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SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM PLANS OFFICER PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

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HEARING

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BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON

MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON


S. 1186

TO AMEND TITLES 10 AND 37, UNITED STATES CODE, RELATING TO THE APPOINTMENT, PROMOTION, SEPARATION, AND RETIREMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

JULY 17, 1979

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM PLANS OFFICER PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

TUESDAY, JULY 17, 1979

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 224, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Nunn, chairman, presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Byrd of Virginia, Jepsen, and Warner.

Also present: Francis J. Sullivan, staff director; George F. Travers, professional staff member; Ronald F. Lehman, professional staff member; Christine E. Cowart, research assistant; Mary A. Shields, clerical assistant; Gerald Stacy, assistant to Senator Culver; Greg Pallas, assistant to Senator Exon; Beth Gilman, assistant to Senator Goldwater; Arnold Punaro, assistant to Senator Nunn; and Jim Dykstra, assistant to Senator Cohen.

Senator NUNN. Before we begin our hearing on S. 1186 this morning, which is the scheduled topic, there is an individual witness that I have asked to appear before us. Last week in the hearing on the Selective Service System plan to meet manpower mobilization requirements, the subcommittee heard from Col. Jack Kaufman, who had been manager of the mobilization readiness division at Selective Service, and who was removed from his job, in part, because he felt the plan would not work.

After that hearing, the subcommittee heard from Mr. Robert M. T. Wilson, a former operations evaluation specialist for the Selective Service System who had also criticized aspects of the Selective Service plan and who also is no longer working for the Selective Service System. Therefore, I have asked Mr. Wilson to appear briefly this morning before the subcommittee.

Mr. Wilson, would you come forward, and if you have an attorney or assistant with you this morning, we would be glad for you to introduce them.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. T. WILSON, FORMER EMPLOYEE, SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, ACCOMPANIED BY JUNE D. W. KALIJARVI, ATTORNEY, AND GEORGE CHUZI, LAW CLERK

Mr. WILSON. To my right is Ms. June Kalijarvi, my attorney, and Mr. George Chuzi, to my left, law clerk.

Senator NUNN. We are pleased to have you here this morning, and you are certainly entitled under our committee rules to consult with your attorney before you answer any questions.

Do you understand that?

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. Does your attorney have any questions on procedure this morning?

Ms. KALIJARVI. No, sir.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Wilson, please give us your full name and address.

Mr. WILSON. It is Robert M. T. Wilson, Silver Spring, Md.

Senator NUNN. Where are you employed, Mr. Wilson?

Mr. WILSON. I am on leave without pay right now from the agency. I have a construction job I am trying to hold the family together with right now.

Senator NUNN. What size family do you have?

Mr. WILSON. I have two boys, 12 and 9, a wife and a mortgage.

Senator NUNN. How long have you been with the Federal Government?

Mr. WILSON. Fifteen years last October.

Senator NUNN. Tell us a little bit about your employment pattern. Where have you worked?

Mr. WILSON. When I graduated from the University of Maryland, I went to work at the Defense Fuel Supply Center out at Cameron Station, back when oil was \$1.99 a barrel from the Persian Gulf, so I was there and I attained career status with the fuel center, and I entered on active duty with the Selective Service System in 1970, and in one of our RIF's I was released and converted to civilian status there at Selective Service. So I have been with Selective Service since 1970.

Senator NUNN. Since 1970?

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. What was your position and your GS rating?

Mr. WILSON. At the end it was operations evaluation specialist, grade 13, sir.

Senator NUNN. What does the operations evaluation specialist do?

Mr. WILSON. We have a variety of—I would like to say from the start, there is such a small staff, we have been so decimated at Selective Service that we have performed in a variety of roles. I was usually called on at budget time to become involved in the budget cycle, but primarily I have been involved with evaluations of readiness, working with directives, plans, making recommendations on those, preparing guidance for the Reserve forces based on plans and directives.

Senator NUNN. And has that been your job ever since you have been with the Selective Service System?

Mr. WILSON. No, sir, it hasn't. That was September of 1976 that I was officially put in that position, although I had been doing that sort of thing for a little bit before that.

Senator NUNN. Did part of your responsibilities entail the evaluation of the plans for meeting the requirement to induct individuals within 30 days after mobilization?

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir, I would say it did.

Senator NUNN. Did you have anybody working under you?

Mr. WILSON. No, sir. Well, there was one, there was one lady that worked under me, and we had some clerical people.

Senator NUNN. Who was your immediate supervisor?

Mr. WILSON. Col. John Neal was my immediate superior, and then in the reorganization, I worked with the Nifty Nugget/Rex 78 Evaluation Group, and then with a Mr. Eichorn after that.

Senator NUNN. Who was Colonel Neal's supervisor?

Mr. WILSON. Col. John Barber, back when the headquarters had three divisions, we had a system mobilization readiness division and a manpower planning division, and Colonel Barber was chief of the system mobilization readiness division.

Senator NUNN. Who was his supervisor? I'm trying to get the chain of command.

Mr. WILSON. His supervisor was the acting director—

Senator NUNN. Mr. Shuck?

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. How long has Mr. Shuck been there?

Mr. WILSON. He was our personnel officer for a few years before he became acting director. I believe it was in 1977 that Mr. Peppitone resigned and Mr. Shuck became acting director.

Senator NUNN. Do you know him personally? Did you ever communicate with him personally or did you communicate with him strictly through your superiors?

Mr. WILSON. No, sir; I have communicated personally with him in the hallway, in his office, in meetings that we have had with—training sessions or staff meetings of the general staff.

Senator NUNN. Did you have anything to do with evaluating the Nifty Nugget exercise that took place last year?

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. From the Selective Service point of view?

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir, I was in on the front end of it as well as the— a portion in October where we went out to the Reserve forces and conducted an exercise.

Senator NUNN. Who did you report to during this time?

Mr. WILSON. That was a Mr. Bill Olney, who was the chief of our evaluation group.

To get across that point of how short-handed we were peoplewise, people that designed and set up the exercise also had to be participants in that exercise.

Senator NUNN. Did you help design the selective service portion of the Nifty Nugget exercise, or were you strictly involved in the evaluation?

Mr. WILSON. I helped put together some of the materials, especially those that related to trying to identify plans that we didn't have, areas

where we needed to establish plans. I helped put together our basic plan.

Senator NUNN. Have you had any occasion to make any kind of report on the Selective Service plan for meeting mobilization requirements, or did you have anything to do with that? Are you familiar with the Selective Service plan?

Mr. WILSON. I am familiar with the EMMPS system and the State mobilization plans. I should point out that I have not been at the job site since November of 1968, so—I mean 1978, so what I will say relates to my knowledge up to that point.

Senator NUNN. Up to November of 1978.

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. All right, during that period of time before you left in November 1978, did the Selective Service System have a plan whereby they would begin the entire registration process on or after M-day?

Mr. WILSON. The only plans that were formally published were some obsolete State reconstitution plans that had been drafted back in 1976. There were no substantial revisions to those up until the time that I departed in November. There was no plan for the augmentation of the national headquarters in an emergency mobilization situation. I could not get a missions and functions statement for any organizational echelons between the national headquarters and the State headquarters. At one time we had had a regional structure that had performed some of the administrative tasks. So there was a lack, in my opinion, of reconstitution plans to build the structure to run the agency in a mobilization.

Senator NUNN. That was as of November of 1978.

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. And what, specifically, was wrong with the plan at that time?

Mr. WILSON. Well, the plan at that time only covered the State echelons, and it didn't do that very well. I can give you a couple of examples that come to mind. I only knew I was going to be here late last night, and I really haven't gone over a lot of this, but there would be things in the State plans such as we will issue a credit card to the State headquarters, and they can meet many of their supply needs from a GSA credit card, even though there is not a GSA store in many areas.

There were things such as when you want to hire someone, call the national headquarters, and if they approve, they will tell you some forms to fill out and send in.

They simply weren't in enough detail, the plans that existed in November of 1978, and those plans were based on the old requirements of first inductee at M-110 days and 100,000 at M-150. Those were the plans that I didn't feel were adequate for the old requirements, much less the new requirements.

Senator NUNN. What are the new requirements?

Mr. WILSON. The new requirements were 100,000 at M-60, the last I heard, and the first inductees at about M-30.

Senator NUNN. Did you feel that the plan would work?

Mr. WILSON. No, sir. I didn't feel that any of our plans, our reconstitution plans, our registration plans, or even our registrant process-

ing plans. Colonel Borg, former staff member there, was working with the EMMPS system, had never done a full scale volume test of the basic EMMPS system, and his feeling was that you could only speculate whether the basic EMMPS system would work in the absence of a full scale volume test of EMMPS.

Senator NUNN. Did you ever give your opinion of the selective service plan to the Director of the Selective Service System, Mr. Shuck?

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. Orally or in writing?

Mr. WILSON. Both, orally and in writing.

Senator NUNN. And what was his reaction to that?

Mr. WILSON. Well, the grapevine told me that Mr. Shuck was enraged over my written memorandum, and after I heard that I didn't confront him with it. I would kind of get just pushed aside in some of the staff meetings that we had, we would go on to another topic, or don't worry about that now, or—

Senator NUNN. So you did notify him that you did not believe the plan, as of November 1978, would work.

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. And you notified him in writing.

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. And you got back through the grapevine that your written memorandum enraged him; is that right?

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. Tell us about the circumstances of your departure.

First, when did you depart, and why?

Mr. WILSON. I departed on November 28, 1978, because I was called into a meeting and told that based upon some communications I had written to the President about the Selective Service, they were instructing me to take a fitness for duty examination.

Senator NUNN. What is a fitness for duty examination?

Mr. WILSON. I only began it. I don't know what the full thing would involve, but I presume that they come up with some kind of ruling to see if you can do your job. However, from what I know about fitness for duty exams, it is a real dilemma. You are damned if you do and damned if you don't. The agency has a wide discretionary authority to dismiss you based on the results of a fitness for duty examination, even if they sound positive. If you refuse to take a fitness for duty examination, that is grounds for dismissal also.

Senator NUNN. Is it a mental or physical examination?

Mr. WILSON. Both. The psychiatric was what they were pushing.

Senator NUNN. They were pushing you to take a psychiatric examination?

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. And did you agree to that?

Mr. WILSON. Not voluntarily, so, sir. I never voluntarily agreed to take it.

Senator NUNN. What communication did you have with the President of the United States and how did you attempt to get to him?

Mr. WILSON. On the night of November 6 I left a package of materials with the Secret Service agent at the White House gate. It included some evaluation reports, it included copies of my—so they

could identify who I was. It included a Department of the Army pamphlet that went into the historical errors we have made in the past mobilizations and need to avoid them in the future. It read much like a story of what is happening today. This was DA Pam 20-212. It goes into the fact that frequently we don't look close enough at our mobilization plans, that the Congress is frequently content to follow the lead of the Executive, this is what it said, and that basically we have never really been prepared for a mobilization, and the time can't be bought at any price.

Senator NUNN. Why did you feel that you needed to get this information to the President of the United States?

Mr. WILSON. Well, he had gone for 2 years, over 2 years without any substantial improvement, in my opinion, in our readiness, our capability. It appeared that we just weren't getting anywhere.

I had worked on a group that rewrote some fiscal directives. We had several months. We knew what the organizational structures were, we had mission and function statements, we had a large group of people doing it. There were no plans to do this sort of thing. We really weren't getting any improvement in our capability. It appeared we were going to be subordinated to DOD. In November, there was no talk of registration in November. It appeared that it was going to be an accomplished fact that we would be subordinated to the Department of Defense in a reorganization plan.

In addition, in August 1977 we had been advised of the new manpower requirements, and nothing really had happened other than there had been discussions and this sort of thing, no formal plan had been published.

Senator NUNN. Would it be fair to say you did not believe the Selective Service System could carry out the mobilization plans for the protection of our national security?

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir, and we are in violation of 10(h) of the Military Selective Service Act, which required the maintenance of a certain capability.

Senator NUNN. And that's the message you were trying to get to the President of the United States?

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. And you had tried to get that message to Mr. Shuck before?

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. And you felt he was enraged and would not make any changes?

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. And you felt it was your duty to get it to higher authority?

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. Did you try to crash the White House gates with the information?

Mr. WILSON. No, sir.

Senator NUNN. Did you take the package to the Secret Service and ask them to deliver it?

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir, I took it to the Secret Service agent and asked that it be delivered to the President without going through too many hands.

Senator NUNN. Were you relieved from your duties because you basically did not believe the selective service plan would work and you protested it, or were you relieved because you had delivered a package to the President, or was it a combination of both? What was the reason for your dismissal as you understand it?

Mr. WILSON. I believe it was a combination, plus focusing the attention.

Senator NUNN. Focusing the attention on what?

Mr. WILSON. On our lack of readiness, by taking the action that I did.

Senator NUNN. And then you were asked to take a psychiatric examination.

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. Have you had any history of mental illness?

Mr. WILSON. No, sir.

Senator NUNN. Did you ever have any serious physical illness?

Mr. WILSON. No, sir.

Senator NUNN. Have you ever consulted a private psychiatrist?

Mr. WILSON. I initiated this examination that the Government wanted before I got an attorney who said you can get injunctions against that sort of thing.

Senator NUNN. You mean you initiated the examination or you complied with Selective Service's request?

Mr. WILSON. Well, complied with their request so that I wouldn't be fired for refusing.

Senator NUNN. Then, you did not initiate the examination yourself, but you complied with Selective Service's request.

Mr. WILSON. Right.

Senator NUNN. Had you ever felt the need for mental assistance or psychiatric care before?

Mr. WILSON. No, sir.

Senator NUNN. Did you have a conversation with Mr. Shuck about this before?

Mr. WILSON. [Nods in the negative.]

Senator NUNN. You never talked to him personally about a psychiatric examination?

Mr. WILSON. No, sir.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Wilson, did you ask the Secret Service to deliver your package to the President?

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. Did you ask the Secret Service man at the White House gate to deliver the package?

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir, at the White House gate. I turned it over to them there and asked that it be passed to the President.

Senator NUNN. Did you ever get his name?

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir, Special Agent Morell.

Senator NUNN. Do you remember what time this took place?

Mr. WILSON. I was just coming back from the National Guard. It must have been about 9-10 p.m. perhaps, maybe 8 p.m., somewhere in the evening. It was dark.

Senator NUNN. Do you recall the date?

Mr. WILSON. November 6.

Senator NUNN. November 6, 1978?

Mr. WILSON. Yes.

Senator NUNN. When were you confronted with the request to reevaluate your capability to perform your job or take your psychiatric examination?

Mr. WILSON. November 28. I had just received an outstanding performance rating for the prior year, an acceptable level of competence statement for step increase. I had just gone before a Federal recognition board at the armory on November 6, the District of Columbia Armory where I am a major, in connection with transfer into a transportation battalion.

Senator NUNN. You are in the Reserve?

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir. District of Columbia National Guard. I am the executive officer of the transportation battalion.

Senator NUNN. Has anybody in the National Guard ever asked you to take a psychiatric test?

Mr. WILSON. No, sir; and I have had pretty good efficiency reports from the National Guard.

Senator NUNN. Who had you just received an outstanding rating from?

Mr. WILSON. Colonel Neal, Colonel Barber, and Mr. Shuck had signed off on it.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Shuck signed it.

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. Who asked you to take the psychiatric exam and was the request in writing or was it requested orally?

Mr. WILSON. It was both. They presented me with a written document signed by Mr. Wisniewski.

Senator NUNN. Who is Mr. Wisniewski?

Mr. WILSON. He is the chief of the administrative and logistics division.

Senator NUNN. Who ordered the examination? Do you know whether it came from your immediate supervisor or did it come from Mr. Shuck?

Mr. WILSON. I am sure it came from Mr. Shuck.

Senator NUNN. How do you know?

Mr. WILSON. There are a lot of minor things that don't happen around the headquarters there without Mr. Shuck's involvement, and nothing like this would happen without Mr. Shuck's involvement.

Senator NUNN. Do you have a copy of that order you received?

Mr. WILSON. I'm sure there is one here.

Senator NUNN. We don't want anything that violates privacy Mr. Wilson, and I would ask you to consult with your attorneys. If your attorneys deem it consistent with your interest, we would like to have a copy of that for our record.

Mr. WILSON. Ms. Kalijarvi will answer the question if that is acceptable.

Ms. KALIJARVI. Sir, most of that is on the public record, and we will turn it over to your committee. We did not bring extra copies today because we had such short notice, but we will turn it over this afternoon.

Senator NUNN. Aren't you engaged in litigation on this point?

Ms. KALIJARVI. Yes, sir; but it is all in the public record, so there is no violation of privacy nor violation of judicial procedures.

[The information follows:]

NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS,
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM,
Washington, D.C., November 28, 1978.

Mr. ROBERT M. T. WILSON,
National Headquarters,
Selective Service System,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. WILSON: In accordance with 5 CFR 831.1203(a), the Selective Service System has determined that a fitness-for-duty examination of you is necessary. This determination is based upon a study of your recent communications addressed to the President. The examination shall include but will not be limited to the indications of mental or emotional illness.

The examination will be conducted by Dr. Robert Buckler in the Psychiatry Clinic at Walter Reed Hospital, third floor, Georgia Avenue entrance, reporting to Mrs. Robinson not later than 11:30 a.m., 6 December 1978, for a doctor's appointment at 12:00 noon.

The examination will be without cost to you. If you object to Dr. Buckler, you may participate in the selection of another examiner.

You will be in a sick leave status pending our receipt of the report of the examination.

Appropriate action will be taken on the basis of the examination, and you will be promptly advised thereof.

Sincerely,

R. F. WISNIEWSKI,
Administrative and Logistics,
Manager.

Senator NUNN. Do you have the package you delivered to the President?

Mr. WILSON. I have some of it, yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. You don't have the entire package?

Mr. WILSON. There were some minor things about what had happened in Colorado that I took off the evaluation report that was there, and I do not have extra copies of the DA pamphlet about military mobilization in the past. We can assemble a complete package I believe.

Senator NUNN. You do have some of the package here today.

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. Could we have that for our record?

If you could supplement it, we would like to have the complete package at some point for the record.

Ms. KALLJARVI. We can have it to you by this afternoon or tomorrow.

Senator NUNN. That will be fine.

[The letter follows; supplemental material is retained in committee files.]

ROBERT M. T. WILSON,
Silver Spring, Md., November 6, 1978.

President JIMMY CARTER,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: It is with deep personal regret that I find I must add to your many burdens by giving you another one. However, the seriousness of the matter warrants your attention as well as the personal risk to my career which may result from my writing to you. I am convinced that facts and the complete story about the Selective Service System's recent past and immediate future may have been, and may continue to be, withheld from you in order to protect those involved in crippling the Nation's conscription apparatus. I am also convinced that at least one high level OMB official is personally involved in the deception being perpetrated on you and that other White House personnel and DoD officials are either knowingly or unwittingly going along with the deception. I have never written to our President before and I assure you that this is no frivolous letter. If I ever have to write to a President again I hope it is under happier circumstances. This is not a case of a "disgruntled employee" getting revenge, but God knows I've been frustrated by my having to witness

the course of events being carried out and feeling unable to do anything about it—although I've tried to do so.

This matter has been discussed among numerous employees at Selective Service and the overwhelming majority understand what is taking place. Everyone is reluctant to be the one who "blows the whistle," but I can remain silent no longer or those involved may actually carry out their scheme by failing to give you the complete facts.

The current top management of the Selective Service System is playing along (Mr. Shuck [Acting Director], Mr. Wisniewski [Manager of Administrative & Logistics Division & also a supergrade], Mr. Eichhorn [Manager of Admins. Branch]). All three of these men were or are Air Force Colonels—more about that later. Here is what these folks have been doing—been very busy denying our basic Selective Service problems (admiring the king's clothes routine); stonewalling the truth; misleading you, the Congress and the American people; protecting what they believe to be their own selfish self-interests; demoralizing, isolating and belittling good Government employees (civilian & military) who know what our problems are and how to correct them; thwarting such employees who try to bring up these important issues at all-employee staff meetings; seeking counsel essentially only among themselves and being very secretive about what they are really up to (courier runs to OMB's New Executive Office Building, 10th floor where there is an inordinate flurry of activity about Selective Service going under DoD and they have time—phased plans being executed now] are now only made by the inner few named above). Failing to be candid with or coordinate with the remainder of the staff; making our Nifty-Nugget participation a farce (but we will "look mostly OK on paper" perhaps); covertly cow-towing to and cooperating with the OMB/DoD "big boys" behind the scenes in the almost completed destruction of the Selective Service System; awarding ourselves and "influential friends" medals; as enjoying ego trips and hob-nobbing with other high-level bureaucrats.

Unfortunately, while management has been very successful in these areas and perhaps again feeling well entrenched, the system has been so busy doing those things that it has:

One: Failed to uphold the public trust, meet its moral obligations, the requirements of the Military Selective Service Act, or even the requirements of the management position descriptions.

Two: Violated the spirit (and no doubt the letter) of other statutes/regulations—I am aware of substantial violations in such areas as property accountability, writing off sizeable dollar amounts of Governments assets without authority, personnel policies, procurement policies, etc.

Three: Calculatingly lied to the Congress as to our readiness to respond to an emergency mobilization need for military manpower.

Four: Contributed to giving our Nation a false sense of security and precluded the Congress from exercising its constitutional responsibilities.

Five: Obstructed those that tried to work within the system to correct its deficiencies.

Six: Perpetrated a fraud upon the taxpayers.

Seven: Failed to produce meaningful or reliable contingency plans as required by law.

Mr. President, I have asked myself on many occasions "Why are they doing this to the Nation?" It is not clear to me. It could be one or more of the following:

One: Protecting the honor of the Air Force (Air Force personnel/former personnel have been in control of the Selective Service System [all Directors starting with Dr. Curtis W. Tarr or Acting Directors] since General Hershey was kicked upstairs;

Two: Psychological hangup by Mr. Stamers at OMB & perhaps others ("knows what is best for the Nation"—secret plan type thinking?).

Three: National politics—there is evidence to support this to an extent.

Four: Bureaucratic security.

Five: Power hungry personality defects?

I've ruled out plain "stupidity." I'd bet money, however, that none of these Air Force colonels ever had a command as a colonel—I'll bet they were staff types!

While I'm burdening you, I may as well go on with it. There are many Government employees out here like myself—we try to do what is right, required by law or simply morally proper. Often these efforts run counter to what superiors are trying to do. All too often we employees try to rationalize how we did our

best, the boss knows best, we've got young mouths to feed, etc. We convince ourselves not to speak outside channels. Eventually we can remain silent no longer. In recognition of this human tendency to "go along" and "not make waves," you must do your best to be sure we have good leadership at our agencies—leadership that will be candid with you and not cover up things that will embarrass all of us in the Federal Service and cause the public to lose even more confidence in their Government and their Nation. It's not "the system" that's bad, it's some of the incumbents in leadership positions. We must never give up on the public, "the system" or ourselves to positively influence the course of events.

You, I'm told, are looking for a new Acting Director of Selective Service. I'd like to join the team. I'll never lie to you, but I won't lie in anyone's behalf. I would keep the staff "honest" at OMB and DOD. If you are interested I'll be happy to send in a resumé (or doesn't it work that way for the top jobs!?). There are others within the Selective Service family who could do the job. If you are interested I'll make you a recommended list. I don't think we can afford the luxury of time in breaking in a newcomer.

As to any changes in Acting Director or even raising hell with your staff in the matters I've raised herein, believe you need to know how well you can rely upon your staff, so suggest you play it this way: wait and see what they recommend to you in terms of what happens to Selective Service and how "ready" it is per Nifty Nugget evaluation reports. If the budget folks tell you we can give DOD 100,000 inductees by M+60 with only 50 more full-time people in the field and a few more reserve officers it's a lie! You will have to act like you are not too inquisitive (more than usual). When the time comes, put all concerned under oath and they you may get some interesting stories. Over here at Selective Service we are waiting for the dam to break—there are lots of folks who know the story but are unwilling for one reason or another to take the kind of step I've taken.

Good luck Mr. President.

Respectfully,

ROBERT M. T. WILSON.

P.S.—Have assembled some interesting reading for you—if the rest of the Gov't. "reorganization studies" are anything like the quality of the one on Selective Service we're all in a lot of trouble—I'd take a closer look before you go very far or to the Congress.

PP.S.—I make a mistake or two (maybe 3) everyday and have no delusion of grandeur. My biggest problem is that I call them like I see them and get impatient with phonies or lies. If you can use someone like that I may be of help. If you had to pick a staff member for a sensitive post and it had to be either Andrew Young (shoots from the hip & aims from his heart) or Clifford Alexander (a careful "in-the boat" player who obviously carefully words his speeches and is concerned with "image"—who would you pick?

Senator NUNN. What the subcommittee has before us is a letter from Mr. Shuck, representing the Selective Service official position and stating that the Department of Defense requirements can be met by a request that has been made to Congress to update and upgrade the computer system, and also stating that these requirements can be met after M-day. In other words, you would begin the system's operation in terms of overall national input after mobilization was ordered. You would begin it by the President of the United States getting on national television and asking young people to come forward to register, and that the first 30 days would produce a sufficient number of people to meet the Department of Defense requirement.

Now, Mr. Wilson, we don't have a plan in writing. What we have is a letter. Is there a plan or was there a thorough, detailed mobilization plan by Selective Service like that in November 1978?

Mr. WILSON. No, sir.

Senator NUNN. What was in existence? What was your plan of operation, if any?

Mr. WILSON. There was no—we ran into the same difficulty in the Index 78 Nifty Nuggett exercise. There was no detailed plan. There

was confusion as to the form of input that we would put into the computer system, whether it be remote terminals or optical character recognition reading of forms. There simply was no detailed plan to do this within the timeframe that you are talking about.

We had what I considered obsolete, old requirement, State reconstitution plans for the State echelons. There was no plan for the national headquarters or any echelons in between the State and the national. There was a national registration manual based on the old requirements. There was some discussion about election machinery at that point, some test activity on feasibility with some selected States.

The EMMPS manual itself was in need of heavy revision, and as I mentioned before, Colonel Borg felt that the hardware had really never been fully tested with a volume run.

Senator NUNN. Is the plan that is being talked about today—well, I should use another word rather than “plan” because I think of a plan as being comprehensive, and you have already testified that there was no comprehensive plan, and I do not know of a comprehensive plan now.

What were the goals of meeting the Department of Defense requirements within the first 30 days after mobilization? Were those goals the same in November of 1978 as you understand them to be now?

