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THE SALT II TREATY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

EX. Y, 96-1

THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND THE PROTOCOL THERETO, TOGETHER REFERRED TO AS THE SALT II TREATY, BOTH SIGNED AT VIENNA, AUSTRIA, ON JUNE 18, 1979, AND RELATED DOCUMENTS

SEPTEMBER 6, 7, 10, 11, AND 12, 1979

PART 4

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

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SALT II TREATY

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 1979

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, at 10:03 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph Biden presiding.

Present: Senators Church, Biden, Stone, Zorinsky, Javits, and Hayakawa.

Also present: Senator Cranston.

Senator BIDEN. The hearing will come to order, please.

OPENING STATEMENT

This morning the Senate Foreign Relations Committee begins its final series of hearings on the SALT II Treaty. Today and tomorrow spokesmen for public groups will be testifying on this agreement. Unfortunately, we will not be able to hear from all such groups who have requested an opportunity to testify, but we have asked for written statements from those not scheduled to appear before this committee.

This morning we will hear from three groups critical of the SALT II agreement, the Committee on the Present Danger, the Coalition for Peace Through Strength, and the Institute of American Relations.

First, we will hear from Eugene Rostow, speaking as chairman of the executive committee of the Committee on the Present Danger. After questioning from the committee, we will hear from Adm. Thomas Moorer on behalf of the Coalition for Peace Through Strength. I understand that accompanying Admiral Moorer to respond to questions is Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Finally, we will hear from retired Gen. David W. Winn and Dr. Victor Fediay, who will speak on behalf of the Institute of American Relations.

Professor Rostow, would you please proceed?

STATEMENT OF EUGENE ROSTOW, CHAIRMAN, EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER, WASHINGTON, D.C.[1]

Mr. ROSTOW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I want to express my own thanks and that of the Committee on the Present Danger for your invitation to appear today to testify on the ratification of the SALT II Treaty. I am appearing on

[1] See page 31 for Mr. Rostow's prepared statement.

behalf of the Committee on the Present Danger, as you said. You have the two formal statements we have issued, as well as related materials, and the statement prepared for these hearings.

The conclusions in our July 19 statement prepared for the hearing before your subcommittee, Senator Biden, states: We believe, a positive and affirmative program for putting SALT II and the SALT negotiating process into the context of our foreign and defense policy as a whole. I emphasize that these conclusions are the basis for our approach, and we have repeated them in the beginning of the statement prepared for my submission this morning.

I thought that my brief opening remarks today would be most useful to you if I supplemented our earlier work on this subject by commenting on some of the key issues which have emerged in the hearings so far.

The strongest argument for SALT II which has thus far been put forward by the administration was summed up by a distinguished Senator in these terms, "To reject SALT II would be to go over the abyss." The variations on this theme are infinite. Some years ago I counted a couple of hundred remarks of this tenor and then gave up counting. President Carter has said that those who oppose the treaty as it stands are warmongers and opponents of détente. Secretary of State Vance is reported by the press to have said that he would resign rather than preside over the end of détente and the revival of the cold war.

The notion that the cold war is over, the notion that Soviet-American relations have improved in recent years is, in our opinion, a dangerous symptom of autointoxication. The cold war is worse today than it has ever been, featured by Soviet threats and thrusts far more sophisticated in character and on a far greater scale than those of the simple days of the Berlin airlift and the attack on Greece. But, as things get worse, many Americans tell each other that they are getting better.

SALT II is a case in point. If ratified in its present form, SALT II would be an act of submission on our part, legitimizing Soviet superiority and military superiority in all spheres. It would be a great Soviet victory in the cold war and would be so perceived everywhere in the world. But we keep repeating to ourselves that SALT II would be a step toward stability, détente, and peace.

This statement is made so often that we accept it as self-evident. But it is not self-evident. The SALT I package was ratified in 1972 on the basis of the same litany of arguments which have been offered to the Senate and the American people this year, offered under very different political and military circumstances, but offered nonetheless.

The period since 1972 has been the worst period of the cold war. It has been the period in which the agreements made for peace in Indochina were openly violated. The promises made to President Nixon in May 1972, with respect to peace in the Middle East were openly violated. It has been the period of the Soviet campaign in Africa and Asia and even of Soviet attempts to penetrate the Caribbean, as we have noticed suddenly in the last few days.

In view of the betrayal of every promise and every expectation on the basis of which SALT I was ratified, how can these arguments be put forward and how can they retain their plausibility?

The fact that they do recalls President Kennedy's celebrated quip that if you are cheated once, it is their fault, but if you are cheated a second time, it is your own.

Many of those who believe that rejecting SALT II, as it stands, would be "going over the abyss" attribute nearly magic influence to arms limitation agreements. Nothing in the history of such agreements gives the slightest encouragement for such beliefs.

The Treaty of Versailles was the most important of modern arms limitation agreements. It set limits on German armaments and it prescribed the demilitarization of the Rhineland, which was also guaranteed by the Locarno Treaty. If Britain had been willing to join France in enforcing that treaty, World War II would never have taken place. But when the treaty was violated—secretly at first, then openly when Hitler introduced conscription in 1935 and marched into the Rhineland in 1936—Great Britain and France did nothing but wring their hands and try to persuade Hitler to sign new treaties limiting arms.

The second most important arms limitation agreement of modern times was the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 and its successors of the early 1930's. Our experience under that treaty, too, was hardly more inspiring than the record of Versailles.

I could mention other instances, even more depressing: the agreements for demilitarized zones in Korea and Vietnam, for example; the Laos accord of 1962, or the arrangement to keep the PLO out of southern Lebanon.

The argument that to reject SALT would be to go over the abyss has another dimension, the notion that such action on our part would make the Soviet Union more aggressive than it is. The claim betrays a misunderstanding of the nature of the Soviet Union and of the serious and devoted men who govern it. They are already behaving as badly from our point of view as they dare. They take every opportunity to expand, and they manufacture several. There is no use getting excited about it. That is the nature of their policy. As a distinguished professor at Princeton has said, they are still in the mood of imperialism of the eighteenth century which we in the west have long since given up.

There is only one argument which can deter Soviet expansion and that is the calm confrontation of unacceptable risks. This factor prevailed in a dozen crises since 1945, from the Berlin blockade to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. It is the visible erosion of that conviction since 1972 or so which has invited a series of Soviet thrusts on every continent and every ocean. In recent years, the pace of Soviet expansion has increased as a result of the shock of Vietnam and Watergate to American public opinion and the perception in the Soviet Union of President Carter as a weak President.

The claim that it would cost us more money to refuse ratification of SALT at the present time or to ratify it only on the conditions that we have outlined here is equally specious. Administration spokesmen have taken many different positions on this question. Paul Warnke has said that it would cost more money if we ratified SALT, but that the increase could not be ratified. Secretary of Defense Brown has testified that it would cost perhaps between $1 billion and $2 billion a year for 4 or 5 years. Now he offers higher

estimates. Mr. Gelb has recently written that saving money is the main argument for ratifying SALT. The fact is that in an area of complex and rapidly changing technology, none of these estimates is of much consequence.

Ambassador Harriman has offered a variant of the abyss argument. Not to accept SALT, he said, would lead to the election of a hardliner to succeed Mr. Brezhnev. The notion that Mr. Brezhnev is a moderate in any sense that we can recognize is denied by anything he has said and done since he became a public figure. He is the author of the Brezhnev doctrine. He claims the right to intervene in any country at any time in behalf either of a socialist government or of a progressive movement, that is to say, a movement he regards as progressive. He is the author of the attacks on the Middle East in 1967 and 1973, and of the attack on Czechoslovakia in 1968. To call Brezhnev a moderate is an abuse of the English language.

Of course, there are differences within the Kremlin, and there probably are groups and sects within the Kremlin, but according to any information we have or have seen, they do not concern Soviet-American relations, nor is there any evidence that any Soviet leader accepts our definition of détente. Of course they all want to see SALT II ratified. They made enormous progress under SALT I, and they expect to make even more under SALT II. Furthermore, if we ever do wake up and decide to restore the military balance, they would surely lose as a consequence, because their economy is so much smaller and weaker than our own. But these are hardly reasons to take the treaty as it stands.

The second best argument offered by the administration for the treaty is that it would not do much harm and should therefore be ratified to demonstrate to our friends and our adversaries that we really do have a government. It is an argument which appeals very strongly to all Americans. For the best of reasons, we tend to rally to the flag when it is under fire, and President Carter is surely under fire.

The fatal flaw in this argument, however, is that the treaty is not harmless. It would do a great deal of harm. It would lock us into a position of strategic inferiority which would also be unstable and unverifiable, the perfect recipe for Soviet nuclear blackmail during the period of our greatest relative weakness in the early and middle 1980's.

Moreover, it would prevent us from redressing the military balance during that period. No spokesman for the administration has as yet seriously addressed the principal issues raised in this connection by its critics. All studies of the problem agree that if present trends continue just a few years longer, the Soviet Union will have significant nuclear superiority in the early 1980's, the capacity, that is, to make a pre-emptive first strike by destroying our ICBM's, our planes on the ground, and our submarines in port with a fraction of their nuclear force, holding enough accurate missiles in reserve to neutralize the whole of our own nuclear arsenal.

This possibility has been on everybody's mind as a nightmare for years. The prospect that these risks will materialize has become very much worse because President Carter has canceled, postponed,

or stretched out the programs initiated by his predecessors to deal with them. The answer of the administration to this analysis is that we could use our submarines in response to any such threat and we could therefore deter it.

Some have even come so far as to argue—Secretary Vance did so—that we might launch our ICBM's on warning within a few moments of receiving a radar signal that such an attack was on its way. Then, finally they say that when the M-X missile becomes available in significant quantities in 1989, it will provide an answer to the vulnerability of our ICBM force. But what are we supposed to do in the meantime, between now and 1989, or between the period in the early 1980's when this possibility becomes a somber prospect?

The administration answers this question by ignoring it.

Under these circumstances, we should be vulnerable to nuclear war or nuclear blackmail. We should face a condition of diplomatic impotence and be totally unable to use our conventional forces. That is the linkage between the nuclear balance and the whole of the rest of our foreign policy, which can never be escaped.

What would we do if there were a Macedonian uprising in Greece, for example, supported from Bulgaria? If Iceland or Norway were pushed somehow out of NATO? If we were told by the Soviet Union to get our fleet and our forces out of the Mediterranean? Under such circumstances, would either the Soviet Union or our allies believe in the possibility of reprisal from submarines which in turn would be suicidal for us? That was the argument, you will recall, that General DeGaulle made some years ago about the credibility of our nuclear weapons, and it is an argument which is becoming more and more visible in the minds of our allies as well as in the minds of the Soviets.

The only answer thus far from President Carter and his aides has been a reiteration of their blind faith in the doctrine of mutual assured destruction, the McNamara doctrine, by which we have lived for more than a decade. It is the heart and nearly the whole of the administration case for SALT II.

As former Secretary of State Kissinger emphasized in Brussels last Saturday, that argument is losing its intellectual and political plausibility. We simply must move and move rapidly to counterforce strategies.

But the treaty would prevent us from undertaking the most feasible and perhaps the only credible and practical counterforce program that could preserve our second strike capability during the early and middle 1980's: to reopen the Minuteman III production lines which the President has recently closed, to make a great many Minuteman III's; and to deploy them in multiple vertical protected shelters, the so-called shell game.

The Soviets take the view that any such approach on our part is prohibited by article IV of the treaty and by the provisions of the treaty banning deliberate concealment. They say that each shelter would be considered a fixed launcher, whether or not it contained a missile, and in any event it would be a form of concealment in their view which the treaty prohibits.

On either theory it would be banned. It may be an impracticable approach for another reason under the treaty, because the number

required would be too great for the quotas of the treaty. That is, Minuteman III is much smaller than many of the Soviet weapons, and it carries only three warheads.

The administration has not, to my knowledge or to the knowledge of any of my colleagues who have followed these things closely, addressed the issue of a possible quick fix approach. Indeed, the administration seems to assume that any program for protecting our fixed ICBM's and other ground-based launchers in the early eighties is impossible.

There are many other features of this treaty which are far from harmless. The provisions with respect to heavy missiles, for example; or the Backfire bomber; or the common understanding in paragraph 8 of article IV which deals with the relationship of the SS–16 intercontinental missile, and the SS–20 missile; or the cruise missile problem, too, which has been much discussed.

Here we find the answer offered by the administration in these hearings to be either nonexistent, or unresponsive and unsatisfactory. This is true as well of what the administration has said on verification. The administration has concentrated on the possibilities of verifying the testing of new weapons, but has not answered the questions which we and others have raised about the possibility of counting missiles in warehouses and the absence of any restraints or any possible monitoring of restraints on the manufacture of missiles rather than the deployment of launchers.

Our committee has recommended that the Senate should not give its consent to the ratification of SALT II unless the most important deficiencies of the treaty are modified by amendment and the President and the Congress are firmly committed to a specific program that would achieve and maintain essential equivalence and adequate deterrence. Among the deficiencies of the treaty requiring amendment I should list first our right to deploy ICBM's in modes and in numbers we deem necessary to insure the survival against surprise attack; the equal right of the two sides to use heavy missiles; the inclusion of the Soviet Backfire and the SS–20 within the numerical limits of the treaty; and provision for the adoption of programs which would reverse the present ominous situation of Soviet strategic superiority in Europe, including change in the provisions regarding the range of land- and sea-based cruise missiles and a clarification of the transfer of technology issue causing so much concern to our allies.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me stress that the responsibility of the Senate in voting on SALT II is unique in our history. Every American shares the goal of achieving true détente with the Soviet Union, which can only be defined, in my opinion, as a policy of scrupulous and reciprocal respect for the rules of the charter of the United Nations regarding the international use of force. True détente in this sense is a central objective of the Committee on the Present Danger and, I am sure, of the American people. Every President and Congress since 1945 have gone to great lengths to reach that goal, but President Carter's quest for détente with the Soviet Union has been based on the misconception that acts of unilateral disarmament on our part and other unilateral concessions will induce the Soviet Union to follow suit.

As a result, President Carter has sacrificed our defenses and weakened our alliances and abdicated his responsibility for the security of the Nation. Under our Constitution, that responsibility therefore falls on the Senate with respect to this treaty and ultimately on the whole Congress and the people. We have not faced decisions of such moment since the Presidency of James Buchanan.

President Carter likes to compare the debate over SALT II with the controversy over the League of Nations in 1919, but the analogy is misleading. If you go back and look at it, the League vote was not the result of the blind opposition of a small group of willfull men who prevented the ratification of the treaty. It was President Wilson himself who urged the Democrats who followed his lead on this matter, and there were 23 of them, to vote against the treaty, with the reservations which had been negotiated by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts as the leader. If only seven more Democrats had refused to follow the President's lead and had voted their convictions, the course of history might well have been very different.

In the second place, President Wilson was proposing full and responsible American participation in world politics. The position today is just the opposite. President Carter is conducting a policy of retreat to isolationism, and unless that policy is promptly reversed, it will soon be beyond our power to do so.

The coming decade will be as difficult and as dangerous as any we have faced in our past. We have a very short time in which to protect our future through allied diplomacy and deterrence rather than through war. A two-ocean navy cannot be restored in a day or a year, nor can the other programs we require to achieve effective deterrence at every relevant level. It will be a ticklish time, calling for cool nerves and a firm grasp of the problem.

The Soviet Union will not view an American awakening with equanimity. It can be expected to take full advantage of positions of relative superiority and the presence in office of a President whom it perceives as weak.

The time to begin is now, and the place to begin is here. Normally, we look to our President to take the lead in decisions of this order. It is now clear that President Carter is firmly committed to another view. What is at stake, Mr. Chairman, is not the balance of power alone, but the future of liberty. Democracy cannot survive in the world unless America plays its full part in assuring its future.

Forty years ago, as the doubts and vacillations of the thirties were being swept away by events, a speaker rose to his feet in the House of Commons to address the great issue of the looming war. Leopold Amery, one of Churchill's companions in the political wilderness, shouted a remark from his seat before the speaker began: "Speak for England," he said. In that spirit, I say to you, speak and vote for America.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. Professor, I am not sure where to begin.

First of all, I think your characterizations of President Carter retreating to isolationism and abdicating his responsibility are a little bit, to say the least, exaggerated. If we are in all the trouble

we are in, is because of the President, it is amazing to think he was deft enough to do it all within 2½ years.

It reminds me a little bit of Henry Kissinger's testimony. He came up here and told us all about what was wrong. Somehow I just had the impression that he had been around when all this was taking place.

ARMS LIMITATION NOT A WISE WAY TO PROCEED

It seems as though you have made a very strong case for the position that arms limitation treaties, regardless of the form, are essentially useless documents. Isn't it really your position and the position of the committee that arms limitation under any circumstances is not a wise way to go?

You give us the Treaty of Locarno. You go back and talk about naval agreements. You offer through a historical analysis of how every treaty related to arms limitation really was a useless document. Isn't that what you are saying?

Mr. ROSTOW. No. The Committee has said that it is in favor of fair and verifiable and balanced arms limitation agreements.

Senator BIDEN. But do you really mean that?

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes, we really mean it. I have pointed out that there was one very famous arms limitation agreement, which has worked very well, that is the agreement with Great Britain about the demilitarization of the Great Lakes, which was made back at the time of the War of 1812, just after that war. It has lasted for a long time.

Senator BIDEN. I think I am getting the picture. I think I am beginning to understand.

Mr. ROSTOW. The point is, if you have arms limitation treaty arrangements between people who fundamentally agree with each other, they can be very useful, or if you have arms limitation agreements between people who do not at all agree with each other, or who agree with each other about the meaning of the terms, they could be useful.

Senator Biden, you suggested that I couldn't possibly mean what I said, that I was attacking the President unfairly. I should like to respond to that if I may for a moment.

Senator BIDEN. Please try to do it as briefly as I did, because I have other questions.

Mr. ROSTOW. I had only 15 minutes in which to open this morning.

Senator BIDEN. Right, I only have 10 minutes.

Mr. ROSTOW. I wanted to focus on the issues that have emerged in this debate over the ratification of the treaty. In a great many other statements over the years, I have severely criticized the administrations of President Nixon and President Ford with great impartiality for various things which they did and did not do. I think the responsibility, for example, for initiating the notion that détente had replaced the cold war goes to President Nixon, who claimed much too much for his policy of rapprochement in negotiations with the Soviet Union. But remember, Senator Biden, my primary responsibility in life is that of a professor, and our responsibility, I believe profoundly, is to call the shots as we see them.

I do think that the President's foreign policy, and particularly his action in canceling and postponing the B–1 bomber and the neutron enhanced radiation warhead, his treatment of the M–X Minuteman III, the Trident, and all the rest of that sad story is very costly and has been a very damaging series of moves.

REOPEN MINUTEMAN III PRODUCTION LINES

Senator BIDEN. Professor, you stated that the United States should reopen the Minuteman III production line and deploy the Minuteman in multiple vertical shelters, but the Defense Department says if the Minuteman III were modified and made mobile, it would be ready only a year ahead of the M–X. It would also have considerably less capability than the M–X, because it would not be capable of handling 10 MIRVed vehicles. So it really would not change our strategic position in the early 1980's.

Do you agree with that or not?

Mr. ROSTOW. Certainly if the M–X could be produced earlier I would not be in the slightest bit interested in reopening the Minuteman production lines. I am trying to fill this gap with the Minuteman, but my understanding was that it would not take so long to resume the production of Minuteman III as it would take now to perfect the M–X, which has been delayed for so long, but the fundamental point is whether under a forced draft we could move ahead quickly either with the M–X or the Minuteman III.

I should, of course, be in favor of the one the experts thought was most effective.

Senator BIDEN. The experts tell us that is the M–X.

Mr. ROSTOW. The basic point is, the treaty would prevent either solution.

Senator BIDEN. How can you say that? Why would the treaty prevent either solution? I just came back after 6 days in Moscow. We raised the M–X question with the Soviets. We told them we would be going forward with the M–X. They are fully aware of its going forward. Nobody in the whole world has any real doubt about what the intentions are. There was no indication that there was, as you have indicated, a firm position taken that that would absolutely violate the SALT agreement. I don't know where you get your information. I have not been able to find any of that information. I have not been able to find any information that any of our allies—any of our allies, any of them, including the military people with whom I met, from General Rogers to the German Command—doubt that we are going ahead.

I don't know where you get your information. I don't know where it comes from. You make these bald assertions. Quite frankly, I find no sympathy for them. Please tell me what we can't do. I have asked you this question before. What can we not do that you feel needs to be done if this SALT Treaty goes forward and is ratified?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, I just testified, and I put into my prepared statement, Senator Biden, that the Russian view of the matter is, and I have in front of me a State Department paper prepared for Senator Stennis and the Armed Services Committee confirming that——

Senator BIDEN. Please read it to me. It would be helpful.

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes.

MPS System in Relation to The Treaty Discussion. This issue was raised by the Soviet delegation in Geneva in July 1978, referring to newspaper accounts concerning the multiple aim point system using vertical shelters. The Soviets stated that it appeared such a deployment would violate both the ban on construction of new fixed ICBM silo launchers and the ban on deliberate concealment measures.

The United States delegation replied that no decision had been made regarding a basing mode, but that whatever mode the United States adopted would be one that violated neither of the provisions cited by the Soviets.

They further stated that:

A draft agreement expressly provided for the deployment after protocol expiration of an ICBM system in which missiles and their launchers are moved from point to point. The subject matter was not addressed again by the delegations.

Senator BIDEN. Right. That was 1978, a year ago. Since then we have signed a treaty. Didn't you say that was July 1978?

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes; that is what it says.

Senator BIDEN. All right. That was 1 year ago. In the meantime there was a great deal of negotiation and the treaty was signed.

Mr. ROSTOW. It says this issue was never raised again.

Senator BIDEN. But it was raised by us publicly. It was raised by us throughout the world. We made what we are going to do clear. There has been no response to it, indicating the Soviets objection.

Mr. ROSTOW. Do you think that constitutes Soviet acceptance?

Senator BIDEN. I don't think the Soviets have to accept it. We go forward with what we tell the world we are going to do, and what we tell them we are going to do prior to the treaty's ratification.

Mr. ROSTOW. Then they will say we violated the treaty,

Senator BIDEN. If they then say we have violated the treaty and they want to pull out, then they can pull out. We have stated our position. If in fact they respond by not saying anything and do not physically or verbally respond to it, and we are able to go forward, then they have acquiesced.

Mr. ROSTOW. But Senator Biden, how do you reconcile these fixed shelters with the definition of the launcher in article IV?

Senator BIDEN. Actually the way I reconcile it is that our Defense Department tells us we should not go the way you suggest anyway. We should go the M-X route.

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, very well, but on the M-X route, which mode of deployment has the administration adopted as of August 1?

Senator BIDEN. They have not adopted one.

Mr. ROSTOW. That is right.

Senator BIDEN. But the point is, we will adopt whatever our military indicates to us is the best mode to adopt.

Mr. ROSTOW. Within the limitations of the treaty.

Senator BIDEN. And all of them are within the limitations of the treaty.

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, Senator, I am sorry, but I can't agree with you. I think that the Soviet analysis of the treaty is correct. To get into a position under a treaty before it is ratified in which you have a dispute with the Soviet Union as to its meaning on an absolutely fundamental point is in my opinion a most unwise procedure. It may be, as you say, that this would put the onus of abrogating the treaty on the other fellow, but that is not the object of going into a treaty.

The object of going into a treaty of arms limitation is to clarify things as much as possible and to help build mutual good faith and trust.

Senator BIDEN. Precisely. We would clarify that.

My time is up. I will come back to that if there is time.

Senator Javits?

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

RIGHT TO DEPLOY ICBM'S IN NUMBERS WE DEEM NECESSARY

Professor Rostow, I notice in your statement you say something which I would like to read into the record. You give your conclusions, and the second conclusion reads:

> That the Senate withhold its consent to the ratification of the treaty the President has submitted unless and until it is modified to meet its demonstrated deficiencies and the President and the Congress are firmly committed to a specific program that will achieve and maintain essential equivalence and adequate deterrence.

I then look further in your statement in which you say that:

> The Senate should not give its consent to the ratification of SALT II unless the most important deficiencies of the treaty are modified by amendment: "Among the deficiencies of the treaty requiring amendment, I should list first our right to deploy ICBM's in modes and numbers we deem necessary to ensure survival against surprise attack."

Now, isn't it a fact that if we ask for that, the Russians will too? This is not a one-party game. In other words, they will ask for the right to deploy whatever ICBM basing mode and numbers they please. Mr. Rostow, is that a treaty, or are you engaging in a charade with us?

You know very well, as well as I do, that there is no treaty the minute they deploy as many as they want and we deploy as many as we want. What are we talking about?

Mr. ROSTOW. I am not talking about a charade. I am not very good at charades, Senator Javits. I am talking about a negotiation to adjust the modes and numbers provided for in the treaty so that we can deal with the problem of the vulnerability of the ICBM's which has been so much discussed. I want to solve that problem through agreement with the Russians. You ask whether the Soviets won't ask for equal priviledges, of course. But they are already deploying variable range mobile SS-20 missiles which are MIRVed, and can reach the United States, but are not covered by the treaty. The Soviet Union now has the capacity through its SS-20's in Europe to reach the United States by a simple device, well, by two simple devices, either by adding an extra booster to the SS-20 and making it into an SS-16, or by substituting a single warhead on the SS-20.

Now, we raise the question here as well in paragraph 3, to clarify those points, of including the Soviet Backfire and the SS-20 within the numerical limits of the treaty for that reason. We are trying simply to point out consequences of this treaty as we analyze it which would make it a much fairer, more equal, more balanced, and more livable treaty. This is not a charade at all. This is dealing with the most vital subject of our national security, the question of whether the strategic balance on which the possibility of diplomatic influence and the use of conventional force depends is going to be tipped adversely to our interests.

Senator JAVITS. Professor, I asked you directly this: if we want to build all the ICBM's that we choose to build under a treaty, don't you expect the Russians to get the same right? Would you say yes or no to that?

Mr. ROSTOW. Senator Javits, I cannot say yes or no to that because that is not what I said. I didn't say that we want to deploy all the ICBM's we want. We want to deploy ICBM's in modes and numbers we deem necessary to insure their survival, and we are talking about negotiating an agreement with the Russians on that point.

Senator JAVITS. And that is not equivalent to all we want as you define it?

Mr. ROSTOW. No, I am talking about negotiation. There is no limit on ICBM production in the treaty. We are talking about using them and being very direct with the Soviet Union. I am talking about amendments, not unilateral declarations.

SIMPLY AGAINST THE TREATY

Senator JAVITS. My dear friend, you are talking about no treaty. What I am trying to get you to say, because that is what you do say, whether you are trying to avoid it or not, is, you are simply against the treaty. You want no treaty. Why do you give us this nonsense about renegotiation of a treaty with amendments when you know that you are taking the whole heart out of the treaty when there is no limit on us and no limit on them? We are just playing with words.

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, I haven't characterized the administration in that way, but yes, I think it is a fair characterization.

Senator JAVITS. I am not saying it is the administration. I am saying it is you, not the administration.

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, there can be two opinions about that. I am talking here, or was trying to talk here, Senator Javits, about renegotiating this treaty. The treaty is not the essential point. The essential point, as we tried to make clear in our statement is to have a foreign policy and a defense policy that would secure the interests of the Nation.

A fair and balanced and verifiable treaty might do that, but we do not think that this treaty is fair, balanced, and verifiable, and we think it would be a profound mistake for the Senate to approve its ratification, to consent to its ratification in its present form.

Now, you can characterize that position as anything you like, of course, but we have tried to make it clear in a succession of statements going back to 1976 exactly what we are saying and why.

ARMAMENTS TREATY BETWEEN NATIONS THAT AGREE

Senator JAVITS. I have already given my view as to what you are trying to do to this treaty. I wish that your organization, like other organizations, would simply be frank about it and say you are against it, and you believe that the only eventuality is for us to make the maximum degree of preparation as rapidly as we can. You gave your own analogy, and please correct me if I am wrong, the only treaty that you believe can be an effective treaty to limit

armaments is between people who essentially agree with each other. That excludes all treaties with the Russians.

So, should we just forget it and arm to the teeth and expect the atomic war which is sure to come, as all of history has shown since man began?

Mr. ROSTOW. Senator Javits, in my reading of history war comes when people feel they are losing control of the situation and when one side becomes very much stronger than the other. Then they strike out in desperation. The point was never better put than by Thucydides about the causes of the Peloponnesian War, which destroyed Greek civilization. He said, there were all sorts of episodes preceding that war, but the real cause of the war was the rise in the power of Athens and the fear which this caused in Sparta.

Now, it is that fear which we are trying to overcome by urging preparations for deterrent strength that would prevent war. The Romans used to say, if you want peace, prepare for war, and we say that in dealing with the Russians, there is no use getting excited about it. The only way to deter them is to present, very calmly, unacceptable risks. That is what we did in the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. That is what we did in Berlin in 1948, and in Greece, and in Turkey, and in a dozen other crises of the period. We stood firm. We used conventional forces, and in the end, we prevailed.

Now, the risk of war in my opinion is just the reverse of what you say. I don't think that a SALT II Treaty would advance the cause of peace any more than the SALT I Interim Agreement did. The SALT I Interim Agreement was signed, and I think it was very reasonable to sign it under the expectations of that period. I supported it. I support it now. But we have to recognize that all the expectations on the basis of which we signed that treaty have been betrayed.

That is to say, we were promised peace in Indochina and peace in the Middle East, instead of which we got the reverse.

Senator JAVITS. All right. I see that my time is up. We can get back to this.

Senator BIDEN. I will yield to you my time to keep up this line of questioning.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you.

LEGALITY OF ATTACKING RESERVATIONS

I am not yet myself committed to this treaty, but the administration, I think, has put it to us on the basis that we do not lose the opportunity to go forward, but we put a cap at least on where we both are. I don't see that you have answered that at all, and I will tell you why, if I may.

I do not think that we are defining terms in the same way. Let me give you a practical example. I notice in your testimony which you made when you appeared before us in July, you were asked by Senator Biden, "The vertical shelter game can be done, assuming that we pass a reservation interpreting the verification provision so as to allow the vertical shelter game." At that point you interrupted: "Mr. ROSTOW. Mr. Chairman, a reservation has the same legal effect as a letter from my mother."

Now, do you still maintain that position?

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes.

Senator JAVITS. Why?

Mr. ROSTOW. In the context of this kind of a treaty; that is, as compared with a tax treaty or a multilateral treaty, a reservation would have the most ambiguous and uncertain effect on the other side. The Russians have said very openly that they would regard such a reservation as a unilateral, domestic matter and would not treat it as significant.

Senator JAVITS. Let me interrupt you. I would like to give you an historical analogy. When the Russians signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, they announced publicly that they would not consider a unified Europe to be a nuclear power even though France and Britain were both nuclear powers and would be part of it. We announced exactly the contrary at exactly the same time. That did not invalidate the Non-Proliferation Treaty, did it? We both are going to wait for the eventuality, and if either of us wanted to pull out, we could.

Mr. ROSTOW. My clear recollection is that we told the Russians that if they said that a united Europe could not become a nuclear power by virtue of the doctrine of succession in international law, that the treaty was abrogated. That is the background of the unilateral interpretations controversy over the 1972 agreement.

Now, it is not my recollection that the Russians ever made any public announcement. I may be wrong—indeed, I often am—but my recollection is that the Russians kept quiet on the issue after both Rusk and Rogers testified.

Senator JAVITS. Well, there is no use in our arguing that, because that will just have to be corrected from the record, but my recollection is exactly the contrary.

Mr. ROSTOW. Very well.

INSISTENCE ON AMENDMENT TERMINOLOGY

Senator JAVITS. Now, the reservation proposition is a declaration which is put into the instrument of ratification so that when we ratify, we ratify with that reservation, and when they ratify they ratify with that reservation in it. I don't understand why you want the amendment business, except that you know as well as I do that now the Russians have to face the proposition on amendments. Brezhnev and Gromyko have said: "If you call it an amendment, forget it, we can't take it, there is no treaty," so we are going to call it a reservation. What is the difference? Do you just want to call it an amendment to torpedo the treaty? Is that why you insist on it?

Mr. ROSTOW. After my exchange with Senator Biden, which you just quoted, I checked with my colleagues, with professors of international law at the Yale Law School. They agree with me that a reservation under these circumstances would not be binding on the other party unless it were accepted, that silence would not be acceptance, and therefore the reservation could not be regarded as more than a unilateral statement for this kind of treaty.

There is no possibility that these issues would go to the courts. In one of the leading American cases on the distinction between reservations and amendments, the Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit in New York threw out a reservation for a treaty on the ground that it was not germane to the subject matter.

CIRCUMSTANCES MAKING RESERVATION INOPERATIVE

Senator JAVITS. Well, I think you are qualifying it. Now I am a lawyer, too, and I don't know what circumstances you are talking about. What are they? What are the particular circumstances that make a reservation inoperative under this matter?

General WINN. Mind you, they have been included in the resolution of ratification which the President must do. He has no choice, and therefore they will be part of the ratification papers of both parties. I just do not understand that particular effort to attack this matter.

UNILATERAL MATTER NOT BINDING SOVIETS

Mr. ROSTOW. The Russians have already said that this is a unilateral matter and it would not bind them.

Senator JAVITS. Professor Rostow, if this treaty is ended because we don't agree on an interpretation, doesn't that suit you fine? You wouldn't be complaining about it. You would love it. You are against the treaty. Why are you debating with us as to what we want to put in if we are for it? You are against it. So if it blows up, you are delighted. You think it is good for the country.

Mr. ROSTOW. Senator Javits, first of all, I have spent a large part of my life trying to make agreements with the Russians. I was the lend lease desk officer in the State Department during the war, and developed the plan for the first reconstruction loans to the Russians. Second, as you know very well, I am a professor. I cannot resist the lure of an issue.

Senator JAVITS. Right, and I don't think you can resist the lure of your own thinking either, whatever may be the realities of the situation.

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, that is a sin from which we all suffer, Senator. [General laughter.]

Senator JAVITS. Would you be good enough to submit a memorandum to us, a legal memorandum by you and your associates as to why you believe that a reservation in this treaty has the same legal effect as a letter from my mother?

Mr. ROSTOW. All right, I shall be glad to do that. I shall be happy to submit a legal memorandum to you, Senator.

[The following information was subsequently received for the record:]

YALE UNIVERSITY, LAW SCHOOL,
New Haven, Conn., September 27, 1979.

Senator FRANK CHURCH,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On September 6th, I was asked by Senator Biden, the Acting Chairman, and by Senator Javits to comment on the staff analysis of the comparative legal status of "amendments", "reservations", and "understandings" with which the Senate might decide to qualify its consent to the ratification of SALT II. The staff analysis appears in two memoranda sent to me by Frederick S. Tipson, Esq., on September 14th. Mr. Tipson's letter and its enclosures arrived here on September 24th. Mr. Tipson also called my attention to the Administration position on these questions contained in an exchange between you and Secretary

Vance at p. 182 of Part 1 of your Hearings on the SALT II Treaty, and in answers to questions on the subject at pp. 606–607 of the same volume.

I have consulted my colleagues Professors Myres S. McDougal, Robert H. Bork, Joseph W. Bishop, Leon Lipson, and W. Michael Reisman on this issue, and I am authorized to say that they join me in this letter.

Both our own usage and international practice have employed a number of words to identify conditions imposed on the ratification of treaties, as the undated memorandum of Mssrs. Glennon and Tipson points out: amendments, reservations, unilateral or common understandings, declarations, explanations, clarifications and so on. Some may deal only with domestic legal or political problems, or indeed with problems not germane to the subject matter of the treaty. For example, if the Senate should condition its consent to the ratification of SALT II on an increase in our own defense budget of 3%, 5%, or 10%, that condition—however it is labelled—would not concern the Soviet Union, and obviously would not require its agreement.

On the other hand, the issues listed in my testimony on September 6th as problems which should be clarified by the Senate before ratification do concern the substance of the Treaty. They are matters on which the utmost precision is desirable in the interest of the great national objectives sought through the negotiation of SALT II.

The heart of our disagreement with those who would deal with questions of this order through "reservations" or "understandings" rather than "amendments" appears on p. 8 of the Glennon-Tipson memorandum, where the authors say that if "reservations" or "understandings" adopted by the Senate as conditions to its consent to ratification are included in the instrument of ratification, and if the Soviet Union "proceeds with the exchange of instruments of ratification, its silence constitutes assent to the treaties as modified by the United States." We believe it is impossible to state the idea as a universal rule in this absolute form. Neither international law nor political prudence justify placing so heavy a burden on the interpretation of Soviet silence.

The supposed rule of assent through silence urged in the Glennon-Tipson memorandum does not correspond to the rule stated in Sections 124 and 126 of the American Law Institute Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States and in many other authoritative comments on International law. There is no assurance that the construction favored by your advisers is widely accepted for the modification of bilateral treaties. Even more important, there is every indication that the Soviet Union does not accept such a rule, but continues to rely on more formal distinctions among amendments, reservations, and other forms of treaty modification.

Soviet spokesmen say repeatedly that they do not care what "reservations" we adopt, since "reservations" are entirely internal in their effect. SALT II concerns matters of the highest possible importance to the security of the United States and of many other nations. International law on this subject, never clear cut, is now in flux, in large part because of the influence of certain obscure, potentially inconsistent, and controversial provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

To assume that the future of SALT II would be governed by so simplistic a rule as that stated in the Glennon-Tipson memorandum would be risky at best, and, on matters essential to the security of the United States, foolhardy.

Traditionally, both international law and our own practice used different words to identify somewhat different procedures for altering a Treaty during the ratification process. "Amendment" was the least ambiguous word customarily used. When the Senate consented to ratification with an amendment, it was understood that the President would submit the proposed change in the text of the Treaty to the other party or parties, and obtain his or their consent to the amendment prior to ratification. "Reservation", on the other hand, was a more ambiguous word used in a variety of contexts. Section 124 of the Restatement defines the word "reservation" as "a formal declaration made by a signatory before it becomes bound by an international agreement that the agreement will not be binding upon it except upon terms that it regards as changing the effect of the agreement under international law." International and American usage is, however, less strict than the Restatement definition. Often, the word "reservation" denotes unconditional consent by the Senate to ratification, subject to a proviso which could have different consequences in different settings. It is most often used in connection with multilateral treaties. "Understanding" and "interpretation" have been used in even more fluid ways.

Since the Glennon-Tipson memorandum seems to rely heavily on a paragraph of Article 20 of the Vienna Convention, it should be noted that in this regard the Convention is having a regressive effect on international law. It seems to lump all forms of treaty emendation and alteration together as "Reservations". Thus it multiplies doubts and ambiguities, and reduces clarity. Some experts believe that

the provisions of the convention on reservations apply only to multilateral treaties. Others believe the purpose of the Convention is to deal with the problem universally. But all must concede that the purport and scope of the provisions are uncertain. (The text of Articles 19 and 20 of the Vienna Convention appears in an Appendix to this letter.)

In their language and range of reference, Sections 2-4 of Article 20 seem to refer only to multilateral treaties. And the Commentary of the International Law Commission on the Draft which became the Vienna Convention is clearly of the view that the Convention would apply only to multilateral treaties, on the ground that "a reservation to a bilateral treaty presents no problem, because it amounts to a new proposal reopening the negotiations between the two states concerning the terms of the treaty. If they arrive at an agreement whether adopting or rejecting the reservation—the treaty will be concluded. If not, it will fall to the ground."

If however, these provisions of the Vienna Convention should be interpreted to apply to bilateral treaties like SALT II, would Section 2 govern? Section 5? If they do not apply, under what circumstances should agreement to a reservation be inferred from silence during the ratification process, even after twelve months? Customary international law is full of episodes of controversy, doubt and confusion.

In view of the unsettled character of international law on the subject at this time, we believe that if the Senate wishes to condition its consent to the ratification of SALT II on certain modifications, clarifications, or interpretations of the text before it, it should proceed only upon the express condition that the Soviet Union formally and explicitly agree to each of our proposals for change in its instrument of ratification.

It is, however, clear both in Secretary Vance's comments to you at p. 182 of the Hearings and from the State Department's statements on pp. 606-607 that the Administration is relying heavily on Soviet "silence" as an important part of the cement of this Treaty, and on our capacity to denounce the Treaty as the sanction behind our views. But where is the evidence that the Soviet Union accepts "silence" as a modality for binding itself to solemn international agreements? Whatever evidence we have seen goes the other way.

The melancholy history of the "unilateral interpretations" of the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms put forward by Administration spokesman in 1972 is enough to warn against reliance on such a procedure. In that case the Soviet Union remained silent while we expounded our interpretations of the Agreement. They then violated the agreement as we interpreted it. Despite our repeated statements to the contrary, we did not denounce the Agreement. Too much was deemed to be at stake to make such a course advisable. Furthermore, our capacity to denounce such a Treaty at will was thought to be at least doubtful, in the absence of a violation of an unambiguous and major term of the Treaty by the other party, Gray v. United States, 21 Ct. Cl. 340 (1886).

It is clear from the debate that many people prefer to label Senate conditions to its consent as "reservations" rather than "amendments", despite the uncertainties such a course would generate, because they are afraid that the Soviet Union would simply refuse to negotiate any further in order to resolve questions which might be raised by the Senate. It is almost inconceivable that the United States Senate would adopt such a posture after mature reflection. As President Kennedy once said, "the United States should never negotiate out of fear, and should never be afraid to negotiate." Surely we should never knuckle under to a position of "Take it or leave it", or any other form of ultimatum.

The Senate should reach its conclusions about SALT II in terms of its analysis of the Treaty's impact on our foreign and defense policies as a whole. If it finds there are certain issues on which it would be desirable to alter the text, or to obtain clarification from the Soviet Union, it should proceed to state those points in a form that would require the unequivocal and explicit concurrence of the Soviet Union. The notion that we should hesitate to raise fundamental questions for further discussion with any nation out of fear is repugnant to our nature and to our history. If the Soviet Union were as arbitrary and unreasonable as some spokesmen for the Administration seem to think, no agreement with it would be worth having.

Yours sincerely,

EUGENE V. ROSTOW.

The signatories to this letter, all members of the Yale Law School faculty, are:

MYRES S. MCDOUGAL.
ROBERT H. BORK.
JOSEPH W. BISHOP.
LEON LIPSON.
WILLIAM M. REISMAN.
EUGENE V. ROSTOW.

Appendix—Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

Article 19—Formulation of Reservations

A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless:

(a) The reservation is prohibited by the treaty;

(b) The treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not include the reservation in question, may be made; or

(c) In cases not falling under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.

Article 20—Acceptance of and Objection to Reservations

1. A reservation expressly authorized by a treaty does not require any subsequent acceptance by the other contracting States unless the treaty so provides.

2. When it appears from the limited number of the negotiating States and the object and purpose of a treaty that the application of the treaty in its entirety between all the parties is an essential condition of the consent of each one to be bound by the treaty, a reservation requires acceptance by all the parties.

3. When a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international organization and unless it otherwise provides, a reservation requires the acceptance of the competent organ of that organization.

4. In cases not falling under the preceding paragraphs and unless the treaty otherwise provides:

(a) Acceptance by another contracting State of a reservation constitutes the reserving State a party to the treaty in relation to that other State if or when the treaty is in force for those States;

(b) An objection by another contracting State to a reservation does not preclude the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting and reserving States unless a contrary intention is definitely expressed by the objecting State;

(c) An act expressing a State's consent to be bound by the treaty and containing a reservation is effective as soon as at least one other contracting State has accepted the reservation.

5. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 4 and unless the treaty otherwise provides, a reservation is considered to have been accepted by a State if it shall have raised no objection to the reservation by the end of a period of twelve months after it was notified of the reservation or by the date on which it expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, whichever is later.

Foreign Relations Committee Staff Memorandum of June 25, 1979 Referred to in Mr. Rostow's Letter

Memorandum to: Members, Committee on Foreign Relations.
From: Michael J. Glennon and Frederick S. Tipson.
Subject: SALT II—Legal and Procedural Issues.

This is a preliminary summary of legal and procedural issues relating to the SALT II Treaty. It attempts to clarify certain basic questions regarding Senate consideration of the treaty and identifies other issues for more detailed consideration in subsequent memoranda. Still other issues will undoubtedly arise in the course of the debate and we will respond to particular inquiries as quickly as possible.

The following subjects are addressed:

1. The Treaty and Associated Documents.
2. Consideration by the Senate.
3. Presidential Alternatives after Senate Action.
4. Soviet Ratification and Modification.

I. The Treaty and Related Documents: Legal Status and Analysis

President Carter signed the SALT II Treaty in Vienna on June 18. As a signatory, the United States is not legally bound to the terms of the treaty, but under international law it is generally accepted that a treaty signatory undertakes in good faith a) to proceed with the process of ratification in accordance with its own constitutional law, and b) to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty during a reasonable interim period.

The President has asked for Senate advice and consent only to the *Treaty* and *Protocol*, presented as a single document. The Protocol is regarded as an "integral part" of the treaty itself and is distinguished by its earlier expiration date: 1981 rather than 1985. (The 1972 SALT Interim Agreement contained a Protocol on

submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and the 1972 ABM Treaty was amended with a Protocol in 1974.)

The President's formal letter of transmittal contains, in addition to the Secretary of State's report on the purpose and provisions of the agreement, the following documents:

1. *Agreed Statements and Common Understandings,* relating to particular articles in both the Treaty and the Protocol;

2. A *Memorandum of Understanding* by the two sides certifying the figures on their present numbers of strategic offensive systems, in accordance with article 17(3) of the Treaty;

3. A *Joint Statement of Principles* agreed upon by Presidents Carter and Brezhnev representing their general objectives with respect to further SALT negotiations;

4. A memorandum from the Secretary of State communicating the *exchange of statements on the Soviet "Backfire" bomber* which took place at the Vienna summit meeting in June.

These four documents, according to the President's letter of transmittal, have been transmitted "for the information of the Senate," not for its advice and consent. Under Senate precedent, such instruments are not susceptible of amendment in the strict sense.[1] However, the Senate could "reach" such documents by conditioning its advice and consent in one of several ways. First, it could amend the Treaty to incorporate the terms of a collateral agreement (or an amended version thereof) within the text of the Treaty itself—as it did in the case of the Carter-Torrijos "Joint Statement" regarding the Panama Canal Neutrality Treaty. Second, it could insist in a reservation that the terms of a collateral agreement be modified in accordance with its instructions prior to ratification. Third, it could announce in a reservation or understanding that it regards the provisions of a collateral agreement or assurance as equal in status to the Treaty itself and consents to ratification subject to that understanding. All such conditions, of course, would have to be accepted by the Soviet Union prior to the exchange of the instruments of ratification.

In the absence of explicit conditions attached by the Senate, the status and effect of collateral or derivative agreements would be governed by international legal principles of treaty interpretation. Thus, the Treaty would be interpreted in light of the negotiating context including those agreements made or assurances offered in connection with its conclusion. Subsequent agreements between the parties regarding the interpretation or application of treaty provisions would also be taken into account.

1. The *Agreed Statements* and *Common Understandings* comprise, in effect, a set of supplementary agreements designed to elaborate the meaning of particular articles in both the Treaty and the Protocol. Earlier in the negotiations, "Agreed Statements" were considered to have a somewhat higher standing than "Common Understandings," but the Administration no longer suggests that there is any legal or political basis for distinguishing between them. Similar terms were used in connection with the SALT I agreements, but unlike SALT I, there are no "unilateral statements" by either side and all Agreed Statements and Common Understandings have been signed by both sides.

2. The *Memorandum of Understanding* on the Establishment of a Data Base on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms relates to Article 17(3) of the Treaty. By the terms of that article, the Parties agree to maintain such a data base on an ongoing basis through the Standing Consultative Commission. The "M.O.U." itself contains figures on strategic arms as of November 1, 1978. In accordance with an earlier understanding, these figures were updated as of the date of treaty signature (June 18, 1979), and these updated figures are contained in accompanying submissions of each side.

3. The *Joint Statement of Principles* and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms, though agreed to by both sides, is not by its nature a binding legal agreement. It represents a set of general common objectives rather than specific undertakings. A comparable joint statement of principles

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[1] The chair noted on March 24, 1922, during the consideration of a treaty with the British Empire, France and Japan concerning their insular possessions in the Pacific Ocean, that a declaration of the signatories as to their understanding and intent made at the time the treaty was signed was not a part of the treaty and not subject to amendment. *Cong. Rec.*, March 24, 1922 at p. 4496. Similarly, the chair (Vice President Mondale, presiding), in response to a parliamentary inquiry by Sen. Allen at the outset of the debate on the Panama Canal Treaties, stated that only "the body of the treaty, including all of the articles, annexes thereto, protocols to it, et cetera, is before the Senate for consideration and therefore amendable." *Cong. Rec.*, Feb. 8, 1978 at p. S1500. "Other documents," the chair stated, "would not be subject to amendments." *Id.*

for the SALT II negotiations was issued at the Washington summit meeting of June 21, 1973.

4. The section of the President's submission to the Senate headed *"Soviet Backfire Statement"* comprises, in effect, a memorandum of the Secretary of State certifying the exchange of statements (written and oral) regarding Soviet production and deployment of the Backfire (TU–22M) bomber which took place at the summit meeting in June. The form of the exchange apparently was negotiated in advance, with the U.S. signature of the Treaty conditioned upon Soviet acceptance of the restrictions contained in their written statement on the Backfire. The nature of this agreement raises a number of legal questions. Because of the special role of the Secretary of State in negotiating and communicating this exchange, it will be important to clarify his own expectations regarding the Backfire statements.

Unilateral written or oral declarations can provide the basis for binding commitments under international law and diplomatic practice, especially if the State making them expects another State to rely upon them. In this case, U.S. reliance upon the Soviet assurances is made explicit. However, it is not clear whether the Soviets would regard the violation of this understanding as equivalent to a violation of the Treaty itself. It is also not clear whether the Soviet undertakings are limited to the period of the Treaty only—i.e., whether their effective date and termination date are identical to those of the Treaty.

Finally, the Secretary of State's Report to the President refers to President Carter's affirmation "that the United States has the right to an aircraft comparable to Backfire" (p. 35), but this affirmation does not appear in the Secretary's memorandum recording the exchange of statements in Vienna (p. 73). In view of the careful orchestration of these statements, it is not evident why it was not included. Therefore, it is not apparent whether U.S. development and deployment of a comparable bomber would be subject to the same restrictions on capability and production rate as the Backfire.

II. SENATE CONSIDERATION OF THE TREATY

Upon transmittal to the Senate, the Treaty will be routinely referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, which has exclusive jurisdiction over all treaties under Rule 25.1j of the Standing Rules of the Senate. While another Committee may hold hearings on certain aspects of the agreement, treaties are never referred, jointly or sequentially, to any Committee other than Foreign Relations.

A. Consideration by the committee

Committee rules make no special provision for the handling of treaties. Thus, unless the Committee determines otherwise, the same procedure followed during the consideration of other measures will be followed in considering the SALT II Treaty.

The Committee will have before it two items: the text of the Treaty (including the Protocol and perhaps other documents considered part of the Treaty), and the Resolution of Ratification. The latter can be introduced beforehand or reported as an original resolution; the procedural difference is described in part B below.

The Senate may grant its advice and consent conditionally, and if the Committee wishes to recommend that it do so, two kinds of conditions are available. The first is an amendment to the text of the Treaty itself. The second is an amendment to the Resolution of Ratification. Amendments to the Resolution are typically designated reservations, understandings, interpretations, declarations, and statements. These are also discussed in more detail below. If it approves the Treaty, the Committee will thus report two instruments to the Senate: (1) the Treaty itself, with or without amendments; and (2) the Resolution of Ratification, with or without amendments.[2]

Treaties are placed on the executive calendar of the Senate in the order reported and are taken up in that order. A motion to proceed to the consideration of executive business is in order at any time and is not debatable unless any other treaty is already on the executive calendar, in which case a motion to proceed to consideration of the SALT Treaty would be debatable.

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[2] During consideration of the Panama Canal Treaties, the Carter-Torrijos Joint Statement was incorporated in the Neutrality Treaty in the form of two "leadership amendments." The Committee had declined to adopt these amendments formally so as to allow other Senators the opportunity to join in their co-sponsorship; instead, it voted to *recommend* to the Senate that it incorporate the amendments. The procedural effect was minimal; the amendments were as a result floor amendments, rather than Committee amendments. Thus, they were not moved by the Floor Manager and did not have priority over other amendments (see part B below).

B. Senate floor action

1. Types of conditions

As discussed above, two types of conditions may be imposed by the Senate upon its consent: amendments to the text of the Treaty itself, and amendments to the Resolution of Ratification.

a. *Textual amendments.*—An amendment to the text of a treaty is in one sense similar to an amendment to a bill—it may strike out certain language in the treaty and insert other language in lieu thereof; it may do the same with respect to numbers appearing in the treaty; or, it may add new articles or sections, or delete entire articles or sections. On the other hand, unlike a bill a treaty is not directly modified by the Senate; rather, the Senate gives its consent upon the *condition* that an amendment be made, and the treaty is actually amended by the President, who does so upon bringing the treaty into force.

b. *Amendments to the Resolution of Ratification.*—Amendments to the Resolution of Ratification may be designated as follows:

i. *"Reservation".*—A reservation modifies or limits the substantive effect of one or more of the treaty provisions. It in effect adds something of substance to the treaty or takes something of substance from it, and gives notice that the United States will not, in that respect, give effect to the treaty except in accordance with the reservation.

The text of a treaty thus need not be amended explicitly in order to effect a change in its substance. An implicit but equally effective amendment may be achieved through a reservation or even an understanding (see below). The Senate may provide by reservation, for example, that a certain provision will be without force and effect; such a reservation would be the functional legal equivalent of an amendment to the text of the treaty which strikes out the provision line by line.

ii. *"Understanding".*—An understanding is a statement which is not intended to modify or limit any of the provisions of the treaty. Rather, it is intended to clarify or explain a treaty provision or to deal with some other matter incidental to the operation of the treaty in a manner other than in a substantive reservation. Sometimes an understanding is no more than a statement of policies or principles or an indication of general procedures for carrying out provisions of the treaty. An understanding may relate to the rights and obligations of either party; like a reservation, it need not be limited to the rights and obligations of the party entering the understanding. Understandings are also on occasion called *"interpretations"*. As noted above, however, their practical effect may be the same as a reservation.

iii. *"Declarations"* and other statements. These are used most often when it is considered essential or desirable to give notice of certain matters of policy or principle, without an intention of derogating from the substantive rights or obligations stipulated in the treaty. *"Explanations"*, *"clarifications"*, and *"recommendations"* are other designations which occasionally have been used.

2. Procedure

Rule 37 of the Standing Rules of the Senate (attached) governs the consideration of treaties. The procedure to be followed in the Senate, and options available to it if it wishes the Treaty modified, are as follows:

The Senate will first consider the Treaty as in "Committee of the Whole." (The Committee of the Whole procedure may be avoided only by unanimous consent or by suspension of the rules.) At this stage, the Senate will go through the Treaty article by article, at which time amendments to each article may be offered; there is no vote on each article as such. Amendments recommended by the Committee on Foreign Relations will be considered first, after which other amendments may be offered. The Treaty is amendable in two degrees (i.e., amendments to amendments) and all votes are by a majority of those present.

Only actual amendments to the text of the Treaty will be in order during the Committee of the Whole proceeding. Amendments to the Resolution of Ratification—i.e., reservations, understandings, etc.—are therefore not in order at this stage. Articles of the Treaty are considered in numerical order, with consideration of the Protocol following considering of the Treaty. Amendments may not be offered to Articles that have not yet been taken up, but may be offered to Articles previously considered once the entire treaty has been considered in the Committee of the Whole proceeding.

After the Senate has considered each article of the Treaty for possible amendment, it will, in effect, "dissolve itself" from the Committee of the Whole and then vote a second time on each of the amendments (if any) passed earlier. (The Senate may accept all the amendments by a single vote only with unanimous consent.) Entirely new amendments may also be offered at this stage.

Following a wait of one day, the Resolution of Ratification is taken up, which will automatically incorporate any amendments to the text of the Treaty. At that point, amendments to the Resolution of Ratification itself are in order. Amendments to the Resolution must be approved by a simple majority. Like amendments to the text of the Treaty, they are amendable in only one degree. The vote on advice and consent, which requires the approval of two-thirds of those present and voting, occurs after the Senate has concluded consideration of the Resolution of Ratification. All votes on amendments, reservations, understandings, etc., require only a majority vote for approval.

Several additional procedural matters should be noted at this point.

Cloture.—The cloture and germaneness provisions of Senate Rule 22 (attached) apply to the consideration of treaties. Thus, in the absence of cloture, an amendment to a Treaty article need not be germane to that article. Cloture, if invoked, would pertain to all aspects of the process: the Committee of the Whole and action on both the Treaty and the Resolution of Ratification. The rule of germaneness would then apply.

Closed sessions.—A motion to consider the Treaty in secret ("with closed doors") may be made at any time by any Senator and requires only a second. In accordance with Senate rule 35 (attached), no vote is taken on such a motion; in contrast, a motion to return to open session, while non-debatable, requires a majority vote.

Recommittal.—The concept of "recommittal" has been used, somewhat loosely, in reference to two quite different procedural steps: returning the Treaty to the Committee on Foreign Relations for reconsideration (possibly with instructions), and returning it to the President for renegotiation with the Soviets. The former represents a simple "motion to recommit" and is in order at any time prior to the final vote on the Resolution of Ratification. The latter is more complex: a treaty may be returned to the President only through the adoption of an order by unanimous consent, or a resolution by simple majority. However, such a resolution would normally be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

III. PRESIDENTIAL ALTERNATIVES AFTER SENATE ACTION

Senate action on the SALT II Treaty could take any one of a number of courses, each of which presents the President with various alternatives.

A. Senate consent without conditions

The Senate may grant its consent without imposing any conditions, as is done with the great majority of treaties. If so, the President may then proceed immediately to ratify the Treaty. Contrary to popular impression, the Senate does not "ratify" treaties as such—it gives its "consent" to ratification by the President. Senate consent constitutes authorization, rather than a directive, to bring the treaty into force. The President may, moreover, withdraw a treaty for which he has requested Senate consent at any time prior to the final vote on advice and consent. Ratification occurs upon the exchange of "instruments of ratification" with the other signatory; these are documents indicating each state's intent to be bound and containing any conditions either state may impose. In the case of bilateral treaties, United States practice has been to execute a "Protocol of Exchange" as well, which is a document signed by both states indicating that each has examined the instruments of a ratification tendered by the other and that each accepts the conditions, if any, imposed by the other.

B. Senate consent with conditions

In the event that the Senate conditions its advice and consent upon the acceptance of certain amendments, reservations, or understandings, the President has several options:

1. Consider the conditions unacceptable and decline to ratify the Treaty;
2. Reopen negotiations with the Soviet Union and seek their acceptance of the conditions;
3. Submit a new Treaty to the Senate; or
4. Resubmit the original Treaty.

Several additional issues arise in connection with the various conditions which the Senate may impose upon its consent:

Presidential objection to the resolution.—Prior to the final vote on the Resolution of Ratification, the President may decide that amendments or other conditions already attached to the Resolution make it unacceptable to him. He may then request those siding with him to vote against the Resolution, rather than to risk Senate advice and consent with unacceptable conditions. (This situation occurred when the Versailles Treaty failed to receive a two-thirds vote because of President Wilson's opposition to Senate approval with the so-called "Lodge Reservations.")

Requirement of Presidential transmittal.—With the possible exceptions of a condition relating solely to a matter of domestic concern (e.g., that a given treaty will be non-self-executing) and a statement not germane to the treaty, the President is required to include each Senate-added condition in the instrument of ratification given the other signatory. "That such conditions must be so included," the Committee said in its report on the Panama Canal Treaties, "is as much a part of customary constitutional law in this country as the right of the Senate to grant conditional consent." Ex. Rept. No. 95–12, Feb. 3, 1978 at p. 11.

Acceptance of United States conditions by the Soviet Union.—Instruments of ratification are not exchanged until the views of the other government concerning United States conditions have been obtained. If the Soviet Union proceeds with the exchange of instruments of ratification, its silence constitutes assent to the treaties as modified by the United States. If the Soviet Union objects to any such condition, however, the treaty may not, in accordance with traditional United States practice, be brought into force by the President. The United States practice of executing a "Protocol of Exchange" incorporating any conditions attached prior to final ratification makes certain that Soviet acceptance or rejection of Senate conditions will be clear.

Right of rejection by the Soviet Union.—Any condition imposed by the United States upon its consent to a treaty gives rise to a right of rejection by the Soviet Union which has agreed tentatively only to the version it signed. A condition is thus analogous to a counteroffer in the law of contracts. It may, if the "offeree" so chooses, require that negotiations be reopened, be rejected outright, or, if the offeree accepts it, bring a legally different agreement into effect.

Significance of the label.—From a strictly legal standpoint the particular label attached to a condition is not determinative. Whether called an "amendment," "reservation," "understanding," "declaration," or something else, any condition imposed by the United States upon its consent to be bound may be rejected by the Soviet Union as incompatible with the original agreement. Alternatively, once accepted, every condition becomes binding along with the provisions of the treaty itself. The significance of a label, as distinguished from the substance of the condition, is therefore more "political" than legal. While a condition designated an "understanding" or an "interpretation" would be no less effective legally in conditioning United States ratification than the same condition labeled a "reservation," or even one cast in terms of an amendment to the Treaty text, it might be regarded by the Soviets as less offensive politically and thus be more easily accepted by them. Practically speaking, therefore, it is the Soviet leadership which will judge the acceptability of any condition attached to the Treaty, which may be influenced by its designation (see part IV below.)

C. Senate inaction

The Senate may simply decline to act on the Treaty, as it has in the case of a number of other treaties. In such event, a treaty simply remains on the Senate's Executive Calendar unless and until withdrawn by the President or returned to him by the Senate.

D. Senate rejection

The Senate may decline to approve the Treaty by failing to accord it the requisite two-thirds vote of approval. This has occurred only 11 times in our history, the most recent occasion being in 1960.[3] Where a final vote on the resolution of ratification fails to achieve the requisite two-thirds, the Senate customarily adopts a resolution returning the treaty to the President.

The Treaty may, of course, be resubmitted thereafter by the President. Two additional options have lately received some attention in the press. One would be to resubmit the SALT agreement for approval by joint resolution—i.e., as a so-called Congressional-Executive agreement. The SALT I Interim Agreement on offensive weapons was handled this way from the outset and might be cited as a precedent. However, the Senate may take a dim view of this approach.

The other option occasionally mentioned would be for the President to issue a unilateral statement announcing the intention of the United States to adhere to the provisions of the defeated Treaty. Prior to the October 1977 expiration of the SALT I Interim Agreement on offensive arms, the United States and the Soviet Union each declared its intent to observe the limitations of the agreement as long as the other did so. While the Administration did not claim that such parallel declarations constituted commitments "binding" the United States, and some Senators defended the President's action as within his Constitutional power, others criticized the

[3] The Dispute Settlement Protocol to the 1958 Conventions on the Law of the Sea.

approach as a circumvention of appropriate constitutional procedures, and a violation of section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.[4]

Concern about such an approach to SALT II has centered not only on Presidential declarations following rejection of the treaty, but also on any attempt by the Administration to extend the limitations of the Protocol beyond its expiration date at the end of 1981. The Administration has conceded on several occasions (most recently during testimony before the Committee on the treaty termination issue) that treaties and treaty provisions may not be formally extended or amended by executive agreement or parallel declarations.[5] This issue will be considered in a later memorandum.

IV. SOVIET TREATY RATIFICATION AND MODIFICATION

It is not clear whether the Soviets will proceed to ratify the SALT II Treaty in advance of Senate consideration. Treaties are ratified for the Soviet Union by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the country's parliament. While this procedure is generally deemed to be merely a formality, it is probably the stage at which the Soviets would attach conditions of their own in response to conditions that might be imposed by the Senate. In the case of the SALT I Agreements, the Presidium did not act until the Senate (on the ABM Treaty) and the Senate and House (on the Interim Agreement) had approved them.

With the possible exception of a matter of purely domestic concern or a statement not germane to the treaty, if the Soviet Union ratifies the SALT II Treaty subject to a condition, the text of the condition must be communicated to the President of the Senate to obtain Senate approval for the acceptance thereof (if the President wishes to accept the reservation or amendment). If, prior to receipt of notification concerning the condition, the Senate has already given its consent to ratification of the SALT II Treaty, the express consent of the Senate to acceptance of the condition must be obtained before proceeding to exchange the instruments of ratification. If the Senate still has the Treaty under consideration at the time the notification is given, the Senate's consent to acceptance of the reservation may be either express or implied; that is, if the Senate, with knowledge of the reservation, advises and consents to United States ratification without reference to a Soviet reservation of which it is aware, Senate approval may be inferred. (See page 23 for discussion of the procedure for Soviet acceptance of Senate conditions.)

Senator BIDEN. After Senator Stone asks his questions, I will read you our legal memorandum relating to reservations.

Senator Stone?

Senator STONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

USE OF MPS FOR EXISTING LAND-BASED MISSILES

Professor Rostow, regardless of the niceties of the form in which a modification of this SALT II Treaty ought to take and which we will explore, the substantive issue here is, should we modify the treaty to specifically permit the use of multiple protective shelters for our existing land-based missiles? Is it correct that your position is that we need to do that because of the vulnerability of our land-based missiles to first strike by the Soviet Union during the life of this treaty?

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes, sir.

DETERRENCE OF SOVIET FIRST STRIKE

Senator STONE. People say, why should we spend all of this money to protect these existing missiles. Really, don't we have

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[4] Section 33 provides that "no action shall be taken under this or any other law that will obligate the United States to disarm or to reduce or to limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States, except pursuant to the treaty-making power of the President under the Constitution or unless authorized by further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the United States."

[5] See, e.g., the testimony of the Justice Department spokesman on page 220 of the Committee's "Treaty Termination" hearings.

enough other missiles apart from those that could be destroyed in a first strike to deter the Soviets from even contemplating a first strike? What is your answer to that?

Mr. ROSTOW. My answer to that is this: It is a question of numbers. The threat to blow up Soviet cities and population had a certain credibility during the period of our nuclear monopoly, and then of our very great nuclear superiority, but as former Secretary Kissinger has emphasized, both in his statement here and in his statement in Brussels last week, as Soviet nuclear parity was approached, and then as Soviet nuclear superiority is threatened, that possibility of retaliation in that way steadily loses its credibility.

I have never been much impressed with the possibility that an American President would actually do it, but I think he certainly would not do it, and no one would believe that he would do it, knowing that the Soviet Union had enough accurate missiles in reserve to blow up our own cities. That would be suicidal and irrational and no one would believe it would be done. The threat to do it would have no deterrent effect, and if we ever allowed such a situation to develop, we should be impotent.

REASON FOR DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE MISSILES

Senator STONE. Is that the reason why the administration is proposing to build and deploy mobile missiles, the M–X missile?

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes.

Senator STONE. Precisely what you just said?

Mr. ROSTOW. That is exactly right.

Senator STONE. And is what you are saying that that same doctrine must be extended to the period of our vulnerability in the early and mid-1980's?

Mr. ROSTOW. That is correct.

PROVOKE SOVIETS TO GO FOR MULTIPLE PROTECTIVE SHELTERS

Senator STONE. Suppose we did it. Suppose we did take for ourselves the legal right to deploy our existing land-based missiles in multiple protective shelters or in a multiple mode during the eighties? It is then said by opponents of this option that we would provoke the Soviets into doing likewise and more so, and that that would lessen our security and increase our risk. What is your answer to that?

In other words, they will go for the multiple protective shelter. They will hide even more effectively in their closed society than we will hide, and we will therefore be more at risk than before. What about that?

Mr. ROSTOW. As I brought out in my colloquy with Senator Javits, the Soviets are now deploying mobile MIRVed SS–20's which are causing great alarm in Europe and which can readily be converted into missiles that can reach the United States as well. Mobile missiles are very difficult for us to target and very difficult for us to knock out. When you add this capacity to the Soviet stockpile of extra missiles stored in unknown sites, in effect, they are already doing the equivalent of what we are proposing.

Now, it may be, as many people have contended, that the development of technology, nuclear technology, has made security through verifiable arms control methods nearly impossible, and that soon, hopefully as soon as possible, the Soviet Union the United States, and other nations which have become nuclear powers will recognize the folly of the entire development and go back to the ideas of the Baruch plan which we proposed immediately after the war, a very wise proposal of which I am very proud.

We, while holding a nuclear monopoly, proposed to internationalize nuclear weapons and nuclear science. They are becoming very complicated. They are becoming very dangerous, and they are proliferating all over the place. I have always favored and will always favor such an approach as soon as the Soviet Union is ready to accept it.

Senator STONE. Professor Rostow, may I say that I completely agree with protecting our land-based missiles with multiple protective shelters of one kind or another during the period of our vulnerability. I agree with that, but I want to address these arguments that have been raised so that whatever form it takes, the committee, the Senate, and the country will feel, as you do and as I do, that we ought to do this.

CHANGE FROM MAD STRATEGY TO COUNTERFORCE

You are saying that we should convert our strategy from a mutual assured destruction strategy in which our missiles kill people and their missiles kill people to where, since their missiles can now in the next year or two destroy our missiles, then our missiles should be able to destroy their missiles as opposed to people. That is counterforce strategy, right?

Mr. ROSTOW. Right.

Senator STONE. So I return to this issue which I just raised with you. If they can go mobile more effectively than we can, how can they by putting in the MPS have a good counterforce? Will it be sufficiently a counterforce if we protect our current land-based missiles to give us a credible counterforce at all, or have we gotten so far behind that we don't even get that with the multiple protective shelter?

Mr. ROSTOW. I am not now, nor have I ever been an expert on arms, and I do not pretend to be, but my experience has been on this side of the river in the State Department, and I am concerned with the political effect of these weapons, but the people I know best who are experts on arms tell me that they believe that for this transition period this is the most feasible and quickest way to assure our ICBM's against the possibility of destruction, which could be the basis of nuclear coercion and nuclear threat.

Their arguments seem to be reasonable, as a practical matter.

EQUAL CREDIBILITY IN OUR STRATEGIC POSTURE

Senator STONE. Professor, is what you are arguing for equal credibility in our strategic posture as compared to the Soviets' credibility as to their strategic posture? You are not arguing for firing any of these things?

Mr. ROSTOW. No, I am arguing for a stalemate.

Senator STONE. You are arguing for a proper stalemate or for what they call these days a rough equivalency, but in this case a rough equivalency of counterforce credibility.

Mr. ROSTOW. That is absolutely correct. We are arguing for a stalemate, for the nonuse of these weapons, to guarantee against their either being used or being brandished.

Senator STONE. During the life of this treaty?

Mr. ROSTOW. During the life of this treaty, and above all during the period of the early 1980's when, as a result of a series of decisions made by President Carter we face what everyone seems to agree are very grave risks. How do we deal with those risks in this period, and how do we deal with these risks in the long run?

BASIC FIREPOWER WOULD BE CREDIBLE DETERRENT

Senator STONE. Doesn't that also provide somewhat of an answer to the question I raised about the capability of the Soviets to deploy mobile missiles during the period, and that is that during this period, the basic firepower would be a credible deterrent because of the number of mobile missiles that the Soviets could deploy during the period, during the treaty period?

Mr. ROSTOW. Absolutely.

Senator STONE. Thank you. I see that my time is up.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. Professor, I have several questions. First, I have a question from Senator Percy, who cannot be here this morning. He would like me to ask it of you and of Admiral Moorer when he testifies.

TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE SALT DEBATE

His question is whether or not the groups which you gentlemen represent, in this case the Committee on the Present Danger, favor television coverage of the SALT debate. That is the question. Does your group favor television coverage of the SALT debate on the floor of the Senate?

Mr. ROSTOW. The group has taken no position on the question, and therefore I cannot speak for the executive committee of the Committee on the Present Danger, but personally I do favor such coverage.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

BINDING EFFECT OF SENATE RESERVATIONS ON U.S.S.R

Now, with regard to the binding effect of Senate reservations on the U.S.S.R., let me read to you from a memorandum, and then we can exchange memoranda.

Mr. ROSTOW. I shall be grateful for a copy of it.

Senator BIDEN. It says:

Under U.S. treaty practice, all reservations which the Senate attaches to a resolution of ratification are included in instruments of ratification which are exchanged with the Soviet Union and are signed by the Soviet Union. It is this exchange under article XIV of the treaty which brings the treaty into force. The protocol of exchange itself reads that the treaty will be carried out by both parties in accordance with the reservation or other conditions contained therein.

Therefore, in agreeing to go forward with the exchange, the Soviets must accept the conditions contained in the protocol of exchange. They can, of course, refuse to

go forward with the exchange, if they do not like one or more of the conditions contained in the instrument, but if they do go forward, they are clearly bound and clearly bound in law.

Now, I would be anxious to hear what your friends at Yale will say.

Mr. ROSTOW. I shall be very grateful for a copy of this document.

Senator BIDEN. We will give you a copy.

Mr. ROSTOW. I can say now with great respect that that is a good recitation of black letter law on the subject, but it does not meet a very important qualification which has developed in a good many cases, which is that the courts have sometimes said that the reservation is incompatible with the treaty and outside the power of the treaty-making process, and therefore can be disregarded.

That kind of control would not be available, of course, in this sort of treaty.

SOVIET CONVERTING OF SS-20 TO SS-16

Senator BIDEN. I will not debate with you now, sir. You are concerned that the SS-20 will be converted in effect to an SS-16 and be able with a single warhead to strike the United States. The Soviets have approximately 100 SS-20's deployed. One thing I do agree with you about, after extensive discussions over the last 6 months with European political and military leaders, is that they are concerned about the SS-20. But I don't understand why in the world the Soviets would ever consider converting the SS-20, either through adding the extra stage or lightening the payload by substituting one warhead for three when to do so would give them only a relatively few extra ICBM warheads, while denuding their theater capability.

It seems that you double-count that SS-20 argument. You use it in the theater to whip that one up, and then you also use it as it relates to central systems, the same with the Backfire bomber.

Mr. ROSTOW. Isn't that true of Backfire?

Senator BIDEN. Yes, as I said, as you do with Backfire.

Mr. ROSTOW. I can't help it that the wretched things have multiple purposes.

Senator BIDEN. Yes, but you can only use them one way. You can't use the same missile two ways. Once it is used it is used.

Mr. ROSTOW. I agree with you completely you can't shoot them twice.

Senator BIDEN. Right. I am glad we have agreed on something.

Mr. ROSTOW. We have agreed on many things, Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. I want the record to show we agree on very little.

Mr. ROSTOW. All right.

Senator BIDEN. That is important to me, as it probably is to you. [General laughter.]

PROGRAMS UNITED STATES NEEDS THAT TREATY PROHIBITS

Senator BIDEN. You mentioned one possible basing mode of the M-X being inconsistent with the treaty.

Is there anything else that the United States must do in your opinion to insure its security but cannot do because of the treaty? You have mentioned the M-X. Is there anything else?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, I mentioned the multiple basing mode. It is the verification problem under this treaty which presents a very, very difficult problem for me, rather than the question of what we should do to rebuild our strength.

Senator BIDEN. But on that one point, before we get to verification, is there anything that we can't do if this treaty is passed which your Committee has recommended?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, I would say certainly the rapid deployment of an alternate basing mode is the first item we have mentioned. I have mentioned also the range on cruise missiles which is mattter of great importance.

Senator BIDEN. The range on ground-launched, on sea-launched cruise missiles, but is that range affected after the expiration of the protocol? Once the protocol expires on December 31, 1981, is there anything we cannot do with regard to cruise missiles that you would like done?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, about the protocol, we had a very unfortunate experience with the expiration of the Interim Agreement which the President has perpetuated by Executive agreement. Now, therefore, the expiration of the protocol date and the effectiveness of that against the possibility of similar action on the part of the President of that period is a matter of some concern.

Senator BIDEN. You would agree, though, that the U.S. Senate can bind this President or any future President of the United States on that issue, wouldn't you?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, the whole U.S. Congress did in the ACDA statute. In section 33, it said that no limitation on our arms shall be effective unless accomplished by treaty or statute. The President has perpetuated the Interim Agreement by Executive agreement.

Senator BIDEN. Don't you agree that if the U.S. Senate passes a resolution specifying that under no circumstances can the President of the United States continue the protocol beyond December 31, 1981, that he would be bound by that?

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes; but I think he is equally bound by section 33 of the ACDA statute, and it has not proved effective.

ABILITY TO DEPLOY GLCM AND SLCM AFTER EXPIRATION OF PROTOCOL

Senator BIDEN. Do you have any doubt about the ability to deploy ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles after the expiration of the protocol? Is there anything in the treaty that would prevent us from deploying the type of ground- or sea-launched cruise missiles that we would need, in your opinion?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, not for ourselves, I suppose. I am not quite certain, but the transfer of technology point might affect the use of such instruments by our allies.

Senator BIDEN. I specifically went to Moscow with six of my colleagues for that very purpose, and met with their military command, with the members of the Supreme Soviet, and with Mr. Kosygin for 3 hours, and made it very clear that certain things were going to be done by the Senate. I will read from my prepared text and tell you what their response was:

In my view and on the basis of my work as Chairman of the European Affairs Subcommittee, there must be a clarification of Article XII of the treaty,

the one to which you referred, non-transfer.

This provision concerns the issue of non-circumvention. Here I want all concerned to be put on notice, our allies, the American people, you in the Soviet Union, that nothing, absolutely nothing in that treaty or protocol can or will inhibit existing patterns of collaboration between the United States and its allies.

I then went on to specify that with regard to the protocol:

Finally, I know you will see a condition of the treaty that makes clear that the protocol means what it says, that is, that it ends in 1981, period, and that there is no possibility of continuing that protocol beyond that date, and at that time the ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missile will be deployed.

I can tell you that the Soviet reaction at all levels was that this was our right under the treaty, that there is nothing that prevents that. They did say they hoped we would continue to discuss that with them but they understood full well that was our right. It seems to me you raise an awful lot of red herrings.

Mr. ROSTOW. But, Senator, with great respect, I don't think you have answered my question. Of course, you are under no obligation to do so, as I am, but still, you have not answered my question about what happened to section 33 of ACDA.

Senator BIDEN. There was no formal extension.

Mr. ROSTOW. Oh, please, sir. The United States and the Soviet Union made simultaneous and identical announcements that they were unilaterally extending the agreement. Are you suggesting that there was no prior agreement to do that?

Senator BIDEN. I am suggesting that if the U.S. Senate specifically tells this President or whomever will be President in the year 1981 that he cannot, absent affirmative action by U.S. Senate, extend, then he cannot extend the protocol.

Now, obviously, any President at any time can refuse to take action.

A President can engage in inaction.

Mr. ROSTOW. But with regard to section 33, it was not a question of inaction. It was a question of action.

Senator BIDEN. What I am saying is that can be specifically handled by a specific reservation by the U.S. Senate on that specific issue.

Mr. ROSTOW. But doesn't section 33 of the ACDA statute do so already?

Senator BIDEN. The answer is, I don't know.

Mr. ROSTOW. All right.

Senator BIDEN. My time is up once again. If there are no further questions, we thank you very much, Professor. We appreciate your testimony.

Senator Zorinsky, do you have any questions of this witness?

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have one question.

BETRAYAL OF PROMISES AND EXPECTATION IN SALT I

Mr. Rostow, in your testimony you allege the Soviet betrayal of every promise and expectation on the basis of which the SALT I package was approved. Would you enumerate what these promises and expectations were and who made them?

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes. In the agreement of May 1972, between President Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev, cooperation was assured to put out

fires all around the world, to work together specifically in the Middle East to assure agreement in conformity with Security Council Resolution 242, to cooperate in ending the war in Indochina on favorable terms, and to give warning when certain kinds of events occurred or were threatened. Instead of cooperating to end the conflict in the Middle East, the Soviet Union had agreed with President Sadat the month before President Nixon came to Moscow in May 1972, that is, in April 1972, to cooperate with President Sadat in launching a war in 1973 and to send all the necessary equipment, experts, and so forth for that purpose.

So far as Indochina is concerned, of course, the Soviets cooperated in obtaining the agreements of January and of March 1973, which from our point of view were satisfactory and reaffirmed the Laos Agreement of 1962, but they cooperated with the North Vietnamese in breaking those agreements and every aspect of those agreements, and in denying their essential purpose.

Those are the two chief items I recall, and I think they are sufficient to indicate that the agreements were not made in all sincerity and were not carried out.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you, Mr. Rostow.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is all I have.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Professor.

Mr. ROSTOW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Rostow's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR EUGENE V. ROSTOW

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your invitation to testify on the ratification of the SALT II Treaty. I am here in behalf of the Committee on the Present Danger, a nonprofit, nonpartisan citizens' committee which began to function on 11 November 1976. Our position on SALT II has been stated on two occasions. In July, 1977, our Executive Committee issued a pamphlet called "Where We Stand on Salt," which was later approved by the Board of Directors. And in July of this year, the Executive Committee adopted a statement which was submitted to your Subcommittee on Europe on 19 July 1979. Both those documents, together with related materials, are before you. They are the basis of what I shall say.

Our conclusions on the Treaty as it stands are summed up on pp. 2–3 of our 19 July statement. They constitute, we believe, a positive and affirmative seven-point program for action, which puts the SALT Treaty and the SALT negotiating process into the context of our foreign and defense policy as a whole.

Permit me to recall those conclusions for ready reference:

"In view of the gravity of the issues raised by the Treaty now before you, and all that has happened since the SALT I package was approved in 1972, we recommend: (1) That the Senate advise the President and the nation of the need to seek a more positive, forward looking, and effective foreign and defense policy, and state the goals and principles on which that policy should be based; and (2) that the Senate withhold its consent to the ratification of the Treaty the President has submitted unless and until it is modified to meet its demonstrated deficiencies, and the President and the Congress are firmly committed to a specific program that will achieve and maintain essential equivalence and adequate deterrence.

"The Committee on the Present Danger is the first to recognize that withholding the Senate's consent for the SALT II Treaty now before you is not in itself a foreign and defense policy. We have concluded, however, that the action I have just outlined is a necessary condition for developing a sound and prudent policy. And it is the only available way to convince the President that the SALT II Treaty he signed in Vienna fails both as a means for protecting our national security, and as an arms limitation measure.

"It is our conviction that what the country needs above all else is to turn a sharp corner in our foreign and defense policy. To recall the language of President Carter's speech of July 15th, we believe the nation should start on a new course, based on a clear recognition of the truth. Such a course, in our view, should include these elements: (1) To shake off our post-Vietnam depression about foreign affairs and the yearning for isolation which is implicit in it; (2) to reach a bipartisan

consensus on what our national interests in this turbulent world really are; (3) to rebuild conventional and nuclear force deterrence so that we can protect those interests by political means or by the use of conventional forces if we have to; (4) to cooperate closely and continuously with our allies and other nations whose interests in a peaceful and stable world political order and economic system are parallel to our own; and (5) on that basis to continue negotiating with the Soviet Union about the limitation of nuclear arms, including both intercontinental and intermediate range nuclear weapons like those threatening Europe and other areas of great importance to us.

"There is still time for that great task to be accomplished in peace. As a group, the NATO allies, Japan, China and other like-minded nations have more than enough power and potential power to contain the Soviet drive for domination. But that power is dispersed and inchoate. It is not being mobilized into forms which can become political power—naval squadrons and armored divisions; planes, reserves and research formations. The potential power of the nations which favor a peaceful world order cannot be brought to bear on world politics unless the energy, optimism and intelligence of the American people are liberated and harnessed once again in considered programs designed to restore the peace and prosperity of the nation. In the bipolar world of nuclear weapons and nuclear blackmail, no coalition to guard the peace can act without the protection of the American nuclear umbrella and confidence that our nation is willing and able to meet its commitments."

II

I thought I could be most useful to you today if this opening statement supplemented our earlier statements by commenting on some of the key issues which have emerged in the SALT hearings so far. President Carter's case for SALT rests on something more than complacency about our own strength and an underestimation of Soviet power and Soviet intentions.

The strongest argument for SALT II thus far put forward by the Carter Administration is an argument of political myth. It was summed up by a distinguished Senator in these terms: "To reject SALT II would be to go over the abyss."

The variations on this theme are infinite. One hears it said everywhere that to reject SALT, or to ratify it with amendments or on conditions, would be to "end" detente and revive the "Cold War." The President has said that those who oppose the Treaty as it stands are war-mongers and opponents of "detente." The Secretary of State is reported to have said that he would resign rather than preside over the end of "detente" and the revival of the "Cold War." Some years ago, I counted a couple of hundred remarks of this tenor, and then stopped counting.

The notion that Soviet-American relations have improved in recent years, that the Cold War is over, and that negotiation has been substituted for confrontation is a dangerous symptom of auto-intoxication. The Cold War is not over. On the contrary, it is worse than ever, featured by Soviet threats and thrusts on a far greater scale than those of the simple days of the Berlin airlift and the crisis in Greece. But as things get worse, many Americans insist on telling each other that they are getting better. SALT II is a case in point. If ratified in its present form, it would be an act of submission on our part, legitimizing Soviet superiority—a great Soviet victory in the Cold War, and so perceived everywhere in the world. But this Administration keeps repeating that SALT II would be a step towards stability, detente, and peace.

This Delphic assertion is made so often that we tend to accept it as self-evident. It implies that the Russians would behave even worse than they are behaving now if SALT II is not ratified in its present form; that it would cost us more to keep up with them in such an event; and that the process of negotiating with the Soviet Union about nuclear weapons somehow contributes to peace and stability. In 1972, the SALT I package was ratified under different geo-political circumstances, but on the basis of this same litany of arguments. The period since 1972 has been the worst and most disastrous period of the Cold War, featured by Soviet deception of the United States in Indochina and the Middle East; the Soviet campaign in Africa and Southern Asia; and an extraordinary Soviet military buildup, far greater than that of the United States and its Allies. In view of the betrayal of every promise and expectation on the basis of which the SALT I package was approved, it is difficult to understand why these arguments are still so popular. But they are. As President Kennedy once remarked, "If you are cheated once, it is their fault. But if you are cheated a second time, it is your own."

The contention that the failure to ratify SALT II in its present form would be "going over the abyss" is not really an argument, but an appeal to fear which attributes nearly magic influence to arms limitation agreements. Those who are swayed by this appeal are hypnotized by the SALT negotiating process as MacDon-

ald, Baldwin, and Chamberlain were hypnotized by the chimera of disarmament forty-five years ago.

Nothing in the history of arms limitation agreements gives the slightest encouragement for such beliefs. The Treaty of Versailles was the most important of modern arms limitation agreements. It prescribed strict limits on German armaments and the demilitarization of the Rhineland. If Britain had been willing to join France in enforcing that Treaty, the Second World War could never have taken place. But when the Versailles limits on arms were violated, secretly at first, and then openly; when Hitler introduced conscription in 1935 and marched into the Rhineland in 1936, Britain and France did nothing except wring their hands and try to persuade Hitler to sign new treaties limiting armaments. We can see parallels to this behavior nearly every week in our reaction to Soviet behavior raising serious questions about whether they are violating the Test Ban Treaty, the SALT I agreements, or the agreement of 1962 about the Soviet presence in Cuba.

The second most important arms limitation agreement of modern times was the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. Our experience under that agreement and its successors is hardly more inspiring than the record of Versailles. Lulled by the delusive security of the Treaty, we, the British, and the French persistently kept our navies relatively low, while Japan and later Germany built to the limits of the Treaty and beyond.

There is another aspect of the Administration's argument that to reject SALT II would be "to go over the abyss": the notion that such action on our part would make Soviet policy even more aggressive than it is. The claim betrays a misunderstanding of the nature of the Soviet Union and of the serious and devoted men who govern it. The Soviet Union is already behaving as badly as it dares. It is moving as rapidly as it deems prudent toward the strategic and political goals of its policy. It takes advantage of every opportunity to expand its sphere of influence. There is no use getting excited about this fact. It is simply a fact. As Professor Bernard Lewis has remarked, the Soviet leaders are still in the imperial mood of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which the West has long since abandoned with relief. In the interests of our own survival, we have to persuade the Soviet Union that this ruthless and cynical process must stop before it results inevitably in war.

There is only one argument that can deter expansion—the conviction on their part that a given action would expose them to unacceptable risk. That is the factor which made our diplomacy persuasive and effective in a dozen crises since 1945, from the Berlin Blockade to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. It is the visible erosion of that conviction since 1972 which has invited a series of Soviet thrusts on every continent. In recent years, the Soviet Union has increased the pace of its expansion because of the impact of Vietnam and Watergate on American policy, and now because it perceives President Carter as weak. As a result, the Soviet Union is moving forward with incredible boldness in several areas of the world, including even the Caribbean.

Some who accept this view of Soviet policy argue for SALT II nonetheless on the ground that under SALT II it would be easier for us to verify Soviet behavior, and confine the Soviet impulse to expand. I shall comment later on the verification controversy as such. Suffice it to remark at this point that there is no reason to suppose that we should have any more confidence in our knowledge of Soviet activities under SALT II than we have had under SALT I. Since our intelligence estimators have recently confessed to being in error by a factor of 100 percent, that is not a comforting thought.

The claim that the ratification of SALT II would save us money is equally specious. Short of general mobilization, it is hardly feasible for the Soviet Union to spend more on military hardware than it has been spending for the last fifteen years or so. I have heard General Jones say that the task of restoring the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union will cost the same with or without SALT II—an estimate which may be erroneous in a perverse way, because some programs—M-X, for example—may cost a good deal more than otherwise if SALT should be ratified, in order to meet its verification standards. Administration spokesmen have offered a variety of opinions on the cost consequences of not ratifying SALT. Paul Warnke has said that the rejection of SALT would be costly, but that its cost could not be quantified. Leslie Gelb has written recently that saving money is the chief reason for ratifying SALT. Others have said quite different things on the subject. The fact is that in an area of complex and rapidly changing technology, none of these estimates are of much consequence.

Averell Harriman and George W. Ball have offered a variant of the "abyss" argument which brings out its basic weakness. Not to accept SALT II, they have told you, would help lead to the election of a "hard-liner" to succeed Brezhnev. The notion that Brezhnev is a "moderate" in any sense we can recognize, or that he

believes in our concept of detente, is denied by everything he has said and done in all the years of his high office. Brezhnev was the architect of the attack on Czechoslovakia in 1968, and on our whole Middle East position in 1967 and 1973. He is the man who broke his solemn agreements with us about Indo-China and the Middle East. In the name of the Brezhnev Doctrine, he claims the right to use force internationally in order to protect or promote regimes or revolutions he regards as socialist or progressive. To call him a "moderate" is an abuse of the English language.

There are of course differences within the Kremlin and no doubt there are groupings among its members. But there is no serious evidence that any of these differences concern Soviet-American relations. Of course all the Soviet leaders want SALT II ratified. They have never made so much progress as they did under SALT I, and they expect SALT II to be at least as productive for them. And they know that if the United States ever does wake up, and decide to restore the military balance, both in strategic and in conventional forces, they would lose ignominiously. Their economy is only half as large as ours. But these are hardly reasons for us to take the Treaty as it is.

There is thus nothing in the contention that to reject SALT would be "to go over the abyss." The leaders of the Soviet Union are patient realists. They will negotiate with us so long as it is in their interest to do so. And it will be in our mutual interest to negotiate about strategic weapons only when we have fully restored essential equivalence and adequate deterrence at every level relevant to our interests.

III

President Carter's second best argument for his Treaty is that it wouldn't do much harm, would not prevent us from restoring the military balance, and should therefore be ratified to demonstrate to our friends and adversaries that we really do have a government. This argument appeals strongly to all Americans. For the best of reasons, we tend to rally to the flag when it is under fire. Foreigners have their own view of our government, based on their daily experience on a dozen issues. In my talks with the leaders of friendly foreign governments in recent years, it became clear that what they want from us is a policy of vigorous and imaginative resistance to the process of Soviet expansion. I am confident that the program our Commiteee has outlined would be well received by friendly nations, and fully respected by our adversaries abroad.

There is, however, a fatal flaw in the argument which would wrap SALT II in the flag of patriotism. The SALT II Treaty is not harmless; it would do a great deal of harm; it would make it far more difficult for us to redress the military balance; and no spokesman for the Administration has as yet seriously addressed the principal issues raised in this connection by its critics.

All studies of the nuclear balance agree that if present trends continue just a few years longer, the Soviet Union will have significant nuclear superiority in the early 1980's authorized by the SALT II Treaty—the capacity, that is, to make a preemptive first strike by destroying our ICBM's, our planes on the ground, and our submarines in port with a fraction of their nuclear force, leaving enough accurate missiles in reserve to neutralize our own nuclear arsenal. If we should ever allow such a position to develop, the military doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction on which we have relied since Secretary McNamara's time would become obsolete, and our submarines and other less accurate missile launchers would be ineffective. Facing such threats, we should be unable to use conventional forces, and our diplomacy would be without influence.

Slowly and reluctantly, the Administration has conceded that at a given point fairly soon our ICBM's and other ground based-launchers will become vulnerable to a Soviet first-strike attack. Some Administration spokesmen say that such a development would not mean the end of the world, because we could always strike back from our submarines, or, in an argument of desperation, even launch our ICBM's on warning. It is hard to believe, but Secretary of State Vance himself has expressed this bizarre view. Others say that our allies must realize that there are limits to our nuclear umbrella: that is, in plain words, that the American nuclear guarantee would be worthless. The official Administration doctrine is that the concerns of SALT critics about our vulnerability to a preemptive first strike are valid, but that they will be cured by the M-X missile, long delayed by President Carter. A decision on its mode of deployment was supposed to have been made by August 1, but has not yet been announced.

But the M-X missile cannot be ready, the Administration says, before 1989 at the earliest, even if President Carter finally solves the problem of reconciling its mode of deployment with the SALT II Treaty.

What are we supposed to do in the meantime—that is, during the period of the 1980's when everybody agrees we shall be in a position of maximum exposure to nuclear war or nuclear blackmail? If the Soviet Union gains sufficient superiority in the early 1980's to threaten our land-based missile launchers with one-third or one-fifth of their force, would it be rational or even conceivable for an American President to use our submarine-launched missiles to destroy Soviet cities, knowing that the Soviets had enough missiles in reserve to blow up a very large fraction of our population in reprisal? Calculations of these gruesome scenarios are affected of course by Soviet active and passive air defense programs and absence of such programs on our part. Such calculations are currently most unfavorable to the United States. In effect, they would reverse the position of the two nations at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Under those circumstances, would the Soviet government believe in the possibility of American retaliation to a first strike, and be deterred by it? Such retaliation would be suicidal for us. No one could believe in so irrational a policy.

This is the key question to consider in evaluating the nuclear balance and its bearing on the political influence of both the Soviet Union and the United States. I have been unable to find an answer on the part of any proponent of the Treaty beyond a blind reiteration of faith in the continued vitality of the McNamara Doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction. This is indeed the heart and nearly the whole of President Carter's case for SALT II. As former Secretary Kissinger emphasized in Brussels last Saturday, this position will soon be intellectually and politically untenable. We simply must move to counterforce strategies or abandon the notion of nuclear deterrence altogether.

But the Treaty would prevent us from undertaking the most feasible, perhaps the only credible counterforce program that could preserve our second-strike capability during the early and middle 1980's: to reopen the Minuteman III production lines, which President Carter has recently closed, and deploy Minuteman IIIs in multiple vertical protected shelters. Such shelters would be considered "fixed launchers" under Article IV of the Treaty, and would be prohibited. And the number of Minuteman IIIs required for such a program would exceed the quotas established by the Treaty, since Minuteman III carries only three warheads. Here again, the Administration has simply not addressed the issue. It is still struggling with its attempt to reconcile the M-X missile with the provisions of the Treaty—a problem that doesn't seem to worry the Soviet Union, which continues to develop and deploy large numbers of mobile intermediate range missile launchers that can be converted into intercontinental missiles by the addition of an extra stage.

There are many other aspects of SALT II which are far from harmless—aspects which have been repeatedly called to the attention of the Administration, and ignored or evaded in these hearings. The strange provision of the Treaty allowing the Soviet Union more than 300 heavy missiles, while we can have none, has been much discussed, but it has not been explained. These heavy missiles of enormous throw weight are designed primarily as first-strike weapons against hardened targets. The essence of the Soviet Union's capacity for a credible first strike is the fact that if present trends continue they will be able to destroy a large part of our land-based missile force with one-third or one-fifth of their missiles. It is quite true that another combination of weapons might also threaten our land-based missiles and submarines in port. But there is all the difference in the world between a strike which would require one-fifth of the Soviet force and one requiring four-fifths of that force. In the strange calculus of nuclear terror, the difference is decisive. It is what is left after the first strike that counts both politically and militarily.

Similarly, the provisions of the Treaty regarding the Soviet Backfire bomber have been vehemently discussed, but the Administration's answer is totally unconvincing. There is no doubt now that the Backfire is capable of reaching targets throughout the United States from the Soviet Union, and that it can be refuelled in the air and land in Cuba. Why is it not counted among the launchers covered by the Treaty, like our B-52's or B-1's? We have to count even mothballed B-52's, cannibalized for spare parts. The Administration does not answer the question, but asks us to be content with Mr. Brezhnev's assurance that the Soviet Union will make no more than 30 Backfires a year. Why 30 a year is to be considered de minimis in a Treaty which purports to limit launchers to some 2,000 on each side isn't immediately apparent, even if there were any way we could monitor these limits. How much damage could 30, 60, or 90 Backfires do from Cuban bases?

Further, the restrictions of the Treaty and its protocol on the development of cruise missiles, especially of land- and sea-based cruise missiles, and the ambiquities of the Treaty about our capacity to transfer cruise missile technology to our Allies, are both dangerous to our security and without any justification. Here again, the testimony offered by the Administration is both unresponsive and unconvincing.

As for the verification provisions of the Treaty, I can find no answer in the testimony thus far available to the facts pointed out on pp. 17-18 of our July 19 statement. My distinguished colleague Paul H. Nitze testified on this aspect of the problem on July 30 before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. I have included a copy of his Prepared Statement in my submission, and call it particularly to your attention.

IV

The Executive Committee of the Committee on the Present Danger has recommended that the Senate should not give its consent to the ratification of SALT II unless the most important deficiencies of the Treaty are modified by amendment, and the President and the Congress are firmly committed to a specific program that would achieve and maintain essential equivalence and adequate deterrence. Among the deficiencies of the Treaty requiring amendment, I should list first our right to deploy ICBM's in modes and numbers we deem necessary to ensure their survival against surprise attack; (2) the equal right of the two sides to use heavy missiles; (3) the inclusion of the Soviet Backfire and the SS-20 within the numerical limits of the Treaty; (4) provision for the adoption of programs which would reverse the present ominous situation of Soviet strategic superiority in Europe, including changes in the provisions regarding the range of land- and sea-based cruise missiles and the transfer-of-technology which is causing so much concern to our Allies.

There are other deficiencies and ambiguities noted in our earlier statements, and in the studies of my distinguished colleagues who have written, spoken, and testified on these matters during the last few years. And there are many which have come to the surface in your hearings and those of other committees of the Senate. These too should be given serious consideration before the Treaty is ratified.

V

In closing, permit me to stress the extraordinary responsibility of the Senate in voting in SALT II. The arguments put forward for the SALT I package were the same as those advanced for SALT II today. Under the political and military circumstances of 1972, they were plausible arguments. But there is no rational way to accept them as the basis for policy in 1979. It is simply too late to entertain such views. Too much has happened to contradict them.

Therefore, the burden of responsibility on the Senate with respect to the Treaty is unique in our history.

Every American shares the goal of achieving true detente with the Soviet Union, which can only be defined, in my opinion, as a policy of scrupulous and reciprocal respect for the rules of the Charter of the United Nations regarding the international use of force. True detente is a central objective of the Committee on the Present Danger, and, I am sure, of the American people. Every President and Congress since 1945 have gone to great lengths to reach that goal. But President Carter's quest for detente with the Soviet Union has been based on the misconception that acts of unilateral disarmament on our part, and other unilateral concessions, will induce the Soviet Union to follow suit. As a result, President Carter has sacrificed our defenses and our alliances, and abdicated his responsibility for the security of the nation. Under our Constitution, that responsibility therefore falls on the Senate with respect to this Treaty, and ultimately on the whole Congress and the people. We have not faced decisions of such moment since the Presidency of James Buchanan.

President Carter sometimes compares the controversy over the ratification of SALT II to the battle over our entry into the League of Nations after the First World War. The analogy is misleading.

In the first place, despite the pervasiveness of the political legend, it cannot be said that "a small group of willful men" blocked the ratification either of the Covenant of the League or of the Security Treaty with France which had been promised to France in order to induce its acceptance of the League, and was therefore brigaded with the League Covenant. President Wilson gave up and indeed strongly opposed the Treaties when he realized that he would have to compromise with the Senate to obtain ratification. In the end, and at President Wilson's urgent request, twenty-three loyal Democratic Senators voted against ratifying the League Covenant with the reservations negotiated by Senator Lodge. History might well have been different if seven members of the Senate had voted then for their convictions. The Treaty with France never came to a vote. President Wilson was always the kind of man who refused half or two-thirds of a loaf when he couldn't get the whole thing. And at the time of the fight in 1919, he was seriously ill as well.

Secondly, President Wilson was proposing full and responsible American participation in world politics, which some members of the Senate were resisting. The position today is just the opposite. For nearly three years, President Carter has been conducting a retreat to weakness and isolation. Unless that policy is promptly reversed, it will soon be beyond our power to do so. We should then be squeezed into a position of passive dependence on the Soviet Union. The program the Committee on the Present Danger is recommending to you today, on the contrary, is one through which we could remain what we have been and are, the bastion of democracy, and a responsible member of the society of nations, capable with our allies and associates of maintaining the balance of world power on which the future of human freedom depends.

It is therefore not hyperbole to say that the state of the union for the next decade at least, and perhaps for much longer, will be determined by the outcome of your vote on the Treaty.

Your vote on SALT is important because the Treaty is important, and in our judgment dangerous to the security of the nation. It would lock us into a position of strategic inferiority which would also be unstable and unverifiable—a perfect recipe for Soviet nuclear blackmail during the period of our greatest relative weakness in the early and middle 1980's. President Carter found that possibility staring him in the face when he took office in 1977. He made the situation worse by cancelling or postponing the programs which his predecessors had initiated to prevent the problem from arising: B-1, the enhanced radiation warhead, M-X, and the rest of the sad story.

Your vote on SALT II is important for another reason. It is the only chance you are likely to have to pass judgment on President Carter's foreign and defense policy as a system: his abandonment of the United Nations Charter as the lodestar of our policy, and many other contradictions, paradoxes, and retreats.

These aspects of President Carter's foreign policy are not extrinsic to the merits of the SALT Treaty. They are what the Treaty is all about. SALT II is not concerned with a remote and upleasant subject of interest only to experts. It is not limited to assuring the immunity of the United States from nuclear attack. The United States has vital security interests beyond Fortress America. There is no escaping the "linkage" between SALT II and the rest of our foreign and defense policy. The state of the nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and the United States is the fulcrum on which the entire process of world politics is poised. The visible and unquestioned availability of usable force has always been the key to effective diplomacy. This maxim has never been more obviously true. Unless we restore and maintain our clear second strike strategic nuclear capability, and our naval and other conventional forces, the American nuclear umbrella will lose all credibility, our political influence will continue to decline, and we shall be unable to use either conventional or nuclear forces anywhere in the world if such action on our part should be required. The pattern of our diplomatic impotence during the last few years will become our normal condition, until it is succeeded by something infinitely worse.

Many have compared the policies of the Carter Administration revealed in its defense of SALT II to the posture of the ostrich taken by Great Britain and to a lesser extent by France during the Thirties, when they failed to act together in time to prevent the Second World War. The comparison is fair. In the Thirties, British policy was determined by wishful thinking and a nearly suicidal paralysis of will. Thus far, these two attitudes have dominated the foreign policy of the Carter Administration. But there is one fundamental difference between the dilemma faced by the United States today and that of Britain and France a generation ago. Even in the darkest days of the Second World War, Britain and France could always hope that the United States and the Soviet Union would somehow be drawn into the fray, so that victory would become possible. There are no great powers in that position now, no nations in the wings who might help to turn the tide if we persist in our folly as Britain and France did during the Thirties, until it was too late to do anything but fight. If we allow the Soviet rush for dominance to continue unchecked; if we allow Europe to be enveloped and reduced, through the Middle East or the Northern seas or both, Japan, China, and many other countries would fall under Soviet control. We should then be truly isolated, living in a state of siege, and confronting the pressures of a hostile Soviet foreign policy backed by an overwhelming array of force. Under such circumstances, if history is a guide, an episode trivial in itself—the murder of an Archduke or the sinking of another Lusitania—would prove again to the flash point of war. This is the nightmare probability at stake in your vote on SALT II.

Some will say that I am too gloomy about the way things are going. The Russians are not ten feet tall, we are frequently reminded. But for decades now the Soviet

Union has been keeping the living standard of its people low in order to support an arms buildup and a foreign policy geared to indefinite expansion. This has hardly been done in a fit of absent-mindedness. You have only to compare the map today with the map in 1945 or 1972 to realize what extraordinary gains the Soviet Union has made in its quest for geopolitical mastery. One after another, the old naval bases of the nineteenth century imperial system are being taken over by the Soviet Union. This process has to be faced and evaluated, not denied or ignored.

Let me appeal directly to those among you who believe that the Soviet Union is a conservative, peaceful power, that the Cold War is over, and that active military and political efforts on our part are not needed to preserve the world balance of power and restore the vitality of the United Nations Charter. In Cromwell's famous words, "Consider that ye may be wrong." If our analysis is correct, isn't it better and more prudent to take precautions now than to be sorry later? If President Carter is wrong, we shall face, over and over again, the choice of surrender or war against bitter odds, alone and unprepared.

President Carter's case for SALT II is the same mixture of incompatible themes, myths, and moods one finds in reviewing the history of the years before the Second World War. The finest study of Pearl Harbor, that of Roberta Wohlstetter, comments that in going over the record one is faced time and time again on the American side "by the paradox of pessimistic realism coupled with loose optimism in practice." If you read what President Carter has said on these problems, you can see exactly what Mrs. Wohlstetter meant. On several occasions, President Carter has described the Soviet arms buildup as offensive in character, and incompatible with any theory of defense. But he has also characterized the Soviet position as defensive in nature, based on exaggerated anxieties about the risks the Soviet Union faces. Clearly, both the President's policies and his actions are based on the second hypothesis, that of an essentially harmless, conservative, and defensive Soviet Union. How he reconciles this view with his daily diplomatic and intelligence reports is a mystery beyond my understanding. It is true that the President is prone to boast that our military power is greater than that of any other nation, despite the statistics, and what Secretary of Defense Brown says. We are left with the disquieting thought that President Carter's defense budgets and policies are based on jejune complacency and on the assumption that the Soviets have feet of clay.

The coming decade will be as difficult and dangerous as any we have faced in the past. We have a very short time in which to protect our future through allied diplomacy and deterrence rather than through war. A two-ocean Navy cannot be restored in a day or a year. Nor can the other programs we require to achieve effective deterrence at every level. It will be a ticklish time, calling for cool nerves and a firm grasp of the problem. The Soviet Union will not view an American awakening with equanimity. It can be expected to take full advantage of positions of relative superiority, and the presence in office of a President whom it perceives as weak.

The time to begin is now. And the place to begin is here. Normally, we look to our President to take the lead in decisions of this order. It is now clear that President Carter is firmly committed to another view.

What is at stake, Mr. Chairman, is not the balance of power alone, but the future of liberty. Democracy cannot survive unless America plays its full part in assuring its future.

The tide has been running against us now for nearly a decade. The leaders of the Soviet Union are pursuing a program of break-neck expansion, and treating our interests everywhere with open contempt.

Forty years ago, as the doubts and vacillations of the Thirties were being swept away by events, a speaker rose to his feet in the House of Commons to address the great issue of the looming War. Leopold Amery, one of Churchill's companions in the political wilderness, shouted a remark from his seat before the speaker began. "Speak for England," he said. In that spirit, I say to you, "Speak and vote for America."

Senator BIDEN. Our next witness is Adm. Thomas Moorer, cochairman of the Coalition for Peace Through Strength. Admiral Moorer is accompanied by Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, cochairman of the Coalition for Peace Through Strength.

Gentlemen, thank you for coming. Admiral, please proceed in any way that is most comfortable.

STATEMENT OF ADM. THOMAS MOORER (RETIRED), COCHAIRMAN, COALITION FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH, WASHINGTON, D.C., ACCOMPANIED BY LT. GEN. DANIEL GRAHAM (RETIRED), COCHAIRMAN, COALITION FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH [1]

Admiral MOORER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to have the opportunity to testify again before this committee on the SALT II Treaty. Today I am testifying as chairman of the executive committee of the Coalition for Peace Through Strength.

The Coalition for Peace Through Strength is a bipartisan alliance of 105 national organizations, 204 Members of Congress and other pro defense leaders across America. The American Security Council, which I serve as a member of the board of directors, is the program secretariat for the coalition.

The purpose of the coalition is to work for the adoption of a national strategy of peace through strength. The perception of weakness on our part in 1941 prompted the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor. Mr. Chairman, at the end of World War II, I was a member of the strategic bombing survey sent to Japan to investigate the Japanese decisionmaking process that led to the attack on Pearl Harbor, as well as other matters.

Since I was at Pearl Harbor when the Japanese attacked, I was charged with investigating this particular question. Why did the Japanese attack Pearl Harbor? I discussed this matter with the Prime Minister, with all the military leaders, the seniors in the Japanese Government, and all without exception said the same thing. They said that the Congress had refused to pass the draft initially, and then they passed it only by one vote. They had refused to fortify Wake and Guam Islands, and that the U.S. Army was in Louisiana training with wooden guns, all of which was a fact, and consequently they did not think that we had the military capability or the will or determination to oppose them.

So, they decided to attack Pearl Harbor.

My point is, if the relative balance as perceived by the potential enemy gets to a point where they think they can attack and succeed, then the country is in danger.

Senator BIDEN. Do you think it has reached that point, Admiral?

Admiral MOORER. I think we are just at that point, yes, sir.

It is our belief that if the U.S. Senate consents to the SALT II Treaty, as now configured, it would make the adoption of such a strategy most unlikely.

We did prepare a detailed study entitled "An Analysis of SALT II." Copies are available to you, and I urge every member of the committee to study the report. However, since this is a 78-page document and thus too long for me to cover in the time alloted today, I will ask permission at this time simply to read a 3-page joint statement signed by 1,678 general and flag officers from all of the armed services. A list of the names of these officers is being provided to the members of the committee. I have the list right here, sir.

Senator BIDEN. Are they all retired, Admiral?

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[1] See page 60 for Admiral Moorer's prepared statement.

Admiral MOORER. Yes, they are all retired. As you know, active duty military leaders are not permitted to flatly oppose SALT II. This is why we at the Coalition for Peace Through Strength have sought out the views of retired military leaders who are now free to speak out.

From my conversations with active and retired military leaders, I believe that the overwhelming majority oppose SALT II as written. This has been confirmed by the fact that only four of the retired officers contacted so far have declined to join in the statement because they support SALT II as written. Another 33 declined for such reasons as that they were undecided, ill, or thought that the statement should be written differently.

We are continuing to circulate the statement and will later give each Senator a copy of the statement with a list of all the signers at that time.

With your permission, sir, I will now read the letter that we have written to the chairman of this committee:

Hon. FRANK CHURCH,
Chairman, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

DEAR SENATOR CHURCH: We, the undersigned retired and reserve general and flag officers of all U.S. Military Services respectfully request you to oppose ratification of SALT II.

We are in full agreement with most of our fellow Americans in preferring international cooperation and equitable arms limitation agreements to hostility and competition. But we cannot agree that we can wish this congenial state of affairs into being by blinding ourselves to the stark realities of our strategic situation and our closely related conventional situation. In our view, SALT II as now written epitomizes the refusal of some Americans to face the facts. The facts which must be faced are these:

Ten years of U.S. restraint in the strategic nuclear field rooted in our faith in the SALT process has not been reciprocated by the Soviet Union. Rather, the Soviets have pursued an unprecedented buildup of nuclear offensive and defensive capability which, as Secretary of Defense Brown points out, is aimed at a war-winning capability. In this pursuit, the Soviets have stretched to the limit or broken when they felt it desirable solemn agreements such as weapons test restraints aimed at slowing down nuclear expansion. This leaves them now with a technical base that we cannot match.

The concept of mutual assured destruction which has shaped U.S. policy since the 1960's was never accepted by the Soviets and has been completely negated by their massive strategic defensive effort, including civil defense. The aggressiveness of Soviet behavior throughout the world has increased ominously as the military balance has tilted in favor of the U.S.S.R. This behavior is part of an overall grand design of which SALT negotiations are an integral part.

Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Iran, and now combat troops and fighter pilots in our own back yard, Cuba, are examples of what I am talking about. Certainly I commend the chairman of this committee, Chairman Church, for taking a strong position in opposition to this action by the Soviets here on our side of the globe. U.S. intelligence capabilities to verify Soviet compliance with arms control agreements have been seriously eroded through compromise of satellite reconnaissance systems and loss of key monitoring facilities.

It seems to us, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, that there is little disagreement inside or outside government that these are the facts, yet the Senate has been asked to ratify a treaty which apparently ignores these facts. We are told by defenders of SALT II that while this treaty does little to slow down the Soviet military surge, it is necessary to ratify it to preserve the process.

The proponents insist that SALT III and SALT IV will cure the inequities of SALT I and SALT II, and in my view this ignores Soviet behavior since SALT I. The Soviets have become harder, not easier to deal with, and as they gain confidence from obvious superiority, I predict they will become even harder. The proponents of SALT II insist that we will improve our security through ratification because the situations would be worse without SALT II. We find it hard to believe that the Soviets could significantly accelerate their current arms buildup in light of the fact that they are already spending 15 percent of their gross national product on arms,

and we find it even harder to believe that ratification of SALT II would be followed by vigorous U.S. efforts to close the widening gap between U.S. and Soviet military capabilities.

It is almost certain that Senate ratification of this treaty would commit the United States to another seven years of pursuing peace through trust of the Soviets and adherence to the obviously bankrupt doctrine of mutual assured destruction. This means further decline of our capability to declare war or to defend ourselves.

We respectfully submit that the arms control process has become dominated by persistent U.S. refusal to face the reality of a failure of the twin policies of détente and disarmament.

SALT II doesn't even limit arms. SALT II is only a set of rules for building arms and some of these rules are nonenforceable. The image of limitation is provided by alleged equal numbers of launchers and aircraft, not to the real destructive elements of nuclear force—missiles and explosive power—where the Soviets have been allowed a heavy advantage. To make matters worse, the "equal" numbers are contrived by failing to count Soviet delivery systems such as the Backfire, the most advanced strategic bomber in the operational inventory of either side, or the SS-20.

We also find the treaty as written unverifiable and attempts to finesse this issue by redefining terms most disturbing. SALT II is much more complex than SALT I and covers qualitative as well as quantitative aspects of nuclear armaments enormously more difficult to monitor. Given the compromise of our key verification satellite systems and the loss of vital monitoring stations in Iran, we cannot ensure against Soviet circumvention of the treaty provisions.

State Department documents describing SALT II now redefine verification. Where adequate verification once required an assurance from U.S. intelligence that attempts by the Soviets to circumvent would be detected, it now requires only that we can detect cheating on such a large scale that it alters the strategic balance in time to assure an appropriate U.S. response.

This new definition completely finesses the problem of adequacy of our intelligence capability since it is totally dependent upon one's view of what constitutes a strategic balance and an appropriate response. For those who find the actual balance of strategic capabilities irrelevant and believe that a single U.S. Poseidon submarine is an adequate deterrent, regardless of the size of the Soviet forces, SALT II can be considered adequately verifiable with no U.S. intelligence capability at all.

We agree with the Secretary of Defense, Dr. Brown, that the Soviets are building forces capable of fighting and winning a nuclear war with the United States and its allies, but we strongly disagree with his view that this aim can be thwarted by ratifying SALT II. Soviet participation in SALT, or any other arms control treaties, is primarily designed to further this goal and to elicit U.S. acquiescence and even cooperation in creating the necessary imbalance of power required by that goal.

I should point out at this time, Mr. Chairman, that like you, I also have been traveling. I spent the last weekend in Brussels at the NATO meeting commemorating the 30th anniversary of NATO. This meeting was attended by very influential legislative leaders in Europe as well as Senators Roth, Morgan, and Garn, and Representatives Zablocki, Beard, and others. I can say that you and I obviously do not talk to the same people, because the facts are that whereas the leaders in NATO have supported SALT II, there is considerable concern within the rank and file of the leadership of NATO, and I can tell you why.

They see this imbalance that has developed with our strategic forces. No longer do they believe that the United States in case NATO is attacked by Russia will be willing to generate or initiate a major nuclear exchange between the United States and Russia because Europe was attacked by the Russians.

Consequently, I think this makes the restraints of the protocol very important, because the NATO nations at this time should begin immediately acquiring a capability to respond to a Soviet nuclear attack on NATO by an attack from Europe on Russia.

I talked to Lord Chalfonte, who is the publisher of the London Times, and in fact he mentioned this. He noted that Pravda had recently said words to the effect that the Americans have the rather forlorn idea that the protocol will cease in 1981, but they say it is not the case, it will be extended. This is the Russians talking in Pravda.

I think that this point was discussed by you and by the previous witness here with respect to what happened with the SALT I interim agreement. It was extended. Now, I am not a lawyer and

cannot debate with you about what it means for Senate passage and resolution, but I am just saying that there are many people who fear that the protocol will be extended.

Mr. Chairman, in sum, we urge the Senate of the United States to consider the grave consequences of ratifying a treaty which will commit this country to the continuation of disarmament policies and philosophy which, however promising when adopted, have imperiled the security of the United States and its allies and encourage ever more aggressive Soviet behavior. The SALT process is not so sacrosanct that we must accept a lopsided and unverifiable agreement simply to show progress. We who know war cherish peace. We are not warmongers, as all who oppose SALT II have been dubbed by some.

As military professionals, and with all due respect for our more circumscribed colleagues still bound by their active service, we strongly urge you to reject SALT II as currently written as being injurious to the security interests of the United States and its allies.

That is signed by me with grave concern.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Admiral.

CONCERN OF NATO ALLIES ON PROTOCOL EXTENSION AND NONCIRCUMVENTION

I would like to proceed with two lines of questioning, one concerns the attitude of our NATO allies. I am not quite sure that we disagree. You say that our allies express grave concern, and then you point out what that concern is. The concern really relates to the extension of the protocol and the noncircumvention provision, doesn't it?

Admiral MOORER. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. Did anyone suggest to you that the central elements of the treaty concerned them, and that the United States should not ratify the treaty?

Admiral MOORER. They did that by inference, in the sense that they feel that the treaty as now constructed further enhances their insecurity. They have what I would call a crisis of confidence.

Senator BIDEN. Sure. Doesn't that crisis of confidence relate to the theater nuclear force relationship between NATO and the Soviet Union and not to the central systems? You have already said to us that you believe it was amplified in what they said that they do not believe that the United States would engage its central systems?

Admiral MOORER. So say them.

Senator BIDEN. Yes. If that is the case, isn't really their concern the theater?

Admiral MOORER. Of course, and I think that the protocol inhibits, in my view, the development in the theater of the kind of capability that they have.

Senator BIDEN. How did it do that, Admiral? How does it inhibit?

Admiral MOORER. Well, as I see it, it restricts the range.

Senator BIDEN. It restricts the deployment.

Admiral MOORER. Yes. In other words, the protocol as I read it restricts the United States and has no impact on the Soviets.

DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE MISSILE AFTER DECEMBER 1981

Senator BIDEN. Isn't it true that we can continue research and development, we can do all we are capable of doing short of deploying, and we are not capable of deploying until December 1981

anyway. Isn't that true? I mean, even if we wanted to deploy the ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missile tomorrow, we don't have that capability, do we, to deploy?

Admiral MOORER. Well, I think it depends entirely on what we feel is urgent. As a matter of fact, when we built the Polaris submarines under a posture of urgency, we turned them out at one a minute. If this becomes an overriding objective, if you view what happened in World War II, certainly we can deploy the missiles before 1981.

Senator BIDEN. I see, and is it your firm belief that a significant portion of our NATO allies wish us to reject the treaty?

Admiral MOORER. I think they certainly wish it to be significantly modified.

CHANGES NATO WANTS AMENDED OR CHANGED

Senator BIDEN. Is there anything beyond those two provisions that they believe has to be amended or changed? Do you hear anybody suggest that unless we include the Backfire bomber, we should reject the treaty? Have you heard anybody say that?

Admiral MOORER. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. You did?

Admiral MOORER. Yes. They feel that the Backfire bomber and SS–20 should be part of the overall package and is not counted.

Senator BIDEN. They think they should be counted as part of the central systems?

Admiral MOORER. Yes; because this in effect, withdrawing them from the Soviet numbers, changes the relative balance between the weapons systems, the central system.

Senator BIDEN. How does it do that?

Admiral MOORER. It degrades the U.S. willingness as part of this crisis of confidence that you and I just mentioned.

INCLUDING BACKFIRE IN CENTRAL SYSTEMS

Senator BIDEN. I see. I thought their concern was that they be able to move forward with TNF modernization, introduce the long-range Pershing, have access to cruise technology, and deploy their ground-launched or sea-launched cruise, and that that was the only prospect that would have any impact in countering the Soviet theater systems, the theater systems being the Backfire bomber and the SS–20.

Now, I am at a loss to understand the argument you have just put forward, that by including them in the central systems, we would in any way alleviate their concern. I don't understand that. They are still sitting there. They are still there directed toward the theater, not toward the United States.

By the way, I spoke to military people in NATO, and they know what the Backfire bomber is for. Not a military man in Europe whom I have run across doesn't know what the Backfire bomber is intended for.

It is not intended for intercontinental use. It is intended for them, and they know it, so they are very worried. How does including it in the central systems affect that at all?

Admiral MOORER. Well, Senator Biden, I don't know how much experience you have had in military planning, but when you begin to plan any kind of military strategy on the basis of predicting what the intentions of the other sides are, you are in deep trouble. You have to look at the capabilities of the other side and not the intentions.

Senator BIDEN. Precisely. The capability of those aircraft and what they are designed for. I don't know of any military men in Europe who believe the primary capability and design purpose of these aircraft is for anything but the theater; do you?

Admiral MOORER. Instead of the word "primary" I think it is probably true that they are primarily devoted to European targets, but they have an easy capability for reaching the United States, and we have no air defense worthy of the name, as you well know.

Senator BIDEN. You know, we can do all kinds of things with any kind of weapon, but it seems to me that you have to look at the purpose, the primary purpose for which they are constructed. Obviously, you can do anything with almost any weapon. I have not run across anybody in Europe, any military people who have any doubt about the Backfire bomber being a theater weapon.

I see that the General is shaking his head no. General, do you know of any military men in Europe who say that is not the purpose?

General GRAHAM. I know a lot of military men in Europe who would say: "Good for you, United States," sarcastically. You don't count the Backfire bomber because you hope they are going to use them on us. I don't think that causes much confidence, and when you come around to say what it was built for, the Backfire bomber is the best bomber the Soviets have ever built for attack on the United States. We are counting 50- to 60-year-old prop jobs in the SALT Treaty, and the Soviets are going to have 400 of these new jobs, and we are not counting them because some believe, and apparently you believe, that they were not built for attack on the United States.

I don't know how you possibly can come to that conclusion.

PRIMARY PURPOSE OF BACKFIRE BOMBER

Senator BIDEN. General, let me ask you the question again, if I could. Are there military people in Europe that you know who believe that the primary purpose for which the Backfire bomber is being built is for use against the United States, or do they believe that the primary purpose of the bomber is for use in the theater?

General GRAHAM. Military men both on this side of the Atlantic and on the other side of the Atlantic look at weapons systems in terms, as the Admiral said, of their capability. They know that it is capable both of attacking peripherally and attacking the United States. Every bomber in anybody's inventory is better for attacking closer targets than farther targets.

Senator BIDEN. Now you are begging the question, sir. Let me ask it in another way. What do the military men in Europe whom you know believe is the mission for which the Backfire is presently tasked? What do you think?

General GRAHAM. I don't know of anybody who says they know what the mission of the Backfire is on this side of the water or over

there. It is, of course, a bigger threat to anything to which it is closer, and that is Europe, Japan, and China. It is a lesser threat if it has a distance to go, but so are the Soviet bombers that we are counting in SALT, and this is a better bomber than any of them.

Senator BIDEN. So the SS–18, because it has less distance to go to get to Bonn, is also more of a threat to Europe than here.

General GRAHAM. No, sir. There is a difference between aircraft and missiles.

Senator BIDEN. Well, tell me the difference in terms of the rationale that you just put forward. You said any target that is closer is obviously more vulnerable. Isn't Bonn therefore more vulnerable to the SS–18 than we are?

General GRAHAM. Yes, sir; but you can get to Bonn without refueling the Backfire, and you have to refuel the Backfire to go to some farther distant target, so there is a great deal of difference how you look at a missile and how you look at an aircraft.

Senator BIDEN. My time is up. Thank you, gentlemen.

Senator Javits?

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, two questions occur to me, and I would like to ask them of you. I apologize for having to run over to the floor of the Senate while you were reading your statement, but I gather you read the letter of your organization into the record. Is that correct?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. It is in the record.

SALT I EFFECT ON U.S. ARMAMENT BUILDUP

Senator JAVITS. I notice you make the point which is probably summed up in these words: "The Soviets have become harder not easier to deal with after SALT I." Would you say that there was anything in the SALT I Treaty which prevented us from taking the same steps forward in armaments that the Soviets did during that time?

Admiral MOORER. No, sir, Senator Javits, and as I have said many times, as you recall I am sure, when I as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed the content of the SALT I Interim Agreement on offensive systems, I had telephone calls between Washington and Moscow on this matter as they were coming down to the fine wire to sign the treaty. We came up with what we called conditions, if you will, or assurances that we felt were necessary in order to make SALT I viable.

The administration, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, if you read the testimony, strongly supported the assurances that were requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is a mattter of record, but subsequent to that time, the B–1 bomber has been canceled, and many other of the actions with respect to the cruise missile, for instance—now, we have agreed to place a restraint on the cruise missile range for land-based and sea-based missiles, and overall the general thrust of what we have been talking about has been slowed down.

I agree with you that we were not restricted from doing any of those things, but I believe you will agree that SALT I created a kind of euphoria in the Congress and in the eye of the public, and consequently people more or less kind of sat back in their chairs

and the progressive buildup of the Soviets continued while ours went down.

DIFFERENCE IN TIME PERIODS FOLLOWING SALT I AND SALT II

Senator JAVITS. I think that is a very fair statement, Admiral. Let me refer to another sentence in the letter which reads as follows:

> And we find it even harder to believe that ratification of SALT II would be followed by vigorous U.S. efforts to close the widening gaps betwen U.S. and Soviet military capabilities.

I ask you this question. Is there any difference between this period which will follow a SALT II ratification if we do ratify and the period which followed SALT I? In other words, will we still be in the same position where we could, if we wanted, build up to the Soviets or get way ahead of them? What is there in this treaty, in your judgment, aside from the euphoria which you feel will continue, which will block us from taking the action we should have taken, assuming your argument after SALT I? What is there in this treaty that will prevent us from moving forward if we wish to with the same vigor and the same strength that you prescribed after SALT I?

Admiral MOORER. You are really asking me two questions. First, what is different about the time today and the time back in 1972? I think there is a radical difference. I think that the rapid buildup by the Soviets in all phases of military equipment, missiles, and conventional forces, and so on, has put them in a far stronger position. That is the first point. I think in 1972 they would not have dared to put troops and fighter pilots in Cuba. I think they are just thumbing their nose at us.

I think they know that they can move ahead and we are not going to do anything about it, so there is a major difference between 1972 and 1979.

Now, so far as the specific treaty is concerned, what can't we do? I have already mentioned what I think are the unnecessary restraints imposed on the United States by the protocol which imposed no restraints on the Soviets, and in my view will slow down a buildup of the NATO countries which is mandatory.

Second, you have such things in the treaty as article IX, I believe it is that article, which restricts us from putting ballistic missiles on ships. Now, if we are a maritime power and the Soviets are a land power, why did we agree to accept a disadvantage which I do not think is necessary? The Soviets were the ones who suggested this. Obviously, they have 2½ times the land area that we do. I think there is another aspect of this about which people do not talk very much, Senator Javits, but if you will look at a map, you will see that our ballistic missiles are west of the population centers of the United States, namely, the Chicago-Boston-Washington triangle, and if the Soviets would undertake a counterforce attack on our land-based missiles, the fallout would come right across the most densely populated area of our country.

Conversely, the Soviet missiles are on the east side of Soviet Russia, and if we were to attack them, as we well know, the fallout would go over Japan and China.

So, I think that we should not just agree to remove an option which could possibly remove the target from the center of the United States.

FEASIBILITY OF BALLISTIC MISSILES ON SHIPS

Senator JAVITS. Have ballistic missiles on ships ever been considered by you as the Chief of Naval Operations as a feasible proposition?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir, many times. This was at a time, of course, when we were beginning to get seriously concerned about the accelerated Soviet buildup that was taking place subsequent to the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. This was looked on very seriously in the Pentagon as an alternative means of rapidly increasing our missile capability.

Senator JAVITS. We will inquire into that, Admiral. So far as I know, it is the first time this has been raised. We will inquire into it.

Admiral MOORER. But the treaty does prohibit this.

Senator JAVITS. Yes, I see that. We will include article IX in the record at this point, and we will investigate it.

[The information referred to follows:]

ARTICLE IX—SPECIAL PROHIBITIONS ON WEAPON SYSTEMS

This Article prohibits or restricts certain types of weapon systems.

Subparagraph 1(a) prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of ballistic missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers for installation on waterborne vehicle other than submarines, and of launchers of such missiles. This provision prohibits the development of a long-range ballistic missile system for surface ships. The United States has no plans for such a system. An Associated Common Understanding declares that this prohibition does not affect current practices for transporting ballistic missiles, such as would be used in supplying missiles to operating bases.

Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 1 of Article IX prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of fixed ballistic or cruise missile launchers for emplacement on the seabed or on the beds of internal waters, or mobile launchers of such missiles which move only in contact with the beds of such waters, as well as missiles for such launchers. The effect of this provision is: (a) to extend the prohibitions of the Seabed Arms Control Treaty [1] to the entire territorial waters and internal waters of the Parties; and (b) to extend its obligations to include development and testing in addition to deployment. The Seabed Arms Control Treaty essentially prohibits Parties from emplacing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction as well as structures, launching installations or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using such weapons, on the seabed and the ocean floor (or its subsoil) beyond a 12-mile coastal "seabed zone" measured from the baseline of the territorial sea. An associated Agreed Statement makes clear that the obligation contained in this subparagraph applies, *inter alia*, to all areas covered by the Seabed Arms Control Treaty.

The prohibition on mobile launchers which can move only in contact with the seabed does not include launchers on submarines, as submarines need not be in contact with the seabed in order to move.

Subparagraph 1(c) of Article IX prohibits the development, testing and deployment of systems for placing into earth orbit nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction, including fractional orbital missiles. This subparagraph expands the obligations of the Outer Space Treaty,[2] in that the Outer Space

[1] The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, signed at Washington, London and Moscow Feb. 11, 1971, 23 UST 701, TIAS 7337. The United States and Soviet Union are both Parties to this Treaty.

[2] Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, signed at Washington, London and Moscow Jan. 27, 1967, 18 UST 2410, TIAS 6347. The United States and Soviet Union are both Parties to this Treaty.

Treaty prohibits only the actual placement in space of weapons of mass destruction, and does not cover fractional orbital missiles.

An associated Common Understanding states that the prohibition on fractional orbital missiles does not require dismantling or destruction of existing launchers of either Party. However, under the Second Common Understanding to paragraph 2 of Article VII the Soviets have agreed to dismantle or destroy twelve SS–9 launchers at the Tyura-Tam test range which have been used to test a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) several times in the past. Moreover, any fractional orbit missiles in existence must be dismantled or destroyed pursuant to the obligation of paragraph 4 of Article XI, and such missiles cannot be developed in the future.

Subparagraph (d) of paragraph 1 prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs. This obligation complements what is in effect a ban on additional fixed launchers of modern heavy ICBMs contained in Article IV. Heavy ICBMs are defined in paragraph 7 of Article II.

Subparagraphs (e) and (f) prohibit heavy SLBMs and their launchers and heavy ASBMs. These subparagraphs in effect define heavy SLBMs and heavy ASBMs in language parallel to that for the definition of heavy ICBMs in paragraph 7 of Article II. A heavy SLBM or ASBM is one with a launch-weight or throw-weight heavier than that of the Soviet SS-19 ICBM. The First and Second Agreed Statements defining launch-weight and throw-weight and the Common Understanding concerning "other appropriate devices" for SLBMs and ASBMs also parallel those under paragraph 7 of Article II. The mutual understanding of the Parties on the terminology related to the definition of throw-weight set forth in the plenary statements by both Parties on October 29, 1976 (stated above), applies here as well.

The second paragraph of this Article prohibits the flight-testing and deployment on heavy bombers of long-range cruise missiles equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads. An Agreed Statement to paragraph 2 defines "independently targetable" warheads of cruise missiles. This definition is similar to that of MIRVs, which are defined under paragraph 5 of Article II. This definition does not include cruise missiles equipped with "cluster warheads"; nor does it include a recoverable, single-warhead cruise missile which can attack independent targets on separate flights.

Admiral MOORER. I am just saying that we should not voluntarily accept the restraint that the Soviets are not going to use anyway.

Senator JAVITS. Well, I know, but it takes two to tango, Admiral. We are not going to have everything our way, if we have a treaty. If we are not going to have a treaty, we and they will each go our own way. That was my argument with Professor Rostow, and that, of course, is another very different matter.

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir, but I think you can carry that only so far, or you will wind up as the low man on the totem pole.

EFFECT ON NO ARMAMENTS PROGRAM OF SALT IS DEFEATED

Senator JAVITS. But that depends on the will of the United States. That is what I am trying to get from you. I am asking you this question. Suppose we do not enter into this treaty and we are still in a state of euphoria. Are we then worse off or better off. In other words, we remain in the same state of euphoria then, but do not make the treaty. You gentlemen will have been successful in defeating the treaty, but if you are not successful in an armament program, then what?

Admiral MOORER. Well, in the first place, I think I emphasize two or three times that we are not opposed to arms limitations. I have never known a military man who was. Second, what we are opposing is the contents of this particular document. We are not opposing disarmament.

Senator JAVITS. If I may have just 2 more minutes, Admiral, let me say that we are now in a very particular situation. You have no

guarantee whatever, believe me, that if we reject this treaty the Congress is going to vote all the things you want or that you think we ought to have. I should not say "things you want;" you are not capricious. You are one of our military leaders.

Admiral MOORER. I am a retired man.

Senator JAVITS. That is all right, but I have known you for years, and I still honor you. I would not take away one whit from you. You cannot assure us of that at all. If we reject the treaty and are still euphoric, aren't we then much worse off?

Admiral MOORER. Senator Javits, I think that the treaty can be put in such a form that it would be a far more balanced and equitable treaty, and we have discussed some of the points here.

Senator JAVITS. Well, Admiral, then you are superimposing your judgment on that of the President, the negotiators, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and saying that we can negotiate a better deal if we turn this down. Now, that is a big question, a very big one. You can't guarantee that.

Admiral MOORER. Of course not, but I feel it would be better to try than to accept this treaty verbatim as written.

Senator JAVITS. By turning it down, whatever may be the consequences?

Admiral MOORER. I think it should be negotiated further.

Senator JAVITS. I know, but that is turning it down. Sir, great nations cannot bluff. The Senate is going to vote on this treaty, and it is going to turn it down if you win. Then where does that leave us? In my opinion, it threatens to leave us with the same euphoria, with no treaty, with an exacerbated situation in the world, and with far more scared European powers than they are today.

Admiral MOORER. Sir, I think you also have to ask the question of where does it leave us if we sign it. That is what concerns me. You can say that it is a matter of opinion, but I think the facts speak for themselves. I think the Soviets have reached a point now that they really do not care what we think. Otherwise, they wouldn't be down in Cuba today.

Senator JAVITS. Well, we will see about Cuba, sir. You are too much of a professional to jump at first assumptions. I do not know what Cuba amounts to, but believe me, we will dig into it carefully. There is indirect linkage for me between Cuba and SALT, and I believe there is for everybody else. There is no use in kidding ourselves about that. However, we are not at the bottom of that story yet.

AGREEMENT TO SALT I TIED TO ADMINISTRATION PRESSURE

You say at the end of your letter, Admiral: "As military professionals, and with all due respect for our more circumscribed colleagues still bound by their active service." Admiral, did you agree to SALT I because the administration wanted you to or because you were convinced it was the right thing to do? In other words, are you attributing a standard to the present Joint Chiefs of Staff which is lower than yours?

Admiral MOORER. No, sir, certainly not, but I can tell you this. Based on years and years of experience in our system of government, we are the only nation to my knowledge that requires a man in uniform to testify before the legislative branch of the Govern-

ment. I do know from my experience that it makes no difference, and I am not getting political on this at all, it makes no difference whether it is a Republican or a Democratic administration. There are pressures brought to bear on the military people which I think are probably proper in an executive pyramid, but they do not have an opportunity to speak as I am speaking to you today.

This is an absolute fact in our system. Now, I do not oppose that. I think in an executive branch, whether it is in the executive branch of the U.S. Government or in the structure of General Motors, that the chairman of the board, or the President, or whoever happens to be the chief executive officer, in all honesty and fairness should ask his assistants, his vice presidents, or his joint chiefs of staff what they think about this issue.

Then, he might say, I hear you but I am going to do it another way. I have done that many times myself with my own staff. I am sure you have, too, Senator Javits, but once the chief executive makes the decision, then the staff is obligated to do everything it can to support that decision. These people have two options, to either support or to resign. That is the way the system works. I do not think it should be changed or that it can be changed.

RELIABILITY OF JCS TESTIMONY

Senator JAVITS. Admiral, you would have us believe, and perhaps this is the most portentious part of your testimony, that in order to get the truth out of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we have to wait until they retire, and they are then no longer Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Admiral MOORER. No; I did not say that at all, and I hope you are not suggesting that I am accusing the Joint Chiefs of Staff of lying.

Senator JAVITS. No; I did not mean to do that at all. You are absolutely right to object, and I apologize, but in order to get what they really think, you tell us we will have to wait until they resign and they are no longer Joint Chiefs of Staff; therefore we cannot rely upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is probably the most serious thing that has been evidenced in this whole hearing.

Senator BIDEN. Or the political leadership you pointed out of the Western World.

Senator JAVITS. Let's talk about the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the professionals, and you were one of them. Did you want us to rely on you when you were Chairman?

Admiral MOORER. Certainly.

Senator JAVITS. You did? Well, why do you not want us to rely on the present Joint Chiefs?

Admiral MOORER. I did not say that. I said you must take the lead of the Chief Executive, and all the people who work for him are required to support him. That is what I said. That is what they all do.

Senator JAVITS. Well, sir, this is where you are an expert, but I must say in my opinion you leave our country in an extremely exposed and vulnerable position to tell us that we can't really know what they think. They will somehow rationalize or conform to the Chief Executive when they are the Joint Chiefs of Staff. You have to face that, Admiral. There is no way of ducking it. That is what you are telling us, in my opinion.

Admiral MOORER. Senator Javits, let me say that the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent several memoranda to the Secretary of Defense on SALT II and they expressed essentially the same concerns that I have expressed today. As a matter of fact, I think some members of this committee remarked at the time the Joint Chiefs were sitting right here that what you are doing is damning the treaty with faint praise. If you are fair about it, if you read what they said, I don't think that they just can't wait until this treaty is signed.

Senator JAVITS. Sir, I am sorry. They are men of authority and decision. I am not a professional, but I have served, too. I know that military people know how to decide and how to give an order, whatever may be their reservations, and they have stated them. They have been given an order. They have said, we are for this, so ratify it. I will say that you worry me very much about many, many things, and not just this particular treaty, but major decisions which involve the very existence of our country.

QUESTION OF VERIFICATION

Senator BIDEN. Let me follow on that one point. You mentioned the question of verification, General, and Admiral. I sit on the Intelligence Committee. I have for a year now heard the testimony of the very men who are the experts both in the military and outside of the military. I have heard Admiral Inman, who is an incredibly qualified fellow. I have heard the heads of our intelligence community come before us and say that we can verify this treaty. I have only one source for classified information. I cannot even go to you any longer. You don't have the access.

The very eminent retired generals and admirals whom you have listed do not have the access to up-to-date information which the people who are now charged by our Government with our security have. They have said to us that this treaty is verifiable. Barry Goldwater says this treaty is verifiable, after listening to them. We all must rely at some point on experts. We are not talking about political questions in terms of verification. We are asking them, can you see X, Y, and Z, and the experts say, yes, we can. You are telling us in your statement, and all of these retired people apparently agree, that it is not verifiable. You go on to tell us that the rank and file of the military in Europe have much deeper reservations about the treaty than the present military leadership. You go on to say that the political leadership is strongly for SALT, but underneath there is really no support.

It seems to me that you have made the most damning indictment of political and military leadership and expertise not only in this country but in the entire alliance that I have ever heard. You are right that I don't have the experience with strategic planning that you do. I am a 36-year-old U.S. Senator, not a retired Admiral with a very distinguished career. But because of what I am, I look to the people who supposedly know, the leadership in the military, the leadership in the intelligence community, the leadership in the alliance, and uniformly they tell me, with reservations that have been expressed, that we should ratify this treaty. And you are saying to us that retired people know better, that we should listen to them, and you, and not to this leadership. And you imply that they are really not telling us what they think.

If that is true, you don't leave us much to rely on, not just in this treaty, but in anything relating to our military establishment.

Admiral MOORER. Senator Biden, I don't wish to leave it in those terms. It is true, as I said before, that we do have a different system which was established by the Congress in the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 as well as the National Security Act of 1927, I believe. You might want to take a look at that. But when you get to technical matters, in terms of the capability of the intelligence system or the capability of our own equipment, of course, you get the greatest detail in this, but when you get into a flat question of, do you approve of the Vietnam conflict, which I did not, and I said so many times, nevertheless, we also talk all the time about civilian control. I'll bet I have heard that term a thousand times, the term "civilian control." We do have civilian control in this country. I have never known a military man who does not support the Constitution, but I think there are pressures put on military people to go along with the administration's policy, and that is just a fact.

I think if you were President, you would do the same thing.

Senator BIDEN. Sure, there is pressure, and I would attempt to do the same thing if I believed it were right, but honorable military men are faced with the same choice that honorable men in politics are, and that is that they can't go along with it if they really believe the security of the country is being jeopardized. Then they would have an obligation to resign. That is a real obligation, not a fictitious one.

You are implying that this treaty truly jeopardizes the security of the United States, and that the military men who are telling us otherwise know that. Now, it seems to me for them to continue in office if they believe that means they would be dishonorable men, regardless of the pressure. If I in fact totally disagree with a position my party takes, my State takes, or my constituency takes, I don't have an obligation to go along. I have an obligation to follow my conscience, and I should resign if I can't go along with it.

These men, you are saying to us, know that this treaty jeopardizes the security of the United States of America but because of political pressure they are not coming forward.

Admiral MOORER. No, sir; I didn't say that. I said that what they told you, I am sure, was their opinion, but I think that this treaty, as I say in my statement, is ill-advised in its present form. I am not like you in the sense that I do not have access to the intelligence reports that you have. General Graham was director of the intelligence agency, and so far as the verification capabilities are concerned, he is an expert.

Senator BIDEN. I know that. I am not suggesting that General Graham cannot disagree with Admiral Inman.

General GRAHAM. I don't think I do, as a matter of fact. One of the problems I think for a Senator getting briefed on verification is, you may not know what questions to ask because you don't know enough about it. Have you questioned this part of the treaty that says the Soviets will not produce an SS-16 missile, will not produce the third stage of it, will not produce the warhead? I don't know of an honest intelligence man, Bobby Inman included, who will say, yes, I can verify that they are not producing the warhead for an SS-16. He knows they can't do that.

I'll bet you if you ask him bluntly, can you tell me, Bobby, can you verify whether or not the Soviets are producing a warhead for an SS-16, he will tell you he doesn't know. I will bet you Admiral Turner, who knows a lot less about it than Bobby does because he hasn't been in it as much, will also tell you no, and General Tighe will tell you know if you ask the right question.

Senator BIDEN. You are a very interesting fellow, General, to imply that after a Senator spends a full year, involving several hundred hours of reading and briefings, that he is not able even to ask the right questions. You guys make such an incredible indictment of the system that I just find it absolutely difficult to believe you are saying it.

Senator STONE. Don't go away mad, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. Oh, no, I won't do that.

INTRODUCTION OF COMBAT TROOPS IN CUBA

Senator STONE. Admiral Moorer, on July 17, you and Admiral Zumwalt testified before this committee and for the first time the issue of Soviet military buildups was raised by me in questioning you. I asked you was it not the case that Soviet Golf II submarines carry nuclear misssiles, and that if servicing such a submarine took place in Cuba, it would be a violation, and you said it would [1] I asked you both this question: I would like to ask either or both of you whether you think a direct or indirect effort to establish a military base would be established by the introduction of a large number of combat troops of the Soviet Union into Cuba.

Admiral Zumwalt said there is no question in his mind. You, Admiral Moorer, said absolutely, yes, sir. I then asked, would you say that if other than advisers, the Soviet Union attempted to introduce as much as a brigade of combat troops into Cuba, that that would constitute a direct or indirect effort to establish a base.

Well, since that time, within a day, the administration witnesses denied that the Golf II submarine does or did carry nuclear missiles, but within a week admitted it, and it is in the record. Within 3 or 4 weeks after that, they have now conceded and now they assert that there is a Soviet brigade of combat troops in Cuba.

My final question to you was this: "I have already inquired about the Soviet submarine visits. I have already inquired about the Mig-23 and Mig-25 presence in Cuba. If in addition to that there were a major introduction of Soviet combat troops into Cuba, could there be any further doubt that we just do not care about protecting our hemisphere against Soviet military bases in this hemisphere?"

At that time you said, Admiral Moorer: "None whatsoever, none whatever, and I think it would be the height of folly for the United Stated to permit that to happen, sir."

It has now happened. What is your suggestion to our policymakers at this juncture? And I would like the opinion of you, Admiral Moorer, and also General Graham, of you.

Admiral MOORER. In my opinion this is directly linked, as I pointed out, this action by the Soviets—as a matter of fact, I predicted this was going to happen when I testified on the Panama Canal issue. I stated that there was a Torrijos-Moscow-Castro axis,

[1] See the SALT II Treaty hearings, part 2, pp. 178-180.

and that the Senate should not be surprised if we did not find an expansion of Soviet activity in Cuba in very short order.

I was sitting right here in this very room, I believe.

In the first place, I believe this is part of the overall effort of the Soviets to gain major influence worldwide. I think there is no way that you can unlink this from the SALT discussion. As I said this morning, I think it is all part of an overall grand design on their part.

In the first place, I think the SALT discussions should be halted until the Soviets reconcile this point. If they refuse to do that, then I think there are several courses of action open to us. Of course, I am not in a position to decide on these.

Certainly I think we should make it crystal clear to the Soviets and to the world at large that we are not going to tolerate this gradual creeping injection of Soviet forces all around the world. I mentioned Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Yemen, and other areas. Obviously, we will give the perception to the world at large that we are engaged in a massive program of worldwide retrenchment.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Admiral.

General Graham?

General GRAHAM. When I heard about the brigades, Senator Stone, the chill that went through me was related to the fact that I was one of the key analysts at the time of the 1962 missile crisis, which is the last time that the Soviets had a brigade in Cuba.

We were thinking about deploying our troops. As a matter of fact, we did deploy our troops down in Florida to go in. The question put to the intelligence people was, what are those Soviet troops going to do? Why are they there? Some of the theses were, well, maybe they put them there to try to deter us from attacking Cuba, but we said one brigade will not deter us from moving against Cuba.

Then maybe they are there to help make sure Castro stays in power as sort of a palace guard. That was rejected. The final analysis from all knowledgeable Sovietologists is that they were there to guard nuclear weapons because the Soviets have never allowed nuclear weapons to get in the hands of even their most trusted satellites. This is a consideration that should be taken very much to heart by the Senate of the United States, because it does have to do with strategy. This business about saying, well, don't worry about them, they are not going to invade Florida, no, they are not going to invade Florida, but the last time a group like that was there, the Government of the United States decided, and the intelligence organs of the United States decided they were there to guard nuclear weapons.

INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT INTO CUBA

As you brought out, and much to your credit, Senator, you did raise your voice when the Soviets introduced new nuclear capable aircraft into Cuba that were better nuclear delivery systems than the ones that Jack Kennedy said they had to take out at the time they took out their missiles. They had some old IL–28's in there, much poorer aircraft than what they put in there now that are nuclear capable, and then there was a chat about, well, this is not the right model, and we don't know whether they are wired and so

forth, but I will tell you, every one of those aircraft that is deployed opposite NATO is counted by the NATO people as a nuclear threat to NATO.

Senator STONE. Are you speaking of the Mig-23's?

General GRAHAM. Yes, the Mig-23's, the floggers. So, this is an extremely serious business, and it should not be handled simply through an expression of concern. I believe something must be done about checking what may be just the tip of the iceberg. This is what we see now in Cuba. What else is in Cuba? Once again, we are getting the kind of reports that one of your colleagues, Senator Keating, was getting before the Cuban missile crisis. They said, watch out, something very sinister is going on down there in Cuba. We could say, well, this is just Cuban exiles having their say again, but now we had better pay some attention to them, as we did not pay attention to them in those days until we took pictures and found out what was going on.

There is one other aspect of this, and here I agree with Henry Kissinger, and sometimes Henry Kissinger and I have not agreed on things. Dr. Kissinger always insisted that we continue to fly reconnaissance flights over Cuba while some of my colleagues even in the Pentagon said that for cost purposes we are getting enough pictures with satellites, so why send aircraft? He said, the day you stop sending the aircraft over Cuba, you are going to give a signal to the Soviet Union that it is now open season for them to do anything they want in Cuba.

When this administration came into power, I regret to say those reconnaissance flights were stopped. I think that makes Henry Kisssinger something of a prophet on this particular occasion.

Senator STONE. Mr. Chairman, may I have an additional 2 or 3 minutes?

Senator BIDEN. Yes, sir.

Admiral MOORER. Senator Stone, please permit me to make an additional comment. I have been extremely concerned about the Soviet pilots in Cuba because I feel that in the short term they are more destabilizing than the troops were, because should they intercept an American plane in the vicinity of Cuba, a situation would be generated which can bring about a confrontation. For them to have their pilots in Cuba, I think, is another matter that should be taken up with the Soviets by the strongest means available.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Admiral.

General, I have another question on this point. How recently did you retire as head of the Defense Intelligence Agency? In what year was that?

General GRAHAM. It was January 1, 1976.

SECRETARY VANCE'S ASSERTION—BRIGADE IN CUBA SINCE 1975

Senator STONE. 1976. As of that time, could you comment on the Secretary of State's assertion of yesterday that the brigade probably was there in 1975 or even earlier?

General GRAHAM. If that is so, then there was absolutely no evidence of that when I was Chief of Military Intelligence.

Senator STONE. And you were conducting the aerial reconnaissance then?

General GRAHAM. That's right. In those days we were looking a lot better than we have been in the last 2½ years.

Senator STONE. Well, in the last 2½ weeks we did conduct the appropriate reconnaissance, the administration says. That is what a lot of them do, piece the jigsaw puzzle together. What you are saying is that that same or equivalent surveillance, up until January 1, 1976, had not produced that kind of evidence or anything like that kind of evidence?

General GRAHAM. That is correct. The most that we could find in those days of evidence of Soviet presence was that they had constructed some facilities for Soviet sailors coming into Cienfuegos. We could see the recreation facilities and some barracks there. They put up some kind of sports fields that—I forget which it was—Cubans don't play, so we know it was Soviets.

Senator STONE. Gentlemen, I am saying, as I have said repeatedly in the last weeks, that what you saw then in Cienfuegos as a few recreational facilities is considerably, substantially, and in a major way more than what is seen now in Cienfuegos. Isn't that a fair comment, from what you know?

General GRAHAM. Yes, sir, that is right. I was amazed to see in the newspapers where somebody said, well, those troops have been there for 5 or 6 years. If they were, we sure missed them, and we were covering Cuba very well. I believe that these troops are part of the pattern that you have begun to see with Mig-23 aircraft arrriving, with the Soviet pilots in their flying combat missions in allegedly Cuban forces, and now this brigade. We are only seeing that which is hard to hide, and we had better take this extremely seriously.

Senator STONE. Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Admiral, I particularly want to thank you for assisting with the disclosure and discovery of what General Graham calls the tip of the iceberg, but which had to come out, and which is now out.

General Graham, I thank you for clarifying this question of when this test substantially began. Thank you.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Senator Stone.

Senator Hayakawa?

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SOVIET SUCCESSFUL FIRST STRIKE POSSIBLE BY 1982-83

There seems to be general agreement that regardless of whether or not we ratify SALT II, by about 1982 or 1983, the Soviets will be able to make a successful first strike.

General GRAHAM. Yes, sir.

Admiral MOORER. Yes.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Now, the M-X will not be fully deployed before 1988. Is that right?

General GRAHAM. I believe it is 1986, sir. If everything stays on track, you will get some of them in 1986.

WHAT UNITED STATES SHOULD DO TO COUNTER SOVIET STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY

Senator HAYAKAWA. What could or should the United States do now, promptly, in order to counter the danger of Soviet strategic superiority by 1982 or 1983?

What are the things we should be doing?

Admiral MOORER. Well, Senator Hayakawa, I have always felt that you cannot uncouple the conventional capabilities from the strategic capabilities, so in my view, in answer to your question, we should start now to redress this imbalance in both the conventional and the strategic areas. Now, some people will say that we can't do anything about that until the treaty expires, so what is the use? However, firm action that is clearly perceived by the world at large that this is what we are doing in itself would have, in my view, a deterrent effect. Had we done this a year ago, I don't think the Soviets would have put troops in Cuba or built them up as they have.

SEPARATION OF STRATEGIC AND CONVENTIONAL PREPARATION

Senator HAYAKAWA. Admiral, possibly to ask another question, you say that strategic preparations and conventional ones cannot be separated from each other. Is that so?

Admiral MOORER. That's right.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Are we not being asked in considering the SALT II Treaty to consider the strategic elements only and to ignore everything else that is going on in conventional weaponry and conventional warfare?

Admiral MOORER. That is correct. I have felt from the outset and have said that SALT II should be a national security debate and not just a SALT debate. SALT should be merely a part of the debate.

General GRAHAM. May I add to that, Senator?

Senator HAYAKAWA. Please do.

NEED TO ERADICATE CLASH OF STRATEGIC PHILOSOPHY

General GRAHAM. The fundamental problem is to get rid of this crazy notion that we have been pursuing for 15 years called mutual assured destruction [MAD]. You in the Senate, in your hearings, have produced some evidence of a profound clash of doctrine in the Pentagon. On July 9, Secretary of Defense Brown said that mutual assured destruction was the bedrock of our strategic doctrines. On July 16, when the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was asked, what do you think of mutual assured destruction, he said, it is an extremely dangerous idea, and we in the military, no matter how much our civilian masters think that is a good idea, have not followed it.

So, until that clash of philosophy or clash of strategy is removed, it seems to me that we are not going to make the kind of military moves that we must in order to defend this country. There are things that are never mentioned. Why don't we go ahead and defend the American people? Under the MAD concept, we have gotten rid of all our defense. We have encouraged the Soviets to

come up with a Backfire bomber by getting rid of all of our defenses against bombers.

Civil defense is not a long leadtime item, and that in itself would help greatly to rectify the gross imbalance in power, but if we only stare at that little piece of the military problem which is called intercontinental delivery, nuclear systems, and then insist on excluding some of them because they get in the way of making an agreement, we aren't even looking at the U.S. military problem. We are not even looking at our strategic problem. We are certainly not looking at the total complex of economic, political and military matters that should be a national strategy.

Instead, we are picking this tiny thing and arguing about cruise missiles, accuracies, and so forth. While we stare at that little piece of the picture, we find the whole Western position crumbling away at an ever increasing rate.

DEGREE OF SCHIZOPHRENIA NEEDED TO DISCARD LINKAGE THEORY

Senator HAYAKAWA. General, I am grateful to you for confirming my worst suspicions. The insistence on the part of both the Soviets and our own administration that we consider the SALT agreement in isolation with no linkage between that and Soviet adventurism in Yemen, Angola, Ethiopia, and so on, we are not supposed to think about at all, they say, but that seems to require of us a degree of schizophrenia of which I am not quite capable.

General GRAHAM. I think there is a gross illogic in that position, too. I am on the road all the time with the administration SALT sellers to try to offset them. When they talk to the people, they say, look, there is no linkage between Soviet past and present behavior and SALT. SALT is in an area all by itself. Then the next speaker gets up and says, we have to have SALT because the Soviets will behave better with it and worse without it, so in the future there is linkage, but in the present and past there is no linkage. These people have no logic to their positions whatsoever.

SUSPENSION OF SALT DISCUSSIONS UNTIL CUBAN PROBLEM IS RESOLVED

Senator HAYAKAWA. General, didn't I understand you to say that our response to the presence of that Cuban brigade should be to suspend the discussion of the ratification of SALT II?

Admiral MOOORER. That is what I said. In my opinion, we should suspend it until this issue is settled. If this is a manifestation of what the Soviets are planning overall in conjunction with the revolutionaries in Cuba, this is only the beginning. We have seen Nicaragua go down the drain, and I think certainly effort is now going to be focused on all of Latin America and South America too, here, right in our own backyard, where the Panama Canal is one of the maritime gateways of the world, it connects the U.S. Western States with the east coast, but the whole objective, in my view, of the Soviets from the outset has been to control the approaches to that Panama Canal for the same reason they are working on the Suez Canal. Now that they have gone into Cam Ranh Bay, which is the best naval base in all of the Pacific they have the Malacca Straits in Singapore staring down their throat.

So, they are working hard all the time to control maritime traffic from one ocean of the world to the other.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you very much, Admiral. I think you will be happy to learn that at a press conference in response to press inquiries yesterday as to what I thought ought to be done about the presence of Cuban troops, I said we should call off the SALT negotiations altogether.

Admiral MOORER. Senator, I think you are absolutely right.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you.

Senator STONE [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Hayakawa.

Admiral, General, thank you very much.

[Admiral Moorer's and General Graham's prepared statements follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADM. THOMAS H. MOORER, USN, RETIRED

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee,

I am honored to have the opportunity to testify again before this Committee on the SALT II treaty.

Today, I am testifying as Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Coalition for Peace Through Strength.

The Coalition for Peace Through Strength is a bipartisan alliance of 105 national organizations, 204 Members of Congress and other pro-defense leaders across America. The American Security Council, which I serve as a member of the Board of Directors, is the program secretariat for the Coalition.

The purpose of the Coalition is to work for the adoption of a national strategy of Peace Through Strength.

It is our belief that if the United States Senate consents to the SALT II Treaty, it would make the adoption of such a strategy most unlikely.

We did prepare a detailed study called AN ANALYSIS OF SALT II. However, this is a 78-page document and thus too long for me to cover in the time allotted to us today.

Instead, I ask permission to read a three-page joint statement signed by 1678 retired general and flag officers from all the armed services.

As you know, active duty military leaders are not permitted to flatly oppose SALT II. This is why we at the Coalition for Peace Through Strength have sought out the views of retired military leaders who are now free to speak out.

From my conversations with active and retired military leaders, I believe that the overwhelming majority oppose SALT II as written. This has been confirmed by the fact that only four of the retired officers contacted so far have declined to join in the statement because they support SALT II as written. Another thirty-three declined for such reasons as that they were undecided, ill, or thought that the statement should be written differently.

We are continuing to circulate the statement and will later give each Senator a copy of the statement with a list of all the signers at that time.

COALITION FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH

Program Secretariat: American Security Council
Educational Secretariat: American Security Council Education Foundation

September 6, 1979

The Honorable Frank Church, Chairman
U.S. Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations

Dear Senator Church:

We, the undersigned retired and reserve general and flag officers of all U.S. Military Services respectfully request you to oppose ratification of SALT II.

We are in agreement with most of our fellow Americans in preferring international cooperation and equitable arms-limitation agreements to hostility and competition. But we cannot agree that we can wish this congenial state of affairs into being by blinding ourselves to the stark realities of our strategic situation. In our view, SALT II as now written epitomizes the refusal of some Americans to face the facts. The facts which must be faced are these:

- Ten years of U.S. restraint in the strategic nuclear field rooted in our faith in the SALT process has not been reciprocated by the Soviet Union; rather, the Soviets have pursued an unprecedented buildup of nuclear offensive and defensive capability which, as Secretary of Defense Brown points out, is aimed at a war-winning capability.

- The concept of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) which has shaped U.S. policy since the 1960's was never accepted by the Soviets and has been completely negated by their massive strategic defensive effort including civil defense.

- The aggressiveness of Soviet behavior throughout the world has increased ominously as the military balance has tilted in favor of the USSR.

- U.S. intelligence capabilities to verify Soviet compliance with arms-control agreements have been seriously eroded through compromise of satellite reconnaissance systems and loss of key monitoring facilities.

It seems to us that there is little disagreement inside or outside government that these are the facts, yet the Senate has been asked to ratify a treaty which apparently ignores those facts. We are told by defenders of SALT II that while this treaty does little to slow down the Soviet military surge, it is necessary to ratify it to preserve the "process." They insist that SALT III and SALT IV will cure the inequities of SALT I and SALT II. This ignores Soviet behavior since SALT I. The Soviets have become harder, not easier, to deal with.

The proponents of SALT II insist that we will improve our security through ratification because the situation would be worse without SALT II.

We find it hard to believe that the Soviets could significantly accelerate their current arms buildup in light of the fact that they are already spending 15 percent of their gross national product on arms. And we find it even harder to believe that ratification of SALT II would be followed by vigorous U.S. efforts to close the widening gaps between U.S. and Soviet military capabilities. It is almost certain that Senate ratification of this treaty would commit the United States to another seven years of pursuing peace through trust of the Soviets and adherence to the obviously bankrupt doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). This means further decline of our capability to deter war or to defend ourselves.

We respectfully submit that the arms-control process has become dominated by a persistent U.S. refusal to face the reality of a failure of the twin policies of detente and disarmament.

SALT II doesn't even limit arms. The image of limitation is provided by alleged equal numbers of launchers and aircraft, not to the real destructive elements of nuclear force--missiles and explosive power--where the Soviets have been allowed a heavy advantage. To make matters worse, the "equal" numbers are contrived by failing to count Soviet delivery systems such as the Backfire, the most advanced strategic bomber in the operational inventory of either side.

We also find the treaty as written unverifiable and attempts to finesse this issue by redefining terms most disturbing. SALT II is much more complex than SALT I and covers qualitative as well as quantitative aspects of nuclear armaments enormously more difficult to monitor. Given the compromise of our key verification satellite systems and the loss of vital monitoring stations in Iran, we cannot insure against Soviet circumvention of the treaty provisions. State Department documents describing SALT II redefine verification. Where adequate verification once required an assurance from U.S. intelligence that attempts by the Soviets to circumvent would be detected, it now requires only that we can detect cheating on such a large scale that it alters the strategic balance in time to assure an appropriate U.S. response. This new definition completely finesses the problem of

adequacy of our intelligence capability since it is totally dependent on one's view of what constitutes a "strategic balance" and an "appropriate response." For those who find the actual balance of strategic capabilities irrelevant, and believe that a single U.S. Poseidon submarine is an adequate deterrent regardless of the size of the Soviet forces, SALT II can be considered "adequately verifiable" with no U.S. intelligence capability at all.

We agree with the Secretary of Defense, Dr. Brown, that the Soviets are building forces capable of fighting and winning a nuclear war with the United States and its allies but we strongly disagree with his view that this aim can be thwarted by ratifying SALT II. Soviet participation in SALT, or any other arms control treaties, is primarily designed to further this goal and to elicit U.S. acquiescence and even cooperation in creating the necessary imbalance of power required by that goal.

In sum, we urge the Senate of the United States to consider the grave consequences of ratifying a treaty which will commit this country to continuation of disarmament policies which, however promising when adopted, have imperilled the security of the United States and its allies and encourage ever more aggressive Soviet behavior. The SALT process is not so sacrosanct that we must accept a lopsided and unverifiable agreement simply to show "progress."

We who know war cherish peace. We are not warmongers, as all who oppose SALT II have been dubbed by some.

As military professionals, and with all due respect for our more circumscribed colleagues still bound by their active service, we strongly urge you to reject SALT II as injurious to the security interests of the United States and its allies.

With Grave Concern,

Thomas H. Moorer

Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN, Ret.
On behalf of the following retired generals and flag officers

Rear Adm. Elmer P. Abernethy, USN, Ret
Rear Adm. Raymond B. Ackerman
Rear Adm. Charles Adair, USN, Ret
Brig. Gen. Charles J. Adams, USAF, Ret
Rear Adm. Frank Akers, USN, Ret
Brig. Gen. Frank Albanese, USA, Ret
Rear Adm. John W. Albrittain, USN, Ret
Rear Adm. Clarence E. Aldrich, USN, Ret
Rear Adm. Leroy J. Alexanderson, USNR, Ret

Maj. Gen. Jesse M. Allen, USAF, Ret
Rear Adm. John M. Alford, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Lawrence H. Allen
Brig. Gen. Richard C. Allgood
Maj. Gen. John R. Allison
Brig. Gen. Conrad S. Allman, USAF, Ret
Brig. Gen. Walter F. Alt
Brig. Gen. Kenneth G. Althaus, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard G. Altmann, USNR, Ret.

Rear Adm. Stephen H. Ambruster, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John G. Ames, III, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Glenn C. Ames, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles C. Anderson, USN, Ret.
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Rear Adm. Herbert H. Anderson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Roy G. Anderson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Vernon L. Anderson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Winston P. Anderson, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. John D. Andrew, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. R. S. Andrews, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John G. Appel, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Jack J. Appleby, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Howard H. Arbury, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Robert J. Archer, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Wilbur W. Aring, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Theodore A. Arndt, USA, Ret.
Admiral Jackson D. Arnold, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Kelly Arnold, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Walter E. Arnold, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Thomas E. Arnott
Rear Adm. G. W. Ashford, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Milton H. Ashkins, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. James H. Ashley, Jr., USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Frederick L. Ashworth, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Raymond Astumian
Vice Adm. Bernard L. Austin, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edward Austin, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Kenneth A. Ayers, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Leo A. Bachman, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert M. Backes
Brig. Gen. Van. N. Backman, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Donald G. Baer, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. George H. Bahm, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. James A. Bailey, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. William B. Bailey, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William S. Bailey, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Lee E. Bains, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Duncan S. Baker, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Felix L. Baker, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Harold D. Baker, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Felix P. Ballenger, USN, Ret.
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Rear Adm. Joseph R. Barbaro, USN, Ret.
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Rear Adm. Ferdinand V. Berley, USN, Ret.
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Maj. Gen. Robert Bernstein, USA, Ret.
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Brig. Gen. Wendell L. Bevan, USAF, Ret.
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Brig. Gen. William H. Birdsong, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Max K. Bitts, USA, Ret.
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Brig. Gen. Thomas Bonner, USA, Ret.
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Admiral Walter F. Boone, USN, Ret.
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Brig. Gen. Arthur F. Brandstatter, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. L. Render Braswell, USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Robert A. Breitweiser, USAF, Ret.
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Brig. Gen. James R. Bright, USA, Ret.
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Brig. Gen. Grady S. Brooks, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Thad A. Broom, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles R. Broshous, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles P. Brown, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Jay G. Brown, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Thomas W. Brown, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William D. Brown, USN, Ret.
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Vice Adm. Carleton F. Bryant, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John H. Buckner, USAF, Ret.
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Brig. Gen. Cady R. Bullock, USAF, Ret.
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Maj. Gen. John W. Burkhart, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John C. Burney, Jr., USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John R. Burns
Maj. Gen. Merrill D. Burnside, USAF, Ret.
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Brig. Gen. Chester J. Butcher, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Benjamin J. Butler, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Ogbourne D. Butler
Maj. Gen. Robert G. Butler, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Thomas F. Butt, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John L. Butts, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Victor A. Byrnes
Rear Adm. Jose M. Cabanillas, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Malcolm W. Cagle, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William R. Calhoun, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John U. Calkins, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. William M. Callaghan, USN, Ret.
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Rear Adm. Thomas S. Cameron, USN, Ret.
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Rear Adm. Robert L. Campbell, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Roland A. Campbell, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William B. Campbell, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. C. Craig Cannon, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert H. Canterbury, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Daniel Carlson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Martin D. Carmody, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Edwin H. Carns, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Stephen W. Carpenter, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Bruce L. Carr, USN, Ret.
General W. Reynolds Carr
Brig. Gen. Richard C. Carrera
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Rear Adm. Joseph M. Carson, USN, Ret.
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Rear Adm. Jesse H. Carter, USN, Ret.
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Rear Adm. Gordon L. Caswell, USN, Ret.
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Gen. Jack J. Catton, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Cecil T. Caufield, USN, Ret.
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Maj. Gen. William S. Chairsell, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. Alvin D. Chandler, USN, Ret.
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Brig. Gen. Harry M. Chapman, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James W. Chapman, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Steve A. Chappuis, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. P. N. Charbonnet, USN, Ret.
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Maj. Gen. Charles H. Chase, USA, Ret.
General Max M. Cherry
Brig. Gen. William H. Cheeseman, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John H. Chiles, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Keith L. Christensen, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. James G. Christiansen, USA, Ret.

Rear Adm. John S. Christiansen
Vice Adm. Ralph W. Christie, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Gordon P. Chunghoon, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Bradford G. Chynoweth, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Albert H. Clancy, USN, Ret.
General Albert P. Clark
Brig. Gen. Allen F. Clark, Jr., USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. David H. Clark, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Jeane R. Clark, USN, Ret.
Admiral John E. Clark, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John M. Clark, USAF, Ret.
General Bruce C. Clarke
Admiral Ralph S. Clarke, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Winton R. Close, USAF, Ret.
Brig, Gen. John B. Coates, Jr., USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ralph G. Coburn, Jr., USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Loris R. Cochran, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Samuel G. Cockerham, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Benjamin Coe, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. James E. Cohn, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Philip P. Cole, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William C. Cole, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Lewis E. Coley, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. R. W. Colglazier
Maj. Gen. Kenneth W. Collins, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John L. Collis, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. John B. Colwell, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Walter V. Combs, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. J. Richard Compton
Brig. Gen. Ross R. Condit, Jr., USA, Ret.
Admiral Ray R. Conner, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Raymond C. Conroy, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Louis J. Conti
Rear Adm. Albert B. Cook, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ralph E. Cook, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William R. Cooke, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Damon W. Cooper, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joshua W. Cooper, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Marcus F. Cooper, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Paul T. Cooper, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Ralph C. Cooper, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Richard H. Cooper, USAR
Rear Adm. Bennett S. Copping, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Thomas G. Corbin, USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Charles A. Corcoran, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frederic W. Corle, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Peter Corradi, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Ted H. Corry, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edward J. Costello, Jr., USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Hugh J. Cox, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William R. Cox, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John S. Coye, Jr., USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Jarred V. Crabb, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Kenneth Craig, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William H. Craig, USA, Ret.

Rear Adm. Wyatt Craig, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard S. Craighill, USN, Ret.
General Reginald M. Cram
Brig. Gen. William J. Crandall, USAFR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Albert B. Crawford, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. B. Hayden Crawford
Rear Adm. George C. Crawford, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Edward I. Creed, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles H. Crichton, USN. Ret.
Maj. Gen. Richard G. Cross, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Thomas H. Crouch, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Albert B. Crowther, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Harry Crutcher, Jr., USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Robert R. Crutchfield, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Allman T. Culbertson, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles R. Cundiff, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John W. Currier, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. R. D. Curtin, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert H. Curtin, USAF, Ret.
General Donald Curtis
Maj. Gen. Gilbert Curtis, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Raymond W. Curtis, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. Walter L. Curtis, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ben Scott Custer, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles S. D'Orsa, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. John A. Dabney, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Leo P. Dahl, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Theodore O. Dahl, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Carl M. Dalton, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. O. T. Dalton
Rear Adm. Winfred P. Dana, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Maurice W. Daniel, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Thomas C. Darcy, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Carlton S. Dargusch, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Carl Darnell, Jr., USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Don O. Darrow, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Anthony F. Daskevich, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Frederick J. Dau, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Lester A. Daughterty, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Buddy R. Daughtrey, USAF, Ret.
General Harry J. Davidson, Sr.
Brig. Gen. Joseph H. Davidson, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles L. Davis, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. George M. Davis, Jr., USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Glenn B. Davis, USN, Ret.
General Raymond G. Davis
Maj. Gen. Woodard E. Davis, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Thurlow W. Davison, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Donald S. Dawson, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Willard H. Day, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James K. DeArmond, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Arthur R. DeBolt, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Chester B. DeGavre, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Merlin L. DeGuire, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John W. Dean, Jr., USA, Ret.

