1963	2,022	1970
Nicaragua:			
30409: Hydro sound boat.....	1956	30	1972
30-ft motor boat.....	1941	6	1972
Peru:			
AFDL-33: Small auxiliary floating drydock.....	1944	1,200	1959
ARD-8: Auxiliary repair drydock.....	1943	4,200	1961
YR-59: Floating workshop.....	1944	530	1961
YW-122: Water barge.....	1945	400	1963
Philippines:			
Caddo Parish (LST-515): Tank landing ship.....	1944	1,780	1969
Hickman County (LST-825): Tank landing ship.....	1944	1,780	1969
Mandera County (LST-905): Tank landing ship.....	1945	1,780	1969
Krishna (ARL-38): Landing craft repair ship.....	1945	2,220	1971
Kukui (WAK-186): Cargo ship.....	1945	4,900	1972
LST-222: Tank landing ship.....	1943	1,780	1972
LST-488: Tank landing ship.....	1943	1,780	1972

Country: Ship: Description	Age date	Tonnage	Year leased or loaned
Philippines—Continued			
LST-546: Tank landing ship	1944	1,780	1972
AFDL-20: Small auxiliary floating drydock	1944	800	1961
AFDL-10: Small auxiliary floating drydock	1944	800	1979
AFDL-44: Small auxiliary floating drydock	1944	7,500	1969
YOG-73: Gasoline barge	1944	440	1967
YD-191: Floating crane	1944	60	1971
YC-1402: Covered lighter	1943	70	1971
YTL-425: Harbor tug (small)	1944	70	1971
YTL-427: Harbor tug (small)	1944	70	1969
LCM-3 (C 30193): Landing craft mechanized	1945	26	1972
LCM-3 (C-30310): Landing craft mechanized	1945	26	1972
Portugal:			
Kellar (T-AGS 25): Surveying ship	1964	1,320	1972
YO-194: Fuel oil barge	1946	240	1962
Taiwan:			
ARD-22: Auxiliary repair drydock	1944	5,200	1971
Keathley (T-AGS-35): Surveying ship	1945	4,100	1972
LCM-6 (50): Landing craft mechanized	1940's	27 ea	1959
LCVP (3): Landing craft vehicle, personnel	1940's	5 ea	1959
Turkey:			
ARD-12: Auxiliary repair	1943	5,200	1972
Safeguard (ARS-25): Salvage ship	1944	1,480	1979
APL-47: Barracks craft	1945	1,300	1972
APL-3: Barracks craft	1944	1,300	1974
Surprise (PG-97): Patrol combatant	1969	180	1973
Defiance (PG-95): Patrol combatant	1969	180	1973
Westchester County (LST-1167): Tank landing ship	1954	2,590	1974
Windham County (LST-1170): Tank landing ship	1954	2,590	1973
Uruguay:			
LCM-6 (C-36824): Landing craft mechanized	1965	27	1972
LCM-6 (CM-65581): Landing craft mechanized	1966	27	1972

Senator BYRD. Prior to retiring a ship or declaring a ships excess to U.S. Naval requirements, does the Navy perform a cost analysis to determine the future annual outlay to keep a particular ship in service?

Is the need and requirement for each ship retired or excessed formally evaluated against cost and effectiveness.

Admiral ALTWEGG. Prior to retirement or excessing a ship the expected costs to operate the ship or retain it in the NDRF are estimated. These costs include not only operation, normal maintenance, and personnel, but the estimated cost to modernize the ship to allow it to be a viable part of the Fleet. Since ships under such consideration are normally near their expected service life much of their equipment is obsolete and difficult to support. Additionally, consideration must be given to the fact that the ship in question was designed more than thirty years previously and may not be compatible with current tactics.

Senator BYRD. The Navy is proposing sale of two amphibious transports to Spain in this legislation.

Are these ships still capable of performing a required amphibious assault mission for the U.S. Navy? What are the deficiencies of these ships in meeting U.S. Navy capability requirements?

Why are these ships excess to U.S. requirements?

What were the cost estimates developed by the Navy that would have allowed the Navy to continue to maintain these ships in the Navy fleet?