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir. I understand that these were communicated to Selective Service. I know in August of 1977, the 100,000 at M-60, first ones at M-30, I know that was communicated to us in writing at that point, and that had to be our objective. But as you know, putting down dates and being able to do it are two different things.

Senator NUNN. Do you believe the Selective Service System can meet the present goals under the plan that has now been submitted to Congress, if Congress fully funds the plan that the administration has presented, or have you kept up to date enough to be able to give an opinion on that?

Mr. WILSON. I don't know what they have produced between November and now. If it is based on the same sort of track record we have had in the past, though, it really won't be very adequate.

Senator NUNN. It won't what?

Mr. WILSON. It won't be adequate. As I have said, in June of 1976 we started talking about the need for better plans, and it hadn't happened as of November 1978, so I don't know—I know that there has been no large-scale increase in resources at Selective Service. The bulk of the people are in the field. There are not that many resources at headquarters. But what they have actually submitted were prepared internally.

Senator NUNN. When did you decide to deliver this package to the President? Was it a spur-of-the-moment decision or had you thought about it?

Mr. WILSON. I had agonized over it, I guess, in the fall, early fall, late summer, and I really didn't know what to do. I felt somewhat like the people, I guess, with the Firestone tires, the people in Government, or some hazardous product. I felt like I knew something that was a danger, and I was really sort of beside myself as to how to handle it. Nothing seemed to be going anywhere internally. The situation seemed, it was headed in a worse direction than a better direction, and I

thought that the best procedure was to go to the next man up the line who was technically responsible.

I am sure there has been all kinds of pressure put on Mr. Shuck from OMB, DOD officials. This is a very politically volatile matter about conscription and the draft, Selective Service.

Senator NUNN. I have discovered that.

Mr. WILSON. I know there has been a lot of pressure, but Pearl Harbor, you know, could happen again. We really don't know when we might have to do something, and I think that is what the danger is. Just as the people told us in that DA Pam of 1955.

Senator NUNN. And you concluded that the Selective Service System did not have an adequate plan to meet mobilization requirements.

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. And you concluded nobody was doing anything about it within the System.

Mr. WILSON. We were not progressing satisfactorily.

Senator NUNN. And then you concluded your only recourse was to go to the President of the United States directly?

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. Did you try to see the President, or did you just leave the package?

Mr. WILSON. I just left the package. I did not ask to see him.

Senator NUNN. Do you know whether the package was ever delivered to President Carter?

Mr. WILSON. No, sir, I don't. I don't think it was.

[Pause.]

Mr. WILSON. I am advised that it was sent from Secret Service to Selective Service.

Senator NUNN. Sent from the Secret Service back to Selective Service?

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. Without ever having gone to the President?

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. Without having gone to any of his top advisers?

Perhaps your attorney could give us an update on the legal standing of this, if you could.

I understand you are in litigation on this?

Ms. KALIJARVI. Yes, Senator. We are currently waiting for decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on a permanent injunction against Mr. Wilson having to take a psychiatric or any kind of medical examination based on the letters he wrote the President. We feel that requirement violates his first amendment rights.

There is a rather lengthy history of the litigation. I will go into it if you want me to.

Senator NUNN. Please give me the current status of it, if you would.

Ms. KALIJARVI. That is the current status.

Senator NUNN. All right.

Ms. KALIJARVI. We are waiting for the court of appeals to decide. There have been two injunctions issued temporarily, or temporary restraining orders which have been vacated for various reasons. The last one was vacated about 2 months ago by the court of appeals, but the court of appeals is still considering the matter.

Senator NUNN. Was there any kind of whistleblower procedure that you felt was available to you under the law as it existed in November of 1978?

Mr. WILSON. No, sir.

Senator NUNN. You did not know of any.

Mr. WILSON. No, sir.

Senator NUNN. You felt that because the Selective Service System is an independent agency, the next in the chain of command was the President himself?

Mr. WILSON. I knew from a technical standpoint that is correct. From a practical standpoint, I don't know what staff would head up this area for him, but from a technical standpoint, technical responsibility, he was in fact the next one.

Senator NUNN. I don't know what staff is heading up this area either. I am afraid there is none.

Senator Byrd, I don't know how much you have heard of this, but we have a witness here who has written the President a substantial amount of information saying that the Selective Service System plan as of November of 1978 would not work. He communicated with the President because he did not get any results within the System. He took a package to the White House, delivered it to the Secret Service, and it was routed back to his boss, Mr. Shuck, at Selective Service. And subsequently he was asked to take a psychiatric examination. His attorney is here representing him. That matter is in litigation now. He is no longer with the Selective Service System. That is where we are right at this point.

You may ask questions.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Senator. No; I don't have any questions to ask, but I was under the impression that the President has stated on television a number of times that he wanted Federal employees to make their views known to the White House.

Does anyone know whether that is accurate or not?

Ms. KALIJARVI. That is true, Senator. If I may, the only reason we know that the documents were sent directly back from the White House to Selective Service for Mr. Shuck's action was discovered through the litigation that we undertook on Mr. Wilson's behalf. He didn't know it had been sent back, and he didn't know it had not been delivered to anybody in the White House.

Senator BYRD. I thought that the President made a great point of inviting individuals to communicate with the White House. Naturally, he doesn't have to agree with the communications, but I would think that the White House would want to receive them and have someone look them over, but apparently that was not the case in this situation.

Ms. KALIJARVI. Senator, if I may, based on our experience in this area, it is not the case—it doesn't happen in any case. The routine of the Secret Service or any other Federal executive agency receiving documentation concerning another agency is to return it directly to that agency for action. That is what happened here. It is the normal procedure.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Thank you. I want to glance over this material and see if I have any particular questions.

Mr. WILSON. Senator, on page 15 of that November 6 document, MRE-78 evaluation report, the typewritten one that is fairly thick, I

went into my evaluation of the adequacy of national headquarters guidance plans, addressed reconstitution plans, registrant processing plans, registration plans, other contingency plans we didn't have. It indicates that they were simply inadequate, no great improvement in this area since I began to officially voice concern on the subject in mid-1976.

Senator NUNN. This is a very thorough analysis. This will be of considerable benefit to us.

Is the letter to the President a public document also?

Ms. KALIJARVI. Yes, sir, it is.

Senator NUNN. You don't have any objection if I read a portion of it into the record at this point?

Ms. KALIJARVI. No, sir.

Senator NUNN. I am reading from the top of page 4 of a letter from Mr. Robert M. T. Wilson, dated November 6, 1978, directed to the President of the United States. I think this perhaps summarizes the letter, although I haven't read it all in great detail.

Unfortunately, while management has been very successful in these areas, and perhaps again feeling well entrenched, the system has been so busy doing those things that it has: number one, failed to uphold the public trust, meet its moral obligations, the requirements of the Military Selective Service Act, or even the requirements of the management position descriptions; two, violated the spirit (and no doubt the letter) of other statutes and regulations. I am aware of substantial violations in such areas as property accountability, writing off sizable dollar amounts of government assets without authority, personnel policies, procurement policies, etc.; three, calculatingly lied to the Congress as to our readiness to respond to an emergency mobilization need for military manpower; four, contributed to giving our nation a false sense of security, and precluded the Congress from exercising its constitutional responsibilities; five, obstructed those that try to work within the system to correct its deficiencies; six, perpetrated a fraud upon the taxpayers; and seven, failed to produce meaningful or reliable contingency plans as required by law.

Do you recall having written this, Mr. Wilson?

Mr. WILSON. [Nods in the affirmative.]

Senator NUNN. Do you have any second thoughts about these conclusions?

Mr. WILSON. [Nods in the negative.]

Senator NUNN. Do you still believe that adequately stated your own feeling about the Selective Service System at the time you departed?

Mr. WILSON. [Nods in the affirmative.] Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. Senator Byrd, do you have other questions?

Senator BYRD. No.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Wilson, we appreciate very much your being here.

Do you have anything else that you would like to say for the record?

Mr. WILSON. No, sir. I just thank you for this opportunity to appear before you, and I hope that through the efforts of the Congress we can create a capability that will insure the independence of this country.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, and we thank your attorney for being with you.

Ms. KALIJARVI. Thank you, Senator.

Senator NUNN. We will make all of this package, plus whatever you submit for the record, part of our official record. [Package retained in committee files.]

[Subsequent to the testimony of Mr. Wilson, the subcommittee invited Mr. Shuck, Acting Director of the Selective Service System, to respond to Mr. Wilson's testimony.]

NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS,
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM,
Washington, D.C., July 31, 1979.

HON. SAM NUNN,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel,
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in response to your invitation to comment upon the testimony of Mr. Robert M. T. Wilson before the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate on July 17, 1979, as reported by the Alderson Reporting Co., Inc. All references are to the transcript prepared by Alderson. The pages of this transcript were not numbered by Alderson, but we have numbered them for convenience in citation.

The statements by Senator Nunn (p. 2, line 9, and p. 27, line 13) that Mr. Wilson is not now an employee of the Selective Service System is inaccurate. Mr. Wilson (p. 3, line 24) correctly stated that he is on leave without pay with the Selective Service System. Mr. Wilson is an Operations Evaluation Specialist, GS-13 (p. 2, line 22).

Mr. Wilson's implications (p. 5, line 16) that his duties included responsibility for overall evaluation of Selective Service System plans for registrant processing are misleading. He was preparing and reviewing portions of materials that would be incorporated in various plans.

Mr. Wilson may express opinions on any subject with or without any stated reason therefor, e.g., p. 8, line 8, but mere unsupported conclusions are generally of limited usefulness. His specific duties and responsibilities did not permit an awareness of the overall agency actions being developed and implemented for rapid response mobilization readiness.

Comment on Mr. Wilson's litigation with the System and the facts giving rise thereto would be inappropriate.

Sincerely,

ROBERT E. SHUCK.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Senator NUNN. The main purpose of our meeting today is to receive testimony on S. 1186 relating to the appointment, promotion, tenure, separation, and retirement of officers of the Armed Forces.

This is the legislative proposal the Department of Defense refers to as the proposed Defense Officer Personnel Management Act. This proposal would revise most of the existing laws governing the Commissioned Officers Corps in each of the military services. It would provide a grade table limiting the number of officers who may serve on active duty in the grades of major/lieutenant commander, O-4; lieutenant colonel/commander, O-5; and colonel/captain, O-6. It would continue the current authorization of general officers and provide for a new one-star rank of commodore admiral in the Navy.

This proposal addresses one of the most important aspects of our national security, the selection and management of military leaders, the military commanders, and the top and middle officers of our Armed Forces. The current laws governing the management of these officers date back to the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 and the Officer Grade Limitation Act of 1954. Both of these acts remain in effect with only minor modifications. Both were drawn up in the years following World War II and the beginning of the cold war. The world situation has changed over the past 25 years, and certainly the size and missions of our Armed Forces have also changed.

This subcommittee and the staff, with the assistance of experts from the Library of Congress, the Congressional Budget Office, private con-

sultants, and representatives of the Department of Defense, have been carefully examining this proposal for some time. Four previous hearings by this subcommittee have been held on the proposal. Several markup sessions were held in the 94th Congress when members of the subcommittee and staff reviewed the issue in depth. A preliminary markup session was held last year, but no action was taken when it became clear that the Senate calendar was too crowded to consider the proposal. A proposal was passed by the House of Representatives in both the 94th and 95th Congresses. If action is not taken by September 30 of this year, emergency legislation will again be necessary to deal with Air Force officer grade limitations and several other aspects of officer management. This is another of the many areas where the leadership and contribution of our former colleague, Senator Dewey Bartlett, will be greatly missed, as he played a vital role in the deliberations on this that have taken place over several years.

All the time we have spent on this proposal has made it clear that the issues associated with effective officer management are complex and are not susceptible to quick resolution.

Our previous deliberations have identified the criteria for an effective officer management system.

We need an officer personnel system that provides youthful, vigorous personnel to perform many combat jobs, but also produces an officer corps with sufficient substantial experience.

We need an officer management system which will attract qualified officers to military careers in the grades needed to meet mission-based requirements at an acceptable level of manpower costs.

We need an officer personnel system adequately controlled by the Congress, which also gives to the President, as Commander in Chief, as much management flexibility as can safely and constitutionally be granted without eroding civilian control and congressional control over the military.

I hope that today's hearings will lead the way to enactment of the bill which will meet these criteria.

Our first witness is Mr. Richard Gabriel, associate professor of politics at St. Anselm's College in New Hampshire. Mr. Gabriel is the coauthor of "Crisis in Command," a recent book about the U.S. Army Officer Corps, highlighting the problems in military officer management, especially in Vietnam. Mr. Gabriel has also written articles on officer management and the All-Volunteer Force.

Mr. Gabriel, as I understand it, you are now in summer training as a major in the Army Reserve as an intelligence analyst. We are happy to have you here today, and we appreciate your detailed work in this area. Your book has been read by many people throughout the country, and I think it has made a substantial contribution to an understanding of some of the problems in the management of the officer system.

We are delighted to have you here today, and we will be pleased to receive any statement you wish to make.

STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD GABRIEL, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF POLITICS, ST. ANSELM'S COLLEGE, NEW HAMPSHIRE; AND MAJOR, U.S. ARMY RESERVE

Mr. GABRIEL. Thank you, Senator.

I will confine my remarks to the section on the bill dealing with the effects, as I perceive them, of the up-or-out system which is proposed

by the bill to enshrine in law and perhaps a comment or two on the proposed aspect of the bill to increase the number of officers who may be deep selected from 5 percent to some 15 percent.

To that end, if I may, I would like to take the first 5 minutes and read a short statement.

Senator NUNN. Fine.

Mr. GABRIEL. The purpose of an armed force is to fight and to fight well. In order to do that it needs a competent, trained, stable, experienced Officer Corps. Further, the bureaucratic mechanisms attendant to the recruitment, training, and retention of an effective Officer Corps must be judged by a single standard: the degree to which they provide an effective combat leadership corps. There are clear instances when the imperatives of cost effectiveness, equity, career and staff assignments must be subordinated to the larger and more important goal of developing a combat-effective Officer Corps, because in point of fact, many of the bureaucratic practices, norms, values, and policies often acquire a life of their own and actually work to undermine the fighting ability of military units. No two greater examples of this could be found than the DEROS system and MILPERCEN. So it seems to me to be the case with the continuation of the up-or-out system of promotion. Its retention must be judged against the overt harm it does to the level of cohesion of military units and the fact that it does not produce an effective corps of combat leaders.

Let me elaborate. What we know about what produces effective combat units, especially units that are highly cohesive and can be expected to stand under the terrible stress of modern combat, suggests, one, that officers must spend long periods of time with their units; two, that experience and judgment gained from stable assignments is vital to the level of competence that units will demonstrate under fire; and three, units in which officers rotate rapidly through for only short periods tend to rapidly disintegrate under fire. The up-or-out policy of promotion, coupled with the individual replacement system of officer assignments, compels the rapid rotation of a multiplicity of officers through combat positions, and thus tends to reduce the level of cohesion of those combat units. Measured in terms of its ability to produce good quality officers who can develop cohesion within their military units, the up-or-out promotion policy is a failure of the first order.

The up-or-out policy requires an officer to rapidly rotate through a series of combat and staff assignments, although mostly staff assignments, in order to qualify for promotion within the unrealistically short 20-year career period of service. This produces several undesirable conditions.

One, short periods of troop duty for many officers who, because their tours of duty are so short, never establish close bonds with their men. This runs the risk of incompetence at the crucial fighting unit level.

Second, it produces a corps of officers in constant motion who are always learning their new job rather than providing experienced performance. Just as the officer gains experience, he is rotated to another assignment in order to punch his next ticket in order to qualify for promotion.

It produces a corps of officers who are always looking beyond their present assignment to the next one, overly concerned with efficiency

reports, and tyrannized by the doctrine of zero defects. They are so future oriented that they often stress the performance of marginalities in their present posts, trying to keep the lid on until they leave for their next assignment.

It produces an officer corps characterized by the ethos of entrepreneurial competition and careerism in which it is every man for himself, a set of values corrosive of any concept of the military as a special calling and one which tends to see one's troops often as mere instrumentalities to the advancement of one's career.

But probably most important, the up-or-out system results in two more damaging conditions.

There is no place left in the system for the competent, dedicated, career officer who wishes only to spend his career as a professional specialist. He must rotate through a series of assignments or he shall surely be passed over and eventually terminated. Linking promotion to retention instead of linking retention to competence and experience is a serious flaw in the system. It works against the establishment of long-term, stable, competent officers. As a consequence, many vital skills are at any given time in the hands of entrepreneurial amateurs rather than experienced professionals, in the hands of men learning their jobs instead of men who know their jobs, in the hands of those who seek to punch their tickets and move on rather than providing dedicated service. This depresses the overall quality of the Officer Corps.

The up-or-out system produces a staggering wastage of talent. At the O-4, O-5, and O-6 levels, thousands of well-trained, experienced officers are lost each year because they cannot go any higher in rank. Reducing the judgment or the reward for competence to meter promotion points enforces the doctrine of "higher or retire" with a vengeance. The 20-year career pattern, with only short stops in grade, a multiplicity of assignments, makes it necessary to force out well-trained, experienced officers in order to make room for the less trained officer whose only edge seems to be that he is younger. The talent drain in my view borders on the criminal.

Thus, the up-or-out policy is a reflection of an unrealistically short career pattern premised on the absurd doctrine that every second lieutenant is a future chief of staff. In terms of any measure of human resource utilization, even compared to private industry, it is a wasteful disaster. Its only virtue is that it provides sufficient career opportunities for career upward mobiles to ply their trade. And indeed, it may even produce men who have had good careers; but it does not necessarily produce good soldiers or good officers.

There is little in that one aspect of the present bill which deals with the up-or-out system that would change any of these. Indeed, to the extent that it rigidifies the up-or-out system, it may make things worse. If the goal is to produce a stable, long-term, professional, experienced and competent officer corps, which can contribute to the development of effective, cohesive combat units, then up-or-out must be abandoned; career terms increased; assignments lengthened and stabilized; promotion slowed; the size of the Officer Corps reduced, especially at the general officer level; and officers allowed to serve 30 years, regardless of rank, with as much honor and respect as those who succeed in the system's terms by making general. In short, we would be well advised to adopt the system used by other countries, Germany, the British, and

above all, the Canadians, which extend periods of service, allow career low-ranking officers to contribute for long periods, and stabilize the assignments of officers, especially in the combat arms.

In closing, I would offer one further instance of the failure of the up-or-out system. In the last 22 years, we have seen that system operate in peacetime. We have seen it operate in wartime. And now we have seen it operate under the All-Volunteer Army. It is well to remember that in the war in Vietnam, those men at the officer level who planned, orchestrated, and advanced so well during that 10-year period of that war were mostly products of the up-or-out system. The evidence is clear, I believe, from the performance of the Officer Corps in that conflict, that they did not perform up to expectations. They did not provide cadre, professional combat effective officers. To be sure, many careers prospered, but the combat ability of the corps to perform in the field, over time in a disastrous war, was a calamity. If the up-or-out system continues in force, the probability is that in the next war, many of the problems which surfaced during the last conflict within the Officer Corps may well surface again.

I would add, to increase the number of officers that could be deep selected from the mere 5 percent it is today to the possibility of 15 percent would only exacerbate the up-or-out system, would only create more staggering career pressures for the officer, would only accelerate the amount of assignments that he would have to complete in order to succeed in the system's terms, that is to say, attain the rank of general officer. And from that perspective I would recommend against the inclusion of this element of the bill as it stands.

Thank you, Senator.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Gabriel.

When was the last time, if there ever has been a period of time in American history, where our military services were run without an up-or-out policy?

Mr. GABRIEL. Well, pretty much prior to World War II. We fought the Civil War that way and we fought World War I that way, with by and large promotion by seniority. The argument was that the result was a corps of officers who were too old to fight effectively.

Yet, it is interesting that this argument has been made in other countries, not the least of which, by the way, was in the Soviet Union, in the old Russian Army in 1905, after its defeat at the hands of the Japanese. They concluded that the problem was that their officers were too old and went to an up-or-out system very radically; and the design of that up-or-out system was predicated on the production of young general officers, preferably by the age of 40. And they did produce them. I need not add these were the men who presided over the defeats of Tannenberg, Smolensk, and the other defeats that occurred in the Russian Army in World War I.

The argument that experienced officers are over the hill at the age of 40 or 45 flies in the face of history. Our up-or-out system also flies in the face of military history in that virtually no other country has ever made, or no other major industrial power, ever made up-or-out a permanent part of its selection system.

Senator NUNN. Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD. What do you regard as the optimum length of time for a peacetime tour of duty?

Mr. GABRIEL. Within a unit?

Senator BYRD. No; what length of time do you feel is the optimum a person should be assigned in peacetime?

Mr. GABRIEL. I think within combat units probably no less than 4 years at any given rank level. The problem is, you see, that as we rotate people through so rapidly and we don't bring them back, there is nowhere for an officer to grow, there is nowhere for an officer to develop as in the British regimental system.

You see, our young lieutenants and our young captains are well aware of the fact that if they make one mistake, one bad mark on that efficiency report, they are doomed forever. As a result, we don't have those kinds of—that kind of attitude of dedication and stability at the unit level. We have got to stabilize tours there. This would require slowing down promotion.

Our officers carry far too much rank for the experience they have had. It is true, for example, that a lieutenant colonel may well have punched through by the time he reaches senior lieutenant colonel. He may well have punched through some 11 or 12 assignments. The question is, how much has he learned in any of those assignments, and in the event of conflict, what kind of jobs can he adequately perform?

Senator BYRD. Many general officers, senior officers are being retired at ages 52, 54, 56. What is your feeling about that?

Mr. GABRIEL. Well, again, I would like to see a 30-year system where no one made general officer unless he had at least 28 to 30 years' service. Right now, as you know, we promote men to general officer at the rank of 22 years' service. Again, it is all part of stabilizing the tours and time in grade.

Promotion—when we are dealing, you know, with a large number of men, as we are in the American Armed Forces, of some, across the board, perhaps, almost 2 million men, while this may sound somewhat pedantic, the fact of the matter is, it really doesn't matter how you select your generals. The law of large numbers will apply. Two tails of the Gaussian curve will produce roughly 5 percent brilliant, competent generals, another 5 percent dunderheads, and the rest of us will fall in the middle. It doesn't really matter. The argument that we have got to rotate people through 17 staff assignments at a year apiece so that he is qualified to become a general results in a general officer at the rank of brigadier general who finds the adjustment almost as great as a second lieutenant does. He has to relearn his job all over again.

I simply see little justification for it if you measure it in terms of competence.

Senator BYRD. It seems to me that in retiring senior officers in their early fifties, that the Government is losing a great deal of tremendous experience and capability. My own feeling has been that that is too young an age to retire these top people.

Mr. GABRIEL. Yes, sir, but with 447 generals, give or take a few, we could perhaps afford to lose some of that. And I agree with you, 50 is too young an age to retire. But the real crunch is coming at the men with 20 years service, who are 40 and 41, 42, where in their own family situations they have children in college and they need greater amounts of money. The system has placed them in a position at the rank of O-5 or perhaps O-6, where if they don't make general, they know they almost never will, and must make the decision to either stay on and al-

most suffer the opprobrium of their peers for not having succeeded, or get out. The real bloodletting in talent is occurring at least at the O-5 and O-6 levels, and more recently even lower.

The U.S. Army, despite the difficulty it has had in recruiting enlisted men over the last 5 years, has had very little difficulty in recruiting young officers. What it has had is staggering difficulty in retaining those young officers. We are losing young officers, by that I mean people under 50, at a staggering rate. If private industry were to do this, I suspect they would find themselves out of business very rapidly.

Senator BYRD. Thank you.

Senator NUNN. Does this apply to the enlisted ranks also?

Mr. GABRIEL. I think that the condition in the enlisted ranks, although it hasn't received the kind of attention it should, is worse. I was talking to a young sergeant yesterday who said, you know, an E-5 cannot spend 20 years of service anymore, or 30 years of service. He said he would even take a cut in rank to stay on.

There are a lot of dedicated enlisted people, but they understand, too, that the ax falls on them at 40, and as a result, they have to get out.

You are well aware, Senator, that the attrition rate in the enlisted ranks at all levels—

Senator NUNN. That is one of the most critical, if not the most critical problem in the military services today. Certainly for the Navy it is the most critical problem. It is not the initial enlistment but rather the retention.

Of course, another result of that is because the Volunteer Force has front-loaded the pay and promotion schedule so much that when you look at the career, the most progress you are going to make is in the first 8 years.

Mr. GABRIEL. The point is, we have linked money only to promotion, and we are to the best of my knowledge one of the few, if not the only industrial system that does that. It is absolutely nonsense to say to a lance corporal, for example, that the only way we can raise your pay is to promote you to buck sergeant, when we don't need that sergeant, and in order to make room for that, we have got to fire another sergeant.

The problem we have in the enlisted ranks is not only the problem of retention of first year soldiers, but where we are beginning to lose our troops, our guys who now have 16, 17, 18 years of service, who would like to stay for 25 or 30 but can't, have got to get out. And those are crucial leaders. It is very—you know, one can replace a combat soldier as an individual soldier. It is much more difficult to replace a fire team leader; more difficult still a squad leader; more difficult still a platoon sergeant. We start creating conditions where our platoon sergeants and our squad leaders, especially our squad leaders, either quit, are forced out, or are introduced to drugs, as they are chronically in Europe; then we are flirting with disaster. We are talking about a military force that although it may technically meet the requirements of—numerical requirements, may even technically meet having everyone in the right place, still cannot function.

You know, to paraphrase Robert McNamara in 1962 when he was fooling around with the Army, he said if you take the 4,200 parts, or 42,000 parts of a Ford, you put them together, you still have a Ford. But if you take the 850 men in a battalion, you put them together, you

don't have a battalion, you have 850 men in an association of strangers. They must train together, they must build a psychological and human cement, and that is not possible when officers are rotating through rapidly, where NCO's are losing their confidence or beginning to realize that for their own career opportunities, there is no percentage in staying in the troop units. They, too, now want to become specialists and move out. That is what is happening at the NCO and the enlisted level.

And I think potentially, if we would apply the same analysis of what I have tried to do to the American Army, for example, in that book, to the Russian Army, and we found the same conditions, there would be dancing in the streets at CIA and DIA that our enemy is incompetent. Yet when those conclusions are leveled at our officers, at our men, drug use, of rotation, they are ignored, except in a few forums, such as the Senate hearing today.