Maj. Gen. Elbert Decoursey, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Russell Defauver, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Clinton G. Defoney, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert L. Delashaw, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Leon Delighter
Maj. Gen. Marvin C. Demler, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Kenneth C. Dempster, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. Francis C. Denebrink, USN, Ret.
Admiral Robert L. Dennison, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Clyde R. Denniston, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John A. Des Fortes, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. Harold T. Deutermann, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. J. P. S. Devereux
Maj. Gen. Lawrence R. Dewey, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. E. B. Dexter, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William J. Deyo, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John S. B. Dick, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. William W. Dick, Jr., USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. George W. Dickinson, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William A. Dietrich, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles E. Dissinger, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John S. B. Divk, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ernest W. Dobie, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John W. Dobson, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen Nevin W. Dodd, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Sydney B. Dodds, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Roy T. Dodge, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph E. Dodson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Carl R. Doerflinger, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John W. Dolan, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William A. Dolan, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John M. Donalson, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Jack N. Donohew, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Philip J. Donovan
Lt. Gen. Stanley J. Donovan, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Thomas A. Donovan, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edward M. Dooley, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles R. Doran, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Paul P. Douglas, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William R. Douglas, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Wallace R. Dowd, Jr., USN, Ret.
Admiral James H. Doyle, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William C. Doyle, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Abraham J. Dreiseszun, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Donn R. Driver, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Raymond F. DuBois, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Thomas H. Dubois, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Francis R. Duborg, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. James R. Dudley, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John H. Dudley, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Clifford H. Duerfeldt, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Irving T. Duke, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert W. Duke, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Leo J. Dulacki
Admiral Charles K. Duncan, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Donald Dunford, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William D. Dunham, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Frank Dunkley, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles G. Dunn, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard T. Dunn, USA, Ret.
Admiral Lewis W. Dunton, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James K. Durham
Rear Adm. William H. Duvall, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. R. T. Dwyer
Brig. Gen. John R. Dyas, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Victor A. Dybdal, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. E. R. Eastwold, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert E. L. Eaton, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Samuel K. Eaton, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Harvey W. Eddy, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Alan C. Edmunds, USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. James V. Edmundson, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Morris O. Edwards, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Parmer W. Edwards, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Clarence T. Edwinson, UAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edward S. Ehlen, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Milton Ehrlich
Brig. Gen. Charles V. Elia, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ernest M. Eller, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Frank W. Elliott, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Howard V. Elliott, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John C. B. Elliott, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. William E. Ellis, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ernest B. Ellsworth, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Hugh M. Elwood
Lt. Gen. William J. Ely, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Henry E. Emerson
Lt. Gen. Jean E. Engler, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. William P. Ennis, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Horace H. Epes, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William H. B. Erwin, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Graydon C. Essman, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William E. Eubank, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Harry L. Evans, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Thomas B. Evans, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Gordon S. Everett, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harry G. Ewart, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Arthur E. Exon, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Francis L. Fabrizio, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. D. S. Fahrney, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William H. Fairbrother, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Ivan L. Farman
Rear Adm. Eugene H. Farrell, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ralph E. Faucett, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. James B. Faulconer, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. Albert J. Fay, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edward L. Feightner, USN, Ret.
General James Ferguson, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. William E. Ferrall, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Angelo L. Ferranti

Rear Adm. Harold F. Fick, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard D. Field, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ralph E. Fielding, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Russell R. Finn, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Alvan Fisher, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Ralph E. Fisher, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard E. Fisher, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John A. Fitzgerald, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Phillip H. Fitzgerald, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. W. F. Fitzgerald, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William H. Fitzgerald, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Michael F. D. Flaherty, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Edward M. Flanangan, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Francis E. Fleck, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Lawrence J. Fleming, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Morton K. Fleming, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William B. Fletcher, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William O. Floyd, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George C. Fogle, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Francis D. Foley, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harry J. P. Foley, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph F. Foley, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Winston P. Folk, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. J. E. Fondahl
Brig. Gen. Paul P. Foran, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. Bernard B. Forbes, USN, Ret.
General G. Foreman
Rear Adm. James E. Forrest, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edward C. Forsyth, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. George I. Forsythe, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Newton P. Foss, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm., Walter M. Foster, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. C. Lyn Fox, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Claud M. Fraleigh, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John W. Francis
Rear Adm. Nickolas J. F. Frank, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John F. Franklin, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Wesley C. Franklin, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Joe N. Frazar, Jr., USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Dewitt L. Freeman, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Mason Freeman, USN, Ret.
General Paul L. Freeman, Jr., USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Leonard F. Freiburghouse, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Leonard Frisco, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William J. Fry, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Thomas Fuller, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Samuel G. Fuqua, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles M. Furlow, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frederick R. Furth, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Walter D. Gaddis, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Frank L. Gailer, USAF, Ret.
George R. Gallagher
Rear Adm. W. Earl Gallaher, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William O. Gallery, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Clarence J. Galligan, USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Walter T. Galligan, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Jack K. Gamble, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Wayne N. Gamet, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert G. Gard, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George W. Gardes, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. E. Blair Garland, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Francis L. Garrett, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Malcolm E. Garrison, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ralph S. Garrison, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Norman F. Garton, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Eugene W. Gauch, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. John D. Gavan, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Donald Gay, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. J. Edwin Gay, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Arthur A. Gentry
Brig. Gen. William F. Georgi, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harry E. Gerhard, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John H. Germeraad, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William K. Ghormley, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frederic Gibbs, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Elmer J. Gibson, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Harold B. Gibson, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Kenneth H. Gibson, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. W. M. Gibson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Raymond A. Gilbert, USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Thomas E. Gillespie, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles H. Gingles, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard P. Glass, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James Glore, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William R. Goade, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George W. Goddard, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Guy H. Goddard, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. George A. Godding, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William H. Godson, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Melvin A. Goers, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert R. Goetzman
Rear Adm. William B. Goggins, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Morton J. Gold, USAF, Ret.
General William B. Gold, Jr.
Admiral Henry W. Goodall, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John C. Gordon, USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Gordon T. Gould, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. C. L. Grabenhorst, USNR, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James E. Graham
Maj. Gen. Donald W. Graham, USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Gordon M. Graham, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. Arthur R. Gralla, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John G. Gramzow, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Etheridge Grant, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Elonzo B. Grantham, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Alfred M. Granum, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Guy J. Gravlee

Rear Adm. Oscar Gray, Jr., USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Philip H. Greasley, USAF, Ret.
General William O. Green
Brig. Gen. James W. Green, Jr., USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. George B. Greene, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. William M. A. Greene, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John F. Greenslade, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Elton W. Grenfell
Admiral Charles D. Griffin, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. James A. Grimsley, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Francis H. Griswold, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Sidney Gritz, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. August H. Groeschel, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Rowland H. Groff, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John V. Grombach
Rear Adm. Royce L. Gross, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Donald G. Grothaus, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William H. Groverman, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Bradford E. Grow, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Richard A. Grussendorf, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. William S. Guest, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William M. Gullett, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frederick A. Gunn, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Karl W. Gustafson, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Kermit L. Guthrie, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frank S. Haak, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Chester E. Haberlin
Maj. Gen. Herbert R. Hackbarth, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Louis J. Hackett, Jr., USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. James F. Hackler, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ira F. Haddock, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Theodore G. Haff, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Hamilton Hains, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Peter C. Hains, III, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Dudley D. Hale, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Stewart L. Hall, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. William E. Hall, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Kay Halsell, II
Maj. Gen. Milton B. Halsey, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Lyle E. Halstead, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Archelaus L. Hamblen, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edward J. Hamilton
Rear Adm. Thomas J. Hamilton, USN, Ret.
Gen. Barksdale Hamlett
Rear Adm. Wellington A. Hammond, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. George F. Hamner, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William L. Hamrick, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Jack L. Hancock, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Walter J. Hanna, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Clifford P. Hannum, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harry J. Hansen, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Norris B. Harbold, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Eads G. Hardaway, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert M. Hardaway, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Harold F. Harding, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Donald L. Hardy, USAF, Ret.
General Robert B. Harkness, Jr.
Vice Adm. F. J. Harlfinger, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John Harllee, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Joseph H. Harper, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Robert W. Harper, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Talbot E. Harper, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Brooks J. Harral, USN, Ret.
General Ben Harrell
Maj. Gen. William S. Harrell, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Alfred R. Harris, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Benjamin T. Harris, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. Roy M. Harris, USNR, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Bertram C. Harrison, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Eugene L. Harrison, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Lloyd Harrison, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William H. Harrison, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Gerald A. Hart
Brig. Gen. Frederick O. Hartel, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Hartford, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles C. Hartman, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William H. Hartt, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Harry L. Harty, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Valery Harvard, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert A. Harvey
Brig. Gen. David C. Hastings, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. W. G. Hathaway
Maj. Gen. John J. Hayes, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Hugh C. Haynsworth
Maj. Gen. Stuart G. Haynsworth, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. John T. Hayward, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Raymond F. Hebrank
Vice Adm. Truman J. Hedding, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Earl C. Hedlund, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edwin C. Heffelfinger, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William T. Hefley, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles A. Heim, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Roger C. Heimer
Rear Adm. Paul R. Heineman, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. John A. Heintges
Lt. Gen. Rolland V. Heiser
Rear Adm. Frank V. Helmer
Brig. Gen. Jack W. Hemingway, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William H. Henderson
Maj. Gen. Raleigh R. Hendrix, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Augustus M. Hendry, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John P. Henebry
Maj. Gen. William H. Hennig, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John B. Henry, Jr., USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Karl G. Hensel, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph L. Herlihy, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Vincent Hernandez, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John H. Herring, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Daniel W. Hickey, Jr., USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. George L. Hicks, USNR, Ret.

Maj. Gen. Gerald J. Higgins, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Paul L. High, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John M. Hightower, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Jim D. Hill
Maj. Gen. Roderic L. Hill, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Harry L. Hillyard, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. William O. Hiltabidle, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. John H. Hinrichs, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. B. J. Leon Hirshorn, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Howard M. Hobson, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John H. Hoefer, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John A. Hoefling, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Herbert L. Hoerner, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Bartholomew H. Hogan, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. R. Wesley Hogan, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harold R. Holcomb, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William H. Holcombe, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard Holden, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. James F. Hollingsworth, USA, Ret.
Admiral William R. Hollingsworth, USN, Ret.
General Bruce K. Holloway, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harland E. Holman, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Ernest V. Holmes, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Carl O. Holmquist, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Everett W. Holstrom, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William H. Holt, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. J. Stanley Holtoner, USAF, Ret.
Admiral Ernest C. Holtzworth, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Edwin B. Hooper, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John E. Hoover, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Lewis A. Hopkins, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles F. Horne, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard C. Horne, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles T. Horner, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John S. Horner, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John B. Horton, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Herschel A. House, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edwin B. Howard, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. James H. Howard, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Hamilton W. Howe, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Hugh H. Howell
Rear Adm. C. C. Howerton, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Lester E. Hubbell, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edward M. Hudgins
Brig. Gen. Oscar Conrad Hudson
Brig. Gen. Ronald S. Huey
Brig. Gen. Harry J. Huff
Brig. Gen. Robert B. Hughes, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert L. Hughes, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. H. E. Humfeld, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Ladd F. Hunt
Rear Adm. Louis H. Hunte, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Albert E. Hunter, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. George P. Hunter, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Raymond P. Hunter, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Robert N. Hunter, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Benjamin Hunton, USAR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Jack E. Hurff, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard M. Hurst, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Samuel H. Hurt, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Eugene L. Husdon, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Vincent G. Huston, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles R. Hutchison, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Joseph C. Hutchison, USA, Ret.
Admiral John J. Hyland, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John P. Ingle, Jr., USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Walter D. Innis, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Donald G. Irvine, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Roy M. Isaman, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert M. Ives, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William A. Jack, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. David H. Jackson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Ivan E. Jackson, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Milton C. Jackson, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. P. W. Jackson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Robert W. Jackson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Oscar J. Jahnsen, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William J. James, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frederick E. Janney, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Carl H. Jark, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Irby B. Jarvis, Jr., USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Hal B. Jennings
Rear Adm. M. J. Jensen
Rear Adm. John R. Johannesen, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Ernest F. John, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles E. Johnson, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. E. Gillis Johnson
Maj. Gen. Earl L. Johnson, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edwin L. Johnson, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Henry C. Johnson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John B. Johnson, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Kenneth L. Johnson, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ralph C. Johnson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard H. Johnson, USA, Ret.
Admiral Roy L. Johnson, USN, Ret.
General Warren R. Johnson
Admiral Means Johnston, Jr.
Rear Adm. Don A. Jones
Brig. Gen. Bruce B. Jones, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Carlton B. Jones, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George M. Jones, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Stanley W. Jones, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William C. Jonson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Allen R. Joyce, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles E. Jung, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Carl S. Junkermann, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William L. Kabler, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph I. Kane, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Constantine A. Karaberis, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Draper L. Kauffman, USN, Ret.

Rear Adm. John H. Kaufman, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Louis Kaufman, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Paul Kaufman, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Albert Kaye, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edgar S. Keats, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. George Keegan, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Gerald F. Keeling, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Naiff H. Kelel
Brig. Gen. Harold K. Kelley, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Arthur W. Kellond, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Maurice W. Kendall, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Richard C. Kendall, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John M. Kenderdine, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Kenneth W. Kennedy, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Thomas B. Kennedy, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard A. Kern, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Redmond F. Kernan
Brig. Gen. H. E. Kessinger, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Wayne O. Kester, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. Dixwell Ketcham, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Gerald L. Ketchum, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Ingolf N. Kiland, USN, Ret.
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Brig. Gen. James I. King, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. Jerome H. King, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John J. King, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Philip V. King, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Thomas H. King, USAF, Ret.
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Rear Adm. William J. Kotsch, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edgar P. Kranzfelder, USN, Ret.
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Brig. Gen. Philip F. Kromer, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Clifford J. Kronauer
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Rear Adm. Paul L. Lacy, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John J. Laffan, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James A. Lake, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Kirby Lamar, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Valdemar G. Lambert, USN, Ret.
General F. H. Lamson-Scribner
Maj. Gen. James E. Landrum, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert B. Landry, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard Lane, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Clarence J. Lang, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Cyrille P. Laporte, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Louis R. Laporte, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William W. Lapsley, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Wharton E. Larned, USNR, Ret.
Vice Adm. Harold O. Larson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Harold V. Larson, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William B. Latta, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Robert E. Laub, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John T. Lawler
Brig. Gen. John D. Lawlor, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Baskin R. Lawrence, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Sidney J. Lawrence, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. William S. Lawton, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Osmund A. Leahy, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William H. Leahy, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John E. Leary, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John E. Lee, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Lamar Lee, Jr., USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Frederick E. Leek
Rear Adm. James E. Leeper, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William C. Lemly
Rear Adm. Frederick W. Lemly, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Kelley B. Lemmon, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles F. Leonard, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William N. Leonard, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Cecil P. Lessig, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph W. Leverton
Maj. Gen. William P. Levine, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. B. E. Lewellen, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. John T. Lewis, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Oliver W. Lewis, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Porter Lewis, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Vernon B. Lewis, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William D. Lewis, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. R. E. Libby, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. David I. Liebman, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Lawrence S. Lightner, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Walter E. Linaweaver, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Lawrence J. Lincoln
Gen. Rush B. Lincoln, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Joseph J. Lingle
Brig. Gen. Andy A. Lipscomb, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John J. Liset, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Elmer L. Littell, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Olin A. Lively
Brig. Gen. B. C. Lockwood, Jr., USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Thomas A. Long, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Victor D. Long, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William H. Longley, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Michael Lorenzo, USNR, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Walter E. Lotz, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles E. Loucks, USA, Ret.

Rear Adm. Kenneth Loveland, USN, Ret.
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Maj. Gen. Sumter L. Lowry, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Bernard R. Luczak, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Garland A. Ludy, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert P. Lukeman, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William S. Lundberg, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Reginald P. Lyman, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. George E. Lynch, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George P. Lynch, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John J. Lynch, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ralph C. Lynch, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Nelson M. Lynde, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Donald J. Lynn
Brig. Gen. Archibald W. Lyon, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harvey E. Lyon, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Hylan B. Lyon, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Raymond R. Lyons, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Clinton S. Lyter, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Donald J. MacDonald, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Duncan C. MacMillan, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John J. Maginnis
Rear Adm. John B. Macgregor, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Robert A. Macpherson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert S. Macrum, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Dashiell L. Madeira, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Frank M. Madsen, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. W. S. Magalhaes
Rear Adm. Thomas B. Magath, USNR, Ret.
General R. J. Maglione, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles J. Maguire, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harry P. Mahin, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Thaddeus P. Malanowski, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ralph W. Malone, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert W. Maloy, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Ben J. Mangina
Maj. Gen. Daniel J. Manning
Rear Adm. Joseph I. Manning, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Alexander Marble, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Theodore H. Marshall, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. William J. Marshall, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Clarence A. Martin, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edward O. Martin, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Sherman F. Martin, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. David L. Martineau, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harry C. Mason, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Stanhope B. Mason, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Theo. C. Mataxis, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Paul L. Mather, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Salve H. Matheson, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Bob O. Mathews, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John H. Maurer, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Azro J. Maxham
Rear Adm. William S. Maxwell, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Walter S. Mayer, USN, Ret.

Brig. Gen. Richard W. Mayo, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John H. McAuliffe, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Madison M. McBraver, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George H. McBride, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William D. McCain
Maj. Gen. Chester E. McCarty, USAF, Ret.
Admiral J. W. McCauley, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Arthur J. McChrystal, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Clyde F. McClain, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. John G. McClaughry, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William M. McCloy, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles M. McCorkle, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. James R. McCormick, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Victor B. McCrea, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Kenneth A. McCrimmon, USA, Ret.
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Maj. Gen. Robert H. McCutcheon, USAF, Ret.
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Brig. Gen. Everett A. McDonald, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ellsworth D. McEathron, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John A. McEwan, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Thomas K. McGehee, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Francis M. McGoldrick, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Thomas J. McGuire, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Godfrey T. McHugh, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. D. E. McKay, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. George H. McKee, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Logan McKee, USN, Ret.
General Seth J. McKee, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William A. McKee, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. C. M. McKeen, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Henry R. McKenzie, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Eugene B. McKinney, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William R. McKinney, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John R. McKnight, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John H. McLain, USAF, Ret.
Major Gen. Richard E. McLaughlin
Vice Adm. Ephraim R. McLean, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. G. A. McLean, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Gordon McLintock
Brig. Gen. Robert McMath
Maj. Gen. Henry W. McMillan, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. George J. McMillin, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edwin E. McMorries, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. James A. McNally
Maj. Gen. Raymond F. McNelly, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Melvin F. McNickle, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard R. McNulty, USNR, Ret.
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Rear Adm. Charles J. McWhinnie, USNR, Ret.
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Brig. Gen. Keith E. McWilliams
Rear Adm. States M. Mead, USNR, Ret.
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Maj. Gen. Edward P. Mechling, USAF, Ret.

Maj. Gen. John B. Medaris, USA, Ret.
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Rear Adm. Roger W. Mehle, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John L. Melgaard, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Robert E. Melling, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Albert L. Melton, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Corwin Mendenhall, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Chauncey D. Merrill, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles H. Mester, Jr.
Brig. Gen. Frank Meszar, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ralph M. Metcalf, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Alfred B. Metsger, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edward F. Metzer, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Richard J. Meyer, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Walter C. Michaels, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Howard E. Michelet, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Bill A. Miles, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edwin S. Miller, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. George H. Miller, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harold B. Miller, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Junior F. Miller, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert B. Miller, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ward S. Miller, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Eugene J. Mincks
Maj. Gen. Charles F. Minter, Sr., USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Augustus M. Minton, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Clinton A. Misson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Burt L. Mitchell, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Cleo N. Mitchell, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William L. Mitchell, Jr., USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. S. Edward Mittler, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Chester J. Moeglein, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert L. Moeller, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert E. Moffet, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William A. Moffett, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Lloyd W. Moffit, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edmund W. Montgomery
Lt. Gen. Richard M. Montgomery, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Harley F. Mooney, Jr., USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Benjamin E. Moore, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. French R. Moore, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Harley L. Moore, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John B. Moore
Lt. Gen. Joseph H. Moore
Brig. Gen. Leon A. Moore, Jr., USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Moore Moore, Jr., USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Robert L. Moore, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William T. Moore, USNR, Ret.
Vice Adm. William J. Moran, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. James L. Moreland, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Henry S. Morgan, Jr.
Maj. Gen. Martin J. Morin, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William F. Morr, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John H. Morrill, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Albert R. Morris, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John H. Morrison, USA Ret.
Brig. Gen. Manley G. Morrison, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard I. Morton, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Alvin J. Moser
Rear Adm. Charles W. Moses, USN, Ret.
Admiral William C. Mott, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Horace D. Moulton, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles F. Mudgett, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Dolf E. Muehleisen, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. E. L. Mueller, USA, Ret.
General Richard Mulberry, Jr.
Maj. Gen. Hal L. Muldrow, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Henry J. Muller, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. George W. Mundy, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. George P. Munson, Jr., USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John D. Murphy, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John W. Murphy, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert F. Murphy, USA, Ret.
General S. A. Murphy
Maj. Gen. James L. Murray
Brig. Gen. Joseph Murray, Jr., USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. Lloyd M. Mustin
Brig. Gen. Philip D. Myers, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Warren E. Myers
Rear Adm. Charles D. Nace, USN, Ret.
General Gus G. Nagy
Brig. Gen. Ezekiel W. Napier, USAF, Ret.
Gen. Joseph J. Nazzaro, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. Ray C. Needham, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Spurgeon H. Neel, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard C. Neeley, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Carson R. Neifert, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Douglas T. Nelson, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Roy W. Nelson, Jr., USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. William T. Nelson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. J. H. Nevins, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James P. Newberry, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Langdon C. Newman, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Henry C. Newton, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Franklin A. Nichols, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard E. Nichols, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles A. Nicholson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Wallace H. Nickell, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Herman Nickerson Jr.
Rear Adm. Hugh R. Nieman, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Samuel Nixdorff, USN, Ret.
Admiral A. G. Noble, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Paul R. Norby, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Robert H. Northwood, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William P. Nuckols
Brig. Gen. Bernard A. Nurre, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Howard O'Connor
Rear Adm. Michael G. O'Connor, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. James W. O'Grady, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles S. O'Malley, USA, Ret.

Rear Adm. John F. Oakley, USNR, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Arthur W. Oberbeck, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Joseph C. Odell, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. T. C. Odom, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Russell G. Ogan, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Milton L. Ogden, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William U. Ogletree, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Nils O. Ohman, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Clay Olbon, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard M. Oliver, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William M. Oller, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Alfred C. Olney, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Carl B. Olson
Brig. Gen. Gustaf P. Olson, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. Howard E. Orem, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William H. Organ, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. David P. Osborne, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Frank A. Osmanski
General J. A. Ostroph
Rear Adm. William W. Outerbridge, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edwin B. Owen, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Hinton A. Owens, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Norris W. Potter, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Roger W. Paine, Jr., USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Ralph A. Palladino, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles J. Palmer, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. George G. Palmer, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George A. Pappas, Jr.
Rear Adm. Charles W. Parker, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Edward N. Parker, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Hugh A. Parker, USAF, Ret.
Admiral George A. Parkinson, USNR, Ret.
General Harlan C. Parks, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joel D. Parks, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Frank J. Parrish
Brig. Gen. Benton K. Partin
Maj. Gen. William A. Patch, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Goldsborough S. Patrick, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Stanley F. Patten, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Alex M. Patterson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard O. Patterson, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. H. C. Pattison, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Leonard E. Pauley, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Albert G. Paulsen
Admiral Charles W. Payne, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. D. J. Peacher
Rear Adm. Rufus J. Pearson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Theodore E. Pearson, USNR, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Willard Pearson, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edwin R. Peck, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Oscar Pederson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Byron E. Peebles, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Howard W. Penney, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Donald G. Penterman, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Louis W. Perkins

Brig. Gen. Howard P. Persons, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Roy W. Peters, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. George E. Peterson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard W. Peterson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Frank I. Pethick, Jr., USAR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert L. Petit, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Roger E. Phelan, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Tobias R. Philbin, Jr., USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Chester G. Phillips, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Eugene Phillips
Lt. Gen. Jammie M. Philpott, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ben B. Pickett, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Joseph E. Pieklik, USA, Ret.
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Maj. Gen. Russell K. Pierce, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Gladwyn E. Pinkston, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Ernest A. Pinson, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. Robert B. Pirie, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Eli P. Plaskow
Rear Adm. William G. Pogue, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Boleslaw H. Pokigo, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. David P. Polatty, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Douglas C. Polhamus, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Jack P. Pollock, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph G. Pomeroy, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Mackenzie E. Porter, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Robert L. Porter, USN, Ret.
General Robert W. Porter, Jr., USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Alton G. Post, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William S. Post, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edwin L. Powell, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Kenneth R. Powell, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. George T. Powers, III, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard R. Pratt, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Arthur W. Price, Jr., USN, Ret.
Admiral Frank H. Price, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Oran O. Price, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Fay B. Prickett, USA, Ret.
Admiral Alfred M. Pride, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. George S. Prugh, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William M. Pugh, II, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harold F. Pullen, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George S. Purple
Rear Adm. Ira D. Putnam, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frank E. Raab, Jr., USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. William H. Rafferty, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Lawson P. Ramage, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Paul H. Ramsey, USN, Ret.
Admiral John E. M. Ranneft
Maj. Gen. Henry A. Rasmussen, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William T. Rassieur, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Clemens V. Rault, USN, Ret.
General Edwin W. Rawlings, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ralph W. Rawson, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Clarence C. Ray, USN, Ret.

Rear Adm. Herman L. Ray, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Joseph G. Rehman, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. E. P. Rectanus, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William H. Reddell, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William N. Redling, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Albert Redman, Jr., USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Allan L. Reed, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Michael J. Reichel, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Leslie L. Reid, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. George H. Reifenstein, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Stewart E. Reimel, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Richard D. Reinhold, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Henry J. Reis-El Bara
Rear Adm. Harry L. Reiter, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Ivan A. Reitz
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Maj. Gen. Thomas F. Rew, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Vorley M. Rexroad, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Emmett R. Reynolds, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George E. Reynolds, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. James R. Z. Reynolds, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William E. Reynolds, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Lester K. Rice, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph E. Rice, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Robert H. Rice, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Clyde K. Rich, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. George J. Richards, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Alvin F. Richardson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Clifford G. Richardson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Hugh A. Richeson, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. James B. Ricketts, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Herman P. Riebe, USN, Rot.
Rear Adm. Charles E. Rieben, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Robert E. Riera, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Cecil D. Riggs, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Whitaker F. Riggs, USN, Ret.
General D. E. Riley, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard A. Risden, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. James P. Riseley
Brig. Gen. Robinson Risner, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Osmond J. Ritland, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. B. A. Robbins
Lt. Gen. Jay T. Robbins, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joe A. Robbins, USN Ret.
Rear Adm. Levi J. Roberts, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Armand J. Robertson, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Pearl H. Robey, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Ray A. Robinson, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Allan B. Roby, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Harry J. Rockafeller, USAR, Ret.
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Brig. Gen. Rafael Rodriguez-Ema, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Frederick C. Roecker, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Andrew W. Rogers, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Jack A. Rogers, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Kenwood B. Rohrer
Maj. Gen. Andrew P. Rollins, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Michael R. Roman, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William K. Romoser, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. David L. Roscoe, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John M. Rose, Jr., USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Philip H. Ross, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard M. Ross
Rear Adm. Henry J. Rotridge, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John A. Rouse, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles H. Royce, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edward A. Ruckner, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Thomas J. Rudden, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Theodore D. Ruddock, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Paul E. Ruestow, USAF, Ret.
Gen. Clark L. Ruffner, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. George Ruhlen, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Louis J. Rumaggi, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard G. Rumney, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph W. Russel, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Michael P. Russillo, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Clifford G. Ryan
Maj. Gen. Charles W. Ryder, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edward A. Sahli
Maj. Gen. Charles E. Saltzman, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. James G. Sampson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Crawford F. Sams, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Kenneth O. Sanborn, USAF, Ret.
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Vice Adm. Harry Sanders, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Homer L. Sanders, USAF, Ret.
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Brig. Gen. Leo A. Santini, USA, Ret.
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Rear Adm. John J. Schieffelin, USNR, Ret.
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Rear Adm. John W. Schmidt, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Raymond J. Schneider, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. William A. Schoech, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Herbert E. Schonland, USN, Ret.
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Rear Adm. Floyd B. Schultz, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Carl F. Schupp, II
Brig. Gen. Francis F. Schweinler, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Albert B. Scoles, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Tom W. Scott, USAF, Ret.

Rear Adm. Eugene T. Seaward, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Wiltz P. Segura
Rear Adm. F. Gordon Selby, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Moise B. Seligman
Vice Adm. Benedict J. Semmes, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John W. Sessums, Jr., USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Paul E. Seufer, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. W. T. Sexton, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John N. Shaffer, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Leland G. Shaffer, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Louis D. Sharp, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Raymond N. Sharp, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William J. Sharrow
Rear Adm. Charles W. Shattuck, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Samuel R. Shaw
Brig. Gen. William L. Shaw
William H. Shawcross
Rear Adm. Maurice W. Shea, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William F. Sheehan, USA, Ret.
General Ralph A. Sheldrick
General Lemuel C. Shepherd
Brig. Gen. Paul D. Sherman
Lt. Gen. James C. Sherrill, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Stephen Sherwood, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Ralph L. Shifley, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Clarence B. Shimer, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John G. Shinkle, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. Allen M. Shinn, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. James M. Shoemaker
Lt. Gen. Raymond L. Shoemaker
Vice Adm. Wallace B. Short, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Anthony T. Shtogren, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Roland P. Shugg, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William R. Shuler, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edwin L. Shull, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Burton H. Shupper, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Thomas N. Sibley, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William B. Sieglaff, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Norman D. Sillin, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Rupert M. Simmerli, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert H. Simmert, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Cecil L. Simmons, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Henry Simon, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Maurice E. Simpson, USN, Ret.
General William H. Simpson
Maj. Gen. John F. Sims
Brig. Gen. Turner A. Sims, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William K. Skaer, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert B. Skinner, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Lecount H. Slocum, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Morris Smellow, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Curtis S. Smiley, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Allen Smith, Jr, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Bertram D. Smith, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. C. Coburn Smith, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles H. Smith, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Donald J. Smith
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Brig. Gen. James M. Smith
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Brig. Gen. Lynn D. Smith, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Paul E. Smith, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Spencer R. Smith, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Stuart H. Smith, USN, Ret.
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Brig. Gen. Willard W. Smith, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Ralph A. Snavely, USAF, Ret.
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Maj. Gen. Oscar P. Snyder, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Maxwell C. Snyder, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Albin R. Sodergren, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Leo E. Soucek, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard B. Spear
Brig. Gen. Max H. Specht, USA, Ret.
General John F. Speer
Brig. Gen. William Spence, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Donald O. Spoon, USA, Ret.
General R. I. Stack
Brig. Gen. John E. Stannard, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George R. Stanley, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Conrad L. Stansberry, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Allen T. Stanwix-Hay, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James B. Stapleton, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Merlin H. Staring, USN, Ret.
General Albert B. Starr
Maj. Gen. Maxwell W. Steel, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. George P. Steele, II, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Wycliffe E. Steele, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Floyd W. Stewart, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James L. Stewart, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. LeRoy J. Stewart, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Kenneth Stiles, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Alden E. Stilson, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. James J. Stilwell, USN, Ret.
General Richard G. Stilwell, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Lewis W. Stocking
Vice Adm. Thomas M. Stokes, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Jack W. Stone, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frank B. Stone, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Leslie O. Stone, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Martin R. Stone, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Aaron P. Storrs, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles L. Strain, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Leland S. Stranathan, USAF, Ret.

Rear Adm. William W. Strange, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Elliott B. Strauss, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Eugene L. Strickland, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert W. Strong, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. William A. Stuart, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Coulter R. Sublett, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Henry Suerstedt, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Henry R. Sullivan, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John B. Sullivan, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William A. Sullivan, USN, Ret.
William F. Summerell
Rear Adm. Paul E. Summers, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Alexander D. Surles, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Frederick J. Sutterline, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frank C. Sutton, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Daniel J. Sweeney, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William E. Sweeney, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Douglas M. Swift, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles A. Symroski, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Alden P. Taber, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Avelin P. Tacon, USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. C. M. Talbott, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Benjamin B. Talley, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. George C. Talley, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Lawrence F. Tanberg, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert M. Tarbox, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Raymond D. Tarbuck, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Thomas M. Tarpley, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. August F. Taute, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edwin A. Taylor, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Edwin B. Taylor
Rear Adm. Ford N. Taylor, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph I. Taylor, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Leonard B. Taylor, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert Taylor, III, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William A. Temple, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Joseph N. Tenhet, Jr., USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Frederick R. Terrell, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Roy M. Terry, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Harold C. Teubner, USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Herbert B. Thatcher, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Thoralf T. Thielen
Maj. Gen. Arthur Thomas, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Lloyd H. Thomas, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles S. Thompson, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James H. Thompson, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Mark R. Thompson, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Roy E. Thompson, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Walter G. Thomson, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Wallace O. Thompson
Rear Adm. William Thompson, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John F. Thorlin, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Harrison R. Thyng, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Paul W. Tibbets, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Murray J. Tichenor, USN, Ret.

Vice Adm. Emmett H. Tidd, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Carl Tiedeman, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Thomas S. Timberman, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. James B. Tipton, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Benton C. Tolley
Rear Adm. Kemp Tolley, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Rutledge B. Tompkins, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William A. Tope, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harold W. Torgerson, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John D. Torrey, Jr., USA, Ret.
General Salvador Torros
Vice Adm. George C. Towner, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles O. Triebel, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Thomas K. Tripp, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. George W. Trousdale, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Orlando C. Troxel, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Herman J. Trum, III, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard B. Tuggle, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Benjamin O. Turnage, Jr., USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Carl C. Turner, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Joseph W. Turner, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Hiram L. Tuttle
General Nathan F. Twining, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Harold H. Twitchell, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Achilles L. Tynes, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Edward H. Underhill, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Edgar H. Underwood, USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. F. T. Unger, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Clarence Unnevehr, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Fay R. Upthegrove, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Lee N. Utz
Lloyd W. Van Antwerp
Rear Adm. Clyde J. Van Arsdall, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Lawrence E. Van Buskirk, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William M. Van Harlingen, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Blinn Van Mater, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Thaddeus J. Van Metre, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Harry Van Wyk, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. James E. Van Zandt, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Roland B. Vanasse, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Daniel Vance, Jr.
Rear Adm. George Vandeurs, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Walter M. Vann, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. Frank W. Vannoy, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. K. L. Veth, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Fred W. Vetter, Jr., USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Felix L. Vidal, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Warren C. Vincent, USNR, Ret.
Admiral Quentell Violett, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Norman H. Vissering, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Edward H. Vogel, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ernest S. Von Kleeck, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Curtis F. Vossler, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John R. Wadleigh, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ruben E. Wagstaff, USN, Ret.

Rear Adm Charles L. Waite, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Alden H. Waitt, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. George H. Wales, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edward K. Walker, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Thomas J. Walker, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Henry T. Waller
Rear Adm. Harry N. Wallin, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harvey T. Walsh, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Louis A. Walsh, Jr., USA Ret.
Rear Adm. Wilfred A. Walter, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Ernest K. Warburton, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Norvell G. Ward, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert W. Ward, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Herbert O. Wardell, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Daniel H. Wardrop, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Thomas G. Warfield, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Aln D. Warnock, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Henry L. Warren, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Hugh Warren, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Jacob W. Waterhouse, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John R. Waterman,. USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Odale D. Waters, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William W. Watkin, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. James H. Watkins, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Tarleton H. Watkins, USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Albert Watson, II, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Carl E. Watson, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Harold E. Watson, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Paul C. Watson, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. George A. Weaver, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Wilburn C. Weaver, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John H. Weber, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. David A. Webster, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George B. Webster, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles S. Weeks, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John F. Wegforth, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Harold F. Weidner
Brig. Gen. Walter D. Weikel, AUS, Ret.
Major Gen. Frank D. Weir
Rear Adm. Robert O. Welander, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Seth L. Weld, Jr., USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. Charles Wellborn, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph A. Wellings, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Benjamin O. Wells, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. David J. Welsh, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Walton K. Weltmer
Maj. Gen. Donald L. Werbeck, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Holden C. West
Brig. Gen. Leslie J. Westberg, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edward W. Westlake
Maj. Gen. James H. Weyhenmeyer, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William J. Whelan, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. David L. Whelchel, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Sherburne Whipple, Jr., USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard S. Whitcomb, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Roger E. Whitcomb, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles F. White, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles H. White, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Donald M. White, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John W. White, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Marshall W. White, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Scott Whitehouse, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Otis M. Whitney, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Howard R. Whittaker, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Carlos W. Wieber, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Geoffrey P. Wiedeman, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. Charles W. Wilkins, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John H. Wilkins, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Collin P. Williams
Maj. Gen. George V. Williams, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. James W. Williams, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Macpherson B. Williams, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard C. Williams, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Roy D. Williams, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Delbert F. Williamson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Francis T. Williamson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John H. Willis, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Delmar E. Wilson, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edwin Mark Wilson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George H. Wilson, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James A. Wilson
Maj. Gen. Thomas N. Wilson, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William R. Wilson
Vice Adm. L. J. Wiltse, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Loren G. Windom, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Walter C. Winn, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Jowell C. Wise, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Narvin O. Wittmann, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Thomas Wolfe
Brig. Gen. Frank P. Wood, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Hunter Wood, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Lester O. Wood, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Robert R. Wooding, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William R. Woodward, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edward L. Woodyard, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Francis A. Woolfley, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph M Worthington, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Stanley T. Wray, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Edwin K. Wright, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Thomas K. Wright, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Henry J. Wuensch
Rear Adm. Don W. Wulzen, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Ira T. Wyche, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Evan W. Yancey, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Earl P. Yates, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles E. Yeager, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George H. Yeager, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Emmett F. Yost, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles M. Young, Jr., USA, Ret.
Admiral Edwin J. S. Young, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George H. Young, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Mason J. Young, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Carl A. Youngdale
Brig. Gen. Ninian L. Yuille, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William T. Zink, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Kenneth F. Zitzman, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Virgil L. Zoller, USAF, Ret.
Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edwin A. Zundel, USA, Ret.

The committee will stand in brief recess while the Senators go to vote. When we come back, we will take our final witnesses. Again, may I thank you both?

[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.]

Senator BIDEN [presiding]. The committee will please come to order.

Our next two witnesses are retired Gen. David W. Winn and Dr. Victor Fediay. They will be speaking on behalf of the Institute of American Relations.

Dr. Fediay, would you please come up to the witness table?

General, thank you very much for your patience in sitting here as long as you have. I assure you that the lack of attendance is not due to a lack of interest in your statement but due to the confusion of voting and other matters taking place on the floor of the Senate right now. I am sure you know this is a very busy time. I am very anxious to hear your statement. Please proceed in any way that would be most comfortable to you.

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. DAVID W. WINN (RETIRED), POLICY BOARD, INSTITUTE OF AMERICAN RELATIONS, WASHINGTON, D.C., ACCOMPANIED BY VICTOR FEDIAY, PRESIDENT, INSTITUTE OF AMERICAN RELATIONS

General WINN. I had a chance to learn a little bit about patience, so that was no problem, Mr. Senator.

The statement I am about to make reflects my own opinion. It should not in any way be attributed to my former period with the Air Force. It does not represent the Air Force.

Senator BIDEN. Are you speaking on behalf of the Institute of American Relations?

General WINN. They have arranged for my presence here. To that extent, yes, but as far as speaking for the Institute of American Relations officially, I do not do so.

I am very pleased to be here to contribute my opinions to this discussion.

Senator BIDEN. We are anxious to hear from you.

General WINN. My last job was Commander of the North American Defense Command Combat Operations Center. This facility is located in the Cheyenne Mountain Complex near Colorado Springs; with all sources of intelligence available. They watch the Soviet Union each day around the clock. Our responsibilities were to provide the President and the National Command authorities warning and evaluation of any threat to the North American continent. From that window, Soviet capability was impressive.

For example, they outshot us 5 to 1 in space launchers and 4 to 1 in missiles in 1977. We saw some events that exceeded our own capabilities and our technological expectations. Sometimes it took us too long to know what we were seeing, and sometimes we were not sure at all what we were seeing. Our intelligence collection is good, but in my opinion it does not support the conclusion that adequate technical verification of Soviet capabilities is possible.

Yet my concern for the future does not stem from verification limitations that I know exist. I am concerned about the basic premise of our strategic arms limitation negotiations. The lopsided conception of the SALT II Treaty implications worries me far more

than the prospect of ICBM's flying both ways over the Arctic. I got out of the Air Force early because I could not find an arena where positions, policies, or concepts could be debated.

For example, I tried to raise issues against the decision eliminating ADCOM [the Aerospace Defense Command]. That decision to me did not make sense from a military or management point of view. I objected to killing the only integrated homeland air defense command we possessed. Nobody even answered the mail. All arguments were totally ignored from start to finish, not just mine. The ADCOM decision was steamrollered from the top.

Shredding out our only full-time, dedicated heartland defense command contributes directly to the SALT II imbalance. The mission of a fully integrated command is now to be split four ways.

It was said that this would save $12 million a year. At the same time, we were in the process of eliminating all but a handful of ground radars with combat capability, turning our air sovereignty over to the FAA with civilian radars and controllers.

I asked a senior officer privately, if the decision to kill ADCOM were yours to make, would you do it, and he said yes. I turned away, and he said, Dave, you just don't understand the pressures.

Well, he is right, I don't know the pressures, and I don't understand the pressure for SALT II. Why do we insist on this treaty? The bottom line of the SALT II advocates is that we are better off with it than without it. I think the opposite is true. Take for instance the Backfire bomber problem. B–52's are counted in SALT II, despite their age and the high threat under which they might have to fly. The Soviet Backfires are not counted, despite our near total inability even to detect them, much less to destroy them.

Contrast that with the defense our aging B-52's and FB-111's would meet to reach a Soviet target. While we systematically reduced both our homeland defense interceptor aircraft and ground control radars, Russia has built and built and built. The Soviets took the lesson of the Cuban crisis of 1962 very seriously. This lesson was simply that the power ratio at that time was wrong for them. The United States could defend herself. In the early sixties, it didn't matter where our interests were threatened. The numbers were wrong for them. Now the numbers are different. You have to conclude that we haven't paid the price to maintain our military parity. The reason that Russia arms is to become a force against which there is no defense. With SALT II, we see in action the belief that there is a disconnect between raw military power and their international behavior.

The SALT II issue is more than ballistic missiles, bombers, and submarines. A lot of history and a few fundamentals are involved.

It has been over 6 years since I returned from Hanoi's Hoa Lo Prison. During these 6 years, and especially during the last 30 months, a pattern in American dialog has developed that is familiar to me, and that pattern goes back to Hanoi. When my parachute popped open over North Vietnam, there was little doubt that my own freedom was over. The Hanoi prisoner had no choices. Pressure was total. Control was complete. There was no end short of yielding. For the prisoner, the inevitable result was inability to continue resistance.

Now America is being challenged, and we have all been conditioned in a sense much like that prisoner in Hanoi.

Freedom throughout the world is being squeezed left, and I wonder how many of us are aware and anxious about it. The prisoner in Hanoi was left with nothing to link him to tradition, family, or country. The United States is not yet cut off from its traditional, historical, and constitutional strength, but the same inexorable pressures faced by the prisoner in solitary can be seen ahead for the American people. America's solitary confinement is our isolation from the premises on which SALT and other issues are being faced, and the same temptation to cave in is working on free people in the same way they did on the captive man in Hanoi. We are being pushed, and pushed very hard.

The basic question, I think, of the SALT II Treaty debate is, do we have a choice in this matter? SALT II is an agreement which we will honor with those whose aim is the destruction of free choice. Is the SALT II ratification process the final argument that everything will come out OK if we simply trust those who say they understand these things?

The American people just as the Soviet citizen may not understand the technicalities of assured destruction, or even when it is about to occur, but every person understands that life without choice is the ultimate weakness.

This treaty lacks fundamental logic and ignores history. Its worst feature is that it is being sold on a mother knows best basis, when people ought to wonder whether mother knows what she is doing. We don't have to do this, but the circle of decision gets smaller and smaller. We risk having fewer choices in deciding when wisdom needs the strength to say no in meeting its responsibilities.

In its recently published annual report, the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London warns the free world that the Soviet Union leaves the United States and its allies far behind in military force, both strategic and conventional. The new generation of missiles developed and deployed by the Soviet Union is more powerful than any of ours, which have not been significantly improved since the sixties. The Institute estimates that the Soviet Union is in the position of achieving a first strike capability against the United States.

These conclusions of the prestigious London Institute, plainly stated, put the ratification of SALT II into a very dubious category. During the 10 years of SALT negotiations, the balance has clearly changed in the overall security posture vis-a-vis that of the Soviet Union. We still have a fundamental policy objective of essential equivalence.

Defense Secretary Brown, speaking of the uncertainties of Soviet response, said:

> Basically they require us to insist on essential equivalence with the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear forces.

He also said:

> The issue is now to make it clear to the Soviets that they cannot gain any military or political advantage from their strategic forces. Insistence on essential equivalence guards against any danger that the Soviets might be seen as superior, even if the perception is not technically justified.

By way of partial clarification of what is understood to be the essential equivalence, Secretary Brown said:

> By essential equivalence we mean the maintenance of conditions such that Soviet strategic nuclear forces do not become usable instruments of political leverage coverage, diplomatic coercion, or military advantage. Any advantage in force characteristics enjoyed by the Soviets are offset by U.S. advantages in other characteristics, and the U.S. posture is not in fact and is not seen as, inferior in performance to the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union.
>
> These conditions exist today, and our objective in the current SALT II negotiations is to maintain them in the future.

The International Institute of Strategic Studies disagrees with Secretary Brown. The conditions for essential equivalence of February 1978, obviously are not a reality in September 1979. According to the London Institute, the Soviets are "seen as superior, and the U.S. posture is in fact seen as inferior."

As if to prove that the strategic forces are usable instruments of political leverage, diplomatic coercion, or military advantage, the Soviet Union has special military troops to maneuver jointly with Cubans on Cuban territory. Under the umbrella of strategic superiority, the Soviets apparently feel free to use their forces in the proximity of Nicaragua or any country which may become their next target. The presence of 3,000 Soviet troops is not a direct threat to the United States, but for wars in Central America it could be decisive.

It is imperative that a SALT Treaty which the United States ratifies does not force the United States to look the other way at every geopolitical move the Soviet Union makes, even in the western hemisphere. If the U.S.S.R. should decide to test our will today or tomorrow, how many warheads would be presumed to be aboard the SS-18? As agreed in the treaty? If they chose to use their superior navy to close the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean in 1980, where would the Backfire bombers be based? And what range would Backfires reach, to what targets, just in case we tried to respond?

Would SALT II have helped? Treaties do not deter. Negotiations never reach the bottom line of deterrence.

Without any agreement at all, we halted the B-1 and enhanced radiation weapons, and stretched out other programs into the period we now seek to cover with SALT II.

Advocates of SALT II insist that it puts a cap on the number of MIRV-type warheads the Soviets can install on the 308 heavy missiles. It is a strange argument. The agreement prohibits the United States from having any such missiles. By 1985, the Soviets will probably have improved the accuracy and yield of increased numbers of warheads. They could increase the MIRV's on each SS-18 to 20 or even 30.

There is an argument that the M-X will re-establish the strategic balance in our favor, but if the production of the M-X moves forward as rapidly as possible, it would be ready for initial deployment only by 1986, and not fully available until 1989. By that time, the SS-18's could be fully MIRVed with 30 accurate warheads per missile. That could give the Soviet Union the capability of striking all M-X and Minuteman missiles in one attack, forcing the United States to launch on warning or face destruction without retaliation.

The SALT II numbers game is obviously not in our favor, but that clearly is not the main reason why the treaty should not be ratified in its present form. The conditions for negotiation of SALT III will be even more restrictive for the United States than experienced in SALT II if it is ratified as it stands. The vulnerability of peace arrangements will be absolute if the conditions of SALT II permit the maximization of Soviet advantage in space and in the air while Soviet conventional forces continue to grow.

Simply by having so much to negotiate away, the Soviet Union has sent us a message. The first line is, let's negotiate if it makes you feel better. The last line is, let the results speak for themselves.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, General. Your testimony is very straightforward, and it reiterates some of the points that have been made earlier by your former colleagues and evidences the same concern. Consequently, I only had a few questions, but in light of the fact that I have only 3½ minutes to vote on the next amendment that is up on the floor, I will not even attempt to ask those questions. I thank you on behalf of the committee for your statement. Thank you for your patience.

This hearing will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.

[Whereupon, the committee recessed, to meet again at 2 p.m. the same day.]

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AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman of the committee), presiding.

Present: Senators Church, McGovern, Biden, Sarbanes, Muskie, Javits, Percy, and Hayakawa.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will please come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

This afternoon we continue to hear from public witnesses on the SALT II Treaty.

Appearing first will be Hon. Charles Yost, Senator Thomas McIntyre and Coretta Scott King, on behalf of Americans for SALT.

Next we will hear from three religious groups. Cardinal Krol will testify for the U.S. Catholic Conference. Dr. Claire Randall will appear for the National Council of Churches. Albert Vorspan will testify on behalf of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations.

Ambassador Yost, we will ask you to begin, if you will.

Ambassador YOST. Senator McIntyre will open for us if that is agreeable to you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is an appropriate way for us to commence these hearings.

Tom, it does my heart good to see you again.

Senator MCINTYRE. Even with my bald head?

The CHAIRMAN. To see you looking so well. And I think that I express the feeling of all of your colleagues and friends in the Senate when I give you a warm welcome back.

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS J. McINTYRE, JR., PRESIDENT, AMERICANS FOR SALT[1]

Senator MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Foreign Relations Committee. Today I offer my testimony on the importance of SALT II on behalf of Americans for SALT, a nationwide citizens' campaign of which I am president.

Americans for SALT is a coalition of individuals and major organizations in support of the ratification of the SALT II agreement. The individuals include retired military officers, former Government officials and other prominent Americans. The organizations include religious groups, business associations, labor unions, scientific and educational organizations, and public interest groups.

The working consensus of these many Americans is that the ratification of SALT II is essential for the security of the American people in several important ways.

First, SALT caps the Soviet strategic threat. The nuclear threat we would likely face without SALT will be both quantitatively and qualitatively more formidable than the threat under SALT.

It is precisely because many of us are concerned about an unrestricted Soviet strategic buildup that we wish to place SALT restrictions on the Soviets. The more one is concerned about the formidable Soviet threat under SALT, the more one should seek to avoid an even greater threat, one without SALT.

[1] See page 86 for Senator McIntyre's prepared statement.

Second, under this treaty we will be able to plan our defense programs more effectively because we will be able to predict with greater accuracy and greater confidence the size and shape of the Soviet threat. The treaty requires them to fit their forces into a well-defined grid of specific limits, sublimits, and qualitative restrictions.

Moreover, the treaty prohibits the Soviets from interfering with our national technical means of monitoring their weapons development and deployment. Under SALT, we will be able to focus our R. & D. moneys much more effectively to counter the Soviet buildup since that threat itself will be more predictable.

Third, SALT leaves us free to choose the strategic and theater weapons we need to secure our common defense.

When I served as chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Research and Development of the Senate Armed Services Committee, my colleagues and I were especially vigilant on this point. So I am particularly reassured that the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified that the United States will be free to exploit its truly formidable military technology to meet the Soviet challenge.

Fourth, I believe we have an opportunity to reunite our Nation behind a prudent national defense program through the debate on SALT. For too long, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we have been divided about both our defense requirements and SALT.

At the heart of this division is a fallacy, a fallacy that SALT and national defense are mutually exclusive. The American people want both a strong national defense and a SALT agreement. The SALT debate gives us an opportunity to reconstruct a broad working American middle that will support both a strong defense program and arms limitations as a means to that same end.

However, Mr. Chairman, if the treaty is rejected, I fear we will return to a polarized politics which will make it difficult for us to rally a stable base of public support behind defense programs. At a time when we find a deep American desire to get together to manage our affairs in so many troubling policy areas—inflation, energy, taxes—we need to demonstrate again to ourselves and our allies and our adversaries that we can find common ground to manage the most dangerous of all problems, nuclear weapons.

This suggests my final point. Although it cannot be proved in any systematic way, we somehow all know that this agreement enhances our security because it represents the common interests of both nuclear superpowers in avoiding the use of nuclear weapons.

The treaty will not eliminate the possibility of nuclear war, but it does, because of this unstated premise, make the use of these weapons somehow less likely. SALT will not eliminate military competition, but it will make it less dangerous and more orderly.

In sum, I believe the American people, and in fact people all over the globe, know they will be more secure in a world in which the two most powerful nations continue to work in our common interest to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war within the framework of this treaty.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Thomas J. McIntyre follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS J. MCINTYRE, JR.

Mr. Chairman, members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Today I offer my testimony on the importance of SALT II on behalf of Americans for SALT, a nationwide citizens' campaign of which I am President. Americans for SALT is a coalition of individuals and major organizations in support of the ratification of the SALT II Agreement. The individuals include retired military officers, former government officials and other prominent Americans. The organizations include religious groups, business associations, labor unions, scientific and educational organizations and public interest groups.

The working consensus of these many Americans is that the ratification of SALT II is essential for the security of the American people. I believe SALT will enhance our security in several important ways.

First, SALT caps the Soviet strategic threat. The nuclear threat we would likely face without SALT will be both quantitatively and qualitatively more formidable than the threat under SALT.

As Secretary Brown has testified:

The Soviet total strategic missile and bomber force will likely be 30 percent larger without SALT than with it.

Their total strategic MIRVed ballistic missiles, both land and sea, will likely be 50 percent greater without SALT than under SALT.

Their MIRVed ICBM's could be up to 75 percent greater if unrestricted by SALT.

Their total strategic nuclear warheads and gravity bombs could easily be half again as large a force if unrestricted by SALT.

The threat to our ICBM's from their silo killer warheads could double without SALT restraints on MIRVed ICBM launchers and number of warheads permitted on each.

Without SALT, the Backfire bomber production could grow unrestricted beyond its current level. Without SALT, the Soviet SS–16, the only mobile ICBM fully developed by either side, could be deployed. Without SALT, the Soviets could proceed to develop their fifth generation of ICBM's without any restrictions.

In sum, it's precisely because many of us are concerned about an unrestricted Soviet strategic buildup that we wish to place SALT restrictions on the Soviets. The more one is concerned about the formidable Soviet threat under SALT, the more one should seek to avoid an even greater one without SALT.

There is a second way SALT will enhance our security. Under this treaty, we will be able to plan our defense programs more effectively, because we will be able to predict with greater accuracy and confidence the size and shape of the Soviet threat. Under SALT, we will know the number and kinds of strategic weapons developed and deployed by the Soviets, because the treaty requires them to fit their forces into a well defined grid of specific limits, sublimits and qualitative restrictions. Moreover, the treaty prohibits the Soviets from interfering with our national technical means of monitoring their weapons development and deployment. Since our own military research and development programs must be designed to hedge uncertainties about the Soviet threat, the greater the unknown, the more difficult our own R. & D. task. In other words, under SALT, we will be able to focus our R. & D. monies much more effectively to counter the Soviet buildup since that threat itself will be more predictable.

Let me suggest an important way this is true. As we all know, current intelligence projections suggest the Soviets will be able to mount a technical threat to our ICBM's in the early to mid-1980's. Any of the basing schemes under consideration to ensure our ICBM's would survive this threat is designed against a specific presupposed number of attacking silo-killer Soviet warheads. Under SALT II, we can predict the maximum number our M–X basing design must be able to counter, because the treaty will limit the number of MIRVed ICBM launchers and the number of warheads permitted on each. Without SALT, that number will be much higher and much more difficult to predict.

This is vividly true in the case of the threat to our ICBM's from the Soviet heavy missiles. SALT restrict's the SS–18's to 308 with no more than 10 warheads on each. Without SALT, they could keep their hot production line going and could relatively cheaply build up to 500 SS–18's. They could also double the number of warheads on each. So instead of having to design an MX basing scheme that would counter a threat of 3,000 warheads from the SS–18's under SALT, we would have to design one to counter 10,000 warheads from the SS–18's. So in this case as in others, SALT will help us design an effective solution to a critical military problem we will face.

Third, SALT leaves us free to choose the strategic and theater weapons we need to insure our common defense. With virtually no exceptions and certainly no important exceptions, the United States will be free to exploit its formidable military technology to meet the Soviet challenge. I am particularly reassured that the Joint

Chiefs of Staff testified this is the case. When I served as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Research and Development of the Senate Armed Services Committee, my colleagues and I were particularly vigilant on this point. Throughout our hearings, we consistently inquired about the degree of technological freedom the emerging agreement would leave us. We urged the Administration to avoid as much as possible any such restrictions.

I realize that our success in ensuring this freedom is a source of some frustration to some who wish that SALT would have resolved domestic debates about what weapons systems we require. I never believed that this was a proper objective of SALT negotiations. If, of course, we would have been required in the bargaining to accept restrictions, we could judge that bargain in the aggregate. But I personally reject the view that it should be an objective of SALT either to preclude or mandate a particular U.S. weapons system. I always felt that was something we should decide for ourselves in our councils.

There is a fourth way SALT can enhance our national security. I believe that we have an opportunity to reunite our nation behind a prudent national defense program through the debate on SALT. For too long, we have been divided about both our defense requirements and SALT. At the heart of this division is a fallacy that SALT and national defense are mutually exclusive. I believe SALT should be a means to a more effective common defense for our nation rather than as an aspect of detente or as an end in itself. Further, I believe, the American people want both a strong national defense and a SALT agreement.

The SALT debate gives us an opportunity to reconstruct a broad working American middle that will support both a strong defense program and arms limitations as a means to that same end. For the first time since Vietnam, we have an opportunity to rebuild a working majority on this common ground.

However, if the treaty is rejected, I fear we will return to a polarized politics which will make it difficult for us to rally a stable base of public support behind defense programs. At a time when we find a deep American desire to get together to manage our affairs in so many troubling policy areas—inflation, energy, taxes—we need to demonstrate again to ourselves, our allies, and our adversaries that we can find common ground to manage the most dangerous of all problems, nuclear weapons.

This suggests my final point. Although it can't be proved in any systematic way, we somehow all know that this agreement enhances our security because it represents the common efforts of both nuclear superpowers to avoid the use of nuclear weapons. The treaty will not eliminate the possibility of nuclear war, but it does, because of this unstated premise, make the use of these weapons somehow less likely. SALT will not eliminate military competition, but it will make it less dangerous and more orderly.

In sum, I believe that the American people, in fact people all over the globe, know that they will be more secure in a world in which the two most powerful nations continue to work in our common interests to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war within the framework of this treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator, for an excellent statement.

I believe that in the interest of time, we should hear from each member of the panel. Then we will address questions to the panel. I think that Mrs. King might testify next.

Mrs. King often speaks for the poor, and we would be interested in knowing what there is in SALT for Americans who are concerned about food, housing, and living standards for our own people.

Mrs. King, I am very pleased to welcome you this afternoon.

STATEMENT OF MRS. CORETTA SCOTT KING, MEMBER, AMERICANS FOR SALT

Mrs. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and your distinguished colleagues on the committee.

I greatly appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee in support of ratification of the SALT II Treaty. I am doubly honored to appear before you today, honored by the privilege of

speaking to this important committee on a subject of such grave significance to the peace of the world.

I am honored to be the first woman, the only mother, and the only representative of any American minority to have this privilege. I am not unaware of the heavy responsibility that this places on me, Mr. Chairman, because it is exactly the women, the mothers, and the minorities of this country that are the real silent majority, who pay the highest price for the continuance of the world's arms race and would pay the highest price for any nuclear or even nonnuclear war.

In the course of the past few weeks, the committee has heard voluminous testimony on the merits and shortcomings of this treaty by experts in the field of nuclear and strategic matters. I, too, come to you as an expert because I am a citizen of this Nation; and as a citizen, I know that the issues in this historic debate on SALT are not confined to missile counts and throw-weight and base modes.

As we all know, a more basic and fundamental issue tests us and challenges us today, and it is this: Shall we, in the name of national security, commit ourselves to a course of confrontation and potential nuclear annihilation by rejecting this treaty; or shall we as a Nation seek a more lasting security through the peaceful resolution of conflict in a way that allows us to free our spirits and resources for the development of human potential in our society?

These are public policy choices which must be made by citizens, for they are the true experts. They are the people whose lives are to be risked, whose children's lives are to be mortgaged, and whose parents' lives are to be wasted should we choose to pursue a course of superiority and winability in an arms race that knows no winners.

Yet, most Americans are overlooked and excluded from this debate. Public polls showing citizen support for the SALT process are ignored or glossed over because we are told citizens are not experts.

My husband, Martin Luther King, Jr., knew these same frustrations during another historical national debate. Though a recent recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, my husband was informed by so-called specialists on the Vietnam war that he was not enough of an expert to discuss this basic issue of war and peace, of violence and nonviolence.

I fervently hope that we as a Nation, in contemplating the wisdom of this treaty to limit nuclear weapons, will listen to those whose lives are directly affected by the outcome of this debate: The mother in Utah who gives her child milk knowing the dangers of radiation from nuclear weapons testing—that mother is an expert on SALT; the unemployed youth who cannot find a job and knows that military spending creates less jobs than spending on human need—that youth is an expert on SALT; the elderly American holding his grandchild, who witnessed the massive loss of life in past world wars—that American is an expert on SALT.

Indeed, no issue of public policy is more personal than this issue of limiting nuclear weapons and ending this senseless arms race. Let me give you an example from an area of personal concerns: unemployment. Studies have shown that $1 billion of military

spending creates about 75,000 jobs. The same amount, if spent on construction, creates 100,000; on health care, 139,000 jobs; on education, 188,000 jobs.

Thus, the military budget swells in the name of national security while our most precious resources stand idle. Our communities may be ringed by missiles and our cities surrounded by silos, but how secure are we if America's future, blighted by high unemployment, holds only the prospect of deterioration and decay.

The twin perils of unemployment and inflation are not confined to our shores. Today, the economically dislocating effects of the arms race can be felt throughout the world. Children with distended bellies still suffer for want of adequate food; yet global military expenditures now exceed $400 billion a year.

This vast expansion of destructive power at the expense of human needs has served to decrease our global security and leaves us ever more vulnerable to random annihilation through nuclear exchange or accident. Yet we recognize these perils and have shown the vision and moral leadership to engage in a process of negotiated restraint.

As we in this country reexamine our commitment to the SALT process, we must ask ourselves this question: What perception will the world community have of our Nation should we fail, after 7 years of deliberation, to proceed with this historic agreement to limit nuclear weaponry? Nothing less than our future is at stake.

Without SALT, any prospect of progress toward further arms limitation is clouded. Without SALT, any hope of replenishing our human resources is undermined. Without SALT, any dream of peace for our children and their children is diminished; in its place, a legacy of tension and fear.

Skeptics will say that the SALT process is untenable in today's world, that mutual accommodation is unthinkable, and that harmony in international relations is impossible. They choose instead to pursue a policy of confrontation and violence, despite the potential for human extinction.

I am accustomed to a great deal of skepticism and even outrage at the thought that the principles of nonviolent social change are relevant to world affairs. Yet, I firmly believe that the world's people, though often divided by nationalism and racism, are united in their instinctive will to live and their civilized will to do so in peace.

I am reminded of my husband's words almost 15 years ago now, and I quote: "I refuse to accept the cynical notion that nation after nation must spiral down a militaristic stairway into the hell of nuclear destruction. I believe that unarmed truth and an unconditional love will have the final word of reality."

Mr. Chairman, this treaty to limit strategic weapons is not a perfect agreement. Indeed, it has been termed "a modest step." How do you define "modest" when any progress toward bringing nuclear weapons under some control means a better chance for a peaceful future for everyone?

I am sure I will be well understood when I say I have learned the virtue of patience, although patience can seem a terrible taskmaster when every fiber of one's being longs for speed in setting right what one knows to be wrong.

The important thing is to keep pressing forward, to take advantage of every opportunity for making progress, even if it is only one step at a time. This opportunity to limit nuclear weapons under the SALT II Treaty, to reduce the probability of destroying civilization itself, and to turn our labors toward improving the quality of all our lives rather than the useless waste of our resources must not be lost.

My experience, Mr. Chairman, is that the United States is most respected in the rest of the world where our other virtues are most recognized, the virtues of quiet rather than noise, of the power to build rather than the power to destroy, and of the spiritual power of being a mediator in disputes, a reconciler among nations rather than a belligerent and demanding nation.

We as a people are by far the most powerful nation in the world, Mr. Chairman, not only politically, economically, and militarily but, I firmly believe, spiritually. We have the potential for world leadership. What other nation could have sponsored a Camp David peace conference? What other world leader but Jimmy Carter could have brought together those two ancient enemies to a table of dialog? What other nation could have sent an Andrew Young to the United Nations for the healing of the nations and the opening of conversation and dialog of all peoples until he gained the love and respect of almost everyone in that most suspicious and conspiracy-ridden of all world institutions?

The United States, Mr. Chairman, is a great hope for peace if we can but learn to use our power with more dignity and restraint.

And finally, Mr. Chairman, let us not delude ourselves out of the challenge before us. It is not a technical nor a military one; it is a moral one, a challenge of moral leadership. The whole world is watching the United States, whether the United States will take the high road of making the dramatic offer to continue this small peace process that we already have started with SALT II.

My late husband found it necessary to remind his listeners that once to every man and nation is given the moment to decide. That this is an hour for courage and decision. The U.S. Senate can decide to take one small step forward for dialog and peace with the Soviet Union, which could be one giant step forward for the women, the mothers, the children, and the poor, not only for this country and the Soviet Union, but for the whole world.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mrs. King, for a very eloquent statement given with much feeling.

I would now like to ask Ambassador Charles Yost to present his testimony.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR CHARLES W. YOST, COCHAIRMAN OF AMERICANS FOR SALT[1]

Mr. YOST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I testify before you today as a cochairman of Americans for SALT and as a former foreign service officer with some 45 years of experience in international affairs. That service included substantial experience in negotiating with the Soviets at the Dumbarton Oaks, San Francisco, and Potsdam Conferences, two assignments in

[1] See page 92 for Ambassador Yost's prepared statement.

Vienna under the Four Power occupation, director of the State Department's Office of Eastern European Affairs, and at the United Nations for 7 years, including those of the Berlin, Cuban, and Congo crises.

I have, therefore, no illusions either about Soviet objectives or about the need for great vigilance in doing business with them.

Senator McIntyre has described the character and purpose of our organization. I am submitting as an annex to my testimony a list of the cochairmen, of the members of our advisory council and of about 140 prominent persons who are publicly supporting our organization and our goals.

As you will note, many of those persons are officers or representatives of other organizations with substantial nationwide memberships, some of which assisted in the establishment of Americans for SALT, and many of which have taken a public position in support of ratification of the treaty.

With respect to the attitude of the American public toward the treaty, you gentlemen are, of course, aware that a substantial number of public opinion polls taken over the past year show that about 70 percent of Americans polled consistently favored a strategic arms control agreement with the Soviet Union.

The Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the senior officials of the administration in their testimony to you before the recess have submitted convincing evidence that this particular strategic arms control treaty before you will, on balance, reinforce the security of the United States, will not inhibit us from further strengthening our armed forces in ways necessary to our defense, and will in several important respects place the United States in a more advantageous military position than if the treaty should be rejected or delayed.

Distinguished private citizens with long experience in negotiating with the Soviets, such as Averell Harriman and John McCloy, have supported these views and have recommended ratification. So, indeed, have the principal leaders of our European allies.

After studying the testimony offered to this committee and examining the provisions of the treaty thoroughly, Americans for SALT is strengthened in its conviction that the treaty, if ratified, will serve to reinforce both the security of the United States and the prospects of world peace.

It therefore, in our view, clearly meets the objective which those 70 percent of Americans who in opinion polls supported an arms control agreement with the Soviets had in mind. Reports from public interest groups throughout the country which are alined with us confirmed that this is the case.

Many of them, like many of you, would have preferred that the treaty provide for more substantial reductions. However, part of a loaf is decidedly better than no bread. If the SALT process is continued and not interrupted, such larger reductions, to which both parties to the treaty are pledged, can be promptly pursued in the next stage of the negotiations.

On the other hand, as Mrs. King has just pointed out, rejection or indefinite delay would seriously increase international tensions and risks of world conflict. If the treaty is not approved, the Soviets

would gain specific substantial military advantages which the treaty would deny them.

They would, instead of being obliged to reduce from 2,500 to 2,250 missile launchers, be able to increase by 1985 to as many as 3,000. Instead of being limited to 10 warheads on each of their 300 heavy missiles, they would be able to install as many as 30 on each, a difference of 3,000 warheads.

They would be able to deploy three or four new strategic systems rather than only the one permitted under the treaty. They would be able to interfere significantly with our monitoring of their military activities in ways that would be prohibited by the treaty.

All these options offered to the Soviets by rejection of the treaty could constitute, together, a most serious threat to our national security. I should like to recall in this connection the public statement Secretary Kissinger made in January 1977, just before leaving office, and I quote:

> I believe that to achieve a usable superiority in strategic nuclear weapons is extremely unlikely and relatively easy to prevent, and the obsession with it distracts us.

What I presume Mr. Kissinger meant was that as long as we maintain a credible second strike capability and show a clear intention to use it if necessary, any superiority the Soviet Union might have in some weapons is not usable, either militarily or politically, because their use would bring about almost total devastation of their homeland.

We do certainly have that capability at present and are in the process of reinforcing it with Trident submarines and missiles and with air-launched cruise missiles. The SALT II Treaty places no obstacles in the way of our maintaining that capability. As long as we do maintain it, scenarios of our docilely succumbing to nuclear blackmail are, in my view, wholly implausible.

The time available to me does not permit my dealing in any further depth with the substance of the treaty. I should like, therefore, to submit for the record a statement of 10 points explaining briefly why I personally support the Treaty and why the principal arguments of its opponents seem to me unconvincing.

I trust that a sober assessment of the benefits of the SALT II Treaty and of the quite predictable consequences of its being rejected will commend themselves to you gentlemen and lead you to the same conclusions.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Charles W. Yost follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR CHARLES W. YOST

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I testify before you today as a Co-Chair of Americans for SALT and as a former Foreign Service Officer with some 45 years of experience in international affairs. That service included substantial experience in negotiating with the Soviets—at the Dumbarton Oaks, San Francisco and Potsdam Conferences, two assignments in Vienna under Four Power occupation, as Director of the State Department's Office of Eastern European Affairs, and at the United Nations for seven years, including those of the Berlin, Cuban and Congo crises. I have no illusions, therefore, either about Soviet objectives or about the need for great vigilance in doing business with them.

"Americans For SALT" is a private organization established for the purpose of mobilizing public support for the conclusion and ratification of the SALT II Treaty. There is submitted as an annex to this testimony a list of the co-chairmen, of the

members of our Advisory Council and of about 140 prominent persons who are publicly supporting our organization and our goals. As you will note, many of these persons are officers or representatives of other organizations with substantial nationwide memberships, some of which assisted in the establishment of "Americans For SALT" and many of which have taken a public position in support of ratification of the treaty.

With respect to the attitude of the American public toward the treaty, you gentlemen are of course aware that a substantial number of public opinion polls taken over the past year show that about 70 percent of Americans polled consistently favored a strategic arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. The Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the senior officials of the Administration in their testimony to you before the recess have submitted convincing evidence that this particular strategic arms control treaty, SALT II, will, on balance, reenforce the security of the United States, will not inhibit us from further strenghthening our armed forces in ways necessary to our defense, and will in several important respects place the United States in a more advantageous military position than if the treaty should be rejected or delayed. Distinguished private citizens with long experience in negotiating with the Soviets, such as Averell Harriman, John J. McCloy, and, subject to some conditions, Henry Kissinger, have supported these views and recommended ratification of the treaty.

After the study of testimony offered to this Committee and a careful examination of the provisions of the treaty by its own experts, "Americans For SALT" is strengthened in its conviction that the treaty, if ratified, will serve to reenforce both the security of the United States and the prospects of world peace. It therefore clearly meets the objective which those 70 percent of Americans who in opinion polls supported an arms control agreement with the Soviets had in mind. Reports from public interest groups throughout the country which are aligned with us confirm that this is the case.

Many of them, like many of you, would have preferred that the treaty provide for more substantial reductions. However, part of a loaf is decidedly better than no bread. If the SALT process is continued and not interrupted, such larger reduction, to which both parties to the treaty are pledged, can be promptly pursued in the next stage of negotiations.

Returning for a moment to Mr. Kissinger, I should like to recall a public statement he made in January 1977, just before leaving office: "I believe that to achieve a usable superiority in strategic nuclear weapons is extremely unlikely and relatively easy to prevent, and the obsession with it distracts us."

What Mr. Kissinger meant was that, as long as we maintain a credible second strike capability, and show a clear intention to use it if necessary, any superiority the Soviet Union might have in some weapons is not usable, either militarily or politically, because its use would bring about almost total devastation of their homeland. We do certainly have that capability at present and are in the process of reenforcing it with Trident submarines and missiles and with air-launched cruise missiles. The SALT II Treaty places no obstacles in the way of our maintaining that capability. As long as we do maintain it, scenarios of our docilely succumbing to nuclear blackmail are in my view wholly implausible.

The time available to me does not permit my dealing in any depth with the substance of the treaty. I should like therefore to submit for the record a statement of 10 points explaining briefly why I personally support the treaty and why the principal arguments of its opponents seem to me unconvincing.

In conclusion I would recall that when the actor Maurice Chevalier was asked how he felt about getting old, he replied that he was not particularly enthusiastic about it but he preferred it to the alternative. I believe that a sober assessment of the benefit of the SALT II Treaty, and of the quite predictable consequences of rejecting it, should lead us to the same conclusion.

I have carefully followed the debate on the SALT II Treaty during the past year, including testimony pro and con before this and other Senate committees. To summarize my conclusions, there seem to me ten major points which emerge in favor of ratification of the treaty. Several of these points seem to me to refute convincingly the principal arguments put forward by opponents of the treaty.

1. The highest officials of our Government, including those responsible for our national defense, have testified unequivocally that this treaty will, modestly but usefully, strengthen the security of the United States. I see no reason to doubt either their judgement or their sincerity.

2. The treaty does not prohibit the United States from taking a wide variety of additional measures to strengthen its national defense, if the Administration and the Congress deem it necessary to do so. Such permitted measures, several of which are already under way, include Minuteman modernization, deployment of Trident

submarines and missiles, deployment of cruise missiles, deployment of the MX missile, and an unlimited range of improvements in conventional forces.

3. If the treaty is not approved, the Soviets would gain specific substantial military advantages which the treaty would deny them. They would, instead of being obliged to reduce from 2,500 to 2,250 missile launchers, be able to increase by 1985 to as many as 3,000; instead of being limited to 10 warheads on each of their 300 heavy missiles they would be able to install as many as 30 on each (a difference of 6,000 warheads, more than their total present number); they would be able to deploy three or four new strategic systems, rather than only the one permitted under the treaty; they would be able to interfere significantly with our monitoring of their military activities in ways that would be prohibited by the treaty. All these options offered gratuitously to the Soviets by rejection of the treaty could constitute together a most serious threat to our national security.

4. One of the principal arguments by opponents of the treaty relates to an alleged approaching vulnerability of our Minuteman missiles. If such a vulnerability were to occur, it would occur either with or without the treaty. Personally I consider such a supposed vulnerability to be purely theoretical. As long as we maintain other invulnerable systems, such as our strategic submarines, the Soviets will not be fools enough to risk destruction of most of their cities and industries by attacking us. Moreover, they would not be able to achieve political advantages by threatening to do so, since both we and they would know that such threats were bluff and would not be carried out.

5. Our principal NATO allies have publicly urged ratification of the treaty and several of their leaders have publicly emphasized the dismay they would feel if it were rejected. In his testimony before this Committee July 31 Henry Kissinger said: "There is no doubt that failure to ratify the treaty will shake European confidence in an American government that for seven years assured them that it knew what it was doing."

6. There can be little doubt that rejection of the treaty, afer seven years of painstaking negotiation, would lead to a further escalation of the arms race, the deployment of additional new systems on both sides, and very heavy expenditures which would not be incurred if the treaty takes effect. There is no warrant for believing that the Soviets have reached a ceiling of military expenditure. Experience clearly shows that they will spend whatever amounts they think are required to keep even with us.

7. On the question of linkage with SALT of Soviet behavior in the Third World, there is no reason whatsoever to suppose that the Soviets would behave better if SALT is rejected than if it is ratified. On the contrary, a significant inhibition on their objectionable behavior—their concern not to risk being too offensive to us—would be diminished by the interruption of the SALT relationship.

8. There is no reason to believe that, if the treaty is rejected or if amendments are added which would require renegotiation, such renegotiation could be either begun or concluded quickly. The United States is about to enter an election year. More important, the Soviet Union is already preparing for and about to undergo a change in leadership. It is highly probable that the SALT process would remain in suspense until that change, which as Mr. Harriman has pointed out could be adversely affected by rejection of SALT, has been completed and assimilated. By that time any one of a dozen contingencies could occur, as we have seen so often in the past 7 years, to cause further and indefinite delay.

9. If the treaty ever should be renegotiated, to accommodate amendments proposed by the United States, we would of course, if we expected a new treaty to result, have to be prepared to make concessions to the Soviets to balance those we would be asking of them. What concessions would we be prepared to make? We might in fact end up with no treaty at all or with one worse on balance than the one we now have before us.

10. Finally, rejection of the treaty would delay indefinitely, perhaps for many years, the process of negotiating the more substantial reductions which are stipulated in the Statement of Principles in the present text and which both proponents and opponents of the treaty solemnly proclaim is their principal objective.

AMERICANS FOR SALT

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Cochairs

Marjorie Benton, Delegate to the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament.

Clark Clifford, Former Secretary of Defense.

The Reverend Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C., President, University of Notre Dame.
Townsend Hoopes, Former Under Secretary of the Air Force.
Henry Cabot Lodge, Former United States Senator; Former Ambassador to the United Nations, and to Vietnam.
Lloyd McBride, President, United Steelworkers of America.
Charles Yost, Former Ambassador to the United Nations.

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Norman Cousins, President, World Federalists Association.
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Emil Mazey, United Auto, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America.
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Wolfgang Panofsky, Director, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center
John Aristotle Phillips, Princeton Student who designed his own bomb
Harvey Picker, Dean, School of International Affairs, Columbia University
Rabbi Ely Pilchik, President, Central Conference of American Rabbis
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Avery Post, President, United Church of Christ
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D. Robert Yarnall, Jr., Chairman, Yarway Corporation

*Inclusion of the names listed above does not necessarily indicate organizational endorsement.

*This is a partial list.

DR. KISSINGER'S TESTIMONY ON SALT II

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Yost, for a very clear statement of your position. The 10 points to which you refer will be incorporated in the record.

You refer to Mr. Kissinger and his statement of January 1977 in which he said, I believe, that to achieve a usable superiority in strategic nuclear weapons is extremely unlikely and relatively easy to prevent, and the obsession with it distracts us. Have you read Mr. Kissinger's more recent testimony on the SALT II Treaty?

Ambassador YOST. I have, indeed. And he referred, I noted, to a statement somewhat similar to this which he had made in a press conference, as he described it, in a moment of fatigue and exasperation. This particular statement, however, I don't believe was made in any such context. It was made in a relaxed moment when he was about to retire. And I have no reason to believe he would have changed his mind in regard to the statement or that it is not just as true now as it was then.

The CHAIRMAN. You believe that this statement has the candor that we normally associate with a death statement; that is, he was approaching the end of his tenure and could consider these matters in a reflective and candid way? [Laughter.]

Ambassador YOST. I do think so, Senator. Actually, if one reads the statements he made in the last month or two before he left office, they were characterized by that frankness which I think reflected exactly the state of mind you describe.

NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY PROMOTES SOVIET ADVENTURISM

The CHAIRMAN. I found his argument unconvincing, that is the argument that he made when he appeared before this committee that nuclear superiority, whatever that may be, somehow creates political advantages that can be used tactically in promoting Soviet adventurism.

It seems to me that in the past, there is no evidence nor do I recall that the Secretary was able to cite any evidence to support that proposition. At times when we have had that nuclear superiority, we have been faced with extreme Soviet adventurism, as in Berlin and, indeed, in Cuba in 1962. And I hardly believe that the Russians will withdraw from Angola, Ethiopia, or, indeed, from Cuba where, we now know, they have deployed a combat brigade, because of any belief that we will nuke them if they don't.

Ambassador YOST. I would quite agree, Senator. I think both sides realize that the results of resorting to nuclear weapons would rebound on them in such a devastating fashion that they are extremely unlikely to use them. And since each side knows that the other feels that way, nuclear blackmail is simply not convincing.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not convincing, and Secretary Kissinger did not make it so in his testimony, at least not to me.

OVERKILL CAPACITY TO DESTROY

Would you agree that once the two countries have achieved that degree of nuclear strength that both have overkill capacity to destroy the other even after surviving an initial attack, that then

the further accumulation of these weapons becomes irrational, wasteful and, indeed, can only increase the level of danger that any nuclear war that might result from such gross miscalculation or some tragic mistake would prove to be utterly devastating to both civilizations?

Ambassador YOST. It certainly seems so to me. Nor do I think that we can rely—if, for example, the treaty should not be approved—on the Soviets not continuing to match whatever we felt we should spend on nuclear weapons. I noticed that one of the witnesses this morning expressed the view that they would be unlikely to do so, that they had reached the limit of their expenditures.

Frankly, I think that is a rather naive point of view. I think they have demonstrated over many years that at no matter what cost or sacrifice, they will spend whatever they think is necessary to match us.

MINORITY AWARENESS OF SALT II

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. King, you spoke from the heart this afternoon, and I have no question about your personal commitment to the support of this treaty. What I would like to ask you is, to the extent that you feel you can answer the question: Does the black community in this country as a whole really care about SALT, or does any other minority group, for that matter? Do you think that there is an awareness of how SALT relates or could relate to these other problems that you have mentioned, that is, the problems of poverty, the problems of insufficient food, the problems of inadequate housing, that tend to plague so many of our black citizens?

Mrs. KING. Yes, I think very definitely that the black community is aware of this relationship. I think that that awareness was created during the Vietnam war period when Martin Luther King, Jr., tied that relationship between excessive spending on an ill-fated, immoral war to the lack of resources for the disadvantaged and deprived communities.

Also, the concern is that blacks have in the past been selected in larger numbers to participate in combat when there was a war, and we know what that means in terms of broken families and lives that are destroyed and so on. So I think that the black community is very much aware of what this could mean.

We are very concerned about the bread and butter issues. Most black people feel that we can have both. There was a discussion during the last Vietnam crisis, guns versus butter and so on. I think black people want the Government to be prepared but they do not feel that being prepared means neglecting those human needs that are so vital to the survival of our culture and heritage and our very being.

The CHAIRMAN. I wanted to make a comment on that particular portion of your testimony because it seems to me a very poignant example of how weak a given government can be despite the enormity of the arms with which it surrounds itself. That is the recent case of Iran.

There was certainly no insufficiency of weaponry to protect the Shah and his regime; yet the lack of solidarity among his people, the lack of support, rendered those forces impotent when the

people once took to the streets against him. And in the long run, the strength of this country will depend in part upon its weapons but far more fundamentally upon the cohesiveness of the American people and their willingness to support the country in times of danger and to fight for it.

That, in turn, as you have said, does not depend upon surrounding our cities with missiles if our cities are full of decadence and decay and the needs of our people left unattended.

CONTRIBUTION SALT MAKES IN CONTROLLING NUCLEAR ARMS

Senator McIntyre, I have just one question I would like to address to you, and then I will turn to Senator Javits. I ask this question because Senator McGovern is not here and he might not return. It is a question I think he might want asked. He has often brought up the point in the course of the hearings.

If this treaty depends on a cocommitment to a whole series of new weapons systems such as the M-X missile, the cruise missile, the Trident submarine, the others that have been urged upon us, what contribution do you think the treaty makes to the ostensible objective which it seeks to serve, namely, putting wraps on the nuclear arms race?

We know that under the treaty, both sides can continue to add thousands of nuclear warheads to their arsenals. And we are told that we should ratify the treaty only if we also approve a very expensive new commitment to the construction and deployment of additional nuclear weapons systems not prohibited by the treaty.

So there are those, including Senator McGovern, who have asked whether this is really an arms control treaty or an arms acceleration treaty when viewed in that context.

Senator MCINTYRE. Mr. Chairman, I think it is regrettable, but it is a matter of fact of life that the treaty is being subjected to all forms of linkage. As I said in my statement, I believe the treaty puts on a cap, some limitations on the Soviet threat. The treaty continues the SALT process, which hopefully will begin to bring the levels further down in SALT III and SALT IV.

We do have to recognize, what I know we saw in the R. & D. subcommittee 6 or 7 years ago, what we considered to be quantum leaps in the research and development that the Soviets were supporting compared to which had previously been more or less incremental.

So we have to turn our attention to the fact that our land-based missiles may very well be in jeopardy by the mideighties.

Now, I don't suppose you recall, Mr. Chairman, but when the M-X was first broached, it had a $20 to $50 billion price tag, and the Air Force could not tell your Armed Services Committee how they were going to do it. I believe I went to the floor and spoke against the M-X system as being premature. As history shows, the Navy was wrong to go too fast on the Trident.

But now I do think we are ready to move out with a solution. So if an M-X system can be put together that will insure that the land-based missiles will not be at risk in the mideighties, then I would be for it.

So I regret, too, that this treaty did not do all we wanted it to do. I regret that the turndown is not more significant. Yet, you want

to cite one thing, the Russians are bound to do something under this treaty. It may be singular, to demolish and destroy some 250 of their missile launchers.

Now, you can say they are obsolete launchers, but they are as good as the ones we have on our Minuteman II. We know the Soviets are aggressive. They are adventuresome, and nothing will change them.

If we do not pass this treaty, it is not going to make them worse or better. If we pass the treaty, it is not going to make them any different.

As a young man in World War II, I ended up in Czechoslovakia in the Army of Occupation, in Strakonice, Czechoslovakia. I will never forget it. We were along side the Russians, and the Russians were as aggressive as any people I have ever met in my life.

Their soldiers thought nothing of trying to steal our Jeeps, and the only way you could get it through their head that they were not to take the Jeep was to take your 45 and put it in their face.

We are dealing with a difficult people. But we must try to understand them. We must realize that the SALT process is so important, because, as Coretta King has said, and I have heard scenarios as you have of nuclear exchanges, it is just insanity.

So I say yes, we must continue to improve our military system to be sure to balance, to maintain the essential equivalence and to continue to strive so that the SALT process will eventually turn this arms race around.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to join the Chair in welcoming the witnesses.

It is a great service you have produced for the committee today, and I am very happy to see you going out and answering many of the questions that many people in the communities ask. You have great talent. It is a good thing.

We had this morning a very powerful aggregation of organizations on the other side. That is good, too. It puts us to our proof to argue with them. But I am glad to see that there is an effective committee on the pro side.

UNITED STATES SEIZED BY STATE OF EUPHORIA AFTER SALT I

I have one question to ask of you, Senator. We served together. Retired admirals and generals testified this morning. They say that in the 5 years after SALT I was ratified, the United States was seized by a euphoria that disarmament was at hand.

We were sold on the idea of overkill without taking account of the fact that in the meantime, counterforce had perhaps overtaken that concept; that, therefore, we allowed the Soviet Union to race way ahead of us until today we don't have superiority, and even the doctrine of equivalence has now been, they think, seriously jeopardized.

Now, from your own experience, would you be kind enough to make any comment that you wish?

Senator MCINTYRE. Senator, I have great respect for our retired military and great respect for the military people I had the opportunity to work with while in the Senate. I once decided that the

difficulty with the admirals of the ocean and sea when they became Chief of Naval Operations is that they wanted every ship they could get.

I thought it was our job to try to test their requests in the Yankee sane way. So I believe that our retired military and other distinguished people who may have testified this morning—and I didn't hear their testimony—can recount all our past mistakes, but when they tell you that the Russians are far superior, I disagree.

We have a new Trident submarine about to go in. We are putting in F–14's to replace the F–4's that were so successful. We have more things going for us. I have been constantly amazed with our technology and with the creativity of our experts. So I don't say we are second at all. I think we are in a period of essential equivalence.

I deplore the tactics of the people who are against this treaty. It is so easy to be against, picking away and trying to say that mistakes have been made in the past when they probably contributed to those mistakes.

UNITED STATES AT MERCY OF SOVIET BLACKMAIL BY 1985

Senator JAVITS. The argument is also made by the same witnesses that they believe that a euphoria could seize us again after we sign SALT II and that we will slip even further behind, so that by 1985, at the expiration of the treaty period, we will be completely at the mercy of whatever the Soviets want to do through nuclear blackmail.

Senator MCINTYRE. Let me say here, and then I will quit on this, the question of what we are going to construct and build for our defense is one that should be taken by itself and not in conjunction with this important treaty. We should be able to decide in our own minds, and in your debates on the floor of the Senate and in the committees, with the help of our military, whether there are gaps we should close and whether there are weaknesses we should overcome. These issues should stand by themselves, our Armed Forces and our defense system. The treaty, which I believe is a step toward what we all want, sanity and peace, should be judged on its own.

Senator JAVITS. So you would not subscribe to Dr. Kissinger's proposition either, would you, that when you sign this treaty, you have to have a flat commitment of x dollars or x programs, or whatever else you have to promise in order to guarantee in advance?

Senator MCINTYRE. No. I do not subscribe to the theory of tranquilizers. I think we can in our own House, Senate, and administration decide what we need to close any gap. We have the technology to do it and more.

Senator JAVITS. And that this is a democratic country, Senator, and that that is the way it is done, not by generals writing conditions.

Senator MCINTYRE. Right.

Senator JAVITS. Now, I had the great privilege of serving with Ambassador Yost in the United Nations in 1970. I have very high regard for him. I have read your 10 points, by the way, and I

believe they are excellent. I wish you had read them to us. They could very well be a syllabus for the debate on this treaty.

Ambassador YOST. Thank you, Senator.

UNITED STATES WILLPOWER TO USE TRIAD

Senator JAVITS. I would like to call one thing to your attention. It is a very important point which I will be raising time and again. We have a Triad. That is our defense. The Soviet Union, in effect, has a unitary system, to wit, land-based missiles.

The rest of it is coming aboard, the Navy SLBM's, et cetera, but they hardly pretend that it represents a major part of their offensive nuclear capability.

Now, all the witnesses are arguing as if we had nothing but land-based missiles, as if we had no SLBM's and no bombers. They are just disregarding them, pushing it out of the window. And yet we have spent billions on these programs.

The Secretary of Defense testified here that these legs of the Triad are critical to us, that they are a significant part of our counterforce capability certainly for the next 5 years until we get the M-X missile.

Now, I notice that you say: "As long as we maintain other invulnerable systems such as our strategic submarines, the Soviets will not be fools enough to risk destruction of most of their cities and industries by attacking us." Well, if you listen to Dr. Kissinger, Ambassador Yost, you would not believe that.

He says no President of the United States will dare to use them when the showdown comes.

Now, you have been our representative at the United Nations and this is your paper. What do you say about that?

Ambassador YOST. Senator, I have heard that argument not only from Dr. Kissinger but from many others, and it has never seemed to me convincing. After all, why did we build a Triad if we didn't intend to use it? The purpose, of course, is deterrence. And to simply assume that if one element of the Triad is outmoded or for any reason is unusable, that we are going to throw up our hands and abandon the other two seems to me to run counter to the entire purpose of our defense programs for the last 30 years.

So I would entirely agree with you that we do have other elements of our Triad, unlike the Soviets, who rely almost entirely on their land-based missiles, and we are in the process of reinforcing the sea-based missiles and we are about to go in for air-launched cruise missiles.

So I would say that regardless of whether or not our land-based missiles become vulnerable, that we are in a very safe, secure situation.

Senator JAVITS. We should not duplicate everything the Russians do man-for-man, tank-for-tank, plane-for-plane, missile-for-missile. On the contrary. I am a tennis player. I know the surest way to lose is to play the other fellow's game.

JUSTIFICATION FOR ADVOCACY OF SALT

Mrs. King, I have just one question of you. I am delighted that you are with us.

This is a very rough game for poor people. A huge part of our budget is going for defense with more in the mill. So much going for military spending is pretty sad stuff, and more will go, I regret to tell you. Under those circumstances, how do you justify, in the interests of the poor, your advocacy of SALT?

It certainly maintains the level of roughly present expenditures and may involve us in more. Can we explain to the poor—and you are one of the most eloquent exponents—that without this treaty, if we do turn it down, the desperate of our country could be very much worse off than they are today?

Mrs. KING. I think, as difficult as it is to explain to people who are struggling with the necessities of life that the alternative is——

Senator JAVITS. Worse.

Mrs. KING. Total destruction, almost, we have to try to do that. In some of my lecturing in talking to college students who are very idealistic, I have had to try to answer some of these questions. And I am a practical idealist, you know. I dream of a day when we actually will have a disarmed world, you know.

I share the views that my husband had that we have to move toward that time. But I realize that we are not nearly there and we have a long, long way to go. And as long as there are the realities of being destroyed by other nations, responsible people in government must make preparation.

So I have said as far as I am concerned I do believe in disarmament. I am a nonviolent person. I believe that ultimately we have to disarm the whole world. But I can only say to people that I talk to that it is very unrealistic to think, even to equate not spending a certain amount for defense in the real world we live in, and to use the argument that we must take away from the preparedness in case there is a war, that we must take away from that and use that money for the resources to feed the poor.

The poor must be fed. We must do that. But to use that as an argument and say that, there are some people who feel that somehow there is no justification for spending the enormous amount for our military defense and spending so little for the human needs.

I subscribe to that, too, but I am realistic enough to know that our Government is not going to do that at this time. Until we can somehow sit down together and work these things out between the Russians and ourselves, we have to somehow destroy the feeling of fear, eliminate the feeling of fear within people.

As my colleague has said here, it is a process. We have to start this process, and I think this is the beginning. We are a long way from having the answer, but I feel it is important for me to be here to say something in support of this treaty because without this, I fear what the alternative will be for all of us.

Senator JAVITS. I can assure you, Mrs. King, without it there will be no limit whatever on the stakes of the game.

Mrs. KING. Yes.

Senator JAVITS. Therefore, any limit is better for the poor who are bound to get the worst chewed up in a war.

Mrs. KING. Right.

Senator JAVITS. So, the most we can do is limit the stakes and cut down the possibilities.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Javits.

When I asked Senator McGovern's question, I didn't know he was going to return in time to ask it himself. So he will now ask the questions I had intended to put to you. [Laughter.]

Senator MCGOVERN. You probably did a better job with it than I would have, Mr. Chairman.

I just want to observe that we have three unusually thoughtful and qualified witnesses here today in Ambassador Yost, Mrs. King and our colleague, Senator McIntyre. I wanted to ask a couple of general questions.

OVERALL STANCE OF UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP

I would like to begin with you, Mr. Yost, if I may.

Last spring, Richard Barnett wrote an article in the Foreign Affairs Quarterly in which he pleaded for a more comprehensive approach to the Soviet Union. He makes this observation in the opening paragraph of the article.

He observes that the strategic arms limitation negotiations in Geneva and Moscow have been exhausting, and the arguments over ratification in Washington promise to be embittering. The process has not led to an improved international climate. Indeed, a strong case can be made that in the last few years, the SALT negotiations have exacerbated tensions between the two superpowers.

Do you feel that through the whole SALT process—and this article was written 4 or 5 months ago and we have now had the experience for several weeks of the ratification process—we are improving our overall stance and our relationships with the Soviet Union, the relationship between the so-called superpowers, or are they being exacerbated.

Ambassador YOST. No, Senator, I don't agree that without the SALT negotiation, the SALT process over the past few years, our relations with the Soviet Union would have been better. I think they would have been decidedly worse. With all the other differences of opinion and conflicts that we have with the Soviets, at least the SALT process, although in my opinion it moved much too slowly, requiring 7 years, nevertheless was an anchor and it did serve as one common objective that we were both agreed on pursuing.

And while, of course, there was sharp argument about some elements in it, on the whole it served to keep us from drifting further apart. It is, after all, the knowledge of the two governments that their peoples are hostage to each other, that either can destroy the other, that provides some limits on the ambitions or adventurism that might otherwise be shown.

And the fact that both are engaging and have been willing to engage now for 10 years in this process of trying gradually to move toward some more stable situation is a positive factor that has improved relations.

I am confident that had that process not existed, or if it should now end, our relations would be infinitely worse and, as Senator Javits has just said, both sides would be spending far more on armaments than they have been.

Senator McGovern. Well, I am inclined to agree with what you have said, that the effort has been worthwhile. However it has also been frustrating. It is one process that will help remove some of the ambiguity between the two superpowers. How much it will do in the way of actual arms limitation, to say nothing of arms reduction, I am not at all clear on. But I do think it helps remove some of the elements of confusion and ambiguity between the great powers and in that sense is important.

All three of you now have argued, I take it, that it is in the interest of the United States that this agreement be ratified. Is that correct?

[Mrs. King nods affirmatively.]

[Senator McIntyre nods affirmatively.]

[Ambassador Yost nods affirmatively.]

LINKAGE TO OTHER ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP

Senator McGovern. If that is true, it seems to me, then, that we ought not surrender that interest. If it is in the U.S. interest to ratify this treaty, we ought not surrender that because we are peeved or concerned or alarmed by developments in some other aspect of the Soviet-American relationship. Would you agree with that?

Ambassador Yost. Yes, I would. It has been my experience over the last 30 years that clashes between us and the Soviet Union in many parts of the world are simply bound to occur. As regrettable as they are, they are, I am afraid, unavoidable in the present climate.

I feel that if we should, whenever there is a clash of this kind, suspend the arms control process, it would aggravate rather than improve the situation.

Senator McGovern. I don't think there is any doubt about the judgment of some of the Senators who have said that the presence of the Soviet forces in Cuba is going to make it harder to ratify this treaty. On the other hand, in terms of logical thinking about what is in the interest of the United States, it does seem peculiar that we would punish ourselves by denying ourselves this treaty because we are unhappy about something else the Soviets do.

If the treaty is in our interest, how does it serve the U.S. interest then to reject it because we are unhappy about something that has taken place elsewhere in the world? That is to inflict punishment on ourselves, is it not?

Ambassador Yost. I would feel so, Senator. I feel, for the reasons I stated in those 10 points, that the treaty is very definitely in our security interests and that it should stand on its own feet. The Soviets are doing a great many things in many parts of the world of which I strongly disapprove.

Nevertheless, I continue to think that it is in our interest to make this particular agreement with them and ratify it.

Senator McGovern. I do think it is important for us to emphasize that this treaty is not a reward for Soviet good behavior, and rejecting the treaty is not a logical form of punishment for Soviet misbehavior.

If you are going to accept the proposition that this treaty helps the United States, it seems to me that the so-called linkage argu-

ment on how we are going to use our support or withdrawing our support from the treaty to regulate the Soviets elsewhere around the world does not carry much weight.

Ambassador YOST. I agree.

Senator MCGOVERN. My time is just about up but I just want to underscore again here what Mrs. King and Senator McIntyre and you have said, Ambassador Yost. I think there are sources of American strength that are very important for us to use around the world. But the one area where we do not have a clear advantage over the Soviet Union is in the military field.

There are a good many other fields where we do: the field of economics, the field of human rights, and in our ability to use intelligent diplomacy. Those are the areas where I would hope more of the competition would be directed rather than keeping so much of it focused on the military struggle.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator McGovern.

Senator Hayakawa.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me start by saying to you, Senator McIntyre, it is a pleasure to see you again. Let me also welcome Mrs. King and Ambassador Yost.

I would like to ask Ambassador Yost something, to start with. He just said the Soviets are doing many things in many parts of the world of which you profoundly disapprove, Ambassador Yost.

Ambassador YOST. [Nods affirmatively.]

ANTICIPATED SOVIET BEHAVIOR AFTER SALT II

Senator HAYAKAWA. What bothers me is so many of the things of which you disapprove—and I am sure you and I agree on what we disapprove of, Soviet adventurism in Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, weapons and military advisers to 40 or more African nations, stirring things up in the Middle East, Latin America and so on—so many of these things happened after the signing of SALT I. What is going to happen after the signing of SALT II?

It seems as if SALT I gave them the assurance that they could go ahead with these things.

Ambassador YOST. Well, Senator, I would not be inclined to associate those two elements so closely. I would think that we should combat those particular examples of Soviet adventurism which you have cited and that we should find appropriate means of doing so. It differs in each case, of course. There is no across-the-board solution.

I personally would like to see the United Nations used a good deal more than it is in dealing with some of those problems you mentioned. But I do not think that it would be either desirable or effective to try to link all of them with the SALT Treaty or the SALT process.

As I mentioned earlier, I am sure, since incidents of this kind are bound to keep occurring, that would be the end of any arms control negotiation because they will keep occurring.

If, for example, the treaty should be rejected or indefinitely delayed, I don't think it would improve Soviet behavior one iota. They would go right on doing, in Angola or wherever else, exactly

what they have been doing. In fact, they might behave a little worse because this one element of restraint, their expectation and desire to have an arms control agreement with us, would be eliminated.

So, while I agree with what Senator McGovern has said, that there is an obvious political connection which affects American public opinion necessarily, I do think that we should try to separate these issues to the extent that we can because in our view the SALT Treaty is so much in our security interest that it would be very foolish indeed to throw it away in the hope that it might make the Soviets behave better in Angola, Cuba or wherever, because I don't think that they would.

SALT I NOT TIED TO ADVENTURISM

Senator HAYAKAWA. Your reply essentially, then, is that the signing of SALT I is not to be connected with the adventurism.

Ambassador YOST. I don't think it made any difference in their behavior in the past.

SALT II MAY DIMINISH ADVENTURISM

Senator HAYAKAWA. Are you not also saying the signing of SALT II may diminish that adventurism in the future?

Ambassador YOST. I think the whole SALT process, as long as it goes on, not simply the fact that we have signed and ratified SALT II but that we have immediately, as the statement of principles in SALT II provides, started the negotiation of SALT III, will have some moderating effect on their behavior. It certainly will not stop all the behavior of which we disapprove, but it will, in my opinion, be less serious, less troublesome than if there were no SALT process.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

EFFECT OF CUBAN PROBLEM ON SALT POSITION

The next question I would like to ask, and I address it to all three of you and any one of you is free to answer it in any way you like, is: Does the revelation of the existence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba influence in any way your position on SALT II? That is, not only on the treaty itself but our approach to its ratification.

Ambassador YOST. Should I say a few words and see if my colleagues want to?

Senator HAYAKAWA. Go ahead.

Ambassador YOST. No, Senator, I think not, for the reasons I have just cited. I think SALT II is in our interest; that we will be more secure with it than without it; that their arms would be restrained in ways they would not be without the treaty, and therefore, we should go ahead and pin down that treaty while we can.

I dislike seeing Soviet troops in Cuba. I hope we can find other ways of dealing with that and eliminating that situation. I don't think there is anything that we need to be panicky about. After all, we are a considerable power, and 3,000 troops there, while unpleasant, is obviously not going to undermine our national security.

That does not mean I think we should ignore it. I think we should pursue with the Soviets through other means the elimination of that situation. But I don't think that we should throw away the benefits I think the SALT Treaty would bring us.

Senator McINTYRE. Well, Senator, I always wonder why we are always surprised. There should be no surprise involved in this matter. But I would say, and I must say this, too, that you gentlemen have had the benefit now of yesterday's hearings from which you have the up-to-the minute information. And I don't have this.

I would say, depending on the nature of those troops and the amount of them and the possibility of bases being constructed, that I would want them out of there. And I would also want SALT II.

You see, the reason I want SALT II is so that we can know what they, our Russian adversaries, are up to.

Mr. Chairman, you must have known that there were Russians in Cuba before it appeared the other day. I don't know what you found out yesterday, but let's get them out of there. But let's also get SALT II.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, I knew there were Russian military personnel in Cuba engaged in training activities and also certain communications activities, but not until last week did I know that there was a Russian combat unit there.

I wish we lived in a world of perfect logic. I have been saying from the beginning that this treaty should be dealt with on its merits. I continue to hope that it will be dealt with on its merits. But I could not truthfully say that the development, the confirmation of the existence of a combat brigade of Russian troops in Cuba that were placed there secretly, does not have a chilling effect in the Senate.

You know as a former Senator that it would have such an effect.

Senator McINTYRE. As one who knows what that means on the street corners of Boise——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, and throughout the country. I also think that unless this matter is satisfactorily resolved, I would be misleading you and misleading the country to say that I believe the Senate would be prepared to ratify the treaty.

It is one thing for the Cubans to move into Angola and Ethiopia, which has never exercised me very much because I think in the end it is going to be for the Africans to solve; but it is another thing to move a combat unit secretly to within 90 miles of our shores. I think that the Senate is bound to view the two together. That is just a simple statement of fact, the facts with which we live.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief.

The CHAIRMAN. We do have a vote, I might say. The Senators might want to go vote and come back so that we don't have an interruption.

Senator BIDEN. I apologize to the witnesses for not having heard their testimony, but I have had an opportunity to read the testimony.

SOVIETS NOT MILITARILY SUPERIOR TO UNITED STATES

I would like to say one thing which contradicts something that seems to be gaining some credibility around here. I, for one, do not believe the Soviets are militarily superior to the United States of America. None of the witnesses have said that but we have been, in effect, for the last several weeks talking as if that is true. It is not true.

We have to look at military posture not just in terms of strategic capability and conventional capability, but geographic location, potential enemies, reliability of allies and a whole range of other questions. I don't think there is a military man in this country who would trade places with the Soviet Union given the entire range of things they would have to trade if we were in a fighting situation.

But I want to say that for the record because it was mentioned again here. I don't think George meant much beyond what he said. He talked about Soviet equality in the military field and the need to emphasize the other areas. I don't even concede that, if you take the entire spectrum of military considerations, the Soviets are superior.

I wonder what would happen. I wonder what Senator Hayakawa and Senator Garn and others are going to say if, in fact, the administration is able to, by whatever means would be employed, force this brigade out of Cuba? If the administration forces the brigade out of Cuba, does that say that we should have SALT? I assume that that is what it means.

I assume it means that if they say they cannot have SALT with the brigade in Cuba because it somehow shows how weak we are, that if, in fact, the brigade is forced to leave, I assume they will be prepared to point out how strong we are and why then it would be useful to have SALT.

I am, as you might guess, prepared to make that argument if and when the brigade leaves.

SALT DISCUSSED IN VACUUM

I would like to compliment you, Mrs. King, on bringing into focus what often is not focused on here. We tend to become, as Senator Church says, nuclear theologians when we discuss SALT. And we discuss it not only in a vacuum in the military—that is, we discuss strategic and not conventional—but we also discuss it within a vacuum of what is happening in the rest of the world and the rest of our economy.

And your point about inflation and unemployment being by-products of the failure to have a SALT agreement is one which should be reiterated time and again. It is not in and of itself reason to vote for SALT if SALT were not a good agreement, if it injured our security. But if it is at a minimum an even call, even if it is close, those two factors play very heavily. I would like to compliment you on bringing them out.

And Senator McIntyre, as usual you have put your finger right on the thrust of why we need SALT from a security standpoint. You point out in your statement that there are several reasons but two main reasons. One, failure to have SALT diminishes our capability of monitoring and controlling Soviet threat. And second, with

the SALT agreement it allows us to do the things we have to do anyway if we decide we must do them and moves forward in continuing the process.

But you again don't argue it, as I read your statement, from a position of anything other than U.S. security. U.S. military security is enhanced.

The reason why I am not asking any questions is I agree with what you all say. And I would just like to compliment each of you on the way in which you have approached it. You seem to have covered all of the basics.

Ambassador Yost, you point out in your statement that there are differences between us and the Soviets. They are always going to be there and we should not reject something just because we have differences in other areas. I guess I have no desire to be contentious after the testimony I heard this morning from the anti-SALT people, but I am going to have to go vote.

I would like to compliment you all once again for putting the issue into what I believe is a proper perspective. I am very anxious to see, if the administration is successful in moving the troops out of Cuba, whether or not there will be the same rallying point, whether or not we will refer to Carter's moving the troops out of Cuba in the same way we refer to, throughout these hearings, the Kennedy blockade of Cuba, that we could do it then because we were strategically stronger and we can't do it now if it were to occur again.

Well, the opponents of SALT have made it sound like it has occurred again. It has not. They make it sound like it has. And I would be very anxious to see what they have to say.

Senator Sarbanes would like to question you all. I imagine he is on his way back. And I will be back also. I must leave now. Besides, if I didn't come back, with the Cardinal about to testify, I wouldn't be allowed back into Philadelphia anyway. So I will be back shortly.

Thank you very much.

If we could recess for 5 minutes to give Senator Sarbanes time to come back. I apologize for having to do this.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order.

Ambassador YOST. Mr. Chairman, Mrs. King had to leave. She asked me to apologize to you.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Thank you.

Our next member to question is Senator Muskie.

Senator MUSKIE. I apologize for not being here when you read your opening statements, but I have read them all and I have listened to my colleagues in their question period. It gives me a lot of reading time as they all tend to use their 10 minutes, which I think is very useful, and the questions have been good. I really have nothing to add to them.

I particularly liked Senator McIntyre's testimony in which he emphasized two points which tend to get overlooked in the debate over the details of the treaties and the details of asymmetrical defense postures in the two countries.

The first is that the Soviets without the treaty would really be less restrained with respect to future defense spending and arms

buildup than they would be with the treaty. That point, I think, needs to be emphasized over and over again. The treaty itself is not likely to be either the cause or the contributing factor to future Soviet buildup except to the effect that it restrains their potential. Without the treaty, their potential is enhanced.

NO LIMITATIONS ON U.S. OPTIONS

On the other side of that coin, insofar as I know, based upon the testimony I have heard, U.S. options for defense buildup, including strategic nuclear weapons, are not limited in any way that we are now considering. Am I correct in that, Senator McIntyre?

Senator MCINTYRE. That is essentially correct, yes.

Senator MUSKIE. So the net effect of the treaty from that point of view is that the Soviets are restrained with respect to options they would clearly exercise. We are not restrained with respect to options we are considering with or without the treaty.

Senator MCINTYRE. The opponents would clearly say we are restraining ourselves on our GLCM's and our SLCM's, submarine-launched cruise missiles and the ground-launched cruise missiles. But the answer to that, of course, is that these provisions are in the protocol and do not restrict us in any practical way. We cannot deploy these systems before the protocol expires. Moreover, there was no restraint there, really, on our development or testing.

Senator MUSKIE. And with respect to Ambassador Yost, I did find your ten points very useful. I think they are an excellent basis on which to rationalize for the average citizen the pros and cons from the national interest point.

Ambassador YOST. Thank you, sir.

Senator MUSKIE. And I think that must be done.

Finally, I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, it is very useful to bring into these hearings, with the exception of Senator McIntyre and Ambassador Yost, perhaps, the average citizen's perspective on these treaties and to emphasize the values and concerns the average citizen ought to be raising as he or she evaluates the national interest as represented by these treaties.

I think that is terribly important. The polls continue to point out that citizens are for arms control. Yet we have witnesses day after day, technicians, experts getting into the details of the treaty and tending to overlook or to overshadow or to put into a dim light the fundamental reasons why arms control is important.

Mrs. King's testimony highlighted that point. I remember discussing that particular point with Mr. Kosygin in Moscow in 1971, and clearly, we both were influenced by that perspective, the fact that the resources of this world were being drained away from the human needs of this planet's occupants to fuel an arms race which at that time, I think, cost about $200 billion a year. Now Mrs. King uses the figure $400 billion.

The figure changes upward so rapidly it is difficult to stay on top of the latest statistic. But that kind of spending on arms, $400 billion, obviously dilutes the capacity of the world's governments or the will of the world's governments to deal with the problems of the disadvantaged. And the problems of the disadvantaged underlie most of the tensions and confrontations upon the face of this globe.

Were it not for the problems of the disadvantaged, those who seek power would not find power so easily attainable as they now find it. And I think it is those kinds of fundamental concerns that ought to be highlighted as often as possible in these hearings and in the public debate over these treaties. There are risks to moving in the direction of peace. There are incomparably greater risks for moving in the direction of war.

I know that oversimplifies the situation but I find some of the experts oversimplifying, too, and occasionally their oversimplifying ought to be set off against the oversimplification of human beings interested in simply surviving, getting enough to eat and a decent environment in which to raise families and to look forward to a better future.

So I am delighted, Mr. Chairman, that this kind of testimony is now entering the hearings, and I appreciate the testimony we received.

I have no further questions. I think the appropriate questions have been asked and, I think, well answered.

Senator McINTYRE. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McIntyre.

Senator McINTRYE. May I request two charts, "Potential Soviet Strategic Threat in 1985, With or Without SALT," and "U.S. Freedom to Develop Strategic Strength Under SALT II," be included in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. The data will be included in the record as you have requested.

[The information referred to follows:]

U.S. Freedom to Develop Strategic Strength Under SALT II

(supplied by Senator Thomas McIntyre)

		SALT Permits	SALT Prohibits
U.S. Strategic Forces At Sea	Trident I Missile	●	
	Trident II Missile	●	
	Poseidon Missile Improvements	●	
	Trident Submarine	●	
	Advanced Small Strategic Submarine	●	
	Submarine Survivability -- Quietness	●	

		SALT Permits	SALT Prohibits
U.S. Strategic Forces on Land	Air-Launched Cruise Missile--Range	●	
	Air-Launched Cruise Missile -- Penetration	●	
	Advanced Strategic Air-Launched Missile	●	
	B-52 Conversion to Cruise Missile Carrier	●	
	Advanced Cruise Missile Carrier	●	
	B-1	●	
	Advanced Penetrating Bomber	●	
	Improved FB-111	●	
	B-52 Improvements	●	

U.S. Freedom to Develop Strategic Strength Under SALT II

		SALT Permits	SALT Prohibits
U.S. Strategic Forces on Land	M-X Missile	•	
	Minuteman III Missile -- Improved Yield	•	
	Minuteman III Missile -- Fractionation (Piggy Back) Small Pbl's tion		•
	Minuteman II -- Replacements	•	
	Survivable Basing -- M-X	•	
	Survivable Basing -- Minuteman	•	
	Missile Penetration Aids	•	

		SALT Permits	SALT Prohibits
U.S. Theatre Nuclear Forces	Ground-Launched Cruise Missile	•	
	Sea-Launched Cruise Missile	•	
	Mobile Medium-range Ballistic Missile	•	

... determined at hearings of Senate Armed Services Committee, July 23, 1979.

POTENTIAL SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT IN 1985

-- WITH AND WITHOUT SALT --

(supplied by Senator Thomas McIntyre)

	WITH SALT	WITHOUT SALT
SOVIET STRATEGIC MISSILE & BOMBERS	2250*	3000**
SOVIET MIRVED STRATEGIC MISSILES	1200*	1800**
SOVIET MIRVED LAND-BASED STRATEGIC MISSILES	820*	1300***
SOVIET SILO-KILLER WARHEADS	6000***	10,000-15,000***
SOVIET TOTAL STRATEGIC WARHEADS & BOMBS	9500***	13,000-18,000***

* FROM TREATY

** SECRETARY BROWN'S STATEMENT TO THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, JULY 23, 1979

*** DETERMINED IN SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE HEARING, JULY 23, 1979, DURING QUESTIONING OF SECRETARY BROWN AND UNDERSECRETARY PERRY

Senator McIntyre and Ambassador Yost, thank you very much for your testimony. The committee is in your debt.

John Cardinal Krol, the Archbishop of Philadelphia; the Cardinal will appear on behalf of the U.S. Catholic Conference.

Cardinal Krol, we are grateful to you to come to appear as a witness today, and I would invite you to proceed with your testimony as you see fit.

STATEMENT OF JOHN CARDINAL KROL, ARCHDIOCESE OF PHILADELPHIA, ON BEHALF OF THE U.S. CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, WASHINGTON, D.C., ACCOMPANIED BY THE REVEREND J. BRYAN HEHIR AND EDWARD DOHERTY [1]

Cardinal KROL. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, as indicated, I am John Cardinal Krol, Archbishop of Philadelphia. I speak on behalf of the U.S. Catholic Conference [U.S.C.C.] comprising over 350 bishops in the United States, serving more than 50 million Catholics.

Mr. Chairman, I respectfully request that my full written testimony be submitted for the record.

The Chairman. Without objection, your prepared statement will be inserted in the record at the appropriate point.

Cardinal KROL. I am accompanied by Father Bryan Hehir, the one with the Roman collar on my right; Mr. Edward Doherty, on my left, both from the U.S.C.C.

I will confine my remarks to a summary of the complete testimony. At the outset, I express the very sincere gratitude of the Bishops of the U.S. Catholic Conference for the opportunity to present their views on the moral dimensions of the nuclear arms race. My testimony, the testimony which I submit, is divided into three sections. The first section focuses your attention on the moral and religious principles which are applicable. The second section focuses these and applies these principles to certain aspects of the current debate on the SALT II Treaty, and a third section directs your attention to the future beyond SALT II.

Now, the first section, the moral principles underlying my testimony have been enunciated in papal declarations and in the documents of the Second Vatican Council. In these statements, the arms race is condemned as a plague on the human race, a radically defective way of maintaining the peace, and an aggression against the poor of this country and of the world.

The imperative of our age is that all must work to put an end to the arms race and make a real beginning of disarmament, not unilaterally, indeed, but at an equal rate on all sides, on the basis of agreements and backed up by genuine and effective guarantees. These principles are the authentic position of the Catholic Church and of faithful Catholics.

However, the application of these principles to a particular proposal such as the SALT II Treaty admits of a divergence of views. Accordingly, the position I present today, while based on generally accepted principles, is not necessarily a unanimous position among the bishops, nor does it represent all the Catholics in the United States. It is, however, the official position of the U.S. Bishops Conference as adopted by its administrative board. In offering this

[1] See page 127 for Cardinal Krol's prepared statement.

testimony, the bishops seek to fulfill a dual role of responsible citizenship and religious leadership. That dual role requires that we speak the truth plainly.

The Catholic bishops of this country believe that for too long we Americans have been preoccupied with preparations for war. Too long have we been guided by the false criterion of equivalence or superiority of armaments. Too long have we allowed other nations virtually to dictate, albeit obliquely and indirectly, how much we should spend on stockpiling weapons of destruction.

Is it not time to give priority to steps towards peace, to move toward it through gradual, bilateral, negotiated disarmament?

I am here, Mr. Chairman, to support ratification of the SALT II Treaty as a partial and very limited step in the process of halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and moving toward real reductions. The support for ratification is severely qualified because of the moral principles which govern our view of arms control. The massive complexity of the nuclear arms race is something which diplomats and analysts grapple with daily. We respect that technical complexity. We have tried to study and to assimilate it in this testimony.

For the church, however, the nuclear arms race is principally defined, as Mrs. King had said, in religious and moral categories since war in any form raises the question of human rights and human life.

In a nuclear age, the moral imperative to prevent war has taken on a qualitatively new character. From Pius XII to John Paul II, the moral teaching is unequivocal: The nuclear arms race is unreservedly condemned, while the process of arms control and disarmament is urgently commended.

The pursuit of peace is not based on a naive or utopian view of the world. The Christian tradition is eloquent about the vision of peace. It is also realistic about the fact of war. Hence, the Second Vatican Council declared that "governments cannot be denied the right of legitimate self-defense once every means of peaceful settlement has been exhausted."

The perspective of this testimony, therefore, recognizes that some forms of war can be morally legitimate, but judges that nuclear war involving the use of weapons of uncontrolled destructiveness surpasses the boundaries of legitimate selfdefense.

The prohibition of use: It follows that the primary moral imperative of the nuclear age is to prevent any use of nuclear weapons. It is this prohibition which is reflected in the following judgment of the Second Vatican Council:

> Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their population is a crime against God and man himself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation.

It should be noted, Mr. Chairman, that in the sixteen documents of the Second Vatican Council, this was the only formal condemnation issued, there was none other. It reflects the gravity of the moral problem before us in these hearings. The primary purpose of the bishops' support of SALT II is to join in any reasonable effort designed to make nuclear war in any form less likely. Our support of the treaty remains qualified, however, because of the moral paradox of the deterrence policy.

The moral dilemma of deterrence: The moral paradox of deterrence is that its purpose is to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, but it does so by an expressed threat to attack the civilian population of one's adversary. Such a threat runs directly counter to the central moral affirmation of Christian teaching on war: that innocent lives are not open to direct attack.

In their moral statement on strategic policy in 1976, the American Catholic Bishops argued that:

> We must be aware that not only is it wrong to attack civilian populations, it is also wrong to threaten to attack them as a part of a strategy of deterrence.

This moral judgment that the use of strategic nuclear weapons and the declared intent to use them in our deterrence policy are both wrong is a fundamental principle in the U.S.C.C. position. It means that deterrence can be tolerated as a lesser evil than use, as long as serious negotiations are pursued, aimed at phasing out nuclear deterrence. If the pursuit of that goal is forsaken, the moral attitude of the Catholic Church would almost certainly have to shift to one of uncompromising condemnation of both use and possession of nuclear weapons.

Based on these moral principles, we cannot regard the SALT II Treaty as a major achievement in arms control. It certainly is not an arms reduction treaty. It is more accurately characterized as a measure which regulates the expansion of the arms race. Nevertheless, it does set some limits. Consequently, the Catholic Bishops of the United States urge the Senate to ratify this treaty because of the process of negotiation which produced it and the further negotiations which it permits offer the promise of escape from the danger of nuclear holocaust, and from the ethical dilemma of nuclear deterrence.

The second part is the principles governing the current debate on the SALT II Treaty.

The bishops have taken this position in support of SALT II conscious of the objections of those who oppose SALT II. We have serious reservations about the treaty because we know it is a deceleration, not a reversal of the arms race. The analysis of this testimony concludes that the quantitative and qualitative limits on delivery systems and weapons achieved by SALT II are worthy of support. We are sympathetic, however, to those critics, including some of my fellow bishops, who cannot find in the SALT process thus far evidence of real arms reduction. Unless there is movement beyond SALT II toward more substantial measures of arms control, our support of SALT II will be hard to sustain.

We are also aware of the far more numerous opponents of SALT II who criticize the treaty as failing to protect U.S. security. Some argue that the treaty will not prevent the U.S.S.R. from achieving a first strike capability against our land-based missiles which they will then use to change the strategic balance in various parts of the world. Others argue that the perception of the U.S.S.R. having a first strike potential will produce a shift in the global political balance.

I am not a political or technical expert, but I must raise some questions. To the first criticism: Would not the leaders of the U.S.S.R. be insane to initiate a nuclear war, even in the possession of a first strike capability against our ICBM's, when the basic

reality of the nuclear age remains deterrence based on the assured destruction policy? Even those of us who oppose the present policy of deterrence have to recognize its function.

To the second criticism: Can it be argued that an increase of strategic power can so easily be translated by the Soviets into an effective instrument of political influence? Is not the influence of the strategic balance on a particular political situation most complex and unpredictable precisely in those situations of the developing world where forces of nationalism and a plethora of ideological positions are vying for control? Has not the cost of using nuclear weapons on the part of those who employ them deprived these weapons of much of their strategic utility and made their political value equally problematic?

Mr. Chairman, you cited some examples, including Iran and Soviet adventurism in the past, and I ask, has the military superiority of the U.S.S.R. enabled it to achieve a decisive political advantage over its neighbor China? I raise these questions to indicate that while we have examined the objections of those who oppose SALT with the arguments just stated, we have not found them sufficient to deter our support for the treaty. There are risks in the SALT II process, but we believe that they are worth taking to solidify what has been achieved by the treaty and to move beyond it to a more significant reduction.

The third section is beyond SALT II. It is our hope that the U.S. agenda for future negotiations will be bold, I might say a bit bolder than it has been, and imaginative, aimed at demonstrable reductions in both weapons and delivery systems.

We realize, Mr. Chairman, that it has been argued during these hearings that ratification of the treaty should be linked to new and massive programs for expanding and improving U.S. strategic nuclear and conventional forces. Several witnesses have said that SALT II is acceptable precisely because it does not prevent the United States from matching expanding Soviet capabilities. Strategic equivalence has become the new name for the arms race.

At the time of SALT I, Dr. Kissinger was quoted as asking: What good is strategic superiority at these levels of numbers? Are we not justified in asking today whether strategic equivalence is an absolute necessity? Why must we accept this criterion which ties our defense spending to our adversary's decisions, when we now have the potential of destroying every human being in the world four times over?

I have come here today, Mr. Chairman, because we believe in negotiated arms control. Because of that belief, we must question the logic of an absolute adherence to the criterion of strategic equivalence. It would radically distort our intention to have our support of SALT II coupled with plans for new military expenditures. The treaty should be ratified as an arms control measure, not as a maneuver to increase the strategic budget.

The proposed new strategic systems will require a massive outlay of funds at a time of increasing fiscal stringency. The Constitution of the United States calls upon the executive and legislative branches of government not only to provide for the common defense, but also to establish justice, to promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity.

Estimates for the M-X missile alone run from $30 billion upward over the next decade. With the national debt today at over $800 billion, and pressure being exerted on legislative bodies at all levels to reduce expenditures, the investment of $30 billion in one weapons system inevitably will result in new limits on spending for essential human services here and abroad.

It is our recommendation that systems like the M-X, as well as Trident II, should be considered negotiable in return for comparable concessions by the U.S.S.R. in SALT III. We have been told that the aim of SALT III will be deep cuts in the strategic arsenals of both superpowers. We fervently hope, we fervently pray, that this will be true.

Mr. Chairman, the attention of the whole world has been captured by the new Pope John Paul II. He has already taken note of the significance of the SALT II Treaty for world peace. The treaty, he said,

> is not yet a reduction of weaponry or, as could be hoped, a provision for disarmament. But that does not mean that the foreseen measures are not a sign, which we ought to greet with pleasure, of the desire to pursue a dialogue without which every hope of working effectively for peace could vanish.

The Pope asked for prayers "to bring progress to the great cause of laying down weapons and pursuing honest, stable and effective agreements" of peace and concord. It is in this spirit that the U.S. Catholic Conference submits this testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, members of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Cardinal Krol, for an extremely well reasoned, comprehensive statement on the position of the U.S. Catholic Conference on this treaty.

I have been informed that I need to go to the floor to deal with a resolution that is presently being debated that would call for the suspension of all further Senate consideration of SALT until written assurances are received from the President that Soviet forces in Cuba pose no threat to the United States nor to U.S. foreign policy. I think this is an indication of the realities to which I alluded earlier.

But before leaving—and I would then extend to Senator Muskie the balance of my time—I want to say that I appreciate very much the decision that has been made by the Catholic Church and by other churches, Protestant and Jewish churches, to speak out on important political issues when they affect moral principles. Indeed, the core of this whole attempt to bring nuclear arms under some restraint is essentially moral in nature, and I think your statement underscores this very persuasively.

I sometimes think that the great moral blindness of the last century was the institution of human slavery, but the most respectable of our leaders in that period, at least in the early part of the century, were content to raise no questions concerning slavery. Even as the century advanced, it became the subject of a great national debate in which the most respectable people found ways to rationalize and to justify the continued existence of slavery. It came at last to the terrible tragedy of the Civil War before that issue was resolved.

It may well be that the great moral blindness of our times is the nuclear arms race, and most respectable, most powerful world leaders and experts of every kind find ways to rationalize its continuation and to justify it on one basis or another. I think that the great contribution of your statement is to bring us back to the basic moral questions and force us to confront them. I am grateful to you for your statement. It is a very important contribution to the committee's consideration of this treaty.

Senator Muskie, please.

Senator MUSKIE. This is the first time at these hearings I have had a chance to ask the first question, and I really don't have a question so much as a reaffirmation of what Senator Church has just said.

NEED FOR MORAL IMPERATIVE TO BE EMPHASIZED

I was delighted in August to learn that you were interested in coming to this hearing because at that point the hearings, by and large, had emphasized the concerns of people who deal with arms and arms diplomacy, on the impact upon national security, and those who believe that national security was not so threatened that we should ignore the moral imperative involved were concerned that the moral imperative was not being sufficiently emphasized.

It is not that those who were testifying were unaware of the moral imperative; it is just that they were so preoccupied and had been for years in negotiating the means for moving toward a reduction in arms that I am not sure they were as sensitive as they ought to be to the fact that this treaty does not produce a reduction in arms.

At what level a reduction would begin, no one would dare predict. I would not predict that a SALT III Treaty would result in a reduction in arms, or even a leveling off of the arms race. And I think it is important that we be reminded that those kinds of risks lie ahead of us, and indeed, that they would be exacerbated if this treaty is rejected.

So I feel I have been privileged this afternoon, Your Eminence, to listen to your statement. I hesitate to ask questions because your statement is so clearly, carefully structured, thoughtfully produced, and based upon a rather careful study of the record, the issues, the questions, the challenges that have been raised that I doubt that the effect of your statement would be improved by interpretations based upon ad hoc questions put to you by Senators on this side of the table.

RESERVATIONS THAT TREATY DOES NOT GO FAR ENOUGH

There is just one question I would really like to ask, not that the point would be left ambiguous, if it is ambiguous, in the record. You were very careful at the outset to point out that this was the official position of the National Council but that it did not necessarily represent the views of every member or of every bishop.

Would it be accurate to characterize the views of those who have reservations about the statement or about the SALT II Treaty to say that their reservations are based upon a conviction that the treaty does not go far enough in the direction of reducing arms,

rather than that it poses a nonacceptable risk to our national security?

Cardinal KROL. The first part is correct. Their objection is that it simply does not go far enough. We have expressed that reservation. They expected that it should have moved in the direction of reduction, disarmament. And actually it doesn't do that at all. There is no reversal. All it does is control or regulate the growth. And it is precisely, I would say, for that reason that there is a divergence of opinion among the fellow bishops.

It is, I would say, a small minority of bishops, but with great conviction.

Senator MUSKIE. I remember, Cardinal Krol, enjoying your hospitality in Philadelphia, and I remember that the bedroom which I occupied was also occupied by the beautiful painting of the current Pope whose eyes followed one wherever one moved in the room. I have seen those kinds of paintings before, but I had never seen such a dramatic one, or representing a personage whose influence and authority was so overwhelming. I can't say that I slept the sleep of the innocent totally that night under such surveillance, but I would say that your testimony here this morning represents that kind of surveillance from the enormously significant moral position of the Catholic Church, and as a Catholic, I am delighted that it has been used as you have used it here this afternoon.

Cardinal KROL. Thank you, Senator.

Senator MUSKIE. Senator Percy.

Senator PERCY. Your Eminence, we all appreciate your presence here and we respect the position that you have taken.

TELEVISED COVERAGE OF SALT FLOOR DEBATE

I think one of the most disappointing aspects of my consideration of SALT II, which may be one of the most important votes that I will cast in the U.S. Senate, has been the low level of interest seemingly shown by our constituents. There is no comparison with the high level of emotion and interest we saw on the issue of the Panama Canal. Yet in SALT II we are dealing with the future of the human race. We tried to grapple with one of the problems of the nuclear age in the Non-Proliferation Act that we passed in the Congress about 1 year ago, and we are trying to grapple with another aspect of the problem here. I think broadcasting these hearings is important. Your presence, speaking on behalf of such a highly valued group of men and women, is important because it promotes public understanding and helps focus public attention on the importance of this issue.

In your opinion, would it be well for us to try to solve the technical problems and open up the Senate of the United States to television and radio coverage of the SALT debate so the people of this country can share in the debate and grasp its significance as you and the group that you represent have so ably expressed?

Cardinal KROL. Senator, I don't think I would be the best judge of that. One of the problems that you would have in this is that you are showing the perfection of refinement of debate on a matter which is complex and involved. We have tried to apply the moral principles. There are other principles of security and so on, and I don't know whether you could convey that even by the intelligent

and reasonable debates that you have in the Senate. I don't know. I don't think I am a good judge of that. The televising of these hearings has provided some preparation beforehand, and there could be some interest generated through the media if the debate is to be televised. The problem is whether the coverage of the media would be read and to what degree would it be understood. But it would be very helpful to have the people interested and knowledgeable.

There is also a question of priorities. If you want to talk about energy, or inflation, or about the shortage of gasoline, that will command the interest of people. But it seems the people are willing to entrust their elected Representatives and Senators with the SALT II decision. It is your responsibility with clear-minded knowledge and perception and courage to make the decisions. I am here only to help you by casting some light particularly on the moral aspects. As Mrs. King said, this was basically and ultimately a moral issue, which is the same theme that I developed in the first section. But it is up to you gentlemen who have to be courageous—and I appreciate fully the risks involved in the democratic processes of election. I think it was Churchill who said that democracy is the worst form of government in the world but better than any other kind. I realize what you have to face when you have elections. But there is an area where you have to be true to yourself, to the truth, and vote with courage.

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF NATIONS TO DEFEND THEMSELVES

I would like to clarify a point you made. You have pointed out that we ought to move toward de-escalating the arms race and bilaterally eliminate nuclear weapons, if at all possible, in their totality. You said this is a moral issue.

Is it not also true, though, that it is a moral responsibility of the Nation to adequately and properly defend its citizens? We have a case in Lebanon where a nation saw fit not to provide adequate defense for its own borders, its own people, and it has been torn asunder for years now.

Isn't there a moral obligation to see that we adequately provide for our defense so as to deter any aggression?

Cardinal KROL. Yes, I have emphasized that, that the right of self-defense is a sound moral principle for individuals and for nations. The right of self-defense is rooted in the law of nature, and of nature's God. At the same time, there is a basic principle we study in moral theology, "en inculpate tutelae," that is, you can only use as much force as is necessary to repel the aggressor.

Now, when a little child comes at you with a toy baseball bat, you don't run for a machine gun; and it is a crude comparison, but that is the concept involved there, and when you have these nuclear stockpilings on both sides, the basic moral issue is the unprotected civilian. If somebody comes at you with a gun, with arms, you shoot at them, but when you have missiles and nuclear power that wipe out, as were wiped out in Nagasaki, hundreds of thousands of innocent people, unarmed, that is morally indefensible. And the nuclear power inherently has that kind of a potential and for that reason, the bishops oppose nuclear power as a viable weapon.

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REJECTION OF UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT

Senator PERCY. You, as I see your statement, reject unilateral disarmament. When you face an adversary of increasing strength and apparently different moral persuasions than we do, there would be no sense, I would think, in unilaterally disarming. That is why this whole process of bilateral negotiation seems to be the sensible way to go about it.

Do I surmise that you would concur with that conclusion?

Cardinal KROL. Positively, Senator. That was, in fact, Paul VI speaking at the U.N. in 1965, when he made that statement "No more war; war never again," and he insisted disarmament was the first step toward peace. But he added a sentence which is not very frequently quoted. It is on the first page of my testimony: "As long as man remains that weak, changeable, and even wicked being he often shows himself to be, defensive armaments will also be necessary."

On the following page, the "Constitution on the Church in the Modern World" says this, that: "Since peace must be born of mutual trust between peoples instead of being forced on nations through threat of arms, all must work to put an end to the arms race and make a real beginning of disarmament, not unilaterally indeed, but at an equal rate on all sides, on the basis of agreements and backed up by genuine and effective guarantees." That is exactly the principle.

Senator PERCY. Thank you, sir, very much indeed.

Cardinal KROL. Thank you, Senator.

Senator MUSKIE. Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Your Eminence, Senator Muskie said that to ask questions in a sense would detract from the statement and the manner in which it was put together, but being the product of 13 years of Catholic education, I can't resist the opportunity to ask a Cardinal a question.

ADOPT DEFENSE POSTURE BASED ON COUNTERFORCE CAPABILITY

Your Eminence, I am concerned that one of the paragraphs in your statement might be taken out of context. One of the debates that has been raging in this committee for the past 2 months has been whether or not the United States should adopt a defense posture based upon the concept of counterforce capability.

The argument has been made that the policy upon which our nuclear deterrent for the past 20 years has been based, which is mutual assured destruction, is not a good policy, not a workable policy, not a moral policy because it means just what it says: that the Soviets should know that if they were to strike the United States or its allies with nuclear weapons, then, as they say in south Philadelphia, school is out, it is all over.

Now, along come Dr. Kissinger and others and they say we need the M-X missile, we need the enhanced radiation weapon, and we need other things like GLCM's and SLCM's and ALCM's, because we must counter the counterforce capability of the Soviet Union. They, with their big missiles, can strike in the mid-1980's our ground-based missiles and knock out those missiles, and only kill

10 to 20 million Americans, and it is suggested that if the United States were to retaliate massively under that circumstance, then it would be immoral, because the Soviets would retaliate in turn and we would have created mutual suicide. In your statement you say: "The moral paradox of deterrence is that its purpose is to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, but it does so by an expressed threat to attack the civilian population of one's adversary. Such a threat runs directly counter to the central moral affirmation of the Christian teaching on war: that innocent lives are not open to direct attack."

What I am leading to is that I don't see how nuclear weapons of the size that either side has now can be employed in a surgical way, and that a policy which is designed to deter the use of those weapons on civilian populations by essentially saying that we have no option open to us but to respond in kind seems to me to be one of the only ways to preclude the prospect of it occurring. And I just wonder whether or not you can help me as a U.S. Senator deal with that dilemma a little further. Should we be designing weapons that are designed to be surgically used? Is that what our Church is saying?

Cardinal KROL. Senator, after 13 years of Catholic education, I am sure you have heard the expression "the lesser of two evils." There is a goal, there is an ideal. There is a practical reality. You can never lose sight of your goal, but you have got to go through the practical reality to achieve your goal. We do not recommend or favor a counterforce capability. I have described the criterion of strategic equivalence as a false criterion: strategic equivalence is another name for the arms race. What I don't like about it and what I think every thinking American shouldn't like about it is that somebody else is dictating how much we are to spend. As I mentioned in the testimony, we have enough power now to kill all the people in the world four times over. Our development is more than sufficient. Well, what are we going to do with the three other striking forces, and why do we need five? I mean, that is why it is a plague, it is an insanity.

Senator BIDEN. I agree.

Cardinal Krol. But in this question of the deterrence, I have made it plain that we are opposed to the use, even to the threat. But we will take deterrence in the process as the lesser of two evils.

I think it was Senator Hayakawa that talked about the Soviets, what they are doing. I think we have to look not only at their actions, we must try to understand why they act as they do. I think we have to look at the basic integrated philosophy of communism. They refer to it as a dialectical materialism, a dialectic in which we find theses and antitheses, constant tension, constant struggle, all directed to the goal of world domination.

For a while we followed the isolation policy. We would not talk to the Soviets. But that is not the way to pursue truth or get truth to prevail. We are dealing with a people and we know what their ideology and goals are, They have never denied that their ultimate goal is world domination. They have never denied or modified their goal of the extermination of religion. But we are dealing with them not because we approve their ideology, not because we approve all

of their actions, but for the interests of the human race and the human family, we have to try to have or at least acknowledge some principles of truth and agree to some principles. And even when we reach the agreement, we have to be aware of the fact that the track record of performance on agreements by the Soviets is not the best. We come back to another maxim which, as an attorney, you would know, that the law serves the vigilant and not the dormant. We must be alert and vigilant.

The SALT II Treaty, as I tried to point out, is not the world's greatest achievement.

Senator BIDEN. I was hoping, quite frankly, you would answer the question that way. My concern—both as a Senator who is a proponent of SALT and as a practicing Catholic—is that some might very well take that statement of yours out of context, not having had the benefit of the scholastic education.

I felt certain that Your Eminence did not want to be even indirectly associated with being a proponent of a counterforce strategy.

I would like to make one further statement, and although it sounds somewhat gratuitous, I really mean it. It is a sincere statement. I think the Holy Father is going to do more for opening up the East-West dialog and opening up the prospects for more freedom and tolerance in Eastern Europe, and eventually in the Soviet Union, than all the arms control agreements and all the agreements that the superpowers have signed so far. I cannot think of a better choice that could have been made for a Pope. I just got back from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and even Communist leaders within those countries were talking about the impact the Pope has had, although some of them clearly were a little worried about it. And in Western Europe, they are absolutely ecstatic about the impact the Pope is having.

And he is doing it in such a forthright yet tactful way. He is not choosing up sides, east and west and good and bad, but he is having a tremendous impact on the tens of millions of people who had just lost hope. I am really, really proud. It almost makes me want to be Polish.

Cardinal KROL. That is a laudable desire, Senator.

Senator BIDEN. Seriously, I just wanted to tell Your Eminence that from my perspective the Pope's personality and presence have had extensive repercussions at the highest political levels throughout the world. But I am sure Your Eminence already knows that.

Thank you very much for your time.

Senator MUSKIE. I have been trying for years to get Senator Biden to make that kind of a statement about the Poles.

Senator BIDEN. My Irish mother had problems with that, but we may be able to work it out.

Senator MUSKIE. Well, Your Eminence, clearly you made an impression on the committee. I am sorry that other members were not present because of preoccupation with similar duties elsewhere on the floor, but I repeat that I am delighted that you could come, that you made your statement. I think you have made an important contribution, and I look forward, too, to the visit of the Pope. We Poles have got to stick together.

Thank you very much.

[Cardinal Krol's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN CARDINAL KROL

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I am Cardinal John Krol, Archbishop of Philadelphia. I speak on behalf of the U.S. Catholic Conference (USCC) comprising over 350 bishops of the United States, serving more than 50 million Catholics.

I express the sincere gratitude of the USCC for the opportunity to present the views of the Catholic Bishops of the United States on the moral aspects of the nuclear arms race.

I. THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE TESTIMONY

The moral principles underlying my testimony have been enunciated clearly in papal documents and speeches, and in Vatican Council II. Pius XII pleaded on the eve of the World War II: "Nothing is lost by peace, everything may be lost by war" (Aug. 24, 1939). Paul VI speaking to the General Assembly of the U.N. said: "No more war, war never again. Peace must guide the destinies of all peoples and of all mankind. . . . Disarmament is the first step toward peace. . . . As long as man remains that weak, changeable and even wicked being he often shows himself to be, defensive armaments will also be necessary" (Oct. 4, 1965).

Vatican Council II, in its "Constitution on the Church in the Modern World," declared: "The arms race is one of the most grievous plagues of the human race, and it inflicts an intolerable injury upon the world" (para. 81); "The arms race is not a secure way of maintaining true peace, and the resulting balance of power is no sure and genuine path to achieving it" (para 80); "Since peace must be born of mutual trust between peoples, instead of being forced on nations through dread of arms, all must work to put an end to the arms race and make a real beginning of disarmament, not unilaterally indeed, but at an equal rate on all sides, on the basis of agreements and backed up by genuine and effective guarantees" (para 82).

These principles reflect the authentic position of the Catholic Church and of all faithful Catholics. The manner and degree to which these principles are reflected in a particular proposal, such as the SALT II Treaty, admits a divergence of views. For this reason, I recognize, and I want this Committee to know, that while the principles to which we subscribe are clear and generally accepted, the position I present here today is the view of the majority of the Administrative Board of the Bishops Conference; it is not a unanimous position within the Conference of Bishops, nor it it the unanimous position of all Catholics in the United States. It is however the official policy of the U.S. Catholic Conference, and in expressing it, we Bishops seek to fulfill a role of responsible citizenship, as well as the religious leadership.

This role requires me to speak the truth plainly. The Catholic Bishops of this country believe that too long have we Americans been preoccupied with preparations for war; too long have we been guided by the false criterion of equivalence or superiority of armaments; too long have we allowed other nations to virtually dictate how much we should spend on stockpiling weapons of destruction. Is it not time that we concentrate our efforts on peace rather than war? Is it not time we take that first step towards peace: gradual, bilateral, negotiated disarmament?

It is impossible to regard this Treaty as a spectacular achievement in the field of arms control. But we support its ratification as a partial and imperfect step in the direction of halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and as part of an ongoing process, begun in 1972, to negotiate actual reductions in nuclear arms. Our support is, however, heavily qualified precisely because of the moral principles which govern our view of arms control.

No question of foreign affairs surpasses the arms race in terms of moral complexity and moral content. Along with the correlative issue of world poverty, the arms race forms the heart of the moral agenda of foreign policy.

The massive technical complexity of the arms race in its political and strategic dimensions is something that people in our government grapple with daily. We respect that technical complexity and have tried to assimilate it in this testimony. At the same time, for the Church the arms race is principally a problem defined in religious and moral categories. The specter of war, in any form, raises for Christian ethics the central question of the taking of human life. Since the life of every single human person bears the sacred dignity of the image of God, the question of the religious and moral significance of warfare has received more sustained reflection in Roman Catholic theology than almost any other moral problem. From St. Augustine's masterful treatment of war in Chapter 19 of "The City of God" to the Vatican Council II's injunction to the Church that it should "undertake a completely fresh

appraisal of war" there has been present in Catholic tradition an abiding determination to limit the impact of war on the human family.

In the nuclear age, the moral sanctions against war have taken on a qualitatively new character. From Pius XII to John Paul II, the moral argument is clear: the nuclear arms race is to be unreservedly condemned and the political process of arms control and disarmament is to be supported by the Christian community. This pursuit of peace is not based on a naive or utopian view of the world. The Christian tradition is eloquent about the vision of peace; it is also realistic about the fact of war. Hence, Vatican Council II, recognizing the inadequate nature of the political structure of the international community, stated that "governments cannot be denied the right of legitimate self-defense once every means of peaceful settlement has been exhausted". (Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, para. 79.)

The perspective which shapes this testimony, therefore, recognizes that some forms of war can be morally legitimate, but judges that nuclear war surpasses the boundaries of legitimate self-defense. The application of this basic moral principle to our present situation requires that we distinguish two problems of the nuclear age: the use of nuclear weapons and the strategy of deterrence. Both are pertinent to our assessment of the SALT II Treaty.

The prohibition of use.—The primary moral imperative of the nuclear age is to prevent any use of strategic nuclear weapons. This prohibition is expressed in the following passage of Vatican Council II: "Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their population is a crime against God and man himself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation". (The Pastoral Constitution, para. 80.)

This was the only formal condemnation of the Council and indicates the seriousness with which the bishops of the world viewed the possible use of what they called "modern scientific weapons". Our first purpose in supporting SALT II is to illustrate our support for any reasonable effort which is designed to make nuclear war in any form less likely. I have said that our support of the Treaty is qualified; one reason for this is the paradox of nuclear deterrence.

The moral dilemma of deterrence.—The moral paradox of deterrence is that its purpose is to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, but it does so by an expressed threat to attack the civilian population of one's adversary. Such a threat runs directly counter to the central moral affirmation of the Christian teaching on war: that innocent lives are not open to direct attack. The complexity of the moral dilemma is reflected in the statement on deterrence of the American Bishops in 1976: "With respect to nuclear weapons, at least those with massive destructive capability, the first imperative is to prevent their use. As possessors of a vast nuclear arsenal, we must also be aware that not only is it wrong to attack civilian populations but it is also wrong to threaten to attack them as part of a strategy of deterrence. We urge the continued development and implementation of policies which seek to bring these weapons more securely under control, progressively reduce their presence in the world, and ultimately remove them entirely". (To live in Christ Jesus: 1976.)

The moral judgment of this statement is that not only the use of strategic nuclear weapons, but also the declared intent to use them involved in our deterrence policy, are both wrong. This explains the Catholic dissatisfaction with nuclear deterrence and the urgency of the Catholic demand that the nuclear arms race be reversed. It is of the utmost importance that negotiations proceed to meaningful and continuing reductions in nuclear stockpiles, and eventually to the phasing out altogether of nuclear deterrence and the threat of mutual-assured destruction.

As long as there is hope of this occurring, Catholic moral teaching is willing, while negotiations proceed, to tolerate the possession of nuclear weapons for deterrence as the lesser of two evils. If that hope were to disappear the moral attitude of the Catholic Church would almost certainly have to shift to one of uncompromising condemnation of both use and possession of such weapons.

With this in mind, the Catholic Bishops of this country ask the Senate of the United States to ratify this Treaty because the negotiations which produced it, and the further round of negotiations which it permits, offer the promise of escape from the danger of a nuclear holocaust and from the ethical dilemma of nuclear deterrence.

II. THE SALT II TREATY

Nevertheless, we have serious reservations about this Treaty. SALT I had created a hope among people that SALT II would require real reductions on both sides. This hope has not been fulfilled and there is no clear indication that SALT III can revive

that hope. That is why some of my fellow bishops and many more concerned Catholics refuse to support SALT II.

The U.S. proposals of 1977 had significant reductions in view but these were rejected by the U.S.S.R. The present Treaty limits strategic nuclear delivery systems to 2,250 (after 1981) on both sides and this will require the dismantling of about 250 Soviet launchers. Such a reduction is not very significant considering the destructive power (3,550 megatons for the U.S., and 7,868 megatons for the U.S.S.R.) that will remain and continue to increase on each side.

Secondly the Treaty does not preclude either side from proceeding to replace its present land-based ICBMs wth a new system, or modifying existing systems within limits, it is true, as to size and number of warheads but obviously embodying significant improvements in accuracy. These systems will obviously be more destructive.

On the other hand it cannot be argued, as do some critics, that the Treaty does not constrain Soviet strategic weapons expansion. Under the Treaty the U.S.S.R. will not be permitted to deploy an already-tested mobile missile (SS–16); it must count all SS–18 missiles as having multiple warheads though some may not; it must stop its current program of deploying additional missiles with multiple warheads by about 1982 and may not increase the number of warheads in existing missiles.

SALT II is thus basically a deceleration, not a reversal of the nuclear arms race. While the weight of this testimony comes to the conclusion that the quantitative and qualitative limits on delivery systems and weapons constitute an arms control achievement worthy of support, that conclusion becomes harder to defend if one assumes SALT II to be the end of the process. Much more remains to be done.

By far the most numerous opponents of ratification are those who reject the Treaty as failing to protect U.S. security. In particular, there are those who argue that this Treaty will permit the U.S.S.R. to achieve a first-strike capability against our land-based ICBM's, and that they will use this threat to challenge and change the strategic balance in various parts of the world. Can this really be reliably predicted? With the U.S. in possession of a large nuclear arsenal and varied means of delivery would not the leaders of the U.S.S.R. be insane to start, or threaten to start, a nuclear war, even in possession of a first-strike capability vis-a-vis our land-based ICBM's? Can we gainsay the tragic reality that deterrence is still based on the posture and policy of mutual-assured destruction? Even if the U.S.S.R. were to acquire the capability to neutralize the U.S. Minuteman force of ICBM's, is it not clear that the other legs of the Triad will continue to deter a Soviet first-strike, if indeed that were the Soviet intention?

Some critics of the Treaty, however, do not base their opposition mainly on the premise that the U.S.S.R. would risk a first-strike. Rather they argue that the perception in the world of the U.S.S.R. having first-strike capability will lead to an adverse shift in the global political balance. I do not pose as a political or technical expert, but I must ask whether, in the nuclear age, it can be argued that an increment of strategic power can so easily be translated into an effective instrument of political influence. This translation from the strategic balance to specific political conflicts seems particularly complex precisely in those situations in the developing world where forces of nationalism and a plethora of ideological positions are vying for control. The cost of using nuclear weapons on the part of those who employ them has deprived them of much of their strategic utility and has made their political usefulness equally problematical. For example, the U.S.S.R. has not been able to achieve a decisive political advantage vis-a-vis China, despite the former's admitted military superiority.

On balance, we are satisfied that while the Treaty does not require a reduction in nuclear weaponry on either side, at the same time it will not substantially endanger U.S. security. Whatever risks may be involved are worth taking for the sake of ensuring that the SALT II negotiations will be followed quickly by a third round aimed at more significant reductions.

III. BEYOND SALT II

By itself SALT II is no more than a beginning. It creates a certain momentum which should make possible more impressive arms control achievements. If not, our confidence may have been misplaced. What are the prospects?

It is our hope that the U.S. agenda for future negotiations will be bold and imaginative, and that the aim of the negotiators should be real, demonstrable reductions in both weapons and delivery systems. Our negotiating posture should not sacrifice long-term possibilities for real disarmament in the name of short-term tactical advantages in the strategic competition.

It can hardly be a source of satisfaction or pride that the ratification of this Treaty may be in doubt or that an arms control agreement can only be purchased in

conjunction with substantially increased expenditures for other arms. There is a prevalent belief in this country that our national security can only be preserved by the dynamic of technlological development and investment in new and ever more destructive weapon systems. One reads that the decision to deploy the MX missile is a response to such perceptions but perhaps still not sufficient to reconcile opponents of the Treaty.

We have already referred to the opportunities which the Treaty affords for further escalation of nuclear weaponry by both sides. It has been argued during these hearings that ratification of the Treaty should be linked to a new and massive program for expanding and improving U.S. strategic nuclear as well as conventional forces. If the Congress accepts this advice, the hope which I referred to earlier for a reversal of the nuclear arms race will grow even dimmer.

Many of us remember being told by the then Secretary of Defense McNamara in the late sixties that U.S. security depended on U.S. strategic forces being maintained at a level 2 or 3 times greater than that of the U.S.S.R. in terms of deliverable warheads. The United States now has 9,200 strategic nuclear weapons (re-entry vehicles and aerial bombs) compared to 5,000 for the U.S.S.R.; yet we are told we are no longer superior, in fact are facing strategic inferiority, and must exert ourselves to maintain or recover "equivalence". Where McNamara once was confident that neither side would be able to acquire a first-strike capability, we are now told that the U.S.S.R. is acquiring a first-strike capability and that the United States must hasten to do likewise. Witness after witness have told this Committee that SALT II is acceptable precisely because it does not prevent the United States from meeting this challenge. Strategic "equivalence" is the new name for the nuclear arms race!

At the time of SALT I Dr. Kissinger was quoted as asking, "what good is strategic superiority at these levels of numbers?". Are we not justified in asking today, is strategic equivalence an absolute necessity? Is this doctrine not an infallible recipe for continuing the strategic arms race? Are we not moving inexorably toward a situation in which each side has a first-strike capability, a posture and a policy, not of deterrence by mutual-assured destruction, but of readiness for and reliance on the capability for fighting a nuclear war?

We, the Catholic Bishops, find ourselves under the obligation of questioning fundamentally the logic of the pattern of events implied by determined pursuit of strategic equivalence. Our purpose in coming before this distinguished Committee is to speak on moral-religious grounds in support of arms control designed to be a step toward real measures of disarmament. It would radically distort our intention and purpose if our support of SALT II were in any way coupled with plans for new military expenditures. The Treaty should be approved as an arms control measure, not a maneuver to increase the strategic budget.

These proposed new strategic systems will require a massive outlay of funds at a time of increasing fiscal stringency. The Constitution of the United States calls upon the executive and legislative branches of our government not only to provide for the common defense but also to establish justice, to promote the general welfare of the nation and to secure the blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity. Estimates for the M-X missile run from $30 billion upwards over the next decade; with the existing national debt at $805 billion and pressure being exerted on legislative bodies at all levels to reduce expenditures, the investment of $30 billion in one weapons system inevitably will result in new limits on spending for essential human services here and abroad.

This topic of the competition of arms for scarce resources has been an abiding concern for me. Speaking at the Synod of Bishops in 1971 I argued then, and still believe now, that: "The armaments race violates the rights of the world's poor in a way that is fruitless and intolerable. The reason is that it is not the way to protect human life or foster peace, but on the contrary the causes of war are thereby aggravated little by little".

It is our recommendation that systems like the MX, as well as Trident II, should be considered as negotiable in return for equivalent concessions by the U.S.S.R. in SALT III. We have been told that the aim of SALT III will be "deep cuts" in the strategic arsenals of both superpowers; we fervently hope this will be true. As we consider the future of U.S. defense policy, including the deployment of the M-X, it might be well to review one dimension of the SALT I negotiations. At that time, the possibility existed of excluding the deployment of MIRVs; we did not take that option. Now we find that one of the major objections of those opposing SALT II is the threat posed by the Soviets to our land-based ICBM's. The Soviet MIRV capability is a central element of the threat to our ICBM's, a threat which we might have obviated by a different negotiating posture in SALT I. Our hope is that we will carefully consider the M-X, and related decisions in the light of their impact on the

negotiating process of SALT III. Perhaps the most important single strategic arms control step would be the elimination of MIRV's from the respective ICBM forces. Unrealistic as it may seem to hardheaded defense planners, the question should be raised now whether the United States could try immediately to negotiate a lower MIRV level for ICBM's.

IV. SUMMARY

The foregoing testimony may be summarized in the following propositions:

1. Catholics reject means of waging or even deterring war which could result in destruction beyond control and possibly a final holocaust of humanity.

2. In particular, strategic nuclear weapons of massive destructiveness and poisonous regional or global aftereffects must never be used.

3. Consequently, the reduction, through negotiated agreements, and eventually the elimination of such weapons, must be the overriding aim of policy. Without it, there can be only one alternative: the indefinite continuation and escalation of the strategic competition. The doctrine of strategic equality, by itself, does not insure against such competition; rather it almost guarantees it. Some risks must be taken in the direction of control, both to avoid nuclear war and to rescue us from the moral dilemma of nuclear deterrence.

4. SALT II, the result of seven years of negotiation, represents a limited but acceptable agreement which constrains the nuclear forces of both the United States and the U.S.S.R., does not jeopardize U.S. security, and can be the beginning of a continuing and necessary process for obtaining meaningful and progressive reductions. The Treaty should be ratified by the Senate.

5. This process must not be sacrificed to a narrow and technologically oriented insistence upon exploitation of new nuclear options, including counterforce options. In particular, final decisions regarding deployment of the M-X and Trident II should be deferred until the utility of those options for negotiation in SALT III can be explored.

6. Failure by the United States to take full advantage of the possibilities for further restraints and reductions will eventually rob U.S. foreign and defense policy of moral legitimacy.

Mr. Chairman, the attention of the whole world has been captured by the new Pope, John Paul II. He has already taken note of the significance of the SALT II Treaty for World peace. The Pope's remarks came in his weekly Sunday talk before leading the noon Angelus in St. Peter's Square. The SALT accord, he said, "is not yet a reduction of weaponry or, as could be hoped, a provision for disarmament. But that does not mean that the foreseen measures are not a sign, which we ought to greet with pleasure, of the desire to pursue a dialogue, without which every hope of working effectively for peace could vanish."

"Believers and men of goodwill who feel themselves so impelled by conscience to pledge themselves as 'artisans of peace' cannot ignore the importance of anything that favors a climate of alleviating tensions. This helps to encourage other indispensable progress on the road to limitation and reduction of armaments".

The Pope asked for prayers "to bring progress to the great cause of laying down weapons and pursuing honest, stable and effective agreements" of peace and concord. It is with such sentiments that the U.S. Catholic Conference submits this testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee.

Senator MUSKIE. Our next witness is Claire Randall, General Secretary of the National Council of Churches.

STATEMENT OF DR. CLAIRE RANDALL, GENERAL SECRETARY, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES, ACCOMPANIED BY ALLEN GUYER [1]

Dr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairperson, I am Claire Randall, the general secretary of the National Council of Churches. I am accompanied by Dr. Allen Guyer who is one of a very large number of persons within the churches' ranks who have given serious and careful thought to these issues and who are the ones who advise and guide and help boards and agencies and executives as we try to deal with these complex issues. Therefore we work not only from our moral

[1] See page 136 for Dr. Randall's prepared statement.

understandings but from some of the technical aid that we do receive.

I would like alsc to say just briefly that 22 church bodies have made statements, copies of which will be coming to all Senators shortly, in support of SALT II, which we think is a very important matter, and 27 such churches and others have come together in a coalition, the Religious Committee on SALT II, which is working at this very hard and is reaching out across the country in education and information ways.

So it is that we are, as churches, working on this issue.

I might also just interject here as my friend Coretta King interjected some other pieces that perhaps have not been presented here, that there are many women in this country who not only as mothers but in other ways are deeply concerned about the issues that are before us in the SALT II discussion. And certainly the churches feel that this is a life and death issue, and therefore it is a theological and moral issue, as has been pointed out.

I would like to share briefly with you some of what the Council of Churches would have me say in this case, and also to point out that we are made up of 32 denominations in this country, which includes the six large black Baptist and Methodist churches and the eight or so orthodox churches, not just the mainstream Protestant churches, which I think is important to know.

And the National Council of Churches has, since its formation 30 years ago, given leadership among the Protestant and Orthodox churches to the struggle for peace and justice. The council came into existence shortly after the world had witnessed the devastating effects of nuclear weapons, and its leadership and the members of the churches ever since have been keenly aware of the danger to all humanity posed by the threat of nuclear war, and in a sense, the line that we have gone across as we have entered into a nuclear age.

In the Old Testament, we are told to beat our swords into plowshares. In the New Testament we are asked not to return evil for evil but to love our neighbors. These biblical injunctions, because we believe these principles expressed in action, create the climate which leads to just, peaceful relations between peoples and nations. These biblical injunctions must be listened to in our opinion.

At its meeting in May of this year, the governing board of the National Council of Churches voted unanimously, and I might say enthusiastically, in favor of the ratification of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. It is my purpose in this testimony to set forth some of the reasons the National Council supports ratification. We have based our testimony on the short phrases that are a part of the introduction to the SALT II Treaty. I will not read those phrases but simply comment at this point on them.

The United States already has in its nuclear arsenal, as you well know, enough nuclear weapons to kill every man, woman, and child in the world, not once, but several times. And once is too much, and more is impossible, and thus an absurd idea. And even limited use of this power would visit devastation on future generations as well as the present due to radiological contamination. The devastation of every major Soviet city by U.S. nuclear weapons might achieve what defense planners call a strategic objective. But

the winds that sweep round the globe would bring deadly radiation to the United States even if no Soviet bombs explode in the United States. And so there are devastating consequences for humankind.

In SALT II, the United States and the U.S.S.R. are mutually agreeing to limit strategic offensive arms. Our country and the Soviet Union have opposing ideological, political and economic systems, but unless all humanity is to be endangered, these two major powers must find ways to improve relations. The treaty provisions which limit arms are of vital significance, but we must not underestimate the symbolic importance of the two superpowers' ability to reduce tension and danger by mutual agreement without resort to war. The ratification of the treaty by these two nations with such opposing views would give evidence to all the world that differences between nations can be dealt with by peaceful means.

While the treaty is a symbol of mutual trust, it does not depend for its success on mutual trust, and there have been those who testified to help us come to that conclusion.

In 1968, under pressure from the United States and the Soviet Union, many nations renounced nuclear weapons for themselves and joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Article VI contains a promise made by the superpowers to make progress in reducing and eliminating their nuclear arsenals and to move quickly toward completion of a ban on all nuclear testing.

In affirming a statement that was drawn up by leaders of the National Council of Churches and representative leaders of Soviet churches this spring, the governing board of the National Council expressed profound concern about the danger of a precarious balancing of humanity on the brink of a nuclear catastrophe. We know that still more terrible weapons are being developed which can only lead to far greater fear and suspicion, and thus to a still more feverish arms race. Against this we say with one voice: No. In the name of God, no.

Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is ready to accept a treaty which gives the other nation strategic offensive superiority. The United States and the U.S.S.R. weapons systems are not identical. Therefore, an element of judgment is involved in determining parity. After long, careful negotiations, agreement has been reached which most American military and intelligence leaders have testified provides equality and equal security. We have indicated some of those facts which we believe lead us to agree that this is something which we can believe.

Without an agreement setting limits on the arms race there can be no strategic stability. Each side will inevitably make huge investments to achieve what is perceived as superiority. The fear that the other nation is achieving strategic superiority has fueled the arms race already between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

SALT II does not reduce U.S. arms. It only sets a ceiling. Without such a mutually agreed upon ceiling, both countries would be tempted to an arms race which would use scarce resources, divert scientific research from avenues designed to benefit all human kind, and in fact endanger rather than enhance the security of the United States. Our Nation's security does not depend solely on its military might. It depends as much on our economic stability and

fairness, our technical competence, and the faith of the people that our Government is truly benefiting all its citizens.

The nations of the world, in 1978, spent more than a billion dollars a day on armaments. We are informed that the World Health Organization required a mere $83 million to eradicate smallpox from this Earth. The United States now has an unacceptable rate of inflation, millions of its citizens are unemployed, and perhaps more will be, almost 20 percent of the population is illiterate. The true strength of a nation is the strength of its people. The only rewards of an arms race with no limitations are widespread moral devastation, cynicism, hopelessness, and possibly even the end of civilization.

So surely limiting the arms race meets the interests of both parties.

While pressing for the earliest possible approval of the SALT accords, the National Council of Churches governing board affirmed that while we understand that SALT II does not provide for more substantial arms reduction, it does provide a new and essential framework of parity for negotiating substantial and equal reductions in SALT III, and further steps in the direction of general and complete disarmament. It promises a new opportunity to consolidate institutions for halting the spread of nuclear weapons. The success of SALT II would open the way to decisive progress on other critical disarmament issues. It would enable our two governments, speaking of the U.S.S.R. and the United States, to share more fully in the constructive works of peace in economic, technical, and cultural affairs. It would help to promote a new climate of international relations in general.

Limiting the arms race by ratifying SALT II is an important step, but it is only one step among many that must be taken. SALT II limits the arms race. It does not reduce it. SALT II does not deal with the vital matter of nuclear nonproliferation. It does not ban chemical or radiological arms, but by limiting strategic arms, the National Council believes SALT II helps to establish a climate in which work in these vital areas can proceed.

The joint statement on subsequent negotiations, which is attached to SALT II, established the framework for negotiating further limitations and reduction in the numbers of strategic arms and so on. Thus, the ratification of SALT II not only limits the current strategic arms race but helps make possible negotiations looking forward to an actual arms reduction.

And so the statement that the governing board of the National Council affirmed expressed profound anxiety for the future of our own and all peoples. It was encouraged by certain things that had been taking place showing that the peoples of the world are calling for disarmament.

Ratification of SALT II is not full disarmament or the establishment of peace. But we believe it promises a new opportunity to consolidate institutions for halting the spread of nuclear weapons, opens the way to decisive progress on other critical disarmament issues, and enables the governments of the United States and the U.S.S.R. to share more fully in the constructive works of peace in economic, technical and cultural affairs. Therefore, we urge ratification of SALT II.

May I say that actions by this U.S. Senate can and do affect the well being of all the world's peoples. We urge you to remember that as you deal with this critical treaty I am sure you do, but we would emphasize that for you.

And may I be bold enough to close with a challenge to you from the book of Deuteronomy:

"I have set before you life and death, blessing and curse, said the Lord. Therefore choose life, that you and your descendants may live." This is the strongest feeling that we in the churches I think have. It is embodied in that biblical quotation.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Randall, for an excellent statement, I must say.

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES SPREADING WORD OF SALT SUPPORT

I wonder what the National Council of Churches is doing to spread the word. You clearly feel very strongly about the treaty and the need for the Senate to ratify the treaty. But the Senate, being a representative body, is influenced by the people who live in each of the 50 States, and what is the National Council of Churches of Christ doing to spread this message?

Dr. RANDALL. There are several things that we are doing. We have staff and committees that work on these matters in trying to get the materials and the educational information prepared. We had this consultation in the spring for three days with church leaders from the U.S.S.R. in which we were miraculously, I think, able to make a statement together calling for this kind of understanding of the life and death matters that we are dealing with. This statement has been widely used and is being widely disseminated, and I think has a strong religious appeal because of its very basic religious tone.

In addition, I mentioned before you came back in that there are 22 church bodies that have made statements in support of SALT II, copies of which are being sent to Senators.

We also are part of the coalition, the Religious Committee on SALT II, which is one way we are attempting to consolidate our efforts of education and information being sent out. And I have been informed of the fact that this material and this kind of education is beginning to spread around, and the interesting thing is that when such education is made available to people, and the opportunity to think along these lines, that there is a very real appreciation and understanding and support for this direction, an understanding of its limitations, but also of its necessity.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I would expect so, but I am keenly aware of the money that is being raised and the rather frenetic effort on the part of certain organizations opposed to the treaty to saturate the country with arguments and frightening charges with respect to what the treaty would do. I don't think that advocates of the treaty have done as much to try and get their message out.

The message you bring to us today is a splendid one, as I have said, but I would urge you to do everything in your power to reach your own membership with it.

Dr. RANDALL. We are urging, and have been urging the churches, the individual churches to work through the many channels that they have on this.

We are quite aware of the problem which you have expressed, and we find that a difficult problem to deal with also since, as we all know, the kinds of monetary resources which such groups have are not available to the mainstream of the church in the same way. But we have analyzed and are analyzing that situation, trying to find those ways in which we can respond, go around or counterbalance that very problem, and we shall continue to do more.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for your testimony.

Dr. RANDALL. Thank you.

[Dr. Claire Randall's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. CLAIRE RANDALL

My name is Claire Randall. I am general Secretary of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A.

The National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. is a cooperative agency of thirty-two Protestant and Orthodox bodies in this country. I do not purport to speak for all members of the communions which are constituent to the National Council of Churches. I am speaking for the Governing Board, the policymaking body which is composed of persons selected by member denominations in proportion to their size. It is this group which determines the policy positions through which the Council seeks to fulfill its expressed purpose "to study, and to speak and to act on conditions and issues in the nation and the world which involve moral, ethical and spiritual principles inherent in the Christian gospel."

The National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. has since its formation 30 years ago given leadership in the Protestant and Orthodox churches to the struggle for peace and justice. The Council came into existence shortly after the world had witnessed the devastating effects of nuclear weapons, and its leadership and the members of the churches ever since have been keenly aware of the danger to all humanity posed by the threat of nuclear war.

In the Old Testament we are told to beat our swords into plowshares. In the New Testament we are asked not to return evil for evil but to love our neighbors as ourselves—and, in fact, to love our enemies. We seek peace, but only because of these biblical injunctions, but because we believe these principles expressed in action create the climate which leads to just, peaceful relations between peoples and nations.

At its meeting in May, 1979, the Governing Board of the National Council of Churches voted unanimously in favor of the ratification of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. It is my purpose in this testimony to set forth some of the reasons the National Council of Churches supports ratification. My remarks will be related to the purpose of the Treaty as stated in its introduction: "Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind (Preamble, SALT II Treaty, 1979), * * *."

The United States already has in its nuclear arsenal enough nuclear weapons to kill every man, woman and child in the world, not once, but several times. Once is too much. And even limited use of this power would visit devastation on future generations as well as the present due to radiological contamination. The devastation of every major Soviet city by U.S. nuclear weapons might achieve what defense planners call a strategic objective. But the winds that sweep 'round the globe would bring deadly radiation to the U.S.A. even if no Soviet bombs explode in the U.S.A. Such "devastating consequences for all mankind" must be prevented.

Convinced that the additional measures limiting strategic offensive arms provided for in this treaty will contribute to the improvement of relations between Parties, help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strengthen internationally peace and security (Preamble), * * *.

In SALT II the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. are mutually agreeing to limit strategic offensive arms. Our country and the Soviet Union have opposing ideological, political, and economic systems, but unless all humanity is to be endangered these two major powers must find ways to improve relations. The Treaty provisions which limit arms are of vital significance. But we must not underestimate the symbolic importance of the two "super powers'" ability to reduce tension and danger by mutual agreement—without resort to war. The ratification of the Treaty by two

nations with such opposing views give evidence to all the world that differences between nations can be dealt with by peaceful means.

While the Treaty is a symbol of mutual trust it does not depend for its success on mutual trust. Article XV provides for verification of compliance. The chief military and intelligence officers of our nation have said the United States is capable of verifying Soviet compliance. We believe the Treaty does, in fact, "help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strengthen international peace and security."

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Preamble), * * *

In 1968 under pressure from the United States and the Soviet Union many nations renounced nuclear weapons for themselves and joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Article VI contains a promise made by the super powers to make progress in reducing and eliminating their nuclear arsenals and to move quickly toward completion of a ban on all nuclear testing.

The Governing Board of the National Council of Churches, in May, 1979, expressed profound concern about the danger of a precarious balancing of humanity on the brink of nuclear catastrophe. We know that still more terrible weapons are being developed which can only lead to greater fear and suspicion and thus to a still more feverish arms race. Against this we say with one voice—No! In the name of God—No!

Guided by the principle of equality and equal security (Preamble), * * *

Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is ready to accept a treaty which gives the other nation strategic offensive superiority. The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. weapons systems are not identical. Therefore, an element of judgment is involved in determining parity. After long, careful negotiations, agreement has been reached which most American military and intelligence leaders have testified provides "equality and equal security." We note the United States now has almost twice as many deliverable strategic nuclear warheads as the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. has 1,400 land based missiles versus 1,054 in the U.S.A. and 950 submarine launched ballistic missiles to 656 in the U.S.A. Both nations in the Treaty have agreed to an overall ceiling of 2,250 nuclear delivery vehicles by 1985, with equally important sub-limits in various categories (U.S. Department of State, 1978). The agreed upon verifiable limits, we believe, do provide "equality and equal security."

Recognizing that the strengthening of strategic stability meets the interests of the Parties and the interests of international security (Preamble), * * *

Without an agreement setting limits on the arms race there can be no strategic stability. Each side will inevitably make huge investments to achieve what is perceived as superiority. The fear that the other nation is achieving strategic superiority has fueled the arms race between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.

SALT II does not reduce U.S. arms. It only sets a ceiling. Without such a mutually agreed upon ceiling both countries would be tempted to an arms race which would use scarce resources, divert scientific research from avenues designed to benefit all human kind and, in fact, endanger rather than enhance the security of the United States. Our nation's security does not depend solely on its military might. It depends as much on our economic stability and fairness, our technological competence, and the faith of the people that our government is truly benefiting all its citizens.

The nations of the world, in 1978, spent more than a billion dollars per day—400 billion per year—on armaments. We are informed that the World Health Organization required a mere 83 million dollars to eradicate smallpox from the face of the earth. The United States now has an unacceptable rate of inflation, millions of its citizens unemployed, almost 20 percent of the population illiterate. The true strength of a nation is the strength of its people. The only rewards of an arms race with no limitations are widespread moral devastation, cynicism, hopelessness, and possibly even the end of civilization.

Surely limiting the arms race "meets the interests of the Parties and the interests of international security."

Reaffirming their desire to take measures for the further limitation and for the further reduction of strategic arms, having in mind the goal of achieving general and complete disarmament (Preamble), * * *

While pressing for "the earliest possible approval of the SALT II accords," the National Council of Churches Governing Board affirmed: "While we understand that SALT II does not provide for more substantial arms reduction, it does provide a new and essential framework (of parity) for negotiating substantial and equal reductions in SALT III, and further steps in the direction of general and complete disarmament. It promises a new opportunity to consolidate institutions for halting the spread of nuclear weapons. The success of SALT II would open the way to decisive progress on other critical disarmament issues. It would enable our two

governments to share more fully in the constructive works of peace in economic, technical and cultural affairs. It would help to promote a new climate of international relations in general."

Declaring their intention to undertake in the near future negotiations further to limit and further to reduce strategic offensive arms (Preamble), * * *.

Limiting the arms race by ratifying SALT II is an important step, but it is only one step among many that must be taken. SALT II limits the arms race. It does not reduce it. SALT II does not deal with the vital matter of nuclear nonproliferation. It does not ban chemical or radiological arms. But by limiting strategic arms the NCC believes SALT II helps to establish a climate in which work in these vital areas can proceed.

The joint statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms which is attached to SALT II establishes the framework for negotiating "further limitation and reduction in the numbers of strategic arms, as well as for their further qualitative limitations." Thus the ratification of SALT II not only limits the current strategic arms race but helps make possible negotiations looking forward to an actual arms reduction.

The NCC Governing Board's May 1979 statement expressed "profound anxiety for the future of our own and all peoples." It was encouraged by the unprecedented range of disarmament negotiations; by the strengthening of the more significant measures taken by the United Nations for disarmament; by the renewed vitality of nongovernmental organizations in the disarmament field; and by the indications that the peoples of the world are calling for disarmament.

Ratification of SALT II is not full disarmament or the establishment of peace. But we believe it promises a new opportunity to consolidate institutions for halting the spread of nuclear weapons, opens the way to decisive progress on other critical disarmament issues, and enables the governments of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. to share more fully in the constructive works of peace in economic, technical and cultural affairs. Therefore, we urge ratification of SALT II.

Actions by this United States Senate can and do affect the well being of all the world's peoples. We urge you to remember that as you deal with this critical Treaty. Therefore, may I close with a challenge to you from the book of Deuteronomy: "I have set before you life and death, blessing and curse. Therefore choose life, that you and your descendants may live" (Deuteronomy 30:19).

NOTES

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Vienna, Austria, June 18, 1979.

U.S. Department of State. SALT and American Security, November 1978.

PREAMBLE TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Vienna, Austria, June 18, 1979

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 29, 1972,

Attaching particular significance to the limitation of strategic arms and determined to continue their efforts begun with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, of May 26, 1972,

Convinced that the additional measures limiting strategic offensive arms provided for in this Treaty will contribute to the improvement of relations between the Parties, help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strenghten international peace and security.

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Guided by the prinicple of equality and equal security,

Recognizing that the strengthening of strategic stability meets the interests of the Parties and the interests of international security,

Reaffirming their desire to take measures for the further limitation and for the further reduction of strategic arms, having in mind the goal of achieving general and complete disarmament,

Declaring their intention to undertake in the near future negotiations further to limit and further to reduce strategic offensive arms,

The CHAIRMAN. Our last witness this afternoon is Albert Vorspan, who represents the Union of American Hebrew Congregations here in Washington.

Mr. Vorspan, it is a pleasure to welcome you to the committee this afternoon. I am sorry that you have had to wait so long. It is now a little after 5 o'clock, so please proceed with your testimony.

STATEMENT OF ALBERT VORSPAN, VICE PRESIDENT, UNION OF AMERICAN HEBREW CONGREGATIONS,[1] ACCOMPANIED BY RABBI DAVID SAPERSTEIN, DIRECTOR, RELIGIOUS ACTION CENTER OF REFORM JUDAISM, AND COCHAIR, RELIGIOUS COMMITTEE ON SALT

Mr. VORSPAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and despite the lateness of the hour, I do want to thank you and the committee for this opportunity. I am really grateful for this opportunity because I think what happened here this afternoon—I am grateful that I had to sit through it, too—what I think happened this afternoon is something which, to me, is indispensible to the SALT debate—that this debate has been placed in a moral framework. The issue of what is right, the issue of the future of the human race has been voiced and echoed this afternoon not only from the profound testimony of Roman Catholic and Protestant religious leaders, but if I may say so, from that side of the podium as well.

And if I can say, I think we have all failed to some extent in posing the issue in terms of these very fundamental dimensions. I think most Americans, while they in general support the idea of SALT, are intoxicated with and mystified by what they read about this debate and these issues. And the reason I believe that the discussion this afternoon was very important is that in my understanding of what SALT signifies, the testimony of the Cardinal, the testimony of the distinguished Protestant leader, the testimony of rabbis and other religious leaders are as relevant to the deepest issues involved here as the testimony of a general or an admiral presently serving or retired, and I am very grateful for the opportunity to have been part of that.

My name is Albert Vorspan. I am the vice president of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations. This is the central body of Reformed Judaism in the United States of America.

In the interest of time, Mr. Chairman, being very conscious of the weight of discussions here, including many repetitive discussions, I am going to be very brief. I would like the opportunity to submit a longer, more detailed statement for the record.

The Chairman. Of course.

Mr. VORSPAN. But I will only spend a few minutes summarizing in sharp telescope some of the things that seem to me to be very important.

The organization that I represent includes 720 Reform synagogues throughout the United States, roughly 1 million members. Like the distinguished people who sat here earlier today, I do not pretend for one moment that every member of every one of those synagogues shares the view adopted by the board of the Union. But I do say that it was very significant that after a study of an entire year, with proponents and opponents of the SALT Treaty being

[1] See page 143 for Mr. Vorspan's prepared statement.

brought before our group, in the end, the decision that was made was a unanimous decision, I think an enthusiastic decision, and I think, the onus is on us as it is on every other religious group to bring that message to our people, to the people in this country, and to oppose it in terms of the issues of choosing life.

With me today is Rabbi David Saperstein, who is the director of the Religious Action Center of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations here in Washington. I want to echo what has been said, but I will do it very, very briefly. I think many Americans have been led to believe that the choice faced by the Senate and the American people is a choice between SALT II and some ideal treaty. The choice, as I think we have heard it today, is that however disappointed many of us are that SALT II does not go nearly far enough, that SALT II is in some measures almost cosmetic and atmospheric; despite that, what we are talking about is a SALT II compared to what? And it seems to me that the "compared to what" is the nightmare of chaos which can lead ultimately, inevitably only to profound tragedy for the human race.

I am one of those who shares the disappointment that this step is too small, but I am also one of those who believes that this treaty must be weighed against events happening in an onrushing way every minute of the day. SALT II cannot be seen in a vacuum because it seems to me that forces are converging on us, on all the human beings on this planet which make it absolutely essential someday, somehow, for the human race to get a handle on this struggle. And those events include the following: The immense size of the superpowers' arsenal; the fact that the nuclear club is expected to increase sevenfold by the year 1990, from 5 to 35 nations; the massive resort by dozens of countries to nuclear technology as an energy source following the energy crisis of 1973 and 1974; the mounting prospects of the utilization by terrorist groups of stolen fissionable material, or even tactical nuclear weapons; the rising curves of hostility and violence in regions such as Southeast Asia, the Korean Peninsula, the Persian Gulf, Southern Africa, and Latin America, and the potential that these tensions can trigger or escalate a nuclear conflict; the ongoing conventional and nuclear arms race, reaching $400 billion in military expenditures this year alone; the lack of firm or coherent policies of security and disarmament at the highest levels of the Government of the United States and U.S.S.R.

I share with the distinguished witnesses who sat here earlier today the belief that mankind faces, as the Senate faces, a penultimate choice, a moment of truth, the kind of choice which God set out for us in the book of Deuteronomy: "I have set before you this day the blessing and the curse, life and death, good and evil. Therefore, choose life in order that you may live."

