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HEARINGS

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BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

EX. Y, 96-1

THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE
LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND THE PRO-
TOCOL THERETO, TOGETHER REFERRED TO AS THE SALT II
TREATY, BOTH SIGNED AT VIENNA, AUSTRIA, ON JUNE 18,
1979, AND RELATED DOCUMENTS


JULY 25, 26, 31, AUGUST 2, 1979

PART 3

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THE SALT II TREATY

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FIRST SESSION

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
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SALT II TREATY

WEDNESDAY, JULY 25, 1979

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:43 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Church, McGovern, Biden, Glenn, Stone, Sarbanes, Zorinsky, Javits, Percy, Helms, Hayakawa, and Lugar.

Also present: Senator Boschwitz.

OPENING STATEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. Today the committee sits to solve a riddle, pierce an enigma, and piece together a puzzle, in short, to decipher the motives, intentions, and capabilities of our principal adversary, and in SALT II, our counterpart, the Soviet Union.

Our hearing, however, is not a foolish rush to judgment. We do not have to judge the Soviet Union in order to judge the merits or demerits of the SALT II Treaty. We must only acquaint ourselves with the unknowns of the Soviet present and the unknowables of our common future in order to put the treaty into a context within which we can assess its contribution to our security and that of the world.

To do more would require a lifetime. I am always struck by the fact that experts on any subject—and the Soviet Union is an excellent example of this pattern—are generally the most cautious in pronouncing final judgment, while those with the least exposure to a complex matter are often the most certain of their views.

In the case of the Soviet Union, I cannot help repeating what Marshall Shulman said on our second day of these hearings, quoting Mr. Dooley: "It ain't the things you don't know that hurts you, it's the things you do know that ain't so."

In assessing the Soviet Union, I start with more questions than answers, and candidly, I expect to finish these hearings in just about the same condition. Our witnesses today are experts, policy-makers, and scholars, but their views are diverse, and the committee is obliged and fortunate to hear them out, not to decide among them. Time and the correctness of the decision we do make on the SALT Treaty will do that.

For now, we can simply seek information and enlightenment, information on Soviet policy today, enlightenment on its likely shape and direction tomorrow. We need to try to understand how Soviet leaders view the SALT process, how they make their choices

between guns and butter, between restraint in the arms race and competition in the Third World.

We need the best advice we can obtain on long-term Soviet goals and on our ability to direct them to match our own as much as possible, to counter them effectively when they spell direct conflict with our own vital interests.

Most of all, I imagine, we need to know the safest path to follow when we know too little of our adversary to choose our course and be sure of his with absolute certainty. The testimony we hear today will not be the last word on this subject. I know, however, that it is the best available to us, and I very much look forward to hearing it.

Our first witness, Ambassador Malcolm Toon, is an official one, but he is also an authoritative expert on the Soviet Union. His expertise has been acquired during three postings in Moscow, under Stalin, under Khrushchev, and under Brezhnev, and several tours of East-West duty in the State Department. As a junior diplomat, he served in Warsaw and in Budapest. As an Ambassador, he has represented the United States in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Israel before returning to the Soviet Union.

As a PT boat commander, he saw duty in World War II. As a diplomat, he has seen long duty in what another PT boat commander, President Kennedy, called the twilight struggle to avert world war III.

In his last posting in Moscow, he has seen his Embassy roof on fire and his basement made a haven for refugees from Soviet religious intolerance. He has been barred from Soviet television for seeking to speak frankly about America's commitment to the pursuit of human rights, and he has been criticized in his own country for seeming to bar contact between the Embassy and Soviet human rights activists.

In short, Ambassador Toon is no stranger to controversy. Before this committee testifying on the subject of SALT, he is then on familiar ground. We are pleased to have you here, Mr. Ambassador. We look forward to what you have to say.

STATEMENT OF HON. MALCOLM TOON, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S.S.R.

Ambassador TOON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be here, as always.

I was interested to note that you referred to experts who are appearing before you this morning. I assume you had in mind those that follow me, because I do not regard myself as an expert. I perhaps know a little bit more than the layman in this country about the Soviet Union because I speak the language, I have lived there for a few years, I have negotiated with them, but frankly, I have never been able to predict Soviet behavior, and that, I think, is the mark of expertise, and therefore I decline the honor.

Now, Mr. Chairman, you have my statement, and I must assume that because of the conscientious attitude toward the problem that confronts you which you have demonstrated—you and your colleagues, throughout these hearings—that you have read it in its entirety. I will try therefore in these few brief remarks not to duplicate what I have set forth in that statement.

I would like in the time allotted to me before we get to questions to do three things: First, clarify my attitude toward SALT; second, give you some thoughts on possible Soviet reactions to courses of action that have been suggested by some witnesses appearing before your committee; third, touch on my own approach to the business of United States-Soviet relations.

As to my attitude toward the SALT process and the SALT agreement itself, you may recall the flurry of articles that appeared in the press after Vienna, some uninformed, others somewhat tendentious, but all of them leaving the impression that I was becoming lukewarm in my support for SALT, or worse, was considering opposing the treaty.

This impression, Mr. Chairman, was completely unfounded. I felt then as I feel now that the SALT process is central to our search for strategic stability, that the agreement itself was a good one, that it constituted in my view a useful, stabilizing element in United States-Soviet relations, that it represented a useful first step, though only a first step toward effective strategic arms control, and that it in no way weakens our security or that of our friends and allies, but I also felt, Mr. Chairman, and it was on this point where the press frankly took license, that no agreement with the Soviet Union can rest on trust. It must be verifiable.

I made clear that I could not support a treaty that I did not believe was adequately verifiable, and frankly, I could not be sure of this in Vienna or in Moscow because of the loss of our Iranian facilities and other developments that had taken place prior to the meeting in Vienna.

I therefore preferred to withhold judgment on verifiability until I could be briefed by the experts in Washington. This is the sort of briefing, as you know, you cannot get in the field, and I had to wait for my return before I could be assured.

Now, since returning to Washington about 10 days ago, I have had my briefings. I am told that the briefings I had were the same that were given to the President, and the Secretary of State, and other top officials in Government, and I assume that were given to you, Mr. Chairman, in your executive session, and I now share the view of our top political and military leaders that no militarily significant violations of SALT II—by this I mean those that could affect the strategic balance—can take place without detection by us.

So, I am satisfied and can in good conscience support the treaty. I do so here and I shall do so in speeches around the country in coming days.

Second, with regard to Soviet reactions to courses of action that have been suggested by some witnesses who have appeared before you, before your committee in recent days, in all frankness, with my some 30 years of experience in dealing with the Soviets, I consider myself somewhat better qualified—although I again say I am not an expert, but better qualified—to estimate Soviet behavior than others who have not had the, I might say, dubious privilege of living cheek by jowl with our Soviet adversaries.

In my view, rejection would not lead to Armageddon, just as approval of the treaty will not bring in a new era of United States-Soviet cooperation, but it will in my view put an end to the SALT

process for the foreseeable future—and make political and strategic competition with the Soviet Union more unstable and possibly more dangerous.

Amendments to the treaty that would amount to mandated renegotiation to resolve issues in our favor, as has been suggested by some witnesses, are inadvisable, in my view. At best, such a course would reopen issues of concern to the Soviets which are now resolved in our favor, thus unraveling the whole fabric of the treaty itself and at worst, the Soviets would simply refuse to discuss changes with us.

This is essentially what Brezhnev said in his toast at Vienna, and I was there to hear it, and what Gromyko reiterated in his press conference subsequently in Moscow. There are times when we should take Soviet statements at face value. This, I feel, is one of those times.

Now, finally, a word on my personal approach to United States-Soviet relations. I have long felt, and I have said so publicly many times, that our relationship with the Soviets is essentially an adversary one. It is not one that can be based on mutual trust, confidence, friendship, not now, not in the foreseeable future, not in my view, until there is a basic change in Soviet world outlook, in Soviet philosophy, in Soviet behavior.

This does not mean that we must regard each other with hostility and unmitigated suspicion, but it does mean that we must be hardheaded in our assessment of Soviet objectives, that we must at all times remain alert to the need to guard our vital interests, and that we should be frank—not offensive, but frank—in expressing our disapproval of Soviet behavior.

On the policy level we should, in a word, recognize and operate on the need to cooperate on some matters, to regulate competition on others, and to try to defuse around the world tensions which might possibly lead to a dangerous confrontation between us.

All of this means, it seems to me, that any Ambassador must approach his job in Moscow with a mixed view, a view comprising both respect and contempt, or perhaps I should use a milder word since I must always be mindful of the friendly Soviet press reaction to what I say, let's say disapproval. Respect for Soviet military strength, for Soviet persistence in pursuing those basic political objectives, Soviet determination to take advantage of perceived weaknesses in their adversaries, coupled with opportunities and world developments which may open up and may give them the chance to project their influence abroad, and finally, respect for Soviet loyalty to their own ideological aims in dealing with their own people and their so-called friends and allies, respect in the sense that we must recognize that this is an element of power that we have to take into account.

Disapproval—disapproval of their ideology and of their contempt for the principles of individual freedom, the dignity of man, the religious ethic, which underlie our own philosophy and behavior and those of our friends and allies in the West.

This, of course, works both ways. The Soviets also have a mixed view of us, also composed of respect and contempt. In this case it is contempt, and not just disapproval. Respect for our military strength, respect for the strength of our economy, and hopefully,

respect for our determination to take all necessary steps to protect our vital interests.

On the other end of the spectrum, contempt—again I say not just disapproval—contempt, as they see it, for our tendency to shift policies from one administration to another, our vacillation in pursuing policies once determined, our tolerance of individual freedom, which they regard as unbridled license, tantamount to anarchy, our search for a warm and friendly relationship with a power whose ideology condemns everything we stand for.

There are more elements, of course, to the mix, but these are the important ones as I see them.

I have felt that the American Ambassador in Moscow, in reflecting this mixed view of Soviet power and in projecting our national interest, should not be reluctant to speak his mind both to the host government and to his superiors in Washington as well as, of course, the American people and the Congress, in his public appearances back here.

Plain speaking, of course, has its hazards—blasts in the Soviet press, and the occasional cold shoulder by Soviet officials, and, of course, on this end, anguish in Washington, in the executive branch.

Despite some rough periods, I believe that this approach has commanded the respect, admittedly very grudging respect, of the Soviet leadership. After all, Soviet leaders themselves are straightforward, frank, frequently insensitive to others' concerns, and I have managed, I think, to develop a dialogue with Brezhnev and some—not all of his colleagues, but some—in order to project this point of view.

In any case, I feel strongly that an ambassador does a disservice to his country if he shades the views of his Government to make them more palatable to his host, his Soviet host, and if he puts an unwarranted gloss on his host government's positions in his communications with Washington. Any other course, in my view, can lead to miscalculation and misunderstanding, neither of which we can afford in this dangerous and unstable world.

As to the future, I do not believe Moscow is going to be any easier for us to deal with even with SALT II and even with a new generation of Soviet leaders in place. Ideology will continue to play a role in Soviet policy. Soviet values and world views will remain very different from our own. This means continued repression of dissent at home and support of radical movements abroad. This friction and unpleasantness in relations thus will continue between our two countries. It is incumbent on both sides to regulate the mutually harmful competition and expand the mutually beneficial cooperation. I am sure, Mr. Chairman, that we will carry our share of the load. Given my skepticism of Soviet intentions, I cannot be sure the other side will do the same.

Thank you very much.

[Ambassador Toon's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR MALCOLM TOON

In my statement today, I would like to discuss SALT against the broader background of U.S.-Soviet relations and in this context, to state my reasons for supporting the Treaty.

Since I will be speaking to you in my capacity as a "Soviet expert," perhaps I should give you my qualifications for doing so.

Our relationship with Moscow has occupied me for over thirty years, from the onset of the Cold War to the present. I am now on my third assignment in Moscow. I first served there in 1951-52 as political officer and again in the early 1960's as political counselor. I have served in Berlin. I directed Soviet Affairs in the State Department for a number of years. I have served as Ambassador in two Eastern European capitals, in Prague and in Belgrade. Finally, I have been Ambassador in Moscow for the past two and a half years. In all, I have served under nine U.S. Administrations and have dealt with the Soviets under Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev.

I am sometimes called a hard-liner. Personally I don't think I'm a hard-liner—nor am I anti-anybody. But since I made the transition from World War II PT-boat commander to career diplomat I have found that I served my country most effectively by speaking frankly to the people and governments I was accredited to about American views and values, and by expressing frankly to my own government and people my views on how best to advance American interests.

It is from this background that I speak today about U.S.-Soviet relations and the role of SALT in that relationship. I believe I might usefully begin by talking about the Soviet regime and how I think we should deal with it.

At the risk of restating the obvious, let me start with some basic truths. The Soviet system reflects a view of history, a concept of man's relation to the state, a complex of values and principles totally different from our own. Historians can argue whether this view is traditionally a Russian one or a basically Soviet view imposed from above in 1917. I am inclined to think that Lenin and Stalin took an essentially Western philosophy, Marxism, and shaped it to fit Russian reality so that from Stalin's time until the present there has been no fundamental conflict between Soviet ideology and Russian nationalism.

In any case, the considerable resources of the Soviet Union are now, and will continue to be for the foreseeable future, effectively mobilized in support of a distinctive and, in my view, distorted historical world outlook. The Soviet regime does not accept and will not tolerate ideas of free expression and of free individual choice as we understand them. It will try to vindicate its ideology by stifling dissent at home and often by supporting abroad various repressive regimes which proclaim themselves Marxist-Leninist.

Beyond ideology, geography and historical experience have also shaped the Soviet system and the policies of its leaders in important ways. Centuries of invasions from both East and West have left their mark on the outlook of the Russian people and of its rulers. The Soviet leadership has invested massive efforts to achieve security on Russia's borders, in part by seeking to push those borders outward. This historic attitude, to which the Communists have added their preoccupation with military strength as a key element of political power, may explain, though it does not justify, why the Soviet Union presently maintains a military machine entirely disproportionate to any objective assessment of its needs. The cost of this quest for absolute security and for greater political influence by means of military strength has been enormous. It has meant deprivation for the Soviet people and strain and friction in the Soviet Union's relations with its neighbors, with sometimes dangerous consequences for world stability. Total security such as the Soviets seek can only mean insecurity for others.

The same passion for security extends to the Soviet domestic scene, although here some striking changes have taken place since my first tour in Moscow in the early fifties. Stalinist terror has ceased. Nonetheless, organized dissent still meets with official hostility, especially when it poses a direct challenge to the Party's official line. Yet I am inclined to believe that domestic repression would be much more severe if the Soviet Union were to give up its policy of detente because then it would be even less concerned about world public opinion.

A central question of U.S. foreign policy for the past thirty years—and one which is still very much with us—has been how we should deal with this complex and repressive system. I think we must begin by seeing the Soviet Union as it really is. Not, as some see it, 260 million people who want to be like Americans, nor, as others see it, 260 million Genghis Khans, ready, willing and able to conquer the world. It is a unique nation travelling slowly along a course of its own, exploiting powerful built-in strengths, yet beset by confounding weaknesses—most importantly in the economic sector—and pursuing objectives and methods profoundly different from our own.

We must also look at the Soviet Union and our relations with it in a long term perspective. If we focus on the short term, we cannot be hopeful of changing either the direction of the Soviet Union's movement or its tendency to override both

individuals and powerless countries that get in its way. If we continually ask ourselves how much progress we have made in the last 24 hours or in the last week or even in the last year, we will have to say frankly; not much. But if we take the longer view, if we look back at the period of the Cold War and the distance we have travelled since that time, then I believe that despite a succession of pendulum swings in our relations, we can see gradual forward movement. Over the past decade Soviet leaders have, out of their own self-interest, modified the way they deal with their own people. And as I mentioned, they are not indifferent to world public opinion. Despite fluctuations, there has been a long-term upward trend towards useful cooperation in those areas where our interests overlap. One of the most important of these is arms control.

For those who have watched the Soviet Union for thirty years, since the depths of the Cold War, as I have, there are grounds for cautious optimism that patience, persistence and hard-headedness on our part can eventually bring Soviet leaders to see that their interest is served less by a continual military build-up and by military adventures abroad and more by negotiated limits on arms and by restraint in other parts of the world.

Clearly, we must not expect too much too soon. As President Carter has said, we must avoid excessive swings in our public mood, from an exaggerated sense of compatibility with the Soviet Union to open expressions of hostility. In my view a troublesome misunderstanding about the real nature of detente developed in the early 1970's which led to uncritical and heedless euphoria. Detente does not mean that a millenium of friendship or mutual trust has arrived—which is impossible, in any case, without a basic change in Soviet philosophy and outlook. At most detente represents a growing sense in this nuclear age of the need to cooperate on some matters, to regulate competition on others and to agree on the means of defusing tensions which could lead to dangerous confrontation. And that is all, nothing more.

Bringing about any basic changes in the Soviet system must be viewed as a very long-term proposition. But the prospect for change, slight though it may be, is better served if there is some degree of engagement between our two countries. And in my view it is equally mistaken to question, as many are doing today, the value of trying to cooperate with Moscow at all.

We need to keep clearly before us our own objectives in our relationship with the Soviet Union. We want to minimize the likelihood of direct confrontation that could escalate into suicidal military hostilities. We want to minimize the chances of destabilizing superpower conduct in the developing world. We want to maximize mutual understanding—which is not, let me stress, dependent on mutual trust—which can contribute to the first two goals and also lead to beneficial cooperation in those areas where our interests overlap.

Having established what we want out of relations with the Soviet Union, we must set out methodically, persistently and realistically to achieve it. Needless to say, I do not hold with the notion that all we have to do is sit down and reason with the Soviets to achieve our aims. I believe that on any given issue we should start with the assumption that we and the Soviets are at opposite poles and that they will seek to take advantage of us wherever possible. But at the same time, we should have enough confidence in ourselves to welcome a dialogue and to use our ingenuity to forge solutions which will attract the Soviets by meeting some of their interests, which at the same time are consistent with our most essential objectives and, most important, which will not weaken our security or that of our Allies.

Our policies will continue to conflict. In my view, the present Soviet leadership continues to believe in the traditional Marxist-Leninist goals of "world revolution." But I also believe that the same leadership is convinced that their global aims will not be promoted by a nuclear war. While arguing for "peaceful coexistence" between East and West, the Soviet Union has continued to serve as protector and supporter of radical, essentially anti-Western currents in the Third World—which the Soviets have labelled "national liberation movements." Such a view of the world offers us little comfort. However, it should also not lead us to conclude that mutually beneficial cooperation is impossible. It is possible—if it is carefully conceived and executed without any illusions or utopian perceptions of what is feasible.

In my view, historical circumstances have combined to make real disarmament measures attractive to the Soviet leadership. Ten years ago, few knowledgeable Americans would have believed that we and the Soviets could sit down together and agree to limit strategic nuclear weapons.

Working out good agreements with the Soviets—ones which they will carry out because it is in their interest to do so, yet which serve our purposes also—can take years. In some instances it will become clear that there is no mutuality of interests—and when this happens we must have both the good sense to realize it and the

will to walk away. But we need to keep in mind our long-range goals, to set a course and to stick to it.

Clear-eyed calculation of our national objectives is a prerequisite for dealing with the Soviet Union. That has been the approach of this and previous administrations in arms control matters, and especially in SALT.

I will not dwell on the contents of the SALT agreement. Let me just mention what I see, from my particular vantage point, as some of its main benefits. I think it will introduce a substantial element of stability in our relations with the Soviet Union. In my view, it is important that the Treaty places equal ceilings on the strategic arsenals of both sides, thereby ending a previous numerical imbalance in favor of the Soviet Union. It preserves our options to build the forces we need to maintain the strategic balance. It enhances our ability to monitor Soviet actions and is adequately verifiable—an essential feature in any agreement with the Soviets since we cannot rely on goodwill.

Here let me say that I had earlier stated publicly that I would actually oppose a treaty which could not be adequately verified. In light of the loss of our facilities in Iran, I reserved my position on the Treaty. Now that I have had a briefing by the experts here in Washington, the same briefing given the President, I agree with him and with Secretary Brown and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. No militarily significant violations of SALT II could take place without detection. I would not be here today to recommend this Treaty if I did not believe that.

Finally, a main benefit of the Treaty is that it leads directly to the next step in controlling nuclear weapons and establishes a basis for further cooperation with the Soviet Union in this important field.

I would like in this connection to say a few words about the negotiation of the Treaty. A view frequently expressed by those critical of the Treaty is that we could have gotten a better deal if only we had been more persistent, less eager to get an agreement—in a word, tougher. The corollary to this is that we still can seek a better deal and can rectify our past mistakes by going back to the Soviets and renegotiating the Treaty. I am convinced that both assumptions are profoundly wrong. They rest in my view on a fallacious view both of what actually happened and of what is possible and feasible in our relations with the Soviets. I think we will be dangerously deluding ourselves if we believe otherwise.

As regards the negotiation of the Treaty, I am confident that the Agreement is the best that could have been obtained. We could not have gotten more out of the Soviets on any specific issue without having to pay an unacceptable price in another part of the agreement. I say this on the basis both of my own involvement in the SALT negotiations and of my long experience with the Soviets.

I think we should also be clear-headed about the prospects for renegotiation. If we go back to the Soviets to demand that certain issues be negotiated in our favor, on the basis of amendments passed by the Senate, this will at best result in a reopening of those issues which were resolved in our favor—and there are many. Or they will turn us down flat. In either case, this would kill the Treaty. I do not think we should entertain any illusions on this score. The Soviets signed the Treaty because they believed it was in their national interest to do so, as we believed it was in ours. They want SALT and they have important reasons for wanting it. But I cannot imagine any circumstance under which we could persuade them to enter into a Treaty which they regarded as disadvantageous to them or to accept an agreement which, at our insistence, was revised in our favor. This simply will not work. From thirty years' experience dealing with the Soviets, I can tell you that I believe that to think otherwise would be not a leap of faith, but a leap of folly.

In this connection, I think it is important to understand why the Soviets want the Treaty. In my view they do want it and largely, I would say, for the same reason that we do. While basically antagonistic toward us, the Soviet leadership has come to realize that world war, involving nuclear weapons, cannot advance Soviet global aims. The Soviets therefore are interested in the development of a more stable relationship with us and in decreasing the likelihood of a dangerous confrontation between us. In addition, the Soviet leaders want to place some limits on the resources which now go into strategic weapons and to have additional resources to devote to other purposes. While they, as we, understand the need for strategic parity and second-strike capability, they are not interested in investing in nuclear weapons systems which they hope never to use—so long as they are convinced they can forego such systems without harming their national security.

At the same time, it is naive to suppose that the Soviet Union is in such a desperate economic state that the Soviets must swallow a SALT package disadvantageous to them. I think this is wrong, and I think the argument is dangerous. It would be equally naive to suppose that Brezhnev is so anxious for a SALT agreement that he would be prepared to override all opposition from his colleagues and

enter into an agreement disadvantageous to the Soviet Union. No one with genuine experience of the Soviet Union would credit this for a minute. Under no conditions would Brezhnev go counter to Soviet interests, and even if he were so inclined, in the interests of self-aggrandizement, he would not have the power to do so.

And what if the Senate fails to ratify SALT II? In my opinion, this would be a severe blow to U.S.-Soviet relations generally and to the SALT negotiating process in particular. I would not go so far as to say that rejection of SALT II would either put a halt to all disarmament negotiations, or cause a permanent rupture in our bilateral relations. But the disarmament process as well as our overall bilateral relationship would be hurt, and at this point no one can say how much time would be needed to repair the damage.

Moreover, I believe the Soviets see an alternative to a SALT II agreement—a risky one but one with considerable appeal. If the Senate fails to approve the agreement or insists on changes unacceptable to the Kremlin, the result will be a crisis of confidence in U.S. leadership among our Western Allies. Driving a wedge between the U.S. and its European Allies is a goal of Soviet foreign policy which long predates arms control. I am persuaded that Moscow would exploit a breakdown in the SALT process to pursue this goal with a vengeance. And I believe that they would have some success in doing so. The result could be increased U.S. isolation and a breakdown in our efforts to stimulate improvement in the conventional and nuclear defenses of Western Europe.

Let me make clear that I do not expect that ratification of SALT II will produce a climate in which all will be sweetness and light in our relations with Moscow. Nothing could be further from reality. Ours is an adversary relationship, and we will always have a substantial measure of friction, problems, unpleasantness.

Looking ahead, what changes can we expect? Prediction in Soviet affairs is a notoriously risky business and ordinarily I studiously avoid trying to forecast Soviet behavior. But we can and should examine domestic Soviet factors that could have an influence on Soviet foreign policy and Soviet behavior abroad. We need to be aware of these, if we are not to be surprised at Soviet actions.

Before long we will be dealing with a post-Brezhnev leadership. Here we have a key variable in the Soviet political equation whose exact weight is impossible to assess. We do not know when this will be or who will succeed him. The emergence of Brezhnev's real successor will take time. There will be a period of jockeying for position within the Politburo. Even if one personality emerges, it may take him several years to achieve Brezhnev's present preeminence, as was the case with Brezhnev himself. During part of this period we can expect some degree of turning inward and a reluctance to take initiatives or make bold moves. This may be accompanied by some hard-line posturing: Both Brezhnev and Khrushchev took a hard line in opposing their predecessors only, of course, to espouse "peaceful coexistence" and "détente," respectively, once their positions were secure.

The Politburo has clearly not been free of disagreement during the past eight years. But at the same time, Brezhnev has—so far as we can tell—been careful not to get out too far ahead of his colleagues and to bring them along. His has been and continues to be essentially a consensus policy. This, I believe, makes a major repudiation of Brezhnev's policies unlikely, provided those policies are intact and viable when handed over.

My confidence in this, however, would be significantly reduced if the longstanding and painfully achieved undertaking to control and reduce strategic arms were to be in disarray.

There is speculation—mostly, in my view, uninformed—about competing interest groups within the leadership. There are those who argue that there are hard-liners and moderates in the Politburo and that we must strengthen the hand of the latter against the former. I think I know the current Soviet leadership as well as any Westerner, and I would find it difficult, if not impossible, to identify who belongs to which group.

There are those who are less interested than others in establishing a cooperative relationship with the United States—for example, the doctrinaire Party functionaries, the KGB, and perhaps the military. And the worst case in terms of American interests would be a stronger voice in policy making for these groups. The result would be a higher Soviet tolerance than during the Brezhnev years for temporary increases in U.S.-Soviet tension.

The best case for American interests probably would involve a stronger voice for relatively non-ideological technocrats, who perceive a need to increase imports of Western technology, who understand the economic and national security benefits of arms limitation, and who are relatively more inclined to defer or de-emphasize policies which increase U.S.-Soviet tension.

An important—perhaps the most important—preoccupation for any future Soviet leadership, as it has necessarily been of the present one, will be the performance of the Soviet economy. Here the prospects are not encouraging: all indicators point to a continued sluggish performance during the 1980's with increasing competition for scarce resources, a backward agricultural sector, and powerful vested interests in the bureaucracy opposing any change in the status quo. A declining rate of population growth will decrease the manpower pool available for labor—and incidentally for military manpower. Nationalism, combining with other frustrations, could become a prominent consideration for Soviet centralism.

But we should not delude ourselves that economic difficulties will moderate Soviet behavior abroad or, in themselves, curtail the Soviet defense effort. It would be a dangerous illusion to base our own policies—in SALT or elsewhere—on the assumption that the Soviets cannot afford to compete with us in an all-out arms race. It is dangerous, because it would dare Moscow to try to leapfrog us in strategic arms. Moscow respects our technological ability and certainly would not welcome a no-holds-barred arms race with us. But history has shown that the Soviet regime will demand any sacrifice from the Soviet people necessary to assure an adequate military posture. And the Soviet people, lacking any effective means to object, have little choice but to comply.

In dealing with the future leadership, as with the present one, I think we must continue to pursue our efforts at cooperation where possible and where consistent with our national security. SALT II will not produce a harmonious relationship with the Soviets. But even though it will not eliminate the abrasive elements of competition between ourselves and the Soviets, it will nonetheless enhance world stability and set the stage for further negotiations and on arms control and political issues. It will enable us to move forward to SALT III—to further reductions in our strategic arsenals and to continued efforts to lower the risk that our competition could erupt in nuclear war. History will not forgive us if we do not continue to probe—without in any way harming our own national security—the extent of Soviet sincerity in this critical field of strategic arms control.

FORWARD MOVEMENT OF ENGAGEMENT WITH THE WEST

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador, for both your abbreviated statement and for the lengthier written statement which you have submitted. Taking the long view, as you do, in your paper, you speak of the belligerent isolationism which characterized Soviet policy in the early years, certainly through the Stalin era, and then what you call gradual forward movement of engagement with the West.

Seldom do we recognize in this country that there was a lengthy isolationist period in Soviet foreign policy, just as there was such a period in our own in the 19th century. The process of forward movement toward an engagement with the West is a subject that I would like to question you on first. How far can Soviet leaders let it go? Do they have a need for our markets and our technology? Is that need sufficient for them to sacrifice anything significant in order to keep the commercial relationship a healthy one?

Ambassador TOON. Mr. Chairman, I think they do have a need for our technology and certainly a desire. This has been demonstrated clearly on many occasions in the past, but I think we are wrong if we assume that we can use our technology and our trade, for example, as levers in order to bring about changes in Soviet behavior and Soviet policies, either foreign or domestic.

I think this has been demonstrated rather clearly, if I may say so, by the Jackson-Vanik amendment, and I think it has been demonstrated rather clearly by other developments.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Toon, if I may interrupt there, do you think we can use the SALT II Treaty as a lever to extract concessions from the Soviet Union or to shape their behavior in other ways?

Ambassador TOON. Absolutely not, and I would hope we would not try to do that. The Soviets are a proud and independent people. They think they are on the right track. They think their policies are correct, and they are not about to listen to us or to anybody outside the Soviet Union as to the need for a change in their policies, nor are they apt to respond to any sort of pressures that we might want to apply to them.

I think this has been demonstrated clearly down through the years, and I think we must take this into account.

The CHAIRMAN. If you do not attribute the rather substantial increase in Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union since mid-1977 to the Jackson amendment, then to what do you attribute it?

Ambassador TOON. This is not an easy question. It is a question that we have focused on very assiduously over the past year in the Embassy in Moscow. I can't give you a definitive answer. I can give you a complex of possible reasons for this very welcome development. One is that the Soviet Union—and some may not believe this—is in my view concerned to a degree with its image in the world. Therefore, it felt that one way of improving its image would be to expand Jewish emigration.

Second, I think the Soviets probably felt they might, through this measure, through this policy action, have some impact on the Senate, not only with regard to the SALT ratification process, but also with regard to the possibility of removing what they regard as a highly offensive amendment, the Jackson-Vanik amendment.

Finally, I think you have to take into consideration the fact—and this has been pointed out to us by refuseniks in Moscow—that there has been a vast increase in the number of applications for emigration, and therefore, according again to the local experts in Moscow, the increase in emigration is not necessarily a very important development in itself. It is simply a function of a vastly expanded number of applications to leave the country. You take your choice.

The CHAIRMAN. I think they are all plausible reasons. I agree with you; I always have agreed that those who think we can push the Soviet Union around by attempting to impose conditions of one kind or another are wrong. Just as we would not respond to such pressures or even consider doing so, I think, neither will they.

IDEOLOGICAL COHESION HAS DECREASED

There are some experts on the Soviet Union, Mr. Ambassador, as you know, who, in comparing internal conditions today with what they were in Stalin's time, assert that the people are less ideologically cohesive today than they were then, that they are less collectivist oriented in social behavior, less disciplined, and perhaps less fearful. Would you agree with that?

Ambassador TOON. I think so, but I think the Soviet population, which has become naturally cautious in its behavior down through the years because of the fear of the secret police in the Stalin era, is not going to behave in a very bold way. I think it is true that the terror we knew when Stalin was alive is no longer a feature of the Soviet political scene. Nonetheless, the KGB [Soviet Secret Police] is still a force to be reckoned with, and most Soviet citizens are

very careful about what they do and what they say, because they know that they could be cracked down upon very easily indeed.

With regard to the ideological appeal of the Soviet system and the Soviet doctrine and the Soviet ideology, it is true, I think, that the Soviet leaders are very disappointed in the attitude of the youth in particular, the fact that they do not respond with enthusiasm, for example, to a lead article in Pravda.

I have the misfortune of reading the language, and I can understand why they don't respond with enthusiasm to a lead article in Pravda. Nothing could be more boring, but in any case this is a problem for the regime.

They now can no longer stir the emotions of the people by referring to the Great October Revolution. They can still do this to a certain extent by referring to the great and valid exploits of the Soviet people during World War II, but even this is losing its appeal, and this is a matter, I think, of genuine concern to the Soviet leadership, not only to this one, but to the one that may follow and the one after that. I do not think we should help them out with this problem.

Senator CHURCH. Neither do I, but I am wondering whether this change in attitude within the Soviet Union, the problem you have just described, may be asserting some pressure on the Soviet Government that would affect or tend to moderate its foreign policy objectives. Do you see any relationship between internal developments of this character and the external policy of the Soviet Union?

Ambassador TOON. To a degree, but not a very significant degree, in my view. Certainly the problems that they face in the economy have forced them to take a much more forthcoming view toward the West than they might otherwise have done.

Second, and on the negative side, the problems they face in controlling their people have made them take a more conservative view with regard to the exchange program and to exercise very tight control over ideas that come in and control over the visitors who come to the Soviet Union on the exchange program.

So, I think to a modest extent some of these internal developments do have some impact on the Soviet policymaker, but I think it is important to recognize that while there are forces at work in Soviet society for change, they are working very slowly and very gradually. I do not think that they will soon have the result that all of us hope will ultimately take place—that is, a basic change in Soviet posture, Soviet behavior, and Soviet world outlook—for a long, long time to come.

In any case, these changes, it seems to me, can only come to fruition and can only be productive if they operate from within and without outside pressures. That is my view.

REASONS SOVIET UNION WANTS SALT

The CHAIRMAN. I have one final question in the time left to me, Mr. Ambassador. It is a question that we have asked many of our witnesses, and I think you are as well qualified as any to answer it. Why do you think the Soviet Union wants SALT II?

Ambassador TOON. Put very simply, they regard SALT II as being in their interest. That is why they want it. They will not

pursue any policy and they will not take any action that they do not regard as being in their self-interest. I think it is important for us to recognize that just because it is in the Soviet self-interest does not mean that it is antagonistic to our own self-interest. I do not think that is the case at all.

Second, I think the Soviets are interested in trying to put a cap on the strategic arms race, primarily because they know, just as we know, that if in fact we should engage in an all out arms race, they can do nothing but lose, because of the strength of our economy and the built-in weaknesses and complications of their own economy.

Finally, I think that the Soviet interest in SALT is geared to the Soviet desire to be seen as an equal with the United States on the world scene. I think those are the basic reasons, but I would add one final objective. They have an interest in stability in the world. They have an interest also in demonstrating to the Chinese that they can cooperate with us in a very significant way.

I think that basically is the way the Soviets look upon SALT II.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

Senator Javits?

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, thank you for being with us. I have had much experience with you in other capitals, and I value your testimony here very much. I am sorry to see you leave our service, however.

EFFECT OF SALT REJECTION ON SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND RENEGOTIATION

The two things that stand out from your statement to me are these, one that you have touched on, and the other you have not yet touched on. What is your judgment as to what will happen if we reject SALT II in terms of a renegotiation? The second, which I would like to ask you, first occurs toward the latter part of your statement; what happens in respect to the change in Soviet leadership? This is a critical matter to us because it is very likely to occur. In your statement, you undertake to analyze the idea, which I myself have raised, that there are hawks and doves in the Politburo, or hardliners and moderates, as you call them.

Your own view is that there are operatives and that there are neither hawks nor doves. There is a group, you say, whose influence in Communist party policy would be, "the worst case in terms of American interest. That is the doctrinaire party functionaries, the KGB, and perhaps the military."

Well, that is a pretty big slice. It almost sounds like the whole apparatus. Could you refine that for us in your thinking?

Ambassador TOON. Senator Javits, first let me say that I appreciate your warm remarks. I think perhaps I should clarify my own position, since you have expressed regret that I am leaving the service. I think everybody should know that I am doing this by choice, and that I am not a victim of certain developments that have taken place in Washington in recent weeks. [General laughter.]

With regard to your questions, Senator Javits, I happen to feel, as I think I pointed out in my statement, that while it is fascinating to deal with the question of personalities in considering the

succession problem, it frankly is not a very productive pursuit, primarily because we know very little about the people in the Politburo except for the top man and Gromyko and perhaps one or two others. I have tried to overcome this handicap by insisting on access to all members of the Politburo. I have been singularly unsuccessful in doing this. This is my biggest regret in my 2½ years as Ambassador in Moscow.

Despite the fact that I speak the language, despite the fact that I know very well the Soviet scene, and despite the fact that the President himself asked me to get to know the people in the Politburo, in the leadership, who might possibly succeed to power when Brezhnev leaves the scene, I have been unable to do this. I have been told by Mr. Gromyko in his very glib way, you know, Mr. Ambassador, we have a different system. I said I understand that, but I think it is time to change it, because this sort of denial of access does not do our mutual understanding any good at all.

Senator JAVITS, I think the important thing for us to do is to focus not on personalities but on policies. My own view is that no matter who succeeds Brezhnev, he or his colleagues will have very little alternative to pursuing basically the same foreign and internal policies that we have seen Brezhnev pursuing over the past 5 or 6 years.

The reason for that is, conditions in the world are such that the Soviet Union has very little choice. The Soviets have deep concern over China, as you know. This means for the most part that they seek—but not at any price to themselves—a relaxed Western flank. This means that some form of détente, perhaps not the same as we know it now, but some form of détente is required in order to meet Soviet basic interests.

The second thing is, they have a very weak economy. I do not want anybody to get the impression that I think their economy is grinding to a halt. I thought so 20 years ago, but I was wrong. I now feel that the Soviet economy, no matter what its condition may be, will muddle through. There is something inherent in the system that makes this inevitable, but the point is, they do have a weak economy, and they need close relations with the Western industrial world.

This also means that they have to have some form of détente. So, I think the important thing for us to focus on is the fact that the policies will remain more or less the same. There will be some nuances which may cause us problems, but basically the thrust will be essentially the same.

Senator JAVITS. And that is to be connected directly with your view that, if we reject the treaty, there is no hope for a renegotiation. That would defy all of the instincts and policies of the Kremlin, and, as a matter of fact, defeat what they want: The respectability of being the equal of the United States in the world. Is that it? They just couldn't take amendments. Is that correct?

Ambassador TOON. I agree with that, but I cannot be absolutely dogmatic about it, because I simply cannot predict Soviet behavior. Others may want to do this, but I can't do it, but I am convinced that if you reopen the treaty, if you reopen the negotiating process, you are going to unleash all kinds of problems. You are going to

unravel certain things that are frankly greatly to our advantage in the treaty itself.

Senator JAVITS. That brings me to the main point I wanted to make; if we do unravel the treaty, don't we have to be prepared to decide in advance what we are ready to give up?

Ambassador TOON. Precisely.

Senator JAVITS. Aren't there those who believe that this is going to be a one-way street, only the Soviets will make concessions: give up? Aren't they completely deluding themselves?

Ambassador TOON. Absolutely, Senator. I agree with that.

Senator JAVITS. You do agree. That is a very important issue to me.

Second, as to the problem of defeating the treaty and its effect, I noticed with great interest your opinion as to what this will mean to "a crisis of confidence in U.S. leadership among our Western Allies, and the fundamental base of American security is its alliance, especially the NATO Alliance." Could you expand on that?

Ambassador TOON. I don't really think I have to expand on it, Senator Javits. You have done it very eloquently. My own feeling is that we have to be more concerned about our credibility with our allies and friends than we do with the Soviets. I feel strongly on the basis of conversations I have had with our German colleagues, our French colleagues, and our British colleagues and others in Europe, that if in fact this treaty is rejected, this will mean to them that the administration is simply not reflecting the gut feeling of the American people in carrying on important negotiations, and therefore they will decide that perhaps they should go some other course. Perhaps they should adapt to this new phenomenon, and perhaps they may go in a way which would certainly not be in the collective interests of the Western world. I agree with you, Senator.

Senator JAVITS. In one word, this is called the Finlandization of Western Europe?

Ambassador TOON. Well, that is your term. [General laughter.] I am still a diplomat.

EMIGRATION OF SOVIET JEWS

Senator JAVITS. There is one last point which was called to my mind by your reference to Jewish emigration and the fact that there are many applications. You know, the Soviets have always used this as a pretext for why fewer people were emigrating. Isn't it a fact that under Soviet practice they determine how many applications there may be just as they determine how many shall leave because of the penalties that they can exact if you even apply? You will lose your job, you will lose your home, your friends will lose their jobs, your family, et. cetera. Isn't that true?

Ambassador TOON. It is true.

Senator JAVITS. So they can turn it on or off as they please. Isn't that a fact?

Ambassador TOON. That is true.

Senator JAVITS. Both in applications and in emigrations?

Ambassador TOON. Yes; therefore, I do not attach too much importance to the opinion of the refusenik community in Moscow. I think it was important to cite it as one in a complex of reasons.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Javits.

Senator McGovern?

Senator MCGOVERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, I want to join my colleagues in commending you on your excellent statement this morning. Also, I want to express my appreciation for your services as Ambassador.

Senator STONE. George, would you just yield to me to ask the Ambassador to repeat his last answer? The last part of his last sentence got lost.

Senator MCGOVERN. Surely, I will yield.

Senator STONE. Mr. Ambassador, when you said, therefore, I don't attach too much importance to—what was it? I didn't hear you.

Ambassador TOON. I said, I don't attach too much importance to the views of the refusenik community in Moscow with regard to the reason for the increase in the emigration rate of the Jewish community.

Senator STONE. Thank you. Thank you, George.

Senator MCGOVERN. Certainly.

Mr. Ambassador, I just wanted to add that I have only had one visit to the Soviet Union, and that was in August 1977. You were my very gracious host at that time, and I thank you for making that visit as instructive and as profitable as it was. I regret that the fire which almost destroyed the Embassy occurred the day you took me on a tour of that building.

Ambassador TOON. I am sure there was no connection between the two events.

Senator MCGOVERN. I have always contended that. [General laughter.]

Ambassador TOON. It was a pleasure to have you in Moscow, Senator.

Senator MCGOVERN. Mr. Ambassador, earlier in the deliberations of the committee, Mr. Nitze and others have argued that one of the dangers in the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union was that the Soviet Union is preparing an elaborate civil defense plan that might enable them to attack the United States with impunity knowing that their population could be safely taken care of in a rather elaborate civil defense plan. He has been making that point for several years.

As you may or may not recall, I raised that concern with you when I was in the Soviet Union and you and your experts at the Embassy told me that you could not find any real evidence of an elaborate civil defense buildup. I am wondering if I am right in my understanding of what the Embassy told me and if so whether there has been any change in the last couple of years since I was there.

Ambassador TOON. No, Senator McGovern, you are right in your recollection of what we told you. I think that remains our opinion today. I think it is important, however, to point out that the Soviet civil defense program is a good deal more comprehensive and extensive than our own, but I think it probably is a good deal less than some people, including Mr. Nitze, think.

It seems to me, as I told you in Moscow, that if in fact the civil defense program were on the scale indicated by Nitze and others, then we would see evidence of it in Moscow simply by walking around the city. I think at the present time their efforts in the civil defense field are concentrated primarily on protecting their leadership, as we do, and on protecting their major industrial installations, but in my view they have not gone far enough to warrant an assumption on our part that they are fully protecting their population and therefore preparing themselves for a first-strike capability. I do not think that is in the cards at the present time.

Senator McGOVERN. The answer they give is, they say you people don't read the civil defense manual that the Soviet Government puts out, and that if you were to take the time to read the manual, you would see all the plans there, that they have very careful preparations for a major effort to cover up their own civilian population and enable them to survive a nuclear exchange with us. This is not my argument. I am just trying to make the case which they made.

Ambassador TOON. This is not the first time they have done us a disservice. In fact, they are doing us a disservice when they said that, that we have not read the manual. Of course we have read the manual, but there is a vast difference between the manual and the operation of a policy and the implementation of a policy.

I do not think they are doing it on the scale that some people who have also read the manual feel they are. That is my view, and I think it is shared by a good many others who have been on the scene and have tried to examine the traces of the evidence for these allegations.

Senator McGOVERN. Mr. Ambassador, in your statement you say the Soviet Union presently maintains a military machine entirely disproportionate to any objective assessment of its needs. Then you go on to warn, and I agree with this, that total security such as the Soviets seek can only mean insecurity for others. I sometimes wonder, though, if the two superpowers do not create a kind of mirror image of fears for each other.

Here you have a country which you know better than most of us, the Soviet Union, which has gone through two incredibly tragic world wars in which the people have suffered enormous casualties. They do have an incredible fear of China, justified or not. They have the memory of the humiliation of being forced to back down in the showdown over the Cuban missile crisis.

I think many Americans assume that their enormous military buildup is primarily an offensive threat designed against us. Isn't it possible that this mirror image scenario could be true, that they are as much defensively oriented and as much fear ridden about the possibility of attack from the West or from China as they are motivated by any aggressive designs on the West or anyone else?

Ambassador TOON. Certainly it is possible, Senator. But I think, frankly, to arrive at that conclusion would reflect a much more charitable view of Soviet policies and attitudes than I am prepared to harbor.

I think my remarks in the paper which I submitted refer primarily to the buildup in central Europe. We have focused on this in great detail in recent years, and none of us can really come up

with a satisfactory explanation of why they feel they have to have a 4 to 1 tank ratio, for example, or a vast advantage in personnel on the ground, and also a vast advantage in the air.

Senator McGOVERN. If I might just break in here, Mr. Ambassador, that really is not relevant to the strategic arms balance, is it?

Ambassador TOON. That is true. I think the strategic arms balance probably does reflect, as you say, a mirror image of what the other side is trying to do.

Senator McGOVERN. Do you think it is possible, if not probable, that both sides have overbuilt in terms of the strategic equation? Lay aside the matter of conventional weapons, but isn't it possible that both sides have pushed this race to the point where they have built strategic systems that go beyond any real defense requirement?

Ambassador TOON. I think that is true, and I will go along with that, but frankly, I think the major fault lies with the other side, that we were reacting to what they did rather than their reacting to what we did. Certainly the essence of SALT II is to meet the problem. We are beginning to reduce the arsenals on both sides, and of course we look forward to even more drastic reductions in SALT III.

I frankly am not entirely optimistic that the Soviet Union will go along with these drastic reductions, but that, at least, is our hope, and that is our policy decision, but to get back to the matter of central Europe, this really bothers me. I don't know why they have done this sort of thing. There is no rational explanation for it. You can argue that it is in terms of their historical experience, if you will.

Senator McGOVERN. Well, I for one do not try to rationalize or justify their buildup in central Europe. I do not understand it, either, but it has long seemed to me that each side, each of these two superpowers, is terrifying the other by needless buildups. I frankly don't know who started it or whether they are reacting to us or we to them. It does seem to me that each time one side or the other gets a new breakthrough on a more terrifying strategic weapon, it is not very long until the other side attempts to match it.

This further creates a climate of uncertainty and fear. If I ultimately decide to vote for this treaty, and I may very well so decide, it will not be because I think it represents a really genuine arms reduction or even genuine arms limitation, but because I think it may possibly eliminate some of the fear and uncertainty between the two superpowers.

Even a bad deal at least means that they are dealing with each other and that they are reducing some of the element of terror, of mutual terror that I think is responsible for this buildup. I am wondering if perhaps in a different wording, that isn't your conclusion, that the chief value of SALT is to reduce some of the uncertainty and risk of error between these two great powers.

Ambassador TOON. I think that is a principal advantage of SALT. I would disagree with you to at least this extent, Senator McGovern, that this is a bad treaty. I do not think it is a bad treaty at all. I think it is probably a bad treaty to those who have a much more ambitious idea as to what is possible.

Senator McGOVERN. It is certainly not what we originally wanted.

Ambassador TOON. That is true.

Senator McGOVERN. I remember it. At the time I was in the Soviet Union, we had offered a much greater cut in terms of nuclear weapons and that had been soundly rejected by the Soviet Union, so from that standpoint I think it is disappointing.

Ambassador TOON. I think you are referring to our March 1977 comprehensive proposal.

Senator McGOVERN. Yes.

Ambassador TOON. That was certainly a much more ambitious proposal than SALT II represents at the present time, but in my view it was totally unrealistic in terms of its acceptability to the Soviets. This was demonstrated by the Soviet reaction to it, but certainly I think all of us look forward to the next round of negotiations following SALT II, when we hopefully can get Soviet agreement to much more drastic reductions. You are right, we do not need the vast arsenals we have today.

Senator McGOVERN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Wherever the skilled technicians are in our Government, they are not on Capitol Hill. The lights are not working again, which seems to be a chronic problem for this system. I just mention this to members because you will have the time cards presented by our timekeeper when the Senator's 10 minutes are up. Senator Percy?

Senator PERCY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, we are delighted to have you here. We have long looked forward to your testimony. Though you do not call yourself a hardliner, you are perceived to be one. I think your testimony and the logic behind it is powerful and really compelling.

Ambassador TOON. Is it bad to be a hardliner?

Senator PERCY. No; I don't think so. I consider myself a hardliner when it comes to the defense of this country. I do not think we would have any differences on that issue. All along in these hearings we have talked about the necessity of having behind our foreign policy a very strong military capability. I feel no hesitancy in saying that again, as I have said it throughout my public and private life.

Ambassador TOON. Then I am in good company.

Senator PERCY. I look upon that as a note of distinction in your record, really. I think because of your three decades of experience, your advice is extraordinarily helpful. I am particularly interested in the comments which Senator Javits drew from you concerning your attitude toward Europe. This treaty's effect on NATO is of deep concern to me.

SCANTY SOVIET COVERAGE OF U.S. SALT DEBATE

It is a matter we must take into account. This committee of all committees must look into that area. I have a number of questions, and I will cover as many as I can. I am interested in the New York Times article today about Soviet press coverage of our consideration of the SALT II debate. The writer says Soviet coverage has

been scanty and attributes it either to a Soviet desire not to interfere in our debate or to a Soviet reluctance to tell its own people the details of the controversy.

What would be your own analysis as an expert on the Soviet Government and people as to why very little has been published about the Senate debate on SALT?

Ambassador TOON. It may be a combination of both, Senator Percy. I think probably it reflects a decision made by the Soviet Administration to avoid excessive rhetoric during the ratification process. This was a commitment made, well, not a commitment, but an understanding that Senator Byrd thought he had reached with Brezhnev and Gromyko when he was in Moscow. There is a practical reason for this, of course. You know the Soviet press as well as I do, and the Soviet newspapers are very tiny.

There is just no room for the sort of extensive coverage that would have to be given to these hearings if in fact you were to give an objective picture, so I think it is a combination of the two.

SOVIET SKEPTICISM IN TRUSTING UNITED STATES

Senator PERCY. One Soviet observer was quoted in the article as saying that there are people writing to government officials asking why should we trust the Americans and sign this treaty? Now, obviously, there is widespread distrust in this country and skepticism about the possibility of Soviet cheating. How widespread is the feeling of skepticism in the Soviet Government as to whether they can trust the American Government, with respect to this treaty?

Ambassador TOON. Certainly, in the first place, I would not attach great importance to a letter to the editor of Pravda or any other Soviet newspaper because it is simply not a voluntary act. It is stimulated by people on high. I think probably there is an innate suspicion of what we are up to.

With all apologies to this administration, this was intensified by certain things that we did in the early days of this administration. I think this would be admitted readily by some of my colleagues in Washington. They weren't quite sure what we were up to. I think while they have a clearer picture now as to what our objectives are, there still is a trace of that suspicion which was engendered in the early days of this administration.

Beyond that, of course, they have always had a suspicion of our intentions going all the way back to 1918, when we invaded the Soviet Union, as you know, with our expeditionary force in Siberia.

While I do not want to say there is a justification for the Soviet feeling, there is a sort of rationale for it. I think it is something with which we have to reckon. Certainly, there is much less rationale for Soviet suspicion of our objectives than there is for our suspicion of theirs.

AMBASSADOR TOON'S POSITION TOWARD NOMINATION OF TOM WATSON

Senator PERCY. I would like to talk about your successor for just a moment. You are perceived to be opposing the appointment of Tom Watson, Jr. As I understand your position, you would prefer

to see careerists go into a post of this kind. We might differ in principle here. I think a certain number of noncareer appointments are fully justified, and the distinguished careers of David Bruce, Averell Harriman, and John Sherman Cooper and others bear out my point.

It is refreshing to have some new blood go into the Foreign Service in key posts. Soon after his appointment became known, Tom Watson was described in several editorials as having no knowledge of the Soviet Union. Since then the Star for one has put on the record that his experience goes back over three decades, that he does speak some Russian, that he was based there for 6 months, that he worked with high military personnel, and that he has continued from those early days his experience with the Soviet Union.

I strongly support his candidacy simply because I think the Soviets have a tremendous regard for toughminded, hardheaded business people, particularly those in the computer field, where the Soviets are struggling to catch up with the United States. The Soviets also have tremendous regard for people who are close to the President, and close to the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. I think he is uniquely qualified.

Could you clarify for the record what your position is with respect to your successor? You have been quoted in ways that I thought possibly may have been somewhat unfair to you.

Ambassador TOON. I will be glad to, Senator Percy. In the first place, I know Tom Watson. I know him well. I have spent a good many hours with him in recent days. He is a fine fellow. He is a man of good judgment. I think if he relies on the competence and advice of the highly professional staff that we have in Moscow, that he should do well. Obviously, I cannot sit in judgment on his particular qualifications for that job or his lack of qualifications for that job. Frankly, that is your business. I do not want to violate the Constitution by telling you how you should handle it.

On the broader question about the infusion of new blood into the diplomatic service, certainly I agree that this is a good thing from time to time, but, Senator Percy, I would caution you and your colleagues that for every David Bruce and Averell Harriman, we wind up with 10 clunks, if I may say so. That may not be the right term, but I have in mind, for example—

Senator BIDEN. It is better than naming them. [General laughter.]

Ambassador TOON. A number of years ago, a dress manufacturer from the Midwest was appointed to a post out in the Far East and came before your committee and did not know the name of the Prime Minister nor the capital of the country to which he was being appointed. In fairness to him, he did say that he would learn these two designations before he arrived. [General laughter.]

I think you can carry this principle too far. Of course, I am subjective in my attitude. I am a professional and I have been for 30 years. I happen to think that the country would be better served by having professionals manning all posts, but having said that, I recognize as a practical person that this is not in the cards. Therefore, I do welcome the infusion of new blood provided it is very carefully selected.

AUTHORITY U.S. AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW SHOULD HAVE

Senator PERCY. There have been discussions in the press about your own position with respect to SALT II, your position with respect to the negotiating posture, and the intimacy of your relationship with the negotiators in this area. Would you care to clarify what authority you feel an American Ambassador in Moscow should have and what relationship he should have with the host government and with the U.S. Government?

How close should he be keyed in? Does it undercut the Ambassador, for instance, if there are end runs around him in such a way as to prevent his position from being the prestigious position it should be? Anatoly Dobrynin has that kind of position right here and has had ever since he arrived in Washington.

Ambassador TOON. Certainly, I think the American Ambassador in Moscow ought to be completely clued in on anything and everything that has to do with our relations with the Soviet Union, whether it is a negotiating process, whether it is a policy statement, whatever it is.

Now, in fairness to this administration, I must say that that has been the case since I have been Ambassador in Moscow once I became legitimate. I was in limbo, as you know, for a number of months, but once I became legitimate, I was clued in on everything that went on with regard to the Soviets.

I also had an opportunity for input not only with regard to SALT II but with regard to other policies that were being formulated back here toward the Soviet Union or toward areas in which the Soviets might possibly have an interest, so I have no complaint on that score. I do feel that we could do more in using the American Ambassador in Moscow, in using the Embassy, in speaking for our Government.

After all, when you have a person in Moscow who speaks the language and who knows something about the Soviet Union, it would seem to me to be to our advantage to speak directly to the leadership when you want to get across a new policy, a new decision on which you want complete understanding on the part of the Soviets.

My own feeling is that at the very least you ought to double track everything through the Embassy in Moscow. That we have done to a significant degree during my tenure in Moscow, but I think we have a way to go in this respect.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Percy.

Senator Biden?

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, I would like to compliment you on what I would characterize as a very realistic view of the limits of our relationship with the Soviet Union and what we still try to call détente. From reading your statement and listening to you this morning, I think you may be asking for what is more than realistic to expect of the American people and the policymakers toward the Soviet Union when you call for method, persistence, and realism in our approach to Moscow.

It seems to me to attain those virtues there has to be some sense of a consensus among those policymakers and among the American people as to who the Soviets are, what they want, and what they are up to. It is because of that missing consensus that I find it hard to buy completely the administration's argument that there should be no linkage between the SALT agreement and the activities and relationships we have with the Soviet Union in other parts of the world and in other matters.

It seems to me that the argument begs the question of the context in which we judge the merits of the SALT agreement. In the real political world the issue is not how many heavy missiles Moscow can build but what Moscow intends to do with those missiles, and why is it building them.

I have a growing sense of frustration after having heard your testimony, not because I disagree with it, but because I guess I continue, as do most congressional policymakers, to look for an expert who somehow is going to codify for me my prejudices with regard to the Soviet Union. In your honest and candid testimony, you have acknowledged your inability to do that even for yourself, and you are not presumptuous enough to suggest you would attempt to do it for anyone else. That creates a certain sense of frustration.

In a sense, the issue of the Backfire bomber is not whether or not it has an intercontinental range, or whether or not our F-111's or FB-111's are a match. The question is the interpretations that we put on the Soviets having these planes at all, or having the SS-20 deployed in Central Europe, or their growing Navy, or their steadily improving air defense system, or their conventional arms build-up in other areas, and so on.

I would like to go through with you, in the time that I have remaining, some assumptions that many Americans make in trying to decipher Soviet intentions and see how you and we might modify our ideas to fit them and match them to the real world.

First, your statement talks of the history of invasions Russians have had and their response to them, that is, their search for security through territorial expansion. To that history, you added the Communist "preoccupation with military strength as a key element of political power," and you concluded that these concepts explain, if not justify the overblown size of the Soviet military machine.

Now, carrying your thinking a little further for us, if you would, I would like to ask a few questions. Is this history and drive that we have witnessed throughout that history insurmountable? Does it mean that we should expect to deal with a Soviet Union which will feel itself insecure in the near future, and as a consequence continue to translate these feelings of insecurity into aggressive actions or at least actions which appear to be preparation for the prospect of taking aggressive action? Calculating how much power is enough, do the Soviets constantly see themselves under the gun from the United States and China, or in your mind can you see a plateau being reached in essential equivalence and establishing that equivalence?

Are we destined to live with this paranoia through the remainder of this century? Do you see any change in it or any plateau?

Ambassador TOON. I can give you a very short answer. The answer is "Yes." We are destined to live with it until the basic change that I talked about earlier in the session comes about, the basic change in world outlook, the basic change in the way they handle their own people, their friends, and so forth and that is a long way down the road.

Senator BIDEN. There is no evidence that that basic change is forthcoming. There is an assumption, is there not, that the present leadership is much more sensitive to domestic pressures within the Soviet Union and that there is a more collegial atmosphere in the Politburo as compared to the days of Stalin, and that these changes amount to some significant political change in the Soviet Union and alteration of their structure, and that therefore we can look forward to a more reasonable response from the Soviets?

Ambassador TOON. I wish I could believe that, but frankly I do not know of any such evidence. Frankly, Senator, all of us must look upon this treaty on its own merits. We cannot expect simply by passing the treaty that we are going to have access to certain leverage which will bring about certain basic changes in Soviet behavior and policies. That is not going to happen. I think it will happen in the long run, as a result of forces at work right now inside Soviet society, but as I said before, that will not happen for 40, 50, or 60 years from now, if you want to put a finite time limit on it.

I hate to be so pessimistic, but that is the way I see the situation.

Senator BIDEN. Let me put it another way. If we do not continue the process which is referred to as détente, do we impact upon those forces at work in the Soviet Union and thereby effect the evolution which might occur 20, 30, or 40 years down the road? By rejecting the process now, do we in any way fundamentally alter when that would come about or is whatever we do irrelevant in terms of when that process will eventually come to fruition?

Ambassador TOON. Senator Biden, I would say it is relevant only in the sense that passing SALT II will create that atmosphere of stability in which we can carry on what I think has been a very useful dialog with the Soviet Union over the past 6 or 7 years in the strategic arms field. I think rejecting SALT II removes that element of stability and therefore jeopardizes the whole process, but I think it is wrong to expect that SALT II is going to have any impact per se on Soviet behavior or Soviet policy or Soviet decisions in the immediate future.

Senator BIDEN. So we should look at SALT II and ask if it enhances U.S. security and leave it at that?

Ambassador TOON. Precisely.

Senator BIDEN. I agree. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MCGOVERN [presiding]. I guess in the absence of a more senior member present on the majority side it falls to me to recognize Senator Hayakawa.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, let me start by thanking you very much for your hospitality to my wife and me and all of us in our party when we visited Moscow in January of this year. We had a wonderful time, as good a time as one could possibly expect to have in Moscow.

Ambassador TOON. It was wonderful to have you there, but having a good time in Moscow is not saying very much. [General laughter.]

Senator HAYAKAWA. You did very well by us, and indeed, we were very grateful.

Ambassador TOON. We were glad to have you there.

Senator HAYAKAWA. I must say in January we were not suffering from a heat wave over there.

STATE OF FALSE SECURITY THROUGH SALT II

At the present time, we are perhaps equal to the Soviets in strategic weapons, and as I understand it we are far behind as conventional forces and conventional weapons are concerned, but whatever the condition, it is argued that signing the treaty will further relax our vigilance and our commitment to an adequate defense, so that we are not likely even to live up to the limits that the treaty allows us in strategic weapons.

Would you care to comment on this argument that we would be put into a kind of state of relaxation and false security by the signing of this treaty?

Ambassador TOON. Senator Hayakawa, first of all, let me say that we were delighted to have you in Moscow, and we were glad that we gave you at least a taste of some hospitality which you found acceptable. Frankly, if I thought we were going to go the route you suggest by passing SALT II, then I would strongly recommend that we reject it. I do not think we are going that way at all. I think we have to maintain a strong defensive posture. We have to maintain our arsenal, one which is the equivalent of the Soviet arsenal, primarily because we cannot trust these people. I am deeply skeptical of their intentions if in fact they found it possible to do certain things with impunity.

Therefore, I would think certainly that we, as the American people, should be willing to pay the price, whatever it may be, in order to maintain essential equivalence, as we call it, or a strong defensive posture, as I put it myself. It is absolutely essential to stability in the world and to our own security.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Secretary Brown has said that with the treaty signed and agreed to, we would still have to spend an additional \$2.5 billion a year on defense and strategic equipment, I suppose, and without the treaty, we would have to spend \$5 billion, so either way, life will be expensive for us for some time to come.

Ambassador TOON. I do not think any of us who have defended the SALT Treaty or the negotiating process has ever maintained that the result would be a savings in defense expenditures.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Of course not.

Ambassador TOON. I think frankly I would respect Secretary Brown's judgment in this respect.

Senator HAYAKAWA. But there is enough sentiment against the increase of expenditures on weaponry that we are likely not to spend either \$2.5 billion if signed or the \$5 billion if not signed. Is that not the case?

Ambassador TOON. Then we are in trouble.

Senator HAYAKAWA. OK, then, we are in trouble. I think that is a quite satisfactory answer, sir.

U.S. STRATEGIC INFERIORITY BY THE 1980'S

In the early 1980's, I understand that we will be in a strategically inferior position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union as regards strategic weapons. Would you expect the Soviets to take greater political risks under those conditions?

Ambassador TOON. Senator Hayakawa, I am not sure that I agree with your premise. I do not think that we will be in an inferior strategic position in the 1980's. One thing is clear. One part of the Triad will be vulnerable in the 1980's, and that, of course, is the Minuteman missile force. That, of course is why we have to develop the M-X, in order to shore up and offset the vulnerability of the Minuteman, but the other two parts of the Triad are going to remain fairly viable at that point, so I would not say that we are going to be strategically inferior.

The second part of your question was what, sir? I am sorry. I didn't quite catch it.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Would you expect that the Soviets would undertake greater risks and be more venturesome as a result?

Ambassador TOON. If they felt they had a strategic advantage over us, then I would think there would be a very good chance indeed of their taking the sort of political risks backed up by military power which would cause us deep concern. I think that is entirely possible.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Since Vietnam, we have been extremely unwilling to venture into the outside world, and it seems to me that the practical consequence of this has been the expansion of Soviet adventurism in Africa and elsewhere.

In your opinion, have we encouraged that by our very steady policy of nonintervention anywhere?

Ambassador TOON. I think to a certain degree that is true. I think the Soviets moved in Africa in the first place not in accordance with any grand design, but simply because the opportunities presented themselves for extension of Soviet political influence, and second, because they felt they could do so with impunity because of their assessment of the American domestic political scene.

Senator, I think it is incumbent upon us—on you as a responsible legislative official, on me as a responsible official of the executive branch, and on the American people—to decide just what are our vital interests, and to make sure that there is no uncertainty on the other side as to what those are, so that there can be no miscalculation in the future which might result in a serious confrontation between us.

I think we should make absolutely clear what these are.

Senator HAYAKAWA. This is exactly the reason why to a considerable extent I agreed with what Senator Biden was saying about linkage and nonlinkage. It is hard to maintain a nonlinkage position when you consider all the other Soviet activities in the world as perhaps an index of what the future might hold. I am simply stating my reservation in this respect.

Ambassador TOON. Senator, as I said before, I think you must assess this treaty on its own merits. If you think as a result of passing the treaty that you are going to affect Soviet behavior—this is simply not in the cards—then I don't think you ought to go

that route. I think you should look at the treaty and decide whether it is in our national interest to approve it. I happen to think that it is.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MCGOVERN. Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Toon, it is good to see you again. I would like to ask a question that might appear unrelated, but it is not. I saw one press report a short time ago that in your tenure in Moscow you were given an opportunity once a year to go on Moscow television. Is that correct? Is there any regular program that you are permitted to appear on each year?

Ambassador TOON. Yes; it is on our national day, the Fourth of July. It is a rare privilege accorded to every Ambassador in Moscow to speak on Soviet television on his national day. I happen to have a rather rare talent in Moscow in the ambassadorial corps, speaking Russian, so I do it in the Russian language, and it is quite effective.

As one of your colleagues pointed out, I think it was the chairman, in my first year in Moscow I was denied the privilege because they had seen the advance text, and there was a paragraph in there on human rights which they did not like, and they suggested that I abbreviate the text, and I said I would be glad to. They said to take out that paragraph. I said; no, I will abbreviate it in other respects. The answer was that I did not appear on television, but I have appeared for the last 2 years.

Senator GLENN. We have had what I view as almost a spectacle in this country of Georgi Arbatov being on our national television here on half-hour shows, national programs such as "Issues and Answers," traveling to various cities in this country, putting forth the Soviet view of SALT. Do you think they would welcome my going to Moscow and putting forth some American views on SALT on national television in Russia?

Ambassador TOON. No.

Senator GLENN. Do you think it would be a futile gesture if I proposed such a thing formally?

Ambassador TOON. No; I meant to say that they would not welcome your appearance on Soviet television, but I think possibly they might reckon with it, and you might succeed. I would be glad to look into it when I get back.

Senator GLENN. Well, I had thought of that at first in jest, but then later on, perhaps seriously, that if we are to be open and have trust in each other, which this treaty is supposed to engender in the future, that we should then start communicating with each other.

It seems to me if we have certain reservations about parts of SALT in this country, it would be good to spell those out to the Soviet people and hopefully open up a dialog in that regard that is not there now. As was already mentioned in the hearings this morning, they get a spoonfed view of everything regarding SALT.

Obviously, if we are to have some sort of rapprochement or continuation of meaningful détente with the Soviet people, which I hope is a people-to-people relationship and not just the hierarchies

of government, then somewhere, somehow, some time we have to start having people-to-people contact on our differing views, or we will never work out our difficulties.

Ambassador TOON. I agree, Senator. The next time you see Arbatov and he is appearing on "Issues and Answers" or some other program, just tell him that you understand that Toon does not get the same privilege in the Soviet Union.

Senator GLENN. I will be glad to point that out. I did see him only briefly while he was here. I had met him when we were your guests in Moscow a year or so ago.

SUPPORT FOR SALT HINGES ON VERIFICATION

Before you left Moscow to come back, you indicated that your support for SALT would perhaps hinge on the monitoring and verification aspects, which to me indicated that you believe that the Soviets would cheat if they had a chance to do so. Is that correct?

Ambassador TOON. I would not want to take that chance, Senator. I can't say that they would cheat if they felt they would not be caught, but I think frankly it is up to us to make sure that that is not the case and that they are not given that sort of temptation. It is not quite correct to say that I would oppose SALT if I felt it would not be verifiable.

I said simply that I had to assure myself that the treaty was verifiable before I could make up my mind as to whether I would go that route.

Senator GLENN. Well, let me put it in different words, then. I guess you would not have much confidence that they would always operate in our best interests within the framework of SALT unless we could check on it.

Ambassador TOON. None whatsoever.

Senator GLENN. I certainly share that view. I have been through all of the briefings that I am sure you have been through and which Senator Biden mentioned here. There are things moving in this area that cannot be talked about publicly. We know there is a lot of effort going on to replace the monitoring capability that we lost in Iran.

Since you have come out very solidly in your statement this morning that you do feel the treaty is verifiable and is monitorable now, would you say that it is monitorable now or are you basing your estimate of this on what you have been briefed that we hope will take place in the future?

Ambassador TOON. I feel strongly on the basis of my briefings that we can detect any significant military violation of the treaty that would have an impact on the strategic balance and we can do that now.

Senator GLENN. Are you talking about deployments?

Ambassador TOON. Well, I would rather not go into the details, Senator.

Senator GLENN. OK, that is what happens all the time in these open hearings. I am not being critical. It should happen. Sometimes we get into sensitive areas on such matters that cannot be discussed publicly. My difficulty with some of the administration witnesses that have appeared before us is, they talk about some of

these things as if everything is in place and operating right now, and that we are not giving away any intelligence information to say some of these things are systems still being put together.

I want to see this be verifiable and monitorable from the day we agree to this and the day the treaty goes into effect. That may be possible. I am certainly not ruling that out, but I think we have perhaps too much talk these days of prospective things which we are assuming will take place by certain time periods, and I want to see more guarantees that these will in fact take place.

Ambassador TOON. Senator, I will be frank with you to this extent. I am perfectly aware that we suffered a rather serious intelligence loss when we lost the facilities in Iran. It is my understanding that we are now studying ways and means of offsetting that loss. I am confident that that can be done in the fairly near future. We don't have that offsetting capability at the moment, but I do not think that has a bearing on our ability to detect the sorts of violations about which I was speaking earlier in my statement.

Senator GLENN. Assuming we do not have those now, then I would disagree with your second statement, because I think as far as monitoring numbers is concerned, and deployed weapons systems, we have that and can do that with a fine accuracy. I think as far as monitoring other key elements of the treaty such as launch-weight, throw-weight, MIRVing, et cetera, I hope some of those things work out so that we can monitor with absolute reliability.

There is a lot being developed along that line, and I am not pessimistic about that taking place, but I want to see that be a fact when this treaty goes into effect.

Ambassador TOON. I agree, Senator.

CONNECTION BETWEEN SALT AND MBFR

Senator GLENN. Do you believe that there is a relationship between SALT and MBFR [mutual and balanced force reductions]? We have seen a mammoth buildup in Soviet forces of a conventional nature on their eastern European front while we have negotiated SALT, and we perhaps have even gotten behind in conventional forces and don't really know for sure, but there are 7,000 NATO tanks and 20,500 Soviet tanks which they claim are defensive.

Now, that is a lot of defense against our 7,000 tanks. Can you spell out a little bit of the relationship between SALT and MBFR and why you think we have held up our negotiations or why the negotiations have been held up while we have negotiated SALT? Why could they have not gone on along together?

Ambassador TOON. I do not, quite frankly, think that there is a direct relationship between SALT and MBFR. I think the only relationship is the one spelled out at Vienna itself when both sides expressed the hope that successful conclusion of the SALT agreement would provide a desirable impulse to the negotiations in Vienna. That has not yet happened. We hope it will happen in the future.

The basic problem in Vienna, as you know, Senator, is the fact that we cannot agree on the data base. We have a disparity of something like 180,000 between their estimate as to what they have in the way of armed forces strength in Central Europe and ours.

Senator GLENN. Well, Mr. Arbatov, when he was here, indicated that he felt MBFR was being held up pending completion of SALT.

Ambassador TOON. Well, that may be Arbatov's view, but I do not share it.

EFFECT OF SALT ON SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP

Senator GLENN. What about the Sino-Soviet relationship and how that may be affected by SALT? What considerations of foreign policy in the Sino-Soviet conflict would influence Soviet behavior toward us? Could you comment briefly on that?

Ambassador TOON. Well, I think, Senator, that virtually every foreign policy decision made by the Soviet Union is filtered through the litmus of their relationship with Peking. They are deeply concerned about the Chinese and they reach almost every foreign policy decision in careful consideration of the impact that this will have on their relations with the Chinese. So, to that extent I think the SALT agreement has some relationship with the China picture.

Senator GLENN. We may get into some discussion of that later. My time is up. Just let me say that when we were in China in January, in the People's Republic, I met with Deng Xiaoping and some of the generals and Army chiefs of staff there. I asked them about their view of SALT and they said they didn't think it did much. I asked if they would be willing to participate in a broadened SALT since they are a nuclear power. I also asked, would they be willing to pursue talks with the Soviet Union and the United States, and they said, well, if we could get a treaty that was more meaningful, perhaps they would. They did not rule out their participating in future talks. I thought that was rather interesting.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador TOON. I would not hold my breath until that happens.

Senator GLENN. I would not either, but it was an interesting comment.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Mr. Ambassador, in connection with your last answer, do considerations of China and Soviet concerns color their military policy as well as their foreign policy?

Ambassador TOON. Yes; I don't think there is any question about that. I think, for example, their reluctance to even contemplate drastic reductions to anything in the military field is related directly to their concern about China.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Lugar?

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Toon, you mention that you have been characterized by some as a hardliner regarding Soviet affairs. You say you do not accept that specifically but you point out your realism as you take a look at these affairs in your long service. Now, for this reason I am disappointed in the conclusion you have reached on the SALT II Treaty, and let me give the reason for my disappointment.

As you are not a naive onlooker in this situation, you have not tried to make all sorts of defenses as to why the Soviets might have been building on and on to defend themselves here and there, I think you have characterized pretty accurately a long-going build-

up of a toughminded regime which continues even more so in the conventional realms.

Now, in the proposition that you look at here, couldn't you say that the Soviets are in fact building for a potential scenario in which they are going to be dominant and in which they see the Soviets as No. 1. They would have a possibility for defeating everybody in sight, including ourselves.

What in SALT deters any of this for a moment? Is it your suggestion that this will continue because the process is useful and the need to keep talking about it has some value and that it is best to keep playing along with the game even if you think it is a totally dominant strategy and even if we are asleep at the switch? Isn't there a potential service on your part simply to sound the alarm bell and to say we had better cut the nonsense of SALT II, reject this treaty, and get on with either of two courses. One would be substantial disarmament, in which our ICBM's would not be in such jeopardy, and in which other legs of the triad might not be in such jeopardy. We need to proceed to do those things that we need to do with the American public fully on notice that we are in trouble because the public is not on that notice.

Knowledgeable people like yourself come back and in a laid-back style the public is being told, pass SALT, stop nuclear war, you are safe, and for a small expenditure of money you can sort of buy peace.

Now, you know better and I know better. Why would it not have been better for you simply to have sounded the alarm and said, SALT II is no good and it is time we got our act together and began building up the things we need in this country.

Ambassador TOON. Senator, the answer to that is very simple. I have not taken that decision because I simply do not believe that SALT II is not any good. I think it is a good treaty, primarily because it does set modest limits on our arsenals, our strategic arsenals, and it is the beginning, I think, possibly, depending on the Soviet reaction to SALT III, of an effective arms control program.

Certainly I agree basically with your thrust that we cannot afford to let down our guard. Certainly, signing SALT II and the fact that the Soviets are prepared to sign SALT II is no indication at all that they have suddenly overnight taken a much more benign view of the United States of America. That is simply not the case.

In that respect, perhaps I am a hardliner. I happen to think that that is just a realistic assessment of what the Soviets will do if in fact they thought they could get away with it.

Now, with regard to the need to maintain our defensive posture in a very good, solid shape, that is something that we have to decide as a matter of national policy. It has nothing to do with SALT II. We have to do it anyway because the Soviets are doing it. Therefore, we must take the necessary steps in order to cope with them and to make sure that they do not receive a certain advantage which they could exploit for their own political purposes.

EFFECTIVE LINKAGE BETWEEN SALT AND STRONGER DEFENSE

Senator LUGAR. But you keep saying that it really has nothing to do with SALT II. It has everything to do with SALT II. Do you really believe as a policymaker that the odds are good that after SALT II is ratified the President of the United States and the defense establishment are going to be successful in getting on with the M-X missile as really a basic item? You know, I am not certain that I believe that for a moment. I don't think the support has been engendered by the President of the United States for the M-X missile. Why, he doesn't even know yet how he would deploy it.

No decision has been made on this. It is a pig in the poke, and you are saying it is a different item, as if we antiseptically have SALT II on one hand and a defense posture on the other. How should we be linking the two? What is the effective way for those who support SALT II but want to make sure the defense continues on to make doggone sure that occurs?

Ambassador TOON. I do not think the answer is not to sign SALT II. I do not think that is the answer at all. I think the answer is, if in fact this is necessary, and I had not thought that it was, to convince the American public that we have to go the M-X route, that we have to do certain other things in order to maintain a healthy defensive posture and essential equivalence with the Soviet Union. I happen to think that we are going to go this route. Perhaps I have more confidence in the American people than you do, Senator, with all due respect, but I think the American people will support this thing, and they had better, because if they do not, we are in trouble.

Senator LUGAR. I am sure the American people will support it, but the question is whether the President of the United States will do so. It has not been the people who have unilaterally been making defense decisions and obviating weapons systems while we were even in the process. This is the dilemma with which we are faced. How do we wicket in some will on the part of our own administration to do those things which have to be done?

I don't know the answer to that. That is why I am appealing to you as somebody who surely must have thought about this. It is just not manifest that these things are going to occur.

Ambassador TOON. I was under the impression, Senator, that the President had already made the decision on M-X.

Senator LUGAR. Well, the President finally, I would say in the last 60 days, with the breath of the SALT hearings coming down upon him heavily, has indicated some disposition in that manner, but even on this committee, in these hearings, there are people expressing the viewpoint that things should never be built. You couldn't get a unanimous feeling on this committee that it ought to happen. I hope you would be able to get a majority.

Now, I think we are in for some heavy sledding.

Let me follow up with one more question. You say you think this offers a modest basis for some arms control. Now, on what basis? Every scenario we have been presented with by the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, shows a piling on of missiles and launchers, one on top of another. As this thing progresses, we recognize that it offers some very modest caps, modest caps in the

launchers, but not in the missile production and not in all sorts of other things that might be brought in.

What is the basis for anticipation that arms control is going to come from this?

Ambassador TOON. I did not say anticipation, Senator. I said I had the hope that perhaps this would prove to be a first step toward effective arms control measures. Now, this depends in large measure on the Soviet reaction, and I do not frankly know what the Soviet reaction is going to be. I know what their reaction was in March 1977, and if in fact that is the precedent on which we build, then the outlook is very pessimistic.

Senator LUGAR. It certainly is. Thank you very much.

Ambassador TOON. I still hope.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Your expression of disappointment that this committee is not unanimous—well, I can think of few occasions when this committee has been unanimous on any issue. I suppose that happens in the Soviet Union, but it is not likely to happen in the U.S. Senate.

Ambassador TOON. It happens every day in the Supreme Soviet.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Stone?

Senator STONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SOVIET REJECTION OF MARCH 1977 PROPOSAL

Mr. Ambassador, why did the Soviets reject the deep cuts that we offered in March 1977?

Ambassador TOON. I think primarily because the deep cuts meant a virtual collapse of their SS-18 arsenal, and they were not about to do that at this particular juncture.

Senator STONE. Why, if it were balanced, did they not prefer, as we, the relative safety of a lower level of weapons?

Ambassador TOON. Sometimes the Soviets behave in an irrational way, and I think they did at that particular time.

Senator STONE. Was it really irrational, or were they acting in their perceived best interests? What you said earlier was a lot more credible, that the Soviets always act in their best interests.

Ambassador TOON. They were acting in their perceived best interests. They were irrational perhaps from the standpoint of sensible arms control. The second fact, Senator, is, they have a genuine concern about China and are not about to engage in substantial drastic cuts in their arsenal until that concern has disappeared. That is a long way down the road.

Senator STONE. Do you perceive that the main substantive reason which you think they had in their mind for rejecting the cuts was their concern about the Chinese situation?

Ambassador TOON. To a large measure; yes.

RADIATION FOCUSED ON U.S. EMBASSY IN MOSCOW

Senator STONE. Mr. Ambassador, you have been there for 2½ years. You have been described twice here as a hardliner. Why do we tolerate the bombardment of our U.S. Embassy in Moscow by

harmful radiation, radiation which is harmful to everyone's health?

Ambassador TOON. Primarily because we can do nothing about it.
Senator STONE. Why?

Ambassador TOON. We made protests on every appropriate occasion. I myself took it up with Brezhnev twice. They maintain with a perfectly straight face—and this is one illustration of why it is so difficult to deal with these people—they maintained with a straight face that there was no radiation being focused on the Embassy, that what had happened was a general increase in the level of radiation in the area because of the number of hospitals that had been built and laboratories and so forth, and that this is perfectly normal in any urban environment around the world. That is what they said. Of course, this argument was totally unacceptable to us, but in fact since they refused to admit they were bombarding the Embassy with radiation, how could they go along with a suggestion that they stop it, but now in fact it has been stopped. I don't know why, primarily because I really do not know why they did it in the first place.

We have a number of theories about this.

Senator STONE. Are you sure it has been stopped?

Ambassador TOON. Just recently it was cranked up again, within the past 2 weeks.

Senator STONE. That is what I read.

Ambassador TOON. Again, I am not excusing Soviet behavior. They ought to stop this sort of thing. It is an inhuman thing to do, to irradiate human beings. That is precisely what they are doing.

Senator STONE. Mr. Ambassador, that is the problem. Are we not excusing that inhuman behavior when we let them do it?

Ambassador TOON. What is your suggestion as to what we should do?

Senator STONE. I think we should take stronger action than just making a suggestion or a protest. Many things can be done at the level of diplomacy, many things, and we have not done anything but make a suggestion or a protest.

Ambassador TOON. Senator, I can assure you that we have given this very serious consideration down through the years, primarily because I am on the spot and it is a problem for me with my personnel, but we have yet to come up with a satisfactory answer. If you could come up with one, except in general terms, I would be happy to listen to you.

Senator STONE. How about withdrawing from there, withdrawing from that building, and telling the world that the Soviet Union radiates our building, and it is unhealthy, instead of just suggesting. Mr. Ambassador, the reason I am pursuing this is not this issue alone. All through these hearings I have been concerned not with verification so much as what we do when we find them doing something wrong. What good does it do if all we do is suggest, if all we do is request, but we never insist or we rarely insist, and when we do we accept their version? That is the problem. We are about to enter into a very major agreement, one in which, if we don't know if the treaty is verifiable, nobody is going to vote for it, but what good is verification if when we find them doing something

wrong we stop at a suggestion or even worse, accept their version of their straight-faced lie?

Now, you know it is a lie that they were not radiating our Embassy because you even know that they started up again 2 weeks ago, right?

Ambassador TOON. I agree with most of what you said.

Senator STONE. I thank you for that.

Ambassador TOON. Except that I have yet to detect a solution to the problem, and certainly, with all respects, Senator, the solution to the problem is not breaking diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

Senator STONE. I did not suggest breaking relations. I suggested moving out of the building.

The CHAIRMAN. Into the street. [General laughter.]

Senator STONE. You know, into the street would focus their attention on you. They might have to put you on Soviet television if you did it. [General laughter.]

PROTEST OF SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN CUBA

Mr. Ambassador, in your 2½ years of service in Moscow, did you protest Soviet activities in Cuba in any respect?

Ambassador TOON. Yes; we have.

Senator STONE. What did you protest, and what was the result?

Ambassador TOON. As I recall, it was with regard to the Mig-23 problem. This was some time ago, and frankly, I think we were satisfied with the Soviet reaction.

Senator STONE. Was it a reaction in action, or was it an explanation of their version of what has happened?

Ambassador TOON. It was primarily an explanation, but we came to the conclusion that our concern was perhaps unduly exaggerated.

Senator STONE. What about the visit of the *Golf II* submarines to Cuba in 1972 and 1974? Did we protest that?

Ambassador TOON. From 1972 to 1974 was before my time in Moscow.

Senator STONE. Then you were not aware of that situation?

Ambassador TOON. I cannot recall at the moment. I was in Israel.

Senator STONE. All right. Mr. Ambassador, you were there when South Yemen invaded North Yemen with support from East Germany, from Cuba, and from the Soviet Union, at least materiel support. Did we protest that in Moscow?

Ambassador TOON. Yes; we made representations about that in Moscow.

Senator STONE. Did we get any response?

Ambassador TOON. I think the situation has calmed considerably since we made representations. Now, I do not say it is necessarily because we did, but the situation has improved.

DETECTION OF SOVIET RADAR TESTING IN ABM MODE

The CHAIRMAN. Were you in Moscow when we detected the testing of Soviet radar in an ABM mode, some more than 30 or as many as 40 times, according to Mr. Nitze?

Ambassador TOON. I am not sure that I am competent to answer that question. I just do not have any knowledge at the present time of that.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Helms?

Senator HELMS. Mr. Ambassador, I want to say at the outset that I respect you. I mean not to offend you, but I hope you will obtain a copy of the transcript of your testimony this morning and read for yourself your own assessment of the backbone of the United States and its relationship with the Soviet Union. I was going to ask almost precisely the questions that Senator Stone has just asked you about the microwave radiation. The American people are persuaded that this Government, our State Department, rolls over and plays dead every time it gets into a confrontation with the Soviet Union, even on the question, as Senator Lugar put it to you, of arms reduction.

Now, if ever there was an opportunity for the United States to stand up and say to the world, we are willing, we are anxious to reduce nuclear arms, that is when we should have done it, but no, what we did is, we went with our hat in our hands, or so it appeared, and said, how would you feel about a little bit of arms reduction, and they said, "nyet," so we backed off and they had their way.

The same thing is true with respect to the bombardment of the U.S. Embassy. I hope you will read your testimony about our reaction to that. I say that not in a critical way.

RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION IN SOVIET UNION

Now, let me raise another question. We are all concerned and all aware of the persecution of religious minorities in the Soviet Union, particularly the Jewish people, but I want to raise a little question about some others. I am receiving a lot of mail from Baptists and people of other denominations concerning their human rights in the Soviet Union which are being violated.

What efforts have we really made, Mr. Ambassador, to bring an end to such persecution not only of the Jews but of the Baptists, the Methodists, and all other denominations represented over there?

What can you say for our posture in that regard?

Ambassador TOON. Senator Helms, I think we have made our position perfectly clear in the public domain. We have tried to focus world public opinion on this problem, not only with regard to the plight of the Jews, but also with regard to the plight of the Baptists and other Christian elements there. I think in very practical terms we have to recognize this is a basically internal problem, and there is nothing really that we can do to change the situation with regard to these people who, after all, are Soviet citizens.

The most we can do, and I think we have done it very adequately in this sense, is to focus world public opinion on the problem, and to make representations to the Soviets and the Soviet leadership on appropriate occasions, which we have done many times.

Senator HELMS. And the results have been almost nil. The persecution continues. Mr. Ambassador, I raise this line of questioning

again not to be in an adversary position with you. I hope you understand that.

Ambassador TOON. Of course.

Senator HELMS. I was in London early in July, and I met with about 75 Members of the House of Commons and made a little speech to them. Then we had a question and answer period, and I must say to you that they do not understand the U.S. posture in terms of standing up for things that count in a confrontation with the Soviet Union.

Now, all of that having been said, and the record of the Soviet Union in terms of keeping agreements and treaties being what it is, even if this SALT II Treaty were a good treaty, which I do not agree that it is, would you not have some apprehension about what may flow from this treaty in terms of relative nuclear strength?

Ambassador TOON. Senator, I think that is the basic reason why we feel strongly that the treaty ought to be completely verifiable. In my view, no treaty with the Soviet Union or frankly with any major power should rest on trust. We should be able to walk out of the treaty if in fact that is what the Soviets are doing. So we must keep a very careful watch on this whole thing.

Senator HELMS. Well, we are making a grave mistake in this committee and in the Armed Services Committee with letting various witnesses get by with interchanging the words "monitoring" and "verification." There is a decided difference between the two. Monitoring is a science. Verification is a political judgment. Again, I am concerned about the posture of this Nation when there is a confrontation with the Soviet Union. I agree with the things that Senator Stone said. I absolutely do. Why, why, why?

Now, some years ago, not many years ago, the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate made a study of 1,000 treaties that were entered into by the Soviet Union with other nations, including with this one. It found that in all but just a handful of them, the Soviets had violated those treaties. That is the concern that I have about SALT II, even if it were a fair treaty for this country, which I do not believe it to be.

Ambassador TOON. Senator, the immediate precedent for SALT II is SALT I. In terms of compliance, I think the Soviet Union honored its obligations under SALT I. Now, let me say this in addition. Certainly the Soviet Union, if it felt that any treaty, no matter how solemnly entered into, acted against its basic self-interest, would walk out, would scrap the treaty. I think we should do the same thing if we found ourselves in that sort of position.

Senator HELMS. It is a matter of good faith, too. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the diplomatic history would pretty well demonstrate that all countries adhere to treaties as long as those treaties are in the self-interest of the countries, and that this is not exclusively a matter that relates only to the Soviet Union. It is a matter of national behavior through the years.

One would expect that if the United States were to find at any time that this treaty impaired our national security interests, we would then opt to abrogate the treaty, which would be our right.

Ambassador TOON. I would hope so.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sarbanes?

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

DEGREE OF RESTRICTIONS SALT PLACES ON UNITED STATES AND
SOVIETS

Mr. Ambassador, first, I want to thank you for your statements which reflects some very hard thinking. I do not think you are a hardliner or a softliner, you are a hard thinker. That is what we ought to have. I particularly welcome this point about the tendency of this county to swing from one end of the pendulum to the other in our attitudes, giving too much significance to détente, while in an earlier period, perhaps going too far the other way, with the cold war attitude. You need a steady, tough, realistic attitude at all times.

The Joint Chiefs testified that the treaty would place substantive restrictions on the Soviets and only nominal restrictions on us.

First of all, do you agree with that?

Ambassador TOON. I think I agree with that judgment.

Senator SARBANES. We have had the argument that the balance has been shifting against us over the SALT I period, and even before that, and that this treaty offers us an opportunity to catch up.

If that is the case, why would the Soviets agree to such a treaty?

Ambassador TOON. Senator, I think they would agree primarily because they see other advantages in the treaty which they consider offset some of the disadvantages which have been cited by the Chiefs. I think the important thing to recognize is that we have not negotiated a treaty which is completely to our advantage. That is impossible. I think all you can negotiate with the Soviet Union is equality. You cannot negotiate superiority. Therefore, they see certain advantages in this from their point of view, just as we do.

Senator SARBANES. Do the Soviets think that a treaty will lull the United States so that it will not do a number of things in the strategic force area that it is free to do under the treaty? That the atmosphere created by the treaty will lead us to relax so that, while the treaty permits us to significantly bolster our strategic forces, the Soviets calculate that we will not as a practical matter avail ourselves of the opportunity.

Ambassador TOON. Well, that may enter into their calculations, but it seems to me the important thing for us to focus on is the will of the administration backed up by the American people and the Congress to do the things we feel have to be done in order to maintain a healthy defense posture, so it really does not depend on what the Soviet calculations are. It depends on what we are prepared to do, and I am satisfied that we will do the necessary thing.

Senator SARBANES. But why would they agree to a treaty that places only nominal restrictions on us unless they sense we will not avail ourselves of the legal opportunities which the treaty gives us?

Ambassador TOON. I suppose you are talking specifically about the protocol and whether the limitations of the protocol will be extended beyond the life of the protocol. Now, this may be the Soviet intention in the next negotiating round, and I would not exclude that possibility. In fact, I would think that is probably what they have in mind, but they cannot succeed in this tactic unless we are prepared to go along with them.

My own feeling is that we are strongly determined to end the protocol in 1981, and that is it.

Senator SARBANES. I was interested in your view that the deep cut approach and in fact the future as we move toward SALT II is very much related to the Soviet position on China, which you see as really blocking further significant arms reduction.

Ambassador TOON. Well, I would use the word "drastic" rather than "significant." I just do not know. I know what the Soviets said in Vienna, for example. They said we can't go very far down this road unless other powers, and they never mentioned China specifically, come on board. I think we have to take this into account in estimating what the possibilities are.

Senator SARBANES. How fearful do you think the Soviets are that they will undertake a major arms commitment without SALT, and that our technology would allow us to outstrip them and place them in a very difficult position?

Ambassador TOON. I think they are concerned about that possibility, but I think it is important for us to recognize that despite the fact that we have a significant economic margin over them, they would pay the necessary price in terms of depriving the population of certain things in order to maintain the pace with us.

I think in the long run they would have to lose simply because of the strength of our economy, and they know that.

EFFECT OF RATIFICATION PROCESS ON SOVIET BEHAVIOR

Senator SARBANES. Do you see Soviet behavior in the world as improved or more responsible now because the SALT Treaty is pending and they would like it ratified?

Ambassador TOON. The world is fairly placid at the moment, but I do not think we should read that as an indication of Soviet restraint. I think possibly the reason for this is that the opportunities are not there at the present time for Soviet exploitation. If something should happen in the next month or two, I think the Soviets would be prepared to move in response to their perception of their own self-interest.

I do not think I would count on restraint in that sense.

SOVIET CONVENTIONAL FORCE BUILDUP

Senator SARBANES. What is behind this tremendous buildup of Soviet conventional forces?

Ambassador TOON. We discussed that earlier in the session, Senator, and I frankly don't know. Do you mean in central Europe for the most part?

Senator SARBANES. Yes.

Ambassador TOON. I do not know why they have done this. It may be a product of their defensive mentality, or their historical experience. It may be in fact that they anticipated a much greater strengthening of the NATO military machine than in fact happened. It may be, finally, that this is in the nature of some sort of payoff to the military as a result of Brezhnev's policies. I do not know. All I know is, this is not justified by the circumstances objectively seen in central Europe, and there is no excuse for it at all in my view.

Senator SARBANES. Do the SALT II terms enhance our ability to monitor what the Soviets are doing with their strategic forces?

Ambassador TOON. Yes. To the extent that there are provisions of the treaty which do provide us with certain monitoring. For example, the telemetry encryption provision provides us with a certain ability in this respect.

Senator SARBANES. Knowing Soviet history as you do, were you surprised by the extent to which they were opening up certain things in order to permit monitoring for verification of the treaty?

Ambassador TOON. I have been surprised in general by the nature of the dialog that we have had with the Soviets since the beginning of the SALT process.

Senator SARBANES. Would you please develop that a little bit? I think it would be helpful.

Ambassador TOON. Well, I think 15 years ago, none of us who felt we knew something about the Soviet Union anticipated that we would get into this sort of really extensive dialog involving awfully sensitive things with the Soviet Union, but this has happened, and this has been an encouraging aspect of the process.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you. I see that my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes.

Senator Percy, do you have any further questions?

Senator PERCY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have one further question. We would like to draw upon Ambassador Toon's vast experience in dealing with the Soviets to get his judgment on how two competing forces can effectively deal with one other.

The President has said that we will be a military power second to none. The Joint Chiefs have in a sense conditioned their support of SALT upon our moving ahead to regain our relative military strength. Many people have said in this debate that you can deal with the Soviets only with superior force. What sort of superior force is most effective against Soviet designs? That is, we have military, political, as well as world public opinion, and economic power. Do we have to be superior, second to none in every single area to gain their respect? Would you comment on just how do we do that? How do we effectively compete without putting them in a posture and a position where there is deep resentment, hostility, and a feeling of insecurity such as they had after the Cuban missile crisis?

Could you just comment on that one area?

Ambassador TOON. I think, Senator, we do not have to get ourselves in a superior military position necessarily. We have to make sure that we are not in an inferior position. We must maintain essential equivalence. Now, with regard to the other elements of the relationship, the political, economic, social and cultural, and so forth, I think it is generally perceived in the world that we are vastly superior to the Soviet Union in our political philosophy, the strength of our economy, in our moral approach to the problems of the world.

I think the proof of that, frankly, is that there is no country in the world today, no people in the world today that wants to emulate the Soviet example. On the contrary, they look to us for

leadership and not to the Soviets. That, I think, is a real indication of the relative strength of our two societies.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very kindly.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Let me announce that we have two more witnesses, but I do want to accommodate any Senators who wish to have a second round. Senator Lugar?

Senator LUGAR. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. I want to follow up once again the question Senator Sarbanes asked and to which the Ambassador responded honestly.

Mr. Ambassador, he asked with regard to the theater buildups and conventional armaments, just how extensive these have been, and likewise your own mystification as to why, whether it is simply that the military continues on and must be satisfied.

It appears to me to be important for the record to indicate that those sorts of buildups do appear to be continuing in the theater sector, leaving the strategic aside for a moment, and the theory that I propounded earlier in questioning you generally is that the Soviets simply wish to be dominant. In other words, one reason why you continue to build arms beyond those that could ostensibly be required for any sort of defensive purposes is, that you wish to intimidate, if not to invade, and at least to make certain that you are in a position to so totally influence the construct of affairs. I think that is a very valid reason why a country might want to do that, though a very frightening reason.

In your judgment is this not the primary reason why they are doing it, or would you still say simply that you do not know?

Ambassador TOON. It could very well be. I was talking about the buildup in central Europe. Now, clearly, one of the reasons which I forgot to mention to Senator Sarbanes for the buildup in central Europe is that the Soviets look upon this as an instrument of political control. Everybody knows that if it were not for the Red Army, why, the Soviet Union would not dominate Eastern Europe today. But with regard to your broader question, I think frankly this depends on us.

Clearly, the Soviets can gain all kinds of superiority in conventional forces as they seem to be aiming at right now, but whether in fact they use these in order to project their political influence, in order to bring about a confrontation with us which they hope they might win, really depends on us.

I think frankly I have enough confidence in the American people and this administration and the Congress to realize that that will not happen.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, your testimony has been extremely helpful this morning. I want to thank you for it.

Ambassador TOON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Sarbanes?

Senator SARBANES. If it is agreeable to our next witnesses, would it be possible to hear from them at the same time?