Senator NUNN. The Army plans to have 31,362 field grade officers this year but only 1,095 command positions. The Navy has 23,521 field grade officers and approximately 1,600 command positions. The Air Force has 36,113 field grade officers and 3,190 command positions.

This obviously gives very little opportunity for a very large percentage of the officers to serve in command positions. Does this lead to any conclusions as to the current number of officers and the needed number? Do we have too many officers?

Mr. GABRIEL. I think so, sir. I think first of all, the fact that there have always been fewer command slots than there are officers, except in wartimes where the wastage of, say, World War I occurs, is a condition of all modern armies. The same is true in the Canadian Army and the British Army and the German Army.

The question to be addressed is whether or not we want to give everybody command experience as their ticket to promotion that we rotate everyone through, or whether we want to stabilize and select the good combat officers and keep them there for great amounts of time.

On top of what you say, there is just no doubt that two things have occurred in the American Armed Forces: A staggering amount of grade inflation. We have generals today doing jobs that could be done by the rank of colonel; and if you don't believe that, the battle of Tannenberg in World War I was commanded by a colonel.

On the second point, we have far too many staff jobs. The Army has become, or the military has become, a grandiose career in bringing men in, and now we have a lot of officers, we have got to find someplace to put them. So we create staff jobs, and then we keep everyone in motion to make sure that they get their tickets punched so that when they reach the O-6 level, we can "select the best." Anyone who knows anything about the selection procedure at the top knows that the difference between the men who made general and the men who did not is marginal. Indeed, I would suspect we could have replaced 100 percent of our generals with the colonels who failed to make it, and it would have made absolutely no difference.

We have, I believe, too many officers. There are far too many general officers. I don't know what we are doing with all the general officers on active duty. General officers are a particular difficulty. At least colonels do not need aides, secretaries, staff, offices, and people to look after

them. General officers generate all of these requirements. More than that, they create a tension within the organization. You know, when a colonel comes down and asks even a captain or a major, full colonel, for help in an answer, that major still feels he can deal straight with that colonel because he is one of his own. They are both in the same boat. But when a general does that, it is a different story. All kinds of things happen. You can't tell the general that. Don't rock the boat. You don't want to get a bad efficiency report. As a result, the mere presence of so many generals creates tension within the organization that should be diffused.

We don't need them. They are holding a lot of colonel slots. There are equally competent colonels. We could probably cut the Officers Corps by about 15 percent, at least, providing we stabilized units. We could not cut the Officer Corps and continue this maniacal rotation all the way through.

Senator NUNN. If you combined a cut in the Officer Corps with the continued rotation and continued the up-or-out system, it would make the system worse rather than better, wouldn't it?

Mr. GABRIEL. Yes, sir. It would, of course, exacerbate it. There would be fewer and fewer opportunities. The sense of competition would be staggering. And mostly it is wasteful.

Why will we not allow a competent major to remain for 20 years of service? Let his pay keep pace, but why do we have to reduce everything in the military to the only mark of success as that of promotion?

I would submit, sir, that there are—that the Pentagon or this man's Army is full of a lot of men who have had good careers who are not good soldiers. It is also full of a lot of good soldiers who have had bad careers.

Senator NUNN. Admiral Rickover testified several years ago that general officers should be divided into three groups. One group would do the leading, the other two groups would be put in rooms over in the Pentagon, and each general officer would be given a yellow pad and a crayon, and they could write memos to each other.

Would you go that far?

Mr. GABRIEL. Well, sir, I don't want to say that because there are a lot of good general officers who really care. But it has also got to be said that the process by which one becomes a general officer to a student of public administration would be called trained incapacity or perhaps even professional deformation.

There is a sense—I have found in my conversations with senior ranking officers an agreement, a willingness to agree behind closed doors, that there are difficulties. The one thing we can never seem to agree on is that the mechanism by which we select generals needs changing. And I don't mean to be unfair. Men do not easily repudiate their own histories, but it is true that those at the pinnacle of the Military Establishment have almost to a man known little else except the system instituted by Mr. McNamara in 1961-62, which stresses careerism, which stresses entrepreneurialism, which stresses rotation.

It is not unrealistic that these men should not repudiate their own histories, and I certainly don't mean to turn this into a personal attack on the general Officer Corps. There are very fine men among them. My only point is there are greater numbers of equally fine men who are forced out every year at the rank of colonel, and that is—it is a waste.

Senator NUNN. What was the system before McNamara implemented the present system in 1961?

Mr. GABRIEL. Well, I think you had a lot more—there was a certain amount of up or out, there is no doubt about that, but the Army was a different place to be. Troops, for example, were in barracks. They were not in two-man rooms. Local commanders were fairly well stabilized in their positions, to be sure, not nearly as much as 4 years, but about 36 months. On top of that, the traditional military ethos was in force where the military was seen as a calling, not as just another job, so that it was what I have called a corporative institution, or what Maxwell Taylor said in 1961, the Army is not for everyone. It is somewhat like a church. And the Army in those days, to some extent, to a very great extent, manifested those values and the practices which flowed from them.

Mr. McNamara's reversion of the Army to model it after the modern business corporation with which he was most familiar, namely, Ford Motor Co., brought into it a whole range of managerial principles and managerial practices which he thought would work, and to some extent they did work.

For example, MILPERCEN does work. The DEROS system does work, but the point is no one ever evaluated the impact of such "excellent" managerial tools on the bottom line of any military force, its ability to fight. When Mr. McNamara was asked, for example, in 1967-68 about the quality of the American Army, he was outraged. He said, we put 160,000 men over the beach in less than 120 days. No other armed force can do that. What he didn't ask about is the quality of those soldiers, and that is what has really changed. The values, the ethics, the ethos which have resulted from the institutionalization of managerial practices has hurt the Army at its fundamental point, at its ability to fight, and that is unforgivable.

The job of this military force is to defend this Republic. It is not to provide job opportunities for a whole host of other men who threaten to go elsewhere. If they do not have or do not wish to bear the burdens of military service, then let them go elsewhere. We are better off without them, in my view.

Senator NUNN. What specific recommendations would you make about the proposed DOPMA legislation pending before us?

For some time we have suggested to DOD that the up-or-out policy be modified. The Department of Defense doesn't want any modification. But nevertheless, what would you suggest that we do with this legislation to begin to move toward the system that you have envisioned?

Mr. GABRIEL. Well, a couple of things I would do immediately. I would kill the provision, right off the bat, for going from 5 to 15 percent deep selection. That would just make the problem worse.

I would defer action on the provision calling for revision of up or out on the grounds that it would finally enshrine into almost concrete a policy that I think needs much further examination in terms of its effect.

Also, I would like to see—the notion of making a decision at 11 years of a man in an All-Regular Force is a great idea, but it would do you no good to do that at 11 years if you merely force him out at 20 again. You would just be changing names on the officers who are forced out.

By and large, I would not want to see the up-or-out system as proposed in this bill passed in the law. I would like to see it thoroughly re-examined, for the first time, from another perspective, not from the perspective of whether or not it is efficient, not from a perspective of whether or not it runs computers well, or whether it provides jobs, or whether or not the staff's efficiency reports are going to work, but from one single perspective: the perspective of its effect, if implemented, on the combat ability of the American fighting units. We already know, I believe, in many instances, what that effect is. We see it today in the inability of tank gunners: 28 percent of the tank gunners cannot use the tank sights. So I think we have got to take a really hard look at that, but from a different perspective.

You know, it is amazing, we use a term in the Army and elsewhere, efficiency report. Any student of public administration will tell you efficiency relates only to the internal operations of a system. It says nothing at all about the effectiveness of that system in producing results. And so that is what has happened to the bureaucratized American Army. We may in fact be very efficient in getting the memos across the hall. We may even be very efficient in getting troops to the point of contact. The question is, will those troops be effective, and under the present bill, some of the provisions of the present bill—and I limit my comments to only those two—I think it would be disastrous. I think it will exacerbate an already bad situation, sir.

Senator NUNN. I have one other question, and then I will defer to Senator Jepsen.

Have you done enough studying to enable you to comment on the All-Volunteer Force? If you have, I would like to get your comments. If not, you may defer it.

Mr GABRIEL. Yes, sir; I have been studying the All-Volunteer Force almost since its inception, and I have written fairly extensively on it.

In my view it is a disaster of the first order, and I will just take it in terms of the problems we have. Drug use is almost as high as it was in Vietnam. The DEROS system is so bad that our units are associations of strangers. They are not cohesive units. Their leaders rotate through, and you even hear them saying on TV, the soldiers are losers. It used to be Army doctrine that there were no bad soldiers, only bad officers. That has been replaced with the managerial notion that there are no bad officers, there are only bad troops.

They are ill trained, and they are sullen. A U.S. Army report out of Heidelberg just this year concludes that the single most important structural support for drug use in the American Army is the two- and three-man room. It makes strangers in which peers can gang up on peers. One could list a whole litany of very obvious sins. The 42-percent MOS mismatch, for example. Of the troops interviewed in the Berlin brigade last year, 53 percent said they would not trust the judgment of their officers in combat. One could list that whole litany of rather obvious pathologies of that Army.

There is another pathology, another problem that goes to the heart of this Republic that is rarely, if ever, addressed, and that is this: That the Volunteer Army, especially in the enlisted ranks, simply is unrepresentative of the American society. It draws disproportionately on the blacks, on the poor, on the disadvantaged, on the ill educated. As a result, when it comes time to die, as inevitably it will, a

very, very narrow section of this Republic will be forced to bear a disproportionate burden of death. That is unacceptable from a moral perspective, in my view. It is unacceptable in a republic, which suggests that it is ruled by the principles of equal opportunity and equal responsibility under law. We are leveling the burden of death almost exclusively on a very narrow percentage of our population, narrow substratum, and that bodes ill for effective combat use because if one uses a European scenario, the number of losses will be very high within a few days, and there will be a reckoning somewhere down the line—other societies have done it. Other societies have leveled the burden of death on narrow segments of the poor and there have been reckonings after defeats.

That is why I think the Volunteer Army has got to be changed. But, I would add, to go back to the draft is merely one step. It will do us no good to go back to the draft for manpower without bringing about the other changes that we have talked about today, the quality of the officer corps, and in the managerial and combat structure of the U.S. Army.

Senator NUNN. Senator Jepsen?

Senator JEPSEN. Yes. In your studies did you find in the area of leadership that the hands of the military people who are in command positions are tied by the various regulations of the Military Court of Appeals?

As a youngster in the 82d Airborne, I grew up in a hurry. But some of the things they tell me that are going on today, I don't know whether or not to believe them.

Mr. GABRIEL. You are getting at a crucial point. There is no doubt that the ability of a commander at almost any level today, especially at the small unit, the company commander, the platoon leader, to deal effectively with his troops, has been hamstrung not only by certain Supreme Court decisions, or the Court of Military Appeals decisions, but equally so by the administrative machinations of the Army itself.

For example, when you were in and when I was an active officer, the company clerk was a very powerful man. He had your pay records. He had your medical records, pass and leave records, the duty roster. The company clerk is no longer there. It is all centralized at the battalion.

We have done study after study about what men identify with: Usually with the squad, sometimes with the platoon, now and then with the company, but almost never with the battalion.

So it is true what you say, that a lot of the prerogatives of a traditional armed force have been eroded by court decisions, by what is popular politically, but equally so, by the military's own standards. For example, if I can just give you one. The 82d Airborne, a proud old division, were until most recently allowed to wear berets. As you know, any soldier likes distinctive headgear, so they were wearing their berets and they were proud. It may be infantile, but there was a distinctiveness about them. The last Chief of Staff ordered the berets off on the grounds of standardization of the Armed Forces.

I frankly, Senator, couldn't care if the men want to dress in blue tutus, as long as it creates a sense of unit cohesion and effectiveness, and that is what we are doing. We are stripping our commanders of a lot of the prerogatives they need to build an effective combat force.

Senator JEPSEN. I have no further questions.

Senator NUNN. Have you had any response from the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army or any high-level people in the Department of Defense to your book "Crisis of Command"?

Mr. GABRIEL. No, sir, certainly nothing formal. You must understand that a Reserve major does not get much opportunity to talk directly with generals. I did have the opportunity to discuss with General Yerks the problems of the All-Volunteer Army on the McNeil-Lehrer report, but I do not know what the reaction to my book is. I would think it is not important what their reaction to my book is. What is important is that if an individual like myself who is isolated on a campus in New Hampshire can use Army official data to marshal a case for these situations, what bothers me is why someone within the military themselves has not made that case publicly, and we are not talking about the failure of a second lieutenant. We are talking about men who at a very high level have grave moral responsibilities to this Republic. If they feel so strongly, I mean, if they cannot perceive the problem, then there is either something wrong with them or with me, and I would debate that question either way. But if they do see the problem and they do not feel strongly enough to bring it to public attention, then perhaps the professional deformation I talked of earlier in which the process of becoming an executive, if I may use that term, puts certain limits on your behavior is operating with a vengeance. I feel it a problem that in the Canadian Army over the last 20 years, they have had 27 flag officers retire in protest over policies, not the least of which was the fighting condition of the Canadian Armed Forces.

In that time, except for the somewhat confused position or confused situation surrounding General Singlaub, it wasn't clear he resigned in protest, we cannot point to a single general officer who has been willing to say, with regard to the Army: "This is wrong, it is not working, I know it, my staff knows it. I will not preside over a condition which is dangerous to this Republic."

We are not talking again about a road that doesn't work, or a building that costs too much. We are talking about the defense of this country.

Senator NUNN. The subcommittee has just heard testimony on the Selective Service. We have a bill pending in the Senate on the subject of registration right now. Just last week we had a colonel who stated his frank opinion to the Director of Selective Service. He did not get any results inside Selective Service. He responded to a legitimate inquiry from our staff, without leaking any information, but simply responded to the inquiry, and within 3 days he was fired. Then, of course, there was a little news article on that. We found out this morning that another person inside the Selective Service System—a civilian who also is a Reserve officer—had protested and gotten no results whatsoever, for many reasons which I outlined this morning by quoting his letter. He then decided to go to the Commander in Chief. He gave the Secret Service a package to deliver to the President, and then he was met with the request for a psychiatric examination.

It is simply incredible that people in this administration and previous administrations are not able to look objectively or even willing to

look objectively at our personnel and manpower problems. I have never seen anything equal to the blinders that are now on in terms of looking at them objectively and discussing it objectively. I can't find anyone who believes that the selective service plan will work now, except the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, the President of the United States, and the Director of the Selective Service. No one else who has examined it thinks it has even the remotest chance of working.

I don't know whether you know about the selective service plan, but everything is supposed to happen after M-day. You are going to register, classify and draft hundreds of thousands of people in the first 30 days, and the first 60 days will produce another 100,000, which is totally, completely, absolutely impossible. And yet, that is the official policy of the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense. It is, needless to say, very discouraging. Do you want to comment on any of that?

Mr. GABRIEL. Except to agree with you, Senator, that it is discouraging, but it is somewhat understandable. Again, the process of managerialism, if going along—the process of getting to the top breeds men, perhaps some men, that are not used to public courage. It is staggering failure of the United States to note that until this year, we have not had a course in ethics taught at West Point, and we still do not have a course in ethics taught in our ROTC programs. If the only ethic or the supreme ethos is that of the entrepreneur, of getting ahead, of making the system work, then you fall into the trap of what I have called Eichmannism, a value-free technician. It is simply nonsense to believe that every course of action is equally acceptable to every other course of action simply because the system demands it. That is true only in a society of fools or madmen.

And perhaps the tendency to get on board, to go along, to not rock the boat, which is the only way one makes it to the top, once you are at the top leads to a tendency, when confronted, perhaps not to recognize grave moral dilemmas, or when one does recognize grave moral dilemmas, to resolve them in favor of the organization, and to merely salute and step into the abyss and retire.

Senator NUNN. And once retired, then testify freely and fully against everything that the administration stands for in the Department of Defense.

Mr. GABRIEL. Well, that sounds like——

Senator NUNN. I have never seen anything like it. You would think that the word "courage" cannot come about until people retire.

I don't know whether I will be for or against SALT II, but we have more testimony against SALT II by retired military officials than you can shake a stick at. But until they retire, they are awfully bashful.

Senator JEPSEN. I wonder if I may, Mr. Chairman, talk about that a little bit.

I feel very sympathetic toward some of the military Chiefs of Staff and the leaders who are very dedicated people who believe in duty, honor, country, and have given their lives and their careers to it; but it does seem in this administration that the message has been very emphatically driven home regarding whether you agree or disagree with certain policies, and I think General Singlaub, whom you mentioned, found that out very quickly. Last year I debated many times the Pan-

ama Canal Treaties, forgetting about the rights or wrongs of the treaties. The fact of the situation was that those who were proponents of it continually and repeatedly pointed to the military Chiefs of Staff who said, in effect, "It is all right." Well, what do you expect them to say when the President of the United States says "The Office of the Presidency depends on the approval of this treaty."

You know, we have a tremendous number of people retire who I am sure are in some very agonizing situations. I think we should be careful that we don't say we have a bunch of gutless wonders as the Chiefs of Staff, because we haven't.

Mr. GABRIEL. I'm not saying that.

Senator JEPSEN. I feel for them, and I hope that some of this leaks back to the administration so they understand there are people in the Senate who feel for some of these people when they are put under this pressure. And as I say, pressure is subtle, it only took one Singlaub, but that was very clear and everybody got the message.

So they come up with a decision, they come out of it now with another SALT, as Senator Nunn has just discussed. We have got retired people, we have got a man who just did retire, Lieutenant General Rowny, I believe, who has been the JCS delegate at SALT since 1973. He can tell you what is wrong with SALT.

How do you set out and try to extract a candid answer from someone in a uniform with regard to SALT? Do you use the institutional view versus your personal view? Do you ask for a military view? How long would they last if they expressed a personal view contrary to their institutional view?

Mr. GABRIEL. You know, Senator, if I may say, because I don't wish to be misunderstood about what I mean and I am not suggesting that Chiefs of Staff or general officers are, to use your words, gutless wonders, not at all.

Senator JEPSEN. I am not sure we just didn't have—

Mr. GABRIEL. Well, for sure, but what the problem is, as you say, how do you get the prophet to speak the truth? Now, George III said of us at the time of our Revolution, "You, too, will be plagued someday with lawyers, as have I been." Well, the distinctions that you make for a military man, for example, say, well, this is the official view and this is my personal view, and this is the technical view, on major issues; such distinctions are merely legalistic. They have no true meaning. For example, I am sure the fellow who defends the crash of the DC-10, as his first position in court, will say, "We take the position that the DC-10 did not crash," and it is up to the defense to drive him off that position.

What I am saying is this: Men ought certainly never to retire or resign over trivialities, and certainly a certain amount of staying in and helping is better than going over the side. By the same token, there are instances where the issues are so great, where the costs are so high that you have got to offer your head and say: "Look, I can't carry this out, and I will quit." What is interesting is that it happens in Britain, it happens in Germany, it happens in France, it happens in Canada, 27 flag officers in 20 years. Why doesn't it happen here? That is the question. And until it does begin to happen here, retirement in protest as opposed to resignation, so they do not lose their benefits, retirement in protest, until—there should be no fear on the part of a

colonel or a major or a general to tell a Senator what he thinks is the truth, and the distinction between the official view and his personal view is almost meaningless.

You know, the Duke of Wellington said with regard to loyalty, and that's what we are talking about, loyalty to one's superiors, the Commander in Chief, your loyalty is owed to your men. It must be earned by your superiors. It is not the ultimate act of loyalty to acquiesce publicly in a position that you feel is dangerous or misled. Quite to the contrary, it is the ultimate act of cowardice and is the ultimate act of disservice to this country. To go along when you feel that your ethics are violated or that what is being done is a disservice to this country, is morally unacceptable. One may only abandon one's judgment to one's God. One may never abandon it to another man. If you do, you quickly find yourself in the trap of Eichmannism, the value-free technician, only following orders. It is insufficient, in my view, in an age where the risks of a bad military force may well be megadeath.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much.

Senator Warner, do you have any questions at this point?

Senator WARNER. No questions, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Gabriel, we thank you very much for being here. You have been most helpful as a witness, and I would hope that we can continue to get the benefit of your considerable wisdom and knowledge in this entire area as we work on this legislation.

Mr. GABRIEL. Thank you, Senator, and thank you for the opportunity.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

Our next witness is Col. William L. Hauser, commanding officer, U.S. Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Colonel Hauser is here at the invitation of the subcommittee, not because of his current assignment in the Army, but because of his long-term interest in officer management.

Colonel Hauser has written several articles on officer personnel management including a recent article entitled "The Army's Officer Career System: A Continuing Need for Professional and Managerial Reform" which will soon be published in the Journal of the Executive Institute. He has also written a book, "America's Army in Crisis."

Colonel Hauser, we recognize that we are asking you to give your personal views today, that you are not expressing the views of the Army.

Colonel HAUSER. Thank you, Senator. I understand that.

Senator NUNN. Thank you. You may go ahead with your statement.

**STATEMENT OF COL. WILLIAM L. HAUSER, COMMANDING OFFICER,
U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR BEHAVIORAL AND SO-
CIAL SCIENCES**

Colonel HAUSER. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, as Senator Nunn has said, I appear as an individual officer, not as a representative of the Army. I am familiar with and understand the Army's position in favoring the passage of this legislation under consideration, and in my judgment, that position, that official position is correct, given the assumptions with which it was formulated, which I shall discuss later.

My personal, individual, professional differing with the Army's position is the result of 25 years of deep thought on the general subject of military professionalism, and 10 years of writing and publication, 1 book and more than 20 published articles on various aspects of military professionalism.

My individual professional views are best expressed in an essay cleared by the Army for publication in the *Journal of the Federal Executive Institute*, "The Bureaucrat," which Senator Nunn cited a moment ago. Having received permission of the editor, I would like to enter a copy of that article into the record.

Senator NUNN. Without objection, it will be entered in the record. [The information follows:]

[From *The Bureaucrat* (Journal of the Federal Executive Institute)]

THE ARMY'S OFFICER CAREER SYSTEM: A CONTINUING NEED FOR PROFESSIONAL AND MANAGERIAL REFORM

(By William L. Hauser)

The U.S. Army, of all armed services, seems the most beset by a multitude of serious problems. The costs of weapon systems have risen dramatically, as have the operating expenses of ready forces and the pay and benefits necessary to attract volunteer soldiers while military budgets have declined in percentage of federal spending, in percentage of GNP, and even in constant dollars. Recruiting is becoming increasingly difficult, despite a continuing high level of unemployment in the economy; an imminent downturn in military-age population portends greater difficulty. Of even more concern than quantity of manpower is the issue of quality. Notwithstanding officials' claims, overwhelmingly bolstered by statistics that "today's soldiers are the best in history," there is widespread uneasiness as to the skills and aptitudes of the Army's rank and file, if not in absolute terms, then relative to the requirements of modern military technology. Further there is a rising debate over whether our forces, especially those in Europe, are trained, disciplined, and motivated well enough to deter, and, if deterrence should fail, to withstand the awesome military machine of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies.

There is yet another problem that appears to transcend all of those listed above. The perception is growing that the Army's uniformed leadership, or the policy-formulating structure which undergirds it, is somehow insufficiently capable of addressing coherently the host of issues which confront it. Admittedly, the combination of accelerating technology, "social revolution," institutional credibility loss, international threat, and reduced access to human and fiscal resources might daunt any leadership group. But the feeling persists that the Army is not coping as well as it ought, that it is not adequately adapting to change.

It is the purpose of this essay to examine how the military profession came to this pass, and whether the problem is truly a serious one—and, if serious, how it might be addressed.

ORIGINS OF THE PROBLEM

Looking back in history, it appears that the watershed experience of our Army was the mobilization of World War II. The applicability of that mobilization model to current strategy is a subject for debate, but not germane to this paper. What is germane is that the Army's postwar leadership, along with that of the other services, drew from that experience a basic premise concerning the officer corps. They observed that the prewar leadership generation of generals and senior colonels (men in their fifties and early sixties) had largely been pushed aside to allow younger men to run the war. That had taken a couple of years, a luxury not to be permitted in the future, given the technological revolution which the war had brought in nuclear weapons, aviation, missiles, communications, and mechanization. The postwar Army had to have a younger officer corps, for the sake of readiness.

From that reasoning came the Officer Personnel Act of 1947. The law had the following major provisions, which have continued in force to this day: Abolition

of the system of promotion by seniority; graduated retirement benefits for 20-30 years' service, and "up or out" mandatory discharge/retirement.

It is now widely accepted that officers make captain in their early twenties, major in their early thirties (or get out), lieutenant colonel in their late thirties (or get out), colonel in their early forties (or retire), and that colonels retire in their late forties, with a small minority holding on until their early fifties. Even general officers retire in their fifties, in contrast to a retirement age some 5-10 years older for senior executives of comparably sized civilian corporations. Truly, the goal of a young officer corps has been achieved.

In retrospect, it seems that the framers of the 1947 Act did not foresee certain factors which would modify the effects of the new policy. First was that the United States Army would have, for a third of a century or more, half of its combat formations overseas. Second was that all officers, even the small minority who become colonels (discounting that smaller minority of general officers), would have to begin thinking, from their mid-thirties on, about a "second career." Third was that the American people and their elected representatives, after an "unwon" war and a "lost" one, would become disillusioned as to the utility of armed force, particularly ground forces, as an instrument of national policy. Finally, the technological revolution would continue unabated and even accelerate, along with a "social revolution."

These factors have had a number of unfortunate effects. First, the high proportion of the Army overseas has caused career officers to rotate frequently between theaters. This, combined with the shorter career's rate of promotion (once every 4-5 years) has meant that officers change jobs—by promotion or transfer—every 1½ to 2 years. If one adds school attendances and short-tour oversea assignments, the average becomes 1½ years or even less. Aggravating this situation has been the efficiency report system, whose inflation and concomitant degrading have caused officers to seek performance in a variety of jobs as evidence of "generalist" versatility and hence promotability. In summary, the shorter career has combined with other factors to create an extreme degree of shoratoriness.

The next factor, the need for a "second career," was not entirely new, even in 1947. It had long been true that officers who dropped behind their contemporaries tended to leave the service earlier than required. The new law, however, by permitting early-forties retirement at one-half base pay (about 40 percent of total pay), and by requiring late-forties or early-fifties retirement at up to three-quarters base pay (about 60 percent of total pay), has tended to encourage some of the more farsighted and adventurous to leave early enough to start a meaningful second career. The alternative, as perceived by many, has been "worst-time" retirement—too young to quit work, too old to start a "real" second career.