I speak also as a representative of a Jewish organization and that Jewish organization has deep concerns about our fellow brothers and sisters in all parts of the country, and one of the aspects of this debate which resonates within the Jewish community is the question: Does our support for SALT II relate to our concern for Soviet Jewry and progress toward peace in the Middle East and would it be good or bad for those issues? Proponents of linkage argue that we should refuse to ratify SALT II unless the U.S.S.R.

improves its human rights performance and supports progress toward peace in the Middle East. Deep as is our concern for Jews in the Soviet Union and other people in the Soviet Union, deep as is our commitment to peace in the Middle East, we believe that SALT II must be examined and measured and judged on its own merits. Our support for SALT II in no way signifies our approval of Soviet domestic or international policies. The SALT Treaty is of momentous intrinsic moral and strategic interest. It is deserving of ratification on its own merits. If the world disappears into a nuclear holocaust, our concerns for human rights and peace become irrelevant. Human life is the ultimate civil and human right.

In fact, however, SALT II can only help to improve the situation of Soviet Jewry and other dissidents, and others seeking to emigrate. Recently Senator Kennedy put this problem to Andrei Sakharov, one of the truly courageous fighters for human rights in the Soviet Union. Senator Kennedy reported, and I quote,

> When I met last year with Andrei Sakharov in Moscow he stressed that the greatest threat to humanity and human rights is the threat of nuclear war. His plea to us is to ratify SALT: not only to reduce the threat of nuclear war but also to create the mutual confidence necessary to resolve the other important issues between the Soviet Union and the United States. Let the advocates of linkage explain how the cause of human rights in the Soviet Union will be served by Senate refusal to ratify SALT.

I firmly believe that it is in the interest of Jews in the Soviet Union, of persons of all religious faiths, seeking liberalization and seeking the right to emigrate, if the stability that is involved in SALT II can be formalized and extended.

I want to conclude, Mr. Chairman, by indicating that I believe religious organizations in this country and the U.S. Senate share in one sense a certain responsibility, and that responsibility is what you, Mr. Chairman, spoke to, I believe with great eloquence, earlier today.

One of the great moments in my life in dealing with public issues in the United States was on that day when Protestant, Catholic and Jewish religious bodies stood together in this Chamber, in this Senate, to speak for civil rights at a time when that issue was in danger of becoming embroiled in political considerations only. And I think SALT is in a similar condition today.

And I want to pledge at least for my small group that we will do all in our power to raise the moral issue, to educate our people, to expose them to both sides and to deal with the fundamental religious and moral message which I believe SALT bears for the human race. What this Senate can say can be a proclamation heard throughout the world, a proclamation unlike that made by a person named Isaiah centuries ago, that the joint benefits for both sides outweigh even deep differences, that there are ways besides bloodshed for nations to redress grievances and resolve disputes, that nations need not be prisoners and hostages of a bitter, unremitting past. We can be the shapers of a better world and a more hopeful future, that humankind is not inexorably doomed to repeat the disasters of history. What always was, need not always be.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Vorspan.

I have been reading from your statement parts that you were unable to recite in order to save time. I must say that it is an

extremely moving and profound statement, and I would want it to appear in the record in its entirety.

Mr. VORSPAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You made an argument that is often overlooked which is that the most fundamental human right of all is the right to exist. The development of nuclear weapons has put the right of existence in jeopardy, the existence of our people, our national civilization, that of the Soviet Union, and indeed, who knows, depending upon the scope and ferocity of the nuclear holocaust, a full scale nuclear exchange, perhaps the survival of the human race itself. And all other rights, however important they may be to the condition of life, rest upon that base.

Mr. VORSPAN. I made that argument not as a unilateral disarmament advocate in any way, but I do believe that there is a kind of a readiness, a kind of a weariness that prepares people for talking in terms of 10 million, 20 million, 40 million, 60 million in ways in which those figures lose all sense of meaning whatsoever. And then somebody comes along and says well, we have miscalculated, there is a way to survive this thing. It really is only 35 million. But there is an obscenity involved in that, and I think it is the weary acceptance of the fundamental premise of the way we have been doing business as a civilization, about which I am talking now. And therefore I think that the reverence for life, the concern for the preciousness of life, while it sounds like a cliche and a sermon that we ask clergymen to come and deliver to us, is really the heart of the matter that we are talking about.

So I am grateful to you for your question.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that the answer must be found in the mutual recognition of the foolishness and futility of an unrestrained nuclear arms race, and the need for both the United States and the Soviet Union as the two so-called superpowers to not only check the acceleration of nuclear arms, but to begin to reverse the trend, reduce the danger, and ultimately, if a sufficiently effective inspection and control system can be devised, to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely from the face of the Earth.

When you consider the importance of that goal and how far we are from it, SALT II becomes a very small step indeed, but it is something, it moves in the right direction, and it keeps the journey alive.

Mr. VORSPAN. The alternative to it, if I may say so, may doom forever the possibility of the kind of dream and the kind of vision we have been talking about here.

The CHAIRMAN. There is that risk.

No one knows for sure but there is that risk.

Thank you very much for your statement.

Mr. VORSPAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you.

Thank you very much also, Mr. Vorspan. I join the chairman in the observations which he has made and I assure you that it is a matter of deep gratification to me that there is such a parallel approach between a Jewish representative here as with the Catholic and Protestant representatives. I was not here when the Cardinal testified, but I read his statement and I had a verbatim report

of it; there is an extraordinary parallelism. That, I think, is extremely gratifying. Of course, Dr. Claire Randall who testified for the Protestant denominations took exactly the same attitude.

So I can only tell you that all of us here on this committee, whether we are for or against the treaty, have the same motivation, and I think for Senator Church and myself and many other members, you can be sure that we know that in this matter we are trying to do the Lord's work. Therefore, it deserves, more than diligence, more than skill, more than dedication; it deserves passion, which I am trying to give it and so is the chairman. I am very impressed by your testimony and it is extremely useful.

Mr. VORSPAN. Thank you, Senator.

[Mr. Vorpan's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALBERT VORSPAN

Good afternoon. I am Albert Vorspan. With Rabbi David Saperstein, the Director of the Religous Action Center of Reform Judaism and co-chair of the Religious Committee on SALT, I am here today to share with you the position on SALT II of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations which I serve as Vice-President. The UAHC represents over one million American Reform Jews in 700 congregations throughout the country. After a year of investigation and discussion, the Board of Trustees of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations voted unanimously in favor of ratification of the SALT II Treaty explaining, in part, that "in keeping with our mandate to 'seek peace and pursue it,' we see in the SALT process the most realistic chance for checking an insane, wasteful and potentially catastrophic nuclear arms race."

A JEWISH IMPERATIVE

This is not the first time that members of the Jewish community have testified publicly on behalf of arms control and disarmament. "They shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning-hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more." These words of Isaiah, echoing down through the centuries have been eloquent testimony of our commitment to disarmament. To ignore those words now is to impreil humankind. Since Hiroshima the prospect of warfare has been raised to a qualitatively different order of risk. We have always had warfare—but never the capacity to destroy human life and to make the world unliveable. Nuclear warfare requires a moral revolution, a revolution in which human life and peace must take precedence over worshipping the idols of production, technics, strategic superiorities and the military-industrial-complex. Because we address the issue of SALT II in this context, we have joined with 26 other national Catholic, Protestant and Jewish groups in the Religious Committee on SALT.

We all share a sense of the urgency of the time. Religious values must be given a chance. If not it may well be too late. Increasing numbers of experts maintain that nuclear war is likely by the end of this centry. This contention is supported by a number of political and military factors in the world today including:

1. The immense size of the superpowers arsenal—the equivalent of 3 tons of TNT for every human being on Earth.
2. A nuclear club that is expected to increase seven-fold by the year 1990, from five to thirty-five nations.
3. The massive resort by dozens of countries to nuclear technology as an energy source following the energy crisis of 1973–74.
4. The faltering prospects for a strong and stable non-proliferation agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries.
5. The mounting prospects of the utilization by terrorist groups of stolen fissionable materials or tactical nuclear weapons.
6. The rising curves of hostility and violence in regions such as Southeast Asia, the Korean Peninsula, the Persian Gulf, Southern Africa and Latin America, and the potential that the tensions in these areas can trigger or escalate to a nuclear conflict.
7. The on-going conventional and nuclear arms race, reaching $400 billion in military expenditures this year.
8. The fragility of United States-U.S.S.R. detente.

9. The commitment on both sides to a qualitative build-up of increasingly sophisticated strategic weapons which go beyond the reach of verification and threaten to destabilize arms control negotiations, and

10. The lack of firm or coherent policies of security and disarmament at the highest levels of the governments of the United States and U.S.S.R.

Thus today, we are faced in fact with precisely the choice God set out for us in The Book of Deuteronomy, "I have set before you this day, the blessing and the curse, life and death, good and evil; therefore choose life in order that you may live."

Through the millennia, the Jewish tradition has painfully developed a set of values limiting war which must serve as our guide in evaluating this treaty;

1. The use of force is permissible for self-defense. Thus SALT II must be evaluated in terms of legitimate U.S. security needs.

2. The goal of humankind is shalom. Shalom is more than the cessation of war. It is the opportunity for national and personal fulfillment and completeness.

3. Any use of force must guarantee absolute protection of non-combat and civilian populations.

4. Any use of force must be guided by a concept of proportionality which insists that no more damage should be inflicted than is necessary to pursue the limited goal of defense.

The dilemma of our age is that the values and positions described above are now faced with a stark reality of new and incomparable proportions—weapons of mass destructions which threaten to erase distinctions between offense and defense; which if used would be a massive violation of the protection of noncombatants and proportionality; which would eliminate the possibility of shalom-indeed, threatens the very possibility of all of God's creation. Since any use of nuclear weapons threatens these values, the goal of the American people must be first, the limitation; then, the reduction; and finally, as President Carter pledged in his inaugural address, the elimination of all nuclear weapons. Thus, SALT must be regarded as a process which transcends SALT II and in which lies our ultimate security.

THE QUESTION FOR THE SENATE: ARE WE MORE SECURE WITH SALT II OR WITHOUT SALT II

Will we be further along the path to achieving the values discussed above with SALT II or without SALT II? After careful and lengthy evaluation, the UAHC concluded that in every way we will be more secure when this treaty is ratified.

If SALT II should be rejected by the Senate it will be a serious set-back for the cause of arms limitation and control. The SALT process provides the best hope for arms control. It has been accepted by the United States and U.S.S.R. Recently, it has been accepted by China. It is accepted by the rest of our allies who are members of the nuclear club. Indeed, the leaders of these and many other countries have called for the ratification of the treaty. The General Assembly of the United Nations voted 127–1 in favor of SALT. The likelihood of successful renegotiation with the U.S.S.R. of any substantive change is very slim. For this reason, the UAHC would like to see the treaty passed in its present form with no amendments or actions which would result in the need for renegotiation. A failure to ratify the treaty would result in a major crisis of confidence among our allies and friends. It would be a major set-back for detente between the United States and U.S.S.R. Thus the failure to ratify SALT II would adversely affect American security.

Without SALT II, United States and Soviet military spending will rise even more rapidly than now planned. Each side will redouble its efforts to achieve illusory superiority. Dangerous and provocative weaponry will be developed and deployed. Trends toward "limited" nuclear wars, massive civil defense programs and a garrison state mentality will ensue.

The economic costs to the United States and the U.S.S.R. would be enormous. Between $30 and $100 billion more would be spent on military expenditures, by 1985. Balanced budgets and inflation controls would be sacrificed. The ability of the United States to increase its security by providing employment and educational opportunities to its citizens; decent health care and housing; and welfare assistance which provides a minimally decent living—all these would be sharply undercut. The result would be the development of an underclass of Americans who are out of jobs and out of hope—filled with frustration and despair. Intergroup tensions would be greatly exacerbated. The spirit and soul of America would be drained by its inability to maintain a fundamentally decent quality of life for its citizens. No country which erodes its internal strength can long endure—no matter how large its military budgets and how great its military forces might be.

Without SALT II, we will be hurt strategically, as all of the compromises and concessions made by the Soviets in the negotiations of this treaty would be lost. In

the sometimes mean spirited and hawkish tone of the recent debate over SALT II, we have constantly emphasized the concessions we made and ignored the concessions which the Soviets made. Without SALT II:

1. The Soviets will have 3–4,000 missile launchers rather than the 2,250 to which they have agreed (a reduction of 250 launchers for them).
2. We would have no common data base as opposed to that to which the two countries agreed under the treaty.
3. The United States and U.S.S.R. would have a number of new land-based missiles as opposed to the one allowed by the treaty.
4. We would face 20 to 30 warheads on some Soviet missiles as opposed to the limit of 10 to which they have agreed.
5. There will be no production limits on the Backfire bomber as promised the United States in an agreement outside the treaty.
6. The Soviets might have thousands more new warheads than they would have with the treaty.
7. Whatever qualms the United States might have on verification, can any sane human being believe that we would be more secure and more capable of verifying what the Soviets did, if they had not accepted our counting rules; if they had not promised to continue their policy of non-interference with our national technical means; if they had not restricted their encryption of missile tests?

In the abysmal ignorance which our inability to monitor the Soviets would create, the military hardliners in both countries would be strengthened. An atmosphere of intense fear and mistrust would blanket the world. Efforts to negotiate further reductions through SALT III or any other arms control agreement would be severely restricted. Successful negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty would be unimaginable. Negotiations aimed at checking proliferation of nuclear and conventional weapons would likely break down.

Despite the accusations of some SALT critics, the U.S. negotiators struck a fair bargain in SALT II. They did not undermine our security. The Soviets agreed not to limit our forward-based missiles. They accepted no limitation on air-launched missile range. They gave up their demand for a non-transfer clause. They gave up their demand for a limit on ground-launched or sea-launched cruise missile testing. They permitted an average 28 cruise missiles per bomber. They accepted limitations on the upgrading of the Backfire bomber. They accepted our definition of what constituted a "new" missile. While, of course, as critics of SALT pointed out, the United States has made numerous concessions to the Soviets—compromise is the essence of a successful agreement. Our negotiators have successfully embodied the notion of nuclear parity in SALT II. This offers a real hope for reduction in the future.

THE SALT DEBATE—SO FAR

Indeed, the debate so far seems to have ignored the basic reality that the SALT II Treaty has balanced the needs of two fundamentally different and asymetrical military forces. The rhetoric of the debate has implied that for each compromise the United States made, the U.S.S.R. must have made a similar one. Such a provision by provision comparison is not grounded in reality. We must rather measure the total effect of the treaty. It is the position of the UAHC that when this standard is applied, the two superpowers have reached an accord which limits arms growth in a way which protects our security and the security of the U.S.S.R.

The debate has been particularly distressing in two other ways. First, the debate has lost sight of the goal of arms reduction and elimination. Instead, SALT II has been used as a political football by those who would seek greater growth of the U.S. nuclear arsenal; a higher military budget or would seek to end the SALT process altogether. Senators who only a few months earlier had voted reductions in military spending now demand, in banner headlines, a sharp rise in the military budget. If SALT II is a bad treaty then no amount of spending will make it a good one.

More importantly, new weapons systems and increased military spending ought to be decided on their own merits. For Senators today to lock the country into new systems, new weapons and higher budgets for years to come after a couple of months of debate on the SALT Treaty, does not appear to be the most responsible way of dealing with the real security and defense needs of our country. The series of extravagent pay-offs which marked SALT I should not be permitted to plague SALT II. We must be most careful to avoid the technological trade-offs of SALT I. Because we led in certain types of technology in the early seventies—MIRV technology, cruise missiles and large submarines—we exempted limitations on such arms. As a result, the Soviets felt compelled to undertake a major "catch-up" program. Today, the Soviets now are MIRVing their missiles. The result is that our land-based ICBM's may soon be theoretically vulnerable to destruction on the ground. Today, because we lead in mobile missile technology, we seek to set time limits on the

controls of mobile missile deployment and thus risk escalating the arms race into a new and dangerous stage. We will soon introduce the unverifiable, destabilizing cruise missiles into the strategic picture. The decisions on the M-X missile and any other new system ought to be carefully evaluated on their own merits with a full public debate after the SALT Treaty has been ratified.

Perhaps even more threatening in the debate has been the virtually unchallenged contentions of those who would provide the United States with the capacity to fight a "limited" nuclear war. This "counterforce" theory has increased its attraction as the Soviets develop the capacity to target U.S. land based missile silos. The ability to destroy accurately military nuclear targets raises the theoretical spectre of a nuclear war which would inflict "acceptable" damage to industrial and human targets. Various basing modes of the proposed mobile missiles seriously raise the spectre of a counterforce capacity.

Increasingly, the rhetoric of counterforce theory has been infused into the SALT II debate. While counterforce theory presumes solutions to strategic and technological problems which may be unsoluble in this century, as a religious presence in this country we are more concerned about the devastating moral implications of this theory. The counterforce theory creates the dilemma that by seeking to give either country various limited strategic options, it makes the use of nuclear weapons more thinkable. Because the effects of the use of limited nuclear strikes appear to be selective, discriminate and controllable, strategic planning and analysis would accept them as real options. If counterforce becomes a part of the strategic relationship, the likelihood of nuclear war would greatly increase.

Given the present state of the arms race, both technologically and politically, it seems more prudent to accept only those weapons and strategic doctrines that seek to prevent any use of nuclear weapons; that renders them "unthinkable" in political and moral terms. Only from this position is it possible to begin reduction of strategic arms in a reasonable, balanced and prudent manner, bring them more surely under control; and decrease their significance and legitimacy in world affairs. This is the theory of SALT, and SALT II is essential to its process. We believe that the whole issue of counterforce theory deserves far more analysis and attention than it has been given so far.

PAST SALT II

Opponents of SALT II have attempted to discredit the notion and the rhetoric of the SALT process. We categorically reject such aspersions. The pursuit of peace and the elimination of nuclear weapons must be a constant and continuous effort by all of us. The notion of a process is inherent in SALT and we must look past SALT II. The UAHC is disappointed in the modest limitations of SALT II. We would have wished that this had been a treaty embodying real arms control.

Arms control must be the essence of the next SALT agreement. This goal should be reflected in understandings and reservations to SALT II which would not require renegotiations. The SALT II limits must be regarded as ceilings not as targets which must be reached. There should be an explicit rejection of the concept of "limited" nuclear war as an element of U.S. foreign or strategic policy. We should clarify that we are prepared to seek meaningful bilateral reductions even before the expiration of SALT II.

The symbolism of the Soviet dismantling of missile launchers without replacement, as required by SALT II, must not be lost in the debate. It should be emphasized as the type of action that will take on real meaning in SALT III. Just this week Senator Biden, upon returning from a series of meetings with Soviet leaders, indicated that they were prepared for real reductions in future arms agreements. The initiative created by those meetings must be seized by the Senate. The United States should clearly set out its intentions as to how these two countries will achieve real reductions and work for that goal as quickly and effectively as possible.

The example which the superpowers sets in controlling nuclear arms will have a significant impact on future efforts to control horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. No dynamic in the 1980's so threatens to destabilize the world and lead to nuclear war as the numerical growth of those countries which will soon possess a nuclear capacity. The United States and U.S.S.R. have succeeded in making the possession of nuclear weapons a "status" symbol of power and influence in the world. We must act dramatically to change that. Ratification of SALT II is an important step in that direction. On the eve of the Second Non-Proliferation Treaty Conference, rejection of SALT II would inevitably undermine any hope to check the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries.

ISRAEL AND SOVIET JEWRY

As Jews, we have a special concern for our brothers and sisters throughout the world. Repeatedly we have been asked how does our support for SALT II relate to our concern for Soviet Jewry and progress toward peace in the Middle East? Proponents of linkage argue that we should refuse to ratify SALT II until the U.S.S.R. improves its human rights performance and supports progress toward peace in the Middle East. We reject that notion. Our support for SALT II in no way signifies our approval of Soviet domestic or international policies. The SALT Treaty is of momentous intrinsic, moral and strategic interest. It is deserving of ratification on its own merits. If the world goes up in a nuclear holocaust, our concerns for human rights and peace become irrelevant.

In fact, however, SALT II can only help to improve the situation of Soviet Jewry. Recently Senator Kennedy put this problem to Andrei Sakharov, one of the truly courageous fighters for human rights in the Soviet Union. Senator Kennedy reported: "When I met last year with Andrei Sakharov in Moscow he stressed that the greatest threat to humanity and human rights is the threat of nuclear war. His plea to us is to ratify SALT: not only to reduce the threat of nuclear war but also to create the mutual confidence necessary to resolve the other important issues between the Soviet Union and the United States * * * Let the advocates of linkage explain how the cause of human rights in the Soviet Union will be served by Senate refusal to ratify SALT."

To the extent that the United States can influence Soviet performance on human rights it can do so best in an atmosphere of detente and cooperation. If SALT II is defeated it is unlikely that the United States will have any impact on U.S.S.R. policies regarding human rights.

The ability of the United States to act as a constructive partner in further progress towards reaching a peaceful resolution of Mid-East problems will be strengthened by SALT II as well. First, progress towards peace requires stability—stability among the superpowers and relative stability among the parties involved in the Mid-East conflict. To the extent that SALT II allows for continued stability on the nuclear front, it permits Israel and its neighbors to focus on their regional concerns.

Secondly, the danger of horizontal nuclear proliferation threatens to engulf the Middle East in a nuclear confrontation. Recent evidence indicates that Pakistan, which may explode a nuclear device in a matter of months, has been bankrolled in its efforts to develop "the bomb" by Libya. Reports indicate that Pakistan will supply Libya with nuclear weapons, in return for its help. No leader on Earth would so threaten nuclear stability as would Qaddaffi. It would be difficult to determine whether his weapons would be aimed first at Egypt or Israel. Such proliferation poses a massive threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East, to Israel's survival and, indeed, to the survival of the world.

Finally, the strategic impact of the SALT Treaty would have little effect on the ability of U.S. forces to maintain a deterrence in the Middle East to Soviet designs. Indeed, by diverting limited U.S. budgetary funds from a senseless and endless strategic weapons arms race, we can better strengthen our conventional forces which would increase our capacity to help our friends in Europe and the Mediterranean basin.

Thus, ratification of the SALT II Treaty will enhance the ability of the American government to further both peace in the Middle East and the cause of human rights in the Soviet Union. During the past year we have made significant progress in both these areas. The peace treaty between Israel and Egypt and the unprecedented levels of Jewish emigration from the U.S.S.R. have been due in large measure to a sense of stability in the relationship of the global powers. We cannot continue to progress towards peace and freedom in the atmosphere of suspicion, mistrust and intense superpower competition which would inevitably follow the failure of the Senate to ratify the SALT II Treaty. Rather, the spirit of cooperation and detente which would be furthered by this treaty is essential to such progress in both of these areas.

CONCLUSION: THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SENATE

The United States has not yet met the issue of arms reduction and control as firmly as the situation requires. Both the religious community and the Senate must bear the responsibility for that failure. The religious community has not posed the moral challenge of the arms race with sufficient clarity and immediacy to capture the imagination and concern of the American people. The Senate has too often permitted the SALT II debate to deteriorate into rhetorical battle of militarism and fear.

Rabbi David Polish points out an insightful lesson in the story of Samson. Before he was born, Samson's mother was told that he was to grow up as a mighty savior of Israel. He was to be set aside as a Nazirite, as a special kind of person, dedicated to God, forbidden to drink wine or to cut his hair. When he was born, he was called Shimshon, meaning sunperson, symbolizing that the brightness of the very sun glowed within his being. What great promise burned within this man who grew to be a powerful figure and who, indeed, did rescue Israel from its enemies. But this giant of a man, this dazzling, brilliant judge in Israel soon forgot the source of his power and his greatness. He was tricked into having his hair shorn. He was captured by his enemies. They put out his eyes. They set him to work in the prison yard, grinding grain. Day in, day out, chained to a huge stone wheel, he trod his blind course, round and round like a beast. Time passed, and his hair grew and his strength was restored. On a festive day, when the enemies of Israel were all assembled in their Temple, he made his way there with the aid of an unsuspecting lad. Planting himself between two huge pillars, he pushed mightily against them, and crying, "let me die with the Philistines," he brought the Temple and its celebrants crashing down upon him.

What do we know from this episode? We learn of the tragic and fatal combination of power and blindness. Samson was once the union of strength and vision. But with vision gone, all that Samson could do was to feed his renewed strength with the venom of revenge, destroying himself with his enemies.

The story of Samson is a warning to America. Our nation arose in this new world like a special being, blessed and nurtured by the sun, the source of light and of life. This giant of a nation was born in the midst of a struggle against tyranny and consecrated to a higher order of political existence than had ever been known. This nation was a kind of Nazirite among the nations, denying itself the temptations of rule by caste and the heady wine of government by the few. It was endowed in its birth with the might of the continent which it straddled and the vision which it drew from its unique history. But we stand in danger of seeing the eyes of the sunblessed giant gouged out, not by its enemies, but at its own hands. Its strength cannot be impaired, but its vision can be mortally impaired. Nothing can be as destructive as the well-meaning power of a bewildered and frightened giant. How well our prophets understood this when they said, "Where there is no vision the people perish."

Together we can ensure that the United States does not lose its vision. But it will be your decision as to whether the debate over this treaty will focus attention on the necessity of multilateral nuclear disarmament. You alone will decide what message SALT II will carry beyond its substantive provisions. It might be a message that this is but one stepping stone in an inevitable escalation of nuclear proliferation. Or the message of SALT II can be a proclamation heard throughout the world:

That the joint benefits for both sides outweight even deep differences;

That there are ways besides strife for nations to redress grievances and resolve disputes;

That nations will not be prisoners of a bitter, unremitting past—we can be the shapers of a better and more hopeful future;

That humankind is not inexorably doomed to repeat the disasters of history—what always was need not always be.

Just as the Bible tells us "the effect of righteousness shall be peace" so do we know—from observation and intuition—that we who share this vulnerable planet can never come into our full human inheritance until we can put bloodshed and war behind us. SALT II can help us achieve this goal.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Vorspan.

Mr. VORSPAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That concludes the hearing this afternoon.

[Whereupon, at 5:24 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10:30 a.m., September 7, 1979.]

SALT II TREATY

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 1979

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, at 10:30 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Church, Glenn, Stone, Javits, and Percy.

Senator PERCY [presiding]. The committee will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

We apologize to our witnesses for the delay this morning. Obviously, the events of the last few days have torn into the schedules of many of our Senators, including our chairman.

Today the Senate Foreign Relations Committee continues to hear from public witnesses on the SALT II Treaty. This morning we have a panel consisting of Robert Schmidt, vice president of the Control Data Corp., appearing on behalf of the American Committee on East-West Accord, Dr. Herbert Scoville, who serves as co-chairman of the New Directions Task Force on Arms Control and Disarmament; Peter Baugher, testifying for the Ripon Society; and John Carey, appearing for the American Legion.

Following the panel, Lane Kirkland will deliver a statement for the AFL–CIO.

Gentlemen, I understand that you each have 10-minute oral presentations. Your longer written statements will be put in the record. After your presentations, the committee will direct its questions to the entire panel.

I think the best way to proceed is in alphabetical order. We will hear from the American Committee first, followed by the American Legion, and so on. Mr. Schmidt, if you would please begin, and as the Senators pay reasonably good attention to the lights, we would appreciate your keeping them in mind as well. They will be just a friendly warning to you. I think when the yellow light goes on, you have 1 minute left. Thank you very much.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT D. SCHMIDT, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON EAST-WEST ACCORD, WASHINGTON, D.C.[1]

Mr. SCHMIDT. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am Robert D. Schmidt, president of the American Committee on East-West Accord, and executive vice president of Control Data Corp. The group I represent today, the American Committee on

[1] See page 153 for Mr. Schmidt's prepared statement.

East-West Accord, is a diverse one. On its board and among its officers and members are people of international repute, representing academia, industry, the world of science, diplomacy, private foundations, labor unions, the legal and publishing professions, and lay people who believe that only through normalization of relations with the Soviet Union can we maintain a workable and lasting peace on this planet.

The American Committee has a strong and continuing interest to promote the SALT process. We have a strong and continuing interest to promote United States-Soviet trade. Both are essential. Trade and the SALT process reinforce each other. They both contribute to lessening those international tensions we know must be controlled lest our acknowledged ability to destroy life on Earth as we know it is unleashed.

The hearings on SALT II thus far have placed primary emphasis on military relations between the Unites States and the U.S.S.R. Who is ahead in what weapon? Who will be ahead in 1985? Which nation is likely to get a scientific breakthrough providing a military advantage? Which nation is spending more for military research and development?

Both societies put more effort and money into planning for a war than on planning how to get along. Both societies act as though the best way to preserve peace is to prepare for war. There has been no apparent progress from this kind of activity. We believe that the SALT Treaty represents some progress.

Perhaps the best way to preserve peace is to adopt a new strategy that depends more on negotiation than confrontation.

I am not so naive as to believe that either the United States or the Soviet Union is about to summarily transfer research and development funds from military purposes to peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, there are many activities we might carry on in tandem with our potential antagonists which may lessen the likelihood of military confrontation.

SALT AND UNITED STATES-SOVIET TRADE

One of those areas is trade. I emphasize the importance of trade because the American Committee believes Senate approval of SALT II is essential to preserve and promote a climate in which nonstrategic trade, joint development of energy, and other projects of common interest may be carried out to the mutual advantage of both societies, economically and politically.

Trade is a path to understanding. It costs us nothing. It costs the Russians nothing. Trade is engaged in only if both parties receive benefits for themselves.

Granted that ill-conceived trade policies can generate negative relationships among countries, nevertheless, as Prof. Thomas Schelling has written, "Aside from war and preparations for war * * * trade is the most important relationship most countries have with each other. Broadly defined * * * trade is what most of international relations is all about."

Accepting the importance of trade in international relations, it follows that an even-handed, realistic, and vigorously pursued trade policy can produce positive results. Trade can be a weapon of war or an instrument for peace; or put more delicately, trade can

promote confrontation or negotiation. That is for the parties to choose.

If SALT II is rejected, the temptation to use trade as a weapon which will exacerbate conflict will be very great. On the other hand, if SALT is approved, trade between the United States and the Soviet Union will be expanded, and the ability of the United States to influence the Soviet Union in ways which will serve our long-term security will be enhanced.

There is another benefit for the American economy that will flow from a successful SALT Treaty. It is the benefit based on the common sense proposition we all recognize, that both parties benefit from trading. If we are moving ahead in the mutual control of strategic weapons, the climate of United States-Soviet relations will be propitious for expanding United States-Soviet trade. Our adverse balance of trade over the past few years demands expansion of our export market, including exports to the Soviet Union. We all know of the importance of Soviet purchases of grain and the help that that has given to balance our trade deficit with the world, as well as to maintain farm prices.

We have not done as well in the export of industrial products to the Soviet Union. Discrimination against Soviet trade imposed by the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments and the use of trade as a political weapon to try to force Soviet emigration policy into line with our concept of free emigration have seriously impaired American sales to and purchases from the Soviet Union, to the detriment of our economy and our political relations.

Furthermore, these measures have not, in my view, been as effective as would have been the encouragement of mutually beneficial programs in science, culture, and nonstrategic trade.

There is another advantage to the United States in expanding trade with the Soviet Union. It is that our system of free enterprise is so much more efficient than the Soviet system that in time I believe we will promote greater Soviet awareness of western values. Those of us who have spent substantial periods of time in the Soviet Union over the past decade have observed changes, liberalization, if you will, which we would have thought impossible a decade ago.

For example, 10 years ago, the word "profit" did not seem to exist in the Soviet vocabulary, at least with the people to whom I spoke. Now, it is commonplace to discuss profit. Five years ago it was not possible to discuss questions of joint ventures. Now a number of elements of Soviet society are exploring ways to accommodate joint ventures.

Five years ago the Soviets never mentioned the Voice of America. Indeed, Voice of America broadcasts were regularly jammed by the Soviet Union until 1973. Not so long ago, in Novosibirsk, halfway around the world from my home office in Minneapolis, Minn., a Soviet scientist remarked to me about a news item he heard the previous evening on the Voice of America.

Western views are beginning to seep into Soviet society.

SALT AND AMERICAN SECURITY

Thus far, I have emphasized the importance of SALT to the expansion of trade and U.S. influence in the Soviet Union, and one

might believe that I ignore the effect of SALT on our military strength. In the words of Secretary of Defense Brown:

> National security is more than a matter of military strength. It includes economic strength. It includes, in the case of the United States, our enormous agricultural production. It includes our technological capabilities, and it includes also our self-confidence, self-cohesion, and will.

So much of the emphasis in these hearings has been on what I consider to be the exaggerated strengths of the Soviet Union that we forget our own tremendous strengths.

Consider, for example, some of the security advantages we have over the Soviet Union—borders with friendly nations, Canada and Mexico. In contrast, the Soviet Union has as neighbors China and a number of Eastern European ethnic groups always threatening turmoil. Consider our NATO allies in contrast to the Soviet Warsaw Pact allies. And consider the Soviet domestic situation in contrast to our own, a situation well summed up by Prof. J. S. Berliner, an eminent Soviet specialist at Brandeis University and a member of the Harvard Research Center.

Berliner writes that Soviet policy is in a shambles and believes that they have lost most of their sources of influence around the world that they had once hoped to have, to the point that their economy has lost its dynamism and is no longer a model for the Third World or anywhere else.

"It is ironic," Berliner writes, "that they have only one major source of influence left, military prowess. That should be small comfort for all that they do not have."

I will skip some of my oral testimony because I see the red light is on.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. It is always surprising how fast 10 minutes does go by. It comes to only about 4 pages of written testimony.

Mr. SCHMIDT. Let us look at the assertion that the one major source of influence left to the Soviet Union is military prowess.

In the last few weeks we have heard opponents of the SALT Treaty repeat and repeat that the United States is behind the Soviet Union in military strength. For that reason, opponents argue, the U.S. Senate must reject SALT II.

This makes no sense to me for the simple reason that if there were no SALT agreement there would be no limitations whatsoever on the production of nuclear weapons by either side. With SALT, for the first time, we have an agreed overall limit on the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles for each side—2,250.

But it is not to the numbers and the footnotes of the SALT Treaty to which Americans must look to determine whether the treaty is in our security interests. We need, rather, to apply our own commonsense.

Is it reasonable to believe that for 7 years the Russians have managed to out-negotiate American representatives of three Presidents?

Is it reasonable to believe that our Joint Chiefs of Staff would recommend the treaty to the Senate if they thought it would damage their security interests?

Is it reasonable to believe that all of our NATO allies would urge ratification of SALT if they did not mean it?

Is it reasonable to believe that American security will be promoted by a reversion to the cold war, that we are more secure in a world of confrontation than negotiation?

Even if one believes the United States is behind the Russians in some categories of weapons, or that we are inferior militarily across the board, which I do not accept, the problem is the failure of our own system to use our resources wisely to achieve a quality—rather than quantity—defensive strategy.

In conclusion, though SALT may not be all we want, we will invite a disastrous escalation of the arms race if it is rejected, but with the approval of SALT, I believe we will move toward further arms reductions which we and the Russians want and need, and there will be a basis for improvement in United States-Soviet relations in other fields as well, including trade.

Mr. Chairman, the American Committee on East-West Accord has recently adopted statements on SALT II and on trade, and I ask that they be included at the end of my remarks. Thank you.

[Mr. Schmidt's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT D. SCHMIDT

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee: I am Robert D. Schmidt, President of the American Committee on East-West Accord, and Executive Vice President of Control Data Corporation.

The group I represent today—the American Committee on East-West Accord—is a diverse one. On its board, and among its officers and members, are people of international repute, representing academia, industry, the world of science, diplomacy, private foundations labor unions, the legal and publishing professions, and lay people who believe that only through normalization of relations with the Soviet Union can we maintain a workable and lasting peace on this planet.[1]

The American Committee has a strong and continuing interest to promote the SALT process. We have a strong and continuing interest to promote United States-Soviet trade. Both are essential. Trade and the SALT process reinforce each other. They both contribute to lessening those international tensions we know must be controlled lest our acknowledged ability to destroy life on Earth as we know it is unleashed.

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Perhaps the best way to preserve peace is to adopt a new strategy that depends more on negotiations than confrontation.

SALT AND UNITED STATES-SOVIET TRADE

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One of those areas is trade.

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[1] Officers and members of the Board of the American Committee are: John Kenneth Galbraith—Co-Chairman, Donald M. Kendall—Co-Chairman, George F. Kennan—Co-Chairman, Robert D. Schmidt—President, Fred Warner Neal—Executive Vice President, Stephen Schlossberg—Vice President, Carl Marcy—Secretary-Treasurer & Co-Director, William Attwood, Meyer Berger, Tilford Dudley, Joseph Filner, Curtis Gans, Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C., Vice Admiral J. M. Lee, Jeanne V. Mattison—Co-Director, Stewart R. Mott, Harold B. Scott, Jeremy J. Stone, Kenneth W. Thompson, Mrs. James P. Warburg, Jerome B. Wiesner.

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Trade can be a weapon of war, or an instrument for peace; or, put more delicately, trade can promote confrontations, or negotiations. That is for the parties to choose.

If SALT II is rejected, the temptation to use trade as a weapon, which will exacerbate conflict, will be very great. On the other hand, if SALT is approved, trade between the United States and the Soviet Union will be expanded and the ability of the United States to influence the Soviet Union in ways which will serve our long term security will be enhanced.

But there is another benefit for the American economy that will flow from a successful SALT Treaty. It is the benefit based on the common sense proposition we all recognize—that both parties benefit from trading.

If we are moving ahead in the mutual control of strategic weapons, the climate of United States-Soviet relations will be propitious for expanding United States-Soviet trade. Our adverse balance of trade over the past few years demands expansion of our export markets—including exports to the Soviet Union.

We all know of the importance of Soviet purchases of grain and the help that has given to balance our trade deficit with the world, as well as to maintain farm prices.

We have not done as well in the export of industrial products to the Soviet Union. Discrimination against Soviet trade imposed by the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments and the use of trade as a political weapon to try to force Soviet emigration policy into line with our concepts of free emigration have seriously impaired America sales to, and purchases from, the Soviet Union—to the detriment of our economy and our political relations. Furthermore, these measures have not, in my view, been as effective as would have been the encouragement of mutually beneficial programs in science, culture, and non-strategic trade.

There is another advantage to the United States in expanding trade with the Soviet Union. It is that our system of free enterprise is so incomparably more efficient than the Soviet system that in time I believe we will promote greater Soviet awareness of Western values. Those of us who have spent substantial periods of time in the Soviet Union over the past decade have observed changes—liberalization, if you will—which we would have thought impossible a decade ago.

For example:

Ten years ago, the word "profit" didn't seem to exist in the Soviet vocabulary—at least with the people to whom I spoke. Now it is commonplace to discuss "profit."

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SALT AND AMERICAN SECURITY

Thus far I have emphasized the importance of SALT to the expansion of trade and U.S. influence in the Soviet Union and one might believe that I ignore the effect of SALT on our military strength. In the words of Secretary of Defense Brown, "national security is more than a matter of military strength. It includes economic strength. It includes in the case of the United States our enormous agricultural production; it includes our technological capabilities; and it includes also, our self-confidence, self-cohesion, and will."

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Consider our NATO allies, in contrast to the Soviets' Warsaw Pact allies.

And consider the Soviet domestic situation in contrast to our own—a situation well summed up by Professor J. S. Berliner, an eminent Soviet specialist at Brandeis University and a member of the Harvard Research Center.

Berliner writes that Soviet policy is in a shambles, and believes that they have lost most of their sources of influence around the world that they had once hoped to have, to the point that their economy has lost its dynamism and is no longer a model for the Third World or anywhere else.

"It is ironic," Berliner writes, "that they have only one major source of influence left, military prowess. . . . That should be small comfort for all that they do not have." (Taken from article to be published in the forthcoming issue of Commentary.)

Let us look at the assertion that the one major source of influence left to the Soviet Union is military prowess.

In the last few weeks we have heard opponents of the SALT Treaty repeat and repeat that the United States is behind the Soviet Union in military strength. For that reason, opponents argue, the U.S. Senate must reject SALT II.

This makes no sense to me for the simple reason that if there were no SALT agreement there would be no limitations whatsoever on the production of nuclear weapons by either side. With SALT, for the first time, we have an agreed overall limit on the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles for each side—2,250.

But it is not to the numbers and the footnotes of the SALT Treaty to which Americans must look to determine whether the Treaty is in our security interests. We need rather to apply our own good sense.

Is it reasonable to believe that for seven years the Russians have managed to outnegotiate American representatives of three Presidents?

Is it reasonable to believe that our Joint Chiefs of Staff would recommend the Treaty to the Senate if they thought it damaged our security interests?

Is it reasonable to believe that all our NATO allies would urge ratification of SALT if they didn't mean it?

Is it reasonable to believe that American security will be promoted by a reversion to the Cold War, that we are more secure in a world of confrontation than negotiation?

Even if one believes the United States is behind the Russians in some categories of weapons, or that we are inferior militarily across the board—which I do not accept—the problem is the failure of our own system to use our resources wisely to achieve a quality—rather than quantity—defense strategy.

In conclusion, though SALT may not be all we want, we will invite a disastrous escalation of the arms race if it is rejected. But with the approval of SALT, I believe we will move toward further arms reductions which we and the Russians want and need, and there will be a basis for improvements in United States—Soviet relations in other fields as well, including trade.

Mr. Chairman, the American Committee on East-West Accord has recently adopted statements on SALT II and on trade. I ask that they be included at the end of my remarks.

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AMERICAN COMMITTEE POLICIES ON SALT, TRADE, AND EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGES.

The purpose of the American Committee is to strengthen public understanding of arms control initiatives, and to encourage mutually beneficial programs in science, culture, and non-strategic trade between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The Committee believes this course of action is the most effective way of furthering human rights, liberalized emigration policies, exchange of information, and freedom to travel for peoples of all nations.

The Board of Directors of the American Committee approved the following statement at its meeting on April 18, 1979:

STATEMENT ON SALT

The American Committee on East-West Accord supports the draft treaty negotiated between the United States and the USSR on the limitation of strategic arms and strongly urges its approval by the United States Senate.

The stakes are high. Either we move ahead with arms limitation and reduce the threat of nuclear war, or we slip back into an era of confrontation and escalating arms competition. The dangers of such a setback are obvious and serious. The increasing sophistication of strategic weapons on both sides seems to accord an advantage to the side which strikes first. Even if, as we believe, neither side would contemplate such a step, growing vulnerabilities would be exploited on both sides by those wishing to escalate the arms race.

The proposed treaty is the culmination of efforts by four U.S. Administrations — two Democratic and two Republican — to stabilize the nuclear threat posed by each superpower against the other. These efforts have won the increasing support of the American public; today four out of five approve the effort to reach a SALT agreement. Just as Americans have a high stake in the outcome of the Senate vote, so do our allies, who could — and probably would — be destroyed along with the two major powers by a U.S.-Soviet nuclear conflict.

Any agreement limiting strategic arms must meet one overriding requirement: it must enhance the security of the United States. We believe this treaty meets that requirement. The strategic forces of the United States and the USSR are not identical; they differ widely in structure, deployment, and weapons systems, as geography makes it natural they should. But the treaty will bring these forces into overall balance. It will for the first time cause a reduction in the stockpiles of strategic delivery vehicles. It will place restrictions upon development and deployment of certain types of strategic weapons. It will moderate arms competition between the two great powers and thus contribute to the maintenance of the present essential equivalence in strategic nuclear arms.

We regret that SALT II does not place more effective controls upon improvements in the nuclear arms permitted under the treaty. It does not prevent the development of a counterforce capability on either side and thus prolongs the danger that mutual fears and suspicions could precipitate nuclear war in a critical situation. It might even encourage more intense arms competition in weapon systems not limited or proscribed by the treaty. We therefore call upon both governments to reexamine their military concepts and strategies and to clarify and curtail their commitments to existing and contemplated arms programs.

Despite these weaknesses, SALT II is an indispensable step in the continuing process of lifting from mankind not only the terrible shadow of nuclear war but the debilitating economic burden of arms expenditures. The resources of both countries are already strained by the need to maintain and to strengthen their military establishments. Without further progress on arms control beyond SALT II, both nations will increase their arms expenditures, thus diverting human and material resources from uses beneficial to mankind, causing both countries to overtax their financial and material resources and — certainly in the United States — contributing to inflationary pressure.

A failure to ratify SALT II would not only undermine the strategic balance which is achieved by the draft treaty but would scuttle arms control for years to come. The fears and uncertainties which would ensue would make even more difficult than at present the problem of pursuing a consistent and effective foreign policy in support of U.S. interests around the world. Above all, it would be widely interpreted as a sign that the American people had lost interest in reducing U.S.-Soviet tensions and improving the prospects for world peace.

Approval of SALT II should usher in a new era in U.S.-Soviet relations. It will reduce mutual fears and suspicions. It will ease the resolution of disputes between the two nations. It will create an atmosphere in which trade and cooperation can prosper. In such an atmosphere lies the greatest chance not only for world peace but for the sort of liberalization in Soviet society that we would like to see.

We recognize that SALT II will not produce any sudden or dramatic abatement of the U.S.-Soviet competition for world influence. But in approving the agreement and in continuation of the SALT process lies the greatest prospect that both countries will carry on that competition by peaceful means and reduce their reliance upon military power.

The SALT II agreement deserves the overwhelming support of the American people and of its legislative representatives.

STATEMENT ON TRADE

July 6, 1979

While welcoming reports that the Carter Administration is about to sign a trade agreement with China, the American Committee has grave misgivings as to the agreement's impact on SALT II.

We are deeply concerned that the U.S. be even-handed in its treatment of China and the Soviet Union with respect to extension of Most-Favored-Nation treatment of imports from both nations. We believe it would be a grave mistake at this time to take any action which would be viewed either in the U.S., China, or the Soviet Union, as tilting toward China. Any discrimination in the treatment of the two communist countries on matters of trade could only damage prospects for SALT II.

The American Committee is in favor of a Presidential waiver, under the authority which the President now posesses, to extend Most-Favored-Nation treatment to both countries and Amendments to the Trade Act which would honor U.S. commitments under the 1972 Trade Agreement to extend unconditional and non-discriminatory MFN tariff treatment and Export-Import Bank credits to the USSR and China simultaneously.

The American Committee believes such moves are in the national interest of the United States and also of importance for the American economy.

The Committee believes these moves should proceed at the same time as Administration efforts to obtain approval of SALT II.

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The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Schmidt, for an excellent statement. I am sorry to have to urge witnesses to limit their presentations to 10 minutes, but in order for the committee to remain on schedule and to give members an opportunity to ask questions, I think that is just going to be necessary.

Our next witness is John Carey. Gentlemen, we will ask for each of you to give your statements, and then we will question the panel as the Senators may care to do.

John Carey is the immediate past national commander of the American Legion.

Mr. Carey, we are very pleased to have you here and to have the benefit of your testimony this morning.

STATEMENT OF JOHN CAREY, PAST NATIONAL COMMANDER, THE AMERICAN LEGION, WASHINGTON, D.C.[1]

Mr. CAREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate the opportunity to present the views of the American Legion on a matter of vital interest to our organization and to the Nation. We are well aware of the situation in Cuba, where the Soviets have deployed a combat brigade, including armor, infantry, and artillery units together with combat support units. We believe this constitutes a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. We also believe that the presence of this brigade constitutes a military base prohibited in the 1962 agreements with the Soviets.

The American Legion 3 weeks ago at its national convention urged Congress to take whatever action is necessary to oppose spread of communism within the Western Hemisphere. This flagrant stationing of Soviet troops in nearby Cuba certainly violates the unanimous position taken by our delegates. Accordingly, we urge this committee to postpone any further action on the strategic arms limitation agreement currently pending until such time as all Soviet combat troops have been withdrawn from the island of Cuba.

All members of the organization, Mr. Chairman, are veterans of wartime service, and many of us have personally experienced the horror of war. As veterans, we realize full well that if conventional wars are horrendous, nuclear war would be an unspeakable catastrophe for mankind. Thus it should not be surprising that we have long supported the concept of strategic arms limitation. Our fundamental position has been that a strategic arms limitation treaty should be equitable, should actually halt the arms race, should reduce tensions and the likelihood of war, and should be fully verifiable.

We have insisted that such a treaty should not place the United States in an inferior strategic position. We realize that each of the contributions made by the treaty is subject to violations, and that many experts have expressed concern over what they consider to be our Nation's limited ability to detect violations.

Our organization, although likewise concerned, feels that it can contribute very little to any serious debate on verification since we have no information on the highly classified intelligence gathering techniques which would be the focal points of any such debate.

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[1] See page 160 for Mr. Carey's prepared statement.

We are aware that it was determined at an early stage of the SALT negotiations that the total number of missiles and warheads could not be limited because of verification problems, and that therefore the criterion becomes the number of launchers, but we strongly recommend that the United States not abandon the principle of counting all nuclear arms during the SALT III negotiations, even if that means demanding onsite inspection.

The treaty's prohibition on the production of any heavy missiles is tantamount to legitimizing the Soviet throw-weight advantage in its land-based ICBM's as gained through deployment of the SS–18. We believe there should be a counting rule adopted under the treaty as an adjustment for the awesome power of the SS–18. Each SS–18 should be counted as more than one launcher.

This provision would not require dismantling any of the heavy missiles, but would necessitate some changes in the makeup or other components of the Soviet arsenal.

The American Legion is fully aware of how firm Soviet negotiators have been in demanding full complement of the SS–18. It therefore might be advisable for this committee to consider the adoption of a new heavy missile counting rule with an effective date perhaps in 1981 to allow the Soviets time to make the necessary adjustments to their arsenal.

Our next major concern over the pending treaty deals with the failure to include the Soviet Backfire bomber as a strategic nuclear delivery vehicle under terms of the agreement. There is general agreement that the Backfire can reach targets in the continental United States by aerial refueling or making one-way flights. We have two recommendations to make relevant to the Backfire bomber.

The first is that the Soviet Union be required to sign and officially acknowledge the letter presented by Secretary General Brezhnev to President Carter which promised the bomber would not be deployed in intercontinental mode and that its production would not exceed 30 per year.

Our second recommendation is that the United States develop and deploy a similar number of comparable aircraft. Another aspect of the treaty that essentially disturbs us is the provisions regarding encryption of telemetry data. The treaty prohibits the encoding of radioed missile test data that would be needed to verify compliance with the treaty. Each side, however, is allowed to determine whether or not such data would be needed to verify compliance.

Our recommendation is that both sides formally agree not to encrypt any missile test data.

We are also concerned with the treaty's protocol which bans the development or flight testing of ICBM's from mobile launchers, and the deployment of cruise missiles with ranges of more than 600 kilometers until the end of 1981, "will assume a life of its own," and that the United States will give in to Soviet demands that the protocol remain in force during the course of SALT III negotiations.

We recommend that the Senate approve an understanding or reservation stating that the protocol will expire on schedule unless this extension is specifically approved by the Senate. We agree

with the critics of SALT II who express concern that the treaty may prevent us from transferring cruise missile or other technology to our NATO allies. We believe it is necessary that the Senate clarify U.S. intentions regarding technology transfer by adopting a reservation or understanding. It is very clear to anyone who considers himself a student of arms limitation talks that our NATO allies in Western Europe have more than a passing interest in the pending agreement.

Since the Soviets would rather the United States not assist NATO in improving its defenses, especially in the area of nuclear weaponry, they have disputed the United States' right to continue to exchange nuclear weapons technology with Western Europe. A Senate understanding that nothing in the treaty precludes a continuation of U.S. technology transfer with NATO would reaffirm our commitment to the alliance, and would create Soviet uneasiness over having a formidable opposing nuclear strike on the same continent.

Mr. Chairman, the American Legion seeks an adjustment in the procedure for reporting treaty violations. The treaty now provides that all actual or suspected violations be reported to a standing commission for consideration. We propose a reservation or understanding that would require a simultaneous reporting of all such actual or suspected violations to the Senate for referral to the appropriate committee.

Such reporting of violations would strengthen the United States commitment for Soviet compliance with the agreement.

Our final recommendation to correct what we consider to be a flaw in the treaty deals with the agreed statements and common understanding. It appears as though these explanations of treaty provisions have been presented as separate documents and therefore are not subject to ratification process. If this is the case, then we demand formal Soviet agreement that these agreed statements and common understandings be made part of the treaty text.

The treaty would be simply unmanageable without such an agreement.

Mr. Chairman, we have called for several modifications to the treaty, some of which seek amendments to the language, and others which seek unilateral declarations by you and your colleagues, and there is little doubt in my mind that the American Legion will be accused by some of proposing so-called killer amendments and accused of trying to sabotage the treaty.

I began my statement by saying that our organization has historically endorsed the concept of limiting strategic arms. I came here today with that attitude, and presented these recommended modifications in that spirit.

In fact, our organization would have been happy if both sides were forced to reduce their strategic arsenals by 50 percent or more, but of course we realize that such reductions ignore the realities of negotiating an arms agreement in an environment of unprecedented weapons production.

I have asked you to consider three amendments, to address the overwhelming Soviet advantage in heavy missiles, to prohibit the encryption of telemetry, and to insure that the agreed statements and common understandings are legally binding. Up to this point

we have recommended certain amendments to the treaty, reservations by the Senate for weapons programs to help compensate for Soviet strategic advantages. These measures alone, however, are insufficient to ensure essential equivalence and effective deterrence.

As I mentioned earlier, our organization believes that the time has come to reconsider our fundamental nuclear strategy. Again, I shall have to skip in the interest of time, sir, and will say that we are very concerned about the position of the United States people and their apathy toward what may happen if a treaty is signed.

In sum, Mr. Chairman, we believe that although the SALT II Treaty, if it is adhered to fully and in good faith, has certain positive features, it also has a number of serious deficiencies. An even greater danger than the deficiencies of the treaty, however, is the prospect that the people of the United States will be lulled into a false sense of security and assume that the treaty will eliminate the likelihood of nuclear war.

We must realize that we can have peace only through strength. The Soviet Union is already ahead of the United States in a number of strategic areas, and by all projections we have seen that the gap will grow in years to come. The American Legion will consider support of the SALT II Treaty only if we are assured that the United States will strengthen its defenses along the lines we have outlined, and the treaty as amended and modified in the areas that we have mentioned. Thank you, sir.

[Mr. Carey's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN CAREY

Thank you Mr. Chairman: I am Jack Carey, immediate past National Commander of The American Legion. I appreciate the opportunity to present the views of The American Legion on a matter of vital interest to our organization and to the nation—the limitation of strategic nuclear arms. All members of The American Legion, Mr. Chairman, are veterans of wartime service, and many of us have personally experienced the horror of war. As veterans, we realize full well that if conventional wars are horrendous, nuclear war would be an unspeakable catastrophy for mankind. Thus, it should not be surprising that we have long supported the concept of strategic arms limitations.

Our fundamental position has been that a strategic arms limitation treaty should be equitable, should actually halt the arms race, should reduce tensions and the likelihood of war, and should be fully verifiable. We have insisted, however, that such a treaty should not place the United States in an inferior strategic position.

The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty now before the Senate does not fully meet those criteria, but before we enumerate the treaty's shortcomings let us acknowledge that it does make certain positive contributions.

Although both sides—especially the Soviet Union—will continue to add considerably to their nuclear arsenals, upper limits are established on the total number of strategic launchers, the number of ICBM's and SLBM's and MIRVed warheads, and so on.

The treaty restricts the number of reentry vehicles either country can install on the various types of ICBM's and SLBM missiles.

The treaty prohibits certain basing modes for strategic launchers.

The treaty prohibits the placing in orbit nuclear weapons of any kind including fractional orbital missiles.

The treaty establishes maximum parameters for the development, testing, and deployment of new missile types.

We realize that each of these provisions is subject to violations and that many experts have expressed concern over what they consider to be our nation's limited ability to detect violations. Our organization, although likewise concerned, feels that it can contribute very little to any serious debate on verification since we have no information on the highly classified intelligence-gathering techniques which would be the focal points of any such debate.

Perhaps the most serious flaw in the pending treaty is that it covers not the total number of missiles and warheads possessed by each side. The Soviet Union could legally stockpile an unlimited number of missiles. Although the treaty pledges both sides to a rather vague commitment not to develop a "rapid reload" system, the Soviets can launch most of their missiles from a "cold launch" mode. Even without improving existing technology, they could launch a second, or perhaps third, salvo from their silos in a matter of hours. Furthermore, many of the reserve missiles could be stored in such a way that they could be fired in place within a short period of time. Then, of course, there is the possibility of outright cheating, of concealing full-fledged launchers in violation of the treaty. In the event of a war or a major crisis, the existence of such a "ready reserve" could give the U.S.S.R. an enormous strategic advantage.

We are aware that it was determined at an early stage of the SALT negotiations that the total number of missiles and warheads could not be limited because of verification problems, and that therefore the criterion became the number of "launchers". But we strongly recommend that the United States not abandon the principle of counting all nuclear arms during the SALT III negotiations, even if that means demanding on-site inspections.

Another glaring deficiency of the treaty is that the Soviet Union is allowed a monopoly on heavy missiles—the SS-18. As has been pointed out numerous times in the course of these hearings, those missiles will be sufficiently accurate by the early 1980's to pose a significant threat to our land-based ICBM's. While we realize that equivalence does not necessarily require our nuclear arsenal be a mirror image of the Soviet Union's, we strongly recommend that the United States urgently proceed with the development, production, and employment of the M-X missile, which will give us roughly the same hard-target capabilities as the Soviet Union and a highly survivable back-up system to our increasingly vulnerable land-based ICBM's.

The treaty's prohibition on the production of any heavy missiles is tantamount to legitimizing the Soviet throw-weight advantage in its land-based ICBM's as gained through deployment of the SS-18. There are those who would argue that U.S. advantages in SLBM and cruise missile technology provides an overall strategic balance. However, we view the heavy missile prohibition under SALT II as an inequitable provision and one which must be addressed. We believe that there should be a counting rule adopted under the treaty as an adjustment for the awesome power of the SS-18. Each SS-18 should be counted as more than one launcher. This provision would not require dismantling any of the heavy missiles but would necessitate some changes in the makeup of other components of the the Soviet arsenal.

The American Legion is fully aware of how firm the Soviet negotiators have been in demanding a full compliment of SS-18's. It, therefore, might be advisable for this Committee to consider the adoption of a new heavy missile counting rule with an effective date several years in the future to allow the Soviets ample time to make the necessary adjustments in their arsenal.

The value of the SS-18 is fully realized when evaluating the most often cited nuclear exchange scenario—one in which the United States accepts a Soviet first strike from its land-based ICBM force. With continuing improvements in Soviet missile accuracy we could expect to lose more than half of our retaliatory capability during such an attack while the Soviets would retain as much as 75-80 percent of their strike potential. This indeed is a rather shocking possibility and one which should encourage our war planners to reconsider the wisdom of accepting a Soviet first strike.

We believe that one of the most effective ways of countering the SS-18 is to minimize the damage inflicted by the weapon through the adoption of a "launch on warning" policy. It's rather obvious that Soviet weapons experts have built such explosive power into the SS-18 for one reason—to give it a hard target kill capability, the sort of hard targets found in and around U.S. missile silos. If we adopt a policy under which the SS-18 would strike an empty silo then we have (1) substantially reduced the effectiveness of an otherwise inflexible weapons system and (2) created some doubt in the minds of Soviet war planners; thereby, reducing their confidence that a Soviet victory can be achieved as a result of nuclear exchange.

I will expand upon our justification for "launch on warning" later in my statement.

Our third major concern over the pending treaty deals with the failure of including the Soviet Backfire bomber as a strategic nuclear delivery vehicle under terms of the agreement. There is general agreement that the Backfire can reach targets in the continental United States by aerial refueling or by making one-way flights.

We have two recommendations to make relevent to the Backfire bomber. The first is that the Soviet Union be required to sign and officially acknowledge the letter

presented by Secretary General Brezhnev to President Carter which promised that the bomber would not be deployed in an intercontinental mode and that its production would not exceed 30 per year. Our second recommendation is that the United States develop and deploy a similar number of comparable aircraft.

Another aspect of the treaty that especially disturbs us is the provision regarding the encryption of telemetry data. The treaty prohibits the encoding of radios missile test data that would be needed to verify compliance with the treaty. Each side, however, is allowed to determine whether or not such data would be needed to "verify compliance." Our recommendation is that both sides formally agree not to encrypt any missile data.

Putting this matter in its simplest terms, we know that the United States does not engage in the practice of encrypting telemetry and that the Soviets have promised not to encrypt any telemetry which would impede verification. It seems only logical that both sides should agree to ban all encryption. Such a ban would be a demonstration of Soviet good faith as well as a commitment by them to the maintenance of a verifiable treaty.

We are also concerned that the treaty's Protocol, which bans the development or flight testing of ICBM's from mobile launchers and the deployment of cruise missiles with ranges of more than 600 kilometers until the end of 1981 will "assume a life of its own", and that the United States will give into Soviet demands that the Protocol remain in force during the course of the SALT III negotiations. We recommend that the Senate approve an understanding or reservation stating that the Protocol will expire on schedule unless its extension is specifically approved by the Senate.

There are those who argue that the Senate already has the power to veto an extension of this or any other treaty protocol. However, our reasons for seeking such an expression by the Senate is to put you and your colleagues firmly on record and to put the Soviets on notice that there will be no tampering with the Protocol termination date.

We also agree with critics of the SALT II Treaty who express concern that the treaty may prevent us from transferring cruise missile and other technology to our NATO allies. We believe it necessary that the Senate clarify U.S. intentions regarding technology transfer by adopting a reservation or understanding. It is very clear to anyone who considers himself a student of arms limitation talks that our NATO allies in Western Europe have more than a passing interest in the pending agreement. The Soviets view themselves as a people surrounded by enemies—a perception which has led to upgrading the armament of Warsaw Pact nations in Eastern Europe. The activity, of course, poses a direct threat to the NATO nations and demands a realistic response.

Since the Soviets would rather the United States not assist NATO in improving its defenses, especially in the area of nuclear weaponry, they have disputed the U.S. right to continue to exchange nuclear weapons technology with Western Europe. A Senate understanding that nothing in the treaty precludes a continuation of U.S. technology transfer with NATO would reaffirm our commitment to the alliance and would create Soviet uneasiness over having a formidable opposing nuclear strike force on the same continent.

We believe that such a Senate expression would provide the additional service of promoting a continental balance between the NATO alliance and the Warsaw Pact nations; thereby, creating a stabilizing factor. Maintaining a viable nuclear strike force in Europe also gives the Soviet war planners yet another contingency to be concerned with, a fact which we believe reduces the threat of nuclear war.

Another step we should take to bolster the security and confidence of our NATO allies is to deploy updated theatre nuclear weapons in Europe to help offset the Soviet SS-20 intermediate range missile, which was not covered by the treaty. By the early 1980's the Soviets are expected to have deployed in Eastern Europe 300 SS-20's with 3 warheads each.

Mr. Chairman, The American Legion also seeks an adjustment in the procedure for reporting treaty violations. The treaty now provides that all actual or suspected violations be reported to a standing commission for consideration. We proposed a reservation or understanding that would require a simultaneous reporting of all such actual or suspected violations to the Senate for referral to the appropriate committee. Such reporting of violations would strengthen the U.S. commitment to force Soviet compliance with the agreement.

Our final recommendation to correct what we consider to be a flaw in the treaty deals with the agreed statements and common understandings. It appears as though these explanations of treaty provisions have been presented as separate documents and, therefore, not subject to the ratification process. If this is the case—and we defer to your ruling on the matter—then we demand formal Soviet agreement that

these statements and understandings be made part of the treaty text. The treaty would be simply unmanageable without such an agreement.

Mr. Chairman, we have called for several modifications of the treaty some of which seek amendments to the language and others which seek unilateral declarations by your and your colleagues. And there is little doubt in my mind that The American Legion will be accused of proposing so called "killer amendments" and accused of trying to sabotage the treaty.

I began my statement by saying that our organization has historically endorsed the concept of limiting strategic arms. I came here today with that attitude and presented these recommended modifications in that spirit. In fact, our organization would have been happy if both sides were forced to reduce their strategic arsenals by 50 percent or more. But, of course, we realize that such reductions ignore the realities of negotiating an arms agreement in an environment of unprecedented weapons production.

I have asked you to consider three amendments—to address the overwhelming Soviet advantage in heavy missiles; to prohibit the encryption of telemetry; and to insure that agreed statements and understandings are legally binding. The first of these creates obvious negotiating difficulties but the existing treaty provisions simply guarantee the Soviets a superior hard target kill capability which must be addressed in one of the ways we've recommended. The issue of heavy missiles will continue to be a problem during SALT III and beyond unless we stand firm. The second and third recommended amendments do not seek any significant changes in the terms of the treaty. They are honest attempts at (1) making the agreement more verifiable and (2) insuring that its provisions are precise enough to be manageable.

Up to this point we have recommended certain amendments to the treaty, reservations by the Senate, or weapons programs to help compensate for Soviet strategic advantages. These measures alone, however, are insufficient to assure "essential equivalence" and effective deterrence. As I mentioned earlier, our organization believes that the time has come to reconsider our fundamental nuclear strategy.

Our present strategy essentially dates back to the early 1960's when Defense Secretary McNamara ordered a study to, for the first time, determined the specific criteria of effective deterrence to serve as a guide for U.S. nuclear war planners. We wanted to determine how much capability the United States would need, after absorbing a Russian first strike, to retaliate and inflict "unacceptable damage" on the Soviet Union. His planners concluded that the "unacceptable damage" threshhold was the destruction of 20–25 percent of Russia's population and at least 50 percent of its industrial capacity. Any capability beyond that would be "overkill" and could only "rearrange the rubble".

McNamara's "Assured destruction" led to the concept of MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) toward the end of the 1960's, by which time the Soviet Union had developed a roughly equivalent strategic posture. The MAD concept denies any significance to superiority in force levels, makes "sufficiency" the standard of deterrent capability, and requires that deterrence be mutual. Professor Richard Pipes summed up the MAD concept with the ironic comment that "to feel secure the United States actually requires the Soviet Union to have the capacity to destroy it". To avoid upsetting mutual deterrence, the MAD concept requires that neither side should threaten the survivability of the other's retaliatory forces.

U.S. nuclear strategy underwent another modification in 1974, when Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, who continued to adhere to the Assured Destruction concept, made explicit a second goal, that the U.S. Strategic forces should be capable of limited attacks on selected economic or military targets, to provide the President with "limited nuclear options" in situations short of an all-out nuclear strike on U.S. cities.

During a recent appearance before this committee, Defense Secretary Brown stated that, "We have today . . . survivable forces capable of massive destruction of Soviet cities and industry, even after an all-out surprise attack on our forces by the Soviets. We also have both the forces and the targeting and employment policies to allow selective use of nuclear force to respond to more limited provocations". Thus the Carter administration essentially retains the strategy of the previous administration, the concept of assured destruction tempered with the concept of "limited nuclear options".

It is evident that since the early 1960's we have taken what is essentially a "second strike" posture. We have indicated, directly and indirectly and at the highest levels, that we would absorb a first strike, and our basic strategy has centered around that assumption. In recent months, high-ranking U.S. officials have on several occasions sought to suggest that the United States might not absorb the first blow, but in each instance they have hastened to add" of course, that is not our

policy", or some other disclaimer. If their intent was to inject an element of doubt into the minds of Soviet war planners, it is doubtful that they have succeeded.

The only problem with the Mutual Assured Destruction thesis is that it is not mutual. Western experts on Soviet military thought agree almost unanimously that Soviet strategists have never regarded nuclear war as unthinkable or unwinnable. In the words of one American analyst, "The only Soviet 'doctrine' is found in its concept of fighting and winning nuclear wars".

Thus the Soviets refuse to accept any concept that would increase Soviet vulnerability, and believe that "deterrence" cannot lead to "victory" and that there is no sense in absorbing an enemy strike merely to retaliate. During the SALT I negotiations, the American delegation officially disavowed the "launch on warning" concept which, it claimed, could result in automatic escalation or even in starting a nuclear war by accident. But efforts to elicit a statement on Soviet policy toward "launch on warning" met with silence. The only Soviet response was that such matters went beyond the proper scope of the SALT talks.

Soviet military writers have clearly and consistently indicated that the Soviet Union will, if attacked, "launch on warning". That policy was affirmed by Secretary Brezhnev at the 24th Congress of the CPSU: "Any potential aggressor is well aware that any attempt to launch a missile attack on our country would be met by devastating retaliation." This fundamental difference in strategic outlook helps explain the Soviet Union's relative lack of concern over the vulnerability of its ICBM silos. At present, its land-based ICBM's carry about 70 percent of its strategic warheads, which account for more than 80 percent of its megatonnage. In contrast, U.S. ICBM's account for about 35 percent of our megatonnage.

Offensively, the Soviet Union has increasingly emphasized the deployment of "hard target killers"—very large and accurate ICBM's such as the SS-18's—which according to the MAD doctrine are "destabilizing". As has been pointed out many times in the course of the Senate SALT II hearings, by the early 1980's the Soviet Union, with the improved accuracy of its powerful missiles, will be capable of launching a counterforce strike that could well destroy 90 percent of our land-based ICBM's (which account for about 35 percent of our megatonnage), at least half of our B-52's (which carry about half of our total nuclear explosive power), and perhaps one-third of our nuclear submarines. As a result, our total megatonnage would be reduced by about 60 percent with the expenditure of only about 20 percent of the Soviet nuclear force. The number of remaining U.S. ICBM's, SLBM's, and bombers that could reach targets in the Soviet Union would be reduced by normal systems failures (about 15 percent), improved Soviet anti-bomber and anti-submarine capabilities, and ABM's. The damage the United States could inflict on the Soviet Union would be further limited by the Soviet civil defense system, which is not so much intended to cope with an all-out attack on its urban/industrial centers as to minimize the damage that might result from U.S. strategic forces that have been significantly reduced by a Soviet first strike and by active Soviet defenses.

Since it would, for example, require more than 100 SLBM's on target to inflict 40 percent damage on a city the size of Leningrad, it is quite possible that we would not be capable of inflicting "unacceptable damage" on the Soviet Union with our surviving forces, largely highly vulnerable B-52's and relatively inaccurate SLBM's. That would be especially true if we had to expend a significant percentage of our remaining delivery vehicles on counterforce targets. But our major concern is that in view of the enormous nuclear disparity between the United States and the Soviet Union following a Soviet first strike our leadership, especially if the Soviets left many major U.S. population centers untouched as "second strike hostages", may decide not to retaliate.

Instead of opting for a "surgical" first strike aimed only at our strategic nuclear forces, the Soviets might attempt to strike a "knock out" blow, to paralyze the United States by destroying all significant military targets, communications installations, transportation hubs, airfields, ports, refineries, power plants, governmental centers, etc. The prospect that the Soviets might opt for more than our ICBM silos on a first strike was reinforced by the late Marshal Krylov, Commander of Strategic Rocket Forces, who in one of the most authoritative public comments on Soviet targeting strategy, revealed that the principal targets of his forces would be the enemy's delivery systems and weapons storage and manufacturing sites, military installations, military industries and centers of political-military administration, command and control. Such a massive assault by as many as 10,000 warheads (the Soviets are expected to have deployed about 14,000 warheads by the early 1980's might leave us with little capability or will to retaliate.

It should be pointed out that the first half of the 1980's, during which time the Soviets will be capable of launching a perhaps decisive counterforce strike, will precede the scheduled deployment phase of the M-X missile system (1986-1989). It

will also coincide with the period during which about half of the Polaris-Poseidon fleet may have to be retired but before the full Trident fleet has been put into service.

In our view, the most effective way of countering the vulnerability, of preventing our ICBM's from being knocked out, assuring the maintenance of essential equivalence and effective deterrence, and lessening the temptation for the Soviet Union to launch a counterforce or nation-paralyzing first strike, would be to adopt a "launch on warning" posture. The adoption of such a policy would also help nullify any strategic advantages the Soviet Union might obtain by violating the SALT II Treaty; by concealing more than the stipulated number of launchers, by increasing the number of reentry vehicles in MIRVed warheads, and so forth. In other words, no matter what the Soviet Union did would be assured of an effective deterrent.

Those who oppose the "launch on warning" policy cite two principal objections. One is the danger of accidental war, that our radar and monitoring systems are not sufficiently reliable. We believe that there is virtually no chance of such an "accident". General James C. Hill, Commander of NORAD/ADCOM, recently remarked that, "We do have the capability now to detect and assess a large-scale ICBM attack on the United States—and so notify the President," although he warned that there are deficiencies if the objective is to extend launch on warning to flexible response and similar kinds of graduated retaliatory actions. Our ICBM warning network consists of a number of redundant systems. First, there are the early warning satellites which detect missile firings at the moment of launch. Confirmation and assessment are provided by the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System [BMEWS]. The Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System (formerly part of the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system) has been integrated into our ICBM warning system. In addition, the PAVE PAWS coastal phased array radar system provide radar confirmation and assessment of SLBM launches to corroborate early detection by early warning satellite systems. We should give the highest priority to further improving our monitoring and communications systems, with the goal of eliminating, to the extent that is humanly possible, the chance of accidental war.

The second major objection to a "launch on warning" policy is that it would restrict the President's ability to employ limited nuclear options. In the words of Secretary Brown, "While I have serious doubts about whether a nuclear war, once started, could be kept limited, it would be imprudent to place the United States in a position in which uncontrolled escalation would be the only course we could follow. Massive retaliation may not be appropriate, nor will its prospect be sufficiently credible in all circumstances to deter the full range of actions we seek to prevent."

We take issue with the views that a launch on warning policy is destabilizing or may prevent uncontrolled escalation. In the first place, the Soviet Union now has, and has long had, such a policy. Second, if there is a destabilizing factor in the nuclear deterrence equation it is that Soviet war planners may be at least 90 percent certain that, according to our present policy, we would absorb a first strike no matter what its magnitude. That could tempt the Soviet Union to try for a "knock out" blow. The possibility of their opting for such a course would be greatly diminished if they knew that their missiles would impact on empty silos.

Furthermore, we believe that there is little likelihood that the Soviet Union would play our game of "limited nuclear options". They would in all likelihood attempt to inflict maximum military-economic damage on the first strike, although perhaps leaving certain population centers "hostage" to a second strike. We would be left with shattered military forces, a shattered economy, and a bag full of limited nuclear options.

In sum, we believe that the United States can no longer afford to pursue a strategic policy that would oblige us to absorb a first strike. We must make it clear to the Soviet Union and while we will not be the first to start a nuclear war, we are prepared to retaliate immediately. This would decrease the likelihood of nuclear war, not increase it.

Although the adoption of a "launch on warning" posture would go a long way toward assuring that we could maintain an effective deterrent, we realize that at the crucial moment the President may fail to act or that there may be some breakdown in the communications link. We, therefore, believe that the M-X program would be a good investment. It would provide the United States with a highly survivable back-up system and with an accurate, powerful hard-target system similar to that of the Soviet Union. But deployment of the M-X system alone is not enough. We must recommit ourselves to the modernization of our strategic Triad—the concept developed as the basis for providing the President certain options during a crisis. The survivability and strike capability of our submarine fleet are matters of debate as the aging Polaris and Poseidon ships quickly approach their

scheduled retirement dates. The schedules for full deployment of the Trident system, therefore, must be accelerated.

A manned penetrating bomber capable of delivering cruise missiles close to Soviet targets is especially critical since B-52 vulnerability to Soviet air defenses is almost a certainty. Our nation's war planners should also examine the feasibility and cost effectiveness of deploying a portion of our current land-based ICBM force in a mobile mode during the early 1980's since it will be a decade before the M-X system is fully deployed.

We are aware that these recommended actions to modernize the strategic Triad are expensive and there are many people in this country who have expressed concern that the SALT II hearings have provided a marketplace in which defense-minded groups and individuals have presented military hardware shopping lists with the totals being the costs of their support of the agreement. We present our recommendations as necessary expenditures, whether SALT II be approved or rejected.

The Soviet Union is a formidable opponent but the greatest potential danger facing our nation today in terms of its security is not the threat of any foreign power but the unwillingness of our citizenry to pay the price of pursuing peace through a position of strength. Regardless of the disposition of this treaty, we will be required to step up defense spending in order to counter improvements in the Soviet strategic arsenal.

Our final recommendation is that the United States should make a much greater effort in civil defense preparedness. The Soviet Union has long realized that civil defense is an integral part of strategic policy. It has devoted a good deal of effort to "hardening" key economic and military installations and in developing evacuation capabilities, with special emphasis on evacuating essential industrial and political personnel. An effective civil defense system would also give the Soviets a strategic advantage in that in the event of a developing crisis they could evacuate their major population centers, perhaps on the pretext that they fear a U.S. preemptive strike, thus presenting U.S. war planners with empty cities while ours are filled with people and panic. In addition to matching the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear weapons, we must also endeavor to match it in terms of civil defense.

In sum, Mr. Chairman, we believe that although the SALT II Treaty, if it is adhered to fully and in good faith, has certain positive features, it also has a number of serious deficiencies. An even greater danger than the deficiencies of the treaty, however, is the prospect that the people of the United States will be lulled into a false sense of security and assume that the treaty will eliminate the likelihood of nuclear war. We must realize that we can have peace only through strength. The Soviet Union is already ahead of the United States in a number of strategic areas, and by all projections we have seen, that gap will grow in the years ahead. But if such a disparity is allowed to exist, that will be not so much the fault of the treaty as the lack of national will, as the result of our own deliberate policies. We are willing to support the SALT II Treaty only if we are assured that the United States will strengthen its defenses along the lines we have outlined and the treaty is modified in the areas that we've mentioned.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Carey, and congratulations. I did not think you were going to manage to keep your presentation within 10 minutes. You had a 15-page statement, and you incorporated all of the major points as well.

Mr. Baugher is our next panelist. Mr. Baugher is the past chairman of the national governing board and present member of the national governing board of the Ripon Society.

STATEMENT OF PETER VINCENT BAUGHER, PAST CHAIRMAN AND PRESENT MEMBER, NATIONAL GOVERNING BOARD, RIPON SOCIETY, WASHINGTON, D.C.[1]

Mr. BAUGHER. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.

My name is Peter V. Baugher. I am a Chicago attorney, and past chairman of the national governing board of the Ripon Society, on whose behalf I am testifying this morning.

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[1] See page 170 for Mr. Baugher's prepared statement.

The debate over the SALT II treaty has been vigorous and far-ranging. We are mindful, Mr. Chairman, of the serious concerns expressed by those who feel that passage of this agreement would threaten U.S. security. We are also aware that the treaty more closely resembles a set of marginal regulations on the nuclear weapons buildup already planned by the parties than it does the strict arms control accord we would have preferred.

These considerations notwithstanding, we believe that the case for ratification remains clear and convincing. The principal benefits of SALT II can be easily summarized.

The treaty places certain qualitative and quantitative limitations on the nuclear arms race. These limitations are not as stringent as we had hoped, but they are nonetheless a significant improvement over the alternative, which is to have no ceilings at all.

The proposed treaty, moreover, is verifiable, and in fact will enhance our ability to monitor Soviet strategic forces. At a minimum, the treaty's precise limits should enable the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to avoid building excessive forces based on worst case estimates.

Finally, ratification of SALT II, while not impairing our efforts to maintain strategic equality, can provide the basis for further negotiations with the Soviet Union out of which more substantial arms control measures, including real reductions in the number and quality of atomic weapons, might emerge.

Opponents of SALT II argue that approval of the treaty would jeopardize our national security. They are wrong. These critics take an inordinately narrow view of what elements contribute to real security. The security of this Nation depends not only upon the status of our nuclear arsenal, but also upon the strength of our political institutions, the health of our economy, and the will of the American people.

Even in terms of military security, our strategic weapons can provide little more than a "force de frappe" if U.S. conventional forces are inadequate.

These components of national security, and the debilitating effect of a profligate nuclear arms race upon them, have been for the most part ignored by SALT II's opponents.

Contrary to the fears of those who oppose the treaty, SALT II's effect upon the strategic balance will be generally favorable. The agreement is based on the principle of "equality and equal security." The United States no longer enjoys nuclear superiority over the Soviets, but only an essential equivalence. SALT II acknowledges and reflects this shift in power. But the treaty is not the cause of the shift, nor will refusing to ratify the agreement reestablish our nuclear preeminence.

Indeed, while SALT II places a lid on certain improvements in the force levels of the two countries, these limits will impinge most immediately on the Soviet Union. By contrast, the treaty interferes with none of the prospective U.S. nuclear defense programs now under consideration.

It is said that we should withhold approval of the treaty because of the Soviet Union's aggressive behavior in the Third World. Without a doubt, Soviet conduct has been disruptive and provocative. Clearly, our attitudes toward the Soviet Union and our will-

ingness to enter into agreements with it are, as a practical matter, linked to what the Soviets do in other parts of the world.

We do not negotiate with the Soviet Union, however, because we admire its policies. We negotiate with the U.S.S.R. because it is to our advantage in the long run to compete diplomatically, politically, and economically, rather than just militarily. The SALT II agreement must accordingly be evaluated on its own merits. It ought to be ratified because it offers significant benefits to the United States, and not defeated because our adversary shows every sign of continuing to displease us.

Finally, the rejection of SALT II would inevitably heighten tensions between the United States and the U.S.S.R. The political repercussions of such new tensions could adversely affect our allies, as well, who rely on us to manage a stable East-West relationship. Rejection of the SALT II Treaty would also further undermine the credibility of the Carter administration and its ability to manage our international relations. While as Republicans we have frequently been critical of the administration's foreign policy, as Americans we believe that it is important to present a reasonably unified front to the rest of the world, and especially to the Soviet Union.

Secretary of Defense Brown and General Jones both testified that, while today our nuclear forces are essentially equivalent to those of the U.S.S.R., the trend is that the Soviets will possess advantages in most of the major indicators of strategic force within the next few years. In particular our land-based ICBM's are projected to be critically vulnerable by the mid-1980's.

The danger of this deterioration in our once dominant strategic position is not that the Soviets would be tempted to launch a nuclear first strike against the United States. In view of the very substantial U.S. retaliatory capacity that would survive any Soviet attack, this eventuality seems highly unlikely.

Rather, as General Jones suggested, the growing disparity would probably be reflected in a more confident Soviet leadership, increasingly inclined toward adventuresome behavior in areas where our interests might clash, and where America's ability to respond by conventional means could be circumscribed. This is not a development the United States can afford to permit.

The trend to which I refer has emerged over the past 15 years as a consequence of unilateral decisions by the United States and the U.S.S.R. It is not the result of SALT, nor will ratification of the proposed agreement in any way aggravate our problem. Indeed, in that it places limits on the further growth of the parties' atomic forces, it should act to stabilize the arms race and to minimize whatever apparent strategic advantage the Soviets may have achieved by the first half of the next decade.

SALT II, however, is not a substitute for a strong defense; nor are America's hopes for SALT III an alternative to an ongoing program of upgrading our strategic forces. This means that within the life of the SALT II Treaty, the United States must develop and deploy several major new atomic weapons systems and modernize those strategic systems already in existence.

As the fact of the Soviet arms buildup has become more generally known, many have assumed that the solution to our projected

strategic deficiencies is to bolster the military budget—typically by 3 to 5 percent, in real dollars. This approach misses the mark. The new weapons systems we need will be costly, but this is exactly why the multibillion dollar programs now envisioned must be judged on an individual basis, not as part of a mandatory quota for overall spending. Dollars alone will not buy national defense.

In order to meet the Soviet challenge and to maintain strategic parity we may be required to boost our real outlays for defense by 5 percent or more every year for the next 5 to 10 years. But this is a conclusion that should be reached after the relative cost-effectiveness of each potential new weapons system has been carefully evaluated. It is not a goal to be sought as an end in itself.

One way of meeting the Soviet military challenge is to augment and modernize our forces. Another is to challenge the Soviet Union to engage in negotiations about actual reductions of nuclear armaments, not just limitations. We advocate that these approaches be pursued concurrently.

It is ironic that the SALT debate has become a debate on rearmament. The problem, unfortunately, is endemic to arms limitation talk, in which the Soviet Union exhibits little interest in curbing the weapons race. The Soviet military buildup has been underway now for 15 years. It began before formal SALT negotiations were inaugurated, and it has continued unabated during the period following the war in Vietnam when U.S. defense spending declined markedly.

Under these conditions arms control talks with the Soviet Union have too frequently served to ratify and legitimize the U.S.S.R.'s latest plans for military expansion. There is no reason to believe that SALT III will offer any more meaningful opportunity. The United States entered the negotiations for SALT I with a pronounced superiority in strategic weapons, and commenced the SALT II talks with a lesser but still significant advantage. The likelihood is that SALT III will begin with the Soviets expecting strategic supremacy by the end of these negotiations.

In such circumstances, the promise of any real arms reduction is illusory. Our best hope is to obtain agreement for a SALT III reduction in arms now, while the United States still retains the power to forestall this shift in the strategic balance. If there are to be substantial weapons cutbacks in SALT III, the mandate for those cuts must be written into SALT II.

Toward this end, Senator Moynihan has proposed an amendment to the treaty, directing that the United States and the Soviet Union "effect significant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic offensive arms consistent with the requirement for the maintenance of essential strategic equivalence." If the parties were unable to conclude such an agreement by December 31, 1981, SALT II would terminate on that date.

Unlike some other proposals that have been made to force the pace of the SALT III negotiations, such an amendment would not require undoing the substantive terms of the present SALT II treaty. A less demanding alternative that could still improve the chances for a "deep cut" SALT III agreement would be to amend the resolution of ratification to include a set of explicit and appro-

priately ambitious guidelines for the next round of negotiations. These kinds of approaches deserve your support.

The SALT II Treaty should be approved because it is a useful, if modest, step in the long-range process of controlling nuclear armaments. But if the SALT process itself is to be preserved, the time has come to face the real issues and the real prospects of substantial arms reductions.

We hope that your committee will recommend the incorporation of a SALT III mandate into the existing agreement and urge that the Senate give its advice and consent to the treaty as so amended.

Thank you.

[Mr. Baugher's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PETER V. BAUGHER

Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations: I appreciate this opportunity to appear befor you to urge that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification of the proposed Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II).

INTRODUCTION

My name is Peter V. Baugher. I am a Chicago attorney and a member of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. I also serve on the Republican National Committee's Advisory Council on National Security and International Affairs and am past Chairman of the National Governing Board of the Ripon Society, on whose behalf I am testifying this morning.

Over the past two decades the Ripon Society has studied and taken positions on many issues of major public importance. Few matters have commanded as much attention, or aroused as much controversy, though, as has the debate over the SALT II Treaty. The agreement now before this Committee bears not only upon our military security and international political relations, but also on what America's role in the world ought to be, whether we are strong enough to carry out that role, and whether the American sun is rising or setting on the world scene. SALT II has thus taken on symbolic importance far exceeding its value as an agreement to limit nuclear weapons. In evaluating the Treaty we are mindful of the serious concerns expressed by those who believe its passage would threaten U.S. security. We are also aware that SALT II more closely resembles a set of marginal regulations on the nuclear weapons build-up already planned by the parties than it does the strict arms control accord we would have preferred. These considerations notwithstanding, we believe that the case for ratification remains clear and convincing.

THE BENEFITS OF SALT II

The testimony on nuclear diplomacy received by this Committee during the last two months has been characterized by a high level of sophistication and expertise. The principal benefits of SALT II can nevertheless be easily summarized. The Treaty places certain carefully defined quantitative and qualitative limitations on the nuclear arms race, which—if permitted to proceed unchecked—would be militarily and politically hazardous, and which could impose the burden of massive additional defense spending upon our citizens. These limitations are not as stringent as we had hoped. But they are nonetheless a significant improvement over the alternative, which is to have no ceilings at all. The proposed Treaty, moreover, is verifiable, and in fact will enhance our ability to monitor Soviet strategic forces. At a minimum the Treaty's precise and agreed upon limits, reinforced by the greater knowledge each side will have of the other's capabilities, should enable the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to avoid building excessive forces based on "worst-case" estimates. Finally, ratification of SALT II, while not impairing our efforts to maintain strategic equality, can provide the basis for further negotiations with the Soviet Union out of which more substantial arms control measures, including real reductions in the number of quality of atomic weapons, might emerge.

More specifically, the major advantages of the SALT II Treaty may be enumerated as follows:

First, the proposed agreement sets important quantitative limitations on the number of strategic delivery vehicles. Both sides agree in Article III of the Treaty to the imposition of a common aggregate ceiling (2,400 initially, to be reduced to 2,250

by the end of 1981) on ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) launchers, SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile) launchers, and heavy bombers. This will compel the Soviets to dismantle or destroy over 250 of the missile launchers or heavy bombers they now have deployed. By contrast, because we are below the SALT II limits, the United States could actually increase the number of launchers and heavy bombers it deploys.

Article V of the Treaty also places equal subceilings on specific categories of launchers. There is a limit of 1,320 on the combined total of MIRVed ICBM and SLBM launchers, together with heavy bombers equipped to carry long-range, air-launched cruise missiles (Paragraph 1). The total number of MIRVed launchers cannot exceed 1,200 (Paragraph 2), and the number of MIRVed ICBM launchers—potentially the most destabilizing weapon system—is restricted to a maximum of 820 (Paragraph 3).

Second, Article IV of the proposed agreement contains a number of qualitative restraints. The Treaty freezes the number of warheads on existing types of ICBM's (Paragraph 10) and establishes ceilings of 14 and 10, respectively, on the number of warheads that can be placed on SLBM's and on any new type of ICBM (Paragraph 11). SALT II, further, bans new ICBM's and new SLBM's that are larger in throw-weight than the largest current light ICBM, the Soviet SS-19 (Paragraph 7). The Treaty permits production of only one new type of light ICBM for each side (Paragraph 9). Article IV also limits improvements to existing types of ICBM's in such characteristics as throw-weight, launch-weight, number of warheads, length, diameter, and fuel type.

There are other qualitative constraints in the Treaty. SALT II (Paragraph 5 of Article IV) bans rapid missile reload systems which, if made workable, could greatly multiply the military capabilities of ICBM launchers. To reinforce this restriction, storage of excess missiles near launch sites is also barred. In addition, Article IX of the Treaty prohibits development, testing, and deployment of seabed, outer space, and a variety of other types of weapons not yet deployed by either side.

Third, under the terms of Articles XV, XVI, and XVII of the proposed agreement our ability to monitor Soviet Strategic systems will be protected and enhanced. Deliberate concealment measures that impede verification, such as encryption of the telemetry associated with missile tests, are banned by SALT II, as is any interference with national technical means of verification. The Treaty, moreover, requires the parties to exchange information on the numbers, sizes, and kinds of their strategic systems, and to notify one another in advance about all planned ICBM launches. Through the Standing Consultative Commission (Article XVII), an institutional mechanism for discussing compliance and verification problems is also made available to the parties.

Fourth, ratification of the proposed agreement will facilitate continuation of the SALT process. The talks on limitation of strategic armaments begun by President Nixon in 1969, buoyed by the signing of the ABM Treaty and Interim SALT agreement in 1972, and accelerated by President Ford at Vladivostok in 1974, may now progress to a new level of negotiations—SALT III—sustaining the forward momentum generated by the successful conclusions of SALT I and II.

THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE TREATY

Opponents of the SALT II agreement argue that approval of the Treaty would jeopardize our national security. They are wrong. These critics take an inordinately narrow view of what elements contribute to real security. The security of this nation depends not only upon the status of our nuclear arsenal, but also upon the strength of our political institutions, the health of our economy, and the will of the American people. Even in terms of military security, our strategic weapons can provide little more than a "force de frappe," if U.S. conventional forces—those we are most likely to rely upon in anything short of a nuclear catastrophe—are inadequate. These components of national security, and the debilitating effect of a profligate nuclear arms race upon them, have for the most part been ignored by SALT II's opponents.

Contrary to the fears of those who oppose the Treaty, SALT II's effect upon the strategic balance will be generally favorable. The agreement is based on the principle of "equality and equal security" (Preamble); the United States no longer enjoys nuclear superiority over the Soviets, as it once did, but only an "essential equivalence". SALT II acknowledges and reflects this shift in power. But the Treaty is not the cause of the shift, nor will refusing to ratify the agreement reestablish our nuclear preeminence.

Indeed, while SALT II places a lid on certain improvements in the force levels of the two countries, these limits will impinge most immediately on the Soviet Union. By contrast, the Treaty interferes with none of the prospective U.S. nuclear defense

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programs now under consideration—the M-X missile, the Trident submarine and missiles, air, sea, and ground-launched cruise missiles, a cruise missile carrier, or a possible new bomber. Should we decide to fund these programs, nothing in the Treaty would prevent us from moving ahead with them on schedule.

Similarly, nothing in Article XII of the Treaty or elsewhere will prevent us from continuing nuclear and conventional military cooperation with our allies. In particular, SALT II does not apply to "Eurostrategic weapons"—those nuclear forces deployed in Europe—and we are free therefore to implement our announced plan to modernize and upgrade NATO's strategic capabilities. For this reason, among others, all of our European allies have endorsed the proposed agreement.

It is said that we should withhold approval of the Treaty because of the Soviet Union's aggressive behavior in the Third World. Without a doubt Soviet conduct in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East—and, as we learned only this week, its stationing of combat troops in Cuba—has been disruptive and provocative. Clearly, our attitudes toward the Soviet Union and our willingness to enter into agreements with it are, as a practical matter, "linked" to what the Soviets (or their representatives) do in other parts of the world.

We do not negotiate with the Soviet Union, however, because we admire its policies. We negotiate with the U.S.S.R. because it is to our advantage, in the long run, to compete diplomatically, politically, and economically, rather than just militarily. The SALT II agreement must accordingly be evaluated on its own merits. It ought to be ratified because it offers significant benefits to the United States and not defeated because our adversary shows every sign of continuing to displease us.

Finally, any examination of the consequences of approving SALT II must be accompanied by an assessment of what is likely to happen if the Senate refuses to give its consent to this agreement. The defeat of SALT II would inevitably heighten tensions between the United States and the U.S.S.R., further eroding whatever may be left of detente. The political repercussions of such new tensions could also adversely affect our allies, who rely on us to manage a stable East-West relationship. Rejection of the Treaty would tend, additionally, to reinforce the Soviet's apparent belief that the only way to attain security is to act unilaterally, and belligerently, to improve their position as a world power.

Beyond this, we are now engaged in a wide range of arms control ventures with the Soviet Union and other nations. Although ratification of SALT II will not guarantee success in these other arms control efforts, the failure of SALT II would almost certainly damage them, perhaps fatally. In addition to the collapse of the SALT process itself, the most important casualty of nonratification would be our attempt to halt the spread of nuclear weapons through the 1968 Nonproliferation Treaty, Article VI of which commits all parties—including the United States and the Soviet Union—"to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date." Nations now poised on the brink of producing nuclear weapons might well use the breakdown of SALT as an excuse (or a reason) to reconsider their own commitment to the Nonproliferation Treaty. It is also likely that rejection by the United States of the SALT II agreement would impair our ongoing negotiations with the Soviets on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, on the prohibition of antisatellite weaponry, and on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe.

Defeat of the SALT II Treaty would also further undermine the credibility of the Carter Administration and its ability to manage our international relations. While as Republicans we have frequently been critical of the Administration's foreign policy, as Americans we believe that it is important to present a reasonably unified front to the rest of the world, and especially to the Soviet Union. This does not mean that the Senate should abdicate its constitutional responsibility to pass upon all treaties between the United States and other nations. It does mean, however, that in judging such treaties allowance must be made for the President's role as the chief architect and manager of our foreign relations.

CLARIFICATION OF TREATY AMBIGUITIES

Like any negotiated agreement, the SALT II Treaty is not without problems. In the context of an accord supposedly premised upon equality, we are concerned about the Soviet Union's unilateral right to deploy 308 modern large ballistic missiles (MLBM), a carryover from SALT I. Clearly, the desired result would have been a major cutback in Soviet MLBM's in order to have reduced the U.S.S.R.'s substantial throw-weight advantage over the United States. For the time being, limiting the SS-18 to 10 warheads provides a significant restraint on their MLBM potential, but obtaining sizeable reductions in the number of these heavy weapons should be one of our major objectives in future negotiations.

Lest there be any confusion about U.S. intentions with respect to certain potentially ambiguous provisions of the Treaty, the Senate should ratify SALT II subject to the following understandings: (1) It should be made clear that the Protocol which, among other things, bars until January 1, 1982, the deployment of ground and sea-launched cruise missiles with ranges of more than 600 kilometers, cannot be extended without the advice and consent of the Senate; (2) In order to clarify the limited scope of our obligations under article XII, the so-called "non-circumvention" clause, the Senate should state that nothing in the Treaty prohibits the United States from continuing traditional patterns of allied defense co-operation, including the transfer of cruise missile technology if it deems such a transfer necessary; (3) President Brezhnev's statement delivered to President Carter at Vienna on June 16, 1979, pledging that the Soviet Union would not build more than 30 Backfire bombers a year and that it would not deploy them for intercontinental missions, should be made a formal part of the Treaty.

These suggested understandings are modest and would not require renegotiation of the agreement. They would, on the other hand, highlight several ambiguities in SALT II which, if not resolved now, could conceivably lead to serious disagreements after the Treaty has gone into effect.

MEETING THE SOVIET MILITARY CHALLENGE

From the outset of these hearings it has been conceded that the days of U.S. nuclear supremacy are past, and that the momentum of atomic weapons development belongs now to the Soviet Union. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and General David Jones of the Joint Chief of Staff both testified that, while today our nuclear forces are essentially equivalent to those of the U.S.S.R., the trend is that the Soviets will possess advantages in most of the major indicators of strategic force within the next few years. In particular, our land-based ICBM's are projected to be critically vulnerable by the mid-1980's.

The danger of this deterioration in our once dominant strategic position is not that the Soviets would be tempted to launch a nuclear first strike against the United States. In view of the very substantial U.S. retaliatory capacity that would survive any Soviet attack, this eventuality seems highly unlikely. Rather, as General Jones suggested, the growing disparity would probably be reflected in a more confident Soviet leadership, increasingly inclined toward adventurous behavior in areas where our interests might clash, and where America's ability to respond by conventional means could be circumscribed. "Such a situation," the General warned, "would carry the seeds of serious miscalculation and run the risk of precipitating a confrontation which neither side wanted nor intended." Plainly, this is not a development the United States can afford to permit.

This trend, which (if allowed to continue) will tip the strategic balance precariously toward the Soviets, has emerged over the past 15 years as a consequence of unilateral decision by the United States and the U.S.S.R. to invest at sharply different rates in the acquisition of nuclear armaments. It is not the result of SALT, nor will ratification of the proposed agreement in any way aggravate our problem. Indeed, in that it places limits on the further growth of the parties' atomic forces, it should act to stabilize the arms race and to minimize whatever apparent strategic advantage the Soviets may have achieved by the first half of the next decade. SALT II, however, is not a substitute for a strong defense; nor, regrettably, are America's hopes for SALT III an alternative to an ongoing program for the upgrading of our strategic forces.

This means that within the life of the SALT II Treaty the United States must develop and deploy several major new atomic weapons systems and modernize those strategic systems already in existence. As the fact of the Soviet arms buildup has become more generally known, many have assumed that the solution to our projected strategic deficiencies is to bolster the military budget—typically, by three to five percent in real dollars. This approach misses the mark.

The new weapons systems we need will be costly. But this is exactly why the multi-billion dollar programs now envisioned—whether one is speaking of the M-X missile with its several competing basing modes (each more expensive than the next), the Trident submarine or Trident missiles, the several varieties of cruise missiles, or the B-1 bomber—must be judged on an individual basis, not as part of a mandatory quota for overall spending. Dollars alone will not buy national defense.

Congressman Joseph Addabbo of New York, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations, commented on this subject last month (Congressional Record, August 2, 1979, pp. 7184-7185):

> There is a limit to what we can afford to spend each year [on defense], yet there are certain levels of capability that we must maintain. It is clear that we

are spending more and getting less for it, year by year, and that the tough years lie ahead, not backward.

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Budget officers, be they civilian or military, tend to stockpile dollars for a rainy day. We just cannot afford to let them do this any longer, nor can we begin a procurement unless we are reasonably sure that it will do the job it is supposed to do when it comes into the inventory, and unless we are reasonably sure it can be produced in line with what we anticipate, and unless we are sure it is not low on the priority list.

These problems have been exacerbated by the failure of the Department of Defense to improve its weapons program review capability. Without a strengthened independent review effort it would be wasteful to increase the Pentagon's budget, no matter how unfavorable the balance of forces might become.

In order to meet the Soviet challenge and to maintain strategic parity we may be required to boost our real outlays for defense by five percent or more every year for the next five to ten years. But this is a conclusion that should be reached after the relative cost-effectiveness of each potential new weapons system has been carefully evaluated. It is not a goal to be sought as an end in itself.

CHALLENGING THE SOVIET UNION

One way of meeting the Soviet military challenge is to augment and modernize our strategic (and conventional) forces. Another is to challenge the Soviet Union to engage in negotiations about actual reductions in nuclear armaments, not just limitations.[1] We advocate that these approaches be pursued concurrently.

It is ironic that the SALT debate has become (as Senator Moynihan recently remarked) a "debate on rearmament." The problem, unfortunately, is endemic to arms limitation talks in which the Soviet Union exhibits little interest in curbing the weapons race. The Soviet military buildup has been underway now for 15 years. It began before formal SALT negotiations were inaugurated in 1969, and it has continued unabated during the period following the war in Vietnam when U.S. defense spending declined markedly. It has never ceased because the Soviets have thus far been unwilling to give up the advantages they perceive in acquiring new and ever more powerful weapons systems.

Under these conditions arms control talks with the Soviet Union have too frequently served to condone and legitimize the U.S.S.R.'s latest plans for military expansion. The agreements resulting from these talks have as often as not encouraged both sides (and especially the Soviet Union) to enlarge their forces to the maximum size allowed and to attempt to exploit to the fullest whatever marginal advantages may be discerned in the accord.

There is no reason to believe that SALT III will offer any more meaningful opportunities. The United States entered the negotiations for SALT I with a pronounced superiority in strategic weapons and commenced the SALT II talks with a lesser but still significant advantage. The likelihood is that SALT III will begin with the Soviets expecting strategic supremacy by the end of those negotiations. In such circumstances, the promise of any real arms reductions is illusory.

Our best hope is to obtain agreement for a SALT III reduction in arms now, while the United States still retains the power to forestall this shift in the strategic balance. If there are to be substantial weapons cutbacks in SALT III, the mandate for those cuts must be written into SALT II.

Toward this end, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York has proposed an amendment to the Treaty that would add a new Paragraph 4 to Article XIX of the test:

> The Parties shall conclude, by December 31, 1981, an agreement which shall, as a result of the negotiations undertaken in accordance with the Joint Statement of Principles and Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms agreed upon at Vienna on June 18, 1979, effect *significant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic offensive arms,* consistent with the requirement for the maintenance of *essential strategic equivalence.* This agreement shall enter into effect immediately upon the expiration of the present Treaty or sooner, as the Parties shall decide. *If the Parties are unable to conclude such an agreement by December 31, 1981, the present Treaty shall terminate on that date.* (Emphasis added.)

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[1] The agenda for future negotiations must also include (1) tighter limits on the testing and development of new weapons, (2) some kind of answer to the concern the MIRVed Soviet ICBM's will jeopardize the survivability of U.S. ICBM's, (3) mutual reductions in European theatre nuclear weapons systems, and (4) a plan for regular on-site inspection of atomic arms facilities.

This kind of approach deserves your support. Unlike some other proposals that have been made to force the pace of the SALT III negotiations, such an amendment would not require undoing the substantive terms of the present SALT II Treaty. A less demanding alternative that could still improve the chances for a "deep cut" SALT III agreement of the kind we seek would be to amend the resolution of ratification to include a set of explicit guidelines for the next round of negotiations. This list of objectives would operate similarly to the amendment to SALT I which required that future weapons limitations impose equal aggregate ceilings on both countries.

As Senator Moynihan noted in advancing his proposal:

> This much is certain: Our margin for error in SALT has disappeared. We must rescue the "process" from itself; otherwise, it will present us with ever more unappealing choices. We must recover for SALT the possibility of arms limitation and genuine arms reductions. This, so it seems to me, is the major contribution the Senate can make to preservation of the SALT process that the President, and others, seek. We must at least make the effort.

This is a challenge, Mr. Chairman, worthy of the United States. The SALT II Treaty should be approved because it is a useful, if modest, step in the long-range process of controlling nuclear armaments. But if the SALT process itself is to be preserved, the time has come to face the real issues and the real prospects of substantial arms reductions. We hope that your Committee will recommend the incorporation of a SALT III mandate into the existing agreement and urge that the Senate give its advice and consent to the Treaty as so amended.

DESCRIPTION OF THE RIPON SOCIETY

Founded in 1962, the Ripon Society is a national Republican research and policy organization that takes its name from Ripon, Wisconsin, the birthplace of the GOP. It has chapters in cities across the country and members in all 50 States. The Society encourages young men and women to participate actively in public affairs. Ripon also works to formulate the kind of sound programs that will enable our Party to better fulfill its potential for constructive political leadership. We believe that we can assist the GOP in identifying and claiming the issues of the future; that we can help Republicans to raise the questions others will not ask and to grasp ideas whose times are yet to come. Above all, the Ripon Society seeks to serve as a spokesman for the progressive Republican tradition whose integrity and vision have inspired the GOP throughout its history.

The Society maintains its national headquarters at 800 Eighteenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006 (202-347-6477).

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON PETER VINCENT BAUGHER

Peter Vincent Baugher is an attorney at Schiff Hardin & Waite law firm in Chicago, Illinois. He was Law Clerk to Judge Philip W. Tone, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in 1973-74.

Born in Chicago in 1948, Baugher received his legal training at Yale Law School (J.D. 1973), and his undergraduate education at Princeton University (A.B. 1970), where he studied in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs.

Baugher is past Chairman of the National Governing Board of the Ripon Society and serves on the Republican National Committee's Advisory Council on National Security and International Affairs. He is a member of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, the American Council on Germany, the Economic Club of Chicago, and a variety of other professional, civic, and community associations.

Baugher serves on several boards of directors, including those of the Chicago Educational Television Association (WTTW/Chicago Public Television), WFMT, Inc. (which owns and operates WFMT-FM radio and Chicago Magazine), and the Princeton Club of Chicago.

Baugher is married to the former Robin Stickney of Pacific Palisades, California. They live at 816 Monticello Place in Evanston, Illinois.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Baugher, for your statement. Our next and final member of the panel is Mr. Herbert Scoville, a member of the governing board of New Directions, of Washington, D.C.

STATEMENT OF HERBERT J. SCOVILLE, JR., MEMBER, GOVERNING BOARD, NEW DIRECTIONS, WASHINGTON, D.C.[1]

Mr. SCOVILLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate very much this opportunity to appear before this committee and testify on the SALT II Treaty on behalf of New Directions. New Directions is a citizens' lobby for world security whose fulltime president is former Congressman Charles W. Whalen, Jr.

I, Herbert Scoville, cochair the New Directions Task Force on Arms Control and Disarmament with Betty Goetz Lall.

New Directions supports the SALT II Treaty and urges that it be ratified without amendment. We believe that SALT II improves the United States-Soviet strategic balance, takes important first steps in controlling the offensive strategic arms race, and will improve our knowledge of Soviet military programs, and thereby reduce the need to procure unnecessary weapons in order to deal with an uncertain and unlimited Soviet threat.

We believe that a failure to ratify the treaty can only result in increased tensions, in a less secure and more unstable strategic balance, in accelerated arms buildups, and in increased and unnecessary military expenditures. In such a world, the real security of the United States will be lower, and the Nation will be less able to deal with the critical economic and political problems facing it.

Too often in the debate over the SALT II Treaty there has been a tendency to focus on what the treaty does not do and to pay little attention to its positive benefits. This, in our view, has led to a distorted picture of the contribution that this treaty will make to our national security. We believe that it would be most useful to consider the treaty as a glass that is half full rather than half empty.

In my written text, I have summarized some of the important benefits of SALT, but I believe the committee has heard these points from many sources already, and in the interest of saving time, I will not repeat them this morning, but I would like to address a couple of other points which have received less attention.

While we strongly support the ratification of the SALT II Treaty, we are increasingly concerned with a tendency during the debate to turn the SALT II Treaty into a Christmas tree loaded with presents to be exchanged for SALT support. We have already seen President Carter's decision only a week before he signed the SALT II Treaty in Vienna to proceed with a full-scale development of a new, large model M–X missile.

We, too, are concerned about the theoretical vulnerability of the Minuteman ICBM, but it is not clear that the weapons procurement rather than the weapons limitation approach is the best way of solving this problem. In SALT I, the United States opted to continue the arms race in MIRVed missiles. Then the United States was more than 5 years ahead, since the Soviet Union had not yet carried out its first test of such a missile system. Now the United States is paying the price for its failure to deal with this problem through arms control. Quite predictably, the Soviets have followed along behind the United States, and will now in the 1980's

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[1] See page 178 for Mr. Scoville's prepared statement.

have sufficient numbers of accurate MIRVed warheads at least to threaten our entire ICBM force.

Now it appears that the United States may be repeating this failure of the early 1970's by not exploring vigorously enough possible arms control solutions to ICBM vulnerability. Instead of adopting with the M–X the new weapons route, which in the long run may not work and would cost many tens of billions of dollars, we should be exploring every effort to seek an arms control solution to this problem and make sure that no doors are shut that would foreclose such an option in the future.

The most obvious approach is to establish much stricter mutual limitations on the total number of MIRV missiles and their warheads.

We have also seen explicit linkage of a 5-percent increase in the total military budget as a price for supporting SALT ratification. A decision to increase the military budget is of paramount national importance, not only because of its effect on our military posture, but also because of its effect on the economy of the country.

Dollars wasted on unnecessary strategic weapons means less money for conventional forces. Dollars spent for the military means less money available for other pressing national needs. Dollars spent for the military means increased inflationary pressures. Dollars spent for the military means fewer people employed. All these facts must be taken into consideration, and the decision on what funds to spend on nonstrategic weapons should not be tied to support for SALT.

Furthermore, since in 1985 the relative United States-Soviet strategic balance will be more favorable to the United States with the SALT Treaty than without, logic would say that there is less need for increased military spending if SALT were ratified than if it were not. Thus a more appropriate linkage with SALT would be an increased military budget if SALT is not ratified and a decreased budget if it were.

Tying SALT support to an increased military budget is a mindless connection.

Finally, it would be wrong to leave the discussion of SALT II Treaty ratification without voicing the view that the entire climate of the ratification debate in the United States is based on a fundamental misconception that somehow our Nation has become or is rapidly becoming inferior to the Soviet Union and subject to military coercion and blackmail.

Those who urge boosting military spending above the very high levels projected for the coming years assume that the Soviet Union is gradually becoming dominant on the world scene and that the United States has been standing still militarily. They ignore three factors: one, U.S. strategic programs and strength, two, Soviet weaknesses, and three, the unlikelihood of translating nuclear arsenals into political advantage.

Let me comment briefly on these points. The United States has a secure deterrent force composed of a triad of SLBM's, ICBM's, and long-range bombers. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has a less secure force, of which 75 percent are fixed land-based ICBM's which will become increasingly vulnerable in the 1980's.

Furthermore, contrary to the popular impression, the United States has not been standing still. We have been developing and deploying new strategic weapons in vast numbers in the last 10 years. In the past decade, the United States has increased the number of its strategic force loadings, warheads and bombs by 5,250, to nearly 10,000; the Soviets, by 3,590, to only slightly more than 5,000.

The Soviet Union is a military superpower, and there is no way to prevent it from having nuclear weapons that can devastate the United States, but it, too, cannot prevent catastrophic devastation by the United States. Furthermore, it has major economic and political weaknesses. The inefficient Soviet economy requires its leadership to import grain and technology from the west. According to CIA estimates, this dependence will increase as the growth rate of the Soviet economy dips below 1 percent in the mid-1980's.

After six decades in power, the Soviet leadership has no big power ally. It is bordered by a hostile China and restive eastern European countries. Compare this situation with the close ties the United States has with its NATO partners and with Japan.

Three, the Soviet Union has been unable to use its nuclear weapons for political advantage or even prevent a number of developments that are inimical to Soviet power. This situation will continue into the future unless the United States talks itself into a position of weakness. Despite their 5,000 strategic warheads, the Soviets were unable to prevent Pope John Paul from speaking to millions in Poland and were unable to require Romanian acceptance of the military budget increased by the Warsaw Pact.

In conclusion, as the United States faces the decision to ratify or not to ratify the SALT II Treaty, it must recognize its real strength and stop exaggerating its weaknesses. Poormouthing military capabilities can only create self-fulfilling prophecies. Statements that the United States would not retaliate even after a Soviet attack that killed tens of millions of Americans do more to undercut the deterrent than all the Soviet heavy missiles.

Implying that the President would have no choice but to retaliate against Soviet cities is dangerously misleading, when our capability and strategy have long been to attack military targets and the industries supporting the military.

In conclusion, New Directions believes that security lies not in supporting a self-defeating arms race, but in taking all the steps to end it. The ratification of the SALT II Treaty is such a step.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Scoville's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HERBERT J. SCOVILLE, JR.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate very much this opportunity to appear before this Committee and testify on the SALT II Treaty in behalf of New Directions. New Directions is a citizens' lobby for world security whose full-time president is former Congressman Charles W. Whalen, Jr. I co-chair the New Directions Task Force on Arms Control and Disarmament with Betty Goetz Lall.

New Directions supports the SALT II Treaty and urges that it be ratified without amendment. We believe SALT II improves the United States-Soviet strategic balance, takes important first steps in controlling the offensive strategic arms race, and will improve our knowledge of Soviet military programs and thereby reduce the need to procure unnecessary weapons in order to deal with an uncertain and unlimited Soviet threat. We believe that a failure to ratify the Treaty can only result in increased tensions, in a less secure and more unstable strategic balance, in

accelerated arms buildups, and in increased and unnecessary military expenditures. In such a world the real security of the United States will be lower and the nation will be less able to deal with the critical economic and political problems facing it.

New Directions believes that a strong case can be made that with the Treaty our security will be significantly enhanced and the dangerous arms race provided with important brakes. Too often in the debate over the SALT II Treaty, there has been a tendency to focus on what the Treaty does not do and to pay little attention to its positive benefits. This, in our view, has led to a distorted picture of the contribution that this treaty will make to our national security. We believe that it would be useful to consider the Treaty as a glass that is half full rather than half empty.

It was never practical to expect that the SALT II Treaty would solve all our strategic policy problems nor lead directly to the end of the arms race. Negotiated arms control agreements are only one means of ensuring that our security is maintained and of reducing the burden of continued weapons procurement. National decisions are equally important if we are to prevent new weapons from increasing the risks that we will be embroiled in a nuclear conflict which can only lead to catastrophic devastation of the United States and most of the world.

It is, of course, impossible to list in this testimony all of the benefits which the SALT II agreements provide, but it might be useful to summarize some of the more important elements.

1. The Treaty establishes ceilings on all types of offensive strategic weapons, heavy bombers as well as ballistic and cruise missiles. These ceilings are low enough to require the Soviet Union to dismantle without replacement about 250 relatively modern operational strategic delivery systems; therefore it establishes the precedent of reducing weapons stockpiles rather than allowing continued buildups. Although this cutback is only 10 percent of the Soviet strategic force, the direction of the change is of prime importance. Furthermore, since this ceiling primarily affects the U.S.S.R. and only marginally affects the United States, it will improve the relative United States-Soviet strategic balance. Without this ceiling the Soviets could during the lifetime of the Treaty increase substantially their lead in numbers of strategic delivery vehicles.

2. The Treaty for the first time places an upper limit on the total number of missile warheads that each side can have by setting ceilings on the number of MIRVed missiles and the number of warheads each type of missile can carry. While these limits are much higher than would have been desired, they will at least place an upper range on the number of warheads, make finite the maximum threat to U.S. land-based ICBM's and limit the potential advantage of the larger throw-weight of Soviet ICBM's. They will provide a fixed base for possible future negotiations to reduce the number of warheads on both sides to less threatening levels.

3. The Treaty will prevent the Soviets from deploying their potentially mobile SS-16 ICBM, and the Protocol will ban the deployment of any mobile ICBM's by either nation until 1982. The failure to include this prohibition in the Treaty lasting until 1985 is a result of the U.S. desire to keep the option open for the M-X mobile deployment, but in the long run this loophole may prove to the U.S. security disadvantage since deceptive mobile basing schemes, such as multiple launch point systems, may be of greater advantage to the Soviet Union than to the United States. Verification of future limits on ICBM's and warheads may prove very difficult, and this could lead to a future breakdown in the ability to control the size of Soviet strategic arsenals.

4. The Treaty includes air-launched cruise missile carriers within the 1,320 MIRV delivery vehicle ceiling, and thus controls for the first time this new type of strategic weapon. Without such provisions the way would be open for an uncontrolled race in this alternative to ballistic missiles. Long range ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles cannot be deployed for the duration of the Protocol, but their testing is permitted. This loophole could produce a difficult if not insoluble problem in controlling such weapons after 1982. Although this option was kept open in order to permit U.S. deployment of such weapons in the future, it could prove in the long run to work to our detriment by preventing the achievement of verifiable controls on this class of weapons.

5. The Treaty limits each side to the testing and deployment of only one new type of ICBM. For many characteristics, modernization of existing types will now be strictly limited so that any allowed changes would have little military significance. For example, the launch-weight and throw-weight of current ICBM's cannot be changed by more than 5 percent; such a change would make little military difference, particularly since the number of warheads a missile can carry cannot be increased. However, for other characteristics, such as accuracy, no verifiable limitations could be agreed upon. This loophole could not be closed, unfortunately, without relaxation of U.S. standards for verifying compliance.

6. The Treaty contains many provisions that will improve the information on Soviet strategic forces, without which major uncertainties could develop on the size and nature of the Soviet strategic threat. Without the bans on deliberate concealment against national technical means of verification, the Soviets would be in a position to adopt many techniques for denying intelligence on strategic weapons developments to the United States. Without this intelligence the United States would be forced to rely on worst case estimates, which could only lead to excessive force buildups.

While we strongly support the ratification of the SALT II Treaty, we are increasingly concerned with the tendency during the debate to turn the SALT II Treaty into a Christmas tree loaded with presents to be exchanged for SALT support. We have already seen President Carter's decision, only a week before he signed the SALT II Treaty in Vienna, to proceed with the full-scale development of the new large-model M–X missile. We, too, are concerned about the theoretical vulnerability of the Minuteman ICBM. But it is not clear that the weapons-procurement rather than the weapons-limitation approach is the best way of solving this problem. In SALT I the United States opted to continue the arms race in MIRVed missiles when the United States was more than 5 years ahead, since the Soviet Union had not yet carried out a first test of such a missile system. Now the United States is paying the price for its failure to deal with this problem through arms control; quite predictably, the Soviets have followed along behind the United States and will now some time in the 1980's have sufficient numbers of accurate MIRV warheads at least to threaten our entire ICBM force. Now it appears that the United States is repeating this failure of the early 1970's by not exploring vigorously enough possible arms control solutions to ICBM vulnerability. Instead, it is adopting the new-weapons route, which in the long run may not work and would cost many tens of billions of dollars.

Furthermore, the decision by President Carter in June to procure the largest of the candidate M–X missile models for full-scale development cannot be justified as a solution to the ICBM vulnerability problem. Because of its large size, the missile will be harder to make invulnerable than would smaller designs. In fact, the characteristics of the new missile can only increase the potential vulnerability of land-based ICBM's, since this M–X missile is designed to have a counter-silo capability against Soviet ICBM's. Such a program can only force the Soviets, who rely on fixed land-based ICBM's for 75 percent of their deterrent force, to take one or more of the following alternative actions: (1) They could in time of crisis launch a preemptive strike; (2) place all of their missiles on launch-on-warning, thus increasing the risk of an accidental nuclear conflict, or (3) adopt a mobile basing scheme, making it impossible for the United States to verify the number and type of missiles which the Soviets had deployed. Each of these hurt U.S. security.

So far the Administration has not yet determined the exact basing scheme that it will use for the new M–X missile, but it appears likely that it will involve some sort of multiple-launch-point system. It is conceivable that a U.S. system could be designed in some Rube Goldberg way so that the Soviets could verify the number of U.S. ICBM's actually deployed. But the problem for the United States is not Soviet verification of U.S. compliance, but instead, United States verification of Soviet compliance. The Soviets may not find it so easy with their liquid-fueled missiles to adopt a mobile system, a ceiling on which would be verifiable by U.S. intelligence. Since they will feel threatened by the counter-silo capability of the United States M–X, they may be forced to adopt such an unverifiable basing scheme even if it were to lead to a breakdown of the entire SALT process. Yet, without SALT limitation on the number of Soviet warheads the effectiveness of the multiple-launch-point system for obtaining invulnerability for U.S. ICBM's is lost. There is no easy solution to the ICBM vulnerability problem, and the United States should not rush into weapons programs in order to solicit support for the SALT II Treaty when these programs could well lead to a collapse in the efforts to establish long-term controls on strategic nuclear weapons.

Instead, the United States should be exploring every effort to seek an arms control solution to this problem and make sure that no doors are shut that would foreclose such an option in the future. The most obvious approach is to establish much stricter mutual limitations on the total number of MIRVed missiles and their warheads. This should be the highest priority issue to be dealt with in the aftermath of SALT II. To be successful in controlling the theoretical threat to land-based ICBM's, both negotiated agreements and difficult national decisions by the United States and the U.S.S.R. will be required in the near future.

To date no other specific weapons programs have been directly tied to SALT ratification, but such linkages could implicitly or explicitly develop at any time. One can visualize attempts to get commitments for future deployment of ground- and

sea-launched strategic cruise missiles in exchange for SALT support. Decisions on these weapons are very complicated and intimately related to the military and political relationships with our NATO allies. They should not be taken hastily during the SALT debate. The reason that provisions relating to these weapons were placed in the Protocol, which expires in 1981, was to provide time to make these decisions. One should not, in the heat of the SALT debate, preclude such careful consideration.

There may also be pressures to add a new manned bomber to the SALT Christmas tree. President Carter made the decision in 1977 against the B–1 and in favor of air-launched cruise missiles on purely military-effectiveness grounds, not on arms-control considerations. It would be a travesty if now a hasty decision were made to proceed with a new manned bomber as well as cruise missiles to generate support for an arms control agreement.

We have already seen explicit linkage of a 5 percent increase in the total military budget as a price for supporting SALT ratification. A decision to increase the military budget is of paramount national importance not only because of its effect on our military posture but also of its effect on the economy of the country.

Dollars wasted on unnecessary strategic weapons means less money for conventional forces.

Dollars spent for the military means less money available for other pressing national needs.

Dollars spent for the military means increased inflationary pressures.

Dollars spent for the military means fewer people employed.

All of these facts must be taken into consideration, and the decision on what funds to spend on non-strategic weapons should not be tied to support for SALT. Furthermore, since in 1985 the relative United States-Soviet strategic balance will be more favorable to the United States with the SALT Treaty than without, logic would say that there is less need for increased military spending if SALT were ratified than it it were not. Thus a more appropriate linkage with SALT would be an increased military budget if SALT is not ratified and a decreased budget if it were. Tying SALT support to an increased military budget is a mindless connection.

Finally, it would be wrong to leave the discussion of the SALT II Treaty ratification without voicing the view that the entire climate of the ratification debate in the United States is based on a fundamental misconception—that somehow our nation has become or is rapidly becoming inferior to the Soviet Union and subject to military coercion or blackmail. Yet Secretary of Defense Harold Brown said in his January 25, 1979 Annual Report:

"National Security has always been comprised of a number of factors and has always required a number of strengths—non-military as well as military. The United States fortunately is by most measures the strongest nation in the world. No other country—certainly not the Soviet Union—can compete with us in economic power, political stability and cohesion, technological capability, national will, or appeal as to way of life and international policies."

Those who urge boosting military spending above the very high levels projected for the coming years assume that the Soviet Union is gradually becoming dominant on the world scene and that the United States has been standing still militarily. They ignore three factors: (1) U.S. strategic programs and strengths; (2) Soviet weaknesses; and (3) the unlikelihood of translating nuclear arsenals into political advantage.

Let me comment briefly on each of these points.

1. The United States has a secure deterrent force composed of a triad of SLBM's, ICBM's, and long-range bombers; the Soviet Union has a less secure force of which 75 percent are fixed land-based ICBM's which will become increasingly vulnerable in the 1980's. In the past decade the United States has increased the number of its strategic force loadings (warheads and bombs) by 5,250 to nearly 10,000; the Soviets by 3,590 to only slightly more than 5,000. As Dr. Kissinger once said when he worked in the government, it is warheads, not delivery vehicles, that kill people and destroy targets. Moreover, during the same period the United States deployed hundreds of new Minuteman III ICBM's; upgraded its existing missiles by adding new guidance systems and more powerful warheads; hardened the Minuteman silos; deployed a thousand SRAM air-to-surface missiles; developed the highly accurate air-launched cruise missiles, which will virtually nullify the large, extremely costly Soviet Air Defense system; made major modifications in the B–52 bomber; deployed hundreds of Poseidon MIRVed SLBM's, and developed the quieter Trident submarine and longer-range Trident I missile. The United States has not been standing still. The United States has and will continue to have a balanced, enormously destructive strategic deterrent, capable of retaliating after any Soviet attack and destroying thousands of Soviet military and industrial targets.

2. The Soviet Union is a military superpower, and there is no way to prevent it from having nuclear weapons that can devastate the United States. But it, too, cannot prevent catastrophic devastation by the United States. Furthermore, it has major economic and political weaknesses. The inefficient Soviet economy requires its leadership to import grain and technology from the West. According to CIA estimates, this dependence will increase as the growth rate of the Soviet economy dips below 1 percent in the mid-1980's. After six decades in power, the Soviet leadership has no big-power allies. It is bordered by a hostile China and restive East European countries. Compare this situation with the close U.S. ties to its NATO partners and to Japan.

3. The Soviet Union has been unable to use its nuclear weapons for political advantage, or even to prevent a number of developments that were inimical to Soviet power. This situation will continue into the future unless the United States talks itself into a position of weakness. Despite their 5,000 strategic warheads, the Soviets were unable to prevent Pope John Paul II from speaking to millions in Poland, unable to prevent Hua Kuo-feng from visiting Eastern Europe, unable to require Romanian acceptance of a military budget increase voted by the Warsaw Pact, unable to exert its influence in the Middle East, and unable to dissuade the Japanese from signing a peace treaty with China. In a world of two nuclear-armed superpowers, there is no known way for one of them to use weapons of mass destruction for limited political gains.

In conclusion, as the United States faces the decision to ratify or not to ratify the SALT II Treaty, it must recognize its real strength and stop exaggerating its weaknesses. Poor-mouthing military capabilities can only create self-fulfilling prophecies. Statements that the United States would not retaliate, even after a Soviet attack that killed tens of millions of Americans, do more to undercut the deterrent than all the Soviet heavy missiles. Implying that the President would have no choice but to retaliate against Soviet cities is dangerously misleading when our capability and strategy have long been to attack military targets and the industry supporting the military.

The SALT II agreements must be understood as useful and important steps, not end points, toward improved security and toward controlling and reversing the dangerous nuclear arms race. To this end we urge prompt ratification of the Treaty without amendment. SALT II must not be asked to bear the burden of all the complex problems of foreign relations. Neither must the ratification process be used to adorn the SALT Christmas tree with all manner of new weapons programs, many of which in the long run could not only decrease security but also make future agreements to limit nuclear weapons more difficult, if not impossible. The United States should make decisions on future military programs on the basis of its true security needs in the light of the limitations that the SALT II Treaty provides, and not in the light of whether they will provide increased support for its ratification.

New Directions believes that U.S. security between now and the expiration of the SALT II Treaty would be greatly enhanced by taking further steps to end the United States-Soviet competition in arms and to curb the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries. Among the steps that should be vigorously pursued during this period are a Comprehensive Test Ban, an agreement banning anti-satellite weapons, a first-step accord on mutual reductions in conventional forces in Europe, and some partial agreements in SALT III that can be added as protocols to SALT II. New Directions is most interested in securing deep cuts in MIRVed missiles in order to allay fears of surprise attack. In addition, the first accords on medium-range nuclear weapons could be achieved during this time frame.

Security lies not in pursuing a self-defeating arms race, but in taking all necessary steps to end it.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for your testimony, Mr. Scoville. I again want to thank the panel for its cooperation.

CONTRIBUTION OF TRADE TO PRESERVATION OF PEACE

I would like to go back first to Mr. Schmidt's testimony and its emphasis upon the importance of the growth of trade and the contribution that trade itself can make to stability in our relations with the Soviet Union and in the preservation of peace. I agree with that, and I think that the long period of time when we engaged in no trade with the Soviet Union because we disapproved of its society was typical of that tendency in our foreign policy, to

try and isolate countries that we dislike for one reason or another, even though such a policy is almost always self-defeating.

I happen to think that our policy toward Cuba through the years has been self-defeating. We have minimized our influence in that country by refusing to trade with it for so many years having no representation there, and we can see the end result in the most recent developments in that country.

It has been an unproductive, indeed, a counterproductive policy for the United States. I think we finally came to understand that the same was true for the Soviet Union, and fortunately we did commence some years ago to expand our trade with the Soviet Union. I think that has been a very important step.

My question to you, Mr. Schmidt, is this. Don't you feel that one of the most important benefits that could flow from the Senate's ratification of the SALT treaty would be an improvement in the general climate that could lead to further expansion of trade and other peaceful contacts with the Soviet Union, and that this would be stabilizing and beneficial to the prospects for continued peace, that this indeed could help lay the basis for substantial reductions in these arms that we must never fire except in the act of committing national suicide?

Aren't these collateral benefits that could and should flow from the Senate's ratification of the treaty?

Mr. SCHMIDT. Yes, sir. I believe you have very accurately stated those extra benefits that we would receive were the Senate to ratify the SALT II Treaty. The Soviets are great immitators of the United States. You see them imitate the United States in a military environment. You see them imitate the United States in our industrialization process, and if we were to ratify SALT II and stabilize our trade with them, I think you would see a greater emphasis on their part to imitate the United States in our mutually beneficial trade relationships. They believe that the United States is large areas of production, and industrialization, and maybe we should be given credit for that.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Schmidt. I personally concur in your position.

Mr. Carey, as a long-time member of the American Legion I want to say, first of all, that the Legion's position favoring limitation of nuclear arms has always in my judgment been a very enlightened position; for a veterans' organization, I think it has been a courageous position.

Your statement today raising, as it does, certain recommendations for reservations, understandings, and modifications in this treaty, is one that this committee will carefully weigh. I would like to call your attention to certain reservations and understandings that have been proposed by Senator Javits and myself and receive your response and what you think the response of the Legion would be to those proposals.

Since I cannot find them at the moment, let me briefly describe them to you. We will supply you with a text of these proposals.

RESERVATION ON BACKFIRE STATUS IN TREATY

The first is a reservation. You mentioned in your testimony your concern about the Backfire bomber because it does have a capabili-

ty, even though it may be primarily designed as a theater weapon, in extremis to reach the United States with a refueling in flight. In your testimony you have dealt with the commitments that Mr. Brezhnev made to President Carter in the unsigned statement, offering the suggestion that we require the statement be signed by Brezhnev.

Our reservation seeks to accomplish the same thing by making the consent of the Senate conditional upon the reservation that the commitments contained in the Soviet written statement, that is the unsigned statement, and in his oral assurance that the production of these bombers would not exceed 30 per year are essential, in the words of the reservation, to the obligations assumed under the treaty. These commitments are legally binding on the Soviet Union, and their violation would give the United States the right to withdraw from the treaty.

In other words, the reservation would in effect incorporate by reference these assurances, elevate them to the status of the treaty, and provide that the violation of those commitments would be the same as the violation of any provision of the treaty, and thus grounds for withdrawal.

I take it the Legion would support such a reservation.

Mr. CAREY. Yes, sir. I believe from the discussions we had from our special committee's hours and days spent on this, it would be acceptable to the organization.

RESERVATION ON COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREED STATEMENTS

The CHAIRMAN. A second recommendation you made had to do with the common understandings and the agreed statements. Again, we have proposed a reservation to the effect that the agreed statements and common understandings regarding the treaty and the protocol transmitted by the President on June 22, 1979, with the treaty are of the same force and effect as are the provisions of the treaty itself.

The intent here is to make the Senate's consent conditional upon an acceptance by both parties that the agreed statements and common understandings are to be treated as though they were part of the text of the treaty itself.

I take it that the Legion would also endorse that position.

Mr. CAREY. Well, we definitely would like to see it a part of the treaty. If you are saying that, Senator, I think we will have that.

The CHAIRMAN. This will have the same effect, because the consent would be made conditional upon both parties treating these agreed statements and common understandings as though they were part of the treaty itself.

Mr. CAREY. If I could say one thing, referring to the Backfire bomber, Senator, it has bothered us very greatly. It bothers us as to why—why do they have to say that they are going to continue to build 30 Backfire bombers a year? Why do they need them if we are supposed to have this peace and live with this peace? That is the thing that has bothered us. We are recognizing that they can go ahead and continue to build 30 Backfire bombers a year.

Again, in part of my statement that I was not able to make, and in part of the statement which is on file, I know we want to limit

spending and we want to limit the whole situation, but if we are recognizing and allowing them even to consider building that type of thing, and we recognize that in this treaty of 30 per year, we have to have a defense to go against that in this country, we had better have something that can counteract it as far as that is concerned.

That bothers us.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Carey. I see that my time is up. I want to come back to a second round in order to address a couple of questions to the other members of the panel, but under the 10-minute rule I will turn now to Senator Percy.

Senator PERCY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Carey, along with Senator Church, I have been a member of the American Legion for a long time. I think my membership is in its 34th year. I was very impressed with the statement you made from the standpoint of the fundamental principles of the Legion, and I applaud your long-term support for strategic arms limitations.

FULLY VERIFIABLE IN AREAS AFFECTING NATIONAL SECURITY

I would like to ask for clarification on your position on verification. The more we have looked into verifications, the more I have come to the conclusion that it would be unrealistic to look for 100-percent verifiability, but that if the treaty is sufficiently verifiable so that we can have enough advanced notice to void the treaty or withdraw from it and take action, that would be acceptable.

Would you accept the statement that it should be verifiable in areas that affect the national security interests of the United States and its allies? Is that the crux of what you are after?

Mr. CAREY. That is, sir. As I said in the statement, this concerns a lot of classified intelligence gathering information. Therefore, we have to depend upon those people who have that information. What you are saying is the fact that the statement would be for those people who have that information and not available to the general public have to be fully satisfied and concerned with this, and that we would accept that.

AFFECT OF CUBAN SITUATION ON SALT NEGOTIATIONS

Senator PERCY. The support the American Legion has given to the treaty understandings some of us have proposed, including our chairman and ranking member, Senator Javits, has been very helpful indeed, and we are appreciative. In your opening comments, you spoke about the Cuban troop situation. What was your recommendation with respect to carrying on these negotiations with the Soviets regarding the troops in Cuba?

Mr. CAREY. We talked about the particular fact, Senator, that we feel this is a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, and second, we believe that the presence of that brigade constitutes a military base which was prohibited in the 1962 agreements with the Soviets in Cuba.

Our recommendation was that we urged the committee to postpone any further action, not hearings, but any further action on the strategic arms limitation agreement currently pending until

such time as all Soviet combat troops have been withdrawn from the island of Cuba.

Senator PERCY. In other words, you feel we should continue with the process of ratification, but not take final action until such time as this is clarified?

Mr. CAREY. That is right, until some understanding comes out of that particular situation.

Senator PERCY. I think you and I then both disagree with the State Department as to whether or not this violates the Monroe Doctrine. I happen to think it does. Department officials feel that only the spirit of the doctrine is violated, but I am with you in that I think it really does violate the doctrine. The Soviets in their sophisticated knowledge of our system must really understand that this is a fundamental thing that we cannot permit.

Mr. CAREY. There are a lot of spirits floating around this country, Senator, and a lot of types of spirits that we can talk about, too. [General laughter.]

Senator PERCY. I would welcome warmly Mr. Peter Baugher, a valued constituent. I commend him for the contributions he has made through the years.

USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO DEFEND EUROPE

Mr. Baugher, you made a very good point when you argued that national strength is more than just military strength, that really it is the whole composite. You mentioned the word "will." It is the will that is important. Do you have any doubt that if there were an invasion of Western Europe by the Warsaw Pact countries and our conventional weaponry appeared inadequate to defend our allies, we would use strategic nuclear weapons? Should the Soviet Union be on notice that we would have the national will to use them on those without hesitation in the case of that kind of provocation?

Mr. BAUGHER. My own view is that we do have the national will to protect the security of Europe with the defense umbrella of the United States, and this would include the use of nuclear weapons. The more difficult question is whether our NATO allies and the Soviet Union are persuaded of that point. The decline in recent years of our military position relative to that of the Soviets, not only in Europe but in the rest of the world as well, has made some people doubt that we would ever use our nuclear weapons. But I think that if we go forward with a sensible plan to strengthen both our conventional and our strategic armaments, we will be able to quiet those doubts.

Senator PERCY. I agree with Mr. Carey about the horrible nature of nuclear war and our abhorrence of it, but we have placed these weapons there as a deterrent and they do not act as a deterrent, we have to have the will to use them. There should be no ambiguity or misunderstanding about that.

When the Ripon Society, not known for its right-wing positions through the years, can state through it representative that we have the will to use those weapons if it becomes necessary, then there cannot be any ambiguity about it or any misunderstanding. I think we all stand together on that—the Congress and the executive branch. You also mentioned that our national strength reflects,

among other factors our economic strength. Here we face a dilemma.

As you well know, I am totally committed to balancing this budget. I am spending a tremendous amount of time and effort to accomplish that. I think the strength of the dollar and the strength of our whole economic situation is factor which is very important and something that the Soviet Union fully respects. It is our economic strength that would give us the ability to sustain an arms race if that is what the Soviets want to continue to engage in.

BALANCING THE BUDGET AND FUTURE MILITARY EXPENDITURES

What do we do if we get to the point where the increase in military spending is such that we cannot balance the budget? I think we will have to cut some social spending but we still may not be able to balance the budget with large defense increases. What do we do then? After all, we are committed as a nation to try to balance our budget beginning October 1 of next year.

Mr. BAUGHER. That is correct, Senator. I think the commitment to balance the budget is very important. In fact, it is essential to our national security to try to get America's economic house in order. If I were to list present threats to the United States, the possible defeat of the SALT Treaty or the nuclear arms race generally, would not be the first items on my list. The first item on my list would be the serious economic straits in which we now find ourselves. The combination of inflation and recession is a problem that we are going to have to cope with if we want to remain strong in the world.

Now, as to how one makes the tradeoffs between boosting defense spending and maintaining a ceiling on the overall budget, this is something that I think has to be done on a program by program basis. That is why we are critical of those who say, let's just increase the defense budget by 5 or more percent. That is the wrong way of going about the process. What we have to do is to decide: Do we want to be spending our discretionary tax dollars on the M–X missile system in 1979, or should we be spending that money on social programs? Should we be devoting our limited resources to new weaponry, whether strategic or conventional, or should we be reducing the burden of taxation on our citizens?

Senator PERCY. Thank you. Thank you very much.

AFFECT OF TRADE ON U.S. STRENGTH

Mr. Schmidt, I have a quick question for you. You have linked the passage of SALT to continued U.S. trade with the Soviets. There are those who would say there should be no trading with the Soviets. Anything we trade to them somehow adds to their strength and ability to be an adversary.

I have faith in trade. The Yankee trader certainly might not always be getting the best of the deal, but we certainly should not get the worst of the deal time after time.

Do you have confidence that trade can be carried on in such a way that it does not weaken the United States but in fact actually strengthens us economically?

Mr. SCHMIDT. I would certainly agree with the statement that trade with them does strengthen us economically, but it also strengthens them economically. As many people argue trade also strengthens them militarily. I always have been of the opinion that we can wipe the floor with the Soviets militarily, economically, and politically any time we decide we are going to exercise our will to do so.

The Soviet Union cannot and will not get the best of us economically. You only need to observe that system for a little while to observe that there is so much inefficiency in it, so much bureaucracy that they cannot possibly compete with us, so it just makes sense to me that we ought to strengthen our position more and more with trade.

One of the things you do in business, and I am sure you may know better than many without business experience, is the following. When there is a competitive situation in business, the first thing one does is to get close to your adversary. You want to know exactly what he is going to do next. You want to know as much about him as possible. You want to know about his people. You want to know about his sales force. You have to get next to him before you can adequately determine what his strengths and weaknesses are.

Senator PERCY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Percy.

Senator Stone is next.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

AMERICAN LEGION'S POSITION TOWARD SOVIET TROOP SITUATION

Commander Carey, does the American Legion take a position on what it feels would be acceptable in this Soviet troop situation? Specifically, would the American Legion consider that it would be acceptable if the Soviets left their forces there, but assured the United States that they would not be used in an offensive mode, or would it be acceptable to the Legion if most but not all of the combat union were withdrawn so that a combat union presence much reduced would be left there or anything short of total removal of the combat union?

Mr. CAREY. Sir, what we take and what we look at are the people we have dealt with for years. I realize we need all the trade and everything else that we need. We also take what I looked at in my year of travel all over the world, the pincers movement that I see and the involvement that I see in Africa, the Middle East, the Far East, and so on where the Soviets' hands are in. You want to take a look at the isolationism, what is happening to the United States as far as the Soviet Union is concerned.

Our feelings at the present time, are that we feel that that whole group must be removed just like they did in 1962 when they took the missiles and the missile launchers that they were bringing in, they put them back on the ships, and took them out of there. They have no reason to be there, and we are still of the stand that they should all come out of there before we continue to actually make a final decision on SALT II.

Senator STONE. So the Legion's position is, it is appropriate to continue these hearings, to continue our work, but not to take any

definitive action on this treaty pending the total removal of the total combat unit. Is that right?

Mr. CAREY. That is right, sir.

Let me make a statement to you that gets us possibly off the hook. I have made it all year long on public television and in other fora. We are a group of war veterans who have seen action. We take care of those who are in the hospital and the families of those who are killed. We never want to see war again, but we believe, as history shows us, that peace through preparedness keeps the wolf away from the door.

I think unless this country comes forth and sets forth, such as the example in Cuba right now, and shows that we are the No. 1 free nation of the world, and we want the rest to look to us, that we have to take this type of stand. We don't want to see another war. We have seen war. But we also feel that there has to be peace through preparedness, and through particularly not allowing their actions to infringe on us. They are coming closer and closer to our shores, and we do not feel they should be there.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Commander Carey.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Stone.

Senator Glenn, do you have any questions of this panel?

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CAPABILITIES OF SS–18

Gentlemen, I regret that I was not able to be here earlier.

Commander Carey, I was going through your statement, and I have only one comment at this time, and it is your particular concern about the SS–18 and its capabilities. I share your concerns about that. My main concerns have been expressed in the possibility that they could do additional testing, have additional warheads on that booster, and that they could theoretically come up with some 6,000 to 8,000 additional warheads at least.

I know the intelligence community is doing its very best to try to recoup the monitoring capability that we at one time had on the SS–18 out of Iran, but which still, at least as of today, is probably not a replacement for that monitoring capability that we want American security to rely on in the future.

I just wanted to make that comment. It is not in the form of a question, really. It would give them the potential for a breakout capability later on resulting in a huge preponderance of available weaponry opposed to the balance that we are trying to set, monitor, maintain, and verify in the whole SALT II process. I was glad to see that brought out in your statement. I think it is a very key part of this whole thing.

We have to be able to monitor, as I see it, or we don't know what is happening with the launch-weights, the throw-weights, and the additional warheads that you talk about in your statement, which I think we absolutely must be able to monitor. We want to have this so that we can get on with SALT III, IV, V, and VI. We want to scale down the nuclear weaponry arsenals throughout the world, but it seems to me that we will only do that if we get enough confidence in the Soviets living up to their agreements to warrant going on with this.

Certainly, the Cuban situation ties into this. If we are building confidence in each other or trying to, it sure isn't done by moving troops into Cuba. No one is concerned that 2,000 or 3,000 troops will attack Washington, D.C., Key West, or New Orleans, or anywhere else over here, but when we see the pattern of worldwide expansionism going on, whether it be in Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf, in Yemen or in Africa, where there are Cuban surrogates, we see a big pattern. We see Cuba involved throughout the Third World. We see MIG–23's coming into Cuba.

Well, I don't think that the MIG–23 is a big offensive nuclear delivery system, but it is one more bit of a pattern where we are being bit and piecemealed to death. We cannot ignore it and say it has no relationship to SALT II. Of course, no one wants to start World War III over this, but I share your concern about the break-out capability and the SS–18 monitoring and various other points. I just wanted to make that comment. I would, of course, welcome any comment you wish to make at this time.

Mr. CAREY. Thank you, sir. I prefer to leave your statement as it stands. We do think there should be a new counting system which is basically what I believe you suggest.

Senator GLENN. Mr. Chairman, I would make one other comment. When it was stated that the negotiations perhaps should have included some other things in SALT II, I basically agree with that, but perhaps when SALT II was started so many years ago, I do not believe anyone could have foreseen at that time the extent to which MIRVing would take place, and the numbers of additional warheads that we could put on these boosters.

With the throw-weight that they have on the SS–18, they could theoretically deliver between 25 and 40 warheads. Although they are limited to 10 now, we have already monitored them testing beyond the 10 they are allowed by simulating a couple of additional RV's.

It seems to me therefore they have already indicated what their intention is if they can get away with it. That is the reason why I put so much emphasis on our monitoring capability. I am willing to sign a treaty with the Russians. I am willing to approve a treaty and see it ratified, but only if we have high confidence in our intelligence system, so that we will know what they are doing, know whether they are living up to the treaty, just as they already know through the open literature and easy monitoring of us that we will live up to it.

It is on that basis that we will go on to SALT III, SALT IV, and SALT V. If we don't do it on that basis, it seems to me we are just playing russian roulette, and I don't mean to make a horrible pun. We are playing russian roulette with American security for the future, and I don't want to see us do that. I still think the Senate's action should hinge in large measure on the monitoring which you stress, particularly regarding the SS–18 and the other missiles which they have tested from their southern site, the site we used to monitor from Iran.

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, time seems to be slipping away, so I would thank you all for your help today.

Senator PERCY. May I have one additional minute, please?
The CHAIRMAN. Of course, Senator Percy.

NEW DIRECTIONS SUPPORT FOR SENATE UNDERSTANDINGS

Senator PERCY. Mr. Scoville, you say you support this treaty and hope the Senate will not amend it in any way. Does New Directions support the understandings that the chairman has read?
Mr. SCOVILLE. Yes, it does.
Senator PERCY. Fine. Thank you.

TELEVISED COVERAGE OF SALT FLOOR DEBATE

I would appreciate a one-word answer from each of the panel on this question. Do you think it would help public understanding if we were technically able to work it out so that we had television and radio coverage of the debate on the Senate floor, that is, the SALT debate?
Mr. SCOVILLE. Yes.
Mr. CAREY. Yes.
Mr. SCHMIDT. Yes.
Mr. BAUGHER. Yes.
Senator PERCY. Thank you very much. I appreciate all four acceptances on that.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Percy, you have unanimous support, it appears. That is an enviable political position.
Gentlemen, thank you very much. I want to acknowledge the presence here of Carl Marcy, who is now the executive secretary for the American Committee on East-West Accord, and for many years has served this committee with ability and distinction as the staff director of the committee.
Carl, it is nice to see you back again. We appreciate very much your continued activities in a good cause.
Gentlemen, we thank you all very much.
[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.]
The CHAIRMAN. Our next witness is Mr. Lane Kirkland, Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL–CIO [American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations]. Mr. Kirkland, the committee is very happy to welcome you today. We look forward to your testimony.

STATEMENT OF LANE KIRKLAND, SECRETARY-TREASURER, AFL–CIO, WASHINGTON, D.C.[1]

Mr. KIRKLAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My name is Lane Kirkland. I am Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL–CIO. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much the opportunity to appear before the committee to advance the views of the AFL–CIO on the SALT II Treaty which now awaits the advice and consent of the Senate. The AFL–CIO has consistently supported a strong national defense, not as a source of jobs, but as insurance of our freedoms in a very dangerous world of continued social and economic progress, and of the democratic values that we prize, including free trade unions.

[1] See page 193 for the prepared statement of the AFL–CIO Executive Council.

We do not subscribe to the notion of inherent conflict between the equally vital imperatives of necessary defense expenditures and domestic programs and progress. The Constitution defines the duty of government as to provide for the common defense and to promote the general welfare. It does not say to provide for the common defense or to promote the general welfare. It is scarcely prudent to finance one's household improvements by neglecting to pay one's fire and insurance premiums.

Such a folly holds the prospect that all may well be lost. Defense goals must, of course, be gaged and judged as relative to the threat that one perceives. We perceive the threat presented by the rate of expansion and improvement of Soviet strategic nuclear arms as real and as growing and as not seriously deterred by this treaty or by public need or opinion in that country, or by any benign intentions on the part of the leaders of that power, present or future.

We believe that the security of our Nation and its allies, which is the real issue here, can be enhanced by either or both of two methods, stronger defenses or genuine significant and mutual arms reduction agreements with our potential adversaries. We certainly prefer the latter course, but we cannot assume it, and SALT II by its terms does not assure us that it is yet more than a hope.

We do, however, support the proposition that that hope should be kept alive long enough, at least, to test it once more, rather than to abandon it now by rejecting the treaty. But that test should be an urgent, real, and searching one, and we should be fully prepared to live with the conclusion revealed by its success or failure. Nor should we meanwhile permit that process to anchor us further behind the defense posture that we ought to be in if the result is failure.

We would welcome a treaty that would require and warrant drastic dismantling on our part as well as that of the U.S.S.R., and we would not mourn or grieve over or regard as wasted money the expenditures negated by that happy event.

Limits to be obtained by dismantling only across the board ought in fact to be the goal rather than, as in the present treaty, limits well above levels currently in place in critical categories of weaponry, establishing virtual goals and time tables for the further escalation of an already staggering array of instruments of doom.

We must in the meanwhile do what is necessary to pursue parity as well as security from the threat that will emerge under the terms of the treaty before you rather than engage, through unilateral restraint or attrition by neglect, in premature, preemptive compliance with a treaty that does not yet exist, and may never come to pass.

We are conscious that despite the administration's assurances of prudent intent, there are many voices in and outside the Congress that will ardently press for the consent of the Senate to SALT II but that will, after the fact, just as ardently oppose the measures necessary to maintain parity and security under the terms of the treaty.

Such a posture, it seems to me, is far more dangerous to peace and stability and destructive of the arms control process, if it should prevail, than is any criticism of the treaty itself. That is why we have conditioned our support of SALT II on a strong

expression in the instrument of advice and consent of the principle that parity requires that we continue to modernize and develop our forces and a further strong expression of a proposition that says, in effect, that we shall not continue to pursue the beguiling phantom of a process that produces nothing of consequence but dangerous illusions. Those are the broad considerations that underly the statement of policy on SALT II recently adopted by the AFL–CIO executive council which has been previously provided to the Committee and which is our essential statement.

I ask at this point that the council's statement be made part of the record, and I am ready to respond to any questions you may have.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kirkland, your statement will appear at this point as part of the record.

[The AFL–CIO executive council's statement of policy on SALT II follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE AFL–CIO EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

The Strategic Arms Limitation negotiations, begun ten years ago, have so far failed either to curb the nuclear arms race or to stabilize the strategic balance of power. Whatever restraint we have been has been in the form of unilateral U.S. decisions to cancel or delay new weapons systems, while the Soviet Union has engaged in the most massive military buildup in peacetime history. The facts are no longer contested.

Whether SALT II, by contrast, will serve as a significant step toward arms control depends on what the U.S. government does within its terms. Inaction on the part of the United States while the Soviets build up to the high limits allowed in the treaty, would lead the U.S. into a position of gross inequality, from which this nation could offer the Soviets no effective inducements to accept real arms reductions. The arms race would continue.

The AFL–CIO will support SALT II if the following steps are taken both to remedy the emerging strategic imbalance and to move toward genuine strategic arms control:

(1) In its resolution of advice and consent to the ratification of SALT II, the Senate should stipulate that under the terms of the treaty, parity requires the modernization and development of U.S. strategic forces—including, and most particularly, the MX missile based in such a mode as to survive a first strike by Soviet missiles.

Without the MX, the U.S. will be restricted to 3 warheads on its Minutemen ICBMs' compared with 10, 6, and 4 on the Soviet's SS–18, SS–19, and SS–17. The only way to protect U.S. ICBM's from a Soviet first-strike would then be to rely on the most dangerous of all strategies: The launch-on-warning of hair-trigger missiles that virtually fire themselves. If instead the U.S. is to maintain multiple presidential options in a crisis, this country must proceed to develop the MX in a survivable basing mode so as to remove the temptation of a first strike.

(2) The way to reduce strategic arms expenditures is not to stand pat on inferior or vulnerable systems but to proceed forthwith to real and dramatic mutual arms reductions.

The Senate, therefore, should further stipulate in its instrument of advice and consent more stringent and specific directives to U.S. negotiators than the vague and general language now contained in the Statement of Principles for SALT III, so as to assure that SALT III negotiations will constitute a genuine, early and searching test of whether or not the SALT process will, in fact, lead to significant and continuing reductions in strategic arms. A time limit for a final response and evaluation, such as the termination date of the protocol (December 1981), should be set forth so as to assure urgency and to avoid the endless protraction of negotiations while the build-up continues beyond the point of no return.

The stipulation should also call for limits not only on launchers but on warheads-which are the real instruments of destruction and which SALT II permits to increase dramatically in numbers and accuracy.

The Senate should stipulate that U.S. negotiators in SALT III insist on limits which would require the dismantling of warheads to a level of parity significantly

(at least 30 percent) below the existing level of the higher party in each leg of the triad (air, sea and land-based strategic nuclear forces). Once these limits are set, the basis will then exist for further annual across-the-board percentage reductions.

The general, unchecked growth of warheads, combined with the acquisition of counterforce capability, exposes the inadequacy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) as a deterrence theory. To compel an American President, in the wake of a Soviet first strike, to choose between negotiating terms of surrender or launching an annihilative retaliatory attack on Soviet civilians is both morally unacceptable and lacking in the chief prerequisite of deterrence: credibility. The U.S. must move from MAD to Mutual Assured Non-destruction (MAN). That is, these negotiations must seek to create conditions which make it impossible for either side to destroy the other as a viable society through a nuclear attack, or to believe that it can.

Only then can we begin to look forward with optimism to the ultimate goal of total nuclear disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN. I commend you upon the clarity and precision with which you summarized the statement of the AFL-CIO in an extemporaneous way. I see that you are speaking from notes. I always appreciate that, because it contributes to the brevity of the presentation, and thus enables us to move ahead with questions.

Senator Percy has told me that he has a time problem. Senator Javits has graciously agreed to permit Senator Percy to open the questioning.

Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much indeed. Senator Javits, thank you. I very much appreciate this.

AFL-CIO COSPONSORSHIP OF NEGATIVE FILM ON SALT

Mr. Kirkland, I think the position taken by the AFL-CIO is a very, responsible position, and a very powerful voice has spoken out on this matter. I have no doubt that the direction in which you have indicated this Nation should go is probably the direction in which it will go.

There was a film produced within the past year, I believe, by the American Security Council. It was stated that the film was produced in cooperation with the AFL-CIO. It was a very negative film on the whole United States-Soviet military balance and it had implications for SALT process. Could you clarify whether the AFL-CIO did sponsor that film, or was that a misimpression?

Mr. KIRKLAND. Not to my knowledge, sir.

TELEVISED COVERAGE OF FLOOR DEBATE

Senator PERCY. Not to your knowledge. Could you tell us what your reaction might be to having the Senate floor debate opened to radio and television to permit a better understanding of this whole process by the American people? Do you think it is essential and important that the American people follow more closely this debate and argument and have a better understanding of what the significance of this treaty is?

Mr. KIRKLAND. I think it would be useful, sir.

LINKAGE BETWEEN SALT AND SOVIET TROOPS IN CUBA

Senator PERCY. Do you believe the presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba should be linked in any way with the SALT debate, and if so, in what way? What position would you as an individual or would the AFL-CIO take in this matter?

Mr. KIRKLAND. Well, sir, that was not, of course, before the council at the time we considered SALT II, so the council did not act with the benefit of the information that is now generally available. I can, therefore, only speak for myself. I think it is an exceedingly serious matter that we should press as an issue with or without SALT. I find it rather difficult to see how the issue of SALT alone will necessarily resolve it.

I think the important thing is to resolve the question. To put it in another way, I think it ought to be looked at in terms of its proper context. In the broad range and scale of Soviet adventures that have been taking place in recent years this is simply another episode. It calls into question two elements that I think are very important in our consideration of arms control negotiations with the Soviets. Those are the questions of intentions, and the question of our prudence in relying on their observation of any agreements that we make. But there are abundant reasons in recent history to have those questions in our minds before this. I suspect that the existence of those questions has far more to do with what misgivings there may be in the public mind about arms control negotiations than anything else, than any appraisal of the particular balance of forces in the treaty, the general suspicion and lack of confidence in the Soviet Union as a negotiating partner, but I still believe that should be tested and explored to its limits because of the importance of the issues.

With respect to the Soviet troops in Cuba, I personally have always regarded Cuba, since the advent of Mr. Castro, as a Soviet colony. I think so far as it relates to the Monroe Doctrine, the colonization of the Caribbean and that part of the Caribbean by the Soviet Empire is for all practical purposes as much a matter of concern as anything that has followed. I regard all troops in Cuba as soldiers of the Soviet Empire, whether they are Cuban or Russian. I am somewhat more concerned with the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba as it is related to the broader question, about the soldiers of the Soviet Empire who happen to be Cuban, who are operating widely in Africa, in an active mode, than I am with 2,000 or 3,000 Soviet troops under the same general command and serving the same general purpose in Cuba in thus far a passive mode.

AFFECT OF SALT DEFEAT ON NATO ALLIANCE

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much. My last question is this. Let's assume that the conditions the council has laid down are met by the Congress and the President, and yet either crippling amendments are adopted by the Senate such that it is impossible for the Soviet Union to accept the treaty modified in that way or it is just flatly turned down by the Senate.

How do you feel a defeat of SALT II under such conditions would affect our relationships throughout the world with our NATO allies? What do you think would be the reaction of the American people?

Mr. KIRKLAND. Well, sir, with respect to the question of amendments which would require the renegotiation of SALT II or which look to the prospect that the Soviet Union will return to the negotiating table and deal with those issues that we raised through amendments, I have thought about that very carefully. I have

reached the conclusion that I would prefer to see us press forward with a genuine and real test for SALT III to see whether it is productive and make that the acid test of our future view of the strategic arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.

If we seek a return to the table on certain elements of SALT II through amendments looking to renegotiation, I am somewhat apprehensive that it might delay us and hold out some false hopes. It would delay us from taking the prudent steps in terms of our own forces that we need to do in the hope that we might accomplish something through those renegotiations. It would also delay what I would like to see as an early and severe and searching test of whether we can achieve really genuine and severe drastic arms reductions as early as possible. That is why you will note in the statement of the council that the negotiations should be time urgent and there should be a deadline for us to evaluate their response, which would be coterminous with the expiration of the protocol. I think we ought to be prepared to make that judgment. There is some reason to say, I suppose, in SALT II that it was a follow-on of Vladivostok and should have run its course in those terms, and that these matters such as a search for more severe cuts ought to be scheduled for the SALT III talks.

But let's get on with that, and get on with it quickly, and make a judgment fast before we get led further down this path.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much, indeed, Mr. Kirkland. We appreciate your appearance. And I thank my colleagues for yielding to me.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Percy. Senator Glenn?

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

AFL-CIO'S POSITION ON ABILITY TO MONITOR AND VERIFY

Mr. Kirkland, I was just rereading the statement by the Executive Council that was adopted in Chicago on August 7 which you asked be entered into the record. I think as a statement of the objectives toward which we should be striving, it is an excellent statement.

My question would be mainly on how we implement such a thing and still know what the Soviets are doing in a secret society. Our ability to monitor is not addressed in that statement—our ability to verify. I think that is the key to whether we are willing to go these extra steps which I agree with you completely should be our objectives for future negotiations, and we all regret we are not part of these negotiations.

How we implement those and still know what is going on in a secret society and know, for instance, that this 30-percent reduction called for in the statement is being carried out, is a very difficult situation, and especially post-Iran, where we are not going to have quite as good a handle on their testing program, and we only know what has happened, perhaps, after the fact, after the weapons system is deployed. Then we can measure things to a fine accuracy.

But did the AFL-CIO executive council consider this area of monitoring and of verification and what their assessment of it would be in getting on to these very laudible steps that are outlined in the statement?

Mr. KIRKLAND. Certainly, Senator, we were aware of the issues raised with regard to verification in our consideration. But the statement does not specifically address verification. Obviously, it assumes at least some adequate capacity to verify the critical elements of an arms control agreement. My own view on verification as it has affected negotiations in the past is that it has been somewhat ambivalent, a sort of two-edged sword.

To some extent, I think it may have led us into the measurement of the less relevant factors in the nuclear strategic arms balance. The things that are simplest to verify—there is a temptation to count those, even though they are far less important. Launchers, for example, have been made largely irrelevant as a measure by technology. To reduce launchers while letting other aspects of weaponry run free, warheads specifically, is equivalent to sort of replacing a muzzle-loaded rifle with an Ouzi or a Kalachnikov or an Armalite, and I don't regard that as arms control. That is productivity.

The SALT II agreement does for the first time create an obligation and a promise that warheads must now be brought within the purview of our capacity to verify by at least imposing limits on the number of warheads that can be launched with a particular configuration of a missile. That implies to me that we must undertake the responsibility of counting warheads and knowing how to count warheads.

I have had some exposure to verification techniques in connection with my service on a number of presidential committees and commissions. I have been generally impressed with our ability to monitor. There are, of course, as you very well know, further steps in ultimate verification. It is evaluating what you monitor and being willing to face the results of that judgment.

I guess, in the last analysis, I think that during the term of the treaty, and this perhaps bears on the question of the loss of the stations in Iran, the monitoring stations there, and the time that it will take to recover what we lost, the levels that are permitted are so staggering in real weaponry, in warheads particularly, that a modest infraction is of no great consequence. If you add another 100 when you cheat and produce another 100 or 150 warheads, when you are up to the 9,000 or 10,000 level is not of earth-shaking consequence as affecting the real utility of these forces.

I do think that if we succeed and were to get an agreement that significantly reduces these levels, and that looks to further and further reductions as we would hope and as we would regard as necessary to say that this process is productive, as you get lower, I think the issue of verification increases in importance. But I think at these levels I tend to agree with the administration that verification is probably adequate for all practical purposes.

Senator GLENN. I think both sides have a tremendous overkill capability right now. What we are trying to establish, of course, is this balance. I thnk we all regret that we did not make warheads the subject of the negotiation early on in SALT II. I think the whole process, however, is a step forward if we can work out sufficient monitoring and verification capability to approve the treaty as it is.

At least it is a step forward in placing some limit where no limit previously existed, even though it is preposterously high. It is generally recognized that we have some 10,000 deliverable warheads available right now. The Soviets have about five. Under SALT II, you can set up a scenario of different missiles and numbers of warheads permitted that would permit them to triple their five and for us to go up by 50 percent on ours, so we would come up at around 15,000 on each side.

Although it is a little hard for me to accept that as much progress in arms limitation and arms control, at least it is some limit where none previously existed, and it is a base for getting on to stressing warhead reduction in SALT III, IV, V, and VI.

Mr. KIRKLAND. I look at it as a way station on to some real test of whether we are ever going to start turning that curve around. The curve is still going up and that concerns me very deeply.

You mentioned that within this treaty the Soviet Union can increase its warheads by a factor of three. I think it is somewhat worse than that. They can and will increase their accuracy, I think from something like 1,200 feet to 600 or 700 feet, which, as I am told, makes a factor of four. It is not just the doubling, since there is a geometric ratio. You multiply the factor of four on accuracy by the factor of three on the number of warheads, and you have a factor of escalation on their side of 12, 1200 percent, which is a far cry from the kind of arms control that we would hope for if this were the end of the line, these levels of real redundancy—I question whether it would be of any great consequence to us whether they added further than that, whether it would be cost effective expenditure and of great concern to us.

But as I said, our final judgment tells us, OK, we will pass this marker and move to the next, and let the next one be a real test from which we ought to be willing to hold a position and walk away from the table if necessary without continually bargaining with ourselves to formulate a new position and another new position.

Senator GLENN. My time is up. Thank you. I agree that we should move on to that next step. I think we can only move on to that next step, however, if we build enough confidence each step along the way by knowing what they are doing so that we are willing to move on to that next step. We are not willing to buy just a pig in a poke and just assume they are living up to these things. We have seen too many activities in other areas of the world where we do not trust them to act in our best interest, to put it very mildly.

I think I agree with your emphasis on warheads completely. Unless SALT III is to have as its basis the limitation of deliverable nuclear warheads, I would be prepared to vote against SALT II and the whole works right now because it is a sham, a charade. We should not go any further with it unless subsequent negotiations are to bear on the subject of deliverable nuclear warheads. That is what the big bang comes from. You are absolutely right on that.

Mr. KIRKLAND. I agree with that completely, sir.

Senator GLENN. I think that should be the absolute basis for any future negotiation, and we not continue our emphasis on launchers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KIRKLAND. In fact, I have heard some students of this issue argue that it is far more stabilizing to count warheads and let launchers run free than the other way around.

Senator GLENN. That might give them a little additional flexibility that we might not prefer.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Javits?

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ATTITUDE OF AMERICANS TOWARD RISKTAKING

Mr. Kirkland, we welcome you here very much, first as an old friend, and second, because you speak for such a vast constituency of those who fight wars and make the things with which we fight wars. One thing that has bedevilled Washington policymakers on which I would greatly value your view is this. After Vietnam, after Angola, and after Watergate, what is the attitude of the American people toward the risktaking which is implied in your statement?

That is, we have certain stopping points, and we go so far and no further, and then we will face whatever the issue is. We don't know. That may be a very portentious decision. The way the Kremlin works, as we see it demonstrated in from Cuba, in this highly surreptitious way, is that you don't know what they are liable to spring, and you are always confronted, therefore, with the worst case hypothesis.

As you reflect so ably, as you always do, the views of the Executive Council of the AFL-CIO for us today by their designation, which is critically important, could you also reflect to us how you feel the rank and file AFL-CIO members, feel about this issue? Do you think notwithstanding the disillusionment of Watergate and the reversals of Vietnam and the frustrations which we have suffered, that they are nonetheless in the great tradition of this country ready to face whatever it is, putting freedom even above these dangers?

Mr. KIRKLAND. I am confident of that, Senator. I think that our statement and our other statements—we had a parallel statement on which the Council acted at the same time which addressed the so-called transfer amendment with which I am sure you are all familiar, that puts the proposition to you that the price of social progress and domestic progress has to come out of defense expenditures.

We oppose that. I think in my opening statement I refer to a view of that principle. I am confident that that view reflects the general view of the membership of the trade union movement. As you very well know, we have a constant system of meetings, conventions, conferences, board meetings, and so forth where these things emerge and come to our attention. The executive council represents a pretty good cross section of the leadership of the American trade union movement, and that leadership reflects, I think, quite accurately their perception of the attitudes of the members, or they wouldn't survive too long.

I think the problem with any democracy is that we tend to relax and hope for the best in between perceived crises. When we see a crisis, when we see a gun at our head, we pull ourselves together and do remarkable things. The challenge of leadership is how to do

those remarkable things when you are not looking down that gun barrel, but the crisis is a little more vague and a little more nebulous.

That places a great burden on leadership, but I think it is a burden that has to be assumed day in and day out, and not just at crisis time, if we are going to meet the sort of challenge presented by a totalitarian society, which doesn't really count, and manipulates the public attitudes or the public role.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Kirkland, that is tremendously heartening to me. I think it should be to the policymakers in addition to those of us who are here. I think these are words the President should hear and listen to and pay attention to. It is tremendously heartening to the country and a great tribute to the labor movement.

I personally agree with the two conditions that you set, that is, tragic as it is, as you have just said, we are going to have to continue to work to maintain parity. It is compelled upon us. I agree with you that SALT III is the watershed, that our negotiators of SALT III have to be told that we will reject SALT III if they bring it back, without making substantial arms reduction.

Beyond that, from what you say, I am deeply heartened that our people are willing. We must be alert about becoming ensnared time and again in any euphoria which has been talked about so much which, after another SALT. We are told it will put us to sleep, will put us even further behind in negotiating power, and only bring us to a day which could mean surrender, a word which we hate to utter, let alone think about, but which the way this world is run, we cannot simply forget.

I am very hopeful that the desires of the AFL-CIO will be realized through the reservations we consider respecting this treaty.

Mr. KIRKLAND. Senator, if I may just say a word and get back a little bit to an observation of Senator Glenn's. I think it is true there is some marginal value in a treaty which in effect sort of administers and exchanges information and marginal assurances on the tremendously continuing high level of weaponry. It is sort of a gross redundant administration procedure. I just doubt whether that sort of aim or object warrants a treaty, a treaty labeled arms limitations, and surrounded by the hopes and expectations that we are going to reduce in any genuine way.

The real treaty ought to have more substance than that. If we are just going to administer redundancy on a mutual basis with the Soviet Union, I think there are other procedures that would not carry with it the expectations and promises that a treaty does. In that case, I would far prefer to see us set up a bilateral permanent administrative committee with the Soviet Union and let it sink into the backwater that mutual and balanced force reduction has been in for years.

Senator JAVITS. Isn't the difficulty, however, that considering where we are and where we came from and the necessity for catch-up, that you cannot just practically do that? It would put us in a tailspin that would indicate a condition of instability in the world which would make it impossible to do exactly what you want done.

If we had come from there, I would be inclined to agree with you, but we have not, so it seems to me that in view of the situation

which we face, your resolution makes the best of a realistic existing situation, to wit, go ahead with SALT II with these caveats.

Mr. KIRKLAND. I believe so.

Senator JAVITS. I thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Javits.

REDUCTIONS IN SALT III IF PARITY IS NOT ACHIEVED

I fear we will have to cut this meeting short, because Senator Javits and I have been asked to go to the White House, so I will just ask one question, Mr. Kirkland, and with this question I also want to express my thanks for your testimony. If parity is not maintained during the period of the treaty, then it is really not realistic to expect that we could ever secure substantial reductions in nuclear arms in SALT III. Do you agree with that?

Mr. KIRKLAND. I agree with that completely, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what has led me to believe that these other weapons systems which have been proposed will be necessary, because I share with you the goal that we must bring down these hideous levels, and SALT III will be the test. Without parity in our position there is no prospect that those reductions could be achieved.

It is a price we have to pay, but it is the necessary price.

Mr. KIRKLAND. That is a major consideration to us, sir. The position we are in in the ongoing negotiations and their perception of our will and our resolve and our capacity plus, until we have a SALT III in hand that tells us that it is worth the candle, we have to operate on the assumption that this treaty defines the levels we are going to have to live with, at least for its term, and establishes the base, if the process fails us in the future.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Kirkland, for your testimony.

This afternoon, the committee will resume its hearings on the SALT II Treaty at 2 o'clock. Senator Stone will chair the afternoon hearing, and Senator Zorinsky after him. Phyllis Schlafly will be a witness. Edward Teller and Philip A. Carver are the other witnesses on the agenda for this afternoon. The hearing for this morning is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, to reconvene at 2 p.m. the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee met, at 2:10 p.m., in room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Stone presiding.

Present: Senators Stone, Javits, Percy, Helms, Hayakawa, and Zorinsky.

OPENING STATEMENT

Senator STONE. This afternoon we will continue taking testimony from public witnesses on their views on the SALT II Treaty.

Our first witness is Mrs. Phyllis Schlafly, representing the American Conservative Union. Mrs. Schlafly is an analyst and author with interests in national defense, nuclear strategy and weaponry.

The American Conservative Union [ACU] is the first organization we will hear from today. Following the ACU, we will hear from Dr. Edward Teller, a world-renowned physicist, who will give us his view as a scientist. Dr. Teller has spent much of his career working on nuclear weapons and has often been termed the father of the hydrogen bomb.

Our last witness this afternoon will be Mr. Phillip Karber, an expert on the European military balance, both conventional and nuclear.

Because the overall military balance in addition to the strategic nuclear balance is important to our SALT deliberations, we believe it important to review the European balance.

Mrs. Schlafly, we welcome you to the committee and ask you to proceed with your statement.

STATEMENT OF PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY,[1] AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE UNION, ACCOMPANIED BY YVONNE CHICOINE AND SUSIE BLOSSER

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Thank you, Senator Stone and members of the committee. I appreciate your courtesy in being willing to hear me today.

My name is Phyllis Schlafly, of Alton, Ill. I am an author, a journalist and a member of the Illinois Bar. I appear here as a representative of the American Conservative Union, of which I am a member of the board of directors. I am accompanied by several members of their staff, including Yvonne Chicoine, on my right, and Susie Blosser, on my left.

For the past 15 years, my major field of research and writing has been strategy. I am the coauthor of five books on nuclear strategy, books which made a series of remarkable predictions which, unfortunately, have all come true.

At a time when others were discounting Soviet intentions and capabilities, my books predicted that the Soviets would keep building nuclear weapons until they achieved decisive strategic superiority, while the United States was opting out of the arms race by a self-imposed freeze on the building of additional strategic weapons.

It is now obvious that this is exactly what has happened.

[1] See page 219 for Mrs. Schlafly's prepared statement.

Mr. Chairman, I ask that my full statement be printed in the record and, in the interest of time, I be permitted to summarize it.

Senator STONE. Your full statement will appear in the record at the appropriate point. Please proceed.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Thank you.

My testimony shows that SALT II will deliver to the Soviet Union three powerful political and economic weapons against which we will have no defense. First, the oil weapon, the power to cut off U.S. imported oil. Second, the dollar weapon, the power to destroy our U.S. dollar by denying us the importation of strategic materials and thereby unsettling our economy. And third, the Cuba weapon, the power to put missiles and troops and bombers in Cuba.

We have already had a taste of what these weapons can mean. In 1973, we had oil embargo I when the Soviet Union openly and flagrantly encouraged the oil-producing nations of the Middle East to use their oil weapon against the West.

We all know that after an embargo of 5 months, they jacked up the price fivefold. That was followed by tremendous inflation in our own country, following which we have lost about one-half the value of our dollar.

We all know about the troops in Cuba today. In my statement I show several scenarios of what oil embargo II and Cuba crisis II might mean to the United States if initiated by the Soviet Union. Of course, these are just examples of what the Soviets might do. There are any number of variations.

They could proceed by the salami technique instead of all at once, say, cut off our oil 5 percent at a time. We already know what that means after the cutoff of oil by the loss of Iran.

The point is that SALT II gives to the Soviets sufficient superiority of nuclear weapons so that they can use the political and economic weapons with impunity. Some people think that dropping bombs is the only utility of nuclear weapons, but superiority would give to the Soviets such economic and political weapons that they could, in effect, tremendously upset our way of life.

I brought with me a map which shows how these political and economic weapons are interrelated to Soviet strategic superiority and how the Soviets and Cubans are already getting ready in position to use them. The red countries are these where Cuba has stationed troops in Africa. Cuba has about 50,000 troops there and, of course, they are using Soviet weapons.

The red anchors show where the Soviets have, in effect, bases for their fleet. They have three in the Mediterranean, two around where Saudi Arabia and Kuwait send out their oil, three on the eastern side of Africa. In addition to that, they have a bunkering area in the Indian Ocean, and they have a great presence through those vessels which are called fishing vessels stationed all around the coast of Africa.

The red stars are friendly ports where the Soviets can bring their navy in. We, of course, have no such ports on the continent of Africa.

The big green stream shows the flow of oil from the Middle East to Western Europe and to the United States, and the brown stream is the flow of oil from Africa to western Europe and the United States. I think the map makes it very clear how easy it would be

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for the Soviets to use either their naval superiority or their strategic superiority through nuclear blackmail in order to cut off the flow of oil to the West.

It is obviously a much easier job to interrupt that flow than it is to keep the sea lanes open. The Soviets will have sufficient superiority through SALT II in addition to their tremendous naval power.

We all know what the gas lines were in June when we lost 5 percent of our oil. I would suggest that, if you liked waiting in gasoline lines in June, you will love SALT II. Half of our oil comes from imports at the present time, and 59 percent of our imported oil comes from Africa and the Middle East. How in the world dare we give to the Soviet Union the power to cut off that oil, to cause the economic dislocations that that would mean, with the resulting effects in inflation, in the closing of plants, in unemployment, and in all such disruption to the economic life of our country?

I believe that this map shows that the linkage between SALT and oil and the dollar is tremendous. SALT II, in effect, would pour salt into the gasoline tank of the free world. Translated into plain English, SALT II equals Soviet superiority in nuclear weapons, equals Soviet ability to wage political and economic blackmail in the Middle East and in Africa, and equals more gasoline shortages in America.

We have at stake not only our gasoline but the stability of our U.S. dollar. The Soviets could even unsettle it by delays, by harassments, or by cut-offs of that stream of gasoline flowing to our country.

The map also shows the linkage between the Soviet strategic superiority and Russian troops in Cuba and Cuban troops in Africa. They are all tied in together. If we no longer have strategic superiority, how are we going to make the Russians pull their troops out of Cuba?

We can ask them. The President can say, please take them out. Mr. Vance can call up and say, do you realize this is a very serious matter, as he said the other day. The Soviets must know it is a serious matter. They must have thought seriously about it before they sent their troops into Cuba.

But the point is, can we make them? SALT II not only allows the Soviets to have the power, but also the perception of power. It is obvious that SALT is so unequal, so unfair, so humiliating to the United States. It gives so many advantages to the Soviet Union that I don't know how the Kremlin could have anything but contempt for a country which would acquiesce in such an unequal, unfair deal.