The CHAIRMAN. In fact, it would be necessary to do that, and I was going to propose it, because it is now 11:55 and we do have an afternoon hearing.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you. I think in this way we will at least have a chance to hear their prepared testimonies.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator. I do think we should proceed in that way. Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much for your testimony.

Let me ask our two next witnesses, Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt and Prof. Richard Pipes, if they would come to the table.

Helmut Sonnenfeldt has been working on East-West relations almost as long as Ambassador Toon. He has spent 23 years in the State Department and in the National Security Council. He has been responsible for analyzing Soviet behavior and advising policymakers how to deal with it.

As a participant in three summit sessions between President Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev, he has seen the Soviet leadership in close quarters, but he also brings to our hearing the perspective of a scholar, a title he now holds at the Brookings Institution. Counselor of the State Department when détente was still a word Washingtonians could use with equanimity, he remains a valued contributor to public counsels now that détente is a word to be whispered or shunned.

Not by his choice, he has been made the author of a doctrine. This morning he comes to urge a strategy, and we welcome the chance to hear his views.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt, if you will present your statement, then we will turn to Professor Pipes, then we will ask questions of you both.

STATEMENT OF HON. HELMUT SONNENFELDT, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, FORMER COUNSELOR, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. SONNENFELDT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee and Senator Boschwitz.

I think in the interest of time I will be brief in my preliminary remarks because I have given you a written statement which should go into the record.

I am pleased and honored to be here to participate in your very important deliberations on the SALT Treaty. When you invited me to testify, Mr. Chairman, you asked that I comment on the place occupied by the SALT process and the particular treaty before you in the broad context of United States-Soviet relations. It is to that complex problem which has in some ways already been addressed in earlier testimony that I have directed the comments in my paper.

It is often said that SALT should be judged on its own merits. That is hardly a disputable proposition. The question is how these merits are to be defined, whether narrowly or broadly, and I am inclined to want to see them defined broadly.

I believe in a nutshell that SALT negotiations and possible or actual agreements in that area should be part of a broad range of policies and actions designed to protect our interests in a world where Soviet power has been steadily increasing and Soviet ambitions are actively asserted. Our purpose must be to see to it that the uses of Soviet power are restrained and that at any given moment and also over time Soviet leaders recognize that the risks of assertive and aggrandizing uses of power outweigh the benefits.

I believe that this is essential for any positive evolution in our relations with the Soviet Union. Arms control may have some useful role to play in structuring our policies along these lines and for the purposes indicated. Much of American arms control doctrine, and particularly the doctrine underlying the SALT negotiations, has gone on the presumption that there is an overriding mutual interest between ourselves and the Soviet Union in this area and that is the interest in the prevention of nuclear war.

I think this is a notion, appealing though it may be, whose validity needs to be questioned and examined more deeply. In any case, the slow progress in arms control negotiations, including SALT, and the very marginal accomplishments to date in these negotiations, suggest that other factors than a mutual interest in preventing war are at work as well.

I think we need to define our purposes with respect to SALT in American terms. That clearly includes the prevention of war, and to that extent it may overlap to a degree with the interests of the Soviet Union. But we cannot ignore, and we must centrally incorporate in our policies, in our defense policies, and in our negotiations with the Soviet Union the protection of our security and well-being in the face of challenges posed to us and other nations by the emergence of the Soviet Union as a major military power on the international scene.

I see no sign that the impulses and ambitions which have carried the Soviet Union to the position and status that it has reached to date are subsiding. On the contrary, they remain a central ingredient in Soviet conduct. Soviet interest in arms control, including SALT, remains subordinate to them. I should say that ever since the Bolshevik revolution, ever since the Soviets first raised the disarmament issue, a term that is still preferred to arms control, they have sought to pursue through it certain very concrete political and military aims.

In the days of their weaknesses, early on, the purpose was to attempt to inhibit and demobilize their potential enemies as much as possible through agitation and through mobilizing the so-called masses against bourgeois governments.

In Stalin's day, when the United States had its nuclear monopoly and substantial nuclear superiority, Soviet arms control or disarmament policy was heavily directed, again principally through agitation, mass movements and the signing of appeals, such as the Stockholm Appeal, toward inhibiting the potential American use of nuclear weapons and the building of the American nuclear arsenal. These were very concrete aims for the Soviet Union because the United States had to rely on its nuclear and strategic power in order to offset the traditional military advantages that the Soviet Union had on its own periphery, and which after the Second World War it was continuing to build up with considerable momentum and at considerable sacrifice to the population of the Soviet Union.

Consequently, Soviet arms programs and Soviet strategy was directed at offsetting the principal counterweight which the United States was marshalling to this massive Soviet power on the Eurasian land mass. Thus, even in the days when Soviet disarmament policy was essentially agitational, it pursued very concrete Soviet interests.

It is worth bearing in mind at all times that this subordination of arms control or disarmament to overriding political goals has never changed in the case of the Soviet Union. Soviet devotion, Soviet belief in and Soviet adherence to certain abstract principles like stability has never been anywhere near the same as has been the case in American arms control doctrine and American strategic doctrine, and in our political discussions on the matter.

The Soviet system is strongly geared to the accumulation of military power, and this has been a fact which has not changed, particularly since World War II. For us, this ineluctably leads to the conclusion that we cannot in the foreseeable future expect to avoid maintaining our own strong and diversified military programs. Arms control arrangements may affect the pace and the character of some of these military programs, but they are at best likely to be modest and almost certainly unlikely to contribute substantially to the balance we require for our security.

In my prepared statement, I have said a number of things about the relationship of strategic forces and the strategic balance to regional military situations in various parts of the world, particularly in Europe. In our debates concerning the security situation in Europe, we frequently ignore that it remains NATO doctrine, agreed NATO doctrine, that the conventional forces of the alliance, the theater nuclear forces of the alliance, and the strategic nuclear forces of the United States constitute a whole.

We tend to forget also that NATO doctrine, and indeed European security depends upon a strategy that calls for potential first use of nuclear weapons by the United States. That is an accepted NATO doctrine which has never been changed.

To point that out by itself demonstrates beyond doubt the integral relationship between the state of the strategic balance and the state of regional balances.

I would like to make one further comment, Mr. Chairman, on the matter of the difference, alleged or real, between the United States and the Soviet Union on the matter of the possibility of nuclear war. The Soviets do not make a distinction between deterrence and war fighting, indeed, between deterrence, war fighting, and war winning.

They do believe in deterrence because they do not wish to suffer the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear war. But it is clear that their military programs, particularly in recent decades but really from the beginning, have always been based on the proposition that the best deterrent is that capability which also carries the greatest potential for fighting a war in the event deterrence should fail.

We are sometimes much less clear about this proposition than the Soviets, even though we do ourselves procure programs that have utility, real utility, in the fighting of a war should that prove to be necessary. But we are less clear about the integral connection between credible and usable military force and deterrence, deterrence not only of strategic attack against the United States but of military action in other parts of the world, notably in Europe.

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, it is for this reason that I think it is important that what happens in the context of SALT and the circumstances in which SALT is implemented do not in any way

derogate from the credibility and the potential usability of American military forces. This SALT agreement places certain modest limitations on Soviet programs. It is often said that it does not inhibit any programs of our own. There is, of course, a question whether these programs have in the first instance already been tailored to fit SALT prescriptions. But even apart from that, you have had testimony here that in regard to the M-X, one of the criteria for its deployment must be its verifiability under SALT. That is clearly a constraint placed by SALT on an American military program.

There has also been some question about the freedom of action which the United States might have with respect to theater weapons in Europe, particularly the cruise missiles, whose deployment is now prohibited for 2 years in the protocol, and the possibilities of cooperation with allies with respect to these particular weapons as well as others.

Mr. Chairman, it is my view that before the ratification process on this treaty can be properly completed, the questions that have been raised, at the very least in these matters—the deployment mode of the M-X and its compatibility to SALT requirements, the cruise missile programs and possible potential cooperation with allies—need to be clearly resolved.

I believe the means for doing so are available, given the schedules that you have set for yourselves in regard to the ratification process.

Since you asked me to talk about the broader context as well, I would like to do so very briefly. The military relationship is, of course, dominant between ourselves and the Soviet Union because it is so dangerous, because of the pervasive militarization of Soviet policy, and because of the fact, as has been pointed out, that military power is the principal asset of the Soviet Union. Its other attributes turn out to be not nearly so appealing or effective internationally as was once thought.

I do believe that the Soviet Union has, particularly in recent years, become more conscious of its needs with respect to the outside world. This is true in economic matters, in commercial relations, in financial relations, in technology exchange, and in other respects.

There are other matters—the environment, nuclear nonproliferation, the regime of the oceans, various other things—in which the Soviet Union has found it desirable, perhaps more than some of us believed some years ago was likely, to participate in the international system.

It is my view that on the whole these are desirable trends and afford us opportunities for conducting policies that increase Soviet stakes in a more disciplined orderly international system.

I believe we should consciously and deliberately follow policies that increase the degree to which the Soviet Union needs to rely on the external world and obeys the disciplines of the international system from which it seeks benefits. This is not a substitute for maintaining a balance of usable military forces across the whole spectrum of military power, because I believe without that we will find our security constantly in jeopardy, I mean our security broadly construed, because it involves the security of others.

It is in that sense that military policy and our other policies should form a single whole, and it is therefore that I believe that SALT as well should be a product of our overall strategy toward the Soviet Union rather than the other way around.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Sonnenfeldt's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. HELMUT SONNENFELDT

I am honored to appear before you and to be afforded the opportunity to participate in the deliberations concerning the Senate's action on the SALT II treaty completed and signed by Presidents Carter and Brezhnev at Vienna on June 18, 1979.

When you invited me to testify, Mr. Chairman, you asked that I comment on the place occupied by the SALT process, and the treaty before you, in the broad context of U.S.-Soviet relations. This is a complex question, but I welcome the fact that you have posed it in this way. It is often said that SALT II should be judged on its own merits. This is hardly a disputable proposition. The issue is how these merits are to be defined.

In my view, SALT negotiations and possible or actual agreements must be viewed as part of a broad range of policies and actions designed to protect our interests in a world where Soviet power has been steadily increasing and Soviet ambitions are actively asserted. Our purpose must be to see to it that the uses of Soviet power are restrained and that at any given moment and also over time, Soviet leaders recognize that the risks of assertive and aggrandizing uses of power outweigh the benefits. I believe this to be essential for a positive evolution of our relations with the Soviet Union.

Arms control, particularly as it may relate to the most destructive weapons, is frequently seen as having intrinsic value, since the incalculable damage that would result from nuclear war gives even adversary powers strong mutual incentives to stabilize military relationships in ways that would make the outbreak of such wars less likely. Much American arms control theory—and, indeed, of our approach to the SALT negotiations—has been based on this premise of mutual interest. I believe this premise to be only partly valid and still to be largely unproven. At any rate, the slow progress in arms control negotiations, and the modest accomplishments which they have produced to date, suggest that other factors than a mutual interest in preventing war are at work as well.

It is for this reason that I have stated what I believe to be our broad purpose in conducting our policies toward the U.S.S.R. in terms of our own, American, interests. These interests clearly include the prevention of war and may, in that respect, overlap to a degree with the interests of the U.S.S.R. But they cannot ignore, and must centrally incorporate, the protection of our security and well-being in the face of challenges posed to us and other nations by the emergence of the Soviet Union as a major military power in the international arena. I see no sign that the impulses and ambitions which have carried the Soviet Union to the position and status it has reached to date are subsiding. On the contrary, they remain a central ingredient in Soviet conduct. Soviet interest in arms control, including SALT, remains subordinated to them.

It should be observed that since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 and the subsequent establishment of the Soviet state, advocacy of disarmament has been an important instrument of Soviet policy. In the early years, it was intended as one means of inhibiting external enemies from acting individually or in concert against the then still weak and fragile Soviet state. Soviet disarmament policies were agitational, and designed to mobilize the "masses" against governments. But their goals were quite concrete in a period when Soviet fears of foreign intervention, even if objectively exaggerated, were real. It was after all the Bolshevik leadership itself which had declared the surrounding "bourgeois" world as its enemies and which had proclaimed itself to be the agent of allegedly inevitable historical processes which would transform other societies, and the international system as a whole, in the image of the Bolshevik Revolution. Communist doctrine and the beliefs of its proponents anticipated that those destined to be superseded would resist by force. Their preparations and plans, imagined or real, needed to be undermined.

The stress on disarmament remained prominent in Soviet policy after World War II and continued to serve the quite practical and concrete aim of braking the defense efforts of nations feeling themselves threatened by Soviet ambition and pressure. The agitational content and methods of Soviet policy were, if anything, even greater in the post-War period than in the twenties as countries on the

U.S.S.R.'s periphery reacted to the satellization of Eastern and Southeastern Europe, Soviet claims to territory elsewhere and the evident commitment of the Soviet Union to the building of massive military forces.

The decision of the United States to participate in collective security arrangements with nations threatened by potential Soviet expansion, and the reliance of the United States on atomic weapons as the ultimate sanction against such expansion, made these weapons a special target of Soviet disarmament policy. (In retrospect, it is perhaps paradoxical that the United States relying as it did on the nuclear sanction, also concentrated its disarmament efforts on the control of nuclear weapons. The Soviets, of course, saw these efforts as designed to perpetuate the United States monopoly.) Meanwhile, the Soviets themselves moved with vigor to equip themselves with nuclear weaponry and the requisite delivery systems in order gradually to neutralize the very weapons on which the U.S. and its allies relied to offset the traditional military power of the U.S.S.R. on the Eurasian landmass.

It was in the Khrushchev era that Soviet leaders began to recognize that agitation and extravagant disarmament proposals alone would be unlikely to block the defense programs of the West. Consequently, the decade from the mid-fifties to the mid-sixties saw the beginnings of exchanges at the negotiating table about more specific measures to limit arms. The Soviets evidently came to see that if binding limitations on Western programs were to be achieved, they would probably have to accept some restrictions on their own programs. There developed, too, a hesitant recognition that in the era of nuclear weapons some kinds of cooperation in reducing the risks of miscalculation might have merit. Thus, after tortuous negotiations, agreements such as those on limiting atmospheric testing, on non-proliferation and on the establishment of the Hot Line proved feasible.

For the Soviets, however, agreements of this kind did not take the place of military strength. While Khrushchev, like Brezhnev after him, was conscious of the economic burdens of amassing military power in all its dimensions, the long-term momentum of Soviet programs did not slacken. Disarmament negotiations—or "arms control" negotiations as we came increasingly to call them—were an adjunct of Soviet military policy. This has not changed, even as in subsequent years the subject matter and scope of negotiations has broadened to include strategic armaments. When limitations have been accepted, the Soviets have generally maintained vigorous programs within, and up to, the very margins of the limitations. Other programs not affected by agreements have been pressed to offset restrictions and prohibitions imposed by agreements.

There has been much debate in the West—and in your hearings—about the motivations underlying the persistent Soviet commitment to the accumulation of military power. Stalin's decisions in the mid-forties setting priorities, which in essence have changed little, might originally well have been due to his determination to ensure that the Soviet Union would never again suffer the catastrophes of invasion and occupation and that the Communist regime would never again be brought to the brink of destruction by external attack. But even if this "defensive" purpose of Soviet power and expansion was at first dominant in Stalin's time, the concept of security on which it was based in fact implied that other countries, particularly those near the Soviet Union, would be under constant pressure from the weight of Soviet power. As time went on, the Soviet definition of security became increasingly expansive, in part, no doubt, stimulated by the reactions of other countries which felt themselves threatened precisely by the broadening Soviet definition of security.

The Soviets have stressed that what they seek is equality of equal security, that they are "catching up". But the Soviet view of equality is heavily colored by the evident conviction that the threats to Soviet security are unending and somehow, despite its vastly enhanced military strength, always leave the U.S.S.R. in greater danger than the United States with its surrounding oceans and militarily unthreatening neighbors. The Soviet response is to seek "compensation" through more military power. Catching up seems to be a permanent process which, in the perspective of the outside world, looks like a quest for military advantage. Considering where the momentum of their military programs will carry them in the years to come, the notion that the Soviets are catching up, even if that is what they themselves believe, cannot be a source of comfort.

In addition, it has become apparent over the years that the sources of growing Soviet influence in the world were not to be found in the attractions and achievements of the Soviet domestic system but largely in the fact that increasingly diverse and far-ranging military capabilities enabled the U.S.S.R. to become more active in international politics. Although in the early stages of the decolonization process, the Soviet Union seemed to offer a source of economic and other support to new nations, and some of the latter seemed impressed by Communist doctrines and prescriptions,

the Soviet model made little lasting headway. Moreover, the struggles and divisions within the so-called socialist camp raised serious questions about Moscow's ability to lead or even shape an international system of diverse nations, peoples and societies. Whether nearby, in Eastern Europe and Asia, or in remoter regions, it was military strength that was—and remains—the chief attribute of the Soviet Union's role.

It is hard to know to what extent Soviet leaders and elites acknowledge these realities to and among themselves. What is clear, however, is that Soviet politics, especially in periods of maneuver for succession but also in more normal times, are geared to preserving the priorities that sustain the military underpinnings of Soviet policies. It is evident also that, in these circumstances, arms control arrangements can have little intrinsic appeal to the Soviets. Of course, they want to see potential enemies constrained, particularly the United States with its impressive economic and technological resources. And they probably wish to have greater certainty in their economic planning. But they are unlikely to want to see the principal source of their international influence significantly curtailed.

From the American standpoint, the aspects of the Soviet evolution sketched so far will seem profoundly pessimistic. They do lead ineluctably to the conclusion that we cannot in the foreseeable future expect to avoid maintaining strong and diversified military forces of our own. Arms control arrangements may affect the pace and character of some military programs, but they are likely to be modest in effect and are almost certainly unlikely to contribute substantially to the balance we require for our security. But if we maintain our military strength, and if it is seen and known to be usable in the numerous contingencies with which we may be confronted, we can still have considerable scope for policies that contribute to restrained and even constructive relationships with the Soviet Union.

Before turning to this latter aspect of the problem, it is necessary to address, briefly, the relationship between strategic, or intercontinental, military forces and those with other roles. For it is by examining this relationship, perplexing and intangible as it may be in some respects, that light can be shed on the oft-repeated question as to the utility of modern strategic forces.

As already noted, in the early post-War period, the United States relied chiefly on its monopoly, and then its superiority, in nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, to deter significant regional Soviet military aggression. Even then, however, the threat of nuclear retaliation was insufficient to prevent every form of Soviet pressure against neighboring areas or to contain entirely Soviet intrusions by means short of direct military actions into various parts of the world.

The Korean War led us to the recognition that we would require conventional military power to protect our interests in many circumstances; it brought about the increase in our stationed forces in Europe and the establishment of a number of military commands within NATO and elsewhere.

In due course, the development of early generations of Soviet long-range nuclear weapons delivery systems, required our introducing nuclear weapons to buttress our theater forces in Europe and elsewhere. Questions came to be raised, rightly or wrongly, whether the United States could be expected to put its own cities in jeopardy in the event of limited Soviet attacks in central Europe. This, among other reasons, led the French to develop their own nuclear weapons. The British maintained and modernized theirs.

With time, as they acquired more diversified nuclear weapons and means for their delivery, the Soviets moved to deploy them with their forces in central Europe. Medium and intermediate range nuclear weapons were targeted in increasing numbers against Western Europe. These developments, along with the steady and cumulatively impressive improvements in Soviet conventional theater forces, in turn, obliged our Allies and us to undertake programs to strengthen our own conventional forces and to improve reinforcement capabilities. We now also have the urgent task of modernizing the theater nuclear forces within NATO. And the British and French are reported weighing modernization options for their respective nuclear forces in face of improving and increasing Soviet nuclear capabilities for use against targets in Europe.

NATO has continued to rely on conventional forces, nuclear forces in the theater and American strategic forces to deter attack. Moreover, it remains NATO doctrine that the Alliance would, if necessary, initiate the use of nuclear weapons in the event conventional forces are unable to repel attack. At the same time, whatever the adequacy of particular conventional, i.e. non-nuclear, capabilities and improvement programs in the European theater, there is widespread agreement that because of the evolving nuclear balance in all its elements, effective deterrence of non-nuclear attack requires large and modern non-nuclear forces on our side so that if deterrence fails we would not be confronted at once with the decision to resort to nuclear weapons.

Yet, as noted, the security of the Alliance continues to depend on the credibility of our nuclear posture, both within the European theater and in the form of our strategic forces. More particularly, it depends on a continued ability of the United States to control the process of escalation, if that has to be resorted to. It is in this perhaps esoteric but crucial respect that the most serious questions have been raised among those concerned with the defense of Europe. They have arisen because of the concern that at both the theater and intercontinental levels, the ability to control escalation may be shifting to the Soviet side—that our strategic forces may be “decoupled” from our and the Allies’ other forces.

If NATO’s strategy is to continue to have meaning, it is essential that at all levels of nuclear power we have survivable and flexible forces. And it is for this reason alone that we must be concerned about the future of each leg of our strategic Triad, as well as the nuclear forces located in Europe. These concerns have been frequently voiced in these hearings. They are legitimate concerns.

To be specific: I believe, first, that an effective and credible American commitment to the defense of Europe demands that we act rapidly to equip ourselves with survivable ICBMs while also proceeding with the modernization of our SLBM and bomber forces. I believe there should be no shred of doubt not only that the United States is legally able under SALT to proceed with the MX program, including an optimal basing mode, but that it is actually doing so. I single out the MX in this context because questions as to the compatibility of certain of its possible basing modes with provisions of SALT II have been raised. I believe these doubts need to be removed by word and deed as promptly as possible. But I wish to stress also the urgency of proceeding on schedule with the other strategic programs.

A second specific point relates to the European nuclear theater forces. Since effective deterrence of attack in Europe requires diversified, accurate and modern nuclear weapons, I believe the United States should at this stage make clear in word as well as deed, i.e. in the programs Congress authorizes and funds, that it does not intend to renew the prohibition now contained in the Protocol to SALT II against deployment of ground and sea-launched cruise missiles beyond 600 km in range. There are other reasons for taking these actions, e.g. the needs of the navy, but I consider them especially necessary in the context of European defense and our Alliance commitments.

Third, I believe that the considerations just mentioned also require us to leave no doubt whatever that SALT provisions dealing with cruise missiles of whatever type do not preclude us from undertaking any kind of cooperation, from technology and other transfers to the coordination of forces, which we and our Allies may judge to be necessary.

I have dwelled on the relationship between strategic forces and European defense because it is in that context that the growth of Soviet capabilities has long posed the most complex problems of strategy and programs for us and our Allies. These problems will continue and will require constant attention. I see no prospect at the moment that arms control agreements either on strategic or on theater forces will alleviate our difficulties. My concern is that they should not make them greater.

But, in addition to the problems of European defense, we must also recognize that Soviet military deployments and actions can jeopardize our interests elsewhere. The direct relevance of the strategic force balance to such contingencies is harder to demonstrate than in the case of European defense. But there can be little doubt that the strategic balance that exists today and is projected to exist in the years to come at the very least makes decisions to use American forces more complicated and hazardous than they were even five or ten years ago. Above all, the changed and changing strategic balance does require us to give attention to the state of our naval and long-range intervention forces. It would be a dangerous situation indeed if the Soviets, under the umbrella of the developing strategic balance, saw increasing opportunities for uncontested uses of their own or proxy military forces.

Soviet arms control propositions bearing on these situations have generally sought to constrain us more than the U.S.S.R. In some instances, e.g. in connection with the establishment of facilities for our use on Diego Garcia, the Soviets have resorted to traditional agitational techniques and political pressures to impede us. It seems unlikely that arms control arrangements can be looked to for much help in safeguarding our interests. Not, at least until the Soviets judge the risks of intervention to be sufficiently great to make negotiated restraints that are equitable in their effects a more attractive alternative for them.

I should like to make some further comments on the Soviet view of the role of military power because of its bearing on an evaluation of SALT and other arms control efforts. It is frequently contended that a major difference between the United States and the Soviet Union is that we tend to see military forces, particularly nuclear forces, as having chiefly a deterrent function whereas the Soviets

intend and actually procure such forces to fight wars. Related to this difference, there is the further proposition that while we tend on the whole to see nuclear wars as unwinnable in any meaningful sense, the Soviets regard them as winnable and, if war were to come, would intend to fight it through to victory. Soviet doctrinal writings, military exercises and force dispositions suggest that Lenin's adaptations of Clausewitz remain valid for present Soviet leaders: political goals can still be pursued in war, indeed must be, even if destruction is unprecedented.

I believe that the distinction between deterrence and war-fighting is not one that the Soviets make. They, too, wish to deter or avoid war. They give every evidence of recognizing the catastrophic consequences of nuclear conflict, although they, far more than we, devote efforts and resources to limiting these consequences. How confident they are in such efforts, however, is difficult to determine. But the Soviets do proceed on the premise that war-fighting forces and war-winning doctrines are the most effective deterrent to attacks against themselves, and the most effective restraint on an enemy's recourse to military force in a crisis, whatever the origin of that crisis—precisely because such forces are usable if deterrence fails.

In many crises of the past, the Soviets found themselves deterred from pressing for major advantages; in some, indeed, they found themselves backing down when faced with a seemingly credible threat of military action against them. It is this kind of situation which the Soviets have sought, and continue to seek, to avoid by their military build-up. One of their purposes in pursuing arms control, including SALT, is to support this objective, although they place their main reliance on their own programs rather than on arms control.

While some Americans support what may be called a "deterrence-only" view of the role of military, particularly nuclear forces, this has not in fact been our dominant attitude to date. We, too, have sought to procure forces and weapons systems and to adopt doctrines that enable us to fight if necessary. But we have continued to have vigorous debates about the wisdom and morality of thinking in terms of fighting nuclear wars. Ironically perhaps, many of those most critical of "Strangelovian" war scenarios, have urged us to procure forces which could be used primarily for the most destructive attacks on population centers. The more vulnerable our cities (and those of the Soviets), it has in effect been argued, the more effective the deterrent.

As will be evident from my earlier comments on European defense, I believe that deterrence increases as the usability of weapons and the credibility of our commitments and doctrines for their use increase. I take this view not because it happens to be that of the Soviets but because by acting on it we do, in my judgment, have a more effective deterrent to attacks on our interests and, ultimately, to war, given the nature and direction of Soviet military programs. I believe that SALT agreements should in their terms and in their effects be compatible with the maintenance of our war-fighting capabilities or else SALT will detract from, rather than enhance deterrence.

More fundamentally, the time may well have come to review our arms control doctrines and approaches which now go back more than twenty years and still dominate our negotiating goals. "Stability", a key concept in arms control, does not appear to have impressed the Soviets greatly. While many Soviet analysts, especially in the Institutes with which many of us are familiar, have adopted American vocabulary, Soviet forces in practice bear no necessary resemblance to stability criteria.

For example, while the Soviets accepted the ABM treaty, they have continued to assign major resources to research and development for anti-missile defense. Moscow's ultimate intentions in this field remain unclear. But anti-missile defense, anathema as it is to stability doctrine, is hardly so to the Soviets. Defense against aircraft is clearly a high Soviet priority, to the point that the bomber leg of our Triad must now be drastically modified in order to penetrate to its (second strike) targets. How long the 25-year old B-52 force will remain an adequate launch platform in the face of Soviet air defense efforts remains to be seen.

The Soviets have refrained from procuring counter-force weapons. Either the SS-19 or the SS-18, and certainly portions of both in combination, will threaten the most reliable and flexible part of our Triad. We are now faced with acquiring less vulnerable land-based forces and adopting launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack doctrines. Some analysts believe the time has come to give serious fresh consideration to defending our land-based forces.

The Soviets have done work on anti-satellite systems which if developed and deployed could threaten the command, control and communications of our most numerous and secure retaliatory forces.

Given these developments and some of the responses we plan to make or may yet have to consider, it seems at least questionable that what should determine our

policy are arms control doctrines (e.g. verifiability in the case of the MX deployment mode), rather than defense doctrines adapted to the realities of the eighties and nineties. Whatever the ultimate disposition of the present treaty by the Senate, it is urgently necessary to ensure that future SALT negotiations, and the purposes and doctrines that govern them, are the product rather than the determinant of our defense policy.

Military issues dominate much of our relationship with the Soviet Union but they are not the only ones involved in it. The Soviets seek influence and associations in the world to shift the geo-political balance, but in the process they also want to obtain a variety of other benefits and to meet needs which they cannot fill by themselves. Indeed, it is one of the characteristics of the present period that the Soviets have found it necessary and desirable to interact more extensively and intensively with the outside world than at any time in their history. These interactions remain marked by strong hesitations; the innate autarkic impulses of the Soviet system remain vigorous and Soviet resistance to external intrusion remains powerful. Nevertheless, the iron curtain of 30 years ago has become more porous in both directions. The Soviets are more active, if still reluctant and selective participants in international institutions, practices and agreements.

Many of these developments result from the shortcomings of the Soviet economy and its technological backwardness. Some are due to the fact that the Soviet resource base, while impressive, is no longer fully able, and will become less able, to meet the growing demands of a maturing economy. With the labor supply tighter than in the past, increases in production depend heavily on improved productivity. This, in turn, demands more and better technology. Soviet agriculture continues to be afflicted by uneven harvests and a seemingly chronic inability to meet the objective of the leadership to improve the population's diet. The consequent need for manufactured goods, commodities, technology and capital from the outside world has increased Soviet hard currency requirements, since exports, though growing, are inadequate to finance imports. This has led the Soviet Union to engage in more extensive international financial operations and has made it more sensitive to foreign fluctuations, interest rates and other commercial and economic trends.

Other concerns which have tended to bring the Soviet Union more actively into the international arena include such problems as environmental pollution, nuclear proliferation, exploitation of the resources of the oceans, regulation of airspace, etc. In all such matters, the Soviet Union is unable to protect its interest unilaterally and therefore finds it desirable to participate in international arrangements and institutions.

More closely related to security, the Soviets have viewed the widening contacts between China and other nations, especially Japan, Western Europe and the U.S., with mounting uneasiness. Apart from military measures, calculated to keep China under threat, Soviet diplomacy also seeks to counteract these developments, which Moscow interprets as a hostile effort at encirclement. Sometimes, this takes the form of attractive political and economic overtures; sometimes it involves threats. Usually, both elements are present. Thus, the Japanese and West Europeans and the Americans are simultaneously offered the rewards of détente but sternly warned against military cooperation with China. Elsewhere, the Soviets seek to offset alleged Chinese-inspired encirclement by efforts of their own to surround China with Soviet allies. Soviet policies designed to build influence in Third World areas by military support for and intervention in behalf of, so-called liberation movements and regimes engaged in "just" wars, are in part intended to pre-empt China's influence and to acquire allies against it.

The Soviet emergence into the world in search of beneficial economic, political and security connections makes it important for us to devise and to pursue a comprehensive strategy aimed at strengthening the incentives for restraint in all aspects of relations. Put most simply, and perhaps somewhat crudely, we and others must be clear among ourselves, and make it clear to the Soviets, that assertive uses of power, and efforts to shift the geo-political balance, are fundamentally incompatible with productive and constructive relations in other respects.

This is not the occasion to discuss in detail how these connections or "linkages" can and should be established and implemented. What is required in a broad and conscious attuning of cooperative projects and associations to military relations and the overall level of tensions and crises.

It is sometimes suggested that in the early seventies, the Administration of that day somehow deluded itself into believing that economic rewards and agreements on "rules of conduct", along with SALT I and other arms control agreements, would ensure moderate Soviet international conduct. This, I believe, is a caricature of what came to be called "détente".

Among the absolutely essential parts of the comprehensive approach developed in the early part of this decade were to have been: (1) An effective balance across the whole range of military power; and (2) the maintenance of high risks, if necessary by unambiguous demonstration of our readiness and ability to react to militant behavior. In both these crucial respects, we fell short of what we should have done. Important defense programs lagged, in part due to Congressional action and, more recently, also due to curtailments by the Administration. And in several instances of Soviet intervention, directly and by proxy, we failed to achieve the necessary consensus at home that our interests were threatened and that this required action on our part. The element of risk was kept excessively low. (It should be added that positive incentives for Soviet restraint were not particularly high either. There has, for example, been little in our trade and other policies to suggest to the Soviets that a coherent pattern of benefits is to be derived from moderation.)

In sum, Mr. Chairman, we must see our relations with the U.S.S.R. in their totality. We must recognize that the Soviets are driven by powerful impulses to amass military strength and, on that basis, to consolidate and expand their status as a power with world-wide interests and ambitions. This quest for status is not limited by a desire to attain "equality" or "parity" but is dynamic and open-handed. The most effective way for us to deal with this aspect of Soviet reality is to maintain our own end of the military balance and to make certain that our military power is known and seen to be usable. Arms control agreements, including the area of strategic weapons can play a modest role in contributing to military balance; but they may also make it more difficult to maintain balance. In any event, however, our own defense programs will remain the principal means by which we maintain balance and these must, therefore, be our overriding concern.

Military balance and maintaining high risks for predatory actions by the Soviets provide a basis for pursuing other policies utilizing the Soviet need for, and reluctant but real interest in, beneficial relations with the outside world. We must establish and pursue in practice more explicit connections between the state of military and security relations and these other aspects. It is possible that over time the economic shortcomings of the Soviet system, in part caused by its militarization, will induce Soviet leaders to practice greater military restraint and to seek more far-reaching arms control limitations. But this is likely, if at all, only as a result of sustained policies by us and others which make clear to the Soviets: (1) The futility of seeking military advantage; (2) the risks of using military power, directly or indirectly, for aggrandizement; and (3) that there is a direct connection between the relief and benefits the Soviet Union can expect from the external world on the one hand, and the manner in which it defines and pursues its interests and uses its power, on the other.

I believe, in conclusion, that SALT agreements pursued and concluded in isolation from these considerations, that is, on the basis of narrow technical "merits", are unhelpful and therefore undesirable. SALT, particularly, because of its at best marginal effects cannot carry the burden of regulating American-Soviet relations. The historical record does not bear out the proposition that arms control agreements, SALT included, lead to better, more restrained relations. On the contrary, the more poorly managed the relationship with the U.S.S.R. the more prolonged and tortuous the negotiations, and the more likely that whatever results they may produce will be negated by intensified military programs.

SALT must support what we can fundamentally do only by our unilateral, and Allied, military programs. This is the military test that must be applied to the SALT process and the present treaty.

Completion of the ratification process for this treaty, in my view, requires that there should be precise answers to the questions that have been raised concerning the impact of particular SALT provisions on needed American programs and on various existing and future forms of cooperation with Allies. In addition, it is essential that Congressional action this year—before final disposition of the treaty—firmly establish these programs in our defense budget and force planning. It is not too late to act on the premise that SALT is a function of security policy, rather than the other way around.

Finally, within the context of our defense policies, SALT should be an integral part of a wider strategy encompassing all phases of relations with the U.S.S.R. and designed to constrain the militant and aggrandizing aspects of Soviet conduct while maximizing stakes in more disciplined and beneficial relationships with us and in the world at large.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Sonnenfeldt, for an excellent presentation.

Our final witness this morning is a scholar who has also played an important role in our public debate over the nature of the Soviet challenge and the form of America's response to it. Prof. Richard Pipes of Harvard University is one of many very distinguished Cambridge sages who have found willing students on the banks of the Potomac as well as the Charles. As a researcher, he is intimately acquainted with Russia under the old regime. As a policy advisor, he has been nominated by a New York Times columnist for a high post in Washington's next Republican regime. In fact, his advice was already sought by the CIA when it looked for authorities on Soviet affairs to pit against its own analysts, by the Committee on the Present Danger when its executive committee sought authoritative academic advocates of its views.

Professor Pipes, I do not know what your prospects are for becoming a permanent Washingtonian, but in any case we are happy to receive you this morning in these hearings, and I invite you now to make your presentation, and then we will go to questions.

Senator JAVITS. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. May I just apologize to both witnesses? I must leave promptly at 12:30, but I hope to hear all of Mr. Pipe's opening statement.

**STATEMENT OF PROF. RICHARD PIPES, HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
CAMBRIDGE, MASS.**

Mr. PIPES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the purpose of my testimony is to explain Soviet attitudes toward nuclear weapons, toward the prospect of nuclear war, and towards the arms limitation process. I will address myself obliquely to several critical questions which have loomed behind these hearings from the outset: for example, why do the Russians insist on the right to the exclusive possession of modern heavy missiles? Why do they demand the protocol and the noncircumvention clause? In other words, why do they make so much of all those things which we are told by the advocates of SALT II have no military value, and if conceded will not in the least affect U.S. security? In dealing with my subject, I shall draw on Soviet military literature and what we know of Soviet strategic deployments, reinforcing both sources of information with references to Soviet history and politics. It clearly is essential to try to understand Soviet behavior in terms of Soviet traditions, values and aspirations, which unfortunately is not always done by the treaty's more zealous advocates.

The Soviet regime has from its inception placed great reliance on military instrumentalities both to insure its internal security and to pursue its external goals. Russia is an inherently poor country, and the Communist system, by depriving the population of meaningful incentives, guarantees that it remains poor. At the same time, however, the Communist system, which places the country's entire human and economic resources in the hands of a self-perpetuating elite of rulers is excellently suited for purposes of military mobilization. Such power as the Soviet Union enjoys in the world today is due almost exclusively to its military might.

In a world from which all weapons would be banned, the Soviet Union would at once become a second-rate power, since it possesses neither the civilization nor the material wealth that would qualify

it as a superpower. Contrary to some of the sentiments expressed in the debate over SALT II, there is no contradiction between Soviet Russia's low-living standards and her willingness to commit immense funds for armaments. The Soviet military drive is in fact a natural corollary of endemic poverty. These economic factors making for militarism are reinforced by an ideology which views the modern age as a time of a life or death struggle between capitalism and socialism. Militarism is the very essence of the Communist mentality. It has aptly been said that Lenin put Clausewitz on his head by transforming politics into the pursuit of war by other means.

When nuclear weapons first made their appearance, the Soviet Government found itself in a quandary. It realized their potential importance early enough. As we now know, Stalin had a research program to construct atomic weapons under way at the very outbreak of World War II, but the United States forged ahead and hence for some time a tendency prevailed in the Soviet Union to denigrate the effectiveness of these new weapons. Immediately after Stalin's death, a keen debate developed in Russia on the subject in which the professional military played a key role. The conclusion reached some time in the late 1950's and signaled by the establishment of the Strategic Rocket Forces as a separate, fourth branch of the armed services, was that nuclear weapons have indeed become the decisive weapons of modern warfare—the very opposite conclusion from the one reached more or less concurrently by America's civilian strategists.

Soviet nuclear strategy as well as the political strategy that accompanies it is internally consistent and intellectually impressive—at any rate to anyone who is not “a priori” convinced that the Russian military have nothing to teach us. It rests on several related propositions.

One, the introduction of nuclear weapons with intercontinental delivery vehicles has revolutionized warfare in the sense that henceforth the ultimate objective of all war, which is to incapacitate the enemy's military forces, can be attained directly and immediately rather than gradually by means of many separate operations.

Two, within that context, the traditional principles of the science of war remain fully intact. The advantages of preemption, of superior quantity and quality, of good defenses, et cetera, are as valid in the age of hydrogen bombs as they had been in that of gunpowder.

Three, even under the most auspicious circumstances, however, nuclear weapons cause such widespread destruction that great power conflict which may lead to nuclear war ought to be avoided to the maximum extent possible: In the nuclear age the struggle with capitalism must of necessity assume indirect forms such as flanking movements, proxy wars, seizure of energy resources, and all the other forms which are subsumed under the general title of *détente*.

Four, it is nevertheless possible that *détente* may fail, and an all-out war with the United States break out, either as the result of a local crisis getting out of control or the United States, isolated and driven against the wall, lashing out in a Samson-like act of univer-

sal destruction; this contingency calls for the ability to deliver a quick surgical preemptive strike designed to eliminate as much of the enemy's nuclear arsenal as possible and thereby to reduce to the utmost his ability to inflict damage.

It is sometimes said that the Soviet war-winning strategy is irrational, and need not be taken seriously in view of the indisputable fact that a Soviet first strike against the United States would surely invite a devastating counterattack on Soviet cities and industrial centers. To say that, however, is to assume that a Soviet first strike would come about as the result of a coldblooded calculation. Such an out of the blue assault is not part of Soviet doctrine, and no responsible specialist considers it likely. A Soviet decision to preempt would come under conditions of extreme crisis, after the Soviet leadership had concluded that general war has become unavoidable. It would not be an act of bold adventurism, but of desperation; its aim would be to minimize inevitable casualties and losses. It must be realized that inasmuch as fractionalization of nuclear warheads allows one missile to destroy several enemy nuclear systems, under conditions of modern war preemption today is even more attractive militarily than it has been in the past.

The Soviet strategic buildup must be understood in the light of these premises and expectations. The Soviet Union has never adopted our doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction; nor has it ever been content with parity or essential equivalence. These are concepts of people who do not believe in the military and political utility of nuclear weapons. Once it has made up its mind on this issue, the Soviet Union has consistently striven to attain overwhelming strategic superiority that would make allowance for all kinds of unforeseen contingencies as well as for the prospect, which it takes seriously, of a protracted nuclear conflict.

In these calculations, SALT is assigned a role of some prominence, not as a vehicle for general disarmament, as it is with us, but as a device which inhibits U.S. responses to Soviet long-term strategic programs.

One, on the most elementary level, SALT fixes the number of American systems and therefore facilitates the task of estimating what is required to render them harmless in the event of war under conditions which I have outlined.

Two, on a higher level, it alleviates in some degree Russia's recurrent nightmare lest an American technological breakthrough—such as the ABM and the cruise missile—suddenly nullify the rather ponderous and incremental Soviet buildup. In this sense, the acronym SALT can properly be deciphered to read, "Stop the American Lead in Technology."

Three, last but not least, SALT creates in the United States a political atmosphere that is not conducive to defense expenditures. It persuades much of the public that any improvements in strategic forces are destabilizing and at the same time inhibits the U.S. Government from funding weapons programs which may be limited or even prohibited by future arms limitation treaties.

All these features of SALT are inherently so beneficial to the Soviet Union that it understandably likes to depict SALT as the lynchpin of détente, as it depicts détente as the only alternative to nuclear holocaust. It is not so apparent why an American adminis-

tration would adopt this point of view unless it believes that SALT can be translated into domestic political benefits at a minimum military risk.

To conclude, let me address myself to the question of what is likely to happen should SALT II, for whatever reason, not come into force.

There is no cause to believe that the Senate's assertion of its constitutional prerogative to amend or reject this treaty outright will result in any of the harrowing scenarios with which we are being regaled. The inability of the great powers to agree on the terms of a treaty resolving the differences does not in and of itself cause the relationship to deteriorate. For the latter to occur, there must be other, more positive reasons driving them towards hostility. The Soviet leadership has entered into SALT negotiations not in order to maintain a favorable climate of United States-Soviet relations, for had it desired the latter it would not have dispatched military advisors and mercenaries to the four corners of the world following the signature of SALT I.

It has entered into these negotiations in the hope of securing the distinct military and political advantages enumerated above. Should SALT II fail, the Russians would promptly write it off as a bad investment, and try to secure the same results by other means, if necessary, by a more equitable SALT. Their military programs, already operating at peak capacity, are not likely to be accelerated in any significant way as a result.

There is something very dubious about the proposition, advanced by both the United States and Soviet administrations that we either ratify this treaty as written and advance along the royal road toward peace, or else risk growing enmity and war. Such doomsday scenarios are not only unrealistic, they place in doubt the very basis of the proposed accord, and I am speaking here as a historian.

The viability of international treaties ultimately depends on a combination of self-interest and good will of the signatories. Either such self-interest and good will exist in respect to SALT II, in which case the parties ought to be willing to negotiate and renegotiate its terms until they arrive at a generally acceptable agreement; or else these qualities are lacking, in which case the treaty will not hold in any event and ought to be rejected. Realistically speaking, no treaty can be said to advance the cause of peace if its sole alternative is hostility and all-out war. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Professor Pipes.

I will try to keep my questions brief because of the hour.

You make a point in your statement about Soviet activity in the Third World as proving Russian disinterest in the maintenance of a favorable climate between the United States and themselves. That puzzles me. I have not heard any spokesman for the treaty, for the administration or any advocate outside the administration who has spoken for the treaty claim that the Soviets were acting or were likely to act out of an interest in good will.

In other words, that strikes me as falling outside the scope of the arguments that have been made for or against the treaty.

Mr. PIPES. The argument which is made in favor of the treaty by most of its advocates runs roughly as follows: "Certainly, this is not a perfect treaty. There are many things wrong with it, but it is the lynchpin of détente, and détente is quintessential to gradual improvement in American-Soviet relations. Therefore, we ought to ratify this treaty, which does not inhibit our matching the Soviet buildup, for the purpose of maintaining the process of arms limitations, or, if you will, the dialog between us and the Soviet Union." They lay great emphasis on the importance of SALT in the development of general American-Soviet relations.

I, on the other hand argue that the Soviet Union does not look at it in this long-term political way. Rather, it looks at SALT as essentially a military treaty, inhibiting American military development, and it will go on doing what they are doing in the rest of the world because it is in this sense that they define détente.

The CHAIRMAN. In my experience, I have never attended lengthy or extensive hearings on this committee having to do with a so-called arms control agreement that involved such a vigorous presentation for a much larger American arms budget. Nearly everybody has come here to say yes, SALT, in the context of a bigger arms budget, yes, SALT, because it helps to improve American prospects for doing what it should do militarily.

Maybe this is a beginning of an American consensus that links these two things together, and it will only strengthen our resolve to make certain that our military is sufficiently strong. You would at least acknowledge the possibility that your political judgment in that respect might not be infallible.

Mr. PIPES. In respect to what?

The CHAIRMAN. With respect to the fact that the Senate's ratification of the treaty would undermine America's resolve to maintain an adequate defense budget.

Mr. PIPES. I do not say that. I say that this is a Soviet expectation.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you share that expectation?

Mr. PIPES. I would say if you look at the experience of SALT I, yes, they have a point. I think these hearings to some extent will overcome this danger, but the hearings on SALT I, which were to some extent perfunctory had led to this consequence. It has been very difficult for U.S. administrations to fund strategic programs even psychologically because SALT I created the impression in this country that we have attained stability and therefore anything we would do would be destabilizing.

Now, what I say here is: This is how they view the matter. This expectation is an added bonus for them in the SALT agreement.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I can assure you that none of the testimony that we have received even by the most spirited proponents of the treaty have suggested that our ratification of the treaty will place us on the royal road to peace, as you say, or that its rejection would result in growing enmity and war, as you say.

Now, those may be the ultimate choices for this generation, and should that happen, should nuclear war happen, I think that those who survive will look back on the occasion and curse all of us for having failed to take the necessary steps to prevent it.

I do not regard SALT as a very daring step in the direction of reduced nuclear arms. The question I would put to you is about the process itself, whether it is another step in the process that could lead to some meaningful reductions in the future.

You have heard Ambassador Toon say he thought it would keep alive the hope. What do you think?

Mr. PIPES. I see no reason to think so. I think you will agree, Senator Church, that this is not an arms limitation treaty, really. I listened on television to most of the testimony of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, and it is very clear to us that upon the expiration of the treaty both parties will have more warheads and strategic weapons in general than they have right now.

Now, one can argue that without the treaty there would be even more of a strategic buildup. That is an argument that I do not quite buy, but I think one can argue that way. That argument carried some weight when the Interim Agreement was signed. Then it was said that by the time we got to SALT II we would have real cutbacks. Well, they have not occurred. Now we are told these will happen in SALT III. I worry that this will not be the case either because when SALT III will be negotiated, we will be in a position of such vast inferiority in almost all respects except numbers of warheads, which I do not think have much meaning, that we will have to take the best bargain we can—and if SALT II will produce arms limitation, it will be largely on our side again.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sonnenfeldt, let me ask you a question that occurred to me during your testimony. You said that there was some connection between SALT and what we might do. You mentioned the M-X, and said, the fact that we must build it in a verifiable mode illustrates the connection. Well, wouldn't we want to build it in a verifiable mode anyway, because of the element of instability that would be injected into the nuclear arms balance if we began to hide weapons?

Mr. SONNENFELDT. Senator Church, I think the irony, even from an arms control standpoint, is that a mobile missile makes for stability and it is a matter of relative inconsequence whether we can see it and count it.

The CHAIRMAN. Why?

Mr. SONNENFELDT. Because the missiles, that is, the launchers themselves by their mobility are invulnerable, and therefore the capacity that a large mobile missile force might provide for a disarming counterforce strike against another mobile force is very limited.

Of course, the problem that we have and will have for a long time ahead is that there would be a mixed force of mobile and fixed missiles. But from a purely arms control standpoint we would both be better off if our missiles were mobile and we would be far less sensitive to whether our count may be wrong by 10 or 12 or 15 or 20.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but certainly numbers are the other part of the equation, and if we had no way of knowing whether the Russians had 10 mobile missiles or 1,000, we would feel ourselves in a highly precarious position, would we not?

Mr. SONNENFELDT. Certainly as long as we rely as much as we do on our fixed Minuteman force, which, though small in comparison to Soviet fixed forces, is our most reliable and most flexible force, this is a problem. But I have another concern, Senator Church. It is that I think it may prove to be the case that by having to have the verifiability criterion for the M-X basing mode, we will in fact be driven to other basing modes that will be open to serious question in regard to cost, environmental considerations, and so on.

I am therefore not as persuaded as perhaps some others that the issue of the M-X is a settled issue. The fact that verifiability is one of the principal criteria to which we must now adhere in regard to M-X deployment complicates that problem, and is one of the reasons why I have testified to you that it is one of the issues I would like to see settled before one can—I don't want to give you advice, but before I personally would want to see any definitive action taken in disposition of this treaty.

QUESTION OF CRUISE MISSILE AND ALLIED COOPERATION

The CHAIRMAN. You also mentioned the cruise missile question and the question of our cooperation with allies. Do you see these as preconditions for ratification of the treaty?

Mr. SONNENFELDT. I would like to see the ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles properly funded to the extent that authorizations can and must be gotten this year. I would like to see us firmly committed the procurement of those weapons systems. In short, I do not believe it is sufficient to contend, which is almost a tautology under our law, that the protocol cannot be extended without further action by two-thirds of the Senate.

I would like to know as clearly as one can, barely 2 years before the lapse of the protocol, that it is not in fact the intention of anyone to seek the extension of the protocol, that there is not in fact any intention under foreseeable circumstances to curtail these programs. I happened to listen to some testimony before this committee some days ago in which one of the administration witnesses suggested that of course we ought to retain our options because it is conceivable that the Soviets may make an offer we cannot resist, such as offering to throw away all of their land-based ICBM's.

Now, I know this witness acknowledged he was giving an example of an absurd proposition, but one man's absurdity may be another man's intriguing possibility. These programs are essential to a viable NATO European defense strategy and I would like to see any question removed regarding the possibility that that part of the protocol, or restrictions in some other form, would continue in effect.

Moreover, were the protocol restrictions in some way to continue in effect, the administration's negotiated statement—of June 29, 1979—with the allies concerning nontransfer would also come into play, because we would then have a prohibited weapon and the transfer situation with respect to prohibited weapons is quite different from the transfer situation with respect to limited weapons.

The CHAIRMAN. My time is up. Senator Javits has asked me to put one question to our witnesses on his time. His question is whether you would vote—if you were a Senator—for or against ratification on the SALT Treaty.

Mr. SONNENFELDT. If I were to vote today, which fortunately you gentlemen do not have to do, I would have the greatest hesitation in voting for it. I am hoping that this process—and I am sorry to use the word “process,” which is the most overworked word at both ends of town these days—but I would hope that this process that you and the other committees are going through would make this a ratifiable treaty.

I have raised a couple of issues about which I feel very strongly, and I may say if to clarify them means having to go back to the Soviets, although I have an open mind on that, I would be prepared to see us do so. I would like to be able to support this treaty. I could not do it today, but I would hope that perhaps by October or November, when and if the issues have been clarified, and the budget in all its aspects passed through the Congress, and the defense programs put on course, I would like then to be able to be in a position to vote for this treaty were I to be a Senator, which I am not.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Sonnenfeldt. I think you can thank your lucky stars for that. [General laughter.]

Senator Hayakawa.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry, I have no questions to address directly to you, Dr. Sonnenfeldt. I have to worry about the small farmer, among other things, and was unable to be here through your presentation and did not have a chance to hear it.

Mr. SONNENFELDT. He makes the world go around, Senator. I think you did the right thing.

Senator HAYAKAWA. However, I am very glad I got here in time to hear Dr. Pipes, whose testimony I find extraordinarily persuasive. Let me see if I understand you correctly. Did you say that on the whole, we as Americans tend to think that other peoples in the world, whether in Asia or Europe, are sort of like ourselves, understandably so in our terms, human, but you are saying Soviet society is essentially profoundly different, and it is run, as you say, in a country in which the entire human and economic resources are in the hands of a self-perpetuating elite, and whatever the wish of the common people, its ultimate aim is military modernization of the whole society, and the aim of the whole society is warlike.

Is that your statement?

Mr. PIPES. That is correct. We have special difficulty allowing for the Russians to be different from us. We have not so much difficulty with people who are racially very distinct. Nobody will approach, say, an African tribesman with the notion that he is just a backward American.

When we are dealing with the Russians, we have a special problem, because they are of the same race, they have much of the same cultural background, a Christian background, and they speak a language that belongs to the Indo-European family. Therefore, it is very difficult for us to see the fundamental differences dividing their history and civilization from our own.

As a Russian historian, I have to battle against the tendency of people to blur these differences all the time, because that is the easy thing to do.

Senator HAYAKAWA. That, I think, is what gives your testimony its particular force and persuasiveness, Dr. Pipes. I am very, very glad that I got here in time to hear you. There are some ancillary questions that were raised in my mind. How do you explain then our allies and their desire to see us ratify the SALT Treaty?

According to reports we have received, they are unanimous in wishing us to ratify it. Are they in fact actually that unanimous?

Mr. PIPES. I think this question can be answered in several ways. I think what they say publicly and what they say privately is not quite the same thing. What they say publicly, at least those who are now in office, is, I believe, due to two kinds of considerations. One is direct pressures from the Carter administration. It is very difficult for a European leader whose security, after all, ultimately depends on the American deterrent, to come out and say, no; "the American administration is making a bad deal." He really would find that extremely difficult to say even if he believed in it.

Second, I think there is a belief in Europe that SALT—I think it is a false belief, but nevertheless it exists—that SALT would lead to a decrease in expenditures on strategic weapons and that the money saved in this fashion would go for beefing up conventional forces in Europe.

I think both of these factors play a role, but I also think if you talk to Europeans privately you will find many more doubts than they are willing to express publicly.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Do you think if the treaty were signed we would beef up our forces in Europe, our conventional forces in Europe?

Mr. PIPES. First of all, I do not believe that this treaty is going to lead to a great saving of money. Second, even if it should lead to it, I don't quite believe that there will be direct transfer of the funds of beefing up NATO forces.

Senator HAYAKAWA. One of my concerns with the treaty, Dr. Pipes, is whether or not it would act as a kind of tranquilizer to our public, so that we would relax our efforts to maintain our defense posture.

Mr. PIPES. Yes. Senator Church questioned me on this. I think the experience of SALT I suggests that the Russian expectation of it acting as a tranquilizer is to some extent justified. I do feel, however, that the present debates to the extent that they are nationally followed, will have a sobering effect, because there are two messages getting across to the people at large: "It is not a good treaty. You can't trust these Russians, and maybe there ought to be amendments, maybe it ought to be rejected. But no matter what we do, we have to beef up our defense forces." On the second proposition, I think there is a broad consensus across the country.

From that point of view, these debates are fulfilling a useful educational function.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you very, very much, Dr. Pipes.

Senator BIDEN [presiding]. Dr. Pipes, I have several questions.

You indicated in a rather bold statement that we will be inferior in all aspects except warheads. Tell me, will we be inferior in terms of launchers?

Mr. PIPES. We are inferior right now because the figures of launchers from the Interim Agreement to the present have always been higher in favor of the Russians.

Senator BIDEN. But the passage of SALT requires that there be the same number of launchers. Now, how will we be inferior?

Mr. PIPES. You measure missiles or launchers not only in numbers but also in throw-weight.

Senator BIDEN. No, you don't. I don't know anybody who does measure it that way. Let's talk about how it is measured. Let's talk about warheads, launchers, megatonnage, and accuracy. What other elements of the strategic mix are there that determine whether or not there is parity? Tell me one other one.

Mr. PIPES. Senator, you know very well there are very many, including throw-weight.

Senator BIDEN. I said accuracy, megatonnage, warheads, and launchers. What else is there?

Mr. PIPES. How will you guarantee equal accuracy? How can you do that?

Senator BIDEN. By our verification capability.

Mr. PIPES. But there are no limits placed on accuracy improvements.

Senator BIDEN. But we know what they have.

Mr. PIPES. That is correct, but you know very well that ICBM's are far more accurate than SLBM's.

Senator BIDEN. But we also know very well that the cruise missile is more accurate than the ICBM.

We also know that our ICBM's are more accurate than their ICBM's.

Mr. PIPES. I understand this, Senator, but there are very many, as you know, criteria by which you judge.

Senator BIDEN. I do not know anyone in the strategic community who has suggested through weeks of hearings that now, in the near future, or in the long-term future the Soviets will equal or surpass our accuracy. Do you know of any?

Mr. PIPES. I am not saying that, Senator.

Senator BIDEN. What are you saying?

Mr. PIPES. I am saying, if you take throw-weight as your basic factor, throw-weight which allows you to put on your missiles larger warheads, with greater yields and if you then catch up in accuracy, which is not controlled and is uncontrollable, you then are getting much greater destructive capacity, with the same number of launchers and warheads.

Senator BIDEN. But isn't it true that in the treaty, for the first time we control fractionation? Isn't throw-weight and launch-weight a future argument? Isn't it only relevant as it relates to the number of RV's that are placed on the head of that post-boost vehicle?

Mr. PIPES. We are controlling through this treaty the number of warheads which either party can put on its missiles. That is correct, and that is, as far as I can see, the only positive achievement of this treaty, assuming it can be verified. I see no others, but I grant that this is a certain plus.

You are questioning my statement that the Soviet Union will be superior by 1985. It will be superior because it will have an equal

number of missiles with a higher throw-weight and an accuracy approaching ours. If you know the relationship between accuracy, yield, and destructiveness, you know what this means.

Senator BIDEN. But the fact of the matter, though, is, isn't that countered by the number of warheads?

Mr. PIPES. We shall have equal numbers of warheads of different yields. They shall have larger warheads with equal accuracy or, in some ways better overall accuracy, because ICBM's—which constitute the bulk of their forces—by their very nature are more accurate than SLBM's—which predominate in our forces.

Senator BIDEN. But they do not have superior accuracy. There is no evidence that they do have. They don't even have equal accuracy.

Mr. PIPES. They are approaching it very rapidly.

Senator BIDEN. They do not have equal accuracy.

Mr. PIPES. I beg to differ with you, Senator.

Senator BIDEN. Let me ask you, Mr. Sonnenfeldt, you suggested that on the protocol we should be more definite about not extending it. My experience after several weeks of sitting here listening to the testimony is that the Secretary of Defense of the United States has indicated that there is no intention to extend the protocol, and that we have had in the negotiating documents our assertion that we have no intention of extending the protocol.

Public statements by administration witnesses and others have declared that we will not extend the protocol, and in fact we are moving rapidly forward to be able to deploy the very thing that is precluded in the protocol.

Now, I wonder what else we can do other than never having agreed to the protocol in the first instance?

Mr. SONNENFELDT. That would have been helpful. I am glad that you are as certain, Senator, of these matters as you are. I do think, however, that we need an affirmative and binding commitment. We need to buttress such a commitment by what we do in appropriations and authorizations, and also by what we are doing in regard to the basing and launching modes, particularly of the ground-launched cruise missile.

Senator BIDEN. Now we are talking about something beyond the protocol.

Mr. SONNENFELDT. We are talking about a commitment to a program, so that when the date of December 1981 approaches—and that is just 2 years away, more or less, by the time the treaty is ratified, if you ratify it—we will have ongoing programs which it will not be argued are so modest at that point that we are giving up nothing in exchange for something that may be offered us from the other side, or in response to some threat that may be made by the other side, for example, that with the lapse of the protocol, the Soviets will go into a major and rapid mobile missile program apart from the SS-16.

In other words, we must be in a position by the time this protocol ends not to be either tempted or threatened by what the other side may propose to cut our losses or to curtail programs to which we are not yet fully committed at that time.

Senator BIDEN. You mentioned nontransferability of technology.

Mr. PIPES. Senator Biden, may I just add a footnote to this, please?

Senator BIDEN. You can after I ask my questions. I have only 2 minutes left. You have all the time in the world, so you can beat the system by continuing to talk, and I can't.

With regard to your statement, Mr. Sonnenfeldt, about nontransferability, my understanding was that was the language that the Soviets sought. We rejected that and put in noncircumvention and have subsequently defined noncircumvention as not in any way precluding our transfer of any technology to our allies.

Mr. SONNENFELDT. Excuse me, Senator. The phrase is "not necessarily" on page 2 of the June 29, 1979, statement. That is a little different from what you have just said.

Now, I do not want to raise questions on the relationship with the allies in a session such as this.

Senator BIDEN. Why not?

Mr. SONNENFELDT. Because I happen to have devoted my life in Government to NATO and the building of our alliance relationships, and I do not want to sit here to question what administration witnesses have said concerning their intentions in regard to case-by-case decisions on cooperation with allies. But I do think it is important that in some way this issue be resolved very clearly.

Senator BIDEN. How would you suggest?

Mr. SONNENFELDT. I would refer you to the sentence in the statement at the North Atlantic Council which is in the record here and which, I take it, some people suggest ought to be part of the treaty.

With respect to systems numerically limited in the agreement, which I presume affects these, transfers would not be necessarily precluded by the agreement.

Senator BIDEN. Does that not merely mean that we are maintaining the option as to whether or not we transfer? In a given case, we may not wish to transfer technology irrespective of what the Soviet position is.

Mr. SONNENFELDT. I completely agree that we should have a policy of our own with respect to the issue of transfers, but what I am concerned about is that there not be a shred of prior commitment to the Soviets on that matter. Incidentally, it is not just transfer of technology but the whole question of how these forces are coordinated within the alliance, and the extent of assistance to or cooperation with the British or an independent British force, be it of ALCM's or of SLCM's. I think it is absolutely essential that the whole range of cooperation from technology all the way to close coordination, joint targeting, and so on, be in no way inhibited by commitments we may have made to the Soviets.

For other reasons, we, or they on the European side may decide to go some different way. That is another matter, but I do not believe that we should have prior commitments or even the possibility of a commitment to the Soviets in regard to these matters.

Senator BIDEN [presiding]. I fully agree, but my time is up. Senator Lugar?

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I suppose one of the frustrations that those of us on the committee who are less than enthusiastic about the treaty face

is the major suppositions about the Soviet Union and their history, both recent and past.

It seems to me that both of you have focused on this in a way that is very important. For example, Mr. Sonnenfeldt has mentioned that the Soviets, whatever might be our desire for stability, have not shared that fear of destabilization. Mr. Sonnenfeldt, you mentioned as I recall, the continued work on the SS-19 and the SS-18, clearly large counterforce weapons, and work on anti-satellite systems, the so-called killer satellite project, which are clearly destabilizing.

The fact is, work continues there, and work on antimissile defense systems continues. I have tried to question witnesses and point out that I do not think the B-52 is a very certain leg as the second leg of our Triad, and we keep getting insistence that 75 percent are going to go back and forth in Soviet airspace with relative impunity, which in my judgment is incredible.

The point you are making is that the Soviets, whatever may be their general posture, have not been that concerned about destabilization. As a matter of fact, Mr. Sonnenfeldt, you contend that whereas we take a look at the situation as a force that has deterrence, you say that the Soviets in fact are prepared to actually procure such forces to fight wars, and there is the further proposition that while we tend on the whole to see nuclear wars as unwinnable in any meaningful sense, the Soviets regard them as winnable. If war were to come, they would intend to fight it through to victory.

Now, this is a critical point. Again and again, various Senators or various witnesses start out by saying nuclear war is unthinkable, it is unwinnable. We do not know what the word "advantage" would mean. All of that sort of testimony has floated through.

Now, do you mean what you say here? Are you saying that the Soviets regard nuclear war as winnable, and furthermore, that they are prepared to fight and win? They would prefer not to fight a war, mind you, but they are prepared to be expansive and dominant, and if anybody finally contests their world view they will fight wars if certain inconveniences occur.

Would you comment again on that?

Mr. SONNENFELDT. You have described my view of the matter accurately; maybe more cogently and consequently slightly more categorically than I did, but I think in essence I agree with it. But I think that the answer to that proposition is to prove the invalidity, to demonstrate the invalidity of these Soviet views. This is why I harped again and again in this testimony and elsewhere on the necessity to keep the risks high for Soviet assertive behavior, not only in the military realm, but in the political realm. Incidentally, there was an earlier colloquy in response to a question from you, Senator Lugar, as to whether the Soviets are likely to take greater risks in the next generation because of their military growth. I think the danger is not so much that they see themselves taking greater risks, but rather that a particular course of action strikes them as not carrying great risks because of the way they calculate the balance.

Consequently, I think it is essential and absolutely vital to our well-being, but also vital to any kind of effective policy toward the

Soviet Union, that the risks are kept high and that the Soviets recognize at all times that the risks are high. I would say one of the criteria by which an arms control agreement should be judged—and I think arms control agreements can have some effect on the pace with which these things develop and their predictability, and therefore I think we ought to pursue them, but I think one of the criteria that has to be used in judging them is, do they help us keep the risks high?

Senator LUGAR. Right.

Now, if we are really antiwar, antinuclear war, indeed, anti any kind of war, your testimony is that you must keep the risks high so that our credibility is there. Now, along comes Dr. Pipes, and he points out three things that this particular SALT Treaty does. On the elementary level, SALT fixes the number of American systems and therefore facilitates the task of estimating what is required to render them harmless; namely, the targets are there, and we are determined that they be totally verifiable. We are determined even though it may compromise the security of our system that the Soviets can count, target, and know precisely what they need to do to destroy each of our sites.

That is hardly an escalation of the risk for the Soviets.

Second, it alleviates in some manner Russia's recurrent nightmare lest an American technological breakthrough such as the ABM or cruise missile suddenly nullifies their gains once again. This treaty has removed the possibility for such a breakthrough. Indeed, there are some in this committee and in this Senate that would say that was destabilizing, to even proceed in such a fashion.

Third, last but not least, SALT creates in the United States a political atmosphere that is not conducive to defense expenditures, and persuades much of the public that any improvements in strategic forces are destabilizing, and at the same time inhibits the United States from funding programs which may be limited or even prohibited by future arms limitation treaties. In short, I agree with you.

You have pointed out, both of you, good reasons why we may never build the M-X, and you are right. Why, in fact, we may extend the protocol forever, and you are right. This is the dilemma that I think we are in as we take a look at this.

Mr. SONNENFELDT. If I may say so, Senator, since it is a dilemma, there are two horns, and we do not necessarily have to be impaled on both of them.

First of all, to be able to count a weapon does not necessarily mean that you can target it. What concerns us, of course, about the land-based missile force as it is now constituted, is that it is both countable and targetable and with a high probability in the next few years of a substantial kill ratio. The submarines can be counted because you can see them come out of the building sheds and so on, but it is much more difficult to target them at present.

My main concern about the submarines for the time being has to do with their command, communications and control. Aircraft can be counted, but you can alert them and you can keep them in the air and so on, so I think we have to be a little careful not to exaggerate, at least for the moment, this problem of counting and targeting.

What I was saying about the M-X is that the need to allow them to be counted greatly complicates our decisions on basing and may also make them more expensive. Consequently it may make our decisions more questionable in terms of their ultimate implementation than I personally would like. So, I would qualify what you have said on that score.

Second, in regard to technology, there is, of course, nothing in SALT that prevents the United States from using its technological advantage to look at various possible weapons systems to cope with our problem. That is true of defense. I do not think we should stop that. I even think that we ought to take a fresh look at air defense, quite apart from our ongoing programs on ABM point defense.

So, I see no intrinsic reason why we should not let our technology continue to provide us with considerable assets. I would only say these things to add to your presentation, sir, because I do not believe that the situation is quite as bleak as you say, and I do believe it is in our capacity to maintain the kinds of risks about which I was talking earlier.

I believe the most important role of these hearings and this process of ratification, as Senator Church was alluding to earlier, is to contribute to public awareness, congressional awareness and administration awareness that we face serious problems across the board in military relationships with the Soviet Union over the next 10 or 15 years.

I hope these hearings have already made a contribution which will be reflected in what we do in our defense budgets.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Pipes, do you have any further comment about your three points?

MR. PIPES. I would like to give you perhaps one concrete illustration of what is meant there. A lot has been made of the utility of cruise missiles as a counterforce weapon and of the fact that the protocol will expire in 2½ or 3 years, allowing us then to proceed with the deployments. This is not the Soviet view.

I would like to read to you a passage from Pravda of February 11, 1978. This is what it says—and as you know, nothing appears in Pravda without expressing the highest political consensus.

[U.S. SALT critics] would like to remove from the limitations sea-launched and surface-launched cruise missiles. This is in fact a blatant attempt to insure right now that after the 3 year term of the protocol ends, there is freedom of action to develop such missiles and increase their agreed range above 600 kilometers, and ultimately to retain the possibility of deploying them outside of the United States that is as close as possible to the Soviet borders. Comment, as they say, is superfluous. It is surely quite obvious this is yet another attempt to emasculate the limitations already agreed upon and to wreck the agreement as a whole.

The Russians are putting us on warning here that the attempt to construct and deploy land-based and sea-based cruise missiles with ranges above 600 kilometers after the expiration of the protocol will be viewed by them as a breach of the treaty.

I think very earnest attention ought to be paid to this statement, because otherwise it may happen that the Senate will agree within its own walls that there will be no extension of the protocol, but this may not be the Soviet view.

Senator LUGAR. I agree. I will not prolong the agony of you two gentlemen, who have been very patient witnesses and listeners all morning here, but I would comment as a member of the Intelli-

gence Committee, having heard the team A, team B controversy, that it is ironic that so much of the testimony during these hearings has been based, Professor Pipes, on the assumption that you were right rather than wrong. Your perception of Soviet will appears to have turned out to be a great deal more valid.

At the time the team A, team B exercise was occurring privately and then leaked publicly, and then in all of the aftermath of the restudy, the attempt was made, in my judgment, to prove not only that you were wrong, but almost injurious to the intelligence process of formulating the national estimates. I suspect there has been a remarkable shift without acknowledgment of that shift and of really how team A and team B came out. At least I have not seen any generous acknowledgment throughout the committee, either Intelligence Committee or Foreign Relations Committee or in the public in general.

Now, far be it from me to do this individually, but I do acknowledge the fact that I think your initial contribution was very helpful. Perhaps as both of you point out, although you have played to a limited audience of Senators, I am impressed, as is everybody else, with the fact that your team B episode played to a very limited and critical audience earlier on, too, and yet forms a basis for enlightened debate on the subject.

I am indebted to you on behalf of the committee. As I am the sole survivor, I thank you for appearing, and have been asked to announce that the committee will resume action in this room at 2 p.m. Senator Biden will chair the European Subcommittee, which will hear witnesses at that time.

Thank you, gentlemen. This committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 2 p.m. in room 4221 Dirksen Senate Office Building.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations met at 2:15 p.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph Biden (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Church, McGovern, Stone, Sarbanes, Javits, Percy, and Hayakawa.

Also present: Senator Mathias.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order.

OPENING SESSION

This afternoon, as part of the Foreign Relations Committee's consideration of the SALT II agreement, the Subcommittee on European Affairs will hear from three distinguished academicians on the subject of SALT and United States-Soviet relations.

Our witnesses, appearing as a panel, are Prof. Adam Ulam, who will analyze the goals of Soviet foreign policy; Dr. Robert Legvold, who will assess the doctrines and internal factors shaping that policy; and Prof. Donald Zagoria, who will discuss Soviet foreign policy with regard to China and the Third World.

We will proceed by having our witnesses make their presentations in the order that I named them, and then turn to questions afterwards. If, however, during the presentation, my colleagues wish to interject with a thought or question, I hope they will. I suggest also that we extend this informal approach to the question period, and that we avoid applying strict time limits.

We have a very distinguished panel and are fortunate to have you testify. You have all been very incisive and prolific in the areas on which you are going to speak. I look forward to hearing your testimony.

Professor Ulam, if you will begin.

STATEMENT OF PROF. ADAM B. ULAM, GURNEY PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

Mr. ULAM. The treaty which is before you has been characterized by some as being essential to the security of the United States, by others as posing grave dangers to it. There is, I believe, a general consensus that no strategic arms agreement can by itself guarantee security. Weapons do not make wars; states do.

NUCLEAR SUFFICIENCY OR DETERRENCE IN A CRISIS

What constitutes nuclear sufficiency or deterrence in a crisis lies not only in the objective data, but also in the eye of the beholder. And it does not make a difference whether the beholder is a democratic society like ours, a small group of men making policies in secret or not subject to many external constraints, or a nervous

ally of the United States whose statesmen are aware of how loath our leaders are, and rightly so, to incur even a slight risk of a nuclear confrontation.

Hence, it might have been avoidable, and it is regrettable that this country has allowed the Soviet Union to get ahead of it in certain categories of nuclear weapons. The current leaders of the U.S.S.R. are rational and prudent men, but those who come after them may not always be so. In any case, our policies should be such as to give them every possible incentive for additional prudence and restraint.

The treaty has been discussed mainly in terms of what it might do for our security in the most direct sense of the term. Whether and to what extent it would safeguard the territory of the United States from a nuclear attack. Yet, even under its most favorable interpretation, the present treaty does not guarantee the security of our allies, nor our access to vital raw materials, nor some other elements which add up to national security in the broader, but essential, sense.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF STRATEGIC ARMS AGREEMENT

Is the strategic arms agreement as currently framed likely to lead to more amicable relations with the Soviet Union, place restraints on its policies, and be productive of greater national security for the United States?

Here the record since SALT I has not been very encouraging. It was expected at the time that in addition to arms limitation, both powers would observe in their foreign policy a certain code of behavior which would inhibit them from encroaching on each other's vital interests.

Hence, SALT I was accompanied by a number of other agreements, such as the Berlin agreement, and other declarations, the general purpose of which was expressed in a statement signed by Messrs. Brezhnev and Nixon, the most salient part of which read:

The U.S.S.R. and the United States attach major importance to preventing the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations. . . . Both sides recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantages at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with these objectives.

SALT I, it is said, made possible détente. The alternative to détente, it is added, is a relapse into the cold war. Whatever the causes of the cold war, and many people have some extraordinarily muddled ideas on the subject, it is instructive to reflect that at no period prior to 1972, with the exception of the Berlin crisis and the Korean war, had Soviet policies been as consistently expansionist, as purposefully designed to undermine Western interests and influence as has been the case during the last few years.

Furthermore, Soviet actions on Berlin and Korea could be rationalized to some extent by the fact that they affected areas and issues which the Soviets, by their lights, saw as crucial to their security. During the last few years, Soviet expansion and their search for unilateral advantages at the expense of the West, and of international stability in general, has been directed at areas where no crucial interests of the Soviet Union are involved.

One can understand, if not justify, Soviet activities in the Near East—it is a region where historically the Russian state has long sought to obtain a foothold. But even old fashioned imperialism cannot explain Soviet intrusion into Africa, South Yemen, and their support of the replacement of an already friendly regime in Afghanistan by an out-and-out pro-Soviet one.

Economically such actions involve a not inconsiderable burden to the Soviet state. And so their only rationale must be that they undermine Western interests in those areas, and do harm to the prestige of the United States and its allies.

What must be of even greater concern is the new character of Soviet intervention in, up to now, Third World areas. For long the Soviets have assumed the prescriptive right to license any conflict in a country whose regime is even mildly pro-West or even neutralist as a "war of liberation" and to provide the insurrectionists with arms and other supplies. Beginning with the midseventies this approach has been supplemented by large-scale, under local circumstances, direct and open military intervention by the Soviet bloc forces, involving Cuban troops and Russian, East German, et cetera, officers.

SOVIET DESTABILIZING POLICIES AND SALT I LINKAGE

Let me add hastily that there is no direct evidence of a causal link between the Soviet decision to intensify their anti-Western and destabilizing policies and SALT I. In fact, as Communist spokesmen have themselves occasionally admitted, their changed tactics have been influenced mainly by what they perceive to be the growing political and economic weakness of the West, the energy crisis and recession, and the debilitating effects of Vietnam and Watergate on America's society, and hence its ability and determination to protect its own and its friends' interests abroad. But what has been happening since SALT I throws some light on the one argument used in support of the present treaty; without it, we would not be able to continue our hitherto quite satisfactory relations with the Soviets.

In making this point to some of my friends in the administration, I often encountered the counterargument that by its very nature détente between two such powers must imply a relationship partly competitive, and partly cooperative in its nature.

The sad fact is that competition, if such it has been, has come mainly from the U.S.S.R., cooperation from the United States. This country and other Western industrial nations have undoubtedly greatly helped the Soviets' economy at a time when its hitherto spectacular growth has begun to level off, by expanding their trade with the U.S.S.R., and by providing it with some of their most sophisticated technology.

By contracting to ship great quantities of grain to the U.S.S.R., America has been helping the regime to avoid food shortages occasioned by periodically bad harvests, as well as by the inefficient organization of Soviet agriculture. When it comes to trade with the U.S.S.R., the distinction between goods with or without military significance is not very meaningful. Foreign help, by contributing to greater efficiency in any sector of its production or consumption, may enable the regime to divert more resources to military use.

In addition to this direct help we assist the U.S.S.R. indirectly, but significantly, by credits to and commerce with the Soviet bloc countries. Without it the Soviet Union would have to shoulder at least part of the economic burden in shoring up the local Communist regimes.

BENEFITS TO WEST OF DÉTENTE

There have been, in all fairness, some benefits to the West. Expanded exports to the U.S.S.R. bring more jobs at home. Increased contracts between Americans and Russians are valuable, and in the long run they may have beneficial political side effects. There has been some but rather marginal improvement in the way the regime has dealt with dissidents. Yet, on balance, most of the benefits of détente have accrued to the Soviet Union, something I certainly would not begrudge, if it were not that Soviet policies in practically every part of the world are directed at undermining the position and interests of this country and its allies.

The main premise behind those policies of the U.S.S.R. has been the assumption, alas for the most part correct, that they have carried with them but little risk. Therefore, what must be of concern to us is not only the substance and verifiability of the treaty, but also whether through the process of negotiation and ratification this country will have been able to convince the Soviet leaders of the tenacity of its purpose, of its determination and ability to bar their further "efforts to obtain unilateral advantages" at the expense of the West.

If the Kremlin becomes convinced of that, then the way indeed will be open for "the establishment of a more stable and constructive foundation for United States-Soviet relations," as stated in the preamble to this treaty. If it does not, and the present thrust of Soviet policies is allowed to continue, then, whether we do or do not have a strategic arms agreement, there is a high probability of our relations growing worse, and leading eventually to dangerous confrontation.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Legvold?

STATEMENT OF PROF. ROBERT LEGVOLD, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NEW YORK, N.Y.

Mr. LEGVOLD. My prepared statement deals with Soviet perspective on the fundamental questions of nuclear war and strategic deterrence, nuclear deterrence, and so on. Rather than reading, or summarizing that, I thought that I would try to go from it to some specific considerations that bear on the immediate question of SALT, but that deal primarily with Soviet perspectives.

SOVIET PERSPECTIVES ON SALT

In the next few minutes, I would want to comment on those aspects of this process, the debate within the country and within the Senate, which the Soviet Union finds confusing, or unconvincing, or the way in which Soviet perspectives are probably quite different from those that some anticipate or expect.

I am doing so, not because I think that the Soviet perspective is right, and not because I think the Soviet perspective is justified. I

am doing so because I think that this is what the Soviet perspective is, and I think that it is important to have it in mind.

Everything that I am saying does not for a moment gainsay the serious challenge that Soviet activities, particularly its efforts, its military forces, present for us, and the extent to which these have to be answered. But their perspective on basic trends within the strategic nuclear arms race are important to our considerations here, as are Soviet perspectives on the SALT debate, and their sense of what the agreement is, what kind of a bargain it is.

It is those two items that I want to focus on: Soviet perspectives on strategic trends; and Soviet perspectives on the kind of a bargain that SALT is. I do so for two reasons.

First, because in both respects, Soviet perspectives will significantly influence the kind of reaction that you get from them, depending on Senate action in adjusting or accepting or rejecting the SALT Treaty. Second, Soviet perspectives bear very much on what the possibilities are for the process of SALT in some larger sense, and in the specific sense, what the potential of SALT III may be.

I start by saying that I don't believe in their heart of hearts and in their genuine convictions that the Soviet leadership, military and civilian, sees trends in the strategic balance in the same way that those who are most critical, or most suspicious, or most concerned about the SALT agreement do within this country. I don't think that they see, second, in terms of SALT as an agreement, that the bargain is as unequal or as dangerous from American perspectives as the critics within this country do.

That is, to put it the other way around, I think the Soviets believe that it is a genuinely equitable bargain. I will talk to both points.

SOVIET PERSPECTIVES ON STRATEGIC TRENDS

First, in terms of Soviet perspectives on strategic trends, because it is clear that that is an utterly crucial context for the discussion of these agreements at the moment, I think that the Soviet leadership recognizes and would agree with those who emphasize the extent to which it has improved its relative position over the last decade. There is no disputing that.

The Soviets have made enormous gains in eliminating their strategic nuclear inferiority which was substantial as late as 1967, and there is no question of that, and the Soviets say so publicly. I think that they would even, though this is not publicized in their press, agree that now and in the near future their advantage in static indicators will be clear, when you are talking about megatonnage or throw-weight, or any of the others, with the exception of warheads in the near term.

I might say that in these terms, from a psychological perspective, the Soviets would regard that as important, and I suspect they would not be surprised if the United States, from the point of view of correcting the psychological impact of this, as opposed to its substantive or intrinsic military significance, moved to do something about the discrepancy in static indicators. We are not likely to because it is not necessarily in our interest for intrinsic reasons.

But the Soviets understand the political/psychological aspects of this kind of thing.

They would, however, I think disagree over the extent to which they have improved their relative military position, and the extent to which they will continue to do so in the near term and where we will be left, both in the early 1980's and particularly in the late 1980's, which is where the Soviet perspective tends to turn at this point, because the critical decisions affecting the late 1980's are now being formed.

I think they would disagree because in a fundamental way their comparative threat perception is different from our comparative threat perception. That is, I don't believe that one is the obverse of the other. I think that we are looking at things in basically different ways.

First, because the Soviets have a different notion of the role that allies and enemies play in defining threat, at this point. The Soviets have a different sense of the strength of alliances and the vulnerability of alliances at this point, and understand that not only are there those essential differences, but they are critical. We tend to factor them out when we measure the balance, except in counting strategic vulnerabilities in the case of the theater nuclear balance.

The same thing is true in terms of enemies. We are reminded since the war in Indochina this last year, and the considerable Soviet effort to strengthen its military posture since late March, all the things that are going on in the Far East now, the extent to which the China factor is a real one and bears on these considerations of strategic nuclear balance.

Second, not only because they are more inclined to weigh in, in more significant ways, the issue of alliances and enemies, but also because they do not see us standing still. Aside from the point of how much of an improvement in their relative position they have made, having said that, having recognized that, the Soviets do not for a moment believe that we have done nothing, as so many critics of the SALT agreement are implying at this point before the two committees that are taking testimony.

The Soviets recognize that since the SALT process began in 1969, in the early stages the United States continued and completed deployment of a Poseidon missile series, which was the first MIRVed SLBM, and which increased the number of warheads by a factor of 3, and that within a year of that, the United States introduced the MIRV into the strategic balance, which has been the most destabilizing development of the last decade. This was in the first stages of the SALT process.

Since SALT II, the United States has gone forward with the modernization of the Minuteman III, and the development of Minuteman III with the new warhead, the MK-12A, and the new guidance system, the NS-20, together with the software coming on line at the end of the decade, it transforms that weapon. It is a new weapon. That becomes effectively a counterforce weapon from the Soviet Union's point of view.

In 1979, the United States will begin retrofitting the Trident I missile, the C-4, into Poseidon boats. That is a different level or category of MIRV weapon. The number of warheads that we have

increased from 1972 to the present is well known because it has been repeated regularly in the hearings.

In the future, the United States is going forward with the cruise missile program, and with the Trident II missile, which comes very close to invulnerable counterforce at sea from the Soviet point of view, which is another important threshold in this competition.

All of these things are underway before the issue of whether we go ahead with M-X or not. I am not arguing, and I don't want to be misunderstood that any of these things are unwise on our part. I think that they are absolutely essential. I think they are the minimum that is essential in terms of maintaining competition, but I am talking about the Soviet perspective on the arms race itself, and the extent to which the United States has supposedly been standing still while the U.S.S.R. has raced forward.

There are any number of ways in which you can talk about these things. It is clear that the one issue, in terms of threat perception, which exercises more people at this point is the impending vulnerability of the Minuteman III and all that that spells in terms of our approach to nuclear deterrence, the window of opportunities in the 1980's as it is often referred to.

But the Soviets could, if I play hard and loose with the figures, come up with a different calculation by the early 1980's, not in terms of genuine first-strike capability against the ICBM force, that is the extent to which you can eliminate 90 percent of the ICBM force. They know that they will be able to do that to our ICBM force. They know that the maximum for us, by the mid-1980's, would be 60 percent by best estimates, talking about that modernized and transformed Minuteman III.

The CHAIRMAN. We would eliminate 60 percent of their ICBM force?

Mr. LEGVOLD. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Which is 70 percent of their force.

Mr. LEGVOLD. That is right.

The point that I was about to make is that when you work that math out, we are talking about a capacity on our part to eliminate 42 percent of their warheads, or force loadings, or whatever that 70-percent measure means, in contrast to their ability to knock out 22 percent of ours.

I say that this is playing fast and loose with the figures, but it is something that a person who has some concerns within the Soviet Union would make.

The basic point is that they are not likely to see the speed with which their relative position has improved is quite what we say it is, or the extent to which it will be in the near term.

It is furthermore true, in terms of the way we think about basic issues, that we have a different notion of what it means to make an ICBM force hostile, and the extent to which that is a basis for nuclear blackmail, a different notion of what the risks of nuclear blackmail are within these circumstances.

SOVIET PERSPECTIVES ON SALT II AS A BARGAIN

The second set of comments bear on SALT as a bargain, and whether the Soviet Union understands that they really have pulled one over on us, and that they fully expect us to catch them and

propose a wide range of amendments, and secure the right kind of renegotiation in order to have an equitable agreement.

I think that the Soviet leadership believes that this is a fair and an equitable bargain. I think they believe that it does not do much to constrain the arms competition in a critical respect, but then very few people in this country or in this Senate believe that it does an enormous amount to correct or to control the arms race.

I think that the Soviet leadership believes that if the SALT process is to amount to something, it will soon have to begin digging in and accomplishing something in the future, even though, I think, increasingly they are likely to go in the direction of incrementalism because of the obstacles they see to comprehensive SALT negotiations and attempt to break out pieces of the problem and negotiate them the next time around.

I think they believe that if the thing is not to become unraveled, if it is not to finally disintegrate, something has to be done in the next round. But not that it has been done in this round.

I think they believe it is a genuinely equitable bargain to the extent that they think they are paying a price for it which is at least as large as the price that critics in this country say we are paying for the SALT agreement. I think they feel that it is the product of a genuine compromise.

I sat down and thought my way through the range of compromises that were made, the critical compromises, in SALT II. From the Soviet point of view, it seems to me that there are basically five substantial compromises that mattered, that were a cost for them, and indeed there is some evidence that they were the subject of considerable debate.

I think that there are five others that are probably less substantial in terms of the cost, how much it really mattered to offer the concession or the compromise.

In terms of the concessions that mattered from the Soviet point of view, the first of them is the issue of counting rules. The Soviet Union took seriously paying that price in the interest of verification of the SALT agreement because it did compel them to alter force deployments that they would otherwise have made. For instance, they were prepared to go forward with—and indeed are prepared to go forward—100 or more single-warhead SS-17's and SS-19's that are already sitting in the modernized silos in the old mode, which they now will have to dispose of in one way or another.

In a way, we have forced them to modernize with this, in the name of verification. But it was not their preference.

Second, in terms of cruise missiles, it has been plain from the very beginning that the Soviets take the cruise missile threat seriously. Given the extent to which we also regard it as an important part to the solution to our security problem, indeed, they should.

They, from the beginning, wanted either to eliminate the thing, or to count it, if it was more than 300 miles. They gave on every one of those issues. What we have as a result is 120 new delivery vehicles that are MIRVed with a minimum of 24 warheads and a total of up to 4,000 additional warheads that are effective second-

strike counterforce—not merely second-strike, but second-strike counterforce, potentially, with their accuracy.

There are parts to that that go along with it. The Soviets conceded nontransfer. They wanted to make sure that we could not transfer to the Europeans, and they know now with the noncircumvention provision that we will be able to transfer to the Europeans, to the extent that we are not bound to develop the weapon ourselves.

The same is true in terms of the length of the protocol. The Soviets wanted that to be longer. They wanted the restraint, to the extent that it existed, for a longer period than they got. Now it ends in December in a less significant manner.

Third, on the SS-16, the Soviets, it is true, had developed it to a certain point in the testing in 1975, but now they will not be able to go forward with the mobile SS-16, which is in many ways the precursor of their M-X, when they develop their M-X. We are going forward with M-X in these circumstances.

I am talking now not merely about counterforce. I am talking about invulnerable counterforce, this next stage in the competition. The Soviets have prejudiced their ability to go forward with that in the SS-16. I might say that they have conceded the M-X issue to us as part of that.

In the summer of 1978, if I am not mistaken, the Soviets made some attempt to control M-X by suggesting that we do without the single new missile through 1985. They conceded the issue to us. Those mattered to them, it seems to me.

Fourth, and fifth, which are really left over from Vladivostok, but Vladivostok is a part of SALT II, the Soviets conceded equal aggregates, which is no small matter because it means that in conceding us the opportunity to build up to equal totals, they are making the problem of coping with the China factor more difficult. If we build up the totals, then they have to deal with the China factor out of equal totals, and indeed with American forces that equal theirs at the same time.

This is not an insignificant consideration for Soviet leaders that are looking in that direction.

Fifth, the finessing of FBS [forward-based systems] one more time. The Soviets are not using FBS. This is simply an issue to seek compensation in other areas. They take seriously the nuclear threat based in Europe, whatever portion of the overall threat it is, and its relationship to national nuclear forces. It is a security problem from their point of view, and they allowed it to be finessed one more time.

I think that I will not go through the five concessions that they made that seem to me to be with lesser cost, but concessions nonetheless in the course of the negotiations: The reductions total, the limits on land-based MIRV and combined ICBM-SLBM MIRVed, the encryption issue, the modernization constraint, the fractionation, and so on. I will not spell those out.

I think that the Soviets see strategic trends differently from the way in which the severest SALT critics in this country see them. I think that they see it genuinely as an equitable bargain between the two sides in contrast to the way in which many in this country present the SALT agreement. They do not, I repeat, for a moment

underestimate the extent to which they have made progress, and how much happier the military balance is from their point of view than from what it was in the 1960's, nor am I in presenting my personal view, for a moment underestimating the extent to which these trends are issues that need to be corrected. It does have implications for what the Senate does in these terms, and that is the question of not merely ratification, but understandings, reservations and amendments.

If the Soviet Union believes, as I think it does, that this is a fair and an equitable bargain that has been driven with great difficulty, then I think they are prepared to live with understandings and reservations that clarify the bargain. But if the essential proposition is to drive another bargain, to change the bargain, I don't think that they are prepared to accept that.

I cannot say for sure what the line is. I have a strong conviction that the understandings that are being talked about within this committee on noncircumvention, for example, or on the termination of the Protocol, are not problematic. It may even be that the Soviets would swallow a demand for equal rights to heavy missiles on our part if that were to be done.

I think the Soviet Union might be willing to accept clarifying language on encryption, and the extent to which they can do more than encryption in order to obstruct telemetry, and so on. But, then, when you cross over into the next category, and that may already be with the question of the right to heavy missiles, but it certainly is Backfire counting, and so on, at that point I think that it is quite clear that we are driving another bargain, and I don't think that the Soviets are prepared to.

I think people are operating under a delusion if they believe that the Soviet Union will be an easier negotiating partner the next time around, having lost this time around and being extremely concerned about what the traffic will bear, and what you can negotiate with this country.

I think, for example, that even were they to negotiate the Backfire issue, they would negotiate it. They would not simply accept the amendment. They would negotiate it. If one were looking for the equivalent for them, in terms of what they are concerned about, it would be much tighter constraints on cruise missiles, because from their point of view Backfire is essentially a theater weapon, whatever potential threat it poses for us, and it is addressed to their China problem and their European problem.

If we want to negotiate the Backfire in terms of counting because of the potential problem to us, then I think the Soviets will, as their counter, raise the essential theater problem, and that, from our point of view in the SALT context, means tougher constraints on cruise, and so on. Or else, it does mean nothing because the Soviets will be extraordinarily skeptical about what kind of a bargain they can drive with us.

Whether that, in some larger sense, forces us back to the days of cold war or not, it seems to me is largely a false issue. I am uncomfortable with people who say that the failure of SALT is going to throw us back into the days of the cold war. I think that Mr. Ulam's comment about the nature of the cold war in the

recent period of tension, and Soviet ambition and the difficulty of distinguishing between the two of them is well taken.

For me the critical characteristic of the cold war, which is at the moment, is not the extent to which we had tension, or competition, or Soviet ambition, but the extent to which we had direct confrontation, the Berlin crisis and Cuba. I don't think that will be restored by a failure of SALT. But I think an enormous range of opportunity will have been lost, and I think that is important.

[Professor Legvold's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PROF. ROBERT LEGVOLD

As someone interested in Soviet affairs, I think I can best aid you by focusing on the attitudes that the Soviet side brings to SALT. These, of course, are not easily determined, but neither are they so inaccessible as we sometimes assume. Nor are they so crude as we sometimes imagine for want of knowing. They are a mix of subtlety, ambivalence, assertiveness, and concern roughly consistent with the complexity of strategic trends and the challenge of SALT, and, in my judgment, they are important to consider.

THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN APPROACHES TO WAR AND ITS AVOIDANCE

No factor more vexes the effort to negotiate arms control with the Soviet Union than the differences between us. Not the differences in ideology or political order, though these matter ultimately. The more fateful differences are in the structure of our military forces, in the nature of the threats we face, and in the strengths and vulnerabilities of the alliances we rely on and mean to defend.

The United States has built forces stressing diversity, flexibility, and technological prowess; the Soviet Union, numbers, firepower, and redundancy. Our means of nuclear attack comprise a TRIAD, a concept that has come to have considerable importance to us. The Soviet Union has persisted instead with essentially a DYAD, one resting heavily on land-based ICBMs. But Soviet ICBMs, in turn, being larger than ours, will pose a threat to this part of our deterrent sooner than we can threaten any part of theirs. Should both countries develop the ability to destroy the others' fixed ICBMs, however, the implications are graver for the Soviet Union because roughly three and a half times more of its forces are ICBMs. And should the competition turn toward acquiring invulnerable counterforce weapons, an increasingly likely prospect, the superiority of our next generation of SLBMs and mobile ICBMs over theirs makes the implications graver still.

Discrepancies like these—the practical consequence of the differences in the throw-weight of each side's ICBMs, in the levels of their SLBM technology, and in the versatility of their delivery vehicles—are SALT's great burdens. Add to these the effects of geography, the China factor, and allies who bring vastly different resources and concerns to the common defense, and the plight of SALT II or any other attempt to reach meaningful and negotiable strategic arms limitations emerges more clearly.

The asymmetries in capabilities, enemies, and alliances deeply influence the perspectives each side brings to the SALT process. But there is still another important asymmetry—this, in the way the two leaderships think about war and its prevention. The contrast stems not from a more cynical or cavalier attitude on the part of one leadership toward the risks of war. Nor, as some seem to suggest, from a Soviet willingness to treat war, even nuclear war, as an acceptable means to their political ends. No such willingness exists, not as reflected in what they say and write.

The real contrast is in the way the two nations cope with the theoretical possibility of nuclear war. Given the suicidal implications of using nuclear weapons, American strategists have concentrated on the psychology and framework of deterrence—that is, on the process of dissuading the Soviet Union from risking nuclear war or, if war comes, on cutting it short. Strengthening our ability to dissuade has not been divorced from defense—that is, from developing the ability to fight a war—but the stress has been on structuring choice and, if you will, "bargaining" in the shadow of nuclear conflict. By this I mean spinning out scenarios designed to convince the Soviet leaders in advance that we can and will attach too high a price to any prize they may wish to capture with military force. In the process, the civilian strategists, game theorists, and scientists who dominate strategic thinking in this country have come to worry most about the credibility of our deterrent, the stability of the

nuclear balance in moments of crisis, and the raising or lowering of the nuclear threshold.

In the Soviet Union, the task of dealing with the specter of nuclear war belongs to military men. They, by tradition and profession, make it a matter of waging war. By preparing to prosecute war successfully, they assume, they are both deterring war and putting their country in the best possible position should deterrence fail. Nuclear weapons have revolutionized warfare, and this they recognize. But their inclination is still to approach the problem as traditionally as possible, committing themselves to victory on the battlefield and, to this end, the destruction of the other side's war-making potential.¹ The more abstract notion that the outcome of a nuclear war can be decisively shaped by launching a limited number of nuclear weapons at a selected set of (military) targets and then waiting to see whether the other side will desist remains largely alien to their way of thinking. Thus, where we tend to start with deterrence, pressing on to defense, ultimately subordinating defense to deterrence, they skip the issue of deterrence and concentrate on defense, assuming deterrence will follow.

THE CONSEQUENCES FOR SALT

Inevitably the different way Soviet and American leaders think about nuclear war influences the way they judge the strategic balance, the trends altering it, and the process of regulating it. Inevitably it also shapes their perspectives on the SALT II accords.

Some say that our original goals in SALT were doomed to failure because, as events turned out, the Soviet Union did not share them. We envisaged SALT as a chance to reduce and stabilize the strategic nuclear balance, to turn the competition from arms building, and to shift these resources in other directions. The Soviet leaders, in contrast, it is said, viewed the SALT process not so much as a joint enterprise to manage the arms race as an opportunity to codify their superpower status and, if possible, to improve their military position by impeding U.S. defense efforts. We were simply working on different levels.

It seems to me that this misstates the problem. For the Soviet leadership SALT has been preeminently a political exercise, but in the sense of the contribution that arms control efforts make to the over-all U.S.-Soviet relationship. From the beginning, the Soviet leaders have been more inclined to focus on the place of arms control in East-West relations than on the role of arms control in restructuring the military balance or in imposing a particular discipline on the arms competition. They have tended to urge SALT as a necessary and integral part of a broader process of easing tensions between our two countries, arguing the obvious proposition that not much progress can be made if both are locked in an unyielding arms competition. The challenge of using SALT to shape the strategic nuclear balance has concerned them less.