Tragically, this perception has been strongest in the Army among combat arms officers, whose military skills are not easily transferable to the civilian job market. Although unremarked at the time, a basic contradiction was created in 1947—between the traditional concept of lifetime "profession" and a new reality that, for most officers, their military service is only the first of two or more careers.

The fact that more officers have not retired at twenty years can only be attributed to a high order of professional dedication, in spite of economic self-interest. A large part of that dedication has sprung from a deep reservoir of public respect for the profession of arms. Even in the darkest days of the Vietnam War, one read very little blame of the military services themselves. The nation's political leadership took—and deserved—the brunt of criticism. With such public acceptance, the Army emerged from the war free of the sort of bitterness felt by the German military after World War I and the French after Indochina and Algeria.

But while the Army has largely avoided Vietnam-generated public antipathy, it is facing increasing apathy toward the utility of armed force as an instrument of national policy, the third factor cited earlier. However illogical, this has been a major element in recent foreign policy and budget priorities and in officers' motivation. To the extent that American public opinion perceives that armed forces (particularly ground forces) may not be needed in the future, or if needed may not be used, or even if used may not be effective, esteem for the military has tended to decline. Such a decline, coupled with officers' regarding the Army as only their "first" career, has had a serious impact on retention in the service, collective morale, and the maintenance of professional standards.

Finally, the pace of the technological and social revolutions (one might add a managerial revolution as well) has made it difficult for even the best officers to

keep up with change. The shorter, faster career and its resulting transitoriness have aggravated this situation, making it almost impossible for an officer to become truly expert at anything. This has frustrated those who have sought excellence in modern management and technology, added to the Army's difficulties in adapting, to charge, and contributed to what Samuel Huntington has termed "subjective" civilian control over service matters.

AN EARLIER ATTEMPT AT SOLUTION

These four factors—career transitoriness, replacement of "profession" by "first career," diminution of public regard, and acceleration of change—go far to explain the problems and scandals which racked the Army during the latter years of the Vietnam War. To be sure, the peculiarities of the war itself (in Vietnam and back home in America) contributed greatly to the situation. Still, it is obvious that the state of affairs in the Army was aggravated by, rather than totally caused by, the stresses of the war. The visible events were symptoms of an underlying professional malaise.

This unpleasant truth was brought home to the Army's leadership by a remarkable study conducted by the Army War College in academic year 1969-70. The "Professionalism Study" revealed that, in the opinions of a representative sample of officers, professional standards of technical competence, concerned leadership, and unselfish service had been dangerously eroded. In their place had grown up "ticket-punching" (frequent job-switching to get a variety of career-enhancing roles on the record), overemphasis on superficial indicators of performance (to the detriment of longer-range values), and apparent exploitation rather than development of subordinates.

The Army's leaders, at first stunned by these revelations, took a number of remedial actions. Tenure in command of brigades and battalions was restored to the pre-Vietnam standard of eighteen months, major studies were launched in the areas of leadership and training, and a flurry of communications went forth urging revitalization of professional ethics.

More fundamental was the Army Chief of Staff's announcement in 1971 of the new Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS). OPMS, it was said would free officers from the pretense and pressures of trying to be "jack of all trades and master of none." Rather, those with a liking and talent for troop leadership would be able to spend more of their careers in that sort of activity; while specialists in modern technological skills would be able to concentrate in the area of their expertise, without fear of thereby forfeiting advancement. For both categories of officers, and for those others whose service might entail some mixture of troop duty and technical specialization, there would be "many roads to the top." The major beneficiary of the reform—which would result in troop units' being better led and modern technology's being better managed—would be the Army itself and its combat-readiness mission.

THE UNDERLYING LOGIC OF OPMS

Although contribution to national security is clearly the primary purpose of OPMS, the motivation of the officer corps is an equally important goal, for its nonfulfillment would undermine the primary purpose. Officers must be motivated to develop their skills for contribution to the Army's mission, and to remain in the Army and employ those skills in the country's service. Failure to motivate them could lead in time to our losing too many of the best skilled and most conscientious, increasing the proportion (thankfully, now small) of those retained principally by either inertia or careerist ambition. Such a prospect, to anyone sensitive to the lessons of history, would bode great danger to our national security.

What motivates Army officers? The answer varies depending on whom you ask, but probably everyone would agree on a Maslow-type "hierarchy of needs," here listed in ascending order: First (and lowest), economic security; second, sense of belonging to an "officer corps"; third, status/prestige/rank—promotion; next to highest, interesting work; and highest, service to country.

Economic security does not appear to be a motivational problem at this time. Pay and benefits, although perceived as eroding, are high enough not to trouble most officers. Continued erosion, however, might lead to such unprofessional behavior as "moonlighting" and second-career preparation to the extent of detracting from current duties. The Army's leadership has rightly shown practicality and foresight in resisting further erosion.

Switching to the top of the hierarchy, neither service to country nor interesting work seem to be in jeopardy as motivators. A growing international threat and a still-reasonable level of domestic support demonstrate both actual and perceived linkage between military service and worth to country. And most officers have interesting and challenging work, their variety of assignments adding to that interest.

The problem appears to lie with the second and third motivators—sense of belonging and promotion. But before discussing them, another look is in order concerning the concept of hierarchy of needs.

As generally agreed by modern psychologists and sociologists, when any one of a hierarchy of needs is satisfied, it ceases to have much motivational effect. The individual then strives toward the next element up on the hierarchy. Conversely, if a lower-level need is threatened, the individual's interest in higher-level matters diminishes, and concentrates instead on the imperiled lower one. In sum, what motivates people is not their current level of satisfaction but their anticipation of gain at the next higher order or loss at the current or next lower.

Thus, with economic security not seriously threatened, Army officers are not motivated or demotivated by that factor. As for service to country and interesting work, they are motivators only to the extent that the intermediate-order motivators, belonging and promotion, are satisfied. In blunter language, if officers are doubtful about their standing within the officer corps (worth, sense of professional membership, etc.) or about their prospects for promotion, no amount of appeal to higher principle is going to sustain their motivation for service over the long term. (Many otherwise well-versed senior officers appear to misunderstand this key concept of behavior—that the higher motivational factor follows satisfaction of the lower; it cannot substitute for it.)

There is a serious anomaly in the Army's administration of OPMS, which explains why it today is neither widely understood nor widely accepted throughout the Army. In an appeal to the motivational concept of officers corps belonging, the Army tells officers that commanders and specialists are equally valued members of the team. The perception persists, however—reinforced by ex-commander predominance on high-level school and promotion lists—that command is almost a necessity for success, and, given an "up or out" system of tenure, continued status as a member of the officer corps. The officer who would prefer to concentrate on developing some highly complex specialty is thereby discouraged from doing so, and encouraged to dilute his skills for the sake of advancement (or to leave the Army as the only way to pursue excellence in his chosen field).

Conversely, the officer who would prefer to stay mostly with troops, specializing only to the extent of having continuity in his intermittent tours on staff, is also faced with a tough choice. So long as he receives tangible indicators of success, (school, command, and promotion selections), he remains motivated by both anticipation of advancement and a sense of place within the officer corps.

However, given the shortness and rapidity of the career and the inexorability of "up or out," the officer has only to miss one indicator of success—one school, command, or promotion list—to be suddenly confronted with a threat to his officer corps standing, and perhaps even his economic security. He must immediately turn much of his attention to his imminent "second career" and thus divert his energies from the higher elements of motivation. His anxiety is enhanced by the knowledge that his definable skills (troop command and related staff processes) may not be readily transferable to civilian employment.

THE ESSENCE OF OPMS

Correcting this professional malaise was the second purpose of OPMS. It complemented the primary purpose of providing the Army with the best commanders and the most expert specialists. The concept was brilliant in its simplicity, as explained in the next three paragraphs.

1. The combat arms officer, early in his service, would be required to choose (or would be assigned) a "secondary specialty." He would work in that field whenever he served on a staff. If selected for command (by a centralized board at both battalion and brigade levels), he would have a clear indication of potential for advancement to higher levels of rank and responsibility. If not so selected, a signal that he was no longer "competitive" in a combat arms career, he would have his staff specialty to fall back on. Because of the Army's policy of "many roads to the top," which would be made manifest through promotion board re-

sults, both the command-selected officer and the non-selected would have avenues for advancement and for productive roles in the officer corps.

2. A similar career pattern and motivational climate would apply to officers commissioned in the combat support and service support branches, in most of which are found a mixture of command and specialist career opportunities. The obvious difference, of course, is that many of these branches have somewhat greater transferability to the civilian economy than do the combat arms. Even so, it is usually technical skills associated with the combat support and service support branches which are transferable, rather than the branches' functions in the Army in the field. Thus the motivational problem, while perhaps not so severe as in the combat arms, is not totally dissimilar.

3. At the other end of the spectrum is the "true specialist." This is the officer who, in accordance with his pre-service background or, more likely his in-service schooling and experience, would pursue development in and contribution through his specialty. Just as it is in the Army's interest to have the best "commanders" (as contrasted with best "all-around officers") in command, it makes sense to maximize the skills of officer specialists in such intricate fields as command-control-communications, personnel management, material acquisition, cryptology, etc. Depending on the needs of the service, officers would be allowed to focus their careers in these narrow and highly technical specialties without penalty, because of the policy that specialists are equally valued members of the officer corps and have similar opportunity for advancement in rank and responsibility.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that officer morale was not the principal purpose of OPMS. First and foremost was the aim of supporting the Army's mission, by getting the best commanders in command and by retaining and maximizing the contribution of officer specialists. However, the fact that the system would also benefit professional motivation was not just a happy coincidence. The Army was adopting a military version of modern management practices, essential in this era of social and technological complexity and rapid change.

THE KEY TO IMPLEMENTING OPMS

If the logic is so overpowering, both for the Army's mission and for the motivation of officers, why is OPMS so widely misunderstood? And it is, no matter how much we wish it were not so. One might well discount the attitudes found often among colonels and general officers who rose to their present positions under the previous system. But one cannot so easily dismiss the beliefs of many younger officers, captain to lieutenant colonel, to the effect that "I believe in OPMS, but I don't see the theory being practiced."

They are right. Command is still a "ticket" for advancement, even for those specialists whose narrow and highly technical skills are critically needed by the Army; and staff work is still the most frequent career activity for commanders, even the most leadership-talented. The ideal career, whatever may be said officially, is still perceived to be frequent alternation of command with a staff specialty.

It would be unrealistic, of course, to have expected OPMS to become reality overnight. Such a fundamental shift in the attitudes of an entire profession will probably take a generation. Neither those who favor OPMS nor those who oppose it can expect soon to see it made manifest in such crucial indicators as selection lists.

But this is the paradox. Until change in section lists occurs and is perceived, attitudes are not likely to change. Selection lists speak louder than words. So the most direct way to speed up the implementation of OPMS is to lengthen command tours and thereby reduce the number of officers who command. Only the very best commanders at the company level should be allowed to command battalions, and only the best battalion commanders should go on to lead brigades. Officers not so selected, at whatever career point, should be allowed thereafter to concentrate in those specialties which the Army needs and the individual officers are willing to pursue. To make the new policy manifest in selection lists, there need to be promotion quotas (or floors, if quotas are illegal or infeasible) based on the Army's projected needs for each specialty in the higher grade.

Does this mean establishment of a "command specialty"? Not in a formal sense. All that is necessary is to lengthen command tenure. For example, if an officer were to have commanded well as a captain, perhaps more than once, with a couple of years on "troop staff," he would be a strong contender for selection to battalion command. Then if he volunteered for and commanded at both battalion and brigade levels, each for three years or so, the result would be perhaps fifteen years with troops in twenty-five years of service.

There are a number of additional arguments for lengthening command tenure—correction of emphasis on superficiality, heightened concern for and development

of subordinate officers and NCOs, less "whiplashing" of the troops, heightened performance standards, enhanced readiness, and more efficient administration. All of these are very persuasive, as are the arguments against lengthened command tours: commander "burn-out," fewer ex-commanders for staff jobs which need such experience, fewer ex-commanders for higher command in the event of total mobilization, and the need for command opportunity as a motivator for officers. When one weighs the arguments for and against, they are almost equally balanced. Which way the balance tips depends on judgment as to the weight to be given the various arguments.

It is instructive to note, however, that the arguments for lengthening command tours are concerned mostly with the current effectiveness of the Army. The arguments against are largely centered on providing ex-commanders for various purposes. While both are important, it appears that an outdated mobilization model may still be driving the career/professionalism policies of a "ready now" (or, to use Morris Janowitz's term, "constabulary") Army.

Moreover, as stated in the previous section of this paper, an attempt to motivate officers by allowing a maximum number to keep their commander/specialist options open may be self-defeating. In fact, it may well explain why OPMS is still neither widely accepted nor widely understood in the officer corps. Those who are inclined to command see that they will be allowed to do so only rarely, while those who wish to specialize perceive that to do so—despite official statements to the contrary—is destructive of the career. In other words, the officer corps doubts that the Army is really serious about OPMS. They believed in OPMS initially; now they are "waiting for the other shoe to drop."

THE CONTINUING NECESSITY FOR OPMS

Is OPMS really necessary? Assuming for the moment that lengthening command tours is essential to genuine implementation of OPMS, is such implementation itself essential to the accomplishment of the Army's mission?

Yes, for a variety of reasons. First, the Army has today a strategic role of unprecedented immediacy. It must maintain mechanized forces in Europe, which, combined with other services and a multi-national alliance and coupled with American strategic nuclear power, must be credibly ready to deter military dominance by the Soviet Union. The Army must also be prepared, as part of that deterrence, to deploy reinforcements to Europe quickly. Moreover, it must be ready to dispatch light, mobile forces to any point on the globe, to handle contingencies where speed is more important than massive force. (The fact that the United States may appear currently disinclined to military "intervention" can be no excuse for failing to be ready; if history teaches anything, it is to plan for the unexpected.) Of last priority is preparation for protracted warfare and for the national mobilization and military expansion which would accompany such a situation. The emphasis is on readiness now, which calls for the highest possible expertise of both commanders and specialists.

Second, the Army must cope with an era of rapid technological and social change. Perhaps the cruelest dilemma of current civil-military relations in America is that military technology is undergoing a revolution in sophistication at the very moment when an expanding economy coupled with a declining military-age population portends even greater difficulty in matching human and material resources. (This subject, too complex to be treated adequately in this paper, is most clearly discussed in recent writings and public testimony by Charles Moskos.) Coping with these social and technological forces will require an officer corps of great expertise and excellence, in both command and technical specialties.

Third, the Army must increasingly husband its resources of dollars, manpower, and materiel. Both men and machines are becoming more expensive, and the nation's elected leaders seem disinclined to provide the armed services with either manpower or dollars sufficient to meet adequately the threat facing the country. Management of all the resources allocated to the Army is going to have to improve significantly—including in troop units and including soldiers' time and energy—if we are to get the most defense within constrained resources. If the Army's officer corps cannot demonstrate the expertise to handle these matters internally, interference by civilian officialdom (perhaps to a dysfunctionally "subjective" degree) is inevitable.

Fourth, greater officer stability and expertise is needed to restore the professionalism of the NCO corps. With battalion and brigade commanders (and key staff officers) in place for only eighteen months or so, there still exists a "zero defects" climate throughout the troop units of the Army. The temptation is

almost irresistible for commanders to oversupervise their subordinates, to strive for administrative perfection, and to "get an officer to do it."

There is a great deal of energy spent on NCO professionalism "programs," but examination reveals them to be largely concerned with perquisites and promotion opportunity. In actual practice, junior officers tend to usurp the NCO's role in maintenance, supply administration, individual soldier training, and discipline, and these activities are often not done well, for officers are simultaneously under pressure to administer various requirements to perfection but still not delegate "people and things" activities to NCOs; the officers are overly busy, while the NCOs and soldiers are often underchallenged. To be fair, the situation is better than it was a few years ago—but not by much. More stability and personalized leadership are needed in the Army's troop units if a viable command climate and associated NCO professionalism are not to be replaced by impersonal centralization or even unionization. We are neglecting the simplest and most readily available measure for enhancing interpersonal communication and thereby the commitment of our soldiers and the cohesiveness of our units—lengthening of person-to-person contact.

Finally, OPMS is needed to preserve the "combat ethic" of the United States Army. So long as troop command is the way to advancement in the Army (or is so perceived), command will be regarded as one of many "tickets" in a career, rather than as an art and science in itself. Whether one agrees with the provisions of the 1947 Officer Personnel Act or not, the fact is that it established a 20-30 year career for all but that tiny minority who became general officers. For the individual officer to pack everything he must into that short career—and still be able to leave early enough for a meaningful "second career"—he must move rapidly from job to job, to troop command then quickly back to staff specialty. OPMS, as thus far implemented, has only partially addressed the problem, by allowing the officer to return intermittently to work in the same staff specialty. Like it or not, the almost universal perception among officers is that non-selection for command spells the end of higher aspiration. It is then time to prepare for the "second career." Such preparation does not emphasize expertise in military-peculiar matters: weapons, military training, tactics, strategy.

CONCLUSION

The conclusion reached in this paper is probably self-evident but nonetheless worth stating. Not only the primary-mission-"production" function of an organization but also its "adaptive-coping" functions are crucially dependent on the quality of its decision-makers. High-level decision-makers, and the middle-level executives who facilitate and implement their judgments, are products of their various career experiences. If these high and mid-level executives, and the organization's whole corps of junior executives who aspire to join their ranks, come to perceive that job variety and visible short-term results are the keys to career advancement, then superficiality and short-range thinking become organizational virtues. As a result, the collective ability of the organization to see ahead—to visualize tomorrow's consequences of today's decisions—so that the organization can pre-adapt to change rather than hurriedly and incoherently react, is seriously hindered. The problem is not that the top leadership product is bad, but that the career process gradually and subtly degrades the organization's ability to do business.

This is what may have happened to the Army. Officers' careers are so short and rapidly upward-mobile (compared to modern corporate practice), that the diversification which might be a virtue in a longer and more geographically stable professional life becomes, through excess, a vice. The right people may indeed rise to wear the stars, but, in the process, the entire officer corps adopts a cultural pattern of transitoriness and superficiality.

A fundamental solution would be to repeal the Officer Personnel Act of 1947, at least that provision which has led to the Army's (and the other services') discarding their experienced colonels in their forties and most of their generals in their early fifties. But the legislation would have to be tailored carefully to avoid a massive stagnation of colonels and generals in their late fifties and early sixties, totally blocking the mobility of their juniors. Some sort of early culling process, notionally in the captain-major ranks (late twenties to early thirties in age) will probably be necessary, with the uncultured minority being allowed to stay on for "life-time" careers as military specialists of various kinds.

But that is not likely to occur in the near future. Indeed, the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act, which has been before Congress for several years, would have the effect of putting current policies in concrete. The systematized waste of executive talent, the enormously high cost of military retirement, and

the management superficiality born of transitoriness will continue, modified only by the dubious benefits of interservice uniformity. The need for reform will surely be recognized in ten years or so, as the armed services come to see that excessive career mobility is dysfunctional to sound management, and as civilian political leaders act to halt escalating retirement costs. Unfortunately, an increasingly hostile international situation coupled with a persistently skeptical domestic mood may not permit us that much time.

The Army, which has perhaps a more serious problem than the other services, is in the fortunate position of being able to devise a significant, near-term, unilateral improvement. The Army can truly implement OPMS—the OPMS described in this paper—to strengthen the military profession and better serve the national defense.

Colonel HAUSER. I would like now to make a brief oral summary of the main points of the essay.

As I see it, the current up-or-out system derives from the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 which was a reaction from the necessity in World War II for wholesale replacement of old colonels and generals with younger men. I understand the historical necessity of that wholesale replacement of people at the beginning of World War II, and the logic that went into the Officer Personnel Act of 1947. But the framers of that act did not take into consideration certain key factors which were operative even in the days shortly after World War II and have been operative ever since: First, the massive overseas stationing of roughly half of the combat forces of the U.S. Army; the effect on turbulence of officers and transitoriness of officers caused by the short career resulting from that act; the weakness and almost ineffectiveness of the officer evaluation system, which the Army continues to try to improve; the overall result of these being a pervasive transitoriness in officer stability in commands and in jobs.

The second factor that was not foreseen by the framers of the 1947 act was the effect that the need for a second career would have upon the professional behavior of officers nearing the end of their "truncated" careers, if you will, and the effect this would have on their professional behavior.

Third unforeseen was a national disillusionment with military force as an instrument of national policy, as a result of the Korean and Vietnam wars.

And finally, the accelerating technological, social, and managerial revolutions in our society and our Armed Forces.

I suggest to you that the problems experienced by the Army, which are too well known for me to reiterate here, the problems we experienced during the Vietnam war, were in large part a result of the decline of officer professionalism which resulted from these factors, combined with the short, rapid career of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947.

There was an effort by the Army in the post-Vietnam period to institute reforms in the officer career system. The new system was known as OPMS, the officer personnel management system, and the theory of OPMS was that the best commanders would command, and that other officers who were not able to command would then specialize in those staff or technical specialties for which they exhibited the greatest talents, and therefore, the Army would get the best commanders in command and the best specialists in the specialties.

Unfortunately, this reform has never truly been implemented in the Army. Command as a ticket to higher level authority and rank is still firmly entrenched as a practice in the Army career system. The resulting transitoriness, superficiality of behavior and conservatism, not

innovation but conservatism born of insufficiently deep professional knowledge of one's job, these factors still persist to a disturbing degree in the professional ethos of our Officer Corps.

Now, there are many fine features of the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act. The fact that the—the provision that all officers become Regular officers after 11 years of service, the advantages of predictable career management and predictable Officer Corps management, and the advantages of interservice coordination I suggest are all very great benefits of this act.

But on balance, I believe that the act should not be enacted into law because it would put, echoing Professor Gabriel's words, it would put in concrete a career system which has done more to degrade military professionalism and our Army's combat readiness for war than any other single factor in recent history.

The Congress therefore, I suggest, should not pass this bill but insist that the career system of the Officer Corps of the services first be overhauled, and then legislation be resubmitted.

Sir, this concludes my statement.

Senator NUNN. Colonel, you stated that the people who did this study and came up with this legislation made the correct decisions based on their assumptions, but you felt the assumptions were erroneous.

Could you just briefly outline again those assumptions that you feel are most in error?

Colonel HAUSER. Yes, sir. What I meant to say was they did not assume that these factors would operate. They assumed the absence of these factors.

Senator NUNN. You are talking about omission——

Colonel HAUSER. Omission, yes.

Senator NUNN. Erroneous omission rather than criteria that have been in error.

Colonel HAUSER. That is correct.

The first is the turbulence caused by the overseas stationing of roughly half of the combat formations of the U.S. Army for a third of a century, for the last third of a century.

Second is the rapidity of promotion which would result from the 20- to 30-year career, and the up-or-out provisions of the act.

And third, the weakness of the officer evaluation system, if you will, the efficiency report system, which encourages and continues to encourage officers to seek a variety of assignments as evidence of versatility, and thereby promotability.

So turbulence of stationing, turbulence of promotion, and turbulence of jobs.

Senator NUNN. You are saying they did not consider these.

Colonel HAUSER. I am saying that nowhere in the record that I have been able to read have I found evidence that the framers of that act, either the Defense Establishment framers or the congressional framers, considered that this would be the case in the third of a century following.

Second, they failed, I believe, to assess the impact on the professional behavior of officers of the need to prepare themselves for a second career, to psychologically disengage from their professionalism, from knowledge of military tactics and military strategy and military weapons and military leadership.

Senator NUNN. The last 3 or 4 years, or at what stage does that begin to—

Colonel HAUSER. I cannot guess. I am not a professional psychologist. I see around me, though, my colleagues, through no fault of their own, at a point in their service continuing to work, but continuing to work without heart because—not because their military careers are going to come to an end, all careers must come to an end, but because their careers are going to come to an end at the most possibly awkward stage of life, in the late forties or early fifties, with wives, children, mortgages, and a new career to begin in middle age.

Third, I spoke of the national disillusion with military force as an instrument of national security policy. I am suggesting that there is a national disillusionment, a stripping away of illusions, not anti-military but a coolness and an apathy toward military, and we are—again I am speaking of a matter of degree, not black or white, but this, the impact of this upon the motivation of professional officers. And finally, the rapidly accelerating technological, social, and managerial revolution which makes it all the more necessary that officers be deeply grounded in their professional skills and makes all the more severe the penalties for their not being so.

Those are the four factors I referred to, sir.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much.

You mentioned that "greater officer stability and expertise is needed to restore the professionalism of the noncommissioned officer corps."

Could you explain this relationship between officer stability and professionalism in the NCO ranks?

Colonel HAUSER. I did not refer to that, sir, in my oral remarks, but I do refer to it in my paper, and I have from observation come to the very, I think, well-grounded conclusion that officer transitoriness breeds officer insecurity, and officer insecurity breeds "do it yourself" rather than trust anyone else to make a mistake that might reflect on you.

I know many, many fine officers. I also know that all of us, including myself, if we are in jobs for a short period, too short a period of time, we tend to get very edgy and very cautious, and we tend to be reluctant to allow our subordinates to make mistakes, and therefore we tend to be reluctant to allow them to learn on the job and develop themselves professionally. And I am as guilty as anyone of having committed these errors.

Senator NUNN. You are describing a sort of defensive mechanism approach to the job rather than offensive, innovative leadership, delegation of authority, and so forth.

Colonel HAUSER. Yes, sir, exactly.

Senator NUNN. One other question, then I'll defer to my colleague.

Do you believe that there are too many field grade officers in the military today?

Colonel HAUSER. Sir, given the transitoriness of the current career pattern, no. We need all those people in order to have the pool of skills to reinforce one another. You need more people when their skill at what they are doing is less firmly established.

Were we to have instead of a 20- and 30-year career, were we to have a 30- to 40-year career of vigorous men, and were we to have unit rotation in the Army where units stay together and officers stay with their men instead of individual rotation, and were we to have somewhat slower promotion—I wouldn't think that we would want to go to

much slower promotion, I still think we ought to do like a good corporation, pick our senior executives probably in their forties—and here I part company with Professor Gabriel, but then don't throw all the others out, don't throw all the experience away just because the people didn't make general officer. But if we had these reforms, then I hazard a guess that we could do with a substantially smaller Officers Corps than we have today.