SALT allows the Soviets to have 308 heavy missiles and doesn't allow us to have even one. It allows them to have four times the number of land-based MIRV's that we have, MIRV's which will have 26 times the power of our land-based MIRV's. It limits the range of our cruise missiles but it allows their submarines to prowl our coasts within range of our cities.

It does not allow us to have a mobile missile until 1982, but allows the Soviets to have hundreds of mobile missiles today. It forbids us to catch up with the Soviets in numbers of ICBM's, in

megatonnage, in throw-weight or in any meaningful measure of what strategic superiority is all about.

And above all, SALT II gives to the Soviet Union the power to use the political and economic weapons, the power to cut off our oil, to destroy our dollar, and to use Cuba as a base.

If we ratify SALT II, that is what it means. If we reject SALT II, on the other hand, we can be masters of our own destiny. We can build the weapons that we need to defend the independence of our country and its economic stability. Rejection of SALT II would show that we are not going to let the Soviets have the power to cut off our gasoline at the pump, to cut the value of our dollar to 10 cents, or to put troops, missiles or submarines or bombers in Cuba.

So the specter of gasoline lines and closed plants and unemployment hangs over SALT II. The linkage is complete. I believe that our Nation is hungry for Senate leadership to say that the United States will rebuild our strategic power so that we can assure the political and economic independence of the United States.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Mrs. Schlafly.

Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mrs. Schlafly, we appreciate your coming before the committee today. You are a distinguished American and I congratulate our colleague from Illinois for having such a constituent as Mrs. Schlafly.

Senator PERCY. We haven't always seen eye to eye, but I have always admired her many qualities, her tenacity, perseverence, and her power of expression. It is one of the best testimonies I have heard. I am sorry I was tied up and could not hear it from the start.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Thank you, Senator.

Senator HELMS. The Chairman and I were just remarking that there are very few witnesses who, while delivering testimony, could get up and walk over to a map, describe it, come back and sit down without missing a syllable. [Laughter.]

IMMORALITY OF MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION

Mrs. Schlafly, I had an opportunity to read your statement in advance. In your statement, you refer to the doctrine of mutual assured destruction, or MAD. Now, Henry Kissinger was recently quoted in the Washington Star, I believe on September 2 of this year, in reference to MAD.

In that article, Dr. Kissinger described mutual assured destruction as, and I quote: "a bloodthirsty doctrine which is immoral, senseless, demoralizing." A moral issue is raised because the doctrine rests upon the idea that we shall use nuclear retaliation against a civilian population.

Now, on the other end of the extreme of those who would target civilian populations are those who wish to have the U.S. disarm itself unilaterally. Their moral position appears to be that all killing is immoral; therefore, we should not even have arms to defend ourselves since defense implies killing.

Somewhere, Mrs. Schlafly, between those two extremes must lie a rational explanation of how a Christian nation can conduct itself in a war-torn world without losing its moral values. This is the first question I would like to ask.

Do you agree with Dr. Kissinger that the MAD doctrine is immoral?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Senator, I think the MAD doctrine is the most immoral doctrine that anyone ever devised. The MAD doctrine is based upon the proposition that if there is a war, we must kill the maximum number of civilians it is possible to kill. That is what mutual assured destruction means.

It is based on the doctrine that we keep all of our cities like sitting ducks, open to any incoming missiles from any nation, while we do nothing whatsoever to protect them. And if deterrence fails, we have no alternative except surrender. But at that point we then launch our missiles and kill millions of Russians who had nothing to do with participation in the decision to make the launch.

I really don't know how anyone could support that theory, but it is the basic theory of SALT II. As a matter of fact, Secretary Brown testified before this committee that the MAD doctrine is the bedrock of our policy and the bedrock of SALT II. Yet it is based on killing people instead of keeping people alive.

I do not see what good millions of dead Russians will possibly do for the United States if our cities have been hit. We should direct our attention toward keeping Americans alive rather than killing Russians.

On the whole moral issue, I think one of the most immoral things I can think of is the absolute abandonment and default of the United States in retaining the great gift of strategic superiority that we had. Nuclear weapons in themselves are neither good nor evil. They are instruments of power. In 1945, our country was so fortunate that God allowed the great atomic weapon to be developed by the United States instead of by Hitler or Stalin. One can speculate on what the world would have been like had the Nazis or Russians gotten it.

But we got it and we built up that nuclear superiority to where it peaked at 8 to 1 in 1962, at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. What happened? We don't have the superiority any more. The Joint Chiefs have said that even essential equivalence will be lost in the early 1980's. Our superiority is gone. We have defaulted on our responsibility to maintain the peace of Western civilization.

We proved, from 1945 to 1967 or 1972, that, when possessed by the United States, nuclear power is the greatest instrument for peace anyone developed. But in the hands of the Soviet Union, it is not that at all. It is an instrument of aggression.

The Gospel of St. Luke tells us that, when a strong man armed keepeth his palace, his goods are in peace. That is really the best prescription for peace. Our large, wonderful, productive country, has moral responsibility to defend our people and to defend the whole of Western civilization, and not to default and give away this great talent we were given in the nuclear weapon.

CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY PARALLEL TO MORAL DUTY

Senator HELMS. Well, the constitutional duty of this Government to provide for the common defense, I judge you are saying, is parallel to a moral duty, for this Government to protect American citizens from war. Is that essentially what you are saying to me?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Yes. To provide for the common defense is the first constitutional duty of our Government. But I would add to that the moral duty to defend this great country, the lives of our people and, in fact, Western civilization against an enemy, the Soviet Union, which has built the most tremendous military arsenal in the history of the world and has never abandoned its goal to use every weapon it has to achieve world conquest.

CONFLICT BETWEEN MORAL DUTY AND IMMORAL KILLING

Senator HELMS. How does this moral duty to protect American citizens at war square with the immorality of killing in the context of your first eloquent answer?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. We proved when we had nuclear superiority from 1945 through 1967 that there was nuclear peace. There was peace between the nuclear superpowers. And if the United States has nuclear superiority, there will be no nuclear war. That is the surest way to peace.

As George Washington said: "To secure the peace it must be known that we are at all times prepared for war." And nuclear superiority in the hands of the United States is the surest, best means of peace. We proved that when we had it.

The only reason we are nervous today and worried is because we no longer have it. Decisions were made which allowed that great superiority to shift to the Soviet Union.

SALT II PREVENTS UNITED STATES FROM MEETING MORAL OBLIGATIONS

Senator HELMS. In view of the acknowledged essential equivalence by the early eighties, I take it you believe the SALT II Treaty will not allow the United States to meet its moral obligations.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. That is correct, because SALT II prohibits us from catching up with the Russians. It is that simple. SALT II permits the Soviet Union to have all the weapons they need to control the world. It enables them to have decisive military superiority and it forbids us to catch up. It forbids us to increase our numbers of missiles. It forbids us all across the board to catch up with the Soviets in throw-weight, in megatonnage, in MIRV's, in missiles and so forth on down the line.

SALT II means that, if it is ratified, we will be humbly accepting a position of inferiority to the Soviet Union. What is our recourse after that? After that, we can say please, Mr. Brezhnev, be nice to us, but we will not have the power to force him to do it.

When Khrushchev put his missiles in Cuba in 1962, our great Strategic Air Command went on airborne alert and could drop 50,000 megatons of nuclear striking power then. That is why we

were safe and there wasn't any war. We can't do that today. We can't even make a credible threat of that today.

Senator HELMS. And we will be even worse off.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. With each succeeding year, we will be worse off.

Senator HELMS. Right. My time is up. Thank you, Mrs. Schlafly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STONE. Senator Hayakawa.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Senator Percy, would you like to question now?

Senator PERCY. No, please go ahead. I have time.

SOVIET STOPPAGE OF WORLD OIL FLOW

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mrs. Schlafly, for your able and eloquent presentation. I would like further explanation of that map, Mrs. Schlafly. There is that heavy green line of Middle Eastern oil going around the Cape of Good Hope up through Europe and the United States.

This shipment can be interdicted, interrupted, or stopped, you are saying, by the Soviet Navy? Or what are the ways in which this flow of oil can be stopped? What are the ways in which it is likely to be stopped, given Soviet power and, as you say, Soviet superiority in nuclear weapons?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Once they have the strategic superiority, they can stop it in any one of a variety of different ways. For example, they could do it like oil embargo I in 1973. They could simply tell the Middle East and African nations, we want you to embargo oil for the next 5 months, and don't worry, you can recoup your losses after that by jacking up the price 10 times.

The Soviets will have the power to do what they want. With their great naval superiority, they could simply impose a blockade. They could harass our shipping line. They could cut it off at some of those narrow points where the oil comes through. There are any number of options. When you have the power, you can deal any card in the deck.

AFRICAN SEAPORTS FRIENDLY TO SOVIET NAVY

Senator HAYAKAWA. What are the seaports on the east coast of Africa which would be friendly to and therefore probably usable by the Soviet Navy?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. They have several ports there at the present time, and they have that bunkering facility where there is the break in the green line.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Yes. What is that bunkering facility?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. A major place where they can come in for repairs and do anything they want.

Senator HAYAKAWA. What island is that?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Senator, the technical information for this is from a congressional source and some of the strategic authorities, and I will be happy to submit the name of that island to you. I don't have it right now.

Senator HAYAKAWA. I should know these things.

Senator STONE. It will be accepted into the record when it is submitted.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Thank you.

[The information referred to follows:]

The name of the island is Mauritius. Data for the map was obtained from a House Committee on International Relations publication of the 95th Congress, dated May 8, 1977 and entitled "The Soviet Union and the Third World."

Senator HAYAKAWA. But there are seaports along the east coast which the Soviet Navy could use, would be welcome at, and there are some on the west coast as well?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Yes, they have many friendly ports in Africa—any place where there is a country with Cuban troops with Russian arms.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Like Angola?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Yes, Angola will allow the Soviet Navy to come in. It is my understanding that all up and down the coasts of both sides of Africa, they have friendly ports where they can put in for repairs, and supplies, and so forth.

Senator HAYAKAWA. They wouldn't have friendly ports in the former French colonies like Gabon, the Ivory Coast, would they?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. The French have been doing a great job of maintaining some very key spots, especially that one where the oil comes out of Saudi Arabia. The Soviets wouldn't need every country. But as you can see by the map, they have plenty of countries with plenty of ports.

Senator HAYAKAWA. So one of the very real dangers, given nuclear superiority on the part of the Soviets, would be their power to cut off oil altogether to us at any time they wanted to.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Yes. And I think it is very important to face up to the fact that it is not true that dropping bombs is the only utility of nuclear weapons. You can use them to threaten, to blackmail, to achieve political and economic objectives.

U.S. STRATEGIC SITUATION NOT RESULT OF SALT I

Senator HAYAKAWA. Isn't it a fact that our strategic situation is not so much the result of SALT I but a self-inflicted condition of weakness?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. That is true. The original decisions were made in the mid and early 1960's.

Senator HAYAKAWA. But after the passage of SALT I, after the ratification of SALT I.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. No. The original decisions were made when the self-imposed freeze began, and that began right after the Cuban missile crisis. 1967 was the last year when the United States added a single strategic weapon.

Senator HAYAKAWA. I see. So that SALT I really reaffirmed that which we were already doing insofar as arms limitation is concerned.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Yes; and it made public and official the second-rate status of the United States, which I believe destroyed the credibility of our nuclear umbrella and thereby led directly to oil embargo I.

Senator HAYAKAWA. If the ratification, then, of SALT I didn't matter one way or the other, in effect——

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Oh, I wouldn't agree with that. I think SALT I was a dreadful mistake. SALT I was a mistake because, in the first

place, we gave up our right to defend ourselves against incoming missiles based upon the mutual-assured-destruction rationale.

Second, we accepted inferiority in numbers at the ratio of 3 to 2. That is, for every three ICBM's the Soviets were permitted to have under SALT I, we said we will have only two. And for every three missile-firing nuclear submarines the Soviets had, we permitted ourselves to have only two.

What SALT I did was to codify and legitimize the self-imposed freeze that started in the mid-1960's. The Soviets kept us negotiating until they had that advantage, and then they nailed it down in SALT I.

But time has gone on and the situation gets worse because the Soviets keep building and we remain in at a freeze.

Senator HAYAKAWA. And we maintain a self-imposed reticence about increasing our Armed Forces, our defenses.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Yes. I think it would come home to people if they would realize that the numbers of our strategic weapons that defend our country today, namely, 1,054 ICBM's and 41 Polaris Poseidon submarines, and a shrinking number of B–52 bombers, were the numbers that were set and established in the Eisenhower administration before Eisenhower went out of office as the force we needed to defend our country then.

Although some of those weapons kept coming in the pipelines up to 1967, their numbers have never been changed. And certainly the danger to us is infinitely greater than it was when Eisenhower was in the White House.

Senator HAYAKAWA. So, if we continue in the next 10 years to behave as we have in the last 10 years insofar as defense is concerned, will not the nonsigning of SALT II be the solution?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. The rejection of SALT II will enable us to go ahead and do what we need to defend our country. The ratification of SALT II would deprive us of that right.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Of course, I am very nervous about our determination to go ahead in any case.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. I am nervous about that, too, Senator, but in any event, with SALT II our hands would be so tied that we would put ourselves in a legal bind as well as other kinds of binds.

RATIFICATION TIED TO INCREASE DEFENSE SPENDING

Senator HAYAKAWA. So when people like Senator Nunn and Dr. Kissinger say that they would vote for the ratification of SALT II if we expended x billion dollars a year for the improvement of our weaponry, would you agree with that?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Senator, I would not put it in terms of a percentage of the defense budget. Over the past few years, as we all know, the defense budget has gone up every year but we have not gotten more strategic weapons. The strategic weapons are only a small part of the defense budget, but they are the part that makes the difference.

I think we must build mobile missiles. I think we must build the B–1 bomber. I think we must build whatever mix and readiness of weapons we need to defend ourselves. But we put ourselves in a legal bind with SALT II.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you very much, Mrs. Schlafly.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Thank you, Senator.
Senator STONE. Thank you, Senator Hayakawa.
Senator Percy.

SOVIET PRESSURE IN 1973 OIL EMBARGO

Senator PERCY. Mrs. Schlafly, we welcome you once again. I have just a few questions about your testimony first and then a couple of other substantive questions that I would like to put to you. In a few of the cases you cite in your testimony I view history a little bit differently than you do. I would like to have your amplified thoughts on some of these cases.

You state: "In October 1973, the Kremlin openly, brazenly, and defiantly goaded the Middle East oil producers to use their oil weapon against the West." I hope there is no implication on your part that the Soviets should take credit for that oil embargo. That, as I saw it, and I was out there at the time in the Middle East, was entirely motivated by Middle Eastern events.

I think such anti-Soviet countries as Saudi Arabia and Oman would be highly incensed at the thought that they were just a tool of the Soviet Union in this regard. They were working entirely from the standpoint of their own political interests in the Middle East.

Could you document for us any evidence you have that they "openly, brazenly and defiantly goaded the Middle East oil producers" and had any effect whatsoever?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Yes; they did openly and brazenly do it through their radio broadcasts and through their newspapers, through every means of communication. That is the documentation of that.

Now, with regard to the motivation of the Arabs, of course there are other factors and controversies in the Middle East. But I think it is important to remember that in the Middle East, the Arabs and the Israelis had fought, I believe, three previous wars, and our policy was always to help Israel.

But before 1973, the Arabs didn't use their oil weapon against us, and I think that is the big difference. In the previous controversies they may have been unhappy about what we did. They may not have liked our siding with Israel. But they did not use their oil weapon.

And what was it that was different in 1973? It was that the American nuclear umbrella had been replaced by the Soviet umbrella, and no longer could the Arabs be in fear that we would send the Marines in as Eisenhower sent the Marines into Lebanon in 1958, in a nice clean operation. We prevented the threatened coup. No one got killed. It was a show of strength that everyone respected. But in 1973, the Arabs didn't need to worry that we were going to send the marines in.

Senator PERCY. I respectfully disassociate myself from that analysis. I think the Mideastern powers, the OPEC countries, acted strictly in their own political interests there. I wouldn't want to give the Soviets credit for that devastating economic blow against us.

SALT I AND II PREVENT BUILDING OF ICBM'S

In your statement you say our technique of keeping SALT I and II negotiations pending for 12 years kept the United States from building up any additional ICBM submarines or bombers. We have been building submarines. John Glenn just dedicated the U.S.S. *Ohio,* the first Trident submarine, and we have a full-scale program underway to continue that.

We have the ability to build more ICBM's. We have just chosen not to. SALT I has not inhibited us. We also have the right under SALT I or II to build a B–1 bomber if we want.

Is that statement correct, that SALT I and II keeps us from building any more ICBM's, submarines, or bombers?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Well, it is a fact that that is the way it has happened.

Senator PERCY. That is what happened but it is not because of SALT I or II.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. But all those years of the negotiation of SALT I, from 1967 to 1972, we were all told no, we don't need to build any more weapons because we are going to have an arms control agreement. And during that period, the Soviets were digging holes like mad so they would have 1,618 by the time SALT I was signed.

So I think the SALT negotiations were a tactic of the Soviets to inhibit our adding additional weapons.

Now, you mentioned the submarine. Of course, that Trident that Senator Glenn christened is not going to be in the water for another year or two. But the U.S. plan for the Tridents that we are supposedly building is to take out and throw away a Polaris for every Trident built. The number 41 has never changed since 1967 and it is not planned to change.

That is the shocking thing that has happened to this country. While we have built some new weapons, some new missiles, some new submarines, we have destroyed one for every one that was built. As I pointed out in my testimony, one of the really shocking things is that when we built 550 Minutemen III's, we could have had 550 additional missiles for the puny additional expenditure of $110 million.

Instead of that, it was the policy of this country to destroy a Minuteman I or II for every Minuteman III that was built. So the total figures remained the same. The SALT negotiations kept us from ever changing the figures of 1,054 ICBM's and 41 submarines.

Senator PERCY. From all the testimony we have had from the Department of Defense, the decision not to go ahead with certain weapon systems, the B–1, accelerating the Trident program, et cetera, were all based on questions of cost, need, and effectiveness rather than on SALT restrictions. We have, after all, in the last decade doubled the number of warheads we have. There was no inhibition in SALT I or II from our going ahead with that particular program, and we did.

Mainly, canceling the B–1 was a decision reached by the Pentagon, the administration, and backed by the Congress, although some Members disagreed strongly and probably were right that we have cut back too much. But I don't think we can attribute that to SALT I.

As you know, you and I did disagree on SALT I. We had the power under SALT I to go ahead with a second ABM site. We voluntarily chose not to go ahead with it, and you cannot really find any defenders of an ABM system today who feel that that expenditure would have been cost-effective.

So whether it was right or wrong is immaterial. We voluntarily decided not to do certain things.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Senator, may I say something to that? I did not say——

Senator PERCY. My time is terribly short and I have a couple of other points to cover with you.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. I did not say SALT I prevented us from doing that. I said the tactic of keeping the negotiations pending kept us from doing it. And you are right, those decisions were made by this country. But I think they were wrong decisions.

Senator PERCY. You mention a scenario, which is an interesting scenario, of oil embargo No. 2—and you are quoting, I think, the Soviet Union's presumed speech—"the oil embargo II will enable our Middle East friends to become richer and richer at the expense of the capitalist imperialist nations."

I would hate for any of those nations to get the feeling that they could somehow become richer by embargoing us again. They have made all their investments here. I don't know of any investments any OPEC countries have made in the Communist world. They have put all their chips here.

Every bit of inflation we have here erodes their base. Every time prices get higher, everything we build in Saudi Arabia gets more expensive. And they have their money scattered all over our banks and our bonds and everything else.

Anything they do to undercut us—and Saudi Arabia has made this very clear to other OPEC countries—undercuts them because they have invested so heavily here.

DECLINE OF U.S. DOLLAR TIED TO SOVIET SUPERIORITY

You also indicate that the rapid decline of the U.S. dollar has exactly tracked the world's perception of the fact that the Soviet Union is building toward a decisive military superiority. I agree with the feeling the world has that they are building toward it has eroded America's position and we must find a way to correct that.

But wouldn't you agree that the thing that has really cut the dollar is not that perception but low productivity in this country and an unwillingness to work harder and smarter and better? Our balance of payments is way out of balance. Ruinous inflation and an excess of Federal spending, excess budgets year after year are the things that have really eroded the dollar. It is not military superiority of the Soviet Union.

Do we agree on that?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Those are all factors, Senator, but I would suggest that the No. 1, most important factor was the 5-month oil embargo in 1973 followed by the fivefold increase in oil prices which unsettled everything and was the start of the tremendous inflation and other economic changes that resulted.

And again, I suggest that oil embargo I was the direct result of the perception of who has strategic superiority, as explained by the SALT I statistics.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much. My time is up and I have a few more questions.

Senator STONE. Would you like to take an extra 2 or 3 minutes out of my time, Senator Percy?

Senator PERCY. I would be happy to.

Senator STONE. Go right ahead.

NECESSARY EXPENDITURE TO SAFEGUARD U.S. SECURITY

Senator PERCY. Very quickly. We have a tremendous debate now in the Congress as to whether our defense spending should be increased by 5 percent, 3 percent, some lower figure, or some higher figure. Could you, because of the amount of time, Mrs. Schlafly, you spend on these matters, give us your judgment of what expenditure would be necessary to really safeguard America's security?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. As I mentioned earlier, I think it is the spending on strategic weapons rather than the overall defense budget that makes the difference. I believe that whoever has strategic superiority will determine whether we can survive as a free nation. There isn't anything that government does that is as important as that.

So I think the first thing is to decide what strategic weapons we need and then go after that rather than saying that it should be a 2- or 5-percent increase in overall spending. It is not the overall budget. The budget has been big and growing. It is the strategic weapons that really matter.

I pointed out in my statement about how, for just a pitiful expenditure, we could have increased our ICBM force by 50 percent by simply digging 550 more holes. Exactly the same thing is true when the Poseidons were built. We destroyed a Polaris for every Poseidon that we built. For a minimal expense, we could have had 31 additional submarines instead of 31 Polaris-retrofitted-Poseidon submarines.

Senator PERCY. Could you give us some sort of a figure, though? When we work with the concurrent budget resolution coming up on the floor, we must work with specific figures. Do you have any ideas you can give us as to how much you think we need to develop to increase our overall spending to accommodate the program you are talking about?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. If you defeat SALT II, I will come back and give you those figures. [Laughter.]

But I don't think a specific budget is necessary in order to defeat the treaty.

BALANCED BUDGET AS IT RELATES TO NATIONAL SECURITY

Senator PERCY. A witness this morning said to us that the strength of our country, and I agreed with him, is not just our military superiority but it is also the will to use our weapons at the right time and the right place. It is also our economic strength which has to be dominant.

Now, when we are faced with problems like budget balancing, and the second concurrent resolution is coming up, we are going to be faced with some tough decisions. I think we have to cut back some social programs. I have outlined a number of them which I think are outrageous for this Nation at this time to be spending money on.

We must cut some back, and I think we have to increase somewhat our Federal defense spending. But how important do you think it is for this Nation to stick with its resolve now to balance the budget and, as we are now projecting, have a surplus in the fiscal year beginning October 1, 1981.

How important is that insofar as the perception of America's strength, its will, its ability to manage its fiscal affairs in a sound and prudent way? How much importance do you attach to that for sustaining the image of this country as a powerful, strong, leading nation?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. There is no question but that our country and our Government has certain image, credibility, and confidence problems at the present time. And one of the big areas is money. But I do think that if we don't rebuild our strategic superiority, the effect on the dollar will be more disastrous than anything else.

I really think, as I pointed out in my statement, that the whole matter of cost as related to strategic weapons is a phony issue. It is such a small part of the budget that it does not really even figure in the overall total. But I am glad to hear you say that you are going to cut back some other programs in order to build defense, because I do believe that that is the first duty of government.

Senator PERCY. I think we simply have to. I think we can find a way to do it and keep our objectives. I hope we do agree on an objective to keep that budget balanced. It is a very, very high priority as it relates to our national security and our strength as a nation. Economic strength is just as important as military strength. That shows our ability in the long run.

If they want to pursue an arms race and keep at it, we could beat them hands down on that any time we decide we want to do that.

The last question, Mr. Chairman, if you will indulge me with one more.

Senator STONE. Go right ahead.

USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IF EUROPE IS THREATENED

Senator PERCY. It is a question that I put to the Ripon Society, and there couldn't be a group of Republicans more on two ends of the spectrum than the Ripon Society and the Conservative Union. But I was pleased that the representative of the Ripon Society from Evanston, Ill., answered the question I put to him because our will to use our weaponry has been questioned in Europe in recent days, as you well know, and I think many wars come about as a result of miscalculation by one of the adversaries as to the intention and will of the other.

Is there any question in your mind that if, for instance, the Warsaw Pact powers in the Soviet Union moved in with conventional weaponry to threaten Western Europe, that we would and should, if Western Europe was in danger, use our ultimate weapon,

which none of us want to use but which we have there as a deterrent? Will it ever be a deterrent if we don't use it under those circumstances?

Would you agree with the Ripon Society, who, I was pleased, said yes? He thinks the country would have the will, as he knows it. There are very few people who get around the country more than you do and know more people. From the standpoint of conservatives in the country, do you feel they would support the will to use those weapons and that Russia should never miscalculate our first line of defense being NATO and Europe?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. I believe the country has the will. But it is not the American people who have their finger on the button; it is the President. And I must tell you truthfully that I don't believe the President has the will to use it. And he is the only one who will decide.

When Secretary Brown went on "Meet the Press," he was asked the question: What are we going to do if the Soviets fire their missiles at our Minutemen? And he refused to say that we would launch them before the Soviet missiles arrived. He is going to sit there and let them be sitting ducks.

If they would simply say, out in public for everyone to see, that if we get verified word of a Soviet launch, the "birds" will fly and there will be nothing but empty holes for the Soviets to hit, that in itself would be a tremendous deterrent. But when the Secretary of Defense leaves it unsure, uncertain, then I don't believe he would push the button and I don't believe the President would. And it will not matter what the American people want because they are not the ones who will make the decision.

Senator PERCY. I will let others speak for the President. I don't feel I can or should in this particular case. But whatever reason Secretary Brown might have had for not enunciating what he would do, I have known him for many, many years and I think he is a man of a very strong will and a man who would recognize that the potential use of a deterrent must always be present if it is to be a deterrent.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. But if I am not sure, how are the Soviets to be sure? The important thing is to let them know in advance. It makes no sense to say that after they hit us, we will pause and then we will think about it, and then we don't know what to do or not, so we will have a conference in the situation room in the White House.

It should be known in advance.

Senator PERCY. Well, I feel very strongly that we should leave no doubt in the minds of the Soviets where we would draw the line. I have tried to draw that line with China on Formosa, and I have tried to draw that line on Western Europe with the Soviet Union. And I don't think the American people would tolerate the Government which would not stand up for what we believe in and the avowed pledge that we have to protect Europe.

I cannot conceive of the President of the United States not having the will to carry that out, whether he be Democrat or Republican.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. But the real issue is not whether we will or not, but it is what the men in the Kremlin think we will do.

Senator PERCY. That is right.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. And if I am unsure, you must admit that perhaps they are unsure, too.

Senator PERCY. That is why I wanted then and always to constantly repeat, so that they at least know how one Senator feels and interprets the will of the country and the Government of the United States of America, so that they never underestimate our ability just because of Vietnam.

This is a different matter. Vietnam was never a matter of our total national security. Our national security does depend upon NATO countries. I think they know it and I think the Kremlin knows it.

Thank you very much.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. But the best way to send the message is to defeat SALT II. That would send a big message.

Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much your yielding some of your time to me. I thank you very much and my colleagues.

Senator STONE. Since I yielded my time to Senator Percy, I would offer Senator Hayakawa and Senator Helms a second round, and then I will do mine.

Senator HELMS. No, you go right ahead.

[Senator Hayakawa indicating.]

Senator STONE. Thank you.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SOVIET NUMBERS AND UNITED STATES NUMBERS

Mrs. Schlafly, early in your testimony, you provided quite a remarkable summary, which is, I think, probably the most lucid that I have heard, of the difference between Soviet numbers and the American numbers as limited by SALT II. Would you repeat that briefly?

You were talking about their heavy weapons as opposed to ours. And in about 2 minutes you summarized the strategic numerical differences at the very least in this treaty. Would you repeat that?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. SALT II allows the Soviets to have 308 heavy missiles. It does not allow us to have a single one. SALT II allows the Soviets to have—well, they did have 1,618 ICBM's. I think they are claiming they have only about 1,500 now. But it allows us to have only 1,054.

SALT II allows them to have almost 4 times as many MIRV's on their land-based ICBM's as we have, and it allows those Soviet MIRV's to be 26 times more powerful than our land-based MIRV's.

SALT II allows the Soviets to have their submarines prowling our coast with weapons that can reach all of our major cities. But we are prohibited from building a cruise missile that will reach Soviet territory. It allows them to build all the Backfire bombers they want, but we are strictly limited on our bombers and, in effect, are very handicapped in building the B–1 bomber if we choose to build it.

Nobody knows how many mobile missiles they have. Of course, mobiles were the big loophole in SALT I. They had the legal right and the capability to build a couple of thousand mobile missiles under SALT I. We don't know how many they have built and

hidden. But under SALT II we would be prohibited from deploying a mobile missile until 1982.

The disparities are so tremendous that the whole thing is humiliating to us. In addition to the actual differences in power and numbers and throw-weight and megatonnage, there is the perception of power. Again, I don't see how they could respect us for signing such an unequal agreement.

QUALITY EDGE VERSUS QUANTITY EDGE

Senator STONE. Mrs. Schlafly, the administration argues that we have a quality edge, while the Soviets under the treaty have a quantity edge. What is your understanding of that quality edge in the strategic missiles and other strategic weapons included in this treaty?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. We did have a quality or accuracy edge, but I think most people believe that most or all of that is gone now. Recent tests show that the Soviet ICBM's are very accurate, possibly as accurate as ours. The whole rationale originally for saying that we would not build heavy missiles was a kind of pride that our missiles were more accurate so we didn't need heavy missiles.

But now that their missiles are almost as accurate as ours, our advantage is gone. It is like the old saying that a good big man can always beat a good little man. If missiles are bigger and accurate, they are going to be tremendously more powerful than smaller and accurate missiles.

WINDOW OF VULNERABILITY OF ICBM'S

Senator STONE. Mrs. Schlafly, witnesses in opposition to the treaty have expressed their military opposition, their prime military opposition in regard to the window of vulnerability of our land-based missiles, our current Minutemen III missiles, during the mid life of this treaty, roughly from 1981 through 1984, maybe as late as 1985, until the M–X mobile missile is deployed in sufficient quantity.

Those opposition witnesses have advanced the thought that the quickest way to even this out so that the vulnerability of our land-based missiles would be reduced substantially would be to permit by specific provision in this treaty multiple protective shelters, vertical shelters or some other form of mobile basing. What do you think about that?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. I think the window is very serious. Secretary Brown talks about it as starting in the early 1980's, and that is only about 4 or 5 months from now. I think the quickest way, the easiest way, as I mentioned in my testimony, is to adopt a launch on verification of warning strategy. In other words, the President should proclaim that, if we pick up word that the Soviets have launched, then our Minutemen fly; so the Soviet missiles would hit nothing but empty holes.

That would give immediate invulnerability to the Minuteman missile force.

I do agree that the next move should be the mobile basing.

INITIATION OF COUNTERFORCE STRATEGY

Senator STONE. Now, in regard to them flying, the way they are targeted now, most people think, is against civilian populations, mainly; some hardened military targets, but mainly, because of the doctrine of mutual assured destruction, they are targeted against the Soviet civilian populations.

Others, mainly those in opposition to this treaty, have advocated a counterforce approach in which, as soon as we can, we would target the force, against the strategic missiles, of the Soviet Union. What is your view about that?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Of course we should have a counterforce strategy. The question is do we have the weapons that can do it? It is not believed that our Minuteman missiles are sufficiently powerful to knock out Soviet missiles in their hardened silos.

Senator STONE. That is part of this window of vulnerability until we get a larger M-X missile, isn't that right?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. That is correct. And that is the reason why SALT is so unfair in not permitting us to have heavy missiles, because that is the value of a heavy missile. It can knock out a missile in its hardened silo.

NEED FOR HEAVY MISSILE DURING LIFE OF SALT

Senator STONE. And you are saying we need a heavy missile and we need it during the life of this treaty; is that right?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. I think we need everything, a mix, and readiness. I think we need whatever it takes to stay ahead of the Soviet Union. We have a nation that will support it. We have an economy that will support it. We are blessed with a GNP twice that of the Soviet Union. And I am convinced that the American people will support it.

And if they find that some months hence we are all sitting in gasoline lines because half of our gasoline has been cut off, and if they find that we are absolutely unable to do anything about Soviet troops or bombers or missiles in Cuba, I think they are going to come right back and say: how did that happen?

ACU'S ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION OF CUBAN SITUATION

Senator STONE. Mrs. Schlafly, speaking of that Cuban situation, would you or would you think the American Conservative Union would accept a resolution of this problem at less than the full withdrawal of the combat unit?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. No, we want them out. It is a real test and it is only the harbinger of things to come.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Mrs. Schlafly.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mrs. Schlafly's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MRS. PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY

My name is Phyllis Schlafly of Alton, Illinois. I am an author, a journalist, and a member of the Illinois Bar. I appear here as a representative of the American Conservative Union, of which I am a member of the board of directors.

For the past 15 years, my major field of research and writing has been strategy. I am the co-author of five books on nuclear strategy, which have sold in the hundreds of thousands of copies. Beginning in 1964, these books made a series of remarkable

predictions which, unfortunately, have all come true. At a time when others were discounting Soviet intentions and capabilities, my books predicted that the Soviets would keep building nuclear weapons until they achieve decisive strategic superiority, while the United States was opting out of the arms race by a self-imposed freeze on the building of additional strategic weapons. It is now obvious that this is what happened.

Strategy is the science of planning and using your assets to achieve your objective. Many people seem to assume that the only utility of nuclear weapons is to kill millions of people. Nothing could be further from the truth, and nothing could be a more dangerous assumption. Today I ask you to consider the other uses of nuclear weapons, and how ratification of the SALT II Treaty would allow the Soviet Union to have powerful political and economic weapons against which we would have no defense.

Ratification of the SALT II Treaty would deliver to the Soviet Union: (1) the power to cut off U.S. imported oil, (2) the power to destroy the U.S. dollar, and (3) the power to use Cuba as a Soviet base. Ratification of the SALT II Treaty will prevent the United States from effectively interfering with or stopping the Soviet exercise of the Oil Weapon, the Dollar Weapon, or the Cuba Weapon.

Rejection of SALT II, on the other hand, will not give the Soviet Union any additional power which is realistically usable, but it will permit the United States to control our own destiny, politically and economically.

I. THE OIL WEAPON

The great American industrial nation, a people on wheels to whom gasoline is almost as much an essential of life as water, is now facing the prospect of gasoline rationing. What is it that has brought us to the point of accepting rationing? President Carter says he needs standby power to cope with a sudden, massive oil shortage. Obviously, all the oil wells in the United States will not dry up at the same time. The very request for rationing power reveals our humiliating dependence on the whim of the OPEC nations thousands of miles away, in the shadow of the Soviet Union.

In October 1973, the Kremlin openly, brazenly, and defiantly goaded the Middle East oil producers to use their "oil weapon" against the West. Use of the "oil weapon" was so very simple: just embargo oil to the West for five months, and then jack up the price fivefold. It cost the Soviets nothing. With the higher prices, the Arabs quickly recouped their temporary losses. And the United States was exposed as an impotent giant who could do nothing, absolutely nothing, to force the Arabs to respect U.S. property and contracts.

We have had six years since Oil Embargo I to prepare and defend our nation against the contingency of Oil Embargo II. Instead of improving our situation, we have become dependent on imported oil for an even larger percentage of our consumption. Nobody likes to talk about it publicly, but the only reason there is the slightest need for gasoline rationing is the clear and present danger from the threat of Oil Embargo II. Dr. Ghazi A. Algossibi, Saudi Arabia's Minister of Industry and Electricity, said in a July speech in Los Angeles: Your industrial way of life for the coming decades will collapse without Arab oil. The independence of the Arab countries in the face of expanding Communism cannot be maintained without your strength and resolve. No interdependence could be more complete."

Translated into plain English, SALT II=Soviet superiority in nuclear arms=Soviet ability to wage political nuclear blackmail in the Middle East=more gasoline shortages in America. So, let's consider a possible scenario of what Oil Embargo II might mean to America.

SCENARIO: OIL EMBARGO II

Time: Early 1980. Scene: The Kremlin, Moscow. Members of the Politburo are hosting a meeting of the chiefs of the Middle East oil-producing states. Brezhnev (or his successor) is doing all the talking.

"Comrades of the Middle East, we all have a common interest in world peace and prosperity. Although we have been enjoying apparent peace, our great leader Lenin warned us that, so long as Capitalist Imperialism exists, war is a constant danger. Our courageous intelligence agents have uncovered a massive plot by the Capitalist Imperialist Warmongers to launch a new world war. This would bring death and destruction such as the world has never seen before. This would be bad for your business. Your good customers, the United States and Western Europe, would be destroyed by our necessary retaliation. Since your economies are based on continuing revenues from your great oil resources, you have a vital interest in preventing such a senseless Armageddon.

"Fortunately, there is a peaceful way to avert this nuclear destruction, and that is why I have invited you to Moscow. I want you all to agree to impose immediately a total embargo on sales of oil to the warmongering United States and her NATO allies. Within a few weeks, hardly a wheel will be turning in Western factories. They will have little electricity. They will be on their knees to you, pleading for oil on any terms. Then you and the great peace-loving U.S.S.R. will impose our joint terms. The Western democracies will pay any price you set for your oil and you can easily recover tenfold the revenues you lost during the embargo.

"For our part in the settlement, the Soviet Union will demand that the Capitalist Imperialist Warmongers surrender all their nuclear and conventional weapons to the United Nations. And, since most UN members do not possess the technology to handle the takeover of nuclear weapons, the U.S.S.R. will gladly take custody for the UN.

"Do you want to know what the United States will do to pressure you into terminating your embargo? The answer is NOTHING. Just remember back to your first courageous and innovative use of your oil weapon back in 1973. What did the United States and Western Europe do then? Nothing! They meekly agreed to pay you a fivefold increase in the price of oil, even though that increase disrupted the stability of their economies. It was your courageous action in 1973 which brought about so much costly inflation and unemployment in the Western nations.

"The United States had far more conventional military power than any of the Middle East nations. Yet the United States did not dare to use its conventional military power because the great peace-loving Soviet Union gave you the protection of our strategic nuclear umbrella.

"The United States will never again dare to send in the Marines as President Eisenhower did to avert a threatened coup in Lebanon in 1958.

"Our technique of keeping SALT I and II negotiations pending for 12 years kept the United States from building up any additional ICBM's, submarines, or bombers, while we built up continuously and massively. The Soviet nuclear umbrella is now three times more powerful than it was in 1973. During the last six years, we have tripled the throw-weight of our strategic forces. We have replaced a thousand of our older ICBM's with advanced models many times more powerful and more accurate. We have deployed 29 of our huge Delta-class missile-firing submarines and hundreds of new strategic bombers.

"Thus, Oil Embargo II will enable our Middle East friends to become richer and richer at the expense of the Capitalist Imperialist nations, and it will give the great Soviet Union the power to enforce world peace, on our terms of course. The massive nuclear power we were allowed to retain under the terms of the SALT II Treaty has made all this possible. SALT II prevented the United States from building any weapons to challenge our use of the Oil Weapon.

"We realize that Saudi Arabia recently established a friendly relationship with the United States, selling them oil at less than world prices and increasing production to help them alleviate their shortages. However, in view of the massive shift in the world's strategic balance, it would be very foolish of the Saudis to remain friends with the Capitalist Imperialists. We can stop the flow of oil with our naval superiority alone. It is in your own best interests to cooperate with our plan for world peace."

II. THE DOLLAR WEAPON

The second power that the SALT II Treaty, if ratified, would accord to the Soviet Union is the power to destroy the U.S. dollar. The value of a nation's paper currency is based directly on that nation's promise-to-pay credibility and on the public's perception of the government's ability to survive and redeem its paper-money promises. The rapid decline of the value of the U.S. dollar in the last few years exactly tracks the world's perception of the fact that the Soviet Union is building toward a decisive military superiority which will soon be able to dictate the terms of surrender-or-survival to the United States.

From 1945 to 1967, the United States had clear and undisputed nuclear superiority which peaked at the ratio of 8-to-1. During those years of undisputed U.S. nuclear superiority (which were disparagingly known as the Cold War), we had hard currencies, a stable dollar, and inflation only in that controllable degree which accompanies an increase in the Gross National Product. The U.S. nuclear umbrella was the basis for the stability of relationships in the Western world, not only for political freedom, but for trade relationships and agreements, for the stability of the flow of raw materials in and finished products out, and for the availability of oil and other energy sources at reasonable prices.

The year 1967 was the last year in which the United States added a single strategic weapon (ICBM, nuclear missile-firing submarine, or strategic bomber) to

our forces. Many of us knew that the United States that year opted out of the arms race at a time when the Soviets were building toward a first-strike capability, but most Americans refused to believe it. The U.S. nuclear umbrella remained credible, and therefore effective, for another five years because of the lag in international perception that the strategic balance was shifting in favor of the Soviets.

The SALT I Agreements signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972, made it officially and publicly apparent that the United States had voluntarily and unilaterally put ourselves in a nuclear-weapons freeze and abandoned our once-overwhelming strategic superiority. Under the SALT I Treaty (on defensive weapons), the United States gave up our right to defend our population against incoming nuclear missiles, and under the SALT I Interim Agreement (on offensive weapons), we agreed that, for every three ICMB's and every three nuclear missile-firing submarines the Soviets build, we will limit the United States to only two, respectively.

Publication of the SALT I statistics in May 1972 destroyed the credibility of the U.S. strategic umbrella. The newly credible Soviet strategic umbrella protected the Arabs in their effective use of the oil weapon against the great oil-consuming Western nations. Although the conventional military power of the Western nations overshadowed that of the Arabs by a factor of about 1,000-to-1, that was no help whatsoever in the face of the soviet nuclear umbrella.

Thus, mere possession by the Soviets of nuclear weapons of sufficient numbers and power rendered impotent all other forms of American power, including conventional military power, industrial power, financial power, technological power, population power, and even food power. All those other factors, however mighty in themselves, even in combination are not enough to challenge Soviet nuclear power.

It is not even necessary to discuss the point of whether the 3-to-2 numbers superiority in ICBM's and nuclear missile-firing submarines did or did not give the Soviets an across-the-board strategic superiority. The fact is that the SALT I gave the Soviets a worldwide *perception* of nuclear superiority, and it gave the Soviets a *sufficiency* of nuclear power to use the Oil Weapon and the Dollar Weapon.

THE FINANCIAL COST OF SALT I

When we plot on a graph what has happened to the U.S. dollar, it is clear that our runaway inflation started with the signing of SALT I in 1972. If our leaders don't learn the lesson of the financial cost of SALT I, we will find to our sorrow that the cost of SALT II is far higher.

The Consumer Price Index is based on the 1967 dollar (the last year the United States acquired an additional strategic weapon). The Consumer Price Index, which stood at 100 in 1967, had risen only to 125 by 1972 (the year of SALT I). However, subsequent to SALT I and Oil Embargo I, we slid into double-digit inflation. By 1979 the Consumer Price Index had shot up to 217, and inflation is now running at 13.4 percent a year. It now takes $2.17 to buy what $1.00 would buy the year the United States stopped building nuclear weapons. This means that more than half of all our savings in bank accounts, savings and loan companies, life insurance, pensions, and other money investments has been stolen from us by those who changed American strategic policy from superiority to inferiority.

According to conventional wisdom, stocks are supposed to be a good hedge against inflation. From 1950 to 1968, stocks did as expected, rising 436 percent during a period of relatively low inflation. But since 1968, while consumer prices have more than doubled, stocks have fluctuated widely and the 1979 average is a pitiful two percent higher than in 1968. This means that stocks in 1979 have really lost half their 1968 value, because the dollars they are worth will buy only half as much.

And the price of gold rose from $60 in the year of SALT I to $329 in the year of SALT II.

American history provides a tragic lesson of what happens to paper money when the government which issues it lacks the military weapons necessary to maintain itself as an independent nation. In the South, children of the second generation after the War Between the States in impoverished households had a unique toy. Instead of play money, they had quite literally scores of thousands of dollars in genuine American currency. Thousands of southern patriots had turned in their gold for this currency in order to buy essential food and war materials from abroad. The first postwar generation still treasured this paper, hoping that some day it might be redeemed. They finally learned the bitter lesson that the paper-money promises of a government which has been militarily destroyed will never again be honored.

However, Confederate paper money did not lose its value overnight. When it was first issued, it was accepted at face value in the South. Progressively, as it became apparent that the industrial North was building toward decisive military superiority, the credibility of the Confederate Government's promise-to-pay began to deterio-

rate. As it was perceived that the North's power would soon become overwhelming, Confederate currency began its slide down to nothingness.

This is what is happening to the American dollar as the power centers of the world progressively grasp the fact that the Soviet Union is building toward decisive military superiority. The progressive attainment by the Soviet Union of the military power which will enable it to fulfill what it has openly declared to be its "historic" mission (to destroy the Western capitalist nations) has resulted in a growing loss of confidence in the U.S. dollar.

SALT I and Oil Embargo I which resulted cut the value of the U.S. dollar in half. SALT II and any resulting Oil Embargo II will complete the destruction of the U.S. dollar.

III. THE CUBA WEAPON

The recent relevation that there are thousands of Russian combat troops in Cuba is only the tip of the iceberg of what a Cuban Crisis II could mean to the United States. What will we do if the Soviets send 200 Backfire bombers or 225 SS–20 missiles to Cuba?

At the time of Cuban Crisis I (the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962), the United States was able to face down Khrushchev because our Strategic Air Command put our then-new and impressive B–52 fleet on airborne alert. This constituted a credible threat that we could deliver up to 50,000 megatons of nuclear striking power on Soviet territory.

No U.S. President could make that threat today. It would not be credible to the Soviets or to anyone else. So what will our President do if the Soviets send Backfire bombers or nuclear missiles into Cuba? Plead with them to take them out? Humbly appeal to their good faith? Tell them we will denounce them in the UN or the OAS? Is that what the great United States is reduced to when it comes to the supreme matter of protecting the lives and property of our own citizens?

First, let's consider a scenario of the Soviets sending 200 Backfire bombers to Cuba. Basing Backfire bombers in Cuba would give the Soviets a dramatic option to exercise their strategic power without the launching of a single missile or the dropping of a single bomb.

The Kremlin could send a flight of 200 Backfire bombers to overfly New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, Pittsburgh, Detroit, Cleveland, Chicago, St. Louis, Atlanta, and any other cities convenient to a plan of concentrating on areas of dense population. The flight could be timed to arrive over the cities during late-afternoon rush hours. No bombs would be dropped, but they would be on board.

The force of 200 could be divided into flights of 10 Backfires each, and they could sweep in low over our great cities at, say, ten-minute intervals; each flight could make two sweeps over each city. The Backfires are large and impressive, and they fly at mach 2.2. Sonic booms would break windows by the thousands. Motorists on the freeways would abandon their cars, attempting to find shelter from what they would think was a bombing attack. No wheels would be moving because of the massive traffic jams. Telephone systems would be swamped by the volume of calls from frightened people trying to find out where to go and what to do.

What would our President do? Get on the Hot Line and ask the Kremlin, please not to drop any bombs? Or please, order the bombers home? There is no way we could stop the overflights because our policy for years has been one of zero defense against bombers.

This use of the Backfires to create Cuban Crisis II would be in exquisite technical compliance with the SALT II Protocol which allegedly (though not directly) prohibits the Backfire bombers from "operating at intercontinental distances" or from "in-flight refueling" or from a production rate of not more than 30 per year. Of course the Backfires would not run out of gasoline on this overflight mission; they could all return to their bases in Cuba.

Second, let's consider the scenario of the Soviets' sending 350 SS–20s into Cuba. The SS–20 is a compact, land-mobile missile launcher having three MIRV warheads. The 350 SS–20s would give the Soviets a total of 1,050 warheads, or about one warhead for each of our 1,000 Minuteman missiles and 54 Titan II missiles. It is reasonable to suppose that U.S. intelligence will be just as slow in discovering SS–20s in Cuba as it was in discovering offensive missiles in Cuba in 1962 and in discovering thousands of Russian troops in 1979; so the Soviets could expect to get them all deployed before a U.S. President recognized the threat.

The strategic power which 350 SS–20s in Cuba would give to the Soviets is almost incalculable. The Soviets would know that, even if we had instantaneous warning of a launch from Cuba, it would require 10 to 12 minutes time to launch our ICBMs. But missiles launched from Cuba would require only 8 or 9 minutes travel time to

reach most of our Minuteman bases. So the SS–20s could reach our ICBMs before they could be launched.

The Soviets would not have to violate SALT II to carry out this SS–20 scenario. The SS–20 is not an ICBM, is not fixed-based, and is not a "heavy" missile, so is not covered by SALT II.

Again, the question remains, what would the United States do? What could the United States do? We would be reduced to doing nothing at all except pleading on the Hot Line for the Kremlin to show compassion, mercy, and good faith. Ask Alexander Solzhenitsyn how much compassion the Kremlin bosses show when there is no force able to make them act in a civilized manner. If our State Department couldn't even make the Soviets accede to our request to let Russian ballerina Vlasova be interviewed on American soil without the intimidating presence of 12 KGB kidnappers, how can we make the Soviets respect our demands about Cuba?

RATIFICATION V. REJECTION RISKS

What are the risks of SALT II Treaty ratification versus rejection? If the Treaty is rejected, we risk a tantrum by Kremlin officials. If the Treaty is ratified, we risk Soviet use of the Oil Weapon, the Dollar Weapon, and the Cuba Weapon. Is it worth the risk? I think not.

If SALT II is ratified, the Soviets will be given both the power and the perception of power to use the Oil Weapon, the Dollar Weapon, and the Cuban Weapon. If SALT II is rejected, the Soviets will have substantially the same power, but the worldwide perception of that power will be diminished because of new respect for the United States in rejecting such an unequal deal. Everywhere in the world, people will have a new respect for the determination of the United States to control its own destiny.

The perception of power can be just as important as the power itself. Neither idealism nor semantics can conceal the fact that SALT II is an unequal bargain for the United States. The Treaty does not limit the carrying capacity of either individual weapons or the total weapons forces of the two superpowers.

The alleged "equality" of SALT II is like saying that two intercontinental freight-moving firms are equal when each one has 2,250 "delivery vehicles," even though one firm has all 50-ton tractor-trailers and the other has only one-ton pickup trucks. Our principal ICBM, the Minuteman, has a "carrying capacity" of one megaton; the 308 Soviet SS–18 ICBMs have a "carrying capacity" of 50 megatons each.

The humiliating inequality of SALT II is also shown by the comparison of what the Treaty allows each side in the most powerful category of nuclear weapons: land-based ICBM MIRVs. Article V allows each side to have 820 land-based ICBMs which can be MIRVed. The Soviets have 308 heavy SS–18 ICBMs. Article IV, Section 10, allows each SS–18 to have ten MIRVs. That leaves 512 (820 minus 308) other land-based launchers of ICBMs which the Treaty allows the Soviets to equip with MIRVs. Since the Treaty allows the Soviets to MIRV any mix of ICBMs they choose, and since neither the Soviets nor the Pentagon will say how many SS–17s and SS–18s the Soviets have, they can choose to deploy 512 SS–19s with MIRVs. Article IV permits six MIRVs on each SS–19. The Treaty thus permits the Soviets to have 3,080 (308 times 10) MIRVs on their SS–18 force, and 3,072 (512 times 6) MIRVs on their SS–19 force; making a total of 6,152 Soviet MIRVs on their land-based MIRVed ICBM force alone.

The United States has no heavy ICBMs at all. We have 550 Minuteman IIIs, our only ICBMs capable of being MIRVed, and the Treaty does not permit us to add any more. The "Common Understanding" of Article IV prohibits the United States from flight-testing or deploying the Minuteman III "with more than three reentry vehicles." Therefore, the United States is effectively limited to only 1,650 (550 times 3) MIRVs on our land-based missile force.

The Treaty, therefore, allows the Soviets to build almost four times as many MIRV's on land-based ICBM's as it allows the United States to build: 6,162 to 1,650.

But that's not all. The treaty places no limit whatsoever on the power of MIRVed warheads. The Soviet SS–18 and SS–19 MIRV's are estimated at a power of 1.2 megatons each. Multiplying 1.2 megatons by 6,152 MIRV's gives the Soviets at least 7,382.4 megatons (7 billion, 382 million, 400 thousand tons) of TNT explosive-equivalent in our land-based MIRVed missile force.

The U.S. Minuteman III MIRV's are only 0.17 megaton each. Multiplying 0.17 megaton by 1,650 U.S. MIRV's gives us 280.5 megatons (280 million, 500 thousand tons) of TNT explosive-equivalent in our land-based MIRVed missile force.

The Treaty thus allows the Soviets to have land-based ICBM MIRV's with explosive power more than 26 times that of ours. The power centers of the world will not be fooled by calling this fantastic disparity "equality." With SALT II, the Soviets

will not only have the power, but just as important, they will have the worldwide perception of power.

Defense Secretary Harold Brown argues that, without SALT II, the Soviets could build even more strategic weapons. His speculation as to how many more weapons the Soviets might build sets up a strawman in the SALT II debate. Nobody can offer any reason for why the Soviets might want to build more strategic weapons than they are permitted under the terms of SALT II; there simply are not that many targets in the world. Under SALT II, the Soviets clearly have enough weapons to destroy the United States as a viable Nation if they choose to use that power and risk our retaliation.

But even assuming the existence of Secretary Brown's boogeyman of the additional weapons the Soviets might build if we reject SALT II, those hypothetical additional weapons add nothing whatsoever to the Soviet power to use the Oil Weapon, the Dollar Weapon, or the Cuba Weapon. The lessons of history are impressive and convincing on this point. The lesson of Oil Embargo I, the decline of the U.S. dollar since then, and Cuba Crisis I, all prove that the Soviets now have a sufficiency of power to confront us with Oil Embargo II, a coordinated assault on the U.S. dollar, and Cuba Crisis II. The Kremlin will not need to launch any missiles against us. The Soviets will not even need to suggest the use of nuclear missiles against us. A few "peaceful" measures will suffice: cut off our oil supplies from abroad, cut off our imports of other essential materials, and make the dollar unacceptable in international trade.

Now let's look at the differences to the United States between ratification and rejection of the SALT II Treaty. If SALT II is ratified, we clearly will not have the power to prevent the Soviets from using the Oil Weapon, the Dollar Weapon, or the Cuba Weapon. SALT II prevents us from ever catching up with the Soviets in major strategic weapons. We couldn't do anything to save ourselves from Oil Embargo I, and our position is vastly weaker as we face the possibility of Oil Embargo II. The galloping dollar decline is a pervasive reality. There is no way we could face down the Soviets in Cuban Crisis II.

With SALT II ratification, we would lose the perception of power even more dramatically than we did after SALT I. SALT II is so obviously unequal that nations which respect power would lose all respect for us. Ratification of SALT II would advertise to the world that we have accepted strategic inferiority to the Soviets and are willing to place our destiny in the hands of the good faith of the Kremlin bosses.

It is important that we not get hung up on the issue of whether the United States is inferior today or whether that point will arrive in 1981 or 1984. The prevailing dogma is that, while the United States does not have superiority today, we enjoy an intangible something called "essential equivalence." Nobody knows for sure what that is, but assuming it means something like "rough equality," even if this were an accurate assessment (which it is not), it would not be good enough to prevent the Soviets from using the Oil Weapon, the Dollar Weapon, or the Cuba Weapon. In a situation of equivalence or parity, all the odds favor the aggressors, not the defenders. The side committed to the strategy of a surprise attack needs fewer weapons than the side which must defend its people at all times. The side which places no value on human life can afford to take more risks than the side which values the life of every citizen. The side which has the nerve to use nuclear blackmail can outmaneuver the side which respects life, liberty, and property.

American strategy for survival in the nuclear age is still based on the long-since discredited and now hopelessly-obsolete doctrine called Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). This strategy keeps American citizens as hostages in the face of the Soviet nuclear weapons force, hoping that the men in the Kremlin will be deterred from attacking us by the knowledge that we will retaliate and kill millions of Russians. If deterrence fails, we have no contingency plan except surrender. Even if the plan works, it is based on killing Russians instead of on saving American lives.

But most immediately relevant here, this strategy is completely unable to cope with Soviet use of the Oil Weapon, the Dollar Weapon, or the Cuba Weapon.

If SALT II is rejected, the United States would be vastly better off. It will immediately give us a new perception of power because it will be a clear signal to the world that we intend to be masters of our own destiny, and that we are not going to submit to Soviet blackmail in the Middle East or in Cuba or elsewhere.

If SALT II is ratified, it will prevent the United States from taking those steps which are essential to the survival of our Nation.

THE ALTERNATIVE TO SALT II

The best and time-proven strategy for survival in the nuclear-space age is the one which worked so well in its first 27 years from 1945 to 1972, namely, U.S. nuclear superiority combined with a war-winning capability. The history of 1945 to 1972

proves—and millions of us are witness to it—that American nuclear superiority did preserve the nuclear peace between the great powers. In themselves, nuclear weapons are neither good nor evil. They are just instruments of power. In the hands of a peaceful nation like America, nuclear weapons can ensure world peace because no nation would be able to challenge them. In the hands of an evil, aggressor nation like the Soviet Union, nuclear weapons are a force for tyranny, destruction, and world conquest.

Our first priority must be to rebuild the credibility of our strategic deterrent, and our second priority must be to rebuild our strategic deterrent itself. Unless we do that, our entire population, deprived of all ABM defenses by the SALT I Treaty, will be sitting ducks for mass murder, nuclear blackmail, or economic disaster, at the will or caprice of the Kremlin.

The fastest and easiest way of restoring the credibility of our strategic deterrent would be for the United States to adopt a launch-on-verification-of-warning strategy as a substitute for our present strategy of not launching our ICBMs until after a Soviet disarming strike has impacted. This is the only way we can preserve our Minuteman force as a credible deterrent. This changeover in strategy will immediately render our 1,000 Minuteman force invulnerable and make it safe against a preemptive strike by the Soviets. Defense Secretary Brown has testified that our Minuteman missile force will be "vulnerable" in the 1980s, a timeframe which begins in only a few months. A launch-on-verification-of-warning strategy can prevent that vulnerability before it begins.

The second way to rebuild the credibility of our strategic deterrent is to reject the SALT II Treaty. This would be a clear signal to the world that the United States will not accept a position inferior to the Soviet Union, and that we will reassume control of our responsibility to defend our own people and our allies from any vital threat, political or economic.

Then comes the task of rebuilding our strategic deterrent. Remembering always that it is the mix and the readiness of weapons which are paramount, here are some specific suggestions—all of which would be prohibited if we ratify SALT II, but which becomes possible if we reject SALT II.

1. Start immediate production of the B–1 bomber. SALT II would effectively limit bomber production because the Treaty would force us to count every B–1 built under SALT II limits. Without SALT II, we can build all the bombers we need. If the Soviets can build 30 Backfires a year, we can build 60 B–1s a year.

2. Reopen production lines for the Minuteman III. Deploy the missiles as land-based or sea-based mobile missiles or, alternatively, install them in Minuteman I silos and immediately transfer the Minuteman Is to mobile launching pads. This would be prohibited by SALT II because the Treaty does not permit us to deploy mobile missile launchers until 1982.

3. Proceed immediately and rapidly with development and deployment of the MX mobile missile, and deploy it variously on railroad cars and trucks. This would make effective use of one of our great American assets: our far-flung and efficient transportation system. This can be our counterbalance to the Soviet capability of hiding their mobile missiles in their enormous land mass protected by the tight security of their closed society. The Soviets had the capability and the legal right under SALT I to build and hide 2,000 mobile missiles; no one knows how many they have.

4. Develop, test, and deploy the cruise missile in ranges that can reach the Soviet Union from our delivery vehicles. This is prohibited by the SALT II Protocol until 1982.

5. Go into immediate and rapid production of the Trident submarine and submarine-launched missiles. If the Soviets can build eight such submarines a year, we can build 16. The Soviets already have 27 Trident-class submarines, and at our present snail's pace of production, we will have only one in 1981.

6. Withdraw from the SALT I ABM Treaty in accord with Article 15 which permits either country to do that when "extraordinary events related to the subject-matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests." Certainly the staggering momentum of Soviet weapons buildup and their steady substitution of heavy missiles for lighter missiles jeopardize our supreme interests.

7. Proceed with research and development on the beam weapon, as urged by Major General George Keegan, former head of U.S. Air Force Intelligence. If ever developed, this beam weapon may be the "ultimate weapon" and we cannot afford to let the Soviets get it first. Evidence indicates that the Soviets are five to seven years ahead of U.S. physicists in beam weapon research.

A country so divinely blessed as America, with boundless resources, a Gross National Product twice that of the Soviet Union, a technology which is the envy of the world, and the "can-do" resourcefulness that put a man on the moon, certainly has all the qualities it takes to defend ourselves against the Soviet Union—not only

against its nuclear arsenal, but also against its use of the Oil Weapon, the Dollar Weapon, and the Cuba Weapon. Some will say that the rebuilding of our strategic deterrent along the lines outlined here will cost too much money, and that we cannot afford it. I submit that "cost" is now and has always been a phony argument when applied to strategic weapons. Here is just one shocking example to prove that statement.

This phony "cost" argument is brought forth by the same deceptive persons who destroyed 550 Minuteman missiles. When our nation built and deployed our 550 Minuteman III missiles, we did not get a single additional missile because the Defense Department scrapped one Minuteman I or II for every minuteman III we built. We were told it was more cost-effective to use the same silos used by the Minuteman I and II. But digging holes with modern earth-moving equipment is a very minor expense. New holes for the Minuteman III's would not have cost more than $1 million per Minuteman III, complete with launch tube and hole, as compared to the $800,000 we paid to "modify" each existing launch tube and fit each Minuteman III into it. We invested at least $2½ billion in the cost of the 550 Minuteman III's. But because we used the Minuteman I and II holes, we did not add a single missile. For a puny $110 million more, we could have increased our missile force by 50 percent! Such an addition would have been vastly more valuable than adding extra warheads to a constant number of missiles; such an addition would have kept our Minuteman missile force invulnerable years past 1980. It cannot be argued that such an addition was prohibited by SALT I: the Minuteman IIIs were ready for deployment in 1970, two years before SALT I imposed a freeze on digging new holes; and it was widely known that the Soviets were rapidly digging holes during that same period.

Cost was a phony argument then, and it is a phony argument today. The funds spent for strategic weapons are the smallest part of the Defense Department budget; yet strategic weapons will determine whether we survive as a free nation, and whether we are able to defend ourselves against the Soviet use of the Oil Weapon, the Dollar Weapon, and the Cuba Weapon.

In conclusion, I ask the Senators to ponder the warning given to us by Winston Churchill in his later years when he surveyed the prospects for survival in the nuclear age:

"Sometimes in the past we have committed the folly of throwing away our arms. Under the mercy of Providence, and at great cost and sacrifice, we have been able to recreate them when the need arose. But if we abandon our nuclear deterrent, there will be no second chance. To abandon it now would be to abandon it forever."

Those who vote for SALT II will be abandoning our nuclear deterrent forever. Our nation will never get a second chance. The "peace" bought by the SALT II Treaty will be as fragile, as temporary, and as dangerous as the "peace in our time" bought by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain at Munich in 1938.

Senator STONE. Mrs. Schlafly, we thank you and the American Conservative Union very much. Are there further questions?

[There was no response.]

Our next witness is Dr. Edward Teller of the Hoover Institution of Stanford, California.

Dr. Teller, before calling on you for your testimony, Senator Hayakawa has a short statement he wants to make.

Senator Hayakawa.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Mr. Chairman, it was my hope that one of Dr. Teller's associates, Dr. Charles Teevan from the Lawrence Livermore Laboratories, would also be one of the witnesses before this committee. As you know, the schedule of the committee has been so crowded that it was impossible to include Dr. Teevan in the witness list.

I have asked Dr. Teevan, therefore, to send me his statement, and I would appreciate it greatly if it could be included in the record.

Senator STONE. It will be included in the record at this point. Thank you, Senator Hayakawa, for that addition to the record.

[Mr. Charles L. Teevan's statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES L. TEEVAN

SALT AND THE CONTROL OF U.S. NATIONAL DESTINY

The Secretary of Defense has informed us that a relatively small fraction of Soviet MIRVed ICBMs could, by the early to mid-1980's, reduce the number of U.S. MINUTEMAN ICBMs to low levels. Soviet ICBMs that threaten MINUTEMAN have all been developed and deployed since the 1972 SALT I agreements. We have also been advised by the Secretary that the Soviet Union, on the eve of a SALT II agreement, has a new generation of ICBMs in development, estimated to consist of up to four new or modified missiles. These missiles are expected to begin flight testing at any time or at the latest by the early 1980's; however, we know little about their characteristics or capabilities. We may not know these characteristics until they are tested—and not necessarily even then. The implications of this information are that the Soviet Union has maintained an industrial capability of producing several hundreds or more ICBMs per year and making qualitative improvements in forces that undeniably are intended to further improve their strategic position; we do not even know the degree to which their posture will be improved nor are we preparing any concrete response, achievable within the next five years, to any challenge that these new missiles may present.

New policies, and most importantly actions are required if we are to survive as a nation. The United States is presently committed to the negotiating table as a principal means of attaining and preserving national security. Our objectives during the 1970s were to have the Soviet Union negotiate away future military expansions while we offered appropriate measures in return. Although claims of accomplishment have been made concerning the enhancement of U.S. national security, these claims at best are misconceptions; they are overstated, incorrect, misleading, and self-serving to those who believe that any agreement is better than no agreement at all. By any measure, the relative position of the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union has declined more rapidly during the period following the SALT I agreements than during any other comparable period. It is important that we recognize the circumstances leading to this decline in U.S. strategic power during an era that was dominated by political control of strategic weaponry. Simply, the agreements represented an admirable experiment that has failed to attain the expected goals. The U.S. entered these agreements aware that the Soviet potential existed for continued improvement and expansion of their forces. The U.S. position relied on the good faith and good will of Soviet leadership. The Soviet Union, in return, manipulated the literal content of these treaties to allow accomplishment of its planned objectives without restrictions. The Soviet Union achieved these objectives—to a greater extent than the most farsighted U.S. observer could have predicted. The U.S., if it derived any benefit, should have learned a valuable lesson; however, this lesson must be explicitly understood now if it is not to be repeated. Time is working in favor of the Soviet Union; we can not afford to waste another five years.

To understand the severity of the U.S. position, several points will be discussed in this paper. First, the SALT I agreements provided the mechanism for the Soviet Union to achieve an unprecedented, unanticipated and unopposed strategic position. Second, the provisions of the SALT II agreement will not allow the U.S. to enhance its relative strategic position or to arrest the trend of growing Soviet power. Third, our verification process is inadequate and outdated. If we continue to place high confidence in this process, we practice self-deception and provide the Soviets with a means for subterfuge on a grand scale.

RESULTS OF SALT I

The U.S. claimed that SALT I had halted or frozen Soviet strategic programs. The Soviet Union has since accomplished, among other things, the following:

1. Introduced new ICBMs leading to a twofold increase in overall throw-weight for the entire force.
2. Introduced MIRVs on both ICBMs and SLBMs leading to more and larger deliverable warheads than the U.S.
3. Developed one of the new ICBMs as a mobile system.
4. Achieved a capability through accuracy improvements to attack and destroy a large percentage of U.S. ICBMs before they are launched.
5. Introduced new and larger SSBNs. Doubled the number of SSBNs and SLBM launchers. Unveiled new SLBMs with ranges and throw-weights far exceeding those under development prior to SALT I.
6. Developed a rapidly deployable and transportable ABM system.
7. Developed the Backfire bomber with an inter-continental range.

8. Developed a mobile IRBM system and the technology to convert the deployed version to a mobile ICBM system.

PROSPECTS FOR SALT II

In 1972, during the SALT I debate, the U.S. pointed to several advantages that it believed it would maintain as a result of the SALT I Interim Agreement. These advantages, namely a greater number of heavy bombers and a greater number of MIRVed ballistic missile warheads, are disappearing. Soviet air defenses are so massive that the effectiveness of U.S. bombers, even if they are equipped with cruise missiles is questionable and the Soviets will be allowed to produce the Backfire bomber, in sufficient quantities to eliminate U.S. numerical superiority in this field. Soviet MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs will provide them with not only larger but with a greater number of ballistic missile warheads than the U.S. has.

In 1979, it is not possible to point out any U.S. advantages. Furthermore, the SALT II agreements, do not provide for the U.S. to regain any of the lost posture of the past decade, nor do the provisions of the agreements reduce Soviet potential for causing a further decline of this posture. One reason for this is that SALT II does not consider strategic defensive systems or theater nuclear forces. Although it may be convenient for negotiators to separate strategic systems from defensive systems for negotiating purposes, negotiations alone are not the goal. In practice, strategic defenses are intimately related to offensive forces. For example, the Soviet Union has air defenses ten times larger than the U.S. had when the principal threat to this country was from an air attack. Soviet air defenses are being increased and improved continually. On the other hand, the U.S. has essentially no air defense; Soviet bombers, including Backfires, can attack the U.S. virtually unopposed. The Soviets can rapidly deploy an ABM defense around key targets and further develop and expand their already impressive Civil Defenses. The result of these efforts are a further reduction in the effectiveness and deterrence of U.S. offensive forces and therefore must be considered a very important factor of the strategic balance.

The introduction of a mobile IRBM force by the Soviet Union is also extremely disturbing. This force completely dominates the European continent and, therefore, our allies and U.S. forces in Europe. Furthermore, by relatively simple modifications it can be upgraded to a mobile ICBM. Soviet potential in deploying this force, without restrictions and with its inherent technical flexibility, provides them with an opportunity to circumvent SALT II beyond any reasonable justification.

Another reason for a declining U.S. posture is the Soviet potential for expansion and modernization of strategic offensive forces to achieve an almost fivefold advantage over the U.S. This paper makes no prediction but it does provide some examples of how the Soviet Union has the capability to benefit from the technical flexibility inherent in their existing systems. As an example, the Soviet SSBN/SLBM force although larger than its U.S. counterpart, can be considered at an embryonic stage in its development. It has already demonstrated an SLBM with a MIRV capability and with a range far exceeding that required for a missile based on a nuclear submarine. This excess range capability could be converted into an increase in the throw-weight and provide for increased numbers or sizes or warheads. We also expect qualitative improvements in the Soviet ICBM force in the near future; however, as noted earlier, we are unaware of how great an effect these improvements will have on the strategic balance.

Perhaps the greatest opportunity for force expansion as a result of SALT II is our acceptance of the Backfire Statement in which the Soviet Union states its intentions not to give the Backfire an intercontinental capability. This statement of course, is misleading. Backfires can fly from Russia to Mexico, Cuba, or even as far as Panama without refueling and with several megaton bombs on board. By further stating: "In this connection, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the *radius of action* (emphasis by author) of this airplane as to enable it to strike targets on the territory of the USA," they compound this deception—no heavy bomber, including those that are counted in SALT, can fly such a two-way intercontinental mission without refueling.

Not including Backfire in SALT II, not only provides the U.S.S.R. with a modern bomber force that is not counted under SALT, but more importantly, it allows them to dispense with their older bombers that are presently counted and to replace them on a one-to-one basis with ICBM or SLBM launchers.

THE INADEQUACY OF VERIFICATION

U.S. dependence upon its verification capability can only aggravate the deteriorating strategic situation. Our sources of information for verification of this treaty can

no longer be considered reliable; verification is based upon an intelligence system that has been compromised. Conditions leading to this assertion are:

1. A major portion of U.S. intelligence upon which verification depends is obtained through sensors carried by satellites and other platforms.

2. To impress the U.S. with Soviet might and to deter the U.S. from attacking the Soviet Union, sufficient information on Soviet strategic military forces must be displayed for U.S. observation.

3. To allow the U.S. to establish a basis for treaty verification of Soviet compliance with the SALT agreements and at the same time prevent unnecessary, unauthorized or undesirable observations, rigid control and high level authorization of these displays are necessary.

4. The Soviet Union deliberately conceals information on major strategic systems, yet we claim that they do not violate the treaty; this is further indication of the control and finesse that is employed in the management of our observations.

5. The Soviet Union is therefore, sensitive to and aware of, and arranges for essentially all of the information obtained by the U.S. and which we regard as "intelligence".

Recently, Secretary of State Vance, advised the Congress that in 1975, two years following SALT I, the extent of Soviet concealment activities associated with strategic weapons programs had increased substantially. The U.S. stated its concern to the Soviet side and, in 1975, the U.S. concluded that an expanding program no longer appeared to be associated with this concealment. However, the Secretary has also advised us of more recent Soviet concealment activities involving the SS–16 mobile ICBM, ICBM launchers at R&D facilities, and the encoding of telemetry. These concealment attempts, are readily detected; they involve major strategic systems and politically sensitive agreements and therefore must be sanctioned and coordinated at the highest levels; they are unquestionably the product of a deliberate arrangement.

From the above conditions it is obvious that the information provided by our national technical means for verification should be regarded with the same skepticism as that provided by a double-agent, i.e., a spy who has been identified by his enemies but tolerated because he becomes the means for providing information that is managed, probably false or misleading and, when accurate, of questionable utility. Moreover, and in accordance with long standing protocol, double-agents are removed when they have served their purpose. The Soviet Union, equipped with an operational antisatellite system, stands ready to destroy these satellites when they have served their purpose and at a time of Soviet choosing.

As a nation concerned with our destiny, we have grave cause to review our position at this time. SALT II places technical, political, and military restrictions on what this nation can and needs to accomplish. In the light of increasing Soviet military strength, industrial momentum and political assertiveness, such restrictions are leading to a precarious situation in which by default, our destiny as a sovereign nation is being placed in the hands of the Soviet leadership—an intolerable posture.

Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, may I join you in welcoming Dr. Teller. I look back on the days that I served together with him on the Rockefeller Brothers Study Project as one of the more informative periods of my life. And for better or worse, that is what brought me into public life.

I appreciate all of the time and talent Dr. Teller gave that study project.

I certainly welcome you, sir.

Senator HAYAKAWA. It is also my pleasure to welcome my dear friend Dr. Teller, who has instructed me in so many areas.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Senators Percy and Hayakawa.

Dr. Teller, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF DR. EDWARD TELLER,[1] HOOVER INSTITUTION ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE, ACCOMPANIED BY HON. DAN KUYKENDALL

Dr. TELLER. Mr. Chairman, gentlemen. I think it has become very clear in the debate on SALT II that we are at a watershed. For many years, the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union has been shifting. Now it has shifted.

I would like to emphasize one point. The men who are leading the Pentagon today are excellent, dedicated people working under difficult conditions. They have made the best of possible decisions in many respects.

Yet almost all of them believe that unless we do something, we will soon be in a position of inferiority.

One of your most eminent witnesses, General Haig, has argued that we are inferior even today. So have others. There is plenty of evidence, and I will give you some of it, that they are right.

I think that we have made, historically throughout the years, a tremendous mistake. We have confused the words "arms race" with the concept of a race in technology. An arms race is something that you can quantify, something that you can regulate, something that you can limit. A race in technology cannot be quantified or limited.

It is not possible to make rules about ideas that are yet to come, and such ideas do emerge in a time of rapidly developing, unpredictable technology. I have been associated with intelligence, and unfortunately I am not allowed to tell you everything I have learned.

But I know and many of you know that we have observed in Russia a number of projects which we do not know how to interpret. I don't think the Russians are crazy. As long as they were following in our footsteps, they were moving rapidly. Now they have moved ahead of us according to the indications we can gather, not only quantitatively but also qualitatively.

I do not believe that SALT II should be ratified provided our military budget is increased. What is needed is specific projects. And today it is extremely difficult even to propose these specific projects. I will try to, and I will not succeed. I am 71 years old.

Senator JAVITS. You are a young man.

Dr. TELLER. Thank you, sir.

Our young scientists, our young men have been indoctrinated that to work on arms is the wrong thing to do, and in scientific circles this point of view is widespread. Gentlemen, I had a hard time trying to make up my mind to work on the Manhattan Project. What decided me was a speech, the only speech I heard President Roosevelt deliver. He said that if scientists in the free world won't work on weapons, freedom will cease to exist.

It was true then. It is true now. Then the world was bigger. Today we are more exposed. Then our opponent attacked prematurely. Today our opponents are deliberate. The Russians move when they are sure of their goal, in the Middle East, in Europe, in the Caribbean.

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[1] See page 239 for Dr. Teller's prepared statement.

We are offered a treaty. If we reject it, it will become clear that we don't need to worry. If we accept it, we are apt to ignore a very dangerous situation which I want to describe to you.

We are told that retaliation rests on three secure foundations: Land-based missiles, bombers, and submarines. Of the three legs, two are very doubtful. This is admitted about land-based missiles by the administration. They will deploy the M–X, but under present plans, the deployment will not have an effect during the time of validity of SALT II.

We have accepted a form of the M–X which is costly and slow to develop, although I am happy to see from today's press that the President, under the urging of the Pentagon, has decided on a big missile. That, at least, was a good point. Our land based missiles are certainly vulnerable.

Our planes are exposed to a Russian first strike because our air bases are close to the coast. They can be shot down by saboteurs shortly after they take off, with relative ease. They can be stopped in mid-course, having been observed by Russian radar, before they can release their cruise missiles. And then they face a tremendous air defense.

We have practically no air defense, not against the older Russian bombers and not against the Backfire. Instead of three solid legs, we have a single wobbly leg. Our submarines may survive, but the Russians are working diligently not only on acoustic detection but on all kinds of much more advanced detection.

This is one of many examples where we have reason to believe that Russian military technology is ahead of ours. The fact that their civilian technology is way behind us has lulled us into a false sense of security.

Apart from its inherent weakness, the treaty as it is written is very hard to verify. Just one example: It limits only launchers, not missiles. The Russians, openly or covertly, could deploy in warehouses away from their launching sites, hundreds, even thousands of additional missiles, together with makeshift launchers we could never identify. Thus they could develop a much greater superiority even than the one they possess today.

There are other ways in which they can further enhance their lead over us.

The fact is they can evacuate their cities, threaten to destroy us, and I believe there is today no realistic way to respond to the threat. Apart from all of this, the treaty practically disregards our allies; there are no limitations on the Backfire, in the hope it might not reach us, even though it is certain that the Backfire is a dreadful threat to our allies. There are no limitations on the SS–20, which could be easily and rapidly changed to become an intercontinental missile. But even as it now stands, it can destroy the European forces overnight. This, together with the noncircumvention clauses, articles XII and XIII, is deeply discouraging to our allies.

The testimony of General Haig, who until recently served our Government, is the most eloquent and the most authoritative to show our weakness and our need to act.

We are in an extremely difficult situation. The debate on SALT II is something upon which I look as an opportunity. By voting against the ratification of SALT II, you can deliver a message to

the American people that we are in danger. We cannot be saved except by mobilizing our scientists and our industry, and we need that more badly than we ever needed it when the Second World War was impending.

Young people with imagination are desperately needed to do what they should have been doing in the last 20 years, inventing ways out of difficulties. What we need equally, perhaps even more, is discussions with our allies who otherwise in their desperation may have to submit to the Soviet Union or else develop—openly or covertly—their own nuclear deterrent.

The research, the preparation should be our main immediate purpose. I would not settle for any increase in the budget. I might be tempted to settle for concrete and helpful projects that would, in fact, deter the Russians. But these projects themselves should be preceded by thorough research and development of technology.

It is not the money that will save us. It is the ideas. And you have a handle. You have a signal that you can give to the American people that unless we come up with new ideas for our defense, the lives of all Americans are at risk.

I want to finish by making one remark. The weakness that has developed throughout the years is made visible by SALT II. It has persuaded many, and not only Mrs. Schlafly, that we should fire on warning; that when the Russians fire at our missiles, we should retaliate by firing on Russian cities.

I am against it. I am against the arms race. I am for new ideas. And one of these ideas is not so new. The Russians have a plan to evacuate their cities. When we notice it, we should warn our citizens to evacuate, and they could do so, promptly, provided that we prepare now.

We can do many other things. Our electronics is superb. We could develop remotely controlled vehicles in the air, on land, and in the sea more cheaply and effectively. These would be both more expendable, more survivable than our present arms, which are, in fact, obsolete.

The Russians are working on ABM. We should work on ABM. A new line of research is laser research. Three people shared the Nobel Prize for lasers: The American, Townes, who is now working on the question what happens in our galaxy and in distant galaxies, and two Russian scientists, Basow and Prokoroff, who are working on lasers and working to help Soviet defense, which is really preparation for Soviet aggression. All of this is narrowly and closely linked.

That is narrowly and closely linked with all kinds of plans to increase the Communist sway over the world.

I have in the past said that trouble is coming. Today I am not alone in saying that trouble has arrived. Our Secretary of Defense, in the guarded language imposed by his office, said, in his way, the very same thing.

Thank you very much.

Senator JAVITS [presiding]. Thank you very much, Mr. Teller. We all know your repute and sincerity. We deeply appreciate your testimony.

We operate under a 10-minute rule of questions and answers. Senator Helms is first.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions of Mr. Teller but I do want to express to him my appreciation for his coming here today, and also I want to express my admiration for you, sir.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you very much.

Senator Hayakawa.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

RELEVANCE OF SALT II TO TECHNOLOGICAL RACE

I too am extremely grateful for Dr. Teller's testimony. He aroused my curiousity a great deal about the coming race in technology. The old concept of an arms race which is purely quantitative in weapons is obsolete. The future lies in a technological race, and to that technological race, SALT II is practically irrelevant, if I understand you correctly.

Dr. TELLER. SALT II is doubly relevant.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Is what?

Dr. TELLER. Doubly relevant for the technology race. It is specifically relevant, and it is relevant in connection with motivation. SALT II, for instance, permits only one new missile to be tested. Of course, that applies to the Russians as well. But what a new missile is is so loosely defined that the Russians can circumvent it. We in our open system cannot.

The very fact that we outlaw new missiles is a clear signal to our young and imaginative people not to engage in this work. By working closely with our allies, we could mobilize the immense manpower and intellectual power that exists in the free world. That is explicitly forbidden in SALT II.

Finally, to give you one other example, the deployment of the M-X is slow, clumsy and, in the end, ineffective because of real limitations or perceptions that today govern decisions about the M-X. This is one end. The other end I have indicated.

Unless our people will hear words similar to the words that I heard from Roosevelt in 1940, they will continue to feel that they would rather look into the structure of the smallest particles in the world and will not worry about the defense of our country because that presumably has been taken care of by the SALT II agreements.

It is up to you to tell them clearly.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Would you quote again for me what you quoted from Franklin Roosevelt, that one sentence?

Dr. TELLER. Franklin Roosevelt, on the day after Hitler invaded Belgium and Holland, addressed the Pan American Scientific Congress, which I attended. It was the first political meeting I ever attended. He said: "You scientists are being blamed for the weapons of destruction that are now being used. But I tell you, unless scientists in the free world work on weapons, freedom will cease to exist."

I was very deeply impressed, Senator Hayakawa, because I was there when Einstein signed a letter to Roosevelt a few months earlier suggesting the development of atomic weapons. I thought I knew what Roosevelt was talking about.

Today, not many people and in particular not many people in high authority think this way.

Senator HAYAKAWA. What you said about young scientists at that point—and you were a young scientist then—struck me very forcibly because at that time I was teaching at the Illinois Institute of Technology. I remember that my colleagues in the scientific departments, in physics, in chemistry and metallurgy and so on, suddenly disappeared. And after the war was over, I learned they had been at Oak Ridge.

But I do know that they were motivated by exactly the kind of idea that President Roosevelt formulated at that time. Unless scientists in the free world work on weaponry, there will no longer be any freedom.

So, as a former college president and educator, I would like to ask you, what about young scientists now? Are they willing to engage in this kind of race in technology to protect our freedoms?

Dr. TELLER. No. And I would like to have permission to give you a further example.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Please.

Dr. TELLER. Christmas 1950, the president of the Physical Society, later scientific adviser of the President, addressed a meeting of physicists in Pasadena at Cal Tech, of which he was then president. And he said:

> We are now at war in Korea. Many of the young people have come to me and asked should we go back and work on weapons? I had been in Washington. I had inquired. I can tell you the answer is no, we have all the weapons, all the ideas we can possibly use. All we need to worry about is that what we have learned should not be misused.

As far back as 29 years ago, our young people were indoctrinated by their highest authority not to work for the military. We knew everything.

That was just the beginning of the debate on the hydrogen bomb which DuBridge and many others opposed. We now know that the hydrogen bomb was produced by the Russians and by us, as far as one can tell, at the same time. Had we not produced the hydrogen bomb and the Russians would have produced it, we would have denied that it exists. We would have ignored it as we are now trying to ignore the reality of Russian superiority.

Senator HAYAKAWA. So this is a message which must ultimately be brought to young scientists, is it not?

Dr. TELLER. Senator Hayakawa, this is the case. And my question is: Who will do it?

My hope is that you in the Senate might make a tremendous contribution in bringing home to our young people that peace can be kept if there is power in the hands of those who love peace more than they love domination.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Dr. Teller. Thank you very much.

Senator ZORINSKY [presiding]. Senator Javits.

MAIN FAULTS OF SALT II

Senator JAVITS. Dr. Teller, I just want to be sure that I understand very clearly your argument because I would like to pose what I consider to be a grave dilemma to you concerning young scientists.

In the first place, may I say that although your views and mine may not necessarily be parallel, there are few men in American life who are more valuable to our country in compounding our national decisions which require men of strong views, of high character and of great professional and personal ability.

So the fact that we may not agree does not mean a thing to me.

Do I understand your argument to be that the main fault with SALT II is that it doesn't accomplish anything and that it will again make us complacent, and will lull us to sleep? Or do I understand your argument to be that SALT II affirmatively hurts us, for example, that at the end of the SALT II period, no matter what we do, the Russians will be at us. No matter what we do, even if we do everything you say.

Dr. TELLER. Senator Javits, I want to say two very difficult things. First, the possibility for us to disagree is the very essence of the idea of freedom and this is what both you and I want to defend.

Second, I want to say that a few months ago I had the opportunity to talk to an official in the White House, not a very high official, about SALT. I said to him, there is one condition under which I would consider SALT as possibly acceptable, not as helpful, not as valuable, but as acceptable: If the President would put it before the American people together with the statement that we are in deep trouble and in great danger; that we must take immediate steps to mobilize our scientists and our technologists to remedy all deficiencies that we can.

Even then, SALT would have great shortcomings. But a statement of that kind coming from the President, put forward in a forceful and clear manner, could sway my opinion.

The President instead addressed the joint Congress with the false statement, which he should have known is false, that America is the strongest military power.

Since this is the history of SALT II, I see no way in which I can recommend its support.

Senator JAVITS. That leads me to this dilemma. As I say, I am not going to in any way dispute details with you. For example, my staff gave me a long list of all the strategic weapons we are developing now, including new weaponry like particle beams and so on, but you are very familiar with that, much more than I.

Dr. TELLER. Senator, may I tell you, on particle beams we are spending a few million dollars. We have a program on that. I am not sure that it is the most essential program but I have supported it.

FUTURE ROLE OF YOUNG SCIENTISTS IN ARMAMENT PROGRAMS

Senator JAVITS. I won't even debate that, but I would like to ask you a fundamental question.

You spoke of young scientists. I agree with you a lot about that, I really do. We have an excellent educator here in Senator Hayakawa, and he agrees with you, which is more important than my agreeing. But this is an equation that troubles me. And I am speaking as a politician.

These very young scientists, maybe, are much more likely to go to work if we approve SALT II with some declaration dedicating

ourselves to equity, parity, equivalency, whatever you may call it. I am sure it is coming and I will be for it, I will help to work it out.

What concerns me is then that these young scientists who think differently in many respects from you and from me, may be much more willing to say, OK, my Senator really tried. They approved what was before them. They continued this process. So OK, now we will go with them whereas before we hung back because we didn't want to contribute to warmaking. We think they, too, are men of peace, they are trying. We will go with them.

Whereas, if we turned down SALT II, maybe their reaction will confound you and other very able people who think like you, and they will say, oh, the jig is up. These people think about nothing but armament, nothing but confrontation, nothing but war. We are not going, we are against it. We don't believe that the human race should be exterminated with our aid.

I ask you that question. Is it not possible that their reaction will be precisely the contrary of what you picture for us in the greatest good faith?

Dr. TELLER. Senator, you ask me an honest question.

Senator JAVITS. I do.

Dr. TELLER. And I will give you an honest answer. I supported, I am sorry to say, SALT I. I did because at that time the danger was not as imminent as it is today. I did it because SALT I for the first time spelled out an actual disparity, which the Senate did point out.

We did at that time what you now recommend. It did not help. Would it not be better this time to do the opposite and raise the red flag of danger? Short of that, you cannot be effective.

It is important that our young people work for peace, but if we talk not of the United States but of the free world, if we combined the mobilization of our scientists with the unification of the free world for the common defense in an unreserved manner, in such a program there could be enough ideals to attract many young people who probably are not so different from what you and I used to be.

Senator JAVITS. Dr. Teller, my time is up and I would just like to make this one comment. I have felt very deeply that there is nothing wrong with the world, including the danger of the Soviet Union, that could not be fixed infinitely more quickly by real harmony and unity in the policy of western Europe and the United States and Japan.

We still have it. I don't know how long we will keep it, but we have it.

Dr. TELLER. And SALT II may do its greatest damage in disrupting this harmony.

Senator JAVITS. What I say to you is this: We may have even more trouble with the European countries and the European scientists than with the young American scientists precisely because we turned down SALT II, but I appreciate your thesis. It is tremendously helpful and informative.

Dr. TELLER. Sir, I appreciate yours fully.

ADVOCATE QUALITATIVE RACE

Senator ZORINSKY. Dr. Teller, you indicate that there is a vast disparity between the Soviet Union's quantitative nuclear ability and that of our Nation. Do you advocate, rather than engaging in a numbers race, a quantitative race, that we direct our attention to technology and improving the quality of our delivery systems and our capability? Is that correct?

Dr. TELLER. In part, sir.

Senator ZORINSKY. Do we have time?

Dr. TELLER. I would not limit it to our delivery systems. I would include active defense, like ABM. And now I am in a really difficult position because if we realize that there is trouble, what can be invented is not something for one person—and at that, an old person—to say.

What I do know is that in our efforts, essentially new ideas have been missing for almost 20 years. This is a direct consequence of the discouragement of this type of work among scientists. This is the point we have to remedy. I hope that the outcome will be different from more arms of destruction.

Civil defense is one thing I strongly and most seriously advocate. There are many other things that probably will emerge, and I mentioned only a few.

Senator ZORINSKY. You indicate that we should not engage in quantitative but rather qualitative competition, and my question is: Do you feel we have time to enter the qualitative field rather than the quantitative field inasmuch as you do indicate a feeling of hesitancy in the document you presented today?

Dr. TELLER. I am deeply grateful to you for this last point. I hesitate. There may not be time for the qualitative development. It may be necessary to spend more money, perhaps in a non-too-effective manner, because the trouble is upon us. But the more we delay in informing and mobilizing all the young people of the free world, the more we will be driven toward the ineffective and more destructive quantitative aspects.

That is the very reason why we should act fast and act now. I am much more interested in this point of mobilization than in the point of any special problem. But as things are at the present, I believe that your best choice of appealing to the sense of urgency of all Americans, including the scientists——

PRECLUSION OF ACTIONS BY SALT II

Senator ZORINSKY. Other than the psychological aspects of a ratification of SALT II, is there anything in SALT II that would prohibit or preclude the American public and the scientists from doing exactly what you are recommending?

Dr. TELLER. Yes, there is. There are words in the whole SALT process, ill-defined words to the effect that more weapons, new weapons, should not be introduced. When we outlawed ABM, we made it very clear that we oppose defensive weapons as well as weapons of destruction. The whole disarmament procedure, the whole tradition of SALT negotiations is, in a sense, to discourage new ideas in weapons., This is a part of the agreement which we observe and the Russians never have observed.

Senator ZORINSKY. But it mentions no specific prohibition of increased technology or research and development in that area other, maybe, than deployment and a protocol beyond a certain year.

Dr. TELLER. It does so in this connection. But I would say—and I am very sorry that Senator Percy is no longer here—I most definitely disagree with his statement that nobody any longer advocates ABM. I certainly do. I had considered it in the late fifties as too difficult. The more I see of scientific developments, the more I believe that it is possible. And the more I observe what the Russians are doing, the more I feel that in this specific instance they are apt to be way ahead of us.

If you could manage to abrogate the ABM Treaty, it might be a long step in the right direction.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you very much, Dr. Teller. I appreciate the context of your statement, together with your taking your time to appear before this committee to enlighten not only us but the American public as to your views on this vital issue of concern to our Nation.

Thank you very much.

[Dr. Teller's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. EDWARD TELLER

SALT II AND ARMS RACE OR RESEARCH AND SAFETY

Introduction

The SALT II Treaty was presented to the Joint Session of Congress by President Carter and most Americans were listening. We were told that the United States is the strongest military power, that atomic weapons are too dangerous, and the danger for everybody can be diminished if SALT II is ratified. Ensuing discussions resulted in proposals that SALT II indeed should be ratified provided that by further expenditures we increase our military preparedness. It is indeed generally believed that we are involved in a quantitative arms race and our military experts are beginning to recognize that the Russians are outspending us. Indeed Secretary of Defense Brown has stated before the Senate Armed Services Committee: ". . . the gap between U.S. and Soviet defense expenditures cannot go on increasing without a dangerous tilt in the relevant balances of power and a weakening of the overall U.S. deterrent."

He also said: ". . . our strategic submarines and bombers are aging; the ICBM leg of the TRIAD is becoming vulnerable; and our command and control system is not as capable as it should be."

I claim that all these somewhat divergent statements point in the wrong direction. They suggest that we are, and for some time will be, involved in an arms race, that the race can be slowed down by ratifying SALT II and if there are residual dangers they can be rectified by spending more money.

To the extent to which we are involved in an arms race, we have lost it and it will take many years and extremely heavy financial sacrifices to catch up. Even in the quality of the weapons the Soviets are ahead of us, a shocking circumstance since many Americans continue to think of the Soviet Union as a primitive nation.

If we continue on our present course, adopt SALT II, and try to apply the proposed corrective measures we shall fail and the 1980s will become an exceedingly dangerous period for the United States as well as for the Free World.

There is a possibility to correct this dangerous situation. We should get rid of the idea that we are involved in an arms race. We should realize that we are involved in a race of technology. If we turn our full attention to the weakest points in our defense, to qualitative improvements of our weapons, to strengthening our alliances, and sharing responsibilities and benefits with our friends, and if we place the highest priority on defending the lives of the citizens of America, we still may escape the consequences of mistakes that have been made in past years.

One essential difference between an arms race and a race in technology is that in the former quantities are important and limitation of the number of weapons makes sense; in the latter qualitative improvements are emphasized and there is not much

point in counting the numbers of various pieces of equipment. In an arms race arms limitations such as proposed in SALT II could, under some circumstances, lead to more security; in a race of technology arms limitations can hardly be formulated.

Conversely, ratification of SALT II will of necessity drive us into a continuing arms race. In playing "catch up" we are not apt to be successful, particularly because of the sense of prevailing complacency which has been strengthened by the President's over-optimistic presentation.

If on the other hand we realize the present danger, if we mobilize American talent, inventiveness and capability of innovative production, the United States together with its Allies may prevail in an effort to stabilize peace and avoid war. The more we emphasize ingenuity in defense and the less we rely on the obsolete idea of an arms race the less expensive it will be to insure desperately needed stability.

The imbalance of arms

We have been told by our government officials that at present Russian and American strategic forces are roughly equivalent. This statement is made in spite of the accepted fact that in one of the categories where comparisons are most easily made, the land-based missiles, the Russians enjoy a 5 to 1 advantage in throw weight, that is, the weight of the explosives that the rockets can carry across the ocean. That the Russian advantage is not only in quantity but also is in quality has been denied by our Secretary of Defense. Even he admits, however, that the Russians "have been developing several land-based missiles, their fifth generation of them." By comparison our missiles are fifteen years old. Even to maintain them places considerable burden on our economy.

Our bombers have been built thirty years ago while the Soviets are turning out the new "Backfires," planes that constitute a formidable danger to our Allies and that can cross the Atlantic, deliver atomic bombs on the United States and land in Cuba.

There is evidence of considerable Russian progress in submarines, which is not fully acknowledged by our Navy and is known to our public only through rumors.

We are being told that our retaliatory force is three-fold assured. The "three legs of the TRIAD" are the land-based missiles, the American bombers, and the missile-carrying submarines. Let us consider these three legs.

It is officially acknowledged that by the early 1980's our land-based missiles can be wiped out by a Russian first strike. We are told that the new big MX missile will be survivable. Unfortunately MX is supposed to be flight tested only in 1983. Full deployment cannot be expected before 1986 and probably not even then. In the meantime the Soviets have several methods by which they can destroy our present Minuteman together with the new MX sites. This situation is in part due to the fact that for MX an optimal mode of deployment has not been chosen. The deployment appears to have been influenced by acceptability to the Soviets even though other modes of deployment could be checked as easily as the presently planned MX. The Soviets seem to be more willing to accept our present plans which are more expensive, less efficient, and slower in deployment than others that have been suggested. From the Soviet point of view their behavior is fully understandable.

In this difficult situation it has been even suggested that our land-based missiles should be fired "on warning." This is a proposal dangerously close to the concept of an American first strike which in my opinion we must avoid. By overemphasizing insufficiently controlled arms reduction we appear to be driven into the destabilizing position where we may be willing to release our rockets before America or our Allies have actually suffered nuclear damage at the hands of the Soviets.

I am not suggesting that our land-based missiles should be abandoned. I am suggesting that constructive improvements should be sought and that these improvements should not be constrained by arbitrary restrictions presumably originating in the Kremlin.

Our reliance on retaliation by our airplanes is hardly more secure. Practically all our airfields are a short distance from the ocean and can be destroyed within a few minutes by rockets launched from Russian submarines. To establish an inland air field will cost 50 million dollars and it is difficult to understand why a considerable number of such air fields have not yet been established.

Airplanes are also vulnerable shortly after takeoff by rockets fired by saboteurs. This is all the more easy since the course of an airplane immediately after takeoff is relatively easily predicted.

Deployment of cruise missiles on airplanes is a real help. It is therefore no surprise that in the SALT II negotiations the Soviets objected to the cruise missiles in a most vigorous manner.

There is a serious danger that for a considerable period to come our planes will be vulnerable to Russian air defense before they can release the cruise missiles. Taking

all this into account I am happy to express my strongest support to Secretary Brown's advocacy of the cruise missile. I wish he had been even more successful in the rapid deployment of this instrument.

This is indeed one of the examples where American know-how is making an improvement in a difficult situation.

And the situation is indeed difficult. Soviet air defenses are by far the best in the world, while we have practically nothing with which to stop Soviet bombers if they choose to attack us.

Considering the danger to our air fields, the danger to our planes at takeoff, the danger to our planes in midcourse as they are being observed by long-range Soviet radar and subsequently attacked, and finally considering Soviet air defenses by which they can oppose airplanes and also a considerable number of cruise missiles, we have to conclude that our strategic bomber force is not a reliable leg of the TRIAD.

This leaves a single leg: our missile-carrying submarines. Here we are moving in the direction of putting more and more eggs into fewer and fewer baskets. We hope, but we do not know, that our submarines will not be detected. We have paid careful attention to minimize the noise of the submarines and the Soviets may find acoustic detection difficult indeed. They have openly stated that they are working on non-acoustical unconventional means of detection. This is one field where we have to suspect that their technology is ahead of ours. That suspicion of course cannot be proved even though the Russians have stated that they have solved the submarine detection problem. Our information on this topic is so highly classified that the Navy practically keeps these data secret from itself.

This question has been carefully discussed in a book entitled, "Strategic Deterrents in the 1980's" by Dr. Roger Speed. The book is based on unclassified data. The relevant portion on our submarines, taken from Chapter 3 on the "The Survivability of U.S. Strategic Forces," is attached as Appendix I to this report.

The conclusion is that the uncertainty concerning submarines is the greatest. They may work, but on the other hand, they may be the first which are lost.

CAN SALT II BE VERIFIED?

In his testimony before the Armed Services Committee of the Senate, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown stated: "This (SALT II) would require the Soviets to reduce by approximately 250 these strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Without SALT II, if the present trend continued, as I believe it would, the Soviet Union would instead have about 3,000 such weapons by 1985, instead of 2250."

According to the Secretary, one of the considerable advantages of SALT II is therefore to reduce the prospective number of Soviet weapons in 1985 by 25%.

The remarkable point is that according to the provisions of SALT II the difference of 750 weapons could hardly be noticed. Indeed SALT II permits to produce additional rockets which could be stored in unknown locations, in warehouses or even in holds of ships as long as no launching equipment is associated with them.[1] Of course, these sites would not be hardened but they also would not be known to us. Soft launching equipment can be exceedingly simple and can be rapidly assembled, probably in not more than 24 hours.

This example illustrates how easy it is for the Soviets to evade a provision of the SALT II agreements which our Secretary of Defense counts as one of the big advantages of SALT II.[1]

Article XV, paragraph 2, provides that neither Party will: "interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party."

It also states in paragraph 3 that: "Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty."

While this seems to be a satisfactory statement it becomes dubious due to the Second Common Understanding attached to this provision according to which: "Each Party is free to use various methods of transmitting telemetric information during testing, including its encryption, except that, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, neither Party shall engage in deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as through the use of telemetry encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty."

It would be interesting to know how complete an explanation of the encryption would be needed in order to be assured that Soviet encryption does not carry additional information which is denied to our side.

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[1] See Appendix II.

This point is of importance, for instance, in connection with obtaining most important information concerning accuracy of Soviet missiles. We have consistently claimed that the accuracy of our missiles is considerably higher than that of the Soviets. This claim has been always based on somewhat involved and complicated inferences. SALT II opens an easy possibility for the Soviets to let us know as much of the details of their telemetry as is convenient for them and to deny information which they want to keep concealed.

In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee Secretary Brown rightly places emphasis on the limitation that the Treaty imposes on "fractionation." He points out that within the Treaty only ten-fold MIRVing is permitted and continues: "Were it not for this limit, the Soviet SS–18 missile could be equipped to carry as many as 30 independently targeted warheads in the 1980's. With SALT II, that will not happen. . . . The treaty also provides measures to permit unimpeded verification by national technical means."

The question must be raised whether a thirty-fold MIRVed SS–18 may be tested but only ten of the thirty reentry vehicles may be released. This would be a sufficient test from the point of view of the Soviets. That two-thirds of the payload is not released as reentry vehicles could in principle be detected by our side. Such detection, however, would be hard and the evidence would be dubious particularly in view of permission that Soviet telemetry be encrypted.

In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee Secretary Brown states: "The Treaty limit means that now all but one of those new missiles[2] will have to be restricted to designs whose capabilities can differ from those of their predecessors in only quite limited fashion."

This claim is based on Article IV, paragraph 9: "Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy new types of ICBMs, that is, types of ICBMs not flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, except that each Party may flight-test and deploy one new type of light ICBM," and in particular on the Second Common Understanding, according to which: "the term 'different,' referring to the length, the diameter, the launch-weight and the throw-weight, of the missile, means a difference in excess of five percent from the value established for each of the above parameters as of the twenty-fifth launch or as of the last launch before deployment begins, whichever occurs earlier. The values demonstrated in each of the above parameters during the last twelve of the twenty-five launches or during the last twelve launches before deployment begins, whichever twelve launches occur earlier, shall not vary by more than ten percent from any other of the corresponding values demonstrated during those twelve launches."

It is remarkable that the Soviets have not communicated to us the values from which according to the Second Common Understanding they must not deviate by more than five percent or more than ten percent. These values are based on American inferences. The difficulty of verification is obvious and has been emphasized in the press.[3] In particular it was pointed out that the text of Article IV was drafted in such a manner to give latitude for Soviet tests sufficient to gain a decisive advantage.

SOVIET GOALS

Our Secretary of Defense, to my positive knowledge, has given the question of Soviet goals careful thought for many years. In his testimony to the Senate Armed Service Committee he has stated:

"Although Soviet intentions cannot be confidently assessed, there can be no doubt about the steady increase in the Soviet defense effort. As the Soviet gross national product has grown, so have expenditures on the defense effort; Soviet armed forces have improved substantially with these steadily increasing outlays.

"My judgment is that these developments have been for more than a decade substantially insensitive to changes in the magnitude of U.S. and allied programs.

"It is worth noting, moreover, that the growth in Soviet military spending has correlated quite closely with the overall growth in the U.S.S.R.'s economy, while our own military effort has steadily shrunk as a fraction of our economy. Nowhere in the record do I find historical evidence that if we are restrained, the Soviets will reciprocate—except where specific and verifiable arms control agreements are negotiated.

"The Soviets have made steady and impressive military strides during the last 15 years. We cannot afford either to underestimate or to exaggerate them."

It has been widely noted that as Soviet strength has continued to increase so did Soviet interference in parts of the world which were not previously included in their

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[2] The Secretary refers here to the fifth generation of Russian missiles.

[3] See Appendix III.

zone of influence. This fact has been stressed in the testimony of Secretary Kissinger. Soviet weapons have appeared in Angola, in the guerrilla fights in Rhodesia, and they have established Soviet dominance in the horn of Africa. South Yemen now does the bidding of the Kremlin. The regime in Afghanistan is based on Soviet arms. Soviet influence has aided in bringing about the present continuing disorder in Iran.

The time may not be distant when the Soviet Union can dictate terms to the oil-producing countries in the Middle East. It is not difficult to foresee that Soviet confidence in their own arms may enable them to extend their domination into the Middle East, that is into a region which in turn, through the oil weapon, could have the most deep influence on decisions made in Western Europe, in Japan and in the Third World.

To what extent and how explicitly the Kremlin intends to use its military power as a threat and whether any such threat may be carried to the extreme of action and in particular employment of nuclear weapons, this is and remains impossible to predict.

EFFECT OF SALT II ON NATO

The United States negotiated a treaty with the Soviet Union which includes no limitations on the SS-20 missiles and little limitation on the "Backfire" airplane. These are formidable weapons which put our NATO Allies into mortal danger. Our Allies not wanting to offend both the super powers are under extreme pressure to agree to the SALT II Treaty. This agreement is further based on general fear of nuclear weapons, a motivation which for understandable reasons is shared by many people in the United States.

In spite of this there can be no question that our NATO Allies are deeply disturbed by the turn of events. It is probable that both England and France will increase their nuclear preparedness and thereby decrease their reliance on the United States. Germany and also Japan (which of course is outside the NATO Alliance) are in an even more difficult position. These countries may have to make a choice in the coming years between being Finlandized or developing, probably in complete secrecy, a nuclear strike force of their own.

The upshot of all this is that SALT II, instead of decreasing the arms race, will contribute to nuclear arms proliferation in a most dangerous manner.

THE TESTIMONY FROM THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

Statements of support of SALT II from our Allies cannot be considered as being made in a completely free and voluntary manner. The same may hold for witnesses who are a part of the Executive Branch of our Government.

I have little doubt that discussions within the Executive Branch are conducted on the highest intellectual level and in a free manner. But when the Executive Branch comes to a policy decision members of the Executive Branch must work as a team. For this reason they cannot oppose the policy decisions of the Executive Branch without losing their effectiveness or at least a great part of their effectiveness.

In a problem as complex as SALT II it is not easy to arrive at a clear and conclusive answer. The result is that testimony in favor of SALT II must be carefully reviewed and should not always be taken completely at its face value.

The division of power in our Constitution has the purpose of rendering the other Branches of our Government truly independent of the Executive Branch. If the Senate is overly influenced by testimony from the Executive Branch this would contradict the spirit of our Constitution.

I would like to add a personal remark. The testimony of our Secretary of Defense before the Senate Armed Services Committee, which I have quoted on several occasions, comes from a person of the highest competence and of impeccable honesty. I believe that he is the best qualified Secretary of Defense this Country has ever had in the Modern Age. It is significant that his testimony in favor of SALT II contains a number of serious warnings.

It may be even more significant that General Haig who left the Executive Branch before testifying came among his colleagues closest to a recommendation against ratifying the SALT II Treaty.

CONSEQUENCES OF REJECTING SALT II

It has been repeatedly stated that rejection of SALT II would result in an arms race and in high expenditures. Secretary Brown estimates that total added expenditures needed would be 30 billion dollars. Others have rightly suggested that in case of ratification of SALT II the defense budget in real dollars should be increased by 5 billion dollars annually for a number of years, a total expenditure considerably in

excess of what Secretary Brown has recommended. In the whole discussion whether one argues for SALT II or against it, it seems that we will have to spend more dollars. This whole line of reasoning is faulty and is a symptom of the arms-race mentality which is closely connected to SALT II.

I would like to recommend a radically different approach, the first step of which would be to deliver a negative vote on the ratification of the SALT II Treaty, thereby providing the incentive for a number of events.

The first is a widespread realization that we are in serious trouble. Indeed SALT II is not a measure by which our danger is decreased. Rather it is a measure by which our danger will be hidden. The ultimate consequence of a belated realization of our troubles will be greater and perhaps even inescapable danger to the welfare and perhaps even to the survival of our Country.

The second consequence should be to take some elementary steps to insure the survival of our citizens. I recommend a first inexpensive step toward civil defense which should consist in a careful plan for national counter-evacuation in case we observe that the Soviets evacuate their cities. It is a well known fact published by the Soviets and verified in detail by our intelligence that the Soviets have a very thorough evacuation plan which is obligatory for all citizens affected by it. Our own plan could not and should not be obligatory but should consist in advising our citizens to evacuate in case of an emergency and making it possible for them to find temporary shelter and food and to construct elementary protection against an atomic attack. The Federal Emergency Management Agency could provide an adequate framework for this procedure if it would be properly supported and properly staffed. That this Agency performs important duties in peace time is an added advantage. Unfortunately the President has separated its civil defense activities from its remaining duties and has reduced its civil defense budget recently from the low figure of 106 million dollars to the even lower figure of 100 million dollars.

The third action that should follow the refusal to ratify SALT II is to introduce negotiations not with the Russians but with our friends and allies. We should make sure that our NATO Allies as well as Japan should be fully satisfied that the joint defenses of the Free World are being planned in an optimal fashion for the purpose of preserving the peace in the interest of all of us. The best and probably the only way to prevent dangerous nuclear proliferation is to make sure that none of the powerful countries perceives nuclear defense in its own hands as a necessary measure of preserving its own independence. What the outcome of such negotiations should be can of course not be predicted. We must postulate however one part of the outcome: All parties must be satisfied, that their interests are protected, and all parties must understand that they must make a proper contribution to the common defense of all of us.

The fourth step is the mobilization of American science and industry to insure the common defense. The danger to freedom from Soviet Imperialism is less visible than the danger signals that preceded World War II. This is due to the fact that the Soviet leaders are incomparably more cautious than Hitler had been. The greater caution on the part of our opponents provide us with some time but it also has the consequence that unless we take timely counter-measures it will become too late to defend ourselves. If this fact is fully understood by the American community I have no doubt that in the course of a few years we can establish a stable equilibrium in the world.

What technical measures should be taken, no single person is qualified to state. As one man's opinion I may state that we should exploit our undoubted lead in electronics. This leadership position enables us to construct unmanned, remotely piloted vehicles in the air, on the ground, and also on the oceans. Such a development could reverse the trend that has dominated our defense development for many years: to construct ever more costly weapons which are fewer in number and therefore basically more vulnerable. It is a characteristic fact that a first step in that direction, the cruise missile, strongly advocated by our Secretary of Defense, has also strongly, and in part successfully, been opposed by the Soviets in the SALT II negotiations.

What I have said so far could be carried out with relatively little expenditures. They are the preliminary steps needed to change the arms race into a technological race in which we could prevail and thereby serve the interest of peace. I had argued that our deterrent which we call the TRIAD stands on one dubious leg rather than being based on three firm foundations. The one presently proposed improvement called MX has been adjusted to Soviet demands in the SALT II negotiations and has thereby become expensive, late in execution and probably ineffective when executed.

Into what kind of deterrent the TRIAD should be changed is something that must be determined by careful and diligent cooperation between our scientists, our technologists, and our military leaders.

A compromise that has been proposed concerning SALT II starts with more expenditures and proceeds to spend more money without introducing basic improvements. This is the reverse of the proper order. We should start by careful study, proceed to detailed technological plans and then spend the money that is necessary. The technological effort which we should pursue and by which we can win may in the end be less expensive than the present defense effort which is dominated by the weight of obsolescent equipment.

CONCLUSION

If the Senate ratifies the SALT II Treaty it will have contributed to a most dangerous cover-up. It will have helped to lull the American public into a sense of security which is not based on reality and which in itself is our greatest danger.

If, on the other hand, the Senate rejects SALT II the American people will become aware of the need to reconsider our defense posture. I have the firm confidence that once the American people realize that they are facing a real danger they will act with determination, with moderation, and with success.

SUMMARY

The majority of Americans dislike the arms race. So do I. SALT II is offered as a palliative. In fact, if ratified, it will intensify the arms race and make it more disastrous. If the Senate refuses to ratify SALT II more reasonable alternatives will emerge.

An arms race is a quantitative competition. SALT II claims to limit it. But the limitations are unfair and they are not verifiable.

The Soviets have won the arms race. They possess a 5 to 1 advantage in throw weight of their missiles. Our planes are 30 years old, our missiles 15 years old. Soviet equipment is new and is in the process of rapid improvement. SALT II would freeze us in a state of perpetual inferiority.

We are told that our retaliatory force, the TRIAD, rests on three solid foundations. Actually the Administration admits that one leg of the TRIAD, our land-based missiles, is losing its survivability. Unfortunately the remedy, called M-X, cannot be deployed before SALT II has expired.

The second leg, our bomber force, can be destroyed on the ground by Soviet submarine-launched missiles, by saboteurs shortly after takeoff, by the Soviet air force in midcourse before cruise missiles can be launched or by the powerful air defense of the Soviet Union. We cannot rely on our B-52s as the Soviets can on their Badgers, Bears, Blinders or Backfires, which can penetrate practically unopposed by any American air defense.

The only remaining leg of the TRIAD is our missile-carrying submarine force. The Soviets have pursued unconventional detection methods in which they appear to be qualitatively superior to American research. This retaliatory force is the most uncertain one. It may survive but it may well be the first to be wiped out.

The result of SALT II will not be safety for the United States but the illusion of safety.

This Treaty apart from other shortcomings is not verifiable. Because we have concentrated on missile launchers rather than the missiles themselves, the Soviets can covertly or legally store hundreds or even thousands of additional missiles in warehouses or holds of ships. These missiles could well be launched within 24 hours.

The Treaty will not impede the Soviets from testing of essentially new missiles which they will claim as insignificant modifications of old ones.

The Treaty permits encrypted telemetering of tests which means that secret messages are exchanged but we are supposed to believe that we shall be given a key to all the secrets contained in the messages.

The Treaty does not limit Soviet SS-20 missiles and relies on the Russian assurances concerning the Backfire bombers. These weapons can be used easily after minor changes have been made in an attack on our Country. They are an obvious and deadly danger to our Allies. Together with the noncircumvention provisions (Articles XII and XIII) the Treaty will serve to undermine the NATO Alliance.

If SALT II is ratified, even with the provision that our defense spending shall be greatly increased, we shall further contribute to the arms race mentality.

If the Treaty is not ratified, this will serve as a clear message to the American people and warn them of the real danger that has developed in the last decade. The road will be open for us to engage in a technological competition. This competition,

which is quite different from an arms race, we can win and we can, thereby, insure stability and peace.

To do so two measures are necessary.

One is to replace negotiations with the Soviet Union by careful and complete discussions with our friends and Allies. The free democracies are collectively stronger than the Soviet Union, provided that full cooperation is established between these free countries. In the absence of such full cooperation our friends may have to choose between surrender to the Soviet Union or development, in some cases secret development, of their own nuclear deterrents.

The second obvious step is to mobilize American and Allied science and industry for the technological race. What the result of such activity will be depends on the collective inventiveness and wisdom of the best experts. A technological race is, of course, unpredictable and cannot be limited by treaty restrictions.

My own guess is that American superior know-how in electronics could be put to excellent use in defense. We should construct unmanned, remotely-piloted vehicles in the air, on the ground, and on the oceans. Thereby we could reverse the present trend toward bigger and more costly weapons which are becoming fewer in number and ever more vulnerable. A first step in this direction, the cruise missile, has been vigorously opposed by the Soviets in the SALT II negotiations. They succeeded in imposing serious limitations on these missiles.

The consequences of the current trends can be illustrated by a final juxtaposition. One of our eminent officials stated that our missiles may have to be fired on warning. This terrible and destabilizing plan is a direct result of the SALT process.

Would it not be better to match Soviet civil defense plans by an inexpensive procedure of voluntary evacuation in case that we observe that the Soviets evacuate their cities? Peaceful protection of our citizens is a better deterrent than missiles that would be fired by a hair trigger procedure.

If the Soviets know that we are making realistic plans to survive, if they notice that together with our Allies we have developed novel weapons, they will never dare to attack us.

Appendix I

(Reprinted from "Strategic Deterrents in the 1980's" by Dr. Roger Speed)

Chapter 3—The Survivability of U.S. Strategic Forces

TRAIL

The primary mode of protecting the SSBNs is to "hide" them in the vast expanse of the ocean. The SSBNs do, however, return to port after two months at sea. The protection of the ocean can thus be negated if the Soviets undertake a trail of SSBNs as they leave port.

Because Soviet attack submarines are faster than U.S. SSBNs, they are an ideal vehicle for tracking. Although it is difficult for the Soviets to maintain a covert trail using passive sonar (because U.S. submarines are quieter than those of the Soviets), a covert trail using nonacoustic techniques (to be discussed below) could be feasible.[47] However, even if the tracking submarine were discovered, the SSBN could find it difficult to break trail if the Soviet submarine used its active sonar system, particularly if the Soviets supported their attack submarines with surface ships.

The argument raised against the possibility of the Soviets undertaking such overt trails has been more political than technical. It has been suggested that such threatening actions would cause the breakdown of détente. Although, the Soviets may not be willing at present to damage the chances for détente, a change in world conditions could create a state of tension lasting for several months, and détente may then cease to be a prime consideration in Soviet strategic planning.

AREA SEARCHES

If a U.S. SSBN is not trailed as it leaves port, the Soviets face the much more difficult task of finding it in the open ocean. Because the range of the Polaris and the Poseidon missiles is about 2,500 nm and because at any one time, about 55 percent of the SSBNs are at sea, the Soviets must contend with sixteen or seventeen boats in an Atlantic patrol area of around one million square nautical miles.

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[47] It should be noted that the Soviets maintain a fleet of 128 diesel-powered attack submarines in addition to their 39 nuclear-powered attack submarines (see "The Military Balance 1977/78," op. cit., p. 69). Diesel submarines running on batteries are even quieter than U.S. nuclear submarines. Thus, a threat of a *covert* trail may exist, particularly for those SSBNs operating out of European ports.

Several acoustic and nonacoustic techniques that could possibly be used by the Soviets for this task are described below.

Towed arrays.—The development of a line array of hydrophones that can be towed through the water represents a potential breakthrough in acoustic ASW technology. According to Larry L. Booda, an editor of *Sea Technology:* "The success of towed hydrophone arrays has been outstanding. They have been designed for towing by surface ships, submarines and helicopters. (They are used as protective detection devices by the ballistic missile submarines.) These arrays offer high gain reception combined with a very narrow beam. Thus two of them deployed one hundred miles or more apart can locate a submarine with sufficient accuracy for the pinpointing detectors of the operating forces to take over to complete the mission." [48]

In the hands of the Soviets, this new technology could pose a serious threat to the SSBNs. If the detection range is, in fact, at least 50 nm, the SSBN patrol area can be searched in two days or less.[49] The data from the arrays could be processed on board the towing ships or relayed via satellite back to the Soviet Union for processing at a larger computer center. Once a submarine is detected, other forces (aircraft and surface ships) can be assigned to verify the detection and to maintain trail.

Another approach to area surveillance is to augment these towed arrays with small, portable, active acoustic sources, either small, disposable explosive charges or more conventional, very high-powered but portable acoustic generators.[50] A few acoustic sources could be operated by a small number of towed-array ships distributed about the SSBN patrol area. By listening for a signal bouncing off a submarine, it could be possible to obtain a cross-fix and to localize a submarine in a half hour or less. Soviet ICBMs could then be targeted to the suspected targets, or aircraft and ships could be used to verify each detection.[51]

Sonobuoy surveillance.—At present, when a submarine is detected, aircraft-dropped sonobuoys are generally used to localize it. The data obtained from these buoys are relayed by radio to the aircraft for analysis. Because the buoys deploy hydrophones with directional capabilities, two or more buoys can give a cross-bearing to localize the target.

Most buoys float on the surface and generally have a short detection range, but this range can be extended considerably by mooring the hydrophones to the ocean bottom. The United States has a program of this type called the Moored Surveillance System.[52] It is an aerially dropped sonobuoy system that is self-mooring and is intended to create a surveillance barrier. The data from these sonobuoys can either be transmitted to aircraft for retransmission to ships and to shore-based processing centers or be sent to shore by satellite relay.

If the Soviets were to deploy a similar system, they could cover a million square nautical miles by using from around 1,000 to 1,500 sonobuoys if the detection radius at the surface were 15 to 20 nm. The sonobuoys could be clandestinely deployed by

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[48] Booda, op. cit., pp. 13, 40. For a description of the current U.S. program, see Harold Brown, op. cit., pp. 181–182.

[49] With a detection range of 50 nm (on either side of the boat), twenty vessels towing these arrays at a speed of ten knots (nm/hr) could search an area of one million square nautical miles in about two days.

[50] The Soviets could use larger sources. By 1970, high-energy transducers that could generate acoustic power in the millions of watts were available. (Even a noisy submarine radiates less than one watt of acoustic power.) Dr. Victor Anderson of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography predicted that this technology, when combined with the advances in signal processing that enable the returning signal from a submarine to be distinguished from background noise, could in effect make the oceans transparent, and submarines would no longer be safe from detection. The Soviets could deploy such transducers from large, stable, surface platforms in the open ocean. However, the effectiveness of this approach is unclear. Because these large platforms could be easily detected, the United States could employ countermeasures. The outcome is uncertain because attempts to jam the receiver with noise might be overcome by adaptive processing techniques (which, in effect, filter out the noise from the jammer). (See V. C. Anderson, "Ocean Technology," in Impact of New Technologies on the Arms Race, ed. Feld et al. [Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1971], pp. 201–216.)

[51] The effectiveness of this approach depends to a great extent on the false-alarm rate. If only the seventeen SSBNs are detected, it may take 150 1-MT warheads to barrage the area in which the submarines are thought to be located. (This assumes that the SSBNs patrol at five knots, that their initial positions are known within a radius of 15 nm, and the warheads arrive one hour after detection.) If there are 100 total targets (only seventeen actually being submarines), the Soviets will have to use about 800 warheads to cover the area of uncertainty. They could, in theory, do this with 100 SS-18 ICBMs and still have around 1,300 ICBMs left. However, warheads exploded at or near the ocean surface are not as effective against undersea targets as those burst at some depth under the ocean surface. Thus, this approach might require the development of a warhead that could withstand the impact of hitting the ocean surface or the use of more warheads if a surface burst were used.

[52] Booda, op. cit., p. 40.

surface ships and set to start broadcasting at a particular time, sending their data via satellite to the Soviet Union for processing. All designated targets could be attacked using ICBMs within a half hour of the start of broadcasting. Or, on a longer time scale, aircraft and surface ships could be used to investigate suspected targets, bring them under trail, and, if required, deliver weapons against them.

NONACOUSTIC THREATS

Although the United States has devoted most of its ASW effort to acoustic techniques of detection, nonacoustic techniques also exist. Admiral Donald P. Harvey, director of Naval Intelligence, stated in 1978 that "methods of detection could include, but not be limited to, radars, optical systems, and lasers." [53] The United States now has a limited capacity to detect submarines using nonacoustic techniques. A more extensive, operational capability is expected in the 1980s.[54]

Some of the phenomena that the Soviets might exploit to detect submarines are described below.[55]

Surface effects.—When a body moves through a stratified medium like the ocean, internal waves are generated that make their way to the surface, and the interaction of these internal waves with the surface changes the reflective properties of the surface. This change reportedly can be detected by radars operating in the millimeter wavelength region [56] and possibly by other systems such as lasers.

Other hydrodynamic phenomena associated with the passing of a submarine can cause a difference in surface temperature. For example: "The sea water used to cool machinery discharged from a submerged submarine is warmer than the surrounding water and, therefore, represents a heat anomaly in that region of the ocean." [57] According to the Soviets, such temperature differences can be detected by earth satellites.[58]

Another potential threat results from the small rise in the surface level of the water above a passing submarine.[59] Both optical and radar techniques could possibly be used to detect this change.

Finally, there is another phenomenon that reportedly not only affects the ocean surface but also the atmosphere above it and thus may be easier to detect. According to *Air Force Magazine.*

"There's mounting concern that the Soviets may have made significant progress in submarine detection through the energy emissions that surface from the wake of even deeply submerged boats. These irregular emissions, called convective cells, show up as hot sports in the atmosphere and cause moisture. They are detectable by special radar and infrared detection systems on ships or in space."[60]

Contaminant wakes.—Besides a hydrodynamic wake, a submarine can leave behind other indications of its recent presence. Because some neutrons escape from the nuclear reactor used to power a submarine, it leaves behind a trail of neutrons and radionuclides. It has also been suggested that a submarine leaves a biological track formed by microorganisms killed by its passage.[61] Finally, submarines use electrolysis of water to obtain oxygen for their crews. If precautions are not taken, the residual hydrogen can leave a trail in the water and at the surface that can be detected by such means as lasers.[62]

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[53] Testimony of Adm. Donald P. Harvey, in U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve, and Civilan Personnel Strengths: Hearings on S. 210, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977, part 10, p. 6655.

[54] Testimony of Adm. James Holloway, chief of Naval Operations, in ibid., part 2, p. 1043.

[55] Until about 1965, the Soviets wrote quite openly about most of these nonacoustic techniques. For a review of the Soviet literature, see K. J. Moore, "Antisubmarine Warfare," in "Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions," ed. M. McGwine and J. McDonnell (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 185–200.

[56] Ibid., p. 192.

[57] Testimony of Rear Adm. J. Metzel, in U.S., Congress, Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization, op. cit., part 10, p. 6655.

[58] Moore, op. cit., p. 191. Infrared detectors deployed on aircraft can reportedly detect temperature variations on the sea surface of 0.2°C. (See "Strategy Survey, 1970"; London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970), p. 14.

[59] Moore, op. cit., p. 192.

[60] "Focus On . . . ," Air Force Magazine, May 1978, p. 20. See also Henry S. Bradsher, "Vulnerability Growing for U.S. Sub-based Missiles?" Washington Star, Dec. 12, 1977, Focus section, p. 1.

[61] Moore, op. cit., p. 191; and Bradsher, op. cit.

[62] Hydrogen in concentrations of one part per million can be detected at 300–400 yards by laser resonance Raman spectrography. Whether the concentration of a hydrogen wake left by a submarine is greater or lesser than this is unknown.

EM Signals.—Electrochemical processes generate varying electrical potentials at different points on a submarine.[63] Because seawater is a conductor of electricity, an electric current (which is modulated at the frequency the propeller shaft is turning) travels between the points of different electrical potential. The resulting low-frequency electromagnetic (EM) field can be detected by a number of devices, such as those using very large magnetic loops or those using superconducting devices based on the Josephson effect.[64]

Direct detection.—Water is opaque to visible light except for a very narrow frequency band. However, lasers operating in the blue-green region of the spectrum can penetrate to some depth underwater and detect submarines. This is of particular concern because U.S. submarines must remain fairly close to the surface for communication purposes.

Conclusion.—A serious threat to the SSBNs would exist if nonacoustic techniques could be used by aircraft to make detections. Aircraft with a detection range of around 10 nm could complete a search of the SSBN patrol area in a few hours.[65] Satellites would, of course, be even more effective. The detection of subsurface wakes by surface ships or submarines could also present a threat even though their sweep of the patrol area would be slower. If these subsurface wakes persisted for a long enough time, a covert trail might be established as an SSBN left port since the trailer could remain outside the acoustic range of the SSBN.

OTHER THREATS

In addition to acoustic and nonacoustic threats, there are a number of other methods of detecting submarines that do not fit either of these two categories, although they obviously use one or the other (or both) of these techniques.

Trailing communications wire or buoy.—The requirement that the U.S. SSBN fleet remain in constant communication with the U.S. military command poses a serious hazard to the survival of the fleet. Because most radio waves cannot significantly penetrate the ocean, each submarine is required to maintain an antenna at or near the surface. This antenna (which is connected by a buoyant cable to the submarine takes the form of a long communications wire [66] or a communications buoy. [67]

The Navy has testified before Congress that this arrangement offers many opportunities for detection.[68] Both the wake of the antenna and the antenna itself can be detected by radar, infrared, laser, or visual (photographic and television) techniques.[69]

Other means of communication are possible. Extremely low frequency (ELF) radio can penetrate the ocean to great depths. An ELF communications system (originally called Sanguine but now known as Seafarer) has been proposed for some time by the Navy but has been delayed, primarily because of opposition from environmentalists. Until this or other methods of communicating with the SSBNs are deployed, the trailing antennas will remain a significant threat to the safety of the submarines.

Tags.—U.S. SSBNs operate from only a few ports and are constantly observed by Russian trawlers as they leave. It is possible that as a submarine leaves port, some device (a "tag") could be attached to its hull by a frogman or a trained animal (sea

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[63] Moore, op. cit., p. 190. See also Giordio tacconi, "Fundamentals of ELF Communication and Detection," in "Applications of Remote Sensing to Ocean Surveillance." AGARD Lecture Series No. 88 (Neuilly Sur Seine, France: NATO Advisory Group for Aerospace Research & Development, 1977) pp. 9–17, 9–18.

[64] See Frank Chilton, Lowell Wood, and Rod Buntzen, "Electric and Magnetic Sensing Sensors: Applications," UCID—17597 (Livermore, Calif.: Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, 1977). Also contained in "Applications of Remote Sensing to Ocean Surveillance," op. cit. p. 10–1.

[65] With a detection range of 10 nm (and a "sweep width" of 14 nm), 30 aircraft flying at 300 knots could search an area of one million square nautical miles in about eight hours. Of course, even smaller detection ranges could be quite useful.

[66] As described by Fessenden and Cheng: "Since the early nineteen sixties, U.S. submarines have utilized trailing-wire antennas in order to remain submerged while maintaining RF reception with an antenna at or near the ocean surface. The trailing wire is simply an RF transmission line and/or single conductor encased in a buoyant, polyethylene foam jacket and is usually referred to as a buoyant cable. It is normally about 2000 ft (610 m) in length and may be divided, functionally, into three parts: transmission line section, antenna section, and drogue section (if any)." A typical configuration would have a 105 ft section at the end of the cable to receive very-low-frequency (VLF) up to high-frequency (HF) messages. (Charles T. Fessenden and David H. S. Cheng, "Development of a Trailing-Wire E-Field Submarine Antenna for Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) Reception," IEEE Transactions on Communications 22 [April, 1974]: 428.)

[67] See U.S., Congress, Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization, op. cit., part 10, pp. 6690–6695.

[68] Ibid.

[69] For a photograph of the trailing wire floating on the surface, see ibid., p. 6694.

lion or dolphin). This tag could take many forms and could be designed either to release a device that will rise to the surface at a set time to reveal the submarine's position or to release a series of devices that will reveal the submarine's position over a long period of time. To reveal the position of the submarine at a preset time, a miniature radio broadcaster could be used. To maintain a trail over a longer period of time, a series of devices that remain silent until interrogated by some Soviet surveillance system could be used. A number of such devices are conceivable. For example, recent advances in large-scale integrated circuits make possible the construction of tiny transponders designed to respond only when interrogated by a specially coded pulse from a microwave radar. Thousands of these devices could be placed in a relatively small package and periodically released to form an easily followed trail on the ocean surface.

Sabotage.—The U.S. SSBN is a formidable nuclear force, but it is also a very concentrated one. Normally, about half the force (around twenty boats) is at sea while the rest are in port and vulnerable to attack. A boat remains at sea for about two months and then returns to port for another month before returning to sea again. If the Soviets ever believed that war was inevitable, they could decide that the sabotage of a submarine while in port would be far easier than attacking it at sea.

There are any number of chemical and biological agents that could incapacitate or kill a submarine crew. They could be brought on board in the ship's supplies (or through other means) and released at a preset time. In this way, the whole at-sea fleet could be attacked at once.[70]

Boost phase intercept.—Soviet antiballistic missile (ABM) systems placed in the vicinity of a U.S. launch area could be more effective than those systems that have to wait until a U.S. RV enters the atmosphere over the Soviet Union. If Soviet ships (and possibly aircraft) with radars and ABM missiles were placed in the U.S. SSBN patrol area, a serious threat would exist to any SLBM that was fired (and also to the submarine because a missile could be backtracked by radar to its point of origin, thus revealing the submarine's position).

Such an ABM system would be designed to attack the booster or the postboost vehicle (the "bus") before the RVs were released. These boosters are easy to track because they make very large targets for ABM radars. Once the booster is above the atmosphere, the computers used for guidance and control aboard the booster and the bus can be incapacitated by a nuclear explosion at a very large distance (perhaps 50 to 100 nm depending on the computer hardness and the yield of the ABM warhead). A successful attack on the computers insures that, at a minimum, the RVs will miss their targets.

Forward-based ABMs are now outlawed by treaty. However, the Soviets have continued a massive ABM research and development program. If the treaty is ever abrogated, they may be able to deploy a forward-based system of this type much more rapidly than they can a land-based system.

CONCLUSION

The military doctrine of the Soviet Union takes the possibility of war, even nuclear war, seriously, and the Soviets have made a concentrated effort to develop countermeasures to America's strategic forces. By the early 1980s, the Soviets could (if appropriate counteractions are not taken) seriously threaten the ICBM and bomber legs of the triad. It is unlikely that they will fail to try to counter the SSBNs also.

This section has discussed a large number of individual threats, but it should be noted that the Soviets practice "defense in depth." If one technique or system guarantees only partial success, then the Soviets add another to improve their chances. For example, the Soviet air defense system consists of many layers, and the Soviets continue to upgrade, improve, and expand their forces. A similar approach can be expected in ASW, although any one of the techniques mentioned above could be enough to compromise almost the entire SSBN fleet.

Understanding the extent of the Soviet ASW threat is one of the more crucial tasks of the intelligence community, but it is an area in which great uncertainties exist. As Admiral Harvey, director of Naval Intelligence, noted in 1978, the Soviets'

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[70] This approach has the possible drawback that it would take about two months before all the boats had been cycled through port and returned to sea with the sabotage devices aboard. This conflicts considerably with the general notion that a nuclear war would occur by accident or in the heart of a worldwide crisis. Of course, the crisis could come and appear to subside in the eyes of the West. The Soviet perception might be quite different. In the height of the crisis, the Kremlin might decide that war is inevitable and proceed with war preparations while giving all appearances of cooling the crisis and pushing for a return to the precrisis political atmosphere.

"extensive [ASW] R&D effort . . . is the area in which we could be expected to know the least, because it does not have the manifestations in the open seas that their weapons and platforms do." [71] Because these ASW systems often have no easily identifiable characteristics, the Soviets can successfully disguise or hide critical aspects of their program.

It is known, however, that the Soviets have for some time had an extensive ASW program, and there appears to be growing concern recently over the possibility of a breakthrough, particularly in the nonacoustic area.[72] In this field, the Soviets are known to have research programs on lasers, processed optical scanners, advanced radar, and infrared detection systems.[73] It is the evaluation of the U.S. Navy that a "significant advancement in any of these techniques would pose a potential threat to the security of our SSBNs." [74]

Considering the wide range of possible threats (acoustic, nonacoustic, and unconventional) and the intensive Soviet ASW effort, the continued survivability of the SSBNs should not be taken for granted. In fact, unless appropriated countermeasures are taken, the viability of this force in the near future could be in serious doubt.

Early Warning and Strategic C³

The United States maintains tactical warning systems to detect an incoming attack and a command, control, and communications (C³) network to assure that war orders are implemented. Quick and reliable tactical warning of an attack on U.S. bomber bases is particularly critical because, as noted earlier, a delay of a few minutes could result in almost complete destruction of the strategic bomber force. The maintenance of a communications network between the strategic forces and the National Command Authority (NCA) (the president or his designated successor) is also critical because all strategic forces are under positive control: U.S. missiles cannot be launched nor can U.S. bombers proceed to target without positive authorization from the NCA. The following sections briefly describe these systems and discuss some of their major weaknesses and vulnerabilities.

STRATEGIC WARNING

Strategic warning is usually on a time scale of hours, days, or weeks before actual hostilities begin. It might result from an evaluation that a severe international political crisis existed or from positive intelligence that an attack was being planned. Strategic warning is important because it would allow the readiness status (alert rate) of the strategic forces and the C³ network to be raised. At the highest level of alert, the president could be airborne and prepared to direct the retaliatory strike if an attack materialized.

The technical means of obtaining strategic warning (as opposed to normal diplomatic assessment of the political situation) primarily consists of photographic and electronic satellites and numerous electronic surveillance ground stations located around the periphery of the Soviet Union. In addition, some observers believe the disposition of Soviet missile-carrying nuclear submarines (SSBNs) could offer a means of strategic warning. At present, the Soviets operate only a few SSBNs off U.S. coasts, and none are located very close. Under present bomber basing patterns, alert rates, and reaction times, this small force could post a threat to much of the bomber force in a surprise attack (at the minimum it could destroy the 70 percent of the force not on alert). However, most defense planners assume that the Soviets will move fifteen or twenty boats closer to U.S. coasts if they are planning an attack.

To follow the movements of Soviet submarines, the United States uses SOSUS, a system of underwater hydrophones.[75] These hydrophone line arrays are generally located along the edge of the continental shelf and feed their data through underwater cables to shore-based stations along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. Ship-towed hydrophone arrays are being developed to supplement the SOSUS system. Their data will probably be relayed via satellite to a shore-based processing center.

It is likely, but not certain, that the United States would detect a change in Soviet SSBN deployments. Detection depends on the noise level of the submarines, and it is possible that this noise level will be lowered in the future. In addition,

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[71] Testimony of Adm. Donald P. Harvey, in U.S. Congress, Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization, op. cit., part 10, p. 6620.

[72] Bradsher, op. cit.

[73] Testimony of Vice Adm. Robert Kaufman, director, Command, Control and Communications, in U.S. Congress, Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization, op. cit., part 10, p. 6756.

[74] Ibid.

[75] For a description of SOSUS and other U.S. ASW systems, see the November issues of "Sea Technology" for 1974, 1975, and 1976.

there may be gaps in the coverage; apparently, the Gulf of Mexico is not covered, for example. Also, because the SOSUS hydrophones are located in the so-called "deep sound channel" (in order to obtain the low-frequency signals that travel great distances at this depth), a submarine operating close to shore in shallow water could go undetected.

A more important point is that if the Soviets were planning an attack, it seems unlikely that they would suddenly move twenty SSBNs close to the U.S. coasts. If the Soviets were to build up their force over a period of several months, it is doubtful that true strategic warning (in the sense of a conviction that the Soviets were planning a war) would be obtained or acted upon.

In general, strategic warning can be very beneficial, but, as noted in chapter 2, it may fail to materialize at the critical moment. This may not be due to lack of data, but rather to a failure to perceive the significance of the data or to believe data that conflict with preconceived notions of the other party's behavior. In view of the long-held American belief that a deliberate nuclear war is almost inconceivable, the past history of the success of surprise attacks is even more relevant.

Appendix II

SALT II, Article VI, paragraph 1 states:

"The limitations provided for in this Treaty shall apply to those arms which are:

(a) operational;
(b) in the final stage of construction;
(c) in reserve, in storage, or mothballed;
(d) undergoing overhaul, repair, modernization, or conversion."

The statement would seem to exclude keeping considerable numbers of added missiles in storage. Actually the number of surface-to-surface missiles is nowhere explicitly regulated in the SALT II Treaty.

The limitations apply, according to Article III, only to ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and air-to-surface ballistic missiles. Therefore production and widespread distribution of excess numbers of surface-to-surface ballistic missiles would not only be difficult to find but if found would not be in clear violation of the Treaty. Deployment of launchers, however primitive, would be in violation, but primitive launchers particularly in a not completely assembled form, could hardly be identified.

Appendix III

[From Inside Report (Field Newspaper Syndicate), Aug. 10, 1979]

(By Rowland Evans and Robert Novak)

SALT, Soviet-Style

Washington.—Preparation of three "distinctly new" test silos for "modernized" Soviet long-range missiles are now receiving final preparations at Soviet test ranges, a piece of intelligence that could doom continuation of SALT as a game that runs so heavily in the Kremlin's favor.

No longer in question is the clarity of intelligence demonstrating Moscow's intent to trigger a huge new test program the instant the new Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) is ratified. It seems likely to harden American public opinion against what has come to be called the SALT "process."

"This may well prove to be the end of the SALT process," says a Nixon-Ford administration official, who was one of the original authors of SALT II and supports the final version. "When our people read about what Moscow is legally doing under this new treaty, they may say to hell with SALT."

Students of SALT, mostly critics but also including important supporters, long have been concerned that the "process" of SALT, replacing substance, has become the political objective. The impending Soviet test program could stop this dangerous inversion by concentrating public attention on substance.

During the period of intense Soviet testing following SALT I, the U.S. still had strategic superiority. In contrast, the U.S. today is on the verge of losing, if it has not already lost, strategic parity. That points to outrage as the public watches four free years of testing for Moscow, while the U.S. fails to test a single new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

Preparations of the new test silos to let Moscow exploit Article 4 of SALT II are virtually complete. High Pentagon officials are privately warning Senators and other politicians not to be surprised when "modernized" (improved) versions of the main Soviet ICBM force are tested immediately following the final ratification of the new treaty.

One defense official made this clear last week to a meeting attended by Senate staff experts: U.S. negotiators of SALT II "know that the Russians deliberately negotiated Article 4 so that they could go ahead and test and deploy all their new missiles without violating the treaty."

This Soviet upgrading or modernization of the existing force is a loophole totally separate from the provision in the treaty (Article 2) that gives each side the right to build one new missile. President Carter has announced a decision (still resisted by arms control enthusiasts) for the U.S. to build the MX mobile missile as its new missile.

The U.S. has no plans for upgrading or modernizing its present landbased missile force. There is today no intention to fire a single test of any long-range missile until the MX itself is fired (now scheduled for 1983).

That means silence from the Americans amid heavy Russian missile-rattling. The Soviet Union, without cheating, is in the same position to modernize its land-based long-range missiles as it was after ratification of SALT I on Sept. 14, 1972. Immediately thereafter, the Soviets began initial tests of the huge SS–18 and the large SS–19, whose size did violent injustice to the spirit of SALT I. Now, both the SS–18 and the SS–19 will be modernized under SALT II, along with three lesser missiles.

Skeptics within the U.S. SALT delegation sounded repeated warnings during the negotiations that Article 4 must not leave the "modernizing" door wide open. One result was to limit the modernized missiles to a 5 percent variation from the older missiles (which the Soviets can easily violate).

Moscow's negotiators never have been willing to give the U.S. accurate measurements of its existing missiles from which to measure the permitted 5 percent variations. Indeed, the "modernizing door" was left open, as the intelligence reports of the new silos at Soviet test sites prove.

That sets the stage for public outcry as soon as the new Soviet tests are launched. It could mark the end of the innocence that up to now has made the SALT process a self-contained objective even more important than the SALT substance.

Senator ZORINSKY. Mr. Phillip Karber, vice president of the national security programs at BDM Corp. in McLean is our next witness.

Mr. Karber, you have a prepared testimony. If you would like to give us a condensed version, you may.

Mr. KARBER. I have a prepared testimony.

Senator ZORINSKY. Fine. It will be included in the proceedings at the appropriate point and you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF PHILLIP A. KARBER, VICE PRESIDENT, BDM CORP.[1]

Mr. KARBER. I thought I would quickly summarize and perhaps raise some of the issues that I went into in more depth in the prepared text and offer you the opportunity to ask some questions. Before starting, I would like to emphasize that I am testifying as an individual, and that my remarks reflect neither the views of my corporation nor any agency with which I have been associated.

I was asked to address the relationship between SALT II and the European balance. I don't claim great personal expertise in terms of strategic arms, but I have spent the last 12 years looking at the balance in Europe relatively closely.

The first thing I would like to point out is I think there is a tendency which has grown ever since 1969 to separate the strategic balance from the theater balance. I think it is in some ways logical to do that. The systems are so complex and the quantities of the weapons so much greater, and it is very difficult to have meaningful negotiations in a multilateral context.

It makes sense for two countries to negotiate together, but the result of that has been that we have artificially—to a great extent,

[1] See page 264 for Mr. Karber's prepared statement.

to a phony extent—separated the strategic balance from the NATO theater balance.

I say it is phony or artificial for several reasons. First of all, if you look at the history of the strategic arms race going back to the forties, we find that we were members of NATO, we deployed the Seventh Army to Europe before we really had a strategic retaliatory capability.

We seemed to think that the strategic balance is sort of historical, that it started by itself and has progressed by itself. But in fact the strategic arms race grew out of our concern to protect our NATO allies from what was then perceived as a very strong European imbalance balance of forces in the late forties and early fifties.

We felt we had to depend upon nuclear weapons, and have increasingly put a heavy dependence on them because neither our European allies nor we felt that we could afford to match the Soviets in conventional weapons. But it is not just in terms of history that this dependence has grown.

The Soviets were unable through a good part of the fifties to target the United States, were unable to match our deployed systems overseas which could reach the Soviet Union, and thus deployed most of their medium bombers and medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles opposite Europe.

In essence, they held our European allies as hostages to our nonuse of the nuclear weapons that were deployed to originally protect our NATO allies. In fact, I think to a great extent that experience which had a psychological impact on our allies is something we Americans didn't really understand.

In 1957, Khrushchev announced to our European allies that unless they did certain things, nuclear rockets would rain down on their capitals. We never experienced that hostage mentality that the Soviets held over our European allies. I think even today that background influences them.

The Soviets have since, of course, built up a strategic retaliatory capability against us. They continue building a very strong nuclear force opposite Europe.

I know of relatively little evidence of Soviet planning that assumes a strategic nuclear exchange out of the blue. I think when people talk about that, it is relatively absurd to say that Brezhnev wakes up in the morning and he says, "oh, gee, there's no soccer game and my masseuse is off, so let's start a strategic war. After all, the indicators look pretty good".

I think all the evidence suggests that the Soviets tend to see a strategic exchange growing out of the theater conflict, and today, the theater that they still see as the most likely to produce a strategic exchange is Central Europe.

There is another reason not to divorce the two, and that is NATO doctrine as it has evolved over the years, particularly as codified in its 1967 flexible response strategy, laid out three principles for the defense of Central Europe, principles which we essentially sold to our European allies, principles which we said "accept them and we will back you up".

The first principle was direct defense. That is, in the event of aggression, we want to have sufficient conventional forces to make

sure that we don't start a strategic nuclear exchange over a few troops across the border. We wanted that direct defense to be able to hold, to buy us time to feel out Soviet motivations, to try and see the size of the attack, see if we couldn't limit it.

If our direct defense forces or conventional defenses could not hold, the second concept was deliberate escalation, to employ, in a restricted way, use relatively few warheads against relatively few targets, to demonstrate that NATO had the willpower to back up its conventional defense with the initiation of nuclear war, without starting the immediate strategic exchange. The Soviets would have some idea they were going too far and it was time to quit.

But there was a third element, general nuclear response, one which has increasingly, I think, been ignored and which is directly related to SALT and our strategic balance. And to this day neither we nor our European allies have ever repealed that element of the current NATO doctrine of flexible response.

Remember, flexible response presumes our first use of nuclear weapons if we can't hold conventionally and the eventual initiation of a strategic nuclear strike.

To back this strategy up, we gave NATO elements of our strategic forces for to use in the general nuclear response. We even assumed that under certain circumstances it would be launched simultaneously with our SIOP.

The point I am trying to make, through background, through current Soviet doctrine, through our own doctrine of the defense of Europe, is that we have inextricably and irrevocably linked the defense of Central Europe to the strategic balance.

To a certain extent, any SALT Treaty is damaging to the doctrine of flexible response. This one, ones of the past, and undoubtedly ones of the future. To the extent that SALT codifies or legitimizes strategic parity and essentially symbolizes that strategic forces are of relatively little value other than to deter their own first use. Any agreement that emphasizes that, pulls out from underneath NATO this doctrine which says we will initiate first use of nuclear weapons if we can't hold conventionally and we will escalate the strategic level unilaterally if we have to.

Now, that in itself, I would argue, would not be decisive in accepting or rejecting this treaty. We have known it for a long time. Analysts have been talking about it, predicting it ever since the fifties.

But several things have changed since the beginning of the SALT process. First of all, there has been a massive arms race in Central Europe, one which has received relatively little attention. Since the SALT negotiations started in 1969, the Soviet Union and its East European allies, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland, have added—not replaced in terms of modernization, but added—12,000 major pieces of combat equipment. I have the charts in my prepared statement which you may want to refer later for more detail. The impact of this Soviet led build-up is that it has altered NATO's ability to fight a successful direct defense, initiate a deliberate escalation or deter via a credible general nuclear response.

You might call it a NATO Triad. That is, by having a conventional defense, a deliberate escalation capability within the theater, and then the tie-in to strategic forces, we hope to have a credible

deterrent force that we would never really have to exercise and use.

Unfortunately, the conventional balance has eroded and very little attention has been paid to that.

Second, there has been no greater myth that has been promulgated in the American strategic community than that American technology or Western technology offsets the Soviet quantitative superiority in Central Europe. You see it over and over. In the State Department bulletin several months ago, there was an article that said, oh, after all, NATO superiority in antitank weapons, qualitatively and quantitatively, offset Soviet Warsaw Pact tank strength.

It has never been true when it was first stated in 1968, and it is not true today. The Warsaw Pact has 16,000 tanks in Central Europe today, and NATO has 3,500 of the new modern antitank guided missiles launchers. The Warsaw Pact, which ostensibly is on the offensive have 5,000 of the antitank guided missile launchers.

In essence, they have more of these defensive weapons than we do.

Another aspect in the late 1960's in terms of our direct defense was that we had a clear superiority in terms of advanced technology. We have lost it. We, in terms of the United States, had a lost decade in which we spent most of our time and most of the general purpose forces budget focused on Southeast Asia.

Today in Central Europe, the Soviet Army has more of their new main battle tanks than we or the West Germans will have, Leopard II or X-M I, in the mid-1980's. They have more of their new infantry fighting vehicles than we and all of NATO will have in the mid-eighties.

Their new self-propelled artillery is better than anything being designed in central Europe.

The point I am trying to make is that in terms of the conventional defense, it is eroded and eroded quite badly. That is not the only area that is eroded.

In the late 1960's NATO had a clear intratheater nuclear capability that supplied the link between conventional defense and strategic forces. Today that has been lost by a substantial increase in Warsaw Pact theater nuclear forces. The Warsaw Pact increase in theater nuclear forces combined with a strong chemical warfare capability, which NATO has no capacity to even defend itself, let alone respond in kind, offers the potential of a very devastating Soviet riposte or first use coercive potential vis-a-vis central Europe.

I notice the lights are out. Is my time up?

Senator ZORINSKY. If you could sort of summarize.

Senator JAVITS. Especially tell us what you want us to do about SALT II.

Mr. KARBER. The reason I have emphasized the European defense aspects is that if we had a strong conventional defense in Europe, if we had a credible intratheater nuclear defense, the pressures on SALT II in terms of its relationship to our allies would be far less. The fact is, we don't.

With SALT II essentially adding one more step in terms of the codification of parity, that nuclear weapons only deter the use by

the opponent in a strategic context, day by day, NATO's dependence on first use of nuclear fire is being weakened. The Euro-strategic linkage, the life blood of the alliance—and I am not saying that strategy can't be changed, but it hasn't been and I know of no conversations being conducted to change it—is becoming more hollow with the passing of every day.

That in itself does not argue against SALT II. What it does suggest is that if SALT II is going to be a success over the long term, it means that we are going to have to increase two facets of the NATO alliance: its theater nuclear capability and its conventional capability.

Various people have proposed in relation to SALT substantial spending on arms. I know of no evidence where throwing money at a problem is necessarily a solution. But there are some very hard things we need to do. I would never tie it to SALT II specifically—as an amendment or condition—but I think in the interest of the people who are in favor of SALT, more resources, the right kinds of resources, have to be spent to restabilize the European balance.

Otherwise, the treaty itself in the long run, assuming it passes now, will be, in my opinion, in trouble.

Senator ZORINSKY. Senator Hayakawa, have you any questions you would like to ask?

Senator HAYAKAWA. I really don't, Mr. Chairman. I am simply trying to digest what you have said.

If I may summarize, you are saying that we have to consider the strategic treaty relationship in full conjunction with the theater relationships and relative strength of the theater; and since we are very much weaker in the European theater, then what are the consequences of that weakness insofar as the ratification of SALT is concerned? That I didn't quite get clear.

Mr. KARBER. If one did not ratify SALT, I think the potential for Soviet malevolence to teach us a lesson could be quite high. And perhaps it is a statement on the European perception of our leadership or our own global military capability. But they could make things quite rough for us. I know of no current NATO capability, for example, if the access routes were closed to Berlin, to retrieve them other than to politically make some concessions.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Our NATO allies, then, really want us very much to ratify SALT?

EUROPEAN ATTITUDES

Mr. KARBER. I spent a portion of the prepared statement, and I apologize for not spending more time on it, trying to address the European attitudes. I have listened to previous testimony which sounds like a game of "name your favorite European." People say, I have talked to so-and-so and he is in favor or against and the Government is in favor and so forth.

My experience is that there are many people in Europe who are very much in favor of SALT. But having said that, I think we ought to realize, and it doesn't necessarily argue against the SALT Treaty, but we ought to realize why they are in favor of it.

I spent some time in the statement on this and maybe I can recap it very quickly. I think one of the major reasons they place such an emphasis on SALT and believe in it, is that every time

there has been a superpower confrontation, they feel caught in the middle. And not only is their security directly threatened, but they have no recourse or they feel they have no recourse to control the events threatening their security. That is why they, far more than we, I think, have embraced the concept of détente in a political sense as opposed to a military power sense. They don't want to be caught in more confrontations.

Second, however, and it almost produces a schizoid attitude, if I can use the expression, they are desperately afraid of being left out by the United States. And the French today are quite smug in pointing out to other Europeans we told you so, DeGaulle was right, the United States will go hand in hand with the Soviet Union and slowly withdraw its protection from the alliance.

And those Europeans who are involved in defense planning, for example, and one has to differentiate their private views and those which they feel they have to support officially, repeatedly note a high degree of concern about the need to continue the link between the European balance and the strategic balance, and any perception that the strategic balance has become so stable that it is unusable then is seen as dangerously eroding the European deterrent.

Now, in terms of SALT, if in fact the process of ratifying SALT or the negotiated treaty leads to the suggestion that the strategic balance is getting so stable we can no longer credibly threaten its use, then we have a concomitant responsibility, if we want to save the alliance, to start building up the other two elements of that Triad, which are really quite weak right now.

OFFER OF EQUIVALENCE THROUGH SALT

Senator HAYAKAWA. Do you feel that the treaty does offer equivalence?

Mr. KARBER. There are several aspects of that, I think, and again, to put it from a European perspective: One is the equivalence of assured destruction. I think most Europeans believe that once you have launched so many warheads, it really doesn't matter very much. I haven't found too many of them who are willing to get out their bomb damage calculator and run their equation and say, oh, yes, the Warsaw Pact is ahead by so many.

So I think there is a point where they overdose on strategic numbers and say, well, they sort of all equal each other out.

There is another aspect to it, and that is what might be called the perceptual aspect. We all know it is relatively simple minded, but when one reads in a newspaper that the Russians have x number of warheads or x number of missiles and we have a countervailing number, it is very tempting for people to sort of say, oh, who is on top today? Who is 10 feet high and who is 6 feet high?

I think there is a growing perception that the United States is becoming less and less willing to risk its own survival for that of the NATO alliance. I think that is not the only problem and that is not the sole cause of potential European disenchantment over the next several years, but it is certainly a key element.

The other has been a slow erosion in their faith in U.S. leadership.

REASSURANCE TO EUROPEANS THROUGH SALT REJECTION

Senator HAYAKAWA. Would we reassure the Europeans in any way if we were to reject SALT?

Mr. KARBER. I am sorry, I did not hear the question?

Senator HAYAKAWA. Would it reassure the Europeans in any way if we were to reject SALT, or would it reassure them if we were to ratify it?

Mr. KARBER. General Haig had an interesting comment before this committee several weeks ago. I was talking to several Europeans about his comment that they would be relieved if it were not ratified and would hope that there would be a new breath of American leadership.

The Europeans I have talked to—and, of course, everyone has their favorite Europeans, so I claim no statistical significance—felt generally that that was very unlikely. That if SALT were rejected, they felt the administration would continue to observe it, and then you would have sort of the worst of both worlds, from the European perspective.

So I think they are very concerned that the rejection of SALT II is, in a way, a rejection by the United States of its role as the alliance's chief negotiator with the Soviet Union.

I think there is also a danger, in several of the major NATO countries, some of the ones who contribute the most today to NATO's defense, believe that there is a growing sentiment among them that if the United States can't provide the negotiating leadership, perhaps they should do it themselves.

In fact, I was told by one European parliamentarian that "maybe it is time for us to pack the bags and go to Moscow and see what kind of deal they will offer us. We are not going to give up the farm, but maybe they will offer us a deal."

In West Germany today, it is no secret that one element of a major political party believes very strongly that the Soviets would like to have détente with them, a much more friendly relationship, use German influence to help stabilize the East German regime, and all they have to do is cooperate with the Soviet Union in the international political sphere, be very cooperative on arms control, be very cooperative in terms of economic relationships.

And that, I think, is endemic of what we are probably going to see a lot more of unless the United States is willing to go back into central Europe and play a significant role as a superpower.

It is interesting. The Soviet Army today represents over 50 percent of the forces deployed in central Europe. The U.S. Army represents less than 25 percent, and there is an asymmetry in superpower presence there that cannot help but affect political attitudes.

I think it is probably a legitimate point to say what does this have to do with the SALT II Treaty? And I don't think it is a copout to say the impact of these issues on SALT II Treaty is far less in terms of whether the treaty is accepted or rejected than in whether the treaty is a success or a failure over the long term.

EVIDENCE OF LEADERSHIP THROUGH RATIFICATION OF SALT

Senator HAYAKAWA. I want to get clear this one last question. Would ratification of SALT assure Western Europe and the NATO allies that we do maintain leadership? Can you simply say yes or no?

Mr. KARBER. No, and I don't think the reciprocal of that question would be yes, either. In other words, I think whether SALT is passed or rejected, I don't see it as being a major element in Europeans saying, ah, yes, the United States has assumed leadership again.

Senator HAYAKAWA. What I am trying to get is some sense of what you are recommending as a witness.

Mr. KARBER. I guess what I am trying to get across is less a point of whether the treaty should be ratified in terms of its specific elements, because they are hard to forecast. In my testimony I talk about some of the potential problems protocol could cause in our European relations, but they are relatively minor.

They are relatively minor compared to the real question of whether the treaty is going to be a success or not. And it is my argument that the treaty is probably going to be a failure unless we conduct a substantial buildup in American arms, coupling it with very aggressive attempts at arms control in terms of central Europe.

And if we don't do that and the treaty is accepted, then we, I think, are buying a treaty that will over the long run be relatively weak and we will be very sorry for it in terms of our relationship with the NATO Alliance.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is more than up.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you.

Dr. Karber, the day of the vote on SALT, we get to say one of two words, "aye" or "nay." And there is no "maybe" column. And therefore, I am asking you: are you a proponent or an opponent of SALT II?

Mr. KARBER. It is time to vote?

Senator ZORINSKY. I wish I could vote 60 percent "yes" and 40 percent "no." But unfortunately, I only get it one way or the other. [Laughter.]

Mr. KARBER. But everyone has to live with their vote or their hypothetical vote.

Senator ZORINSKY. I understand.

Mr. KARBER. I will answer the question but there is an explanation for it. If I were a U.S. Senator, which I am not, and if I felt that there was support within the U.S. Congress to not only meet the administration's request for the new NATO defense plans but to really push forward and if I felt the kinds of recommendations that had been placed by General Hollingsworth, and currently by Ambassador Komer for the administration would receive full support in the Congress, then I would vote yes because I think over the long term the treaty would have a chance of being a success.

If I felt the current trend of imbalance in Central Europe was going to continue to slide and get us caught, then I think I would have to vote "no." Is that too much of a cop-out?

Senator ZORINSKY. No. I have done it myself. I sympathize with you.

EQUALIZING ABILITY OF THE NEUTRON WARHEAD

You indicate that there is a disparity in NATO concerning, well, ake the area of tanks. Certainly the Soviet Union is recognized as aving far greater superiority in that area. Would the neutron varhead be an equalizer of the numerical disparity numbers in anks?

Mr. KARBER. You know we are always talking about new technol-gy. The cruise missile is another one. But the neutron bomb is an nteresting one as well. We are always talking about both of them as if that technology is solely possessed by us.

The current warheads for the nuclear artillery in NATO are so bsolete they are almost unusable. You take the warhead apart nd you have 57 parts, and some tech sergeant is trying to put it ogether in the mud. It is really quite incredible to try to effective-y use them.

They are not ballistically matched to conventional shells, so you ire and you don't know where it will land. We have problems with ur current stockpile and I suggest they need to be improved. The eutron bomb, the enhanced radiation warhead, coupled with other heater nuclear modernizations, given the current balance, and if he Warsaw Pact did not respond in kind, would have been a ubstantial increase in the credibility of NATO's doctrine, even uring conventional operations, because the opponent knowing hat you have a usable tactical capability, cannot then afford to nass against your conventional defenses, because you might use it n him.

So it even increases the viability of your conventional defenses efore nuclear weapons are used. If it is solely possessed! I am not ure that the option of enhanced radiation warheads is solely ours.

EXISTENCE OF NATO IF SALT IS DEFEATED

Senator ZORINSKY. Carrying that one step further then, if we uilt more tanks we wouldn't be the only one to have tanks, so herefore let's not build any more tanks because the Soviet Union an build tanks. But the point I am making is it is an offset to the umbers of tanks.

Any military commander I have ever talked to, including Gener-l Haig, has admitted to that. So therefore, I ask you why won't hese NATO nations looking to us for leadership allow us to deploy eutron warheads? If they are the ones who indicate we are not iving them that leadership, why not accept our attempt to equal-e an equation on their behalf?

And certainly I think the leadership in this country got a bum ap when they held up production. The reason production was held p was the inability of our nation to deploy this type of equipment n the very countries that are seeking leadership from us to equal-e the equation.

It doesn't stop there. We have offered the deutschmark the lead s the monetary value of the world. They say, oh, no, strengthen

the dollar, we don't want any part of putting our deutschmark out there to assume the financial leadership in this world.

Everybody looks for leadership to this country but everyone wants to cop out when the time comes to put their neck out where the United States neck is. And the point I am trying to make is what do you suggest in the way of getting an affirmative answer from the participants in NATO to allow us to exert that leadership? And if we don't, do you think that without the ratification of SALT II, that NATO as we know it today would continue to exist?

EUROPEAN ATTITUDES ON THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Mr. KARBER. I was asked to testify before the Dutch Parliament not too long after the neutron bomb embroglio, and I had an opportunity to talk to a lot of the members and find out what it was that bothered them. Put yourself in their shoes. They were being asked, essentially, to fight what they perceived as a tactical nuclear war in their backyard.

Sitting here in Washington, it is like using nuclear weapons out on the beltway. And they were willing to do that. But they didn't want to do it for a long time, and they didn't want to do it all across the breadth of Central Europe. So they said what is the next step? Are you expecting us to fight this tactical nuclear campaign solely within Europe?

When do we stop targeting Eastern Europe, because while the majority of NATO's current tactical and theater and nuclear systems can only reach Eastern Europe, the Eastern Europeans are not the ones who have initiated aggression or who have a nuclear striking ability in Europe. It is the Soviet Union.

And, most significantly our allies asked—what is the likelihood the U.S. will go after the guy who really perpetrated this? When do we start targeting the Soviet Union? And the conclusion they came to after participating in numerous NATO exercises and watching the extreme hesitance of many Americans in even planning go to that step was that the credibility of our willingness to back them up by putting our cities on the line like we were asking them to do was not there.

Quite frankly——

Senator ZORINSKY. Are they so naive that they don't think our cities are targeted from the Soviet Union and that we haven't targeted Soviet cities?

Mr. KARBER. No, not at all. The point they make is—that is, is one thing to be on a target list, and it is something else, knowing your cities are on a target list, to start firing at the other superpower. They found they were being asked to fight a nuclear campaign essentially in their backyard in their countryside when it wasn't even clear that warheads were going to be used against tank armies moving through Eastern Europe, let alone major assembly points, let alone the SS–4's and SS–5's stationed in western U.S.S.R. or against Soviet air bases in Russia.

They were very, very concerned that as a result of the American preoccupation with strategic stability, we had essentially given away our commitment to them that we will share vulnerability. We were asking them to carry a higher vulnerability ratio in the

conduct of an actual campaign as opposed to being on a peacetime target list than we were willing to bear.

I am not saying that is the truth. I am saying that is a perception which I think is growing throughout much of Central Europe. And the day, and I don't think it will be that far away—that is a personal opinion—the day that this perception becomes widespread, we will not have much of an alliance any more.

ABILITY OF NATO TO EQUALIZE EQUATION WITH U.S.S.R.

Senator ZORINSKY. Do you feel, then, without the ratification of SALT II, that NATO can still proceed to equalize the equation with the Soviet Union?

Mr. KARBER. It is doubtful. As I said, I don't consider myself an expert in the strategic side as in the amount of time I have spent in Europe. But if one looks at it, the Soviet momentum gained in strategic weapons is substantial. I don't think it is within our capacity, at least in terms of a first strike capacity, to recoup any meaningful sense of superiority. There are technologies one could try to employ to reduce one's vulnerability, the ABM, for example, but they are of questionable total utility.

One of the advantages is they tend to create a higher ambiguity so it allows you to have some flexibility in at least selecting a target.

Senator ZORINSKY. Mr. Karber, you are saying then, in conclusion, your advice to me as a Senator and to other Senators is if we see a commitment by the leadership to future equalization of our capabilities with those of the Soviet Union in the area of offensive and defensive weapons, to vote for SALT; and if not, to vote against SALT?

Dr. KARBER. That would be my personal criteria, yes, sir.

Senator ZORINSKY. And how, in your estimation, would I be able to bind a future administration to what this administration says it would do to equalize that equation, or even the Congress in which I serve?

Mr. KARBER. Obviously, you cannot bind another administration or the U.S. Congress. I think, though, you can establish a sense, not a formal sense of the Congress, but a sense that something needs to be done.

Senator ZORINSKY. Like we did under SALT I and with the B–1 bomber and the Trident, all of those things we talked about?

Mr. KARBER. I think there was a difference there, if I might respond to that. I don't think we said what we wanted to do. It wasn't really clear why we wanted those systems. In other words, they were more systems, they were modern systems. Yes, the others were antiquated, but we didn't really get specific and say here is how the B–1 contributes to our defense. And this is why the B–1 and not a B–52 with cruise missiles is so important.

Senator ZORINSKY. I was mayor of Omaha, Nebraska then, and SAC headquarters is located there and they knew what they wanted the B–1 for. They knew exactly what they wanted it for. They laid out and stated what they wanted it for.

Mr. KARBER. I am not sure it was conveyed to the people who made decisions. It is interesting. If one looks, for example, at the way most weapons bills are handled here in the Congress, there is

relatively little emphasis on the mission and how it fits into the actual force structure and doctrine of use.

It tends to be what kinds of tradeoffs can we make with this versus another one. It is frequently a very simplistic cost-effectiveness tradeoff. We do very little what one might call—planning for a strategy of long term competition—laying out what it is you are trying to do and then establishing a force optimized to meet those objectives. We tend to talk in sort of vague generalities of a Triad, and so forth. We don't really get down and say what specifically is a B–1 supposed to do or an aircraft like it.

So it is very easy then to give them up and trade them off.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you very much, Mr. Karber, for taking your time to be with us. And on behalf of the rest of the committee, Senator Javits and Senator Hayakawa specifically, I would like to thank you for your presence and your astute observations. Thank you for being here.

[Mr. Karber's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PHILLIP A. KARBER

SALT II AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I would like to thank you for the honor of testifying. The focus of my remarks will be addressed to the relationship between SALT on the one hand and European security and the security of the NATO alliance on the other. This is the subject I was asked to address and the area where I have spent most of my professional time. In my prepared opening remarks I have not recommended either the rejection or acceptance of this treaty, its protocol, or any recommended amendments. If you would like my views on this, I would be glad to give them, but, I would like to make it clear that they are my personal opinion and not based on professional expertise.

There are four major points which I would like to make:

1. European security is intimately and inextricably linked to the strategic balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union by history, alliance politics, current military strategy and public perception. Any discussion of a strategic arms limitations agreement which does not take into consideration the potential impact on European security, even though subtle and implicit, may produce disastrous political consequences.

2. NATO's current strategy, the doctrine of flexible response, is directly dependent on the use of nuclear weapons by the United States in the event that NATO conventional defenses cannot hold against a Soviet-led Warsaw Pact attack. Since the beginning of the SALT negotiations over a decade ago, the conventional military balance in central Europe has eroded significantly, creating a potentially unstable correlation of forces and making NATO more dependent than ever on the first use of nuclear weapons. Yet NATO's once clear superiority in tactical and theater nuclear weapons has declined to the point that when considered with the ratification of parity under SALT, the credibility of the American nuclear deterrent has become in danger of being decoupled from Europe.

3. There has been considerable discussion before this committee with respect to European attitudes toward SALT II. I believe it is fair to say that the NATO allies generally support detente and simultaneously have deep concerns about its long-term consequences. This apparent contradiction is more understandable, if more complex, when one looks at it from a European perspective.

4. Failure to ratify the SALT Treaty expeditiously may produce reactions within the NATO alliance and by the Soviet Union which could have seriously destabilizing consequences for European security. It is perhaps unfortunate that the negotiated treaty—admittedly less than perfect—threatens such dire consequences to which both the proponents and opposition should give careful consideration.

I. THE EURO-STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

There has been a growing tendency in the United States, reinforced in each succeeding discussion of SALT, to divorce the strategic United States/Soviet balance from considerations of European security. There is a certain logic for doing this. Soviet strategic nuclear weapons pose a direct threat to the survival of the United

States and it makes sense to reduce these weapons via arms control. That is, the most obvious threat must be addressed first. Second, the complexities involved in defining weapon systems and placing restrictive parameters on their quantity and technical specifications is difficult enough with strategic weapons, without adding the ambiguities inherent in so many of the "gray area" systems (e.g. multiple mission profiles, rapid redeployable mobility, and employment contingencies). Third, recent experience has shown that there is a much higher probability of success in bilateral arms control negotiations than when many states are involved each with differing preceptions, strengths and security requirements.

Nevertheless, having recognized that a dyadic relationship between the United States and Soviet Union is important and deserving of special attention, we should also realize that it is an arbitrary, indeed false duality. Europe is intimately and irrevocably tied to the strategic balance between the superpowers. This, as I noted, is a product of history, alliance strategy, Soviet force posture, current NATO doctrine and the political requirements of our closest allies.

History may be prologue, but it is seldom predictive. And thus, it is quite specious to claim that what has been, will be. Nevertheless, the United States, the Soviet Union and our European allies are, to a great extent, products of our past experience, and that experience shows a very clear interrelationship between the U.S. strategic deterrent posture and our commitment to Europe. It is interesting to note that the U.S. signed the NATO Treaty and deployed the Seventh Army in Europe to back it up, before we possessed a significant strategic nuclear force, before we adopted a doctrine of massive retaliation, and before the continental United States was vulnerable to Soviet retaliation. Indeed, it was the perceived Soviet threat to Europe and the inability of the West to match with conventional forces, which led us to attempt to redress the conventional imbalance by depending upon our strategic forces. Thus, it is fair to say that not only did NATO antedate our strategic posture, but necessitated it. Moreover, throughout the 1950's the United States used Eurpoean territory in order to deploy much of our strategic force capability.

Since the Soviet Union could not match our advantage, indeed superiority, in their own overseas deployment, they concentrated on a major build-up of European oriented strategic forces (medium bombers and MR/IRBMs). In essence, the Soviets held the European NATO member nations as hostages to the American strategic deterrent that was there to protect them. Furthermore, the leadership of the Soviet Union showed no reticence in making this unambiguously obvious. There has been considerable discussion about Soviet military doctrine with respect to whether it is oriented to war-fighting as opposed to retalitory deterrence. The evidence is unambiguously clear that while they do not relish the prospect of a major conflict, either conventional or nuclear, should such a war occur, it would be waged to achieve definite political/military objectives, one of which being the destruction of NATO's military capabilities through offensive action. Likewise, the evidence equally demonstrates that the Soviets believe that the most likely route to a strategic nuclear change is via a European connection. If they perceive the highest proximity between European security and strategic stability, we cannot afford to do anything less.

Most of the political upheavals within the Atlantic Alliance have been as a result of U.S. attempts to cope with our growing vulnerability to Soviet nuclear strikes. Thus the withdrawal of France from military cooperation with NATO was a direct product of U.S. reluctance to share authority over nuclear weapon employment with our allies, when we expected them to share the consequences. The imbroglios over the Multi-Lateral Force, the cancellation of Skybolt, and even the fallout from the neutron bomb decision were clearly exacerbated, if not caused, by U.S. insensitivity to legitimate allied security concerns. NATO's current doctrine of flexible response, promulgated by the U.S. at a time when we had clear strategic superiority, was predicted on the unambiguous and deliberate commitment of U.S. strategy nuclear power to NATO's security. The U.S. has repeatedly emphasized this coupling through such actions as: deploying large quantities of tactical nuclear weapons and delivery systems to our European allies (albeit under U.S. control); formally dedicating strategic nuclear delivery systems to NATO; and announcing a selective European-oriented targeting doctrine for the U.S. ICBMs.

The point is that the U.S. Government, through successive administrations including the current one, has drawn a direct and purposeful linkage between NATO security and the U.S. strategic forces. It is we who have repeatedly asked them to accept that linkage and we should not think anything less of them now or in the future for taking us at our word. Our European allies cast their future with ours, not because they had no other option nor because they were coerced, but because they had an honest faith that the United States had irretrievably cast its fate with them. They believed and continue to believe that we define their existence as coterminous with ours, that we are consciously willing to share the threat of nuclear

annihilation equally. Any negotiations that the United States conducts with the Soviet Union which have the appearance—let alone the reality—of implicit hedging of this EURO-Strategic linkage requires the most deliberate consideration. If we decide to alter our commitment, we, at a minimum, owe our NATO allies an explanation before, not after the fact.

In no way, however, does this suggest that the intent of the current SALT II Treaty or those who negotiated it, at least from the American side, was to weaken the linkage of U.S. strategic forces to our NATO commitment. In fact, from personal observation, I believe that those representing this administration have as strong a desire to maintain that linkage as any who have preceded them. Nevertheless, appearances are not always the product of conscious decisions. Strategic nuclear parity reduces the credibility of U.S. strategic first use against the Soviet Union. Suicide is not a credible means of demonstrating one's feality to a friend. To the extent that a SALT agreement codifies strategic parity, it gives a global recognition to the illogic of strategic first use. This is compounded if the targets of such strikes are the opponent's civilian population centers, due to limitations in the survivability, penetrability, and/or sufficient quantity of systems. It is magnified even more, if, as a result of either unilateral inhibitions or the provisions of a treaty, there is an appearance of asymmetrical parity—that is, if our side is notably weaker in the typical measures of a strategic equality: throw-weight, delivery vehicles, equivalent megatonage, warheads. It is unfortunate, although undoubtably necessary, that the expressions of "Angst" over U.S. nuclear viability produced by the current strategic debate does not help in giving the appearance of credibility to our European allies.

If the United States has no intention of weakening the linkage, it is less than obvious that the Soviets share that same motivation. In fact, the politics that they have played in the SALT negotiations and other arms control forums (the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and MBFR negotiations), coupled with their theater force deployment and modernization, suggest just the opposite. The Soviet Union apparently considers it most fortuitous to sever the U.S. EURO-strategic relationship by simultaneously trying to reduce: (1) the linkage between NATO's conventional defense and its escalatory first use of tactical weapons; and (2) the European theater nuclear forces linkage with U.S. strategic strike systems. One does not have to manufacture a myth of Soviet malevolence to suggest that since the mid-1950's, they have considered that the de-coupling of Europe from their American strategic deterrent is in their highest political self-interest and is a major policy objective.

Recognizing that the Soviets have considerable self-interest in producing such a decoupling does not mean that we cannot negotiate meaningful strategic arms agreements which are mutually satisfying. It does suggest, however, that if as the consequence of a strategic arms limitations agreement the linkage of the American deterrent to Europe should come into question, we should not optimistically expect the Soviets to come to our rescue. In fact, we should realistically anticipate that they will try and make the most political capital, should our strategic currency be devalued.