Admiral ALTWEGG. These ships represent a pre-World War II amphibious assault tactic. To offload their troops the ships have to lie to for about 40-45 minutes while boats are hoisted by crane and lowered into the water. Troops have to embark by climbing down cargo nets hung over the sides of the ship. Advances in weapon range and accuracy makes this an extremely risky tactic. Consequently the Navy developed amphibious ships which carry their assault craft internally and which can be launched while the ships remain underway at high speed. Troops can be loaded into the craft easily and safely and the launch can be accomplished in one to two minutes. The LHA, LPD, LSD, and LST all have this capability.

The LHA was designed to replace the LPA. With the impending delivery of the fifth LHA the capability represented by the LPHs has been replaced by a more effective ship.

In order to retain these ships in the fleet the following costs would accrue, annually.

	<i>Fiscal Year 1979</i>
Operation and maintenance-----	\$1.5M
Personnel -----	2.8M
Total -----	4.3M

Additionally, both ships would require an overhaul at an estimated cost of \$10.6M per ship with an additional \$7M in ship alterations outstanding.

Chairman BYRD. Does the Marine Corps now have sufficient amphibious shipping capability to meet their requirements?

Colonel CONLIN. Reduction in the number of available amphibious ships (lift) have led to the separation of a MAF size force into an Assault Echelon (AE) and an Assault Follow-On Echelon (AFOE) in order to capitalize on all types of available shipping. The AE and the AFOE are a division of the forces comprising a MAF into the forces required to conduct the initial assault and those required to sustain it.

Assault echelon (AE)

The Joint Chiefs and CINCs have determined that to support national strategy with a reasonable assurance of success in a war with the Soviets requires sufficient amphibious shipping to lift the AE of [deleted] MAFs simultaneously. The Commandant fully supports this determination.

The 1½ war strategy requires availability of shipping for a [deleted]. About [deleted] of [deleted] MAF lift at 15 percent non-availability for ships in regularly scheduled overhaul. In the Commandant's judgment this is the minimum level required to support national strategy.

The Commandant has agreed that 1.15 AE lift (program objective) as directed by the Consolidated Guidance (CG), is the minimum level required to support a one MAF lift. [Deleted.]

Assault follow-on echelon (AFOE)

The AFOE requires approximately [deleted] commercial ships as indicated below:

Ship type:	<i>Quantity</i>
TAP (personnel carrier)-----	[Deleted.]
TAK (cargo ship)-----	[Deleted.]

[Deleted.] Consequently, the Marine Corps is particularly concerned about the declining capability of the MSC Nucleus Fleet, the shortage of responsive MSC troop lift capability and the orientation of the commercial fleet toward container and barge ships, which are presently not readily adaptable for use in over-the-beach operations. Therefore, the Marine Corps strongly supports proposals to improve the responsiveness of the Ready Reserve Fleet and the Build and Charter program for introducing modern ships into the MSC Nucleus Fleet.

Chairman BYRD. Does the Marine Corps agree that these ships if overhauled as necessary would not be required for their amphibious needs?

Colonel CONLIN. The two LPAs scheduled for transfer to Spain are in excess of the 1.15 MAF (AE) lift as directed by OSD. [Deleted.]

Because these ships are relatively old and have limited capability, primarily personnel, they would be of marginal utility as a hedge to buy back a level of lift in excess of 1.15 MAF if authorized in the future.

The LPAs have no wet well and consequently are not suited for operations with the new air-cushion landing craft. Additionally, the LPAs are not capable of operating helicopters. They have only one helicopter spot, have no facilities for repair, and have no hangar.

The Marine Corps would have to defer to the Navy on the feasibility/affordability of overhauling these ships for continued use in amphibious operations.

Senator BYRD. The reported use of these ships by Spain will include joint amphibious exercises with the U.S. Sixth Fleet. How can these ships be fit enough to satisfy the amphibious requirements of the Spanish Navy in joint exercises if the U.S. Navy has decided they are excess?

Admiral ALTWEGG. The force structure and the mission requirements of the Spanish Navy differ from those of the U.S. Navy. In a joint exercise, each navy would be assigned missions for which its units were suited.

Senator BYRD. If these ships are old and slow, etc., as indicated by the Navy as a basis for retiring the ships, then how can these ships keep up with the more modern U.S. naval vessels in joint exercises with the Spanish?