Indeed, by and large, their natural preference has been to define the objectives of SALT modestly, rather than get bogged down in the complexities and intractable dimensions of a far-reaching effort to regulate the strategic arms race. In SALT I, they would have been happy to settle for an ABM agreement, and it required considerable determination on the part of the Nixon Administration to negotiate the interim agreement limiting offensive weapons. In SALT II, they have generally sought the simplest and least arduous route to agreement, meaning inevitably a less ambitious one. They have not pressed to circumscribe or avoid new technologies, threatening to make the strategic arms competition more unmanageable, like MIRV or mobile ICBMs. And, when in March 1977 they were offered the opportunity to achieve major reductions, they angrily backed away. Their anger had to do with what they regarded as the one-sided nature of the 1977 proposals, but this did not fully explain their refusal to respond with counterproposals.²

This preference for unencumbered arms control, I think, in large part traces back to the Soviet Union's broader political stakes in SALT. True, another powerful syndrome is at work, a Soviet reluctance to constrain the other side if it means constraining yourself. But the same can be said of the American approach to SALT, and that has not prevented us from trying to push SALT in more ambitious

¹ "Winning" a nuclear war in this sense is scarcely a good in Soviet eyes. It is better than losing, but no Soviet leader in the last twenty years, military or civilian, has suggested that nuclear war would be anything other than an unimaginable calamity, leaving victor and vanquished in virtually the same condition.

² They also resented the way the proposal was sprung on them and objected to an attempt, as they saw it, to throw over Vladivostok and the laboriously negotiated compromises of the intervening two and a half years. Still, the Soviet reaction was so swift and sharp that obviously they had not even paused over the prospect of making more of SALT.

directions. Rather, the further explanation is that the Soviet Union cares more about the political effect of a successful SALT process, and, for this, small steps, setting aside the hard choices that generate controversy, may be best.

It is also true that the Soviet Union has looked upon SALT as a mechanism for controlling American military programs. Preventing the United States from going forward with an elaborate ABM system was obviously a high priority for the Soviet Union in 1969. Limiting, even eliminating, the contemporary U.S. cruise missile program has also been a major Soviet objective in SALT. But, we, too, have sought to circumscribe through SALT Soviet weapons that are particularly disturbing to us. The ceiling on SS-9s in SALT I is a case in point and so is our attempt to impede the development of a fifth generation of Soviet ICBMs in SALT II. The attempt to use SALT to hamper the other side's defense efforts is not what divides us.

Neither the self-serving aspects of the Soviet approach to SALT nor its political stake in SALT proves that the Soviet Union has no desire to stabilize the nuclear balance or to shrink both countries' strategic arsenals. The problem is in defining what it means to stabilize the balance, a problem that ultimately traces back to our contrasting way of thinking about nuclear war and its avoidance.

It is not merely that our attempts to give stability to the nuclear balance, that is, to reduce the incentives to squeeze the trigger first in crisis situations, come across to Soviet observers as self-seeking. Thus, from the original Option E proposed in the opening rounds of SALT I to the March 1977 scheme for "deep cuts," our efforts to increase crisis stability have seemed distinctly in our favor. Again and again we have come back to the notion of abandoning potentially vulnerable ICBMs, where so much of the Soviet effort is focused, and moving the competition to less vulnerable SLBMs, weapons of a more clearly second-strike character, but in which we hold a clear technological edge, not the least in the race to turn them into first-strike weapons. On the other hand, a Soviet might note, when the most "de-stabilizing" weapon of the last decade was introduced, that is, MIRV, we introduced it and we did so without giving much thought to SALT and an agreement to banish MIRVed forces on both sides.

There is, however, a more profound problem than notions of stability that appear to Soviet leaders as discriminatory and calculated to enhance U.S. advantage. The problem is that our notions of what is stabilizing and destabilizing in the strategic arms competition, to a large degree, remain alien to them. This, some would argue, arises out of the Soviet tendency to equate stability with the growth of Soviet military power. The point is not made derisively: Soviet speakers do suggest that a stronger Soviet Union is the surest guarantee of nuclear stability; indeed, it is the way they most commonly discuss the issue. (To say the least, it is not an approach that will get the two sides very far.)

Still, this does not gainsay the extent to which our own concept of stability is a function of the way we happen to think about nuclear deterrence. Worrying about a Soviet ability to destroy 90 percent of our fixed land-based ICBM force, while we can destroy only 60 percent of theirs, makes sense at a certain level of abstraction. For us, the abstraction is important, because we have predicated deterrence on ensuring that the Soviet Union cannot come out ahead in any nuclear exchange. This proposition has a significance of its own, independent of the question of what objective could activate a chain of events resulting on this 30 percent margin, what fortuities would threaten to undo any calculus based on the 30 percent, and what other dimensions of war might prove more decisive.

For the Soviet leaders, however, given their approach to nuclear deterrence, this proposition has no significance independent of these other considerations. They are less sensitive to and, happily, less emboldened by Minuteman vulnerability, because of the difference in approach. Less sensitive, because they are inclined to view their ability to destroy a large part of the Minuteman force as simply one component in a war-fighting strategy—that is, a measure, albeit a critical one, for reducing the damage a foe can inflict in the course of a war. They are less emboldened, because, as they judge matters, this ability affords them little leverage as long as they cannot launch and win a war at a tolerable cost.

By the same token, I think they are baffled by and more than a little mistrusting of the concern expressed by many in this country over trends in so-called "static indicators." They understand the psychological problem. They understand that numbers and seeming inferiorities in the tally of weapons—megatonnage, throw-weight, total warheads, numbers of delivery vehicles, and so on—have an impact on the public mind. But, when serious defense planners and analysts make the gap in the throw-weight of the two countries' forces decisive, arguing that by this gift the Soviet Union can launch a nuclear attack knowing that after each exchange its remaining forces will be fractionally larger than American forces, Soviet observers suspect ulterior motives.

Because Soviet defense planners make do with the science of war, abjuring the development of "strategic doctrine," they look upon our attention to doctrine as politically inspired. That is, they think the fussing we do with declaratory policy, replacing the "doctrine of massive retaliation" with "flexible response," modified by the "doctrine of limited nuclear options," is designed to squeeze the maximum political-psychological leverage out of a defense posture. Talk about the meaning of the discrepancy in throw-weight, translated into a concept like "escalation dominance," the language of American strategists, is lumped into the same category.

Soviet and American views of SALT II also derive to an important degree from their respective views of military trends, a further dimension shaped by our contrasting approaches to the challenge of nuclear war. In this country what different people think about the SALT II accord follows closely from their apprehension over the comparative momentum of Soviet and American military efforts. The fears generated by recent trends impinge constantly and heavily on judgments about SALT II, even where the connection, both for good and ill, is nearly nonexistent.

Not surprisingly, in the Soviet Union, the link between the evolution of the military balance and SALT matters less. Whatever the defects of the agreements—and from the Soviet perspective there are a number—these are softened by the general context. SALT or no SALT, the Soviet Union has made enormous strides in overcoming its strategic nuclear inferiority. In these circumstances, even the most equitable agreement looks different to the side losing ground than to the one gaining ground.

But the contrast has still deeper sources. Because we and our NATO allies place so much weight on U.S. strategic forces, accepting the abstractions of deterrence theory and neglecting other dimensions of our common defense, the erosion of our comfortable advantages in the nuclear competition is particularly disturbing. SALT may have very little to do with this situation and it may offer little solution—short of the futility of expecting it to re-establish American strategic superiority—but it becomes its victim. Suddenly everything, even at the margin, acquires significance: the chance that the Soviet Union could use its large medium-range BACKFIRE bombers in a nuclear attack on the United States, the chance that a disputed interpretation of the SALT protocol might impede our efforts to rectify a deteriorating theater nuclear balance, and the chance that the Soviet Union would cheat under the terms of SALT and, escaping detection, produce a larger and more accurate successor to the SS-19 two or three years earlier than it could if it waits for the Treaty to expire.

Both in its posture and in its concepts, the Soviet Union is less dependent on carefully calculated nuclear deterrence. Because the Soviet Union believes the decisive feature of any general war will be the ability of one side to triumph at all levels, from conventional to nuclear, and has designed a posture around the integration of capabilities for fighting at all levels, it worries less about the precise calibration of the nuclear balance. Or, to put the matter another way, it has a different sense of what constitutes the basis for "nuclear blackmail." To a Soviet mind it is not the ability to wipe out one leg of a TRIAD that counts most, and even less is it a gap in throw-weight, translated into a scenario in which one of two devastated countries after a series of nuclear exchanges ends up with a fraction more weapons. Rather, the decisive consideration in the Soviet perspective is the over-all military balance. Provided one has a sufficient ability to survive a nuclear attack and strike back with a certain level of viciousness, the key concern is with prosecuting war, and that involves something much beyond the refinements of nuclear strategy.

Not that the Soviet Union has ceased to worry about trends in the strategic arms competition. In a looser fashion, the Soviet leaders do apparently fear the twists and turns that the competition may yet take. They are concerned with the implications of cruise missiles and what the introduction into Europe of large numbers of these weapons, blurring the line between conventional and nuclear, will mean. They are beginning to stir at the prospect of a race in counterforce weapons. And, in general, they continue to watch warily for the new directions in which we, with our technological superiority, will push the nuclear arms competition. But these are concerns for the future, for SALT III, and the Soviet leaders do not feel them so acutely as we feel ours. For the moment, the two countries' anxiety over military trends is out of phase.

I have chosen not to address more directly the concerns that are usually debated, because I believe the problem runs more deeply. I could have made the case that, whatever our image of emerging Soviet superiority, the Soviet leadership does not share the same perception. I could have summarized for you the defects that the Soviet leaders see in the treaty. I could have reviewed for you the compromising the Soviet Union did to get this agreement, by way of disproving the impression that we

have let ourselves be slickered. I could have commented on the faithfulness with which the Soviet Union keeps the contracts it signs or the likelihood that it wants an inadequately verifiable agreement. The reality in all these cases, I am convinced, is more reassuring than assumed by many of those who oppose SALT II or who would substantially rewrite it.

I did not because I think the factors that lead the two countries to view strategic trends and SALT II so differently—that make these agreements so controversial in our country and not in the Soviet Union—flow from far deeper considerations. Much of the trouble SALT II is in stems from our basic outlook, from the way we choose to define what counts in the nuclear balance, from the way we choose to define Soviet calculations, and, ultimately, from the way we choose to cope with the specter of nuclear war. Much of the trouble with SALT—and a challenge that we must deal with more effectively if the process is to come to really matter—stems from the fact that the Soviet Union does each of these things another way.

The CHAIRMAN. Professor Zagoria.

STATEMENT OF PROF. DONALD S. ZAGORIA, CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK, N.Y.

Mr. ZAGORIA. Senator Biden, and distinguished members of the committee.

As you continue your deliberations on the SALT II Treaty and the role of that treaty in the United States-Soviet relations, it is a privilege for me to be invited to present my views.

As a student of Soviet foreign policy for three decades, and as one who has no illusions whatever about the nature of the Soviet system, or about Soviet expansionist objectives in the world today, I have still felt uncomfortable with what I regard as the extreme views on the Soviet Union that often dominate our national discourse.

On one extreme, Soviet power is frequently exaggerated and Soviet ideology is frequently confused with that of Nazi Germany. A Chicken Little school of American foreign policy thinks that the sky is falling down and that the United States is powerless to reverse unfavorable trends. This school is nostalgic for the 1950's, when the United States was the most powerful country in the world, and it seeks to turn the clock back to the situation that prevailed then when the United States enjoyed unquestioned military superiority over the Soviet Union.

The Chicken Little school, in my opinion, exaggerates the Soviet menace. It minimizes the strength and vitality of the United States and the resources of our many friends and allies. I believe it is incapable of devising a measured and discriminating response to the Soviet challenge.

Generally opposed to SALT II, this school fails to tell us how the defeat of SALT and the escalation of the nuclear arms race will help to contain Soviet advances, or to induce greater Soviet restraint.

On the other extreme, the very challenge of growing Soviet military power and the problems created by the Soviet offensive in the Third World are frequently minimized by the "so what" school of American foreign policy. This anti-geopolitical school seems incapable of understanding that many of our friends and allies are adversely affected by changes in regional balances of power.

Seven pro-Soviet Communist parties have taken power or territory by armed force since the spring of 1975. Between 20,000 and 40,000 Cuban gendarmes are now in Africa with guns for hire. To the extent that our friends and allies lose confidence in our ability

to contain this offensive, they will be forced to reconsider their own foreign policy alignments.

But rejecting SALT II is not the answer to this problem either. The challenge for the United States is to devise a steady, measured, and broad response to these and other problems with which the Soviet Union confronts us. But to do this, we must recognize first of all that many of our problems have been made or aggravated not by the Russians, but by our own erratic and indecisive national behavior in recent years, behavior that has led many countries and many leaders throughout the world to believe that the United States is engaged in a global retreat.

Many of the most serious problems we face in the global arena today are the result of a crisis of confidence in American leadership, a crisis that has spread throughout the world since Watergate, since our defeat in Vietnam, since our announced withdrawal from Korea, since our lack of reaction to Soviet-Cuban advances in Africa, and since our continuing inability to meet some of our most pressing domestic problems.

Our first and highest priority should be to get our own act together, to achieve some national consensus on a long-range strategy designed to meet the crisis, a strategy that would be designed to reassure our friends and to warn our adversaries that the United States is not engaged in a global retreat.

Second, we must recognize, that the world of the 1980's is different from the world of the 1950's and 1960's. We no longer have, and are unlikely ever to regain, unquestioned nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. In many parts of the Third World, the Soviet Union has cleverly positioned itself on the side of parties and states that enjoy considerable support. But rejection of SALT II will not solve any of these problems.

It will not raise the confidence in us among our friends and allies. Rather, it will lower their confidence in our ability to pursue a unified foreign policy. It will not help us regain military superiority over the Soviet Union. Rather, it will lead us to a new, even higher, and more dangerous level of the nuclear arms race.

Rejecting SALT II will not improve our position in the Third World, on the contrary it will make our competition with the Russians in these regions fraught with much greater danger.

This is neither the time nor the place for me to spell out in great detail what I mean by a steady, persistent, broad, and measured response to the problems we face in our dealings with the Soviet Union. To put the matter in shorthand, I would say that we need a policy that combines *détente* with containment.

To achieve such a *détente*, the administration must make two things clear to Moscow. First, that it will be to the Soviet advantage if they exercise greater self-restraint. Second, that it will be risky if they don't. In the recent past, I believe we have failed to provide the Russians either with positive or with negative incentives for restraint.

There are three steps in particular that we need to take to provide Moscow with positive incentives for restraint. First of all, Congress should make the kinds of amendments in trade legislation that Senator Stevenson is now proposing. The effect of Senator

Stevenson's amendment would be to increase the President's flexibility to trade with Moscow, and to use such trade for linkage.

Second, I believe we should engage the Russians in preliminary discussions about regional security problems in various parts of the Third World. We cannot exclude the Russians from all negotiations on regional matters and then ask them for restraint in the regions.

Finally, and not least important, we need to sign and to ratify the SALT II agreement as a symbol both of our desire to slow down the nuclear arms race, and of our desire to pursue a more cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union.

In sum, passing SALT II should be part of a larger strategic concept that makes it clear to Moscow that we, for our part, are anxious for a more comprehensive détente.

But along with the carrots there should also be some sticks. The Senate, when it ratifies SALT II, as I hope it will, should warn Moscow in a sense of the Senate resolution that the United States will no longer accept a narrow and unreciprocal détente, and that future Soviet conduct in the Third World will influence the future development of détente, including the prospects for SALT III.

Moscow should understand that if it continues to conduct violent interventions in the Third World whenever the opportunity beckons, we will eventually be forced into consolidating our new relationship with China. In a word, the Russians must be forced to face a basic question. What is more important to them: A steady, stable, and reasonably cooperative relationship with the United States, or a license to stir the boiling pot of the Third World, a license that will no longer be free of charge.

One case for SALT II, then, seems to me to rest on one very simple proposition. If we expect to make even modest progress in developing our political relations with the Russians and in getting them to exercise restraint in the pursuit of their overall foreign objectives, we must first obtain the needed strategic stability that only SALT-type agreements can provide. The absence of a SALT II agreement will make our competition with the Russians much more dangerous, and even most hopes for improving our political relations will be doomed.

But there is still another argument for SALT II that I believe has not yet received sufficient attention. In our continuing competition with the Russians, competition that will continue as far into the future as we can now see, our biggest advantages are not in the military but in the nonmilitary areas.

These advantages are our economic and technological dynamism, our democracy which can count on genuine popular support, our ability to count on allies who join us freely, our society's openness, flexibility and ability to innovate, our commitment to pluralism and diversity. In all of these respects, we have fundamental advantages over the Russians, who by contrast have only one great strength, their sheer military might. And that is why, in pursuing their goals around the world, the Soviets rely primarily on their military power. They have few other assets.

It follows from this, I believe, that our long-range political objective should be to lessen the military competition with the Russians and increasingly to divert that competition into areas in which we hold the lead, and in which the Russians are behind, and may

never catch up. They can always catch us in military power. They have demonstrated this during the past 15 years. By diverting massive resources from their civilian economy, they can match and, perhaps, if we fell asleep, they can even surpass our military might.

But the Russians will have greater difficulty in catching up to us in all other areas. Their economy is in serious trouble. Their technology lag continues. Their ability to motivate their own people to work harder and more efficiently is limited. Their ability to attract genuine allies rather than proxies or satellites will remain small.

Consequently, by putting a cap on the strategic arms race in SALT II, and by moving SALT III to cut those arms further, we will be diverting the competition between us into the economic, technological, and moral arenas in which our advantage is incomparably greater. Can there be any doubt over the long run as to whose system, theirs or ours, is likely to prevail in protracted, peaceful competition?

Before I turn to some concluding thoughts, there is one other consideration that deserves to be weighed in the SALT balance. If the Senate refuses to ratify SALT II, at the same time that Western Europe, with American acquiescence, begins to sell arms to China, and at the same time that the West begins to trade with China on a rather large scale, the Soviets may well conclude that the United States is forming an anti-Soviet alliance against it.

There is already a good deal of suspicion in the Kremlin that this is in fact our policy. Rejecting SALT II while embracing China is the surest way to confirm these suspicions in the minds of the Kremlin leaders. If the Soviets do come to the conclusion that we are forming an anti-Soviet entente, including Europe, Japan, and China, they will be tempted to react in some way that is bound to be profoundly destabilizing.

They might even be tempted to take military action against China before such an entente emerges. They might suspend the MBFR talks, and increase their forces both in Europe and on the Chinese border even more.

The best way for us to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet conflict is to pursue a policy of balance between Moscow and Peking. Yet, rejecting SALT II at the same time that we are warming up relations with China will mean taking a giant stride towards an unbalanced policy.

Finally, with all due respect to the Members of the Senate, and other distinguished Americans who oppose SALT II, I must say that none of the arguments I have heard so far against the treaty seem very convincing. For those who say that SALT does not go far enough in cutting strategic arms, the answer surely is that this is an admittedly imperfect but necessary step in the right direction. To those who say that this agreement will lead to our strategic inferiority, the answer is that this agreement does not prevent us from developing any of the weapon systems, such as M-X, Trident submarines, air-launched cruise missiles, that we may need to ensure parity.

To those who say that we cannot trust the Russians, the answer surely is that we could trust them even less if there is an unregulated, and unrestrained nuclear arms race.

Some opponents of the SALT II Treaty seem to believe that unless the treaty is defeated, the necessary military programs that we need to deter the Russians will never be mounted. They see the defeat of the treaty as a kind of shock therapy for the American public. But the effect of defeating the treaty is more likely to be to shock the Russians into higher and higher levels of military spending, while we continue at our more modest pace. Thus, defeating the treaty may have precisely the opposite effect of the one intended by those treaty opponents.

Some treaty opponents apparently oppose the treaty because they do not like the general character of Soviet foreign policy in Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere. As I hope I have made clear, neither do I. Although we should take this opportunity to warn the Russians that in the long run détente is incompatible, or will be incompatible with many of their actions in the Third World, we cannot reasonably ask them to suspend those actions as a precondition for accepting SALT II.

After all, the Soviets for their part do not like the new relationship that we are developing with the Chinese. What would be our response if they sought to link SALT directly to our China policy?

We have a genius in this country for oversimplifying complex problems. But sometimes that same genius leads to phrases that cut through all the complexities to the heart of the matter. I do not know who among your previous witnesses said that SALT II is a small gift horse which we should not look in the teeth, but he was certainly right. SALT II is neither a panacea nor a disaster. It is a step in the right direction and it is a precondition for a long range response to the Soviet challenge that we desperately need to develop.

In the words of one White House official, SALT II does not signal an end to the arms race. It does not mean an end to competition between the Soviet Union and the United States. It is not a substitute for a strong defense. But it is decidedly better than having no treaty at all.

Thank you.

[Professor Zagoria's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PROF. DONALD S. ZAGORIA

Senator Church and Distinguished Members of the Committee, as you continue your deliberations on the SALT II Treaty and the role of that Treaty in U.S.-Soviet relations, it is a privilege for me to be invited to present my views. As a student of Soviet foreign policy for three decades, and as one who has no illusions whatever about the nature of the Soviet system or about Soviet objectives in the world today, I have still felt uncomfortable with what I regard as the extreme views on the Soviet Union that often dominate our national discourse. On one extreme, Soviet power is frequently exaggerated and Soviet ideology is frequently confused with that of Nazi Germany. A "Chicken Little" school of American foreign policy thinks that the sky is falling down and that the United States is powerless to reverse unfavorable trends. This school is nostalgic for the 1950's when the United States was the most powerful country in the world, and it seeks to turn the clock back to the situation that prevailed then when the United States enjoyed unquestionable military superiority over the Soviet Union. The Chicken Little school exaggerates the "Soviet menace." It minimizes the strength and vitality of the United States and the resources of our many friends and allies. It is incapable of devising a measured and discriminating response to the Soviet challenge. It confuses developments in Iran, southern Africa, Yemen, Afghanistan, Vietnam, and elsewhere, and sees only the Soviet hand behind all of the unfavorable trends in the world today. Instead of helping us to understand that the challenges we face in the Third World are varied and complex and cannot be met merely with guns and missiles, it

encourages a mindless militarism. Generally opposed to SALT II, this school fails to tell us how the defeat of SALT and the escalation of the nuclear arms race will help to contain Soviet advances.

On the other extreme, the challenge of growing Soviet military power and the problems created by the Soviet offensive in the Third World are frequently minimized by the "so what" school of American foreign policy. This mindless anti-geopolitical school seems incapable of understanding that many of our friends and allies are adversely affected by changes in regional balances of power. Seven pro-Soviet communist parties have taken power or territory by armed force since the spring of 1975. Between 20,000 and 40,000 Cuban gendarmes are now in Africa with "guns for hire." To the extent that our friends and allies lose confidence in our ability to contain this offensive, they will be forced to reconsider their own foreign policy alignments. A substantial change in the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia, combined with the recent Islamic revolution in Iran, could, for example, imperil Western interests in the Middle East.

But rejecting SALT II is not the answer to this problem either. The challenge for the United States is to devise a steady, measured and broad response to these and other problems of foreign policy. But to do this, we must recognize first of all that many of these problems have been made or aggravated by our own erratic and indecisive national behavior in recent years. Many of the most serious problems we face in the global arena today are the result of a crisis of confidence in American leadership, a crisis that has spread throughout the world since Watergate, our defeat in Vietnam, and our continuing inability to meet some of our most pressing domestic problems. We can no longer afford the luxury of 102 different foreign policies, one for each Senator, one for the Department of State, and one for the National Security Council. Our first and highest priority should be to achieve some national consensus on a long range strategy.

We must recognize, secondly, that the world of the 1980's is different from the world of the 1950's. We no longer have, and are unlikely ever to regain, unquestioned strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. And, in many parts of the Third World, the Soviet Union has cleverly positioned itself on the side of parties and states that enjoy considerable support—in Rhodesia, on the side of the Patriotic Front; in the Arab world, on the side of the PLO against Israel; in the Persian Gulf, on the side of the rebels against conservative oligarchies; in Ethiopia, on the side of a government protecting the existing territorial status quo against internal dissidents supported by Somalia. Rejection of SALT II will not solve any of these problems. It will not help us to regain military superiority over the Soviet Union. Rather, it will lead us to a new and even higher level of the nuclear arms race, a level that will be much more dangerous because it will be out of control. And rejecting SALT II will not improve our position in the Third World. On the contrary, it will make our competition with the Russians in these regions fraught with much greater danger.

This is neither the time nor the place for me to spell out in great detail what I mean by a steady, broad and measured response to the problems we face in our dealing with the Soviet Union. To put the matter in shorthand, however, I would say that we need a policy that combines detente with containment. To achieve such a detente, the Administration must make two things clear to Moscow: first, that it will be to the Soviet advantage if they exercise greater self-restraint; second, that it will be risky if they don't. In recent past, we have failed to provide the Russians either with positive or negative incentives for self-restraint. By foolishly imposing congressional restrictions on trade with the Russians, and by linking those restrictions to Soviet emigration policies—rather than to Soviet foreign policy—we have deprived ourselves of positive leverage on Soviet behavior. At the same time, we have not been able to demonstrate any kind of military or political response to Soviet activity in the Third World that might be a negative incentive for further Soviet advances.

There are three steps in particular that we need to take in providing Moscow with positive incentives for restraint. First, Congress should make the kinds of amendments in trade legislation that Senator Adlai Stevenson is now proposing. The effect of Stevenson's amendment would be to increase the President's flexibility to trade with Moscow and to use such trade for "linkage." Second, we should engage the Russians in preliminary discussions about regional security problems in various parts of the Third World. We cannot exclude the Russians from all negotiations on regional matters and then ask them for restraint in the regions. Finally, and not least important, we need to sign and to ratify the SALT II agreement as a symbol both of our desire to slow down the nuclear arms race and of our desire to pursue a more cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union. In sum, passing SALT II

should be part of a larger strategic concept that makes it clear to Moscow that we, for our part, are anxious for a more comprehensive detente.

But along with the "carrots" there should also be some "sticks." The Senate, when it ratifies SALT II, as I hope it will, should warn Moscow in a "sense of the Senate" resolution that the United States will no longer accept a narrow and unreciprocal detente, and that future Soviet conduct in the Third World will influence the future development of detente, including the prospects for SALT III. And Moscow should understand that if it continues to conduct violent interventions in the Third World wherever the opportunity beckons, we will eventually be forced into consolidating our new relationship with China. In a word, the Russians must be forced to face a basic question. What is more important to them: a steady, stable and reasonably cooperative relationship with the United States, or a license to stir the boiling pot of the Third World, a license that will no longer be free of charge?

The case for SALT II, then, seems to me to rest on one very simple proposition. If we expect to make even modest progress in developing our political relations with the Russians and in getting them to exercise restraint in the pursuit of their overall foreign objectives, we must first obtain the needed strategic stability that only SALT can provide. Passing SALT is, in fact, a necessary precondition for devising a measured and broad response to the Soviet challenge in the world today. With it, we may be able to devise such a response. Without it, we have no chance. The absence of a SALT II agreement will make our competition with the Russians much more dangerous and even modest hopes for improving our political relations will be doomed.

But there is still another strong argument for SALT II that has not yet received sufficient attention. In our continuing competition with the Russians—competition that will continue as far into the future as we can now see—our biggest advantages are not in the military but in the non-military areas. These advantages are our economic and technological dynamism, our democracy which can count on genuine popular support, our ability to count on allies who join us freely, our society's openness, flexibility and ability to innovate, and our commitment to pluralism and diversity. In all of these respects, we have fundamental advantages over the Russians who, by contrast, have only one great strength—their sheer military might. And that is why, in pursuing their goals around the world, the Soviets rely primarily on their military power. They have very few other assets.

It follows from this that our long range political objective should be to lessen the military competition with the Russians and increasingly to divert that competition into areas in which we hold the lead and in which the Russians are behind and may never catch up. They can always match us in military power. They have demonstrated this during the past 15 years. By diverting massive resources away from their civilian economy, they can match, and perhaps, if we fell asleep, they can even surpass our military might.

But the Russians will have much greater difficulty in catching up to us in all other areas. Their economy is in serious trouble. Their technological lag continues. Their ability to motivate their own people to work harder and more efficiently is limited. Their ability to attract genuine allies rather than proxies or satellites will remain small. Consequently, by putting a cap on the strategic arms race in SALT II, and by moving in SALT III to cut those arms further, we will be diverting the competition between us into the economic, technological and moral arenas in which our advantage is incomparably greater. Can there be any doubt over the long run as to whose system—theirs or ours—is likely to prevail in protracted, peaceful competition?

Why, if this is the case, should the Russians be interested in SALT agreements? The answer, in my opinion, is not that they want to lull us. The answer, I believe, is that the Russians know even better than us how far behind they are the West in the economic and technological arena and they are determined to catch up there, too, just as they have caught up in the military field. But for them to have even the slightest change of reducing the gap between us in these areas, they must begin to divert resources away from their massive military industrial complex and back into their civilian economy. For their great military strength is also their great economic weakness. They must soon pay much more attention to increasing productivity, to obtaining capital for investment, to increasing consumption, and so on, or their lag behind the West will grow even more. But to accomplish this goal, the Russians will need to change their present priorities. They will need to cut back on their huge military programs in order to catch up to the West in the non-military areas in which they are now so seriously behind.

In sum, in addition to our common interests in survival and in safely managing our competition, both we and the Russians have another reason for wanting to limit, and eventually to reduce, our strategic nuclear arsenals. We want the Rus-

sians to divert their resources away from the military and back into the civilian economy in order to divert our competition into areas in which we are superior. They have a stake in diverting resources back into the civilian economy because, in the long run, that is their only hope of catching up to us as an economic, as well as a military, superpower.

Before I turn to some concluding thoughts, there is one other consideration that deserves to be weighed in the SALT balance. If the Senate refuses to ratify SALT II, at the same time that Western Europe, with American acquiescence, begins to sell arms to China, and at the same time that the West begins to trade with China on a rather large scale, the Soviets will conclude that Washington is forming an anti-Soviet alliance against it. There is already a good deal of suspicion in the Kremlin that this is in fact our policy. Rejecting SALT II while embracing China is the surest way to confirm these suspicions in the minds of the Kremlin leaders. If the Soviets do come to the conclusion that we are forming an anti-Soviet entente that includes Europe, Japan and China, they will be forced to react in some way that is bound to be profoundly destabilizing. They might even be tempted to take military action against China before such an entente emerges.

The best way for us to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet conflict that has been developing for two decades is to pursue a policy of equidistance or balance between Moscow and Peking. Such a policy would exploit our unique position in the triangle and make it possible for the United States to improve its relations with both the Soviet Union and China at the same time. Such a policy would be a major contribution to global stability. It would be a policy dictated by our own national interests. And it would be a policy warmly endorsed by our allies. A policy that tilts sharply towards China, on the other hand, would be a major contribution to global instability. It would not be in accord with our own interests and it would lead to great strains within our own alliance system. Yet rejecting SALT II at the same time that we are warming up relations with China will mean taking a giant stride towards such an unbalanced policy.

Finally, with all due respect to the members of the Senate and other distinguished Americans who oppose SALT II, I must nonetheless say that none of the arguments I have heard so far against SALT II seem very convincing.

To those who say that SALT II does not go far enough in cutting strategic arms, the answer surely is that this is an admittedly imperfect but necessary step in the right direction. To those who say that this agreement will lead to our strategic inferiority, the answer is that this agreement does not prevent us from developing any of the weapons systems such as the MX, Trident submarine, and air-launched cruise missiles, that we may need to ensure parity. To those who say that this agreement does not include the Backfire bomber which could reach the United States, the answer is that it also does not include our bombers based in Britain which could also be used against the Soviet Union. To those who say we cannot trust the Russians, the answer surely is that we could trust them even less if there is an unregulated and unrestrained nuclear arms race.

Some opponents of the SALT II Treaty seem to believe that unless the Treaty is defeated, the necessary military programs that we need to deter the Russians will never be mounted. They see defeat of the Treaty as a kind of shock therapy for the American public. But the effect of defeating the Treaty is more likely to shock the Russians into higher and higher levels of military spending while we continue at our more modest pace. Thus, defeating the Treaty may have precisely the opposite effect of the one intended by these Treaty opponents.

Some Treaty opponents evidently oppose the Treaty because they do not like the general character of Soviet foreign policy in Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere. As I hope I have made clear, neither do I. But although we should take this opportunity to warn the Russians that detente is incompatible with many of their actions in the Third World, we cannot reasonably ask them to suspend those actions as a precondition for accepting SALT II. After all, the Soviets, for their part, do not like the new relationship that we are developing with the Chinese. What would be our response if they sought to link SALT directly to our China policy? To impose a direct linkage between SALT and the general character of either Soviet or American foreign policy would mean that each side would have to accommodate each other on matters of concern as a precondition for agreement on strategic limitations. Such a procedure puts the cart before the horse. We cannot hope to resolve matters in which our interests are divergent, as they are in various parts of the world, if we cannot begin by resolving matters in which our interests coincide, as they do on the need to limit the strategic arms race.

We have a genius in this country for oversimplifying complex problems. But sometimes that same genius leads to phrases that cut through all the complexities to the heart of the matter. I do not know who among your previous witnesses said

that SALT II is a small gift horse which we should not look in the teeth, but he was certainly right. SALT II is neither a panacea nor a disaster. It is a step in the right direction and it is a precondition for a long range response to the Soviet challenge that we desperately need to develop.

The CHAIRMAN. Last week, at the close of the hearings on Allied attitudes toward SALT, I put into the record testimony that John Armitage had prepared for an earlier subcommittee hearing on that subject which had to be canceled.

The other witness who was to have testified at that time was Prof. Leo Labeledz, a respected author on Soviet and East European affairs. Today, I am happy to be able to put Professor Labeledz' testimony on Allied attitudes into the hearing record as well, which I will do without objection.

As editor of *Survey*, the distinguished journal on East-West studies published in London, Professor Labeledz knows whereof he speaks when he argues in this testimony that SALT II must be judged on whether or not it reflects and contributes to "the decline of American power."

He holds that the treaty does intensify the preconception of eroding American power and will, and that the Europeans support the agreement only because they are too weak to take on themselves the burden that the United States is shedding.

His testimony is a welcome addition to our deliberations on the treaty.

[Professor Labeledz' prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PROF. LEOPOLD LABEDZ

Mr. Chairman, it is my belief that the advocates of SALT II are confused about the problem of its significance for Europe and that they systematically neglect the question of Soviet motives in wanting it.

They argue that the refusal to ratify SALT II by the Senate would, in the words of George W. Ball, "reinforce European doubts as to [the American] steadiness on course and thus [the American] reliability as Europe's main defense". In support of such speculations they often quote official and unofficial pronouncements by European leaders, politicians and journalists.

It seems to me that this is profoundly misleading and that if these propositions are accepted at face value it would contribute not to the maintenance, but to the erosion of Atlantic solidarity which is the political basis of Western security.

There is a striking discrepancy between public postures and private anxieties in European political circles. It is a mistake to take the official endorsements of SALT II as a sufficient indication of European attitudes on the subject. Neither in America, nor in Europe is there a unanimity on it, yet in the United States there is a genuine grand debate on it, while in Europe there is nothing comparable, even though it has profound implications for European security. Such anxieties as exist are hidden behind the facade of the official endorsements. Therefore, one has to probe the reasons for them, examine the motives and apprehensions underlying them, and only then draw conclusions about probable political consequences for Europe and NATO of the ratification of SALT II, rather than limit the argument to the formal declarations on the European interest in it.

It is not my contention that the refusal to ratify SALT II will have no disturbing effect on the European political scene. European leaders and even more the European public are still largely thinking in terms of the early premises of "détente" and are even less inclined to shed their illusions than are the Americans. Nor do they think that they can influence the outcome. Yet whether SALT II is ratified or not, Europeans are in for a shock, one way or another, when they more generally realize the implications of the political and strategic shift in the balance of power. It is not the SALT treaty itself, but the realization of the decline of the protective American power which is the basic cause of the future shock in Europe. The question therefore is whether the ratification of SALT II will in this context increase or decrease European efforts to enhance its security and the Atlantic cooperation, or whether it will only intensify the shock and contribute to neutralist tendencies in Europe by demonstrating not only a deterioration of American strategic position, but also a

further erosion of American political will. Because Europe is so dependent on the American military support, while being in the front line, it should be even more concerned about the preservation of the American strength and the impact of SALT on it. As yet such concerns manifest themselves only on the unofficial level, but they are real nevertheless. The ratification of SALT II in its present form will contribute no less to the European than to the American continued complacency about the growing threat of Soviet ascendancy. Americans have at least grown skeptical about "détente". The sooner the Europeans get out of its still lingering anaesthesia, the better the chances that they would face the reality of the growing peril to Europe. The cooperation of the ostriches is hardly an answer to it.

George W. Ball argues that the rejection of the SALT II Treaty would undermine the vitality of the Western Alliance and "give renewed vitality to the movement for the Federal Republic [of Germany] to undertake independent negotiations with the Soviet Union". There was a time when he stressed that American weaknesses provide fuel to neutralist tendencies in Europe, now he disregards his own old reflection when it became even more relevant in the context of further decline of the American power. The danger of German "self-Finlandization" represented by the Wehner-Bahr tendency exists, but it is not the consecration of the American decline in SALT II, but its refusal that would avoid adding to its chances of growing. The perception not just of decline, but of its acceptance can only have the opposite effect and strengthen the neutralist potential in Germany and Europe.

Indeed, the official endorsements of SALT II by the NATO leaders are, paradoxical as it may seem, an indication of the undermined European political morale in the face of growing Soviet threat. The fact that they have meekly accepted the treaty which separates American and European security interests is an ominous sign that in the future they may not have the courage to defend them from the Russians and may choose "self-Finlandization" instead.

The reason why they do not object to SALT II is a measure of European weakness, not of European political wisdom. It produces no protests about sacrificing European security interests in SALT II, such as for instance the acceptance of "Backfire" and of SS 20 non-strategic weapons, because of the desperate need to cling to the American "clinging deterrence". Ironically, European weakness instead of producing intensified concern about the growing American weakness, only leads to a growing nervousness about the possible loss of American military protection. Many Europeans, such as Chancellor Schmidt, feel that a failure to support SALT II by the Europeans may result not in a resolution by the Americans to reverse the unfavorable trend in the balance of power between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., but in a growing American isolationism which will totally undermine European security. They are ready therefore to support SALT II in spite of its negative features from the European point of view. They think, on plausible if not necessarily realistic grounds, that the alternative is even more dangerous. Within this framework of thought, Europeans choose the lesser evil, they do not aspire to be the actors in the wider political game. It is up to the Americans to face the more profound historical alternatives and to provide the leadership of the Alliance: Europeans can only follow suit.

Besides, different European leaders have their own additional political motives to adopt such attitudes. They stem from internal political pressures. Herr Schmidt faces the neutralist wing of the SPD, Mr. Ecevit the growing dissatisfaction with NATO and the Left-wing opposition to it, Mrs. Thatcher seeing the prospect of internal economic and Trade Union battles does not want to jeopardize their outcome by foreign policy stands which may appear quixotic and make her more vulnerable internally. Italian and French communist parties are powerful reasons not to appear "plus Catholique que Le Pape," more royalist than the king, more American than Jimmy Carter.

Yet, ultimately, all these reasons can only explain, but they do not justify the European failure to take a more far-sighted stand on SALT II. When all is said and done, they are in the same boat as the Americans and if the boat is leaking it is not just up to the boatswain to take care of it.

There are other voices in Europe. They presage the as yet as muted anxiety that SALT II may contribute to the dialectic of decline in the relations between Europe and America. From the European point of view, even the fact that the American and Soviet strategic armaments may cancel each other out and leave Europe exposed to Soviet conventional military superiority (with no realistic chance to match it) is bad enough. "The SALT process" undermined European theatre stability from its inception. But this is water under the bridge: now Europeans face the situation in which, as the Norwegian General Zeiner Gundersen said to NATO defense ministers, the Russians are gaining ascendancy "in every category of capability, be it nuclear, chemical, land, sea, air, or space". They can see as well as anyone the

decline of American power. As the liberal German journal, "Die Zeit" (23 March 1979) put it not long ago:

"The President had to take shameful chiding in Mexico. The U.S. marines were disgracefully defeated in Tehran. The U.S. ambassador to Kabul died ignominiously in the exchange of fire between Islamist terrorists and Marxist "Liberators". To Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia the U.S protective power was no longer worth being visited."

They can visualize Soviet soldiers conducting operations in Eritrea, the Soviet navy moving to Aden and Cam Ranh Bay (while the American navy has not enough strength to establish a permanent presence in the Indian ocean to protect the vital oil area), Soviet MIGs and submarines in Cuba violating the 1962 agreement without American protest, Nicaragua falling to the Sandinistas with Cuban help, the "allied" Turkey refusing to grant the United States, after the Iranian debacle, the substitute facilities for SALT nuclear verification. The Turkish Foreign Minister said: "We have told the United States not to consider us a spearhead of NATO".

In such context, it requires an effort for Europeans to believe in the credibility of the American deterrent after the ratification of SALT II; therefore it is not surprising that there may be some skepticism in Europe about the value of Mr. Vance's assurances (in his speech of May 1, 1979) about the need for "more—not less American leadership . . . to inspire others to work with us towards goals we share but cannot achieve separately."

One can only say: "Amen". European skepticism was bluntly put in the French *Figaro* (11 May 1979). Referring to President Carter's warning that the failure to ratify the treaty "would play into the hands of the most hardline and intransigent elements in the Soviet leadership," it wrote:

"This kind of logic is reminiscent of the school playground. . . . The thesis that refusal by the American Senate to ratify the agreement would play into the hands of the Moscow 'hardliners' is extremely weak, if only because whether 'hard or soft' all Soviet leaders share a similar concept of history. You cannot, without risk, reduce the Kremlin to a kind of aviary in which 'hawks' and 'doves' contest for power. . . . It is time that Mr. Carter realized this and stopped confusing foreign policy with ornithology."

The argument is indeed boringly familiar. Already during the last war Stalin used Western mirror-perceptions to get concessions from Roosevelt and Churchill, warning them that otherwise he may be "overruled" by the hardliners in the Politburo.

It was in fact difficult for the hard-bitten Europeans to look at the course of negotiations without skepticism. The cancellation of the B-1, the "postponement" of neutron bomb production, the unilateral abandonment of weapon projects which could have at least served as bargaining counters, the naive expectation of reciprocal "good-will gestures" from the Russians, "deadline diplomacy"—all this seemed, as Mr. Paul Nitze described it, "an Alice in Wonderland approach in meeting the Soviet threat." To many Europeans it looked like a course for teaching vegetarianism to tigers by a correspondence course. They wondered whatever happened to all the hard-headed Yankee traders. The half-hearted attempts to maintain the strategic balance will not compensate for the negative long-term effect on Europe of the ratification of SALT II.

Of course, the show counts for more than the billboard pictures. Ultimately, it is the American defense effort itself, with or without SALT, which counts most. But in this case the show and the billboard only too obviously are politically linked. The billboard matters because the European spectators know that the previous shows were not very good and they fear that they are getting weaker. They can only wonder what will happen if the "Cuba-in-reverse" situation should occur. The most prominent European commentator on international affairs, Raymond Aron, noticed that a decade of SALT negotiations "accompanied and masked" Soviet ascendancy and he asked (in "Commentaire," No. 5, 1979) the pertinent question—whether SALT II does not in itself mark the replacement of American by Soviet hegemony. The implications of this for Europe, America, and the world should be soberly assessed before the ratification of SALT II significantly adds to the political momentum of this process.

When it comes to the question of the Soviet enthusiasm for SALT II the rationalizations of its supporters are inverted. They take the official European declarations at face value without looking at any other political considerations. But they disregard Soviet political and ideological pronouncements which explain Soviet purposes and strategy. The general reasons for both Soviet intensive pressure for the ratification of the treaty and for its significance against the background of the history of Soviet expansionism are thus avoided.

When attempts are made to face this crucial issue, they are not only reluctant and infrequent, but also evasive and inconsistent. In particular, the SALT supporters find it hard to explain away the Soviet continuous arms drive in the Sixties and Seventies, when America unilaterally abandoned the "race" and the "SALT process" reigned supreme. Thus, for example, George Kistiyakovsky first tries to "prove" in his article, "False Alarm: The Story Behind SALT II" (*The New York Review of Books*, 22 March 1979) that "hardliners" have been consistently exaggerating the Soviet military build-up, only to come up with the lame (even though misleading) statement that: "since intercontinental missiles were introduced some twenty years ago, the Soviets have tested thirteen known ICBM designs—and probably several other models not identified by American intelligence—while the U.S. tested and deployed only six models. This is an extraordinary waste of Soviet economic and technical resources. It seems likely that the Soviet leaders have had even more difficulty controlling their 'military-industrial' bureaucracy than our own government has."

"Bureaucratic inertia" is, of course, not the reason for the Soviet arms drive, but whatever it is, it presents a threat to the West which is not explained away by such arguments.

The slipperiness of the pro-SALT case can also be seen in the inconsistency of the reasoning employed by its advocates. Some of them acknowledge the threat, but ignore the historical roots of Soviet expansionism, others deny its existence and try to explain Soviet behavior by the tired argument about the legitimate concern with security. It has been used ever since Stalin gobbled Eastern Europe, but it does not sound convincing at the time of the Soviet global thrust.

Secretary Brown recognized in his FY 1980 Annual Report "the degree of emphasis in Soviet military doctrine on war-winning nuclear capability, and the extent to which current Soviet programs are related to the doctrine", but he failed to look into the motives underlying both the programs and the doctrine. The implications of this for the future can only be gauged if one relates SALT to the fundamental sources of Soviet conduct and not, as Secretary Brown did in his testimony before the Senate Committee, to the tactical considerations alone.

While some SALT II advocates do not address themselves to the right historical questions, others provide the wrong answers to them in their testimonies. Thus Richard J. Barnet rightly stressed that "the debate over SALT really comes down to a disagreement about Soviet goals", but reduced them to "the historic concern of the Russians with territorial security" and asserted that "their weapon programs, military doctrines, and political uses of military power have been imitative of and responsive to U.S. programs, doctrines and operations." All these propositions are demonstrably false.

Soviet actions in Angola or Ethiopia are hardly concerned with the Russian territorial security. Nor is it relevant to the development of the Soviet missile superiority or the Soviet blue water navy. And they were not built in response to American arms expansion: as noted above, the enormous increase in Soviet military expenditures coincided with a steady decrease in American military expenditures. In short, the old chestnut about the Soviet "security" should be finally put to rest and be replaced by concern about Western security in the face of Soviet expansionism, of which the years of Soviet history provide such ample evidence.

Military technology matters, but it is not everything. Political perspective is even more important. The problem before the Senate is how the ratification of SALT II in its present form will affect the situation in which the decline of American power is acknowledged by everybody except the American President. Inevitably, its acceptance without serious amendments will be generally taken as an indication that the Soviet expansion and drive for ascendance is going to meet with even less resistance in the future than in the recent past. (Conversely, a modification of the treaty, with a view for a better balance will have the opposite political effect. As both supporters and opponents of SALT II realize, its symbolic significance will be enormous. For the world as a spectator, its ratification may raise the specter of a possible emergency of Soviet hegemony in Europe and adjoining areas, if not yet of a more general Pax Sovietica.

Seen in this light the attempts to represent the opposition to the ratification as somehow illegitimate, or as the President put it, "the height of irresponsibility," turn against those who became known as "SALT-sellers" (Churchill would undoubtedly have called them "the boneless wonders"). Soviet pressures against any amendments give us an early taste of what Soviet intimidation might become if the United States were to continue down the slippery slope.

A day after he accepted Mr. Brezhnev's non-treaty assurances on the use of the "Backfire", President Carter said that "SALT II is not based on trust" and added

that the "U.S. means of verification would discover, in time for an effective response, any Soviet cheating on the treaty."

Leaving aside the question of verification, one wonders what this "effective response" might be, whether the Russians are, or are not, cheating. This one effectively guarded secret has not been detected through the national means of verification in the SALT II debate. The comparison of the American starting position in March 1977 with the outcome of the Geneva negotiations throws some doubt on how resolute the will behind such "effective response" would be, especially in the context of an even more adverse balance of power.

No, the time for such an "effective response", which does not require any dramatics but only a reassertion of national will, is now. In part it requires refusing to accept SALT II as it stands, having emerged from ill-conducted negotiations which were based on false political and strategic perceptions. Wrong expectations in the past cannot inspire confidence in wishful assurances today.

In his Foreign Policy article of Spring 1974, Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote that: "Nobody knows what the American policy is," a statement which has acquired an additional pertinence with the passage of time. At present nobody knows what American foreign policy is either, but it became clear that at least some of its premises are incompatible. There is a growing tension between the need to preserve American alliances (NATO, in particular) and the strategic concepts elaborated in the sixties (the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction, in particular). What happens to the operational relevance of the theories of "tripwire", of "limited response", or of "damage limitation" when the credibility of the American deterrence umbrella itself comes into question? And if, in order to strengthen European defense, a European nuclear deterrent is promoted in spite of Soviet objections in SALT III, what will happen to the American concern with nuclear non-proliferation and, indeed, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself? If Europe had to rely on its own deterrent, can Japan be far behind? What about other nations which are already on the brink of nuclear capability? And how can NATO, conceived as a regional alliance limited in its functions to a specific geographic area, be effective against the growing Soviet threat to the strategic points vital to its survival, but lying outside its "jurisdiction"? Such and similar questions are increasingly forcing themselves on the agenda as a result of the American drift into impotence.

The Soviets were, of course, skillfully exploiting such "contradiction," trying to aggravate them through their tactics. The divorce between the political and strategic concerns, the "decoupling" of various vital American considerations have been sharpened by the acceptance of Soviet diplomatic strategy which has separated *ab initio* the political and strategic, the nuclear and conventional, the American and the European interests simply through the assignation of different subjects to different diplomatic pigeonholes, in Helsinki (only general "security"), Vienna (MBFR—only NATO conventional arms), Geneva (SALT II—only American strategic arms). This diplomatic arrangement precluded in effect the necessary "linkages" inconvenient to the Soviets, but it is, of course, not the only reason for the divorce between different elements in American foreign policy which is now so confused in its concepts, its perceptions and its responses.

If paradoxically, both the acceptance and the rejection of the ratification of SALT II create considerable concern among West Europeans, it will be the result of this confusion. Europe should realize now the relevance of the celebrated question by Edward Gibbon in his "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire."

"The savage nations of the globe are the common enemies of civilized society; and we may inquire with anxious curiosity, whether Europe is still threatened with a repetition of those calamities which formerly oppressed the arms and institutions of Rome." Optimistically, Gibbon answered this question in the negative, but two hundred years later, one cannot help but feel that there is a real possibility that the answer may after all turn out to be positive.

And if Europe is lost it would not be a calamity just for Europe. It would be a disaster for America too. Europe does not have to be lost in any dramatic way, it may simply drift into neutralism or self-Finlandization, just as America may drift into the isolationist impotence of a "fortress" mentality. The Orwellian "Eurasia" and "Oceania" would then acquire realistic, rather than horror-fiction characteristics. Considerations of American security apart, this is not a development which would be conducive to the minimization of the chances of nuclear war after the 1984 elections, with the United States increasingly isolated and with the possibility of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement or a Sino-Soviet nuclear confrontation looming.

There is no earthly reason why this kind of development should occur. The potential strength of the antagonists of the Soviet Union is immensely greater than its own and it is the Soviet menace which brings them together. Besides, the potential weaknesses of the Soviet Union—in economics, technology, and national

problems—could be very troublesome if the Soviet Union cannot compensate them with foreign policy successes. Even such successes created new difficulties for the Soviet Union. It cannot consolidate its imperial realm through the cultural superiority of its institutions. It has only brute force and totalitarian techniques, not Roman law or British constitutionalism. Its economic base is too weak by itself to sustain the imperial expansion, it can only count on the weakness of its opponents. Western strengths and Soviet weaknesses can be politically exploited, the American political will strengthened, the morale of its allies reinforced, and Soviet expansionism checked. Given a clear vision of the aim, there is no reason why America and the West should not pull through the dangerous period of the Eighties. But this cannot be done by a Wilsonian "guarantee by word" of peace and an unequal treaty signalling American decline and Soviet ascendancy. However concealed, this kind of arrangement cannot dispel anxieties in Europe and elsewhere, including America itself.

The hairsplitting about "adequate" verification, "significant" threat and all the other weasel words in the SALT II debate (which George F. Will called "the canned cant") can, of course, confuse the public. But although it is difficult for the public to find its way through the welter of technical claims and counter-claims, it can sense the danger. After all, as Pericles said, in a free society "although only a few may originate a policy, we are all able to judge it."

For this purpose it is essential to realize a few fundamental historical and political facts.

We all know that SALT I was supposed to be an "interim" agreement to be followed by a more permanent arrangement providing for increased arms limitations and a real arms control. We also know that after six-and-a-half years of negotiations nothing came out of it, except another Soviet step en route to the consolidation of Soviet strategic superiority and a similar promise of increased arms limitations and control in SALT III. We are therefore bound to ask ourselves the worrying question, as so many asked in the Thirties, where all the concessions to the dictators are leading, whether the optimistic anticipations are not equally illusory this time and whether the SALT II agreement will not prevent the recognition of the dangers involved. If we do not all remember the still relevant distant past, we remember the recent past and, as Henry Kissinger put it in his Statement to a Senate Committee (on 15 April 1975), "to fully understand what has happened it is necessary to have an appreciation of all that went before."

Those who have not only a sense of responsibility to the present, but also a sense of history and of responsibility to future generations, to our own children should be able to see that the ratification of SALT II may be a political calamity.

"Detente" was a victory of false hopes over historical experience. SALT I was a victory of wrong concepts over strategic experience. SALT II will be a victory of discredited illusions over both historical and strategic experience. It should not be ratified in its present form.

We will proceed, at this time, to the questioning of the panel, and I would yield to Senator Church.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I confess that because of another engagement, I have been unable to hear all of the statements, but I can assure you, gentlemen, that I will read them.

Mr. Zagoria, you say in your statement—and it struck me as I quickly perused it—"A Chicken Little school of American foreign policy thinks that the sky is falling down, and the United States is powerless to reverse unfavorable trends."

I must say that there is a popular view that this is happening to us, and one that seems to be so deeply implanted that it may give rise to another attempt to find scapegoats like we witnessed after the Second World War.

You define this school as:

Nostalgic for the 1950's, when the United States was the most powerful country in the world, and it seeks to turn the clock back to the situation that prevailed then, when the United States enjoyed unquestioned military superiority over the Soviet Union.

"The Chicken Little school," you go on,

exaggerates the Soviet menace, and minimizes the strength and vitality of the United States and the resources of our many friends and allies. It is incapable of devising a measured and discriminating response to the Soviet challenge. It confuses developments in Iran, Southern Africa, Yemen, Afghanistan, Vietnam and elsewhere, and sees only the Soviet hand behind all of the unfavorable trends in the world today. Instead of helping us to understand that the challenges we face in the Third World are varied and complex, and cannot be met really with guns and missiles, it encourages a mindless militarism.

As I said, I see much evidence of this school of thought, not just among the experts that are down at Foggy Bottom, but out in the country at large. Politicians are trying to latch on to that, and make the most that they can of it.

What I would like to ask you is, there really isn't any way to turn the clock back, is there, Mr. Zagoria?

Mr. ZAGORIA. I don't think that it is possible for the United States to achieve for any length of time strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. I think they would do everything to deny us that, and I don't think that it is technically possible.

Senator CHURCH. Is it even conceptually sound? When we had a monopoly on the weapons, or when in the early 1950's we had so large a number of these weapons as compared to the Soviet Union, or even during the Cuban missile crisis, when we had such a preponderant advantage, then there was such a thing as strategic superiority, and it had some impact upon the Berlin crisis of that period, and the Cuban missile crisis.

Once both sides have built up their arsenal to the point where either can pulverize the other several times over, then is it sensible anymore to talk about achieving a strategic preponderance that has any meaning?

Mr. ZAGORIA. I don't think it is sensible. But I think on both sides there are fears that the other side is trying to get strategic superiority. I think that there is probably a Soviet counterpart of our people who fear for ICBM vulnerability. Professor Legvold gave some very interesting figures that can be used by those Soviet counterparts.

At the moment, because we have diversified our strategic force, our ICBM land-based missiles are more vulnerable than the Russian land-based ICBM's because they have not diversified their force. But they are going to face the same problem later on.

Senator CHURCH. Yes, they will face the same problem later on, but the question is, how much of a real problem is it, or how much is it the result of the nuclear theologians who concoct these scenarios?

When the committee was told by the commission that we wanted to study what the actual physical effects of a nuclear exchange would be on the United States and the Soviet Union, they spoke of a strike against our missile bases, our Minutemen missiles—and not of the sort of surgical strike that we hear about in this antiseptic language of the military experts and the nuclear theologians, but of a strike that would wipe out between 15 and 20 million Americans.

Then, the scenario went, an American President would hesitate to strike back even though he had the power left to destroy the Soviet Union for fear that the Soviet Union, in the last act of the last person, would touch the buttons and fire the remaining missiles at us.

All of this seems to me to be unreal. I cannot imagine any Soviet military leader saying to the Kremlin:

We now have the necessary measure of nuclear preponderance that we can take out those Minutemen, and when we do so, we will paralyze the American President who will then refrain from retaliation, or if he does retaliate, at least we have a sufficient margin of missiles that we can get back at them and decimate what is left of the United States.

It seems to me that it is unreal, once you get to the point where the missiles can destroy both countries.

Mr. ZAGORIA. I agree with you that it would be irrational for Soviet leadership to launch a first strike against the United States now or at any time in the foreseeable future. I think that some of the better critics would respond that they are talking about the political and psychological consequences of the perception of American inferiority.

I agree with you that there is a great deal of theology in the debate as it is taking place in the pages of many of our journals.

Senator BIDEN. Don't the theologians encourage that perception? The very people who argue that perceptions of American weakness are important are the same people who contribute to a perception of American weakness, by constantly talking about scenarios in which the United States either loses or gives in to Soviet intimidation. The trouble is that these scenarios are totally implausible. They exist only in the minds of the nuclear theologians. A first-strike threat is only significant if a rational Soviet leader would consider it. If he is irrational, then it doesn't matter in this context. We can have 4 million M-X, if they are irrational, and they are still going to be able to eliminate somewhere up to 125 million Americans.

Mr. ULAM. Senator, if I may say something. If we look at one point where everybody agrees there was some risk of a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union, that was the Cuban missile crisis. At the time, the Soviets were in a condition of considerable inferiority to us in nuclear weapons. Still, the situation developed because of their perception of our weakness, that we would not react, and a series of events started, the momentum of which could have led to a nuclear crisis.

Mr. Khrushchev was not irrational. He was harebrained, as his successors say, and had harebrained ideas occasionally. But one thing that impressed me at the time was that even at the time of the decided inferiority in nuclear weapons, the Russians assumed that the mere prospect of any nuclear conflict with the United States would act as a deterrent for the United States in defending its interests.

I remember Mr. Gromyko was in Washington at the time, and at the time the Berlin crisis was ripening, and President Kennedy called out 150,000 reservists. Mr. Gromyko in his interview with the American press said that President Kennedy should realize that we don't live in the 19th century, and consequently calling out 150,000 reservists makes no difference in the age of modern weapons.

In other words, the Russians were using something of a nuclear bluff at a time when they were decidedly inferior to us. So the question is not academic, or theological whether with a much

increased power vis-a-vis us in nuclear weapons, whether this would not increase their propensity for similar plays.

Senator CHURCH. My belief has always been that the harebrained idea was that the Russians could achieve something comparable to nuclear equivalence cheaply, by putting medium range missiles in Cuba that would strike the United States and would make up for their inferiority in intercontinental ballistic missiles, and that this kind of bluff would give them a nuclear equivalence that they could not otherwise attain, except for the massive expenditure of resources in the Soviet Union itself.

When the bluff was called, the Russians withdrew the missiles. They did behave rationally.

Mr. ULAM. They did break down.

Senator CHURCH. The threat was really not credible. When the President reacted, the Russians recognized that it was not credible, and that they were not going to suffer the destruction of their own society. So they backed down. It was a great miscalculation and humiliation for them.

After that, they apparently made a conscious decision that they would devote however much of their resources as would be necessary to achieve nuclear equivalence with the United States, to close the gap so that in the future they would be in a position of parity. Today they are roughly in that position.

The other factor that has been added to the equation in the meantime is that our nuclear arsenal has continued to grow massively—over 10,000 warheads, equivalent to 600,000 Hiroshimas. In the event of a miscalculation today, the level of danger arising out of a confrontation between these two arsenals is enormously greater. Both sides have each spent \$1 trillion just to make the two countries the two most insecure in the world today. That is, I think, the central insanity of our times.

I don't know how we crawl down from this precarious position. But the only hope that I can see is that we take advantage of the parity which makes negotiation possible. As modest as SALT II is, the hope that I have is that it is a stepping stone that may lead to more substantial reductions on both sides in the SALT III talks.

That would sum up my feelings toward the treaty. Do you have any response to that?

Mr. ULAM. I will just use this as an example that perceptions are important, and the argument that psychologically numbers are of some importance. What is even more important is the impression that the Soviets perceive how eager we are just to concede to their viewpoint without protecting our own interests, and arriving at a fair bargain from our point of view. Those things add up to a situation where they would make another miscalculation. We cannot preclude it.

Mr. LEGVOLD. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could comment on the same range of questions.

The issue, if you will, is nuclear blackmail in these circumstances. I think it is fair to say it never comes as a proposition or a shot out of the blue, but out of a crisis situation. The essential proposition of rationality, or irrationality in actually using the nuclear weapons is very rarely in dispute.

By and large, the question of nuclear blackmail is more a comment on us, that is the potential victim, than it is on the Soviet Union. That is, the extent to which we would, in the shadow of nuclear war, given physical, visible, or tangible advantages on the Soviet Union's part, yield.

That has to be converted into some set of scenarios, and the nuclear theologians, and so on, who develop this argue it in the following fashion. It is almost like one of those computerized chess games in which you can set up four moves, and then press the button and see what happens. The whole thing plays its way through, and you see the results. At that moment, we press the button and we see what the whole set of moves are, and responses through nuclear war. Since we know that at the end of this process, called escalation or dominance, we lose, we yield before we ever get to that point. That is the real problem.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a matter of will, isn't it?

Mr. LEGVOLD. Yes, and that is why, Mr. Chairman, I said that it really was a comment on us rather than it is on the realism of the proposition.

There is a second side to this, and it is very important. It brings us back to Cuba. It is the extent to which at this moment, if we are not bluffing, if we do not yield, even if we were to perceive the way in which the calculator plays out the chess game in the right way, then what does the Soviet Union do in these circumstances, when the balance no longer looks the way it did in the Cuban missile crisis.

That raises the question of the link between the state of the strategic balance and Soviet behavior in various parts of the world, or specifically the question of Soviet risk taking. I am not satisfied on two scores yet, and I think that people ought to be satisfied on this score before they draw hasty conclusions. I am not satisfied, first of all, that there is a direct correlation between the state of the nuclear balance and the way in which people behave, by and large, when there are risks involved at the low end.

The moment of the crunch, when you are eyeball-to-eyeball, there is a link between the strategic balance and risk taking. But at the lower level, I am not sure there is.

The second point that I would make, as I look at Soviet behavior over the 17 years since the Cuban missile crisis, I am not convinced that the Soviets are more prone to take risks today than then. In a period of inferiority, I think that they took greater risks.

I think that the Berlin crisis from 1958 to 1961, and I think the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 far exceed risk taking as such, when contrasted with Angola, with the Horn, or anything else that you might cite in the recent period.

There is another way in which you can phrase the problem of Soviet behavior in risk taking, and that has to do with the way in which we have been behaving outside the context of the shifting military balance, although maybe because of it. That is the extent to which our failure to resist Soviet probing has caused them to redefine what constitutes a risk. Therefore, they feel they can do what they want in Angola or the Horn because of our failure of will. But even that is not necessarily linked to the strategic balance.

I don't know who believes that the American response or failure of response in Angola was due to the state of the overall military balance, or the failure to respond in the Horn of Africa was due to the state of the strategic nuclear balance.

So even here, I don't see evidence that, in fact, the Soviets are more prone to run risks, or to recalculate or redefine what constitutes a risk at the moment.

Senator CHURCH. In the whole course of the debate in the Senate about what American policy should be in Angola—I don't remember anyone talking about the threat of a nuclear war.

There were those who wanted to send in the CIA, and send in Marines, and start another war in the jungles, and so on. But none of them talked about the risk of a nuclear war. The nuclear element, the strategic nuclear balance did not really enter into the debate.

Mr. LEGVOLD. That is my point.

Senator CHURCH I was underscoring your point.

Mr. LEGVOLD. If the general statement is frequently made, as it is, that the Soviets are more inclined today, because of the changing military power, to run risks, then where is the evidence?

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, during that debate, and we had closed and open sessions, I don't remember any discussion about the prospect of a direct head-to-head confrontation with the Soviets. The issue was not that as it was debated.

I am going to revamp what I said initially. I said that this was to be an open forum, which I prefer. But all of the gentlemen who showed up decided that they prefer not to have an open forum, and the ones who agree with me are not here. We will return to the 10-minute rule, and I yield to Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. I would just like to thank the witnesses. I am reading their statements now, and I prefer to wait for any questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McGovern?

Senator MCGOVERN. Thank you.

First of all, I want to commend all four of the witnesses for the very thoughtful statements they have presented here today. I am particularly pleased to have Mr. Legvold here because, Mr. Chairman, he once worked in my office many years ago. I don't take any credit at all for his brilliance and his perception, but I do feel very proud that we once worked together.

I would like to ask all of you a general question in whatever time I have. I think that we are dealing in these hearings not only with Soviet perceptions of us, but American perceptions of what the Soviets are up to. It has been repeatedly stated in these hearings, and implied when it was not stated by other witnesses, that the Soviet Union is bent upon a course that is aimed at virtually devouring the West. But I am wondering whether it is not the emergence of the Soviet Union as a major superpower in the world today that is really troubling us.

In other words, are their efforts an attempt to emulate what we are doing as a superpower around the world? I see them doing a number of things in the Third World and elsewhere that are of concern to me, but I have been concerned about that pattern of conduct when we practiced it.

Senator Fulbright used to make the observation when he was here that when he traveled around the world, he saw more American soldiers in airports going hither, dither, and yon, to various posts of duty, than he saw Soviet forces. Maybe that is an oversimplification, but we see the Soviets sending arms and advisors to South Yemen, and to Africa, and other crucial points, but we have sent more arms and advisors to the Third World, I think, than they have.

We see them supporting the Cubans in other countries, but we have had our share of direct interventions, and no one needs to tick off that list to this audience. We see them building nuclear weapons, despite SALT I, and that point has been made by a number of witnesses. But we have not been standing still either in the SALT I. We have taken the first technological step on such things as the MIRV, and now the cruise missile.

I would like to raise the question, isn't the basic source of the tension the fact that we have two major superpowers, each trying to look after their interests, and extend their influence wherever they reasonably can, and that that competition is not quite the one-sided campaign of Soviet aggression that it is sometimes made out to be?

Aren't some of the same things that worry us in their behavior a cause for worry to them when they are practiced by us?

I would appreciate comments from any of you who care to comment on it.

Mr. LABEDZ. I could not agree, Senator, that this is just the function of two superpowers, and that the Russians in some way are copying our behavior. I think our whole engagement in the business of selling arms started very largely with the Soviet position after the war, and evaluation by the Soviet Union of its wartime pledges, extending its sphere of influence over Eastern Europe, replacing the governments with military force. We may have acted clumsily, or overreacted at times, but certainly I don't think that you can make the comparison and say that this is just the traditional competition, natural competition of two superpowers.

I think that for all our sins of commission and omission, the record as to which power stands for more peaceful international relations is very clear. I think that any sense of proportion should indicate that Russian behavior has been such that it should have caused us legitimate concern, and should concern noncommunist and even some Communist countries all over the world.

Mr. ZAGORIA. I do think that there is a basic validity to the argument, Senator McGovern, that we are witnessing two great superpowers in competition, seeking to extend their influence. I think, in fact, that a good analogy, insofar as analogies are ever useful, sometimes some of our people refer to Nazi Germany, to Munich, they evoke the Germany of the 1930's as an analogy of the Soviet Union of today.

I think that a better analogy would be the analogy that existed on the eve of World War I between Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany and Great Britain at that time, in which Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany was determined to catch up to Great Britain and achieve its place in the sun.

I think that that is the situation today. I think that the Russians want a place in the sun. Their idea of a place in the sun is to have as much influence in the world as the United States has.

I think there are a number of things that create the problem. One is that the Soviet Union is a rising power. We came out of World War II as the only global power, economically, culturally, ideologically, militarily, and every other way.

What has now been happening in the past decade or so is that the Soviet Union, particularly through the growth of its military might, is challenging that dominance. That, understandably, creates great fear, alarm, suspicions, as did the rise of German power on the eve of World War I in Great Britain.

Senator MCGOVERN. The reverse of that, Mr. Zagoria, is that they must have felt enormous anxiety during that period when they were so clearly overshadowed by American power.

Mr. ZAGORIA. That is right.

I think another factor that has to be brought into this equation is that they benefit more from global disorder, disorder particularly in the Third World, because they are an anti-status quo power, and we are, by and large a status quo power. Therefore, if one can bet on anything it is that there will be more radical transformations in the Third World, many of them will benefit the Soviets and probably come at our expense. This will increase our anxieties and our fears.

A lot of the debate, a lot of the discomfort in the United States is precisely over their taking advantage of those opportunities created by that disorder in the Third World.

Having said all that, I would agree with Professor Ulam on one point. Recognizing this competition, I think that we should all recognize it, I happen to prefer our system, our values.

Senator MCGOVERN. I think that that goes without saying. I hope that all of us here are in agreement that we prefer the constitutional democracy of the United States, and our system of free enterprise, and our respect for spiritual values more than we do the Soviet system.

The only question I am raising is, is it proper for us to deduce, when we see the Soviets actively exploiting revolutionary situations in Africa, that that is necessarily a major threat to the security of the West?

Mr. ZAGORIA. It is proper for us to be alarmed, if we want to stay ahead. I would like us to stay ahead.

Senator MCGOVERN. The irony of this is that one does not have to go very far back in the history of the two countries when the tables were reversed, when we were the country that was seen as the inspiration for revolutionary forces around the globe, and the Russians were the great status quo power, fearful of these libertarian ideas that had been unleashed in the United States. I think now those days are gone. We are now at a point where neither country is going to sit still while the other achieves a clear position of superiority.

Mr. LEGVOLD. If you would allow me a short comment on the same question, and if you will allow me the prerogative of disagreeing with an old employer.

As Don Zagoria said, I think that it is an argument. I think it is a half-argument. I think it gets to an essential element of the problem, the dimension of the problem, the competition between two superpowers. Indeed, the Soviet Union in its own perspective often is merely attempting to do what we have done along the way, especially in terms of Angola or Ethiopia.

We have had our share of interventions, and we have used our military power in foreign policy comparably more often than the Soviet Union. But, as I said, I think that it is only part of the problem. I think beyond that, I would argue, by my terms, by my definitions, the Soviet Union does mean us malice. It does not have our interests, by almost any definition of those, however they are to be perceived or defined, as in their interests.

There are certain points at which this becomes complicated. Let us say, a Western recession which poses problems to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and so on.

Second, as Mr. Zagoria has said, the Soviet Union is power seeking, and it is a rising power. It is seeking its place in the sun.

I think that you are right in your formula to the extent to which you correct those people who believe that the whole thing, the primary inspiration, the wellspring of Soviet behavior is to, in your words, devour the West, a campaign of aggression, simple expansionism, or in Mr. Zagoria's terms, the equivalent of Nazi Germany in the 1930's.

Nonetheless, they are seeking power, and they would use it in order to influence outcomes that in the long-run are not in our interest. They want different outcomes from what we want, and that is why I come to this third instance, which seems to me to be at the very heart of the matter. We have different values. They wanted a different outcome in Chile from what we wanted. They want a different outcome in the Middle East from what we want. They want a different outcome after Tito in Yugoslavia from what we want.

That is not in our interest, and to the extent that they are able to combine power in order to produce influence, in order to affect those outcomes, it is not in our interest, even if, to a certain extent, there is the problem of doing what we have done before.

I think that this all comes down to the basic question of how we cope with the problem, provided we define it properly. It means that we are really interested in influencing their behavior, and when it comes to something like Ethiopia, or Angola, it seems to me, in the future, the problem is not whether the Soviets have a right to do this because we have arrogated that right in the past, and have done it in the past. But that neither side, nor the communities about them, are going to do very well if we both insist on that right.

We have to figure out some way to work our way through that problem because that is another way in which we cannot go back.

Senator MCGOVERN. We may disagree on some of the nuances, but we come out with the same conclusion, that both sides ought to exercise extreme caution in trying to control events in other people's backyard. I think that that doctrine practiced by either side is going to be self-defeating.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Percy.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I would very much appreciate each of you responding to a question with respect to the effect on our NATO Allies, if this treaty is not ratified.

Ambassador Toon said this morning:

I believe the Soviets see an alternative to a SALT II agreement, a risky one, but one with considerable appeal. If the Senate fails to approve the agreement, or insists on changes unacceptable to the Kremlin, the result will be a crisis of confidence in U.S. leadership among our Western allies.

Were all of you here this morning?

[No response.]

Senator PERCY. Let me just finish that paragraph.

Driving a wedge between the United States and its European Allies is a goal of the Soviet foreign policy which long predates arms control. I am persuaded that Moscow would exploit a breakdown in the SALT process to pursue this goal with a vengeance. I believe that they would succeed in doing so. The result could be increased U.S. isolation, and a breakdown in our efforts to stimulate improvement in the conventional and nuclear defenses of Western Europe.

I happen to believe that if this whole process broke down, there would be an attempt by the Soviet Union to exploit it worldwide, as well as in Europe.

Now if we have a bad treaty, we must convince the world that it is bad for the security and safety of not just the United States but the world itself. The United States is a protector of many interests around the world.

Could you comment on the degree of concern you feel there would be if the treaty were turned down?

What effect would failure to ratify the treaty have?

I have a couple of other questions, so could each of you be as brief as possible? I ask that the record be left open so that your remarks can be amplified, if you so wish.

Mr. LABEDZ. Senator Percy, I believe that the ratification of the treaty, and the rejection of the ratification of the treaty, will both cause some sort of disturbance on the European scene. On the whole, I think that the ratification, in the long run, will produce a more harmful political effect for the following reasons:

The Europeans are so dependent on the American support and deterrence that they naturally cling to the support. They feel that it is not up to them, but up to the Americans to take the leadership in enhancing western defenses which has been generally recognized as necessary after the experience of the last decade.

They feel, therefore, that they cannot come out and stick out their neck in opposing the SALT Treaty ratification. But if your premise of the perception of the balance of power in the world is that there is a decline in the power of the United States, which leads to a possible undermining of the American security umbrella in Europe, then the full impact of the ratification, in terms of political perception, of the possible legitimation of the Soviet drive toward superiority may come with a delayed effect on the European scene.

There may be then, a shock of recognition, a recognition of the new position of the Western European scene vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, and at that point the present complacent view in Europe of SALT may turn into, if not a panicky attitude, at least a much more nervous attitude toward the Soviet Union.

As we see now already, there are tendencies, Mr. Ball referred to them with respect to Germany, toward some kind of European neutralism. I believe contrary to what Mr. Ball said that such neutralist tendencies will be enhanced only at that point, rather than the failure of ratification may bring them about now.

Senator PERCY. Thank you, Mr. Labeledz.

Mr. Zagoria?

Mr. ZAGORIA. I think the basic question is a question of the confidence that our Allies have in us. I think that their lack of confidence will grow if we demonstrate that we are incapable of pursuing a unified policy. The administration wants to do one thing, and the Congress does not go along.

If we act as if we are paralyzed, and if we act as if we are unreasonable, I think that the Europeans will draw many of these conclusions from the act of not ratifying the treaty.

Therefore, I would think that it would have a much worse impact on our lives. I think that, for example, the Germans, who are in the forefront of the Ostpolitik of improving relations with the Soviet Union in Europe, and the Japanese who are in a very tender strategic situation, and who do not want to provoke a new cold war with the Russians, both would certainly be very anxious.

The French and the British might very well conclude that their only alternative was to increase their own nuclear forces, if the Soviet Union was going to increase theirs. This would create new tensions in NATO.

So, I think, yes; Ambassador Toon is absolutely correct. There would be new tensions in NATO along similar lines to pro and antitreaty forces in the United States. There would be great opportunities for the Russians to exploit those tensions, play off European powers against the United States, and European powers against each other, and Japan against the United States, to exploit their fears that this country no longer seems to be able to conduct a unified, coherent strategy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. I think that it would be very dangerous.

Mr. LEGVOLD. I think the basic proposition is correct at a certain level. But like so much else in this debate, I think that it is vastly overdrawn. I think that the Soviet Union would try to exploit the failure of the treaty in two respects.

One, I think we would be engaged in a battle of who destroyed SALT internationally, with what effect I don't know. Second, I think that the Soviet Union would make progress on the European front, and particularly press forward with the MBFR negotiations, and I think that they would receive some response on the part of the Europeans, probably with also some greater support on the part of the American administration, concerned also about the implications of a lost SALT.

Senator PERCY. The failure of SALT would help MBFR?

Mr. LEGVOLD. The failure of SALT may, indeed, in that way.

The CHAIRMAN. You just made the strongest argument to vote against SALT.

Mr. LEGVOLD. If that is the strongest argument to vote against SALT, then I assume all of you are voting for it.

The larger proposition, though, is would it really explode the alliance, and would there be the enormous tensions, and the failure

of NATO, as some prominent official has said, in these circumstances? That, it seems to me, is vastly overdrawn.

The Europeans are concerned, the Germans particularly, they want to go forward with their own Ostpolitik. But the failure of SALT is not going to transform the Atlantic relationship in the dire ways that are predicted.

Finally, in terms of the United States-Soviet relationship, I said in my opening comments that, again, these things are overdrawn. It is going to accentuate the tensions. I think that it will make things at least as bad as they were in the spring of 1978 and that is as bad as they have been in a very long time, certainly in the last decade. I am talking now about the context of the Horn, Soviet intervention in the Horn, the trials in Moscow, and so on.

But I don't think that it would lead us back to that one fundamental proposition of the 1950's and the early 1960's, and that is the risk of direct confrontation. Tension, yes; direct confrontation, I am not certain. As far as the SALT process itself is concerned, again, those people who say that failure either to ratify here, or to attach amendments that cause the Soviet Union to reject, will mean that we cannot go forward with the SALT process, I think that that is overdrawn.

I think we probably will be able to continue with the SALT process, but that is not the central issue. The issue is what kind of a party will the Soviet Union be the next time around in a SALT negotiation, and that is of important consequence, and I don't think they are going to be an easier party with which to negotiate.

Senator PERCY. Mr. Ulam?

Mr. ULAM. I think the worst possibility from the European viewpoint is if this treaty is ratified unchanged, even if there is a strong feeling that it confers substantial advantages to the Soviet Union, and you pass it simply because you feel that this is the way toward getting better relations with the Soviet Union.

I think, if the treaty is rejected, and I am not saying that I am for rejection of it as a whole, what you would probably have is a fierce baying and gnashing of teeth by the Russians, which would be bad for our nerves for a while, and for the European nerves. But if it is accompanied by a reasoned case for a different type of treaty, I think eventually it might have beneficial rather than detrimental effects on our alliance and our own national security.

Senator JAVITS. Would the gentleman yield?

Senator PERCY. I will be happy to.

Senator JAVITS. Gentlemen, a sequel to that question is, our primary problem today is the destabilization that the Soviets are imposing on the world in various areas by their policy and arms supply. What is the view of each of you as to the effect upon their activities in areas, such as the Middle East, and Africa, and other places, of the Senate's ratifying or not ratifying?

Mr. LABEDZ. In general, it would have a very negative effect in the world on the perception of the American political will and of the American resolve to stop the process which has been going on for many years of the Soviet political and strategic ascendancy in the international balance of power.

Therefore, I believe that one has to, first of all, concentrate on the problem of the tendency which exists now in terms of this

balance, rather than on the treaty itself. I believe that there is a connection in terms of political dimension between the ratification of the treaty and the perception of this balance. But the fundamental thing is what the Russians themselves see as the relation of these factors.

To the extent that the symbolic significance of the treaty will contribute to the perception which is, to the Europeans and, indeed, to many Americans, deeply worrying, to this extent the Soviet calculation of the correlation of forces; i.e. not only of the military strategic balance, but of the overall political balance, will raise the possibility of the Soviet risk taking, the threshold of risk will be lower for them.

Of course, the fundamental thing is the real thing, namely, the balance of forces.

Mr. ZAGORIA. I think that there is a limited payoff that we are going to get from SALT in terms of trying to get Soviet restraint in the world. We will remain competitive. However, I think that what marginal chances there are for inducing greater restraint on the Russian side for turning what will remain a basically competitive relationship into a somewhat more civilized competitive relationship, and a somewhat less dangerous competitive relationship, the chances for that are better over the longer run if we continue SALT as a process, and not just SALT II, but SALT III and so on, because I think the Soviets have a stake in that process, and particularly if we are able to convince the Russians that their violation of certain rules of the game—their use of Cuban troops in Africa and in the Middle East—is simply incompatible with our understanding of détente, and that eventually the SALT process will be affected by that.

If we can get that message across to them, and continue SALT at the same time, then I think there is certainly some chance of inducing greater restraint in their behavior, but it will be very, very difficult. They are very, very persistent. We have to be also.

Mr. LEGVOLD. I agree with so much of what Mr. Zagoria has just said. Again, there are two important refinements, it seems to me.

The first is the way in which SALT may fail, and the second is the content of the relationship in its other aspects, economic cooperation, the status of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, or the Stevenson amendment, and other forms of cooperation in other areas.

In terms of the way in which it fails, there is a vast difference in terms of Soviet behavior in other areas, if the failure is because the Soviets are convinced that this body has decided that they want to destroy the treaty, and attach killer amendments, and that is it, and the onus branding it is to be transferred to the Soviet Union. Or if they perceive that there are people, from their point of view, who are misguided, but who want to correct an agreement, and who are also basically committed to the agreement.

The Soviets are not utterly incapable of appreciating that. How they are going to cope with it is another matter. They may not respond well.

The third factor is the role of the administration. The worst of all worlds, and you could never have had the two combined—a Senate determined to destroy the SALT agreement, and an administration unwilling to fight for the SALT agreement.

I believe, in looking at Soviet responses, that 1 year ago or 1½ years ago, beginning in the fall of 1977 and going through the spring of 1978, one of the great Soviet concerns was the extent to which this administration, the Carter administration was really committed to SALT. Now they are satisfied that this administration is committed to SALT. Of course, to a large part they respond to American policy in terms of the administration's policy. So that is a further factor.

Now, in terms of the direct relationship of Soviet behavior in the Third World, as I said, I second so much of what Mr. Zagoria has argued. I believe that the essential proposition is one of restraint and constraint. That is, securing Soviet restraint by patterns of mutual restraint in the things that we do, or do not do, and at the same time constraining them by making it plain that if they intervene there is always the risk, when we choose, of counterintervention, for example.

Here I would argue that the balance of forces matters, not precisely as Mr. Labeledz states in terms of the larger correlation of forces, or the overall military balance, but the relevant military power, and that is force projection and what we need to cope with circumstances like a crisis in the Persian Gulf, or Angola, or Ethiopia.

Through this combination of constraint/restraint, as Mr. Zagoria pointed out, we begin to lose a part of that balance, we forego the movement toward patterns of mutual restraint if we defeat SALT. But basically, and on balance, I think that that is largely marginal because I think it is going to come out of the complex of the relationship, and out of the totality of the components of the relationship, including economic cooperation, and the way we deal with one another on a range of problems.

Senator JAVITS. Professor.

Mr. ULAM. I think in the paper I tried to spell out the original concept behind SALT I, that it was not merely a strategic arms agreement but was conducted on certain assumptions of mutual behavior by both parties. By and large the Soviets' behavior has not been such to meet our expectations.

As I said, the worst thing from every point of view would be if we conclude SALT II just out of weakness or out of fear of displeasing the Russians and making them quite mad at us. I think that would be very largely a self-fulfilling prophecy.

On the other hand I think if this discussion leads to amendments and declaratory statements and so on, it will give enough warning to the Russians that we are stubborn about our interest, especially if this is accompanied by our readiness to use other weapons at our disposal, the economic weapon and the diplomatic weapon.

I do not think it quite fits to say we know you have been misbehaving and this time we give you SALT II but watch out for the future, we may not do it again. I think that kind of impression would probably be the worst impression we could create both for the Russians and the Third World which would encourage and strengthen their mischief making all over the world.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hayakawa, you have been very patient.

Senator HAYAKAWA. I am enjoying this very much and I want to thank all of you for being here. I have enjoyed your presentations and have been fascinated by your discussion. I am especially happy to see Professor Ulam. I think I reviewed a book of yours about 7 or 8 years ago, did I not?

Mr. ULAM. I hope favorably.

Senator HAYAKAWA. I think so. I think we had some correspondence afterwards. It is a pleasure to see you here, sir.

I have some questions for various individuals to discuss. I would like to ask Mr. Legvold why it is in March 1977 we made certain proposals to the U.S.S.R. which entailed a fairly substantial reduction of strategic weapons and the Kremlin flatly refused to consider such a proposal. Why was that?

Mr. LEGVOLD. I think there were three reasons. I think the first was, and in ascending order of importance, the way in which it was sprung on them. It was announced publicly virtually at the same time they received it. They do not take well to this kind of negotiation. The second reason was, from their point of view, it threw over an agreement that had been laboriously negotiated since the fall of 1974, and when the Soviets do these things, they proceed incrementally.

I said in order of importance. The third reason was they regarded it as a one-sided proposition. One-sided because it asked them to make, talking about the three dimensions in terms of the overall cuts, the major cuts in all the programs including the heavy missiles down to 150, the MIRV program down to 550 when they probably projected a minimum of 820 as we now know or maybe even 1,000. We were settled on the 550, and so on.

Second, in terms of cruise missiles, the only limit that we were offering them was a range limit. There was no indication that we were prepared to do anything other than build as many as we cared to build of those within that range limit which in their point of view was interpreted in the context of European theater.

Third and most important, the essential limit on modernization was for ICBM's. It said nothing about modernization of the SLBM force where we had the lead and where the concern from their point of view at that juncture was Trident II and indeed Trident I before it and no pledge that we would do anything about that race. As a modernization limit on ICBM's, it meant it came at a point in which we were considerably advanced with our MIRV development and they were essentially 3 years into their MIRV development.

From their point of view it was a one-sided arrangement.

I want to add something that I have often said to them in this context. I think they were wrong to respond only at those three levels. I think they were wrong to reject the notion that we might be able to proceed toward deep cuts in principle and they were mistaken not to offer a counterproposal and see whether we could negotiate at that point. They should not have rejected it out of hand but if I answer your question as a Soviet watcher, then the third point was they thought, I think, that it generally was one-sided and whether it was or not is another matter.

Senator HAYAKAWA. I think you have already answered, you feel they should have taken us up on the proposal.

Mr. LEGVOLD. That is right. I think the worst circumstance was for them to reject it the way they did and force us back to the consequences in May and so on, but so they did.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Professor Zagoria, I have a question for you also. I love your metaphor of the Chicken Little school of foreign policy. I enjoyed your paper very much.

There is something which bothers me. You said we should take this opportunity to warn the Russians that détente is incompatible with many of their actions in the Third World. Of course I believe, myself, that we have never had a détente as long as they have been keeping with this kind of action.

We have warned the Soviets. You say we should take this opportunity to warn the Soviets. It seems to me that we have warned the Soviets repeatedly and what makes you think a new warning will be any more effective than the previous warnings?

Mr. ZAGORIA. I am not talking, Senator, just about a warning. I think we have to, by both word and deed, make it clear to the Russians that if there is continued Cuban combat troop involvement in the Third World, if there is continued heavy arming of Mr. Quadaffi in Libya—and there are a whole variety of other actions of this kind that the Russians categorize as national liberation movements, which they say are compatible with their understanding of peaceful coexistence and détente—we should make it clear to them by word and by deed that in our vocabulary these two things cannot be compartmentalized, that ultimately there will have to be a reciprocal détente in which they will have to show much greater restraint in the Third World, particularly than they have shown in the past.

My proposition is if we say that and act that way at the same time that we are engaged in the SALT process and at the same time we are engaged in a growing economic relationship and at the same time that there is a stake for the Russians in improving relations with us, that at some point the leaders will have to sit around with each other and say, well comrades, we have a choice that we have to make. Who is more important? What is more important, our relationship with the Americans, technology, trade, developing Siberia, and so on or Angola and South Yemen?

That is the choice I would like to force the Soviet leadership to make. You are quite right. So far we have not gotten very far.

Senator HAYAKAWA. We have had words and no deeds.

As you say, it should have compelled the Soviets to ask themselves the question, do we want to improve our relations with the United States. It seems to me they have never had to ask that question because we have had a few mild words but no deeds.

Mr. ZAGORIA. I think we have had the worst of both worlds. We promised them or seemed to be promising them in the early 1970's a huge trading relationship and then we withdrew that. At the same time when they did make their various advances in the Third World, we were unable to mount any actions, political, military, or otherwise to stop them from doing that, from thinking that it might be risky.

We have not offered them a stake in the relationship and at the same time we have been impotent in meeting their challenge. What I am proposing is that we reverse that, we offer them a

positive stake in the relationship and that we do try to take a variety of actions that will convince them that their continued fishing in troubled waters in the Third World will be risky.

Senator HAYAKAWA. The problem you raise is a crucial one to me because those who have proposed this SALT II Treaty have insisted that there be no linkage between this treaty and all the other Soviet behavior elsewhere in the world. We should try to think of this treaty by itself in a kind of isolation. I find it difficult to achieve that level of schizophrenia, to be able to divide myself into two and look at these things separately.

Mr. ZAGORIA. I agree with you, Senator. I think in fact that the SALT debate in the country as a whole and perhaps even in the Senate is in large part a debate about the nature of the Soviet Union and the nature of Soviet foreign policy and the nature of Soviet objectives in the world. I think in a country such as ours those things cannot be separated from SALT.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Professor Zagoria.

I would like to address a question to Professor Ulam. You say in your opinion we ought to convince the Soviet leaders of our purpose, the determination and ability to bar further efforts of being unilaterally advantaged at the expense of the West, in other words, how can we show the Soviets that kind of finality of purpose without risking a confrontation or do we want to risk that confrontation in order to clarify our purpose?

Mr. ULAM. I tried to point that out in the paper and that is why I spoke about economics. I am far from being an expert but I somewhat disagree with my colleague, Professor Zagoria, that the Soviet Union has not already gotten tremendous advantages from détente economically and in transfers of technology. Look at the figures of trade. The original principle of SALT I was the carrot and stick simile of our relations with the Soviet Union. For the past 7 years they have been munching the carrots but the stick has not been very much in evidence. I do not think we can do it. I think they are very tough customers. We cannot do it simply by saying next time you will go too far. I think we have to start doing it now about the whole problem of the Cubans. Scrutinize the provisions of SALT II with an eye to whether we gave in on some provisions simply to have a treaty or whether we feel that some provisions are unfair advantages to the Soviet Union.

I think warnings are not very useful but I would go even so far as to say that when it comes to verbal warnings, we have not done enough. There were some people who were unconcerned, believing that the Soviets would eventually develop sort of indigestion, they will have their own Vietnams and so on. I have not seen the Soviet students demonstrating against their policies in Afghanistan and Angola and they are not likely to.

I think we should pass deeds fairly soon and do it right now, and the process of this détente itself is one yardstick of how seriously the Soviets take our warnings, if indeed we do issue warnings.

I agree with you that it is impossible to separate SALT II completely from other aspects of our policy. That was not done with SALT I. I think I would have been happier if indeed we could have made it clear during the process and stuck to it that any treaty eventually to some extent must depend on Soviet behavior in var-

ious areas of the world and not just on quantities of this or that weapon.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, with your leave, I am going to make a statement which is really only a question in the sense that all these gentlemen are welcome to comment on it, if they wish. It is triggered off by Professor Zagoria's statement that we cannot any longer afford the luxury of 100 foreign policies, one for each Senator, one for the State Department and another one for the National Security Council.

Of course that is the way our country works. I feel myself at a very serious disadvantage in negotiating or talking about coming to a treaty agreement with a nation whose representatives are not elected. They are a self-perpetuating elite. As far as we know they have no consultative process by which they know what the various nationalities, the various working class groups, et cetera, want out of Soviet life. This elite decides foreign policy for itself and even within that elite there is no visible difference of opinion.

Here we have not only 100 but possibly several million foreign policies in this country which we have to pull together into one document, a treaty that we can discuss and negotiate with another party. On the other side we have a peculiar monolithic system. On top of that they have full access to our discussion including the words we are speaking this very afternoon which are all on the record and which are published freely and they have full access to our technical journals and our scientific information, all sorts of information about our weapons which is published and all sorts of information about our public discussions is published.

We have no such access to what they are thinking. They have only one monolithic party line. This makes it very difficult to think of this treaty as being a resolution of differences between two equal powers confronting each other. They are extraordinarily different powers.

If we were negotiating this treaty with Japan or Britain, France, or Italy, or Greece, it would be one thing. We are negotiating this treaty with a peculiarly monolithic totalitarian state in which as you say there are no student demonstrators for testing the policies of their government.

Therefore, whatever treaty we enter into, I must say I am terribly nervous about it. We are not as two nations confronting each other as peers. We are confronting each other as two entirely different kinds of political animals. I do not know what historical meaning such a treaty will have in that situation.

The CHAIRMAN. You keep coming back to student demonstrators. I do not know how you always get to that.

Senator HAYAKAWA. He brought it up.

The CHAIRMAN. I am teasing you. If anybody has experience with student demonstrators, the two most experienced are you and I because at the time when the demonstrations were going on I was one of the ones demonstrating unlike anyone else in the U.S. Senate and at the time they were going on, you were one of the ones speaking out. Thank God I was in Syracuse and you were in San Francisco. You might have flunked me.

Senator HAYAKAWA. I would have had you arrested.

The CHAIRMAN. I expect you might have. I am just thankful that you do not share the viewpoint of some who agree with you on SALT, which is that I should now be arrested for my position.

I would like to pursue if I may several of the lines of questioning. I would like to commend me for my patience. I thought by opening this up, and chairing, that I would get to ask all the questions. Lo and behold all the senior members showed up.

I forget who made the statement that there tends to be an oversimplification when we discuss events in other parts of the world. Angola and Iran were mentioned. I am just wondering whether the Soviet Union's activities in say, Angola, bore any relationship to their perception of having achieved strategic parity with the United States. In other words, did they take the action they took in Angola as a consequence of their significantly increased strategic capability or did they do it for a totally different reason having no relationship to the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union?

I wish you would respond to that specific question. We are talking about motivation. What was the Soviet motivation? What made them think they could run the risk they ran in Angola? Was it because they felt they were so strong strategically or was it for other reasons?

Let's start with Professor Ulam.

Mr. ULAM. I think you emerge sometimes with a very strange sort of rationalization of rational behavior. People say before the late 1960's they acted aggressively because they were unsure of themselves and we had strategic superiority. Now they act because they have equivalence or they feel they have some superiority and consequently they feel more assured.

I feel the main explanation is simply they acted the way they did in Angola not so much because they counted the relative state of their strategic weapons but they felt the United States would not meet their challenge at the other level, that you will not react economically. We would not do a symbolic thing like recalling an ambassador or being vigorous. They felt the advantage was to decrease the U.S. prestige and power in the opinion of the Third World.

Now of course we should not concentrate on the Third World. They may feel their strategic gains under this agreement if it does confirm them or they perceive them as such may allow them to act more vigorously elsewhere.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to get to that question as a follow-on question. If I could get just once and for all some specific comment as you just gave me on the Third World connection if you will. It is used so much so many times by so many people, pro and con, in this debate.

Professor Legvold?

Mr. LEGVOLD. Earlier I referred to an important part or core of this question and that is Soviet risk taking and the correlation between the state of the military balance and Angola as an instance of risk taking.

I do not think there is anyone at this table who would disagree that the question really is unanswerable. I do not think any of us know in a fundamental way.

You give us a choice between the two. Was it the change in the power balance that caused them to do what they did in Angola or was it simply an opportunity that came along that they would have seized whatever the state of the overall military balance, particularly the strategic nuclear balance? The problem is that it gets blurred because somewhere in between the definition of "opportunity" has to do with the obstacles they thought they would meet which means what we would do and then the problem is what determined our behavior in these circumstances.

Was it the state of the military balance or was it a so-called Vietnam syndrome, a kind of immobility and unwillingness to become involved in other such events along the way?

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any place in the literature on Angola that suggests that overall military force balance was a factor in what we did?

Mr. LEGVOLD. On our side or their side?

The CHAIRMAN. On our side.

Mr. LEGVOLD. In a sense, yes. There are people who argue that the erosion of the military balance between the two sides, including the strategic balance, contributed to our sense of will, if you like, or lack of will in these circumstances, whether it was operational in the day-to-day sense that influenced it or what.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe that happened in the academic world, but it did not happen down here. It did not happen in the State Department. It did not happen in the Defense Department. It did not happen on the floor of the Senate. It did not happen here in committee. It did not happen anywhere at any place at any time under any circumstances at all among the policymakers of this country.

I would be really interested if you in your future research can come up with any evidence that any policymaker in the United States of America even considered the comparability of forces being a faction in whether or not we responded in Angola. I have never heard it even from my strange friends at the Defense Department who march in with their death scenarios for us. This is for the record, as they say.

Mr. LEGVOLD. To try to disentangle some of these elements, first of all I am not arguing that if the argument was made, and I think it was made, maybe not by policymakers but I would argue a version of it was made, as far as I understood their public statements, by people within the Congress, for example, in a very general way. The policymaker is another matter.

I want to separate another thing, the extent to which I think that is the case. I am the one who began by saying that I doubt the correlation between the military balance and Soviet risk taking, and for that matter our willingness to respond in these instances at this low level of something like Angola. This is not my perception.

As far as the Soviet side is concerned, I would argue that if there was any factor that they thought explained our behavior in some larger sense, that is a continuing factor that impinged on our decisions in Angola as opposed to the immediate considerations of Angola, including our South African foreign policy in that case, it was more Vietnam than it was the military balance, the overall shift in the military balance.

In any case the Soviets never defined the balance between us in terms of the military balance alone. The military balance is always a component of what Mr. Labeledz referred to as the correlation of forces and that correlation of forces also includes a Vietnam syndrome or it includes the strength of national liberation, revolution forces, or what have you in the area.

When the Soviets analyzed it, that is the way in which they put it.

There is a final comment that I would make because my basic proposition is I do not see a connection between the two, either in Soviet perception or in fact in determining our reaction and the kind of opportunity the Soviets had.