Senator NUNN. Going to unit rotation rather than individual rotation would be kind of a revolution of everything in the Army, wouldn't it?

Colonel HAUSER. Yes, sir, it would. The Army would have to do everything differently. It would be massive in its impact, and it would be—we would all, working, burning the midnight oil, curse the guy who thought it up. But we would be a better Army because of it.

Senator NUNN. What, then, do you suggest we do in this committee with this legislation, because your assumptions about what we really would have to do in order to cut the number of officers are of such a profound nature that it would take several years to implement. We face the problem of dealing with this legislation now.

If you were faced with that problem now, what would you do if you were on this committee?

Colonel HAUSER. If I were a Member of the U.S. Senate, sir, I would vote this legislation down and let it be known that I would not vote favorably on such legislation until the career system were reformed.

Senator NUNN. That's clear enough. Thank you.

Senator Jepsen?

Senator JEPSEN. I have no questions.

Senator NUNN. Senator Warner?

Senator WARNER. A man of courage, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Senator NUNN. Colonel, thank you very much. We hope you will stay in touch with us as we consider this legislation.

Your testimony has been very valuable, and we appreciate it.

Colonel HAUSER. Thank you, sir.

Senator NUNN. Our next witness is the Honorable Robert Pirie, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics.

Mr. Secretary.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT B. PIRIE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MANPOWER, RESERVE AFFAIRS, AND LOGISTICS, ACCOMPANIED BY MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM USHER, U.S. AIR FORCE, DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL PLANS; MAJ. GEN. JAMES BOATNER, U.S. ARMY, DIRECTOR OF MILITARY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT; MAJ. GEN. A. J. POILLON, U.S. MARINE CORPS, DIRECTOR, MANPOWER PLANS AND POLICY DIVISION; AND REAR ADM. JAMES R. HOGG, U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR MILITARY PERSONNEL/TRAINING DIVISION

Mr. PIRIE. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NUNN. We are pleased to have you this morning.

I know you have been here a long time. I regret that but I did that purposely because I believe that you should have the benefit of the views that have preceded you.

Before we get started on the questions relating to this legislation, I want to ask you one question. We have had several hearings on the Selective Service System. I know it is an independent agency. It is not directly under the Department of Defense at this time. But the requirement that the first inductee not be delivered until M+30, that is the present plan, is based on two assumptions as I understand it: No. 1, the Army training base capacity; and No. 2, that up to 100,000 veterans would be recalled.

Are those two assumptions correct?

Mr. PIRIE. The first assumption, Senator, with respect to the Army training base capacity, that is part of the calculation that goes into the requirement for Selective Service. The second with respect to the veteran recall is not the case.

Senator NUNN. I thought that was part of your official policy now.

Mr. PIRIE. No, Senator, that is not the case, nor does it have anything to do with the question of selective service for filling the ranks of the Armed Forces with people who are not pretrained.

With respect to our present shortfalls, pretrained manpower is an option to make up for the shortfalls until our initiatives have succeeded in filling Selected Reserves and Individual Ready Reserves which we expect to take place in the next 5 years. One of the things that could be done to fill the shortfalls in pretrained manpower is to recall nonobligated veterans.

Senator NUNN. What are the other things?

Mr. PIRIE. Well, some of the other things are to increase the use of retired personnel. Ultimately, as I say, the correct fix is to fill the ranks of the Selected Reserve until we—

Senator NUNN. That is going to take 5 years, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. PIRIE. It will take time.

Senator NUNN. All right. What are we going to do right now, because the testimony before this committee is that very clearly the Department of Defense has this as a primary contingency, to recall veterans, and also the testimony before this committee from the Department of Defense is that the reason you don't need selective service inductees before the M+30 is because you are going to have part of your training capacity occupied by the 100,000 veterans that you are going to be recalling.

Now, are you rejecting that as a Department of Defense position today?

Mr. PIRIE. I am saying it is not the case, Senator. Part of the training capacity is absorbed by Individual Ready Reserves who are being retrained. Part of it is being absorbed by the delayed entry pool. Part of it is being absorbed by the normal stream of volunteers. So there is enough pressure on the training base in the first 30 days that there simply isn't room for inductees.

Senator NUNN. You are not including the 100,000 veterans?

Mr. PIRIE. That is correct, Senator.

Senator NUNN. Well then, what is the status of your plan for the possible drafting of veterans? Is it not part of your DOD mobilization plan?

Mr. PIRIE. At the moment it is not an official part of the DOD mobilization plan. We are looking at the possibility of pre-positioning legislation to make that possible.

Senator NUNN. Pre-positioning legislation?

Mr. PIRIE. Simply having legislation available; in case of a national emergency, the legislation could be passed so that nonobligated veterans could be recalled, as they have been in previous wars, Senator.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Secretary, isn't it true you cannot meet anywhere near your mobilization plans without drafting veterans now? Isn't that true? Isn't that a matter of fact, and haven't you had DOD studies that have shown exactly that?

Mr. PIRIE. Senator, it is true we have shortfalls in pretrained individual manpower, as we have testified before to this committee and others. We are working vigorously to fill those shortfalls.

Senator NUNN. I am asking you what other alternative you have if we have a war tomorrow morning other than to draft veterans?

Mr. PIRIE. We will, in all probability, Senator, as we have in past wars, not only draft veterans, because we will probably raise the service age right away for induction, we will draft not only veterans, we will draft all the other age groups and people, and there will be a general motion toward the training centers which will be expanded as rapidly as possible.

Senator NUNN. Have you asked Selective Service to give you any kind of estimate about how long it will take them to recall the veterans that you have as a part of your contingency plan?

Mr. PIRIE. Not that I know of, Senator.

Senator NUNN. It would not just be part of the plan, the capacity of Selective Service, to get these people—

Mr. PIRIE. Well, not so much the matter of the capacity of the Selective Service System. It is the identification of the individuals.

Senator NUNN. Well, who is doing that?

Mr. PIRIE. We are formulating schemes to identify pretrained individuals, not only nonobligated veterans, but also people in individual Ready Reserves and retired personnel, so that those individuals can be properly utilized if we need them.

Senator NUNN. What are those schemes?

Mr. PIRIE. Well, they are simply ways of keeping track by making sure that there is an annual updating registration, a mailing in of changes of address and things of that kind.

Senator NUNN. You don't have that now.

Mr. PIRIE. That is not in place now.

Senator NUNN. If we had a war tomorrow morning, then you could really not recall veterans, could you?

Mr. PIRIE. That is right, Senator.

Senator NUNN. How long would it take you to get that capacity?

Mr. PIRIE. I have no way of knowing that.

Senator NUNN. So not only do we have a critical shortage in the IRR, but your No. 1 contingency plan, to recall veterans, could not be now implemented if we had a war tomorrow morning, could they?

Mr. PIRIE. The No. 1 contingency plan is to recall the IRR.

Senator NUNN. But everybody knows that that is critically short—you can go anywhere from 200,000 to 500,000 or 700,000 as far as the shortage. You are not saying the IRR would fill this need?

Mr. PIRIE. No, I am not; that is right. We have great shortfalls, as I have testified before. We have a problem, and that problem didn't occur overnight, and it won't go away overnight either, but—

Senator NUNN. It is not going to go away at all, Mr. Secretary, unless you are prepared to deal with it, and I don't see any indication that you are.

Mr. PIRIE. We are dealing with it, Senator. We are dealing with the problems of shortfalls in the Selected Reserves with a wide variety of initiatives, including increased full-time manning, increased full-time recruiting, bonuses both for—

Senator NUNN. What is the status of that package? Is legislation involved in that?

Mr. PIRIE. Well, legislation is involved in some of it.

Senator NUNN. What is the status of it?

Mr. PIRIE. In full-time manning, for example, legislation is not required. It is simply a programing adjustment, and the Department of Defense is proceeding with that, doubling the amount of full-time manning.

Senator NUNN. What about the legislative package on Reserves? What is the status of it?

Mr. PIRIE. Various pieces are in various stages. I simply don't have the data at my fingertips, but I would be glad to provide it to you later.

Senator NUNN. How long have you been working on it now? I have been hearing about it for 3 years.

Mr. PIRIE. I have been working on it for the last 6 months.

Senator NUNN. When is it going to be presented to the Congress?

Mr. PIRIE. Pieces of it have been. Pieces of it are making their way through the legislative process now.

Senator NUNN. How much is it going to cost?

Mr. PIRIE. In toto?

Senator NUNN. Yes.

Mr. PIRIE. The answer is I don't have precise figures, but we are talking about, particularly with respect to Reserves, Reserve bonuses and things of that kind, we are talking about hundreds of millions.

For example, last year the bonus program for the Selected Reserves was \$25 million. We expect to increase that modestly in our next year's program.

Senator NUNN. Have you given the Army any instructions, Mr. Secretary, to be prepared to draft 100,000 veterans?

Mr. PIRIE. I am not totally familiar with the status of that, Senator. We have had dialog with the Army about what we would do and under what conditions we would do it, and what implications that would have. I don't recall that we have directed the Army to do that.

Senator NUNN. You haven't asked the Army to refresh the training of 100,000 unobligated veterans who would volunteer or be called back under emergency legislation?

Mr. PIRIE. That's volunteers.

Senator NUNN. Volunteer or be called back under emergency legislation.

Mr. PIRIE. We expect that a sizable number would volunteer.

Senator NUNN. I'm asking you a direct question.

Mr. PIRIE. Part of the calculations—

Senator NUNN. I'm asking you a question, Mr. Secretary.

Have you directed the Army to refresh the training of 100,000 unobligated veterans who would volunteer or be called back under emergency legislation?

Mr. PIRIE. We have not directed the Army to do that, Senator.

Senator NUNN. You have not.

Mr. PIRIE. We have not.

Senator NUNN. General Boatner, you are in the Army. Have you been directed along the lines that I just read or quoted?

General BOATNER. Senator, I have not been directed, but that is not my area of responsibility. I simply do not know the status of that. I would be happy to try to find it for you.

[The information follows:]

The Army and OSD recognize that the existing supply of pretrained manpower will not meet our requirements upon mobilization. In searching for solutions, new initiatives were developed and various alternatives evaluated in an effort to reduce the shortage. One such initiative was the use of veterans as a source of pretrained manpower in case of emergency. In 1978 the Army was directed by OSD to develop legislation and supporting plans for emergency recall of unobligated veterans. The proposed legislation was developed but the Army demurred on supporting plans until after the legislation was approved. Draft guidance in early 1979 reiterated the directive to plan for their use and identified an objective of 100,000 veterans.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Secretary, you are sure of your testimony?

Mr. PIRIE. Sir, it hinges about the issue of direction. We have had exploratory discussions with the Army. We have not directed the Army.

Senator NUNN. Well, have you asked the Army to plan to refresh the training of 100,000 unobligated veterans who would volunteer or be called back under emergency legislation?

Mr. PIRIE. I think the discussions we have had with the Army could be considered to be tantamount to that, but I would have to refresh my memory as to the exact correspondence.

Senator NUNN. So you are distinguishing between the words "directed" and "planned"?

Mr. PIRIE. Yes, yes, I am.

Senator NUNN. So you have asked the Army to plan to refresh the training of 100,000 unobligated veterans who would volunteer or be called back under emergency legislation?

Mr. PIRIE. Part of the discussions about whether the training base capacity is adequate to absorb all the people who would be available in the first 30 days has had to do with how many nonobligated veterans might be expected to be available. One of the planning numbers that has been kicked around is 100,000 people. That is for sizing purposes, considered a hypothesis.

Senator NUNN. Well, I will just ask you one other question on this, and then I will go to other subjects.

Have you, Mr. Secretary, told the Secretary of Defense that you have told the Army to plan to refresh the training of 100,000 unobligated veterans who would volunteer or be called back under emergency legislation?

Mr. PIRIE. You are obviously reading from a piece of correspondence that I may well have signed, Senator. I don't recall the way that was phrased, and I would like to refresh my memory before responding directly to that question.

[The information follows:]

The Secretary of Defense directed the Army to prepare a plan to provide refresher training immediately after M-Day for 100,000 veterans. This directive was issued as part of the overall guidance for the FY 1981-85 program. The

Army plan has not yet been submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for review and approval.

Senator NUNN. Well, it is obvious we are going to have to have a battery of lawyers here to get you to testify, because I use the word "direct" and you adamantly say no, and I use the word "plan" and now you start hedging and say you want to refresh your recollection. It seems to me that you would know one way or the other on this. I am not trying to play games. I am just asking you whether we in fact have to recall veterans, and the reason I am asking you is because the Director of Selective Service says that he has gotten nothing from the Department of Defense on this, and it would take him 90 to 110 days to be able to even implement it, and we have been informed that this is the No. 1 contingency plan of the Department of Defense if a war broke out tomorrow morning. This is not an academic, legalistic exercise, Mr. Secretary. We are trying to find out if this country is capable of defending itself.

I think the question is relevant.

Mr. PRIE. I think the question is relevant. I think it is a fair point. You are trying to establish whether we have a specific plan that calls for the recall of 100,000 unobligated veterans.

Senator NUNN. That is correct.

Mr. PRIE. I am saying that we have no such plan at the moment. It is in discussion stages. There are people in the Department who believe that is the wrong thing to do. There are people in the Department who think that it is something that is the right thing to do and is justified by historical precedent.

I think if we have a war tomorrow, I think you could quite reasonably expect, amongst the people who would be drafted would be non-obligated veterans. There is good reason for that; that is, they have recent military training and they would not be subject to the congressionally mandated limitations on the amount of training that is required to send them overseas, so they can be moved overseas more quickly.

There are serious questions of equity about that that have been raised by the military services, the Army in particular just doesn't care for that. On the other hand, there are people who take the view that someone who has spent his military career not in combat, possibly never even leaving the United States, how should that person be different from someone else who might be drafted at the same time.

Senator NUNN. Well, it also conveniently allows you to avoid confronting the question about whether you may have to go to any kind of registration and whether you may have to deliver people a little quicker than you originally—

Mr. PRIE. I think the question is separable, Senator. I think there will still be enough people to fill the training base without the 100,000 veterans. So it would be very difficult to use inductees before M+30.

Senator NUNN. Well, you disagree with the Army's reassessment after Nifty Nuggett.

Mr. PRIE. The Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense are having continuing discussions about this, and I don't expect the matter to be resolved soon.

Senator NUNN. Well, obviously you don't agree with the Army because they have basically stated that they can take in 133,000 more people than was originally anticipated.

Mr. PIRIE. That is correct, and that might be at some price. We are not exactly certain how they are going to do that. I would like to be certain that they can do it, and we can go ahead and make plans on the basis of being able to realize that capacity and before we incur the costs that are necessary.

Senator NUNN. And it would also make this administration face up to the whole issue of registration, would it not, which is a rather uncomfortable position.

Mr. PIRIE. The administration has faced up to the case of registration, Senator, and has concluded that it is not required at this time.

Senator NUNN. Well, I want you to go over to the Selective Service Office and find anybody other than the Director who believes that.

Mr. PIRIE. As you pointed out, Senator, the Selective Service doesn't work for me.

Senator NUNN. Well, they respond to you.

You are basing your opposition to a registration bill based on Selective Service System's goals which have never even been reduced to a plan. That is what you are basing the mobilization of this Nation on, Mr. Secretary. If you are not, what are you basing it on?

Mr. PIRIE. If they respond to me, I expect them to respond to the requirements which we have laid on them. The Selective Service Director has assured us that he can meet that. There is justifiable skepticism at this point as to whether he could meet it. I think the primary thing that has to be done is to get on with fixing the Selective Service System so they can do what they are required to.

Senator NUNN. Well, you are—

Mr. PIRIE. The question you didn't ask Mr. Wilson was: "Mr. Wilson, if they had done what you suggested, could the Defense Department's goals have been met?" I didn't hear that.

Senator NUNN. I didn't ask—

Mr. PIRIE. I think there are people who believe that the Selective Service System can be fixed and made to produce the first inductee by M+30, a plan.

Senator NUNN. Not doing anything in peacetime.

Mr. PIRIE. Not doing any peacetime registration, that's correct.

Senator NUNN. Do you believe that?

Mr. PIRIE. Yes. I think it can be done.

Senator NUNN. Do you believe the present goals of the Selective Service can be met?

Mr. PIRIE. They can be met. It would take money, people, and time.

Senator NUNN. Do you believe that can be done—

Mr. PIRIE. And leadership.

Senator NUNN. Leadership from whom?

Mr. PIRIE. In the present scheme, the Director of the Selective Service System is the guy who is in charge of that responsibility.

Senator NUNN. So you, right now, base your mobilization plans and your contingencies at the Department of Defense on the Selective Service System's assurance that they can meet their own requirements and your requirements within 30 days after M-day?

Mr. PIRIE. That's correct.

Senator NUNN. Without any peacetime acceleration except the administration proposal which is now submitted before the Congress.

Mr. PIRIE. That is correct.

Senator NUNN. All right, let's move on to DOPMA.

Mr. PIRIE. Senator, this morning I have with me at the witness table Maj. Gen. James Boatner, Director of Military Personnel Management of the Army; Rear Adm. James Hogg, Director of Personnel Training Division of the Navy; Maj. Gen. William Usher, Director of Personnel Plans of the Air Force; and Maj. Gen. Arthur J. Poillon, Director of Manpower Plans and Policy Division of the Marine Corps.

I have a brief written statement, Senator, which I would like to read, and then respond to your questions.

I appreciate the opportunity to testify today on the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act, known as DOPMA, a bill to amend titles 10 and 37, United States Code, relating to the appointment, promotion, separation and retirement of members of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

As you know, we have testified several times before on essentially the same legislation. It is not my intent today to review in depth all the issues. Rather, I would prefer, with the chairman's concurrence, to simply highlight the major features of the bill and make a few explanatory comments.

Officer personnel management is governed today primarily by the Officer Personnel Act of 1947, and the Officer Grade Limitation Act of 1954. While these laws have served us well, Mr. Chairman, they were not designed for today's defense force; consequently, they contribute certain deficiencies and inequities which both Congress and the Department of Defense recognize as needing correction. DOPMA will correct these problems.

DOPMA is not a radical change from the temporary systems in use today, however, it represents a major change to existing permanent officer personnel laws. Although it is a lengthy document, it is not, in principle, a complex piece of legislation. It will correct some inefficiencies, cure some inequities in officer treatment, provide new tools to control the force during expansion and contraction, and establish more uniform permanent promotion, separation and retirement laws for each service. The resultant officer personnel management system will allow the services to meet requirements for officers in the various grades at ages conducive to effective performance; provide career opportunity that will attract and retain the number of high caliber officers needed; and provide career opportunity which is reasonable and consistent among the four services.

These objectives represent a balance between two different, and in some respects, opposite perspectives, those of management on the one hand and those of the individual on the other.

For the remainder of these remarks, I would like to review the major features of the bill while concurrently addressing the key issues and concerns that have arisen during the extensive preparation of this proposal.

GRADE TABLES

DOPMA proposes a revised set of field grade officer ceilings for each service based upon current and projected requirements. These requirements are supported by quantitative and qualitative considerations of missions, staffs, and functions. They are currently supported

by an officer inventory management system that provides for the necessary flows into, out of, and within the force that will provide a flexible and enduring structure capable of responding to a wide range of contingencies. The grade tables were painstakingly developed and rigorously tested against these criteria. They provide a sound basis and visible guide for force structure planning and officer inventory management.

UP-OR-OUT SYSTEM

The up-or-out system, as we currently know it, has evolved from the lessons of history and has been more than adequately tested over the past 30 years.

We are sensitive to the concerns expressed over the continued use of the up-or-out system and have examined it in depth. The services are releasing each year less than 2 percent of the officer corps under the up-or-out system. This continual adjustment to officer force quality and potential, used generally on a permissive basis, has served us well and we recommend its continued discretionary use without reservation. We have allowed in our proposal for continuation of selected officers in the grade of O-4 who have twice failed of selection for promotion. Each service, based on service needs, would be authorized to continue selected officers until retirement eligibility. All services would expect to use this continuation provision for selected officers. In the case of officers in the O-2 and O-3 grades who twice fail selection for promotion to the next higher grade we believe that greater individual equity will be achieved if these officers who have been identified as having limited potential for future advancement or continued service are released from active duty with adequate compensation before they enter the career active duty force.

APPOINTMENTS

The bill standardizes, between the services, certain basic qualifications for appointment, such as citizenship and age, while maintaining the authority for each service to appoint officers into the various categories of professional groups and specialties needed to meet the unique requirements of the individual service.

The proposed legislation provides equity and uniformity in the application of constructive service credit for officers in professional specialties and eliminates its use where it is not appropriate. Constructive service credit will be provided on a year-for-year basis for each year of education normally required beyond the baccalaureate level; in other words, beyond 4 years. Constructive service credit would be used only for determining entry grade, position on the active-duty list, seniority in grade and time in grade for promotion eligibility.

SINGLE PROMOTION SYSTEM

A single-step promotion system will replace the dual, temporary/permanent systems now in effect. Promotion will be on a permanent basis as vacancies occur under a single set of statutory limits for each service.

ALL REGULAR CAREER FORCE

DOPMA provides for an all Regular career force by the end of 11 years of commissioned service or after two promotion zone considerations for selection to the grade of major or lieutenant commander,

whichever is later. The early integration of Reserve officers into the career force is intended to end the contradiction of Reserve officers serving in career active duty status and will prevent the inequities and uncertainties which the current system imposes on those officers during force reductions. Under normal conditions, it is anticipated that the integration of Reserve officers to regular status will be completed well prior to the 11th year. Essentially, all Reserve officers who are serving on active duty today in a career status will be integrated into the Regular officer force. Additionally, all officers not previously integrated but subsequently selected for promotion to the O-4 grade may expect to be offered Regular status.

SELECTIVE CONTINUATION

A new authority is provided for the selective involuntary retirement of officers in the grades of O-5 and O-6 prior to their 26th and 30th years of service respectively. These selective continuation procedures are intended to be used sparingly and are primarily a means of reducing the numbers in grade when necessary, such as a reduction in force.

EQUALIZATION OF TREATMENT FOR FEMALE OFFICERS

DOPMA repeals many long-standing provisions of law which cause female officers to be treated differently from male officers in the promotion system. Of particular significance is the improved equity of opportunity for promotion to flag grade for women in the Navy. Existing combat exclusions are retained, however.

SEPARATION PAY

Under present law, officers separated with more than 5 but less than 20 years of service receive severance pay or readjustment pay equal to 2 months' basic pay for each year of service up to a maximum of \$15,000. As originally envisioned in 1963, the \$15,000 maximum was realized by an O-4 with approximately 15 years of service. Because of inflation and pay raises, that maximum is now reached by an O-3 with between 6 and 7 years of service. DOPMA, as submitted currently, will not change the current separation pay formula or maximum of \$15,000 but will combine all present laws on separation pay into one.

ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMODORE GRADE IN THE NAVY

The Navy has not had a one-star rank under the normal grade structure since 1899, although it has had a temporary one-star grade of commodore for use in wartime. DOPMA incorporates provisions creating a one-star rank in the Navy which parallels those in the other services. The new grade will have the title of commodore. This, and the changes affecting women, are the only substantive changes from the current system in DOPMA for general and flag officers.

COST IMPACT

A steady state cost analysis of DOPMA against the current management system indicates that it has the potential to generate long-

term savings of about \$62 million annually. Savings begin to accrue after the first year of transition and grow to \$49 million at the end of the 5-year transition period. Thus, DOPMA not only has the virtue of avoiding major turbulence in personnel management policies and practice, but reduces costs from the outset.

SEPARATE LEGISLATION

I have summarized the major features of the bill and the management system it is intended to support. Let me briefly comment on the situation should DOPMA not be favorably considered. Current temporary authority for Air Force officer grades expires on September 30, 1979. Separate legislation to extend this authority for the 10th time will be necessary if DOPMA is not enacted this session. Also, there are seven separate legislative proposals related to the National Emergencies Act which must also be considered by September 30, 1979. Six of these legislative proposals, if not enacted, will cause serious personnel problems within the Navy Department; and the final item, if not enacted, will cause problems for each service. Last year, 11th hour legislation was enacted to take care of both the Air Force and the National Emergencies Act related items. Finally, there are more than eight other separate pieces of service-connected legislation which the Department would submit absent the passage of DOPMA.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, I would conclude by recommending that the legislation not be judged on the basis of any single aspect, but in terms of our overall objective of improving and better rationalizing the officer personnel management system for the military services. The system we are proposing preserves the best features of the current system while correcting deficiencies. It allows sufficient flexibility to adjust to warranted service differences. It will help us meet the challenges of the Department's long-range leadership needs. We are particularly appreciative of the contributions and genuine concern for improvement of our officer management system from members of the congressional staff as DOPMA has been developed, not among the least of which, Mr. Chairman, has been your own personal interest.

We are confident the DOPMA will be a significant improvement to the Department's efforts to provide the most effective and efficient Officer Corps for our Nation.

That is my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman. I will be happy to answer your questions.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

UP-OR-OUT SYSTEM AND TOUR LENGTHS

We had a couple of witnesses here this morning who have studied this whole officer personnel management system at length. They have some strongly held views on it, Mr. Pirie. You have heard those views.

I would like to ask you to respond first to the critique that I believe both witnesses made to the current up-or-out policy.

Mr. PIRIE. I think in Professor Gabriel's presentation and also Colonel Hauser's, there is some confusion between the up-or-out

policy and the question of career management, and it seems to me it is not at all inconsistent to have an up-or-out policy and nevertheless have careers managed in such a way that people remain long periods of time, if that is deemed to be advisable, in tours of duty.

I don't see that there is a serious inconsistency. I pointed out that under the up-or-out policy we are losing about—it is really closer to 1 percent, but between 1 and 2 percent of our officer force each year. That doesn't strike me as a dramatically large amount, and so I don't see that amount of turnover as being the cause of maladies to which the previous witnesses have referred.

Senator NUNN. Well, I can't read their minds on this subject, but I would think that what they are saying is the up-or-out policy itself is the fundamental, underlying premise on which the whole rotation system is based, because people are promoted now on the basis of wide experience, diversity of experience, and that means they have got to move through one job very quickly and go to another one, and they are always in a learning process.

Are you saying you can change that system by career management and keep the up-or-out policy?

Mr. PIRIE. Yes, sir, if you thought that was the problem, and I am not entirely certain I agree with that, then what you probably ought to do is change the criteria for promotion, not change the up-or-out system.