Admiral ALTWEGG. Missions in exercises, as in actual conflict, are assigned on the basis of the capabilities of each unit in a task organization. The U.S. Navy would probably be assigned missions which required the more advanced ships, and the Spanish Navy those missions for which its ships were suited.

Senator BYRD. Will the Spanish Government overhaul and modernize these ships? If so, who will pay for this overhaul? Will this be paid for through U.S. loans or grants?

Admiral ALTWEGG. The Spanish Navy will probably overhaul the two amphibious transports, both of which are due for overhaul by U.S. Navy standards. The source of funds for such overhauls is not known, but it is not expected to be U.S. loans or grants.

Senator BYRD. Since the two amphibious assault ships proposed to be transferred to Spain are converted merchant ships, why couldn't these ships be converted back to merchant ships to meet this new requirement in the Defense Department's enhanced mobility force.

Admiral ALTWEGG. It would be possible to convert the LPA's back to a merchant configuration but it is not considered to be cost effective to do so. Conversion of these two ships to meet the enhanced mobility requirements could easily cost as much or more than the cost of a new construction ship which would have a greater capacity than the combined capacity of the 2 LPAs. Similarly, conversion of one of the LPAs would probably equal or exceed the cost of converting one of the existing merchant ships also under consideration. If a merchant ship conversion were the final selection the ones being considered would exceed the capabilities of a converted LPA. In view of the advanced age of the LPAs the greater utility of the candidate ship being considered for the enhanced mobility program, and costs associated with LPA conversion, conversion of the LPA being transferred to Spain would not be a cost effective alternative.

Senator BYRD. Does the Defense Department plan to purchase new merchant ships for the prepositioning ship role in this enhanced mobility force? How much funding is presently planned in the Navy 1981 budget for new merchant ships to meet the prepositioning logistic ship requirement?

Admiral ALTWEGG. At this time, procurement of new construction multi-purpose, self-sustaining ships with RO/RO cargo/container and fuel carrying capability appears to be the best way to acquire the needed ships for the maritime prepositioning concept. However we are continuing to refine the concept and will examine other alternatives which may provide an earlier capability and/or be more cost and operationally effective. The President has not yet decided on the funding to be included in the fiscal year 1981 budget to implement this concept.

Senator BYRD. Three other cargo/amphibious type ships are proposed for sale in this legislation—an LST to Brazil, a cargo ship to the Philippines and an LSD to Greece. Could any of these ships be useful in meeting the requirements for the enhanced mobility force?

Admiral ALTWEGG. As with the LPAs it would be possible to modify these ships to accomplish the enhanced mobility mission at an inordinate cost for conversion and high annual operating cost. Since the LPAs and the LSTs have a relatively small capacity compared to the ships under consideration for the mobility enhancement mission, a large number of LPAs and LSTs would be required. A large hybrid mix of ships would have less utility and would impose significant additional operating and support costs.

Senator BYRD. Was the Navy aware of the requirements for this enhanced mobility/prepositioning ship concept prior to indicating the retirement of the two amphibious assault ships in this proposed legislation?

Admiral ALTWEGG. No. The retirement of the two amphibious ships in the proposed legislation had been determined well before conception of the enhanced mobility/ship prepositioning option. The details are still being developed.

Senator BYRD. Isn't the planned use of these ships by the Spanish Navy very similar to the requirements of a prepositioning ship concept in an enhanced mobility force?

Admiral ALTWEGG. No. It is understood that the Spanish Navy intends to use these ships in an amphibious and logistics support role.

Senator BYRD. I understand that these two amphibious assault ships are essentially in settlement of treaty obligations with Spain. Is that correct?

Admiral ALTWEGG. Yes, the sale of the two amphibious transports is in settlement of U.S. commitments remaining from a 1970 Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation and a 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

Senator BYRD. Does the Navy currently plan to retire from the U.S. Navy ship fleet any more amphibious ships during the next 5-8 year period? If so, please provide for the record the numbers and types of amphibious ships planned for retirement in this period?

Admiral ALTWEGG. The LSD-28 class ships reach expected service life in accordance with the following schedule: fiscal year 1984—1; fiscal year 1985—3; fiscal year 1986—2; fiscal year 1987—2.