II. NATO STRATEGY AND THE EUROPEAN ARMS RACE

In 1967, NATO formally adopted the strategy of flexible response. This strategy, frequently cited but seldom discussed in depth, specified three sequential but co-equal defense requirements necessary to deter, with a sufficient level of confidence, any Soviet-led Warsaw Pact attack on NATO's territory. The first of these requirements was Direct Defense, which called for the maintenance of adequate ground, air and naval forces in a high state of peacetime readiness to meet any likely contingency. Although there was a recognition that defensive nuclear weapons employment on or over NATO territory might be necessary during Direct Defense, the primary emphasis was on having sufficient conventional forces to meet a major Warsaw Pact attack. And, if unable to defeat a massive attack, then at least be able to hold it at bay for a considerable period of time, while defending as far forward as possible, so as to provide adequate time to determine the optimum level of response for the later doctrinal phases.

The second phase of flexible response was Deliberate Escalation; clearly intended to symbolize, by a nuclear strike on Warsaw Pact territory, the seriousness with which NATO viewed the aggression. The scope, magnitude and duration of the Deliberate Escalation phase has never been explicitly defined. Rather NATO defense planners have assumed that by keeping it ambiguous, Soviet military and political elites will be uncertain as to its application, and thus be deterred by this uncertainty. There was also the implicit assumption that Deliberate Escalation is unlikely to be exercised until the prospect of the collapse of NATO's conventional defense and or the loss of sufficient territory is imminent.

Quite clearly the Deliberate Escalation phase was conceived as a transitory pause, after which, should the situation continue to deteriorate, NATO would initiate a General Nuclear Response. This large-scale nuclear strike would not only be delivered against Eastern Europe but also against critical military targets in the USSR as far as the Urals. A major element in NATO's General Nuclear Response would be U.S. strategic forces and the implementation of this phase could either precede or be exercised simultaneously with the unleashing of U.S. SIOP.

These three phases remain current NATO strategy. However, events over the intervening period may call into question the viability of some, perhaps all, of these three elements. Shortly after the adoption of flexible response, the NATO leadership recognized that arms control and force reduction could enhance the viability of its flexible response strategy. It was assumed that a reduction of forces to a more balanced position would not only increase the stability of the European balance but would perhaps even favor NATO, given the West's substantial qualitative superiority in conventional weapons technology. Thus, after repeated invitations, the Warsaw Pact joined with NATO in 1972 in the MBFR talks. To date, although there is increased speculation that the positions of the two sides are getting closer, there has been no formal agreement.

Unfortunately, many of the assumptions upon which NATO's Flexible Response strategy were initially premised have been undermined. The Soviets have not been content with the balances that have existed in 1967 but rather have undertaken a major arms build-up opposite NATO in Central Europe. The clear qualitative superiority of NATO in conventional weapons technology has been nullified by the extensive modernization of Soviet forces and the overall quantitative increase in the threat. What could have been characterized as a fairly stable balance in which neither side had any incentive to undertake rash actions, has now become highly unstable. A Soviet-led attack, even with relatively small East European participation, would enjoy major advantages if launched with minimum preparation (and thus warning) while NATO's conventional defenses are still in the process of mobilization and forward deployment.


By striking before NATO's defenses are fully prepared, there is even the prospect that the survivability of NATO nuclear forces could be so seriously degraded, its air base and command and control elements so greatly disrupted, and ground defenses so rapidly and deeply penetrated and overrun, that NATO's Deliberated Escalation policy would be in large measure irrelevant. The accompanying charts, utilizing the same definitions of units and geography that are under consideration in the MBFR negotiations, graphically illustrate to the extent to which the arms race in Central Europe has been one sided—a race that NATO is clearly losing. Figure 1 shows the geographical area and forces involved in the MBFR discussions.

It is interesting to note that since the inception of the SALT negotiations, the Warsaw Pact has introduced nearly 12,000 major combatant weapons into Central Europe. These are given for major weapon categories in Figure 2. In almost every major weapons category where they had a lead they have increased it. In most areas where the Soviets were behind (mostly notably in SAMS and antitank guided missiles), they have since taken the lead.

In terms of the quality of conventional weapons, in many areas the Soviets have not only caught up but surpassed NATO's deployment of new technology. For example, Soviet forces in Eastern Europe today have a greater quantity of new tanks—the T-64—than NATO will have Leopard II and XM-1 tanks in 1983. Likewise, the number of Soviet BMP's (infantry fighting vehicles) in Central Europe today exceeds the counterpart systems that NATO will have in the mid 80s. This is also true in the areas of surface-to-air missiles and self-propelled, radar directed, air defense guns. Where NATO had a clear lead in self-propelled artillery this is being matched by the extensive deployment throughout the Warsaw Pact of new Soviet designed self-propelled systems which are at least the equal of NATO deployed artillery weapons. Where in 1970 it could be rightly claimed that the quality of NATO aircraft more than compensated for their quantitative inferiority, the rapid and extensive modernization of Soviet frontal aviation in Central Europe clearly opens to question the long held premise of NATO air superiority over the battlefield. (It should be noted that Soviet frontal aviation in Central Europe by itself is equal to the total number of available NATO aircraft, with Soviet aircraft payloads in addition being doubled.)

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A U.S.
G F.R.G.
U.K.
B BEL.
F FR.
N NETH.
SOVIET
E. EUROPEAN
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BEL.
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POL.
F.R.G.
AUS.
CZECH.
HUNG.
SWITZ.
FR.


CENTRAL REGION FORCE COMPARISONS
1965 - 1977
NATO
WARSAW PACT
TANKS
APCs
ATGMs
AT GUNS
ARTILLERY
MRLs
SSMs
MORTARS
AIRCRAFT
ARMED HELICOPTERS
SAMs
AIR DEFENSE GUNS
65
70
75
77

There is no more persistent myth than the repeated claim that NATO's superiority in the number and quality of its antitank weapons makes up for its quantitative inferiority in tanks. This misconception, which started in the late 1960s, has persisted with such resiliance that I hope you will forgive a short digression aimed at putting this falsehood to rest. NATO has never had a sufficient enough quantity of antitank weapons (either antitank guided missiles, antitank guns or antitank grenade launchers) to offset its noticible lack of tanks. Today NATO faces in Central Europe over 36,000 Soviet and Warsaw Pact armored vehicles (16,000 tanks, and over 20,000 APC's, light tanks and armored reconnaissance vehicles). As the defender, NATO's tank and antitank crews cannot afford to concentrate solely on the opposing tanks while having their positions overrun by the other armored vehicles. To oppose this array of Warsaw Pact armor, NATO has a total of 6,000 tanks, approximately 4,000 antitank guided missile launchers, and no more than 2,000 light tanks and antitank guns. While many exaggerated claims have been made for the antitank guided missile, the combined effect of its deficiencies to include low rate of fire, terrain limitations in Europe which preclude its maximum range of effectiveness, the lack of armored protection or tactical mobility for its crews, and the fact that the high theoretical accuracy of these systems is degraded by two thirds due to the finanical limitations on training, all contribute to minimizing the impact of these weapons. Moreover while NATO had a clear advantage in guidance technology this has been lost with the introduction of second and even third generation guidance for Warsaw Pact ATGMs. It should be pointed out that today the Warsaw Pact has more antitank guided missile launchers deployed in Central Europe than does NATO, and over 80 percent of these are mounted on armored vehicles providing protection and tactical mobility to the crews. This is in comparison to only 40 percent for NATO.

In other areas NATO has not been able to exploit its supposed technological lead in weaponry. One looks in vain for precision delivered air munitions (such as Maverick) in the air forces of our European allies: their high cost, limited utility in European weather, and operational problems having been a disincentive for our allies. NATO has placed heavy emphasis on the use of the armed helicopter equipped with antitank weapons, but the numbers deployed or programmed are pathetically small in comparison to the quantities of armor they face and the density of the opposing air defenses. In fact, the Warsaw Pact has nearly matched NATO's deployment of armed helicopter; their MI-24 Hind helicopter equaling the best that NATO has available. The U.S. Army has been intensely developing a long-range multiple rocket launcher (called GSRS) for dispensing antitank mines designed to impede the rapid advance of second echelon armored formations. It is depressing to consider that this system, which is scheduled to be available in the mid 1980's, already has a counterpart deployed today with Soviet Ground Forces. Thus, NATO has lost the quantitative race and is rapidly falling behind in the qualitative aspects as well. If an MBFR agreement had been reached early on, quite clearly the conventional threat would be far less. In fact the Soviets have introduced more combat equipment into Central Europe since 1973 than the current MBFR proposals would require them to remove. Perhaps we were overly ambitious in attempting scaled reductions when a simple ceiling or qualitative moderization sub-ceiling would have helped considerably. On the other hand, no one predicted such a massive expansion and modernization build-up when MBFR started.

The erosion of NATO's relative conventional capability to conduct a Direct Defense, coupled with a decline in its force readiness due to the high cost of modernization, also impacts negatively on the Alliance's ability to provide sufficient time for a well planned and conscious exercise of Deliberate Escalation. Moreover NATO's clear superiority in tactical nuclear weapons has been substantially degraded by a series of Warsaw Pact actions. They have a substantial lead in the survivability of their tactical air bases and the command/control structure. Extensive modernization of Soviet Frontal Aviation gives it a battlefield and interdiction dual capability almost double what it had a few years ago. The extensive quantities of chemical warheads, and delivery systems and protective measures of the Warsaw Pact have no equal within NATO. And should they be used either prior to or simultaneously with tactical nuclear weapons, NATO's ground and air capabilities could be decisively impared within a few hours. This is not to mention Soviet doctrine, which clearly calls for the purposeful degradation of NATO's nuclear capability and command survivability during the conventional phase of battle. Nor does it include the clear escalatory dominance in Soviet long-range, theater-oriented bombers and MR/IRBM systems deployed in the Western USSR sanctuary—this being an effective staging area for launching strikes against NATO's land based delivery systems.

The point is that the conventional and theater nuclear legs of the NATO "triad" are in bad shape and seem to get worse with the passing of each year. This would not be so destabilizing if the U.S. had still clear strategic superiority. Those days, however, are long gone and while we can bemoan their passing a dependance on U.S. strategic forces to make up for NATO's inadequacy in conventional and theater nuclear weapons makes the implementation of current NATO strategy an exercise in Nihilism.

III. EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD SALT II

There has been considerable discussion before this committee with respect to the European attitude toward SALT II. Some suggest that they wholeheartedly endorse it while others, citing unnamed sources, suggest that the Europeans harbor grave misgivings. While there appears to be an apparent contradiction between these two perspectives, the reality seems more complex and perhaps these views are even complementary.

Before addressing this question, however, several points are worth noting. First, there is no single integrated European perspective on SALT II or anything else for that matter. There are considerable differences between political parties, within governments and between the NATO members states themselves. If we are willing to except the ambivalence of a strategic debate in this country with all its varying nuances and shades of perceptions, we should expect no more certitude from our allies.

Secondly, I have noticed from personal experience a considerable difference between official utterances in public forums, and the personal convictions conveyed in privacy by the same people. This is neither duplicity nor lack of courage on their parts. Most, by definition, are "influential" Europeans tending to be officials in their respective governments and feel that they have an obligation to support the official position. They are sufficiently sophisticated to be able to differentiate personal opinion from their official responsibility. This is no different than what happens daily in the United States. There is also a deep-rooted deference to the NATO alliance and very few individuals feel that it is worth undermining a jointly agreed position or appearing to contradict what the United States, as the leader of the alliance, has made a cornerstone of its foreign policy.

Thirdly, no American can or should presume "to speak for" the Europeans. All too often the United States has treated our allies with condescension rather than understanding, management instead of maturity. European governmental leaders have minds of their own, and, if they have decided to support SALT II it should be taken as a given government's position. I know of no case where any government has been coerced by the U.S. administration into an endorsement of SALT II. In fact—and just to the contrary—I have been told repeatedly by Europeans at many different levels how much they appreciate the extent to which this administration, far more than its predecessors, has kept them informed on the developments in SALT II and listened with open ears to their views and concerns, even if they were not reflected in the final treaty.

Having registered these caveats, I would like to try and explain the apparent ambivalence that I believe many Europeans feel toward SALT II. As a whole they are far more committed to detente as a long term political process than we in the United States. There is a good reason for this. They have to live on the same continent as the Soviet Union, an environment which could place them directly in the middle of a superpower confrontation. It simultaneously heightens their anxieties with respect to their own security and yet gives them a feeling of impotence at not being able to control or even significantly influence actions which may have dire consequences for them. At the same time the Europeans realize that to a great extent they have been left out of the bilateral SALT negotiations. And they have watched from the sidelines as each successive negotiation has involved itself more and more with that part of the strategic balance that relates to them. Thus the ABM Treaty only affected Europe tangentially in that it highlighted U.S. acceptance of shared vulnerability with them and the Soviet Union. In the interim agreement, the Soviets unilaterally interpreted the U.S. SLBM limitations as including French and British systems. While this did not have any effect on their programmed forces, no one likes to have someone else to take it upon themselves to negotiate for them. This was more than compensated for by the onset of superpower agreement and the effervescent euphoria of detente. The Vladivostok Accord impacted more directly in that it appeared to codify a strategic assymetry even if the net affect was parity.

SALT II has increased their direct interest not only because the protocol affects systems which they may receive and calls for even further discussions in their area under SALT III but, as a result of U.S. policy they were briefed extensively on its

developments and watched from the sidelines as the Backfire bomber slipped through the cracks. We should thus expect that in the future our NATO allies, having tasted the semblance of participation, will expect a greater amount of influence in the outcome of strategic negotiations.

The greater the apprehension in the United States over the credibility of the linkage between our strategic systems and our commitment to European security, the greater will be European desire to actively participate. The key to the long-term success in this process is U.S. leadership in demonstrating that we know where we are going, that we still hold a shared destiny, and that the United States is willing to cooperate as well as consult.

Our European allies have consistently followed our lead. When the U.S. ignored European defense during our preoccupation with Southeast Asia they followed suit with unilateral manpower reductions and force economizing measures. Now that the U.S. has "rediscovered Europe" our European allies have certainly kept up their end of the bargain. In fact, to the extent that NATO forces in Central Europe have increased at all during the last decade it has been primarily due to the European contribution rather than that of the U.S.

There is no greater injustice done to our European allies than the claim that they are unwilling to provide for their own defense. They realize that there is a growing conventional imbalance and that something needs to be done with respect to NATO's theater nuclear modernization although they are far less certain with respect to what is the right course in the latter area.

They are not blind. Increasingly West Europeans realize that the credibility of NATO's first use of nuclear weapons, the fundamental cornerstone of alliance strategy and the critical link to the U.S. strategic deterrent is becoming less credible. Moreover there is increasing concern in the more informed circles (particularly the military) that the option for first use is not NATO's alone, and that the growing Soviet theater nuclear capability requires some point of modernization of NATO's systems if nothing more than to insure their survival as a deterrent to preemption.

IV. SALT II RATIFICATION AND ALLIANCE INSTABILITY

Whether or not the SALT II Treaty is ratified or rejected, it is my opinion there is a significant chance for instability within the alliance. This does not mean that the resultant perturbations would be the same or the consequences symmetrical. Nevertheless, the significances of these potential instabilities ought to be given considerable attention. If the treaty is ratified we should be aware of the potential dangers posed by: (1) the inhibiting potential for TNF moderation following the inclusion of cruise missile range limitations in the protocol; and (2) the transference of superpower confrontations in the third world to a crisis in Europe. If the treaty is rejected the Soviet ability to teach us a lesson and the potential anxiety within the NATO alliance should not be minimized.

A potential problem inherent in the passage of SALT II is the political effect in Europe of the inclusion of cruise missile range limitations in the protocol. Recognizing that an amendment to the SALT II Treaty may specify to the Soviets that the extention of these limitations is unlikely short of major arms control agreements dealing with theater oriented systems, nevertheless the mere fact that these systems are covered under the treaty may mean that some European governments could have difficulty convincing their electorates that they should commit themselves to a nuclear modernization program, parts of which are banned for the present. For those who witnessed the Soviet propaganda campaign directed at Europe on the possible deployment of the neutron bomb this raises the spectre of a fertile area for similar efforts with even more devisive effects upon the NATO TNF modernization program in particular.

There has been considerable discussion before this committee with respect to Soviet adventurism in the Third World, and its "linkage" to the Treaty. I personally find this argument more convincing in a debate over detente foreign policy rather than in terms of the specifics of SALT II. There is an element here which could have an adverse effect on our European allies. If the Treaty is passed and such adventurism continues in the absence of an effective U.S. repoiste the tendancy in Europe to identify strategic parity with the loss of United States will, could lead to the unwarranted extrapolation that the Euro-Strategic relationship is also in doubt. The stability of the European balance is not unrelated to events in the Third World. If we and the Soviet Union should come into confrontation there is a distinct potential that this "macho" political posturing may be transferred to calls for increased readiness of the forces in Europe, the only place where units of two superpowers are currently in direct opposition. This could result in a breakdown of the very detente environment which the Europeans depend upon so heavily. Thus is

we do not deal with Soviet adventurism now in SALT the U.S. had better do it soon before it is too late and the reverberations are bouncing off European capitals.

Far more likely is a negative reaction that the rejection of SALT ratification could have on the European alliance at least initially. The Soviet military capability and political capacity to "teach us a lesson" has in my opinion received far too little attention to date. If SALT II is spurned, there is in my opinion no small likelihood that the Soviet Union would take this as a national insult and it is no great inferential leap from there to a coordinated political/military strategy that is designed to demonstrate that the global correlation of forces has changed. To be quite frank, the United States and NATO have many areas of potential politico-military vulnerabilities in which the Soviets could apply substantial pressure with minimal risk. At least the option of terminating the crisis would be theirs with the escalatory onus on the West. To name only one, it is difficult to conceive how the West would be able to achieve a favorable accommodation should the Soviets exercise a contingency to enforce East German sovereignty over Berlin. If the land and air routes were closed I can conceive of no readily available means given the current imbalance of forces in Central Europe to reopen them short of a political concession. By such action this or other less dramatic actions the Soviets could not only demonstrate to us that they are not to be trifled with but also bring out the most latent tensions inherent in the NATO alliance structure.

The same divisive effect could be achieved, albeit less dramatically, by a misbegotten attempt to accelerate "the internal contradictions of capitalist strategy" by increasing Soviet theater nuclear capability. It would not surprise me to find that within the next several years that the Soviets have introduced a whole new generation of tactical rockets and missiles (to replace or augment Frog, Scud, and Scaleboard) into their forces located in Central Europe.

Over the last several years the Soviets have been deploying considerable quantities of the self-propelled 152mm artillery systems. There has been increasing speculation in Europe that these weapon systems are capable of firing a low yield tactical nuclear device and that warheads may be soon deployed. If such an eventuality occurs it will erase the last semblance of NATO tactical nuclear superiority represented by the current 155mm and 203mm artillery systems. NATO has long assumed that nuclear artillery provided a substantial advantage to the defense which, because of its accuracy, response time, and direct battlefield impact serves as an inhibitant to the attackers massing of armor. However, when both sides have nuclear artillery of comparable range and warhead size, it is far from self evident that mutual possession inherently favors the defense.

If the Soviet artillery systems are equipped with a nuclear capability it would not be out of the question for us to "discover" sometime in the 1980s that these warheads have an enhanced radiation (ER) effect—a Soviet neutron bomb. Contrary to many statements that were made during the recent Western neutron debate, low yield accurate artillery delivered munitions with an ER capability are likely to aid the attacker more than the defender because it is the latter's infantry, deployed on the ground in relatively static and open positions who are far more vulnerable than fast moving armored columns. Needless to say that the political reaction in Europe accompanying such a "discovery" would create considerable public pressure for a mutual cessation of TNF modernization and possibly a no first use agreement.

Many in the West are acting as if cruise missile technology were beyond the reach of Soviet science. It is only a matter of time and resource commitment. They could appear in much larger quantities and much quicker than we expect. The short ranges to NATO targets, their high vulnerability, and the great number of Soviet medium bombers, a Soviet theater oriented ALCM could significantly tip the TNF balance scales with a far less sophisticated technology.

These speculations could certainly be characterized as alarmist and I am not predicting them. On the other hand the Soviets may not wait for NATOs TNF modernization to mature or for the United States to regain strategic ascendence. Of course, there is nothing in SALT II that would prevent Soviet TNF "posturing" either except their desire to keep the treaty in force.

Less dramatic but no less significant, even in the absence of Soviet actions (other than verbal abuse) following the rejection of SALT II, would be the negative impact on allied politics. Having committed themselves to favoring the treaty its rejection could lead to the most devisive tendencies. While some would hope that rejection would lead to a new vigor in U.S. world leadership, others would see it as a symbolic proof of American administrative division and impotence. In the rejection of SALT II, there are those in Europe, and their numbers are currently growing, who would argue that individually their countries should maintain the momentum of detente and approach Moscow to negotiate the best deal they can. The effects of such action on the NATO alliance would be catastrophic.

Thus, on balance, the onerous aspects of the rejection of the SALT II Treaty seem to have a more immediate and dangerous consequence for the stability of our European alliance than would be the more tangential negative consequences of ratification. On the other hand it is a commentary on the current state of U.S. military preparedness and the perception of U.S. leadership within the alliance that such coercive elements as Soviet crisis manipulation, TNF posturing or playing on European fears, must be considered with respect of the ratification of this treaty.

With or without SALT II, if the current trends with Central Europe continue the day will come when the credibility of the U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee to our European allies will not be in doubt but a recognized anachronism. The political result is not likely to bear any resemblance to the much maligned status of Finland. If one must use analogies, the European environment is far more likely to resemble "Balkanization" rather than "Finlandization", with all the attendant instabilities and dangers to world peace.

V. CONCLUSIONS

With respect to SALT II, the stability in Central Europe and the security of the NATO alliance, I have one recommendation: the United States must increase the American forces deployed in and programed for Central Europe. I would not recommend this as a formal condition to the Treaty, but it seems only prudent that if SALT II is going to have a fraction of the success its proponents hope, the Treaty should neither undermine the Euro-Strategic Relationship nor be undermined by current force imbalance in Central Europe.

The administration has made major strides in this direction. The positive actions of the Secretary of Defense and his advisor on NATO Affairs have had a noticeable impact in giving a renewed sense of purpose to the alliance, enhancing the commitment of its membership and in initiating major substantive improvements. Nevertheless the administration's NATO initiatives desperately need additional congressional support. Inflation is hollowing out much of the increased NATO oriented defense spending, each of the services require additional support if they are to fulfill their NATO oriented missions, and there are many areas for force improvements that need even greater emphasis. Two years ago I described these initiatives as helpful actions to help redress the European imbalance. Now I believe they are the minimum necessary to keep it from getting worse.

Arms control and the theater force improvement can be mutually supported rather than mutually exclusive. A dynamic U.S. leadership which encompasses both a combined European oriented strategy and puts the security of our allies above the good will of our opponents could produce a restabilization of the European military balance. I could think of no more meaningful contribution which could come in the wake of the current SALT II debate than the conveyance of the message to the Soviet Union that they cannot have it both ways: that Europe and the United States are indivisible. The security of one directly affecting the other. That the stabilization produced by arms control with one alliance partner must ultimately be available to all.

Senator ZORINSKY. This hearing is in recess until Monday at 10 a.m. We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., September 10, 1979.]

SALT II TREATY

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1979

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph Biden (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Church, McGovern, Biden, Javits, Percy, Helms and Hayakawa.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

Today the Subcommittee on European Affairs is honored to have a particularly distinguished group of witnesses to testify on the subject of allied attitudes toward the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty that is before the U.S. Senate. Appearing first is Prof. Stanley Hoffmann, a very eminent expert on American foreign policy in general and alliance relations in particular. The subcommittee will then hear from a panel consisting of four European parliamentarians, each of whom is an active member of the North Atlantic Assembly. While it has long been a tradition of the Foreign Relations Committee to receive testimony only from American citizens, an exception is being made today because of the importance of our subject, and because this group of men represents an interparliamentary organization which is an adjunct to NATO, and in which Members of the Congress regularly participate as part of their formal responsibilities.

Gentlemen, I look forward to hearing the testimony of each of you, and I would like to thank you for making the long journey across the ocean to help us with what many view as a U.S. question, but which I believe is an Alliance question.

As we begin, I would like to insert in our record, testimony from Prof. George Kennan, who was invited to be here with us today, but unfortunately could not appear because he has been temporarily hospitalized. He was kind enough, however, to send us a short statement in which in discussing the SALT issue he displays his characteristic lucidity as well as a certain understandable pessimism about our ability to manage the superpower relationship in a calm and rational manner.

[Prof. George F. Kennan's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEORGE F. KENNAN, PROFESSOR EMERITUS, THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY

I appreciate the invitation to appear before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and regret that ill health has made it impossible for me to do so. The following represents, for whatever interest it may hold for the members of the Subcommittee, a summary of those views which I would have presented to the members of the Subcommittee had it been possible for me to appear.

1. I would like to say at the start that I am not an enthusiast for such negotiations as those out of which the present SALT agreement has flowed. I never regarded the SALT negotiating process as the best means of trying to bring about the control and reduction in nuclear weaponry. It seemed clear to me from the start that the pace of advancement in military technology was faster, and would continue to be faster, than the predictable pace of such negotiations; and this, I believe, has been borne out by recent experience. Talks of the SALT variety have, no doubt, a certain positive value as one more form of communication between the Soviet Government and our own; but they should not be expected to produce adequate results unless they are accompanied by unilateral measures of restraint on both sides in weapons development.

I did not, therefore, expect much more from these negotiations than has actually come out of them; and this last I regard as wholly inadequate for the overcoming of a situation which is becoming more burdensome and potentially more dangerous with the passage of every year.

2. On the other hand, whereas what has been achieved to date in these negotiations, as represented by the final agreement, does not go very far, it is positive as far as it goes; and it seems clear to me that the rejection of it would be a tragic, and perhaps final, blow to the entire effort to bring about the control and reduction of this form of weaponry. It would also be an unnecessary blow. While claiming no expertise on the technical aspects of the problems at issue, I cannot see that there is anything of real significance which we would like to do in the strengthening of our own armed forces which the terms of the treaty would prevent us from doing; nor am I able to see that there are any of the dangers which critics of the treaty profess to see in it which would not exist, and in an even more acute form, if there were no treaty at all.

For these reasons, I favor ratification of the treaty, always bearing in mind that it has, and could have, only a modest practical value. Its ratification should be regarded, I consider, only as a beginning, not an end, to what needs urgently to be done if the increase in nuclear arsenals, which have already achieved nightmarish dimensions, is to be halted.

3. While recognizing that failure of ratification of the SALT accord would have serious and highly unfortunate effects on Soviet-American relations, I would like to warn against the assumption that everything depends on this one factor. There is, it seems to me, reason to suppose that Soviet attitudes towards Soviet-American relations have already been deeply affected by a number of other developments of the past four or five years. It would be unrealistic not to recognize the probability that there are already important factions in the Soviet structure of power which would argue, on the basis of recent experience, that no real improvement of Soviet-American relations could be had, except at a price which no Soviet leader would be willing to pay. Such people would maintain that other alternatives ought therefore to be found. There is also good reason to assume that views of this sort will inevitably enter into the crisis of succession to the Brezhnev regime—a crisis which cannot now be far off. While ratification of SALT would certainly strengthen the hands of those who have supported Mr. Brezhnev's policies towards this country, just as rejection of the treaty would strengthen those of his hard-line opponents, it would be wrong to suppose that this would be the only factor, or even necessarily the decisive one, in the designing of the policies of a post-Brezhnev regime. For this, other factors, including our policies on trade, on credits, on "human rights," and on China, would have to be taken into consideration.

4. Finally, I see no reason why the ratification of the SALT accord should be influenced by Soviet behavior in other areas of United States-Soviet relations. This is not, as I see it, a favor we are doing the Soviet Government, for which we could expect concessions in other fields. If this is the way we regarded it, we ought not to have entered into these negotiations in the first place. We have, in my own view, as deep an interest as they have in bringing about, if possible and to the extent possible, a reduction in nuclear armaments and the removal of the immense dangers associated therewith. If this requires negotiation even with a regime whose policies and actions in other fields are unacceptable to us, I consider that we have no choice but to pursue such negotiations; and I think we should not try to sell

twice over, for purposes ulterior to this undertaking, whatever concessions we find it possible to make with a view to arriving at an acceptable agreement.

The CHAIRMAN. Professor Hoffmann, please begin in any manner which is most comfortable to you, and again, welcome to the committee.

STATEMENT OF PROF. STANLEY HOFFMANN, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.[1]

Mr. HOFFMANN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to read some excerpts from my testimony in which I deal with two different issues. The first one is the agreement itself, its flaws and its advantages. The second one, since the agreement does not exist in a vacuum, is the military and political environment.

Let me begin with some remarks about the agreement itself. I see it as having some flaws and many advantages. I find three flaws, none of which are fatal. First of all, from the viewpoint of arms control, it has been pointed out that the treaty allows for a vast increase in the number of warheads, in the development of new launchers, and the modernization of existing forces. Once more it has become clear that arms control and arms reduction are not the same thing.

However, it is true that the restrictions imposed by SALT II are more comprehensive than those of SALT I and will constrain and regulate the arms race more than did SALT I. Moreover, the alternative to this agreement is most likely to be not a better agreement with deep cuts, but no agreement for a long time and political tension.

Second, from the viewpoint of American security, opponents of the treaty have pointed out that it allows the Soviets to keep their heavy missiles and that it leaves our land-based missile force vulnerable to a Soviet first strike in the early or middle 1980's, but this vulnerability was not created by SALT II, and the agreement leaves us free to take steps to try to reduce it.

While heavy missiles give the Soviet a throw weight advantage, the number of warheads capable of hitting missiles is a far more significant measure. Precisely, the treaty puts limits on the numbers of Soviet warheads and in the long run the treaty also places the heavy Soviet missiles in jeopardy since it bans mobile heavy missiles.

Third, from the viewpoints of both security and arms control, the provision of the protocol which temporarily bans land- and sea-launched cruise missiles of a range superior to 600 kilometers, but imposes no restriction on the SS–20 and no other restriction on the Backfire bomber than Mr. Brezhnev's promise, leaves much to be desired.

Soviet weapons systems aimed at our allies in Western Europe have not been curbed. We have, however, accepted to place restrictions on systems that could give us a comparable ability.

However, this is no reason to repudiate the protocol as it now stands. We could not deploy those cruise missiles before 1981 anyhow, and the protocol allows the United States and its allies full freedom to deploy a middle range mobile land-based missile

[1] See page 289 for Professor Hoffmann's prepared statement.

capable of reaching Soviet targets from positions in Western Europe, so this third flaw can be reduced to small proportions.

The advantages of SALT far exceed the disadvantages. First of all, from the viewpoint of security, the Soviets have accepted a number of major restrictions that blunt their throw weight advantage, slow down their threat to the Minuteman, make a mobile land-based missile system more survivable, and attainment of overall Soviet strategic superiority less possible.

It is true, as Secretary Kissinger said in his testimony, that quantitative limits on launchers are not the most significant measures but SALT II goes much beyond this by limiting the number of warheads that can be placed on each type of launcher and by limiting quite strictly the number and type of new ICBM systems or the conversion of existing ones.

Without SALT, the problems which the Soviet buildup and the gallop of technology have created for us would worsen, since the Soviets could have many more launchers and particularly Mirv'ed ones, many thousands of more warheads on these, more heavy missiles, more new types of ICBM's, more Backfire bombers, and more methods of concealment.

Those who argue that the Soviets aim is strategic superiority and political exploitation still have to explain why the U.S.S.R. has accepted the handicaps created by this agreement, and if the tentative answer is that the Soviets have obtained an end to the American lead in technology, there remains a need to explain why the Soviets did not obtain a ban on airborne cruise missiles, the Trident submarine, the M–X, or more accurate warheads.

Second, from the viewpoint of arms control, the treaty will provide both sides with a modicum of predictability. It will also help lay the foundations for efforts in other areas than those covered by SALT, such as a comprehensive test ban, efforts at limiting conventional or theater nuclear arms races, and nonproliferation.

Third, from the viewpoint of security and arms control, SALT is important because it provides the main cooperative element in Soviet-American relations at present, and there are two main reasons why this link has to be preserved. First, our common interest in limiting nuclear war does in fact create a common bond. It is absurd to invoke the lack of trust and fundamental differences between us and the Soviets as arguments against a balanced SALT agreement. In the nuclear age especially, it is between adversaries that such an agreement is indispensable. If trust and a common code of behavior existed, the elaborate network of formal deals could be replaced by informal understandings.

Fourth, our allies, Western Europe and also Japan, are keen on preserving what has been accomplished through détente. Since they have no or practically no arms control agreements with the Soviets, they have built a network of cultural and economic relations and political consultation. We have no comparable network. For our allies, the preservation and pursuit of SALT are evidence of continuing convergence between their course and ours. They want both security and détente, and they worry not only when they suspect us of neglecting the European balance of forces in favor of the global strategic one but also when they hear us arguing about security versus détente.

For the United States to reject the SALT agreement after 7 years of bargaining would weaken our allies' confidence in America's ability to follow a steady and responsible course.

Let me now turn to the military and political environment on which opposition to SALT has concentrated.

It has been said that our strategic situation has seriously deterioriated, and that the Soviets have launched an unprecedented geopolitical offensive. Let me start with the strategic issues, two of which are worth mentioning, Soviet strategic conception and the growing vulnerability of our land-based missiles.

It has been said that the United States has put all of its eggs in the basket of the doctrine of mutual assured destruction, whereas the Soviets are following a war-winning strategy. This strikes me as a distortion of reality. First, it is true that we had in the sixties proclaimed the virtues of mutual assured destruction, but the more the Soviets succeeded in reducing our superiority, the less credible our strategy of massive retaliation for all occasions became, and the more warheads we had, the more opportunities for selective and accurate targeting. As a result, we developed the idea of a limited counterforce strategy which may not be a war-winning strategy—nobody has yet explained how nuclear war can be won—but certainly is a war-fighting strategy.

On the other side, the Soviet strategy is not a simple war-winning strategy that treats nuclear weapons like ordinary ones. The Soviets have repeatedly acknowledged the folly of nuclear war or superiority. On the other hand, their conception differs from ours. In Moscow, deterrence is seen not as the opposite of war, not as sharply distinct from defense, as we tend to do, but as part of the science of war, and inseparable from defense, because they assume that war is still possible and must, if it comes, aim, as before, above all at the destruction of enemy forces; and since war may come, they believe they have an interest in limiting damage to themselves.

Now, the question raised by this difference in conceptions is, does it matter? It has not prevented pragmatic incremental bargaining on arms control. Indeed, the difference makes arms control more rather than less necessary while also making it more difficult. The problem with the difference is that it allows for wide divergences in the assessment of Soviet strategic purposes. First, does the Soviet design aim at winning a nuclear war or only at deterring us from resorting to nuclear weapons and at limiting damage to Soviet society if deterrence fails?

My own assessment is that it aims at the latter. The Soviets are fully aware of the enormity of our capabilities, hence their determination to try to reduce them; and the limitations they have accepted in SALT II are far more comparable with the second interpretation than with the first.

However, even the second interpretation presents serious problems for us, because there is another alternative. Is the Soviet conception essentially defensive or is it primarily offensive, aimed at making it possible for them to win either without resort just to nuclear weapons, for instance, by resorting to conventional weapons, or through pressure, through blackmail, through the political

exploitation of their advantages in regional balances and the composition of nuclear forces.

Now, it is here that the issue of Minuteman vulnerability comes in. We have for months now been obsessed by a nightmare scenario. At the height of a political crisis, for instance in Europe, we would let ourselves be intimidated by the Soviets' ability to destroy our ICBM's, leaving us with no alternative to capitulation, other than mutual destruction.

This scenario strikes me as perverse and as an extraordinary instance of self-intimidation and self-scare. First, purely in military terms, the Soviets could never be sure that an attack on all our land-based forces, which would cause considerable civilian casualties, would not trigger off our remaining retaliatory force, 75 percent of our arsenal. For the Soviets, it would be a cosmic roll of dice, expecting perfect success on their side and cool, rational control on ours.

If the Soviets simply waged selective strikes against our land-based missiles, we would have enough ICBM's to retaliate against their land-based forces, and anyhow, the scenario of a nuclear war of attrition is highly dubious. The ultimate threat in the nuclear age remains the menace of city destruction. Counterforce war can give a side victory only if it deters the loser from carrring out the supreme threat, and this is quite independent of the momentary military balance, since the ability to hit the other side's cities exists whether one is superior or inferior in first strike forces.

Second, even in military terms, after a Soviet first strike aimed at all our ICBM's, if we chose not to attack their cities, we would have another alternative to capitulation. Given our advantages in bombers and air-launched cruise missiles, we would have huge residual means of hitting Soviet military targets, and enough warheads left to be able to hit Soviet cities later.

Third, the vulnerability of land-based forces is not an American problem only. Both sides' land-based missile forces will be vulnerable.

Fourth, it is impossible to prove that the outcome of political conflict in the last 30 years has been determined by the exact ratio of strategic military forces. It is the relative importance of the stake to each side in every crisis which has been decisive. Now, to be sure, we may try to fortify our resolve and to make that importance more manifest by having essential equivalence in nuclear forces, as Secretary Brown has stated, but nuclear equivalence or superiority did not help us in Vietnam and there are other ways to bolster one's resolve and to demonstrate one's commitment.

I come to the conclusion that the seriousness of our strategic situation, vis-a-vis the Soviets, has been much exaggerated. If essential equivalence means that we must be perceived by others, and that we must perceive ourselves as able to do whatever the Soviets are technically able to do, then a limited deployment of the M–X is justified. If, however, one concludes, as I do, that there is nothing to be gained by having a first-strike ability against land-based missiles, the M–X becomes more difficult to justify—by contrast with just giving a mobile basing system to Minuteman.

In the meantime, our main military effort ought to be aimed at shoring up regional balances. None of the scenarios that entail the

use of strategic nuclear weapons really makes sense, neither massive retaliation nor limited counterforce. The function of nuclear weapons is likely to remain deterrence from their use. This means that the real danger lies in the problems of regional instability in a world strategically fragmented under a stable superpower nuclear umbrella.

In the specific case of Western Europe, what is needed is both modernization of conventional forces and an effort at restoring the theater nuclear balance in such a way both as to deprive the Soviets of any reason to believe that they could start a conventional war and keep it from escalating, and so as to provide an incentive for mutual limitations and reductions in theater nuclear forces.

Finally, let me make a few remarks about the political environment itself. Two issues must be addressed here, that of Soviet behavior and that of American power.

It has been asserted that the Soviets have launched a geopolitical offensive precisely because military might is the only dimension in which they are a superpower. I believe that this view imposes far more coherence and design on Soviet policy than is warranted by reality. Frankly, what has happened since I sent this paper has not changed my opinion. Rather than as a deliberate, planned and masterly march toward world domination, Soviet policy is much easier to interpret as first a relentless attempt at achieving equality with the United States by breaking the American monopoly of control of the high seas, or of means to intervene all over the world, and imposing Soviet participation in the settlement of all major disputes, and second, as the skillful exploitation of opportunities, many of which arise either without having been created by the Soviets or through the actions of a Soviet client or ally.

To be sure, recent Soviet successes are profoundly irritating to Americans, but the idea of linking explicitly arms control agreements to Soviet good behavior does not deserve being revived. It suggests that such agreements must somehow be in the Soviets interests more than in ours, which is false.

It also suggests that they are so much in the Soviets interest that we could use them as a lever and shortcut to obtain Soviet acquiescence to our idea of international stability and moderation, a very static idea. Not only is it hard to believe that a power that has never given up the effort to tilt the correlation of forces in the world in its favor would do so in exchange for mutually beneficial arms restraints, but we must also reflect first that we ourselves would not like to have to give up the pursuit of unilateral advantages—think about the Middle East or relations with China—and that we would object violently to any Soviet attempt to subordinate SALT or Soviet cooperation in nonproliferation efforts to our behaving the way they would like us to behave in every part of the world.

There is in any case an implicit linkage. If the Soviets do rock the boat too much, they will find it impossible to get the American Senate and American opinion to endorse arms agreements that see incompatible with such behavior. If it is military might only that bolsters the Soviet claim to world power, then the appropriate strategy for us is first to constrain that might through SALT and

arms control bargains, second, to match it and help others match or deter it in those areas where it is already deployed, and third, to see to it that third party conflicts do not provide the Soviets with opportunities to project and inject their power in a manner detrimental to our interests.

Strategic arms control agreements should not explicity be linked to anything. However, their own progress will depend on the superpowers' ability to manage their inevitable contest in a less antagonistic way.

Next, those who speak of the retreat of American power seem to me to lump together very different factors. One is inevitable comparative decline. The preponderance which we had in economic and military might in 1945 simply could not last.

The second factor is quite different. It consists of recent American defeats. In almost every instance, we find that our failure was due not to a lack of material power, but to a deficiency in political analysis and skill, in the use of our power, in our capacity to control the outcomes, in our ability to anticipate events and to either exploit opportunities or get out of hopeless situations in time or align ourselves with the forces that were destined to prevail, not in order to capitulate to them, but in order to influence them. In other words, it has to do not with muscle but with brain.

On the other hand, the world as seen from Moscow is not rosier than the world as seen from here. China's drive for development, its rapprochement with Japan, largely because of Soviet bungling, at least partial peace under American auspices in the Middle East, continuing negotiations under Western auspices about Zimbabwe and Namibia, the consolidation and enlargement of the European community, the cooling of relations with India, continuing discontent in Eastern Europe, quagmires in Eritrea and Afghanistan, all of this shows that growing might is not a perfect answer on the other side, either.

A third factor lumped with the other two is our alleged lack of will or resolve, but will, resolve, or taking a stand become much too easily show without substance and empty rhetoric or recipes for disaster. The key problem here is that the instruments of control on which we used to rely, the application of military force or assistance, the provision of economic aid, are simply inappropriate or insufficient in three kinds of issues that dominate today's agenda: Economic problems—the energy crisis, inflation, recession—disputes between states both of which happen to be our friends or our allies, and internal disorder in friendly countries whose problems are too deep to be resolved by covert action.

The real drama is the divorce between an expectation of control and the difficulties of influence. It is not the absence but the impotence of power in a world in which America's own preponderance and position as guardian of the status quo make it the inevitable target of all the discontent.

In concluding, let me say that although there are more than enough reasons to worry about the future of America's role in the world, I am more disturbed by some conceptual or perceptual deficiencies that mark the way Americans look at the world. The first deficiency is the tough guy approach to international affairs; the number of problems likely to be resolved or even just improved by

displays of force and dramatic acts of commitment is limited. Such acts are often useful in a crisis, but there is no substitute for political skill before, even during and after the crisis.

Yet there is in the land a nostalgia for big sticks and heroic strikes, for a kind of "High Noon" version of international diplomacy, for a world policed by America's sheriffs or marshals, for the superiority of American might and simplicity of moral division between good and evil that such a world entails.

The Carter administration has been good at resisting such pressures, but one does not win much support by pointing out what mistakes one has not made, what follies one has avoided, especially not when the official voice is as hesitant and cacophonous as has sometimes been the case in the past 3 years.

There is a second manifestation of the same flight from the imperatives of political analysis and skill; the obsession with calculations of strategic nuclear equivalence and in particular of Minuteman vulnerability. It is as if numbers of warheads or launchers, figures of throw-weight and potential destruction provided one with a gruesome but welcome certainty, with a firm and measurable handle over the messy uncertainties of international relations.

The overemphasis of very improbable doomsday military scenarios, like the recurrent belief in the domino theory shows a never-abandoned quest for precision and predictability. Not only is this a misplaced quest, it is also dangerous insofar as it takes attention and money away from the indispensable study of the mass of complex economic, social, and political forces that crisscross in more than 150 countries, and that we desperately need to understand if we want to be able not to control them, because this is far beyond one country's reach, but to affect them and to prevent them from pushing us into the decline we seem to fear so much.

Arms control agreements such as SALT II which do not lull us into complacency about the military balance, at least provide us with more leeway to turn to what really counts. I won't say ultimately in order not to offend those who believe that military might remains decisive in the last resort, but certainly in the daily contests of world politics.

A rejection of SALT or amendments that would in effect destroy the agreements would encourage the national obsession with numbers of weapons, concentrate attention on the arms race, and divert it from all the rest.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Professor, thank you very much. I cannot restrain myself from making the following statement. As have my colleagues, I have sat through hours and hours of these hearings, I personally have traveled halfway around the world to speak with our allies, and with our antagonists, and I have heard everyone from Dr. Kissinger, who is presented as the high prophet, straight through to my gas station attendant, comment on SALT.

Your statement is without question the best statement I have ever heard. And I sincerely mean that. We always say when we hear a witness: "Thank you for the very cogent, informative statement. You have obviously put a lot of time into it, et cetera." But let me do away with all that pap. This is the best statement I have ever heard. I hope we can get every one of my colleagues to read it.

Whether or not they will agree with it, I don't know, and for that matter I would like to get all my constituents to read it. It would be incredibly helpful in our effort to deal maturely with the subject matter not only of SALT but also all the related foreign policy questions it is raising.

Well, enough praise. Let me now ask a few questions. We will proceed with the 10-minute rule, gentlemen. Let me inform our friends from Europe that there is a senatorial disease that everyone becomes afflicted with once elected, and that is the inability to stop talking. I am probably the most afflicted of all my colleagues. Those little lights up there operate just like traffic lights. When that red light goes on, not you, but we must stop.

There were a number of points that you raised, and I hope I will have an opportunity to come back after my colleagues have asked some questions and go into more detail in the second round of questioning. Let me begin by discussing the question which I raised during my recent trip to Europe with several of my colleagues. I believe it was unintentionally misrepresented by Dr. Kissinger in his recent visit to Brussels to speak at the Center for Strategic and International Studies Conference held a week or so ago.

DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE MISSILE WHEN PROTOCOL ENDS

Let me quote from Dr. Kissinger. He said:

> But first, let us have another effort at negotiating. I saw a report about a distinguished American Senator—

I assume he was referring to me—

> returning from Moscow the other day who said, "It is virtually certain that cruise missiles will be deployed and that NATO will undertake a buildup of its own unless negotiations to a new treaty are begun soon." This is still our position. All the Soviets have to do is begin a negotiation to keep us from doing what they are already doing, negotiating or not negotiating.

Since I was the only one who made a statement remotely close to that, I would like to clarify for the record and also ask for your comment on what I said. I informed the Soviets, Mr. Gromyko in particular, that it was my opinion that when the protocol ended, it ended, and that there was virtually no prospect of the U.S. Senate allowing the President to continue the protocol.

I was, as strongly as I could, admonishing the Soviets not to engage in what Dr. Kissinger suggests they would, and that is to say, "We will negotiate beginning January 1, 1982, what we will do about the extension," which would in effect be a de facto extension of the protocol.

As I said, I firmly believe that the United States will deploy—not if, not maybe, but will. This leads us to the point that if the Soviets or anyone interested in arms control wants to prevent the deployment of the GLCM's and SLCM's, the Soviets will have to make some major concessions prior to December 31, 1981. That was one of the reasons for my visit to Moscow, to urge that process be moved on rapidly.

That brings me to this question: Do you believe that there is a need for the United States, absent the Soviet Union making a demonstrable concession, to deploy in the earliest time frame that we can?

Mr. HOFFMANN. I think there is a need for a number of reasons. I am not sure that cruise missiles are the answer. In fact, as I said in the paper, I am almost sure that ground-launched cruise missiles are not the answer, simply because one would need far too many of them, and the same could be achieved more easily both in military and in diplomatic terms through an extended Pershing which is not covered by the protocol at all. But I think such a deployment would probably be necessary partly because the Soviet advantage in theater nuclear weapons due to the SS–20 and Backfire does create for the first time the possibility of a Soviet conventional strike that they could think might remain purely conventional. As long as we had thousands of short-range nuclear warheads in Europe and all they had was the very heavy missiles capable of reaching not only Western Europe but also the United States, I think it would have been foolish for them to believe that they could start a conventional strike and not have us resort to nuclear weapons.

Once they have achieved superiority in theater nuclear forces, they may believe that they will thereby intimidate us or prevent us from resorting to our tactical nuclear weapons. I think it is mainly in order to redress that imbalance that we have to do something, but again, whether it takes the form of cruise missiles, I do not know.

There is another problem which your question raises. When it comes to getting the Soviets to make concessions in exchange for our continuing in some form to curtail ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles, we may find them rather edgy because their viewpoint is likely to be that they have already made some concessions in this treaty in exchange for our acceptance of restrictions on the cruise missiles.

They may object to our asking them to pay twice. On the other hand, there is political reality which is exactly the one you mentioned, so they may very well have to.

The CHAIRMAN. Whether or not they think it is double paying, they should understand that the register shuts on that date.

RATIONALISM IN POLITICAL PROCESS AND DEBATE

I have many more questions, but let me skip to the end of your statement, because I am sure that my time is rapidly evaporating. In your closing analysis, you suggested that the SALT debate, with all of its numbers and focus on an identifiable adversary, is a kind of surrogate for our concern with other problems which we find it difficult to understand and resolve, such as energy, inflation, and regional conflicts.

Do you have any suggestions as to how we can make our political process and debate any more rational, or is the genie out of the bottle now?

Mr. HOFFMANN. No; I don't think it is out of the bottle. At least I hope not, but I am going to give you an extraordinarily parochial answer. I am an educator, and it seems to me that there is no substitute for education, that what is missing and what has been missing for many years is simply sufficient attention to everything that goes on in the outside world and that is neither a crisis—we get very excited when something happens, when the Shah falls or

when a Somoza falls, but we have not followed it up to then, we are not very sensitive to what happens which is neither a crisis nor a purely military affair. Yet if you look at what I called in the paper the litany of American defeats in recent years, such as Iran, the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, South Yemen, what have you, it seems to me that in almost every instance rational debate would presuppose much more knowledge of what is going on and also, I think, a much more relaxed view of things, much more confidence in the fact that in a world of 150 powers, there are very few definitive victories or definitive defeats. My former colleague, Mr. Kissinger, has, as you know, very often talked about the terrible consequences of Angola. Well, if one looks at international affairs today, it is very hard to look at Angola as a pure and simple Soviet satellite. We have not found the Angolans totally untractable, for instance, when it came to negotiating over Zimbabwe and Namibia.

So, it seems to me that what is needed is much more willingness to study cultures and political forces and economic forces very alien to us. Here, what disturbs me is, I would say, perhaps not the disappearance, because that is too big a word, but the shrinking of the space devoted to the outside world by the American media in the last 10 years. Now it is inevitable that American Senators and Congressmen concentrate primarily on domestic problems because this is indeed what concerns their constituents most, but at a time when the interconnection between domestic politics and foreign policies is as great as it is, if our legislators do not spend enough time on political, economic, and social forces by contrast with the seductive military calculations, there will be a terrible tendency to treat foreign policy as an appendix of domestic politics. That is very dangerous.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. My time is up. I would like to get back to you to discuss Cuba and a number of other things, but I will yield to Senator Percy.

Senator PERCY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WILL TO USE MILITARY FORCE IF NECESSARY

Professor Hoffmann, I agree with our chairman that your contribution this morning is an unusual one. The preparation that you have put into your testimony is very apparent indeed. You do speak from a very unique perspective, having your roots deep in Europe and in the United States. Your European ties could be possibly exceeded only by our next distinguished panel, where we break our precedent of not having testimony from foreign leaders but because of the unusual nature of the contribution that they can make, we are looking forward to it. I would like to ask you as someone who has a strong background in Europe and can speak on behalf of the Europeans, this question. The question came up last week about not just having military equality but the will to use military force if necessary. This question has been raised recently in Europe at high levels.

From your perspective, if the Soviets invaded Western Europe and if it appeared as though the conventional forces of NATO would be inadequate to protect Europe, do you have any doubt at all that the American people would support and that this adminis-

tration or any that you can see succeeding it would fail to use nuclear weapons if necessary to save Europe?

Mr. HOFFMANN. I have no doubts about it. What worries me are two different sorts of connected issues. The first one is what would happen if one were faced not with an overall Soviet conventional attack, but with a more limited operation, what has sometimes been referred to in NATO jargon as the "Hamburg Grab," although why anybody would want to grab Hamburg and just stop I have never understood. [General laughter.]

There, of course, serious questions would arise, and I think it would be necessary in the case of a limited operation to try to prevent what would be in fact the incineration of Europe before one reaches the nuclear level.

Second, what also worries me is the following kind of ping pong game, if that is the expression. A number of Americans go over to Europe and tell the Europeans that America has lost its will, that America has lost its nerve, that really the threat of massive retaliation has become totally incredible and therefore they shouldn't really count on this.

This is very often said with a very good purpose. The purpose is to get the Europeans to do more about their conventional defense and to be less reluctant—I am thinking, for example, of the Federal Republic of Germany—about the basing of new theater nuclear weapons. But even though the intention is good, the result is to make the Europeans wonder about the credibility of the American deterrent.

The only thing that reassures me is that even though the Europeans have repeatedly been told over the last 18 years actually, that our strategic force is no longer credible and even though many Europeans have believed it, the Soviets have never quite believed it, because it is they who have to take the initiatives for a worldwide disaster, and they can never be sure that whatever these Americans say is really likely in a test, in a crisis, to be the policy of the U.S. Government. They cannot be sure that we will indeed let ourselves be, so to speak, dismantled piecemeal.

This is one of the reasons why I am not so worried.

Senator PERCY. Thank you for your answer.

SOVIET COMBAT FORCES IN CUBA

The last week has been devoted to an issue that dominated the news, the presence of Soviet combat forces in Cuba. Over the weekend, there have many been arguments and analyses presented on all sides by journalists. The administration has attempted to deescalate this, and, in their terms, put it back into perspective. From the perspective of Europe, how would you look at this from that side of your own personality and background? Could you give us your view as to the importance of those forces and how you perceive a scenario unfolding where we do not get into a position where we have made it literally impossible for the Soviets to do anything, and we in the Senate have boxed ourselves into a point where we can't back off.

Mr. HOFFMANN. Well, first of all, I am sure, and I have already seen evidence of this in recent European press analyses that the Europeans see a great difference between the Cuban missile crisis

of 1962 and the presence of one combat brigade which may or may not have been there for a very long time, so there is a kind of general hope—both on substantive grounds and because nobody wants to go through the nervewracking experience of October 1962—that the United States will manage this reasonably and coolly.

Second, I have seen very few comments in Europe suggesting that anybody ought to link SALT to this. This is not seen as quite comparable or as in anybody's interest. Third, I think that we should negotiate this with the Soviet Union, and I think we have some arguments or some weapons at our disposal.

First of all, it is quite clear that the chances of this treaty have not exactly been improved by the discovery. The Soviets, I think, are quite keen on getting the treaty through for reasons of their own, and I think that the point certainly can be made by the Secretary of State in his negotiations with the Soviets that even though there is no explicit linkage, there is an implicit one.

Second, if this incident should lead to some kind of modus vivendi which would make it clear once and for all, first of all, what margin of maneuver the Soviets are allowed to have in Cuba, and second, how close to each superpower's borders forces of the other are allowed to stand, it would not be a bad thing. We can point out to them that even though we have, of course, both listening devices close to their borders and troops in NATO at the edge of the Iron Curtain, we don't have, as far as I know, ground combat forces that close to the Soviet Union itself.

We could point out that some reciprocity is not a bad idea. If all of this fails, I think we have probably means of pressure within the Caribbean which do not have to escalate to blockade and so on, but I would hope this would be resolved diplomatically and quietly, and I would personally say—although I know this is not the view of many of your colleagues—without too much of a sense of hurry, I don't think there should be ultimata or anything of that sort.

The situation has existed for many years. If the Soviets are mainly there to man listening devices, well, it is difficult for us to object to listening devices. They are part of the system of SALT, strange as it seems, and if they are in excess of this then I think we should negotiate their exit, but I don't see any reason to get terribly excited.

Senator PERCY. Thank you, Professor.

SOVIET PRESSURE AND EXPANSION THROUGH BLACKMAIL

In your testimony, you say that the Soviet goal may be, and I will quote, "to pressure and expand but not through the use of conventional weapons but through blackmail." I wonder if you could elaborate on that very important observation, and also comment on whether their strategy is feasible.

Mr. HOFFMANN. I think whether their strategy is feasible really depends very much on not only our resolve but also on our skill. I think one of the reasons why they accumulate military force in an area like Europe is not because they believe that some day they will be able to grab Europe by war—I think they know they would mainly grab ruins, after which they would have to feed and administer the people, and it is already not that easy to keep the Poles,

Hungarians, Czechs, et cetera, under control—but because they believe that sooner or later perhaps the Americans will go home, and the Europeans, faced with an enormous mass of Soviet troops there, will indeed let themselves be intimidated.

I do not like to use the term "Finlandization" because I think it is an insult to the Finns, and also because the situation of Western Europe and that of Finland is not comparable. The choice for Finland was between Finlandization and should we say "Czechlandization." The choice in Western Europe is between independence protected by us and Finlandization. So it is not the same. I think this may be the Soviet calculation, and in that situation, if you go back to Europe, the way of thwarting this kind of expectation is simply to see to it that we do not pull out all our troops, and that we have a reasonable balance of tactical nuclear forces.

There is no evidence whatsoever of Finlandization of Western Europe in the last 10 or 15 years even though every 6 months somebody comes and says that they are already beginning to be Finlandized. The latest that we have heard, in fact, during these meetings, has been a really quite extraordinary argument. It is the idea that the European Governments' failure to oppose SALT II is evidence of their being Finlandized. Well, you can't win.

It is a combination of diplomatic skill and military presence that can prevent this from happening.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very kindly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Professor.

[Professor Hoffmann's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PROF. STANLEY HOFFMANN

I would like to address myself to two different issues. The first is the SALT II agreement itself (by which I mean the treaty, protocol, and joint statement). How good a treaty is it, from the (sometimes conflicting) viewpoints of American security and of arms control? This should be our primary concern. But the agreement does not exist in a vacuum, and many members of the Senate, along with many witnesses, have made it clear that their assessment of the agreement depends on their view of the military and political environment of SALT: What are Russia's and America's positions in the world at present, and what are the trends for the 1980's? I shall examine this environment in the second part of my testimony.

I

The SALT agreement, negotiated by three American administrations, has some flaws, and many advantages.

A. I find three flaws, none of which is fatal.

1. From the viewpoint of arms control, it has often been pointed out that the treaty, while imposing a number of numerical ceilings and, for the first time, qualitative restrictions on the arms race, actually allows for a vast increase in the number of warheads, for the development of new launchers (new ICBM, air-launched cruise missiles), and for the modernization of existing forces. Once more, it has become clear that arms control and arms reduction are not the same thing. One of the most frequent arguments of those who, like Secretary Brown in his remarkable and forceful testimony, defend the agreement against the charge that it is dangerous for U.S. security, is that SALT II allows the U.S. to pursue all of its defense plans for the 1980's—an argument which has cost the treaty some support on the side of those for whom arms limitations should be the first priority, once the capabilities for mutual assured destruction exist in both superpowers.

It is true that the treaty is a modest step on the road to arms control—more modest than the Carter Administration would have liked. But it is also true, first, that the restrictions imposed by SALT II are more comprehensive than those of SALT I, and, while allowing the nuclear arms race to continue, will constrain and regulate it more than did SALT I. (Between SALT I and II, there was in fact a

formidable acceleration of the arms race on both sides, partly because of the deployment of new weapons systems, partly because of the failure to limit or ban MIRV; a failure which blots the record of the American negotiations in particular—we were ahead then—and which is largely responsible for the Minuteman vulnerability problem.) Secondly, the carefully balanced limits imposed by SALT II should make future reductions possible, and can be seen as a prerequisite. Thirdly, the alternative to this agreement is most likely to be, not a better one, with deep cuts, but tension and no agreement for a long time.

2. From the viewpoint of U.S. security, opponents of the agreement have pointed out that it allows the Soviets to keep their heavy missiles (for which we have and plan no equivalent) and that it leaves our land-based missile force vulnerable to a Soviet first strike in the early or middle 1980's. But this vulnerability (whose importance will be discussed below) was not created by SALT II, and the agreement leaves us free to take steps to try to reduce it, by making present and future U.S. land-based missiles mobile. Moreover, with or without the MX, Soviet land-based missiles (a component of the Soviet nuclear force much larger than U.S. land-based missiles in our arsenal) will become vulnerable also, given the increasing accuracy and power of penetration of our warheads. And while the heavy missiles give the U.S.S.R. a throwweight advantage, the number of warheads capable of hitting missiles is a far more significant measure. Precisely, the treaty puts limits on the numbers of Soviet warheads, and, in the long run, places the heavy Soviet missiles in jeopardy, since it bans mobile heavy missiles. It has been pointed out that the threat to our ICBM force would exist even if the SS–18 did not. Soviet willingness to dismantle part of their SS–18 arsenal (as requested by the Carter Administration in March, 1977) would have undoubtedly made this threat less ominous. But if this agreement is not a mutual disarmament treaty, it is hard to imagine either side letting it be unilateral (even partial) disarmament treaty. The Soviets had good reasons to see our March 1977 offer in this light: we were asking them to give up part of what they had, with no comparable cuts by us, only promises of future restraint.

3. From both the viewpoints of security and arms control, the provision of the Protocol which temporarily bans ground and sea launched cruise missiles of a range superior to 600 Km., but imposes no restriction on the SS–20 and no other restriction on the Backfire bomber than Mr. Brezhnev's promise not to produce more than 30 a year leaves much to be desired. Soviets weapons systems aimed at our allies in Western Europe have not been curbed, even though they have serious strategic implications (they deprive us of the advantage we had in theater nuclear weapons as long as the Soviets disposed only of long-range strategic weapons against West European targets; we have only a small number of planes based in Europe, capable of hitting objectives in the U.S.S.R.). We have, however, accepted to place restrictions on systems that could give us a matching ability.

It is, of course, true that the duration of the Protocol is short and there is merit in the suggestion made by Henry Kissinger, of an amendment that would subordinate post-1981 limitations on U.S. theater weapons to Moscow's acceptance of similar limitations on "Soviet weapons performing comparable missions." We must remember, however, that the Soviets may look at the matter quite differently. It was our allies who insisted on keeping American Forward Based Systems (and consequently Soviet systems aimed at Europe but not at the United States) out of SALT. And the American concession on ground and sea launched cruise missiles—our only planned weapons systems that we have accepted to curtail, if only temporarily—is likely to be seen by the Soviets as having already been paid for, i.e. by Soviet acceptance of various bans (such as that of the SS–16) and limitations in the agreement. Their willingness to pay twice may not be very great.

This, however, is no reason to repudiate the protocol as it now stands: we could not deploy such cruise missiles before 1981 anyhow, nor is it at all certain that they are the answer to the problem of the "Eurostrategic" balance. It is, indeed, clear that at least ground-launched cruise missiles are not. And the protocol allows the United States and its allies full freedom to deploy a new middle range mobile land based missile capable of reaching Soviet targets from positions in Western Europe. Thus, this third flaw can be reduced to small proportions: a question mark about the ease with which our SALT III negotiators will be able either to negotiate Soviet restrictions on their theater weapons in exchange for prolonging the ban on sea-based cruise missiles, or else to get the Soviets to accept an end to the ban—and a hope that the American willingness to give up, even temporarily, one type of weapon of interest to our allies, in exchange for Soviet restrictions on weapons capable of hitting the United States but none on weapons capable of hitting them (a move of greater symbolic than military meaning) will not be repeated. I have not

mentioned the non-circumvention provision of the treaty, for it is not likely to turn out to be troublesome in our relations with our allies.

B. The advantages of SALT far exceed the disadvantages.

1. From the viewpoint of security, it is important to stress, as Secretaries Vance and Brown have done, that the Soviets have accepted a number of major restrictions that blunt their throwweight advantage, slow down the threat to Minuteman, make a mobile land-based missile system more survivable, and attainment of overall Soviet strategic superiority less possible. Secretary Brown and General Seignious have provided this Committee with figures and examples. It is true that quantitative limits on launchers are not the most significant measure. But SALT II goes much beyond this, by limiting the number of warheads that can be placed on each type of launcher, and by limiting quite strictly the number and type of new ICBM systems or the conversion of existing launchers. It is clear that without SALT, the problems which the Soviet buildup and the gallop of technology have created for us would not only persist but worsen, since the Soviets could have many more launchers, and particular MIRVed launchers, many thousand more warheads on these, more heavy missiles, more new types of ICBM, more Backfire bombers, and more methods of concealment. Those who worry about verification would have to prove how an uncontained arms race would improve our ability to detect what our adversary does, and to prove that under the agreement a Soviet violation could remain undetected long enough to upset the balance of forces. Those who argue that the Soviets aim at strategic superiority, and at its political exploitation, still have to explain why the U.S.S.R. has accepted the handicaps created by the agreement; and if the tentative answer is that, in exchange for some limits, the Soviets obtain an end to the American lead in technology, there remains a need to explain why, in exchange for these limits, the Soviets did not obtain a ban on air-borne cruise missiles, on the Trident submarine, or on the MX, or on more accurate warheads.

2. From the viewpoint of arms control, despite the permissiveness of the agreement, it will constrain the arms race, as indicated above, and above all—thanks in part to the articles on verificaton—provide both sides with a modicum of predictability. This, to be sure, helps defense planners, but it also helps arms control, especially in providing both a comprehensive baseline for reductions and the foundations for new efforts in areas other than those covered by SALT: a comprehensive test ban, a non-proliferation strategy, efforts at limiting conventional or theater nuclear arms races. Each of these efforts has to overcome formidable obstacles of its own. Each one would be underminded or set back by a failure to go through with SALT II.

3. From the viewpoints of security and arms control, SALT II is important because it provides the main—almost the exclusive—cooperative element in Soviet-American relations at present. There are two main reasons why this link has to be preserved. First, our common interest in avoiding nuclear war does in fact create a common bond. I will discuss its limits later; but both sides have an interest in managing their unavoidable competition in such a way as (i) to leave them with a considerable margin of maneuver and error before having to reach fateful decisions about military confrontation or threats, (ii) to make it easier for them to protect their common concern with survival and with avoiding the kind of spread of nuclear weapons that might be uncontrollable by the superpowers. These two goals can obviously be met more easily if arms control agreements provide an underpinning of predictability, a reassurance against worst-case hypotheses, and a basis for joint anti-proliferation policies. It is absurd to invoke lack of trust and fundamental differences as arguments against a balanced SALT agreement. In the nuclear age especially, it is between adversaries that such an agreement is indispensable: if trust and a common code of behavior existed, the elaborate network of formal deals could be replaced by informal understandings and parallel unilateral moves.

Second, our allies—Western Europe but also Japan—are keen on preserving whatever has been accomplished through détente. Since they have no, or practically no, arms control agreements with the Soviets, they have built a network of cultural and economic relations, and political consultations. We have no comparable network. For our allies, the preservation and pursuit of SALT are evidence of continuing convergence between their course and ours. They want both security and détente; both major parties in West Germany, for instance, emphasize both the need for NATO to deal with the issues of theater nuclear imbalance, and the need to continue reaping whatever benefits have been obtained through détente—they range all the way from humane contacts between Germans from East and West, to business involvements in Eastern Europe, to the kind of protection against any further erosion of America's strategic nuclear sword (or shield) which SALT II entails. Our allies are worried, not only when they suspect us of neglecting the European balance of forces for the global strategic one, but also when they hear us

arguing about security versus détente. This fear is not evidence of their "Finlandization"—unless one applies this silly term (insulting to the Finns) to every concern for improved and mutually beneficial relations between East and West. For the United States to reject the SALT agreement, after 7 years of bargaining, would weaken our allies' confidence in America's ability to follow a steady and responsible course. This faith has already been eroded by a series of disagreements over economic and nonproliferation policies. Those who worry about the decline of American power should remember that some of the worst wounds are self-inflicted.

II

Opposition to SALT II has concentrated less on the agreement than on the international strategic and political environment. It has been said that our strategic situation has seriously deteriorated: both the intercontinental and the European theater nuclear balances have been shifting to the advantage of the Soviets, their capacity to intervene far from their borders has increased while ours has declined, and they have launched an "unprecedented geopolitical offensive." SALT II, insofar as it ratifies "a dangerous shift," is therefore viewed by such critics either as a symbol of our decline, or, at best, as a harmless snapshot of an uncomfortable moment: let us not tear it up, but let us do all we can to reverse the trend. I will try to address myself briefly to the strategic and to the political aspects of the problem.

A. Two strategic issues are worth mentioning: Soviet strategic conceptions, and the growing vulnerability of our land-based missiles. It is these two issues which are said to put us in grave danger, exposing us to blackmail and to the risks of escalation control by a foe determined to use its growing military capabilities in order to reach its political goals.

1. It has been said that the United States has put all its eggs in the basket of deterrence, more specifically the doctrine of mutual assured destruction (M.A.D.), whereas the Soviets are following a war-winning strategy. This strikes me as a distortion of reality. First, it is true that we have, in the 1960's, proclaimed the virtues of M.A.D. There were good reasons for this: if the main thing was the possession of a "survivable" second strike force capable of devastating the enemy's population and economic centers so as to deprive him of any reason for a surprise attack, if wisdom also suggested leaving one's own country exposed so as to leave oneself with no hope of getting away with such an attack, the quest for security and for arms control would merge, and stability would be achieved. However, the more the Soviets succeeded in reducing our erstwhile huge superiority, the less credible a strategy of massive retaliation for occasions became; and the more warheads we had, the more opportunities appeared for selective and accurate targeting. As a result, the idea of a limited counterforce strategy—not a first-strike force aimed at disarming our enemy, but the targeting of other military objectives—reappeared in the Nixon Administration and has been confirmed by Secretary Brown. It may not be a war-winning strategy (nobody has yet explained how nuclear war can be won), it certainly is a war-fighting strategy.

Second, Soviet strategy is not a simple war-winning strategy that treats nuclear weapons like ordinary ones. Soviet leaders have repeatedly acknowledged the folly of nuclear war or nuclear superiority. On the other hand, Soviet conceptions differ from ours. In Moscow, deterrence is seen, not as the opposite of war, nor as sharply distinct from defense, as we tend to do, but as part of the science (or art) of war, and inseparable from defense; not, I think, because the Soviets' objective is victory in the classical sense, but because they assume that war is still possible, and must, if it comes, aim as before above all at the destruction of the enemy's forces. To them, therefore, deterrence means being capable of deterring us from striking first; and this is best done, by having the ability not only to bust cities, but also to destroy a sizable fraction of our nuclear forces—preemptively if necessary (not, as Professor Pipes rightly points out, out of the blue, but at the height of a crisis). And since war may come, the Soviets believe they have an interest in limiting damage to themselves: both the development of heavy missiles capable of destroying part of the American striking force, and the civil defense efforts, correspond to this concern.

Clearly, such a conception is not an endorsement of M.A.D. (Soviet acceptance of the ban on ABM, which was sometimes interpreted as one, was probably due to the fact that our technological superiority might have made it easier for us to protect our forces, thus thwarting the Soviets' ambition to be able to destroy part of them.) Nor is it an assent to our notion of stability: given their conception, it made sense for them to keep expanding their ICBM force even after they had caught up with ours. The reasons for their adoption of this design are multiple. they do have a profound sense of technological inferiority, they see us as setting the direction of the arms race and therefore define their mission as being able to intimidate the intimi-

dator. Therefore, insofar as they have a notion of stability, it is not ours (i.e. neither side should be able to threaten the other's retaliatory force), it is the idea of stopping the development of new weapons systems once they have caught up with us. Russia's traditional emphasis on defense, and the major role of the military in strategic thinking and decision-making also account for this.

Now, the question raised by the difference in conceptions is: does it matter? It has not prevented pragmatic, incremental bargaining on arms control, with each side succeeding in blunting what it considered the most threatening new developments of the rival. Indeed, the difference makes arms control more rather then less necessary (if both sides embraced M.A.D., one wouldn't need such elaborate "structures of peace"), while also making it more difficult. The problem with the difference is that it allows for wide divergences in the assessment of Soviet strategic purposes: does the design aim at winning a nuclear war, or only at deterring us from resorting to nuclear weapons and at limiting damage to Soviet society if such deterrence fails? A "war-fighting" strategy can aim either at both, or at either one of these goals. My own assessment is that it aims at the latter: the Soviets are fully aware of the enormity of our capabilities (hence their determination to be able to reduce them!) and the limitations they have accepted in SALT II are far more compatible with the second interpretation than with the first.

However, even the second presents serious problems for us. For there is still another alternative. Is the Soviet conception of deterrence essentially defensive (i.e. "intimidate the intimidator so he can't pressure you"), or is it primarily offensive, aimed at winning without resort to nuclear weapons ("intimidate him so as to be able to pressure him and to expand")? The Soviet build-up of the SS-20 and Backfire bombers allows one to suspect that the latter may well be the goal (to be sure, they are first-strike weapons that could be used against military objectives, including American FBS, in Western Europe, but despite their precision, they would create such vast civilian casualities that a war that began with such an attack could not remain "limited" easily: it could trigger the U.S. strategic forces. The new Soviet weapons seem much more apt at deterring our inferior theater nuclear weapons from being used to stop a Soviet conventional thrust, while the Soviet strategic force would deter our strategic force. As long as we had superiority in theater forces, it would have been risky for the Soviets to begin a conventional strike and to believe that no nuclear weapons would be used). Indeed, the Soviet goal may be to pressure and expand, not through the use of conventional weapons, but through blackmail, by exploiting politically Soviet advantages in regional balances and in the composition of nuclear forces.

2. This is where the issue of Minuteman vulnerability comes in. For many months now, we have been almost obsessed by a nightmarish scenario: at the height of a political crisis, we would let ourselves be intimidated by the Soviet ability to destroy our ICBM force, leaving us with no alternative to capitulation other than mutual destruction. It is in order to escape from this dilemma that we are planning a mobile MX—which won't be ready until after our Minutemen have become vulnerable. This scenario strikes me as perverse, and as an extraordinary instance of self-intimidation and self-scare. First, in purely military terms, it is hard to believe that the Soviets could ever be sure than an attack on all our land-based forces—which would cause considerable civilian casualties would not trigger our remaining retaliatory force (ca. 75 percent of our arsenal!) into devastating the U.S.S.R. For the Soviets, it would be a cosmic roll of dice, expecting perfect success on their side and cool, rational control on ours. As for selective Soviet strikes against our land-based missiles, they would leave us with enough ICBM to retaliate against their land-based forces, and the scenario of a nuclear war of attrition is highly dubious. The gradual destruction of the enemy's first-strike forces, and even of his military installations, is not sufficient to give one "victory," as long as his second strike force is intact: one would win only if the "loser" spared the "winner's" own cities. The ultimate threat, in the nuclear age, remains the menace of city destruction, and counterforce nuclear war can "succeed" only if it deters the loser from carrying out the supreme threat. This is independent of the momentary military balance, since the ability to hit the other side's cities instead of (or in addition to) his forces exists whether one is superior or inferior in first-strike forces.

Second, again in military terms, after a Soviet first strike aimed at our whole ICBM force, if we chose not to retaliate against their cities, we would have another alternative to capitulation: given our advantages in bombers and ALCM, we would have huge residual means of hitting military targets, including the remaining Soviet land-based missiles (assuming they wait for our counter-blows; but if they don't wait, and aim at ports, factories, airfields, the civilian casualties might be enough to provoke radical escalation); and we would still have enough warheads left

to be able to hit Soviet cities later. In other words, there is no decisive Soviet advantage in striking first.

Third, as I have pointed out before, the vulnerability of land-based forces is not an American problem only. Indeed, it is not clear that any of the mobile basing systems discussed until now (other than those which would, in effect, turn land into sea-based missiles) would guarantee invulnerability, given the vast numbers of warheads available to each side. And yet, precisely because there is no decisive Soviet advantage to striking first, and even with the planned MX, we could probably not destroy the whole Soviet ICBM arsenal in a first strike, not be sure to escape Soviet massive retaliation if we did; the balance of terror is much less delicate than Albert Wohlstetter had suggested.

Fourth, it is impossible to prove that the outcome of political conflicts has been determined by the exact ratio of strategic military forces. Both sides—not just the U.S.S.R.—refrained from the use of force during the Berlin crises of 1948 and 1968–61, despite our nuclear superiority; and if we prevailed, it was because we had shown resolve and demonstrated the importance of the stake to us. In the Cuban missile crisis, the local advantage we had, and the same demonstration of resolve, plus (again) our ability to put on the Soviets the burden of having to risk initiating the use of force, gave us our victory, rather than the imbalance of strategic forces. It is the relative importance of the stake to each side, that is decisive. To be sure, we may try to fortify our resolve, and to make that importance more manifest, by having "essential equivalence" in nuclear forces, as defined by Secretary Brown. But nuclear equivalence or superiority did not help us in Vietnam, and there are other ways to bolster one's resolve and to demonstrate one's commitment.

3. I come to the conclusion that the seriousness of our strategic situation vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. has been much exaggerated. What would deter us, in a crisis, from attacking Soviet cities, is not the new phenomenon of Soviet heavy missiles and throwweight superiority, it is the old fear of retaliation against our cities—it is mutual vulnerability. On the other hand, scenarios of protracted counterforce nuclear war sparing cities are inherently dangerous: the more accurate each side's missiles become, the greater the enemy's incentive to preempt. To develop one's counterforce capability may well, however, be ultimately irrelevant, except as a waste of money: because of the uncertainty of fighting such an unprecedented war, of the problems of command and control, of the fact that city-busting is always in reserve, the enemy may never be sure that we actually mean to fight a limited nuclear war, and he may therefore be quite unwilling to test, try and see.

If "essential equivalence" means that we must be perceived by others, and perceive ourselves, as able to do whatever the Soviets are technically able to do—i.e. destroy part of the enemy force—then a limited deployment of the M–X is justified (even through we could probably achieve the same result with our existing forces). If however one concludes, as I do, that there is nothing to be gained by having a first-strike ability against land-based missiles, it becomes much more difficult to justify the M–X (as opposed to merely giving a mobile basing system to Minuteman). Ultimately, the choice for both superpowers will be between expensive mobile systems that may not guarantee invulnerability anyhow, and could seriously complicate the verification of arms control, and gradually phasing out ICBM altogether. Since the Soviet arsenal consists so largely of ICBM, the coming predicament will hit them much more than us.

In the meantime, our main military effort ought to be aimed at shoring up regional balances. None of the scenarios that entail the use of strategic nuclear weapons really makes sense—neither massive retaliation, not limited counterforce. The function of these weapons is likely to remain deterrence from their use: even if both sides don't endorse it as their common strategy, mutual assured destruction is sufficiently possible to perpetuate, as Churchill saw it, safety as the sturdy child of terror, and survival as the twin brother of annihilation. This means that the real danger lies in the problems of regional instability, in a world strategically fragmented under a stable superpower nuclear umbrella. In the specific case of Western Europe, what is needed is both modernization of conventional forces, and an effort at restoring the theater nuclear balance in such a way (a) as to deprive the Soviets of any reason to believe that their advantage in this respect could allow them to exploit their conventional superiority and to keep a conventional war from escalating to the nuclear level, (b) as to provide an incentive for mutual limitations and reductions in theater nuclear forces.

However, regional balances depend decisively on underlying political and economic factors. We must end with some remarks about the "geopolitical" situation.

B. Two issues must be addressed separately: that of Soviet behavior, that of American power.

1. It has been asserted that the Soviets have launched a "geopolitical offensive," precisely because military might is the only dimension in which they are a superpower; it has been stated that the combination of internal tensions (due to economic inefficiency, nationalities' claims and succession troubles) and strategic advantages in the early 80's might lead them to take greater risks and act more aggressively than in the past.

I believe that this view imposes far more coherence and design on Soviet policy than is warranted by reality. I agree with Robert Legvold, certainly one of our most balanced and knowledgeable analysts of Soviet behavior, that military power has never been quite the central and blunt instrument of Soviet foreign policy which so many tell us it is. Surely, without such power the U.S.S.R. would neither have won the Second World War (after the disasters of 1941-early 1942), nor have obtained territorial gains and superpower status after the war. Nor would the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe survive without the Red Army. However, rather than as a deliberate, planned and masterly march toward world domination, Soviet policy is easier to interpret as (a) a relentless attempt at achieving equality with the United States, i.e. at breaking the American monopoly of control of the high seas or of means to intervene all over the world, and at imposing Soviet participation in the settlement of all major disputes, whether in the Middle East or in Southern Africa, (b) the skillful exploitation of opportunities, many of which arise either without having been created by the U.S.S.R., or through the independent action of a Soviet client or ally. The U.S.S.R. has moved, but with considerable caution. Its presence in the Arab-Israeli conflict has led to its expulsion by Egypt, and to increasing ambivalence on the part of Syria and Iraq. The litany of Angola, the Horn of Africa, South Yemen, Afghanistan, Vietnam, throws together disparate events, tied only by two threads: low risks and opportunities provided by previous Western mistakes or defeats or (in the case of Afghanistan) indifference.

To be sure, Soviet successes such as these are profoundly irritating to Americans. But the idea of linking explicitly arms control agreements to Soviet "Good" behavior does not deserve being revived. It suggests that such agreements must somehow be in the Soviets' interest more than in ours, which is false. It also suggests that they are so much in the Soviets' interest that we could use them as a level and shortcut to obtain Soviet acquiescence to our idea of international stability and moderation—a very static idea which looks at every change of regime in "our" parts of the world with suspicion. Not only it is hard to believe that a power that has never given up the effort to tilt the "correlation of forces" in the world in its direction, would do so in exchange for mutually beneficial arms restraints. But we must reflect that (a) we ourselves would not like to have to give up the pursuit of unilateral advantages (banned by the fatuous language of the 1972 Soviet-American agreement): for instance in the Middle East peace process, or in relations with China, (b) we would object violently to any Soviet attempt to subordinate strategic arms control, or Soviet cooperation in non-proliferation efforts, to our behaving the way they would like us to behave in every part of the world. Henry Kissinger, who had come to office with firm ideas about linkage, later became the most convincing exponent of the view that our mutual interest in arms control precluded any effort to link SALT to other matters. There is, in any case, an implicit linkage: if the Soviets rock the boat too vigorously, they will find it impossible to get the American Senate and public opinion to endorse arms agreements that seem incompatible with such behavior.

If it is military might only that bolsters the Soviet claim to world power, then the appropriate strategy for us is (a) to constrain that might through SALT and other arms control bargains, (b) to match it, and help others match or deter it in those areas where it is already deployed, (c) to see to it that third party conflicts do not provide the U.S.S.R. with opportunities to project and inject its power in a manner detrimental to our interests. Our competition with the U.S.S.R. will continue. But competition can take many forms: from outright confrontation, to cooperative contests. It is, in the long run, in our interest to move more toward the latter end of the spectrum—both because there are indeed many vital issues that cannot be handled without some participation of the U.S.S.R., and because only if there is some density of cooperative relations in which the Soviets have a stake, may consideration of linkage be effective (for instance, between economic help from the West and Soviet external behavior; explicit linkage to domestic behavior is not likely to work). Strategic arms control agreements should not be explicitly "linked" to anything. But their own progress will depend on the superpowers' ability to manage their contest in a less antagonistic way.

2. Those who speak of the retreat of American power lump together very different factors. One is an inevitable comparative decline. The preponderance of military and economic power enjoyed by the United States in 1945 could not last; it was clear that the U.S.S.R. would want to close the gap (and even if we have often been wrong in expecting less of a Soviet nuclear build-up than took place, our own massive program of 1961, plus the humiliation inflicted on the Soviets during the Cuban missile crisis, gave them two powerful jolts and incentives). The economic recovery of our allies, as well as the economic integration of Western Europe, were our own objectives. The rise of OPEC is another element in that comparative decline; ironically, what has given OPEC its power is the very spectacular economic growth of the advanced capitalist states, based on cheap energy.

A second factor is quite different. It consists of recent American defeats; see the litany above, and add Iran, or the disintegration of our position in Turkey or in Pakistan. But on the one hand, in practically every instance, we find that our failure was due, not to a lack of material power, but to a deficiency in political analysis and skill—in the use of our power, in our capacity to control the outcomes, in our ability to anticipate events and to either exploit opportunities, or get out of hopeless situations in time, or align ourselves with the forces that were destined to prevail (not in order to capitulate to them but in order to influence them). This has to do not with muscle but with brain. On the other hand, the world as seen from Moscow is not rosier than the world as seen from here. China's drive for development, its rapprochement with Japan (largely because of Soviet bungling), at least partial peace, under U.S. auspices, in the Middle East, continuing negotiations, under Western auspices, about Zimbabwe and Namibia, the consolidation and enlargement of the EEC, the cooling of relations with India, and continuing discontent in Eastern Europe—not to mention quagmires in Erithrea and Afghanistan: all of this shows that growing might is not a perfect answer on the other side either.

A third factor in the alleged "retreat" is lack of will or resolve. But will, resolve, taking a stand, become all too easily grandstanding, show without substance, and empty rhetoric—or, as in Vietnam, recipes for disaster. The key problem here is that the instruments of control on which we have been used to rely: the application of military force or assistance, and the provision of economic aid, are simply inappropriate or insufficient in three kinds of issues that dominate today's agenda: economic problems such as the energy crisis or the questions of inflation and recession that plague us and our allies, disputes between states both of which happen to be our friends or allies, internal disorder in friendly countries whose troubles are too deep to be "resolved" by covert action. Thus the real drama lies in the divorce between an expectation of control and the difficulties of influence; it lies not in the absence but in a kind of impotence of power—in a world in which America's own preponderance and position as guardian of the status quo make it the inevitable target of all the discontented, of all the efforts at rewriting the rules of every game.

3. In concluding, let me say that although there are more than enough reasons to worry about the future of America's role in the world, if one looks at trends in the world economy, or at world population figures, or at political and social conditions in developing countries, or at racial issues and festering conflicts in most areas, or at productivity figures in the United States, I am more disturbed by some conceptual or perceptual deficiencies that mark the way in which Americans look at the world. The recent debate on the Panama Canal as well as the current one on SALT have thrown alarming light on these flaws (and also on serious institutional problems concerning the ability of a system of checks and balances to work effectively at a time when isolation is impossible but patriotic mobilization around an imperial President is also ruled out, and when one observes both a weakening of parties and a rise of single-issue pressure groups).

A first deficiency is the tough-guy approach to international affairs. The number of problems that are likely to be resolved or even just improved by displays of force and dramatic acts of commitment is limited. Such acts are often useful, in a crisis. But they are no substitute for political skill, before, even during, and after the crisis (or so as to avoid one). And yet there is, in the land, a nostalgia for big sticks and heroic strikes, for a kind of High Noon version of international diplomacy, for a world policed by America's sheriffs or marshals, for the superiority of American might and simplicity of moral division between good and evil which such a world entailed. The Carter administration has been good at resisting these pressures, but one doesn't win much support by pointing out what mistakes one has not made, what follies one has avoided—especially not when the official voice is as hesitant and cacophonous as has been the case in the past three years.

There is a second manifestation of the same flight from the imperatives of political analysis and skill: the obsession, criticized above, with calculations of

strategic nuclear equivalance, and in particular of Minuteman vulnerability. It is as if numbers of warheads or launchers, figures of throwweight and potential destruction, provided one with a gruesome but welcome certainty, with a firm and measurable handle over the messy uncertainties of international relations. The overemphasis of politically very improbably doomsday military scenarios is, like the recurrent belief in dominoes, proof of a never-abandoned quest for precision and predictability. But not only is this a misplaced quest, it is also dangerous insofar as it takes attention and money away from the indispensable study of the myriad of complex economic, social and political forces that criss-cross in more than 150 countries, and that we desperately need to understand if we want to be able, not to control them, for this is beyond any single nation's reach, but to affect them, and to prevent them from pushing us into the decline we seem to fear so much. For there are many ways in which great powers fall into decadence. Military ineptitude is only one of them, and certainly not the one that threatens us most. Getting out of touch with what is happening outside is another way of failing. Arms control agreements such as SALT II, which do not lull us into complacency about the military balance, at least provide us with more leeway to turn to what really counts, I won't say "ultimately," in order not to offend those who believe that military might remains decisive in the last resort, but certainly in the daily contests of world politics. A rejection of SALT, or amendments that would in effect destroy the agreements, would encourage the national obsession with numbers of weapons, concentrate attention on the arms race, and divert if from all the rest.

The CHAIRMAN. Our next witnesses are representatives from the North Atlantic Assembly, and they are to come forward as a panel.

We have Mr. Paul Thyness, President, from Norway, Patrick Wall from the United Kingdom, Chairman of the Military Committee, Klaas G. de Vries of the Netherlands, Rapporteur of the Military Committee and Peter Corterier, of Germany, who is the Rapporteur of the Political Committee.

As we now begin with this delegation from the North Atlantic Assembly, I would just like to emphasize how very important I consider this testimony to be. It is a common practice in this country to describe congressional participation in interparliamentary organizations as mere junketing, and perhaps in some instances the Congress may be guilty of that. But it certainly does not apply to our participation in the North Atlantic Assembly, which I consider to be an important institution serving the valuable purpose of facilitating communication between elected representatives of all the NATO countries. Moreover, I believe that today's hearings graphically illustrate that purpose by allowing the Foreign Relations Committee an opportunity to hear firsthand a balanced presentation of opinion of American allies on this most important issue.

Gentlemen, once again, I welcome you and look forward to your testimony.

I yield to Senator Church, who would like to make a comment.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to join in welcoming this distinguished panel to the committee. It is very unusual for the committee, if not unprecedented, to hear testimony from foreign citizens. We thought that in this case the committee should bury its former practice, because you gentlemen are representatives of the North Atlantic Assembly. We have our own membership in that Assembly, and it is an arm of the NATO alliance.

Furthermore, the attitude taken by our NATO allies toward the SALT II Treaty is highly relevant to the Senate's consideration of the treaty, and bears upon the final judgment that the Senate will

reach. For that additional reason we thought that it would be advantageous to this committee to hear your testimony.

So, we welcome you here cordially, and I want to say that this particular testimony is being given to the Subcommittee on European Affairs and that its chairman, Senator Biden, within the past few months, has completed a trip to Western Europe, has visited with our allies in the NATO alliance at very high levels, and that the trip was well received.

All of us on the committee were proud of the work that Senator Biden did on that trip, and we felt that it had a most productive effect.

With that, Senator Biden, I commend you for your own trip, your own efforts in connection with NATO and its relationship to this treaty, and I join with you in welcoming these distinguished witnesses this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Church, and thank you for putting into focus just how important the testimony is, for if each or any of your countries were in firm opposition to this treaty, I doubt very much if any of us would want it to go forward.

Mr. Thyness, I would suggest that you and the panel proceed in any way that is most comfortable for you.

STATEMENT OF PAUL THYNESS, NORWAY, PRESIDENT, NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY [1]

Mr. THYNESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator.

Let me first of all say that we really are very grateful for the invitation to testify before this committee, because we see it as an appreciation of the concern of the alliance in connection with the SALT II Treaty.

Let me also say that I appreciate on behalf of the North Atlantic Assembly the kind words that Senator Church directed toward the assembly. I hope I can take that as a sign that Senate attendance will increase in the future, and that the Senate will not be discouraged by comments on foreign junketing, which is absolutely not the case at the North Atlantic Assembly.

Now, with your permission I would now like to turn to my views and impressions on the substance of the matter before us, that is, European reaction to SALT II. I think it is correct to say that broadly speaking, both détente and arms control measures have over the years been more popular issues with European politicians and voters than with their North American counterparts.

There are a number of historical, cultural, and geographical reasons for this which are not necessary to go into here, but I would like to warn particularly against any confusion of this attitude with any tendency toward appeasement or defeatism.

For instance, in Norway, one of your smallest allies and one of the two with a common border with the Soviet Union, recent polls have shown 84 percent of the people support our military defense and 65 percent actively support our membership in NATO. There is absolutely no tendency to uncritical accommodation to Soviet wishes, but the perspective is somewhat different from the one commonly found on this side of the Atlantic.

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[1] See page 302 for Mr. Thyness's prepared statement.

For Europeans, a normalization of East-West relations and a dialog between the superpowers is viewed more pragmatically and has a somewhat deeper and more immediate significance than perhaps is felt by most Americans.

On this background, Europeans welcomed the SALT process from the start, and European reactions to the SALT II Treaty as it has emerged have been markedly favorable. There are, of course, critical voices to be heard, but they are few. For the most part, European support of SALT II has been overwhelming.

The more generalized criticism that the treaty does not directly and specifically enhance the security of Western Europe overlooks the fact that the primary impulse behind the SALT process has been to secure limitations on intercontinental nuclear systems, and that the negotiations have not until the very last stage involved systems of direct and specific relevance to the European theater.

It will be remembered that the United States consistently and with full concurrence of our European allies has rejected Soviet efforts to include U.S. systems based in Europe. It will inevitably distort the picture if this historic perspective on the SALT II Treaty is forgotten.

That is not to say, however, that the central nuclear balance is not a relevant European concern, because it is. These systems represent the final and indispensable guarantee for the security of Western Europe, and agreement that affects this balance also affects European security, but it is extremely difficult to see how, as some critics assert, the United States is moving into a position of strategic inferiority as a result of SALT II.

On the contrary, I think it can be argued that without SALT II the prospects for continued essential equivalence in the 1980's is more, not less in doubt. Nor have I seen it substantiated that the treaty in any way undermines or diminishes the U.S. guarantee to Europe. That guarantee has always been a question of trust, unknowable and unprovable, to us and to the Warsaw Pact, and nothing in the treaty challenges that basic trust.

I would like very much to go on record here as one who feels this trust, and I know that my belief is shared by an overwhelming majority of my countrymen.

I think it must be accepted that over the last decade the military balance has tilted significantly in favor of the Warsaw Pact, leading to considerable uneasiness is most Western European countries. In Norway, our worry is mainly concerned with the Soviet naval buildup. In other countries, the focus is more on Soviet superiority in armor, and more recently on superiority in theater nuclear forces. The need to redress the balance has become pressing before the gap creates a situation in which Western Europe becomes highly vulnerable to Soviet pressure. This means that there is a need for costly modernization of conventional and theater nuclear forces in Europe, but hopefully kept within reasonable bounds by substantial arms control measures, MBFR and SALT III. But the gateway to SALT III is obviously SALT II, and it is difficult also to believe that MBFR could continue in the wake of a defeat of the SALT II Treaty.

Without SALT II, the watch will be put back several years and the climate for negotiations will inevitably deteriorate to a point

where we in fact will only be left with one option, of matching Soviet buildup at all levels, strategic, theater nuclear, tactical, conventional.

This in a no-SALT environment may prove to be a very difficult task, and much more than with a SALT II Treaty in the background. I seriously question the possibility of persuading European public opinion to back nuclear and conventional modernization if the United States rejects the SALT II Treaty. In my opinion, an acceptance of SALT II would not create a climate in Europe that would undermine military vigilance.

Rather, it would signify a willingness on the part of the western world to go along with serious arms control measures and the reluctance to participate in an unrestrained arms race that could erode public support for maintaining adequate defense postures.

Meeting the Euro-strategic requirements would require active participation on the part of the United States. Except for the British and French nuclear forces, it is the United States that holds the nuclear umbrella over Western Europe. This, of course, is of crucial importance to prevent the total defeat for our civilization. But central systems are last resort forces and not forces that directly counterbalance the kind of pressure that the Soviet Union can exert on Western Europe on the basis of conventional superiority backed by a superior theater nuclear capability.

That balance can only be achieved with American participation at all levels. Without SALT II, Europeans may have reason to fear that the United States would have to pour so much money and effort into the strategic arms race that the contribution to the defense of Western Europe will suffer. Seen through European eyes, it is obviously a much more attractive alternative to get some measure of stability into the strategic balance through SALT II and at the same time preserve the United States as an active participant in those fields which are more in need of concern in Western Europe. I do believe that this also makes good sense in the context of American security and global policies.

Now, in order to save time, I shall not go into the two points on which there has been some anxiety in Europe, the noncircumvention clause and the question of the duration of the protocol. I refer here to my written statement and to my colleagues, particularly Mr. de Vries and Mr. Corterier, with whom I believe I am in full agreement.

Let me, however, comment on the rather frequent statements heard on this side of the Atlantic that the United States did not consult with her European Allies during the negotiation process, that what was called consultations were more like briefings. The facts are that the American administration deserves high praise for the frequency with which it has informed the allies of developments throughout the negotiation process.

In matters that have been of particular concern to Europeans, the Allies have been given every opportunity to express their views fully before the United States committed herself vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly, there have been situations during the 7 years of negotiations when the consultation process did not function at its optimum. Progress in such negotiations is not always orderly and evenly spaced. Sometimes there has been little time for real

negotiations, and sometimes sensitivity of the issues has worked against the ideal form of consultation.

On the other hand, the European Allies have not always earned full marks for their active participation. I believe it can be argued that a consistently greater response from the Allies, particularly during the first half of the negotiations, would have triggered improvements in the consultations, generally.

What is of importance is two things. First, that it is very rare to meet anyone who really feels that European interests have been neglected during the negotiations, and second, when we hopefully start on the SALT III negotiations, direct European interests will be much more concretely affected.

Here, the consultations must be broadened compared to what was natural and necessary during SALT II. If the criticism aimed at SALT II consultations has served to sharpen the awareness in this respect, it will have been of real service to the alliance as such, I believe.

I would like to end my statement on the point which I believe is perhaps the single most important one, namely, the results to be expected in Europe if the treaty should not meet with the approval of the Senate. For a variety of reasons, foreign affairs have always in all countries been the particular province of the executive power. Foreigners will always have difficulties in evaluating the internal policies of another country.

We have witnessed the total incomprehension on the part of the Soviet Union of the role of the Senate in shaping American foreign policy. Here, of course, we are faced with a combination of a general problem and a specific problem reflecting the vastly different Soviet system, but the Europeans are not immune either to this compound problem. In Europe, the parliamentary system of government implies that the government will have to resign if it is voted down in Parliament on a major issue, and the system has evolved in a way that imposes great restraints on the individual member of Parliament. European members of Parliament very rarely have that freedom to exercise an independent and personal judgment which is a matter of course here in the U.S. Senate.

I am very much afraid that an adverse vote in the Senate will never really be understood in Europe, and when people do not understand something, they become suspicious, and the explanations they make up are usually rather ungenerous, if not outright hostile and accusatory.

If I had no other reason to support the treaty, this would have been enough. Previous witnesses before this committee have underlined that Allied expressions of support for the treaty have been influenced, among other things, by European domestic pressures. I believe this to be true, but it would be wrong to ascribe this pressure to European political leaders' fear of losing the next election. Few elections are lost on questions of foreign policy anyhow, and SALT II is not an issue of that kind. The pressure felt by political leaders in Europe stems from a recognition of the vital necessity of insuring public support at all times for the NATO alliance and for a national defense posture and of the devastating effect nonratification is likely to have on the credibility of both

United States leadership of the Alliance and the aims and the purposes of the Alliance as such.

We in Europe will be faced with a public opinion problem of staggering proportions, and no doubt the Soviet Union will work that for all it is worth.

I quite realize that this is only one of the many points the Senate will have to consider, and perhaps not a major one seen from this side of the Atlantic. By the Constitution of the United States, it is the right and the duty of the Senate to work the will of the American people and of the Europeans, but in the same way I as a European politician must try to persuade you of the case for Europe, and this I have tried to do.

Fortunately, I have been aided in this by my firm conviction that in the long term there is no conflict of interest between us, that nothing which harms the one can serve the other, and that no dividing influence will ever serve either. Thank you.

[Mr. Thyness' prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PAUL THYNESS

The North Atlantic Assembly is a semi-official organization of parliamentarians that was started 25 years ago—five years after the signing of the NATO Treaty—by a number of European and Canadian members of parliament soon joined by a number of prominent Senators and Congressmen from the United States, who felt that parliamentarians in a modern democracy have an increasingly important role to play in questions of foreign policy and defence as intermediaries between governments and people. To discharge these duties members of parliament needed a forum to provide a greater active involvement in the affairs of the Alliance, independent sources of information and broad contact with their colleagues from Allied nations.

The organization was first known as "The NATO Parliamentarians' Conference" and grew from an annual meeting to a permanent body that assumed the name of the North Atlantic Assembly in 1966. It has a bureau consisting of a President, three Vice Presidents and a Treasurer, one of whom must always be a North American. The bureau is supported by a Standing Committee of one representative of each national delegation, and an international secretariat situated in Brussels.

The Assembly works through five main committees: Political, Military, Economic, Scientific and Technical, and Education, Cultural Affairs and Information Committees. These committees in turn may establish subcommittees for dealing with specific issues.

The group meeting with you today has been called—for want of a better name—a Presidential Working Group. It has for various reasons not been set up a subcommittee by the ordinary procedure, and it cannot speak for the North Atlantic Assembly as such. Its main task is to coordinate preparations for the discussions on strategic arms limitations and theatre nuclear modernization at the Assembly's annual plenary session in Ottawa in late October this year.

While it cannot speak for the Assembly it is, however, a singularly representative group comprising the Chairman and General Rapporteur of the Military Committee, the General Rapporteur of the Political Committee and the President of the Assembly. These four people come from two of the greater European Allies, United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, and two small Allies, the Netherlands and Norway. Two are Conservative, two are Social Democrats. One Conservative and one Social Democrat belong to parties in government and one of each of parties in opposition. And we are all four of us deeply concerned with politico-military affairs in our respective parliaments.

With the Committee's permission I would now like to turn to my views and impressions of the substance of the matter before us, i.e. European reactions to SALT II.

I think it is correct to say that broadly speaking both detente and arms control measures have over the years been more popular issues with European politicians and voters than with their North American counterparts. There are a number of reasons for this. One of that the European nations individually cannot match the Soviet Union militarily. The United States can, and NATO collectively can, but dependence on others will never breed that deep sense of self-reliance that comes from a knowledge of being able to go it alone if necessary. No European nation can

do that, and this fact naturally colours European thinking. Another reason is that the European nations are very much aware that they would be the first casualties in any armed conflict between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. And Western Europe, with its small, densely populated territory, has been engulfed in devastating wars twice already in this century.

This attitude must not be confused with appeasement or defeatism. For instance in Norway—one of your smallest Allies and one of the two with a common border with the Soviet Union—recent polls have shown 84 percent of the people to support our military defence and 65 percent actively to support our membership in NATO. There is no tendency to uncritical accommodation to Soviet wishes. But the perspective is somewhat different from one commonly found on this side of the Atlantic. For Europeans a normalisation of East-West relations and a dialogue between the super-powers is viewed more pragmatically and has a somewhat deeper and more immediate significance than is felt by most Americans.

On this background Europeans welcomed the SALT process from the start, and European reactions to the SALT II treaty as it has emerged have been markedly favourable. There are of course critical voices to be heard, but they are few. For the most part European support for SALT II has been overwhelming.

The more generalised criticism that surfaces from time to time is directed against the treaty for not being what it was never intended to be, viz. a treaty designed to enhance the security of Western Europe specifically and directly. The primary impulse behind the SALT process has been to secure limitations on the intercontinental nuclear systems, traditionally termed "strategic" systems. This dividing of nuclear weapons systems into "strategic" and "tactical" is imprecise and generally unsatisfactory, in that it leaves out nuclear systems aimed at Western Europe. For that reason and with considerable merit it has lately become fashionable to speak of "Eurostrategic" systems. But this is a fairly recent development, and the fact remains that the negotiations have not, until the very last stage, involved systems of direct and specific relevance to the European theatre. It will be remembered that the United States consistently, and with full concurrence of her European Allies, has rejected Soviet efforts to include U.S. systems based in Europe. It will inevitably distort the picture if this historic perspective on the SALT II treaty is forgotten.

This is not to say, however, that the central nuclear balance is not a relevant European concern. These systems represent the final and indispensable guarantee for the security of Western Europe, and an agreement that affects this balance also effects European security. But apart from the tiny minority that specialises in the somewhat arcane world of strategic theory where the conclusions one reaches fairly often are of doubtful relevance to the affairs of living and breathing men, most Europeans are content to study the treaty in its broadest terms. These appear to indicate that SALT II does establish a position of "essential equivalence" where advantages for one side in certain areas are balanced by concessions in others. It is extremely difficult to see how, as some critics assert, the United States is moving into a position of strategic inferiority. Nor have I seen it substantiated that the treaty in any way undermines or diminishes the U.S. guarantee to Europe. That guarantee has always been a question of trust, unknowable and unprovable, to us and to the Warsaw Pact, and nothing in the treaty challenges that basic trust. I would like to go on record as one who feels this trust, and I know that my belief is shared by the overwhelming majority of my countrymen.

I think it must be accepted that over the last decade the military balance has tilted significantly in favour of the Warsaw Pact, leading to considerable uneasiness in most Western European countries. In Norway our worry is mainly concerned with the Soviet naval build-up, in other countries the focus is more on Soviet superiority in armour and more recently on superiority in theatre nuclear forces. The need to redress the balance has become pressing before the gap creates a situation in which Western Europe becomes highly vulnerable to Soviet pressure. This means that there is a need for a costly modernisation of conventional and theatre nuclear forces in Europe, but hopefully kept within reasonable bounds by substantial arms control measures—MBFR and SALT III. But the gateway to SALT III is obviously SALT II, and it is difficult to believe that MBFR could continue in the wake of a defeat of SALT II. Without SALT II the watch will be put back several years and the climate for negotiations will inevitably deteriorate to a point where we in fact will only be left with the one option of matching the Soviet build-up at all levels, strategic, theatre nuclear or Eurostrategic and conventional.

This in a no-SALT environment may prove to be a very difficult task, and much more than with a SALT II treaty in the background. I seriously question the possibility of persuading European public opinion to back nuclear and conventional modernisation if the United States rejects the SALT II treaty. In my opinion the acceptance of SALT II would not produce a climate in Western Europe that would

undermine military vigilance; rather, it would signify a willingness on the part of the Western World to go along with serious arms control measures and a reluctance to participate in an unrestrained arms race that could erode public support for maintaining an adequate defence posture.

Meeting the Eurostrategic requirements will also require active participation on the part of the United States. Except for the British and French nuclear forces it is the United States that holds the nuclear umbrella over Western Europe. This of course is of crucial importance to prevent a total defeat for our civilisation. But the strategic nuclear systems are last resort forces, and not forces that directly counterbalance the kind of pressure that the Soviet Union can exert on Western Europe on the basis of conventional superiority backed by a superior theatre nuclear capability. That balance can only be achieved with American participation at all levels. Without SALT II Europeans may have reason to fear that the United States will have to pour so much money and effort into the strategic arms race that the contribution to the defence of Western Europe will suffer.

Seen through European eyes it is obviously a much more attractive alternative to get some measure of stability in the strategic balance through SALT II, and at the same time preserve the United States as an active participant in those fields which are of more immediate concern to Western Europe. And I believe that this also makes good sense in the context of the American security and global policies.

At the outset of the debate in Europe some anxiety was expressed concerning the ambiguity of the non-circumvention clause. If it could involve the American assistance to the United Kingdom in the modernisation of its strategic force or the deployment to Europe of cruise missiles for use in the theatre role it would indeed have put a different complexion on the treaty, and might very well have had a serious negative effect on European attitudes. In fact I believe that before clarification on this point was obtained some skepticism was created that has not been completely dissolved. It is a fairly common phenomenon which we politicians have to live with that initial impressions die hard.

However, the Administration has repeatedly stressed, and has indeed formally stated in a letter to the NATO Council, that not only has the United States consistently rejected the inclusion of a non-transfer provision in the SALT II agreement, but it has made it clear that the transfer of weapons and technology to the Allies will continue and cannot ipso facto constitute circumvention. In the light of this statement and the testimony of Administration witnesses before this Committee I believe that any serious question on this point has been satisfactorily answered.

Another point of a similar character was the initial debate over the question of the duration of the protocol to the treaty, although this was not only a specific European concern. In my opinion critics of the treaty were quite right in pointing out the danger of the protocol being extended beyond 1981. We all know how easily such provisions become an integral part of an established order. The Administration might very well find itself in the position either having to prolong the protocol, and thereby further postponing the possible deployment of ground and sea launched cruise missiles, or refusing to prolong the protocol, and thereby appear to undermine ongoing negotiations. But that situation cannot arise when the possible extention of the protocol has been extensively debated and decided against beforehand. Witnesses for the Administration have repeatedly stressed that the protocol will end in 1981, and have also intimated that the Soviet Union has accepted this. Under these circumstances it is the prolongation of the protocol that would constitute a major new departure. Thus one of the weaker spots in the whole package has been effectively dealt with.

It has been said that the United States did not consult with her European Allies during the negotiation process, that what was called consultations was more like briefings on a take it or leave it basis.

To my mind this is largely a question of semantics. Consultations is a point on a scale that ranges from the European Allies dictating to the United States on the one side, to the Europeans being told flatly what the United States has decided at the other extreme.

The facts as I have understood them are that the Administration deserves high praise for the frequency with which it has informed the Allies of developments throughout the negotiation process. In matters that have been of particular concern to the Europeans, for instance the non-circumvention question and the questions relating to the protocol issue, the Allies have been given every opportunity to express their views fully before the United States committed herself vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly there have been situations during seven years of negotiation when the consultation process did not function at its optimum. Progress in such negotiations is not always orderly and evenly spaced, sometimes there has

been little time for real consultations, sometimes the sensitivity of the issues has worked against the ideal form of consultations.

On the other hand, the European Allies have not always earned full marks for active participation. I believe it can be argued that a consistently greater response from the Allies would have triggered improvements in the consultations generally.

What is of particular importance is two things. First, that it is very rare to meet anyone who really feels that European interests have been neglected during the negotiations. Secondly, when we hopefully start on the SALT III negotiations, direct European interests will be much more concretely affected. Here the consultations must be broadened compared to what was natural and necessary during SALT II. If the criticism aimed at the SALT II consultations has served to sharpen the awareness in this respect it will have been of real service to the Alliance as such.

I would like to end my statement on the point which I believe is perhaps the single most important one, namely the results to be expected in Europe if the treaty should not meet with the approval of the Senate.

We all know that the role of the legislature is much smaller in foreign affairs than in domestic affairs. For a variety of reasons foreign affairs has always and in all countries been the particular province of the executive power. The corollary is that when it comes to other countries all of us tend to look to a President, a Prime Minister or a Foreign Secretary to speak legitimately and responsibly for their country's interests. Foreigners will always have difficulties in understanding major differences of opinion between Government and Parliament.

We have witnessed the total incomprehension on the part of the Soviet Union of the role of the Senate in shaping foreign policy. Here we were faced with a combination of the general problem and a specific problem that has its roots in the vastly different Soviet system. But the Europeans are not immune either to this compound problem. In Europe the parliamentary system of government is prevalent, and since this implies that the government will have to resign if it is voted down in parliament on a major issue, the system has evolved in a way that has imposed great restraints on the individual member of parliament. European members of parliament very rarely have that freedom to exercise an independent and personal judgment which is a matter of course in the United States Senate.

I am very much afraid that an adverse vote in the Senate will never really be understood in Europe. And when people do not understand something they become suspicious, and the explanations they make up are usually rather ungenerous if not outright hostile and accusatory.

If I had no other reason to support the treaty, this would have been enough. Previous witnesses before this Committee have underlined that Allied expressions of support for the treaty have been influenced among other things by European domestic pressures. This I believe is true. But it would be wrong to ascribe this pressure to European political leaders' fear of losing the next election. Few elections are lost on questions of foreign policy, and SALT II is not an issue of that kind. The pressure felt by political leaders stems from a recognition of the vital necessity of ensuring public support at all times for the NATO Alliance and the national defence posture, and of the devastating effect non-ratification is likely to have on the credibility of both the United States' leadership and the aims and purposes of the Alliance. We in Europe will be faced with a public opinion problem of staggering proportions, and no doubt the Soviet Union will work that for all it is worth.

I quite realise that this is only one of the many points the Senate will have to consider, and perhaps not a major one seen from this side of the Atlantic. By the Constitution of the United States it is the right and the duty of the Senate to work the will of the American people, not the Europeans. But in the same way I as a European politician must try to persuade you of the case for Europe. Fortunately I am aided in this by a firm conviction that in the long term there is no conflict of interest between us, and that nothing which harms the one can serve the other and that no dividing influence can serve either.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Church has a full schedule, so I will yield to him to ask some questions of you, Mr. Thyness, and then we will, with the permission of my colleagues, go down the line for your other statements. Then we, the remainder, will ask the panel questions, if that is all right.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for that courtesy.

EUROPEAN ENDORSEMENT SO NOT TO OFFEND UNITED STATES

Mr. Thyness, you have made a very strong statement of support for the SALT Treaty. It is a well-reasoned statement. We have heard opponents of this treaty who testified before the committee say that although the European governments have formally endorsed the treaty, the primary reason they have done so is not to offend the United States. They have said that actually there were serious doubts about the treaty, at least in European military circles.

What is your response to that argument?

Mr. THYNESS. Well, Senator, it is, of course, practically impossible to speak for several thousand political leaders in 13 countries in Europe, and of course there are dissenting voices to be heard. That is beyond doubt. But my personal impression from speaking to political leaders in my own country and in most of the other countries of the European side of the alliance is that their expressions of support for the treaty are absolutely genuine, and that most political leaders see, as I do, that there are grave problems with which European political leaders will be confronted if this treaty is rejected.

My impression is that most of the criticism of SALT II is not particularly directed against the treaty as such, although of course it is pegged to one or two specific questions, but that it is more or less directed against what some people see as a trend in European and alliance policies going against a reasonable defense effort.

No doubt our expenditure on defense has been going down for 20 years, I believe, and the Soviet Union has gone up, but this trend is not a consequence of the SALT Treaty and will not be influenced by the SALT Treaty. As a matter of fact, I believe that the trends are straightening out, and partly perhaps as a result of the debate on the treaty as such.

REJECTION COULD REVERSE DEFENSE SPENDING

Senator CHURCH. But you say reversal of increased defense spending direction in your testimony:

> I seriously question the possibility of persuading European public opinion to back nuclear and conventional modernization if the United States rejects the SALT II Treaty.

In other words, you feel that the trend which is now in the direction of increased defense spending in Europe as well as in the United States, could be reversed in the event that the Senate were to reject this treaty.

Mr. THYNESS. Yes, sir, I do. I think that most Europeans will go for a reasonable increase in the defense expenditure, provided they are convinced that their leaders are doing what is necessary and not what is superfluous. They want to see their leaders do everything reasonable to get more balance into the East-West relationship in the military field, and this, of course, can be achieved in two ways, either by hiking our own expenditure or by getting the other side to back down a bit.

Senator CHURCH. So would it be accurate for me to conclude on the basis of your testimony that the adverse balance in Europe between conventional and nuclear forces in Western Europe and

Eastern Europe, is less likely to be redressed in the event the Senate were to reject this treaty than otherwise.

Mr. THYNESS. Very much so, Senator. I spent 14 years in the Norwegian parliament defending the Alliance and our military establishment's requirements. I see very little prospect of being heard any more if the SALT II Treaty, representing a serious attempt to get some balance into the picture through arms control, is rejected. I think it would be a hopeless situation.

Senator CHURCH. I think your testimony is very important, because what you are saying very clearly here, and I have approached the matter in three directions, or at least have approached it three times, perhaps from the same direction, is we can anticipate a weakened NATO should the Senate reject this treaty.

Mr. THYNESS. Yes, sir.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senators, may we go on?

Sentor HAYAKAWA. That would be fine.

Senator BIDEN. Gentlemen, please proceed.

STATEMENT OF PATRICK WALL, UNITED KINGDOM, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY COMMITTEE, NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY [1]

Mr. WALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

May I say what a privilege it is for us to be asked to give testimony to this important committee, and may I also say that as our President, Mr. Thyness, has emphasized, we are not speaking as representatives of our respective governments, but as individual members of the North Atlantic Assembly.

In this alliance, Mr. Chairman, the United States, as we all know, is the leader and the strongest Nation, and unless there is some fundamental disagreement, it would be quite wrong for your allies not to give you their full support. We must therefore hope that the treaty will be ratified.

Indeed, the price of failure of these long negotiations would be high. I suggest that it is not for us to question your views as to the question of nuclear balance between the two superpowers. That is your responsibility. But as a European, there are certain issues which directly concern me.

First if I may speak as a politician of some 25 years' standing, I am concerned that such matters of international strategy have to some extent become a matter of domestic political controversy. Obviously, the Administration has a great deal to gain politically with ratification of the treaty.

May I say that such a situation is certainly not unknown in Europe?

Second, there are powerful Soviet weapons which today threaten Europe but not the United States of America. Should at a later date an American administration be voted into office which, unlike previous administrations, would be deterred from using its strategic force to retaliate after a limited theater nuclear attack against Europe, this factor could have the gravest consequences.

I refer, of course, to the SS-20 and the Backfire. At present and in the immediate future, Europe's main protection certainly against the SS-20 is the American strategic nuclear deterrent. The

[1] See page 309 for Mr. Wall's prepared statement.

counter to this weapon may lie in the cruise missile. It is therefore essential in my submission that the protocol to the treaty should not be renewed after its expiration date on the 31st of December, 1981.

Mr. Chairman, my Government believes in the importance of a continued British nuclear deterrent. The Nassau Agreement allowed us to purchase your *Polaris A3* and to fit them with our own nuclear warheads. One of the options for replacing these A3's in the future could be a similar purchase of your Trident I's, or cruise missiles, or a mixture of both. It is therefore of primary importance that the noncircumvention clause of the treaty is clearly understood not to prohibit such a purchase should this be desired by our two countries.

It is, of course, possible for us in Britain to produce our own complete missiles, but this would be more expensive and could mean less would be spent on other forms of mutual defense hardware.

Third, while these hearings are a magnificent exercise in democracy, and an education to all our peoples, they are taking a long time. The question of the Alliance's solution to the problem of theater nuclear weapons is pressing, and as the Senators well know, we are all hoping to get a positive answer in December.

Now, my question is this. Will this decision on arms sale of theater nuclear weapons be held up if the SALT II debate is not completed by then? In some ways, it might be advantageous if the decision on allied theater nuclear weapons policy was made before the treaty was ratified, as it would then be quite clear that such an agreement in no way interfered with SALT II.

But as I have said, such a decision is urgently needed if the SS-20 is not to assume a potentially commanding position in Europe.

Now, sir, I understand that the administration has given firm assurances on these questions during these hearings, but they are of such importance to Great Britain that I would like to repeat them.

First, will it be made clear to the Soviets that the protocol will not be extended under any circumstances?

Second, that the transfer of cruise missile and other technology be authorized; for example, that it be made clear by Senate resolution that there is nothing in the treaty to prevent Britain from purchasing the Trident I should this be desired by the U.S. Government.

Third, that every effort should be made to speed up the Alliance's decision on theater nuclear weapons.

Finally, there is the whole question of the East-West balance. The U.S.S.R. has been outbuilding NATO for many years, and the balance is tilting dangerously against us. In my own country, during the periods from 1964 to 1970 and from 1974 to 1977 our defense forces have been cut to the bone. The new British Government is doing it best to repair this damage. It is not for nothing I suggest that Mrs. Thatcher has been christened the Iron Maiden by the Russians.

It would appear that President Carter's important initiative in 1977 has caused NATO to wake up.

In my view, ratification of the SALT II Treaty, which I hope will take place, should be accompanied by a rearmament program by all the NATO allies, and especially by our leader, the United States of America.

Mr. Chairman, may I conclude by saying that members of this committee have in their possession a written statement amplifying my short oral statement, and also dealing with an important question of East-West balance which I believe is often overlooked by the general public, and I refer to Western Europe's extreme dependence on imported oil from the Gulf and vital minerals from Southern Africa, which could well prove to be our Achilles' heel, had we ever had to fight not a hot war or even a limited war, but a battle for resources. Thank you.

[Mr. Wall's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PATRICK WALL

In this prepared statement I propose to amplify certain specific issues, namely the strategic nuclear balance, domestic political controversy, and the Euro-strategic and theatre nuclear balance made in my verbal presentation as well as dealing with some points on the East-West balance that we may have to face in the next few years.

THE NUCLEAR BALANCE

The balance since SALT I

The SALT I Agreement in 1972 was justified by some as an Agreement that codified strategic parity. It has also been stated that, in fact, it allowed the U.S.S.R. some 50 percent more ICBM Launchers and 45 percent more SLBM Launchers than the U.S.A. The throw-weight of the deployed Soviet ICBM's was also considerably more than that of the U.S. ICBM's. However, it was claimed that because of superior MIRV technology, and its lead in heavy bombers, the United States could afford the Soviet advantage in the number of ICBM Launchers.

In fact, the U.S.S.R. caught up with MIRV technology within two years. In 1974 the Vladivostock understanding prolonged SALT I and was based on essential equivalence in launchers; 2,400 each including 1,320 MIRV Launchers; freedom to detemine the mix of weapons and no restrictions on the number of warheads in each MIRV, but there was no reference to advanced technology weapons such as the Cruise Missile. It formed the framework of SALT II.

The net result of the failure of SALT I to restrict modernisation and replacement has been an unprecedented buildup of the Soviet strategic nuclear capability, with no corresponding American increase.

In fact, since 1975 the U.S.S.R. has deployed the SS-17, 18, 19 and 20. The SS-18 having a throw-weight exceeding twice that of any U.S. missile.

By 1980 the total Soviet throw-weight will be almost double that of the U.S.A. and the number of warheads multiplied by 4 or 5. But the U.S.A. will still have a lead in the total number of warheads.

In contrast the U.S.A. has deployed no new ICBM since 1972 and has only modernised existing Minutemen III's roughly doubling the present 170 kilo ton yield compared to the 2 megaton yield of the SS-18. The United States missiles are still more accurate but the Soviet Union is catching up.

Much the same story can be told about SLBM's in which the SSN8 has now been deployed in some 29 Delta class submarines, thus permitting them to hit the U.S.A. from the Barents Sea. Whereas the first USN equivalent, *U.S.S. Ohio,* armed with the Trident I, will not be operational until at least 1980, and the 6,000 mile range Trident II is not expected to be available until the mid-1980s when only 10 *Ohios* will be deployed. However the MIRVed SSNX-18 is now becoming operational in the Delta III submarines.

In 1972, the U.S. had some 400 heavy bombers compared to 140 in the Soviet Air Force, The ratio is now nearer to 350 to 135, but the U.S. bombers are mainly B52s, the B1 having been cancelled. On the other hand the U.S.S.R. has so far built some 100 Backfire medium bombers and is expected to have some 300 by 1985.

These figures are taken from various United States and British sources and may not be 100 percent accurate, but they do clearly show the trend since 1972, which has been wholly in favour of the Soviet Union.

The same overall trend can be found in conventional forces, a trend which, if continued, will put the U.S.S.R. in a commanding position to impose its will on most of the continents of the earth.

The strategic balance today and in 1985

The ratification of the SALT II agreement would limit the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. to a total of 2,250 ICBM's, SLBM's and heavy bombers, of which 1,320 can be MIRVed. ICBM's and SLBM's and heavy bombers carrying ALCM's of intermediate range. Within the limits of 1,320 MIRVed launchers a sublimit of 1,200 is placed on MIRVed ICBM's and SLBM's and a further sublimit of 820 is placed on MIRVed ICBM's. It is estimated that these limits will have the following results by 1985:

(a) MIRVed ICBM's—The Minuteman III production line is now closed down and the new MX delayed and cannot now be operational by 1985. The 550 Minuteman III's can be upgraded in accuracy but the aggregate useful payload or throw-weight of the U.S. MIRVed ICBM force in 1985 will not exceed 1¼ million pounds and 1,650 RV's (1,650).

The U.S.S.R. can deploy 300 plus SS–18's (308) and some 500 (512) SS–17's and 19's, giving an estimated aggregate throw-weight for the Soviet Union ICBM Force of 8 to 9 million pounds, and 6,000 (5,662) RV's.[1]

It has thus been estimated that in a first strike the U.S.S.R. could eliminate from 70 to 90 percent of U.S. silos whereas the U.S.A. would have the capability of destroying 65 percent of the Soviet ICBM silos.

(b) Un-MIRVed ICBM's—The U.S. 450 Minuteman II and 54 Titan has an estimated 1 million pounds (1.5 million) throw-weight and 1,000 megatons (936) of yield. The Soviet may substitute 360 SSII's by a new ICBM as permitted under the agreement which could produce an estimated throw-weight of 2½ million pounds and some 6,000 megatons yield.

(c) MIRVed SLBM's—The U.S. is expected to have 21 *Poseidon* submarines, 10 *Trident I* backfitted submarines, and 7 (10) new *Trident I* submarines by 1985, giving a total of 38 (41) nuclear-propelled MIRV'ed SLBM submarines with some 664 (650) MIRVed tubes with some 5,300 (5,700) RV's.

The Soviet Union could, under the agreement, deploy some 400 MIRV missile launchers. It is expected that the new Soviet Typhoon submarines will carry 20 to 24 missiles with up to 14 RV's. The SSN18 is expected to have some 7 MIRV's. The U.S. therefore, will continue to lead in SLBM MIRVed tubes and RV's.

(d) Un-MIRVed SLBM's—The U.S. is expected to retain only some 80 SLBM's and the Soviet some 600.

(e) ALCM Bombers—The U.S. plans a possible deployment of 120 such aircraft with cruise missiles of over 600 kilometers range.

If these figures are approximately correct it will be seen that the U.S. inferiority in all categories of strategic power except accuracy, SLBM's and heavy bombers has been frozen for the duration of the agreement. The argument, therefore, rests on whether the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent will remain credible during the duration of the treaty. This question together with that of verification, has been debated during the hearings and must remain an American decision, but already the balance is tilting against the U.S.A.

In addition the virtual deadlock of the MBFR negotiations for so long does not appear to indicate a Soviet desire for a balance but rather a drive for further superiority.

DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTROVERSY

It has always been a matter for concern when the international strategic balance or, for that matter, national defense, becomes a domestic political issue.

To the outsider the U.S. administration has fallen over backwards to commend this agreement. There are many arguments in its favour, but the briefing of foreign Members of Parliament by U.S. Embassy staff, the knowledge that the Administration is in trouble over other national issues and badly needs successful ratification, makes an experienced politician wonder about the political as opposed to the military need for an Agreement.

This, I fear, is not unusual as opposing party lines on defense issues are current both in my own country and in Europe as a whole.

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[1] The figures in the text are drawn from U.S. sources and the figures in parentheses from non-Government British sources.

THE EURO-STRATEGIC AND THEATRE NUCLEAR WAR BALANCE

As currently constituted, the SALT II Treaty affects only missiles and heavy bombers of intercontinental range. This has meant the exclusion of a number of systems whose characteristics make them difficult to define but which are of great relevance to Europe. There can be no question that the U.S. authorities have kept their allies fully informed during all the SALT discussions. However, Europe is menaced by two major new weapons systems that are not included in SALT II—the Backfire bomber and SS-20. On the other hand, restrictions on the deployment of cruise missiles are included in the treaty.

It has already been stated that the strategic balance has tilted against the United States. As far as Europe is concerned the shift in theatre nuclear capabilities in favour of the Warsaw Pact has been even more dramatic.

In January 1978 the U.S.S.R. had about 700 I/MRBM's, 430 medium bombers and 20 plus SLBM's targeted on high priority European targets. By 1985 it has been estimated that there will be some 275 SS-20 missiles and 250 Backfire bombers deployed against European targets, plus 700 I/MRBM's (some targeted on China), 430 medium bombers and 20 SLBM's.

NATO Europe can produce 150 British and French IRBM's and SLBM's and some 200 nuclear capable aircraft, which is a deterrent but no real answer to the scale of the Warsaw Pact threat, even when backed by the USAF's F111's and other aircraft and the USN's SLBM's allocated to SACEUR.

Anti-Backfire defences can be improved with the advent of the British Air Defence Tornado and new types of U.S. aircraft based in Britain. But the SS-20, which is mobile and has a range of some 3,000 miles can, therefore, be targeted on European ports and airfields from inside Russia, it can, therefore only be attacked by aircraft which would inevitably suffer appalling losses.

The counter to the SS-20 may be a new long-range theatre nuclear ballistic missile, an extended-range Pershing or a Cruise Missile, or a mix of all three. The new theatre ballistic missile cannot be operational by 1985. A stretched Pershing is unlikely to have a range of more than 1,000 miles, and aircraft equipped with intermediate range Cruise Missiles are counted as heavy bombers and included in the SALT numerical aggregates.

They are also limited to an average of 28 missiles, with not more than 20 carried in each existing B-52 Bomber. Even more important, ground and sea-launch Cruise Missiles are restricted to a range of 600 kilometres (350 miles) by the Protocol to the Agreement, which expires on the 31st of December, 1981.

If Cruise Missiles are to have a limited range for the next few years why are not certain specific restrictions on range applied to the Backfire and the SS-20?

However, there is nothing in the Agreement to prevent new theatre ballistic missiles being developed by the Allies and the United States will not be ready to deploy longer-range ground and sea-launched Cruise Missiles until after 1981.

Two factors of primary importance to Europe therefore emerge: (i) the Protocol MUST NOT BE extended beyond its expiry date whatever the Soviet Union may demand, and (ii) it must be made plain that Article XII the "noncircumvention" clause will not only permit the transference of Cruise Missile technology from the U.S.A. to her Allies but will also permit the sale, for example of Tomahawk and Trident I, should this be desired.

Administration assurances have been given during these hearings, but it is hoped that the Senate will insist on these two clarifications being written into the Treaty in such a way as there can later be no misunderstanding.

The Soviet aim may well be the decoupling of the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent from the defence of Western Europe together with the creation of an overwhelming nuclear and conventional advantage against NATO forces in Europe.

The problem of the theatre nuclear weapons is separate from the Euro-strategic balance, but is related to it. The overall balance in theatre nuclear capability between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is roughly equal to the number of warheads in their respective nuclear stockpiles, but in delivery systems the Warsaw Pact has a considerable advantage and the balance is tilting further in their favour.

It is to be hoped that should the Senate not complete its discussion of SALT II this year that this will not delay a NATO decision on TNW which is due to take place in December. Indeed, it might be an advantage that the theatre nuclear decision be taken before the SALT ratification so as to make it clear that such a decision is in fact within the terms of the treaty.

It must be borne in mind that the balance of conventional Forces in Europe is continuing to shift against NATO and is now approximately 2.8:1 in armour, 2.2:1 in tactical aircraft, 2.7:1 in artillery, and 1.2:1 in men. Also that the Soviet forces have been reorganised in recent years for offensive rather than defensive operations and are fully capable of repeating Hitler's Blitzkrieg.

EAST-WEST BALANCE

It is now obvious that the balance is tilting against the West both in the nuclear and in the conventional fields.

It must, however, be borne in mind that the Leaders of the U.S.S.R. may hope to take over Asia, Africa and South America, followed by Europe, without running the risk of a nuclear or even a conventional war.

The key to the industrialized West lies in supplies of energy and raw materials. Should the U.S.S.R. secure the dominating influence over the Gulf or over Southern Africa she will control directly, or indirectly, the West's major supplies of oil and key minerals (platinum, chrome, manganese, gold, vanadium, fluorspar, asbestos, uranium, titanium, industrial diamonds etc).

Her growing influence in the Third World and in the countries of the Middle East and Africa could enable her to cut off Western supplies at the source or on passage, or, in the case of Southern Africa, to create so much chaos that minerals could not be exported. Industrial Europe, starved of raw materials or energy could then be faced with capitulation or resorting to nuclear war.

The writing is on the wall—in the 1930's the Rhineland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the U.S.S.R. In the 1970's Afghanistan, Iran, the Horn of Africa, Aden—and then who knows, Kuwait? Saudi Arabia? Turkey? In southern Africa, Angola, Mozambique, followed by Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, Namibia, Zaire, Zambia, and finally South Africa. Thus, the U.S.A. could become isolated in a hostile world.

This is, of course, an extreme concept but the fact remains that countries friendly to the West are being rapidly reduced in numbers and the West takes no action. Western influence, quite recently supreme in the Pacific, the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic, is disappearing and with it the freedom for which we fought two World Wars.

Surely détente means something quite different in the West than in the U.S.S.R. Does SALT also have different connotations? If so, there is little hope for SALT III or, from our concept, of détente.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Dr. Corterier?

STATEMENT OF PETER CORTERIER, GERMANY, RAPPORTEUR, POLITICAL COMMITTEE, NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY [1]

Dr. CORTERIER. Mr. Chairman, let me first say that it is a great pleasure and honor for me to appear here before your subcommittee. I know that there have been many views and arguments regarding the treaty now before the Senate that concern or deal with the European view. The European view obviously plays an important role in the debate on SALT, and therefore I wish to congratulate you personally, Mr. Chairman, for having taken the trouble to invite this group of parliamentarians from the North Atlantic Assembly to testify.

The invitation itself is a vivid example of the Alliance's solidarity and it proves that you indeed recognize the international dimension of the treaty. The treaty now before you is not merely a domestic American affair. It is an element of world peace, and no country would be more seriously affected by a failure to ratify than my own country, the Federal Republic of Germany.

German approval of the treaty now before the Senate results from our own basic interests, from the geopolitical and strategic situation, from the vital interests in the stability and continuity of the détente policy, as well as from the need to preserve and safeguard a stable military balance between East and West.

Those here in the United States who want to ignore not only the German but the widescale support for the treaty throughout the Alliance on the grounds that it is insincere or the result of pressure assess the European interests wrongly.

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[1] See page 314 for Dr. Corterier's prepared statement.

There have been, of course, mainly two European criticisms of the treaty in the past, as it was still being negotiated, one concerning the protocol, the other the noncircumvention clause. However, I must say that the assurances, clarifications, and interpretations that we have received from the American Government are satisfactory on both counts, and protect European security interests adequately.

Concerning the noncircumvention clause, it has been made clear that the existing forms and structures of cooperation and policy are not prejudiced by the treaty. It has also been made clear that after the expiration of the protocol, U.S. options will again be open to contribute to European defense with cruise missiles or to incorporate cruise missiles in arms control negotiations, but because of the importance of keeping alliance options open, I would welcome a Senate understanding in support of this position.

An important reason for Europeans to support the ratification of SALT II is that we believe this treaty is an essential precondition for dealing with nuclear weapons systems now threatening Western Europe and the alliance as a whole. I hope this will be achieved in the SALT III negotiations. We must be careful that after SALT II the arms race not be shifted to Europe. All the issues of middle-range weapons which are to be the subject of the SALT III negotiations are currently being discussed within the alliance both from the aspect of defense policy in the high level group and from the aspect of arms control policy in the special group.

The intention is to elaborate within the alliance a concept for SALT III, as far as the theater nuclear balance is concerned, aiming at a stable balance and at closing any gaps in our deterrent capability in Europe. Where this can be achieved with arms control arrangements, this should take priority over the introduction of new weapons systems. This depends, of course, on whether or not the Soviet Union is prepared to effect corresponding limitations or reductions of its own medium-range nuclear weapons.

In other words, when the Atlantic alliance takes a position on the deployment of American medium-range weapons in Europe, it must remain clear that this position in its implementation will also depend on progress or nonprogress in the arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.

The forthcoming decisions must be taken by the alliance as a whole, and the coherence of the alliance also is a decisive factor in determining the success of future arms control negotiations.

When these decisions are made, it must be absolutely clear that the security within the alliance is indivisible. There is only one security in the alliance, and this covers the territory of all the alliance states. For the same reason, there can be no isolated TNF arms control in Europe. Rather, when adopting a joint strategy to curb the escalation of arms, and when reaching arms control agreements, the link with the overall strategic balance of power must be preserved.

Let me sum up, then, what in my opinion would be the implications of rejection or ratification of the SALT Treaty by the Senate. Without the SALT II Treaty, the prospects of a political and military stabilization in East-West relations are absolutely minimal. In

such a case, it must be feared that the arms buildup will continue unchecked, if not forever, certainly for a very long time.

The policy of détente and ongoing arms control efforts will suffer setbacks. From the European viewpoint, this applies particularly to the negotiations that are of vital importance to European security such as MBFR and CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe]. The political leadership and those political forces in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe advocating reconciliation and rapprochement with the West will be weakened. The political consensus on defense and détente policy existing within the alliance for over 10 years as a result of the so-called Harmel Report will be weakened. The trust placed in the United States as the leading power within the alliance will be undermined. The Nonproliferation Treaty will be less credible, and might ultimately even fail.

On the other hand, a successful conclusion of SALT will help to safeguard the West's capability to preserve a stable balance; provide a sound basis in terms of armaments and arms control policy for a strategy of military balance; create the prerequisites for progress at the MBFR talks and the CSCE follow-up conference in Madrid; make it possible to limit nuclear weapons in Europe, especially medium-range weapons systems; create the prerequisites for further arms control and disarmament negotiations, for example, with regard to a complete ban on nuclear weapons tests or a ban on killer satellites, radiation weapons, and chemical weapons; and ensure the continuation and hopefully the successful conclusion of talks on the limitation of conventional arms exports.

This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. Thank you again for this opportunity to give you my reflections on the SALT II Treaty.

[Dr. Corterier's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. PETER CORTERIER

SALT II AND GERMAN SECURITY INTERESTS

The decision on the ratification of the SALT II Treaty is the responsibility of the U.S. Senate alone—a responsibility that weighs heavily. For with this Treaty an attempt has been made in the face of rapid arms technology developments to solve the complicated and controversial problem of stabilizing the strategic nuclear balance. Consequently, it is no exaggeration to state that the SALT II Treaty touches upon the problem of peace in our time. For the same reason this Treaty is not merely a domestic American affair. It is also—since we belong to the Atlantic Security community—a decisive bearing on European security. No country would be more seriously affected by its failure than the Federal Republic of Germany. The German approval of the Treaty now before the Senate results from our own basic interests: from the geo-political and strategic situation, from the vital interest in the stability and continuity of the detente policy, as well as from the need to preserve and safeguard a stable military balance between East and West. Those here in the United States who want to ignore the wide-scale support for the Treaty on the grounds that it is insincere or the result of pressure assess the European interests wrongly.

There are many reasons for our supporting the SALT II Treaty. One of the main reasons is that with the policy of detente we have achieved many improvements and we hope that the ratification of the SALT II Treaty will lead to this detente policy continued and consolidated; if the SALT II Treaty were to fail, we would have to fear for the results achieved so far. Especially from the German viewpoint the policy of detente has yielded many improvements in the humanitarian field. In Berlin, a city which for decades suffered particularly severely from the division of Germany, many people are now able to see each other again. Traffic to and from Berlin now flows virtually unimpeded. The position of Berlin has become more secure. Millions of Germans take advantage of the opportunity to visit their rela-

tives in the GDR, and Germans from the GDR—albeit a limited number—can also travel to the West. In the context of the reunification of families, hundreds of thousands of Germans living in Eastern European countries are now able to join their families in the Federal Republic. We do not want to jeopardize these significant results of Ostpolitik and detente policy. Nor should we forget the many people in Eastern Europe for whom the detente policy has resulted in definite improvements in their situation and who hope that this policy will be continued.

Furthermore, from the European viewpoint the preservation of a stable military balance is equally the prerequisite for a continuation of the process of detente. Without the SALT II Treaty the prospects of a political and military stablilization in East-West relations are absolutely minimal. In such a case it must be feared that:

The arms build-up will continue unchecked, if not forever certainly for a very long time;

The policy of detente and on-going arms control efforts will suffer setbacks;

The political leaderships and political forces in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe advocating reconciliation and rapprochement with the West will be weakened;

The political consensus on defence and detente policy existing within the Alliance for over ten years now as a result of the Harmel Report will be weakened;

The trust placed in the United States as the leading power within the Alliance will be undermined.

The non-proliferation policy will be less credible and might fail ultimately.

On the other hand, a successful conclusion of SALT II will help to:

Safeguard the West's capability to preserve a stable balance;

Provide a sound basis in terms of armaments and arms control policy for a strategy of military balance;

Create the prerequisites for progress at the MBFR talks and the CSCE follow-up conference in Madrid;

Make it possible to limit nuclear weapons in Europe, especially medium-range weapons systems;

Create the prerequisites for further arms control and disarmament negotiations, for example with regard to a complete ban on nuclear weapon tests or a ban on killer satellites, radiation weapons and chemical weapons;

Ensure the continuation and the successful conclusion of talks on the limitation of conventional arms exports.

If the Senate does not consider itself in a position to ratify the SALT II Treaty, this will have serious adverse effects on other arms control efforts between East and West. This applies, from the European viewpoint, particularly to the negotiations that are of vital importance to European security, such as MBFR and CSCE. Here, too, the American leadership role is indispensable to progress at the negotiations.

The SALT II Treaty is a matter of political common sense. Individual provisions may give some American and European observers cause for a critical assessment of the Treaty from the military and/or arms control aspects, but despite these possible objections the overall assessment is, from the German viewpoint, a positive one. You can draft an ideal treaty unilaterally but you cannot negotiate it. The SALT II Treaty should therefore not be measured in terms of theoretical possibilities but of political reality. In this respect it represents an important step along the path towards more stability and security in international relations and a mile-stone along the difficult path of co-operative arms control and limitation. It has not attained the objective of comprehensive reductions of strategic nuclear weapons, but has nevertheless led to quantitative and qualitative limitations of the nuclear weapons systems of the two superpowers, who have committed themselves in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament under effective international control. The SALT II Treaty is of considerable importance for a successful non-proliferation policy. Although it does not compensate the conceivable vulnerability of the land-based American ICBM's, it obliges the contracting parties to undertake "in the near future negotiations further to limit and further to reduce strategic offensive arms". Finally, the Treaty does not contain any provisions on behaviour in other geographical regions of the world, but it ensures the continuity of the SALT process and thus of the dialogue on strategic arms.

The SALT II Treaty opens up substantial new prospects for the future, which should be preserved through ratification by the U.S. Senate in the interest of stable international relations. The military parity of the Soviet Union is the result of many years of Soviet arms efforts and American restraint. This is a fact which cannot be eliminated even through arms control. In other words, the renunciation of military superiority has become an integral part of strategic policy. However,

parity or rough equivalence in the strategic nuclear field does not imply neutralization. The composition and size of the nuclear systems permitted under the Treaty and the total number of existing or permitted warheads appear adequate at present to maintain the deterrent. The limitations agreed on in the SALT II Treaty do not give grounds for adopting alarmist attitudes. The agreed maximum numbers of MIRV's also guarantee that a programme such as the MX programme can be carried out without forgoing other MIRV launchers. Thus, the second strike capability of the United States, on which our security also depends, appears to be guaranteed in future, too. The difficulties and problems of Western defence would be immeasurably greater without a SALT II agreement because the Soviet Union could then deploy by 1985 numerous strategic systems which would be a far greater threat to the West.

The SALT II Treaty makes for greater predictability and transparency of strategic developments and accordingly facilitates arms planning. But the possibilities of arms growth afforded by the Treaty should be used with moderation and with a view to the negotiating possibilities during the SALT III round. However, considering the rapid Soviet arms build-up of the last ten years it will not be easy during the SALT III negotiations to incorporate into a treaty the principles contained in the Joint Statement on subsequent negotiations. From the European viewpoint the main problems will be those resulting from the existing situation in the field of nuclear medium-range weapons. They will certainly not be the sole subject of the negotiations, but the disparities existing in this field, made especially acute by the deployment of the SS-20 and the Backfire, will make this subject particularly important at future SALT negotiations. The aim of the talks must be to ensure an overall strategic balance and to preserve the strategic unity within the Alliance. Schematic parity at all individual levels cannot, however, be our objective because that would not be conducive to the strategic unity of the Alliance, in fact it would be counter-productive.

European critics of the SALT II Treaty refer to two of its provisions in particular which they consider disadvantageous to Europe. The first of these is Article II, Paragraph 1, of the Protocol of the treaty:

"Each Party undertakes not to deploy cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers on sea-based launchers or on land-based launchers."

The Protocol will remain in force until 31 December 1981, unless replaced earlier by an agreement on further measures limiting strategic offensive arms. The misgivings about this provision are due less to the provision itself than its prejudicial effect. It is feared that the cruise missile limitation might be extended without a genuine Soviet concession in return. It is true that the concession of Article II, paragraph 1, is hardly offset by a parallel Soviet concession but it will depend primarily on our own political will whether or not this fear is realized. The limitation of this provision of the Protocol should not be treated as a self-fulfilling prophecy but be understood as being what it is: as a measure of a precisely defined duration and thus as a challenge to the Soviet Union to negotiate this matter with us. The following should therefore be emphasized:

1. As of 1982 the United States will be able to decide freely on the deployment of cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

2. Other arms options are left open.

However, to preclude any possible doubts still existing on this matter it would be welcomed in Europe if the Senate followed the example of the U.S. Government and made it clear that, when the protocol expires, U.S. options will again be open to both contributing to European defence with cruise missiles or incorporating cruise missiles in arms control negotiations.

We Europeans have an interest in the nuclear weapons systems threatening Europe also being limited in the SALT III negotiations. The arms race must not be shifted to Europe. All the issues of middle range nuclear weapons which are subject of the SALT III negotiations are currently being discussed within the Alliance, both from the aspect of defence policy (in the High-Level Group) and from the aspect of arms control policy (in the Special Group). The intention is to elaborate within the Alliance a concept for SALT III aiming at a stable nuclear balance of power and at closing any gaps in our deterrent capability in Europe.

Where this can be achieved with arms control arrangements, the latter should take priority over the introduction of new weapons systems. This depends on whether or not the Soviet Union is prepared to effect corresponding limitations or reductions of its own medium-range nuclear weapons. This issue must be discussed with the Soviet Union.

On 4 July of this year, Federal Chancellor Schmidt said before the German Bundestag: "That the Western Alliance must undertake all measures necessary to preserve its security. The extent to which we can restrict the scale of concrete

measures aimed at adjusting to the continuous armament effort within the Warsaw Pact will depend on the degree of success in achieving an effective limitation of continental strategic systems in the East and West through arms control negotiations, for instance in SALT III."

This quote makes it very clear that we in Europe must also attempt to make progress in arms control negotiations. In other words, when the Atlantic Alliance takes a decision on the deployment of American medium-range weapons in Europe, it must remain clear that their decision on its implementation will also depend on progress or non-progress on the arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Federal Republic of Germany is not a nuclear weapons State. Therefore, it must not create the impression of striving to participate in deciding on the production of nuclear weapons. Such a decision must remain the responsibility of the United States. We continue to set store by not being forced into any special role within the Alliance. The forthcoming decisions must be taken by the Alliance as a whole. The coherence of the Alliance is also a decisive factor determining the success of arms control negotiations. On the basis of the Harmel Report a broad consensus on détente policy has developed within the Alliance over the last ten years. This consensus must now be extended with intensified efforts to all fields of arms control policy and be brought to bear the SALT III negotiations. Our joint objective must be to curb the increase of Soviet systems in the field of nuclear medium-range missiles and reduce the disparities in the Euro-strategic field. In this connection, a limitation of the existing modern Soviet systems—SS-20—and Backfire—could be useful as in initial concrete objective. However, we should not attempt to deploy an equal capability in Europe specifically against the SS-20 because in the final analysis we can counter the resultant threat only within the entire range of systems available for deterrence, including American strategic arms. Technological developments on the substrategic level have rendered the differentiation between strategic weapons of international and continental range useless and even politically dangerous. Security within the Alliance is indivisable. It should not be measured on the issue whether a weapon system has a range of more than 5000 km or not. There is only one security within the Alliance and this covers the territory of all Alliance states. There should not be any zone of different security. For the same reason, there can be no isolated TNF arms control in Europe. Rather, when adopting a joint strategy to curb the escalation of arms and when reaching arms control agreements, the link with the overall strategic balance of power must be preserved. The Chairman of the SPD parliamentary group, Herr Herbert Wehner, formulated the objective of our efforts as follows:

"Of course we must not simply trivialize or accept any gap in the system of deterrence which might lead to a miscalculation by the other side. The deterrent must continue to make it impossible to wage war. That involves our reacting to challenges and taking the necessary decisions jointly. At the same time, we must ensure that all—I repeat: all—possible forms of arms control are used to prevent armament and counterarmament resulting in a new arms race. After all we are already in the midst of such an arms race, and we should try to do everything within our power to stop it from assuming immeasurable dimensions.

"In other words, we must render unto the Alliance all that it requires to remain capable of defence, which is our defence too; that is perhaps the soundest basis for peace and for our objective of consolidating peace through détente. For us, for our policies, and for the existence of our people there can be nothing more important than to undertake all efforts to preserve and safeguard peace, which again means that together with our Allies we should take advantage of every opportunity for further agreements on détente."

We must therefore undertake a two-fold interactive effort, that of harmonizing our defence efforts with the requirements of arms control.

The second provision of the SALT Treaty which has been criticized by some people in Europe is Article XII that reads as follows:

"In order to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to circumvent the provisions of this Treaty, through any other state or states, or in any other manner."

In this connection some European commentators quote Soviet remarks to prove that the so-called non-circumvention clause jeopardizes both the transfer of cruise missile technology and American assistance in the modernization of the French and British nuclear armed forces. It may be true that the Soviet Union is attempting to interpret the non-circumvention clause in a manner unfavourable to the West, but it would be more than foolish if here in the West of all places we gave more credit to the "Pravda" than the U.S. Secretary of State and thus promoted the Soviet interpretation. The Secretary of State delivered a detailed statement on the interpretation of the non-circumvention clause before the Senate on 10 July of this year.

From the European viewpoint this statement is entirely satisfactory. We support the efforts of the Senate itself to clarify the interpretation of the non-circumvention clause. It should be noted that, according to the principles of international law, a State is obliged not to circumvent the international agreements it has concluded. Furthermore, a bilateral treaty cannot impose obligations on third States, unless such state expressly accepts such obligations. Therefore, according to the principles of international law, the non-circumvention clause does not permit any obligations or interpretations exceeding the scope of the Treaty itself. As a result, the existing forms and structures of participation and cooperation are not prejudiced by the non-circumvention clause. In other words, the modernization of the nuclear weapons systems existing in Europe and the continuous cooperation in the nuclear and conventional fields within the Alliance are not affected. Nor is cooperation in research, development and production jeopardized as regards cruise missiles. Therefore, the non-circumvention clause cannot and should not be interpreted as a non-transfer clause.

The SALT III negotiations on nuclear medium-range weapons represent a very complex problem. They will doubtless require closer consultations than has been the case until now with SALT II. In the case of SALT II, the Allies were consulted adequately and comprehensively, but for SALT III two parallel efforts are nevertheless necessary in order to:

(*a*) Make possible further reductions of the strategic intercontinental capability of the United States and the Soviet Union, and

(*b*) Reduce disparities in the field of continental nuclear weapons in Europe.

It is to be welcomed that in future there will be no more unilateral U.S. arms limitations in the TNF field, as there are in the present Protocol. The statement which was delivered on behalf of the U.S. Government at the session of the NATO Council on 29 June in connection with the statement of intent of the SALT II Treaty and which Secretary of State Vance quoted at the hearing of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs on 9 July, represents a step in this direction and guarantees strict reciprocity in the future limitation of non-central systems.

On this point, too, it would be desirable from the European viewpoint if in its ratifying resolution the Senate reaffirmed the position of the U.S. Government. SALT II would then represent a suitable basis for reducing at the SALT III negotiations also the Soviet superiority in the medium-range field which is a threat to the European members of NATO in particular.

The Alliance will also have to adapt organizationally and technically to the political and military requirements arising in this context. The experience gained so far with the High-Level Group and the Special Group is most positive. The importance of the political, military and strategic issues arising in connection with SALT III justifies new organizational and technical efforts. SALT III negotiations will affect matters relating to European security to a far greater extent than SALT II did. They will continue to be basically bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, but the consultation will naturally have to be much more intensive than has been necessary until now. The consultations will have to include the elaboration of negotiating positions. We need suitable arrangements for the Allies to be able to have a say in the negotiations, which is not the same as participating in them. A new institution along the lines of the Special Group might be a solution to this problem.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. de Vries?

STATEMENT OF KLAAS G. de VRIES, NETHERLANDS, RAPPORTEUR, MILITARY COMMITTEE, NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY [1]

Mr. DE VRIES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I join my colleagues in expressing my gratitude at being invited to appear before your subcommittee.

May I also say that I am deeply impressed by the way the subcommittee and committee have devoted attention to European attitudes and alliance needs during the discussion and consideration of the treaty that is before you.

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[1] See page 321 for Mr. de Vries' prepared statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me, but if anything has come out of the debate on this treaty, it has been an overwhelming reaffirmation both from the left, right, and center of this body, and this country, of our view of the essential necessity for us to maintain strength in the NATO alliance. I hope that message is crystal clear.

Mr. DE VRIES. I think it has not gone unnoticed, Senator.

In the course of the Senate's hearings on the proposed SALT II Treaty, the question of European attitudes, as I said, has emerged as a pivotal issue. While administration officials have forcefully characterized allied support of ratification as unequivocal and broad-based, some witnesses have advanced a number of rationales which, if true, would significantly depreciate the value of official endorsements of SALT II by European governments.

In brief, the Senate has been warned that it can draw little comfort from public expressions of European support, indeed, that these declarations may even have been proffered under duress.

Let me begin by observing that there can be no disputing the fact that Europe has overwhelming declared its clear support for the treaty. To be sure a few isolated and not entirely unpredictable objections have been heard, but they have been drowned in the flood tide of public European support for the treaty.

The North Atlantic Council, individual national governments, prestigious centers of security and foreign policy research, leading newspapers have all gone on record endorsing treaty ratification.

Thus, it seems astonishing to have to respond to the suggestion that at worst Europeans do not really mean what they say or at best that what we have said should be discounted. To suggest that European governments would knowingly and deliberately prevaricate on an issue of such single importance as strategic arms limitations is tantamount to declaring that there is no basis for trust between the nations of the Atlantic Alliance.

SALT II is not a partisan issue in Europe. Indeed, support for SALT may be one of the few issues on 1979 on which European leaders, conservatives, Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, and others find themselves in basic agreement. The theory that there is disparity between official and private European views usually relies on one or two of the following arguments: one, that the administration has arm-twisted European governments into expressing support in order to save the prestige of the presidency, and two, that public sentiment in favor of détente and arms control runs so strongly in Europe that no public figure can prudently speak out in favor of vigilance and defense.

I cannot accept the suggestion that the administration has pressured European governments into endorsing SALT II against their will. Of course, Europe recognizes the importance to Alliance cohesion of a strong American Presidency. This shouId not suggest that Europe would support SALT II against its better judgment for the sake of helping a particular President's standing in public opinion polls.

Europe is vitally interested in American leadership. It is, by the same token, not interested in helping to create the illusion of American leadership.

Second, to claim that disarmament euphoria is so rampant on the European continent that no one can prudently speak out for

military preparedness simply cannot be reconciled with the facts. I mentioned the 3 percent increase in defense spending, the Long-Term Defense Program, the AWACS program, procurement of F-16's, Tornado aircraft, and Leopard tanks—all events which signify that Europe is prepared to share its burden in the defense efforts of the Alliance.

Some SALT critics would have us believe it both ways, that Europe publicly supports the treaty out of a lack of will to stand up to the Soviets yet privately opposes the agreement because the protocol allegedly denies them the hardware needed to stand up to the Soviets. I don't think you can have it both ways.

Let me now turn to the line of argument that approval of the terms of the treaty themselves is not a primary factor accounting for European support. In other words, that European disappointment with the terms of the treaty yielded to a higher priority; European interest in preserving progress toward détente.

I wonder if anyone, American or European or Soviet, can actually declare himself totally satisfied with the terms of the treaty. Even the administration acknowledges that it is disappointed with the height of the ceilings and the degree of strategic force modernization permitted both parties under the accord.

The question then is not whether Europe approves 100 percent with the provisions of the agreement. The question is whether these provisions on balance are acceptable and whether no treaty or a reopened negotiation would not be worse.

Of course, European support of SALT II reflects a desire to promote a lessening of East-West tensions, and a certain anxiety that rejection of the treaty might occasion a new cold war. No one denies that, but what is not to be accepted is the view that Europe's interest in detente is so preeminent that we are blinded from the recognition that arms, vigilance, and the will to defend ourselves are still required in this 30th year of the alliance.

Maintaining military security while simultaneously pursuing detente have long been the twin pillars of alliance strategy. They have not suddenly become mutually exclusive in 1979.

This leads me to a second point.

Europeans are intimately familiar with the terms of the treaty. Ambassador Earle's testimony to your committee underscores the unprecedented degree of consultation and coordination within the Alliance on SALT II. The much appreciated and publicly applauded effort of three successive administrations to inform and consult with its allies has found its deserved reward in that all the European allies became intimately familiar with the treaty and were able to support its final version.

I believe that the SALT II Treaty will make a positive contribution to the future security of the Alliance. Failure to ratify this agreement would represent a reversal in the efforts to secure a more stable relationship between East and West. The SALT process has provided an important framework for the communication and exchange of information necessary for the building of mutual confidence.

Such confidence is a prerequisite if stability is to be assured.

One great American once said that your country would never negotiate out of fear and never fear to negotiate. Successive admin-

istrations have conducted the SALT negotiations in this spirit. I sincerely believe that the treaty that is now before you serves the security interests of the nations and peoples of our alliance. At the same time, this treaty is a true expression of Western determination to contribute to restraining weapons systems that if used would destroy civilization itself.

Thank you very much.

[Mr. de Vries' prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KLAAS G. DE VRIES

Mr. Chairman, in the course of the Senate's hearings on the proposed SALT II Treaty, the question of European attitudes toward the Treaty has emerged as a pivotal issue in the debate. While Administration officials have forcefully characterised Allied support of ratification as unequivocal and broad-based, other witnesses have advanced a number of rationales which, if true, would significantly depreciate the value of official endorsements of SALT II by European governments. In brief, the Senate has been warned that it can draw little comfort from public expressions of European support; indeed that these declarations may even have been proffered under duress.

I appreciate that you felt it important to clarify this question of European assessments by inviting four Europeans representing different countries, different parties and different political perspectives to present you with their views first hand.

I would like to divide my remarks into two areas. First, I want to address head-on this crucial issue of the credibility of European support for SALT II. In the second part of my testimony, I will explain why I personally support approval of the Treaty.

Let me begin by observing that there can be no disputing the fact that Europe has overwhelmingly declared its clear support for the Treaty. To be sure a few isolated, and not entirely unpredictable, objections have been heard. But they have been drowned in the flood tide of public European support for the Treaty. The North Atlantic Council, individual national governments, prestigious centres of security and foreign policy research, and leading newspapers have all gone on record endorsing Treaty ratification.

Thus, it seems astonishing to have to respond to the suggestion that, at worst, we do not really mean what we say, or, at best, that what we have said should be discounted.

To suggest the European governments would knowingly and deliberately prevaricate on an issue of such signal importance as strategic arms limitation is tantamount to declaring that there is no basis for trust in relations between the proud nations of the Atlantic Alliance. SALT is not a partisan issue in Europe. Indeed, support for SALT may be one of the few issues in 1979 on which European leaders—Conservative, Social Democratic, Christian Democratic and others—find themselves in basic agreement.

The theory that there is a disparity between official and private European views usually relies on one or the other of two lines of argument:

One, that the Administration has "arm-twisted" European governments into expressing support in order to save the prestige of the Presidency; and

Two, that public sentiment in favour of détente and arms control runs so strongly in Europe that no public figure can prudently speak out in favour of vigilance and defence.

Lest these theories gain credence through unrefuted repetition, I feel that I must challenge each of them in turn. First, I cannot accept the suggestion that the Administration has pressured European governments into endorsing SALT II against their will. Of course Europe recognises the importance to Alliance cohesion of a strong American Presidency. But this should not suggest that Europe would support SALT II against its better judgment for the sake of helping a particular President's standing in public opinion polls. Europe is vitally interested in American leadership. It is not interested in helping to create the illusion of American leadership.

Second, the claim that pro-disarmament euphoria is so rampant on the European continent that no one can prudently speak out for military preparedness simply cannot be reconciled with the facts. The NATO Allies have agreed to a 3 percent increase in defence spending and committed themselves to the Long Term Defence Programme. The French Government has just announced a 15 percent increase in its defence budget. The United Kingdom Government has declared that it intends to

undertake greater defence expenditures. NATO has held to a firm position in the MBFR talks and has just bought the expensive AWACS programme. NATO countries are re-equipping their forces with F-16s, Tornado aircraft, and Leopard tanks.

Why did NATO insist on preserving technology transfer and cruise missile deployment options under SALT II? Some SALT critics would have us believe it both ways: that Europe publicly supports the Treaty out of a lack of will to stand up to the Soviets, yet privately opposes the agreement because it allegedly denies them the hardware needed to stand up to the Soviets. You cannot have it both ways.

Let me turn now to the line of argument that approval of the terms of the Treaty themselves is not a primary factor accounting for European support, in other words, that European disappointment with the terms of the Treaty yielded to a higher priority: European interest in preserving progress toward détente.

I wonder if anyone—European or American or Soviet—can actually declare himself totally satisfied with the terms of the Treaty? Even the Administration acknowledges that it is disappointed with the height of the ceilings and the degree of strategic force modernisation permitted both Parties under the accord. By definition this negotiation required some compromises to be made on both sides or else there would have been no agreement. Disappointment over certain negotiating outcomes cannot stand in isolation from other considerations and be allowed to constitute a basis for rejecting the Treaty.

The question is not whether Europe approves 100 percent with the provisions of the agreement. The question is whether these provisions on balance are acceptable and whether this Treaty, now laid on the table for rejection or acceptance, is better than no Treaty or a reopened negotiation. And in making that assessment obviously judgments about the provisions of SALT II must be weighed along with other considerations, including the value of SALT II as one step in the long-term process of SALT and within the overall framework of détente.

Of course European support of SALT II reflects a desire to promote a lessening of East-West tensions and a certain anxiety that rejection of the Treaty might occasion a new Cold War. No one denies this. But what is not to be accepted is the view that Europe's interest in détente is so pre-eminent that we are blinded from the recognition that arms, vigilance, and the will to defend ourselves are still required in this, the 30th year of the Alliance. Maintaining military security while simultaneously pursuing détente have long been the twin pillars of Alliance strategy. They have not suddenly become mutually exclusive in 1979.

This leads me to a second point. Europeans are intimately familiar with the terms of the Treaty. The degree of co-ordination and consultation has been extraordinary and unprecedented. SALT II is not something that has suddenly been thrust upon the Europeans for approval or disapproval. It is an agreement that was methodically worked out under three American administrations in concert with the European Allies. Europe has every opportunity to express reservations about provisions considered during the course of formulating negotiating positions, and in those cases where Europe did insist on measures to protect certain interests more stringently—for example, on technology transfer—the United States accommodated European recommendations. Ambassador Earle's testimony to your Committee underscores the unprecedented degree of consultation and co-ordination within the Alliance on SALT II. The much appreciated and publicly applauded effort of three successive Administrations to inform and consult its Allies has found its deserved reward in that all European Allies became intimately familiar with the Treaty and were able to support its final version.

Turning now from the subject of European attitudes generally, I would like to put forward some personal views on the merits of this Treaty. In explaining the basis for my strong support of SALT II, I want to touch on four main themes: (1) SALT II and the credibility of the U.S. strategic deterrent, (2) SALT II and European defence options, (3) European interests in SALT III, and (4) SALT as an element in a broader framework of East-West relations.

SALT II AND THE CREDIBILITY OF THE U.S. STRATEGIC DETERRENT

The question of whether SALT II entails negative implications for the credibility of the U.S. strategic deterrent has centered on the fact that the Soviet Union is allowed to maintain 308 heavy missiles (SS-9's now being replaced by SS-18's) while the United States is permitted none. It is argued that this permanent advantage in throw-weight when married to the inevitable improvements in accuracy will give the Soviet Union a convincing first strike capability, that is, Soviet leaders will have a high confidence possibility of taking out 90 percent of United States land-based missiles with only a small proportion of their own land-based systems. With only the bomber and submarine proportion of the United States deterrent force remaining, a United States President would allegedly be deterred from retaliatory action.

The critics do not actually believe that such a scenario will take place but rather that the perception of superiority that this situation will create will be manipulated by Soviet leaders to obtain their political objectives. This superiority will, it is alleged, be used for nuclear blackmail. The critics argue that under this situation nuclear weapons retain considerable political utility.

It is my belief that this strategic superiority argument is based on a highly selective and inadequate interpretation of weapons criteria. The current asymmetry in United States and Soviet force levels is the result of differences in force structure and military planning. The United States has developed smaller, more accurate missiles, while the Soviet Union has, largely because of technological restraints, developed larger missiles with heavier throw-weights. It must be noted that throw-weight is only one of a number of criteria that can be used to measure strategic power. Accuracy is far more important in terms of destructive capability since very large warheads tend to be less efficient than smaller warheads. In terms of accuracy and the numbers of warheads, the United States has a decided lead over the Soviet Union.

It is therefore unreasonable and distortive to single out one element of the strategic picture in order to prove a picture of United States inferiority. Asymmetries in one area should be measured against advantages in others. In fact, the composition of the two strategic arsenals is very different. The Soviet Union has placed a very heavy emphasis on its land-based forces. It has relatively small bomber forces (none on permanent alert as with Strategic Air Command) and while it has a large number of submarines, only 15 percent of these are on station at any one time. The United States on the other hand has fewer than 25 percent of its warheads in Minuteman silos, and by the 1980's with the deployment of Trident and the cruise missile this proportion will be even lower. It has a formidable bomber force a proportion of which will shortly be equipped with air-launched cruise missiles and a substantial force of Poseidon/Polaris submarines, 60 percent of which are permanently on station. It is estimated, for example, that owing to higher alert rates and multiple warhead advantages, approximately 2,446 United States as against 140 Soviet SLBM warheads are at sea. As these characteristics indicate, a direct comparison of the effectiveness of either strategic force is to say the least complex. It is for this reason that the term "essential equivalence" has come to describe the current balance.

With regard to the specific disparity in heavy missiles it is necessary ask whether given the opportunity the United States would seek to construct an equivalent number of heavy missiles. The answer would be certainly negative because it has no need of them.

Finally, the question of Minuteman vulnerability: the suggestion that the Soviet Union will in the 1980's have the capacity to destroy United States land-based forces may be mathematically provable but such action would depend on so many uncertain variables as to be beyond rational comprehension. Such variables include human error, equipment failures, the effect of atmospheric turbulance caused by the first explosion on incoming warheads, and also the "fratricidal" effect on these warheads. In addition to these uncertainties, a Soviet leader would have to gamble that a United States President would not launch his ICBMs as soon as he knew Soviet missiles had been dispatched, and that he would not retaliate with his remaining force of submarines and bombers. Such risks may seem reasonable in the artificial vacuum of theoretical strategic planning and force exchange calculations but they have little to do with the choices that face political leaders in the real world. If the vulnerability argument is without military logic then the political advantage that is said to accrue from it is likewise without foundation.

It is therefore unfortunate that when based on so many questionable assumptions the concept of Minuteman vulnerability has been allowed to become an established truth, almost an article of faith on which critics of the SALT process base their arguments. The effect of their criticisms could be to weaken our self-confidence, create doubts in the minds of friends and neutrals, and suggest to Soviet leaders possibilities that do not actually exist. Thus, the final result of their arguments is to undermine deterrence. The eventual theoretical vulnerability of fixed land-based systems was inevitable once MIRVed warheads entered the strategic arsenals, and had nothing to do with the SALT process. In the words of Secretary of Defence Brown, "Minuteman vulnerability was not a problem created by SALT, nor is it a problem we can solve with a SALT agreement . . . we would have the same problem without such an agreement, only in that case we would have other problems as well". It is not a question of establishing that a number of fixed points can in theory be hit by a certain number of missiles, but of deciding whether in the realm of practical politics this paper certainty would translate into a tangible political advantage.

If the United States Administration is concerned that this is a weakness that should be fixed than it has the MX mobile missile under development. Currently, the Administration is studying the basing problem in order to establish a mode that will give the necessary mobility and yet be verifiable under a future arms control agreement. However, it should be noted that in discussing the vulnerability of land-based systems the Soviet Union has far more to fear than the United States. She places a far greater reliance on her land-based missiles than the United States and does not possess an equivalent Triad of forces.

SALT II AND EUROPEAN DEFENCE OPTIONS

It has been argued that while the Treaty places no limits on Soviet theatre systems such as the SS-20 and Backfire bomber, thus allowing the Soviet Union a substantial advantage in the theatre field, it imposes limitations on the development of ground and sea launched cruise missiles which could be used to offset this advantage. Thus, some analysts have worried that, over time, many Europeans might conclude that the United States—in order to reach an agreement—has mortgaged systems that are most likely to serve Western, rather than American, interests.

While acknowledging that the restrictions on GLCM's and SLCM's are for the duration of the protocol and therefore officially temporary, nevertheless critics assert that under a SALT III climate these limitations will be extended. Some have suggested that it is hopelessly naive to believe the West will be able to turn back the clock on "temporary" arms limitations and plunge ahead with new and previously banned weapons as though they had never been prohibited.

The Allies' access to cruise missile technology is also linked to the provision in the Treaty which bars circumvention of the Treaty provisions through third countries. Critics believe that the wording of this provision is so vague that the Soviet Union will be able to use it to prevent the United States sharing certain crucial military technologies with its Allies.

The argument that SALT excludes Soviet medium range systems represents a curious approach since it was the firm position of the United States, with complete Alliance support and approval, to keep forward based systems and medium range theatre systems out of the negotiations. Thus having successfully resisted Soviet pressure to include these systems it is slightly distortive to complain that SALT II will fail to constrain them. Moreover, it should be noted that the Alliance has exactly the same freedom as the Soviets to augment its theatre systems if it sees the need.

On the question of the restrictions on cruise missiles contained in the Protocol, the Administration has made it clear that the availability of options for theatre nuclear forces is unaffected by the Protocol. Specifically, testing of ground and sea launched missiles can go forward to unlimited ranges. The prohibition against deployment of ground and sea launchers of cruise missiles with a range in excess of 600km will expire well before such systems could in fact be deployed. Thus the decision on the utilization of cruise missiles within NATO will be decided through consultation within the Alliance, most likely at the Ministerial meetings in December. Administration officials stress that the Protocol was a compromise to settle a bargaining impasse and to leave time for more definitive negotiation while not imposing, in the meantime, any practical limits on the United States or NATO. They stress that the Soviets have indicated that they recognise that the Protocol will expire according to its terms.

Concerning the issue of non-circumvention, it is evident that the Soviet Union pressed hard for a very restrictive ban on transfers of technology and equipment covered in any way by the agreement. The United States however did not agree to such a clause. The non-circumvention clause is therefore very general and does no more than state an obligation which the United States would be under in any event. In testimony before this Committee, Administration officials have affirmed in the most explicit language that the non-circumvention clause will not affect existing patterns of collaboration and co-operation with America's allies, nor will it preclude co-operation in modernisation or continued nuclear or conventional co-operation with the Allies.

I will not comment at length here on the relationship between strategic and theatre forces except to emphasise that while the Protocol has ensured that a number of options remain open to the Alliance, close consultation will be necessary to decide whether these options are actually needed, under what circumstances and how they will fit into future arms control negotiations. In particular, it will be necessary to consider whether a decision to deploy these new options in Europe and thus provide Europe with a more substantial regional capability could be interpreted as a serious step to loosening the United States strategic commitment.

EUROPEAN INTERESTS IN SALT III

It is already accepted that once SALT II is signed the United States and the Soviet Union will proceed with negotiations on further limitations on strategic arms. SALT II includes a statement of principles and guidelines concerning a SALT III negotiation. While the United States originally wanted the statement of principles to set fairly explicit and ambitious targets regarding further reductions and modernisation restraints, it accepted the Soviet position of a fairly generalised statement. The Soviet Union is expected in SALT III to argue again that United States and Allied theatre nuclear weapons capable of reaching the Soviet Union must be taken into account in arriving at new ceilings.

It has always been difficult to restrict the negotiations to strictly bilateral issues since from the earliest days the Soviet Union raised the issue of the French and British nuclear forces and of American nuclear-capable aircraft stationed in Europe and capable of striking Soviet territory. Now, with the development of the strategic cruise missile, the controversy over the Backfire bomber and the emergence of the SS–20, attention has been focused on a number of systems whose characteristics defy precise definition and which will complicate any further negotiations.

Since these "grey area" or theatre systems have particular significance for Europe, it is evident that European interests must in some way be represented. However, several complex issues remain to be settled: namely, what sort of negotiating forum would be set for what particular weapons and for which particular participants?

The most realistic formula of the various proposals that have been circulated would be a continuation of the bilateral dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union with consideration of those theatre systems under United States or Soviet control. It is difficult to see any multilateral negotiation making much progress and several countries are opposed to dealing with theatre systems in isolation from strategic systems. Furthermore, the French have refused to participate in any negotiations on their nuclear forces and while the United Kingdom has not made its position clear on its willingness to see restraints placed on its strategic force is doubtful. This would inevitably mean that the Soviet Union will ask to be given compensation for the French and British nuclear forces. It will also mean continuing the present system of Alliance consultation as a means of securing European involvement. However, it may be possible to secure more permanent involvement through a new institutional mechanism. Whatever the mechanism, it must be made clear that Alliance participation means all members or at least those who participate in the basing or ownership of nuclear weapons.

As long as a satisfactory consultation mechanism could be established a continuation of the bilateral approach would certainly be the most likely to achieve progress. This approach would have the advantage of maintaining the essential continuity of nuclear systems and counteracting the tendency to try to separate the theatre and strategic levels. It would also facilitate matching constraints as, for example, United States constraint on the ground launched cruise missile in return for Soviet restraint on the SS–20.

SALT II AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Some critics have suggested that United States conduct in the SALT negotiations should have been linked to Soviet behaviour in other areas, in other words, a SALT agreement would have been conditional upon Soviet actions in areas such as developing countries, human rights, etc.

It is clear that SALT is one component of many that constitute the East-West relationship, and as an effort to establish understanding and a mutually acceptable framework in nuclear armaments it is clearly an important component. SALT therefore forms part of overall United States defence and foreign policy and just as it is influenced by developments in other areas so it will itself contribute to the general climate of East-West relations. Thus while SALT cannot be separated by developments in other areas it cannot be made responsible for them and cannot be used as a mechanism to influence them. It would have been wrong for the United States to have made concessions in SALT II in order to influence Soviet actions and it would have been wrong to have suspended SALT II in order to punish the Soviet Union. Above all, it must be stressed that SALT II is of substantial interest to both sides and must be judged on the basis of its own merits.

CONCLUSION

While re-emphasising my support for the Treaty, I wish to endorse the criticism voiced by several observers that not only are the levels too high but that the Treaty does too little in checking the momentum of armaments development. As has been

pointed out by opponents and supporters of the Treaty alike, the Treaty does nothing to constrain the development of planned United States strategic systems, including the MX, Trident submarine and missile, and cruise missiles, as well as new generations of Soviet strategic systems. I join those who urge that the next round of negotiations seriously tackle the unnecessarily high levels and potentially destabilising qualitative developments.

Despite this criticism, I support the current Treaty because it is an essential element of the East-West relationship and because it establishes a framework of mutual understanding and confidence which will permit the eventual acceptance of lower levels of forces. The Treaty provides a number of important steps in this direction:

It reinforces the perception and reality of balance by establishing equal levels of intercontinental nuclear delivery systems;

For the first time it requires actual reductions of about 250 Soviet (and no United States) strategic delivery systems;

It will limit Soviet MIRVd ICBM's, the most threatening part of their force, to 820;

It will prevent increases in the maximum number of warheads deployed in ICBM's, thus limiting Soviet ability to exploit their throw-weight advantage;

It will channel Soviet activity into certain areas and thus simplify United States planning, and it will constrain the deployment of Soviet strategic nuclear forces well below the levels which could be deployed in the absence of an agreement.

I believe that the SALT II Treaty will make a positive contribution to the future security of the Alliance. Failure to ratify this agreement would represent a reversal in the efforts to secure a more stable relationship between East and West. The SALT process has provided an important framework for the communication and exchange of information necessary for the building of mutual confidence. Such confidence is a prerequisite if stability is to be assured.

One great American once said that your country would never negotiate out of fear and not fear to negotiate. Successive administrations have conducted the SALT negotiations in this spirit. I sincerely believe that the Treaty that is now before you serves the security interest of the nations and peoples of our Alliance. At the same time, this Treaty is a true expression of Western determination to contribute to restraining weapons systems that, if used, could destroy civilisation itself.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I will yield in just a moment to Senator Hayakawa and let him begin the questioning, but I would like to underscore both to my colleagues and to the media two points which I think are very important. One is that we not only have a panel of four distinguished persons, but the four persons are evenly divided in terms of how they are viewed as representing conservative and liberal points of view in Europe. So we don't have a unified political philosophy being represented here.

Second, you do not represent your governments, but rather you speak individually as members of the North Atlantic Assembly.

I can say that I have personally spoken with the heads of state in two of your governments, to the Secretaries of Defense and the Foreign Ministers in three of your countries, and to a wide spectrum of elected leaders in Germany—from the CDU to what is viewed as the left of the SPD. And I would say that absolutely, officially, unofficially, equivocally, unequivocally, any way you want to characterize it, your governments have reflected the point of view that each of you have put forward.

And I would just add, Mr. de Vries, that you are rightfully startled and maybe somewhat offended by the doubts expressed by some as to the worth of the statements made by significant leaders in Europe and whether or not we should be able to believe them—doubts suggested by some who have testified before this committee, and some on this committee, that we should take it with a grain of salt, that it is really not meant. These doubts, of course, go to the very heart of the question of trust and the value of leadership.

Nor has our own Government been spared. We have had witness after witness come forward and tell us essentially, don't believe the President, don't believe the military, don't believe anybody who holds public office or has any significant public position, whether it be in the military or out of the military. The only ones you can really believe are those who no longer hold office, those who no longer have any responsibility, those who no longer have access to information.

Mr. DE VRIES. And who don't want to be named.

The CHAIRMAN. That's right. There was a very staggering presentation made by a retired Admiral and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the other day that I just found absolutely incredible. Nonetheless, he made that statement. So, don't feel badly. Our own Government has not been spared that criticism. I will now yield to Senator Hayakawa for questioning.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me join with others in thanking all of you for being here and in making your presentations. It is an act of international cooperation which we deeply, deeply appreciate. Again, thank you.

I would like to address my first question to Mr. Thyness, and I hope I pronounce the name correctly.