LENGTH OF SERVICE

Senator NUNN. What about the point that is made about people leaving in the middle of their most productive years, when they are 40 to 50 years old, having to change careers, basically not being effective in the latter part of their career because they are obviously thinking about changing careers? How do you respond to that?

Mr. PIRIE. I think that affects a relatively limited number of people, Senator, and I think my colleagues here will chime in on this. I think people in the military now are serving a relatively long period of time in the O-6 grade, on the order of 5 years, 5 to 7 years, and indeed, those who are selected for flag rank serve a relatively long period of time, so it seems to me that in point of view of management needs, experienced people come and serve reasonable lengths of time in these grades. It seems to me the system is working properly.

I would like General Boatner to chime in on that, if I may.

Senator NUNN. General?

General BOATNER. Reference to your first question, it is simply not factual. In recent years, people have not been rotating through these jobs with that kind of speed. I think Professor Gabriel is looking at 1968 and what happened in Vietnam.

Colonel Hauser did mention the officer personnel management system which we put into effect specifically to add stability and to create an officer corps that was more professional. Now, since this system really has only been in being for 2 or 3 years, it will take at least 20 to 25 years to get the system completely in being because we have to create a new group of officers. So from that standpoint, we are doing many of the things that Professor Gabriel and Colonel Hauser have commented on.

With respect to the age, the Army full colonel now serves over 26 years' service, and over 6 years as a colonel. That is pretty good.

Senator NUNN. Take a look at the majors, General. In 1958, the average Army major had 17.8 years of service. In 1976, the average Army major had 11.8 years of service. It certainly appears from all the statistics that we have that the officer personnel system has been changed to provide the officer corps with a richer grade and better pay, but less military experience.

Do you disagree with that?

General BOATNER. Well, I am sure your statistics are correct, but I think you have got to focus on the fact that the Personnel Act of 1947, in the OPA, was instituted because the system we had was based completely on seniority. In the 1930's, officers were not promoted to major until they were 47 years old—I would submit that that is too old.

Senator NUNN. This is 1958.

This is 11 years after the 1947 act.

General BOATNER. Yes; and the result is, a young officer with a better balance between experience and age.

Senator NUNN. So are you basically saying you disagree?

Are you saying you disagree with the thrust of Mr. Gabriel's testimony, or are you saying he has made valid points which are now being taken into account with new procedures in the Department of Defense?

Which of those are you saying, or maybe neither?

General BOATNER. Well, I think he made so many points that obviously some of them are things the Army is taking action to correct, but in terms of what I understand to be the heart of what he was saying, I believe the selection process, the select up process, has worked well for the Army during the period since 1947. DOPMA is very consistent with what we are doing now. That is why the Army supports the DOPMA legislation. For example, our analysis shows that the selection rate to major would be on the order of 80 percent. We feel that if you are going to have a competitive system at all, you have to begin to identify people whose potential to lead and be soldiers, or to be staff officers, is on the low side of the scale.

COMMAND TOUR LENGTHS

Senator NUNN. You said in the last 2 or 3 years it has been changing. Are you indeed assigning people and letting them stay in one job longer than you have in the past? Has that changed?

General BOATNER. Yes; that is changed. That is a conscious decision in terms of how long a commander will command.

Senator NUNN. And when was that changed? By what order?

General BOATNER. I would say in the neighborhood of 3 to 4 years ago.

Senator NUNN. And it is reduced to policy or regulation or rule?

General BOATNER. It was a very definite policy decision.

Senator NUNN. By the Army?

General BOATNER. Yes.

Senator NUNN. Is there something in writing on that? Is there a plan or a program that we can look at on it?

General BOATNER. Yes; I am sure there is. I would be glad to provide it for you, whether we call it a plan or policy, I am not certain. [The information follows:]

COMMAND TOUR LENGTHS

Command tour lengths are specified in Army Regulation 600-20, Army Command Policy and Procedure. The optimum length of command tours for company grade officers is 18 months with a minimum of 12 months. Field grade command tours are 18 months with a maximum of 24 months. Currently, field grade commanders in Europe are serving 24-month command tours.

Senator NUNN. Do you have any statistics to show what happened since that began?

General BOATNER. Well, I know, for example, the tour for a battalion commander in Europe now is 2 years.

Senator NUNN. As opposed to what?

General BOATNER. As opposed to 6 months during Vietnam. As opposed to perhaps a year in the period 5 years ago.

Senator NUNN. So battalion commander's tour in Europe is lengthened.

General BOATNER. Yes, and also a brigade commander.

Senator NUNN. Now, these are in combat units.

Does that flow up, all the way up the line?

General BOATNER. Yes, in combat support units.

Senator NUNN. How about general officer ranks? Has there been any change in rotation there, in jobs?

General BOATNER. I would have to provide that for the record.

[The information follows:]

GENERAL OFFICER TOUR LENGTH

Army policy has always aimed for stability in general officer assignments. However since 1976 the Army has made a concerted effort for maximum stability and tour length for general officers within recognized dynamics of assignments practices. The policy has been that general officer assignments are normally for a minimum of two years. The success of these efforts is measured in the fact that during the past three years, with the exception of moves caused by retirement and promotion, only 9 percent of the Army's general officer tours have been for less than the prescribed two years.

I can simply say that I have recently commanded a brigade for over 3 years as a general officer.

Senator NUNN. You were a brigade commander for 3 years?

General BOATNER. For over 3 years.

Senator NUNN. Over 3 years.

General BOATNER. I would have to provide for the record whether that is a typical or atypical case. I just don't know.

Senator NUNN. But you agree that the people in combat units, in combat support units need to stay in their jobs longer than they were in recent years.

General BOATNER. Yes. I think we are at about a proper level right now. Like everything else it is a tradeoff. You have to measure the benefit that you get from stability against some of the other considerations; being ready to go to war, the number of experienced commanders you have to have, and the role that people who have this experience play in the training base and in writing doctrine. There is a tradeoff, and I would say it is about right now. The discussion that I have heard in the Army, which is only discussion, would be to perhaps lengthen it.

Senator NUNN. To lengthen it.

General BOATNER. Yes,

Senator NUNN. So you are saying the Army is generally moving in the direction that Mr. Gabriel pointed out, in lengthening terms.

General BOATNER. In terms of command tours, yes. In the last 3 or 4 years the Army has moved toward lengthening command tours.

Senator NUNN. How about Colonel Hauser? Did you find any part of his testimony that you would like to comment on in terms of either agreement or disagreement?

General BOATNER. As I understood Colonel Hauser's testimony, he did not disagree with up-or-out. It is more a question of degree rather than a fundamental philosophical difference. I would also like to point out that it shows the strength of our system that a friend of mine like Bill Hauser can come here and testify as freely as he did. The Army policy is of course to allow a person to appear and freely express his personal beliefs.

Senator NUNN. You don't plan to give him any psychiatric tests.

General BOATNER. No. [General laughter.]

UNIT ROTATION—INDIVIDUAL ROTATION

Senator NUNN. Well, I think it is good that he feels free to come forward. I think that is a strength of this system, and I think we need more of that, and particularly in terms of congressional committees, because you are the people that work at it all the time and we have to get information from the services or we don't get it at all.

What about the unit rotation versus individual rotation?

General BOATNER. I am not an expert in this area. The Army has tried unit rotation a number of times since 1950, and because of the large number of personnel involved, the percentage of the Army that we have overseas, and because of the costs, the Army has found, to the best of my knowledge, that the disadvantages have outweighed the advantages.

Senator NUNN. So you would disagree with that suggestion.

General BOATNER. Yes, based on the knowledge that I have now.

Senator NUNN. What are the disadvantages of unit rotation?

General BOATNER. You drive the costs way up. You have more people in the transit account, and PCS costs. The increased turbulence is a price that offsets any of the advantages.

I participated in one of these in 1955.

UP-OR-OUT TOUR LENGTHS

Senator NUNN. Admiral Hogg, how about your comments on the testimony we have had this morning particularly on the up-or-out policy?

Admiral HOGG. Mr. Chairman, the Navy likes the up-or-out system we have in effect now. We use it with a certain amount of balance. It provides a young force, and it also at the same time provides an experienced force, and they are not inconsistent. This last year in fiscal year 1979 we will have 667 officers depart the Navy because of the up-or-out system, and that is just about 1 percent of our total force. And as Mr. Pirie testified, I feel that there is no inconsistency between up-or-out and extending tour lengths. Extending tour lengths is a function of career development, and career development does not have to be driven by up-or-out.

We promote in the Navy, not necessarily based on wide experience as defined by one of the previous testifiers. In fact, we have gone in the direction of a subspecialty. We encourage that in the unrestricted line, and of course, we have the restricted line and staff corps which are totally specialized and which make up some 37 percent of the naval officers on active duty.

Senator NUNN. What is the trend in the Navy? Are you going toward longer tours in one specialty, or are you going in the other direction?

Admiral Hogg. In terms of actual tour length for any officer, as a result of a policy established in 1975 by OSD, we did lengthen some tour lengths, and there is an established DOD-wide policy in that regard. It is in writing and we report back on how we are doing, and that is for all officers, including flag. The average tour length for a flag officer should run about 3 years ashore and about 2 years of sea duty.

Now, when the policy was established, we asked for and received a waiver with the Secretary of the Navy authority to govern this waiver for sea duty so that we did not keep our people on sea duty for extraordinary periods of time, especially because in some of our enlisted ratings, as you know, they are already stretched to the limit on sea duty.

We would like to have; our objective is a 3-3 rotation, sea-shore. Today among all of our 118 ratings, we experience a 4-3 sea-shore rotation, which is not too bad. In some of our critical ratings, there are some critical ratings that have a 5-2 sea-shore rotation and we would like to try to correct that.

Senator NUNN. What about the enlisted ranks, Admiral? I know the Navy is having a very severe retention problem at about the 8-, 9-, and 10-year level. What about rotation in these jobs? Are you on an upward trend in terms of rotation or are you having more job stability in the enlisted ranks?

Admiral Hogg. Senator, we are trying very hard to gain stability, but not by having longer sea tours for them. If I may go back for just a moment, if I could, the ratings in which we have the poorest retention in the second term personnel, and it runs from 7 to 16 years of service, those which we call, well, by definition a rating becomes critical when its retention drops to a certain point, and invariably, those ratings are the ones in which we have a very extensive period at sea with a short period ashore, such as the BT's, machinists mates, for example, where they spend 5 years at sea and then only 2 years ashore before they rotate back to sea. We are trying to stabilize those personnel by having them homestead so that they don't relocate their families when they come ashore and then go back to sea again. But we don't really have the management tools to stabilize them.

It is not desirable to have them in sea duty for any longer periods of time, and we don't have the sufficient manpower, personnel in those years of service to allow them to stay ashore any longer.

Senator NUNN. Is your retention problem in the enlisted ranks getting worse or better now?

Admiral Hogg. It is stable in some areas and it is improving in some. The career force dropped slightly this past month from 91 percent down to 90. The first termers are running about 31 percent for 4 YO's and up to 37 percent for 6 YO's, and that is pretty good. The second termers are the area of concern. They dropped slightly recently.

We are looking into the large number of extensions in the second term, personnel who are extending their enlistments up to 2 years. We believe it is to align their projected rotation dates and their obligated service dates so they can take advantage of the new GUARD III program which we have in effect which allows a member more flexibility in having a say over what his or her next duty assignment will be when they come off sea duty.

So we are hoping for pretty good results in that. This has also been helped in the last few months by the fact that our attrition has reduced considerably. We have gained some 3,500 members on active duty since January of this year by reduced attrition in the first term.

UP OR OUT—RETENTION

Senator NUNN. General Usher, last October a former Air Force captain wrote in a widely publicized letter in the Colorado Springs Sun, and I quote him:

Over the last 5 years, changing Department of Defense policies gradually caused me to give attention to matters totally unrelated to my first love, flying. The term "career progression" received increasing emphasis, and I was forced to worry more about being promoted than doing my military duties. With this up-or-out policy staring me in the face, an officer has to think very hard about serving a career in the military. It has been said that if a military man can feel his future is reasonably secure, he can be a better performer. The irony of the situation is the fact that civilian life seems to offer more security than military life.

Do you think one of the causes, General, for retention problems of young officers is this insecurity that is brought about by an up-or-out policy, or how would you respond to this statement by the Air Force captain?

General USHER. Well, again I think you have to put up-or-out in some sort of perspective, Mr. Chairman. As mentioned by the Navy, it is also true in the Air Force that the actual number of officers who are involuntarily separated each year is a small number, on the order of 1 to 2 percent, and indeed, if you take a group of individuals over the course of their career, say you have on the order of a typical year about 6,000 or so that enter as second lieutenants. By the time that they would reach assurance of serving to retirement eligibility, which would be about 18 years to be in the sanctuary, perhaps only about 10 percent of them over the course of that 18-year period would have been involuntarily separated.

Senator NUNN. I thought the retention rate for a major was 80 percent.

General USHER. The promotion opportunity rate?

Senator NUNN. Yes; promotion opportunity rate was 80.

General USHER. It has been historically. It has been in recent years 80 percent.

Senator NUNN. How do you get a 1 or 2 percent—you mentioned that he had only a 1 or 2 percent—

General USHER. That is over—you are talking about over the numbers of times that an individual was considered for promotion. As a group, the opportunity approximates 80 percent, so in any given year, when we are talking about our total Officer Corps, the number who are involuntarily separated having been twice failed for promotion represents about 1 or 2 percent.

Senator NUNN. What does this captain face in terms of his odds of being selected on a statistical basis?

General USHER. On a statistical basis? I would say he stands a very, very good chance of being selected. As you know, historically the opportunity has been 80 percent. With this year's board, because of our lower retention rates, and because of the quality that we felt was there, this is a large year group, we went to 90 percent promotion opportunity for this year's consideration. So, on the whole, I think an officer looking at promotion to major has overall a very, very good chance. I think that the number of people that we actually involuntarily separate from the service is indeed quite small, and is consistent, with our efforts to maintain a quality force to meet the challenges we have.

Senator NUNN. Are you going for more stability now in the Air Force, officer corps?

General USHER. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I was interested in that discussion. Indeed, I think you will find that most of our tours are lengthening, and you do gain benefit from continuity and experience there. And I think most of us notice that and we are pleased about that.

On the other hand, you can go too far in that direction. Our requirements change, the atmosphere in which we have to perform our mission changes and our weapons systems change. For instance, as we reequip a squadron with a new weapons system, depending on a particular individual's qualifications and so forth, it may not be appropriate for an individual to stay with that squadron. It may be more appropriate, because of his unique experience, to go to another squadron that already has or will continue to have that same type of aircraft. It might be more economical and more effective to have a mixture of people in that squadron who are less experienced and some who are more experienced. So you need flexibility, although as an overall objective you do attempt to maintain good tour lengths on various jobs in order to capitalize on that experience.

Senator NUNN. General, how about the Marine Corps?

General POILLON. I am going to go pretty much with what my cohorts say, Senator. We have about 1 percent forced out as a result of twice fails, 1 percent of our officer population, and we do support the up-or-out policy. We feel it is in the best interest of the service to have a quality officer corps, to have that requirement, that capability, to force out our twice failed.

In regards to lengthening tours, as you know, Mr. Chairman, the Marine Corps, because it is much smaller, has been able to go to unit deployment in our ground and aviation units at the squadron and battalion unit level.

Senator NUNN. You do have what was referred to this morning as unit rotation in the Marine Corps.

General POILLON. Yes, sir, and because we do it—we are a small organization, we do it on a small scale, we have found that this has given us a great deal more continuity within our organization, a great deal more stability in our small unit organization such as Mr. Gabriel was talking about.

Senator NUNN. Do you find that the costs are greater?

General POILLON. Actually, no, sir. We are finding some savings involved in it, although this opinion may be a little premature because

we are not into our full evolution. We are doing it on a gradual basis, but we have been doing it too few years to have considerable savings as a result of this.

Senator NUNN. General Boatner, have you looked at the cost figures of what the Marine Corps is doing? Your testimony was the Army would spend a lot more money in unit rotation.

General BOATNER. I personally have not, so I am not familiar with the cost comparisons.

Senator NUNN. Is anybody in the Army looking at these unit rotations, at least monitoring what the Marine Corps is doing?

General BOATNER. Yes; I believe in response to congressional questions, the Army is looking at this again and is looking at the costs.

Senator NUNN. Could you tell us who in the Army or furnish that for the record?

General BOATNER. I would like to furnish that for the record.

Senator NUNN. And Mr. Secretary, could you get whoever in the Army is monitoring that to give us a report about how they are monitoring, their methods, and what their overall plan is for determining what the Army should be looking at this?

Mr. PIRIE. I would be glad to, Mr. Chairman.

[The information follows:]

UNIT ROTATION

The Army has had numerous experiences with unit rotation since 1953. Our most recent experience was the Brigade 75-76 program which terminated in November 1976 when all units were converted to permanent change of station status. Analysis of the programs indicates that, although temporary duty versus permanent change of station costs are almost equal, there is unacceptable level of turbulence for personnel in the sustaining base and that the unit readiness is decremented below acceptable levels with the unit rotation system.

Our most recent assessment of the Marine Corps system, completed in June 1979, indicates that due to the differences in size and structure of the USMC and the U.S. Army that the benefits derived by the Marines are not reasonably applicable to the Army.

The Marine system was implemented for overseas units in an unaccompanied 12-month tour situation. The vast majority of Army overseas positions are in Europe where the tour length is 36 months for all accompanied personnel and bachelor careerists. When we considered areas where Army troops are serving unaccompanied tours we still encountered the same problems.

Essential to the Marine system is the 3-to-1 ratio of units in the United States to units overseas. The Marine force structure and current distribution accommodates this ratio. The Army has 32 infantry and mechanized battalions in Europe and 50 in the United States. Conceptually, no more than 15 to 16 European battalions could be sustained under any similar plan without increasing the size of the sustaining base in the United States.

In summary, our experience indicates that unit rotation does not work for the Army. Personnel turbulence, unit readiness, the size of the sustaining base and differences in unit structure make a unit rotation plan unacceptable under our current configuration.

EXPERIENCE IN GRADE

Senator NUNN. I will pose this question to you, Mr. Secretary, and then if the officers would like to comment on it that will be fine.

The average officer grade has increased from 1958 to 1976 by 6 percent in the Army, and 10 percent in the Navy and the Air Force. Real pay for these grades has also increased, even discounting inflation. Yet, experience levels have declined in all the services. In the Army, the average length of service for Army officers has declined from 1958 to 1976 by 28 percent.

Now, my question is, if there has been any change in the last 2 or 3 years, it would have to be a very pronounced change if you are going to reverse this policy.

General Boatner, has the Army reversed this 1958 to 1976 trend of less and less experience, higher and higher grades, and more pay in grade?

General BOATNER. I am not sure I understand what you mean by experience. We have reduced what by 28 percent?

Mr. TRAVERS. You have reduced the total of years of service that the Army officer has.

Mr. PIRIE. I think that refers to the 17 years of the major in 1958 as opposed to 11 years in 1976.

General BOATNER. Well, our goal in DOPMA is to promote a man to major at 10 years of service, 10 plus or minus 1 year. But we feel that is the optimum balance, otherwise you are going to have stagnation and you are going to have promotions that are too slow to attract the kind of people that you want. So we think that moving toward that 10-year point is good personnel management.

Senator NUNN. But a few minutes ago you said the Army in those 2 or 3 years is moving toward more stability in certain jobs for more officers. The whole 20-year trend is different from that. So it sounds to me as if you are suggesting a rather substantial departure in the last 2 or 3 years from the 20-year trend in the Army. Maybe you are not, but that is the way it looks.

General BOATNER. I think you misunderstood what I said. I said we have the officer personnel management system. It is only 3 or 4 years old, and we bring officers into the Army with a specialty now. We previously called this a branch. Some people come in as infantrymen, some may come in with a logistics specialty. We don't expect that officer to be able to do all the many jobs. What we try to do is focus, not on a generalist philosophy where an officer can do any of a number of jobs, but on developing a system where the officer specializes in two areas. He serves his first 8 years as an infantryman. He will be expected to pick some other specialty, and then he will alternate. That doesn't mean that he will not come back and command troops, but it means that if his second specialty is in a technical area, he will concentrate there. If it is personnel management, he will concentrate there.

So what I am saying is this system, given time, I believe will have a good effect.

Senator NUNN. Well, then you have made a substantial change in the last 2 or 3 years.

General BOATNER. Yes, yes; but it is going to take a while before this thing gets completely in being.

SELECTIVE CONTINUATION FOR O-3'S AND O-4'S

Senator NUNN. Mr. Secretary, I know you have been here a long time. All of us have. I will try to wrap up my questions and we will submit some for the record.

Last year during the subcommittee's preliminary markup, several options to the proposed bill were considered. Option No. 1, the subcommittee option, would provide for the mandatory separation of the officer who twice failed permanent promotion to the next higher grade,

but would authorize selective continuation to 20 years for O-3's and to 24 years for O-4's.

Would you comment on the Department of Defense's position on that option?

Mr. PIRIE. Senator, we don't think that is a good idea, particularly in the case of the O-3's continuing to 20 years. In the first place, anyone who is passed over twice for promotion to O-4, and that occurs about the 10th year, will be looking forward to 10 years of service before he can retire, without the prospect of promotion. We don't think very many people would sign up for anything like that, and I don't think that you would want anybody who would. So I think that particular provision would not be useful to us.

With respect to the O-4's to 24 years, I think roughly the analogous arguments obtain.

My colleagues can probably comment on that from their points of view as well.

Senator NUNN. Fine. Does anyone want to comment?

General BOATNER. Well, the Army completely supports that. Going out to 24 years with a major is going to have a substantially bad impact on our ability to promote.

Senator NUNN. You support it because you would not be able to promote someone else?

General BOATNER. No; we support the DOPMA legislation which we feel is adequate.

Senator NUNN. What I am saying is on that option, you would not favor continuing O-3's and O-4's for an extended period of time if they were not promoted, and I understand you to say you would not favor that option because it would disrupt your promotion opportunities for others, is that right?

General BOATNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. PIRIE. It would have that effect, Mr. Chairman, but it would also have the other effect which I suggested, which is the effectiveness of this body of people. If you were able to find that number of people and continue them, I think what you would have, instead of people who were looking forward to career opportunity and interested and engaged and so forth, is people serving time, serving out the time until it was time to retire.

Admiral HOGG. May I comment additionally, Mr. Chairman?

The Navy agrees with the discontinuation type or noncontinuation policy, and we like the idea of lieutenant commanders to the 20-year point, either by DOPMA or current continuation; in other words, we continue people as we need them.

Mr. PIRIE. And that authority is in the bill.

Admiral HOGG. Yes, sir.

Now, when one looks at the promotion system today, built into it is the fact, because we do have a fail-selection point, that approximately 20 percent of our lieutenant commanders in the Navy today are fail-select twice, either once or twice or more, and they continue on to retirement at the 20-year point. Approximately 15 percent of our commanders are in that same category and they continue on to their 26-year point, and it is our experience that that is about the percentage and absolute numbers of people we would want in that category to carry through our inventory.

Senator NUNN. Well, what you are saying is you already are carrying out this option 1 in the Navy?

Admiral HOGG. I am saying that the law says that a lieutenant commander retires at 20 years and a commander at 26 if twice-failed for selection for the next rank.

Senator NUNN. Is that different from the Army?

General BOATNER. Our policy is different. We would retain now a major who fails promotion twice only if he is within the 18-year sanctuary.

Senator NUNN. Well, why if the Navy is already doing this, Mr. Secretary, are you opposed to this provision which would give the authority to it but would not mandate it in the other services? Is the law unique as far as the Navy is concerned in that regard?

Mr. PIRIE. The Navy and the Marine Corps—Now, I think the issue, Mr. Chairman, is whether this provision is useful to us, and does its existence help us with personnel management.

The position I am taking is that it is something which we probably would not use extensively. I don't think that Admiral Hogg was talking about O-3's and O-4's.

Admiral HOGG. No, sir, I am not at all.

Senator NUNN. You are not talking about O-3's and O-4's? What are you talking about?

Admiral HOGG. The O-4 to O-5 and O-5 to O-6, lieutenant commanders to—

Senator NUNN. What we are talking about is 20 years for O-3's and 24 years for O-4's.

What are you talking about?

Admiral HOGG. I am talking about 20 years for O-4's and 26 years for O-5's.

Senator NUNN. And nothing for O-3's.

Admiral HOGG. No, sir, nothing for O-3's except today we do have authority to recall those who are Reserves back to active duty in the grade of O-3, but that is a very small number and a separate issue in the context of this discussion.

Senator NUNN. Now, is what you just described for O-4's, O-5's, did you name O-6's?

Admiral HOGG. No, sir.

Senator NUNN. Is that authority unique to the Navy and the Marine Corps?

Mr. PIRIE. No; I don't think so. It is across the services, the retention of O-4's to 20 years and O-5's to 26.

Senator NUNN. Well, is that practice employed by the Army and the Air Force?

General USHER. Yes, except that Air Force law mandates the retirement of O-5's after 28 years.

General BOATNER. It is not generally practiced by the Army unless the officer is in the 18-year sanctuary, except for one category that we have used this last year, and it has to do with a shortage of certain denominations of chaplains, so the Army is using it in very limited ways.

Senator NUNN. Chaplains. You just started that.

General BOATNER. Yes.

Senator NUNN. The Navy all along has used that on chaplains, have you not?

Mr. PIRIE. That's right.

Admiral HOGG. Yes, sir, we have. In fact, the point I was making there was not the mechanics of it as much as the fact that based on our experience using this system, we find that it produces, given the current promotion opportunities and flows, it produces as many officers in this category of fail-select as we feel that we would like to have in our force and still maintain an aggressive force which balances youth and experience, and which has the quality across the board that we feel that we need in order to get to that bottom line of combat readiness.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROMOTION

Senator NUNN. Mr. Secretary, does the Department say that giving more than two opportunities for selection for promotion—

Mr. PIRIE. Well, as things work out, in some cases individuals have more than two opportunities. Our view is that as far as enforcing these fail-of-select rules, up-or-out rules, that two looks is the appropriate number.

Senator NUNN. Do all of you agree with that?

[The witnesses nod in the affirmative.]

PERMISSIVE ALL REGULAR AT 11 YEARS

Senator NUNN. The subcommittee also considered an option to retain the current policy of the permissive separation of active duty reservists at the 11-year point. The administration proposal would make the separation of active duty reservists at the 11-year point mandatory.