The Navy is currently assessing the cost and feasibility of retaining some of these ships until they are replaced by new construction LSD-41 ships.

Senator BYRD. The 1976 treaty with Spain indicated the transfer of mine-sweepers. Why are these amphibious ships now being used to meet treaty requirements?

Admiral ALTWEGG. The Spanish Navy determined in 1976 that the only mine-sweepers that the U.S. Navy could offer were not satisfactory to meet Spanish needs, principally because of their material condition and anticipated support problems. The U.S. Navy has had available no other types of ships which would meet Spanish Navy needs. The Spanish Navy has for some time anticipated the need to replace two aging amphibian ships, thus the agreement that the two amphibious transports would be purchased in satisfaction of the treaty commitment.

Senator BYRD. In May 1978 the Navy reportedly transferred by sale 8 ships to Spain—3 landing ships tank (LST) and five destroyers. Why didn't these ships satisfy the treaty requirements?

Admiral ALTWEGG. The five destroyers and three tank landing ships were ships previously loaned to Spain in partial satisfaction of the terms of the 1970 Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation. Pursuant to that Agreement, the U.S. Navy was to have transferred to Spain 2 submarines, 5 destroyers, 4 minesweepers, 3 tank landing ships, 1 ammunition ship, and 1 oiler. Ships were transferred to meet all commitments except the oiler. The 1978 purchase of the previously loaned destroyers and tank landing ships completed Spain's purchase of all ships previously on loan. The Spanish Navy has agreed that the proposed sale of two amphibious transports will satisfy the remaining 1970 commitment of 1 oiler as well as the 1976 commitment of four MSOs and one ARL.

Senator BYRD. The Navy indicates that some minesweepers and other ships were offered to Spain to meet treaty commitments but none were acceptable to Spain? Provide for the record the disposition of these ships that were offered to Spain but which Spain turned down and what is the current status of these ships? Are any of these ships still included as part of the U.S. naval forces?

Admiral ALTWEGG. The U.S. Navy offered, as stipulated in the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, four ocean minesweepers (MSOs) and one minesweeper support ship (ARL). The ships, all of which have been retired from U.S. Navy service, are:

Ship	Disposition
Agile (MSO 421)-----	Stricken 1977. Fleet stripping in preparation for sale.
Sturdy (MSO 494)-----	Stricken 1977. Sold 1978.
Swerve (MSO 495)-----	Stricken 1977. Fleet stripping in preparation for sale.
Venture (MSO 496)-----	Stricken 1977. Sold 1978.
Sphinx (ARL 24)-----	Inactivated 1971, stored INACTSHIP-FAC Bremerton, WA.

Senator BYRD. Are the two amphibious ships mandatory to be transferred to Spain to meet treaty commitments or would other ships satisfy the commitment?

Admiral ALTWEGG. Lengthy negotiations which led to the agreement on the amphibious transports included discussion of a number of ships, including auxiliaries, submarines, and other amphibious ships. From this experience it is concluded that no other ships excess to U.S. Navy requirements would meet the needs of the Spanish Navy.

Senator BYRD. When does the current treaty with Spain expire?

Admiral ALTWEGG. The treaty expires in September 1981.

Senator BYRD. What impact would there be if these amphibious assault ships were not approved, but recommendations for other type ships were to be considered?

Admiral ALTWEGG. The Spanish Navy has expressed interest in acquiring helicopter capable ships such as the amphibious assault ships (LPHs) and amphibious transport docks (LPDs). Unless such ships or other modern ships, which are not excess to U. S. Navy requirements, were made available it is unlikely that the Spanish Navy would agree to any transfers which would finally satisfy the remaining commitments.

Senator BYRD. The Navy currently has two diesel submarines that were previously declared excess and were in the process of being overhauled for Iran. What is the current status of these boats and what is the planned disposition?

Admiral ALTWEGG. U.S.S. *Tang* (SS 563) is operating with the Atlantic Fleet. Lease of *Tang* to the Turkish Navy is planned.

U.S.S. *Wahoo* (SS 565) is at Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, approximately half-way through an overhaul funded by Iran. All work has been stopped. Several navies have expressed interest in acquiring *Wahoo*, but a decision has not yet been made with respect to the submarine's disposition.