The last point I would make is what they did in Angola they did rather cautiously. Mr. Ulam is absolutely correct in saying that they pushed against no resistance and it allowed them to go forward. They went through a whole series of stages before the thing was finally consummated in the spring of 1976. They watched the insipid escalation of supply to the respective groups in the spring. They watched the reaction of the OAU [Organization of African Unity] in the summer. They watched the reaction of Secretary Kissinger's policy in the fall. They watched it through the December 19 vote within the Congress on further assistance to the parties and finally they watched it all the way through that critical OAU vote in January 1976.

They did not rush in but they did push in gradually and met no resistance and that was decisive.

Mr. ZAGORIA. Are you asking about their motivation or ours or both?

The CHAIRMAN. I started off by asking about theirs. Did they move because they felt they now had a strategic advantage or at least parity? Did that embolden them to do something?

Mr. ZAGORIA. I would say other factors were much more important and some have already been mentioned. There was the Vietnam syndrome in the United States, Watergate, the fact that so many Americans thought we had no good options and therefore there was a virtual certainty that we would not become involved.

I think also the Soviets thought they had a just cause or a cause that could be portrayed as just among many Africans. After all, these were people fighting against the Portuguese, although they ultimately sided with only one faction in that struggle against the Portuguese.

I think they also felt that since the other African countries were divided among themselves as to which of these various factions to support, they could weigh in in support of one of them without getting an extremely negative reaction from a lot of African countries.

I think the South African intervention on the side of MPLA's enemies helped legitimize even more the Soviet-Cuban support for the MPLA.

I think there are a whole variety of considerations in the Soviet mind. I think one of the critical factors that the Soviets always weigh very carefully is, is the United States in or out, is it likely to get in or out, and therefore is this intervention likely to lead us to an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with the United States?

For example, if you look at their behavior in Korea over the past decade, even when they have been amassing all this military power, they have been extraordinarily cautious. They do not supply advance weapons systems to Kim Il Sung although he is desperately anxious for them. In 1968, when he seized the Pueblo and the United States sent in a naval task force in response to that, the Soviets were very cautious then. In 1969, when we sent in another naval task force to the Sea of Japan after the North Koreans shot down an EC-121, the Soviets not only were cautious in response but they helped us pick up the survivors as a clear warning to Kim Il Sung that they did not want him to get them involved with us in a war in Korea.

Again in 1976, when the North Koreans killed a couple of Americans and South Koreans over a poplar tree incident, we sent a naval task force into the Sea of Japan and this time the Russians did not do a thing.

I think in places where the United States is present with a strong commitment or there is a strong likelihood that the United States would consider it as a challenge to some vital interest and might get involved or where the United States has some good options, the Russians would think twice. I think they pick their targets very carefully and there are many factors involved apart from the overall balance.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they not going to think twice regardless of whether or not they have strategic parity?

Mr. ZAGORIA. I think Professor Legvold is correct, that the burden of proof is on those who say this changed correlation of forces at the strategic level has greatly increased their risk taking. One could make the case that they were taking risks in the 1950's.

The CHAIRMAN. It did not seem to slow them down in Czechoslovakia.

Mr. ZAGORIA. At the same time, it is a moot question. We do not know what is likely to happen in the 1980's. I would say we would certainly not want to put ourselves into a position where not only the alarmists regard us as inferior but also many other people both in the United States and throughout the world who are not alarmists. If such a situation were to develop, I think it would have an impact on Soviet behavior.

Mr. LABEDZ. Senator Biden, Professor Ulam mentioned that the Soviet leaders have acted aggressively when they were weak and behaved aggressively also when they became stronger. There is no contradiction between the two because as any poker player can say, you can sometimes bluff when you have nothing in your cards but it is better to have a royal flush if you want to win.

Indeed there is a correlation between the Soviet's strength and their behavior, not in the sense that they cannot try to do a Cuba but in the sense that if they had to do a Cuba nowadays it would be a much less risk taking operation from their point of view than it was in 1962.

I find this is an exercise of unreality when my friend Professor Zagoria argues that at any given instance, when the Soviets were facing real risks, they were not taking these risks. He also says that we have to demonstrate to them by words and deeds that

there are risks involved in what he calls "détente after SALT II ratification."

I would like to hear what such deeds can be and whether such deeds would not immediately bring from him a charge to a person proposing them that he is Chicken Little. I see here a certain schizophrenia, a certain contrast between one part of Professor Zagoria's reasoning with the premise that the Soviets are not taking any risks and the argument that in fact all the evidence of Soviet history points precisely to the opposite conclusion. It is not only Soviet history but universal history which shows that empires expand until they find themselves facing some other power.

If there is no possibility of presenting them with it, then the Soviet Union will expand and that is why I feel the question of the Soviet sources of conduct, the question which you put to us, is to be seen in this particular political dimension.

They have of course been taking risks such as Angola. I was in Peking at that time. The Chinese expected the United States to react. The Soviets had a better perception because they had taken the risks on the premise that there would be no reaction.

The CHAIRMAN. Part of the same debate that went on when the Chinese had to make a decision about Vietnam and we had to make a decision about what the Russians were likely to do as a consequence of the Chinese decision.

Mr. LABEDZ. Obviously each power makes a preliminary calculation of what is the likely behavior or reaction on the part of the other power. At that time, if you recollect, Secretary Kissinger actually came with the question of what the consequences of doing nothing in Angola might be in the long run. I am no friend of Henry Kissinger's policy but I remember at that time he had actually brought to the notice of the Senate a possible consequence of not facing the question and we are discussing now such potential possibilities after SALT II.

The CHAIRMAN. My only point is that the strategic balance seemed to be an irrelevant consideration.

Is there anyone of you who would suggest that by signing the SALT Treaty, we would be precluded from moving forward on what we need to do to have a viable strategic force?

Mr. ZAGORIA. I would like to say that Mr. Labedz and others are worried about the United States being in a position of strategic inferiority and so am I. SALT did not put us into a position of strategic inferiority.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the passage of this agreement?

Mr. ZAGORIA. I do not think ratifying or rejecting SALT is going to put us in the position of strategic inferiority. On the contrary, I think it leaves open for us many options that we should take up that would lead us militarily to a position where we are not inferior. I think we have to leave open every option. I think it leaves open a great many.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it closes any?

When Mr. Nitze testified, I listed the eight things the committee on Present Danger said we must do. I asked: "Is there anything here you cannot do?" As usual, he begged the question. I respectfully pursued it, and he finally said, no except the M-X. I said the M-X problem, if there is one, can be cleared up with a reservation,

and then he went into perceptions and will, as his fallback arguments.

I asked the same question of Admiral Zumwalt. I asked the same question to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I listed every one of the things that critics have suggested we need and not one witness to date has suggested that any one of them is out. They acknowledged that all of them are in, except for a very strained argument that M-X is not. But if the reservation were passed, M-X would be in, even by their definition.

I wonder why we continue to talk about something that no one has shown is precluded by SALT. Why do we not move beyond that? If we want to argue about American resolve, let's argue about it but let's not suggest that this treaty prevents us from doing what we need to do. If the issue is perceptions, let's talk about that.

Speaking of perceptions, I went to Europe specifically for the purpose of trying to find out what our allies think. In Germany, where perceptions are particularly important, I spoke with all those folks on the left within the SPD, within the right in the CDU [Christian Democratic Union]. I sat down with the head of their parliamentary defense committee, their equivalent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, their Chancellor, their Defense Minister, their Foreign Minister. Nobody privately, publicly, directly, indirectly, upside down, rightside up or whatever suggested that we not go forward with SALT.

The only time I ever heard anything negative was when they would say—and it is the most I ever heard—the only thing that worries us is you have people in America telling us that SALT makes you weak. You have Mr. Nitze saying there is a reason to worry about perceptions, and, Mr. Jackson in the Senate.

Mr. LABEDZ. If I may, Senator Biden, I will try to answer the points you make. You try to argue the case that there is no remote connection between the change in the balance of power and the Soviet behavior in the Third World.

The CHAIRMAN. In certain parts of the Third World.

Mr. ZAGORIA. Excuse me but that was not your argument. You were not talking about the change in the balance of power. You were talking about SALT.

The CHAIRMAN. Exactly.

Mr. ZAGORIA. The change in the balance of power is something separate from SALT.

Mr. LABEDZ. You said the change in the balance of power according to your perception may not have any remote connection between the Soviet activities and the strategic mix SALT II "brings about or changes"—

The CHAIRMAN. I contend SALT does not change the balance of power.

Mr. LABEDZ. The argument is predicated on the fact of what the United States can do in international law. The political question is what the United States will do, particularly in a contingency. Therefore it is connected via the balance of power with the possibility of reaction or nonreaction on the part of the Soviets.

The CHAIRMAN. I may grant you that but it is not connected to SALT, is it?

Mr. LABEDZ. In the Soviet perception, the question of the balance of power is connected with SALT and so it is in fact all over the world. That is why there is so much interest in the question of the ratification of SALT. If this were not so, there would have been little interest in SALT II and there should have been no Senate hearings. There would have been no press coverage all over the world, no television coverage and all the rest of it.

There must be some special relevance to this question. If there is, then we face a puzzling question. The only conceivable logical inference from this reasoning is that the Soviet Union is totally irrational in trying to change the balance of nuclear power in its favor. Why on earth do they do it if they cannot possibly exploit politically this change? They themselves perceive it as a necessary precondition of taking risks to this or that degree. The Soviet Union is a very cautious power as Professor Zagoria and Professor Legvold said in their description of the Angola situation. Soviet leaders have not acted precipitously. They have been acting slowly step by step.

If there is such a perception on the part of the Soviet leadership and we know this from empirical evidence during the last 15 years that they were trying to change the balance of the central military power, nuclear and strategic, what is the premise of their nuclear build-up? Either they are totally irrational or we are wrong.

Mr. ZAGORIA. With all due respect, the question is being evaded. The question is not whether the Soviets are trying to change the balance of power. Of course they are. The question is whether our signing SALT will enable the Soviets to change the balance of power starting from the time we sign SALT. If one agrees that there are virtually no constraints on our ability to do what we want to do, then I do not see how one could make that argument.

Mr. LABEDZ. Let's be clear about it. The argument is not whether SALT does or does not prevent the American reaction but what is the political likelihood that such a decision will be taken in the new situation? We have the whole history of SALT I and you yourself described all these African adventures and we know there was no such reaction there or elsewhere.

You say it is up to those who oppose the ratification of SALT to prove that the Russians are not going to take the kinds of risks which you say we must try by words and deeds to persuade them not to take.

My point is they certainly do not go by words and as far as deeds are concerned, the deeds in the last 10 years are a very emphatic illustration of the decline in political will on the part of the United States to take the steps which you yourself seem to envision.

I find it rather ironic that those people who are now supporting the ratification of SALT in the present form are retrospectively implying the necessity of action in Angola. I would like to have this question clarified. Is Professor Legvold retrospectively advocating or at least acknowledging that the American inactivity in Angola was a mistake?

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to hear your answer, Professor.

Mr. LEGVOLD. To answer Leo's question and also comment on what you have said because basically what you said, Senator Biden, I agree with.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not have to say any more.

Mr. LEGVOLD. I would add another feature which I think is important and in a moment I will indicate why I do not think it is an element of complacency.

I do not think the Soviet Union at this point underestimates the American will to respond even at the level of the Angolas out in the hinterland, at great distances. I think it is a moment where the Soviet Union is the last power to underestimate the American will to act at this juncture.

In 1979 we are a very considerable distance from Angola in the spring and summer of 1975. We have had the intervening events and the outcry within this country and we have had the action on the part of an administration. We have had the intervening events of the two Yemens and the Southern Arabian Peninsula and the edginess along the way and in between when we also had the second Shaba incident with the 82d Airborne. We have planning within this administration to cope with those kind of things.

I repeat myself: of all the parties in the world that pay attention to this kind of thing it is the Soviet Union.

I would argue we ought not to count only on that as we have to make good and we have to continue to act in those terms otherwise it does become a guide to complacency. To assume today in Moscow that the Soviets see a declining American will in the case of Angola is simply inaccurate as far as I can judge the Soviet perception of the United States at this juncture.

In terms of Angola itself, if your only basis for judging American policy in Angola was cutting short the Soviet intervention by any means and you are convinced that the only way that you could have cut short Soviet Union intervention in Angola was by a firm response, that is by matching power with power, intervention with counterintervention, then the answer is yes, American policy was a mistake. Those are not the only two grounds on which you judge American policy in Angola or even the basic problem of coping with Soviet behavior in areas of regional instability. Let me separate the two.

First of all there are other dimensions of American policy within that area that were deeply affected by the way in which we responded with what parties, with what partners in the area. We had other portions of American foreign policy at stake than making a general point by responding forcefully to Soviet intervention.

The CHAIRMAN. Considerably more.

Mr. LEGVOLD. Second, in terms of how we are effective in controlling the Soviet dimension of the problem of regional instability, even here I am not convinced that Leo is right in assuming the only way they would have been stopped was by a counteraction, setting aside the costs and other dimensions of American policy.

I am not convinced at this point that had we in the spring of 1975 before the scenario played itself out come to the Soviets and said, we are on the road to supporting and sponsoring our various clients, you, the MPLA. We do not know where this is going to lead, it looks like a civil war because the cords are not going to hold in these circumstances and there is going to be intervention, counterintervention, the prospect of the South Africans involved and it is going to create an enormous difficulty. Let's both of us

cool it and let the chips fall where they may. The Soviets might not have responded favorably. I think there is a possibility they might have and there are people within the administration of that day, people very close to Secretary Kissinger, who had his notion of what was going right and wrong in Angola, who believed the same thing.

The CHAIRMAN. There are people within this committee and you are looking at one of them who shared that point of view.

Mr. LEGVOLD. The question is why did we not do it at the time and it was because Vietnam and a lot of other things were coming down around our shoulders. That is a fair explanation for what happened then but it is not a justification for not having this in mind the next time around.

Coming back to the complacency issue, I do not believe that is sufficient. I do not know whether that would have worked. I do believe there was a possibility that it could have worked. If it did not, I do not think the cost to American policy and other parts, our African policy, were worth it. That does not end the issue.

I think there are occasions where it does make sense to respond forcibly if that kind of invitation to the Soviets pointing out the implications of their actions, is not sufficient where we act. The Yemens are a case in point and I support that kind of thing.

To argue the failure of an appeal to the Soviet Union in the spring, if that had not brought a response and that we therefore should not have dealt with them because of the cost to other parts of policy is not a statement that says we ought not to respond to them in other circumstances elsewhere.

The CHAIRMAN. We should go through that process. I think it is important to reiterate what you have just said regarding other foreign policy interests that the United States had, and I think rightfully considered, in Africa and Southern Africa specifically. I think it was the Soviet reading of the U.S. real interests that emboldened them to do what they did. As they measured where we were and the spot we were in, irrespective of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, they properly read what should have been the reasonable course for us to follow if pushed to it.

Although we might have succeeded in thwarting the Soviets, we would have lost a whole lot more in my opinion, and I think they properly read that.

Without refighting that battle once more and since time is running short, I would like to honor Senator McGovern's request to me before he left. He has a written question which he would like me to ask you, Professor Legvold, and I will read that question. If you will respond, I will appreciate it. He said:

Your statement touches very directly on my main concern in these hearings. As you know I seek genuine arms reductions as the best path to mutual security. You suggest that the Soviets view SALT primarily as a political exercise in terms of regulating East-West relations rather than as a military exercise to regulate and reduce the arms race. If as you say the Soviets care more about the political effect of a successful SALT process and therefore are willing to sidestep some hard choices, how is it ever going to be possible to get a genuine arms reduction? Will it ever be possible? Will it come about only if détente improved dramatically or do you think a sufficient halt in the arms race such as a freeze or a moratorium might itself create the improved political climate in which détente could progress?

Mr. LEGVOLD. First of all, to the basic point Senator McGovern referred to, to put that in context of my prepared statement, I said I think the Soviets have several levels at stake or several kinds of stakes in the SALT process.

I think their primary stake in contrast to what we assumed at the outset was our primary stake, that is to reshape or stabilize or effect or restructure the strategic balance in some fashion, is essentially political, the impact that it has on East-West relations, promoting the process of détente and so on.

I hasten to add this does not mean they do not have other stakes including as I have indicated in my testimony, a desire to regulate or influence American military programs. I think they do, as we have a stake in regulating Soviet military programs. That does raise a basic problem.

I think the extent to which the Soviets feel an urgency about stabilizing the nuclear arms race particularly according to definitions of stability derived peculiarly from our notion of nuclear deterrents and what constitutes stability which is a further problem and that is what the presentation is about, does create real obstacles to substantial progress in SALT.

I do not think that the way in which we are going to overcome that in the long run is by taking the heat off and saying we will not race if you will not race and declare a moratorium for the moment.

I think that will lead to a kind of open-ended negotiation in which the Soviets are continually looking for the political fill-ups or benefits from the process. It will in a sense unleash that even more so. In any case there is no prospect of that.

I think the realization will come only with the continued development of both sides' programs until both sides begin to believe out of deep convictions that the road to their security, their self-security, is going to come out of a combination of arms control and defense planning. It is out of that we will move toward a more stable balance according to anyone's definition.

It is never going to be possible to persuade the Soviets they ought to commit themselves to stabilizing the nuclear balance as we define it. The thrust of my whole paper is that they do not operate with the same definitions.


The essential objective is to persuade them as well as many on our own side that arms control combined with defense planning in a fairly ambitious way is the best way to pursue security and frankly I think that is going to come only out of the continued competition because they are going to prosecute their end of the competition and we are not going to gain if we do not maintain our own end. A moratorium makes no sense in my judgment.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, you have been very helpful. I appreciate your spending so much time with us. You have been with us for 3 hours.

For my benefit, I could keep you 3 more hours if you would be willing to stay. We are going to vote in a few minutes and I have already trespassed on your good will keeping you this long.

Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 5:07 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]



SALT II TREATY

THURSDAY, JULY 26, 1979

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10:50 a.m. in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Church, Biden, Zorinsky, Javits, Percy, and Lugar.

Senator BIDEN (presiding). The hearing will come to order, please.

OPENING STATEMENT

Today marks the end of the third week of hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the proposed SALT II Treaty. This week we continue to explore significant issues raised by the treaty. On Tuesday, the committee held an executive session on the critical issue of our ability to monitor and verify Soviet compliance with the SALT II Treaty. Yesterday, we addressed the broader question of United States-Soviet relations in the context of SALT. This morning, the subject is the Soviet Backfire bomber.

We have with us Gen. Richard Ellis, Commander in Chief of the Air Force Strategic Air Command; Gen. James Hill, Commander in Chief of the North American Air Defense Command; Mr. Walter Slocombe, Director of the Department of Defense SALT Task Force; Dr. James Timbie, Chief, Strategic Affairs Division of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Ambassador Ralph Earle, head of the U.S. SALT delegation.

Their appearance here today will permit us to review the treatment of the Backfire bomber within the context of the SALT II agreement. Earlier this morning, the committee received an intelligence briefing on the technical capabilities of the Backfire. We now turn our attention to the negotiating history of this issue and the military significance of the limitations finally agreed upon as they relate to the Backfire. We will examine how the Backfire was handled in the earlier SALT proposal, and then compare the Backfire with other American and Soviet bombers.

Gentlemen, I understand that three of you, General Hill, General Ellis, and Mr. Slocombe have submitted written statements for the committee; is that correct?

General HILL. Yes, sir.

Senator BIDEN. General Hill, we will start with you, then we will hear from General Ellis and Mr. Slocombe.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES E. HILL, COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENSE/AIR DEFENSE COMMAND

General HILL. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am pleased to have the opportunity to discuss the Soviet Backfire bomber and its effects on the North American Air Defense Command within the context of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty.

First, let me say, I unequivocally support the concept of arms control and the philosophy of strategic arms limitations. This arms control agreement with the Soviet Union is a step toward the establishment of equal aggregates from which balanced and phased reduction can occur. Adjustments to force structure by the Soviet Union, as well as by the United States, must be made to achieve the levels of equality described by the treaty. The United States must, of necessity, be prepared to defend against those offensive forces that do and will exist. This, of course, will force a reevaluation of our defensive forces and strategies but a reevaluation which will be able to be made in the context of agreed upon specifics.

The SALT II Treaty, in the short term, appears neither to improve nor to degrade the ability of the North American Air Defense Command [NORAD], to perform its atmospheric defense mission. The treaty does bring into focus some significant considerations peculiar to NORAD which involve our atmospheric defense capability, especially as it relates to the Backfire bomber.

At the outset, let me state our basic NORAD atmospheric defense missions. The first is to provide surveillance and control of the air space of Canada and the United States; second, to provide warning and assessment of an air attack; and third, to provide appropriate response against air attack.

I will discuss the capabilities of the Backfire bomber and our present ability to defend against it, some implications that SALT II has for the atmospheric defense mission, and finally outline what we need to do to improve our atmospheric defense capabilities.

For a number of years the Soviet strategic long-range aviation force has included the four-engine turboprop Bear and the four-engine jet Bison. This force consists of about 150 aircraft. The LRA [long range aviation] also has about 30 Bisons that are configured as tankers. These tankers can refuel the Bear, the Bison, and the Backfire bombers.

We at NORAD view the Soviet bomber force as a more formidable threat with the introduction of Backfire. I would have preferred to see the Backfire treated within the formal constraints of SALT II; but in any case its capability and its availability are factors we must consider in the formulation of our atmospheric defense strategy. Although there is some disagreement in the intelligence community about the operational characteristics of the Backfire, even the most conservative estimates acknowledge its capability to reach the continental United States and Canada in an operational mode. Without aerial refueling, it is clearly capable of flying from Soviet Arctic bases across virtually the entire United States and Canada on one-way missions with recovery in third countries. With refueling, the Backfire can achieve similar target coverage and return to the Soviet land mass. On missions to Canadian and northern U.S. targets, arctic staging and tanker support would enable the Backfire to use supersonic dash or to fly low to avoid radar detection.

All Backfire aircraft apparently are either equipped for, or actually carry, air refueling probes.

As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has testified, the Backfire will be limited to a production rate not to exceed 30 aircraft per year. Over 100 Backfires have been produced to date, and we believe that the LRA force will eventually include several hundred Backfires.

In addition to Backfire production, the Soviets may be in the process of developing a new long-range bomber to replace the Bear and Bison. Since 1974, Soviet officials have on several occasions referred to such developments. If such a program is underway, this new bomber could appear in the early 1980's.

We at NORAD have examined the SALT II Treaty in view of this trend in Soviet bomber modernization. The treaty specifically spells out strategic systems limitations. The multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicle limits of the treaty provide for an aggregate of 1,320 MIRV, ICBM's, SLBM's, ASBM's and long-range cruise missile equipped heavy bombers.

Since the treaty restricts the number of MIRV ballistic missiles to 1,200, an attractive strategic expansion option for the Soviet planner, and one which is relatively inexpensive, would be the introduction of a long-range cruise missile equipped bomber force of at least 120 aircraft. Should the Soviets select this option, it will complicate significantly our ability to defend against a Soviet air attack, due to both increased weapons and standoff tactics.

Our national policy does not give major priority to strategic defense in general. The United States relies on a strong strategic offensive force and a credible tactical warning system to achieve deterrence goals. Strategic defense policy has changed since the 1950's and early 1960's when we had numerous fighter interceptor squadrons. The mid-1960's brought strategic defense resource reductions which were attributed to a shifting emphasis in military priorities, as well as budget constraints. This change in emphasis culminated in a policy guidance memorandum from the Secretary of Defense in March 1972. As a result of this change in policy our fighter interceptor force today stands at 315 aircraft. These interceptors are essentially the same aircraft we had in 1958—that is F-106's and F-101's, now augmented by some TAC F-4's and a few F-15's; and thus this fighter force is inadequate to stop a determined attack. We have seen similar reductions in all atmospheric defense systems. In the past 20 years NORAD has been reduced 70.3 percent in long-range radars; 61.7 percent in distant early warning line [DEW] radars; 83.3 percent in control centers, and 75.2 percent in manpower.

Given the dramatic decline of our atmospheric defense forces, the present Soviet force of 150 Bear and Bison bombers, even without Backfire augmentation, could pose a real threat to North America. It also provides greater flexibility for Soviet selection of strategic options and a usable strategic reserve force.

The continued production of Backfire and development of new heavy bomber systems demonstrates continuing force modernization efforts in Soviet long-range aviation. We need to continue our conversion to the joint surveillance system to become operational

in 1981 for peacetime sovereignty of North America, as well as proceeding with the upgrading of the Canadian Pinetree system.

However, in view of the Soviet force modernization, it is essential for our warfighting capability that we rely on the AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System] and a modernized fighter interceptor task force. In order for our fighter interceptor force and the AWACS to be responsive to an incoming threat, it is imperative that we upgrade our long-range tactical warning system with the planned over-the-horizon-backscatter radar and enhanced DEW line.

In view of the ongoing developments in the Soviet bomber force, which includes the continued production of the Backfire, the options afforded the Soviet planner and our very limited air defense capability, I believe that a reevaluation of our national policy for atmospheric defense is now required.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to appear before the committee.

Senator BIDEN. Before we get to the next statement, can you augment your statement slightly and at least set out for the record what the rationale for the degrading of NORAD was at the time? You said there were budget constraints, but what were the arguments at the time of the tradeoff?

General HILL. The reduction in atmospheric defense forces has been continuing over a long period of time, Mr. Chairman. Fundamentally our national policy has been to rely on a strong offensive deterrent force in the United States, rather than provide for defense against ballistic missiles. The Secretary of Defense who initiated this decision as well as those who followed, determined that since there would be no defense against ballistic missiles it seems imprudent to spend money on bomber defenses.

Senator BIDEN. The reason being there is not much that will stop it, once it breaks out anyway; is that the rationale?

General HILL. If you mean a massive nuclear exchange, that is correct, yes, sir.

Senator BIDEN. I just wanted to be sure I understand it. General?

STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD H. ELLIS, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

General ELLIS. Mr. Chairman, a considerable amount of study over a long period of time has been expended at Strategic Air Command [SAC] in an effort to better understand the Backfire. Our analysis of its relationship to SALT II was undertaken in the context of the strategic force portion of the treaty as a whole and of the entire United States-Soviet strategic force relationship. My statement was prepared using the same comprehensive approach.

Furthermore, since the security of our country, with or without a treaty, depends upon U.S. strategic force modernization initiatives, I have also briefly described in my statement those things SAC believes must be undertaken. I will read just a summary of my statement.

SAC's interest in this treaty is straightforward and relates solely to our mission of nuclear deterrence. We have two very basic questions.

The first question: During the life of the treaty, will it be more difficult or less difficult to accomplish the objectives of our deterrent and emergency war missions with a treaty utilizing the weapon systems we have and expect to have between now and the end of 1985?

The second question relates to the post-treaty period, and it is: Is SAC likely to be more capable or less capable of carrying out the objectives of its deterrent and emergency war missions during the post-treaty period by reason of our country having abided by SALT II?

It is our assessment that during the period of the treaty, SAC will have less difficulty executing its deterrent and emergency war missions with a treaty than we would without a treaty. Now, the reasons for this positive assessment.

First, under the treaty we will have approximately 250 less Soviet strategic delivery vehicles to contend with in our planning. Additionally, we undoubtedly would have a much larger number of Soviet weapons to consider in our planning if there were no treaty.

Second, the treaty places a limit of 10 warheads on each SS-18 missile or a total of 3,080 for the entire SS-18 force until 1985. In the absence of a treaty, we believe the Soviets have the technology and production base not only to increase the number of SS-18's that could be deployed, but also to increase the number of weapons each SS-18 could carry during the 1980-85 time period. Additionally, such increases in SS-17's and SS-19's could also be achieved.

Third, the Soviets have follow-on modifications underway to existing fourth generation ICBM's, along with some fifth generation ICBM's under development; but under the treaty they may test and deploy only one new system. Additionally, the Soviets undoubtedly have extra Backfire production capacity but have agreed to limit production to 30 a year.

Fourth, under the treaty it will be easier to verify Soviet actions than it would be without a treaty. Our Nation's current capability, together with programs underway, will preserve an ability to adequately verify Soviet activities. Whether adequate is sufficient for this treaty could be a shaky judgment if taken in isolation. But when weighed with treaty imposed restraints that can be verified, I believe it is acceptable. However, the uncertain aspects of treaty verification once again bring home the absolute requirement for more positive cooperative measures, including onsite inspection, if we are to expand qualitative limitations in SALT III.

Fifth and most important, we are not restricted by the treaty from doing those things we must in the way of strategic force modernization.

Now, to the second question regarding the performance of SAC's mission in the post-treaty period. Our position in the post-treaty period, from a war planning and execution point of view, should be better by reason of having complied with SALT II because we will better understand and be better informed on the Soviet post-treaty force structure and capabilities; and we will not be restricted from undertaking our modernization program.

However, there are two areas of concern: the SS-18, the Soviet heavy, modern ICBM, which we are not permitted to duplicate, and the Backfire bomber.

With regard to the SS-18, during SALT II we can expect the Soviets to concentrate on identification of methods for exploiting the enormous throw-weight available in the missile—almost twice that of the M-X—in the post-treaty period. The technology of fractionation is well known to the Soviets, and I expect them to progress in this area during the course of and within the limitations of the treaty. The Soviet planner will also identify other techniques for utilizing this excessive throw-weight, such as accuracy improvements and increases in warhead yield. The question then becomes whether the United States would prefer the Soviets to do them with an agreement, or take the chance of them being done, plus fractionating and additional SS-18 deployments, without a treaty. I choose the former with the hope that future negotiations will cancel out this clear Soviet advantage.

With regard to Backfire, I would echo the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This bomber has an intercontinental capability and should have been considered a strategic nuclear delivery vehicle. The promised production constraint can be monitored in peacetime, but whether the Soviets would use the Backfire in a strategic role during a crisis is a matter for conjecture. The fact remains that in the post-treaty period the Soviets could have a force of some 300 or more Backfires with which we will have to contend.

I am led to the conclusion that the SS-18 and Backfire are central to the Soviet side of SALT II, and efforts to further constrain these systems could very likely delay the treaty for an extended period of time or leave us with an incomplete treaty during a period when treaty constraints will be helpful—even necessary—to the strategic planner and commander.

Perhaps the most significant point to emerge from this Nation's debate on SALT II has been the growing consensus on the need for U.S. strategic force modernization. The best way to outline SAC's views in this critical area is to first comment on modernization programs now underway.

The air-launched cruise missile which will be integrated into our B-52G model force is now scheduled to go into production early next year. The ALCM promises to be a valuable supplement to our capability for the rest of this century.

We fully expect the ALCM-equipped B-52G to be employed in a "shoot and penetrate" role until 1985, at which time we recommend its transition to an all-stand-off ALCM carrier. The B-52H model will be upgraded to insure it has the ability to penetrate until the late 1980's. Then, SAC recommends that it, too, be converted to an ALCM stand-off carrier role, thereby permitting us to delay the costly introduction of a new cruise missile carrier until the 1990's.

President Carter's recent decision to authorize full-scale engineering development of the M-X missile is encouraging. A basing decision is now required and, further downstream, a timely production decision.

Preliminary work on an advanced strategic-manned penetrator for the 1990's has just started, and we will watch progress with interest.

At this point in time, the programs I have just described appear to be an effective hedge against the strategic threat projected for

the post-1985 period, when these systems, plus the Trident, will be entering the force in operational numbers.

I would now like to turn to the period before these new systems are available in the necessary quantity—1980-1985—a time frame when the United States is very likely to lose strategic equivalence with the Soviet Union.

Several agencies have looked at various alternatives to offset the serious threat in this period of uncertainty. SAC believes the most promising solution is the early modification of 155 FB-111's and F-111's into FB-111BC's with new engines, enlarged weapon capacity, and sharply increased range capabilities. This option would not only help in the early 1980's but also replace the B-52's as they are phased out of the penetration role in the post-1985 period.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, the treaty you are considering will be helpful to the SAC Commander. However, it must be realized that SALT II, or any reasonable modification thereof, can in no way be regarded as an alternative to strategic modernization. The modernization requirement matured during the past few years as we began to understand the full meaning and impact of the Soviet strategic buildup. Depending on what the Soviets do in the future, the treaty can perhaps reduce the magnitude of our modernization, but the necessary minimum strategic modernization requirement has already been identified and is not coupled to approval or disapproval of the treaty.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, General. Mr. Slocombe, do you have a statement?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I will summarize my statement briefly if I may, Senator Biden.

STATEMENT OF WALTER SLOCOMBE, DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SALT TASK FORCE AND PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The purpose of my statement is to describe the resolution of the Backfire issue in the SALT II negotiations and to set it in perspective with some of the other issues which were considered in the talks.

A definitional issue that has been an element in the negotiations from the outset and has had a substantial impact on the negotiations concerning the Soviet Backfire bomber, is the definition of a strategic weapon. The Soviets have used their geographical position—that is, they are close to our allies and far from the United States—to press a simple but totally unacceptable definition of "strategic." The Soviet definition is that any weapon owned by one side capable of striking the territory of the other with a nuclear weapon is a strategic system. This would count all of the central strategic systems—ICBM's, SLBM's, and heavy bombers—on both sides, but in addition would include all of the United States so-called forward-based systems. According to the Soviets, this definition would, however, exclude all of the Soviet noncentral strategic systems since they could not strike U.S. territory.

Our definition was more empirical and reflected our alliance interests. In essence, we argued that whatever a strategic system

may be in the abstract, SALT should deal with central systems, and that ICBM's, SLBM's, and heavy bombers were the central systems. Other U.S. systems that were designed or deployed for theater missions should not be considered in SALT, especially because they have to counter Soviet theater nuclear systems which are not limited by SALT.

With the firm support of our allies we adamantly resisted the Soviet position that our forward-based systems be limited in SALT. Whatever the theoretical capability of these aircraft, they are deployed for theater missions and thus should not be subject to bilateral SALT limitations, especially since Soviet theater systems were not covered.

This fundamental definitional dispute stalemated the SALT I negotiations on offensive forces for an extended period. The dispute was never resolved in SALT I, but merely set aside, and it arose again early in SALT II.

In SALT II the United States pressed for Soviet acceptance of a concept of equal aggregates covering central systems only, with no limits on forward-based systems. The Soviets for their part proposed asymmetrical central system limitations—a larger aggregate for themselves, in part to compensate for our forward-based system. They also proposed eventual withdrawal of all U.S. forward-based systems from third countries. They further argued that the Soviet Union should be entitled to compensation for allied nuclear forces.

These early negotiations did not directly address the issue of the Soviet Backfire bomber. The United States wished to settle first on the principle of equal aggregates and exclusion of forward-based systems with no compensation for allied systems before discussing the precise systems to be covered.

As you know, these two general principles, equal aggregates and exclusion of forward-based systems which had been espoused by the United States, were agreed upon when President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev met at Vladivostok in 1974. The Vladivostok framework provided among other things for an equal aggregate ceiling of 2,400, and included no limitations on or account taken of U.S. forward-based systems or allied systems. It was agreed that the 2,400 aggregate would apply to launchers for ICBM's and SLBM's and to heavy bombers.

When the two delegations resumed work in Geneva in early 1975 to draft detailed language implementing the general principles agreed to at Vladivostok, the U.S. Delegation proposed that Backfire be included as a heavy bomber because of U.S. concerns about its inherent intercontinental potential. The Soviet delegation rejected that proposal on the basis that Backfire was not a heavy bomber and thus not subject to SALT. The United States kept the proposal to include Backfire on the list of heavy bombers formally on the table until well into 1979, but discussion of the Backfire for all practical purposes ceased at the delegation level and was conducted thereafter instead in higher level channels, that is, at the level of contacts through Foreign Ministers and through the two Presidents.

During 1975 and 1976, the United States presented to the Soviets at higher levels a number of SALT proposals addressing Backfire

and the cruise missile question which had also arisen after the Vladivostok meetings. Some of these would not have counted Backfire as a heavy bomber. As President Ford notes in his memoirs, these included a proposal in January 1976 that would have limited the U.S.S.R. to 275 Backfire bombers by 1981. Another approach proposed in February 1976 would have put both Backfire and cruise missiles into separate packages for 3 years while negotiations proceeded. During that time, the Soviets would have agreed not to increase Backfire production rates, and the United States would have made various commitments with regard to cruise missiles. Neither of these proposals proved negotiable, and the Backfire issue was not resolved.

In part, of course, our inability to agree turned on a factual dispute over the range capability of the Backfire. But there was also a difference over whether the standard for inclusion in SALT should be the physical capability of a weapon delivery vehicle to strike the homeland of the other side. In our view the Backfire issue was in an important way different from the FBS problem because we believed—and continue to believe—the Backfire to have a capability to attack the United States from the U.S.S.R. Nonetheless, there was clearly some tension between efforts to include Backfire, whose primary current mission we acknowledged to be other than intercontinental, and our successful insistence that U.S. forward-based aircraft be excluded despite their physical capability to strike Soviet targets. They are, of course, in fact assigned to different missions and have their primary role in different missions.

The Soviets from time to time used the logic of our argument on FBS to insist that Backfire be excluded from SALT II. Including Backfire in the treaty and excluding FBS would not, in their view, be a compromise with the United States, but a reversal of a position they had held since the opening round of SALT I.

When Secretary of State Vance met with the Soviet leaders in Moscow in March 1977, neither of the two U.S. proposals he presented—the so-called deferral proposal and the better known comprehensive proposal—provided for Backfire to be counted under the SALT II aggregate ceiling.

After prolonged negotiations, again conducted at the higher level, the sides subsequently agreed that Backfire would not be counted in the SALT II aggregate, but that there would be written commitments on Backfire by President Brezhnev to President Carter. In the context of the mutual understanding that the Backfire issue would be resolved at the summit, the U.S. withdrew our formal listing of Backfire among the heavy bombers as it appeared in the treaty.

At the Vienna Summit in June 1979, President Brezhnev handed President Carter the following written statement after having read it to him—and it is set out in my statement and in the documents which have been circulated to the Senate. The statement reads:

The Soviet side informs the U.S. side that the Soviet "TU22M" airplane, called "Backfire" in the U.S.A., is a medium-range bomber, and that it does not intend to give this airplane the capability of operating at intercontinental distances. In this connection, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the radius of action of this aircraft in such a way as to enable it to strike targets on the territory of the U.S.A. Nor does it intend to give it such a capability in any other manner, including by in-

flight refueling. At the same time, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the production rate of this airplane as compared to the present rate.

In response to a direct question, President Brezhnev confirmed that the Soviet Backfire production rate would not exceed 30 per year. President Carter further stated that the United States entered into the SALT II agreement on the basis of the commitments contained in the Soviet statement with respect to Backfire, and that it considers the carrying out of these commitments to be essential to the obligations assumed under the treaty. He also stated that the United States has the right to a comparable bomber.

The Soviet commitments given at the Vienna summit are consistent with the U.S. objective of constraining the intercontinental potential of the Backfire force while continuing to exclude our own European-based and Pacific-based theater aircraft from SALT.

The production rate commitment limits the total number of Backfires and thus the overall effectiveness of the Backfire force. In particular, it means that a possible Soviet diversion of Backfire from its theater and naval mission to an intercontinental role would substantially reduce Soviet strength in those areas, while adding only marginally to overall Soviet strategic capability.

With respect to the legal status of the Soviet commitments on Backfire, the Soviet commitments are clearly binding legal obligations of the U.S.S.R. Moreover, President Carter's statement at the Vienna Summit makes clear that the United States enters into the SALT II agreements on the basis of the obligations undertaken in the Soviet statement and considers these commitments as essential to the obligations assumed by the United States under the treaty. The result is that, even though the Soviet Backfire commitments are not a part of the formal treaty text, the United States would view a Soviet violation of these commitments in exactly the same manner as we would view a Soviet violation of the treaty text itself, and would act accordingly. The Soviet Union understands that this is our position.

In sum, while it would of course have been desirable to count Backfire in the aggregate if we could have done so, the resolution of the Backfire issue satisfactorily serves our interests. Our exchange with the Soviets gives us a firm production rate commitment; it limits increases in its capability of the Backfire; it makes clear our own right to a comparable bomber, and it definitely links Soviet fulfillment of its obligations on Backfire to the continued viability of SALT.

Thank you, Mr Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. I think we had better go to questions now. Are there any other prepared statements that other members of the panel would care to submit to the committee?

Ambassador EARLE. I do not have one.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Timbie?

Mr. TIMBIE. I do not have one.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Then, I think, we should go to questions.

STATUS OF ORAL ASSURANCE OF BREZHNEV TO CARTER

My first question is directed to you, Mr. Slocombe. On July 10 Secretary Vance testified before this committee and stated that if the Russians violated the Backfire agreement, the United States—and I am quoting the Secretary—“would consider that a basis for repudiating the treaty.”

Now, my question to you is, what is the status of an oral assurance given by Mr. Brezhnev to the President of the United States under international law?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Under international law it is a binding, legal commitment of the Soviet Union. Further, in light of our statement that we are relying on that commitment in undertaking our own obligations—assuming the treaty is ratified—with respect to the SALT Treaty, under international law a violation of the Soviet commitment with respect to Backfire would give us grounds, as the Secretary of State said, for abrogating the treaty itself.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, all of this could be made very explicit and could be tied down with a reservation which has the effect of incorporating these assurances into the treaty, giving them the same status as the commitments made by the Soviet Union in the treaty itself. The Senate could make that a condition to its consent.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The Senate certainly has that power, Mr. Chairman. It is our position that such a reservation would be unnecessary and not change the legal effect of the posture as it now stands.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it would certainly remove any possibilities for ambiguity or disagreement in the future; would it not? It is your position that that is unnecessary?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. It is our position that there is no ground for ambiguity or uncertainty in the future without such a reservation.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Warnke said in his testimony before the committee on July 16 that he had no objection to the Senate reaffirming the administration's position in an understanding, and he has been as close to these negotiations as anyone.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. He has indeed, but he does have the luxury of speaking as a private citizen.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. This committee often turns for its advice to well-informed private citizens.

Under the present circumstances it is my view that we have to consider the capability of the Backfire. It may well have been designed primarily as a theater weapon, and as a naval weapon; but if it can be used in an extreme case, such as a nuclear war, to strike the United States, then I think we have to look at it that way.

Now, it is true that the treaty, or at least the statement made by Brezhnev, restricts the Soviet Union to its present level of production. It is also true that the United States is not inhibited in building a comparable weapon if it were to choose to do so. I would like to ask, General Ellis, if in your view the United States has a need for a weapon comparable to the Backfire, a new plane with the Backfire's general capabilities.

General ELLIS. Mr. Chairman, as indicated in my statement, I strongly believe that we need additional capability, particularly in the 1980-85 time period. I would not, however, want it classed as a

peripheral bomber. We need it for use against a primary target area.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, does the FB-111 which is based in this country satisfy our need, in your opinion, if we had added numbers of that type of aircraft?

General ELLIS. Our proposal has been to increase its range, modernize its engines, and to more than double its bomb-carrying capability.

The CHAIRMAN. And if that were done, you would then be satisfied that our bomber force, both that counted within the treaty and that not counted in the treaty, would be adequate for our needs as a part of the Triad on which we rely?

General ELLIS. That, in conjunction with other programs that are under way.

The CHAIRMAN. Like the cruise missile?

General ELLIS. The cruise missile. Our recommendation on the FB-111 is so strong simply because it is the only thing we can get in the near term in a timely manner.

NEGOTIATING TRADEOFFS

The CHAIRMAN. Now, as the Commander in Chief of SAC, General Ellis, can you tell us if our FB-111's and F-111's, the aircraft we have in this country and in Europe with which we could strike the Soviet Union, were counted in the treaty along with the Backfire, would you prefer that to the present arrangement where the F-111's are not counted and the restriction is imposed on the limited production of the Soviet Backfire?

I am trying to assess the two situations and have your judgment.

General ELLIS. No, I would not, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I want to draw a distinction between the FB-111, which is a strategic bomber, and the F-111, which is a European based and general purpose fighter aircraft.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General ELLIS. We have large numbers of those, several hundred. To throw them into any exchange with the Backfire in my opinion would be very harmful to our conventional posture as well as to our tactical nuclear posture.

If you are talking in terms of the FB-111's alone as a tradeoff for the Backfire, at this point in time because they are roughly equivalent in terms of the Backfire assigned to the long-range Air Force, I would say that it could be done because we have headroom within our total number of SNDV's whereas they would have to make some sort of accommodation in the way of reduction of other weapon systems.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Senator, could I add a comment on that?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; of course.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Quite apart from the numbers and the impact on our own capability, the question you put, of including all of the FBS that are in Europe in exchange for counting the Backfire, would raise very considerable concerns among our allies. They would, I think, be very reluctant to see the United States agree to limit FBS in Europe, even as a matter of principle, without some limits on Soviet theater nuclear forces such as the SS-20.

I think that is another consideration that bears on the FBS position which we have taken consistently in the negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Senator Javits?

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I am a little bit puzzled by the statements of General Hill and General Ellis.

At the end of General Hill's statement, he discussed his own responsibilities in NORAD and he says, "I believe that a reevaluation of our national policy for atmospheric defense is now required," pointing out that this policy would be very materially changed from the present state of our interceptor force in which we are now deficient.

Then General Ellis concludes:

It is our assessment that during the period of the treaty, Strategic Air Command will have less difficulty executing its deterrent and emergency war mission with a treaty than we would without a treaty.

Now, is there any inconsistency in those statements or are they entirely reconcilable; and if so, why?

General Hill?

General HILL. May I review General Ellis' portion that you are referring to?

Senator JAVITS. Certainly. He goes on to detail his reasons which are reasons we are very familiar with because we have had a good deal of testimony. But we are not familiar as far as I know, with your concerns about the fact that perhaps we have a new situation respecting Soviet bomber capability which requires a revision of our national policy for atmospheric defense, involving interceptors.

I would like to see if there is a consistency between your statement or if there is not.

General HILL. Speaking only for the defense forces, my statements, Senator Javits, were made on the basis that over the years the Soviet bomber force has not been a large force and has not been considered to be a threatening force to the United States, certainly not as threatening as SLBM's or ICBM's. Therefore, national policy has been to reduce our military defensive capabilities with regard to bomber attacks and bomber forces. Due to this policy, our systems have declined over the years to the point where today our capability is one of peacetime air sovereignty with a limited ability to fight a war.

The introduction of the Backfire to the Soviet bomber force increases the capability of the Soviet bomber force and therefore in my view, as the commander of the defensive forces, makes that force a more threatening one. As I see it, we need to re-evaluate; the current national policy regarding bomber defense and determine if that policy is still a valid one. That was my suggestion in my statement.

Senator JAVITS. You two come to the same conclusion, however, that everything considered—after all, I cannot match your professionalism—"It is our assessment that during the period of the treaty NORAD will have less difficulty executing its mission with the treaty than without a treaty."

You both come to the same conclusion. Would you rather have the treaty or not have it in order to free you to do what you think you have to do?

General HILL. I have indicated in my statement, Senator Javits, that the treaty neither improves nor degrades my ability to perform the air defense mission, however, I think the treaty is a valuable document for the United States. As I have indicated, it does take the first step toward the establishment of equal aggregates from which balanced and phased reductions can occur. I think that is good, I think we need that.

At the same time, it does in fact create a situation from a defensive point of view of an increased potential threat to this Nation. That is what I am calling attention to. I am suggesting that it now is time for our Nation to understand that and re-evaluate our past policies.

Senator JAVITS. Is the word "it," "it does create a potential threat," the treaty for SALT II, or is the word "it" the present ongoing momentum of the Soviet military preparations?

General HILL. I am referring, sir, to the Soviet bomber force, the ongoing upgrading of the Soviet bomber force and the continuing modernization of that force.

Senator JAVITS. So, that notwithstanding, you still think you are better off with the treaty because whatever limits are placed, at least there are some limits.

General HILL. Narrowly speaking from the defensive point of view the treaty does not affect my capability in either regard.

Senator JAVITS. What about not narrowly speaking?

General HILL. I have already said, sir, that as far as the United States is concerned, I think the treaty is good. I am in favor of the treaty.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you. Is there anything you want to add to that, General Ellis?

General ELLIS. No, I do not want to speak for NORAD, I will speak for SAC. I think my statement stands, Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. And you do not want to change anything based on what has just been said.

General ELLIS. No, I do not.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I have a few minutes I would like to yield to Senator Percy.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Percy.

INCLUDING BACKFIRE IN AGGREGATE

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much, Senator Javits, for accommodating my schedule. Gentlemen, we very much appreciate your help in this regard.

General Ellis, Mr. Slocombe says in his statement that it would have been desirable to count Backfire in the aggregate. If you had your choice, would you have wanted to have included the Backfire in the aggregate, and could you give a reason for your position?

General ELLIS. Let me understand the proper assumptions here. Is there an additional tradeoff that we would have to throw into the total aggregate?

Senator PERCY. Well, there has been, as I understand it, negotiations to include the Backfire in the aggregate, to count it in the treaty limits. It has been excluded. Would you have preferred also, as Mr. Slocombe said, to have included the Backfire in the aggregate?

General ELLIS. Very much so.

Senator PERCY. Very much so.

The Soviet Union in its statement to the United States said that it did not intend to give the Backfire the capability of operating at intercontinental distances. There are estimates that the Backfire already has some intercontinental strategic capability. Is the Soviet statement, then, somewhat misleading in this regard?

General ELLIS. Is that question directed to me, sir?

Senator PERCY. Yes, sir.

General ELLIS. On strict terminology, and taking our knowledge or estimate of its capabilities, it could be misleading. However, I look at it as a statement, a Soviet statement, indicating the primary role of that bomber; that is in the peripheral role, and we will assume that is what they intend to do with it until indications would direct otherwise.

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

SENTIMENT TO INCLUDE BACKFIRE IN TREATY LIMITS

Mr. Slocombe, there is sentiment on some Senators part to include the Backfire in the treaty limits. If such action were taken, would the Soviets be over the limit? Would they have to retire other systems to deploy more Backfires?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. You mean if all the Backfires were counted against the SNDV aggregate? They are already over the 2,400 and 2,250 limits counting only the things which it has been agreed to count, so they would be further over the limit to the extent of any Backfires being counted against the 2,400 and 2,250 total.

Senator PERCY. If we for instance decided to include our F-111's deployed in Europe in the treaty limits, would we have to retire other systems to stay within the limits, also?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I believe that we could stay within the limit if we counted only the F-111's that are now deployed in England and not the FB-111's in the United States. We would be just under the limit if you do not count the nonoperational systems. We would have to dismantle and destroy the nonoperational aircraft, virtually all of them.

By my calculations, if you kept everything which now counts and which is operational, and you counted both the F-111's and the FB-111's, we would be, I think, just over the total. Whether that would have any impact depends on what assumptions you made about what we do with the 160 Polaris tubes.

U.S. DEPLOYMENT OF AIRCRAFT COMPARABLE TO BACKFIRE

Senator PERCY. The final two questions. Does the United States have any intention of deploying an aircraft similar to the Backfire during the next decade? If theoretically we did deploy a Backfire, how would we use it? Would we consider it a strategic weapon? Perhaps the latter, or both questions, could go to General Ellis.

General ELLIS. Our proposal as set forth in my statement, Senator Percy, was directed toward a strategic vehicle.

Senator PERCY. I am sorry, I did not hear you.

General ELLIS. It was directed toward a strategic vehicle, I was not thinking of a peripheral bomber in the classic definition of the Backfire.

Senator PERCY. But if, just on a theoretical basis, we did deploy a weapon similar to the Backfire, how would we use it? Would we consider it useful as a strategic weapon?

General Ellis. Very much so, that is the whole thrust of my argument.

Senator PERCY. I thank you very much, and thank you, Senator Javits, very much indeed.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Zorinsky?

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

BACKFIRE CAPABILITIES WITH REGARD TO FIRST STRIKE

General Ellis, I would like to welcome you to the hearing, having known you prior to coming here to Washington. The home State of SAC is Nebraska and I certainly appreciate your coming here to lend your expertise and testimony regarding this very serious treaty.

General, I would like to focus on the scenarios that you conduct concerning the first-strike capability of the Soviet Union. Given the fact that the Backfire bomber is capable of in-flight refueling, has the internal system built into the structure of the aircraft, that is, it is capable of being a long-range intercontinental bomber even though there is some question between the Air Force, Defense Department, and the CIA concerning the exact range of the Backfire; given those factual realities, do you or do you not project the Backfire's capabilities with regard to first-strike potential against this Nation?

General ELLIS. We take them into consideration in our planning, Senator, but obviously, whether they would use it in that role is conjecture. It might also be used in postattack, and by that I mean after the initial strike.

Senator ZORINSKY. Well, do you allow for conjecture? I think you made the comment earlier this morning in our other briefing that when people are at war panic sometimes evolves or people may do things with weapons unintentionally.

So, what I am saying is, in the event the Soviets had to use the Backfire for intercontinental bombers, they certainly could, and I would assume that you do allow for more than conjecture, the possibility of the actual use of those Backfire bombers.

General ELLIS. Absolutely. If I were a Soviet strategic planner I would count on it and would insist on using it that way, just as we can use B-52's in the conventional phase of a European conflict, and then they revert to the nuclear phase in the event there is a nuclear phase. That would be the logical way for them to use them.

Senator ZORINSKY. The point I am making is, you are counting them, the treaty does not count them.

General ELLIS. I look at them as a system that can strike the United States.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you. Then, let me ask one other question. How old are our B-52 bombers versus the development of the B-1?

General ELLIS. We received the last B-52 bomber in 1962, that was 17 years ago. That was the last B-52 bomber. The first B-52 was accepted in the middle 1950's.

Senator ZORINSKY. Would you say objectively that our development of air bomber systems has kept pace with that of the Soviet Union?

General ELLIS. Very definitely not, Senator.

Senator ZORINSKY. And would I be wrong in saying that you did support the continued production of the B-1 bomber?

General ELLIS. I did.

Senator ZORINSKY. And if you were asked that question again now, would you continue to support the need for the production of the B-1 bomber?

General ELLIS. I would look at two things. I would look at how long it would take us to get started on the B-1 again. I would look at the cost that would be imposed on us at this time, and I would look at alternatives. That is how we came up with the FB-111 B and C. We can get it sooner at a much cheaper price than we can get the B-1.

Senator ZORINSKY. Would the FB-111 be a suitable replacement in lieu of the B-1 bomber, in your estimation?

General ELLIS. It does not have the overall capability of the B-1, obviously; but it could be made available faster, in greater numbers, at reduced cost. We are looking for the earliest possible capability to counter the threat that I described in the early 1980's in my statement.

MAINTAINING PARITY

Senator ZORINSKY. From the first day of this hearing, General Ellis, I have attempted to portray the issue as not being one of whether SALT II does or does not resolve our deficiencies concerning parity with the Soviet Union, but as one of the will of the American people, the administration, the Congress, as to how much we want to do to catch up in these areas. I have asked for definitive lists. I have admitted you cannot bind one administration to another administration; neither can you bind one Congress to another Congress.

In your view, do you look at SALT II as a purchaser of time where the real issue is that we must continue to do those things that need to be done in order to maintain a parity outside of SALT II, concerning our strength and weakness as compared to the Soviet Union?

General ELLIS. Senator, I have the scars of the B-70 and the B-1 decisions. So, I share the apprehension that I know has been expressed to this committee by certain committee members on whether or not the treaty would be a substitute for modernization.

As I have tried to bring out most strongly in my statement, modernization is not coupled with the treaty, it is something that must be done.

Senator ZORINSKY. As a military leader, what advice can you give me as an elected official about locking in, or creating a commit-

ment on behalf of the administration and this Congress? To what extent do you feel we have to make plain, solid and simple our meaning to the American public?

I keep hearing the word from all those who testified that we must do what needs to be done. Well, that is a simple statement. But I am sure that statement was heard many times during SALT I. I feel one of the reasons we have the disparity now is because we did not do what we could have done under the parameters of SALT I. Now, as you pointed out, the fear continually exists that we will not do under SALT II parameters what we are allowed to do.

So, what I am saying is, as a military man you must have had disillusionments with what we did not do during SALT I, and to avoid that happening again, what advice can you give us about what should be done to lock into the focus of the American public the sacrifices that might have to be made in the area of playing catchup?

General ELLIS. Senator, I cannot give you the legislative mechanics of how to do it. I can tell you, as I think I made clear in my statement, that it seems to me it is most important that that point be made, and it be made over and over again; and that it be done by action on the part of this body. That, to me, is more convincing than any amount of rhetoric.

Senator ZORINSKY. Can you make a definitive statement such as that neither you and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nor any other military leaders, responsible military leaders, could guarantee the safety of this Nation in the event that we do not make a total commitment to creating parity with the Soviet Union?

General ELLIS. Senator, I cannot speak for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I can give my advice and they make their own judgment. I think I made the judgment in my statement on the situation in the early 1980's. I think the chance of losing essential equivalence is likely. To me, if you lose essential equivalence, we have always looked at it as the bottom line in terms of the capability that would be represented by the strategic forces and strategic capability of the United States.

Senator ZORINSKY. General, you are looked at very highly, and you know how the people in Nebraska feel about the Strategic Air Command. I think many times we take it for granted that we can go to bed and wake up in the safety and sanctity of our own homes, and that is only due to the fact that we have experts and professionals guarding the integrity of this Nation militarily.

I think if you unequivocally said that you could no longer guarantee the security and safety of the people, many of whom take that safety for granted, without our commitment to continue to modernize our military forces, it would bring a meaningful reality to a lot of people that take this country for granted.

General ELLIS. Senator, I do not want to overstate this. I have never been one that believes the most effective way to make your point was to hang up your uniform, but the responsibility of the Commander in Chief of SAC is not only to our people, to the military, but to the public as you indicated.

I have long held the assumption—and by that I mean from the very first day that I assumed command at SAC—that if I was ever unable to execute my mission I would make it known, and I would

at that point leave. I will not be in a position of trust such as this in which the American people are expecting us to do something and we cannot do it. At that point I will be heard.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you. I hope at that point it is not too late, General.

General ELLIS. I do too.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar, please?

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I suspect one way in which the media might cover the testimony today is to suggest that the NORAD commander and the SAC commander endorse the SALT Treaty, which would be a shame because essentially, of course, you have indicated that you support it for various reasons. At least you have said—and I now quote General Ellis: "It is our assessment during the period of the treaty SAC will have less difficulty executing its deterrent and emergency war missions with the treaty than we would without it."

And yet, this precedes a recitation of five situations in which in various ways, General Ellis, you point out that the Soviets have either a production capability or a technical capability. For example, you cite the treaty limitation on the SS-18, 10 warheads can be put on each launcher as opposed to 30, and that this is one value in the treaty. Clearly implicit in that is that they have the capability to go to 30. The treaty means 250 strategic delivery vehicles that you will not contend with because they will be destroyed. Clearly, that implies they are there, the buildup has occurred, the modification of the fourth generation ICBM's, the fifth generation ICBM's are under development; the treaty might hold that down to a dull roar—but we can only be hopeful that is the case.

In essence, as one analyzes your testimony, and I hope people will, it underlines again that the Soviets have been going great guns and we have not really been keeping up. That is what this SALT debate is finally coming down to. The antiseptic view that this treaty could be considered on the merits while we ignore the comparative difficulty. As you in your testimony pointed out, we are going to have a possibility of strategic inferiority in the early 1980's—and if we do the right thing, somehow we may get through that period.

But it has not yet sunk in, I think, on this committee, this Congress, or this Nation that we are in this sort of danger. When it does, you will get the support you need.

I am encouraged by the testimony that Senator Nunn has reported to have offered yesterday in which he was saying that this treaty should be examined and may offer some benefits. That is about what you are saying. Given the fact that they have been going great guns, it may be wise to contain the threat as best as possible.

But the critical factor is whether or not there is the will of the leadership in this country to provide, as I understand Senator Nunn said, about 1 or 2 percent more increase in real terms in the defense budget each year. Some staff member interprets that to mean \$7 to \$9 billion more each year.

What I think would be useful for you to address yourself to if you could, sir, is: In the event that this position prevails and there are a growing number of us who say there is indeed linkage in this treaty and the linkage is that there must be a national commitment to do those things that have to be done before we even consider this treaty, what sort of things should we do?

You are giving testimony, I am afraid, battered by the rejection of the B-1; battered by rejection of this and that and you suggest that finally, given all these constraints, some modification of the FB-111 is about the best we can do. But if in fact this Congress says, "We are going to spend the money that we need to, to save the country, leaving aside the Soviet Union, the SALT Treaty," or what have you, sort of pick that up as a secondary consideration, what should we do to enforce your ability to do your mission?

That, I think, is what some of us who would like to do those things would like to know, what our program ought to be. The administration has its program, it is the passage of the SALT Treaty. But our program is something else, and the administration is going to have to bargain with us. I think in order to have some expert testimony—and maybe you cannot answer that today—we need to know what that program ought to be.

In that case, why, eventually we might take a look at SALT and may hold things to a "dull roar" as you have suggested. It might not cost us that much because we will be coming out in a different negotiating posture and SALT III, or SALT II-and-a-half will be a different sort of treaty because of that.

Now, with all of that preface, what can you say today, or what could you say later on if there were other assumptions made about the defense budget and about what we should do?

General ELLIS. Senator, let me address first the force requirements. I tried in a general way to describe those requirements during the period of the 1980's. I can give it in more precise language, including dollar costs if that is the will of the committee.

But let me say one other thing about coupling it to the treaty. You remember I said the need to modernize is not coupled with the treaty. I recognize that is the mechanics that can help us accomplish modernization, that is, coupling modernization approval to SALT ratification. I do not know about that, and I do not want to overstate this, either.

But we people in the Strategic Air Command consider ourselves in the nuclear front trenches. We are in the process of "hunkering" down right now because of the early 1980's, and I will take help wherever I can get it. The SALT Treaty provides some help simply because it restrains what we know the Soviets can do, it is that simple.

I will be most happy to provide you with the precise force structure recommendation.

Senator LUGAR. I appreciate the point you are making, and obviously one can make a case that we should proceed anyway and, indeed, I think we should. But the testimony being presented broadly around this country is, with SALT, why, we only spend x number of dollars; without SALT we have to do something else. \$30 billion has been cast around for the next decade as the difference in expenditures, and that is a lot of money. Furthermore, one can

argue in domestic politics, if we had \$30 billion, there are a good number of social programs that this country might adopt, that we would not have to spend—to use the words of the opponents—“on Pentagon-inspired buildups” and this type of thing.

I think your point is well taken; the Joint Chiefs made the same, but they said that at the time of SALT I they also had a list of things to do and they recited how one after another was dashed away.

The question I had for them was, “On what basis of faith do you anticipate that there will be any other difference?” Now, I think there will be because we are debating the SALT Treaty in this format. It is going on for a long time; it may go on for a very long time, as a matter of fact, until a defense budget is pinned down. That could be much longer than many proponents have any thought of it taking. But, it could go on just that long.

I think for those of us who see any leverage or linkage in this situation and who are concerned about the defense of this country, why, this means a great deal to us.

I do not mean to put you on the spot today, but I think we will be coming back to you, the Joint Chiefs and others, in due course for somewhat of an agenda as to things that need to be done, even as we are considering SALT. As you say, with the limitations of the Soviet thrust that are involved in it, it may be somewhat helpful in this interim period of danger for us in the early 1980's.

Thank you very much.

SOVIET RESPONSE TO RENEGOTIATION

The CHAIRMAN. We are just about finished, and I want to ask a question of Ambassador Earle, who has been left out.

Ambassador EARLE. I have not felt left out, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. If I understood General Ellis correctly—and please listen closely to this, General Ellis, because I want to state your position accurately—General Ellis has said that if we could have obtained a deal with the Russians that would have included the Backfire in the aggregate limitation of the treaty, and the FB-111 in the aggregate limitation, that that would not have been a bad deal. But if we could have only agreed upon counting the Backfire in return for which both the FB-111 and our F-111 were both counted in the aggregate limits, that would not have been a good deal.

That is an accurate statement, is it not?

General ELLIS. That is an accurate statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, if the Senate, by reservation, insisted on counting the Backfire alone, what, in your judgment, would be the Soviet response?

Ambassador EARLE. Mr. Chairman, in my judgment the Soviet response would be very negative. They have maintained from the outset that the Backfire is a medium bomber. As Mr. Slocombe's testimony indicated—and I think the record shows—they essentially refused to discuss the Backfire at the negotiations in Geneva, taking the position that those negotiations dealt with strategic arms and the Backfire was not a strategic arm and therefore not subject to consideration by the Delegations.

So far as I know, Backfire was not discussed at Vladivostok but my own judgment is that we never would have reached agreement on equal aggregates at Vladivostok had the Soviets contemplated that we would take the position that the Backfire was indeed a heavy bomber and should be included.

So, in short, I think the reaction would be totally negative I think it would reopen, among other things, the whole concept of equal aggregates.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, during the negotiations which, after all, went on for nearly 7 years, did you try to make a deal that would have counted the Backfire in, along with our F-111's

Ambassador EARLE. No, we did not, Mr. CHAIRMAN.

The CHAIRMAN. If not, why not?

Ambassador EARLE. Because we did not want to, we did not think it was a good deal. We did try to include the Backfire simply as a heavy bomber, but you know the history of that. At no time did we ever suggest that we would consider inclusion of our F-111's in exchange for their Backfire.

The CHAIRMAN. What about just the FB-111's?

Ambassador EARLE. That was not considered either, so far as I know. I was in Geneva; whether it was considered in Washington or not, I simply do not know.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Mr. Slocombe.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. While it is certainly true we never proposed to count the FB-111 explicitly, we did make a number of offers which would in effect have counted Backfire after a certain number, and initially those numbers were not unrelated to the number of FB-111's. For example, in President Ford's book he points out that the initial proposal which we made in January 1976, would have counted Backfire after 120, which is of course in excess of the number of FB-111's. That proposal was not accepted. Because of our great desire not to draw the question of FBS into the negotiations we never proposed to count FB-111's if Backfire would count. But I think it is important to understand in the negotiating record we did make a number of proposals to count Backfire only after a certain number.

The CHAIRMAN. And those were all rejected.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I think I have no further questions. Senator Zorinsky, do you have further questions?

Senator ZORINSKY. No, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to thank you all for the executive session this morning in which we pursued these matters in greater specificity and for your testimony during the public session. Your testimony has been very helpful to us. We thank you very much.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Thank you, Mr. CHAIRMAN.

General ELLIS. Thank you, sir.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

Question 1. In the Joint Chiefs' testimony before the Committee on July 11, General Jones stated that the United States "needs to keep a penetrating bomber force, and we need to modernize." Is the Administration currently examining various options for a new penetrating bomber? Would any of the options envision an aircraft comparable to the Backfire? Would a new bomber carry cruise missiles of range greater than 600 km? (If yes) Would the United States plan to count any new

bomber, regardless of its capabilities, under the SALT II limits? (If no) Why wouldn't we plan to deploy our newest air-delivered weapons on a new bomber?

Answer. There are studies in progress examining a wide range of possible strategic aircraft. These studies are looking at what could be built with today's technology, what may be needed in the future and how effective the various concepts would be.

We are considering, as one possibility, bombers of the approximate size of Backfire. Since, however, effectiveness evaluation studies are a long way from complete, no design or size has yet been identified as the most desirable bomber of the future.

A number of possible payloads including cruise missiles of range greater than 600 km are under consideration. The question of the best weapon mix for strategic bombers is a complex issue. In general, however, flexibility in what a bomber may be equipped with is very desirable and long range cruise missiles are a good candidate for any new bomber.

As you know, any bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km are considered, under the SALT II Treaty, to be heavy bombers and will be counted in both the 2400/2250 and the 1320 aggregate limits. Whether or not a new, non-cruise missile-carrying bomber will be counted under SALT II will be decided on a case-by-case basis.

Question 2. Several Administration witnesses before the Committee have asserted the United States right to build a bomber comparable to the Backfire, and that it would not be included in SALT II. If the United States built such a bomber, would it be subject to any of the same restrictions as the Soviet Backfire, i.e. production rate no more than 30 per year, and "not capable of operating at intercontinental distances"? Would we be permitted to deploy such an aircraft in the Strategic Air Command, provide it with a refueling capability, and target it against the Soviet Union?

Answer. If the United States built a bomber comparable to its Backfire, there would be no restrictions on the production rate or capability of such an aircraft. The United States could deploy such a bomber in any way it saw fit.

Question 3. Do we and the Soviets have any formal or informal understandings about the interpretation of the restrictions on the Backfire? For example, Mr. Nitze said in his testimony before this Committee that it isn't clear when the "year" starts for counting the Backfire production rate. Thirty bombers per year is equivalent to 2½ per month. Would the Administration regard the production of 4 Backfires in any one month a violation of the agreement? For how long a period must the production rate exceed 2½ per month before the Administration would feel a violation had occurred?

Answer. The Soviets have agreed that Backfire production will not exceed 30 per year. This means a monthly production average of 2½ aircraft. We do not expect the Soviets to turn out precisely 2½ Backfires every month, but any production significantly in excess of this rate—particularly if carried on for several months—would be cause for challenge in the Standing Consultative Commission.

Question 4. When Secretaries Vance and Brown appeared before the Committee on July 9, Senator Glenn asked if the United States had made unilateral statements that the Soviets have not yet responded to. Secretary Brown responded "... in every case where we have made a statement with respect to their future actions, that has been resolved satisfactorily." Besides the Backfire statement, what other such agreements exist?

Answer. During the course of the negotiations, each side made many statements which are included within the negotiation record. These statements are of varying degrees of formality. Further, some are obligatory, such as the Soviet Backfire statement; some are interpretive in nature, usually to clarify a technical aspect of the Treaty, such as our statement with regard to U.S. terminology for terms in the throw-weight definition; and some are merely informational in nature, such as our statement with regard to the status of Hound Dog missiles. A complete list of each side's statements and responses will be provided to the Chairman of the Committee by the Secretary of State.

Question 5. The Treaty "defines" heavy bombers by listing all current types of heavy bombers. Is there any formal agreement or informal understanding between us and the Soviets that attempts to specify such a definition? What criteria does the Administration use in judging whether a bomber should count under SALT? By these criteria, is the Backfire a heavy bomber? Using these criteria, how would the following United States and Soviet aircraft compare: Bear, Bison, Backfire, Blinder, Badger, Fencer, B-52, B-1, FB-111, F-111, A-7.

Answer. Paragraph 3 of Article II of the SALT II Treaty establishes the airplanes to be considered "heavy bombers" in a number of ways. First, it lists existing types. Second, it includes those aircraft in the future which can carry out the mission of a heavy bomber in a manner similar or superior to that of current heavy bombers.

The criteria to be used for determining this are to be agreed upon by the two sides in the Standing Consultative Commission. No formal or informal understandings exist as to what such criteria might be. However, it is likely that the United States will include range and payload capability among such criteria.

The term "heavy bombers" also includes types of bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers or air-to-surface ballistic missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers (ASBM's).

The bombers listed in the question are all existing bombers. Of these, only the Bear, Bison, B-52, and B-1 are listed as current heavy bombers in the Treaty. The others, by virtue of their neither being so listed nor being equipped for long-range cruise missiles or ASBM's, are not considered to be heavy bombers. It is not possible to evaluate these other bombers based upon the criteria to be used for future heavy bombers, as these criteria have not yet been developed by the sides.

Question 6. Does the Administration expect the Backfire to become a carrier for ALCMs, with ranges in excess of 600 km, during the period of the Treaty?

Answer. [Deleted.] Were the Backfire to be deployed with such a missile system, then all Backfires, except those which were distinguishable on the basis of functionally-related observable differences (FROD's), would be accountable as heavy bombers under SALT, and would count under both the 2400/2250 and 1320 aggregate limits. The Backfire weapon system currently includes the [deleted] air-to-surface missile. While replacing this missile with a longer-range one would increase the system's effective range and consequently its standoff capability, [deleted].

Question 7. What improvements in the Backfire seem reasonable to expect and how would they affect range and weapons delivery? How confident is the United States that it can detect such activity? Was a higher production rate than 30 per year thought to be a likely option for the Soviets?

Answer. With various modifications, the range of the Backfire could be significantly increased. Some modifications could be incorporated relatively quickly and easily—for example, increasing fuel capacity by adding external fuel tanks or installing fuel tanks in the weapons bay. Other possible modifications—such as improved engines, aerodynamic improvements, or lengthened fuselages to permit greater fuel capacity—would be more complex and would probably be built into new Backfires at the production plant.

[Deleted.] Without SALT there would, of course, be no constraints on improvements to Backfire.

[Deleted.] The Intelligence Community believes that Soviet Backfire production facilities are capable of producing more than the 30 aircraft per year limit agreed upon at Vienna.

[Deleted.]

Question 8. What is the evidence that a new tanker for the Backfire may be under development? It was first suggested in early 1975 in Secretary Schlesinger's Annual Report. Why haven't we seen this aircraft tested or deployed yet?

Answer. [Deleted.]

Question 9. Did the United States consider "collateral constraints" on the Backfire earlier in the negotiations in hopes of constraining the growth potential and intercontinental capability of the Backfire? What were such constraints?

Answer. During the course of SALT II negotiations the United States proposed a number of assurances other than a production rate limit and constraints on range/payload capability of Backfire. These included restrictions on refueling, training, basing, and armament. The Soviets rejected these proposals. In the end, we concluded that a production rate limit and a more generalized approach to restricting the capability of the Backfire provided an acceptable resolution of the issue.

Question 10. Is the exclusion of the Backfire from SALT II's aggregate limitations and allowing up to 30 per year to be produced contrary to the assurances the United States made to its allies early in SALT II that the United States could not "permit threats to our allies to develop unchecked because of SALT agreements"? What positions have our Allies taken with respect to including the Backfire in SALT II?

Answer. No. The exclusion of the Backfire from SALT II's aggregate limitations and the limitation on Soviet Backfire production are not contrary to the assurances that the United States made to its allies early in SALT II that the United States could not "permit threats to our allies to develop unchecked because of SALT agreements." That assurance is given substance (1) by our efforts jointly with our NATO allies to modernize and improve NATO conventional and theater nuclear capabilities in Europe to counter growing Soviet conventional and TNF capabilities and (2) by our refusal in SALT II to permit limitations on U.S. forward-based systems in Europe. In the context of our assurance, it also is important to note that the Soviet commitment to limit Backfire production to 30 per year not only serves to constrain the intercontinental potential of the Backfire force, but also places a ceiling on the number of Backfire available for theater and naval missions—a constraint which otherwise would not exist.

Since we consulted with our allies throughout the SALT II negotiations, they are aware of the history of the Backfire negotiations. Their primary concern was that U.S. forward-based systems not be constrained. We were successful in resisting Soviet demands for limits on U.S. forward-based systems.


Question 11. In Mr. Slocombe's prepared statement he states that, "The Vladivostok framework . . . included no limitations on or account taken of U.S. forward-based systems or Allied nuclear systems." Hasn't the United States included some future forward-based systems of high interest to NATO, GLCM and SLCM, in the SALT II Protocol? Is this an important exception to the U.S. position that FBS be excluded because they relate to commitments to allies and counter Soviet theater forces not included in SALT (or MBFR) which threaten our allies?

Answer. Early in SALT II, the Soviets proposed that the Treaty contain a ban on the testing and deployment of SLCM's with ranges over 600 km and later adopted the same position for GLCM's. We took the position that consideration of restrictive long-term limits on these systems should be postponed to future negotiations. However, the Soviets insisted that SALT II should contain some limits on SLCM's and GLCM's, and it became clear in the post-Vladivostok negotiations that an agreement could not be concluded without some GLCM and SLCM limits. The compromise between Soviet insistence that GLCM's and SLCM's be limited and our insistence that long-term limits be postponed to future negotiations was to include some GLCM and SLCM limits in a short-term Protocol, not in the Treaty itself. By this approach, we accommodated Soviet insistence that the agreement address SLCM's and GLCM's, while making certain that these limitations would have no impact on U.S. programs.

The Protocol bans the deployment of SLCM's and GLCM's capable to ranges greater than 600 km until after December 31, 1981, but places no limits on development and flight-testing, which can go and are going forward. Since neither the GLCM or the SLCM would be ready for deployment until 1983, well after the Protocol will have expired, and development and testing of the systems is permitted during the time the Protocol is in effect, the Protocol will not constrain these programs. Further, the limitations in the Protocol expire with the Protocol and set no precedent for future negotiations.

We have and continue to consult closely with our allies on the potential role of SLCM's and GLCM's in NATO long-range theater nuclear force modernization and in arms control. Decisions on the role of SLCM's and GLCM's in NATO's modernization should be forthcoming by the end of the year. The Protocol limits will in no way constrain these decisions. With respect to future limits on these systems, the United States, after consultation with the allies, declared that any future limits on U.S. systems principally designed for theater missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theater systems.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]



THE SALT II TREATY

TUESDAY, JULY 31, 1979

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Church, Pell, McGovern, Biden, Glenn, Stone, Sarbanes, Zorinsky, Javits, Percy, Baker, Helms, Hayakawa, and Lugar.

Also present: Senators Cranston, Nunn, Moynihan, Mathias, and Boschwitz.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

Appearing before the committee this morning is a distinguished participant of the SALT I and early SALT II negotiations. Dr. Kissinger was Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Secretary of State, and as far as I know, the only man to hold both jobs simultaneously for a time, and he was a leading figure in developing U.S. positions and negotiating strategy for SALT I and for the negotiations that led to the Vladivostok understanding between President Ford and Chairman Brezhnev in November 1974.

Dr. Kissinger was also one of the major negotiators of SALT II. We have been informed that about three-quarters or more of the SALT II Treaty now before the Senate was actually negotiated by the time he left office.

Dr. Kissinger, we welcome you. We will appreciate your views and judgments on the SALT Treaty. Your participation in the SALT process goes back to the beginning. You have also thought deeply about the SALT process, the nature of deterrence, and strategic stability, and the need for a viable international order. We welcome your testimony.

I understand you have presented the committee with an even more extended text of your remarks and that you have an abbreviated text which you would like to deliver at this time.

STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY KISSINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Secretary KISSINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, it is a privilege to appear again before this committee, with which I spent so many hours when I was in office.

With your permission, I will read excerpts from the statement which I have submitted, and then I will answer your questions.

First, I will deal with the general problem presented by this treaty.

In his essay, "Perpetual Peace," the philosopher Immanuel Kant wrote that world peace would come about in one of two ways: After a cycle of wars of ever-increasing violence, or by an act of moral insight in which the nations of the world renounced the bitter competition bound to lead to self destruction.

Our age faces precisely that choice. For the first time in history, two nations have the capacity to inflict on each other and on mankind a level of destruction tantamount to ending civilized life; yet they have also before them unprecedented possibilities of cooperation, to harness technology to improve the human condition.

Both mankind's hopes and fears are bound up with the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. These two countries possess huge nuclear arsenals; they also espouse sharply opposing concepts of justice and conflicting visions of the future. Hence, the Soviet Union and America clash in areas that each considers vital. We have allies whose interests we will not sacrifice. Soviet allies such as Vietnam and Cuba are quite capable of generating crises of their own, all too frequently encouraged by Moscow to do so.

The peace we seek must therefore rest on something more tangible than a hope or a fear of holocaust. It must also reflect a military and geopolitical equilibrium. How to strive for both peace and our moral principles; how to avoid nuclear war without succumbing to nuclear blackmail—this is the overwhelming problem of our period.

The new treaty poses a particularly complex problem. I have a long-standing commitment to the process of limiting strategic nuclear arms. As your chairman pointed out, I was involved in the negotiations of the Vladivostok Accord of 1974, and I played a role in the negotiations which followed it.

As an historian, I am conscious of the lessons of World War II, when global war resulted because the democracies disdained to maintain the balance of power. But equally, we must not forget the tragedy of World War I, when disaster resulted even with an equilibrium of power, when technology and rivalry outran the control of statesmen.

Thus, SALT cannot be considered in isolation. It must be viewed in the context of the global balance that it reflects or purports to effect.

Thus, I regret to have to say that the present treaty comes up for ratification at a time of grave danger to our national security and to the global equilibrium. The military balance is beginning to tilt against the United States in too many significant categories of weaponry. The unprecedented Soviet use of proxy forces in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, and the turmoil caused by radical forces and terrorist organizations sponsored by Moscow's friends, mark ours as a time of profound upheaval.

In addressing the treaty before you, I respectfully submit, the Senate has a responsibility to examine the broader conditions of our national security. Without such an examination, SALT will become a soporific, a form of escapism. I shall submit specific proposals to achieve this, later in the statement.

Let me now turn to the shifting strategic balance.

The basic technical facts about the current military balance have been presented in great detail before this and other committees. Let me concentrate first on the serious transformation, adverse to our interests, that has taken place in the overall strategic balance during the last decade and a half.

For about the first 25 years of the postwar period, the problem of maintaining the military equilibrium was relatively straightforward. The Soviet Union was always superior in ground forces on the Eurasian continent. We were vastly ahead in strategic striking power as well as in theater nuclear forces. The reach of the Soviet Union was limited to regions accessible to motorized ground transport, generally adjacent territories in Europe, and to some extent China. Africa, most of the Middle East, and Southeast Asia were beyond the capacity of major Soviet military intervention. And the areas which were hostage to Soviet ground armies were protected by three factors:

First, by the American preponderance in strategic nuclear striking power, capable of disarming the Soviet Union or at least reducing its counterblow to tolerable levels while still retaining large residual forces for attacks on industrial targets;

Second, by a vast American superiority in so-called theater nuclear forces;

And third, in Europe, by substantial American and allied ground forces that posed at least a major probability that Soviet ground attack would trigger the nuclear retaliation of the United States.

This state of affairs will soon have ceased to exist. Starting in the 1960's, the military balance began to change—almost imperceptibly at first, so great was our superiority—but with growing momentum in recent years. It is imperative that we recognize without illusion the dangerous trends that are emerging. It is crucial that we begin to rectify them now.

The growth of Soviet strategic nuclear forces has been inexorable for a decade and a half. In 1965, the Soviet strategic arsenal comprised about 220 intercontinental ballistic missiles and 100 submarine-launched ballistic missiles. By 1968, the number had grown to 860 ICBM's and over 120 SLBM's. By mid-1970, the Soviets had caught up with us in numbers of launchers. Instead of stopping when they reached parity with us, as the Johnson administration expected, the Soviets continued their missile buildup—until they were frozen at the levels of the ceilings established by the first SALT agreement in May 1972. Then, they switched energetically to qualitative improvements in their missile forces.

Our problem derives not only from the larger number of warheads on Soviet ICBM's, but above all from the difference in the types of weaponry emphasized by the two sides. In the sixties, the United States unilaterally decided to base its strategic forces on light but highly accurate ICBM's, the less vulnerable but also less

accurate SLBM's, and the more versatile but more vulnerable manned bombers.

The Soviets made the opposite decision, relying on large land-based missiles capable of delivering a far heavier payload. At first, the crudeness of their technology and the lack of accuracy deprived these weapons of effectiveness against military targets. But as Soviet technology improved, its advantage in numbers and missile payload was bound to tell.

There is now general agreement that their improvements in missile accuracy and warhead technology will put the Soviets in a position to destroy our land-based forces of Minuteman ICBM's by 1982. Whether this capability is ever exercised or not—and I consider it improbable—it reverses and hence revolutionizes the strategic equation on which our security and that of our friends have depended through most of the postwar period.

The revolution in the strategic balance is aggravated by a comparable buildup of Soviet aircraft and missiles, and theater based nuclear forces, to a point where Soviet superiority in theater striking forces is upon us.

All this has been accomplished while the Soviet advantage in conventional forces has grown, and while the reach of Soviet power has been extended enormously by the rapid development of the Soviet Navy, an expanding long-range airlift capability, the acquisition of Soviet bases in countries like South Yemen and Vietnam, and the establishment of vast Soviet arms depots in such countries as Libya and Ethiopia, which will enable the Soviet Union to move its own or proxy troops rapidly to their prepositioned weapons.

Rarely in history has a nation so passively accepted such a radical change in the military balance. If we are to remedy it, we must first recognize the fact that we have placed ourselves at a significant disadvantage voluntarily. This is not the result of SALT. It is the consequence of unilateral decisions extending over a decade and a half: Of a strategic doctrine adopted in the sixties, of the bitter domestic divisions growing out of the war in Vietnam, and of the choices of the present administration.

All these actions were unilateral, hence avoidable. They were not extracted from us by clever Soviet negotiators. We imposed them on ourselves by our choices, theories, and domestic turmoil. It is therefore in our power to alter them.

The prevailing American strategic doctrine of the sixties went under the name of "assured destruction." According to it, deterrence was guaranteed so long as we possessed the ability to destroy a predetermined percentage of Soviet population and industrial capacity. Strategy thereby turned into an engineering problem, an economic analysis essentially independent of the size of the opposing forces.

The emergence of a new strategic nuclear environment should have forced a reconsideration of this doctrine and a renewed attention to regional nuclear and conventional balances. Unfortunately, at the precise moment that such a reexamination became urgently necessary, all our programs came under systematic attack as a byproduct of the bitter domestic debate over Vietnam.

On the one hand, the war in Vietnam reduced funds available for modernization. Even more important, the wholesale assault on

defense spending jeopardized even those projects for which funds were available and budgeted. After the end of our involvement in Vietnam, new strategic programs could at last be funded: The B-1 manned strategic bomber, to become operational in 1979; the M-X, to become operational in 1983; the Trident submarine and missile, expected to become operational in 1978; various kinds of cruise missiles for the 1980's—all of which would give the United States greater options, and some of which would bring about a new counterforce capability.

Every one of these programs has been canceled, delayed, or stretched out by the current administration, so that we are at a point where only the Trident can be operational during the period of the projected SALT Treaty. We now face the challenge of the early eighties with forces designed in the sixties.

Since our modern military doctrine and strategy have depended much more on strategic forces than those of the Soviets, even overall equality revolutionizes the postwar security and geopolitical structure. But in fact the situation is worse. My principal worry is not only the growing vulnerability of our land-based forces but the growing invulnerability of Soviet land-based forces. The deterrent effect of our strategic forces in defense of allies will in these circumstances continually decline; our strategic forces will surely lose their ability to offset the Soviet capacity for regional intervention. And this capacity will be reinforced by the growing edge in Soviet theater nuclear forces.

I want to reiterate that it is not necessary for present purposes to debate whether the Soviet Union would in fact run a risk of a global war; it will be grave enough if the willingness to run risks in regional conflicts is magnified. And that seems to me the minimum consequence of what is ahead. We cannot possibly continue to gamble with inferior forces for regional defense, a shifting balance in theater nuclear forces, vulnerable land-based strategic forces, and invulnerable Soviet ICBM's, without courting the gravest dangers.

How in such circumstances will we fulfill our commitment to our allies? How will we protect our vital interests in areas such as the Middle East? How will we prevent nuclear blackmail?

No responsible leader can want to face the 1980's with the present military prospects. This, and not SALT in isolation, is the principal problem facing us.

We must now ask, how does the SALT II agreement affect the strategic balance? Any fair-minded analysis must recognize the beneficial aspects of the SALT II agreement. The overall ceilings of 2,250 will force the Soviets to get rid of 250 strategic systems, including some modern ones, while giving us the right to equalize the numbers. The permitted number of land-based Soviet MIRV's, 820, is some 100 below the maximum number that they probably intended to build in the absence of SALT. There are some restrictions on missile testing procedures. There are limits on numbers of missile warheads on ICBM's, and a prohibition on more than one "new" ICBM. There is for the first time an agreed base line of information on the Soviet forces.

Regrettably, none of these achievements affects the grave strategic situation which I have described and which must urgently be

reversed. The treaty does not reduce the Soviet first strike capability against our land-based forces or improve our ability to survive a first strike. It does not diminish the Soviet residual capability to destroy civilian targets in the United States. And it does not enhance—indeed, it may slightly inhibit—the possibility of the United States to catch up in the capacity of our strategic forces to attack military targets.

The reduction in Soviet numbers is irrelevant to our strategic problems. The danger to our security derives from warheads, not from launchers, and the Soviet total of ICBM warheads will increase from 3,200 at the time of the signing of SALT to over 6,000. Even after the reduction in Soviet launchers is supposed to take place, the total number of Soviet warheads including SLBM's will approach 12,000 in 1985, as compared to 8,000 at the time of the SALT signing.

I will not read other numerical analyses which make the same point, but to sum up: The Vienna Treaty will not diminish the threat to the strategic balance. During the life of the treaty, the Soviets will complete their counterforce capability against our ICBM's. This will coincide exactly with our period of maximum danger.

At the same time, I must repeat, any SALT Treaty is likely to ratify existing strategic trends. SALT negotiators cannot produce what our military programs—for whatever reason—have neglected. The Soviets will never agree to unilateral reductions. If we want equality, we must build to equality.

The novel—and to me the most disturbing—feature of the current treaty is its impact on the theater nuclear balance. The Soviet Backfire bomber is limited to production of no more than 30 per year, through an oral agreement outside the treaty or protocol. There has been dispute about the utility of the Backfire in carrying out unrefueled attacks against the United States. There is no doubt of its ability to threaten all our allies as well as China and the sea approaches to Eurasia.

The most immediately available American counter to the Backfire and the SS-20 missile has been cruise missiles. But the provisions of the protocol restrict exclusively American programs on cruise missiles. They affect not a single Soviet program. They amount to a unilateral renunciation of an American capability.

The protocol also for the first time limits American weapons relevant primarily to the theater nuclear balance, thus affecting important interests of our allies in return, at best, for restrictions relevant primarily to the United States.

This is something we have heretofore consistently refused to do as a matter of principle in the decade that SALT negotiations have been taking place. It is a dangerous precedent.

To sum up: I have serious reservations about the protocol. As for the treaty, its terms do not improve our strategic situation, but neither do they prevent our remedying it during the remaining 6 years of its life.

The crucial question is whether we can unite behind what is clearly necessary. Ratifying SALT—or rejecting SALT makes—sense only if it prompts a renewed dedication to our national defense and security.

Let me say a few words about the political context.

First, with respect to the Soviet Union, the awesomeness of modern weapons and the aspirations of all peoples for peace impose the imperative of peaceful coexistence. No democratic leader deserves the public trust if he fails to make a genuine effort to reduce the dangers of nuclear holocaust and to free national energies for dealing with the many urgent problems of mankind.

The temptation is overwhelming to view this common stake in peace as a common bond between us and the Soviet Union. It should be, and some day it must be, if a cataclysm is to be avoided. But we cannot in good conscience say that the current evidence supports the proposition that the time has yet arrived.

The fact is that since 1975, there has been an unprecedented Soviet assault on the international equilibrium—1975 saw the introduction of Cuban combat forces into Angola, eventually reaching 40,000, backed by Soviet financing, airlift, and policy support. By 1977, Soviet planes and pilots were flying air defense missions out of Cuba, so that the Cuban air force could operate in Africa—1977 witnessed the spread of Cuban forces to Ethiopia. East German military and intelligence advisors have now joined the Cubans all over Africa and the Middle East. There have been two invasions of Zaire—and there may yet be a third. There have been Communist coups in Afghanistan and South Yemen, and the occupation of Cambodia by Vietnam, preceded by a Soviet Friendship Treaty designed to secure Hanoi's rear during its aggression. Soviet arms depots in Libya and Ethiopia fuel insurgencies all over Africa.

Nor is this all. Terrorist organizations supported by Communist funds, armed by Communist weapons, and trained by Communist instructors are becoming a systematic instrument of anti-Western policy, threatening countries friendly to us on several continents. They are not, to be sure, all controlled by Moscow, but someone who has started a rockslide cannot avoid the responsibility by claiming that the rock he threw was not the one that ultimately killed bystanders.

Whatever label we give to recent Soviet conduct—whether "Cold War" or opportunism—it must be ended if there are to be any prospects for East-West coexistence or cooperation. Surely, it is not provocative to ask the Soviet Union to accompany restraint in arms with restraint in political conduct. Attention to this kind of linkage insures that no agreement stands alone, vulnerable to the next crisis, or turns into a soporific to lull the West while adventurism runs free.

Let me now turn to the concerns of our allies.

All our allies have expressed support for ratification of the Vienna Treaty. But their endorsement results from a complex of factors of which approval of the provisions of the treaty is by far the least significant. Each has been urged, if not pressed, by the administration to express support. In some cases, the Soviets have added their entreaties. Refusal to comply would thus risk relations with both superpowers over an issue that is of high technical complexity and has been under negotiation for 7 years.

Some allies are afraid lest their objection endanger their essential defense cooperation with the United States. All are reluctant to contribute to a further weakening of American executive author-

ity. There is no doubt that failure to ratify the treaty will shake European confidence in an American Government that for 7 years has assured them that it knew what it was doing.

At the same time, allied endorsement should be seen in the context of a pervasive ambivalence. The thoughtful leaders among them know that the basis of their security is eroding as our strategic superiority ebbs—but they fear they do not have enough domestic support for a really significant defense effort, especially when American attitudes on that score are so ambiguous. They do not want to be perceived as an obstacle to SALT II, but they are highly uneasy about the inevitable SALT III.

The United States thus stands in danger of being blamed by our allies at one and the same time for risking détente and for paying inadequate attention to security, for provoking the Soviets and for jeopardizing the defense of the free world. It has ever been thus in the postwar period.

The test of our leadership is American willingness to give a clearcut signal of what we understand by Western security and how we intend to maintain it. No other country or group of countries, however closely associated, can take this burden from our shoulders. None of our allies will forgive us if we fail.

Thus, we return to our original problem. The Senate, in considering ratification, needs urgently to address our dangers in a comprehensive way:

First, how the Senate can take concrete steps to begin redressing the military balance.

Second, how to deal with the specific problems in the treaty and the protocol.

Third, how the Senate can put the Soviet Union on notice that continued attempts to upset the global equilibrium will not be tolerated.

After much reflection I have concluded that I can support ratification only with the following conditions.

First, if it is coupled with a defense program representing an obligatory understanding between the Congress and the President which overcomes on an urgent basis the grave peril posed by the current military balance.

Second, if it is accompanied by amendments—not requiring renegotiation—clearing up ambiguities in the treaty, defining the status of the protocol, the meaning of noncircumvention, and setting guidelines for follow-on negotiations.

And third, if it is accompanied by a vigorous expression of the Senate's view of the linkages between SALT and Soviet geopolitical conduct.

Let me deal first with the military balance. With respect to the military programs, I respectfully recommend that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification of the SALT Treaty only after the administration has submitted, and the Congress has authorized and begun appropriating, a supplemental defense budget and a revised 5-year defense program that will begin rectifying some of the shortcomings that I have identified.

The congressional recess provides an opportunity to prepare such a program, on which work should already be far advanced as part of the normal budgetary process. If the administration is unable to

put forward such a program to this session of the Congress, I recommend that the Senate delay its advice and consent until a new military program has been submitted to and authorized by the next session of Congress.

I would be openminded about other methods to achieve this end, provided they are unambiguous and represent an obligatory commitment by both branches of the Government. Assurances that the Executive intends to proceed with individual weapons systems like the M-X after ratification are not enough, either for the reality of our danger or to reverse the political and psychological trends which will make the immediate future a period of great peril.

Nor have the percentage figures of projected increases proved effective because of ambiguities about the baseline and how to compute rates of inflation. It is not a question of a legislative compromise, or of what price should be paid for the approval of SALT. The issue is what our country needs for its long-term security.

My support for ratification is entirely conditional on the development of a new program and doctrine, given some binding form by the Congress.

Clarifying the treaty and the protocol. In addition to these military programs, I recommend that the Senate add the following amendments to its advise and consent resolution.

First, as far as cruise missiles are concerned, that the protocol may not be extended after 1981. The Senate should stipulate that this particular limitation can be submitted to the Congress only as part of an equitable arrangement for theater nuclear forces. Specifically, no limitations may be negotiated for American theater weapons such as cruise missiles which are not matched by similar limitations on Soviet weapons performing comparable missions. This will bring cruise missiles into some equilibrium with the Backfire and the SS-20.

Second, the Senate should specify that as part of SALT III the United States be entitled to any weapons system permitted to the Soviets in the new agreement unless the Soviets agree to some compensation by giving up a weapons system of equivalent characteristics allowed to us. This should take care of the problem of the heavy missile within the only framework which will give us a real option to produce it.

Third, that the noncircumvention clause be interpreted by the Senate as not interrupting cooperative relationships with allies with respect to technology needed to modernize their forces.

I also suggest that the Senate reexamine the SALT agreement every 2 years, specifically to determine its verifiability.

Finally, addressing the geopolitical problem. I respectfully urge the Senate to use the ratification process to put the Soviet Union on notice that this country is prepared, indeed eager, for peaceful coexistence that reflects true stability and equality in arms, but also that insists on political restraint.

The Senate should attach to its instrument of advice and consent an expression of the following principles:

That the absence of political restraint will seriously jeopardize continuation of the SALT process.

That the Senate understands this to include Soviet supply or encouragement of intervention by proxy military forces; the use of Soviet forces on the territory of its allies, such as Cuba, to free Cuban forces to fight in Africa; the support, financing, or encouragement by any member of the Warsaw Pact of groups and activities seeking to undermine governments friendly to the United States; or the exacerbation of regional conflicts.

That the administration be required to submit an annual report to the Senate on the degree to which the Soviet Union is living up to these criteria.

That the Senate vote every 2 years its judgment whether the Soviet Union has lived up to these criteria. If the judgment is negative, the Senate should then vote whether whatever SALT negotiations are taking place should be continued.

I recommend the approach outlined here because it gives this country an opportunity to address its dangers without abandoning an important negotiation that has already extended over 7 years. And it gives us an opportunity to proceed as a united people.

To be sure, the course I propose will make SALT II far from the turn in the arms race many of us hoped for when the negotiations were inaugurated. But too much time has been lost, too many weapons systems have been unilaterally abandoned, too many military adventures have been encouraged by the Soviet Union, the geopolitical balance has been too severely strained, for SALT to be much more than a base from which, one can hope, a new and serious effort at equitable arms reduction can be made.

Concrete steps to rectify this situation are urgently required. In this context, SALT II can play a useful role as a signpost to continuing negotiations, as a beacon illuminating the path to genuine coexistence, and as a means to contain current tensions.

There are deeply concerned people who want SALT but doubt the need for augmented defense. Others see in SALT an obstacle to augmented defense. Let there be a serious effort to reconcile these points of view before we turn to domestic confrontation.

Rarely is an opportunity so clearly presented to determine the course of national policy in a direction vital to the future of the democracies. After the 1919 Versailles Treaty, misjudgments by the Senate and the administration lead to a debacle which undermined international security and doomed the world to another bloody holocaust. At this moment, the Senate and the administration can point us in a different direction—toward the restoration of our national unity, toward the strengthening of the security of this Nation and its allies, and toward a more constructive relationship with our principal adversaries. This is America's responsibility if we are to remain true to our trust and to the hopes of mankind.

Thank you very much. My apologies for the extended statement.
[Dr. Kissinger's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER

THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY

In his essay *Perpetual Peace* the philosopher Immanuel Kant wrote that world peace would come about in one of two ways: after a cycle of wars of ever increasing violence, or by an act of moral insight in which the nations of the world renounced the bitter competition bound to lead to self-destruction.

Our age faces precisely that choice. For the first time in history two nations have the capacity to inflict on each other and on mankind a level of destruction tantamount to ending civilized life; yet they have also before them unprecedented possibilities of cooperation to harness the wonders of technology to improve the human condition.