Mr. THYNESS. Astonishingly correctly, sir.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you.

CANCELLATION OF NATO MANEUVERS UNDER SOVIET PRESSURE

Is it not true that about a year ago the planned movement to Norway of German troops for NATO manuevers had to be canceled because of Soviet pressure? Would you care to comment on that?

Mr. THYNESS. Yes, sir, I will comment on that. I believe that the government had planned over a prolonged period of time to integrate the whole of the German component into the ACE Mobile Force step-by-step. Whether this time schedule was a little bit out of order or not is a matter for dispute, but most of the German contingent is in this ACE Mobile Force by now. Currently there is only one component lacking. Of course the question of German troops in Norway has always been a very critical point between Norway and the Soviet Union, presumably because of Norwegian proximity to Soviet territory.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Was it something of a humiliation to Norway or to Germany to have to do this?

Mr. THYNESS. We have never considered this to be any kind of humiliation to Norway. It simply affected Norway, positioned as it is on the map. We have always felt that we have a certain responsibility not to act in a way which legitimately could be said to be provocative by the Soviet Union.

Senator HAYAKAWA. I see. Thank you. Another question I have is for Dr. Corterier.

VULNERABILITY OF ICBM'S

I believe your statement was security within the Alliance is indivisible. I believe that is a very important statement that you have made, but since security is indivisible, how do you feel about the fact that in a few years the Soviet Union, striking first, will be

able to destroy most of our land-based strategic missiles because the M–X will not be deployed until about 1986?

Dr. CORTERIER. Well, that is a difficult question. On the one hand, of course, I agree with what you say, Senator, that our security in Europe depends on the viability of the strategic U.S. deterrent, but on the other hand it is quite difficult for us to judge what the viability really is or is going to be over the next 10 years or so. I have only read the statement by Secretary Brown that he made to this committee and that he believes it is going to remain viable even if during a certain period of time the land-based systems will be a little bit less viable than they probably should be before the M–X is going to be deployed, but of course he has said also that the sea-based systems and the bombers will remain credible, and in that respect the strategic systems will remain a credible deterrent. I have had no information really to contradict that statement.

Senator HAYAKAWA. I must say, Dr. Corterier, that this real vulnerability between 1983 or 1982 and 1986 is something that concerns many of us very, very much. This is why I asked the question. Thank you.

There is one other question which I would like to address to the panel as a whole. I will invite the comment of any one of you.

NONLINKAGE CONSIDERATION OF SALT

One of the important points about SALT upon which we have the insistence both of the Soviet Union and of our own administration is the nonlinkage, that we must consider the treaty within its own terms and not in connection with Soviet adventurism in Africa or the Near East or Latin America, that we must not think about those things, but must think only about the treaty.

In light of this injunction from both the Soviet and our own Government, I have tried to consider the treaty by itself, apart from all the other things that trouble us in our relations with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, I just find it impossible to maintain this nonlinkage, especially as a result of the revelations of the last few days about the Soviet combat troops in Cuba.

I would like to ask to what degree must we maintain this nonlinkage, because after all, the fact of Soviet troops in Cuba is only one more example of Soviet adventurism in different parts of the world. It has been going on ever since the signing of SALT I.

So, I guess I have to ask you what would be a rational reaction to this, on top of all of the other provocations that we are asked to ignore as we contemplate this treaty?

Mr. THYNESS. Perhaps, Senator, I might begin. The SALT II Treaty as I see it is not a unilateral gift by the United States to the Soviet Union. By throwing out the SALT II Treaty we would in fact in many aspects be punishing ourselves as much as we punish the Russians for their misbehavior in other places. I do think it is important that we give up this unrealistic concept of détente; that is, that it is ushering in a millenium of good behavior on the part of the Russians. Obviously, it is not going to work that way. It is going to be a case-by-case situation, and we will have to meet Soviet challenges in all fields, and we will constantly be pressed on our will and determination to stand up to them. In my thinking,

that is not any case for throwing out the treaty which in one field stabilizes the relationship and controls it.

Perhaps some of my colleagues would like to comment, too.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Mr. Wall?

Mr. WALL. It is a difficult question to answer, Senator, because it covers both the military and the political field. The SALT II Treaty is a military treaty and is desired by the Russians. I think that is fairly obvious, but you can never separate completely the military and the political. I do believe there is some degree of linkage, because the Soviets want SALT II and all four of us have said that as far as the Europeans are concerned, we will back you in getting SALT II, subject to certain amendments and resolutions, but we also believe that it is about time that all of us collectively stood up to Russian imperialism.

I personally believe that Cuba is a try-on. If they get away with this one, they may try it in Nicaragua or somewhere else. I believe the situation, as I said in my testimony, in Africa is extremely dangerous, because if chaos was created through Soviet surrogates in Southern Africa, Europe would not get vital minerals and that would create massive unemployment in the industrial centers in Europe. This would have military effects.

Therefore, I would agree with Mr. Thyness that SALT II is a military problem which should be considered on its merits. You can't altogether divorce it from the political situation, and I believe all of us in the West have got to stand up to the Russians who are probing all over the place but always respond to strength, which we haven't very often used.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Do you mean that we should consider SALT independent in any case but at the same time also take action in response to these provocations?

Mr. WALL. That is correct, Senator. For example, with regard to the Berlin blockade, we responded with strength and the Russians responded to the West's standing up, but unfortunately, as with my country and other countries in the alliance, you haven't stood up to the Soviets prodding quickly enough in recent years, perhaps. I think that is what I am stating.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. Wall. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. Might I have a reply from the rest of the panel?

The CHAIRMAN. Of course.

Mr. CORTERIER. I think we have to make the difference between a formal linkage and what I would call a de facto linkage. If you would make it formal, I think you would allow the Russians to do the same in reverse, and they might link SALT II to good American behavior in China or anywhere else in the world, I think that would lead us nowhere.

But a de facto linkage is, of course, there. It is obvious that the Senate, while considering this important treaty, will watch very carefully what the Soviets are doing, if they have a policy of restraint or of a lack of restraint. In that respect, I think what they are doing in Cuba is ominous and is a matter of concern to all of us. On the other hand, and I am basing myself only on the immediate information that I have so far, and I am not sure that we have all the information to really make a final judgment on this, on the other hand, what I know so far wouldn't warrant in my

opinion to really let SALT fall through because of what has happened in Cuba.

I think there are other options open to the U.S. Government to use in order to make the Russians—to lead the Russians to a more restrained policy in Cuba, and these options have, for instance, been explained this morning very eloquently, I think, by Professor Hoffmann.

Senator HAYAKAWA. What makes me so nervous is the fact that we have not achieved restraint on the part of the Russians at any time, in all their adventures in Africa and the Middle East as well. Mr. de Vries, did you have a comment, please?

Mr. DE VRIES. Could I just briefly add to what my colleagues have been saying, Senator, that I feel in this time in which everyone is concerned with leadership and who is providing leadership and what kind of leadership do we need, probably what we need most is to be able to distinguish between what is vital to our own interests and what is not vital, and to cope with these issues on the appropriate levels.

As far as I have been able to read from your newspapers, it might not be a vital threat, that is, the Cuban situation. I don't think anyone has stated that. And I think you should be careful in linking it to something that I think is vital to our security interests. There are different levels and different means with which you can cope with different problems, and I think that the action your administration has taken by trying to solve this problem through diplomatic means is appropriate.

If you are going to go from event to event and move from the main course that we have to settle on, we are really in bad shape. As Mr. Thyness has said, the Soviets are going to pose problems for many more years. They will range from small incidents to perhaps large provocations, let's say perhaps from ballerinas to Cuba.

If we are always going to let that confuse us and take us away from the course on which we ought to embark, which is to pursue our own interests and to pursue the interests of the world as we see them, then we really are in trouble.

We have a saying in our country that someone who does not know where to sail will never have favorable wind. I think we ought to decide where we want to sail.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Gentlemen, thank you all very much, and Mr. Chairman, thank you for the extension of time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Hayakawa.

Senator Percy.

Senator PERCY. Gentlemen, I would like to thank you all for the time you have given us. We deeply appreciate it. You give us a perspective we could not otherwise get.

We also appreciate your service to the North Atlantic Assembly. I have looked on this body through the years as having made a tremendous contribution to the strength and cohesion of the alliance. The broad scope of the assembly's work has emphasized the importance not only of NATO's military strength but also of the political and economic stability it can contribute to the entire free world.

We are very grateful to you in many respects.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS ON SALT

Mr. Thyness, starting with you, I will ask this question. You indicated for the most part that European support for SALT II has been overwhelming. I would ask each of you to comment.

With respect to the military in NATO, it has been said that there is a difference between the political leadership in Europe and the military. Taking into account that there will always be exceptions, would you say that, for the most part, those members of the military establishment in NATO countries generally support SALT II?

Mr. THYNESS. Well, Senator, I readily confess that the critical voices one hears are mainly from military people, perhaps preferably retired military people. This is not surprising since their view will always be focused on hardware and will not take into consideration what is to us here more important, namely, the long-term political considerations of the treaty.

You cannot divide the treaty between those two sides. It must be taken as an entity. Still, I would say that from my experience in my many conversations with military leaders both in my own country and within the alliance, it is also in these circles that a basic support for the SALT II Treaty is very, very high.

Senator PERCY. I would say that my question would have to be based on the assumption that we are able to totally satisfy military concerns about the nontransfer provision and the extension of the protocol. Those two things, we concur with you, must be laid in cement.

Mr. WALL. Yes, Senator, I would fully agree with what you just said, provided these two matters are absolutely clear. Then I believe the military in my country would certainly support SALT II. But I think they would also like to see a reversal of adverse trends and more military and political strength in the alliance's dealing with some of the problems we have discussed just now.

Mr. CORTERIER. I think the concerns that the military may have had, Senator, are mainly concerns that they have had in the past during the negotiations. At that time there was a feeling for a while that maybe you would limit yourselves too much as far as cruise missiles are concerned and that there would be problems as far as transfer of technology is concerned, and so on and so forth.

But as the process of consultation between your Government and the NATO governments went along, our experts and our governments have been able to put in their desiderata and their concerns, and now I think there is a general feeling also on the part of our military experts that this input has been taken care of, has been taken seriously by you. And with the assurances you have given us, we feel that our concerns have been satisfied.

So I think there has been a change from some time when the negotiations were going along and the present situation.

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

Mr. de Vries.

Mr. DE VRIES. Let me give you a footnote. As rapporteur of the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly, I have never let an occasion go by in recent years to ask the military in different countries we have visited about their attitude on SALT. And I must say that Mr. Corterier is right in his assessment.

Of course, during the course of the negotiations, people have been studying it carefully and have brought up concerns, but I think they are satisfied with the debate as to SALT. Of course, one of the problems which is on the military mind as well as on the political mind in Europe is how will we proceed from here.

I think Europe is far more concerned with the future than with the past in SALT II and will be satisfied with the result of the negotiations.

Senator PERCY. Mr. President, in your statement you say you have put on record your trust that the United States will stand behind its guarantees to Europe. I hope that you can carry back to Europe the judgment that the American public, the Congress of the United States and the President of the United States stands behind those guarantees without any equivocation whatsover.

You just have to take my State of Illinois. There are only a few relatives of my constituents in Vietnam. There was a lot of dissension in my State about that war. It was not in our national security interest. We shouldn't have committed ourselves so strongly. We committed about 3 percent of our GNP to the war effort in Vietnam and about 40 percent our GNP to the war effort in World War II.

Virtually everyone in my State has roots in Europe. They all came from European nations. We all did. You are a part of us and we are a part of you. We cannot separate our own national security from your security interests. Because wars are started through miscalculation, I hope the Soviets would never miscalculate the devotion we have to those guarantees, which are absolute and complete.

GATEWAY TO SALT III OBVIOUSLY SALT II

You mention that the gateway to SALT III is obviously SALT II. In other words, those who feel that this treaty does not go far enough in the way of real disarmament or bilateral reductions in armaments, that is really an answer to them, isn't it? You cannot get to SALT III and go any further—and many on this committee on both sides of the aisle have evidenced a desire to move forward and that this treaty does not go far enough—if you don't ratify SALT II. You can't get there unless you ratify SALT II, is that correct?

Mr. THYNESS. Yes, Senator. First let me say that I am very grateful for your statement about American intentions. But I can assure you that very few people in Norway feel a need of assurances of that kind.

Second, on the first question, of course SALT II is a very limited thing. There are a number of other areas where we need to move forward in order to create a more stable world. But I think most Europeans will agree with the statement that if SALT II is defeated, the whole atmosphere, the climate for negotiations, will be set back many years and that our present concerns with theater nuclear weapons, et cetera, would simply not be in the pale of any kind of arms control measure.

AGREEMENT WITH DR. KISSINGER'S ASSESSMENT

Senator PERCY. Mr. Wall, I went through your written statement and did not find in there a statement that you supported ratification of SALT II. In your verbal statement you did say it, but your statement is the most pessimistic.

Would you characterize it as something akin to statements made by Secretary Kissinger, that coupled with adequate defense expenditures, you would then support SALT II?

Mr. WALL. First, Senator, may I say that I understood wrongly, I believe, that the oral statement would be circulated with the written statement. In my view it is essential that both should be taken together because, as you pointed out, they are somewhat different in balance.

The CHAIRMAN. Both, of course, will appear in the record.

Mr. WALL. Thank you.

I fully support SALT II but, as I said, I think a lot depends on reversing the trend, both militarily and in political will. Therefore, I do to quite a large extent agree with Dr. Kissinger that the two need to come together.

MINUTEMAN VULNERABILITY

Senator PERCY. There is one other thing I would like to clarify in your statement. You discuss Minuteman vulnerability. You mention that the Soviets could conceivably knock out 70 to 90 percent of our ICBM force with a first strike, whereas we could only hope to destroy 65 percent of theirs.

Could you amplify that by commenting on, however, the fact that their strategic force is primarily land based and is therefore more vulnerable, where ours is primarily under water or in the air where it is highly invulnerable.

Mr. WALL. Yes, Senator, I will accept that. I put a lot of figures in my paper which are drawn from many different sources and, in some respects, contradict each other. On the other hand, I think that the statement is probably at the moment true, but of course American weapons are still much more accurate.

As you say, the United States depends on a triad of weapons, whereas the Soviets concentrate on land-based ICBM's. So on that point of view we are fairly happy. I really put it in my statement to show that in recent years, in fact since SALT I, the Soviets have deployed SS–17, 18, 19, 20. They are developing the SS–22, 23, 24 and 25 and have had SSN's 6, 8, 17 and 18.

During the whole of that period, the Americans have only been talking about the M–X cruise missiles and the Trident. That is the only reason I put it in. The trend is working against us. That is why in supporting SALT II, I do believe that this trend has to be reversed.

Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, I see my time is up. May I ask another question, please?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly, Senator. We have some time.

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

The question has been raised here before in the committee. We feel the debate so far has focused on many, many aspects of our overall foreign and military policy and has helped public under-

standing. My question is whether or not we should try to televise the debate on the floor of the Senate. The British Parliament is not televised, as I understand it, but the Dutch, and German Parliaments are. And I am not sure about Norway.

Could you comment very briefly as to whether you feel that the experiment would be worthwhile here? We have never televised the Senate floor debate of the United States but we had public radio coverage of the debate on the Panama Canal.

Gentlemen, would you care to give us the benefit of your advice on that as parliamentarians? We would appreciate it. What are the plusses and what are the minuses?

Mr. DE VRIES. Senator, we have had television in our chamber for more than 10 years now. We leave it to the networks what they want to broadcast and what not. I think it may have an effect in the short term, maybe on people having to appear on TV and making their speeches far more beautiful than they usually are.

But that wears off. And I think in the long run, it is just coverage that our discussions ought to have anyway. I do not think we are uncomfortable with it. As a matter of fact, we think it is quite natural nowadays.

Mr. CORTERIER. Senator, let me say that I agree with my colleague that probably when you have it all the time, people don't care that much any more. But we have a system where we mostly have television when we have important debates. I must say that we very often find that our voters watch these debates, and I think a debate on SALT II would probably be a good occasion to have such coverage from our experience.

Senator PERCY. So you would support it. I am sure we are not going to open up all floor debate to television coverage and it is only a question of this particular debate. How do you feel about that then?

Mr. DE VRIES. I think you should.

Mr. CORTERIER. So do I.

Mr. WALL. As I said, Senator, the majority are against television in our chamber. I continue to be against it. On the other hand, we do occasionally televise the opening of Parliament by the Queen. So there are exceptions. I would have thought there was quite a strong case to make in this debate which is so important on your country and to the alliance, an exception by televising it.

Of course, since you ask my advice, I give it, but it is really a problem for you to solve.

Mr. THYNESS. Senator, in Norway we have debates in our Parliament which are considered interesting by our network and these are carried on live television. Whether or not this is an advantage politically and gives information to the public, I really could not say. I do believe that television perhaps is slightly overrated as a means of information through debate because the viewers have a tendency more to see your tie than to listen to what you are saying.

The CHAIRMAN. I noticed the networks turned off their cameras when you said that. [Laughter.]

Mr. THYNESS. They are here to stay. Sooner or later they are going to come in, so why not now?

Senator PERCY. I want to thank you all very much indeed.

Senator Biden, because I may not otherwise have an occasion to do so, let me join Senator Church in commending you on what I consider to be an extremely important trip that you took to the Soviet Union. It was hardworking, and from my conversations with other members of the delegation, it was an extraordinary experience for all of them and added immeasurably to their understanding of some of the problems that were discussed.

But also I hope the understanding of those whom you visited was improved, if only to get at this one deeply perplexing problem that you have referred to, the role of the U.S. Senate in foreign policy. It is so hard for foreigners to really understand it. We want no misunderstanding on the Soviet Union's part, and I think you have helped emphasize that very much indeed.

I hope that they will look upon the understandings that we intend to accept as essential and really as reaffirming and making more binding some of the understandings they have already had with the executive branch of Government. It will bind future administrations.

I think Jack McCloy, whom all of you know, probably gave the best, most thorough explanation as a scholar and lawyer of the role of the Senate of the United States in making foreign policy. I will see that each of you gets a copy of that paper. He did a thorough research job, going back to the founding fathers and their intentions.

He described the executive branch, the President, as an agent in making foreign policy and certainly in making treaties. So we do recognize our responsibility. I hope we will carry it out in a very responsible manner because it must not be done capriciously. It is a grave responsibility. I think this vote will be the most important vote I will have cast in 13 years in the Senate, and your contribution in being here and in helping us is very deeply appreciated.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Percy.

Senator Percy, I thank you most sincerely for your fine compliment.

SENATE ACTION ON EXTENSION OF THE PROTOCOL

Mr. Thyness, you appear to be the one who seemed very satisfied by the administration's present statements on noncircumvention and nonextension of the protocol. Would you be satisfied with the U.S. Senate taking no formal action on that other than what the administration has already stated?

Mr. THYNESS. Senator, I have no objections to anything being written into the ratification resolution, but for my own part I think that the clarifications and the understandings given as of now are sufficient and I see no particular need for going further in that respect. I do, however, believe that some of my colleagues disagree with me in that.

Mr. WALL. May I take a rather different view? Administrations change and their policies change and public opinions change; but as I understand it, Senate resolutions do not change. They have the effect of law. Therefore, I would like to see the two particular issues I raised, noncircumvention and the transfer of technology, written into a Senate resolution if this is possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wall, I expect that your wish will be carried forth. We have all introduced various resolutions on the same subject.

Mr. CORTERIER. Mr. Chairman, as I have said, I think the assurances that have been given by the administration are satisfactory, but at the same time, I think it will certainly be useful if the Senate adopts a resolution that more or less goes in the same direction as the administration had done.

In addition to that, perhaps I am not familiar enough with your procedure, but as far as the protocol goes, the Senate has a very special responsibility. Therefore, I think it would be important that the Senate too states that the protocol is only there until the date of expiration that is written in.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, you have all referred to the concern on the part of our European allies about theater force modernization.

Several times in my conversations with Chancellor Schmidt, he called it Euro-strategic. He kept pointing out to me that although Bonn may be my theater, it is his home.

I believe there is unanimity in the view that we will not get to SALT III, which most assuredly will deal with some of the issues relating to TNF, unless we get through SALT II.

PROPOSAL FOR TNF MODERNIZATION

Now, if we may turn to something about which I have had a growing concern and which seems, in my opinion, to have gotten a bit out of hand. There seems to be an almost absolute adherence to the idea that December is the crucial time for all of NATO to arrive at the form that TNF modernization will take.

It seems somehow that we have set our own standard again, and if the high level group and the special group fail to reach a recommendation agreeable to all by December, somehow that will be viewed as a lack of solidarity by the Alliance.

Would you all individually comment? Perhaps we could begin with Mr. de Vries.

Mr. DE VRIES. Senator, it is good procedure to set a deadline for the procedures that you are developing, but it looks a bit like the tail is wagging the dog at the moment. I feel that where these issues of theater nuclear modernization in some countries of the Alliance, especially in my own, are so difficult and have to be discussed so thoroughly, that it would be rather dumb to let the calendar dictate when a decision is going to be on the table.

The CHAIRMAN. There seems to be a blind optimism that somehow the country of your eminent colleague on to your left—the FRG—will be able to reconcile its nonsingularity doctrine with the aversion that your country—Holland—has to deploy nuclear weapons. Everywhere I speak, they say they hope they will work it out. But, you know, "which weapons and where" is not an easy question. What truly is the prospect of us arriving at a unified NATO position?

Mr. DE VRIES. Sir, it is a bit difficult to comment on that. I know the discussions of the Government are very difficult for me as a parliamentarian who will have to look at what comes on the table. It is a bit difficult to pay the bill in advance.

But I think our government will have a very difficult decision to make and probably a very difficult time, if it comes to a positive decision, to convince our Parliament that it has done what was necessary, although I don't know the outcome. I really don't want to speculate on it.

But I think our public opinion is not prepared to accept at this very moment the introduction of long-range TNF in our own country.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, please continue down the line.

Mr. CORTERIER. Senator, we have had some talks last week with European governments and with NATO in Brussels. My impression is that on the technical level, they are making good progress. The high level group and the special group will be ready each before December.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think both groups will be ready?

Mr. CORTERIER. Yes. But as far as my government's opinions go, Chancellor Schmidt has said on several occasions that he will not let himself be pressured too much by that date. He has said that only if we are politically ready, if our consultations have gone far enough, if we have really been able to come up with a viable solution, would he be ready to make a final decision in December.

On the other hand, I think we want to get into SALT III as quickly as possible. In that respect I think we have an interest to not delay the decision for too long, but I don't think we should let ourselves be pressured by that December date too much.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, please use your judgment not to answer if you think it is most appropriate. I will not be offended. Do you see any prospect of the Federal Republic of Germany backing off its nonsingularity doctrine in the event that the Alliance cannot convince others to participate in the placement of long-range nuclear weapons of this sort?

Mr. CORTERIER. Well, sir, that is a very difficult question because I think there are very good reasons for us to take that stand. I think it would be very bad for the Alliance if this important position would not be taken by all its members, if not all its members would share in the responsibilities that go with it.

I am quite happy with a statement the Foreign Minister of Belgium made just a few days ago. Unfortunately, I have it here in French and it is a bit difficult to translate, but the gist of what he is saying is really that he feels as a Belgian it would be bad for the Alliance to have this kind of division.

I think some of the Alliance members like Holland or Belgium would be relegated almost to a kind of second class status. Of course, in addition to that you have to have in mind that Germany is probably the most exposed member of the Alliance and would have to suffer most from a propaganda campaign from the Soviet Union, from pressure from the Soviet Union and its allies.

I think also on that score it would be unfair to let Germany bear this burden alone.

Then there is another concern that I have that may not be as well understood here in the United States as it is understood in Western Europe, and that is that Germany's history is still there. There are still quite a few Eastern Europeans and Western Europeans, as well, who do not want Germany to be too strong.

If the impression that would be created that we in one way or another would be associated with nuclear weapons, and Germany alone, not the Alliance, I think it would not only hurt us in the East; it would hurt us in the West as well.

So these are very important considerations, Senator, and I think it would be very difficult for us to have almost a kind of bilateral solution to this problem. I think it must be an Alliance solution.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Wall.

Mr. WALL. Well, Senator, being a nuclear power, we do not face the problems that some of my European colleagues face. On the other hand, we have to realize that really, Europeans have no theater arms such as the SS–20, and therefore the sooner we can have an agreement to modernize NATO's theater nuclear forces the better. I believe the date of December is very important indeed.

I hope very much the Council of Ministers will be able to reach a definite decision, bearing in mind that whenever the decision is reached, it will be some considerable period before it can be implemented.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Thyness.

Mr. THYNESS. Senator, I believe that December is not simply set as a deadline. It is part of the internal NATO procedure. There is a ministerial meeting in December, and the next one would be in May. May would mean that the possible programs would be actually delayed.

I think we have up to January or February, actually, to make a decision, and the delay will occur in the development and deployment of systems we might agree on. So December is not absolute.

The CHAIRMAN. With regard to the practical or technical effect of a delay on the ability to deploy, I have spoken with our military leaders in NATO, including General Rogers, and your military leadership, specifically in Great Britain and Germany, and I think the idea that technologically we would be seriously hampered in terms of deploying unless the decision were made by December is a bit of a red herring.

IMPORTANCE OF THROW-WEIGHT IN SUPERPOWER BALANCE

I will ask one final question and will then yield to Senator Javits, who in my opinion is probably the most knowledgeable man in the Senate on questions relating to the Atlantic Alliance

Mr. de Vries, you and others have mentioned that throw-weight is only one of a number of criteria that can be used to measure strategic power.

How much importance do each of you gentleman believe that people in your countries and Europeans generally tend to attach to throw-weight as they assess the superpower balance?

It is argued by some that because the Soviets have a throw-weight advantage and because Europeans are obviously looking, they will say, my God, the superpower balance is obviously tipped and we should place less faith and reliance on the United States.

How much significance to you believe either your governments, your parliaments, and/or Europeans generally actually attach to throw-weight as they assess the superpower balance?

Mr. DE VRIES. Senator, I would not dare to comment on behalf of all Europeans, but from the discussions in which I have been involved, I do not think people perceive throw-weight as something very special. I think people are very practical and very cool in thinking about the different criteria by which one has to measure strategic power.

I think we would basically agree with the judgment made earlier by previous administrations in your country that if you deploy nuclear weapons, you have first of all to determine what you are going to do with them. If you can do that with lower throw-weights and higher accuracy, for instance, then you are probably better off than by just trying to buy something very big and a bit dumb and clumsy.

I don't think in public opinion it plays any role whatsoever. I don't think very many people know what throw-weight is, actually. If they know, I don't think at the same time they will be able to analyze what it would mean. So I do not attach very much value to it in terms of public opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Wall.

Mr. WALL. I think, as you say, it is part of the general scenario. I don't think it is really relevant how much overkill there is on each side. I believe what is more important than throw-weight is accuracy. Of course, your missiles are considerably more accurate than the Soviets, but they seem to be catching up.

Mr. THYNESS. Senator, may I just say that it is at least my understanding that the United States has deliberately not developed those gigantic weapons simply because they put more store in accuracy. I think most people who are apt to have a view on these questions are apt also to accept that policy of the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. We have a common failing in this country. We tend to double argue every issue using it both ways. Present and retired military leaders have sat at that table and told us about the throw-weight problem. We then ask, do you want to build heavy missiles if we amend the treaty? And they say no.

I will yield to Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I dashed down as quickly as I could. I had a speaking engagement in New York of long standing. I want to welcome you as brothers in arms with whom I have served for so many years in the North Atlantic Assembly, and to especially welcome you because it is rather an innovation for us to have witnesses who are from out of our country.

I cannot think of a finer set of witnesses to have on this subject, and I shall read avidly everything that you have said on this subject. I am sure, knowing my colleagues as I do, that there isn't anything that I could ask that you have not already been asked, but I would like the privilege, without interfering with Senator Biden's lunch because I will only take a minute, to ask you one question.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SALT II AND SALT III

It relates to the relationship between SALT II and SALT III. Senator Biden made a very gracious reference to me. I don't deserve it. I have served in this field a long time and I have always

considered Europe the linchpin of our hope for retaining peace, social justice, and prosperity in the world.

I have always felt that Western Europe, the United States, and Japan, if we ever were really working hand and glove, would find no problem, really, that we couldn't very readily handle. But, of course, we don't. Our main problem is ourselves. But, I have confidence in Europe's confidence in us because I have comparable confidence in Europe.

Therefore, I believe the greatest question you can answer for us is the relationship between SALT II and SALT III. We will unquestionably, gentlemen, give some instruction of a binding character to our negotiators about SALT III. The present indications are that we will want them, before they bring back SALT III, to have effected a real limitation in nuclear armaments. Otherwise, they should not bring it back; and to serve notice on the Russians that without a real limitation, there will be no SALT III.

Now, as Europe—and when I use the word "Europe," I mean you, our allies—has favored SALT II because it counted on that as the condition precedent to SALT III. There may be something else that you could suggest to us that we could look forward to and provide for respecting SALT III, which is of the most burning interest to Europe. That, to me, would be the single most critical factor.

I would like to recall for you gentlemen that in the debate between Senator Jackson and me before the North Atlantic Assembly in Lisbon last December, that was the issue. Jackson argued that we were leaving you vulnerable and that there might not even be a SALT III, and I argued that SALT II made SALT III inevitable and that without SALT II it was not inevitable, just the contrary.

My view prevailed overwhelmingly, and it was very heartening. Is that still the case, and how do you look at it? That is my question.

Mr. THYNESS. Senator, I would just like to say that since I represent the country that has taken the decision not to have nuclear weapons stationed on its soil in peacetime, I always find it a little bit difficult to argue these matters because, on the one hand, I can be shown up as someone who wants others to do the dirty job and still stay out of it; on the other hand, from time to time I can be shown to be more ferocious than really I have any background for being.

So I would very much like my colleagues, particularly from Germany and the Netherlands, who are more in the picture here to give views which I do believe from present and past discussions will be the same as mine on this issue.

Peter, would you begin?

Mr. CORTERIER. Thank you. I would be happy to.

Senator, I think I am safe in saying that support for your position has not diminished, and I think it may be even greater on that issue in the assembly, and I am sure we will see that in October at our next meeting.

I am very gratified that not only you but your colleagues as well seem to realize our ardent desire that we move as much and as quickly as possible from SALT II into SALT III and that it should

be possible to deal there with those issues that are of particular concern for us in Europe and that have not been resolved so far in SALT II or in any of the negotiations.

I think there is a real danger that if we don't do that very quickly, the arms race might move more and more into that area, because I think the Soviets have started to move into that area to exploit this gap that there is between the SALT II negotiations, on the one hand, and MBFR, on the other hand. They really have exploited that opportunity, in my opinion.

So I think it is important, particularly for Americans, to realize that you should not only deal with the central systems in SALT III but you should deal with the theater nuclear forces, particularly the long-range nuclear forces that are of so much concern to us in Europe.

I think it is also important that we should not make an artificial difference between central systems and theater nuclear systems. As Senator Biden has so well put it, for us in Bonn, for instance, it really is a strategic system when it comes to being able to wipe out not only Bonn but the whole surrounding area, for example by an SS–20.

We feel we must not allow the Russians to get away with their idea of strategic, because they call strategic whatever can hit them and they don't admit the same criteria for their systems that can hit Western Europe.

We believe that the alliance territory must have the same security criteria. Therefore, we hope that this difference is not going to be continued to be made between central systems and theater nuclear forces.

We would certainly appreciate very much if the Senate would make it very clear that it wants these systems to be included in the next round of negotiations between you and the Soviet Union.

NEED FOR REDUCTIONS IN SALT III

Senator JAVITS. The other part of my question is: Suppose we put the firm condition on that that there must be a real reduction? Now, I have one-half of the answer. You would feel a real reduction has to be not only in what the Russians define as strategic, to wit, intercontinental, but also any nuclear use in any place within the NATO area.

Mr. CORTERIER. Yes, that is exactly how I feel. If you would have a real reduction only in central systems and would leave the medium-range systems untouched, I think the problem would be even bigger for us in Europe.

Senator JAVITS. The converse of the proposition is this. We set that condition and our negotiators start. Therefore, we run the risk that there will be no SALT III. Do you believe Europe would be willing to run that risk, that the next time out there has to be a real reduction?

Mr. CORTERIER. Well, I think after so many years of negotiations, it is obvious that you have to go further now than you have been able to go in SALT II. This is something I have not been able to consult with my friends back home on, but I think there would be a general support for the idea that now the time has come where we need to go much further than we have been able to do so far.

Mr. THYNESS. Senator, I would like to say that although, of course, the aim should always be a real reduction in nuclear armaments of all systems of all kinds, I think perhaps it will be going a bit far to make that a precondition for entering into the negotiations.

After all, although we prefer a real reduction, a stabilization at an acceptable level would also be something that would be valuable in curbing an aspiring arms race.

Mr. WALL. Senator, let me say that we all want to see a limitation of arms, both nuclear and conventional, but obviously SALT II must come before SALT III, and without SALT II, SALT III will not get off the ground. I believe SALT III is important for reasons to which I have already testified. The SS–20 and the Backfire are the two weapons to which Europe is most vulnerable and are not included in SALT II.

Also there is the problem of the British and the French strategic nuclear deterrents. So after SALT II must come SALT III, but because of the reasons I have given, there must be very full consultations.

I am not suggesting that there haven't been such consultations in SALT II. Indeed I have testified that consultations in SALT II were excellent. But I think the Europeans will be much more intimately affected by SALT III for the reasons that I have given, such as the existence of the British and French nuclear deterrent and possible Soviet weapons directed at Europe.

I think it will therefore require much closer consultation than has been necessary in SALT II.

Senator JAVITS. And would you agree with Mr. Thyness as to the fact that it should accommodate also a stabilization even though an absolute reduction, a material reduction cannot be obtained.

Mr. WALL. Yes, sir, I would. What worries me is the background to the whole problem. The debate we have been having over the years has shown that the trend, both politically and militarily, has been to the advantage of the Soviet Union and I believe that this trend has to be reversed if we are going to obtain a proper balance and proper and lasting SALT II, III, IV, and so forth.

Mr. DE VRIES. Senator, regarding your first question, I think we all remember in the North Atlantic Assembly the intervention you made in Lisbon. I think people are still very supportive of that. If you ask whether we would want to run the risk of having no SALT III by asking for deep cuts, I think my answer would be that I think a little risk-taking in addressing this problem could do no harm.

I think it is extremely important that after the preliminary exercises that we have had in SALT I, and hopefully in SALT II, that we address the real problem and try to not only restrain and channel the arms race, but achieve some real progress by making deep cuts.

Of course, if the price for that would be the loss of stability, I think we would have to have a close look at that again. But I think that our aims and our goals should be to pursue a strategy which would lead to dramatic cuts in the arsenals which have been built up.

Senator JAVITS. Gentlemen, thank you very much. I have greatly appreciated your responses.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Javits.

SENATE REQUIREMENT FOR DEEP CUTS IN SALT III

Gentlemen, if we go to deep cuts in SALT III and if the Senate requires the negotiators for the administration to do that, isn't that going to raise other problems?

If we accomplish deep cuts in the strategic and theater nuclear areas, what happens with the Soviets advantage in conventional force capability? Hasn't the fact that we have relied so long on the nuclear deterrent as the essential part of the overall deterrent allowed us not to have to respond inkind to conventional capability? We had this trip wire, this nuclear deterrent? But if we codify an equivalence in both the theater and the central systems, what does that do to European security, given the disparity in conventional capability?

Mr. THYNESS. Senator, I think we should not forget that there is another set of negotiations underway between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and that is the MBFR negotiations.

MBFR WITHOUT SALT

The CHAIRMAN. It is essential that we arrive at an MBFR conclusion? Can we have one without the other?

Mr. CORTERIER. The question is will the Soviets after the failure of SALT II trust you to ratify an MBFR Treaty?

The CHAIRMAN. I am assuming for the sake of my question that we have ratified SALT II and that we are on the way to negotiating SALT III. But part of the command that has been issued from the Senate to the President, whomever that may be at the time, would be, "You must come back with deep cuts or else the Senate will not entertain a SALT III agreement."

What happens with that conventional disparity? Does not that, when we look at overall military capability, give the Soviets a decisive advantage unless we have at the same time arrived at some resolution at MBFR that fits in? That is my question.

That is what scares me about deep cut requirements.

ROLE OF TNF IN THE ALLIANCE

Mr. DE VRIES. I think it is a very difficult question which one has to ponder, and I would not presume to be able to answer it fully. But as to the role of theater nuclear weapons in the inventory of the alliance, there has always been a great confusion. I think what strategic parity might mean is—of course, we have to deal with the theater level, also—mainly that we want to have a closer look at the conventional area.

We have always looked at theater forces as forces which would indicate to a possible aggressor that there is an ultimate deterrent. And of course there are many distinctions to be made in the battlefield in theater systems and so forth.

But basically a better definition of the role of those systems has never been given. I think theater nuclear warfare in Europe means

total warfare in Europe, and to prevent total warfare in Europe, I think the conventional balance might be the one we want to look at, as well in arms control as in our defense posture.

Mr. WALL. Senator, in the scenario you have proposed, the deterrent is still there. Both sides have nuclear forces and can still use them, but I don't believe either side will use them. Therefore, I believe the deterrent will depend largely on our keeping our conventional forces up to date. So I hope that if we do manage to secure limitation on nuclear arms, we won't run away with the idea it is going to save a lot of money. It isn't. You are going to have to spend more on conventional forces.

But I do believe the scenario you have proposed would mean that we would pay much more attention to flanks because you would have a stalemate in nuclear forces in Europe. You would have a Russian superiority in conventional. But they have that today. As long as we keep a reasonable balance of modern conventional forces whatever it is, I think you will continue to have a stalemate in Europe and have to give more thought to the area outside the NATO boundaries.

Mr. CORTERIER. I would like to briefly comment on MBFR. At the beginning of MBFR, they said that their superiority, which they have had for many years, was good. It had contributed to maintaining peace in Europe and they didn't want to change it.

One of the signs of progress we have made in MBFR is now they have recognized the necessity to have parity there, too. Of course, there is still the data question that has to be resolved, but I think we have to take them up on this. What we want is parity not only on the strategic nuclear level and the theater nuclear level, but also so far as the conventional forces go. I think we have to pursue that in MBFR.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. President.

Mr. THYNESS. I would just like to say that it is very difficult to answer the question because it all depends on how the SALT III Treaty eventually will come out. It is an immensely complicated thing, and you really need to go from weapons system to weapons system and balance them all against each other to see what sort of package you end up with before you can really give an answer to the question.

But I would say in general that I cannot see it being more dangerous to have a kind of parity on theater nuclear forces and inferiority in conventional forces as more dangerous than being inferior in both fields.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, thank you very much. We have kept you here for a very long time. You have earned your lunch and we look forward to seeing you in just a few moments for luncheon.

This hearing is recessed until 2 o'clock this afternoon, when the lead-off witness will be the Honorable Paul Warnke, former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Thank you all, gentlemen, very much.

[Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 2 p.m. the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator MCGOVERN. If the witnesses will please come forward, we will open the hearing. Other Senators will be joining us later on.

OPENING STATEMENT

This afternoon we return to the theme of SALT and arms control. We have spent a great deal of time in our hearings on the military balance, the impact of SALT on our programs, future trends in Soviet programs and so on. We wanted to be sure we looked at the consequences of the treaty for our national security.

We do not want to lose sight of the other side of SALT, its arms control capability and impact. After all, the SALT process is also about limiting strategic weapons. We want to assess this treaty in two respects. From the arms control perspective, what contribution does it make to limiting weapons? How effectively does it prepare the way for more far reaching arms control in SALT III?

We also want to consider the possibilities and prospects for SALT III assuming SALT II is ratified. Some have said SALT III is the last chance for stopping the strategic arms race. Such a somber prediction puts all the more weight on a careful and well thought out approach to SALT III to enhance the prospects for success.

Today we welcome three eminent arms control experts to help us in these considerations. They are Ambassador Warnke who has been before this committee in an earlier hearing. We are glad to have him again today. Dr. Panofsky is presently director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center. He is a distinguished scientist with a long history of involvement in arms control who has testified before this and other committees of the Congress on numerous occasions. Dr. Brennan is well known as a strategist and student of national security problems having written or collaborated in many important publications on arms control. He is currently director of National Security Studies at the Hudson Institute.

We welcome you, gentlemen, to this session of the committee to compile the record that we need for our further judgments on this treaty. I think we will begin with Mr. Warnke and then we will hear from Mr. Panofsky and Mr. Brennan in that order. We will reserve questions until all three of the panelists have had a chance to make an opening statement.

Mr. Warnke?

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL WARNKE, FORMER DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY AND FORMER CHIEF, SALT NEGOTIATIONS [1]

Ambassador WARNKE. Thank you, Senator McGovern.

I have submitted a written statement which I assume will be put into the record.

Senator MCGOVERN. Your prepared statement will be inserted into the record at the appropriate place.

Ambassador WARNKE. I will just endeavor to highlight some of my views with regard to SALT III.

[1] See page 349 for Ambassador Warnke's prepared statement.

The suggestions I would like to make are relatively primitive. I hope they are practical. They are based on my experience in the SALT negotiations and my expectations as to what will occur when the two countries come back to the negotiating table.

As I have indicated in my previous testimony before this Committee, I see one of the major advantages of the SALT II Treaty as providing a firm foundation for subsequent efforts. I do not think we should view SALT III as being necessarily the same kind of protracted exercise. I would certainly hope it would not require something like 7 years in order to get further steps toward more effective strategic nuclear arms control.

I think of the SALT II Treaty as providing the basis for a continuing strategic arms control regime. As I have indicated in my prepared statement, a great deal of the negotiations had to do with the basic definitions. We had to establish the principles which would permit us to control the various types of strategic nuclear weapons. Another major part of the negotiating time was occupied in working out the provisions on verification. I think perhaps that was the single subject which occupied more time than anything else.

I do not think in SALT III we have to reinvent the wheel. We can start off with the proposition that this is a basic treaty that can be continued. It can be continued with amendments.

I believe what we ought to do as a priority item in SALT III is to try and shrink the SALT II limits, not only the overall aggregate ceiling of strategic nuclear weapons but also the various subceilings on the subcategories.

As you know, Senator, one of the major accomplishments of SALT II is that for the first time it takes a selective approach to arms control. It does not just set an overall aggregate but it sets a subceiling of 1,200 on the number of launchers of MIRVed ballistic missiles and then a lower subceiling of 820 on the launchers of MIRVed ICBM's, the most dangerous and the most destabilizing of the systems.

One of the items that ought to receive a great deal of attention in SALT III in the very early stages is negotiation of a much lower sublimit on the MIRVed ICBM launchers and of course also shrinking the other ceilings in SALT.

In addition I believe a package of amendments can be developed which would be further stabilizing measures. Such things for example as limits on flight tests of ballistic missiles. If there are some narrow limits on those flight tests this will very significantly impede the possibility of development of new types of ballistic missiles.

Another proposal that we did bring to the negotiating table quite late in SALT II and really too late for it to receive much attention was the idea of a ban on depressed trajectory testing of submarine launched ballistic missiles—again a stabilizing measure because that would prevent the development of a capability of the submarine launched ballistic missiles to attack our strategic bomber force with a very sharply reduced warning time.

Possible limits on antisubmarine warfare would preserve the present invulnerability of our ballistic missile submarine force. In addition I think we ought to be able to work out further limits on

changes in intercontinental range ballistic missiles. In SALT II we have for the first time some limits on the amount of tinkering that can be done with existing missiles. Limits for example on significant changes in the dimensions and limits on changes in propulsion systems. As part of SALT III we ought to see if we cannot develop further controls on modernization or modification of existing missile systems. In company with those further controls we might need further verification measures, things that would permit us to have a greater certainty.

If you put together these various possibilities, I think we can see that there is in fact a prospect of being able to work out some sort of a modification and restraint package. For example if we have a limit on flight tests of ballistic missiles, we might then be able to develop some additional or some supplemental verification procedures that would enable us with a higher degree of confidence to monitor that limited number of tests.

To a very real extent these are synergistic possibilities.

I think from the procedural standpoint we ought to regard SALT III as being a process that can yield results in perhaps a series of packages, a piecemeal approach, not necessarily all at once and nothing first. One of the factors that led to the prolongation of the SALT II negotiations was that we did not have a basic treaty to start with and accordingly nothing could be settled until everything was settled.

If we take that same approach to SALT III, then we will have to look forward to a multiyear negotiation before any productive results can be reached. I would not like to see that happen. Instead I would prefer to see an approach under which, when a particular package of amendments has been agreed upon, they then could be signed and presented to the U.S. Senate for ratification.

One of the reasons I feel that this approach is necessary is that we will have one new item of immense complexity on the SALT III negotiating agenda and that is the treatment of the theater nuclear forces.

We felt in SALT II that we had to avoid getting into the theater nuclear forces because that would prevent the continuation of the negotiations on a primarily bilateral basis. Because obviously when you get into the theater nuclear forces, that intimately engages the interest of our Western European allies and we would require some kind of a continuing consultative mechanism to permit their views to become a part of the SALT negotiations.

President Ford at Vladivostok was able to get the Soviets to agree that SALT II would not include theater nuclear forces. However it seems to be almost inevitable that theater nuclear force issues will come up in SALT III. They will for one thing because of the fact that the protocol expires at the end of 1981. At the end of that time there will be no controls over the ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles.

I think it is also inescapable because of the grave concern that our Western European allies have about the development of such gray area systems as the SS–20, a mobile medium range ballistic missile launcher and the Backfire bomber. Because of that fact, they see the possibilities that rather than the nuclear arms compe-

tition being stopped or retarded, it may instead focus just on theater nuclear forces.

Presently we are trying to work out with our allies a dual approach to the problem of theater nuclear forces. We are discussing modernization of our own theater nuclear forces perhaps by extended range Pershing missiles or perhaps by long-range ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles, but at the same time we and our allies feel it is important to try and pursue the possibilities of some arms control constraints on theater nuclear forces.

The complexity of the issue is such that I would very much dislike to see all progress on SALT II halted while we try and work out the details of some controls over the gray area systems and the theater nuclear forces.

We ought to be able to agree bilaterally with the Soviets on further reductions in the aggregate and further reductions in the subceilings while pursuing the question of control of the theater nuclear forces.

As I have mentioned in my prepared statement, I think it will be necessary to develop some kind of continuing consultative mechanism at a minimum to deal with the theater nuclear force issue. Although we consulted on a very frequent basis with our allies during the development of SALT II, when we get into the theater nuclear forces, I think we will need a more formal method of consultation so their views will be reflected because of the fact that these issues are not primarily and certainly not exclusively bilateral issues.

I have also stated in my prepared comments that I think we ought to pursue other arms control initiatives as being complementary to SALT. I believe for example that we ought to pursue the possibility of a cutoff on the production of fissionable material. That would complement SALT because it would further impede the development of new types of nuclear weapons.

I feel very strongly that we ought to pursue the completion of the current negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. Again that complements SALT because it again impedes the development of new types of strategic nuclear weapons.

Based on my experience as head of the American delegation to the comprehensive test ban talks, I believe the way is now clear to solve the major problems that have prevented the completion of a comprehensive test ban for so many years and this is in my view a matter of great importance to the security of the United States.

I think we should not underemphasize the risks of proliferation of nuclear weapons. I think it is quite clear that we are never going to be able to bring to bear the maximum pressure on other countries to prevent them from getting into the nuclear weapons business as long as we consider it necessary to continue to test nuclear explosive devices.

I recommend that the comprehensive test ban negotiations be pursued as a priority item in conjunction with SALT III.

I would like to make my own plea that the Senate act rapidly on SALT II. The time is not running in our favor. As we wait, technological developments make arms control ever more difficult.

I think we need the SALT II Treaty as the firm foundation that will permit us to get ahead with the process and to achieve significant and prompt results.

Thank you very much.

[Ambassador Warnke's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR PAUL C. WARNKE

ARMS CONTROL AND SALT III OBJECTIVES

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, as the Members of the Committee know, I left my government responsibilities with regard to the strategic arms limits negotiations over ten months ago. Accordingly, my comment today on possible approaches to SALT III must be considered to be those of a private citizen. They are, of course, based on my close personal observation of the SALT process.

In my opinion, it is imperative that the ratification of the SALT II Treaty take place as soon as possible so that this process may go ahead without further loss of time. Experience shows that, as SALT plods along, the unimpeded advance of nuclear technology puts ever greater obstacles in the path of sound and effective nuclear arms control.

As I testified before this Committee last July, I see one of the main advantages of the SALT II Treaty as being the creation of a firm foundation on which further quantitative reductions, qualitative constraints and other limits on nuclear weapons development may be based. Accordingly, I do not see as the goal of the SALT III negotiations the creation of a whole new replacement treaty. With the entry into force of the SALT II Treaty, we will have the basic structure for a continuing nuclear arms control regime. Much, if not most, of the SALT II negotiations centered around such fundamental issues as the definitions of the particular nuclear weapons systems to be covered and the provisions on verification. These issues need not and should not be renegotiated. They may, of course, be supplemented.

Nor, as was the case with the SALT II Treaty, need there be agreement on the entire congeries of complicated issues before agreement can be reached on any individual item or related set of items. In SALT II, nothing could come into effect until everything was settled. Now, it would facilitate the negotiations and yield much more rapid progress if SALT III is conceived as a set of separable packages.

Thus, President Carter has made it clear that he places very high priority on substantial reductions in both the overall aggregate of nuclear weapons delivery systems and the subceilings on the more dangerous and destabilizing of these weapons systems. These subceilings are among the more useful precedents created by the SALT II treaty. At an early stage, it should be possible to agree, for example, that when the reduced ceiling of 2,250 is reached by the end of 1981, further reductions will be made to bring the aggregate strategic nuclear delivery vehicle total to a figure well below that level by the end of 1985. At the same time, and as part of the same package, agreement should be reached to cut, by that same end date and to a significant extent, the subceilings of 1,200 MIRVed ballistic missile launchers and 820 launchers of MIRVed intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Associated with this package of quantitative cuts, there should be an agreement to extend the term of the SALT II treaty, at least through 1990.

This relatively simple package would, of course, require Senate ratification before it came into effect. It could, however, be presented to the Senate as soon as it has been negotiated and it should not, I think, prove to be controversial.

Another set of related proposals could be those that are designed to have a further inhibiting effect on the development of new types of strategic nuclear weapons capability. One such measure would be a limit on the number of intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missile tests that can be conducted in any one year. Either the limit of six which was part of the March 1977 proposal might be considered or perhaps some separate ceiling applicable only to ICBM's.

Another such limit, which could be associated with that on test firings, could be a ban on any testing of submarine-launched ballistic missiles in depressed trajectories, a development which would lessen the warning time for attacks on our strategic bomber force. The limits on changes in existing missiles should be tightened to the extent that verification considerations permit. Specific inhibitions on any new strategic weapons in the early concept stage could also be included in this particular package of SALT III amendments to the basic SALT II treaty.

My preference for this separate package approach to SALT III is grounded in large part by the next set of SALT III issues that I would like to discuss. These involve the so-called grey area systems—the theatre nuclear weapons that come in between the tactical battlefield classification and those of strategic intercontinental

range. Obviously, these longer range weapons in the theatre nuclear forces create negotiating and political problems of great complexity. Their direct relationship to alliance force structure decisions means that their disposition in treaty provisions cannot be an exclusively bilateral process. Our recognition of the sensitivities that these theatre nuclear forces evoke was reflected in our insistence in SALT II that only weapons of intercontinental range would be covered. At the Vladivostok meeting between President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev, the Soviets accepted our position that forward-based systems in Europe would not be included.

There is, as the members of the Committee know, not complete consonance of views among the NATO allies as to the inclusion of theatre nuclear forces in SALT III. At the same time, it is clear that alliance decisions on the upgrading of NATO's theatre nuclear forces can only be made in the context of developments in Soviet nuclear forces of comparable range. Moreover, the only restraints on long-range ground launched and sea launched cruise missiles are those contained in the Protocol, which inhibits only the deployment but not the testing of such weapons through 1981. It seems very likely that the Soviet negotiators will propose, as part of SALT III, new restrictions on cruise missiles on ground or sea launchers that could reach the Soviet Union from Western Europe. We, however, have made it very clear to the Soviets that no such restrictions could be accepted unless there are comparable restrictions on such long-range theatre systems as the Soviet SS–20 and the Backfire bomber.

Any decisions as to what theatre nuclear weapons we are prepared to forego, and in return for what limits on Soviet theatre nuclear forces, must be made in close consultation with our Western European allies. These decisions will require careful analysis of the implications for NATO's security of going ahead or holding back. Will, for example, a surprise attack on Western Europe be less or more feasible if both NATO and the Warsaw Pact have uncountable numbers of long-range cruise missiles deployed on ground and sea launchers? Splendid as our verification capability is, I know of no way that we could tell or the Soviet Union could tell how many such missiles are in fact deployed, against what targets they are aimed, or even whether they are armed with nuclear or conventional warheads or a mix of both.

Moreover, even if the other NATO countries are willing to have questions of theatre nuclear forces negotiated in bilateral meetings between the United States and the Soviet Union, it seems certain that this part of SALT III could only go ahead with some more formal and more continuous consultative mechanism, whereby we would have constantly to renew the proxy given to us by our allies. We would, I am certain, be completely unwilling to decide issues basic to NATO's nuclear military forces except on the basis of full agreement and understanding within the alliance.

But, as I see it, there is no reason why this set of issues, which raise such troubling political, military and negotiating problems, should hold up further bilateral agreement on deep cuts and new qualitative restraints on strategic range nuclear weapons systems. There is, I recognize, a temptation to find a relationship among all of the questions that can arise as the SALT negotiations continue. The breaking down of these issues into separate packages, that might be negotiated, signed and ratified as separate amendments to the basic SALT II treaty, foregoes some opportunity for trade-offs. But, to take one simple instance, we would certainly have preferred to see lower figures than 2,250, 1,200 and 820 as part of SALT II. We in fact proposed, unsuccessully, limits on flight tests and the testing of submarine launched ballistic missiles in depressed trajectories. If and when we can secure agreement on these further cuts and these new restraints, I can see no reason why they should not promptly be brought into force as amendments of the basic treaty.

As for the relationship between SALT and other arms control initiatives, I would support Dr. Panofsky's suggestion that the SALT forum might be used to agree with the Soviet Union on a cutoff of production of fissionable material for military purposes. The United States has repeatedly supported such a cutoff in the past and its coming into being would be consistent with our attempts to improve security and lessen the risk of nuclear war by limiting further the development of new nuclear weapons. In addition, I think the speedy completion of a comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear explosive devices is both possible and highly desirable. Again, such a ban would impede the creation of new and even more destructive nuclear weapons systems. Having headed our delegation to these Comprehensive Test Ban negotiations until last November, I am confident that what once appeared as the major problems can now be readily resolved.

Moreover, the cessation of testing of nuclear explosive devices is, as I see it, an indispensable part of a realistic policy against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. So long as we and the Soviet Union insist on our need for further tests of nuclear weaponry, our pleas that other sovereign states forego any such testing are destined

to fall on deaf ears. Whatever national security arguments might be made for continued testing are, I am convinced, dwarfed by the national security detriment of encouraging other countries to acquire a nuclear weapons capability.

Finally, I would like to make my own plea for the assigning of a higher priority to the completion of new limitations on strategic nuclear weapons. The process, as I see it, is inescapably a slow and cautious one. We can't afford to speed it up at the sacrifice of thorough consideration and full exploration of the possibilities. But neither, in my opinion, can we afford to draw it out artificially and unnecessarily by holding SALT hostage to every swing in United States/Soviet relations.

SALT, as I have said repeatedly, is not a favor that we are doing to the Soviets, one that we can withhold as a punishment or proffer as a bribe. SALT is instead a responsibility that history, our scientific genius and our position of world leadership have placed upon us. Confident as I am that the SALT II Treaty is a major step forward to nuclear sanity, I am equally convinced that we must go further and go faster. It is for these reasons that I recommend strongly that we get ahead with it, that the SALT II Treaty be ratified promptly, and that it be used as the firm foundation for a series of additional and separable improvements that can be considered and accepted as amendments to the basic treaty.

Such an approach can mean more rapid and substantial progress, and permit the consideration of SALT issues in an atmosphere less politically charged. It affords a means whereby the more complex and controversial issues will not prevent the prompt entry into force of simpler but no less significant steps in nuclear arms control.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Ambassador Warnke. We will proceed with the testimony of Dr. Panofsky.

STATEMENT OF DR. WOLFGANG PANOFSKY, DIRECTOR, STANFORD LINEAR ACCELERATOR CENTER[1]

Dr. PANOFSKY. Thank you, Senator Lugar.

I am pleased to have the privilege again of testifying before this committee. I am currently a member of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament of the Executive Branch and I would like to emphasize that I am here testifying as an individual citizen giving my personal views.

I continue to be persuaded that ratification of SALT II is strongly in the national security interest of the United States.

This committee has heard many witnesses from within and without the administration enumerating how the provisions in SALT II place limits on the threat against which this country has to be prepared and how several of the other provisions assure integrity of our intelligence collection assets.

It has been amply demonstrated that the level of strategic nuclear weapons in the absence of SALT on both sides would be substantially higher than with SALT enacted. Moreover, witnesses have been persuasive in demonstrating that SALT II places more substantial restraints at this stage of nuclear weapons development and deployment on the Soviet Union than it does on the United States.

I will not repeat these arguments here in further detail.

You have also heard numerous criticisms of SALT. Yet I have heard no criticisms to which an easier remedy can be found through repudiation of SALT II. You have heard numerous criticisms of our military posture. Yet I have heard no proposed measure to improve that posture which is easier to achieve by repudiation of SALT II.

Most, if not all, of these criticisms deal with questions outside provisions of the SALT agreements themselves but involve issues

[1] See page 357 for Dr. Panofsky's prepared statement.

which the critics believe will be affected adversely through political linkages if SALT were enacted.

I find it interesting to note that many of these arguments are in opposing directions. There are those who argue that enactment of SALT will lull us into a false sense of security and therefore will impair the willingness of this country to provide adequately for its own defense.

To argue against an arms control treaty which demonstrably, in terms of its intrinsic content, will enhance our security by claiming that it will make future administrations and Congresses be less than diligent in providing for the national defense is at variance with the basic tenets of our system.

There are also those who argue that the price for ratification in terms of additional armaments is too high. In other words, they maintain that SALT II will increase military spending beyond what would have been justified in the absence of the treaty.

I note that these two criticisms are paired in their consequences and I do not believe that either is valid. I have confidence that future elected officials of this Nation can establish national priorities wisely.

It is essential to refocus the debate on the fundamental issues of the content of the treaty and protocol and not to be swayed unduly by the perceived linkages between SALT and other political or military issues. This conclusion is particularly important in the SALT III context. The progress from SALT II to SALT III to which both the United States and the Soviet Union are committed, can hardly continue if the process is burdened with the politically perceived linkages of critics with a wide variety of views.

Let me specifically comment on the linkage between ratification of SALT II and a commitment on the part of the administration for increased defense spending, either in terms of a rate of growth of the U.S. defense budget for several years or in terms of procurement of specific military hardware.

I find this concept extremely troublesome. Requiring as a price for ratification increased military spending in the name of arms control would destroy the very purpose of that process. It would contradict the key conclusion which I believe has been presented persuasively to this committee by the majority of witnesses, namely that the security of this Nation will be greater, albeit by a small measure, with enactment of SALT than without.

Therefore however threatening one evaluates the Soviet military buildup to be, the defense spending required to counter that threat would be lower with SALT enacted. Note that this comment does not specify how large defense expenditures should actually be. I am only saying that the effect of SALT should tend to decrease that burden.

To maintain exactly the opposite, that ratification of SALT should be held hostage to a commitment for increased military spending, lacks any logical connection, irrespective of Soviet conduct or threat.

If as part of the duty of the Senate to pass on ratification of a treaty negotiated by the executive the Senate would precommit itself on defense expenditure levels or approval of specific military

systems, this would be a disservice to another constitutional role of the executive and legislative branches.

The Congress through both the Senate and the House has the responsibility of examining critically any public spending, be it military or civilian, and of passing upon the merit of specific military systems through the annual authorization and appropriation processes.

If ratification of SALT II in essence predetermines such decisions, then the power of both Houses and also of the executive branch in setting the budget is weakened.

If SALT II is held hostage until this year's authorizing and appropriating processes have been completed or until supplementary appropriations have been procured, then SALT II bears a burden through delays and linkage with other issues which would augur badly for the future of SALT III.

This leads me directly to the matter which concerns me most about SALT and that is its slow rate of progress. SALT was initiated in 1967 at the meeting of President Johnson with Premier Kosygin at Glassboro, N.J.

It has hence proceeded through four administrations, through a treaty and several agreements and protocols and has now led to the signature of SALT II.

This process was initiated by the realization that apparently inexorably the world has been accumulating nuclear warheads. Their number is now greater than 30,000, the great majority of which are more powerful than the two weapons which killed one-quarter of a million people in Japan. It appeared to both nations to be a pressing matter to reverse this evolution.

Since well over 99 percent of the world inventory of nuclear weapons was and still is in the hands of the Soviet Union and the United States, a bilateral negotiation with its expectation of relative simplicity appeared to be the best focus. Now 12 years later although SALT I has had the beneficial effect in assuring the penetration of our deterrent warheads and despite the fact that SALT II in itself is a clear asset to our national security, we find that technology has outstripped the pace of diplomacy and political decisionmaking.

In other words, the arms limitation which the SALT process has so far achieved is of lesser magnitude than the evolution of new military technical systems which has occurred in the interim period during which these limitations have been achieved.

Such items as the cruise missile and the Backfire bomber as well as most long range weapon systems which have theater warfare roles were not in the picture when the SALT process commenced and their emergence greatly complicates future negotiations.

The quality of strategic weapons has greatly improved while SALT was in the process of negotiation. Therefore such problems as the vulnerability of the land-based deterrents of both sides and the consequent deterioration of strategic stability have grown during that period.

It is therefore my belief that SALT III offers possibly the last opportunity to convert the important but relatively modest achievements of SALT II into a true halt and possible reversal of the dangerous and burdensome competition in nuclear weapons.

There is currently a substantial division of opinion on the role of SALT III. Some believe that the function of SALT III should be primarily to settle the unfinished business of SALT II. There are others and I count myself among them who believe SALT III must achieve what colloquially is designated as "deep cuts." I would rather use the term "incisive arms control" to signify that a great deal more must be involved than major numerical reduction in military systems.

I recommend strongly that highly ambitious goals be set for SALT III since I see the SALT process as the only avenue in view which has any hope of reversing the threatening rise in nuclear weaponry which we are experiencing and I see the race between SALT and nuclear weapons evolution lost unless the SALT process can be accelerated.

Let me now turn to SALT III in the "incisive arms control" context. Deep numerical cuts in nuclear weapons systems in themselves may or may not add to our security depending on their detailed nature.

For instance, a formula for annual reduction of the aggregate strategic nuclear delivery vehicles with complete "freedom to mix" among them could have destabilizing consequences.

For example, one or the other of the two nations might under such a formula choose to eliminate first those deterrent strategic nuclear delivery systems which are unsuitable for a counterforce role but would retain those which have the largest potential to preempt through a first strike the deterrent forces of the opponent. If such a choice was made we would face an even more dangerous world.

Therefore I see no escaping the conclusion, however much one would like to see a treaty as complex as SALT II to be followed by the high simplicity of a simple reduction scheme, that such an agreement would not be in the United State's security interest.

SALT III is likely to be a complex undertaking and will again require careful attention to details and definitions as was the case with SALT II, although I do agree with Mr. Warnke that much of the base of definitions which has been established so carefully in SALT II can be capitalized on in pursuing SALT III.

This does not mean that the details of the process under which SALT II was negotiated must be repeated again. On the contrary, I hope means will be found to accelerate the negotiation and ratification processes.

Starting from the premise that SALT III will have to be an arms control package containing both mutual reductions and qualitative limits on technology I would like to enumerate several candidate provisions for such an agreement.

I am talking here only about candidate provisions because at this time no one can reasonably give detailed prescriptions for each element or the totality of such a total package.

While I would encourage the Senate to adopt a resolution urging "incisive arms control" and an increase in the pace of arms control negotiations, I strongly counsel against being too specific or constraining in such a resolution. Not only are the necessary basic studies within the Government in formulating specific provisions incomplete, but there is also a danger that a Senate resolution

which constitutes a "de facto" instruction to the SALT III negotiators will impair the negotiating flexibility of U.S. negotiators which may prove necessary under future circumstances.

Too specific a resolution might even increase Soviet intransigence because it would give the appearance of denying them the opportunity of negotiating SALT III on a balanced basis. Numerical targets, specifically the delineation of systems to be controlled, schedules for reduction or restraint, these are all proper subjects for negotiation, not prior determinations.

With your permission I would like to turn to a brief listing of candidate examples for inclusion in the SALT III negotiations. I have elaborated on these items in considerably more detail in my prepared statement and would therefore like to only enumerate them here with one exception which I would like to describe in further detail.

Naturally, SALT III must face the unfinished business of the protocol of SALT II, the question of controls on ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles, GLCM's and SLCM's and on land mobile ICBM's.

Substantial reductions of central nuclear weapon systems must remain of course the cornerstone of any incisive arms control agreement. Within this aggregate cut, I would recommend that the number of MIRVed land based ICBM's be further reduced disproportionately.

I would recommend that consideration be given to reduce the number of land based MIRVed ICBM's substantially below 550.

The second major component for an incisive arms control proposal should be a limit on the annual rate of permitted ICBM and SLBM test firings. Such a missile test firing quota was incorporated by in the United States in the March 1977 proposal relating to ICBM's only. A rate of six per year for both parties was suggested. I consider this number to be a reasonable goal for phased reduction of annually permitted firings.

A limit on annual permitted rates of test firings is the most powerful verifiable restraint at our command for limiting the rate of growth in technology in the missile arts.

More importantly the confidence which each side can acquire under such a restrictive test regime, that missiles will perform with high reliability and high accuracy will be low. Accordingly, a decisionmaker of either side will most likely be dissuaded from considering a preemptive or first strike attack under all circumstances.

Let me give another example. Deployment but not development and testing of land-mobile ICBM's is prohibited in the protocol of SALT II. This provision in no way inhibits any U.S. programs including the M-X.

Competition in mobile land based ICBM's is an area of contest between the United States and the Soviet Union unfavorable to U.S. interests, as Soviet assets are clearly superior to ours. They have larger land areas which can be dedicated solely to military use. They are less constrained by environmental impact factors and successful concealment and deceptive moves are more easily carried out in a closed society.

I, therefore believe that other means of protective basing of ICBM's other than land mobility is superior. I will not discuss this matter here further but I conclude that superior and practical alternatives do exist and therefore I recommend for serious consideration that the ban on deployment of land-mobile ICBM's be continued as a result of the SALT III negotiations.

I would also like to join Mr. Warnke in that an SLBM standoff and a ban on depressed trajectories of SLBM's be considered for inclusion in a SALT III package.

I also agree that it will, as a practical matter, be unavoidable and in effect necessary and desirable to include gray area systems in the SALT III total deliberations.

This raises the question as to how in detail our European allies shall be included in the consultative process of negotiation. If gray area systems and central strategic systems are to be considered in completely different forums then it would raise the specter of "decoupling"; this means removing our nuclear umbrella from our European allies. Therefore the tight relationship between negotiation of gray area systems and central systems must be preserved.

This can only be done if the consultative process with our allies will be tightened relative to that which prevailed during the SALT II process.

I would like to comment in more detail on the matter of cutoff of production of fissionable material for military purposes.

This is a clear candidate for inclusion in SALT III or as a side negotiation parallel to SALT III.

This proposal has been previously endorsed by the United States and has never been withdrawn by the United States. The current inventories of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons of both sides are large. Any further production can of course feed fabrication of additional nuclear warheads. Such increases can support further fractionation of MIRV's, additional cruise missile warheads, stockpiles of weapons for reload of delivery systems or can be used for defensive warheads.

By cutting off the production of fissionable materials for military purposes you would force each side into the posture of having to balance these various applications.

In this connection I would like to stress that ratification of SALT II has a major impact on the efforts to limit proliferation of nuclear weapons to other nations. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signed in 1968 and ratified in 1970 contains an explicit declaration that the nuclear weapons states intend "to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament."

Failure to ratify SALT II would contribute to the growing cynicism of the nonnuclear weapons states regarding sincerity and good faith of the Soviet Union and the United States in implementing their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In addition I cannot think of any more powerful incentive toward nuclear nonproliferation than for the nuclear weapon states, the Soviet Union and the United States, to place their production plants of fissionable materials under the safeguards program of the International Atomic Energy Agency and thereby remove that particular inequity which exists between the have and have not states.

Let me close with some comments on the larger difference between perception which pertains to nuclear weapons and the physical reality which relates to them and their potential use.

The above discussions have emphasized the technical content of possible SALT III provisions and this has been done deliberately. There has been in the discussions of the merit of SALT II a great overemphasis on the perceptions which might flow from the SALT process and from the Soviet and United States strategic military posture to the detriment of considerations of the actual provisions of SALT II and the physical realities which would befall mankind should nuclear weapons in part or in their totality actually be used in war.

As a member of the technical community, I feel a strong obligation to continue to remind the political leaders and decisionmakers of this country that there is a great danger in considering nuclear weapons primarily as political symbols and only secondarily as tools which might actually be used.

I am hardly alone in raising this issue. Let me remind you of the words of Andrei Sakharov, the eminent and frequently dissident Soviet nuclear physicist, "I believe that the problem of lessening the danger of annihilating humanity in a nuclear war carries an absolute priority over all other considerations."

We must continue to examine the consequences of actual use of such weapons and how they would affect the true outcome of a conflict. If we permit nuclear weapons to enter the decisionmaking processes primarily as symbols of national strength and resolve, then we deny ourselves any rational means to decide when enough is enough.

In this regard, let me reemphasize two salient facts. One, if nuclear weapons are actually used in any theater, against any set of targets, for any purpose, by any nation, under any military doctrine, then large fractions of the populations of both the United States and the Soviet Union and their neighbors are at the gravest risk.

Two, the number of nuclear weapons in the possession of the United States and the Soviet Union is now so large that a very large fraction of these weapons is aimed against targets of relatively minor economic, political or military importance.

Under these circumstances many of the arguments which have been presented to this committee on the details of the relative military standing of the two nations become relatively less significant when compared to the overarching danger of nuclear war.

Let me close with the expressed hope that it is consideration of the physical realities rather than political perceptions pertaining to strategic nuclear weapons which will remain in the forefront of deliberations of the Senate in considering the question of ratification of SALT II.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Dr. Panofsky's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. WOLFGANG PANOFSKY

APPROACHES TO SALT III

I am pleased to have the privilege of testifying before your Committee again, this time in connection with the pending ratification of the SALT II Treaty. I have been interested and involved in Arms Control since World War II, and I am currently a

member of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. However, I am testifying here as an individual citizen, giving my personal views.

SALT III in the context of SALT II

I am speaking about approaches to SALT III in the context that SALT II will be ratified without amendments. I will assume that any concurrent resolutions would deepen the legal commitment to the provisions of SALT II, but would not change its substance or basic intent. I continue to be persuaded that ratification of SALT II is strongly in the net security interest of the United States. This Committee has heard many witnesses from within and without the Administration enumerating how the provisions in SALT II place limits on the threat against which this country has to be prepared, and how several of the other provisions assure the integrity of our intelligence collection assets. It has been amply demonstrated that the level of strategic nuclear weapons in the absence of SALT on both sides would be substantially higher than with SALT enacted. Moreover, witnesses have been persuasive in demonstrating that SALT II places more substantial restraints at this stage of nuclear weapons development and deployment on the Soviet Union than it does on the United States. I will not repeat these arguments here in further detail.

You have also heard numerous criticisms of SALT. Yet I have heard no criticisms to which an easier remedy can be found through repudiation of SALT II. You have heard numerous criticisms of our military posture. Yet I have heard no proposed measure to improve that posture which is easier to achieve by repudiation of SALT II. Most, if not all, of these criticisms deal with questions outside the provisions of the SALT agreements themselves, but involve issues which the critics believe will be affected adversely through political linkages if SALT were enacted. I find it interesting that many of these arguments are in opposing directions: There are those who argue that enactment of SALT II will lull us into a false sense of security and therefore will impair the willingness of this country to provide adequately for its own defense. To argue against an arms control treaty which demonstrably in terms of its intrinsic content will enhance our security by claiming that it will make future Administrations and Congresses be less than diligent in providing for the national defense, is at variance with the basic tenets of our system.

There are also those who argue that the price for ratification in terms of additional armaments is too high; in other words that SALT II will increase military spending beyond what could have been justified in the absence of the Treaty.

I note that these two criticisms are paired in their consequences, and I do not believe that either is valid. I have confidence that future elected officials of this nation can establish national priorities wisely.

It is essential to refocus the debate on the fundamental issues of the content of the Treaty and Protocol and not to be swayed unduly by the perceived linkage between SALT and other political or military issues. This conclusion is particularly important in the SALT III context: the progress from SALT II to SALT III, to which both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. are committed, can hardly continue if the process is burdened with the politically perceived linkages of critics with a wide variety of views.

SALT II versus defense spending

Let me specifically comment on the linkage between ratification of SALT II and a commitment on the part of the Administration for increased defense spending, either in terms of a rate of growth of the U.S. defense budget for several years, or in terms of procurement of specific military hardware. I find this concept extremely troublesome. Requiring as a price for ratification increased military spending in the name of arms control would destroy the very purpose of that process. Moreover, it would contradict the key conclusion which I believe has been presented persuasively to this Committee by the majority of witnesses, namely, that the security of this nation will be greater, albeit by a small measure, with enactment of SALT than without. Therefore however threatening one evaluates the Soviet military build-up to be, the defense spending required to counter that threat would be lower with SALT enacted. Note that this comment does not specify how large defense expenditures should actually be; I am only saying that the effect of SALT should tend to decrease that burden. To maintain exactly the opposite, that ratification of SALT should be held hostage to a commitment for increased military spending, lacks any logical connection, irrespective of Soviet conduct or threat.

If, as part of the duty of the Senate to pass on ratification of a treaty negotiated by the Executive, the Senate would pre-commit itself on defense expenditure levels or approval of specific military systems, this would be a disservice to another constitutional role of the Executive and Legislative branches. The Congress through both the Senate and the House has the responsibility of examining critically and public spending, be it military or civilian, and of passing upon the merit of specific

military systems through the annual authorization and appropriation processes. Such decisions determine our national priorities and are traditionally decided by a majority of both houses, not by one third of the Senate. If ratification of SALT II in essense pre-determines such decisions, then the power of both houses and also of the Executive branch in seting the budget is weakened. If SALT II is held hostage until this years' authorizing and appropriating processes have been completed, or until supplementary appropriations have been procured, then SALT II bears a burden through delays and linkage which would augur badly for the future of SALT III.

Arms control versus technology

This leads me directly to the matter which concerns me most about SALT and that is its slow rate of progress. SALT was initiated in 1967 at the meeting of President Johnson with Premier Kosygin at Glassboro, N.J. It has thence proceeded through four administrations, through a Treaty and several Agreements and Protocols, and has now led to the signature of SALT II. This process was initiated by the realization that, apparently inexorably, the world was accumulating nuclear warheads. Their number is now near 30,000, the great majority of which are more powerful than the two weapons which killed one-quarter of a million people in Japan. It appeared to both nations to be a pressing matter to reverse this evolution. Since well over 99% of the world inventory of nuclear weapons was (and still is) in the hands of the Soviet Union and the United States, a bilateral negotiation with its expectation of relative simplicity appeared to be the best forum. Now, 12 years later, although SALT I has had a beneficial effect in assuring the penetration of our deterrent warheads, and despite the fact that SALT II in itself is a clear asset to our national security, we find that technology has outstripped the pace of diplomacy and political decision making. In other words, the arms limitation which the SALT process has so far achieved is of lesser magnitude than the evolution of new military technical systems which has occurred in the interim period during which these limitations have been achieved. Such items as the Cruise Missile and the Backfire Bomber, as well as most long-range weapons systems which have theatre-warfare roles, were not in the picture when the SALT process commenced, and their emergence greatly complicates future negotiations. Moreover, the quality of strategic weapons has greatly improved while SALT was in the process of negotiation. Therefore, such problems as the vulnerability of the land-based deterrents of both sides and the consequent deterioration of strategic stability have grown during that period. It is therefore my belief that SALT III offers possibly the last opportunity to convert the important but relatively modest achievements of SALT II into a true halt and possible reversal of the dangerous and burdensome competition in nuclear weapons.

SALT III: limited or ambitious objectives?

There is currently a substantial division of opinion on the role of SALT III. Some believe that the function of SALT III should be primarily to settle the unfinished business of SALT II. The reason why SALT II has such a complex structure is that it represents different levels of agreement. The Treaty deals with items on which definite long-term agreement was possible. The Protocol covers items which are being put on a limited time "hold" because these issues could not be resolved to the satisfaction of the negotiating parties. The Backfire letter deals with a military area which had been excluded by mutual agreement from the SALT process but on which the U.S. demanded assurance. All these instruments are binding legally but cover a different stage of decision making. Considering the difficult negotiations of the past, it therefore appears natural for some to view SALT III as a vehicle to complete negotiations on these items, and to deepen the mutual constraints of SALT II.

There are others, and I count myself among them, who believe that SALT III must achieve what colloquially is designated as "deep cuts." I would rather use the term "incisive arms control" to signify that a great deal more must be involved than major numerical reduction in military systems. I recommend strongly that highly ambitious goals be set for SALT III since I see the SALT process as the only avenue in view which has any hope of reversing the threatening rise in nuclear weaponry which we are experiencing, and I see the race between SALT and nuclear weapons evolution lost unless the SALT process can be accelerated.

SALT III: simple formula or complex package?

Let me now turn to SALT III in the "incisive arms control" context. Deep numerical cuts in nuclear weapons systems in themselves may or may not add to our security, depending on their detailed nature. For instance, a formula of annual reduction of the aggregate strategic nuclear delivery vehicles with complete "freedom to mix" among them could have destabilizing consequences. For example, one

or the other of the two nations might under such a formula choose to eliminate first those deterrent strategic nuclear delivery systems which are unsuitable for a counterforce role, but would retain those which have the largest potential to preempt through a first strike the deterrent forces of the opponent. If such a choice were made, we would face an even more dangerous world. Therefore I see no escaping the conclusion, however much one would like to see a treaty a complex as SALT II be followed by the high simplicity of a simple reduction scheme, that such an agreement would not be in the U.S. security interest. SALT III is likely again to be a complex undertaking and will again require careful attention to details and definitions, as was the case with SALT II. This does not mean that the details of the process under which SALT II was negotiated must be perpetuated; on the contrary, I hope means will be found to accelerate the negotiation and ratification processes.

Starting from the premise that SALT III will have to be an arms control package containing both mutual reductions and qualitative limits on technology, I would like to enumerate several candidate provisions for such an agreement. I am talking here only about candidate provisions because at this time no one can reasonably give detailed prescriptions for each element or the totality of such a package. While I would encourage the Senate to adopt a resolution urging "incisive arms control" and an increase in the pace of arms control negotiations, I strongly counsel against being too specific or constraining in such a resolution. Not only are the necessary basic studies within the government in formulating specific provisions incomplete, but there is also a danger that a Senate resolution which constitutes a "de facto" instruction to the SALT III negotiators will impair the negotiating flexibility of U.S. negotiators which may prove necessary under future circumstances. Too specific a resolution might even increase Soviet intransigence, because it would give the appearance of denying them the opportunity of negotiating SALT III on a balanced basis. Numerical targets, delineation of systems to be controlled, schedules for reduction or restraint—these are all proper subjects for negotiation, not prior determinations.

EXAMPLES OF SALT III CONTENT

(a) Reduction in central systems

Naturally, SALT III must face the unfinished business of the Protocol of SALT II: these are the questions of controls on ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs and SLCMs), and on land-mobile ICBMs. I will discuss these items as candidates for inclusion in the total SALT III agenda.

Substantial reductions of central nuclear weapons systems must remain, of course, the cornerstone of any incisive arms control agreement. I would recommend for the reasons mentioned above that U.S. proposals for reductions apply separately to each category of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles already identified in SALT II, as well as to overall aggregates. I would recommend that the United States push for phased reductions with a target of about 50% in overall aggregate. Even an eventual reduction as large as that should not induce the Soviet Union to be excessively concerned with the threat they are facing from other unfriendly borders, although this concern can by no means be neglected. Within this aggregate cut I would recommend that the number of MIRVed land-based ICBMs be further reduced disproportionately. I note that in the ill-fated March 1977 proposal the U.S. moved to reduce this number to 550, with a number of 820 finally arrived at in SALT II. The number 550 proved difficult to negotiate because it corresponds precisely to the number of Minuteman III launchers. Therefore that number, if adopted, would have forced the Soviets to substantial reduction of land-based MIRVed ICBMs, while it would have implied no reduction whatever on our side; clearly not a negotiable position unless compensating concessions are made elsewhere. I would recommend that consideration be given to reduce the number of land based MIRVed ICBMs substantially below 550.

The history of proposals for deep reduction in land-based MIRVs or even a zero MIRV provision is checkered. There have been objections by specific interests within this country, and the Soviets opposed reductions in this category initially because they did not wish to be frozen in a position of inferior technology. At this time, with Soviet MIRV technology approaching U.S. performance, particularly with respect to accuracy, and with growing Soviet concern about the vulnerability of their land-based deterrent, I would recommend a serious effort for a very drastic reduction in the land-based MIRVed ICBMs.

Verification of such a provision would, of course, be a very serious issue. At this time the only available means of verifying the number of MIRVed land-based ICBMs rests on the counting rule which makes any launcher capable of launching a tested MIRVed ICBM count as a MIRVed ICBM launcher. Therefore, single warhead launchers would have to have credible distinguishable characteristics for this

counting rule to be effective. It is this consideration which would have to be carefully studied as part of the foundation of the American position for SALT III.

(b) Quota on permitted missile test firings

A second major component for an incisive arms control proposal should be a limit on the annual rate of permitted ICBM and SLBM test firings. Test firings can serve development, troop training, and proof test purposes. If there were a permitted quota, each side would have to divide its number of firings among these objectives. Present test practices are asymmetrical due to the larger diversity of Soviet deployed systems and their missile firings for troop training from operational silos. Due to its geographic constraints, this is not feasible for the U.S. Accordingly, an equal quota for both sides would have a dissimilar impact on current practice. Such a missile test firing quota was incorporated in the U.S. March 1977 proposal relating to ICBMs only; a rate of 6 per year for both parties was suggested. I consider this number to be a reasonable goal for a phased reduction of annually permitted firings.

A limit on annual permitted rates of test firings is the most powerful verifiable restraint at our command for limiting the rate of growth in technology in the missile arts. Traditionally each new generation of missiles has required 10–30 or so test launches and therefore a stringent limitation of the testing rate would impact drastically the evolution of new generations of missile systems. There is no question that a test ban quota as low as 6 per year would severely constrain modernization. More important, the confidence which each side can acquire under such a restricted test regime, that missiles will perform with high reliability and high accuracy will be low. Accordingly a decision maker of either side will most likely be dissuaded from considering a preemptive or first strike attack. Thus a limitation on the rate of permitted missile firings would be a substantial factor in increasing strategic stability.

A measure parallel to a restriction on the rate of firing of ICBMs and SLBMs would be a total prohibition on test firings for development of any new system of MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs. Such a prohibition would be a useful additional step to prevent an increase in the threat to the fixed land-based deterrents of the two sides, and would be a significant impediment to the deployment of SLBMs with accuracy contributing to the threat to land-based ICBMs of both sides.

(c) Ban on deployment of mobile land-based ICBM's

Deployment, but not development and test, of land-mobile ICBMs is prohibited in the Protocol of SALT II; this provision in no way inhibits U.S. programs. Note that deployment of the already developed Soviet land-mobile SS–16 is explicitly prohibited in the Treaty. This leaves the question of control of mobile ICBMs definitely on the agenda for SALT III. Definition of a U.S. position is to some extent linked to the total SALT III package. If the matter of vulnerability of the land-based ICBMs is dealt with by the provisions just mentioned (large reduction of the number of MIRVed missiles, and limits of the rate of missile test firings), then there is no question that U.S. security will be served by negotiating a total ban on mobile land-based ICBMs. The Senate should note that this was at an earlier time the U.S. position in SALT I. Competition in mobile land-based ICBMs is an area of contest between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. where Soviet assets are clearly superior to ours. They have larger land areas which can be dedicated solely to military use; they are less constrained by environmental impact factors; successful concealment and deceptive moves are more easily carried out in a closed society. Thus only if we are willing to give overriding priority to the matter of preserving land-based ICBMs, and if this problem cannot be solved by other measures in arms control, can a mobile land-based system offer a possible strategic advantage. I will not discuss here the complex issue of protective basing of ICBMs in a manner other than land-mobile, but I conclude that superior and practical alternatives do exist.

(d) SLBM standoff and ban on depressed trajectories

I would suggest for inclusion in a package for SALT III two specific measures relating to the survivability of the air-borne component of the triad of strategic systems. The first is a ban on testing and development of depressed trajectories from submarines and the second is a minimum standoff distance from shore for submarines capable of launching SLBMs.

Currently there exists a technical possibility that Soviet submarines could approach U.S. coasts and launch SLBMs on trajectories which assure a minimum flight time to U.S. air fields. This could make the time for U.S. bombers to escape marginal. Although the principal counter-measure against such a possibility would be to base an increasing number of bombers further inland, an arms control measure to remedy this threat would be to ban the testing of submarine-launched

missiles in short flight time, so-called depressed, trajectories. In addition, agreement on a forbidden zone of approach of submarines capable of launching SLBMs would be a further measure to decrease this threat to both sides.

(e) Gray area systems

The above examples, which are by no means exhaustive, all relate to central strategic systems and do not touch upon control of the so-called gray area systems, that is those systems which can have both a theater-warfare and a long-range capability. Few believe that the discussion of gray area systems can be excluded from SALT III. It is anticipated that the Soviets will insist on the inclusion of foward-based systems in SALT III because they will maintain, with some merit, that "incisive arms control" leading to substantial cuts in central strategic systems increases the relative importance of the U.S. controlled forward-based systems. In turn, inclusion of forward-based systems, reinforced by the technical developments which blur the border between strategic and theatre-warfare systems, will make consideration of the Euro-strategic balance an unavoidable issue also from the NATO and U.S. points of view. Note that the need to include consideration of GLCMs and SLCMs as "unfinished business" from the SALT II Protocol will also contribute to the pressure to consider European theatre-warfare systems comprehensively.

These issues raised the question of the details of the negotiating format for SALT III, which as a minimum will require a more intensive consultative process with NATO as part of policy formulation. Separating the consideration of gray area systems from SALT and placing it into a separate negotiating forum appears inadvisable, since such a move would be viewed by NATO as an effort to decouple consideration of the Euro-strategic balance from consideration of the overall U.S./U.S.S.R. strategic situation. Such decoupling, in turn, would further detract from the credibility of the U.S. central strategic nuclear forces as an element in deterring Soviet incursion into Europe.

(f) Cut-off of production of fissionable material for military purposes

An additional element of a SALT III package might well be a renewal of a proposal, previously endorsed by the United States, for the cutoff of production of fissionable materials for military purposes. The current inventories of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons of both sides are large. Any further production can, of course, feed fabrication of additional nuclear warheads. Such increases can support further fractionation of MIRVs, additional cruise missile warheads, or stockpiles of weapons for reload of delivery systems. Moreover, such growth can provide additional warheads for defensive weapons, in particular should ABM deployment again become permissible. A production cut-off would limit these activities on both sides, with a substantial gain in overall strategic stability. Under such an arms control regime there could, of course, be conversion of nuclear weapons inventories among a diversity of military weapons without increased production. Moreover, some increase in total weapons inventory could be advanced through improved economies in the use of fissile materials. A production cut-off agreement would have to permit maintenance of the existing nuclear device stockpile through certain exceptions to a total production prohibition.

In this connection I would like to stress that ratification of SALT II has a major impact on the efforts to limit proliferation of nuclear weapons to other nations. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signed in 1968 and ratified in 1970 contains an explicit declaration that the nuclear weapons states intend "to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament," as well as a specific article constituting a good faith obligation to pursue negotiations toward terminating the nuclear arms race. Failure to ratify SALT II would contribute to the growing cynicism of the non-nuclear weapons states regarding the sincerity and good faith of the Soviet Union and the United States in implementing their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Quite apart from the important arms control impact of a provision to terminate production of fissionable material for weapons purposes on its own merit, such a cutoff would demonstrate dramatically to the non-nuclear weapons states a good faith in adherence to the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Let me repeat that the above listing of possible inclusions in a SALT III package is given only on a "for instance" basis, and each item requires detailed analysis both as to specific substance and optimum negotiating tactics. However, it is my deep conviction that if a maximum number of such provisions were introduced and proved negotiable with the Soviet Union, then incisive arms control would indeed result, and the SALT process would have fulfilled its promise of having not only limited but also reversed the competition in nuclear weapons between the United

States and the Soviet Union. Yet I see no way in which this expectation, which would greatly increase the security of this Nation, can be fulfilled without prompt ratification of SALT II.

SALT: perception versus reality

The above discussions have emphasized the technical content of possible SALT III provisions and refrained from commenting on the future political context and the general question of linkage of the SALT process to Soviet conduct and attitudes. This has been done deliberately. There has been in the discussions of the merit of SALT II a great overemphasis on the perceptions which might flow from the SALT process and from the Soviet and the United States strategic military posture, to the detriment of considerations of the actual provisions of SALT II and the physical realities which would befall mankind should nuclear weapons in part or in their totality actually be used in war.

As a member of the technical community I feel a strong obligation to continue reminding the political leaders and decision makers of this country that there is a great danger in considering nuclear weapons primarily as political symbols, and only secondarily as tools which might actually be used. I am hardly alone in raising this issue. Let me remind you of the words of Andrei Sakharov, the eminent and frequently dissident Soviet nuclear physicist: "I believe that the problem of lessening the danger of annihilating humanity in a nuclear war carries an absolute priority over all over considerations."

We must continue to examine the consequences of actual use of such weapons and how they would affect the true outcome of a conflict. If we permit nuclear weapons to enter the decision making processes primarily as symbols of national strength and resolve, then we deny ourselves any rational means to decide when enough is enough.

In this regard let me reemphasize two salient facts:

(1) If nuclear weapons are actually used in any theater, against any set of targets, for any purpose, by any nation, under any military doctrine, then large fractions of the populations of both the United States and the Soviet Union and their neighbors are at the gravest risk.

(2) The number of nuclear weapons in the possession of the United States and the Soviet Union is now so large that a very large fraction of these weapons is aimed against targets of relatively minor economic, political, or military importance.

Under those circumstances, many of the arguments which have been presented to this Committee on the details of the relative military standing of the two nations become relatively less significant when compared to the overarching danger of nuclear war.

Let me close with the expressed hope that it is consideration of the physical realities rather than political perceptions pertaining to strategic nuclear weapons which will remain in the forefront of deliberations of the Senate when considering the question of ratification of SALT II.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Dr. Panofsky.

Mr. Brennan?

STATEMENT OF DONALD BRENNAN, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, HUDSON INSTITUTE[1]

Mr. BRENNAN. Thank you, Senator Stone.

I am pleased to be able to testify before you. I shall summarize my prepared statement very rapidly.

I should state at the outset that I oppose SALT II and believe the Senate should not consent to its ratification.

My first serious involvement with arms control was in connection with a small summer study in 1958 in Cambridge, Mass., of which I was one of the organizers.

I was an organizer and codirector of a much larger summer study on arms control held in 1960, again in Cambridge, and concurrently served as guest editor of a special issue on arms control, published in the fall, 1960 issue of the journal Daedalus of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

[1] See page 369 for Mr. Brennan's prepared statement.

This volume, of which Senator Hubert Humphrey was one of the authors, was later published as a book in the spring of 1961 under the title "Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security" and was widely described as the bible of arms control. It was endorsed by Senator Fulbright and by President Kennedy, among others.

In the early summer of 1961, as a consultant to John McCloy, I helped to draft the statute that created the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

My first interaction with this committee came in August of 1961, in connection with the hearings on the creation of ACDA, which I supported with a statement submitted for the record. I first testified to this committee in person in August of 1963 in support of ratification of the partial nuclear test ban, and have been here on several occasions since including the ratification hearings for the Geneva protocol on chemical warfare and for SALT I.

I supported, and indeed helped to create, mechanisms for serious private American-Soviet discussions of arms control as a supplement to governmental negotiations.

With the exceptions of the agreements signed in May of 1972 and June of 1979 on SALT, I have supported in one way or another every arms control agreement adopted by our Government since World War II. This history should make it very clear that my opposition to SALT II does not derive from an opposition to arms control in general—indeed, quite the contrary.

I oppose SALT II because it is bad arms control. The traditional major objectives of arms control have long been understood to be to reduce the likelihood of war and to reduce the scope and violence of war if it occurs. I judge that SALT II is more likely to increase the chance of war than to reduce it, and it most certainly will do very little to reduce the scope and violence of war if it occurs.

The most basic difficulty is as follows. A highly plausible means by which the United States may become involved in a war is for a prospective opponent to decide that the United States will not react to some move, which the opponent thereupon undertakes, only to discover that the move was beyond the limit of our toleration.

The Korean war, for example, clearly resulted from this mechanism. If a American-Soviet war ever arises, it is most likely to involve this means, in which the Soviets underestimate American willingness to respond to some adverse Soviet move. That Soviet judgment will relate to their beliefs about comparative Soviet and American military strength among other factors.

The plausible role of SALT II in such a crisis is that it will contribute to Soviet beliefs both in their military superiority and in our lack of willingness to stand up to them, even at the level of maintaining military forces on a par with theirs. I judge that such a role is more likely than any major constructive results from the treaty. Of course such a role would be highly dangerous.

There has been a pronounced slide in American military strength since the 1960's especially in the strategic nuclear area. I believe this has chiefly been the result of a SALT-related euphoria.

Within the projected lifetime of SALT II, there may well be additional SALT-related euphoria, but there will certainly be contributions from the specific details of SALT II.

Let me next discuss some of these. First, on asymmetries in terms. A major defect of SALT II resides in the fact that the Soviets are allowed 308 "heavy" ICBM's while the United States is allowed none, and there is no compensating capability that is asymmetrically in our favor.

The absolute maximum MIRVed ICBM payload or throw-weight that would thereby be allowed the Soviets under SALT II would give the Soviets roughly 40 percent more MIRVed ICBM payload than the maximum allowed the United States.

This guaranteed margin would be of political significance even if its military significance were doubtful, which it is not, as I shall show below. That the United States should sign a treaty with its principal opponent in which that opponent is allowed by our agreement any capability—however trifling—we are denied, while there is no counterbalancing capability allowed to us but denied to them, would widely and accurately be read as a political statement of weakness on the part of the United States.

This interpretation would be particularly strong and important in the Soviet Union. It would be a contributing factor to the risk-of-war mechanism I mentioned above.

The significance of these heavy ICBM's is considerable, even allowing for the 10-warhead-per-missile limit imposed by SALT II. The warheads on a 10-warhead "heavy" of 16,000 pounds payload might have yields twice those of a maximum light missile with 10 warheads.

The major significance of the larger yield weapons resides in the additional fallout fatalities they would produce. The extra yield would probably be in the neighborhood of 2,000 megatons, which would be certain to produce many extra fatalities.

Exactly how many additional Americans would be killed by 2,000 megatons additional yield would depend upon many factors, including many details of the attack and the extent of civil defense preparations made before the attack.

A plausible range of added fallout fatalities would be from a few million to a few tens of millions.

The ICBM asymmetries seem to me to be clearly against the spirit of the Jackson Amendment embodied in Public Law 92-448. The Senate at the time of adopting this in 1972 understood it to mean that we should not be limited to levels of strategic forces inferior to those of the Soviet Union in payload. This is manifestly clear from its legislative history.

As to asymmetry in coverage of the agreement, the extra ICBM payload in the 308 heavies and the extra ICBM's, 344, allowed the Soviets result from explicit provisions of SALT II. A different major difficulty of SALT II resides in the fact that a Soviet weapon system that appears to be of major potential strategic significance, namely, the Backfire bomber, is excluded altogether from the SALT II Treaty ceilings, while American bombers that apparently are closely comparable in capabilities, specifically our B-52's, must be counted.

As in the case of the heavy ICBM's, there is no offsetting capability that we are allowed but the Soviets are not.

Western estimates of Backfire capabilities are imprecise. For a 5-ton bomb load, representative Backfire estimates give it a combat

radius of 3,074 nautical miles or 10,600 kilometers one way unrefueled range. The corresponding unrefueled combat radius for a B-52D with a 5-ton bomb load is 3,012 nautical miles, less than this widely accepted Backfire estimate.

While lower estimates of Backfire capabilities can be found, these comparisons show that it would be impossible to have confidence that Backfire performance is significantly less than the B-52D, which must be counted under SALT II ceilings.

Another topic I should like to turn to is effects on vulnerabilities. The way in which the limits in SALT II are formulated contributes to the vulnerabilities of our strategic forces. These limits are formulated in such a way as to encourage the deployment of a small number of large systems rather than a large number of small systems, and this constitutes a major contribution to the future vulnerability of our forces.

On the matter of possible gains of SALT II, I should point out that while the potential gains of SALT II seem to me to be much outweighed by its drawbacks, there are some potential gains.

There are only two unambiguous gains I can see and these are both modest. One is that ratification of SALT II should result in better information about Soviet forces than we would otherwise be likely to have.

The other is that we shall probably have slightly more influence over Soviet decisions in non-SALT policy areas if the treaty is ratified than if it is not. This influence, which would never be large, would be greatest on the eve of or during ratification debates. It would likely be near zero at other times. That we could exploit this influence to enforce anything like specific Soviet restraints in non-SALT areas seems to me virtually impossible.

Several other gains have been claimed for SALT II which seem to me to range from negligible at best through highly contingent in the middle to wrong at worst. Some of these are discussed in my prepared statement.

I should mention here that the claimed gain for SALT II that seems to me most mistaken is that it would reduce the likelihood of war. There is very little reason to believe this claim. I believe, as I pointed out before, that SALT II is much more likely to increase the likelihood of war. This is related to the most important reason for rejecting SALT II.

This brings me to my recommendations concerning SALT II.

Some of the leading critics of SALT II apparently oppose it primarily because of the relationship of the SALT to American euphoria about strategic forces. This opposition seems to me entirely reasonable.

There can be no doubt that three successive administrations have, in some collective sense, believed that SALT would enable us to have strategic nuclear security "on the cheap," in the slang phrase, and that this belief has been a major factor in the evolution of our greatly weakened strategic posture. There is therefore something to be said for imposing a major pause on the process of the SALT, not particularly related to the specific terms of SALT II, while—it is hoped—we regain our strategic wits.

I was struck by Paul Nitze's quotation in his July 12 statement of Lincoln's celebrated phrase that "First we must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save the country."

Yet there is no doubt that it requires a certain degree of optimism—from my perspective—about the American administration coming to power in January of 1981 in order to believe that our strategic posture will be adequately repaired, whatever happens to SALT II in the meanwhile.

As a matter of realistic politics, it is not obvious that my optimism should improve substantially as a result of rejection of SALT II. Even my most preferred candidate administrations would be unlikely to accomplish many strategic repairs before 1986 that would be prohibited by SALT II.

Nevertheless, I believe that the case for rejecting SALT II is something close to overwhelming. The lesser, but nevertheless significant, part of this case resides in the fact that some potentially desirable specific repairs would be much less likely to be adequately studied, still less developed under constraints that would prohibit their deployment and which might be continued beyond SALT II.

The major part of the case for rejection resides in the necessity to make it manifest to the Soviets and to some degree to the rest of the world, that the American body politic will simply not accept further one-sided constraints that allow the Soviets a guaranteed margin of superiority.

This treaty will strengthen Soviet beliefs—already too strong—that they constitute the wave of the future, that they have increasing military preponderance, and that the United States is increasingly unwilling to stand up to them, even at the level of insisting on a mere paper equality of allowed forces. The extent of these effects may be argued, but surely the direction cannot. And the direction is dangerous. It is the route to war.

I believe the best way of minimizing that danger is to reject SALT II outright. If I were asked what modifications in the treaty would make it minimally acceptable, I have suggested two in my prepared statement.

If these suggested changes were made, I should be willing to ignore certain remaining disadvantages and, with reluctance, could support ratification of SALT II as so modified.

Mr. Chairman, I was asked to address the subject of arms control and SALT III objectives and I will turn to them. I shall indicate what I believe is a suitable avenue to pursue in the next negotiations whether they be called SALT III or SALT II prime or whatever, and whether SALT II is ratified or not.

The best approach to such next negotiations is to use a scheme for limiting and reducing strategic nuclear offensive forces that is based on—or closely related—to the payload or "throw-weight" of such forces. Schemes of this general type have been suggested to the Soviets in the past but, at least in recent official negotiations, the Soviets have rejected such an approach. I believe we should persevere in this approach.

An illustrative comprehensive scheme is shown in table 1 of my prepared statement, to which you should turn if you have a copy within reach.

[The table referred to appears on page 374.]

The basic idea of this scheme is as follows: Nuclear delivery systems of various kinds are grouped in the categories listed in the first column. In each category, the initial Soviet and American capabilities measured in tons of payload—or throw-weight—estimated for 1985 are given. An initial ceiling for each category is then selected basically as the larger of the Soviet or American capabilities in each category, in some cases rounded upward.

The symbol that is an upside down "v" appearing in the initial ceiling for the bottom category means "greater of," so that initial ceiling is the greater of X or Y. These ceilings are then decreased over time, not necessarily at the same rate for each category, and not necessarily by the same factor in each 5-year period.

Each force, Soviet and American, must not exceed the ceilings on each category imposed at points 5 and 10 years after the initial ceilings.

For example, in this illustrative scheme, the ICBM ceiling is cut in half in the first 5-year period and cut in third in the following 5-year period. The SLBM ceilings are decreased by smaller factors so that the allowed SLBM forces at the end of 10 years would constitute a larger fraction of the then-allowed total of strategic forces than they did at the beginning.

Different aggregations within categories would be possible and may well be desirable. For example, it might be desirable to lump together ICBM's and SLBM's in a single category, and allow each side to choose its own mix of such missiles, subject to the overall ceiling for this category.

It might also be desirable to split up the cruise-missile category into two or more categories depending on range. It should be noted that there is no need for separate subcategories of MIRVed and un-MIRVed missiles. Each side should be free to choose the nature and details of its allowed forces within each category.

Lower ceilings would be desirable if they would be compatible with verification capabilities and with nuclear forces in the possession of other countries.

It should be noticed that the scheme includes shorter range missiles and aircraft. Even systems of still shorter range might be included. I believe this provides a sensible way of including the so-called gray-area systems; the quantity of such systems allowed each side in inventory would be limited by this SALT like scheme but where they would be deployed—for example, in Western Europe or in the United States—would not be a matter for negotiation in this framework.

Verification issues associated with such reductions are touched upon in my prepared statement.

Of course, the Soviets are most unlikely to agree to any scheme of this general form within the near future. It would impose genuine general parity in the allowed ceilings, and I believe the Soviets have little if any foreseeable interest in such a result. They will come to have such an interest, I fear, only when they perceive that the alternative would be worse for them. This perception will come to them only when they see credible American defense programs that promise to leave them behind.

So, Mr. Chairman, my recommendation for achieving a satisfactory outcome in SALT II prime or III or whatever, in the form of

the scheme above or any other, is to begin a vigorous program to restore our nuclear forces to the relative health they had in the past. The Soviets do not seem to understand any other language.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I shall be pleased to reply to questions.

[Mr. Brennan's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DONALD BRENNAN

Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee. I am pleased to be able to testify before you. I should state at the outset that I oppose SALT II, and believe the Senate should not consent to its ratification. Before explaining why, let me tell you something of my background; a biographical sketch is at the end of my statement, but it will be appropriate to mention here some details relating to arms control. I shall then sketch my objections to SALT II, and then take up how the next round of negotiations might better be structured.

My first serious involvement with the subject was in connection with a small summer study in 1958 in Cambridge, Massachusetts, of which I was one of the organizers. I was an organizer and co-director of a much larger summer study on arms control held in 1960, again in Cambridge, and concurrently served as guest editor of a special issue on arms control, published in Fall 1960, of the journal "Daedalus" of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. This volume, of which Senator Hubert Humphrey was one of the authors, was later published as a book in the Spring of 1961 under the title "Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security," and was widely described as the "bible" of arms control. It was endorsed by Senator Fulbright and by President Kennedy, among others. In the early summer of 1961, as a consultant to John McCloy, I helped to draft the statute that created the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. My first interaction with this Committee came in August 1961, in connection with the hearings on the creation of ACDA, which I supported with a statement submitted for the record.[1] I first testified to this Committee in person in August 1963, in support of ratification of the partial nuclear test ban, and have been here on several occasions since, including the ratification hearings for the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Warfare and for SALT I. I supported, and indeed helped to create, mechanisms for serious private Soviet-American discussions of arms control as a supplement to governmental negotiations. I have visited the Soviet Union in this connection on three occasions. With the exceptions of the agreements signed in May 1972 and June 1979 in the SALT, I have supported, in one way or another, every arms-control agreement adopted by our Government since World War II. This history should make it very clear that my opposition to SALT II does not derive from an opposition to arms control in general—indeed, quite the contrary.

I oppose SALT II because it is bad arms control. The traditional major objectives of arms control have long been understood to be to reduce the likelihood of war, and to reduce the scope and violence of war if it occurs. For reasons I shall explain, I judge that SALT II is more likely to increase the chance of war than to reduce it, and it most certainly will do very little to reduce the scope and violence of war if it occurs. It also has other disadvantages, of which I shall mention some. It should therefore be rejected as unsound arms control.

The most basic difficulty is as follows. A highly plausible means by which the United States may become involved in a war is for a prospective opponent to decide that the United States will not react to some move, which the opponent thereupon undertakes, only to discover that the move was beyond the limit of our toleration. The Korean war, for example, clearly resulted from this mechanism. If a Soviet-American war ever arises, it is most likely to involve this means, in which the Soviets underestimate American willingness to respond to some adverse Soviet move. And that Soviet judgment will relate to their beliefs about comparative Soviet and American military strengths, among other factors.

The plausible role of SALT II in such a crisis is that it will contribute to Soviet beliefs both in their military superiority and in our lack of willingness to stand up to them, even at the level of maintaining military forces on a par with theirs. I judge that such a role is more likely than any major constructive results from the Treaty. Of course, such a role would be highly dangerous.

The slide in American military strength since the 1960s (in comparison to that of the Soviets), especially in the strategic nuclear area, has been discussed by many

[1] Disarmament Agency, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, on S. 2180, August 14, 15, and 16, 1961. (Brennan statement at pp. 328–329.)

witnesses in the SALT II hearings, and need not be detailed here. (See, for example, Annexes III and IV in the statement of Paul Nitze submitted to this Committee on July 12.) Up to the present, I believe this has chiefly been the result of a SALT-related euphoria since the late 1960's, although the specific terms of SALT I contributed their share. Within the projected lifetime of SALT II, there may well be additional SALT-related euphoria, but there will certainly be contributions from the specific details of SALT II. Let me next discuss some of these; I shall then take up some suggestions for subsequent negotiations.

Asymmetries in terms

A major defect of SALT II resides in the fact that the Soviets are allowed 308 "heavy" ICBM's, while the United States is allowed none, and there is no compensating capability that is asymmetrically in our favor. The absolute maximum MIRVed ICBM payload (or "throw-weight") that would be allowed the United States under SALT II would result from deploying 820 new "light" ICBM's with 8,000 pounds payload each; the Soviets would be allowed 820 MIRVed ICBM's of which 308 could have 16,000 pounds and the other 512 could have 8,000 pounds. This would give the Soviets roughly 40 percent more MIRVed ICBM payload than the maximum allowed the United States.

In actuality, it would be virtually impossible for us to deploy that maximum MIRVed ICBM force within the lifetime of SALT II, and the actual Soviet MIRVed ICBM payload by the end of 1985 is likely to exceed ours by a factor of 6 or more,[2] not a "mere" 40 percent. However, under reasonably plausible circumstances, the 40 percent figure is illustrative of what might obtain under SALT III, e.g., if the SALT II limits are simply extended, and in any event it is unambiguously the minimum margin of MIRVed ICBM payload superiority guaranteed to the Soviets under SALT II.

This guaranteed margin would be of political significance even if its military significance were doubtfull (which it is not, as I shall show below). That the United States should sign a treaty with its principal opponent in which that opponent is allowed, by our agreement, any capability (however trifling) we are denied, while there is no counterbalancing capability allowed to us but denied to them, would widely (and accurately) be read as a political statement of weakness on the part of the United States. This interpretation would be particularly strong, and important, in the Soviet Union; it would be a contributing factor to the risk-of-war mechanism I mentioned above.

Some of the proponents of SALT II have tried to disparage the signficance of the "heavy" ICBM's. However, their signficance is considerable, even allowing for the 10-warhead-per-missle limit imposed by SALT II. If we consider for comparison a 10-warhead "light" ICBM of 8,000 pounds payload, the warheads on a 10-warhead "heavy" of 16,000 pounds payload might have yields twice those of the "light" missile. For a given accuracy, the higher-yield weapons would be of some significance for attacking "hardened" American targets such as missile silos. However, the larger significance of the larger yield weapons resides in the additional fallout fatalities they would produce. The extra yield of 308 "heavy" ICBM's (with 10 warheads each), as compared to 308 maximum "light" ICBM's (also with 10 warheads each), would probably be in the neighborhood of 2,000 MT; the maximum plausible difference might be perhaps 2,400 MT, and a difference of less than 1,500 MT would be unlikely. A total of 2,000 MT extra yield used in an attack on the United States would be certain to produce many extra fatalities.

Exactly how many additional Americans would be killed by 2,000 MT additional yield would depend on many factors, including many details of the attack and the extent of civil-defense preparations made before the attack. However, a plausible range of added fallout fatalities would be from a few million to a few tens of millions.[3] Under some (not implausible) conditions, American fallout fatalities could be doubled or even tripled.

Another asymmetry in the terms of SALT II, though of much less importance, is that the Soviets are allowed more ICBM's than are we, specifically 1,398 against our 1,054—344 more. These Soviet ICBM's must, of course be counted under the overall ceilings, and if they wish to have more bombers or more SLBM's, they must reduce their ICBM's accordingly. However, they are allowed the option of up to 1,398 ICBM's, and we are not. This gives them more flexibility in their strategic posture, e.g., in choosing to have even more ICBM payload if they wish.

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[2] See Nitze, July 12 statement, Annex III, chart 19, "1985—U.S./U.S.S.R. ICBMs", or chart 6, "The Balance in Throw-Weight".

[3] Some fallout-fatality curves recently calculated by Earl V. Sager of the System Planning Corp. are useful for such estimates.

These asymmetries seem to me to be clearly against the spirit of the "Jackson Amendment" embodied in Public Law 92-448, which states: "The Congress recognizes the principle of United States-Soviet Union equality reflected in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and urges and requests the President to seek a future treaty that, inter alia, would not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union; * * *". The Senate, at the time of adopting this in 1972, understood it to mean that the United States should not be limited (by agreement) to levels of strategic forces inferior to those of the Soviet Union in payload; this is manifestly clear from the legislative history of the Jackson Amendment. If, in the face of this language, the Senate now accepts SALT II, then Public Law 92-448 should be pickled.

Asymmetry in coverage

The extra ICBM payload (in the 308 "heavies") and the extra number of ICBM's (344) allowed the Soviets result from explicit provisions of SALT II. a different major difficulty of SALT II resides in the fact that a Soviet weapon system that appears to be of major potential strategic significance, namely the "Backfire" (TU-22M) bomber, is excluded altogether from the SALT II Treaty ceilings, while American bombers that apparently are closely comparable in capabilities—specifically our B-52's—must be counted. As in the case of the "heavy" ICBMs, there is no offsetting capability that we are allowed but the Soviets are not.

Western estimates of Backfire capabilities are imprecise. It is estimated in Jane's that, with a 10-ton bomb load, Backfire has a maximum unrefueled combat radius (for a two-way mission) of 3,100 nautical miles (nm).[4] I understand that a somewhat lower estimate of 2,900 nm is widely accepted in the Government for a 10-ton bomb load, which would correspond to 5,400 nm or 10,000 Km one-way range. For a 5-ton bomb load, for comparison with readily available B-52 data, these latter values should increase at least 6 percent, to 3,074 nm radius or 10,600 Km one-way range. (Compare this with the SALT range criterion for ICBM's of 5,500 Km.) The corresponding unrefueled combat radius for a B-52D with a 5-ton bomb load is 3,012 nm,[5] less than these widely accepted Backfire estimates, still less than the Jane's estimate.

While lower estimates of Backfire capabilities can undoubtedly be found, these comparisons show that it would be impossible to have confidence that Backfire performance is significantly less than the B-52D, of which we have about 80 in current active inventory, all of which must be counted under SALT II ceilings. Of all the B-52's produced, only the G and H models, about one third of the total, have an unrefueled range capability somewhat in excess of the Jane's Backfire estimate. Backfire has a supersonic capability not matched by any of the B-52's.

By the projected expiration date of SALT II, the Soviets could have 30 percent or more of their total strategic payload in Backfire (which is a very substantial increment). They have said that they do not intend to use Backfire in a strategic nuclear role against the American homeland, but, as an ACDA statement accurately put it, "* * * there are no assurances that will ensure that Backfires would not be used against the continental United States in time of war." [6] It is as if the United States were to refuse to include all of the Poseidon launchers under the SNDV ceilings because some are assigned to SACEUR for theater targets. Note that the omission of Backfire from the aggregate counts means that the often-repeated assertion of "equal aggregate ceilings" under SALT II is untrue even as concerns simple numbers of strategic delivery vehicles.

Effects on vulnerabilities

The way in which the limits in SALT II are formulated—basically in numbers of delivery vehicles, at least in intention, with some refinements—contributes to the vulnerabilities of our strategic forces. In principle, this is a symmetric effect, but the Soviet forces threaten ours much more than ours do theirs, now and for at least the lifetime of SALT II, so it is not symmetric in practice.

Consider, for example, a proposed American MX deployment of 200 missiles with 10 warheads each, in comparison to a hypothetical deployment—let us call it MY—of the same total number (2,000) of the identical warheads, but on 2,000 individual boosters with one warhead each. The MX deployment would give the Soviets only 200 real targets to "shoot" at, either before launch, during launch, or for a short time after launch, while the MY deployment would give the Soviets 2,000 real

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[4] Jane's "All the World's Aircraft, 1977/78," p. 463; "All the World's Aircraft, 1978/79," p. 202.
[5] U.S.A.F. publication "Standard Aircraft Characteristics."
[6] Quoted in "SALT II: An Interim Assessment," Report of the Panel on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, December 23, 1978 (H.A.S.C. No. 95-95), p. 11.

targets in each of these phases. The MY deployment would therefore be easier to protect, by any of several means, i.e., it would therefore be more secure, and hence more reliably stable in a crisis, than would be the MX force. The MY force would also allow improved and/or simplified command and control. However, the MY force would be precluded by the terms of SALT II, because it would exceed the total of allowed ICBM's—1,054 for the United States and 1,398 for the Soviet Union. The fact that the proposed SALT II limits are formulated in such a way as to encourage the deployment of a small number of large systems, rather than a large number of small systems, constitutes a major contribution to the future vulnerability of our forces. This need not have been so.

Another problem of SALT II in this connection is that some of the means that might have been used to protect our strategic retaliatory capability, specifically air-to-surface ballistic missiles and mobile ICBM's, are precluded by the SALT II Protocol, which may or may not prove to be only temporary. Finally, one of the potentially best means of protecting our ICBM forces, as many of the proponents of SALT agree, is the use of active defense, specifically ABM, and this means is substantially precluded by the ABM Treaty of SALT I.

Limited gains

It is conceivable in principle that SALT II might achieve sufficient potential gains to offset its drawbacks. However, I do not believe this would be true in practice.

There are only two unambiguous gains I can see, and these are both modest. One is that ratification of SALT II should result in better information about Soviet forces than we would otherwise be likely to have. Since I do not believe that we shall be significantly restraining our own forces during the lifetime of SALT II on the basis of promised Soviet restraint,[7] this implies that verification problems should not directly be an obstacle to ratification, even though some Treaty prohibitions almost certainly cannot be verified by national technical means, such as production of SS–16 warheads [8] or cruise missile range limits.

The other unambiguous gain I can see is that we shall probably have slightly more influence over Soviet decisions in non-SALT policy areas if the Treaty is ratified than if it is not. This influence, which would never be large, would be greatest on the eve of, or during, ratification debates; it would likely be near zero at other times. That we could exploit this influence to enforce anything like specific Soviet restraints in non-SALT areas seems to me virtually impossible.

Several other gains have been claimed for SALT II that seem to me to range from negligible at best, through highly contingent in the middle, to wrong at worst.

At the negligible end is the point that the Soviets will be required to destroy some actual weapons. This is true, but the capabilities destroyed will be small in comparison to those added, resulting in substantial net increases in every other important parameter of their ICBM force (warheads, megatons, equivalent MT, counter-military potential, and payload), while reducing the total number of ICBM's by slightly over 200.[9]

The warhead fractionation limits may prove useful if continued well beyond 1985, but are of little significance within the projected lifetime of SALT II. Indeed, it is not expected that the Soviets will even build up to the maximum warhead count allowed them under the Treaty within its lifetime.[10] Whether these limits are significant is therefore contingent on continuing them in effect for at least several additional years, a contingency that is nothing but a hope.

This is closely related to the issue of saving costs, a gain promised by many proponents. I have already noted my belief that we shall not be significantly restraining our own forces during the lifetime of SALT II on the basis of promised Soviet restraint, a belief strengthened by the estimate just mentioned that the Soviets will not even build up to the levels allowed them under SALT II. This, however, is to say that there is probably nothing substantial that we shall not be doing because of SALT II that we should be doing without it, i.e., there is probably no significant saving within SALT II itself. Assertions to the contrary would depend on highly convenient estimates. Major savings in the future would be contingent on continuing (or strengthening) the restraints of SALT II, again, nothing but a hope. This subject of costs should be considered in the light of the fact that major increases in American strategic-force expenditures are probably vital in any event.

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[7] A point that suggests that promised cost savings of SALT II are illusory, if not wholly fictitious, as I shall point out below.

[8] See the Common Understanding to Paragraph 8 of Article IV.

[9] Compare Charts 13 and 19 of Nitze's Annex III.

[10] Nitze, Annex III, Charts 19 and 20. (I omit some obvious interpretive remarks here.)

Somewhat incidentally, it should be noted that anyone who would argue for major cost savings under SALT II would have a correspondingly major burden in verifying the putative Soviet restraint that permitted the savings.

The claimed gain for SALT II that seems to me most mistaken is that it would reduce the likelihood of war. There is very little reason to believe this claim. I believe, as I pointed out near the beginning of this statement, that SALT II is much more likely to increase the likelihood of war. This is related to the most important reason for rejecting SALT II.

Recommendations concerning SALT II

Some of the leading critics of SALT II apparently oppose it primarily because of the relationship of the SALT to American euphoria about strategic forces. This opposition seems to me entirely reasonable. There can be no doubt that three successive Administrations have, in some collective sense, believed that the SALT would enable us to have strategic nuclear security "on the cheap", in the slang phrase, and that this belief has been a major factor in the evolution of our greatly weakened strategic posture. There is therefore something to be said for imposing a major pause on the process of the SALT, not particularly related to the specific terms of SALT II, while—it is hoped—we regain our strategic wits. I was struck by Paul Nitze's quotation (in his July 12 statement) of Lincoln's celebrated phrase that: "First we must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save the country."

Yet there is no doubt that it requires a certain degree of optimism—from my perspective—about the American Administration coming to power in January 1981 in order to believe that our strategic posture will be adequately repaired, whatever happens to SALT II in the meanwhile. As a matter of realistic politics, it is not obvious that my optimism should improve substantially as a result of rejection of SALT II. And even my most preferred candidate Administrations would be unlikely to accomplish many strategic repairs before 1986 that would be prohibited by SALT II.

Nevertheless, I believe that the case for rejecting SALT II is something close to overwhelming. The lesser, but nevertheless significant, part of this case resides in the fact that some potentially desirable specific repairs—such as the MY missile force—would be much less likely to be adequately studied, still less developed, under constraints that would prohibit their deployment and which might be continued beyond SALT II.

The major part of the case for rejection resides in the necessity to make it manifest to the Soviets, and to some degree to the rest of the world, that the American body politic will simply not accept further one-sided constraints that allow the Soviets a guaranteed margin of superiority, whatever efforts we may make within the Treaty limits. This Treaty will strengthen Soviet beliefs—already too strong—that they constitute the wave of the future, that they have increasing military preponderance, and that the United States is increasingly unwilling to stand up to them, even at the level of insisting on a mere paper quality of allowed forces. The extent of these effects may be argued, but surely the direction cannot. And the direction is dangerous. It is the route to war.

I believe the best way of minimizing that danger is to reject SALT II outright. In this, I seem to differ with many of my fellow critics. However, if I were asked what modifications in the Treaty would make it minimally acceptable, I should suggest two.

First, the "heavy" ICBM's should be counted as two each. Thus, if the Soviets wish to retain 308 SS-18's, these would count as 616 against their allowance of 820 MIRVed ICBM's (and similarly for other limits and sublimits), so they could then have only 204 "light" MIRVed ICBM's. Under this condition, the Soviets might reasonably be allowed 20 warheads each on the "heavy" missiles, rather than the 10 now allowed.

Second, four B-52's should be omitted from the Treaty (simply by omitting references to the B-52 in paragraph 3 of Article II, and related common understandings). Because of the apparently close similiarity of Backfires and B-52's in unrefueled range-payload characteristics, and their comparable numbers, this would be the appropriate counter to the Soviet refusal to include Backfire. The Soviets could then reasonably be relieved of the restrictions (other than on production rate) contained in thier unilateral Backfire statement at the Vienna Summit.

If these two changes were made, I should be willing to ignore the matter of the extra Soviet ICBM's, and, with reluctance, could support the ratification of SALT II as so modified. But there is very little chance, in my view, that the Soviets would accept these changes under current circumstances, and rather than seem to be taking refuge in such devices, I believe the forthright and proper action for the United States is to reject the Treaty outright. I therefore recommend that the Senate withhold its consent to ratification.

Future limitations

Mr. Chairman, you asked me to address the subject of arms control and SALT III objectives. It will be clear to you from the foregoing that I hope SALT II will be defeated, and, therefore, I shall not assume that the next negotiations will be preceded by ratification. The second paragraph of your letter of August 10 mentioned specifically the "direction, pace an scope" we should pursue "in future negotiations on strategic armaments," apparently not necessarily assuming the ratification of SALT II, and I shall therefore assume that acceptance of SALT II is not necessarily a prerequisite to these "future negotiations". I shall indicate what I believe is a suitable avenue to pursue in the next negotiations, whether they be called SALT III or SALT II, or whatever, and whether II is ratified or not.

The best approach to such next negotiations is to use a scheme for limiting and reducing strategic nuclear offensive forces that is based on (or closely related to) the payload (or "throw-weight") of such forces. Schemes of this general type have been suggested to the Soviets in the past, but, at least in recent official negotiations, the Soviets have rejected such an approach. I believe we should persevere in this approach.

An illustrative comprehensive scheme is shown in Table 1. The basic idea of this is as follows. Nuclear delivery systems of various kinds are grouped in the categories listed in the first column. In each category, the initial Soviet and American capabilities measured in tons of payload (or "throw weight") estimated for 1985 are given.[11] An "Initial Ceiling" for each category is then selected, basically as the larger of the Soviet or American capabilities in each category, in some cases rounded upward to a round number. The symbol that is a "v" appearing in the initial ceiling for the bottom category means "greater of", so that initial ceiling is the greater of X or Y. These ceilings are then decreased over time, not necessarily at the same rate for each category, and not necessarily by the same factor in each 5-year period. Each force (Soviet and American) must not exceed the ceilings each category imposed at points 5 years and 10 years after the initial ceilings.

For example, in this illustrative scheme, the ICBM ceiling is cut in half in the first 5-year period, and cut in third in the following 5-year period. The SLBM ceilings are reduced by smaller factors, so that the allowed SLBM forces at the end of 10 years would consititute a larger fraction of the then-allowed total of strategic forces than they did at the beginning.

TABLE 1.—SAMPLE LIMITATION SCHEME FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES

[Tons of payload]

Category	Initial U.S.	Initial U.S.S.R.	Initial ceiling	5-yr ceiling	10-yr ceiling
ICBM	1,230	5,670	6,000	3,000	1,000
M/IRBM	0	1,000	1,000	500	250
SLBM	1,075	1,195	1,200	800	500
Cruise missiles	300	1,000	1,000	750	500
Heavy bombers	1,660	360	2,000	1,000	500
Medium bombers	1,000	4,000	4,000	2,000	1,000
NucTacAir	X	Y	(XvY)	(XvY)/2	(XvY)/4

Different aggregations within categories would be possible and may well be desirable. For example, it might be desirable to lump together ICBM's and SLBM's in a single category, and allow each side to choose its own "mix" of such missiles, subject to the overall ceiling for this category. It might also be desirable to split up the cruise-missile category into two or more categories, depending on range. It should be noted that there is no need for separate sub-categories of MIRVed and un-MIRVed missiles. Each side should be free to choose the nature and details of its allowed forces within each category; e.g., the 1,000-ton ceiling on ICBM payload at the end of ten years could be deployed as 100 missiles of 10 tons each, or 1,000 missiles of 1 ton each, or 10,000 missiles with 200 pounds each (roughly the maximum number of warheads that could be fitted into 1,000 tons), or some combination of such missiles

[11]Initial U.S. and U.S.S.R. payload capabilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers are taken from the 1985 columns of Chart 6, "The Balance in Throw-Weight", of Annex III of Paul Nitze's statement, converted into tons. (Nitze's estimate for Soviet heavy bombers did not include the Backfire, which I have therefore included under medium bombers.) Other initial estimates in the table should be thought of only as selected to illustrate the scheme; they have no pretense whatever to accuracy.

not exceeding 1,000 tons total payload. Lower ceilings would be desirable if they would be compatible with verification capabilities and with nuclear forces in the possession of other countries.

I have discussed this scheme in terms of payload, because that is conceptually simple and (in some sense) the real parameter of interest, but the scheme might actually be formulated (at least for the missile categories) in terms of the total gross volume of the missiles, which is of course more readily verifiable than payload, but closely related. Different parameters could be used for different categories.

It should be noticed that the scheme includes shorter-range missiles and aircraft. Even systems of still shorter range might be included. I believe this provides a sensible way of including the so-called gray-area systems; the quantity of such systems allowed each side in inventory would be limited by this SALT-like scheme, but where they would be deployed (e.g., in Western Europe or in the United States) would not be a matter for negotiation in this framework.

Any system requiring substantial reductions in nuclear delivery systems will pose correspondingly substantial verification problems, and this scheme is no exception. While the specific verification issues of such a scheme have not been extensively studied, as far as I know, there is no reason to believe that the scheme is worse from this perspective than any other that would provide similar reductions. Particular problems will predictably arise with miniaturized systems, e.g., advanced cruise missiles, and with dual-capable systems, e.g., tactical aircraft. Whether satisfactory solutions to such verification issues can ultimately be found is not clear unless the Soviets collaborate much more in providing verification than now seems likely.

Of course, the Soviets are most unlikely to agree to any scheme of this general form within the near future, in any event. It would impose genuine parity in the allowed ceilings, and I believe the Soviets have little if any foreseeable interest in such a result. They will come to have such an interest, I fear, only when they perceive that the alternative would be worse for them. And this perception will come to them only when they see credible American defense programs that promise to leave them behind.

So, Mr. Chairman, my recommendation for achieving a satisfactory outcome in SALT II or III or whatever, in the form of the scheme above or any other, is to begin a vigorous program to restore our nuclear forces to the relative health they had in the past. The Soviets do not seem to understand any other language.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I shall be pleased to reply to questions.

Biographical Sketch of Donald G. Brennan, Director of National Security Studies, Hudson Institute

Donald G. Brennan is a strategist and student of national security problems. His special interests are in arms control, alliance relationships in Europe, and advanced military policy, such as policy issues relating to tactical and strategic nuclear forces.

Prior to joining Hudson Institute, of which he was President from July 1962 until May 1964 and where he is now Director of National Security Studies, Dr. Brennan worked for nine years as a research mathematician and communication theorist at Lincoln Laboratory of Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In addition to his technical research there, he devoted substantial time to studies of arms control and related national security problems.

Dr. Brennan's serious interest in arms control began in 1957, when he was organizer of a group that led to the 1958 Summer Study on Arms Control held in Cambridge, Massachusetts, under the auspices of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He was an organizer and co-director of the 1960 Summer Study on Arms Control, again held in Cambridge under American Academy auspices. He was chairman of the Academy's Committee on International Studies of Arms Control in 1961–62.

Dr. Brennan has served as a consultant to the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Department of Energy (and its predecessors, the AEC and ERDA), the Executive Office of the President, and to several research organizations. He is the editor of the well-known anthology, *Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security* (New York, George Braziller, 1961), sponsored by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and guest editor of its predecessor, the special (Fall 1960) issue of *Daedalus* on "Arms Control". He has edited studies of future military technology and several publications on arms control, and is currently a member of the Editorial Board of the journal *International Security.* He has contributed articles on national security topics to a large number of books and journals, including *Foreign Affairs, Orbis,* the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, The New York Times,* and publications of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He has lectured on national security subjects at many universities, at the U.S. National, Air, and Naval War Colleges, at

the Canadian National Defence College, and at defense study centers in London, Bonn, Paris, Rome, and Oslo, among others, and has given seminars on arms control in the Soviet Union and China. He is a frequent witness at Congressional hearings concerned with national security affairs.

Born in 1926 in Waterbury, Connecticut, Dr. Brennan received the B.S. (1955) and Ph.D. (1959) degrees in mathematics from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he was a Gerard Swope Fellow and received other graduate and undergraduate prizes and awards. Prior to entering M.I.T., he was engaged in radio engineering as a registered professional engineer in the State of Connecticut. He is a member of Sigma Xi, the American Mathematical Society, the Council on Foreign Relations, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and the Republican National Committee's Advisory Council on National Security and International Affairs, and is a member of the Board of Directors of the Committee on the Present Danger.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Dr. Brennan.

Senator Javits?

HEAVY ICBM'S COUNTED AS TWO EACH

Senator JAVITS. I am very interested, Dr. Brennan, in the two things which would induce you to accept SALT II. You have mentioned them in your statement, first the heavy ICBM's should be counted as two each.

Does that not guarantee rejection? Absolutely. It is generally agreed that the heavy Soviet ICBM's were developed to compensate for the Soviet deficiences in accuracy, and for which we may compensate for by the retention of the right to produce a new MIRVed ICBM.

As to the complete omission of the B–52's, is it not a fact that we have satisfied ourselves that essentially the Backfire is a European theater weapon designed for sea lanes around Europe. Also it is an impractical weapon for attack against the United States, although it could be forced to do it?

What is your comment on both of those points?

Mr. BRENNAN. To take the last one first, Senator Javits, I do not understand that it is universally agreed that the Backfire is not a capable strategic bomber. It is generally agreed, I believe, that the Backfire has been primarily deployed by the Soviets and oriented by the Soviets toward use as a theater weapon or toward naval warfare, but it is not my understanding that it is generally agreed that it is not a capable intercontinental weapon.

I believe even ACDA, at some time during the period when Mr. Warnke headed it, made a statement to the effect that no assurances given in peacetime would assure that the Backfire could not be used in time of war. It has capabilities and range and payload that are widely believed to be closely comparable to the B–52's.

The fact that the Soviets are presently intending to use it for theater purposes would no more suggest to me that it should be excluded from the ceilings than the fact that we have a certain number of Poseidon missiles allocated to SACEUR would suggest that we should claim some of the Poseidon missiles should not be counted under the ceilings. They can be reassigned at any time and on fairly short notice. I believe something closely similar is true of the Backfire.

As far as any acceptability of the idea of counting the heavy missiles as two each is concerned, I am sure the Soviets would not accept that, because I believe they wish to preserve a degree of

superiority that is reflected in those ICBMs. I do not think it would be generally agreed that it is impossible to achieve the same capabilities such as accuracy, for example, with the heavy-payload missiles as can be achieved with light payload missiles.

By reasonable measures of what the missiles can accomplish, the heavy payload missiles are in effect twice what the maximum allowed light missile would provide.

It therefore seems to me that an equitable way of counting them would be to count them as two each. If you ask whether the Soviets would be likely to accept this, I should say no, but I think we should insist on some things that would be equitable whether the Soviets accept them or not.

Senator JAVITS. I have one question of you and then I would like the others to comment if they would on what you have said.

TWO LEGS OF U.S. TRIAD COMPLETELY DEPENDABLE

We noticed, or at least I have noticed in discussions in these hearings almost the complete relegation to nothing of the sea and air legs of the U.S. Triad. I noticed it in your testimony too.

We were told by Secretary of Defense that these two legs are completely reliable and dependable, and we design our strategy to have three legs instead of essentially one which the Soviets essentially have.

We are faced constantly with the argument that you compare the 30-percent U.S. dependence on our ICBM's with the 70 percent Russian dependence. If you disregard the rest of our forces, the balance seems all lopsided.

Should we disregard the rest of it? Could you briefly explain to me your argument that for practical purposes we should junk our air and sea based strategic forces and forget them?

Mr. BRENNAN. It was not my argument——

Senator JAVITS. I understand, but it was implied.

Mr. BRENNAN. I should deny even that it is implied. Let me address the point apart from what was or was not implied.

I think the American forces other than the ICBM's, the SLBM's and the bomber forces primarily, are of considerable significance and they are sufficient to insure that the Soviets will certainly not undertake a nuclear attack against the United States frivolously. There is no question in my mind about that.

If one asks a slightly different question, would a two-legged Triad, possibly with one leg being severely threatened by the Soviets, be sufficient to give you political confidence in managing any crisis which might come along, in the way in which we had this confidence in the past or relative confidence in the past, then I think the answer to that is "No." I think some of the witnesses who have been before you have made this point fairly well.

Senator JAVITS. May we have your comment, Ambassador Warnke? We will then have your comment, Professor Panofsky.

Ambassador WARNKE. I will try to deal with them, Senator Javits, in the same order.

Senator JAVITS. You may deal with them in any way you wish.

Ambassador WARNKE. First, of course Backfire is exclusively deployed as a theater bomber. It has never been exercised in a

strategic role and I think it is obvious that it is not adapted for a strategic role. It is a very effective theater bomber.

Therefore I think that the restraints President Carter was able to achieve should be regarded as frosting on the cake. We have a limit on production. We have a prohibition against upgrade that would give it a significant strategic capability.

With regard to heavy missiles, let me try to put this into perspective in terms of the negotiations. At the time I took over the negotiations there was nothing that would have limited the size of the M-X below the size of the SS-18. We could have made the M-X just as big as the biggest Soviet missile. The M-X was intended to be deployed as a mobile ICBM. Therefore, no limit on size existed because the only control was on the size of the fixed silos in which ICBM's are now deployed.

We negotiated the limit on the size of a mobile ICBM. We did so at the request of the Pentagon because they had no intention of making the M-X any bigger than the SS-19 and they were concerned that if there was not a ban on heavy missiles on mobile launchers that would work to the unilateral advantage of the Soviet Union.

It was for our own military considerations that we proposed that constraint.

Let me also point out, with respect to the idea that the heavy missiles should count as two, that you can sell a dead horse just so many times. We were able at Vladivostok to get the Soviets to agree not to include our forward-based systems. Part of the quid pro quo for that was that we would not insist on further reductions of heavy Soviet missiles. We are not going to be able to sell it again.

The proposal that the SS-18 should count as two would obviously be countered by some such Soviet proposal as counting our Poseidon missiles as two because they have twice as many RV's as the only Soviet MIRVed SLBM.

I think again we have to look at this in the context of the totality of the agreement. Obviously, there are some respects in which the asymmetries in the present forces are in favor of the Soviet Union, but it is not possible to negotiate an agreement that strips off those asymmetries but leaves us with all of the respects in which our strategic forces are superior to those of the Soviet Union.

Senator JAVITS. You did not answer as to the other two legs of the Triad, nor has Professor Panofsky. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent if the other members do not ask these questions or if I do not get to them on the second round, that the witnesses be asked to reply in writing and that it be made part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection that will be as so ordered if it is possible to order witnesses to reply in writing. That may exceed my authority. It is so requested.

[The information referred to is contained in the response to question 11 on pages 387, 392, and 396.]

Is it your turn, Senator McGovern?

Senator MCGOVERN. I think it is unless you wish to ask questions at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. I defer to you.

PERCENTAGE ANNUAL REDUCTION SCHEME

Senator MCGOVERN. Dr. Panofsky, as you may or may not know, I plan to offer a version of the percentage annual reduction approach as a declaration of policy for SALT III, not as an amendment or reservation on SALT II but simply as an accompanying policy statement that I hope the Senate will approve in consideration of the resolution or ratification.

In your statement you state that a percentage annual reduction scheme with complete freedom to mix it would be destabilizing. I agree with that.

What I have in mind is to reduce annually not just the overall aggregates of launchers and delivery vehicles but to reduce on a percentage basis annually the various subcategories so that the levels of 2,250 and 1,320 and 1,200 and 820 and so on down to the 308 heavy systems of the Soviet Union, would have to be reduced by a certain percentage whether it is 5 percent or 10 percent or whatever the Senate would agree on.

I am wondering if you would still oppose the so-called PAR or percentage annual reduction principle if the reductions had to apply to each of the SALT II ceilings and subceilings?

Mr. PANOFSKY. Senator McGovern, I am still somewhat uncomfortable, not with the idea of annual reduction per se, but with too specific a prescription to have exact proportionality in the various subcategories because I believe it may be preferable to have a disproportionately large annual reduction required for MIRVed ICBM's in order to achieve larger stability.

I am simply somewhat uncomfortable, not with the concept as such but that our negotiators will enter the negotiating table with a preannounced predetermined negotiating position. I feel that just because of the necessity of trading things off in the asymmetric situation which we and the Soviets are facing that it may turn out to be an undue constraint on our negotiators to be quite as specific as this.

I have no objection at all to a negotiated scheme of planned reductions as long as the freedom to mix provision in the reduction is not insisted on.

It is a relatively minor point from my point of view.

Senator MCGOVERN. Ambassador Warnke, what is your view of the principle of percentage annual reduction? It occurred to me listening to your statement that it does address one of the concerns you expressed, that we not reinvent the wheel, that we begin with SALT II. This has the advantage of taking those levels that we have ratified in SALT II, assuming we are ever going to get to that, and then building on that base with a percentage cutback in SALT III on an annual basis with each side being required to make substantial cutbacks.

Ambassador WARNKE. I would feel, Senator McGovern, that this could be a useful approach provided it did apply to the various subcategories as well as the overall categories.

Senator MCGOVERN. That is the way it is going to be offered.

Ambassador WARNKE. I would not want to see a situation in which the only arms control was to cut back on the total number,

then one side or the other might maximize the number, for example, of MIRVed ICBM's.

Senator McGOVERN. I fully agree.

Ambassador WARNKE. I would agree with Dr. Panofsky that the important thing is to try to bring about a very substantial cutback in the number of launchers of MIRVed ICBM's. I think PAR or percentage annual reduction is part of an overall approach that could be useful.

Senator McGOVERN. Mr. Brennan, do you have any comment?

Mr. BRENNAN. No, sir. I should not inherently object to a program of that kind at all. It could be easily compatible with the kind of program that is envisioned in the table in my prepared statement.

While I have the microphone I would like to make a very brief remark about one point Mr. Warnke made in responding to the question about my earlier remark in which he said part of the quid pro quo of Vladivostok for omitting the forward based systems in Europe was allowing the Soviets to have the large ICBM's.

I wanted to point out that General Rowny who was one of the negotiators during that era, denied on the record at an earlier session of these hearings that any such linkage was present. I have heard a similar denial from other people not on the record but who were concerned with this issue at that time. General Rowny's testimony is on the record.

Ambassador WARNKE. If I may point out, Senator McGovern, of course those records would be available to the Senate and they can determine from the facts whether I am correct or General Rowny. I am content to rest on that.

[The following information was subsequently supplied by Mr. Brennan:]

PASSAGE FROM GENERAL ROWNY'S PREPARED STATEMENT

[Supplied by Donald Brennan]

[Mr. Brennan later submitted the following passage from General Rowny's prepared statement of July 12, with a request that it be inserted at this point in the record: "It has been stated that we accepted this inequality in a trade for the Soviets not counting our so-called 'forward-based systems' (FBS) and the nuclear systems of our Allies. Evidence of such a trade is not supported by the record. I clearly recall the days just before Vladivostok when the Soviets sent us signals in Geneva that they would drop their FBS arguments. Once told that by insisting on including our FBS, the Soviets would be required to count their more numerous systems (which could strike our systems and our troops in Europe, and our NATO partners), the Soviets realized it was to their advantage to drop the FBS argument."]

SALT PROCESS MEANS FOR ACHIEVING REAL ARMS LIMITATION

Senator McGOVERN. Thank you, gentlemen.

Do any of you really expect the SALT process or the ratification process in SALT III to move along more rapidly and more satisfactorily in terms of achieving real arms limitation and hopefully arms reduction?

Are you optimistic based on what has happened in the last few years that we can do better in SALT III if we ratify SALT II?

Ambassador WARNKE. I would be quite optimistic, Senator McGovern, that the ratification process could proceed with more expedition provided that what we did as I indicated in my prepared

statement—that is to utilize SALT II as the basic treaty to which a series of amendments could be made. Some of those amendments could be in my opinion noncontroversial.

An example would be the shrinking of the totals in SALT II; further reductions; further substantial reductions both in the overall categories and in the subcategories and primarily the total of MIRVed ICBM's.

I do not see why that should present anything of a controversial nature. I think there are also some other refinements that could occur during the SALT III negotiations that again would not give the members of the Senate any major concern.

Obviously some other types of changes would raise questions of greater complexity and on which there may be difference of opinions.

I think if we take the approach that when we have reached agreement on perhaps a related set of provisions these should then be put into effect, this would allow us to make more rapid progress.

Senator McGOVERN. Professor Panofsky?

Mr. PANOFSKY. I am guardedly optimistic, just from the experience of these hearings, that the Senate will be persuaded that the arguments which are now swirling around the ratification process deal with issues which are relatively marginal in comparison to the major issue, namely trying to make the political process more adequate to get ahead of the technological evolution. I agree with Mr. Warnke that some future steps will deal with relatively uncontroversial amendments, and that therefore the ratification process will proceed more expeditiously.

My main concern about the relative rate of the political process to the technological process is not so much focused on the ratification process of the Senate but on the negotiating and instructing process.

Senator McGOVERN. I meant the whole process.

Mr. PANOFSKY. On the overall negotiating process. Again there I hope, at least with faith in our system, that the lessons learned here of the necessity of not being diverted by relatively minor Soviet moves will be learned and the process will go more rapidly.

I am guardedly optimistic. It is certainly quite possible that it will not happen that way.

Senator McGOVERN. Mr. Brennan?

Mr. BRENNAN. I am not sure whether I should describe my attitude as optimistic or pessimistic. I think it very unlikely that the Soviets will be more rapidly moved toward reasonable looking postures in SALT III than they were in SALT II.

It is very difficult for me to project that belief into a comment on ratification. It is hard to know what will emerge from the negotiating process, which will depend enormously on what administration is in power, and I have no crystal ball for that.

Senator McGOVERN. Thank you, gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator McGovern. We have a rollcall vote. I think this is a good place to break so the Senators may vote. We will reconvene in about 15 minutes.

[The committee recessed for a vote on the floor.]

The CHAIRMAN. I understand we have another vote to come but rather than to keep you gentlemen longer, I thought we would

commence the proceedings again; then perhaps we can take turns voting and we can complete this hearing.

FUTURE POSSIBILITIES FOR SALT III

I would like to explore during my round of questioning what the possibilities really are for SALT III. There seems to be a consensus emerging that perhaps the best argument going for SALT II is it leaves the gate open for SALT III.

I would like to ask the panel beginning perhaps with Ambassador Warnke, for an appraisal of what he believes is realistic to anticipate in the way of reductions of these nuclear weapons that have become so redundant, so costly and so dangerous to both sides.

You know a number of formulas have been suggested. Some of them are very ambitious ones.

You have negotiated with the Russians and you have had a good deal of experience, about as much as anyone in this field.

I would like to ask for your assessment. Up to now, none of these so-called arms control treaties except the ABM Treaty and the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and I might say even that treaty may not have posed any meaningful limitation on the nuclear arms race since both sides were able to proceed with underground testing to their heart's desire and what was adequate to the military's needs.

I would think that perhaps only the ABM Treaty actually put a stop to the development of a nuclear weapons system and to the expansion of that system. Everything else we have had has permitted both sides really to proceed with a continuing buildup of nuclear warheads.

What can we expect realistically in the light of that history as we look ahead to SALT III?

Ambassador WARNKE. Of course my crystal ball, Mr. Chairman, is probably just as clouded as that of anybody else. It does seem to be we can be quite ambitious in SALT III.

I think one of the reasons why we were not able to get sharper reductions in SALT II is explained by the Soviet decisionmaking process. When we went to Moscow in March of 1977, as you will recall we had quite an ambitious comprehensive proposal that would have involved sharper cuts.

It became apparent that the Vladivostok figures were something that had become of such political importance to Mr. Brezhnev that he had to get a Vladivostok type treaty out of his system before he could go onto something that was more ambitious.

We had the greatest difficulty even getting down from 2,400 to 2,250. As a matter of fact it was necessary to write the 2,400 figure into the treaty as the immediate figure with the 2,250 being something that would be accomplished at the end of 1981.

Similarly with the 1,320. That again had to appear someplace in the treaty which is why we were able to come up with this complex, and very favorable to the United States, combined ceiling of 1,320 for the total of strategic bombers with long-range cruise missiles plus MIRVed ballistic missiles. Both of those figures as a matter of an imperative had to be in the SALT II Treaty.

My feeling is once we have that SALT II Treaty we will be able to get the Soviets to concentrate on substantially greater reduc-

tions as a part of SALT III, not only in the overall aggregate but in the subceilings.

As you know in the Joint Statement of Principles, there is an agreement on the part of both sides to negotiate significant reductions. At one point we considered putting figures into that Joint Statement of Principles. It was then decided that those figures would become not only new ceilings but also floors, that if we had specific figures put in the Joint Statement of Principles that would substantially eliminate any possibility of getting further down and we were better off holding our options open.

For that reason I would hope that any resolution that the Senate might pass with respect to SALT III would not be too specific and would instead indicate a general direction on the part of the Senate that we go for substantial reductions but not set a figure which will become not only a new ceiling but also a new floor.

I think also as part of SALT III that it will be possible to get some further qualitative restraints. For example I mentioned in my opening statement that I would hope, as Professor Panofsky has proposed, that we could get a ban on the testing of submarine launched ballistic missiles in depressed trajectories. This was brought up fairly late in the SALT II negotiations. The Soviets were not able to deal with it at that point. The negotiations had been going on for too long.

It is therefore my hope that with the prompt ratification of SALT II we will have the foundation from which we can proceed.

I would like to give my own view, Mr. Chairman, that SALT II is important not just in holding the gate open for SALT III but it is important in itself. Compared with the alternative, if there were no SALT II constraints our best estimate is that the Soviets would have by the end of 1985 some 3,000 strategic nuclear weapon systems. With SALT II, they are held at 2,250. That is a difference of just about 25 percent if you go from the 3,000 figure.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree that the treaty contains provisions that are beneficial. I did not mean to suggest that the treaty was totally without substance. It also establishes a ceiling for the first time on the number of warheads which I think is a very important achievement, as well as the requirement that the Russians demolish and dismantle 250 intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The principle of equal ceilings is also an important principle looking to the future.

What we both want and I certainly know that to be your feeling from our previous conversations, is some substantial reduction in these force levels, even the ones that have been established under SALT II are much too high.

Ambassador WARNKE. I would certainly agree with that, Mr. Chairman, and I certainly think a priority objective ought to be to reduce the overall total of MIRVed ICBM launchers because that is where the greatest instability resides.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brennan?

Mr. BRENNAN. It is very difficult for me to have any confidence in what might happen in the next round of negotiations. As I earlier remarked I am not sure whether the next round of negotiations will be called SALT III or SALT II prime or something else.

I am sure there will be future negotiations with the Soviets even if SALT II should be rejected. Sooner or later there will be negotiations with the Soviets on these issues again. The question would be how soon and under what kind of framework and for what objectives and over what time scale.

Assuming SALT II would be ratified in the relatively near future, which of course I do not recommend, but if it were to happen, then I would suppose the negotiations would start fairly early, but my best guess about the Soviets is that they will be very reluctant to scale down their forces substantially, and I suspect they will be even more reluctant to scale them down with what would seem to me sufficient symmetry.

In other words, I think they will be likely to be determined to retain some advantages, such as some fraction of the heavy payload ICBM's, for example, or precluding American systems that would seem especially attractive to us while not precluding any systems of their own that they are particularly interested in.

If the Soviets behave in this way and they are confronting an American administration that is determined not to allow the Soviets to retain one-sided advantages, then I suspect those negotiations may go on for quite a long while. If one supposes that the next administration may be a continuation of the present administration, or a new administration that may be willing to continue those kinds of Soviet advantages as the price for getting an early agreement, then we may have an earlier agreement.

My sense is that even some people in the administration who have been the architects of SALT II, and who are favorable to it and are promoting it as best they can, are very pessimistic about early major achievements in the next round of negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Panofsky?

Mr. PANOFSKY. I have confidence that both substantial numerical reductions will be negotiable and also that limitations on the rate of test firing of missiles will be negotiable. I consider the latter to be probably the most powerful tool in terms of dampening down the concern of vulnerability of the land-based deterrent.

I have much less confidence at what point of reduction of central systems the Soviets will insist on coupling any reduction with gray area systems. I believe it would be a great advantage if we could continue to negotiate reduction of central systems by 20, 30, or 40 percent before also fully negotiating the gray area question because the gray area question negotiations would surely complicate the negotiation process and stretch it out.

I am more concerned with when and how that transition will occur rather than whether reductions will become negotiable. I believe, in the next decade, reductions possibly as much as 50 percent will become negotiable.

The CHAIRMAN. There is another vote, gentlemen. I am going to have to call the hearing to a close.

BASING MODE OF THE M-X

Could we have a very brief answer before I have to leave on the President's decision with respect to the basing mode of the M-X? Do any of you have any strong feelings about that one way or the other?

Mr. BRENNAN. Not I.

Ambassador WARNKE. Let me say, Mr. Chairman, that I believe the M-X has to be considered on its military merits. It has to be considered in terms of whether this is the best way to improve the survival of our forces. From the arms control standpoint it is completely consistent with SALT.

I believe I was questioned in detail when I testified on July 16 as to whether a particular type of mobile basing of the M-X would be inconsistent with SALT. I can tell you and the committee that this system conforms in every respect with the requirements of SALT and conforms in every respect with what we told the Soviets would be permitted under the terms of SALT.

[Additional questions submitted for the record follows:]

AMBASSADOR WARNKE'S RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Question 1. In your view, how do the Soviets view the SALT process? Is there any mutuality of goals and interests between the United States and the Soviet Union in SALT? If not, what does that imply about the prospects of desirable SALT outcomes?

Answer. In my view, the Soviets view the SALT process as a means of lessening the risk of strategic nuclear war and thus protecting their national security. There is, I believe, a considerable mutuality of goals and interests between the United States and the Soviet Union in SALT, including not only a common interest in national survival but also a common concern about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which would be significantly encouraged by a failure of the United States and the Soviet Union to take steps to bring their own nuclear arms under control. In addition, it seems clear that the Soviets recognize that, although success in SALT won't automatically bring about more useful relations between the two countries, it is a prerequisite to any improvement in relations.

Question 2. What, in your view, will be the relative bargaining positions of the two sides in SALT III as a consequence of the SALT II agreement, assuming the Treaty is ratified along its current lines?

Answer. The ratification of the SALT II Treaty along its current lines will give the United States a very strong relative bargaining position in SALT III. As stated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff last July, SALT II contains "important restrictions which operate primarily to our benefit", while at the same time "the specific limits on the United States are quite nominal." Our ability to proceed with the modernization of each part of our nuclear deterrent triad, the fact that we can test ground launched and sea launched missiles at any range during the Protocol period and that there are no restrictions on such cruise missiles after 1981, are among the things that give us substantial bargaining leverage.

Question 3. What impact could ratification of the SALT II agreement have on other arms control efforts, in particular the CTB and MBFR negotiations, and on the effort to control the spread of nuclear weapons?

Answer. The SALT II agreement is the cornerstone of our arms control efforts. If after almost seven years of negotiations it were to be rejected, I see no possibility of progress in the Comprehensive Test Ban negotiations and Mutual Balance Force Reduction negotiations for the foreseeable future. Our rejection of SALT would also contravene our commitment under Article VI of the Non-proliferation Treaty to take prompt steps to control and reduce United States and Soviet nuclear arms. It would deprive us of any effective moral suasion in discouraging other countries from acquiring nuclear weapons capability. It could lead to wide-spread defections from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, when it comes up for review in June of next year.

Question 4. What are likely Soviet goals and objectives for SALT III?

Answer. The likely Soviet goals and objectives for SALT III will be to persuade the United States to accept restrictions on those developments that they regard as most threatening, such as greater counterforce and the amplification of our long-range theatre nuclear capability. These Soviets concerns are major reasons for the strong relative bargaining position that we will have in SALT III. It will be important to make it clear that we will accept such restrictions only in return for significant reductions in the Soviet MIRVed ICBM force and such theatre nuclear weapons as the SS-20 medium-range ballistic missile and the Backfire bomber.

Question 5. You support the idea of a Senate resolution setting goals for SALT III, but you recommend that it be general and not tie the hands of the negotiators. In view of past performance, why shouldn't the Senate make clear the specific arms control goals against which it will evaluate a future agreement? What do you believe the Senate should do to improve the prospects for real arms control in SALT III?

Answer. I believe that a Senate resolution setting goals for SALT III should be cast in quite general terms because I do not believe it is possible for the Senate to pre-negotiate the major parts of SALT III. The attempt to do so would deprive the U.S. negotiators of the necessary bargaining flexibility; any numerical ceilings would, in effect, become floors and frustrate the chances of more significant reductions. In addition, such specificity would in all likelihood be regarded by the Soviets as an attempt to prejudice arms-length bargaining and would thus provoke Soviet intransigence and similar insistence on pre-determined positions.

As for past negotiating performance, I think the SALT process can be faulted not in terms of the individual steps involved in SALT I and SALT II but rather in terms of the time it has taken to complete these steps. The most effective action the Senate could take to further progress toward arms control in SALT III would be the speedy ratification of SALT II, accompanied by an expression of the Senate's feeling of the urgency of achieving more substantial reductions and tighter qualitative controls.

Question 6. Mr. Warnke, in the past you have said that the SALT process gives each side a voice in the strategic force structure of the other. How has the United States been able to influence Soviet force structure in SALT I? In SALT II? Haven't the main deficiencies in the Soviet strategic force structure, such as their emphasis on ICBMs over SLBM's retention of heavy missiles, development of counterforce capabilities, buildup of throw-weight, persisted in spite of SALT?

Answer. The Interim Agreement on control of offensive arms which was a part of SALT I consisted essentially of a freeze on launchers of ICBM's and SLBM's. Even this limited agreement, however, affected the Soviet strategic force structure by preventing the addition of substantially more ICBM silos which, according to our estimates, would have been built in the absence of SALT I. Although the agreement expired by its terms in October of 1977, the Soviet undertaking to abide by its provisions pending SALT II entry into force has prevented additional Soviet ballistic missile submarines from being placed on sea trials. The SALT II Treaty will more significantly affect the Soviet strategic force structure by limiting all launchers of MIRVed ICBM's to 820 and launchers of MIRVed heavy ICBM's to 308. If SALT II were not to come into existence, our intelligence estimates are that there would be at least 100 more Soviet launchers of MIRVed ICBM's.

Limitations on verification are such that improvements in counterforce capabilities by both sides have not been considered susceptible to verifiable constraints in SALT II. However, the counterforce threat is reduced by provisions of SALT II that limit the number of reentry vehicles to the maximum tested on each type of ICBM and SLBM and by the ban on more than one new type of ICBM per side through 1985.

We would not, of course, have been able to trim from the respective force structures only those asymmetries that favor the Soviets while retaining the many more asymmetries that favor the United States.

Question 7. What do you think the Soviets would do if we sent the treaty back for renegotiation? Would that mean the collapse of SALT, or would the Soviets be compelled by their own stake in the process to renegotiate?

Answer. There is, I think, no chance that the Soviets would be willing to renegotiate the SALT II treaty so as to make it tougher on them without compensating additional restrictions on U.S. forces. Such an attempt unilaterally to renegotiate a treaty that is the product of hard bargaining would, in my opinion, mean the collapse of SALT. The Soviets, I am quite sure, would not be willing to concede, explicitly or implicitly, that they have a greater interest in the SALT process than we do.

Question 8. You have described SALT as a step-by-step process. What does this incrementalist concept imply for SALT III? Doesn't it mean that SALT III will also be another rather modest step, not a radical reversal of the arms race? Do you think the SALT process can survive another agreement like SALT I and II?

Answer. As I see it, an "incrementalist concept" is the only realistic concept for the SALT process. SALT I froze ICBM and SLBM launchers and paved the way for SALT II. SALT II sets equal aggregates, imposes subceilings and the first qualitative controls, and provides the basic definitions, procedures and verification measures for a continuing strategic arms limitation regime. Neither side appears ready for a SALT III agreement that would constitute a "radical reversal of the arms race."

The SALT process could not have survived without agreements like SALT I and SALT II. SALT III will build on the foundation they have laid and can produce deeper reductions and tighter controls.

Question 9. What was the negotiating history of the Joint Statement of Principles? Didn't the United States propose a rather specific set of goals for SALT III? Why, in your view, did the Soviets reject specific goals in favor of the very general objectives in the Joint Statement?

Answer. In proposing the Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for SALT III, the United States initially contemplated specific numerical limits and less general goals. On reconsideration, it was decided that negotiation of specific ceilings might actually limit the reductions that could be achieved and that the effort to spell out goals in detail would unduly delay completion of SALT II and commencement of SALT II negotiations.

Question 10. In your statement, you suggest that progress on central system issues in SALT III not be linked to agreement on theater nuclear issues. In effect, you argue that these two sets of issues should proceed independently within the overall SALT framework. Do you believe this is feasible? Won't the Soviets attempt to link resolution of TNF issues to central system issues, especially deep reductions whether we like it or not? Isn't your approach the equivalent of conducting separate negotiations on TNF? Won't that lead to perceptions of a Eurostrategic balance, with all the decoupling problems that implies?

Answer. My statement suggested that finalization of agreement on an important issue or related set of issues should not be postponed because of the fact that not all other items on the SALT III negotiating agenda had yet been resolved. I do not argue that the various sets of issues should proceed at separate times and places and hence do not advocate separate negotiations on TNF. For example, all theatre nuclear issues need not necessarily be resolved in a single package. Some controls over the longer-range gray area systems might in fact accompany further central system reductions.

I do not believe it would be useful to try to decide in advance what breakdown of issues might prove possible. What I do suggest is that we should seize the opportunity to put into effect further meaningful measures of strategic nuclear arms control when and as the sides have been able to come to agreement on them.

Question 11. Why is there such stress on the land-based ICBM leg of the Triad? Little mention is ever made of the sea-and airborne legs of the Triad. Should we just disregard these other two legs in assessing whether we have a good deterrent force?

Answer. As I see it, there is such stress on the land-based ICBM leg of the Triad because this is where the preponderance of Soviet strategic strength is concentrated. Whereas we have diversified our strategic forces about equally among our land, sea and air launchers, almost three-fourths of the Soviet strategic nuclear resources are in their land-based force. Critics of SALT therefore score debating points by comparing this three-fourths of the Soviet force with the less than one-third of our strategic nuclear capability which resides in our land-based ICBM launchers.

In my opinion, the U.S. strategic decisions that led to our maintenance and modernization of the sea and airborne legs as equally important parts of our Triad were sound and gave us the more survivable deterrent force. The upgrading of these two legs permitted by SALT II will further improve the least vulnerable components of our deterrent. Our Trident missiles, with greatly increased range, will preclude any ASW threat for the foreseeable future and will minimize command and control problems. The unlimited range cruise missiles permitted on our strategic bomber force will ensure the penetration capability of the airborne leg.

These two legs should not be disregarded. They, in fact, buttress the survivability of our land-based ICBM leg by making it clear to a potential adversary that an attempted preemptive first strike against our ICBM silos would be futile because of our assuredly survivable retaliatory capability.

Dr. Wolfgang Panofsky's Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for the Record

Question 1. In your view, how do the Soviets view the SALT process? Is there any mutuality of goals and interests between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in SALT? If not, what does that imply about the prospects of desirable SALT outcome?

Answer. I have no direct knowledge of "the Soviet view" on the SALT process or on specific SALT issues. However, I am persuaded from personal contacts, the negotiating record, and Soviet writings that the Soviets view SALT as a highly desirable element of their future security. The Soviets clearly share the justified concern with the United States on the increasing burdens and dangers of nuclear weapons. The economic load on the Soviet budget of procuring and operating their

strategic nuclear systems is considerably higher than that on the United States. Quite apart from the specific technical objectives of the SALT process the evolving political context has made SALT a test of the viability of the continuing policies of the Brezhnev administration.

Thus there is a mutuality of goals and interest between the United States and the Soviet Union in respect to SALT as far as reducing the dangers and burdens of nuclear armaments is concerned, but there remain conflicting interests between the United States and Soviet Union in many other areas. There never has been explicit agreement between the Soviets and the United States on strategic policies and doctrine, although the recent gradual shift of emphasis from deterrent to counter-force policies on the part of the United States gives the appearance of greater similarity in this respect. However, as pointed out in my testimony, the physical consequences of nuclear war fought under any doctrine are awesome and tend to be similar. For this reason both nations have recognized that avoiding initiation of nuclear war is a matter of overriding consideration. Thus the shared common interests in progress of the SALT process take priority over the dissimilar goals and objectives of the two nations; therefore a positive outcome of SALT serves the interests of both.

Question 2. What, in your view, will be the relative bargaining positions of the two sides in SALT III as a consequence of the SALT II agreement, assuming the Treaty is ratified along its current lines?

Answer. If SALT II is not ratified along the current lines, then there will be no SALT III in the predictable future. Therefore the inverse of the question, namely what the relative bargaining position of the two sides would be if SALT II were not ratified, has no answer. The terms of SALT II have indeed yielded a basis for a better U.S. bargaining position for future arms control agreements than would uncontrolled expansion in strategic weapons. SALT II will have significantly arrested the momentum of the current Soviet buildup. At the same time programs such as deployment of the air-launched cruise missile, the Trident submarine, and various modernization programs undertaken by the United States are in no way impeded by SALT. MX and its "racetrack deployment" is compatible with SALT II. Although no final decision to deploy MX has been made since the program is only in engineering development, the future of MX is now unaffected by enactment of SALT II and will depend on progress of that engineering development and the evaluation of the Public, the Congress, and future Administrations of the merits of the program. In view of all the above, I believe that ratification of SALT II will strengthen the bargaining position of the United States in future arms control negotiations.

Question 3. What impact could ratification of the SALT II agreement have on other arms control efforts, in particular the CTB and MBFR negotiations, and on the effort to control the spread of nuclear weapons?

Answer. I am answering this question in a one-sided manner: If SALT II is not ratified, then negotiations on the CTB and MBFR in their present framework would become hopeless for the foreseeable future. Discussions on these topics may continue in such multilateral contexts as in the CCD in Geneva or in the United Nations, but progress under these circumstances would be extremely unlikely. Similarly, I would consider non-ratification of SALT II a very significant blow to the U.S. effort to control the spread of nuclear weapons. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) imposes, both in the Preamble and in specific provisions, a positive obligation on the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce their nuclear arsenals. Non-ratification of SALT II would thus contribute to the cynicism of non-nuclear weapons states on the sincerity of the U.S. and the Soviet Union to live up to their part of the obligations taken in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In a fundamental sense the Non-Proliferation Treaty aims to make a freeze of the non-nuclear weapons states in that status acceptable by persuading them that the nuclear weapons states are willing to reduce the inventories of the nuclear weapons and reduce the importance of nuclear weapons in the conduct of foreign affairs. Non-ratification of SALT II would strongly contravene that purpose.

Question 4. What are likely Soviet goals and objectives for SALT III?

Answer. I find it difficult to identify specific Soviet goals and objectives for SALT III beyond those agreed on in the "Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms." Stated Soviet goals and objectives for SALT III include genuine and substantial reductions of nuclear strategic systems. However, there is little question that the Soviet goals and objectives also include reintroduction of the Forward Based Systems (FBS) of the United States on the bargaining table. This, in turn, will lead to broadening of the SALT III negotiations to consideration of other long-range nuclear delivery systems designed for theatre use in Europe. I surmise, but have no definite evidence, that the Soviets share a common interest with the U.S. in decreasing the

vulnerability of their land-based deterrent ICBMs, which comprise about three-fourths of their retaliatory striking power.

Question 5. You recommend a goal of "phased reductions" of about 50 percent in the overall aggregate for SALT III. What do you mean by "phased restrictions"? Over what period would such reductions take place? Would reductions of this magnitude be negotiable? How would such extensive reductions affect the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over our allies?

Answer. By phased reduction I mean a decrease in the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) on an agreed-upon schedule. As emphasized in my testimony, I do not consider it feasible or desirable to establish the specific schedule desired by the United States before commencement of negotiations. However, I consider the goal of reducing the totality of SNDVs by, perhaps, 50 percent during a period of less than 10 years to be reasonable and negotiable. I recommended that, in the interest of strategic stability, reductions be negotiated not only in the overall aggregates, but also in the subcategories of central strategic systems as now identified in SALT II. I also specifically recommended that the "phasing", that is the schedule of reduction, should not be the same for each of the SALT II categories. Specifically, the schedule of reductions for MIRVd land-based ICBMs should be more rapid than that of the overall aggregate.

Such a scheme of phased reduction should be negotiable but divergent positions are likely to be taken by the Soviet Union and the United States in entering negotiations on the specific time table of reductions. Moreover, the Soviet Union will take the position that once reductions have exceeded a specified amount, then the United States' Forward Based Systems must also become targets for reduction. I recommend, however, that an object of U.S. negotiating strategy should be to agree on the first steps of the reduction schedule before the entire matter of reductions in long-range European theatre systems has been agreed upon. The reason for this recommendation is that the negotiating process would become unduly long and involved if both the European theatre systems question and the initial phases of reductions of SNDVs be tied into an indivisible package.

The credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella is not as much affected by the specific numbers of nuclear delivery systems, but by the faith of the Allies that the U.S. has a credible potential to initiate a strategic nuclear attack against the Soviet Union without incurring unacceptable risks. As has recently been pointed out by many authors, the credibility of the nuclear umbrella has already eroded substantially since effective strategic parity has been reached by the Soviet Union, replacing the unquestioned U.S. nuclear superiority of the 1960's. Once parity at any substantial level of nuclear weapons is achieved, then the credibility of the nuclear umbrella will erode. One should note again that currently the levels of strategic nuclear weapons on both sides is so large that a large majority of them are targeted against installations of limited military or economic value. Therefore, reductions on both sides which maintain the relative parity of the two powers will not affect the credibility of the nuclear deterrent significantly.

Question 6. You advocate, in the context of deep reductions and qualitative constraints, the prohibition of mobile ICBMs. This could kill the MX program; do you agree? Some would argue that mobiles, being more survivable, are stabilizing. Why do you want to ban mobiles while permitting the retention of a few hundred fixed ICBMs?

Answer. I am advocating, in the context of deep reductions and qualitative constraints, the prohibition of mobile ICBMs because I conclude that a continuing contest between the Soviet Union and the U.S. in mobile ICBMs will in the long run work to the detriment of U.S. security.

I agree that land-based ICBMs might superficially be considered stabilizing and would, on the face of it, constitute a means to extend the time during which land-based ICBMs are survivable. However, this is only true provided the location of the mobile ICBMs remains truly unknown to the enemy, and this in turn requires deception, concealment, and use of large areas of land for military purposes, all of which are assets in which the closed society of the Soviet Union is superior to ours. Accordingly, I predict that in the long run a competition in land-based mobile ICBMs would work to the detriment of U.S. security. I therefore specifically recommend that the matter of vulnerability of the land-based deterrent be faced by other means than deployment of mobile ICBMs and that the qualitative constraints and reductions of SALT III be specifically designed to improve survivability of land-based ICBMs. I will discuss the relationship of this recommendation to the M-X program in my reply to Question 10.

Question 7. Deep reductions would, as you state, increase the relative significance of "gray area systems", which you believe should be involved in SALT III. Won't we have to concede a great deal on gray area systems—FBS, cruise missiles, allied

systems—to get Soviet agreement to deep reductions? How would this affect NATO security and our relations with the Allies? If we insist on linking our FBS and cruise missiles to Soviet theatre systems, do you believe the Soviets will agree to deep reductions in their central systems?

Answer. I believe it is unavoidable that consideration of gray area systems will enter into SALT III. The expressed Soviet position, that deep reductions of central strategic systems increase the relative military importance of U.S. controlled weapons systems in Europe which can strike the Soviet Union, has merit. Therefore, once such reductions are proposed, long-range European nuclear delivery systems must be discussed in some context, be it SALT, MBFR, or some other forum. Separating negotiations on long-range theatre nuclear systems from SALT would raise the concern in NATO circles that the United States is considering the "Euro-strategic balance" as an issue separate from U.S. strategic systems. This would raise the spectre of decoupling the U.S./U.S.S.R. strategic balance from the European theatre. In turn, this would lower European confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella still further.

I see no reason why one should presume that the United States would make excessive concessions in a negotiation of gray area systems. Indeed, FBS, ground-launched, and sea-launched cruise missiles, and possibly other Allied systems, would be on the bargaining table, but so would the Soviet SS-20, the Backfire, and Soviet IRBMs now threatening Western Europe. Reduction in the overall level of these combined forces would clearly be welcomed by the Allies. Even now it is proving extremely difficult to persuade the Allies to permit on their soil U.S.-controlled nuclear systems which can strike the Soviet Union. The Allies seem to be fully aware of the fact that any use of nuclear weapons in Europe would imply enormous collateral civilian deaths and other damage in Europe. Thus a limitation, and hopefully balanced reduction in nuclear theatre weapons of both sides would be in their interest.

The Soviets may well agree to deep reductions in their central strategic systems in balance with deep reductions in U.S. central systems, provided the total level of European theatre systems (including U.S. and Soviet systems) is also reduced. Here again both parties share a common overriding interest in reducing the dangers inherent in the continuing deployment of what are essentially unusable systems. Needless to say, the Soviets will attempt to strike the best bargain in their favor in the actual details of these negotiations, and we must do our best to strike the best bargain in the interests of U.S. security. It is destructive and unsupported by the negotiating history of SALT I and SALT II to personnel that U.S. negotiators will be out-maneuvered in such a situation.

Question 8. Your notion of a cutoff of production of fissionable materials for military purposes would be a completely new element in SALT. Would you elaborate on how such a cutoff would work and the impact it might have on the forces and programs of both sides?

Answer. A cutoff on the production of fissionable material for military purposes has been a proposal made by the United States several times in the past. I suggested in my testimony that this proposal be re-introduced as part of the SALT III framework. However, I would recommend that this item not be incorporated into a SALT III "package" but be negotiated separately on its own merit, possibly as an amendment or Protocol. A cutoff of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes is a meaningful arms control step and would be relatively easy to verify and put into action. Verification would consist of placing U.S. and Soviet military production reactors under IAEA safeguards with due regard for the need for specific materials required for the maintenance of the weapons stockpiles of the two sides. Procedures have been studied in the past and found practical to take care of this latter concern.

Such a cutoff would place a ceiling on the total stockpiles of fissionable materials both sides would have available for configuring their nuclear strategic and tactical forces, and both sides would be compelled to manage that limited stockpile in their own military interests. As a practical matter, on the U.S. side, such a cutoff would force some choices within the overall deployment of MIRVd strategic warheads on land and sea, expansion of the total number of cruise missiles carried by aircraft, and possible reintroduction of defensive nuclear warheads. On the Soviet side it is believed that such a cutoff might force limits on increased fractionation of MIRVd missiles (thus supplementing the controls of SALT II) as well as limiting the number of defensive warheads (as limited in the case of ABM through SALT I, but unlimited in the case of air defense missiles at present). As a result such a cutoff would offer advantages to both sides by setting limits to the "worst case" projections which an intelligence analyst could foresee. For obvious reasons I cannot discuss

here the details of the impact of such a cutoff on specific programs and forces of both sides, but this matter has been extensively studied in the past.

Probably the greatest impact of a production cutoff of fissionable materials for military purposes, combined with placing military production reactors under IAEA safeguards would be in connection with proliferation of nuclear weapons. Placing both military production and civilian power reactors under IAEA safeguards removes one of the most onerous discriminatory provisions between the nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapons states under the NPT.

Question 9. You support the idea of a Senate resolution setting goals for SALT III, but you recommend that it be general and not tie the hands of the negotiators. In view of past performance, why shouldn't the Senate make clear the specific arms control goals against which it will evaluate a future agreement? What do you believe the Senate should do to improve the prospects for real arms control in SALT III?

Answer. I recommended a Senate resolution setting goals for SALT III without specific numerical targets in order not to tie the hands of our negotiators. This recommendation was based on the realities of the negotiating process and the past record of that process. An essential element of arms control negotiations is to allow for flexibility in mutual concessions which do not profoundly affect the net security interests of the two nations. A frequent criticism of SALT II, which I consider merited, is that the Treaty, the preceding negotiations and the subsequent ratification debate have given excessive emphasis to the detailed "numerology" of the nuclear arms competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. As has been amply developed in testimony before this Committee, many factors are not easily quantifiable such as geographic differences, the sturdiness of command and control, the reliability and qualitative performance of strategic systems, and ultimately the leadership and decision-making process and the national will of each side. Such factors would control the outcome of a nuclear conflict, at least as much as the numbers of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the contestants. Moreover, the total number of nuclear systems is now so large that a large fraction of them are targeted against installations of limited military and economic value.

All this adds up to the conclusion that the value of the specific numbers of permitted systems in a negotiated arms control agreement has been highly exaggerated. If the Senate adopted specific numerical targets this would aggravate further this already false public perception and would give such numerical targets a political significance unwarranted by their military and other security importance.

I recommend that a Senate resolution designed to genuinely improve arms control in SALT III should proclaim that the Senate will measure the merit of a future agreement by evaluating whether the dangers and burdens of nuclear armaments are greater or smaller after conclusion of a SALT III agreement than they were prior to the inception of the SALT process.

Question 10. You have heard the President's decision on the "race-track" concept for the mobile basing mode for M-X. Would you comment on the compatibility of such a basing scheme with the provisions of SALT II, and the possible implications of such a concept? What consequences do you think a mobile M-X along the lines the President has chosen might have for the future of arms control?

Answer. I conclude that the basic scheme proposed by the President for the mobile based M-X is compatible with SALT II. The President's proposal meets the requirement of being verifiable in that the number of launchers in the system can be counted by National Technical Means. I also conclude that the mobile based mode proposed by the President, if deployed, would leave no ambiguity that the TEL (Transporter-Erector-Launcher) is the launcher, while the missiles and decoys are not the objects to be counted under the rules of SALT II. The M-X and its ten warheads meet the SALT II limits on missile size and the fractionation limits on the number of reentry vehicles.

The above comments certify to the compatibility of the M-X and its proposed basing scheme with the provisions of SALT II. These comments are independent of my views as to whether this scheme is a cost-effective solution to the problem of Minuteman vulnerability, or in general is an optimal use of resources available to augment the arsenal of strategic weapons for the United States. I believe that the Senate has an obligation to examine that question through the regular military authorization and appropriations processes and I would be pleased to offer testimony in that respect, if requested.

Engineering development of the mobile basing mode as such along the lines the President has chosen does not have a substantial effect on the future of arms control in itself. I do, however, believe that the choice of the size and accuracy of the M-X system has a destabilizing effect in that it further enhances the incentive to preempt in case of crisis.

I do not consider the specific M–X basing scheme to be the best choice for providing a survivable basing mode for a follow-on system to Minuteman. The time scale of deployment of M–X is such that it would not assure, even if it worked with perfect security and performance, survival of the land-based component of the U.S. strategic missile forces against the Soviet threat faced in the early 1980's until the very end of that decade, several years after the expiration date of SALT II. During that time other systems, superior to the proposed scheme, could be developed if there were a decision to do so expediently.

Question 11. Why is there such stress on the land-based ICBM leg of the Triad? Little mention is ever made of the sea and airborne legs of the Triad. Should we just disregard these other two legs in assessing whether we have a good deterrent force?

Answer. I believe that the stress on the land-based ICBM leg of the triad which has emerged during the testimony before this Committee is unwarranted. The main reason such emphasis has been given is because the land-based leg is endangered on both sides by the emergence of accurate, highly MIRVd missiles. I would like to note that this vulnerability was envisaged well over a decade ago; when decisions were made to deploy Minuteman it was not believed that the system would remain forever an invulnerable part of the deterrent. Concern about the vulnerability of the land-based leg of the deterrent should be shared between the United States and the Soviet Union. It should be noted that the United States has about 25 percent of its retaliatory warheads in land-based ICBMs, while the Soviet Union has about 75 percent of their retaliatory power so deployed. It is indeed true that calculations predict that during the first few years of the next decade a very large fraction of the U.S. land-based Minuteman force can be destroyed by Soviet preemptive attack. It can be similarly shown that about one-half of the Soviet ICBM forces can be destroyed. Although the entire land-based ICBM leg of the triad of the United States will be at risk, while only one-half of the Soviet land-based ICBM component is endangered, the latter represents destruction of a larger fraction of the total megatonnage available for retaliation. For this reason both nations face this problem, but the Soviet concern will justifiably be heightened as U.S. deployment of "silo killers" is increased, as will be the case through M–X.