Senator BYRD. I understand that the Navy had planned to excess about 20 Gearing class destroyers by year's end, some of which had already been approved for transfer by this Committee. It is now my understanding that the transfer is being held up. Please explain the reasoning for the transfer of these ships being delayed and to Navy's position on whether this delay is a prudent reanalysis of the Navy's ship requirements?

Admiral ALTWEGG. The fiscal year 1980 President's Budget called for retirement of 20 Gearing class Naval Reserve Force (NRF) FRAM destroyers.

The House Appropriations Committee Report on the fiscal year 1980 Budget has added funds to operate 15 of the 20 destroyers scheduled for strike in fiscal year 1980, as well as fiscal year 1980 overhaul money for 5 of these ships. However, after notifying the Chairman of the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee of our intentions and the need for their retirement, 8 of the 20 ships have already been decommissioned under the authority granted the Secretary of the Navy in 10 USC 7304. Concerning the other 12 ships, eight of the ships have had their retirement dates postponed until January 1980 to await the final outcome of congressional action on the fiscal year 1980 President's Budget. Three other ships have recently entered fiscal year 1979 overhauls commencing in September 1979, which were directed by the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee in connection with a denial of a Navy reprogramming request for fiscal year 1979 overhaul funds previously budgeted but no longer desired to overhaul these three ships. These three ships also have had their retirement dates postponed. One ship is scheduled for February 1980 decommissioning, as originally planned. The delays in retirement have resulted in cancellation or postponement of foreign military transfers of the ships, although it is emphasized that foreign military sale was not a reason for the retirements.

The Navy does not consider this delay in decommissioning to reflect a prudent reanalysis of the Navy's ship requirements. Rather the delay has been necessitated solely by the possibility of Congressional direction to retain some of the destroyers in commission. We had not anticipated this possibility in our fiscal year 1980 ship retirement planning. The Department of the Navy considers the ships to be no longer threat capable against the types of threats the U.S. must face in wartime. They are excessively costly to modernize, and too difficult to support and maintain. The ships are already well beyond their estimated service life, averaging nearly 35 years of age.

The Navy desires to effect decommissioning of the remaining 12 of the 20 ships at the earliest possible date in fiscal year 1980, and hopes for Congressional agreement to such action, so as to avoid further inappropriate expenditure of scarce resources, both dollars and personnel.

Senator BYRD. Does the Army have any naval vessels that would compare with the amphibious assault ships or cargo ships in this proposed ship sale program?

Admiral ALTWEGG. No.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR GARY HART

AMPHIBIOUS LIFT

Senator HART. Colonel Conlin, does the Marine Corps consider its current lift—I include here all strategic lift, not just amphibious assault shipping—adequate?

Does the Marine Corps require more amphibious assault shipping?

Does it require more shipping for the follow-on echelons, that is to say, not for the forces which seize the beach (if the local situation requires a beach to be seized) but for the forces which must fight the subsequent campaign?

Colonel CONLIN. Reduction in the number of available amphibious ships (lift) have led to the separation of a MAF size force into an Assault Echelon (AE) and an Assault Follow-On Echelon (AFOE) in order to capitalize on all types of available shipping. The AE and the AFOE are a division of the forces comprising a MAF into the forces required to conduct the initial assault and those required to sustain it.

Assault echelon (AE)

The Joint Chiefs and CINCs have determined that to support national strategy with a reasonable assurance of success in a war with the Soviets requires sufficient amphibious shipping to lift the AE of [deleted] MAFs simultaneously. The Commandant fully supports this determination.

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Assault follow-on echelon (AFOE)

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[Deleted.]

Consequently, the Marine Corps is particularly concerned about the declining capability of the MSC Nucleus Fleet, the shortage of responsive MSC trooplift capability and the orientation of the commercial fleet toward container and barge ships, which are presently not readily adaptable for use in over-the-beach operations. Therefore, the Marine Corps strongly supports proposals to improve the responsiveness of the Ready Reserve Fleet and the Build and Charter program for introducing modern ships to the MSC Nucleus Fleet.

Senator HART. What are the advantages of maritime prepositioning in comparison with strategic airlift? In comparison with current practice of loading ships in the U.S. once a crisis has developed and then sailing to the crisis area?