Both mankind's hopes and fears are bound up with the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. These two countries possess huge nuclear arsenals; they also espouse sharply opposing concepts of justice and hold conflicting visions of the future. The ideology of Soviet leaders does not make them content to practice their preferred social system at home; they strive for its victory worldwide. Hence the Soviet Union and America clash in areas that each considers vital. We have allies whose interests we will not sacrifice. Soviet allies such as Vietnam and Cuba are quite capable of generating crises of their own, all too frequently encouraged by Moscow to do so.

The peace we seek therefore must rest on something more tangible than a hope or a fear of holocaust. It must also reflect a military and geopolitical equilibrium. The notion of balance of power has always been unfashionable in America. But it is the precondition of security, and even of progress. If the mere avoidance of conflict becomes our overriding objective, and if our own military power is disparaged, the international system will be at the mercy of the most ruthless. If the desire to conciliate becomes the sole operational basis of policy, we run the risk that the threat of war will become a weapon of blackmail; our allies and our moral values will both be permanently in danger. The desire for peace will be transformed into a caricature of itself, and become instead the beginning of appeasement. How to strive for both peace and our moral principles; how to avoid nuclear war without succumbing to nuclear blackmail—this is the overwhelming problem of our period.

The United States must proceed simultaneously on three fronts:

First, we must maintain a military balance that does not tempt aggression against our friends or allies, against our vital interests, or in the extreme case against ourselves.

Secondly, beyond resisting naked aggression, we have a stake in the principal that political or economic pressure, or military or terrorist blackmail, not become the arbiter of the world's political disputes. The geopolitical equilibrium must be maintained lest radical forces hostile to the West gain such momentum that they appear as the irresistible wave of the future.

And thirdly, on the basis of a balance thus achieved and preserved, we must be ready to explore routes to genuine peaceful coexistence. The great powers, having learned that they cannot dominate each other, must practice moderation and ultimately cooperation. The creativity of a world of diversity and peaceful competition can be the basis of unparalleled human progress. A stable balance is the most hopeful—perhaps the only—basis for the control and ultimately the reduction of weapons of mass destruction.

Too often these requirements are posed in the alternative. But the quest for security and for peace are inseparable; we cannot achieve one without the other. No democracy can court conflict. Our government will have support in resisting challenges to our vital interests only if confrontation is seen to have been unavoidable. Our people have a right to expect of their government that it will explore all avenues to a genuine peace. And our allies will insist on it.

The new Treaty poses a particularly complex problem for me. When I was a professor, I participated in the academic discussions of military doctrine and strategy that underlay early initiatives in arms control. I helped design the first SALT agreements in 1972. I was involved in the negotiations of the Vladivostok accord of 1974 which marked the first breakthrough of SALT II; I played a major role in the negotiations which came close to completing an agreement in January 1976. I have a long-standing personal commitment to the process of limiting strategic nuclear arms. As an historian I am conscious of the lessons of World War II when a global war resulted because the democracies disdained to maintain the balance of power. But equally we must not forget the tragedy of World War I: When disaster resulted even with an equilibrium of power, when technology and rivalry outran the control of statesmen.

Thus SALT cannot be considered in isolation. It is one element in our overall national security policy. It must be viewed in the context of the global balance that it reflects, or purports to affect.

Thus I regret to have to say that the present Treaty comes up for ratification at a time of grave danger to our national security and to the global equilibrium. The military balance is beginning to tilt ominously against the United States in too many significant categories of weaponry. The unprecedented Soviet use of proxy forces in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, and the turmoil caused by

radical forces and terrorist organizations sponsored by Moscow's friends, mark ours as a time of profound upheaval. We have learned painfully that we alone cannot be the world's policeman. But neither our moral values nor our safety can tolerate the Soviet Union's increasing tendency toward global intervention. As the United States nurses its wounds after Vietnam, radical forces are threatening regional stability and attempting the violent overthrow of moderate governments friendly to the West. If present trends continue, we face the chilling prospect of a world sliding gradually out of control, with our relative military power declining, with our economic lifeline vulnerable to blackmail, with hostile forces growing more rapidly than our ability to deal with them, and with fewer and fewer nations friendly to us surviving.

In addressing the Treaty before you, I respectfully submit, the Senate has a responsibility to examine the broader condition of our national security. The Senate has an opportunity at least to begin to reverse the unfavorable trends in the military balance and to put the Soviet Union on notice that we consider the constant probing of every regional equilibrium and the encouragement of subversive and terrorist groups as incompatible with any definition of coexistence. Without such an affirmation, SALT will become a soporific, a form of escapism. I shall submit specific proposals to achieve this, later in the statement.

THE SHIFTING STRATEGIC BALANCE

The basic technical facts about the current military balance have been presented in great detail before this and other committees. Let me concentrate first on the serious transformation, adverse to our interests, that has taken place in the overall strategic balance during the last decade and a half.

For about the first twenty-five years of the postwar period, the problem of maintaining the military equilibrium was relatively straightforward. The Soviet Union was always superior in ground forces on the Eurasian continent; we were vastly ahead in strategic striking power as well as in theater nuclear forces. The reach of the Soviet Union was limited to regions accessible to motorized ground transport, generally adjacent territories in Europe and to some extent China. Africa, most of the Middle East, even Southeast Asia were beyond the capacity of major Soviet military intervention. And the areas which were hostage to Soviet ground armies were protected by three factors:

First, by the American preponderance in strategic nuclear striking power capable of disarming the Soviet Union or at least reducing its counterblow to tolerable levels while still retaining large residual forces for attacks on industrial targets;

Second, by a vast American superiority in so-called theater nuclear forces everywhere around the Soviet periphery.

And thirdly, in Europe by substantial American and allied ground forces that posed at least a major probability that Soviet ground attack would trigger the nuclear retaliation of the United States.

Not surprisingly, the major crises in the first twenty years of the postwar period—whether in Berlin, Korea, or Cuba—were ultimately contained, because the risks of pushing them beyond a certain point always appeared exorbitant to Moscow.

This state of affairs will soon have ceased to exist. Starting in the 1960's, the military balance began to change—almost imperceptibly at first, so great was our superiority—but with growing momentum in recent years. It is imperative that we recognize without illusion the dangerous trends that are emerging. It is crucial that we begin now to rectify them.

The growth of Soviet strategic nuclear forces has been inexorable for a decade and a half. In 1965 the Soviet strategic arsenal comprised about 220 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and 100 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). By 1968 the number had grown to 860 ICBMs and over 120 SLBMs. We had stopped our build-up at 1054 ICBMs and 656 SLBMs in 1967. By mid-1970 the Soviets had caught up with us in numbers of launchers. Our intelligence estimates of their plans invariably turned out to be too low; contrary to popular mythology the Soviets did build on the scale of the "worst case" hypothesis of our intelligence community and not to the level that was defined as "most probable."¹ Instead of stopping when they reached parity with us, as the Johnson Administration expected, the Soviets continued their missile build-up—until they were frozen at the levels of the ceilings established by the first SALT agreement in May 1972. Then they switched energetically to qualitative improvements in their missile forces.

¹ See Albert Wohlstetter, "Is There a Strategic Arms Race?" *Foreign Policy*, No. 15 (summer 1974), pp. 3-20; "Rivals, But No 'Race,'" *Foreign Policy*, No. 16 (fall 1974), pp. 48-81.

Our problem derives not only from the larger number of warheads on Soviet ICBMs but above all from the difference in the types of weaponry emphasized by the two sides. In the Sixties, the United States unilaterally decided to base its strategic forces on light but highly accurate ICBMs, the less vulnerable but also less accurate SLBMs, and the more versatile but more vulnerable manned bombers. The Soviets made the opposite decision, relying on large land-based missiles capable of delivering a far heavier payload. At first the crudeness of their technology and the lack of accuracy deprived these weapons of effectiveness against military targets. But as Soviet technology improved, its advantage in numbers and missile payload was bound to tell. For the land-based ICBM is always likely to be the most accurate and powerful strategic weapon, and the one most capable of a rapid attack against the military targets of the other side. In short the Soviets have emphasized quick reaction forces by modernizing their ICBMs; we concentrated on slow-reacting forces like air-launched cruise missiles. Thus the asymmetry in the capacity of the two sides to destroy each other's military targets has grown with every passing year.

There is now general agreement that their improvements in missile accuracy and warhead technology will put the Soviets in a position to wipe out our land-based forces of Minuteman ICBMs by 1982. Whether this capability is ever exercised or not—and I consider it improbable—it reverses and hence revolutionizes the strategic equation on which our security and that of our friends have depended through most of the postwar period.

The revolution in the strategic balance is aggravated by a comparable build-up of Soviet aircraft and missiles that threatens to overturn the American advantage in theater-based nuclear forces. The Soviet Union has deployed scores of new missiles of 2,000-mile range—the SS-20—which carries a MIRVed warhead of three reentry vehicles. Several hundred supersonic Backfire bombers will threaten all peripheral areas in the Eighties (leaving aside for the moment their utility for inter-continental missions). A Soviet superiority in theater striking forces is therefore upon us. The inequality is demonstrated by the fact that we have had to assign part of our strategic forces—a number of Poseidon boats—to cover targets threatening NATO. Thus in case of war we are likely to be strained either with respect to our strategic or with respect to our theater nuclear coverage.

All this has been accomplished while the Soviet advantage in conventional forces has grown, and while the reach of Soviet power has been extended enormously by the rapid development of the Soviet Navy, an expanding long-range airlift capability, the acquisition of Soviet bases in countries like South Yemen and Vietnam, and the establishment of vast Soviet arms depots in such countries as Libya and Ethiopia, which will enable the Soviet Union to move its own or proxy troops rapidly to their prepositioned weapons. At the same time our Navy declines and our access to overseas bases shrinks.

Rarely in history has a nation so passively accepted such a radical change in the military balance. If we are to remedy it, we must first recognize the fact that we have placed ourselves at a significant disadvantage voluntarily. This is not the result of SALT: it is the consequence of unilateral decisions extending over a decade and a half: by a strategic doctrine adopted in the Sixties, by the bitter domestic divisions growing out of the war in Vietnam, and by choices of the present Administration. All these actions were unilateral, hence avoidable. They were not extracted from us by clever Soviet negotiators; we imposed them on ourselves by our choices, theories, and domestic turmoil. It is therefore in our power to alter them.

The prevailing American strategic doctrine of the Sixties went under the modest name of "assured destruction." According to it, deterrence was guaranteed so long as we possessed the ability to destroy a predetermined percentage of Soviet population and industrial capacity. Strategy thereby turned into an engineering problem, an economic analysis essentially independent of the size of the opposing forces. So long as enough of our weapons survived to wreak the theoretically calculated havoc, deterrence would be maintained; our military effectiveness was essentially independent of the threat we faced; the vulnerability of part of our forces—such as our ICBMs—was irrelevant so long as enough warheads would remain to inflict an "unacceptable" amount of damage on the Soviet Union.

This doctrine not only took for granted continued Soviet inferiority in technology; it also ignored the psychological inhibitions in the way of implementing such a strategy. The targeting scenarios developed from this doctrine left a President with no other options in a crisis but the mass extermination of civilians, or capitulation. This strategy was morally questionable even in an era when we had superiority. In an age of strategic equality it would be a formula for mutual suicide.

The emergence of a new strategic nuclear environment should have forced a reconsideration of this targeting doctrine and a renewed attention to regional nuclear and conventional balances. Unfortunately, at the precise moment that such a

reexamination became urgently necessary, all our defense programs came under systematic attack as a byproduct of the bitter domestic debate over Vietnam. On the one hand, the Vietnam war reduced funds available for modernization of our military forces; even more important, the wholesale assault on defense spending and programs jeopardized even those major projects for which funds were available and budgeted. New weapons were decried as excessive, as symptoms of a military psychosis, as wasteful and dangerous. "Reordering national priorities" was the slogan of the day; it was the euphemism for cutting the defense budget. The ABM passed by only one vote and was then emasculated in the appropriations process; the C-5A transport aircraft which later saved an ally in the 1973 Middle East war was challenged repeatedly on budgetary grounds; MIRV's, the only strategic system available to us to offset the Soviet numerical superiority in the 1970's, were under constant attack. In the realm of strategic doctrine, paradoxically it was those most alarmed at the arms race who clung to the most bloodthirsty targeting strategies, in the hope that these would obviate the need to strengthen or increase our strategic forces.

In this atmosphere, maintaining even the strategic forces inherited from the Sixties absorbed the energies of the Administrations up to the end of the Vietnam war; obtaining funds for new programs was enormously difficult. The best that could be accomplished in the early 1970's was to alter the older strategic doctrine and shift targeting from civilian to military objectives. (Paradoxically, however, the decline of our capability for a counterforce strategy turned even the more sophisticated targeting into a high-risk tit-for-tat option with no logical stopping place.)

After the end of our involvement in Vietnam, new strategic programs could at last be funded: the B-1 manned strategic bomber, to become operational in 1979; the MX ICBM, to become operational in 1983; the Trident submarine and missile, expected to become operational in 1978; various kinds of cruise missiles for the 1980's—all of which would give the United States greater options and some of which would bring about a new counterforce capability.

Every one of these programs has been cancelled, delayed, or stretched out by the current Administration, so that we are at a point where only the Trident (with only the most limited counterforce capability) can be operational during the period of the projected SALT Treaty. In addition, even the Minuteman production line was closed down, leaving us without an emergency hedge for rapid build-up in unexpected contingencies. We now face the challenge of the early Eighties with forces designed in the Sixties. We have been able to develop new programs in only four years out of the last fifteen, and most of them have been held in abeyance since 1977.

Furthermore, a remedy will be more difficult if the Administration intends to return to the pure "assured destruction" strategic doctrine. In his State of the Union address last January 23, President Carter proclaimed that "just one of our relatively invulnerable Poseidon submarines * * * carries enough warheads to destroy every large and medium-sized city in the Soviet Union."

But this truism demonstrates rather than solves our strategic dilemma. Even under SALT conditions we will have in the early Eighties at best equality in the capacity of our strategic forces to inflict civilian damage, and a clear inferiority in the ability to attack and destroy the land-based missiles of the other side. Our Minuteman missiles do not carry sufficient warheads or possess adequate throw-weight for a disarming attack against Soviet ICBMs; our present strategic forces can put at risk less than one-half of Soviet ICBMs. All of our ICBMs will in the Eighties be vulnerable to an attack by the greater numbers of missiles and warheads, and improving accuracy, of soviet land-based missiles.

Since our modern military doctrine and strategy have depended much more on strategic forces than those of the Soviets, even overall equality revolutionizes the postwar security and geopolitical structure. But in fact the situation is worse. My principal worry is not only the growing vulnerability of our land-based forces—though this must be remedied—but the growing invulnerability of Soviet land-based forces. The deterrent effect of our strategic forces in defense of allies will continually decline; our strategic forces will surely lose their ability to offset the soviet capacity for regional intervention. And this capacity will be reinforced by the growing edge in Soviet theater nuclear forces, a naval and airlift capability which immeasurably extends the reach and preponderance of Soviet conventional power.

I want to reiterate that it is not necessary for present purposes to debate whether the Soviet Union would in fact run a risk of war on the global level; it will be grave enough if the Soviet willingness to run risks in regional conflicts is magnified. And that seems to me the minimum consequence of what is ahead. The side that can defend its interests only by threatening to initiate the mutual mass extermination of civilians will gradually slide towards strategic, and therefore eventually geopolitical, paralysis. The consequence, to put it bluntly, is that in the 1980's regional

conflicts—whether deliberately promoted or not—threaten increasingly to grow out of control unless we drastically reverse the trend. We cannot possibly continue to gamble with inferior forces for regional defense, a shifting balance in theater nuclear forces, vulnerable land-based strategic forces, and invulnerable Soviet ICBMs without courting the gravest dangers. The decline in relative power must be dramatically reversed.

Even more important is a strategic doctrine which answers the following questions:

(1) How in the Eighties will we safeguard our national security when we face adverse trends in every significant military category?

(2) How will we fulfill our commitments to our allies in the absence of a significant counterforce capability, when strategic parity is at best tenuous and the theater nuclear balance is turning against us?

(3) How will we protect our vital interests in areas such as the Middle East with our present conventional forces, airlift, and declining naval capability?

(4) How will we prevent global blackmail?

Our safety and that of all of those who depend on us depends on the response. Every day we delay in dealing with the issue magnifies our peril.

The Senate therefore cannot deal with the SALT Treaty in a vacuum; it must simultaneously seek to restore the military and geopolitical balance. No responsible leader can want to face the 1980's with the present military prospects. This, and not SALT in isolation, is the principal problem facing us.

SALT IN THE CONTEXT OF AMERICAN STRATEGY

The idea of arms control developed in the late Fifties and early Sixties. The underlying rationale derive from the indisputable fact that thermonuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles have added a new dimension of peril to the historical problem of military rivalry. In the past it could be argued that weapons were a symptom rather than a cause of tension. Indeed it is difficult to find an historical example for the cliché that arms races cause wars. (What caused World War I was mobilization schedules, not the rate of increase of armaments.) But today, indeed, the nuclear age combines weapons of unprecedented destructive power, extremely rapid modes of delivery of intercontinental range, and high vulnerability to a surprise attack.

In these new and unprecedented circumstances, the conclusion seemed inescapable that the side whose capacity for retaliation was vulnerable must react in crises in ways which would heighten the likelihood of cataclysm; a country whose strategic forces were not secure could be driven, even against its will, to strike first rather than await the opponent's attack which it would know it could not survive. In the late Fifties, one of the most brilliant students of deterrence, Albert Wohlstetter, correctly perceived that what Churchill called the "balance of terror" was perilously delicate. Arms control sought to circumscribe and if possible eliminate this danger by measures that would enhance each side's "second-strike capability," that is, its secure capacity to retaliate, thereby reducing the incentive and capacity for surprise attack.

This analysis was essentially correct. At the same time this novel military doctrine—according to which an adversary's invulnerability was thought to add to stability—was combined with "assured destruction" reasoning to produce a kind of "minimum deterrence" theory by which we allegedly had no need to consider the threat posed by the level of Soviet forces. Even theorists of arms control who valued maintaining the strategic balance only dimly perceived that the strategic stability they sought implied a strategic revolution. For if attained, it would greatly magnify the danger at levels of violence below that of general nuclear exchange. If crises no longer produced fear of escalation to all-out war, they would also grow more likely. Thus even strategic stability (not to speak of a Soviet edge) would require new major military efforts by us on the regional level or else major political weakness would result. Above all it was erroneously assumed the Soviets held a similar view. In fact, there was no evidence that Soviet strategic planners—almost all military men—subscribed to the academic subtleties of American strategic theory. As Secretary Harold Brown has said, our unilateral restraint does not seem to be reciprocated by the Soviets: "We have found that when we build weapons, they build; when we stop, they nevertheless continue to build * * *."²

As one of the architects of SALT, I am conscience-bound to point out that—against all previous hopes—the SALT process does not seem to have slowed down Soviet strategic competition, and in some sense may have accelerated it. The Soviets

² Statement of Secretary Brown before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 9, 1979.

worked hard and successfully to enhance the first-strike capabilities of their land-based ICBMs despite our restraint and within the framework of SALT. The Administrations of the early 1970's of which I was a member sought to use SALT to demonstrate their commitment to easing tensions and thereby restore a public consensus behind a strong national defense; to some extent we succeeded. But we will not draw the appropriate conclusion if we do not also admit that SALT may have had a perverse effect on the willingness of some in the Congress, key opinion makers, and even Administration officials to face fully the relentless Soviet military build-up.

New weapons systems have long had to overcome the traditional objection of advocates of "minimum deterrence" that they were unnecessary (because we already possessed an "overkill" capability); they were now also attacked by arms control experts as endangering the prospects of SALT. Indeed, many new programs could be put through the Congress less on their merits than as a "bargaining chip"; they were needed, various Administrations argued, so that they could be traded in a negotiation. Whatever the tactical utility of this argument, it tended to reduce the energy with which such programs were pursued. The Pentagon found it difficult to muster enthusiasm—or scarce resources—for programs which were ephemeral by definition. After a while the Soviet Union began to play the game deliberately: from ABM to cruise missiles it systematically sought to use SALT to inhibit our military and technological development; it tried to fuel our domestic debate, adding its own propaganda pressures to domestic pressures against new weapons systems.

The theory that new American weapons weakened the prospects of arms control thrived despite all evidence to the contrary. In 1967, before we had an ABM program, when President Johnson suggested to Soviet Premier Kosygin at Glassboro that both sides renounce ABMs, Kosygin contemptuously dismissed the idea as one of the most ridiculous he had ever heard. By 1970, after the Nixon Administration had narrowly won its Congressional battle for funding of an ABM, Soviet SALT negotiators refused to discuss any subject except ABM, and it required the most strenuous negotiating efforts to maintain the crucial linkage between offensive and defensive limitations. Conversely, neither the abandonment of the B-1 by the current Administration, nor its stretch-out of the MX missile, nor the slowdown in the Trident program, speeded up SALT negotiations or improved the terms.

The SALT negotiations have always proceeded against the background of the strategic balance as it existed, and must be considered in this context.

The negotiations for SALT I grew out of the ABM debate of the 1960s: whether the U.S. should follow the Soviet lead and build a defense against ballistic missiles, or try to head off such a new competition by negotiating some limits with the U.S.S.R. After considerable Soviet stalling, to see whether Congress might kill the ABM without any need for Soviet reciprocity, the SALT negotiations began in November 1969. Almost from the outset it was apparent that the only system the Soviets were eager to limit by negotiation was the sole system we were building—the ABM. In the 1972 ABM treaty both sides agreed in effect to leave themselves indefinitely vulnerable to missile attacks; ABMs were restricted to a token deployment at one site (which we then unilaterally abandoned for budgetary reasons). In effect we traded our superior ABM technology for a halt to the numerical build-up of Soviet offensive forces.

To restore equality in this critical area—strategic offensive forces—proved to be enormously difficult, largely due to the unilateral decisions of the Sixties that stopped both our ICBM and SLBM programs by 1967. As I have said, in pure numbers of offensive missiles the Soviets passed the United States in 1970; in this category we had no bargaining chips. Our only active program was adding multiple warheads (MIRVs) to our land- and sea-based missiles. The Soviet numerical building program was so considerable, and Congressional opposition to comparable American programs was so unrelenting, that it was the Defense Department which in July 1970 and then again in January 1972 urged a five-year mutual freeze on offensive weapons, primarily to arrest the momentum of the Soviet build-up and to give us an opportunity to catch up.

The first SALT agreement on offensive weapons was thus a photograph of the existing balance, not an alteration of it: it froze the numbers of American and Soviet land- and sea-based missiles for five years. The numerical balance was favorable to the U.S.S.R. in the same proportion that the previous decade of unrestricted arms competition had produced. Because of our MIRV program, the United States retained a substantial advantage in numbers of warheads for the lifetime of the Interim Agreement and beyond. The criticism later heard, that SALT I "gave" the Soviets unequal numbers, missed the central point: what had produced the Soviet numerical edge was not SALT I but the unilateral American decisions of the Sixties to stop our strategic building programs, and then the Congressional and

public attacks on the defense budget growing out of the Vietnam war. The 1972 SALT agreement curtailed no American offensive program; it did halt the numerical growth of the Soviet strategic forces. It gave us an opportunity to catch up—which we sought to do by pushing the development of the B-1 slated to be operational in 1978, the Trident submarine and missile planned for 1979, the MX missile for 1983, and a variety of cruise missiles for the early Eighties.

But the simple Interim Agreement of SALT I could not deal with—nor did it pretend to address—the rapid evolution of technology. Modernization of existing weapons was allowed, and both sides proceeded apace with new programs. The U.S. funded its MIRV program, and the Soviets developed a new generation of ICBMs; in doing so they pushed to its outer limit the SALT I provision restricting conversion of "light" to "heavy" missiles. It was these larger missiles (the SS-17, 18 and 19), soon equipped with MIRVs, and with the potential of greatly improved accuracy, that were bound to give the Soviets for the first time in history a capacity to launch a first strike against our land-based missiles.

These trends, which would eventually put our force of ICBMs into jeopardy, led us first to undertake a complex but eventually fruitless negotiation to set a low, long-term ceiling on Soviet missile capabilities both in numbers and in quality. For a time these negotiations seemed promising; but they fell victim to the collapse of executive authority resulting from Watergate. In the wake of President Nixon's resignation, it seemed prudent to pick up the thread of a simpler agreement that at least consolidated numerical equality, and then to move as quickly as possible in SALT III into the more intricate discussion of the qualitative factors (missile accuracy, throw-weight, number of warheads, testing limits and so forth). Thus, in November 1974 in Vladivostok, President Ford pressed for an agreement based on equal aggregate ceilings, and the Soviet Union accepted our proposal. A framework accord was reached specifying strict equality of 2,400 missiles and strategic bombers for each side, and an equal limit of 1,320 missiles with MIRVs, in an agreement to run through 1985.

The Ford Administration had first hoped that a treaty implementing the Vladivostok accord could be completed in 1975. But two new issues intervened to slow down the talks: first was the Soviet insistence that cruise missiles be entirely banned if they had a range of more than 600 kilometers (350 miles); second was the U.S. counterdemand that the Soviet aircraft called the "Backfire" be counted as a "heavy" bomber and thus be included in the SALT totals. Inevitably the two systems became linked in the talks. Throughout 1975 and into early 1976, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. made proposals to resolve the dispute. Basically, the Ford Administration was prepared to limit the range and number of some cruise missiles provided the Soviets would reciprocate by limiting the Backfire bomber in some comparable manner. In January 1976, we were close to a compromise along these lines which also would have lowered the Vladivostok ceilings of 2,400 to "below 2,300."

Two events prevented the completion of the negotiations. First, the introduction of 25,000 Cuban proxy troops in Angola raised serious doubts about Soviet motives and fueled a whole new debate in this country about United States-Soviet relations. And the imminent American Presidential election convinced President Ford that it would be best to keep SALT from turning into a partisan issue and so to wait to conclude an agreement after the election.

The advent of a new Administration brought with it the obligatory new approach. The first proposal to Moscow in March 1977 abandoned the negotiations as they then stood. An entirely new proposal was submitted, immediately rejected, and quickly withdrawn. The parties returned to earlier proposals, and over two more years were spent refining the agreement. Meanwhile the presuppositions of that agreement were daily challenged by technological change, the pace of the Soviet build-up, and the unilateral abandonment or stretching out of major American weapons systems, all of which further tilted the strategic balance dangerously against us.

Three conclusions emerge: The imbalances we now face, and which concern so many, stem in essence from unilateral American decisions rather than from the SALT negotiating process. This is important when we consider the provisions of the SALT Treaty. No negotiation can achieve through diplomacy that for which we have been unwilling to make unilateral efforts.

Second, SALT by itself cannot bring about parity; it can only ratify trends which exist. SALT cannot be a substitute for defense programs. If we fall behind by our own actions, SALT runs the risk of perpetuating an inequality. But whether that comes about is up to us; and to avoid it must be a principal concern of the Senate.

Third, SALT III cannot simply be an extension of the previous process. It must be explicitly related to our long-term strategic program. Its principles must be clearly

worked out between the Administration and the Congress and settled with our allies before we launch ourselves into it.

THE VIENNA TREATY: HOW DOES IT AFFECT THE STRATEGIC BALANCE

We must now ask, how does the SALT II agreement affect the strategic balance? The agreement is composed of three documents:

The Treaty itself, running until the end of 1985, would limit the total numbers of ICBM and SLBM launchers (though the term is not defined); heavy bombers; MIRVed missiles; and land-based MIRVed missiles. It also defines counting rules for MIRVed missiles and for heavy bombers equipped with air-launched cruise missiles.

Second is a Protocol that restricts cruise missile other than on heavy bombers to a range of 600 kilometers (or 350 miles) and bans the testing and deployment of mobile ICBMs. The Protocol is supposed to expire on December 31, 1981.

Third is a set of principles to guide the negotiations for SALT III.

Any fair-minded analysis must recognize the beneficial aspects of the SALT II agreements. The overall ceiling of 2,250 will force the Soviets to get rid of 250 strategic systems, including some modern ones, while giving us the right to equalize the numbers. The permitted number of land-based Soviet MIRVs (820) is some 100 below the maximum number that they probably intended to build in the absence of SALT. There are some restrictions on missile testing procedures. There are limits on numbers of missile warheads on ICBMs and a prohibition on more than one "new" ICBM. There is for the first time an agreed baseline of information on the Soviet forces. The counting rules are a useful way of dealing with the MIRV problem.

Regrettably none of these very real achievements affects the grave strategic situation which I have described and which must urgently be reversed. The Treaty does not reduce the Soviet first-strike capability against our land-based forces, or improve our ability to survive a first strike. It does not diminish the Soviet residual capability to destroy civilian targets in the United States. And it does not enhance—indeed it may slightly inhibit—the possibility for the United States to catch up in the capacity of our strategic forces to attack military targets.

To be sure, the Soviets will be obligated after 1981 to reduce the total number of their launchers by about 250. But the new ceiling of 2,250 will not limit the Soviets' ability to destroy our ICBM force or to inflict devastating damage upon the United States. The reduction in Soviet numbers is irrelevant to our strategic problem. For the danger to our security derives from warheads, not from launchers, and the Soviet total of ICBM warheads will increase from 3,200 at the time of the signing of SALT II to over 6,000 even after the reduction in Soviet launchers is supposed to take place; the total number of Soviet warheads (including SLBMs) will approach 12,000 in 1985 as compared to 8,000 at the time of the SALT signing. (In fact, if the Soviets went all out they could get 8,000 MIRVed warheads in the permitted new land-based missiles.) Moreover, the total Soviet missile throw-weight will increase from about 6 million pounds at the time of the signing of SALT I, to 7 million pounds at the signing of SALT II, to 9 million pounds (compared to our 2.5 million) in 1985. And improvements in Soviet accuracy will approach ours by 1982; the practical effect of this will be to reduce the number of warheads that need to be aimed at our ICBM silos, freeing a larger number of the ever-increasing Soviet warheads for other targets.

The agreed ceiling, of course, is some 200 above the 2,060 operational systems we now possess. We thus have some considerable room for expansion of single-warhead systems. But given the cancellation of the B-1 bomber, the delay in the operational date for MX, and the slow pace of Trident production, there is almost no chance that the United States can reach the permitted total of 2,250 except perhaps by keeping in service ten older Polaris submarines (with 160 missiles); this the Navy is likely to oppose because of the heavy cost of operation and relatively short range of its missiles. The result, therefore, is that in practice the overall aggregate numbers will continue to be unequal.

The limitation of land-based MIRVed launchers to 820, which may be some 100 below the probable Soviet program, is equally welcome and similarly without significance to our fundamental problem. The Soviet Union can destroy our land-based ICBMs with about half of the land-based MIRVs permitted by the Treaty; this would leave over 300 Soviet land-based MIRVed launchers, 380 sea-based MIRVed systems, and some 500 single-warhead systems—or well over 5,000 warheads—aimed at our

civilian population and industrial potential. (By contrast, if we expended our entire land-based force against the Soviet ICBM silos we could destroy less than half.)³

Nor is the threat to our forces and to the overall strategic balance reduced by the provision limiting new missiles during the time of the Treaty. The provision is drafted so as to permit the deployment of the MX for the United States, a comparable new missile for the Soviet Union, and the modernization of existing missiles allowing an increase in their volume of up to five percent in each direction. Except for setting a precedent for qualitative restraints, these limitations have little operational effect on the Soviet program—all the less so as there seems to be no definition of baselines. The testimony of Administration witnesses seems to confirm that no known Soviet program is affected.

In short, the Vienna Treaty will not diminish the threat to the strategic balance. During the life of the Treaty the Soviets will complete their counterforce capability against our ICBMs. This will coincide exactly with our period of maximum danger. To be sure, a good case can be made for the proposition that in the absence of the Treaty the relative numbers will be even worse. But the analysis here suggests that what is allowed to the Soviets will meet all their foreseeable counterforce and residual needs.

But I must repeat: any SALT treaty is likely to ratify existing strategic trends. SALT negotiators cannot produce what our military programs—for whatever reason—have neglected. The Soviets will never agree to unilateral reductions. If we want equality, we must build to equality. We must reverse the strategic trends if we are serious about an equitable SALT treaty. Nothing in the Vienna Treaty diminishes the need for a substantial military build-up by the United States. In fact, the situation which SALT reflects makes such a build-up imperative.

In fairness, it must be pointed out that the same was true of the SALT II aggregates worked out in the previous Administration. There are nevertheless three essential differences: first, the rate of advance of Soviet technology which has been unexpectedly rapid (the estimate at Vladivostok was that Minuteman would not become vulnerable to a Soviet counterforce strike until after 1985); second, the unilateral abandonment or stretch-out of almost every American strategic program inherited by the Carter Administration, which makes the Soviet threat even more ominous; and third, the Soviet geopolitical offensive in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia which has gained momentum since. But to help a bipartisan solution I am willing to concede that the problem we face has origins going back at least 15 years.⁴

The novel—and to me the most disturbing—feature of the current Treaty is its negative impact on the theater nuclear balance. The Soviet Backfire bomber is limited to production of no more than 30 per year, through an oral agreement outside the Treaty or Protocol. There has been dispute about the utility of the Backfire in carrying out unrefueled attacks against the United States. There is no doubt of its ability to threaten all our allies as well as China and the sea approaches to Eurasia. In addition, the Soviet Union is developing a large number of SS-20 missiles each with a range of 2,000 miles and three MIRV warheads. Like the Backfire, the SS-20 is convertible to intercontinental range—in the case of the Backfire by adding fuel tanks, or an aerial refueling capability; in the case of the SS-20 by adding another stage, thereby converting it into the already tested mobile SS-16. These actions are prohibited by SALT II but they are not easily verifiable, and in any event they represent a rapid break-out potential should the Treaty be broken or lapse.

The most immediately available American counter to these weapons has been cruise missiles. In the negotiations conducted by the Ford Administration, proposed restrictions on cruise missiles were made conditional on comparable restrictions on

³ Though the permitted total of land-based MIRV's is some 300 above what we possess, we cannot expand our land-based MIRV's significantly since the Treaty also contains a subceiling of 1200 permitted MIRVed vehicles. We could thus increase the number of our land-based missiles only by reducing the number of submarine-based missiles. That sublimit will also force us to dismantle either one Poseidon boat (or 14 Minuteman III) when the seventh Trident submarine goes on sea trials, probably by 1983. If the eighth and ninth Trident were to become operational before December 1985, three more Poseidon boats or 48 Minuteman II or some combination of the two would have to be dismantled.

⁴ On at least one occasion I contributed to the existing ambivalence. After an exhausting negotiation in July 1974 I gave an answer to a question at a press conference which I have come to regret: "What in the name of God is strategic superiority?" I asked. "What is the significance of it . . . at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?" My statement reflected fatigue and exasperation, not analysis. If both sides maintain the balance, then indeed the race becomes futile and SALT has its place in strengthening stability. But if we opt out of the race unilaterally, we will probably be faced eventually with a younger group of Soviet leaders who will figure out what can be done with strategic superiority.

the Backfire. The concept was to limit the number of cruise missiles of more than 600-kilometer range in some relationship to limits on the Backfire. The Protocol, on the other hand, prohibits the deployment of land- and sea-based cruise missiles and of air-launched cruise missiles of more than 600-kilometer range on other than heavy bombers altogether—even when they carry conventional warheads. The same Protocol prohibits the testing and deployment of mobile ICBM launchers, even though the Soviets have already tested a mobile system (the SS-16) and we have neither tested nor developed a comparable weapon.

The provisions of the Protocol with respect to cruise missiles, especially, restrict exclusively American programs; they affect not a single Soviet program. They amount to a unilateral renunciation of an American capability. The Protocol also for the first time limits American weapons relevant primarily to the theater nuclear balance—thus affecting important interests of our allies—in return at best for restrictions relevant primarily to the United States. This is something we have heretofore consistently refused to do as a matter of principle in the decade that SALT negotiations have been taking place. It is a dangerous precedent.

Two arguments are advanced on behalf of the Protocol: First, that it was necessary to induce the Soviet Union to go along with limits in the overall Treaty; second, that since the Protocol will lapse at the end of 1981 and since we will have no cruise missiles of more than 600-kilometer range before then, no real concession is involved. These propositions are mutually inconsistent; if the Protocol restrains nothing we can do before the end of 1981 and will lapse, then why are the Soviets so insistent on it?

The answer is that the Soviets know the history of moratoria and protocols very well; they are aware that such "provisional" agreements almost never end on their expiration date, especially if a negotiation is then taking place. At a minimum the Protocol's terms will be the point of departure for the next round of negotiations. The Soviets will have the option of offering a seeming concession—for example, reducing the SALT totals to 2,150 (which we know they can accept since at one stage in the current negotiations they suggested it), or even lower. They can conversely threaten to abandon whatever negotiation is then taking place. Will we then insist on pursuing the development of cruise missiles, without which we have done for nearly three years? And if we do extend the moratorium, we will then have explicitly traded theater capabilities important to our allies in return for marginally reducing the threat against ourselves.

This deficiency of the Protocol would not be cured by a proposed Senate amendment or reservation stating that it may not be extended except with the Senate's approval. Such an amendment, to begin with, implies that the Protocol with its existing one-sided terms might well be extended, albeit with the Senate's consent. This will make it more difficult to appropriate significant sums for cruise missile programs which may at any moment be ended by an extension of the Protocol.⁵ Moreover, if the Protocol comes up for extension independently of a broader consideration of the strategic balance, the temptation to extend it could easily be overwhelming.

To sum up: I have serious reservations about the Protocol. As for the Treaty, I conclude that its terms do not improve our strategic situation but neither do they prevent our remedying it during the remaining six years of its life. Undoubtedly it imposes some inhibitions on us—the prohibition against "heavy" missiles for the United States, for example, as well as the Protocol's ban on mobile missiles through 1981. But I believe that the Senate can deal with these during the ratification process. (The issue of heavy missiles seems to me most relevant to the period after the expiration of the Treaty since we could not build any before 1985 and since MX should take care of immediate needs.)

The crucial question is whether we can unite behind what is clearly necessary. Ratifying SALT—or rejecting SALT—makes sense only if it prompts a renewed dedication to our national defense and security. The Senate's judgment of the Vienna Treaty should hinge, in my view, on what will be done to remedy existing trends and on the international impact of ratification or rejection.

Let me turn, therefore, to the broader political context of this SALT II agreement.

⁵ Apparently the Navy has virtually abandoned the development of cruise missiles aimed at land targets—a role still considered important enough in the Ford Administration to cause the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1976 to withhold their consent to an agreement which did not protect that capability.

A. *The Soviet Union*

The awesomeness of modern weapons, and the aspirations of all peoples for peace, impose the imperative of peaceful coexistence. No democratic leader deserves the public trust if he fails to make a genuine effort to reduce the dangers of nuclear holocaust, and to free national energies for dealing with the many urgent problems of mankind. The temptation is overwhelming to view this common stake in peace as a common bond between us and the Soviet union. It should be and someday it must be if a cataclysm is to be avoided. But we cannot in good conscience say that current evidence supports the proposition that the time has yet arrived.

For a too brief period in 1972 and 1973, our insistence on restraint in the conduct of international relations seemed to bear fruit. SALT I was accompanied by a declaration of principles signed by the United States and the Soviet Union. It affirmed the necessity of avoiding confrontation, the imperative of mutual restraint, the rejection of attempts to exploit tensions to gain unilateral advantage, the renunciation of claims to special influence in any region of the world. These principles, of course, reflected an aspiration, not a contract; they defined a yardstick by which to assess Soviet behavior. The strategy of detente was to encourage observance of these standards by a combination of positive incentives for constructive behavior and firm responses to block adventurism. The principles agreed to in Moscow were a paradigm of conduct which the Soviet Union could violate only to its political cost.

Whether the Soviet Union ever intended to comply with them, or whether it was tempted into an adventurous course by the collapse of our executive authority as a result of Watergate (which deprived us of both incentives and penalties), or whether a combination of all these factors was responsible, will never be known.

Whatever the cause, the fact is that since 1975 there has been an unprecedented Soviet assault on the international equilibrium. 1975 saw the introduction of Cuban combat forces into Angola, eventually reaching 40,000, backed by Soviet financing, airlift, and policy support. By 1977 Soviet planes and pilots were flying air defense missions out of Cuba so that the Cuban airforce could operate in Africa. 1977 witnessed the spread of Cuban forces to Ethiopia. East German military and intelligence advisers have now joined the Cubans all over Africa and the Middle East. There have been two invasions of Zaire—and there may yet be a third; there have been Communist coups in Afghanistan and South Yemen; and the occupation of Cambodia by Vietnam, preceded by a Soviet Friendship Treaty designed to secure Hanoi's rear during its aggression. Soviet arms depots in Libya and Ethiopia fuel insurgencies all over Africa. While the collapse of the Shah of Iran had many causes, one contributing factor surely was the demoralization of a pro-Western leadership group by the gradual and unopposed growth of Soviet power in nearby areas.

Nor is this all. Terrorist organizations support by Communist funds, armed by Communist weapons, and trained by Communist instructors are becoming a systematic instrument of anti-Western policy threatening countries friendly to us on several continents. They are not, to be sure, all controlled by Moscow; but someone who has started a rockslide cannot avoid responsibility by claiming that the rock he threw was not the one that ultimately killed bystanders. These tactics, reinforced by a Soviet military build-up clearly threatening the strategic, theater, and conventional balances, are incompatible with any notion of detente or coexistence.

Some argue that SALT is necessary lest we risk a return to the Cold War. This is a curious argument. Whatever label we give to recent Soviet conduct—whether "Cold War" or opportunism—it must be ended if there are to be any prospects for East-West coexistence or cooperation. No leader serves his people by pretending that SALT is needed to perpetuate an acceptable state of affairs. It is not an acceptable state of affairs, and it cannot be continued.

The Vienna summit recorded no progress toward a clear understanding with the Soviet Union on the key issue of political restraint. It was not possible, of course, to settle in the space of three days all the outstanding issues of Africa, the Middle East, or Southeast Asia. Nor can the Senate responsibly delay SALT until these vexing matters are settled; they must be dealt with by intelligent and patient diplomacy and firm resistance to pressure. But it would have been important to give at least symbolic expression to what is the overwhelming political challenge of our period: the ultimate test of an improved relationship—the real turning away from the Cold War—must be restrained Soviet international conduct. The refusal of the Soviets even to discuss the subject at Vienna, the reiteration by Brezhnev of the commitment to so-called struggles of liberation, is worrisome indeed.

What is involved here is a profound issue in United States-Soviet relations which is both philosophical and practical. Can peace be realized exclusively by restraint in

the field of arms? Or does the structure of peace require a geopolitical dimension as well? Is it possible to proceed in separate negotiations on their merits, or must there be some relationship between all the various interactions of two superpowers in the field of foreign policy? In the language of recent controversies, should there be "linkage" or not?

In my view, to seek to separate United States-Soviet relations into discrete compartments runs the risk of encouraging Soviet leaders to believe that they can use East-West cooperation in one area as a safety valve while striving for unilateral advantage elsewhere. The Administration, imagining that linkage was a personal idiosyncrasy of previous administrations, decided to "abolish" it. SALT was pursued for its own sake, unaffected by Cuban troops in Ethiopia and East German auxiliaries in Mozambique; by Communist coups in Afghanistan and South Yemen; or by Soviet Friendship Treaties such as the one with Vietnam that was a prelude to the occupation of Cambodia.

This raises several problems. First of all, it is not possible to "abolish" the simple reality that the two superpowers impinge on each other on a broad range of issues and areas. Moreover, the attempt to do so produces an almost compulsive commitment to whatever particular subject seems susceptible to solution, such as SALT, thus permitting the Soviets to dictate the pace of negotiations and to use it to reduce the risks of aggressiveness. And it simultaneously overloads the issue under negotiation. If SALT must bear the whole weight of East-West relations, it runs the risk of turning into escapism; it will eventually crumble under the strain.

No serious person would maintain that nothing should be settled until all issues are settled; nor should SALT become the hostage of every passing political tension of a world in flux. What is needed, however, is a broad recognition that in an interdependent world the actions of the major nuclear powers are inevitably related and have consequences beyond the issue or region immediately concerned. A demonstration of American impotence in one part of the world erodes our credibility and hence the stability of other regions; pressures against our friends, encouraged by the Soviet Union or its proxies, cannot be compensated for by other negotiations such as SALT. If we ignore these facts we paradoxically enhance the attractiveness of such adventures. It surely is not provocative to ask the Soviet Union to accompany restraint in arms with restraint in political conduct. Attention to this kind of linkage ensures that no agreement stands alone vulnerable to the next crisis, or turns into a soporific to lull the West while adventurism runs free.

I am inclined to agree that the failure to ratify an agreement negotiated over seven years by three Administrations would have a disruptive impact on East-West relationships, creating a crisis atmosphere for which we may have little public or allied support. This is undoubtedly one of the telling arguments in favor of ratification. But the Senate will also wish to consider that to deal with SALT in isolation runs the risk of seriously misleading the Soviet Union. Moscow cannot have it both ways: the slogan of detente and the reality of the systematic undermining of the geopolitical equilibrium. We should use the SALT debate to force a decision. The Senate will want to make clear that Soviet expansionism threatens the peace and that coexistence depends above all on restrained international conduct, for which the Senate should define some criteria.

In the long run this is also in the Soviet interest, for current trends will make a confrontation inevitable sooner or later. Our country will not be defeated without noticing it and when it does take notice, it will resist. The course of inadequate defense preparation, gradual reduction of military capacity, and partial accommodation to Soviet expansionism must be reversed—on a bipartisan basis and by cooperation between the Administration and the Congress.

B. The concern of allies

All our allies have expressed support for ratification of the Vienna Treaty. But their endorsement results from a complex of factors of which approval of the provisions of the Treaty is by far the least significant. Each has been urged, if not pressed, by the Administration to express support. In some cases the Soviets have added their entreaties. Refusal to comply would thus risk relations with both superpowers over an issue that is of high technical complexity and has been under negotiation for seven years. If the Treaty failed as a result of their opposition, our allies might find themselves in the uncomfortable position of taking on both superpowers. Some governments are loath to expose themselves to domestic criticism as an "obstacle to detente"—especially over a Treaty which the United States has already declared compatible with Western security. Some allies want to keep open their own individual options for detente and increased East-West trade. Some are afraid lest their objection endanger their essential defense cooperation with the United States (even while worried about the non-circumvention clauses of the Treaty). Some sense the changing military balance but, unsure of our direction and

unwilling to demand domestic sacrifice, seek to mitigate their perils by accommodation with the Soviet Union, staying one step ahead of us on the road to Moscow. All are reluctant to contribute to a further weakening of American executive authority, reasoning correctly that whatever their views on particulars their ultimate security depends on the self-assurance and credibility of the American President. There is no doubt that failure to ratify the Treaty will shake European confidence in an American government that for seven years assured them that it knew what it was doing.

At the same time, allied endorsement should be seen in the context of a pervasive ambivalence. Our allies, especially in NATO, fear an exacerbation of tensions—but they are also deeply worried about the military imbalance on the European continent which the ratification of the present strategic relationship brings to the forefront of concern. The thoughtful leaders among them know that the basis of their security is eroding as our strategic superiority ebbs—but they fear there is not enough domestic support for a really significant defense effort, especially when American attitudes on that score are so ambiguous. They do not want to be perceived as an obstacle to SALT II, but they are highly uneasy about the inevitable SALT III, in which some limitation of theater-based nuclear weapons has already been placed on the agenda.

The United States thus stands in danger of being blamed by our allies at one and the same time for risking detente and for paying inadequate attention to security, for provoking the Soviet colossus and for jeopardizing the defense of the free world. It has ever been thus in the postwar period. The ultimate test of our leadership cannot be a poll of our allies, which will always reflect a mixture of incommensurable motives. The test of our leadership is American willingness to give a clearcut signal of what we understand by Western security and how we intend to maintain it. No other country or group of countries, however closely associated, can take this burden from our shoulders. None of our allies will forgive us if we fail.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We thus return to our original problem. The Senate is in the anomalous position of being asked to ratify a treaty which is essentially peripheral to our basic security and geopolitical concerns but whose either simple ratification or simple rejection would have a profound and dangerous symbolic impact. Failure to ratify an agreement negotiated over seven years would compromise international confidence in our ability to perceive our own interests or to harmonize the various branches of our government. But it is equally true that if the custodian of free world security neglects its task, sooner or later panic will become inevitable. The Senate in considering ratification needs urgently to address our dangers in a comprehensive way:

First, how the Senate can take concrete steps to begin redressing the military balance;

Second, how to deal with the specific problems in the Treaty and Protocol; and

Third, how the Senate can put the Soviet Union on notice that continued attempts to upset the global equilibrium will not be tolerated.

Some, whose analysis I respect, have urged amendments to the Treaty to accomplish these goals. These amendments are of two kinds. The first category would not require any renegotiation with the Soviet Union. They would either express the Senate's interpretation of the meaning of ambiguous clauses of the Treaty, or instruct our negotiator on criteria to be applied in any follow-on negotiations, or reassure uneasy allies about our intentions in applying SALT provisions, for example, on non-circumvention. The second category of amendments would seek changes in the text. These amendments would require renegotiation of the Vienna agreement and they again fall into two categories: One type would alter the strategic balance during the term of the Treaty, for example, by forcing a reduction of Soviet throw-weight or heavy missiles. The second type would represent a claim of equal "entitlement"—such as an American right to possess 308 heavy missiles—which cannot be exercised during the life of the Treaty and would therefore represent an assertion of principle rather than a contribution to the strategic balance.

The only amendments that would make any immediate difference are the kind which go to the heart of the problem: they would remove the Soviet counterforce capability against our ICBMs (by mandating a drastic reduction of throw-weight, for example). Such amendments are almost certain to be rejected by the Soviets; they would be accepted, if at all, only after an actual build-up of our forces, which in turn might well be delayed by the very fact that renegotiations were underway. If we maintained current limits while negotiating, the result would be a continuation of the existing deterioration of the strategic balance. We might thus wind up without either SALT or a strengthened defense.

After much reflection I have concluded that I can support ratification only with the following conditions:

First, if it is coupled with a defense program representing an obligatory understanding between the Congress and the President which overcomes on an urgent basis the grave peril posed by the current military balance.

Second, if it is accompanied by amendments—not requiring renegotiation—clearing up ambiguities in the Treaty, defining the status of the Protocol, the meaning of non-circumvention, and setting guidelines for follow-on negotiations.

And third, if it is accompanied by a vigorous expression of the Senate's view of the linkage between SALT and Soviet geopolitical conduct.

This approach would avoid the negative consequences of a collapse of SALT. But ratification must not become an end in itself. In my view it can only be justified if the Administration is prepared to unite our country by demonstrating its determination to restore our military strength and the geopolitical equilibrium. This seems to me the sense of what Senator Nunn among others has proposed, and it points the way to a bipartisan resolution of the issue.

A. To redress the military balance

With respect to the military programs, I respectfully recommend that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification of the Vienna Treaty only after the Administration has submitted, and the Congress has authorized and begun appropriating, a supplemental defense budget and a revised five-year defense program that will begin rectifying some of the shortcomings I have identified. The Congressional recess provides an opportunity to prepare such a program, on which work should already be far advanced as part of the normal budgetary process. If the Administration is unable to put forward such a program to this session of Congress, I recommend that the Senate delay its advice and consent until a new military program has been submitted to and authorized by the next session of Congress. I would be open-minded about other methods to achieve this end, provided they are unambiguous, and represent an obligatory commitment by both branches of our government.

Assurances that the Executive Branch intends to proceed with individual weapons systems like the MX are not enough, either for the reality of our danger or to reverse the political and psychological trends which will make the immediate future a period of great peril. Nor have the percentage figures of projected increases—such as the three-percent increase agreed with NATO—proved effective, because of ambiguities about the baseline and how to compute rates of inflation. I am worried that if the consideration of defense programs takes place after SALT is ratified, the debate over the proposed defense programs may stifle remedial actions or delay them beyond all relevance—all the more so as the Administration seems to have a far from settled view about the need for a strengthened defense. Witness the cancellation of the B-1, the nuclear carrier, and the neutron bomb; the closing down of the Minuteman III production line; and the stretch-out of the MX, Trident, and cruise missile programs. After ratification, Soviet propaganda pressures can be expected to multiply, particularly against an MX basing system that ensures survivability. Allied doubts about the security situation—especially with respect to theater forces—will grow.

It is not a question of balancing the insistence of conservatives for higher defense with the considerations of liberals for a reduction in our military spending. The issue is what our country needs for its long-term security. The President and the Congress must choose. After fifteen years of giving inadequate priority to defense, it is time for a serious long-term effort to prevent a menacing imbalance against us. The program must include accelerated development of a counterforce capability through the MX and Trident II, air defense against Backfire, immediate steps to restore the theater nuclear balance, and urgent measures to beef up our capacity for regional defense including accelerated modernization and expansion of our Navy. Our current five-year program is deficient in all these categories. My support for ratification is entirely conditional on the development of a new program and doctrine given some binding form by the Congress.

The Joint Chiefs have testified that the rapid improvements required cannot be achieved at expenditures representing less than a five percent real increase over current programs, for at least the next five years. The burden of proof to the contrary should rest with the Administration.

B. Clarifying the treaty and protocol

In addition to these military programs, I recommend that the Senate add the following amendments to its advice-and-consent resolution. None of them requires renegotiation with the Soviet Union:

First, as far as cruise missiles are concerned, that the Protocol may not be extended after 1981. The Senate should stipulate that its particular limitations can be submitted to the Congress again only as part of an equitable arrangement for

theater nuclear forces. Specifically, no limitations may be negotiated for American theater weapons—such as cruise missiles—which are not matched by similar limitations on Soviet weapons performing comparable missions. This will bring cruise missiles into some equilibrium with the Backfire and the SS-20.

Second, the Senate should specify that as part of SALT III, the United States be entitled to any weapons system permitted to the Soviets in the new agreement unless the Soviets agree to some compensation by giving up a weapons system of equivalent characteristics allowed to us. This should take care of the heavy missile inequity within the only framework—that of SALT III—which will give us a real option to produce it.

Third, that the non-circumvention clause be interpreted by the Senate as not interrupting cooperative relationships with allies with respect to technology needed to modernize their forces. No technology available to us should be barred for transfer.

I also suggest that the Senate reexamine the SALT Agreement every two years, specifically to determine its verifiability.

C. To address the geopolitical problem

Finally, I respectfully urge the Senate to use the ratification process to put the Soviet Union on notice that this country is prepared, nay eager, for peaceful coexistence that reflects true stability and equality in arms, and also political restraint. We are ready to pursue the control and reduction of arms with dedication. But we will brook no subterfuge, nor can we continue a conciliatory policy if Moscow chooses to exploit that policy as a convenient opening to Soviet predominance. The Senate should attach to its instrument of advice and consent an expression of the following principles:

That the absence of political restraint will seriously jeopardize continuation of the SALT process.

That the Senate understands this to include Soviet supply or encouragement of intervention by proxy military forces; the use of Soviet forces on the territory of its allies such as Cuba to free Cuban forces to fight in Africa; the support, financing, or encouragement by any member of the Warsaw Pact of groups and activities seeking to undermine governments friendly to the United States; or the exacerbation of regional conflicts.

That the Administration be required to submit an annual report to the Senate on the degree to which the Soviet Union is living up to these criteria.

That the Senate vote every two years its judgment whether the Soviet Union has lived up to these criteria. If the judgment is negative, the Senate should then vote whether whatever SALT negotiation are taking place should be continued.

Finally, if we thus reassess our strategic position, we must also take another look at the SALT process. Though the strategic conditions I have described result largely from unilateral American decisions, they have been reflected in the SALT process which was essentially a confirmation of them. The fact that I have participated in the process—and must share some of the responsibility—entitles me to warn against continuing it by rote. I urge that its long-term implications be carefully considered. Never in the postwar period has there been more disagreement and intellectual confusion about the requirements of strategic stability and the implications of arms control. A thorough reassessment and the fullest consultation with our allies are crucial before we launch ourselves into SALT III, which will directly affect our allies and hence may jeopardize our alliances.

CONCLUSION

I recommend the approach outlined here because it gives this country an opportunity to address its dangers without abandoning an important negotiation that has already extended over seven years. And it gives us an opportunity to proceed as a united people. If the Administration rejects this approach, the Senate will have no alternative except to go the route of farther-reaching amendments, either holding the Treaty in abeyance or forcing a renegotiation. The result will almost certainly be a diplomatic stalemate until the Soviets are convinced that we are determined to restore the strategic balance; it would be an indirect—and in my view less productive—route which, even if successful, would lead to the same result of a major new effort to meet out imperative security needs.

To be sure, the course I propose will make SALT II far from the turn in the arms race many of us hoped for when the negotiations were inaugurated. But too much time has been lost, too many weapons systems have been unilaterally abandoned, too many military adventures have been encouraged by the Soviet Union, the geopolitical balance has been too severely strained by Soviet pressures, for SALT to be much more than a base from which, one can hope, a new and serious effort at

equitable arms reduction can be made. Concrete steps to rectify the global balance are urgently required. In this context a ratified SALT II Treaty can play a useful role as a signpost to continuing negotiations, as a beacon illuminating the path to genuine coexistence and detente, and as a means to contain current tensions. But SALT must contribute to the world's security, not insecurity.

At this moment our major obligation is to restore the confidence of all those who depend on us; to redress the military balance; to reestablish some effective link between arms control and restrained international conduct. All Americans—of either party—should share these goals.

There are deeply concerned people who want SALT but doubt the need for augmented defense. Others see in SALT an obstacle to augmented defense. Let there be serious effort to reconcile these points of view before we turn to domestic confrontation. I am prepared to do my best in this effort.

Rarely is an opportunity so clearly presented to a legislative body to determine the course of national policy in a direction vital to the future of the democracies. After the 1919 Versailles Treaty, misjudgments by the Senate and the Administration led to a debacle which undermined international security and doomed the world to another bloody holocaust. At this moment, the Senate and the Administration can point us in a different direction—toward a restoration of our national unity, toward the strengthening of the security of this nation and of its allies, and toward a more constructive relationship with our principal adversaries. This is America's responsibility, if we are to remain true to our trust and to the hopes of mankind.

DARK VISTAS OF LOOMING U.S. INFERIORITY

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Kissinger, for your statement, which gives us much room for thought.

The committee will operate under the 10-minute rule, as usual, one with which you are familiar.

Dr. Kissinger, in March 1976, just over 3 years ago, you said, and I quote your statement

But we must be clear what maintaining the balance means. We must not mesmerize ourselves with fictitious gaps. Our forces were designed according to different criteria than those of the Soviet Union. Their adequacy must be judged by our strategic needs, not theirs.

You then went on to say—

Those who paint dark vistas of a looming U.S. inferiority in strategic weapons ignore these facts, and the real choices facing modern leaders.

What has changed in the last 3½ years which you could not foresee when you made this statement in 1976, and which has led you now to paint dark vistas of a looming U.S. inferiority?

Secretary KISSINGER. What has changed since 1976 is the following: When I made this statement, it was in the context of a military program that included the B-1, which was to become operational 2 or 3 years later; the M-X missile, which was supposed to become operational in 1983; and a Trident development which has since slipped by some 3 or 4 years. It was also made before our intelligence indicated that our missiles would become vulnerable to the accelerated Soviet technological development about 4 years before previous estimates. And finally, it was made before the geopolitical offensive that I have described. But if we confine it to the military equation, I will put it in relationship to the military program as was then being contemplated.

DELAY IN U.S. STRATEGIC PROGRAMS

The CHAIRMAN. Looking at that military program, you have mentioned weapons systems which were delayed, which you antici-

pated would move ahead on schedule. Now, there have been some very important programs that have continued on schedule. The hardening of the missile silos for the Minuteman, the accuracy improvement for the Minuteman, the substitution of a much larger MIRVed warhead for the Minuteman, all of which have improved our counterforce potential and all of which have contributed to the survivability of the Minuteman, those programs have continued without delay and on schedule. Would you agree to that?

Secretary KISSINGER. Yes. I agree to that. I do not think they changed the basic situation that I have described.

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

Now, with respect to the Trident and the cruise missile, this committee is informed that delays that have extended that schedule have been caused at least in major part by technical problems that had to be resolved, the difficulty of building the submarine, as we had hoped, and technical problems in connection with the missile, while, as for the M-X, we have, as you know, been attempting to determine a basing mode that would work best for us and would not constitute a serious impediment to the continuing SALT process in that we want it to be verifiable.

We decided against the B-1 bomber after coming to the conclusion, which I think is based on good military grounds, that the cruise missile was preferable, mainly because the B-1 could be shot down by the Russians by 1982, and the cruise missile not only had great accuracy but greater penetrating power. Therefore, the cruise missile was substituted in favor of the B-1, each one of which would have cost over \$100 million a copy.

So, my question to you is, given these technical problems that have arisen, given the decision to substitute a superior missile system for the B-1, would any prudent planner have proceeded more rapidly with these programs in your judgment?

Secretary KISSINGER. My basic purpose here is not to assess blame, but to describe a condition. With respect to the B-1, I have personally never accepted the proposition that our choice was between the B-1 and the cruise missile, because the original planning was that we would have both, given the danger to the survivability of the over-aged B-52's. The theory on which we were operating was that both systems would be maintained; therefore I think that the choice between the cruise missile and B-1 was not the only choice that was before us.

It is undoubtedly true that Trident had technical problems and that this was not a deliberate decision based on strategic doctrine. The fact nevertheless remains that in the 1980's we will face a grave situation in which we will be either even or behind in every significant strategic and military category. And that in the past has always had geopolitical consequences.

This is the problem that I am trying to address without assigning the blame to any one decision.

PAST POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES

The CHAIRMAN. What are those past political consequences to which you refer? In the earlier postwar period, when, according to your statement, the United States enjoyed predominant military advantage in the strategic field and in the conventional field as

well, we had such aggressive and adventuresome threats from the Soviet Union as the Berlin crisis and as the Cuban missile crisis. Apparently the obvious preponderance of military strength in the strategic field was not a deterrent to Soviet adventurism in that period.

Secretary KISSINGER. They were not a deterrent to the adventures, but they were a deterrent to their success.

The danger that is foreseeable is threefold. One is that in a world in turmoil, crises affecting vital interests can arise—not deliberately sought by either of the major powers—in which then the capacity for intervention as we have seen can play a decisive role.

Second, there can be deliberate encouragement of these crises, and in the extreme, there can be direct pressures of the kind we have not yet seen.

CAUTIOUS BEHAVIOR DURING NUCLEAR EQUIVALENCE

The CHAIRMAN. I understand the doctrine, but the question I put to you is this, that if, during a period when we had preponderant military superiority over the Soviet Union, they were willing to take the risk of very aggressive moves, what makes you think that in a period when we have at least an equivalence of nuclear power, they would not be more cautious in taking such gambles?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, I would say two things. One is that if they were willing to run risks during a period of American preponderance, it would seem to follow that they may be prepared to take greater risks when there is no American preponderance.

Second, the definition of nuclear equivalence is usually derived from the capacity to destroy civilian population. I believe that a country that puts itself into the position where its only military option is to initiate the mass killing of civilians has written for itself a prescription for paralysis, because that is a recourse to which we should not condemn ourselves, and which is out of proportion to almost any objective that one can foresee.

The CHAIRMAN. If your assessment of the American military balance and the trends is correct, and it echoes an assessment we have heard from the Chiefs of Staff and others—

Secretary KISSINGER. I have the impression that Harold Brown agrees with it too, substantially.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; if that is a correct assessment, the trend has not been brought about either by the SALT I Treaty or the SALT II Treaty. Wouldn't you agree? And I think you have stated that neither of these treaties is at fault with respect to whatever danger the present trend may present to the United States, and what the answer is is to do the things that are necessary to redress the balance in the coming years.

Secretary KISSINGER. I have indicated my specific concerns with respect to the SALT II Treaty and the methods for dealing with them. As a general proposition, the present strategic balance has come about by our unilateral decisions extending over a fairly lengthy period of time, and can be importantly remedied by our unilateral decisions.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to commend you for your support of SALT as you have conditioned it and for the specific proposals you

have made for the consideration of the committee in connection with the instrument of ratification.

I am sure, as you know, Dr. Kissinger, they will be given very serious consideration.

Secretary KISSINGER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Kissinger, I join in thanking you for your testimony, which I will say lives up to expectations in its understanding of the issues and its sophistication. I am very glad you said one thing, that you are not here to assess blame. You are here to establish a condition and to present your approach to how to deal with it. I am glad to see that you confess blame yourself.

In your statement, you say that in 1974:

I gave an answer to a question at a press conference which I have come to regret. "What in the name of God is 'strategic superiority,'" I asked. "What is the significance of it * * * at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?" My statement reflected fatigue and exasperation, not analysis, et cetera.

I think that is the right spirit for SALT.

Secretary KISSINGER. It also makes for a historical occasion.

[General laughter.]

ABILITY TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE

Senator JAVITS. Yes; very much. Well, we wish to establish history, and you are helping us with your testimony. I am a pragmatist in that ultimately we have to do something and write something, and you are helping us.

I find one basic question in your testimony which I think is the key to your ability to help us. You say about the SALT Treaty in your statement, "The Senate is in the anomalous position of being asked to ratify a treaty which is essentially peripheral * * *." You repeat the same thing further on. Nonetheless, notwithstanding that it is peripheral, you seek to build a structure of commitment in your statement. You ask us at the end of your statement not only to resolve to do certain things about strengthening our defenses and our military establishment, but to defer until the next session of Congress the final action on this treaty. What is even more important, and what to me is the reverse of what you asked us to do, you imply that we do not have trust in ourselves; you say that you want an obligatory commitment by both branches of our Government to this very major program of rearmament. Nor do you trust the administration.

You say you want an obligatory commitment from the administration. You want it in binding form. Now, whether that can be done or not I do not know. It seems to me that, if the United States is going to take the position that it does not trust itself to go ahead with this business, if the pledge is any good—with Congress appropriating every year—I wonder how you come to the conclusion at the end of your statement: "At this moment, our major obligation is to restore the confidence of all those who depend on us." How are we going to restore their confidence, if we have no confidence in ourselves?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, I believe that a SALT agreement that is perceived as simply perpetuating existing trends, even if it is

received with temporary relief, will sooner or later lead to massive global insecurity when the nature of what I have described will become apparent. I therefore think it is in our national interest that we make both commitments simultaneously, to a program of arms control and to a program of fixing the shortcomings in our national defense.

I remember after SALT I there were a number of intentions with respect to defense programs which then turned out to be extremely difficult to fulfill in later budgetary cycles.

Second, I believe that as the facts that I have described sink in on the rest of the world, we will face a crisis in the conduct of our foreign policy, and I believe this has to be rectified quickly. It is not a question of not having confidence in ourselves. It is a question, on the contrary, of having enough confidence in ourselves to do what is necessary simultaneously and not defer it to some indeterminate future in an election year when then we will be under strong pressure after ratification from the Soviet Union that what we are doing is incompatible with the spirit of our relationship.

I think we should put it all on the table simultaneously, so that everybody understands the framework within which we are operating.

MEANING OF OBLIGATORY COMMITMENT

Senator JAVITS. Dr. Kissinger, I am all for putting it all on the table simultaneously, but having been Secretary of State, will you explain to me how you can get an obligatory commitment either from the Congress or from the President in view of the fact that in 1981 neither we nor the President may be here? In short, isn't what you are suggesting just a brake on action and a brake on expressing our confidence in ourselves. By saying that we will go ahead with SALT II, perhaps with many of the precautions you propose—I like many of them very much—and by saying we are going ahead with a rearmament program, we will not be sitting on our hands until such time as we legislate these things. It may not mean anything because it can be undone by the next Congress.

Secretary KISSINGER. Yes, but it is one thing for the next Congress to undo something that was solemnly decided in connection with an agreement. It is another to have to start the whole process from the beginning.

Senator JAVITS. The process can be started. I am still trying to get what you mean by an obligatory commitment. What is an obligatory commitment?

Secretary KISSINGER. I have suggested one way of doing it which would be for the administration to submit a supplementary budget and a 5-year program that the Congress could look at. Of course, it could be undone by a future President and a future Congress, but at least we would then know what we are talking about and others would know what we are talking about in terms of what is considered essential for our national defense.

Also, you flatter me, of course, when you say that as Secretary of State I should know how the Congress can conduct its business. I seem to remember that is not what it was usually said I would go down in history for. [General laughter.]

I am sure that the Senate and the gentlemen here could find other methods by which to record a solemn understanding between the Congress and the President which would be found to weigh heavily with whoever is in office in 1981.

Senator JAVITS. There I am with you, but I do not believe that it would serve our purposes or the national or international interest of the United States to simply lay this over while we fight around about a new armaments program. I believe that we can by a suitable resolution pledge ourselves to bring our armament up to proper equivalency and that that would serve the purpose which you and all the proponents of the tranquilizer theory have in mind. That is the only thing I am proposing.

Secretary KISSINGER. I would have to see what that method is and what the resolution is before I could pass a judgment on it.

Senator JAVITS. I understand that.

Secretary KISSINGER. If it is kept in general terms, it would not meet my purposes. I do not want to prescribe precisely how to do it, but I am sure that between the Senate and the President there must be some way that can be found that is substantially binding and at least during the period of this Congress.

RUN THE RISKS IF WE REJECT SALT

Senator JAVITS. Dr. Kissinger, before my time is up, I wanted to ask you one other question. I do not think you testified clearly enough to the fact that we are better off without the SALT Treaty than we are with it, if we do not fulfill your conditions. In other words, we have to vote yea or nay. Suppose all of your conditions cannot be fulfilled; in your judgment, should we reject it and run whatever the risks?

Secretary KISSINGER. That is such an inconceivable idea to me that I have not addressed it. [General laughter.]

I would have very grave doubts about voting the SALT Treaty up or down without the major part of at least the spirit of the proposals that I have made here. Under those conditions, I would be very reluctant to go along with the treaty.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you.

Senator BIDEN. What was the answer, yes or no? I am not sure I understood that.

The CHAIRMAN. He would be reluctant.

Secretary KISSINGER. If the issue were simply up or down, which I think should not happen, then I would recommend that the Senate hold it over until it can find a position that can encompass my concerns.

Senator BIDEN. But if it does not, then you would vote no?

Secretary KISSINGER. Then I would vote no, yes.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell is next.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

THREE CAVEATS TO SUPPORT SALT RATIFICATION

Mr. Secretary, as I understand your testimony, and it was a very strongly erudite statement, you would support ratification with three caveats: that there be an increase in our military budget,

certain reservations, to the treaty, and a degree of linkage to Soviet behavior around the world. In this regard, I would like to go down each one of these three points.

In connection with the military program or enlargement, I think you are dealing here with a political process, and there are some of us, maybe a minority, who feel that if the price to secure SALT is a vastly enlarged arsenal, with all the expense that goes with it, we would prefer not to see SALT come along, because equally important as our military strength is, it would seem to me, our economic strength, upon which you have not touched in your testimony. I was wondering what your own view was as to whether you truly believe that we can engage in a program, as you have suggested and as some of our colleagues have suggested, without doing tremendous damage to our somewhat imperfect economic machine now which is suffering.

Secretary KISSINGER. What we must try to bring about is a situation of substantial reduction of armaments on both sides. I do not believe that this will occur as long as the Soviet analysis of the military balance roughly coincides with the one that I have described. I therefore share your objective of lowered military expenditures, and on the other hand, I believe that the consequences of the strategic imbalance that I have analyzed will be so serious for us over the period of a decade that its costs would be infinitely less than the costs that I have described.

Second, I look ahead over a 10-year period. I see every possibility of the pressures on the Soviet system leading to a better definition of coexistence than to my great regret has proved possible. I had hoped very much in 1972 at the initiation of that period of détente, that it would lead to restrained political conduct and to a reduction in armaments which I believe must be the ultimate objective.

This not having taken place, we must now face the facts. And compared to the dangers that have resulted from the geopolitical offensive, the rapid Soviet buildup, and the lack in our efforts, I think we now must meet that danger, but with the attitude that we will move then to new negotiations that will seek to bring about the objectives that were originally envisaged.

Senator PELL. If the price of doing this in economic terms is moving from where we are now, which is practically, I believe, a 12- or 13-percent rate of inflation to a 20-percent rate of inflation, and the continuation of the energy problems we have, I would question whether the price would be worth it. Do you think it would?

Secretary KISSINGER. Senator, I am not in a position to say whether it would lead to a 20-percent rate of inflation and what sacrifices have to be made. But we have seen that upheavals, not primarily caused by the Soviet Union, say, in Iran, can produce a change in the economic environment.

If we suddenly find ourselves in a world which is substantially hostile and which is pursuing policies over which we have lost any degree of influence, I think the economic price to us would be potentially greater than anything that might have to be undertaken under what I am proposing.

Senator PELL. Still, on the question of military weapons; I am wondering, looking back at SALT I and the early days when we all

agreed that weapons in submarines were probably less destabilizing than weapons ashore—and you will recall, I am sure, that old triplet.

Let's put the weapons out to sea
Where the real estate is free; and
Far away from you and me.

Why was there not more of an effort made in those early days to try to restrict the increase in weaponry to nuclear submarines?

Secretary KISSINGER. As a general proposition, we, of course, moved a much greater proportion of our weapons to sea than has the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, for a variety of reasons, kept most of its effective throw-weight on land; partly, one has to assume, because this is a more effective way of achieving a first strike capability, partly because its submarine technology is probably behind ours. So, in the long-term evolution I would think that increasing the invulnerability of both sides' strategic forces will be in the interest of both sides.

However, one has to add this proviso to it, as far as the United States is concerned. For the United States, for better or worse, a much greater emphasis for our security depended on our counterforce capability throughout all of the postwar period. We were always inferior in forces for regional defense. As this counterforce capability is lost, either as a result of unilateral decisions by the United States or as the inevitable result of technology and therefore through no fault of ours, a totally new security problem arises for our allies and for the composition of our military forces, a problem to which none of us paid adequate attention in the period that arms control theory was being developed. I confess that I myself did not adequately analyze the crucial role that our strategic superiority played in defending peripheral areas, so that even if equivalence is achieved, even if we lose our present relative vulnerability, that, too, will constitute a fundamental change in the strategic relationship which we should address, and we do not need to discuss whose fault that is.

That may be an inherent fact of life, to which I am trying to call attention and which will dominate the 1980's, even if we make the proper efforts in the strategic area.

SOVIET DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR SUBMARINES

Senator PELL. Returning for a moment to submarines, isn't it a fact that now the Soviets are putting more of their emphasis on the development of nuclear weapons and submarines than on the other elements of their military forces?

Secretary KISSINGER. I think you can get a better judgment on Soviet strategic programs from the intelligence community than from me. My impression is that the Soviet Union is approaching the completion of the buildup of its MIRVed missiles, and that this buildup is sufficient to give them a counterforce capability against our ICBM's and still leave them with a very large residual force, so they can put more into submarines. I think one cannot draw any conclusions.

I would be convinced that they are shifting into submarines if they began dismantling some of their land based forces and putting

them to sea. That would represent an important change in the strategic equation and a very positive one.

JUDGING DECISION MADE ON MIRVING

Senator PELL. Speaking of MIRVed weapons, I remember some years ago some similar discussions. I was in the minority that said we should really not go for MIRVing because it was just a question of time before the Soviets would follow us in that pursuit. In retrospect, do you think we were correct in moving ahead then in MIRVing?

Secretary KISSINGER. Of course, it depends on your judgment of whether our failure to MIRV would have brought about a Soviet decision not to MIRV. At the time when proposals on limitations of MIRVing were made, what the Soviet Union counterproposed was a limitation on deployment of MIRV's but no limitation on testing of MIRV's, which led us to the thought that they wanted to use the moratorium to catch up on our technology.

Second, our predecessors made the decision in the sixties to stop the buildup of the numbers of missiles—we essentially stopped our numerical buildup in 1966 and 1967—and we substituted for that an increase in the number of warheads.

Whether that was the right decision, whether we should have continued to build more missiles with single warheads, whether we could have achieved from the Soviets an agreement not to test MIRV's at an earlier stage, must remain conjectural. In retrospect, I think, if one could have avoided the development of MIRV's, which means also the testing of MIRV's by the Soviets, we would both be better off.

Senator PELL. Thank you. I see that my time has expired.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Senator Percy?

Senator PERCY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

RECOMMEND SENATE DELAY ADVICE AND CONSENT

Dr. Kissinger, I am interested in pursuing Senator Javits question in regard to the statement you made:

If the Administration is unable to put forward such a program to this session of Congress, I would recommend the Senate delay its advice and consent until a new military program has been submitted to and authorized by the next session of Congress.

I am afraid that might be used by those who will do anything to delay consideration of this treaty in an attempt to wreck it.

Could you clarify whether you feel there is any sense of urgency in regards to considering this treaty? We have to stay here until the end of the year, dealing simultaneously with the problems of energy, inflation and the weakened dollar and all of the problems that we face in lagging productivity. Should we also keep our feet to the fire on this issue and try to finish it, vote up or down, on it this year? Wouldn't that be a goal that we should establish?

Secretary KISSINGER. If the conditions that I have outlined here can be met this year, I would prefer that to delay. I would prefer an up or down vote within the framework that I have outlined this

year. I do not see why it should be impossible for the administration to put before the Congress a program on which they must already be working as part of the budgetary process anyway, which from my recollection of the process must be well advanced by now, or why, if there is a serious intention on both sides to deal with this, one could not advance this during September and October and complete it by the end of this year.

Senator PERCY. I, for one, would join you in urging the administration to put forward such plans for our consideration, to develop them in the month of August for our consideration in September. It is essential that we be assured that we will maintain our strategic balance in future years. I think that is a fine contribution.

I would like to read from your testimony before this committee on the Panama Canal Treaty—

Ambiguity is, of course, the essence of diplomacy. It often permits each side to maintain its essential international interest. I have resorted to it in negotiations on several occasions. I have never considered ambiguous language acceptable, however, if it masked a true difference of interpretation.

Do you still stand by this statement?

Secretary KISSINGER. Yes. This is why I am trying to remove differences of interpretation in the treaty.

Senator PERCY. Did you want to expand on that at all?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, I have grave concerns about the protocol. The protocol is now being advanced with two contradictory propositions. One is that the Soviets would not have signed the agreement without the protocol, but we need not worry about it because it will end in 1981 anyway, and we could not do what we might do under its terms. I therefore would like to put the Senate unambiguously on record that the protocol in its present form cannot be continued after 1981, and that its particular restrictions can only be negotiated in the future as part of a theater nuclear balance which includes the Backfire and SS-20 on the Soviet side, the cruise missiles and correlative systems on our side. Then one's concerns about the protocol's ambiguities would disappear, as one example.

NEED TO ADOPT CLEAR-CUT UNDERSTANDING ON PROTOCOL EXTENSION

Senator PERCY. Even though President Carter has assured us that he would not unilaterally extend the protocol, we have had strong evidence from General Rowny and others that the Soviets would attempt to interpret its possible extension as a part of SALT III. They would apply great pressure to extend it. Don't you feel it would be a good idea for us to adopt a clearcut understanding that no President could unilaterally extend the protocol without the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate?

Secretary KISSINGER. Senator Percy, I actually go further than that. I am opposed to the continuation of the protocol in its present form because in its present form it limits unilaterally an American system, and the only justification for it is, under present terms, that we are told we could not do these systems in the period of the protocol. Also it sets a precedent where for the first time we have limited theater systems without reciprocity. We should make clear

that any future negotiation must involve comparable systems on the Soviet side.

If one leaves it vague, the negotiation is bound to start with the protocol, and the reservation that the protocol must be approved by the Senate does not change the fact that one will then have a completed document, and the reservation in fact implies that under some conditions the existing protocol might be continued.

I would recommend an instruction that makes it clear that future negotiations would lump comparable systems, so that if we restrict systems that are relevant to the theater nuclear balance, the Soviets will be forced to restrict systems relative to the theater nuclear balance. On that basis, there can be no ambiguity or misunderstanding about the follow-on negotiations or about the significance of the protocol.

AMBIGUITY WITH REGARD TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO NATO
ALLIES

Senator PERCY. I met earlier this morning with Jack McCloy, who will be testifying before us on Thursday and who is uniquely qualified to talk about the reaction of our NATO Allies. I think he will indicate some lack of enthusiasm on their part.

During the course of the negotiating process, I understand the Soviets demanded a nontransfer provision in the treaty. We rejected that demand because we want to transfer anything that is necessary to our NATO Allies, but we did agree to article XII in the treaty which prohibits circumvention through third parties.

I have offered for consideration of the Senate an understanding of the treaty stating that this article does not prohibit continued defense cooperation with our allies.

As I interpret your testimony, you would concur particularly with respect to transfer of cruise missile technology. However, an administration official told me privately that the Soviets would object to this understanding, if it specifically mentions cruise missile technology.

Now, if they would object to such an understanding, it stands to reason that they believe the treaty does affect our collaboration with the allies. This, in my view, is an issue which we should set straight. We cannot afford to have any ambiguity, it would seem to me, on that particular point.

Do you think that, if we left it ambiguous, it might create some problem later? Should we adopt an understanding, even though the administration objects to it, clearly stating that we have the right, without any equivocation, to transfer technology to our NATO Allies involving cruise missiles or any other systems involved in our mutual defense?

Secretary KISSINGER. I am not in a position to judge whether the Soviet Union would object to it or not. It seems to me that either the administration is prepared to share cruise missile technology with our allies, in which case it should welcome such an expression from the Senate, or it does not, in which case it would have massive difficulty with our allies, and we had better know it now. But if there is an intention to share cruise missile technology with our allies, it is in everybody's interest—ours, our allies', and the

Soviet Union's—that this be made clear and that the treaty not be ambiguous on this point.

Senator PERCY. I would feel strongly enough about it that I do not see how I could vote for ratification without an absolutely clear-cut understanding on the transfer of technology to our allies. I think the testimony before us is evidence that we do intend to continue sharing technology with our NATO Allies, but I think we ought to put it clearly on record as part of the treaty process itself.

You mentioned in your testimony the geopolitical consequences of the treaty. In rereading an interview you had with *The Economist*, I know that you are particularly concerned about this. Some of us have concentrated a good deal of our time on trying to determine what effect this treaty has on our allies. I think it is extraordinarily important that we fully understand NATO views of not only the political leadership, but also the military leadership.

In my view, the strength of our alliance is a major factor in determining the strength of our own national defense. Could you give us your views on the impact defeat of this treaty in the Senate would have on our NATO Allies? How would it be interpreted? There is support shown by the political leadership and ministers of defense, but do you see some degree of skepticism by the NATO military? Do you see skepticism that could not be answered by understandings or reservations?

Secretary KISSINGER. I have not had an opportunity to talk to the defense ministers of our European Allies, and therefore I think General Haig, when he testifies here, will be in a better position to give you a conclusive judgment on that. I believe that what I have outlined here would meet the concerns of our allies. I think there is a pervasive ambivalence among our allies. If the treaty is rejected, they will conclude that a negotiation that went on for 7 years, on which they were briefed for 7 years, then failed at the very last stage, and it would reinforce doubts about the American political process, since they approved every stage of this, and since some of the fine points will be elusive to them.

On the other hand, if the treaty ratifies a situation in which their military security will be seen to be jeopardized in another year or two, that, too, is going to have the profoundest consequences on us, even if not immediately. Therefore, I think the necessity of statesmanship is to find a solution as far as our allies are concerned that avoids both of these dangers, one that avoids the sense of growing impotence, and that avoids the reflections about whether the United States knows where it is going.

This has been what I have attempted to present to this committee and on which, of course, others may have modifying views, but this is my best judgment of what I think is needed for both of these requirements.

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McGovern?

Senator MCGOVERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Kissinger, thank you for your testimony.

FORMULA NOT FOR ARMS LIMITATION BUT ARMS ESCALATION

Dr. Kissinger, after listening to the terms that you have laid down as a condition of your support for SALT II, I have serious doubts that this treaty is worth the price, because I think what you have offered, and not you alone, but many others who have testified here, is a formula not for arms limitation but for arms escalation. Indeed, having sat at this table for the last month and listened to a parade of witnesses my doubts are more serious than ever about the whole SALT process. I think it may very well have come a cropper in terms of any limitations or reductions of armaments.

I am slowly coming to the conclusion that with or without my vote SALT II will probably be ratified by the Senate, but I fear it is going to be ratified at the price of a more costly arms race. I fear it will not live up to what we had expected to get from anything called strategic arms limitation, and because of the influence of you and other distinguished Americans who are demanding the price for this treaty in the form of more and more weapons, we will lose anything we might have gained by the whole process.

It seems to me the trouble with the SALT process is that it moves so slowly, and no one knows that more painfully than you. The military technology always races ahead of the negotiations. You never catch up. You, yourself, have pointed out this morning that the Soviets had 3,200 warheads when we signed SALT I, and now they have 6,000, and you tell us they will have 12,000 by the end of SALT II. We have been producing those weapons, as you know, at about the same rate of four or five a day all these years, so we will probably end up with 12,000 or 13,000, too, by the end of 1985.

I can see some advantages of this treaty in preserving détente or what is left of it and avoiding a shock to our allies which would result from rejection, but it does seem to me that the greatest possible advantage of the treaty is that it might set the stage for SALT III and genuine reductions. I am as interested as you are in trying to arrive at some formula that would achieve national unity on this question of national security. I do not like this debate between hawks and doves. I do not even like the words. I never have. I have always hoped that we could somehow find a basis on which Americans could agree what our security posture ought to be.

Now, you have laid out your terms for supporting the treaty. Just give me a minute to lay out mine, and then I wish you would respond to it.

RESOLUTION IN SALT II FOR SALT III NEGOTIATION

I would like to see a resolution accompany this treaty that would clearly instruct our negotiators on SALT III to begin working the day after ratification of SALT II on real reductions in SALT III. Perhaps we could begin with a freeze, a mutual freeze, by both the Soviet Union and the United States on all nuclear weapons systems and accompany that with a serious effort to get a 10-percent reduction in all the categories—their big SS-18's, the whole range of nuclear weapons that are covered by this treaty. Then, work out

an arrangement, a serious effort to reduce nuclear arms at the rate, let us say, of 10-percent a year on both sides.

It seems to me, having listened to a lot of people who were described as hawks, that that is what they want. They want genuine reductions on both sides. You have talked about the growing vulnerability of our land-based system, presumably because the Soviets are building so many warheads, but wouldn't it appeal to those who are extremely conscious of our security position if we could negotiate that kind of arrangement in SALT III to get genuine reductions on both sides? Would it not also provide a basis for unity on the part of those most closely identified with arms control and those who are on the other side of that equation.

Secretary KISSINGER. Before I deal with your proposal, Senator, let me make two comments on your preliminary observations. First of all, I do not think the Senate should pay any price for getting the treaty ratified. I do not think it is a desirable way of putting the issue, because it implies that something is paid that one really should not do. I think what the treaty provides is an opportunity to address problems that have to be solved anyway.

Supposing that the opponents of increased spending in military efforts defeat this treaty on their grounds that it is not adequate arms control. We would be right back at the strategic situation that I have described, and we would still have to make, in my judgment, the efforts that I have outlined.

I am not asking a price for SALT. I have tried to indicate a serious situation that has developed over an extended period of time which in my view has to be remedied with or without SALT.

Senator MCGOVERN. Mr. Secretary, if I could interrupt you there, I think one point on which you and I agree is that the central issue here all along has not been so much the terms of SALT II as the future of American foreign policy.

Secretary KISSINGER. That is right.

Senator MCGOVERN. That is what comes across in your statement, and I agree with that. I think that is why this ratification process is equally important, maybe more important than the exact terms of the treaty, because it is what we do here in the next few weeks in the Senate and the Congress that may determine what happens in terms of American foreign policy and American national security policy.

So, it is not so much what is in SALT II to which I object. It is the whole process of ratification in which I see you as a threatening part. [General laughter.]

And I say that with the greatest respect. [General laughter.]

Secretary KISSINGER. I am trying to outline the circumstances that have to be addressed whether SALT is ratified or rejected. The particular imbalances that have been developing over an extended period of time, and that have largely been the result of many unilateral decisions by us, in my view must be remedied.

I also agree that SALT III should deal with reductions as its pre-eminent objective. I would welcome an instruction to the negotiators that that should be their principal goal, but reductions ought to operate from a relatively equal base, and that is a concurrent concern of mine, to bring about a strategic situation in the overall

balance less threatening to our overall interests than the one I now foresee.

Senator McGOVERN. Dr. Kissinger, don't you think we are at rough equivalence now? That has been the testimony of the Joint Chiefs.

Secretary KISSINGER. Senator, I think that rough equivalence is one of the slogans which in itself does not mean anything. We are at rough equivalence in the capacity to destroy civilians. I am of the view that this is the most demoralizing, indeed, the most immoral strategy that we can adopt.

Second, I believe that rough equivalence in that sense, even assuming that we were willing to execute such a strategy, which I would hope we would not be, then raises in much more acute form the issue of regional balances, as I have described, which has been neglected by us and by our allies over an extended period of time. It is that to which I want to call attention.

In the long run, if adequate efforts are made, it should be possible to demonstrate that superiority in the strategic field is bound to be ephemeral, and that would be the basis for significant reductions. Unfortunately, that situation does not fully exist today.

Senator McGOVERN. I am anxious to get back to that, but I see that my time is up. Thank you, Secretary Kissinger.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator McGovern.

Senator Baker?

Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

AGREEMENT WITH POINTS MADE BY DR. KISSINGER

Dr. Kissinger, I think we owe you a debt of gratitude for a well thought out and comprehensive statement on a highly complex and difficult subject. I think it was extraordinarily well done. There are some parts of it with which I disagree and will discuss if time will permit in a moment, but there are many parts with which I do agree.

I agree particularly with the thrust of your statement which, as Senator McGovern pointed out, seems to be a recitation of the fact that strategic arms limitation negotiations cannot exist in a vacuum; whether it is SALT I, the interim agreements at Vladivostok, SALT II or SALT III—these treaties, these undertakings must be considered in the real world as it exists. You have to take account of the real world situation, and the fact of the matter is, we do live in a hostile world or a world that is at least threatening. We must, therefore, consider this treaty in the context of recent Russian foreign policy and world conditions elsewhere.

Some of us for a while referred to that as linkage. I noticed that in your statement you used the term "linkage," so I was particularly pleased to see that you suggested the committee and the Senate should consider this treaty in the context of the real world circumstances that exist. I recall that when I was in Russia in January, I had the privilege of meeting with President Brezhnev. I spoke of linkage. I spoke of Cubans in Africa and Russians in Cuba, and on the situation worldwide.

I was lectured at some length by President Brezhnev about the inappropriateness of linkage. He admonished me that the treaty

should be considered, as he put it, within the four corners of the document. You have to read the language. It must stand on its own merits. He rejected the idea of linkage, the idea that you consider this treaty in the context of Russian foreign policy or military adventure.

I was appalled then to find that the Carter administration also suggested that we must not consider linkage. I have not heard the administration suggest that lately, but that was its early position. I think the administration was wrong then, and I think you are right now. We must take account of it. That permits me to lead into your specific recommendations, which I would like to discuss with you.

I take it that the recommendations are made to take into account the world situation as we find it.

Secretary KISSINGER. That is correct.

Senator BAKER. And that you find the world situation to be threatening or potentially so.

Secretary KISSINGER. That is correct.

Senator BAKER. And that we must take certain clearly defined, easily understood steps in this country to improve the military relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Secretary KISSINGER. Yes; also to make clear that constant pressures on the geopolitical balance are bound to create a crisis situation threatening the peace of the world, and that we have to move simultaneously on controlling arms and restraining political conduct.

SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS FOR SALT II

Senator BAKER. Dr. Kissinger, I agree with that. As you know, I supported SALT I, the Vladivostok accords, and I would like to support this treaty if that is possible in this context.

So, I would like to examine your proposals, but before I do, let me suggest that I have some concern about whether we can afford to postpone until SALT III changes in or improvements of SALT II. I understand that to be the burden of your remarks as well—that rather than amend this treaty, we ought to resolve that in the next treaty and we will do certain things in addition to the unilateral action we can take in the Congress to improve our military strength.

Secretary KISSINGER. I suggested two improvements in the present treaty, one with respect to the protocol, the second with respect to the noncircumvention clause. The issue of heavy missiles, which has a long history, and which in any event cannot be solved during the term of this treaty, I would recommend postponing to SALT III, not because we necessarily want to build a heavy missile, but because I think we ought now to make it a principle of SALT to have equivalent positions so that the psychological impact on other countries is taken into account.

Senator BAKER. What about the Backfire bomber? Would you consider that now in the context of this treaty, or would you postpone that consideration to a future possible SALT III?

Secretary KISSINGER. My recommendation with respect to the Backfire bomber is to handle it in the follow-on negotiations to the protocol, that is to say, to bring its limitations into relationship to

limitations on cruise missiles or overseas deployed missiles by the United States and airplanes and to seek equivalence in theater-based striking forces in that manner.

Senator BAKER. Let us assume for the sake of argument that we can do this. Would you agree with me that if we can obtain some changes in this treaty, if not by amendment, then at least by mutual understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union with respect to heavy missiles, the Backfire bomber, noncircumvention, or verification—if we can do it now, wouldn't it be better to do it now than to do it later?

Secretary KISSINGER. What has to be judged at that point, certainly, is whether we can achieve it now; one would have to judge that on the merits of each of these proposals.

My particular proposal on Backfire, the relationship of Backfire and cruise missiles, would have to begin in the real world to be implemented almost immediately if we were to negotiate it. If my proposal were accepted, we would have to begin negotiating it almost immediately if it were to become effective by the end of 1981.

Senator BAKER. So it really is a value judgment, then, on whether or not we would make a serious effort to amend or change this treaty, or to reserve on the treaty with a mutual understanding between our countries, which would be the functional equivalent of the same thing—

Secretary KISSINGER. That is correct.

Senator BAKER [continuing]. Or to postpone that until the next negotiations. You recommend that it is more likely to succeed if we reserve that for negotiations in SALT III, but only if we go ahead with the weapons development program now that will help redress the military imbalance that has occurred in the last few years.

Secretary KISSINGER. Absolutely; that is the absolute condition.

Senator BAKER. Dr. Kissinger, those are extraordinarily important ideas. They are ideas that I would like to consider fully in the course of the next few days and weeks.

I would like to conclude this round, Mr. Chairman, by expressing to Dr. Kissinger again my appreciation for a well thought out and highly important statement of these considerations.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Biden?

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, Mr. Secretary.

As usual, your statements are thorough and provocative. I am not sure that I completely understand what I see to be some of the inconsistencies, which I would like to explore, if I could.

If your assessment of the relative posture of the U.S. military capability is correct, and the reasons for this shift relative to the Soviet Union are correct, then Vietnam did a great deal more damage to our national security and future than even I thought it did, and I have been consistently opposed to that policy as a student and as a Senator.

In listening to you today discuss predictions of cataclysm, it seems to me the cataclysmic predictions we hear from witnesses somehow increase after a political cataclysm has occurred regarding that witness. In other words, the political cataclysm is, you are

out of office, and the predictions of cataclysm have seemed to escalate.

You have said that you would oppose SALT, that is, vote against it unless the conditions you suggested are met. If you were a Senator, and I know you have never entertained that thought, but that is, if you were—

[General laughter.]

CONDITIONS FOR RATIFYING SALT II

Senator BIDEN. Now, the conditions you have stated seem to fall into two categories. The first concerns a number of clarifying measures relating to provisions of the treaty: Our intent to carry out military cooperation with our allies, the noncircumvention clause, and the termination of the protocol. Quite frankly, I do not find these a very significant aspect of your testimony.

The reason I say that is, I am already confident that the Senate is going to adopt all of these. As a matter of fact, on the second day of the hearing, I for one and many others introduced reservations or amendments, whatever you would like to call them, that specifically take that into effect. I think the administration is totally unrealistic if it thinks there is any prospect of passage of this treaty without those reservations or a version of them being adopted.

The second category of concern which you have expressed is your condition that a special augmented program be launched to improve our strategic arsenal. Now, this is going to be a significant gesture, symbolic and practical, but I am not sure exactly what you want.

You mention the B-1 bomber repeatedly, but the B-1 bomber in any of the military testimony I have heard will not in any way allow our ICBM vulnerability problem, nor given our ability to put ALCM's on B-52 and other ALCM carriers, will the B-1 improve our counterforce capability.

What else do you want? You have indicated the M-X. We are already moving ahead with the M-X, with the Mark 12A warhead for the Minuteman missile, with the cruise missile, and with the Trident. The fact is, we are moving rapidly to render the Soviet arsenal in the mid-to-late eighties much more vulnerable to a first strike than our arsenal would be because ours is more diversified, if you will. Our Trident is deployed in a way that makes us less vulnerable by the mid-to-late eighties than the Soviets will be with 70 percent of their force in their land-based ICBM's.

So, I think you would probably be able to vote with confidence knowing now what I have just told you for the SALT agreement because I think all of those things that you have spoken of are clearly in motion. If you talk about this binding commitment with respect to our defense budget, as you well know, the way the operation works here, certain things are already in the mix.

First of all, the 1979 supplemental has already been completed. Second, the Senate has completed action on the 1980 authorization bill, and it is almost identical to the \$135 billion which the administration requested. The House Armed Services Committee has reported the bill and in the process has added about \$2 billion. The House Appropriations Committee is currently marking up the 1980 defense appropriations, and so on and so on.

So, the mechanism by which we would get the binding commitment that has been suggested is well underway, if not completed. It would be an extraordinary procedure—and I do not understand how it would work—to be able to do what I think is fair to say we have already done. We have done all of the things that you suggest are important. There is one caveat.

I sit on the Budget Committee, and it was the Congress and not the President which reduced this defense budget. The President wanted 3 percent real growth. Some may argue that it is 4 or 5. The President came forward with a 3-percent real-growth request. The Congress said, no, we are not going to do that, so we can in fact turn around our own actions, it seems to me.

ABILITY TO NEGOTIATE TREATY BASED ON U.S. SUPERIORITY

Specifically, I am confused by your comments about rough equivalence. I think I will at least paraphrase if not quote you. You said rough equivalence is a strategy that we should not follow. Now, how can we have a contractual agreement, if that is what the SALT agreement is, with a party when ahead of time we say we want an agreement that will clearly insure that you are inferior to us, that we are strategically superior, but yet we want you to agree? Isn't that inconsistent with the concept of SALT which you so articulately argued and formulated?

CONCERNS ABOUT PROTOCOL EXTENSION

Secretary KISSINGER. Senator, first with respect to your view about the amendments or reservations that I put forward, I do not consider they are disqualified by the fact that you agree with them, and have even thought of some of them ahead of time. I have attempted to phrase the relationship of the protocol's continuation, I think, in a more specific way than the amendments that I have seen before the committee which require that the protocol cannot be extended except by the agreement with the Senate.

I am saying that the protocol in its present form should not be extended, and that the cruise missile limitations should be absorbed in a negotiation on theater nuclear balances, which is a somewhat more precise definition of it.