Mr. Secretary, could you give us your reasons for that?

Mr. PIRIE. We would expect that most reservists who were going to enter the career force, Mr. Chairman, would become Regular officers before the 11-year point. At the 11-year point, those who were not going to enter the career force would be separated, but those—it wouldn't mean that every Reserve officer who reached the 11-year point would be separated. In fact, that is not the case, and we have modified the act in this year's submission to afford those that have reached that point but have not yet been considered for promotion twice for lieutenant commander or major, the opportunity to stay until that occurs.

INITIAL APPOINTMENT

Senator NUNN. The administration proposal would continue the policy of awarding a regular commission to military Academy graduates. The subcommittee was considering an option to change this policy by awarding a Regular commission to Academy graduates only after several years. In other words, the graduate would not automatically receive his Regular commission but would have to compete and qualify for it, and you would have the equity in the competition between Academy graduates and those that come through ROTC and those who go through OCS.

Could you comment on this subcommittee proposal?

Mr. PIRIE. Yes, Mr. Chairman, we favor giving Academy graduates and Regular ROTC graduates the Regular commission. We believe the selectivity that goes into those programs and the rigor of the courses

and the cruises and summer camps and things of that kind constitute an appropriate probationary period for the purposes of seeing whether these people are fit to be members of the Regular officer corps. The same, of course, is not true of someone who comes in through OCS or some of the other systems.

Senator NUNN. But if the Academy education and selection system is so superior, and you are satisfied with your promotion opportunities and the way you do that now, what is wrong with letting the Academy graduate compete with those who have lesser education and those who have less selectivity as a way of their own background?

Mr. PIRIE. It is not a matter of competing for spaces. It is a matter of having done an appropriate amount of screening before you take people on as Regular officers.

Senator NUNN. But you wouldn't lose any of that under our proposal. You would just have until 6 years. We are not suggesting that you screen everybody early and make the selection early. We are just saying keep everybody in one pool, let the Academies demonstrate their superiority by having their own graduates compete with everybody else. What is wrong with that?

Mr. PIRIE. Well, I think, as I said, what is wrong with it is that essentially it is something that is unnecessary from the standpoint of assuring that the Academy graduates and the regular ROTC graduates are the right kind of people for the military services. I don't think what we are having here is a large-scale competition. I think what we are having here is a system that gets a cadre of professionals for the Armed Forces. The Academies have performed over many years very well in this regard. We have much better track records with respect to retention of people over a long period of time.

Senator NUNN. But you are taking a certain group of people either because they got appointed to the Academy either through the political system or through the appointment of children of military officers and so forth, all of which we know about, and they have gotten a superior education, supposedly, and it has all been paid for by the Government. You are setting them up and you are getting a certain number of the regular slots that are removed from the others that you have, and the others compete for everything that is left. Why not just let them all compete?

Are you concerned that the Academy graduates won't be able to successfully compete with the people who come through officer training school?

General BOATNER. I would be glad to comment from the point of view of the Army. We want a quality force. If this idea somewhere down the line would give us that, I think it is worth studying. The Army U.S. Military Academy produces only somewhere in the neighborhood of 37 percent of our regular officers each year. The others come from, you know, the colleges and universities. Now, somebody has mentioned 4 or 5 years. Now, there has been no analysis of that. Those figures, for example, are beyond the obligation of some of our ROTC people. So it seems to me that we just really haven't looked at that. There is something in the proposal about perhaps you selecting 10 percent after 1 year. Well, why 10 percent? Why 1 year? What are you going to know about a lieutenant, whether he is in ROTC, DMG, or a West Point graduate after 1 year?

So it seems to me that this idea has not had the analysis that we really need to give to it.

Senator NUNN. When do you select your current ROTC people for regular commissions, at what stage?

General BOATNER. They are selected before they are commissioned. They must all go before a board.

Senator NUNN. I know, but you have only a very few selected for regular commission that come out of ROTC.

General BOATNER. I know; I know.

Just a little over one-third of the regular officers that come into the Army come from the U.S. Military Academy.

Senator NUNN. I understand that. Let's say an ROTC graduate gets out of Georgia Tech in the Army, gets a commission. Out of that class at Tech, how many of them are selected for a regular commission?

General BOATNER. I would have to provide that for the record.

Senator NUNN. A very small number.

General BOATNER. I am not certain of that.

Senator NUNN. I am saying immediately after graduation.

General BOATNER. Let me provide the number for you.

[The information follows:]

ROTC REGULAR ARMY COMMISSIONING

The Army Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) program commissions officers for service with both the Active and Reserve Components. Selection for Regular Army (RA), active duty as an other than RA (OTRA) officer, Reserve Forces Duty (RFD), or delay status to attend graduate school is accomplished by boards of officers at MILPERCEN. The selection boards which met in December 1978 considered 6,297 School Year (SY) 1979 cadets (those to be commissioned between 1 April 1979 and 31 March 1980). Board results were as follows:

	ROTC total	GA Tech
Regular Army.....	1,659	12
Active duty—USAR.....	2,875	10
Reserve Forces duty.....	1,134	1
Delay status.....	629	1
Total.....	6,297	24

Senator NUNN. But what I am asking you is: When are those graduates of ROTC given an opportunity to become Regulars, if they are not among the very few who are given a Regular commission when they graduate?

General BOATNER. They have the opportunity to apply for integration into the Regular Army while they are on active duty. It is a function of the number of people in their particular age group, year group, and the vacancies we have.

Senator NUNN. Why not let them compete for all of the spots instead of just the ones that are left over after the Academies get theirs?

General BOATNER. You know, if that is going to give us a better Army, fine, but the fact that you take 4 or 5 years, some of these Reserve officers might leave the Army before they ever became eligible for a Regular appointment.

Senator NUNN. The point is a lot of them are leaving the Army now without ever being selected. What is the difference between that and the current system?

General BOATNER. They have an opportunity. It is a competitive thing, and one of the things that DOPMA is going to be a major improvement in, is getting away from this dual system that we have of Reserve officers and Regular officers.

Senator NUNN. But in getting away from it, you are creating a presumption that all of the people who graduate from the Academy are good guys and wonderful officers, and, therefore, should be Regulars, and now you are saying the rest of you guys compete for the other slots that are left over.

General BOATNER. I don't think that is correct. There is a competition during the year that these people are commissioned. Anybody in the ROTC is free to compete.

Senator NUNN. Compete for the number of slots that are left over after you give the Academies their regular appointment, right? They are competing for less Regular slots than they would be if everybody competed on the same basis, General.

General BOATNER. It is correct that the lieutenants commissioned out of the Military Academy are commissioned in the Regular Army.

Senator NUNN. Presumably if they were not given that commission, there would be more slots so everybody could compete.

General BOATNER. You know, the system worked pretty well for a long time. I don't think we ought to rush into trying to change it without realizing it.

Senator NUNN. Well, I am saying—we are not rushing. This committee hasn't rushed on DOPMA at all. [General laughter.]

In fact, we don't intend to. But this proposal has been kicking around for 2 years. If the Army wanted to study it, you could study it. Have you done it?

General BOATNER. Not to my knowledge.

Senator NUNN. Well, I would be perfectly happy to study it.

General BOATNER. We don't think DOPMA is the place for this particular feature.

Senator NUNN. Where is the place?

General BOATNER. Well, we think we ought to—

Senator NUNN. What bill should we amend to put this in?

General BOATNER. I would hesitate to guess on that.

Senator NUNN. General, let's hear your view in the Air Force about letting all the academy graduates prove the superiority of their tax-paid education by competing with those who paid their own bill and went to school and got a commission, and also those who have been to OCS.

General USHER. I think it is a procedure we should continue.

Senator NUNN. The current procedure.

General USHER. Our current position is that we do tender a Regular commission to those who successfully complete the course of study at the military academies. My reason for saying that is because I think that we do look at them very closely, and we have a very, very good idea of what their capabilities are. If they can't hack it, they either weren't accepted in the first place or they were eliminated along the way.

But I think also it helps to cement their commitment to the professional Air Force by giving them a Regular commission. As I say, we have a program of military training and academic instruction that is highly demanding. I think it is something that is a small signal to them

that we have entered an agreement here, which says in effect: "You are part of the Regular Establishment, and this is in return for the hard work that you have done and our high expectations of your potential in the future." I think there is emphasis on that latter part.

Senator NUNN. Doesn't this set the stage for the entire promotion system that basically tells the academy graduates, if it is a valid presumption at the earlier stages, why doesn't that flow all the way through the promotion?

General USHER. I don't think that is fair to say in the Air Force. While I am not an academy graduate, I have been in for 25 years. I don't feel that that obtains in the Air Force, which is the only service about which I am competent to speak.

Senator NUNN. The difference is that DOPMA introduces a new concept here. You have either got to get to be a Regular in your first 10 years or you are gone. Now, that concept to me is only valid to the extent that everybody competes fairly. You are not talking about comparing the existing system to DOPMA because DOPMA puts this new feature in there, and that becomes the whole career pattern. Everybody has got a lot at stake in competing for these Regular slots, x number, whatever it is, and whatever number of academy graduates you are giving this regular commission to automatically reduces x by one. So instead of competing for x slots, you are competing for x minus y , whatever that is.

Admiral, what do you say about this as far as the Navy?

Admiral Hogg. Mr. Chairman, the Navy's system is a little different. I must explain. Our three sources for officers in the line are the Naval Academy which probably averages 800 to 900 a year; NROTC scholarship, which is also a Regular commission source which averages 800 to 900 a year; and—well, that is it. That is the two primary commissioning sources for unrestricted line, which provide a Regular commission.

Senator NUNN. Both of them have Regular commission.

Admiral Hogg. Yes, sir.

Now, the Reserve commission, we have the NROTC contract students, which is just the 2 years' pay, which is a very small number today. In fact, it is 185. Our primary source, and that would be a reserve contract. Our other sources of reserve contracts are OCS. So we have some total of about 3,300 reserve contracts this year, and 2,000 regular contracts.

Our other sources of Reserve contracts are OCS. So we have some total of about 3300 reserve contracts this year, and 2000 regular contracts.

Now, from my personal viewpoint and my professional viewpoint, I am a Naval Academy graduate. It was to me professionally stimulating and motivating when I was commissioned to take an oath of commission which said that the President of the United States had trust and confidence in me as a Regular officer in the U.S. Navy. That meant that the Navy did not come at some point in time at the 4-year point when my service obligation was completed and tell me I would have to request permission to become a Regular.

Since that time, the Navy has changed its procedure and policy with respect to how we handle requests by Reserves to augment and become Regulars. We have learned that it is a discouraging thing for an

officer to have to request it. We now go out, we screen automatically all of our Reserves officers a good year to 2 years before each member's obligated service is completed, and those that we would like to retain in the Navy we ask to go Regular, and we find that to be a stimulating experience for them, and we get better retention because of it.

So our system is a little unique.

Senator NUNN. Well, it is not likely that you have a shortage of people wanting to get into the academies. We have a fierce competition for that, I know.

Mr. PIRIE. A strong competition for that, which argues a healthy preselection at that point, and a high quality of people.

Senator, it is not like it is a dog-eat-dog competition with Reserve and Regular in the Armed Forces today. That is not the case at all. And I would like to point out that if we—

Senator NUNN. I am talking about the DOPMA.

Mr. PIRIE. Under DOPMA we would be able to augment all the Reserves we have at this point. That is another point that is worth consideration.

Senator NUNN. Not if we cut the number of officers.

Mr. PIRIE. No; not if we substantially cut the number of officers; no, sir.

Senator NUNN. At this stage I will submit the rest of the questions for the record.

I have two questions I want to submit to the Navy; one relating to quarters allowance for Navy personnel aboard ship and also the advanced pay prior to deployment.

Admiral HOGG. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.

[See questions submitted by Senator Nunn, p. 285.]

Admiral HOGG. Thank you for the opportunity.

Mr. PIRIE. I will be glad to add supporting responses.

Senator NUNN. Fine.

Senator Jepsen has questions for the record.

The only other thing, I would like to give Colonel Hauser a chance to come forward, if he would like to, and comment on anything that has been said, while these witnesses are still here.

And I will also ask that for Mr. Gabriel's comments.

Colonel HAUSER. Mr. Gabriel stepped out a moment.

I don't feel comfortable debating in this forum. I respectfully disagree with the gentlemen. I respectfully disagree with the unified service position on most of the essential points that have been discussed.

COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS

Senator NUNN. Fine. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Gabriel, I just wondered if you wanted to say anything here while we have our witnesses. So many times we have hearings and we hear from one side and we hear from the other side but the issues are never completely joined. If you want to comment here, you would be glad to hear from you further.

Mr. GABRIEL. I would just ask or request the chief of personnel, the question fundamentally in my mind of any institution, whether it be up or out, or upward promotion, or whatever it is that we are going to do, must ultimately be tied to combat effectiveness.

It is my understanding at this time there is no effort underway to evaluate any of these things in terms of combat effectiveness. I have heard people talk about cost savings, and that is important. We have heard people talk about career progressions, and that is important, but I think especially with respect to ground forces, Marine and Army, we must know before we proceed what is the effect of the proposed changes on the combat performance of military units, and until we know that, how much money we save probably is a secondary consideration.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much.

General Boatner, would you respond to that? Has the Army weighed the DOPMA legislation in respect to its combat effectiveness?

General BOATNER. I will have to respond for the record. I cannot name the specific study that took place several years ago.

[The information follows:]

COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS STUDIES

The Army has not conducted a study to review DOPMA with respect to combat effectiveness. However, there are many provisions of DOPMA that are part of our current personnel management system and as separate entities have been looked at over the years both as they contribute to quality of life and the combat effectiveness of units. Many of these studies are complete, such as "Leadership Monograph No. 8" and "Professionalism of the 70's." Others are ongoing: "Command Climate," "Personnel Management System Study," and "Officer Competition Study."

Mr. PIRIE. What is your opinion, General?

Senator NUNN. How long have you been in this job?

General BOATNER. About 6 months.

Senator NUNN. Well, you would certainly know if there was input on combat effectiveness. Have you ever asked the question of anybody, what this is going to do to our combat effectiveness?

General BOATNER. No; I haven't asked in those terms, but I think that having the all-career force and getting the promotion system that provides attractiveness, that will attract the quality officer that we are looking for, I think that that will have a positive effect on combat effectiveness. Obviously we have got to have the proper number. If we do not have the numbers of officers and the qualities of officers we need, of course that will have an effect on the combat effectiveness.

Senator NUNN. So your own personal feeling is that this would be consistent with combat effectiveness.

General BOATNER. Yes.

Senator NUNN. But there has been no study by the U.S. Army in all these years of talking about it.

General BOATNER. I simply do not know. I can't answer that question. I'll try to find out.

Senator NUNN. Well, if you would, and if you find any study on that, if you would furnish it for the record, we would appreciate it.

General Poillon?

General POILLON. Mr. Chairman, I would let the Marine Corps record speak for itself. I believe it will show the Marine Corps has been effective in everything it has been asked to do in the combat area.

Senator NUNN. What about this proposal? Has combat effectiveness been weighed in the DOPMA proposal which is a change in some respects?

General POILLON. I don't believe the up-or-out portion that Professor Gabriel objects to is that much different under DOPMA than it is under the present system.

Senator NUNN. So your present feeling is combat effectiveness—

General POILLON. I think it will not affect the combat effectiveness of the Marine Corps from what it has been in the past.

Senator NUNN. Admiral?

Admiral HOGG. Mr. Chairman, I feel the same way. We essentially have the DOPMA system in effect in the Navy today in terms of up or out and virtually every other aspect of the bill except for the women legislation and the commodore one-star rank.

The Navy analyzes in terms of professional development and how that translates into combat readiness, unit readiness on a daily basis, and we have no reason to feel that the current system is in any way suppressing combat readiness. In fact, we believe it enhances combat readiness.

Senator NUNN. General Usher?

General USHER. I would approach it from the other way. If we didn't have up or out now I think it would have a very considerable effect on our readiness and combat capability because I think it would tend to push promotion points out to the point where we could not attract and retain the kinds of people that we need to conduct our mission effectively.

Senator NUNN. General Boatner, have you read the book Mr. Gabriel wrote entitled "Crisis in Command"?

General BOATNER. No; I have not read it.

Senator NUNN. Has anybody in your shop, or have you heard any discussions on it?

General BOATNER. I have read some reviews on it some time ago, and I saw a portion of the discussion that was on TV that he mentioned.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Secretary, have you read that book?

Mr. PRIE. No; I have not, Senator.

Senator NUNN. Do you know, Mr. Secretary, of any study the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, or anybody in the Secretary of Defense's office has done relating to the current up-or-out system and/or DOPMA to our combat effectiveness?

Mr. PRIE. I know of no such study.

I think what the witnesses have said here today is that there is a presumption that they have been able to perform successfully under the modified OPA and OGLA systems, and DOPMA will permit them to continue to perform in the same effective way.

Senator NUNN. So no one here is concerned about the status quo. You believe we do have a combat effective officer corps, and you believe there is nothing in DOPMA that would hurt that; is that right?

Mr. PRIE. That is correct.

Senator NUNN. Do you ever conduct studies on combat effectiveness and personnel policies?

Mr. PRIE. Yes, I think it is true to say that I am grasping for specific examples, and I will supply a list of such studies and examples.

[The information follows:]

PERSONNEL POLICY RELATED TO COMBAT READINESS

The Services conduct analyses and make judgments on personnel policy alternatives related to combat effectiveness on a daily basis in the management of personnel inventories against current and projected requirements. This process pervades the planning, programming, budgeting, and evaluation activities of the

Services and within the Department. To cite a specific example, the Air Force systematically reviews its rated officer force distribution, training, and management policies and formalizes proceedings in published reports. On a broader base, the operational readiness exercises, such as Reforger, test the capacity of the personnel system to produce a capable, motivated force in all grades, experience, and skills needed. Recent formal studies on specific personnel policy issues include Air Force analyses on the impact on operational readiness of accompanied versus unaccompanied tours overseas, officer versus enlisted manning of navigator crew positions on Military Airlift Command C-141 and C-5 aircraft, and Army analyses on the structure of its personnel management system and command climate as they relate to organizational effectiveness. These are but a few examples of the continual examination and analyses of personnel policies of all Services and their effect on the combat readiness of our defense forces.

As indicated in a previous response, DOPMA is founded on a regularized manpower determination process that takes into account current and long term operational commitments. Alternatives to DOPMA should be founded on a similar basis.

Senator NUNN. As you know, the critics of not just the up-or-out policy but the whole personnel system relating to grade structure, promotion, the criticism has been leveled time after time that there is no one who considers personnel policies in relation to combat effectiveness except as an incidental matter, that basically it is based on career patterns, promotion patterns, that kind of thing.

Do you think it might be helpful in the manpower area to occasionally do a study on combat effectiveness and the way personnel policies relate to that rather than just going on intuition? I am sure that everyone here has got their intuition that this is not going to hurt combat effectiveness. Otherwise, you would not be supporting it, but has there ever been any kind of empirical data or analytical data on this, and if not, which you said, there is not that you know of. I think it might be a good idea to begin at least on some of these matters of great significance like DOPMA or like the retirement reform proposal, to look at the question of combat effectiveness.

Mr. PIRIE. I think to formulate the question somewhat more sharply so we could focus on it, it would be quite useful to us, Senator.

Senator NUNN. We will look into that and see if we can't sharpen it.

Admiral HOGG. I think it would be fair to say, Mr. Chairman, that while there may not be a study that has recently been conducted, that the effect of personnel policies on combat readiness is evaluated on a daily basis, and that every fleet unit, and I am sure it is the same in other services, must report its readiness. Combat personnel readiness is one of the five factors the Navy must report any time manning gets below a certain level, or quality of manning reduces, or the experience level and the training of the individuals is reported by the commanding officer of every ship in the Navy.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much. We appreciate your being here.

The Naval Reserve Association has requested that their prepared statement be made a part of the record, and without objection, it will be inserted.

[The prepared statement follows:]

NAVAL RESERVE ASSOCIATION,
July 24, 1979.

HON. SAM NUNN,
Chairman, Manpower and Personnel Subcommittee, Senate Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR NUNN: It is understood that your subcommittee has again held hearings concerning the DOD proposed Defense Officer Personnel Management

Act (DOPMA) legislation. Since this matter is of great interest to our membership and since the Naval Reserve Association has a standing resolution supporting the proposed legislation, we would appreciate the opportunity to testify on the DOPMA. Consequently, I have attached a proposed NRA statement on the subject.

I request that the attached statement be included in the record of hearing. I have included copies of the proposed testimony for other members of the subcommittee should you honor our request.

Thank you for your continued special interest in and thoughtful consideration of matters affecting the Guard and Reserve Forces.

Respectfully yours,

FRED D. CARL.

[Enclosure.]

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to submit a brief statement on the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) legislation now pending before your committee. The Naval Reserve Association has expressed its support of DOPMA on many occasions as a result of a resolution adopted by our organization at the NRA National Convention three years ago. I do not intend to present an in-depth analysis of each issue of particular interest to the NRA. However, I would like to summarize our position on DOPMA.

We sincerely feel that the laws governing our officer corps is deficient in many areas and that legislation to correct these problems for both regular and reserve officers is long overdue. Some of the areas regarding the management of reserve officers are covered by DOPMA and we support the Defense Department's proposed legislation as beneficial to the Naval Reserve. Further upstream, however, is the need to revise the Reserve Officer Personnel Act (ROPA) which covers the laws pertaining to the promotion, separation and retirement of reserve officers. This legislation has been prepared by the Department of Defense and is commonly referred to as the Reserve Officer Personnel Modernization Act (ROPMA). Realistically, we know that Reserve legislation must follow DOPMA if a technically and conceptually correct proposal is presented for Congressional action. For this reason, we encourage enactment of DOPMA at the earliest possible date.

As a total package, the NRA supports DOPMA as presently written. However, there are two areas which we feel could be strengthened without change in concept and in which we feel would provide a more consistent level of treatment for the reserve officer.

1. The Defense proposal would separate O-4s (majors and lieutenant commanders) twice failed of selection to the grade of O-5 if they had less than 18 years of service for retirement purposes unless a board were convened by the Service Secretary concerned to continue those officers until 20 years of service. We feel that this provision could be enhanced if the language were changed to continue O-4s twice failed of selection until reaching 20 years of commissioned service unless the Service Secretary concerned convenes a board to separate those officers. The net result in numbers could be the same; however, we feel the change would be more palatable to the officer corps if this provision were rewritten.

2. We support a severance pay maximum of \$30,000, which is consistent with the expression of the House of Representatives in the two DOPMA bills passed the 94th and 95th Congresses.

In summary, we support and encourage enactment of DOPMA legislation and are confident that this bill will make a significant improvement in the management of our officer corps. The unique relationship of the Regular Navy to the Naval Reserve via the running mate system for promotion, separation and retirement creates a direct linkage between the Regular and the Reserve officer personnel management systems. Any significant change to the variables involving active duty officer personnel management; such as grade tables, promotion timing and length of service, will have a corresponding effect on reserve officers. The NRA believes the DOPMA legislation as written with the two exceptions noted earlier is compatible with the existing Reserve Officer Personnel legislation and should be favorably considered by your committee.

Thank you for permitting the NRA to express its views on DOPMA.

[Additional questions were submitted for the hearing record; the questions, with answers supplied, follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAM NUNN

QUARTERS ALLOWANCE

Senator NUNN. Mr. Pirie, the Committee has received a proposal from the Department to authorize the reimbursement for expenses in obtaining quarters for Navy officers and enlisted personnel who are assigned to ship overhauls and are supposed to be berthed on the ship but who cannot because the living quarters are uninhabitable. It is estimated that this proposal would cost about \$10 million a year. Would you explain why this change is necessary?

Admiral Hogg. The conditions of overhaul, whereby heat, lighting, and other utilities are lost and the ship is torn apart, mandate a crew "move-off" for the majority of the overhaul period. When this occurs, Navy must provide government quarters for these people. Existing berthing shortfalls ashore preclude adequate housing for these crews. Navy is making efforts to overcome this deficiency by concentrating on afloat berthing facilities (APL/YRBM), bachelor quarters at ship repair and overhaul yards, berthing/messing facilities at, or in close proximity to, private yards holding Master Ship Repair Contracts, and determination of the adequacy of leased quarters procedures.

In its final form the full corrective plan of action must of necessity be at least partially long-term in nature, by virtue of the elements of new construction, rehabilitation and the high costs of both. The one corrective effort which could bring the most immediate relief, to the highest percentage of existing overhaul berthing problems, and which would also provide a highly visible positive commitment to quality of life and habitability as well as improve retention, is expeditious passage of pending BAQ legislation.

Senator NUNN. How many people would be involved?

Admiral Hogg. A monthly average of 9,000 members, primarily enlisted bachelors, require government housing due to overhaul. Current and projected adequate government quarters ashore can house approximately 2,000 of these members. The remaining 7,000, currently housed in inadequate quarters ashore or on afloat living barges, would be entitled under the proposal.

Senator NUNN. Does this proposal mean some officers and enlisted personnel will be receiving two quarters allowance—the first if they have dependents or do not normally live on base and the second when they go for an overhaul?

Admiral Hogg. In a very limited number of cases, yes. In most cases, however, the ship undergoes overhaul in its normal home port. If not, the home port is normally changed to the site of the overhaul so that married members are entitled to move their dependents to the overhaul location. In a very few cases, particularly when the ship is being overhauled in a civilian shipyard, the home port is not changed and the overhaul is then conducted away from the home port. Only in the latter case would married officers and enlisted personnel be entitled to a reimbursement for housing expenses in addition to receiving BAQ to support dependents at the home port who are not authorized to move to the overhaul location.

ADVANCE PAY

Senator NUNN. The Committee has received a proposal from the Department to change current law to authorize advanced pay to individuals scheduled to deploy when they register for an allotment for dependents. The proposal would not result in any additional budget cost. Would you explain why you think this proposal is necessary?

Admiral Hogg. This proposal is designed to reduce the financial impact of losing earned pay to accumulate money during the month prior to the first payment of the allotment. The member would be permitted to receive regular pay during the two pay periods in the month preceding payment of the allotment, and then have the advance amortized over a period of time when the ship is deployed. The eligibility period is immediately prior to deployment in order to provide an added incentive to members to register allotments which will be in effect during deployment periods, when transmittal of funds to dependents can be difficult and uncertain. The legislation recognizes that the pre-deployment period is a time of unusually high expenses. Junior enlisted personnel most often, for example, send their wives and young children back to home towns during deployment periods.