Colonel CONLIN. The advantages of maritime prepositioning in comparison with strategic airlift accrue from the major increase in combat power available through maritime prepositioning. The combat equipment and supplies of a credible force cannot be moved by strategic airlift in a reasonable period of time without some form of prepositioning. Therefore the major advantages of maritime prepositioning is the availability of not only a responsive force, but a responsive fully integrated air-ground force with a combined arms capability that is truly a credible force. Loading and sailing ships to the crisis area after the crisis has developed can provide a credible force but response time may be less than desired. The maritime prepositioning concept provides decreased response time because the ships could already be moved to within a short sailing distance of the crisis area. The maritime prepositioning concept then overcomes the inability to strategically airlift a credible force at the same time reduces delays normally associated with loading and sailing the ships after the crisis has developed.

Senator HART. Could you describe the concept of "maritime pre-positioning," the rationale behind the concept, and the planned program to implement it?

Colonel CONLIN. The concept of "Maritime prepositioning" is specifically de-

signed to greatly increase the national capability to rapidly respond to a crisis situation with a credible force. Basically an administrative airlift option, the concept rests on the procurement and prepositioning of appropriately configured ships in which combat equipment is prepositioned. When directed the ships would proceed to a designated port or other nonhostile off-load area in the vicinity of an airfield to which the troops would be flown. Marry-up of the troops with the equipment provides the credible force and combat power that can be made available through the implementation of this concept. Funds for the initial acquisition of ships and equipment have been proposed to be included in the FY81 budget.

Senator HART. If the goal is to permit rapid response over a strategic distance with a heavy unit (i.e., a unit partly or fully mechanized), what are the alternatives to maritime pre-positioning?

Colonel CONLIN. An alternative to maritime prepositioning to permit rapid response is a concept such as (Prepositioned Overseas Material Configured in Unit Sets) POMCUS, wherein the equipment is prepositioned on land at a specified place where specific units are designated for reinforcement as might occur in a NATO scenario. Maritime prepositioning has the advantage of being a flexible tool for crisis response because the equipment is placed aboard ship. Therefore, it is mobile and has world-wide application in those crisis situations in which an assault is not required to secure an airhead/beachhead to facilitate troop/equipment link-up.

In the latter case an amphibious task force will be required and sufficient time allotted to plan and execute the mission.

Senator HART. In your view, what capabilities should the maritime-prepositioning ships have?

Colonel CONLIN. Ideally, we would like to have ships with capabilities now inherent in the current multipurpose amphibious ships. The funding constraints associated with providing this type of ship are recognized. Appreciating this fact a maritime prepositioning ship should have the following capabilities:

Roll-on/Roll-off.

Self-load/off-load.

Administrative instream load/off-load.

20 knot plus speed.

Command, control and communications.

Damage control systems commensurate with the mission (as a minimum meet Coast Guard regulations for commercial shipping).

Capable of supporting modular troop berthing containers for maintenance crews.

Climate control.

Ship system redundancy to insure mission accomplishment.

Senator HART. Would amphibious ships currently in reserve be adequate? If not, why not?

Colonel CONLIN. Although amphibious ships could be used for the mobility enhancement concept they are USN ships built to military specifications specifically designed for use in amphibious assault against a hostile defended shore. Maritime prepositioning ships on the other hand will be large multi-purpose self-sustaining ships built to commercial specifications and would not be suited for use in the amphibious assault. Therefore, use of amphibious ships for maritime prepositioning would take valuable amphibious assets in critical short supply away from the amphibious force and utilize them where ships built to commercial standards would be more cost and operationally effective.

Senator HART. Would current MSC ships be adequate to this purpose, in the view of the Marine Corps? If not, why not?

Colonel CONLIN. No, the current MSC Nucleus and Charter Fleets would not be adequate without major modifications to selectively incorporate—as required by each ship—the necessary features specified above. Almost without exception, the command and control communications system redundancy, damage control, and climate control features are absent from the MSC ships.

Senator BYRD. Senator Thurmond, do you have anything else?

Senator THURMOND. No. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BYRD. Thank you ladies and gentlemen very much.

Admiral ALTWEGG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the hearing was concluded subject to the call of the Chair.]