Senator BIDEN. That is precisely what the administration has said publicly, isn't it? Maybe we shouldn't take them at their word, but the administration publicly has said, that the United States will not discuss theater systems such as the cruise missile except in the context of reciprocal theater reductions and will not extend the protocol except with the concurrence of the Senate and our allies and in the context of TNF.

Secretary KISSINGER. But our allies could again be in the same position that they are now, where they are confronted with a negotiation in which, for example, one has traded the cruise missiles for some additional reduction in Soviet strategic forces, and thereby we magnify the distinction between our allies and ourselves.

My concern here is not to attempt to demonstrate who has thought of what first.

Senator BIDEN. I did not mean to suggest that it was.

Secretary KISSINGER. My concern is to indicate what I think is required. If it is as easy as you suggest, then we will be in better shape than I think we are.

MEANING OF ROUGH EQUIVALENCE

Now, since I see the yellow light, I would like to make a point about rough equivalence. I did not say we cannot accept rough equivalence. I am saying the rough equivalence to which the administration witnesses referred is a rough equivalence in the capacity of destroying industrial targets and civilian populations. It is not a rough equivalence in the capacity to destroy military targets.

Senator BIDEN. Oh, sure, it is. Their ICBM is more vulnerable with the Mark 12A's coming on in 1983, the cruise missile, the ALCM, the SLCM, the GLCM's, the whole works, the Soviets are going to be considerably more vulnerable.

Secretary KISSINGER. Senator, pardon me. ALCM is not useful as a counterforce weapon.

Senator BIDEN. But it has the capability of hard targeting kill.

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, it has the theoretical capability, but it takes 12 hours to get there.

Senator BIDEN. The Mark 12A doesn't, and that can knock them out right now.

Secretary KISSINGER. There will be, at best, 1,500 of those on the 500 Minutemen, which makes it about one for each Soviet missile, which most people will tell you is not adequate.

Senator BIDEN. 820.

Secretary KISSINGER. But you also have to count the single warhead missiles. There are 820 MIRVed missiles, but 1,460 is the total number of land-based missiles.

All I am saying is, rough equivalence is calculated by the doctrine of assured destruction, which in turn is based on the destruction of civilian populations, and that, I think, is a strategy that should not be pursued. And when both sides have reached that point, then I think they should not execute that strategy but should rely on other balances; namely, theater and conventional balances.

It is that which I meant, and not that we must be superior and they must be inferior as a result of SALT. No negotiator can negotiate one into a position of superiority that is not voluntarily accepted by the other side.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger. My time is up.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Helms?

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Kissinger, I welcome you to the committee and thank you for your testimony. It is very scholarly, and is very thoughtfully done.

I want to read it again, because my first impression of it is such that it reminds me of the man who was struggling to find something nice to say about the next door neighbor, and he said for a fat lady she don't sweat much. [General laughter.]

SALT II SENT BACK FOR MEANINGFUL REDUCTIONS

Senator HELMS. I believe that is your impression of the SALT II Treaty. You are exactly right about noncircumvention. I was in London earlier this month, and they are exceedingly concerned. If we do not do anything else right, we had certainly better spell out what we mean about this.

I also appreciate your comments about rough equivalency. I hope the American people will understand exactly what you are saying.

Now, you indicated that what we need to do is to build strategic equality to prevent the absolutely unacceptable condition in the 1980's wherein our land-based missiles are in jeopardy. It appears that there is another way, and that is to have a treaty where meaningful reductions are made, where neither side can put the other's strategic forces in jeopardy.

Of course, if this is done, this Nation could avoid the massive outlay of funds that will be required to build the strategic equality about which we talk.

Mr. Secretary, my question is this. Do you feel really that there would be any significant loss to our security if the Senate sent this treaty back and asked forcefully for meaningful reductions? What would be the hazards of rejecting this treaty and saying to the world that we must start reducing nuclear capability and stop the arms race?

Secretary KISSINGER. First, on the strategic side, there are two dangers. One is the danger to our land-based missiles. I do not believe that the Soviets will exercise that capability against our land-based missiles, except that it will give them greater confidence in the handling of regional crises, some sought by them, some developing out of revolutionary situations.

So, even if a strategic equivalence were achieved, we would still have the serious problem of how to remedy the various regional balances around the world that have arisen.

Second, I believe that under current circumstances it will not be possible to negotiate reductions unless we are seen to be building. The danger that I see in the course you propose is that it will lead to a protracted negotiation during which current SALT limits will be observed, and at the end of which, if it fails, we will be right back to where we are today, under perhaps even more adverse circumstances.

UNITED STATES-U.S.S.R. ECONOMIES STRAIN UNDER MASSIVE MILITARY BUILDUP

Senator HELMS. The economies of both the United States and the Soviet Union are in rather desperate circumstances in terms of inflation and other aspects of a weakened economy. Is that not correct? Neither side, Dr. Kissinger, really can afford in the normal set of circumstances a great thrust in arms building.

Is that not essentially correct?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, I think we can afford it better than they can.

Senator HELMS. True. This would make more valid our saying to the world that this Nation is ready to start arms reduction. Now, you were quite effective in explaining to the world various matters of foreign policy. Is this not the time, Mr. Secretary, for the United States to take the lead and say, let's stop this insanity and we will go first, hand in hand with the Soviet Union? How could we lose on a proposition like that?

Secretary KISSINGER. Because I think as a practical matter it would be impossible to explain to the American people that we are turning this down in order to get arms reduction, while at the same time—what would be our military program that goes with it, if I might ask?

Senator HELMS. Oh, I would have the same condition that you stated so eloquently in your statement. There are all sorts of ways to send that signal, as you know.

Secretary KISSINGER. Under the military conditions that I have outlined, I believe we can negotiate arms reductions under SALT II conditions. I certainly agree that the Senate should attach the strongest recommendation to the administration that the purpose of SALT should be reduction.

Now, the question that you and I are discussing is whether that is best accomplished by sending SALT II back or whether it is best accomplished by ratifying SALT II with the various conditions attached and then insisting that the preeminent objective of SALT III must be that the reductions to military programs that we are recommending would be, as I understand it, substantially identical.

Under those conditions, I would lean toward ratification.

Senator HELMS. With those conditions?

Secretary KISSINGER. Yes, with my conditions. I have already indicated that I would not lean toward it in the absence of a major defense program by the United States plus all of the clarifying amendments that I have proposed.

Senator HELMS. But without your conditions, you hold your position stated earlier this morning of no ratification?

Secretary KISSINGER. That is correct.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Secretary, again, I commend you for your statement, and I want to thank you publicly for your great helpfulness in connection with the Rhodesian problem. You have been immensely helpful. I know it took courage for you to take some of the positions that you have taken, and I want to thank you for that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Helms.

Senator Glenn?

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

NEED FOR MILITARY BUILDUP STRESSED

Mr. Secretary, these buildups that you have talked about that the Soviets are making have been going on for a very long time. They did not just occur in the last 2½ years since you have been out of office. Why were you not stressing the need for these buildups as strenuously prior to your departure from office as you are today? What has changed in this interim period?

Secretary KISSINGER. I think when the internal records of the administrations in which I served become public, as seems to be the destiny of all classified documents these days—

[General laughter.]

Senator GLENN. Intentionally or unintentionally, too.

Secretary KISSINGER [continuing]. It will be clear that I consistently from 1969 on warned against the danger that would arise for the United States under the doctrine of assured destruction and under the doctrine in which strategic equivalence is defined by the relative capability of destroying civilian populations and industrial targets.

We suffered severe inhibitions partly as a result of the military program we inherited, partly as the result of the divisions caused

by the Vietnam war in which our military budget proposals were slashed by some \$35 billion over a 4-year period. So, I believe that it is fair to say that my theoretical position at least was consistent.

Now, in addition, I have been profoundly disturbed by the Soviet geopolitical offensive as it has developed since 1975, in other words, preceding the current administration. I was hoping in 1972 that when we coupled SALT I with a declaration of principles of conduct, both of these documents might serve as a charter for the next period, and lead to a slowing down of the arms buildup on both sides and above all, lead to restrained conduct in international affairs.

As late as 1974, at Vladivostok, our intelligence estimates were that the Soviets would not develop a counterforce capability against the United States until about 1985, 1986. That turned out to be overoptimistic. But starting in 1975, we have been confronted with a more rapid pace of Soviet technology, a major geopolitical offensive by the Soviet Union, plus the abandonment of some of the programs that were going on, plus the maturing of trends that preceded this administration, that took a long time to reach their present state.

So, it would be wrong to blame any one administration.

SOVIETS' CONTINUED BUILDING OF STRATEGIC FORCES

Senator GLENN. You previously expressed yourself, I believe, that you felt there was a limit above which it did not pay to build more strategic nuclear weapons, and felt that the Soviets probably would limit themselves to such a self-imposed limitation also, I suppose, just on cost-effectiveness. When did it become clear to you that at least the Soviets did not share this theory and they would keep right on building their strategic forces?

Was there any one incident or any one time that led you to see a change in their view?

Secretary KISSINGER. Until 1974, they really did not have any MIRV's. When they continued to push the development of the SS-17's, 18's, and 19's, and kept working on the accuracy of their missiles and on the throw weight, and when they pushed against at least the spirit of what we had in mind in the 1972 agreement with respect to the conversion of "light" to "heavy" missiles, one really could interpret that only in terms of an intention to achieve a counterforce capability against the United States. I think this began to dawn on me in 1975.

TREATY BASED ON LAUNCHERS RATHER THAN DELIVERABLE WARHEADS

Senator GLENN. Why did we make the treaty based on launchers rather than on deliverable nuclear warheads?

Secretary KISSINGER. Because when SALT I was negotiated, we were dealing initially with single warhead systems.

Senator GLENN. But we had MIRV's under development and knew that they did, too, at that time.

Secretary KISSINGER. That is right. I suppose that this is one of the legacies of a period in which technology outran us.

Senator GLENN. You mentioned in your statement a changed direction a little bit. Let me say that I hope in any future SALT—

SALT III, IV, V, or VI—that they do deal specifically with deliverable nuclear warheads. What we are faced with now is a rather preposterous situation that under a strategic arms limitation treaty we would be permitted to build 50 percent beyond what we have now theoretically; they can triple their strength and still be within the treaty, so it does become a little incongruous here that we are calling this strategic arms limitation, and that is all it is. It is finally putting a cap where there was no cap before, but it is tremendously above anything that we had hoped for.

Secretary KISSINGER. I think deliverable warheads is a much better criterion than launchers.

Senator GLENN. Yes. You mentioned that the administration had perhaps pressured our allies some. That portion of your statement, as I read it, inferred that perhaps our allies really did not want this treaty as much as we had been led to believe and that their public statements had indicated. Would you follow up on that?

Secretary KISSINGER. I think our allies are extremely ambivalent about the treaty. They do not want the treaty to fail.

Senator GLENN. Now, their leadership's statements have not been particularly ambivalent.

ALLIES ARE AMBIVALENT ABOUT TREATY

Secretary KISSINGER. I can only give you my impression, which may be incorrect, and my impression is that there is considerable ambivalence, that they do not want the treaty to fail. It would create a real crisis of confidence if the treaty failed. I completely agree with that statement. On the other hand, they are also deeply worried about the military balance. They are putting these two things into two different baskets, and it is quite possible that a year from now they will blame us for conditions of the military balance even when we have carried out their recommendations with respect to the treaty.

All I am suggesting is that the relationship with our allies is more complicated. But without doubt, nonratification of the treaty would have a negative impact on our allies. And I am proposing a means by which we can avoid both the negative impact of an unfavorable military balance and the unfavorable impact of nonratification.

SOVIETS TO ABIDE BY SALT IF WE CAN MONITOR

Senator GLENN. I know we are putting a tremendous effort these days into recouping, getting back some of the information sources regarding monitoring, has caused much of the verification problem. You mentioned that just in a couple of sentences in your statement but then you put more emphasis on it by following up and saying that every 2 years the Senate should reassess whether they are complying with the treaty or not and revote on it again, which would be a very drastic change in how we have ever operated under any treaty before.

Evidently, you do not trust them very much to live up to this unless we can monitor it, and I hope with some of the developments going on now we can monitor this also. Would you care to elaborate on that?

Secretary KISSINGER. There are two separate things. I think the Senate ought to view at regular intervals, as the Intelligence Committee would do anyway, the verification problem with respect to

SALT. I, myself, am not an expert on the verification issue, and while I have had a briefing on it, I really do not feel confident to pass a judgment.

I think the judgment should be made by the Intelligence Committee and by what other committees review our verification capabilities. What I would like the Senate to review every 2 years are the principles of international conduct which I think need to be spelled out, and which would be an attempt to go back to what we agreed to in 1972, to make sure that political restraint and military restraint go hand in hand.

CONCENTRATING ON MILITARY TARGETS RATHER THAN POPULATION CENTERS

Senator GLENN. I see that my time is almost up, but I would like to comment on your view regarding concentrating on military targets and keeping away from population centers. War is not very pleasant, as everybody knows. When you go to the Soviet Union these days, the first thing they tell you when you get there, and you still hear it when you leave in speech after speech after speech, is how they lost 20 million people in World War II.

They talk about the buffer states and the Eastern European states, and a lot of their policy regarding Europe apparently stems from their paranoia about never having a Napoleon or Hitler come into the Soviet Union. I think they are most concerned about that. I would submit that our possible inaccuracies, as you described them, with our submarine weapons, with the SLBM's and all, is not a disadvantage. I think if the Soviets know that if they are so stupid as to make any attack on this country, that they can fully expect to lose not 20 million people but perhaps 150 million people or more out of their population, that may be our biggest deterrent to them ever making such a crazy move.

Secretary KISSINGER. My concern is also for an attack on the United States. But I do not believe they would attack the territory of the United States without feeling that they are running an unacceptable risk. My concern is the gradual undermining of security on a global basis. I would hate to see the American President in a position where he has to decide to initiate what amounts to the mutual mass extermination of civilians as the only means of protecting overseas commitments of the United States. That is my concern.

Senator GLENN. I would agree with that, but I think the Soviets should be well advised by any U.S. President that if they are crazy enough to take the Nitze scenario and make the first strike on this country, that the retaliation is going to be mammoth and horrendous and across the board on the Soviet Union.

Secretary KISSINGER. That is clear, but a first strike against the United States I would put very low in the category of dangers, except insofar as the consciousness of the capability gives them greater confidence in the management of local crises.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hayakawa?

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Kissinger, let me thank you, first of all, for your presentation. I always enjoy the texture of your thought, the stately procession of your sentences and paragraphs, and the way it all weaves together, its logic. I must say, I enjoy it very much.

NO AMENDMENTS OR CHANGES IN SALT TREATY

Let me start out by asking a broad and elementary kind of question. Why is it that the Soviets and our President are so united in insisting that there can be no amendments or changes in the SALT Treaty? I must say I am puzzled by this either or proposition that says, in effect, that we either ratify this treaty as written and thereby proceed toward SALT III and peace, or reject it at the risk of increased hostilities and war.

Are these indeed the only alternatives before us?

Secretary KISSINGER. Of course, any group of national leaders who have negotiated over an extended period of time, and who know all the agonies through which they went to achieve the balance of compromises which constitutes any major document, are going to be massively reluctant to alter it.

Obviously, they believe, or they would not have signed it, that this balance of compromises represents the best that is attainable, and indeed I found myself in that position. Second, I suppose it also involves a question of prestige, whether once one has gone through this whole question of negotiation, it should be reopened.

On the other hand, I have indicated certain areas which do not require renegotiation but which do require some changes unilaterally on our side, which I believe are necessary.

SKEPTICISM OF EFFECTIVENESS OF TREATY NEGOTIATORS

Senator HAYAKAWA. Well, Foy Kohler, who is the former Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., has been very critical of the negotiating process. He says that Americans tend to look in negotiations for a common ground, whereas the Soviet negotiator is not interested in a common ground, but simply in getting his way, and he gives away only as much as is necessary, so that we approach negotiation with different assumptions, different ideas in our heads, and General Rowny has also testified as to his skepticism about the effectiveness of American negotiators in this treaty.

Do you have reason from your past diplomatic experience, Dr. Kissinger, to have similar doubts?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, I think that American negotiators tend to come from an environment in which there are no irreconcilable differences domestically, and therefore they find it very difficult as a national phenomenon to deal with dedicated revolutionaries who prefer success to compromise. American negotiators have a tendency to believe that they have an obligation to break every deadlock with a new idea. This has the strange consequence of putting a premium on intransigence, because it tempts the other side to wait to see what our impatience will produce in the way of new ideas as the negotiation continues.

Our negotiators have a tendency to believe that if two parties disagree, the truth is found somewhere in the middle, which has the paradoxical consequence of really rewarding extreme positions

in order to make the compromise proposal come as close to the middle position. All of this one can say really is a national characteristic, which one could trace through negotiations over an extended period of time. I would say that the major Soviet negotiating asset in my experience is not diabolical cleverness, which is often presented, but persistence. They adopt an idea and they keep sticking to it, and they are not embarrassed to repeat it year after year after year, until we just get tired of it, and we are told, at home: "Come on, now, change your position a little bit," and then we are on the road that you have described.

LINKAGE BETWEEN SALT AND SOVIET GEOPOLITICAL CONDUCT

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you very much.

With Senator Baker, I am very grateful to you for bringing up this whole linkage question. As you point out in your statement, the Cubans have been romping all over Angola, Ethiopia, and around Africa. They have gone into Afghanistan, South Yemen, and so on, and you enumerate numerous instances of the continuation of the cold war.

You say that recent political conduct of the Soviet Union and its allies, whether cold war or opportunism, must be ended if there are to be any prospects for East-West coexistence or cooperation. I would like to ask you, Dr. Kissinger, how can we put muscle into that demand if such conduct must be ended?

In your statement, you propose a vigorous expression regarding linkage, a vigorous expression of the sense of linkage between SALT and the Soviet geopolitical conduct. What do you mean then by vigorous expression? How vigorous can it really be to guarantee any kind of Soviet compliance?

Secretary KISSINGER. You cannot be vigorous in guaranteeing Soviet compliance but you can be vigorous in expressing your view as to what constitutes acceptable conduct and assessing some penalties for noncompliance. Who would have thought it possible 10 years ago that in policy discussions it would be said that we must do this or that in Africa lest Cuban troops intervene? Whatever other arguments might have been used. The idea that a small Caribbean country would send expeditionary forces all over the world, supplied, trained, equipped, and financed by the Soviet Union, that Soviet airplanes are in Cuba flying air defense missions so that Cuban airplanes can be in Africa, not to speak of East German military and police instructors all over the Middle East and Africa, is a disturbance and a challenge to any sense of international conduct and any concept of *détente*. And it cannot be even in the long-term Soviet interest that this be continued, because sooner or later somebody is going to resist, and then the danger of a confrontation is increased.

This is what I mean by linkage. Linkage is not an invention of a particular administration, of a particular individual. It either reflects reality or it does not. I do not see how we can speak only of restraint in arms and not about restraint in international conduct. Soviet conduct has been in my view, at least since 1975, unacceptable. Every war since 1971 has been started by Soviet arms, encouraged by Soviet friendship treaties, protected by Soviet vetoes, or

been fought by Soviet proxies. Some end must be put to this process.

Senator HAYAKAWA. So at the same time, as Senator Baker said, we are asked by Brezhnev to look at the treaty around the four corners of the piece of paper on which it is written and to think of nothing else. Dr. Kissinger, this seems to me to require of us a level of schizophrenia of which I am hardly capable, to think of the Soviets in one respect totally independently of thinking of the Soviets in the other respect.

Dr. Kissinger, thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Hayakawa.

TENDENCIES OF U.S. NEGOTIATORS TO MOVE TO MIDDLE GROUND

Dr. Kissinger, I was fascinated with your analysis of the national character and the tendency of our negotiators to exhibit impatience and to move toward the middle ground. Were these tendencies which afflicted our negotiations with the Soviet Union while you were presiding over them?

Secretary KISSINGER. I think it is fair to say that the pressures on any Secretary of State in that direction are very great, and the temptations of any Secretary of State in that direction must always be guarded against. This is the conventional advice one tends to receive. And it does not reflect the worst qualities in the American character, either. I tried to guard against them, but I would not exclude that I, too, felt subject to them from time to time.

The CHAIRMAN. And you feel every Secretary of State is confronted with that problem?

Secretary KISSINGER. I think it is a national characteristic.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Stone?

Senator STONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MAJOR SOVIET GEOPOLITICAL OFFENSIVE SINCE 1975

Dr. Kissinger, in these hearings the issue of the Soviets' refusal to consider reductions in this SALT II process has been raised. It looks unyielding. The issue of our own increase in arms strength in order to reduce our vulnerability and redress the balance has been raised, and the issue of verification has been raised here by Senator Glenn and others.

As for me, I have pursued one of the thrusts of your main testimony here today. That has to do with Soviet conduct in the world and our response to it. What good is verification if we find the Soviets pushing, probing, and going over the line and we do little, if anything, about it? What good is having valid military offsetting strength if they push and we yield?

I want to discuss this in general, and then I want to discuss this in particular with regard to the Soviets in Cuba and the Cuban situation, particularly in the light of the negotiation you had in 1970 regarding the submarine servicing.

In general, you have described today that since 1975, you have seen the Soviets conduct a major geopolitical offensive, mainly through Soviet weapons and proxies in regional theaters, and to a very great extent through the use of Cuban forces as those proxies.

You stated in your presentation that no democracy can court conflict, and I could not agree with you more. Then you said that all of the conflicts and issues that have been thrust upon the world in recent years have been at the initiative of the Soviets in connection with this geopolitical offensive. What response is practical to that kind of a major geopolitical offensive, apart from or in addition to our redressing the military balance by our own increase in investments?

Secretary KISSINGER. Without an adequate military balance there is no possibility of doing anything. Second, the use of proxy forces must be made too costly, both to the proxies and to the instigator, by attaching clear penalties to such conduct and increasing the risks for the proxy in the area where he is operating. It is very hard to make abstract statements, but I find the proposition hard to accept that Cuban forces should be invincible.

Senator STONE. If they are not opposed, then they are invincible.

Secretary KISSINGER. If they are not opposed, but if they are opposed, you cannot require a huge amount of opposition to resist them.

SOVIET CONSTRUCTION OF NAVAL BASE IN CUBA

Senator STONE. Mr. Secretary, in regard to the Soviet presence in Cuba, in a letter to me released publicly Friday by the Secretary of State, he describes an agreement entered into in communications between the two governments in the fall of 1970 concerning the establishment of Soviet naval bases in Cuba, and then says: "We have no evidence that the Soviets are in violation of this understanding."

Does that exchange of communications establish a commitment by the Soviet Union that the Soviets will not construct a naval base in Cuba sufficient to service Soviet submarines or only Soviet nuclear powered submarines, or only Soviet submarines carrying nuclear missiles.

Secretary KISSINGER. I do not have the text of the documents in front of me, so it is very difficult for me to answer what a textual analysis would show. The concern which we felt in 1970 was that the Soviets were developing a capability from which to service submarines carrying nuclear missiles in Cienfuegos. Those submarines as a practical matter happened to be all nuclear powered, with a few exceptions. But what concerned us was the capability of nuclear missile-carrying submarines, and the understanding which we sought and in my belief achieved was the prevention of servicing submarines carrying nuclear missiles.

What the exact phraseology is, I do not know. I just do not have the text before me.

Senator STONE. Mr. Secretary, would an occasional port call of a Soviet submarine which is carrying nuclear missiles violate that understanding?

Secretary KISSINGER. As in every agreement with the Soviet Union, as soon as you make it, you find that it is constantly being tested. That understanding or exchange was reached in the fall of 1970. From the fall of 1970, then, until about May 1971 the Soviets tried just about every combination that the human mind can imag-

ine except the crucial combination of a submarine tender and a nuclear missile-carrying submarine.

We violently protested every encroachment on the understanding even when there was no such combination. The concern was that the submarine tenders would service the missile-carrying submarines. And they would try out various combinations. We protested strongly the individual arrival of these ships even when not in combination, and then, to the best of my recollection, after May 1971 there was no further attempt to test the limits of that understanding during the term of my incumbency. I do not remember that we had any other occasion to protest it, but I don't have all the evidence in front of me. That is my recollection of it.

Senator STONE. I understand. I will read now again from Secretary Vance's letter to me of Friday. The essential understanding is that "the Soviets agreed in 1962 that offensive weapons could not again be introduced into Cuba? In 1970, it was made clear that this understanding included sea-based systems." Would you agree with that?

Secretary KISSINGER. Yes.

Senator STONE. Therefore, does it make any difference if a Soviet submarine carrying nuclear missiles claims that it is on port call and stays for several weeks or claims that it is not being serviced and stays for several months?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, we had a tendency to protest such actions as maybe within the verbal limits of the understanding but against its spirit. But I have no independent knowledge whether this is taking place.

Secretary STONE. Dr. Kissinger, is there an increasing risk of Cuban export of revolution to Central America and countries outside of it, in addition to Nicaragua, and does that pose a security threat to the United States and its allies and friends?

Secretary KISSINGER. I am not sure that Nicaragua should be conceived as a direct export of the Cuban—

Secretary STONE. No; outside of Nicaragua. I do not mean from Nicaragua.

Secretary KISSINGER. I think there is a danger that as the radical elements in Central America gain ascendancy, they will tend to look toward Cuba for training, political leadership, military leadership, and that in this sense the combination of certain events in the Caribbean, events in Nicaragua, raise disturbing prospects for the stability of Central America and indeed the northern rim of Latin America.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly, Senator Stone.

Senator Lugar, please.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

LIKELIHOOD OF CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL FOR MILITARY MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

Dr. Kissinger, earlier in the conversation this morning, you took issue with what we have been doing in our own ball park, and said an obligatory commitment was required that would make certain we proceeded with our needed defense plans and modernization.

Senator Javits in the questioning picked that up and asked, why should we have a debate among ourselves or with ourselves on this situation? You have pointed out we could have been doing these things all along, and your comment does imply a degree of mistrust or unease about our will really to proceed in doing so.

Now, in addition to that, we have had questions this morning that tended to ratify that sense of unease. My colleagues Senator Pell and Senator McGovern, as I understood them, pointed out that the price that you were suggesting was too high, and you protested it was not a price, that this was a policy, things that we ought to be doing. They are interpreting it as a price, suggesting, as I recall Senator Pell's comments, that we might have 20-percent inflation as a price to pay for this treaty, for example, or further energy crisis in the country.

Is it not a fact that as you witness this hearing, as you take a look at debate in America today, that there is in fact a real debate in this committee, there is a certain lack of trust, really, within our group as to whether we would proceed with the defense modernization if we had a quick signing or ratification of the SALT Treaty, and is it not a fact that right here in the hearing or in the ratification process we must determine what our political will will be?

In essence, what is your perception right now as to the likelihood that the administration, or as Senator Biden has pointed out, even if the administration suggests the 3-percent increase, that the Congress would proceed with the modernization you have suggested, if this is not battened down before the SALT is ratified?

Secretary KISSINGER. I believe that if present strategic conditions continue, the United States faces a very grave danger in the 1980's. The problem in many parts of the world, including, for example, the Middle East, is doubt on the part of those who have heretofore relied on us in our ability to protect them against the dangers that they are facing. Since many of their energy decisions really are a price they pay for their protection, for example, in countries like Saudi Arabia, there is a greater danger of an energy crisis as a result of perceived American impotence than as a result of building up our strength.

My suggestions arise from my conviction that we must move to remedy these dangers, however they arose, as rapidly as possible, and that we must give a clear signal to the world as rapidly as possible, and that this provides the opportunity to do it.

I fear if we do not do it in conjunction with this treaty, this opportunity will be lost.

Senator LUGAR. Dr. Kissinger, I agree with your analysis, but the fact of life as I perceive this debate is that many people do not. In other words, you are presenting a clear warning to the country but if your analysis were unanimously agreed to by this committee, by the Senate, by the President of the United States, indeed, by the country, people would already be moving.

The point I am trying to raise in this question is that I perceive a lot of people do not believe you. They are saying your analysis is very interesting, but all things considered, let's get on and ratify this treaty, and do a little better if we can with SALT III and let's modernize here and there as we are doing. In fact, the sequence

you are suggesting is radically different, and in fact, if I heard you correctly, you are saying that you have such a mistrust really of where we are headed right now that those of us who are seriously concerned as you are had better get this thing signed and signed among ourselves. In return for our support we are going to have modernization, that that is the quid pro quo for willy-nilly going on with the treaty, which might otherwise be almost irrelevant. Is that not so?

Secretary KISSINGER. That is correct. First of all, I am not talking about modernization of strategic forces. I am talking really about a combination of strategic doctrine and an overall strengthening of our military forces beyond those that are covered by the SALT Treaty.

Senator LUGAR. Could you describe that a little more explicitly?

Secretary KISSINGER. As I have already pointed out, I believe that even if we fix some of the imbalances that now exist in the strategic equation, this will still not restore the situation as it existed in the 1950's and 1960's, because the numbers of strategic weapons that have grown on both sides are so large that the risk of regional conflict, and of the sort of pressure that we have been witnessing in the last few years, is bound to multiply over the next few years, and may in not too long a time even reach traditional allies in Europe. Therefore, we must be prepared to deal with the theater balances side by side with the strategic balance.

If I am right and we do not do anything, we are running a grave risk to our national security. If I am wrong, I do not think that we are running anything like that risk in following my course.

Senator LUGAR. Are you suggesting now that in this 5-year plan the administration might present to the Senate in the next month or in the next 2 months that these theater weapons, the theater buildup, the overall aspect of defense could be presented in a comprehensive form so that we had in essence a debate and an agreement that this is our 5-year plan before we get on to the ratification of SALT?

Secretary KISSINGER. I believe that the administration is in any event already working on a 5-year program. Secretary Vance yesterday indicated that he wants a 3-percent increase. The difficulty with the previous formula, the 3-percent increase, has been that there has been no agreement as to the baseline. There has been no agreement as to how you compute inflation rates. There has been dispute about the allowances you make for productivity and so forth. So in fact it has amounted to less than a 1-percent increase, and in some categories even, a reduction of forces.

So, I think it ought to be possible for the administration to put before the Senate in a conceptual way what it is attempting to do in the world strategically, what kind of forces it thinks it needs, and to translate those into a 5-year program.

In that way, one would understand what the 3 percent means, or whether it should be 4 percent or 2.5 percent. This I am in no position to judge. But major shortcomings now exist which will produce a serious danger in the eighties, and have already produced enormous instabilities.

The fact that every nation, every ally is acting like an ostrich and attempting to avoid the problem only will make the eventual

crisis that much more serious when it hits us. This is the obligation of the Senate, I believe. This is the urgency, and not just the personal distrust of members of this committee for each other.

Senator LUGAR. Isn't it a fact, however, that the President is going to have very considerable political problems with this? For example, Ambassador Young to the United Nations suggested that the increased spending is just not in the cards as he sees it, given the domestic difficulties and promises of the President. The President is coming into a 1980 campaign, thinking about all the types of spending.

Does this not make it all the more critical, given their political problems, problems even within that particular party, that things be buttoned down with regard to the 5-year plan this year? If I can ask your advice in terms of negotiations, would it not be wise of some of us who are pursuing the course you have suggested to be patient, to be persistent, to say in essence that SALT does not have to occur next month or the month after or even 3 months from now, but that certain things must occur before two-thirds of the Senate will ratify this treaty?

Secretary KISSINGER. As I have already indicated, I would insist on a statement by the administration both conceptually and in detail of how it perceives the defense needs of the United States. The debate between the President and Ambassador Young can only be resolved in terms of what do we actually need. What is our defense plan? If we have certain requirements, then Ambassador Young's considerations have to be subordinated. If these requirements are excessive, then of course nobody wants to spend excessively for defense.

It is for this reason that I support those who have insisted on seeing the 5-year plan and some translation of it into concrete terms before ratification proceeds.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Lugar.

Senator Sarbanes is next.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

IS TREATY IN U.S. INTERESTS

If the clarifications that you referred to in your statement are included, do you consider the treaty in our interests?

Secretary KISSINGER. If it is coupled with the military program that I have indicated.

Senator SARBANES. I am not asking whether we should ratify it. I want to know whether the treaty, coupled with those clarifications, is in our interests.

Secretary KISSINGER. The thrust of my statement is that you cannot separate the treaty from the strategic environment, and therefore I would suggest that both are required, that we change the strategic environment. And in that context I would think the treaty would be in our interest.

Senator SARBANES. We could change our strategic environment without approving the treaty.

Secretary KISSINGER. That is also true.

Senator SARBANES. Is the treaty alone in our interests, with the clarifications?

Secretary KISSINGER. The treaty alone with the clarifications I would be very uneasy about, if it were not also coupled with a change in the strategic balance.

Senator SARBANES. I understand that, but I want to know whether you see the treaty itself with the clarifications as being disadvantageous to us. You discussed that in your statement.

Secretary KISSINGER. I have made it very clear in my statement that I agree with Senator Nunn and others who have indicated that they want to see the 5-year program before they can make a final judgment on the treaty. I am in the same position. I have indicated that with the appropriate strategic program and with the particular clarifications that I have indicated, I would support the treaty. I think that makes my position clear. I cannot separate it.

Senator SARBANES. In your statement you discuss some of the beneficial aspects of the SALT II agreement. Then you state that "a good case can be made for the proposition that in the absence of a treaty, the relative numbers would be even worse."

Secretary KISSINGER. Yes.

LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY TREATY

Senator SARBANES. Now, does the treaty impose limitations that are beneficial to us or does it impose limitations that you see as being harmful to us?

Secretary KISSINGER. I think if the treaty is perceived as ratifying the existing strategic environment, then I believe it would have a harmful effect. I believe if the treaty as it now stands, with the clarifications that I have recommended, if we were placed into a different strategic environment—then I would support it. I think, as I have pointed out in my statement, these achievements of the treaty are essentially irrelevant to the danger we face, and therefore do not alter the need for changing the strategic environment. They do not change the threat to our strategic forces. They do not change the threat to the regional balances. Probably no negotiation can achieve what unilateral efforts have not created the predicate for.

WOULD KISSINGER HAVE SIGNED SALT II

Senator SARBANES. Would you have closed on this treaty? Would you have signed off on it?

Secretary KISSINGER. This is a very difficult question to answer. I have continuously expressed my reservations about the protocol, for example, in all of my discussions with administration officials, who, incidentally, kept me generally briefed about the discussions. I am not here to criticize the signing of the treaty. I am addressing the question of the context in which ratification should take place.

Senator SARBANES. I understand that, but assuming those clarifications you mentioned had been negotiated, would you have signed the treaty and presented it to the Senate for our consideration?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, you see, in any administration in which I served, I would have opposed the unilateral changes in our defense program that took place since 1976, and therefore I would expect that the treaty would have come up under conditions of the military environment different from the ones that now exist. So it is very hard for me to answer the question in the abstract of what I would have done if I would have signed this. I am not objecting to the signing of it.

Senator SARBANES. Would you have signed it under the circumstances?

Secretary KISSINGER. If I had been in office and had had an influence over the military program, we would have had a different military program, and with that different military program—

Senator SARBANES. I understand that hypothetical. If you had had the clarifications that deal with the protocol and the noncircumvention provision, would you have now signed the treaty and presented it to the Senate?

Secretary KISSINGER. Yes, probably, but probably I would have then simultaneously asked for the changes in the military environment as an administration request. I think we have a real problem that is incumbent upon us.

STRATEGIC CHANGES OVER LAST SEVERAL YEARS

Senator SARBANES. I understand that. I am not dealing with that issue at the moment. What I want to try to understand is whether you perceive weaknesses in the terms of the treaty itself that make those terms in and of themselves harmful to our interests.

Secretary KISSINGER. I think the treaty has to be seen in the context of the Soviet geopolitical offensive that has taken place, and of the military crisis that we are facing. I am attempting to deal with all three issues simultaneously. It is therefore impossible for me to separate these issues.

Senator SARBANES. At the time of signing of SALT I, should there have been this agreed statement on our force status that you are asserting we should have now?

Secretary KISSINGER. At the time of the signing of SALT I, there was a totally different situation. First, at that time, we still had a considerable strategic superiority. Second, there had not been the massive geopolitical assault about which I am talking. Third, I would have welcomed at that time such an agreed statement—our difficulty then was to get any defense appropriations out of the Congress—but I would have welcomed that.

Indeed, we committed ourselves unilaterally to do certain things, accelerating certain programs as part of SALT I, which we then had great difficulty funding in subsequent years.

Senator SARBANES. In 1976, if you had worked out the cruise missile Backfire questions, would you have gone ahead to sign the treaty if you had not had the problems of an election year and a partisan issue?

Secretary KISSINGER. In 1976, I was in favor of the formula that we were negotiating in January which linked ship-launched cruise missiles to the Backfire, left ground-launched cruise missiles unconstrained, and therefore went beyond what I am proposing here as a solution. At that time, we still had the B-1, the M-X, and the Trident I and Trident II on a much more accelerated schedule. Under all of those circumstances, I would have proceeded.

Senator SARBANES. Despite the Soviet adventurism in Angola?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, it was a very marginal case. I began to feel very dubious in January 1976 about whether I should go into that negotiation. I went. It might have been a mistake to have gone. This was the first Soviet adventure of this kind. Since that time, we have had Ethiopia, Zaire, Afghanistan, South Yemen, Cambodia, and a whole collection of these moves.

So, we now face a much graver situation than we did then.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Secretary, I just want to go back to my opening question. I do not think you can totally intertwine the question of the merits of the treaty with these other two considerations you have raised and I will just underscore this by leaving you with this thought before we all go to vote. Suppose the Soviets foreswore adventurism, and suppose we carried out the military program you are suggesting. You still might vote against the treaty—

Secretary KISSINGER. No.

Senator SARBANES [continuing.] Whose terms were not acceptable?

Secretary KISSINGER. Oh, yes.

Senator SARBANES. Therefore you would have to make a judgment about the terms of the treaty.

Secretary KISSINGER. But my whole point, Senator, is, the terms of the treaty cannot be isolated, but have to be analyzed in terms of the strategic situation.

Senator SARBANES. You would not recommend a treaty to us whose terms you perceived as negative on the basis that that was balanced off and outweighed by a falling off in Soviet adventurism and an increase in the American arsenal, would you?

Secretary KISSINGER. The practical effect of any SALT Treaty, however cleverly negotiated, is to ratify the existing balance. If, therefore, I am uneasy about the existing balance, I am bound to be uneasy about the treaty, even if I otherwise agree with its terms.

Senator PELL [presiding]. The committee will recess for about 5 minutes, and then Senator Church will be back to preside.

[A recess was taken.]

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will please come back to order.

Senator Zorinsky is our next and last Senator for the first round of questioning.

Dr. Kissinger, Senators may wish a second round of questioning, and that questioning period should be limited to 5 minutes, depending upon how many Senators wish to ask questions. Otherwise, they would have the regular 10-minute period.

I would like to ascertain your own desires. Would you prefer to continue and complete your testimony or to break and come back this afternoon?

Secretary KISSINGER. Whichever is more convenient for the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee has two conferences with the House of Representatives this afternoon, one of which is to begin at 2 o'clock.

Secretary KISSINGER. Then you would probably prefer to finish it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; we would prefer to finish it.

Secretary KISSINGER. Then I would be happy to oblige.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Zorinsky.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Dr. Kissinger, to the committee.

STEPS RECOMMENDED TO HALT SOVIET ADVENTURISM

Dr. Kissinger, you refer to Soviet adventurism in the world remarking that it is not an acceptable state of affairs and cannot be

continued. You date that unacceptable state of affairs from 1975, 2 years before you left the State Department. What steps did you recommend in those 2 years to encourage a halt to Soviet adventurism?

Secretary KISSINGER. I, of course, sought to resist the Cuban efforts in Angola. We were prevented from doing so by various congressional actions. We wanted to support forces that were resisting. I thought that was a watershed decision in the postwar period. The Cuban forces did not show up in Angola until the fall of 1975, so in fact we did not have 2 years to deal with it; we only had 1 year, in effect, before the election, after which we were lame ducks and could not do anything anyway.

In that 1-year period, we then gradually froze all negotiations with the Soviet Union on other issues. But the major debacle was the inability to resist the Cubans in Angola, in my perception.

SPECIFICS OF REQUIRED PROGRAMS

Senator ZORINSKY. Dr. Kissinger, I am interested in your proposal that we should spell out what programs are needed to maintain strategic equivalence and express our determination to carry out such programs. Indeed, I have recommended that we do just that since the first day of these hearings.

How specific do you think the Senate should be in terms of listing the programs required and what items specifically would you include in that list as being essential for equivalence with the Soviet Union?

Secretary KISSINGER. I of course am not a technical military expert, and this is not a matter on which I should comment lightly. First, in terms of specificity, I think we need a 5-year program that indicates the kind of strategy that the administration envisions for the United States and some theoretical concept which addresses specifically the question of what happens under conditions of the relationship of strategic forces that are foreseeable for the 1980's, and what happens even if rough parity is achieved.

Senator ZORINSKY. Mr. Secretary, you are aware of an imbalance between this Nation and the Soviet Union, so therefore you must have a perception of what is needed.

Secretary KISSINGER. Senator, we need two things. We need a concept of what we are trying to do. Then we need some specific forces to try to meet that concept. I want to avoid just throwing weapons systems around. I think that for strategic forces we have one of two requirements. Either we need an equivalent counterforce capability against the Soviet Union, or they have to get rid of their counterforce capability against the United States.

Since I do not see the latter happening, I would therefore urge an accelerated deployment of M-X.

Senator ZORINSKY. Being fully cognizant that no administration can bind a future administration and no Congress can bind a future Congress, how do you perceive our ability in the U.S. Senate to lock in some of these suggestions that you have made?

Secretary KISSINGER. Of course, there is no safeguard against a President and Congress determined to act against what I consider the national interest, in their perception of the national interest. But let me put it more positively, I would think that the Congress,

having carefully considered the military position of the United States in relationship to the SALT Treaty, together with the administration, could articulate a program. This would be something that a future administration and a future Congress would take seriously. If they are determined to undo it, they will probably undo it. But that would certainly weigh heavily on the scale, and those members of the Congress who are of a different view would then be able to appeal to that prior determination.

To continue to answer your question, I think we need to do something on theater nuclear balances. I think we need to do something on the capacity of our conventional forces for regional defense. And I think in this our allies must make a larger effort or this whole enterprise is not going to be successful. But that part, of course, you cannot legislate here.

Senator ZORINSKY. Mr. Secretary, unfortunately, both you and I know that given the choice between national health insurance and doing some of these things we are speaking about doing now, that national health insurance could run a very strong first.

Secretary KISSINGER. It could then happen that by 1982, 1983, our national security would run a very strong second, and we will pay the sort of price that was paid in the thirties.

Senator ZORINSKY. I fear you may be right.

SURVIVABILITY OF NATO SHOULD SALT BE REJECTED

Secretary KISSINGER. My duty is to indicate what is needed. I recognize your problems with various constituencies.

Senator ZORINSKY. Mr. Secretary, let me ask you this question. The current Secretary of State was unable to give me a definitive answer, and replied "I don't know," but that being as it may, I thought maybe from your perspective you might tell me if NATO would be able to survive the nonratification of SALT II?

Secretary KISSINGER. Yes, I think NATO would survive the nonratification of SALT II because our allies in NATO are tied to us by their self-interest in having American protection in case of aggression. On the other hand, I agree with the Secretary of State, for whom I have a very high regard, that nonratification would have an unfortunate impact in many European countries, and would raise serious questions about the stability of our governmental processes. But so would a perceived military imbalance. That is our problem.

Senator ZORINSKY. From your contact with the nations of the NATO alliance, is it your assessment that they are supportive of the ratification of SALT II?

Secretary KISSINGER. They are in the same position I was in with Senator Sarbanes. If you press them to ratify or not ratify, separated from all contexts, they will say they are in favor of ratification, but they would also be deeply worried in my judgment about changes in the strategic balance. And they should not have that choice put to them. But there is no question in my mind that the European leaders would prefer ratification to nonratification.

Senator ZORINSKY. Were you aware that this Nation could not get the acceptance of the NATO nations to deploy the neutron bomb?

Secretary KISSINGER. Was I aware of that?

Senator ZORINSKY. Yes.

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, you see, Senator, this is one of those situations in which we are perceived to be doing and what we are perceived to want has a major impact. As the custodian of nuclear weapons for the alliance, we are putting our allies into a very difficult position if we ask them whether we should or should not deploy a weapon and leave it up to them without indicating a preference of our own.

Therefore, their reaction is apt to be a reflection of their perception of how firm we are in our determination. If we had said we intend to deploy this unless you object, I doubt seriously that we would have had an objection, at least not from Germany.

Senator ZORINSKY. Do you feel, then, that this Nation should take it upon itself to mandate where we do deploy these types of armaments?

Secretary KISSINGER. No, but I think with respect to nuclear weapons, in which we have almost a monopoly of experience, that we have a special responsibility of leadership. I think we are putting a heavy burden on allies, especially on the Germans, of asking them to take a positive step before we make a decision.

Senator ZORINSKY. I might point out that we cannot even find a State in this country that will accept the burial of nuclear wastes, let alone the deployment of something like the neutron bomb.

Secretary KISSINGER. There is no question that every country has major domestic problems. What we face is how long this can continue without somebody having to pay a price for it. It is not free.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, as we start the second round, and to accommodate Dr. Kissinger and all of our time, may I suggest that the second round be 5 minutes for each member?

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection?

[No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, each Senator will have 5 minutes.

Secretary KISSINGER. I don't know whether I can give an answer in 5 minutes. [General laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. As you have said, you do not get to the verb until then. [General laughter.]

FEASIBILITY OF OBLIGATORY COMMITMENT ON FUTURE CONGRESSES

Dr. Kissinger, you have talked about an obligatory commitment. We do not quite understand how an obligatory commitment can be made, because all of us appreciate that one Congress cannot bind another. We cannot put a handle on the future, but you have not been very precise about what we should commit ourselves to.

As I understand it, the administration is committed to the building of the Trident, a very big, new weapons program. We are committed to cruise missiles which will have a far better penetrating capacity than the B-1 and we are well ahead of the Soviets in that field. We are committed now to the M-X, which does have the capacity to strike and destroy the most hardened Soviet military weapons, and thus is a kind of counterforce strike. What more do you think we should commit ourselves to?

When you answer that question, will you also be precise in numbers? Suppose that the administration does keep its commitment for a 3-percent increase in real terms in the military budget. Is that sufficient, or do you want 4 percent or 5 percent? What is it you are asking us to do?

Secretary KISSINGER. Senator, I can answer better the category of weapons in which I think we need improvement, rather than give a precise budgetary estimate which requires a kind of technical knowledge and staff which I do not have. I believe, however, that between the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Armed Services Committees, and the knowledge of this committee, it ought to be possible to work out an agreed framework.

As I have said, in the strategic field I would like to see an accelerated schedule for the M-X and a clear-cut basing system—which still does not exist. In the field of theater nuclear forces, I would like to see a precise program and not a theoretical program for cruise missiles, and some theater missiles to offset the SS-20 and the Backfire.

Third, I would like to see a program for strengthening conventional forces and our capabilities for rapid overseas deployment. What percentage increase this requires, I am not in a position to say. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have indicated 5 percent. I said in my statement that the burden of proof that this is too high ought to rest on the administration, given the military expertise of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But I think we need a rapid and visible effort in these categories.

Some of it may already be coming on. I am not saying everything is new that I am proposing.

SALT II DISTINCT IMPROVEMENT OVER SALT I

The CHAIRMAN. Would you agree that the SALT II Treaty is a distinct improvement over the SALT I Treaty and the Vladivostok agreement from our standpoint?

Secretary KISSINGER. It is a much more complex treaty than the SALT I Treaty, and it is therefore almost impossible to compare these two, because they occurred in different circumstances. With respect to Vladivostok, it is an improvement in the lower numbers and in the ceilings on the numbers of warheads. It is less good, I would think, in the ambiguities with respect to cruise missiles, but I am not criticizing it for being less good than Vladivostok. I think it has some improvements over Vladivostok. In some respects I would say it is slightly—

The CHAIRMAN. On balance, it reduces the overall numbers to 2,250, since for the first time it does establish limits on warheads. Since it also creates a sublimit on MIRVed intercontinental ballistic missiles and things that they do, on balance, wouldn't you have to say that it was better?

Secretary KISSINGER. I would list all of those as positive achievements.

The CHAIRMAN. Those are positive achievements.

Secretary KISSINGER. Definitely.

The CHAIRMAN. Just to sum up your testimony, if the suggestions you have made on reservations and clarifications of certain ambi-

guities with respect to the treaty and a commitment to strengthen our own defense posture is also made—

Secretary KISSINGER. And the geopolitical linkage which I indicated.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know what that means, really. I would have to get into that in more time than I have, and my time is up. I think that this whole discussion overemphasizes the importance of the nuclear balance of terror as it affects political activities of the Soviet Union. I just think that is a revolutionary country, it is not going to change, it will not change its stripes. It is not going to withdraw from Africa or from other places where it seeks to increase its influence, whether or not we enter into the SALT II agreement.

I see no basis in past experience to expect that they will. If they would build a wall in Berlin, if they would turn Cuba into a Soviet military base, when we had a preponderance of nuclear superiority, then it does not strike me as very persuasive that they will be more inhibited if we build the M-X.

Secretary KISSINGER. I think they may be less inhibited if we do not build it.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Javits?

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ABSENCE OF COOPERATION IF SALT II IS HELD HOSTAGE

Dr. Kissinger, I am concerned about the sense of timing here. If you agree that there would be a serious blow of confidence to at least some European temperaments, and if two of the three defense programs which you wish the Congress and the President to articulate precisely heavily depend upon our allies—to wit, theater nuclear balance, and the capacity of conventional forces for regional defense, the other being the accelerated M-X—won't we have a very tough time getting that kind of cooperation if the SALT II Treaty is held hostage to the obligatory commitment you want from Congress and the Executive? It is likely to tear apart the McGovern and the Helms in terms of what it ought to be and how precise it ought to be, and could just tie this thing up for months?

Secretary KISSINGER. If the McGovern and the Helms are torn apart now, why would they not be torn apart next year?

Senator JAVITS. I understand, sir. I only say that this will represent a struggle over a finite thing which we have to decide even before the SALT II Treaty. Won't this undermine our hopes for getting that kind of confidence and that kind of unity which we need for more effective defense?

I ask the question because it is a thesis.

Secretary KISSINGER. Before I interrupted the chairman, I thought he was heading in the direction of asking me whether if all these things could be achieved, I would then support the treaty. I want to make clear that I would.

I say that, Senator Javits, before I answer your question.

The CHAIRMAN. You would? I see. I wish when I had put the final question to you, what I had meant to say, and I do not know whether I said it properly, was that I fail to see the connection between the great emphasis that is placed on the connection between the balance of our nuclear deterrent, however important

that might be for the avoidance of a nuclear war between our two countries. That is quite a separate question, but I do not see in the history of the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union since the Second World War much evidence to support the proposition that that nuclear balance, if maintained as you would maintain it, will have any great effect upon Soviet behavior in other parts of the world.

I think they are a revolutionary country, and will continue to support revolutions. I do not think that they will regard the nuclear deterrent as credible, as a weapon that would actually be employed because it involves the self-immolation of both countries, and therefore when they were willing to take big risks, when they were terribly inferior to us, it seems hard for me to understand why they should not be equally willing to take big risks when they have the equivalent of our power.

Secretary KISSINGER. They were willing to take finite risks when they were inferior to us, from which I would draw the conclusion that when they are superior to us in strategic effectiveness or in the military use of strategic weapons—or equal, if you do it on the basis of population damage and destruction—then they are bound to run bigger risks. Therefore I would think that the various other balances become more and more important.

This is my concern, and this is why I am convinced that we will face, if present trends continue, dangerous situations in the 1980's. This is what I am trying to deal with and on which I would like to get some sort of national expression and within a framework that does not unbalance the perceptions.

I am sorry, Senator Javits. I felt that I had cut off the chairman.

EFFECT OF KISSINGER PLAN ON SOVIETS AND BREZHNEV SUCCESSION

Senator JAVITS. That is all right. We appreciate having your answers to our questions. I would like to have you answer one question, though, and abandon the other one, because I do not want to intrude. We have looked at only one side of the equation, to wit, the United States, how do we react, what do we think is necessary, and so on. What do you think would be the effect of your plan on the Soviets, including the Brezhnev succession?

Let's look at that side of the equation. Would you inform us on that subject as you see it?

Secretary KISSINGER. I think that successions in communist countries are always very uncertain matters. I doubt that Brezhnev knows who his successor is going to be. If you look at successions in other Communist countries, and in the Soviet Union, it almost always has been somebody who had not been predicted by outsiders—partly because if somebody emerges as a clear successor, he is not always allowed to stay in his current position indefinitely.

With respect to the Soviet Union, we have two somewhat contradictory problems. On the one hand, we have to foreclose opportunities for expansionism, for adventurism, and for escaping their very serious domestic dilemmas by conspicuous successes abroad. At the same time, we have to keep open the possibilities of genuine coexistence. But that always gets us into a massive domestic debate, because there are some people in our country who are willing to

back only one side, either the confrontation side or the coexistence side.

I think if we do not have a balanced approach we are not likely to be able to succeed in either. If we emphasize only confrontation, then sooner or later this is bound to become the dominant feature of our relationship, and in the nuclear age that is extremely dangerous.

If we emphasize only conciliation, we will become subject to nuclear blackmail and we will create opportunities for adventurism. I do not think the Soviets have a master plan of world conquest. I think the Soviets have a master plan, if any, of accumulating power, without a precise concept of how they are going to use it. This is why the opportunities have to be foreclosed. One cannot look at this buildup that has been going on since 1963 uninterruptedly without assessing the options it opens up for them in the eighties.

So, I think for the Soviet succession it is important both that they be discouraged from adventurism but also that they have an opportunity for a relationship of coexistence with the United States. We need both of these.

Senator JAVITS. So you feel your policy adjusts to both?

Secretary KISSINGER. This is what I have in mind.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you.

I thank the Chair for his indulgence.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Javits.

Senator McGOVERN?

Senator McGOVERN. Dr. Kissinger, a mutual friend of ours thought I was disrespectful to you earlier in the day in suggesting that you were part of the threat.

Secretary KISSINGER. Absolutely not.

Senator McGOVERN. I assume it goes without saying that I was not talking about you personally. I was talking about the fact that I feel that the cause of disarmament and of arms control is threatened by the position that you and many other distinguished witnesses have taken that we cannot have this treaty unless it is accompanied by military buildup. That is what worries me.

Secretary KISSINGER. Senator, we have faced each other across a gulf of perceptions, always with mutual respect.

NEED FOR MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Senator McGOVERN. We have indeed.

If we could in fact get to a freeze, a moratorium on nuclear weapons on both sides, rather quickly, in SALT III, with agreed upon percentage reductions, in your judgment, would that remove most of the things you seem to fear, not only about the treaty, but about the ratification process? Would it, for example, mean that the ICBM systems on both sides would then be survivable, and that there would be no need for the M-X?

Secretary KISSINGER. I would have to see the current numbers before I can make a judgment. I know what the trends are. I do not know exactly what the current deployments are.

Senator McGOVERN. As I understand it, you have been concerned throughout your career with the problem of how to make nuclear weapons relevant to foreign policy. I think back as early as the

1950's you were arguing that the doctrine of massive retaliation is so horrible that it would never be used, and therefore becomes irrelevant to the conduct of foreign policy.

Secretary KISSINGER. That is correct.

Senator MCGOVERN. You seem to be saying the same thing now, that we have to develop a concept of limited war, the so-called counterforce capability whereby we could knock out Soviet missiles without necessarily destroying Soviet cities. Is that in fact your position? Are you trying to develop a scenario under which a nuclear exchange might become thinkable and therefore a possible foreign policy tool?

Secretary KISSINGER. Any nuclear war would have enormous casualties, even a war confined to strictly military targets. The situation that I find unacceptable is where the Soviet Union can destroy our land-based weapons while we cannot offer a significant threat to their land-based weapons, and on top of it are inferior in theater nuclear weapons and in conventional forces.

I think the cumulative impact of all these imbalances is unacceptable. I would therefore recommend since that is the only thing we can do now, that we develop a counterforce ability against their weapons which will then either drive them to sea or make them accept substantial limitations that would reduce the counterforce threat to both sides, which I would welcome.

85 PERCENT OF SOVIET THROW-WEIGHT IN VULNERABLE TARGETS

Senator MCGOVERN. Just a short time ago, I think, in 1974 or 1975, you said that the Soviet Union has 85 percent of its throw-weight in the most vulnerable targets, that is to say, land-based missiles. The United States has only about 25 percent of its throw-weight in vulnerable targets, and this is continuing your quote:

In the 1980's, the greater flexibility of our force and the greater vulnerability of their forces is very likely to bring about a situation in which the threat to their force is likely to be much greater than the threat to our total force, regardless of the weight of the individual warhead.

Now, that was only a very short time ago. What has changed?

Secretary KISSINGER. What has changed is the abandonment or the stretch-out of the strategic programs that would have made their force vulnerable. At that time, the M-X was going to be in operation in 1983. Now it will be 1987. At that time, we were thinking of B-1's with cruise missiles, and of a much faster Trident program. I think that the conditions that I described may still come about, but they cannot now come about until the late eighties, so that there will be a time period in which the relative capabilities are dangerously against us.

At that time also, in 1974, we thought that our forces would not become vulnerable until 1985, or later. After 1985, was the official estimate that we had at that time. These are the changes that have occurred.

Senator MCGOVERN. Mr. Secretary, I am frustrated by this 5-minute rule. We never seem to be able to finish anything that we start here. Of course, I am not complaining, Mr. Chairman. That is the nature of the process.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand the process, and I have to apologize to the Secretary for leaving now. I need to get a cup of soup before

we get into conference with the House at 2 o'clock. I am going to pass the chairmanship on down the table, if I might. Gentlemen, we are operating under a 5-minute rule, so that the Secretary can get away some time this afternoon at a reasonable hour.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Secretary, I, too, have to join the chairman for the conference, and I apologize to you for leaving.

The CHAIRMAN. May I turn the gavel over to you, Senator Pell? I believe Senator Percy is next. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for your testimony. We are much indebted to you.

Senator PELL [presiding]. Senator Percy?

Senator PERCY. Mr. Secretary, I would like to spend 15 seconds to also express my appreciation to you for the immense contribution that you have made to this committee and to Members of the Senate. You have analyzed this problem in a careful and thoughtful way and given us the benefit of your advice and counsel.

One of the great privileges that I have had in the Senate has been working with you intimately through the years, and I look forward to continuing that close relationship.

A former Secretary of State said to me some years ago that the foreign policy of this country can be no better than the understanding of it by the American people and the support given to it by the American people. I presume you would agree with that.

Another treaty, the Panama Canal Treaty, carried with a margin of one vote, and it was implied that without administration commitments to public works and other extraneous things, there would have been no ratification. I understand there will be no deals cut by this administration on extraneous matters to get consent from any Senators, and I think that is a wise policy.

ALLOWING MEDIA COVERAGE OF SALT FLOOR DEBATE

Do you think that to enhance public understanding of this treaty, it would be well for the Senate to open up the Chamber to allow television, radio, and recordings to be made under the rules of the Senate? All of the proceedings of the Senate in this debate on a treaty that involves the future security of the United States of America, the free world, and our relationship with the other super-power would be opened to public view.

Secretary KISSINGER. I really am reluctant to offer advice to the Senate on its procedures.

Senator PERCY. You did not hesitate in the past.

Secretary KISSINGER. Oh, but on its procedures, I have hesitated. Given the eloquence of the Members of the Senate, I think what you suggest might produce a longer delay in ratification than anything that has heretofore been proposed. [General laughter.]

Senator PERCY. I do not think that is a factor that has inhibited the House. There is some concern about that, but the House has adjusted. Do you think it would be good for the country to have a better understanding of it that could be provided by sharing the debate?

Secretary KISSINGER. What would have to be weighed is the advantage to the country in sharing the debate against what it would do in the long term to the kind of debate that would be conducted. I frankly just have not thought that through. If I could limit it to that debate itself, it would certainly seem to me benefi-

cial to the country to see as much of the debate as possible, but I have really not thought this one through.

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

UNDERSTANDING CLARIFYING TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO ALLIES
AND EXPIRATION OF THE PROTOCOL

The administration has argued against attaching an understanding to the instruments of ratification, stating that we can transfer technology to our allies. The reasoning they use is that it would look as though we were asking for Soviet consent. Certainly that would not be the intention of any of us who would offer such an understanding. It would simply be notification to the Soviets that our ratification is conditioned upon our understanding that we are free to transfer whatever technology is necessary for the security of our NATO allies and for our own security.

Do you feel that there is sufficient validity to the administration's position that we should not consider such an understanding?

Secretary KISSINGER. No, I favor such an understanding.

Senator PERCY. Do you believe that the ambivalence that you have said our allies feel about this treaty can be satisfied if we adopt understandings on protocol extension and noncircumvention? I understand the concerns are mainly military concerns in terms of how this treaty could affect their own security.

Secretary KISSINGER. I think their concerns would be substantially eased.

Senator PERCY. Finally, in your statement you state that limitations on cruise missiles after the protocol should be submitted to Congress only if it is part of an equitable arrangement for theater nuclear forces. I certainly commend your making this recommendation to us, and many of us will study it carefully.

The administration has committed itself to this position. Do you think an additional statement by the Senate is necessary to reassure our allies, taking into account that the election of 1980 could bring any kind of results and we should bind any President in the future?

Secretary KISSINGER. I have not studied the record enough to say. My understanding is that what the administration is willing to accept is that there be no extension of the protocol without the advice and consent of the Senate. My view is that there should be no extension of the protocol, period—that any cruise missile limitation should be done only in the context of an entirely new negotiation on the theater nuclear forces on both sides.

In this respect, I believe my position differs from theirs, but I have not studied the record enough. If it agrees with the administration, I am delighted.

Senator PERCY. We will certainly study it in that context, and I thank you for your suggestion on it.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Senator Percy.

Mr. Secretary, I was interested in your comments about the eloquence of Senators and the effect television might produce. In the House it has had a certain prolonging of events. My own view is that probably we should do it with public radio as we did with our debate on the Panama Canal, and leave open the question of television. This is a question that will be discussed in the coming weeks.

I appreciate your testimony very much indeed. I think you have a marvelously diplomatic way of not being too precise sometimes, and I am trying to figure out in my mind if you are really a hawk in dove's feathers, or really a dove with hawk's feathers.

I think basically, whichever it is, it is a sensible road, and obviously has a very real appeal to all of us, and in this regard, I was wondering if your suggestions for amendments—actually, each one of those amendments as I studied them could be equally easily construed as reservations or understandings. The very word "amendment" is a word that indicates, I think, in international law, the necessity for renegotiation. Isn't that correct?

Secretary KISSINGER. I think what I have in mind here is achievable without renegotiation, but should be expressed as a binding instruction by the Senate to the administration.

Senator PELL. That could be an understanding or a reservation just as easily, could it not?

Secretary KISSINGER. Probably.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

QUESTION OF GEOPOLITICAL LINKAGE

Now, coming to your third point, the question of geopolitical linkage, do you really feel it is necessary that we take this treaty, which is concerned with the strategic balance of the two superpowers' forces, and link it to the various political problems around the world? It seems to me you are putting an awful lot of weight on a pretty frail back. It reminds me a little bit in domestic political terms of how we want to get rid of all prejudice and bigotry by having desegregation in our Nation's schools, and that has been a pretty heavy load for the schools to carry.

I am wondering if you try to link Soviet good behavior to the treaty, if that is not a pretty heavy load on the treaty, and if by the same token they will not make counterdemands on us.

Secretary KISSINGER. I am not linking Soviet good behavior to the ratification of the treaty. I would like to use the occasion of ratification of the treaty to have the Senate express its view of what is acceptable international behavior, and to relate future negotiations not to every dispute that exists in the world, but to an overall pattern of conduct.

Obviously, competition is going to continue. Obviously, history is not going to stop. But proxy forces financed by the Soviet Union do not have to march around the world; Soviet planes do not have to be in Cuba so that Cuban planes can be in Africa; East German military personnel do not have to be all over the world. This is the point that I am trying to make, in gross terms rather than linking it to any one individual situation. All I am suggesting is a periodic review on whether these criteria have been met, after which a decision can still be made on what conclusions to draw from it.

Senator PELL. If I understand you, your linkage would be more like the Helsinki Accords. You would set up a norm of what we expect of the Soviets; is that correct?

Secretary KISSINGER. I would not make the present ratification conditional on a retroactive analysis of what the Soviets have done in the recent past, but I would use this ratification to put the Soviets on notice that future negotiations will be affected, not by every little dispute we may have, but by the overall conduct, in terms of criteria that could be worked out by this committee or by

this committee together with the administration. And a periodic review would be made in the form of a report by the administration to the Senate, and then a periodic review by the Senate of whether these criteria have been met, after which the conclusion to be drawn would still be open to judgment, including whether any SALT negotiations then going on should be continued. But I think it would put the Soviets on notice that in our mind political conduct and military buildups and military restraint are related.

Senator PELL. Thank you. My time is up. I am very glad to have been with you. I ask you to excuse me, too. The gavel will be passed to Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN [presiding]. I knew the day would come, Mr. Secretary, when I would be chairman of something you were testifying at, if I just waited long enough. [General laughter.]

Mr. Secretary, you see, you have me conditioned to speak in conditions.

Dr. Kissinger, I apologize for leaving for about an hour. I do not know whether any of my colleagues have asked this question. If they have, I will leave it on the record and you need not respond.

That is, do you have any doubts about our ability to verify this treaty?

Secretary KISSINGER. I am not an expert on verification. I have had one briefing which I found impressive. There are certain aspects which in the nature of things are difficult to verify. For example, since we do not have a baseline on the volume of the missiles, we will not be able to tell exactly whether it is a 5-percent or 8-percent increase. I have concluded that I do not know enough about the verification issue, but not enough doubts have been raised in my mind with respect to the verification issue for me to raise it.

IMPACT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON REGIONAL CONFLICTS

Senator BIDEN. With regard to the role of nuclear arsenals shaping regional outcomes, I think Senator Church, as I believe he usually does, has identified a very basic issue, and that is, can nuclear weapons really influence the outcome of regional developments? My knowledge of the chairman's position is that he is very skeptical of their having an influence on regional outcomes as am I. You, in contrast, seem to be saying that the vulnerability of the Minuteman at a minimum has a political value or weighs in the political mix. That is, it seems to indicate that if we, the Soviets and the rest of the world perceive that Minuteman is vulnerable, as a consequence of that perceived vulnerability we in turn will not have the backbone potentially to stand up in areas of regional conflict. It seems to me there are a couple of things to be said about that, and I would like you to comment on them.

The first is that if the ICBM vulnerability question is a problem for the United States, the Soviets are going to have an even greater problem by the time the decade of the 1980's is out. We are talking about a window here somewhere between 1983, 1984, 1987, and 1988. Once our new Trident is on, the M-X—I misspoke and said cruise the last time, I meant to say M-X—the Mark 12A warhead, all of these and all the things which you suggested are important to go forward with are on line, then the vulnerability that we are going to feel in the early to mid-1980's will be contrasted to the vulnerability of the Soviets with their land-based system in the late

1980's. The Soviets might have more to worry about in that regard than we, and the lifespan of these kinds of agreements is a matter of 4 or 5 years. That is not significant. We think further ahead than that. It takes a long time for these systems to come on.

The second thing that needs to be said is, as Senator Church argued, that these weapons are simply not that important in shaping regional outcomes. For example, there was Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Vietnam up through the early 1970's. The Soviets have been adventurists for the past 35 years. They view us as having been adventurists for the past 35 years, and I do not think it is realistic to assume that the theoretical calculations of the vulnerability of land-based systems is going to fundamentally curb this adventurism on the Soviets' part. I wonder if you would comment on that.

Secretary KISSINGER. Let me clarify my position. I am not saying that superiority and strategic striking power by itself is going to solve regional conflict. I am saying that in the 1950's and 1960's, and even in the early 1970's, we used superiority and strategic striking powers to affect at least some local outcomes.

Senator BIDEN. Where?

Secretary KISSINGER. All of the situations which you have mentioned were those in which it was very clear that the United States would not resort to general nuclear war—in Czechoslovakia, in Hungary. In those instances in which the United States really confronted the Soviets, they generally pulled back rather quickly—over Berlin in 1961, on Cuba in 1962; during my period in office, in 1970 in the Jordan crisis, in 1970 in the Cienfuegos crisis, in 1973 during the Mideast alert—at least in part because we still had a substantial nuclear superiority.

Now, I would not want the United States with the present numbers of weapons, no matter what theoretical superiority we could achieve, to rely on strategic nuclear weapons for the prevention of regional conflict. The problem is, the Soviet Union has been superior regionally in the entire postwar period, and that superiority, if anything, has grown. No substantial efforts have been made to redress it.

If we add to that the vulnerability of our strategic forces, so that there is no possibility whatever that in an extreme we might resort to nuclear weapons, then it seems to me that the willingness to run risks that the Soviets demonstrated—as the chairman correctly pointed out, even during the period of our nuclear superiority—must exponentially increase. That is the danger I see. Nor am I saying that we can solve this problem by trying to reconstruct the situation of the 1950's and 1960's. That is beyond our capability, and is undesirable. But at least we should not add a vulnerability in the strategic field to the existing vulnerability in the theater field. We should work drastically to overcome the vulnerabilities in the regional field, because then we can be somewhat more relaxed in the strategic field. This is the general concept I am putting forward.

Senator BIDEN. My time is up, I am afraid.

Secretary KISSINGER. If I could make one more comment, you are quite right, Senator, that prospects for the late 1980's are really quite favorable, both in terms of the military trends and in terms

of economic and political trends, provided we can overcome our various energy crises and economic problems, and so on. But for that very reason, if there is a window of, say, 5 years, in which the Soviets are faced with a problem of whether to change their society or first clean up their international environment, the temptation may be very great to try to clear up the international environment. This is the period that I would call our period of maximum danger. If we can get through that, I would say the trends in the longer term are very much in our favor. I would like to compress that window as much as possible.

Senator BIDEN. I would really like to pursue that point, but my time is up. Thank you very much.

Senator Glenn?

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Although I think the balance of nuclear terror idea as proposed by Chairman Church and then as followed up somewhat by Senator Biden has not deterred Soviet behavior, it certainly may well have deterred other nations from following the Soviets more closely, and I think that is the important point, that is, the perception of the other nations as to where the balance of power lies. I think if other nations perceive one of these days that the Soviets really are almighty in the strategic field, there will be a far greater likelihood that they are going to follow the Soviets by tolerating local communist parties, negotiating more favorable trade agreements or permitting Soviet naval bases or whatever the issue might be at that particular time, I think that is the important thing.

Secretary KISSINGER. I agree completely.

WOULD KISSINGER SIGN SALT II

Senator GLENN. Let me get back to another subject. With all of the changes that you feel have occurred and the short-term benefits of this treaty, would you have recommended that the President sign this treaty when he did?

Secretary KISSINGER. I was asked the same question by Senator Sarbanes.

Senator GLENN. I am sorry, I was not here then.

Secretary KISSINGER. I did not give a clearcut answer.

Senator GLENN. OK, then, I will give you another shot at it.

Secretary KISSINGER. The answer I gave to Senator Sarbanes was that it is very difficult to separate a treaty from the general strategic environment. What I would probably have done is recommend to the President to sign the treaty and then to come to the Congress with the sort of program that I am proposing, and I would have tried to incorporate into the treaty the reservations that I have indicated here need to be made. That would have probably been my recommendation. It is very hard to know what you would recommend.

Senator GLENN. It has been said that some 80 percent of the treaty was negotiated by you prior to your leaving office. What would you have negotiated differently since you have left office?

Secretary KISSINGER. Primarily it would be in the area of the protocol. I think perhaps a disproportionate effort was made on the definition of new missiles, considering that in effect they really do not limit anything. But, you know, any outsider can nitpick any

agreement when he has not been in the conference room and has not been present in the balance of give and take.

Senator GLENN. Mr. Secretary, I disagree with you. We were not in the conference room. We were not negotiating it, either, yet we are going to have to vote yes or no. There is not any maybe column for us to check. This is why we are calling on your expertise.

Secretary KISSINGER. Senator, I have indicated those areas of the treaty as it now stands that I would like to see clarified by the Senate. With those clarifications and with the military program that I have proposed, I would recommend ratification.

AMBIGUITIES IN THE TREATY

Senator GLENN. But in addition to those caveats you have also mentioned ambiguities that you would like to get straightened out. I have gone through those in your statement, and I would trust that you have several more ambiguities and perhaps understandings of unilateral statements that you would like to get ironed out. Would there be others besides the ones you mentioned here?

Secretary KISSINGER. Those are the principal ones.

Senator GLENN. The main one that you mentioned is noncircumvention.

Secretary KISSINGER. They are noncircumvention, the protocol, and future negotiations on SALT III. Those are the three that I mentioned.

Senator GLENN. Those are not exactly ambiguities. We understand the protocol situation, and when it runs out.

Secretary KISSINGER. That is right. Noncircumvention is the main ambiguity.

Senator GLENN. Are you concerned about any of the unilateral statements that we have made through all of the negotiating history? I have been very concerned about this, and I asked the other day for a complete rundown from the Secretary of State for the whole history of this as to where we have made a statement, and even though the Soviets did not reply we have taken it that that is accepted because of their nonreply.

I question that modus operandi.

Secretary KISSINGER. I agree with you, Senator. We resorted to it ourselves to perhaps an excessive degree in 1972, and in speaking to a group of Congressmen in the White House at the time, I mentioned unilateral statements that we had made as a restraint on Soviet conduct. I think experience has shown that the unilateral statements that we have made are not a restraint on Soviet conduct, that they do not bind the Soviet Union. And as a general proposition I would think it unwise to rely on them unless we are really determined to break up the agreement over noncompliance, and in practice we are not likely to be willing to break up the agreement on noncompliance.

Senator GLENN. I hope we get a complete listing on that. If you could add to any of that for the Secretary of State, I am sure they would appreciate your interpretation.

Secretary KISSINGER. I think any unilateral statements that we made are in writing somewhere. I do not believe there are any for which there is no record.

Senator GLENN. I am sure they will all be in the record, and I hope to get a complete listing of those very shortly, because I think they can be very, very important. The issue of the Backfire and the

number to be produced is an example of the problem. We have a unilateral statement. They did not reply. Then when they came down to really pushing apparently to get a firm positive statement, there was all sorts of foot-dragging and reluctance on the part of the Soviets to really finally come out and make a firm public statement that yes, this was the limit.

I would imagine if it came to push and shove on all the unilateral statements, we might find the same reticence on their part.

Secretary KISSINGER. Unilateral statements are very difficult to enforce.

Senator GLENN. Thank you.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Senator Glenn.

Senator Stone?

Senator STONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

U.S. PROTESTED NUCLEAR MISSILE SUBMARINES IN CUBA

Dr. Kissinger, you testified in my first round that the U.S. Government protested every time the U.S.S.R. tested us on the visits of all kinds and combinations of Soviet submarines to Cuba following the Cienfuegos crisis.

Secretary KISSINGER. I think nuclear missile-carrying submarines.

Senator STONE. Nuclear missile-carrying submarines, and you testified that the essence of the understanding that you negotiated was to not prohibit nuclear-powered submarines but to prohibit Soviet nuclear-missile-carrying submarines. That is what we are concerned about. Is that not right?

Secretary KISSINGER. That is right. But you have to remember, Senator, that I am doing this from memory, so if you find that some submarine called there that we did not protest, I just do not remember.

Senator STONE. I am in a position to summarize and wrap this up in just a minute. I have just one more question. Do you recall, Mr. Secretary, whether when you negotiated the agreement, you negotiated an exception, to wit, that even if a Soviet submarine carrying nuclear missiles would be in violation, such a visit to Cuba would not be in violation even if it lasted several weeks. If it were called a port call. Do you recall an exception under the denomination of port calls?

Secretary KISSINGER. I am sure we did not negotiate an exception. The major concern we had was the servicing of nuclear submarines from Cuban ports. Now, how you define servicing—I do not think the issue ever arose where a submarine carrying nuclear missiles made a port call, at least what our definition of nuclear missiles was, which would be G, H, or Y class submarines. So, I do not believe we negotiated the exception, but those who have the records ought to be able to check all of this.

Senator STONE. Well, something as important as a loophole—

Secretary KISSINGER. But there would be no point in negotiating a formal exception.

Senator STONE. Exactly. There would be no point in allowing a Soviet missile-carrying submarine to stay around in Cienfuegos at the base for several weeks carrying nuclear missiles and then when you challenge them, to accept as an excuse, that this is just a port call, would it?

Secretary KISSINGER. We would have emphasized the issue of whether they were being serviced in Cienfuegos. At that time we had some criteria for servicing which we in fact even wrote down.

Senator STONE. To take on provisions? Would that be included?

Secretary KISSINGER. Not knowing the facts to which you are referring, my tendency would be to protest this rather strenuously.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Secretary Kissinger.

I think I can now summarize what I have been after in all of this submarine questioning. You have testified that you protested and would protest Soviet missile-carrying submarines making visits or being serviced at Cienfuegos, at least.

Secretary KISSINGER. There were a number of occasions when the Soviet activity was not in legal violation of the agreement, or where the agreement was sufficiently ambiguous that you could have a debate about it, but where we felt that it was a needless provocation and made rather sharp and pointed comments.

Senator STONE. You did make protests of some of those visits, did you not?

Secretary KISSINGER. That is correct.

Senator STONE. You consider some of them to be violations, did you not, and therefore protested them?

Secretary KISSINGER. We considered them incompatible with—

Senator STONE. With the agreement.

Secretary KISSINGER. And with good relations between us.

Senator STONE. I would like to proceed for at least one extra minute after the red light goes on in order to summarize what this line of questioning has been all about.

Senator BIDEN. That is all right with me if it is all right with Senator Zorinsky.

Senator ZORINSKY. It is fine with me.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Senator Zorinsky.

The administration asserts or least implies that the prohibition that you negotiated is against nuclear-powered submarines. They assert that in supplementing the record, as against the earlier statement of my question and the Chief of Naval Operations answer. I read from the supplementation of the record recently received:

It is my understanding that as a result of an October 13, 1970, exchange between the United States and Soviet representatives, President Nixon subsequently announced that servicing of nuclear submarines either in or from Cuba would be a violation of the understanding. This would apply to servicing of nuclear-powered submarines, both SSBN's [nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine] and SSN's nuclear-powered attack submarine. It would not, however, prohibit port calls by such submarines.

I challenge that in the light of the logic of your testimony that it is nuclear missiles we are trying to keep out of Cuba, and not whether the platform that brings them in is either powered by diesel or powered by nuclear. That is point 1. Point 2, I asked the Chief of Naval Operations, did the *Golf* submarines which visited Cuba in 1972 and 1974 carry nuclear missiles. He denied that they did. The administration has now supplemented the record, a portion of which is classified, and my question and his answer now read as follows:

If it were the case that the *Golf-1-II* submarines had visited Cuba, and there were two, and they were as recent as 1974, actually carried SS-N-5 ballistic missiles, would that be a violation?

Admiral HAYWARD. As I indicated earlier, *Golf II* diesel submarines carry the SS-N-5 SLBM's which is not accountable under the SALT I Treaty or the provisions of SALT II. The SS-N-5 SLBM is assessed to have a nuclear warhead [deleted.] The *Golf II* submarines which visited Cuba in [deleted] 1972 and [deleted] 1974. Characterization of those visits as violations, or non-violations, of an understanding with the U.S.S.R. is more properly within the purview of the State Department, to which I would defer on the issue.

I have now had a letter from Secretary of State Vance denying that any of the submarine occasional port calls were violations. I will read his answer.

Subsequently, in the early 1970's submarines did make occasional port calls. According to the understanding with the Soviet Union, such port calls do not constitute violations.

Yet you have testified that we did raise the question that there were visits which were in violation.

I am not quite through, but if you have a comment, I will take it.

Secretary KISSINGER. My comment would be this. I think the Secretary of State is correct in pointing out that port calls not involving the servicing of the submarines or missiles would not be a technical violation. On a number of occasions, and I just don't remember the years now, we protested even though technically a sharp lawyer could prove that there were not violations, we felt they were incompatible with the spirit of what we were trying to accomplish.

Therefore, we protested it.

Senator STONE. It troubles me, Dr. Kissinger, very much when the administration denies that nuclear missiles are what this is all about, and when they imply by their answers that we never protested anything because there were no violations when in fact we did protest those visits.

Secretary KISSINGER. Again, I have to say in defense of the administration, to the best of my knowledge the protesting always occurred in White House channels' so it may be that there is no formal record in the State Department about whether we protested or not.

Senator STONE. It troubles me greatly, Dr. Kissinger, that when I inquire using open, unclassified information from Janes Fighting Ships, that the two Soviet submarines which visited Cuba carried nuclear missiles, that is denied. Then, later, by supplementing the record, it is admitted.

What I am troubled by is our posture of requiring compliance when we are pushed by the Soviet Union even in our own hemisphere. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. You are welcome, Senator.

Senator Zorinsky?

Senator Zorinsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REQUIREMENT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION REPORT ON SOVIET BEHAVIOR

Mr. Secretary, in your statement with respect to your recommendations concerning those criteria which should accompany SALT II, you precondition ratification of the treaty on the following: "That the Administration be required to submit an annual report to the Senate on the degree to which the Soviet Union is living up to these criteria, that the Senate vote every 2 years its judgment whether the Soviet Union has lived up to these criteria. If the

judgment is negative, the Senate should then vote whether whatever SALT negotiations are taking place should be continued."

If these provisions had been proposed in connection with SALT I, would you have supported these provisions?

Secretary KISSINGER. Probably not, but that was before the Soviet geopolitical offensive. We tried to act on some principles like this. The idea of linkage was one that was hotly debated, and that we affirmed we were carrying out. So, I would have supported it in practice. Whether I would have supported it as a Senatorial amendment, I do not know. I think now, after 4 years of a geopolitical offensive by the Soviet Union, we face a more difficult situation than we did in 1971. Now I think it is important to put them on notice that this conduct is unacceptable, and indeed dangerous for them as well. So I think under the conditions of 1979 that it is necessary.

EFFECT OF AMENDING THE TREATY

Senator ZORINSKY. Mr. Secretary, what would you envision in the event that the Senate approves a direct amendment to the treaty? Do you feel that would put us back to square one?

Secretary KISSINGER. No. I expect that in case of an amendment by the Senate, it would probably end any negotiations until our election. I believe that there would be a tremendous blowup, a crisis atmosphere, and that nothing further would happen until after our elections. In all probability, the administration would follow, as the President has already indicated on a number of occasions, the SALT limits. We would not get the higher defense program that I am talking about, and therefore the process of rectification that I consider essential will be delayed by 2 or 3 years, at which point probably negotiations would start again. This is why, on balance, I prefer to find a way to implement the remedial measures now.

Senator ZORINSKY. Let me summarize this, because I want to know your thinking.

Now, you do support the ratification of the SALT II Treaty by the Senate?

Secretary KISSINGER. Within the framework that I have indicated.

LINKAGE BETWEEN SALT AND OTHER SOVIET ACTIONS

Senator ZORINSKY. With the changes in the determination of this Nation to recognize certain deficiencies and to link and tie Soviet actions elsewhere directly to this treaty?

Secretary KISSINGER. I would say Soviet geopolitical conduct elsewhere, and with the clarifications that I have indicated, yes. I would support it.

Senator ZORINSKY. Is this an inseparable linkage that you are presenting to us?

Secretary KISSINGER. Yes.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Secretary, I will just detain you one more moment, if I may. I think your clarification of how linkage relates to SALT II is important, at least as I understood it, and I would like to repeat what I think it is, and have you tell me if I am correct or not.

You are not saying that we are linking Soviet conduct to passage of SALT II, but what we are doing, you are saying, is that at the time passage of SALT II, we are putting the Soviets on notice that for SALT III we are going to consider linkage?

Secretary KISSINGER. Correct.

Senator BIDEN. And one other point. I think I understand your explanation, and it explains what I quite honestly, quite bluntly viewed as an inconsistency based on a political motivation, but maybe I was too cynical, and I mean this sincerely.

In SALT I, at the very time we were mining Haiphong Harbor, you were arguing, no linkage.

Secretary KISSINGER. I was not arguing anything.

Senator BIDEN. I know well there were those in the Senate—I was not here then, but if I am not mistaken—who were arguing, although the word did not take on the meaning to the full extent that it has now when we say linkage, that SALT I should be viewed in the context of overall United States-Soviet relations, yet at that time literally we were in Vietnam and literally mining Haiphong Harbor, and it did not seem to get in the way of whether or not we should have a SALT agreement.

Secretary KISSINGER. First of all, literally, the North Vietnamese were launching a major offensive with Soviet weapons—

Senator BIDEN. I know. That is the whole point.

Secretary KISSINGER [continuing]. Which is what triggered the whole enterprise. Secondly, when the decision was made to mine Haiphong Harbor, we fully expected that the Soviet Union would apply linkage, and in fact expected that they would. They decided for reasons of their own that they had too many other interests at stake, so they did not apply it. We have the option under what I am suggesting here also not apply it in specific circumstances. I believe that as a general proposition the conditions that have existed in the last 5 years are too dangerous.

Senator BIDEN. Maybe focusing on Haiphong Harbor was the wrong focus. The point was that the Soviets were supplying arms and were part of the Vietnamese offensive. They were supporting the North Vietnamese offensive which brought us to the point of deciding to mine Haiphong Harbor. The whole point is, we were in conflict more directly with the Soviet Union there than we are now, and yet we went forward with SALT I.

You just stated that the Soviets had the option if you will, to apply linkage from their perspective, and they chose not to, the same option that we would have in SALT III if we adopted your language, but I wonder as a practical matter—you knowing the political system as well as any person in this town—if the language which you suggest attend this treaty as it relates to SALT III and to linkage were to be passed, would there be any option for a future Congress to make the choice of what it considers to be linkage that would warrant us not going forward with a SALT III. As a practical matter, once that language is in there, I doubt whether we would have that option.

Secretary KISSINGER. First let me deal with the point you made, that this was put forward for political reasons. I have not noticed that the word "linkage" evokes wild public applause in front of audiences or that this is an issue on which the political benefits are self-evident to anybody. I believe that we are facing a very serious problem in the use of proxy forces, in the assault on the general

world equilibrium, and I am groping for some way of finding a national consensus to indicate that this is unacceptable. I will not insist on every last word of that particular provision as long as the spirit of it can be embodied in some method of putting the Soviets on notice of what we consider acceptable conduct, and as long as some periodic review of it is made, whatever conclusions are then drawn from it.

Senator BIDEN. I do not think that is an unreasonable approach. For the record, to clarify, I did say that at the outset I thought it was politically motivated, and I am not at all sure that is the case. I think it is not politically motivated now, but to make the point further, it would be politically advantageous—you will get much more wild applause from the public today saying, let's get tough with the Russians than to make the argument of let's really limit arms, let's not have a buildup. Further, just as in the Democratic Party, if someone attempted to get the Democratic nomination for President, let's say, so you will know I am not talking about you because you are constitutionally ineligible to be President by reason of birth, but if someone were seeking the nomination for President in the Democratic Party, it would be very difficult in my political opinion for them to take a very, very hard line anti-SALT, antinegotiation posture, and not run the risk of losing the liberal wing of the Democratic Party, and conversely in the Republican Party.

I think it would be very difficult for someone to come out four-square strongly jumping in with both feet for a pro-SALT position, now, and not at least have to face the element of the party that is represented by fine men, and I mean it sincerely, like Jesse Helms and others. So there are political considerations that might be taken into consideration not by you but by some of us possibly in deciding how we came down on SALT, depending on what are our interests and aspirations and what political party we are in.

That is all I meant. It can have some relevance. It is not pristine.

Senator Stone?

Senator STONE. Dr. Kissinger, I simply want to thank you for putting this SALT hearing in the context of the real world—particularly what you have been able to enlighten the American public on today with regard to the regional challenges, the proxy challenges, the gnawing away not directly at the United States but at the Third World and in other regions, and just all over the world, and in linking not the wording of treaty but the posture of the United States to both what we do about our own strength and what we do about the challenges.

I think you have made a great contribution today, and I thank you for it.

Secretary KISSINGER. I thank you, Senator.


Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I think you have made a contribution today and I appreciate it very much.

As chairman, it is my task to do two things at this point. One is if not to announce, at least to suggest that this committee may very well like to have you back in September if you would consider coming back and testifying. You are always a brilliant witness.

Also, I wish to announce that tomorrow the committee will meet in executive session all day on the question of verification. On

Thursday, the committee will meet in this room in open session to hear John J. McCloy and General Haig testify. Again, Mr. Secretary, thank you for your indulgence. This meeting is adjourned until tomorrow.

[Whereupon, at 2:35 p.m., the committee adjourned subject to call of the Chair.]



SALT II TREATY

THURSDAY, AUGUST 2, 1979

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:07 a.m., in room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Church, Pell, McGovern, Biden, Glenn, Stone, Sarbanes, Zorinsky, Javits, Percy, and Hayakawa.

Also present: Senator Cranston.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will please come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

We are pleased to have before the committee this morning John J. McCloy, a distinguished elder statesman in the field of arms control as well as United States-European relations. Mr. McCloy was High Commissioner for Germany from 1949 to 1952. Since the early 1960's he has been involved in disarmament and arms control activities and has been a senior adviser on arms control to Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford.

Mr. McCloy, I am pleased to welcome you to the committee this morning. We look forward to your statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN J. McCLOY, COORDINATOR OF U.S. ARMS CONTROL ACTIVITIES, 1961-63, AND FORMER U.S. MILITARY GOVERNOR AND HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR GERMANY, NEW YORK, N.Y.

Mr. McCLOY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I think, if I may, instead of reading my statement I will summarize it and then open myself to your questions. I do not want to impose on the committee's time. I know that it has been very pressing. I will refer a little bit to my experience to which you have already referred, Mr. Chairman. I was also the Assistant Secretary of War, as you know, and had a combination of military defense and disarmament experience and a considerable amount of confrontation with the Soviet Union.

I do not go quite as far back as Averell does, Averell Harriman—I think he went back to Trotsky the other day—but I go back to Stalin and to Molotov, and certainly Khrushchev, but I wanted to start off by talking a little bit about the treaty process, which has troubled me a little bit.

The other day I called the White House to try to find out how this two-thirds thing really got into the Constitution. Well, he

couldn't tell me, because he was doing something else, but they referred me to the State Department, and in the meantime I went up and did a little research myself, and I think it is very revealing. I am sure there are Members of the Senate that are quite as familiar as I am with the subject, or more familiar than I am with this subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McCloy, would you please pull the microphone up a little closer?

Mr. McCLOY. Certainly.

As I said, my research was quite revealing. I went back to some very early records. I found that in the Articles of Confederation, the whole treaty making process from beginning to end, from the negotiations and first contacts to the final approval was in the Continental Congress. It was in Congress assembled. They didn't have any President or didn't have anybody else involved, and they had agents. They called them agents. I think John Adams was one. I think John Jay, for whom I have been named, was one, too. But then they came to the Constitutional Convention and they had to have a new provision because they had two bodies in the Congress, the House and the Senate.

The first draft that came through in the Constitutional Convention provided that the Senate would have all of the complete authority in respect to a treaty, no President, nobody else involved. That was the first draft. Then they began to think a little about the inconvenience and how hard it would be to negotiate, and they said, well, we have had agents in the past, and as a matter of convenience, they brought the President into this process.

At that time, the House of Representatives got a little restive and wanted to get into the act, and I think it was Wilson of Pennsylvania and Mason of Virginia who tried to get the entire Congress in. That was defeated. Then they put what in effect is the present provision into the Constitution with a two-thirds vote, so the two-thirds figure seems to have come from the old Articles of Confederation where nine out of the 13 states had to assert approval.

Again, John Jay began to talk about how elite the Senate was and how much more significant it was than the House of Representatives. He gave a great deal of kudos to the Senate and said what a fine deliberative body it was, but he pointed out that the Senators were appointed by the States. That is how it was then. It was not changed, I believe, until around 1912.

So, by one vote they put the two-thirds provision into the Constitution.

The significant thing to me is that they treated this whole thing as a legislative problem, because they talked in terms of the law, the supreme law of the land. Well, who makes the law of the land? It is the legislative body; the executive does not make it.

Then Alexander Hamilton made a statement which I have in my statement. I thought this was a very interesting statement. If I may, I will just read it. This is regarding the Constitutional provision as it is now, and was adopted. He said, "The qualities elsewhere detailed as indispensable in the management of foreign negotiations"—he spelled it with a "c" in those days and we spell it with a "t"; I see it has been corrected in my draft though I had

hoped they had left the "c" in there—"point out that the executive as the most fit agent in those transactions"—he was referring to the convenience of it—"while the vast importance of the trust and the operation of the treaties as laws plead strongly for the participation of the whole or a portion of the legislative body in the office of making them."

James Madison said the same thing even more pointedly, and as I said, the Senate was ultimately chosen to receive this trust on the argument of John Jay regarding the significance of the Senate as it was selected by the legislatures of that time.

When they went back to the original record, I could not help but see the tremendous emphasis placed upon the legislative aspect of this, and the fact that from the very beginning it was thought to be a legislative problem because of its association with the supreme law of the land.

In my original draft, I commented that I had the impression that if it was thought at any point that the Executive was exerting any influence or pressure on the legislative body in the course of its deliberations on a treaty, I used the expression that they would turn in their graves. However, I dropped that rhetoric and said that they would not look kindly upon it.

Bear in mind that treaties were very unpopular in those days, and there was a great deal of criticism. There was a great deal of criticism with this particular provision. Later on, John Hay criticized it. He was Abraham Lincoln's secretary, as I recall it, and later he was Secretary of State in the Roosevelt administration.

In any case, the essence of the thing lies in the legislative body. It was pointed out that a treaty could get you into a war, you could come to the aid of another country, and you could even dispose of some property in the United States, because it was the supreme law of the land, and therefore it was fundamentally a legislative prerogative.

I thought that was very interesting. As I say, it is only an aside, but I am concerned about the treaty process, because I have a feeling that as we go along, something is wrong with it. We get into these sort of Army-Navy games just before the treaty. We have the pressures to reach an agreement. There is pressure on our delegation to reach an agreement. I think the idea of having success rather than failure, public opinion, media all have an effect on the process. We are subjected to pressures which I do not believe the Soviet negotiators are. They know they are the beginning and the end of all of their process. but I think others have spoken about that here.

I have read some of the transcripts, and they indicate this. My experience has been that, at least as of my time, there was a pressure exerted to get to a treaty at the last minute, and that pressure generally was favorable to the Soviets rather than to us. Now, I do not want to make too much of it. In here, I used the term "they get agreementitis." That is a term that I have coined. I have noticed it develop. I think that we are subject to pressures by reason of our open society to a degree.

The CHAIRMAN. It really is the fundamental difference between an open and a closed society.

Mr. McCLOY. That is right. That is exactly what it comes down to.

My other point is this, and I will not spend so much time on it. You know, we send out task forces all over the place, and I have attended two or three of those. Now, they did not help me. I was struggling to try to find my own answer to this question of what do you think about this treaty. I went to two or three of those meetings. There were lawyers' briefs presented. They were minimizing the arguments on the other side and maximizing their own arguments.

I do not recall having any talk about the buildup or the vulnerability aspect, which has been such a large part of your deliberations here. I suppose this is part of our democratic process, but I have the feeling that the country and the Senate deserves a little better than this. But at this point let me say that I am very much impressed because I have read the transcripts of the presentations made here to date. I think they have been objective, well done, and that there has been a rather high order of testimony, so my criticism does not go to that. My criticism goes to the drumming up of sentiment throughout the country, which I do not think is very helpful.

How the questions are put is not significant. Of course, it is too late to change our constitutional provisions. We certainly don't want to change that now. If I said that the Founding Fathers turned over in their graves, well, they have been turning over a good bit in the last 200 years when they see what has happened to the Constitution in that period, but I do think this is worthy of a study by the Committee on Foreign Relations.

This treaty making process—I got a Macedonian call in connection with the Panama Treaty to try to push things through. I would hope that somehow we could space the process so that somehow it would not have the political aspect, and particularly in this one which so vitally affects the security of this country.

I think both sides, pro and con, doves and hawks, have to get together to try to work out the proper solution and proper answer to this question.

Mr. Chairman, as you mentioned, I was the first Chairman of the Advisory Committee. I formed the original ACDA. President Kennedy asked me to come down and set that up, which I did, and I did become the first Chairman.

Let me say a word or two about verification. I will not dwell on it because I think you have gotten some very good briefings in connection with it. At one time I was very familiar indeed with this verification process, and what we had in the way of material, and the extent to which we could really verify what the Soviets were doing, and I have seen all of this technique. I have not been briefed up to date on this, but I am sure it is better now than when I was here.

I want to emphasize again that when we are in an open society and they are in a closed society, and we are dealing with a security matter, they start with a verifiable treaty and we do not have a verifiable treaty, despite all the techniques and the signs that we have.

We cannot get so much knowledge of what is going on in their country, not as much as they can get about us. They have a passion for secrecy as opposed to our passion for disclosure and leaks. That is a big asset on their side, but I do want to say this about verification, if I may. I believe the President said that he would assure the American people that he would not sign any treaty that could not be verified. Well, that is OK, but there has been a great deal of emphasis on adequate verification.

However, I go beyond that. I say that the Soviets are a strong and powerful nation. They have an ideology that is different from us. We have to take some risks, and even though we know we cannot verify as well as they do, if we are going to get on with this thing and have a *modus vivendi* with them and try to achieve peace and some reduction of armaments which is so important, we have to take those risks. I would want to say one or two things more about that.

First, let me say that the amount of intelligence I think we have to gather now is very much greater than what we had in the past, what with the killer satellites, of the Cuban business, and so many other things. There is generally information that we do not have. We must not be misled by the fact that when you see some of these photographs, they will show you the head of a screw on a missile. That is not the measure of our ability to tell what is going on in nuclear weaponry in the Soviet Union.

As one man said to me, Mr. McCloy, don't be misled by that. You must not think because we see that screwhead on that missile that we can tell every time Mr. Brezhnev goes to the bathroom. He said there is an awful lot we do not know in areas beyond the testing areas, but as I say, it is a fact of life, and you have to take some risks. We have to trust them to some degree and they have to trust us to some degree or we will not be getting it on, and this is such a very vital element, this problem that we have for us. I did talk in terms of what my experiences have been in connection with the bona fide of the Soviet Union, as I call it. I have dealt with a great many of them in Berlin and West Germany, and then on the missile crisis.

When I sat on the fence and negotiated with Kusnetsov, he made me go out and sit on the fence because he thought my house was bugged, and we were trying to work out the removal of the missiles in Cuba. He had been educated in this country, and was absolutely meticulous in following the understanding that we arrived at. He leaned over backwards. It was clearcut and there was no chance for equivocation on it.

Having that, he certainly honored his commitment. On the other hand, if I had to rely in the process of verification on the word of the Soviet foreign minister, I would not be so happy. Everybody knows that he was less than frank, let's put it that way, in connection with the missiles in Cuba, when he knew they were there, and he told the President that they were not there, and he told Adlai Stevenson in my presence that they were not there when he knew perfectly well that they were there.