On the U.S. side the threat against land-based ICBMs affects only 25 percent of the deterrent and the survival of the balance of the SLBMs and airborne deterrent, including ALCM, is, of course, very important. The matter of vulnerability of these other components of the triad is a complex issue. It is generally believed, and I concur, that no foreseeable threat against the SLBM leg of the triad exists during the coming decade which would deny retaliation by more than a small fraction of our submarines. The matter is more complex in respect to the retaliatory systems depending on strategic aircraft. These face problems with pre-launch survivability, should a substantial number of U.S.S.R. submarines approach our shore and fire SLBMs on short flight time, depressed trajectories. It is for this reason that I recommend serious consideration of a minimum standoff distance for SLBMs from shore, and a ban on testing of SLBMs in depressed trajectories to become a part of the SALT III negotiations. In addition I recommend rapid implementation of the often proposed program to base a large fraction of strategic aircraft further inland.

It has been frequently pointed out that it is difficult even conceptually for an enemy to attack both airfields and ICBM silos. The reason is that the missile flight time from Soviet silos to U.S. ICBM sites is about half an hour, while the flight time from enemy submarines to attack U.S. bombers successfully before almost all of them can escape has to be well under 15 minutes. Accordingly, if enemy missiles designed to destroy both airplanes and land-based ICBMs are to arrive simultaneously, then the longer flight time of attacking ICBMs will generate an additional 15 minutes of advance warning time, which permits all the U.S. aircraft to escape safely. Conversely, if enemy SLBMs and ICBMs are being launched simultaneously, then U.S. ICBMs can be launched in retaliation on receipt of information that a substantial fraction of U.S. bombers has been destroyed by enemy attack. Thus ICBMs and airplanes each constitute a symbiotic, mutually reinforcing arm of the U.S. deterrent. In principle this mutually reinforcing relationship can be impaired by a so-called pindown attack. A pindown attack consists of missiles from Soviet submarines fired at U.S. ICBM fields creating a nuclear environment which makes it impossible for U.S. ICBMs to survive during the launch phase. If such an environment is created for the 15-minute flight time differential referred to above, then in principle both the airborne and land-based ICBM arm of the deterrent can be successfully attacked together. However, such a combined threat is extremely difficult to manage even conceptually, let alone operationally. Moreover such a combined attack would require the prior presence of a large number of Soviet submarines offshore, which will surely not go undetected or unchalleged, leading to a higher alert status of our bombers.

In addition to pre-launch survivability one is, of course, also concerned with penetration. Due to the strictures of SALT I which ban any militarily significant ABM system, there is little question that the reentry vehicles launched by the SLBMs will penetrate into enemy territory. The bomber force can either operate as penetrators or as a platform for air-launched cruise missiles. Currently the Air Force has confidence that a large fraction of B-52's can pentrate enemy defenses. In addition air-launched cruise missiles are assured penetration through present Soviet defenses. I have confidence that should Soviet defenses be augmented further, that in an offense/defense race between air-launched cruise missiles and increased air defense the cruise missiles will prevail.

On the basis of the above discussion I conclude that even once the land-based ICBM leg of the triad becomes vulnerable the other two arms constitute a formidable deterrent. In fact, the Committee should be reminded that the very reason for adopting a triad mode of deterrence was to permit possible failure of one of the legs without unduly denying U.S. deterrent capability.

An argument is frequently made that it is absolutely essential to preserve the land-based ICBM component of the triad because its specific characteristics are essential and cannot be compensated for by increases in the other legs. This statement is, to a limited extent, correct. The land-based ICBM force is characterized by a number of assets as follows: (a) sturdy command and control; (b) long endurance; (c) ability to hit "time-urgent" targets; (d) potential to develop high accuracy; (e) independence from warning.

If it is deemed essential to maintain all these assets in a single weapons system, then indeed the present ICBM's must be replaced by a similar system which is more survivable. I disagree with this conclusion on two counts. The first is that it is not clear that a confident replacement is physically possible. While the proposed M-X basing mode assures survivability under certain assumptions, the associated disadvantages outweigh this gain. Moreover, other systems, for instance air-launched ICBM's and augmentation of the submarine-based retaliatory forces by small, near-shore submarines, can amply compensate in aggregate for the loss caused by the unavoidable deterioration of the survivability of land-based ICBM's.

For all the above reasons I agree that the stress during testimony before this Committee on the land-based ICBM leg of the triad has been excessive. At any rate the vulnerability of land-based ICBM's is an issue not related at all to the merits of ratification of SALT II, since none of the measures relating to compensating for the increased vulnerability as discussed here are inhibited by SALT II.

Mr. Donald Brennan's Answers to Additional Questions Submitted for the Record

Question 1. In your view, how do the Soviets view the SALT process? Is there any mutuality of goals and interests between the United States and the Soviet Union in SALT? If not, what does that imply about the prospects of desirable SALT outcomes?

Answer. The Soviets undoubtedly view the SALT process from a considerably different perspective than that common in American arms-control circles. I believe that the Soviets, at least so far, have been interested in the SALT process primarily as a political tool to inhibit American strategic programs very substantially, while interfering very little with their own strategic programs. It is, thus, a process for helping them achieve an increasing degree of strategic superiority. So far as I can see, conceptions of common interest play little role in the Soviet view of the SALT. There is thus very little mutuality of goals and interests between ourselves and the Soviets. This implies that the prospects of desirable outcomes in the SALT are very poor, unless and until Soviet views change substantially.

Question 2. What, in your view, will be the relative bargaining positions of the two sides in SALT III as a consequence of the SALT II agreement, assuming the treaty is ratified along its current lines?

Answer. The SALT II agreement, if ratified, will have cemented a number of Soviet advantages, including their unilateral right to heavy-payload ICBM's, a potentially important bomber force with strategic capabilities that is not counted under the ceilings, and restriction on systems of much greater potential importance to us than to the Soviets. There is utterly no reason to expect that the Soviets will give up such advantages except to return for an outcome that would appear even more favorable to them. Since we have no programs in prospect during the lifetime of SALT II, with the partial and limited exceptions of M-X and ALCM, that would significantly worsen the circumstances for the Soviets, we shall have very little bargaining power to persuade the Soviets to agree to programs that would provide better balanced Soviet and American postures.

Question 3. What impact could ratification of the SALT II agreement have on other arms control efforts, in particular the CTB and MBFR negotiations, and on the effort to control the spread of nuclear weapons?

Answer. There would be relatively little effect of the SALT II agreement on the CTB, and what effect it would have would result primarily from domestic political considerations in the United States. It appears that the Administration is reluctant at this time to pursue a CTB while SALT II is under consideration in the Senate. So far as ratification of SALT II would have an effect on the spread of nuclear weapons, I believe the effect would most likely be bad. This is because the countries most likely to be next into the nuclear "club" are candidates for admission primarily because of security reasons, rather than prestige considerations. Such candidate countries include Taiwan, South Korea, Pakistan, and Israel. The best way of keeping these particular candidates from explicitly joining the "club" is to provide them with a sense of security, while ratification of SALT II will be widely read in these countries as further evolution of American weakness. In potential nuclear-weapon states such as Brazil, where prestige and other political considerations would likely dominate any decision for a national nuclear-weapon program, the effect of ratifying SALT II would be likely to be wholly negligible. The MBFR negotiations are most unlikely to produce significant results, whatever happens to SALT II.

Question 4. What are likely Soviet goals and objectives for SALT III?

Answer. To consolidate, and if possible to strengthen, the dramatic improvement in their strategic nuclear position, without stirring up the United States to a degree that would result in the substantial weakening of their overall gain.

Question 5. You have heard the President's decision on the "racetrack" concept for the mobile basing mode for M–X. Would you comment on the compatibility of such a basing scheme with the provisions of SALT II, and the possible implications of such a concept for SALT III? What consequences do you think a mobile M–X along the lines the President has chosen might have for the future of arms control?

Answer. This concept has a kind of "Rube Goldberg" quality. However, it does seem compatible with the provisions of SALT II. I know of no implications for SALT III that are specific to the "racetrack" concept, although there are important implications for SALT III in the development of any ICBM that can be launched from a cannister. Soviet development of systems of this kind will pose severe and possibly insuperable verification problems.

Question 6. You contend the 308 Soviet MLBMs give them a major advantage in MIRVed ICBM payload. If this is of major military significance, why do you believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided against building heavy missiles for the U.S.? The Treaty also prohibits mobile heavy missiles, which suggests further lack of interest by the Joint Chiefs in having a heavy ICBM. Do you believe the Chiefs are wrong, and we should have retained the right to a mobile heavy ICBM?

Answer. As I pointed out in my prepared statement, "the larger significance of the larger-yield weapons resides in the additional fallout fatalities they would produce." By and large, it has not been an American strategic planning objective to kill Russians with fallout radiation, and this fact alone would mean that the military advantage I imputed to the heavy Soviet ICBM's would not loom as a major attraction to American planners. However, two additional points should be noted. First, since the signing of SALT I, it has not appeared that "heavy" ICBM's were going to be allowed in the American strategic force, so little consideration has been given to this possibility. Second, I observe that when the Defense Department did decide to deploy a new ICBM, specifically the M–X, they chose approximately the heaviest-payload ICBM that would be allowed to us under the SALT constraints. There was indeed a lack of interest on the part of the Chiefs in a mobile heavy ICBM, I presume in large degree because of the engineering difficulties of producing and protecting such a system; the M–X is already a major engineering project as a mobile ICBM. In connection with this question, I should recall the point made in my statement (in connection with the 308 heavy ICBM's) that "this guaranteed margin would be of political significance even if its military significance were doubtful", and the major political significance is embodied in the point in my statement that: "This Treaty will strengthen Soviet beliefs—already too strong—that they constitute the wave of the future, that they have increasing military preponderance, and that the United States is increasingly unwilling to stand up to them, even at the level of insisting on *a mere paper equality* of allowed forces" (emphasis added).

Question 7. In your statement you say that a 200-missile M–X force would give the Soviets only 200 "real" targets to shoot at. If we deploy M–X in a mobile basing mode that proliferates aimpoints wouldn't the Soviets have to target all 4,600 or more of the aimpoints?

Answer. Perhaps, perhaps not. Let me recall the point in my statement was that "the M-X deployment would give the Soviets only 200 real targets to 'shoot' at, either before launch, during launch, or for a short time after launch . . .". Taking the later phases first, some active defense systems (ABM) may become feasible in the future that would permit attacking an ICBM during its boost phase, or attacking the bus shortly after boost before it had dispensed its several warheads, rather than attacking the separate warheads in their terminal phase. It is obvious without further explanation why the M-X system would provide only 200 "real" targets for such defense systems to shoot at. An ICBM system with 2,000 boosters would greatly complicate the problems of such a defense, which is not a remote possibility. As for attacks before launch, many analysts are apprehensive of possible weaknesses in a multiple-aimpoint mobile basing scheme. The Soviets may possibly find means of identifying which shelter contains the ICBM, in any of these "shell-game" schemes, by any of several possible techniques. It should be noted that these apprehensions tend to be greatest for the physically largest missiles we might deploy, such as the proposed M-X. Obviously, the Air Force and all others concerned with the M-X project will work assiduously at making it difficult for the Soviets to identify which shelters have real targets, but some doubt will always remain, and there will always be the possibility that the Soviets will find some technical means for identifying the real targets so that they alone could be attacked before launch.

Question 8. Your hypothetical force of 2,000 "M-Y" ICBM's would complicate Soviet targeting by giving them 2,000 "real" targets to cover. Would your "M-Y" be fixed or mobile? If it were mobile, why would it be preferable over 200 M-X with 2,000 RV's? If it were fixed, wouldn't it face exactly the same vulnerability problem of the Minuteman force, but on a larger scale?

Answer. I did not discuss basing modes for the MY ICBM system in my statement. One might, for example, use some form of multiple-aimpoint system such as that envisaged for the M-X, in which, say, 20 shelters would be provided per booster. This would provide 40,000 aimpoints. The unit costs of these would be considerably cheaper and the systems for making the missiles mobile would be substantially simpler (the missiles themselves being perhaps only one-tenth the weight and volume of the M-X), and the real missiles would be more difficult to detect, other things being equal. For the near future, it would probably not be necessary to use as many as 20 aimpoints per missile. It is likely that some combination of active ABM defense together with some form of mobility would probably provide the best overall security, on a cost-effectiveness basis, but detailed studies to determine approximately what an "optimum" configuration would consist of have not been carried out.

Question 9. You urge two modifications of the Treaty if it is to be ratified: Each heavy ICBM should count as two (although the RV limit could be doubled to 20), and our B-52's should not be counted, as an offset to Backfire's exclusion from the aggregates.

(a) What would be the value of counting each heavy ICBM as two if it could carry double the number of RV's? Isn't it the number of RV's and accuracy that pose the threat—not the number of missiles?

(b) If we did not count our B-52's as compensation for Backfire, don't you think the Soviets would at a minimum insist on dropping the 30 per year production constraints? What else might they demand in exchange?

Answer. (a) It would reduce the maximum total payload of the Soviet MIRVed ICBM force to that which would be allowed them if they could deploy only 820 light ICBM's. In accordance with the discussion of this point in my statement, it would reduce the maximum yield available in that force by perhaps 2,000 megatons (which is over twice the total yield of our entire Minuteman force). The number and accuracy of weapons are not the only significant parameters. Perhaps the most important gain would consist of the elimination of the symbolic and political importance to the Soviets of those weapons. It is primarily for this reason that it is most unlikely that the Soviets would agree to this idea.

(b) If we were not constrained from producing additional B-52s, it would be reasonable to abandon production constraints on the Backfire.

In relation to both parts of Question 9, I should recall the point in my statement that "there is very little chance, in my view, that the Soviets would accept these changes under current circumstances, and, rather than seem to be taking refuge in such devices, I believe the forthright and proper action for the United States is to reject the Treaty outright."

Question 10. How would your payload reduction scheme constrain the technological competition? Wouldn't it simply channel the arms race into the direction of warhead miniaturization, improved propellants, lightweight materials and improved accuracy?

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Answer. The payload reduction scheme *per se* would not constrain technological competition. It would not "simply" channel the arms race into the direction indicated, first because such developments—other things being equal—would be taking place anyway, and second, because the reduction scheme envisaged would provide a very substantial reduction in capabilities in being, far more than could be compensated for—at least with respect to most plausible strategic-force objectives—by technological developments. In this connection, it should be noted that further major improvements in warhead miniaturization and yield beyond the level of technology already achieved in, say, the Trident I warhead, are not to be expected. (This is, of course, not to say that *no* improvements are possible.) I should point out that my payload-reduction scheme was intended to be the centerpiece of the negotiations, and I did not intend to suggest that other issues, such as constraints on some forms of testing, could not be included. Broadly speaking, if any specific technological constraints could sensibly be imposed in connection with any reduction scheme whatever, they would be compatible with this one.

Question 11. You conclude that the Soviets are not likely to agree to your scheme, nor to the modifications you believe necessary to make the SALT II Treaty acceptable. Do you believe that SALT process should simply be abandoned? What do you believe the strategic environment would be like without SALT?

Answer. To take the last question first, I lived through over twenty years of a strategic nuclear environment without any SALT constraints, and have so far lived through seven years of a strategic environment with some SALT constraints imposed, and my experience so far is that the latter environment has clearly been worse. However, I do not favor abandoning the SALT process. (I do favor changing the name and the acronym, but that is a minor matter.) I believe it remains true that we and the Soviets have a common interest in reducing the likelihood of war, most especially nuclear war, and in reducing the scope and violence of such a war if it occurs. However, the Soviets plainly do not see their interest in such objectives as comparable to their interest in maintaining a superior military position. I therefore believe the Soviets are not likely to accept sound and genuinely balanced constraints until they perceive that the United States is embarked on programs that may well return the Soviet Union to a position of inferiority. If this view of Soviet attitudes is correct, the Soviets will become reasonably tractable in negotiations only when they perceive alternatives—perhaps future alternatives, i.e., the forces need not be fully in being—that will seem worse to them.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I really have to leave. I am sorry. I want to thank you all for your testimony. We appreciate it very much.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:06 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 2 p.m., September 11, 1979.]

SALT II TREATY

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1979

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:20 p.m., in room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Church, Javits, Pell, Hayakawa, Lugar, and Helms.

The CHAIRMAN. This afternoon the committee will consider the issues in SALT II related to ICBM's. These issues can be grouped into four broad categories—first, heavy missiles and throw-weight; second, Minuteman vulnerability; third, mobile ICBM's and fourth, the new type of ICBM limits.

Some of the major questions which the committee is seeking answers to include, what are the implications of the right of the Soviets to have 308 heavy throw-weight ICBM launchers while the United States has no such right?

Will SALT II make solving the Minuteman vulnerability problem easier or more difficult?

Are the schemes devised to make the new U.S. M–X mobile ICBM's system verifiable by the Soviets adequate?

Will the new types limitations of SALT II actually limit the Soviets' fifth generation of ICBM's?

These are some difficult questions to which the committee must find the correct answers.

We have before us three witnesses with excellent backgrounds and long experience in areas related to the issues we are addressing. Mr. Jan Lodal worked with the Department of Defense Systems Analysis Group studying strategic systems. He was, from 1973 to 1975, Deputy for Program Analysis on the National Security Council's staff where SALT was one of his primary responsibilities.

Dr. Michael May was formerly director of the Lawrence-Livermore Laboratory, one of the two U.S. nuclear weapon development laboratories. He was, from 1974 to 1976, the Secretary of Defense representative for the SALT delegation following Paul Nitze. Recently he chaired the Defense Sciences Board's task force which reviewed M–X basing concepts.

Mr. Paul Nitze we will remember as Secretary of the Navy, Deputy Secretary of Defense and from 1969 to 1974, a member of the SALT delegation. Since 1974 he has written and spoken often on SALT and ICBM basing concepts.

Gentlemen, I would hope that you could each make a brief oral statement as planned and then we will have questions.

Mr. Lodal?

STATEMENT OF JAN LODAL, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, AMERICAN MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

Mr. LODAL. Thank you, Senator.

I would like to comment briefly on our primary topic today, land-based ICBM's and SALT II.

Our land-based ICBM's have important technical and military characteristics not found in the other components of our strategic forces. I believe that we should retain a land-based ICBM force and that it would be unwise to abandon our present Triad of land-based ICBM's, air-breathing bombers and cruise missiles and submarine launched ballistic missiles.

This is true despite the emerging vulnerability of fixed land-based ICBM's. Depending upon the nature of future United States-Soviet arms control agreements one might be able to reduce the numbers of our land-based ICBM's somewhat but I foresee no circumstances in which we could safely eliminate them altogether.

We need ICBM's to provide a capability to launch selective and limited attacks against military targets and land-based forces provide an important hedge against possible breakdowns in the more difficult command and control arrangements associated with bombers and submarines.

Our silo-based ICBM's have become an issue because we can now see the day when they will be theoretically vulnerable to Soviet attack. This vulnerability arises directly from two technological advances; the advent of independently retargetable reentry vehicles or MIRV's and the development of highly accurate ICBM guidance systems. Without MIRV's it takes at least one missile to destroy an opponent's missile.

Thus if the forces are of approximately equal size nothing can be gained by an attack. MIRV's change this calculation, permitting one missile to destroy several, provided the warheads have the accuracy necessary to hit their targets. Accuracy and not the yield or size of the warhead is the key to this capability. One cannot make up for any significant lack in accuracy with larger warheads or greater throw weight.

I can see no rationale for permitting the Soviets to maintain a unilateral counterforce capability against our silo-based missiles. One can make a theoretical argument that by increasing our own counterforce capability we increase the incentive a Soviet leader would have to launch a surprise attack. In practical terms I believe the situation would be otherwise. A Soviet leader would be less likely to risk escalating a political crisis in the first place if he realized his own forces were as much at risk as ours. His belief that he had a significant unilateral advantage could only fuel adventurism.

I support U.S. development and deployment of an improved land-based missile as well as the Mark 12A warhead on existing Minuteman III missiles.

I also support efforts to develop a new and more survivable basing mode for our land-based ICBM's. I do not believe that the formidable technical problems associated with the development of such a basing mode should delay proceeding with a new missile.

With respect to the missile itself I would have favored proceeding with a joint Air Force/Navy program to provide a missile for use either on the Trident submarine or on land, rather than with the Air Force only M-X program. This is not the key point. The key point is to develop the missile as opposed to doing nothing.

The best way to reduce the cost and uncertainties associated with a mutual buildup of United States and Soviet land-based forces would be to negotiate a significant reduction in land-based MIRV's in SALT. Such a negotiation should be in the Soviet's own interest since the emerging vulnerability of land-based ICBM's has a much greater effect on the Soviet Union than it does on the United States.

The Soviets have invested much more heavily in these systems. They have placed roughly 75 percent of their strategic nuclear capability in land-based ICBM's as compared to only about 25 percent for the United States.

Thus, unless the United States unilaterally abandons the ability to attack these Soviet military targets a step which I would strongly oppose, the Soviets should be willing to negotiate mutual reductions in land-based MIRVed forces in SALT III.

With respect to the SALT II Treaty you are now considering, I know of no way it harms the ability of the United States to modernize its land-based ICBM force. The treaty does help our military situation in several ways.

The sublimit of 820 on MIRVed land-based ICBM's eliminates the worst case threats against which force planners would otherwise have to prepare. Furthermore the limits on numbers of reentry vehicles a missile can carry will considerably reduce the cost and technical difficulty associated with deploying a survivable multiple aim point land-based system assuming these limits are carried forward into future SALT agreements.

In summary, the SALT II Treaty helps us with some of the military problems we face related to our land-based missiles and to my knowledge it makes none of our problems more difficult. We should keep our land-based ICBM's and they should be modernized.

If we take reasonable steps to deploy a new survivable land-based ICBM we should be able to improve the stability of the strategic balance, increase the military options available to an American President and provide a strong incentive to the Soviet Union to negotiate more stringent limits in future agreements.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for your statement.

PRESERVATION OF THE TRIAD

I have a couple of questions I would like to put to you before we go on to the rest of the panel.

You say, "In summary, the SALT II Treaty helps us with some of the military problems we face related to our land-based missiles and to my knowledge it makes none of our problems more difficult."

That has been the impression which has come across to me on the basis of all of the testimony we have heard so far. I think our hearings have put this full question into a much clearer perspective than we had before.

The weapon systems that these Chiefs of Staff have urged upon us in order to maintain a nuclear balance are all permitted by the treaty. The cruise missiles are permitted. The M–X mobile missile is permitted. The Trident submarine is permitted. Those are the three systems that we are told this country needs to maintain that balance until such time as the treaty expires and hopefully this would lay the basis for substantial reductions in numbers on both sides as a result of the negotiations of SALT III.

You have spoken specifically to the M–X missile and the need for it. My question is I can understand your position as long as you base it upon the premise that the Triad, this three legged stool on which our nuclear deterrent rests, is the best form for our need today and tomorrow.

Am I to believe that the Triad is some sort of permanent system that we will have to preserve in the future in order to have an adequate deterrent?

The question arises because in another place in your testimony you say you would have preferred a missile that could have been used both by the Navy and by the Air Force suggesting that a missile can be developed that would be just as accurate and reliable which could be used on a submarine.

That makes me wonder if it is so necessary to keep ourselves as the bull's-eye of the nuclear target by insisting on placing weapons in the United States that would force the Russians to strike at us if ever they were to decide to risk a nuclear war, to strike at the heartland of America.

I have never understood the compulsion for making this country or the heartland of this country the necessary target. If the mobile missile, land missile is now needed to eventually replace our Minuteman force, the static force, if such a missile could be made sufficiently accurate to be carried equally well by submarines, why would we not be much better served to put that whole force out to sea?

What is so magical about the Triad that must be preserved?

Mr. LODAL. You have raised a series of important and provocative questions. Let me see if I can deal with them.

I do not think there is anything magic about the Triad. But I do think that there are quite a few advantages associated with having diversity in the characteristic of our forces, primarily because the nature of these weapons is such that they are subject to a tremendous degree of uncertainty.

Modern nuclear weapons have, thank goodness, never been used. Therefore, they have never really been tested. Throughout history, most military weapon systems have tended not to work as well as people thought they would the first time they were used in actual combat.

One tends not to know where vulnerabilities are and where difficulties are likely to arise. But by having three different types of basing modes, we make it considerably more difficult for the Soviets to be able to mount an effective attack—not only because of the general principle that they have to do more things, but because in some cases what they have to do to attack one leg of the force helps the other.

I am sure you are familiar with the arguments made about the synergism of ICBM's and bombers; if the Soviets attack the ICBM's first, the bombers have time to get off the ground; if they attack the bombers first with their SLBM's, then the ICBM's can be launched, since they will get some warning.

It is much harder to design an attack against three different types of forces than it is against a single type. The forces are therefore inherently more survivable.

I also have considered concern about command and control. Command and control is a difficult exercise in any event during a nuclear attack, and it is particularly difficult with bombers and submarines. But it is much less difficult on land. One can make land-based communications and control systems much more redundant, reliable, and survivable. Should an attack occur, it would be crucial to have good command and control, and it is crucial that the Soviets know we have it so that they make no mistake about the strength of our deterrent retaliatory capability.

SURVIVABILITY OF LAND-BASED MISSILES AND BOMBERS

The CHAIRMAN. Surely you do not mean that our bombers and our land-based missiles are today more survivable than our submarines?

Mr. LODAL. No, sir. Our submarines are clearly the most survivable. I think they will remain the most survivable for the foreseeable future. But they also have the weakest command and control by their very nature. They are the hardest to communicate with. Thus, while they are the best in one respect, they are the worst in another respect. The ICBM's are the reverse: best in command and control, worst in survivability.

Accuracy is also an issue. One can make a missile as accurate whether it is on a submarine or on land; the trouble is that you do not know exactly where the submarine is to start with when you launch its missiles. Therefore the overall accuracy of a submarine-based missile system is not as high as that of a land-based missile. There are theoretical ways to improve SLBM accuracy, but I do not believe they are available in the near term as practical deployment options.

My belief that the single Air Force/Navy missile would have been better was partially a cost consideration. The studies done by the Congressional Budget Office, which I found to be quite thorough, indicated that the overall cost of a multiple aim point system would be somewhat less with the joint missile.

As important as anything else, is the fact that a joint missile would give us a capability to go both ways. If we need to get additional missile capability deployed quickly, we could put the missile on the Trident submarines if we ran into technical problems with the M-X program.

PROBABILITY OF TOTAL SEA-BASED NUCLEAR FORCE

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell has often recited a little verse that I have, because of his reference to it from time to time, committed to my memory. It goes, "Put the missiles out to sea where the real

estate is free and far away from you and me." There seems to be a lot of sense to that if it can be done.

Would you foresee a time when that might be done or when we would no longer bull's eye the U.S. heartland the way the present Triad system does and overcome these problems of command and control?

Mr. LODAL. Quite frankly, Senator, I would not. First of all, in order to do that you have to get the bomber bases to sea as well, or else give up the bombers. You end up with a monad so to speak, if you really want to eliminate the Soviet threat to U.S. based military targets.

Second of all, to rely so heavily on one type of system, the submarines, which are purely 100 percent dependent upon deception for their survivability, seems to me to be an unnecessary risk.

While I understand and sympathize with the thought that it would be helpful to remove any threat to our own society, as I have said, I do not think that can be realistically done.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Javits?

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, I submit that normally we hear the panel and then examine them. If the chairman would like to proceed that way, I am sure we would not mind.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. We will proceed that way. Mr. Nitze, may we hear from you?

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL NITZE, FORMER DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND FORMER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY [1]

Mr. NITZE. Rather than summarize my own prepared statement it might be more helpful if I commented on the previous discussion, Mr. Chairman.

You quoted Mr. Lodal as having said the SALT II Treaty makes some of our missile problems easier and makes none more difficult. I question the truth of that statement.

When one takes into consideration the fact that the treaty expires in 1985, I do not believe that the fractionalization limitations for instance make our problem easier. I do not see anything in the treaty, which expires in 1985, that makes more solid our anticipations with respect to the M-X missile and its basing mode. Full operational capability of the M-X is not expected until 1989. That all depends upon SALT III.

The provisions of SALT III will determine whether or not the Russians are restrained or not restrained from further fractionating their large missiles in response to our ICBM basing mode and whether they can add to the threat by that or other means.

I see nothing in SALT II which relieves our missile problems. In fact I see the reverse. It is quite clear that the provisions of SALT II permit the Soviets to do those things necessary from their standpoint to create an intolerable threat to our Minutemen.

I think Harold Brown agrees that our Minuteman will become vulnerable during the course of SALT II by virtue of systems that the Soviets are permitted to have and are expected to deploy during the period of the treaty.

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[1] See page 403 for Mr. Nitze's prepared statement.

The more important question is whether it makes it more difficult meeting these problems. I believe it does make it more difficult meeting the problems.

What I have in mind particularly is that if it had not been for SALT II we would long ago have gone forward with what the Air Force calls the multiple protective shelter [MPS] basing mode for our Minuteman.

The President, however, laid down criteria for the basing mode for the M-X in order to be sure the M-X basing will be consistent with his interpretations of the provisions of SALT II and presumptively not interfere with SALT III provided SALT III is like SALT II. The requirements he has laid down eliminate the possibility of the multiple vertical protective shelter mode and make it necessary to go to what they call the racetrack mode.

I believe the racetrack mode will be more expensive. In fact I think the Pentagon estimates the cost of the racetrack mode will be someplace between $33 billion and $34.5 billion for the initial deployment apart from operational costs while their original estimate of the cost of the multiple vertical protective shelter system was $24.5 billion which I think they have now revised to $25.5 billion.

In any case I think those differences in cost are attributable to an effort to meet the requirements of SALT II. Furthermore I believe this racetrack mode of deployment is not necessarily as secure and as useful as the multiple protective shelter mode would have been. I think the incremental cost to add additional shelters should the Soviets decide to fractionate more highly their missiles after 1985 or should the SALT III Treaty, if there is one, not provide for the same fractionalization limitations is significant; under those circumstances I think it does make a difference what the incremental cost of a shelter is.

I believe in the racetrack mode that incremental cost is estimated to be someplace between $2.1 million per shelter and $2.6 million per shelter which is much higher than was estimated for either the trench system, $150,000 or for the multiple protective shelter system—$0.5 to $1 million. I think such differences make a substantial difference in whether the Soviets would think it wise to meet our new ICBM deployment mode by adding large numbers of RV's.

I question the truth of the statement that the SALT II does not make protecting our ICBM's more difficult; I think it does make it significantly more difficult.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Nitze, we have a vote. I think we should take a 10-minute recess. We will then ask Mr. May to make his statement and then the committee will proceed with questions.

For the next 10 minutes, the committee will stand in recess.

[The committee stood in short recess for a vote.]

[Mr. Nitze's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL H. NITZE

Assessment of deterrence depends significantly on our day-to-day alert forces. Our day-to-day alert forces must have adequate survivability in the face of any attack which might be made against them. The surviving forces must be appropriate for their mission, responsive to command and control, able to penetrate defenses intended to blunt their effectiveness, and capable of putting out of action the targets that must be eliminated if we are to pursue a rational strategy were war to come.

In addition to these straightforward considerations, insurance against unforeseen vulnerabilities can be provided by utilizing a diversity of forces.

The objective of diversity is to distribute our deterrent capability through different forces having a variety of survival modes, defense penetration techniques, and attack characteristics so that no single breakthrough by an opponent, either in destroying our forces before launch, or in defense against our surviving and counter-attacking forces, would significantly reduce our second strike and reserve capability. Moreover, such variety would also lessen the vulnerability of our forces to a single force-wide weakness.

A minimal approach to diversity is a triad of forces providing two different survival modes and two different penetration modes for: (a) Time-urgent hard and soft targets; (b) non-time-urgent hard and soft targets; and (c) targets enduring more than a day. Both survivability and confidence in the ability of the force to penetrate should be considered when matching specific systems to target classes, as shown in table 1.

Table 1 divides targets into three classes; time-urgent, non-time-urgent, and enduring, and each of these into hard and soft.

You will note that only our SLBM's can now be expected to have a capability to endure more than one day, and they have little capability against hard targets.

TABLE 1

STRATEGIC FORCE EMPLOYMENT, SURVIVAL, AND PENETRATION CHARACTERISTICS

	APPROPRIATE TARGET CLASS						SURVIVAL MODE	PENETRATION MODE
	TIME-URGENT (Within 15 to 40 mins)		NON-TIME-URGENT (Within 6 to 12 hrs)		ENDURING (Within 1 to 30 days)			
	Hard	Soft	Hard	Soft	Hard	Soft		
ICBMs	yes	yes	1/	3/	1/	1/	Hardened and dispersed	Hyper-sonic reentry, low radar cross-section, chaff and decoys masking real versus false targets, ABM Treaty limitation on ABM defenses
SLBMs	2/	yes	2/	yes	2/	yes	Concealed mobile	Hyper-sonic reentry, high arrival rates
BOMBERS with ALCMs	no	no	yes	yes	no	no	Take-off on warning but vulnerable if not promptly used	Low altitude flight, reactive defensive avionics, and variety in penetration and defense suppression modes (SRAMs, ALCMs, etc.)

1/ Only if deployed in an MVPS or effective mobile (Racetrack?).

2/ Only if SLBMs are provided with RVs with a combination of higher yield and greater accuracy.

3/ Only if deployed in either an MVPS or effective ground or air mobile mode.

You will note that it is only the ICBM's that have a significant capability against time-urgent hard targets.

Our bomber cruise missile capability is limited to non-time-urgent targets. Few, if any, of our heavy bombers are expected to ensure more than a day or so. They must be used within the first few hours. Those that disperse or return suffer grave danger of destruction on their bases.

To achieve the capabilities to fight a war, and thus to deter one, we must both give our SLBM's a greater hard target kill capability and give our ICBM's the ability not only to survive for an immediate launch but to endure for more than a day.

The ICBM force has played a dominant role in determining the military capability of our strategic forces.

The central issue that must be considered is what to do about our ICBM force to restore the declining credibility of that leg of our deterrent. Some of the alternatives are as follows:

a. Accept the intrinsic vulnerability of our fixed silo-based missiles and count on only a small residual ICBM force surviving an attack, thus essentially being driven to acceptance of a dyad.

b. As in (a), accept the vulnerability of our ICBM silos but deploy a larger missile in the silos to increase the power of those few ICBMs which might survive.

c. Adopt a launch-under-attack policy and perfect such a capability.

d. Provide dedicated ICBM silo defenses.

e. Re-base our ICBM's in a mode which maintains adequate ICBM survivability and endurance, and thus satisfies our crisis stability and sufficiency requirements.

Alternative (a) results in a dyad and eventually a monad. A survivable and enduring U.S. counterforce-capable ICBM system is required to ensure a diverse enduring retaliatory capability against all types of targets. A dyad will not meet that requirement.

Deployment of a larger missile in the Minuteman silos, alternative (b), does nothing to solve the silo vulnerability problem and in addition has the negative feature of a threatening, but vulnerable, U.S. first-strike counterforce capability. Accordingly, it would increase crisis instability and the prospect that deterrence would fail.

Alternative (c), launch-under-attack, refers to launching a threatened force once unequivocal assessment is received that an attack on that force is in progress, and before the attack reaches a point where it prevents a launch. It requires highly reliable command, control, and communication systems and extremely rapid decision-making. The decision time projected to be available varies, from about 3 minutes in complex scenarios utilizing SLBM attacks on communication modes and pindown of Minuteman, to about 15 to 20 minutes in a straightforward ICBM attack on Minuteman. However, an important issue surrounding the launch-under-attack option is "launch what against what Soviet targets—upon what degree of evidence that an attack of what size is underway against what U.S. targets?" Extremely difficult considerations are involved in answering those complex questions. Should the President be asked to resolve them in the few minutes which may be available to him, or should the anwers be preprogrammed into a computer? Neither alternative is without immense dangers.

Alternative (d), that dedicated ICBM silo defenses be deployed as a solution to our current and future silo vulnerability problem, would require Soviet agreement to modify the ABM Treaty so as to allow for the eventual deployment of dedicated defenses.

Dedicated ICBM defenses can be of significant benefit when used as an overlay to an already reasonably survivable ICBM system. Against a maximum threat, it would be possible to complicate any Soviet attack with a preferential ABM defense of missiles deployed in an effective dispersed deceptive basing mode.

A number of alternate basing concepts, alternative (e), have been proposed which enhance ICBM survivability through a multiple vertical protective structure system (MVPS),[1] air mobility, other forms of MAP employing transporter/erector/launchers (including the Racetrack system) or by other deceptive actions. As stated in General Allen's letter of December 29, 1978, over the last ten years about 30 alternate basing modes have been investigated in detail; and after extensive reviews and evaluations, the MVPS system was found to be the best technical solution that retains the unique, positive characteristics of the ICBM force. The Racetrack system may, or may not, be comparably effective but will certainly be more expensive.

Purely mobile concepts tend to rely on strategic and/or tactical warning both to enhance survivability and to reduce operating costs. Air mobility has much the same survival and durability vulnerabilities characteristic of the bomber force and therefore does not contribute significantly to force diversity. Pure land mobiles are dependent on warning, and are vulnerable to an area Soviet barrage attack.

Since the MVPS ICBM deployment concept achieves survivability through uncertainty in location, its deployment may raise questions concerning verification. In assessing this problem it should be emphasized that the advantages the MVPS basing offers in increasing survivability and thus enhancing stability and deterrence, and thus reducing the risk of war, far outweigh the strategic significance of uncertainty in verification. It should also be noted that all alternate basing concepts currently under consideration raise some verification issues, but that cooperative methods can reduce Soviet verification uncertainty to very low levels.

Two additional points should be made. It is wholly feasible for the U.S. to give the U.S.S.R. high confidence that we are not deploying more than one canister containing a missile per MVPS launch complex. If the Soviet Union wished to give us similar high confidence, if they developed an MVPS system, they also could do so. If

[1] A multiple protective structure (MPS) system employing vertical structures.

they wish to deny us verifiability of the number of ICBM's they deploy, they can do so, whether they deploy an MVPS or not. It is unlikely they would wish to deploy a mirror image of our Racetrack system.

It is reported that as a part of the current SALT II deliberations two demarches were made by the U.S. side to the Soviets stating that we interpret the SALT II provisions to permit the deployment of an MPS system after the expiration of the Protocol.

The demarches referred not to multiple silos but to hardened launch points (which, as phrased, could include not only vertical structures but also horizontal structures). The Soviet side focused on the distinction between vertical structure deployments and horizontal structures protecting mobile transporter/erector launchers. They unambiguously stated that a vertical deployment mode would involve additional fixed ICBM launchers which are prohibited by the Treaty. They also implied, however, that the horizontal shelter deployment mode, if associated with transporter/erector/launchers (TEL's), might be considered to be a mobile system permissible after expiration of the Protocol but requiring that each TEL be counted under the ceilings on numbers of ICBM launchers. The newly proposed Racetrack system appears to satisfy the Soviet position on the requirements for a permitted mobile system.

The Soviets might or might not respond to a U.S. deployment of an MVPS or Racetrack system. It would be feasible, by the late 1980's or the 1990's, for the Soviets, in the absence of SALT, to deploy more highly fractionated payloads with up to about 20 to 30 RV's per SS–19-type missile, and up to about 30 to 40 RV's per SS–18-type missile. These RV's would have to have smaller weight and thus yield, and therefore would have to have improved accuracy to maintain the same single shot kill capability. There would be severe technical problems involving accuracy and reliability, and financial and availability of fissionable material considerations could arise. But it is not certain that such considerations would preclude such a Soviet response.

SALT II limitations cannot be helpful unless continued beyond 1985 in SALT III. The currently agreed SALT II provisions include a maximum fractionation limit of 10 RV's per ICBM and 14 RV's per SLBM. The number of RV's in the overt threat is therefore limited under SALT II but only until 1985. The earliest deployment of the MX will be after 1985.

However, even if the Soviets developed and deployed highly accurate, high fractionation RV's, and even if they covertly deployed additional missiles, an MVPS or Racetrack system would exact a very high price for each U.S. missile destroyed. An MVPS or Racetrack system would restore the stable pre-1978 situation in which an attacker could not expect to destroy, in an initial attack, as many missiles as he expended in that attack. The incremental cost of adding additional shelters and thus aim points would be much less under the MVPS system than under the Racetrack system.

Modernization of U.S strategic nuclear forces with emphasis on survivability and endurance together with careful attention to the roles assigned to each part of the force structure should greatly diminish the likelihood of any rational Soviet decision to attack these forces or, directly or indirectly, to threaten such an attack. It would also provide the best hope for survival should any such attack, intended or resulting from an unintended chain of events, occur. In the longer run, it should also make equitable and constructive arms control more feasible and more likely.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. May, I wonder if we could have your remarks and then we will go to questions.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL MAY, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, LAWRENCE-LIVERMORE LABORATORY, LIVERMORE, CALIF.[1]

Mr. MAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will paraphrase and summarize those parts of my statement which concern matters which the committee has heard quite a bit about already and will try to dwell on parts which may be a little newer.

The question is how to retain a deterrent force especially under SALT and most particularly about the vulnerability of the ICBM missiles. There is general agreement, I believe, that a deterrent

[1] See p. 411 for Mr. May's prepared statement.

force, in order to do its job of deterrence, has to exist before the crisis occurs and must be able both in fact and appearance to survive an attack and be utilizable afterwards.

Right now, the part of the U.S. strategic forces which is alert and survivable and reliable is only a fraction of the whole. It consists of somewhere between 3,000 and 4,000 nuclear weapons, with an effective yield which can be arrived at in various ways but the equivalent effectiveness of the yield is something over 1,000 equivalent megatons. These are approximate figures.

The U.S. ICBM force right now provides about 50 percent of this alert, reliable, and survivable force. The rest is provided by bombers on alert status; that is, ready to take off within a few minutes, and by submarines which are actually in operational zones.

We have other forces, as you know, which are not on alert and which would therefore be quite vulnerable to surprise attack. I am not counting them in this total.

The ICBM's not only provide about 50 percent of the alert and survivable force but they are also qualitatively different from the bombers and submarines, as has been repeatedly pointed out. Mr. Lodal pointed it out. They have no need of warning, unlike bombers, and no need to penetrate enemy defenses; they have different and better communication links than submarines and they must be attacked with different weapons than either bombers or submarines and at different times.

As has been repeatedly emphasized, the three elements together are much harder to attack by the Soviet Union than any one or two of them would be.

The forecast is that by the mid-1980's the U.S. ICBM force could largely be destroyed by a Soviet attack. With it would go about 50 percent of our deterrent force, our alert and reliable and survivable force, as well as the qualitative advantages which were noted above.

The proportional cost to the Soviet forces would be far less and the Soviet Union would therefore benefit in the military sense from an attack on our forces. The value of this potential benefit in day-to-day politics or in crises or in war is something that has been debated at length in these hearings and elsewhere and I cannot add very much to the debate except to say, having about 50 percent of our bottom line deterrent forces subject to destruction by a first strike is not a satisfactory outcome for all the years of investment and technological development we have put in, and for all the years of SALT negotiations.

It is possible of course to plan on launching the ICBM force on warning of an attack before the attacking weapons actually explode. There would be very little time for the President to decide whether to do that or not. Furthermore, no warning system is 100-percent reliable.

It would be much preferable to devise a new system that could replace the present Minuteman ICBM system and retain its major advantages. Unfortunately that task has proven to be very difficult, largely because of the size and accuracy of the possible Soviet attack.

There are only four ways to protect missiles, in a general sense, whether on land or anywhere else. One can harden them. One can defend them. One can keep them moving and one can hide them.

Hardening, given the anticipated Soviet accuracies and yields, requires going so deep underground that the missiles could not be launched after an attack for days or perhaps weeks. It is infeasible from that point of view.

Active defense is currently under continuing study and research and development, but no sufficiently reliable system has emerged from these studies to warrant going beyond R. & D. in my opinion. In addition, active defense is banned by the ABM Treaty as it now stands.

The third alternative, to keep the missiles continually on the move, whether on planes or trucks or some other mode of locomotion, is extremely expensive and would have weaknesses of a security, safety, and environmental nature. Moving them only after receiving warning would lose the present advantage of ICBM's, which is they do not require warning.

That leaves hiding; that is, some mode of deception. Deception in one form or another has been the essential element in providing survivability for the ICBM systems under consideration today.

It is not entirely satisfactory. It raises difficulties in connection with SALT and with security maintenance. But so far, no one has come up with anything else that better meets all the requirements and constraints.

Deceptive land basing for ICBM's has a relatively long history of studies reaching back to the 1960's, and most of the variations have been looked at one time or another.

The latest version, the M-X racetrack concept, is a relatively newcomer. It is more expensive and more complex in my judgment, and less certain to operate than the other alternatives. Most important, in my judgment, it would take a long time to deploy. It would take too long to be in time to meet the Soviet threat to the Minuteman.

It has these defects because even though it is a mobile system in which deception must be maintained, it is being designed to follow SALT verification precedents which require that the ICBM launchers be counted at the site of deployment. This is the major reason for its defects in my view.

I believe that approach to verification; namely, to count the launchers at the site of deployment, which applied to fixed launchers under SALT I and SALT II, does not provide the right model for verification of mobile deceptive systems.

A quicker, cheaper, and more flexible way to go to preserve the survivability of the ICBM force of the United States, or at least half of it, which is all that is now contemplated, would be to redeploy the present Minuteman missiles with some modification, using the present bases and the public roadways and some 10,000 places, approximately, which could be shelters or garages, in which the missiles could be hidden.

Such a deployment, if pursued with some urgency should shave about 4 years and $15 billion from the proposed M-X racetrack deployment. These two numbers, 4 years and $15 billion, are my own estimates, based on the study you referred to in your introduc-

tion. I do not think the Defense Department will necessarily concur with them.

I think such a deployment would be a relatively flexible way to go. For instance, the number of hiding places could be expanded if we needed a hedge in case the Soviet Union expanded their number of reentry vehicles. The design and the spacing of the hiding places or the shelters could be altered as we deployed the system and got some experience.

I believe that the political and legal difficulties in acquiring the additional land would be minimized if we deployed in States where there already are Minuteman bases and people are used to them.

Whether the Minuteman is used or the M–X, if ICBM's are to be deployed in a deceptive mode, I believe their number should not be verified at the sites of their deployment. Maintaining deception is a difficult business wherever you try to do it. It is very hard to be certain that adequate security is maintained. That is true whether you are talking about land-based missile systems, or submarines, or anything else.

On top of that, attempting to introduce cooperative verification measures at the site of deployment so that the number of ICBM launchers can be verified there makes the maintenance of security even more difficult and uncertain.

I have participated in attempts to do so over the past few years. I do not believe they have led to a successful result. Not only is the resulting system itself not satisfactory in my judgment, but there is no guarantee that the Soviet Union would, if it wished to base its ICBM's deceptively, follow our precedent, because it leads to what seems to me to be a cumbersome, expensive, and possibly an insecure system.

A better approach would be to verify the number of mobile, deceptively based ICBM's in a way that is generally similar to the way we verify the number of the other systems controlled by SALT which are mobile and deceptively based; that is, bombers and submarines. These numbers are verified in part by counting at or near the production sites, and in part by collateral information which cannot be discussed in open session.

If we merely redeploy Minuteman as I suggested, that kind of an approach to verification should pose the Soviet Union no problem. The Soviets know how many Minuteman ICBM's we have and they know we have closed the production line. If they need any further assurance, we can offer on-site inspection to make sure they have that knowledge.

There is no conflict between meeting in a timely and effective way the problem which the Soviet Union has itself caused us, or will cause us, in making the ICBM's vulnerable and with the Soviet Union maintaining an adequate knowledge of our forces if we redeploy Minuteman.

If we decide to get M–X missiles instead of keeping Minuteman missiles, or if, at some time in the future, the Soviet Union itself decides to base its ICBM's deceptively, which they have little incentive to do since we do not pose a first strike threat to them, then we will need some SALT provision under which verification of the numbers of these new missiles can be arranged.

To meet that contingency, the United States could propose that the deceptive basing be allowed for ICBM's in the same way that it is allowed for planes and submarines: Such weapon systems may be deployed when and only when the number of units produced and destroyed can be verified with adequate accuracy.

Adequate accuracy does not mean 100-percent accuracy but accuracy adequate for strategic purposes, which might mean 20 percent as an example.

The party which is doing the verification would have to be the one that is satisfied, so that either on-site inspection or maybe some less intrusive cooperative method, as now used with submarines, would be needed.

The Soviet Union may or may not accept this proposal. If they do accept it, I think we would have better arms control in the future. We would be limiting and verifying the number of missiles instead of the number of launchers and we would be coming closer to limiting and verifying the number of actual weapons.

If the Soviet Union does not accept this proposal, I think we should proceed with rebasing ICBM's anyway, in the way that is most effective and timely. We have a situation where 50 percent of our deterrent force is at stake. We should put timely and effective preservation of that force first and immediate progress at SALT second, in my judgment.

In the longer run the SALT process itself will be healthier if it is not allowed to lead to an increased advantage of first strike forces over deterrent forces. I think we would all lose faith in it if it does that.

In addition, I believe that the Soviet Union would in fact accept this approach to the ICBM rebasing problem eventually, after refusing it probably for a while. The Soviet Union has on other occasions accepted the U.S. approach where U.S. systems which we considered vital to our security were at stake. For instance, they have accepted our approach in the case of forward-based systems and they have accepted our approach in the case of strategic cruise missiles.

We, on the other hand, have accepted their approach where systems which they considered vital were at stake, as in the case of their heavy missiles and their Backfire bombers. I am not saying whether this is good or bad, but the history has been that we have gotten our way for those U.S. systems which we considered vital.

The Soviet Union would stand to lose nothing by accepting the proposal outlined, except the chance to cost us time and money. Their present programs would not be affected. They could continue to emplace large missiles into silos, which is what they are doing now.

Even if, at worse, the Soviet Union never accepted the proposal outlined, we would be no worse off than we are now. We do not know now how many ICBM's they have. We now rely on approximate intelligence estimates to plan survivability. None of this would be changed by their refusing to abide by verification constraints which we would consider adequate on their future deceptive rebasing.

The only significant strategic change would be that we would be able to pursue an effective course in dealing with the problem of vulnerability of our own ICBM's.

The proposal that I have just made—to verify production and destruction of mobile, deceptively based ICBM's instead of trying to count launchers at the deployment site—could possibly be introduced as a replacement for the protocol. The protocol, as it now stands, does not make satisfactory provisions for survivable land-based systems in my judgment. It merely delays testing and deployment of mobile systems. I think less vulnerable basing, such as mobile, deceptive basing, should be encouraged rather than discouraged by SALT.

If we rebase Minuteman, it would serve to maintain our deterrent forces in the mid-1980's and for some time beyond. It is far from the last thing that needs to be done. All the existing strategic systems will eventually wear out and, in addition, the technologies for survival, verification, attack, for defense, and for warning are all going to change. We should not lock ourselves into a system of which major features are being dictated by the perceived need to adhere to verification standards that were never designed to cope with the present technological dilemmas.

The SALT process should instead evolve in such a way as to permit the timely maintenance of assured and not too costly deterrent forces. The present SALT II Treaty seems adequate from this point of view for the period during which it will be in force, except that I believe it does need a change as outlined in order to deal appropriately with the dangers to U.S. ICBM's which we see coming and with the possibility of mobile systems.

That is my statement, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. May's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL M. MAY

The question I will address in this testimony is how to retain a deterrent force under SALT. The most urgent part of that question is what to do about the anticipated vulnerability of the U.S. ICBM missiles and that is what I will mainly talk about, but the ICBM question cannot be resolved without considering the entire deterrent force and some of its problems.

I believe there is general agreement that a deterrent force is supposed to deter nuclear attack on the United States and its allies; such drastic aggression as might not be settled without nuclear war; and nuclear coercion. The size and makeup of the force that will do those jobs have long been subjects of debate, but it is clear that the force must be in being before the crisis occurs and that it must be able in fact and appearance to survive an attack and be utilizable afterwards.

Right now, the U.S. force that would survive and be utilizable after a full-scale surprise Soviet attack on it, that is, the alert, survivable and reliable fraction of the U.S. force consists of between 3,000 and 4,000 nuclear weapons of various yields. Measures of the utility of the various yields can be arrived at in several ways, depending on effectiveness of something over 1,000 equivalent megatons.

That is a lot of yield, even though it may be only one-fifth to one-tenth of the Soviet first strike equivalent megatons. It is probably enough to destroy most but not all of the known Soviet military force: air and naval bases, including submarines in port and planes on the ground; major army installations; major supply and communication centers; some but not all hard nuclear sites; the most essential war industries. It is enough also to provide for a reserve of weapons that would not be used at once, but that could destroy Soviet cities and economic capability, and would serve to prevent our being left disarmed against Soviet reserves.

I believe the threat of prompt and assured military defeat rather than some undefined and probably unusable threat of holocaust is the best deterrent. While the alert, reliable, survivable force we have now does not guarantee that we can promptly and assuredly cause the Soviet Union a military defeat, its use (assuming

the worst, an attack on the United States) would make the further prosecution of the war by the Soviet Union very difficult and would almost surely give us enough time to prevent their terminating the war on their terms.

Right now, the U.S. ICBM force provides about 50 percent of this alert, reliable, survivable force. The rest is provided by bombers on alert status—that is, ready to take off within a few minutes—and submarines in operational zones. We have more forces which are not on alert and which would be quite vulnerable to a surprise Soviet attack. To the extent that we have indications of Soviet intent to attack—for instance, through political tension, or evacuation, or increased alertness of their strategic forces—we can put more of our bombers and submarines on alert, for a time that is limited by crew and equipment availability.

The ICBM's not only provide about 50 percent of the alert survivable force, they are also qualitatively different from the bombers and submarines. They have less need of warning than bombers and no need to penetrate enemy defenses; they have different and probably better communication links than submarines; they must be attacked with different weapons than either bombers or submarines. As has been repeatedly emphasized, the three elements together—ICBM's, bombers and submarines—are more difficult to attack than any one or two of them, and are more flexible in their response.

The reason for the concern about ICBM's is the forecast that by the mid-eighties the U.S. ICBM force could largely be destroyed by a Soviet attack. With it would go about 50 percent of our alert, reliable, survivable force as well as the qualitative advantages noted above, while the proportional cost to the Soviet forces would be far less. The Soviet Union would therefore benefit in a military sense from an attack on these forces. The value of this potential benefit in day to day politics, or in crises, or in war, given the risks that attend an attack, can and has been debated at length. I can add little to the debate, except to say that having about 50 percent of our bottom line deterrent subject to destruction by a first strike is not a satisfactory outcome for years of technological development, investment and SALT negotiations.

It is possible, of course, to plan on launching the ICBM force on warning of an attack, before the attacking weapons actually explode. There would be very little time for the President to decide whether to do that. Furthermore, no warning network is 100 percent reliable. It would be preferable to devise a new system that could replace the present Minuteman ICBM system and retain its major advantages. Unfortunately, that task has proven to be very difficult, largely because of the size and accuracy of the possible Soviet attack.

There are only four ways to protect missiles, on land or anywhere else: to harden them, to defend them, to keep them moving and to hide them. Hardening, given anticipated Soviet accuracies and yields, requires going so deep underground that the missiles could not be launched for days, perhaps weeks after an attack. Active defense is under study but no sufficiently reliable system has emerged from the studies to warrant going beyond R&D. In addition, active defense is banned by the ABM Treaty as it now stands. Keeping the missiles continually on the move, on planes or trucks for instance, is extremely expensive and has weaknesses of a security, safety and environmental nature. Moving them only after receiving warning would lose the present advantage of ICBM's, that they do not require warning.

That leaves hiding, that is, some mode of deception. Deception in one form or another is the essential element in providing survivability for the ICBM systems being considered today. It is not entirely satisfactory. It raises difficulties in connection with SALT verification and with security maintenance. But so far no one has come up with anything else that better meets all the requirements and constraints.

Deceptive land basing for ICBM has a relatively long history of studies, reaching back to the 1960's. Most variations and most arguments have been considered several times by several groups of people. The latest version, the so-called MX race track concept, is a relative newcomer. It has been described to this Committee. It is more expensive and more complex (and in my judgment, less certain to operate properly than alternatives. Perhaps most important, it would take a long time to deploy, too long to be in time to meet the Soviet threat to Minuteman. It has these defects because, even though it is a mobile system in which deception must be maintained, it is being designed to follow SALT verification precedents which require that the ICBM launchers be counted at the site of the deployment. I believe that this approach to verification, which applied to fixed launchers under SALT I and will apply to them under SALT II, does not provide the right model for verification of deceptive mobile systems.

A quicker, cheaper and more flexible way to preserve the survivability of the U.S. ICBM force (at least of half of it), in my opinion, would be to redeploy the present Minuteman missiles, with some modification, using the present Minuteman bases

and public roadways and some 10,000 places (shelters, garages, and others) in which the missiles could be hidden. Such deployment, if pursued with some urgency, should shave about four years and 15 billion dollars from the proposed MX race track deployment. It would also be a relatively flexible way to go. For instance, the number of hiding places could be expanded if needed as a hedge against a greater Soviet RV deployment than we are expecting. The design and spacing of the hiding places could be altered as the system is designed and deployed and we learn more about it, and more than one design could be tried out. Political and legal difficulties connected with buying land and putting out environmental impact statements in areas where minuteman is not now deployed might perhaps be largely avoided.

Whether Minuteman or MX is used as the missile, if ICBM's are to be deployed in a deceptive mode, their number should not be verified at the sites of their deployment. Maintaining deception, whether on land or elsewhere, is always difficult and one can never be 100 percent certain that adequate security has been provided. Attempting to introduce cooperative verification measures so that the number of ICBM launchers can be verified at or near the area of deceptive deployment makes the maintenance of security even more difficult and uncertain. I have participated in these attempts over the last two years and I do not believe they have led to a successful result. Not only is the resulting system itself less than satisfactory, but there is no guarantee that the Soviet Union would, if it wished to base its ICBM's deceptively at some time in the future, follow a U.S. precedent that leads to a cumbersome, expensive and possibly insecure system.

A better approach to verification, it seems to me, would be to verify the number of mobile and deceptively based ICBM's in a way generally similar to what is used to verify the number of the other mobile and deceptively based systems controlled under SALT, namely, bombers and submarines. These numbers are verified in part by counting at or near the production sites, together with collateral information.

If we merely redeploy Minuteman, as suggested above, such an approach to verification would pose the Soviet Union no problem. The Soviets know how many Minuteman ICBM's we have, to good enough accuracy for all strategic purposes, and they also know that the Minuteman production line is closed. We could offer on-site inspection to make the verification surer. Thus there is no conflict between our meeting, in a timely and effective way, the problem which the Soviet Union has caused us in making our ICBM's vulnerable, and the Soviet Union maintaining an adequate knowledge of our forces such as may be needed for a continued and successful SALT process.

If we decide to get MX missiles instead of keeping Minuteman missiles, or if at some time in the future the Soviet Union decides to base its own ICBM's deceptively (which they have little incentive to do since our forces do not pose a serious first strike threat) we will need some SALT provision under which verification of the numbers of these new missiles could be arranged. To meet that contingency, the United States could propose that deceptive basing be allowed, for ICBM's as for planes and submarines, when and only when the number of units produced (and destroyed) can be verified with adequate accuracy. Adequate accuracy need not mean 100 percent accuracy, for ICBM's, but accuracy adequate for strategic purposes, say, for the sake of example, within 20 percent. The party doing the verification would have to be satisfied, so that either on-site inspection or perhaps a less intrusive cooperative method is likely to be needed.

If the soviet Union accepts this proposal, we would have better arms control. We would be limiting and verifying missiles rather than launchers, which is to say, we would be coming closer to limiting and verifying actual weapons.

If the Soviet Union does not accept, I think we should proceed with our rebasing of ICBM's anyway. In a situation where 50 percent of our deterrent force is at stake, we should put timely and effective preservation of that force first and immediate progress at SALT second. In the longer run, the SALT process itself will be healthier if it is not allowed to lead to an increased advantage of first strike forces over deterrent forces.

I believe, in addition, that the Soviet Union would eventually accept this approach to the ICBM rebasing problem. They have on other occassions accepted the U.S. approach where U.S. Systems which we considered vital to our security were at stake, for instance in the case of the forward based systems and the strategic cruise missiles. We have accepted Soviet approaches where Soviet systems which they considered vital were at stake, as in the case of heavy missiles and of Backfire bombers. The Soviet Union stands to lose nothing by accepting the proposal outlines above, except the chance to cost us time and money. Their present programs are not affected. They could continue to emplace large missiles into silos under presently agreed provisions, which is what they seem most interested in doing.

Even if the Soviets never accept the proposal outlined here, we will be no worse off than we are now. We do not know now how many ICBM's they have. We rely on approximate intelligence estimates to plan a survivable force. None of this would be changed by their refusing to abide by verification constraints which we would consider adequate on their future deceptive or mobile ICBM rebasing. The only significant strategic change would be that we would be able to pursue an effective course in dealing with the problem of vulnerability of our ICBM's

The proposal to verify production and destruction of mobile and deceptively based ICBM's rather than attempt to count launchers of such ICBM's at the deployment site could be introduced as a replacement for the Protocol. The Protocol as it stands now does not make satisfactory provision for survivable land based systems. It merely delays testing and deployment of mobile systems, whereas less vulnerable basing, of which deceptive basing is an instance, should be encouraged, not discouraged, by SALT.

Rebasing Minuteman would serve to maintain our deterrent forces in the mid-eighties and for some time beyond. It is far from the last thing that needs to be done, however, all existing strategic systems will wear out. In addition, the technologies for survival, for verification, for attack and defense, will continue to change regardless of agreements. Such technologies are closely tied to civilian technologies and cannot be frozen.

Thus, we should not lock ourselves into systems the major features of which are dictated by the perceived need to adhere to verification standards that were never designed to cope with the present technological and strategic dilemmas. The SALT process should instead evolve in such a way as to permit the timely maintenance of assured and not too costly deterrent forces. The present SALT II Treaty seems adequate from this point of view for the period during which it will be in force, except that I believe it needs a change as outlined in order to deal appropriately with the dangers to U.S. ICBM's which we see coming.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. May.

U.S. VULNERABILITY AND THE PROSPECT OF SOVIET STRIKE

With all of the discussion of the vulnerability of our Minuteman system during the mid-1980's—whenever we have press witnesses, including the military witnesses, we have had before us, they have said that it was hard to conceive that the Russians would take the risks involved in a nuclear strike because they could not know what our response would be and it would be placing themselves in the position of igniting their own funeral fire. But a knowledge of this vulnerability and the theoretical possibility that they might engage in such a strike would give them leverage in dealing with the power politics of the world in ways advantageous to them.

We know now in Cuba that they have established a combat brigade and they concealed it from us for some period of time. They have done this well in advance of that period when we foresee a vulnerability on the part of our land-based missiles.

They also provoked the Berlin crisis which was a very serious one and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 which brought us to the verge of nuclear war during periods when they were at a decided disadvantage vis-a-vis the United States with respect to their strategic force.

I have never seen the historical connection or much evidence that the one is necessarily related to the other.

Everybody concedes that a strike against the United States could not be surgical and it would involve 10 to 20 million casualties and deaths perhaps in the first explosions. Any country that would launch such a strike would risk full scale retaliation which could utterly incinerate it.

ADOPTING LAUNCH ON WARNING POLICY TO OFFSET VULNERABILITY

If there is this period, as I judge everyone agrees will come, in the mid-1980's when our Minuteman will be at least theoretically vulnerable, what would be wrong with announcing that during that period the United States would adopt a launch upon warning policy so that the Russians could not be assured that the missiles would be there when they fired at them, with the kind of vast attack that would be necessary to knock out over 1,000 of our missiles?

Mr. May?

Mr. MAY. That is a difficult question as you know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It certainly would be an added deterrent.

Mr. MAY. Yes. The Soviet Union now does not know whether we would launch missiles on warning or not. They do know we are prepared to get the bombers off the ground on warning and they do not know whether we would take the further step of launching the missiles on warning. I guess I would think that is the best way to leave it, so that they do not know and we will not commit ourselves ahead of time.

I think, if we can do better, we should. If it becomes impossible to do anything better than launch on warning, we would have much more of a hair trigger type of response and I think we would lose some assurance of deterrence.

The CHAIRMAN. Remember this is a period when we are going to cure this. We are not going to be in that state indefinitely. There is a period of 4 or 5 years when there is some Soviet advantage and we worry about the possible vulnerability of this force. That is going to be corrected. It is not going to last forever.

During that period we might simply say the United States holds open the option of firing these missiles on warning just to make certain the Russians are not under any misconceptions.

Mr. MAY. I think we have effectively made it clear that they might well be fired on warning. If I recall, President Carter made some general statement to the effect that no one should expect him to just sit there with the missiles coming. I do not remember the exact words. I think that delivers the idea effectively.

If you are addressing yourself, Mr. Chairman, to the suggestion that we rebase Minuteman instead of building a brand new missile, it is true that suggestion would fix the interim period, but eventually the rebasing with M-X would also fix that vulnerability.

I must confess to some doubt as to whether the M-X missile is the right long term solution. It is a big missile. It is going to be inherently harder to move and harder to hide than the Minuteman. I am not sure, from a purely technical point of view whether that is the way we should go.

I have the same problem with the presently proposed M-X mobile scheme which is now being suggested, the racetrack scheme. Again it strikes me as a very expensive system and one with very limited flexibility. I do not quite see that we should lock ourselves in that direction. Those are technical rather than strategic judgments.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Nitze?

Mr. NITZE. I think Harold Brown has said that it would be unwise to not leave the Russians in doubt as to what we might do

with respect to launch on warning. Maybe that is not too objectionable a position to take.

I think there is all the difference in the world between that kind of a posture where you leave the Russians in some doubt and when the basis of your policy really is to launch on warning.

Certainly we have not done those things which would be consistent with the policy of launch on warning. As far as I know we have never exercised, even in simulated form, a launch on warning. I do not believe we are properly equipped to do so.

I do not think we have gone through the necessary analyses as to what targets we would attack if there were warning of such and such number of missiles addressed to such and such number of targets on our side.

The President will have a very short period of time in which to make up his mind as to what to launch against what in response to what kind of an indication of attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think we should do all of those things and go through those disciplines and make those preparations?

Mr. NITZE. I was just going to get to that point. If you really go to a serious launch on warning policy and not just leaving the Russians in doubt, then I think you should do all these things. Then you ought to look at what the nature of the world is under those circumstances. I believe that the world would be less secure.

I believe one of the things you need in the event of an attack is the necessary sensors being in full operation. You have to know what it is that is coming at you. Generally when one talks about launching on warning one assumes knowing very promptly after launch what has been launched against you. Those satellites that give us that information are not wholly secure and certainly the down links that give us the information and bring it to Washington are highly insecure.

We would have to do all kinds of things in order to increase the security of that system and I do not think you could ever make it really secure.

Then you run into the question of what would we in fact wish to do in the event of the destruction of the sensors and the communications from them? You talk about an initial attack resulting in millions of casualties. An attack upon the sensors would not necessarily result in any casualties.

What do you do under those circumstances? If you are dealing from a position of clear and manifest second grade position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and you get into a situation of that type, it is very difficult to figure out what it would be wise for the United States to do.

I really do urge, Mr. Chairman, that we look seriously at this question of maintaining an adequate deterrent and not try to do it through mirrors such as launch on warning.

The CHAIRMAN. No one has quite made it clear to me how this could be done without running a period of a few years even if we were to accelerate the proposed construction of the M-X missile.

Mr. NITZE. Mr. Chairman, please, if one were to take seriously Mr. May's proposal, if one had taken that proposal seriously 2 years ago or 3 years ago when the proposal was initially made, William Graham and I proposed the same thing at about the same

time, if that had been taken seriously 3 years ago, today we would be in a position where we could be deploying at least 1,000 additional holes per year. That is what my computations indicate.

If we were to take it seriously today, within 2 years I think you could begin the deployment of additional shelters in the Minuteman fields.

The question at issue is whether one really takes this thing seriously or not, whether one does take the time urgency seriously and does something about it. If one does, there have been occasions when we could do effective and timely things about it. There are still today, things we could do which would enable us to deploy additional shelters more or less pari passu with the increase in the threat.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. My time is up.

Senator Javits?

SUBLIMIT ON MIRVED LAND-BASED ICBM'S

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Lodal, one thing you said puzzled me. You said "The sub-limit of 820 on MIRVed land-based ICBM's eliminates the worst case threats against which force planners would otherwise have to prepare."

I do not understand.

Mr. LODAL. I think it is quite possible for the Soviets to deploy considerably more than 820 MIRVed land-based ICBM's by 1985. It is my understanding quite a few of those who engage in the art of projecting these sort of things projected more than that number.

When I was personally involved in these negotiations, there was some more direct evidence that the Soviets planned more than 820, in that at one point in time, they refused to agree to limits even somewhat higher than 820.

The $33 to $34 billion cost you are looking at today for an M-X system is predicated on the assumption that 820 is approximately the size Soviet new MIRV threat we will face. If we face a threat which is much bigger, then the costs get proportionately larger for the type of systems necessary to counter the threat to land-based forces.

SURVIVAL REQUIREMENT OVER 1,000 EQUIVALENT MEGATONS

Senator JAVITS. Does this tie in with Mr. May's conclusion that even in the worst case theory, if you adopt SALT II, and you have this limit and we would have a survival equivalent to something over 1,000 equivalent megatons?

Does your thesis tie in with that? Do those two relate to each other?

Mr. LODAL. I do not believe so.

Mr. MAY. I do not believe so, Senator Javits. I believe the thesis you are referring to occurs on page 1. That is what we have right now, sir. That is the present situation, with Minuteman not being terribly vulnerable. It is not what we are going to have in a few years. It is the present situation which we would like to maintain. It is not the worst situation.

Senator JAVITS. As I understand it, we are not destroying any missiles. Even if you are right, why would we not in 2 or 3 years continue to have 1,000 equivalent megatons?

Mr. MAY. Because in 2 or 3 years the Soviet Union will have enough accurate weapons to destroy practically all of our Minuteman force should they attack us.

Senator JAVITS. Even if SALT II were approved?

Mr. MAY. Yes.

Senator JAVITS. That is your thesis?

Mr. MAY. I believe that is not questioned by anyone.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Lodal, what do you say?

Mr. LODAL. I agree with Dr. May. I think they will have enough forces, even with SALT II, to attack the Minuteman force in a few years.

I would add one or two points where perhaps our degree of emphasis differs somewhat, I am less concerned about the instabilities inherent in the next 3 to 5 years, when the Soviets do have this capability, but before we have an opportunity to deploy some type of multiple protective shelter system which would take away at least some of that capability. I am sure you have heard discussion of the practical difficulties of mounting a large-scale preemptive attack against our land based forces. Then vulnerability is primarily theoretical, although it is a real vulnerability to which we should respond. But it is not one which should cause us immediate alarm.

Should the Soviets launch a large-scale attack against all of our Minuteman, they could reduce our 1,000 equivalent megatons to perhaps half that number, but we would not be left without options. An American President has his bomber force, which has highly accurate weapons on it and will have even more accurate weapons as the cruise missiles are deployed. As my colleague Mr. Nitze likes to point out, that bomber force has limited usability because it can only stay in the air a certain amount of time if you are in the middle of a nuclear war. But an American President could respond with our bombers, using them to destroy virtually all interesting Soviet military targets in a retaliatory strike.

The Soviets would face a situation where they could perhaps attack U.S. military targets, but after the end of the first exchange they would be without their military targets also. We would both be left with only our submarine forces, where we are vastly superior. Thus, they could reduce our equivalent megatonnage considerably, but to do so they would end up after the attack in worse shape than we. Therefore, they should have no incentive to mount an attack in the first place.

Senator JAVITS. What do you say to that, Mr. May?

Mr. MAY. I would say it seems to me more prudent if we can rebase Minuteman in such a way as to avoid this period where it would be subject to attack.

One reason is, the other elements of the triad are not perfect. Nothing is perfect. In particular if you look closely at bombers and at submarines as well as ICBM's, there are problems. I think the committee is well aware of them.

In the case of bombers you always have the question as to whether they or the cruise missiles will penetrate Soviet defenses.

That has to remain an area of uncertainty. Will they in fact get away from base? Will they get the warning? Will the communication systems be so disrupted that they will not? Will the communication system work to the submarines?

All these are areas of concern. They are areas on which the Defense Department works daily to try to keep the situation from getting worse, but there remains questions.

I think it would be prudent to avoid the additional very severe question about the vulnerability of the Minuteman if possible. I think it is possible without too much cost.

That is the main reason for thinking that we should go ahead and rebase Minuteman. I might add, one of the major points that I was trying to put across in my testimony was, whether we go to the M–X or Minuteman, we should not hobble the system that we deploy with SALT restrictions that really do not belong there. We should go for the kind of verification agreements that would enable us to field at reasonable cost and without too much complexity a land-based mobile system, whether it uses Minuteman or M–X.

We ought to go for verification of production and destruction. We should insist on that. That is the direction which I think favors the deterrent forces over the first strike forces, independently of whether we do something to fill in the near time gap or not.

CRUISE MISSILE NOT PROHIBITED BY PROTOCOL

Senator JAVITS. I think I understand your respective views on this. Do you think that we could produce a cruise missile which is not prohibited by the protocol for air-to-ground use? If we put on a Manhattan project type effort, could we produce the air-launched cruise missile much sooner than we now plan to? That seems to be the added element which would give us a strike capability which would be responsive to what the Soviets have in their ICBM force?

Mr. MAY. To answer your question directly, I don't know how much we could speed up the cruise missile schedule. I couldn't answer the question. I would be wary of putting all our bets on the cruise missiles. They don't as you know, sir, increase the firepower of the bomber. The bombs and the short-range missiles are simply replaced with long-range missiles. Cruise missiles may increase the survivability of the force, but not its firepower. They provide a relatively slow response. They require that the bombers get warning to get off the ground; and they have to fly through the Soviet defenses.

So, for all these reasons, they don't strike me as the answer for later on. I think they are an adequate way to make the B–52 survive another decade maybe, but I don't see them as being much more than that.

Senator JAVITS. My time is up, but with the Chair's permission, we will get the others to comment.

Mr. NITZE. I would like to make a few comments with respect to the bomber force.

I think everybody who has worked on these problems would agree that estimating the probable penetration to target of bomber weapons is the most uncertain part of trying to wargame what might happen in an exchange. There are so many parts to the air-breathing system which you have to estimate. You have to esti-

mate the ability of the bombers to get off the ground. You have to estimate the ability of the bombers to escape out far enough so that they won't be vulnerable to the effects of a barrage. You have to estimate the ability of the bombers to get to the place where they launch their cruise missiles.

Now, as to being able to estimate the vulnerability of the cruise missiles to the various types of Soviet defenses, all of which we don't really understand today; we don't know how many SA-10's, for instance, they are going to have deployed at a given time and the degree to which we can know the location of those missiles.

Further than that, against hard targets, I believe everyone agrees that the cruise missiles are vulnerable to terminal defenses at the hard point. For instance, if you are defending silos, I believe it is a relatively easy job to have defenses at the silo which could shoot down the cruise missiles or at least deny them the high accuracy which is estimated for them.

So that when people give you figures as to what the bombers can do, these are generally what are called the best number and they don't give you any indication as to the range of uncertainty which is involved. The range of uncertainty in the effectiveness of our bomber/cruise missile system is really very high, and one ought to bear that in mind when one just says, you know, we are going to have these bombers. Sure, we are going to have the bombers and maybe they are going to work well, but maybe they are not going to work very well. For instance, we don't understand all we should understand about the degree to which the enormous Soviet radar network is interconnected with their ground control intercepting centers.

If it is really interconnected, then our bombers and our cruise missiles might have a very hard time indeed penetrating the Soviet Union.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Lodal, would you care to make an observation?

Mr. LODAL. Yes; on the cruise missiles and the bombers: My point concerned the situation we would face in the early 1980's. While I agree in theory with the points Mr. Nitze makes, his points do not apply in the early 1980's. During that time period, we will have a secure bomber penetration capability, since the Soviets won't have the type of defenses we referred to. Therefore, the bombers could be used in the way I described.

Now, with respect to what Mr. May said, I think there is an important question here, and that is the extent to which the SALT Treaty does or does not stand in the way of deploying the type of multiple-aim-point systems which we might wish to deploy. And, quite frankly, with respect to SALT II and ICBM's, I think this is the predominant technical issue that remains, it is the one place where there perhaps is an interaction between the treaty and what we might otherwise choose to do.

Among the three of us, I hear a lot more agreement than disagreement. We are all saying we should keep and rebase the land-based ICBM force, and we should deploy some type of multiple-aim-point system in order to do that. Mr. May and I both commented that we find problems with the large M-X missile. I suggested the Trident D-5 missile as an alternative; he suggested the existing

Minuteman III as an interim alternative. Those are relatively minor differences on technical points. But, on the question of whether the SALT treaty gets in the way of our deployment programs, there may be some more important difference.

I find nothing in the SALT Treaty which gets in the way of doing anything we might wish to do. To the extent that there is an argument about that, it is an argument over whether we can deploy multiple silos—additional so-called vertical shelters, which look just like missile silos, deployed around the existing silos or in some new place. The issue is whether such deployments are consistent with the treaty.

But let me say that in my view, it is much in our country's interest that the Soviet side not deploy such a system. If horizontal shelters, which have some other advantages as well, happen to cost an extra $1 billion a year over 10 years to deploy, but would permit us to retain some confidence that the Soviets cannot and will not deploy a multiple-silo system, I think that the $1 billion a year is a price worth paying.

So, in my view, the treaty is beneficial to us in this area and not harmful.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Helms?

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SALT II—ARMS ESCALATION TREATY INSTEAD OF LIMITATION TREATY

The testimony of all three of you gentlemen has been most helpful to me. I want to take it with me and study it carefully.

I am constantly struck by a persuasion that I have that we are embarking on absolutely the wrong course. Is there any disagreement among the three of you that this, in fact, is an arms escalation treaty instead of a limitation treaty? Do you agree with that?

Mr. LODAL. No.

Mr. NITZE. I am not sure I would use those words. Instead, I would say the treaty does not adequately limit the increase in Soviet forces. In fact, I think the limits are much too high; and certainly with respect to the Soviet Union permits them what I believe to have been their initial program. I don't believe it interferes in any basic way with their initial program.

Mr. LODAL. It is my view that deployments on both sides are likely to be less with the treaty than they would be without the treaty, and that our own military problems are reduced by the treaty, not increased by it. The size of the deployments we would need to solve the military problems which are not solved by the treaty are less than they would otherwise be.

Mr. MAY. Sir, I don't know; I can't come to a reasonable statement regarding what would be the size of the deployment without the treaty. If there had not been these negotiations, presumably the whole political situation would be different, and I just don't know what the eventual deployment on the two sides would be.

I tend to agree with Mr. Nitze, that probably the treaties didn't make too much of a dent in the Soviet plans. The Soviet Union tends to plan a long time in advance, and has a lot of inertia regarding its plans. On the other hand, I think that the treaty on

other counts is compatible with our maintaining what we want to maintain, that is, a deterrent second strike force adequate to deter hostile action against us and our allies.

In the respect of mobile and land-based ICBM's, I believe the treaty does not make adequate provisions. That is a weakness of the treaty.

As to whether it is an escalation or a limitation treaty, that is very hard for me to respond to.

Senator HELMS. Well, all three of you gentlemen very eloquently have talked about how we are not limited in doing this and not limited in doing that in your statements, in your interpretation of the treaty; and I certainly have no intention of being argumentative. I have just come to the inescapable conclusion, satisfactory to me, that we have got to stop this insanity. I am talking about killing 20 million here and 30 million there. Where are we in terms of humanity? My own judgment certainly, as of this time, is that the treaty ought to be rejected outright and the United States ought to demand that the Soviet Union begin negotiations for a true arms reduction treaty and go before the court of world opinion and make clear this is the way we feel about it. But that is neither here nor there in terms of the question I wanted to ask.

POSSIBILITY OF LASER SATELLITE INTERCEPTING AND DESTROYING MISSILES

I suppose, Mr. Nitze, I would direct the first to you, and then to the other two. I have done a bit of study of the possibility of a laser satellite that would intercept and destroy missiles after launch. I have no scientific expertise, but if this had a potential, it is certainly interesting.

Do you think it has any potential?

Mr. MAY. You are asking me?

Mr. NITZE. I think Mr. May is better qualified.

Mr. MAY. Well, from what I have seen on the subject, present lasers are too big to accomplish that task on present satellites. However, these are not necessarily permanent restrictions.

Senator HELMS. Let me see if I understand. The acoustics in here are not all that good. You are saying it is too large for each satellite and would require too many satellites?

Mr. MAY. Yes, sir; that is my understanding of the situation.

Senator HELMS. But those obstacles might possibly be eliminated by enough R. & D.?

Mr. MAY. Yes, sir; they might.

CRASH PROGRAM TO NULLIFY MISSILES AIMED AT US

Senator HELMS. Does that lead you to any conclusion that perhaps instead of our concentrating on weapons building, that maybe we ought to go into a crash program of R. & D. to render null and void missiles which might be aimed at us?

Mr. MAY. I think we ought to consider our program of R. & D. and maybe expand it. I don't know in enough detail to have a judgment on that, particularly on knocking down missiles. It is a very tough job. However good we get at it, we are not going to be able to guarantee that all of the missiles are going to be destroyed,

and we are going to want to retain some offensive arms which are invulnerable and controllable after an attack.

In maybe a lighter vein, Senator, I don't know if this belongs here, but I am reminded of the definition that was given by Ambrose Bierce in the "Devil's Dictionary" of what the word "defenseless" means. Mr. Bierce was a San Franciscan of about 100 years ago. He defined the word "defenseless" as meaning "unable to attack." I think there is a lot of depth to that and——

Senator HELMS. I don't disagree with that. I think that is right. I just don't know which way is the best to turn. All I know is that I fear that we are lulling the American people to sleep by repeatedly describing this treaty as a limitations treaty; and I find that in my own contacts with constituents and others that they have been led to believe that this is going to take care of the problem. That is a grievous mistake.

At the very minimal, I would hope that the people would understand that this treaty is seriously, if not fatally, flawed; and I hope that the Senate in these deliberations and in later ones will make that point clear, and to whatever extent I can, I am going to do that.

Well, time is running short. But I gather that you feel that an appropriate amount of money is being spent on R. & D.?

Mr. MAY. I have not looked at the situation in detail. I think it should receive quite a bit of money, but I am not familiar with what the program is today, so I can't answer your question definitely.

Senator HELMS. Well, if we can provide you with information, and I would be able to provide whatever is available to me, I would like to have you study that and drop me a note. I mean R. & D. in terms of destroying missiles, because if we could get to the point that neither side can realistically hope to get a missile through, that would put an end to the nuclear arms race.

But I am concerned about where we are headed with this treaty. Now, I don't think the Senate has a stronger national defense man than me. I think my voting record will show that; but I think we have reached the point now that when you talk about destroying each nation two or three times, it is absurd.

Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions. I thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hayakawa?

REDEPLOY MINUTEMAN MISSILES WITH SOME MODIFICATIONS

Senator HAYAKAWA. I have only one question. I will address it to Dr. May.

In your statement you talk about:

> A quicker, cheaper and more flexible way to preserve the survivability of the U.S. ICBM force, at least of half of it, in my opinion, would be to redeploy the present Minuteman missiles, with some modification, using the present Minuteman bases and public roadways and some 10,000 places, shelters, garages and others, in which the missiles could be hidden. Such deployment, if pursued with some urgency, should shave about 4 years and $15 billion from the proposed M-X racetrack deployment.

This seems very attractive to me, but is it not true this is not possible under SALT II as now designed?

Mr. MAY. That is a matter of interpretation. The SALT II provisions forbid additional fixed ICBM launchers. They do not forbid except for the protocol, the possibility of nonheavy mobile missiles and deceptive basing.

The protocol forbids such deployment; and I would suggest that we either turn down the protocol or allow it to lapse, depending on what kind of schedule we want to be on. The protocol is indeed incompatible with the kind of deployment which I have suggested.

Senator HAYAKAWA. What you are saying is, the Soviet interpretation of the SALT Treaty would forbid us to do this?

Mr. MAY. I think both sides' interpretation of the protocol, sir, would forbid our deployment of any mobile missile on land. I believe that is correct.

I also think that is wrong, that is, I think that provision of the protocol is not in our best interest.

Senator HAYAKAWA. When does the protocol expire?

Mr. MAY. In 1981.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Then what happens?

Mr. MAY. Then we can go ahead, I believe; but I think that it would take a clear declaration of intent. I am not familiar with all the negotiations history that has gone on in the last 3 years with SALT. I would imagine if we plan to deploy Minuteman or any other system in this deceptive mode, and to not permit verification at the site of deployment, but, rather, go for verification at the sites of production, I believe it would take a clear declaration from the United States that this would be its policy, and then a steady, long-term attempt to work it out with the Soviet Union.

I think that attempt would be successful. Maybe it would take a while. It wouldn't be successful right away.

MULTIPLE VERTICAL SHELTERS ALLOWED BY PROTOCOL

Senator HAYAKAWA. I want to understand this. Mr. Nitze, in your statement you state:

> The Soviet side focused on the distinction between vertical structure deployments and horizontal structures protecting mobile transporter/erector launchers. They unambiguously stated that a vertical deployment mode would involve additional fixed ICBM launchers which are prohibited by the treaty.

Are we referring to the same kind of thing?

Mr. NITZE. Yes. There is a difference of view between what Dr. May has said and what I believe to be the facts. I believe that the multiple vertical protective shelter system is not a mobile system. I believe the distinction between a mobile system and a system involving fixed launchers is that a mobile system has transporter/erector launchers in which the transporter/erector launcher functions are all integral to the same device. There is no other way of making a clearcut distinction between what is a fixed launcher and a mobile launcher.

I believe that is the way the Russians look at the problem. I believe that is the way the President interprets the treaty.

Under that interpretation, the multiple vertical protective shelter system would not be, would not satisfy, the criteria of being a mobile system, and, therefore, the protocol would not bear upon it.

Now, frankly, I think that this is a very bad thing from the standpoint of the interests of the United States. I agree entirely

with Dr. May, that the most advisable thing for us to do today would be to deploy the Minuteman in a multiple vertical protective shelter mode. But if the President's interpretation, and if the Soviet interpretation, of the treaty is correct, the treaty prohibits that.

Now, if that is correct, if one accepts the Russian and the President's interpretation of the treaty, then I think the best alternative is the alternative that the executive branch has come up with, and that is, the racetrack system. But I think one should be clear that the racetrack system is much more expensive, will be less good, won't work as well, is much more risky, than the multiple vertical protective shelter system and will take much longer to deploy. Further, the Russians do not agree that even the racetrack system is compatible with the treaty.

I find it hard to imagine that one will use the racetrack system for the Minuteman; therefore, it will depend upon the M-X.

I really doubt very much whether the M-X will meet its present deployment schedule of 1986, and its full deployment schedule of 1989. On present plans and programs, I think we are in a very bad situation with respect to the ICBM part of the Triad.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. Nitze.

POSSIBILITY OF DECLARATION ALLOWING MULTIPLE VERTICLE SHELTERS

Can we introduce to the treaty an amendment to make this possible on our side, or can we make a unilateral declaration that this is what we intend to do?

Mr. NITZE. I think we could have done that, and maybe we still could; but it would require, I think, a conviction on the part of the executive branch that that is what they want to do for it really to work.

Gen. Lou Allen proposed that we just tell the Russians that the problem on the U.S. side is a risk created by the fact that the Russians are in the process of deploying these very large, accurate missiles, and in very large quantity, and that this is threatening the survivability of our Minuteman; that, therefore, our security requires we do something about it, and therefore that we intend to deploy the multiple vertical protective shelter system, and that we don't intend to have more than one missile per complex of launchers.

And, just as the Soviet Union has told us, that we shouldn't worry about their 3-X command-and-control silos—which, as far as we can tell, can be readily converted to launch a missile—because it wasn't their intent to put a missile in it, we similarly, could tell the Russians it wasn't our intent to have more than one missile per complex of multiple vertical shelters, and that, therefore, this is what we propose to do.

But if we were to do that, it would require resolution on the part of the executive branch, backed by the support of the Congress.

Frankly, that is what I think we ought to do. I thought General Allen was correct; 2 years ago a number of us came out in support of that position. But that was not persuasive to the President.

Unless the executive branch were to be behind it, it won't work. If they are not behind it, then I think the racetrack system is the best fallback position I know of.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you.

That is all my questions for now.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar?

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

NEW METHODS OF VERIFICATION IN SALT III

Gentlemen, I would like to continue in the same area that Senator Hayakawa was exploring and try to trace further the parliamentary situation that we have here.

We have a treaty that is signed and, in essence, we are now in the process of taking a look at what has occurred. And as you have just pointed out, Mr. Nitze, before the situation described by Dr. May could take place, it would call for a resolution by the President, by the administration, to do this, which is a difficult proposition for all of us at this point.

In other words, if we were exploring as a study committee what the best options were for this country prior to somebody making a decision, we are in one predicament, as the treaty has been signed, and we are trying to decide as Senators whether to ratify it; or, beyond that, whether to give advice to the President as to what he needs to do.

Now, I suspect that almost all good ideas, and I believe this is a very good one, have foundered on the point that is made by opponents to the ideas, that to adopt the idea would be to kill the treaty; that is, to require significant renegotiation, to which the Soviets might not prove to be amenable.

What I suppose I would like to gain from you gentlemen is some personal opinion as to whether we are dealing with something here that is in the realm of an idea that would have mutual advantage to the point that even if we did go to renegotiation, there is at least some probability that there is something here to talk about.

Now, I say that from the standpoint of having visited, with five other Senators, Premier Kosygin a couple of weeks ago; and we tried to present at least some common consent of things that we believed were going to occur.

We also suggested things that might occur and which would require, in that case, further negotiation. The prime minister indicated, I think, the standard feeling that that would not be in the realm of the possible. And yet we did find, I think, particularly in the areas of discussion of verification, some feeling, not on his part but on other Soviet officials, that in the SALT III picture changes in verification might indeed be required, substantial changes beyond that which they believed SALT II requires.

Now we come to the verification issue in this proposal by Dr. May, and I think an intriguing one, that essentially, verification might occur with regard to land-based missiles in a similar way that it occurs with regard to aircraft and submarines. If this would be of mutual advantage to both sides, if this is not to be conceived as totally a cat-and-mouse game forever, in which we sort of hope for the best in terms of verification, and that if verification really is the stymie, what is the prospect? Would any of you offer an

opinion as to whether the Soviets would find it somewhat advantageous or not advantageous at all? Should the advice of the Senate be to the President to proceed toward filling the strategic gap that almost all witnesses now believe we have in the intermediate period between now and 1986 or 1989 by moving around our Minutemen?

Would you make a comment on any or all of that?

Mr. NITZE. First of all, with respect to indications from some of the Soviets that they might be interested in new methods of verification in connection with SALT III, having been one of those who was deceived by what they told us with respect to the bearing of SALT I on SALT II, I wouldn't pay much attention to what they say now about SALT III.

We had clear language in the Interim Agreement that nothing in the Interim Agreement would prejudice the terms or scope of SALT II; but the moment we started to negotiate SALT II their position was, "The Interim Agreement was agreed at the highest levels between the two countries and we can't possibly change it; the provisions in the Interim Agreement must be carried forward into SALT II."

So I would not give high credence to the suggestion that what they say at one time is binding on them in any way with respect to the next negotiating phase.

The second point, I am not sure that they would see it as really being mutually beneficial to both sides. The situation of the Soviet Union is quite different than ours. They have big land masses not highly populated in which they can have a truly mobile system, which they can hide by just digging trenchs someplace or another, the way they do with the SS-20. We don't have uninhabited land masses of the same volume; we have a much greater public interface problem than they do.

So I think they would be reasonably happy if the protocol expires and mobile systems are permitted. They would probably choose a mobile system like the SS-20, but larger. They are not that much concerned about verifying what we do.

I think they feel the verification problem is a unilateral problem for us, not for them. They have lots of ways of finding out what we are doing.

I think they are interested in diminishing, to the extent that they can, the amount of information they have to give us on verificational grounds, but otherwise I don't really think that they are that much concerned about being able to verify what we do.

On a theoretical basis though, I do agree with what Dr. May has said. I think his is potentially a better way of going at the problem. If we were two equally responsible sides, going at it with similar objectives, I would wholly agree that methods to carry out what he is talking about could be developed. But if we put this off now until SALT III, I don't think we ever will get it, because we would have nailed down a different procedure in SALT II, and I just don't think the Russians would give in on this.

So that now is the time I think the Senate has to make up its mind whether it wishes to withhold consent unless certain changes are made in the agreements. Unless the executive branch comes up with a somewhat different formula from what they have come up

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with as yet, both with respect to amendments to the treaty and with respect to support for adequate defense programs and budgets in order to preserve an adequate deterrence for us.

Senator LUGAR. Do either of the other of you have comments?

Mr. LODAL. Senator, I would like to make several comments.

First, as I said earlier, I don't believe the situation is critical in the next 3 or 4 year period. Our deterrent is not significantly threatened in this period. The Soviets, to take advantage of this theoretical vulnerability of Minuteman, would have to do some terribly irrational things.

I do believe it is worth the money it costs us to fix this problem and gain the additional security associated with eliminating it altogether; but I don't think it calls for any hair-trigger responses on our part.

Now that being said, on your specific point I don't believe that the treaty prohibits us from deploying vertical shelters. If we want to do it, we should simply assert that it is what we are going to do. I haven't heard the administration say the treaty prohibits them, and I have heard some officials say they believe the treaty does permit the system. But I suspect that if one went forward and asked the Soviets to clarify this explicitly, they might or might not object, but at a minimum, they would insist that they have the right to do the same thing.

In fact, the Soviets might well choose to deploy such a vertical shelter system, which would cause us considerable trouble.

Finally, I think it is worth pointing out that if some approach like the racetrack option can be worked out technically I admit it does have problems as Dr. May has suggested, its only real disadvantage is one of cost, and the cost difference isn't that great. $1 billion a year over the life of the system is the official number, but my own view is that the cost difference is more in the neighborhood of one-half billion dollars a year for the racetrack-type system.

What we are doing is for one-half billion dollars a year, which is a relatively small amount is to eliminate both an issue of potential political contention and the problems associated with our verification of a similar Soviet system in the future.

MOBILE MINUTEMAN NOT IN VIOLATION OF TREATY

Senator LUGAR. You are contending that we could move around the Minuteman now, and that would not be a violation of the treaty? Could we assert our right to do that?

Mr. LODAL. I think that is right; so long as we came up with some sort of a scheme that was verifiable along the lines of what Dr. May has said, that we could do that.

We have said consistently to the Soviets that in our view the launcher is not the silo itself, but rather it is the entire launch mechanism—not just the shelter, regardless of whether the shelter is horizontal or vertical.

Senator LUGAR. But your point is that if they did the same thing, we could not have much confidence in verification. You really need to have the twin point of our asserting and doing it, but at the same time working out a verification scheme in which both sides notice, as they do with the submarines and the aircraft, what we

are doing? And Mr. Nitze's contention is that the Soviets would have no desire to do that, and they feel that it is really a unilateral problem of our own.

So your point is, we could proceed, but you think we would have a disadvantage, because they would then have the right to proceed, and would have really more going for them there?

Mr. LODAL. Yes, sir; that is the point, very precisely stated.

ADVANTAGES OF RACETRACK SCHEME

I should add one last point. There are some technical advantages of the racetrack scheme which should not be overlooked. You do get a little bit for that extra money. In particular, you can move the missiles around a little more rapidly. I don't find that particularly helpful once the war is started, like some people have argued, but it would be helpful in a crisis, to reduce further the biggest worry I have about deceptively based systems, which is the possibility of some kind of compromise of their security. Being able to move them around a little more rapidly in a crisis and sealing off the areas permits one to be pretty well certain that the location of the missiles has not been compromised. While somebody might be able to get clandestine information over a long period of time, you can keep the system secure for a few weeks at least. You can do this to some extent with the vertical shelters, but it is easier with the racetrack.

So you pay a little bit; but you get a little bit, and you eliminate this thorny problem associated with the Soviets deploying the same type of system.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. May, do you have a comment?

Mr. MAY. Yes, I have a couple of comments.

What you are asking is, how do we get from here to there, and that is a very tough question. I agree, of course, that when Minuteman becomes vulnerable in its present silo, it isn't necessarily going to be the end of the world; but it is half of our residual deterrent force. That is an enormous chunk, and I do think we should do something about it, not that I think the Soviets are likely to attack us if we don't, but I believe that no one can foretell the kind of political circumstances that would lead to crisis. And this would be something that would seriously worsen the atmosphere in which crises take place.

PROBLEMS WITH THE RACETRACK SYSTEM

Now I have a very uneasy feeling that the M-X racetrack deployment will be something of an albatross. It is a huge thing and in my judgment, a technological dead end. It is going to demand a lot of attention and take up a lot of money that is badly needed for many other strategic programs, like better command and control and eventually better aircraft; and it may well not get done at the end because of the technical difficulties associated with it.

I can't prove that; that is just a guess, a feeling I have.

I would like to do something more expeditious and flexible, and that is why the suggestion about the Minuteman. As to how to do that, I agree with Mr. Nitze, that the Soviets are not likely to easily agree to production verification, but it is the sort of thing

which I think they will agree to if we argue hard enough, because it doesn't directly interfere with things they have agreed to in their 5-year plan themselves. It simply means they can't deny us a certain advantage.

As to what the Senate should do, I don't have any complete, thorough recommendations.

I would like to suggest the following as partial recommendations. It would be good to recommend that the protocol be allowed to expire. It is an inadequate treatment of mobiles. Mr. Nitze is right, it is not at all clear that what I am suggesting is a mobile. I have been fairly general about what I am suggesting, because I think we ought to look at several options, but the Senate might well make it clear that the United States must reserve the right to maintain its present minimum deterrent reliable forces after an attack under SALT by any method that seems expeditious and timely, so long as, in fact, the total number of missiles deployed is well known and knowable to the Soviet Union.

So long as the issue is one of legalisms and not of substance, then I think we would not violate the SALT spirit and should allow ourselves to proceed.

Now, following these general declarations, there will be a lot of work to be done, both technical to see how best to take advantage of our options and, of course, negotiating to lay the groundwork for eventual agreement concerning verification of mobiles. I am not anticipating there would be prompt agreement, but I think there would be eventual agreement.

PROCESS FOR DEPLOYING MOBILE MINUTEMAN

Senator LUGAR. Just give me an indication—I know this is probably rudimentary for those of you who have discussed this for many years—but you mentioned we have 10,000 miles of roadways and sheds. Specifically, how would you go about deploying Minuteman up and down roadways? What sort of technical problems are there? Would neighborhoods or cities or States agree to such a plan or would everybody come into the fray, saying that this is an environmental hazard to have around?

Mr. MAY. Sir, right now Minuteman is deployed in 1,000 such 3- or 4-acre plots. Maybe you have seen them. The ones I have seen were in the corner of wheatlands or pastures. They are very unobtrusive; they are on country roads. In fact, you have to be right on top of them with a helicopter or very close in a car to see them.

The idea would be to multiply this number by 10. The Government purchases the land and places a Minuteman there. They are quiescent systems; they don't have any emanations or anything like that. I can't, and I don't think anybody else can, foresee how much environmental fuss might be made. I think the real environmental impact would be trivial. The Minuteman are now being moved up and down the holes in North Dakota and elsewhere on transporters. You would have somewhat more motion, but I think the general public wouldn't mind it or be aware of it.

As to how much fuss would be made, I think that would all depend on the resolve with which the system were pursued. If it was clear this was indeed the most viable, cheapest way to go, and

it was safe, it seems to me there should not be a problem; but I am really not an expert in that.

I might say the system, as I suggested, doesn't contemplate doing anything very different from what is being done now. Minuteman is now being moved on those roads, now placed in silos in the corner of wheat and other fields, and the plowing goes right up to the fences. You may have seen it. It is not much of an obstacle to any of the life that goes on around it.

PUBLIC DEBATE ON M-X OR MOBILE MINUTEMAN

Senator LUGAR. I have already overextended my time, but I just want to intrude one final question. Has your proposal received really serious consideration over the course of the last 2, 3, or 5 years? In other words, suddenly the M-X and the racetrack thing have sprung upon us, really during the course of these hearings. Now at some point, you know, the American public may very well want to review the bidding as to how we got to that point; and other people hearing your testimony for the first time may say, "Well, all things considered, this seems like a much more attractive situation; it gives us security faster; it costs less money; it doesn't involve the technical problems that may be there; and we didn't like the idea of the M-X anyway," some would say, "so why not use what we have got?"

What I am wondering is, how full a public debate or even a private debate has gone on with regard to this? And are we likely to have another one in the future as discovery is made or your idea has a revival and people get exercised about the M-X?

Mr. MAY. Well, sir, there are two issues: One is, do we rebase Minuteman, and the other is, do we separate the verification from the site of the deployment?

On the first issue, do we rebase Minuteman: There has been considerable discussion of that defense and science circles for a number of years. People are far from unanimous about what should be done.

I believe you are scheduled to hear from Defense spokesmen tomorrow, and they will probably give you good arguments as to why we should not rebase Minuteman.

There are divided views on whether we should build M-X missiles or not. I happen to think we don't need to now. We don't know what missile to build, so we should wait.

But many people disagree with me within the Defense Department. I certainly can't say I did not get a hearing. People have listened to me everytime I wanted to say something. They did not necessarily do what I said, but—

Now, the other question regarding verification of production, I really can't say how seriously that has been taken. It goes against the SALT I precedent. It is more difficult and requires more cooperation. It is not an easy thing for the bureaucracy to do. It is not an easy thing to propose to the Russians and get an agreement to, because they presumably are not going to like it. It is a little more intrusive from their point of view.

So I feel more work could be done on that.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I have just one final question, which I will address to Mr. May and Mr. Lodal, because I know Mr. Nitze's position and therefore need not ask him to reply again.

QUESTION OF RATIFICATION OR REJECTION

Would you tell me, Mr. May, since we are faced with not the question of negotiating with the Soviet Union, which falls outside our purview, but the question of whether or not we should ratify or reject the treaty that has been presented to us, or ratify it subject to certain understandings and reservations. What would be your recommendation to us, limited as we are to those particular choices?

Mr. MAY. My answer to that would be to take the third option you mentioned. I would suggest ratification, ratification subject to certain understandings, including, specifically, the one about the protocol, and, generally speaking, an adequate treatment of a survivable land-based ICBM. And I might say I am also in great sympathy with the suggestion made by Senator Nunn and others, which, in essence, says that SALT doesn't solve our defense problem; it puts some limitations on some of these defense problems, and we have to go ahead and maintain and increase our defenses.

So I would take the third suggestion you made, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

And Mr. Lodal?

Mr. LODAL. Senator, my views are very similar to Dr. May's.

I think that some of the clarifications suggested would be helpful, those that essentially go to the question of putting on the record our interpretation of items which might otherwise be somewhat ambiguous, but about which the Administration has said that there is no real argument, such as the protocol's duration, our rights to deploy the type of multiple aim point system that has been discussed here, and so forth.

But other than these unrelated clarifications, I would not suggest recommitting the treaty or starting the process over. I think there would be significant harm in doing that, and that the treaty deserves ratification.

The CHAIRMAN. We have Mr. Nitze's letter on this subject which, together with his recommendation, will be inserted in the record.

[Mr. Nitze's letter appears in Part I, July 12, 1979 p. 529–530.]

The CHAIRMAN. I have no further questions. Have you, Senator?

Senator LUGAR. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for your testimony, gentlemen.

Let me announce for the purposes of the press that tomorrow's hearing, the scheduled hearing on the M–X, or, rather, the ICBM aspect of the SALT II Treaty, will be held in room 4221, the committee's regular hearing room in the Dirksen Office Building, beginning at 10 a.m.

There will be no further hearings on the SALT II Treaty for the balance of the week. The hearings scheduled on the treaty for next week will be announced at a later date.

Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the committee was adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., September 12, 1979.]

APPENDIX

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C., July 16, 1979.

Hon. CYRUS VANCE,
Secretary of State, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Over the past several days the Committee has heard conflicting testimony on whether the Soviet Union views the multiple protective structure (MPS) basing mode for the MX missile as compatible with the SALT II agreements. In order to assist the Committee in its examination of this issue, would you please provide the Committee the record of exchanges at all levels, including all official public statements, between the United States and the Soviet Union which pertain to the right of the United States to deploy an MPS type system. The Committee would also appreciate a narrative which places these exchanges and statements in the context of the negotiating process.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

FRANK CHURCH, *Chairman.*

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., August 2, 1979.

Hon. FRANK CHURCH,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am writing in response to your letter of July 16 regarding Soviet views and the record of exchanges between the sides concerning the multiple protective structure (MPS) basing mode for the MX missile, under the provisions of the SALT II Treaty.

This matter was raised by the Soviet Delegation in Geneva in the summer of 1978 when, referring to newspaper reports regarding a vertical MPS basing mode, they stated that it appeared that such a deployment would violate both the ban on construction of new fixed ICBM silo launchers and the ban on deliberate concealment measures. The United States Delegation replied that no decision had been made regarding a basing mode but that whatever mode the United States adopted would be one that violated neither of the provisions cited by the Soviets. They further stated that the draft agreement expressly provided for the deployment, after Protocol expiration, of an ICBM system in which missiles and their launches are moved from point to point. The subject matter was not addressed again by the Delegations. This issue was discussed on several occasions through diplomatic channels along the same lines.

Specifically the United States has made clear to the Soviets that the various mobile ICBM systems we are considering, including ones in which the launch point could itself be hardened, are permitted during the post-Protocol period. An early and important statement of U.S. policy on this subject was made by Secretary of Defense Brown in his speech before the National Convention of the American Legion in New Orleans on August 22 of last year. (I enclose the relevant portion of that speech.)

Finally, prior to the Vienna Summit, the United States publicly announced that it intends to proceed with the MX system and described the various MPS basing modes under consideration. At Vienna the Soviets complained about the introduction of a new powerful missile and questioned the verifiability of its deployment. The President noted that the Soviets had already deployed missiles comparable in power to the MX and he assured them that the basing mode would be verifiable. Thereafter President Brezhnev signed the Treaty and the Protocol.

Further for your information, I would add the following points:

As noted, we do not accept the Soviet argument that the vertical MPS approach would involve construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers, since the shelters in a vertical MPS system are not ICBM launchers. These shelters would clearly be incapable of launching an ICBM; rather they provide blast protection to the mobile launchers themselves. Vertical MPS is a mobile system because the launchers, which contain the equipment required to launch the missile, would be moved together with the missile periodically from one shelter to another. This is the case regardless of the type of shelter used or whether the shelters are vertical or horizontal.

As to the claims the Soviets made about verification, we accept the requirement that any mobile ICBM basing system must permit adequate verification of the number of launchers deployed. In fact, it is in our interest to insist that this be the case, given our high standards concerning verification and the possibility that the Soviets might deploy a similar system themselves. The systems for MX basing that we have considered, including vertical MPS, would be designed to meet this requirement.

As you know, the President decided in early June to enter full-scale engineering development on the MX missile, thereby committing this country to maintaining a survivable land-based ICBM leg of our strategic triad. This Administration will shortly be making a decision on the precise nature of the basing mode for MX. While the vertical shelter MPS approach has not been discarded, we are now giving more active consideration to other approaches which involve other sheltering concepts and appear to offer a number of other advantages, including improved confidence in survivability, over the vertical MPS approach. In any case, our final decision will not be influenced by Soviet objections.

In summary, SALT II clearly permits an adequately verifiable mobile ICBM system. The concepts that we have considered seriously and the basing mode we will soon select will meet that standard.

I hope this has been helpful in clarifying the MPS/SALT II issue.

Sincerely,

CYRUS VANCE.

Enclosure: As stated.

A BALANCED AND EFFECTIVE DEFENSE

(Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, before the Annual National Convention of the American Legion, New Orleans, August 22, 1978)

Any mobile ICBM basing system would, of course, have to be fully consistent with all provisions, including verification provisions, of a strategic arms limitation agreement. The United States will not deploy a mobile ICBM system that would not permit adequate verification of the number of launchers deployed, and other provisions of the agreement. You may be confident that we will insist that any Soviet system meet the same verification standards.

The parts of the joint draft text of the SALT TWO agreements that have already been agreed allow deployment of mobile ICBM systems of the types we are considering. The draft agreement explicitly permits deployment of mobile ICBM launchers during its term, after the expiration of an interim protocol period which would end well before mobile ICBM systems would be ready for deployment.

SALT II TREATY

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1979

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:16 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Church, Stone, and Percy.

OPENING STATEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. This morning, the committee will continue its consideration of the SALT II issues related to ICBM's.

Yesterday, the committee heard from public witnesses on these issues. Today we will hear from two representatives of the administration. Our witnesses are Dr. William Perry, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and Ambassador Ralph Earle, Chief of the U.S. SALT delegation.

I understand that Ambassador Earle has a brief written statement to present and that Dr. Perry has some remarks he would like to make before we move to questions.

Let us proceed first with Ambassador Earle's statement and then with Dr. Perry's.

STATEMENT OF HON. RALPH EARLE, II, CHAIRMAN OF THE U.S. SALT DELEGATION

Ambassador EARLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to appear once again before this committee.

The U.S. M-X ICBM program is consistent with the SALT II agreement signed by the President in Vienna on June 18. Indeed, insuring this consistency was one of our goals in negotiating the agreement with the Soviets.

Let me first review briefly with you the specific provisions in the agreement which are most pertinent to the M-X ICBM.

In article II, paragraph 1, the ICBM launcher definition includes mobile ICBM launchers. The second agreed statement to that paragraph provides explicitly that mobile ICBM launchers shall be counted in the aggregate after the termination of the protocol.

In article IV, paragraph 9, the ICBM "new types" limitation permits each party to have one new type of light ICBM, thus permitting the U.S. M-X ICBM.

In article IV, paragraph 11, the one new type of light ICBM for each party is permitted to have up to 10 reentry vehicles. This will accommodate the U.S. plans for M-X.

In article XV, paragraph 3, we have the provision which bans deliberate concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the provisions of the treaty. The mobile basing mode of the U.S. M-X ICBM is being designed so that it will not violate the prohibition on deliberate concealment measures. M-X will be adequately verifiable by national technical means.

Article I of the protocol: The protocol ban on deploying mobile ICBM launchers and on flight-testing ICBM's from such launchers will expire the end of 1981, when the protocol terminates. In view of the M-X schedule, these prohibitions will not affect the M-X program. In addition, let me note that even during the period of the protocol, the United States will be permitted to test a mobile ICBM launcher short of flight-testing the missile from the launcher, and will be permitted to flight test M-X ICBM's from fixed launchers.

As you know, last Friday the President announced his approval of the mobile basing plans for the M-X missile, which Dr. Perry will describe in greater detail. The United States has designed this system, as I mentioned, so that it will be adequately verifiable under the SALT II agreement.

In particular, the assembly of M-X missiles, launchers, and transporters will be done in the open to the extent feasible.

Special transport techniques will be used to move each launcher and missile to the deployment area. This unique system, together with barriers between the deployment area and the assembly area, will provide confidence that only one launcher is deployed on each so-called loop road.

The loop roads will not be connected, so launchers cannot transfer from one to another.

Finally, the shelters at each loop road can be uncovered periodically, and thus, the Soviets will be able to verify that there is only one M-X launcher on each oval loop road.

It is important to note that paragraph 3 of article XV of the treaty does not prohibit deliberate concealment in general, but prohibits only deliberate concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the provisions of the treaty. The treaty does not require that the sides know exactly where every strategic system is at every given moment. Rather, the treaty sets numerical limits on strategic systems.

Verifying compliance with such numerical limits requires counting the number of launchers deployed. This is already clear in the case of SLBM launchers on submarines. The submarines spend months at naval bases, which serve as verification choke points, initially for fitting out and later between patrols and for overhauling. This permits the United States to count the number of Soviet SLBM launchers with high confidence, and it permits the Soviets to count the number of United States SLBM launchers with equally high confidence.

However, the submarines deliberately conceal themselves while on patrol; but since this does not impede verification of compliance with the agreement, it is permitted under SALT. The mobile basing mode of the U.S. M-X ICBM system has been designed in an analogous fashion and will be adequately verifiable under the SALT II agreement.

Should the Soviets decide to deploy a mobile ICBM force in the future, the United States will insist on the same high standard of verifiability.

Now, Mr. Chairman, let me turn to the discussions which the United States has had with the Soviets on this multiple protective structure [MPS] basing mode for the M–X ICBM under the provisions of the SALT II agreement.

This matter was raised by the Soviet Delegation in Geneva in the summer of 1978 when, referring to newspaper reports regarding a vertical MPS basing mode, they stated to us that it appeared that such a deployment would violate both the ban on the construction of new fixed ICBM silo launchers, provided for in article IV, and the ban on deliberate concealment measures, to which I have already referred.

The U.S. Delegation replied that no decision had been made regarding a basing mode, but that whatever mode the United States adopted would be one that violated neither of the provisions cited by the Soviets. We further stated that the draft agreement expressly provided for the deployment, after protocol expiration, of an ICBM system in which missiles and their launchers are moved from point to point.

The subject matter was not addressed again by the delegations.

This issue was discussed on several occasions through diplomatic channels along the same lines. In particular, the United States has made clear to the Soviets that the various mobile ICBM systems we have considered, including ones in which the launch point could itself be hardened, are permitted during the post protocol period.

Prior to the Vienna Summit, the United States publicly announced that it intended to proceed with the M–X system and described the various MPS basing modes under consideration. At Vienna, the Soviets complained about the introduction of a new powerful missile and questioned the verifiability of its deployment. The President noted that the Soviets had already deployed missiles comparable in power to the M–X and he assured them that the basing mode would be verifiable. Thereafter, President Brezhnev signed the treaty and the protocol.

Let me add the following.

The United States does not accept the Soviet argument, raised in the context of vertical shelters, that the MPS approach would involve construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers; the shelters in an MPS system are not ICBM launchers. These shelters could not launch an ICBM; rather, they provide blast protection to the mobile launchers themselves.

On the other hand, the mobile launchers may launch a missile whether or not they are in fact located in one of the shelters. MPS is a mobile system because the launchers, which contain the equipment required to launch the missile, would be moved together with the missile periodically from one shelter to another.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

Dr. Perry, we would be pleased to hear from you at this point.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM J. PERRY, UNDER SECRETARY FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE;[1] ACCOMPANIED BY SEYMOUR ZEIBERG, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING, AND WALTER SLOCOMBE, DIRECTOR, DOD SALT TASK FORCE

Dr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I do have a written statement which I would like to submit for the record. I would prefer not to read that written statement. Instead, I will summarize some highlights from it.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be pleased to accept your written statement and it will be inserted in the record at the appropriate place.

Dr. PERRY. I am going to be discussing the introduction of the M-X system into our strategic deterrent forces.

The purpose of these forces, which is the deterrence of nuclear war, is achieved by two related actions: first of all, by building the strength of our strategic forces; second, by diplomatic initiatives to achieve bilateral reduction in deployed forces. These related actions have led to both a SALT II Treaty and to the proposal to deploy an M-X system.

We do not know precisely what it is that would deter the Soviet Union from a nuclear war. We have 9,000 nuclear warheads in our strategic forces. We believe this is more than enough to deter war, and, in fact, we have built a substantial safety factor into those forces.

The concern we have is not whether we have sufficient nuclear power, but whether we can survive a surprise attack.

If the Soviet Union believes that it could destroy some substantial percentage of these forces by a surprise attack, that would eliminate the safety factor we have built into the forces and, in a sense, weaken our deterrence. Therefore, the actions we are taking to modernize our strategic forces emphasize improving the survivability of those forces so that they can withstand a surprise attack and so that the Soviet Union could not believe that it could effectively attack these forces.

A factor which gives us confidence in the survivability of the forces and therefore the strength of our deterrence is the diversity of the forces—the fact that we have submarine-launched missiles, bombers, and land-based ICBM's.

Each of those forces, in its own way, has susceptibility to a particular type of attack. One of the great strengths of this diverse system of forces is that the vulnerability of each force is occurring at a different time in history. We can rectify the vulnerability, then, in one force while the other two maintain the deterrence during that period.

Let me go very quickly through what we are doing now to modernize the forces with the emphasis on the M-X program. With your permission, I have some charts which will facilitate the discussion.

[The chart referred to follows:]

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[1] See page 474 for Hon. Perry's prepared statement.

U.S. STRATEGIC FORCE MODERNIZATION

COMPONENT	WARHEAD RATIO (US TO SU)	SOVIET THREAT TO SURVIVABILITY	US RESPONSE	
ICBM	1:2	SU CAPABILITY TO DESTROY MOST MM SILOS (EARLY 1980's)	MX (MOBILE BASING)	
SLBM	4:1	POTENTIAL SU ADVANCED ASW CAPABILITY (EARLY 1990's)	• TRIDENT SUB (QUIETER) • TRIDENT MISSILE (INCREASES ASW SEARCH AREA TENFOLD)	
BOMBER	8:1	SU LOW ALTITUDE AIR DEFENSE (MID 1980's)	CRUISE MISSILE (PENETRATES LOW ALTITUDE AIR DEFENSE–SMALL SIZE, LARGE NO.s)	

ABBREVIATIONS

ASW: ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

CM: CRUISE MISSILE

MM: MINUTEMAN

RV: REENTRY VEHICLE

Dr. PERRY. In summary form, Mr. Chairman, this lists the three components of our strategic forces: the ICBM's, the SLBM's, and the bombers. Of these 9,000 warheads that we have, if we compare them in net to those of the Soviet Union, we see that in the land-based ICBM forces, the Soviet Union has about a 2-to-1 advantage in number of warheads deployed.

The CHAIRMAN. This is just a comparison of numbers and not a comparison of size, is that right?

Dr. PERRY. These are just numbers of warheads. In this simplified form it does not take into account qualitative characteristics or survivability.

A simple comparison of numbers says there is about a 2-to-1 advantage in ICBM warhead for the Soviet Union. But the United States has an advantage of about 4-to-1 in submarine-launched missiles warheads and about 8-to-1 advantage in the number of warheads or bombs in our bomber force.

In net, we assess that we have equivalence in our strategic forces, averaged out over the entire set of strategic forces. So, the issue which we are confronting is not the number of warheads in our forces, but the ability to maintain their survivability.

We look, then, to each of these forces. In the case of the ICBM's, the threat to their survivability will become severe in the early 1980's. Our response to that is to develop the M-X system which provides mobile basing and therefore is able to resist the sort of attack which might be launched against the Minuteman silos. I will talk later in somewhat more detail about that M-X system.

Let me briefly point out the fact that our other two legs of the Triad also have potential vulnerabilities.

In the case of the bombers, we believe that the new air defense system being deployed by the Soviet Union will threaten the survivability of that force after the mid-1980's. This survivability problem is occurring about 5 years after the survivability problem of the ICBM. Our solution is to deploy cruise missiles which will be able to penetrate this new low altitude air defense system which is now in the final stages of testing in the Soviet Union and will soon begin deployment.

In effect, we believe the cruise missile will make that Soviet air-defense system obsolete before it is deployed.

QUESTION OF B-52 LAUNCHING PLATFORM BECOMING OBSOLETE

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Percy, I invite you to ask any questions at any time that you wish. Since there are only the two of us here at the moment, we can indulge in that luxury.

Dr. Perry, what about the argument that we heard yesterday that the B-52 is an airplane that is getting old, that it is going to become an obsolete launching platform for these cruise missiles and, therefore, that we cannot look to the future with any degree of confidence as long as this aerial launching pad, so to speak, is one that is wearing out?

Dr. PERRY. That is a fair argument, Mr. Chairman. We assess that the B-52 will indeed be wearing out—will be not useful as a launcher of cruise missiles—by 1990 or the early 1990's, and, therefore, we will need a replacement for it as a cruise missile carrier by this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Rather than as a bomber?

Dr. PERRY. Rather than as a bomber. It will become ineffective as a bomber by the mid-1980's—not because it is wearing out, but because we will not have high confidence in its ability to penetrate Soviet air defenses. The cruise missile will provide that for us, so wearout and penetration capability there are two different issues.

WIDE BODIED COMMERCIAL JET AS ADEQUATE LAUNCHING AIRCRAFT

The CHAIRMAN. Does a regular wide bodied commercial jet or commercial type jet, with which we are all familiar, constitute an adequate aerial launching pad for cruise missiles, looking to the future?

Dr. PERRY. Not in my judgment, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We are going to have to have an expensive new airplane because from the military designs they are about five times as expensive as otherwise. What are we going to need in the way of expensive aircraft in the future?

Dr. PERRY. The fundamental requirement which the airplane must have—which is different from that of transport airplanes—is that it be hardened to a nuclear blast, so that it would not be possible for the Soviet Union to conduct a barrage attack against that airplane as it is departing its base. That is the fundamental characteristic which would distinguish a cruise missile carrier, whether we would design it from scratch or adapt a wide bodied transport for that purpose. But I do not believe it is practical to adapt a wide bodied transport to obtain that hardening.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. So, you will have to design a new aircraft?

Dr. PERRY. Yes, we will.

We may be able to adapt other military designs for that purpose; but I do not believe it will be practical to go back after the aircraft is developed, to obtain the structural hardening which is necessary in the airplanes that were designed for transport purpose.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. PERRY. The other features of a transport airplane might be satisfactory, such as the speed and load capacity; but the resistance to nuclear blast will be the singular deficiency.

I do want to reassert again that the B–52 will be adequate as a cruise missile carrier, certainly until to the 1990 period, but not as a penetrating bomber.

In the case of the submarine-launched ballistic missiles, we believe that they will remain invulnerable through the 1980's and the earliest that the Soviets might be able to conceive of an attack against our submarines at sea would be in the early 1990's, about 10 years from now. So, we have, separated by about 5-year intervals, a threat to the survivability of each element these forces: one coming in the early 1980's, one in the mid-1980's and one in the early 1990's. This does give us an opportunity to phase our responses to these.

In the case of the bomber, the response is already underway. It is deploying cruise missiles. They will begin to go into our forces in about 2 years. We will achieve an initial operational capability in 1982. That action will anticipate the deployment of the improved Soviet air defenses.

In the case of the submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the new Trident missile will begin deployment later this year and the Trident submarine in about another year or so. Both of those are anticipating increased Soviet threats to detectability of submarines at sea. So, we are satisfied that the actions we are taking in these two legs of the Triad will maintain invulnerability against these threats to their survivability.

SUBMARINE WARHEADS LESS ACCURATE AND MUCH SMALLER

The CHAIRMAN. Before we leave the submarines, Dr. Perry, the critics of the treaty argue that though we have a numerical advantage in the number of nuclear warheads that we carry aboard our submarines, these warheads are less accurate and much smaller than the warheads on the intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Soviet missiles particularly, and that, therefore, the 4 to 1 ratio which appears to be an American advantage is, in fact, an American disadvantage because the size of the submarine warhead being so much less than the typical Russian warhead and the accuracy being less, you have a decided Russian advantage in terms of the nuclear power or the explosive power which they can place on target as compared to what we can place on target.

Senator PERCY. Dr. Perry, while you are answering that question, would you supplement it with a statement on the whole question of heavy missiles and throw-weight? Since your last testimony, opponents of the treaty have constantly pounded away at the fact that the Soviets do have a right to 308 heavy throw-weight ICBM launchers while the United States does not have that right.

Would you comment on how important, in your judgment, throw-weight is as a measure of strategic force capability?

Dr. PERRY. I would be happy to comment on that, Senator Percy, but, with your permission, I will defer that to a few minutes later in the discussion when I plan to explicitly address that issue.

Senator PERCY. Very well.

Dr. PERRY. Relative to the submarine question, Mr. Chairman, I have a number of comments.

First of all, it is correct that the missiles on the SLBM's are both smaller in yield and less in accuracy than those on our ICBM's. However, the smallest warhead we have on a submarine is about three times the size of the Hiroshima warhead. I wanted to put that in some sort of perspective.

Second, the warhead going on the new Trident missile, the so-called C-4 missile, will be about 2½ times greater in yield than that smaller SLBM warhead. So, they are smaller in yield than the ICBM warheads; but they are still very substantial.

Third, to the extent that there are unique characteristics in the ICBM force, which I believe there are, the moves that we are taking in ICBM modernization—namely, the M-X—retain those characteristics. It is not an issue that has anything to do with the treaty, so far as I can see, unless the treaty were in some way to prevent us from taking this action of preserving the ICBM leg of the Triad.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is a legitimate point that needs to be constantly reiterated. The point is that whatever the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the present nuclear balance be-

tween the two countries, whatever need we may have to develop new weapon systems, to preserve that balance the systems we desire to develop are not prohibited by the treaty. So, it is difficult for me to make the linkage that opponents of the treaty make. Unless one believes that we will all be lulled to sleep by ratification of the treaty, it is hard for me to follow them to their conclusion, even accepting their analysis of the throw-weight advantage which the Soviet Union possesses in the size of the nuclear warheads.

I cannot see how we are impeded in any way by the ratification of the SALT Treaty. In fact, it would seem to me that we are better off with the treaty, whatever we must do in the development of weapon systems, than we would be without the treaty.

Mr. PERRY. It is quite correct that the treaty is not impeding programs which we plan to undertake. It is also correct that in at least one of our systems, namely, the M-X, the design of that system is facilitated by limiting of Soviet ICBM MIRV's. I will talk more about that later.

I would make one other comment about this Triad and compare it with that of the Soviet Union.

VALUE OF THE TRIAD

In my judgment, the balance of forces that we have—we tend to have a balanced capability in the ICBM, SLBM, and bomber forces—is a far superior composition of forces than that of the Soviet Union. They have concentrated their resources to the point where about three-fourth's of their capability is in the ICBM force.

I would not want to exchange our balance for their great concentration of ICBM's. I think the fallacy of the approach they are taking will become clear. As M-X is developed, they will then be confronted with the same type of ICBM vulnerability problem which we have, although not to the same degree. But they have three-fourths of their force invested in that ICBM's and they will not be in a strong position to fall back on the high survivability components of the force, the submarines and bombers, as we are able to do.

I do suggest, though, that the Soviets are probably as dissatisfied with that unbalanced Triad as we would be if we had it. I believe we will see, over the period of the next 5 or 6 years, a very greatly increased emphasis in Soviet submarine and bomber forces. We will see them converging to the same sort of balanced triad which we ourselves have selected.

PERCEPTION OF LACK OF EQUALITY

Senator PERCY. Dr. Perry, is your judgment, why is there the perception of our lack of equality? The perception of Soviet superiority is sinking deeper into the American public consciousness as the opponents of the treaty keep pounding away that we are now in an inferior position. Why is it that we have not gotten the message across to our people about the lack of vulnerability we have in the various components of our Triad—specifically in bombers and submarines, and very soon in cruise missiles?

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We simply have not gotten this story across. Perception in the world and the perception of the American public are very important factors.

Dr. PERRY. Since the purpose of these forces is to deter a war, and since that depends at least on the Soviet Union's perception of what the strength of our force is, this is an extremely important issue.

I think the possible answer to that is twofold.

First of all, of all of the forces, ICBM's seem to have the greatest symbolic value. They are a symbolic measure of military strength. In ICBM's big is beautiful, so to speak.

Second, we have conducted a well publicized debate on the deficiencies of our force in the last few years as we studied the vulnerability of the Minuteman and opened public debate on the SALT Treaty. There is no equivalent debate in the Soviet Union on the deficiencies of their force.

If I were looking at their force as a Soviet military planner, I would be very greatly concerned and I would be conducting a debate to do something about the significant concentration of ICBM's, which will be highly vulnerable, and on the very weak force they have in submarine forces and bombers. I would be campaigning to try to correct that weakness.

In the course of that campaign, I would be creating a public perception of weakness.

Senator PERCY. Somehow we have to get that story across because the rest of the world may become convinced by the opponents of the treaty that we are in a militarily inferior position and that we are far more vulnerable than the Soviets are. Yet I perceive us to be less vulnerable than the Soviet Union. I would not want to keep my eggs in the same basket where the Soviets have theirs.

But this story is not getting across. I wanted to ask you about it so that it could be repeated.

Thank you.

HORIZONTAL SHELTERS AS STORAGE FACILITIES

The CHAIRMAN. Since I am going to have to leave in only a few minutes, Dr. Perry, I wonder if you could answer two questions for me which I think need to be addressed.

First of all, you have spoken of the M-X missile and its horizontal shelter basing mode. There is a provision in the treaty that storage facilities and launch sites are prohibited so that we avoid the danger of having one missile fired from a silo and then another missile inserted and fired and so on. I believe this is called something like "machinegun silos."

How do these horizontal shelters in this basing mode that is being proposed become distinguished from storage facilities at launch sites, which are prohibited by the SALT II Treaty?

I would address this question to either Dr. Perry or Ambassador Earle.

Dr. PERRY. I will give a very quick answer to that and then pass it to Ambassador Earle.

They are not storage facilities. We do not store anything in them. To facilitate verification of that we have provided for portholes in

the tops of the shelters which we will periodically remove to allow inspection.

That is a simple answer to the question. Let me pass the ball at this point to Ambassador Earle.

Ambassador EARLE. I don't think I can add very much to that, Mr. Chairman. When the provision to which you refer in paragraph 5 of article IV was negotiated, I think it was clear on the part of both sides that this is what a storage facility meant: it meant a facility in which an excess missile remained for a period of time. As I think Dr. Perry will develop, these are storage sites only in the sense that one missile is available to the complex of 23 shelters and, therefore, I do not think would fall within the understanding between the sides as to what we had in mind when this provision was agreed.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that is a distinction with which the Russians will agree?


Ambassador EARLE. Yes, I do. At no time have they raised this as an issue with us. I think also the negotiating history of the storage facilities was in the context of fixed ICBM launchers, which, of course, this new M-X system is not.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

CHARACTERISTICS OF M-X MISSILE

Dr. PERRY. Let me go very quickly through the characteristics of the M-X missile and then proceed to a description of the basing system which will be employed.

[The chart follows:]



MX FEATURES

- GROSS WEIGHT — 190,000 LBS
- THROW WEIGHT — 7,900 LBS
- WARHEADS — 10
- ACCURACY — MUCH BETTER THAN MINUTEMAN III

MX MILESTONES

- ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT — 1976
- FULL SCALE DEVELOPMENT —1979
- FIRST FLIGHT — 1983
- DEPLOYMENT BEGINS — 1985
- 1st SQUADRON OPERATIONAL (IOC) — 1986

Dr. PERRY. The missile, which weighs 190,000 pounds, is about 2½ times the size and weight of the Minuteman missile. It is about equal to the size of the SS-19, and it is about half the size of the SS-18. It will have 10 warheads, compared with 3 on the Minuteman and 6 on the SS-19, and 10 on the SS-18.

The accuracy figure is classified, but I can say that it will be significantly better than that of Minuteman III.

Senator PERCY. Did you say infinitely better? I thought Minuteman III was pretty accurate.

Dr. PERRY. I said significantly better.

Senator PERCY. Oh, I see. I thought you used the word "infinitely."

Dr. PERRY. No. "Significantly."

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

OBJECTION TO LEGALITY OF M-X

Senator STONE. Dr. Perry, has Defense Minister Ustinov of the Soviet Union objected to the legality of the M-X missile, or has he not?

Ambassador Earle, you may address this question, if you wish.

Ambassador EARLE. Senator Stone, I would infer that the question in part arises from a recent alleged quotation which appeared, I believe, in the Wall Street Journal about a discussion Secretary Brown and General Jones had with Minister Ustinov. I was not present at that meeting. But my understanding is that he made comments similar to the ones I described in my statement and that their concern was expressed that a multiple basing mode could violate either or both the provision regarding construction of additional ICBM launchers and the provision prohibiting on deliberate concealment measures.

That expression by Mr. Ustinov at that meeting was a reiteration of one that Minister Semenov had made previously and one which President Brezhnev also made.

In all cases, the Soviets were assured that whatever basing mode was adopted would be adequately verifiable by national technical means and, as I noted earlier in your absence, subsequently President Brezhnev did sign the agreement, as agreed upon in Geneva.

Senator STONE. So, it is your position, then, that the Soviet Union will not object to the racetrack mode which we have adopted?

Ambassador EARLE. Senator Stone, I do not know whether they will object or not. I think it depends on the way it comes out. Based on what Dr. Perry has been saying and will tell you, I think it will be adequately verifiable and they may, indeed, not object to it. If they raise questions regarding the verifiability of the system, we are quite prepared to discuss those questions with them in the Standing Consultative Commission.

STATEMENT OF NONOBJECTION BY SOVIETS

Senator STONE. Wouldn't you think it would be reassuring to the Senate in connection with the ratification procedure that you obtain their approval, or at least their statement of nonobjection? Otherwise, you are going to be faced with an amendment.

Ambassador EARLE. Senator Stone, you can speak better than I can as to what would reassure the Senate. In my view, it would be highly inappropriate to ask the Soviets for permission to deploy a system which we believe would be adequately verifiable.

Senator STONE. The administration has been taking that line during the entire debate on SALT, that you do not think it is appropriate for us to ask their permission. You have been told, though, by members of this committee repeatedly that we do not like the kind of ambiguity which substitutes ambiguity at the moment for objection later on. It is not a question of permission; it is a question of their nonobjection. It is not a question of asking them "Please may I". It is a question of getting out on the table whether or not they are going to object, so that we know. It makes the difference between an understanding and a reservation, or a reservation and an amendment.

That is important to the administration and not just to the Senate.

Ambassador EARLE. Senator Stone, I would simply comment that if I were in the opposite position and the Soviets asked us if we would acquiesce in a program which was merely on the drawing board, I would not acquiesce.

Senator STONE. But we are about to be asked for billions of dollars to fund a system which we want to be sure is not, on its face, objectionable to our treaty partners. This is supposed to be a treaty.

Ambassador EARLE. And I think, Senator Stone, that the provisions of the treaty are quite clear that the compliance——

Senator STONE. Then you can assure us that it is not objectionable and that we can go ahead and will not have this problem later on.

Ambassador EARLE. I can assure you that it is permissible.

Senator STONE. That's fine.

WHAT CONSTITUTES A MOBILE MISSILE

Let me ask this question. What does constitute a mobile launcher when there is no SALT II agreed definition of a mobile launcher?

Ambassador EARLE. Senator, I agree that there is no specific definition of a mobile launcher. That is because of the variety of type of mobility that could be used with respect to launchers. I think that the words themselves, and the negotiating record with the Soviets indicate that a mobile launcher is a launcher which can move, in contradistinction to the so-called fixed silo launchers. In other words, any launcher of an ICBM which is not fixed is, by definition, mobile. I am quite comfortable with the lack of precision there.

INCREASED CAPABILITY OF SOVIET ICBM'S

Senator STONE. With regard to their response to our mobile launcher or their own initiatives, it has been said frequently and recently on the floor of the Senate and elsewhere, and is it not possible, that an entirely new Soviet ICBM which did not violate the "new types" definition could increase: (1) their accuracy; (2) their reliability; (3) their range capability; (4) their warhead yield; (5) their ABM defense penetration capability; (6) their targeting

capability; and (7) their capability of command and control subsystems?

Finally, in this question, could not any of these factors, or all, significantly increase their military capability and, hence, the utility of their ICBM?

I ask those questions of both of you.

Dr. PERRY. The answer is certainly. The answer is self-evident from the question. All of those are desirable features of the ICBM. They are permitted and they can increase their capability.

We, of course, are permitted to make similar improvements.

"THE SS-19 LOOPHOLE"

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Perry, there is a report in the Evans and Novak column which is entitled "The SS-19 Loophole." I will read a portion of it and wish to get your response, but disregard the hyperbole and just address the argument.

A reading of the fine print in the SALT II Treaty after it went to the Senate has revealed, to the horror of supporters of the arms control pact, an uncanny repetition of the worst U.S. blooper in the 1972 SALT I Treaty.

The 1972 mistake, not discovered until long after ratification, failed to pin down specific limits on the size of a replacement for the SS-11 intercontinental ballistic missile. Now, in a new negotiating blooper discovered as the Senate ratification debate begins, SALT II does not clearly define the size of Moscow's mainstay SS-19 ICBM, which it sets as the limit on the size of any new missiles.

That history should be so sadly replayed is explicable only by this fact: The Russians simply refused to agree on a specific definition of the size of the SS-19. This adds new evidence that U.S. negotiators, under orders from Washington for an agreement at almost any cost, bowed to the iron will of their Soviet counterparts."

What is your response to the argument that this treaty, by failing to exactly define the SS-19, has failed to establish a reliable limit on the size of the new missile that the Russians would be permitted to develop under the terms of the treaty?

Dr. PERRY. I would make just two brief comments on that and then would see what Ambassador Earle cares to say.

First of all, the revelation in the column is not really a revelation or a surprise to anybody who has been working with the treaty, nor is it to the horror of the people who are working on the treaty.

Second, the issue of verification of changes in weight is such that in my judgment it is, in fact, easier and more reliable to verify changes or increments of weight, such as a 5-percent or 10-percent increase, than it is to verify absolute numbers. So, I do not see how that issue complicates our verification problem one way or the other since, indeed, what we would be doing in our verification is comparing a new system with the SS-19 and determining what, if any, increase there was. This we can do more reliably and more accurately than we can the assessment of absolute weights.

Ambassador EARLE. Senator Church, let me add this. I think in the light of what Dr. Perry said about verification that the treaty itself is quite clear. Each side is permitted one new type of ICBM. It must be light. It is agreed formally in the document that the SS-19 is the heaviest in terms of launch-weight and throw-weight of any existing light ICBM. Ergo, here, not even the 5-percent provision applies. Any ICBM with a throw-weight or launch-weight greater than that of the SS-19 is prohibited and, given what Dr.

Perry said about the verification of changes of weight, there is not any question or any basis for the article to which you referred.

The CHAIRMAN. What if the Russians were to say that we were mistaken about the size and throw-weight of the SS–19? Since they have not agreed to our definition of the dimensions and the capabilities of that particular missile, our argument that some new missile exceeds it would be unacceptable to them.

In other words, they have not agreed as to the size, the weight, throw-weight, and capability of the SS–19; is that correct?

Ambassador EARLE. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Don't we have here a possibility for argument in the future?

Senator STONE. The Senator's question is very cogent. They have not agreed to the upper limit of the SS–19, so how can we maintain that anything higher than the SS–19 is not light?

Ambassador EARLE. They have agreed that the throw-weight and launch-weight of the SS–19 are the ceilings for the light ICBM's.

Senator STONE. But they have not yet said what they are?

Ambassador EARLE. They have not.

Senator STONE. How will we know what they are?

Ambassador EARLE. The problem would exist even if they said what they are. If we say that the throw-weights of a new missile exceeds the throw-weight of the SS–19 or if we say that the throw-weight of that new missile exceeds *x*-thousand kilograms, the problem is exacty the same except, as Dr. Perry said, it is easier to verify that it is heavier than the existing SS–19 than that it is heavier than a fixed number.

You have the problem. I agree with that.

Senator STONE. Don't we need both?

Ambassador EARLE. I don't think that the number would help at all.

Senator STONE. It doesn't help at all?

Ambassador EARLE. No; for the reasons that Dr. Perry stated.

Dr. PERRY. I would like to make one other point and come at this from a different direction.

Suppose it is the motivation of the Soviets to make that change or some of the other changes to which Senator Stone referred earlier, I expect to see those product improvements to which Senator Stone referred earlier as a matter of course, particularly the guidance improvements. But, to a very great extent, adding more weight or adding those other features does not really change the nature of the threat to the United States. The present SS–18 and SS–19 already are capable of providing all of the threat the Soviets need to the Minuteman system. Adding to that threat does not change the nature of the problem.

If we deploy an M–X system and if they want to try to overwhelm that system, those features will not affect the vulnerability of M–X. Only additional reentry vehicles will do that.


So, the principal point of verification to which we have to address ourselves, I believe, is action which could lead to significant increases in the number of reentry vehicles. This is what could cause us a problem in the M–X system.

Let me get to Senator Percy's question.

Again, it is difficult to address this problem in an unclassified manner, but I have attempted to do that by comparing the capabilities of four different missiles: the Minuteman III; the SS–19; the M–X; and the SS–18.

[The chart referred to follows:]

COMPARISON OF MISSILE MILITARY CAPABILITIES



Dr. PERRY. There is a whole spectrum of targets against which these missiles might be used. I have taken the two ends of the spectrum: A very hard target—and you might think of a silo as being representative of that—and a very soft target which would be an economic or an industrial target.

I have taken off the scale of these two graphs, but it is still representative of the actual results when the calculations were made. This shows that the number of soft targets which could be successfully attacked by Minuteman III, SS–19, M–X, and SS–18 is basically a function of only the number of reentry vehicles on those missiles, going from 3 to 6 to 10.

Senator STONE. How many reentry vehicles will the Russians have in 1986, compared to us for all systems?

Dr. PERRY. May I defer an answer to that for just a minute, Senator? I will come back to that.

In the case of the hard-target capability, it is a function not only of the number of warheads, but also of the accuracy and the yield. Here we see that the M–X, when it becomes operational in 1986, will have greater capability than the SS–19 now or at that time. It will have greater capability than the SS–18 presently has, and slightly less or about as equivalent capability of what we project for the SS–18 at that time. This is on a missile-by-missile basis.

Now I will address your question, Senator Stone.

ICBM REENTRY VEHICLES RUSSIANS WILL HAVE BY 1986

Senator STONE. How many heavy warhead, reentry vehicles, will they have in 1986? How many will we have under the treaty?

Dr. PERRY. In ICBM's?

Senator STONE. All right, yes. The missiles limited by the treaty. Under the missiles limited by the treaty, how many heavy reentry vehicles will they have and how many will we have? How many light ones will they have and how many will we have, as limited by the treaty?

Dr. PERRY. At the end of the treaty, we would expect there to be about an equal number of warheads on each side.

Going into categories of warheads, we will expect the same ratio of advantage in ICBM's that they presently have over us and the same relative advantage we presently have in SLBM's and bombers.

Sentor STONE. In other words, they will have more heavy reentry vehicles than we will and we will have more light reentry vehicles than they will. Is that it?

Dr. PERRY. Senator Stone, light or heavy they have the same capability on target. Ours are heavy enough.

Senator STONE. I will get to the capability in a minute. Please answer my question.

Dr. PERRY. Ours are heavy enough. They will have——

Senator STONE. You have not answered my question, Dr. Perry. Are they going to have more than we have of heavies?

Dr. PERRY. Certainly. They will have approximately 6,000 ICBM RV's at that time.

Senator STONE. How many will we have?

Dr. PERRY. We will have the same as we have now, about 2,000.

Senator STONE. They will have 6,000 heavy reentry vehicles and we will have 2,000 heavy reentry vehicles.

Dr. PERRY. A little more than 2,000; yes.

Senator STONE. Let's now talk about light ones. How many will they have and how many will we have?

This is all under the treaty and assuming 100 percent verification and compliance on both sides.

Dr. PERRY. We will have about a 2-to-1 advantage in light reentry vehicles in the SLBM field by the end of the treaty.

Senator STONE. The problem, of course, is——

Dr. PERRY. Senator Stone, there is a third part of the question, which is the bombers and the cruise missiles.

Senator STONE. That's right. Please tell us about that.

Dr. PERRY. We will have upward of 3,000 cruise missile warheads at that time and we expect they will have none.

Senator STONE. They will have no cruise missiles?

But they already have cruise missiles.

Dr. PERRY. Strategic cruise missiles that come under this treaty.

Senator STONE. Don't they have supersonic cruise missiles operational today?

Dr. PERRY. They have tactical supersonic cruise missiles today, that is correct. They do not have stategic cruise missiles and we do not expect them to have those by the end of the treaty.

Senator STONE. We will have how many strategic cruise missiles?

Dr. PERRY. By the end of the treaty, the number is about 3,000. I can get you the specific figure.

Senator STONE. This is strategic cruise missiles with ranges longer than 600 kilometers.

Dr. PERRY. The range is on the order of 3,000 kilometers. The accuracy is far better than any ICBM on either side.

[Subsequent information was supplied for the record]

PRODUCTION RATE OF ALCM'S

[SUPPLIED BY DOD]

At the presently planned rate of production (40/month), we will have 3,400 ALCM's produced by early 1989. Should we increase the production rate to 60/month in late 1982, we would produce 3,000 ALCM's by mid-1986.

PARITY OBTAINED THROUGH CRUISE MISSILES

Senator STONE. Do you feel that it is the cruise missiles that make up the difference between their heavy reentry vehicles and our heavies? Is that where we are getting our parity?

Dr. PERRY. I think that during the period between now and the M-X deployment, the cruise missile represents an offsetting feature. I would not want to rest on that position.

Senator STONE. But where do we get our parity since they have so many more heavy reentry vehicles than we do? It is on the order of 3 to 1. Where do we get even?

Dr. PERRY. We get our parity by the ability of these various systems to attack targets which are in our target inventory—both soft targets and hard targets. We will have more cruise missiles in the inventory at the end of 1986 than we have hard targets in our target list. The cruise missile is quite capable of attacking any of

those hard targets, including silos, with a higher probability of kill, in fact, higher than an ICBM.

Senator PERCY. Dr. Perry, I have a few other questions.

I want to give you a chance to respond to opponents of the M-X. But if there is anything further that you would like to present to us, I would like to hear it. We have been interrupting you quite a bit, and I have questions following your presentation.

Dr. PERRY. Why don't I go quickly through the rest of my presentation, then.

Senator STONE. Before you do, Dr. Perry, let me finish up my group of questions.

CASE OF SOVIET HARD TARGETS

Is it not the case that the Soviet hard targets are far harder than ours, more numerous and more widely scattered?

Dr. PERRY. The hardest Soviet hard target can be attacked with a probability of kill of about 99 percent for the cruise missile. This is the hardest target which they have.

To answer your question directly, yes.

Senator STONE. You then believe that they cannot intercept those long-range cruise missiles with look-down, see-down, or other capabilities by the time we have these large numbers ready?

Dr. PERRY. You bet I believe that. I would be glad to have a detailed and lengthy discussion with you on that.

Senator PERCY. I am happy you believe it. You think that is where we get our comparability—with the cruise missiles.

Dr. PERRY. The whole strategic force balance is a dynamic affair which changes from year to year. During the window between the vulnerability of the Minuteman and the emergence of the M-X, the cruise missile will make the difference. It will begin deployment at about the same time that the Minuteman becomes vulnerable.

Senator STONE. Provided we do not extend the Protocol restriction in any way, shape, or form?

Dr. PERRY. Correct.

[The following information was subsequently supplied for the record.]

PROTOCOL LIMITATIONS ON GLCM'S AND ALCM'S

[SUPPLIED BY DOD]

The Protocol limitations affect the ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles, but not the air-launched cruise missile.

Senator STONE. I'm glad you made that point.

Dr. PERRY. We are leaning on the other two legs of this three-legged stool during that period.

Senator STONE. We are leaning on the sea-launched system during that period?

Dr. PERRY. On the sea-launched systems and on the cruise missiles.

Senator STONE. All right. Thank you.

EXTREMELY LOW FREQUENCY COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM FOR SLBM

Senator Percy, I am sorry to delay letting him get to the rest of his survey, but since he mentioned sea-launched ballistic missiles, I

would like to refer both witnesses to a hearing of the Subcommittee on Research and Development of the Armed Services Committee of June 8, 1978. I will read you what Senator McIntyre said and what Secretary Brown answered. Then I will ask you to bring us up to date.

Senator McIntyre. Mr. Secretary, for 10 years our subcommittee has been a supporter of the Department's efforts to develop an extremely low frequency [ELF] communication system which would enable both our strategic and attack submarines to operate day to day at greater, more survivable depths. Is there any element of the SALT negotiations which might produce a constraint on our development of this technology?

Secretary Brown. No. The principal constraint on the development and deployment of an extemely low frequency communications system, Mr. Chairman, is the U.S. Congress.

Gentlemen, since that time the U.S. Congress both authorized and appropriated funds for that system, and I understand that the Defense Department has recommended doing it. Why is it since we are going to be relying on our sea-launched systems during this window of vulnerability, that the administration has held it up?

Dr. Perry. The recommendation which I have personally made on this question and which I believe is the recommendation the Secretary is making to the President, is that the country does need and will need an ELF system. The time of that need will be the late 1980's, and not the early 1980's. The timing does not go with the vulnerability of the Minuteman issue; it goes to the time at which the Soviets may have developed a submarine detection capability. The purpose of the ELF system is to allow our submarines to run deep, to minimize their chances of detection.

Senator Stone. You don't think the Soviets have developed that detection capability?

Dr. Perry. I am confident that the Soviets do not today and will not in the next 5 to 10 years, have a capability to detect our submarines at sea of sufficient operational credibility to be a threat to that force. But I cannot project that more than about 10 years into the future.

I think it is very important in the future that we have that system operational.

Senator Stone. What if you are wrong and the Soviets have that capability or are about to get it in the very near future? Would we then not need to have the capability to get our subs deeper for their communications so that we do not have the problem?

Dr. Perry. Yes.

Senator Stone. So, if you are wrong, we really do need to be moving on it, and both the administration, up to now, and the Congress have agreed to do it, yet we are not doing it. Why aren't we doing it?

Dr. Perry. Senator Stone, as I said, the issue in my mind is one of timing. If I thought there were any significant doubts about my assessment of the Soviet ASW capability—not whether they could eventually have it, but whether they could have it in the next 5 years—I would be recommending an urgent and accelerated program to do that.

Senator Stone [presiding]. Well, I am recommending it.

Senator Percy.

Senator PERCY. Dr. Perry, did you wish to finish your presentation before I ask you further questions?

Dr. PERRY. Thank you.

What I have now is primarily descriptive information about the basing system. Once I go through this, you may want to ask some questions about how that system works.

NO PROTOCOL LIMITATIONS ON ALCM'S

Ambassador EARLE. Senator Stone, if I might interrupt Dr. Perry, I would like to correct what appears to have been a misconception in your questions regarding the extension of the protocol in the context of discussing air-launched cruise missiles.

There is nothing in the protocol which limits air-launched cruise missiles. If the protocol were extended, which I do not anticipate it will be, there would be no impact whatsoever on our air-launched cruise missile program for development and deployment.


Senator PERCY. And we understood fully that there will be no extension of that.

DESCRIPTION OF M-X BASING SYSTEM

Dr. PERRY. The basing system about which you have read in the newspapers and may have received some early information on I will describe as quickly and as briefly as I can.

The concept is to put that missile, of which you have already seen a picture, on a large transporter erector launcher, which will be based in a horizontal shelter.

[The chart referred to follows:]




Dr. PERRY. This is an artist's concept of what that might look like. Let me show you a more accurate picture of what the transporter erector launcher will be.

[The chart referred to follows:]

FIGURE 3

TRANSPORTER-ERECTOR-LAUNCHER CONCEPT



CHARACTERISTICS	
WEIGHT (KLB) (WITH MISSILE)	670
LENGTH (FT)	180
HEIGHT (FT)	13.5
WIDTH (FT)	13.0
TIRE TREAD WIDTH (INCH)	156
NO AXLES/TIRES	6/24
MAX. TIRE PRESSURE (PSI)	40
WHEEL BASE (ft)	145
MOTIVE POWER (HP)	3250


Dr. PERRY. This is a large vehicle which may be likened to a locomotive. It is about the same weight as a locomotive. It will carry the missile and the launching equipment in the middle. The difference between this and a locomotive is it will operate on rubber wheels or tires instead of on a track.

Let me give you a few numbers.

This one weighs about 700,000 pounds with a missile on it.

[The chart referred to follows:]

FIGURE 2
HORIZONTAL SHELTER CONCEPT




Dr. PERRY. This is a picture of a horizontal shelter into which it is placed. I have depicted here four portholes. We envision that periodically or on challenge we would remove these portholes to allow the Soviet Union satellite to inspect the shelter to verify that there were no missiles located in it.

[The chart referred to follows:]

FIGURE 1

LOOP ROAD FOR 1 MISSILE WITH 23 SHELTERS



Dr. PERRY. That is necessary because 1 missile will have as its base 23 separate shelters, and we will move the missile periodically from shelter to shelter to maintain confusion about the location of the missile.

Senator PERCY. What is the distance between the two?

Dr. PERRY. The spacing between shelters if 6,000 to 7,000 feet. It is a little greater than 1 mile.

Senator PERCY. From extreme point to extreme point, what is the greatest distance?

Dr. PERRY. It is about 10 miles. That will vary quite a bit, depending on the topography of where it goes.

SS-18 CAPABILITY TO DAMAGE M-X

Senator PERCY. If an SS-18 landed right in the center, what circumference of damage would it have? How large an area would it cover?

Dr. PERRY. It would cover about four of the holes.

Let me make a differentiation. The SS-18 is available in a single, large blockbuster, and it is also available in what Senator Stone was calling the heavy RV, but I want to differentiate between these because it would not be a heavy RV in Soviet parlance. They have a 10-RV version and a single RV version. The single RV version could take out about four of these at once. But then they could only get one RV per SS-18.

The 10-RV version would require 1 RV per shelter. In other words, if they tried to space an RV between two shelters, they would end up getting neither one of them. Of course, that was the factor which determined the spacing of the shelters.

We have spaced them not for the size of the present Soviet RV's, but for a size of about twice that large, on the theory that they might, by improving warhead efficiency, over the next 5 or 6 years get an even higher yield RV in their 10-RV system than they now have.

Senator PERCY. Of the 23 shelters, a single RV SS-18 put right in the center would take out 4 shelters. Two simultaneous launches of SS-18's, one in the center of the left-hand segment and one in the center of the right-hand segment, would take out about how many shelters?

Dr. PERRY. For a 10-RV SS-18, each one of its RV's would take out one shelter, if it hit it. It has to have sufficient accuracy to hit it, which we believe they do have.

So, one SS-18 RV equals one shelter.

If, as I said, they elected to use their single RV, the big blockbuster, and put one on either end, then they would get the four on this end and the four on that end [indicating].

Senator PERCY. So, it would be 8 out of 23 with a single SS-18 warhead?

Dr. PERRY. Yes, 8 out of 23 for 2 SS-18's.

Senator PERCY. It is a shell game.

Dr. PERRY. It is more effective for them to use their 10-RV system because then with 2 SS-18's, they could get 20 of these 23 shelters.

PAUL NITZE'S CRITICISM OF COST OF M-X

Senator PERCY. Could we talk about Paul Nitze's criticism of the M-X. He said that it would cost $7 billion to $8 billion just to make it verifiable.

Dr. PERRY. That is not correct.

Senator PERCY. It is not.

What do you estimate the cost to be?

Dr. PERRY. What Paul was doing was comparing the cost of a vertical shelter MPS system with this system. The difference between those two in cost is about $7 billion.

The difference in performance or the difference in characteristics between the two, however, is that this system has a totally different survivability mode than the vertical shelter system. That is the main driving factor in considering this system as opposed to the vertical shelter system. I will discuss this in a minute.

The features of this system which are unique to making it verifiable—such as these large portholes on top—cost something less than $1 billion. It is between $0.5 billion and $1 billion.


Senator PERCY. So, he is saying $7 billion to $8 billion. You are saying it is less than $1 billion?

Dr. PERRY. No. I am saying that the $7 billion figure is correct; but I am attributing slightly under $1 billion of that uniquely to verification. The other $6 billion is to make this system have a dash capability. This is to allow it to move quickly from one shelter to another shelter.

The reason we want that feature is the following.

The system achieves its survivability by maintaining the uncertainty as to where it is located. Let me describe how that happens first and then see if I can go directly to your questions.

[The chart referred to follows:]



M-X RAPID REDEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY

Dr. PERRY. As we move it from one shelter to another shelter, we have it covered up with this large quonset hut on wheels, so to speak.

Senator PERCY. Would you mind showing the chart very quickly to the audience so that they can have at least a quick perception of what you have. It will make this a little more understandable to them.

Dr. PERRY. Certainly.

I said that I would describe this [indicating] as a large quonset hut on wheels. It is intended as a visibility shield, to cover the transporter erector launcher.

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

Dr. PERRY. As the transporter erector launcher moves from one shelter to another, it is covered by this vehicle. At one of the shelters it deposits its missile, but it continues then to traverse all of the shelters. So, an observer of this deployment would not be able to tell in which shelter it was located.

If this deployment system were successful, then that is all we would need to do.

As we studied this system, our ingenious technical people raised all sorts of questions as to how the Soviet Union may be able to devise ways of breaking into the security of the system.

We do not believe they can do it. But we did not want to be locked into a system which, if we discovered they could do it, would leave us simply trapped in our silos and unable to respond. So, we insisted that the system be capable of rapid redeployment. That, then, required us to put the missile on its launcher, the transporter erector launcher, at all times, whereas in the other systems of deployment the missile was separated from the launcher when it was put in the silos and it took up to 1 day to redeploy it.

With this system, if we have any reason to believe that the security has been compromised—for example, if we observed an ICBM attack heading in this direction—we could rapidly move it out of one shelter to any other shelter in this system in less time than it takes an ICBM to reach the United States. So, this is an additional survivability feature. This is what we are paying the extra $6 billion for.

Senator PERCY. This might be an appropriate point for you to comment on survivability. Again, Paul Nitze has categorically stated that the racetrack mode will be less survivable and more expensive than a vertical shelter deployment.

Would you comment on that?

Dr. PERRY. I have to categorically agree with the statement about its being more expensive. It is about $7 billion more expensive.

COST OF M-X SHELTERS VERSUS SOVIET WARHEADS

Senator STONE. In that regard, is it less expensive to add one of these shelters, as it is to add an RV in the new system?

Dr. PERRY. The answer is no. If we take our shelters and our RV's and try to make a cost comparison, the shelters are somewhat cheaper.

Senator STONE. Not our shelters and our RV's, but our shelters versus their RV's.

Dr. PERRY. The problem is that we don't know what their RV's cost. That is my problem in answering your question.

If you take the difference between ours, where we see an advantage of about 25 percent for shelters versus reentry vehicle we might believe that that is an adequate safety factor to say that in the case of the Soviets, it is about equivalent—about a wash—with probably some advantage to the shelters over the reentry vehicles.

I would make one other comment about that, though.

The race between shelters and reentry vehicles, which I think we should take every effort to keep from happening, is a race in which where we are building a system that is more and more survivable while they are putting a greater and greater investment in reentry vehicles that go into fixed silos which are highly vulnerable to attack from ours. If you imagine that they are putting these reentry vehicles into a mobile deployment system then the advantage goes very much to our shelters.

FAILURES IN DEVELOPMENT OF CRUISE MISSILES

Senator STONE. I would like to ask about cruise missiles if I could, since you have put a great weight—in fact, the whole administration has put a great weight on closing the gap and reducing the window of vulnerability by the use of cruise missiles.

The New York Times reported last Sunday a crash of a test flight cruise missile and summarized several other failures of testing. Have these failures postponed the period in which we can both contract and get deployed sufficient numbers of these missiles? What has it done to the timetable?

Dr. PERRY. The answer is no, it has not affected the timetable.

Senator STONE. Would you submit to the committee, on a classified basis if necessary, some information about the failures?

Dr. PERRY. Yes, sir, I will.

But I can give you a summary statement on an unclassified basis.

[The information referred to is classified and is in comittee files.]

Senator STONE. Fine.

Dr. PERRY. The successes on the cruise missile tests we have had to date have been about 30 out of about 40 tests. I will get you the actual numbers. As missile test programs go, this has been quite a successful one.

There have been some failures which the New York Times reported. There will be more failures in the system before our testing is done.

But, looking at the overall test program, we have a good feeling about its success. The projection of initial operational capability in late 1982 we still believe is good.

TRIAD WILL FAVOR SOVIETS BY 1986

Senator STONE. Let me ask about the allegations made by opponents of our strength versus their strength under the treaty in regard specifically to our Triad and their Triad. It is asserted by opponents of the treaty that in 1986, either two or all three legs of

the Triad will be in the favor of the Soviets, as opposed to us. What is your answer to that?

Dr. PERRY. I do not agree with that.

As I mentioned, the Soviets will have a distinct advantage in the ICBM leg. We should not gloss over that.

Senator STONE. That is their 6,000 to our 2,000.

What about airborne?

Dr. PERRY. Senator, it is not only 6,000 to 2,000. The quantitative characteristics are 6,000 to 2,000. Their accuracy and yield will be either comparable to or greater than ours.

Senator STONE. The accuracy is greater?

Dr. PERRY. Either comparable to or greater. In 1986, we anticipate that the Soviet ICBM will have comparable accuracy to our Minuteman—not our M-X, but our Minuteman.

ADVANTAGE IN AIRBORNE LEG OF TRIAD

Senator STONE. What about airborne, their Backfire numbers versus our B-52 numbers? Our B-52's are fixed. They are going to be producing Backfires, according to the Brezhnev limitation, at 30 per year. In 1986, who will have more, and is the relative strength of the airborne then in our favor or in their favor?

Dr. PERRY. Senator Stone, in my judgment, we will have an enormous advantage in the airborne leg of our Triad in 1986, primarily because of the introduction of cruise missiles as a weapon in that system. It is not a question of comparing the airplanes. It is a question of comparing the ability to deliver weapons on target.

Senator STONE. Then you assume they will not catch up with us on airborne cruise missiles?

Dr. PERRY. I assert that by the end of 1986 it is not within their capability to field an air-launched cruise missile on their strategic bombers anywhere near or comparable to the one we have or in anything like the numbers we will have.

Senator STONE. How many Backfires will they have and how many B-52's will we have?

Dr. PERRY. I can get the Backfire number for you simply by taking the number they have now and adding 30 per year.

Senator STONE. Let's do that. What is it?

Dr. PERRY. Let me see—between now and then—I don't have it in my head.

Mr. ZEIBERG. It is about 200 now.

Dr. PERRY. So, I would therefore estimate that it would be between 300 and 400 by 1986.

Senator STONE. How many B-52's will we have operational by then?

Dr. PERRY. We will have B-52G's and B-52H's, which are the ones we really ought to count. We will have something on the order of 250. We will also have FB-111's, in a number of something over 60, I believe, deployed in the strategic forces. Then we will have a host of other airplanes, such as B-52D's and our F-111's in Europe, which we do not consider part of our strategic forces, but which do have the capability of delivering nuclear weapons to the Soviet Union.

Senator STONE. But other than the cruise missile aspect, which, of course, is quite important and may be decisive, the numbers are that they will have more than we will have of those carriers at that time. Is that right?

Dr. PERRY. You are making the equation of——

Senator STONE. I am granting the cruise missile situation because I think what an airplane carries is more important than how many wings it has.

Dr. PERRY. If you include the Backfire——

Senator STONE. I believe I said that wrong. It needs at least two wings. [General laughter.]

Dr. PERRY. If you include the Backfire, then I have to wonder about how many other U.S. airplanes need to be included besides the B–52G's and B–52H's.

Even if you assume that some of those Backfires are going to be used intercontinentally, it is quite clear that a substantial number of them are going to be used for naval attack and for what we might call theater nuclear forces.

Senator STONE. Also ours, if you are including FB–111's.

Dr. PERRY. That is why I say if we limit it to B–52G's and B–52H's, and to FB–111's, which is where I got the 300-odd number, those are the only ones dedicated to strategic forces. The F–111's and the other light bombers in our forces forward based systems I did not include in that calculation because they are going to be used for other purposes. I think a substantial number of Backfires will be used for other purposes, too. No matter what you think about its intercontinental capability, it is a formidable antishipping weapon. It is clear that the Soviets intend to use at least some of them for that purpose.

NUMBER OF SOVIET SLBM'S BY 1986

Senator STONE. Finally, about the sea-based systems, how many submarines will they likely have compared to what we will likely have carrying strategic missiles or intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles in 1986?

Dr. PERRY. I will have to get you those numbers, Senator Stone. I don't carry them in my head.

Senator STONE. Just a ballpark figure.

Dr. PERRY. They will have more submarines than we have. They will have more missiles than we have. They will have about a factor of two disadvantage in the number of warheads that can be delivered.

Senator STONE. We will have twice as many warheads in our sea-based systems?

Dr. PERRY. Yes.

Senator STONE. Even though they will have more vehicles?

Dr. PERRY. Yes; this is because they have been much slower than we in developing SLBM MIRV's. It is because of a technical difference, I believe, Senator Stone. They have not had the solid fuel capability to introduce the modern SLBM's into their force to date, and they have not had the same MIRV capability in the submarine force. I believe they will overcome that disadvantage after 1986.

Senator STONE. You are placing the main distinction in these last two legs of the Triad as to airborne because of the preponderance

of our cruise missile edge and as to seaborne because we have more warheads in our system than they have, even though they have more vehicles, right?

Dr. PERRY. Right.

Senator STONE. But you are saying that they may overcome that warhead number in sea-based systems by 1986?

Dr. PERRY. No; let me be more precise. It is not by 1986. I am saying that I don't think we should stand pat on that and that is why we are moving with the M-X. I don't believe they will stand pat either in that they will be improving both their bomber forces and cruise missile forces—pardon me, and their submarine forces. I do not expect to see that significant improvement happening until the late 1980's, though. That is not contemporary with the date about which we were talking.

Senator STONE. Suppose at the end of the 1986 treaty period we have not yet reached a SALT III with a reduced number or some kind of cap number in it, what happens if the Soviets do not remain at 10 RV's per missile at the end of the treaty? Let's say they go to 30 warheads on an SS-18 after 1985. What does that do to the M-X system before it is fully operational and deployed?

Dr. PERRY. If they really do that in an attempt to overwhelm the system, that puts us into the shelter-versus-RV race to which you referred. The main feature that the treaty will have gotten us then, in that case, is about a 5-year breathing spell. So, by the time that race started, we would be in production and in deployment of our missiles and our shelters.

Senator STONE. You surely cannot be referring to the treaty period as a breathing spell when it is our window of vulnerability, isn't that right? We were getting our breathing spell in 1986.

Dr. PERRY. Relative to the M-X system, it is a breathing spell because it is not possible for us to have those missiles or those shelters in production before about 1984. So, we have a 5-year period in which, no matter how much we want to be building these new missiles and shelters, we do not have the capability of doing so.

LARGER M-X DEPLOYMENT BY BUILDING MORE SHELTERS

Senator STONE. Could we get a substantially larger M-X deployment by building shelters at the rate of 2,000 per year?

Dr. PERRY. Yes. If we started in 1984 or 1985, for example, we could have 10,000 of them deployed by the date that we are now quoting for full operational capability—1989.

Senator STONE. But your overall feeling is that other than the heavy missile RV's and the heavy missile comparisons, the Triad is in our favor as to at least two legs and not in their favor as to at least two legs?

Dr. PERRY. That is correct.

Senator STONE. Thank you.

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

NITZE COMMENT THAT M-X IS LESS SURVIVABLE/MORE EXPENSIVE

Dr. Perry, when Paul Nitze had categorically stated that the M-X is less survivable and more expensive, as I related in my last question, you agreed with him that it is more expensive. Would you

please expand and comment on his statement that it is less survivable.

Dr. PERRY. I think it is unquestionable that this is not so. I have no question at all in my mind that this system is more survivable than the vertical shelter MPS system. That is precisely why we have designed it. That is why we were willing to pay the extra expense to get it.

Both of them have, as their principal mode of survivability the hiding of missiles in a large number of shelters. From that point of view, they are essentially identical in survivability.

The difference between the two systems is that this system in addition has a dash capability. So, if you have any reason to believe that the uncertainty of missile location has been compromised, you still can have a last minute dash to save the system.

I do not envision a scenario in which all of this ever happens. The importance is that we want to convince the Soviet war plan that trying to coordinate and launch an attack against this system is really impossible. If he could become convinced that he had an espionage system or an exotic sensor system which located the missiles in the shelters, he still could not become convinced that he could successfully attack the system because he has to recognize that even if he knows where the missile is when he launches his ICBM's, he does not know where it will be when the ICBM's arrive on target.

This has to throw such an element of uncertainty into his planning that I think it makes it completely unreasonable to believe he would ever try to attack the system. This is why I say that this system is more survivable. What I really mean to say is that it creates an unacceptable uncertainty in the mind of anybody trying to attack it—uncertainty caused by this additional complication of mobility.

ARGUMENTS OF SALT OPPONENTS ON M–X AND CRUISE MISSILE PROGRAMS

Senator PERCY. Would you respond to the arguments of a couple of other opponents to our M–X system and cruise missile program.

SPEEDING UP M–X AND CRUISE MISSILE PROGRAM

We have heard from several opponents of the treaty that the M–X and cruise missile program could be speeded up by as much as 18 months to 2 years and that speeding up these programs, particularly the M–X, would mean a shorter period of time in which our land-based missiles would be vulnerable to attack. The opponents charge that the real reason we do not speed up these programs is that they will never be built.

Could either of these programs be speeded up? If we cut through all the redtape, what would be the earliest that we could deploy ALCM's and the M–X. Second, how would you respond to the charge that these programs will be held hostage to SALT III?

Dr. PERRY. That is the largest slice of baloney that I have ever seen in one sandwich.

Senator STONE. Not salami, but baloney?

Dr. PERRY. Very well, take your pick.

Senator STONE. The difference is important.

Dr. PERRY. Let me first describe the cruise missile program. We are farther along in it and I can describe more concretely what is going on.

We are now, as Senator Stone mentioned, conducting the competitive flyoff tests in that system. We have two different contractors and we are paying an extra several hundred million dollars to have two contractors proceeding in parallel to have maximum assurance that one of them will have a successful program.

In addition to that, we have more of what we call concurrency in that program than any other program in which we are engaging. By concurrency I mean that while we are doing the development phase, we are also doing production. While we are doing the testing, we have production going on as well. If there is any legitimate criticism as to how we are handling that program, it is that we have too great a degree of concurrency. Both of these contractors already have started building the production facility and already have started producing the missiles. Clearly, that effort is going to be more or less wasted so far as the loser is concerned.

I cite this example to point out the very high degree of concurrency that we have in the cruise missile program. It is a program which, when I came into this job in early 1977, really did not exist. The long-range, air-launched cruise missile program was only a technology program at that time. We have been moving it on the fastest possible course for operational capability. Any objective examination of the record will sustain that fact.

In the case of the M-X, it is conceivable that we could accelerate the initial operational capability date by about a year under the following set of circumstances.

First of all, we would have to presume a much heavier transfusion of early year funding. Second, we would have to assume greater overall funding because of the inefficiency of that particular compression. Third, we would have to assume that we could solve the various land withdrawal and environmental problems on about a year faster timescale than we now imagine it can be done. In my opinion, that would probably take legislation to waive certain of the environmental requirements, which legislative action we do not feel necessary, nor do we plan to ask for it. We believe that it is important that this system meet objective environmental constraints. We may ask for support in minimizing the time involved with procedural aspects of this. But we intend to see that this system should meet all legitimate environmental considerations placed on it.

So, it would take some sort of special action on the part of the Congress, I think, to waive some of those requirements in order to get an earlier availability date than 1986.

Senator PERCY. But you do not now intend to ask for that extra authority?

Dr. PERRY. We may ask for some authority to streamline procedures. We do not intend to ask for a waiver of any substantial environmental considerations.

Senator PERCY. If you did pick up a year, you would still be within the provisions of the protocol, so far as deployment?

Dr. PERRY. There is nothing we can do technically or programmatically to violate the protocol, no matter how hard we try.

MAKE MINUTEMAN MOBILE RATHER THAN BUILD M-X— BUILD ABM DEFENSES AROUND MINUTEMAN

Senator PERCY. Yesterday, we heard a witness, Dr. May, who argued that the United States should make the Minuteman mobile rather than build the M-X. We have heard others argue that we should build ABM defenses around Minuteman missiles and seek an exception to this purpose to the ABM Treaty rather than build the M-X. I would give you an opportunity to comment on those criticisms made yesterday.

Dr. PERRY. Thank you. I would be happy to do that.

Let me take the second issue first.

First of all, the ABM system would clearly be a violation of the ABM Treaty which we have. But second, and perhaps more importantly, we do not know how to build an ABM system in which we could have any confidence that it could protect our Minuteman sites against a determined ICBM attack.

The cost and the time to develop and deploy that system, even if we thought we could do it—certainly the schedule is on the same order as the M-X schedule would be. But to put that ABM in better context, I would say that we can design a system which can defeat the presently deployed Soviet ICBM's. This is simply because they have not put penetration aids for ABM's in that system because they do not envision that they are going to have ABM's to operate against.

But we know how to develop and deploy penetration aids which would defeat such an ABM system, and it would be rash in the extreme to believe that the Soviets could not do that.

So, when people are advocating an ABM system for defending Minuteman, I believe they are imagining that the sophistication of the Soviet ICBM threat remains constant, which is a naive assumption.

Now, the other question concerns the mobile Minuteman. We have looked quite extensively at using Minuteman either as an interim system or as an alternative system to M-X. It is hard to give a simple answer to that question because there are three fundamentally different ways in which it might be deployed. One proposal has been that we proceed to build an M-X basing system such as I have described to you today, but instead of putting the M-X missile in it, we put Minuteman missiles in it. I think there is some belief that this would be a great saving of time and money.

The simplest answer to that is that it would save very little money and maybe no time at all—or at most maybe a year or so of time.

The pacing item in the operational date of this system is in the base, not in the missile.

Of the $33 billion which has been estimated as the cost of M-X, something on the order of $24 billion is associated with the base and support facilities, not with the missile itself.

My final comment is this. We simply cannot take the Minuteman as it is and do that. It would require modification. It would

require further tests. It is not designed for a horizontal transport mode of operation. So, it would require some modifications.

Finally, when this system has all reached its final operational capability, about 1988 or 1989, what we would have deployed in this $24 billion base is a 20-year-old missile. The first thing we would have to do is take all the old chemicals out of that missile and replace them with new chemicals because they would be worn out. I think that is a poor proposal.

I really feel more strongly about it than that last phrase, but that is all I will say for the record.

Another version that is being considered is the mobile Minuteman, where you take the missile and you put it on the transporter erector launcher. Then you save all of the costs of this enormously expensive basing system. You can say we already have a basing system which is the U.S. Interstate Highway System. So now you will have this system which will roam up and down the interstate highways. That system has a high degree of survivability because we have an enormous area in the country for it to get lost in. There is no doubt in my mind that that system has good survivability. But I have never really been able to bring myself to propose that system. It envisions not only driving around on interstate highways with three nuclear warheads per missile, but those missiles are connected to about 60,000 pounds of TNT equivalent, which is a simple way of describing the chemical fuel in that missile. I really think that is an irresponsible proposal and I would not make it.

TESTING/DEPLOYING MOBILE MINUTEMAN SYSTEM DURING PROTOCOL

Senator PERCY. Well, with the uproar that we have gotten in Illinois over nuclear waste alone, I would not suggest that you use our interstate highways.

Could the mobile Minuteman system be tested or deployed before the protocol expired?

Senator STONE. Don't use the Whitehurst Freeway, whatever you do. [General laughter.]

Dr. PERRY. It is pretty close, but the answer really is no. We think it would take us about 3 or 4 years on the simple version, the road mobile system, to get it deployed. You might envision a test happening about halfway through that period. The answer is that the protocol would not be a substantial constraint to us, if that is truly what the country wanted to do.

Senator PERCY. Senator Stone, I have just two more questions. One relates to another criticism of Paul Nitze and another relates to a previous question which you asked. May I just finish up with those before I yield the floor?

Senator STONE. Go right ahead, Senator Percy.

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

CRITICISM OF TREATY FOR LIMITING LAUNCHERS RATHER THAN MISSILES

Yesterday, Paul Nitze criticized the treaty for limiting launchers rather than missiles. He said the Soviets could hide ICBM's in

warehouses with retractable roofs and could fire them in a strategic exchange.

Would you comment on the validity of this criticism.

Dr. PERRY. That criticism has the seeds of its own defeat imbedded in it. If you really believe that the Soviets could hide missiles in warehouses and launch them and that we would have no way of detecting or verifying that, then why in the world would we want a treaty that counts missiles? You have aleady stated that you have no way of verifying them, so why——

Senator STONE. Well, you might count production rates and stocking rates as opposed to launch sites.

Dr. PERRY. But if you believed you could do that, then the problem with counting launchers tends to go away.

There is one other point I want to make.

Some people have said—and I think it is worth illuminating this issue—that yes, but you could have only the prescribed number of launchers and then you could have a number of missiles waiting in the wings to go into those launchers on a reload capability. Aside from the provisions in the treaty which make that difficult by limiting storage sites around missile areas, there is another factor, particularly with the Soviet liquid fuel missile. Reloading a silo takes some time and you can argue whether it is 2, 4, or 8 hours. It is not a simple or easy task. During that time, the complex is totally soft. The hardness of the silo does not protect the crew or the missile while it is in this loading and fueling process.

We have pointed out that our submarine launched missiles have no hard target capability. You would never use them to attack a silo. But if you envision a reload being used against you, they could certainly make very unattractive the job of reloading this silo. The multikiloton warhead going off within 1,000 or 2,000 feet of it would certainly destroy everything in the vicinity, not counting the silo. So I think the reload capability is handled adequately by our SLBM force.

ONSITE INSPECTIONS OF PRODUCTION FACILITIES

Senator PERCY. On the same point, Paul Nitze undoubtedly would like to count missiles with onsite inspection of the production facilities. This is another criticism of his. Would you care to comment on it? I presume that we tried to get that and it has been turned down.

Dr. PERRY. Speaking for the U.S. development program, we would have no objection to there being an onsite inspection of our missiles. But if Paul Nitze can go over and negotiate that clause into the treaty, I think that would be just great.