Senator NUNN. How many people would be involved?

Admiral Hogg. Married members on sea duty, 17,500, who do not already have a pay allotment payable to their dependent(s) would be eligible for this benefit.

Senator NUNN. How can we be providing a large number of people advanced pay but not result in any increased budget?

Admiral Hogg. The pay advanced would be repaid to the government during the deployment. Because only a few ships are preparing to deploy during a given period, only a limited number of the 17,500 members potentially eligible would be able to receive advance pay at one time. As a result, the effect of the legislation would be negligible in a given fiscal year appropriation and can be accommodated within current budgets. Furthermore, there is no actual cost to the government. Moneys paid in advance would accrue as a deficit if paid at the latter part of a fiscal year. However, the amounts would accrue as a surplus in the next fiscal year.

Senator NUNN. Under what circumstances would individuals not be required to repay the advanced payment?

Admiral Hogg. There is no provision to forgive an advance of pay. If a member were to be separated early, before the advance was repaid, the funds due would be taken out of the final pay check.

ADMIRALS AND GENERALS

Senator NUNN. Mr. Pirie, in March of this year I questioned you on the subject of admirals and generals. I would like to ask you some questions along those lines for today's hearing.

As you know, the Committee rejected the Department's proposal to repeal the provision of law enacted two years ago to reduce the number of flag and general officers to 1,073. The Defense Department had proposed to hold the number of generals at 1,119—the same as in 1978. This proposal would increase the number of generals per active duty member. Enlisted strength will decline by 15,000 from 1978, civilians will decline by 31,000 from 1978. Yet not one general officer would have been reduced.

(a) The DOD proposal would provide one general for every 1,580 enlisted personnel compared to one for every 1,600 enlisted personnel in 1978 and one for every 6,000 enlisted personnel in World War II. Mr. Pirie, does this trend seem right to you?

(b) The average general officer now has served only 3.7 years as a general officer—down by 25 percent from the average of 4.9 years in 1968. Mr. Pirie, are you satisfied with this experience level?

Mr. PIRIE. (a) I think that it would be a mistake to relate the size of our flag and general officer force to the numbers of enlisted personnel we have on active duty. The need for military executive leadership derives from managerial responsibilities in complex technological, political and economic spheres which remain relatively constant regardless of force size—or whether we are at war or peace. An excellent example of this was the nominal (3 percent) expansion of the flag and general officer force during the Southeast Asia (SEA) conflict versus a total force expansion of about 22 percent.

If we were to manage flag and general officer strength as a ratio based on enlisted force levels, which have the potential for dramatic changes, the relative stability we have today in our flag and general officer resource would be substantially jeopardized. To illustrate, if we were to assume that a 1,600:1 ratio is correct, a return to force levels similar to those experienced during the SEA era would mean a substantial increase of well over 500 flag and general officers. On the other hand, if the World War II 6,000:1 ratio was considered appropriate we would only have about 300, a number which would fall far short of our commitments as required in law, the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act, NATO, etc.

(b) Although the Services are making every effort to improve this average, there are other complications. For example, in 1968, retiring flag and general officers were largely World War II veterans, many of whom were promoted to grade with substantially less time in service than is the case today. These officers served longer in the flag/general officer grades than a typical officer does today which accounts for the variance in the averages that you have cited.

ALL REGULAR FORCE

Senator NUNN. I note that in the provision submitted this year, the forcing out of these reserve officers has been modified to insure that a reserve officer has at least 2 considerations for promotion to O-4 before he is released. Why was this modification made?

Mr. PIRIE. The proposed legislation was modified to provide for an all Regular career force by the end of 11 years of commissioned service or after two promotion zone considerations for selection to the O-4 grade, whichever is later. This modification was made to ensure that reserve officers would not be forced off active duty simply because they bumped up against the 11 year provision, which could occur before they received two considerations for promotion to O-4. Any Reserve O-3 who is selected for promotion to O-4 will be offered a regular appointment. The only reserve officer who would be involuntarily separated because of the all Regular provision is one who is selected for promotion to the O-4 grade but declines to accept a regular appointment.

WHY IS DOPMA NECESSARY?

Senator NUNN. Mr. Pirie, why do you consider this proposal to be important? Would you list the reasons why you feel quick action on the part of Congress is necessary?

Mr. PIRIE. S. 1186 resulted from a proposal initially submitted by the Department in January 1974 in compliance with Public Law 92-561. This law directed the Secretary of Defense to recommend grade limitations that would provide similar career opportunity for the commissioned officers of each military service and eliminate the recurring need since 1959 for temporary grade relief legislation for the Air Force. The DOPMA proposal that you are considering represents the culmination of efforts by both the Department and the Congress over a period of many years and its enactment will provide the statutory authority which has been needed for some time to implement a vastly improved and modernized officer personnel management system for the Department of Defense. DOPMA will correct some inefficiencies, cure certain inequities in officer treatment, provide new tools to control the force during expansion and contraction, and establish more uniform permanent promotion, separation and retirement laws for each service.

The current temporary authority for Air Force officer grades expires on September 30, 1979. Separate legislation to extend this authority for the tenth time will be necessary if DOPMA is not enacted by that time. Also, there are seven separate legislative proposals related to the National Emergencies Act (Public Law 94-412) which must also be considered by September 30, 1979. Six of these legislative proposals, if not enacted, will cause serious personnel problems within the Navy Department and the final item, if not enacted, will cause problems for each service. Last year eleventh hour legislation (Public Law 95-377) was enacted to take care of both the Air Force and the National Emergencies Act related items. Finally, there are more than eight other separate pieces of service connected legislation which the Department would submit absent the passage of DOPMA. We have reached a point in time where management of the officer corps is becoming increasingly more uncertain as a result of outmoded laws, conflicting pressures and unwarranted service differences. For several years now our officers have been anticipating changes in the management system which are of vital importance to them and their careers. The uncertainties need to be removed as soon as possible so that the efficiency, readiness, combat effectiveness, and morale of the officer corps will not be impaired.

EXTENT OF CIVILIAN REVIEW OF DOPMA PROPOSAL

Senator NUNN. Mr. Pirie, you are the fourth Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower to present his views on DOPMA to this Subcommittee. Before getting into the details of the proposal, I wonder if you would review your own personal involvement in this legislation. How did you go about reviewing the proposal? What areas of concern did you identify? Are there any areas in the proposal, which is almost identical to the previous defense proposal, that you think should be changed?

Mr. PIRIE. I have been personally involved in the preparation and review of DOPMA for over two years. I have read the proposed legislation in detail. I have been involved in numerous meetings, discussions and policy decisions regarding the more controversial parts of DOPMA. Areas of concern were centered primarily around the extent of use of the up-or-out system and the proposed reductions in the grade tables. I personally support the provisions of the legislation outlined in the Department's proposal.

CHAPLAINS

Senator NUNN. In last year's hearing on DOPMA, we spent a great deal of time on the problem of chaplains under the "up-or-out" policy. The Subcommittee

continues to receive a great deal of correspondence from chaplains who have been forced out. In many cases, these chaplains are Catholic priests who retain all of the credentials of a chaplain and who wish to continue to serve in the military, but they are forced out—some with 16 or 17 years of service—under the “up-or-out” policy. At the same time, the Services are unable to attract new priests into the military. Many of these chaplains have asked for a special hearing on this problem, and we will not have time to review all of the details today. Does it make sense to you, Mr. Pirie, to force out qualified chaplains who cannot be replaced solely on the basis of the “up-or-out” policy?

Mr. PIRIE. Promotion policy (up-or-out) has minimal effect on denominational shortages, while providing necessary and desirable quality control of the chaplaincy. For example, there were 162 chaplains separated because of non-selection for promotion within the Department from January 1970 through December 1978 (an average of 18 per year). Of that number, 28 were Roman Catholic Priests—9 Army, 5 Navy and 14 Air Force (an average of 3.1 per year or one per service per year). Denominational shortages are caused primarily by the inability of denominations to provide clergy. The Department believes that the continued use of up-or-out promotion policies for chaplains is warranted and highly desirable. Each service, however, expects to use the O-4 continuation authority contained in DOPMA to continue officers according to the needs of the service. For example, to retain officers in any area where critical shortages exist (such as chaplains).

Senator NUNN. Last year, it was indicated that while the Army has forced out a number of chaplains, the Navy has adopted a policy of continuing Catholic reserve officers in the grade of O-4, even though they twice failed to be promoted. Under DOPMA, this policy would have to end. Does it make sense to you that the Navy end this policy and that the “up-or-out” problem for chaplains be made worse?

Mr. PIRIE. The DOPMA proposal will in no way end the Navy policy of continuing officers in the O-4 grade who have twice failed selection for promotion to the O-5 grade. The question of continuation of twice passed over active duty reserve chaplains in the O-4 grade would not arise under DOPMA. The number of reserve officers needed in the various categories to size the career force would be accomplished essentially prior to the eleventh year of service. A reserve O-3 who is selected for promotion to O-4 will be offered regular status; therefore, twice passed over O-4 chaplains under DOPMA management would be regular officers because their second failure of selection for promotion to O-5 would occur after the establishment of the all-regular career force. Under DOPMA, these officers may be continued to 20 years of service. Therefore, with respect to meeting the needs of the Navy, DOPMA would retain essentially the same authority to continue O-4's as was recently used in the case of reserve O-4 chaplains continued under present policy.

COMPARISON OF MAJOR PROVISIONS OF DOPMA TO CURRENT LAW

Senator NUNN. The DOPMA proposal contains many management changes in the services. For example, it would replace the current Navy “running mate system” which the Navy has emphasized needs to be replaced to improve officer management. Would you go through the current system and the changes this legislation would make?

Mr. PIRIE. The attached table highlights changes to the current officer management system proposed by DOPMA.

Attachment.

COMPARISON OF MAJOR PROVISIONS OF DOPMA TO CURRENT LAW

Current Law

Appointment provisions for regular officers are not consistent across the Services and are set forth in many different statutes.

Appointment

Common general authority for permanent appointment of regular officers by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Standardizes among the Services certain basic qualifications for appointment, such as U.S. citizenship and age (minimum: 21, maximum: complete 20 years of service by age 55).

DOPMA

Constructive Service Credit

Granting of constructive service credit for various professional groups is inequitable among groups and inconsistent across the services, e.g. physicians and dentists can count constructive credit for active and retired pay purposes, in some services it advances point of involuntary separation or retirement.

Equity and uniformity in the application of constructive service credit is established-generally one year of promotion credit for each year of advanced education. Use of constructive credit is eliminated for inappropriate purposes; e.g. pay and involuntary retirement or separation.

Grade Limits

(1) Active Duty Regular (1947 OPA) - Percentage in Grade fixed regardless of total officer strength:

	<u>USAF / USA</u>	<u>USN / USMC</u>
0-6	8%	6%
0-5	14%	12%
0-4	19%	18%

(1) Active Duty Regular - No separate table established for Regular officers.

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(2) Active Duty Regular and Reserve (1954 OGIA) - Sliding Scale

Total Officers: 1/	212,500	-	213,500	(2) Active Duty Regular and Reserve (DOPMA) - Sliding Scale
0-6	5.85%	-	5.00%	4.72%
0-5	12.95%	-	11.75%	11.04%
0-4	19.16%	-	19.95%	18.18%

1/ Range of officer strength, excluding medical, dental general and flag officers and certain others not accountable.

Accountable Categories

Certain categories of officers serving on active duty are excluded from total strength accountability and from the grade ceilings. Categories of exclusions vary among the Services and total 13 percent of the total active duty commissioned strength.

Consolidates common language in two sections of law applying to all Services and provides for uniformity in exclusions. Officers who are neither accounted for nor paid from the Military Personnel Appropriation are excluded from total strength accountability. Officers who are out of the normal active duty promotion career path are excluded in computing and determining strengths in the controlled grades (O-4 through O-6). Exclusions from grade table accountability are reduced from 13 percent to seven percent.

Career Progression

(1) Active Duty Regular - No separate career progression established for Regular officers.

(1) Active Duty Regular (1947 OPA) -

	Promotion Point		Opportunity	
	USA/USAF 1/	USN/USMC 2/	USA/USAF 3/	USN/USMC
0-6	NS	25	NS	NS
0-5	21	18	80%	NS
0-4	14	12	80%	NS
0-3	7	6	80%	NS
0-2	3	3	NS	NS

1/ Time in years--not later than 2/ Time in years--normal
 3/ Minimum Opportunity NS= Not specified

Promotion System

Dual (temporary/permanent) - Temporary promotions are administered within the ceilings of the OGLA of 1954, while permanent promotions are made under the permanent regular limits prescribed by the OPA of 1947. In the Army and Air Force, the law and policy provide for two separate selections, one for temporary ("insignia-change") promotion, and a second for permanent ("regular") promotion which governs length of service expectation. In the Navy and Marine Corps, law and policy provide for a single selection for advancement to both temporary grade and permanent grade with promotion occurring as vacancies occur under the respective statutory limitations.

Single (permanent) - Promotion will be on a permanent basis as vacancies occur under a single set of statutory limits for each Service.

Management of Reserve Officers

Mobilized reserve officers are placed on the active-duty lists, compete for promotion with career active-duty officers and are charged to the strength in grade of the service.

Mobilized reserve officers are excluded from the active duty promotion system and grade strength accountability.

Reserve officers are subject to 2 promotion systems.

Reserves will be managed either under DOPMA or inactive duty reserve statutes but not both simultaneously.

	<u>USA/USAF</u>	<u>USN/USMC</u>	<u>Career Expectation (Tenure)</u>
0-6	30	30-31	<u>ALL SERVICES</u>
0-5	28	26	30
0-4	21	20	26
0-3	14	2 promotion failures	To retirement eligibility (requires board continuation)
0-2	7	2 promotion failures	2 Promotion failures
		2 promotion failures	2 Promotion failures

Selective Continuation

No provision

0-6 30% can be non-continued after 4 years in grade.

0-5 30% can be non-continued after 2 promotion failures

Separation Pay

\$15,000 Maximum

Formula results in maximum (which was established in 1963) being reached by an O-3 with 6-7 years of service. Inequity exists because O-4 with 16-17 years of service can receive no more than \$15,000.

\$15,000 Maximum

Current law formula of 2 months' base pay times years of service, not to exceed \$15,000 is retained until consideration can be given to the USBA which revises the severance pay (readjustment pay) formula.

Female Officers

Women are currently treated separately with regard to appointment, promotion, accountability, and retirement. In addition, there is no provision for women to attain flag grade in the Navy as a normal promotion except in the medical and Dental Corps.

Repeals separate promotion category for women in the Navy and provides greater equity for them to be selected to flag grade. Also disestablishes WAC. Many sections of law are repealed and changed in order to provide equality of opportunity for women officers.

Below the Zone Selection

	<u>USA/USAF</u>	<u>USN/USMC</u>	<u>ALL SERVICES</u>
Law:	No restriction	5% (suspended)	1.5% maximum
Practice:	5-15%	5-15%	Design: Col 15% LtCol 10% Maj 5%

Commodore Grade

Navy officers selected to 0-7 grade become rear admirals (lower half) and flow automatically to 0-8 grade as rear admirals (upper half) when by seniority they reach the top 50% of the Navy flag officer population.

Navy officers selected to 0-7 grade would be commodores and promotion to 0-8 grade (rear admiral) would be as a result of selection board action.

"Running Mate System"

Navy "running mate system" requires several separate lineal lists of officers and ties staff corps officers to unrestricted line officers for purposes of selection eligibility and promotion. Causes inconsistent promotion flow among officer communities.

Eliminates "running mate system" and places all officers on single active-duty list in order of seniority. Single promotion zone establishes common promotion phase points for all communities.

RESERVE ASSOCIATIONS' VIEW ON DOPMA

Senator NUNN. (a) Have you discussed DOPMA with organizations like the Reserve Officers Association?

(b) What is their view?

(c) Are you aware of Resolution 7932, adopted by the National Convention of ROA on June 16, 1979 that "deplore the use of the "up-or-out" system of promotion for purposes other than the elimination of the unqualified, and oppose any measures or systems that involuntarily eliminate from the active Army officers qualified for promotion or retention"?

Mr. PIRIE. (a) We have briefed and discussed DOPMA with the Reserve Officers Association as well as many other reserve affiliated organizations on a continual basis during the preparation of the legislative proposal.

(b) The reserve associations have, in general, been supportive of DOPMA. For example, in the Subcommittee hearing in June 1978 Major General (Ret.) J. Milnor Roberts testified for the Reserve Officers Association in general support of the provisions of DOPMA. In June 1979, a comprehensive briefing on DOPMA was presented to representatives from the National Guard Association, Air Force Association, Navy League and the Association of the U.S. Army. All present voiced general support for the proposals as outlined in DOPMA.

(c) The Department is aware of the many concerns voiced over the years concerning the "up-or-out" system such as expressed by the June 16, 1979 ROA resolution. Throughout the preparations of DOPMA, "up-or-out" has been continually weighed and examined. The Department believes that the continued use of the "up-or-out" philosophy as modified in our proposal to allow continuation of selected officers at the O-4 grade is supportable, warranted, and in the best interests of our defense forces.

DOPMA COST ANALYSIS

Senator NUNN. In November 1978, you submitted a cost analysis which stated that DOPMA would cost \$35 million during the first 5 years following enactment and \$55 million per year in the long term. Would you please explain the reasons for the differences between these estimates and those on page 6 of your statement?

Mr. PIRIE. The original costing of DOPMA in November 1978 stated that DOPMA would cost \$35 million over the first 5 years and eventually stabilize at an annual savings of \$55 million as the force approaches steady-state. This version of DOPMA included a change to the current separation pay formula from 2×1 month's basic pay \times years of service to 10 percent \times basic pay (annually) \times years of service. Additionally the maximum payout was changed from \$15,000 to \$30,000. Costs over the first 5 years result primarily from this increased involuntary separation pay. DOPMA as submitted currently, will not change the current separation pay formula or maximum of \$15,000 but will combine all present laws on separation pay into one. This change results in DOPMA saving \$49 million over the first 5 years and eventually stabilizing at an annual savings of \$62 million as the force approaches steady-state.

As originally envisioned in 1963, the \$15,000 maximum was realized by an O-4 with approximately 15 years of service. Because of inflation and pay raises that maximum is now reached by an O-3 with between 6 and 7 years of service. The Department strongly believes separation pay needs to be revised and updated and has included the subject of separation pay in the Administration's action on modernizing the military retirement/compensation system.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER W. JEPSEN

DOPMA GRADE TABLES

Senator JEPSEN. Mr. Pirie, have you personally examined the proposed DOPMA grade tables? Do you believe they reflect valid requirements?

Mr. PIRIE. Yes. I have personally examined the DOPMA grade tables and believe they constitute valid sets of grade limits for the Services that are requirements based. It may be instructive to review the relationship of these tables to the numbers derived through the Services' requirements determination processes and those that appear as programmed end strengths in annual Service budgets. Specifically:

Grade requirements are the numbers in each grade that are needed to fulfill the Defense mission. They are the ultimate quantification of the ideal structure necessary to man the units and forces that make up the Defense program.

Programmed grade strengths reflected in Service budgets represent trade-offs in the ideal structure that are a result of economic decisions on Defense priorities. They reflect the structure that the Services and Department consider acceptable in weighing necessary capability and risks.

DOPMA grade strengths are proposed statutory ceilings that constrain the grade structure based upon recognition of historical and projected grade requirements tempered by actual grade allowances funded in the past. They provide the long-term basis for officer force management and are a visible expression of career opportunity that serves to attract and retain the numbers and kinds of officers needed.

Thus, each serves a valid function. The first tells us what kind of force structure we should ideally have, the second tells us what we can afford to have without incurring undue risk, and the third gives us a planning horizon for the future based upon the first two.

Senator JEPSEN. Mr. Pirie, to what degree are the DOPMA grade tables based upon officer career management flow rather than operational requirements?

Mr. PIRIE. The two considerations you cite are inseparable. As a management system, DOPMA is designed to produce an inventory of officers distributed by grade and years of service that is flexible enough to meet the short and long term operational requirements of the services. It does so by establishing mechanisms that control flows into, out-of, and within the force. These mechanisms also provide a stable, visible planning horizon for those in the system. The DOPMA grade tables are finite expressions of the operation of the system that embody these considerations.

Senator JEPSEN. Mr. Pirie, do you believe that a trimming of the proposed grade tables by this Committee would have an adverse effect on recruiting and retaining qualified officers?

Mr. PIRIE. Yes, I believe that a reduction on the scale proposed by the Subcommittee staff would have an adverse effect on recruiting and retaining qualified officers because it would require the services to reduce promotion opportunity and/or extend promotion points well beyond prudent levels. The sensitivity of retention to these changes have been studied, quantified and reported to the subcommittee staff. For example, the subcommittee's alternative could reduce retention at the end of initial obligation point by up to 33 percent and significantly increase turbulence and cost over a lengthy transition period. More importantly, such a reduction would ignore established grade requirements and consequently have a negative effect on readiness.

UP-OR-OUT SYSTEM

Senator JEPSEN. Mr. Pirie, in areas such as physicians and chaplains and other technical specialties, what changes have been made to reduce the impact of the up-or-out system?

Mr. PIRIE. Under the current system, the up-or-out provisions have a minimal impact on physicians and chaplains. Physicians enter service at the grade of O-3 or above and are selected to O-4 on a fully qualified basis with a selection rate approaching 100 percent. Promotion opportunity to O-5 this year was at least 90 percent. For chaplains, from January 1970 through December 1978, 162 were released due to up-or-out or about 6 per service per year. Presently, the Air Force and Navy are retaining some chaplains who are failed of selection. This year, the Army instituted a policy of retaining, in grade, selected chaplains not deemed best qualified for promotion.

Under DOPMA, provisions allow for retention of O-4's, failed of selection to O-5 based on service needs. All services envision that this retention provision would be liberally used according to the needs of the service, for example, in the case of physicians, chaplains and other technical specialties where shortages and service requirements dictate. Additionally, DOPMA allows Service Secretaries to establish separate promotion categories and to adjust the rates of selection, or opportunity, within those categories, providing flexibility to adjust to critical service needs.

"DUAL TRACK" PROMOTION SYSTEM

Senator JEPSEN. Mr. Pirie, the so-called "dual track" promotion system now in effect has worked for many years. Why do you believe that a one track system

is better and how would the one track system work in times of large expansions and contractions of the military services?

Mr. PIRIE. I believe that the single promotion system in DOPMA will eliminate the inefficiency and redundancy of the "dual track" system currently used by the Army and Air Force. The current system unnecessarily treats promotion and tenure as separate entities—the temporary system promotes and the permanent system confirms this action with tenure. Under the DOPMA single promotion system, we will combine these features, as originally envisioned by the 1947 Officer Personnel Act, eliminate uncertainty on the part of the officers concerned, and streamline administration of the program as a whole.

With regard to those times where we are faced with large expansions and contractions of force levels, DOPMA addresses this possibility with selective continuation provisions applicable to the field grades. The current law has no comparable provisions.

REGULAR STATUS FOR MILITARY ACADEMY GRADUATES

Senator JEPSEN. Mr. Pirie, do you believe that military academy graduates should be given regular status immediately upon graduation, or do you believe that a probation period would be useful?

Mr. PIRIE. I believe that military academy graduates should be given regular status immediately upon graduation. The fundamental objective of the service academies is to develop a cadre of trained career professionals. The environment at the academies and in other accession programs that lead to a regular commission upon entry provide sufficient opportunity and an adequate appraisal period to determine an individual's fitness for regular status. In addition, those individuals who are offered a regular commission upon entry must undergo a three year period of probation in which time the services assess whether the individual is meeting the standards required of a regular officer. The DOPMA proposal further extends this probationary period to five years. Historically, the voluntary retention of these officers has been substantially better than that of officers assessed from other sources. The awarding of a regular commission and its implicit commitment for these individuals is an expression of trust and confidence on both the part of the Government and the newly commissioned officer. Because of the higher retention and the commitment to longer service, conferring a regular commission upon entry to service academy graduates and other selected individuals, such as selected ROTC scholarship graduates, is valid in terms of both management needs and individual equity.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN REGULAR AND RESERVE OFFICERS

Senator JEPSEN. Mr. Pirie, why is it necessary to distinguish between regular and reserve officers at all? Why not simply distinguish between officers on active duty and officers not on active duty?

Mr. PIRIE. Obviously there are several alternative management concepts that could be used in officer management. However, the career officer corps has traditionally been composed of predominantly regular officers. Even the planners of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 envisioned an all regular officer force to be achieved over a 10 year transition. The concept of an all regular career officer force of highly trained professionals who form the nucleus of our standing officer force appears to be just as valid today as it has been over the history of our nation. The requirement for officers in the junior grades to meet our officer manpower demands is extremely high. However, there are insufficient billets available in the more senior grades for all officers who are initially commissioned to continue on active duty for full 20 to 30 year careers. Consequently, the arrangement, whereby our nucleus of regular officers is supplemented by the phased integration of reserve officers needed in the career active duty force to regular status, serves us very well. Under this concept, reserve officers who are not offered regular status can evaluate their potential for future service on active duty and consciously decide whether to leave active duty and join reserve components or look to careers in the civilian sector. This arrangement we believe satisfies our management needs by giving us adequate flexibility while at the same time providing equity to the officers concerned.

DOPMA DURING MOBILIZATION

Senator JEPSEN. Mr. Pirie, it has been suggested that DOPMA may work effectively during peacetime but would be very difficult to implement in times of rapid mobilization. What is your view?

Mr. PIRIE. The DOPMA proposal is totally adaptable to operation in peacetime, during mobilization, and during war or national emergency. DOPMA was developed under the concept that future emergencies would be met initially and predominantly by mobilizing reserve units and utilizing reserves in their planned role under the Total Force policy, thereby reducing the extent to which the active force structure would have to be expanded. Experience indicates that most officer management problems have occurred as a result of integrating a large number of mobilized members of the Reserve components into the active duty officer management system and then releasing them from active duty after a relatively short period of time. Our DOPMA proposal will provide for ease of lateral movement between the active duty component and the non-active duty Reserve component of our total Defense force.

[Whereupon, at 1:49 p.m., the subcommittee recessed subject to the call of the Chair.]

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The first part of the report deals with the general situation of the country and the progress of the work during the year. It is followed by a detailed account of the various projects and the results achieved. The report concludes with a summary of the work done and the plans for the future.

The following table shows the results of the work done during the year.