So, it depends, like everything else, I suppose, on the individual, but generally, my experience has been, if the thing is clearcut and definite, and not subject to equivocation, the Soviets are apt to

honor their commitment. For what it is worth, I would say that in respect of the verification issue.

There are a number of other things I could say about verification, but you have heard so much about that, and you have been so well briefed on it that I think that probably this is as much of it that I would like to take my time on.

Somebody in one of the transcripts I read was asking what sort of negotiators these people were. I said I would summarize my experience in this way. They are good chess players, as everybody knows. On top of this, they have a deep-seated or gut instinct as to what they want to feel they should have for their security. After having been the victims of Western European aggression for two successive centuries—once, you remember, it was the French in one century, then it was Hitler in the other century. They resist all blandishments. There is no such thing as the force of good example.

They operate in terms of size, quantity, and power, and I am going to emphasize that, because power and size is a very big aspect in their sense of security. When I was dealing with Mr. Khrushchev over in Putsinda on the Black Sea, he gave me the same treatment that he later gave President Kennedy. Wielding those big cannisters around his head and threatening, he said, I have got to have the biggest, and I began talking about the fine quality of ours, and he said, I don't care, I want the biggest. He does want the biggest, and they place a great deal of emphasis upon the biggest. They have the concept that this connotes power. Why do they strut out those big cannisters around Red Square the way they do? Why, we would not think of putting our cannisters out and parading them around on the Fourth of July, but for them it is meant to impress. It is the idea of the prestige of size. It is like the old days when Navy ships were in the harbor, who had the biggest guns. He was the fellow who sat on the right of the executive.

It is that aspect. I guess it is the perception of power, as has been said here. That is a very important thing for them, and he stressed it with me when I talked with him at Putsinda. He was very threatening at that time. It was only a few weeks after that that he talked with President Kennedy.

Let me say this next. In terms of what their intentions are, I rather agree with the Chief of Staff that they are not planning for a bolt out of the blue. I do not think they are preparing for a nuclear exchange with us. I think they are just too intelligent for that, but some think they are. I just say that I think they are too intelligent to risk the terrible consequences of a nuclear exchange, but I want to emphasize this. There is no question about it. They have been constantly seeking a position in relation to us in which they felt they might be able to apply pressures or leverages which would enable them to extend their influence and their so-called hegemony.

I have no question about that. You have to believe these people when you have been in contact with them after a time. When they make a certain statement to you, you are inclined to accept it.

When I finished my conversations with Kusnetsov, and we got off the fence, we sat down and we shook hands. He said, Mr. McCloy,

we are going to live up to this commitment, but we are never going to be in this position again. I think you will be able to trace around that time the increase in the so-called buildup. He said another very ominous thing, and Senator Javits, I think you will be interested in this. He said, it is all very well for us to be sitting on this fence talking about Cuba, but this is inconsequential. The real thing that some statesmanship should be applied to is the Middle East, because there I see—and he went into this exposition.

Later, I heard and read in the newspaper that Mr. Kissinger talked a good bit about geopolitics. Well, I have not had the advantage of seeing his testimony. I hope to get a chance to see it today, but I read something about it in the newspaper. He pointed out that the Middle East was the juncture between the east, the west, the north, and the south, the old caravan routes, the navel idea of the strategic aspect of that.

He said, now we have oil there. We have energy there. He said there is one place where there is more apt to be an exchange, and besides that, we think there are some nuclear weapons there. There may be rumors that there are some there.

Now, that is the area statesmen should be dealing with, because that is where pressures are most apt to arise. He said, when I was a young man, we were always told in Russia that our destiny was a warm water port and the warm water ports are the Mediterranean.

Now, I found that to be pretty enlightening.

Next, we get to a real problem, and I will gallop through this because I do not want to take too much time. It is indisputable, and I think everybody agrees, that there has been a major buildup on the part of the Soviets. There has been a period of 10 years or so where they have been spending far more than we have, not only on strategic weapons and ICBM's, but they have been doing it in other respects, too, and there are consequences that have flown from that and that are just beginning to emerge. You know what they are. You have had a lot of testimony in regard to that.

There are ICBM's in the west. That is our main nuclear battery, and we cannot afford to have a weakness in that area. There has been a lot of talk around about rough equivalence. Well, you can talk about rough equivalence in a number of areas, but if you talk about rough equivalence in that area after the buildup has been going on for several years and the new stages of that thing, and the amount of sheer poundage that they can deliver—Nitze points out the potentiality of something like 7 or 8 to 1 when you multiply the launchers and the MIRV's. It is in that character with respect to ours. Well, if that is rough equivalence, you have to put an awful lot of reliance on the word "rough." In my judgment, we cannot afford to have the most symbolic of our nuclear weaponry in an inferior position.

From what I read in the transcripts, this seems to be the case. Secretary Brown seems to feel that. I have a very high regard for him. I was involved with him in the early days in this nuclear business when he was out in the laboratory out west. I think he is very aware not only of the nuclear potential but of the conventional potential as well.

He is quite prepared to admit that we are weak in that particular area, and that is a very important area, because in terms of

accuracy, time of flight, and command and control, it is the most critical. It may not be so 20 or 30 years hence, but that is the way it is now. That is the symbol of our strength, and in my judgment we have to repair that.

In my statement, I refer to the bolt out of the blue and the possibility is, as the scenarios go, that we could be vulnerable and that there could be a first strike which would knock out our counterforce, but Secretary Brown says that there are measures, and this is in my statement, that they can take on this in the meantime.

One of them is the release on warning. Well, that leaves you on a very narrow ledge, and I do not believe many people have much confidence in the thought that even after our experience at Pearl Harbor, we just might release on warning, but it is a very short period of time, a very narrow ledge on which to stand, and we do not know who would be standing on that ledge at that point.

There are some things that have been done, but I gather they do not quite fit. I am not saying that we have goofed. I am not trying to fight over words, but in comparison with the Soviets there has been a very definite disparity in the expenditures that we have made in that area.

I think that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others have pointed out that if we have the will, if we have the gumption, and if we don't overly rationalize, I think a good bit of our effort has been spent in coining phrases that would justify inaction. The emphasis that we put on minimum deterrent, too. There has been an awful lot of stress on minimum and on overkill and that sort of thing. I think all of those things tend to rationalize inaction at a very critical point.

There was an effort to understand what was ahead of us and a belated effort to counter it. I wish that we had had an earlier M-X for example, and there are a number of other things that could have been done. I do not say that nothing was done in that period. I think there was a good bit done. I am not as familiar as I perhaps should be with what was done in that period, but it does fall short of what is necessary as I read the testimony of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Secretary Brown talks about an improved submarine force and our bombers, particularly the B-52's. He talks about the penetrability of those. I have a very high regard and respect for the air defense of the Soviet Union, which is certainly going up in its efficiency, and I am not sure, I am not as confident, I think, as he is that the B-52's will have the penetrability as late as that. I talk about that in my statement, there is not a nice fix in time there, and there may be a period when they would be tempted to strike, but even so there would be considerable risks for them to take, but we just cannot afford, either perceptionwise or in reality, to have that main factor of our nuclear weaponry at a point of inferiority.

I have some difficulty in following the argument that the treaty freezes us into a position of inferiority. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense have placed a great deal of reliance on them that we can in time remedy the vulnerability of our ICBM's, and there is nothing in SALT that prevents us from doing so. They are quite confident that that is the fact. I do not know

enough about it to be as confident as they are. They know what they have in mind. I do not know what they have in mind. I do not read the cables any more, but they do say that, and they assert that, and they said nothing can stand in the way of our being able to do these things unless it is a matter of will, and they say that there is nothing in SALT II as they read it which impairs our ability to do whatever they think is necessary to do in order to redress this imbalance.

I place great reliance on their testimony in this respect. I suppose what they have in mind is that certainly they have in mind the M-X and the Trident submarine and missiles, and I guess the cruise missile as well. There may be other items. I noticed that General Jones talked about other items that he was rather vague about. I do not know what he has in mind. They may be in the conventional area. They may be in the gray area with the SS-20's and the buildup in that part of the world. At any rate, there is an area there that is something other than just the ICBM's.

Now, I have come to the conclusion that I am sure that what we failed to do in the past is set a bad precedent. My feeling is that in this freezing, I do not know why we cannot be as obdurate as they are at a given point. I have no question that they will be tough in the SALT III negotiations, as tough as they have been in coming to their conclusions in SALT II, but at some point we at least ought to be able to be as obdurate as they are.

So, I come to the conclusion that in taking these steps that they refer to, that we are on balance better off with the treaty in effect than without it. I place a great deal of emphasis in coming to that conclusion on the ability to get information on which we need their cooperation to a substantial degree. We know more with the treaty than we would know without it.

As I said, we depend a great deal on their cooperation in getting the information that we now do get, and I think that would be excluded if we did not have the treaty. Again, I am not impressed by the fact that we do have limits on these categories and subcategories. They do not impress me very much. I gather they do not impress Senator McGovern very much.

All I can say is, they are considerably better than no limitations at all, and I am thinking particularly in terms of some of the subcategories. So, I think that is a major and important factor. I believe it is very important for us to think in terms of the so-called next phase, SALT III, the opportunity there that we would have to go into that area and to press upon them again the importance of significant and equal reductions.

I was very much impressed by General Rowny's testimony. He was before this committee, I believe, as well as before the Armed Services Committee. He said that if we had been a little more obdurate and more tough in 1977, we would have had significant reductions, but we did not. We faded before their adamant attitude. I do not know why we always have to fade before that, and with the SALT III coming along.

I accept the emphasis which the administration has put upon the importance of going forward and going into that area provided we are at least as tough as they are, and that in the meantime we do not rationalize and drop back to a point where we are now, which

is very dangerous. I am impressed, I guess, as I think Senator McGovern also said, at the many segments of opinion that feel that we should have deeper reductions and more equal reductions which would have deep significance.

I feel if we do move ahead with this program that we have now, the chances of our being able to get those deeper, more significant reductions, will be increased rather than diminished by the fact that we are in such a program. The fact that it is futile for them to try to freeze us into an inferior position, I think, would tend to induce their acceptance, if we pound down hard enough on the importance of these significant reductions, both in terms of the arms race and the peace aspects of it, and the tremendous burdens that we are under at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. That must be our hope. Otherwise, the SALT process, which we tend to view as an effort to achieve nuclear arms control, won't be that at all. It will be arms facility rather than arms control.

Mr. McCLOY. Yes, I say, why continue with it? As somebody said the other day in the transcripts that I read, let's get rid of all of this talk of the hawks, doves, and calling of names. I do not think that advances us very far. I have high regard for Paul Nitze, but I hear him called a hawk all the time. I think he has made a great contribution to the country, and I don't believe we would have as clear a picture of the situation if he had not pointed out the vulnerability that now exists there, and I would say that in respect to anybody else, I think we need the cooperation of the pros and the cons in order to work out the right solution for this thing.

I would like to go back and remind this committee that if it had not been for the generals, the admirals, and the air chiefs, you would never have any legislation. I know. I was asked by President Kennedy to give up my practice and come down here and work on this subject. I spent so much time in my life, and it goes back to World War I, in destroying that I thought this was the time to try to do something to put things together and maybe disarmament was very much in my mind.

He made a great deal of it in his State of the Union message at his inauguration. Well, I burned my bridges and came down here. Then he called me up one day and asked me to breakfast and said, Mr. McCloy, my advisers on the Hill tell me I cannot risk a defeat this early in my administration. He said, no longer can I let you be an administration measure, and I cannot give you White House support.

Well, he pulled the rug out from under me. I said I had burned my bridges and come down here. He said, well, if you want to try it out on your own, you can. Then I was on speaking terms with every war hero in the War Department, from Eisenhower down. I brought them up here. I had them write in, and every war hero that you can name testified and the thing went through with a hoop and a holler, and he thought I was a great lobbyist.

Hubert Humphrey, who was doing all the work with the civilians on this, as he called it in those days, the "do good" people, he was helpful, he was fine, he was in fine spirit, but Lyndon Johnson did not think he could deliver the votes. The people who delivered the votes were the soldiers, the hawks. That is how the ACDA got

together, and some of the testimony on that is very graphic from Eisenhower on down.

There are one or two other points I want to make. First, when you look at the priorities, and goodness knows, we have some very big issues at this time facing this country, I believe that the greatest issue facing us, facing the human race today is this balance between peace and war. When one thinks of the number of these highly targeted, alerted, massive weapons and engines of destruction and their launchers all around the world and what they could do to our civilization if they are all let go, it dwarfs some of the other issues facing us such as energy, even inflation, even the tyranny of bureaucracy.

These have to take second or third place. Happily, I do not think the approval or disapproval of this treaty is the issue between peace and war, but it is a step, and it is something that I think we should continue to try to advance even though the discouragements may be rather great along the line.

I do not place very much emphasis upon the fact that if we do not go through with this treaty, it will tend to proliferate weapons. I think the example is not all that eloquent in terms of reduction, to cause them to start proliferating, so I do not place a great deal of emphasis on that.

I think I have talked enough about the real and the favorable aspects of the treaty. I like that consultive mechanism, the Standing Consultative Commission, which you can use to work out your disputes. I think you can continue to press for these significant reductions in the future. I think you can be sure that this hearing itself has stimulated a great deal of interest. There is not a day that does not go by that I do not get telephone calls from abroad about what is going on over here.

Let me say a word about that. I have heard that everybody abroad is enthusiastic about this treaty. I rather doubt that, and I think I have very considerable contacts. Of course, I do not have the same contacts that the Government has, because my bailiwick has really been Europe and the unity of Europe. But I find more concern today about the credibility of the American deterrent than I have ever heard since the close of the war. They are nervous over there. There is no question about it. They have seen the combination of our loss of superiority together with the buildup, which is very significant.

You saw what Harold McMillan said the other day in the *Observer*. He said the exigency is great. We do not have a Churchill to expound it. I think that was a little extreme, but that was the thought. Do not tell me there is not concern about the credibility of the American deterrence. For so long they have been living under that umbrella, and they wonder if in effect it may not be as impervious as it once was.

This is a matter of great concern for them. I saw in the paper this morning that Dr. Kissinger talked about the attitude of some of our allies. He used the word "ambivalent." Well, I thought he might have been stealing from me, because I used the word "ambivalent" in my statement here. In other words, I agree with him on that. I think they are disturbed as to what might happen if there is no agreement.

They are sitting on the firing line and do not want anything unduly provocative. Do not be misled. There is a great nervousness over there. I want to stress again the importance of Europe. Forgive me if I am rattling on, but I am trying to get through my statement, and then I will open it to questions.

I have been involved in NATO, the setting up of NATO and in the general unity of Europe. That has been my major concern and interest defensewise. In fact, I go back to World War I. I am rather proud of the fact that I was commissioned in the Regular Army in World War I. The commission I had was called provisional second lieutenant. If there is a lower form of animal life in commissioned ranks, I do not know what it is.

At that point, I was a sort of lackey in the postwar negotiations, and got a feel of the importance of the unity of Europe. The unity of Europe and the concept of united with us, is worth I don't know what. I would say it is worth x divisions. They say how many divisions does the Pope get, I don't know. It is just one aspect that is extremely important in the next step, that whatever we do, we keep them in train.

The Soviets are always trying to undermine that relationship between the countries on either side of the Atlantic. They do not think we are Europeans and that we have no business over there. Mr. Khrushchev has said, you are not Europeans, we are Europeans. You have no business in Europe. They do not like the idea of unity in the West, but it is extremely important to us. Everything must be done to keep it. We cannot ignore that any longer and be as cavalier as I think we have been in the past. So, I place a great deal of stress on that.

As I have said, my main preoccupation for years has been in the strength of the alliance and defense unity of Europe. I have had a great many contacts with European allies. Make no mistake. There has been deep concern about the perception of the strength of the United States that persists. I don't know of an Allied chancellor who is not concerned about that. I very much feel that our allies would react favorably if the Senate took any steps to clarify or even amend the treaty in such a way as to confirm the aspect and the power of the U.S. deterrent.

This is particularly true in face of the realization of the loss of American strategic superiority, and the dimensions of the buildup.

Let me end up with one little bit of history. I am not trying to give out any flattery here, but I am very comforted by the fact that the Senate is now squaring itself away to deal with this very difficult problem, and it is a very difficult problem. It has many imponderables in it. We have all heard about the great Senate debates such as those on slavery in the old days, that on the League of Nations at Versailles. That is a part of our history.

I want to say that I once had the opportunity to attend on the floor one of what may be classed as the great debates of the U.S. Senate. It was the lend-lease debate. I was then in the War Department, and I hope the statute of limitations has run on whatever law I violated, but I went down and posed with the pageboy. Jimmy Burns put me down there, really, because I knew that statute like the back of my hand, and I sat through that entire debate. I was 40 years old then, so I was a rather poor elderly pageboy.

Senator BIDEN. That explains to me why you look so young now. [General laughter.]

Mr. McCLOY. Well, we got past the Sergeant at Arms, anyway. As I say, I was very much impressed and very amazed, really, at the knowledgeability of issues that was shown, the way the Members displayed their familiarity with the subject and their capacity to deal with it. It was more than capacity. In some cases it was sheer brilliance.

There was not a weak point that was not detected somewhere in the course of that debate, nor a strong one that was not weighed in connection with arriving at their conclusions. Of course, it was not all of a magnificently high order, but there were some very fine minds at work on it. When they got through, I really felt that they had preserved the integrity of the Nation.

I am confident that in the consideration of the SALT Treaty, the present Senate is quite as equipped as the old one was to reach a conclusion that will preserve peace and security for the country.

Gentlemen, forgive me if I have rattled on, but in closing let me say this. I would redirect your attention to Alexander Hamilton's statement. You, like no one else, are charged with the trust. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. McCloy's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN J. MCCLOY

I have been asked to appear before this Committee to express my views regarding the pending treaty or draft treaty known as SALT II. In doing so I shall also, with your permission, express certain views on our treaty-making process, particularly as it relates to SALT II and our security and defense interests. I approach this problem from what may be a somewhat different perspective than those who have been actively negotiating the treaty provisions or serving as the immediate back-up groups. I am a private citizen and for a substantial period of time I have not been connected in any way with the SALT negotiations, owing, I imagine, to my past experience with them and with other Soviet contacts I have been asked to give my views regarding the pending treaty. I trust this experience may be of some value to the Senate in arriving at a sound determination of its difficult and very important task.

Perhaps I should first sketch briefly the experience I have had which gives rise to my views. My interest in military matters and foreign affairs dates back to World War I when I held a commission in the so-called Regular Army, serving in France and Germany. I was The Assistant Secretary of War during World War II under Secretary Stimson. My duties in that office were varied; they related, though not exclusively, more to the political-military aspects of the war than to problems of procurement. I had close relations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and attended a number of conferences with our Allies during and after the World War, including the one at Potsdam at the close of the war where we came face to face with the Soviet leaders. Later, following General Lucius Clay, I became the U.S. Military Governor of Germany and after this the U.S. High Commissioner. During this period I had various confrontations with the Soviets and their political and military chiefs, particularly in regard to the defense of the City of Berlin. On a number of occasions I undertook missions or attended conferences with our Allies or our own Government on defense matters, including our force levels in Europe and the establishment of NATO, with whose leaders I often maintained close contact.

Following the inauguration of President Kennedy, I acted as his general advisor on matters of disarmament and helped set up the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1961. At first I was acting director of that Agency, later becoming the first Chairman of its Advisory Committee. I took part in meetings related to disarmament with Messrs. Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gromyko, Semenov and other Soviet leaders. Though I never was a member of the active negotiating team which represented the United States in the negotiations leading up to SALT I, I kept in close touch with the negotiations and attended some of those negotiations. I dealt directly with the First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the

U.S.S.R., Mr. Kuznetsov, as well as with other Soviet officials, including Mr. Zorin, on the matter of the removal of the Soviet strategic missiles from Cuba.

I had considerable experience in connection with the development of our nuclear armament in the early days when I served under Mr. Stimson and later during the period when I was Chairman of the Advisory Committee to which I have referred. I was a member of the Baruch Committee and had close dealings with the Acheson-Lilienthal Committee which gave considerable time and thought to the formulation of our nuclear policy following World War II. At one time I was quite familiar with our national means of intelligence gathering in regard to Soviet nuclear armament. This experience, then, and my reading of the transcripts of the current hearing have shaped my understanding of the issues and my comments to this Committee today.

First, let me say something regarding our treaty-making process, for I am concerned over what I consider to be some of its defects. We are now all familiar with the constitutional process which requires that before the President can make a treaty which becomes effective as the supreme law of the land, it must have been arrived at "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, . . . provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur", (Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution). This is a rather extraordinary and unique provision and I am not aware of any similar provision in any other country. I have heard a good bit of comment on how this provision came to be incorporated into the Constitution of the United States. I have consulted some constitutional historians on the subject and I have conducted some research of my own.

Members of this Committee, or at least some of them, are probably quite as familiar with the history of this provision as I am, but I believe it is pertinent to point out that under the original Articles of Confederation the United States "In Congress assembled" had the full power both to negotiate and approve any treaty, provided 9 of the representatives of the 13 states assented. When the Founding Fathers, with their memories of George the Third, regarded this power, they were sensitive of the danger of concentrating too much power in one person. They intended that the making of treaties (which were not too popular) should be a difficult process. From the beginning of the Constitutional Convention's consideration of the treaty provision, it was contemplated that a fundamental element in the making of a treaty was the participation of a Federal legislative body. At one time, some sought to introduce the House of Representatives into the act—for example, James Wilson of Pennsylvania (3 *Records* 538) and George Mason of Virginia (4 J. Elliott, *Debates on the Federal Convention* 331 (1836)) supported such a position. Recognizing that the power of making a treaty could have far-reaching consequences, the Constitutional Convention's first draft of the treaty-making power provided that it would reside completely in the Senate. Due to considerations of expediency and efficiency, however, later drafts introduced the President into the process, giving him the right to "make" a treaty "by and with the advice and consent" of the Senate provided that the consent of two-thirds of the members present was obtained. In a somewhat different form this provision was finally adopted by the Convention. The role of the President, as I read the early history, was conceived of as that of an agent rather than a prime mover. In speaking of the treaty-making power, Alexander Hamilton had this to say: "The qualities elsewhere detailed, as indispensable in the management of foreign negotiations, point out the executive as the most fit agent in those transactions; while the vast importance of the trust, and the operation of the treaties as laws, plead strongly for the participation of the whole, or a portion, of the legislative body in the office of making them." *Federalist Papers* No. LXXV.

James Madison said very much the same thing during the debates of the Constitutional Convention. (2 *Records of the Federal Convention of 1787* 329 (M. Farrand, ed. 1911)).

The Senate was ultimately chosen as the more experienced and elite legislative body to receive this "trust" being, as John Jay pointed out, not elected by the general public, as it is now but appointed by the legislatures of the several states. (*Federalist Papers* No. LXIV). In any event, and for a combination of these reasons—distrust of the concentration of power, expediency and the need for legislative participation—the provision, as it now stands, was incorporated into the Constitution.

There has been sharp criticism of the provision from time to time. Frequently Secretaries of State, I believe, have not been very happy with it. John Hay, when he was Secretary of State, called the provision "the original mistake in the Constitution". (3 J. Hay, *Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary* 156 (privately printed 1908)). I am not certain that he was right. At any rate, there it is, a part of our basic law of which everyone is on notice, and the wording is very clear. Neither the

negotiators, nor the Secretary of State, nor even the President of the United States can create a commitment, in any sense, binding upon the country as "the supreme law of the land", without the vote of two-thirds of the Senators present. I refer to this fact because I believe the concept that the Senate, by its consideration and its vote on the treaty, could somehow be undermining the authority of the President of the United States or his Secretary of State, is not well founded.

I now see the Executive branch sending so-called "task forces" throughout the country urging audiences "to write you senators". I have attended some of these sessions in my neighborhood. They did not help me resolve the very difficult problems I had in making up my mind on the merits of the treaty. Certainly, if my reading of the record as to how this provision came into the constitution is at all correct, the Founding Fathers would not have taken kindly to the thought that the Executive should bring pressure on the Senate in the course of giving its advice and consent to a treaty, in accordance with the provision of the Constitution.

There are two other aspects of our negotiating procedures which I would like to mention. As I look back on our negotiations with the Soviet Union on disarmament or on the limitation of strategic weapons, I feel that we have been handicapped by the fact that our negotiators seem always to come under pressure when arriving at an agreement in the closing or critical stages of a negotiation. Every administration which sets out to seek a treaty, whether with the Soviet Union or someone else, seems to come under pressure before it is over to achieve what is considered to be the political success attached to an agreement, or at least to avoid the sense of failure if agreement is not reached. On the Soviet side, there is no such public opinion nor administrative pressure. Given the nature of the Soviet system, the Soviet negotiators for all practical purposes have the final power in their own hands. They do not have pressures on them to reach an agreement as do those of the United States. The result has been that the Soviet negotiators could and, I thought, did on occasion in my experience sit back and say "nyet" while waiting for pressure on the U.S. negotiators to build up for an agreement.

The other side of this coin is, I suppose, that with Senate approval necessary the Soviet side could claim it has been at a disadvantage since an agreement between the negotiators, while conclusive for practical purposes so far as the Soviet side was concerned, is not final with us until the Senate approval is forthcoming. This tends, I imagine, to give rise to the present demand on the part of the Soviets that no amendments to the treaty can be entertained. My experience has been, nonetheless, that as the negotiations reach a climax, the United States side tends to contract "agreementitis" so as to achieve the appearance of success or avoid the charge of failure if no agreement transpires.

There is another aspect of our treaty making which, I believe, is unfortunate and it affects the treaty now under consideration as well as some others. In the effort to secure Senate approval we too frequently feel the need to mount an intensive public relations program to bring about approval or rejection. Polls are taken and advertised and claims are made that such and such a percentage of the people are in favor of a treaty and such and such are opposed, without much consideration of how well informed those polled were or how they were questioned. I deplore the fact that our treaty-making process seems so frequently to take on this form. May I add that from reading the transcripts and sitting in some of the hearings I believe this Committee has been hearing a high quality of testimony and an objective presentation of the rather complicated problems involved.

At this stage in our history we cannot and should not change our constitutional treaty-making process, but we ought to be able to arrange our negotiation and ratification procedures in such a way as to minimize the political pressures and maximize serious discussion and debate of treaties related to the security of the country.

Now as to the merits of the treaty. I believe it is indisputable that there has been in recent years a very heavy Soviet buildup of strategic and conventional forces, army, naval and air as well as civilian defenses. For over 10 years this has been going on in terms of appropriations substantially larger than ours and now the consequences of this effort have quite inevitably begun to emerge. Let us face it, these consequences are bad. In view of this, I believe that what this country and this body need and deserve is the most objective analysis available of our present strategic position, particularly in the light of this Soviet buildup.

I have read Secretary Brown's analysis of our position which he submitted to this Committee and, of course, I have read the statement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff though they do not purport to be comprehensive. Secretary Brown has a wide and, indeed, a profound knowledge of our nuclear and conventional potential and I believe the same thing can be said of his knowledge of the potential of the Soviet Union.

He has, at times, been one of our negotiators in the SALT process and to a large degree he has been a proponent of it, as I have been. But I would wish it were possible to have an analysis of our overall strategic position independent of and quite unrelated to the present issue of the merits of SALT II. I do not know of any general board such as we once had which would now be equipped to make an independent analysis of our overall position. It is probably too late in the day for it and perhaps there would be all sorts of security objections to making it public. But it does seem that somewhere along the line there should be available to the Senate an understanding of what our overall strategic (not only in the sense of nuclear) situation really is in relation to that of the Soviet Union. It could serve as background to all the determinations this body has to make in considering the merits of this treaty and the ultimate decisions as to what needs to be done to bring about equality as well as to determine whether there is anything in SALT II which would seriously constrain or inhibit our authority to do it. With such an analysis one might find it easier to come to decisions. We must always bear in mind that not only do we have an obligation to maintain our security, but we must always bear in mind that of our Allies as well. I suggest we do not need more polls or pressures to reach our conclusions. But every effort on the part of the Administration, as well as on the part of the critics of the Treaty, should be voted to helping this body arrive at an informed and satisfactory determination of these questions.

Before dealing further with the serious security considerations which, I believe, are the main questions before the Senate, I would like to talk for a few minutes about the matter of treaty verification as I appraise it. The President has said that the country could be assured that he would never sign a treaty that could not be adequately verified. Of course, it must depend heavily on what is meant by the term "adequately" or, as it is sometimes expressed, "significantly" verified. I gather the Senate now has the opinion of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the treaty is adequately verifiable.

There was a period when, as Chairman of the Advisory Committee of the Disarmament Agency, I was rather well informed about our verification capability in regard to the characteristics and trend of Soviet nuclear weaponry. Our capacities in this respect impressed me very much, but it was quite clear even then that we did not have the whole story. I received from time to time detailed presentations of the intelligence that we had in this area. The material given us was, of course, most sensitive. It is difficult for the Senate as a whole to satisfy itself as to the efficacy of our so-called national capabilities without seriously risking the security of our information. Valuable information can be imparted to selected members of the Senate, I suppose, but in some degree it will be necessary to take something on faith. Impressive as this material is, the sum total of our information in regard to the Soviet nuclear and military capabilities, would not, I believe, ever be as complete as the sum total of the information which the Soviet Union has of ours. Once we enter into a treaty with the Soviet Union, with its closed society and almost passionate attachment to secrecy, they will have a better verifiable treaty than we will have simply because of our open society and our almost equally passionate attachment to disclosure and leaks. What with our Freedom of Information Act, our investigative reporters, our open publications, free wheeling commentators, over-staffed staffs and government publications, any espionage or information gathering system as efficient as that of the Soviet Union must certainly have a much easier time gathering information on our weaponry in this country than our CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies can ever hope to attain on theirs in the Soviet Union.

Having said this I have come to the conclusion that this is a fact of life with which we simply have to live. The Soviet Union with its might and its ideology is not going to go away; we must continue to attempt to find a *modus vivendi* with them and they with us if we ever hope to advance the cause of peace in a nuclear world and, at the same time, retain our essential security. In short, we have to take some risks. Even so, I must confess I am somewhat skeptical of the extent of our "significant" knowledge with respect to verification. I believe there is much information which we would have great difficulty in obtaining in regard to Soviet weaponry particularly before it gets to the testing stage. Having been familiar with the sites in Iran, I was most skeptical of the Statement made so shortly after their loss that the verifiability of our treaties with the Soviet Union on strategic weapons was not significantly impaired. In some way, the Senate must be put in a position to reach a reliable judgment on our so-called national intelligence sources and our ability to verify the important treaty provisions.

I have been impressed in the past, as I have said, by what we were able to find out about Soviet weaponry, but I suggest that you do not let the fact that in one of our photographs you can see a small screw head in a Soviet missile mislead you into thinking that this is the measure of our intelligence capacity in the Soviet Union in

respect of its strategic weapons. As one of our intelligence officers said to me once, "Do not think that this means we can tell you every time Mr. Brezhnev goes to the bathroom." There is much we do not know but, I repeat, I believe we have to take some risks in the way of trusting the Soviets and they us if we are to hope to lessen the dangers of a nuclear exchange and to arrive at a point where we can bring about a really significant limitation on our respective nuclear and conventional weaponry.

I have dealt with the Soviets on a number of occasions where I have had an opportunity to judge their bona fide. As I have indicated, I had to deal with them in such important areas as the defense of Berlin and West Germany and in the Cuban missile crisis. As to their attitude and negotiating tactics, I would summarize it this way. They are good chess players, as we all know, and on top of this they have a deep-seated or "gut" instinct as to what they want to feel they should have for their security. After having been the victims of Western European aggression in two successive centuries, they resist all blandishments, the force of good example or bluffing and they operate in terms of size, quantity and power. By and large I have come to the conclusion that once the Soviets make a commitment which is clear cut and incapable of equivocation, they will honor it. I found this to be so in my dealings with Mr. Kuznetsov over the actual removal of the missiles from Cuba. I gained the impression he was meticulous in carrying out our understanding. On the other hand, if in our verification process we were compelled to rely at any point on the word of the Soviet Foreign Minister, I would have little confidence in it as I cannot forget that he quite blandly stated to Adlai Stevenson among others that there were no Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba when he knew there were.

I rather doubt that the Soviets would have much of a motive to cheat in regard to this treaty. I believe they would very much like to see it in force and have it remain in force. It is clearly favorable to them in that it does ensure them of at least parity with US in strategic strength. We have come a very long way from our position of complete superiority to the present level of relative parity or something less. I believe they would be ill advised, as a matter of their own interest, to risk the consequences of cheating, even though I certainly could not exclude the possibility of it.

One more thought on verification. Although in the past we have been able to rely heavily on our satellite photography of the Soviet ICBM sites, because it was there that the Soviet strategic power was centered, it is now quite apparent that with the whole Soviet buildup we face the need of intelligence on a much wider and penetrating scale than heretofore. The introduction of MIRVing on top of their civil defense, the threat of killer satellites to our control and command systems, the great superiority in armor and artillery facing West European targets, the presence of new forces, including the Cubans, in the Middle East area, the improvements generally in Soviet anti-European offensive systems (the gray area) will require expanded intelligence capacities on our part. I would strongly urge that the time for open season on the CIA and our other intelligence gathering services is passed. They will need all the talent, energy, esprit de corps and dedication they can muster if we are to gather the "significant" verification data, as well as the broad intelligence as to Soviet intentions and capabilities which we should have.

In considering this treaty, I believe, the Senate is aware that there are even more serious and wider problems before it than how the constitutional provisions regarding the making of our treaties came to be adopted or even how well the provisions of this particular treaty can be verified.

It is now a fact that by a combination of the Soviet buildup within the treaty and our own laxity in not reacting to it while we had the perfect right to do so, we are now in a position of vulnerability. SALT I really had little to do with it. It is clear now that there has been a continuous series of improvements in their ICBM land-based systems, none of which, while disappointing to us, constitutes a proven violation of any existing SALT provision. The Soviets acted within their rights under the provisions of the treaty and we acted within ours in choosing not to react, beyond continuing a rather well ordered maintenance of our existing land-based system avoiding obsolescence and coining phrases such as "minimum deterrence" designed to rationalize our failure to do anything more than we were then doing. I gather that very few, if any, now seriously deny that our main land-based nuclear battery has been made increasingly vulnerable and may well become compromised by this continuous improvement of the Soviet ICBM land-based systems. The Department of Defense, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I believe, do not contest this vulnerability, and indeed, if I have read them correctly, actually assert it.

There was some objection voiced the other day, according to a transcript I read, to the use of the term "goofed" in describing our inaction over the last ten years. Let us not deal in semantics; let us not waste time in ascribing fault. Let's admit there

were a number who could be criticized. There is enough fault to go around. The fact is we did allow our investment in our main ICBM battery to lag just when the Soviet buildup was going along at its greatest pace. This, of course, had consequences and we should not blink them by ignoring the facts or by creating phrases or slogans to rationalize inaction. The basic scenario is that with an immensely greater throw weight, together with increased accuracy and general quality due in large part to the Soviet Union's buildup aimed at a given time in the mid 1980's, the U.S.S.R. would be in a position to destroy or nearly destroy all our land-based ICBMs on a first strike and still have a reserve of land-based ICBMs to deliver against the United States. To be sure we would have the capacity to inflict some heavy reprisals against the Soviet population and their industrial targets, but the option is not a very satisfying one on the hypothesis that the Soviets would have a considerable remaining potential, after a first strike, in their land-based ICBM reserves as well as in their submarines and bombers.

If we accept the superiority of the Soviet land-based ICBM potential over that of the United States as the Department of Defense does, together with the general superiority of Soviet or Warsaw European-based nuclear and conventional strength over Allied European strength, the credibility of the American deterrent on which so much of the security and confidence of the whole free world depends could be materially impaired.

Our ICBM land-based batteries are probably the most efficient, the most accurate and best controlled and commanded, of all our nuclear weaponry. They are also, I would say, the most symbolic of our strength. We cannot afford inferiority in this area irrespective of where we stand in others. If our Allies and our potential enemies perceive that our main land-based nuclear battery is vulnerable, it could well induce pressures, tensions and tests of will that could lead to dangerous confrontations.

I doubt that the Soviets are looking toward or preparing for a successful nuclear exchange with us or a "bolt out of the blue" as General Jones calls it. Some contend that they are. I think they are too intelligent to risk such a confrontation, but I do believe, without any doubt, that they have been consciously seeking a position in relation to us on which they felt they might be able to apply pressures or leverage which would enable them to extend their influence over our Allies or their so-called hegemony without resorting to the risks of war. The signs, particularly since Cuba, certainly point that way.

Hopefully the scenario to which I referred will never take place. Indeed, we have to do what we can to ensure that, in fact, it does not occur. The Secretary of Defense points to a number of things, some of which are already in effect and some which can be put into effect that would not only deter the Soviet Union from undertaking such a strike but also would restore confidence all along the Allied line, that the credibility of the U.S. deterrent remains firm.

What are these measures? First, it is suggested that there is always the possibility facing the Soviet Commander who is contemplating a first strike that if the first strike were attempted, the targeted ICBMs might not be there. Any such strike is probably not going to occur without some buildup of warning signals; and the United States, with memories of Pearl Harbor in mind, just might fire on warning. It would require a bold decision made within minutes. However you look at it, it is a very narrow ledge on which to stand and who can tell who will be standing on that ledge when the decision must be made.

Next the Secretary of Defense states that by 1985 we will have in our improved submarine force and our bombers a capability of destroying a large number of the Soviet land-based ICBMs, which should deter them from risking a first strike on our land-based ICBMs. The B-52 bombers, though aging, he contends, will still have penetrability and could be put into operation either simultaneously with or before our ALCM's begin to come in.

We also now have the belated decision to start on the MX's with their mobile basing modes.

I am a little confused as to just when the MX and the air cruise missiles are planned to come in. I have the impression there is not a nice time fix on which we can rely. There may well be a time gap within which it might be tempting for the U.S.S.R. to attack our ICBMs. I do not believe that our relations with the Soviet Union are on such a delicate balance that we need to have all our deterrents in place at the right time in order to create constant and full deterrence. We can strive to do so, but if, in the meantime we show we have measures on the way and we can improvise to a degree with our existing forces, there would still be considerable risks for an attacker to take. Though we may have to go through a nervous period, it is one so relatively short that the U.S.S.R. would have to make some very fine calculations, indeed, to choose the right moment to attack.

But SALT II is not responsible for this. I wish we had accomplished our modernization a little earlier. I wish we had been a little more discerning of what was happening in the way of the Soviet buildup and that we had started to counter it some years ago particularly by starting on the MX program earlier. I wish from what may be incomplete information that we had not scrapped the B-1, but we did. We made some miscalculations of the time it would take for the Soviets to improve the quality of the Soviet ICBMs. However, we should waste no time, as I have said, in assessing blame, but concentrate on restoring the balance. We shall have to play catch up football to a degree in bringing our land-based ICBM force either through survivability or other measure to a point when it is again, both perception wise and in fact, essentially equal in power to the U.S.S.R.

I have difficulty following the argument that the treaty freezes us into a position of inferiority. Secretary Brown and the Joint Chiefs of Staff seem to think we can in time remedy the vulnerability of our ICBMs and that there is nothing in SALT II to prevent our doing so.

If I heard the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff right, they said there was nothing in SALT II which would inhibit or seriously impair the United States from taking any steps which they thought were necessary to offset the threats to our land-based ICBMs or indeed any other serious threats or to help our Allies to offset the threats to them in the regional area. This is assuming we and our allies have the will to do so. I place great reliance on their testimony in this respect. I do not know that I know enough about the situation to be as confident about this as they are, but then I do not know what measures they feel we should take in order to regain the essential equivalence, as the phrase goes. I take it that it certainly includes the MX, the Trident II submarine and missile as well as the cruise missile. There may be other items. I also assume that in saying this they mean action, and not merely reservations of options, for I believe we have passed beyond the stage where they will prove effective.

I am quite prepared to accept the contention that what we have done or failed to do thus far has set a bad precedent and that the Soviets can be counted upon to be as obdurate in SALT III as they have been in leading up to SALT II. But is not the answer that for once we can be equally as obdurate? My position is that it should be made perfectly clear that under the treaty we intend to go ahead immediately to restore the balance with respect to our security. It should also be made clear that we intend to help our Allies establish the forces necessary to maintain their security, through the transfer of technology and equipment. The treaty does not insure our security by any means. No one can seriously contend that it does. It requires other determined steps to do that. My belief is that in taking those steps we are, on balance, better off with the treaty in effect than without it.

I wish to add that if I felt the approval of this treaty would recreate an aura of complacency resulting in failure to take action to redress the imbalance caused by the Soviet buildup, the treaty would not have my support.

In considering the favorable aspects of the treaty, I have come to the conclusion that we shall be in a much better position to verify what the Soviets are doing and what they are intending to do under the proposed and existing treaty provisions than we would be without them. Moreover, though the limits set for launchers are so high that they do not have much meaning, they do constitute limits which are now set not only in the overall but in the important subcategories as well. They do restrain unlimited increases in missiles and RVs and hopefully this may encourage further limitations. To put it another way, they are considerably better than no limits at all.

I am also ready to accept the Administration's emphasis on the importance of the next phase, i.e. SALT III although this may be in the realm of hope rather than reality. I believe it is important to continue in spite of our discouragements to strive to bring about really significant and equal reductions of armaments as between ourselves and the Soviet Union. This, I think, we should do as long as we feel there is a reasonable hope of Soviet acceptance of arms reductions. I do not know enough about present Soviet intentions to know whether there is such a hope. People whose judgment and experience I respect feel there is. I have become convinced we have a better chance of finding this out with the treaty than without it. I am impressed, as is Senator McGovern, with the fact that so many segments of opinion among the military and nonmilitary favor the principle of much larger equalized limitations. General Rowny even seemed to think if we had been a little more persistent about it, we could have had Soviet agreement to greater reductions in 1977. Larger reductions continue to be highly desirable, both in the cause of peace and in the relief they could give each of our countries from massive financial burdens. I would suggest to Senator McGovern that a convincing demonstration of our willingness to take the steps to redress the present imbalance ought to induce a willingness on the

part of the Soviets to agree to significant reductions. Or to put it another way, to discourage them from clinging to the high levels they have been demanding. I am inclined to agree with those who say that if there is no hope of going forward steadily with significant and equal reductions in our armaments, there will be real doubts as to the sense of continuing the SALT process at all.

The size and nature of the Soviet buildup is, of course, related to this treaty as well as the security of ourselves and our Allies. It makes this debate in the Senate take on serious proportions. I would hope that it would introduce a note of objectivity that will dispense with some of the name calling which has marked certain phases of the earlier argumentation. I should like to record that I believe that Paul Nitze, who was one of our early negotiators and who is an expert in security matters and a patriot has done the country a service in pointing out publicly what he sincerely considers to be substantial disadvantages in this treaty. But for him and the work of his Committee, I doubt the country and this Committee would have had as clear a picture of the problems which have resulted from the steady improvements and investments in the Soviet ICBM systems over the last 10 years. I would like also to remind this Committee of the fact that had it not been for the support of the generals, the admirals and the air chiefs, mainly the World War II military leaders from Eisenhower down, there would never have been a disarmament agency or the legislation which gave momentum to arms limitation efforts.

When we look at the priorities, I believe, we must conclude that the greatest issue facing this country, and the human race remains the balance between peace and war. When one thinks of the number of these massive engines of destruction, all targeted, aimed and alerted in their launchers, and what they can do to our civilization if they were to be let go, all other issues such as energy, inflation and the tyranny of the bureaucracy, would have to take second, third or fourth place. Happily the question of the approval or disapproval of this treaty is not synonymous with the issue of peace and war, but the treaty, as I see it, does give us, at least, one more crack in the future at attempting to reduce this costly pile of armaments with which we are now so heavily and dangerously burdened. If we have the treaty, I repeat, I would hope that it will afford us another chance to talk seriously with the Soviets about the real need for more significant and equal reductions of our respective armaments nuclear and conventional.

I do not place much importance on the argument that if we do not ratify this treaty limiting nuclear arms with the Soviets, others, absent our example, will be disposed to start proliferating on their own. I say this because the example set by SALT II is not all that eloquent. On the other hand, I do believe, as I have indicated, that we would be better served with this treaty with such clarifications and reservations this body may see fit to make than we would be without it. I place particular emphasis on the opportunity for improved intelligence and the opportunity for going forward which SALT II provides. If we do not go to sleep, and let's not cavil about it, we at least nodded, then we ought to have a better chance of keeping our deterrent capability alert and convincing because of certain provisions in SALT II. The idea of having a standing consulting organization to which each side can come with its suspicions of cheating is a helpful if not a sure way to test out each other's bona fide. Under the treaty and with SALT III it would seem to me that we could establish a continuing forum within which to press our point of view and in the last analysis to convince the Soviet Union that we intend always to take such action as we feel necessary to resist any attempt on their part to put us to a position of inferiority. One must remember that, with or without SALT, the price of our security will, remain as always in eternal vigilance.

Our progress with SALT III may tell us a good bit about the value of the SALT II treaty. It may prove to be a decisive step. The strong emphasis which the Administration places on the on-going effect of the SALT process seems to indicate to me its own appreciation of the shortcomings of SALT II, as well as its conviction that the opportunity exists for substantial progress in the next phase of the negotiations. As long as that hope persists and as long as we remain alert to our own security needs and those of our Allies, the more we talk with the Soviets about the limitation of armaments the better. There may be considerable momentum generated toward such progress by reason of the airing of the whole subject of the strategic situation in the world which the announcement of this proposed treaty and these hearings have provoked. One can be sure that the U.S.S.R., as well as our Allies, will "cover" these hearings and the ensuing debates with deep interest. This is an opportunity of going further. I believe this opportunity for going forward is worth exploring. It might be irretrievably lost were SALT II to fail approval.

Here I wish to emphasize that in negotiations for SALT III, it is essential that we establish a system to obtain the views and meet the requirements of our NATO Allies whose interests will be profoundly affected by that treaty. We must never

forget that the unity of the Alliance remains a vital element in our defense and that of the free world. The Soviets never cease their attempts to undermine it. We must constantly preserve it whether we are operating under SALT II or SALT III.

I have said that the consideration of this treaty and its relevance to the Soviet buildup and our general strategic position in the world is worthy of a profound Senate debate. There is much more involved than just arriving at a bareboned conclusion that we are or are not better off with this particular treaty than without it. What clarifications it may need, what is required in the way of bolstering the credibility of our deterrent and the security of Allies in the general strategic situation are all involved.

When it is suggested that there is enthusiastic support for the treaty among our Allies, I must say I fail to discern it and I have long been fairly close to European opinion. One has to realize that the United States and the free world are faced with the reality that this country is no longer in a military class by itself. It is matched, or, as many serious analysts here and abroad believe, outmatched by the Soviet Union. Our Allies are very deeply concerned about it. They are close to the division lines between the East and the West and they are anxious to avoid unnecessarily provocative attitudes. Their position, as I read it, is somewhat ambivalent. They are aware of and are deeply concerned about the Soviet buildup; at the same time that they fear what the consequences might be if after all the publicity no treaty should ensure.

My main preoccupation for a number of years has been in the strength of the alliance and the defense unity of Western Europe. I still have a good many contacts among our European Allies. I am aware that the Administration sought and obtained considerable Allied governmental support for this treaty, but make no mistake, deep concern about the perception of the strength of the United States persists. Naturally, I do not purport to have the wide contacts that our Government people have abroad, but from my not inconsiderable ones and from much reading of serious comment I sense a deeper concern today regarding the credibility of the American deterrent than at any time I can recall. I do not believe there is an Allied Chancellery in Western Europe which is not uneasy at the thought that in the future it may not be able to assume, as it has in the past, the U.S. umbrella remains as firmly placed and impervious as ever. I am inclined to think that our Allies would react favorably if the Senate took steps to clarify or even amend the treaty in such a way as to confirm the aspect and power of the U.S. deterrent. This is particularly true in the face of the realization of the loss of American strategic superiority and the concurrent dimensions of the Soviet military buildup.

I am much comforted by the fact that the Senate is squaring away to deal with the difficult problem it faces with the treaty. We all know about some of the great Senate debates in the past—the great slavery debates, the Versailles and League of Nations treaty, etc. They are a stirring part of our history. I had the opportunity once to sit on the floor of the Senate through what might be classed as a great debate. I was then in the War Department, it was the Lend-Lease debate, and I posed as a page to get by the Sergeant-at-Arms. At issue was our old isolation policy against the call for our intervention in critical world affairs. I came away from that debate with great respect for the body you represent.

I knew that legislation like the back of my hand, but I was frequently amazed at how knowledgeable of the issues involved the members, as a whole, were. There was not a weak point that was not detected nor a strong one that was not weighed in the course of debating and concluding the issue. I am confident that in consideration of the SALT II treaty the present Senate will reach a conclusion consistent with the security of the country and preservation of peace. I would remind you of what Alexander Hamilton said: You like no one else are charged with the trust.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. McCloy. You may be certain that we are keenly aware of the responsibility borne by this committee and borne by the Senate as a whole.

I think that your testimony is very helpful because it extends back over a long period of time and your dealings with the Russian Government give you a very special perspective. You have said that it is your conclusion that the country would be better off with the treaty than without it, and the reasons you have given us are that with the treaty we will have a better grasp of what the Russians are doing than we would have without it.

URGES AGAINST COMPLACENCY

You have said that with the treaty there will be at least ceilings placed on the numbers of weapons and warheads applicable to both sides, which will in turn give us a better opportunity to strengthen our own deterrent in the years ahead. I take it then that since the Senators must decide whether to vote for or against ratification, you would urge us to vote in favor of ratification.

Mr. McCLOY. Let me point out one paragraph which I did not read. This is very important. If I thought that adoption of this treaty would induce the complacency that we have experienced recently, I would be against it. I read in the newspaper this morning Dr. Kissinger's testimony, although I did not have the opportunity to hear him personally.

I am urging against complacency, and if I thought complacency were involved here, I would be against the treaty. He is now trying to put a guarantee into the treaty, and this is a new thought with me, one that I think you ought to take into account, because if there is any guarantee against complacency, I would be for it. I want to make that part of my remarks to you.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know whether we can guarantee against complacency. I know of no way of doing that, but there is nothing in the testimony that we have heard over the past month that would be conducive to complacency.

Mr. McCLOY. I should think not. I would hope not.

The CHAIRMAN. That is either on the part of the proponents or the opponents of this treaty.

RESERVATIONS OR UNDERSTANDINGS COMMITTEE SHOULD CONSIDER

You made one other observation with which I agree, but before I go to that I would want to ask you if you have any reservations or understandings that you think this committee should consider in connection with the instrument of ratification.

Mr. McCLOY. Oh, I think we ought to have some clarification, but I do not know that there should be amendments. There are things that have troubled me. They have already been expressed, and I have not tried to repeat them here. You know them, the expiration of the protocol, the circumvention matter, and two or three other things.

The CHAIRMAN. The Backfire bomber.

Mr. McCLOY. Yes, the Backfire. You have to have some reservations, and some fine drafting, I think, has to go into that. As I said, I cannot believe that the allies would object to that. I think they will all applaud that, and I think it is an element in our understanding of the treaty, so that we will understand and the Soviets will understand just what we intend to do.

Let me come back to what I understand Dr. Kissinger spoke of yesterday. He talked about a program, something that would clearly demonstrate we were on our way, and demonstrate to the Soviets as well as to ourselves, and that even though we can't bind another Congress, that this was a program that could be adopted. I was rather intrigued with that. I didn't have any collaboration, of course, with him at all on this. I met him at breakfast one time, but he did not tell me what was involved.

I would be in favor of anything that can seal or be the earnest of our will.

TREATY AS A STEPPING STONE TOWARD REDUCTIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it may be that there is a way to deal with two concerns. As you have already indicated, the SALT process has not carried us very far toward arms reduction in the nuclear field, yet everybody knows the ominous danger and the futility of a continued buildup of nuclear weapons and the terrible devastation that would be wrought by nuclear war.

It seems to me that the chief justification for this treaty is that it is a stepping stone and a necessary stepping stone toward the day that we can reduce these levels on both sides. So, possibly there is an opportunity here to do two things. One would be to try to find a consensus on what needs to be done to strengthen our deterrent in the coming years, both to eliminate any possible hazard to that deterrent and to give us a bargaining position from which we could seriously endeavor to achieve substantial reductions on both sides.

If we could combine the two and on the one hand say these things need to be done in connection with our own defense in the coming years, and on the other hand say that our objective in SALT III will be to achieve substantial reductions in the number of nuclear weapons on both sides, and thus make it clear what our path would be to set out the guideposts which will delineate the path the country intends to follow in the coming years, it would be helpful to us.

Would you agree this might be an opportunity for us?

Mr. McCLOY. I was rather impressed when I read in the paper this morning about what Secretary Kissinger said. He said, let's be sure in the meantime that we don't slide back, because to the extent we slide back, the less chance you have in my judgment of getting to the objective. I think it is important therefore to examine what he had to say in regard to the assurance—he talked about a 5-year program. I do not know how you could have just 5 years and not bind the other years, but we do have plans. We had plans in the War Department in my day that extended for 4 or 5 years and there they were. It took something to change that plan. I guess that is what he was driving at, although I do not know. I have not talked to him about it.

I am terribly concerned that we do not find ourselves at a given point in the same situation that we are in now, that's all. Somebody asked me about linkage, and I wanted to talk a little bit about that. That was a new thought that he introduced yesterday on which I have some ideas. Forgive me for interrupting.

LINKAGE ARGUMENTS NOT PERSUASIVE

The CHAIRMAN. Surely. I think Dr. Kissinger's testimony was very valuable. I did not think that his linkage argument was very persuasive. I do not think that the Russians are going to leave Angola because they think if they do not we might nuke them. This connection between nuclear deterrent and adventurism is one for which no one has given us any evidence, just doctrine so far.

Mr. McCLOY. I would like to make a comment about that later on.

The CHAIRMAN. My time is about up, so if you would like to make a comment, please do.

Mr. McCLOY. Thank you. I listened to the linkage argument and it disturbs me. Somebody said to me the other day when we were talking about this that we do not want to go back to the cold war. Well, I was in the cold war. I was eyeball to eyeball in it in the city of Berlin at that point, but what are we in now with Yemen, with Afghanistan, with the Horn of Africa, and the other tender spots of the world where the pressures are coming from with the Cubans abroad. At least it was concentrated at one time in the city of Berlin, and in and around Germany.

I do not understand the matter of linkage. Then there is this report that you have to make every 2 years, according to the newspaper this morning. I think that would be rather awkward, but I do not mind saying that if you continue this adventurism and it begins to get so utterly consistent with the concept of détente or the concept of trust that we have to have in connection with disarmament, that you had better watch out, but my feeling is, I would not put it in the treaty. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. McCloy.

Senator Javits?

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, we have before us this morning one of the men whom I respect most in our country. He is from my native city, and he and Averell Harriman are two of the most distinguished and most experienced minds that we have related to the foreign policy of the country.

Mr. McCloy, I thank you very much for appearing here today.

Mr. McCLOY. Thank you, Senator.

Senator JAVITS. There is one element that our chairman said he is thinking about, about which I am also thinking: future negotiation. I am quite sure he would agree with me. This is the additional point that we should not negotiate a SALT III Treaty without giving notice in advance that it must substantially reduce aggregate armaments. It seems to me that that begins to fashion a policy we want because it will be remembered that in SALT I we committed to equivalency of aggregate numbers by Senator Jackson for SALT II, and in SALT II we should give the Soviets notice in advance that we will not have a SALT III unless there is a substantial and meaningful reduction in aggregate nuclear armament.

Would you agree with that?

Mr. McCLOY. Yes, I agree with that. I have something to that effect in my statement. What is the use of going on if you cannot achieve that?

Senator JAVITS. Right. The other question I would like to ask you is this. I notice with great interest this particular sentence in your statement: "I have difficulty following the argument that the treaty freezes us into a position of inferiority."

It seems to me that that is the way the SALT argument is now going. I think the proponents so far have had the edge in the debate in the sense that we lose nothing and may be gaining something, provided, as you and Dr. Kissinger and the Joint Chiefs

of Staff all say, we take the necessary precautions to insure that we do not slip behind but that we remain where we are because there does not seem to be any great argument that there is rough equivalency now, to wit, August 2, 1979.

Therefore, it seems to me that the burden has shifted to the opponents of the treaty to show that we are going to be taken by a tranquilizer or by complacency or by something which is going to lull us to sleep. Their argument is, don't do it, not because of what the treaty says, but because of your own state of mind or your psyche and so on.

What would you say about that?

Mr. McCLOY. Senator, I was trying to get at that thought. As I said a little while ago, why can't we be as obdurate as they are? This is a substantial argument to me, as you point out.

Senator JAVITS. Now, no one knows the Europeans better than you; they are the principal factor in Europe. Now, we are adopting a new concept, to wit, superiority cannot be continued in nuclear armaments. We are accepting the doctrine of essential equivalence. Do you believe that Europe is likely to continue to have faith in the U.S. deterrent and in the U.S. defense posture respecting their security with the acceptance of that doctrine of essential equivalence, assuming that we really implement it, or do you think that that will change Europe's reliance on the United States?

Mr. McCLOY. That question requires a rather difficult judgment. They deplore the fact that we have given them superiority. They think of the American umbrella and have thought of it too confidently, in my judgment, and without enough effort on their own part. So, anything in the way of a diminution of American superiority concerns them and worries them, but I have the feeling that they have no other alternative than to come along with us because it is so important that we have this unity with them, and if they have any doubt about the vigor and strength of our equality and our parity position, if that doubt were removed, I think their confidence would be restored.

I think for the moment they are nervous. The way it is now, in flux, they are not secure. They do not have a sense of security, but if we go along the way that you are talking with an honest, definite, earnest—we won't call it a guarantee, we will call it an earnest, which is more than just mere words—I think their confidence would be restored, and you would have a confident, a much more stable situation in Europe than you have today.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you.

Few men have had as much experience negotiating with the Soviets as you have, and under very tough circumstances.

Now, there is a question before us. We have rough equivalency. We are likely to lose it unless we follow these highly expert judgments of your own, of Dr. Kissinger's, and I am sure General Haig will tell us about this, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Now, there are some who would say, tell the Russians you are going to do this and negotiate on the basis that they know we are well able to do it once we get our teeth into it. There is another school which says, do it, start doing it. Kissinger wants a binding commitment, and we probably can't do that, but we can do something along that line, as I have just mentioned.

My question is this. Knowing the Russians as you do, are they going to believe us unless we actually go ahead, spend money, invest resources to build up? Only then will they believe that we really intend to negotiate earnestly, or do you believe that our reputation for being able to do fabulous industrial things is so great and so established as to put a man on the Moon, the Manhattan project with the atom bomb, and so on, that if we say we are going to do it they will take our word for it and negotiate as if we did?

Mr. McCLOY. We have to put our redressing steps in process. They are realists. If they see that we are moving in that direction, they will be much more convinced and much more apt to be responsive than if we simply say, look out, or we are going to do it. They need a demonstration. They are realists. If they see that we are deliberate and that the meshers are in train, I think you would have a better chance with them and having them respond than you would otherwise.

Senator JAVITS. So we have to show them, not just tell them?

Mr. McCLOY. Yes. They resist blandishments. They resist good examples. I think we have to get to the point where we are not just reserving options, but where we are acting. The reserving of the options is *passee* now.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you very much, Mr. McCloy. Your testimony has been very, very helpful. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Javits.

Senator McGovern?

Senator MCGOVERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. McCloy, I want to join my colleagues in expressing my appreciation for your long years of service to our country. I was delighted with your answer to Senator Javits when you said that you thought this treaty ought to be accompanied in some fashion by a clear resolution on the part of the Senate that our negotiators in SALT III ought to press hard for meaningful and substantial reductions and, failing that, we are not really interested in SALT III. That has been my position all along. I do not see much point in ratifying SALT II unless it can be accompanied by that kind of assurance.

This morning I had breakfast with a number of Senators whom I guess you would describe as moderates. Some of them may be liberals. They are generally Senators that I think would hold views that you would respect. The debate was whether we ought to go that route with a resolution that I have drafted which would accompany the treaty, not as an amendment, but simply as an accompanying resolution committing our negotiators and instructing them to go into SALT III with a position that we are going to press first for a freeze and then for a certain percentage reduction in aggregates of nuclear weapons.

There was a counterview presented by Senator Hatfield; I know he now has talked publicly about it and would not resent my mentioning it here today. He argued that we ought to have an amendment to SALT II which says that we want a freeze now. We do not want the formula that is presently written into SALT II. We want a freeze on existing weapons systems, the theory being that there is a rough equivalency between the two countries. So why not

write it into the treaty right now and go back to the drawing boards and negotiate that freeze at the moment?

I would have to say that the Senators in the room, the 8 or 10 of them, were pretty evenly divided between those two approaches. Which of the two would you tend to support?

Mr. McCLOY. A little while ago, I said to one of the Senators here that my conclusions were as of this date. I am not sure that the case is yet in. I think the case is going to develop as the debate goes on. One of the chief points is, how do you do this drafting? I have not addressed myself to it at all. I know it is going to be a pretty neat bit of draftsmanship that you will have to think about in order to put this into the right nuance.

Senator McGOVERN. Would you be willing to look at a possible draft?

Mr. McCLOY. Yes, I would be willing to look at it. I haven't any thoughts about it now, but I can sense perhaps as a lawyer that some tough drafting is necessary, whether it is amendment form, resolution form, how it reads, and how it matches is, I think, extremely important.

Senator McGOVERN. We would like to draw on your expertise and submit that to you.

Mr. McCLOY. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

Senator McGOVERN. I was reading in preparation for your testimony, Mr. McCloy, the statement of principles that you negotiated with your counterpart, Mr. Zorin, back in 1961, that you submitted to the General Assembly, a statement of eight principles which commits the two countries to achieve agreement on disarmament that is general and complete.

It goes on to call for the cessation of the production of armaments, the elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction. Then the final point says that, states participating in the negotiation should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date.

Now, that was 18 years ago that we committed ourselves to complete and general disarmament. When Dr. Kissinger was here the other day, he pointed out that when we signed SALT I, the Soviets had 3,200 warheads. By the time we ratify SALT II, if we do, they will have 6,000, and by the time SALT II is ended, we will have 12,000. Now, what happened? Where did the whole process go off the track from what you and Mr. Zorin agreed upon some years ago?

Mr. McCLOY. Well, that is interesting. Of course, that was a long time ago, and I would have to give you my first blush reaction to the Zorin thing. If you remember, at that point the Soviets were making tremendous propaganda about how peaceful they were and how we were the imperialists. The phrase was that they were in favor of general and complete disarmament. This was all over the world. It was a real propaganda effort. I think if you look back 18 years ago, you will find they were making great strides in their propaganda.

One day I said to him, OK, I will call your bluff. Are you prepared to sign this agreement? You are talking about general and complete disarmament. Everybody is in favor of peace. We are, too, so let's write this down, and this resulted. As a concomitant of that, I said that you have to have some sort of arbitration here in case we get into difficulties.

At that point, their enthusiasm for that propaganda died. I would throw that in at this point as one of the elements that caused the McCloy-Zorin statement of principles to sort of fade away. They lost interest in it. The Soviets lost interest in it at that point. There had been a tremendous propaganda flag at that stage, and I came to the conclusion later on that they were not really interested in general and complete disarmament with all that went along with it.

I said to Khrushchev at that time, there it is. Now, then, we have to submit to arbitration. He said, we cannot submit to any court that I do not control.

Senator MCGOVERN. Mr. McCloy, I have read your prepared statement, and a good deal of it is on your own concern about the negotiation and ratification procedures?

Mr. McCLOY. Yes.

Senator MCGOVERN. I gather that for perhaps somewhat different reasons you share the concern that I do about this whole process. Senator Church has described it as a stepping stone to real reduction. I have the greatest respect for Senator Church. I guess I am still not sure that it is a stepping stone to real reductions because of this negotiation and ratification process about which you talk. You talk about the political pressures. The press has been filled with references lately that Senator Nunn and others are not going to vote for this treaty unless the President agrees to a major military expansion.

Senators who make those kinds of comments are always referred to in the press as "respected Senators." Now, I respect them, but I respect every Senator on this committee. What can those of us do who really want substantial reductions in order to get it? We have watched this process year after year, and the arms race continues to escalate. I am very skeptical about what we will get in SALT III. Do you have any thoughts on that?

Mr. McCLOY. Well, more and more as the years have gone by I have noticed that process developing. As I have read your statements and other transcripts, my answer is: I have the feeling that unless you convince the Soviets that there is no chance of their achieving any sort of superiority or putting us into a position of inferiority, until you get to that conviction, considering everything that has developed in terms of their buildup in these last years, you are not going to get them seriously to consider significant and equal reductions.

I think the best opportunity we have is to convince them that we are serious about this. I do not know whether or not you were in the room when I spoke about General Rowley. Well, I perked up my ears when he said: "I thought that in 1977 if we had been insistent enough we might well have gotten that reduction." I know at a given point if we had insisted on onsite inspections I feel we could have gotten it. I feel that. I have a feeling that we need that little

note of iron will in there to take this next step. Without it, I rather despair of it.

Senator McGOVERN. Thank you, Mr. McCloy.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Percy.

Senator PERCY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. McCloy, first, let me say that knowing your own style as I have learned to know it through the years in working with you, out of 47 pages of testimony, I would say 45 pages represent your own handiwork. I do not know where the other 1½ or 2 might have come from.

Mr. McCLOY. Well, now, I will tell you. A very attractive young girl works in the summer in our office. She goes to Columbia Law School. She is at least responsible for those two pages. [General laughter.]

Senator PERCY. I pay tribute to her also, but I think the contribution you have made in researching the treaty making power of the Senate is invaluable to us.

As you say here: "As I read history, the executive branch is the agent rather than the prime mover." Does Secretary Vance agree with Alexander Hamilton and James Madison that the President is an agent and that the prime mover is the legislative body in making a treaty? As you say the concept that the Senate by its consideration of a treaty could somehow be undermining the authority of the President of the United States or his Secretary of State is not well founded. Have you taken that up with the Secretary of State?

Mr. McCLOY. I have not taken it up with Mr. Vance, although I do know that Secretaries of State are not particularly fond of this doctrine. Hay did not like it, and I think, as you said, there was another Secretary who complained about the fact that he had to submit the thing as much as he did, but I have no doubt about how the Founding Fathers felt about it. They were pretty astute men. These were Alexander Hamilton, James Wilson, James Madison. They are all on the record. The statement of Alexander Hamilton's was an eyeopener to me.

It has not happened that way and, as a practical matter, I suppose we have to take it for granted that the President does play a larger role as a matter of custom, but the fundamental reasoning was to me very, very persuasive. This is the law of the land, the supreme law of the land.

EFFECT OF SALT II ON CONFIDENCE CRISIS ON EUROPE

Senator PERCY. I wish Senator Byrd had had your testimony with him when he talked to Mr. Brezhnev and people in the Kremlin. I think it would have reinforced his hand when he said the Senate's imprint is going to be felt on this treaty. It reinforces our position that, as we develop understandings and reservations to clarify ambiguities, we are fulfilling a constitutional function. It is not an intrusion. It is our duty and our responsibility.

President Carter has cited a national crisis of confidence as the reason for much of the domestic difficulty the U.S. currently faces. You sense a similar confidence crisis within NATO as regards the will and capability of the U.S. Government. Does the SALT II

agreement erase these doubts? Does it increase them or have any effect at all on this crisis of confidence in Europe?

Mr. McCLOY. I would have to speculate as to just what the opinion of Europe is. I tried to say a little while ago—perhaps you were not here—that there was an ambivalent attitude which I noticed Dr. Kissinger has addressed, also. I am sure that generally there is a question around the world about leadership. We talk about leadership everywhere. It is not so evident in Europe either, and there is some skepticism about it as well.

I have a feeling that everybody craves this thing that we call leadership, and it does not seem to be as apparent as it used to be. I have a feeling that that is mixed in with their worries and concerns over the Soviet buildup and the loss of American superiority to which they have become so used.

I think they have to adjust themselves to what is happening in the world just as we do. My plea is that we keep in closer contact with them, and have a better exchange. That is why I feel this circumvention business is so important.

EFFECT OF DEFEAT OF SALT TREATY ON NATO ALLIANCE

Senator PERCY. Both you and Dr. Kissinger used the term "ambivalent" to describe European attitudes. There has been a significant difference of opinion among witnesses that have appeared before us regarding the effect the defeat of the SALT Treaty would have on the NATO alliance. How do you feel our allies would react if the U.S. Senate failed to ratify the SALT II Treaty by a two-thirds vote?

Mr. McCLOY. I think if the Senate failed to ratify after all of this publicity and after all of the emphasis that has been placed upon it—I talked to Helmut Schmidt about this a good bit—there would be an easiness that would develop there. On the other hand, in my judgment, they are all uneasy as to the Soviet buildup and the loss of the American superiority, and what is it that they can lay to as the sailors say? What is it that they can lay to in terms of what they could hope in the way of aid and security from the United States in the next decade or so. I think that is why they are worried.

It is a combination of things. When somebody tells me they are all enthusiastic for this treaty, I just do not think that is so from the reactions that I get, because there is an element of worry. I say there is the loss of American superiority and the dimensions of the Soviet buildup, particularly regarding things like SS-20's and Backfire, which they feel threaten them as they have never been threatened before.

Senator PERCY. Do you think some of that apparent lack of enthusiasm by, say, the military might be clarified by some of the understandings that we were discussing here?

Mr. McCLOY. Yes; I think that is a very important aspect of this whole thing.

Senator PERCY. We think so, too, and we certainly will be pursuing them. Until recently, the United States maintained a strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. The consensus is that now, at best, we are in a position of essential equivalence. Some feel this development has been accompanied by a decline in U.S. world

influence and prestige, and the forecasts for the future are even more ominous. Do you share these views?

Mr. McCLOY. Oh, I think there is a nervousness all around the world. We are in a troubled period. There is no question about that.

Senator PERCY. Are our European allies especially concerned about the U.S. military capability, or are there other reasons for their apparent concern about U.S. leadership? Is it essentially based on the decline of U.S. military superiority or are there other things about U.S. leadership that concern them just as much?

Mr. McCLOY. You are getting me into political areas now. Let me say this. I am not partisan at all in this thing. The only jobs I have ever had in Government were given to me by Democrats, even though I am a Republican. I think that the resignation of the Cabinet the other day sent a tremor, judging from the telephone calls I got. They did not understand that. There was a nuance there that meant the collapse of government to them, those across-the-board resignations. That sort of culminated the general worries they had about the leadership here.

They so crave a vigorous, strong leadership from this country because they are so used to it and so dependent upon it that any sign of weakness is disturbing to them.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much indeed, Mr. McCloy. We very much appreciate the time and thought that you have put into your testimony. It has been extraordinarily helpful to us.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Percy.

Senator Biden?

Senator BIDEN. Would Senator Pell like to go first?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell had asked to pass for the moment.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD SALT II

Mr. McCloy, I found your testimony most interesting. Your historical perspective on these matters, which is unique, was very fascinating. I would like to make a few comments and ask you to comment on my comments, if you will. It seems as though this committee is being prepared to accept the concept of nuclear superiority as having any relevance. Although I may be a minority of one in this regard, it seems to me that nuclear superiority is a meaningless concept. Unless we fundamentally and unilaterally reduced our central systems we are so beyond the point where either nation could inflict upon the other a nuclear strike with any degree of impunity.

The other thing I would like to mention on which you can comment is this. No one has a better perspective than you of the European attitudes about which we frequently talk and which I fully agree. I obviously do not have your experience, background, or knowledge, but in my recent trips to Europe and my contacts with the European leaders of all political parties, there is the skittishness you referred to, but it seems to me it does not have much, if anything, to do with central strategic systems. It has to do with Henry Kissinger's policies, the very ones that he criticized. The "Year of Europe" never came about because he kept us in

Southeast Asia. European attitudes and concerns were never addressed because we kept involved in parts of the world, not understanding what our real security interests were and where they lay.

Now we come about and we say, well, somehow the Europeans have lost faith. Well, they lost faith because we paid no attention. I have only been here since 1972, but I kept hearing what are you guys doing in Southeast Asia, what are you doing there? Why aren't you paying attention to Europe? Why aren't you paying attention to your real interest? Now we have a man who has impressed you by his testimony yesterday. He has impressed the press. Apparently he has impressed my colleagues in the Senate, and yet he was the problem, or at least he was part of the problem. Let me respectfully suggest that. Yet we are sitting here talking about Henry Kissinger's secret solution or unique solution to a problem that I firmly believe he, although not alone, was at least a significant part of, he and the architectural team that brought about the malaise that exists in Europe today.

Mr. Chairman, I may be mistaken, but for the first time I believe you have approved having European parliamentarians actually testify here in this body before this committee in September.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, that is correct.

Senator BIDEN. We may hear more about it, but I have not heard anywhere anyone suggest that their analysis of our central strategic systems revealed that we are inferior. The only thing I hear Europeans say is, well, you fellows say you are. Nitze says you are. Haig says you are. It looked to us like you are not, but since they are saying you are, we have to pay attention.

I am sorry to express my frustration like this, but it seems that what is being accepted here, Mr. Chairman, is, nuclear superiority is really a live concept, that it makes a difference, and that we are inferior, or at least barely hanging on. That is No. 1. No. 2 is that somehow it has been inaction on the part of an administration in building up massively in nuclear weapons that has caused this insecurity in Europe. Third, that we are in a position now where all we have to do is make a massive commitment to nuclear arms and we are somehow going to redress this attitude that worries us. I would respectfully suggest that Europeans are more concerned, and this is what I want you to comment on if you would, Mr. McCloy; No. 1, they are more concerned about our will.

Our will is reflected in terms of our attitude and our attending to their concerns, being responsive to them, listening to them, being a partner with them. Second, they are most concerned about conventional capability. Third, they seem to be concerned about our ability to be discriminating about what really constitutes U.S. self-interest, to be able to discriminate between our interest in Angola and our interest in the Middle East, to be able to discriminate between our interest in Germany and our interest in Botswana. We have shown, it seems to me, a real propensity not to be able to discriminate, and now we have men coming before us who are architects of that indiscriminate—my term—policy, that caused this attitude in large part to exist, saying that the way out, the cure, is to build more nuclear weapons. By the way, it follows that we are not going to be able to do as much on conventional weaponry if we do. What we are going to do—not quite in John Kennedy

terms of fight any fight or light any light—is to go wherever we need to go to show the Soviets that we intend to stand up to them.

I would respectfully suggest that in an attempt to overcome a real problem—that the United States has shaken the confidence of its allies through a whole series of events, and the United States will is in question both here and abroad, both of which are true and we accept or seem to be taking for granted as the basic premise for the syllogism that we are putting together here in the Senate to come to our logical conclusion—we are accepting the wrong answers.

You used the phrase, slide back; we do not want to slide back. I agree with you. What I do not want to slide back to is the Kissinger era, the Johnson era, slide back to the indiscriminate misunderstanding of where our interest lies. That is where I do not want to slide back to, and my time is going to be up in another 2 minutes, and I haven't asked you a question but I have expressed a point of view that you may very well disagree with, and because I do respect you so much, I would like you, in as discriminating a way as you desire, to tell me why I am all wet, or why I am correct.

Mr. McCLOY. Well, that is quite a comment you made. I have been trying to think about what appropriate comment I could give you in response. Bear in mind that our allies abroad are nervous every time we do not look at them. They want their hands held. They have been through all these great disasters in Europe. When we move toward the East, they deplore it. They say, pay attention to us, and I was critical—I will say that I was critical of Dr. Kissinger. I thought of him as fundamentally a European. I do not think he paid enough attention to the European thing. I think he was a little too confident that he could control it, and he did not pay as much attention to mending his fences over there as I thought he should.

I have told him this at times. There is nothing very bitter about it, of course. I just had the feeling that we were neglecting the European scene. but you know, you are a creature of your own experience. This is where I have put most of my energies, and I would deplore a diverse, indiscriminate presentation, to be sure.

Certainly, we are a world power, and some of those countries are not world powers, and we have responsibilities in the Pacific as well as the Atlantic, and they have to live with that. I thought for a while we were missing the emphasis that we should have had. I told Kissinger that at one point, but that is as far as I will go. I do not want to criticize him. He was sitting there where he had the responsibilities, and I did not have the responsibility, but I had the feeling that the cohesiveness of our policy was not apparent enough to be convincing to our most important friends.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden.

Senator PELL, I will turn to you.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION CAPABILITIES ENHANCED BY SALT II

Mr. McCloy, there is one point that you touched on in your testimony, and that concerns our ability to follow the weapons development in the Soviet Union. I believe you said that our intelligence collection capabilities are vastly enhanced by the passage of SALT II. Could you enlarge upon that thought, please?

Mr. McCLOY. I am not quite sure I understood you, Senator.

Senator PELL. In other words, by passing SALT II, we will have an increased intelligence collection capability that we would not have otherwise.

Mr. McCLOY. We would have facilities with SALT II for collecting intelligence in the Soviet Union. I think we would not have if we did not have SALT II, because we are dependent to a substantial degree on their cooperation with some of the intelligence that we get. They would not let us fly over there the way we do if it were not for SALT II, and I am aware of what we can do in the way of monitoring and in the way of verification, which is very impressive, even though I am not brought up to date with it.

So, I would just say that, but I would not say that is the difference between whether you should ratify or whether you should not ratify. It is a broader question than that.

Senator PELL. Right, but this is one very important point that has not been made in the past, and I think it is a very useful point indeed.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Senator Stone is next.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

EUROPEAN DISTRESS ABOUT AMERICAN WILLPOWER

Mr. McCloy, you have referred to the perceived distress by our European allies or at least some elements among them regarding the state of American willpower. Historically speaking, how has that progressed? Did they have a distress about our willpower during the Berlin crisis?

Mr. McCLOY. They were always nervous, because they are right on the scene, but I am not aware that they were nervous about the position that we were taking in connection with the Berlin crisis. They were always afraid of an explosion there because they know they are the first ones that are going to be hit, but they certainly were cooperative with us in that connection.

I was in the center of the airlift at the time, and they were solid with us, the Berliners were; down in the zone they were, too.

Senator STONE. Were they distressed at the status of our willpower during the Cuban missile crisis?

Mr. McCLOY. That was interesting. I was in Europe at the time that thing broke. They called me home. I am just trying to remember what the atmosphere was then. The interesting thing was the promptness with which General DeGaulle saw the significance of those missiles in Cuba. He saw that the United States was under the same beat, so to speak, as the Europeans, and he immediately picked that up. He was the first one to respond in this.

The others were wondering what was going on in Cuba and why we were diverting our attention from them, but DeGaulle was very clearcut about it, and he did not hesitate a minute when he saw the significance of that and how profoundly that would affect the security of Europe. That is the thing that is most present in my mind today when you ask me what their attitude was. He was the most emphatic and striking and cooperative at that time.

Senator STONE. Mr. McCloy, during both of those crises, was the comparative military strength of the United States and the Soviet Union a factor in the strength of our willpower, or was it not?

Mr. McCLOY. We certainly had it then, and we had it both in conventional and in nuclear capacities.

Senator STONE. Are you saying that in both of these crises the United States had at least some measurable superiority in some strategic as well as conventional capabilities?

Mr. McCLOY. Oh, we had superiority then, yes.

Senator STONE. All right. Now, in recent years, can it be said that we have had or now have superiority in conventional strength compared to the Soviet Union?

Mr. McCLOY. I do not think so in conventional. I am very much impressed with the ground strength of the Soviet Union. In the first place, they have a conscripted army. They can bring the finest talents into the army. They have increased their manpower. They have this enormous superiority in armor in which they are very good in rocketry and artillery, and they have this very much improved air defense system, which is very impressive to me, at least.

Senator STONE. How about strategic?

Mr. McCLOY. Well, not in all categories. What I keep talking about is in the main battery they have a superiority and I think the Secretary of Defense will admit that.

Senator STONE. Mr. McCloy, is it fair to say that during the 1980's that superiority that you described as being current will be reduced or increased?

Mr. McCLOY. I think the trend is now toward an increase unless we take steps to counteract it which are belated now. I wish we had done a little more of our modernizing a little further back, and I wish the M-X had come along a little earlier.

Senator STONE. Mr. McCloy, is it fair to say that this administration made every effort to get the Soviets to reduce their strategic strength in these later negotiations? Did we try to get them to reduce their heavy missiles? Did we try to get them to reduce the numbers down below what the numbers are in this treaty?

Mr. McCLOY. I think we did. I did not follow it as closely as I used to follow it. I am thinking of what I said a moment ago about General Rowley, who was very convinced in 1977 that if we had been a little tougher, we might have gotten it.

Senator STONE. Right. Well, Mr. McCloy, if we were sufficiently strong in our willpower during a time when we had superior strength both conventionally and strategically, and if some of the recent challenges not only to ourselves but to the Third World seen as targets of opportunity by the Soviet Union have occurred during a backdrop of their conventional superiority in military forces and their emerging strategic superiority, which as you describe, and

really, it has not been negated, will be increased during the period of this treaty, and if we tried to get the Soviets to reduce the numbers and to become more strategically equal to us on a reduction basis and failed, is there any alternative, if they will not reduce, to ourselves building up in terms of the challenges that the Soviet Union has increasingly taken directly and through proxies in recent months and years?

Mr. McCLOY. Well, I think that unless we get to that stage, unless we get to a stage where we do have that type of reduction, I do not see much sense in having a SALT II, SALT III, or whatever you call it. I believe this is the objective that we seek. We must not lose the opportunity even if it is the last gasp.

Senator STONE. Well, Mr. McCloy, why, if during SALT I the reductions were promised for SALT II and we didn't get them, why are we so confident that we will get them in SALT III, when we didn't get them in SALT II, and why, when the trend seems to favor the Soviets' strength increasing compared to ours, will they be more interested in reducing either conventional or strategic strength?

Mr. McCLOY. Well, I think that probably the answer to that is that we ought to be more definite and more adamant in respect to SALT III than we were in respect to SALT I.

Senator STONE. Why postpone that to the future? Why can't we get a little stronger now? Why must our strength always be seen in the future, whether military strength or willpower?

Mr. McCLOY. Well, we lagged just when the Soviet Union was spending its greatest efforts not only in the strategic area but also in the conventional area. Our figures went down while theirs were going up. As I said a little while ago, that has consequences you cannot blink at, and those consequences are just beginning to emerge now. We have to do something about it. As I said, I wish we had modernized earlier than we did. I wish the M-X's had not been belated. I am a little indefinite as to how much pressure we put on at that point. It was a little while back.

I know we had the feeling that they were not going to go bigger than the SS-11's. I do not think there was any agreement concluded on it. We were taken by surprise when they suddenly went to these big fellows. I think we rather had the idea it was going to be the fine example of strength that we were indulging in that would induce them not to move into this new area.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Stone.

Senator Hayakawa?

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have not been privileged to hear the testimony so far, so I will pass at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, Senator.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ROLE OF SENATE IN TREATY RATIFICATION

Mr. McCloy, first I want to echo the comments of others in thanking you for an extremely thoughtful and well-prepared statement. I think it is very helpful to us. I was interested in the

introductory part about the role of the Senate and your perception of that. Some argue that failure by the Senate to ratify it would show that we cannot harmonize the views of the various branches of our Government.

Failure to ratify would indicate an inability of the Executive to lead and therefore this need to present an image of the Nation that can act in unity is a strong argument for ratifying the treaty.

Do you agree?

Mr. McCLOY. I think any evidence of unity is impressive around the world. I think one of the most impressive things that occurred during the war was the bipartisan—I am thinking of Senator Vandenberg and the note on foreign policy then was quite apparent, and it was a unified thing, and people took comfort in that, and I think that that is an incident or at least was taken as an incident of strength rather than complete partisan disparity.

I would like to see that type of support in respect to this very important element of our security, and that is why I said I would like to see the hawks and the doves get together. I am not talking about the Republicans and the Democrats as such, but getting together to work out what is a very difficult problem, I think, that we face.

Senator SARBANES. I agree with that, as far as the attitude with which we approach it, but it seems to me that there is something of a bootstrap argument being made. In other words, once the Executive submits a treaty, if the Senate does not simply move forward with it, we have cast doubt over our ability to function as a nation.

I was interested in the opening portion of your statement, because it clearly underscores the fact that there is a separate and distinct role for the Senate and we have to come at it from the point of view of judging the thing on the merits. It seems to me the bootstrap argument has in some instances been carried quite far.

Mr. McCLOY. Well, I tried to draw some inferences, I guess, from that research that I did to show the importance of the Senate on it, and I rather discount the idea that unless you go through in this way you are going to show weakness. I think there was too much of what the lawyers call in *terrorem* arguments in connection with it, but this is one of the things that affect the whole country so much that I repeat, I would like to see a combined effort to reach a solution on it. In itself, I think it would increase confidence, so I deplore the argumentation to which you were referring in terms of do it or else.

SUBSTANTIVE RESTRICTIONS ON SOVIETS

Senator SARBANES. The Joint Chiefs and others have testified that the treaty places only nominal restrictions on us in the strategic area, and that it does place substantive restrictions on the Soviets.

Assuming that that is the case, why would the Soviets agree to such a treaty?

Mr. McCLOY. I think that the treaty rather implicitly seals the concept of parity, and that is a very important thing to the Soviets. From where we have come, I have a feeling that it is in their interest, and that we have agreed to that, and this is the way we are going to play the game from here on. I feel that the concept of

our loss of American superiority is comforting to the Soviets in their political as well as military thinking.

That is one of the reasons why I am inclined to think that the chances of their cheating are not too good. Why should they cheat? Why should they take the risks of being caught when the fundamental benefit of this to them in my judgment is the sealing of the equality aspect to them from where they were? That is my estimate of their motivation.

CONTRIBUTION OF SALT I TO AURA OF COMPLACENCY

Senator SARBANES. Do you think that SALT I contributed to the complacency about which you are concerned in this country?

Mr. McCLOY. No, I do not think SALT I as such did. No. SALT I was more involved in the ABM's. I do not trace that element in SALT I. It was what occurred after that that I think caused the trouble. This rationalization—Kissinger was involved in it. He is a very good friend of mine, and I perhaps should not be bringing this up, but in his article in *The Economist* he said, I thought we were so far ahead that we did not need to think about it. He acknowledged that he was wrong.

There is no sense blaming people about the thing. The considerations were different then than they are now. The problem is, now that we see it, we ought to do something about it, and I would hope we would jointly do something about it.

Senator SARBANES. Do you think the Soviets have any expectation that SALT II will contribute to that aura of complacency? You have spoken against it very eloquently, but do you think they have made the calculation that SALT II might contribute to this?

Mr. McCLOY. Well, they look at the Presidents and they see what happened in the past, and the past has enabled them to achieve a superiority in a very critical area of our weaponry, and I suppose they say, well, we did pretty well.

Senator SARBANES. If we were to move toward SALT III, the Senate could every 2 years in a formal way pass judgment on Soviet conduct around the world. If found unacceptable, the Senate should then decide on whether the negotiations for a SALT III should continue. What do you think of this idea?

Mr. McCLOY. I did not hear Dr. Kissinger's testimony. I saw a reference to that in the paper. I had difficulty with that, with the idea that every 2 years you review it. I do not know how that would work out. It did not sound very solid to me. I would like to see the testimony before I really express an opinion on it, but it seems to be a very awkward situation; I should think, to have us every 2 years tell the world whether the Soviet Union is behaving or whether it is not, and to have a particular formal time for expressing that view, but I would like to see his argument on it. I think he spent some considerable time on that.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it did not take a great part of his testimony to set forth the proposition, at least, that the Senate vote every 2 years its judgment whether the Soviet Union has lived up to these criteria. If the judgment is negative, the Senate should then vote whether whatever SALT negotiations are taking place should be continued.

Mr. McCLOY. I do not think I would follow that if I were the Secretary of State.

Senator McGOVERN. If we are going to do that, Mr. Chairman, we might as well just forego trying to do everything else.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Well, we are pretty much preoccupied with that assessment anyway from day to day.

Senator Zorinsky?

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PRESSURE ON BREZHNEV TO CONCLUDE SALT II

Mr. McCloy, in your statement you state: "Every administration which sets out to seek a treaty, whether with the Soviet Union or someone else, seems to come under pressure before it is ever able to achieve what is considered to be the political success attached to an agreement, or at least to avoid the sense of failure if agreement is not reached. On the Soviet side, there is no such public opinion nor administrative pressure," I can understand your statement with regard to Soviet public opinion, but is the leadership and authority of the Soviet leaders, such as Brezhnev, so secure as to remove him from the pressures of others in the Soviet leadership? Because SALT II negotiations began and have been carried out during the Brezhnev leadership, do you believe he might have been under some pressure to conclude an agreement during his term?

Mr. McCLOY. Well, I do not know the inner workings of the Soviet Union too well. I suppose there are certainly pressures within the government, but I have the impression, for example, dealing with Semenov, that he knows what the policy is, and there it is, it is the end all with him. He can speak and does speak with a great deal of authority, and there is no real pressure, there is certainly no media pressure. There is no legislative pressure, and Mr. Brezhnev is so firmly fixed that there is no political pressure on him.

At least, that is the impression that I have had as our people have sat around there and negotiated with these Soviets, that we are always trying to find a compromise. When they say "nyet" on this, it is instinctive, I think, for the Americans to try to bring about an agreement. At a certain point, it gets to where the pressures are so great here that I took the liberty of coining the word "agreementitis." I have seen it afflict some of our negotiators, I thought, when they might have held on, at the risk, perhaps, of failure to reach an agreement.

Senator ZORINSKY. Do you feel that in your opinion, from your observations, that the Soviet leadership has no pressures on it?

Mr. McCLOY. It certainly doesn't seem to me to have any public opinion pressures in this area.

Senator ZORINSKY. Well, peer pressures from within the administrative group?

Mr. McCLOY. Oh, there must be dissensions. There must be. There certainly were dissensions in the case of Khrushchev when he was there. I know that he told me one time there was only one thing that was wrong with the Soviet system, and that was their succession, that we had solved succession satisfactorily in our democracy, but they had not solved it there, but he was going to solve it. In a few weeks he was out.

CONTINUITY AFTER BREZHNEV

Senator ZORINSKY. Well, in your opinion, then, can this Nation in the event it does ratify SALT II be pretty well assured that whoever succeeds Brezhnev will of necessity continue the SALT process inasmuch as he can do pretty much as he wants?

Mr. McCLOY. I do not know. Following a succession, I don't think I would venture to speculate on that. I hear a lot of rumors that there are some young people around that may be tougher than the existing officialdom, and I do not know who they are. I do not know who the heirs apparent are. All I am saying is, it is a very tight discipline in the Soviet Government when you are dealing with them that does not seem to be influenced at all by what is coming from the street or from the journalism. There is no legislative body that exerts any influence.

Sure, there will be all kinds of pulls and hauls and intrigues within the Government, but I would not venture to say after Brezhnev leaves office, what the new character of the Soviet Government would be. I would suppose we have a good bit of intelligence on that, but I just do not know who the successors will be. I have not dealt with them.

Mr. ZORINSKY. Thank you, Mr. McCloy.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Zorinsky.

Are there any further questions?

Senator HAYAKAWA. Mr. Chairman, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hayakawa?

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. McCloy, it is a real pleasure to greet you. I have admired your work in Germany and elsewhere for a long, long time. It is a real honor to see you. I would like to ask a couple of questions.

DR. KISSINGER'S RECOMMENDATION OF POSTPONEMENT OF
RATIFICATION

First of all, Dr. Kissinger has recommended postponement of ratification until after certain conditions are met in regards to our own defense posture and so on. Would you agree with this assessment that there should be such a postponement?

Mr. McCLOY. Senator, before you came in, I pointed out that I had a paragraph in my statement warning against complacency, and I made a statement that if I thought SALT II would really enhance this complacency from which I think we have suffered a little bit in the past, I would be against ratification. Now, Dr. Kissinger has set up a sort of means by which he would insure that there would be no complacency. I used the word "guarantee." I do not know if that is the right word, but he has a plan that would dispense with complacency because that plan would do what he feels and what I gather the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel are necessary to bring about the redress of this imbalance.

If you can do that, that is fine. I would applaud any step to insure that there was no complacency in that area. To that extent, I would agree with him. I would like to know how we did it, how we would go about it. I know you cannot bind future Congresses, but I suppose there are plans that you could set up which would

demonstrate a determination and a policy sufficiently clear and sufficiently eloquent to have an influence on the Soviets.

Senator HAYAKAWA. I agree that it is difficult to avoid that complacency, especially if the treaty is signed and ratified. I think we find as Americans that we have a kind of built-in optimism that says, in effect, you do not really have to prepare for another war. It is not likely to happen at all, and of course it is. This is one of the things I fear very, very much.

Mr. McCLOY, do you feel that the treaty has some ambiguities within it? I do not know to which ambiguities you refer, but supposing we were to draft some amendments which would clarify those ambiguities. Would such clarifying amendments have to be renegotiated?

Mr. McCLOY. I suppose it would depend upon what the amendment or the clarification was. There are certainly some things, I suppose, you would not have to renegotiate in the way of clarification. I cannot put my finger on them at this time. I do not have as much detailed knowledge as I would like, and I know there are some drafting problems that face us, but I would think that there are sufficient ambiguities and other problems in this connection that might very well be improved by clarifications or explanations and by drafting, whether it would be an amendment that would have to be negotiated or one that would not.

I am not familiar enough with the problem to be able to give you specifics.

Senator HAYAKAWA. I suppose some of these ambiguities could be cleared up in understandings rather than amendments.

Mr. McCLOY. I would think so.

Senator HAYAKAWA. But certainly those ambiguities ought to be dealt with. Do you believe that the allied support of SALT II is prompted by the fear on the part of our allies that the United States is psychologically unprepared to stand up to domestic and international pressures resulting from the ratification.

Mr. McCLOY. Well, I tried to speculate as best I could as to what the allied position was. I do not know that I could go into it any further. I think there is a combination of things that are impressing them and making them nervous, which I tried to summarize. I do not think I can go any further than I have already gone in terms of describing or speculating what their motivation is.

I hear things that are quite different, I am sure, than what the State Department hears. Individuals, particularly from Germany, come into my office all the time, and when I hear somebody say that they are all enthusiastic for the treaty, I must say that I did not get that from them. I think they are worried if they did not have a treaty and the consequences that would come from that, but they do not want to see any weakening of the American deterrent.

They are going to have to face the fact, in my judgment, that the American deterrent is no longer based on superiority.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Yes. We have had some testimony here to the effect that what the allies say publicly is sometimes quite different from what they say privately.

Mr. McCLOY. Yes; I have noticed that from time to time.

Senator HAYAKAWA. And that is confirmed by your own experience?

Mr. McCLOY. Yes, sir, I have frequently found that they publicly say one thing and on the side they say something else. I am not relating it to this particular matter, however.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. McCloy.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Hayakawa.

I believe that completes the questioning, if the Senators have no further questions. Mr. McCloy, you are indeed an elder statesman, and we appreciate having the benefit of your views.

Mr. McCLOY. Do not emphasize the elder part of that too much, please. [General laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. A senior statesman.

Mr. McCLOY. Let me tell you of an experience that I had, if I could just impose upon you for another moment. For the bicentennial I came down here. The chairmen had set up an award. They called it the McCloy award or something like that. It was one of these exchange things. Mr. Ford was President at that time, and he very graciously invited me down here. This was a Bicentennial gift. I went into the rose garden, and it was perfectly clear that Jerry Ford had thought I was dead. [General laughter.]

He made this speech, and he dwelled considerably and I had thought too pointedly on my age. When I had to respond, I got up and said, well, it is perfectly true that my life span represents 40 percent of the entire lifespan of the country, but I prefer to look upon that not as evidence of my extreme age but the extreme youth of the country. [General laughter.]

So I guess I am a little sensitive when you use such terms as "elder statesman."

The CHAIRMAN. I am happy to see you in such obvious vigor and good health, Mr. McCloy. Thank you so much for your testimony. It has been very helpful.

[The committee turned to other business.]

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The CHAIRMAN. Before we take a brief recess and ask General Haig, our next witness, to come into the room, I want to read a letter that I have received from Adm. Stansfield Turner, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, relating to his conclusions with respect to the verifiability of the SALT II Treaty. The letter is dated August 1, 1979, and is addressed to me. It reads:

Dear Mr. Chairman, it has been a pleasure for me to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to discuss details of the monitoring capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community with respect to provisions of the SALT II Treaty. The fact that my appearances were in executive session recognizes the concern of the committee for the sensitivity and classification of the information discussed. It has also allowed me to be totally candid while at the same time fulfilling my responsibility of protecting intelligence sources and methods, as is my obligation under the National Security Act of 1947.

While finding it my duty to keep from public view the details of my discussions with the committee, I would like to provide the following unclassified statement of my conclusions which you may use as you deem necessary.

My overall judgment, based on the considerations I have set forth in my testimony in executive session is that during the period of the SALT II Treaty the United States Intelligence Community will be able to monitor most of its provisions well enough to provide confidence that the Soviets cannot gain a substantial strategic advantage through cheating.

For the few provisions that we cannot monitor with this degree of confidence, I believe the Soviet perception of risks versus gains will make such cheating an unattractive option to them.

I will be happy to return in executive session at any time to answer further questions the committee may have.

The letter is signed, Stansfield Turner. Copies of this letter will be made available to the press.

The committee will stand in recess for 5 minutes, and then we will hear from General Haig.

[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.]

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will please come back to order.

This morning is the final day of hearings for the committee this month. We devoted the month of July to hearings on this treaty. In September, we will have some further wrap-up hearings before we proceed to a markup of the treaty.

We are pleased to welcome you as our final witness for this series of hearings. We know of your distinguished military career.

General Haig has recently retired from the Army, having served 4½ years as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, where he was NATO's chief military officer. He was an able spokesman for NATO's military interests.

General, we would invite your statement at this time, and then we will proceed to questions.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, may I on behalf of the minority, which has a very long-standing relationship with General Haig, both in the Army and in the White House, welcome him here and express our appreciation for his testimony and the expectation of its importance?

STATEMENT OF GEN. ALEXANDER HAIG, JR., U.S. ARMY, RETIRED, FORMER SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE, PHILADELPHIA, PA.

General HAIG. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Senator Javits. It is a great honor for me to have an opportunity to appear before this distinguished committee this morning. May I please proceed with my brief statement?

Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity presented today to take part in your deliberations on the SALT II Treaty. Thoughtful analysis and assimilation of a document of this breadth and complexity is a formidable task. It is clear, however, that the outcome of your efforts will have an indelible effect in shaping the terms and climate of United States-Soviet relations and thereby prospects for peace in the years ahead.

Today you have asked for my views on the effectiveness of the treaty in meeting the security requirements of the North Atlantic Alliance, our oldest and most compelling defense commitment. In the next few minutes I will try to characterize for you the significance of SALT to European leaders.