Senator PERCY. So, it is just a matter of their simply rejecting it?

Dr. PERRY. Ambassador Earle apparently was not able to negotiate that.

Ralph, what can you say about that?

Ambassador EARLE. Senator Percy, we did not try to negotiate it. Onsite inspection has inherent difficulties. Reliance on spot checks in this case in my view does not lead you to total reliance on what you derive from them.

Unless we had resident inspectors at every known production facility, it would be of little value. When you get into that area, what about the unknown production facilities?

I do not find it a feasible approach. We did not propose it. I don't think the Soviets would accept it. But I really do not think it would be of that great a benefit to us.

MESSAGE TO SOVIETS ON MPS QUESTION

Senator PERCY. Ambassador Earle, my last question is to you and it relates back to your conversations with Senator Stone on this subject.

I know that sometimes the State Department feels that ambiguity is a good thing. We felt that way originally on Resolution 242 of the United Nations.

I think I stand together with Senator Stone in believing that in this case one of our jobs in the Senate is to try to look at any place that can be ambiguous and to try to clarify it.

We just do not want mistaken Soviet perceptions about what they think we can and cannot do. It is not a matter of going to them for permission. Rather, it is making perfectly clear to them right from the outset our position and that we intend to go forward with something and do it in as public a way as we can and privately as well.

In your own statement you mentioned a problem. You said that the United States does not accept the Soviet arguments raised in the context of vertical shelters that the MPS approach would involve construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers. The shelters in an MPS system are not ICBM launchers.

We have a difference of opinion there with the Soviets. Have we in that particular case told them clearly how we feel about this? If so, when did we do that and what was their response?

Ambassador EARLE. Senator Percy, what we said was that any MPS system which we developed would be verifiable and it would not violate the prohibition on the construction of new fixed ICBM silo launchers. There was silence on their part thereafter. As I mentioned, Mr. Brezhnev did sign the agreement.

Now that statement was made to them in Geneva; it was made through diplomatic channels; and it was also made to them by the President.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much.

I would like to say that we very much appreciate both of you coming back. We felt that to complete the record several appearances would be necessary in order to give you a chance to respond to the critics. I think this helps clarify the record.

In the event that we have overlooked some of the criticisms that we subsequently feel are valid enough to warrant questioning, Mr. Chairman, I would ask that the record be kept open so that any of the committee members can submit further questions that would clarify criticisms that have been made. In this way, before we complete the record, our witnesses will have an opportunity to respond to those criticisms.

Senator STONE. There will be additional questions which we will ask be submitted for the record, so without objection, it is so ordered.

Thank you, Senator Percy.

I have one or two final questions, and one relates to Cuba, Dr. Perry.

ADDITIONAL ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE FACILITIES IN CUBA

The Cienfuegos Naval Base construction involves the possibility of antisubmarine warfare against us. In connection with my questioning of you regarding their antisubmarine warfare technology, you assured us that they are several years away at least, and even later than 1986, from any really substantial capability in that regard. Therefore, can you assure us that there is no technical antisubmarine warfare additions being made by the Soviets in Cuba?

Dr. PERRY. Senator Stone, I am not a good source on what the Soviets are or are not doing in Cuba.

Senator STONE. Well, if they don't have it at all, how can they be doing it in Cuba—right?

Dr. PERRY. I would comment that I do know what their technology and operational capability in this field is and it would not change my judgment on it if I learned that they had deployed some of that capability in Cuba.

I am not saying that that is a good thing or something that we should condone. But I am saying that it would not change my judgment on their ability to localize our SLBM's at sea.

Senator STONE. Thank you.

Thank you, Ambassador Earle and Dr. Perry, for a very helpful and enlightening session. We appreciate it.

Dr. PERRY. Thank you, Senator Stone.

Ambassador EARLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Dr. Perry's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM J. PERRY

Mr. Chariman and Members of the Committee, I am pleased to testify before you today on MX and our planned program of Strategic Force Modernization.

The testimony is divided into three parts. First is an overview of our Strategic Force Modernization Program. Next, the major portion of my testimony will address the MX program—missile and survivable basing system—which the President has recently approved. Finally, I will review the impact of our planned modernization program on arms control.

STRATEGIC FORCE MODERNIZATION

The primary objective of our strategic forces is to deter nuclear war. The present TRIAD of strategic forces has been successful in achieving this objective since the 1960's. This TRIAD of forces includes:

(1) ICBM's—more than 1,000 Minuteman and Titan II launch vehicles with a total of more than 2,000 warheads;

(2) SLBM's—more than 600 Polaris and Poseidon launch vehicles with nearly 5,000 total warheads; and

(3) Heavy Bombers—more than 300 B-52's with a total of more than 2,000 warheads.

In aggregate we have more than 9,000 warheads, comprising a powerful deterrent force. Given the size and strength of this force, some have questioned the need for modernization. While it is true that the present balance is adequate in terms of our objectives of deterrence and equivalence, we face challenges for the future that we cannot ignore. Indeed, while the strategic balance through 1985 will continue to be adequate, it will be less favorable to us in the early 1980's than it is now. That is true with or without a SALT II agreement.

The first challenge is the obsolescence of our own strategic forces. We need to modernize, improve, and in some cases replace these strategic forces in order to

maintain a responsive and reliable deterrent, and we will need to do so regardless of the status of SALT.

The second challenge we face is the growing vulnerability of our ICBM force. By the early 1980's the Soviets will have the combination of guidance accuracy and warhead numbers that will give their ICBM's the theoretical capability to destroy most of our Minuteman force in a preemptive attack. Fortunately, the future vulnerability of the Minuteman force does not imply the concurrent vulnerability of the United States. We can afford some temporary degradation in the ICBM force because our overall strategic capability will remain strong. The other two legs of the strategic Triad are not now threatened in the same way as our ICBM's. But we have decided to build up the leg of the Triad that is temporarily weak so that should other parts of our strategic forces become more vulnerable at some later time, our overall strategic deterrent will not be eroded.

A third challenge is the possibility of longer term threats to our bombers and missile-carrying submarines. Under some circumstances Soviet SLBM's could pose a significant counterforce threat to our bombers, by barrage attack on our present SAC bases. There is also the potential of our bombers being destroyed with an ICBM barrage attack. The larger number of ICBM RV's (relative to SLBM RV's) could compensate for the longer time available for bomber escape, so that even though the bombers get off the ground, they may not escape the area that is barraged. Our air-breathing force will also have to deal with the growing Soviet air defense threat posed by look down—shoot down interceptors and advanced surface-to-air missiles currently under development. Well into the 1980's our bombers will be able to penetrate Soviet defenses—and our ALCM's indefinitely.

Fortunately, we are also quite confident that, through the 1980's—which is about as far as we can confidently predict—our SLBM's cannot be located by Soviet anti-submarine warfare forces sufficiently well for an ICBM barrage attack to be effective against them. But we are not so sure what ASW capabilities the Soviets may develop and deploy in the 1990's, so we cannot simply assume that our SLBM force will remain invulnerable indefinitely.

To meet these challenges, we have been working to find ways to restore the survivability of ICBM's, to maintain our SLBM survivability into future decades, and to strengthen the survivability of our air-breathing forces. We have programs in the works to do all of these things.

The most difficult issue to resolve has been the survivability of the land-based leg of the Triad; as I said earlier, this is the single most serious strategic problem we face at the present time.

We have sought a solution to this problem that will satisfy our military requirements and be consistent with our efforts and to have verifiable strategic arms limitations. Because it is relevant to SALT II and important to the future viability of our strategic forces, I would like to describe the MX and its basing system in some detail.

M-X

In June the President approved full scale development of the MX missile. MX is the largest new missile permitted under SALT II. It will be 71 feet in length and 92 inches in diameter, weighing 190,000 lbs. With a throw-weight of 7,900 pounds, the MX can be loaded with 10 Mk-12A reentry vehicles. Assuming that SALT II constrains ICBM's to no more than 10 reentry vehicles, the MX will have a military capability equivalent to the SS-18, the largest Soviet ICBM.

Last week the President approved the mobile basing system for MX. This basing method evolved from previous designs of both the underground trench and surface horizontal shelters. The concept combines the most desirable features of these two approaches. Derived from the trench concept are system confinement and the associated benefits to verification; an integral transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) which makes it unambiguously clear that shelters are not launchers; and rapid force reposturing or dash on tactical warning. Derived from the horizontal shelter concepts are lower cost designs; reduced environmental impact; improved options for preservation of TEL location uncertainty; and, greater public acceptance in the states where the system will likely be deployed.

Each TEL is confined to operate on a loop type road network with shelters located on spurs as depicted in Figure 1. Figure 2 shows a sketch of the shelter concept. The shelters are hardened and have openable roofs for verification.

Figure 3 shows a sketch of the TEL concept and lists some of its characteristics. The complete TEL is parked in a shelter in the normal, peacetime operating mode. The missile can be launched from the TEL on the road—the shelter is not required for launch. When launching the missile from inside the shelters, the TEL mechanism pushes up through the shelter roof so there will be no problem of debris from a nearby nuclear burst blocking the door.

There are about 4600 shelters deployed on 200 road loops. Each loop has 23 shelters, with only one TEL which carries one missile. Adjacent loops are not connected by roads capable of supporting TELs, and TELs cannot be moved from one loop to another without being disassembled and passed through the normal support process. The TELs are too heavy (about 700,000 pounds) and too cumbersome (about 180 feet long, 13 feet high and 13 feet wide) to operate off-road; they would sink into the surface, be trapped by small terrain variations, or tip over. Therefore, each TEL is confined to operate only within its 23 shelter loop; this aids verification.

The preferred deployment area is a series of valleys in the western desert area. About 100 valleys appear usable based on topologic and geologic considerations. The valleys are not very large and on the average only a few loops will be in a single valley. This natural clustering feature adds another level of confinement to the system by impeding transfer of equipment throughout the deployment area except through well defined, observable entry and exit points.

Further enhancement of system verifiability is built in by the operations and flow indicated in Figure 4. The missile, its canister and communications modules are assembled in the designated assembly area (DAA) in facilities that are open to the extent possible (e.g., openable-roof facilities). The assembly process is designed to take a significant time (about one week) and only one missile is in work at any time.

The missile, its launch-related equipment and TEL subassemblies are shipped at a slow pace to the designated deployment area (DDA) on a special railroad. A spur of the special track connects each valley to the mainline and there is a major barrier which must be removed before the flatcar can enter the valley. The barrier is designed to require a considerable time period to disassemble, keeping the overall process slow.

Once in the valley the flatcar delivers the equipment to a final assembly area (FAA), but first has to pass through another barrier station. This second barrier is of the same type as the first one, increasing confidence that the TEL could not move undetected among the road loops.

The TEL is put together in final, workable form in the FAA and is then mated with the missile and launch-related equipment. This step ensures that the TEL cannot exist in its final operational form anywhere but as its deployment site in the DDA. Verification is thereby enhanced. After assembly, the TEL is driven into the road loop.

Survivability

Survivability of the system is based on two independent elements: preservation of location uncertainty and a high degree of mobility.

Location uncertainty is maintained by periodically moving the TEL from one shelter to another and by making it impossible for remote observers to determine whether what is being moved is indeed the TEL. Since the movement of the TEL from shelter-to-shelter occurs on surface roads out in the open, a visibility shield is used to cover it. This shield, illustrated in Figure 5, is provided by a special vehicle which can move alone, or straddle and move in unison with the TEL when the TEL is moved. After the TEL is relocated in a new shelter, the shield vehicle visits all the shelters and replicates the procedures associated with TEL entry into a shelter. Thus, the identification of the shelter into which the TEL was inserted is denied.

Under normal conditions, the missile would be moved to another shelter in its cluster when maintenance is required, or at least once every few months if no maintenance was needed. The crew schedule for movements would be established so that no crew would know where more than a very few missiles were located. The many observables associated with movement of a 700,000 pound TEL and a 190,000 pound missile need to be simulated or masked in the overall process. In-shelter and in-transit signatures (e.g., electromagnetic, acoustic and thermal emissions) will be simulated by a combination of countermeasures placed in the shelter and carried by the vehicle.

Denial of the opportunity to measure many of the system's observables is accomplished by a combination of exclusion from the immediate vicinity of the shelter (as is currently the case with the Minuteman silo sites) and by sweeping the area to detect sensors or agent operations. Seismic effects, however, are long-range and might be measurable by remote sensors. If this proves to be a real concern, the seismic effects can be simulated by carrying mass simulators in the shield vehicle whenever it is moving without a TEL. The need for mass simulators is not yet firmly established, but we plan to retain the option to include mass simulators should the need be established. Actual deployment of mass simulators would add $1.4B (in FY 80$) to the cost.

Survivability of the system is provided by this basing arrangement is in three different modes of operation. First, the system can be repostured in a short time;

using normal practices a few hours is achievable. This operating practice might be useful if some concern about location uncertainty develops, or if an international crisis appears to be developing. Second, if the location uncertainty becomes in grave doubt then the system, or a portion of it, could be placed in constant motion; if tactical warning indicates an attack, the TELs could then drive into the nearest shelters. Third, as an alternative to constant motion, the TELs could be poised to dash on tactical warning to reposture some designated percentage of the force during the flight time of attacking ICBMs (it is not feasible to do this during close-in SLBM flight times, although dash to a few of the nearest neighboring shelters is possible here). The dash on warning mode sizes the TEL's locomotion capability and allows any one of the shelters on the loop to be reached in the 30 minute ICBM flight time.

We have analyzed the MX system in response to a variety of Soviet counterforce threats. The threats considered ranged from a moderate Soviet buildup constrained by SALT II to a high Soviet buildup assuming SALT II never goes into effect. In each case the number of MX missiles and shelters were adjusted so that when the Soviets had expended all of their ICBM RV's in one-on-one attacks on MX shelters (after first attacking Minuteman), we still have some ICBMs surviving. This approach takes away any Soviet incentive to attack our ICBM force using their ICBM force, since they degrade their relative position by undertaking such an attack.

For example, if they launch their entire ICBM force against ours they would be left, after the attack, with their SLBM and bomber forces facing our superior SLBM and bomber forces plus the remaining US ICBMs that have survived the attack. Should they choose to hold some ICBMs in reserve, they will still lose (although a smaller amount) relative to their position before the attack.

In response to a moderate Soviet buildup constrained by SALT II, we estimate that the MX program would require 200 missiles and 4,600 shelters at a cost of $33 billion in constant FY 80 dollars. In reaction to a high Soviet buildup assuming SALT II never goes into effect, the MX program would require 400 missiles and 13,500 shelters at a cost of $59 billion in constant FY 80 dollars.

Even for this most very severe threat excursion, the MX system can be expanded to meet the threat even if it had to take the entire ICBM threat by itself. In fact, it is inconceivable that we would not also attempt to deter such an enormous (and enormously costly) Soviet buildup—if it seemed to be materializing—by augmenting other legs of the triad. For example, we could increase our deployment of cruise missiles and C-4 SLBM's.

We would not have significant programmatic difficulty in expanding MX to meet these advanced threats. We can build shelters, for example, at a rate of 2000 per year, or even higher under emergency conditions.

In MX system configurations, missiles and shelters can be traded off within wide limits without major changes in cost or survivability. Thus, our response to a breakout could emphasize either missiles or shelters, depending on available production resources and policy considerations.

Verification

Verification of the system is accomplished on the basis of several general characteristics which have been noted earlier. These include:

(1) A designated assembly area (DAA) used for the equipment, with operations conducted as openly as is feasible to aid observations by National Technical Means (NTM).

(2) Special transport techniques used to move the equipment from DAA to the designated deployment area (DDA). The uniqueness of these transport techniques aids in identification and monitorability.

(3) A final assembly area, used at the entry of the DDA where the TEL assembly is completed and the missile is mated with the TEL. The TEL, therefore, only exists in the DDA.

(4) Barriers between the DAA and the DDA. They require a significant time to disassemble in order to permit transit of equipment.

(5) Clustering of road loops in small groups in the valleys comprising the DDA. This makes transfer between groups impossible.

(6) No interconnection between road loops which would allow TEL transfer. Thus TELs cannot be transferred from loop-to-loop.

Openable roofs on the shelters permit viewing via NTM. The shelters would be opened periodically, (e.g., at major maintenance periods), and a specified number of openings would occur each year. Provisions for "on-demand" openings would also be made in order to handle ambiguous cases. The shelter roofs are opened by removing, by crane, a number of plugs built into the roof, as indicated in Figure 2.

We have made comprehensive assessments of the verifiability of the system. The results may be summarized as follows:

The Soviets can verify the proposed U.S. system.

Soviet concern over US cheating should be ineligible due to the availability of collateral information.

If employed by the Soviets, a system designed along the lines of MX would be verifiable by the United States. We could monitor with high confidence the number of MX-type launchers the Soviets deployed in designated areas and would have high confidence that no such launchers deployed elsewhere.

Environmental and public issues

The MX basing system involves "point security" practices. This means that only the land in the immediate vicinity of each of the shelters is withdrawn from public use. The area is about 2.5 acres per shelter—essentially the same as current Minuteman sites. Thus only about 25 square miles would be withdrawn from public use, including land for the assembly areas.

Every effort will be made to make MX energy self-sufficient. Each MX shelter may require 5–10 kw of power in steady-state operation, which results in several tens of megawatts of total power requirement. It appears feasible to power MX in peacetime by photo-voltaic solar systems emplaced at the shelters, along with some geothermal plants or windmills. This would avoid energy problems and also provide a pathfinder program for large scale production of commercially useful photovoltaic systems. The size of the solar units would be in the range of interest for individual homes.

Costs

The total DoD system costs for the current baseline concept are estimated in FY 80 dollars at $33 billion for acquisition and $440 million for annual operations and support. The costs include RDT&E for mass simulators in the shield vehicle and shelters. Actual deployment of the mass simulators would add about $1.4 billion to the acquisition costs and about $10 million to the annual operations and support costs.

The cost estimates have been carefully prepared, but with any complex system projected 10 years into the future there is bound to be uncertainty. "Improvements" will be resisted unless an overriding need can be demonstrated. However, there are some features which probably will ultimately be added to the system (e.g., mass simulators). Implementation of these improvements will be deferred until their need actually arises, though low-cost provision will be made for them. Costs will also be influenced should the Soviets increase their ICBM threat beyond our estimates, especially in the absence or termination of SALT II. In that case we would expand the MX system in response and that would, of course, increase the cost (but by less than the Soviet threat augmentation would cost them).

Incremental costs to expand the system are roughly $2.6 million per shelter against a proliferated Soviet missile threat and $2.0 million per shelter against a Soviet threat based on fractionation of the current missile inventory. These costs are slightly less than our acquisition cost per RV. While we do not know what Soviet RV costs are, we have no reason to believe them to be substantially different from our own. Thus there would be no advantage to the Soviets in pursuing an RV vs shelter race, considering that they would be investing in RVs based in vulnerable silos and obtaining no cost advantage in the process.

This is an expensive system like all other major strategic systems we have built. In FY 80 dollars the Minuteman ICBM program cost $40B, the B–52 program cost $54B (not including the supporting tanker force and ALCM), and the TRIDENT program will cost about $39B (assuming 25 submarines and 600 C–4 misiles). Annual operating costs of MX will be comparable to Minuteman, and about one-third those of the SLBM force or bomber force.

IMPACT OF STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM ON SALT

I have described for you today the strategic force modernization programs which the Administration has planned for the years ahead. These efforts have become an important issue in the debate over SALT II. In my view this is an entirely proper extension of the SALT debate. The value of SALT II cannot be determined in isolation; the treaty must be judged in terms of its effect on U.S.-Soviet relations and on the overall defense posture of the United States.

As Secretary Brown has said repeatedly, SALT II by itself is not sufficient to ensure the strategic balance between the United States and Soviet Union. But it does permit us to take the steps necessary to maintain the strategic balance and it makes that task easier by putting important limitations on Soviet strategic forces.

With or without SALT we will need to modernize our strategic forces. during the lifetime of SALT II we will continue deployment of the Trident submarines and

missile, we will begin to deploy ALCMs which will dramatically improve the capability of our bomber forces, and we will move toward IOC of MX in a survivable and verifiable basing mode. These programs are necessary because SALT will not solve all of our strategic problems, but SALT II will make the resolution of those problems easier than would be the case without an agreement.

The need for greater defense efforts has led some to ask whether SALT is really worth the effort, whether in fact it is arms control at all. My own view is that SALT II will make a valid and significant contribution to US national security if it is combined with a vigorous program of strategic force improvements.

It is important to understand that strategic arms control and force modernization are not inconsistent undertakings. They are complementary ways of maintaining a stable nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. By modernization and improving our strategic forces we can ensure that we are capable of meeting our defense objectives despite the continued Soviet buildup. By negotiating an equitable and verfiable SALT agreement we can constrain Soviet forces and limit the threat to which we must respond.

We must also understand that arms control cannot substitute for strategic force modernization. We need to pursue both courses of action, and this Administration is committed to doing so.

Arms control and Force modernization are mutually supportive:

Arms control helps modernization: by limiting the Soviet threat, and by adding predictability to the Soviet force buildup we are able to respond more prudently and more efficiently in designing our own forces. Specific example: the SALT II limit on RVs per missile will make MX more survivable and less expensive.

Modernization helps arms control: by keeping our forces strong, secure, and survivable, we can negotiate with greater confidence. This will also provide our adversaries with a greater incentive to negotiate.

The June decision on the MX missile was criticized by some on grounds that it would give the United States a destabilizing first-strike capability, suggesting that we instead rely on smaller missiles such as Minuteman. This issue, of course, is not affected by the decision on the basing mode. The MX missile will be capable of attacking Soviet silos in the late 1980's. In sufficient numbers it could give us effectively the same capability against silos that the Soviets will have in the early 1980's. In the mid 1980's the ALCM will provide us with a capability (although not prompt) of the same sort, and SLBMs at some future date will probably achieve a counter-silo accuracy.

But in none of those cases, for ourselves or for the Soviets, will this amount to a disarming first-strike capability, since the very formidable at-sea SLBM forces of both countries (and the bomber/cruise missile force) will not be affected by an attack on silos. The primary advantage to the United States of having the same counter-silo capability as the Soviets, besides the obvious perception reasons, is that by giving the Soviets the same problem that they gave us, we motivate them to go to smaller, mobile survivable ICBM's as did we. Smaller missiles are less threatening to the United States, and stability will actually be *enhanced* if both sides move to survivable and verifiable ICBM basing.

In summary, MX is consistent with our arms control objectives for the following reasons:


(1) It restores confidence in the one vulnerable leg of Triad,

(2) It reduces the need to consider LUA as a policy option,

(3) It discourages the Soviets from preemptive attack (and encourages them to move to smaller, less threatening mobile ICBM's or to SLBM's).

FIGURE 4

DEPLOYMENT CONCEPT



Senator STONE. This session is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene subject to call of the Chair.]

[Additional questions and answers follow:]

AMBASSADOR EARLE'S AND DR. PERRY'S RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Question 1. Did the United States allow a significant loophole in the SALT II Treaty by not obtaining Soviet agreement to the numerical magnitudes of the launch-weight and throw-weight of the SS-19 (the largest light ICBM which sets the standard for the dividing line between light and heavy ballistic missiles)? Won't the Soviets be able to exploit this loophole by making their "new type" ICBM somewhat larger than the SS-19's such that the United States will not be able to challenge because it will not know precisely the magnitude of the limit?

Answer. The absence of Soviet data on the launch-weight and throw-weight of the Soviet SS-19 will not interfere with our ability to determine whether the Soviets are complying with the agreement or to challenge a suspected violation. A Soviet statement on data could not substitute for our own estimates of SS-19 launch-weight and throw-weight.

Under the terms of the SALT II Treaty, the Soviets are barred from any increase in the launch-weight or throw-weight of the SS-19, because they have agreed that the SS-19 defines the upper limit for "light" ICBM's. Our intelligence can detect a change in these factors more easily and with greater precision than it can measure their exact size. The requirement that any follow-on to the existing SS-19 not exceed the current launch-weight and throw-weight of the SS-19 is monitored by comparing our intelligence on the new missile with our extensive intelligence data on the SS-19. Our own monitoring capability will allow us to determine whether there are any significant increases in the size of the SS-19 and whether there is any significant discrepancy between the SS-19 and any new Soviet "light" missile.

In short, there is no loophole. We have a firm basis for challenging Soviet efforts to evade the limits on new or modified ICBM's, and we have clear guidelines for our own design of the M-X ICBM.

Question 2. Couldn't an entirely new ICBM which didn't violate the "new types" definition have increased (1) accuracy, (2) reliability, (3) range capability, (4) warhead yield, (5) ABM defense penetration capability, (6) targeting capability and (7) capability of command and control subsystems? Couldn't any of these factors significantly increase the military capability and, hence, utility of the ICBM?

Answer. An existing ICBM could be improved in the course of modernization in these categories, to the extent that those improvements could be made without violation of the SALT II Treaty limits on modifying existing ICBM systems. These require that any modifications have to be made within the constraints of limiting the length, the largest diameter, the throw-weight, and the launch-weight of the ICBM to changes of between plus or minus 5 percent; and not changing the number of stages or type of stage propellant. Thus, even with improvement in the seven categories you mentioned, "an entirely new missile" would have to be one where throw-weight, number of warheads, dimensions, and type of propellants were essentially the same as before. (In some categories, notably yield, the throw-weight limit would inhibit improvements.) Improving any of these factors would increase to some degree the absolute capability of the ICBM, but would not cause us significant concern militarily. However, taking into account the capabilities of existing Soviet ICBM's, even very large improvement in these areas would not affect our deterrent capability or the strategic balance. This is because the newest Soviet ICBM's already have sufficient accuracy, yield, reliability, range, command-and-control, etc., to attack any target, hard or soft. Therefore, further improvements in these parameters would be of marginal significance.

What is important with regard to further improvements in accuracy and yield-to-weight ratio would be the deployment of more, smaller RV's on Soviet ICBM's while retaining good hard target capability. The provisions of the Treaty (new types limitations, fractionation limits, and MIRVed ICBM launcher limitations) will constrain the number of Soviet ICBM RV's which can threaten U.S. ICBM's in the future. Combined with the limits on smaller RV's, they will effectively prevent such exploitation of improved accuracy and yield.

Question 3. In the selected M-X horizontal shelter basing mode, do the shelters constitute storage facilities at launch sites which are prohibited by SALT II? What was the original intent of the sides in agreeing to this prohibition? What is the meaning of the terms "storage facilities" and "launch sites"?

Answer. Subparagraph 5(b) of Article IV of the Treaty prohibits either side from providing storage facilities for or storing ICBM's in excess of normal deployment requirements at launch sites of ICBM launchers. The associated Agreed Statement defines the term "normal deployment requirements" as the deployment of one missile at each ICBM launcher. The sides did not define the other terms formally in the Treaty, but their meaning was made clear in the negotiating record. An ICBM "launch site" refers to the area adjacent to and surrounding an ICBM launcher. "Storage facilities" refer to some protective structure, either above or below ground, in which missiles would be stored and from which they would have ready access to the ICBM launcher. The intent of the sides in this provision was to prohibit either side from deploying near ICBM launchers excess missiles which could be used for rapid reload and refire of the ICBM launchers.

The horizontal shelters in the U.S. MPS (multiple protective structure) basing mode for the M-X ICBM will not be storage facilities for excess missiles pursuant to subparagraph 5(b) of Article IV. They will never be used for storing missiles, but only for housing a missile on its launcher. The MPS system is being designed so that the Soviets can verify that there is only one M-X launcher carrying its one M-X missile in each designated deployment area with its associated 23 horizontal shelters. They will be able to verify that there are no excess ICBM's and no storage facilities for excess ICBM's. Thus, the U.S. MPS system will be consistent with the SALT II agreement.

Question 4. In their testimony, the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated concern with the inclusion in SALT II of conventionally armed cruise missiles. As you know, NATO counts heavily on air-delivered conventional munitions to counter Soviet armored strength. When was the decision made by the United States to agree to the Russian insistence that conventionally armed cruise missiles also be included?

Answer. Since we had no programs for long-range, conventionally-armed, air-launched cruise missiles, and in view of verification concerns, we indicated to the Soviets in late 1978 that, in the context of satisfactory resolution of other issues, we would agree that the limits in the Treaty on ALCM's and in the Protocol on GLCM's and SLCM's would apply to both conventional and nuclear weapon-delivery vehicles. We made clear that such a definition of GLCM and SLCM in the Protocol set no precedent for future limits, if any, on such weapon systems. After prolonged negotiation on the issue, the sides agreed shortly before the Summit to a separate definition of GLCM and SLCM in the Protocol covering both conventional and nuclear weapon-delivery systems. This separate definition underscores the U.S. no-precedent position, as made clear in the negotiating record.

Question 5. Was a detailed study undertaken and presented to the Secretary of Defense and the President on the utility for NATO of conventionally-armed cruise

missiles for penetrating dense Warsaw Pact air defense? If such a study was done, when was it completed?

Answer. Although no formal study was undertaken and presented to the President on the utility for NATO of conventionally armed cruise missiles for penetrating dense Warsaw Pact air defenses, there have been a number of staff and contractor studies which explored this and other issues related to conventionally-armed cruise missiles. The Secretary of Defense was informed of staff assessments of the utility, feasibility and potential availability of conventional cruise missiles. Based upon this work the results of these assessments were used in analyses of the issues for the Special Coordination Committee (SCC) and the President. For example, during 1978, in the context of the SCC deliberations on the SALT cruise missile definition, the Secretary received staff summary papers on conventional applications of cruise missiles. A draft version of one such paper, Conventional Applications of Cruise Missiles, was provided to the SFRC by ACDA on July 26, 1979.

Question 6. There was a recent report that the State Department had objected to a joint USAF/West German low-cost, lightweight (about 100 lbs.) miniature drone program (with a 20-lbs. conventional warhead) to be used against Warsaw Pact air defense radars on the grounds that such a drone would violate SALT II. Was this report accurate?

Answer. Since the system to be developed by the United States and FRG is an unmanned guided mini-drone, the issue regarding whether this joint program would violate the SALT II protocol was addressed by the DoD as a key issue is whether the program should be approved. The DoD review, which included review by the DoD SALT II representative, concluded there would be no conflict between the program and SALT II. We therefore recommended to the Department of State and the Office of Management and the Budget that we approve the program and provided them our assessment regarding SALT II. After careful review, especially on this point, State and OMB concurred in the proposed joint program.

Question 7. In Secretary Brown's posture statements for both fiscal year 1979 and fiscal year 1980, the prospect of fifth generation Soviet ICBM's was presented. In his fiscal year 1979 statement he said:

"In addition, the Soviets have a fifth generation of ICBM's in development, estimated to consist of four missiles. Flight testing of one or two of these missiles could begin at any time, with the others following by the early 1980's."

What are your current expectations? How does the "new type" rule in the Treaty really affect this prospect? Has the testing of fifth generation been delayed or already begun?

What additional constraints to make the "new type" rule more effective did the United States propose during the negotiations but which were not included in the final agreement?

Answer. Much as Secretary Brown indicated in his posture statement for fiscal year 1980, current projections by the Intelligence Community are that the Soviets probably have under development at least four new or modified types of ICBM's. Flight-testing of these systems could begin within the next year or so. However, modifications currently being tested may incorporate some of the improvements intended for the projected fifth generation systems. In any event, given existing Treaty constraints, it is expected that any additional improvements to these systems will meet the Treaty criteria for existing type modernization. The effect will be that, to the extent these programs continue—as they may—they will be restricted to modification of existing types that do not significantly increase the threat to the United States. (See previous answer.)

Furthermore, in view of the early Soviet insistence on a single exemption to the new types rule contained in the Treaty, it is expected that one of the projected systems will have substantially different characteristics and quality as a new type of ICBM in terms of Treaty provisions. However, the Soviets will *not* be permitted *both* to replace the MIRVed SS-17 (4 RV's) or SS-19 (6 RV's) ICBM's with a 10-RV light ICBM *and* to replace their non-MIRVed SS-11 ICBM with a non-MIRVed light ICBM that differs substantially from the SS-11.

The United States first advocated a ban on new types and on modifications to existing types of ICBM's in its Comprehensive Proposal of March 1977. The new types issue became the subject of detailed negotiations in Geneva, beginning in the fall of 1977, when the United States initially proposed that a new type be considered as any ICBM which had a propulsion system, guidance system, reentry vehicles, penetration aids, and/or post boost vehicle (PBV) of a type different from such components on existing ICBM's. In April 1978, a new United States proposal was tabled which reflected a shift of focus away from attempts to control ICBM accuracy improvements by means of a freeze on changes in guidance system hardware. Under this proposal, which formed the basis for the new types definition as it finally

evolved, a new type was defined as an ICBM different from existing types (those flight-tested as of April 15, 1978), in one or more of the following respects:

(*a*) the number of stages, the length, the largest diameter, the launch-weight, or the throw-weight, of the missile;

(*b*) the initial weight, the type of propellant (i.e., liquid or solid), or the total impulse, of any of its stages;

(*c*) the initial weight, the type of propellant (i.e., liquid or solid), or the total impulse, of the post-boost vehicle (PBV).

"Different" with respect to length, diameter, launch-weight, throw-weight, initial weight, and total impulse, was defined as any change (plus or minus) in excess of five percent. This value was chosen both to be adequately verifiable and to allow for possible minor design or production changes necessary for the maintenance of the effectiveness of existing types of ICBM's, while preventing significant modifications in the components subject to constraint.

The United States introduced another proposal designed to make the fractionation limits—the limits on the number of RV's on ICBM's of existing types—more effective. It proposed—and the Soviets agreed—that the weight of individual reentry vehicles on existing types of ICBM's with multiple reentry vehicles be no lighter than those already flight-tested on that type of ICBM as of May 1, 1979. Limitations were also agreed on the minimum weight of RV's on existing types of ICBM's with single reentry vehicles. These provisions are intended to inhibit a Party from quickly deploying, at a later date, more reentry vehicles than the number to which existing types of ICBM's are limited by the fractionation limits.

Additionally, the United States proposed that the weight of each reentry vehicle on the one permitted new type of ICBM be greater than four percent of the missile throw-weight. We eventually dropped this proposal in the context of agreement on other issues. However, the United States made an informal statement that, if a side tested RV's on the permitted new type of ICBM, for which the total weight of 10 such RV's was less than 40 percent of the throw-weight, it would raise serious questions whether the new system was really designed to be one in which the payload would not exceed 10 RV's. The United States further stated that if such a problem arose in the future, it would be an issue for discussion and resolution in the Standing Consultative Commission. The Soviets made no comment with regard to this statement.

Question 8. Does the chart presented on relative United States and Soviet hard target kill capability reflect the differences in the target structure of the United States and the Soviet Union in terms of numbers and hardness of military targets?

Are hard targets more numerous and harder in the Soviet case? If so, how is this reflected in the charts?

Answer. Let me start by noting that the purpose of the chart is to compare the military capabilities of single, individual missiles of various types against, first, hard targets, and second, soft targets. The chart does not, therefore, attempt to reflect the difference in numbers of United States and Soviet missiles, nor does it reflect relative hardness of United States and Soviet targets. For the purpose of this chart, a hard target, whether United States or Soviet, was defined as having overpressure hardness of at least 2,000 psi.

The Soviet silos and command and control facilities are typically harder than ours and there are more of them. Rather than building super-hard silos, which will not be able to withstand the better ICBM accuracies both sides are achieving, we have taken with M-X the more effective route of combining hardness with mobility and location uncertainty. We also derive our strength and survivability from a more balanced triad of survivable strategic forces rather than an unbalanced dependence on ICBM's.

Question 9. Please provide the Committee with a cost-effectiveness comparison of the selected horizontal shelter ("racetrack") M-X basing concept and the previously studied vertical shelter basing concept. The comparison should be done using the same basic constraints, requirements, threats and scenarios.

Also please provide a specific comparison of the hardness and spacing of the horizontal and vertical shelter concepts.

Was a less demanding Soviet threat assumed in appraising the horizontal shelter concept than was used in appraising the vertical shelter concept?

Answer. As implied in the question, any meaningful cost comparison of two design concepts must use the same basic constraints, requirements, threats, and scenarios. Applying this groundrule, the horizontal shelter plus dash version will cost approximately $7 billion more than the vertical shelter concept. Roughly $6 billion of this increase is to acquire the shuffle and dash on warning features that add significantly to the survivability and, hence, deterrence, of the selected design. These mobility features are a hedge against possible Soviet attempts to identify and

target only those shelters containing missiles. The remaining one billion dollars is attributable to SALT related features, such as openable ports in the roof of each shelter. We believe this expenditure is clearly cost effective. If we failed to offer a system having verifiability satisfactory to the Soviets and thereby undermined SALT, we could then need to spend many more billions to maintain the strategic balance.

A number of different combinations of hardness and spacing have been used in various papers in the past three years as preliminary design work has progressed, theoretical analyses have been completed and field tests of preliminary designs have been conducted. No final decisions on design or spacing were ever made for vertical shelters, and they would not have been made until after two or three more years of design and testing. The criteria for hardness for the horizontal shelter system will be the same as they would have been for vertical shelters. Since it is more expensive to harden a horizontal then a vertical shelter to the same level, cost optimization leads to a somewhat larger spacing for the horizontal shelters, but the survivability of the system will be the same.

Question 10. In a letter dated August 2, 1979, to the Committee Chairman, Secretary Vance described Soviet views and the record of exchanges between the two sides concerning the MPS basing mode under the provisions of the SALT II Treaty. The Secretary referred to the matter being raised by the Soviet Delegation in Geneva in the summer of 1978. He described this exchange in some detail. He then mentioned but did not describe the issue having been raised in diplomatic channels on several occasions.

Paul Nitze has indicated that the United States made at least two important demarches to the Soviets on this issue which seem not to have been described by the Secretary. Would you please describe in more detail all exchanges the United States had with the Soviets on this issue.

Answer. As Secretary Vance stated in his letter of August 2 to the Committee Chairman, this subject was raised in the Soviet Delegation in Geneva in the summer of 1978. Referring to newspaper reports regarding a vertical MPS basing mode, they stated that it appeared that such a deployment would violate both the ban on construction of new fixed ICBM silo launchers and the ban on deliberate concealment measures. The United States Delegation replied that no decision had been made regarding a basing mode but that whatever mode the United States adopted would be one that violated neither of the provisions cited by the Soviets. They further stated that the draft agreement expressly provided for the deployment, after Protocol expiration, of an ICBM system in which missiles and their launchers are moved from point to point.

In addition, as Secretary Vance also mentioned in his letter of August 2, the subject was discussed on several occasions in diplomatic channels other than between the Delegations. In particular, the United States approached the Soviet Union at the Ambassadorial level in Washington and Moscow, also in the summer of 1978. In these discussions, the United States made clear to the Soviets that the various mobile ICBM systems that we are considering, including ones in which the launch point could itself be hardened, are permitted during the post-Protocol period. The Soviets stated that construction of additional ICBM launch silos would be inconsistent with the SALT agreement, and questioned how the number deployed could be verified.

An early and important statement of U.S. policy on this subject was also made by Secretary of Defense Brown in his speech before the National Convention of the American Legion in New Orleans on August 22 of last year.

Finally, prior to the Vienna Summit, the United States publicly announced that it intends to proceed with the M-X system and described the various MPS basing modes under consideration. At Vienna the Soviets complained about the introduction of a new powerful missile and questioned the verifiability of its deployment. The President noted that the Soviets had already deployed missiles comparable in power to the M-X and he assured them that the basing mode would be verifiable. Thereafter President Brezhnev signed the Treaty and the Protocol.

Question 11. Could you provide the Committee with the statements made by the Soviets in the SALT II negotiations about the capabilities of the Backfire (such as that President Ford notes in his memoirs was presented to him by President Brezhnev)? Would you also provide the analysis of those statements in light of United States estimates of the Backfire's capabilities?

Answer. During the more than six years of the SALT II negotiations there were a number of exchanges between the Soviets and the United States regarding the capabilities of the Backfire bomber. Members of the Soviet Delegation have informally stated that Backfire has a 4,000 km radius for a mission flown entirely at high altitudes and subsonic speeds. An early Soviet-proposed version of the Backfire

statement contained a reference to a Backfire radius of action of 2,200 km. (The Soviets indicated that this included some supersonic flight.) The United States opposed inclusion of this number because we did not wish to endorse the 2,200 km combat radius figure, and the Soviets removed it.

Although there is some disagreement within the intelligence community on the maximum range of the Backfire, there is general agreement that it has enough range to reach the United States under certain conditions. Such estimates are, however, sensitive to assumptions regarding payload and flight profile. The range capabilities for Backfire stated by the Soviets during the course of SALT II negotiations may not be inconsistent with our own estimates of Backfire's capabilities, depending on the assumptions that are made. This spread of numbers illustrates the flexibility of aircraft to trade speed, altitude and payload for range.

APPENDIX

Comparison of the Russian and English Texts of the SALT II Treaty

In connection with its examination of the SALT II Treaty and related documents, the Foreign Relations Committee examined the Russian text of the Treaty, the Protocol, the Agreed Statements and Common Understandings, the Memorandum of Understanding and the Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines to ascertain whether there were significant differences between the Russian and English versions of the documents.

Using a typescript of the Russian texts (64 pages in all) provided by the Department of State, the Committee consulted expert linguists and legal scholars in the Congressional Research Service and the Law Library of the Library of Congress and retained Professor Leon Lipson of Yale Law School, an authority on Soviet law, as a special consultant to examine and compare the Russian and English texts. Their research revealed seven points of possible discrepancy on which the Committee sought and obtained further clarification from the Department of State.

To provide interested members of the public with the background research on this subject, the following documents are printed below:

Letter of Senators Church and Javits of July 23, 1979 to Secretary Vance, enclosing a memorandum of questions on the two texts;

Reply of the Department of State of August 17, 1979 with comment by the Division of Language Services.

July 23, 1979.

Hon. Cyrus Vance,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary: As part of its consideration of the SALT II Treaty and related documents, the Committee on Foreign Relations has made a thorough study of the Russian text of the documents to determine their compatibility with the English text submitted by the President to the Senate for ratification.

In general, the Committee has found no alarming discrepancies between the two texts. Nevertheless, seven specific questions have been raised about seeming discrepancies of varying, generally minor degrees of significance. Inasmuch as the Department's Division of Language Services, in a memorandum of June 14, found the two texts "to have the same meaning in all substantive respects," the Committee would appreciate clarification of the seven points it has noted.

They are set out in detail in the accompanying memorandum. Please supply the Committee with responses to these points in similar detail at your earliest convenience, but if possible before the planned Congressional recess beginning on August 3.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.

Sincerely,

Frank Church,
Chairman.

Jacob K. Javits,
Ranking Member.

Enclosure.

Memorandum of Questions Concerning the Russian and English Texts of the Salt II Treaty

This memorandum raises a number of questions, presented in order of importance, about apparent discrepancies between the Russian and English texts of the SALT II treaty. Any eventual decision on the seriousness of any of these discrepancies will be up to the Committee on Foreign Relations, but to make that decision, it would be appropriate to get explanatory comments from the Department of State and those who negotiated the agreement.

Following, with Russian words rendered in the Latin alphabet, are detailed presentations of the various questions:

1. "Zablagovremenno" to mean "well in advance"—

In Article XVI of the Treaty, paragraph 1, line 2, the English text reads (emphasis added):

"Each Party undertakes, before conducting each planned ICBM launch, to notify the other Party *well in advance* on a case-by-case basis that such a launch will occur, except for single ICBM launches from test ranges or from ICBM launcher deployment areas, which are not planned to extend beyond its national territory."

In two other cases—both connected with plans to notify of flight-testing or deployment of cruise missiles—the English text also uses "well in advance" to modify the concept of notification. One use occurs in the Fifth Common Understanding to Paragraph 8 of Article II of the Treaty (dealing with ALCMs "capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers"). The other occurs in the Fifth Common Understanding to Paragraph 3 of Article II of the Protocol (dealing with longer-range GLCMs and SLCMs).

In all three cases, the English phrase "well in advance" is rendered in the Russian text by the word, "zablagovremenno." Although the Oxford Russian-English Dictionary (1972) renders the Russian word as "in good time; well in advance," both a Soviet dictionary (the 1965 Soviet Encyclopaedia Publishing House edition, supervised by A. I. Smirnitsky) and a Western one (the 1944 E. P. Dutton, Muller edition) give the meaning as "in good time, in advance."

More importantly as a matter of precedent, "zablagovremenno" was used in the Russian text of the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Nuclear War Outbreak, signed on September 30, 1971 (22 U.S.T. 1590) when the English text read simply "in advance."

Unless there have been clarifying statements between the parties making more precise the number of days or hours of the agreed prior notification of ICBM tests or ALCM, GLCM and SLCM testing or deployment, there is considerable imprecision even in the English rendition. The question is whether or not the English "well in advance" is more precise and restrictive than the Russian "zablagovremenno" and, if so, whether the difference is a signficant one.

2. The use of negative conjunctions to connect three verbs (develop, test, deploy)—

In Article IV, Paragraph 5(c) and Paragraph 7 of the Treaty, the Parties undertake, respectively, "not to develop, test or deploy" rapid ICBM-launcher reload systems or missiles heavier than those they now have deployed. In those two instances, after the word "undertake" (Russian "obyazuetsya"), the three verbs are written as follows (emphasis added):

ne cozdavat', *ne* ispiytiyvat' i *ne* razvyortiyvat' and rendered in English: "not to develop, test or deploy."

In another passage—the Common Understanding to Paragraph 8 of Article IV of the Treaty—the English text (emphasis added) reads:

"During the term of the Treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics *will* not produce, test, or deploy ICBMs of the type . . . known . . . as the SS-16."

The Russian rendition, in this instance, uses a different conjunction ("i"—"and") to link the three verbs after the negative statement ("will not"—"ne budyet"). Arguably, in Russian, the obligation as stated is only not to take *all three* of the actions (production, testing *and* deployment) rather than to forego each and all of them, as in the undertaking on "systems for rapid reload of ICBM launchers *and on heavy missiles.*" There is also, in the grammatical construction, an obvious difference between *undertaking* not to do three things and stating that one *will* not do them. Most authorities on Russian usage consulted on this question see little difference in the "will not" context, between the use of ":"—"and" and the three negative conjunctions. They do suggest that even after "ne budyet" it would be possible, if stiff, to use the "ne . . . ne . . . ne" construction of Article IV itself.

In any event, the translation does present a measure of ambiguity, and it is proper, at least, to ask for its clarification, especially as it would have been possible in the Common Understanding to achieve a parallel formulation by having the USSR "undertake" not to produce, test or deploy, in the same fashion as in Article IV itself.

3. The Russian "kazhdaya" to mean "either";

In Article XVII, dealing with the Standing Consultative Commission, the Treaty states that "the Parties will . . .

"(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as *either* Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;" . . . (emphasis added)

In the Russian text of this section, the word "either" is rendered as "kazhdaya," an adjective used elsewhere throughout the Treaty and accompanying documents to

mean "each", its common Russian meaning. The result of this apparent discrepancy in the two texts is that it is not clear what obligation is assumed. In English it does seem clear that a request from *either* party should result in a *voluntary* response from the other; in Russian, that connection seems somewhat obscured. The fact that the provision of information is to be on a voluntary basis in any event may well render this point insignificant but it is still worth asking why the negotiators did not have the Russian text read "lyubaya" ("either") instead of "kazhdaya" in this instance.

4. The Russian rendering of "update"—In the Memorandum of Understanding exchanged by the SALT delegation heads, the Parties agreed on the U.S. and USSR data base on strategic offensive arms as of November 1, 1978 and agreed to "update the above agreed data" when SALT II enters into force. In the Russian text, the words "will update" are given as "proizvedut utochnyenie," literally, "to produce clarifications or revisions," "to revise." In a sense the Russian is more precise than the English in this instance, but neither really spells out the nature of the commitment in great detail. Perhaps there is no need to do so, as it is clear that what is intended is an exchange of information in which numbers that were accurate in November 1978, are to be revised to be accurate on the date the treaty goes into force. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to ask for clarification of this translation.

5. The translation of "as appropriate"—In Article XVII, Paragraph 2 (f) and (g) and in the Second Agreed Statement to Article II, Paragraph 3 of the Treaty—all provisions dealing with activities in the Standing Consultative Commission relating, respectively, to consideration of improving the treaty by amendment, of further limiting strategic offensive arms, and consulting on revision of the agreed list of definitions of planes as heavy bombers—the English phrase "as appropriate" is given in Russian as "po mere neobkhodimosti." The connotation of the English words would seem to be broader, to carry more of a sense of discretion and desirability, than the Russian, which usually is restrictive and implies necessity or need.

In practice the decision of whether or not it is "appropriate" for the Parties to get into discussions on amending this Treaty or further limiting the arms race will depend entirely on political considerations and not on treaty language. In the case of a disagreement over whether or not a plane should be considered a heavy bomber, however, it is conceivable that one Party could treat the question as a matter "appropriate" for consultations, while the other Party held that consultations on the subject were not "needed."

It is not easy to conceive of a better Russian translation than the one used for "as appropriate," but it is nevertheless appropriate to raise the question with the State Department on this point, as it should have been possible—even if a different Russian construction were required—to come closer in Russian to the connotation of desirability or possibility of the English "as appropriate".

6. Inconsistent repetition of the word "further"—In the preambular sections of both the Treaty and the Protocol reference is made to the desirability of the Parties' taking "measures for" (Treaty) or concluding "early agreement on" "the further limitation and further reduction of strategic arms." While the English text uses the word "further" twice in both instances, the Russian text uses the translation "dal'nyeishemu" only once in the Treaty preamble and "dal'nyeishem" twice in the Protocol preamble.

The inconsistency is minor to the point of insignificance, except as it may reflect on the care taken in coordinating the English and Russian texts generally. It is therefore worth noting.

7. The Russian translation of the English "develop"—In Article IV, Paragraph 5 (c) and Paragraph 7, the Parties undertake not "to develop, test or deploy" rapid reload systems for ICBM launchers or heavier missiles than those now deployed. (See Point 2, above). In both instances the word "develop" is given in Russian as "cozdavat' ", a verb more usually translated as "invent". In more conventional usage, the idea of development would be rendered in Russian through the verb "razviyvat' ". It seems probable in the context of the Treaty that "cozdavat' " has a mechanistic and perhaps a special military usage in Russian, different from its standard sense of "invent" or "create". An alternative Russian verb that might have come closer to the English "develop" in this sense would have been "razrabatiyvat' ".

The point is one on which State Department authorities can perhaps provide an added assurance.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., August 17, 1979.

Hon. FRANK CHURCH,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of July 23, 1979 requesting a clarification of seven specific questions concerning the Russian text of the SALT II Treaty.

The Language Services Division of the Department of State has reviewed the matters raised in your Memorandum of Questions, and their comments are enclosed.

If you or your colleagues have further questions on this matter, they may be addressed to the Language Services Division at 632-1528.

Sincerely,

J. BRIAN ATWOOD,
Assistant Secretary of State
for Congressional Relations.

Enclosure.

COMMENT BY THE LANGUAGE SERVICES DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ON THE SEVEN POINTS RAISED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH TEXTS OF THE SALT II TREATY

1. The best translation of the Russian word "zablagovremenno" is "in good time" (and all the dictionaries cited in the memorandum give this as the first translation). The U.S. side preferred to use the term "well in advance" which it considered essentially the same. Both terms are a matter of subjective judgment. The meaning of both "well in advance" and "in good time" would depend on the type of limitation involved. In this case, the objective on both sides was that there be a reasonable interval of time between the notification and the actual activity. It will be the task of the Standing Consultative Commission to define more precisely what constitutes sufficiently timely notification in each case.

2. The Common Understanding to paragraph 8 of Article IV is an elaboration of the text of the Article, and words different from those of the Article but meaning the same thing ("will" as opposed to "undertake") were used in the part of the text which is of concern here. This applies equally to both the English and Russian texts.

If it stood alone, the Russian construction "ne budet proizvodit', ispytyvat' i razvertyvat' " might be ambiguous, but since the basic obligation is stated unequivocally in the text of the Article itself, there can likewise be no ambiguity in the text of the Common Understanding on this point.

3. It is true that "kazhdaya" means "each" rather than "either". However, since the response referred to in Article XVII is to be voluntary, it was not considered a substantive discrepancy. Moreover, the wording of this paragraph is taken directly from the ABM Treaty, Article XIII, par. 1(b), which has been in force for seven years, without any problem arising in this regard.

4. There is no better Russian translation of "update" than the one given, and since it does provide for the intended exchange of new or "revised" information, the meaning of both texts was considered to be identical.

5. It is correct, as the memorandum states, that it is difficult to come up with a better translation of "as appropriate" than the wording used in the Russian text. The U.S. side insisted on the expression "as appropriate". The translation thereof was the subject of lengthy discussions, but neither side was able to come up with anything better than "po mere neobkhodimosti". Since both "as appropriate" and "po mere neobkhodimosti" are a matter of subjective judgment, the difference, if any, between them was not considered substantive. Moreover, the wording of these paragraphs is taken directly from Article XIII, pars. 1 (f) and (g) of the ABM Treaty, which, as previously pointed out, has been in force for seven years.

6. The second "further" was added in the English version to provide emphasis. Even without the second "further", the first would apply to "reduction" as it does to "limitation". The same applies in Russian, so that the absence of the second "dal' neyshemu" in the Treaty preamble does not signify any substantive discrepancy.

7. The English word "develop" can have both the meaning of "create" (e.g. "to develop a new type of fuel") and to "improve something already existing" (e.g. "to develop one's capabilities"). In the present context, "develop" is used in its first sense, conveyed in Russian by "sozdavat' ", and not in its second, more restrictive meaning, which would be conveyed by "razrabatiyvat' " (the same construction is found in Article IX, par. 1 of the Treaty). The wording is the same as that in Article V par. 1 of the ABM Treaty.

Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson's Responses To Additional Questions for the Record of July 16, 1979, Part 2

Question 1. What is your response to the charges that the Treaty as it now stands establishes the conditions which threaten our security for the years to come?

Answer. In my reply to this as well as to the following questions I want to emphasize the point I made in my statement to the Committee on July 16, 1979, that is, that having retired from the Foreign Service and resigned as Chief of our SALT Delegation on February 29, 1977, I can in no way speak for or on behalf of the present Administration. For the same reason I have no information not generally available to the public on the negotiations subsequent to that date, the considerations that led this Administration to adopt or not to adopt certain positions, or the programs and planning for our strategic forces. Thus, except for those matters that occurred during the period I was Chief of our Delegation, the following answers are only an expression of my personal opinion.

With respect to the foregoing question my answer is that the charge is nonsense. To the best of my knowledge the Treaty in no way constrains any programs or plans for our strategic forces that are in contemplation for the duration of the Treaty, while it does place meaningful constraints on the numbers of Soviet strategic systems and their qualitative characteristics. If we choose not to exercise the rights that we have under the Treaty that is our choice rather than the consequence of the Treaty.

Question 2. Can the Soviets indeed deploy several new types of ICBMs under the Treaty, as some have charged, or must all new ICBMs (except one) be limited to modifications of existing types?

Answer. I am not familiar with the basis on which the charge is made, nor am I familiar with the negotiations that led to this provision in the Treaty. However, reading the plain language of paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty it seems clear to me that each side is permitted to deploy only one new type of ICBM through the life of the Treaty and that modifications of existing types of missiles are limited to not more than a five percent change either up or down in the length, the largest diameter, the launch weight, or the throw weight of the type of missile being modified. Any change beyond five percent in any of those dimensions would in itself classify the missile as a new type and hence subject to the limitation of not more than one new type during the life of the Treaty.

Question 3. What is the negotiating history in Geneva—or to the extent you know, at the other levels—with regard to forward-based systems during the period immediately preceeding Vladivostok? In particular, did the Soviets indicate they would drop their FBS position in response to US arguments that more numerous Soviet systems would have to be counted? Did the Soviets ever threaten to revive the FBS issue?

Answer. As I said in my oral testimony before the Committee on July 16, 1979 (page 32) I know of no basis whatsoever for the conclusion that prior to Vladivostok the Soviets had indicated that they were prepared to concede on the position they had theretofore maintained on forward based systems. In fact, if anything, at Geneva they repeated their position even more often and more insistently. In doing so the only "concession" that I can recall them offering was that instead of immediately withdrawing all of our "forward based systems" and liquidating the bases we would be given a reasonable period of time to do so in an orderly manner.

After Vladivostok the Soviet Delegation insistently tried to reintroduce the forward based system issue into the text of the Treaty by various formulae which would commit the United States to negotiate a resolution or liquidation of the question within a limited period of time in SALT III. My Soviet colleague often said to me that I should not interpret their conceding on the issue at Vladivostok as meaning that they had forgotten it.

Question 4. Doesn't the fact that the Treaty expressly permits encryption seriously inhibit our ability to verify the new types limits?

Answer. In my own view the mention of encryption in the second Common Understanding under paragraph 3, Article XV of the Treaty in no way adds to or subtracts from the broad obligation under paragraph three "not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means. . .". The test is simply whether anything, including encryption, is a deliberate concealment measure which impedes verification. Nothing is prohibited under that article, including encryption, unless it is a deliberate concealment measure that impedes verification. Thus the specific mention of encryption in the Common Understanding under that paragraph for purposes of clarification, does not "permit" any encryption that either party would otherwise be "permitted" if it was not a deliberate concealment measure which impedes verification.

Question 5. Does the USSR have the right to decide what telemetry to encrypt?

Answer. I do not see how the mention of encryption in the second Common Understanding to paragraph 3, Article XV gives the USSR any more "right to decide" what telemetry to encrypt than it has to decide what it will do with respect to any other obligation under the Treaty. We have monitored telemetry from Soviet missile tests for years and I have confidence that our technicians in this field know what is pertinent to verification and what is not. If the Soviets encrypt telemetry that we consider pertinent to verification it seems clear under the language of the Treaty that we are just as entitled to raise or challenge any questionable activity in this field in the Standing Consultative Commission or elsewhere, as we are any other activity pertinent to the Soviet obligations under the Treaty.

Question 6. Some have charged that SALT legalizes the position the Soviets will soon achieve strategic superiority. What is your response to that?

Answer. I have difficulty in following the logic of this and similar arguments as a reason for not ratifying the Treaty. Whatever views one may have with regard to the wisdom or desirability of the restraints placed on the Soviet Union under the Treaty, in the absence of a SALT Treaty there would be no restraints and therefore nothing that the Soviet Union did could be considered as "illegal".

As I said in my statement on July 16, 1979 to the Committee, the ideal would be an agreement so comprehensive, so perfectly balanced, and so well anticipating the future that we would never again have to concern ourselves with the problem. The present agreement obviously does not meet that test. However, as I then said I feel it is a constructive and useful step forward and therefore I favor its ratification.

Question 7. Is the United States contemplating building conventionally armed cruise missiles which would have to be counted as nuclear weapons and, therefore, are effectively prohibited?

Answer. I do not feel qualified to discuss U.S. plans for deploying cruise missiles. However, I note that deployment of cruise missiles is covered only by the Protocol to the Treaty which remains in force only through December 31, 1981. If my understanding is correct that we have no plans for deploying any cruise missiles prior to that date I do not see that the question is pertinent either to the present Treaty or its Protocol.

Question 8. Do you agree that a tougher U.S. line would have produced a better result on Backfire or MLBMs? That reopening the talks now would do so?

Answer. My answer to both questions is no.

For years official statements by the Secretary of Defense and Chairmen of the JCS, even after the Backfire emerged as an issue, indicated that Soviets had about 150 heavy bombers. In agreeing to the 2,400 aggregate at Vladivostok the Soviets could assume that we would not seek to charge more than that number of heavy bombers against the aggregate. Thus subsequently to agree to include the Backfire in the aggregate would have required the Soviets to destroy a corresponding number of ICBMs and/or SLBMs additional to those they had planned when agreeing to the 2,400 figure. I did not then nor do I now think that they are prepared to do this. Thus I was pleased to see the constraints on the Backfire that the present Administration was able to negotiate. Although not as substantial as inclusion of the Backfire in the aggregate, I feel that they are meaningful.

With respect to MLBMs, assuming they have the importance which some attach to them, even though it has never been proposed that we deploy such systems, the Treaty does freeze the number of launchers for such missiles, bans their deployment in a mobile mode and imposes fractionation limits lower than it was estimated the Soviets were capable of achieving. It seems to me these are meaningful constraints and I have no reason to feel that no matter how "tough" our negotiators, additional constraints could have been negotiated at this time. Nor do I feel that reopening negotiations on this Treaty without offering substantial concessions on our part would achieve such a result. If we continue to attach the same importance to these missiles it is, of course, open to us to seek to achieve further constraints in negotiations for a subsequent agreement.

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY GENERAL ROWNY

On page 585 of part 1 of The SALT II hearings, Senator Sarbanes asked General Rowny the following question and received the following answer:

"Senator SARBANES. General Rowny, do you think that SALT I was a good idea?"

"General ROWNY. Yes, sir. I think that taking the initiative for the interim agreement was a good idea."

General Rowny subsequently submitted the following clarification: "However, I would have had my assurances in hand before supporting it."

On page 586, Senator Sarbanes asked the following question and received the following reply from General Rowny:

"Senator SARBANES. None of these assurances were precluded by SALT I. We could have done them if we had chosen to do them. Is that correct?"

"General ROWNY. I think that is correct."

General Rowny subsequently submitted the following clarification:

"* * * except that promises are forgotten and besides, asking for more weapons did not seem to many as being in step with the spirit of SALT."

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS RECEIVED FOR THE RECORD

STATEMENTS OF DR. WES SCHWEMMER CADY, ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REPRESENTATIVE; KATHERINE EATON, CHAIRMAN, ASSOCIATION LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM COMMITTEE; AND DR. J. DAVID EDWARDS, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Since 1922 the American Association of University Women (AAUW) has included in its legislative programs provisions for the control and limitation of armaments. Numerous Association study programs have examined arms control as an integral part of an enlightened foreign policy and as a means to achieve meaningful national security. In recent years AAUW has enthusiastically supported the creation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the ratification of the SALT I Treaty, and significant United States participation in the United Nations' Special Session on Disarmament. Strongly in accord with the aim of the SALT Process, AAUW members have carefully analyzed the provisions of the pending SALT II Treaty Proposal and find them sound, desirable, and supportable.

Petitioning as an aggregate of approximately 190,000 members, the AAUW urges the unconditional ratification of the SALT II Treaty. We believe ratification is necessary for the following reasons:

One: SALT II will enhance U.S. national security and global security by reducing the risk of thermonuclear war through the establishment of quantitative and qualitative ceilings on the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals.

Two: SALT II will maintain national security by allowing, within the quantitative and qualitative ceilings, ample arms for deterrence through the respective retaliatory capabilities.

Three: SALT II will slow expensive and inflationary arms competition between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. By setting limits on strategic nuclear weapons, it will prevent a new escalation in this phase of the already exorbitant arms race.

Four: SALT II will inhibit further proliferation of strategic nuclear weapons and, within the content of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, will provide substantial evidence that the United States is serious in its intent to achieve effective arms control measures and, ultimately, a cessation of the nuclear arms race.

Five: SALT II will strengthen detente by providing a climate of stability in East-West relations and will also strengthen regional collective security systems by addressing the concerns of our NATO allies who strongly support the treaty.

Six: While SALT II is based on the mutual interests of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in avoiding thermonuclear genocide, it is not based on misplaced trust. The maintenance of a strategic balance and a safeguard against treaty violation is ensured through various national technical verification processes.

Seven: SALT II, in addition to being a sound instrument to enhance national security, bears desirable moral, social, and economic impact. For example, a reduction in arms expenditures, if truly effected, allows a reallocation of funds for peaceful domestic and international development, thus augmenting global and national security through concomitant reduction of economic problems and the international tensions such problems produce.

Eight: Finally, SALT II is necessary because its Joint Statement of Principles lays the groundwork and establishes the objectives for SALT III and a continuing process of arms reduction.

THE SECURITY ISSUE

Full scale thermonuclear warfare between the superpowers is unconscionable. Estimates of the number of deaths and the degree of destruction created by a major nuclear exchange vary so much that they are confusing at best. At worst, they are of such magnitude that they create an aura of unreality and disbelief. We can be certain, however, that a full nuclear exchange will leave tens of millions of U.S. and Soviet citizens dead and hundreds of millions dying. Vast expanses of radioactive terrain will be uninhabitable for hundreds of years. The major responsibility of a SALT II treaty is to reduce the risk of such human extermination. SALT II will decrease the risk of nuclear war by ensured maintenance of the balance of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles at a level where neither side would gain from striking first because of the destructive retaliatory capability. Without SALT II we will face the certain instability of an unrestrained and expensive nuclear arms race which will not in the future, any more than in the past, improve our military security. Without SALT II the unrestrained arms race will certainly increase fears and distrust on both sides and among our respective allies. The fear and insecurity, coupled with

increased weaponry, multiply the possibility of war by miscalculation. Greater security through reduced arsenals also reduces the possibility of genocide by tragic accident. A reduction in the nuclear arms industry will similarly reduce the risk of a tragic domestic accident in production, transportation, or storage.

By providing equal aggregate limits on launchers, heavy bombers and long-range air to surface ballistic missiles, ceilings on throw-weight and launch-weight, and qualitative restrictions on testing and deployment, SALT II creates stability and predictability in the strategic balance. By placing a ceiling of 2,250 on strategic delivery vehicles and limits on numbers of warheads, this treaty balances the apples of more accurate and numerous U.S. MIRVs against the oranges of larger Soviet warheads and heavier Soviet missiles.

The U.S. Triad defense strategy of land-based, sea-based, and bomber-launched missiles is not undermined by SALT II. In fact, SALT II allows the U.S. to make changes, within the limits imposed, to counter any allowable Soviet changes. Under the provisions of this agreement, moreover, the U.S.S.R. must dismantle 200 to 250 strategic systems. Within the context of predictability/stability provided by SALT II, U.S. military options remain open. According to Leslie H. Gelb, Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, "the agreement allows the United States to go forward with every single strategic nuclear program now on our drawing board."

SALT II is arms control as well as a step in the process of arms limitation. The Protocol provides for some additional temporary limitations through 1981, but it does not seriously inhibit the development of cruise missiles, the M–X land-based missile, the Soviet Backfire bomber or intermediate range ballistic missiles. These remain to be addressed in SALT III. In this regard, we must agree with the critics of this agreement who charged that SALT II does not go far enough. Perhaps SALT II is the best we can achieve at this point. It is progress and we (and the world) will be better with it than without it. Since genuine security will only come with the elimination of the possibility of nuclear annihilation, AAUW urges that SALT II be ratified as a step toward such ultimate security and that the negotiations for SALT III begin in earnest as soon as possible.

VERIFICATION

A strong argument for SALT II is that it is in the best national security interests of the U.S. and of the Soviet Union to limit the risk of nuclear war. Verification of the treaty ensures that both nations will honor those interests by making it difficult for either side to cheat. It is our opinion that the Soviets will violate SALT II only if they can gain a *significant* military advantage from such violation. The U.S. intelligence community and our "national technical means" of verification are sophisticated enough to ascertain whether the U.S.S.R. is violating the treaty on such massive and extensive scale as to attempt to gain some advantage in the strategic balance. It is not in the national interest by either signatory to violate the treaty and thereby to risk repudiation by the other side. Simply put, a renewed arms race is in no nation's best interest.

The Standing Consultative Commission established under the provisions of SALT I has a successful record of resolving questions of compliance, matters of interpretation and procedures for implementation. The continuance of the SCC plus U.S. national technical means of verification will allow us to identify and resolve any questions of violation or, if necessary, to revoke the treaty long before there is significant threat to our security. Additionally, the Soviet Union, were it to attempt to gain advantage, would have to consider the negative political effects worldwide from being caught cheating.

The verification and consultative procedures have proved viable under SALT I. Verification "by any national technical means" is even stronger under the terms of SALT II. That U.S. security will not depend on "trust" of the U.S.S.R. increases the attractiveness of the SALT II treaty proposal.

GLOBAL RELATIONS

The ratification of SALT II should not be linked to detente and/or matters of political and military competition for allies. Nonetheless, the practicalities of SALT II will reduce tensions and set the parameters of the most dangerous dimensions of U.S.-Soviet competition. As Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and other experts have noted, SALT is the foundation of an enduring political relationship with the U.S.S.R. based on a reduction of tensions and areas of competition. This does not mean competition will not continue; on the contrary, our political, economic and social systems make competition inevitable. It does mean, however, that we can compete without bringing about our mutual destruction. Further, rejection of SALT

II will occasion a chill in U.S.-Soviet relations and might end the SALT Process—a turn of events which the world cannot afford.

Rejection of SALT II will seriously damage U.S. leadership and prestige in the Third World and with our allies. Third World states have been vocal in reminding us of the commitment to arms control and to the nuclear arms reduction entailed in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. They recently rebuked us at the United Nations' Special Session on Disarmament for our slow progress and recalled that their pledge to abstain from developing nuclear weapons is tied to U.S.-Soviet reductions in nuclear armaments. A failure with SALT II will reenforce their fears, heighten the arms race in the Third World, encourage states like Pakistan and Brazil to develop their own nuclear weapons, and retard progress on other arms control measures such as a comprehensive test ban treaty, restriction of arms sales, prevention of satellite warfare and a mutual reduction of forces in Europe.

U.S. leadership will suffer not only in the developing nations, but our status with our NATO allies will suffer from a failure of SALT II. The treaty does not adversely affect our cooperation with our NATO allies. In fact, it can be cogently argued that SALT II enhances our position by allowing us to focus on strengthening allied conventional and tactical nuclear forces by placing no bans on weapons systems in Europe and no bans on sophisticated technology transfer, and—significantly—by providing stability in East-West relations. In addition to endorsing SALT II formally, our allies have expressed concern that rejection of SALT II will open a new phase in the Cold War which would serve neither their interests or ours.

SALT II AS A WOMEN'S ISSUE

SALT II is an issue that carries considerable importance and concern for the women of the U.S. and of the world. It is important morally because it is an issue that threatens world peace and the very existence of humanity. Historically women have been in the front ranks of issues of peace and humanitarian concerns. Moreover, we do understand the jargon and technical nature of the arms control debate. A vital part of the National Plan of Action drafted in 1977 by women from all parts of the United States—representing all segments of the female population—asks that the President and Congress intensify efforts to negotiate disarmament and to reduce military expenditures. As women we have traditionally been the primary nurturers and educators of the young. As women we are distressed that the generations we have reared may be doomed and annihilated by thermonuclear warfare. We are distressed that our government spends 60 times more to equip one soldier than to educate one child.

For women SALT II is an economic issue as well as a moral issue. As producers and consumers—as wage-earners, shoppers, taxpayers, investors, and money-managers—women are acutely aware of the cost of the arms race. The United States has spent about 2 trillion dollars on the military since World War II to be less secure now than we were then. The current global arms race costs 400 billion dollars a year, one billion dollars a day, or one million dollars a minute. Compared to the amount spent on health or education, the imbalance is staggering.

Women understand and suffer from inflation and unemployment and we are disconcerted because military expenditures are largely economically nonproductive. They enormously intensify inflation. Such spending creates few jobs since the arms industry is technology- and hardware-intensive. Such spending results in few usable goods or services. Military spending deprives society of raw materials and human energies which are desperately needed in the domestic economy and especially needed for Third World development. No matter how we analyze it, increasing military expenditures do mean sacrificial trade-offs in human needs.

SALT II must be ratified. Its failure will mean an increase in U.S. military spending of $30 billion to $60 billion over the next decade. SALT's failure will mean a 50 percent to 60 percent increase in our current defense expenditures for nuclear strategic forces. We are not content that even with SALT II our expenditures on nuclear forces will increase by 20 percent to 40 percent; we deplore that the political trade-off for SALT II could be increased non-strategic military spending. Even the wealthiest nation in the world must make economic choices. The people of the United States have always been our greatest resource. Within a tightening budget we cannot afford to give human problems—poverty, health care, inadequate schooling and housing, and unemployment—less attention because we are unwilling to grapple with the problem of fruitless military expenditures. By reducing the nuclear arms race, SALT II is at least a beginning.

SALT AS A PROCESS

AAUW urges ratification of SALT II. As a second step in an arms control process SALT II is vital and lends hope for an improved future. The United States is now, and always has been, a strong nation because of our people, our national character, our adaptability, and our worldview. Our commitment, through the Joint Statement of Principles, to SALT III indicates that we are serious about arms reductions and about preventing nuclear war. SALT II is, admittedly, limited in its achieved agreements. It is what can be accomplished through the *SALT PROCESS* that is vital. We must not relinquish our leadership or our national commitment to a safe and peaceful world by failure to ratify SALT II.

STATEMENT OF RAYMOND NATHAN, DIRECTOR, WASHINGTON ETHICAL ACTION OFFICE, AMERICAN ETHICAL UNION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

The American Ethical Union is the national religious federation of ethical humanist societies. At its recent annual assembly, it adopted the following resolution:

Whereas an uncontrolled nuclear arms race may end in nuclear holocaust, and

Whereas the United States and the Soviet Union have been negotiating Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II for six years, and

Whereas SALT II levels off the strategic arms race by numerical and qualitative restrictions, with sound verification arrangements, and

Whereas SALT II lays the groundwork for more meaningful restrictions in a SALT III Treaty: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the American Ethical Union urges the United States Senate to:

1. Vote for ratification of SALT II, as a necessary step to continue the arms control process, and

2. Work for a freeze on further testing, deployment and production of nuclear weapons and systems, to stop the arms race at the present level.

We regard the limitation, and eventual elimination, of nuclear armaments as essential not only to a better life, but to sheer survival. As concerned laymen, we have followed closely the long drawn out efforts to achieve such limitation, and believe it is high time to take the small step forward that SALT II represents.

When both the United States and the Soviet Union have the nuclear weapons to destroy each other many times over, the idea that the modest limitations proposed in SALT II could give either side an advantage that would pose a threat to the other becomes meaningless. However patriotically motivated, attempts to rewrite the treaty in the Senate serve no constructive purpose. Instead, they may trigger a vastly accelerated arms race which, by heightening the threat of nuclear war, could reduce our military security while dealing a severe blow to our already shaky economy.

We urge ratification of SALT II as submitted, with a sense-of-the Senate resolution that work should proceed immediately on a SALT III treaty to bring about more substantial limitations of nuclear arms.

STATEMENT OF WALTER HOFFMANN, CHAIRMAN, CAMPAIGN FOR U.N. REFORM, WAYNE, N.J.

SUGGESTED OUTLINE OF RESOLUTION ON SALT PROTOCOL VERIFICATION PROBLEM

With respect to the SALT II Protocol limiting the deployment of cruise missiles and mobile launchers of ICBM's, and with respect to the agreed Statement of Joint Principles for SALT III, it is the sense of the Senate of the United States that a SALT III extension of the constraints of the Protocol may be even more difficult to verify by national technical means alone than the subject matter of the SALT II treaty, and

Therefore, the Senate urges the President of the United States, prior to signing a SALT III treaty which might extend the constraints of the Protocol, to attempt to negotiate a treaty establishing an International Arms Control Verification Agency with on-site inspection authority, so that such an agency may be available in the future to supplement U.S. national technical means of verification and thereby help insure the adequate verifiability of a SALT III agreement and any other future arms accords.

Revised May 29, 1979.

Memorandum in Support of Resolution Urging the President To Negotiate for the Establishment of an International Arms Control Verification Agency with On-site Inspection Authority Prior To Signing SALT III

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

One: The SALT I and SALT II agreements can be verified to a large extent by satellite reconnaissance and other national technical means.

Two: The SALT II Protocol, however, which prohibits for a short period of time the deployment of long range ground and sea launched cruise missiles and the deployment of mobile launchers of ICBM's, is extremely difficult to verify by satellite reconnaissance or by other national technical means.

Three: While the SALT II Protocol can be defended, and should be ratified, on the ground that it is for a limited period of time during which neither side will be ready to deploy such weapons, it is contemplated that, immediately after the ratification of SALT II, negotiations will be undertaken for SALT III which may involve the extension of the restrictions in the Protocol.

Four: The Senate of the United States should make clear to the Administration now, during the SALT II debate, that the verification problems inherent in the Protocol must be solved before the temporary restrictions in the Protocol are extended in a SALT III agreement.

Five: The most effective way of resolving the verification problems inherent in a SALT III extension of the Protocol constraints is to supplement national technical means of verification with some kind of on-site inspection authority.

Six: Rather than bilateral inspection of Soviet installations by the U.S. and of U.S. installations by the Soviets, it may be more feasible politically and more acceptable from a national security standpoint, to develop on-site inspection capability through the establishment of a neutral International Arms Control Verification Agency.

Seven: An International Arms Control Verification Agency with on-site inspection authority would supplement, but not replace, U.S. national technical means of verifying SALT III. It would also help insure the adequate verifiability of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and other possible future arms accords.

Why an Extension of the Protocol Would Present More Difficult Verification Problems Than Subject Matter of SALT I and SALT II

Satellite reconnaissance and other national technical means of verification were able to monitor agreements imposing limits on ABM systems because ABM systems require extremely powerful supporting radar, which can be detected through appropriately equipped satellites.

Limits on land-based ICBM launchers, such as those contained in SALT I and II, can be monitored by satellites because such monitoring merely requires relatively simple silo counting operations with some dimensional analysis. Moreover, hardened silos take around two years to complete and require extensive support facilities, both factors simplifying verification through national technical means.

The construction of new submarines is readily subject to satellite observation and therefore agreements on limiting the total number of submarine launchers can be verified. National technical means may also prove acceptable to monitor limits on the number of strategic bombers in the same way.

MIRV numerical limitations, which are contained in SALT II, present another kind of verification problem. Satellite reconnaissance cannot determine the type of warheads a particular missile carries. The way to overcome this is to provide, as SALT II does, that any system which is tested with multiple warheads will be assumed to be equipped with that number of warheads if it is deployed.

SALT II also provides that bombers which carry air launched cruise missiles having a range in excess of 360 miles should be counted as heavy bombers in computing strategic nuclear delivery systems. To aid verification, it is reported that both sides have agreed that aircraft carrying cruise missiles will be distinguishable from other aircraft. Even if this verification device were not adhered to, it might conceivably be possible to determine by national technical means that a particular bomber is carrying cruise missiles, but it is extremely difficult to determine how many of such missiles it is carrying, and whether the range of such missiles is below or in excess of 360 miles.

The SALT II Protocol presents even more difficut verification problems. It will ban through 1981 the deployment of all ground and sea-launched cruise missiles that have a range in excess of 1500 miles. The Protocol will also ban through 1981 the deployment of mobile launchers of ICBM's sometimes referred to as the MX.

The existence of cruise missiles, as distinguished from bombers, is not easily observable by satellite. Because cruise missiles travel so close to the ground, border listening posts often cannot be relied upon for crucial information. When you add to these problems specific range limitations, as the agreement does, permitting the deployment of ground and sea launched cruise missiles with a range of less than 1500 miles, but prohibiting the deployment of such missiles with a range in excess of 1500 miles, precise verification by national technical means alone, becomes a practical impossibility.

Limits on the deployment of the multiple launch point ICBM (sometimes called the "MX") present another difficult verification problem. Whether the tunnel method is employed or mobile launchers riding on standard railroad tracks, it is very difficult for satellite reconnaissance to supply the type of verification that is needed to locate all mobile launchers at any given time.

WHY THE SENATE SHOULD ADVISE THE PRESIDENT THAT THE VERIFICATION PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THE PROTOCOL MUST BE RESOLVED BEFORE THE PROTOCOL RESTRICTIONS ARE EXTENDED BY SALT III

The SALT I Interim Agreement permitted the Soviet Union to have 1,615 ICBM's, 740 SLBM's and 62 modern ballistic missile submarines, as compared to only 1,052 ICBM's, 710 SLBM's, and 44 modern ballistic missile submarines for the United States. Although significant U.S. advantages in heavy bombers, missile accuracy, and MIRV's compensated for the disparity in launcher numbers, many Senators were unhappy with the unequal numbers. Therefore the Senate attached an amendment introduced by Senator Henry Jackson requiring the President to negotiate a future SALT agreement which "would not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union." As a result of the Jackson amendment, SALT II provides for exact equality on permitted levels of MIRV systems (1,320 each), as well as aggregate strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (2,400 each).

Many Senators today are uneasy about the verifiability of certain parts of the SALT II package—particularly the prohibitions regarding the deployment of MX and ground and sea launched cruise missiles contained in the Protocol. In response, the Administration points out that the SALT II Protocol is only for a very short period of time and that during that period the technology of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. is such that neither will be ready to deploy the ground or sea launched cruise missile or the MX, anyway. The Administration argues that we can continue the development of these new weapons during the Protocol period, but the Protocol banning their deployment for a brief period of time can and should be ratified. We agree with the Administration and urge the Senate to ratify both the SALT II Treaty and the Protocol.

It is contemplated, however, that as soon as SALT II and the Protocol are ratified, negotiations will be initiated for SALT III, and that SALT III may extend the restrictions in the Protocol on the deployment of the cruise and MX missiles. The Administration will submit to the Senate as part of the SALT II package, an agreed Statement of Joint Principles for SALT III. While there is general language in the statement on cooperative measures for verification, there is no specific reference as to how the verification problems inherent in long term constraints on the cruise and MX missiles are to be solved.

During the debate on ratification of SALT II and the Protocol, it is respectfully submitted that the Senate should pass a resolution urging the Administration to resolve the verification problems inherent in the Protocol prohibitions before the President signs a SALT III Treaty extending the restrictions on the deployment of cruise and MX missiles or limiting other weapon systems which are difficult to verify by national technical means alone. If the Senate can make certain that the Protocol constraints in SALT III will not be extended without more adequate verification, then we hope that those Senators who are now uneasy about the verification question will support the Protocol as a temporary stop-gap in the SALT process.

In any event, it is essential that the Senate not only make known its uneasiness about verification, but more importantly, suggest a constructive solution to the verification problem.

WHY AN INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION AGENCY WITH ONSITE INSPECTION AUTHORITY IS THE MOST FEASIBLE SOLUTION FOR THOSE SITUATIONS WHERE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS ALONE WILL NOT SUFFICE

When satellite reconnaissance, border listening posts, intelligence networks, and other national technical means are not sufficient by themselves to verify an arms

control agreement, it is necessary to evolve some kind of on-site inspection authority. Then, if the United States should receive information which leads it to believe that the Soviets are violating an agreement prohibiting the deployment of new weapons, it can have the site of the suspected violation inspected. Even this may not be foolproof, but it would add a very important supplemental deterrent to intentional violations. On-site inspections would be particularly useful in checking factories suspected of manufacturing new weapons, in checking sites where new weapons are suspected of being tested, in checking weapons stockpiles, and in checking sites where constrained weapons are suspected of being deployed. If the element of surprise can be added, the value of on-site inspections would increase proportionately. Greater frequency of on-site inspections would also increase the effectiveness of their violation deterrence.

It is difficult to imagine, however, that the Soviet Union would agree to permit U.S. inspectors to visit Soviet installations to verify compliance. It is equally difficult to imagine that the United States would allow Soviet agents to go snooping around our missile sites. There is both a political problem and a national security problem in permitting bilateral on-site inspections. Probably neither we nor the Soviets would allow it.

Furthermore, if bilateral inspection were agreed upon, who would be the final judge of whether cheating had occurred? If the Soviets filed a complaint, would not they be prone to find that cheating had occurred even if in fact it had not? At the very minimum, the participation of neutral observers would be necessary to give credibility to the findings of an inspection team.

For all of these reasons, the best hope of getting some kind of meaningful on-site inspection authority for major weapons systems is through the creation of a neutral international arms control verification agency. Admittedly, the establishment of such an agency would be difficult, but it is the best hope we have of achieving on-site inspection capability to supplement U.S. national technical means of verification.

The American people would more easily permit international representatives from neutral countries, such as Sweden and Switzerland, to inspect U.S. military installations to verify U.S. compliance with SALT III. At the same time, our national security would clearly be enhanced by international inspection of Soviet installations to assure Soviet compliance. We are also confident that an appropriate international system of security checks can be devised for the selection of neutral international inspectors that will guarantee the protection of each nation's security.

Whether we can sell the Soviets on the idea of neutral international inspection is not known, but we must try. Otherwise, further agreements in the SALT process will become more and more difficult to verify by national technical means alone. This in turn will cause a complete breakdown in SALT progress.

An additional advantage of an international verification agency is that it would increase the participation of other nations in the arms control process. This would serve to focus greater international attention on disarmament issues and might serve to accelerate the arms control process in other countries in addition to the two superpowers.

An International Arms Control Verification Agency with on-site inspection authority could also provide significant verification assistance if a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is negotiated. National technical means are adequate to monitor above ground nuclear tests and even some underground tests of a certain magnitude. But they are not adequate to monitor all underground tests. While remote control "black boxes" could be an important verification aid in underground nuclear test detection, they would occasionally need to be supplemented by some form of on-site inspection.

SALT III will undoubtedly involve more than an extension of the protocol constraints on the MX and cruise missiles. It may involve prohibitions or limitations on the development or manufacture of laser beams, killer satellites, and other equally deadly technological advances. In verifying such agreements, the existence of international on-site capability to visit selected manufacturing plants could be significant.

If other negotiated agreements in SALT III or SALT IV resulted in actual arms reductions, such as the reduction of nuclear weapons themselves, the danger of relying solely on national technical means for verification would increase substantially. An International Verification Agency with on-site inspection authority would be a crucial verification supplement in such agreements.

How an International Verification Agency With Onsite Inspection Authority Would Work

The verification process of the International Atomic Energy Agency offers one possible model of how an International Arms Control Verification Agency might work. The IAEA, which came into existence in 1957, establishes and administers safeguards to insure that fissionable and other atomic materials made available by or through the Agency to non-nuclear powers are not used by those nations for military purposes. This is done by inspecting nuclear research projects in the territories of member states. The IAEA is governed by a General Conference where each nation has one vote, a 23-member Board of Governors, and a Secretariat headed by a Director General who has a four year term. No nation has a veto, although certain questions require a two-thirds vote for passage.

Another possible model is the International Disarmament Organization proposed by President John F. Kennedy in 1962. Under the 1962 U.S. proposal, the International Disarmament Organization would have been governed by an Administrator responsible to a Control Council consisting of the major signatory powers as permanent members, together with certain other parties to a multi-lateral treaty that would be elected on a rotating basis by a General Conference of all members. The Kennedy I.D.O. would have had the task of verifying, at agreed depots or other locations, the destruction of armaments during three stages, or where appropriate, the conversion of armaments to peaceful purposes. A proposal for an International Disarmament Organization similar to the Kennedy proposal was made by the Netherlands Government to the 1978 U.N. Special Session on Disarmament.

Regardless of the structure, it would be essential for the Administrator or Director General of an International Verification Agency to be absolutely impartial and to have a fairly large degree of independence. It would also be essential for the inspectors to have a background that would insure strict impartiality, and the training and experience that could provide a high degree of technical competence. Perhaps such inspectors could be trained by the United States and the Soviet Union.

The inspectors would need unrestricted access to all areas of the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as other nuclear powers. On-site inspections would be ordered by the Agency's Administrator in two ways: either as a part of a routine surprise check-up, or as the result of a complaint lodged with the Administrator by one of the signatory nations.

An International Verification Agency might also be given satellite reconnaissance capability. France did propose the creation of an International Satellite Agency at the 1978 Special UN Session on Disarmament. Since U.S. technical means of verification already embrace the most advanced satellite reconnaissance technology, there would be no technical advantage for the U.S. in such international capability. There might, however, be a political advantage for the United States. If cheating which is denied by the accused nation is discovered by U.S. national technical means, confirmation by the International Verification Agency of such cheating could bring world public opinion to bear heavily on that nation.

The most important addition to the verification process that an International Verification Agency could provide, however, is the ability to conduct on-site inspections to supplement national technical means and to determine by such inspections whether cheating has occurred. It should be emphasized that the International Verification Agency would never replace U.S. national technical means. It would only supplement such means through on-site inspections.

Conclusion

The Campaign for UN Reform supports Senate ratification of SALT II and the SALT II Protocol. In addition, for all of the reasons stated, the Campaign respectfully urges the Senate of the United States to adopt a resolution urging the President, prior to the signing of a SALT III agreement, to negotiate a treaty establishing an International Arms Control Verification Agency with on-site inspection authority, so that such an agency will be available in the future to supplement U.S. national technical means of verification and thereby help insure the adequate verifiability of SALT III and any other future arms accords.

COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA,
(AFFILIATED WITH AFL-CIO),
Washington, D.C., August 1, 1979.

Hon. FRANK CHURCH,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR CHURCH: Rank-and-file delegates to the 41st Annual Convention of the Communications Workers, gathering in Detroit from every part of the nation, strongly endorsed the SALT II Treaty as a pragmatic diplomatic instrument, which, if approved and put into force, would be in the best interest of the United States.

This recent action by the delegates followed the issuance, earlier, of a CWA Executive Board Statement which cited key points in the Treaty and urged ratification by the Senate after presentation for advice and consent by President Carter.

A copy of the statement approved by the CWA Convention is enclosed.

As you consider this most important matter, I urge you to take into consideration the views of our CWA members who reflect in large part the thinking of their neighbors and fellow citizens in communities throughout the country.

Sincerely,

GLENN E. WATTS,
President.

Enclosure.

EXCERPT FROM STATEMENT ON FOREIGN POLICY

SALT II

After more than six years of bargaining, the United States and the Soviet Union have signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, known as SALT II, in Vienna where President Carter met Premier Brezhnev for their first summit conference.

The prolonged meetings between the two superpowers, a process that began with SALT I more than a dozen years ago, has been called "the most important negotiations of the post-World War II era."

But whether the agreement is to become law depends upon ratification by the United States Senate, and the impending debate could be the most difficult foreign policy debate in Congress since the Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles in 1920.

SALT II does not put an end to the arms race, but the treaty does provide for stability, predictability and equality through 1985 in the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

From a military standpoint, a principal virtue of SALT is that it provides a base line for judging what the Soviets are up to. It establishes rules for what they can build and also for what they can't.

If the treaty is ratified, the Soviets and we will be bound to limit the total number of strategic launch vehicles (missiles and bombers) to 2,400 at first and then to 2,250 by the end of 1981.

SALT II, however, does not deny the United States the right to proceed with developing and deploying the new (MX) land missile nor does the treaty prevent the United States from making this new superweapon mobile in order to decrease its vulnerability to Soviet attack. President Carter has, indeed, decided to advance to the full-scale development stage of this 190,000 pound missile which is capable of carrying 10 warheads of 335 kilotons each. The MX missile would supplement the 1,000 Minuteman and 54 Titan ICBMs reposing in underground silos. About 200 MX missiles which could be deliberately hidden from Soviet spy satellites, could be built and deployed by 1986.

Moreover, the treaty forbids interference with our ability to verify Soviet missile developments by satellite surveillance as well as by electronic ground station monitoring.

Despite the loss of monitoring stations in Iran, the United States retains the capacity to verify Soviet compliance with SALT II.

By ratifying the SALT Treaty, the United States Senate would by no means be ignoring the fact that there remain fundamental differences between the economic, social and political structure of the United States and that of the Soviet Union. Nor would approval of the pact sweep away the compelling reality of the basic adversary relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Communications Workers of America continues to view the Soviet Union as an imperialist totalitarian state which violates the human rights of its citizens and is a threat not only to the multi-party democracies of the West, but also to the nations of the "third-world."

In summary, we believe the SALT Treaty reflects a pragmatic diplomatic instrument, which, if approved and put into force, would be in the best interest of the United States. It is not a panacea for the International arms race or for the ongoing conflict between the political theories of Thomas Jefferson and V. I. Lenin. Within its stated limits, however, it is a rational document, which deserves support.

STATEMENT OF EDWARD F. SNYDER, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

There is widespread support among Quakers for far-reaching steps toward world disarmament. There is, however, less agreement among Friends on the proposed SALT II Treaty because some Friends feel that it provides little or no progress towards disarmament and should therefore be opposed or at least ignored.

Our own Friends Committee on National Legislation urges final Senate ratification—after strenuous efforts are made through related agreements, understandings, declarations, or interpretations to halt new missile and warhead production and to reduce rapidly the launcher and warhead ceilings in a follow-on agreement to be concluded long before the SALT II expiration at the end of 1985 and preferably before the expiration of the Protocol on December 31, 1981.

Our support for the SALT II Treaty is based on its value as a political document which affirms detente with the Soviet Union. It chooses accommodation over unremitting hostility. It can open the way for significant weapons reduction in later negotiation on SALT and related issues.

SALT II's ratification would also affirm a national consensus that more real national security can be found in mutual attempts to reverse the arms race than in an uncontrolled race to devise and build ever more dangerous weapons of mass destruction.

Unlike some other witnesses before this Committee, we do not find SALT II's military limits particularly impressive or commendable. Indeed, this treaty appears to confirm the upward thrust of the arms race by giving the military establishments of the Soviet Union and the United States most of what they might reasonably hope to obtain in terms of weaponry in the next five years. We are amazed to find in this "arms control" agreement an unbelievably high ceiling on warheads which would permit a combined United States and Soviet increase of about 7500 warheads, as well as the authorization of a new ICBM system (which might be made mobile after 1981) and the opening of a whole new arms race escalation through cruise missiles.

We find highly disturbing the collateral demands being made which would link SALT II ratification to increases in military spending. In Salt I seven years ago accompanying military increases were rationalized as necessary to obtain bargaining chips. Those increases purchased mainly an accelerated arms race and greater insecurity. Current calls for additional military spending increases appear to be crass quid pro quos for Senatorial votes, unrelated even to Pentagon requirements. The concept of "essential equivalence" in bald terms says that if the Soviet Union is foolish enough to spend its desperately needed resources for arms which increase its stockpiles of weapons, the United States should do likewise whether or not this increases United States security or is viewed by the Defense Department as necessary.

This is not the leadership for peace which our nation should be exerting in the world. It is following the herd over the cliff to disaster.

While SALT II's ratification will not take us very far down the road to real arms limitation and disarmament, its rejection by the Senate would be highly unfortunate. If the Senate does not ratify SALT II, it seems probable that:

U.S. and Soviet military spending will rise even more rapidly than now planned.

Efforts to negotiate SALT III reductions will be blighted, as will negotiations on a comprehensive test ban, mutual reduction of forces in Europe, and arms sales limits.

Hard-line advocates in the U.S.S.R. will be strengthened in the struggle for leadership in a post-Brezhnev period. Their ascendancy would strengthen their counterparts in the United States.

"Near nuclear" powers, frustrated by the failure of nuclear powers to make progress on arms limitation as promised in Article VI of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, may decide to develop their own nuclear weapons, thus hastening further proliferation and danger.

PROPOSED CHANGES IN SALT II TREATY

Senate consideration is one of the few opportunities during the marathon SALT process when the public and its representatives in the Senate can insert their own

views. At all other times the military establishments of the United States and the Soviet Union are either in control of the agenda or at least able to exercise veto power. This is therefore a precious moment which should not pass without maximum effort to demonstrate that the public wants arms control agreements that reduce rather than increase arms.

We therefore urge your favorable consideration of amendments such as the one proposed by Senator Hatfield to mandate a freeze on further expansion of strategic offensive arms. If the Senate of the United States would send the SALT II Treaty back to the negotiators to attempt to write in such a freeze it would have a stunning and positive impact around the world. This would be a momentous declaration by you as representatives of the United States public that the nuclear arms race must be reversed now rather than continuing into the indefinite future.

If the Hatfield amendment is not approved, we support a declaration such as Senator McGovern proposes for negotiations in SALT III for a freeze and an annual reduction thereafter of ten percent.

We strongly urge your support for these approaches. We hope this prestigious Committee is as able as the small boy to point out that the Emperor has no clothes—that more nuclear arms buy more insecurity rather than security, that war preparations usually are followed by wars and not peace treaties, and that arms control treaties should reduce arms rather than authorize increases in arms.

ACCELERATING THE SALT PROCESS

It should be clear that if the arms race worsens as much between SALT II and SALT III as it did between SALT I and SALT II, the costs and risks will be nearly unbearable. Some way must be found to accelerate the SALT process. Now the negotiating process is continually subverted by simultaneous arms building. Often negotiators' efforts are overrun by development or deployment of new weapons systems.

To advance true arms limitation efforts, we urge this Committee to give greatly increased emphasis to the collateral events surrounding the negotiating process. Specifically, we suggest that an early SALT III agreement making substantial reductions in nuclear arms is much more likely to be achieved if there is a U.S. moratorium on testing and production of the weapons under negotiation than if there is a crash program under way to produce them.

While those who place their faith in arms may find some risks in such a moratorium, we suggest that those risks are far less than the risks now being run in an ever accelerating arms race.

We also hope this Committee will review in the near future the roles that various moratoriums on testing or arms development have played in reaching arms agreements. While much controversy attended the occasions when the United States and the Soviet Union suspended nuclear tests in the period 1958 to 1963, we believe it is beyond doubt that such moratoriums helped to create the political climate in which the partial test ban treaty finally became a reality in 1963.

We hope your Committee will hold hearings on the question of how the SALT process may be speeded. And in those hearings we urge your consideration of the concept of reciprocal initiatives, of which Prof. Charles E. Osgood of the University of Illinois is a chief exponent.

A policy of "essential equivalence" in provocative weapons systems can lead to moral and fiscal bankruptcy. A policy of essential equivalence in peaceful policies, where each side takes steps away fron confrontation and toward tension-reducing measures, could substitute a peace race for the arms race.

The world's peoples desperately need leadership away from the brink of nuclear destruction. You members of this Committee and your colleagues in the Senate have an opportunity unparalleled in history to turn this nation and the world toward peace rather than being swept along toward disaster.

Our prayer is that you have the vision and courage to make the right decisions for peace and the ability to translate them into effective policy.

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN E. SEADLER, PRESIDENT, IDEOLOGICAL DEFENSE CENTER, NEW YORK, N.Y.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In his message to the United States Senate on January 22nd, 1917, President Wilson declared, "The question of armaments, whether on land or on sea, is the most immediately and intensely practical question connected with the future fortunes of mankind."

2. Standing before the Inaugural crowds on January 19th, 1961, President Kennedy declared, "So let us begin anew . . . Let both sides, for the first time, formulate serious and precise proposals for the inspection and control of arms—and bring the absolute power to destroy other nations under the absolute control of all nations."

3. In his Inaugural Address on January 20th, 1977, President Carter declared, "The world is still engaged in a massive armaments race designed to insure continuing equivalent strength among potential adversaries. We pledge perserverance and wisdom in our efforts to limit the world's armaments to those necessary for each nation's own domestic safety. We will move this year a step toward our ultimate goal—the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this earth. We urge all other people to join us, for success can mean life instead of death."

4. In the spirit and sixty years of those intentions the world has seen a plethora of peace-security, non-armament, arms reduction, and arms control instruments such as the Covenant of the League of Nations (1919), League Commission on Armies Draft Treaty (1925), Pact of Locarno (1925), Washington Naval Conference Agreement (1927), Geneva and London Naval Conference Agreement (1927, 1930), Geneva Protocol (1928), Kellog-Briand Pact (1928), Charter of the United Nations and its Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945), Antarctic Treaty (1961), Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963), Outer Space Treaty (1967), Non-Proliferation Treaty (1970), Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (1971), 'Accidents Measures' Agreement (1971), Seabed Arms Control Treaty (1972), Biological Weapons Convention (1972), ABM Treaty (1972), SALT I (Interim Agreement) (1972), ABM Protocol (1974), Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement (1973), Threshold Test Ban and Protocol (1973), Treaty and Protocol on Underground Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (1976), and Environmental Modification Ban (1977).

5. Yet, despite those imperative and paramount intentions and despite those hopeful instruments, a Second World War ravaged the planet, and a monumental world-wide arms race now hurtles us toward the inevitable and historic outcome of all arms races. If that certainly can be made more certain it has now so become, for arms control itself has become an instrument of the arms race—legitimating it, institutionalizing it, guiding it, optimizing it, and integrating itself with it.

6. Now we are engaged in the design and consideration of yet another instrument, SALT II. This testimony on that projected Treaty is being presented to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations during the concluding month of its hearings—the month that marks the 40th anniversary of the start of World War II.

II. PRINCIPLES

1. It is therefore fitting to begin by noting that that war's fundamental lesson still has not been learned—a lesson fundamental to the very definition of war, to the failures of the aforementioned intentions and instruments, and to the inevitable failure of arms control as traditionally and presently conceived.

2. Not only has this lesson not been learned, but there exists a strong cultural bias against even considering it, for it involves consideration of ideologies. This bias has resulted in dealing with ideologies by simply pronouncing them insignificant, irrelevant, passé, defunct or dead. Manifestation of this bias range from popular thought-blocking shibboleths such as 'Actions speak louder than words,' to the extremely serious flaw in US classical Military Intelligence Doctrine of concentrating on adversary capabilities to the neglect of intentions. The consequences have been most tragic.

3. On the other hand, our culture includes profound implicit recognitions of the significance of ideas and hence of ideologies. These include the very concept of democracy and the foundations of this Republic, which evolved from the pre-revolutionary ferment of ideas to the ultimate Jeffersonian 'market place of ideas'—implying that ideas affect behavior, including votes and polity—exampled by these hearings themselves.

4. Our concern here is with an utterly different domain of ideas: state ideologies of aggression; more especially, their core ideologies of violence and license (Core IVLs). The contemporary form of this problem began with Bismarck, extended through the Hohenzollerns, and proliferated into the new strains of Marxism-Leninism, Tanakaism, [1] Fascism and Nazism. Consequences have been The Second Reich, World War I, The Third Reich, World War II, the Gulag Archipelago, the present arms race, and impending World War III.

5. Despite those realities, the traditional concept of war encompasses only the condition of armed conflict, and threat to the peace only the immediacy thereof. Clarification of the concept of war and the fact that we have been in World War III for some time is provided by the following passage from Hobbes' "Leviathan":

> For WARRE, consisteth not in Battell only, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known: and there the notion of Time, is to be considered in the nature of Warre, as it is in the nature of Weather. For as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a Showre or two of rain, but in an inclination thereto of many dayes together: So the nature of Warre, consisteth not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE.

The inclination and disposition to war are crystallized in its ideological foundations, which rationalize, legitimate, motivate, unify, guide and impassion 'the Will to contend by Battell.'

6. It is not possible in brief testimony to develop the foregoing, nor to present the essentials of the new field of ideologics (i' dē ŏ lŏ' gics), which formulates the problem and solutions to it. For this background the Committee is referred to the first 25 pages of the paper "Ideologic Essentials of Public Administration," [2] copies of which are submitted with this testimony for its convenience. With this understanding, we now proceed to applications to the predicament of SALT II.

III. APPLICATIONS

1. An indication of the aforementioned fundamental lesson of World War II is given by William L. Shirer in "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich." [3]

> * * * had the foreign statesman of the world perused it /Mein Kampf/ carefully while there still was time, both Germany and the world might have been saved from catastrophe . . . /but/ his opponents inside and outside Germany were too busy, or too stupid, to take much notice of it until it was too late . . .

2. A general cue for learning and applying that lesson is given by the following from a House Committee on Foreign Affairs report: [4]

> Our reluctance to face the facts concerning Soviet policy, when they have done their best to make its nature explicit, is parallel to our earlier reluctance to recognize the nature of Nazi ambitions when they lay plain in the text of Hitler's book. This reflects our disbelief in the capacity of dogmatists, especially if they take their dogma for a science, to think in theoretical terms and to believe in their own theories.

3. Focus within that cue is provided by the following admonitions of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn: [5]

> The most important aspect of détente today is that there is no ideological détente . . . And détente? There is no détente . . . One can't raise the question of détente without ideological détente.

4. Specificity within that focus is provided by the following slogans from among those provided by the Central Committee of the CPSU for May Day 1979: [6]

> Hail to Marxism-Leninism—the mighty ideological weapon . . .
>
> Under the banner of Marxism-Leninism, under leadership of the Communist Party—forward to the victory of communism!

For the significance of that weapon and banner, which we occasionally reference but rarely if ever understand, see the section 'Communist Ideology' in [2], pages 168–174.

5. Next, we must apply in foreign relations the understanding of threat that obtains in domestic relations. When threatened with violence you are not obliged to wait for the act; you can deal with the threat itself. All state codes provide imprisonment for assault, which is commonly understood to be the threat of injury by force under such circumstances as create well-founded fear of imminent peril, coupled with apparent present ability to execute attempt if not prevented. Battery in assault and battery is carrying out the threat. Furthermore, state codes provide for the arrest and imprisonment of any person who has threatened to commit any offense punishable by law, and also provide long sentences for advising, encouraging, advocating or inciting murder. Contrastingly, nations have been recognizing and dealing only with extreme assault (posed armies) and actual breaches of the peace (battery), rather than recognizing and dealing with the threat—which is manifest in the combination of an aggressive violent ideology and significant armaments.

6. We now see that ideological arms control (IAC) must be incorporated into the arms control concept and process, that IAC is a condition precedent to, the sine qua non of, meaningful physical arms control, and that the illusion that physical arms control alone can be effective has been nourished by the delusion that intentions can be contained by limitations on capabilities.

7. Fortunately, the means for implementing IAC are already at hand. They consist of certain interlocking language in existing US–USSR arms control treaties and the UN Charter, chronologically as follows.

1. *UN Charter.* Chapter VII, Action With Respect To Threats To The Peace, Breaches Of The Peace, And Acts of Aggression. Article 39: The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

2. *Outer Space Treaty.* Preamble. . . . Taking account of United Nations General Assembly resolution 110(II) of 3 November 1947, which condemned propaganda designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, and considering that the aforementioned resolution is applicable to outer space, . . .

3. *Non-Proliferation Treaty.*

1. Preamble. . . . Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force. . .

2. Article VI. . . . Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament. . .

4. *SALT I (Interim Agreement).* Preamble. . . . Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. . .

5. *Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War.* Article II. The Parties agree, in accordance with Article I and to realize the objective stated in that Article, to proceed from the premise that each Party will refrain from the threat or use of force against the other Party, against the allies of the other Party and against other countries, in circumstances which may endanger international peace and security. The Parties agree that they will be guided by these considerations in the formulation of their foreign policies and in their actions in the field of international relations.

6. *SALT II.*

1. Preamble. /Language identical to that in SALT I (Means No. 4)/

2. Statement of Principles. . . . The Parties will also consider further joint measures, as appropriate, to strengthen international peace and security and to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war.

7. *International Law.* In addition to the foregoing legal Means, further, fundamental, legal Means exist by virtue of the fact that those Means: (1) constitute established provisions in international law; (2) repeatedly distinguish between 'threat' and execution of threat; and (3) can draw on the concept of 'threat' conveyed in para. III.5, above, inasmuch as: (i) that concept is a general principle of law recognized by civilized nations, and (ii) the Statute of the International Court of Justice lists as one of the major sources of international law 'the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.'

8. *Precedent.* The foregoing Means are so well established that for application they need only the elucidation and integration provided herein. However, a clear precedent already exists in UN General Assembly Resolution 3379(XXX), which took note of a Declaration adopted at the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs at Lima in August 1975 that 'condemned zionism as a threat to world peace and security and called upon all countries to oppose this racist and imperialist ideology.' As much as we may abhor its substance as invalid, malicious mischief, we must recognize the Resolution's significance as a major, prototypical, international, formal ideological defense (of the peace) measure. That significance is enormously enhanced by the fact that the USSR and the Soviet bloc strongly supported the Resolution. For more on this see [2], pages 178–179.

9. *Ideological Defense (ID).* The term 'ideological defense,' above, derives from the phrase in the UNESCO Charter; 'Since wars begin in the minds of men it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed.' Since the relevant operative content in the minds of men are ideologies, the defenses of peace must be ideological. This, too, provides Means.

8.0 The spirit and letter of the Means set forth in para. III.7, above, provide sufficient foundations for introducing IAC into the SALT process. In broad terms this involves undertaking ideological negotiations (ideonegotiations) that deal with both edges of the Marxist-Leninist 'mighty ideological weapon,' especially as honed by its Core. To summarize the section on 'Communist Ideology' in [2], the first, or

Violence, edge of the sword scientifically legitimates and espouses violence; the second, or License, edge 'scientifically' legitimates and espouses a super-ethic that frees comrades from 'ethical encumbrances.' The License edge includes the extremely important corollary of legitimating and espousing duplicity, which explains much in contemporary history. It constitutes a continuous 'fingers crossed behind the back' vitiation of all agreements and treaties with the USSR, which 'honors,' stretches or abrogates their terms on a day-to-day basis, depending on Soviet assessments of each term's congruence with Soviet strategic goals and needs and tactical opportunities as events transpire. These considerations require that ideonegotiations deal with both edges as follows.

8.1 *Violence Edge.* Ideonegotiations must: (1) Seek adequate recission or modification of those aspects of Marxism-Leninism that constitute threats to the peace, threats of force, propaganda designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression; and (2) Serve as joint measures to strengthen international peace and security and reduce the risk and outbreak of nuclear war, as formal evidence that they will be guided by these considerations in the formulation of their foreign policies and in their actions in the field of international relations, and as effective measures essential to cessation of the arms race.

8.2 *License Edge.* Ideonegotiations must seek adequate recision or modification of those aspects of Marxism-Leninism that free the USSR from 'ethical encumbrances' and undermine the integrity of agreements and treaties. Bases for these negotiations are provided by the same Means as for the Violence Edge negotiations—plus Means provided by terms calling for negotiations in good faith, as in SALT I and II references to Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by references to the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations in the Outer Space and Non-Proliferation Treaties, and by the good faith obligations of the U.N. Charter.

8.3 Whether ideonegotiations should be undertaken via amendment, annex or other provision integral with SALT II, or by measures outside of but complementary to it, will not be entered into in this testimony.

9.0 Recent testimony seeking to enhance the SALT process by monitoring and assessing Soviet conduct as a criterion for continuation of the process is notable in that it would convert the SALT process from a series of tenuously related episodes into a system, and merits consideration here.

9.1 Despite its system merit, that enhancement is fundamentally flawed in that: (1) Conduct has already occurred and may have seriously inimical consequences; (2) It provides no fundamental means for affecting conduct, only hopes for its rectitude in the future under pressure of threatened withdrawal from SALT, which threat carries little if any credibility; (3) It is fraught with possibilities for evasion, equivocation, subterfuge; camouflage and confoundation; and (4) It provides only Go/NoGo decision outcomes.

9.2 In system terminology, it constitutes a reactive, feedback system, which is inadequate for the purpose. What is needed is an anticipatory, feedforward system—wherein we deal with the ideology that drives and guides the policies that determine the conduct, and then monitor and assess both ideology and conduct. This constitutes an organic approach, which is essential when dealing with societal systems, expecially when the stakes are so high.

9.3 Behavioral pressure is applied continuously or repeatedly by the ideonegotiations themselves—and by our intimating our inclination, should they fail, to turn from such cooperative proceedings to full-scale adversary proceedings via a wide range of ideological defense measures (some of which are outlined in [2])—the one countermeasure the USSR most dreads.

IV. CONCLUSION

1. The need for introduction of Ideological Arms Control in arms control in general and the SALT process in particular is clear and urgent. That need will become underscored by the difficulties it will face. Such difficulties can be anticipated by the fact that the USSR has repeatedly and vehemently excluded Ideological Detente from Detente. That exclusion alone evidences the hollowness of "Detente" as we continuously misunderstand it, which in turn underscores the urgency of IAC.

2. When that exclusion is combined with an understanding of what Ideological Detente would mean, with what Marxism-Leninism means, with the relentless Soviet arms build up and world-wide strategic and tactical operations, including its utilization of arms control as an element of those operations, and with the history of arms control and other peace and security instruments as conventionally conceived and executed, our vision becomes clear. We then perceive the inevitable disaster of vanquishment or thermonuclear war that will befall us unless we undertake to

introduce and establish the ideological dimension in world affairs, beginning now, with SALT II.

3. More especially, we will have begun to extend universally that Novus Ordo Seclorum envisioned in our Great Seal, wherein Mankind will have learned to recognize and disdain the dogmatic fallacies of tyrannical malevolence, and to value more noble and glorious purposes.

NOTES

1. The term "Tanakaism" denotes the Japanese Imperial Ideology of World Conquest (both terms are coined) as exemplified in the Memorial presented to the Emperor of Japan by Baron Tanaka in 1927.
2. Seadler, S E. "Ideologic Essentials of Public Administration," in "Management Handbook For Public Administrators," John W. Sutherland, Editor (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1978).
3. Shirer, William L. "The Rise And Fall Of The Third Reich" (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), Chapter 4, "The Mind of Hitler and the Roots of the Third Reich." Also recommended: Sklar, Dusty. "Gods & Beasts/The Nazis & The Occult" (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1977).
4. "The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism." House Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee No. 5, National and International Movements, 80th Congress, 2d Session, House Document No. 619 (Washington: USGPO, 1948).
5. During the extraordinary interview on the BBC, March 10, 1976.
6. "Current Digest of the Soviet Press." Vol. XXXI No. 15 (May 9, 1979), p. 11.

STATEMENT OF BISHOP THOMAS J. GUMBLETON, PRESIDENT, PAX CHRISTI USA, CHICAGO, ILL.

Mr. Chairman: I am Bishop Thomas J. Gumbleton, President of Pax Christi USA and Auxiliary Bishop of the Archdiocese of Detroit. I am happy to present this testimony on SALT II on behalf of Pax Christi USA and of many people who are deeply concerned about the morality of our world's weapons systems, which, instead of safeguarding our future, threaten its very existence.

Before I proceed to Pax Christi's position on SALT II, I should like to offer two preliminary considerations which will help you understand the context of Pax Christi USA's position on SALT II. The first is that while the global arms race is very much a strategic, political, and economic concern, we believe that the arms race at heart represents a profound spiritual crisis for our times. We act as though we have lost faith in our destiny and no longer believe that we can solve problems in a nonviolent manner which is most truly expressive of human dignity.

We ought, rather, to take courage from instances of nonviolence in political conflict. For example, during and immediately after World War II, a major international conflict between Great Britain and India was resolved without recourse to arms, thanks to the leadership of Gandhi in politicizing nonviolence. In the same decade, the atomic bomb was used against a civilian population, setting us on a tragic path towards nuclear holocaust. Recent history thus lays before us two models of conflict resolution, demanding that we make a choice. The SALT II treaty is an acid test of our fundamental option. If we approve a treaty which allows an escalation of nuclear arms, we demonstrate a cynicism, or worse, a despair about the human potential for security through nonviolence. If, on the other hand, we insist that the treaty provide for an immediate limit of nuclear arms, we affirm that the bedrock or our defense policy is our faith in the strength that comes from trust in God and in human goodness.

The assumption that global peace can be achieved only through massive weapons buildups is not only a delusion, it is a psychological and spiritual sickness. Thus the real issue is whether we shall accept the challenge of humanity in our international debates and conflicts, or whether we shall continue to act as creatures who deny the lordship of God over our entire universe. We realize that a humanistic and religious perspective is not often considered in weapons debates, but unless we bring that perspective to the debate we shall be lost in an uncharted sea without guidelines of any sort.

My second consideration deals with the place of morality in conducting political and foreign policy. Often we hear the argument that we can act only in our own "enlightened self interest" in fashioning foreign policy. This attitude extends to the debate on the arms race and SALT II with the consequence that wider moral questions are dismissed or ignored in our discussion. What passes for "enlightened self interest" may cloak a self defeating shortsighted policy divorced from ethical considerations. In this time of unprecedented challenge forced upon us by escalating

arms development, genuine enlightened self interest demands that we locate our political debate within such fundamental questions as these: Do we have the right to plan the near total destruction of the human species? If it is wrong to attack civilian populations is it not also wrong to make the weapons to execute such an attack? Is it morally permissible to endorse or even accept a policy based on Mutually Assured Destruction when we clearly have superior nonviolent alternatives to manage conflicts between adversary powers?

These questions should carry much more weight in our arms development discussions. For too long we have discussed morality as if it were simply an individual question. It is time to bring the full force of moral concern to such issues as SALT II, for without any significant moral debate we shall be left with a purely political debate which will only end in the escalation of the arms race with its consequent denial of fundamental human rights: the right to life, the right to survival, and the right to live in freedom from fear of the nuclear threat which daily grows stronger.

PAX CHRISTI AND SALT II

I shall now proceed to Pax Christi's position on SALT II. Pax Christi USA is part of the International Catholic Movement for Peace which has its headquarters in Belgium and branches in Europe, Australia, and North America. Pax Christi was founded to seek reconciliation between French and Germans after World War II, and has since become very strongly involved in disarmament issues. The five program priorities of Pax Christi USA are: Disarmament, A Just World Order, The Primacy of Conscience, Education for Peace, and Alternatives to Violence. Regarding our disarmament priority, we hold the following position: "Pax Christi USA seeks to foster both nuclear and general disarmament. It believes that the construction and possession of nuclear weapons represents a profound immorality in the contemporary world. Pax Christi USA seeks to reorient the priorities of our national government away from heavy arms spending and trading to policies which have as their chief concern the truly human survival of all people. Far from weakening the United States, disarmament will strengthen it and help it become a more constructive leader among nations."

There are two fundamental reasons why we cannot support SALT II in its present form: first, the increase in strategic weapons and weapons systems permitted by SALT II along with corresponding escalation in research and development of weapons systems, both of which are sanctioned by the morally intolerable doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD); and second, our commitment to the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church on the arms race and the preparation and use of nuclear weapons.

Regarding our first reason, we are deeply disappointed that a treaty which has the title of "limitation" of arms is in reality a treaty which specifically permits escalation in arms. While we in Pax Christi call for disarmament, we are prepared to support any truly effective limitation in arms as a meaningful step to security. The minor limitations in SALT II are greatly outweighed by the major escalation in strategic weapons permitted by the treaty. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency officials ask us to wait for SALT III for any real limitation or disarmament measures. Should not the entire SALT process, not just its third phase, produce some measure of limitation? To this point the "arms control" provided by SALT I and SALT II has actually increased the deadly supply of strategic weapons on our globe. Marek Thee of Oslo's International Peace Research Institute has observed that the bilateral United States/Soviet accords have "not halted the arms race, but rather impelled its course."

The basis of our decision not to support SALT II in its present form lies in our commitment to the peace message of Jesus and to Catholic principles and teachings which call for an end to the arms race itself. These are, in briefest summary, the following:

1. The Catholic Church has publicly condemned the use of indiscriminate weapons.—At the Second Vatican Council convened by Pope John XXIII, the assembled bishops of the world spoke in the document, "The Church in the Modern World," of the "horror and perversity" of the use of scientific weapons in war which compelled them to "undertake an evaluation of war with an entirely new attitude." This new attitude was most clearly expressed in their condemnation of total war: "Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their population is a crime against God and man himself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation." (*The Church in the Modern World*, art. 80).

While we realize that SALT II does not propose the use of nuclear weapons and is supposed to serve as an important psychological barrier against their use, we cannot

ignore the fact that even to make one more nuclear weapon enhances the chance of its use, a use we cannot morally sanction.

2. The Catholic Chruch has spoken out against the philosophy of deterrence and Mutually Assured Destruction which are the basis of SALT II.—At Vatican II the Catholic bishops of the world observed that "this accumulation of arms, which increases each year, also serves in a way heretofore unknown, as a deterrent to possible enemy attack." (*The Church in the Modern World,* art. 81) The bishops did not, however, endorse the philosophy behind deterrence and noted instead that it is "not a safe way to preserve a steady peace. Nor is the so-called balance resulting from this race a sure and authentic peace. Rather than being eliminated thereby, the causes of war threaten to grow gradually stronger." (*Ibid.*) Later, in the context of the discussion on deterrence the bishops declared: "Therefore, it must be said again: the arms race is an utterly treacherous trap for humanity, and one which injures the poor to an intolerable degree. It is much to be feared that if this race persists, it will eventually spawn all the lethal ruin whose path it is now making ready." (*Ibid.*)

In 1976 the Holy See was even more outspoken in its testimony to the United Nations on disarmament. Concerning deterrence, it declared, "The severity of the diagnosis is thus clear. In the eyes of the Church *the present situation of would-be security is to be condemned."* (emphasis in the original)

Perhaps there is nothing which is more telling evidence of the insanity and immorality of our age than the policy of "Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). For self-professed civilized nations to use the phrase, much less make it the cornerstone of their foreign policies testifies to the utmost callousness regarding the sanctity and dignity of human life. This MAD doctrine which undergirds the policy of deterrence and which is endorsed by SALT II has been explicitly condemned by the Catholic Church. In their 1976 pastoral letter, *To Live in Christ Jesus,* the Catholic bishops of the United States stated: "As possessors of a vast arsenal, we must also be aware that not only is it wrong to attack civilian populations but it is also wrong to threaten to attack them as part of a strategy of deterrence."

Finally, the Catholic Church oppposes the arms race which is permitted by SALT II. In testimony to the United Nations in 1976, the Holy See declared that the arms race "is to be condemned unreservedly" and explained: "The obvious contradiction between the waste involved in the overproduction of military devices and the extent of unsatisfied vital needs * * * *is in itself an act of aggression* against those who are the victims of it. It is an act of aggression which amounts to a crime, for *even when they are not used,* by their cost alone *armaments kill the poor by causing them to starve." (The Holy See and Disarmament* I.2)

The implication is clear. Not only is it immoral to use nuclear weapons, or to threaten their use as a deterrent; it is also immoral and a "crime" even to make them, for their very existence is already killing peope. SALT II does not substantially reduce our existing stockpile of those criminal weapons; instead, it allows their increase. Pax Christi USA cannot support this escalation.

We see in this escalation a "machine gone mad", a technology which does not serve and liberate humankind, but enslaves it. (*The Holy See and Disarmament* I.5) Pope John Paul II has pointed out that "the exploitation of the earth * * * for military purposes, and the uncontrolled development of technology outside the framework of a long range authentic humanistic plan often bring with them a threat to man's natural environment, alienate him in his relations with nature, and remove him from nature." (*Encyclical Redemptor Hominis* art. 15) In this context he raises the question whether humankind is "developing and progressing or * * * regressing and being degraded in [its] humanity." (*Ibid.*)

What, you may ask, are our concrete proposals on SALT II since we do not support this treaty in its present form? While the treaty as it is does not merit our support, there is an important amendment to this treaty which we can wholeheartedly support. This is the amendment introduced by Senator Hatfield, which would mandate a moratorium on any strategic offensive arms already developed. This amendment would add to the SALT II treaty the following, at the end of Article IX: "3. Notwithstanding any other provision of this treaty, each party agrees not to deploy, on or after the date of entry into force of this treaty, any number of strategic offensive arms in excess of the number of strategic offensive arms deployed by such party on the date of signature of this treaty, and each party agrees not to develop, test, or deploy strategic offensive arms of a type not deployed by such party on the date of signature of this treaty."

We believe that such an amendment will provide the effective arms limitation dimension to SALT II which is now lacking. SALT II will then be far better deserving of its name and will insure some significant measure of limitation which is both morally and strategically sound. While the present dimensions of the United

States and Soviet arsenals are indeed frightening, the future weapons already being developed will almost surely lead us to the very calamity we are trying to avoid. In addition, while the Soviets have made it clear they would not accept any further arms escalation amendments to SALT II, it is our hope that they may be willing to renegotiate this treaty if, in fact, a significant limitation measure is added by this Senate. The Senate's endorsement of the Hatfield amendment will be a living testimony to the moral conscience of this esteemed body and evidence to the world that moral and human considerations bear on arms policy decisions made by the United States.

The present occasion of the SALT II debate is indeed a crisis in the sense of a turning point; it is an unprecedented opportunity for the development of a new attitude, a new vision, a new consciousness on which the future of our race depends. Millions of our fellow Americans have sound intuitions that our security is threatened rather than enhanced by policies based on Mutually Assured Destruction. The emerging consciousness of the possibilities and the imperative of arms limitation is still feeble and unformed. Pax Christi pledges itself to spare no effort in our commitment to foster this emerging consciousness which repudiates nuclear war as well as preparation for it. We will match our commitment to arms limitation and disarmament with an equal commitment to the constructive works of social justice which are the indispensable foundation of peace.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to present this testimony of Pax Christi USA on SALT II to this body. Please be sure of our prayers for you as you debate this treaty. Your deliberations may well determine the survival not only of this nation but of the entire world. In a very real sense, this is a test of the power of the spirit and all that is noble in humankind; it is a test to determine whether it is yet possible to control the destructive force of these weapons and the unspeakable evils they threaten to unleash.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT OF DR. ALAN GEYER, REPRESENTING THE COUNCIL OF BISHOPS AND THE BOARD OF CHURCH AND SOCIETY OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: My name is Alan Geyer. It is my privilege today to testify on behalf of the Council of Bishops of the United Methodist Church and also on behalf of our denomination's Board of Church and Society. I am not myself, a bishop, I regret to say, although some of my best friends are bishops. I am a political scientist whose main teaching and research have been in international relations, with a special interest in arms control and disarmament. I am also an ordained minister, which many folks imagine is incompatible with being a political scientist or a political anything. My present position is Executive Director of the Churches' Center for Theology and Public Policy, an ecumenical study center here in Washington. I wish to state clearly that I am not speaking today for that Center but only for my own denomination.

Last April, the Council of Bishops adopted "A Resolution on SALT II and Commitment to Disarmament" which urged approval of the SALT II Treaty. That resolution also expressed determination "that the American people and their government must not fail to make positive decisions for disarmament in the days just ahead." The text of the resolution is attached to this testimony and I shall make continuing reference to it in my remarks today.

Several weeks ago I heard a private complaint from one of our government's key officials in SALT affairs. He said, with great vexation, that the churches have waited much too long to get into the action on nuclear arms issues—and that even now they bring mostly a dilettantism to the really hard choices.

I could not argue with him—except to say that there is a new seriousness about disarmament on the part of many church leaders and local congregations, as many members of the Senate and the House are beginning to discover in their constituencies. The survival of the human race is, at last, becoming a theological issue. In fact, it is hard to think of a more fundamentally theological issue.

If the nuclear arms race really does raise serious theological questions, it should point us toward mysteries which we cannot pretend fully to understand. And, truth to tell, we do not understand very much about the human consequences of nuclear technology, or about the dynamics of political power in a nuclear age, or about the limits of human rationality in coping with nuclear crisis.

Our national security debates in these late 1970s have once again become preoccupied with strategic scenarios of nuclear war. The SALT II hearings themselves have too often been turned into a platform for promoting the further development of offensive nuclear weapons and military budget increases. These hearings and the

general public require a more adequate framework of political vision and humane policy if the SALT process is to be an effective instrument of peacemaking.

Our religious communities are clearly summoned to lift up some alternative scenarios: some new scripts for the strategies of peace. Scenarios in which both our real security and our very survival are more surely promised than they are by the fatuous assumption that we'd be better off with still more and bigger and better nuclear weapons than the 32,000 already in the U.S. arsenal. Scenarios in which our leaders muster the wit and the will to draw us away, at last, from these grisly apprehensions of total terror which make mental health and normal living impossible for us all. Scenarios which appeal to "the better angels of our nature."

Deep beneath the military mathematics of the SALT debate are some searing questions of moral wisdom.

What, if anything, would we not do to 260 million Soviet people, or to our own people and institutions, or to all Earth's peoples, for the sake of promoting our military technology and our perceptions of our own prestige? Do we have enough vision of our creaturehood in God's good Creation, or of the humanity even of our enemies, or of the things that really make for peace and security—any redeeming vision which may yet spare us all from the Great and Final Firestorm?

The political setting in this country for discussing these questions right now is hardly auspicious. We are heavily burdened with political cynicism, wounded pride, Cold War hallucinations, loss of common purpose, and manipulation of all of the above by lushly funded propaganda from mean-spirited interests.

I wish to raise four broadly political questions which should be basic to the SALT II debate. Each of these is morally loaded precisely because it is political, and not simply technical.

Questions

(1) What moral claims, if any, do the Soviet government and people have against us—and what do we do about them?

(2) What are the moral claims of non-nuclear-weapon states against both the Soviet Union and the United States—and what do we do about them?

(3) What view of the meaning of our own security do we bring to arms limitation issues?

(4) Can we make a national decision on SALT II without further corrupting the integrity of our domestic politics?

Answers

(1) You do not have to overlook the repressive habits of Russian governments, or the opportunism of Soviet foreign policy, or their Avis complex about catching up with the U.S. in strategic weapons to ask whether the SALT debate isn't plagued with very crude images of the Russians as our enemies. One such crudity is to ignore obvious Soviet motives in avoiding a war even more devastating than World War II and in reducing the terrible economic burdens of the arms race. Another crudity is to attribute irresistible force to Soviet penetration of such societies as Afghanistan and Ethopia—thus failing to see how bogged down the Soviets now are in coping with national and religious forces in those societies. Still another crudity is the unwillingness to recognize how many concessions the Soviets have actually made on SALT and other disarmament questions.

After all, in SALT I, they did agree to exclude U.S. bombers and NATO forward-based systems from the accords.

In SALT II, they agreed to come down from the 1974 Vladivostok launcher limit, which means scrapping 250 of their own launchers capable of devastating all our major urban areas. They changed their positions to accommodate demands on sharing a common data base; permitting one new land-based missile system; defining the size of "new" missiles; limiting land-based missiles to 10 warheads; permitting the U.S. to deploy long-range cruise missiles from our bombers, then permitting an "average" limit of 28 cruise missiles per bomber after proposing a limit of only 20; stipulating that the Backfire will not be upgraded into a long-range bomber nor will its production rate increase.

One of our senior U.S. negotiators has reported that "all the major moves" on concessions have come from the Soviet side. While some Americans complain of appeasing the Russians, we may well suspect that there is honest perplexity in Moscow as to what more they must do to appease the Americans.

In short, our antipathies to many aspects of Soviet politics and policy must not blind us to the very human seriousness of Soviet leaders about avoiding nuclear war—a seriousness which transcends all ideologies and cultures.

(2) The moral claims of many other nations—in fact, of all nations—are at stake in the SALT process.

There is no greater sense of inequity in the world today than that felt by nations which have renounced nuclear weapons for themselves and, under U.S. and Soviet pressure joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. But they joined only because of a clear promise by the superpowers, written into that treaty, that there would be an end to all nuclear testing and steady progress in reducing nuclear arsenals. Next year's second Review Conference on that treaty could witness the collapse of effective international cooperation in halting the spread of nuclear weapons if it convenes with neither a SALT agreement nor a comprehensive test ban.

Mr. Chairman, I attended the First Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty in Geneva in May 1975 and I served as head of this country's non-governmental observers there. That conference, just six months after President Ford met Chairman Brezhnev in Vladivostok, heard repeated assurances that a SALT II accord was just ahead. Those assurances were offered in the face of understandable protests from non-nuclear-weapon states that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was increasingly an intolerable instrument of invidious discrimination.

Now, more than four years later, can we really suppose that a refusal to ratify SALT II on the eve of the Second NPT Review Conference will promote the safety or security of this nation? Is there any more likely circumstance of nuclear war than the threat or use of nuclear weapons by any of a dozen other states which already possess, or could soon possess, them in a world of uncontrolled proliferation?

It is primarily because of this perverse linkage between the vertical spiral of strategic arms and the horizontal spread of nuclear arms that the United Nations General Assembly last fall voted 127-1 (only Albania voting No) to urge the earliest possible conclusion of the SALT II accords. That doesn't mean universal enthusiasm for SALT itself: it does mean that the non-fulfillment of SALT II is almost universally viewed as the greatest obstacle to progress on all the other issues on the world's disarmament agenda.

(3) Perhaps our most basic ethical concern in national security policy is not a conflict between principles and politics: it is the question as to how we conceive political reality.

Do we really believe, for instance, that more and bigger nuclear weapons have a redeeming effect on our insecurities, or that "strategic superiority" is still a politically meaningful term in nuclear policy? A much more useful perspective has been suggested by Henry Kissinger in an uncharacteristic moment of modesty and perplexity (which was one of his wiser moments) when he blurted out: "What, in the name of God, is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it politically, militarily, operationally at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?"

The ultimate contradiction of the nuclear age is that the more we have committed our substance to the idols of defense and deterrence, the more defenseless we have become. Our insecurity has been compounded by every new escalation of military technology. Not only have our national boundaries become indefensible against nuclear attack: offensive technology increasingly threatens to outrun the technology of arms control itself. As ingenious and even redundant as our present verification systems may be, they can be overtaken by still more exotic offensive weapons if we do not develop more peaceable political relationships and reverse the dynamics of the arms race. There is no technical escape from the requirements of reconciliation.

Not only has our defenselessness been compounded militarily: non-military threats to our security—resource exhaustion, ecocatastrophes, inflation and massive poverty and human degradation—all are severely aggravated by the arms race. As our power to destroy has grown, our power to conserve and to create has shrunk.

SALT II can be a step toward greater security if, as the Council of Bishops has said, the US and USSR proceed "immediately after the approval of SALT II to negotiate substantial reductions in nuclear weapons in SALT III and succeeding agreements."

If, however, this treaty's "disturbingly limited" provisions are used to push on with still more devastating weapons and with thousands of additional nuclear warheads, we cannot believe that our national security will really be served. The Council of Bishops declared themselves "persuaded of the hard truth declared by the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament that nuclear weapons constitute 'much more of a threat than a protection' for the future of humanity."

(4) Our domestic political integrity is very much on trial in the SALT II decision.

One of the sorriest episodes in our political history was a whole series of extravagant pay-offs for SALT I. The director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was dismissed, along with his top aides. The Agency's budget was sharply cut. Both research and public affairs functions were guttered. And the SALT II negotiations have, from the beginning, been burdened with promises of new weap-

ons systems made at the time of SALT I: full-scale MIRV deployment, cruise missiles, Trident submarines.

The consideration of SALT II on its merits has, I personally believe, been made much more difficult by a series of decisions about weapons, budget, and personnel, as well as by official and unofficial rhetoric about Soviet policy.

I regret very much having to report my own impression that the prospects for public support of SALT II were badly damaged by the Administration's own anti-Soviet talk during the spring and summer of 1978. In fact, there was more than alarmist talk. There was the first public cruise missile test. There was stepped up planning for MX mobile missile development. There was a revival of evacuation planning for civil defense. There was a highly publicized mock anti-Soviet maneuver in Texas, attended by the President. In the early fall, a general was named to succeed Paul Warnke at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. All of these happenings tended to reinforce public hostility toward the Soviet Union—yet all of them were rationalized as efforts to consolidate support for SALT II.

Even before SALT II was signed in Vienna and before these hearings began, the White House had decided that the MX mobile missile had become a domestic political necessity if SALT II were to be ratified. The tragedy of this most costly and ominous development is that it could have been avoided politically if the public had been engaged on the merits of SALT II during 1978.

The United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in May and June of 1978 offered a timely opportunity to engage the public on the issues of nuclear arms control and disarmament. In fact, the mobilization of public opinion was clearly the prime purpose of the Special Session. But the President declined even to attend, the United States offered no significant policy initiatives, and the Special Session became a non-event for the American public. Yet these decisions, too, were rationalized as political necessities for the sake of SALT II.

Whatever political games may be played in support of SALT II, we must also be candid about the degree to which treaty opponents have cheapened the debate by the hard selling of raw fantasies, not only about the Soviet Union but also about American groups committed to arms limitation. One of the silliest canards is being spread by the American Security Council's Coalition for Peace Through Strength: the claim that there is a $100 million pro-disarmament lobby led by the National Council of Churches and the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy. Those of us who have tried for years, without success, to get the National Council to fund at least one modestly-paid staff person on disarmament issues—and who are familiar with the subsistence style of the latter Coalition—have reason to wonder whether the inadequacy of the American Security Council's political research may help to explain the vain imaginings of their strategic analysis.

If there is any set of issues which ought to lift the level of political debate in this country to the highest levels of honesty and integrity—and a clear-eyed view of the common good—it is these issues of national security and human survival.

Now I must conclude this review of the moral ambiguities of SALT II. I wish to share with this Committee the fruit of a U.S.-Soviet disarmament consultation in Geneva last spring, in which I was privileged to participate, along with governmental and church leaders from both countries. A major product of that consultation was the very first joint U.S.-Soviet theological statement on any policy issue, a statement which has since been warmly endorsed by both the Council of Bishops of the United Methodist Church and the Governing Board of the National Council of Churches. The benediction of that statement was written mostly by a Russian Christian and ends with a familiar and terribly appropriate text from Exodus:

"Finally, our sisters and brothers, we call to your attention the authoritative predictions that nuclear war by the 1990's is an increasing probability. In that decade of high risks we will be approaching the end of our millenium. Even now, only twenty years separate us from the moment when we will be called upon to mark prayerfully the bi-millenary anniversary of the coming to the world of our Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ, the Prince of Peace. How shall we meet that day!? In what state shall we present our planet to the Creator? Shall it be a blooming garden or a lifeless, burnt out, devastated land!?

"Thus the Lord has set before us again life and death, blessing and curse! Therefore choose life that you and your descendants may live!"

A Resolution on SALT II and Commitment to Disarmament

(Adopted by the Council of Bishops, UMC, Spring 1979)

Convinced that Christians have no higher calling than to be peacemakers who teach nations to renounce the ways of war and to transform tools of death into tools of life;

Confronted by multiplying evidence that the nuclear arms race is out of control and the prospects of nuclear war in our generation are mounting;

Disturbed by the resurgence of Cold War hostility and alarmism among some of our people;

Persuaded of the hard truth declared by the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament that nuclear weapons constitute "much more of a threat than a protection" for the future of humanity;

Determined that the American people and their government must not fail to make positive decisions for disarmament in the days just ahead;

We, the Council of Bishops of the United Methodist Church, urge the approval of the SALT II Treaty. While we regret that the treaty is a disturbingly limited step toward the reversal of the arms race, we believe that it will provide a more equitable and effective framework for negotiating significant disarmament agreements between the superpowers.

We call upon the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union to demonstrate their good faith by proceeding immediately after the approval of SALT II to negotiate substantial reductions in nuclear weapons in SALT III and succeeding agreements.

We affirm the crucial importance of meaningful SALT accords in fulfilling U.S. and Soviet pledges to those nations which have renounced nuclear weapons under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and in halting the spread of nuclear weapons.

We believe that SALT II has become a necessary step toward other disarmament agreements such as a comprehensive nuclear test ban, mutual force reductions in Europe, and curbing the arms trade.

We believe, further, that the development of more peaceable relationships in economic, technical and cultural field—not only for the superpowers but for all nations—is critically dependent upon progress toward nuclear disarmament.

We are deeply grateful for the March 27-29 Geneva Disarmament Consultation of church representatives from the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and their joint appeal to "choose life in spite of the spreading power of death." Confessing a common faith in "Christ, the All Powerful, the Conqueror of Death," that appeal sets before us a vision of the year 2000 in which our planet may be either "a blooming garden or a lifeless, burnt out, devastated land".

We commend Americans for SALT and the Religious Committee on SALT as appropriate channels for Christian witness.

Finally, we pledge ourselves and we summon all our pastors and people to a new and steadfast commitment to the works of disarmament and peace. Such a commitment requires our constant prayer, our faithful study our courageous advocacy, and our effective political action.

Endorsed by the Executive Committee of the Board of Church and Society of the United Methodist Church.

STATEMENT OF COL. PHELPS JONES, USA (RET.) DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. Chairman and members of this distinguished committee: My name is Colonel Phelps Jones, USA (Ret.). It is my privilege and honor to serve the 1.85 million members of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States as their Director of National Security and Foreign Affairs.

I appreciate this opportunity to furnish this important panel with the views of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States with respect to SALT II.

Our recorded opposition to this document of transcendant substantive and symbolic importance did not arise in any "knee jerk" fashion. V.F.W. representatives have met with President Carter, Dr. Brzezinski, Mr. Warnke and General Seignious, as well as with responsible opponents of SALT II, inside and outside of government.

As you may be aware, mandated positions of the V.F.W. are arrived at democratically at our annual National Conventions.

Our 79th National Convention was held in Dallas, Texas, in August, 1978. National Security Resolution Number 434, "Strategic (SALT) Negotiations with the USSR," passed without dissent.

This resolution is appended to this statement as Enclosure Number 1 and will be, with your Chairman's permission, made a permanent part of the hearings.

As to the treaty proper, certain basic questions need to be considered.

Treaty proponents, often with considerable emotion, assert as self-evident truth that SALT II advances the national security policy of the United States.

To this assertion, I can only reply that after a conscientious 29-month search, I have yet to locate an unambiguous statement by the President or the Secretary of

State which, in concrete, dispassionate terms, sets forth: (a) Where we think we are in the world; (b) where we hope to get to; and, (c) how we propose to get there. I have been obliged to fall back on a 17-month old set of remarks delivered by Mr. Anthony Lake, of the State Department's Policy Planning Office, in San Francisco on March 14, 1978, which included the following, somewhat elastic, paragraph:

"Our approach, therefore, is to make constant, pragmatic, case-by-case decisions, seeking the most constructive balance among our interests and adjusting our tactics as circumstances change."

In short, not knowing where we're going, we react.

While this approach does not make for wise policy, I suggest that Mr. Lake's words are an accurate depiction, probably unwitting, of the absence of any central strategic conception, sense or direction in our overall security policy.

SALT II, then, can be fairly viewed as being, to this Administration, an end in itself.

For the Soviets, on the other hand, the treaty is but a useful component of a wider, and geo-politically thrusting, foreign policy.

My point here is a simple one. To treaty proponents who assert that SALT II supports U.S. national security policy, the sad rejoinder must be:

What national security policy?

SALT II, through the period of the protocol and the treaty proper, sets agreed limits on only one component of military power: central, offensive, strategic systems. At Enclosure Number 2, attached hereto, are these various limits and sublimits.

Not considered are central defensive systems, active and passive civil defense measures, conventional force levels and, most telling, any restraints on aggressive foreign policy thrusts designed to upset global balance; i.e., the issue of "linkage which will not, nor should not, go away.

These omissions from SALT II pose a dilemma for SALT-sellers. On the one hand, treaty proponents urge us repeatedly not to "hang too much on the SALT tree." SALT II is, in General David Jones' words, "a modest but useful step." (In the V.F.W., we believe that SALT II is a "modest" treaty that has much to be "modest" about. The testimony of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before this distinguished Committee was more of a collective dental extraction than a combined chorus of support. General Rowny's considered non-concurrence is on the record.)

On the other hand, the President and his leading "SALT-sellers" have either stated (as has President Carter) or implied (as has the Administration-supported house organ "Americans For SALT") that to oppose SALT II would cause Americans to be viewed throughout the world as "war mongers." Our reaction to this "war mongering" charge is to recall that in March, 1977, Secretary Vance travelled to Moscow with the then new Administration's preferred "SALT II" package—a treaty involving deep, important and mutual reductions.

Secretary Vance was turned down cold by the Soviet Union.

No one, here or abroad, charged the Soviets with being "war mongers" for this abrupt and unexplained rejection. And, incidentally, this cold turn-down occurred two and one half years ago. SALT II then, is the product of the Carter Administration. It is then not, as the "SALT-sellers" would have use believe, the product of seven years of negotiations covering three Administrations. Since March, 1977, we have been negotiating with ourselves—and, we in the V.F.W. suspect America has lost.

Mr. Chairman, I urge, on behalf of the V.F.W., that the Senate vote up or down on SALT II and not, as was the case with the May, 1972 SALT I Accord, merely add "reservations" and "unilateral declarations" that will have no enduring meaning.

The *Wall Street Journal*, in a brilliant editorial, "Off the Reservation," tracks carefully the sad fate of the U.S. Senate-approved "unilateral declarations" addressed to the May, 1972 SALT I Treaty.

The last three paragraphs of this perceptive editorial make an enduring point. These paragraphs follow:

"If the Senate foregoes cosmetics and spells out its concerns in clear amendments to the treaty, it will at least force some clarification of the issue. Our suspicion is that the Soviets are likely to find the treaty, even with amendments, so much in their interest they will come back to the negotiating table. But it is of course quite possible that, as Foreign Minister Gromyko threatened (in plain English) in a Moscow press conference, that they will kill the negotiations.

"This might be a good thing. At least we will know where we stand. At least we will be out from under the process that, for example, led President Carter to delay our cruise missile program unilaterally while the talks were in progress. If Soviet rejection of equalizing amendments proves that they will not negotiate limits on their buildup, we could at least set about offsetting their drive in the cheapest and

most effective way we can, unencumbered by treaty constraints that force us into cumbersome and expensive systems like the proposed MX missile shuffled around in a 20 mile trench.

"The worst choice the Senate could make would be to do nothing while pretending to do something. Its members need to suppress their first instinct, and face up manfully to the fundamental decision before them. When tempted to straddle, they ought to look at the history of unilateral declarations. If the Senate votes a list of reservations, it will only have compiled a handy catalog of what the Soviets will do to us during the life of the treaty."

As to the issue of whether we should "trust" the Soviets, once again, in our view, President Carter's advisors miss the point.

The Soviets can be "trusted" to act as the 1979 inheritors of the Marxist-Leninist tradition. They seek the fruits of conquest preferably without fighting.

The more relevant issue is whether or not we can "trust" this Administration—heavily staffed as it is with symbol-manipulators and America-lasters.

It is a harsh judgment, but the V.F.W. believes it to be true: We "trust" the Soviets to pursue their national and ideological goals more persistently and purposefully than we "trust" this Administration to conserve, protect and decently advance our 203-year democratic experience.

A lengthening litany of anti-defense decisions taken by the Administration leaves one little hope that the MX will finally be deployed to offset ICBM vulnerability in the 1980's.

Mr. Chairman, the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States recommends that either:

(a) SALT II be returned to the Executive Branch without the Senate's consent and with the Senate's admonition to re-negotiate, in due course, a true, mutual, verifiable and deep mutual arms control treaty.

(If the Soviets are not interested in such an approach, they are not, as we suspect, interested in arms control in any non-symbolic way.)

Or,

(b) The Senate add precise and unambiguous amendments (not "reservations" or "unilateral declarations") covering such areas as: (1) on site verification, (2) the "Backfire" bomber, (3) the heavy ICBMs permitted the Soviet Union (308 SS-18's) which are denied us, and (4) Soviet geo-strategic adventurism conducted under the umbrella of "detente."

Truly, Mr. Chairman, an enduring peace is the heart felt goal of the V.F.W. Our members and their sons have fought in our last four wars. Others conceived of—or dissented from—these conflicts. We need no urging to fight for peace. We do and we will.

But an America, locked into strategic inferiority and narcotized by an inherently unequal treaty, does not enhance a stable peace.

SALT II, as written, is a self-inflicted slide backwards towards a strategically vulnerable, hence politically isolated, America whose policies will become increasingly irrelevant to allies, fence-sitters, and communist totalitarians alike.

Our national experience deserves better. We remain, in Lincoln's words, the "last best hope on earth."

SALT II is a painfully structured strategic "apology" where none is needed. As written, we urge its resounding defeat.

ENCLOSURE No. 1

Resolution No. 434

STRATEGIC (SALT) NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USSR

Adopted by the 79th National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States held in Dallas, Texas, August 18–25, 1978.

Whereas, with respect to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of May 1972:

(a) neither side is permitted to deploy a nationwide ABM defense or a base for such a defense;

(b) each side is permitted to deploy a limited defense of one area. In each defense area, out to a 150 km radius, each side is permitted up to 100 ABM launchers and interceptors and a limited radar base for these interceptors;

(c) neither side is permitted to give ABM capability to non-ABM systems; e.g., air defense systems;

(d) verification will be by national means. The parties have agreed not to interfere with these means; and

(e) the treaty will be of unlimited duration. Withdrawal is permitted for supreme interest; and

Whereas, with respect to the Interim Offensive Agreement of May 1972:

(a) each side is permitted to keep any fixed land-based ICBM launchers currently operational or under construction. No new fixed land-based ICBM launchers may be built;

(b) the Soviets may complete the 313 modern large ballistic missile launchers; e.g., for SS–9 class missiles, currently operational and under construction. No new ones may be built;

(c) neither side may convert to modern large ballistic missile launchers or any other ICBM launchers;

(d) each side may keep any SLBM launchers operational or under construction; also, newer SLBM launchers may be built as replacements for older SLBM launchers or for older heavy ICBM launchers;

(e) verification will be by national means. The parties have agreed not to interfere with these means;

(f) the duration of the Agreement is five years. Withdrawal is permitted for supreme interests. The parties have agreed in the ABM Treaty to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic arms; and

Whereas, it is crucial to note that since 1972, the year of SALT I, the Soviets have:

Deployed four (4) new ICBM's, SS–16, SS–17, SS–18, and SS–19;

Built and deployed over 100 supersonic, inter-continental "BACKFIRE" bombers;

Deployed the DELTA I and DELTA II missile-launching submarines. A DELTA III is undergoing sea trials;

Improved the targeting and accuracy of their ICBM force;

Developed and tested a satellite killer; and,

Exceeded the U.S. effort in research, development, test, and evaluation, weapons procurement and other defensive investments every year since 1969. During 1977, their effort was 75 percent larger than ours; now, therefore be it

Resolved, by the 79th National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, That:

(a) continued U.S. adherence to the May 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement occur *only* if the most thorough-going verification techniques reveal that the Soviets are complying;

(b) no effort or expense be spared to verify Soviet compliance with this agreement and any other agreement this year or next;

(c) the American public be fully and frankly kept informed of the dynamic and shifting U.S.-Soviet balance so that if the U.S., by living up to agreements, is faced with being the "second strongest" nation in the world, domestic public opinion will support U.S. withdrawal from these Agreements and massive re-arming;

(d) the U.S. fully fund and deploy the Trident submarine and restore and fund the B–1 Bomber, and permit test firing of our land-based ICBMs;

(e) no effort or expense be spared in the critically important research and development of offensive and defensive strategic weapons technology; and

(f) current negotiations with the Soviet Union, aimed at changing the nature of the May 1972 "Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons" and the November 1974 accords into a permanent treaty (as with ABMs), accept the philosophy that the U.S. not agree to any formulation that would freeze the United States at a lower number of offensive launchers than the USSR, in short, apply the President's formula following the abortive Vance mission to Moscow in March 1977, i.e., we continue to "hang tough".

ENCLOSURE No. 2

THE PRESENT ARSENALS

United States	*Soviet Union*
573 Bombers (3 set for cruise missiles)	156 Bombers
1,054 ICBM's (550 with MIRV's)	1,398 ICBM's (608 with MIRV's)
656 SLBM's (496 with MIRV's)	950 SLBM's (144 with MIRV's)
Total: 2,283	Total: 2,504

HOW THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET ARSENALS OF OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS ARE AFFECTED

Ceiling on strategic weapons until the end of 1981: The Soviet Union has six months after the treaty goes into effect to destroy 104 missile launchers or bombers. The U.S. has no plans to increase arsenal up to 2,400 limit.

Ceiling from January 1, 1982 to the Treaty's expiration date, December 31, 1985: Of the 573 U.S. bombers, about 220 are in storage. The U.S. expects to destroy stored planes to get under the ceiling.

HOW THE TREATY RESTRICTS COMPOSITION OF ARSENALS

No more than 820 of the 1,200 may be multiple-warhead ICBM's. No more than 1,200 of the 1,320 may be multiple-warhead ICBM's and SLBM's. No more than 1,320 of the 2,250 may be multiple-warhead ICBM's and SLBM's and bombers with cruise missiles. Of the 2,250 weapons systems allowed, at least 930 must be single-warhead missiles and bombers.

STATEMENT OF THE WOMEN'S NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC CLUB, POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

POLICY POSITION ON SALT II TREATY

The Political Action Committee of the Woman's National Democratic Club has studied the provisions of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Arms (SALT II) and has heard presentations by both proponents and opponents of the Treaty. As a result, the Committee has decided to support the Treaty and the continuing negotiations on arms limitation that would follow.

By establishing essential parity in the strategic forces of the two opposing sides, SALT II enhances the stability of the strategic balance and reduces the possibility of nuclear war.

The Treaty imposes equal aggregate ceilings on the numbers of launchers of nuclear warheads which each side may deploy, as well as subceilings on specific types of launchers. In addition, the Treaty imposes limitations on the number of warheads which can be placed on a single missile and restricts the deployment of new types of missile systems to one for each side. For the first time, significant restrictions are agreed on qualitative improvements, thus curbing the sophisticated technology which drives the arms competition.

Compliance with the Treaty is based on national technical means of verification rather than on the good intentions of either side. The Committee accepts the assurance given by the President and the Secretary of Defense that the U.S. intelligence capabilities are sufficient to monitor Soviet strategic forces so that no violation of the Treaty that would alter the strategic balance could take place without being detected. Over and above that assurance, the Committee believes that it is in the overriding interest of both nations to preserve the integrity of the Treaty just as it had been in their mutual interest to negotiate and sign the Treaty.

The Committee understands that the terms of the Treaty permit the United States to maintain a strong defense force and supports the Administration's stated intention to maintain such a force. This course is essential for deterring against nuclear attack and against aggressive moves in the global arena by the Soviet Union which would be detrimental to the interests of the United States and its allies. At the same time, the Committee opposes the acquisition by the U.S. of weapons systems for the sole purpose of gaining political support for ratification of the Treaty.

Accordingly, the Political Action Committee endorses the SALT II Treaty and urges prompt ratification of it by the Senate without amendments which would jeopardize the agreement which has been painstakingly negotiated over a period of seven years.

STATEMENT OF LESTER H. AHLSWEDE, REPRESENTING CITIZEN-TAXPAYERS, SILVER SPRING, MD.

INTRODUCTION

As a spokesman for what I am sure is a considerable segment of the American public which believes that other behavior besides armament spending is urgently needed in foreign relations, I respectfully submit this statement of testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate in relation to the SALT II treaty with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

I offer this testimony because, on the basis of news reports, there has been none given to date from the standpoint of the interests and concerns of the public. All testimony offered so far has been presented by people who generally have personal or position prejudices which impugn their presumed expertness. I do not claim that

the viewpoints and conclusions presented here represent those of all the people, but they do represent the concerns of a great many.

My qualifications are these: I am a university graduate, now 64 years old, who has spent a career in newspaper work, government information, public relations and in recent years as a writer. In the course of my work I have been in most of the 50 states and have had jobs in the midwest, New York City and Washington, D.C. In most of these years I have been a student of human nature and behavior concerned with the lack of understanding of human judgment and integrity and interested in finding the keys to them. I am the author of a book about integrity which I expect to be published soon. I am not a crank or a publicity seeker but someone genuinely concerned about mankind who believes much greater emphasis is needed on other than physical force in all human affairs.

THE POSITION

By itself, the SALT II treaty allows so much armament production that it is a phoney symbol of peace and a cruel joke which only perpetuates fear, distrust and arms spending. Especially if its approval must be accompanied by increased arms expenditures, it is a mockery of credulity and a scrap of nonsense.

THE VIEWPOINT

Many of us citizen-taxpayers of the United States are growing increasingly tired of the tremendous appropriations for military spending which is inherently wasteful both with what is actually obtained and in terms of excessive over-abundance of military hardware. What we want is international diplomacy which alleviates fears and distrust accompanied by substantial reductions in armament appropriations. We want all of our leaders in the legislative as well as executive branches of government to be working to achieve these ends.

Most of us of the people are not nearly as frightened by a so-called threat of communist military invasion as some individuals proclaim and think we are. On the contrary, we objectively see that no nation in the world, including the United States and the U.S.S.R., can afford to risk starting an atomic holocaust which would devastate it as well as its enemeis. We see nuclear weaponry more as a deterrent than as a danger. Furthermore, we believe, on the basis of frequently published reports, that the United States already has a massive overkill power in its atomic arsenal which more than adequately protects our interests. We, therefore, see past and present—and proposed—armament spending programs as extravagant and excessively wasteful.

We do not want or believe we need a so-called arms limitation treaty with the U.S.S.R. which, instead of honestly limiting armaments, perpetuates for years to come a continuum of suspicion, antagonisms and heavy spending for unneeded military power—all of which breeds conflict, not compatibility.

Far more important than arms in relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. is the contest of political and economic behavior, which too often has been atrocious on both sides and about which far too little is done to achieve correction and improvement. In this contest, abuses of the so-called "free enterprise" system, which is not to be confused with democracy, in both national and international spheres are more relevant than quantities of missiles or powers of warheads, and insidious activities of the U.S.S.R. also are importantly relevant. Unfair and unfounded charges on either side are equally reprehensible. The existence of the different systems of the two countries and their competitiveness in the world scene, however, must be accepted as facts of life. All of this needs much more attention than is now given, and a treaty on political-economic behavior would be far more valuable than the sham SALT II treaty. This, furthermore, may require corrections and changes in the internal affairs and functioning of the two nations, which, then, also merits the attention of the leaders of each.

Beyond this, we believe that inordinate fear of the U.S.S.R. has long been falsely propagated by a powerful clique within the United States with which the industrial-military complex is related or associated. This group greatly benefits from such fear propagation. While the original concept of Marxism projects world-wide development, this far from automatically implies that the U.S.S.R. or any other communist nation plans to impose communism by military force on the United States or even elsewhere in the world. It needs to be seen objectively that the behavior of the U.S.S.R. with nations on its western borders has been primarily nationalistic, as a defensive measure, and not political, although political influence has followed in the wake of nationalism.

We must credit others besides the Russians with reading "Das Kapital" and believing in its concepts. This is especially applicable to people in countries where

oppression, autocracy, deprivation and injustice have prevailed. It is in the presence of such evils that communism breeds, and it is the existence of such evils that we should fear more than the danger of communist military takeovers. We even need to be concerned about such evils within our borders.

Another factor about which we need to be cognizant in our relations with the U.S.S.R. is that it will obviously seek military agreements which allow for its relationship with China. Because it faces a vast border with China and uncertain Chinese intentions, it cannot afford as much limitation of arms as the United States can. A truly meaningful arms limitation treaty between only the United States and the U.S.S.R., therefore, is not possible; yet we are unnecessarily affected by this circumstance.

Since this situation illustrates the fact that effective disarmament in the world is a broad international matter, the role of the United Nations must also be considered. The U.N. has lost favor and impact in recent years because of defects in its procedures, including the basis for votes in the General Assembly, the single veto power in the Security Council and other flaws. If it were an effective international body, it could do much to reduce fears, tensions and armaments in the world. Action needs to be taken, initiated by leading powers, to revise the charter of the United Nations so that it can become a more viable force in the developing and maintaining of world peace.

THE SITUATION

Specifically in relation to the SALT II treaty, conditions and factors beyond those already considered are as follows:

1. Relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. can currently be described as reasonably stable and are certainly greatly improved over the Cold War period following World War II. There is no substantial basis for fear of a U.S.S.R. attack on the United States or its European allies, and cause for such fear is less now that it has been in previous years. Nor is there serious reason to believe the U.S.S.R. will have a desire to attack the United States in the forseeable future. Launching a major war by any nation in this nuclear age is pure folly.

2. The United States already has more than enough destructive power to devastate the U.S.S.R. should it attack and can maintain such power with far less armament spending than is currently allocated.

3. Neither the Department of Defense nor the CIA can be relied upon to offer more than technical advice on a SALT II treaty and are not qualified to advise on broader policy issues. Spokesmen associated with the industrial complex benefitting from military spending also are not qualified to be objective. All will be disposed to overplay the fear theme because it serves their appropriation, stature or profit interests. The State Department has appeared to be barren of original, constructive, affirmative ideas for years and, therefore, its spokesmen cannot be expected to offer much of substance or consequence.

4. Testimony of Mr. Kissinger must be judged both on the basis of his performance as Secretary of State and as a Presidential advisor, plus his current position as a representative of a political party out of power. Nor does he now address himself to continuing or future needs. When he supports greater military spending, the reasons for such support should be questioned.

5. The apathy with which the public responded to the signing of the SALT II treaty should be a good indication of how the public feels about it. Obviously, the people of the United States do not consider it of much consequence.

6. That the Carter administration wants the treaty approved cannot be viewed as of major importance. Its interests are colored by political wishes; and in view of the general ineptness of the administration, there is no reason to bestow credit to it for any great achievement in arranging the treaty.

7. As a document of mechanics about numbers of weapons, the treaty, as a whole, in inconsequential. If it does nothing more than limit a few armaments, it may be doing a disservice rather than a service to the peoples of the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the world by encouraging a continuation of the present arms race and the present accompanying fears and tensions.

8. Because there will be objection to reduced arms spending on grounds of economic effect in areas of arms production, let it be added that at least some of the savings can be used for relocation of displaced workers but more importantly, funds can be allocated to development of new energies, subsidizing of consumer purchases of solar energy systems, necessary welfare programs and other such projects. Some savings also could be used to reduce the inordinate national debt and its huge interest cost.

CONCLUSION

The United States Senate should reject the SALT II treaty as predominantly an exercise in futility which perpetuates excessive armament production and its accompanying evils.

As an alternative, the Senate should adopt a resolution referring the treaty back to a joint United States-U.S.S.R. Study Committee composed of broad representation from the societies of both nations, with instructions to create an agreement which will reduce fears and tensions as well as armaments.

In addition, the Senate should adopt a resolution to encourage creation of an international United Nations Charter Review Committee with instructions to revise the charter in such ways, including revising the basis for Assembly voting rights, so that the United Nations can become a more viable institution for the initiating of effective international disarmament treaties.

BENJAMIN M. BECKER,
Highland Park, Ill., July 19, 1979.

Hon. FRANK CHURCH,
U.S. Senator, Idaho, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR CHURCH: As a concerned American, I take the liberty of writing to you and the members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations with respect to its current consideration of SALT II.

In April 1971, prior to adoption of SALT I on May 29, 1972, my article "The Myth of Arms Control and Disarmament" appeared in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (April 1971—Volume XXVII Number 4, copy enclosed). The major points made there were that strategic arms control agreements are a myth and deceptive; that the key to nuclear arms control and ultimately meaningful disarmament was to work toward eliminating the mutual fears of the United States and the Soviet Union of one another, and that such fears could possibly be alleviated over a period of time by voluntary and reciprocal acts of nuclear arms control of the two superpowers. SALT I has not arrested the nuclear arms race, and one of the few and uncontested aspects of SALT II is that neither will it arrest the nuclear arms race.

I briefly note some observations for consideration by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

1. Americans do not trust the Russians and the Russians do not trust the Americans. That mutual distrust has prevailed with ebb and flow since the day when the United States recognized the Soviet Union during the days of Franklin Roosevelt. Despite the Non-Proliferation Treaty, SALT I agreement, technical and cultural exchanges and growing trade, this mutual distrust persists.

2. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have some reasonable basis for their respective mistrust of one another, the United States with its bases surrounding the Soviet Union and nuclear submarines within attacking range of Russia and the Soviet Union with its continuing quest for nuclear superiority (and perhaps already achieved), its unrelenting encouragement of revolution throughout the world and indirect aggression through its surrogate nations.

3. From the beginning, SALT has been nothing but a myth. During the entire period from 1972 (SALT I) there has been a continuing development, deployment and increase of nuclear arms, notwithstanding that SALT I was and SALT II is being hailed as a step toward nuclear arms control.

4. Apart from worsening economic conditions, the current debate on SALT II is sparking more divisiveness among Americans and encouraging disenchantment with government. Americans are asking: How can their elected officials and experts differ so sharply on an issue involving the very fate of civilization?

5. The failure of the Senate to approve SALT II will not be as tragic as contended by its advocates. It is not the end-all of American relations with the Soviet Union. Before approving SALT II we must be certain that it makes some meaningful contribution to slowing the nuclear arms race. SALT I has not accomplished that objective. There is no valid reason now to suppose that that will be done with SALT II.

6. A major objection to SALT II asserted by opponents is that compliance by the Russians is unverifiable. State Secretary Cyrus Vance and Defense Secretary Harold Brown argue that violations of SALT II by the Soviet Union can be monitored, but for some reason these assertions by the U.S. defense establishment are not convincing. Americans are asked to support SALT II without the confidence that there will be compliance by the Soviet Union. Their record on compliance with SALT I is replete with known violations.

7. In the final analysis, at no time in international history has any kind of arms limitation agreement prevented, let alone restrained, war between the parties to such agreements. Alleged violations of such agreements are not enforceable under our sovereign-nation-international system. There is no international force, nor can one be conceived, and by no means the United Nations, which can enforce international arms control agreements. So to identify SALT as an agreement is a deceptive misnomer. It is not an agreement. SALT is not enforceable. So all we have is an understanding or a series of understandings which can be violated by either party at will and at any time. So why mislead the American people that we have an ageement? To call SALT an "agreement" does not make it so.

No nation has ever exercised restraint in going to war by reason of non-aggression treaties or arms control agreements. Neither did the existence of the League of Nations nor the United Nations Organization to which member nations are pledged to maintain the peace prevent a series of small and large wars. So, why deceive the American people that SALT will bring peace or strategic arms control.

8. A meaningful discussion of SALT II, and for that matter the whole subject of strategic arms control, involves knowledge and understanding of highly technological information, some of which, to be sure, is under high security secrecy. It is just impossible for the average American and voter to be familiar with the technical aspects of the SALT discussions. This may be even the case with some of the Senators who are asked to vote on SALT II. Yet, the U.S. Senate is asked to ratify a treaty where the basic technological considerations are subject to considerable conflict of opinion among the experts on both sides of the issue. No one has brought into question the loyalty and patriotism of experts on each side—the President, Vance, Brown, Warnke, Nitze, Rowny, Helms, Hart or Garn and many others. Yet, they differ sharply on the facts and interpretation of SALT. How are the people expected to be able to make some respectable judgment on the issue?

9. Proponents argue that SALT II for the first time places an upper limit on certain nuclear arms. Opponents say this is not so. Proponents argue that SALT II will "establish", "limit", "compel", "impose" certain things and at the same time argue that SALT II is not a substitute for a strong defense, such as equipping our strategic bomber force with long-range cruise missiles, placing the new longer-range Trident I missile in our existing missile carrying submarines, etc. Both the proponents and opponents agree that SALT II does not arrest the continuing race for bigger and better nuclear arms. There is no restriction on continuing technological research and development in nuclear arms by either party. Then why have SALT II? Gen. Edward Rowny, who for six years represented the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the SALT II negotiations, testified that SALT II "does not meet minimally acceptable standards" for United States security and that "agreeing to a bad agreement is worse than no agreement at all."

10. There is the claim by proponents of SALT II that the failure of the Senate to approve the SALT II treaty or adding amendments would diminish the Soviet Union's confidence that the President speaks for the nation, and that amendments requiring renegotiation will lead to corresponding demands by the Soviet Union. The Russians well know the American democratic processes in the adoption of treaties. It is presumptuous for Brezhnev or Gromyko to warn that we better not propose any amendments to the SALT II agreement. Let there be full and complete consideration by the United States Senate, and if the consensus is that in the interests of the United States there should be amendments, so be it. This should constitute another excellent example of how democracy works. It will demonstrate that while the President may speak for the nation what he says or does is subject to the will of the people as expressed through their representatives. If the Russians demand additional concessions in exchange for any proposed amendments, let us cross that bridge when we reach it. If the Soviet sponsored amendments are reasonable we can agree to them. If such amendments are contrary to the interests of U.S. security, we might as well get it all on the table and know it now, and act accordingly. Let us keep in mind that the Soviet leaders want SALT as much as we do.

11. Finally, there is an absence of war and the existence of peace only when it is in the interests of potential antagonists to abstain from war. With the penultimate disastrous effects of nuclear warfare, the United States and the Soviet Union have remained at peace. With the nuclear deterrence possessed by both superpowers, restraint has been exercised out of fear. If it is fear which is the basis of concern by the United States and the Soviet Union, does it not make sense, as suggested in my article, to minimize, and hopefully eliminate, the causes of fear of one another? Does it not make sense for the United States to explore what it is that the Russians fear about the United States? Step by step we voluntarily and reciprocally take the first small steps to alleviate such fears, starting with the removal of a base here and

there and initiating self-imposed limitations on specific nuclear weapons, stopping there and awaiting reciprocal voluntary steps which in response would hopefully be taken by the Soviet Union. Some will say that this is whistling in the dark, the Soviets will never respond voluntarily. It is submitted that they are as likely to respond as they would be with a SALT agreement, no more, no less. With claimed verification capability by both superpowers and substantial equivalence in existing nuclear power capability of destroying one another many times over, there is no greater risk in the voluntary-reciprocal proposal than in unenforceable so-called strategic arms limitations agreements.

The early lineup of proponents and opponents of SALT II long before negotiations were completed and the President and Brezhnev signed the agreement gave the appearance of an upcoming battle. Experts, political leaders lined up their forces and the American people were showered with public relations presentations on each side of SALT II. On the issue of survival from a possible nuclear conflict, there can be no victors. It is clear from the public discussion thus far that the danger of nuclear conflict is not diminished with or without SALT. Let's not divide the nation more than it is divided by endless debate on SALT II.

I would appreciate if this presentation can be made part of the proceedings of your Committee. I would welcome the opportunity to appear before your Committee to present and discuss my views personally.

STATEMENT OF ROGER A. SINGERLING, HACKETTSTOWN, N.J.

DOCENDO DISCIMUS

I was a U.S. Navy survival instructor for two and one-half years during the war in Vietnam. U.S. Navy pilots and aircrewmen were serving in Southeast Asia and it was mandatory that they be adequately prepared to survive if they were shot down. They would also have to be prepared to evade the enemy; resist the enemy; escape from the enemy. The records show that training received was highly beneficial to U.S. Navy personnel who did become actual prisoners of war. They did survive captivity and were returned home safely. Some of them are still on active duty; some of them are now civilians and we are no longer at war with North Vietnam. The SERE schools served their purpose.

The SERE schools did serve a purpose during the Vietnam era but I believe the lessons learned are as applicable today as they were during the sixties and early seventies and should not be ignored. We as a free nation must still be concerned, deeply concerned about our survival—our survival as a world leader. Perhaps the following insights will provide assistance in making a final determination regarding ratification of the SALT II treaty as it was originally written.

Point

Freedom! Try to imagine what it would be like without it. As I sit at my typewriter writing this I don't have to fear a knock on my door. I'm a citizen of the United States of America, free to write and speak as I chose. I have peace of mind because I know that what I write might help to make my country a better one, whether or not my government agrees or disagrees with what I have to say. Needless to say, I value my freedom very highly. But that was not always the case.

In August, 1965, I suddenly found myself adorned in a black uniform and being referred to as Comrade Ivan, interrogater. I was being ordered by the U.S. Navy to withhold freedom from my fellow navymen in a pseudo Communist prisoner of war camp.

My initial reaction was: "What am I doing here? Why am I required to do this? I've been trained by the U.S. Navy to be a hospital corpsman; trained to assist in curing aches and pains—not inflict them." But as the training officer explained to me upon reporting for duty: "The job you will be doing is an important one and it will require a personality change—you are going to be the enemy."

Change my personality. Become the enemy. As I gained on the job experience I did manage to become more and more like them. I learned to be cruel and sadistic like them. I learned how to quote passages from American newspapers to be used for propaganda purposes. I became very adept at quoting anti-war statements from the Holy Bible when appropriate or also if appropriate, ripping pages from it. Occasionally I would set the Stars and Stripes afire; I learned to ignore the stench of burning nylon. I learned how to instill fear in my fellow man through intimidation and degradation. I did become like the enemy but I also became a better American—I would never again take freedom for granted.

I had been in close physical and psychological contact with more than fifty students a week, every other week, for two and one-half years; twenty-five hundred

Americans from varied backgrounds who repeatedly sacrificed their own comfort and well being voluntarily without having a real gun held to their heads. They did so because they believed in their country and what it was attempting to do for them; they had learned about freedom too. Perhaps that was why there were not a few tears being shed when we; students and instructors alike; stood together as we saluted the flag at the end of the training program while the national anthem played over the public address system where Communist propaganda had blared from only moments before.

Point

Throughout these hearings it has been my observation that almost all testimony and debate has focused consistently on the quantity, capabilities and individual strengths of various weapons systems. As I interpret it, the consensus has been: that due to the recent increases in Soviet military strength and due to the projection of their future potential increases we in turn must match them weapon for weapon at the very least. The theory being: that if the Soviets are able to go beyond parity with us they might risk branching out due to an extra ounce of courage. This consensus is probably a realistic one, however, what disturbs me is that the question of our national unity has been barely touched upon. The Soviets appear to be unified—unified through fear but unified none the less.

The Soviet Union reminds me of the typical bully on the block who is fully aware of his motives. He knows from experience that if he just waits long enough, eventually someone weaker than he will come along to be taken advantage of.

Are we presently, perhaps, reacting like the weak, immature youngster, who, thinking he might be confronted by the bully when he steps out into the street takes a loaded shotgun from his father's gun cabinet before leaving his house? Is our loaded shotgun going to be the M-X?

Just for a moment, consider the absurdity of the M-X taken out of context. Consider the Dr. Strangelove atmosphere that hovers over it. Consider the ridiculous labyrinth of roadways and tunnels. Consider the cost. The M-X is our saviour? Technology is the ultimate weapon? If any member of this committee sincerely believes that hypothesis then it seems to be democracy as we now know it is endangered and peace as we expect it will not be forthcoming.

It is understandable that we should be concerned with the maze of nuclear weapons now planted in the earth by both we and the Soviet Union, but I don't believe either of us will ever be tempted to use them against each other—it's inconceivable.

It's inconceivable because the United States being a Christian nation would never initiate a first strike. It's inconceivable because the Soviet Union being the bully that it is would never initiate a first strike due to their fear of a retaliatory one.

I sincerely feel we should be concerned about Soviet military strength, but the emphasis must be centered on their conventional forces, not their nuclear arsenal. I am inclined to believe they would launch a first strike somewhere in the world but it would be a conventional strike not a nuclear one.

I believe we should begin in earnest to establish a firm foreign policy based on a renewal of national unity. National unity should be our watch words for the eighties because our degree of strength will be determined, can only be determined by our degree of national unity.

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH E. TRACEY, JR., WHEATON, MD.

I am 72 years of age. I was born and raised on Capitol Hill, eight blocks from the Capitol in Southeast Washington, D.C. I graduated from Georgetown Law School with a LL.B and Doctors of Jurisprudence degrees. I retired in 1970 from the Internal Revenue Service as an Estate and Gift Tax Attorney.

I served with the 29th Division in World War II in the Invasion of Normandy. I received the Infantry Combat Badge, Arrow Head for the Normandy Invasion, Presidential Citation Badge and the Bronze Star Medal for Valor and Meritorious Services. I am a disabled veteran.

I submit my observations and opinions as an ordinary citizen with no technical background or armed with statistics. I base my reasoning on intense listenings and reading of the conflicting comments and testimony of "experts", I have also listened and solicited opinions from my friends, neighbors, barber-shop talk, all from ordinary citizens like myself who are and will be effected by the outcome of the treaty.

The premises that I think the committee should start out with is:

1. No one trusts the Russians.
2. No one suggests lowering our guard or weakening our military strength.

3. We all believe in the famous motto of one of our original colonies, "Don't Tread on Me".

I sincerely think that the SALT II agreements should be ratified, because it is a continuation of sincere efforts to reduce arms, it is not a "peace treaty". We do not need months of testimony to know that the Russians will cheat. If they decide to go to war a piece of paper will not stop them. What the signing of the treaty will do, is keep the jaw-boning going, similar to the Middle East. As long as we talk and communicate, the chance of war is postponed and hopefully a new generation of Russians will see the folly of a holocaust or economic disaster.

If we do not ratify the SALT II, what do we have, isn't it status quo? Will not ratifying bring peace with Russia? Will Russia disarm, will Russia stop infiltrating wherever opportunity presents itself. To hear General Haig and Mr. Kissinger testify to a Disarmament Agreement, stating that they agree to its ratification, only on one condition, that we increase our defense spending, amazes me. Do you think for one minute that the Russians will agree to this. Would you? A disarmament treaty with the condition that we increase our arms is contradictory and ridiculous. The State Department and experts on both sides worked on this agreement for years with the full knowledge of prominent Senators. Kissinger, Haig, Ford and on and on. Then suddenly when it is culminated, they suddenly discover that they have reservations. This looks to me as if our leaders and representatives can't make a decision or do not know what the score is. The American public would be utterly confused if they didn't have the common sense that they possess. They know that the only way to walk is to crawl first. They all say, "What can we lose by ratifying." What do we lose by not ratifying. Answer these questions. We do not need months of technical, confusing testimony.

My friends continually question the arms race. Congress and experts seem to be obsessed with the idea that spending billions on defense will automatically give us security. The only thing it is sure to do is to make the arms manufacturers rich, more generals, more admirals, more experts, huge printing bills.

Military security must be based on economics, strength, patriotism and love of country. The morale of our citizenry is not helped by the utter confusion amongst our leaders on whether to ratify or not to ratify. What is the big concern about Russia allowing us to observe. Would that keep her from cheating. If we caught her cheating, what are we going to do about it? Protest certainly, and get a promise not to do it again.

Ratify the treaty. Stop wasting money on defense. Dollars do not guarantee security, wise spending, planning, employment and a restoring of confidence in our people, for our leaders will give us changes. We can proceed with SALT III, IV, and on and on with the hope that both sides will see the folly of ridiculous waste on defense and spend the people's money on both sides, for economic stability and mankinds stability. Stop playing politics and use the common sense that our Supreme Being endowed in us. Lets all remember John Kennedy, "It is not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your county." Let Russia remember our Motto. "Don't Tread on Me."

I did not use the 2500 words alloted to me because any more comments would be excess verbage. I sincerely think that if we do not ratify we will have lost our last opportunity of getting Russia to cooperate with us even to a limited degree. I cannot imagine Russia or any other responsible government agreeing to go back to a treaty table after being insulted by the dumping of an agreement that took years of debate, compromising and good faith on both sides.

Let's ratify with hope and eternal vigilance and get on with getting our beloved country strong again. Let's have more jobs, more military parades, waving of the flag, integrity in our leaders. A strong patriotic America is a strong military America. Let the free world see our determination to grab at any peace effort. Ratification of SALT II is a good beginning. Let us not panic everytime Russia builds a canoe by building two billion dollar aircraft carriers, which can be blown out of the sea in five seconds.

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