NATO's strategy, as you know, calls for defense against conventional attack as far forward as possible. In addition, if necessary to limit penetrations and restore boundaries, the strategy calls for the use of tactical nuclear weapons and ultimately central strategic systems if escalation is not earlier contained. Although a conventional attack would be met in kind, the serious historical imbalance in conventional forces favoring the Warsaw Pact has led to

the common expectation among our allies of early resort to nuclear weapons, both tactical and strategic. Consequently, the reason for their interest in negotiations which affect these systems is very, very clear.

In recent years, there has been a dramatic shift in the balance of theater nuclear forces in favor of the Warsaw Pact. As a result of an extremely vigorous Soviet program of modernization and replacement, the Warsaw Pact has redressed their historical position of inferiority in theater nuclear systems to a position of approximately 3 to 1 advantage. The deployment of the SS-20 IRBM and the Backfire bomber has been especially troubling throughout the alliance. Within the context, allied concerns over SALT focus on its impact on the existing imbalance. That is, does the treaty provide special benefit to the Soviets, or prevent allied efforts to catch up?

Viewed in these terms, the exclusion of the Backfire and the SS-20 and the restricting of the range and deployability of cruise missiles has raised serious questions in NATO capitals. From their perspective both systems have a central influence on their security, and the exclusion of the Backfire and the SS-20 contrasted with the inclusion of cruise missiles was both puzzling and a cause for concern.

With respect to the integration of cruise missiles into NATO units, no precise schedule or mode has been decided as of yet. The need, however, is clear. The desirability of having a conventional variant has also been raised. In this regard, I believe the potential of these systems to be enormous. There is no question that unhindered access by our European allies to cruise missile technology is vital to restoring the balance.

Our NATO partners have always placed foremost importance upon secure linkage of U.S. strategic forces to their defense. In this light, the relationship of SALT to European security is very apparent. During the years of unquestioned U.S. superiority, the credibility of the U.S. commitment was high. As that position of superiority eroded towards parity, our reliability became less certain. As it erodes further toward clear Soviet advantage in the next few years, even greater doubts will arise.

Despite the foregoing, however, European political leaders have expressed their support for SALT II. This support is conditioned among other forces by the following factors. First, Europeans, like Americans, are generally supportive of efforts to reduce levels of nuclear armaments. Second, there is strong sentiment to avoid any action which might further weaken the U.S. Presidency.

Third, there is concern that the nonratification of SALT II in its present form would disrupt the overall United States-Soviet relationship of détente and lead to increased tension and possible United States-Soviet confrontation which might be resolved at the expense of our allies.

Nevertheless, despite these overarching considerations, there is a deep concern in Europe over the very painful realities reflected in SALT II. Consequently, they are seeking and would surely welcome a definitive signal of reassurance with respect to the steadily worsening trend in both theater and nuclear balances.

In specific terms, they would welcome actions which confirm unequivocally the U.S. commitment to a program of prompt strate-

gic force modernization and improvement. They have been heartened by U.S. pledges of unhindered sharing of systems and technologies designed to restore the theater nuclear balance. The obvious corollary, however, is the absolutely imperative termination in 1981 of the protocol restrictions on ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles.

A firm, unambiguous demonstration of renewed U.S. strength and ability to lead is overdue. The global power balance is viewed in Europe as shifting against us, and we can ignore it no longer. It is in this context that Senate action on the SALT II Treaty as a political expression of national will takes on special meaning, and I urge you to consider it in these terms.

The SALT II Treaty is viewed as a benchmark. It can be an instrument which marks the end of a period of drift in American leadership, and whatever the substantive alterations the Senate may wish to consider, it is essential that this debate result in a demonstration of our resolve to redress this imbalance by an immediate and unequivocal commitment of greater resources to our defense needs.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I am not satisfied that the necessary commitments have been made with respect to our strategic needs. I am also concerned that the administration's budgets for the past 2 years and the President's defense budget projections through fiscal year 1984 are inadequate to meet our conventional needs, to say nothing of our already proffered commitment to NATO.

Furthermore, I consider that the SALT II Treaty itself contains flaws which must be given serious attention in your deliberations. Beyond that, the necessary consensus between the United States and its European allies has yet to be achieved for the implementation of absolutely essential theater nuclear modernization. This includes determination of systems to be provided, deployment patterns to be pursued, arrangement of funding, and in the light of SALT II, the provision of necessary technology to our allies.

Finally, I believe these programmatic commitments must be based on a two-tiered U.S. consensus which addresses the fundamental directions of future United States-Soviet relations on the one hand and clearly delineates U.S. strategic nuclear policy on the other.

Until such firm commitments and their underlying strategy have been confirmed and resulting programs in strategic theater nuclear and conventional areas have been carefully assessed and agreed upon, and until the Senate has assured itself that the flaws in SALT II have been resolved, I urge that ratification of SALT II be held in abeyance.

That concludes my formal statement, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for your statement, General.

QUESTIONS RELATING TO JCS TESTIMONY

I would like to go down through three or four questions which relate to testimony that was given to this committee by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General, I would appreciate it if you could give me very brief answers to the questions, and then when we have com-

pleted the series, please elaborate as you wish. I would just like to complete the series first. Then please feel free to elaborate in any way you care to to make your position clear.

General HAIG. Certainly, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. When the Chiefs were before the committee, General Jones told us that any changes in the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union will be, to quote him, "the product of unilateral choices rather than the outcome of negotiated arms control."

Dr. Kissinger made the same point. In other words, whatever assessment one makes of the strategic balance, it is not the product of the arms control agreements but of decisions we have made outside the framework of those agreements which agree or disagree with that assessment.

General HAIG. That is consistent with the position that I have taken on this for a number of months.

The CHAIRMAN. You would agree then?

General HAIG. I would.

The CHAIRMAN. General Jones and the Chiefs also said the following in their statement before the committee with respect to verification: "While recognizing the difficulties associated with verification, we must also acknowledge the important assistance the SALT II Treaty will provide in this effort." Do you agree or disagree with that assessment?

General HAIG. On that particular subject, Mr. Chairman, I would prefer to have the experts comment. I know we have had certain aggravations as a consequence of certain losses in our acquisition capabilities. We have habitually and traditionally accepted certain risks in this area, and I would think that the committee would want to investigate in great detail these risks that are associated with this SALT II agreement and earlier risks that we have taken.

The CHAIRMAN. We have been looking into that subject very carefully with the experts, as you know, General. However, it is my understanding that when you testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee you identified verification as one of the flaws in the treaty.

General HAIG. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Does this mean you believe the Chiefs are incorrect in their assessment that the treaty is adequately verifiable?

General HAIG. No; I think there may be varying judgments on this very complex subject by serious people with differing views. What concerns me in the verification area are aspects of the data base and the fact that if we were to be faced with technological changes with a revised data base, it would make it somewhat difficult to verify and complicate the task. But as I say, I do not want to portray myself as an expert on verification. It is a very dynamic area in which I have not been participating.

RESERVATION ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is fair enough. We did have the conclusions of the director of the CIA today on that subject which were made public a few moments ago. Let us get back to your testimony, General. I would call your attention to that part of your statement in which you say:

With respect to the integration of cruise missiles into NATO units, no precise schedule or mode has been decided. The need, however, is clear. The desirability of having a conventional variant has also been raised. In this regard, I believe the potential of these systems to be enormous, and there is no question that unhindered access by our European allies to cruise missile technology is vital to restoring the balance.

I have two questions to ask in that connection. I take it from the general thrust of your statement that you would approve of an understanding or a reservation that would make it expressly clear that the SALT II Treaty does not in any way interfere with our right to transfer technology as we have done in the past to our NATO Allies, that it is in no way an impediment to that practice.

General HAIG. Whatever the committee in its wisdom feels would assure the prevention of restrictions under the verification or non-circumvention clauses, I think, I would welcome.

The CHAIRMAN. That would have your approval?

General HAIG. Yes.

The Chairman. General, to what extent is this problem of which you speak, that is, the theater imbalance, and the need to introduce new weapons in the NATO alliance that will redress that imbalance—complicated by the attitude of our NATO Allies themselves? In other words, as I have understood it, we are prepared to introduce certain new systems, weapons systems, into the NATO region of Western Europe, but we have run into great problems with the NATO governments themselves when it comes to accepting those weapons on their territory.

General HAIG. Mr. Chairman, I have participated rather intimately in the evolution of European thought on theater nuclear modernization, starting with the controversy associated with the so-called neutron warhead, the ER/RB system. I would be less than precise were I to suggest that this is not an extremely sensitive and anguishing question for our European partners; that is, the deployment of additional nuclear systems on their soil.

We have been engaged in the process of attempting to build a consensus since the second summit. I would have been happier had we been somewhat more vigorous as a nation in taking up the leadership in this issue, as I certainly would have been on the neutron warhead issue, where there were rather sharp setbacks in political terms to certain European leaders who preside over tightly balanced constituencies.

The aftermath of the neutron situation has conditioned European attitudes on theater nuclear modernization in general. It has made them more sensitive and more uncertain as to the role that the United States will play in meeting this urgent military need.

They have laid out certain preconditions, some of the more important of potential recipients. They would insist that they not be put in a position as they were in the neutron bomb to be the demanders for these systems, and I remain confident today that the problems, some of which have been reported rather extensively and in timely fashion in the Washington press, are resolvable issues if they are dealt with by firm American leadership and that those nations who are primary potential recipients of such systems are consulted with in an intense way and at the highest level.

This is not a matter to be handled at second level bureaucratic exchanges but rather by heads of state and governments. Were the

American President to provide the kind of assurances which I think he is capable of doing, I am confident the matter could be resolved rather promptly, perhaps not fully to the degree that in military terms I would be most comfortable with, but certainly in an optimum way that will enable us to get on with this important task.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it accurate to say that your hope and expectation would be that these matters could be resolved, but that as yet they have not been resolved?

General HAIG. That is right, Mr. Chairman. I do not want that, with the broad comments I have just made, to be interpreted as criticism of the efforts underway and the high level group, for example, which is a multinational body considering this issue.

The CHAIRMAN. This leads me to the conclusion that whatever imbalance may exist in the theater forces in Europe which are outside the scope of the SALT II Treaty, at least part of that problem is derived from our failure to date to achieve the necessary consent of our own NATO Allies to deploy these new weapons systems on their soil.

General HAIG. I would not want to portray it in such simplistic terms, although I recognize the desirability of doing so. In this issue, there are contradictions, but I would say that the most fundamental aggravating problem, was the precedent of the neutron experience which has converged with traditional reservations on the part of our European allies as they exist in our own country, about additional nuclear systems in general. But, I think our allies have agreed and they have formally committed themselves that there is a need for prompt steps to be taken to modernize our theater nuclear capabilities.

What remains to be done is to flesh out the bona fides of this consensus with specific program deployment modes and numbers of systems. There is another aspect to this, Mr. Chairman. When we were vastly superior in the central area and when we were superior in the theater nuclear area, these kinds of precise determinations were less relevant. Today, as we have gone into parity and the prospect of inferiority in the central area, these regional balances take on increased significance in the context of our overall deterrent.

Beyond that, the rapid deployment of the SS-20 and the Backfire is a fundamental challenge to European confidence in our overall deterrent.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General Haig. My time is up.

Senator Javits?

ABEYANCE THEORY AND LINKAGE

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General I will not go over the ground that Senator Church did. I heard the particularity with which you defined the need for maintaining our armament and improving our state of readiness. We are faced with this question, with which I hope you will help us. I have looked forward to your testimony. I know you so well, and I believe it could prove very important and very helpful to us. We

have been faced with the "tranquilizer theory." That is the theory that if we sign the treaty, it will lull us to sleep.

Then Mr. Nitze gave us the "shock theory" that we should turn it down, and that will let the Russians know that we mean business. Now you give us the "abeyance theory." That is, don't do it, do other things first. I can understand how we might try something respecting armament. We have discussed it this morning with Mr. McCloy, and you have given us certain specifics. Although I do not see how Dr. Kissinger's idea that we should get a binding commitment from the Congress or the President would work, I think we can work to contrive something which will fill that gap. I notice in your prepared statement an interesting thing that you have added to your position that you gave before the Armed Services Committee, and that is another dimension to the abeyance theory. Forgive me. I am not trying to be invidious. It is important, very important. It is contained in the final page of your statement where you said.

Finally, I believe these programmatic commitments must be based on a two-tiered U.S. consensus which addresses the fundamental directions of future United States-Soviet relations on the one hand and clearly delineates U.S. strategic nuclear policy on the other.

Now, I have just spoken to the last, but what about the first, which is the linkage question? Dr. Kissinger and, I assume you by reference, have ticked off Angola, the Horn of Africa, Southern Africa, the Middle East, and so on referring to the linkage question. Now, if you are going to negotiate such linkage what are we prepared to give, General? Do we think the Russians are going to give us everything and just walk out of all these places? What are we prepared to give? How long will it take and what effect will it have on the abeyance theory?

General HAIG. Senator, first let me address the abeyance theory. I suppose one could read that as a suggestion that we go into never-never land in terms of the ratification process. I would not suggest that at all, really. These are matters which have long been under consideration in this committee and in our body politic in both the executive branch and the Congress. These are matters for which a prompt clarification of the American executive branch's view could be elicited and proposed and rapidly endorsed by the legislative branch.

So, I am not talking about an interminable delaying tactic. I am talking about sorting out our thinking, being sure that the premises upon which we enter into this treaty and develop our strategic forces and conduct arms control at large are at least defined within a broad conceptual framework of approved and agreed upon American policy.

Let me turn first to the linkage problem, and I want to assure you that I do not feel the least bit inconsistent about having been more specific, because in the conduct of the discussions in the Armed Services Committee it became clear that there was some confusion in this area and I wanted to be more specific for this body which is far more concerned with foreign policy in its broadest sense.

I have always been a proponent of linkage. I do not feel that the suggestion that linkage be reapplied to the conduct of American

foreign policy is retroactive in character and that we now have to extract retrenchments from the Soviet Union in areas where our failure to challenge these illegal interventionisms have resulted in *de facto* changes in status quo; hardly at all. What I am suggesting is, and not too differently from what Dr. Kissinger suggested before this committee, that I think the time has come for the United States to recognize that it is very self-defeating to proceed in a mindless way in a number of functional areas—whether they be arms control, credit, or technology transfer with the Soviet Union—while they are simultaneously conducting blatant illegal interventionisms aimed at our vital interests and those of our allies and our traditional friends in the Third World.

I feel the Soviet Union should be put on notice that this kind of activity which we have witnessed over the past 3 years in Africa, the Middle East, and Eurasia is not consistent and not conducive to continuing dialogs in other areas, and that they must be brought into some synchronism.

Now, again, I am not an advocate with an overzealous attitude on this. I recognize the U.S. President, the executive branch must have a degree of flexibility in orchestrating the linkage *per se*, and linkage is not a plus and minus, debit and credit exercise.

On the other hand, I think in our efforts to discredit this concept we have gone beyond the limits of prudence and it is time for us to pull up our socks and rethink this issue and put the Soviet Union on notice that the kinds of activities we have been facing recently are no longer acceptable. I would suggest it would be important for this committee to ascertain what Chairman Brezhnev said to President Carter at Vienna on this subject.

Senator JAVITS. General, I just want to refine that because it is critically important. Does that mean that what you want is for us to state our policy—whether Brezhnev accepts anything we say or takes any action respecting it or not—that we hold in abeyance until the President of the United States declares what is his policy respecting each of these matters upon which you want linkage?

Is that your position?

General HAIG. Absolutely, Senator. We should make our position clear, and the President henceforth should be held responsible by the American people and by this committee and the Congress for implementing that policy in a consistent way.

Senator JAVITS. And, you consider that wise in terms of the way in which the President should negotiate with the Russians? That is, he should tell them all our policy, and whether they respond or not is not material? You want to lock him into our policy in each of these matters now before we ratify the treaty?

General HAIG. I would like clarification from the executive branch that there is at long last recognition that these illegal Soviet interventionisms are not consistent with the overall improvement of East-West relations in general, arms control and other functional areas of improved East-West relations.

Senator JAVITS. Forgive me. I want to extract what it is you are really recommending to us. What you want from the President is the acceptance of the doctrine of linkage. That is, look, Mr. Russia, we are not going to negotiate SALT III, we are not going to negotiate a trade agreement, we are not going to negotiate anything with

you that is not linked to the overall situation, and if we are not satisfied with the overall situation, we won't make agreements. Would you apply that to SALT II, however, in short? Would you turn down SALT II or is this irrelevant to whether we turn it down or not?

General HAIG. No. I think it is very relevant, Senator, along with the overall approach in the other areas that I have recommended to assess existing faults in this treaty as a precondition to ratification so that we can really assess with greater clarity in the context of our overall security needs what is dangerous in this treaty, what is perhaps unacceptable and needs some kind of improvement and adjustment by the committee. But when you start out from a fuzzy point of departure, I find it an extremely dangerous way to proceed. It could be very deleterious to American interests in the period ahead.

Incidentally, I don't want to suggest preoccupation with the term "linkage." It now generates a great deal of visceral reaction by the pros and cons, as do a number of other things historically, such as the domino theory. I really do not like the term, except in a sophisticated group like this for telegraphic purposes. It does not lend itself to a legalistic formula of the kind your question would suggest. Rather, it lends itself to an understanding, first within our own Government, that what has been going on over the past 2 years is unacceptable from the American policy point of view.

Hopefully, that can be clearly conveyed to the Soviet Union and their leaders, but it should be done in the most delicate way, and no one has a precise formula. I certainly would not suggest here how that should be done. But I would say that we have had confusion in this area, and it does impinge on functional activities, such as arms control.

Senator JAVITS. General, would you consider what you have defined, just to close this argument, as "a political expression of national will, a demonstration of our resolve, even though we then ratify the SALT II Treaty?"

General HAIG. With respect to this aspect of my statement and not prejudging the other aspects of the statement, I think this is an important step to be taken.

Senator JAVITS. Is it what you say? You want a political expression of national will, a demonstration of our resolve.

General HAIG. That is correct.

Senator JAVITS. If we get that from the President and we satisfy the flaws, et cetera, and he charts out what he proposes to do about defense, then is your answer to my question yes, that is a political expression of national will, a demonstration of our resolve?

General HAIG. And then, I believe, with that and the other measure—

Senator JAVITS. Is your answer yes?

General HAIG. My answer is then the flaws in the treaty, as it is currently written, should be examined against that backdrop.

Senator JAVITS. Is your answer no, that we still ratify, doing all the things you say, that this is a political expression of national will and a demonstration of our resolve? Is it or isn't it? You are the one who set the standard and now you have given me your condition. I still want to know whether that meets your condition.

General HAIG. Well, it may be that I am not sufficiently clear as I lay them out. But I think what my statement says is if we can satisfy these conditions, then we can very promptly look at the risks associated with the existing flaws in the treaty and decide whether they are acceptable or not acceptable, or whether they lend themselves to the kinds of recommendations that, for example, Dr. Kissinger put before the committee.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, General. My time is up.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PELL [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Javits.

General Haig, I have two separate lines of questions that I would like to go through this morning. The first is in connection with our relationship with our allies.

NATO ALLIES SUPPORT SALT II

Would you agree that our allies, our NATO allies, without exception, strongly support the SALT II agreement?

General HAIG. I think I have said that in my statement.

Senator PELL. Well, you said it in a qualified way in your statement.

General HAIG. Yes; with the qualifications that I would insist be applied to my answer to your question right now.

Senator PELL. The reason I am puzzled by your qualifications is this.

I have been Chairman of the Senate Delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly for the last year, and on each of my trips to Europe, without exception, my opposite numbers in the European parliaments have come up to me to say how much they hope SALT is ratified and how important they feel it is. At the same time, we hear that some of our allies don't really want it or that they have been pressured into supporting it and so forth. So, I get a completely different impression from those two different views. I have not had one European at these meetings tell me that they oppose SALT or that they think we would be better off not ratifying it—not one. This is without reservations and without qualifications.

At the same time we hear that there is a great deal of sentiment against it. What is the reason for this dichotomy?

General HAIG. Well, this is not an unusual situation. I would suggest also, at the time you discussed this with your European counterparts, that their knowledge of this agreement and the resulting imbalances that would emerge in the period of the 1980's was, at best, shallow. I think probably the last occasion was at the Lisbon meeting, and even at that meeting, Senator, I think you will recall that there was great controversy among the participants and the parliamentarians.

Senator PELL. Well, there was great controversy among the American Delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly. That delegation was almost evenly split. But I do not recall great controversy from the other allies, at least not anywhere near to that extent.

General HAIG. I agree that the primary controversy was within the American Delegation. But my discussions with a number of the parliamentarians suggested that there were mixed views in Europe. But this is the important thing and this, I think, needs a clarification because it is difficult to comprehend. I would describe

European support as premised not essentially, but largely, on tactical or political expediency. Beneath the surface there is, at the same time, concurrently, a fundamental concern about the prospects of worsening balances between the United States and the Soviet Union in the strategic area and the possibility that SALT somehow is contributing to this or could codify it in a way that would be henceforth a permanent state of affairs.

Senator PELL. Let's put it in another way. Let's say that we attached a reservation to the SALT II Treaty requiring that each one of our NATO partners would have to approve it. Is there any doubt in your mind that they all would approve it?

General HAIG. I have no doubt at all at the political level that the European political leaders—and I think most of them are on record today—would support this. On the other hand, I think we have all lived in a world where contradictions of the kind we are trying to discuss here have been normal, and the long-term proposition facing us as a Nation in our relationship with our allies is not what is their immediate attitude on SALT II per se, but what will be the long-term attitude of our European allies as some of the worsening strategic realities begin to become more evident to them in a situation where there are growing doubts about American reliability, consistency, and willingness to provide the historic U.S. mantle of leadership and guarantee.

Senator PELL. But certainly a rejection of SALT II would do nothing to enhance those thoughts of American reliability and determination.

General HAIG. No, it certainly would not.

REJECTION OF TREATY AND INCREASE IN SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES

Senator PELL. Do you believe that the Soviets would or would not increase their strategic forces beyond the limit, beyond the cap of SALT II if SALT II is rejected? In other words, if SALT II is rejected by us, would that not result in a greater increase in Soviet strategic weaponry than would be the case otherwise?

General HAIG. I think we have to be very careful about glib generalizations on this subject, Senator. For example, with SALT II, it is very clear that the Soviet Union will enjoy a level of superiority that would not suggest to me a motivation for extensive increases in numbers without SALT II, especially as you look at the potential within SALT II in the fractionation area, where they could explode from 10 warheads on their heavies to 20 or 30, and perhaps even beyond that.

I would look to the Soviets with or without SALT II to focus ahead on improved accuracies and improved reliabilities in their new systems, rather than on dramatic increases in numbers. So, I think this can be a straw man alternative that can be deceptive to those who are analyzing this difficult question.

Senator PELL. I believe that there have been intelligence estimates that the Soviets, without SALT II, would have, by 1985, 3,000 central weapon systems, as opposed to 2,250 under this treaty; 1,800 MIRV systems, as opposed to 1,200; 1,200 MIRVed ICBM's, as opposed to 820.

Would you agree with those estimates?

General HAIG. I think that the inference of that statement is correct, that they certainly could do so.

Senator PELL. How do you feel that rejecting SALT II could possibly help us meet the Soviet threat of competition, or whatever you want to call it?

General HAIG. I don't think that in my statement I have been laying out the historical alternatives posed by your question. You want my judgment on this isolated question, I take it, which is not relevant to my own point of view.

Senator PELL. The point is that so many people have come here to give us advice, and they are always for it, but with a whole lot of reservations, amendments, and things of that sort.

We try, perhaps, to achieve too great a simplicity because we have to vote on this issue. If we are faced with voting yea or nay on this treaty, we would like to have your advice. We respect your advice without qualifications.

General HAIG. First, Senator, I do not envy you your responsibility because I think it is extremely important. Perhaps no issue has been of comparable importance than this one in post World War II American history.

Senator PELL. Would you vote yea or nay under those circumstances?

General HAIG. Today?

Senator PELL. Yes, today.

General HAIG. Today I would insist, were I in your chair, that I have the clarifications in the two areas my statement laid out: What is our approach to East-West relations, in general, and to the kinds of illegal Soviet activity that are underway today; second, have we clarified our doctrinal strategic thinking and do we know whether or not we are trending, consciously or unconsciously, toward mutual assured destruction or minimum deterrence, which is the de facto reality of our trending in recent years, or are we determined and dedicated to the proposition of a more balanced equality, which will avoid the sterile, self-defeating, and immoral implications of the MAD concept.

I know from reviewing the questions of the members of this committee that there is confusion, even within this committee, on this vitally important subject, and I think you should clarify that before you go on with such a vitally important step as ratification.

Senator PELL. I don't feel my view is clarified particularly by your statement. But let me return, for a moment, to this.

If you had to vote yea or nay today on this, without qualification, how would you vote, General?

General HAIG. I would refuse to vote until the questions have been answered.

You know, the United States has lived for 200 years without SALT II and has done quite well. I do not understand the breathless urgency of consummating a matter of such gravity to the American people until we have assured ourselves of the backdrops under which we proceed.

Senator PELL. I would agree with you that it has been a tremendous national policy to overemphasize the importance of SALT II. This SALT II is just one small step in a long process; "a useful and modest step" I believe was the expression of the Joint Chiefs. I

agree with you in that I do not believe it is that significant a treaty; but it has been made one by the proponents and opponents of it. It has gotten completely out of context from the viewpoint of its importance.

That is my feeling.

Thank you, General Haig.

Senator Percy.

Senator PERCY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Haig, I would like to say that if you would refuse to vote, you would afford yourself a luxury we have never been afforded. I have had to cast 10,000 votes yea or nay. I have never refused to vote, and very few of my colleagues ever have. You are uncertain, sometimes, but you have to vote.

General HAIG. Senator, I know that. I think you are somewhat humble about your ability to manage your affairs.

Senator PERCY. We have to vote this up or down.

CONDITIONS FOR RATIFICATION

Now you and others have said that it is flawed. But there seem to be two schools of thought among those who feel it is flawed. There are those who feel it is so fatally flawed that it requires a total renegotiation, which means it must be turned down. On the other hand, there are those who feel that the flaws are such that we can, through reservations, understandings, and modifications, improve the treaty by making changes that would not send it back to the drawing board and require total renegotiation.

As I interpret what Dr. Kissinger has said, he could endorse this treaty providing certain things are done. I do not see anything that he has laid out that is unreasonable or that could not be achieved by the United States in most respects. I am saying that he is not attempting to wreck the treaty. He is not recommending that it be sent back to the drawing board. He is in the school that says it can be ratified if certain conditions are met.

Into what category would you put yourself? Would you concur with Dr. Kissinger?

General HAIG. Clearly, I am in the latter category. I suppose there is a nuance of difference between Henry and me. He likes to describe the bottle as half full; I tend to describe it as half empty.

He said that he could ratify or recommend ratification if certain conditions were met. I have said that I would not ratify and I would hold in abeyance until certain things are done.

Senator PERCY. But isn't that really saying the same thing?

General HAIG. That is what I am saying—these are differences in nuance.

On the other hand, I have not agreed, as has Henry, that the flaws can be remedied exclusively by changes that need not be negotiated. That is a judgment I personally would not feel comfortable making until I have seen what progress we have made in meeting these other conditions which I have asked for.

So there is another difference in nuance, if you will.

Senator PERCY. I was tremendously interested in your testimony before the Armed Services Committee because you did address one of the principal concerns I have had about the treaty. I have tried to determine what effect it does have on our NATO allies—our

first line of defense and our greatest single commitment beyond our own shores.

ALLIED CONCERNS ABOUT SALT TREATY

In your testimony you indicated that there was greater concern among Europeans about this treaty than might be reflected in the official positions of the governments. In fact, you said that professional and military men have uniformly expressed a grave concern about the imbalance in this treaty and the implications of these imbalances for the period ahead.

Since your statement, with the help of our own staff and the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, I have tried to research the proceedings of NATO meetings that have been held in past years. I have found evidence of some of the concerns you have expressed.

From what I have seen, I believe that military concerns, if I could summarize them, break down into two principal areas. First, NATO military leaders are concerned about how this treaty affects their own plan for modernization of their forces. Second, they are concerned about the tranquilizer effect to which Senator Javits referred, that is, that this treaty will reduce public willingness to spend the money necessary to maintain a strong defense.

In essence, is this what you have summarized the European concerns to be?

General HAIG. Yes, Senator, and I would also add two other factors which influence that.

One is just the stark reality of worsening balances between ourselves and the Soviet Union, about which European professional military men are extremely cognizant. So, it is just an expression of reality.

I would take credit for your first two and say, fourthly, that there is an underlying discomfiture in Europe today about the United States in general, its ability or willingness to stand up to the Soviet Union, and its overall will.

Senator PERCY. I would hope that they never misunderstand or misinterpret the will of this country to move, and move swiftly to use whatever military resources we have to defend Europe. I don't see any lack of will in the United States in that regard.

Vietnam was a different situation, I think. We did not have the kind of commitment in Vietnam that we have to Europe.

General HAIG. I had to be an exponent of that view for the past 4½ years with my European partners, and I have never shrunk from stating it with vigor.

On the other hand, there are manifestations of American policy which, in a prudent circle, could be described as rather confusing to those whom we asked to accept this assurance.

PRECEDENTIAL CHARACTER OF CRUISE MISSILE CONSTRAINTS

Senator PERCY. Is it true that our NATO allies, particularly the military, are concerned about the precedential character of cruise missile constraints?

General HAIG. They are very concerned about that, sir, of course.

Senator PERCY. The administration has argued that these concerns have been met because they have made it clear that the protocol will expire on its expiration date.

Has that assurance by the administration wholly satisfied the NATO military?

General HAIG. Not at all, sir. There are two levels of argument. One is the logic of the issue in its first instance. Our European allies could not understand that if we had written a prohibition which we intend to lift at the end of a set period of time, why we had put in the prohibition in the first instance. So, it is the logic of the issue which is giving them great difficulty. I must admit that it gives me equal difficulty.

The other aspect of it has to do with this shifting strategic balance situation between ourselves and the Soviet Union. Our European allies begin to question whether or not, at the end of the protocol period, when we are obligated in the statement of principles to negotiate, we will have the leverage to, in fact, reverse the precedent. So, the assurances become rather legalistic and not sufficiently clear to our European allies in purely political terms.

I must say that I have serious questions myself about this problem.

Senator PERCY. I anticipated that you would respond in that way because I think the European allies, the military personnel particularly, would not be satisfied with a unilateral statement by the administration in this regard.

For that reason, many of us have discussed an understanding, one that I have introduced, which states that nothing in the statement of principles for SALT III commits the United States to enter into a future agreement on protocol issues and that any such agreement takes a two-thirds vote of the Senate to be approved. In the legislative history of the discussion of this treaty, we would make it eminently clear that there should be absolutely no chance that two-thirds, or even a majority, of the Senate would concur to an extension.

Would that understanding be the kind that should be entered into as a part of the ratification process and yet be the kind of understanding that would not wreck the treaty?

General HAIG. Again, Senator, the value judgment for me on that issue is this. Clearly I am comfortable with the general thrust of your proposal. But I could only give you a clear value judgment on it in the context of what forces the United States was going to be proceeding with in the interim period. There we leave the legalistic aspect which your fix would be—rather exclusively that—and we get into the business of leverage on the part of the United States at the end of the protocol period to effect, in practical terms, what we have stated we will in legalistic terms. I do not suggest subterfuge.

Senator PERCY. Dr. Kissinger suggested on Tuesday that the Senate state that any such agreement, including restrictions on cruise missiles, can be submitted only as a part of an equitable, balanced arrangement in theater nuclear forces in Europe. Do you think this would be helpful to allay our allies' concerns, particularly those of military personnel, about SALT III?

General HAIG. In general, I would be comfortable with that. But again, what I would prefer is the achievement of a programmatic consensus that is so fundamental to our theater modernization target, which incidentally, we have already established as a nation and within the NATO family, to achieve by the end of this year.

Whether we are going to be able to succeed in that I think in large measure will be a consequence of the kind of leadership the U.S. exercises between now and then, and at the highest level.

Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, may I take just another 30 seconds to finish up on this, please?

Senator PELL. Yes; Senator.

Senator PERCY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, the last question I would like to ask you is whether article XII is a particularly bothersome article. It is about noncircumvention.

Is it essential, in your judgment, that we absolutely clarify that particular issue beyond the statements of the administration?

A "yes" or "no" answer would be fine.

General HAIG. My answer is yes. I think there are different views on both sides.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PELL. Senator McGovern.

Senator MCGOVERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Haig, first of all, I agree with the observation that Senator Pell expressed, which I think you at least partially agreed with, that this treaty probably has been vastly oversold in terms of what is really in it. I would only add that I think those who welcome the treaty express too much joy about it and those who oppose it probably express too much fear.

If I were back in the classroom instead of in the Senate, I would give this treaty about a D minus.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

In any event, here we are with this treaty. I think perhaps the superficial character of the treaty has contributed in part to a situation where the debate has become one not so much about what is in it, but a debate about America's global role and about the relationship of nuclear weapons to American foreign policy.

I think we have needed for a long time, at least since Vietnam, a fundamental, far-ranging debate on American foreign policy in the post-Vietnam period. We have not yet had that kind of debate.

After listening to the hearings here for the last 4 weeks—and I believe you are the last witness before we go into our August recess—I am wondering more and more if a nuclear treaty is a good vehicle around which to build a debate on American foreign policy. The problem is that the debate necessarily is distorted in the direction of military ends, especially nuclear ends.

I have thought here at times that if I were a theater commander out somewhere around the globe, I would be very nervous about the public focus, the exaggeration, that is being placed on the nuclear equation at the expense of any attention to conventional systems. I am sure if I were an economic or a political planner looking at American strength, I would worry about the absence of

any foreign policy implications based on, let us say, our dependence on oil from a rather unstable region of the world, the growing inflation, the loss of productivity—I would worry about all those things and how they bear on American strength around the world.

But what has happened is that we have listened to one person after another whose expertise is primarily in the military field, and, goodness knows, we need that expertise.

General HAIG. I hope you are not putting me in that category, Senator. [General laughter.]

Senator MCGOVERN. Well, I put you in the field as a military expert. But most of the recommendations that have come from these references—and I am not speaking about you, specifically—have dealt with matters like public perceptions. They have dealt with political judgments about American foreign policy. They have dealt with negotiating questions. It has tended to just distort the whole direction of what is becoming a foreign policy debate toward military ends.

I guess the question I am leading up to is this. Are you concerned about the discussion of American foreign policy in the context of a nuclear debate, which may very well distort the whole emphasis of what we ought to be doing in terms of devising a foreign policy that is relevant to the world we face?

General HAIG. Senator, I suppose I have to go back to my Jesuit training—

Senator BIDEN. Oh, now I am beginning to understand. [General laughter.]

General HAIG [continuing]. But I think, in general, the thrust of your question is very, very understandable to me. I think it is a shame that we do have to address SALT II in the broad context that I am suggesting we must. The reasons for that are that we have now reached a level of imbalance with worsening trends between ourselves and the Soviet Union in the central strategic nuclear area which do, indeed, impinge on all of these broad issues that have been now raised in the context of SALT II.

For example, certainly as a theater commander I am concerned about our conventional capability to deal with potential difficulty in perhaps the energy area—oil in the Middle East. But, you know, every day I see a very, very clear linkage between worsening strategic balances between ourselves and the Soviet Union and the attitude of oil producing nations upon whose good will we so vitally depend.

You know, Saudi Arabia today could get by with about 4 million barrels-a-day production. The rest of that production we are realizing is based in large measure on their confidence in our credibility as a nation. That is what is under discussion today.

Senator MCGOVERN. General, you do not really believe they are setting their oil production standards on the basis of the nuclear equation, do you? What does one have to do with the other? I don't understand that kind of linkage.

General HAIG. I had supposed that was why the question was asked in the first place.

Clearly we have built our deterrence since the Second World War on a combination of our central strategic military power, in

which we have enjoyed superiority until very recently, and our conventional power.

Senator MCGOVERN. But what is the implication—that the Saudis are going to fear a nuclear strike if they do not increase the number of barrels of oil? What is the point you are making?

General HAIG. No, Senator, it is not that at all. Perhaps I was not clear.

What I am suggesting is that Saudi attitudes, the convergence of Saudi Arabian policies with our own, the level of oil production in which they engage, as well as the prices which they ask, are influenced by their perception of American guarantees to maintain stability in that area of the world—an obligation we have incurred since the Second World War and have, until recently, rather rigidly adhered to.

Senator MCGOVERN. But isn't our energy policy much more relevant to the question of Saudi oil production than our nuclear policy? I do not mean that the nuclear policy is not important, but I don't see what it has to do with oil.

General HAIG. In my judgment it is very much interrelated, or I would not be urging the assessment I am urging here.

SPENDING FOR STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY

Senator MCGOVERN. You testified before the Armed Services Committee, General, that if we had spent \$2 billion or \$3 billion a year, presumably additional money beyond what we did spend, on strategic systems since 1962, we could have the kind of superiority we had enjoyed at that time. I believe that is a direct quote.

Now, according to figures that I have, in 1962, the United States had about 1,840 strategic missiles and bombers and the Soviets had about 215. In other words, we had about eight or nine times as much.

Are you advocating, when you say we could have maintained that kind of superiority, that this is what we should be striving for now—eight or nine times as much as the Soviets?

General HAIG. No, Senator, not at all.

History and technology have passed us by. I am not so sure I would have been an advocate for that kind of superiority in 1962.

The statement which you have quoted was merely to reflect that the situation in which we find ourselves today is a consequence of conscious, unilateral American policy decisions with respect to the level of nuclear capability we were willing to maintain and pay for, and that the cost, for example, of the extreme superiorities that we had in 1962 could have been realized in very modest terms if you look at our Federal budget and our defense budget.

Senator MCGOVERN. But if it wasn't feasible to think in terms of maintaining an eight or nine times American margin of superiority, why should we not have made a unilateral decision not to try to sustain that posture?

General HAIG. That is not the point.

Senator MCGOVERN. What is the point?

General HAIG. The point, Senator, is this. At the time—and what generated this statement, which was taken somewhat out of context is—we Americans decided that both these costs, the \$2 billion to \$3 billion, plus the more overriding belief that we had that if we

managed ourselves from superiority to parity with the Soviet Union, it would influence the Soviet leaders to exercise restraint in their building programs. In other words, we would have a more stable international environment.

The point I made at the time that statement was made was that we were wrong in this belief.

Senator McGOVERN. I wish we had tested that restraint theory when we had the MIRV capability and the Soviets had not made any move in that direction and we decided we had to build it as a bargaining chip. In retrospect, wouldn't we have been much better off if we had restrained the building of the MIRV system which now makes our land-based system vulnerable and tried to work out an arrangement with them for neither side to build it?

I think Secretary Kissinger once said that he wished, in retrospect, that we had done that.

General HAIG. I might be inclined to share that view, but not for those reasons.

When we decided to go with MIRV's, and my memory is accurate on this since I was working for Secretary McNamara at the time, it was predicated on the proposition that we had no need for larger yields for which the Soviets were opting, and that our technology, our ability to achieve accuracy with miniaturization would have enabled us to achieve our goals in the strategic area far more cheaply and perhaps more moderately under the MIRVing concept.

We were wrong again because the Soviets have subsequently developed the kinds of technology and accuracy which we should have known at the time they ultimately would. That has been superimposed on the huge yields which they enjoy today, and we are faced with the explosion of Soviet systems at the end of this treaty period, in 1985, if we do not maintain the leverage to prevent that.

Senator McGOVERN. I see that my time is up. It is getting kind of discouraging hearing our distinguished military leaders tell us how many times we were wrong about military judgments.

General HAIG. Well, Senator, I could write a book on that.

Senator McGOVERN. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PELL. Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, I am a little bit astonished at the suggestion that there is no relationship between SALT II and oil.

On July 4, I was in London and I spoke with and met with about 75 or 80 Members of Parliament. You had better understand that they know the relationship between this treaty and the availability of oil in the future and the impact it will have on the oil-producing nations or the impact it could have.

Of course, anything we say now is purely speculative, but we had better hedge our bets. I think that is what you were saying to Senator McGovern.

Furthermore, there is, or was, great concern expressed by those Members of Parliament with respect to articles XII and XIII concerning noncircumvention.

Have you discussed this aspect with any legislators?

General HAIG. Yes, Senator, I have.

Senator HELMS. What precisely was their attitude or their concern?

General HAIG. Well, sir, I suppose it was twofold.

First is whether or not the understandings between the United States and the Soviet Union on the noncircumvention clause are consistent with the provision of the necessary technology that they feel they are going to need in the cruise areas and in other areas.

Second, and I must say this to this committee, there are serious European parliamentarians and officials who doubt, whether or not that restriction in the language of the treaty is binding, who doubt, whether or not the United States is really willing to share with them in the nuclear area. This is because of a perceived attitude developing in our own country suggesting animosity toward anything nuclear.

Senator HELMS. That was precisely the concern that was emphasized to me in my meeting.

When I came back here, I was surprised to see the constant portrayals before this committee and others that everything is fine with our allies, that they just love this treaty, that it is better than sliced bread. That is not the attitude that I found among the Members of Parliament. They are terribly apprehensive about it.

Do you agree with that?

General HAIG. Yes, sir. A great number are.

Senator PELL. If the Senator would yield, sir, your experience is diametrically opposed to mine. I was Chairman of the Delegation to NATO and we must have just talked with different parliamentarians.

Senator HELMS. Well, I do not know with whom my distinguished friend met. But I met in a relatively private set of circumstances. There was no press. As the saying goes, we let our hair down. They expressed their concerns very candidly as I would imagine some have done with you.

We were talking about the will of this Nation, and that is pretty good rhetoric.

I have to divide it into two categories. One is the willingness of the people to sacrifice. But how are they going to do that without the proper leadership?

I think this delineation ought to be made, and I think that is what you are talking about this morning.

General HAIG. I could not agree more, Senator, and not only the proper leadership but the accurate facts.

Senator HELMS. Well, I agree with that.

SALT II AN ESCALATION TREATY

Let me raise a question with you that I have raised with several other witnesses, General.

This is not a limitation treaty. In my view it is an escalation treaty. And yet, there have been propaganda forces at work for a year or more going around this country. They spent something more than \$1 million in travel alone for Government officials to go around to every talk show and rotary club to say that this is fine, that this treaty will end our problems. Mostly the spokesmen were people who would not know the difference between SALT II and a

hog trying to rollerskate. But, nevertheless, that much money was spent.

Here we confront a situation where the American people really believe this is going to work out in terms of our fears about the Soviet Union.

General, what would be wrong with this Government taking a stand before the court of world opinion and saying this is not really a good treaty—which it is not? Let us both have an arms reduction treaty, a true arms reduction treaty, and get out of this insanity, which everybody questions.

How would that play, not in Peoria, but in our allied nations? Would they understand what we are talking about?

General HAIG. I think that is a difficult question to answer, Senator, because events that follow such an act by the United States would influence what essentially would be a dynamic reaction in Europe.

I think it is awfully important that we consider this as well.

I clearly believe that no treaty is better than a fundamentally bad treaty. But we are now dealing with a situation in which I think we are going to have to step back, because I know from my point of view and from my military experience—and this is, after all, arms control, and arms control is the business of military people because you are dealing with the discipline to which we dedicate our professional lives and training. So, we have not only a right, but an obligation to be engaged, and a very special expertise, to be tapped in this area.

We are here today, after 7 years of negotiations with the Soviet Union, and, as an individual, I would be more inclined to look to this as a great opportunity for our Nation to sort out its thinking, to blow the pipes clean, if you will, rather than to take steps which may require further steps which this clarification of thinking should precede before we would be able to do the right things and then take the subsequent steps—if you gather what I am suggesting.

Senator HELMS. I follow you.

General HAIG. So, I think it is so important, whatever the Senate does, in its wisdom, with respect to SALT II, per se, that we, as a nation, step back and take a look at the two areas I have suggested we look at in my statement.

Senator HELMS. I do not disagree with that at all.

I certainly agree with you that no treaty is better than a bad treaty, which I consider this one to be. But I still believe that ultimately, if humanity is to survive, we have to confront the question of genuine arms reduction. Why wait until the next round? Why not lay this treaty aside and go before the court of world opinion and say to the Soviet Union: "OK, if you need this thing, let's start now."

I don't know about the Soviet people. Theirs is a closed society. We had some discussion of this at a code word level meeting yesterday. It may be that the Soviet people are beginning to get fed up with so much of their GNP [gross national product] going to this sort of thing.

I don't know when the first step ought to be taken, General, but we have to take it sometime.

General HAIG. There are some other very fundamental considerations with respect to that, and I share your concern, Senator, and your disappointment that this is not a treaty that has really brought down the limits of strategic nuclear power and could be even an incentive to build up with greater intensity. But we also have to know some other things as we make generalizations in the nuclear disarmament area. First, we must know that we get to a certain point in balances between ourselves and the Soviet Union where their yields and their demography, if you will, or their geography, or their target complex would make it very, very dangerous for the United States to go below certain limits, despite our well-meaning efforts to control, unless we were to make some other very fundamental decisions.

Senator HELMS. Oh, I agree with that.

If you interpret me to mean that I advocate unilateral disarmament, please dismiss that from your mind.

General HAIG. No, sir. I am talking about much the same arguments that we have today in MBFR. When you have imbalances that exist and you recreate them at lower levels, it makes them more dangerous than at higher levels, where you have greater flexibility and there is some synergism. The same thing would apply if you are talking about massive reductions suddenly in nuclear systems between ourselves and the Soviet Union. Then you will have to recognize that while we will all have fewer weapons, theirs will be huge in terms of yield and throw-weight and then that anomaly becomes even more significant than it is today.

Second, there are differences in targeting. I am talking about deterrence and not just about war fighting between the Soviet Union. This involves vast territories and dispersed targets in the United States with its highly vulnerable and concentrated industrial and population complexes.

Senator HELMS. Thank you very much. I see that my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PELL. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Haig, I hardly know where to start.

It sounds to me as though you are a man who supports SALT, and I wish I could think of a Jesse Helms analogy, but it is a little bit like the girl who says no but who is praying you keep it up. That's not a very good one. I am not from North Carolina. [General laughter.]

Seriously, everything you say seems to say that you are for SALT, and that you are for this SALT agreement and not another SALT agreement, and that you just want this thing debated long enough so that the views which you share with others will be ventilated, but you want to vote for SALT, and if you were in the Senate—not that you have ever harbored that consideration, I know—you would vote for SALT.

That is the way it seems to me.

Am I wrong about that?

General HAIG. I suspect that you are reading somewhat more enthusiasm on my part for SALT, this particular SALT II.

Senator BIDEN. The reason I am beginning to understand you is that we both have been trained in the scholastic background to which you referred.

As a matter of fact, yesterday I said in response to the question of what do I think of Henry Kissinger's testimony, that it was the best performance since Jerry Brown. He was a man talking right and moving left.

It seems to me that maybe you have to do what you are doing because of other considerations.

General HAIG. That has been suggested by backgrounding from the administration here, after my Armed Services appearance.

Senator BIDEN. Let's run through your testimony.

You make the linkage argument—you are not asking for specific language, but you just want the concept firm and you want the administration to say that we are going to deal in a positive, tough way. But you are not suggesting anything specific. Senator Javits very eloquently pursued this point.

Then you say that the agreement is flawed, and you name the flaws. You say the protocol is one. You know as well as I do that there is not a chance in the world of that protocol being extended now and that the Senate is going to pass what you suggest is necessary.

You then say that verification is an issue, but that you are willing to leave it to the experts. I have been talking to those experts for literally 60 or 70 hours now, and they seem—no, not seem—they are convinced that it is adequately verifiable. So you do not have any problem on that. You tell us to look to the experts, and the experts are clear. So you know you are all right there.

Then you say to us that noncircumvention should be looked out for; but you know darn well that the noncircumvention issue has been solved now by unilateral statements, by joint meetings with our allies and our military commanders, and if I am not mistaken, by you with your NATO counterparts, assuring them that the noncircumvention provision was not a nontransfer provision.

These are the things that you specify. By the way, I even read all of your testimony before the Armed Services Committee. That shows you how interested I am in your testimony.

AMENDMENTS TO CORRECT BASIC FLAWS IN THE TREATY

Then you say that there are basic flaws. Well, what, other than the protocol, verification, linkage—a term neither of us like—and noncircumvention are the basic flaws in this treaty? You keep talking about basic flaws. What are they?

General HAIG. You will recall that in my testimony I made strong mention of both the single new missile exception and the fact that that could permit additional new Soviet systems, and also the heavy missile exclusion, which really is the centerpiece of my concern, because it gets into our whole strategic doctrine and the drift toward MAD or minimum deterrence.

Senator BIDEN. Since I do not have the time, I will not debate those two issues. Let me ask you this. Are you insisting upon amendments that correct those two flaws? Are you insisting on a Baker amendment and are you insisting before us here today on an amendment that does something more about the new system?

Are you asking us to do that?

General HAIG. Well, first, Senator, since you have made more of a speech than you have a question, permit me to answer the nuances of your question.

Senator BIDEN. Answer my question. Are you suggesting that there is a need for an amendment that says that they must reduce the number of heavy missiles or that we must have the right for them? Are you saying that?

General HAIG. I think you read my statement. You see no mention of that.

Senator BIDEN. That's exactly right.

General HAIG. It was not mentioned in my testimony of several hours before the Armed Services Committee—

Senator BIDEN. That is precisely right.

General HAIG [continuing]. And I don't know why you are asking the question. It is not relevant.

Senator BIDEN. Then it is not a basic flaw, is it?

If you are not asking for it to be corrected, then it is not a basic flaw.

General HAIG. My friend, you are leading me toward your conclusions, which may be your Jesuit training, but it is not what I have testified to and I am not going to be forced to testify to it at your questioning.

What really bothers me is the inference about my testimony that is suggested in your question, that I am here for some political gain. I resent that strongly, Senator.

Senator BIDEN. You can read that as you think. Let me read your testimony to you. You can explain this to me, if you will.

In response to Senator Tower before the Armed Services Committee you said such things as:

I would dread the consequences of a balance between ourselves and the Soviet Union where, for the first time since the development of nuclear weapons, the United States is second.

It seems to me that there is a non sequitur there. You dread the consequence of a balance, but you would also dread the consequence of being second.

Is a balance being second? If we are balanced, does that make us second?

General HAIG. Are you indulging in debate with me or do you want an answer?

Senator BIDEN. I am trying to. I am really trying to debate.

General HAIG. My answer is whether you use the term "balance" to suggest equivalence or whether you use balance as a state of the art term to express a relationship between the Soviet Union on the one hand and the United States on the other, which is the context of its usage in this discussion.

Senator BIDEN. All right. Let me read some more.

You said:

This is my most significant concern about this treaty, because to me the treaty seems to reflect a tendency to drift from what was original insistence on American superiority to what more recently has become acceptance of equality and parity, to a new trend in which minimum deterrence considerations are beginning to creep into the American conception of our defense.

Are you suggesting that we need be superior strategically in central systems?

General HAIG. Not at all.

Senator BIDEN. Good. Then I have that clarified.

Are you suggesting that we need be superior in theater systems?

General HAIG. Not at all.

Senator BIDEN. Are you suggesting that the SALT agreement does, by its very nature, make us inferior in those systems, either of them, central or theater?

General HAIG. Not in the context of your question, but it could fundamentally contribute to trendings which are already taking place outside of SALT which are leading us in that direction.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS NOT PRECLUDED BY SALT

Senator BIDEN. Are you suggesting that there is anything we need do to assure that we do not become inferior that is precluded by the SALT agreement? Is there anything that you think we need do to assure that we not be inferior in strategic systems that is precluded by SALT?

General HAIG. The answer to that question, Senator, could only be forthcoming from me in the context of my exposure to what this administration's—executive branch and the legislative branch's policy is in our strategic doctrine.

Senator BIDEN. Let me ask the question again. Does the treaty language preclude anything you feel need be done, not whether or not the subjective judgment of this President or the next President or this Congress or the next Congress decides to do or not do? Is, as a matter of international law, anything you think need be done precluded by this treaty?

General HAIG. Senator, in the context of your question, I would have to see what our plans are to do it. I know what I would like to see, and if that is done, then I would be comfortable in the context of your question.

Senator BIDEN. Is there anything you would like to see, that, if you were President, you would not be able to do under this treaty?

General HAIG. Oh, I suppose there is a great deal, yes.

But I think in the context of your question, that is not the major issue.

Senator BIDEN. Well, it sure seems to me it is in terms of SALT. It sure seems to me that what we have to decide on here is whether or not this treaty—the language in this treaty—is going to put America in an inferior position. That is my concern. I don't want America to be inferior. I want to make sure America is not inferior, just as I assume you do.

Does this treaty put America in an inferior position?

General HAIG. The answer to that is it could very easily result in that outcome.

Senator BIDEN. Unilateral actions outside the treaty could result in that or the treaty?

General HAIG. The treaty per se.

Senator BIDEN. How?

General HAIG. You know, these questions are very legalistic and, unfortunately, these matters do not lend themselves to that kind of treatment.

Senator BIDEN. Oh, my goodness. Wow.

General HAIG. What are you trying to get me to say, Senator?

Senator BIDEN. I am trying to understand you, General, I really am. I think I do, but in order to understand you I have to make a subjective judgment, because on the record it is not understandable in my opinion.

General HAIG. I would be happy to rehash again my view on the SALT II Treaty in very precise terms.

Senator BIDEN. All right, I will stick around.

My time is up.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PELL. The Senator from California.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Haig, it is good to see you again.

General HAIG. Thank you, Senator.

NATO FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Senator HAYAKAWA. My first question refers to an ambiguity in your statement. You say:

Although a conventional attack would be met in kind, the serious historical imbalance in conventional forces favoring the Warsaw Pact has led to the common expectation among our allies of early resort to nuclear weapons.

Your sentence does not make clear whether this early resort to nuclear weapons would be undertaken first by the Soviets or by us.

General HAIG. I apologize for the lack of clarity of this statement. I mean it in the context of the West, because of our conventional weaknesses.

Senator HAYAKAWA. That we might be forced to be the first to use nuclear weapons?

General HAIG. That is correct, Senator.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Perhaps at the theater or tactical level. OK, I understand that now.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND COMBAT READINESS

Let us talk about conventional warfare for a minute, because that is among the possibilities that we are trying to avoid.

General, are you satisfied with the combat readiness of the American Army in Europe?

General HAIG. No, Senator, I am not. But I am encouraged that it has been improving steadily since low points in the early 1970's.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Do you consider the fact that it is a non-volunteer Army to be a plus or a minus?

General HAIG. Senator, I want to be careful not to have my answer be interpreted as an expression of a lack of confidence in the fine young men and women who are serving in our forces voluntarily today. I have never been really comfortable with the all volunteer concept. I am consistent about that because I opposed it in 1970, while in the White House, when the elimination of conscription was undertaken.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you very much. That is a very clear answer.

I have been told that the volunteer army is somewhat more interested in pay and in the rewards connected with the position than in what are believed to be the usual motivations of soldiers.

Would you expect that the results would become evident in unsatisfactory performance of such an army—in other words, that they would have to have more money in order to function well?

General HAIG. I think, as a philosophy, that is a very uncomfortable concept for me. But that is not my main concern about the army. I do think costs have gone up. We have created a customer army and there are certain consequences and increased costs.

Senator HAYAKAWA. There certainly are, there have been, and probably there will continue to be.

In order to modernize our theater forces, precisely what should be done? Do we need more planes or tanks? What do we need?

General HAIG. In the conventional sector?

Senator HAYAKAWA. Yes, in the conventional sector. Or, are they pretty adequate now in combination with the European contribution?

General HAIG. No, sir, they are not adequate. No one could be complacent about our current conventional posture in Europe, our in-place forces.

We have never sought to match the Warsaw Pact tank for tank or man for man, and I would not recommend it today. On the other hand, we have certain areas of traditional weakness which we revise and reprioritize on a quarterly basis. At least we did so while I was in command. There are areas of key concern to me today, such as command control and communications, where I think we still have a great deal to do.

We have been emphasizing and have made some progress there, but we have more progress to make in antitank capability. We have some very fundamental deficiencies in the logistics area—stockage levels, in place, which would enable us to sustain ourselves in an emergency.

We have deficiencies in electronic warfare, both our ability to defend against Warsaw Pact warfare against us and our ability to exercise interdiction of its communications through the system.

Senator HAYAKAWA. I ask these questions because to me nuclear war seems, despite the enormous amount of weapons on both sides, very improbable. I think both sides are likely to hold back on the ultimate weapon. This is why I am concerned about the strength of the conventional forces and our equipment.

Would it require a considerable outlay to bring our conventional forces up to your requirements as regards equipment, manpower, womanpower, improving communications, and everything else? In other words, do we need to spend a lot more money?

General HAIG. Senator, any increased spending in the current environment is an onerous prospect for our Nation.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Yes.

General HAIG. But, as you know, at the NATO summit we have agreed to 3-percent real-term increased spending each year for the next six. I have described that as being at the very bottom edge of prudence, and it will have to be reassessed each year as we assess ongoing Warsaw Pact improvement. It could, perhaps, be scaled down or inflated.

I would be more comfortable with something in the neighborhood of 5 percent, and I have made that clear consistently over the 3 years I have been in Europe.

Senator HAYAKAWA. How about our allies? Are they doing the same? I am still talking about conventional forces.

General HAIG. Well, this anticipates a post-summit period of compliance with the agreed upon goals by our allies. I am happy to say, with the exception of those who you and I would not want to spend more—such as Turkey, which is an economic basket case, and Portugal, which is in a similar position—most are doing quite well, and, I would say, much better than the United States.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you.

I have another line of questions.

CONTINUOUS CONSULTATIONS WITH NATO ON SALT

Secretary Vance told us that there have been continuous consultations with NATO throughout the SALT negotiations. I presume that this is correct.

General HAIG. With the caveat that the initial framework of the treaty—that aspect of it that included the protocol, limiting the cruise range, the exclusion of the Backfire—was not, to my knowledge, coordinated with our European allies, nor were they consulted on these issues before the broad concept was presented to them. I know it was not coordinated with me, because I would have been strenuously opposed.

Senator HAYAKAWA. That does answer what was to be my next question, whether or not you were consulted in all of this.

General HAIG. Senator, in the subsequent period I would want to make it clear that I feel the United States has been rather consistent in its prenegotiation information briefings to our allies and following the sessions, the debriefs.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Were there any recommendations made by our allies as to what should be in the treaty that were omitted or that were not followed up on? Did our allies make recommendations that were not acceptable?

General HAIG. There were a number of levels of consultation. There were some done in a rather formal setting in the North Atlantic Council where permanent representatives were dealt with. During this period, there were also a number of bilateral contacts between the United States and our European allies. The subject of those discussions I was not privy to.

I would say that in most instances the American briefers were aware of European concerns in the area of noncircumvention, the protocol and its potential extension, and the Backfire, which to Americans may not be strategic, but it certainly is to Europeans. They were worried about its running free.

They have been worried about how we would go with SALT III, where their systems will become more heavily engaged. But I am not aware of any very vigorous expression of dissent or urging for modification in the noncircumvention area. Specifically, in the non-circumvention area, there were intense discussions in the North Atlantic Council because the United States went in with one initial position, which would have been unambiguous. It then had a fall-

back position and it had what I consider a total cave position. We finally went to our fall-back position.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you very much, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Hayakawa.

Senator Stone is next.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

LINKAGE BETWEEN SALT II AND OIL

General Haig, before I inquire regarding your suggestions as to both the flaws and the correction of flaws in the treaty, as to the general position of our security, and the general balance, compared with the Soviet Union, there was one issue that I think we might be able to clarify, in which you asserted that there is linkage in the minds of the oil-producing nations between oil and our United States strength and resolve.

I would read you a paragraph from a speech made in Los Angeles by Dr. Ghazi Algosabi, the Minister of Industry and Electricity of Saudi Arabia, and reprinted in the Washington Star a few days ago. It was quite apart from the subject of the speech with regard to how best to justly settle the dispute within the region.

I would read you this paragraph and ask you if this is not exactly what you meant to convey when you made and expressed that language. I quote:

The new Arab world is interdependent with America. Please allow me to put the matter in blunt terms. The subject is too important for shyness. Your industrial way of life for the coming decades will collapse without Arab oil. The independence of the Arab countries, in the face of expanding communism, cannot be maintained without your strength and resolve. No interdependence could be more complete.

General Haig, is that what you had in mind?

General HAIG. Precisely.

Senator STONE. General Haig, the question of the shortcomings of the treaty, just as the treaty, is one question, and then the question of our general posture in the world and in the theater in which you just recently represented the United States as our NATO leader, is the other question.

First, with regard to the difficulties posed by the treaty, do I correctly assess that you are concerned by the 3- to 1-theater nuclear superiority in the European theater, based on the Russians introducing the SS-20 and the Backfire, by the inclusion of the cruise missile within the limits of the treaty, but the exclusion and not replacing of limits of the SS-20 and Backfire within the same treaty? Are those among the major concerns that you have about the treaty itself?

General HAIG. Yes; they are, Senator.

ACTIONS TO MAKE TREATY ACCEPTABLE FOR U.S. SECURITY

Senator STONE. Other than clarifying the intent of the Senate in ratifying this treaty, if and when it does, that the restrictions of the protocol must end, that the transfer both of cruise missile technology and cruise missiles themselves to NATO countries must take place at the end of the protocol, other than including the production limits and assertions by President Brezhnev in some

form in what the Senate does, what else must we do in your conviction to make this treaty fit within a general posture of acceptable U.S. security?

General HAIG. I would not want to put myself in the category of a SALT expert. I have been abroad for 4½ years. I have followed, as closely as I could through the resources available to me, what has been occurring as this treaty took shape. Therefore, I think I am familiar with its ramifications. However, I am not familiar with the definitive esoteric skill that I should have, for example, to make a judgment on noncircumvention.

I suspect strongly, having talked to General Rowny in the evolution of this article of the treaty, that there are differences in perception between the Soviet signatories and the American signatories as to what precisely it means. I think that should be clarified.

Senator STONE. So, the circumvention clause should be clarified by us?

General HAIG. I think it should be clarified. I think the Soviet Union should register some expression of acceptance of our interpretation, or at some point we are going to be challenged when it is to their convenience to do so.

Senator STONE. What of the Backfire statements by Brezhnev? If we were to include those statements as part of the treaty, would that be a sufficient protection from the risk of the Backfire or would it not, or would it be merely helpful, but not sufficient?

General HAIG. Well, I think it is helpful. But the facts are that we are letting a system, which represents a one-third increase to the overall megatonnage of the Soviet Union or destructive power, to run free. That is a flaw.

My point on that flaw, Senator, is I am not sure that I could make a judgment on the acceptability of the risks associated with it until I have seen what our building program is going to be and our 5-year commitment to that program, and until I have weighed that against some consensus in this government on our strategic doctrine.

Senator STONE. Now that shifts us over into the second issue which, I take it, you feel is at least as important as the wording of the treaty itself?

General HAIG. I think it is far more important.

Senator STONE. You feel that by delaying the ratification process and, in effect, saying that a price of completing the process is some further clarity on the strategic goals and commitments of the United States, we would be serving national security?

General HAIG. Senator, I would even put it somewhat differently. I would say that until we have clarified our thinking, at least in the context of the policies of this Government, the executive branch and the support of a necessary majority in the Congress, we cannot really assess with clarity the implications of the risks associated with SALT II.

I have found this as I sat down and tried to really come to this committee with a recommendation as to what we should do.

Senator STONE. General Haig, let's take an example of the difficulty in the cruise missile situation.

Are you clear that the U.S. policy, say the 5-year military policy, is not only to transfer cruise missiles at less than 600 miles of range to NATO powers, but to transfer such cruise missiles and cruise missile technology to our NATO allies that they could, in effect, match the range and capabilities of the SS-20's? Do we have that goal or not?

General HAIG. I feel that we have that goal and I am comfortable that this is the administration's intention in the period ahead. But I would feel far more comfortable if I could see this consensus in the theater nuclear modernization area, which I have recommended, which can be done by the end of the year, to be sure that the specific technology about which we are really talking, we have made bona fide commitments to our European allies on, and that they have agreed and said this is generally what we are going to need.

Senator STONE. How soon do you think that could be negotiated?

General HAIG. I believe this is very do-able between now and the end of the year, or within a month beyond that.

Senator STONE. I have one question about the offsetting strength of the Soviet Union in the cruise missile field.

It is generally believed that we are far ahead on cruise missiles. Are our cruise missiles subsonic?

General HAIG. Well, they are air-breathing, and essentially, in today's state of the art, you think of them as subsonic.

Senator STONE. Is it not the case that in openly published, non-classified, American publications, the Soviets are shown to have cruise missile technology in being and cruise missiles which are supersonic?

General HAIG. They have had cruises for a number of years, yes, sir.

Senator STONE. Which are supersonic?

General HAIG. I would have to check the speed of their latest models, but I am inclined to agree that this is so.

SPECIFIC ACTIONS NEEDED WITHIN AND WITHOUT THE TREATY

Senator STONE. It would be very helpful to the committee, the Congress, and the country if you would further amplify and supplement your testimony before our two committees which you have made so far with additional specifics of what you feel our national security would need or would be helped by, both within the four corners of the treaty and outside the four corners of the treaty. That kind of guidance would help those of us who are concerned about our comparative strength and the deterrent posture that that yields us.

I wonder whether in the future weeks or several months before we conclude our work on the treaty you would be willing to follow this debate further and amplify and supplement your remarks.

General HAIG. I would be happy to do so, Senator, with the caveat that I am going through the culture shock of being without a staff and all of the emoluments that the position I formerly occupied led me to enjoy.

Senator STONE. Within those constraints, I thank you for your willingness to help.

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Haig, the New York Times this morning in the column entitled "The Editorial Notebook" wrote as its first paragraph the following:

Now that the stardust has settled, the real significance of Henry Kissinger's SALT testimony is plain. The former Secretary of State has called on the Senate to ratify the pending arms treaty as it stands. All the rest was literature, with some politics mixed in. He made the case of the SALT critics his own, but proposed solutions that should preserve the treaty.

This is not the only account that reads this way. The first paragraph of The Wall Street Journal editorial today, "Mr. Kissinger on SALT" says:

Henry Kissinger says it would be okay to ratify the Strategic Arms Treaty during the Carter Administration provided the leopard changes its spots. The Administration thanks him for his support. Treaty advocates profess a great victory.

The same thing happened last week to Senator Sam Nunn, who also coupled approval of SALT to a large increase in the U.S. military budget. Senator Nunn did not think he was handing out a victory to the Administration and we doubt that Secretary Kissinger did, either.

The cheering from treaty advocates is, to some extent, mere whistling past the graveyard, but it is also something beyond that. What the advocates plainly believe, or at least hope, is that Mr. Kissinger, and Senator Nunn, are not serious.

My question to you this morning, General Haig, is a parallel one, I think, and that is that they could have substituted for Henry Kissinger or Sam Nunn the name of Alexander Haig. I would guess that essentially many people are going to say, as Senator Biden already in his questioning I think has said, that you are offering endorsement of the treaty, and you are offering a number of steps that ought to be considered before that occurs; but, in terms of digging in to specific amendments, specific reasons why a Senator should vote no or should condition his vote on the basis of specific things that need to be renegotiated with the Soviet Union, that at least to this point, you have not offered that kind of opposition.

This is important to me because I am not inclined to feel that the treaty text as it stands is all that good, nor, I gather, are you.

The point is that I think we are going to have to zero in on the specifics. You may not have wanted to do so in this current set of testimony, but I would ask you, as Senator Stone has, that in subsequent weeks, if it is possible that you could detail, a military program from your best judgment that is required in a 5-year plan that you, or Secretary Kissinger, or others have suggested. What should, in fact, make up a 5-percent increase in defense spending, if this is the general figure with which you are most comfortable?

Otherwise, my guess is that people will continue to write that Secretary Vance has assured us that 3-percent real spending is going to be made despite inflation, that the President will agree with you that we really ought to do a great number of things, such as the M-X missile and upgrading the Trident, and so forth.

What assurance can you give me today, or what hope can you give me, that in subsequent weeks you will be able to say something specific so that those of us who want to make some sort of case will have a horse to ride on?

General HAIG. Senator, that was quite a mouthful, and I would like to start at the beginning of your question.

First, with respect to the New York Times report, as you read it, and Dr. Kissinger's testimony, I think Dr. Kissinger would be very, very disturbed at such an interpretation of what he said before this committee. I have read his testimony and his formal statement and I observed a great deal of the televised view of it, and I can hardly and would hardly suggest that, whether I am a subjective or objective observer, I could conclude from what was read to me that this was not a serious concern. In fact, I think Dr. Kissinger's own testimony suggested, and I would reaffirm this, that this issue of these peripheral considerations, if you call them that, on linkage, on the strategic doctrine, on the bona fides of an American defense posture in the period ahead, dwarf SALT II in importance.

Senator LUGAR. I am sure he said that. Why wouldn't President Carter simply say: "Well, I agree with you, Dr. Kissinger. I think there are very serious problems here and we have all been remiss, several administrations. Now we are going to change. As a matter of fact, you will be surprised how many good things we are going to do."

Why doesn't that satisfy Dr. Kissinger at that point?

General HAIG. I do not want to put myself into the position of speaking for Henry Kissinger. I did not coordinate my position with him nor he his position with me. The same goes for Senator Nunn.

I have told you where the general risk areas are in the agreements, as I judge them to be. In my testimony I said whether or not these risks are acceptable or unacceptable will depend in large measure on the broader questions that must be answered and can be within a very finite period of time, and that I feel should be answered at this juncture in history.

You know, Senator, I have been a part of this process since 1962, almost without break, at a very high level. I think we have been indulging in American sophistry on this question and I think it is time for us to strip some of that away from the process. We are now faced not with peeling off excess levels of American superiority, but with fundamental inferiority.

Now that does not mean that I can really give you a specific amendment. I would leave that to the experts. I have not negotiated this thing.

The other thing that worries me is if you think I can develop a 5-year program and flesh it out and do a better job than the Pentagon, well then, I would say a lot of people are getting overpaid and I am badly underpaid.

Senator LUGAR. That could very well be. But the problem, I suspect, still gets back to the specifics.

It may be that the value of your testimony is just simply what it says, the face value as an overall view as to where we stand and that we need to look elsewhere for specifically what we are to do. I would accept that.

I suppose, however, that it makes your testimony much easier to dispose of, simply because it is a qualitative judgment as to what sort of plans then are reassuring.

Now after the President has said he thinks we really ought to get consensus between ourselves and our European allies for nuclear modernization and that we ought to get new deployment pat-

terns and so forth, you could say that these still are not satisfactory to you, but that you have made an honest attempt, that there is new thrust and change in all of this.

I suppose that maybe this is asking too much of our witnesses. But, on the other hand, I still want to pursue it because I value your military judgment and the skill that you might bring to more specific pursuits. There is still time. We are going to be out of session for a while.

General HAIG. Right now I could give you some general ideas on what we must do in my judgment. I would say we need 200 to 300 M-X systems, with 10 warheads each, and improved accuracy; a penetrating bomber, which I have long since felt remains an essential ingredient.

Senator LUGAR. The resumption of the B-1 program?

General HAIG. Yes, the B-1, or a comparable supersonic penetrating bomber, manned bomber. Also I believe we need to get the Trident back on the schedule of 1.5 per year, as we had originally conceived it; the Trident II missile, with its midcourse guidance, which will give us increased hard target kill capability at sea. This is a very important system.

Also there is the area that I have put into my testimony on theater nuclear modernization. This should involve a number of systems which do not match system for system Soviet capability, but serve as a credible deterrent to their existing deployment levels and projected levels.

This would involve an improved Pershing, with a range that would strike the Soviet Union and the SS-20 systems that are involved, and that is very do-able within the time frame about which we are talking. It could be in place by 1983 or so.

I am talking about an air-launched cruise which is theater based and theater controlled. I am talking about a ground-launched cruise, too, which is similarly theater deployed.

I still have some questions about the desirability of a sea-launched system, unless political value would outweigh what I think are excessive costs.

Senator LUGAR. To bring this into context, you would say that in fleshing out the general pattern, these specific weapon systems ought to be pledged by the President and even perhaps a first year appropriation of funds voted by the Congress?

General HAIG. Yes.

Senator LUGAR. This is the type of thing that must occur in your judgment before the SALT Treaty should be ratified?

General HAIG. Yes, sir. I think it can be very easily done and can be done very promptly.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much.

Senator HAYAKAWA. General, I would thank you, too, for your specificity.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sarbanes.

ARE NECESSARY PROGRAMS PRECLUDED BY TREATY

Senator SARBANES. General, do you understand the provisions of the SALT II Treaty to preclude the United States from doing any

of those programs which you have just enumerated, assuming the protocol is clearly terminated in 1981?

General HAIG. I would also add to that, if we had no hitches in the ability to transfer technology as well under that article.

Senator SARBANES. On the noncircumvention matter?

General HAIG. Yes.

Senator SARBANES. Assuming it is clear that the protocol will terminate and the noncircumvention does not have some deficiency in it, do the terms of the treaty preclude any of the specific force modernizations that you have just listed?

General HAIG. Let me answer this question as best I can. This is a difficult question, and there are some ambiguities that could give us problems. For example, clearly, we have a problem on conventional cruise missiles by the acceptance in the waning hours of our negotiations of counting conventional as nuclear or within the overall limit. That has a de facto effect of precluding our proceeding with a conventional cruise missile. I think that is an imbalanced aspect of the SALT II accord.

There are possible difficulties in the basing mode for the M-X missile. I think there are some fundamental differences between the United States and the Soviet Union on what the mobile missile amounts to and perhaps there could be questions with respect to verification in this. I think it has to be wrung out. What really worries me are residual forces available to us with which to enter SALT III and whether or not we are going to be able to have sufficient levels which will enable us to continue to impose corresponding restraint on the Soviets.

I have some serious doubts about this. This is what really worries me about the heavy missile exception in SALT II.

Senator SARBANES. You, and others, have stated the need to modernize and approve our strategic forces. The Joint Chiefs have told us that there is nothing in the terms of the treaty that would preclude the modernization that they think is necessary.

Now, whether we will do that modernization and improvement has a question mark over it, and you, of course, have alluded to that in a different portion of your testimony here. But that is a question of whether we will in effect do what we have to do or at least what some people think we have to do. They have said that the terms of the treaty, however, would not preclude us from doing these things. Do you disagree with that view of theirs?

General HAIG. Yes, to the degree that I just offered you some areas where I thought so.

Senator SARBANES. I would like to get you to specify those areas. In other words, I would like to know what strategic force modernizations and improvements you think should be made which you see precluded by the treaty.

General HAIG. The cruise missile issue that I raised, I am talking about in the theater context. It could also be applied in the strategic context, that we would decide that the cost of these systems, their accuracy would lend itself to proceed with a conventional warhead either in the theater environment or in the strategic environment. That unfortunately would now be precluded by the treaty in de facto practical terms.

Senator SARBANES. Is that the only thing?

General HAIG. No, the second thing is, I think there are some questions which need to be resolved, and they have to be resolved by the experts and those who negotiated probably on both sides with respect to our proposed deployment of an M-X. Will that be in violation of the Soviets' interpretation of the treaty, both in the context of mobile missiles and second in the context of possible complications in verification, depending on what our base mode would ultimately be? I would have to leave that to the experts, Senator, because frankly, I do not feel qualified to address it.

The other area which really prevents the simple, straight up and down answer that your question deserves is the impact on SALT III. You really cannot judge that until you look at our approved ongoing programs, and then you have an idea of what kind of leverage we are going to have in SALT III to protect our vital interests.

Senator SARBANES. The two things you mentioned—the cruise missile and the M-X—contain ambiguities as to what is permitted or not permitted. If those ambiguities are resolved in a positive fashion, then there is nothing in the terms of the treaty which preclude any strategic force modernization or improvement that you think should be made, which is essentially what the Joint Chiefs have said.

General HAIG. You know, this question worries me because it is repeatedly asked of witnesses here. I think it should be accompanied with a equally and perhaps even more important question, and that is, what does the treaty prevent the Soviets from doing?

I think you have to look at that in the context of their ongoing momentum, the programs they have supported in the past, and whether or not this becomes somewhat irrelevant.

Senator SARBANES. That is the other side of the coin that one must examine, but I am trying to get one specific area resolved, and that is whether the force modernization and improvement which you think the United States should undertake—beyond the two instances where you have some concerns about ambiguity—are precluded by the terms of the treaty. I take it not if we have resolved those ambiguities.

General HAIG. To the best of my judgment I am telling you where I see possible difficulties. I am not aware of any other at the moment. On the other hand, I do hope, Senator, in your objectivity on this very important area, that you will always accompany your assessment of that response with assessments on what the Soviets would be doing in the interim period and what the treaty permits them to do.

Senator SARBANES. Of course, if there were no treaty, there would be no limitations on what the Soviets could do.

General HAIG. No, other than the kind of logic which has driven force postures since the beginning of time.

Senator SARBANES. So, if it imposes some limitations on the Soviets and does not limit anything we wish to do, that might be a preferable position from our point of view, might it not?

General HAIG. It is hard to answer that with precision. I could see instances where it might, and I could see others where it may not be.

Senator SARBANES. Well, if you have a treaty that does not limit us from doing anything we think needs to be done, and it does place some limits on the Soviets, and without the treaty you would have no limits on the Soviets, why isn't that an improved situation for us?

General HAIG. I think in general, yes, but I am also persuaded that Dr. Kissinger's testimony here yesterday with regard to the U.S. ability to go into heavier systems would seem to be a point worth considering.

Senator SARBANES. Do you include going into heavier systems as part of your strategic force modernization and improvement? You did not list that when you were giving the specifics.

General HAIG. No, I did not, and I think the reasons for that are very easily grasped, Senator. This is not something that has been in the American state of the art since I would say the mid-1960's when a decision was made for us not to go into the larger systems. I have pointed out that in hindsight that could historically be proven to be a very bad call.

Senator SARBANES. Well, if it was a bad call in your view, should we now seek to remedy it by going into the heavy system? Do you advocate the heavy system?

General HAIG. Before answering that, and to give such a serious question a credible response, I would just have to know what in the state of the art would be available, because we have not even been thinking in those terms on the American side, and I certainly am not familiar in terms of costs with deployment times and the desirability and context of our overall doctrine whether I could make such a recommendation. Right now I could not.

JUDGMENT OF JCS ON NEED FOR HEAVY MISSILE

Senator SARBANES. Would we be acting responsibly to place a great weight on the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the question of whether we should go into the heavy missiles ourselves?

General HAIG. I will be very heavily influenced by their collective judgment, both by experience and by respect for their judgment.

Senator SARBANES. As to whether they thought we should develop such a heavy system?

General HAIG. Again, I think all kinds of answers can be given to all kinds of questions, Senator. That has become the business of Government here in Washington.

Senator SARBANES. Well instead of broadening everything out through all kinds of questions and all kinds of answers, we are trying to narrow it down, and to get the benefit of your own views.

Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Zorinsky?

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

GENERAL HAIG'S POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS

General Haig, I want to preface my questions with an explanation of why I want to ask them. A good number of my constituents believe that it is important to know where a witness is coming from. They have told me that they believe a retired military officer is more credible in most instances than one that currently is at a post due to the fact that he is no longer under direct authority of the chain of command. So on that score I would imagine that you are OK with my constituents, but recently the press has had some accounts about your possible interest in politics and so some of my constituents may ask about political motivations for your answers to questions before this panel.

General HAIG. Well, one of your members has already, with one of his leading questions suggested that that was a motive behind my testimony here today.

Senator ZORINSKY. Sir, if I thought that, I would not be asking the question. I am leaving it up for you to answer. I do not know the answer. So let me ask you before some of my constituents say yes, but is he running for this or that? I believe you and I are mature enough to understand that the political realities of this world are that many times things are said in order to benefit one's own interest politically in adverse relationship to what may be in the best interest of people. I know that is a sad commentary, but that being as it may, it is a reality and a fact of life that many of us do not want to admit to or that many of us do not want to face up to, but it is there.

So, first, I would like to ask, do you have any aspirations to elective office? And second, if the SALT II Treaty is passed in anything like its present form, what role would you see for it as an issue in the 1980 elections?

General HAIG. Let me start with the second, first. I think that is a very difficult question to answer. I think the only thing one can concern himself with in the political area is if the United States were to consummate and ratify this treaty and subsequent events confirmed that we had in effect in the context of doing that either continued with the current confusion, failure to challenge blatant illegal Soviet interventionisms where they are occurring in increasing numbers over the past years, and if we failed to structure our forces in such a way that we were not slipping into such a minimum deterrent mode. Then I would suggest that perhaps by 1980 or certainly shortly thereafter the American people are going to ask about the American leadership they have been experiencing, and, they will seek a change.

Now, there are a number of other imponderables associated with that, but it is just that simple. Now, whether it is going to be attributed to SALT II or to something else is less significant. It is going to fall on the shoulders of those who ratified this treaty and those who consummated it. With respect to my own political role, Senator, you know, I have spent almost 35 years of my life in the service of my country in uniform. I have served in two wars. I have had an 18-month break in which I was required by political practicalities rather than executive mandate to terminate that service, and I was fortunate enough to be able to come back and continue it.

I have seen a lot of speculation about political ambitions on my part. I do not know of anyone who could justify such speculation by a confirmation from me that I am running or intend to run for political office. At this juncture, I do not. What I intend to do is come home and I am home now, and to speak to my concerns, because I have returned home profoundly concerned about the drift of this Nation and the impact that perceived drift is having on our friends abroad, and the fact that that will converge in the decade of the 1980's into a strategic environment that is the most dangerous that I have observed since the Second War.

I intend to speak to that, and if it is a constructive effort on my part, I will continue it. Now, I have not discounted political office, and I see no reason why I should any more than I would discount the possibility of taking over General Motors. What obligation do I have to do that for your constituents or anyone else? I should not and I will not as a free citizen of this land.

So, I am keeping my options open for what I feel will serve to realize the expression of my concerns and the changing of American policy that I think is driving this country into bankruptcy abroad.

Senator ZORINSKY. General, as you are aware, the great thing about this country is, you are free to maintain whatever options you so desire. That is why we fight hard to maintain this democracy. I think that in essence is what a great deal of this conversation is about.

General HAIG. Of course it is.

Senator ZORINSKY. But also I think the American people are at a stage when the Government has lost credibility with them, where elected officials have lost their credibility. In some instances, we have caused some of that ourselves. When I say we, I mean some of the elected officials. Too many times we are painted with a broad brush, but I think the American public appreciates the sincerity of an individual who in giving testimony to a subject as serious as this one, is open if they have any motivations or aspirations that are driving them independently of whatever choice is before them.

General HAIG. Senator, as a shrewd politician, which I know you are, I would suspect that the positions which I have taken on SALT are not very political in a self-serving way. Now, some may misread that, but I do not think they could be interpreted that way.

Senator ZORINSKY. I just wanted to clear the air for those who might have interpreted it in that way. Every time I believe I am on a solid issue and have taken a judicial approach to the resolution of a problem, I always seem to get the other side of the coin, the protest from the citizenry, as I have described it.

General HAIG. Senator, I have lived in this town for almost 20 years, except for the time abroad and a year or two away in Vietnam. The background that goes on is just mind boggling. I know there was backgrounding done immediately following and during my testimony before the Armed Services Committee which suggested political motivations. I know where it came from, and I am perfectly capable of responding in the same mode. That happens to be the political life here in Washington. You know, I wouldn't have it any other way.

Senator ZORINSKY. Let me ask you a followup question. What do you feel the principal threats currently are to European security during the period of the SALT Treaty? Should we take higher priority steps in conventional forces or nuclear forces?

General HAIG. Senator, unfortunately, it is not an either-or-proposition. It is a balanced proposition. I would say in dialectical terms that the neglect of our nuclear elements, theater and central strategic, are the most urgent at the moment, not only because of SALT but because of the more fundamental issues of worsening balances. On the other hand, it is vitally important in a period of parity, or worse, between ourselves and the Soviet Union that our regional balances in the conventional area remain very strong and be improved.

Senator ZORINSKY. Is NATO in a position currently to the best of your knowledge to deploy weapons such as the neutron bomb? Would it accept the deployment of those types of weapons?

General HAIG. I cannot speak for them on this issue. They certainly were a year ago, at least those for whom it was necessary to accept them were ready. I think developing that consensus today would be an almost insurmountable task in the short term, given the propaganda play and the emotion that has been built up among the Western European voting population.

Senator ZORINSKY. How do you suggest we aid them and beef up that type of armament when you say it is almost hopeless that they will allow us to deploy that?

General HAIG. I would distinguish between the neutron warhead issue and the kinds of systems we are talking about, long range theater modernization. It is a very different kettle of fish.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Zorinsky.

General Haig, I believe that we are about to adjourn for two reasons. First, it is 2 o'clock and you have been on the stand since 11 o'clock, and also because there is a vote on in the Senate to which we must respond, but Senator Javits has a final question.

Senator JAVITS. I have one final thing for you, General. I know you have been through a great deal this morning and this afternoon.

I asked General Seignious the following question:

I think you ought to put into the record a statement as to what approval of the treaty or rejection of the treaty would do to the ongoing negotiations on the format to which you referred in your testimony, to wit, a nonproliferation treaty, a ban on nuclear testing, the comprehensive test ban, the MBFR, and the anti-satellite.

He has now filed an answer in which, in a word, he says the following. I will read it carefully.

Ratification of entry into force of SALT II will not necessarily make it easier to achieve success in other arms control efforts, but failure of SALT II could close the door to progress on them.

Shall I read that again for you?

General HAIG. Sir, I got the comment.

Senator JAVITS. He said failure could close the door to progress. Now, what do you think? You have been working with these issues for years.

General HAIG. I do not accept any of these overly pessimistic prognostications of the consequences of failing to ratify SALT. I think the statement that NATO would collapse which has been made is misinformed and injudicious, just as I think statements that are made to the effect that those who favor SALT are surrender artists and those who oppose it are warmongers. I think this is very self-defeating.

Senator JAVITS. What do you think will happen with the NATO leaders and military in general if we reject it?

General HAIG. I think that they would weather it, and if it were accompanied by the kinds of things that Senator Helms said, they would probably say, my God, there is a reborn America. I hope they mean it, and are willing to pay the price for what they are doing, and if they are, we are with them. Unfortunately, that is a nice theory to have, but I do not see it as a practical one.

Senator JAVITS. So, therefore, what will happen? As you know, we are not going to go into this blindly.

General HAIG. I think we have the opportunity to get the best of both worlds, Senator, and that is to pull up our socks in the context of our defense capabilities, our doctrine, our expressed intention to preserve our vital national interests abroad, and especially in the Third World, and to assist our allies in doing so as well, and then make whatever adjustments are necessary perhaps along the lines Dr. Kissinger suggested, which are nonbinding, very easily accomplished things, or if we have not realized what we really are comfortable with in our consensus development, then we had better look very hard to some other changes that are perhaps more difficult.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. General Haig, on behalf of the committee, I thank you very much for your testimony, which winds up the first month of this committee's consideration of the SALT II Treaty.

General HAIG. Thank you, Senators.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. This meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:02 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF COL. PHELPS JONES, U.S.A. (RET.), DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. Chairman and members of this distinguished committee, my name is Colonel Phelps Jones, USA (Ret.). It is my privilege and honor to serve the 1.85 million members of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States as their Director of National Security and Foreign Affairs.

I appreciate this opportunity to furnish this important panel with the views of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States with respect to SALT II.

Our recorded opposition to this document of transcendent substantive and symbolic importance did not arise in any "knee jerk" fashion. V.F.W. representatives have met with President Carter, Dr. Brzezinski, Mr. Warnke and General Seignious, as well as with responsible opponents of SALT II, inside and outside of government.

As you may be aware, mandated positions of the V.F.W. are arrived at democratically at our annual National Conventions.

Our 79th National Convention was held in Dallas, Texas, in August, 1978. National Security Resolution Number 434, "Strategic (SALT) Negotiations with the USSR," passed without dissent.

This resolution is appended to this statement as Enclosure Number 1 and will be, with your Chairman's permission, made a permanent part of the hearings.

As to the treaty proper, certain basic questions need to be considered.

Treaty proponents, often with considerable emotion, assert as self-evident truth that SALT II advances the national security policy of the United States.

To this assertion, I can only reply that, after a conscientious 29-month search, I have yet to locate an unambiguous statement by the President or the Secretary of State which, in concrete, dispassionate terms, sets forth: (a) where we think we are in the world; (b) where we hope to get to; and, (c) how we propose to get there. I have been obliged to fall back on a 17-month old set of remarks delivered by Mr. Anthony Lake, of the State Department's Policy Planning Office, in San Francisco on March 14, 1978, which included the following, somewhat elastic, paragraph:

"Our approach, therefore, is to make constant, pragmatic, case-by-case decisions, seeking the most constructive balance among our interests and adjusting our tactics as circumstances change."

In short, not knowing where we're going, we react.

While this approach does not make for wise policy, I suggest that Mr. Lake's words are an accurate depiction, probably unwitting, of the absence of any central strategic conception, sense or direction in our overall security policy.

SALT II, then, can be fairly viewed as being, to this Administration, an end in itself.

For the Soviets, on the other hand, the treaty is but a useful component of a wider, and geo-politically thrusting, foreign policy.

My point here is a simple one. To treaty proponents who assert that SALT II supports U.S. national security policy, the sad rejoinder must be:

What national security policy?

SALT II, through the period of the protocol and the treaty proper, sets agreed limits on only one component of military power: central, offensive strategic systems. At Enclosure Number 2, attached hereto, are these various limits and sub-limits.

Not considered are central defensive systems, active and passive civil defense measure, conventional force levels and most telling, any restraints on aggressive foreign policy thrusts designed to upset global balance; i.e., the issue of "linage" which will not, nor should not, go away.

These omissions from SALT II pose a dilemma for SALT-sellers. On the one hand, treaty proponents urge us repeatedly not to "hang to much on the SALT tree." SALT II is, in General David Jones' words, "a modest but useful step." (In the V.F.W., we believe that SALT II is a "modest" treaty that has much to be "modest" about. The testimony of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before this distinguished Committee was more of a collective dental extraction than a combined chorus of support. General Rowny's considered non-concurrence is on the record.)

On the other hand, the President and his leading "SALT-sellers" have either stated (as has President Carter) or implied (as has the Administration-supported house organ "Americans For SALT") that to oppose SALT II would cause Americans to be viewed throughout the world as "war mongers." Our reaction to this "war mongering" charge is to recall that in March, 1977, Secretary Vance traveled

to Moscow with the then new Administration's preferred "SALT II" package—a treaty involving deep, important and mutual reductions.

Secretary Vance was turned down cold by the Soviet Union.

No one, here or abroad, charged the Soviets with being "war mongers" for this abrupt and unexplained rejection. And, incidentally, this cold turn-down occurred two and one half years ago. SALT II then, is the product of the Carter Administration. It is then not, as the "SALT-sellers" would have us believe, the product of seven years of negotiations covering three Administrations. Since March, 1977, we have been negotiating with ourselves—and, we in the V.F.W. suspect America has lost.

Mr. Chairman, I urge, on behalf of the V.F.W., that the Senate vote up or down on SALT II and not, as was the case with the May, 1972 SALT I Accord, merely add "reservations" and "unilateral declarations" that will have no enduring meaning.

The Wall Street Journal, in a brilliant editorial, "Off the Reservation," tracks carefully the sad fate of the U.S. Senate-approved "unilateral declarations" addressed to the May, 1972 SALT I Treaty.

The last three paragraphs of this perceptive editorial make an enduring point. These paragraphs follow:

"If the Senate foregoes cosmetics and spells out its concerns in clear amendments to the treaty, it will at least force some clarification of the issue. Our suspicion is that the Soviets are likely to find the treaty, even with amendments, so much in their interest they will come back to the negotiating table. But it is of course quite possible that, as Foreign Minister Gromyko threatened (in plain English) in a Moscow press conference, that they will kill the negotiations.

"This might be a good thing. At least we will know where we stand. At least we will be out from under the process that, for example, led President Carter to delay our cruise missile program unilaterally while the talks were in progress. If Soviet rejection of equalizing amendments proves that they will not negotiate limits on their buildup, we could at least set about offsetting their drive in the cheapest and most effective way we can, unencumbered by treaty constraints that force us into cumbersome and expensive systems like the proposed MX missile shuffled around in a 20 mile trench.

"The worst choice the Senate could make would be to do nothing while pretending to do something. Its members need to suppress their first instinct, and face up manfully to the fundamental decision before them. When tempted to straddle, they ought to look at the history of unilateral declarations. If the Senate votes a list of reservations, it will only have compiled a handy catalog of what the Soviets will do to us during the life of the treaty."

As to the issue of whether we should "trust" the Soviets, once again, in our view, President Carter's advisors miss the point.

The Soviets can be "trusted" to act as the 1979 inheritors of the Marxist-Leninist tradition. They seek the fruits of conquest preferably without fighting.

The more relevant issue is whether or not we can "trust" this Administration—heavily staffed as it is with symbol-manipulators and America-lasters.

It is a harsh judgment, but the V.F.W. believes it to be true: We "trust" the Soviets to pursue their national and ideological goals more persistently and purposefully than we "trust" this Administration to conserve, protect and decently advance our 203-year democratic experience.

A lengthening litany of anti-defense decisions taken by the Administration leaves one little hope that the MX will finally be deployed to offset ICBM vulnerability in the 1980s.

Mr. Chairman, the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States recommends that either:

(a) SALT II be returned to the Executive Branch without the Senate's consent and with the Senate's admonition to re-negotiate, in due course, a true, mutual, verifiable and deep mutual arms control treaty.

(If the Soviets are not interested in such an approach, they are not, as we suspect, interested in arms control in any non-symbolic way.)

Or,

(b) The Senate add precise and unambiguous amendments (not "reservations" or "unilateral declarations") covering such areas as: (1) on site verification, (2) the "Backfire" bomber, (3) the heavy ICBMs permitted the Soviet Union (308 SS-18s) which are denied us, and (4) Soviet geo-strategic adventurism conducted under the umbrella of "detente."

Truly, Mr. Chairman, an enduring peace is the heart felt goal of the V.F.W. Our members and their sons have fought in our last four wars. Others conceived of—or dissented from—these conflicts. We need no urging to fight for peace. We do and we will.

But an America, locked into strategic inferiority and narcotized by an inherently unequal treaty, does not enhance a stable peace.

SALT II, as written, is a self-inflicted slide backwards towards a strategically vulnerable, hence politically isolated, America whose policies will become increasingly irrelevant to allies, fence-sitters, and communist totalitarians alike.

Our national experience deserves better. We remain, in Lincoln's words, the "last best hope on earth."

SALT II is a painfully structured strategic "apology" where none is needed. As written, we urge its resounding defeat.

ENCLOSURE No. 1

Resolution No. 434

STRATEGIC (SALT) NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE U.S.S.R.

Whereas, with respect to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of May 1972:

(a) neither side is permitted to deploy a nationwide ABM defense or a base for such a defense;

(b) each side is permitted to deploy a limited defense of one area. In each defense area, out to a 150 km radius, each side is permitted up to 100 ABM launchers and interceptors and a limited radar base for these interceptors;

(c) neither side is permitted to give ABM capability to non-ABM systems; e.g., air defense systems;

(d) verification will be by national means. The parties have agreed not to interfere with these means; and

(e) the treaty will be of unlimited duration. Withdrawal is permitted for supreme interest; and

Whereas, with respect to the Interim Offensive Agreement of May 1972:

(a) each side is permitted to keep any fixed land-based ICBM launchers currently operational or under construction. No new fixed land-based ICBM launchers may be built;

(b) the Soviets may complete the 313 modern large ballistic missile launchers; e.g., for SS-9 class missiles, currently operational and under construction. No new ones may be built;

(c) neither side may convert to modern large ballistic missile launchers or any other ICBM launchers;

(d) each side may keep any SLBM launchers operational or under construction; also, newer SLBM launchers may be built as replacements for older SLBM launchers or for older heavy ICBM launchers;

(e) verification will be by national means. The parties have agreed not to interfere with these means;

(f) the duration of the Agreement is five years. Withdrawal is permitted for supreme interests. The parties have agreed in the ABM Treaty to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic arms; and

Whereas, it is crucial to note that since 1972, the year of SALT I, the Soviets have:

deployed four (4) new ICBM's SS-16, SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19;

built and deployed over 100 supersonic, inter-continental "Backfire" bombers;

deployed the Delta I and Delta II missile-launching submarines. A Delta III is undergoing sea trials;

improved the targeting and accuracy of their ICBM force;

developed and tested a satellite killer; and,

exceeded the U.S. effort in research, development, test, and evaluation, weapons procurement and other defensive investments every year since 1969. During 1977, their effort was 75 percent larger than ours; now, therefore be it

Resolved, by the 79th National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, that:

(a) continued U.S. adherence to the May 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement occur only if the most thorough-going verification techniques reveal that the Soviets are complying;

(b) no effort or expense be spared to verify Soviet compliance with this agreement and any other agreement this year or next;

(c) the American public be fully and frankly kept informed of the dynamic and shifting U.S.-Soviet balance so that if the U.S., by living up to agreements, is faced with being the "second strongest" nation in the world, domestic public opinion will support U.S. withdrawal from these Agreements and massive re-arming;

(d) the U.S. fully fund and deploy the *Trident* submarine and restore and fund the B-1 Bomber, and permit test firing of our land-based ICBMs;

(e) no effort or expense be spared in the critically important research and development of offensive and defensive strategic weapons technology; and

(f) current negotiations with the Soviet Union, aimed at changing the nature of the May 1972 "Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons" and the November 1974 accords into a permanent treaty (as with ABMs), accept the philosophy that the U.S. not agree to any formulation that would freeze the United States at a lower number of offensive launchers than the USSR, in short, apply the President's formula following the abortive Vance mission to Moscow in March 1977, i.e., we continue to "hang tough".

Adopted by the 79th National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States held in Dallas, Texas, August 18-25, 1978.

ENCLOSURE No. 2

THE PRESENT ARSENALS

<i>United States</i>	<i>Soviet Union</i>
573 Bombers (3 set for cruise missiles)	156 Bombers
1,054 ICBM's (550 with MIRV's)	1,398 ICBM's (608 with MIRV's)
656 SLBM's (496 with MIRV's)	950 SLBM's (144 with MIRV's)
Total: 2,283	Total: 2,504

HOW THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET ARSENALS OF OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS ARE AFFECTED

Ceiling on strategic weapons until the end of 1981: The Soviet Union has six months after the treaty goes into effect to destroy 104 missile launchers or bombers. The U.S. has no plans to increase arsenal up to 2,400 limit.

Ceiling from January 1, 1982 to the Treaty's expiration date, December 31, 1985: Of the 573 U.S. bombers, about 220 are in storage. The U.S. expects to destroy stored planes to get under the ceiling.

HOW THE TREATY RESTRICTS COMPOSITION OF ARSENALS

No more than 820 of the 1,200 may be multiple-warhead ICBMs. No more than 1,200 of the 1,320 may be multiple-warhead ICBM's and SLBMs. No more than 1,320 of the 2,250 may be multiple-warhead ICBMs and SLBMs and bombers with cruise missiles. Of the 2,250 weapons systems allowed, at least 930 must be single-warhead missiles and bombers.



